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CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

 

 

 

 

 

 
v2
Publications of the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Division of International Law
Washington
THE DEBATES IN
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

REPORTED BY

JAMES MADISON

A Delegate from the State of Virginia

International Edition

GAILLARD HUNT anno JAMES BROWN SCOTT
EDITORS

I send you enclos’d the propos’d new Federal Constitution for these States.
I was engag’d 4 Months of the last Summer in the Convention that form’d it.
It is now sent by Congress to the several States for their Confirmation. If it
succeeds, I do not see why you might not in Europe carry the Project of good
Henry the 4th into Execution, by forming a Federal Union and One Grand
Republick of all its different States & Kingdoms; by means of a like Conven-
tion; for we had many Interests to reconcile. (Benjamin Franklin to Mr. Grand,

October 22, 1787. Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. IV, pp. 341-
342.) ‘

NEW YORK
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMERICAN BRANCH: 85 West Senn Srreer
LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY

1920
Jk
P97
LERD

re AGDTOLGL
COPYRIGHT 1920
BY THE
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Wasarncron, D.C.
EXTRACT FROM THE WILL OF JAMES MADISON?
Aprin 19, 1835

Considering the peculiarity and magnitude of the occasion which
produced the convention at Philadelphia in 1787, the Characters who
composed it, the Constitution which resulted from their deliberation,
it’s effects during a trial of so many years on the prosperity of the
people living under it, and the interest it has inspired among the
friends of free Government, it is not an unreasonable inference that
a careful and extended report of the proceedings and discussions of
that body, which were with closed doors, by a member who was con-
stant in his attendance, will be particularly gratifying to the people
of the United States, and to all who take an interest in the progress
of political science and the cause of true liberty.

+ Writings of James Madison (Hunt, Editor), Vol. IX (1910), p. 549.

 
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Inrropuctory Note:
I. Mr. Madison’s Record . . xxi
II. The Federal Convention of 1787 an International Conference . . XXV

PART I.
ANTECEDENTS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. ‘ : ‘ : . . . 3 xxxili
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION . xxxvii
RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY or Virainta, JANUARY ‘21, 1786,
PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING OF THE COMMISSIONERS FROM THE SraTes
TO CONSIDER AND RECOMMEND A FEDERAL PLAN FOR REGULATING COM-

MERCE z . xivii
PROCEEDINGS OF COMMISSIONERS TO REMEDY DEFECTS OF THE FEDERAL Gov-
ERNMENT, ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND, SEPTEMBER 11, 1786 ‘ . xlviii
Report oF PROCEEDINGS IN CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 21, 1787, CONCERNING
RECOMMENDATIONS OF ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION 2 = . : . hi
CREDENTIALS OF MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION: . ‘ : . i
State of New Hampshire gd Ce ee ee ee |
State of Massachusetts . . . . . . . « «© . « Ivii
State of Connecticut ks, cl: ty Ugh Gee RS man “ie cl cae APNE
State of New York a Gl ek ae eo. Sel, 8 lix
State of New Jersey ow ho OR Ce Ixi
State of Pennsylvania ily SE Sa a) ce ERE
State of Delaware A ‘ ‘ . . fs ‘ : . z ; . Ixvi
State of Maryland . . . . . joe Se Geo. aedeval
State of Virginia be Re ar pe a . ixviii
State of North Carolina. . . . . . . . . xxii
State of South Carolina . : iz 2 . - : ‘ : , . Ixxvi
State of Georgia : . . xxix
List OF DELEGATES APPOINTED BY. SraTes “REPRESENTED IN THE "FEDERAL
CONVENTION. : lxxxili
Magork WILL1aM PIERCE, CHARACTERS IN THE ConvENTION oF THE STATES
HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, May, 1787. . . é 3 é P Ixxxvi
PART II.

THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787."

Mapison’s Prerace—A SKETCH NEVER FINISHED NOR APPLIED. 1
Necessity of political confederacies—Meeting of colonial deputies at
Albany in 1754—Congress of 1774—of 1775—Declaration of Inde-
pendence—Articles of Confederation—Franklin’s plan—Difficulties in
the way of a confederation.

 

1The Table of Contents to The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787
is, with the exception of the first entry, the Session of Thursday, June 14, and
the various items in the Appendix, reproduced from Documentary History of the
Constitution of the United States of America, Vol. III (1900), pp. v-xix.

vii
viii CONTENTS

Ppaen
Tue DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPORTED BY
JAMES MapIson, A DELEGATE FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
Monday, May 14 ‘5 : i 5 i 5 : i , ‘ 4 AT
Meeting of the convention.
Friday, May 25... bene OO: . HT « KS wtb aie Tee eet ets (abe
Convention organized—Washington made president, Major Jackson,
secretary—Credentials of deputies from Delaware—Committee
on rules.
Monday, May 28 5 , ‘ ‘i ‘ - ‘ F 7 ‘ 5 - 18
Rules of procedure reported, discussed, and adopted—Letter from
Rhode Island.
21

Tuesday, May 29 2 3 - - ‘ : : ‘ < . : 3

Additional rules—Randolph’s plan—Pinckney’s—Randolph’s speech
and text of his propositions.

Wednesday, May 30 . 48 be 4 F * « « -« 2B

Convention goes into committee of the whole.

Randolph’s first proposition withdrawn and another substituted—

The Government to be national, not federal—Division of its
powers.

Randolph’s second proposition discussed and postponed.

Thursday, May 31 , ; . ‘ - s : ‘ A - il

Randolph’s third proposition agreed to.

His fourth discussed—Agreed that the first branch of the Legis-
lature be elected by the people—Consideration of qualifications,
etc., of members of the first branch postponed.

Randolph’s fifth proposition discussed and not agreed to.

His sixth agreed to except as to the exertion of the power of the
General Government against a delinquent State, which was
postponed.

Friday, Junel . a 3 : 7 - ‘ te eke

Randolph’s seventh proposition discussed—Motion for a single Ex-
ecutive postponed—Amendments giving the Executive power to
execute the laws and to appoint to offices, and that he be elected
for seven years, agreed to.

Saturday, June 2 4 5 5 ‘ ‘ . 2 a “i . S s

Election of the Executive by an electoral college negatived—Agreed
that’ he be chosen by the Legislature—Amendment that the
Executive receive no salary postponed—Agreed that he be ineligi-
ble for a second term and be removable on impeachment.

Monday, June 4 . i a , a < 3 ‘ s ‘ Bs oy 8

Agreed that the Executive consist of one person—Randolph’s eighth
proposition considered—Clause providing for a council of re-
vision postponed—Amendment giving Executive an absolute veto
disagreed to—Likewise amendment giving him power of suspen-
sion of legislative acts—Qualified veto granted to the Executive—
Randolph’s ninth proposition considered—Amendment that the
national judiciary consist of one supreme and one or more
inferior tribunals adopted.

Tuesday, June 5 x 3 , 4 3 : ; 2 :

Appointment of the judiciary by the Legislature negatived—That
they hold office during good behavior and receive fixed com-
pensation, which should neither be increased nor diminished, is
agreed to—Remainder of the ninth proposition postponed—Ran-
dolph’s tenth proposition agreed to—Randolph’s eleventh proposi-
tion postponed—His twelfth proposition agreed to—His thir-
teenth proposition postponed—Randolph’s fourteenth proposition
postponed—His fifteenth proposition considered and postponed.

“Inferior tribunals” stricken out of the ninth proposition and
the National Legislature empowered to create inferior tribunals

Wednesday, June 6 . . s ‘i é : ‘ ‘ & Z x ; 62

37

41

49

56
CONTENTS

Amendment of the fourth proposition, that members of the first
branch of the national legislature be elected by State legislatures,
negatived—On reconsideration, amendment, of the eighth proposi-
tion, to unite a member of the judiciary with Executive in the
revision of legislative acts, disagreed to.

Thursday, June 7

Election of members of the Senate by State legislatures “discussed

and agreed to.
Friday, June 8.

Motion to extend the ‘negative of the Legislature to all such acts

of State legislatures as should be deemed improper not agreed to.
Saturday, June 9 %

Election of the Executive by, the executives of the States not

agreed to—Ratio of representation in the Legislature discussed.
Monday, June 11

Ratio of representation resumed—Agreed that the rule of the
Articles of Confederation be not adopted—Representation accord-
ing to quotas of contribution postponed—Agreed that the ratio
be according to the whole number of free citizens and three-fifths
of all other persons—Rule allowing each State one vote in the
second branch not agreed to—Agreed that the ratio in the second
be the same as that in the first branch of the Legislature—
Federal guaranty of a republican government and of its territory
to each State agreed to—Amendment guaranteeing a republican
constitution and its existing laws to each State was agreed to—
Randolph’s provisions for amending the Constitution agreed to—
Provision making the consent of the National Legislature
unnecessary to amend Constitution postponed.

Randolph’s fourteenth proposition, requiring oath of fidelity from
national and State officers, agreed to.

Tuesday, June 12...

Randolph’s fifteenth proposition, relative to ratification by the
people, agreed to.

Agreed that members of the first branch of the Legislature be
elected every three years—Limitation of age of members not
agreed to—Amendments that compensation of members should
be fixed and that they should be paid out of the National
Treasury agreed to—Likewise that they be ineligible to State
offices and to national offices during their term of service and
for one year—Clause prohibiting their reelection and providing
for their recall not agreed to—That Senators shall be 30 years
of age agreed to—Likewise that their term of office be for
seven years, but not that they be entitled to no compensation—
Agreed that the compensation and ineligibility of the first
branch apply to the second also—Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court amended, and its consideration then postponed.

Wednesday, June 13 .

Jurisdiction of national tribunals considered—Agreed that judges
be appointed by the Senate—But not that the Senate be pro-
hibited from originating appropriation bills.

Report of the committee of the whole—Text of the resolutions
adopted by it.

Thursday, June 14

Upon the request of several deputations, the Convention adjourned
to meet the 15th, in order to allow the members further time to
contemplate the plan reported from the Committee of the Whole
and to digest cne purely federal in its nature.

Friday, June 15...

Paterson’s nine resolutions to be substituted for the report of the
committee of the whole—Sentiments of the different States upon
a revision of the Articles of Confederation and upon a new plan
of government.

PAGE

69

79

84

91

96

101

101
CONTENTS

Saturday, June 16. is ‘ ‘ * ‘ . ‘ - ‘ ‘6

Discussion and comparison of the two plans, more particularly of
the first resolution of each relative to character of proposed
government.

Monday, June 18 . i 5 ei 3 ‘ , 5 .

Paterson’s first resolution postponed—Hamilton’s plan.

Tuesday, June 19 ¥ Se. em, ae - : ; 5 2

Paterson’s first resolution postponed—Randolph’s propositions, as
before amended and adopted by the committee, reported back
unchanged and first resolution considered.

Wednesday, June 20 . a . ‘ fe é z a be +t ®

Amendment that a Government of the United States be established
adopted—Second resolution—The word “national” stricken out
—-Amendment that “legislation be vested in the United States
in Congress” voted down.

Thursday, June 21. a t 2 - . ~ “ e 7 : 2

Second resolution, that the Legislature consist of two branches,
resumed and agreed to.

Third resolution—Amendment that the first branch be elected as
the various State legislatures should direct not agreed to—That
that branch be elected by the people adopted—That it be elected
for two years adopted.

Friday, June 22 - : . 5 “ g ; _ 3 , ‘

Third resolution—Amendment that salaries of members be fixed by
the National Legislature not agreed to—That the words “ Na-
tional Treasury” be stricken out not agreed to— Adequate
compensation ” substituted for “ fixed stipends”—Agreed that
members of the first branch be 25 years of age—Ineligibility of
members of the first branch to offices adhered to.

Saturday, June 28 : F A é F a ‘ ‘ 2 . ‘

Third resolution—Amendment that members of the first branch be
eligible to State offices adopted—Amendment that they be ineligi-
ble to such national offices as should be created or the emolu-
ments whereof should be increased while they were members not
agreed to—Extending ineligibility to offices for one year after
the term for which they were elected not agreed to.

Monday, June 25 © ‘ 5 . 2 ‘ . 2 : 5 Z

Fourth resolution considered—Agreed that members of the second
branch be elected by the legislatures—That they be 30 years of
age—Minor amendments—Motions that their terms of office be
seven years, six years, and five years defeated.

Tuesday, June 26 b . aoe he é 2 3 : 7 : fees ee

Fourth resolution—Agreed that they serve for six years, one-third
‘to go out biennially—Amendment that they receive no salary
defeated—That they be paid by their respective States not agreed.
to—Nor that the words “be paid out of the public Treasury ”
should stand—Agreed that they be ineligible to national offices
during their term and for one year longer—But not to State
offices—That each branch have the right to originate acts
agreed to.

Wednesday, June 27 . ‘ 5 bs 2 - ‘ i 3 3 ty

Sixth resolution postponed—Seventh resolution, relative to the
rule of voting in Congress considered.

Thursday, June 28 . - 3 s é : : ‘ ‘ 5 ; .

Seventh resolution—Amendment that the rule of voting in Con-
gress be as established by the Articles of Confederation consid-
ered—Franklin’s motion for prayers.

Friday, June 29... ee NS ete , 3 mare tS

Seventh resolution—Amendment of yesterday agreed to—Re-
mainder of the seventh resolution postponed—Eighth resolution
taken up—Rule of representation in the Senate considered.

PAGE
104

111
120

131

139

146

155

155

166

174

176

182
CONTENTS

Saturday, June 30. :

Eighth resolution—That each State have an equal vote in the
Senate resumed—Franklin’s plea of ‘gulbling voting.

Monday, July z .

Eighth resolution—That each State have an equal vote in the
Senate not agreed to—Agreed to commit to a committee of one
from each State.

Thursday, July 5.

Report of the committee of one from each State read and dis-
cussed—Amendment that representation in the first branch be
according to contribution defeated.

Friday, July 6 z

“One Representative ‘for every 40, 000° inhabitants > recommitted
to a committee of five—Agreed that the first branch alone should
originate appropriation bills.

Saturday, July 7.

Highth resolution—Agreed that each State shall have an equal

suffrage in the second branch.
Monday, July 9 . 5

Report of the committee of five considered—Second paragraph
thereof, authorizing the Legislature to regulate the ratio of
representation from time to time, adopted—First paragraph,
apportioning the number of Representatives among the States,
committed to a committee of one from each State.

Tuesday, July 10

Report of the committee of yesterday, apportioning ‘sixty- -five
Representatives among the States, adopted—Motion that the
Legislature cause a census to be taken and arrange representation
according to it discussed.

Wednesday, July 11 .

Amendment that in the ratio of representation blacks be rated
equally with whites defeated—Amendment that a census of free
white inhabitants be taken agreed to—That five slaves be rated
with three whites in the ratio defeated—That a census be taken
the first year after the meeting of the Legislature carried—Like-
wise that one be taken every fifteen years.

Thursday, July 12 .

Agreed that direct taxation be in ‘proportion to representation—
Likewise that a census be taken within two years after the first
meeting of the Legislature; that one be taken every ten years
thereafter, and that slaves be rated in proportion to whites as
five to three. ©

Friday, July 13 .

Agreed that ‘until a census be taken all money raised by direct
taxation should be proportioned according to the number of
Representatives—Provisions authorizing the Legislature to ad-
just representation according to the proportion of wealth and
inhabitants reconsidered, and the number of inhabitants made
the rule.

Saturday, July 14.

That the Representatives ‘of future new States never exceed in
number those of the original States not agreed to—On reconsid-
eration of the equality of States in the second branch no change
made.

Monday, July 16 ,

Seventh and eighth resolutions, providing for representation in the
two branches and for proportionate direct taxation, agreed to
as amended—Sixth resolution, relating to the powers of Con-
gress, considered.

Tuesday, July 17 i
Sixth resolution—Amendment that Congress have power to legis-

xi

PAGE
190

201

206

213

220

223

226

231

241

246

251

259

263
xil CONTENTS

late in all matters except those of internal police not agreed to—
Amendment that Congress have power to legislate in cases affect-
ing the general interests, and where the States are separately
incompetent, ete., agreed to—The negative of Congress on certain
laws of States not agreed to—That all laws of the United
States and all treaties shall be the supreme law, etc., agreed
to.

~~ Ninth resolution considered—Agreed that the Executive be one
person—That he be not elected by the people—Nor by electors
appointed by legislatures—But that he be chosen by the National
Legislature—That he be charged to execute the national laws
agreed to—So that he appoint to offices in cases not otherwise
provided for—So that he be not ineligible a second time—But
not that he be appointed during good behavior—Amendment that
he be not elected for seven years defeated.

Wednesday, July 18 ‘ ‘< ‘i 7 * ‘ 3

Tenth resolution taken up—That the Executive have a veto on laws
not afterwards passed by two-thirds of the Legislature agreed to.

Eleventh resolution considered—That the judiciary consist of one
supreme tribunal adopted—Appointment of judges of this court
considered—Agreed that they hold office during good behavior
and receive fixed salaries in which no diminution should take
place—Agreed further that the Legislature have power to estab-
lish inferior tribunals.

Thirteenth resolution considered and jurisdiction of the national
judiciary defined.

Fourteenth resolution, providing for admission of new States,
adopted.

Fifteenth resolution, relative to continuance of Congress and com-
pletion of its engagements, not agreed to.

Sixteenth resolution considered—Amendment that a republican
form of government be guaranteed to each State and it be pro-
tected against foreign and domestic violence agreed to.

Thursday, July 19 ee a Pere ewe

“Constitution of the Executive” reconsidered—Agreed that he be
elected by electors—So that the electors be chosen by State
legislatures—So that he be not ineligible a second time—So that
his term continue for six years.

Friday, July 20... wen Ses Ge meat

Proportion of electors in the different States for election of the
Executive adopted—Likewise that he be impeachable—So that
he receive a fixed compensation to be paid out of the National
Treasury—Also that electors should not be members of the
Legislature or officers of the United States, and that electors
themselves be not eligible for the Presidency.

Saturday, July 21... ‘ e : i : : * i ‘ ‘

That the electors be paid out of the National Treasury agreed to—
But not that the judiciary be “associated with the Executive in
the revisionary power ”—That the Executive have a veto on the
laws carried.

Eleventh resolution, that judges be appointed by the Senate,
adopted.

Monday, July 23 ‘ ; 5 5 y ‘ F i i

Seventeenth resolution, that provision be made for future amend-
ments of the Constitution, agreed to.

Eighteenth resolution, requiring oaths of fidelity to the Constitution
from State officers, amended to require such oaths also from
national officers, and in this form agreed to.

Nineteenth resclution discussed—That the Constitution be ratified
by the State legislatures not agreed to—But that it be referred
to assemblies chosen by the people carried—That the repre-

PAGE

274

282

288

294

303
CONTENTS

sentation of each State in the Senate consist of three members
not agreed to—But that it consist of two carried—So also that
they vote per capita.
Election of the President to be reconsidered.
Agreed that a committee of five be appointed to report a constitu-
tion conformably to the resolutions adopted.
~~. Tuesday, July 24 :

Election of the President reconsidered—Agreed that he be elected
by the Legislature—Various lengths of his term of service pro-
posed—Consideration postponed—Committee of detail appomied
—Committee of the whole discharged.

Wednesday, July 25

Election of the President and length of term of service taken ‘up—
Various modes proposed, but not acted upon favorably—That
delegates might take copies of resolutions which had been
adopted not agreed to.

5 Thursday, July 26

Election and term of service of the Executive—Agreed that he be
elected by the National Legislature for seven years, and be
ineligible for a second term—The whole clause then agreed to
as amended—Agreed that members of the Legislature have the
qualifications of property and citizenship—That persons “ having
unsettled accounts with the United States ” be disqualified from
being members of the Legislature not adopted.

Monday, August 6.

Text of the report of the committee of detail—Draft of a Con-

stitution.
Tuesday, August 7

Report of committee of detail considered—The preamble and
articles first and second agreed to—Article third—Agreed to con-
fine the negative of each branch to legislative acts—And to
strike out “shall in all cases have a negative on the other ”—
Agreed that a different day for meeting of the Legislature may
be enacted by law—That the Legislature meet in December—That
it meet once, at least, each year—And article third adopted as
amended.

Article fourth, section one—Not agreed that suffrage be confined to
freeholders.

Wednesday, August 8

Article fourth, section one, adopted—Section two amended. that
citizenship of seven years be required—Also “inhabitant ” sub-
stituted for “resident ”—Section three adopted—Section four
amended that representation be regulated according to the rule
hereafter to be provided for direction taxation—Amendment to
insert “free” before “inhabitants” not agreed to—Section five,
relating to origin of appropriation bills, stricken out.

Thursday, August 9

Sections six and seven, relating to power of impeachment and to
filling of vacancies in the House, agreed to.

Article fifth, section one, considered—Amendment, that the power
of State executives to fill vacancies in the Senate be stricken
out, not agreed to—That such vacancies be filled by the legis-
latures or executives of the respective States agreed to—The
whole section adopted—Section two adopted with slight change
of phraseology—Various terms of length of residence required
from Senators proposed and disagreed to—Nine years adopted—
Inhabitancy required instead of residence as a qualification—
Section four agreed to.

Article sixth—Motion to take from the Legislature the power to
regulate election of its members disagreed to—Section one
adopted.

xiii

PAGE

311

318

324

337

346

355

363
XIV CONTENTS

PAGE
Friday, August 10. bins nd s : Se. ik : ; ~  .«  . 878

Article sixth—Prqperty qualification of President, legislators, and
judges voted down and section two not adopted—Section three
adopted with an amendment authorizing the Houses to compel
attendance of absent members—Sections four and five adopted—
Section six amended to require the concurrence of two-thirds to
expel a member, and thus adopted—Motion to strike out the
clause in section seven confining keeping and publication of the
Journal to legislative business agreed to—Amendments to allow
one member to call for yeas and nays and to allow Senators to
enter their dissent not carried.

Saturday, August 11 . 5 : 3 - : : ‘ < : A . 380

Article sixth—Section seven adopted—Section eight adopted after
the last sentence relative to the Senate had been struck out.

Monday, August 13 . : 7 : ‘ : 3 ‘ - ‘

Article fourth—Section two reconsidered—Amendments requiring
merely “citizenship and inhabitancy,” requiring a residence of
nine years, requiring a residence of four years, requiring that
qualification of residence do not apply to foreigners now in the
country, and requiring residence of five years not agreed to.

Article fifth—Section three confirmed after attempt to reduce the
necessary residence from nine years to seven.

Article fourth—Section five, relating to appropriations, reconsid-
ered—Several amendments offered, but not agreed to, and the
matter left in statu quo.

Tuesday, August 14 ‘ 5 ‘ ‘ : 3 ‘ : =

Article sixth—Two amendments to section nine, to allow members
of the Legislature to accept office but to vacate their seats, lost—
The section postponed—Section ten amended that legislators be
paid out of the National Treasury and that their salaries be
ascertained by law, and so adopted.

Wednesday, August 15 . : ‘ ‘i 4 . ‘ : : i a

Article sixth—Section eleven adopted—Section twelve postponed—
Amendments to section thirteen, that the Supreme Court be
joined with the President in the revisionary power and that the
Presiient have a veto on “ resolutions,” rejected—But that three-
fourths of each House be required to overrule the President’s
veto and that he have ten days to veto bills adopted, and the
section carried as amended.

Thursday, August 16 . 5 2 é 3 , ‘ 3 : = é

Amendment subjecting resolutions to the President’s veto adopted
and made section fourteen of article sixth.

Article seventh, relating to the power of Congress, considered—Sec-
tion one taken up—Clauses relative to regulation of commerce,
to coining money, to regulation of value of foreign coin, and to
establishing standards of weights, etc., adopted—Amendment
adding “post roads” after “ post-offices ” carried—Power to emit
bills of credit stricken out.

Friday, August 17 . ; i : 3 § ‘ F 3 E 2

Amendment that treasurers be appointed by “joint ” ballot—All
clauses to and inclusive of “to declare war” adopted after sev-
eral slight changes of phraseology.

Saturday, August 18 % ‘ See ee :

Amendments to give Legislature certain other specified powers
referred to committee of detail of eleven—Appointment of com-
mittee to consider assumption of State debts—*To raise and
support armies” adopted—So “to provide and maintain a navy”
—Motion to restrict the size of the army voted down.

Monday, August 20 . : : i : 3 ; : ‘ ‘

More propositions relative to powers of the Legislature and mis-
cellaneous provisions referred to committee of detail—Power to

384

395

404

408

415

420

427
CONTENTS

enact sumptuary laws disagreed to—General clause that Congress
have power to enact laws necessary to enforce enumerated powers
carried—Article seventh, section two, concerning treason and its
punishment, discussed, changed, and adopted—Section three—
Amendment that the first census be taken within three years
agreed to.

Tuesday, August 21 .

Report of the committee of eleven upon State debts and organiza-
tion, etc., of the militia received—Section three, article seventh,
agreed to—Section twelve of article sixth, relative to representa-
tion and taxation, again considered—Likewise article seventh,
section four, relating to exports—Exports not to be taxed.

Wednesday, August 22

Article seventh, section four—Prohibition of importation of slaves
discussed and referred—Motions that bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws be prohibited, and that the Legislature discharge
the debts, etc., of the United States, were agreed to.

Thursday, August 23 é

Article seventh—Organization, ete., ‘of the militia discussed and the
paragraph adopted as reported-—Agreed that no officer of the
United States receive presents, titles, etc., from any foreign
State.

Article eighth—Supremacy of the Constitution, treaties, and na-
tional laws adopted—Motion to give the Legislature a negative
on acts of State legislatures not committed and withdrawn.

“~ Article ninth, section one, discussed and referred.
Friday, August 24

Further report from ‘the “grand committee upon importation of
slaves, capitation tax, and navigation act.

Article ninth—Sections two and three stricken out.

Article tenth, section one—Amendments that President be elected
by the people, by electors chosen by the people, not agreed to—
By joint ballot of the Legislature and a majority of those present
agreed to—That each State have one vote not carried—Nor that
in case of a tie vote the President of the Senate have the casting
vote—Section two discussed—That the President should not
appoint to offices otherwise provided for agreed to—But not that
State legislatures and executives be authorized to appoint.

Saturday, August 25 .

Article seventh—Wording of section one > changed—Agreed that im-
portation of slaves be prohibited after 1808—And that a tax of
not more than ten dollars may be levied upon each slave so
imported—Agreed that section five stand as in the report of the
committee of detail.

Article tenth, section two, changed in phraseology—Amendment
that President may grant reprieves “ until the ensuing session of
the Senate” not agreed to—Nor that he grant pardons “ with
consent of the Senate.”

Monday, August 27 . 5

Article tenth, section two—Agreed ‘that President’s command over
State militia be confined to the time of their service under the
Federal Government—Form of oath required from President
agreed. to.

Article eleventh—Section one amended, giving judicial power “as
well in law as equity,” and so adopted—Section two adopted—
Discussion of section three relative to judicial power, etc.—
Amendments relative to increase of salaries of jucges and to their
removal on application by legislature not agreed to—Provision as
to trial by impeachment postponed—Judicial power extended to
cases under the Constitution or laws of Congress, to cases
in which the United States are a party, to grants of land by

xV

PAGE

435

443

451

459

465

471
CONTENTS

different States, and to appellate jurisdiction as to law and
fact.
Tuesday, August 28 . ‘ 3 ¢ : % , ‘ . ‘ ‘

Article eleventh—Section four amended and sections four and five
adopted.

Article twelfth amended, prohibiting emission of bills of credit and
making anything but gold and silver coin legal tender, and so
passed—States prohibited from passing bills of attainder and
retrospective laws.

Article thirteenth amended, that States shall not lay duties on
imports or exports but for the use of the United States, and in
this form passed.

Article fourteenth, relating to equal privileges of citizens,
carried.

Article fifteenth amended by substituting “other crime” for “ high
misdemeanor,” and so passed.

Wednesday, August 29 . 5 j 4 é : E : § s

Article sixteenth, relating to faith to be given to exemplified
records and official acts, etc., referred.

Article seventh, section six, requiring majority of two-thirds of
each House to pass a navigation act, struck out.

Article fifteenth extended to provide for surrender of fugitive
slaves.

Article seventeenth—Provisions relative to conditions upon which
new States may be admitted stricken out.

Thursday, August 30 ‘ ‘ 5 . 5 i , ‘ . ;

Article seventeenth, relative to the admission of new States, further

considered—Amendments that no new State shall be formed
within one of the present States without consent of legislature
‘of such State, nor by a union of two or more States or parts
thereof without their consent, that the Legislature shall have
power to dispose of the property, etc., of the United States, and
that nothing in this Constitution shall prejudice the claims of
the United States or of the States to lands ceded by treaty of
peace, agreed to.

Article eighteenth amended, giving also State executives the right
to apply for protection to the National Government against
domestic violence, and in this form passed.

Article nineteenth adopted.

Article twentieth, requiring oath of fidelity, agreed to with amend-
ment prohibiting religious tests, etc.

Friday, August 81. soe 2 5 ‘ ‘ : ‘ 5 ‘ 3

Article twenty-first considered and agreed to, that nine States be
necessary to organize this Constitution.

Article twenty-second—Amendment that the approbation of the
Continental Congress be not necessary to establish the Constitu-
tion agreed to—That conventions be “ speedily ” called to ratify
not agreed to—The article adopted as amended.

Article twenty-third adopted after the words “ choose the President
of the United States and” were stricken out.

Article seventh, section four, amended that no commercial regula-
tion give preference to the ports of any State, that no vessel
ee Wan from a State enter or pay duties in another, and

at all duties, imposts, and excises be uniform t f
United States. A Hrobghont the
ee of undetermined sections to a committee of one from each
ate.
Saturday, September 1 : . : : é 2 . ‘

Partial report of committee of yesterday—Report of committee of
ae 29, relative to faith and credit to be given to acts, etc.
of States. :

PAGE

476

481

489

496

502
CONTENTS

Monday, September 3 3 5
Amendment agreed to that Legislature may prescribe the manner
of authenticating records, etc—That Congress have power to
establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies agreed

to.

Article sixth—lIneligibility of legislators to office confined to such
offices as were created or the emoluments whereof were increased
during their term of office, and so agreed to—Likewise that no
officer of the United States hold a seat in the Legislature.

Tuesday, September 4

That Congress lay and collect taxes to provide for the common

defense, etc., and regulate trade with Indian tribes agreed to.
Wednesday, September 5.

Agreed that Congress have power to declare war and grant letters
of marque and reprisal; that no appropriation for the army be
for longer than two years; that Congress have exclusive legisla-
tion over the district in which the seat of government may be
located, and likewise over all places purchased, etc., for forts,
arsenals, etc.; to enact laws providing for patent rights and copy-
rights—Provision relative to meeting expenditures of the con-
vention adopted—Election of the President resumed—Amend-
ments offered, but only that requiring a “majority of the whole
number of electors appointed ” to elect, agreed to.

Thursday, September 6

Election of President considered—No one holding an office under the
United States shall be an elector, agreed to—President’s term
of office to be four years, agreed to—Minor amendments in
phraseology adopted—Others not agreed to—Agreed that election
be on the same day throughout the United States—Likewise that
in the event of no election the Senate elect the President, two-
thirds of the Senators, at least, to be present—Likewise that not
the Senate but the House elect the President, two-thirds of the
States to be present.

Friday, September 7 . ‘

Agreed that Legislature have power to determine the succession to
the Presidency, etc.—So that in the House a concurrence of a
majority of all the States be necessary to a choice—So that the
President be a native, a resident for fourteen years, and thirty-
five years of age—So that the Vice-President be President of the
Senate—Paragraph fifth of report of September 4 adopted—
Paragraph seventh considered—House excluded from treaty-
making power—Agreed that the President, “by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate,” make treaties, appoint am-
bassadors, etc., and “all other officers,” ete.—That President have
the power to fill vacancies during the recess of the Senate—That
two-thirds of the Senate concur in making treaties, “ except
treaties of peace”—But amendments, that the concurrence of
the President be not required in treaties and that an executive
council be established for the President, not carried.

Saturday, September 8

Reconsideration of provisions relative to treaties—Treaties of peace
placed upon same footing as others—Carried that two-thirds of
“all” Senators be not required—That two-thirds of the Senate
be a quorum not carried—Agreed that the Senate be a court of
impeachment of the President for treason, bribery,’ and other
high crimes and misdemeanors—Likewise that “other civil of-
ficers ” of the United States be subject to impeachment—Also
that appropriation bills should originate in the House, but that
the Senate may propose amendments, etc., as in other bills—Also
that every Senator be on oath when trying impeachment—So that
President have the power to convene Congress or either House,

Xvii

PAGE
503

506

513

518

525

532
xviii CONTENTS

PAGH
etc.—Motion to reconsider the ratio of representation not carried
—Committee on style and revision appointed.

Monday, September 10. : 6 2 ; : ‘ : ¥ :

Amendment to article nineteenth, that Legislature be empowered to
propose amendments which shall be binding when agreed to by
three-fourths of the States.

Articles twenty-first and twenty-second adopted—Assent of the Con-
tinental Congress to Constitution not required—That an address
to the people accompany the plan referred.

Tuesday, September 11 . . ‘ : 5 % $ ‘ ‘ . . 545
Wednesday, September 12 ‘ ‘ eee . é ~  . 545

Text of the Constitution as reported by the commitee on style.

Amendment to section seven, article first, that a two-thirds vote be
required to overrule the President’s veto, instead of three-fourths,
carried—That a bill of rights be annexed to the Constitution not
carried.

Thursday, September 18... Po, Wei 5 , : -  . 558

Committee appointed to draft articles of association to encourage
economy, frugality, and American manufactures—Amendment to

ermit States to levy certain duties for the sole purpose of de-
Taying charges of inspecting, storing, etc., such power to be
subject to Congressional contro] and revision, carried—Report
from the committee on style regarding the manner of procedure
of ratification of the Constitution.

Friday, September 14 x & SF 2 &  * é ;

Changes of phraseology—Amendments to change the present pro-
portion of Representatives, to suspend impeached officers until
they have been tried, to compel the House to publish all its
proceedings, to give Congress power to cut canals and grant
charters of incorporation in certain cases, to establish a uni-
versity, and to secure the liberty of the press, were not carried—
Otherwise with amendments that the treasurer be appointed as
are other officers and that Congress publish from time to time
accounts of the public expenditures.

Raturday, September 15. «© . .  . “ x 8 i

Amendments to change the representation of the States not agreed
to—To deprive Congress of the control over State laws imposing
duties in certain cases, not agreed to—That the President receive
no emolument besides his salary carried—To deprive the Presi-
dent of the pardoning power in cases of treason not carried—That
appointments of inferior officers may be vested by law in the
President alone, or, etc., agreed to—But not that trial by jury be
preserved in all civil cases—Carried that on application of two-
thirds of the States Congress call a convention to amend the
Constitution—Likewise that no State be deprived of its equal
representation in the Senate without its consent—But not that
a two-thirds vote be required to pass a navigation law before 1808
—Nor that amendments be submitted to a new Federal conven-
tion—Constitution as amended agreed to and ordered to be
engrossed.

Monday, September 17 . Bi WE es, ap re tet, Ja oo

Amendment that “the number of Representatives shall not exceed
one for every 30,000 inhabitants” carried.

Agreed that the Constitution be signed as “done by the unanimous
consent of the States present.”

Agreed that the journals and papers of the convention be deposited
with its President, subject to the order of the Congress if the
government be ever formed.

Constitution signed and convention adjourned.

538

560

567

577
CONTENTS

APPENDIx TO DEBATES:

I.

No. 1. Extract of letter from General Knox to General Washing-
ton, October 23, 1786.
No. 2. Extract of letter from John Jay to General Washington,
: June 27, 1786.
No. 3. Extract of letter from General. Washington ‘to John Jay,
August 1, 1786 .

II. No. 1. Extract of ietter from James Madison to Thomas ‘Jefferson,

March 19, 1787...

No. 2. Extract of letter from James Madiaon to Edmund Randolph,
April 8, 1787.

No. 3. Letter from James Madison to ‘George Washington, April
16, 1787

III. Letter from Merchants, Tradesmen, ete., ‘of Providence, Rhode

Island, to the Chairman of the General Convention, May
11, 1787

IV. The Pinckney Plan presented t to the Convention at its Session of

VI.
VII.

May 29, 1787:

No. 1. Outline of the plan.

No. 2. Letters from Charles Pinckney to. John Quincy Adams,
Secretary of State, relating to the alleged Pinckney ‘Plan,
December 12, 1818

No. 3. Text of the alleged plan submitted by Pinckney to John
Quincy Adams .

No. 4. Madison’s note on the Pinckney plan apparently written to
accompany his Debates. é

. Hamilton’s draft of a constitution for the United States .

Randolph’s proposed compromise to the small States, July 10, “1787

Subsequent notes and remarks by Madison to his speech of August
7, 1787, on the question of suffrage:

No. 1. Note to speech of James Madison in Convention of 1787,
August 7th. .

No. 2. Note to speech of James Madison on the 7th day 0 of August

No. 3. General remarks on the Convention. .

PART III.

THE CONSTITUTION, ITS RATIFICATION AND AMENDMENTS.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES .
LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL “ConvENTION, DATED SEPTEMBER

17, 1787, To THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS, TRANSMITTING THE Con-
STITUTION

RESOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL ConvENTION SUBMITTING THE ‘ConstT1TUTION

To ConecRESsS, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 .

RESOLUTION OF ConcrEss OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1787, ‘SUBMITTING THE ‘Con-

STITUTION TO THE SEVERAL STATES .

CIRCULAR LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF Concress" DATED SEPTEMBER 28,

1787, TRANSMITTING COPY OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE SEVERAL
GOVERNORS

RATIFICATION OF THE Constrrution BY. THE SEVERAL Sates, ARRANGED IN

THE ORDER OF THEIR RBATIFICATION:

State of Delaware
State of Pennsylvania
State of New Jersey .

State of Georgia Se in SE SR ig

State of Connecticut . : . 3 .

State of Massachusetts . 3 - 7 s ‘ ‘ 5
State of Maryland . . . . «© «© «© «©

Sti

ate of South Carolina . 3 s s F % 3 2 :

x1x

PAGE

585
586
587
589
590
592

595

596

598
600

606
608
618

619
619
' 623

627

639
640
641

642

642
642
643
644
647
649
651
653
655
xX CONTENTS

PAGE

State of New Hampshire. . . . . . . «© « ~~ 656

State of Virginia tke ii ge et WB we aye Jen MD ed £009

State of New York . . . . . 7 ee eee 665

State of North Carolina . . . . : : ‘i 3 3 j . 674

State of Rhode Island 3 2 ‘i : : ‘ 2 : : 7 . 680
RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS DATED JULY 2, 1788, SUBMITTING BATIFICATIONS

OF THE CONSTITUTION TO A COMMITTEE . Fé ‘ ‘ : : . 687
RESOLUTION OF THE CONGRESS, OF SEPTEMBER 13, 1788, FIXING DATE FOB
ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERN-

MENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, IN THE CiTy of NEw YoREK . . 688
RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST CONGRESS SUBMITTING TWELVE AMENDMENTS TO

THE CONSTITUTION . : , ‘ 2 ; ‘ . 689

Fmst TEN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION . : - . 692

SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 2 ‘ A é . . 694

InDEX TO THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 17877 . .  . 699

ILLUSTRATIONS

FACING

Z PAGE

First page of Mr. Madison’s manuscript—facsimile . . . . . . IT
Facsimile reproduction of Mr. Madison’s “Notes” relating to coercion of

States : : : . ¢ s ei é é : . 7 . 37

Last page of Mr. Madison’s manuscript—facsimile . . . . . 583

 

* The Index is only to Madison’s Notes of Debates and the A i
The Table of Contents is believed to be sufficient for Part I, (eilscmre eo
Federal Convention of 1787, and Part III, The Constitution, its Ratification and
Amendments.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
I. Mr. Manpison’s Recorp

There have been three prints from Madison’s manuscript notes of
the debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution of the
United States—that in Volume III of the Documentary History of
the Constitution, published in 1900 by the State Department which
is the custodian of the original manuscript; that in Volumes III and
IV of The Writings of James Madison, edited by Mr. Hunt, published
in 1902 and printed separately in two volumes in 1908 (G. P. Put-
nam’s Sons); and that published by the Yale University Press in
1911, Max Farrand, editor, as the chief part of Volumes I and II of
the three volume edition of The Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787. All of these works are reasonably accurate prints of the
Madison record, while none is nor can be perfectly accurate. In
the Documentary History and Professor Farrand’s work an attempt
is made to indicate in the printed page the alterations which Madison
made in his manuscript. In the Documentary History this is done by
the use of the caret, interlineations and the words “‘ stricken out ’’ to
show the words through which Madison had drawn his pen. Mr.
Farrand has made use of ‘‘ angular brackets ’’ to indicate additions
made by Madison to his original notes and has added numerous foot-
notes to show what words were struck out by Madison. The inevitable
result is that we have texts which are confusing or disagreeable to
read. Hven the special student who cares more for the form than the
substance, and the suspicious investigator, who thinks that Madison
may have made alterations in his original record so as to suppress or
distort the truth or give a coloring to the facts, will not be satisfied
with these attempts to visualize manuscript by print. He must, in
fact, see the manuscript itself or a good photograph of it. None other
than the special student would however, tolerate a photograph in this
case, for the penmanship is not easy to read, and is so microscopic at
times as to be a severe strain upon the eye.

The chief source of Madison’s corrections of his notes was the
official Journal of the Convention which was printed in 1819 and
Yates’s Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Federal Convention
which appeared in 1821. Whenever Madison thought either of these
records more correct than his he changed or added to his; but he noted
more frequently errors in the official Journal itself. Yates’s record he

xX1
xxii INTRODUCTORY NOTE

regarded as having little value. Nevertheless, he derived from it @
few lesser motions which had escaped him.

Madison began the revision of his Notes after he retired from the
Presidency in 1817 and had the manuscript copied under his own eye
by his amanuensis, John C. Payne, Mrs. Madison’s brother. On De-
eember 27, 1821, he wrote to John G. Jackson that he had set about
arranging his papers ‘‘ in earnest.’’ On February 2, 1827, he wrote
to Samuel Harrison Smith, who urged him to publish his record, that
the world would not have long to wait for it. It was to be posthumous,
he said, and Rufus King, William Few and himself were the only
signers of the Constitution then surviving; ‘‘ and of the lamps still
burning, none can now be far from the socket,’’ he added. King died a
few months after this letter was written and Few in the following
year. It is probable that the transcript was completed when Madison
wrote, and the fact that it was being made caused a rumor to get
abroad that he was writing a history of some sort, for he was obliged to
deny to several correspondents that he had such a project.

At the end of the original manuscript of the debates in the Con-
vention Madison wrote: ‘‘ The few alterations and corrections made
in these debates which are not in my handwriting, were dictated by
me and made in my presence by John C. Payne.’’ The entries made
in Payne’s hand are indeed few, and a careful examination fails to
identify positively more than half-a-dozen, but when Payne wrote in
small characters his writing resembled Madison’s, and there were
doubtless a few alterations made by him which can not be identified.

In Madison’s will made in 1835 he says:

In consideration of the particular and valuable aids received
from my brother in law, John C. Payne and the affection which
I bear hin, I devise to him and his heirs two hundred and forty
acres of land on which he lives.

The ‘‘ particular and valuable aids,’’ doubtless, were his services in
revising the record of the debates and transcribing it for publication.

Madison died on June 28, 1836. In replying to the letter of
condolence which the President, Andrew Jackson, sent to her, Mrs.
Madison wrote (August 20, 1836):

The best return I can make for the sympathy of my coun-
try is, to fulfil the sacred trust his confidence reposed in me—
that of placing before it and the world what his pen prepared
for their use—a legacy, the importance of which is deeply im-
pressed on my mind.?

* Executive Documents, No. 8, 24th Congress, 2d Sess., Vol. I.
MR. MADISON’S RECORD xxiii

On November 15, 1836, she offered this legacy to the Government,
and by act of March 3, 1837, the Government bought it for thirty
thousand dollars. It was delivered to the Secretary of State, John
Forsyth, by Mrs. Madison April 1, 1837, being described by her as:
‘‘the manuscript copy: of the Debates in the Convention of 1787 and
of the Debates & in the Congress of the Confederation.’’ In a letter
of November 15, 1836, to President Jackson, she stated Mr. Madison’s
intention and gave a further description of the documents, saying:

It was also intended to publish, with these debates, those taken
by him in the Congress of the confederation in 1782, ’3, and ’7,
of which he was then a member, and selections made by himself,
and prepared under his eye, from his letters narrating the pro-
ceedings of that body during the periods of his service in it, pre-
fixing the debates in 1776 on the declaration of independence by
Thomas Jefferson, so as to embody all the memorials in that shape
known to exist.’

These were ‘‘ The Madison Papers.’’ They comprised the original
manuscripts and transcripts of them. Most of the transcripts, includ-
ing the transcript of the debates in the Constitutional Convention,
were made by Payne, but a few of the letters had been copied by Mrs.
Madison herself. On July 9, 1838, a law was passed providing for the
publication of ‘‘ The Madison Papers.’’ Henry D. Gilpin, Solicitor of
the Treasury, was selected as the editor, and the joint committee of
Senate and House on the Library ordered the withdrawal from the
State Department of ‘‘ one of the duplicate manuscript copies,’’ which
Mrs. Madison had deposited there. ‘‘ The Madison Papers,’’ being the
debates and the other papers described by Mrs. Madison in her letter
to the President, were published in three volumes in 1840 and from
this edition several prints have since been made of the whole and of
the debates separated from the other papers. The printer’s copy for
the publication of 1840 was returned to the joint Library Committee
by the editor or printer, and the committee deposited it with the
Librarian of Congress, instead of returning it to the Department of
State whence it had come. It was not known until recently that this
deposit was itself ‘‘ one of the duplicate manuscript copies,’’? which
Mrs. Madison had deposited with the State Department. That part
of it which concerns us, the debates in the Constitutional Convention,
was Payne’s transcript made under Madison’s supervision; and Madi-
son had himself gone over the transcript and had made a few addi-
tions and notes in his own hand. This printer’s copy, therefore, has

 

4‘ Baecutive Documents, No. 8, 24th Congress, 2d Sess., Vol. I.
XXIV INTRODUCTORY NOTE

more importance than commonly ‘attaches to such material. It must,
in fact, be considered when we are searching for an absolutely correct
version of Madison’s record. As, however, no transcript ean be as
correct as the original document which is transcribed, 80 the most cor-
rect version of the Madison record must be the original manuscript
in Madison’s own hand; but wherever Madison changed the transcript
the change represents his final judgment and must be noticed in the
interest of accuracy. Bringing the Payne transcript into comparison
with the original record kept by Madison himself we have the last
word in Madison’ s history of the Constitutional Convention.

In so far as any long text can be. accurate the text which i is printed
here is believed to be accurate. Before it went to the printer. it was
collated with the original manuscript twice, each time by a different
person. The galley proof was compared word for word with the
original manuscript; the page proof was compared word for word by
a different person with the original manuscript. The whole of the
Payne transcript was read by the side of the Madison record to ascer-
tain all variations and all corrections, or additions which Madison
made in the Payne transcript. With the exception of differences. i in
spelling, abbreviation of words and punctuation, all variations be-
tween the two texts are stated in footnotes.. The page proof
was read against the text of the Documentary History and that of’
Professor Farrand in The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, and the Madison manuscript was again consulted whenever a
comparison showed any difference, however slight, in the three texts.

Finally, the foundry proof has, in the interest of accuracy, been
read against Mr. Madison’s original manuscript.

This is the first publication of the Madison record so compared.

GatLLarp Hunt.
WaAsHINeTON, D. C.,
November 11, 1918.
IL. THE FEDERAL ConvENTION oF 1787 AN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

The notes which James Madison made of the proceedings of the
Federal Convention which met in Philadelphia, May 25th and ad-
journed September 17, 1787, were in fact, though not in form, the
notes of the proceedings of an international conference, to use the
language of today, or of a continental conference, as its members
might have phrased it had they not preferred the term federal, as
we apparently prefer constitutional, convention. Each preference is,
however, correct according to the point of view of the observer. It
was indeed a constitutional convention or. conference, in the sense
that it drafted a constitution of a more perfect Union of and for the
States ratifying it; it was a federal convention or conference, in the
sense that it proposed a draft for a federation of the States which the
framers of the Constitution called a more perfect Union than that
created by the Articles of Confederation, which the Constitution was
to replace; it was a continental convention or conference in that it
was composed of twelve of the thirteen States of the American conti-
nent; it was an, international convention or conference, in that it was
composed of official representatives of twelve of the thirteen ‘‘ sov-
ereign, free and independent ’”’ States of America, acting under in-
structions and meeting ‘‘ for the sole and express purpose of revising
the Articles of Confederation ’’ in order to ‘‘ render the federal Con-
stitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preserva-
tion of the Union.’’

The Union to be preserved had been composed but a short time
previously of the thirteen American colonies, whose official repre-
sentatives in the Continental Congress, on July 4, 1776, declared,

- hat these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be
Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all
Allegiance to the British Grown, and that all political connection
between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be
totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they
have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances,
establish. Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which
Independent States may of right do.

The official representatives in the Congress of the States thus de-
clared to be free and independent drafted, and on November 15, 1777,

xxV
XXV1 INTRODUCTORY NOTE

approved Articles of Confederation, which, ratified by each of the
thirteen States at various times, became effective on March 1, 1781,
by the ratification of the State of Maryland, the last so to do. The
contracting parties were thus the thirteen States declared to be free
and independent by the Declaration of Independence; and the origin,
the form and nature of the Union, its name and the relation of the
States to one another and to the Confederation and perpetual Union,
are thus stated in the caption and in the first three of the Articles of
Confederation : +

Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the
states of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhodeisland and
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina,
South-Carolina and Georgia.

Article I. The Stile of this confederacy shall be ‘‘ The United
States of America.”’

Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is
not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States,
in Congress assembled.

Article III. The said states hereby severally enter into a
firm league of friendship with each other, for their common de-
fence, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual and gen-
eral welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all
force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on
account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence
whatever.

The ‘‘ Confederation and perpetual Union between the States ’’
not proving to be ‘‘ adequate to the exigencies of government & the
preservation of the Union,’’ the Congress, on February 21, 1787,
deemed it ‘‘ expedient that on the second Monday in May next a
Convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by the several
states be held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of re-
vising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and
the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall
when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the
federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the
preservation of the Union.’’

Pursuant to this resolution, twelve of the thirteen ‘ sovereign
free and independent ’’ States sent official delegates to the convention
to be held in Philadelphia for the revision of the Articles of Confed-

* Journals of the Contimental Congress, Library of Con iti
XIX (1912), p. 214. oe gress edition, Vol.
THE CONVENTION AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE xxvii

eration, and succeeded with much good will, concession, and com-
promise, in drafting, instead of revising the Articles, a constitution
and a scheme of government of a more perfect Union, which, sub-
mitted to the Congress of the Confederation, referred by it to the
States, ratified in the course of 1787-88 by conventions in eleven of
the States, became effective in accordance with the 7th Article of the
Constitution, providing that ‘‘ The Ratification of the Conventions of
nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Consti-
tution between the States so ratifying the Same.’’

The government of the more perfect Union was to go into opera-
tion on March 4, 1789, and, in the course of that and of the subsequent
year, the people of the States of North Carolina and of Rhode Island
ratified the Constitution, thus making it the union of all thirteen of
the original States of America.

In the leading case of Ware v. Hylton (8 Dallas, 199, 224), de-
cided in 1796, Mr. Justice Chase took occasion to consider the course
of events leading to the Declaration of Independence of the colonies,
the result of that Declaration upon the colonies, and the relation of
the States to one another before the Articles of Confederation became
binding by the ratification of the State of Maryland, on March 1,
1781. In the course of his opinion that learned Justice said, under
a sense of judicial responsibility :

In June 1776, the Convention of Virginia formally declared,
that Virginia was a free, sovereign, and independent state; and
on the 4th of July, 1776, following, the United States, in Congress
assembled, declared the Thirteen United Colonies free and in-
dependent states; and that as such, they had full power to levy
war, conclude peace, &. I consider this as a declaration, not
that the United Colonies jointly, in a collective capacity, were
independent states, &c. but that each of them was a sovereign
and independent state, that is, that each of them had a right to
govern itself by its own authority, and its own laws, without any
controul from any other power upon earth.

Before these solemn acts of separation from the Crown of
Great Britain, the war between Great Britain and the United
Colonies, jointly, and separately, was a civil war; but instantly on
that great and ever memorable event, the war changed its nature,
and became a PUBLIC war between independent governments; and
immediately thereupon au the rights of public war (and all the
other rights of an independent nation) attached to the govern-
ment of Virginia; and all the former political connexion between
Great Britain and Virginia, and also between their respective
subjects, were totally dissolved; and not only the two nations,
but all the subjects of each, were in a state of war; precisely as
XXvili INTRODUCTORY NOTE

in the present war between Great Britain and France. Vatt. lib.
8. e. 18. § 292. to 295. lib. 3. c. 5. § 70. 72. and 73

From the 4th of July, 1776, the American States were de
facto, as well as de jure, in the possession and actual exercise of
all the rights of independent governments. . . .

The Supreme Court of the United States, of which Mr. Justice
Chase was a member, apparently attaches great weight to this opin-
ion in Ware v. Hylton, inasmuch as Mr. Justice Swayne, in deliver-
ing the unanimous opinion of this court in the case of Hauwenstein v.
Eynham (100 U. S., 483, 489), decided in 1879, said:

We have quoted from the opinion of Mr. Justice Chase in
that case, . . . beeause it shows the views of a powerful legal
mind at that early period, when the debates in the convention
which framed the Constitution must have been fresh in the mem-
ory of the leading jurists of the country.

It is proper to add, in this connection, that Mr. Justice Chase was a
signer of the Declaration of Independence.

It is also interesting to note, in this connection, that John Marshall
of Virginia, shortly to become and thereafter to remain, the great
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, appeared in 1796 as counsel for
his State, in the case of Ware v. Hylton, and that in the course of his
argument he said:

Ist. It has been conceded, that independent nations have, in
general, the right of confiscation; and that Virginia, at the time
of passing her law [1777], was an independent nation.

Speaking of the nature of the Confederation, the relations of the
States composing it both to themselves and to the Union, Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall observed, speaking for the Supreme Court of the
United States in Sturges v. Crowninshield (4 Wheaton, 122, 192),
decided in 1819:

It must be recollected, that previous to the formation of the
new constitution, we were divided into independent States, united
for some purposes, but, in most respects, sovereign.

‘And in the later case of Gibbons v. Ogden, (9 Wheaton, 1, 187), de-
cided in 1824, the same great jurist, recurring to this matter, again,
remarked:

As preliminary to the very able discussions of the constitution
which we have heard from the bar, and as having some influence
on its construction, reference has been made to the political sit-
uation of these States, anterior to its formation. It has been said,
THE CONVENTION AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE xxix

that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were
connected with each other only by a league. This is true.

As to the nature of the more perfect Union and the relation to it of
the States whereof it is composed, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall solemnly
declared, in the course of his opinion announcing and justifying the
unanimous judgment of his brethren, in McCulloch v. Maryland, (4
Wheaton, 316, 410), decided in 1819, and which the late Professor
Thayer considered the greatest of his cases:

In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the
government of the Union, and those of the States. They are each
sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither
sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other.

And in the great and leading case of the State of Texas v. White,
(7 Wallace, 700, 725), decided in 1868, Mr. Chief Justice Chase thus
restated and elaborated in classic terms the views of his vigorous name-
sake, Mr. Justice Chase, and of his illustrious predecessor, Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall:

Under the Articles of Confederation each State retained its sov-
ereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdic-
tion, and right not expressly delegated to the United States. Un-
der the Constitution, though the powers of the States were much
restricted, still, all powers not delegated to the United States,
nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respect-
ively, or to the people. And we have already had occasion to re-
mark at this term, that ‘‘ the people of each State compose a
State, having its own government, and endowed with all the
functions essential to separate and independent existence,’’ and
,that ‘‘ without the States in union, there could be no such political
body as the United States.’’ Not only, therefore, can there be no
loss of separate and, independent autonomy to the States, through
their union under the Constitution, but it may be not unreason-
ably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance
of their governments, are as much within the design and care of
the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the main-
tenance of the National government. The Constitution, in ali
its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of in-
destructible States.

The international import of the Constitution of a more perfect
Union was not lost upon Benjamin Franklin, the keenest, shrewdest,
most sagacious and far-sighted observer of his day, who, shortly after
the adjournment of the Federal Convention, was pleased to say in a
letter to a friend in Europe:

I send you enclos’d the propos’d new Federal Constitution
for these States. I was engag’d 4 Months of the last Summer
XXX INTRODUCTORY NOTE

in the Convention that form’d it. It is now sent by Congress to
the several States for their Confirmation.

And he was bold enough to suggest that:

If it succeeds, I do not see why you might not in Europe
carry the Project of good Henry the 4th into Execution, by form-
ing a Federal Union and One Grand Republick of all its different
States & Kingdoms; by means of a like Convention; for we had
many Interests to reconcile.!

In view of the origin and nature of the Constitution drafted by
official delegates of twelve of the thirteen ‘‘ sovereign, free and in-
dependent ” States of America, submitted to and ratified by the peo-
ple of each of the several States in conventions assembled for that
purpose, and binding only those States which had done so; and in view
of the authoritative, conspicuous, and pertinent judgments of the
Supreme Court of the United States regarding the nature and mean-
ing of the Constitution thereof, it would appear that Madison’s notes
of the proceedings of that memorable and significant international
conference from which there sprang ‘‘ a more perfect Union .
for the United States of America,’’ are not only of interest to students
of Federal Government, and to the good people of the United States,
but also to students of International Law, and to the peoples of all
the States forming the Society of Nations.

JAMES Brown Scort.

Wasurinerton, D. C.,
November 11, 1918.

 

* Letter of October 22, 1787, to Mr. Grand. Documentary History of the Con-
stitution of the United States of America (published by the Department of State
of the United States), Vol. IV (1905), pp. 341-342.
PART I

ANTECEDENTS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 |
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE—1776 +
In Coneress, Juty 4, 1776

THE UNANIMOUS DECLARATION OF THE THIRTEEN UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

WHEN in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for
one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Na-
ture’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind
requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the.
separation.—We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pur-
suit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed,—Tha' whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation
on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established
should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accord-
ingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to
suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolish-
ing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train
of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their
right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide
new Guards for their future security——Such has been the patient
sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which
constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The
history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of re-
peated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the-
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To

 

* Printed from the facsimile of the engrossed copy of the original manu-
script in the Library of the Department of State of the United States.

xxxiii
xxxiv DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.—He has re-
fused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for
the public good.—He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws
of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their
operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so sus-
pended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.—He has refused
to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people,
unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in
the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants
only—He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual,
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public
Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with
his measures.—He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly,
for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the
people.—He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to
cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative powers, incapable
of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise ;
the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of
invasion from without, and convulsions within.—He has endeavoured
to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing
the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to
encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new
Appropriations of Lands.—He has obstructed the Administration of
Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary
powers.—He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.
—He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms
of Officers to harrass our people, and eat out their substance.—He
has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies, without the
Consent of our legislatures——He has affected to render the Military
independent of and superior to the Civil power.—He has combined
with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution,
and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of
pretended Legislation :—For quartering large bodies of armed troops
among us:—For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment
for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of
these States :—For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world :—
For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent :—For depriving us
in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury :—For transporting
us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences :—For abolishing the
free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing
therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 xxxv

to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing
the same absolute rule into these Colonies:—For taking away our
Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering funda-
mentally the Forms of our Governments:—For suspending our own
Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legis-
late for us in all cases whatsoever.—He has abdicated Government
here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against
us.—He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns,
and destroyed the lives of our people.—He is at this time transporting
large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death,
desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of
Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and
totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.—He has constrained
our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms
against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends
and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.—He has excited
domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on
the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose
known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages,
sexes and conditions. In every stage of these Oppressions We have
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated
Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince,
whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a
Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. Nor have We been
wanting in attentions to our Brittish brethren. We have warned them
from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an un-
warrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the
circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have
appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have con-
jured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these
usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and
correspondence They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and
of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity,
which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest
of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.—

We, THEREFORE, the Representatives of the UNITED StaTEs OF
AMERICA, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme
Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the
Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly
publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right
ought to be FREE AND INDEPENDENT StaTEs; that they are Absolved
from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political con-
xxxvi DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

nection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to
be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they
have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances,
establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Inde-
pendent States may of right do—And for the support of this Declara-
tion, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we
mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our

sacred Honor.
JOHN HANCOCK.

New Hampshire
JosiaH BARTLETT,
Wa. WHIPPLE,

MatrHew THORNTON.

Massachusetts Bay
Sami. Apams,
JOHN ADAMS,

Rost. Treat Pare,
ELBRIDGE GERRY.

Rhode Island
Step. Hopkins,
Wr114M ELLEry.

Connecticut
Roger SHERMAN,
Sam’EL HuNTINGTON,
Wm. WILLIAMS,
OtiveR Wotcort.

New York
Wa. Froyn,
Put. LIVINGSTON,
Frans. Lewis,
Lewis Morais.

New Jersey
Ricup. Stockton,
JNO. WITHERSPOON,
Fras. Hopkinson,
JoHN Hart,
ABRA. CLARK.

Pennsylvania
Rost. Morris,
BENJAMIN RUSH,
BENJA. FRANKLIN,
Joun Moerron,
Gro. CLYMER,
Jas. SMITH,
Gero. TAYLOR,
JAMES WILSON,
Gro. Ross.

Delaware
Cargsak RODNEY,
Gro. Reap,
Tuo. M’KEan.

Maryland
SAMUEL CHASE,
Wm. Paca,
Tuos. STONE,

Virginia

GrorceE WYTHE,
RicHarp Henry LEE,
TH. JEFFERSON,

Benga. Hagrison,

Tus. NELSON, JB.,
Francis Licotroot Les,
CaRTER BRAXTON.

North Carolina

Wma. Hooper,
JosePH HEWES,
JOHN PENN.

South Carolina

Epwagp RUTLEDGE,
Tos. Hrywakp, JUNB.,
Tomas LyncH, JUNB.,
ARTHUR MIDDLETON.

Georgia

Burton GWINNETT,
Lyman Hatt,
Gro. WALTON.

CHARLES CARROLL of Carrollton.

Nore.—Mr. Ferdinand Jefferson, Keeper of the Rolls in the Department of
State, at Washington, says: “The names of the signers are spelt above as in
the facsimile of the original, but the punctuation of them is not always the
same; neither do the names of the States appear in the fascimile of the original.
The names of the signers of each State are grouped together in the facsimile of
the original, except the name of Matthew Thornton, which follows that of
Oliver Wolcott.”—Revised Statutes of the United States, 2d Edition, 1878,

page 6.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION?
Marca 1, 1781

To all to whom these Presents shall come, we the wnder signed Dele-
gates of the States affixed to our Names, send greeting.

Whereas the Delegates of the United States of America, in Con-
gress assembled, did, on the 15th day of November, in the Year of Our
Lord One thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy seven, and in the
Second Year of the Independence of America, agree to certain articles
of Confederation and perpetual Union, between the States of New-
hampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhodeisland and Providence Planta-
tions, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina and Georgia in
the words following, viz. ‘‘ Articles of Confederation and perpetual
Union between the states of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay,
Rhodeisland and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York,
New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-
Carolina, South-Carolina and Georgia.

Article I. The Stile of this confederacy shall be ‘‘ The United
States of America.’’ ‘

Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and inde-
pendence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by
this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Con-
gress assembled.

Article III. The said states hereby severally enter into a firm
league of friendship with each other, for their common defence, the
security of their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, bind-
ing themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or at-

 

* Journals of the Continental Congress, Library of Congress edition, Vol.
XIX (1912), p. 214.

The Articles of Confederation were agreed to by the Congress, November 15,
1777. They were, as appears from the list of signatures affixed to these Articles,
signed at different times by the delegates of the different American States.
On March 1, 1781, the delegates from Maryland, the last of the States to take
action, “did, in behalf of the said State of Maryland, sign and ratify the said
articles, by which act the Confederation of the United States of America was
completed, each and every of the Thirteen United States, from New Hampshire
to Georgia, both included, having adopted and confirmed, and by their delegates
in Congress, ratified the same.” Ibid., p. 214.

xxxvii
xxxviii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

tacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion,
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever.

Article IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friend-
ship and intercourse among the people of the different states in this
union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vaga-
bonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and
the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and
from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of
trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and re-
strictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such
restriction shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of
property imported into any state, to any other state, of which
the Owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or
restriction shall be laid by any state, on the property of the united
states, or either of them.

If any Person guilty of, or charged with treason, felony, or other
high misdemeanor in any state, shall flee from Justice, and be found
in any of the united states, he shall, upon demand of the Governor
or executive power, of the state from which he fled, be delivered up
and removed to the state having jurisdiction of his offence.

Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the
records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates
of every other state.

Article V. For the more convenient management of the general
interests of the united states, delegates shall be annually appointed
in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct, to meet
in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a
power reserved to each state, to recal its delegates, or any of them,
at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead, for
the remainder of the Year.

No state shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor
by more than seven Members; and no person shall be capable of
being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years;
nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any
office under the united states, for which he, or another for his benefit
receives any salary, fees or emolument of any kind.

Each state shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of
the states, and while they act as members of the committee of the
states.

In determining questions in the united states in Congress assem-
bled, each state shall have one vote.
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 xxxix -

Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached
or questioned in any Court, or place out of Congress, and the mem-
bers of congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests
and imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from, and
attendance on congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the
peace.

Article VI. No state, without the Consent of the united states
in congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any
embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or
treaty with any King prince or state; nor shall any person holding
any office of profit or trust under the united states, or any of them,
accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever
from any king, prince or foreign state; nor shall the united states
in congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility.

No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation
or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the united
states in congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for
which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.

No state shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere
with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the united states
in congress assembled, with any king, prince or state, in pursuance
of any treaties already proposed by congress, to the courts of France
and Spain.

No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any state,
except such number only, as shall be deemed necessary by the united
states in congress assembled, for the defence of such state, or its
trade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any state, in
time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgment of the
united states, in congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to
garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such state; but every
state shall always keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia,
sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and constantly
have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces
and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp
equipage.

No state shall engage in any war without the consent of the united
states in congress assembled, unless such state be actually invaded
by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being
formed by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and the
danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the united
states in congress assembled can be consulted: nor shall any state
grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque
- xl DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the united states
in congress assembled, and then only against the kingdom or state and
the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and
under such regulations as shall be established by the united states in
congress assembled, unless such state be infested by pirates, in which
case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so
long as the danger shall continue, or until the united states in con-
gress assembled, shall determine otherwise.

Article VII. When land-forces are raised by any state for the
common defence, all officers of or under the rank of colonel, shall
be appointed by the legislature of each state respectively, by whom
such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such state shall
direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State which first
made the appointment.

Article VIII. All charges of war, and all other expences that
shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and al-
lowed by the united states in congress assembled, shall be defrayed
out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several
states in proportion to the value of all land within each state, granted
to or surveyed for any Person, as such land and the buildings and
improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as
the united states in congress assembled, shall from time to time
direct and appoint.

The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by
the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states
within the time agreed upon by the united states in congress as-
sembled.

Article IX. The united states in congress assembled, shall have
the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article—of sending
and receiving ambassadors—entering into treaties and alliances, pro-
vided that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legis-
lative power of the respective states shall be restrained from im-
posing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people
are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importa-
tion of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever—of establish-
ing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall
be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces
in the service of the united states shall be divided or appropriated—
of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace—appoint-
ing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 xli

appeals in all cases of captures, provided that no member of congress
shall be appointed a judge of any of the said courts.

The united states in congress assembled shall also be the last re-
sort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that
hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary,
jurisdiction or any other cause whatever; which authority shall always
be exercised in the manner following. Whenever the legislative or
executive authority or lawful agent of any state in controversy with
another shall present a petition to congress stating the matter in
question and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by
order of congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other
state in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the
parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint
by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for
hearing and determining the matter in question: but if they cannot
agree, congress shall name three persons out of each of the united
states, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately
strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be
reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven, nor
more than nine names as congress shall direct, shall in the presence
of congress be drawn out by lot, and the persons whose names shall
be so drawn or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to
hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part
of the judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the determina-
tion: and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed,
without showing reasons, which congress shall judge sufficient, or
being present shall refuse to strike, the congress shall proceed to
nominate three persons out of each state, and the secretary of con-
gress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the
judgment and sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner
before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the
parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to
appear or defend their claim or cause,. the court shall nevertheless
proceed to pronounce sentence, or judgment, which shall in like man-
ner be final and decisive, the judgment or sentence and other proceed-
ings being in either case transmitted to congress, and lodged among
the acts of congress for the security of the parties concerned: pro-
vided that every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take
an oath to be administred by one of the judges of the supreme or
superior court of the state, where the cause shall be tried, ‘‘ well and
truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the
best of his judgment, without favour, affection or hope of reward: ”’
xlii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

provided also, that no state shall be deprived of territory for the
benefit of the united states.

All controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed un-
der different grants of two or more states, whose jurisdictions as they
may respect such lands, and the states which passed such grants are
adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time
claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of juris-
diction, shall on the petition of either party to the congress of the
united states, be finally determined as near as may be in the same
manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting terri-
torial jurisdiction between different states.

The united states in congress assembled shall also have the sole
and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of
coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective
states—fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the
united. states—regulating the trade and managing all affairs with
the Indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the
legislative right of any state within its own limits be not infringed
or violated—establishing or regulating post-offices from one state to
another, throughout all the united states, and exacting such postage
on the papers passing thro’ the same as may be requisite to defray
the expences of the said office—appointing all officers of the land
forces, in the service of the united states, excepting regimental of-
ficers—appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commission-
ing all officers whatever in the service of the united states—making
rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval
forces, and directing their operations.

The united states in congress assembled shall have authority to
appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of congress, to be denomi-
nated ‘‘ A Committee of the States,’’ and to consist of one delegate
from each state; and to appoint such other committees and civil of-
ficers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the
united states under their direction—to appoint one of their num-
ber to preside, provided that no person be allowed to serve in the
office of president more than one year in any term of three years;
to ascertain the necessary sums of Money to be raised for the aeivine
of the united states, and to appropriate and apply the same for de-
fraying the public expences—to borrow money, or emit bills on the
credit of the united states, transmitting every half year to the re-
spective states an account of the sums of money so borrowed or
emitted,—to build and equip a navy—to agree upon the number of
land forces, and to make requisitions from each state for its quota, in
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 _ xliii

proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such state; which re-
quisition shall be binding, and thereupon the legislature of each state
shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men and cloath, arm and
equip them in a soldier like manner, at the expence of the united
states; and the officers and men so cloathed, armed and equipped shall
march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the
united states in congress assembled: But if the united states in con-
gress assembled shall, on consideration of circumstances judge proper
that any state should not raise men, or should raise a smaller number
than its quota, and that any other state should raise a greater number
of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, of-
ficered, cloathed, armed and equipped in the same manner as the quota
of such state, unless the legislature of such state shall judge that such
extra number cannot be safely spared out of the same, in which case
they shall raise officer, cloath, arm and equip as many of such extra
number as they judge can be safely spared. And the officers and men
so cloathed, armed and equipped, shall march to the place appointed,
and within the time agreed on by the united states in congress as-
sembled.

The united states in congress assembled shall never engage in a
war, nor grant letters .of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor
enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the
value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expences necessary for the
defence and welfare of the united states, or any of them, nor emit
bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the united states, nor ap-
propriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war, to
be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be
raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy, un-
less nine states assent to the same: nor shall a question on any
other point, except for adjourning from day to day be determined,
unless by the votes of a majority of the united states in congress
assembled.

The congress of the united states shall have power to adjourn
to any time within the year, and to any place within the united
states, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than
the space of six Months, and shall publish the Journal of their pro-
ceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, al-
liances or military operations, as in their judgment require secrecy ;
and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each state on any question
shall be entered on the Journal, when it is desired by any delegate;
and the delegates of a state, or any of them, at his or their request
shall be furnished with a transcript of the said Journal, except such
xliv DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

parts as are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the sev-
eral states.

Article X. The committee of the states, or any nine of them, shall
be authorized to execute, in the recess of congress, such of the powers
of congress as the united states in congress assembled, by the con-
sent of nine states, shall from time to time think expedient to vest them
with ; provided that no power be delegated to the said committee, for
the exercise of which, by the articles of confederation, the voice of nine
states in the congress of the united states assembled is requisite.

Article XI. Canada acceding to this confederation, and joining in
the measures of the united states, shall be admitted into, and en-
titled to all the advantages of this union: but no other colony shall
be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine
states.

Article XII. All bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed and
debts contracted by, or under the authority of congress, before the
assembling of the united states, in pursuance of the present con-
federation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the
united states, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said united
states, and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged.

Article XIII. Every state shall abide by the determinations of
the united states in congress assembled, on all questions which by this
confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this confed-
eration shall be inviolably observed by every state, and the union
shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be
made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a con-
gress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legis-
latures of every state.

And Whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the World to
incline the hearts of the legislatures we respectively represent in
congress, to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify the said articles
of confederation and perpetual union. Know Ye that we the under-
signed delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for
that purpose, do by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our
respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and
every of the said articles of confederation and perpetual union, and
all and singular the matters and things therein contained: And we
do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective con-
stituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the united
states in congress assembled, on all questions, which by the said con-
federation are submitted to them. And that the articles thereof shall]
be inviolably observed by the states we respectively represent, and
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 ~~ xlv

that the union shall be perpetual. In Witness whereof we have here-
unto set our hands in Congress. Done at Philadelphia in the state of
Pennsylvania the ninth day of July, in the Year of our Lord one
Thousand seven Hundred and Seventy-eight, and in the third year of
the independence of America.

Josiah Bartlett,
John Wentworth, junt
August 8th, 1778,

John Hancock,
Samuel Adams,
Elbridge Gerry,
Francis Dana,
James Lovell,

Samuel Holten,

William Ellery,
Henry Marchant,
John Collins,

Roger Sherman,
Samuel Huntington,
Oliver Wolcott,
Titus Hosmer,
Andrew Adams,

Jas Duane,
Fra: Lewis,
Wm Duer,
Gouvt Morris,

Jn° Witherspoon,
Nath! Scudder,

Robert Morris,
Daniel Roberdeau,
Jon. Bayard Smith,
William Clingar,
Joseph Reed,

22d July, 1778,

Thos McKean,
Feby 22d, 1779,
John Dickinson,
May 5th, 1779,
Nicholas Van Dyke,

John Hanson,
March 1, 1781,
Daniel Carroll, do

Richard Henry Lee,
John Banister,
Thomas Adams,
Jn° Harvie,

Francis Lightfoot Lee,

t on the part & behalf of the State of New Hampshire.

; On pert and behalf of the State of Massachusetts
J

On the part and behalf of the State of Rhode-Island
and Providence Plantations.

On the part and behalf of the State of Connecticut.

On the part and behalf of the State of New York.

On the Part and in Behalf of the State of New
Jersey, November 26th, 1778.

On the part & behalf of the State of Delaware.
On the part and behalf of the State of Maryland.

On the Part and Behalf of the State of Virginia.

| On the part and behalf of the State of Pennsylvania.
|
J
J
xlvi DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

John Penn, 7}

July 21st, 1778, On the part and behalf of the State of North
Corns Harnett, f Carolina.
Jno Williams,

Henry Laurens,

7}
William Henry Drayton :
Jno Vnthews” yton, On the part and on behalf of the State of South

Richd Hutson, Carolina.
Thos Heyward, junr.
Jn° Walton,
sgt re Degdlas On the part and behalf of the State of Georgia.*

Edw4 Telfair,
Edw Langworthy,

 

1The proceedings of this day with respect to the signing of the Articles of
Confederation, the Articles themselves and the signers are entered in the Papers
of the Continental Congress, No. 9 (History of the Confederation), but not in the
Journal itself. The Articles are printed here from the original roll in the
Bureau of Rolls and Library, Department of State.
RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VirGIntia, JANUARY 21,
1786, PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING OF COMMISSIONERS FROM THE
STATES TO CONSIDER AND RECOMMEND A FEDERAL PLAN FOR REGU-
LATING COMMERCE.*

A motion was made, that the House do come to the following
resolution :

Resolved, That Edmund Randolph, James Madison, jun. Walter
Jones, Saint George Tucker and Meriwether Smith, Esquires, be ap-
pointed commissioners, who, or any three of whom, shall meet such
commissioners as may be appointed by the other States in the Union,
at a time and place to be agreed on, to take into consideration the
trade of the United States; to examine the relative situations and
trade of the said States; to consider how far a uniform system in their
commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and
their permanent harmony; and to report to the several States, such
an act relative to this great object, as, when unanimously ratified by
them, will enable the United States in Congress, effectually to provide
for the same.

 

+ Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Jan-
uary 21, 1786, p. 153; Richmond, 1828. Journal of the Senate, January 21, 1786,
p. 102; Richmond, 1827.

“Tn the Senate a further addition was made of Col. Mason Mr. D. Ross and
Mr. Ronald. The name of the latter was struck out at his desire.” James
Madison to James Monroe, January 22, scl Writings of James Madison,
Hunt, Editor, Vol. II (1901), p. 223.

xvii
PROCEEDINGS OF COMMISSIONERS TO REMEDY DEFECTS
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT +

ANNAPOLIS IN THE STATE OF MarYLAND

SEPTEMBER 11 1786.

At a meeting of Commissioners, from the States of New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia—

Present.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON

Eq@pert BENSON New Mork

Wiuuiam C. Houston
James SCHUARMAN

New Jersey

TENCH CoxE Pennsylvania

Grorce Reap
JoHN DIcKINSON
Ricuarp BAssETT

Delaware

ABRAHAM CLARKE

Epmunp RANDOLPH
James Mapison, Junior \ Virginia
Saint Grorce TUCKER

M? Dickinson was unanimously elected Chairman.

The Commissioners produced their Credentials from their respec-
tive States; which were read.

After a full communication of Sentiments, and deliberate consid-
eration of what would be proper to be done by the Commissioners
now assembled, it was unanimously agreed: that a Committee be
appointed to prepare a draft of a Report to be made to the States
having Commissioners attending at this meeting—Adjourned ’till
Wednesday Morning.

1¥From the original in the Library of Congress.
Notwithstanding the order to the chairman to si
by all the members of the Convention.

xlviii

gn the address it was signed
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787  xlix

WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 138% 1786.

Met agreeable to Adjournment.

The Committee, appointed for that purpose, reported the draft of
the report; which being read, the meeting proceeded to the considera-
tion thereof, and after some time spent therein, Adjourned ’till
tomorrow Morning.

Tuurspay Seprt 14 1786.

Met agreeable to Adjournment.
The meeting resumed the consideration of the draft of the Report, and
after some time spent therein, and amendments made, the same was
unanimously agreed to, and is as follows, to wit.

To the Honorable, the Legislatures of Virginia, Delaware, Pennsyl-
vania, New Jersey, and New York—

The Commissioners from the said States, respectively assembled at
Annapolis, humbly beg leave to report.

That, pursuant to their several appointments, they met, at An-
napolis in the State of Maryland, on the eleventh day of September
Instant, and having proceeded to a Communication of their powers;
they found that the States of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia,
had, in substance, and nearly in the same terms, authorised their re-
spective Commissioners ‘‘ to meet such Commissioners as were, or
might be, appointed by the other States in the Union, at such time and
place, as should be agreed upon by the said Commissioners to take into
consideration the trade and Commerce of the United States, to con-
sider how far an uniform system in their commercial intercourse and
regulations might be necessary to their common interest and perma-
nent harmony, and to report to the several States such an Act, relative
to this great object, as when unanimously ratified by them would en-
able the United States in Congress assembled effectually to provide
for the same.”

That the State-of Delaware, had given similar powers to their
Commissioners, with this difference only, that the Act to be framed
in virtue of those powers, is required to be reported ‘‘ to the United
States in Congress assembled, to be agreed to by them, and confirmed
by the Legislatures of every State.’’

That the State of New Jersey had enlarged the object of their
appointment, empowering their Commissioners, ‘‘ to consider how far
1 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

an uniform system in their commercial regulations and other wm-
portant matters, might be necessary to the common interest and per-
manent harmony of the several States,’’ and to report such an Act
on the subject, as when ratified by them ‘‘ would enable the United
States in Congress assembled, effectually to provide for the exigencies
of the Union.”’

That appointments of Commissioners have also been made by the
States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North
Carolina, none of whom however have attended; but that no informa-
tion has been received by your Commissioners, of any appointment
having been made by the States of Connecticut, Maryland, South
Carolina or Georgia.

That the express terms of the powers to your Commissioners sup-
posing a deputation from all the States, and having for object the
Trade and Commerce of the United States, Your Commissioners did
not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of their mission,
under the Circumstance of so partial and defective a representation.

Deeply impressed however with the magnitude and importance of
the object confided to them on this occasion, your Commissioners
cannot forbear to indulge an expression of their earnest and unani-
mous wish, that speedy measures may be taken, to effect a general
meeting, of the States, in a future Convention, for the same, and such
other purposes, as the situation of public affairs, may be found to
require.

If in expressing this wish, or in intimating any other sentiment,
your Commissioners should seem to exceed the strict bounds of their
appointment, they entertain a full confidence, that a conduct, dictated
by an anxiety for the welfare, of the United States, will not fail to
receive an indulgent construction.

In this persuasion, your Commissioners submit an opinion, that
the Idea of extending the powers of their Deputies, to other objects,
than those of Commerce, which has been adopted by the State of
New Jersey, was an improvement on the original plan, and will de-
serve to be incorporated into that of a future Convention; they are
the more naturally led to this conclusion, as in the course of their
reflections on the subject, they have been induced to think, that the
power of regulating trade is of such comprehensive extent, and will
enter so far into the general System of the federal government, that
to give it efficacy, and to obviate questions and doubts concerning its
precise nature and limits, may require a correspondent adjustment of
other parts of the Federal System.

That there are important defects in the system of the Federal
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 li

Government is acknowledged by the Acts of all those States, which
have concurred in the present Meeting; That the defects, upon a
closer examination, may be found greater and more numerous, than
even these acts imply, is at least so far probable, from the embarrass-
ments which characterise the present State of our national affairs,
foreign and domestic, as may reasonably be supposed to merit a de-
liberate and candid discussion, in some mode, which will unite the
Sentiments and Councils of all the States. In the choice of the mode,
your Commissioners are of opinion, that a Convention of Deputies
from the different States, for the special and sole purpose of en-
tering into this investigation, and digesting a plan for supplying
such defects as may be discovered to exist, will be entitled to
a preference from considerations, which will occur, without being
particularised.

Your Commissioners decline an enumeration of those national
circumstances on which their opinion respecting the propriety of a
future Convention, with more enlarged powers, is founded; as it
would be an useless intrusion of facts and observations, most of which
have been frequently the subject of public discussion, and none of
which can have escaped the penetration of those to whom they would
in this instance be addressed. They are however of a nature so
serious, as, in the view of your Commissioners to render the situa-
tion of the United States delicate and critical, calling for an
exertion of the united virtue and wisdom of all the members of the
Confederacy.

Under this impression, Your Commissioners, with the most re-
spectful deference, beg leave to suggest their unanimous conviction,
that it may essentially tend to advance the interests of the union, if
the States, by whom they have been respectively delegated, would
themselves concur, and use their endeavours to procure the concur-
rence of the other States, in the appointment of Commissioners, to
meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take into
consideration the situation of the United States, to devise such further
provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitu-
tion of the Foederal Government adequate to the exigencies of the
Union; and to report such an Act for that purpose to the United
States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to, by them, and after-
wards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State, will effectually
provide for the same.

Though your Commissioners could not with propriety address
these observations and sentiments to any but the States they have
the honor to Represent, they have nevertheless concluded from mo-
lii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

tives of respect, to transmit Copies of this Report to the United States
in Congress assembled, and to the executives of the other States.

By order of the Commissioners
Dated at Annapolis
September 14th, pe

Resolved, that the Chairman sign the aforegoing Report in be-
half of the Commissioners.
Then adjourned without day—
it:
Egb? Benson } New York

Alexander Hamilton

Abra: Clark
W" Ch! Houston New Jersey
J? Schureman

Tench Coxe Pennsylvania
Geo: Read

John Dickinson Delaware
Richard Bassett

Edmund Randolph
J? Madison Jt Virginia

St George Tucker
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
In Conaress. *
WEDNESDAY FpY 21, 1787
Congress assembled as before.

The report of a grand com® consisting of M? Dane M' Varnum
M: S. M. Mitchell Mt Smith M? Cadwallader M! Irwine M? N.
Mitchell Mt Forrest Mt Grayson M? Blount M* Bull & M' Few,
to whom was referred a letter of 14 Sept! 1786 from J. Dickinson
written at the request of Commissioners from the States of Virginia
Delaware Pensylvania New Jersey & New York assembled at the
City of Annapolis together with a copy of the report of the said
commissioners to the legislatures of the States by whom they were
appointed, being an order of the day was called up & which is con-
tained in the following resolution viz

‘“ Congress having had under consideration the letter of John
Dickinson esq! chairman of the Commissioners who assembled at
Annapolis during the last year also the proceedings of the said com-
missioners and entirely coinciding with them as to the inefficiency of
the federal government and the necessity of devising such farther
provisions as shall render the same adequate to the exigencies of the
Union do strongly recommend to the different legislatures to send
forward delegates to meet the proposed convention on the second
Monday in May next at the city of Philadelphia ”’

The delegates for the state of New York thereupon laid before
Congress Instructions which they had received from their constitu-
ents, & in pursuance of the said instructions moved to postpone the
farther consideration of the report in order to take up the following
proposition to wit

‘* That it be recommended to the States composing the Union that
a convention of representatives from the said States respectively be
held at on for the purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation and perpetual Union between the United States of
America and reporting to the United States in Congress assembled
and to the States respectively such alterations and amendments of
the said Articles of Confederation as the representatives met in such

 

 

 

1 Journals of the Continental Congress, Vol. 38 (manuscript), Library of
Congress.
liii
liv DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

convention shall judge proper and necessary to render them adequate
to the preservation and support of the Union ’’

On the question to postpone for the purpose above mentioned the
yeas & nays being required by the delegates for New York.

’

Massachusetts Mr. King nyt
Mr. Dane ay
Connecticut Mr. Johnson ay |g
Mr. S. M. Mitchell a
New York Mr. Smith ay} 4
Mr. Benson ay} y
New Jersey Mr. Cadwallader ay
Mr. Clarke no no
Mr. Schurman no
Pensylvania Mr. Irwine no
Mr. Meredith ay ‘no
Mr. Bingham no
Delaware Mr. N. Mitchell no x
Maryland Mr. Forest no x
Virginia Mr. Grayson ay
Mr. Madison ay bay
North Carolina Mr. Blount no
Mr. Hawkins no +29
South Carolina Mr. Bull no
Mr. Kean no
Mr. Huger no oe
Mr. Parker no
Georgia Mr. Few ey ba
Mr. Pierce no

So the question was lost.

A motion was then made by the delegates for Massachusetts to
postpone the farther consideration of the report in order to take into
consideration a motion which they read in their place, this being
agreed to, the motion of the delegates for Massachusetts was taken
up and being amended was agreed to as follows

Whereas there is provision in the Articles of Confederation &
perpetual Union for making alterations therein by the assent of a
Congress of the United States and of the legislatures of the several
States ; And whereas experience hath evinced that there are defects in
the present Confederation, as a mean to remedy which several of the
States and particularly the State of New York by express instructions
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 lv

to their delegates in Congress have suggested a convention for the
purposes expressed in the following resolution and such convention
appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these states
a firm national government

Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that
on the second Monday in May next a Convention of delegates who
shall have been appointed by the several states be held at Philadel-
phia for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Con-
federation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures
such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in
Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal constitu-
tion adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation
of the Union.
CREDENTIALS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION *

Srate or New HaMPsHIRE?

In the Year of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and Highty
seven.

An Act for appointing Deputies from this State to the Convention,
proposed to be holden in the City of Philadelphia in May 1787 for
the purpose of revising the federal Constitution

Whereas in the formation of the federal Compact, which frames
the bond of Union of the American States, it was not possible in the
infant state of our Republic to devise a system which in the course of
time and experience, would not manifest imperfections that it would
be necessary to reform.

And Whereas the limited powers, which by the Articles of Con-
federation, are vested in the Congress of the United States, have been
found far inadequate, to the enlarged purposes which they were in-
tended to produce. And Whereas Congress hath, by repeated and
most urgent representations, endeavoured to awaken this, and other
States of the Union, to a sense of the truly critical and alarming
situation in which they may inevitably be involved, unless timely
measures be taken to enlarge the powers of Congress, that they may
be thereby enabled to avert the dangers which threaten our existence
as a free and independent People. And Whereas this State hath been
ever desirous to act upon the liberal system of the general good of
the United States, without circumscribing its views, to the narrow
and selfish objects of partial convenience; and has been at all times
ready to make every concession to the safety and happiness of the
whole, which justice and sound policy could vindicate.

BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED, by the Senate and House of Repre-

 

* The States of Virginia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, Delaware, and Georgia took legislative action, and in the order named,
before the resolution of Congress of February 21, 1787, formally authorizing the
Convention.

Thereafter, and in the order named, the States of New York, South Carolina
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maryland took legislati 5 i
sented in the Federal Convention. » Brean eones ae vee

so Island took no action and was not represented in the Federal Con-
vention.

oe froma Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
pp. v-1¥.

lvi
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 vii

sentatives in General Court convened that Joun Lanepon, JOHN
PickERING, NicHouas Giuman & BengAMIN West Esquires be and
hereby are appointed Commissioners, they or any two of them, are
hereby authorized, and empowered, as Deputies from this State to
meet at Philadelphia said Convention or any other place, to which
the Convention may be adjourned, for the purposes aforesaid, there
to confer with such Deputies, as are, or may be appointed by the
other States for similar purposes; and with them to discuss and de-
cide upon the most effectual means to remedy the defects of our fed-
eral Union; and to procure, and secure, the enlarged purposes which
it was intended to effect, and to report such an Act, to the United
States in Congress, as when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed
by the several States, will effectually provide for the same.

State of New ) In the House of Representatives June

Hampshire ; 27 1787.

The foregoing Bill having been read a third time, Voted that it pass
to be enacted.
Sent up for Concurrence
JOHN SPARHAWEK Speaker

In Senate, the same day—This Bill having been read a third
time,—Voted that the same be enacted.
Jn° SuLLivan President.
Copy Examined.
P: JoszpH Pearson Sec’. (Seal appendt.)

CoMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS *

(Seal Appendt.) By His Excellency James Bowdoin Esquire
Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

To the Honorable Francis Dana, Elbridge Gerry, Nathaniel Gor-
ham, Rufus King and Caleb Strong Esquires. Greeting.

Whereas Congress did on the twenty first day of February A° Di
1787, Resolve ‘‘ that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that
on the second Monday in May next a Convention of Delegates who
shall have been appointed by the several States to be held at Phila-
delphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several Legislatures,
such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in
Congress, and confirmed by the States render the federal Constitu-

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
pp. 11-12.
lviii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

tion adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation
of the Union.”’ And Whereas the General Court have constituted
and appointed you their Delegates to attend and represent this Com-
monwealth in the said proposed Convention; and have by a Resolu-
tion of theirs of the tenth of March last, requested me to Commission
you for that purpose. :

Now therefore Know Ye, that in pursuance of the resolutions
aforesaid, I do by these presents, commission you the said Francis
Dana, Elbridge Gerry Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus King & Caleb Strong
Esquires or any three of you to meet such Delegates as may be ap-
pointed by the other or any of the other States in the Union to meet
in Convention at Philadelphia at the time and for the purposes
aforesaid.

In Testimony whereof I have caused the Public Seal of the Com-
monwealth aforesaid to be hereunto affixed.

Given at the Council Chamber in Boston the Ninth day of
April A° Do” 1787 and in the Eleventh Year of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America.
JAMES BowpDorn
By His Excellency’s Command
JOHN Avery Jun’, Secretary

State oF Connecticut !

At a General Assembly of the State of Connecticut in
(Seal.) America, holden at Hartford on the second Thursday of
May, Anno Domini 1787.

An Act for appointing Delegates to meet in a Convention of the
States to be held at the City of Philadelphia on the second Monday
of May instant.

Whereas the Congress of the United States by their Act of the
twenty first of February 1787 have recommended that on the second
Monday of May instant, a Convention of Delegates, who shall have
been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia for the
sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confedera-
tion.

Be it enacted by the Governor, Council and Representatives in
General Court Assembled and by the Authority of the same.

That the Honorable William Samuel Johnson, Roger Sherman
and Oliver Ellsworth Esquires, be and they hereby are appointed

1 Reprinted from D i an
pp. 12-13. ocumentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 _ lix

Delegates to attend the said Convention, and are requested to pro-
ceed to the City of Philadelphia for that purpose without delay; And
the said Delegates, and in case of sickness or accident, such one or
more of them as shall actually attend the said Convention, is and are
hereby authorized and empowered to Represent this State therein, and
to confer with such Delegates appointed by the several States, for the
purposes mentioned in the said Act of Congress that may be present
and duly empowered to act in said Convention, and to discuss upon
such Alterations and Provisions agreeable to the general Principles
of Republican Government as they shall think proper to render the
federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and,
the preservation of the Union; And they are further directed, pur-
suant to the said Act of Congress to report such alterations and pro-
visions as may be agreed to by a majority of the United States rep-
resented in Convention to the Congress of the United States, and to
the General Assembly of this State.
A true Copy of Record
Exam?
By Grorce Wv1itys Sec’.

New-York +

By His Excellency George Clinton Esquire Governor of
(Seal) the State of New York General and Commander in Chief
of all the Militia and Admiral of the Navy of the same.
To all to whom these Presents shall come
It is by these Presents certified that John M°Kesson who has sub-
scribed the annexed Copies of Resolutions is Clerk of the Assembly
of this State.
In Testimony whereof I have caused the Privy Seal of the said
State to be hereunto affixed this Ninth day of May in the
Eleventh Year of the Independence of the said State.
Gro: CLINTON.
State of New York
In Assembly February 28% 1787.
A Copy of a Resolution of the honorable the Senate, delivered by
M Williams, was read, and is in the Words following, viz*.
Resolved, if the honorable the Assembly concur herein, that
three Delegates be appointed on the part of this State, to meet
such Delegates as may be appointed on the part of the other

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
pp. 13-16.
Ix DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

States respectively, on the second Monday in may next, at Phila-
delphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles
of Confederation, and reporting to Congress, and to the sev-
eral Legislatures, such alterations and Provisions therein, as shall,
when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the several States,
render the federal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of
Government, and the preservation of the Union; and that in case of
such concurrence, the two Houses of the Legislature, will, on Tues-
day next, proceed to nominate and appoint the said Delegates, in like
manner as is directed by the Constitution of this State, for nomi-
nating and appointing Delegates to Congress.

Resolved, that this House do concur with the honorable the Senate,
in the said Resolution.

In Assembly March 6" 1787.

Resolved, that the Honorable Robert Yates Esquire, and Alex-
ander Hamilton and John Lansing, Junior Esquires, be, and they
are hereby nominated by this House, Delegates on the part of this
State, to meet such Delegates as may be appointed on the part of the
other States respectively, on the second Monday in May next, at
Philadelphia, pursuant to concurrent Resolutions of both Houses of
the Legislature, on the 28 Ultimo.

Resolved, that this House will meet the Honorable the Senate, im-
mediately, at such place as they shall appoint, to compare the Lists
of Persons nominated by the Senate and Assembly respectively, as
Delegates on the part of this State, to meet such Delegates as may
be appointed on the part of the other States respectively, on the second
Monday in May next, at Philadelphia, pursuant to concurrent Resolu-
tions, of both Houses of the Legislature, on the 28t Ultimo.

Ordered That M! N. Smith deliver a Copy of the last preceding
Resolution, to the Honorable the Senate.

A Copy of a Resolution of the Honorable the Senate, was deliv-
ered by M! Vanderbilt, that the Senate will immediately meet this
House in the Assembly Chamber, to compare the Lists of Persons
nominated by the Senate and Assembly respectively, as Delegates,
pursuant to the Resolutions before mentioned.

The Honorable the Senate accordingly attended in the Assembly
Chamber, to compare the Lists of Persons nominated for Delegates,
as above mentioned.

The list of Persons nominated by the Honorable the Senate, were
the Honorable Robert Yates Esquire, and John Lansing Junior, and
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 _ Ixi

Alexander Hamilton Esquires; and on comparing the Lists of the
Persons nominated by the Senate and Assembly respectively, it ap-
peared that the same Persons were nominated in both Lists. There-
upon, Resolved that the Honorable Robert Yates, John Lansing Junior
and Alexander Hamilton Esquires, be, and they are hereby de-
clared duly nominated and appointed Delegates, on the part of this
State, to meet such Delegates as may be appointed on the part of
the other States respectively, on the second Monday in May next, at
Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress, and to the sev-
eral Legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein, as shall,
when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the several States,
render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Gov-
ernment, and the preservation of the Union.

True Extracts from the Journals of the Assembly

Joun M°Kzsson Clk.

Tue State oF NEw JERSEY.

(Seal) To the Honorable David Brearly, William Churchill
Houston, William Patterson and John Neilson Esquires. Greeting.
The Council and Assembly reposing especial trust and confidence
in your integrity, prudence and ability, have at a joint meeting ap-
pointed you the said David Brearley, William Churchill Houston,
William Patterson and John Neilson Hsquires, or any three of you,
Commissioners to meet such Commissioners, as have been or may be
appointed by the other States in the Union, at the City of Philadel-
phia in the Commonwealth of Pensylvania, on the second Monday in
May next for the purpose of taking into Consideration the state of
the Union, as to trade and other important objects. and of devising
such other Provisions as shall appear to be necessary to render the
Constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies
thereof.
In testimony whereof the Great Seal of the State is hereunto
affixed. Witness William Livingston Esquire, Governor, Cap-
tain General and Commander in Chief in and over the State of
New Jersey and Territories thereunto belonging Chancellor and
Ordinary in the same, at Trenton the Twenty third day of
November in the Year of our Lord One thousand seven hun-

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
pp. 16-19.
lxii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

dred and Eighty six and of our Sovereignty and Independence
the Eleventh.
Wi: Livineston.
By His Excellency’s Command
Bowes Rzep Sec’.

The State or NEw JERSEY.

(Seal) To His Excellency William Livingston and the Hon-

orable Abraham Clark Esquires Greeting.

The Council and Assembly reposing especial trust and Confidence
in your integrity, prudence and ability have at a joint Meeting ap-
pointed You the said William Livingston and Abraham Clark Es-
quires, in conjunction with the Honorable David Brearley, William
Churchill Houston & William Patterson Esquires, or any three of
you, Commissioners to meet such Commissioners as have been ap-
pointed by the other States in the Union at the City of Philadelphia
in the Commonwealth of Pensylvania on the second Monday of this
present Month for the purpose of taking into consideration the state
of the Union as to trade and other important Objects, and of devising
such other Provisions as shall appear to be necessary to render the
Constitution of the federal Government adequate to the exigencies
thereof.

In Testimony whereof the Great Seal of the State is here-

unto affixed. Witness William Livingston Esquire, Governor,

Captain General and Commander in Chief in and over the

State of New Jersey and Territories thereunto belonging Chan-

cellor and Ordinary in the same at Burlington the Eighteenth

day of May in the Year of our Lord One thousand seven hun-

dred and Eighty seven and of our Sovereignty and Inde-

pendence the Eleventh.

Wu: Livineston
By His Excellency’s Command
Bowes ReEep Sec’.

The Stare or New JERSEY.

To the Honorable Jonathan Dayton Esquire

The Council and Assembly reposing especial trust and confidence
in your integrity, prudence and ability have at a joint Meeting ap-
pointed You the said Jonathan Dayton Esquire, in conjunction with
His Excellency William Livingston, the Honorable David Brearley,
William Churchill Houston, William Patterson and Abraham Clark
Esquires, or any three of you, Commissioners to meet such Commis-
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 | Ixiii

sioners as have been appointed by the other States in the Union at
the City of Philadelphia in the Commonwealth of Pensylvania, for the
purposes of taking into consideration the state of the Union as to
trade and other important objects, and of devising such other Pro-
vision as shall appear to be necessary to render the Constitution of
the federal Government adequate to the exigencies thereof.

In Testimony whereof the Great Seal of the State is hereunto

affixed:—Witness Robert Lettis Hooper Esquire, Vice-Presi-

dent, Captain General and Commander in Chief in and over

the State of New Jersey and Territories thereunto belonging,

Chancellor and Ordinary in the same at Burlington the fifth

day of June in the Year of our Lord One thousand seven hun-

dred and Highty seven and of our Sovereignty and Inde-

pendence the Eleventh.

Rost L. Hoorer
By his Honor’s Command
Bowes Reep Sec’.

PENSYLVANIA

An Act appointing Deputies to the Convention intended to be
held in the City of Philadelphia for the purpose of revising the fcederal
Constitution.

Section 1** Whereas the General Assembly of this Commonwealth tak-
ing into their serious Consideration the Representations heretofore
made to the Legislatures of the several States in the Union by the
United States in Congress Assembled, and also weighing the difficul-
ties under which the Confederated States now labour, are fully con-
vineed of the necessity of revising the federal Constitution for the
purpose of making such Alterations and amendments as the exigencies
of our Public Affairs require. And Whereas the Legislature of the
State of Virginia have already passed an Act of that Commonwealth
empowering certain Commissioners to meet at the City of Philadel-
phia in May next, a Convention of Commissioners or Deputies from
the different States; And the Legislature of this State are fully sensi-
ble of the important advantages which may be derived tp the United
States, and every of them from co-operating with the Commonwealtk
of Virginia, and the other States of the Confederation in the said
Design.

Section 2"4 Be it enacted, and it is hereby enacted by the Representa-

 

+ Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
pp. 19-23.
lxiv DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

tives of the Freemen of the Commonwealth of Pensylvia in Gen-
eral Assembly met, and by the Authority of the same, That Thomas
Mifflin, Robert Morris, George Clymer, Jared Ingersoll, Thomas Fitz-
simmons, James Wilson and Governeur Morris Esquires, are hereby
appointed Deputies from this State to meet in the Convention of the
Deputies of the respective States of North America to be held at the
City of Philadelphia on the second day of the Month of May next;
And the said Thomas Mifflin, Robert Morris, George Clymer, Jared
Ingersoll, Thomas Fitzsimmons, James Wilson and Governeur Morris
Esquires, or any four of them, are hereby constituted and appointed
Deputies from this State, with Powers to meet such Deputies as may be
appointed and authorized by the other States, to assemble in the said
Convention at the City aforesaid, and to join with them in devising,
deliberating on, and discussing, all such alterations and further Pro-
visions, as may be necessary to render the fcederal Constitution fully
adequate to the exigencies of the Union, and in reporting such Act
or Acts for that purpose to the United States in Congress Assembled,
as when agreed to by them and duly confirmed by the several States,
will effectually provide for the same.

Section 3° And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That
in case any of the s* Deputies hereby nominated, shall happen to die,
or to resign his or their said Appointment or Appointments, the
Supreme Executive Council shall be and hereby are empowered and
required, to nominate and appoint other Persons or Persons in lieu of
him or them so deceased, or who has or have so resigned, which Per-
son or Persons, from and after such Nomination and Appointment,
shall be and hereby are declared to be vested with the same Powers
respectively, as any of the Deputies Nominated and Appointed by
this Act, is vested with by the same: Provided Always, that the
Council are not hereby authorised, nor shall they make any such
Nomination or Appointment, except in Vacation and during the
Recess of the General Assembly of this State.

Signed by Order of the House
Seal of the Laws \

of .Pensylvania THomas Mirruin Speaker

Enacted into a Law at Philadelphia on Saturday December the
thirtieth in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and
Highty six.

Peter ZacHary Luoyp
Clerk of the General Assembly.
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787  lxv

I Mathew Irwin Esquire Master of the Rolls for the State of Pen-
sylvania Do Certify the Preceding Writing to be a true Copy
(or Exemplification) of a certain Act of Assembly lodged in my
Office.

In Witness whereof I have hereunto set my Hand and

(Seal.) Seal of Office the 15 May A. D. 1787.

MatuW. IRwiIne
M. R.

(Seal) A Supplement to the Act entitled ‘‘ An Act appointing
Deputies to the Convention intended to be held in the City of Phila-
delphia for the purpose of revising the Federal Constitution.

Section 1%* Whereas by the Act to which this Act is a Supplement,
certain Persons were appointed as Deputies from this State to sit in
the said Convention: And Whereas it is the desire of the General As-
sembly that His Excellency Benjamin Franklin Esquire, President
of this State should also sit in the said Convention as a Deputy from
this State—therefore

Section 2° Be it enacted and it is hereby enacted by the Representa-
tives of the Freemen of the Commonwealth of Pensylvania, in General
Assembly met, and by the Authority of the same, that His Excellency
Benjamin Franklin Esquire, be, and he is hereby, appointed and
authorised to sit in the said Convention as a Deputy from this State
in addition to the Persons heretofore appointed; And that he be, and
he hereby is invested with like Powers and authorities as are invested
in the said Deputies or any of them.

Signed by Order of the House
THomas Mirruin Speaker.

Enacted into a Law at Philadelphia on Wednesday the twenty
eighth day of March, in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred & eighty seven. Peter ZacHary Lioyp

Clerk of the General Assembly.

I Mathew Irwine Esquire, Master of the Rolls for the State of
Pensylvania Do Certify the above to be a true Copy (or Exemplifica-
tion) of a Supplement to a certain Act of Assembly which Supplement
is lodged in my Office

In Witness whereof I have hereunto set my Hand and

(Seal) Seal of Office the 15 May A° D. 1787.

Mart Irwine
M. R.
lxvi DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 ©

DELAWARE 7

His Excellency Thomas Collins, Esquire, President, Cap-
tain General, and Commander in Chief of the Delaware
State; To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting.
Know Ye, that among the Laws of the said State, passed

(Seal) by the General Assembly of the same, on the third day
of February, in the Year of our Lord One thousand seven
hundred and Highty seven, it is thus inrolled.

In the Eleventh Year of the Independence of the Delaware State

An Act appointing Deputies from this State to the Convention
proposed to be held in the City of Philadelphia for the Purpose of
revising the Federal Constitution.

Whereas the General Assembly of this State are fully convinced
of the Necessity of revising the Federal Constitution, and adding
thereto such further Provisions, as may render the same more ade-
quate to the Exigencies of the Union; And Whereas the Legislature
of Virginia have already passed an Act of that Commonwealth, ap-
pointing and authorizing certain Commissioners to meet, at the City of
Philadelphia, in May next, a Convention of Commissioners or Deputies
from the different States: And this State being willing and desirous
of co-operating with the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the other
States in the Confederation, in so useful a design.

Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly of Delaware, that
George Read, Gunning Bedford, John Dickinson, Robert Bassett and
Jacob Broom, Esquires, are hereby appointed Deputies from this State
to meet in the Convention of the Deputies of other States, to be held at
the City of Philadelphia on the Second day of May next: And the said
George Read, Gunning Bedford, John Dickinson, Richard Bassett and
Jacob Broom, Esquires, or any three of them, are hereby constituted and
appointed Deputies from this State, with Powers to meet such Deputies
as may be appointed and authorized by the other States to assemble in
the said Convention at the City aforesaid, and to join with them in
devising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and further
Provisions as may be necessary to render the Foederal Constitution
adequate to the Exigencies of the Union; and in reporting such Act or
Acts for that purpose to the United States in Congress Assembled, as
when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several States,
may effectually provide for the same: So always and Provided, that

1 Reprinted fr D t Hi ee
pp. woe ed trom Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 | lxvii

such Alterations or further Provisions, or any of them, do not extend
to that part of the Fifth Article of the Confederation of the said
States, finally ratified on the first day of March, in the Year One
thousand seven hundred and eighty one, which declares that ‘‘ in
determining Questions in the United States in Congress Assembled
each State shall have one Vote.’’

And be it enacted, that in Case any of the said Deputies hereby
nominated, shall happen to die, or to resign his or their Appointment,
the President or Commander in Chief with the Advice of the Privy
Council, in the Recess of the General Assembly, is hereby authorized
to supply such Vacancies

JoHN Coox, Speaker
Signed by Order of the Council
Gro CRAGHEAD, Speaker.

Passed at Dover, Signed by Order of the House of Assembly

February 3? 1787.

All and singular which Premises by the Tenor of these Presents, I
have caused to be Exemplified. In Testimony whereof I have hereunto
subscribed my Name, and caused the Great-Seal of the said State to be
affixed to these Presents, at New Castle the Second day of April in the
Year of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and eighty seven, and
in the Eleventh Year of the Independence of the United States of
America

Attest TxHo® CoLLins

Ja Boots Sec’.

MaryYLanpb.?

An Act for the Appointment of, and conferring Powers in Deputies
from this State to the federal Convention.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, That the Hon-
orable James M*Henry, Daniel of Saint Thomas Jenifer, Daniel Carroll,
John Francis Mercer and Luther Martin Esquires, be appointed and
authorised on behalf of this State, to meet such Deputies as may be
appointed and authorised by any other of the United States to as-
semble in Convention at Philadelphia for the purpose of revising the
Foederal System, and to join with them in considering such Alterations
and further Provisions as may be necessary to render the Frederal
Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union and in reporting
such an Act for that purpose to the United States in Congress Assem-

 

Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894).
pp. 25-26.
lxviii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

bled as when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several
States will effectually provide for the same, and the said Deputies or
such of them as shall attend the said Convention shall have full Power
to represent this State for the Purposes aforesaid, and the said Depu-
ties are hereby directed to report the Proceedings of the said Conven-
tion, and any Act agreed to therein, to the next session of the General
Assembly of this State.

By the Senate May 26. 1787. By the House of Delegates
Read and Assented to May 26° 1787.

By Order J. Dorsey Clk. Read and Asented to
True Copy from the Original By Order W™ Harwood Clk.
J. Dorszy Clk. Senate. True Copy from the Original

W™” Harwoop Clk Ho Del.
W. SMALLWOOD.

VIRGINIA t

GENERAL AssEMBLY begun and held at the Public Buildings
in the City of Richmond on Monday the sixteenth day of Oc-
tober in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred
and Highty six

An Act for appointing Deputies from this Commonwealth to a
Convention proposed to be held in the City of Philadelphia in May
next for the purpose of revising the federal Constitution.

WHEREAS the Commissioners who assembled at Annapolis on the
fourteenth day of September last for the purpose of devising and
reporting the means of enabling Congress to provide effectually
for the Commercial Interests of the United States have represented
the necessity of extending the revision of the federal System to all
it’s defects and have recommended that Deputies for that purpose be
appointed by the several Legislatures to meet in Convention in the
City of Philadelphia on the second [Mon]day of May next a provision
which was preferable ? to a discussion of the subject in Congress where
it might be too much interrupted by the ordinary business before them
and where it would besides be deprived of the valuable Counsels of
sundry Individuals who are disqualified by the Constitution or Laws
of particular States or restrained by peculiar circumstances from a
Seat in that Assembly: AND Wuereas the General Assembly of this
Commonwealth taking into view the actual situation of the Confed-

i aa from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
pp. 26-31.

? The original law reads “which seems preferable.”
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787  Ixix

eracy-as well as reflecting on the alarming representations made from
time to time by the United States in Congress particularly in their
Act of the fifteenth day of February last can no longer doubt that
the Crisis is arrived at which the good People of America are to de-
cide the solemn question whether they will by wise and magnanimous
Efforts reap the just fruits of that Independence which they have so
gloriously acquired and of that Union which they have cemented with
so much of their common Blood, or whether by giving way to un-
manly Jealousies and Prejudices or to partial and transitory Inter-
ests they will renounce the auspicious blessings prepared for them
by the Revolution, and furnish to its Enemies an eventual Triumph
over those by whose virtue and valor it has been accomplished: AND
Wuereas the same noble and extended policy and the same fraternal
and affectionate Sentiments which originally determined the Citizens
of this Commonwealth to unite with their Bretheren of the other
States in establishing a Federal Government cannot but be Felt with
equal force now as motives to lay aside every inferior consideration
and to concur in such farther concessions and Provisions as may be
necessary to secure the great Objects for which that Government was
instituted and to render the United States as happy in peace as they
have been glorious in War BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia that seven Commissioners
be appointed by joint Ballot of both Houses of Assembly who or any
three of them are hereby authorized as Deputies from this Common-
wealth to meet such Deputies as may be appointed and authorized by
other States to assemble in Convention at Philadelphia as above recom-
mended and to join with them in devising and discussing all such
Alterations and farther Provisions as may be necessary to render the
Fodéral Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union and in
reporting such an Act for that purpose to the United States in Con-
gress as when agreed to by them and duly confirmed by the several
States will effectually provide for the same. AND BE IT FURTHER EN-
ACTED that in case of the death of any of the said Deputies or of their
declining their appointments the Executive are hereby authorized to
supply such Vacancies. ANp the Governor is requested to transmit
forthwith a Copy of this Act to the United States in Congress and to
the Executives of each of the States in the Union.
JouN JoNnEs Speaker of the Senate
Signed JosEPH PRENTIS, Speaker of the
House of Delegates.
A true Copy from the Inrollment
JoHN BrcKLEyY Clk House Del*.
lxx DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

In the House of Delegates
Monday the 4 of December 1786.

Tur House according to the Order of the Day proceeded by joint
Ballot with the Senate to the appointment of Seven Deputies from
this Commonwealth to a Convention proposed to be held in the City
of Philadelphia in May next for the purpose of revising the Federal
Constitution, and the Members having prepared Tickets with the names
of the Persons to be appointed, and deposited the same in the Ballot-
boxes, M? Corbin, M? Matthews M* David Stuart, M! George Nicholas,
M: Richard Lee, M: Wills, M? Thomas Smith, M! Goodall and M:
Turberville were nominated a Committee to meet a Committee from
the Senate in the Conference-Chamber and jointly with them to ex-
amine the Ballot-boxes and report to the House on whom the Ma-
jority of Votes should fall. The Committee then withdrew and after
some time returned into the House and reported that the Committee
had, according to order, met a Committee from the Senate in the
Conference-Chamber, and jointly with them examined the Ballot-boxes
and found a majority of Votes in favor of George Washington,
Patrick Henry, Edmund Randolph, John Blair, James Madison,
George Mason and George Wythe Esquires.

Extract from the Journal,
JouHN BecKuey Clk House Del!
Attest Jon BECKLEY
| Clk. H. Del? {

In the House of Senators
Monday the 4% of December 1786.

THE SENATE according to the Order of the Day proceeded by joint
Ballot with the House of Delegates to the Appointment of Seven
Deputies from this Commonwealth to a Convention proposed to be held
in the City of Philadelphia in May next for the purpose of revising the
Federal Constitution, and the Members having prepared Tickets with
the names of the Persons to be appointed, and deposited the same in the
Ballot-boxes, M! Anderson, M! Nelson and M? Lee were nominated
a Committee to meet a Committee from the House of Delegates in the
Conference-Chamber and joinly with them to examine the Ballot-
boxes and report to the House on whom the Majority of Votes should
fall. The Committee then withdrew and after some time returned
into the House and reported that the Committee had, according to
order, met a Committee from the House of Delegates in the Confer-
ence-Chamber, and jointly with them examined the Ballot-boxes and
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787  Ixxi

found a Majority of Votes in favor of George Washington, Patrick
' Henry Edmund Randolph, John Blair, James Madison George Mason
and George Wythe Esquires.
Extract from the Journal
Attest, JoHN BEcELEY Clk, H. Ds
H. Broox Clk 8.

VIRGINIA TO WIT

(Seal) I do Certify and make known, to all whom it may Con-
cern, that John Beckley Esquire, is Clerk of the House of
Delegates for this Commonwealth, and the proper Officer for attesting
the proceedings of the General Assembly of the said Commonwealth,
And that full Faith and Credit ought to be given to all things attested
by the said John Beckley Esquire, by Virtue of his Office aforesaid.
Given under my hand as Governor of the Commonwealth of
Virginia and under the Seal thereof, at Richmond this fourth

day of May, one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven.

; Epm: RANDOLPH

VIRGINIA TO WIT.

(Seal) I do hereby Certify, that Patrick Henry, Esquire, one
of the seven Commissioners appointed by joint ballot of both Houses
of Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, authorized as a Deputy
therefrom, to meet such Deputies as might be appointed and author-
ized by other States to assemble in Philadelphia and to join with them
in devising and discussing all such Alterations and further Provisions,
as might be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to
the exigencies of the Union; and in reporting such an Act for that pur-
pose to the United States in Congress, as when agreed to by them and
duly confirmed by the several States, might effectually provide for the
same, did decline his appointment aforesaid; and thereupon in pur-
suance of an Act of the General Assembly of the said Commonwealth
intituled ‘‘ An Act for appointing Deputies from this Commonwealth
to a Convention proposed to be held in the City of Philadelphia in
May next, for the purpose of revising the Federal Constitution ’’ I
do hereby with the advice of the Council of State, supply the said
Vacancy by nominating James M°Clurg, Esquire, a Deputy for the
Purposes aforesaid.

Given under my Hand as Governor of the said Commonwealth

and under the Seal thereof this second day of May in the Year

of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and eighty seven.
Epm: RANDOLPH
lxxii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

State of NortH Carona +

To the Honorable Alexander Martin Esquire, Greeting.

Wuereas our General Assembly, in their late session holden at
Fayette-ville, by adjournment, in the Month of January last, did by
joint ballot of the Senate and House of Commons, elect Richard Cas-
well, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs
Spaight, and Willie Jones, Esquires, Deputies to attend a Convention
of Delegates from the several United States of America, proposed to
be held at the City of Philadelphia in May next for the purpose of
revising the Fcederal Constitution.

We do therefore by these Presents, nominate, Commissionate and
appoint you the said ALEXANDER Martin, one of the Deputies for and
in our behalf to meet with our other Deputies at Philadelphia on the
first day of May next and with them or any two of them to confer with
such Deputies as may have been or shall be appointed by the other
States, for the purpose aforesaid: To hold, exercise and enjoy the
appointment aforesaid, with all Powers, Authorities and Emoluments
to the same belonging or in any wise appertaining, You conforming,
in every instance, to the Act of our said Assembly under which you
are appointed.

Witness Richard Caswell Esquire, our Governor, Captain-
General and Commander in Chief, under his Hand and our
Great Seal at Kinston the 24% day of February in the XI Year
of our Independence
Ric? (Seal) CasweE.u.
A° Di 1787.

By His Excellency’s
Command.

Winston CaswE.u P. Sec’

The State of Nortu-CaroLIna
To the Honorable Wimu14M Ricuarpson Davis Esquire Greeting.
Whereas our General Assembly in their late session holden at
Fayette-ville, by adjournment, in the Month of J anuary last, did by
joint-ballot of the Senate and House of Commons, elect Richard Cas-
well, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs
Spaight & Willie Jones Esquires, Deputies to attend a Convention of

 

*Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894)
pp. 32-38. ’
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 Ixxiii

Delegates from the several United States of America proposed to be
held in the City of Philadelphia in May next for the purpose of re-
vising the Federal Constitution.

We do therefore, by these Presents, nominate Commissionate and
appoint you the said WimL1AM RicHARDSON Davis one of the Deputies
for and in our behalf to meet with our other Deputies at Philadelphia
on the first day of May next and with them or any two of them to
confer with such Deputies as may have been or shall be appointed by
the other States for the Purposes aforesaid To hold, exercise and enjoy
the said appointment with all Powers authorities and emoluments to
the same belonging or in any wise appertaining, You conforming, in
every instance, to the Act of our said Assembly under which you are
appointed.

Witness Richard Caswell Esquire, our Governor, Captain-
General and Commander in Chief under his Hand and our
Great Seal at Kinston the 24" day of February in the XI. Year
of our Independence, Anno. Dom. 1787:
RP (Seal) CaswELu
By His Excellency’s Command
Winston CaswELu P. Sec’

The State of NortH CaRoLina

To the Honorable Richard Dobbs Spaight Esquire, Greeting.

WHEREAS our General Assembly in their late session holden at
Fayette-ville, by adjournment, in the month of January last, did
elect you the said Richard Dobbs Spaight with Richard Caswell, Alex-
ander Martin, William Richardson Davie, and Willie Jones Esquires,
Deputies to attend a Convention of Delegates from the several
United States of America proposed to be held in the City of
Philadelphia in May next, for the purpose of revising the Federal
Constitution.

We do therefore, by these Presents nominate, Commissionate and
appoint you the said Ricaarp Dopgs SpaieutT one of the Deputies for
and in behalf of us to meet with our other Deputies at Philadelphia
on the first day of May next and with them or any two of them to
confer with such Deputies as may have been or shall be appointed by
the other States for the purpose aforesaid. To hold, exercise and
enjoy the said Appointment with all Powers, Authorities and Emol-
uments to the same incident and belonging or in any wise appertain-
ing. You conforming in every instance, to the Act of our said As-
sembly under which you are appointed.
lxxiv DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Wirness Richard Caswell Esquire, our Governor Captain-
General and Commander in Chief under his Hand and our
Great Seal at Kinston the 14" day of April in the XI Year
of our Independence Anno. Dom. 1787.
R? (Seal) CaswELL
By His Excellency’s Command
Winston CasweE tu P, Sec’

State of NortH-CARoLINA
His Excellency Richard Caswell Esquire Governor, Captain
General and Commander in Chief in and. over the State afore-
said.

To all to whom these Presents shall come

Greeting.

Wuereas by an Act of the General Assembly of the said State
passed the sixth day of January last, entitled ‘‘ An Act for appoint-
ing Deputies from this State, to a Convention proposed to be held in
the City of Philadelphia in May next, for the purpose of Revising the
Feederal Constitution ’’ among other things it is Enacted ‘‘ That five
Commissioners be appointed by joint-ballot of both Houses of Assem-
bly who, or any three of them, are hereby authorized as Deputies from
this State to meet at Philadelphia on the first day of May next, then
and there to meet and confer with such Deputies as may be appointed
by the other States for similar purposes, and with them to discuss and
decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of our
Federal Union, and to procure the enlarged Purposes which it was
intended to effect, and that they report such an Act to the General
Assembly of this State as when agreed to by them, will effectually
provide for the same.’’ And it is by the said Act, further Enacted,
‘‘ That in case of the death or resignation of any of the Deputies or
of their declining their Appointments, His Excellency the Governor
for the Time being, is hereby authorized to supply such Vacancies.”’
And Whereas, in consequence of the said Act, Richard Caswell, Alex-
ander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs Spaight and
Willie Jones Esquires, were by joint-ballot of the two Houses of As-
sembly, elected Deputies for the purposes aforesaid: And Whereas
the said Richard Caswell hath resigned his said Appointment as one
of the Deputies aforesaid.

Now Know YE that I have appointed and by these Presents do
appoint the Honorable Wiu1am Biount Esquire, one of the Deputies
to represent this State in the Convention aforesaid, in the room and
stead of the aforesaid Richard Caswell, hereby giving and granting
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787  lxxv

to the said Wiiu14m Buount the same Powers, Privileges and Emolu-
ments which the said Richard Caswell would have been vested with or
entitled to, had he continued in the Appointment aforesaid.

Given under my Hand and the Great Seal of the State, at

Kinston, the 234 day of April Anno Dom 1787. And in the

Eleventh Year of American Independence.

RP. (Seal) CaswEiu
By His Excellency’s Command
‘WINSTON CASWELL P. Sec’

State of NortH-CaRroLIna
His Excellency Richard Caswell Esquire, Governor, Captain-
General and Commander in Chief, in and over the State afore-
said.

To all to whom these Presents shall come

Greeting.

Whereas by an Act of the General Assembly of the said State,
passed the sixth day of January last, entitled ‘‘ An Act for appoint-
ing Deputies from this State, to a Convention proposed to be held
in the City of Philadelphia in May next for the purpose of revising
the Federal Constitution ” among other things it is enacted ‘‘ That
five Commissioners be appointed by joint-ballot of both Houses of As-
sembly, who, or any three of them, are hereby authorized as Deputies
from this State, to meet at Philadelphia on the first day of May next,
then and there to meet and confer with such Deputies as may be ap-
pointed by the other States for similar purposes and with them to
discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects
of our Federal Union, and to procure the enlarged purposes, which
it was intended to effect, and that they report such an Act to the Gen-
eral Assembly of this State, as when agreed to by them, will effectually
provide for the same.’’ And it is by the said Act, further enacted
‘That in case of the death or resignation of any of the Depu-
ties, or their declining their Appointments His Excellency the
Governor for the Time being is hereby authorized to supply such
vacancies. ’’

AND WHEREAS in consequence of the said Act Richard Caswell,
Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs Spaight
and Willie Jones Esquires, were by joint-ballot of y® two Houses of
Assembly elected Deputies for the purposes aforesaid. And Whereas
the said Willie Jones hath declined his Appointment as one of the
Deputies aforesaid

Now kKNow YE that I have appointed and by these Presents do
Ixxvi DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

appoint the Honorable HucH Witu1amson Esquire, one of the Depu-
ties to represent this State in the Convention aforesaid in the room
and stead of the aforesaid Willie Jones, hereby giving and granting
to the said HuaH Witt1AMson the same Powers, Privileges and emol-
uments which the said Willie Jones would have been vested with and
entitled to had he acted under the Appointment aforesaid.

Given under my Hand and the Great Seal of the State at

Kinston the third day of April Anno Dom. 1787. and in the

Eleventh Year of American Independence

Rr (Seal) CaswEiu
By His Excellency’s Command
DatuamM CasweE.u Pro
Secretary

State of SourH CaROLINA"

By His Excellency Thomas Pinckney Esquire, Governor and
Commander in Chief in and over the State aforesaid.
To the Honorable John Rutledge Esquire
Greeting.

By Virtue of the Power and Authority in me vested by the Legis-
lature of this State in their Act passed the eighth day of March last
I do hereby Commission You the said John Rutledge as one of the
Deputies appointed from this State to meet such Deputies or Commis-
sioners as may be appointed and authorized by other of the United
States to assemble in Covention at the City of Philadelphia in the
Month of May next, or as soon thereafter as may be, and to join with
such Deputies or Commissioners (they being duly authorized and em-
powered) in devising and discussing all such Alterations, Clauses,
Articles and Provisions, as may be thought necessary to render the
Federal Constitution entirely adequate to the actual Situation and
future good Government of the confederated States, and that you
together with the said Deputies or Commissioners or a Majority of
them who shall be present (provided the State be not represented by
less than two) do join in reporting such an Act, to the United States
in Congress Assembled as when approved and agreed to by them, and
duly ratified and confirmed by the several States will effectually pro-
vide for the Exigencies of the Union.

Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State in the

1 Reprinted from Documentary Hi Rpdune
- wis ry History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 lxxvii

City of Charleston, this tenth day of April in the Year of our
Lord, One thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and of the
Sovereignty and Independence of the United States of America
the Eleventh.
THomas (Seal.) PmIncKNEY.
By his Excellency’s Command
PrerTer FRENEAU Secretary.

State of Sour Carouina
By His Excellency Thomas Pinckney Esquire, Governor and
Commander in Chief in and over the State aforesaid.
To the Honorable Charles Pinckney Esquire.
Greeting.

By Virtue of the Power and Authority in me vested by the Legis-
lature of this State in their Act passed the eighth day of March last,
I do hereby Commission you the said Charles Pinckney, as one of the
Deputies appointed from this State to meet such Deputies or Com-
missioners as may be appointed and authorized by other of the United
States to assemble in Convention at the City of Philadelphia in the
Month of May next, or as soon thereafter as may be, and to join with
such Deputies or Commissioners (they being duly authorized and em-
powered) in devising and discussing all such Alterations, Clauses,
Articles and Provisions, as may be thought necessary to render the
Federal Constitution entirely adequate to the actual Situation and
future good Government of the confederated States, and that you
together with the said Deputies or Commissioners or a Majority of
them who shall be present (provided the State be not represented by
less than two) do join in reporting such an Act, to the United States
in Congress Assembled as when approved and agreed to by them and
duly ratified and confirmed by the several States will effectually pro-
vide for the Exigencies of the Union.

Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State in the
City of Charleston this Tenth day of April in the Year of
our Lord One thousand seven hundred and Eighty Seven and
of the Sovereignty and Independence of the United States of
> America the Eleventh.
Tuomas (Seal.) PrvcKNEY
By His Excellency’s Command
Peter FreNzEAUv Secretary.
ixxviii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

State of SouTH-CaRoLina.
By His Excellency Thomas Pinckney Esquire, Governor and
Commander in Chief in and over the State aforesaid.
To the Honorable Charles Cotesworth Pinckney Esquire,
Greeting.

By Virtue of the Power and Authority in me vested by the Legis-
lature of this State in their Act passed the eighth day of March last,
I do hereby Commission you the said Charles Cotesworth Pinckney as
one of the Deputies appointed from this State to meet such Deputies
or Commissioners as may be appointed and authorized by other of
the United States to assemble in Convention at the City of Philadel-
phia in the Month of May next or as soon thereafter as may be, and
to join with such Depuities or Commissioners (they being duly author-
ized and empowered) in devising and discussing all such Alterations,
Clauses, Articles and Provisions as may be thought necessary to ren-
der the Federal Constitution entirely adequate to the actual Situation
and future good Government of the Confederated States, and that
you together with the said Deputies or Commissioners, or a Majority
of them, who shall be present (provided the State be not represented
by less than two) do join in reporting such an Act to the United
States in Congress: Assembled as when approved and agreed to by
them and duly ratified and confirmed by the several States will
effectually provide for the Exigencies of the Union.

Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State in the
City of Charleston this tenth day of April in the Year of our
Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and of the
Sovereignty and Independence of the United States of America
the Eleventh.
Tuomas (Seal.) PINCKNEY.
By His Excellency’s Command
Peter FRENEAU Secretary.

State of Soura-CaroLina.
By His Excellency Thomas Pinckney Esquire, Governor and
Commander in Chief in and over the State aforesaid.
To the Honorable Pierce Butler Esquire
Greeting.

By Virtue of the Power and authority in me vested by the Legis-
lature of this State in their Act passed the eighth day of March last,
I do hereby Commission you the said Pierce Butler, as one of the
Deputies appointed from this State to meet such Deputies or Com-
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787  Ixxix

missioners as may be appointed and authorized by other of the United
States to assemble in Convention at the City of Philadelphia in the
Month of May next, or as soon thereafter as may be and to join with
such Deputies or Commissioners (they being duly authorised and em-
powered) in devising and discussing, all such Alterations, Clauses,
Articles and Provisions as may be thought necessary to render the
Federal Constitution entirely adequate to the actual Situation and
future good government of the confederated States, and that you
together with the said Deputies or Commissioners or a Majority of
them who shall be present (provided the State be not represented
by less than two) do join in reporting such an Act, to the United
States in Congress Assembled as when approved and agreed to by
them and duly ratified and confirmed by the several States will
effectually provide for the Exigencies of the Union.

Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State in the

City of Charleston this Tenth day of April in the Year of our

Lord one thousand seven hundred and Highty seven, and of the

Sovereignty and Independence of the United States of America

the Eleventh.

Tuomas (Seal.) PINCKNEY.
By His Excellency’s Command
Perer Freneau Secretary.

Stare or Georata *

The State of Georgia by the grace of God, free, Sovereign and In.
dependent.

To the Honorable Wint1Am Pierce Esquire.

WHEREAS you the said William Pierce, are in and by an Ordinance
of the General Assembly of our said State Nominated and Appointed
a Deputy to represent the same in a Convention of the United States
to be assembled at Philadephia, for the Purposes of revising and dis-
eussing all such Alterations and farther Provisions as may be neces-
sary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies
of the Union.

You are therefore hereby Commissioned to proceed on the duties
required of you in virtue of the said Ordinance

WITNEss our trusty and well beloved George Mathews Esquire,
our Captain General, Governor and Commander in Chief, un-

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894),
pp. 43-46.
Ixxx DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

@ der his hand and our Great Seal at Augusta this Seventeenth
S day of April in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hun-
dred and eighty seven and of our Sovereignty and Independ-
ence the Eleventh. .
By His Honor’s Command.
J. Muon. Sec’.

=~
TR
oO
E

~~

SMAHLVIY

The State of Georgia by the grace of God free, Sovereign and In-
dependent.

To the Honorable WiLL1AaM Few Esquire.

Wuereas you the said William Few, are in and by an Ordinance
of the General Assembly of our said State Nominated and appointed
a Deputy to represent the same in a Convention of the United States
to be assembled at Philadelphia, for the Purposes of devising and
discussing all such Alterations and farther Provisions as may be
necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the Exigen-
cies of the Union.

You are therefore hereby Commissioned to proceed on the duties
required of you in virtue of the said Ordinance.

WITNESS our trusty and well-beloved Gzorcz Maturews Esquire
our Captain-General, Governor and Commander in Chief, un-
der his hand and our Great Seal at Augusta, this seventeenth
day of April in the Year of our Lord One thousand seven
hundred and eighty Seven, and of our Sovereignty and In-
dependence the Eleventh.

By His Honor’s Command

J. Mitton See”

SMAHLVIT (‘Te9Q) : O84

The State of Georgia by the grace of God, free, Sovereign and In-
dependent.

To the Honorable WiuL1Am Houstoun Esquire

WuHereas you the said William Houstoun, are in and by an Or-
dinance of the General Assembly of our said State nominated and
appointed a Deputy to represent the same in a Convention of the
United States to be assembled at Philadelphia, for the purposes of
devising and discussing all such Alterations and farther Provisions
as may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to
the Exigencies of the Union.

You are therefore hereby Commissioned to proceed on the Duties
required of you in virtue of the said Ordinance.
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 Ixxxi

WITNEss our trusty and well-beloved Gzorcze MatuEews Es-
quire, our Captain-General, Governor and Commander of
Chief, under his hand and our Great Seal at Augusta, this
seventeenth day of April in the Year of our Lord One thou-
sand seven hundred and eighty seven, and of our Sovereignty
and Independence the Eleventh.
By his Honor’s Command

J. Mmton. Sec’.

SMHHLV]L (Tee) : ony

GEORGIA.
By the Honorable Grorcz Maruews Esquire, Captain General,
Governor and Commander in Chief, in and over the said State
aforesaid.

To all to whom these Presents shall come Greeting.

Know YE that Jonn Mizton Esquire, who hath Certified the an-

nexed Copy of an Ordinance intitled ‘‘ An Ordinance for the ap-
pointment of Deputies from this State for the purpose of revising
the Feederal Constitution ’’—is Secretary of the said State in whose
Office the Archives of the same are deposited. Therefore all due faith,
Credit and Authority are and ought to be had and given the same.
In Testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the Great Seal of the said State to be put and affixed at
Augusta, this Twenty fourth day of April in the Year of our
Lord One thousand seven hundred and eighty Seven and of
our Sovereignty and Independence the Eleventh.

By his Honor’s Command

J. Maton Sec’

‘SMAHLVY (Teg) : 0m

An OrpInance for the appointment of Deputies from this State for
the purpose of revising the Federal Constitution.

Br ir OrpAINeD by the Representatives of the Freemen of the
State of Georgia in General Assembly met and by the Authority of
the same, that Witt1am Few, ABRAHAM BALDWIN, WILLIAM PIERCE,
GeEorcE WALTON WitLiam Houstoun AND NATHANIEL PENDLETON Es-
quirEs, Be, and they are hereby appointed Commissioners, who, or any
two or more of them are hereby authorized as Deputies from this
State to meet such deputies as may be appointed and authorized by
other States to assemble in Convention at Philadelphia and to join
with them in devising and discussing all such Alterations and farther
Provisions as may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution
adequate to the exigencies of the Union, and in reporting such an Act
lxxxii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 '

for that purpose to the United States in Congress Assembled as when
agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several States, will
effectually provide for the same. In case of the death of any of the
said Deputies, or of their declining their appointments, the Executive
are hereby authorized to supply such Vacancies.
By Order of the House
(signed) W™ Grpgons Speaker.

Augusta the 10 February 1787.

Georgia.

Secretary’s Office

The above is a true Copy from the Original Ordinance deposited

in my Office.
J: Miuton Sec’.
Augusta
24 April aver f
LIST OF DELEGATES APPOINTED BY THE STATES REP-
RESENTED IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION *

From
New Hampshire.

Massachusetts.

Rhode Island.
Connecticut.

New York.

New Jersey.

Pennsylvania.

ine

oO

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

John Langdon,
John Pickering,

. Nicholas Gilman,

Benjamin West.
Francis Dana,
Elbridge Gerry,

. Nathaniel Gorham,
. Rufus King,

Caleb Strong,
[No appointment. ]

. Wm. Sam. Johnson,
. Roger Sherman,

Oliver Elsworth,
Robert Yates,

. Alexander Hamilton,

John Lansing,

. William Livingston,
. David Brearley,

William C. Houston,
William Patterson,
John Neilson.
Abraham Clark.
Jonathan Dayton,
Benjamin Franklin,
Thomas Mifflin,
Robert Morris,
George Clymer,
Thomas Fitzsimons,
Jared Ingersoll,

Attended
July 23, 1787

July 28,

May 29,
May 28,
May 25,
May 28,

June 2,
May 30,
May 29,
May 25,
do.
June 2,
June 5,
May 25,
do.
do.

June 21,
May 28,
do.
May 25,
May 28,
May 25,
May 28,

 

+ Reprinted from Journal, Acts and Proceedings of the Convention which
formed the Constitution of the United States, John Quincy Adams, Editor

(1819), pp. 13-15.

For a more elaborate list including the names of delegates who were elected
but declined, and fuller and revised details of attendance, see The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787, Max Farrand, Editor, Vol. III (1901), pp. 557-559,

586-590.

lxxxiii
Ixxxiv DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

From

Delaware.

Maryland.

Virginia.

North Carolina.

South Carolina.

Georgia.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

24

20.
26.
27.

28.

29.
30.

31.

382.
39.

34,

35.
36.
37.

38.
39.

James Wilson,
Gouverneur Morris,
George Read,
Gunning Bedford, jr.
John Dickinson,
Richard Basset,
Jacob Broom,

James M‘Henry,
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer,
Daniel Carroll,

John Francis Mercer,
Luther Martin,
George Washington,
Patrick Henry,
Edmund Randolph,
John Blair,

James Madison, jr
George Mason,
George Wythe,

Attended
May 25,
do.
do.
May 28,
do.
May 25,
do.
May 29,
June 2,
July 9,
Aug. 6,
June 9,
May 25,
(declined. )
May 25,
do.
do.
do.
do.

James M‘Clurg, (in the room of

P. Henry)

Richard Caswell,
Alexander Martin,
William R. Davie,

do.

(resigned. )

May 25,
do.

William Blount, (in the room of

R. Caswell)
Willie Jones,
Richard D. Spaight,

June 20,

(declined. )

May 25,

Hugh Williamson, (in the room

of W. Jones)

John Rutledge,
Charles C. Pinckney,
Charles Pinckney,
Pierce Butler,
William Few,
Abraham Baldwin,
William Pierce,
George Walton.
William Houstoun,
Nathaniel Pendleton,

May 25,
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.

June 11,

May 31,

June 1,
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 Ixxxv

Those with numbers before their names, signed the Constitution... 39
Those in Italicks, never attended.............cececeeeeereeees 10
Members who attended, but did not sign the Constitution..... 16
MAJOR WILLIAM PIERCE

CHARACTERS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE StaTES HELD aT
PumaveLpHia, May 1787?

From New HampsHIre.

Jn° Langdon Esq? and Nich’ Gilman Esquire.

M: Langdon is a Man of considerable fortune, possesses a liberal
mind, and a good plain understanding.—about 40 years old.?

M: Gilman is modest, genteel, and sensible. There is nothing bril-
liant or striking in his character, but there is something respectable
and worthy in the Man.—about 30 years of age.

\

From MassacuusErts.

Rufus King, Nat! Gorham, Gerry and Jn° Strong? Esquires.

M: King is a Man much distinguished for his eloquence and great
parliamentary talents. He was educated in Massachusetts, and is said
to have good classical as well as legal knowledge. He has served for
three years in the Congress of the United States with great and de-
served applause, and is at this time high in the confidence and ap-
probation of his Country-men. This Gentleman is about thirty three
years of age, about five feet ten Inches high, well formed, an hand-
some face, with a strong expressive Eye, and a sweet high toned voice.
In his public speaking there is something peculiarly strong and rich
in his expression, clear, and convincing in his arguments, rapid and
irresistible at times in his eloquence but he is not always equal. His
action is natural, swimming, and graceful, but there is a rudeness of
manner sometimes accompanying it. But take him tout en semble, he
may with propriety be ranked among the Luminaries of the present _
Age.

M? Gorham is a Merchant in Boston, high in reputation, and much
in the esteem of his Country-men. He is a Man of very good sense,

 

1Text and footnotes reprinted from The American Historical Review, Vol.
Il (1898), pp. 325-334. Major Pierce’s sketches of his fellow members were
printed in the Review from a manuscript found among his papers.

* Pierce’s statements of age, throughout the paper, are only approximately
correct.

® Caleb Strong.
lexxvi
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 Ixxxvii

but not much improved in his education. He is eloquent and easy in
public debate, but has nothing fashionable or elegant in his style ;—all
he aims at is to convince, and where he fails it never is from his audi-
tory not understanding him, for no Man is more perspicuous and full.
He has been President of Congress, and three years a Member of that
Body. M® Gorham is about 46 years of age, rather lusty, and has an
agreable and pleasing manner.

M: Gerry’s character is marked for integrity and perseverance.
He is a hesitating and laborious speaker ;—possesses a great degree of
confidence and goes extensively into all subjects that he speaks on,
without respect to elegance or flower of diction. He is connected and
sometimes clear in his arguments, conceives well, and cherishes as his
first virtue, a love for his Country. M! Gerry is very much of a
Gentleman in his principles and manners;—he has been engaged in
the mercantile line and is a Man of property. He is about 37 years
of age.

M: Strong is a Lawyer of some eminence,—he has received a liberal
education, and has good connections to recommend him. As a Speaker
he is feeble, and without confidence. This Gent? is about thirty five
years of age, and greatly in the esteem of his Colleagues.

From CoNNECTICUT.

Sam! Johnson, Roger Sherman, and W. Elsworth? Esquires.

D? Johnson is a character much celebrated for his legal knowledge;
he is said to be one of the first classics in America, and certainly
possesses a very strong and enlightened understanding.

As an Orator in my opinion, there is nothing in him that warrants
the high reputation which he has for public speaking. There is some-
thing in the tone of his voice not pleasing to the Har,—but he is
eloquent and clear,—always abounding with information and in-
struction. He was once employed as an Agent for the State of Con-
necticut to state her claims to certain landed territory before the
British House of Commons; this Office he discharged with so much
dignity, and made such an ingenious display of his powers, that he laid
the foundation of a reputation which will probably last much longer
than his own life. D! Johnson is about sixty years of age, possesses the
manners of a Gentleman, and engages the Hearts of Men by the sweet-
ness of his temper, and that affectionate style of address with which
he accosts his acquaintance.

M: Sherman exhibits the oddest shaped character I ever remember

 

2 Oliver Ellsworth.
lxxxviii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

to have met with. He is awkward, un-meaning, and unaccountably
strange in his manner. But in his train of thinking there is something
regular, deep, and comprehensive; yet the oddity of his address, the
vulgarisms that accompany his public speaking, and that strange new
England cant which runs through his publie as well as his private
speaking make everything that is connected with him grotesque and
laughable ;—and yet he deserves infinite praise,—no Man has a better
Heart or a clearer Head. If he cannot embellish he can furnish
thoughts that are wise and useful. He is an able politician, and ex-
tremely artful in accomplishing any particular object ;—it is re-
marked that he seldom fails. I am told he sits on the Bench in Con-
necticut, and is very correct in the discharge of his Judicial functions.
In the early part of his life he was a Shoe-maker ;—but despising the
lowness of his condition, he turned Almanack maker, and so pro-
gressed upwards to a Judge. He has been several years a Member
of Congress, and discharged the duties of his Office with honor and
eredit to himself, and advantage to the State he represented. He is
about 60.

M: Elsworth is a Judge of the Supreme Court in Connecticut ;—he
is a Gentleman of a clear, deep, and copious understanding; eloquent,
and connected in public debate; and always attentive to his duty. He
is very happy in a reply, and choice in selecting such parts of his ad-
versary’s arguments as he finds make the strongest impressions,—
in order to take off the force of them, so as to admit the power of his
own. M: Elsworth is about 37 years of age, a Man much respected for
his integrity, and venerated for his abilities.

From New York.

‘Alexander Hamilton, Yates, and W. Lansing? Esquires.

Col? Hamilton is deservedly celebrated for his talents. He is a
practitioner of the Law, and reputed to be a finished Scholar. To a
clear and strong judgment he unites the ornaments of fancy, and
whilst he is able, convincing, and engaging in his eloquence the Heart
and Head sympathize in approving him. Yet there is something too
feeble in his voice to be equal to the strains of oratory ;—it is my
opinion that he is rather a convincing Speaker, that [than] a blazing
Orator. Col? Hamilton requires time to think,—he enquires into
every part of his subject with the searchings of phylosophy, and when
he comes forward he comes highly charged with interesting matter,
there is no skimming over the surface of a subject with him, he must

 

> John Lansing.
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 _ Ixxxix

sink to the bottom to see what foundation it rests on.—His language
is not always equal, sometimes didactic like Bolingbroke’s, at others
light and tripping like Stern’s. His eloquence is not so defusive as
to trifle with the senses, but he rambles just enough to strike and keep
up the attention. He is about 33 years old, of small stature, and lean.
His manners are tinctured with stiffness, and sometimes with a degree
of vanity that is highly disagreable.

M! Yates is said to be an able Judge. He is a Man of great legal
abilities, but not distinguished as an Orator. Some of his Enemies
say he is-an anti-federal Man, but I discovered no such disposition in
him. He is about 45 years old, and enjoys a great share of health.

M: Lansing is a practicing Attorney at Albany, and Mayor of that
Corporation. He has a hisitation in his speech, that will prevent his
being an Orator of any eminence ;—his legal knowledge I am told is
not extensive, nor his education a good one. He is however a Man of
good sense, plain in his manners, and sincere in his friendships. He
is about 82 years of age.

From New JERSEY.

W" Livingston, David Brearly, W* Patterson, and Jon Dayton,
Esquires.*

Governor Livingston is confessedly a Man of the first rate talents,
but he appears to me rather to indulge a sportiveness of wit, than a
strength of thinking. He is however equal to anything, from the ex-
tensiveness of his education and genius. His writings teem with satyr
and a neatness of style. But he is no Orator, and seems little ac-
quainted with the guiles of policy. He is about 60 years old, and
remarkably healthy.

M: Brearly is a man of good, rather than of brilliant parts. He
is a Judge of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and is very much in
the esteem of the people. As an Orator he has little to boast of, but
as a Man he has every virtue to recommend him. M: Brearly is about
40 years of age.

M! Patterson is one of those kind of Men whose powers break in
upon you, and create wonder and astonishment. He is a Man of great
modesty, with looks that bespeak talents of no great extent,—but he
is a Classic, a Lawyer, and an Orator ;—and of a disposition so favor-
able to his advancement that every one seemed ready to exalt him with
their praises. He is very happy in the choice of time and manner of
engaging in a debate, and never speaks but when he understands his

 

1W. C. Houstoun omitted.
x¢ DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

subject well. This Gentleman is about 34 y< of age, of a very low
stature.

Capt Dayton is a young Gentleman of talents, with ambition to
exert them. He possesses a good education and some reading; he
speaks well, and seems desirous of improving himself in Oratory.
There is an impetuosity in his temper that is injurious to him; but
there is an honest rectitude about him that makes him a valuable Mem-
ber of Society, and secures to him the esteem of all good Men. He is
about 30 years old, served with me as a Brother Aid to General Sulli-
van in the Western expedition of 79.

From PENNSYLVANIA.

Benj? Franklin, Tho’ Mifflin, Robt Morris, Geo. Clymer, Thomas
Fitzsimons, Jared Ingersol, James Wilson, Governeur Morris.

D: Franklin is well known to be the greatest phylosopher of the
present age ;—all the operations of nature he seems to understand,—
the very heavens obey him, and the Clouds yield up their Lightning
to be imprisoned in his rod. But what claim he has to the politician,
posterity must determine. It is certain that he does not shine much
in public Council,—he is no Speaker, nor does he seem to let politics
engage his attention. He is, however, a most extraordinary Man, and
tells a story in a style more engaging than anything I ever heard. Let
his Biographer finish his character. He is 82 years old, and possesses
an activity of mind equal to a youth of 25 years of age.

General Mifflin is well known for the activity of his mind, and the
brilliancy of his parts. He is well informed and a graceful Speaker.
The General is about 40 years of age, and a very handsome man.

Robert Morris is a merchant of great eminence and wealth; an
able Financier, and a worthy Patriot. He has an understanding equal
to any public object, and possesses an energy of mind that few Men
can boast of. Although he is not learned, yet he is as great as those
who are. I am told that when he speaks in the Assembly of Pennsyl-
vania, that he bears down all before him. What could have been his
reason for not Speaking in the Convention I know not,—but he never
once spoke on any point. This Gentleman is about 50 years old.

M! Clymer is a Lawyer of some abilities ;—he is a respectable Man,
and much esteemed. M* Clymer is about 40 years old.

M Fitzsimons is a Merchant of considerable talents, and speaks
very well I am told, in the Legislature of Pennsylvania. He is about
40 years old.

M? Ingersol is a very able Attorney, and possesses a clear legal
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 = xci

understanding. He is well aducated in the Classic’s, and is a Man of
very extensive reading. M®* Ingersol speaks well, and comprehends
his subject fully. There is a modesty in his character that keeps him
back. He is about 36 years old.

M: Wilson ranks among the foremost in legal and political knowl-
edge. He has joined to a fine genius all that can set him off and show
him to advantage. He is well acquainted with Man, and understands
all the passions that influence him. Government seems to have been
his peculiar Study, all the political institutions of the World he
knows in detail, and can trace the causes and effects of every revolu-
tion from the earliest stages of the Greecian commonwealth down to
the present time. No man is more clear, copious, and comprehensive
than M= Wilson, yet he is no great Orator. He draws the attention
not by the charm of his eloquence, but by the force of his reasoning.
He is about 45 years old.

M: Governeur Morris is one of those Genius’s in whom every
species of talents combine to render him conspicuous and flourishing
in public debate:—He winds through all the mazes of rhetoric, and
throws around him such a glare that he charms, captivates, and leads
away the senses of all who hear him. With an infinite streach of
fancy he brings to view things when he is engaged in deep argumenta-
tion, that render all the labor of reasoning easy and pleasing. But
with all these powers he is fickle and inconstant,—never pursuing one
train of thinking,—nor ever regular. He has gone through a very
extensive course of reading, and is acquainted with all the sciences.
No Man has more wit,—nor can any one engage the attention more
than M? Morris. He was bred to the Law, but I am told he disliked
the profession, and turned Merchant. He is engaged in some great
mercantile matters with his namesake M: Rob! Morris. This Gentle-
man is about 38 years old, he has been unfortunate in losing one of
his Legs, and getting all the flesh taken off his right arm by a scald,
when a youth.

From DELAWARE.

Jn? Dickinson, Gunning Bedford, Geo: Read, Rich‘ Bassett, and
Jacob Broom Esquires.

M: Dickinson has been famed through all America, for his Farmers
Letters; he is a Scholar, and said to be a Man of very extensive in-
formation. When I saw him in the Convention I was induced to
pay the greatest attention to him whenever he spoke. I had often
heard that he was a great Orator, but I found him an indifferent
xcii DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Speaker. With an affected air of wisdom he labors to produce a
trifle—his language is irregular and incorrect,—his flourishes, (for
he sometimes attempts them), are like expiring flames, they just shew
themselves and go out;—no traces of them are left on the mind to
chear or animate it. He is, however, a good writer and will be ever
considered one of the most important characters in the United States.
He is about 55 years old, and was bred a Quaker.

MM: Bedford was educated for the Bar, and in his profession I am
told, has merit. He is a bold and nervous Speaker, and has a very com-
manding and striking manner ;—but he is warm and impetuous in
his temper, and precipitate in his judgment. M* Bedford is about 32
years old, and very corpulant.

M! Read is a Lawyer and a Judge ;—his legal abilities are said to
be very great, but his powers of Oratory are fatiguing and tiresome
to the last degree ;—his voice is feeble, and his articulation so bad that
few can have patience to attend to him. He is a very good Man, and
bears an amiable character with those who know him. M® Read is
about 50, of a low stature, and a weak constitution.

ME Bassett is a religious enthusiast, lately turned Methodist, and
serves his Country because it is the will of the people that he should
do so. He is a Man of plain sense, and has modesty enough to hold
his Tongue. He is a Gentlemanly Man, and is in high estimation
among the Methodists. M!' Bassett is about 36 years old.

M? Broom is a plain good Man, with some abilities, but nothing to
render him conspicuous. He is silent in public, but chearful and con-
versable in private. He is about 35 years old.

From Maryuanpb.

Luther Martin, Ja? McHenry, Daniel of St Thomas Jenifer, and
Daniel Carrol Esquires.?

M Martin was educated for the Bar, and is Attorney general for
the State of Maryland. This Gentleman possesses a good deal of in-
formation, but he has a very bad delivery, and so extremely prolix,
that he never speaks without tiring the patience of all who hear him.
He is about 34 years of age.

M! McHenry was bred a physician, but he afterwards turned
Soldier and acted as Aid to Gen! Washington and the Marquis de la
Fayette. He is a Man of specious talents, with nothing of genious to
improve them. As a politician there is nothing remarkable in him,

 

2 James Francis Mercer omitted.
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 = xciii

nor has he any of the graces of the Orator. He is however, a very
respectable young Gentleman, and deserves the honor which his
Country has bestowed on him. M! M‘Henry is about 32 years
of age.

M: Jenifer is a Gentleman of fortune in Maryland ;—he is always
in good humour, and never fails to make his company pleased with
him. He sits silent in the Senate, and seems to be conscious that he
is no politician. From his long continuance in single life, no doubt
but he has made the vow of celibacy. He speaks warmly of the
Ladies notwithstanding. M=! Jenifer is about 55 years of Age, and
once served as an Aid de Camp to Major Gen! Lee.

M* Carrol is a Man of large fortune, and influence in his State.
He possesses plain good sense, and is in the full confidence of his
Country-men. This Gentleman is about years of age.

From VIRGINIA.

Gen! Geo: Washington, Geo: Wythe, Geo: Mason, Ja’ Maddison
junt Jn° Blair, Edm? Randolph, and James M*Lurg.

Gen! Washington is well known as the Commander in chief of the
late American Army. Having conducted these States to independence
and peace, he now appears to assist in framing a Government to make
the People happy. Like Gustavus Vasa, he may be said to be the
deliverer of his Country ;—like Peter the great he appears as the
politician and the States-man; and like Cincinnatus he returned to
his farm perfectly contented with being only a plain Citizen, after
enjoying the highest honor of the confederacy,—and now only seeks
for the approbation of his Country-men by being virtuous and useful.
The General was conducted to the Chair as President of the Conven-
tion by the unanimous voice of its Members. He is in the 52% year
of his age.

M: Wythe is the famous Professor of Law at the University of
William and Mary. He is confessedly one of the most learned legal
Characters of the present age. From his close attention to the study
of general learning he has acquired a compleat knowledge of the dead
languages and all the sciences. He is remarked for his examplary
life, and universally esteemed for his good principles. No Man it is
said understands the history of Government better than M? Wythe,—
nor any one who understands the fluctuating condition to which all
societies are liable better than he does, yet from his too favorable
opinion of Men, he is no great politician. He is a neat and pleasing
Speaker, and a most correct and able Writer. M! Wythe is about
55 years of age.
xciv DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M! Mason is a Gentleman of remarkable strong powers, and pos-
sesses a clear and copious understanding. He is able and convincing
in debate, steady and firm in his principles, and undoubtedly one of
the best politicians in America. M? Mason is about 60 years old, with
a fine strong constitution.

M? Maddison is a character who has long been in public life; and
what is very remarkable every Person seems to acknowledge his great-
ness. He blends together the profound politician, with the Scholar.
In the management of every great question he evidently took the
lead in the Convention, and tho’ he cannot be called an Orator, he is
a most agreable, eloquent, and convincing Speaker. From a spirit
of industry and application which he possesses in a most eminent
degree, he always comes forward the best informed Man of any point
in debate. The affairs of the United States, he perhaps, has the most
correct knowledge of, of any Man in the Union. He has been twice a
Member of Congress, and was always thought one of the ablest Mem-
bers that ever sat in that Council. M! Maddison is about 37 years of
age, a Gentleman of great modesty,—with a remarkable sweet temper.
He is easy and unreserved among his acquaintance, and has a most
agreable style of conversation.

M* Blair is one of the most respectable Men in Virginia, both on
account of his Family as well as fortune. He is one of the Judges of
the Supreme Court in Virginia, and acknowledged to have a very ex-
tensive knowledge of the Laws. M? Blair is however, no Orator, but
his good sense, and most excellent principles, compensate for other
deficiencies. He is about 50 years of age.

M? Randolph is Governor of Virginia,—a young Gentleman in
whom unite all the accomplishments of the Scholar, and the States-
man. He came forward with the postulata, or first principles, on
which the Convention acted, and he supported them with a force of
eloquence and reasoning that did him great honor. He has a most
harmonious voice, a fine person and striking manners. M? Randolph
is about 32 years of age.

M? M‘Lurg is a learned physician, but having never appeared be-
fore in public life his character as a politician is not sufficiently
known. He attempted once or twice to speak, but with no great
success. It is certain that he has a foundation of learning, on which,
if he pleases, he may erect a character of high renown. The Doctor

is about 38 years of age, a Gentleman of great respectability, and of
a fair and unblemished character.
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 = xev

NortH CaRouina.

W® Blount, Rich? Dobbs Spaight, Hugh Williamson, W2 Davey,
and Jn° Martin? Esquires.

M: Blount is a character strongly marked for integrity and honor.
He has been twice a Member of Congress, and in that office discharged
his duty with ability and faithfulness. He is no Speaker, nor does
he possess any of those talents that make Men shine;—he is plain,
honest, and sincere. M? Blount is about 36 years of age.

M: Spaight is a worthy Man, of some abilities, and fortune. With-
out possessing a Genius to render him briliant, he is able to discharge
any public trust that his Country may repose in him. He is about
31 years of age.

M: Williamson is a Gentleman of education and talents. He en-
ters freely into public debate from his close attention to most sub-
jects, but he is no Orator. There is a great degree of good humour
and pleasantry in his character; and in his manners there is a strong
trait of the Gentleman. He is about 48 years of age.

M! Davey is a Lawyer of some eminence in his State. He is said to
have a good classical education, and is a Gentleman of considerable
literary talents. He was silent in the Convention ? but his opinion was
always respected. M? Davy is about 30 years of age.

M: Martin was lately Governor of North Carolina, which office he
filled with credit. He is a Man of sense, and undoubtedly is a good
politician, but he is not formed to shine in public debate, being no
Speaker. M? Martin was once a Colonel in the American Army, but
proved unfit for the field. He is about 40 years of age.

SourH CAROLINA.

Jn? Rutledge, Ch? Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, and
Pierce Butler Esquires.

M? Rutledge is one of those characters who was highly mounted at
the commencement of the late revolution ;—his reputation in the first
Congress gave him a distinguished rank among the American Worthies.
He was bred to the Law, and now acts as one of the Chancellors of
South Carolina. This Gentleman is much famed in his own State as
an Orator, but in my opinion he is too rapid in his public speaking
to be denominated an agreeable Orator. He is undoubtedly a man

1 Alexander Martin.
? Not absolutely; see Madison Papers, 1007, 1039, 1081, 1154, 1191.
xevi DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of abilities, and a Gentleman of distinction and fortune. M: Rut-
ledge was once Governor of South Carolina. He is about 48 years
of age.

M? Ch’ Cotesworth Pinckney is a Gentleman of Family and fortune
in his own State. He has received the advantage of a liberal educa-
tion, and possesses a very extensive degree of legal knowledge. When
warm in a debate he sometimes speaks well,—but he is generally con-
sidered an indifferent Orator. M! Pinckney was an Officer of high
rank in the American Army, and served with great reputation through
the War. He is now about 40 years of age.

M! Charles Pinckney is a young Gentleman of the most promising
talents. He is, altho’ only 24 y? of age, in possession of a very great
variety of knowledge. Government, Law, History and Phylosophy
are his favorite studies, but he is intimately acquainted with every
species of polite learning, and has a spirit of application and industry
beyond most Men. He speaks with great neatness and perspicuity,
and treats every subject as fully, without running into prolixity, as
it requires. He has been a Member of Congress, and served in that
Body with ability and eclat.

M: Butler is a character much respected for the many excellent
virtues which he possesses. But as a politician or an Orator, he has
no pretentions to either. He is a Gentleman of fortune, and takes rank
among the first in South Carolina. He has been appointed to Con-
gress, and is now a Member of the Legislature of South Carolina. M!
Butler is about 40 years of age; an Irishman by birth.

For Geroreia.

W? Few, Abraham Baldwin, W? Pierce, and W" Houstoun
Esq’?

M? Few possesses a strong natural Genius, and from application
has acquired some knowledge of legal matters ;—he practises at the
bar of Georgia, and speaks tolerably well in the Legislature. He has
been twice a Member of Congress, and served in that capacity with
fidelity to his State, and honor to himself. M! Few is about 35 years
of age.

M? Baldwin is a Gentleman of superior abilities, and joins in a
public debate with great art and eloquence. Having laid the founda-
tion of a compleat classical education at Harvard College, he pursues
every other study with ease. He is well acquainted with Books and
Characters, and has an accomodating turn of mind, which enables
him to gain the confidence of Men, and to understand them. He is
ANTECEDENTS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1787 xcvii

a practising Attorney in Georgia, and has been twice a Member of
Congress. M! Baldwin is about 38 years of age.

M' Houstoun is an Attorney at Law, and has been Member of Con-
gress for the State of Georgia. He is a Gentleman of Family, and
was educated in England. As to his legal or political knowledge he
has very little to boast of. Nature seems to have done more for his
corporeal than mental powers. His Person is striking, but his mind
very little improved with useful or elegant knowledge. He has none
of the talents requisite for the Orator, but in public debate is con-
fused and irregular. M! Houstoun is about 30 years of age of an
amiable and sweet temper, and of good and honorable principles.

My own character I shall not attempt to draw, but leave those who
may choose to speculate on it, to consider it in any light that their
fancy or imagination may depict. I am conscious of having discharged
my duty as a Soldier through the course of the late revolution with
honor and propriety ; and my services in Congress and the Convention
were bestowed with the best intention towards the interest of Georgia,
and towards the general welfare of the Confederacy. I possess am-
bition, and it was that, and the flattering opinion which some of my
Friends had of me, that gave me a seat in the wisest Council in the
World, and furnished me with an opportunity of giving these short
Sketches of the Characters who composed it.
PART II
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
PREFACE TO DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION?

A SKEtTcH NEVER FINISHED NoR APPLIED.?

As the weakness and wants of man naturally lead to an association
of individuals, under a common authority, whereby each may have
the protection of the whole against danger from without, and enjoy
in safety within, the advantages of social intercourse, and an exchange
of the necessaries & comforts of life: in like manner feeble communi-
ties, independent of each other, have resorted to a Union, less intimate,
but with common Councils, for the common safety ag*t powerful neigh-
bors, and for the preservation of justice and peace among themselves.
Ancient history furnishes examples of these confederal ® associations,
tho’ with a very imperfect account, of their structure, and of the at-
tributes and functions of the presiding Authority. There are ex-
amples of modern date also, some of them still existing, the modifica-
tions and transactions of which are sufficiently known.

It remained for the British Colonies, now United States, of North
America, to add to those examples, one of a more interesting char-
acter than any of them: which led to a system without a* example
ancient or modern, a system founded on popular rights, and so com-
bing. a federal form with the forms of individual Republics, as may

 

+The proposed Preface has been printed from Madison’s original manuscript
in the Department of State. There is a transcript of the Preface in an unknown
hand in the Library of Congress, which was sent to the printer and from which
Henry D. Gilpin printed The Papers of James Madison, 3 volumes (1840). The
text of the Preface as here printed has been read with the printer’s copy thereof
and important differences noted.

In the Preface, Madison referred in passing to documents which he evi-
dently intended to embody in a finished draft which, unfortunately, he never
completed. The matter referred to has been placed in footnotes or reference has
been made to other pages of the present volume.

Footnotes bearing star or dagger instead of figures to indicate their order,
are Madison’s own notes and have been placed above the line. The editors’
notes and indications of differences between the Madison manuscript and the
transcript of the Preface have been numbered and placed below the line.

? These are the words which Madison wrote at the head of this document after
he had scratched out the phrase “Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787.”
It is a very rough and uneven draft, full of insertions and deletions. The
last few pages are in Mrs. Madison’s hand, having been written from her hus-
band’s dictation when his hands were crippled with rheumatism. A few words
in the draft were written by John C. Payne (Mrs. Madison’s brother) at Madi-
son’s direction. The date of the draft was between 1830 and 1836.

2 The word “confederate” is substituted in the transcript for “confederal.”

‘The word “an” is substituted in the transcript for “a.”

1
2 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

enable each to supply the defects of the other and obtain the advan-
tages of both.?

Whilst the Colonies enjoyed the protection of the parent Country
as it was called, against foreign danger; and were secured by its
superintending controul, against conflicts among themselves, they con-
tinued independent of each other, under a common, tho’ limited
dependence, on the parental Authority. When however the growth
of the offspring in strength and in wealth, awakened the jealousy and
tempted the avidity of the parent, into-schemes of usurpation & ex-
action, the obligation was felt by the former of uniting their counsels
and efforts to avert the impending calamity.

As early as the year 1754, indications having been given of a de-
sign in the Brittish Government to levy contributions on the Colonies,
without their consent; a meeting of Colonial deputies took place at
Albany, which attempted to introduce a compromising substitute, that
might at once satisfy the British requisitions, and save their own
rights from violation. The attempt had no other effect, than by bring-
ing these rights into a more conspicuous view, to invigorate the attach-
ment to them, on ? one side; and to nourish the haughty & encroaching
spirit on the other.

In 1774. The progress made by G. B. in the open assertion of
her pretensions, and in? the apprehended purpose of otherwise main-
taining them than by Legislative enactments and declarations, had been
such that the Colonies did not hesitate to assemble, by their deputies,
in a formal Congress, authorized to oppose to the British innovations
whatever measures might be found best adapted to the occasion; with-
out however losing sight of an eventual reconciliation.

The dissuasive measures of that Congress, being without effect,
another Congress was held in 1775, whose pacific efforts to bring about
a change in the views of the other party, being equally unavailing,
and the commencement of actual hostilities having at length put an
end to all hope of reconciliation; the Congress finding moreover
that the popular voice began to call for an entire & perpetual
dissolution of the political ties which had connected them with G. B.,
proceeded on the memorable 4 of July, 1776 to declare the 13 Col-
onies, Independent States.*

During the discussions of this solemn Act, a Committee consisting
of a member from each colony had been appointed to prepare &

 

1In place of “the advantages of both” the transcript reads “that advan-
tage of both.”

?The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The word “in” is omitted in the transcript.

‘The words “Independent States” are italicized in the transcript.
PREFACE TO DEBATES 3

digest a form of Confederation, for the future management of the
common. interests, which had hitherto been left to the discretion of
Congress, guided by the exigences of the contest, and by the known
intentions or occasional instructions of the Colonial Legislatures.

It appears that as early as the 21% of July 1775, A plan entitled
** Articles of Confederation & perpetual Union of the Colonies ’’ had
been sketched by Doc! Franklin, the plan being on that day sub-
mitted by him to Congress; and tho’ not copied into their Journals
remaining on their files in his handwriting. But notwithstanding the
term ‘‘ perpetual ’’ observed in the title, the articles provided ex-
pressly for the event of a return of the Colonies to a connection with
G. Britain.

This sketch became a basis for the plan reported by the Com? on
the 12 of July, now also remaining on the files of Congress, in the
handwriting of M! Dickinson. The plan, tho’ dated after the Decla-
ration of Independence, was probably drawn up before that event;
since the name of Colonies, not States is used throughout the draught.
The plan reported, was debated and amended from time to time, till
the 17 of November 1777, when it was agreed to by Congress, and
proposed to the Legislatures of the States, with an explanatory and
recommendatory letter. The ratifications of these by their Delegates
in Cong? duly authorized took place at successive dates; but were not
compleated till March 1,1 1781. when Maryland who had made it a
prerequisite that the vacant lands acquired from the British Crown
should be a Common fund, yielded to the persuasion that a final &
formal establishment of the federal Union & Govt would make a favor-
able impression not only on other foreign Nations, but on G. B. herself.

The great difficulty experienced in so framing the fed! system as
to obtain the unanimity required for its due sanction, may be inferred
from the long interval, and recurring discussions, between the com-
mencement and completion of the work; from the changes made during
its progress; from the language of Cong? when proposing it to the
States, w™ dwelt on the impracticability of devising a system accept-
able to all of them; from the reluctant assent given by some; and the
various alterations proposed by others; and by a tardiness in others
again which produced a special address to them from Cong? enforcing
the duty of sacrificing local considerations and favorite opinions to to
the public safety, and the necessary harmony: Nor was the assent of
some of the States finally yielded without strong protests against par-

 

*The phrase “the first of March” is substituted in the transcript for
“March 1.”
4 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ticular articles, and a reliance on future amendments removing their
objections.

It is to be recollected, no doubt, that these delays might be oc-
casioned in some degree, by an occupation of the public Councils both
general & local, with the deliberations and measures, essential to a
Revolutionary struggle; But there must have been a balance for these
causes, in the obvious motives to hasten the establishment of a regular
and efficient Gov'; and in the tendency of the crisis to repress opinions
and pretensions, which might be inflexible in another state of things.

The principal difficulties which embarrassed the progress, and re-
tarded the completion of the plan of Confederation, may be traced
to 1.1 the natural repugnance of the parties to a relinquishment of
power: 21 a natural jealousy of its abuse in other hands than their
own: 37? the rule of suffrage among parties unequal in size, but equal
in sovereignty. 4 the ratio of contributions in money and in troops,
among parties,’ whose inequality in size did not correspond with that
of their wealth, or of their military or free population. 5.* the selection
and definition of the powers, at once necessary to the federal head,
and safe to the several members.

To these sources of difficulty, incident to the formation of all such
Confederacies, were added two others one of a temporary, the other
of a permanent nature. The first was the case of the Crown lands, so
called because they had been held by the British Crown, and being
ungranted to individuals when its authority ceased, were considered
by the States within whose charters or asserted limits they lay, as de-
volving on them; whilst it was contended by the others, that being
wrested from the dethroned authority, by the equal exertion of all,
they resulted of right and in equity to the benefit of all. The lands
being of vast extent and of growing value, were the occasion of much
discussion & heart-burning ; & proved the most obstinate of the impedi-
ments to an earlier consummation of the plan of federal Govt The
State of Maryland the last that acceded to it held out as already
noticed, till March 1,* 1781, and then yielded only to the hope that by
giving a stable & authoritative character to the Confederation, a suc-
cessful termination of the Contest might be accelerated. The dispute
was happily compromised by successive surrenders of portions of the

 

* The figures 1, 2, and 3 are changed to “ first.” “ 2 ‘thi a
Gna gt st,” “secondly ” and “ thirdly

? The phrase “unequal in size, but equal in sovereignt; 4 th i

Bsa A 3 ’ . tio of
contributions in money and in troops, amo fea” een > oul
ie een Pp ng parties” ig erroneously omitted

* The figure 5 is changed to “fourthly” in the transcript

‘In the transcript the date reads “the first of March, 1781.

a
PREFACE TO DEBATES 5

territory by the States having exclusive claims to it, and acceptances
of them by Congress.

The other source of dissatisfaction was the peculiar situation of
some of the States, which having no convenient ports for forcign
commerce, were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, thro whose
ports, their commerce was carryed on. New Jersey, placed between
Phil? & N. York, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and N.
Carolina, between Virg? & S. Carolina to a patient bleeding at both
arms. The Articles of Confederation provided no remedy for the
complaint: which produced a strong protest on the part of N. Jersey;
and never ceased to be a source of dissatisfaction & discord, until the
new Constitution, superseded the old.

But the radical infirmity of the ‘‘ art’ of Confederation ’’ was the
dependance of Cong? on the voluntary and simultaneous compliance
with its Requisitions, by so many independant Communities, each con-
sulting more or less its particular interests & convenience and dis-
trusting the compliance of the others. Whilst the paper emissions of
Cong? continued to circulate they were employed as a sinew of war,
like gold & silver. When that ceased to be the ease, the fatal defect
of the political System was felt in its alarming force. The war was
merely kept alive and brought to a successful conclusion by such
foreign aids and temporary expedients as could be applied; a hope
prevailing with many, and a wish with all, that a state of peace, and
the sources of prosperity opened by it, would give to the Confederacy
in practice, the efficiency which had been inferred from its theory.

The close of the war however brought no cure for the public em-
barrasments. The States relieved from the pressure of foreign dan-
ger, and flushed with the enjoyment of independent and sovereign
power; [instead of a diminished disposition to part with it,] per-
severed in omissions and in measures incompatible with their relations
to the Federal Govt and with those among themselves;

Having served as a member of Cong? through the period between
Mar. 1780 & the arrival of peace in 1783, I had become intimately ac-
quainted with the public distresses and the causes of them. I had ob-
served the successful opposition to every attempt to procure a remedy
by new grants of power to Cong? I had founnd moreover that despair
of success hung over the compromising provision ' of April 1783 for
the public necessities which had been so elaborately planned, and so
impressively recommended to the States.* Sympathizing, under this

*See address of Congress.”

 

1The word “principle” is substituted for “ provision ” in the transcript.
? This footnote is omitted in the transcript.
6 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

aspect of affairs, in the alarm of the friends of free Gov‘, at the
threatened danger of an abortive result to the great & perhaps last
experiment in its favour, I could not be insensible to the obligation to
co-operate 1 as far as I could in averting the calamity. With this view
I acceded to the desire of my fellow Citizens of the County that I
should be one of its representatives in the Legislature, hoping that
I might there best contribute to inculcate the critical posture to which
the Revolutionary cause was reduced, and the merit of a leading
agency of the State in bringing about a rescue of the Union and the
blessings of liberty a? staked on it, from an impending catastrophe.

It required but little time after taking my seat in the House of
Delegates in May 1784 to discover that, however favorable the general
disposition of the State might be towards the Confederacy the Legis-
lature retained the aversion of its predecessors to transfers of power
from the State to the Gov! of the Union; notwithstanding the urgent
demands of the Federal Treasury; the glaring inadequacy of the
authorized mode of supplying it, the rapid growth of anarchy. in the
Fed! System, and the animosity kindled among the States by their
conflicting regulations.

The temper of the Legislature & the wayward course of its pro-
ceedings may be gathered from the Journals of its Sessions in the
years 1784 & 1785.

The failure however of the varied propositions in the Legislature,
for enlarging the powers of Congress, the continued failure of the
efforts of Cong? to obtain from ther..-the means of providing for the
debts of the Revolution; and of countervailing the commercial laws
of G. B. a source of much irritation & ag‘t which the separate efforts of
the States were found worse than abortive; these Considerations with
the lights thrown on the whole subject, by the free & full discussion it
had undergone led to an * general acquiescence in the Resol” passed, on
the 21. of Jan? 1786. which proposed & invited a meeting of Deputies
from all the States to ‘‘ insert the Resol (See Journal.) 1.4

The resolution had been brought forward some weeks before on the
failure of a proposed grant of power to Congress to collect a revenue
from commerce, which had been abandoned by its friends in conse-
quence of material alterations made in the grant by a Committee of
the whole. The Resolution tho introduced by M? Tyler an influ-

 

*The word “aid” is substituted in the transcript for “co- m

* The word “a” is omitted in the transcript. P re

3 Ae ae “a” is substituted in the transcript for “an.” iS

“The phrase “to ‘insert the Resol. (See Journal ) 1” is omitted in th
transcript which substitutes the words “as follows: and i aeolian
which is printed in this volume at page xlvii. Sit net at ee eet op
PREFACE TO DEBATES 7

encial member, who having never served in Congress, had more the
ear of the House than those whose services there exposed them to an
imputable bias, was so little acceptable that it was not then persisted
in. Being now revived by him, on the last day of the Session, and
being the alternative of adjourning without any effort for the crisis in
the affairs of the Union, it obtained a general vote; less however with
some of its friends from a confidence in the success of the experiment
than from a hope that it might prove a step to a more comprehensive
& adequate provision for the wants of the Confederacy

It happened also that Commissioners who had been? appointed by
Virg? & Mary? to settle the jurisdiction on waters dividing the two
States had, apart from their official reports, recommended a uniformity
in the regulations of the 2 States on several subjects & particularly on
those having relation to foreign trade. It apeared at the same time
that Mary? had deemed a concurrence of her neighbors Pen? & Dela-
ware indispensable in such a case, who for like reasons would require
that of their neighbors. So apt and forceable an illustration of the
necessity of a uniformity throughout all the States could not but
favour the passage of a Resolution which proposed a Convention hav-
ing that for its object.

The commissioners appointed by the Legisl: & who attended the
Convention were EK. Randolph the Attorney of the State, St Geo:
Tucker & J. M.2 The designation of the time & place for its meeting
to be proposed and communicated to the States having been left to the
Com® they named for the time early * September and for the place the
City of Annapolis avoiding the residence of Cong? and large Commer-
cial Cities as liable to suspicions of an extraneous influence.

Altho the invited Meeting appeared to be generally favored, five
States only assembled; some failing to make appointments, and some
of the individuals appointed not hastening their attendance, the re-
sult in both cases being ascribed mainly, to a belief that the time had
not arrived for such a political reform, as might be expected from a
further experience of its necessity.

But in the interval between the proposal of the Convention and
the time of its meeting, such had been the advance of public opinion
in the desired direction, stimulated as it had been by the effect of
the contemplated object, of the meeting, in turning the genal at-
tention to the Critical State of things, and in calling forth the senti-
ments and exertions of the most enlightened & influencial patriots,

 

1The phrase “who had been” is omitted in the transcript.

? James Madison.
*In place of the word “early” the transcript reads “the first Monday in.”

t
8 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

that the Convention thin as it was did not scruple to decline the lim-
ited task assigned to it and to recommend to the States a Convention
with powers adequate to the occasion. Nor was it * unnoticed that the
commission of the N. Jersey Deputation, had extended its object to
a general provision for the exigencies of the Union. A recommenda-
tion for this enlarged purpose was accordingly reported by a Com?
to whom the subject had been referred. It was drafted by Col:
H. and finally agreed to unanimously® in the following form.
Insert it.*

The recommendation was well rec? by the Legislature of Virg?
which happened to be the first that acted on it, and the example of
her compliance was made as conciliatory and impressive as possible.
The Legislature were unanimous or very nearly so on the occasion,
and® as a proof of the magnitude & solemnity attached to it, they
placed Gen! W. at the head of the Deputation from the State; and as
a proof of the deep interest he felt in the case he overstepped the ob-
stacles to his acceptance of the appointment.

The law complying with the recommendation from Annapolis was
in the terms following: °

A resort to a General Convention to remodel the Confederacy, was
not a new idea. It had entered at an early date into the conversations
and speculations of the most reflecting & foreseeing observers of the
inadequacy of the powers allowed to Congress. In a pamphlet published
in May 81 at the seat of Cong? Pelatiah Webster an able tho’ not con-
spicuous Citizen, after discussing the fiscal system of the U. States,
and suggesting among other remedial provisions? including a national
Bank remarks that ‘‘ the Authority of Cong? at present is very in-
adequate to the performance of their duties; and this indicates the
necessity of their calling a Continental Convention for the express
purpose of ascertaining, defining, enlarging, and limiting, the duties
& powers of their Constitution.’’ ®

 

. Bs words “had it been” are substituted in the transcript for the words
was it.

2 Alexander Hamilton.

* The word “ unanimously ” is omitted in the transcript.

‘ Madison’s direction “Insert it” is omitted in the transcript, and there is
inserted the text of the proceedings and recommendation of the Annapolis
nee Ag ee ee ons Fg xlviii-lii. The transcript text begins with

e words “To the Honorable,” and concludes with the pa inni
“Though your Commissioners,” etc. Sey eee

° The word “and” is omitted in the transcript.

* The text of this law of October 16, 1786 (printed ante pages Ixviii-lxix) is
inserted in the transcript beginning with the words “Whereas, the Commission-
ers,” etc. and ending with the words “. . . States in the Union.”

™The word “one” is here inserted in the transcript.

* Madison was in error. The pamphlet was written by William Barton.
PREFACE TO DEBATES 9

On the 1. day of Ap! 1783, Col. Hamilton, in a debate in Cong?
observed that?

He alluded probably to [see Life of Schuyler in Longacre ?

It does not appear however that his expectation had been ful-
filled.]

In a letter to J. M. from R. H. Lee then President of Cong’ dated
Nov! 26, 1784 He says*

The answer of J. M. remarks *#

5 In 1785, Noah Webster whose pol. & other valuable writings had
made him known to the public, in one of his publications of American
policy brought into view the same resort for supplying the defects
of the Fed! System [see his life in Longacre]

The proposed & expected Convention at Annapolis the first of a

 

See Gaillard Hunt, “ Pelatiah Webster and the Constitution,” in The Nation,
December 28, 1911.

+The following is supplied in the transcript: “he wished instead of them
[partial Conventions] to see a general Convention take place; and that he
should soon, in pursuance of instructions from his constituents, propose to Con-
gress a plan for that purpose, the object [of which] would be to strengthen the
Federal Constitution.”—See The Writings of James Madison, Hunt, Editor,
Vol. I (1900), pp. 488, 439.

? The phrase “ [see Life of Schuyler in Longacre” is omitted in the tran-
script and the following quoted matter is substituted: “the resolutions intro-
duced by General Schuyler in the Senate, and passed unanimously by the
Legislature of New York in the summer of 1782, declaring, that the Confedera-
tion was defective, in not giving Congress power to provide a revenue for itself,
or in not investing them with funds from established and productive sources;
and that it would be advisable for Congress to recommend to the States to call
a general Convention to revise and amend the Confederation.”

The sketch is of Hamilton, not Schuyler, for which see The National Por-
trait Gallery of Distinguished Americans, conducted by Longacre and Herring,
Vol. II (1835), p. 7.

* The following sentence is supplied in the transcript: “It is by many here
suggested as a very necessary step for Congress to take, the calling on the
States to form a Convention for the sole purpose of revising the Confederation,
so far as to enable Congress to execute with more energy, effect and vigor the
powers assigned to it, than it appears by experience that they can do under the
present state of things.” The letter referred to is among the Madison papers in
the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.

*The transcript here inserts the following: “I hold it for a maxim, that
the Union of the States is essential to their safety against foreign danger and
internal contention; and that the perpetuity and efficacy of the present system
cannot be confided in. The question, therefore, is, in what mode, and at what
moment, the experiment for supplying the defects ought to be made.”—See,
also, The Writings of James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol. II (1901), pp. 99,
100.

*The paragraph beginning “In 1785” reads as follows in the transcript:
“In the winter of 1784-5, Noah Webster, whose political and other valuable
writings had made him known to the public, proposed, in one of his publica-
tions, ‘a new system of government which should act, not on the States, but
directly on individuals, and vest in Congress full power to carry its laws into
effect.’ ” ;

See, also, The National Portrait Gallery of Distinguished Americans, con-
ducted by Longacre and Herring, Vol. II (1835), p. 4.
10 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

general character that appears to have been realized, & the state of
the public mind awakened by it had attracted the particular attention
of Cong? and favored the idea there of a Convention with fuller pow-
ers for amending the Confederacy.*

It does not appear that in any of these cases, the reformed system
was to be otherwise sanctioned than. by the Legislative auth’ of the
States; nor whether or how far, a change was to be made in the
structure of the Depository of Federal powers.

The act of Virg? providing for the Convention at Philad’, was
succeeded by appointments from? other States as their Legislatures
were assembled, the appointments being selections from the most ex-
perienced & highest standing Citizens. Rh. I. was the only exception
to a compliance with the recommendation from Annapolis, well known
to have been swayed by an obdurate adherence to an advantage which
her position gave her of taxing her neighbors thro’ their consump-
tion of imported supplies, an advantage which it was foreseen
would be taken from her by a revisal of the ‘‘ Articles of Confedera-
tion

As the pub. mind had been ripened for a salutary Reform of the
pol. System, in the interval between the proposal & the meeting, of
Com" at Annapolis, the interval between the last event, and the meet-
ing of Dep at Phil? had continued to develop more & more the neces-
sity & the extent of a Systematic provision for the preservation and
Govi of the Union; among the ripening incidents was the Insurrec-
tion of Shays,* in Mass‘? against her Gov’; which was with difficulty
suppressed, notwithstanding the influence on the insurgents of an
apprehended interposition of the Fed! troops.

At the date of the Convention, the aspect & retrospect of the pol:
condition of the U. 8. could not but fill the pub. mind with a gloom
which was relieved only by a hope that so select a Body would devise
an adequate remedy for the existing and prospective evils so im-
pressively demanding it

It was seen that the public debt rendered so sacred by the cause
in which it had been incurred remained without any provision for its
payment. The reiterated and elaborate efforts of Cong. to procure
from the States a more adequate power to raise the means of payment
had failed. The effect of the ordinary requisitions of Congress had

 

*In the transcript after the word “Confederacy” the followin
is inserted: “ The letters of Wm. Grayson, March "bed, 1786, Dara
Monroe, of April 28th, 1786, both then members, to Mr. Madison state that a
proposition for such a Convention had been made.” ;

*The word “the” is inserted in the transcript after “from.”

* The final “s” is crossed off the word “Shays” in the transcript.
PREFACE TO DEBATES 11

only displayed the inefficiency + of the auth’ making them; none of the
States having duly complied with them, some having failed altogether
or nearly so; and ? in one instance, that of N. Jersey * a compliance was
expressly ¢ refused; nor was more yielded to the expostulations of
members of Cong? deputed to her Legislature, than a mere repeal of
the law, without a compliance. [see letter of Grayson to J. M.5

The want of Auth’ in Cong? to regulate Commerce had produced in
Foreign nations particularly G. B. a monopolizing policy injurious to
the trade of the U. S. and destructive to their navigation; the im-
becilicity and anticipated dissolution of the Confederacy extinguish?
all apprehensions of a Countervailing policy on the part of the U.
States

The same want of a general power over Commerce, led to an exercise
of the power separately, by the States, w™ not only proved abortive,
but engendered rival, conflicting and angry regulations. Besides the
vain attempts to supply their respective treasuries by imposts, which
turned their commerce into the neighbouring ports, and to co-erce a
relaxation of the British monopoly of the W. Ind? navigation, which
was attempted by Virg? [see the Journal of ]® the States having
ports for foreign commerce, taxed & irritated the adjoining
States, trading thro’ them, as N. Y. Pen’? Virg* & 8S. Carolina.
Some of the States, as Connecticut, taxed imports? as from Mass®

 

+The transcript substitutes the word “inefficacy” for the word “ inef-
ficiency ” but the Gilpin edition prints the word as in the original notes.

? In the transcript the word “and” is crossed out and the word “which*'
written above it.

* After the word “Jersey,” reference is made in the transcript to the fol-
lowing footnote: “A letter of Mr. Grayson to Mr. Madison of March 22d, 1786,
telating the conduct of New Jersey states this fact. Editor.”

‘The word “expressly ” is italicized in the transcript.

° The phrase “ [see letter of Grayson to J. M.” is omitted in the transcript.
An extract from the letter referred to reads as follows: “The Antients were
surely men of more candor than we are; they contended openly for an abolition
of debts in so many words, while we strive as hard for the same thing under
the decent & specious pretense of a circulating medium. . . There has been
some serious thoughts in the minds of some of the members of Congress to
recommend to the States the meeting of a general Convention, to consider, of
an alteration of the Confederation, & there is a motion to this effect now under
consideration: it is contended that the present Confederation is utterly inef-
ficient, and that if it remains much longer in it’s present state of imbecility
we shall be one of the most contemptible nations on the face of the earth.”—
Letter from William Grayson to James Madison, March 22, 1786. The Madison
Papers (manuscript), Library of Congress.

*In the transcript the footnote “See the Journal of her Legislature” is
substituted for the phrase in brackets. The allusion is to the act of the Virginia
Assembly passed January 21, 1786, imposing a tonnage tax of 5s. on vessels of
foreigners.

7 After the word “imports” down to the sentence beginning, “In sundry
instances,” the transcript reads “from others, as from Mass., which complained
in a letter to the Executive of Virginia, and doubtless to those of other States.”
12 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

higher than imports even from G. B. of w® Mass complained
to Virg? and doubtless to other States. [See letter of J. M. In
sundry instances as of N. Y. N. J. P? & Mary? [see ]? the naviga-
tion laws treated the Citizens? other States as aliens.

In certain cases the auth’ of the Confederacy was disregarded, as
in violations not only of the Treaty of peace; but of Treaties with
France & Holland, which were complained of to Cong?

In other cases the Fed! Auth? was violated by Treaties & wars with
Indians, as by Geo: by troops raised & kept up with! the consent of
Cong? as by Mass® by compacts with! the consent of Cong? as between
Pen? and N. Jersey, and between Virg? & Mary’ From the Legisl:
Journals of Virg* it appears, that a vote refusing to apply for a
sanction of Cong? was followed by. a vote ag% the communication of
the Compact to Cong?

In the internal administration of the States a violation of Con-
tracts had become familiar in the form of depreciated paper made a
legal tender, of property substituted for money, of Instalment laws,
and of the occlusions of the Courts of Justice; although evident that
all such interferences affected the rights of other States, relatively
ereditor,* as well as Citizens Creditors within the State

Among the defects which had been severely felt was that of a uni-
formity in cases requiring it, as laws of naturalization,’ bankruptcy,
a Coercive authority operating on individuals and a guaranty of the
internal tranquility of the States.

As natural consequences ° of this distracted and disheartening con-
dition of the union, the Fed* Auth? had ceased to be respected abroad,
and dispositions* shewn there, particularly in G. B., to take ad-
vantage of its imbecility, and to speculate on its approaching down-
fall; at home it had lost all confidence & credit; the unstable and un-
just career of the States had also forfeited the respect & confidence
essential to order and good Govt, involving a general decay of con-
fidence & credit between man & man. It was found moreover, that
those least partial to popular Govt, or most distrustful of its efficacy
were yielding to anticipations, that from an increase of the confusion a
Govi might result more congenial with their taste or their opinions;
The Writinge of Tomes Modioom Hint Walter, Vol ee La 1

? Madison’s direction “ [see _ |” is omitted in the transcript.

* The word “of” is inserted in the transcript after “Citizens.”

‘The word “creditor” is plural in the transcript.

°The word “and” is inserted in the transcript after “ naturalization.”

°The words “a natural 2 i i i
z a consequence ” are substituted in the transcript for
natural consequences.

"The word “were” is inserted in the transcript after “dispositions.”
PREFACE TO DEBATES 13

whilst those most devoted to the principles and forms of Republics,
were alarmed for the cause of liberty itself, at stake in the American
Experiment, and anxious for a system that w! avoid the inefficacy of a
mere confederacy without passing into the opposite extreme of a
consolidated gov! it was known that there were individuals who had
betrayed a bias towards Monarchy [see Knox to G. W. & him to
Jay] (Marshall’s life) and there had always been some not unfavor-
able to a partition of the Union into several Confederacies; either
from a better chance of figuring on a Sectional Theatre, or that the
Sections would require stronger Gov’, or by their hostile conflicts lead
to a monarchical consolidation. The idea of a? dismemberment had
recently made its appearance in the Newspapers.

Such were the defects, the deformities, the diseases and the ominous
prospects, for which the Convention were to provide a remedy, and
which ought never to be overlooked in expounding & appreciating the
Constitutional Charter the remedy that was provided.

As a sketch on paper, the earliest perhaps of a Constitutional
Gov: for the Union [organized into the regular Departments with
physical means operating on individuals] to be sanctioned by the peo-
ple of the States, acting in their original & sovereign character, was
contained in? a letter of Apl. 8. 1787 from J. M. to Gov! Randolph, a
copy of the letter is here inserted.

The feature in the letter * which vested in the general Authy. a
negative on the laws of the States, was suggested by the negative in the
head of the British Empire, which prevented collisions between the
parts & the whole, and between the parts themselves. It was supposed
that the substitution, of an elective and responsible authority for an
hereditary and irresponsible one, would avoid the appearance even
of a departure from the principle of ° Republicanism. But altho’ the
subject was so viewed in the Convention, and the votes on it were more
than once equally divided, it was finally & justly abandoned see note

 

2 This direction in Madison’s notes is omitted in the transcript. His refer-
ence was to The Life of George Washington, by John Marshall, Vol. V (1807),
pp. 91 et seg. For the text of the correspondence in question, see Appendix to
Debates, I, Nos. 1, 2 and 3, pp. 585-588.

? The word “a” is omitted in the transcript.

* The phrase beginning with the words “a letter” down to the end of the
paragraph is changed in the transcript to read as follows: “the letters of
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson of the nineteenth of March; to Governor
Randolph of the eighth of April; and to General Washington of the sixteenth
of April, 1787, for which see these respective dates.”

For the material portions of these letters see Appendix to Debates, II,
Nos. 1, 2 and 3, pp. 589-595.

*The words “the letter” have been changed to “these letters” in the
transcript.

5 he words “the principle of ” are omitted in the transcript.
14 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

for for this erasure substitute the amend! marked * for this page?
[as, apart from other objections, it was not practicable among so many
states, increasing in number, and enacting, each of them, so many
laws. Instead of the proposed negative, the objects of it were left
as finally provided for in the Constitution. ] ?

On the arrival of the Virginia Deputies at Philad* it occurred to
them that from the early and prominent part taken by that State in
bringing about the Convention some initiative step might be expected
from them. The Resolutions introduced by Governor Randolph were
the result of a Consultation on the subject; with an understanding
that they left all the Deputies entirely open to the lights of discussion,
and free to concur in any alterations or modifications which their re-
flections and judgments might approve. The Resolutions as the
Journals shew became the basis on which the proceedings of the Con-
vention commenced, and to the developments, variations and modifica-
tions of which the plan of Gov! proposed by the Convention may be
traced.

The curiosity I had felt during my researches into the History of
the most distinguished Confederacies, particularly those of antiquity,
and the deficiency I found in the means of satisfying it more especially
in what related to the process, the principles, the reasons, & the an-
ticipations, which prevailed in the formation of them, determined me
to preserve as far as I could an exact. account of what might pass in
the Convention whilst executing its trust, with the magnitude of
which I was duly impressed, as I was with * the gratification promised
to future curiosity by an authentic exhibition of the objects, the opin-
ions, & the reasonings from which the new System of Gov! was to
receive its peculiar structure & organization. Nor was I unaware of
the value of such a contribution to the fund of materials for the His-
tory of a Constitution on which would be staked the happiness of a
people great even in its infancy, and possibly the cause of Liberty
throught the world.

In pursuance of the task I had assumed I chose a seat in front of
the presiding member, with the other members on my right & left
hands. In this favorable position for hearing all that passed, I noted
in terms legible & in abreviations & marks intelligible to myself what
was read from the Chair or spoken by the members; and losing not
a moment unnecessarily between the adjournment & reassembling of

*The words “see note for for this erasure substitute the amendt
marked * for this page” are omitted in the transcript. ;
__, The passage enclosed in brackets is copied from the transcript. The
original notes appear to have been lost since Gilpin’s edition.
* The word “ by” is substituted in the transcript for “ with.”
PREFACE TO DEBATES 15

the Convention I was enabled to write out my daily notes [see page
18—* during the session or within a few finishing days after its close—
see pa. 18? in the extent and form preserved in my own hand on my
files.

In the labour & correctness of doing ® this, I was not a little aided
by practice & by a familiarity with the style and the train of ob-
servation & reasoning which characterized the principal speakers. It
happened, also that I was not absent a single day, nor more than a
cassual fraction of an hour in any day, so that I could not have lost
a single speech, unless a very short one. Insert the Remark on the —
slip of paper marked A ‘*

[It may be proper to remark, that, with a very few exceptions, the
speeches were neither furnished, nor revised, nor sanctioned, by the
speakers, but written out from my notes, aided by the freshness of my
recollections. A further remark may be proper, that views of the
subject might occasionally be presented in the speeches and pro-
ceedings, with a latent reference to a compromise on some middle
ground, by mutual concessions. The exceptions alluded to were,—
first, the sketch furnished by Mr. Randolph of his speech on the in-
troduction of his propositions, on the twenty-ninth day of May;
secondly, the speech of Mr. Hamilton, who happened to call on me
when putting the last hand to it, and who acknowledged its fidelity,
without suggesting more than a very few verbal alterations which
were made; thirdly, the speech of Gouverneur Morris on the second
day of May, which was communicated to him on a like occasion, and
who acquiesced in it without even a verbal change. The correctness of
his language and the distinctness of his enunciation were particularly
favorable to a reporter. The speeches of Doctor Franklin, excepting
a few brief ones, were copied from the written ones read to the Con-
vention by his colleague, Mr. Wilson, it being inconvenient to the
Doctor to remain long on his feet.] °

Of the ability & intelligence of those who composed the Con-
vention, the debates & proceedings may be a test; as the character
of the work which was the offspring of their deliberations must be
tested by the experience of the future, added to that of the nearly
half century which has passed.®

 

1 Madison’s direction “ [see page 18-” is omitted in the transcript.

2 Madison’s direction “see pa. 18” is omitted in the transcript.

* The word “doing” is omitted in the transcript.

* Madison’s direction “Insert the Remark,” etc. is omitted in the transcript.

*The passage enclosed in brackets is copied from the transcript. The
original notes appear to have been lost since Gilpin’s edition.

¢The phrase “of the nearly half century” is changed to “of nearly half a
century ” in the transcript.
16 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

But whatever may be the judgment pronounced on the competency
of the architects of the Constitution, or whatever may be the destiny,
of the edifice prepared by them, I feel it a duty to express my pro-
found & solemn conviction, derived from my intimate opportunity
of observing & appreciating the views of the Convention, collectively
& individually, that there never was an assembly of men, charged with
a great & arduous trust, who were more pure in their motives, or
more exclusively or anxiously [devoted to the object committed
to them, than were the members of the Federal Convention of 1787,
to the object of devising and proposing a constitutional system
which would best supply the defects of that which it was to replace,
and best secure the permanent liberty and happiness of their
country.] 2

 

_ , The passage enclosed in brackets is copied from the transcript. The
original notes appear to have been lost since Gilpin’s edition.
 

 

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1 Monday May 14" 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the
deputies in Convention for revising the federal system of Government.
On that day a small number only had assembled. Seven States were
not convened till,

Friday 25 of May, when the following members? appeared to wit:
see Note A.®

viz,? From Massachussetts Rufus King. N. York Robert Yates,*
Alex? Hamilton. N. Jersey, David Brearly, William Churchill Hous-
ton,* William Patterson. Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, Thomas Fitz-
simmons, James Wilson, Govurneur Morris. Delaware, George
Read, Richard Basset,* Jacob Broome. Virginia, George Washington,
Edmund Randolph, John Blair, James Madison, George Mason,
George Wythe, * James M°Clurg. WN. Carolina, Alexander Martin,
William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs Spaight,* Hugh William-
son. 8S. Carolina, John Rutlidge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,
Charles Pinckney,* Pierce Butler. Georgia, William Few.

M: Ropert Morris informed the members assembled that by the in-
struction & in behalf, of the deputation of Pen? he proposed George
Washington Esq’ late Commander in chief for president of the Con-
vention.» M= Jn? Rutiiwce seconded the motion; expressing his con-
fidence that the choice would be unanimous, and observing that the
presence of Gen! Washington forbade any observations on the occa-
sion which might otherwise be proper.

General WasHINGTON was accordingly unanimously elected by

 

1 The text of the present edition of Madison’s Debates has been read against
the manuscript of the transcript in the Library of Congress, and every differ-
ence between Madison’s original manuscript and the transcript has been noted
except typographical differences such as capitalization, spelling (including ab-
breviation of words and figures), punctuation and paragraphing.

The word “ Debates” is used as a heading in the transcript.

* Madison is not uniform in the spelling of proper names, but the correct
form in each instance is to be found in the credentials of the delegates, pp.
Ivi-lxxxii.

* The words “to wit: see Note A. viz,” are omitted in the transcript.

*The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.

*'The paragraph in brackets beginning with the words “The nomination”
and ending with the word “house” (page 18) is printed as a footnote in the
transcript with reference mark after the word “ Convention.”

17
18 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ballot, and conducted to the Chair by M! R. Morris and M! Rutlidge;
from which in a very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention
for the honor they had conferred on him, reminded them of the
novelty of the scene of business in which he was to act, lamented
his want of better qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of the
House towards the involuntary errors which his inexperience might
occasion.

1 [The nomination came with particular grace from Penna. as Doc:
Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Doc’
was himself to have made the nomination of General Washington,
but the state of the weather and of his health confined him to his
house. ]

M" WiLson moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated
M! Temple Franklin.

Col Hamr.ton nominated Major Jackson.

On the ballot Maj! Jackson had 5 votes & M! Franklin 2 votes.

On reading the credentials of the deputies it was noticed that
those from Delaware were prohibited from changing the article in
the Confederation establishing an equality of votes among the States.

The appointment of a Committee, consisting of Mess* Wythe,
Hamilton & C. Pinckney, on the motion of M! C. Pinckney,’ to prepare
standing rules & orders was the only remaining step taken on this
day.

Monpay May 283—

*From Mass’ Nat: Gorham & Caleb Strong. From Connecticut
Oliver Elseworth. From Delaware, Gunning Bedford. From Mary-
land James M‘Henry. From Penn? B. Franklin, George Clymer,
Th? Mifflin & Jared Ingersol took their seats.

M: Wyrue from the Committee for preparing rules made a report
which employed the deliberations of this day.

M: Kine objected to one of the rules in the Report authorising
any member to call for the yeas & nays and have them entered on
the minutes. He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not
to bind the Constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence
of the votes; and improper as changes of opinion would be frequent

 

*See footnote * on page 17.

*The phrase “on the motion of Mr. C. Pinckney” is transposed in the
transcript so that it reads: “The appointment of a Committee, an the motion
of Mr. C. Pinckney, consisting,” ete.

* The year “1787” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The words “ In Convention” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, MAY 28, 1787 19

in the course of the business & would fill the minutes with contra-
dictions.

Col. Mason seconded the objection; adding that such a record
of the opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of
them on conviction; and in case of its being hereafter promulged
must furnish handles to the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting.

The proposed rule was rejected nem. contradicente. The standing
rules *+ agreed to were as follow: [see the Journal & copy here the
printed rules] ?

[viz. §.A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not
less than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the
greater number of these which shall be fully represented: but a less
number than seven may adjourn from day to day.

Immediately after the President shall have taken the chair, and
the members their seats, the minutes of the preceding day shall be
read by the Secretary.

Every member, rising to speak, shall address the President; and
whilst he shall be speaking, none shall pass between them, or hold
discourse with another, or read a book, pamphlet or paper, printed
or manuscript—and of two members rising* at the same time, the
President shall name him who shall be first heard.

A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without special
leave, upon the same question; and not the second time, before every
other, who had been silent, shall have been heard, if he choose to
speak upon the subject.

A motion made and seconded, shall be repeated, and if written,
as it shall be when any member shall so require, read aloud by the

*Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the rule by which
they ought to vote in the Convention had been made a subject of conversation
among the members present. It was pressed by Governeur Morris and favored
by Robert Morris and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States should
unite in firmly refusing to the small states an equal vote, as unreasonable,
and as enabling the small States to negative every good system of Government,
which must in the nature of things, be founded on a violation of that equality.
The members from Virginia, conceiving that such an attempt might beget fatal
altercations between the large & small States, and that it would be easier to
prevail on the latter, in the course of the deliberations, to give up their equality
for the sake of an effective Government, than on taking the field of discussion
to disarm themselves of the right & thereby throw themselves on the mercy of
the large States, discountenanced & stifled the project.

 

1 Madison’s footnote reference mark after the word “rules” is placed in the
transcript after the word “him” (page 20) thus placing the footnote at the
end of the rules instead of at the beginning.

? Madison’s direction is omitted from the transcript and the word “ Rules ”
is inserted.

® The word “viz.” is omitted in the transcript.

‘The words “to speak ” are inserted in the transcript after “ rising.”
20 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Secretary, before it shall be debated; and may be withdrawn at any
time, before the vote upon it shall have been declared.

Orders of the day shall be read next after the minutes, and either
discussed or postponed, before any other business shall be introduced.

When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other than
to amend the question, to commit it, or to postpone the debate shall
be received. ]

[A question which is complicated, shall, at the request of any mem-
ber, be divided, and put separately on* the propositions, of which it
is compounded.

The determination of a question, altho’ fully debated, shall be
postponed, if the deputies of any State desire it until the next day.

A writing which contains any matter brought on to be considered,
shall be read once throughout for information, then by paragraphs
to be debated, and again, with the amendments, if any, made on the
second reading; and afterwards, the question shall be put on? the
whole, amended, or approved in its original form, as the case shall be.

2 Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and? the members who
have the greatest number of ballots, altho’ not a majority of the
votes present, shall * be the Committee— When two or more members
have an equal number of votes, the member standing first on the
list in the order of taking down the ballots, shall be preferred.

A member may be called to order by any other member, as well
as by the President; and may be allowed to explain his conduct or
expressions supposed to be reprehensible— And all questions of
order shall be decided by the President without appeal or debate.

Upon a question to adjourn for the day, which may be made at
any time, if it be seconded, the question shall be put without a
debate.

When the House shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his
place, until the President pass him.]*

A letter from sundry persons of the State of Rho. Island addressed
to the Honorable > The Chairman of the General Convention was pre-
sented to the Chair by M! Gov! Morris, and being read, was ordered
to lie on the table for further consideration. [For the letter see Note
in the Appendix]®

en eee eee

* The word “shall” is omitted in the transcript.
* See footnote * on page 19.

* The words “the Honorable ” are omitted in the transcript.
*The footnote in the transcript reads as follows: “For the letter, see

Appendix No. blank.” The text referred to i i i i
coe Ge oe ed to is printed in the Appendix to
SESSION OF TUESDAY, MAY 29, 1787 21

M: Butter moved that the House provide ag% interruption of
business by absence of members, and against licentious publications
of their proceedings—to which was added by—M« SpaigutT—a motion
to provide that on the one hand the House might not be precluded
by a vote upon any question, from revising the subject matter of
it, when they see cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily
to rescind a decision, which was the result of mature discussion.—
Whereupon it was ordered that these motions be referred to? the
consideration of the Committee appointed to draw up the standing
rules and that the Committee make report thereon.

Adjé till tomorrow 2 10. OClock.

Turspay May 29.3

John Dickenson, and Elbridge Gerry, the former from Delaware,
the latter from Mass‘® took their seats. The following rules were
added, on the report of M: Wythe from the Committee [see the
Journal ]—*

Additional rules. [see preceding page]*

That no member be absent from the House, so as to interrupt the
representation of the State, without leave.

That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall be or ought
to be, sitting.

That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the
sitting of the House without leave of the House.

That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.

That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise pub-
lished or communicated without leave.

That a motion to reconsider a matter which had ® been determined
by a majority, may be made, with leave unanimously given, on the
same day on which the vote passed; but otherwise not without one
day’s previous notice: in which last case, if the House agree to the
reconsideration, some future day shall be assigned for the® purpose.

M: C. PINKNEY moved that a Committee be appointed to super-
intend the Minutes.

 

The word “for” is substituted in the transcript for the word “to.”

? The word “at” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The words “In Convention” are here inserted in the transcript.

*Madison’s directions “ [see the Journal]—” and “ [see preceding page] ”
are omitted in the transcript as are also the words “ Additional rules.”

° The word “has” is substituted in the transcript for “had.”

° The word “that” is substituted in the transcript for “the.”
22 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Gov! Morris objected to it. The entry of the proceedings of
the Convention belonged to the Secretary as their impartial officer.
A committee might have an interest & bias in moulding the entry.
according to their opinions and wishes.

The motion was negatived, 5 noes, 4 ays.

M: RanpoupH then opened the main business.

[Here insert his speech * including his resolutions. ] ?

(ME R. Speech A. to be inserted Tuesday May 29)?

He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than

those, who were of longer standing in life and political experience,
to open the great subject of their mission. But, as the convention
had originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed that some
proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task
on him.

He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity
of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American
downfal.

He observed that in revising the foederal system we ought to
inquire 1.° into the properties, which such a government ought to
possess, 2.° the defects of the confederation, 3.° the danger of our situa-
tion & 4. the remedy.

1. The Character of such a government ought to secure 1.* against
foreign invasion: 2.3 against dissentions between members of the
Union, or seditions in particular states: 3.° to procure to the several
States, various blessings, of which an isolated situation was incapable:
4.4 to be able to defend itself against incroachment: & 5.° to be para-
mount to the state constitutions.

2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed
a high respect for its authors, and considered them, as having done
all that patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of
constitutions, & of confederacies,—when the inefficiency of requisi-
tions was unknown—no commercial discord had arisen among any
states—no rebellion had appeared as in Mass**—foreign debts had not
become urgent—the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen—
treaties had not been violated—and perhaps nothing better could be
obtained from the jealousy of the states with regard to their sover-
eignty.

 

* The speech is in Randolph’s handwriting.
? Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.

* The figures indicated by the reference mark * are ch i i
to “first,” “secondly,” “thirdly,” ete. ort eee tucteeaer at

*The words “it should” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, MAY 29, 1787 23

He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: 1.1 that the con-
federation produced no security against foreign invasion; congress
not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their own
authority—Of this he cited many examples; most of which tended
to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the
law of nations, to be punished: that particular states might by their
conduct provoke war without controul; and that neither militia nor
draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, inlistments only
could be successful, and these could not be executed without money.

2.1 that the federal government could not check the quarrels
between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power
nor means to interpose according to the exigency:

3.1 that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might
acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation—such as
a productive impost—counteraction of the commercial regulations of
other nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum—&c &c.

4.1 that the federal government could not defend itself against
the? incroachments from the states.

5.1 that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions,
ratified, as it was in may of the states.

3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation,*? appealed to the
sense of the best friends of the U. S.—the prospect of anarchy from
the laxity of government every where; and to other considerations.

4. He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said
must be the republican principle

He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolu-
tions, which he explained one by one [Here insert ye Resolutions
annexed ].*

RESOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY M! RANDOLPH IN CONVENTION
May 29, 1787.4

1. Resolved that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so
corrected & enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their
institution; namely, ‘‘ common defence, security of liberty and gen-
eral welfare.’’

2. Res? therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National Legis-
lature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or to

 

1 The figures indicated by the reference mark * are changed in the transcript
to “ First,” “ Secondly,” ete.

* The word “the” is crossed out in the transcript.

*The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘This direction and the heading are omitted in the transcript.
24 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may
seem best in different cases.

3. Res? that the National Legislature ought to consist of two
branches.

4. Res? that the members of the first branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States
every for the term of ; to be of the age of
years at least, to receive liberal stipends by which they may be
compensated for the devotion of their time to* public service; to be
ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under
the authority of the United States, except those beculiarly belonging
to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and
for the space of after its expiration; to be incapable of re-
election for the space of after the expiration of their term of
service, and to be subject to recall.

5. Resol? that the members of the second branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper
number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of
the age of years at least; to hold their offices for a term
sufficient to ensure their independency ;* to receive liberal stipends,
by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to
public service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a par-
ticular State, or under the authority of the United States, except
those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch,
during the term of service, and for the space of after the ex-
piration thereof.

6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of origi-
nating Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be impowered
to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confedera-
tion & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States
are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may
be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative
all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of
the National Legislature the articles of Union;* and to call forth
the force of the Union ag any member of the Union failing to fulfill
its duty under the articles thereof.

7. Res? that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by

 

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “ independency ” is changed to “ independence” in the t¢: i
* The word “the” is here inserted in the feet ee

“The phrase “or any treaty subsistin der th i ion”
is here added in the transcript. : GAs ge rere Nar tee
SESSION OF TUESDAY, MAY 29, 1787 25

the National Legislature for the term of years,’ to receive
punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services
rendered, in which no increase or? diminution shall be made so as
to affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or dimi-
nution, and to be ineligible a second time; and that besides a general
authority to execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Execu-
tive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation.

8. Res? that the Executive and a convenient number of the
National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with
authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before
it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a
Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said
Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National
Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be
again negatived by of the members of each branch.

9. Res? that a National Judiciary be established to consist of
one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen
by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good be-
haviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensa-
tion for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be
made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such
increase or diminution. that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribu-
nals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the
supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all
piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases
in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such juris-
dictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the
National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and ques-
tions which may involve the national peace and harmony.

10. Resolv? that provision ought to be made for the admission of
States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether
from a voluntary junction of Government & Territory or otherwise,
with the consent of a number of voices in the National legislature
less than the whole.

11. Res? that a Republican Government & the territory of each
State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government
& territory, ought to be guarantied by the United States to each
State

12. Res? that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after

 

1The word “years” is omitted in the transcript.
2The word “or” is changed to “nor” in the transcript.
26 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the
completion of all their engagements.

13. Res? that provision ought to be made for the amendment of
the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the
assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.

14, Res? that the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within
the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles
of Union

15. Res? that the amendments which shall be offered to the Con-
federation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or times,
after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or
assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the several Legis-
latures to be expressly chosen by the people, to consider & decide
thereon.?

He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present oppor-
tunity of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty
in the U. S. to pass away unimproved.*

It was then Resolved—That the House will tomorrow resolve
itself into a Committee of the Whole House to consider of the state
of the American Union.—and that the propositions moved by M?
Randolph be referred to the said Committee.

M: CuHaries Pinkney laid before the house the draught of a
federal Government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between
the free and independent States of America.®—M? P. plan‘ ordered

*This Abstract of the speech was furnished to J. M. by Mr Randolph and
is in his handwriting. * As a report of it from him had been relied on, it was
omitted by J. M.

 

1 The fifteen resolutions, constituting the “ Virginia Plan,” are in Madison’s
handwriting.

? This sentence is omitted in the transcript.

* Robert Yates, a delegate from New York, gives the following account of
Pinckney’s motion: “ Mr. C. Pinkney, a member from South-Carolina, then added,
that he had reduced his ideas of a new government to a system, which he read,
and confessed that it was grounded on the same principle as of the above resolu-
tions.” (Secret Proceedings of the Federal Convention (1821), p. 97.)

“The words, “Mr. P. plan,” are omitted in the transcript, and what pur-
ports to be the plan itself is here inserted.

Madison himself did not take a copy of the draft nor did Pinckney furnish
him one, as he did a copy of his speech which he later delivered in the Convention
and which is printed as a part of the debates (session of Monday, June 25),
infra, pp. 155-161, and Madison’s note, p. 161. Many years later, in 1818, when
John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, was preparing the Journal of the
Convention for publication, he wrote to Pinckney, requesting a copy of his plan,
and, in compliance with this request, Pinckney sent him what purported to be

the draft, but which appears to have been a copy of the report of the Committee |'

- nee eh lees & oe i we certain alterations and additions. The alleged
raft an inckney’s letter transmitting it were written i
the water-mark, “ Russell & Co. 1797.” . ee eee
The Pinckney draft was not debated; it was neither used in the Committee
of the Whole nor in the Convention. It was however referred to the Committee
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1787 27

that the same be referred to the Committee of the Whole appointed
to consider the state of the American Union.
adjourned.

‘WEDNEsDAY May 30.

Roger Sherman (from Connecticut) took his seat.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the State of
the Union. M! Gorham was elected to the Chair by Ballot.

The propositions of M! RanpotPH which had been referred to
the Committee being taken up. He moved on the suggestion of M
G. Morris, that the first of his propositions to wit ‘‘ Resolved that the
articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged, as to
accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, common
defence, security of liberty & general welfare: 1—should be postponed,
in order to consider the 3 following:

1. that a Union of the States merely federal will not accomplish
the objects proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely com-
mon defence, security of liberty, & gen! welfare.

2. that no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States,
as individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient.

3. that a national Government ought to be established consisting
of a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.

The motion for postponing was seconded by M! Gov: Morris and
unanimously agreed to.

Some verbal criticisms were raised ag’ the first proposition, and
it was agreed on motion of M: ButTLER seconded by M! Ranpo.pH, to
pass on to the third, which underwent a discussion, less however on
its general merits than on the force and extent of the particular
terms national & supreme.

M: Cuartes PinkKNEY wished to know of M® Randolph whether
he meant to abolish the State Govern’ altogether. M! R. replied that

 

of Detail, which appears to have made some use of it, as extracts from it have
been identified by J. Franklin Jameson and an outline of it discovered by
Andrew C. McLaughlin, among the papers and in the handwriting of James
Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania, deposited with the Pennsylvania His-
torical Society.

For the main features of this plan as reconstructed by Professor McLaughlin ©

according to Professor Jameson’s and his own discoveries, see Appendix to De- |,

bates, IV, No. 1, 596-598.

For the text of the Pinckney plan submitted to John Quincy Adams and
printed by him in the Journal of the Convention, for Madison’s observations
upon it and for further details concerning it, see Appendix to Debates, IV,
Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 600-607.

1 The resolution is italicized in the transcript.
28 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

he meant by these general propositions merely to introduce the par-
ticular ones which explained the outlines of the system he had in view.

M: Buruer said he had not made up his mind on the subject,
and was open to the light which discussion might throw on it. After
some general observations he concluded with saying that he had
opposed the grant of powers to Cong: heretofore, because the whole
power was vested in one body. The proposed distribution of the
powers into? different bodies changed the case, and would induce him
to go great lengths.

Gen! Pinkney expressed a doubt whether the act of Cong:
recommending the Convention, or the Commissions of the Deputies to
it, could 2 authorise a discussion of a System founded on different prin-
ciples from the federal Constitution.

M: Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt.

M: Gov! Morris explained the distinction between a federal and
national, supreme, Gov'; the former being a mere compact resting
on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat and
compulsive operation. He contended that in all Communities there
must be one supreme power, and one only.

ME Mason observed that the present confederation was not only *
deficient in not providing for coercion & punishment ag%* delinquent
States; but argued very cogently that punishment could not in the
nature of things be executed on the States collectively, and therefore
that such a Govt was necessary as could directly operate on individuals,
and would punish those only whose guilt required it.

M: SHerman who took his seat today,* admitted that the Con-
federation had not given sufficient power to Cong® and that additional
powers were necessary; particularly that of raising money which he
said would involve many other powers. He admitted also that the
General & particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent.
He seemed however not® be disposed to make too great inroads
on the existing system; intimating as one reason, that it would be
wrong to lose every amendment, by inserting such as would not be
agreed to by the States.

It was moved by M! Reap ® 24 by Mt Ch? Coreswortu PINKNEY,

 

1The word “with” is substituted in the transcript for “into.”

2 The word “would” is substituted in the transcript for “ could.”

*The words “not only” are transposed in the transcript, which reads as
follows: “Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present Confederation was
deficient.” . . .

‘The phrase “ who took his seat today” is omitted in the transcript.

*' The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1787 29

to_ postpone the 3° proposition last offered by M! Randolph viz that
a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme
Legislative Executive and Judiciary,’’ in order to take up the follow-
ing—viz. ‘‘ Resolved that in order to carry into execution the
Design of the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish
the objects proposed by the Confederation a more effective Govern-
ment consisting of a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary ought to
be established.’? The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost:

Yeas! Massachussetts, Connecticut, Delaware, S. Carolina—t 4
Nays.2, N. Y. Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina—? 4.

On the question as moved by M! Butler, on the third proposition
it was resolved in Committee of the whole that a national govern! ought
to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive &
Judiciary.’’ Mass® being ay—Connect.—no. N. York divided [Col.
Hamilton ay M™ Yates no] Pen? ay. Delaware ay. Virg* ay. N. C.
ay. S.C. ay.

[Note E] 4

Resol : 2. of M! R’s proposition towit—see May 29.4

The following Resolution, being the 2% of those proposed by M!
Randolph was taken up, viz—‘‘ that the rights of suffrage in the
National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of con-
tribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the
other rule may seem best in different cases.’’®

M= Manison observing that the words ‘‘ or to the number of free
tnhabitants,’’ might occasion debates which would divert the Com-
mittee from the general question whether the principle of representa-
tion should be changed, moved that they might be struck out.

M: Kine observed that the quotas of contribution which would
alone remain as the measure of representation, would not answer, |
because waving every other view of the matter, the revenue might
hereafter be so collected by the general Gov! that the sums respectively
drawn from the States would not appear; and would besides be con-
tinually varying.

M«= Mapison admitted the propriety of the observation, and that
some better rule ought to be found.

 

1The word “Yeas” is omitted in the transcript and the word “aye”
inserted before the figure “4.” : :

2The word “Nays” is omitted in the transcript and the word “no”
inserted before the figure “4.”

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—6; Connecticut, no—1; New
York, divided (Colonel Hamilton, aye, Mr. Yates, no).”

4 Madison’s direetion is omitted in the transcript.

* The resolution is italicized in the transcript.
30 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Col. HammtTon moved to alter the resolution so as to read ‘‘ that
the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be pro-
portioned to the number of free inhabitants. M: Spaicur 2% the
motion.

It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed, which was
agreed to.

M: RanpoupH and M! Mapison then moved the following resolu-
tion—‘‘ that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought
to be proportioned.”’

It was moved and 2%? to amend it by adding ‘‘ and not according
to the present system ’’—which was agreed to.

It was then moved and 2% to alter the resolution so as to read
‘< that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought not to
be according to the present system.”’

It was then moved & 2% to postpone the Resolution moved by
M" Randolph & M! Madison, which being agreed to:

M= Mapison, moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the fol.
lowing resolution—‘‘ that the equality of suffrage established by
the articles of Confederation ought not to prevail in the national
Legislature, and that an equitable ratio of representation ought
to be substituted.’? This was 2%4 by M! Gov! Morris, and being
generally relished, would have been agreed to; when,

M: Reep moved that the whole clause relating to the point of
Representation be postponed; reminding the Com’ that the deputies
from Delaware were restrained by their commission from assenting
to any change of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change
should be fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the
Convention.

M: Gov! Morris observed that the valuable assistance of those
members could not be lost without real concern, and that so early a
proof of discord in the Convention as a secession of a State, would
add much to the regret; that the change proposed was however so
fundamental an article in a national Gov! that it could not be dis-
pensed with.

M* Mapison observed that whatever reason might have existed
for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among
sovereign States, it must cease when a national Govermt should be
put into the place. In the former case, the acts of Cong! depended
so much for their efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these
had a weight both within & without Congress, nearly in proportion
to their extent and importance. In the latter case, as the acts of
the Gen! Gov't would take effect without the intervention of the State
SESSION OF THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1787 81

legislatures, a vote from a small State w? have the same efficacy &
importance as a vote from a large one, and there was the same reason
for different numbers of representatives from different States, as from
Counties of different extents within particular States. He suggested
as an expedient for at once taking the sense of the members on
this point and saving the Delaware deputies from embarrassment, that
the question should be taken in Committee, and the clause on report
to the House be postponed without a question there. This however
did not appear to satisfy M= Read.

By several it was observed that no just construction of the Act
of Delaware, could require or justify a secession of her deputies,
even if the resolution were to be carried thro’ the House as well as
the Committee. It was finally agreed however that the clause should
be postponed: it being understood that in the event the proposed
change of representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection
or difficulty being started from any other quarter than from
Delaware.

The motion of M: Read to postpone being agreed to,

The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported progress, and
the House having resolved to resume the subject in Committee to-
morrow,

Adjourned to 10 OClock.

Tuurspay May 311

William Pierce from Georgia took his seat.

In Committee of the whole on M! Randolph’s propositions.

The 34 Resolution ‘‘ that the national Legislature ought to con-
sist of two branches ’’ was agreed to without debate or dissent, except
that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Doct
Franklin who was understood to be partial to a single House of
Legislation.

Resol: 4.2 first clause ‘‘ that the members of the first branch of
the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the
several States ’’ being taken up,

M: SHERMAN opposed the election by the people, insisting that
it ought to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, im-

 

1The year “1787” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The transcript changes “ Resol: 4.” to “The fourth Resolution.”
32 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

mediately should have as little to do as may be about the Govern-
ment. They want information and are constantly liable to be
misled.

M: Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of
democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pre-
tended patriots. In Mass‘* it had been fully confirmed by experience
that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and o}"nions
by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one
on the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of
due provision for those employed in the administration of Governm!
It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public ser-
vants. He mentioned the popular clamour in Mass‘ for the reduction
of salaries and the attack made on that of the Gov: though secured
by the spirit of the Constitution itself. He had he said been too
republican heretofore: he was still however republican, but had been
taught by experience the danger of the levilling spirit.

M: Mason, argued strongly for an election of the larger branch
by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic
principle of the Gov! It was, so to speak, to be our House of Com-
mons—It ought to know & sympathise with every part of the com-
munity; and ought therefore to be taken not only from different
parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the
larger members of it, which had in several instances particularly
in Virg?, different interests and views arising from difference of
produce, of habits & &. He admitted that we had been too demo-
eratic but was afraid we s? incautiously run into the opposite ex-
treme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people.
He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes
of society to this dictate of humanity & policy; considering that how-
ever affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might
be, the course of a few years, not only might but certainly would,
distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society.
Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to
recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less care-
fully for the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest
orders of Citizens.

M: Wison contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous
branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for
raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that
reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible. No govern-
ment could long subsist without the confidence of the people. In
a republican Government this confidence was peculiarly essential):
SESSION OF THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1787 33

He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legis-
latures by making them the electors of the national Legislature. All
interference between the general and local Governm* should be
obviated as much as possible. On examination it would be found
that the opposition of States to federal measures had proceded
much more from the officers of the States, than from the people at
large.

M: Mapison considered the popular election of one branch of
the National Legislature as essential to every plan of free Govern-
ment. He observed that in some of the States one branch of the
Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people
by an intervening body of electors. That if the first branch of the
general legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the
second branch elected by the first—the Executive by the second
together with the first; and other appointments again made for sub-
ordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight
of _altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their
rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the e policy | \\
of refining the popular appointments by successive ssive filtrations, but
thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient tobe
resorted to “only in the appointment of ' the second branch of the
Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches _ “branches of tl the
Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would
be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation
of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars
of the Legislatures.

M: Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims
taken from the British constitution were often fallacious when
applied to our situation which was extremely different. Experience
he said had shewn that the State legislatures drawn immediately
from the people did not always possess their confidence. He had
no objection however to an election by the people if it were so qualified
that men of honor & character might not be unwilling to be joined in
the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate
a certain number out of which the State legislatures should be bound
to choose.

M Buruzr thought an election by the people an impracticable
mode.

On the question for an election of the first branch of the national
Legislature by the people,

Masst® ay. Connect div’ N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pen’ ay.
Delaw® divi Vt ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Georg? ay.

 

 
34 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

The remaining Clauses of Resolution 47 relating to the qualifica-
tions of members of the National Legislature, being posp* nem. con.,
as entering too much into detail for general propositions ;

The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5.? ‘‘ that the second, [or
senatorial] branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen
by the first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legis-
latures.’’

; M: SpaicHr contended that the 2° branch ought to be chosen by
the State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect.

M: Butter apprehended that the taking so many powers out of
the hands of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that
balance and security of interests among the States which it was
necessary to preserve; and called on M! Randolph the mover of the
propositions, to explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the
number of members he meant to assign to this second braneh.

M« Rano! observed that he had at the time of offering his proposi-
tions stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions
required; that details made no part of the plan, and could not per-
haps with propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an
opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that
it ought to be much smaller than that of the first ; so small as to be ex-
empt from the passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies
are liable. He observed that the general object was to provide a cure
for the evils under which the U. 8. laboured ; that in tracing these evils
to their origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies
of democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for ag** this
tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most
likely to answer the purpose.

M: Kine reminded the Committee that the choice of the second
branch as proposed (by M® Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures
would be impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the
idea of proportion among the States was to be disregarded. Accord-
ing to this idea, there must be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware
to the choice of one of them.—M" Spaicut withdrew his motion.

M? Wiuson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures,
and an election by the first branch of the national Legislature, be-
cause the second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of
both. He thought both branches of the National Legislature ought to

 

*In the transcript the words “ Resolution 4th” are changed to “the fourth
Resolution” and the phrase “the qualifications of members of the National
Legislature ” is italicized.

?In the transcript the words “Resolution 5,” are changed to “the fifth
Resolution ” and the words of the resolution are italicized.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1787 35

be chosen by the people, but was not prepared with a specific proposi-
tion. He suggested the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to
wit of uniting several election districts, for one branch, in chusing
members for the other branch, as a good model.

M: Mapison observed that such a mode would destroy the in-
fluence of the smaller States associated with larger ones in the same
district; as the latter would chuse from within themselves, altho’
better men might be found in the former. The election of Senators
in Virg? where large & small counties were often formed into one
district for the purpose, had illustrated this consequence. Local
partiality, would often prefer a resident within the County or State,
to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also
in a resident would be more known throughout his own State.

M. SuHerman favored an election of one member by each of the
State Legislatures.

M! PinkNEY moved to strike out the ‘‘ nomination by the State
Legislatures.’’ On this question.

* Mass's no. Con? no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pen? no. Del div?
Vi no. N.C.no. 8. C.no. Georg no.?

On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of
nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Cont no. N. Y. no.
N. Jersey. no. Pen* no. Del. no. Virg? ay. N.C. no. S. C. ay.
G? no.?

So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of
the plan.

’The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national
Legislature ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On
the question whether each branch sh? originate laws, there was an
unanimous affirmative without debate. On the question for trans-
ferring all the Legislative powers of the existing Cong? to this Assem-
bly, there was also a silent affirmative nem. con.

* This question’ omitted in the printed Journal, & the votes applied to the
succeeding one, instead of the votes as here stated [this note to be in the bottom
margin] *

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ * Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no—9; Delaware divided”; and Madison’s direction concerning the
footnote is omitted. The word “is” is inserted after the word “ question.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Virginia, South Caro-
lina, aye—3; Connecticut New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North
Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

*In this paragraph the transcript italicizes the following phrases: “the
cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate,” “whether each
branch shd originate laws,” “for transferring all the Legislative powers of the
existing Cong: to this Assembly”; and the phrase “a silent affirmative nem.
con.” is changed to “an unanimous affirmative, without debate.”
36 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

On the proposition for giving “¢ Legislative power in all cases to
which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent.”’

M: Pincney & M: Ruruepcs objected to the vagueness of the term
incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until
they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended
by this definition.

M= Buruer repeated his fears that we were running into an ex-
treme in taking away the powers of the States, and called on M
Randolp for the extent of his meaning.

M« Ranvotru disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers
to the national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed
to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not
think any considerations whatever could ever change his determina-
tion. His opinion was fixed on this point.

Mt Mapison said that he had brought with him into the Con-
vention a strong bias in favor of an enemeration and definition of
the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature ; but
had also brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes
remained unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his
opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should
shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form
of Govt as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the
community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the
necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be sub-
mitted to.

On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States
are not competent, Masst® ay. Con! div? [Sharman no Elseworth
ay] N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. V% ay. N. C. ay.
S. Carolina ay. Georg? ay.*

The other clauses? giving powers necessary to preserve harmony
among the States to negative all State laws contravening in the
opinion of the Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause,
(the words ‘‘or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the
Union,’’ being added after the words ‘‘ contravening &c. the articles

of the Union,’’ on motion of Dt FranKLIN) were agreed to with!
debate or dissent.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New York, N
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Cue Gee
a ery divided (Sherman, no, Ellsworth, aye) .” , :

e phrase, “giving powers necessary to preserve harmo
States to negative all State laws contravening fa Oho opinion of the Nate ne :
the articles of union” is italicized in the transcript. ae
roth tats Lo

Se A ee .
oH 9 coe me weeny Sry, aw

 

ry own on Bee een Te AoeF ay Pryy car pate te oe ay wre? ~weprhy &
See A Gyre Sard yy 4, Coe oy bye gery wrmecs we tymawegroeny fo > -

-29f~ we wry trees fe Ag? eztee we yy ee yang pe IOUS + wiaef fp am

ow ecgemta pare Se 7 ef ager cend 9 peor eisey _perpesbvs me peat (ore poe LHP IS 7B

fo meriny BR a GG EME BO Gemaerag2 CEN ror CFI
Ege hono-ffo x4 ow ply Gp reprrry =a Eqamere wy Teme wy osed
pomapemapitbe 7 ~ cca Owe
= ERE SERIE rene
gomre be pegs wy So woe) vy de weryote vv Dertntfon "299 “ry

be yt?
win bry D meet y 2 2 0f

YESS SESS

 
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1787 37

The last clause of Resolution 6.1 authorizing an exertion of the
force of the whole ag a delinquent State came next into consideration.

M= Manpison, observed that the more he reflected on the use of
force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the effi-
cacy of it when applied to people collectively and not individually.—
A union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to
provide for its own destruction. The use of force ag** a State, would
look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment,
and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolu-
tion of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped
that such a system would be framed as might render this recourse?
unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. This motion
was agreed to nem. con. :

The Committee then rose & the House

Adjourned

Fripay JuNE 1% 1787.

William Houston from Georgia took his seat.

The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7.? ‘‘ that a
national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legis-
lature—for the term of years &e to be ineligible thereafter, to
possess the executive powers of Congress &c.”’

M? Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Ex-
ecutive powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war
&e., which would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind,
to wit an elective one.

M! Witson moved that the Executive consist of a single person.
M: C Pinxyey seconded the motion, so as to read ‘‘ that a National
Ex. to consist of a single person, be instituted.

A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he
should put the question, Doc! FRANKLIN observed that it was a point
of great importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver
their sentiments on it before the question was put.

M! RurTLmcE animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this
and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves

 

The words “the sixth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“Resolution 6” and the phrase “authorizing an exertion of the force of the
whole agst a delinquent State” is italicized.

2 The word “resource” is substituted in the transcript for “ recourse.”

* The words “the seventh Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“Resolution 7” and the words of the resolution are italicized.
388 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

precluded by having frankly disclosed their opinions from after-
wards changing them, which he did not take to be at all the case.
He said he was for vesting the Executive power in a single person,
tho’ he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A
single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer the
public affairs best.

M: Suerman said he considered the Executive magistracy as noth-
ing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature
into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and
accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depositary of the
supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the
business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and
consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it,
he wished the number might not be fixed, but that the legislature
should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might
dictate.

M" Witson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy
dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the
Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining
the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legis-
lative nature. Among others that of war & peace &. The only
powers he conceived * strictly Executive were those of executing the
laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by
the Legislature.

M! Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Execu-
tive in order to give weight & inspire confidence.

M? RanvoLPH strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive mag-
istracy. He regarded it as the fetus of monarchy. We had he said
no motive to be governed by the British Governm! as our prototype.
He did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric.
If we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should
be opposed to it; but the fixt genius of the people of America re-
quired a different form of Government. He could not see why the
great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, despatch & re-
sponsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man.
The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in order
to support its independence to consist of more than one.

M! WILson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the
fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He
repeated that he was not governed by the British Model which was

 

*The transcript here substitutes the word “considered” for “ conceived.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1787 39

inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which
was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great
confederated Republic would do for it.

M* Wilson’s motion for a single magistrate was postponed by
common consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision
on it; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz—‘‘ that a
National Executive be instituted.’’

M: Mapison thought it would be proper, before a choice sh? be
made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the
extent of the Executive authority ; that as certain powers were in their
nature Executive, and must be given to that departm! whether ad-
ministered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent
would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be
safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that
so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the
powers of the Executive sh? be struck out & that after the words
‘* that a national Executive ought to be instituted ’’ there be inserted
the words following viz. ‘‘ with power to carry into effect the national
laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to
execute such other powers ‘‘ not Legislative nor Judiciary in their
nature,’’ as may from time to time be delegated by the national
Legislature.’’? The words ‘‘ not legislative nor judiciary in their
nature ’’ were added to the proposed amendment in consequence of
a suggestion by Gen! Pinkney that improper powers might other-
wise be delegated.

M: WIxson seconded this motion—

M! PINKNEY moved to amend the amendment by striking out the
last member of it; viz: ‘‘ and to execute such other powers not Legis-
lative nor Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be
delegated.’’ He said they were unnecessary, the object of them being
included in the ‘‘ power? to carry into effect the national laws.’’

M! RanpoupH seconded the motion.

M! Mapison did not know that the words were absolutely neces-
sary, or even the preceding words—‘‘ to appoint to offices &c. the
whole being perhaps included in the first member of the proposi-
tion. He did not however see any inconveniency ? in retaining them,
and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts
and misconstructions.

In consequence of the motion of M? Pinkney, the question on
M: Madison’s motion was divided; and the words objected to by

 

1The transcript uses the word “power ” in the plural.
? The transcript changes the word “ inconveniency ” to “ inconvenience.”
40 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Pinkney struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y. N. J.
Pen* Del. N. C. & Geo.t ag’t Mass. Virg? & 8. Carolina? the preceding
part of the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided, all the
other States in the affirmative.

The next clause in Resolution 7,? relating to the mode of appoint-
ing, & the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,

M* Wiuson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which
he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear
chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for
an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York &
Mass!*, shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people
at large, was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of
choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general
notoriety.

M: SHERMAN was for the appointment by the Legislature, and
for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the
will of that which was to be executed. An independence of the
Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very
essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.

M? Wrson moves that the blank for the term of duration should
be filled with three years, observing at the same time that he pre-
ferred this short period, on the supposition that a re-eligibilty would
be provided for.

M: PINKNEY moves for seven years.

M: SHERMAN was for three years, and ag*t the doctrine of rotation
as throwing out of office the men best qualifyed to execute its duties.

M: Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a
re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of
a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit
characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue
with the Legislature for a re-appointment.

M: Beprorp was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven
years. He begged the committee to consider what the situation of
the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled
on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that he did
not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them
after his appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure
for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not

 

*In the transcript the figures “7” and “3” are inserted after the States
Georgia and South Carolina, respectively.

* The words “the seventh Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“Resolution 7.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1787 41

incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility
after a period of nine years.

On the question for seven years,

Mass® divid? Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pent ay. Del. ay.
Virg? ay. N.C. no. §.C. no. Geor. no.2 There being 5 ays, 4 noes,
1 div’, a question was asked whether a majority had voted in the
affirmative? The President decided that it was an affirmative vote.

The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.

M: Wison renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment
by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the
Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State
Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as inde-
pendent as possible of each other, as well as of the States;

Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He
wishes however that M! Wilson might have time to digest it into his
own form.—the clause ‘‘ to be chosen by the National Legislature ’’—
was accordingly postponed.—

M* Rutiipce suggests an election of the Executive by the second
branch only of the national Legislature.

The Committee then rose and the House

Adjourned.

Saturpay JUNE 22? In ComMMITTER OF WHOLE.

* [Insert the words noted here] * * William Sam! Johnson from
Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jennifer, from Mary? & John
Lansing J: from N. York, took their seats.

It was mov? & 2% to postpone ye Resol: of M? Randolph respect-
ing the Executive, in order to take up the 2¢ branch of the Legisla-
ture; which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. 8. C.
Geo:° ag* N. Y. Pen? Mary4® The mode of appoint® ye Executive
Was resumed.

M! Witson made the following motion, to be substituted for the
mode proposed by M: Randolph’s resolution, ‘‘ that the Executive

 

1The transcript italicizes the phrase “for seven years.”

°In the transcript the vote reads: “New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, aye—5; Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no—4; Massachusetts, divided.”

* The year “1787” is here inserted in the transcript.

* Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.

°In the transcript the figures “7” and “3” are inserted after the States
Georgia and Maryland, respectively.
42 DEBATES IN THE FSDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States
be divided into districts: & that the persons qualified to vote
in each district for members of the first branch of the national
Legislature elect members for their respective districts to
be electors of the Executive magistracy, that the said Electors of
the Executive magistracy meet at and they or any

of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their
own body person in whom the Executive authority of the
national Government shall be vested.”’

M: Wison repeated his arguments in favor of an election with-
out the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode
would produce more confidence among the people in the first magis-
trate, than an election by the national Legislature.

Mi Gerry, opposed the election by the national legislature. There
would be a constant: intrigue kept up for the appointment. The
Legislature & the candidates w’ bargain & play into one another’s
hands, votes would be given by the former under promises or expec-
tations from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members
of the Legislature or to+ their friends. He liked the principle of M*
Wilson’s motion, but fears it would alarm & give a handle to the
State partisans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authori-
ties. He thought the Community not yet ripe for stripping the
States of their powers, even such as might not be requisite for local
purposes. He was for waiting till people should feel more the neces-
sity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the
States instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and
the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people ought to
act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little in-
formed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to
deceptions.

M: Wiuiamson could see no advantage in the introduction of
Electors chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation
to them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be
attended with great trouble and expence.

On the question for agreeing to M! Wilson’s substitute, it was
negatived: Mass no. Cont no. N. Y. no.* P2 ay. Del. no. Maré
ay. Virg? no. N.C.no. 8. C.no. Geo? no?

*N. Y. in the printed Journal— divided?

 

*The word “to” is omitted in the transcript.

* In the transcript the vote reads; “ Pennsylvania, Maryland, aye—2; Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, New York,* Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1787 43

On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legis-
lature for the term of seven years, it was agreed to Mass ay. Con!
ay. N. Y. ay. Pen? no. Del. ay. Mary? no. V2 ay. N. C. ay.
8. C. ay. Geo. ay.t

Doc! FRANKLIN moved that what related to the compensation for
the services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute—
“* whose necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive
no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services ’’—He
said that being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he
had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed
to support his motion, and had reduced them to writing, that he
might with the permission of the Committee read instead of speaking
them. M! Wizson made an offer to read the paper, which was ac-
cepted—The following is a literal copy of the paper.

Sir.

It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of
any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the
honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading
I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In
this particular of salaries to the Executive branch I happen to
differ; and as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is
only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty
that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my reasons when
they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change
mine.—I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of sal-
aries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great
advantages.

Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on
the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of
power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great
force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the
same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place
before the eyes of such men, a post of honour that shall be at the
same time a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to
obtain it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the
British Government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the
true sources of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the
Nation, distracting its Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless &

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, no—2.”
44 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

mischievous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable
terms of peace.

And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable
pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention,
the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of
characters? It will not be the wise and moderate; the lovers of peace
and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold
and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity
in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your Gov-
ernment and be your rulers—And these too will be mistaken in the
expected happiness of their situation: For their vanquished competi-
tors of the same spirit, and from the same motives will perpetually
be endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their meas-
ures, and render them odious to the people.

Besides these evils, Sir, tho’ we may set out in the beginning with
moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long con-
tinuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmenta-
tions. And there will always be a party for giving more to the
rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them.—
Hence as all history informs us, there has been in every State &
Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the governing &
governed: the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the
other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned great convulsions,
actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the Princes, or
enslaving of the people. Generally indeed the ruling power carries
its point, the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see
that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more
the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the greater
need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans and
pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to
plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred who would
not, if he could, follow the example of Pharoah, get first all the peoples
money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children
servants for ever. It will be said, that we don’t propose to establish
Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind
to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from Aristocratiec
domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred.
It gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and that
they like. I am apprehensive therefore, perhaps too apprehensive,
that the Government of these States, may in future times, end in
a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if
in our proposed System we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1787 45

& tumult, by making our posts of honor, places of profit. If we do,
I fear that tho’ we do employ at first a number, and not a single
person, the number will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the
fetus of a King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very
aptly expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us.

It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and
that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive department,
without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be
a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which in-
cline me to a contrary opinion. The high Sheriff of a County in
England is an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is
rather expensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is executed
and well executed, and usually by some of the principal Gentlemen
of the County. In France, the office of Counsellor or Member of
their Judiciary Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore pur-
chased at a high price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings,
which are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to
more than three per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore
as legal interest is there at five per Ct they in fact pay two per Ct
for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the Nation, which
is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of paying them
any salaries for their services. I do not however mean to recommend
this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only bring
the instance to shew that the pleasure of doing good & serving their
Country and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient
motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time
to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.

Another instance is that of a respectable Society*who have made
the experiment, and practised it with success more than an? hun-
dred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with
them, that they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they
must apply to their monthly, quarterly and yearly meetings. Com-
mittees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much
time in composing their differences. In doing this, they are sup-
ported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It
is honorable to be so employed, but it was? never made profitable by
salaries, fees, or perquisites. And indeed in all cases of public service
the less the profit the greater the honor.

To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great
and most important of our offices, that of General of our armies

 

*The word “one” is substituted in the transcript for “an.”
? The word “is” is substituted in the transcript for “ was.”
46 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

executed for eight years together without the smallest salary, by a
Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and this
through fatigues and distresses in common with the other brave men
his military friends & companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar
to his station? And shall we doubt finding three or four men in all
the U. States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful
Council for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil
concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a
better opinion of our Country. I think we shall never be without
a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute
well and faithfully the office in question.

Sir, The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is
not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them
are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amend-
ment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented with the
satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and done my
duty.

The motion was seconded by Col. Hammon with the view he said
merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Com-
mittee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a
certain degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was
postponed for the consideration of the members. It was treated with
great respect, but rather for the author of it, than from any apparent
conviction of its expediency or practicability.

M" Dickenson moved ‘‘ that the Executive be made removeable
by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legis-
latures of individual States.’’ It was necessary he said to place the
power of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of im-
peaching the Great officers of State. He did not know how provision
could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which
he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the State Governments
as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this
Country in his opinion required considerable powers to be left in
the hands of the States.

M* Beprorp seconded the motion.

M? Suerman contended that the National Legislature should have
power to remove the Executive at pleasure.

M? Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is ren-
dered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as
by the corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the
making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a
violation of the fundamental principle of good Government.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1787 47

M! Mapison & M! Wixson observed that it would leave an equality
of agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable
a minority of the people to prevent y? removal of an officer who had
rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it
would open a door for intrigues ag*t him in States where his adminis-
tration tho’ just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay
court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear,
or wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy
to introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their
agency could be otherwise supplied.

M: Dickenson considered the business as so important that no
man ought to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of
some length, the sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, &
Judiciary departments ought to be made as independ! as possible; but
that such an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was
not consistent with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist
in a limited monarchy. In the British Govt itself the weight of the
Executive arises from the attachments which the Crown draws to
itself, & not merely from the force of its prerogatives. In place of
these attachments we must look out for something else. One source
of stability is the double branch of the Legislature. The division of
the Country into distinct States formed the other principal source
of stability. This division ought therefore to be maintained, and
considerable powers to be left with the States. This was the ground
of his consolation for the future fate of his Country. Without this,
and in case of a consolidation of the States into one great Republic,
we might read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A limited
Monarchy he considered as one of the best Governments in the world.
It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable from any
other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been
derived from any of the republican form. A limited Monarchy
however was out of the question. The spirit of the times—the state
of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable. Was it
possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if these
obstacles were less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential
to such a Govt could these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of
the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise
under a complication of circumstances none of which existed in this
Country. But though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself be
unattainable, we must not despair. If antient republics have been
found to flourish for a moment only & then vanish for ever, it only
proves that they were badly constituted; and that we ought to seek
48 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

for every remedy for their diseases. One of these remedies he con-
ceived to be the accidental lucky division of this Country into distinct
States; a division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogether.
As to the point of representation in the national Legislature as .
it might affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end
in mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an .
equal voice at least in one branch of the National Legislature, ‘and
supposed the sums paid within each State would form a better ratio
for the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the
quantum of property.

A motion being made to strike out ‘‘on request by a majority
of the Legislatures of the individual States’’ and rejected, Con-
necticut, 8. Carol: & Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question was
taken—

On M! DickENnson’s motion for making * Executive removeable by?
Nat! Legislature at? request of ? majority of State Legislatures * was
also rejected—all the States being in the negative Except Delaware
which gave an affirmative vote.

The Question for making y? Executive ineligible after seven years,*
was next taken, and agreed to:

Mass ay. Conf no. N. Y. ay. P? divi Del. ay. Mary? ay.
Ve ay. N. C.ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. no:*5

M? Wiuuiamson 274 by M! Davie moved to add to the last Clause,
the words—‘‘ and to be removeable on impeachment & conviction of
mal-practice or neglect of duty ’’—which was agreed to.

M: Rutuwee & M C. Pinkney moved that the blank for the n°
of persons in the Executive be filled with the words ‘‘ one person.”’
He supposed the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of
one that no member would oppose the motion.

M! Ranpo.tpxH opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he
should not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were
silently to suffer the establishm' of a Unity in the Executive depart-
ment. He felt an opposition to it which he believed he should con-

*In° printed Journal Geo. ay.

 

* The word “the ” is here inserted in the transcript.

? The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “which” is here inserted in the transcript.

. js The phrase “ineligible after seven years” is italicized in the tran-
script.

'In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New York, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—7; Connecticut,
Georgia,* no—2; Pennsylvania, divided.”

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1787 49

tinue to feel as long as he lived. He urged 1.1 that the permanent
temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy.
2. that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent
to all the objects of the department. 3.1 that the necessary con-
fidence would never be reposed in a single Magistrate. 4.1 that the
appointments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near
the center of the Community, and consequently the remote parts
would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor of three mem-
bers of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the
Country.

M: Butter contended strongly for a single magistrate as most
likely to answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should
be appointed he would be responsible to the whole, and would be
impartial to its interests. If three or more should be taken from as
many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advan-
tages. In Military matters this would be particularly mischievous.
He said his opinion on this point had been formed under the oppor-
tunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality of mili-
tary heads? distracted Holland when threatened with invasion by the
imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the defence
of this part, another to that part of the Country, just as he happened
to be swayed by prejudice or interest.

The motion was then postp’ the Committee rose & the House Adj?

Monpay June 4.23 IN CoMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

The Question was resumed on motion of M? Pinney 24 by
4 Wison, ‘‘ shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled
with a single person? ”’

M! Wison was in favor of the motion. It had been cyposed by
the gentleman from Virg? [M! Randolph] but the arguments used
had not convinced him. He observed that the objections of M? R.
were levelled not so much ag*t the measure itself, as ag*t its unpopu-
larity. If he could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of
the plan of which it should form a part, though the part was® an

 

1The figures “1,” “2,” “3” and “4” are changed to “ first,” ‘* secondly,”
“thirdly ” and “ fourthly.” ; a

2The transcript italicizes the phrase “ plurality of military heads.”

® The year “1787” is here inserted in the transcript.

«The transcript inserts the word “ Mr.” before “ Wilson.”

* The word “was” is changed to “were” in the transcript.
50 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

important one, yet he would give it up rather than lose the whole.
On examination he could see no evidence of the alledged antipathy
of the people. On the contrary he was persuaded that it does not
exist. All know that a single magistrate is not a King. One fact has
great weight with him. All the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce
any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head
of the Governt The idea of three heads has taken place in none.
The degree of power is indeed different; but there are no co-ordinate
heads. In addition to his former reasons for preferring a unity,
he would mention another. The tranquility not less than the vigor
of the Govt he thought would be favored by it. Among three equal
members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled, continued, & violent
animosities; which would not only interrupt the public administra-
tion; but diffuse their poison thro’ the other branches of Gov‘, thro’
the States, and at length thro’ the people at large. If the members
were to be unequal in power the principle of the? opposition to the
unity was given up. If equal, the making them an odd number would
not be a remedy. In Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a
question. In the Legislative & Executive departm® questions have
commonly many sides. Each member therefore might espouse a
separate one & no two agree.

M! Suerman. This matter is of great importance and ought to
be well considered before it is determined. M! Wilson he said had
observed that in each State a single magistrate was placed at the
head of the Gov! It was so he admitted, and properly so, and he
wished the same policy to prevail in the federal Govt But then it
should be also remarked that in all the States there was a Council of
advice, without which the first magistrate could not act. A council
he thought necessary to make the establishment acceptable to the
people. Even in G. B. the King has a Council; and though he
appoints it himself, its advice has its weight with him, and attracts
the Confidence of the people.

M! Wiu1amson asks M? Winson whether he means to annex a
Council.

M: Wiuson means to have no Council, which oftener serves to
cover, than prevent malpractices.

M! Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of three members
for the Executive. It w4 be extremely inconvenient in many in-
stances, particularly in military matters, whether relating to the
militia, an army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads.

 

* The word “the” is omitted in the transcript. i
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1787 51

On the question for a single Executive it was agreed. to Mass‘
ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. Pent ay. Del. no. Mary? no. Virg. ay.
[Mt R. & M: Blair no—Doc! M°C! M: M. & Gen W. ay. Col. Mason
being no, but not in house, M! Wythe ay but gone home]. N. C. ay.
S.C. ay. Georg* ay.

First Clause of Proposition 8"? relating to a Council of Revision
taken into consideration.

M! Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part
of it, as they will have a sufficient check ag’t encroachments on their
own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a
power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the
Judges had actually set aside laws as being ag%t the Constitution.
This was done too with general approbation. It was quite foreign
from the nature of y? office to make them judges of the policy of public
measures. He moves to postpone the clause in order to propose ‘‘ that
the National Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative
act which shall not be afterwards passed by parts of each
branch of the national Legislature.’’

M? Kine seconds the motion, observing that the Judges ought to
be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from
the bias of having participated in its formation.

_ M! Wison thinks neither the original proposition nor the amend-
ment go far enough. If the Legislative Exetv & Judiciary ought to
be distinct & independent. The Executive ought to have an absolute
negative. Without such a self-defence the Legislature can at any
moment sink it into non-existence. He was for varying the proposi-
tion in such a manner as to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly
an absolute negative.

On the question to postpone in order to take M! Gerry’s proposi-
tion into consideration it was agreed to, Mass? ay. Cont no. N. Y.
ay. P* ay. Del. no. Mary? no. Virg? no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
G? ay?

M* Gerry’s proposition being now before + Committee, Mt Wison
& M: Hamiton move that the last part of it [viz. ‘‘ w® s! not be

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, (Mr. Randolph and Mr. Blair, no; Doctor McClurg, Mr.
Madison, and General Washington, aye; Colonel Mason being no, but not in the
House, Mr. Wythe, aye, but gone home), North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—-7; New. York, Delaware, Maryland, no—3.”

? The phrase “the eighth Resolution” is substituted in the transcript for
“Proposition 8th ”

* In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, Delaware, Mary.
land, Virginia, no—4.” :

‘The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
52 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

afterw® passed unless? by parts of each branch of the Na-
tional legislature] be struck out, so as to give the Executive an
absolute negative on the laws. There was no danger they thought
of such a power being too much exercised. It was mentioned by
Col: Hamiuton that the King of G. B. had not exerted his negative
since the Revolution.

M! Gerry sees no necessity for so great a controul over the legis-
lature as the best men in the Community would be comprised in the
two branches of it.

Doct FranKuin, said he was sorry to differ from his colleague
for whom he had a very great respect, on any occasion, but he could
not help it on this. He had had some experience of this check in
the Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary Government
of Pen? The negative of the Governor was constantly made use of
to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without
a private bargain with him. An increase of his salary, or some
donation, was always made a condition; till at last it became the
regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, pre-
sented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually
receive the former before he should sign the latter. When the
Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived,
the concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-defence could
not be got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from
taxation: so that the people were to fight for the security of his
property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden. This was a
mischievous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a Council,
such a power would be less objectionable. It was true, the King of
G. B. had not, as was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution;
but that matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments
now given to the members of parliament rendered it unnecessary,
every thing being done according to the will of the Ministers. He
was afraid, if a negative should be given as proposed, that more
power and money would be demanded, till at last eno’ would be
gotten * to influence & bribe the Legislature into a compleat subjection
to the will of the Executive.

M! SHERMAN was ag* enabling any one man to stop the will of
the whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in
wisdom. He thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in
revising the laws, but not permit him to overule the decided and
cool opinions of the Legislature.

 

*The word “unless” is crossed out in the transcript.
*In the transcript the syllable “ten” is stricken from the word “ gotten.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1787 53

M? Mapison supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch
should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it
would answer the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would
rarely if ever happen that the Executive constituted as ours is pro-
posed to be would, have firmness eno’ to resist the legislature, unless
backed by a certain part of the body itself. The King of G. B. with
all his splendid attributes would not be able to withstand y? unani-
mous and eager wishes of both houses of Parliament. To give such
a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this
Country; its present temper at least.

M* Witson believed as others did that this power would seldom
be used. The Legislature would know that such a power existed,
and would refrain from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its
silent operation would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mis-
chief. The case of Pen* formerly was very different from its present
case. The Executive was not then as now to be appointed by the
people. It will not in this case as in the one cited be supported by the
head of a Great Empire, actuated by a different & sometimes opposite
interest. The salary too is now proposed to be fixed by the Consti-
tution, or if D' F.’s idea should be adopted all salary whatever inter-
dicted. The requiring a large proportion of each House to overrule
the Executive check might do in peaceable times; but there might
be tempestuous moments in which animosities may run high between
the Executive and Legislative branches, and in which the former
ought to be able to defend itself.

M! Butver had been in favor of a single Executive Magistrate;
but could he have entertained an idea that a compleat negative on
the laws was to be given him he certainly should have acted very
differently. It had been observed that in all countries the Execu-
tive power is in a constant course of increase. This was certainly
the case in G. B. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had nothing
to apprehend from an abuse of the Executive power. But why
might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this Country as well as
in others.

M! BEpForD was opposed to every check on the Legislative, even
the Council of Revision first proposed. He thought it would be
sufficient to mark out in the Constitution the boundaries to the Legis-
lative Authority, which would give all the requisite security to the
rights of the other departments. The Representatives of the people
were the best Judges of what was for their interest, and ought to

 

1In the transcript the syllable “tive” is stricken from the word “ Legis-
lative” and “ture” is written above it.
54 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

be under no external controul whatever. The two branches would pro-
duce a sufficient controul within the Legislature itself.

Col. Mason observed that a vote had already passed he found
[he was out at the time] for vesting the executive powers in a single
person. Among these powers was that of appointing to offices in
certain cases. The probable abuses of a negative had been well ex-
plained by D! F. as proved by experience, the best of all tests.
Will not the same door be opened here. The Executive may refuse
its assent to necessary measures till new appointments shall be re-
ferred to him; and having by degrees engrossed all these into his
own hands, the American Executive, like the British, will by bribery
& influence, save himself the trouble & odium of exerting his nega-
tive afterwards. We are M? Chairman going very far in this busi-
ness. We are not indeed constituting a British Government, but a
more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing a
new principle into our system, and not necessary as in the British
Gov' where the Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentle-
men mean to pave the way to hereditary Monarchy? Do they flatter
themselves that the people will ever consent to such an innovation?
If they do I venture to tell them, they are mistaken. The people
never will consent. And do gentlemen consider the danger of delay,
and the still greater danger of a a rejection, not for a moment but
forever, of the plan which shall be proposed to them. Notwithstanding
the oppressions & injustice experienced among us from democracy;
the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the
people must be consulted. He could not but consider the federal
system as in effect dissolved by the appointment of this Convention
to devise a better one. And do gentlemen look forward to the dan-
gerous interval between the extinction of an old, and the establishment
of a new Governm! and to the scenes of confusion which may ensue.
He hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be attempted in
this Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people
through the late Revolution. Will it not be eno’ to enable the Execu-
tive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and
the objections to them overruled by a greater majority than was re-
quired in the first instance. He never could agree to give up all the
rights of the people to a single Magistrate. If more than one had
been fixed on, greater powers might have been entrusted to the
Executive. He hoped this attempt to give such powers would have
its weight hereafter as an argument for increasing the number of
the Executive.

Doc! Franxuin, A Gentleman from 8. C. [M? Butler] a day or
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 4, 1787 55

two ago called our attention to the case of the U. Netherlands. He
wished the gentleman had been a little fuller, and had gone back to
the original of that Govt The people being under great obliga-
tions to the Prince of Orange whose wisdom and bravery had
saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder. He did very well.
Inconveniences however were felt from his powers; which growing
more & more oppressive, they were at length set aside. Still how-
ever there was a party for the P. of Orange, which descended to
his son who excited insurrections, spilt a great deal of blood, mur-
dered the de Witts, and got the powers revested in the Stadtholder.
Afterwards another Prince had power to excite insurrections & to?
make the Stadtholdership hereditary. And the present Stadth* is
ready to wade thro a bloody civil war to the establishment of a mon-
archy. Col. Mason had mentioned the circumstance of appointing of-
ficers. He knew how that point would be managed. No new appoint-
ment would be suffered as heretofore in Pens? unless it be referred to
the Executive ; so that all profitable offices will be at his disposal. The
first man put at the helm will be a good one. No body knows what
sort may come afterwards. The Executive will be always increasing
here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a Monarchy

On the question for striking out so as to give? Executive an abso-
lute negative—Mass‘* no. Contno. N. Y.no. P? no. Di. no. Méno.
Vino. N.C.no. S.C. no. Georg? no.®

M: Burier moved that the Resol? be altered so as to read—‘‘ Re-
solved that the National Executive have a power to suspend any
Legislative act for the term of ee

Doct? FRANKLIN seconds the motion.

VE Gerry observed that a* power of suspending might do all the
mischief dreaded from the negative of useful laws; without answer-
ing the salutary purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones.

On? question ‘‘ for giving this suspending power ’’ all the States,
to wit Mass's Cont N. Y. P? Del. Mary? Virg* N. C. S. C. Georgia,
were No.

On a question for enabling two thirds of each branch of the
Legislature to overrule the revisionary * check: it passed in the affirma-

 

1The word “to” is omitted in the transcript.

2 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no—10.”

*The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “a.”

5In the transcript the word “ provisionary ” was erroneously used in place
of “revisionary.”
56 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

tive sub silentio; and was inserted in the blank of M! Gerry’s motion.

On the question on M? Gerry’s motion which gave the Executive
alone without the Judiciary the revisionary controul on the laws unless
overruled by % of each branch; Mass® ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. P&
ay. Del. ay. Mary? no. V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

It was moved by M: Witson 2%? by MF Mapison—that the follow-
ing amendment be made to the last resolution—after the words
‘‘ National Ex.’’ to add ‘‘ & a convenient number of the National
Judiciary.”’

An objection of order being taken by M? Hamizron to the intro-
duction of the last amendment at this time, notice was given by M:
W. & Mt M.—that the same wi be moved tomorrow,—whereupon
Wednesday (the day after)? was assigned to reconsider the amend-
ment of M? Gerry.

It was then moved & 2% to proceed to the consideration of the
9% resolution submitted by M! Randolph—when on motion to agree
to the first clause namely ‘‘ Resolved that a National Judiciary be
established ’?* It passed in the affirmative nem. con.

It was then moved & 2% to add these words to the first clause
of the ninth resolution namely—‘‘ to consist of one supreme tribunal,
and of one or more inferior tribunals,’? which passed in the
affirmative—

The Commé then rose and the House

Adjourned.

TEUSDAY JUNE 5. IN CoMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

Governor Livingston from * New Jersey, took his seat.

The words, ‘‘ one or more’”’ were struck out before ‘‘ inferior
tribunals ’’ as an amendment to the last clause of Resol? 95 The
Clause—‘‘ that the National Judiciary be chosen by the National
Legislature,’’ being under consideration.

M! Wixson opposed the appointm’t of Judges by the National
Legisl: Experience shewed the impropriety of such appointm’ by
numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the

 

_\ In the transcript this vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
Connecticut, Maryland, no—2.”

* The phrase “ (the day after) ” is crossed out in the transcript.

_ ..' The phrase “Resolved that a National Judiciary be established” is
italicized in the transcript.

‘The word “of” is substituted in the transcript for “from.”

5 “ * . ys . . rn
. ae oe the ninth Resolution ” is used in the transcript in place of
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1787 57

necessary consequences. <A principal reason for unity in the Execu-
tive was that officers might be appointed by a single, responsible
person.

M: RutupGE was by no means disposed to grant so great a power
to any single person. The people will think we are leaning too much
towards Monarchy. He was against establishing any national tri-
bunal except a single supreme one. The State tribunals are most
proper to decide in all cases in the first instance.

Doc! FRANKLIN observed that two modes of chusing the Judges
had been mentioned, to wit, by the Legislature and by the Executive.
He wished such other modes to be suggested as might occur to other
gentlemen; it being a point of great moment. He would mention
one which he had understood was practiced in Scotland. He then
in a brief and entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which
the nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the
ablest of the profession in order to get rid of him, and share his
practice among themselves. It was here he said the interest of the
electors to make the best choice, which should always be made the
case if possible.

Mr. Mapison disliked the election of the Judges by the Legis-
lature or any numerous body. Besides, the danger of intrigue and
partiality, many of the members were not judges of the requisite
qualifications. The Legislative talents which were very different from
those of a Judge, commonly recommended men to the favor of Legis-
lative Assemblies. It was known too that the accidental circumstances
of presence and absence, of being a member or not a member, had
a very undue influence on the appointment. On the other hand he
was not satisfied with referring the appointment to the Executive.
He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch, as numerous
eno’ to be confided in—as not so numerous as to be governed by the
motives of the other branch; and as being sufficiently stable and
independent to follow their deliberate judgments. He hinted this
only and moved that the appointment by the Legislature might be
struck out, & a blank left to be hereafter filled on maturer reflection.
M: Witson seconds it. On the question for striking out. Mass‘ ay.
Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pen* ay. Del. ay. M4 ay. V? ay.
N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.?

M:! WILson gave notice that he should at a future day move for
a reconsideration of that clause which respects ‘‘ inferior tribunals.’’

 

1Jn the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
no, Georgia, aye—9; Connecticut, South Carolina,—2.”
58 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M= Pinkney gave notice that when the clause respecting the
appointment of the Judiciary should again come before the Com-
mittee he should move to restore the ‘‘ appointment by the national
Legislature.”’

The following clauses of Resol: 9.1 were agreed to viz “‘ to hold
their offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctually at
stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no
increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons
actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.’’

The remaining clause of Resolution 9.2 was posponed.

Resolution 10% was agreed to—viz—that provision ought to be
made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of
the U. States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government &
territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in
the National Legislature less than the whole.

The 11. propos: * “ for guarantying to States Republican Gov‘ &
territory &c., being read, Mt Parrerson wished the point of rep-
resentation could be decided before this clause should be considered,
and moved to postpone it: which was not opposed, and agreed to:
Connecticut & S. Carolina only voting ag** it.

Propos. 12° “‘ for continuing Cong: till a given day and for ful-
filling their engagements,’’ produced no debate.

On the question, Mass. ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J.* ay. P?
ay. Del.no. Miay. Veay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. G. ay.

Propos: 13. ‘‘ that provision ought to be made for hereafter
amending the system now to be established, without requiring the
assent of the Nat! Legislature,’’ being taken up,

M: Pinkney doubted the propriety or necessity of it.

M: Gerry favored it. The novelty & difficulty of the experiment
requires periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would
also give intermediate stability to the Govt Nothing had yet hap-
pened in the States where this provision existed to prove its im-
propriety.—The proposition was postponed for further consideration:

* New Jersey omitted in the printed Journal.

 

*The transcript uses the phrase “the ninth Resolution” in place of
© Resol: 9,” and italicizes the resolution.
* The transcript here uses the phrase “the ninth Resolution.”
ce geeereg = ara ” is here used in the transcript.
n place o e words ‘ Rey i fads: “
ay ye el et e 11. propos: ” the transcript réads: “ The
* The transcript changes “ Propos. 12” to “The twelfth Resolution.”

° The transcript changes “ Propos: 13” to read as follows: “ hi h
Resolution, to the effect.” P ree ca
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1787 09

the votes being, Mas: Con. N. Y. P? Del. Ma. N. C.—-ay Virg? 8. C.
Geo: no

Propos. 14.1 “‘ requiring oath from the State officers to support
National Gov'” was postponed after a short uninteresting conversa-
tion: the votes, Con. N. Jersey. M? Virg: S. C. Geo. ay N. Y. P?
Del. N. C. — - — no Massachusetts — — — divided.

Propos. 15? for ‘‘ recommending Conventions under appointment
of the people to ratify the new Constitution ’’ &e. being taken up.

M: SHarman thought such a popular ratification unnecessary: the
articles of Confederation providing for changes and alterations with
the assent of Cong’ and ratification of State Legislatures.

M: Mapison thought this provision essential. The articles of
Confed® themselves were defective in this respect, resting in many
of the States on the Legislative sanction only. Hence in conflicts
between acts of the States, and of Cong’ especially where the former’
are of posterior date, and the decision is to be made by State tri-
bunals, an uncertainty must necessaily prevail, or rather perhaps
a certain decision in favor of the State authority. He suggested
also that as far as the articles of Union were to be considered as
a Treaty only of a particular sort, among the Governments of Inde-
pendent States, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any
one article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from
the whole obligation. For these reasons as well as others he thought
it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified in the
most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the
people themselves.

M: Gerry observed that in the Eastern States the Confed" had
been sanctioned by the people themselves. He seemed afraid of
referring the new system to them. The people in that quarter have
at this time the wildest ideas of Government in the world. They
were for abolishing the Senate in Mass* and giving all the other
powers of Gov‘ to the other branch of the Legislature.

M? Kine supposed that the last article of y® Confed? rendered
the legislature competent to the ratification. The people of the
Southern States where the federal articles had been ratified by the
Legislatures only, had since impliedly given their sanction to it.
He thought notwithstanding that there might be policy in varying
the mode. A Convention being a single house, the adoption may
more easily be carried thro’ it, than thro’ the Legislatures where
there are several branches. The Legislatures also being to lose

 

1The transcript changes “Propos. 14” to “The fourteenth Resolution.”
2? The transcript changes “ Propos. 15” to “The fifteenth Resolution.”
60 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

power, will be most likely to raise objections. The people having
already parted with the necessary powers it is immaterial to them,
by which Government they are possessed, provided they be well
employed.

Mt Wison took this occasion to lead the Committee by a train
of observations to the idea of not suffering a disposition in the
plurality of States to confederate anew on better principles, to be
defeated by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few States.
He hoped the provision for ratifying would be put on such a footing
as to admit of such a partial union, with a door open for the acces-
sion of the rest.*

M: Pinkney hoped that in case the experiment should not unani-
mously take place, nine States might be authorized to unite under
the same Govern?

The propos. 15.2 was postponed nem. cont

Mt Pisenzy & M! Rutuiwee moved that tomorrow be assigned
to reconsider that clause of Propos. 4:* which respects the election of
the first branch of the National Legislature—which passed in * affirma-
tive: Con: N.Y. P? Del: M? Vt—ay—6 Mas. N.J. N.C. S.C.
Geo. no. 5.

Mz Rurumce hav? obtained a rule for reconsideration of the
clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority,
now moved that that part of the clause in propos. 9.° should be ex-
punged: arguing that the State Tribunals might and ought to be left
in all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the
supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national
rights & uniformity of Judgm's: that it was making an unnecessary
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States and creating unneces-
sary obstacles to their adoption of the new system—M! SHERMAN
2%4 the motion.

M! Mapison observed that unless inferior tribunals were dis-
persed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases,
appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that be-
sides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was
to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under

* The note in brackets to be transferred to bottom margin.*

[This hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller St
Jersey & Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to it.] pce ars

 

* Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.
* The transcript changes “The propos. 15” to “The fifteenth Resolution.”
* The transcript changes “Propos. 4” to “the fourth Resolution.”
The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
°The transcript changes “propos. 9” to “the ninth Resolution.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 1787 61

the biassed directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices
of an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would
answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the Supreme bar would
oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, tho’ ever so distant
‘from the seat of the Court. An effective Judiciary establishment
commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A Govern-
ment without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere
trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or move.

M* Wison opposed the motion on like grounds. he said the
admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national Gov-
ernment, as it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of par-
ticular states, & to a scene in which controversies with foreigners
would be most likely to happen.

M! SHERMAN was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly on the
supposed expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the
existing State Courts would answer the same purpose.

ME! Dickinson contended strongly that if there was to be a National
Legislature, there ought to be a national Judiciary, and that the
former ought to have authority to institute the latter.

On the question for M! Rutlidge’s motion to strike out ‘‘ inferior
tribunals ’’? ,

Mass‘: divided. Cont ay. N. Y. div? N. J. ay. P* no. Del. no.
Mino. V? no. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay?

M: Witson & M? Mapison then moved, in pursuance of the idea
expressed above by M?! Dickinson, to add to Resol: 9.° the words
following ‘‘ that the National Legislature be empowered to institute
inferior tribunals.’’ They observed that there was a distinction be-
tween establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion
to the Legislature to establish or not establish them. They repeated
the necessity of some such provision.

M: Butter. The people will not bear such innovations. The
States will revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an estab-
lishment to be useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow
the example of Solon who gave the Athenians not the best Gov’ he
could devise; but the best they w‘ receive.

M Kine remarked as to the comparative expence that the estab-

 

1The phrase “ it passed in the affirmative” is here inserted in the transcript.

?In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, no—4; Massachusetts, divided.” New York which was
“ divided” was erroneously placed among the “ayes” in copying, although the
number was correctly given as “5.”

* The transcript changes “ Resol: 9” to “the ninth Resolution.”
62 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

lishment of inferior tribunals w4 cost infinitely less than the appeals
that would be prevented by them.

On this question as moved by M? W. & M: M.

Mass. ay. Cino. N. Y. divi N. J.* ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. Ma
ay. Vtay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.

The Committee then rose & the House adjourned to 11 OC
tom” +

WEDNESDAY JUNE 672 In CoMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

M Pinkney according to previous notice & rule obtained, moved
‘« that the first branch of the national Legislature be elected by the
State Legislatures, and not by the people.’’ contending that the
people were less fit Judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures
would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new Government,
if they were to be excluded from all share in it.

M Rurumer 2% the motion.

M! Gerry. Much depends on the mode of election. In England,
the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the
proportion having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from the
opposite extreme: hence in Mass® the worst men get into the Legis-
lature. Several members of that Body had lately been convicted
of infamous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance & baseness, spare
no pains, however dirty to carry their point ag** men who are
superior to the artifices practised. He was not disposed to run into
extremes. He was as much principled as ever ag* aristocracy and
monarchy. It was necessary on the one hand that the people should
appoint one branch of the Gov‘ in order to inspire them with the
necessary confidence. But he wished the election on the other to be so
modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit. His
idea was that the people should nominate certain persons in certain dis-
tricts, out of whom the State Legislatures sh? make the appointment.

M: Wiuson. He wished for vigor in the Gov‘, but he wished that
vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of
all authority. The Gov't ought to possess not only 1% the force, but
247 the mind or sense of the people at large. The Legislature ought
to be the most exact transcript of the whole Society. Representation
is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act
collectively. The opposition was to be expected he said from the

*In the printed Journal N. Jersey—no.

* The transcript omits the phrase “to 11 OC tomw”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 1787 63

Governments, not from the Citizens of the States. The latter had
parted as was observed [by M? King] with all the necessary powers ;+
and it was immaterial to them, by whom they were exercised, if well
exercised. The State officers were to be the losers of power. The
people he supposed would be rather more attached to the national
Gov! than to the State Gov’ as being more important in itself, and
more flattering to their pride. There is no danger of improper elec-
tions if made by large districts. Bad elections proceed from the
smallness of the districts which give an opportunity to bad men to
intrigue themselves into office.

M SHERMAN. If it were in view to abolish the State Gov the
elections ought to be by the people. If the State Gov's are to be
continued, it is necessary in order to preserve harmony between the
National & State Gov’ that the elections to the former sh? be made
by the latter. The right of participating in the National Gov‘ would
be sufficiently secured to the people by their election of the State
Legislatures. The objects of the Union, he thought were few.
1.2 defence ag* foreign danger. 2? ag*t internal disputes & a resort
to force. 3.? Treaties with foreign nations. 4? regulating foreign
commerce, & drawing revenue from it. These & perhaps a few lesser
objects alone rendered a Confederation of the States necessary. All
other matters civil & criminal would be much better in the hands
of the States. The people are more happy in small than* large
States. States may indeed be too small as Rhode Island, & thereby
be too subject to faction. Some others were perhaps too large, the
powers of Gov’ not being able to pervade them. He was for giving
the General Govt power to legislate and execute within a defined
province.

Cou. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy, Cong? represent
the States* not the people of the States: their acts operate on the
States, not on the individuals.’ The case will be changed in the new
plan of Govt The people will be represented; they ought therefore
to choose the Representatives. The requisites in actual representa-
tion are that the Rep® should sympathize with their constituents; sh‘
think as they think, & feel as they feel; and that for these purposes
shi even be residents among them. Much he sé had been alledged ag*t
democratic elections. He admitted that much might be said; but

 

1 The phrase “ with all the necessary powers” is italicized in the transcript.

? The figures “1,” “2,” “3” and “4” are changed to “ first,” “secondly,”
ete. in the transcript.

® The word “in” is here inserted in the transcript.

“The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.

5 The transcript italicizes the word “ individuals.”
64 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

it was to be considered that no Govt was free from imperfections &
evils; and that improper elections in many instances, were inseparable
from Republican Gov But compare these with the advantage of
this Form in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human
nature. He was persuaded there was a better chance for proper
elections by the people, if divided into large districts, than by the
State Legislatures. Paper money had been issued by the latter when
the former were against it. Was it to be supposed that the State
Legislatures then w‘ not send to the Nat! legislature patrons of such
projects, if the choice depended on them.

M: Mapison considered an election of one branch at least of
the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of
free Govt and that this mode under proper regulations had the addi-
tional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of
avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the Gen-
eral one.—He differed from the member from Connecticut [M°
Sharman] in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal
ones that required a National Govt Those were certainly important
and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity of
providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the
steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils
which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced this conven-
tion. Was it to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist
under the abuses of it practised in some of the States. The gentle-
man [M* Sharman] had admitted that in a very small State, faction
& oppression w? prevail. It was to be inferred then that wherever
these prevailed the State was too small. Had they not prevailed in
the largest as well as the smallest tho’ less than in the smallest; and
were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the
nature of the Govt would admit. This was the only defence ag*t the
inconveniencies of democracy consistent with the democratic form of
Govt All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects,
Factions, & interests, as they happened to consist of rich & poor,
debtors & creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial
interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the followers
of this political leader or that political leader, the disciples of this
religious Sect or that religious Sect. In all cases where a majority
are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority
are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? <A prudent
regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by
experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals.
Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the num-
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 1787 65

ber among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience,
the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals:
In large numbers, little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion
itself may become a motive to persecution & oppression.—These
observations are verified by the Histories of every Country antient
& modern. In Greece & Rome the rich & poor, the creditors &
debtors, as well as the patricians & plebeians alternately oppressed
each other with equal unmercifulness. What a source of oppression
was the relation between the parent cities of Rome, Athens & Car-
thage, & their respective provinces: the former possessing the power,
& the latter being sufficiently distinguished to be separate objects
of it? Why was America so justly apprehensive of Parliamentary
injustice? Because G. Britain had a separate interest real or sup-
posed, & if her authority had been admitted, could have pursued
that interest at our expence. We have seen the mere distinction of
colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of
the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man. What
has been the source of those unjust laws complained of among our-
selves? Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major
number? Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed in-
terest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The Holders of
one species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on
the holders of another species. The lesson we are to draw from the
whole is that where a majority are united by a common sentiment,
-and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become
insecure. In a Republican Gov! the Majority if united have always
an opportunity. The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby
divide the community into so great a number of interests & parties,
that in the 1% place a majority will not be likely at the same moment
to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of
the minority; and in the 24 place, that in case they sh? have such
an interest, they may not be? apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It
was incumbent on us then to try this remedy, and with that view
to frame a republican system on such a scale & in such a form
as will controul all the evils w have been experienced.

M: Dickenson considered it as? essential that one branch of the
Legislature sh? be drawn immediately from the people; and as ex-
pedient that the other sh? be chosen by the Legislatures of the
States. This combination of the State Gov't with the national Govt
was as politic as it was unavoidable. In the formation of the

 

1The word “so” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The word “as” is omitted in the transcript.
66 ‘DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Senate we ought to carry it through such a refining process as will
assimilate it as near as may be to the House of Lords in England.
He repeated his warm eulogiums on the British Constitution. He
was for a strong National Gov't but for leaving the States a con-
siderable agency in the System. The objection ag®* making the former
dependent on the latter might be obviated by giving to the Senate
an authority permanent & irrevocable for three, five or seven years.
Being thus independent they will speak? & decide with becoming
freedom.

M: Reap. Too much attachment is betrayed to the State Govern®
We must look beyond their continuance. A national Gov! must soon
of necessity swallow all of them? up. They will soon be reduced
to the mere office of electing the National Senate. He was ag*
patching up the old federal System: he hoped the idea w4 be dismissed.
It would be like putting new cloth on an old garment. The con-
federation was founded on temporary principles. It cannot last: it
cannot be amended. If we do not establish a good Govt on new
principles, we must either go to ruin, or have the work to do over
again. The people at large are wrongly suspected of being averse
to a Gen' Gov! The aversion lies among interested men who possess
their confidence.

M: Pierce was for an election by the people as to the 1% branch
& by the States as to the 24 branch ; by which means the Citizens of the
States w? be represented both individually & collectively.

General PinKNEY wished to have a good National Govt & at
the same time to leave a considerable share of power in the States.
An election of either branch by the people scattered as they are
in many States, particularly in S. Carolina was totally imprac-
ticable. He differed from gentlemen who thought that a choice by
the people w* be a better guard ag’t bad measures, than by the Legis-
latures. A majority of the people in S. Carolina were notoriously
for paper money as a legal tender; the Legislature had. refused to
make it a legal tender. The reason was that the latter had some
sense of character and were restrained by that consideration. The
State Legislatures also he said would be more jealous, & more ready
to thwart the National Gov‘, if excluded from a participation in it.
The Idea of abolishing these Legislatures wi never go down.

M? Witson, would not have spoken again, but for what had fallen
from M: Read; namely, that the idea of preserving the State Gov®
ought to be abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between the

*The word “check ” is substituted in the transcript for “ speak.”
* The words “them all” are substituted in the transcript for “all of them.”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE .6, 1787 67

National & State Gov’ provided the latter were restrained to certain
local purposes; nor any probability of their being devoured by the
former. In all confederated Systems antient & modern the reverse
had happened; the Generality being destroyed gradually by the
usurpations of the parts composing it.

On the question for electing the 1% branch by the State Legis-
latures as moved by M? Pinkney: it was negatived:

Mass. no. Ctay. N.Y. no. N. J. ay. P?# no. Del. no. M? no.
Ve no. N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. not

M! Wiuson moved to reconsider the vote excluding the Judiciary
from a share in the revision of the laws, and to add after ‘‘ National
Executive ’’ the words ‘‘ with a convenient number of the national
Judiciary ’’; remarking the expediency of reinforcing the Executive
with the influence of that Department.

M? Manson 2%? the motion. He observed that the great diffi-
culty in rendering the Executive competent to its own defence arose
from the nature of Republican Gov! which could not give to an
individual citizen that settled pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest,
that weight of property, that personal interest ag*t betraying the
national interest, which appertain to an hereditary magistrate. In
a Republic personal merit alone could be the ground of political
exaltation, but it would rarely happen that this merit would be so
pre-eminent as to produce universal acquiescence. The Executive
Magistrate would be envied & assailed by disappointed competitors:
His firmness therefore wi need support. He would not possess those
great emoluments from his station, nor that permanent stake in the
public interest which w’ place him out of the reach of foreign cor-
ruption: He would stand in need therefore of being controuled
as well as supported. An association of the Judges in his revisionary
function w? both double the advantage and diminish the danger. It
w' also enable the Judiciary Department the better to defend itself
agit Legislative encroachments. Two objections had been made 1*
that the Judges ought not to be subject to the bias which a partici-
pation in the making of laws might give in the exposition of them.
249 that the Judiciary Departm! ought to be separate & distinct from
the other great Departments. The 1% objection had some weight; but
it was much diminished by reflecting that a small proportion of the
laws coming in question before a Judge w’ be such wherein he had
been consulted; that a small part of this proportion wi be so am-

 

1In the transcript the vote reads “ Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina,
aye—3; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania. Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”
68 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

biguous as to leave room for his prepossessions; and that but a few
cases w’ probably arise in the life of a Judge under such ambiguous
passages. How much good on the other hand w proceed from the
perspicuity, the conciseness, and the systematic character w™ the
Code of laws wi receive from the Judiciary talents. As to the 2?
objection, it either had no weight, or it applied with equal weight
to the Executive & to the Judiciary revision of the laws. The maxim
on which the objection was founded required a separation of the Ex-
ecutive as well as of! the Judiciary from the Legislature & from each
other. There w’ in truth however be no improper mixture of these
distinct. powers in the present case. In England, whence the maxim
itself had been drawn, the Executive had an absclute negative on the
laws; and the supreme tribunal of Justice [the House of Lords]
formed one of the other branches of the Legislature. In short whether
the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the Legislature
from encroaching on the other co-ordinate Departments, or on the
rights of the people at large; or from passing laws unwise in their
principle, or incorrect in their form, the utility of annexing the
wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Exeeutive seemed in-
contestable.

M! Gerry thought the Executive, whilst standing alone w‘ be
more impartial than when he cé be covered by the sanction & seduced
by the sophistry of the Judges.

M: Kine. If the Unity of the Executive was preferred for the
sake of responsibility, the policy of it is as applicable to the revision-
ary as to the Executive power.

M! Pingney had been at first in favor of joining the heads of
the principal departm® the Secretary at War, of foreign affairs &—
in the council of revision. He had however relinquished the idea
from a consideration that these could be called in? by the Executive
Magistrate whenever he pleased to consult them. He was opposed
to an® introduction of the Judges into the business.

Col. Mason was for giving all possible weight to the revisionary
institution. The Executive power ought to be well secured ag*t Legis-
lative usurpations on it. The purse & the sword ought never to
get into the same hands whether Legislative or Executive.

M: Dickenson. Secrecy, vigor & despatch are not the prin-
cipal properties req? in the Executive. Important as these are,
that of responsibility is more so, which can only be preserved;

 

* The word “of” is omitted in the transcript.
* The word “on ” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”
* The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “an.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1787 69

by leaving it singly to discharge its functions. He thought too a
junction of the Judiciary to it, involved an improper mixture of
powers.

M: Witson remarked, that the responsibility required belonged
to his Executive duties. The revisionary duty was an extraneous
one, calculated for collateral purposes.

M Wiu1amson, was for substituting a clause requiring % for
every effective act of the Legislature, in place of the revisionary
provision.

On the question for joining the Judges to the Executive in the
revisionary business, Mass. no. Contay. N.Y. ay. N.J.no. P# no.
Del. no. Mf no. V? ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

M! PINKNEY gave notice that tomorrow he should move for the
reconsideration of that clause in the sixth Resolution adopted by the
Comm? which vests a negative in the National Legislature on the
laws of the several States.

The Com? rose & the House adj? to 11 OC?

THURSDAY JUNE 772 1787 23—IN CoMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

M* PinkKNEy according to notice moved to reconsider the clause
respecting the negative on State laws, which was agreed to and
tomorrow for fixed * the purpose.

The Clause providing for y? appointment of the 24 branch of
the national Legislature, having lain blank since the last vote on the
mode of electing it, to wit, by the 1% branch, M: DickENson now
moved ‘‘ that the members of the 24 branch ought to be chosen by
the individual Legislatures.’’

M" SHarMAn seconded the motion; observing that the particular
States would thus become interested in supporting the national
Governmt and that a due harmony between the two Governments
would be maintained. He admitted that the two ought to have
separate and distinct jurisdictions, but that they ought to have a
mutual interest in supporting each other.

M? Pincney. If the small States should be allowed one Senator
only, the number will be too great, there will be 80 at least.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, Virginia,
aye—3; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

2 The expression “to 11 OC” is omitted in the transcript.

* The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

“The words “for fixed” are corrected in the transcript to “ fixed for.”
70 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Dickenson had two reasons for his motion. 1.1 because the
sense of the States would be better collected through their Govern-
ments; than immediately from the people at large; 2.1 because he
wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters,
distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property,
and bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as
possible; and he thought such characters more likely to be selected
by the State Legislatures, than in any other mode. The greatness
of the number was no objection with him. He hoped there would
be 80 and twice 80. of them. If their number should be small, the
popular branch could not be balanced by them. The legislature of a
numerous people ought to be a numerous body.

M Wiuiamson, preferred a small number of Senators, but wished
that each State should have at least one. He suggested 25 as a con-
venient number. The different modes of representation in the differ-
ent branches, will serve as a mutual check.

M: ButTuer was anxious to know the ratio of representation be-
fore he gave any opinion.

M* Wison. If we are to establish a national Government, that
Government ought to flow from the people at large. If one branch
of it should be chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the
people, the two branches will rest on different foundations, and dis-
sensions will naturally arise between them. He wished the Senate
to be elected by the people as well as the other branch, and the
people might be divided into proper districts for the purpose & ? moved
to postpone the motion of Mi Dickenson, in order to take up one
of that import.

M: Morris 2%4 him.

M? Reap proposed ‘‘ that the Senate should be appointed by the
Executive Magistrate out of a proper number of persons to be nomi-
nated by the individual legislatures.’ He said he thought it his
duty, to speak his mind frankly. Gentlemen he hoped would not
be alarmed at the idea. Nothing short of this approach towards a
proper model of Government would answer the purpose, and he
thought it best to come directly to the point at once—His proposi-
tion was not seconded nor supported.

M® Mapison, if the motion [of Mr. Dickenson] should be agreed
to, we must either depart from the doctrine of proportional rep-
resentation; or admit into the Senate a very large number of mem-

 

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “ First” and “ secondly ” in the
transcript. —

* The word “he” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1787 71

bers. The first is inadmissible, being evidently unjust. The second
is inexpedient. The use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding
with more coolness, with more system, & with more wisdom, than
the popular branch. Enlarge their number and you communicate
to them the vices which they are meant to correct. He differed from
M D. who thought that the additional number would give additional
weight to the body. On the contrary it appeared to him that their
weight would be in an inverse ratio to their number.t. The example
of the Roman Tribunes was applicable. They lost their influence
and power, in proportion as their number was augmented. The
reason seemed to be obvious: They were appointed to take care
of the popular interests & pretensions at Rome, because the people
by reason of their numbers could not act in concert;? were liable to
fall into factions among themselves, and to become a prey to their
aristocratic adversaries. The more the representatives of the people
therefore were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities
of their constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among
themselves either from their own indiscretions or the artifices of the
opposite faction, and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust.
When the weight of a set of men depends merely on their personal
characters; the greater the number the greater the weight. When
it depends on the degree of political authority lodged in them the
smaller the number the greater the weight. These considerations
might perhaps be combined in the intended Senate; but the latter
was the material one.

M: Gerry. 4 modes of appointing the Senate have been men-
tioned. 1.8 by the 1% branch of the National Legislature. This would
create a dependence contrary to the end proposed. 2.* by the
National Executive. This is a stride towards monarchy that few
will think of. 3.3 by the people. The people have two great interests,
the landed interest, and the commercial including the stockholders.
To draw both branches from the people will leave no security to the
latter interest; the people being chiefly composed of the landed in-
terest, and erroneously supposing, that the other interests are adverse
to it. 43 by the Individual Legislatures. The elections being carried
thro’ this refinement, will be most likely to provide some check in
favor of the commercial interest ag%* the landed; without which

 

The transcript uses the word “number” in the plural.

? The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The figures “1,” “2,” “3” and “4” are changed to “ First,” “Secondly,”
ete., in the transcript.
72 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

oppression will take place, and no free Gov’ can last long where
that is the case. He was therefore in favor of this last.

M: Dickenson.* The preservation of the States in a certain
degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision be-
tween the different authorities which should be wished for in order
to check each other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether,
would degrade the Councils of our Country, would be impracticable,
would be ruinous. He ccmpared the proposed National System to
the Solar System, in which the States were the planets, and ought
to be left to move freely in their proper orbits. The Gentleman
from P* [M? Wilson] wished he said to extinguish these planets. If
the State Governments were excluded from all agency in the national
one, and all power drawn from the people at large, the consequence
would be that the national Gov! would move in the same direction as
the State Gov now do, and would run into all the same mischiefs.
The reform would only unite the 13 small streams into one great
current pursuing the same course without any opposition whatever.
He adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed of
a large number, and, that their influence from family weight & other
causes would be increased thereby. He did not admit that the
Tribunes lost their weight in proportion as their n° was augmented
and gave a historical sketch of this institution. If the reasoning of
[M: Madison] was good it would prove that the number of the Senate
ought to be reduced below ten, the highest n° of the Tribunitial corps.
_ M! Wuiason. The subject it must be owned is surrounded with
doubts and difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British
Governm! cannot be our model. We have no materials for a similer
one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails and of primo-
geniture, the whole genius of the people, are opposed to it. He did
not see the danger of the States being devoured by the Nation! Govt
On the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the national
Gov! He was not however for extinguishing these planets as was
supposed by M' D.—neither did he on the other hand, believe that
they would warm or enlighten the Sun. Within their proper orbits
they must still be suffered to act for subordinate purposes for which
their existence is made essential by the great extent of our Country.
He could not comprehend in what manner the landed interest wi
be rendered less predominant in the Senate, by an election through
the medium of the Legislatures than by the people themselves. If

* Tt will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by the
State Legislatures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on by the large
States & dreaded by the small ones, namely that of a proportional representation

in the Senate. Such a rule wd make the body too
State must elect one member at least. - ce
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1787 73

the Legislatures, as was now complained, sacrificed the commercial
to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such a choice
from them as would defeat their own views. He was for an election
by the people in large districts which w’ be most likely to obtain
men of intelligence & uprightness; subdividing the districts only
for the accomodation of voters.

M* Mapison could as little comprehend in what manner family
weight, as desired by M? D. would be more certainly conveyed into
the Senate through elections by the State Legislatures, than in some
other modes. The true question was in what mode the best choice
wi be made? If an election by the people, or thro’ any other channel
than the State Legislatures promised as uncorrupt & impartial a
preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity for an appoint-
ment by those Legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more useful
check would be derived thro’ that channel than from the people
thro’ some other. The great evils complained of were that the State
Legislatures run into schemes of paper money &c. whenever solicited
by the people, & sometimes without even the sanction of the people.
Their influence then, instead of checking a like propensity in the
National Legislature, may be expected to promote it. Nothing can
be more contradictory than to say that the Nat! Legislature witht a
proper check, will follow the example of the State Legislatures, & in
the same breath, that the State Legislatures are the only proper check.

M* SHarman opposed elections by the people in districts, as not
likely to produce such fit men as elections by the State Legislatures.

M! Gerry insisted that the commercial & monied interest w? be
more secure in the hands of the State Legislatures, than of the people
at large. The former have more sense of character, and will be re-
strained by that from injustice. The people are for paper money
when the Legislatures are ag*' it. In Mass the County Conventions
had declared a wish for a depreciating paper that w? sink itself.
Besides, in some States there are two Branches in the Legislature,
one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There wi therefore be so
far a better chance of refinement in the choice. There seemed, he
thought to be three powerful objections ag%t elections by districts.
1.1 it is impracticable; the people cannot be brought to one place for
the purpose; and whether brought to the same place or not, numberless
frauds w* be unavoidable. 2.1 small States forming part of the same
district with a large one, or* large part of a large one, wi have no
chance of gaining an appointment for its citizens of merit. 31a new

 

1The figures “1,” “2” and “3” are changed to “ First,” “Secondly” and
“Thirdly ” in the transcript.
2 The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
74 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

source of discord wi be opened between different parts of the same
district.

M: Pinxney thought the 2% branch ought to be permanent & in-
dependent, & that the members of it w? be rendered more so by
receiving their appointment + from the State Legislatures. This mode
w' avoid the rivalships & discontents incident to the election by dis-
tricts. He was for dividing the States into three classes according
to their respective sizes, & for allowing to the 1%* class three members—
to the 2% two, & to the 3¢ one.

On the question for postponing M! Dickinson’s motion referring
the appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, in order to
consider M! Wilson’s for referring it to the people

Mass. no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P? ay Del. no. Mé
no. V@no. N.C. no. 8. C.no. Geo. no?

Col. Mason. whatever power may be necessary for the Nat!
Gov't a certain portion must necessarily be left in® the States. It is
impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. 8.
so as to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also
ought to have some means of defending themselves ag*t encroachments
of the Nat! Govt In every other department we have studiously
endeavored to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the
States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what
better means can we provide than the giving them some share in,
or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Nat! Establishment.
There is danger on both sides no doubt; but we have only seen the
evils arising on the side of the State Gov's Those on the other side
remain to be displayed. The example of Cong’ does not apply.
Cong? had no power to carry their acts into execution as the Nat!
Gov! will have.

On M? Dickrnson’s motion for an appointment of the Senate by
the State-Legislatures.

Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. Y. ay. Pt ay Del. ay. M@ ay. V? ay
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M? Gerry gave notice that he wi tomorrow move for a reconsidera-

 

* The word “appointment” is used in the plural in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, aye—1; Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10.”

* The word “with” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,

Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—10.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1787 75

tion of the mode of appointing the Nat! Executive in order to sub-
stitute an appointmt by the State Executives
The Committee rose & The House adjé

Fripay Junge 8T! In Committee oF THE WHOLE.

On a reconsideration of the clause giving the Nat! Legislature a
negative on such laws of the States as might be contrary to the
articles of Union, or Treaties with foreign nations,

M! Pinkney moved ‘‘ that the National Legislature sh? have
authority to negative all laws which they sh? judge to be improper.’’
He urged that such a universality of the power was indispensably
necessary to render it effectual; that the States must be kept in due
subordination to the nation; that if the States were left to act of
themselves in any case, it wi be impossible to defend the national
prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper; that the
acts of Congress had been defeated by this means; nor had foreign
treaties escaped repeated violations; that this universal negative was
in fact the corner stone of an efficient national Gov'; that under
the British Gov't the negative of the Crown had been found beneficial,
and the States are more one nation now, than the Colonies were then.

M! Manson seconded the motion. He could not but regard an
indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the States as abso.
lutely necessary to a perfect system. Experience had evinced a con.
stant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority;
to violate national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each
other; to oppress the weaker party within their respective juris-
dictions. A negative was the mildest expedient that could be devised
for preventing these mischiefs. The existence of such a check would
prevent attempts to commit them. Should no such precaution be
engrafted, the only remedy w? lie? in an appeal to coercion. Was
such a remedy eligible? was it practicable? Could the national re-
sources, if exerted to the utmost enforce a national decree ag’* Mass!*
abetted perhaps by several of her neighbours? It wi not be pos-
sible. A small proportion of the Community, in a compact situation,
acting on the defensive, and at one of its extremities might at any
time bid defiance to the National authority. Any Gov‘ for the U.
States formed on the supposed practicability of using force ag’ the

 

1The word “be” is substituted in the transcript for “ lie.”
76 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

unconstitutional proceedings of the States, wi prove as visionary &
fallacious as the Gov’ of Cong’ The negative wi render the use of
force unnecessary. The States c4 of themselves then + pass no opera-
tive act, any more than one branch of a Legislature where there are
two branches, can proceed without the other. But in order to give the
negative this efficacy, it must extend to all cases. A discrimination
wi only be a fresh source of contention between the two authorities.
In a word, to recur to the illustrations borrowed from the planetary
system. This prerogative of the General Gové is the great pervading
principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the States;
which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits and
destroy the order & harmony of the political System.

M Wiu1amson was ag giving a power that might restrain the
States from regulating their internal police.

M" Gerry c? not see the extent of such a power, and was agst every
power that was not necessary. He thought a remonstrance ag? un-
reasonable acts of the States w? reclaim? them. If it sh? not force
might be resorted to. He had no objection to authorize a negative
to paper money and similar measures. When the confederation was
depending before Congress, Massachussetts was then for inserting the
power of emitting paper money am® the exclusive powers of Con-
gress. He observed that the proposed negative w? extend to the regu-
lations of the Militia, a matter on which the existence of a? State
might depend. The Nat! Legislature with such a power may enslave
the States. Such an idea as this will never be acceded to. It has
never been suggested or conceived among the people. No speculative
projector, and there are eno’ of that character among us, in politics
as well as in other things, has in any pamphlet or newspaper thrown
out the idea. The States too have different interests and are igno-
rant of each other’s interests. The negative therefore will be abused.
New States too having separate views from the old States will never
come into the Union. They may even be under some foreign influ-
ence; are they in such case to participate in the negative on the will
of the other States?

M* Suerman thought the cases in which the negative ought to
be exercised, might be defined. He wished the point might not be
decided till a trial at least sh*t be made for that purpose

M! Witson would not say what modifications of the proposed
power might be practicable or expedient. But however novel it

 

*The word “then” is omitted in the transcript.
> The word “restrain” is substituted in the transcript for “ reclaim.”
* The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “a.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1787 17

might appear the principle of it when viewed with a close & steady
eye, is right. There is no instance in which the laws say that, the
individual sh? be bound in one case, & at liberty to judge whether
he will obey or disobey in another. The cases are parallel. Abuses
of the power over the individual person may happen as well as over
the individual States. Federal liberty is to+ States, what civil lib-
erty, is to private individuals. And States are not more unwilling to
purchase it, by the necessary concession of their political sovereignty,
that ? the savage is to purchase civil liberty by the surrender of his?
personal sovereignty, which he enjoys in a State of nature. <A defini-
tion of the cases in which the Negative should be exercised, is im-
practicable. A discretion must be left on one side or the other?
will it not be most safely lodged on the side of the Nat! Gov? Among
the first sentiments expressed in the first Cong? one was that Virg?
is no more, that Mas® is no‘, that P? is no more &. We are
now one nation of brethren. We must bury all local interests & dis-
tinctions. This language continued for some time. The tables at
length began to turn. No sooner were the State Gov® formed than
their jealousy & ambition began to display themselves. Each en-
deavoured to cut a slice from the common loaf, to add to its own
morsel, till at length the confederation became frittered down to
the impotent condition in which it now stands. Review the progress
of the articles of Confederation thro’ Congress & compare the first
& last draught of it. To correct its vices is the business of this con-
vention. One of its vices is the want of an effectual controul in the
whole over its parts. What danger is there that the whole will un-
necessarily sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the
whole at the mercy of each part, and will not the general interest be
continually sacrificed to local interests?

M! DicKENSON deemed it impossible to draw a line between the
cases proper & improper for the exercise of the negative. We must
take our choice of two things. We must either subject the States to
the danger of being injured by the power of the Nat! Gov't or the
latter to the danger of being injured by that of the States. He
thought the danger greater from the States. To leave the power
doubtful, would be opening another spring of discord, and he was
for shutting as many of them as possible.

Mz Beprorp. In answer to his colleague’s question where w? be

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The word “that” is changed to “than” in the transcript.

® The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “his.”
4The word “more” is here inserted in the transcript.
78 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the danger to the States from this power, would refer him to the
smallness of his own State which may be injured at pleasure without
redress, It was meant he found to strip the small States of their
equal right of suffrage. In this case Delaware would have about 0
for its share in the General Councils, whilst P? & V* would possess
% of the whole. Is there no difference of interests, no rivalship of
commerce, of manufactures? ‘Will not these large States crush the
small ones whenever they stand in the way of their ambitious or in-
terested views. This shews the impossibility of adopting such a
system as that on the table, or any other founded on a change in
the principle of representation. And after all, if a State does not obey
the law of the new System, must not force be resorted to as the only
ultimate remedy, in this as in any other system. It seems as if P?
& V2 by the conduct of their deputies wished to provide a system
in which they would have an enormous & monstrous influence. Be-
sides, How can it be thought that the proposed negative can be
exercised? are the laws of the States to be suspended in the most
urgent cases until they can be sent seven or eight hundred miles,
and undergo the deliberations* of a body who may be incapable of
Judging of them? Is the National Legislature too to sit continually
in order to revise the laws of the States?

M= Manison observed that the difficulties which had been started
were worthy of attention and ought to be answered before the ques-
tion was put. The case of laws of urgent necessity must be provided
for by some emanation of the power from the Nat’ Gov! into each
State so far as to give a temporary assent at least. This was the
practice in Royal Colonies before the Revolution and would not
have been inconvenient, if the supreme power of negativing had been
faithful to the American interest, and had possessed the necessary
information. He supposed that the negative might be very properly
lodged in the senate alone, and that the more numerous & expensive
branch therefore might not be obliged to sit constantly —He asked
M: B. what would be the consequence to the small States of a dissolu-
tion of the Union w® seemed likely to happen if no effectual sub-
stitute was made for the defective System existing, and he did not
conceive any effectual system could be substituted on any other basis
than that of a proportional suffrage? If the large States possessed
the avarice & ambition with which they were charged, would the
small ones in their neighbourhood, be more secure when all controul
of a Gen! Govt was withdrawn.

 

1 The transcript uses the word “ deliberations” in the singular.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1787 79

M: BurTLer was vehement ag’t the Negative in the proposed extent,
as cutting off all hope of equal justice to the distant States. The
people there would not he was sure give it a hearing.

On the question for extending the negative power to all cases
as propos? by [M! P. & Mt M—] Mass. ay. Confno. N.Y. no. N. J.
no. P? ay. Del. divi M! Read & M? Dickenson ay. M? Bedford &
M: Basset no. Mary? no. V? ay. M? R. M! Mason no. MI Blair,
Doc! M°C3 M' M. ay. Gen! W. not consulted. N.C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.1

On motion of M: Grrry and M: Kine tomorrow was assigned for
reconsidering the mode of appointing the National Executive: the
reconsideration being voted for by all the States except Connecticut
& N. Carolina. :

M: Pinkney and M! Rutiipce moved to add to Resol® 4.2
agreed to by the Com® the following, viz. ‘‘ that the States be divided
into three classes, the 1% class to have 8 members, the 24 two. & the
3? one member each; that an estimate be taken of the comparative
importance of each State at fixed periods, so as to ascertain the
number of members they may from time to time be entitled to’’
The Committee then rose and the House adjourned.

Sarurpay JUNE 9T2 M® Luruer Martin From MARYLAND TOOK HIS
SEAT IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

M: Gerry, according to previous notice given by him, moved ‘‘ that
the National Executive should be elected by the Executives of the
States whose proportion of votes should be the same with that
allowed to the States in the election of the Senate.’’ If the appointmt
should be made by the Nat! Legislature, it would lessen that in-
dependence of the Executive which ought to prevail, would give birth
to intrigue and corruption between the Executive & Legislature
previous to the election, and to partiality in the Executive after-
wards to the friends who promoted him. Some other mode therefore
appeared to him necessary. He proposed that of appointing by the
State Executives as most analogous to the principle observed in elect-

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
[Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason, no; Mr. Blair, Doctor McClurg and Mr. Madison,
aye; General Washington not consulted,] aye—3; Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7; Delaware,
divided, [Mr. Read and Mr. Dickinson, aye; Mr. Bedford and Mr. Basset, no).”

? The words “the fourth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“ Resola 4.”
80 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ing the other branches of the Nat! Govt; the first branch being chosen
by the people of the States, & the 2? by the Legislatures of the States;
he did not see any objection ag*' letting the Executive be appointed
by the Executives of the States. He supposed the Executives would
be most likely to select the fittest men, and that it would be their
interest to support the man of their own choice.

M: RanpoLpH, urged strongly the inexpediency of M™ Gerry’s
mode of appointing the Nat! Executive. The confidence of the
people would not be secured by it to the Nat! magistrate. The small
States would lose all chance of an appointm' from within them-
selves. Bad appointments would be made; the Executives of the
States being little conversant with characters not within their own
small spheres. The State Executives too notwithstanding their con-
stitutional independence, being in fact dependent on the State Legis-
latures will generally be guided by the views of the latter, and pre-
fer either favorites within the States, or such as it may be expected
will be most partial to the interests of the State. A Nat! Executive
thus chosen will not be likely to defend with becoming vigilance &
firmness the National rights ag’ State encroachments. Vacancies also
must happen. How can these be filled? He could not suppose either
that the Executives would feel the interest in supporting the Nat!
Executive which had been imagined. They will not cherish the great
Oak which is to reduce them to paltry shrubs.

On the question for referring the appointment of the Nat! Ex-
ecutive to the State Executives as prop? by Mt Gerry Mass‘? no. Cont
no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. div? M2 no. V2 no. S.C.
no. Geo. no.*

M: PaTTERSON moves that the Committee resume the clause re-
lating to the rule of suffrage in the Nat! Legislature.

M: Brearty seconds him. He was sorry he said that any ques-
tion on this point was brought into view. It had been much agitated
in Cong? at the time of forming the Confederation, and was then
rightly settled by allowing to each sovereign State an equal vote.
Otherwise the smaller States must have been destroyed instead of
being saved. The substitution of a ratio, he admitted carried fair-
ness on the face of it; but on a deeper examination was unfair and
unjust. Judging of the disparity of the States by the quota of
Cong: Virg? would have 16 votes, and Georgia but one. A like
proportion to the others will make the whole number ninity. There

 

1 In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no;
Delaware divided.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1787 81

will be 3. large states, and 10 small ones. The large States by which
he meant Mass’ Pen? & Virg? will carry every thing before them.
It had been admitted, and was known to him from facts within N.
Jersey that where large & small counties were united into a district
for electing representatives for the district, the large counties always
earried their point, and Consequently that+ the large States would
do so. Virg? with her sixteen votes will be a solid column indeed,
a formidable phalanx. While Georgie with her Solitary vote, and the
other little States will be obliged to throw themselves constantly into
the scale of some large one, in order to have any weight at all.
He had come to the convention with a view of being as useful as he
could in giving energy and stability to the federal Government.
When the proposition for destroying the equality of votes came for-
ward, he was astonished, he was alarmed. Is it fair then it will be
asked that Georgia should have an equal vote with Virg?? He would
not say it was. What remedy then? One only, that a map of the
U. 8S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, and
that a new partition of the whole be made into 13 equal parts.

M! PattTERSON considered the proposition for a proportional rep-
resentation as striking at the existence of the lesser States. He w4
premise however to an investigation of this question some remarks
on the nature structure and powers of the Convention. The Con-
vention he said was formed in pursuance of an Act of Cong’ that this
act was recited in several of the Commissions, particularly that of
Mass‘* which he required to be read: that the amendment of the
confederacy was the object of all the laws and commissions on the
subject; that the articles of the Confederation were therefore the
proper basis of all the proceedings of the Convention.2. We ought
to keep within its limits, or we should be charged by our Constituents
with usurpation, that the people of America were sharpsighted and
not to be deceived. But the Commissions under which we acted were
not only the measure of our power, they denoted also the sentiments
of the States on the subject of our deliberation. The idea of a
national Govt as contradistinguished from a federal one, never entered
into the mind of any of them, and to the public mind we must accom-
odate ourselves. We have no power to go beyond the federal
scheme, and if we had the people are not ripe for any other. We
must follow the people; the people will not follow us—The proposi-
tion could not be maintained whether considered in reference to
us as a nation, or as a confederacy. A confederacy supposes sov-

 

1The word “that” is omitted in the transcript.
2 The word “that” is here inserted in the transcript.
82 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ereignty in the members composing it & sovereignty supposes equality.
If we are to be considered as a nation, all State distinctions must be
abolished, the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an
equal division is made, then there may be fairly an equality of
representation. He held up Virg* Masst* & P* as the three large
States, and the other ten as small ones; repeating the calculations of
M: Brearly as to the disparity of votes which w‘ take place, and
affirming that the small States would never agree to it. He said
there was no more reason that a great individual State contributing
much, should have more votes than a small one contributing little,
than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes than an
indigent one. If the rateable property of A was to that of B as
40 to 1, ought A for that reason to have 40 times as many votes as B.
Such a principle would never be admitted, and if it were admitted
would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As A. has more to be
protected than B so he ought to contribute more for the common
protection. The same may be said of a large State w% has more
to be protected than a small one. Give the large States an influence
in proportion to their magnitude, and what will be the consequence?
Their ambition will be proportionally increased, and the small States
will have every thing to fear. It was once proposed by Galloway &
some others that America should be represented in the British Parlt
and then be bound by its laws. America could not have been entitled
to more than % of the n° of? Representatives which would fall to the
share of G. B. Would American rights & interests have been safe
under an authority thus constituted? It has been said that if a
Nat! Govt is to be formed so as to operate on the people and not on
the States, the representatives ought to be drawn from the people.
But why so? May not a Legislature filled by the State Legislatures
operate on the people who chuse the State Legislatures? or may not
a practicable coercion be found. He admitted that there was none
such in the existing System.—He was attached strongly to the plan
of the existing confederacy, in which the people chuse their Legis-
lative representatives; and the Legislatures their federal representa-
tives. No other amendments were wanting than to mark the orbits
of the States with due precision, and provide for the use of coercion,
which was the great point. He alluded to the hint thrown out here-
tofore by M™ Wilson of the necessity to which the large States might
be reduced of confederating among. themselves, by a refusal of the
others to concur. Let them unite if they please, but let them re-

* The words “n° of” are omitted in the transcript.

Ct et Ul
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 1787 83

member that they have no authority to compel the others to unite.
N. Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the Committee.
She would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to
a despot, than to such a fate. He would not only oppose the plan
here but on his return home do every thing in his power to defeat
it there.

M" Wison. hoped if the Confederacy should be dissolved, that
a majority, that a minority of the States would unite for their safety.
He entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representa-
tion, stating for his first position that as all authority was derived
from the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal n°
of representatives, and different numbers of people different numbers
of representatives. This principle had been improperly violated in
the Confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the time.
As to the case of A. & B, stated by M® Patterson, he observed that
in districts as large as the States, the number of people was the
best measure of their comparative wealth. Whether therefore wealth
or numbers were? to form the ratio it would be the same. M!? P. ad-
mitted persons, not property to be the measure of suffrage. Are not
the Citizens of Pen® equal to those of N. Jersey? does it require 150
of the former to balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of differ-
ent districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other,
as their respective Constituents hold to each other. If the small
States will not confederate on this plan, Pen? & he presumed some
other States, would not confederate on any other. We have been
told that each State being sovereign, all are equal. So each man is
naturally a sovereign over himself, and all men are therefore nat-
urally equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes a mem-
ber of Civil Government? He can not. As little can a Sovereign
State, when it becomes a member of a federal Govern! If N. J. will
not part with her Sovereignty it is in vain to talk of Gov’ A new
partition of the States is desireable, but evidently & totally im-
practicable.

MM Wiu1aMson, illustrated the eases by a comparison of the dif-
ferent States, to Counties of different sizes within the same State;
observing that proportional representation was admitted to be just in
the latter case, and could not therefore be fairly contested in the
former.

The Question being about to be put M! Patterson hoped that as

 

1The word “was” is substituted in the transcript for “ were.”
84 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

so much depended on it, it might be thought best to postpone the
decision till tomorrow, which was done nem. con.
The Com’ rose & the House adjourned.

Monpay. June 11T= M® Apranam BALDWIN FROM GEC2GIA TOOK
HIS SEAT. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the nat! Legislature
postponed on Saturday was resumed.

M: Suarman proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1*
branch should be according to the respective numbers of free in-
habitants; and that in the second branch or Senate, each State should
have one vote and no more. He said as the States would remain
possessed of certain individual rights, each State ought to be able to
protect itself: otherwise a few large States will rule the rest. The
House of Lords in England he observed had certain particular rights
under the Constitution, and hence they have an equal vote with the
House of Commons that they may be able to defend their rights.

M: Rutiwce proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1**
branch should be according to the quotas of contribution. The justice
of this rule he said could not be contested. M! Burner urged the
same idea: adding that money was power; and that the States ought
to have weight in the Gov! in proportion to their wealth.

M: Kine & M* Witson,* in order to bring the question to a point
moved ‘‘ that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national
Legislature ought not to be according+ the rule established in the
articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of
representation.’’ The clause so far as it related to suffrage in the
first branch was postponed in order to consider this motion.

M: Dickenson contended for the actual contributions of the States
as the rule of their representation & suffrage in the first branch.
By thus connecting the interest * of the States with their duty, the
latter would be sure to be performed.

M: Kine remarked that it was uncertain what mode might be
used in levying a national revenue; but that it was probable, imposts
would be one source of it. If the actual contributions were to be
the rule the non-importing States, as Cont & N. Jersey, wi be in a

its In the printed Journal Mr. Rutlidge is named as the seconder of the
motion.

* The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.
? The transcript uses the word “interest” in the plural.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1787 85

bad situation indeed. It might so happen that they w’ have no
representation. This situation of particular States had been always
one powerful argument in favor of the 5 Per Ct impost.

The question being ab‘ to be put Doc! FRANKLIN s? he had thrown
his ideas of the matter on a paper w% M: Wilson read to the Com-
mittee in the words following—

M? CHairMaNn

It has given me great pleasure to observe that till this point, the
proportion of representation, came before us, our debates were carried
on with great coolness & temper. If any thing of a contrary kind,
has on this occasion appeared, I hope it will not be repeated; for
we are sent here to consult, not to contend, with each other; and
declarations of a fixed opinion, and of determined resolution, never
to change it, neither enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness and
warmth on one side, naturally beget their like on the other; and
tend to create and augment discord & division in a great concern,
wherein harmony & Union are extremely necessary to give weight
to our Councils, and render them effectual in promoting & securing
the common good.

I must own that I was originally of opinion it would be better
if every member of Congress, or our national Council, were to con-
sider himself rather as a representative of the whole, than as an
Agent for the interests of a particular State; in which case the
proportion of members for each State would be of less consequence, &
it would not be very material whether they voted by States or
individually. But as I find this is not to be expected, I now think
the number of Representatives should bear some proportion to the
number of the Represented; and that the decisions sh? be by the
majority of members, not by the majority of + States. This is objected
to from an apprehension that the greater States would then swallow
up the smaller. I do not at present clearly see what advantage
the greater States could propose to themselves by swallowing? the
smaller, and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I
recollect that in the beginning of this Century, when the Union was
proposed of the two Kingdoms, England & Scotland, the Scotch
Patriots were full of fears, that unless they had an equal number of
Representatives in Parliament, they should be ruined by the superior-
ity of the English. They finally agreed however that the different
proportions of importance in the Union, of the two Nations should

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The word “up” is here inserted in the transcript.
86 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

be attended to, whereby they were to have only forty members in
the House of Commons, and only sixteen in the House of Lords; A
very great inferiority of numbers! And yet to this day I do not
recollect that any thing has been done in the Parliament of Great
Britain to the prejudice of Scotland; and whoever looks over the
lists of public officers, Civil & military of that nation will find I
believe that the North Britons enjoy at least their full proportion
of emolument.

But, Sir, in the present mode of voting by States, it is equally
in the power of the lesser States to swallow up the greater; and this
is mathematically demonstrable. Suppose for example, that 7 smaller
States had each 3 members in the House, and the 6 larger to have
one with another 6 members; and that upon a question, two members
of each smaller State should be in the affirmative and one in the
Negative; they will? make

Affirmatives ........00eeeeee 14....... Negatives 7
And that all the larger States

should be unanimously in

the Negative, they would

MAKE: wee caw cesses Canes ae Sata ES ....-Negatives 36

Tri alll. cece ce ecee ce en cee be ead bee ee ieee. 43 -

It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question against the 43.
and the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the common
practice of Assemblies in all Countries and Ages.

The greater States Sir are naturally as unwilling to have their
property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller are to
have theirs in the disposition of the greater. An honorable gentle-
man has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of equalizing
the States. It appears to me an equitable one, and I should, for my
own part, not be against such a measure, if it might be found prac-
ticable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province had a differ-
ent Constitution, some with greater others with fewer privileges, it
was of importance to the borderers when their boundaries were con-
tested, whether by running the division lines, they were placed on
one side or the other. At present when such differences are done
away, it is less material. The Interest of a State is made up of
the interests of its individual members. If they are not injured,
the State is not injured. Small States are more easily well & hap-

 

1 The word ‘ will” is changed to ‘“ would ” in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1787 87

pily governed than large ones. If therefore in such an equal division,
it should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not
be averse to the giving a part of it to N. Jersey, and another to
Delaware. But as there would probably be considerable difficulties
in adjusting such a division; and however equally made at first,
it would be continually varying by the augmentation of inhabitants in
some States, and their: fixed proportion in others; and thence fre-
quent occasion for new divisions, I beg leave to propose for the con-
sideration of the Committee another mode, which appears to me, to
be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and more permanent
in its nature.

Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or force
it is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the
Union.

Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal
proportion.

The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the disposition
of Congress.

The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal number of
Delegates from each State.

And their decisions to be by the Majority of individual members
voting.

If these joint and equal supplies should on particular occasions
not be sufficient, Let Congress make requisitions on the richer and
more powerful States for farther aids, to be voluntarily afforded,
leaving to each State the right of considering the necessity and utility
of the aid desired, and of giving more or less as it should be found
proper.

This mode is not new, it was formerly practised with success
by the British Government with respect to Ireland and the Colonies.
‘We sometimes gave even more than they expected, or thought just
to accept; and in the last war carried on while we were united, they
gave us back in 5 years a million Sterling. We should probably have
continued such voluntary contributions, whenever the occasions ap-
peared to require them for the common good of the Empire. It
was not till they chose to force us, and to deprive us of the merit
and pleasure of voluntary contributions that we refused & resisted.
Those? contributions however were to be disposed of at the pleasure
of a Government in which we had no representative. I am therefore

 

1The word “more” is in the Franklin manuscript.
2 The word “These” is substituted in the transcript for “ Those.”
88 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

persuaded, that they will not be refused to one in which the Repre-
sentation shall be equal

My learned Colleague [M: Wilson] has already mentioned that
the present method of voting by States, was submitted to originally
by Congress, under a conviction of its impropriety, inequality, and
injustice. This appears in the words of their Resolution. It is of
Sept 6.1774. The words are

“Resolved that in determining questions in this Comg? each
Colony or province shall have one vote: The Cong? not being pos-
sessed of or at present able to procure materials for ascertaining the
importance of each Colony.’’

On the question for agreeing to M! Kings and M* Wilsons
motion it passed in the affirmative

Mass’? ay. C® ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P# ay. Del. no. M?
diva. Vtay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.t

It was then moved by M! Rutiapce 2% by M! ButiEr to add to
the words ‘‘ equitable ratio of representation ’’ at the end of the
motion just agreed to, the words ‘‘ according to the quotas of con-
tribution.’’? On motion of M: Wuison seconded by M! C. PINCKNEY,
this was postponed ; in order to add, after, after the words ‘‘equitable
ratio of representation’? the words following ‘‘ in proportion to
the whole number of white & other free Citizens & inhabitants of
every age sex & condition including those bound to servitude for
a term of years and three fifths of all other persons not compre-
hended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes,
in each State,’’ this being the rule in the Act of Congress agreed
to by eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue on the
States, and requiring a Census only every 5-7, or 10 years.

M: Gerry thought property not the rule of representation.
Why then sh? the blacks, who were property in the South, be
in the rule of representation more than the Cattle & horses of the
North.

On the question,—Mass: Con: N. Y. Pen: Mary? Virg? N.C. S.C.
& Geo: were in the affirmative:? N. J. & Del: in the negative.?

M! Suarman moved that a question be taken whether each State
shall have one vote in the 24 branch. Every thing he said depended
on this. The smaller States would never agree to the plan on any

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, no—3; Maryland divided.”

? In place of the phrase “ were in the affirmative” the transcript substitutes
“aye—9; ” and instead of “in the negative” the expression “no—2” is used.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1787 89

other principle than an equality of suffrage in this branch. M*
ELswortH seconded the motion. On the question for allowing each
State one vote in the 24 branch.

Mass no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P# no. Del. ay.
Ma ay. V2 no. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

M: Witson & M: Hamiuton moved that the right of suffrage in
the 2? branch ought to be according to the same rule as in the 1%
branch. On this question for making the ratio of representation
the same in the 2? as in the 1% branch it passed in the affirmative:

Mass’ ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pt ay. Del. no. M?
no. Viay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay?

Resol: 11,5 for guarantying Republican Gov! & territory to each
State being considered: the words ‘‘ or partition ’’ were, on motion
of M" Manpison, added, after the words ‘‘ voluntary junction: ”’

Mas. N. Y. P. V3\N. C. S. C. G. ay* Con: N. J. Del. M@ no*

M° Reap disliked the idea of guarantying territory. It abetted the
idea of distinct States w would be a perpetual source of discord.
There can be no cure for this evil but in doing away States altogether
and uniting them all into one great Society.

Alterations having been made in the Resolution, making it read
‘that a republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be
guaranteed to each State by the U. States ’’’ the whole was agreed
to nem. con.

Resolution 13,5 for amending the national Constitution hereafter
without consent of * Nat! Legislature being considered, several mem-
bers did not see the necessity of the Resolution at all, nor the propriety
of making the consent of the Nat! Legisl. unnecessary.

Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a provision. The plan
now to be formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation
has been found on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be neces-
sary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular
and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence. It

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, aye—5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye; Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no.”

* The words “The eleventh Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
for “ Resol: 11.” :

‘The figures “7” and “4” are inserted in the transcript after “ay” and
“no,” respectively.

* The words “The thirteenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
for “Resolution 13.”

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
90 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

would be improper to require the consent of the Nat' Legislature,
because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent * on that
very account. The opportunity for such an abuse, may be the fault
of the Constitution calling for amendm!

M! RanpboupH enforced these arguments.

The words, ‘‘ without requiring the consent of the Nat! Legis-
lature ’’? were postponed. The other provision in the clause passed
nem. con.

Resolution 14,2 requiring oaths from the members of the State
Gov* to observe the Nat! Constitution & laws, being considered.

M" SHarMan opposed it as unnecessarily intruding into the State
jurisdictions.

M: RanpoupH considered it as? necessary to prevent that com-
petition between the National Constitution & laws & those of the
particular States, which had already been felt. The officers of the
States are already under oath to the States. To preserve a due
impartiality they ought to be equally bound to the Nat! Govt The
Nat! authority needs every support we can give it. The Executive
& Judiciary of the States, notwithstanding their nominal indepen-
dence on the State Legislatures are in fact, so dependent on them,
that unless they be brought under some tie to the Nat! System, they
will always lean too much to the State systems, whenever a contest
arises between the two.

M" Gerry did not like the clause. He thought there was as much
reason for requiring an oath of fidelity to the States, from Nat!
officers, as vice. versa.

M* Luter Martin moved to strike out the words requiring such
an oath from the State officers, viz ‘‘ within the several States ’’
observing that if the new oath should be contrary to that already
taken by them it would be improper; if coincident the oaths already
taken will be sufficient.

On the question for striking out as proposed by M: L. Martin

Mass? no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P® no. Del. ay.
Mi ay. V2 no. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

Question on° whole Resolution as proposed by M! Randolph;

 

*The word “assent” is substituted in the transcript for “consent.”

* The words “The fourteenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
for “ Resolution 14.”

* The word “as” is crossed out in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, aye—4; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 1787 91

Mass® ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P* ay. Del. no, Mé
no. Viay. N.C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.t
2 Com? rose &? House adj?

Truspay JUNE 12T# In CoMMITTEE OF 2 WHOLE

The Question * taken on Resolution 15,‘ to wit, referring the new
system to the people of the’ States for ratification it passed in the
affirmative: Mass’ ay. Contno. N. Y. no. N.J.no. P?* ay. Del.
div? Mé divi Vtay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

M? SHarman & M* Evsewortu moved to fill the blank left in the
4% Resolution for the periods of electing the members of the first
branch with the words, ‘‘ every year.’’ M? SHarman observing that
he did it in order to bring on some question.

M! RutwipcE proposed ‘‘ every two years.”’

M J=nnNIFER prop? ‘‘ every three years,’’ observing that the too
great frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them,
and made the best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a service.

M* Mapison seconded the motion for three years. Instability is
one of the great vices of our republics, to be remedied. Three years
will be necessary, in a Government so extensive, for members to form
any knowledge of the various interests of the States to which they
do not belong, and of which they can know but little from the situa-
tion and affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in
preparing for and travelling to & from the seat of national business.

M! Gerry. The people of New England will never give up the
point of annual elections, they know of the transition made in Eng-
land from triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an
innovation here as the prelude to a like usurpation. He considered
annual elections as the only defence of the people ag%* tyranny. He
was as much ag‘ a triennial House as ag*t a hereditary Executive.

* Pennsylvania omitted in the printed Journal. The vote is there entered
as of June 11th.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no—5.”

2'The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The words “the fifteenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
for “Resolution 15.”

* The word “United ” is here inserted in the transcript.

° In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,* Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, no—3; Delaware, Maryland, divided.”
92 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Mapison, observed that if the opinions of the people were to
be our guide, it w? be difficult to say what course we ought to take,
No member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his
Constituents were at this time; much less could he say what they
would think if possessed of the information & lights possessed by
the members here; & still less what would be their way of thinking
6 or 12 months hence. We ought to consider what was right &
necessary in itself for the attainment of a proper Governm' A plan
adjusted to this idea will recommend itself—The respectability of this
convention will give weight to their recommendation of it. Experi-
ence will be constantly urging the adoption of it, and all the most
enlightened & respectable citizens will be its advocates. Should we
fall short of the necessary & proper point, this influential class of
Citizens will be turned against the plan, and little support in opposi-
tion to them can be gained to it from the unreflecting multitude.

M® Gerry repeated his opinion that it was necessary to consider
what the people would approve. This had been the policy of all
Legislators. If the reasoning of M! Madison were just, and we sup-
posed a limited Monarchy the best form in itself, we ought to recom-
mend it, tho’ the genius of the people was decidedly adverse to it,
and having no hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute of
the essential materials for such an innovation.

On the question for? triennial election of the 13 branch

Mass. no. [M* King ay.] Mi Ghorum wavering. Cont no. N. Y.
ay. N.J. ay. Ptay. Del. ay. Méay. Veay. N.C. no. 8. C. no.
Geo. ay?

The words requiring members of y® 1% branch to be of the age
of years were struck out Maryland alone, no. The words “ lib-
eral compensation for members ’’ being consid’ M: Mapison moves to
insert the words, “‘ & fixt.’’ He observed that it would be improper to
leave the members of the Nat! legislature to be provided for by the
State Legisl? because it would create an improper dependence; and to
leave them to regulate their own wages, was an indecent thing, and
might in time prove a dangerous one. He thought wheat or some other
article of which the average price throughout a reasonable period
preceding might be settled in some convenient mode, would form a
proper standard.

Col. Mason seconded the motion; adding that it would be im-

*The word “the” i i i ‘

7In the transcript fe eee “New won eo Jersey, Pennsylvania,

Delaware, Maryland, Virginia Georgia, aye—7; Massachusett: i
‘2 et > a 3 M . K y ,
Mr. Gorham, wavering] Connecticut, North Carolina, South Castine. noe
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 1787 93

proper for other reasons to leave the wages to be regulated by the
States. 1.1 the different States would make different provision for
their representatives, and an inequality would be felt among them,
whereas he thought they ought to be in all respects equal. 2.1 the
parsimony of the States might reduce the provision so low that as
had already happened in choosing delegates tc Congress, the question
would be not who were most. fit to be chosen, but who were most
willing to serve.

On the question for inserting the words ‘‘and fixt.”’

Mass'** no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Peay. Del. ay. M4
ay. Vtay. N.C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. ay?

Doct! FRANKLYN said he approved of the amendment just made
for rendering the salaries as fixed as possible; but disliked the word
* iberal.’’? he would prefer the word moderate if it was necessary
to substitute any other. He remarked the tendency of abuses in every
case, to grow of themselves when once begun, and related very pleas-
antly the progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first de-
parture from the gratuitous provision for the Apostles, to the estab-
lishment of the papal system. The word ‘‘ liberal ’’ was struck out
nem. con.

On the motion of M! Pierce, that the wages should be paid out
of the National Treasury, Mass® ay. Ct no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay.
P? ay. Del. ay. Miay. Ve ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. G. ay.’

Question on the clause relating to term of service & compensation
of* 13* branch

Mass? ay. Ct no. N. Y no. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. M? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.®

On a question for striking out the “‘ ineligibility of members of
*Nat! Legis: to State offices.’’

Mass'® div? Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no.
Me div? Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no®

e

 

1The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “First” and “Secondly” in
the transcript.

?In the transcript the vote reads: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Massachusetts,
Connecticut, South Carolina, no—3.”

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Con-
necticut, New York, South Carolina, no—3.”

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

®In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Connecti-
cut, New York, South Carolina, no—3.”

® In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, North Carolina,
South Carolina, aye—4; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, Georgia,
no—5; Massachusetts, Maryland, divided.”
94 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended,

Mass ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay M!
ay. Veay. N. C.ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

On a question for making Members of ? Nat! legislature ineligible
to any office under the Nat! Govt for the term of 3 years after ceasing
to be members. ,

Mass‘ no. Cont no. N. Y.no. N.J.no. Ptno. Del. no. May
Vino. NC. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.’

On the question for such ineligibility for one year

Mass ay. Ct ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M?
divi Vt ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. no.*

On? question moved by M! Pinceney for striking out ‘‘ incapable
of re-election into? 1% branch of? Nat! Legisl. for years, and
subject to recall ’’ ag? to nem. con.

On? question for striking out from Resol: 5° the words requiring
members of the senatorial branch to be of the age of years at
least

Mass’ no. Contay. N. Y.no. N.J.ay. Ptay. Del. no. M?no.
V2 no. N. C. div? S.C. no. Geo. div?®

On the question for filling the blank with 30 years as the qualifica-
tion; it was agreed to.

Mass® ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay N.J.no. P? ay Del. no Mi? ay
Ve ay N.C. ay S.C. ay Geo. no’

M: Spaicur moved to fill the blank for the duration of the ap-
pointm® to the 2? branch of the National Legislature with the words
“7 years.

MM: SHerman, thought 7 years too long. He grounded his opposi-
tion he said on the principle that if they did their duty well, they
would be reelected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—10; Conneeticut, no—1.”

? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Maryland, aye—l; Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10.”

“In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—8; New
York, Georgia, no—2; Maryland, divided.”

*The words “the fifth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“ Resol: 5.”

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
aye—3; Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Caro-
lina, no—6; North Carolina, Georgia, divided.”

"In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—7; Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, no—4,”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 1787 95

should be allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred 5 years
which w‘ be between the terms of ?'1%* branch & of the executive

M: Pierce proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise an alarm.
Great mischiefs had? arisen in England from their septennial act
which was reprobated by most of their patriotic Statesmen.

M* RanpotepH was for the term of 7 years. The democratic
licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm
Senate. The object of this 24 branch is to controul the democratic
branch of the Nat! Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other
branch being more numerous, and coming immediately from the
people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on
like principles had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent.
No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other
branch, and in some measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be
necessary. A firmness & independence may be the more necessary
also in this branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution ag’t encroach-
ments of the Executive who will be apt to form combinations with the
demagogues of the popular branch.

M: Mapison, considered 7 years as a term by no means too long.
What we wished was to give to the Gov! that stability which was
every where called for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form
alledged to be inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of
giving too much stability by the term of Seven years. His fear was
that the popular branch would still be too great an overmatch for it.
It was to be much lamented that we had so little direct experience
to guide us. The Constitution of Maryland was the only one that
bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In no instance had the
Senate of Mary! created just suspicions of danger from it. In some
instances perhaps it may have erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates.
In every instance of their opposition to the measures of the H. of D.
they had had with them the suffrages of the most enlightened and
impartial people of the other States as well as of their own. In
the States where the Senates were chosen in the same manner as the
other branches, of the Legislature, and held their seats for 4 years,
the institution was found to be no check whatever ag** the insta-
bilities of the other branches. He conceived it to be of great impor-
tance that a stable & firm Gov‘ organized in the republican form
should be held out to the people. If this be not done, and the people
be left to judge of this species of Gov! by y? operations of the de-
fective systems under which they now live, it is much to be feared

 

2The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The word “have” is substituted in the transcript for “had.”
86 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the time is not distant when, in universal disgust, they will renounce
the blessing which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and be
ready for any change that may be proposed to them.

On the question for ‘‘ seven years ’’ as the term for the 2% branch
Mass’ divided (M= King, Mt Ghorum ay—M= Gerry, M' Strong, no)
Cont no. N. Y. divi N. J. ay. P? ay Del. ay. M% ay. V3? ay.
N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.2

M: Butter & M! Rutwipce proposed that the members of the 29
branch should be entitled to no salary or compensation for their
services On the question,*

Mass‘ div? Contay. N.Y.no. N.J.no. P.no. Del. ay. M4 no.
Vino. N.C.no. S.C. ay. Geo. no.®

It was then moved & agreed that the clauses respecting the
stipends & ineligibility of the 2? branch be the same as, of the 1*
branch: Con: disagreeing to the ineligibility.

It was moved & 2%4 to alter Resol: 9.4 so as to read ‘‘ that the
jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be to hear & determine in
the dernier resort, all piracies, felonies &c.’’

It was moved & 2% to strike out ‘‘ all piracies & felonies on the
high seas,’’ which was agreed to.

It was moved & agreed to strike out ‘‘ all captures from an enemy.”’

It was moved & agreed to strike out ‘‘ other States ’’ and insert
“two distinct States of the Union ’’

It was moved & agreed to postpone the consideration of Reso-
lution 9,‘ relating to the Judiciary :

The Com then rose & the House adjourned

WEDNESDAY JUNE 13. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Resol: 9* being resumed

The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the

* [It is probable ye votes here turned chiefly on the idea that if the salaries
were not here provided for, the members would be paid by their respective

States]
This note for the bottom margin.?

 

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Con-
necticut, no—1; Massachusetts [Mr. Gorham and Mr. King, aye; Mr. Gerry and
Mr. Strong, no] New York, divided.”

* Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina,
aye—3; New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, Georgia, no—7; Massachusetts, divided.”

de : ate words “the ninth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“Resol: 9.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 1787 97

Nati! tribunals, was struck out nem. con in order to leave full room
for their organization.

M: RanpotpH & M! Mapison, then moved the following resolution
respecting a National Judiciary, viz ‘‘that the jurisdiction of the
National Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection
of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and
questions which involve the national peace and harmony ’’ which was
agreed to.

M: Prnzney & M' SHerman moved to insert after the words ‘‘ one
supreme tribunal ’’ the words ‘‘ the Judges of which to be appointed
by the national Legislature.’’

ME Mapison, objected to an app! by the whole Legislature. Many
of them were? incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications.
They were too much influenced by their partialities. The candidate
who was present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legis-
lative field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of
their own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means,
would without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the
laws prevail over a competitor not having these recommendations, but
possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the
appointment should be made by the Senate, which as a less numerous
& more select body, would be more competent judges, and which was
sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in them.

M: SHarmMan & M!? Pinkney withdrew their motion, and the appt
by the Senate was ag? to nem. con.

M: Gerry. moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating
money bills. The other branch was more immediately the representa-
tives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold
the purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed to originate such
bills, they wt repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish a
sett of representatives in the other branch who will fall into their
snares,

M* Butter saw no reason for such a discrimination. We were
always following the British Constitution when the reason of it did
not apply. There was no analogy between the H. of Lords and the
body proposed to be established. If the Senate should be degraded by
any such discriminations, the best men would be apt to decline serving
in it in favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter into
the practice of tacking other clauses to money bills.

M: Maptison observed that the Commentators on the Brit: Const:

 

2The word “are” is substituted in the transcript for ‘‘ were.”
98 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of L. in
money bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the
case before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people
as well as the 1% branch. If they si have any dangerous influence
over it, they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to
originate the bill they wished to be passed. As the Senate would be
generally a more capable sett of men, it wi be wrong to disable them
from any preparation of the business, especially of that which was
most important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other.
The Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the re-
straint to the amendment, as well as the originating of money bills,
since, an addition of a given sum w? be equivalent to a distinct proposi-
tion of it.

M! Kine differed from M! Gerry, and concurred in the objections
to the proposition.

M! Reap favored the proposition, but would not extend the re-
straint to the case of amendments.

M* Prnxney thinks the question premature. If the Senate sh?
be formed on the same proportional representation as it stands at
present, they s* have equal power, otherwise if a different principle
s? be introduced.

M‘: SHerman. As both branches must concur, there can be no
danger whichever way the Senate: be formed. We establish two
branches in order to get more wisdom, which is particularly needed
in the finance business—The Senate bear their share of the taxes, and
are also the representatives of the people. What a man does by
another, he does by himself is a maxim. In Con‘ both branches can
originate in all cases, and it has been found safe & convenient. What-
ever might have been the reason of the rule as to The H. of Lords,
it is clear that no good arises from it now even there.

Gen! Pinkney. This distinction prevails in 8. C. & has been a
source of pernicious disputes between y? 2 branches. The Constitu-
tion is now evaded, by informal schedules of amendments handed
from y? Senate to the other House.

M? WILLIAMSON wishes for a question chiefly to prevent re-dis-
cussion. The restriction will have one advantage, it will oblige
cu member in? lower branch to move, & people can then mark

im.
On the question for excepting money bills as prop? by M: Gerry,

* The word “may” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13, 1787 99

Mass. no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Del. ay.. M? no. V®# ay.
N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

? Committee rose & M' GHorum made report, which was postponed
till tomorrow, to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed.
The report was in the words following:

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WHOLE ON M! RANDOLPH’S
PROPOSITIONS °

1. Res? that it is the opinion of this Committee that a National
Governm! ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legisla-
tive, Executive & Judiciary.

2. Resol? that the National Legislature ought to consist of two

branches.

3. Res? that the members of the first branch of the National Legis-
lature ought to be elected by the people of the several States for the
term of three years, to receive fixed Stipends by which they may be
compensated for the devotion of their time to? public service, to be
paid out of the National Treasury: to be ineligible to any office estab-
lished by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States,
(except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first
branch), during the term of service, and under the national Govern-
ment for the space of one year after its expiration.

4. Rest that the members of the second branch of the Nat! Legis-
lature ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures, to be of the
age of 30 years at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to
ensure their independency,* namely, seven years, to receive fixed
stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their
time to? public service to be paid out of the National Treasury; to be
ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the
authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the
functions of the second branch) during the term of service, and under
the Nat! Govt for the space of one year after its expiration.

5. Res? that each branch ought to possess the right of originating
‘Acts \

6. Res? that the Nat! Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy
the Legislative rights vested in Cong? by the Confederation, and
moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are
incompetent; or in which the harmony of the U.,S. may be inter-
rupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all laws
passed by the several States contravening in the opinion of the
National Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting
under the authority of the Union.

e

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ New York, Delaware, Virginia, aye—3;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Georgia no—7.”

?The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

? This heading is omitted in the transcript.

‘The word “ independency ” is changed to “ independence” in the transcript.
100 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

7. Res‘ that the rights of suffrage in the 1% branch of the National
Legislature, ought not to be according to the rule established in the
articles of confederation but according to some equitable ratio of
representation, namely, in proportion to the whole number of white
& other free citizens & inhabitants, of every age sex and condition,
including those bound to servitude for a term of years, & three fifths
of all other persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description,
except Indians not paying taxes in each State:

8. Resolved that the right of suffrage in the 2? branch of the
National Legislature ought to be according to the rule established for
the first.

9. Resolved that a National Executive be instituted to consist of a
single person, to be chosen by the Nati! Legislature for the term of
seven years, with power to carry into execution the national laws, to
appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for—to be ineligible
a second time, & to be removeable on impeachment and conviction of
malpractices or neglect of duty—to receive a fixed stipend by which
he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to * public service
to be paid out of the national Treasury.

10. Resol? that the Nat! Executive shall have a right to negative
any Legislative Act, which shall not be afterwards passed unless? by
two thirds of each branch of the National Legislature.

11. Resol‘ that a Nat! Judiciary be established, to consist of one
supreme tribunal, the Judges of which to* be appointed by the 24
branch of the Nat! Legislature, to hold their offices during good be-
haviour, & to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation
for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made,
so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase
or diminution.

12. Resol’ that the Nat! Legislature be empowered to appoint
inferior Tribunals.

13. Res? that the jurisdiction of the Nat! Judiciary shall extend
to all cases which respect the collection of the Nat! revenue, impeach-
ments of any Nat! Officers, and questions whic: involve the national
peace & harmony.

14, Res? that provision ought to be made for the admission of
States lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States, whether
from a voluntary junction of Government & territory or otherwise,
with the consent of a number of voices in the Nat! Legislature less
than the whole.

15. Res? that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges untill a given day after
the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted and for the com-
pletion of all their engagements.

16. Res? that a Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought
to be guaranteed to each State by the U. States.

 

+The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
? The word “unless” is omitted in the transcript.
®* The word “shall” is substituted in the transcript for “to.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 1787 101

17. Res‘ that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary.

18. Res? that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers within
me fe States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles
of Union.

19. Res? that the amendments which shall be offered to the con-
federation by the Convention ought at a proper time or times after
the approbation of Cong? to be submitted to an Assembly or Assemblies
recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the
people to consider and decide thereon.

TaursDAY JUNE 14. In ConvENTION 2

M: PatTERSON, observed to the Convention that it was the wish
of several deputations, particularly that of N. Jersey, that further time
might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the
Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and contra-
distinguished from the reported plan. He said they hoped to have
such an one ready by tomorrow to be laid before the Convention:
And the Convention adjourned that leisure might be given for the
purpose.

Frmay June 157 17872

3M: Parterson, laid before the Convention the plan which he said
several of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that
proposed by M! Randolph. After some little discussion of the most
proper mode of giving it a fair deliberation it was agreed that it
should be referred to a Committee of the whole, and that in order
to place the two plans in due comparison, the other should be recom-
mitted. At the earnest desire* of M? Lansing & some other gentle-
men, it was also agreed that the Convention should not go into
Committee of the whole on the subject till tomorrow, by which delay
the friends of the plan proposed by M! Patterson w? be better pre-
pared to explain & support it, and all would have an opportu’ of
taking copies.*

[* this plan had been concerted among the deputations or members thereof,
from Cont N. Y. N. J. Del. and perhaps Mr Martin from Mary4 who made with

 

1The words “In Convention” are crossed out in the transcript.
The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

* The words “In Convention ” are here inserted in the transcript.
‘The word “request ” is substituted in the transcript for “ desire.”
102 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

The propositions from N. Jersey moved by M! Patterson were
in the words following.

1. Res‘ that the articles of Confederation ought to be so revised,
corrected & enlarged, as to render the federal Constitution adequate
to the exigencies of Government, & the preservation of the Union.

9. Res? that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in
Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation, they be
authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or
duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign growth or manufacture,
imported into any part of the U. States, by Stamps on paper, vellum
or parchment, and by a postage on all letters or package3 passing
through the general post-office, to be applied to such federal purposes
as they shall deem proper & expedient; to make rules & regulations
for the collection thereof; and the same from time to time, to alter
& amend in such manner as they shall think proper: to pass Acts for
the regulation of trade & commerce as well with foreign nations as
with each other: provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures &
penalties to be incurred for contravening such acts rules and regula-
tions shall be adjudged by the Common law Judiciaries of the State
in which any offence contrary to the true intent & meaning of such
Acts rules & regulations shall have been committed or perpetrated,
with liberty of commencing in the first instance all suits & prosecutions
for that purpose in the superior common law Judiciary in such State,
subject nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law &
fact in rendering Judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the
U. States.

3. Res? that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead of
the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of Con-
federation, the United States in Cong? be authorized to make such
requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white & other free
citizens & inhabitants of every age sex and condition including those
bound to servitude for a term of years & three fifths of all other

them a common cause? on different principles. Cont & N. Y. were agst a depar-
ture from the principle of the Confederation, wishing rather to add a few new
powers to Cong: than to substitute, a National Govt The States of N. J. & Del.
were opposed to a National Govt because its patrons considered a proportional
Tepresentation of the States as the basis of it. The eagourness displayed by the
members opposed to a Nat! Govt from these different motives began now to pro-
duce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention. Mr Dickenson said to
Mr Madison—You see the consequence of pushing things too far. Some of the
members from the small States wish for two branches in the General Legis-
lature, and are friends to a good National Government; but we would sooner
submit to a foreign power, than submit to be deprived of an equality of suffrage,”
in both branches of the legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination
of the large States.]
*The note in brackets for the margin.®

1The word “though” is here inserted in the transcript.
_? The phrase “of an equality of suffrage” is transposed so that the tran-
script reads “deprived, in both branches of the legislature of an equality of
suffrage, and thereby” . .

3 Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 15, 1787 103

persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except In-
dians not paying taxes; that if such requisitions be not complied with,
in the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the
non complying States & for that purpose to devise and pass acts
directing & authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers
hereby vested in the U. States in Cong? shall be exercised without the
consent of at least States, and in that proportion if the num-
ber of Confederated States should hereafter be increased or diminished.

4, Res? that the U. States in Cong? be authorized to elect a
federal Executive to consist of persons, to continue in office
for the term of years, to receive punctually at stated times a
fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminu-
tion shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the Executive
at the time of such increase or diminution, to be paid out of the
federal treasury; to be incapable of holding any other office or
appointment during their time of service and for years there-
after; to be ineligible a second time, & removeable by Cong? on
application by a majority of the Executives of the several States;
that the Executives? besides their general authority to execute the
federal acts ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise pro-
vided for, & to direct all military operations; provided that none
of the persons composing the federal Executive shall on any occasion
take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct any? enter-
prise as General or in other capacity.

5. Rest that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a
supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the Execu-
tive, & to hold their offices during good behaviour, to receive punc-
tually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services in which
no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons
actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution; that the
Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear & determine in
the first instance on all impeachments of federal officers, & by way of
appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights of Am-
bassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of
piracies & felonies on the high Seas, in all cases in which foreigners
may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or
which may arise on any of the Acts for® regulation of trade, or
the collection of the federal Revenue: that none of the Judiciary
shall during the time. they remain in office be capable of receiving
or holding any other office or appointment during their time* of
service, or for thereafter.

6. Res? that all Acts of the U. States in Cong? made by virtue
& in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of Confedera-
tion vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under the
authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the respective

 

1The transcript uses the word “ Executives” in the singular.

? The word “ military” is here inserted in the transcript.

®’ The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The word “term ” is substituted in the transcript for “ time.”
104 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said
States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States
shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective
laws of the Individual States to the contrary notwithstanding; and
that if any State, or any body of men in any State shall oppose
or prevent y° carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal
Executive shall be authorized to call forth y* power of the Con-
federated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce
and compel an obedience to such Acts, or an observance of such
Treaties. :

7. Res? that provision be made for the admission of new States
into the Union. ;

8. Res?! the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every
State.

9. Res? that a Citizen of one State committing an offence in
another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offence
as if it had been committed by a Citizen of the State in which the
offence was committed.*

Adjourned.

 

SaTurDAY JUNE 16. In ComMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE ON ? RESOLUTIONS
propos? By ME P.& MER

M: LanstnG called for the reading of the 1% resolution of each
plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast;
that of M: Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective
States, that of Mt Randolph distroys it: the latter requires a negative
on all the laws of the particular States; the former, only certain
general powers for the general good. The plan of M* R. in short
absorbs all power except what may be exercised in the little local
matters of the States which are not objects worthy of the supreme
cognizance. He grounded his preference of M: P.’s plan, chiefly on
two objections agst? that of M? R. 1.4 want of power in the Con-
vention to discuss & propose it. 2* the improbability of its being

* This copy of Mr Patterson’s propositions varies in a few clauses from that
in the printed Journal furnished from the papers of Mr Brearley a Colleague of
Mr Patterson. A confidence is felt, notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the
copy in the Journal is not entirely correct is shewn by the ensuing speech of
Mr Wilson [June 16] in which he refers to the mode of removing the Executive
by impeachment & conviction as a feature in the Virg? plan forming one of its
contrasts to that of Mr Patterson, which proposed a removal on the application
of a majority of the Executives of the States. In the copy printed in the
Journal, the two modes are combined in the same clause; whether through inad-
vertence, or as a contemplated amendment does not appear.

* The word “that” is here inserted in the transcript.
? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
*> The word “to” is substituted in the transcript for “agst”

‘The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “secondly” in the
transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 16, 1787 105

adopted. 1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the
Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and
having for their basis the Confederacy in being. The Act of Congress
The tenor of the Acts of the States, the Commissions produced by the
several deputations all proved this. And this limitation of the power
to an amendment of the Confederacy, marked the opinion of the
States, that it was unnecessary & improper to go farther. He was
sure that this was the case with his State. N. York would never have
concurred in sending deputies to the convention, if she had sup-
posed the deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the States,
and a National Government.

2. was it probable that the States would adopt & ratify a scheme,
which they had never authorized us to propose? and which so far
exceeded what they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several
Acts particularly in relation to the plan of revenue proposed by
Cong. in 1783, not authorized by the Articles of Confederation, what
were the ideas they then entertained. Can so great a change be sup-
posed to have already taken place. To rely on any change which is
hereafter to take place in the sentiments of the people would be trust-
ing to too great an uncertainty. We know only what their present |
sentiments are. And it is in vain to propose what will not accord
with these. The States will never feel a sufficient confidence in a
general Government to give it a negative on their laws. The
Scheme is itself totally novel. There is no parallel to it to be
found. The authority of Congress is familiar to the people, and an
augmentation of the powers of Congress will be readily approved by |
them.

M: Patterson, said as he had on a former occasion given his
sentiments on the plan proposed by ME: R. he would now avoiding
repetition as much as possible give his reasons in favor of that pro-
posed by himself. He preferred it because it accorded 1.1 with the
powers of the Convention, 21 with the sentiments of the people. If
the confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States,
and obtain larger powers, not assume them of ourselves. I came here
not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent
me. Our object is not such a Governm' as may be best in itself, but
such a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as
they will approve. If we argue the matter on the supposition that
no Confederacy at present exists, it can not be denied that all the

}

—_

 

1The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “secondly” in the
‘transcript.
106 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

States stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All therefore must
concur before any can be bound. If a proportional representation be
right, why do we not vote so here? If we argue on the fact that a
federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it we still
find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of it. He reads the 5 art:
of t Confederation giving each State a vote—& the 13% declarmg that
no alteration shall be made without unanimous consent. This is
the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be
unanimously undone. It was observed [by M! Wilson] that the larger
States gave up the point, not because it was right, but because the
circumstances of the moment urged the concession. Be it so. Are
they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can the donor resume
his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine may be con-
venient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser States. The
large States acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the small
ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland were
the two last, the former objecting to the want of power in Congress
over trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate the
vacant territory to the benefit of the whole.—If the sovereignty of the
States is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn im-
mediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no
power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. The only expedient
that will cure the difficulty, is that of throwing the States into
Hotchpot. To say that this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let
it be tried, and we shall see whether the Citizens of Mass's Pen? &
V* accede to it. It will be objected that Coercion will be imprac-
ticable. But will it be more so in one plan than the other? Its
efficacy will depend on the quantum of power collected, not on its
being drawn from the States, or from the individuals; and according
to his plan it may be exerted on individuals as well as according?”
that of M! R. A distinct executive & Judiciary also were equally
provided by his plan. It is urged that two branches in the Legis-
lature are necessary. Why? for the purpose of a check. But the
reason of? the precaution is not applicable to this case. Within a
particular State, where party heats prevail, such a check may be
necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less necessary, and besides,
the delegations of the different States are checks on each other. Do
the people at large complain of Cong? No, what they wish is that
Cong? may have more power. If the power now proposed be not eno’,

 

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.
*The word “for” is substituted in the transcript for “ of.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 16, 1787 107

the people hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers
Cong? will act with more energy & wisdom than the proposed Nat!
Legislature; being fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by
the mode of election. The plan of M? R. will also be enormously
expensive. Allowing Georgia & Del. two representatives each in the
popular branch the aggregate number of that branch will be 180.
Add to it half as many for the other branch and you have 270.
members coming once at least a year from the most distant as well
as the most central parts of the republic. In the present deranged
state of our finances can so expensive a system be seriously thought
of? By enlarging the powers of Cong? the greatest part of this
expence will be saved, and all purposes will be answered. At least
a trial ought to be made.

M* Wison entered into a contrast of the principal points of the
two plans so far he said as there had been time to examine the one
last proposed. These points were 1. in the Virg* plan there are 2 &
in some degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan from
N. J. there is to be a single legislature only—2. Representation of
the people at large is the basis of the? one:—the State Legislatures,
the pillars of the other—3. proportional representation prevails in one:
—equality of suffrage in the other—4. A single Executive Magistrate
is at the head of the one:—a plurality is held out in the other.—5. in
the one the? majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail :—in the
other a minority may prevail. 6. the Nat! Legislature is to make
laws in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent &:—
in place of this Cong? are to have additional power in a few cases
only—7. A negative on the laws of the States:—in place of this
coertion to be substituted—8. The Executive to be removeable on
impeachment & conviction ;—in one plan: in the other to be remove-
able at the instance of? majority of the Executives of the States—
9. Revision of the laws provided for in one:—no such check in the
other—10. inferior national tribunals in one:—none such in the other.
11. In y? one jurisdiction of Nat! tribunals to extend &c—; an
appellate jurisdiction only allowed in the other. 12. Here the juris-
diction is to extend to all cases affecting the Nation! peace & har-
mony: there, a few cases only are marked out. 13. finally y? ratifica-
tion is in this to be by the people themselves:—in that by the legis-
lative authorities according to the 13 art: of * Confederation.

 

1The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.

? The word “a” is substituted in the transcript for “the.”
*The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
108 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

With regard to the power of the Convention, he conceived himself
authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose any
thing. In this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the
two plans.

With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived it difii-
cult to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in
which one moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He
could not persuade himself that the State Govs & Sovereignties were so
much the idols of the people, nor a Nat! Gov! so obnoxious to them, as
some supposed. Why s? a Nat! Gov! be unpopular? Has it less
dignity? will each Citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection?
Will a Citizen of Delaware be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the
United States?+ Where do the people look at present for relief from
the evils of which they complain? Is it from an internal reform of
their Gov®? no, Sir. It is from the Nat! Councils that relief is
expected. For these reasons he did not fear, that the people would
not follow us into a national Gov! and it will be a further recom-
mendation of M! R.’s plan that it is to be submitted to them, and not to
the Legislatures, for ratification.

proceeding now to the 1* point on which he had contrasted the two
plans, he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of
the federal powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he
could ever consent to give powers to Cong$ he had two reasons either
of w® was sufficient. 1.2 Cong’ as a Legislative body does not stand
on the people. 2.? it is a single body. 1. He would not repeat the
remarks he had formerly made on the principles of Representation.
he would only say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison
contaminating every branch of Gov! In G. Britain where this poison
has had a full operation, the security of private rights is owing
entirely to the purity of Her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of
which are neither appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The
political liberty of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representa-
tion is at the mercy of its rulers. He means not to insinuate that
there is any parallel between the situation of that Country & ours at
present. But it is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the smallest
bodies in G. B. are notoriously the most corrupt. Every other source
of influence must also be stronger in small than * large bodies of men.
When Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch provinces

 

+The transcript does not italicize the word “ States.”

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “secondly” in the
transcript.

* The word “in” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 16, 1787 109

had been seduced into the views of France, he need not have added,
that it was not Holland, but one of the smallest of them. There
are facts among ourselves which are known to all. Passing over
others, he* will only remark that the Impost, so anxiously wished for
by the public was defeated not by any of the larger States in the
Union. 2. Congress is a single Legislature. Despotism comes on
Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive, sometimes
in a Military, one. Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism?
Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be
not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can
only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and in-
dependent branches. In a single House there is no check, but the
inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it.

On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to
the plan reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the
Executive powers in a single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey,
vested them in a plurality. Im order to controul the Legislative
authority, you must divide it. In order to controul the Executive
you must unite it. One man will be more responsible than three.
Three will contend among themselves till one becomes the mas-
ter of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome first Cesar,
then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings of Sparta,
& the Consuls of Rome prove also the factious consequences of dividing
the Executive Magistracy. Having already taken up so much time he
w’ not he s‘ proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he had
dwelt, are sufficient of themselves: and on a decision of them, the
fate of the others will depend.

M:! Pinkney, the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N.
Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in
the Nati! system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any
length in recommending, which they found necessary to remedy the
evils which produced this Convention.

M! ELseworTH proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting
the mind of the Committee on the subject, ‘‘ that the Legislative
power of the U. S. should remain in Cong?’’ This was not seconded,
though it seemed better calculated for the purpose than the 1:* prop-
osition of Mt Patterson in place of which M: E. wished to substitute it.

M! RaNDOLPH, was not scrupulous on the point of power. When
the salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to

 

1The word “we” is substituted in the transcript for “he.”
110 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

our trust, not to propose what we found necessary. He painted in
strong colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy, & the
danger of delaying a substantial reform. In answer to the objection
drawn from the sense of our Constituents as denoted by their acts
relating to the Convention and the objects of their deliberation, he
observed that as each State acted separately in the case, it would
have been indecent for it to have charged the existing Constitution
with all the vices which it might have perceived in it. The first
State that set on foot this experiment would not have been justified
in going so far, ignorant as it was of the opinion of others, and
sensible as it must have been of the uncertainty of a successful issue
to the experiment. There are certainly seasons 1 of a peculiar nature
where the ordinary cautions must be dispensed with; and this is
certainly one of them. He w’ not as far as depended on him leave
any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The present moment is
favorable, and is probably the last that will offer.

The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan,
or introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has
been fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two
modes, by which the end of a Gen! Gov! can be attained: the 1% is? by
coercion as proposed by M! P.s plan 2.* by real legislation as prop?
by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable,
expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended also to habituate the instru-
ments of it to shed the blood & riot in the spoils of their fellow Citi-
zens, and consequently trained them up for the service of ambition.
We must resort therefore to a National * Legislation over individuals,
for which Cong? are unfit. To vest such power in them, would be
blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary to the rec?
maxim on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in
Cong? has been safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of
that body. Cong’ are moreover not elected by the people, but by the
Legislatures who retain even a power of recall. They have there-
fore no will of their own, they are a mere diplomatic body, and are
always obsequious to the views of the States, who are always en-
croaching on the authority of the U. States. A provision for harmony
among the States, as in trade, naturalization &¢.—for crushing rebel-
lion whenever it may rear its crest—and for certain other general

 

_ _.7 The words “certainly seasons ” are transposed to read “seasons certainly ”
in the transcript; but the word “seasons” was erroneously printed “ reasons ?
which error has been followed in other editions of Madison’s notes. :

2 The word “is” is omitted in the transcript.

* The figure “2” is changed to “the second” in the transcript.

‘The transcript italicizes the word “ National.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1787 111

benefits, must be made. The powers for these purposes, can never
be given to a body, inadequate as Congress are in point of rep-
resentation, elected in the mode in which they are, and possessing
no more confidence than they do: for notwithstanding what has been
said to the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that. a rooted
distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed. A Nat! Gov! alone,
properly constituted, will answer the purpose; and he begged
it to be considered that the present is the last moment for estab-
lishing one. After this select experiment, the people will yield to
despair.
The Committee rose & the House adjourned.

Monpay JUNE 18. In COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE ON THE PROPOSITIONS
oF M' Patterson & M!? RanDOoLPH

On motion of M: Dickinson to postpone the 1** Resolution in M!
Patterson’s plan, in order to take up the following viz—‘‘ that the
Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as
to render the Government of the U. S. adequate to the exigences,
the preservation and the prosperity of the Union ”’ the postponement
was agreed to by 10 States, Pen: divided.

M: Hammon, had been hitherto silent on the business before
the Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities
age & experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dis-
similar to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect
to his own State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleagues,
he could by no means accede. The crisis however which now marked
our affairs, was too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail
over the duty imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the
public safety & happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare him-
self unfriendly to both plans. He was particularly opposed to that
from N. Jersey, being fully convinced, that no amendment of the
Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their Sovereignty
could possibly answer the purpose. On the other hand he confessed
he was much discouraged by the amazing extent of Country in ex-
pecting the desired blessings from any general sovereignty that could
be substituted.—As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the
doubts started on that subject had arisen from distinctions & reason-
ings too subtle. A federal Gov! he conceived to mean an association
of independent Communities into one. Different Confederacies have
112 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

different powers, and exercise them in different ways. In some in-
stances the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in others over
individuals, as in the German Diet—& among ourselves in eases of
piracy. Great latitude therefore must be given to the signification of
the term. The plan last proposed departs itself from the federal
idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on
individuals. He agreed moreover with the Honble gentleman from
V* [M: R.] that we owed it to our Country, to do on this emergency
whatever we should deem essential to its happiness.{ The States sent
us here to provide for the exigences of the Union.| To rely on &
propose any plan not adequate to these exigences, merely because it
was not? clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means
to the end, Hines be said that the States can not ratify a plan not
within the purview of the article of? Confederation providing for
alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in
which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the
Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large.
In the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the
Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the
people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the
reason assigned ag* it being, that it might possibly be found an
inconvenient shackle.

The great question is what provision shall we make for the
happiness of our Country? He would first make a comparative ex-
amination of the two plans—prove that there were essential defects
in both—and point out such changes as might render a national one,
efficacious—The great & essential principles necessary for the sup-
port of Government are 1. an active & constant interest in supporting
it. This principle does not exist in the States in favor of the federal ,
Govt They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps.
They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the
whole. They have their particular debts—their particular plans of
finance &c. All these when opposed to, invariably prevail over the
requisitions & plans of Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love
power. The same remarks are applicable to this principle. The
States have constantly shewn a disposition rather to regain the powers
delegated by them than to part with more, or to give effect to what
they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is known to
hate the controul of the Gen! Government. It may be remarked too

 

1The word “not” is blotted in the notes but is retained because it is in
the transcript.
? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1787 113

that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of
the Gen' Govt as of the particular Gov A dissolution of the latter
would be fatal; of the former would still leave the purposes of Govt
attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as
Virg? will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations.
How strongly will it feel its importance & self-sufficiency? 3. An
habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on
the side of the State Govt Its sovereignty is immediately before the
eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by them.
From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which familiarize
& endear * Gov! to a people, are dispensed to them. 4. Force by which
may be understood a coertion of laws or coertion of arms. Cong?
have not the former except in few cases. In particular States, this
coercion is nearly sufficient; tho’ he held it in most cases, not
entirely so. <A certain portion of military force is absolutely neces-
sary in large communities. Mass? is now feeling this necessity &
making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted on the
States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between
the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators. They
will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the
Union ensue. 5, influence. he did not mean corruption, but a
dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an
attachment to the Govt Almost all the weight of these is on the side
of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to
exist. All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest,
which govern most individuals, and ali public bodies, fall into the
current of the States, and do not flow in the stream of the Gen! Gov!
The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the Gen!
Govt and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious.
Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyc-
tionic Council had it would seem ample powers for general purposes.
It had in particular the power of fining and using force ag** de-
linquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were
mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it.
Philip at length taking advantage of their disnnion, and insinuating
himself into their Councils, made himself master of their fortunes.
The German Confederacy affords another lesson. The authority of
‘Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The
great feudal chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon
felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments, which reduced

 

1The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
114 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has suc-
ceeded, which tho’ aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority
independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illustration of
the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other examples instruct
us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any Union at
all, and have been more than once at war with one another—How
then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a compleat sover-
eignty in the general Governm! as will turn all the strong principles
& passions above mentioned on its side. Does the scheme of N. Jersey
produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy whatever?
On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect of some
of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct
revenue to Cong? but this will not be sufficient. The balance can
only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves can not be
relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also
deliberate on the object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant
as they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will
invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature
of things be so unequal as to produce the same evil. To what
standard will you resort? Land is a fallacious one. Compare
Holland with Russia: France or Eng‘ with other countries of Europe.
Pen* with N. Carol* will the relative pecuniary abilities in those
instances, correspond with the relative value of land. Take numbers
of inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison of different
countries, and you will find it to be equally unjust. The different
degrees of industry and improvement in different Countries render the
first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much depends too on
situation. Cont N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being commercial States
& contributing to the wealth of the commercial ones, can never bear
quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They will & must
fail in their duty, their example will be followed, and the Union itself
be dissolved. ‘Whence then is the national revenue to be drawn?
from Commerce? even from exports which notwithstanding the com-
mon opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from excise, &e &c.
These tho’ not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another destrue-
tive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which is so
much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that V*
& the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they sh?
long abide by it. It shocks too much the? ideas of Justice, and every
human feeling. Bad principles in a Gov‘ tho slow are sure in their

 

*The word “all” is substituted in the transcript for “the.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1787 115

operation, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised
whether Cong? at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in
time of peace. He leans to the negative. M? Ps plan provides no
remedy.—If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization of
Cong? is such that they could never be properly & effectually exer-
eised. The members of Cong? being chosen by the States & subject
to recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers be
found effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till
a tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power whatever
be its form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers.
Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them. It is ag*t all the prin-
ciples of a good Government to vest the requisite powers in such a
body as Cong? Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same
limits. Giving powers to Cong? must eventuate in a bad Gov't or
in no Gov! The plan of N. Jersey therefore will not do. What then
is to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the Country
to be governed, discouraged him. The expence of a general Gov‘
was also formidable; unless there were such a diminution of expence
on the side of the State Gov® as the case would admit. If they
were extinguished, he was persuaded that great economy might be
obtained by substituting a general Gov! He did not mean however to
shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other
hand he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are not neces-
sary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agri-
culture. Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary.
There must be district tribunals: corporations for local purposes. But
cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the
States. The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to
him, was that of drawing representatives from the extremes to the
center of the Community. What inducements can be offered that will
suffice? The moderate wages for the 1% branch would* only be a
bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed
would be the utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause,
would be filled by certain undertakers who wish for particular offices
under the Govt This view of the subject almost led him to despair that
a Republican Gov't could be established over so great an extent. He
was sensible at the same time that it would be unwise to propose one
of any other form. In his private opinion he had no scruple in de-
claring, supported as he was by the opinions of so many of the wise
& good, that the British Gov! was the best in the world: and that he

 

1The word “could” is substituted in the transcript for “would.”
116 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America,
He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in
this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this
subject which had taken place and was still going on. It was once
thought that the power of Cong? was amply sufficient to secure the end
of their institution. The error was now seen by every one. The
members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud
as any in declaiming ag" the vices of democracy. This progress of the
public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as
himself would join in the praise bestowed by M? Neckar on the British
Constitution, namely, that it is the only Gov! in the world ‘‘ which
unites public strength with individual security.’’-—In every com-
munity where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into
the few & the many. Hence separate interests will arise. There will be
debtors & creditors &e. Give all power to the many, they will oppress
the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many.
Both therefore ought to have? power, that each may defend itself
ag*t the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper money,
instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe
the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most
noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a
sufficient interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the
national interest, they form a permanent barrier ag*t every pernicious
innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the
Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness eno’ to answer
the purpose. The Senate [of Maryland] which seems to be so much
appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people been
unanimous & eager, in the late appeal to them on the subject of a
paper emission they would would have yielded to the torrent. Their
acquiescing in such an appeal is a proof of it.—Gentlemen differ in
their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from the different esti-
mates they form of the human passions. They suppose seven years
a sufficient period to give the senate an adequate firmness, from not
duly consideriug the amazing violence & turbulence of the democratic
spirit. When a great object of Gov! is pursued, which seizes the
popular passions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable.
He appealed to the gentlemen from the N. England States whether ex-
perience had not there verified the remark.—As to the Executive, it
seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on
Republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the ques-

 

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1787 117

tion: for can there be a good Gov! without a good Executive. The
English model was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary
interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation, and
his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above the danger
of being corrupted from abroad—and at the same time was both
sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the pur-
pose of the institution at home. one of the weak sides of Republics
was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of
little character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of inter-
medling Neibours. Sweeden was a striking instance. The French &
English had each their parties during the late Revolution which
was effected by the predominant influence of the former.—What is
the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far
in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles
will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for
life or at least during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for
life. He appealed to the feelings of the members present whether a
term of seven years, would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which
an acceptance of public trust would require, so so as to ensure the serv-
ices of the best Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate
a@ permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential
purposes. But is this a Republican Govt, it will be asked? Yes if
all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the
people, or a process of election originating with the people. He was
sensible that an Executive constituted as he proposed would have in
fact but little of the power and independence that might be neces-
sary. On the other plan of appointing him for 7 years, he thought
the Executive ought to have but little power. He would be am-
bitious, with the means of making creatures; and as the object of his
ambition w’ be to prolong his power, it is probable that in case of a+
war, he would avail himself of the emergence,? to evade or refuse a
degradation from his place. An Executive for life has not this
motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer
depository of power. It will be objected probably, that such an
Executive will be an elective Monarch, and will give birth to the
tumults which characterize that form of Gov! He wi reply that
Monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not either the degree or dura-
tion of power. If this Executive Magistrate w? be a monarch for life
—the other prop? by the Report from the Comtte of the whole, w’

 

1The word “a” is omitted in the transcript.
2 The word “emergence” is changed to “emergency” in the transcript.
118 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being elective was
also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious writers
that elective monarchies w? be the best if they could be guarded ag*
the tumults excited by the ambition and intrigues of competitors.
He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He
rather thought this character of Elective. Monarchies had been
taken rather from particular cases than from general principles.
The election of Roman Emperors was made by the Army. In
Poland the election is made by great rival princes with in-
dependent power, and ample means, of raising commotions. In
the German Empire, the appointment is made by the Electors &
Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting cabals & parties.
Might not such a mode of election be devised among ourselves as
will defend the community agt these effects in any dangerous de-
gree? Having made these observations he would read to the Com-
mittee a sketch of a plan which he sh‘ prefer to either of those under
consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most
members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return
he would ask will the people adopt the other plan? At present they
will adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or already dis-
solved—he sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure
the people of their fondness for democracies—he sees that a great
progress has been already made & is still going on in the public
mind. He thinks therefore that the people will in time be un-
shackled from their prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will
themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan of M: R. w?
place them, but be ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He did
not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition to the
Committee. It was meant only to give a more correct view of his
ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should probably pro-
pose to the plan of M: R. in the proper stages of its future discussion.
He read? his sketch in the words following: towit

_ I. ‘* The Supreme Legislative power of the United States of
America to be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be
called the Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall form the
Legislature of the United States with power to pass all laws what-
soever subject to the Negative hereafter mentioned.

II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people to
serve for three years.

III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good
behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for that pur-

 

1The word “reads” is substituted in the transcript for “ read.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1787 « 119

pose by the people: in order to this the States to be divided into
election districts. On the death, removal or resignation of any
Senator his place to be filled out of the district from which he came.

IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be
vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour—
the election to be made by Hlectors chosen by the people in the Election
Districts aforesaid—The authorities & functions of the Executive to
be as follows: to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and
the execution of all laws passed; to have the direction of war when
authorized or begun; to have with the advice and approbation of the
Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment
of the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and
Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers (Am-
bassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or
rejection of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning. all offences
except Treason; which he shall not pardon without the approbation
of the Senate.

V. On the death resignation or removal of the Governour his
authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till a Suc-
cessor be appointed.

VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the
power of advising and approving all Treaties, the power of approving
or rejecting all appointments of officers except the heads or chiefs of
the departments of Finance War and foreign affairs.

VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in Judges
to hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and per-
manent salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in all
eauses of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all causes in which
the revenues of the general Government or the Citizens of foreign
Nations are concerned.

VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to
institute Courts in each State for the determination of all matters of
general concern.

IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States
to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon
conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for holding any
place of trust or profit—All impeachments to be tried by a Court to
consist of the Chief or Judge of the superior Court of Law
of each State, provided such Judge shall hold his place during good
behavior, and have a permanent salary.

X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution
-or laws of the United States to be utterly void; and the better to
prevent such laws being passed, the Governour or president of each
State shall be appointed by the General Government and shall have
a negative upon the laws about to be passed in the State of which
‘he is? Governour or President.

XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the Militia
of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
120 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

United States, the officers of which to be appointed and commissioned
by them.

On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations *
corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.’
3 Committee rose & the House Adjourned.

TruspAY JUNE 19T# in CoMMITTEE OF ? WHOLE ON THE PROPOSITIONS
or ME PatrEeRsON

The substitute offered yesterday by M? Dickenson being rejected
by a vote now taken on it; Con. N.Y. N.J. Del. ay.* Mas. P? V.
N.C. 8. C. Geo. no. May? divided. M* Patterson’s plan was again
at large before the Committee.

ME Mapison. Much stress had ® been laid by some gentlemen on
the want of power in the Convention to propose any other than a
federal plan. To what had been answered by others, he would only
add, that neither of the characteristics attached to a federal plan
would support this objection. One characteristic, was that in a
federal Government, the power was exercised not on the people in-
dividually ; ? but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet in some
instances as in piracies, captures &c. the existing Confederacy, and in
many instances, the amendments to it proposed by M? Patterson, must
operate immediately on individuals. The other characteristic was,
that a federal Gov‘ derived its appointments not immediately from
the people, but from the States which they respectively composed.
Here too were facts on the other side. In two of the States, Connect
and Rh. Island, the delegates to Cong? were chosen, not by the Legisla-

 

1In the transcript the following footnote was inserted with reference mark
after “ observations ”: ;

“The speech introducing the plan, as above taken down & written out
was seen by Mr. Hamilton, who approved its correctness, with one or two verbal
changes, which were made as he suggested. The explanatory observations which
did not immediately follow, were to have been furnished by Mr. H. who did not
find leisure at the time to write them out, and they were not obtained.

“Judge Yates, in his notes, appears to have consolidated the explanatory
with the introductory observations of Mr. Hamilton (under date of June 19th,
a typographical error). It was in the former, Mr. Madison observed, that Mr.
Hamilton, in speaking of popular governments, however modified, made the
remark attributed to him by Judge Yates, that they were ‘but pork still with
a little change of sauce.”

? For the text of Hamilton’s Plan handed to Madison about the close of the
Convention, but not actually submitted to that body, see Appendix to Debates,
V, pp. 608-618.

*The word “The” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The figure “4” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The figure “6” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “has” is substituted in the transcript for “had.”

™The transcript italicizes the word “ individually.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1787 121

tures, but by the people at large; and the plan of M: P. intended no
change in this particular. ,
It had been alledged [by M* Patterson], that the Confederation
having been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by
unanimous Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature
of compacts? does it arise from any particular stipulation in the
articles of Confederation? If we consider the federal union as
analogous to the fundamental compact by which individuals compose
one Society, and which must in its theoretic origin at least, have been
the unanimous act of the component members, it can not be said that.
-no dissolution of the compact can be effected without unanimous con-
sent. A breach of the fundamental principles of the compact by a
part of the Society would certainly absolve the other part from their
obligations to it. If the breach of any article by any of the parties,
does not set the others at liberty, it is because, the contrary is wmplied
in the compact itself, and particularly by that law of it, which gives
an indifinite authority to the majority to bind the whole in all cases.
This latter circumstance shews that we are not to consider the federal
Union as analogous to the social compact of individuals: for if it
were so, a Majority would have a right to bind the rest, and even
to form a new Constitution for the whole, which the Gent? from N.
Jersey would be among the last to admit. If we consider the federal
Union as analogous not to the social compacts among individual
men: but to the conventions among individual States. What is the
doctrine resulting from these conventions? Clearly, according to
the Expositors of the law of Nations, that a breach of any one article,
by any one party, leaves all the other parties at liberty, to consider
the whole convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather to com-
pel the delinquent party to repair the breach. In some treaties in-
deed it is expressly stipulated that a violation of particular articles
shall not have this consequence, and even that particular articles
shall remain in force during war, which in general is* understood to
dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are there any exceptions of
this sort to the Articles of confederation? So far from it that there
is not even an express stipulation that force shall be used to compell
an offending member of the Union to discharge its duty. He observed
that the violations of the federal articles had been numerous & noto-
rious. Among the most notorious was an act of N. Jersey herself;
by which she expressly refused to comply with a constitutional
requisition of Cong’ and yielded no farther to the expostulations of

 

1The words “in general is” are transposed to read “is in general” in the
transcript.
122 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

their deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of refusal without
passing any positive act of compliance. He did not wish to draw any
rigid inferences from these observations. He thought it proper how-
ever that the true nature of the existing confederacy should be in-
vestigated, and he was not anxious to strengthen the foundations on
which it now stands.

Proceeding to the consideration of M° Patterson’s plan, he stated
the object of a proper plan to be twofold. 1.* to preserve the Union.
2.1 to provide a Governm! that will remedy the evils felt by the States
both in their wnited and individual capacities. Examine M* P.s plan,
& say whether it promises satisfaction in these respects.

1. Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations & of
Treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities
of foreign wars? The tendency of the States to these violations has
been manifested in sundry instances. The files of Cong? contain com-
plaints already, from almost every nation with which treaties have
been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to us. This can
not be the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with
other powers is among the greatest of national calamities. It ought
therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall
have it in its power to bring them on the whole. The existing Con-
federacy does not sufficiently provide ‘against this evil. The proposed
amendment to it does not supply the omission. It leaves the will of
the States as uncontrouled as ever.

2.- Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority? A
tendency to such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified,
among ourselves, as well? in every other confederated republic
antient and Modern. By the federal articles, transactions with the
Indians appertain to Cong? Yet in several instances, the States have
entered into treaties & wars with them. In like manner no two or
more States can form among themselves any treaties &c. without the
consent of Cong: Yet Virg? & Mary’ in one instance—Pen? & N.
Jersey in another, have entered into compacts, without previous
application or subsequent apology. No State again can of right raise
troops in time of peace without the like consent. Of all cases of the
league, this seems to require the most scrupulous observance. Has
not Mass“, notwithstanding, the most powerful member of the Union,
already raised a body of troops? Is she not now augmenting them,
without having even deigned to apprise Cong? of Her intention? In

 

1 The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “secondly” in the
transcript.

2 The word “as” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1787 123

fine—Have we not seen the public land dealt out to Cont to bribe her
acquiescence in the decree constitutionally awarded ag* her claim on
the territory of Pen®? for no other possible motive can account for the
policy of Cong? in that measure?—If we recur to the examples of
other confederacies, we shall find in all of them the same tendency of
the parts to encroach on the authority of the whole. He then reviewed
the Amphyctionic & Achzan confederacies among the antients, and
the Helvetic, Germanic & Belgic among the moderns, tracing their
analogy to the U. States—in the constitution and extent of their
federal authorities—in the tendency of the particular members to
usurp on these authorities; and to bring confusion & ruin on the
whole——He observed that the plan of Mr. Pat-son besides omitting
a controul over the States as a general defence of the federal pre-
rogatives was particularly defective in two of its provisions. 1.1 Its
ratification was not to be by the people at large, but by the legislatures.
It could not therefore render the Acts of Cong? in pursuance of theic
powers, even legally paramount to the Acts of the States. 2.7 It gave
to the federal Tribunal an appellate jurisdiction only—even in the
criminal cases enumerated, The necessity of any such provision sup-
posed a danger of undue acquittals * in the State tribunals. Of what
avail cl‘ an appellate tribunal be, after an acquittal? Besides in most
if not all of the States, the Executives have by their respective Con-
stitutions the right of pard? How could this be taken from them by
a legislative © ratification only ?

3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other? Of these
enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virg* & Mary-
land which give ® a preference to their own Citizens in cases where the
Citizens of other States are entitled to equality of privileges by the
Articles of Confederation. He considered the emissions of ‘paper
money & other kindred measures as also aggressions. The States
relatively to one an other being each of them either Debtor or
Creditor; The creditor States must suffer unjustly from every emis-
sion by the debtor States. We have seen retaliating acts on this
subject which threatened danger not to the harmony only, but the
tranquility of the Union. The plan of M* Paterson, not giving even
a negative on the acts of the States, left them as much at liberty
as ever to execute their unrighteous projects ag*t each other.

 

1The figure “1” is changed to “In the first place” in the transcript.

2 The figure “2” is changed to “and in the second place” in the transcript.
* The transcript uses the word “ acquittals ” in the singular.

4 The word “ would” is substituted in the transcript for “cd”

® The word “legislative” is not italicized in the transcript.

°The word “gave” is substituted in the transcript for “ give.”
124 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

4, Will it secure the internal tranquility of the States themselves?
The insurrections in Mass admonished all the States of the danger
to which they were exposed. Yet the plan of M" P. contained no
provisions for supplying the defect of the Confederation on this
point. According to the Republican theory indeed, Right & power
being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonimous. Accord-
ing to fact & experience, a minority may in an appe:! to force be an
overmatch for the majority. 1. If the minority happen to include
all such as possess the skill & habits of military life, with such as
possess the great pecuniary resources, one third may conquer the re-
maining two thirds. 2.2 one third of those who participate in the
choice of rulers may be rendered a majority by the accession of those
whose poverty disqualifies them from a suffrage, & who for obvious
reasons may * be more ready to join the standard of sedition than that
of the* established Government. 3.5 where slavery exists, the Repub-
lican Theory becomes still more fallacious.

5. Will it secure a good internal legislation & administration to
the particular States? In developing the evils which vitiate the
political system of the U. S. it is proper to take into view those which
prevail within the States individually as well as those which affect
them collectively: Since the former indirectly affect the whole; and
there is great reason to believe that the pressure of them had a full
share in the motives which produced the present Convention. Under
this head he enumerated and animadverted on 1.° the multiplicity of
the laws passed by the several States. 2.° the mutability of their laws.
3.° the injustice of them. 4.7 the impotence of them: observing that
M: Patterson’s plan contained no remedy for this dreadful class of
evils, and could not therefore be received as an adequate provision
for the exigences of the Community.

6. Will it secure the Union ag* the influence of foreign powers
over its members. He pretended not to say that any such influence had
yet been tried: but it was naturally to be expected that occasions
would produce it. As lessons which claimed particular attention, he
cited the intrigues practised among the Amphyctionic Confederates
first by the Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally by Philip of
Macedon: among the Acheans, first by Macedon & afterwards no less

1The fi “ype s cos aie .

dis fgce 8" ty chanced th “In ioe oom lace tn eee isk

* The word “ must” is substituted in the transcript for “may.”

‘The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.

* The figure “3” is changed to “and in the third place.”

° The figures “17 «9 and ©3” are changed to “ first,” ondly ” and
“thirdly ” in the transcript. 8 gC ERECONGLY:

"The figure “4” is changed to “and fourthly ” in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1787 125

fatally by Rome: among the Swiss by Austria, France & the lesser
neighbouring powers: among the members of the Germanic Body by
France, England, Spain & Russia—: and in the Belgic Republic, by all
the great neighbouring powers. The plan of M! Patterson, not giving
to the general Councils any negative on the will of the particular
States, left the door open for the like pernicious machinations among
ourselves.

7. He begged the smaller States which were most attached to
M: Pattersons plan to consider the situation in which it would leave
them. In the first place they would continue to bear the whole
expence of maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought not
to be said that if they were willing to bear this burden, no others
had a right to complain. As far as it led the small Siates to forbear
keeping up a representation, by which the public business was delayed,
it was evidently a matter of common concern. An examination of the
minutes of Congress would satisfy every one that the public business
had been frequently delayed by this cause; and that the States most
frequently unrepresented in Cong® were not the larger States. He re-
minded the convention of another consequence of leaving on a small
State the burden of maintaining a Representation in Cong? During
a considerable period of the War, one of the Representatives of Dela-
ware, in whom alone before the signing of the Confederation the
entire vote of that State and after that event one half of its vote,
frequently resided, was a Citizen & Resident of Pen? and held an
office in his own State incompatible with an appointment from it to
Cong? During another period, the same State was represented by
three delegates two of whom were citizens of Penn* and the third a
Citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must have been intended
to avoid the burden of supporting delegates from their own State.
But whatever might have been y® cause, was not in effect the vote of
one State doubled, and the influence of another increased by it? In
the 22 place The coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan depends,
can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will be
impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it. He
illustrated the position by the history of the Amphyctionie Con-
federates: and the ban of the German Empire. It was the cobweb
w% could entangle the weak, but would be the sport of the strong.

8. He begged them to consider the situation in which they would
remain in case their pertinacious adherence to an inadmissible plan,
should prevent the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of such
an event was painful; but it would be prudent to submit to the task
of examining it at a distance, that the means of escaping it might be
126 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the more readily embraced. Let the Union of the States be dissolved,
and one of two consequences must happen. Hither the States must
remain individually independent & sovereign; or two or more Con-
federacies must be formed among them. In the first event would the
small States be more secure ag*t the ambition & power of their larger
neighbours, than they would be under a general Government per-
vading with equal energy every part of the Empire, and having an
equal interest in protecting every part ag3t every other part? In the
second, can the smaller expect that their larger neighbours would
confederate with them on the principle of the present confederacy,
which gives to each member, an equal suffrage; or that they would
exact less severe concessions from the smaller States, than are pro-
posed in the scheme of M! Randolph?
The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation ; and if this
, could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable. It was ad-
“mitted by both the gentlemen from N. Jersey, [M*? Brearly and Mt
Patterson] that it would not be just to allow Virg? which was 16
times-as large as Delaware an equal vote only. Their language was
that it would not be safe for Delaware to allow Virg? 16 times as
many votes. The expedient proposed by them was that all the States
should be thrown into one mass and a new partition be made into
13 equal parts, Would such a scheme be practicable? The dis-
similarities existing in the rules of property, as well as in the man-
ners, habits and prejudices of the! different States, amounted to a
prohibition of the attempt. It had been found impossible for the
power of one of the most absolute princes in Europe [K. of France]
directed by the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and patriotic
Ministers [M? Neckar] that any age has produced to equalize in
some points only the different usages & regulations of the different
provinces. But admitting a general amalgamation and repartition of
the States to be practicable, and the danger apprehended by the
smaller States from a proportional representation to be real; would
not a particular and voluntary coalition of these with their neigh-
bours, be less inconvenient to the whole community, and equally
effectual for their own safety. If N. J ersey or Delaware conceived
that an advantage would accrue to them from an equalization of the
States, in which case they would necessaryly form a junction with
their neighbours, why might not this end be attained by leaving them
at liberty by the Constitution to form such a junction whenever they
pleased? And why should they wish to obtrude a like arrangement

 

* The word “the” is crossed out in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1787 127

on all the States, when it was, to say the least, extremely difficult,
would be obnoxious to many of the States, and when neither the
inconveniency,? nor the benefit of the expedient to themselves, would
be lessened, by confining it to themselves——The prospect of many new
States to the Westward was another consideration of importance. If
they should come into the Union at all, they would come when they
contained but few inhabitants. If they sh? be entitled to vote accord-
ing to their proportions of inhabitants, all would be right & safe.
Let them have an equal vote, and a more objectionable minority than
ever might give law to the whole.

On a question for postponing generally the 1% proposition of
M: Patterson’s plan, it was agreed to: N. Y. & N J. only being no—

On the question moved by M! King whether the Committee should
rise & M! Randolphs propositions be re-reported without alteration,
which was in fact a question whether M: R’s should be adhered to as
preferable to those of M' Patterson:

Mass® ay. Cont ay. N.Y. no. N. J. no. Pi ay. Del. no. M%
divi Vt ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay?

Insert here from Printed Journal p. 13° copy of the Resol™? of M?
R. as altered in the Com’ and reported to the House *

[State of the resolutions submitted to the consideration of the
House by the honorable Mr. Randolph, as altered, amended, and agreed
to, in a Committee of the whole House.

1. Resolved that it is the opinion of this Committee that a national govern.
ment ought to be established consisting of a Supreme Legisla-
tive, Judiciary, and Executive.

2. Resolved. that the national Legislature ought to consist of Two Branches.

3 Resolved that the members of the first branch of the national Legislature
ought to be elected by the People of the several States for the
term of Three years. to receive fixed stipends, by which they
may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public
service to be paid out of the National-Treasury. to be ineligible
to any Office established by a particular State or under the
authority of the United-States (except those peculiarly be-
longing to the functions of the first branch) during the term
of service, and under the national government for the space
of one year after it’s expiration.

 

1The word “inconveniency” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-
script.

B In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, no—3; Maryland divided.”

2 Found at page 134 instead of page 13, and here printed from the original
manuscript deposited in the Department of State by President Washington.

4 Madison’s direction concerning Mr. Randolph’s Resolutions and the Reso-
lutions themselves are omitted in the transcript.

yw
128 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

4 Resolved. that the members of the second Branch of the national Legislature

10

il

12
13

14.

Resolved

Resolved.

Resolved.

Resolved.

Resolved.

Resolved.

Resolved.

Resolved.
Resolved.

Resolved.

ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures. to be of the
age of thirty years at least. to hold their offices for a term
sufficient to ensure their independency, namely seven years.
to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated
for the devotion of their time to public service—to be paid out
of the National Treasury to be ineligible to any office estab-
lished by a particular State, or under the authority of the
United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the fune-
tions of the second branch) during the term of service, and
under the national government, for the space of one year after
it’s expiration. . Tice an

that each branch ought to possess the right of originating
acts.

that the national Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the
legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation—and
moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States
are incompetent: or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legis-
lation. to negative all laws passed by the several States con-
travening, in the opinion of the national Legislature, the
articles of union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority
of the union.

that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national
Legislature ought not to be according to the rule established
in the articles of confederation: but according to some equitable
ratio of representation—namely, in proportion to the whole
number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of
every age, sex, and condition including those bound to servitude
for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not
comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians, not
paying taxes in each State. ‘

that the right of suffrage in the second branch of the national
Legislature ought to be according to the rule established for
the first. ,

that a national Executive be instituted to consist of a single
person. to be chosen by the National Legislature. for the
term of seven years. with power to carry into execution
the national Laws, to appoint to Offices in cases not otherwise
provided for to be ineligible a second time, and to be re-
movable on impeachment and conviction of mal practice or
neglect of duty. to receive a fixed stipend, by which he may
be compensated for the devotion of his time to public service
to be paid out of the national Treasury.

that the national executive shall have a right to negative any
legislative act: which shall not be afterwards passed unless
by two third parts of each branch of the national Legislature.

that a national Judiciary be established to consist of One Su-
preme Tribunal. The Judges of which to be appointed by the
second Branch of the National Legislature. to hold their
offices during good behaviour to receive, punctually, at stated
times, a fixed compensation for their services: in which no
encrease or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons
actually in office at the time of such encrease or diminution

That the national Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior
Tribunals.

that the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to
cases which respect the collection of the national revenue:
impeachments of any national officers: and questions which
involve the national peace and harmony.

that provision ought to be made for the admission of States,
lawfully arising within the limits of the United States,
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1787 129

whether from a voluntary junction of government and terri.
tory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in
the national Legislature less than the whole.

15. Resolved. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress
and their authorities until w given day after the reform of the
articles of Union shall be adopted; and for the completion of
all their engagements.

16. Resolved that a republican constitution, and its existing laws, ought to
be guaranteed to each State by the United States.

17. Resolved. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.

18 Resolved. that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers within
the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the
articles of Union.

19 Resolved. that the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation
by the Convention, ought at a proper time or times, after the
approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or
assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several

Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the People to consider
and decide thereon.

\

(Of + M: Randolph’s plan as reported from the Committee) ?. the
1. propos: ‘‘ that a Nat! Gov! ought to be established consisting &c.’’
being taken up in the House.’

M: WItson observed that by a Nat! Govt he did not mean one
that would swallow up the State Gov as seemed to be wished by
some gentlemen. He was tenacious of the idea of preserving the
latter. He thought, contrary to the opinion of [Col. Hamilton] that
they might not only subsist but subsist on friendly terms with the
former. They were absolutely necessary for certain purposes which
the former could not reach. All large Governments must be sub-
divided into lesser jurisdictions. As Examples he mentioned Persia,
Rome, and particularly the divisions & subdivisions of England by
Alfred.

Col. Hammton coincided with the proposition as it stood in the
Report. He had not been understood yesterday. By an abolition of
the States, he meant that no boundary could be drawn between the
National & State Legislatures; that the former must therefore have
indefinite authority. If it were limited at all, the rivalship of the
States would gradually subvert it. Even as Corporations the extent
of some of them as V? Mass's &c. would be formidable. As States, he
thought they ought to be abolished. But he admitted the necessity of
leaving in them, subordinate jurisdictions. The examples of Persia
& the Roman Empire, cited by [M? Wilson] were he thought in favor
of his doctrine: the great powers delegated to the Satraps & pro-

 

1The word “of” is omitted in the transcript.

2The words “June 13 being before the house” are here inserted in the
transcript. : .

® The words “in the House” are omitted in the transcript.
130 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

consuls, having frequently produced revolts, and schemes of inde-
pendence.

M: Kine, wished as every thing depended on this proposition, that
no objections might be improperly indulged ag** the phraseology
of it. He conceived that the import of the terms ‘‘ States ’’ ‘‘ Sover-
eignty ’’ ‘‘ national ’’ ‘‘ federal,’’ had been often used & applied in
the discussions inaccurately & delusively. The States were not
“* Sovereigns ’’ in the sense contended for by some. They did not
possess the peculiar features of sovereignty, they could not make
war, nor peace, nor alliances nor treaties. Considering them as
political Beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak to any
foreign Sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could not
hear any propositions from such Sovereign. They had not even the
organs or faculties of defence or offence, for they could not of them-
selves raise troops, or equip vessels, for war. On the other side, if
the Union of the States comprizes the idea of a confederation, it
comprizes that also of consolidation. A Union of the States is a
Union of the men composing them, from whence a national character
results to the whole. Cong? can act alone without the States—they can
act & their acts will be binding ag* the Instructions of the States. If
they declare war: war is de jure declared—captures made in pur-
suance of it are lawful—No acts of the States can vary the situation,
or prevent the judicial consequences. If the States therefore retained
some portion of their sovereignty, they had certainly divested them-
selves of essential portions of it. If they formed a confederacy in
some respects—they formed a Nation in others—The Convention
could clearly deliberate on & propose any alterations that Cong? could
have done under y? federal articles, and could not Cong? propose by
virtue of the last article, a change in any article whatever: and as
well that relating to the equality of suffrage, as any other. He made
these remarks to cbviate some scruples which had been expressed.
He doubted much the practicability of annihilating the States; but
thought that much of their power ought to be taken from them.

M: Martin, said he considered that the separation from G. B.
placed the 13 States in a state of Nature towards each other; that they
would have remained in that state till this time, but for the confedera-
tion; that they entered into the confederation on the footing of
equality ; that they met now to to amend it on the same footing; and
that he could never accede to a plan that would introduce an in-
equality and lay 10 States at the mercy of V* Mass'* and Penn?

M: Wixson, could not admit the doctrine that when the Colonies
became independent of G. Britain, they became independent also of
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1787 131

each other. He read the declaration of Independence, observing
thereon that the United Colonies were declared to be free & inde-
pendent States; and inferring that they were independent, not in-
dividually but Unitedly and that they were confederated as they
were independent, States.

Col. Hamiton, assented to the doctrine of M! Wilson. He denied
the doctrine that the States were thrown into a State of Nature He
was not yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confederacy,
could be dissolved by partial infractions of it. He admitted that the
States met now on an equal footing but could see no inference from
that against concerting a change of the system in this particular.
He took this occasion of observing for the purpose of appeasing the
fears of the small States, that two circumstances would render
them secure under a National Gov! in which they might lose the
equality of rank they now held: one was the local situation of
the 3 largest States Virg* Mas’’ & P? They were separated from
each other by distance of place, and equally so, by all the peculiarities
which distinguish the interests of one State from those of another.
No combination therefore could be dreaded. In the second place, as
there was a gradation in the States from V? the largest down to Dela-
ware the smallest, it would always happen that ambitious combinations
among a few States might & wi be counteracted by defensive com-
binations of greater extent among the rest. No combination has been
seen among? large Counties merely as such, ag lesser Counties.
The more close the Union of the States, and the more compleat the
authority of the whole: the less opportunity will be allowed? the
stronger States to injure the weaker.

: Adj?

WEDNESDAY JUNE 20. 1787.2. InN CoNVENTION

M! William Blount from N. Carolina took his seat.

13 propos: ¢ of the Report of Com® of the whole ® before the House.

M: EvsewortH 2%4 by M: GorHaM, moves to alter it so as to
run ‘‘ that the Government of the United States ought to consist of a
supreme legislative, Executive and Judiciary.’’ This alteration he

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.

3 The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript. :

*The words “The first Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
** Jst propos.”

° The word “being” is here iaserted in the transcript.
132 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

said would drop the word national, and retain the proper title ‘‘ the
United States.’’ He could not admit the doctrine that a breach of any
of the federal articles could dissolve the whole. It would be highly
dangerous not to consider the Confederation as still subsisting. He
wished also the plan of the Convention to go forth as an amendment
to the articles of ? Confederation, since under this idea the authority
of the Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the people
will be so too. If the plan goes forth to the people for ratification
several succeeding Conventions within the States would be unavoid-
able. He did not like these conventions. They were better fitted to
pull down than to build up Constitutions.

M! RanvoupH, did not object to the change of expression, but
apprised the gentlemen * who wished for it that he did not admit it for
the reasons assigned; particularly that of getting rid of a reference
to the people for ratification. The motion of M! Ellsew® was acqui-
esced in nem: con:

The 2% Resol: ‘‘ that the national Legislature ought to consist of
two branches ’’* taken up, the word ‘‘ national ’’ struck out as of
course.

M: Lansing, observed that the true question here was, whether
the Convention would adhere to or depart from the foundation of
the present Confederacy; and moved instead of the 24 Resolution,
‘“ that the powers of Legislation be vested in the U. States in Con-
gress.’? He had already assigned two reasons ag** such an innovation
as was proposed: 1.° the want of competent powers in the Conven-
tion.—2.° the state of the public mind. It had been observed by
[Mz Madison] in discussing the first point, that in two States the
Delegates to Cong? were chosen by the people. Notwithstanding the
first appearance of this remark, it had in fact no weight, as the Dele-
gates however chosen, did not represent the people merely as so many
individuals; but as forming a Sovereign State. [M* Randolph] put
it, he said, on its true footing namely that the public safety superseded
the scruple arising from the review of our powers. But in order to
feel the force of this consideration, the same impression must be had
of the public danger. He had not himself the same impression, and
could not therefore dismiss his seruple. [M! Wilson] contended that
as the Convention were only to recommend, they might recommend

 

*The word “ of ” is substituted in the transcript for “to.”

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “gentlemen” is used in the singular in the transcript.

‘The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “ secondly ” in the
transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1787 133

what they pleased. He differed much from him. Any act whatever of
so respectable a body must have a great effect, and if it does not.
succeed, will be a source of great dissentions. He admitted that there
was no certain criterion of the public mind on the subject. He there-

fore recurred to the evidence of it given by the opposition in tha

States to the scheme of an Impost. It could not be expected that
those possessing Sovereignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It
was not to be expected from any one State, much less from thirteen.

He proceeded to make some observations on the plan itself and the

argum's urged in support of it. The point of Representation could

receive no elucidation from the case of England. The corruption of

the boroughs did not proceed from their comparative smallness: but
from the actual fewness of the inhabitants, some of them not having
more than one or two. A great inequality existed in the Counties
of England. Yet the like complaint of peculiar corruption in the
small ones had not been made. It had been said that Congress rep-

resent the State prejudices: will not any other body whether chosen
by the Legislatures or people of the States, also represent their
prejudices? It had been asserted by his colleague [Col. Hamilton]

that there was no coincidence of interests among the large States that
ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it were true that
such a uniformity of interests existed among the States, there was
equal safety for all of them, whether the representation remained as
heretofore, or were proportioned as now proposed. It is proposed
that the Gen! Legislature shall have a negative on the laws of the
States. Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a task?
there will on the most moderate calculation, be as many Acts sent
up from the States as there are days in the year. Will the members
of the general Legislature be competent Judges? Will a gentleman
from Georgia be a Judge of the expediency of a law which is to
operate in N. Hamshire. Such a Negative would be more injurious
than that of Great Britain heretofore was. It is said that the
National Govt must have the influence arising from the grant of
offices and honors. In order to render such a Government effectual
he believed such an influence to be necessary. But if the States
will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse than in vain to make the
proposition. If this influence is to be attained, the States must be
entirely abolished. Will any one say this would ever be agreed to?
He doubted whether any Gen! Government equally beneficial to all
can be attained. That now under consideration he is sure, must be
utterly unattainable. He had another objection. The system was
too novel & complex. No man could foresee what its operation will
134 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

be either with respect to the Gen! Gov! or the State Gov’ One or
other it has been surmised must absorb the whole.

Col. Mason, did not expect this point would have been reagitated.
The essential differences between the two plans, had been clearly stated.
The principal objections ag% that of M? R. were the want of power
& the want of practicability. There can be no weight in the first
as the fiat is not to be here, but in the people. He thought with his
colleague M? R. that there were besides certain crisises, in which all
the ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity. He gave as an
example, the eventual Treaty with G. B. in forming which the
Comrs. of the U. 8. had boldly disregarded the improvident shackles
of Cong’ had given to their Country an honorable & happy peace, and
instead of being censured for the transgression of their powers, had
raised to themselves a monument more durable than brass. The
impracticability of gaining the public concurrence he thought was
still more groundless. [M* Lansing] had cited the attempts of Con-
gress to gain an enlargement of their powers, and had inferred from
the miscarriage of these attempts, the hopelessness of the plan which
he [M? L] opposed. He thought a very different inference ought to
have been drawn; viz that the plan which [M* L] espoused, and which
proposed to augment the powers of Congress, never could be expected
to succeed. He meant not to throw any reflections on Cong? as a body,
much less on any particular members of it. He meant however to
speak his sentiments without reserve on this subject; it was a privilege
of Age, and perhaps the only compensation which nature had given
for the privation of so many other enjoyments: and he should not
scruple to exercise it freely. Is it to be thought that the people of
America, so watchful over their interests; so jealous of their liberties,
will give up their all, will surrender both the sword and the purse,
to the same body, and that too not chosen immediately by themselves?
They never will. They never ought. Will they trust such a body, with
the regulation of their trade, with the regulation of their taxes; with
all the other great powers, which are in contemplation? Will they give
unbounded confidence to a secret Journal—to the intrigues—to the
factions which in the nature of things appertain to such an Assembly?
If any man doubts the existence of these characters of Congress, let
him consult their Journals for the years 78, 79, & 80.—It will be
said, that if the people are averse to parting with power, why is it
hoped that they will part with it to a National Legislature. The
proper answer is that in this case they do not part with power:
they only transfer it from one sett of immediate Representatives to
another sett.—Much has been said of the unsettled state of the mind
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1787 135

of the people, he believed the mind of the people of America, as
elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points; but settled as to others.
In two points he was sure it was well settled. 1.1 in an attachment
to Republican Government. 2.1 in an attachment to more than one
branch in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so generally in
both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have been pre-
concerted. This must either have been a miracle, or have resulted
from the genius of the people. The only exceptions to the establishm!
of two branches in the Legislatures are the State of P? & Cong’ and
the latter the only single one not chosen by the people themselves.
What has been the consequence? The people have been constantly
averse to giving that Body further powers—It was acknowledged by
[M: Patterson] that his plan could not be enforced without military
coertion. Does he consider the force of this concession. The most
jarring elements of Nature; fire & water themselves are not more
incompatible that? such a mixture of civil liberty and military
execution. Will the militia march from one State to® another, in
order to collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of
the Republic? Will they maintain an army for this purpose? Will
not the Citizens of the invaded State assist one another till they rise
as one Man, and shake off the Union altogether. Rebellion is the
only case, in which the military force of the State can be properly
exerted ag‘? its Citizens. In one point of view he was struck with
horror at the prospect of recurring to this expedient. To punish the
non-payment of taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by
despotism itself: yet this unexampled cruelty would be merey com-
pared to a military collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could
make no discrimination between the innocent and the guilty. He
took this occasion to repeat, that notwithstanding his solicitude to
establish a national Government, he never would agree to abolish the
State Gov's or render them absolutely insignificant. They were as
necessary as the Gen! Gov! and he would be equally careful to pre-
serve them. He was aware of the difficulty of drawing the line be-
tween them, but hoped it was not insurmountable. The Convention,
tho’ comprising so many distinguished characters, could not be ex-
pected to make a faultless Govt And he would prefer trusting to
posterity the amendment of its defects, rather than to push the ex-
periment too far.

 

+The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “secondly” in the

transcript. ; :
2 The word “than” is substituted in the transcript for “ that.”
® The word “into” is substituted in the transcript for “ in.”

Se
136 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: LutHer Martin agreed with [Col Mason] as to the impor-
tance of the State Gov® he would support them at the expence of
the Gen! Gov! which was instituted for the purpose of that support.
He saw no necessity for two branches, and if it existed Congress
might be organized into two. He considered Cong® as representing
the people, being chosen by the Legislatures who were chosen by the
people. At any rate, Congress represented the Legislatures; and it
was the Legislatures not the people who refused to enlarge their
powers. Nor could the rule of voting have been the ground of
objection, otherwise ten of the States must always have been ready,
to place further confidence in Cong’ The causes of repugnance must
therefore be looked for elsewhere.—At the separation from the British
Empire, the people of America preferred the establishment of them-
selves into thirteen separate sovereignties instead of incorporating
themselves into one: to these they look up for the security of their
lives, liberties & properties: to these they must look up. The federal
Govt they formed, to defend the whole ag* foreign nations, in case
of war, and to defend the lesser States ag’t the ambition of the larger:
they are afraid of granting powers? unnecessarily, lest they should
defeat the original end of the Union; lest the powers should prove
dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular States which the
Union was meant to support; and expose the lesser to being swal-
lowed up by the larger. He conceived also that the people of the
States having already vested their powers in their respective Legis-
latures, could not resume them without a dissolution of their Govern-
ments. He was ag** Conventions in the States: was not ag*t assisting
States ag? rebellious subjects; thought the federal plan of M= Pat-
terson did not require coercion more than the National one, as the
latter must depend for the deficiency of its revenues on requisitions &
quotas, and that a national Judiciary extended into the States would
be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy inconsistent with
its usefulness.

M: SHerman 2% & supported M? Lansings motion. He ad-
mitted two branches to be necessary in the State Legislatures, but saw
no necessity for them in a Confederacy of States. The examples
were all, of a single Council. Cong? carried us thro’ the war, and
perhaps as well as any Govt could have done. The complaints at
present are not that the views of Cong* are unwise or unfaithful ;
but that their powers are insufficient for the execution of their views.
The national debt & the want of power somewhere to draw forth

 

* The transcript uses the word “powers” in the singular.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1787 137

the National resources, are the great matters that press. All the
States were sensible of the defect of power in Cong? He thought
much might be said in apology for the failure of the State Legisla-
tures to comply with the confederation. They were afraid of bearing
too hard on the people, by accumulating taxes; no constitutional
rule had been or could be observed in the quotas—the accounts also
were unsettled & every State supposed itself in advance, rather than
in arrears. For want of a general system, taxes to a due amount had
not been drawn from trade which was the most convenient resource.
As almost all the States had agreed to the recommendation of Cong
on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly that they were willing
to trust Cong* with power to draw a revenue from Trade. There is
no weight therefore in the argument drawn from a distrust of Cong?
for money matters being the most important of all, if the people
will trust them with power as to them, they will trust them with any
other necessary powers. Cong’ indeed by the confederation have in
fact the right of saying how much the people shall pay, and to what
purpose it shall be applied: and this right was granted to them in
the expectation that it would in all cases have its effect. If another
branch were to be added to Cong? to be chosen by the people, it
would serve to embarrass. The people would not much interest
themselves in the elections, a few designing men in the large dis-
tricts would carry their points, and the people would have no more
confidence in their new representatives than in Cong? He saw no
reason why the State Legislatures should be unfriendly as had been
suggested, to Cong? If they appoint Cong’ and approve of their meas-
ures, they would be rather favorable and partial to them. The dis-
parity of the States in point of size he perceived was the main diffi-
culty. But the large States had not yet suffered from the equality of
votes enjoyed by the small ones. In all great and general points,
the interests of all the States were the same. The State of Virg*
notwithstanding the equality of votes, ratified the Confederation
without, or? even proposing, any alteration. Mass also ratified with-
out any material difficulty &e. In none of the ratifications is the
want of two branches noticed or complained of. To consolidate the
States as some had proposed would dissolve our Treaties with foreign -
Nations, which had been formed with us, as confederated States. He
did not however suppose that the creation of two branches in the
Legislature would have such an effect. If the difficulty on the sub-
ject of representation can not be otherwise got over, he would agree

 

1The word “or” is stricken out in the transcript.
188 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

to have two branches, and a proportional representation in one of
them; provided each State had an equal voice in the other. This
was necessary to secure the rights of the lesser States; otherwise three
or four of the large States would rule the others as they please.
Each State like each individual had its peculiar habits usages and
manners, which constituted its happiness. It would not therefore
give to others a power over this happiness, any more than an in-
dividual would do, when he could avoid it.

M? Witson, urged the necessity of two branches; observed that
if a proper model were + not to be found in other Confederacies it was
not to be wondered at. The number of them was small & the dura-
tion of some at least short. The Amphyctionic & Achean were formed
in the infancy of political Science; and appear by their History
& fate, to have contained radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic
Confederacies were held together not by any vital principle of energy
but by the incumbent pressure of formidable neighbouring nations:
The German owed its continuance to the influence of the H. of
Austria. He appealed to our own experience for the defects of our
Confederacy. He had been 6 years in? the 12 since the commence-
ment of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt all its
weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others whether on
many important occasions, the public interest had not been ob-
structed by the small members of the Union. The success of the
Revolution was owing to other causes, than the Constitution of Con-
gress. In many instances it went on even ag* the difficulties arising
from Cong: themselves. He admitted that the large States did
accede as had been stated, to the Confederation in its present form.
But it was the effect of necessity not of choice. There are other
instances of their yielding from the same motive to the unreasonable
measures of the small States. The situation of things is now a little
altered. He insisted that a jealousy would exist between the State
Legislatures & the General Legislature: observing that the members
of the former would have views & feelings very distinct in this re-
spect from their constituents. A private Citizen of a State is indif-
ferent whether power be exercised by the Gen! or State Legislatures,
provided it be exercised most for his happiness. His representative
has an interest in its being exercised by the body to which he belongs.
He will therefore view the National Legisl: with the eye of a jealous
rival. He observed that the addresses of Cong? to the people at

 

+The word “ was” is substituted in the transcript for “ were.”
* The word “of” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1787 139

large, had always been better received & produced greater effect,
than those made to the Legislatures.

On the question for postponing in order to take up M! Lansings
proposition ‘‘ to vest the powers of Legislation in Cong$’”’

Massi no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P* no. Del. ay M?
div? V? no. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. not

On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question on the
2? Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the whole was
postponed till tomorrow.

Adj

THURSDAY JUNE 21. IN CONVENTION

M: Jonathan Dayton from N. Jersey took his seat.*

3 Doct JoHNSON. On a comparison of the two plans which had
been proposed from Virginia & N. Jersey, it appeared that the
peculiarity which characterized the latter was its being calculated to
preserve the individuality of the States. The plan from V* did not
profess to destroy this individuality altogether, but was charged with
such a tendency. One Gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton) in his
animadversions on the plan of N. Jersey, boldly and decisively con-
tended for an abolition of the State Gov’ M2: Wilson & the gentle-
men from Virg? who also were adversaries of the plan of N. Jersey
held a different language. They wished to leave the States in pos-
session of a considerable, tho’ a subordinate jurisdiction. They had
not yet however shewn how this c4 consist with, or be secured ag*
the general sovereignty & jurisdiction, which they proposed to give
to the national Government. If this could be shewn in such a
manner as to satisfy the patrons of the N. Jersey propositions, that
the individuality of the States would not be endangered, many of
their objections would no doubt be removed. If this could not be
shewn their objections would have their full force. He wished it
therefore to be well considered whether in case the States, as was

* From June 21 to July 18 inclusive not copied by Mr Eppes.”

 

7In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, aye—4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—6; Maryland divided.”

? This footnote is omitted in the transcript. It refers to a copy of Madi-
son’s journal made by John W. Eppes, Jefferson’s son-in-law, for Jefferson’s
use some time between 1799 and 1810. “The Writings of James Madison, Hunt,
Editor, Vol. VI (1906), 329, n; Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. V
(1905), 294-296. : ae,

3 The transcript here inserts the following: “The second Resolution in the
Report from the Committee of the Whole, being under consideration.”
140 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

proposed, sh? retain some portion of sovereignty at least, this por-
tion could be preserved, without allowing them to participate effec-
tually in the Gen! Gov!, without giving them each a distinct and
equal vote for the purpose of defending themselves in the general
Councils.

M" Witson’s respect for Doc: Johnson, added to the importance
of the subject led him to attempt, unprepared as he was, to solve
the difficulty which had been started. It was asked how the Gen!
Govt and individuality of the particular States cculd be reconciled
to each other; and how the latter could be secured ag* the former?
Might it not, on the other side be asked how the former was to be
secured ag* the latter? It was generally admitted that a jealousy &
rivalship would be felt between the Gen! & particular Gov® As the
plan now stood, tho’ indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of
the Gen! Govt (the Senate or second branch) was to be appointed by
the State Legislatures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this
participation in the Gen! Govt would have an opportunity of defend-
ing their rights. Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to
the Gen! Govt of defending itself by having an appointment of some
one constituent branch of the State Gov's If a security be necessary
on one side, it wi seem reasonable to demand it on the other. But
taking the matter in a more general view, he saw no danger to the
States from the Gen! Govt In case a combination should be made
by the large ones it wi produce a general alarm among the rest; and
the project wi be frustrated. But there was no temptation to such,
a project. The States having in general a similar interest, in case
of any proposition* in the National Legislature to encroach on the
State Legislatures, he conceived a general alarm wi! take place in
the National Legislature itself, that it would communicate itself to
the State Legislatures, and w? finally spread among the people at
large. The Gen! Gov! will be as ready to preserve the rights of the
States as the latter are to preserve the rights of individuals; all the
members of the former, having a common interest, as representatives
of all the people of the latter, to leave the State Gov's in possession
of what the people wish them to retain. He could not discover,
therefore any danger whatever on the side from which it had been ? ap-
prehended. On the contrary, he conceived that in spite of every pre-
caution the general Gov! would be in perpetual danger of encroach-
ments from the State Gov*s

 

*The transcript uses the word “ proposition” in the plural.
*The word “was” is substituted in the transcript for “had been.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1787 141

M: Mapison was of opinion? that there was 1. less danger of
encroachment from the Gen! Govi than from the State Gov's 2. that
the mischief from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the
former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other con-
federacies prove the greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than
to tyranny; to a disobedience of the ‘members than to* usurpations
of the federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this
tendency.—But it will be said that the proposed change in the prin-
ciples & form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the Gen! Gov!
will have real & greater powers, and will be derived in one branch at
least from the people, not from the Gov's of the States. To give
full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that
indefinite power should be given to the Gen! Legislature, and the
States reduced to corporations dependent on the Gen! Legislature;
Why sh? it follow that the Gen! Gov! wi take from the States any
branch of their power as far as its operation was beneficial, and its,
continuance desireable to the people? In some of the States, par-
ticularly in Connecticut, all the Townships are incorporated, and
have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives of the
people of the Townships in the Legislature of the State ever en-
deavored to despoil the Townships of any part of their local author-
ity? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people they
are attached to it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to
them naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their
attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a General
Govt to State Gov't is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary ag*
encroachments of the State Gov't on the Gen! Gov! than of the latter
on the former. The great objection made ag%' an abolition of the
State Gov was that the Gen! Gov't could not extend its care to all
the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local juris-
dictions. The objection as stated lay not ag% the probable abuse of
the general power, but ag% the imperfect use that could be made of
it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a
variety of objects. As far as as its operation would be practicable it
could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be imprac-
ticable, the conveniency * of the Gen! Govt itself would concur with
that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments.
Were it practicable for the Gen! Gov! to extend its care to every

 

1The phrase “in the first place” is here inserted in the transcript and the
figure “1” is omitted.

? The figure “2” is changed to “and in the second place” in the transcript.

2 The word “to” is omitted in the transcript.

‘The word “ conveniency ” is changed to “ convenience” in the transcript.
142 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

requisite object without the cooperation of the State Gov‘ the people
would not be less free as members of one great Republic than as
members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware was not
more free than a Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more free
than a Citizen of America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the
Gen! Government to absorb the State Gov’: no fatal + consequence could
result. Taking the reverse of? the supposition, that a tendency
should be left in the State Gov's towards an independence on the
General Govt and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out.
The imagination of them, must have suggested to the States the
experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must
have formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the
arduous task.

On the question for resolving ‘‘ that the Legislature ought to
consist of two Branches ”’

Mass. ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey no P? ay. Del. no.
Mi div’ Vz ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

The third resolution of the Report‘ taken into consideration.

Gen! PrnkNEY moved ‘“‘ that the 1% branch, instead of being
elected by the people, sh? be elected in such manner as the Legis-
lature of each State should direct.’? He urged 1.° that this liberty
would give more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accomo-
date the mode to the conveniency * & opinions of the people. 2.° that it
would avoid the undue influence of large Counties which would pre-
vail if the elections were to be made in districts as must be the
mode intended by the Report of the Committee. 3.5 that otherwise
disputed elections must be referred to the General Legislature which
would be attended with intolerable expence and trouble to the dis-
tant parts of the republic.

M: L. Martin seconded the Motion.

Col. Hamitton considered the motion as intended manifestly to
transfer the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which
would essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State
influence which could not be too watchfully guarded ag%* All too
must admit the possibility, in case the Gen! Govt sh? maintain itself,

 

1The transcript italicizes the word “ fatal.”

2? The word “as” is substituted in the transcript for “ of.”

?Jn the transcript the vote reads: ‘Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, no—3; Maryland, divided.”

* The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.

5 The figures “1,” “2” and “3” are changed to “ first,” “secondly” and
“thirdly ” in the transcript.

®° The word “ conveniency ” is changed to “ convenience” in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1787 143

that the State Gov® might gradually dwindle into nothing. The
system therefore sh? not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.

M: Mason urged the necessity of retaining the election by the
people. Whatever inconveniency? may attend the democratic prin-
ciple, it must actuate one part of the Gov! It is the only security for
the rights of the people.

M: SHERMAN, would like an election by the Legislatures best,
but is content with? plan as it stands.

M: RutiiweE could not admit the solidity of the distinction be-
tween a mediate & immediate election by the people. It was the
same thing to act by oneself, and to act by another. An election by
the Legislature would be more refined than an election immediately
by the people: and would be more likely to correspond with the sense
of the whole community. If this Convention had been chosen by the
people in districts it is not to be supposed that such proper char-
acters would have been preferred. The Delegates to Cong? he thought
had also been fitter men than would have been appointed by the
people at large.

M* WILSON considered the election of the 1%* branch by the people
not only as the corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric:
and that the difference between a mediate & immediate election was
immense. The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this
respect: that the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the senti-
ment of the people; but have an official sentiment opposed to
that of the Gen! Govt and perhaps to that of the people them-
selves.

M: Kine enlarged on the same distinction. He supposed the
Legislatures w? constantly choose men subservient to their own views
as contrasted to the general interest; and that they might even devise
modes of election that wi be subversive of the end in view. He re-
marked several instances in which the views of a State might be at
variance with those of the Gen! Gov!: and mentioned particularly a
competition between the National & State debts, for the most certain
& productive funds.

Gen! PinKNEY was for making the State Gov® a part of the
General System. If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency,
S. Carolina & other States would have but a small share of the bene-
fits of Govt

Gn the question for Gen! Pinkney motion to substitute election

 

The word “inconveniency ” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-
script. : . c .
2 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
144 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of? 1s* branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, in
stead of its being elected by the people.’’

Mass’? no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. ay. M?
div! V2 no. N.C. no. 8. C. ay Geo. no?

General Pinkney then moved that the 1% branch be elected
by the people in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but
waved it on its being hinted that such a provision might be more
properly tried in the detail of the plan.

On the question for y® election of the 1% branch by the people.’’

Mass'® ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay. M?
div’ V2ay. N.C. ay. 8. C.ay Geo. ay.®

1 Election of the 1%* branch ‘‘ for the term of three years,’’* con-
sidered

M: RanpoteH moved to strike out, ‘‘ three years’’ and insert
““two years ’’—he was sensible that annual elections were a source
of great mischiefs in the States, yet it was the want of such checks
ag*t the popular intemperence as were now proposed, that rendered
them so mischievous. He would have preferred annual to biennial,
but for the extent of the U. S. and the inconveniency * which would
result from them to the representatives of the extreme parts of the
Empire. The people were attached to frequency of elections. All
the Constitutions of the States except that of S. Carolina, had
established annual elections.

M: Dickenson. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from
the antient usage of England, a country much less extensive than
ours. He supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred
triennial: and in order to prevent the inconveniency® of an entire
change of the whole number at the same moment, suggested a rotation,
by an annual election of one third.

M! ELSEWORTH was opposed to three years, supposing that even
one year was preferable to two years. The people were fond of
frequent elections and might be safely indulged in one branch of the
Legislature. He moved for 1 year.

M" Strrone seconded & supported the motion.

9

 

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
South Carolina, aye—4; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, no—6; Maryland, divided.”

3In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; New Jersey, no—1; Maryland, divided.”

‘The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.

. oo word “inconveniency” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-
script.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1787 145

M. Wison being for making the 1%* branch an effectual represen-
tation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it. This
frequency was most familiar & pleasing to the people. It would
be not+ more inconvenient to them, than triennial elections, as the
people in all the States have annual meetings with which the election
of the National representatives might be made to co-incide. He
did not conceive that it would be necessary for the Nat! Legisl:
to sit constantly; perhaps not half—perhaps not one fourth of the
year.

M: Mapison was persuaded that annual elections would be ex-
tremely inconvenient and apprehensive that biennial would be too
much so: he did not mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the
representatives. They would have to travel seven or eight hundred
miles from the distant parts of the Union; and would probably not
be allowed even a reimbursement of their expences. Besides, none of
those who wished to be re-elected would remain at the seat of Gov-
ernm!; confiding that their absence would not affect them. The
members of Cong’ had done this with few instances of disappoint-
ment. But as the choice was here to be made by the people them-
selves who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much
more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a Rival candi-
date, it must be supposed that the members from the most distant
States would travel backwards & forwards at least as often as the
elections should be repeated. Much was to be said also on the time
requisite for new members who would always form a large propor-
tion, to acquire that knowledge of the affairs of the States in general
without which their trust could not be usefully discharged.

M:! SHERMAN preferred annual elections, but would be content
with biennial. He thought the Representatives ought to return home
and mix with the people. By remaining at the seat of Gov! they
would acquire the habits of the place which might differ from those
ef their Constituents.

Col. Mason observed that the States being differently situated
such a rule ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as pos-
sible on a level. If elections were annual the middle States would
have a great advantage over the extreme ones. He wished them to
be biennial; and the rather as in that case they would coincide with
the periodical elections of S. Carolina as well of the other States.

Col. Hamitron urged the necessity of 3 years. There ought to
be neither too much nor too little dependence, on the popular senti-

 

1 The words “ be not” are transposed to read “not be” in the transcript.
146 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ments. The checks in the other branches of Govern! would be but
feeble, and would need every auxiliary principle that could be inter-
woven. The British House of Commons were elected septennially,
yet the democratic spirit of y? Constitution had not ceased. Fre-
quency of elections tended to make the people listless to them; and
to facilitate the success of little cabals. This evil was complained
of in all the States. In Virg? it had been lately found necessary to
force the attendance & voting of the people by severe regulations.

On the question for striking out ‘‘ three years ”’

Mass’® ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. div’ P® ay. Del. no.
Méno. Vi ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.2

The motion for ‘‘ two years ’’ was then inserted nem. con.

Adj

Fray JUNE 22. In CoNVENTION

The clause in Resol. 3.? ‘‘ to receive fixed stipends to be paid out
of the Nation! Treasury ’’ * considered.

M! ELsewortH, moved to substitute payment by the States out of
their own Treasurys: observing that the manners of different States
were very different in the Stile of living and in the profits accruing
from the exercise of like talents. What would be deemed therefore
a reasonable compensation in some States, in others would be very
unpopular, and might impede the system of which it made a part.

M? Wiiuiamson favored the idea. He reminded the House of
the prospect of new States to the Westward. They would be‘
poor—would pay little into the common Treasury—and would have
a different interest from the old States. He did not think therefore
that the latter ought to pay the expences of men who would be em-
ployed in thwarting their measures & interests.

M Guorvum, wished not to refer the matter to the State Legisla-
tures who were always paring down salaries in such a manner as to
keep out of offices men most capable of executing the functions of
them. He thought also it would be wrong to fix the compensations * by
the constitutions,® because we could not venture to make it as liberal

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: ‘“ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New York,
Delaware, Maryland, no—3; New Jersey, divided.”

A 2 ie jwords “the third Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“ Resol. 3.”

* The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The word “too” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The transcript uses the words “conpensations” and “constitutions” in
the singular.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 1787 147

as it ought to be without exciting an enmity ag* the whole plan.
Let the Nati: Legisl: provide for their own wages from time to time;
as the State Legislatures do. He had not seen this part of their
power abused, nor did he apprehend an abuse of it.

M: RanpotpH: feared we were going too far, in consulting
popular prejudices. Whatever respect might be due to them, .
in lesser matters, or in cases where they formed the permanent char-
acter of the people, he thought it neither incumbent on nor honorable
for the Convention, to sacrifice right & justice to that consideration.
If the States were to pay the members of the Nat! Legislature, a de-
pendence would be created that would vitiate the whole System. The
whole nation has an interest in the attendance & services of the
members. The Nation! Treasury therefore is the proper fund for
supporting them.

M: Kine, urged the danger of creating a dependence on the
States by leav? to them the payment of the members of the Nat!
Legislature. He supposed it w? be best to be explicit as to the com-
pensation to be allowed. A reserve on that point, or a reference
to the Nat! Legislature of the quantum, would excite greater opposi-
tion than any sum that would be actually necessary or proper.

M! SHerman contended for referring both the quantum and the
payment of it to the State Legislatures.

M: Witson was ag*' fizing the compensation as circumstances
would change and call for a change of the amount. He thought it
of great moment that the members of the Nat}! Gov! should be left as
independent as possible of the State Gov® in all respects.

M= Mapison concurred in the necessity of preserving the com-
pensations for the Nat! Gov! independent on the State Gov® but
at the same time approved of fixing them by the Constitution,
which might be done by taking a standard which w! not vary with
circumstances. He disliked particularly the policy suggested by
ME Wiliamson of leaving the members from the poor States beyond
the Mountains, to the precarious & parsimonious support of their con-
stituents. If the Western States hereafter arising should be ad-
mitted into the Union, they ought to be considered as equals & as
brethren. If their representatives were to be associated in the Com-
mon Councils, it was of common concern that such provisions should
be made as would invite the most capable and respectable characters
into the service.

M! Hamiuron apprehended inconveniency ? from fixing the wages.

 

1The words “said he” are here inserted in the transcript.
2The word “inconveniency” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-
script.
148 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

He was strenuous ag making the National Council dependent on
the Legislative rewards of the States. Those who pay are the masters
of those who are paid. Payment by the States would be unequal as
the distant States would have to pay for the same term of attendance
and more days in travelling to & from the seat of the * Govt He ex-
patiated emphatically on the difference between the feelings & views
of the people—& the Governments of the States arising from the
personal interest & official inducements which must render the latter
unfriendly to the Gen? Gov!

MM" Witson moved that the Salaries of the 1%* branch ‘‘ be ascer-
tained by the National Legislature,’’* and be paid out of the Nat
Treasury.

M= Mapison, thought the members of the Legis' too much in-
terested to ascertain their own compensation. It w? be indecent to put
their hands into the public purse for the sake of their own pockets.

On this question ® Mas. no. Conf no. N. Y. div? N. J. ay. P2
ay. Del. no. Mino. Vino. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. div?*

On the question for striking out ‘‘ Nat? Treasury ’’ as moved by
M Elseworth

M: Hamiuron renewed his opposition to it. He pressed the dis-
tinction between® State Gov!® & the people. The former w? be
the rivals of the Gen! Gov! The State legislatures ought not there-
fore to be the paymasters of the latter.

M: ExvsewortH. If we are jealous of the State Gov they will
be so of us. If on going home I tell them we gave the Gen: Gov!
such powers because we c? not trust you, will they adopt it, and
with! y? approbation it is a nullity.

® Mass's ay. Cont ay. N. Y. divi N. J. no Pen? no. Del. no.
Mé no. V2 no. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. divi*?

*Note. [It appeared that Massts concurred, not because they thought the
State Treasy ought to be substituted; but because they thought nothing should

be said on the subject, in which case it wd silently devolve on the Nat! Treasury
to support the National Legislature.]

 

+The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.

The transcript does not italicize the phrase “be ascertained by the Na-
tional Legislature.”

® The transcript here inserts the following: “shall the salaries of the first
branch be ascertained by the National Legislature? ”

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye—2;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, no—7; New York, Georgia, divided.”

® The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The words “ On the question” are here inserted in the transcript.

7™In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts,* Connecticut, North
Carolina, South Carolina, aye—4; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, no—5; New York, Georgia, divided; so it passed in the negative.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 1787 149

On a question for substituting ‘‘ adequate compensation ’’ in
place of ‘‘ fixt stipends ’’ it was agreed to nem. con. the friends
of the latter being willing that the practicability of fixing the
compensation should be considered hereafter in forming the de-
tails,

It was then moved by M: Butter that a question be taken on both
points jointly; to wit ‘‘ adequate compensation to be paid out of
the Nat! Treasury.’ It was objected to as out of order, the parts
having been separately decided on. The Presid‘ refer’ the question
of order to the House, and it was determined to be in order. Con.
N. J. Del. M2 N. C. S. C—ay—* N. Y. P* V* Geo. no— Mass:
divided. The question on the sentence was then postponed by S.
Carolina in right of the State.

Col. Mason moved to insert ‘‘ twenty-five years of age as a quali-
fication for the members of the 1% branch.’’ He thought it absurd
that a man to day should not be permitted by the law to make a
bargain for himself, and tomorrow should be authorized to manage
the affairs of a great nation. It was the more extraordinary as every
man carried with him in his own experience a scale for measuring the
deficiency of young politicians; since he would if interrogated be
obliged to declare that his political opinions at the age of 21. were
too crude & erroneous to merit an influence on public measures. It
had been said that Cong? had proved a good school for our young
men. It might be so for any thing he knew but if it were, he chose
that they should bear the expence of their own education.

M* Wison was ag* abridging the rights of election in any shape.
It was the same thing whether this were done by disqualifying the
objects of choice, or the persons chusing. The motion tended to
damp the efforts of genius, and of laudable ambition. There was
no more reason for incapacitating youth than age, where the requi-
site qualifications were found. Many instances might be mentioned
of signal services rendered in high stations to the public before the
age of 25: The present M: Pitt and Lord Bolingbroke were striking
instances.

On the question for inserting ‘‘ 25 years of age ’’

Mass® no. Cont ay. N. Y. div’ N. J. ay. P? no. Del. ay.
Mé ay. Viay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.?

 

*In the transcript the figures “6” and “4” are inserted after “ay” and
“no” respectively.

?In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—7; Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Georgia, no—3; New York, divided.”
150 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: GHorum moved to strike out the last member of 3 Resol:!
concerning ineligibility of members of the 1: branch to offices? during
the term of their membership & for one year after. He considered
it as? unnecessary & injurious. It was true abuses had been dis-
played in G. B. but no one ci say how far they might have contributed
to preserve the due influence of the Gov! nor what might have ensued
in case the contrary theory had been tried.

M: Burier opposed it. This precaution ag*t intrigue was neces-
sary. He appealed to the example of G. B. where men got* into
Parlt that they might get offices for themselves or their friends. This
was the source of the corruption that ruined their Gov

M! Kine, thought we were refining too much. Such a restriction
on the members would discourage merit. It would also give a pre-
text to the Executive for bad appointments, as he might always plead
this as a bar to the choice he wished to have made.

M: Witson was ag*' fettering elections, and discouraging merit.
He suggested also the fatal consequence in time of war, of render-
ing perhaps the best Commanders ineligible: appealing® to our
situation during the late war, and indirectly leading to a recol-
lection of the appointment of the Commander in Chief out of
Congress.

Col. Mason was for shutting the door at all events ag’ corrup-
tion. He enlarged on the venality and abuses in this particular in
G. Britain: and alluded to the multiplicity of foreign Embassies by
Cong: The disqualification he regarded as a corner stone in the
fabric.

Col. Hamitton. There are inconveniences on both sides. We must
take man as we find him, and if we expect him to serve the public
must interest his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism
had been the source of many of our errors.. He thought the remark
of M? Ghorum a just one. It was impossible to say what w’ be®
effect in G. B. of such a reform as had been urged. It was known
that one of the ablest politicians [M! Hume,] had pronounced
all that influence on the side of the crown, which went under the
name of corruption,” an essential part of the weight which maintained
the equilibrium of the Constitution.

 

ies mo words “the third Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
esol:
* The letter “s” is stricken out of the word “ offices” in the transcript.
* The word “as” is stricken out in the transcript.
‘The word “ get” is substituted in the transcript for “ got.”
* The word “appealed” is substituted in the transcript for “ appealing.”
* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The transcript italicizes the word “ corruption.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 23, 1787 151

On M: Ghorum’s Motion for striking out ‘‘ ineligibility,’’+
Mas ay. Con! no. N. Y. div? N. J. ay. P? div? Del. div?
Mar? no. Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay?
Adj

 

Saturpay JUNE 23. In CONVENTION

The 3. Resol: resumed.®

On* Question yesterday postponed by S. Carol: for agreeing to
the whole sentence ‘‘ for allowing an adequate compensation to be
paid out of the Treasury of the U. States ’’

Mast? ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pen? ay Del. no.
Mi ay. Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo divided.® So the question
was lost, & the sentence not inserted: '

Gen! PINKNEY moves to strike out the ineligibility of members of
the 1% branch to offices established ‘‘ by a particular State.’’ He
argued from the inconveniency * to which such a restriction would
expose both the members of the 13' branch, and the States wishing
for their services;7 from the smallness of the object to be attained
by the restriction.

It w? seem from the ideas of some that we are erecting a King-
dom to be divided ag*' itself, he disapproved such a fetter on the
Legislature.

M* SuerMan seconds the motion. It w? seem that we are erect-
ing a Kingdom at war with itself. The Legislature ought not to®
fettered in such a case. on the question

Mast no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. no.
Mi ay. Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

1The transcript here inserts the following: “it was lost by an equal
division of the votes.”

2In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Georgia, aye—4; Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina,
no—4; New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, divided.”

®JIn the transcript this sentence reads: “The third Resolution being re-
jumed.”
ee The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

"In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; Connecticut, New York, Delaware, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no—5; Georgia, divided.”

®The word “ inconveniency” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-

Tipt.
at The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The word “be” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Massa-
‘chusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no—3.”

 
152 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M= Mapison renewed his motion yesterday made & waved to
render the members of the 1% branch ‘‘ ineligible during their term
of service, & for one year after—to such offices only as should be
established, or the emoluments thereof, augmented by the Legisla-
ture of the U. States during the time of their being members.’’ He
supposed that the unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of
salaries, were the evils most experienced, & that if the door was shut
ag them: it might properly be left open for the appoint! of mem-
bers to other offices as an encouragemt to the Legislative service.

M:= Alex: Marrin seconded the motion.

M: Buruer. The amend does not go far eno’ & w® be easily
evaded

M: Rutwivcr, was for preserving the Legislature as pure as pos-
sible, by shutting the door against appointments of its own members
to offices,1 which was one source of its corruption.

Mz Mason. The motion of my colleague is but a partial remedy
for the evil. He appealed to him as a witness of the shameful par-
tiality of the Legislature of Virginia to its own members. He en-
larged on the abuses & corruption in the British Parliament, con-
nected with the appointment of its members. He c? not suppose
that a sufficient number of Citizens could not be found who would
be ready, without the inducement of eligibility to offices, to undertake
the Legislative service. Genius & virtue it may be said, ought to be
encouraged. Genius, for aught he knew, might, but that virtue
should be encouraged by such a species of venality, was an idea,
that at least had the merit of being new.

M: King remarked that we were refining too much in this busi-
ness; and that the idea of preventing intrigue and solicitation of
offices was chimerical. You say that no member shall himself be
eligible to any office. Will this restrain him from from availing him-
self of the same means which would gain appointments for himself, to
gain them for his son, his brother, or any other object of his par-
tiality. We were losing therefore the advantages on one side, without
avoiding the evils on the other.

M: Witson supported the motion. The proper cure he said for
corruption in the Legislature was to take from it the power of
appointing to offices. One branch of corruption would indeed re-
main, that of creating unnecessary offices, or granting unnecessary
salaries, and for that the amendment would be a proper remedy.
He animadverted on the impropriety of stigmatizing with the name

 

1The transcript uses the word “ offices” in the singular.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 23, 1787 153

of venality the laudable ambition of rising into the honorable offices
of the Government; an ambition most likely to be felt in the early
& most incorrupt period of life, & which all wise & free Gov had
deemed it sound policy, to cherish, not to check. The members of the
Legislature have perhaps the hardest & least profitable task of any
who engage in the service of the state. Ought this merit to be
made a disqualification?

M‘ SHERMAN, observed that the motion did not go far enough.
It might be evaded by the creation of a new office, the translation
to it of a person from another office, and the appointment of a
member of the Legislature to the latter. A new Embassy might be
established to a new Court, & an ambassador taken from another, in
order to create a vacancy for a favorite member. He admitted that
inconveniencies lay on both sides. He hoped there w? be sufficient in-
ducements to the public service without resorting to the prospect of
desireable offices, and on the whole was rather ag* the motion of M?
Madison.

M: Gerry thought there was great weight in the objection of
M? Sherman. He added as another objection ag%* admitting the
eligibility of members in any case that it would produce intrigues of
ambitious men for displacing proper officers, in order to create
vacancies for themselves. In answer to M: King he observed that
although members, if disqualified themselves might still intrigue &
cabal for their sons, brothers &c, yet as their own interest would
be dearer to them, than those of their nearest connections, it might
be expected they would go greater lengths to promote it.

M: Mapison had been led to this motion as a middle ground
between an eligibility in all cases, and an absolute disqualification.
He admitted the probable abuses of an eligibility of the members,
to offices, particularly within the gift of the Legislature He had
witnessed the partiality of such bodies to their own members, as
had been remarked of the Virginia assembly by his colleague [Col.
Mason}. He appealed however to him, in turn to vouch another
fact not less notorious in Virginia, that the backwardness of the best
citizens to engage in the Legislative service gave but too great
success to unfit characters. The question was not to be viewed on
one side only. The advantages & disadvantages on both ought to
be fairly compared. The objects to be aimed at were to fill all offices
with the fittest characters, & to draw the wisest & most worthy citizens
into the Legislative service. If on one hand, public bodies were
partial to their own members; on the other they were as apt to be
misled by taking characters on report, or the authority of patrons
154 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

and dependents. All who had been concerned in the appointment of
strangers on those recommedations must be sensible of this truth.
Nor wi the partialities of such Bodies be obviated by disqualifying
their own members. Candidates for office would hover round the seat
of Govi or be found among the residents there, and practise all the
means of courting the favor of the members. A great proportion of
the appointments made by the States were evidently brought about
in this way. In the general Gov! the evil must be still greater, the
characters of distant states, being much less known throughout the
U. States than those of the distant parts of the same State. The
elections by Congress had generally turned on men living at the
seat of the fed! Gov! or in its neighbourhood.—As to the next object,
the impulse to the Legislative a was evinced by experience
to be in general too feeble with those best qualified for it. This in-
conveniency + w4 also be more felt in the Nat! Govt than in the State
Gov‘ as the sacrifices req’ from the distant members, wi be much
greater, and the pecuniary provisions, probably, more dispropor-
tiate. It w% therefore be impolitic to add fresh objections to the
Legislative service by an absolute disqualification of its members.
The point in question was whether this would be an objection with
the most capable citizens. Arguing from experience he concluded
that it would. The Legislature of Virg* would probably have been
without many of its best members, if in that situation, they had been
ineligible to Cong’ to the Gov! & other honorable offices of the State.

M: Butwer thought Characters fit for office w? never be unknown.

Col. Mason. If the members of the Legislature are disqualified,
still the honors of the State will induce those who aspire to them
to enter that service, as the field in which they can best display &
improve their talents, & lay the train for their subsequent ad-
vancement.

M: Jenirer remarked that in Maryland, the Senators chosen for
five years, c? hold no other office & that this circumstance gained
them the greatest confidence of the people.

On the question for agreeing to the motion of M? Madison.

Mass® div? Ctay. N. Y.no. N. J. ay. P*no. Del. no. Mé no.
V? no. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

M: SHERMAN mov! to insert the words ‘‘ and incapable of hold-

 

: nd word “inconveniency” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-
script.
* In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, aye—2; New
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—8; Massachusetts, divided.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1787 155

ing ’’ after the words ‘‘ eligible to offices ’?+ w% was agreed to with-
out opposition.

The word ‘‘ established ’’ & the words ‘‘ ? Nat! Govt ’’ were struck
out of Resolution 33; *

M® Spaicut called for a division of the question, in consequence
of which it was so put, as that it turned in‘ the first member of it,
‘* on the ineligibility of the > members during the term for which they
were elected ’’—whereon the States were,

Mass* div’ Ct ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P% no. Del. ay. M?
ay. V2 ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. no.®

On the 22 member of the sentence extending ineligibility of
members to one year after the term for which they were elected
Col Mason thought this essential to guard agst evasions by resigna-
tions, and stipulations for office to be fulfilled at the expiration of
the legislative term. M! Grrry, had known such a case. M! Hamit-
TON. Evasions c? not be prevented—as by proxies—by friends hold-
ing for a year, & them’ opening the way &. M: Rutuipee admitted
the possibility of evasions but was for controuling them as possible.®
°Mass. no. Ctno. N.Y. ay. N. J. no. P? div’ Del. ay. Mar? ay
Ve no. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. no?? -

Adjt

Monpay. JUNE 25. IN CONVENTION.

Resolution 4.° being taken up.
M: Pinxney ¥ spoke as follows— The efficacy of the System will

 

1The words “ineligible to any office” are substituted in the transcript for
“eligible to offices.”

? The words “‘ under the” are here inserted in the transcript.

* The words “the third Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“ Resolution 34”

*The word “on” is substituted in the transcript for “ in.”

5 The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—8; Penn-
sylvania, Georgia, no—2; Massachusetts, divided.”

™The word “then” is substituted in the transcript for “them.”

*The phrase “contracting them as far as possible” is substituted in the
transcript for “controuling them ag possible.”

® The words “ On the question ” are here inserted in the transcript.

10 Tn the transcript the vote reads: “ New York, Delaware, Maryland, South
Carolina, aye—4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, no—6; Pennsylvania, divided.”

11 The words “The fourth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“ Resolution 4.” ; ;

12 Pinckney furnished Madison with a copy of this speech which he trans-
cribed, but apparently not with the whole of it, as Madison’s note at the end
156 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

depend on this article. In order to form a right judgmt in the case,
it will be proper to examine the situation of this Country more
accurately than it has yet been done. The people of the U. States
are perhaps the most singular of any we are acquainted with. Among
them there are fewer distinctions of fortune & less of rank, than
among the inhabitants of any other nation. Every freeman has a
right to the same protection & security; and a very moderate share
of property entitles them to the possession of all the honors and
privileges the public can bestow: hence arises a greater equality,
than is to be found among the people of any other country, and an
equality which is more likely to continue—I say this equality is
likely to continue, because in a new Country, possessing immense
tracts of uncultivated lands, where every temptation is offered to
emigration & where industry must be rewarded with competency,
there will be few poor, and few dependent—Every member of the
Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving at the supreme
offices & consequently of directing the strength & sentiments of the
whole Community. None will be excluded by birth, & few by for-
tune, from voting for proper persons to fill the offices of Government—
the whole community will enjoy in the fullest sense that kind of
political liberty which consists in the power the members of the
State reserve to themselves, of arriving at the public offices, or at
least, of having votes in the nomination of those who fill them.

If this State of things is true & the prospect of its continuing?
probable, it is perhaps not politic to endeavour too close an imita-
tion of a Government calculated for a people whose situation is, &
whose views ought to be extremely different

Much has been said of the Constitution of G. Britain. I will
confess that I believe it to be the best Constitution in existence; but
at the same time I am confident it is one that will not or can not be
introduced into this Country, for many centuries.—If it were proper
to go here into a historical dissertation on the British Constitution, it
might easily be shewn that the peculiar excellence, the distinguishing
feature of that Governm! can not possibly be introduced into our
System—that its balance between the Crown & the people can not be
made a part of our Constitution—that we neither have or can have
the members to compose it, nor the rights, privileges & properties of
so distinct a class of Citizens to guard.—that the materials for form-

 

indicates. The original Pinckney draft is among the Madison papers, and shows
Madison’s copying to have been accurate.

_ | The word “continuance” is substituted in the transcript for “con-
tinuing.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1787 157

ing this balance or check do not exist, nor is there a necessity for
having so permanent a part of our Legislative, until the Executive
power is so constituted as to have something fixed & dangerous in its
principle—By this I mean a sole, hereditary, though limited
Executive.

That we cannot have a proper body for forming a Legislative
balance between the inordinate power of the Executive and the
people, is evident from a review of the accidents & circumstances
which gave rise to the peerage of Great Britain—I believe it is well
ascertained that the parts which compose the British Constitution
arose immediately from the forests of Germany ; but the antiquity of
the establishment of nobility is by no means clearly defined. Some
authors are of opinion that the dignity denoted by the titles of
dux et + comes, was derived from the old Roman to the German Em-
pire; while others are of opinion that they existed among the Ger-
mans long before the Romans were acquainted with them. The
institution however of nobility is immemorial among the nations who
may probably be termed the ancestors of ? Britain —At the time they
were summoned in England to become a part of the National Council,
and * the circumstances which have * contributed to make them a con-
stituent part of that constitution, must be well known to all gentlemen
who have had industry & curiosity enough to investigate the subject—
The nobles with their possessions & and dependents composed a body
permanent in their nature and formidable in point of power. They
had a distinct interest both from the King and the people; an interest
which could only be represented by themselves, and the guardian-
ship # could not be safely intrusted to others.—At the time they were
originally called to form a part of the National Council, necessity
perhaps as much as other cause, induced the Monarch to look up to
them. It was necessary to demand the aid of his subjects in per-
sonal & pecuniary services. The power and possessions of the
Nobility would not permit taxation from any assembly of which they
were not a part: & the blending ® the deputies of the Commons with
them, & thus forming what they called their parler-ment* was per-
haps as much the effect of chance as of any thing else. The Com-
mons were at that time compleatly subordinate to the nobles, whose

 

1The word “and” is substituted in the transcript. for “et.”

2'The word “Great” is here inserted in the transcript.

3 The words “and” and “have” are crossed out in the transcript.
4The words “of which” are here inserted in the transcript.

5 The word “of” is here inserted in the transcript.

° The transcript italicizes the word “ parler-ment.”
158 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

consequence & influence seem to have been the only reasons for their
superiority ; a superiority so degrading to the Commons that in the
first Summons we find the peers are called upon to consult, the com-
mons to consent.: From this time the peers have composed a part of
the British Legislature, and notwithstanding their power and in-
fluence have diminished & those of the Commons have increased, yet
still they have always formed an excellent balance ag* either the
encroachments of the Crown or the people.

I have said that such a body cannot exist in this Country for
ages, and that untill the situation of our people is exceedingly
changed no necessity will exist for so permanent a part of the Legis-
lature. To illustrate this I have remarked that the people of the
United States are more equal in their circumstances than the people
of any other Country—that they have very few rich men among
them,—by rich men I mean those whose riches may have a danger-
ous influence, or such as are esteemed rich in Europe—perhaps there
are not one hundred such on the Continent; that it is not probable
this number will be greatly increased: that the genius of the people,
their mediocrity of situation & the prospects which are afforded their
industry in a Country which must be a new one for centuries are
unfavorable to the rapid distinction of ranks. The destruction of
the right of primogeniture & the equal division of the property of
Intestates will also have an effect to preserve this mediocrity; for
laws invariably affect the manners of a people. On the other hand
that vast extent of unpeopled territory which opens to the frugal &
industrious a sure road to competency & independence will effectually,
prevent for a considerable time the increase of the poor or discon-
tented, and be the means of preserving that equality of condition
which so eminently distinguishes us.

If equality is as I contend the leading feature of the U. States,
where then are the riches & wealth whose representation & protection
is the peculiar province of this permanent body. Are they in the
hands of the few who may be called rich; in the possession of less
than a hundred citizens? certainly not. They are in the great body
of the people, among whom there are no men of wealth, and very
few of real poverty.—Is it probable that a change will be created,
and that a new order of men will arise? If under the British
Government, for a century no such change was probable,? I think it

* The transcript italicizes the words “consult” and “consent.”

: ene word “produced” is substituted for the word “ probable “ in the tran-
script.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1787 159

may be fairly concluded it will not take place while even the sem-
blance of Republicanism remains.—How is this change to be effected?
Where are the sources from whence it is to flow? From the landed
interest? No. That is too unproductive & too much divided in
most of the States. From the Monied interest? If such exists at
present, little is to be apprehended from that source. Is it to spring
from commerce? I believe it would be the first instance in which a
nobility sprang from merchants. Besides, Sir, I apprehend that
on this point the policy of the U. States has been much mistaken.
We have unwisely considered ourselves as the inhabitants of an old
instead of a new country. We have adopted the maxims of a State
full of people & manufactures & established in credit. We have
deserted our true interest, and instead of applying closely to those
improvements in domestic policy which would have ensured the
future importance of our commerce, we have rashly & prematurely
engaged in schemes as extensive as they are imprudent. This how-
ever is an error which daily corrects itself & I have no doubt that a
few more severe trials will convince us, that very different com-
mercial principles ought to govern the conduct of these States.

The people of this country are not only very different from the
inhabitants of any State we are acquainted with in the modern
world; but I assert that their situation is distinct from either the
people of Greece or Rome, or of any State we are acquainted with
among the antients.—Can the orders introduced by the institution
of Solon, can they be found in the United States? Can the military
habits & manners of Sparta be resembled to our habits & manners?
Are the distinctions of Patrician & Plebeian known among us? Can
the Helvetic or Belgic confederacies, or can the unwieldy, unmeaning
body called the Germanic Empire, can they be said to possess either
the same or a situation like ours? I apprehend not.—They are
perfectly different, in their distinctions of rank, their Constitutions,
their manners & their policy.

Our true situation appears to me to be this.—a new extensive
Country containing within itself the materials for forming a Govern-
ment capable of extending to its citizens all the blessings of civil &
religious liberty—capable of making them happy at home. This is
the great end of Republican Establishments. We mistake the object
of our Government, if we hope or wish that it is to make us respect-
able abroad. Conquest or superiority among other powers is not or
ought not ever to be the object of republican systems. If they are
sufficiently active & energetic to rescue us from contempt & preserve
our domestic happiness & security, it is all we can expect from
160 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

them,—it is more than almost any other Government ensures to its
citizens.

I believe this observation will be found generally true:—that no
two people are so exactly alike in their situation or circumstances as
to admit the exercise of the same Government with equal benefit:
that a system must be suited to the habits & genius of the people it is
+o govern, and must grow out of them.

The people of the U. S. may be divided into three classes—
Professional men who must from their particular pursuits always
have a considerable weight in the Government while it remains popu-
lar—Commercial men, who may or may not have weight as a wise
or injudicious commercial policy is pursued.—If that commercial
policy is pursued which I conceive to be the true one, the merchants
of this Country will not or ought not for a considerable time to have
much weight in the political scale——The third is the landed interest,
the owners and cultivators of the soil, who are and ought ever to be
the governing spring in the system.—These three classes, however
distinct in their pursuits are individually equal in the political
scale, and may be easily proved to have but one interest. The de-
pendence of each on the other is mutual. The merchant depends
on the planter. Both must in private as well as public affairs be con-
nected with the professional men; who in their turn must in some
measure depend upon? them. Hence it is clear from this manifest con-
nection, & the equality which I before stated exists, & must for the
reasons then assigned, continue, that after all there is one, but one
great & equal body of citizens composing the inhabitants of this
Country among whom there are no distinctions of rank, and very few
or none of fortune.

For a people thus cireumstanced are we then to form a govern-
ment & the question is what kind? of Government is best suited to
them.

Will it be the British Gov't? No. Why? Because G. Britain
contains three orders of people distinct in their situation, their pos-
sessions & their principles—These orders combined form the great
body of the Nation, and as in national expences the wealth of the
whole community must contribute, so ought each component part to
‘be properly & duly? represented—No other combination of power
could form this due representation, but the one that exists.—Neither

 

1 The word “on” is substituted in the transcript for “ upon.”
2? The word “sort” is substituted in the transcript for “kind.”

The words “properly & duly” are transposed in the transcript to read
“duly and properly.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1787 161

the peers or the people could represent the royalty, nor could the
Royalty & the people form a proper representation for the Peers —
Each therefore must of necessity be represented by itself, or the sign
of itself; and this accidental mixture has certainly formed a Govern-
ment admirably well balanced. —

But the U. States contain but one order that can be assimilated
to the British Nation,—this is the order of Commons. They will
not surely then attempt to form a Government consisting of three
branches, two of which shall have nothing to represent. They will
not have an Executive & Senate [hereditary] because the King &
Lords of England are so. The same reasons do not exist and there-
fore the same provisions are not necessary.

We must as has been observed suit our Governm! to the people
it is to direct. These are I believe as active, intelligent & susceptible
of good Governmt as any people in the world. The Confusion which
has produced the present relaxed State is not owing to them. It is
owing to the weakness & [defects] of a Govt incapable of combining
the various interests it is intended to unite, and destitute of energy.—
All that we have to do then is to distribute the powers of Govt in such
a manner, and for such limited periods, as while it gives a proper
degree of permanency to the Magistrate, will reserve to the people, the
right of election they will not or ought not frequently to part with—
I am of opinion that this may be easily? done; and that with some
amendments the propositions before the Committee will fully answer
this end.

No position appears to me more true than this; that the General
Govt can not effectually exist without reserving to the States the
possession of their local rights. They are the instruments upon
which the Union must frequently depend for the support & execution
of their powers, however immediately operating upon the people,
and not upon the States.

Much has been said about the propriety of abolishing the dis-
tinction of State Governments, & having but one general System.
Suffer me for a moment to examine this question.*

*The residue of this speech was not furnished like the above by Mr
Pinckney.”

 

1The words “be easily ” are transposed in the transcript to “easily be.”

2“The residue” of Pinckney’s speech, according to Robert Yates was as
follows:

“The United States include a territory of about 1500 miles in length, and
in breadth about 400; the whole of which is divided into states and districts.
While we were dependent on the crown of Great Britain, it was in contemplation
to have formed the whole into one—but it was found impracticable. No legis-
lature could make good laws for the whole, nor can it now be done. It would
162 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

The mode of constituting the 2? branch being under consideration.

The word ‘national’? was struck out and ‘‘ United States ’’
inserted.

M: Guorvm, inclined to a compromise as to the rule of propor-
tion. He thought there was some weight in the objections of the small
States. If V2 should have 16. votes & Del’? with several other States
together 16. those from Virg? would be more likely to unite than the
others, and would therefore have an undue influence. This remark
was applicable not only to States, but to Counties or other districts of
the same State. Accordingly the Constitution of Mass‘? had pro-
vided that the representatives of the larger districts should not be in
an exact ratio to their numbers. And experience he thought had shewn
the provision to be expedient.

Mz Reap. The States have heretofore been in a sort of partner-
ship. They ought to adjust their old affairs before they open? a
new account. He brought into view the appropriation of the common
interest in the Western lands, to the use of particular States. Let
justice be done on this head; let the fund be applied fairly & equally
to the discharge of the general debt, and the smaller States who
had been injured; would listen then perhaps to those ideas of just
representation which had been held out.

M: Guorum. did? not see how the Convention could interpose in
the case. Errors he allowed had been committed on the subject.
But Cong? were now using their endeavors to rectify them. The
best remedy would be such a Government as would have vigor enough
to do justice throughout. This was certainly the best chance that
could be afforded to the smaller States.

M: Witson. the question is shall the members of the 2% branch
be chosen by the Legislatures of the States? When he considered the
amazing extent of Country—the immense population which is to fill
it, the influence which * the Gové we are to form will have, not only on
the present generation of our people & their multiplied posterity,

 

necessarily place the power in the hands of the few, nearest the seat of govern-
ment. State governments must therefore remain, if you mean to prevent con-
fusion. The general negative powers will support the general government.
Upon these considerations I am led to form the second branch differently from
the report. Their powers are important and the number not too large, upon
the principle of proportion. I have considered the subject with great attention;
and I propose this plan (reads it) and if no better plan is proposed, I will
then move its adoption.” Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention
Assembled at Philadelphia, in the year 1787, for the purpose of forming the
Constitution of the United States of America, by Robert Yates (1821), p. 163.

1 The word “ opened ” is substituted in the transcript for “ open.”

? The word “could” is substituted in the transcript for “did.”

* The word “of” is substituted in the transcript for “ which.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1787 163

but on the whole Globe, he was lost in the magnitude of the object.
The project of Henry the 4!* & his Statesmen was but the picture in
miniature of the great portrait to be exhibited. He was opposed to
an election by the State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons it
was necessary to observe the twofold relation in which the people
would stand. 1.1 as Citizens of the Gen! Govt 2.1 as Citizens of their
particular State. The Gen! Gov! was meant for them in the first
capacity: the State Gov in the second. Both Gov were derived
from the people—both meant for the people—both therefore ought to
be regulated on the same principles. The same train of ideas which
belonged to the relation of the Citizens to their State Gov't were
applicable to their relation to the Gen! Gov! and in forming the
latter, we ought to proceed, by abstracting as much as possible from
the idea of? State Gov's With respect to the province & objects? of
the Gen! Gov! they should be considered as having no existence. The
election of the 24 branch by the Legislatures, will introduce & cherish
local interests & local prejudices. The Gen! Gov! is not an assem-
blage of States, but of individuals for certain political purposes—
it is not meant for the States, but for the individuals composing
them ; the individuals therefore not the States, ought to be represented
in it: A proportion in this representation can be preserved in the 2?
as well as in the 1% branch; and the election can be made by electors
chosen by the people for that purpose. He moved an amendment to
that effect which was not seconded.

M: ELsEwortTH saw no reason for departing from the mode con-
tained in the Report. Whoever chooses the member, he will be a
Citizen of the State he is to represent & will feel the same spirit &
act the same part whether he be appointed by the people or the
Legislature. Every State has its particular views & prejudices,
which will find their way into the general councils, through what-
ever channel they may flow. Wisdom was one of the characteristics
which it was in contemplation to give the second branch. Would
not more of it issue from the Legislatures; than from an immediate
election by the people. He urged the necessity of maintaining the
existence & agency of the States. Without their co-operation it
would be impossible to support a Republican Gov! over so great an
extent of Country. An army could scarcely render it practicable.
The largest States are the worst Governed. Virg? is obliged to

 

1 The figure “1” is changed in the transcript to “ first,” and the figure “2”
to “and secondly.” :

2 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The word “objects” is used in the singular in the transcript.
164 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

acknowledge her incapacity to extend her Govt to Kentucky. Mas‘?
can not keep the peace one hundred miles from her capitol and is
now forming an army for its support. How long Pen? may be free
from a like situation can not be foreseen. If the principles & ma-
terials of our Gov' are not adequate to the extent of these single
States; how can it be imagined that they can support a single Govt
throughout the U. States. The only chance of supporting a Gen!
Gov! lies in engrafting* it on that? of the individual States.

Doct JoHNSON urged the necessity of preserving the State Gov®
which would be at the mercy of the Gen! Gov! on M! Wilson’s plan.

M: Mapison thought it wi? obviate difficulty if the present resol:
were postponed. & the 8! taken up, which is to fix the right of suf-
frage in the 2% branch.

Doc ® Wituiamson professed himself a friend to such a system as
would secure the existence of the State Gov The happiness of the
people depended on it. He was at a loss to give his vote as to the
Senate untill he knew the number of its members. In order to
ascertain this, he moved to insert these words‘ after ‘‘ 24 branch of
the Nat! Legislature ’’—®‘‘ who shall bear such proportion to the n?
of the 1% branch as 1 to .’ He was not seconded.

M: Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that an efficient
Gov! is necessary that to render it such it ought to have the faculty
of self-defence, that to render its different branches effectual each of
them ought to have the same power of self defence. He did not
wonder that such an agreement should have prevailed in * these points.
He only wondered that there should be any disagreement about the
necessity of allowing the State Gov® the same self-defence. If they
are to be preserved as he conceived to be essential, they certainly
ought to have this power, and the only mode left of giving it to
them, was by allowing them to appoint the 2% branch of the Nat!
Legislature.

M: Butter observing that we were put to difficulties at every
step by the uncertainty whether an equality or a ratio of representa-
tion w? prevail finally in the 2% branch, moved to postpone the 4

Resol: & to proceed to the? Resol: on that point. M: Mapison sec-
onded him.

 

* The word “grafting” is substituted in the transcript for “ engrafting.”
* The word “those” is substituted in the transcript for “that.”

*The word “Mr.” is substituted in the transcript for “ Docr”

‘ The words “these words” are omitted in the transcript. :

* The words “the words” are here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “on” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”

"The word “eighth” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1787 165

On the question

Mass no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. no. Mé¢
no. Vi ay. N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On a question to postpone the 4 and take up the 7. Resol: ays? —
Mar? V? N.C. S.C. Geo:—Noes* Mas. Ct N.Y. N. J. P? Del:?

On the question to agree ‘‘ that the members of the 2% branch be
chosen by the indiv! Legislatures ’’ Mas‘: ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay.
N. J. ay. P* no. Del. ay. M? ay. Vi no. N.C. ay. S.C. ay.
Geo. ay.* ¢

On a question on the clause requiring the age of 30 years at
least—’’ it was agreed to unanimously: ®

On a question to strike out—the words ‘‘ sufficient to ensure their
independency © ’’ after the word ‘‘ term ”’ it was agreed to.

* That the 2% branch hold their offices for ® term of seven years,®
considered

M: Guorvm suggests a term of ‘‘ 4 years,’ 14 to be elected every
year.

M: RanpouPH. supported the idea of rotation, as favorable to the
wisdom & stability of the Corps, which might possibly be always
sitting, and aiding the Executive. And moves after ‘‘ 7 years ’’ to
add, ‘‘ to go out in fixt proportion ’’ which was agreed to.

M! Wiiuiamson. suggests ‘‘ 6 years,’? as more convenient for
Rotation than 7 years.

M? SHERMAN seconds him.

M: Reep proposed that they s? hold their offices ‘‘ during good ”’
behaviour. M! R. Morris seconds him.

*It must be kept in view that the largest States particularly Pennsylvania
& Virginia always considered the choice of the 24 Branch by the State Legis-
Jatures as opposed to a proportional Representation to which they were attached
as a fundamental principle of just Government. The smaller States who had
opposite views, were reinforced by the members from the large States most
anxious to secure the importance of the State Governments.

 

+In the transcript the vote reads: “New York, Virginia, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, North Carolina, no-—7.”

? The word “ays” is omitted in the transcript.

*The word “noes” is omitted in the transcript; “aye—5” being inserted
after “Georgia” and “no—6” after “ Delaware.”

‘In the transcript this vote reads: “‘ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; Pennsylvania, Virginia, no—2.”

°' The words “agreed to unanimously ” are transposed in the transcript to
read “ unanimously agreed to.”

*The word “independency” is changed to “independence” in the tran-
script.

e The words “The clause” are here inserted in the transcript.
® The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.
166 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Gen! PinkNEY proposed “‘ 4 years.’’ A longer term? w? fix them
at the seat of Govt They wi acquire an interest there, perhaps
transfer their property & lose sight of the States they represent.
Under these circumstances the distant States w? labour under great
disadvantages.

M: Suerman moved to strike out ‘‘ 7 years’’ in order to take
questions on the several propositions.

On the question to strike out ‘‘ seven ’’

Mas!* ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pt no. Del. no. M?
div? V2 no. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

On the question to insert ‘‘ 6 years, which failed 5 St? being
ay. 5 no. & 1 divided

Mas’? no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del ay.
M3 div’ V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

On a motion to adjourn, the votes were 5 for 5 ag* it & 1 divided,
—Con. N.J. P? Del. V2? —ay.* Mass’ N.Y. N.C. S.C. Geo: no.*
Mary? divided. :

On the question for ‘‘ 5 years ’’ it was lost.

Mas® no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay.
M? div? V? ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo no5

. Adj¢

TuEsDAY. JUNE 26. In CONVENTION

The duration of the 24 branch * under consideration.

M! GHorum moved to fill the blank with ‘‘ six years,’ one third
of the members to go out every second year.

M: Witson 224 the motion.

Gen' PINKNEY opposed six years in favor of four years. The
States he said had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of
S. Carolina in particular were different from the Northern. If the

 

+The word “time” is substituted in the transcript for “term.”

? In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, no—3; Maryland, divided.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, aye—5; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—5; Maryland, divided.”

‘The figure “5” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, aye—5; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—5; Maryland, divided.”

° The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1787 167

Senators should be appointed for a long term, they w' settle in the
State where they exercised their functions; and would in a little
time be rather the representatives of that than of the State appoint®
them.

M: Reap mov? that the term be nine years. This w? admit of a
very convenient rotation, one third going out triennially. He w4
still prefer ‘‘ during good behaviour,’’ but being little supported in
that idea, he was willing to take the longest term that could be
obtained.

M: Broome 2%4 the motion.

M: Mapison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this
institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served
by it. These were first to protect the people ag%* their rulers:
secondly to protect the people ag%* the transient impressions into
which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a
temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before
them, on the plan of Gov! most likely to secure their happiness, would
first be aware, that those charg’ with the public happiness, might
betray their trust. An obvious precaution ag** this danger wi be
to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might
watch & check each other. In this they wi be governed by the same
prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate depart-
ments of Gov!, where all business liable to abuses is made to pass
thro’ separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It w! next
occur to such a people, that they themselves were liable to temporary
errors, thro’ want of information as to their true interest, and that
men chosen for a short term, & employed but a small portion of that
in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection
wi naturally suggest that the Gov! be so constituted, as that one of
its branches might have an opp? of acquiring a competent knowledge
of the public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people
on such an occasion, w! be that they themselves, as well as a numer-
ous body of Representatives, were liable to err also, from fickleness and
passion. A necessary fence ag% this danger would be to select a
portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness
might seasonably interpose ag* impetuous councils. It ought finally to
occur to a people deliberating on a Govt for themselves, that as differ-
ent interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured,
the major interest might under sudden impulses be tempted to commit
injustice on the minority. In all civilized Countries the people fall
into different classes hav? a real or supposed difference of interests.
There will be creditors & debtors, farmers, merch & manufacturers.
168 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

There will be particularly the distinction of rich & poor. It was true
as had been observ? [by M* Pinkney] we had not among us those
hereditary distinctions, of rank which were a great source of the
contests in the ancient Gov's.as well as the modern States of Europe,
nor those extremes of wealth or poverty which characterize the latter.
We cannot however be regarded even at this time, as one homogeneous
mass, in which every thing that affects a part will affect in the same
manner the whole. In framing a system which we wish to last for
ages, we sh? not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce.
An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion
of those who will labour under all the hardships of life, & secretly
sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in
time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of in-
digence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide
into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been
made in in this Country, but symtoms, of a leveling spirit, as we have
understood, have sufficiently appeared in a certain quarters to give
notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded ag* on
republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of interested
coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded ag**? Among other
means by the establishment of a body in the. Gov't sufficiently re-
spectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergences, the
preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into that scale.
Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed Govt
he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He
did not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any
real danger; but in pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he
should require that the long term allowed to the 2% branch should
not commence till such a period of life, as would render a per-
petual/ disqualification to be re-elected little inconvenient either in
a public or private view. He observed that as it was more than
probable we were now digesting a plan which in its operation wi
decide for ever the fate of Republican Govt we ought not only to
provide every guard to liberty that its preservation c? require, but
be equally careful to supply the defects which our own experience
had particularly pointed out.

M: SHERMAN. Gov! is instituted for those who live under it. It
ought therefore to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their
liberties. The more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Govt
Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the good behavior of
rulers. They also tend to give permanency to the Government, by
preserving that good behavior, because it ensures their re-election.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1787 169

In Connecticut elections have been very frequent, yet great stability
& uniformity both as to persons & measures have been experienced
from its original establishm' to the present time; a period of more
than 180 years. He wished to have provision made for steadiness
& wisdom in thé system to be adopted; but he thought six or four
years would be sufficient. He sh‘? be content with either.

M: Reap wished it to be considered by the small States that it was
their interest that we should become one people as much as possible;
that State attachments sh? be extinguished as much as possible; that
the Senate sh? be so constituted as to have the feelings of Citizens
of the whole.

M: Hamiuton. He did not mean to enter sueeiieies into the
subject. He concurred with M! Madison in thinking we were now to
decide for ever the fate of Republican Government; and that if we
did not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it would be dis-
graced & lost among ourselves, disgraced & lost to mankind for ever.
He acknowledged himself not to think favorably of Republican Gov-
ernment; but addressed his remarks to those who did think favor-
ably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their Government as
high as possible. He professed himself to be as zealous an advocate
for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted he should be as willing
a martyr to it though he differed as to the form in which it was
most eligible-——He concurred also in the general observations of [M!
Madison] on the subject, which might be supported by others if it
were necessary. It was certainly true: that nothing like an equality
of property existed: that an inequality would exist as long as liberty
existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very liberty
itself. This inequality of property constituted the great & funda-
mental distinction in Society. When the Tribunitial power had
levelled the boundary between the patricians & plebetans, what fol-
lowed? The distinction between rich & poor was substituted. He
meant not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose prin-
cipally to remark that [M: Sherman] seemed not to recollect
that one branch of the proposed Gov! was so formed, as to render
it particularly the guardians of the poorer orders of Citizens;
nor to have adverted to the true causes of the stability which had
been exemplified in Cont Under the British system as well as the
federal, many of the great powers appertaining to Gov! particularly
all those relating to foreign Nations were not in the hands of the
Gov! there. Their internal affairs also were extremely simple, owing
to sundry causes many of which were peculiar to that Country. Of
late the Goverm! had entirely given way to the people, and had in
170 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

fact suspended many of its ordinary functions in order to prevent
those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He asks
Mr: S. whether the State at this time, dare impose & collect a tax on y?®
people? To these causes & not to the frequency of elections, the effect,
as far as it existed ought to be chiefly ascribed.

M: Gerry. wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a
permanent Gov't All aim at the same end, but there are great dif-
ferences as to the means. One circumstance He thought should be
carefully attended to. There were not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens
who were not ag%t every approach towards Monarchy. Will they
ever agree to a plan which seems to make such an approach. The
Convention ought to be extremely cautious in what they hold out to
the people. Whatever plan may be proposed will be espoused with
warmth by many out of respect to the quarter it proceeds from
as well as from an approbation of the plan itself. And if the plan
should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent opposition, it is easy
to foresee that discord & confusion will ensue, and it is even pos-
sible that we may become a prey to foreign powers. He did not
deny the position of M™ Madison, that the majority will generally
violate justice when they have an interest in so doing; But did not
think there was any such temptation in this Country. Our situation
was different from that of G. Britain: and the great body of lands yet
to be parcelled out & settled would very much prolong the difference.
Notwithstanding the symtoms of injustice which had marked many
of our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to leave
hopes, that there would be a sufficient sense of justice & virtue for
the purpose of Gov! He admitted the evils arising from a frequency
of elections: and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four
or five years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would
be adopted by the people.

M: Witson did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others,
but w? add an observation or two which he believed had not yet
been suggested. Every nation may be regarded in two relations
12 to its own citizens. 21 to foreign nations. It is therefore not
only liable to anarchy & tyranny within, but has wars to avoid &
treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably be the
depositary of the powers concerning the latter objects. It ought
therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign Nations. The
true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty
with us has been, because she had no confidence in the stability or

 

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “secondly ” in the
transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1787 171

efficacy of our Government. 9 years with a rotation, will provide
these desirable qualities; and give our Gov! an advantage in this
respect over Monarchy itself. In a monarchy much must always
depend on the temper of the man. In such a body, the personal
character will be lost in the political. He w4 add another observa-
tion. The popular objection agst appointing any public body for a
long term was that it might by gradual encroachments prolong itself
first into a body for life, and finally become a hereditary one. It
would be a satisfactory answer to this objection that as % would
go out triennially, there would be always three divisions holding
their places for unequal terms, and consequently acting under the
influence of different views, and different impulses—On the question
for 9 years, % to go out triennially

Mass* no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay.
Mino. V2 ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

On the question for 6 years % to go out biennially

Mass’ ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P* ay. Del. ay.
M4 ay. Veay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no?

+<™Mo receive fixt stipends by which they may be compensated
for their services.’’ 5 considered

General PINKNEY proposed ‘‘ that no Salary should be allowed.”’
‘As this [the Senatorial] branch was meant to represent the wealth
of the Country, it ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and
if no allowance was to be made the wealthy alone would undertake
the service. He moved to strike out the clause.

Doct! FRANKLIN seconded the motion. He wished the Convention
to stand fair with the people. There were in it a number of young
men who would probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appoint-
ments should be recommended we might be chargeable with having
carved out places for ourselves. On the question, Mas* Connecti-
cut * P? M3 S. Carolina ay.? N.Y. N.J. Del. Virg? N.C. Geo. no.8

* Quer. whether Connecticut should not be—no, & Delaware, ay.®

 

1The word “times” is substituted in the transcript for “terms.”

2In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,
aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

3In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye—7; New York, New
Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no—4.”

*The words “The clause of the fourth Resolution ” are here inserted in the
transcript.

5 The word “ being” is here inserted in the transcript.

* An interrogation mark and the initials “J.M.” are here inserted in the
transcript. According to the Journal, Connecticut was “ay” and Delaware “ no.”

7 The figure “5” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The figure “6” is here inserted in the transcript.
172 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M= WILLIAMSON moved to change the expression into these words
towit ‘‘ to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to
the public Service.’’ The motion was seconded by M! Elseworth. And
was! agreed to by all the States except S. Carol? It seemed to be
meant only to get rid of the word “‘ fixt ’’ and leave greater room for
modifying the provision on this point.

M: ELSEworTH moved to strike out ‘‘ to be paid out of the
nati! Treasury ’’ and insert ‘‘ to be paid by their respective States.’’
If the Senate was meant to strengthen the Gov‘ it ought to have the
confidence of the States. The States will have an interest in keeping
up a representation, and will make such provision for supporting the
members as will ensure their attendance.

M: Mapison considered this? a departure from a fundamental
principle, and subverting the end intended by allowing the Senate a
duration of 6 years. They would if this motion should be agreed
to, hold their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of the
State Legislatures. One great end of the institution was, that being
a firm, wise and impartial body, it might not only give stability
to the Gen! Gov! in its operations on individuals, but hold an even
balance among different States. The motion would make the Senate
like Congress, the mere Agents & Advocates of State interests &
views, instead of being the impartial umpires & Guardians of justice
and* general Good. Cong? had lately by the establishment of a
board with full powers to decide on the mutual claims be- between the
U. States & the individual States, fairly acknowledged themselves to
be unfit for discharging this part of the business referred to them
by the Confederation.

M: Dayton considered the payment of the Senate by the States
as fatal to their independence. he was decided for paying them out
of the Nat! Treasury.

On the question for payment of the Senate to be left to the
States as moved by M! Elseworth.+

Mass no. Conf ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P® no. Del. no.
Mino. V? no. N.C. no. §. 0. ay. Geo. ay.®

Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion, but to hint
an idea which seemed to be proper for consideration. One impor-

 

* The word “was” is omitted in the transcript.

? The word “as” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “ the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The phrase “ it passed in the negative” is here inserted in the transcript.
°In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,

South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania Del Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, no—6.” . 2 rad om
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1787 173

tant object in constituting the Senate was to secure the rights of
property. To give them weight & firmness for this purpose, a con-
siderable duration in office was thought necessary. But a longer
term than 6 years, would be of no avail in this respect, if needy
persons should be appointed. He suggested therefore the propriety
of annexing to the office a qualification of property. He thought
this would be very practicable; as the rules of taxation would supply
a scale for measuring the degree of wealth possessed by every man.

A question was then taken whether the words ‘‘ to be paid out
of the public? treasury,’’ should stand.”’’

Mass* ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P® ay. Del. ay.
Mi ay. V? ay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

M: Butter moved to strike out the ineligibility of Senators to
State offices.

M: Wru1aMson seconded the motion.

Mt Witson remarked the additional dependence this w‘ create
in the Senators on the States. The longer the time he observed
allotted to the officer, the more compleat will be the dependance, if it
exists at all.

Gen! PinKNEY was for making the States as much as could be
conveniently done, a part of the Gen! Govi: If the Senate was to be
appointed by the States, it ought in pursuance of the same idea to
be paid by the States: and the States ought not to be barred from
the opportunity of calling members of it into offices at home. Such a
restriction would also discourage the ablest men from going into the
Senate.

M! WriaMson moved a resolution so penned as to admit of the
two following questions. 1.8 whether the members of the Senate should
be ineligible to & incapable of holding offices under the U. States

2.3 Whether &e. under the particular States.

On the Question to postpone in order to consider* Williamson’s
Resol? Mas no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P* ay. Del. ay.
Mé ay. Viay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.®

ME Gerry & M" Mapison—move to add to M* Williamsons 1,*
Quest: ‘‘ and for 1 year thereafter.’’ On this amend:

 

1 The word “public” is changed to “national” in the transcript.

2 In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “secondly” in the
transcript.

«The word “Mr.” is here inserted in the transcript.

5In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Massa-
chusetts, New York, New Jersey, no—3.”
174 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Mas? no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P. no. Del. ay.
Méay. Viay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.

On M! Will-son’s 1 Question as amend** vz. inelig: & incapable
&e. & for 1 year &e. ag? unanimously.

On the 2.° question as to ineligibility &c. to State offices.*

Mas. ay. Ctno. N.Y. no. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. no. M? no.
Ve ay. N.C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.®

The 5.¢ Resol: ‘‘ that each branch have the right of originating
acts ’’ was agreed to nem: con:

Adj?

WEDNESDAY JUNE 27. IN CONVENTION

M: RutiweEe moved to postpone the 6" Resolution, defining the
powers of Cong’ in order to take up the 7 & 8 which involved the
most fundamental points; the rules of suffrage in the 2 branches
which was agreed to nem. con.

A question being proposed on Resol: 77: declaring that the suf-
frage in the first branch s* be according to an equitable ratio.

MM L. Martin contended at great length and with great eagerness
that the General Govt was meant merely to preserve the State
Govern®: not to govern individuals: that its powers ought to be
kept within narrow limits; that if too little power was given to it,
more might be added; but that if too much, it could never be re-
sumed: that individuals as such have little to do but with their own
States; that the Gen! Gov! has no more to apprehend from the States
composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures, that®
a Govt over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects: that to
resort to the Citizens at large for their sanction to a new Governt will
be throwing them back into a State of Nature: that the dissolution
of the State Gov is involved in the nature of the process: that the

 

+In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—7; Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no—4.”

? The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The figure “2” is changed to “second ” in the transcript.

‘The transcript italicizes the words “ State offices.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
aye—3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

° The figure “5” is changed to “ fifth” in the transcript.

"The words “the seventh Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
for “Resol: 7.”

* The word “than” is substituted in the transcript for “ that.”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 1787 175

people have no right to do this without the consent of those to whom
they have delegated their power for State purposes: through their
tongue only they can speak, through their ears, only, can hear: that
the States have shewn a good disposition to comply with the Acts, of
Cong*. weak, contemptibly weak as that body has been; and have
failed through inability alone to comply: that the heaviness of the
private debts, and the waste of property during the war, were the
chief causes of this inability: that he did not conceive the instances
mentioned by M*: Madison of compacts between V? & M® between
P? & N. J. or of troops raised by Mass'* for defence against the Rebels,
to be violations of the articles of confederation—that an equal vote in
each State was essential to the federal idea, and was founded in justice
& freedom, not merely in policy: that tho’ the States may give up this
right of sovereignty, yet they had not, and ought not: that the States
like individuals were in a State of nature equally sovereign & free. In
order to prove that individuals in a State of nature are equally free
& independent he read passages from Lovtke, Vattel, Lord Summers—
Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with States till they sur-
render their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke &
Vattel, and also Rutherford: that the States being equal cannot treat
or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes without giving
up their liberty: that the propositions on the table were a system
of slavery for 10 States: that as V? Mass & P* have *%o of the votes
they can do as they please without a miraculous Union of the other
ten: that they will have nothing to do, but to gain over one of the
ten to make them compleat masters of the rest: that they can then
appoint an Execut? & Judiciary & legislate? for them as they please:
that there was & would continue a natural predilection & partiality
in men for their own States; that the States, particularly the smaller,
would never allow a negative to be exercised over their laws: that
no State in ratifying the Confederation had objected to the equality
of votes; that the complaints at present run not ag* this equality
but the want of power; that 16 members from V* would be more
likely to act in concert than a like number formed of members from
different States; that instead of a junction of the small States as a
remedy, he thought a division of the large States would be more
eligible-——This was the substance of a speech which was continued
more than three hours. He was too much exhausted he said to
finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he should tomorrow,
resume them.
Adjf

?The word “ legislature ” is substituted in the transcript for “legislate.”

 
176 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

THURSDAY JUNE 28T2 in CONVENTION

M L. Martin resumed his discourse, contending that the Gen!
Govt ought to be formed for the States, not for individuals: that
if the States were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of
people, it would be the same thing whether their representatives
were chosen by the Legislatures or the people; the smaller States
would be equally enslaved; that if the large States have the same
interest with the smaller as was urged, there could be no danger in
giving them an equal vote; they would not injure themselves, and
they could not injure the large ones on that supposition without
injuring themselves and if the interests, were not the same, the
inequality of suffrage wi be dangerous to the smaller States: that it
will be in vain to propose any plan offensive to the rulers of the
States, whose influence over the people will certainly prevent their
adopting it: that the large States were weak at present in proportion
to their extent: & could only be made formidable to the small ones,
by the weight of their votes; that in case a dissolution of the Union
should take place, the small States would have nothing to fear from
their power; that if in such a case the three great States should
league themselves together, the other ten could do so too: & that he
had rather see partial confederacies take place, than the plan on
the table.

This was the substance of the residue of his discourse which was
delivered with much diffuseness & considerable vehemence.

M: Lansina & M! Dayton moved to strike out ‘‘not.’’ so that
the 7 art: might read that the rights? of suffrage in the 1% branch
ought to be according to the rule established by the Confederation.”’

M' Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question might not
be put till tomorrow; Govern’ Livingston being kept away by in-
disposition, and the representation of N. Jersey thereby suspended.

M? Wiutamson. thought that if any political truth could be
grounded on mathematical demonstration, it was that if the States
were equally sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of
sovereignty, that they would remain equally sovereign. He could
not comprehend how the smaller States would be injured in the
case, and wished some Gentleman would vouchsafe a solution of it.
He observed that the small States, if they had a plurality of votes
would have an interest in throwing the burdens off their own shoul-

 

* The transcript uses the word “rights” in the singular.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 1787 177

ders on those of the large ones. He begged that the expected addi-
tion of new States from the Westward might be kept in? view. They
would be small States, they would be poor States, they would be
unable to pay in proportion to their numbers; their distance from
market rendering the produce of their labour less valuable; they
would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying
burdens on commerce & consumption which would fall with greatest ?
weight on the old States.

M= Mapison, s? he was much disposed to concur in any expedient
not inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the
difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither
be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor * necessary for
the safety of the small States ag** the large States. That it was
not just, had been conceded by M: Breerly & Mt Patterson themselves.
The expedient proposed by them was a new partition of the territory
of the U. States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the
equality of Sovereign States in the formation of compacts, lay in
confounding mere Treaties, in which were specified certain duties to.
which the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which their
subjects were to be reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with
a compact by which an authority was created paramount to the
parties, & making laws for the government of them. If France, Eng-
land & Spain were to enter into a Treaty for the regulation of com-
merce &c with the Prince of Monacho & 4 or 5 other of the smallest
sovereigns of Europe, they would not hesitate to treat as equals,
and to make the regulations perfectly reciprocal. W4 the case be
the same, if a Council were to be formed of deputies from each
with authority and discretion, to raise money, levy troops, determine
the value of coin &¢? Would 30 or 40. million* of people submit
their fortunes into the hands, of a few thousands? If they did it
would only prove that they expected more from the terror of their
superior force, than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble
associates. Why are Counties of the same states represented in
proportion to their numbers? Is it because the representatives are
chosen by the people themselves? So will be the representatives in
the Nation! Legislature. Is it because, the larger have more at stake
than the smaller? The case will be the same with the larger &
smaller States. Is it because the laws are to operate immediately

 

1 The words “taken into” are substituted in the transcript for “kept in.”
2 The word “greater” is substituted in the transcript for “ greatest.”

®* The words “that it was” are here inserted in the transcript.

«The transcript uses the word “million” in the plural.
178 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

on their persons & properties? The same is the case in some degree
as the articles of confederation stand; the same will be the case in
a far greater degree under the plan proposed to be substituted. In
the cases of captures, of piracies, and of offences in a federal army;
the property & persons of individuals depend on the laws of Cong’
By the plan proposed a compleat power of taxation, the highest
prerogative of supremacy is proposed to be vested in the National
Govt Many other powers are added which assimilate it to the Gov!
of individual States. The negative proposed on the State laws, will
make it an essential branch of the State Legislatures & of course will
require that it should be exercised by a body established on like prin-
ciples with the other + branches of those Legislatures.—That it is not
necessary to secure the small States ag%t the large ones he conceived
to be equally obvious: Was a combination of the large ones dreaded?
this must arise either from some interest common to V? Mas® & P?
& distinguishing them from the other States or from the mere cir-
cumstance of similarity of size. Did any such common interest exist?
In point of situation they could not have been more effectually
separated from each other by the most jealous citizen of the most
jealous State. In point of manners, Religion, and the other cir-
cumstances which sometimes beget affection between different com-
munities, they were not more assimilated than the other States—In
point of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as any three
other States in the Union. The Staple of Mas® was fish, of P?
flower, of V? Tob? Was a combination to be apprehended from the
mere circumstance of equality of size? Experience suggested no
such danger. The journals of Cong? did not present any peculiar
association of these States in the votes recorded. It had never been
seen that different Counties in the same State, conformable in ex-
tent, but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a propensity
to such Aombinations. Experience rather taught a contrary lesson.
Among individuals of superior eminence & weight in Society, rival-
ships were much more frequent than coalitions. Among independent
nations, pre-eminent over their neighbours, the same remark was
verified. Carthage & Rome tore one another to pieces instead of unit-
ing their forces to devour the weaker nations of the Earth. The
Houses of Austria & France were hostile as long as they remained
the greatest powers of Europe. England & France have succeeded
to the pre-eminence & to the enmity. To this principle we owe
perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those powers would have

 

1 The word “ other” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 1787 179

been fatal to us. Among the principal members of antient & Modern
confederacies, we find the same effect from the same cause. The con-
tintions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens & Thebes, proved fatal
to the smaller members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. The con-
tentions, not the combinations of Prussia & Austria, have distracted
& oppressed the Germanict empire. Were the large States formidable
singly to their smaller neighbours? On this supposition the latter
ought to wish for such a general Gov‘ as will operate with equal
energy on the former as on themselves. The more lax the band,
the more liberty the larger will have to avail themselves of their
superior force. Here again Experience was an instructive monitor.
What is y° situation of the weak compared with the strong in those
stages of civilization in which the violence of individuals is least
controuled by an efficient Government? The Heroic period of Antient
Greece the feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe, the
existing condition of the American Savages, answer this question.
What is the situation of the minor sovereigns in the great society
of independent nations, in which the more powerful are under no
controul but the nominal authority of the law of Nations? Is not
the danger to the former exactly in proportion to their weakness.
But there are cases still more in point. What was the condition of
the weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. Plutarch
[? life of Themistocles] will inform us that it happened but too often
that the strongest cities corrupted & awed the weaker, and that
Judgment went in favor of the more powerful party. What is the
condition of the lesser states in the German Confederacy? We all
know that they are exceedingly trampled upon; and that they owe
their safety as far as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting them-
selves, under the rival banners of the pre-eminent members, partly to
alliances with neighbouring Princes which the Constitution of the
Empire does not prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax
system of the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains about % the
people, supplies about 14 of ? the money, and by her influence, silently
& indirectly governs the whole republic. In a word; the two extremes
before us are a perfect separation & a perfect incorporation, of the
13 States. In the first case they would be independent nations sub-
ject to no law, but the law of nations. In the last, they would be
mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one common law.
In the first case the smaller States would have every thing to fear

 

1The word “German” is substituted in the transcript for “Germanic.”
2The word “see” is here inserted in the transcript.
®The word “of” is omitted in the transcript.
180 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

from the larger. In the last they would have nothing to fear. The
true policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting those
principles & that form of Gov! which will most approximate the
States to the condition of counties. Another consideration may be
added. If the Gen! Gov! be feeble, the large States distrusting its
continuance, and foreseeing that their importance & security may
depend on their own size & strength, will never submit to a partition.
Give to the Gen! Gov! sufficient energy & permanency, & you remove
the objection. Gradual partitions of the large, & junctions of the
small States will be facilitated, and time may effect that equalization,
which is wished for by the small States now, but can never be accom-
plished at once.

M: Wrson. The leading argument of those who contend for
equality of votes among the States is that the States as such being
equal, and being represented not as districts of individuals, but in
their political & corporate capacities, are entitled to an equality of
suffrage. According to this mode of reasoning the representation
of the boroughs in Eng!* which has been allowed on all hands to
be the rotten part of the Constitution, is perfectly right & proper.
They are like the States represented in their corporate capacity
like the States therefore they are entitled to equal voices, old Sarum to
as many as London. And instead of the injury supposed hitherto
to be done to London, the true ground of complaint lies with old
Sarum: for London instead of two which is her proper share, sends
four representatives to Parliament.

M: SHerman. The question is not what rights naturally belong
to men?; but how they may be most equally & effectually guarded in
Society. And if some give up more than others in order to attain?
this end, there can be no room for complaint. To do otherwise, to
require an equal concession from all, if it would create danger to
the rights of some, would be sacrificing the end to the means. The
rich man who enters into Society along with the poor man, gives
up more than the poor man, yet with an equal vote he is equally safe.
Were he to have more votes than the poor man in proportion to his
superior stake, the rights of the poor man would immediately cease
to be secure. This consideration prevailed when the articles of Con-
federation were formed.

The determination of the question from® striking out the word
** not ’’ was put off till tomorrow at the request of the Deputies of

 

+The word “ men” is used in the singular in the transcript.
? The word “obtain” is substituted in the transcript for “attain.”
* The word “from” is changed to “for” in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 1787 181

N. York. See opposite page & insert the Speech of Doct F in this
place.t

M President

The small progress we have made after 4 or five weeks close
attendance & continual reasonings with each other—our different
sentiments on almost every question, several of the last producing as
many noes as ays, is methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection
of the Human Understanding. We indeed seem to feel our own want
of political wisdom, since we have been running about in search of it.
We have gone back to ancient history for models of Government, and
examined the different forms of those Republics which having been
formed with the seeds of their own dissolution now no longer exist.
And we have viewed Modern States all round Europe, but find none of
their Constitutions suitable to our circumstances.

In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it were in the dark
to find political truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when pre-
sented to us, how has it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once
thought of humbly applying to the Father of lights to illuminate our
understandings? In the beginning of the Contest with G. Britain,
when we were sensible of danger we had daily prayer in this room
for the divine protection.—Our prayers, Sir, were heard, & they were
graciously answered. All of us who were engaged in the struggle
must have observed frequent instances of a superintending provi-
dence in our favor. To that kind providence we owe this happy
opportunity of consulting in peace on the means of establishing our
future national felicity. And have we now forgotten that powerful
friend? or do we imagine that we no longer need his assistance?
I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more convine-
ing proofs I see of this truth—that God Governs in the affairs of men.
And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it
probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have been
assured, Sir, in the sacred writings, that ‘‘ except the Lord build
the House they labour in vain that build it.’’ I firmly believe this;
and I also believe that without his concurring aid we shall succeed
in this political building no better, than the Builders of Babel:
We shall be divided by our little partial local interests; our projects
will be confounded, and we ourselves shall become a reproach and
bye word down to future ages. And what is worse, mankind may
hereafter from this unfortunate instance, despair of establishing

 

1Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript and the words “ Doctor
Franklin” are inserted.

,
182 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Governments by Human wisdom and leave it to chance, war and
conquest.

I therefore beg leave to move—that henceforth prayers imploring
the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be
held in this Assembly every morning before we proceed to business,
and that one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to
officiate in that Service—

M: SHarmMan seconded the motion.

M: Hamitton & several others expressed their apprehensions that
however proper such a resolution might have been at the beginning
of the convention, it might at this late day, 1.1 bring on it some dis-
agreeable animadversions. & 2.7 lead the public to believe that the
embarrassments and dissensions within the Convention, had suggested
this measure. It was answered by Doc! F. M: Suerman & others,
that the past omission of a duty could not justify a further omis-
sion—that the rejection of such a proposition would expose the Con-
vention to more unpleasant animadversions than the adoption of it:
and that the alarm out of doors that might be excited for the state
of things within, would at least be as likely to do good as ill.

M: Wrtuiamson, observed that the true cause of the omission
could not be mistaken. The Convention had no funds.

M: RaNDoLPH proposed in order to give a favorable aspect to
y° measure, that a sermon be preached at the request of the convention
on? 4% of July, the aniversary of Independence; & thenceforward
prayers be used * in y? Convention every morning. D! FRANK? 2%4
this motion After several unsuccessful attempts for silently post-
poning the® matter by adjourn? the adjournment was at length car-
ried, without any vote on the motion.

Fray JuNE 29T! iw ConvENTION

Doct! Jounson. The controversy must be endless whilst Gentle-
men differ in the grounds of their arguments; Those on one side con-
sidering the States as districts of people composing one political
Society; those on the other considering them as so many political

* The figure “1” is changed to “in the first place” in the transcript.
> The figure “2” is changed to “in the second place” in the transcript.
* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
a“ The words “&ce to be read” are substituted in the transcript for “be
used.” ;
° The word “this” is substituted in the transcript for “ the.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1787 183

societies. The fact is that the States do exist as political Societies,
and a Gov! is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as
well as for the individuals composing them. Does it not seem to
follow, that if the States as such are to exist they must be armed
with some power of self-defence. This is the idea of [Col. Mason]
who appears to have looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides
the Aristocratic and other interests, which ought to have the means
of defending themselves, the States have their interests as such, and
are equally entitled to likes means. On the whole he thought that as
in some respects the States are to be considered in their political
capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens, the two
ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each
other, ought to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought to
be represented ; in the other the States.

M: Guorum. The States as now confederated have no doubt a
right to refuse to be consolidated, or to be formed into any new
system. But he wished the small States which seemed most ready
to object, to consider which are to give up most, they or the larger
ones. He conceived that a rupture of the Union wi be an event
uphappy for all, but surely the large States would be least unable
to take care of themselves, and to make connections with one another.
The weak therefore were most interested in establishing some general
system for maintaining order. If among individuals, composed
partly of weak, and partly of strong, the former most need the pro-
tection of law & Government, the case is exactly the same with
weak & powerful States. What would be the situation of Delaware
(for these things he found must be spoken out, & it might as well be
done? first as last) what w® be the situation of Delaware in case
of a separation of the States? Would she not lie? at the mercy of
Pennsylvania? would not her true interest lie in being consolidated
with her, and ought she not now to wish for such a union with P?
under one Govt as will put it out of the power of Pen* to oppress
her? Nothing can be more ideal than the danger apprehended by
the States, from their being formed into one nation. Mass‘: was
originally three colonies, viz old Mass‘? Plymouth—& the province
of Mayne. These apprehensions existed then. An incorporation
took place; all parties were safe & satisfied; and every distinction is
now forgotten. The case was similar with Connecticut & Newhaven.
The dread of union was reciprocal; the consequence of it equally
salutary and satisfactory. In like manner N. Jersey has been made

 

1The word “at” is here inserted in the transcript.
? The word “be” is substituted in the transcript for “lie.”
184 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

one society out of two parts. Should a separation of the States
take place, the fate of N. Jersey w* be worst of all. She has no
foreign commerce & can have but little. P* & N. York will continue
to levy taxes on her consumption. If she consults her interest she
w! beg of all things to be annihilated. The apprehensions of the
small States ought to be appeased by another reflection. Mass‘: will
be divided. The province of Maine, is already considered as ap-
proaching the term of its annexation to it; and P? will probably not
increase, considering the present state of her population, & other
events that may happen. On the whole he considered a Union of
the States as necessary to their happiness, & a firm Gen! Gov! as
necessary to their Union. He sh? consider it as? his duty if his col-
leagues viewed the matter in the same light he did to stay here as
long as any other State would remain with them, in order to agree
on some plan that could with propriety be recommended to the people.

M: Exvsworrtsu, did not despair. He still trusted that some good
plan of Gov! w4 be divised & adopted. |

M: Reap. He sh‘ have no objection to the system if it were truly
national, but it has too much of a federal mixture in it. The little
States he thought had not much to fear. He suspected that the large
States felt their want of energy, & wished for a Gen! Gov! to supply
the defect. Mass‘* was evidently labouring under her weakness and
he believed Delaware w? not be in much danger if in her neighbour-
hood. Delaware had enjoyed tranquility & he flattered himself w
continue to do so. He was not however so selfish as not to wish for
a good Gen! Govt In order to obtain one the whole States must be
incorporated. If the States remain, the representatives of the large
ones will stick together, and carry every thing before them. The
Executive also will be chosen under the influence of this partiality,
and will betray it in his administration. These jealousies are in-
separable from the scheme of leaving the States in existence. They
must be done away. The ungranted lands also which have been
assumed by particular States must also? be given up. He repeated
his approbation of the plan of M! Hamilton, & wished it to be sub-
stituted in place of * that on the table.

M: Mapison agreed with Doc! Johnson, that the mixed nature of
the Gov! ought to be kept in view; but thought too much stress was
laid on the rank of the States as political societies. There was a
gradation, he observed from the smallest corporation, with the most

 

>The word ‘“‘as” is omitted in the transcript.
* The word “also” is stricken out in the transcript.
*The word “for” is substituted in the transcript for “in place of.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1787 185

limited powers, to the largest empire with the most perfect sov-
ereignty. He pointed out the limitations on the sovereignty of the
States, as now confederated their laws in relation to the paramount
law of the Confederacy were analogous to that of bye laws to the
supreme law within a State. Under the proposed Gov! the powers
of the States will be much farther reduced. According to the views
of every member, the Gen! Gov! will have powers far beyond those
exercised by the British Parliament, when the States were part of
the British Empire. It will in particular have the power, without
the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money directly on? the
people themselves; and therefore not to divest such unequal portions
of the people as composed the several States, of an equal voice, would
subject the system to the reproaches & evils which have resulted from
the vicious representation in G. B.

He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to
renounce a principle w*" was confessedly unjust, which ci never be
admitted, &? if admitted must infuse mortality into a Constitution
which we wished to last forever. He prayed them to ponder well
the conséquences of suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It
had been s‘ that the want of energy in the large states w’ be a security
to the small. It was forgotten that this want of energy proceeded
from the supposed security of the States ag%t all external danger.
Let each state depend on itself for its security, & let apprehensions
arise arise of danger, from distant powers or from neighbouring States,
& the languishing condition of all the States, large as well as small,
_w? soon be transformed into vigorous & high toned Gov’ His great
fear was that their Gov® w? then have too much energy, that these ®
might not only be formidable in the large to the small States, but
fatal to the internal liberty of all. The same causes which have
rendered the old world the Theatre of incessant wars, & have ban-
ished liberty from the face of it, wi soon produce the same effects
here. The weakness & jealousy of the small States w4 quickly in-
troduce some regular military force ag sudden danger from their
powerful neighbours. The example w‘ be followed by others, and
w* soon become universal. In time of actual war, great discretionary
powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant
apprehension of war, has the same tendency to render the head too
large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown

 

1The word “from” is substituted in the transcript for “ on.”
2 The word “ which” is here inserted in the transeript.
° The word “these” is stricken out in the transcript and “this” is written

above it.
186 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of
defence agst foreign danger, have been always the instruments of
tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to
excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all
Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have
enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable, whether the best
concerted system of absolute power in Europe c? maintain itself, in
a situation, where no alarms of external danger ct tame the people
to the domestic yoke. The insular situation of G. Britain was the
principal cause of her being an exception to the general fate of
Europe. It has rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a
kind of defence w® ec? not be used for the purpose of oppression.—
These consequences he conceived ought to be apprehended whether
the States should run into a total separation from each other, or sh?
enter into partial confederacies. Either event wi be truly deplorable;
& those who might be accessary to either, could never be forgiven by
their Country, nor by themselves.

*M! Hami.ton observed that individuals forming political So-
cieties modify their rights differently, with regard to suffrage. Ex-
amples of it are found in all the States. Im all of them some
individuals are deprived of the right altogether, not having the
requisite qualification of property. In some of the States the right
of suffrage is allowed in some cases and refused in others. To vote
for a member in one branch, a certain quantum of property, to vote
for a member in another branch of the Legislature, a higher quan-
tum of property is required. In like manner States may modify their
right of suffrage differently, the larger exercising a larger, the
smaller a smaller share of it. But as States are a collection of in-
dividual men which ought we to respect most, the rights of the
people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from
the composition. Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd
than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been s? that if the
smaller States renounce their equality, they renounce at the same
time their liberty. The truth is it is a contest for power, not for
liberty. Will the men composing the small States be less free than
those composing the larger. The State of Delaware having 40,000
souls will lose? power, if she has Yo only of the votes allowed to P?
having 400,000: but will the people of Del: be less free, if each citizen

* From this date he was absent till the of *

 

>The date, “13th of August,” is supplied in the transcript.
2 The transcript does not italicize the word “lose.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1787 187

has an equal vote with each citizen of P? He admitted that common
residence within the same State would produce a certain degree of
attachment; and that this principle might have a certain influence
in! public affairs. He thought however that this might by some pre-
cautions be in a great measure excluded: and that no material in-
convenience could result from it, as there could not be any ground
for combination among the States whose influence was most dreaded.
The only considerable distinction of interests, lay between the carry-
ing & non-carrying States, which divide? instead of uniting the larg-
est States. No considerable inconvenience had been found from the
division of the State of N. York into different districts of different
sizes.

Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the
establishment of partial confederacies, had been been pointed out. He
would add another of a most serious nature. Alliances will imme-
diately be formed with different rival & hostile nations of Europes,
who will foment disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties
to all their own quarrels. Foreign Nations having American domin-
ions* are & must be jealous of us. Their representatives betray the
utmost anxiety for our fate, & for the result of this meeting, which
must have an essential influence on it.—It had been said that respect-
ability in the eyes of foreign Nations was not the object at which
we aimed; that the proper object of republican Government was
domestic tranquility & happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No
Governm: could give us tranquility & happiness at home, which
did not possess sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable
abroad. This was the critical moment for forming such a Govern-
ment. We should run every risk in trusting to future amendments.
As yet we retain the habits of union. We are weak & sensible of
our weakness. Henceforward the motives will become feebler, and
the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we were* now here
exercising our tranquil & free deliberations on the subject. It would
be madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must
obstruct a reproduction of them.

M: Pierce considered the equality of votes under the Confedera-
tion as the great source of the public difficulties. The members of
Cong? were advocates for local advantages. State distinctions must
be sacrificed as far as the general good required, but without destroy-

 

1The word “on” is substituted in the transcript for “ in.”

2 The word “ divides” is substituted in the transcript for “ divide.”
* The transcript uses the word “dominions” in the singular.

The word “are” is substituted in the transcript for “ were.”
188 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ing the States. Tho’ from a small State he felt himself a Citizen of
the U. S.

M! Gerry, urged that we never were independent States, were not
such now, & never could be even on the principles of the Confedera-
tion. The States & the advocates for them were intoxicated with the
idea of their sovereignty. He was a member of Congress at the time
the federal articles were formed. The injustice of allowing each
State an equal vote was long insisted on. He voted for it, but it
was ags* his Judgment, and under the pressure of public danger, and
the obstinacy of the lesser States. The present confederation he
considered as dissolving. The fate of the Union will be decided by
the Convention. If they do not agree on something, few delegates
will probably be appointed to Cong? If they do Cong? will probably
be kept up till the new System should be adopted. He lamented
that instead of coming here like a band of brothers, belonging to the
same family, we seemed to have brought with us the spirit of political
negociators.

M: L. Martin. remarked that the language of the States being
sovereign & independent, was once familiar & understood; though it
seemed now so strange & obscure. He read those passages in the
articles of Confederation, which describe them in that language.

On the question as moved by M' Lansing. Shall the word ‘‘ not ”’
be struck out.

Mass‘s no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P% no. Del. ay. Mi?
div’ V? no. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.

On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, ‘‘ that the rule
of suffrage in the 1% branch ought not to be according to that
established by the articles of ? Confederation.

Mass. ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M?
divi Vt ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

Doct Jonnson & M!? ELsewortH moved to postpone the residue of
the clause, & take up—y? 8—Resol:

On? question.

Mas. no. Cont ay. N. Yay. N. J. ay. Ptay. Del. no. May.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

+In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, aye_4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—6; Maryland, divided.”

? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: ‘“‘ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, no—4; Maryland, divided.” .

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; Massachusetts, Delaware, no—2.”

 
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1787 189

M: EvsEewortH moved that the rule of suffrage in the 24 branch
be the same with that established by the articles of confedera-
tion.’? He was not sorry on the whole he said that the vote just
passed, had determined against this rule in the first branch. He
hoped it would become a ground of compromise with regard to the
2? branch. We were partly national; partly federal. The propor-
tional representation in the first branch was conformable to the
national principle & would secure the large States ag’t the small.
An equality of voices was conformable to the federal principle and
Was necessary to secure the Small States ag* the large. He trusted
that on this middle ground a compromise would take place. He did
not see that it could on any other. And if no compromise should
take place, our meeting would not only be in vain but worse than in
vain. To the Eastward he was sure Mass'* was the only State that.
would listen to a proposition for excluding the States as equal political
Societies, from an equal voice in both branches. The others would
risk every consequence rather than part with so dear a right. An
attempt to deprive them of it, was at once cutting the body of
America in two, and as he supposed would be the case, somewhere
about this part of it. The large States he conceived would notwith-
standing the equality of votes, have an influence that would maintain
their superiority. Holland, as had been admitted [by M! Madison]
had, notwithstanding a like equality in the Dutch Confederacy, a
prevailing influence in the public measures. The power of self-
defence was essential to the small States. Nature had given it to
the smallest insect of the creation. He could never admit that there
was no danger of combinations among the large States. They will
like individuals find out and avail themselves of the advantage to
be gained by it. It was true the danger would be greater, if they
were contiguous and had a more immediate+ common interest. A
defensive combination of the small States was rendered more difficult
by their greater number. He would mention another consideration
of great weight. The existing confederation was founded on the
equality of the States in the article of suffrage: was it meant to pay
no regard to this antecedent plighted faith. Let a strong Executive,
a Judiciary & Legislative power be created; but Let not too much
be attempted; by which all may be lost. He was not in general
a half-way man, yet he preferred doing half the good we could,
rather than do nothing at all. The other half may be added, when
the necessity shall be more fully experienced.

 

1The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.
199 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Baupwin could have wished that the powers of the General
Legislature had been defined, before the mode of constituting it had
been agitated. He should vote against the motion of M* Elseworth,
tho’ he did not like the Resolution as it stood in the Report of the
Committee of the whole. He thought the second branch ought to be
the representation of property, and that in forming it therefore some
reference ought to be had to the relative wealth of their Constituents,
and to the principles on which the Senate of Mass‘* was constituted.
He concurred with those who thought it w? be impossible for the
Gen! Legislature to extend its cares to the local matters of the
States.

Adjé

Sarurpay JUNE 30. 1787.1. In CONVENTION

M! Brearty moved that the Presid’ write to the Executive of N.
Hamshire, informing it that the business depending before the
Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attend-
ance of the deputies of that State. In support of his motion he ob-
served that the difficulties of the subject and the diversity of opin-
ions called for all the assistance we could possibly obtain. [it was
well understood that the object was to add N. Hamshire to the n?
of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional representation,
which it was presumed from her relative size she must be adverse to].

M! Parrerson seconded the motion

M: Routumee could see neither the necessity nor propriety of
such a measure. They are not unapprized of the meeting, and can
attend if they choose. Rho. Island might as well be urged to appoint
& send deputies. Are we to suspend the business until the deputies
arrive? if we proceed he hoped all the great points would be ad-
justed before the letter could produce its effect.

M! Kine. said he had written more than once as a private cor-
respondent, & the answers? gave him every reason to expect that
State would be represented very shortly, if it sh? be so at all. Cir-
cumstances of a personal nature had hitherto prevented it. <A letter
ce? have no effect.

M* Wiison wished to know whether it would be consistent with
the rule or reason of secresy, to communicate to N. Hamshire that

 

+The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.
? The transcript uses the word “answers” in the singular.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 30, 1787 191

the business was of such a nature as the motion described. It w?
spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety of soliciting
any State on the subject; the meeting being merely voluntary—on
the* motion of M® Brearly Mas no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
P? not on y? floor. Del. not on floor. M4 div? V2 no. N. C. no.
8S. C. no. Geo. not on floor.?

The motion of M? Elseworth ® resumed for allowing each State an
equal vote in y°® 2? branch.

M: Witson did not expect such a motion after the establishment
of y°® contrary principle in the 1%* branch; and considering the rea-
sons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed
in the 1% branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut [M? Elseworth]
had pronounced that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all
the States North of Pen® one only would agree to any Gen! Govern-
ment. He entertained more favorable hopes of Connt and of the other
Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and
that they would not abandon a Country to which they were bound
by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored
event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty.
If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the
majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take
place, it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yester- .
day ag% the just principle of representation, were as 22 to 90 of the
people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this
point, and he was sure if there was any room for change, it could
not be on the side of the majority, the question will be shall less
than % of the U. States withdraw themselves from the Union; or shall
more than 34. renounce the inherent, indisputable, and unalienable
rights of men, in favor of the artificial systems of States. If issue
must be joined, it was on this point he would chuse to join it. The
gentleman from Connecticut in supposing that the prepondenancy ¢#
secured to the majority in the 1%* branch had removed the objec-
tions to an equality of votes in the 2? branch for the security of
the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will
enable the minority to controul in all cases whatsoever, the sentiments
and interests of the majority. Seven States will controul six: Seven

 

2The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ New York, New Jersey, aye—2; Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—5; Mary-
land, divided; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Georgia, not on the floor.”

2 The word “ being” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The word “prepondenancy” is changed to “preponderance” in the tran-

script.
192 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

States, according to the estimates that had been used, composed *%o.
of the whole people. It would be in the power then of less than
¥% to overrule % whenever a question should happen to divide the
States in that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming
a Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called
States? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical
distinctions? Will they, ought they to be satisfied with being told
that the one third compose the greater number of States? The rule
of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2? as in
the 1% branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation,
it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be
local, confined & temporary. This will expand with the expansion,
and grow with the growth of the U. States——Much has been said of an
imaginary combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of
monarchy, sometimes of aristocracy, has been charged on it. No
explanation however of the danger has been vouchsafed. It would
be easy to prove both from reason & history that rivalships would be
more probable than coalitions; and that there are no coinciding in-
terests that could produce the latter. No answer has yet been given
to the observations of [M? Madison] on this subject. Should the
Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large States would
not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the other
States? Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of
the three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones?
Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their influence? It is
all a mere illusion of names. We talk of States, till we forget what
they are composed of. Is a real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed
of aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this species of Gov!
or rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater.
It is true that a majority of States in the 2% branch can not carry a
law ag’' a majority of the people in the 1% But this removes half
only of the objection. Bad Govern’? are of two sorts. 1.1 that which
does too little. 2.1 that which does too much: that which fails thro’
weakness; and that which destroys thro’ oppression. Under which
of these evils do the U. States at present groan? under the weakness
and inefficiency of its Governt To remedy this weakness we have
been sent to this Convention. If the motion should be agreed
to, we shall leave the U. S. fettered precisely as heretofore; with
the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of y® fair

 

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “ secondly ” in the
transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 30, 1787 193

represention of the people in the 1% branch, defeated in? 2%
Twenty four will still controul sixty six. He lamented that such a
disagreement should prevail on the point of representation, as he
did not foresee that it would happen on the other point most con-
tested, the boundary between the Gen! & the local authorities. He
thought the States necessary & valuable parts of a good system.

M: ExvsewortH. The capital objection of M! Wilson ‘‘ that the
minority will rule the majority ’’ is not true. The power is given to
the few to save them from being destroyed by the many. If an
equality of votes had been given to them in both branches, the
objection might have had weight. Is it a novel thing that the few
should have a check on the many? Is it not the case in the British
Constitution the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have united in
applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who form so small a
proportion of the nation a negative on the laws, as a necessary de-
fence of their peculiar rights ag*t the encroachm! of the Commons.
No instance of a Confederacy has existed in which an equality of
voices has not been exercised by the members of it. We are running
from one extreme to another. We are razing the foundations of the
building, when we need only repair the roof. No salutary measure
has been lost for want of a majority of the States, to favor it. If
security be all that the great States wish for the 1*t branch secures
them. The danger of combinations among them is not imaginary.
Altho’ no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the possi-
bility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could easily
conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations.
Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrange-
ment, three or four free ports & no more were to be established
would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston—Philad? & &
some port in? Chesapeak? A like concert might be formed in the
appointment of the great officers. He appealed again to the obliga-
tions of the federal pact which was still in force, and which had been
entered into with so much solemnity; persuading himself that some
regard would still be paid to the plighed faith under which each
State small as well as great, held an equal right of suffrage in the
general Councils. His remarks were not the result of partial or
local views. The State he represented [Connecticut] held a middle
rank,

M" Mapison did justice to the able & close reasoning of M! E.
but must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
? The words “ of the” are substituted in the transcript for “ in.”
194 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

another occasion, the large States were described by him as the
Aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small. Now the small
are the House of Lords requiring a negative to defend them ag*
the more numerous commons. M: FE. had also erred in saying that
no instance had existed in which confederated States had not re-
tained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the
German system in which the K. of Prussia has nine voices, he
reminded M? E. of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component
members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which
Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of Govern-
ment. Had the fact been as stated by M! E. it would have been of
little avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments
ag: him; the History & fate of the several confederacies modern as
well as Antient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure.
In reply to the appeal of M' E. to the faith plighted in the existing
federal compact, he remarked that the party claiming from others an
adherence to a common engagement ought at least to be guiltless
itself of a violation. Of all the States however Connecticut was per-
haps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to
perform the ‘stipulated acts from which no State was free, the Legis-
lature of that State had by a pretty recent vote, positively, refused
to pass a law for complying with the Requisitions of Cong? and had
transmitted a copy of the vote to Cong? It was urged, he said, con-
tinually that an equality of votes in the 24? branch was not only
necessary to secure the small, but would be perfectly safe to the
large ones whose majority in the 1%‘ branch was an effectual bulwark.
But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the majority of States
might still injure the majority of 1 people. 1.2 they could obstruct the
wishes and interests of the majority. 2.? they could extort measures
repugnant to the wishes & interest of the Majority. 3.? they could
impose measures adverse thereto; as the 24 branch will probly
exercise some great powers, in which the 1% will not participate. He
admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any class of citizens,
or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible.
Wherever there is danger of attack there ought? be given a consti-
tutional power of defence. But he contended that the States were
divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by
other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly

 

*'The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The figures “1,” “2” and “3” are changed to “In the first place,” “ Sec-
ondly ” and “ Thirdly.”

* The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 30, 1787 195

from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or
not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great
division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie between the
large & small States: It lay between the Northern & Southern, and
if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given
to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this im-
portant truth that he had been casting about in his mind for some
expedient that would answer the purpose. The one which had
occurred was that instead of proportioning the votes of the States in
both branches, to their respective numbers of inhabitants computing
the slaves in the ratio of 5 to 3, they should be represented in one
branch according to the number of free inhabitants only; and in the
other according to the whole n°? counting the slaves as if} free. By
this arrangement the Southern Scale would have the advantage in
one House, and the Northern in the other. He had been restrained
from proposing this expedient by two considerations: one was his
unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an occasion where
it is but too apt to arise of itself—the other was, the inequality of
powers that must be vested in the two branches, and which w4
destroy the equilibrium of interests.

M* E.sewortu assured the House that whatever might be thought
of the Representatives of Connecticut the State was entirely federal
in her disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the
war, in supplying both men & money. The muster rolls would show
she had more troops in the field than Virg? If she had been De-
linquent, it had been from inability, and not more so than other
States.

M: Suerman. M? Madison has? animadverted on the delinquency
of the States, when his object required him to prove that the Con-
stitution of Cong? was faulty. Cong is not to blame for the faults
of the States. Their measures have been right, and the only thing
wanting has been, a further power in Cong’ to render them effectual.

M! Davy was much embarrassed and wished for explanations.
The Report of the Committee allowing the Legislatures to choose the
Senate, and establishing a proportional representation in it, seemed
to be impracticable. There will according to this rule be ninety mem-
bers in the outset, and the number will increase as new States are
added. It was impossible that so numerous a body could possess the
activity and other qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the

comparative merits of the report as it stood, and the amendment, he

 

1 The word “ if” is omitted in the transcript.
?The word “has” is omitted in the transcript.
196 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

should be constrained to prefer the latter. The appointment of the
Senate by electors chosen by the people for that purpose was he con-
ceived liable to an insuperable difficulty. The larger Counties or
districts thrown into a general district, would certainly prevail over
the smaller Counties or districts, and merit in the latter would be
excluded altogether. The report therefore seemed to be right in
referring the appointment to the Legislatures, whose agency in the
general System did not appear to him objectionable as it did to
some others. The fact was that the local prejudices & interests which
could not be denied to exist, would find their way into the national
councils whether the Representatives should be chosen by the Legis-
latures or by the people themselves. On the other hand, if a pro-
portional representation was attended with insuperable difficulties,
the making the Senate the Representative of the States, looked like
bringing us back to Cong’ again, and shutting out all the advantages
expected from it. Under this view of the subject he could not vote for
any plan for the Senate yet proposed. He thought that in general
there were extremes on both sides. We were partly federal, partly
national in our Union, and he did not see why the Gov! might not
in some respects operate on the States, in others on the people.

M! Witson admitted the question concerning the number of
Senators, to be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one,
and the others in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numer-
ous. He looked forward to the time when the smallest States will
contain 100,000 souls at least. Let there be then one Senator in
each for every 100,000 souls and let the States not having that n? of
inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing himself to submit to this
temporary concession to the small States; and threw out the idea
as a ground of compromise.

Doc! Franxuin The diversity of opinions turns on two points.
If a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend
that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be
put in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger.
When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not
fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In
like manner here both sides must part with some of their demands,
in order that they may join in some accomodating proposition. He
chad prepared one which he would read, that it might lie on the
table for consideration. The proposition was in the words following ”’

“That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose & send
an equal number cf Delegates, namely who are to compose
the 24 branch of the General Legislature—
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 30, 1787 197

That in all cases or questions wherein the Sovereignty of in-
dividual States may be affected, or whereby their authority over their
own Citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General
Government within the several States augmented, each State shall
have equal suffrage.

That in the appointment of all Civil officers of y? Gen! Gov! in
the election of whom the 2? branch may by the Constitution have
part, each State shall have equal suffrage.

That in fixing the Salaries of such officers, and in all allowances
for public services, and generally in all appropriations & dispositions
of money to be drawn out of the General Treasury; and in all laws
for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of the several States
shall have suffrage in proportion to the Sums which their respective
States do actually contribute to the Treasury.’’ Where a Ship had
many owners this was the rule of deciding on her expedition. He
had been one of the Ministers from this Country to France during
the joint war and wi have been very glad if allowed a vote in dis-
tributing the money to carry it on.

M* King observed that the simple question was whether each
State should have an equal vote in the 24 branch; that it must be
apparent to those gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this
equality, nor the report as it stood, that the report was as susceptible
of melioration as the motion; that a reform would be nugatory &
nominal only if we should make another Congress of the proposed
Senate: that if the adherence to an equality of votes was fixed &
unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on the other side, &
that we were in fact cut insunder* already, and it was in vain to shut
our eyes against it: that he was however filled with astonishment
that if we were convinced that every man in America was secured in
all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good
to the phantom of State sovereignty: that his feelings were more
harrowed & his fears more agitated for his Country than he could
express, that he conceived this to be the last opportunity of pro-
viding for its liberty & happiness: that he could not therefore but
repeat his amazement that when a just Govern’ founded on a fair
representation of the people of America was within our reach, we
should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal free-
dom & importance of States: that should this wonderful illusion con-
tinue to prevail, his mind was prepared for every event, rather than
to? sit down under a Gov! founded in * a vicious principle of repre-
sentation, and which must be as short lived as it would be unjust. He

 

1The word “asunder” is substituted in the transcript for “ insunder.”
2? The word “to” is omitted in the transcript.
® The word “on” is substituted in the transcript for “ in.”
198 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

might prevail on himself to accede to some such expedient as had
been hinted by M! Wilson: but he never could listen to an equality
of votes as proposed in the motion.

M: Dayton. When assertion is given for proof, and terror sub-
stituted for argument, he presumed they would have no effect how-
ever eloquently spoken. It should have been shewn that the evils
we have experienced have proceeded from the equality now objected
to: and that the seeds of dissolution for the State Governments are
not sown in the Gen! Government. He considered the system on the
table as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded that
it never would be rec? by the people.

M Martin, wi never confederate if it could not be done on just
principles

M* Mapison would acquiesce in the concession hinted by M!
Wilson, on condition that a due independence should be given to the
Senate. The plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely
dependent on the States. The Senate therefore is only another
edition of Cong? He knew the faults of that Body & had used a
bold language ag* it. Still he w4 preserve the State rights, as care-
fully as the trials by jury.

M: Beprorp, contended that there was no middle way between a
perfect consolidation and a mere confederacy of the States. The
first is out of the question, and in the latter they must continue if
not perfectly, yet equally sovereign. If political Societies possess
ambition avarice, and all the other passions which render them
formidable to each other, ought we not to view them in this light here?
Will not the same motives operate in America as elsewhere? If
any gentleman doubts it let him look at the votes. Have they not
been dictated by interest, by ambition? Are not the large States
evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the
small? They think no doubt that they have right on their side, but
interest had blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small
State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a great
one. §S. Carolina is actuated both by present interest & future pros-
pects. She hopes too to see the other States cut down to her own
dimensions. N. Carolina has the same motives of present & future
interest. Virg? follows. Mary? is not on that side of the Question.
Pen* has a direct and future interest. Mass has a decided and
palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it be expected that the
small States will act from pure disinterestedness. Look at G.
Britain. Is the Representation there less unequal? But we shall be
told again that that is the rotten part of the Constitution. Have not
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JUNE 30, 1787 199

the boroughs however held fast their constitutional rights? and are
we to act with greater purity than the rest of mankind. An exact
proportion in the Representation is not preserved in any one of the
States. Will it be said that an inequality of power will not result
from an inequality of votes. Give the opportunity, and ambition will
not fail to abuse it. The whole History of mankind proves it. The
three large States have a common interest to bind them together in
commerce. But whether a combination as we suppose, or a com-
petition as others suppose, shall take place among them, in either
case, the smaller? States must be ruined. We must like Solon make
such a Govern! as the people will approve. Will the smaller States
ever agree to the proposed degradation of them. It is not true that
the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present Cong’
The Language of the people has been that Cong? ought to have the
power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States when? it
may be necessary. On The first point they have been explicit &, in
a@ manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree
to this & similar measures if they ever mean to discharge their
engagements. The little States are willing to observe their en-
gagements, but will meet the large ones on no ground but that of
the Confederation. We have been told with a dictatorial air that
this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a good Governmt
It will be the last indeed if the propositions reported from the Com-
mittee go forth to the people. He was under no apprehensions. The
Large States dare not dissolve the Confederation. If they do the
small ones will find some foreign ally of more honor and good faith,
who will take them by the hand and do them justice. He did not
mean by this to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence;
which ought to be avoided by enlarging the federal powers not
annihilating the federal system. This is what the people expect. All
agree in the necessity of a more efficient Gov! and why not make
such an one; as they desire.

M: ExvsewortH,. Under a National Gov! he should participate in
the National Security, as remarked by [M' King] but that was all.
What he wanted was domestic happiness. The Nat! Govt could not
descend to the local objects on which this depended. It could only
embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes therefore
for the preservation of his rights to the State Gov’ From these alone
he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life. His

 

+The word “small” is substituted in the transcript for “smaller.”
?The word “where” is substituted in the transcript for “when.”
200 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new born infant
on its mother for nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory,
he had nothing to add that could be so.

M: Kine was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree,
and as far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by
M: Elsewth. He did not think a full answer had been given to those
who apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions.
Expedients might be devised as he conceived that would give them
all the security the nature of things would admit of. In the
establishmt of Societies the Constitution was to the Legislature what
the laws were to individuals. As the fundamental rights of individ-
uals are secured by express provisions in the State Constitutions;
why may not a like security be provided for the Rights of States in
the National Constitution. The articles of Union between Engl? &
Scotland furnish an example of such a provision in favor of sundry
rights of Scotland. When that Union was in agitation, the same
language of apprehension which has been heard from the smaller
States, was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles how-
ever have not been violated and the Scotch have found an increase of
prosperity & happiness. He was aware that this will be ealled a
mere paper security. He thought it a sufficient answer to say that
if fundamental articles of compact, are no sufficient defence against
physical power, neither will there be any safety ag*t it if there be
no compact. He could not sit down, without taking some notice of
the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware [M* Bed-
ford]. It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This
intemperance had marked the honorabl gentleman himself. It was
not he who with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had
declared himself ready to turn his hopes from our common Country,
and court the protection of some foreign hand. This too was the
language of the Honbl member himself. He was grieved that such a
thought had entered into? his heart. He was more grieved that
such an expression had dropped from his lips. The gentleman c?
only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself what-
ever might be his distress, he wt never court relief from a foreign
power.

Adjourned

* The word “into” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 2, 1787 201

Monpay Juuy 2? 1n ConvENTION

On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second
branch as moved by M® Elseworth,? Mass** no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay.
N.J. ay. P? no. Del. ay. M4 ay. M! Jenifer being not present
M® Martin alone voted V* no. N.C. no. §. C. no. Geo. divi ME
Houston no. M? Baldwin ay.

M’ Pinkney thought an equality of votes in the 24 branch in-
admissible. At the same time candor obliged him to admit that the
large States would feel a partiality for their own Citizens & give
them a preference, in appointments: that they might also find
some common points in their commercial interests, and promote
treaties favorable to them. There is a real distinction ? the Northern
& South" interests. N. Carol? S. Carol: & Geo. in their Rice &
Indigo had a peculiar interest which might be sacrificed. How then
shall the larger States be prevented from administering the Gen!
Govt as they please, without being themselves unduly subjected to the
will of the smaller? By allowing them some but not a full pro-
portion. He was extremely anxious that something should be done,
considering this as the last appeal to a regular experiment. Cong?
have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the federal
System. Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it, but the appointm!
of this Convention; & he could not express his alarms for the con-
sequences of such an event He read his motion, to form the States
into classes, with an apportionment of Senators among them, [see
art. 4, of his plan].*

General Pinkney. was willing the motion might be considered.
He did not entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Doc?
Franklin [which see Saturday June 30]. Some compromise seemed
to be necessary: the States being exactly divided on the question for
an equality of votes in the 24 branch. He proposed that a Com-
mittee consisting of a member from each State should be appointed to
devise & report some compromise.

M! L. Martin had no objection to a commitment, but no modifica-
tions whatever could reconcile the Smaller States to the least diminu-
tion of their equal Sovereignty.

 

1 The phrase “it was lost by an equal division of votes,” is here inserted in
‘the transcript and the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Dela-
ware, Maryland,* aye—5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, no—5; Georgia, divided [Mr. Baldwin, aye, Mr. Houston,
no].” The footnote referring to Maryland reads: “Mr. Jenifer not being present,
Mr. Martin alone voted.”

2 The word “between ” is here inserted in the transcript.

® See Appendix to Debates, IV, No. 3, p. 600.
202 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: SHARMAN. We are now at a full stop, and nobody he sup-
posed meant that we sh? break up without doing something. A
committee he thought most likely to hit on some expedient.

* M! Gov? Morris. thought a Com? adviseable as the Convention had
been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of
appointing the 24 branch tended he was sure to defeat the object
of it. What is this object? to check the precipitation, changeableness,
and excesses of the first branch. Every man of observation had seen
in the democratic branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation——
in Congress changeableness, in every department excesses ag*' per-
sonal liberty private property & personal safety. What qualities
are necessary to constitute a check in this case? Abilities and virtue,
are equally necessary in both branches. Something more then is now
wanted. 1.2 the checking branch must have a personal interest in
checking the other branch, one interest must be opposed to another
interest. Vices as they exist, must be turned ag* each other. 2.3 It
must have great personal property, it must have the aristocratic
spirit; it must love to lord it thro’ pride, pride is indeed the great
principle that actuates both the poor & the rich. It is this principle
which in the former resists, in the latter abuses authority. 3.* It
should be independent. In Religion the Creature is apt to forget
its Creator. That it is otherwise in political affairs, the late debates
here are an unhappy proof. The aristocratic body, should be as
independent & as firm as the democratic. If the members of it are to
revert to a dependence on the democratic choice, the democratic scale
will preponderate. All the guards contrived by America have not
restrained the Senatorial branches of the Legislatures from a servile
complaisance to the democratic. If the 2? branch is to be dependent
we are better without it. To make it independent, it should be for
life. It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so: Hé
hoped so. The Rich will strive to establish their dominion & enslave
the rest. ‘They always did. They always will. The proper security
ag* them is to form them into a separate interest. The two forces
will then controul each other. Let the rich mix with the poor and
in a Commercial Country, they will establish an oligarchy. Take
away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it has been

* Transfer hither the marginal note.

* He had just returned from N. Y. havg left ye Convention a few days after
it commenced business.

 

* Madison’s direction concerning the footnote is omitted in the transcript.
> The figure “1” is changed to “In the first place” in the transcript.
* The figure “2” is changed to “In the second place” in the transcript.
“The figure “3” is changed to “In the third place” in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 2, 1787 203

all the world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are
but men: and we are not to expect any particular interference of
Heaven in our favor. By thus combining & setting apart, the aristo-
cratic interest, the popular interest will be combined ag* it. There
will be a mutual check and mutual security. 4.1 An independence
for life, involves the necessary permanency. If we change our
measures no body will trust us: and how avoid a change of measures,
but by avoiding a change of men. Ask any man if he confides in
Cong? if he confides in the State of Pen* if he will lend his money
or enter into contract? He will tell you no. He sees no stability.
He can repose no confidence. If G. B. were to explain her refusal to
treat with us, the same reasoning would be employed.—He disliked
the exclusion of the 21 branch from holding offices. It is dangerous.
It is like the imprudent exclusion of the military officers during
the war, from civil appointments. It deprives the Executive of the
principal source of influence. If danger be apprehended from the
Executive what a lift-handed way is this of obviating it? If the
son, the brother or the friend can be appointed, the danger may be
even increased, as the disqualified father &c. can then boast of a
disinterestedness which he does not possess. Besides shall the best,
the most able, the most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold.
offices? Who then are to hold them? He was also ag paying the
Senators. They will pay themselves if they can. If they can not
they will be rich and can do without it. Of such the 24 branch
ought to consist; and none but such can compose it if they are not
to be paid—He contended that the Executive should appoint the
Senate & fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the
present question. You may begin with any ratio you please; it will
come to the same thing. The members being independ! & for life,
may be taken as well from one place as from another.—It should be
considered too how the scheme could be carried through the States.
He hoped there was strength of mind eno’ in this House to look
truth in the face. He did not hesitate therefore to s.y that loaves
& fishes must bribe the Demagogues. They must be made to expect
higher offices under the general than the State Gov® A Senate for
life will be a noble bait. Without such captivating prospects, the
popular leaders will oppose & defeat the plan. He perceived that
the 1** branch was to be chosen by the people of the States: the 24
by those chosen by the people. Is not here a Gov! by the States. A
Govern: by Compact between Virg* in the 1% & 24 branch; Mas‘ in

 

1The figure “4” is changed to “In the fourth place” in the transcript.
204 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the 1% & 24 branch &c. This is going back to mere treaty. It is no
Govt at all. It is altogether dependent on the States, and will act over
again the part which Cong? has acted. A firm Govern' alone can
protect our liberties. He fears the influence of the rich. They will
have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do not by such a Gov!
keep them within their proper sphere.t_ We should remember that the
people never act from reason alone. The Rich will take* advantage
of their passions & make these the instruments for oppressing them.
The Result of the Contest will be a violent aristocracy, or a more
violent despotism. The schemes of the Rich will be favored by the
extent of the Country. The people in such distant parts can not
communicate & act in concert. They will be the dupes of those who
have more knowledge & intercourse. The only security ag*t encroach-
ments will be a select & sagacious body of men, instituted to watch
agtt them on all sides. He meant only to hint these observations,
without grounding any motion on them

M: Ranvours favored the commitment though he did not expect
much benefit from the expedient. He animadverted on the warm &
rash language of M! Bedford on Saturday; reminded the small
States that if the large States should combine some danger of which he
did not deny there would be a check in the revisionary power of the
Executive, and intimated that in order to render this still more
effectual, he would agree that in the choice of the* Executive each
State should have an equal vote. He was persuaded that two such
opposite bodies as M! Morris had planned, could never long co-exist.
Dissentions would arise as has been seen even between the Senate
and H. of Delegates in Maryland, appeals would be made to the
people; and in a little time, commotions would be the result—He was
far from thinking the large States could subsist of themselves any
more than the small; an avulsion would involve the whole in ruin,
and he was determined to pursue such a scheme of Government as
would secure us ag** such a calamity.

M! Srrore was for the Commitment; and hoped the mode of
constituting both branches would be referred. If they should be estab-
lished on different principles, contentions would prevail, and there
would never be a concurrence in necessary measures.

Doc. Wituiamson. If we do not concede on both sides, our
business must soon be at an end. He approved of the Commitment,

 

1 The transcript uses the word “sphere ” in the plural.
? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
*? The word “ar” is substituted in the transcript for “ the.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 2, 1787 205

supposing that as the Comé w! be a smaller body, a compromise would
be pursued with more coolness

M? Witson objected to the Committee, because it would decide
according to that very rule of voting which was opposed on one side.
Experience in Cong? had also proved the inutility of Committees
consisting of members from each State

M! Lanstne w? not oppose the commitment, though expecting little
advantage from it.

M? Mapison opposed the Commitment. He had rarely seen any
other effect than delay from such Committees in Cong? Any scheme
of compromise that could be proposed in the Committee might as
easily be proposed in the House; and the report of the Committee
when? it contained merely the opinion of the Com? would
neither shorten the discussion, nor influence the decision of the
House.

M: Gerry was for the Commitm! Something must be done, or we
shall disappoint not only America, but the whole world. He sug-
gested a consideration of the State we should be thrown into by the
failure of the Union. We should be without an Umpire to decide
controversies and must be at the mercy of events. What too is to
become of our treaties—what of our foreign debts, what of our do-
mestic? We must make concessions on both sides. Without these
the Constitutions of the several States would never have been formed.

On the question ‘‘ for committing,’’ generally :

Mast? ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. no.
Mé ay. Viay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

On the question for committing * ‘‘ to a member from each State.’’

Mass ay. Contay. N. Y.ay. N.J.ay. P?no. Del. ay. M@ ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

The Committee elected by ballot, were M: Gerry, M! Elseworth,
M™ Yates, M! Patterson, D! Franklin, M! Bedford, M: Martin,
ME Mason, M! Davy, M! Rutlidge, Mr. Baldwin.

That time might be given to the Committee, and to such as chose
to attend to the celebrations on the anniversary of Independence,
the Convention adjourned till Thursday.

 

1The word “ where” ‘is substituted in the transcript for “ when.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; New Jersey, Delaware, no—2.”

2 The word “it” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—10; Pennsylvania, no—1.”
206 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Tuurspay JuLY 57? in CONVENTION

M: Gerry delivered in from the Committee appointed on Monday
last the following Report.

‘“‘The Committee to whom was referred the 8 Resol. of the
Report from the Committee of the whole House, and so much of the
7 as has not been decided on, submit the following Report: That the
subsequent propositions be recommended to the Convention on con-
dition that both shall be generally adopted. 1. that in the I branch
of the Legislature each of the States now in the Union shall be
allowed 1 member for every 40,000 inhabitants of the description
reported in the 7 Resolution of the Com® of the whole House: that
each State not containing that number shall be allowed 1 member: that
all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the
Salaries of the officers of the Governt of the U. States shall originate
in the 1% branch of of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or
amended by the 24 branch: and that no money shall be drawn from
the public Treasury. but in pursuance of appropriations to be
originated in the 1%t branch ’’’ II. That in the 2% branch each State
shall have an equal vote.’’ *

M' Guorum observed that as the report consisted of propositions
mutually conditional he wished to hear some explanations touching
the grounds on which the conditions were estimated.

M: Gerry. The Committee were of different opinions as well
as the Deputations from which the Com? were taken, and agreed to
the Report merely in order that some ground of accomodation might
be proposed. Those opposed to the equality of votes have only
‘ assented conditionally; and if the other side do not generally agree
will not be under any obligation to support the Report.

M? Witson thought the Committee had exceeded their powers.

M? Martin was for taking the question on the whole report.

* This report was founded on a motion in the Committe made by Dr Franklin.
It was barely acquiesced in by the members from the States opposed to an
equality of votes in the 24 branch and was evidently considered by the
members on the other side, as a gaining of their point. A motion was made by
Mr Sherman [he* acted in place of Mr Elseworth who was kept away by indis-
position.] In the Committee to the following effect “that each State should have
an equal vote in the 24 branch; provided that no decision therein should prevail
unless the majority of States concurring should also comprize a majority of
the inhabitants of the U. States.” This motion was not much deliberated on not
approved in the Committee. A similar proviso had been proposed in the debates
on the articles of Confederation in 1777, to the articles giving certain powers
to “nine States.” See Journals of Cong: for 1777, p. 462.

 

* The word “ who ” is substituted in the transcript for “he.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 5, 1787 207

M: Witson was for a division of the question: otherwise it w? be
a leap in the dark,

M! Mapison. could not regard the exclusive? privilege of originating
money bills as any concession on the side of the small States. Experi-
ence proved that it had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch
wished a bill to be originated, they might surely find some member
from some of the same States in the lower branch who would originate
it. The restriction as to amendments was of as little consequence.
Amendments could be handed privately by the Senate to members
in the other house. Bills could be negatived that they might be
sent up in the desired shape. If the Senate should yield to the
obstinacy of the 1* branch the use of that body as a check would
be lost. If the 1% branch should yield to that of the Senate, the
privilege would be nugatory. Experience had also shewn both in
G. B. and the States having a similar regulation that it was a
source of frequent & obstinate altercations. These considerations had
produced a rejection of a like motion on a former occasion when
judged by its own merits. It could not therefore be deemed any
concession on the present, and left in force all the objections which
had prevailed ag*t allowing each State an equal voice. He conceived
that the Convention was reduced to the alternative of either depart-
ing from justice in order to conciliate the smaller States, and the
minority of the people of the U. S. or of displeasing these by justly
gratifying the larger States and the majority of the people. He
could not himself hesitate as to the option he ought to make. The
Convention with justice & the majority of the people on their side,
had nothing to fear. With injustice and the minority on their side
they had every thing to fear. It was in vain to purchase concord
in the Convention on terms which would perpetuate discord among
their Constituents. The Convention ought to pursue a plan which
would bear the test of examination, which would be espoused & sup-
ported by the enlightened and impartial part of America, & which
they could themselves vindicate and urge. It should be considered
that altho’ at first many may judge of the system recommended, by
their opinion of the Convention, yet finally all will judge of the
Convention by the System. The merits of the System alone can
finally & effectually obtain the public suffrage. He was not appre-
hensive that the people of the small States would obstinately refuse
to accede to a Gov! founded on just principles, and promising them
substantial protection. He could not suspect that Delaware would

 

1 The word “ exclusive” is omitted in the transcript.
208 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

brave the consequences of seeking her fortunes apart from the other
States, rather than submit to such a Gov! much less could he suspect
that she would pursue the rash policy of courting foreign support,
which the warmth of one of her representatives [M!? Bedford] had
suggested, or if she sh? that any foreign nation wi be so rash as to
hearken to the overture. As little could he suspect that the people
of N. Jersey notwithstanding the decided tone of the gentlemen from
that State, would choose rather to stand on their own legs, and
bid defiance to events, than to acquiesce under an establishment
founded on principles the justice of which they could not dispute,
and absolutely necessary to redeem them from the exactions levied on
them by the commerce of the neighbouring States. A review of other
States would prove that there was as little reason to apprehend an
inflexible opposition elsewhere. Harmony in the Convention was no
doubt much to be desired. Satisfaction to all the States, in the first
instance still more so. But if the principal States comprehending a
majority of the people of the U. S. should concur in a just & judicious
plan, he had the firmest hopes, that all the other States would by
degrees accede to it.

M! Burusr said he could not let down his idea of the people, of
America so far as to believe they would from mere respect to the
Convention adopt a plan evidently unjust. He did not consider the
privilege concerning money bills as of any consequence. He urged
that the 2? branch ought to represent the States according to their
property. E

M® Gov? Morris. thought the form as well as the matter of the
Report objectionable. It seemed in the first place to render amend-
ments impracticable. In the next place, it seemed to involve a pledge
to agree to the 2% part if the 1% sh? be agreed to. He conceived
the whole aspect of it to be wrong. He came here as a Representative
of America; he flattered himself he came here in some degree as a
Representative of the whole human race; for the whole human race
will be affected by the proceedings of this Convention. He wished
gentlemen to extend their views beyond the present moment of time;
beyond the narrow limits of place from which they derive their
political origin. If he were to believe some things which he had
heard, he should suppose that we were assembled to truck and bar-

‘gain for our particular States. He can-not descend to think that
any gentlemen are really actuated by these views. We must look
forward to the effects of what we do. These alone ought to guide us.
Much has been said of the sentiments of the people. They were un-
known. They could not be known. AIL that we ean infer is that
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 5, 1787 209

if the plan we recommend be reasonable & right; all who have reason-
able minds and sound intentions will embrace it, notwithstanding
what had been said by some gentlemen. Let us suppose that the
larger States shall agree; and that the smaller refuse: and let us trace
the consequences. The opponents of the system in the smaller States
will no doubt make a party, and a noise for a time, but the ties of
interest, of kindred & of common habits which connect them with the
other States will be too strong to be easily broken. In N. Jersey
particularly he was sure a great many would follow the sentiments
of Pen? & N. York. This Country must be united. If persuasion
does not unite it, the sword will. He begged that? this consideration
might have its due weight. The scenes of horror attending civil
commotion can not be described, and the conclusion of them will be
worse than the term of their continuance. The stronger party will
then make traytors of the weaker; and the Gallows & Halter will
finish the work of the sword. How far foreign powers would be
ready to take part in the confusions he would not say. Threats that
they will be invited have it seems been thrown out. He drew the
melancholy picture of foreign intrusions as exhibited in the History
of Germany, & urged it as a standing lesson to other nations. He
trusted that the Gentlemen who may have hazarded such expres-
sions, did not entertain them till they reached their own lips. But
returning to the Report he could not think it in any respect calcu-
lated for the public good. As the 2% branch is now constituted,
there will be constant disputes & appeals to the States which will
undermine the Gen! Government & controul & annihilate the 1%
branch. Suppose that the delegates from Mass** & Rho I. in the
Upper House disagree, and that the former are outvoted. What
Results? they will immediately declare that their State will not
abide by the decision, and make such representations as will produce
that effect. The same may happen as to Virg? & other States. Of
what avail then will be what is on paper. State attachments, and
State importance have been the bane of this Country. We can not
annihilate; but we may perhaps take out the teeth of the serpents.
He wished our ideas to be enlarged to the true interest of man,
instead of being circumscribed within the narrow compass of a par-
ticular Spot. And after all how little can be the motive yielded by
selfishness for such a policy. Who can say whether he himself, much
less whether his children, will the next year be an inhabitant of
this or that State.

 

1The word “that” is omitted in the transcript.
210 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Beprorp. He found that what he had said as to the small
States being taken by the hand, had been misunderstood; and he
rose to explain. He did not mean that the small States would court
the aid & interposition of foreign powers. He meant that they
would not consider the federal compact as dissolved untill it should
be so by the Acts of the large States. In this case The consequence
of the breach of faith on their part, and the readiness of the small
States to fulfill their engagements, would be that foreign Nations
having demands on this Country would find it their interest to take
the small States by the hand, in order to do themselves justice. This
was what he meant. But no man ean foresee to what extremities the
small States may be driven by oppression.’ He observed also in
apology that some allowance ought to be made for the habits of
his profession in which warmth was natural & sometimes necessary.
But is there not an apology in what was said by [M? Gov! Morris]
that the sword is to unite: by Mt Ghorum that Delaware must be
annexed to Penn? and N. Jersey divided between Pen? and N. York.
To hear such language without emotion, would be to renounce the
feelings of a man and the duty of a Citizen—As to the propositions
of the Committee, the lesser States have thought it necessary to have a
security somewhere. This has been thought necessary for the Execu-
tive Magistrate of the proposed Gov! who has a sort of negative on
the laws; and is it not of more importance that the States should
be protected, than that the Executive branch of the Govt sh? be
protected. In order to obtain this, the smaller States have conceded
as to the constitution of the first branch, and as to money bills. If
they be not gratified by correspondent concessions as to the 24 branch
is it to be supposed they will ever accede to the plan; and what will
be the consequence if nothing should be done! The condition of the
U. States requires that something should be immediately done. It will
be better that a defective plan should be adopted, than that none
should be recommended. He saw no reason why defects might not
be supplied by meetings 10, 15, or 20 years hence.

M! ELsewortH said he had not attended the proceedings of the
Committee, but was ready to accede to the compromise they had
reported. Some compromise was necessary; and he saw none more
convenient or reasonable.

M! Wituiamson hoped that the expressions of individuals would
not be taken for the sense of their colleagues, much less of their
States which was not & could not be known. He hoped also that the
meaning of those expressions would not be misconstrued or exag-
gerated. He did not conceive that [M! Gov! Morris] meant that
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 5, 1787 211

the sword ought.to be drawn ag* the smaller States. He only pointed
out the probable consequences of anarchy in the U. S. A similar
exposition ought to be given of the expressions [of M! Ghorum].
He was ready to hear the Report discussed; but thought the proposi-
tions contained in it, the most objectionable of any he had yet heard.

M! PatrEeRSON said that he had when the Report was agreed to
in the Com? reserved to himself the right of freely discussing it.
He acknowledged that the warmth complained of was improper;
but he thought the Sword & the Gallows as? little calculated to pro-
duce conviction. He complained of the manner in which Mt M— &
M? Gov! Morris had treated the small States.

M: Gerry. Tho’ he had assented to the Report in the Committee,
he had very material objections to it. We were however in a peculiar
situation. We were neither the same Nation nor different Nations.
We ought not therefore to pursue the one or the other of these ideas
too closely. If no compromise should take place what will be the
consequence. A secession he foresaw would take place; for some
gentlemen seem decided on it; two different plans will be proposed;
and the result no man could foresee. If we do not come to some
agreement among ourselves some foreign sword will probably do the
work for us.

M: Mason. The Report was meant not as specific propositions
to be adopted; but merely as a general ground of accomodation.
There must be some accomodation on this point, or we shall make
little further progress in the work. Accomodation was the object
of the House in the appointment of the Committee; and of the Com-
mittee in the Report they had made. And however liable the Report
might be to objections, he thought it preferable to an appeal to
the world by the different sides, as had been talked of by some Gentle-
men. It could not be more inconvenient to any gentleman to remain
absent from his private affairs, than it was for him: but he would
bury his bones in this City rather than expose his Country to the
Consequences of a dissolution of the Convention without any thing
being done.

The 1:* proposition in the report for fixing the representation in
the 1:* branch, one member for every 40,000 inhabitants, being
taken up.

Mt Gov! Morris objected to that scale of apportionment. He
thought property ought to be taken into the estimate as well as the
number of inhabitants. Life & liberty were generally said to be of

 

1The word ‘“‘as” is crossed out in the transcript.
212 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

more value, than property. An accurate view of the matter would
nevertheless prove that property was the main object of Society,
The savage State was more favorable to liberty than the Civilized;
and sufficiently so to life. It was preferred by all men who had not
acquired a taste for property; it was only renounced for the sake of
property which could only be secured by the restraints of regular
Government. These ideas might appear to some new, but they were
nevertheless just. If property then was the main object of Govt
certainly it ought to be one measure of the influence due to those
who were to be affected by the Governmt He looked forward also
to that range of New States which w? soon be formed in the West,
He thought the rule of representation ought to be so fixed as to
secure to the Atlantic States a prevalence in the National Councils,
The new States will know less of the public interest than these, will
have an interest in many respects different, in particular will be
little serupulous of involving the Community in wars the burdens &
operations of which would fall chiefly on the maritime States. Pro-
vision ought therefore to be made to prevent the maritime States
from being hereafter outvoted by them. He thought this might be
easily done by irrevocably fixing the number of representatives
which the Atlantic States should respectively have, and the number
which each new State will have. This w? not be unjust, as the
Western settlers wi previously know the conditions on which they
were to possess their lands. It would be politic as it would recommend
the plan to the present as well as future interest of the States which
must decide the fate of it. ’

M: Ruruiper. The gentleman last up had spoken some of his
sentiments precisely. Property was certainly the principal object of
Society. If numbers should be made the rule of representation, the
Atlantic States will! be subjected to the Western. He moved that the
first proposition in the report be postponed in order to take up the
following viz ‘‘ that the suffrages of the several States be regulated
and proportioned according to the sums to be paid towards the
general revenue by the inhabitants of each State respectively. that
an apportionment of suffrages, according to the ratio aforesaid
shall be made and regulated at the end of years from the
ist meeting of the Legislature of the U. S. and at the end of
every years but that for the present, and until the period
above mentioned, the suffrages shall be for N. Hampshire 2
Massach® &e.—

+The word “ would” is substituted in the transcript for “ will.”
? The word “for” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JULY 6, 1787 213

Col. Mason said the case of new States was not unnoticed in the
Committee; but it was thought and he was himself decidedly of
opinion that if they made a part of the Union, they ought to be
subject to no unf@vorable discriminations. Obvious considerations
required it.

M?! Rapoupx concurred with Col. Mason.

On? Question on M? Rutlidges motion.

Mas* no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P# no. Del. no.
Mary? no. V2 no. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. not on floor.

Adj

Frmay Jury 67 in ConveENTION

M! Gov! Morris moved to commit so much of the Report as relates
to ‘‘1 member for every 40,000 inhabitants’? His view was that
they might absolutely fix the number for each State in the first
instance; leaving the Legislature at liberty to provide for changes in
the relative importance of the States, and for the case of new
States.

M? Wirson 244 the motion; but with a view of leaving the Com-
mittee under no implied shackles.

M: GHorum apprehended great inconveniency* from fixing di-
rectly the number of Representatives to be allowed to each State. He
thought the number of Inhabitants the true guide; tho’ perhaps some
departure might be expedient from the full proportion. The States
also would vary in their relative extent by separations of parts of
the largest States. A part of Virg? is now on the point of a separa-
tion. In the province of Mayne a Convention is at this time de-
liberating on a separation from Mas In such events the number
of representatives ought certainly to be reduced. He hoped to see
all the States made small by proper divisions, instead of their be-
coming formidable as was apprehended, to the Small States. He
conceived that let the Gen! Government be modified as it might,
there would be a constant tendency in the State Governm® to

 

1The word “Mr.” is substituted in the transcript for “Col.”

2 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “South Carolina, aye—l1; Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, no—9; Georgia not on the floor.”

*The word “inconveniency” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-

script. . ies : ; .
5 The word “Gen!” is omitted in the transcript.
214 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

encroach upon it: it was of importance therefore that the extent of
the States sh be reduced as much & as fast as possible. The stronger
the Gov! shall be made in the first instance the more easily will
these divisions be effected; as it will be of less®consequence in the
opinion of the States whether they be of great or small extent.

M: Gerry did not think with his Colleague that the large States
ought to be cut up. This policy has been inculeated by the middling
and smaller States, ungenerously & contrary to the spirit of the Con-
federation. Ambitious men will be apt to solicit needless divisions,
till the States be reduced to the size of Counties. If this policy
should still actuate the small States, the large ones cou’d not con-
federate safely with them; but would be obliged to consult their safety
by confederating only with one another. He favored the Commitment
and thought that Representation ought to be in the Combined ratio
of numbers of Inhabitants and of wealth, and not of either singly.

M: Kine wished the clause to be committed chiefly in order to
detach it from the Report with which it had no connection. He
thought also that the Ratio of Representation proposed could not
be safely fixed, since in a century & a half our computed increase of
population would carry the number of representatives to an enormous
excess; that y? number of inhabitants was not the proper index
of ability & wealth; that property was the primary object of Society;
and that in fixing a ratio this ought not to? be excluded from the
estimate. With regard to new States, he observed that there was
something peculiar in the business which had not been noticed. The
U. 8. were now admitted to be proprietors of the Country N. West
of the Ohio. Cong? by one of their ordinances have impoliticly laid
it out into ten States, and have made it a fundamental article of
compact with those who may become settlers, that as soon as the
number in any one State shall equal that of the smallest of the
13 original States, it may claim admission into the union. Dela-
ware does not contain it is computed more than 35,000 souls, and
for obvious reasons will not increase much for a considerable time.
It is possible then that if this plan be persisted in by Cong? 10 new
votes may be added, without a greater addition of inhabitants than
are represented by the single vote of Pen? The plan as it respects
one of the new States is already irrevocable, the sale of the lands
having commenced, and the purchasers & settlers will immediately
become entitled to all the privileges of the compact.

M? Butier agreed to the Commitment if the Committee were to

 

*The word “to” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JULY 6, 1787 215

be left at liberty. He was persuaded that the more the subject was
examined, the less it would appear that the number of inhabitants
would be a proper rule of proportion. If there were no other objec-
tion the changeableness of the standard would be sufficient. He con-
curred with those who thought some balance was necessary between
the old & new States. He contended strenuously that property
was the only just measure of representation. This was the great
object of Govern': the great cause of war; the great means of carry-
ing it on.

M! PINKNEY saw no good reason for committing. The value of
land had been found on full investigation to be an impracticable
rule. The contributions of revenue including imports & exports, must
be too changeable in their amount; too difficult to be adjusted; and
too injurious to the non-commercial States. The number of inhabi-
tants appeared to him the only just & practicable rule. He thought
the blacks ought to stand on an equality with: whites: But w4
agree to the ratio settled by Cong? He contended that Cong?
had no right under the articles of Confeceration to authorize
the admission of new States; no such case having been provided
for.

M: Davy, was for committing the clause in order to get at the
merits of the question arising on the Report. He seemed to think
that wealth or property ought to be represented in the 2? branch;
and numbers in the 1%* branch.

On the Motion for committing as made by M: Gov" Morris.

Mas*® ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P® ay. Del. no.
M? divt V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay?

The members app? by Ballot were M! Gov! Morris, M! Gorham
M Randolph, M? Rutlidge, M: King.

M? Witson signified that his view in agreeing to the commitm'
was that the Com® might consider the propriety of adopting a scale
similar to that established by the Constitution of Mast’ which wi
give an advantage to y? small States without substantially departing
from a? rule of proportion.

.M: Witson & M? Mason moved to postpone the clause relating
to money bills in order to take up the clause relating, to an equality
of votes in the second branch.

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, no—3; Maryland, divided.”

® The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for the word “a.”
216 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

On the question? Mas* no. Cont no, N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pe?
ay. Del. ay. Mi ay. Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.

The clause relating to equality of votes being under consideration,

Doct FRANKLIN observed that this question could not be properly
put by itself, the Committee having reported several propositions as
mutual conditions of each other. He could not vote for it if sep-
arately taken, but should vote for the whole together.

Col. Mason perceived the difficulty & suggested a reference of
the rest of the Report to y® Committee just appointed, that the whole
might be brought into one view.

M! Ranpoupu disliked y?® reference to that Committee, as it con-
sisted of members from States opposed to the wishes of the smalley
States, and could not therefore be acceptable to the latter.

M: Martin & M: JENIFER moved to postpone the clause till the
Com’ last appointed should report.

M! Mapison observed that if the uncommitted part of the Report
was connected with the part just committed, it ought also to be
committed; if not connected, it need not be postponed till report
should be made.

On the question for postponing moved by M* Martin & Mi

Jennifer Cont N. J. Del. M? V? Geo., ay?
Pe Ne SiC ieee baie no §
Mas: Nog -Yiirecexaecaoes divided

The 1% clause relating to the originating of money bills was then
resumed.

M! Govern? Morris was opposed to a restriction of this right
in either branch, considered merely in itself and as unconnected with
the point of representation in the 24 branch. It will disable the 2?
branch from proposing its own money plans, and giving the people
an opportunity of judging by comparison of the merits of those
proposed by the 1% branch.

M? Witson could see nothing like a concession here on the part of
the smaller States. If both branches were to say yes‘ or no,* it was
of little consequence which should say yes* or no* first, which last.
If either was indiscriminately to have the right of originating, the
reverse of the Report, would he thought be most proper; since it

 

*The words “of postponement” are here inserted in the transcript and
the vote reads: “New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Massachusetts, Connecticut, North
Carolina, no—3.”

> The figure “6” is here inserted in the transcript.

° The figure “3” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The transcript italicizes the words “yes” and “no.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JULY 6, 1787 217

was & maxim that the least numerous body was the fittest for
deliberation ; the most numerous for decision. He observed that this
discrimination had been transcribed from the British into several
American constitutions. But he was persuaded that on examination
of the American experiments it would be found to be a trifle light
as air. Nor could he ever discover the advantage of it in the Parlia-
mentary history of G. Britain. He hoped if there was any advantage
in the privilege, that it would be pointed out.

M‘ Wiuiiamson thought that if the privilege were not common
to both branches it ought rather to be confined to the 24 as the bills
in that case would be more narrowly watched, than if they originated
with the branch having most of the popular confidence.

M: Mason. The consideration which weighed with the Com-
mittee was that the 1%* branch would be the immediate representatives
of the people, the 24 would not. Should the latter have the power of
giving away the people’s money, they might soon forget the source
from whence they received it. We might soon have an aristocracy.
He had been much concerned at the principles which had been ad-
vanced by some gentlemen, but had the satisfaction to find they did
not generally prevail. He was a friend to proportional representa-
tion in both branches; but supposed that some points must be yielded
for the sake of accomodation.

M: Wison. If he had proposed that the 2% branch should have
an independent disposal of public money, the observations of [Col
Mason] vould have been a satisfactory answer. But nothing could
be farther from what he had said. His question was how is the
power of the 1% branch increased or that of the 24 diminished by
giving the proposed privilege to the former? Where is the differ-
ence, in which branch it begins if both must concur, in the end?

M! Gerry would not say that the concession was a sufficient one
on the part of the small States. But he could not but regard it in
the light of a concession. It wi make it a constitutional principle
that the 24 branch were not possessed of the Confidence of the
people in money matters, which w? lessen their weight & influence.
In the next place if the 22 branch were dispossessed of the privilege,
they w? be deprived of the opportunity which their continuance in
office 3 times as long as the 1% branch would give them of makig
three successive essays in favor of a particular point.

M: Pinkney thought it evident that the Concession was wholly
on one side, that of the large States, the privilege of originating
money bills being of no account.

M! Gov: Morris had waited to hear the good effects of the re-
218 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

striction. As to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was
that there never was, nor ever will be a civilized Society without an
aristocracy. His endeavor was to keep it as much as possible from
doing mischief. The restriction if it has any real operation will
deprive us of the services of the 2% branch in digesting & proposing
money bills of which it will be more capable than the 1% branch.
It will take away the responsibility of the 2? branch, the great
security for good behavior. It will always leave a plea, as to an
obnoxious money bill that it was disliked, but could not be constitu-
tionally amended; nor safely rejected. It will be a dangerous source
of disputes between the two Houses. We should either take the
British Constitution altogether or make one for ourselves. The
Executive there has dissolved two Houses as the only eure for such
disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply such a remedy? Every
law directly or indirectly takes money out of the pockets of the
people. Again What use may be made of such a privilege in case
of great emergency? Suppose an Enemy at the door, and money
instantly & absolutely necessary for repelling him, may not the popu-
lar branch avail itself of this duress, to extort concessions from the
Senate destructive of the Constitution itself. He illustrated this
danger by the example of the Long Parliament’s exped” for sub-
verting the H. of Lords; concluding on the whole that the restriction
would be either useless or pernicious.

Doc! FRANKLIN did not mean to go into a justification of the
Report; but as it had been asked what would be the use of restraining
the 2? branch from medling with money bills, he could not but
remark that it was always of importance that the people should know
who had disposed of their money, & how it had been disposed of.
It was a maxim that those who feel, can best judge. This end would,
he thought, be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined to
the immediate representatives of the people. This was his inducement
to concur in the report. As to the danger or difficulty that might
arise from a negative in the 241 where the people w4 not be propor-
tionally represented, it might easily be got over by declaring that
there should be no such Negative: or if that will not do, by declaring
that there shall be no such branch at all.

M? Martin said that it was understood in the Committee that
the difficulties and disputes which had been apprehended, should be
guarded ag* in the detailing of the plan.

M! Witson. The difficulties & disputes will increase with the

 

* The word “branch” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JULY 6, 1787 219

attempts to define & obviate them. Queen Anne was obliged to dis-
solve her Parliamt in order to terminate one of these obstinate dis-
putes between the two Houses. Had it not been for the mediation
of the Crown, no one can say what the result would have been.
The point is still sub judice in England. He approved of the prin-
ciples laid down by the Hon’ble President! [Doct Franklin] his
Colleague, as to the expediency of keeping the people informed of
their money affairs. But thought they would know as much, and
be as well satisfied, in one way as in the other.

Gen! PINKNEY was astonished that this point should have been
considered as a concession. He remarked that the restriction? to
money bills had been rejected on the merits singly considered, by 8
States ag*t 3. and that the very States which now called it a con-
cession, were then ag%t it as nugatory or improper in itself.

On the Question whether the clause relating to money bills in the
Report of the Com® consisting of a member from each State, sh?
stand as part of the Report—

Mass divid! Cont ay. N. Y. divi N. J. ay. P? no. Del. ay.
Mi ay. Vino. N.C. ay. §.C. no. Geo. div?3
- A Question was then raised whether the question was carried
in the affirmative: there being but 5 ays out of 11. States present.
The words of the rule are* (see May 28).5

On the * question: Mas. Cont N. J. P? Del. Mi N.C. S. C. Geo ay 7

[In several preceding instances like votes had sub silentio been
entered as decided in the affirmative. ]
Adjourned

 

*In the transcript after the word “President” reference is made to a
footnote which reads: “He was at that time President of the State of Penn-
sylvania.” ;

? The word “as” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, aye—5; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina,
no—3; Massachusetts, New York, Georgia, divided.”

‘The phrase “For the words of the Rule” is substituted in the transcript
for “The words of the rule are.”

5 A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not less than seven
States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater number of these which
shall be fully represented: but a less number than seven may adjourn from day
to day. See ante, p. 19.

® The word “this” is substituted in the transcript for “ the.”

7™The figure “9” is here added in the transcript.

® The figure “2” is here added in the transcript.
220 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

SaturDAY, JuLY 7. IN CONVENTION

1 Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in the 2? branch,
stand as part of the Report’’? being taken up—

M: Gerry. This is the critical question. He had rather agree
to it than have no accomodation. A Govern! short of a proper
national plan, if generally acceptable, would be preferable to a
proper one which if it could be carried at all, would operate on dis-
contented States. He thought it would be best to suspend the?
question till the Comm? yesterday appointed,*? should make
report.

M: SHermMan Supposed that it was the wish of every one that
some Gen! Gov! should be established. An equal vote in the 2!
branch would, he thought, be most likely to give it the necessary
vigor. The small States have more vigor in their Gov than the
large ones, the more influence therefore the large ones have, the
weaker will be the Govt In the large States it will be most difficult
to collect the real & fair sense of the people. Fallacy & undue influ-
ence will be practiced with most success: and improper men will most
easily get into office. If they vote by States in the 2? branch, and
each State has an equal vote, there must be always a majority of
States as well as a majority of the people on the side of public
measures, & the Gov! will have decision and efficacy. If this be not
the case in the 24 branch there may be a majority of the‘+ States ag*
public measures, and the difficulty of compelling them to abide by
the public determination, will render the Government feebler than
it has ever yet been.

M: WILSON was not deficient in a conciliating temper, but firm-
ness was sometimes a duty of higher obligation. Conciliation was
also misapplied in this instance. It was pursued here rather among
the Representatives, than among the Constituents; and it w’ be of
little consequence, if not established among the latter; and there could
be little hope of its being established among them if the foundation
should not be laid in justice and right.

On ® Question shall the words stand as part of the Report?

 

* The words “ The question ” are here inserted in the transcript.

? The word “this” is substituted in the transcript for “ the.”

* The words “ yesterday appointed” are transposed to read “appointed yes-
terday ” in the transcript.

*The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JULY 7, 1787 221

Mass® div? Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. ay.
Méay. V2no. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. div?!

[Note. Several votes were given here in the affirmative or were
div? because another final question was to be taken on the whole
report. |

M: Gerry thought it would be proper to proceed to enumerate
& define the powers to be vested in the Gen! Gov! before a question
on the report should be taken, as to the rule of representation in
the 24 branch.

M: Mapison, observed that it w? be impossible to say what powers
could be safely & properly vested in the Gov! before it was known,
in what manner the States were to be represented in it. He was
apprehensive that if a just representation were not the basis of the
Govt it would happen, as it did when the Articles of Confederation
were depending, that every effectual prerogative would be with-
drawn or withheld, and the New Gov! w’ be rendered as impotent
and as shortlived as the old.

M: Parrerson would not decide whether the privilege concerning
money bills were a valuable consideration or not: But he considered
the mode & rule of representation in the 1% branch as fully so. and
that after the establishment of that point, the small States would
never be able to defend themselves without an equality of votes in
the 24 branch. There was no other ground of accomodation. His
resolution was fixt. He would meet the large States on that Ground
and no other. For himself he should vote ag%' the Report, because
it yielded too much.

M= Gov: Morris. He had no resolution unalterably fixed except
to do what should finally appear to him right. He was ag* the
Report because it maintained the improper Constitution of the 2%
branch. It made it another Congress, a mere whisp of straw. It
had been si [by M! Gerry] that the new Govern't would be partly
national, partly federal; that it ought in the first quality to pro-
tect individuals; in the second, the States. But in what quality
was it to protect the aggregate interest of the whole. Among the
many provisions which had been urged, he had seen none for sup-
porting the dignity and splendor of the American Empire. It had
been one of our greatest misfortunes that the great objects of the
nation had been sacrificed constantly to local views; in like manner
as the general interests of States had been sacrificed to those of

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye—6; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South
Carolina, no—3; Massachusetts, Georgia, divided.”
222 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the Counties. What is to be the check in the Senate? none; unless
it be to keep the majority of the people from injuring particular
States. But particular States ought to be injured for the sake of a
majority of the people, in case their conduct should deserve it.
Suppose they should insist on claims evidently unjust, and pursue
them in a manner detrimental to the whole body. Suppose they
should give themselves up to foreign influence. Ought they to be
protected in such cases. They were originally nothing more than
colonial corporations. On the declaration of Independence, a
Governm! was to be formed. The small States aware of the neces-
sity of preventing anarchy, and taking advantage of the moment,
extorted from the large ones an equality of votes. Standing now on
that ground, they demand under the new system greater rights as
men, than their fellow Citizens of the large States. The proper
answer to them is that the same necessity of which they formerly
took advantage, does not now exist, and that the large States are at
liberty now to consider what is right, rather than what may be
expedient. We must have an efficient Govt and if there be an
efficiency in the local Gov the former is impossible. Germany alone
proves it. Notwithstanding their common diet, notwithstanding the
great prerogatives of the Emperor as head of the Empire, and his
vast resources, as sovereign of his particular dominions, no union
is maintained: foreign influence disturbs every internal operation,
& there is no energy whatever in the general Governmt Whence does
this proceed? From the energy of the local authorities; from its
being considered of more consequence to support the Prince of
Hesse, than the Happiness of the people of Germany. Do Gentlemen
wish this to be y® case here. Good God, Sir, is it possible they
can so delude themselves. What if all the Charters & Constitu-
tions of the States were thrown into the fire, and all their dema-
gogues into the ocean. What would it be to the happiness of
America. And will not this be the case here if we pursue the train
in w* the business lies. We shall establish an Aulic Council without
an Emperor to execute its decrees. The same circumstances which
unite the people here, unite them in Germany. They have there a
common language, a common law, common usages and manners, and
a common interest in being united; yet their local jurisdictions
destroy every tie. The case was the same in the Grecian States. The
United Netherlands are at this time torn in factions. With these
examples before our eyes shall we form establishments which must
necessarily produce the same effects. It is of no consequence from
what districts the 2? branch shall be drawn, if it be so constituted
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 9, 1787 223

as to yield an asylum ag* these evils. As it is now constituted he
must be ag* its being drawn from the States in equal portions. But
shall he was! ready to join in devising such an amendment of the
plan, as will be most likely to secure our liberty & happiness.

M? Surrman & M! EvsewortH moved to postpone the Question
on the Report from the Committee of a member from each State, in
order to wait for the Report from the Com? of 5 last appointed.

Mas* ay. Cont ay. N.Y. no. N.J. ay. Ptay. Del. ay. Mary-
land ay. V?no. N.C. no. §.C. no. Geo. no.”

Adjé

Monpay Juty 9™ in ConvENTION

M? Daniel Carroll from Maryland took his Seat.

M: Gov! Morris delivered a report from the Com? of 5 members
to whom was committed the clause in the Report of the Com® con-
sisting of a member from each State, stating the proper ratio of
Representatives in the 1% branch, to be as 1 to every 40,000 inhabi-
tants, as follows viz

‘“‘The Committee to whom was referred the 1% clause of the
1% proposition reported from the grand Committee, beg leave to
report

I. that in the 1% meeting of the Legislature the 1: branch thereof
consist of 56. members of which Number, N. Hamshire shall have 2.
Mass 7, R. I? 1. Cont 4. N. Y. 5. N. J. 3. BP? 8. Del. 1. M4 4. V2 9.
N.C. 5. 8. C. 5. Geo. 2.—

II.* But as the present situation of the States may probably alter
as well in point of wealth as in the number of their inhabitants,
that the Legislature be authorized from time to time to augment y?
number of Representatives. And in case any of the States shall here-
after be divided, or any two or more States united, or any new States
created within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall
possess authority to regulate the number of Representatives in any
of the foregoing cases, upon the principles of their wealth and number
of inhabitants.”’

M: SHERMAN wished to know on what principles or calculations
the Report was founded. It did not appear to correspond with any

 

+The words “shall be” are substituted in the transcript for “shall he
“2In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, aye—6; New York, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—5.”

* The Roman numerals “1” and “II” are omitted in the transcript,

was.
294 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

rule of numbers, or of any requisition hitherto adopted by Cong?

M: Gornam. Some provision of this sort was necessary in the
outset. The number of blacks & whites with some regard to sup-
posed wealth was the general guide Fractions could not be observed.
The Legisl® is to make alterations from time to time as justice &
propriety may require. Two objections prevailed ag*t the rate’ of
1 member for every 40,000. inh The 1* was that the Representation
would soon be too numerous: the 2% that the West" States who may
have a different interest, might if admitted on that principle by
degrees, outvote the Atlantic. Both these objections are removed.
The number will be small in the first instance and may be continued
so; and the Atlantic States having y? Gov! in their own hands, may
take care of their own interest, by dealing out the right of Rep-
resentation in safe proportions to the Western States. These were
the views of the Committee.

MM L Martin wished to know whether the Com? were guided in
the ratio, by the wealth or number of inhabitants, of the States, or
by ? both; noting its variations from former apportionments by Cong?

M: Govt Morris & M! Rur.tweer moved to postpone the 1% para-
graph relating to the number of members to be allowed each State
in the first instance, and to take up the 2? paragraph authorizing the
Legisl?* to alter the number from time to time according to wealth
& inhabitants. The motion was agreed to nem. con.

On? Question on the 2? parag® taken without any debate

Mas’? ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pt ay. Del. ay.
Mé ay. Viay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M: SHERMAN moved to refer the 1% part apportioning the Rep-
resentatives, to a Comm? of a member from each State. ,

M: Gov? Morris seconded the motion; observing that this was
the only case in which such Committees were useful.

M: Wiuuiamson. thought it would be necessary to return to the
rule of numbers, but that the Western States stood on different foot-
ing. If their property shall® be rated as high as that of the Atlantic
States, then their representation ought to hold a like proportion.
Otherwise if their property was not to be equally rated.

M! Gov: Morris. The Report is little more than a guess. Wealth

 

*The word “rule” is substituted in the transcript for “rate.”

? The word “by” is omitted in the transcript.

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

Rs In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; New York, New Jersey, no—2.”

° The word “should” is substituted in the transcript for “ shall.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 9, 1787 225

was not altogether disregarded by the Com? Where it was appar-
ently in favor of one State, whose n° were superior to the numbers
of another, by a fraction only, a member extraordinary was allowed
to the former: and so vice versa. The Committee meant little more
than to bring the matter to a point for the consideration of the
House.

M* Reep asked why Georgia was allowed 2 members, when her
number of inhabitants had stood below that of Delaware.

M= Gov! Morris. Such is the rapidity of the population of that
State, that before the plan takes effect, it will probably be entitled to 2
Representatives

M: RanvourH. disliked the report of the Com? but had been un-
willing to object to it. He was apprehensive that as the number was
not to be changed till the Nat! Legislature should please, a pretext
would never be wanting to postpone alterations, and keep the power
in the hands of those possessed of it. He was in favor of the
commitmt to a member from each State

M! Patterson considered the proposed estimate for the future
according to the Combined rule* of numbers and wealth, as too
vague. For this reason N. Jersey was ag it. He could regard
negroes ? slaves in no light but as property. They are no free agents,
have no personal liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on
the contrary are themselves property, & like other property entirely
at the will of the Master. Has a man in Virg* a number of votes
in proportion to the number of his slaves? And if Negroes are not
represented in the States to which they belong, why should they be
represented in the Gen! Govt What is the true principle of Rep-
resentation? It is an expedient by which an assembly of certain
individ chosen by the people is substituted in place of the incon-
venient meeting of the people themselves. If such a meeting of the
people was actually to take place, would the slaves vote? They
would not. Why then sh‘ they be represented. He was also ag*
such an indirect encouragem: of the slave trade; observing that
Cong? in their act relating to the change of the 8 art: of Confed?
had been ashamed to use the term ‘“‘ slaves’’ & had substituted a
description.

M: Mapison, reminded M: Patterson that his doctrine of Rep-
resentation which was in its principle the genuine one, must for ever
silence the pretensions of the small States to an equality of votes with
the large ones. They ought to vote in the same proportion in which

 

1 The transcript uses the word “rule” in the plural.
2 The transcript uses the word “ negroes” in the singular.
226 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

their citizens would do, if the people of all the States were col-
lectively met. He suggested as a proper ground of compromise,
that in the first branch the States should be represented according
to their number of free inhabitants; and in the 2% which had for
one of its primary objects the guardianship of property, according
to the whole number, including slaves.

M: Butter urged warmly the justice & necessity of regarding
wealth in the apportionment of Representation.

M! Kine had always expected that as the Southern States are the
richest, they would not league themselves with the North? unless
some respect were paid to their superior wealth. If the latter expect
those preferential distinctions in Commerce & other advantages which
they will derive from the connection they must not expect to receive
them without allowing some advantages in return. Eleven out of
18 of the States had agreed to consider Slaves in the apportionment
of taxation; and taxation and Representation ought to go together.

On the question for committing the first paragraph of the Report
to a member from each State.

Mas ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.t

The Com? appointed were M? King. M* Sherman, M: Yates, M
Brearly, M= Gov? Morris, M! Reed, M* Carrol, MF Madison, M? Wil-
liamson, M' Rutledge, M? Houston.

Adj?

Teuspay. Juty 10 In ConvEeNTION

M: Kine reported from the Com® yesterday appointed that the
States at the 1%* meeting of the General Legislature, should be rep-
resented by 65 members in the following proportions, to wit. N. Ham-
shire by 3. Mas® 8. R. Ist 1. Cont 5. N. Y. 6. N. J. 4. P28. Del. 1.
M? 6. V210. N.C. 5. S.C. 5. Georgia 3.

M: Rutiwee moved that N. Hampshire be reduced from 3 to 2.
members. Her numbers did not entitle her to 3 and it was a poor
State.

Gen! PinKnky seconds the motion.

M: Kina. N. Hamshire has probably more than 120,000 Inhab‘
and has an extensive Country of tolerable fertility. Its inhabts

 

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; New York, South Carolina, no—2.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1787 227

therefore may + be expected to increase fast. He remarked that the
four Eastern States having 800,000 souls, have % fewer representa-
tives than the four Southern States, having not more than 700,000
souls rating the blacks, as 5 for 3. The Eastern people will advert
to these circumstances, and be dissatisfied. He believed them to be
very desirous of uniting with their Southern brethren, but did not
think it prudent to rely so far on that disposition as to subject them
to any gross inequality. He was fully convinced that the question
concerning a difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto
been discussed, between the great & small States; but between the
Southern & Eastern. For this reason he had been ready to yield
something in the proportion of representatives for the security of
the Southern. No principle would justify the giving them a majority.
They were brought as near an equality as was possible. He was not
averse to giving them a still greater security, but did not see how
it could be done.

Gen! Pryxney. The Report before it was committed was more
favorable to the S. States than as it now stands. If they are to form
so considerable a minority, and the regulation of trade is to be given
to the Gen! Government, they will be nothing more than overseers for
the Northern States. He did not expect the S. States to be raised to
a majority of representatives, but wished them to have something
like an equality. At present by the alterations of the Com? in favor
of the N. States they are removed farther from it than they were
before. One member had indeed? been added to Virg? which he
was glad of as he considered her as a Southern State. He was glad
also that the members of Georgia were increased.

M® Wiww1AMson was not for reducing N. Hamshire from 3 to 2.
but for reducing some others. The South? Interest must be ex-
tremely endangered by the present arrangement. The North? States
are to have a majority in the first instance and the means of perpetu-
ating it.

M! Dayton observed that the line between the * North? & Southern
interest had been improperly drawn: that P* was the dividing State,
there being six on each side of her.

Gen! PiInKNEY urged the reduction, dwelt on the superior wealth
of the Southern States, and insisted on its having its due weight in
the Government.

 

1The words “therefore may” are transposed to read “may therefore” in
the transcript. é

2The words “had indeed” are transposed to read “indeed had” in the
transcript. ‘ ; ;

The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.
228 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Gov! Morris regretted the turn of the debate. The States he
found had many Representatives on the floor. Few he fears+ were to
be deemed the Representatives of America. He thought the South-
ern States have by the report more than their share of representation.
Property ought to have its weight, but not all the weight. If the
South? States are to supply money. The North” States are to spill
their blood. Besides, the probable Revenue to be expected from the
S. States has been greatly overrated. He was ag*t reducing N.
Hamshire.

M: RanpDoLPH was opposed to a reduction of N. Hamshire, not
because she had a full title to three members: but because it was
in his contemplation 1.? to make it the duty instead of leaving it
in? the discretion of the Legislature to regulate the representation by
a periodical census. 2.2 to require more than a bare majority of
votes in the Legislature in certain cases, & particularly in commercial
cases. ,

On the question for reducing N. Hamshire from 3 to 2 Rep-
resent? it passed in the negative

Mas no. Cont no. N.J. no. P2 no. Del. no. M@ no. V# no.
N. C. ay.* 8S. ©. ay. Geo. no.* *

Gen! PINKNEY and M! ALex! Martin moved that 6 Rep® instead
of 5 be allowed to N. Carolina

On the Question, it passed in the negative.

Mas® no. Con! no. N.J. no. P? no. Del. no. Mé no. V* no.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

Gen! Pinkney & M? Butter made the same motion in favor of
8. Carolina.

On the Question it passed in the negative

Mas* no. Cons no. N.Y. no N.J. no. P* no. Del. ay. M2 no. V?
no. N. C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.®

Gen! Pinkney & M! Houston moved that Georgia be allowed 4

*In the printed Journal N.C. no. Georgia ay

 

1 The word “ feared” is substituted in the transcript for “ fears.”

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “ secondly ” in the
transcript.

* The word “to” is substituted in the transcript for “ in.”

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “North Carolina,* South Carolina, aye
—2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, Georgia,* no—8.”

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Virginia, no—7.”

° In the transcript the vote reads: “ Delaware, North Carolina, South Caro-

lina, Georgia, aye—4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no—7.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1787 229

instead of 3 Rep? urging the unexampled celerity of its population.
On the Question, it passed in the Negative

Mas‘ no. Cont no. N. Yno N.J. no. P2no. Del. no. Mé no.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.

M: Mapison, moved that the number allowed to each State be
doubled. A majority of a Quorum of 65 members, was too small a
number to to represent the whole inhabitants of the U. States; They
would not possess enough of the confidence of the people, and w4
be too sparsely taken from the people, to bring with them all the
local information which would be frequently wanted. Double the
number will not be too great, even with the future additions from
New States. The additional expence was too inconsiderable to be
regarded in so important a case. And as far as the augmentation
might be unpopular on that score, the objection was overbalanced
by its effect on the hopes of a greater number of the popular Candi-
dates.

M: E.sewortH urged the objection of expence, & that the greater
the number, the more slowly would the business proceed; and the
less probably be decided as it ought, at last. He thought the number
of Representatives too great in most of the State Legislatures: and
that a large number was less necessary in the Gen! Legislature than
in those of the States,—as its business would relate to a few great,
national Objects only.

M! SHERMAN would have preferred 50 to 65. The great distance
they will have to travel will render their attendance precarious and
will make it difficult to prevail on a sufficient number of fit men
to undertake the service. He observed that the expected increase
from New States also deserved consideration.

M: Gerry was for increasing the number beyond 65. The larger
the number, the less the danger of their being corrupted. The people
are accustomed to & fond of a numerous representation, and will
consider their rights as better secured by it. The danger of excess
in the number may be guarded ag* by fixing a point within which
the number shall always be kept.

Col. Mason admitted that the objection drawn from the con-
sideration of expence, had weight both in itself, and as the people
might be affected by it. But he thought it outweighed by the objec-
tions ag*t the smallness of the number. 38, will he supposes, as being
a majority of 65, form a quorum. 20 will be a majority of 38. This

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Georgia, aye—4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no—7.”
230 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

was certainly too small a number to make laws for America. They
would neither bring with them all the necessary information relative
to various local interests, nor possess the necessary confidence of the
people. After doubling the number, the laws might still be made
by so few as almost to be objectionable on that account.

M: Reap was in favor of the Motion. Two of the States [Del.
& R. I.] would have but a single member if the aggregate number
should remain at 65. and in case of accident to either of these one
State wi have no representative present to give explanations or in-
formations of its interests or wishes. The people would not place
their confidence in so small a number. He hoped the objects of the
Gen! Gov! would be much more numerous than seemed to be expected
by some gentlemen, and that they would become more & more so.
As to+ New States the highest number of Rep? for the whole might be
limited, and all danger of excess thereby prevented.

M* RutLivcE opposed the motion. The Representatives were too
numerous in all the States. The full number allotted to the States
may be expected to attend & the lowest possible quorum sh? not
therefore be considered. The interests of their Constituents will
urge their attendance too strongly for it to be omitted: and he sup-
posed the Gen! Legislature would not sit more than 6 or 8 weeks
in the year.

On the Question for doubling the number, it passed in the
negative.

Mas no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P# no. Del. ay.
M’ no. Ve ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no?

On the question for agreeing to the apportionment of Rep* ag
amended by the last committee, it passed in the affirmative

Mas. ay. Cont’ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. ay. Mé ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

M: Broom gave notice to the House that he had concurred with
a reserve to himself of an intention to claim for his State an equal
voice in the 2? branch: which he thought could not be denied after
this concession of the small States as to the first branch.

M? RanDoLpH moved as an amendment to the report of the
Comm: of five ‘‘ that in order to ascertain the alterations in the

 

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Delaware, Virginia, aye—2; Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—9.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
aye—9; South Carolina, Georgia, no—2.”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 1787 231

population & wealth of the several States the Legislature should be
required to cause a census, and estimate to be taken within one
year after its first meeting; and every years thereafter—and
that the Legisl arrange the Representation accordingly.’’

M* Gov: Morris opposed it as fettering the Legislature too much.
Advantage may be taken of it in time of war or the apprehension of
it, by new States to extort particular favors. If the mode was to
be fixed for taking a census, it might certainly be extremely incon-
venient: if unfixt the Legislature may use such a mode as will
defeat the object: and perpetuate the inequality. He was always ag*
such Shackles on the Legisl” They had been found very pernicious
in most of the State Constitutions. He dwelt much on the danger of
throwing such a preponderancy? into the Western Scale, suggesting
that in time the Western people w? outnumber the Atlantic States.
He wished therefore to put it in the power of the latter to keep a
majority of votes in their own hands. It was objected he said that if
the Legisl"? are left at liberty, they will never readjust the Rep-
resentation. He admitted that this was possible; but he did not think
it probable unless the reasons ag* a revision of it were very urgent
& in this case, it ought not to be done.

It was moved to postpone the proposition of M* Randolph in
order to take up the following, viz. ‘‘ that the Committee of Eleven,
to whom was referred the report of the Committee of five on the
subject of Representation, be requested to furnish the Convention
with the principles on which they grounded the Report,’’ which was
disagreed to: §. C. only? voting in the affirmative.

Adjourned

WEDNESDAY JuLY 11. iN CONVENTION

M: Randolph’s motion requiring the Legisl*® to take a periodical
census for the purpose of redressing inequalities in the Representa-
tion, was resumed.

M: SHERMAN was ag*t shackling the Legislature too much. We
ought to choose wise & good men, and then confide in them.

M? Mason. The greater the difficulty we find in fixing a proper
rule of Representation, the more unwilling ought we to be, to throw
the task from ourselves, on the Gen! Legisl"® He did not object to

 

1The word “preponderancy” is changed to “ preponderance” in the tran-
script.
* The word “alone” is substituted in the transcript for “only.”
232 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the conjectural ratio which was to prevail in the outset; but con-
sidered a Revision from time to time according to some permanent
& precise standard as essential to y? fair representation required in
the 1% branch. According to the present population of America,
the North? part of it had a right to preponderate, and he could
not deny it. But he wished it not to preponderate hereafter when
the reason no longer continued. From the nature of man we may
be sure, that those who have power in their hands will not give it
up while they can retain it. On the contrary we mow they will
always when they can rather increase it. If the 8. States therefore
should have 34 of the people of America within their limits, the
Northern will hold fast the majority of Representatives. %4 will
govern the 34. The S. States will complain: but they may complain
from generation to generation without redress. Unless some prin-
ciple therefore which will do justice to them hereafter shall be
inserted in the Constitution, disagreeable as the declaration was to
him, he must declare he could neither vote for the system here, nor
support it, in his State. Strong objections had been drawn from
the danger to the Atlantic interests from new Western States.
Ought we to sacrifice what we know to be right in itself, lest it
should prove favorable to States which are not yet in existence.
If the Western States are to be admitted into the Union, as they arise,
they must, he wi repeat, be treated as equals, and subjected to no
degrading discriminations. They will have the same pride & other
passions which we have, and will either not unite with or will speedily
revolt from the Union, if they are not in all respects placed on an
equal footing with their brethern. It has been said they will be
poor, and unable to make equal contributions to the general Treasury.
He did not know but that in time they would be both more numerous
& more wealthy than their Atlantic brethren. The extent & fertility
of their soil, made this probable; and though Spain might for a
time Ceprive them of the natural outlet for their productions, yet
she will, because she must, finally yield to their demands. He urged
that numbers of inhabitants; though not always a precise standard
of wealth was sufficiently so for every substantial purpose.

M! Wiuiamson was for making it the duty of the Legislature to
do what was right & not leaving it at liberty to do or not? do it.
He moved that M* Randolph’s proposition be postpon? in order
to consider the following ‘‘ that in order to ascertain the altera-
tions that may happen in the population & wealth of the several

 

* The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 1787 233

States, a census shall be taken of the free white inhabitants and
%™s of those of other descriptions on the 1% year after this Govern-
ment shall have been adopted and every year thereafter;
and that the Representation be regulated accordingly.’’

M: RanpotpH agreed that M* Williamson’s proposition should
stand in the place of his. He observed that the ratio fixt for the
1** meeting was a mere conjecture, that it placed the power in the
hands of that part of America, which could not always be entitled
to it, that this power would not be voluntarily renounced; and that
it was consequently the duty of the Convention to secure its renuncia-
tion when justice might so require; by some constitutional provisions.
If equality between great & small States be inadmissible, because in
that case unequal numbers of Constituents wi be represented by
equal number? of votes; was it not equally inadmissible that a
larger & more populous district of America should hereafter have
less representation, than a smaller & less populous district. If a fair
representation of the people be not secured, the injustice of the Govi
will shake it to its foundations. What relates to suffrage is justly
stated by the celebrated Montesquieu, as a fundamental article in
Republican Gov’ If the danger suggested by M* Gov: Morris be
real, of advantage being taken of the Legislature in pressing mo-
ments, it was an additional reason, for tying their hands in such a
manner that they could not sacrifice their trust to momentary con-
siderations. Cong? have pledged the public faith to New States,
that they shall be admitted on equal terms. They never would nor
ought to accede on any other. The census must be taken under the
direction of the General Legislature. The States will be too much
interested to take an impartial one for themselves.

M: Buriter & Gen! Prnxney insisted that blacks be included in
the rule of Representation, equally with the Whites: and for that
purpose moved that the words ‘‘ three fifths ’’ be struck out.

M: Gerry thought that % of them was to say the least the full
proportion that could be admitted.

M: Guorum. This ratio was fixed by Cong’ as a rule of taxa-
tion. Then it was urged by the Delegates representing the States
having slaves that the blacks were still more inferior to freemen.
At present when the ratio of representation is to be established,
we are assured that they are equal to freemen. The arguments on
y? former occasion had convineed him that % was pretty near the
just proportion and he should vote according to the same opinion
now.

 

1 The transcript uses the word “number ” in the plural.
234 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

MM: Butuer insisted that the labour of a slave in 8. Carol? was
as productive & valuable as that of a freeman in Mass‘, that as
wealth was the great means of defence and utility to the Nation
they were equally valuable to it with freemen; and that consequently
an equal representation ought to be allowed for them in a Govern-
ment which was instituted principally for the protection of property,
and was itself to be supported by property.

M! Mason, could not agree to the motion, notwithstand it
was favorable to Virg? because he thought it unjust. It was certain
that the slaves were valuable, as they raised the value of land, in-
creased the exports & imports, and of course the revenue, would
supply the means of feeding & supporting an army, and might in
cases of emergency become themselves soldiers. As in these impor-
tant respects they were useful to the community at large, they ought
not to be excluded from the estimate of Representation. He could
not however regard them as equal to freemen and could not vote
for them as such. He added as worthy of remark, that the Southern
States have this peculiar species of property, over & above the other
species of property common to all the States.

ME Wruu1aMson reminded M: Ghorum that if the South? States
contended for the inferiority of blacks to whites when taxation was
in view, the Eastern States on the same occasion contended for their
equality. He did not however either then or now, concur in either
extreme, but approved of the ratio of %.

On M: Butlers motion for considering blacks as equal to Whites
in the apportionmt of Representation.

Mass‘ no. Con! no. [N. Y. not on floor.] N.J. no. P* no. Del. ay.
Mé no. Vino N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.t

M= Gov! Morris said he had several objections to the proposition
of M: Williamson. 1.? It fettered the Legislature too much. 2.° it
would exclude some States altogether who would not have a sufficient
number to entitle them to a single Representative. 3.* it will not
consist with the Resolution passed on Saturday last authorising the
Legislature to adjust the Representation from time to time on the
principles of population & wealth or® with the principles of equity.
If slaves were to be considered as inhabitants, not as wealth, then

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, no—7; New York not on the floor.”

? The figure “1” is changed to “In the first place” in the transcript.

* The figure “2” is changed to “In the second place” in the transcript.

‘The figure “3” is changed to “In the third place” in the transcript.

° The word “or” is changed to “nor” in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 1787 235

the s? Resolution would not be pursued: If as wealth, then why is
no other wealth but slaves included? These objections may perhaps
be removed by amendments. His great objection was that the
number of inhabitants was not a proper standard of wealth. The
amazing difference between the comparative numbers & wealth of
different Countries, rendered all reasoning superfluous on the sub-
ject. Numbers might with greater propriety be deemed a measure
of stregth, than of wealth, yet the late defence made by G. Britain,
ag*t her numerous enemies proved in the clearest manner, that it is
entirely fallacious even in this respect.

M: Kine thought there was great force in the objections of M'
Gov! Morris: he would however accede to the proposition for the
sake of doing something.

M: RourtimwceE contended for the admission of wealth in the esti-
mate by which Representation should be regulated. The Western
States will not be able to contribute in proportion to their numbers;
they sh? not therefore be represented in that proportion. The At-
lantic States will not concur in such a plan. He moved that ‘‘ at
the end of years after the 1% meeting of the Legislature,
and of every years thereafter, the Legislature shall proportion
the Representation according to the principles of wealth & popu-
lation’’

M: SHERMAN thought the number of people alone the best rule
for measuring wealth as well as representation; and that if the
Legislature were to be governed by wealth, they would be obliged
to estimate it by numbers. He was at first for leaving the matter
wholly to the discretion of the Legislature; but he had been con-
vinced by the observations of [M? Randolph & M* Mason,] that the
periods & the rule, of revising the Representation ought to be fixt by
the Constitution

M Rew thought the Legislature ought not to be too much
shackled. It would make the Constitution like Religious Creeds, em-
barrassing to those bound to conform to them & more likely to produce
dissatisfaction and scism, than harmony and union.

M: Mason objected to (Mt Rutlidge motion, as requiring of the
Legislature something too indefinite & impracticable, and leaving
them a pretext for doing nothing.

M*: Wison had himself no objection to leaving the Legislature
entirely at liberty. But considered wealth as an impracticable rule.

M: Guorum. If the Convention who are comparatively so little
biassed by local views are so much perplexed, How can it be ex-
pected that the Legislature hereafter under the full biass of those
236 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

views, will be able to settle a standard. He was convinced by the
arguments of others & his own reflections, that the Convention ought
to fix some standard or other.

M: Govt Morris. The arg‘? of others & his own reflections had
led him to a very different conclusion. If we can’t agree on a rule
that will be just at this time, how can we expect to find one that
will be just in all times to come. Surely those who come after us
will judge better of things present, than we can of things future.
He could not persuade himself that numbers would be a just rule at
any time. The remarks of [M? Mason] relative to the Western
Country had not changed his opinion on that head. Among other
objections it must be apparent they would not be able to furnish
men equally enlightened, to share in the administration of our com-
mon interests. The Busy haunts of men not the remote wilderness,
was the proper school of political Talents. If the Western people
get the power into their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interests.
The Back members are always most averse to the best measures. He
mentioned the case of Pen* formerly. The lower part of the State
had y°? power in the first instance. They kept it in y',own hands
& the Country was y® better for it. Another objection with him
agst admitting the blacks into the census, was that the people of
Pen* would revolt at the idea of being put on a footing with slaves.
They would reject any plan that was to have such an effect. Two
objections had been raised ag*t leaving the adjustment of the Rep-
resentation from time, to time, to the discretion of the Legislature.
The 1.1 was they would be unwilling to revise it at all. The 2.? that by
referring to wealth they would be bound by a rule which if willing,
they would be unable to execute. The 1% obj? distrusts their fidelity.
But if their duty, their honor & their oaths will not bind them, let
us not put into their hands our liberty, and all our other great
interests: let us have no Gov‘ at all. 2.2 If these ties will bind them,
we need not distrust the practicability of the rule. It was followed
in part by the Com? in the apportionment of Representatives yester-
day reported to the House. The best course that could be taken
would be to leave the interests of the people to the Representatives
of the people.

M? Mapison, was not a little surprised to hear this implicit con-
fidence urged by a member who on all occasions, had inculeated so
strongly, the political depravity of men, and the necessity of check-

 

*The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “second” in the
transcript.

2 The figure “2” is changed to “In the second place” in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 1787 237

ing one vice and interest by opposing to them another vice & interest.
If the Representatives of the people would be bound by the ties he
had mentioned, what need was there of a Senate? What of a Re-
visionary power? But his reasoning was not only inconsistent with
his former reasoning, but with itself. At the same time that he recom-
mended this implicit confidence to the Southern States in the North-
ern Majority, he was still more zealous in exhorting all to a jealousy
of* Western Majority. To reconcile the gentl” with himself, it it
must be imagined that he determined the human character by the
points of the compass. The truth was that all men having power
ought to be distrusted to a certain degree. The case of Pen* had
been mentioned where it was admitted that those who were possessed
of the power in the original settlement, never admitted the new
settlem* to a due share of it. England was a still more striking
example. The power there had long been in the hands of the bor-
oughs, of the minority; who had opposed & defeated every reform
which had been attempted. Virg? was in a lesser? degree another
example. With regard to the Western States, he was clear & firm
in opinion, that no unfavorable distinctions were admissible either
in point of justice or policy. He thought also that the hope of con-
tributions to the Treas’ from them had been much underrated.
Future contributions it seemed to be understood on all hands would
be principally levied on imports & exports. (The extent and and fer-
tility of the Western Soil would for a long time give to agriculture a
preference over manufactures. Trials would be repeated till some
articles could be raised from it that would bear a transportation to
places where they could be exchanged for imported manufactures.
Whenever the Mississpi should be opened to them, which would of
necessity be y? case, as soon as their population would subject them to
any considerable share of the public burdin, imposts on their trade
could be collected with less expence & greater certainty, than on that
of the Atlantic’ States. In the mean time, as their supplies must
pass thro’ the Atlantic States, their contributions would be levied
in the same manner with those of the Atlantic States—He could not
agree that any substantial objection lay ag*' fixi? numbers for the
perpetual standard of Representation. It was said that Represen-
tation & taxation were to go together; that taxation and wealth ought
to go together, that population & wealth were not measures of each
other. He admitted that in different climates, under different forms
of Gov! and in different stages of civilization the inference was per-

 

The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
? The word “lesser ” is changed to “less” in the transcript.
238 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

fectly just. He would admit that in no situation, numbers of in-
habitants were an accurate measure of wealth. He contended how-
ever that in the U. States it was sufficiently so for the object in
contemplation. Altho’ their climate varied considerably, yet as the
Gov® the laws, and the manners of all were nearly the same, and
the intercourse between different parts perfectly free, population,
industry, arts, and the value of labour, would constantly tend to
equalize themselves. The value of labour, might be considered as
the principal criterion of wealth and ability to support taxes; and
this would find its level in different places where the inteleourse
should be easy & free, with as much certainty as the value of money
or any other thing. Wherever labour would yield most, people would
resort, till the competition should destroy the inequality. Hence it
is that the people are constantly swarming from the more to the less
populous places—from Europe to Am* from the North? & Middle
parts of the U. 8. to the Southern & Western. They go where land
is cheaper, because there labour is dearer. If it be true that the
same quantity of produce raised on the banks of the Ohio is of less
value, than on the Delaware, it is also true that the same labor
will raise twice or thrice, the quantity in the former, that it will
raise in the latter situation. )

Col. Mason. Agreed with M= Gov! Morris that we ought to
leave the interests of the people to the Representatives of the people:
but the objection was that the Legislature would cease to be the
Representatives of the people. It would continue so no longer than
the States now containing a majority of the people should retain that
majority. As soon as the Southern & Western population should
predominate, which must happen in a few years, the power w? be
in the hands of the minority, and would never be yielded to the
majority, unless provided for by the Constitution

On the Question for postponing M: Williamson’s motion, in order
to consider that of M? Rutlidge it passed in the negative. Mass‘? ay.
Cont no. N. J. no. Pt ay. Del. ay. M@ no. V2? no. N. ©. no.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

On the question on the first clause of M! Williamson’s motion
as to taking a census of the free inhabitants; it passed in the affirma-
tive Mas’? ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. no. M@no. V? ay.
N.C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

 

7In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, no—5.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 1787 239

the next clause as to % of the negroes? considered.

M: Kine. being much opposed to fixing numbers as the rule of
representation, was particularly so on account of the blacks. He
thought the admission of them along with Whites at all, would
excite great discontents among the States having no slaves. He
had never said as to any particular point that he would in no event
acquiesce in & support it; but he wi say that if in any case such a
declaration was to be made by him, it would be in this. He remarked
that in the temporary allotment of Representatives made by the
Committee, the Southern States had received more than the number
of their white & three fifths of their black inhabitants entitled
them to.

M: Suerman. S. Carol? had not more beyond her proportion
than N. York & N. Hampshire, nor either of them more than was
necessary in order to avoid fractions or reducing them below their
proportion. Georgia had more; but the rapid growth of that, State
seemed to justify it. In general the allotment might not be just,
but considering all circumstances, he was satisfied with it.

M= GHorum. supported the propriety of establishing numbers as
the rule. He said that in Mass‘s estimates had been taken in the
different towns, and that persons had been curious enough to com-
pare these estimates with the respective numbers of people; and
it had been found even including Boston, that the most exact pro-
portion prevailed between numbers & property. He was aware that
there might be some weight in what had fallen from his colleague,
as to the umbrage which might be taken by the people of the
Eastern States. But he recollected that when the proposition of
Cong® for changing the 8 art: of Confed? was before the Legis-
lature of Mass*s the only difficulty then was to satisfy them that the
negroes ought not to have been counted equally with * whites instead
of being counted in the ratio of three fifths only.*

M" Wison did not well see on what principle the admission of
blacks in the proportion of three fifths could be explained. Are
they admitted as Citizens? then why are they not admitted on an
equality with White Citizens? are they admitted as property? then
why is not other property admitted into the computation? These

* They were then to have been a rule of taxation only.

 

Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, aye—6; Delaware, Maryland,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—4.” ; .

1The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
240 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

were difficulties however which he thought must be overruled by the
necessity of compromise. He had some apprehensions also from the
tendency of the blending of the blacks with the whites, to give dis-.
gust to the people of Pen? as had been intimated by his Colleague
[M: Gov? Morris]. But he differed from him in thinking numbers
of inhab®s so incorrect a measure of wealth. He had seen the West-
ern settlem’ of P* and on a comparison of them with the City of
Philad? could discover little other difference, than that property
was more unequally divided among individuals* here than there. Tak-
ing the same number in the aggregate in the two situations he be-
lieved there would be little difference in their wealth and ability to
contribute to the public wants.

M: Govt Morris was compelled to declare himself reduced to the
dilemma of doing injustice to the Southern States or to human
nature, and he must therefore do it to the former. For he could
never agree to give such encouragement to the slave trade as would
be given by allowing them a representation for their negroes, and he
did not believe those States would ever confederate on terms that
would deprive them of that trade.

On? Question for agreeing to include % of the blacks

Mass** no. Cont ay. N.J. no. P? no. Del. no. Mard.* no. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay *

On the question as to taking? census ‘‘ the first year after? meet-
ing of the Legislature ”’

Mas ay. Cont no. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. M4 no. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S. ay. Geo. no.?

On filling the blank for the periodical census, with 15 years.”’
Agreed to nem. con.

M: Mapison moved to add after ‘‘15 years,’’ the words ‘‘ at
least ’’ that the Legislature might anticipate when circumstances
were likely to render a particular year inconvenient.

* [Mr Carrol s¢ in explanation of the vote of M4 that he wished the phrase-
ology® to be so altered as to obviate if possible the danger which had been
expressed of giving umbrage to the Eastern & Middle States. ]

 

1 The words ‘* among individuals” are omitted in the transcript.

? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The transcript italicizes the word “ phraseology.”

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye—4; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land,* South Carolina, no—6.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—7; Connecticut,
Maryland, Georgia, no—3.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1787 24r

On this motion for adding ‘‘ at least,’’ it passed in the negative
-the States being equally divided.

Mas. ay. Conf no. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. no. M‘ no. V® ay.
N. C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.t

A Change of? the phraseology of the other clause so as to read;
“‘and the Legislature shall alter or augment the representation
accordingly ’’ was agreed to nem. con.

On the question on the whole resolution of M! Williamson as
amended.

Mas. no. Cont no. N.J.no. Del. no, Mino. V2 no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.® +

THourspay. JULY 12. IN CoNvVENTION

M: Gov! Morris moved to add to the clause empowering the Legis-
lature to vary the Representation according to the principles of
wealth & number ° of inhab® a ‘‘ proviso that taxation shall be in pro-
portion to Representation.’’

M? Butter contended again that Representation s‘ be according to
the full number of inhab*® including all the blacks; admitting the
justice of M! Gov! Morris’s motion.

M? Mason also admitted the justice of the principle, but was
afraid embarrassments might be occasioned to the Legislature by it.
It might drive the Legislature to the plan of Requisitions.

M« Gov? Morris, admitted that some objections lay ag* his
motion, but supposed they would be removed by restraining the
rule to direct taxation. With regard to indirect taxes on exports &
imports & on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable. Not-
withstanding what had been said to the contrary he was persuaded
that the imports & consumption were pretty nearly equal through-
out the Union.

General Pinkney liked the idea. He thought it so just that it
could not be objected to. But foresaw that if the revision of the

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, no—5.”

2 The word. “in” is substituted in the transcript for “ of.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
no—9; so it was rejected unanimously.”

*The word “ Adjourned” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The transcript uses the word “number” in the plural.
242 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

census was left to the discretion of the Legislature, it would never
be carried into execution. The rule must be fixed, and the execu-
tion of it enforced by the Constitution. He was alarmed at what
was said yesterday,* concerning the negroes. He was now again
alarmed at what had been thrown out concerning the taxing of
exports. S. Carol? has in one year exported to the amount of
£600,000 Sterling all which was the fruit of the labor of her blacks.
Will she be represented in proportion to this amount? She will not.
Neither ought she then to be subject to a tax on it. He hoped a
clause would be inserted in the system, restraining the Legislature
from a? taxing Exports.

Mt Wison approved the principle, but could not see how it could
be carried into execution; unless restrained to direct taxation.

M: Gov! Morris having so varied his Motion by inserting
the word “ direct.’? It pass‘ nem. con. as follows—‘‘ provided
always that direct taxation ought to be proportioned to representa-
tion.”’

M: Davie, said it was high time now to speak out. He saw that
it was meant by some gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of
any share of Representation for their blacks. He was sure that N.
Carol? would never confederate on any terms that did not rate them
at least as %. If the Eastern States meant therefore to exclude them
altogether the business was at an end.

D? JoHNnson, thought that wealth and population were the true,
equitable rule? of representation; but he conceived that these two
principles resolved themselves into one; population being the best
measure of wealth. He concluded therefore that ye. number of
people ought to be established as the rule, and that all descriptions
including blacks equally with the whites, ought to fall within the
computation. As various opinions had been expressed on the sub-
ject, he would move that a Committee might be appointed to take
them into consideration and report thereon.

M: Gov Morris. It has* been said that it is high time to speak
out, as one member, he would candidly do so. He came here to form
a compact for the good of America. He was ready to do so with
all the States. He hoped & believed that all would enter into such
a Compact. If they would not he was ready to join with any States
that would. But as the Compact was to be voluntary, it is in vain

* By Mr Govr Morris.

 

* The word “a” is omitted in the transcript.
2 The transcript uses the word “rule” in the plural.
*The word “had” is substituted in the transcript for “ has.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1787 243

for the Eastern States to insist on what the South® States will never
agree to. It is equally vain for the latter to require what the other
States can never admit; and he verily believed the people of Pen’
will never agree to a representation of Negroes. What can be
desired by these States more than has been already proposed; that
the Legislature shall from time to time regulate Representation
according to population & wealth.

Gen! PINKNEY desired that the rule of wealth should be ascer-
tained and not left to the pleasure of the Legislature; and that
property in slaves should not be exposed to danger under a Gov!
instituted for the protection of property.

The first clause in the Report of the first Grand Committee was
postponed.

M! ExsewortH. In order to carry into effect the principle estab-
lished, moved to add to the last clause adopted by the House the
words following ‘‘ and that the rule of contribution by direct
taxation for the support of the Government of the U. States shall
be the number of white inhabitants, and three fifths of every other
description in the several States, until some other rule that shall more
accurately ascertain the wealth of the several States can be devised
and adopted by the Legislature.”’

M: Butwer seconded the motion in order that it might be com-
mitted.

M: RanvoLeH was not satisfied with the motion. The danger
will be revived that the ingenuity of the Legislature may evade or
pervert the rule so as to perpetuate the power where it shall be
lodged in the first instance. He proposed in lieu of M?: Elseworth’s
motion, ‘‘ that in order to ascertain the alterations in Representa-
tion that may be required from time to time by changes in the rela-
tive circumstances of the States, a census shall be taken within
two years from the 1%* meeting of the Gen! Legislature of the U. S.,
and once within the term of every year afterwards, of all the
inhabitants in the manner & according to the ratio recommended by
Congress in their resolution of the 18" day of Ap! 1783; [rating the
blacks at % of their number] and, that the Legislature of the U. S.
shall arrange the Representation accordingly.’’-- He urged strenu-
ously that express security ought to be provided for including slaves
in the ratio of Representation. He lamented that such a species of
property existed. But as it did exist the holders of it would require
this security. It was perceived that the design was entertained by
some of excluding slaves altogether; the Legislature therefore ought
not to be left at liberty.
244 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Exvseworra withdraws his motion & seconds that of M:
Randolph.

M! WItson observed that less umbrage would perhaps be taken,
ag an admission of the slaves into the Rule of representation, if it
should be so expressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient
in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the rule of taxation:
and as representation was to be according to taxation, the end would
be equally attained. He accordingly moved & was 25% so to alter
the last clause adopted by the House, that together with the amend-
ment proposed the whole should read as follows—provided always
that the representation ought to be proportioned according to direct
taxation, and in order to ascertain the alterations in the direct taxa-
tion which may be required from time to time by the changes in the
relative circumstances of the States. Resolved that a census be taken
within two years from the first meeting of the Legislature of the
U. States, and once within the term of every years afterwards
of all the inhabitants of the U. S. in the manner and according to
the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of April 18.1
1783; and that the Legislature of the U. 8. shall proportion the
direct taxation accordingly.’’

M: King. Altho’ this amendment varies the aspect somewhat, he
had still two powerful objections ag* tying down the Legislature to
the rule of numbers. 1.2 they were at this time an uncertain index
of the relative wealth of the States. 2.? if they were a just index
at this time it can not be supposed always to continue so. He was
far from wishing to retain any unjust advantage whatever in one
part of the Republic. If justice was not the basis of the connection
it could not be of long duration. He must be shortsighted indeed
who does not foresee that whenever the Southern States shall be more
numerous than the Northern, they can & will hold a language that
will awe them into justice. If they threaten to separate now in case
injury shall be done them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual,
when force shall back their demands. Even in the intervening
period, there will? no point of time at which they will not be able to
say, do us justice or we will separate. He urged the necessity of
placing confidence to a certain degree in every Govi and did not
conceive that the proposed confidence as to a periodical readjust-
ment, of the representation exceeded that degree.

 

+The date “April 18” is changed to “the eighteenth day of April” in the
transcript.

2The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “ first” and “secondly” in the
transcript.

* The word “be” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1787 245

M: PinxNnEy moved to amend M? Randolph’s motion so as to
make ‘‘ blacks equal to the whites in the ratio of representation.”’
This he urged was nothing more than justice. The blacks are the
labourers, the peasants of the Southern States: they are as pro-
ductive of pecuniary resources as those of the Northern States. They
add equally to the wealth, and considering money as the sinew of war,
to the strength of the nation. It will also be politic with regard
to the Northern States, as taxation is to keep pace with Represen-
tation.

Gen! PINKNEY moves to insert 6 years instead of two, as the
period computing from 1% meeting of y? Legis— within which the
first census should be taken. On this question for inserting six? in-
stead of ‘‘ two ’’ in the proposition of M! Wilson, it passed in the
affirmative

Masts. no. Ctay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. div’ May‘ ay. V®# no.
N.C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.®

On a* question for filling the blank for y? periodical census with
20 years, it it passed in the negative.

Mas’? no. Cf ay. N.J. ay. P. ay. Del. no. M? no. V? no.
N. C. no. §. C. no. Geo. no.®

On a* question for 10 years, it passed in the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Con! no. N.J. no. P. ay. Del. ay. M? ay. V2 ay. N.C.
ay. 8S. C. ay. Geo. ay.®

On M:! Pinkney’s motion for rating blacks as equal to Whites
instead of as %—

Mas. no. Cont no. [D* Johnson ay] N. J. no. P? no. [8 ag
2.] Del. no. M? no. V2 no. N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo—ay.’

M: Randolph’s proposition as varied by M! Wilson being read
for ® question on the whole.

M: Gerry, urged that the principle of it could not be carried

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2'The word “years” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, South Carolina, aye—5; Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, no—4; Delaware, divided.”

*The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “a.”

5In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, aye—3; Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.” :

®In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
Connecticut, New Jersey, no—2.” : ;

7 In the transcript the vote reads: “ South Carolina, Georgia, aye—2; Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, [Doctor Johnson, aye], New Jersey, Pennsylvania, [3
against 2] Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—8.”

® The words “ taking the” are here inserted in the transcript.
246 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

into execution as the States were not to be taxed as States. With
regard to taxes in* imports, ke conceived they would be more pro-
ductive. Where there were no slaves than where there were; the con-
sumption being greater—

M! ExseworTH. in case of a poll tax there w? be no difficulty.
But there wi probably be none. The sum allotted to a State may be
levied without difficulty according to the plan used by the State in
raising its own supplies. On the question on y! whole proposition; as
proportioning representation to direct taxation & both to the white
& % of2 black inhabitants, & requiring a Census within six years—
& within every ten years afterwards.

Mas. div’ Cont ay. N,J. no. P? ay. Del. no. Mi ay. V? ay. N.C.
ay. S.C. div? Geo. ay. *

Froay. Jury 13. In CoNVENTION

It being moved to postpone the clause in the Report of the
Committee of Eleven as to the originating of money bills in the? first
branch, in order to take up the following—‘‘ that in the 2? branch
each State shall have an equal voice.”’

M! Gerry, moved to add as an amendment to the last clause
agreed to by the House, ‘‘ that from the first meeting of the Legis-
lature of the U. S. till a census shall be taken all monies to be
raised for supplying the public Treasury by direct taxation, shall be
assessed on the inhabitants of the several States according to the
number of their Representatives respectively in the 1** branch.’’
He said this would be as just before as after the Census: according
to the general principle that taxation & Representation ought to go
together.

M? Wiuuiamson feared that N. Hamshire will have reason to
complain. 3 members were allotted to her as a liberal allowance,
for this reason among others, that she might not suppose any ad-
vantage to have been taken of her absence. As she was still absent,
and had no opportunity of deciding whether she would chuse to
retain the number on the condition, of her being taxed in proportion

 

>The word “on” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

>In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; New Jersey, Delaware, no—2; Massa-
chusetts, South Carolina, divided.”

* The word “ Adjourned” is here inserted in the transcript.

° The word “the” is not italicized in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1787 247

to it, he thought the number ought to be reduced from three to two,
before the question ? on M! G’s motion.

M: Reap could not approve of the proposition. He had observed
he said in the Committee a backwardness in. some of the members
from the large States, to take their full proportion of Representatives.
He did not then see the motive. He now suspects it was to avoid their
due share of taxation. He had no objection to a just & accurate
adjustment of Representation & taxation to each other.

M* Gov! Morris & M! Maptson answered that the charge itself
involved an acquittal, since notwithstanding the augmentation of
the number of members allotted to Mas*® & V* the motion for pro-
portioning the burdens thereto was made by a member from the
former State & was approved by M™- M from the latter who was on
the Com? M: Gov! Morris said that he thought P? had her due
share in 8 members; and he could not in candor ask for more.
M M. said that having always conceived that the difference of interest
in the U. States lay not between the large & small, but the N. &
South? States, and finding that the number of members allotted to
the N. States was greatly superior, he should have preferred, an
addition of two members to the S. States, to wit one to N. & 1 to
S. Carl* rather than of one member to Virg? He liked the present
motion, because it tended to moderate the views both of the oppo-
nents & advocates for rating very high, the negroes.

M! ELsewortH hoped the proposition would be withdrawn. It
entered too much into detail. The general principle was already
sufficiently settled. As fractions can not be regarded in apportion-
ing the N° of representatwes, the rule will be unjust, until an actual
census shall be made. after that taxation may be precisely propor-
tioned according to the principle established, to the number of
inhabitants.

M: Witson hoped the motion would not be withdrawn. If it sh4
it will be made from another quarter. The rule will be as reason-
able & just before, as after a Census. As to fractional numbers,
the Census will not distroy, but ascertain them. And they will
have the same effect after as before the Census: for as he under-
stands the rule, it is to be adjusted not to the number of inhabitants,
but of Representatives.

M: SHERMAN opposed the motion. He thought the Legislature
ought to be left at liberty: in which case they would probably con-
form to the principles observed by Cong?

 

2The words “was taken” are here inserted in the transcript.
248 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M! Mason did not know that Virg? would be a loser by the pro-
posed regulation, but had some scruple as to the justice of it. He
doubted much whether the conjectural rule which was to precede the
Census, would be as just, as it would be rendered by an actual census,

M: Exvsewortu & M! SHERMAN moved to postpone the motion of
M: Gerry, on y? question, it passed in the negative.

Mas. no. Cont ay. N.J. ay. P* no. Del. ay. M? ay. V2 no. N.C.
no. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

2 Question on M! Gerry’s motion; it passed in the negative, the
States being equally divided.

Mas. ay. Cont no. N.J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M? no. V2 no. N.O.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.®

M! Gerry finding that the loss of the question had proceeded
from an objection with some, to the proposed assessment of direct
taxes on the inhabitants of the States, which might restrain the Legis-
lature to a poll tax, moved his proposition again, but so varied as
to authorise the assessment on the States, which w? leave *-the mode
to the Legislature, at this caret insert the words interlined © viz ‘‘ that
from the 13 meeting of the Legislature of the U. S. untill a census
shall be taken, all monies for supplying the public Treasury by direct
taxation shall be raised from the said several States according to the
number of their representatives respectively in thé 15* branch.’’

On this varied question, it passed in the affirmative

Mas. ay. Cont no. N. J. no. P% divt Del. no. M@no. V2 ay.
N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.®

On the motion of M* Randolph, the vote of saturday? last
authorising the Legisl* to adjust from time to time, the representa-
tion upon the principles of wealth & numbers of inhabitants was
reconsidered by common consent in order to strike out ‘‘ Wealth 2”
and adjust the resolution to that requiring periodical revisions ac-
cording to the number of whites & three fifths of the blacks: the

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, aye—4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

2The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, no—5.”

“The word “ leaves” is substituted in the transcript for “wd leave.”

* Madison’s direction concerning the interlined words is omitted in the
transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, no—4; Pennsylvania, divided.”

* The word “ saturday” is changed to “ Monday” in the transcript.

® The transcript italicizes the word “ Wealth.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JULY 13, 1787 249

motion was in the words following—‘‘ But as the present situation
of the States may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants,
that the Legislature of the U. S. be authorized from time to time to
apportion the number of representatives: and in case any of the
States shall hereafter be divided or any two or more States united
or new States created within the limits of the U. S. the Legislature
of? U. S. shall possess authority to regulate the number of Rep-
resentatives in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their
number of inhabitants; according to the provisions hereafter men-
tioned.”’

M: Gov? Morris opposed the alteration as leaving still an inco-
herence. If Negroes were to be viewed as inhabitants, and the
revision was to proceed on the principle of numbers of inhab® they
ought to be added in their entire number, and not in the proportion of
36. If as property, the word wealth was right, and striking it out,
would produce the very inconsistency which it was meant to get rid
of.—The train of business & the late turn which it had taken, had led
him he said, into deep meditation on it, and He w* candidly state
the result. A distinction had been set up & urged, between the
N® & South® States. He had hitherto considered this doctrine as
heretical. He still thought the distinction groundless. He sees
however that it is persisted in, and that the South? Gentlemen will not
be satisfied unless they see the way open to their gaining a majority
in the public Councils. The consequence of such a transfer of power
from the maritime to the interior & landed interest will he foresees be
such an oppression of ? commerce, that he shall be obliged to vote for
y? vicious principle of equality in the 24 branch in order to provide
some defence for the N. States ag% it. But to come more to the
point; either this distinction is fictitious or real; if fictitious let it
be dismissed & let us proceed with due confidence. If it be real,
instead of attempting to blend incompatible things, let us at once take
a friendly leave of each other. There can be no end of demands
for security if every particular interest is to be entitled to it. The
Eastern States may claim it for their fishery, and for other objects,
as the South" States claim it for their peculiar objects. In this
struggle between the two ends of the Union, what part ought the
middle States in point of policy to take: to join their Eastern
brethren according to his ideas. If the South States get the power
into their hands, and be joined as they will be withthe interior

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
2The word “to” is substituted in the transcript for “ of.”
2950 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Country, they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the
Mississippi. This language is already held. The interior Country
having no property nor interest exposed on the sea, will be little
affected by such a war. He wished to know what security the
North? & middle States will have ag this danger. It has been said
that N. C. S. C., and Georgia only will in a little time have a
majority of the people of America. They must in that case include
the great interior Country, and every thing was to be apprehended
from their getting the power into their hands.

M! Buturr. The security the South” States want is that their
negroes may not be taken from them, which some gentlemen within
or without doors, have a very good mind to do. It was not sup-
posed that N. C. 8S. C. & Geo. would have more people than all the
other States, but many more relatively to the other States than they
now have. The people & strength of America are evidently bearing
Southwardly & S. westw*¥

M Witson. If a general declaration would satisfy any gentle-
man he had no indisposition to declare his sentiments. Conceiving
that all men wherever placed have equal rights and are equally
entitled to confidence, he viewed without apprehension the period
when a few States should contain the superior number of people.
The majority of people wherever found ought in all questions to
govern the minority. If the interior Country should acquire this
majority, it will not only have the right, but will avail themselves?
of it whether we will or no. This jealousy misled the policy of G.
Britain with regard to America. The fatal maxims espoused by her
were that the Colonies were growing too fast, and that their growth
must be stinted in time. What were the consequences? first. enmity
on our part, then actual separation. Like consequences will result
on the part of the interior settlements, if like jealousy & policy be
pursued on ours. Further, if numbers be not a proper rule, why is
not some better rule pointed out. No one has yet ventured to at-
tempt it. Cong? have never been able to discover a better. No
State as far as he had heard, has suggested any other. In 1783, after
elaborate discussion of a measure of wealth all were satisfied then
as they are now that the rule of numbers, does not differ much from
the combined rule of numbers & wealth. Again he could not agree
that property was the sole or the ? primary object of Governt & society.
The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most
noble object. With respect to this object, as well as to other personal

 

+The word “itself” is substituted in the transcript for “themselves.”
? The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JULY 14, 1787 251

rights, numbers were surely the natural & precise measure of Rep-
resentation. And with respect to property, they could not vary
much from the precise measure. In no point of view however could
the establishm! of numbers as the rule of representation in the 1%
branch vary his opinion as to the impropriety of letting a vicious
principle into the 2? branch.—On the Question to strike out wealth,
& to make the change as moved by M! Randolph, it passed in the
affirmative—

Mas. ay. Cont ay. N.J. ay. P% ay. Del. div’ M® ay. V® ay.
N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.

M REED moved to insert after the word— ‘‘divided,”’ ‘‘or enlarged
by addition of territory ’’ which was agreed to nem. con. [his object
probably was to provide for such cases as an enlargem? of Delaware by
annexing to it the Peninsula on the East side of ? Chesapeak]

Adjourned.

Saturpay. JuLty 14. in CoNvVENTION

M: L. Martin called for the question on the whole report, in-
cluding the parts relating to the origination of money bills, and the
equality of votes in the 2¢ branch.

M: Gerry. wished before the question should be put, that the at-
tention of the House might be turned to the dangers apprehended
from Western States. He was for admitting them on liberal terms,
but not for putting ourselves into their hands. They will if they
acquire power like all men, abuse it. They will oppress commeree,
and drain our wealth into the Western Country. To guard ag*
these consequences, he thought it necessary to limit the number of
new States to be admitted into the Union, in such a manner, that
they should never be able to outnumber the Atlantic States. He
accordingly moved ‘‘ that in order to secure the liberties of the States
already confederated, the number of Representatives in the 1%* branch,
of the States which shall hereafter be established, shall never exceed
in number, the Representatives from such of the States as shall
accede to this confederation.

M: Kina. seconded the motion.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Delaware, divided.” . ; ;

2'The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript; and the sentence in
brackets is a footnote.
252 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M:; SHerman, thought there was no probability that the number
of future States would exceed that of the Existing States. If the
event should ever happen, it was too remote to be taken into con-
sideration at this time. Besides We are providing for our posterity,
for our children & our grand Children, who would be as likely to be
citizens of new Western States, as of the old States. On this con-
‘sideration alone, we ought to make no such discrimination as was
proposed by the motion.

M! Gerry. If some of our children should remove, others will
stay behind, and he thought it incumbent on us to provide for their
interests. There was a rage for emigration from the Eastern States
to the Western Country, and he did not wish those remaining behind
to be at the mercy of the Emigrants. Besides foreigners are resort-
ing to that country, and it is uncertain what turn things may take
there.—On the question for agreeing to the Motion of M! Gerry, it
passed in the negative.

Mas. ay. Cont ay. N.J. no. P? div’ Del: ay. M? ay. V? no.
N. C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. not

M: RutuivcE proposed to reconsider the two propositions touch-
ing the originating of money bills in the first & the equality of votes
in the second branch. :

M Suerman was for the question on the whole at once. It was
he said a conciliatory plan, it had been considered in all its parts, a
great deal of time had been spent on? it, and if any part should
now be altered, it would be necessary to go over the whole ground
again.

ME L. Martin urged the question on the whole. He did not like
many parts of it. He did not like having two branches, nor the in-
equality of votes in the 1% branch. He was willing however to make
trial of the plan, rather than do nothing.

MM Witson traced the progress of the report through its several
stages, remarking y! when on the question concerning an equality of
votes, the House was divided, our Constituents had they voted as
their representatives did, would have stood as %4 ag%t the equality,
and % only in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known, and
it will® appear that this fundamental point has been carried by %
ag*t %. What hopes will our Constituents entertain when they find

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware,
Maryland, aye—4; New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no—5; Pennsylvania, divided.”

? The word “upon” is substituted in the transcript for “ on.”

* The word “ would” is substituted in the transcript for “ will.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JULY 14, 1787 253

that the essential principles of justice have been violated in the outset
of the Governm! As to the privilege of originating money bills, it
was not considered by any as of much moment, and by many as
improper in itself. He hoped both clauses w‘ be reconsidered. The
equality of votes was a point of such critical importance, that every
opportunity ought to be allowed, for discussing and collecting the
mind of the Convention on ‘ it.

M: L. Martin denies that there were % ag%’ the equality of
votes. The States that please fo call themselves large, are the weekest
in the Union. Look at Mas® Look at Virg? Are they efficient
States? He was for letting a separation take place if they desired it.
He had rather there should be two Confederacies, than one founded
on any other principle than an equality of votes in the 2? branch
at least.

M: WILson was not surprised that those who say that a minority
is * more than the * majority should say that * the minority is stronger
than the majority. He supposed the next assertion will be that they
are richer also; though he hardly expected it would be persisted in
when the States shall be called on for taxes & troops—

M! Gerry. also animadverted on M! L. Martins remarks on the
weakness of Masts He favored the reconsideration with a view not
of destroying the equality of votes; but of providing that the States
should vote per capita, which he said would prevent the delays &
inconveniences that had been experienced in Cong’ and would give a
national aspect & Spirit to the management of business. He did
not approve of a reconsideration of the clause relating to money
bills. It was of great consequence. It was the corner stone of the
accomodation. If any member of the Convention had the exclusive
privilege of making propositions, would any one say that it would
give him no advantage over other members. The Report was not
altogether to his mind. But he would agree to it as it stood rather
than throw it out altogether.

The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to

Mt Pinkney moved that instead of an equality of votes, the
States should be represented in the 2% branch as follows: N. H. by.
2. members. Mas. 4. R. 1.1. Cont 3. N.Y. 3. N. J. 2. PP? 4.
Del 1. M@ 3. Virg? 5. N. C. 3. 8. C. 3. Geo. 2. making in the

whole 36.

 

‘1 The word “ upon” is substituted in the transcript for “ on.”
2 The word “does” is substituted in the transcript for “is.”
2 The word “a” is substituted in the transcript for “ the.”
«The word “that” is omitted in the transcript.
254 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Wiison seconds the motion

M:! Dayton. The smaller States can never give up their equality.
For himself he would in no event yield that security for their rights.

M: SHERMAN urged the equality of votes not so much as a
security for the small States; as for the State Gov’ which could not
be preserved unless they were represented & had a negative in the
Gen! Government. Hé had no objection to the members in the 2%
b. voting per capita, as had been suggested by [M* Gerry]

M* Mapison concurred in this motion of M! Pinkney as a reason-
able compromise.

M: Gerry said he should like the motion, but could see no hope
of success. An accomodation must take place, and it was apparent
from what had been seen that it could not do so on the ground of
the motion. He was utterly against a partial confederacy, leaving
other States to accede or not accede; as had been intimated.

M! Kine said it was always with regret that he differed from his
colleagues, but it was his duty to differ from [M* Gerry] on this
occasion. He considered the proposed Government as substantially
and formally, a General and National Government over the people
of America. There never will be a case in which it will act as a
federal Government on the States and not on the individual Citizens.
And is it not a clear principle that in a free Govt those who are

to be the objects of a Govi ought to influence the operations of it?
What reason can be assigned why the same rule of representation
s? not prevail in the 2% branch? as in the 1%? He could conceive
none. On the contrary, every view of the subject that presented
itself, seemed to require it. Two objections had been raised ag* it:
drawn 1.? from the terms of the existing compact 2.2 from a sup-
posed danger to the smaller States—As to the first objection he
thought it inapplicable. According to the existing confederation,
the rule by which the public burdens is to be apportioned is fixed,
and must be pursued. In the proposed Govermt it can not be fixed,
because indirect taxation is to be substituted. The Legislature there-
fore will have full discretion to impose taxes in such modes & pro-
portions as they may judge expedient. As to the 24 objection, he
thought it of as little weight. The Gen! Govern! can never wish to
intrude on the State Govern? There could be no temptation. None
had been pointed out. In order to prevent the interference of

 

*In the transcript the word “branch” is transposed, making the phrase
read: “second, as in the first, branch.”

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “ first” and “secondly” in the
transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JULY 14, 1787 255

Measures which seemed most likely to happen, he would have no
objection to throwing all the State debts into the federal debt, mak-
ing one aggregate debt of about 70,000,000 of dollars, and leaving
it to be discharged by the Gen! Gov!—According to the idea of secur-
ing the State Gov there ought to be three distinct legislative
branches. The 24 was admitted to be necessary, and was actually
meant, to check the 1% branch, to give more wisdom, system, & sta-
bility to the Govt and ought clearly as it was to operate on the
people to be proportioned to them. For the third purpose of secur-
ing the States, there ought then to be a 3% branch, representing the
States as such, and guarding by equal votes their rights & dignities.
He would not pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted with his im-
mediate Constituents as his colleagues, but it was his firm belief
that Mas would never be prevailed on to yield to an equality of
votes. In N. York (he was sorry to be obliged to say any thing
relative to that State in the absence of its representatives, but the
occasion required it), in N. York he had seen that the most powerful
argument used by the considerate opponents to the grant of the
Impost to Congress, was pointed ag’t the viccious constitution of
Cong? with regard to representation & suffrage. He was sure that
no Govt could + last that was not founded on just principles. He pre-
fer’d the doing of nothing, to an allowance of an equal vote to
all the States. It would be better he thought to submit to a little
more confusion & convulsion, than to submit to such an evil. It
was difficult to say what the views of different Gentlemen might be.
Perhaps there might be some who thought no Governm! co-extensive
with the U. States could be established with a hope of its answering
the purpose. Perhaps there might be other fixed opinions incom-
patible with the object we were? pursuing. If there were, he thought
it but candid that Gentlemen would? speak out that we might under-
stand one another.

M: Srrone. The Convention had been much divided in opinion.
In order to avoid the consequences of it, an accomodation had
been proposed. A Committee had been appointed: and though some
of the members of it were averse to an equality of votes, a Report
has‘ been made in favor of it. It is agreed on all hands that Con-
gress are nearly at an end. If no Accomodation takes place, the
Union itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested that if

 

1The word “would” is substituted in the transcript for “could.”
2The word “are” is substituted in the transcript for “were.”
®The word “should” is substituted in the transcript for “ would,”
*The word “had” is substituted in the transcript for “has.”
256 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

we can not come to any general agreement, the principal States may
form & recommend a scheme of Government. But will the small
States in that case ever accede! it. Is it probable that the large
States themselves will under such circumstances embrace and ratify
it. He thought the small States had made a considerable concession
in the article of money bills; and that they might naturally expect
some concessions on the other side. From this view of the matter
he was compelled to give his vote for the Report taken all together.
Mz Manpison expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foun-
dation of Govenm'— was destroyed, by substituting an equality in
place of a proportional Representation, no proper superstructure
would be raised. If the small States really wish for a Government
armed with the powers necessary to secure their liberties, and to
enforce obedience on the larger members as well as on? themselves
he could not help thinking them extremely mistaken in their * means.
He reminded them of the consequences of laying the existing con-
federation* on improper principles. All the principal parties to its
compilation, joined immediately in mutilating & fettering the Gov-
ernmt in such a manner that it has disappointed every hope placed
on it. He appealed to the doctrine & arguments used by them-
selves on a former occasion. It had been very properly observed by
[M: Patterson] that Representation was an expedient by which the
meeting of the people themselves was rendered unnecessary; and
that the representatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to the
votes which their constituents if convened, would respectively have.
Was not this remark as applicable to one branch of the Representa-
tion as to the other? But it had been said that the Govern! would
in its operation be partly federal, partly national; that altho’ in
the latter respect the Representatives of the people ought to be in
proportion to the people: yet in the former it ought to be accord-
ing to the number of States. If there was any solidity in this dis-
tinction he was ready to abide by it, if there was none it ought
to be abandoned. In all cases where the Gen! Governmt is to act
on the people, let the people be represented and the votes be pro-
portional. In all cases where the Governt is to act on the States as
such, in like manner as Cong? now act on them, let the States be
represented & the votes be equal. This was the true ground of
compromise if there was any ground at all. But he denied that there
was any ground. He called for a single instance in which the

 

+The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.

? The word “on” is omitted in the transcript.

* The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “ their.”
* The transcript italicizes the words “ existing confederation.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JULY 14, 1787 257

Gen’ Govi was not to operate on the people individually. The prac-
ticability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as
Political bodies, had been exploded on all hands. He observed that
the people of the large States would in some way or other secure
to themselves a weight proportioned to the importance accruing from
their superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a proportional
representation in the Gov! they would probably accede to no Govt
which did not in? great measure depend for its efficacy on their
voluntary cooperation; in which case they would indirectly secure
their object. The existing confederacy proved that where the Acts
of the Gen! Govt were to be executed by the particular Gov the
latter had a weight in proportion to their importance. No one would
say that either in Cong? or out of Cong? Delaware had equal weight
with Pensylv? If the latter was to supply ten times as much money
as the former, and no compulsion could be used, it was of ten times
more importance, that she should voluntarily furnish the supply.
Tn the Dutch confederacy the votes of the Provinces were equal.
But Holland which supplies about half the money, governs” the
whole republic. He enumerated the objections ag%* an equality of
votes in the 2¢ branch, notwithstanding the proportional representa-
tion in the first. 1. the minority could negative the will of the ma-
jority of the people. 2. they could extort measures by making them
a condition of their assent to other necessary measures. 3. they
could obtrude measures on the majority by virtue of the peculiar
powers which would be vested in the Senate. 4. the evil instead of
being cured by time, would increase with every new State that should
be admitted, as they must all be admitted on the principle of equality.
5. the perpetuity it would give to the preponderance of the North?
agst the South® Scale was a serious consideration. It seemed now
to be pretty well understood that the real difference of interests
lay, not between the large & small but between the N. & South?
States. The institution of slavery & its consequences formed the
line of discrimination. There were 5 States on the South,’ 8 on the
North® side of this line. Should a proport! representation take place
it was true, the N. side* would still outnumber the other; but not in
the same degree, at this time; and every day would tend towards
an equilibrium.
M= Wison would add a few words only. If equality in the 24

 

The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The word “ governed” is substituted in the transcript for “ governs.”
* The word “Southern” is substituted in the transcript for “ South.”
“The word “side” is omitted in the transcript.
258 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

branch was an error that time would correct, he should be less
anxious to exclude it being sensible that perfection was unattainable
in any plan; but being a fundamental and a perpetual error, it ought
by all means to be avoided. A vice in the Representation, like an
error in the first concoction, must be followed by disease, convulsions,
and finally death itself. The justice of the general principle of pro-
portional representation has not in argument at least been yet con-
tradicted. But it is said that a departure from it so far as to give
the States an equal vote in one branch of the Legislature is essential
to their preservation. He had considered this position maturely, but
could not see its application. That the States ought to be preserved
he admitted. But does it follow that an equality of votes is neces-
sary for the purpose? Is there any reason to suppose that if their
preservation should depend more on the large than on the small
States the security of the States ag** the Gen! Government would. be
diminished? Are the large States less attached to their existence,
more likely to commit suicide, than the small? An equal vote then
is not necessary as far as he can conceive: and is liable among other
objections to this insuperable one: The great fault of the existing
confederacy is its inactivity. It has never been a complaint ag*
Cong’ that they governed overmuch. The complaint has been that
they have governed too little. To remedy this defect we were sent
here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing an equality of votes
as is proposed? no: this very equality carries us directly to Con-
gress: to the system which it is our duty to rectify. The small
States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality, but they may
controul the Gov! as they have done in Cong? This very measure
is here prosecuted by a minority of the people of America. Is then
the object of the Convention likely to be accomplished in this way?
Will not our Constituents say? we sent you to form an efficient
Gov: and you have given us one more complex indeed, but having
all the weakness of the former Govern? He was anxious for uniting
all the States under one Governt He knew there were some respect-
able men who preferred three confederacies, united by offensive &
defensive alliances. Many things may be plausibly said, some things
may be justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not how-
ever concur in it himself; but he thought nothing so pernicious as
bad first principles.

M' EtsewortH asked two questions one of M® Wilson, whether
he had ever seen a good. measure fail in Cong? for want of a ma-
jority of States in its favor? He had himself never known such an
instance: the other of M? Madison whether a negative lodged with
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 16, 1787 259

the majority of the States even the smallest, could be more dangerous
than the qualified negative proposed to be lodged in a single Execu-
tive Magistrate, who must be taken from some one State?

M: Suerman, signified that his expectation was that the Gen!
Legislature would in some cases act on the federal principle, of
requiring quotas. But he thought it ought to be empowered to
carry their own plans into execution, if the States should fail to
supply their respective quotas.

On the question for agreeing to M! Pinkney’s motion for allow-
ing N. H. 2. Mas. 4. &e—it passed in the negative

Mas. no. M' King ay. M® Ghorum absent. Cont no. N. J. no.
P? ay. Del. no. Miay. Veay. N.C. no. §.C. ay Geo. no.

Adjourned.

Monpay. Juty 16. In ConvEeNTION

On the question for agreeing to the whole Report as amended &
including the equality of votes in the 2° branch. it passed in the
Affirmative.

Mas. divided M* Gerry, M? Strong, ay. M* King M? Ghorum no.
Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pen? no. Del. ay. Mi ay. V2? no. N. C. ay.
M Spaight no. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

[Here enter the whole in the words entered in the Journal
July 16]?

The whole, thus passed is in the words following viz

““ Resolved that in the original formation of the Legislature of the
U.S. the first branch thereof shall consist of sixty five members, of
which number N. Hampshire shall send 3. Mass*® 8. Rh.I.1. Connt
5. N. Y. 6. N. J. 4. Pen? 8. Del. 1. Mary? 6. Virg? 10. N. C. 5.
S. C. 5. Geo. 3.—But as the present situation of the States may
probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the Legislature
of the U. S. shall be authorized from time to time to apportion the
number of Rep?; and in case any of the States shall hereafter be
divided, or enlarged by, addition of territory, or any two or more
States united, or any new States created with* the limits of the

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, aye—4; Massachusetts, [Mr. King, aye, Mr. Gorham, absent],
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina [Mr. Spaight, no], aye—5; Pennsylvania, Virginia,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—4; Massachusetts, divided, [Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong,
aye; Mr. King, Mr. Gorham, no.] ”

® Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.

*The word “within” is substituted in the transcript for the word “ with.”
260 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

U. S. the Legislature of the U. 8. shall possess authority to regulate
the number of Rep? in any of the foregoing cases, upon the prin-
ciple of their number of inhabitants, according to the provisions
hereafter mentioned, namely 1—provided always that representation
ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation; and in order
to ascertain the alteration in the direct taxation, which may be re-
quired from time to time by the changes in the relative circum-

stances of the States—

Resolved, that a Census be taken within six years from the 1*
meeting of the Legislature of the U. S. and once within the term of
every 10 years afterwards of all the inhabitants of the U. S. in the
manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in
their Resolution of April 18.2 1783, and that the Legislature of the
U. S. shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly—

“* Resolved, that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and
for fixing the salaries of officers of the Gov! of the U. S. shall
originate in the first branch of the Legislature of the U. S. and
shall not be altered or amended in the 24 branch: and that no money
shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursuance of appro-
priations to be originated in the 1%* branch.

“* Resolv? that in the 24 branch of the Legislature of the U. S.
each State shall have an equal vote.”’

The 6™ Resol: in the Report from the Com? of the whole House,
which had been postponed in order to consider the 7 & 8 Resol™:
Was now resumed. see the Resol®

The 1:* member ° ‘‘ That the Nat! Legislature ought to possess the
Legislative Rights vested in Cong’ by the Confederation.’’ was
agreed to nem. Con.

The next,* ‘‘ And moreover to legislate in all cases to which the
separate States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of the
U. S. may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation,”’
being read for a question

M* Butusr calls for some explanation of the extent of this power:
particularly of the word incompetent. The vagueness of the terms
rendered it impossible for any precise judgment to be formed.

M? Guorum. The vagueness of the terms constitutes the pro-
priety of them. We are now establishing general principles, to be
extended hereafter into details which will be precise & explicit.

M. Rutiivce, urged the objection started by M: Butler and moved
that the clause should be committed to the end that a specification

 

* The word “ namely ” is omitted in the transcript.
ae Pea date “ April 18” is changed to “the eighteenth of: April” in the tran-
cript.
* The words “The 1st member” are omitted in the transcript.
* The words “ The next” are omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 16, 1787 261

of the powers comprised in the general terms, might be reported.

On the question for a! commitment, the States? were equally
divided

Mas. no. Cont ay. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M4 ay. V2 ay.
N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay:* So it was lost.

M?! RanpotpH. The vote of this morning [involving an equality
of suffrage in 2? branch] had embarrassed the business extremely.
All the powers given in the Report from the Com® of the whole,
were founded on the supposition that a Proportional representation
was to prevail in both branches of the Legislature. When he came
here this morning his purpose was to have offered some propositions
that might if possible have united a great majority of votes, and
particularly might provide ag*t the danger suspected on the part
of the smaller States, by enumerating the cases in which it might
lie, and allowing an equality of votes in such cases.* But finding
from the preceding vote that they persist in demanding an equal
vote in all cases, that they have succeeded in obtaining it, and that
N. York if present would probably be on the same side, he could
not but think we were unprepared to discuss this subject further.
It will probably be in vain to come to any final decision with a bare
majority on either side. For these reasons he wished the Convention
might ® adjourn, that the large States might consider the steps proper
to be taken in the present solemn crisis of the business, and that the
small States might also deliberate on the means of conciliation.

M? Parrerson, thought with M* R. that it was high time for the
Convention to adjourn that the rule of secrecy ought to be rescinded,
and that our Constituents should be consulted. No conciliation could
be admissible on the part of the smaller States on any other ground
than that of an equality of votes in the 24 branch. If M! Randolph
would reduce to form his motion for an adjournment sine die, he
would second it with all his heart.

Gen! Pinkney wished to know of M: R. whether he meant an
adjournment sine die, or only an adjournment for the day. If the
former was meant, it differed much from his idea. He could not
think of going to S. Carolina and returning again to this place. Be-

* See the paper in* appendix communicated by Mr R. to J. M. July 10.°

1The word “a” is omitted in the transcript.

2 The word “ votes” is substituted in the transcript for “States.”

®In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
North Carolina, no—5.” 5 .

‘The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

’ The transcript here inserts “No—” For the text of this paper see

dix to Debates, VI, p. 618. : ;
APPS the worl “to” is substituted in the transcript for “ might.”
262 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

sides it was chimerical to suppose that the States if consulted would
ever accord separately, and beforehand.

M: RanpoupH, had never entertained an idea of an adjournment
sine die; & was sorry that his meaning had been so readily & strangely
misinterpreted. He had in visw merely an adjournment till to-
morrow, in order that some conciliatory experiment might if possible
be devised, and that in case the smaller States should continue to
hold back, the larger might then take such measures, he would not
say what, as might be necessary.

M: PartTerson seconded the adjournment till tomorrow, as an
opportunity seemed to be wished by the larger States to deliberate
further on conciliatory expedients.

On the question for adjourning till tomorrow, the States were
equally divided.

Mas. no. Cont no. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. no. Mi ay. V2? ay.
N.C. ay. §.C. no. Geo. not So.it was lost.

M: Broome thought it his duty to declare his opinion ag* an
adjournment sine die, as had been urged by M: Patterson. Such a
measure he thought would be fatal. Something must be done by
the Convention, tho’ it should be by a bare majority.

M: Gerry observed that Mas was opposed to an adjournment,
because they saw no new ground of compromise. But as it seemed
to be the opinion of so many States that a trial sh°- be made, the
State would now concur in the adjournmt

M? Ruriipee could see no need of an adjourn! because he could
see no chance of a compromise. The little States were fixt. They
had repeatedly & solemnly declared themselves to be so. All that
the large States then had to do, was to decide whether they would
yield or not. For his part he conceived that altho’ we could not do
what we thought best, in itself, we ought to do something. Had we not
better keep the Gov up a little longer, hoping that another Con-
vention will supply our omissions, than abandon every thing to
hazard. Our Constituents will be very little satisfied with us if we
take the latter course.

M: RanpotpH & M! Kine renewed the motion to adjourn till
tomorrow.

On the question. Mas. ay. Cont no. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. no.
May. V? ay. N.C. ay. 8S. C. ay. Geo. divé?

Adjourned

 

_ ‘In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, aye—5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—5.”

In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—7; Connecticut,
Delaware, no—2; Georgia, divided.” :
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1787 263

- On the morning following before the hour of the convention a
number of the members from the larger States, by common agree-
ment met for the purpose of consulting on the proper steps to be
taken in consequence of the vote in favor of an equal Representation
in the 2? branch, and the apparent inflexibility of the smaller States
on that point. Several members from the latter States also attended.
The time was wasted in vague conversation on the subject, without
any specific proposition or agreement. It appeared indeed that the
opinions of the members who disliked the equality of votes differed
so? much as to the importance of that point, and as to the policy of
risking a failure of any general act of the Convention, by inflexibly
opposing it. Several of them supposing that no good Governnt
could or would be built on that foundation, and that as a division
of the Convention into two opinions was unavoidable; it would be
better that the side comprising the principal States, and a majority
of the people of America, should propose a scheme of Gov! to the
States, than that a scheme should be proposed on the other side,
would have concurred in a firm opposition to the smaller States, and
in a separate recommendation, if eventually necessary. Others seemed
inclined to yield to the smaller States, and to concur in such an
act however imperfect & exceptionable, as might be agreed on by the
Convention as a body, tho’ decided by a bare majority of States
and by a minority of the people of the U. States. It is probable that
the result of this consultation satisfied the smaller States that they
had nothing to apprehend from a union of the larger, in any plan
whatever ag the equality of votes in the 24 branch.

Turspay JuLty 17. In CoNVENTION

M* Govern! Morris. moved to reconsider the whole Resolution
agreed to yesterday concerning the constitution of the 2 branches of
the Legislature. His object was to bring the House to a considera-
tion in the abstract of the powers necessary to be vested in the
general Government. It had been said, Let us know how the Govi
is to be modelled, and then we can determine what powers can be
properly given to it. He thought the most eligible course was, first
to determine on the necessary powers, and then so to modify the
Govern! as that it might be justly & properly enabled to administer
them. He feared if we proceeded to a consideration of the powers,

 

1 The word “so” is omitted in the transcript.
964 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

whilst the vote of yesterday including an equality of the States in
the 24 branch, remained in force, a reference to it, either mental
or expressed, would mix itself with the merits of every question
concerning the powers.—this motion was not seconded. [It was
probably approved by several members, who either despaired of
suecess, or were apprehensive that the attempt would inflame the
jealousies of the smaller States. ]

The 6t Resol” in the Report of the Com? of the Whole relating
to the powers, which had been postponed in order to consider the
7 & 8 relating to the constitution of the Nat! Legislature, was now
resumed.

M«= SuermMan observed that it would be difficult to draw the
line between the powers of the Gen! Legislatures, and those to be
left with the States; that he did not like the definition contained in
the Resolution, and proposed in ' place of ® the words ‘‘ of * individual
Legislation ’’ line 4.¢ inclusive, to insert ‘‘ to make laws binding on
the people of the United States in all cases which may concern the
common interests of the Union; but not to interfere with the Gov-
ernment of the individual States in any matters of internal police
which respect the Govt of such States only, and wherein the general
welfare of the U. States is not concerned.”’

M= Witson 2%? the amendment as better expressing the general
principle.

M! Govt Morris opposed it. The internal police, as it would
be called & understood by the States ought to be infringed in many
cases, as in the case of paper money & other tricks by which Citizens
of other States may be affected.

M= SHERMAN, in explanation of his idea read an enumeration of
powers, including the power of levying taxes on trade, but not the
power of direct taxation.

M: Gov! Morris remarked the omission, and inferred that for the
deficiencies of taxes on consumption, it must have been the meaning
of Mt Sherman, that the Gen! Gov! should recur to quotas & requisi-
tions, which are subversive of the idea of Gov!

M: SHerman acknowledged that his enumeration did not include
direct taxation. Some provision he supposed must be made for sup-
plying the deficiency of other taxation, but he had not formed any.

On*® Question of M! Sherman’s motion, it passed in the negative

 

1The word “its” is here inserted in the transcript.

?The word “of” is crossed out in the transcript and “to” is written
above it.

®°The word “of” is omitted in the transcript.

‘The word and figure “line 4” are crossed out in the transcript.

° The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1787 265

Mas. no. Cont ay. N. J. no. P% no. Del. no. May. V? no.
N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

M? Beprorp moved that the 24 member of Resolution 6.° be so
altered as to read ‘‘and moreover to legislate in all cases for the
general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States
are separately * incompetent,’’ or in which the harmony of the U.
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation.’’

M: Gov? Morris 2% the motion

M* RanpoupH. This is a formidable idea indeed. It involves the
power of violating all the laws and constitutions of the States, and
of intermeddling with their police. The last member of the sentence
is also superfluous, being included in the first.

M: Bevrorp. It is not more extensive or formidable than the
clause as it stands: no State being separately competent to legislate
for the general interest of the Union.

On‘ question for agreeing to M* Bedford’s motion, it passed in
the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont no. N. J. ay.. Pt ay. Del. ay. Mi ay. V®# no.
N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.®

On the sentence as amended, it passed in the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. M@ ay. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.®

The next.?. ‘‘ To negative all laws passed by the several States
contravening in the opinion of the Nat: Legislature the articles of
Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of yy? Union ’’®

M: Gov! Morris opposed this power as likely to be terrible to the
States, and not necessary, if sufficient Legislative authority should
be given to the Gen! Government.

M: Suerman thought it unnecessary, as the Courts of the States
would not consider as valid any law contravening the Authority of
the Union, and which the legislature would wish to be negatived.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, Maryland, aye—2; Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

2The words “the sixth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“ Resolution 6.” ;

*>The word “severally” is substituted in the transcript for “separately.”

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

SIn the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye—6; Connecticut, Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—4.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye—8;
South Carolina, Georgia, no—2.”

7 The word “ clause’ is here inserted in the transcript.

® The phrase “ was then taken up” is here inserted in the transcript.
266 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: L. Martin considered the power as improper & inadmissible.
Shall all the laws of the States be sent up to the Gen! Legislature
before they shall be permitted to operate?

M= Mapison, considered the negative on the laws of the States
as essential to the efficacy & security of the Gen! Gov! The necessity
of a general Gov! proceeds from the propensity of the States to
pursue their particular interests in opposition to the general interest.
This propensity will continue to disturb the system, unless effec-
tually controuled. Nothing short of a negative on their laws will
controul it. They can+ pass laws which will accomplish their in-
jurious objects before they can be repealed by the Gen’ Legisl® or
be? set aside by the National Tribunals. Confidence can not be put
in the State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and
interests. In all the States these are more or less depend‘ on the
Legislatures. In Georgia they are appointed annually by the Legis-
lature. In R. Island the Judges who refused to execute an uncon-
stitutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by the Legis-
lature who would be* willing instruments of the wicked & arbi-
trary plans of their masters.{ A power of negativing the improper
laws of the States is at once the most mild & certain means of pre-
serving the harmony of the system. Its utility is sufficiently dis-
played in the British System. Nothing could maintain the harmony
& subordination of the various parts of the empire, but the preroga-
tive by which the Crown, stifles in the birth every Act of every part
tending to discord or encroachment. It is true the prerogative is
sometimes misapplied thro’ ignorance or a partiality to one particular
part of y? empire; but we have not the same reason to fear such
misapplications in our System. As to the sending all laws up to
the Nat! Legisl: that might be rendered unnecessary by some emana-
tion of the power into the States, so far at least, as to give a temporary
effect to laws of immediate necessity.

M? Gov! Morris was more & more opposed to the negative. The
proposal of it would disgust all the States. A law that ought to be
negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departm! and if that
security should fail; may be repealed by a Nation! law.

M: SHERMAN. Such a power involves a wrong principle, to wit,
that a law of a State contrary to the articles of the Union, would if
not negatived, be valid & operative.

M® PINKNEY urged the necessity of the Negative.

 

*The word “ will” is substituted in the transcript for “can.”
? The word “be” is omitted in the transcript.
* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1787 267

On the question for agreeing to the power of negativing laws of
States &c ’’ it passed in the negative.

Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. no. P* no. Del. no. Mi? no. V8 ay.
N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

M: Lursaer Martin moved the following resolution ‘‘ that the
Legislative acts of the U. 8S. made by virtue & in pursuance of the
articles of Union, and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority
of the U. 8. shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far
as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citi,
zens and inhabitants—& that the Judiciaries of the several States
shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective
laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding ’’ which
was agreed to hem: con:

9" Resol: ‘‘ that Nat! Executive consist of a single person.”’
‘Ag? to nem. con.?

3“< To be chosen by the National Legis}: ’’ +

M! Govern: Morris was pointedly ag%t his being so chosen. He
will be the mere creature of the Legisl: if appointed & impeachable
by that body. He ought to be elected by the people at large, by the
freeholders of the Country. That difficulties attend this mode, he
admits. But they have been found superable in N. Y. & in Cont
and would he believed be found so, in the case of an Executive for
the U. States. If the people should elect, they will never fail to
prefer some man of distinguished character, or services; some man,
if he might so speak, of continental reputation.—If the Legislature
elect, it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it will
be like the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals; real merit
will rarely be the title to the appointment. He moved to strike out
** National Legislature ’’ & insert ‘‘ citizens of 5 U. 8.”’

M: SHERMAN thought that the sense of the Nation would be better
expressed by the Legislature, than by the people at large. The
latter will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and besides
will never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will gen-
erally vote for some man in their own State, and the largest State
will have the best chance for the appointment. If the choice be

 

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, aye—3; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

2—In the transcript this sentence reads as follows: “The ninth Resolution
being taken up, the first clause, ‘That a National Executive be instituted, to
consist of a single person,’ was agreed to, nem. con.”

® The words “The next clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

4 The words “ being considered” are here inserted in the transcript.

5° The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
268 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

made by the Legisl® A majority of voices may be made necessary
* to constitute an election.

= Wison. two arguments have been urged ag™ an election
of the Executive Magistrate by the people. 11 the example of Poland
where an Election of the supreme Magistrate is attended with the
most dangerous commotions. The cases he observed were totally
dissimilar. The Polish nobles have resources & dependents which
enable them to appear in force, and to threaten the Republic as well
as each other. In the next place the electors all assemble in* one
place: which would not be the case with us. The 2? argt is that
a majority * of the people would never concur. It might be answered
that the concurrence of a majority of* people is not a necessary
principle of election, nor required as such in any of the States. But
allowing the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the ex-
pedient used in Mas‘t where the Legislature by ® majority of voices,
decide in case a majority of people do not concur in favor of one

of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to a good nomi-
nation at least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue & cabal. A
particular objection with him ag%t an absolute election by the Legisl”
was that the Exec: in that case would be too dependent to stand the
mediator between the intrigues & sinister views of the Representa-
tives and the general liberties & interests of the people.

M: PINKNEY did not expect this question would again have been
brought forward; An Election by the people being liable to the most
obvious & striking objections. They will be led by a few active &
designing men. The most populous States by combining in favor
of the same individual will be able to carry their points. The Nat!
Legislature being most immediately interested in the laws made by
themselves, will be most attentive ‘to the choice of a fit man to carry
them properly into execution.

M! Gov: Morris. It is said that in case of an election by the
people the populous States will combine & elect whom they please.
Just the reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. If their
be any combination it must be among their representatives in the
Legislature. It is said the people will be led by a few designing
men. This might happen in a small district. It can never happen
throughout the continent. In the election of a Gov: of N. York, it
sometimes is the case in particular spots, that the activity & intrigues

 

+The figure “1” is changed to “ The first is” in the transcript.
? The word “at” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”

* The transcript does not italicize the word “ majority.”

‘The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

° The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1787 269

of little partizans are successful, but the general voice of the State
is never influenced by such artifices. It is said the multitude will
be uninformed. It is true they would be uninformed of what passed
in the Legislative Conclave, if the election were to be made there;
but they will not be uninformed of those great & illustrious char-
acters which have merited their esteem & confidence. If the Execu-
tive be chosen by the Nat! Legislature, he will not be independent
on? it; and if not independent, usurpation & tyranny on the
part of the Legislature will be the consequence. This was the case
in England in the last Century. It has been the case in Holland,
where their Senates have engrossed all power. It has been the case
every where. He was surprised that an election by the people at
large should ever have been likened to the polish election of the
first Magistrate. An election by the Legislature will bear a real like-
ness to the election by the Diet of Poland. The great must be the
electors in both cases, and the corruption & cabal w% are known to
characterise the one would soon find their way into the other. Ap-
pointments made by numerous bodies, are always worse than those
made by single responsible individuals, or by the people at large.

Col. Mason. It is curious to remark the different language held
at different times. At one moment we are told that the Legisla-
ture is entitled to thorough confidence, and to indifinite power. At
another, that it will be governed by intrigue & corruption, and can-
not be trusted at all. But not to dwell on this inconsistency he
would observe that a Government which is to last ought at least to be
practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed election should
be left to the people at large. He conceived it would be as un-
natural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief Magis-
trate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a
blind man. The extent of the Country renders it impossible that
the people can have the requisite capacity to Judge of the respective
pretensions of the Candidates.

MZ Wiuson. could not see the contrariety stated [by Col. Mason]
The Legisl*® might deserve confidence in some respects, and distrust
in others. In acts which were to affect them & y!? Constituents pre-
cisely alike confidence was due. In others jealousy was warranted.
‘The appointment to great offices, where the Legisl** might feel many
motives, not common to the public confidence was surely misplaced.
This branch of business it was notorious was? most corruptly man-
aged of any that had been committed to legislative bodies.

 

In the transcript the word “on” is crossed out and “of” is written

above it. . .
2 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
270 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M= Wiuiamson, conceived that there was the same difference
between an election in this case, by the people and by the legisla.
ture, as between an app! by lot, and by choice. There are at
present distinguished characters, who are known perhaps to almost
every man. This will not always be the case. The people will be
sure to vote for some man in their own State, and the largest State
will be sure to succeed. This will not be Virg? however. Her slaves
will have no suffrage. As the Salary of the Executive will be fixed,
and he will not be eligible a 2? time, there will not be such a de-
pendence on the Legislature as has been imagined.

2 Question on an election by the people instead of the Legislature;
which ? passed in the negative.

Mas. no. Cont no. N. J. no. P2 ay. Del. no. M?% no. V? no.
N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.®

M: L. Martin moved that the Executive be chosen 'by
Electors appointed by the several Legislatures of the individual
States.

M: Broome 2% On the Question, it passed in the negative.

Mas. no. Cont no. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. ay. Mé ay. V? no.
N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

On the question on the words ‘‘ to be chosen by the Nation!
Legislature ’’ it passed unanimously in the affirmative.

‘‘ For the term of seven years ’’—postponed nem. con. on motion
of M: Houston &* Gov. Morris.

“* to carry into execution the nation! laws ’’—agreed to nem. con.

“*to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for.’’—
agreed to nem. con.

** to be ineligible a second time ’’—M! Houston moved to strike
out this clause.

M: SHerman 2% the motion.

M: Gov: Morris espoused the motion. The ineligibility proposed
by the clause as it stood tended to destroy the great motive to good
behavior, the hope of being rewarded by a re-appointment. It was
saying to him, make hay while the sun shines.

 

* The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

*> The word “which” is crossed out and “it” is written above it in the
transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, aye—l; Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—9.”

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Delaware, Maryland, aye—2; Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

° The word “Mr.” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1787 271

On the question for striking out as moved by M: Houston, it
passed in the affirmative

Mas. ay. Con! ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. no. M@ay. V# no.
N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. ay

*“* For the term of 7 years ’’ ® resumed

M" Broom was for a shorter term since the Executive Magistrate
was now to be re-eligible. Had he remained ineligible a 24 time,
he should have preferred a longer term.

Doct MtCLurea moved * to strike out 7 years, and insert ‘‘ during
good behavior.’’ By striking out the words declaring him not re-
eligible, he was put into a situation that would keep him dependent
for ever on the Legislature; and he conceived the independence of the
Executive to be equally essential with that of the Judiciary depart-
ment.

M* Gov! Morris 2% the motion. He expressed great pleasure
in hearing it. This was the way to get a good Government. His fear
that so valuable an ingredient would not be attained had led him
to take the part he had done. He was indifferent how the Executive
should be chosen, provided he held his place by this tenure.

M: Broome highly approved the motion. It obviated all his
difficulties

M: SHerman considered such a tenure as by no means safe ob
admissible. As the Executive Magistrate is now re-eligible, he will
be on good behavior as far as will be necessary. If he behaves well
he will be continued; if otherwise, displaced, on a succeeding election.

M‘ Mapison ¢ If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that
the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential
to a maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent
of each other. The Executive could not be independent of the
Legislure, if dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a re-
appointment. Why was it determined that the Judges should not
hold their places by such a tenure? Because they might be tempted

*The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the argument
against the re-eligibility of the Executive Magistrate, by holding out a tenure
during good behaviour as the alternative for keeping him independent of the
Legislature. : on .

+The view here taken of the subject was meant to aid in parrying the
animadversions likely to fall on the motion of Dr McClurg, for whom J. M.
had a particular regard. The Doct though possessing talents of the highest
order, was modest & unaccustomed to exert them in public debate.

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Georgia, aye—6; Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no—4.” ; :

2 The words “ The clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

® The word “ being” is here inserted in the transcript.
272 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

to cultivate the Legislature, by an undue complaisance, and thus
render the Legislature the virtual expositor, as well! the maker
of the laws. In like manner a dependence of the Executive on the
Legislature, would render it the Executor as well as the maker of
laws; & then according to the observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical
laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner.
There was an analogy between the Executive & Judiciary depart-
ments in several respects. The latter executed the laws in certain
cases as the former did in others. The former expounded & applied
them for certain purposes, as the latter did for others. The dif-
ference between them seemed to consist chiefly in two cireumstances—
12 the collective interest & security were much more in the power
belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary department. 2.? in
the administration of the former much greater latitude is left to
opinion and discretion than in the administration of the latter.
But if the 2% consideration proves that it will be more difficult to
establish a rule sufficiently precise for trying the Execut: than the
Judges, & forms an objection to the same tenure of office, both con-
siderations prove that it might be more dangerous to suffer a union
between the Executive & Legisl: powers, than between the Judiciary
& Legislative powers. He conceived it to be absolutely necessary to
a well constituted Republic that the two first sh? be kept distinct &
independent of each other. Whether the plan proposed by the
motion was a proper one was another question, as it depended on
the practicability of instituting a tribunal for impeachm® as certain
& as adequate in the one case as in the other. On the other hand,
respect for the mover entitled his proposition to a fair hearing &
discussion, until a less objectionable expedient should be applied for
guarding ag*t a dangerous union of the Legislative & Executive
departments.

Col. Mason. This motion was made some time ago, & negatived
by a very large majority. He trusted that it w4 be again negatived.
It w? be impossible to define the misbehaviour in such a manner as
to subject it to a proper trial; and perhaps still more impossible
to compel so high an offender holding his office by such a tenure
to submit to a trial. He considered an Executive during good be-
havior as a softer name only for an Executive for life. And that the
next would be an easy step to hereditary Monarchy. If the motion
should finally succeed, he might himself live to see such a Revolu-

 

*The word “as” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “ secondly ” in the
transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1787 273

tion. If he did not it was probable his children or grand children
would. He trusted there were few men in that House who wished
for it. No state he was sure had so far revolted from Republican
principles as to have the least bias in its favor.

M? Mapison, was not apprehensive of being thought to favor any
step towards monarchy. The real object with him was to prevent its
introduction. Experience had proved a tendency in our govern-
ments to throw all power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives
of the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures
omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised for restraining the
instability & encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind
or other would be inevitable. The preservation of Republican Govt
therefore required some expedient for the purpose, but required evi-
dently at the same time that in devising it, the genuine principles of
that form should be kept in view.

M* Gov! Morris was as little a friend to monarchy as any gentle-
man. He concurred in the opinion that the way to keep out mo-
narchical Gov! was to establish such a Repub. Govt as wi make’ the
people happy and prevent a desire of change.

Doc! M‘Ciure was not so much afraid of the shadow of monarchy
as to be unwilling to approach it; nor so wedded to Republican
Gov! as not to be sensible of the tyrannies that had been & may be
exercised under that form. It was an essential object with him to
make the Executive independent of the Legislature; and the only
mode left for effecting it, after the vote destroying his ineligibility a
second time, was to appoint him during good behavior.

On the question for inserting ‘‘ during good behavior ”’ in place
of 7 years [with a re-eligibility] it passed in the negative.

Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. Mi? no. V% ay.
N. C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.* 1

* Transfer the above notes hither.”

[* This vote is not * be considered as any certain index of opinion, as a num-
ber in the affirmative probably had it chiefly in view to alarm those attached to a
dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, & thereby facilitate some final
arrangement of a contrary tendency. The avowed friends of an Executive, “ dur-
ing good behaviour” were not more than three or four, nor is it certain they
would finally * have adhered to such a tenure. An independence of the three great
departments of each other, as far as possible, and the responsibility of all to
the will of the community seemed to be generally admitted as the true basis of
a well constructed government. ]

 

1Jn the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, aye—4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—6.* ”

? Madison’s direction concerning the footnotes is omitted in the transcript.

® The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The word “finally ” is omitted in the transcript.
274 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

On the motion ‘‘ to strike out seven years’’ it passed in the
negative.

Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. Pt ay. Del. ay. M? no. V* no.
N. C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.*+?

It was now unanimously agreed that the vote which had struck
out the words ‘‘ to be ineligible a second time ’’ should be reconsidered

to-morrow.
Adj

WEDNESDAY JULY 18. IN CONVENTION

On motion of M: L. Martin to fix tomorrow for reconsidering the
vote concerning ‘‘ eligibility of Exec’? a 22 time’’ it passed in
the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. absent. P* ay. Del. ay. Mf? ay.
Viay. N.C.ay. S.C. ay. Geo. absent.®

The residue of Resol. 9.* concerning the Executive was postp? till
tomorrow.

Resol. 10.° that Executive sh} have a right to negative legislative
acts not afterwards passed by % of each branch. Agreed to nem. con.

Resol. 11.7 ‘‘ that a Nat! Judiciary * be estab? to consist of one
supreme tribunal.’’ ag’ to nem. con.

®*¢ The Judges of which to be appoint? by the 2% branch of the
Nat} Legislature.’’

M: Guorum, wi prefer an appointment by the 2? branch to an
appointm! by the whole Legislature; but he thought even that branch

[* There was no debate on this motion, the apparent object of many in
the affirmative was to secure the re-eligibility by shortening the term, and of
many in the negative to embarrass the plan of referring the appointment &
dependence of the Executive to the Legislature.]

 

1Jn the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
North Carolina, aye—4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—6.* ”

* The words “eligibility of Executive” are changed to “the ineligibility of
the Executive” in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—8;
New Jersey, Georgia, absent.” :

‘The words “the ninth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“ Resol. 9.”

* The words “The tenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
“ Resol. 10.”

° The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The words “The Eleventh Resolution ” are substituted in the transcript for
* Resol. 11.”

°' The word “shall” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The words “On the clause” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1787 275

too numerous, and too little personally responsible, to ensure a good
choice. He suggested that the Judges be appointed by the Execu!
with the advice & consent of the 2% branch, in the mode prescribed
by the constitution of Mas's This mode had been long practised in
that country, & was found to answer perfectly well.

M? Wusov, still w!? prefer an appointmt by the Executive; but
if that could not be attained, wi prefer in the next place, the mode
suggested by M! Ghorum. He thought it his duty however to move
in the first instance ‘‘ that the Judges be appointed by the Execu-
tive.’’ M? Gov! Morris 2% the motion.

M: L. Martin was strenuous for an appt by the 24 branch. Being
taken from all the States it wi be best informed of characters &
most capable of making a fit choice.

M: SHERMAN concurred in the observations of M: Martin, adding
that the Judges ought to be diffused, which would be more likely to
be attended to by the 2¢ branch, than by the Executive.

Mi Mason. The mode of appointing the Judges may depend in
some degree on the mode of trying impeachments of the Executive.
If the Judges were to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely
ought not to be appointed by the Executive. There were insuperable
objections besides ag‘ referring the appointment to the Executive.
He mentioned as one, that as the Seat of Govt must be in some one
State, and? the Executive would remain in office for a considerable
time, for 4, 5, or 6 years at least, he would insensibly form local &
personal attachments within the particular State that would deprive
equal merit elsewhere, of an equal chance of promotion.

M: Guorum. As the Executive will be responsible in point of
character at least, for a judicious and faithful discharge of his trust,
he will be careful to look through all the States for proper char-
acters. The Senators will be as likely to form their attachments at
the seat of Gov‘ where they reside, as the Executive. If they can not
get the man of the particular State to which they may respectively
belong, they will be indifferent to the rest. Public bodies feel no
personal responsibly, and give full play to intrigue & cabal.
Rh. Island is a full illustration of the insensibility to character,
produced by a participation of numbers, in dishonorable measures,
and of the length to which a public body may carry wickedness &

cabal.
MM" Gov! Morris supposed it would be improper for an impeachm!

 

1The words “still wi” are transposed to read “would still” in the tran-

script. sci : : :
2 The word “as” is here inserted in the transcript.
276 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of the Executive to be tried before the Judges. The latter would in
such case be drawn into intrigues with the Legislature and an im-
partial trial would be frustrated. As they wi be much about the
Seat of Gov! they might even be previously consulted & arrange-
ments might be made for a prosecution of the Executive. He thought
therefore that no argument could be drawn from the probability of
such a plan of impeachments ag* the motion before the House.

M: Manson, suggested that the Judges might be appointed by the
Executive with the concurrence of % at least, of the 2¢ branch.
This would unite the advantage of responsibility in the Executive
with the security afforded in the 2? branch ag*t any incautious or
corrupt nomination by the Executive.

M: SHERMAN, was clearly for an election by the Senate. It would
be composed of men nearly equal to the Executive, and would of
course have on the whole more wisdom. They would bring into their
deliberations a more diffusive knowledge of characters. It would be
less easy for candidates to intrigue with them, than with the Execu-
tive Magistrate. For these reasons he thought there would be a
better security for a proper choice in the Senate than in the Ex-
ecutive.

M: RanpoutpH. It is true that when the appt of the Judges was
vested in the 2? branch an equality of votes had not been given to
it. Yet he had rather leave the appointm! there than give it to
the Executive. He thought the advantage of personal responsibility
might be gained in the Senate by requiring the respective votes of
the members to be entered on the Journal. He thought too that the
hope of receiving app‘ would be more diffusive if they depended on
the Senate, the members of which w4 be diffusively known, than if
they depended on a single man who could not be personally known
to a very great extent; and consequently that opposition to the
System, would be so far weakened.

M: Beprorp thought there were solid reasons ag% leaving the
appointment to the Executive. He must trust more to information
than the Senate. It would put it in his power to gain over the larger
States, by gratifying them with a preference of their Citizens. The
responsibility of the Executive so much talked of was chimerical.
He could not be punished for mistakes.

M! Guorum remarked that the Senate could have no better in-
formation than the Executive. They must like him, trust to infor-
mation from the members belonging to the particular State where the
Candidates resided. The Executive would certainly be more answer-
able for a good appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one would
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1787 277

fall on him alone. He did not mean that he would be answerable
under any other penalty than that of publie censure, which with
honorable minds was a sufficient one.

On the question for referring the appointment of the Judges to
the Executive, instead of the 2% branch

Mas. ay. Cont no. P? ay. Del. no. Mino. V2 no. N. C. no.
8. C. no.—Geo. absent.2

M Guorum moved “‘ that the Judges be nominated and appointed
by the Executive, by & with the advice & consent of the 24 branch
& every such nomination shall be made at least days prior
to such appointment.’’ This mode he said had been ratified by the
experience of 140 years in Massachuss‘* If the app! should be
left to either branch of the Legislature, it will be a mere piece of
jobbing.

M: Gov? Morris 2% & supported the motion.

M! SHERMAN thought it less objectionable than an absolute ap-
pointment by the Executive; but disliked it as too much fettering
the Senate.

2 Question on M? Ghorum’s motion

Mas. ay. Coni no. P? ay. Del. no. Mi ay. V? ay. N. C. no.
8. C. no. Geo. absent.?

M: Mapison moved that the Judges should be nominated by the
Executive, & such nomination should become an appointment if not
disagreed to within days by % of the 2? branch. M? Gov
Morris 2% the motion. By common consent the consideration of it
was postponed till tomorrow.

‘*To hold their offices during good behavior ’’ & ‘‘ to receive fixed
salaries ’’ agreed to nem: con:

‘In which [salaries of Judges] no increase or diminution shall
be made so as to affect the persons at the time in office.’’+

M: Gov? Morris moved to strike out ‘‘ or increase.’’ He thought
the Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries as circum-
stances might require, and that this would not create any improper
dependence in the Judges.

Doc! FRANKLIN was in favor of the motion. Money may not

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: ‘“ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, aye—2;
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no
—6; Georgia, absent.”

2'The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

® In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, aye—4; Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—4;

Georgia, absent.” . . . . .
“The phrase “actually in office at the time” is substituted in the transcript

for “at the time in office.”
278 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

only become plentier, but the business of the department may in-
crease as the Country becomes more populous.

MM Mapison. The dependence will be less if the increase alone
should be permitted, but it will be improper even so far to permit a de-
pendence Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be
in agitation in the legislature, an undue complaisance in the former
may be felt towards the latter. If at such a crisis there should be
in Court suits, to which leading members of the Legislature may be
parties, the Judges will be in a situation which ought not to?
suffered, if it can be prevented. The variations in the value of
money, may be guarded ag** by taking for a standard wheat or
some other thing of permanent value. The increase of business will
be provided for by an increase of the number who are to do it. An
increase of salaries may be easily so contrived as not to affect persons
in office.

M: Gov: Morris. The value of money may not only alter but
the State of Society may alter. In this event the same quantity of
wheat, the same value would not be the same compensation. The
Amount of salaries must always be regulated by the manners & the
style of living in a Country. The increase of business can not, be
provided for in the supreme tribunal in the way that has been men-
tioned. All the business of a certain description whether more or
less must be done in that single tribunal. Additional labor alone
in the Judges can provide for additional business. Additional com-
pensation therefore ought not to be prohibited.

On the question for striking out ‘‘ or increase ”’

Mas. ay. Cont ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. Mi ay. V2 no. N. C. no.
S. C. ay. Geo. absent.”

The whole clause as amended was then agreed to nem: con:

12. Resol:  ‘‘ that * Nat! Legislature be empowered to appoint in-
ferior tribunals ’’®

M? Butuer could see no necessity for. such tribunals. The State
Tribunals might do the business.

M: L. Martin concurred. They will create jealousies & opposi-
tions in the State’ tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they
will interfere.

 

1 The word “be” is here inserted in the transcript.

?In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, aye—6; Virginia, North Carolina,
no—2; Georgia, absent.”
bios . ae ante “The twelfth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
*12. Resol.”

‘The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The words “ being taken up” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1787 279

M: Guorum. There are in the States already federal Courts with
jurisdiction for trial of piracies &c. committed on the Seas. No com-
plaints have been made by the States or the Courts of the States.
Inferior tribunals are essential to render the authority of the Nat!
Legislature effectual

M? Ranpo.puH observed that the Courts of the States can not be
trusted with the administration of the National laws. The objects
of jurisdiction are such as will often place the General & local policy
at variance.

M= Gov: Morris urged also the necessity of such a provision

M: SHERMAN was willing to give the power to the Legislature but
wished them to make use of the State Tribunals whenever it could be
done, with safety to the general interest.

Col. Mason thought many circumstances might arise not now to
be foreseen, which might render such a power absolutely necessary.

On? question for agreeing to 12. Resol: ? empowering the National
Legislature to appoint ‘‘ inferior tribunals.’’? Ag? to nem. con.

*13. Resol: ‘‘ Impeachments of national officers ’’ were struck
out ’’ on motion for the purpose. ‘‘ The jurisdiction of Nat! Judi-
ciary.’’ Several criticisms having been made on the definition; it was
proposed by M? Madison so to alter ° as to read thus—‘‘ that the juris-
diction shall extend to all cases arising under the Nat! laws: And to
such other questions as may involve the Nat! peace & harmony,’’ which
was agreed to nem. con.

Resol. 14.° providing for the admission of new States? Agreed to
nem. con.

Resol. 15.8 that provision ought to be made for the continuance of .
Cong’ &c. & for the completion of their engagements.®

M: Gov! Morris thought the assumption of their engagements
might as well be omitted; and that Cong? ought not to be continued
till all the States should adopt the reform; since it may become ex-

 

2The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The words “the twelfth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for
‘12. Resol.” :

2 The words “it was” are here inserted in the transcript.

4This paragraph is changed in the transcript to read as follows: “The
clause of ‘Impeachments of national officers,’ was struck out, on motion for the
purpose. The thirteenth Resolution, ‘The jurisdiction of the National Judiciary,
&e. being then taken up, several. . ” :

5 The word “it” is here inserted in the transcript.

°The words “The fourteenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
‘for “ Resol. 14.” :

7 The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

®The words “The fifteenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript

‘for “ Resol. 15.” ; G . ‘
® The words “ being considered ” are here inserted in the transcript.
280 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

pedient to give effect to it whenever a certain number of States
shall adopt it.

Mt Manson the clause can mean nothing more than that provision
ought to be made for preventing an interregnum; which must exist
in the interval between the adoption of the New Gov! and the com-
mencement of its operation, if the old Gov! should cease on the first
of these events.

M! WILson did not entirely approve of the manner in which the
clause relating to the engagements of Cong? was expressed; but he
thought some provision on the subject would be proper in order to
prevent any suspicion that the obligations of the Confederacy might
be dissolved along with the Governt under which they were con-
tracted.

On the question on the 1% part—relating to+ continuance of
Cong?”’

Mas. no. Cont no. P? no. Del. no. Mino. V2 ay. N. C. ay.
S. C.* ay. Geo. no.?

The 24 part as to! completion of their engagements,? disag’ to.
nem. con. |

Resol. 16.4 ‘‘ That a Republican Constitution & its. existing laws
ought to be guarantied to each State by the U. States.’’®

M: Gov? Morris—thought the Resol: very objectionable. He
should be very unwilling that such laws as exist in R. Island should
be guaranteid.

M! Wuson. The object is merely to secure the States ag* dan-
gerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions.

Col. Mason. If the Gen! Gov! should have no right to suppress
rebellions ag*t particular States, it will be in a bad situation indeed.
As Rebellions ag*' itself originate in & ag*t individual States, it must
remain a passive Spectator of its own subversion.

M: RanpotpH. The Resol? has 2. objects. 1.6 to secure Republi-
can Government. 2.° to suppress domestic commotions. He urged
the necessity of both these provisions.

*In the printed Journal, 8S. Carolina—no.

 

+The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

°Tn the transcript the vote reads: “Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina,* aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Georgia, no—6.”

5 The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The words “The sixteenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
for “ Resol. 16.”

°' The words “being considered ” are here added in the transcript.

°The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “secondly” in the
transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1787 281

Mr" Mapison moved to substitute ‘‘ that the Constitutional author-
ity of the States shall be guarantied to them respectively ag*
domestic as well as foreign violence.’’

Doct M‘Ciure seconded the motion.

M? Houston was afraid of perpetuating the existing Constitutions
of the States. That of Georgia was a very bad one, and he hoped
would be revised & amended. It may also be difficult for the Gen!
‘Gov! to decide between contending parties each of which claim the
sanction of the Constitution.

M: L. Martin was for leaving the States to suppress Rebellions
themselves.

M: Guorum thought it strange that a Rebellion should be known
to exist in the Empire, and the Gen! Gov! sh* be restrained from
interposing to subdue it. At this rate an enterprising Citizen might
erect the standard of Monarchy in a particular State, might gather
together partizans from all quarters, might extend his views from
State to State, and threaten to establish a tyranny over the whole &
the Gen! Gov! be compelled to remain an inactive witness of its own
destruction. With regard to different parties in a State; as long as
they confine their disputes to words, they will be harmless to the
Gen! Gov! & to each other. If they appeal to the sword, it will then be
necessary for the Gen! Gov't, however difficult it may be to decide on
the merits of their contest, to interpose & put an end to it.

M: Carrot. Some such provision is essential. Every State ought
to wish for it. It has been doubted whether it is a casus federis at
present. And no room ought to be left for such a doubt hereafter.

M: RanpotpH moved to add as! amend! to the motion; ‘‘ and
that no State be at liberty to form any other than a Republican Gov!
M? Mapison seconded the motion

M: RutuwceE thought it unnecessary to insert any guarantee.
No doubt could be entertained but that Cong’ had the authority if
they had the means to co-operate with any State in subduing a
rebellion. It was & would be involved in the nature of the thing.

ME Witson moved as a better expression of the idea, ‘‘ that a
Republican form of Governm! shall be guarantied to each State &
that each State shall be protected ag%* foreign & domestic violence.

This seeming to be well received, M! Mapison & M* Ranpo.pu
withdrew their propositions & on the Question for agreeing to M*
Wilson’s motion, it passed nem. con.

Adj

 

1The word “an” is here inserted in the transcript.
282 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

TuurRsDAY. JuLY. 19. IN CONVENTION.

On reconsideration of the vote rendering the Executive re-eligible
a 24 time, M™ Martin moved to reinstate the words, ‘‘ to be ineligible
a 2° time.”’

M! GoveRNEUR Morris. It is necessary to take into one view all
that relates to the establishment of the Executive; on the due forma-
tion of which must depend the efficacy & utility of the Union among
the present and future States. It has been a maxim in Political
Science that Republican Government is not adapted to a large ex-
tent of Country, because the energy of the Executive Magistracy can
not reach the extreme parts of it. Our Country is an extensive one.
We must either then renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide
an Executive with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it.
This subject was of so much importance that he hoped to be in-
dulged in an extensive view of it. One great object of the Executive
is to controul the Legislature. The Legislature will continually seek
to aggrandize & perpetuate themselves; and will sieze those critical
moments produced by war, invasion or convulsion for that purpose.
It is necessary then that the Executive Magistrate should be the
guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, ag’t Legislative
tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who in the course of things
will necessarily compose the Legislative body. Wealth tends to
corrupt the mind &? to nourish its love of power, and to stimulate it
to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit of the opulent.
The check provided in the 24 branch was not meant as a eheck on
Legislative usurpations of power, but on the abuse of lawful powers,
on the propensity in? the 1% branch to legislate too much to run into
projects of paper money & similar expedients. It is no check on
Legislative tyranny. On the contrary it may favor it, and if the
1: branch can be seduced may find the means of success. The Execu-
tive therefore ought to be so constituted as to be the great protector
of the Mass of the people.—It is the duty of the Executive to appoint
the officers & to command the forces of the Republie: to appoint
1.° ministerial officers for the administration of public affairs. 2.3
officers for the dispensation of Justice. Who will be the best Judges
whether these appointments be well made? The people at large, who
will know, will see, will feel the effects of them. Again who can judge

 

*The word “and” is crossed out in the transcript.
* The word “of” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “ first” and “ secondly” in the
transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1787 288

2

so well of the discharge of military duties for the protéction &
security of the people, as the people themselves who are to be’ pro-
tected & secured?—He finds too that the Executive is not to be
re-eligible. What effect will this have?. 1.1 it will destroy the great
incitement to merit public esteem by taking away the hope of being
rewarded with a reappointment. It may give a dangerous turn to
one of the strongest passions in the human breast. The love of fame
is the great spring to noble & illustrious actions. Shut the Civil road
to Glory & he may be compelled to seek it by the sword. 2.? It will
tempt him to make the most of the short space of time allotted him,
to accumulate wealth and provide for his friends. 3.* It will pro-
duce violations of the very constitution it is meant to secure. In
moments of pressing danger the tried abilities and established char-
acter of a favorite Magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms
of the Constitution. The Executive is also to be impeachablée. This
is a dangerous part of the plan. It will hold him in such depend-
ence that he will be no check on the Legislature, will not be a firm
guardian of the people and of the public interest. He will be the
tool of a faction, of some leading demagogue in the Legislature.
These then are the faults of the Executive establishment as now pro-
posed. Can no better establishmt be devised? If he is to be the
Guardian of the people let him be appointed by the people? If he
is to be a check on the Legislature let him not be impeachable. Let
him be of short duration, that he may with propriety be re-eligible.
It has been said that the candidates for this office will not be known
to the people. If they be known to the Legislature, they must have
such a notoriety and eminence of Character, that they cannot possibly
be unknown to the people at large. It cannot be possible that a
man shall have sufficiently distinguished himself to merit this high
trust without having his character proclaimed by fame throughout
the Empire. As to the danger from an unimpeachable magistrate he
could not regard it as formidable. There must be certain great
officers of State; a minister of finance, of war, of foreign affairs &e.
These he presumes will exercise their functions in subordination to
the Executive, and will be amenable by impeachment to the public
Justice. Without these ministers the Executive can do nothing of.
consequence. He suggested a biennial election of the Executive at
the time of electing the 1% branch, and the Executive to hold over,
so as to prevent any interregnum in the administration. An election

 

1 The figure “1” is changed to “ In the first place” in the transcript.
? The figure “2” is changed to “In the second place ie in the transcript.
* The figure “3” is changed to “Tn the third place” in the transcript.
284 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

by the people at large throughout so great an extent of country
could not be influenced, by those little combinations and those
momentary lies which often decide popular elections within a nar-
row sphere. It will probably, be objected that the election will
be influenced by the members of the Legislature; particularly of the
1** branch, and that it will be nearly the same thing with an election
by the Legislature itself. It could not be denied that such an influ-
ence would exist. But it might be answered that as the Legislature
or the candidates for it would be divided, the enmity of one part
would counteract the friendship of another: that if the administra-
tion of the Executive were good, it would be unpopular to oppose his
reelection, if bad it ought to be opposed & a reappointm! prevented;
and lastly that in every view this indirect dependence on the favor
of the Legislature could not be so mischievous as a direct dependence
for his appointment. He saw no alternative for making the Executive
independent of the Legislature but either to give him his office for
life, or make him eligible by the people—Again, it might be objected
that two years would be too short a duration. But he believes that
as long as he should behave himself well, he would be continued in
his place. The extent of the Country would secure his re-election
ag*' the factions & discontents of particular States. It deserved con-
sideration also that such an ingredient in the plan would render it
extremely palatable to the people. These were the general ideas
which occurred to him on the subject, and which led him to wish
& move that the whole constitution of the Executive might undergo
reconsideration. ,

M: Ranpourexw urged the motion of Mt L. Martin for restoring the
words making the Executive ineligible a 24 time. If he ought to
be independent, he should not be left under a temptation to court a
re-appointment. If he should be re-appointable by the Legislature,
he will be no check on it. His revisionary power will be of no
avail. He had always thought & contended as he still did that the
danger apprehended by the little States was chimerical; but those
who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly anxious for the motion.
If the Executive be appointed, as has been determined, by the Legis-
lature, he will probably be appointed either by joint ballot of both
‘houses, or be nominated by the 1% and appointed by the 2% branch.
In either case the large States will preponderate. If he is to court
the same influence for his re-appointment, will he not make his
revisionary power, and all the other functions of his administration,
subservient to the views of the large States. Besides, is there not
great reason to apprehend that in case he should be re-eligible, a
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1787 285

false complaisance in the Legislature might lead them to continue
an unfit man in office in preference to a fit one. It has been said that
a constitutional bar to reappointment will inspire unconstitutional
endeavours to perpetuate himself. It may be answered that his
endeavous can have no effect unless the people be corrupt to such
a degree as to render all precautions hopeless: to which may be
added that this argument supposes him to be more powerful &
dangerous, than other arguments which have been used, admit, and
consequently calls for stronger fetters on his authority. He thought
an election by the Legislature with an incapacity to be elected a
second time would be more acceptable to the people that+ the plan
suggested by M: Gov! Morris.

M: Kine. did not like the ineligibility. He thought there was
great force in the remark* of M? Sherman, that he who has proved
himself to be? most fit for an Office, ought not to be excluded by the
constitution from holding it. He would therefore prefer any other
reasonable plan that could be substituted. He was much disposed
to think that in such cases the people at large would chuse wisely.
There was indeed some difficulty arising from the improbability of
a general concurrence of the people in favor of any one man. On
the whole he was of opinion that an appointment by electors chosen
by the people for the purpose, would he liable to fewest objections.

M! Parrerson’s ideas nearly coincided he said with those of M!
King. He proposed that the Executive should be appointed by
Electors to be chosen by the States in a ratio that would allow one
elector to the smallest and three to the largest States.

M: Witson. It seems to be the unanimous sense that the Execu-
tive should not be appointed by the Legislature, unless he be rendered
in-eligible a 2° time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea was gain-
ing ground, of an election mediately or immediately by the people.

M: Mapison If it be a fundamental principle of free Gov't that
the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately
exercised, it is equally so that they be independently exercised. There
is the same & perhaps greater reason why the Executive sh? be
independent of the Legislature, than why the Judiciary should: A
coalition of the two former powers would be more immediately &
‘certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is essential then that the
appointment of the Executive should either be drawn from some
source, or held by some tenure, that will give him a free agency with

 

1The word “that” is changed to “than” in the transcript.
2 The word “remark” is used in the plural in the transcript.
2 The words “to be” are omitted in the transcript.
2986 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

regard to the Legislature. This could not be if he was te be appoint-
able from time to time by the Legislature. It was not clear that an
appointment in the 1%* instance even with an ineligibility afterwards
would not establish an improper connection between the two depart-
ments. Certain it was that the appointment would be attended with
intrigues and contentions that ought not to be unnecessarily ad-
mitted. He was disposed for these reasons to refer the appointment
to some other source. The people at large was in his opinion the
fittest in itself. It would be as likely as any that could be devised to
produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character. The
people generally could only know & vote for some Citizen whose
merits had rendered him an object of general attention & esteem.
There was one difficulty however of a serious nature attending an
immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much
more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the
latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the
Negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this difficulty and
seemed on the whole to be liable to fewest objections.

M: Gerry. If the Executive is to be elected by the Legislature
he certainly ought not to be re-eligible. This would make him abso-
lutely dependent.. He was ag’t a popular election. The people
are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men. He
urged the expediency of an appointment of the Executive by Electors
to be chosen by the State Executives. The people of the States
will then choose the 1%* branch: The legislatures of the States the
2% branch of the National Legislature, and the Executives of the
States, the National Executive. This he thought would form a strong
attachn' in the States to the National System. The popular mode
of electing the chief Magistrate would certainly be the worst of all.
If he should be so elected & should do his duty, he will be turned
out for it like Gov! Bowdoin in Mass‘ & President Sullivan in N.
Hamshire.

On the question on M! Gov! Morris motion to reconsider gen-
erally the constitution of the Executive.

Mas. ay. Ci ay. N. J. ay & all the others ay.

M! ExLsewortH moved to strike out the appointm' by the Nat!
Legislature, and? insert ‘‘ to be chosen by electors appointed, by the
Legislatures of the States in the following ratio; towit—one for
each State not exceeding 200,000 inhab’s two for each above y!

 

+ In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
and all the others, aye.”
* The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1787 287

number & not exceeding 300,000. and three for each State exceeding
300,000.—M: Broome 2% the motion

M? RUTLIDGE was opposed to all the modes except the appointm!
by the Nat! Legislature. He will be sufficiently independent, if he
be not re-eligible.

M: Gerry preferred the motion of M! Elseworth to an appointm!
by the Nat! Legislature, or by the people; tho’ not to an appt by
the State Executives. He moved that the electors proposed by
M: E. should be 25 in number, and allotted in the following pro-
portion. to N. H. 1. to Mas. 3. to R. I. 1. to Cont 2. to N. Y. 2.N. J. 2.
+ Pra. Del 1, +A. Ve 8. N.C. 2,28. C. 2. * Geo, 1,

The question as moved by M? Elseworth being divided, on the 1%
part shall y< Nat? Executive be appointed by Electors?

Mas. div? Cont ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M@ ay. V3?
ay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

On * 2% part shall the Electors be chosen by* State Legislatures?

Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. ay. Mi ay. V?# no.
N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.*

The part relating to the ratio in which the States s¢ chuse electors
was postponed nem. con.

M? L. Martin moved that the Executive be ineligible a 2% time.

M? Wiuuiamson 2% the motion. He had no great confidence in
the Electors to be chosen for the special purpose. They would not be
the most respectable citizens; but persons not occupied in the high
offices of Gov! They would be liable to undue influence, which might
the more readily be practised as some of them will probably be in
appointment 6 or 8 months before the object of it comes on.

M: ELsewortH supposed any persons might be appointed Elec-
tors, excepting ® solely, members of the Nat} Legislature.

On the question shall he be ineligible a 22 time?

Mas. no. Ctno. N.J.no. P2no. Del.no. M?no. Vino. N.C.
ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.®

 

1The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.

?In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—6; North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
no—3; Massachusetts, divided.”

® The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
Virginia, South Carolina, no—2.”

5 The word “except” is substituted in the transcript for “ excepting.”

° In the transcript the vote reads: “ North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—2;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, Georgia, no—8.”
288 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

On the question Shall the Executive continue for 7 years? It
passed in the negative

Mas. div’ Cont ay.* N.J.no.* P%no. Del. no. M% no. V* no.
N. C. div? S. C. ay. Geo. ay.’

M: Kine was afraid we sh? shorten the term too much.

\t Govt Morris was for a short term, in order to avoid im-
peach which w? be otherwise necessary.

M: Butuer was ag’ a? frequency of the elections. Geo. & S. C.
were too distant to send electors often.

M: Evseworts was for 6. years. If the elections be too frequent,
the Executive will not be firm eno’. There must be duties which will
make him unpopular for the moment. There will be outs as well as
ins. His administration therefore will be attacked and mis-
represented. /

Mt Wiu1amson was for 6 years. The expence will be consider-
able & ought not to be unnecessarily repeated. If the Elections are
too frequent, the best men will not undertake the service and those
of an inferior character will be liable to be corrupted.

On ? question for 6 years?

Mas. ay. Cont ay. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. no. Mi ay. V3? ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.‘

Adjourned

Frmay Juuy 20. in CoNVENTION

The postponed ® Ratio of Electors for appointing the Executive;
to wit 1 for each State whose inhabitants do not exceed 100,000,°
&e. being taken up.

M: Maptson observed that this would make in time all or nearly
all the States equal. Since there were few that would not in time
contain the number of inhabitants intitling them to 3 Electors: that
this ratio ought either to be made temporary, or so varied as that it
would adjust itself to the growing population of the States.

*in the printed Journal Cont, no: N. Jersey ay

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut,* South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—3; New Jersey,* Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no—5;
Massachusetts, North Carolina, divided.”

* The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “a.”

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Delaware, no.” ‘

* The word “proposed” is substituted in the transcript for “ postponed.”

°In the figure “100,000” the “1” is crossed out and a figure “2” is
written above it in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1787 289

M' Gerry moved that in the 1:¢ instance the Electors should be
allotted to the States in the following ratio: to N. H. 1. Mas. 3.
R. 1.1. Conf 2. N.Y. 2. N.J.2. P23. Del. 1. M22. V2 3.
N.C. 2. 8.0.2. Geo. 1.

On the question to postpone in order to take up this motion of
M: Gerry. It passed in the affirmative

Mas. ay. Coni no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M no. Vé® ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.2

M° ELsewortH moved that 2 Electors be allotted to N. H. Some
rule ought to be pursued; and N. H. has more than 100,000 inhabi-
tants. He thought it would be proper also to allot 2. to Georgia

M' Broom & M* Martin moved to postpone M! Gerry’s allotment
of Electors, leaving a fit ratio to be reported by the Committee to be
appointed for detailing the Resolutions.

On this motion.

Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. P* no. Del. ay. M? ay. V* no.
N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no?

M: Houston 2% the motion of M! Elseworth to add another
Elector to N. H. & Georgia. On the Question:

Mas. no. Cf ay. N. J. no. P# no. Del. no. M4 no. V? no.
N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M! WILLIAMSON moved as an amendment to M! Gerry’s allot-
ment of Electors in the 1% instance that in future elections of the Nat!
Executive, the number of Electors to be appointed by the several States
shall be regulated by their respective numbers of Representatives in
the 1% branch pursuing as nearly as may be the present proportions.

On question on M! Gerry’s ratio of Electors

Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. P* ay. Del. no. M4 no. V? ay.
N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. no.*

5‘< to be removeable on impeachment and conviction for mal
practice or neglect of duty.’’ see Resol: 9.¢

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, no—4.”

2In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina,

South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.” ‘

2In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—3; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, no—7.”

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—6; New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, Georgia, no—4.” : ;

® The words “On the clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

*The words “the ninth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript for

“Resol: 9.”
290 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M:! PinKNEy & M! Gov: Morris moved to strike out this part of
the Resolution. M! P. observ? he ought not to be impeachable whilst
in office

M: Davie. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare
no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected. He con-
sidered this as an essential security for the good behaviour of the
Executive. ;

M: Witson concurred in the necessity cf making the Executive
impeachable whilst in office.

M! Gov? Morris. He can do no criminal act without Coadjutors
who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that will be
sufficient proof of his innocence. Besides who is to impeach? Is the
impeachment to suspend his functions. If it is not the mischief will
goon. If it is the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a dis-
placement, and will render the Executive dependent on those who
are to impeach

Col. Mason. No point is of more importance than that the right
of impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above Jus-
tice? Above all shall that man be above it, who can commit the
most extensive injustice? When great crimes were committed he
was for punishing the principal as well as the Coadjutors. There
had been much debate & difficulty as to the mode of chusing the
Executive. He approved of that which had been adopted at first,
namely of referring the appointment to the Nat! Legislature. One
objection ag* Electors was the danger of their being corrupted by
the Candidates; & this furnished a peculiar reason in favor of im-
peachments whilst in office. Shall the man who has practised cor-
ruption & by that means procured his appointment in the first in-
stance, be suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his guilt?

Doct FRANKLIN was for retaining the clause as favorable to the
Executive. History furnishes one example only of a first Magistrate
being formally brought to public Justice. Every body cried out
ag*' this as unconstitutional. What was the practice before this in
cases where the chief Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why
recourse was had to assassination in w” he was not only deprived of
his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his character. It w4
be the best way therefore to provide in the Constitution for the
regular punishment of the Executive where his misconduct should
deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal when? he should be un-
justly accused.

 

>The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The word “where” is substituted in the transcript for “ when.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1787 291

M" Gov! Morris admits corruption & some few other offences to
be such as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases ought to
be enumerated & defined:

M: Mapison thought it indispensable that some provision should
be made for defending the Community ag’ the incapacity, negli-
gence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the
period of his service, was not a sufficient security. He might lose
his capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his ad-
ministration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He
might betray his trust to foreign powers. The case of the Executive
Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that of the Legislature or
of any other public body, holding offices of limited duration. It could
not be presumed that all or even a majority of the members of an
Assembly would either lose their capacity for discharging, or be
bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the restraints of their per-
sonal integrity & honor, the difficulty of acting in concert for pur-
poses of corruption was a security to the public. And if one or a
few members only should be seduced, the soundness of the remain-
ing members, would maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body.
In the case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be administered
by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within
the compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to
the Republic.

Mi PINKNEY did not see the necessity of impeachments. He was
sure they ought not to issue from the Legislature who would in that
ease hold them as a rod over the Executive and by that means effec-
tually destroy his independence. His revisionary power in particular
would be rendered altogether insignificant.

M: Gerry urged the necessity of impeachments. A good magis-
trate will not fear them. <A bad one ought to be kept in fear of
them. He hoped the maxim would never be adopted here that the
chief magistrate could do no wrong.

M: Kine expressed his apprehensions that an extreme caution in
favor of liberty might enervate the Government we were forming.
He wished the House to recur to the primitive axiom that the three
great departments of Gov® should be separate & independent: that
the Executive & Judiciary should be so as well as the Legislative:
that the Executive should be so equally with the Judiciary. Would
this be the case, if the Executive should be impeachable? It had been
said that the Judiciary would be impeachable. But it should have
been remembered at the same time that the Judiciary hold their
places not for a limited time, but during good behaviour. It is neces-
292 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

sary therefore that a forum should be established for trying mis-
behaviour. Was the Executive to hold his place during good be-
haviour? The Executive was to hold his place for a limited term like
the members of the Legislature: Like them particularly the Senate
whose members would continue in appointmt the same term of 6
years he would periodically be tried for his behaviour by his electors,
who would continue or discontinue him in trust according to the
manner in which he had discharged it. Like them therefore, he
ought to be subject to no intermediate trial, by impeachment. He
ought not to be impeachable unless he held his office during good be-
havior, a tenure which would be most agreeable to him; provided an
independent and effectual forum could be devised. But under no
circumstances ought he to be impeachable by the Legislature. This
would be destructive of his independence and of the principles of
the Constitution. He relied on the vigor of the Executive as a
great security for the public liberties.

M! RanpoteH. The propriety of impeachments was a favorite
principle with him. Guilt wherever found ought to be punished. The
Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing his power; par-
ticularly in time of war when the military force, and in some respects
the public money will be in his hands. Should no regular punish-
ment be provided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults & in-
surrections. He is aware of the necessity of proceeding with a
cautious hand, and of excluding as much as possible the influence
of the Legislature from the business. He suggested for consideration
an idea which had fallen [from Col Hamilton] of composing a forum
out of the Judges belonging to the States: and even of requiring
some preliminary inquest whether just grounds: of impeachment
existed. ‘

Doct! FRaNKLIN mentioned the case of the Prince of Orange dur-
ing the late war. An agreement was made between France & Hol-
land; by which their two fleets were to unite at a certain time &
place. The Dutch fleet did not appear. Every body began to wonder
at it. At length it was suspected that the Statholder was at the
bottom of the matter. This suspicion prevailed more & more. Yet
as he could not be impeached and no regular examination took
place, he remained in his office, and strengtheing his own party,
as the party opposed to him became formidable, he gave birth to the
most violent animosities & contentions. Had he been impeachable,
a regular & peaceable enquiry would have taken place and he would

 

* The transcript uses the word “grounds” in the singular.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1787 293

if guilty have been duly punished, if innocent restored to the con-
fidence of the public.

M: Kina remarked that the case of the Statholder was not
applicable. He held his place for life, and was not periodically
elected. In the former case impeachments are proper to secure good
behaviour. In the latter they are unnecessary; the periodical re-
sponsibility to the electors being an equivalent security.

M* WIxson observed that if the idea were to be pursued, the
Senators who are to hold their places during the same term with the
Executive, ought to be subject to impeachment & removal.

M: PINKNEY apprehended that some gentlemen reasoned on a
supposition that the Executive was to have powers which would not
be committed to him: He presumed that his powers would be so
circumscribed as to render impeachments unnecessary.

M: Gov: Morris’s opinion had been changed by the arguments
used in the discussion. He was now sensible of the necessity of
impeachments, if the Executive was to continue for any? time in
office. Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life in-
terest, much less like one having an hereditary interest in his office.
He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and
no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of
seeing the first Magistrate in forign pay, without being able to guard
agst it by displacing him. One would think the King of England
well secured ag*' bribery. He has as it were a fee simple in the
whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV. The
Executive ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery ; Corrupt-
ing his electors, and incapacity were other causes of impeachment.
For the latter he should be punished not as a man, but as an officer,
and punished only by degradation from his office. This Magistrate is
not the King but the prime-Minister. The people are the King. When
we make him amenable to Justice however we should take care to pro-
vide some mode that will not make him dependent on the Legislature.

It was moved & 2%4 to postpone the question of impeachments
which was negatived. Mas. & S. Carolina only being ay.

On y? Question, Shall the Executive be removeable on impeach-
ments &c.?

Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del ay. M? ay. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.’

 

2The words “length of” are here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Massachusetts,
South Carolina, no—2.”
294 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

‘<1 Executive to receive fixed compensation.’’ Agreed to nem. con.

‘‘ to be paid out of the National Treasury ’’ agreed to, N. Jersey
only in the negative.

M: Gerry & ? Gov? Morris moved ‘‘ that the Electors of the Execu-
tive shall not be members of the Nat! Legislature, nor officers of the
U. States, nor shall the Electors themselves be eligible to the supreme
magistracy.’’ Agreed to nem. con.

Doct M‘Ciure asked whether it would not be necessary, before
a Committee for detailing the Constitution should be appointed, to
determine on the means by which the Executive is to carry the
laws into effect, and to resist combinations ag*t them. Is he to have
a military force for the purpose, or to have the command of the
Militia, the only existing force that can be applied to that use? As
the Resolutions now stand the Committee will have no determinate
directions on this great point.

M: Witson thought that some additional directions to the Com-
mittee wi be necessary.

M: Kine. The Committee are to provide for the end. Their
discretionary power to provide for the means is involved according to

an established axiom.
Adjourned

SatTurDAY JULY 21 IN CoNVENTION

M! WiLiaMson moved that the Electors of the Executive should
be paid out of the National Treasury for the Service to be performed
by them.’’ Justice required this: as it was a national service they
were to render. The motion was agreed to Nem. Con.

M* Witson moved as an amendment to Resol® 10. that the supreme
Nat! Judiciary should be associated with the Executive in the Re-
visionary power.’’ This proposition had been before made and failed:
but he was so confirmed by reflection in the opinion of its utility, that
he thought it incumbent on him to make another effort: The Judi-
ciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstrating ag*t projected
encroachments on the people as well as on themselves. It had been
said that the Judges, as expositors of the Laws would have an oppor-
tunity of defending their constitutional rights. There was weight
in this observation; but this power of the Judges did not go far

 

* The word “The” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The word “Mr.” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The words “the tenth Resolution” are substituted for “Resolm 10.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JULY 21, 1787 295

enough. Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous,
may be destructive; and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to
justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a
share in the Revisionary power, and they will have an opportunity
of taking notice of these? characters of a law, and of counteracting, by
the weight of their opinions the improper views of the Legislature.—

M: Mapison 2% the motion

M= GuHorum did not see the advantage of employing the Judges
in this way. As Judges they are not to be presumed to possess any
peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures. Nor can
it be necessary as a security for their constitutional rights. The
Judges in England have no such additional provision for their de-
fence, yet their jurisdiction is not invaded. He thought it would be
best to let the Executive alone be responsible, and at most to authorize
him to call on? Judges for their opinions.

M: ELsEwortH approved heartily of the motion. The aid of the
Judges will give more wisdom & firmness to the Executive. They
will possess a systematic and accurate knowledge of the Laws, which
the Executive can not be expected always to possess. The law of
Nations also will frequently come into question. Of this the Judges
alone will have competent information.

M: Mapison considered the object of the motion as of great im-
portance to the meditated Constitution. It would be useful to the
Judiciary departmt by giving it an additional opportunity of de-
fending itself ag’* Legislative encroachments; It would be useful to
the Executive, by inspiring additional confidence & firmness in exert-
ing the revisionary power: It would be useful to the Legislature
by the valuable assistance it would give in preserving a con-
sistency, conciseness, perspicuity & technical propriety in the laws,
qualities peculiarly necessary; & yet shamefully wanting in our
republican Codes. It would moreover be useful to the Community at
large as an additional check ag*t a pursuit of those unwise & unjust
measures which constituted so great a portion of our calamities. If
any solid objection could be urged ag%t the motion, it must be on the
supposition that it tended to give too much strength either to the
Executive or Judiciary. He did not think there was the least ground
for this apprehension. It was much more to be apprehended that
notwithstanding this co-operation of the two departments, the Legis-
lature would still be an overmatch for them. Experiénce in all the
States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb

 

1The word “those” is substituted in the transcript for “these.”
?The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
296 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

all power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the
American Constitutions; & suggested the necessity of giving every
defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with
republican principles.

ME Mason said he had always. been a friend to this provision. It
would give a confidence to the Executive, which he would not other-
wise have, and without which the Revisionary power would be of
little avail.

M: Gerry did not expect to see this point which had undergone
full discussion, again revived. The object he conceived of the Re-
visionary power was merely to secure the Executive department ag**
legislative encroachment. The Executive therefore who will best
know and be ready to defend his rights ought alone to have the
defence of them. The motion was liable to strong objections. It
was combining & mixing together the Legislative & the other depart-
ments. It was establishing an improper coalition between the Execu-
tive & Judiciary departments. It was making Statesmen of the
Judges; and setting them up as the guardians of the Rights of the
people. He relied for his part on the Representatives of the people
as the guardians of their Rights & interests. It was making the
Expositors of the Laws, the Legislators which ought never to be
done. <A better expedient for correcting the laws, would be to appoint
as had been done in Pen* a person or persons of proper skill, to
draw bills for the Legislature.

M: Srrone thought with M= Gerry that the power of making
ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No
maxim was better established. The Judges in exercising the func-
tion of expositors might be influenced by the part they had taken,
in framing? the laws. :

M:! Gov! Morris. Some check being necessary on the Legislature,
the question is in what hands it should be lodged. On one side it was
contended that the Executive alone ought to exercise it. He did
not think that an Executive appointed for 6 years, and impeachable
whilst in office w? be a very effectual check. On the other side it was
urged that he ought to be reinforced by the Judiciary department.
Ag* this it was objected that Expositors of laws ought to have no
hand in making them, and arguments in favor of this had been
drawn from England. What weight was due to them might be easily
determined by an attention to facts. The truth was that the Judges
in England had a great share in y°® Legislation. They are consulted

 

* The word “passing” is substituted in the transcript for “framing.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JULY 21, 1787 297

in difficult & doubtful cases. They may be & some of them are
members of the Legislature. They are or may be members of the
privy Council, and can there advise the Executive as they will do
with us if the motion succeeds. The influence the English Judges
may have in the latter capacity in strengthening the Executive check
can not be ascertained, as the King by his influence in a manner
dictates the laws. There is one difference in the two Cases however
which disconcerts all reasoning from the British to our proposed
Constitution. The British Executive has so great an interest in his
prerogatives and such powerful means of defending them that he
will never yield any part of them. The interest of our Executive
is so inconsiderable & so transitory, and his means of defending it so
feeble, that there is the justest ground to fear his want of firmness
in resisting incroachments. He was extremely apprehensive that the
auxiliary firmness & weight of the Judiciary would not supply the
deficiency. He concurred in thinking the public liberty in greater
danger from Legislative usurpations than from any other source.
It had been said that the Legislature ought to be relied on as the
proper Guardians of liberty. The answer was short and conclusive.
Hither bad laws will be pushed or not. On the latter supposition no
check will be wanted. On the former a strong check will be neces-
sary: And this is the proper supposition. Emissions of paper money,
largesses to the people—a remission of debts and similar measures,
‘will at some times be popular, and will be pushed for that reason
At other times such measures will coincide with the interests of the
‘Legislature themselves, & that will be a reason not less cogent for
pushing them. It may be thought that the people will not be deluded
and misled in the latter case. But experience teaches another lesson.
The press is indeed a great means of diminishing the evil, yet it is
found to be unable to prevent it altogether.

ML. Martin. Considered the association of the Judges with the
Executive as a dangerous innovation; as well as one which? could
not produce the particular advantage expected from it. A knowledge
of Mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be presumed to belong
in a higher deger degree to the Judges than to the Legislature. And as
to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the Judges
in their proper? official character. In this character they have a
negative on the laws. Join them with the Executive in the Revision
and they will have a double negative. It is necessary that the Su-
preme Judiciary should have the confidence of the people. This will

 

1The word “that” is substituted in the transcript for “ which.”
2The word “proper” is omitted in the transcript.
298 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

soon be lost, if they are employed in the task of remonstrating ag*
popular measures of the Legislature. Besides in what mode &
proportion are they to vote in the Council of Revision?

M: Mapison could not discover in the proposed association of
the Judges with the Executive in the Revisionary check on the Legis-
lature any violation of the maxim which requires the great depart-
ments of power to be kept separate & distinct. On the contrary
he thought it an auxiliary precaution in favor of the maxim. If a
Constitutional discrimination of the departments on paper were a
sufficient security to each ag** encroachments of the others, all further
provisions would indeed be superfluous. But experience had taught
us a distrust of that security; and that it is necessary to introduce
such a balance of powers and interests, as will guarantee the provi-
sions on paper. Instead therefore of contenting ourselves with lay-
ing down the Theory in the Constitution that each department ought
to be separate & distinct, it was proposed to add a defensive power
to each which should maintain the Theory in practice. In so doing we
did not blend the departments together. We erected effectual bar-
riers for keeping them separate. The most regular example of this
theory was in the British Constitution. Yet it was not only the
practice there to admit the Judges to a seat in the legislature, and
in the Executive Councils, and to submit to their previous examina-
tion all laws of a certain description, but it was a part of their
Constitution that the Executive might negative any law whatever;
a part of their Constitution which had been universally regarded
as calculated for the preservation of the whole. The objection ag**
a union of the Judiciary & Executive branches in the revision of the
laws, had either no foundation or was not carried far enough. If
such a Union was an improper mixture of powers, or such a Judiciary
check on the laws, was inconsistent with the Theory of a free Con-
stitution, it was equally so to admit the Executive to any participation
in the making of laws; and the revisionary plan ought to be dis-
carded altogether.

Col. Mason Observed that the defence of the Executive was not
the sole object of the Revisionary power. He expected even greater
advantages from it. Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the
Constitution of the Legislature, it would still so much resemble that
of the individual States, that it must be expected frequent'y to pass
unjust and pernicious laws. This restraining power was therefore
essentially necessary. It would have the effect not only of hindering
the final passage of such laws; but would discourage demagogues
from attempting to get them passed. It had been said [by M! L.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JULY 21, 1787 299

Martin] that if the Judges were joined in this check on the laws,
they would have a double negative, since in their expository capacity
of Judges they would have one negative. He would reply that in
this capacity they could impede in one ease only, the operation of
laws. They could declare an unconstitutional law void. But with
regard to every law however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which *
did not come plainly under this description, they would be under the
necessity as Judges to give it a free course. He wished the further
use to be made of the Judges, of giving aid in preventing every im-
proper law. Their aid will be the more valuable as they are in the
habit and practice of considering laws in their true principles, and
in all their consequences.

M? Witson. The separation of the departments does not require
that they should have separate objects but that they should act
separately tho’ on the same objects. It is necessary that the two
branches of the Legislature should be separate and distinct, yet
they are both to act precisely on the same object.

M: Gerry had rather give the Executive an absolute negative for
its own defence than thus to blend together the Judiciary & Executive
departments. It will bind them together in an offensive and de-
fensive alliance ag* the Legislature, and render the latter unwilling
to enter into a contest with them.

M! Gov! Morris was surprised that any defensive provision for
securing the effectual separation of the departments should be con-
sidered as an improper mixture of them. Suppose that the three
powers, were to be vested in three persons, by compact among them-
selves; that one was to have the power of making, another of execut-
ing, and a third of judging, the laws. Would it not be very natural
for the two latter after having settled the partition on paper, to
observe, and would not candor oblige the former to admit, that as a
security ag*’ legislative acts of the former which might easily be so
framed as to undermine the powers of the two others, the two
others ought to be armed with a veto for their own defence, or at
least to have an opportunity of stating their objections ag* acts of
encroachment? And would any one pretend that such a right tended
to blend & confound powers that ought to be separately exercised?
As well might it be said that If three neighbours had three distinct
farms, a right in each to defend his farm ag** his neighbours, tended
to blend the farms together.

M: Guorum. All agree that a check on the Legislature is neces-

 

2The word “that” is substituted in the transcript for “ which.”
300 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

sary. But there are two objections ag*' admitting the Judges to share
in it which no observations on the other side seem to obviate. the
1%‘ is that the Judges ought to carry into the exposition, of the laws
no prepossessions with regard to them. +2¢ that as the Judges will
outnumber the Executive, the revisionary check would be thrown
entirely out of the Executive hands, and instead of enabling him to
defend himself, would enable the Judges to sacrifice him.

M: Witson. The proposition is certainly not liable to all the
objections which have been urged ag‘ it. According [to M? Gerry]
it will unite the Executive & Judiciary in an offensive & defensive
alliance ag*t the Legislature. According to M! Ghorum it will lead
to a subversion of the Executive by the Judiciary influence. To
the first gentleman the answer was obvious; that the joint weight
of the two departments was necessary to balance the single weight
of the Legislature. To the 1% objection stated by the other Gentle-
man it might be answered that supposing the prepossion to mix
itself with the exposition, the evil would be overbalanced by the
advantages promised by the expedient. To the 2? objection, that such
a rule of voting might be provided in the detail as would guard
ag*t it.

M: Rutiivce thought the Judges of all men the most unfit to
be concerned in the revisionary Council. The Judges ought never to
give their opinion on a law till it comes before them. He thought it
equally unnecessary. The Executive could advise with the officers
of State, as of war, finance &c. and avail himself. of their informa-
tion & opinions.

On? Question on M? Wilson’s motion for joining the Judiciary in
the Revision of laws it passed in the negative—

Mas. no. Conf ay. N. J. not present. P* div? Del. no. Mé ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. div??

Resol. 10, giving the Ex. a qualified veto, without the amend‘
was then ag? to nem. con.®

The motion made by M‘! Madison July 18.4 & then postponed,
‘“ that the Judges sh‘ be nominated by the Executive & such nomina-

 

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
aye—3; Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—4; Penn-
sylvania, Georgia, divided; New Jersey, not present.”

* This sentence has been changed in the transcript to read as follows: “The
tenth Resolution, giving the Executive a qualified veto, requiring two-thirds of
each branch of the Legislature to overrule it was then agreed to nem. con.”

eee date “July 18” is changed in the transcript to “on the eighteenth
of July.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, JULY 21, 1787 301

tions become appointments unless disagreed to by % of the 22 branch
of the Legislature,’’ was now resumed.

M= Mapison stated as his reasons for the motion. 1.4 that it
secured the responsibility of the Executive who would in general
‘be more capable & likely to select fit characters than the Legislature,
or even the 2% b. of it, who might hide their selfish motives ,
under the number concerned in the appointment.— 2.1 that in case
of any flagrant partiality or error, in the nomination it might be
fairly presumed that % of the 2? branch would join in putting a
negative on it. 3.1 that as the 27 b. was very differently constituted
when the appointment of the Judges was formerly referred to it,
and was now to be composed of equal votes from all the States, the
principle of compromise which had prevailed in other instances
required in this that their sh? be a concurrence of two author-
ities, in one of which the people, in the other the States, should be
represented. The Executive Magistrate wi be considered as a
national officer, acting for and equally sympathising with every part
of the U. States. If the 2¢ branch alone should have this power,
the Judges might be appointed by a minority of the people, tho’ by
a majority, of the States, which could not be justified on any prin-
ciple as their proceedings were to relate to the people, rather than
to the States: and as it would moreover throw the appointments
entirely into the hands of y° Northern States, a perpetual ground
of jealousy & discontent would be furnished to the Southern States.

M: Pinxney was for placing the appointm! in the 2? b. exelu-
sively. The Executive will possess neither the requisite knowledge of .
characters, nor confidence of the people for so high a trust.

M: Ranpo.peH wi have preferred the mode of appointm! proposed
formerly by M! Ghorum, as adopted in the Constitution of Mass’
but thought the motion depending so great an improvement of the
clause as it stands, that he anxiously wished it success. He laid
great stress on the responsibility of the Executive as a security for
fit appointments. Appointments by the Legislatures have generally
resulted from cabal, from personal regard, or some other considera-
tion than a title derived from the proper qualifications. The same
inconveniencies will proportionally prevail, if the appointments be
be referred to either branch of the Legislature or to any other
authority administered by a number of individuals.

M: ELsewortH would prefer a negative in the Executive on a

 

?The figures “1,” “2” and “3” are changed to “first,” “Secondly” and
“ Thirdly ” in the transcript.
302 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

nomination by the 24 branch, the negative to be overruled by a con-
currence of % of the 24 b. to the mode proposed by the motion ;
but preferred an absolute appointment by the 24 branch to either.
The Executive will be regarded by the people with a jealous eye.
Every power for augmenting unnecessarily his influence will be dis-
liked. As he will be stationary it was not to be supposed he could
have a better knowledge of chatacters. He will be more open to
caresses & intrigues than the Senate. The right to supersede his
nomination will be ideal only. A nomination under such circum-
stances will be equivalent to an appointment.

M: Gov: Morris supported the motion. 1.1 The States in their
corporate capacity will frequently have an interest staked on the
determination of the Judges. As in the Senate the States are to vote
the Judges ought not to be appointed by the Senate. Next to the
impropriety of being Judge in one’s own cause, is the appointment
of the Judge. 2.1 It had been said the Executive would be uninformed
of characters. The reverse was y? truth. The Senate will be so.
They must take the character of candidates from the flattering pic-
tures drawn by their friends. The Executive in the necessary inter-
course with every part of the U. S. required by the nature of his
administration, will or may have the best possible information. 3.1
It had been said that a jealousy would be entertained of the Execu-
tive. If the Executive can be safely trusted with the command of the
army, there cannot surely be any reasonable ground of Jealousy in
the present case. He added that if the objections agst an appoint-
ment of the Executive by the Legislature, had the weight that had
been allowed there must be some weight in the objection to an
appointment of the Judges by the Legislature or by any part of it.

M! Gerry. The appointment of the Judges like every other
part of the Constitution sh? be so modelled as to give satisfaction
both to the people and to the States. The mode under consideration
will give satisfaction to neither. He could not conceive that the
Executive could be as well informed of characters throughout the
Union, as the Senate. It appeared to him also a strong objection
that % of the Senate were required to reject a nomination of the
Executive. The Senate would be constituted in the same manner
as Congress. And the appointments of Congress have been gen-
erally good.

M! Mapison, observed that he was not anxious that % should be
necessary to disagree to a nomination. He had given this form to

 

The figures “1,” “2” and “3” are changed to “ First,” “Secondly” and
“Thirdly ” in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 23, 1787 303

his motion chiefly to vary it the more clearly from one which had just
been rejected. He was content to obviate the objection last made,
and accordingly so varied the motion as to let a majority
reject.

Col. Mason found it his duty to differ from his colleagues in
their opinions & reasonings on this subject. Notwithstanding the
form of the proposition by which the appointment seemed to be
divided between the Executive & Senate, the appointment was sub-
stantially vested in the former alone. The false complaisance which
usually prevails in such cases will prevent a disagreement to the
first nominations. He considered the appointment by the Executive
as a dangerous prerogative. It might even give him an influence over
the Judiciary department itself. He did not think the difference of
interest between the Northern and Southern States could be properly
brought into this argument. It would operate & require some pre-
cautions in the case of regulating navigation, commerce & imposts;
but he could not see that it had any connection with the Judiciary
department.

On the question, the motion now being? that the executive
should nominate, & such nominations should become appointments
unless disagreed to by the Senate ”’

Mas. ay. Cino. Ptay. Del. no. Mino. Viay. N.C.no. 8. C.
no. Geo. no.”

On * question for agreeing to the clause as it stands by which the
Judges are to be appointed by ? 24 branch

Mas. no. Ct ay. P? no. Del. ay. M? ay. V2 no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay.*

Adjourned

Monpay. Juty. 23. IN CONVENTION.

M: John Langdon & M! Nicholas Gilman from N. Hampshire,
took their seats.

 

1The words “now being ” are transposed to read “being now” in the tran-
script.
B In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
aye—3; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no—6.”

2 The word “the ” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, no—3; so it passed in the affirmative.”
304 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Resol?: 17.1 that provision ought to be made for future amend-
ments of the articles of Union,? agreed to, nem. con.

Resol® 18. ‘‘ requiring the Legis: Execut: & Jud’ of the States
to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union,’’* taken into
consideration.

M: Wi.i1amson suggests that a reciprocal oath should be re-
quired from the National officers, to support the Governments of
the States.

M! Gerry moved to insert as an amendm! that the oath of the
officers of the National Government also should extend to the sup-
port of the Nat! Gov! which was agreed to nem. con.

M: Witson said he was never fond of oaths, considering them as
a left handed security only. A good Gové did not need them, and a
bad one could not or ought not to be supported. He was afraid
they might too much trammel the members of the Existing Gov’ in
case future alterations should be necessary; and prove an obstacle to
Resol: 17.1 just ag’ to.

M: Guorum did not know that oaths would be of much use; but
could see no inconsistency between them and the 17. Resol: or any
regular amend of the Constitution. The oath could only require
fidelity to the existing Constitution. A constitutional alteration of
the Constitution, could never be regarded as a breach of the Con-
stitution, or of any oath to support it.

M: Gerry thought with M! Ghorum there could be no shadow of
inconsistency in the case. Nor could he see any other harm that
could result from the Resolution. On the other side he thought one
good effect would be produced by it. Hitherto the officers of the
two Governments had considered them as distinct from,‘ not as
parts of the General System, & had in all cases of interference given
a preference to the State Gov’ The proposed oaths will cure that
error.

The Resol? [18°] was agreed to nem. con.—

Resol: 19.° referring the new Constitution to Assemblies to be
chosen by the people for the express purpose of ratifying it’’ was
next taken into consideration.

 

*The words “The seventeenth Resolution” are substituted in the tran-
script for “ Resoln 17.”

* The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The words “The eighteenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
for “ Resol= 18.”

*The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.

° The words “the eighteenth” are substituted in the transcript for “18.”
‘ sae oe “The nineteenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
or “ Resol: 19.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 23, 1787 305

M: ELseworru moved that it be referred to the Legislatures of
the States for ratification. M! Parrerson 244 the motion.

Col. Mason considered a reference of the plan to the authority
of the people as one of the most important and essential of the Reso-
lutions. The Legislatures have no power to ratify it. They are the
mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and can not be greater
than their creators. And he knew of no power in any of the Con-
stitutions, he knew there was no power in some of them, that could
be competent to this object. Whither then must we resort? To the
people with whom all power remains that has not been given up in the
Constitutions derived from them. It was of great moment he observed
that this doctrine should be cherished as the basis of free Govern-
ment. Another strong reason was that admitting the Legislatures
to have a competent authority, it would be wrong to refer the plan
to them, because succeeding Legislatures having equal authority could
undo the acts of their predecessors; and the National Gov! would
stand in each State on the weak and tottering foundation of an Act
of Assembly. There was a remaining consideration of some weight.
In some of the States the Gov were not derived from the clear &
undisputed authority of the people. This was the case in Virginia
Some of the best & wisest citizens considered the Constitution as
established by an assumed authority. A National Constitution de-
rived from such a source would be exposed to the severest criticisms.

M: RanpoupH. One idea has pervaded all our proceedings, to
wit, that opposition as well from the States as from individuals, will
be made to the System to be proposed. Will it not then be highly
imprudent, to furnish any unnecessary pretext by the mode of
ratifying it. Added to other objections ag* a ratification by Legis-
lative authority only, it may be remarked that there have been
instances in which the authority of the Common law has been set up
in particular States ag%t that of the Confederation which has had
no higher sanction than Legislative ratification—Whose opposition
will be most likely to be excited agt the System? That of the local
demagogues who will be degraded by it from the importance they
now hold. These will spare no efforts to impede that progress in the
popular mind which will be necessary to the adoption of the plan,
and which every member will find to have taken place in his own,
if he will compare his present opinions with those brought with
him into the Convention. It is of great importance therefore that
the consideration of this subject should be transferred.from the
Legislatures where this class of men, have their full influence to a
field in which their efforts can be less mischeivous. It is moreover
306 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

worthy of consideration that some of the States are averse to any
change in their Constitution, and will not take the requisite steps,
unless expressly called upon to refer the question to the people.

M: Gerry. The arguments of Col. Mason & M? Randolph prove
too much. they prove an unconstitutionality in the present federal
system even in some of the State Gov’ Inferences drawn from
such a source must be inadmissible. Both the State Gov® & the
federal Gov: have been too long acquiesced in, to be now shaken.
He considered the Confederation to be paramount to any State Con-
stitution. The last article of it authorizing alterations must conse-
quently be so as well as the others, and every thing done in pur-
suance of the article must have the same high authority with the
article—Great confusion he was confident would result from a re-
currence to the people. They would never agree on any thing. He
could not see any ground to suppose that the people will do what
their rulers will not. The rulers will either conform to, or influence
the sense of the people.

M: GHorum was ag* referring the plan to the Legislatures.
1. Men chosen by the people for the particular purpose, will dis-
cuss the subject more candidly than members of the Legislature who
are to lose the power which is to be given up to the Gen! Govi
2. Some of the Legislatures are composed of several branches. It
will consequently be more difficult in these cases to get the plan
through the Legislatures, than thro’ a Convention. 3. in the States
many of the ablest men are excluded from the Legislatures, but
may be elected into a Convention. Among these may be ranked many
of the Clergy who are generally friends to good Government. Their
services were found to be valuable in the formation & establishment
of the Constitution of Massach®® 4. the Legislatures will be inter-
rupted with a variety of little business, by artfully pressing which,
designing men will find means to delay from year to year, if not
to frustrate altogether, the national system. 5. If the last art: of
the Confederation is to be pursued the unanimous concurrence of the
States will be necessary. But will any one say, that all the States
are to suffer themselves to be ruined, if Rho. Island should persist
in her opposition to general measures. Some other States might
also tread in her steps. The present advantage which N. York seems
to be so much attached to, of taxing her neighbours by the regula-
tion of her trade, makes it very probable, that she will be of the
number. It would therefore deserve serious consideration whether
provision ought not to be made for giving effect to the System without
waiting for the unanimous concurrence of the States.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 238, 1787 307

M: Evsewortu. If there be any Legislatures who should find
themselves incompetent to the ratification, he should be content to
let them advise with their constituents and pursue such a mode as
w’ be competent. He thought more was to be expected from the
Legislatures than from the people. The prevailing wish of the people
in the Eastern States is to,get rid of the public debt; and the idea of
strengthening the Nat! Govt carries with it that of strengthening the
public debt. .It was said by Col. Mason 1.1 that the Legislatures
have no authority in this case. 2.? that their successors having equal
authority could rescind their acts. As to the 2% point he could not
admit it to be well founded. An Act to which the States by their
Legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a compact from which
no one of the parties can recede of itself. As to the 1% point, he
observed that a new sett of ideas seemed to have crept in since the
articles of Confederation were established. Conventions of the people,
or with power derived expressly from the people, were not then
thought of. The Legislatures were considered as competent. Their
ratification has been acquiesced in without complaint. To whom have
Cong’ applied on subsequent occasions for further powers? To the
Legislatures; not to the people. The fact is that we exist at present,
and we need not enquire how, as a federal Society, united by a char-
ter one article of which is that alterations therein may be made by
the Legislative authority of the States. It has been said that if
the confederation is to be observed, the States must unanimously
concur in the proposed innovations. He would answer that if such
were the urgency & necessity of our situation as to warrant a new
compact among a part of the States, founded on the consent of the
people; the same pleas would be equally valid in favor of a partial
eompact, founded on the consent of the Legislatures.

ME Wiutiamson thought the Resol?: [19°] so expressed as that it
might be submitted either to the Legislatures or to Conventions
recommended by the Legislatures. He observed that some Legisla-
tures were evidently unauthorized to ratify the system. He thought
too that Conventions were to be preferred as more likely to be com-
‘posed of the ablest men in the States.

ME Gov? Morris considered the inference of M? Elseworth from the
plea of necessity as applied to the establishment of a new System on
y® consent of the people of a part of the States, in favor of a like
establishnt on the consent of a part of the Legislatures as a non

 

1The figure “1” is changed to “ in the first place” in the transcript.
2The figure “2” is changed to “and in the second” in the transcript.
2 The words “the nineteenth” are substituted in the transcript for “19.”
308 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

sequitur. If the Confederation is to be pursued no alteration can be
made without the unanimous consent of the Legislatures: Legislative
alterations not conformable to the federal compact, would clearly not
be valid. The Judges would consider them as null & void. Whereas
in ease of an appeal to the people of the U. S., the supreme authority,
the federal compact may be altered by a majority of them; in like
manner as the Constitution of a particular State may be altered by a
majority of the people of the State. The amendm! moved by M! Else-
worth erroneously supposes that we are proceeding on the basis of
the Confederation. This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.

M: Kine thought with M: Elseworth that the Legislatures had a
competent authority, the acquiescence of the people of America in
the Confederation, being equivalent to a formal ratification by the
people. He thought with M? E— also that the plea of necessity was
as valid in the one case as in? the other. At the same time he pre-
ferred a reference to the authority of the people expressly delegated
to Conventions, as the most certain means of obviating all disputes
& doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new Constitution; as well
as the most likely means of drawing forth the best men in the States
to decide on it. He remarked that among other objections made in
the State of N. York to granting powers to Cong® one had been that
such powers as would operate within the State,? could not be recon-
ciled to the Constitution; and therefore were not grantible by the
Legislative authority. He considered it as of some consequence also to
get rid of the scruples which some members of the State Legislatures
might derive from their oaths to support & maintain the existing
Constitutions.

M: Mapison thought it clear that the Legislatures were incom-
petent to the proposed changes. These changes would make essential
inroads on the State Constitutions, and it would be a novel & danger-
ous doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under
which it held its existence. There might indeed be some Constitu-
tions within the Union, which had given a power to the Legislature to
concur in alterations of the federal Compact. But there were cer-
tainly some which had not; and in the case of these, a ratification
must of necessity be obtained from the people. He considered the
difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and
one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league
or treaty, and a Constitution. The former in point of moral obliga-
tion might be as inviolable as the latter. In point of political opera-

 

*The word “in” is omitted in the transcript.
* The transcript uses the word “State” in the plural.
SESSION OF MONDAY, JULY 23, 1787 309

tion, there were two important distinctions in favor of the latter. 1.1
A law violating a treaty ratified by a pre-existing law, might be
respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one.
A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves,
would be considered by the Judges as null & void. 2.1 The doctrine
laid down by the law of Nations in the case of treaties is that a
breach of any one article by any of the parties, frees the other
parties from their engagements. In the case of a union of people
under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always been under-
stood to exclude such an interpretation. Comparing the two modes
in point of expediency he thought all the considerations which recom-
mended this Convention in preference to Congress for proposing the
reform were in favor of State Conventions in preference to the
Legislatures for examining and adopting it.

On? question on M* Elseworth’s motion to refer the plan to the
Legislatures of the States

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci ay. no.2 P?no. Del. ay. Mi ay. V2 no.
N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.*

M! Gov? Morris moved that the reference of the plan be made to
one general Convention, chosen & authorized by the people to con-
sider, amend, & establish the same.—Not seconded.

On * question for agreeing to Resolution 19.° touching the mode of
Ratification as reported from the Committee of the Whole; viz, to
refer the Const? after the approbation of Cong? to assemblies chosen
by the people: —

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Chay. P? ay. Del. no. Mi ay. V2 ay. N.C. ay.
8. C. ay. Geo. ay.®

M! Gov! Morris & M! Kine moved that the representation in the
second branch consist of members from each State, who shall
vote per capita.

M! EvsewortuH said he had always approved of voting in that
mode.

 

The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “First” and “Secondly” in
the transcript.

2The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

>The entry in the notes was originally “N. J. no.” Madison struck out
«WN. J.” but inadvertently let “no” remain.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

® The words “the nineteenth Resolution” are substituted in the transcript
for “ Resolution 19.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Delaware, no—l1.”
310 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Gov! Morris moved to fill the blank+ with three. He wished
the Senate to be a pretty numerous body. If two members only
should be allowed to each State, and a majority be made a quorum,
the power would be lodged in 14 members, which was too small a
number for such a trust.

M: Guorum preferred two to three members for the blank. A
small number was most convenient for deciding on peace & war &c.
which he expected would be vested in the 24 branch. The number
of States will also increase. Kentucky, Vermont, the Province of
Mayne & Franklin will probably soon be added to the present num-
ber. He presumed also that some of the largest States would be
divided. The strenghth of the General Gov! will lie not in the large-
ness, but in the smallness of the States.

Col. Mason thought 3 from each State including new States
would make the 2? branch too numerous. Besides other objections,
the additional expence ought always to form one, where it was not
absolutely necessary :

M: Wituiamson. If the number be too great, the distant States
will not be on an equal footing with the nearer States. The latter
can more easily send & support their ablest Citizens. He approved
of the voting per capita.

On the question for filling the blank with ‘‘ three ’’

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont no. P? ay. Del. no. V* no. N. C. no.
8. C. no. Geo. no.?

On * question for filling it with ‘‘ two.’’ Agreed to nem. con.

M: L Marrin was opposed to voting per Capita, as departing
from the idea of the States being represented in the 2% branch.

M: Carrol, was not struck with any particular objection ag%* the
mode; but he did not wish so hastily to make so material an
innovation.

On the question on the whole motion viz. the 24 b. to consist of
2 members from each State and to vote per capita.’’

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. Mé no. Vé® ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M Houston & M? Spaicut moved ‘‘ that the appointment of the
Executive by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States, be re-

 

+The transcript does not italicize the word “ blank.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, aye—l1; New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

“In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Maryland, no—1.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1787 311

considered.’’ M:! Houston urged the extreme inconveniency & the
considerable expence, of drawing together men from all the States
for the single purpose of electing the Chief Magistrate.

On the question which was put without any? debate.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. P* no. Del. ay. M? no. Virg® no.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay?

Ordered that tomorrow be assigned for the reconsideration.

Cont & Pen? no—all the rest ay.

M: Gerry moved that the proceedings of the Convention for the
establishment of a Nat! Gov! (except the part relating to the Execu-
tive), be referred to a Committee to prepare & report a Constitution
conformable thereto.

Gen! PINKNEY reminded the Convention that if the Committee
should fail to insert some security to the Southern States ag’ an
emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, he shi be bound by
duty to his State to vote ag% their Report— The appt of a Com?
as moved by M! Gerry.? Ag? to nem. con.

* Shall the Com® consist of 10 members one from each State pres*?
All the States were no, except Delaware ay.

Shall it consist of 7. members.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci ay. P# no. Del. no. M? ay. V2 no.
N. C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. no. The question being lost by an equal
division of Votes.

It was agreed nem- con- that the Comttee® consist of 5 mem-
bers, to be appointed tomorrow.

Adjourned

TuEspay Juuty 24. mn CONVENTION

The appointment of the Executive by Electors? reconsidered.
M: Houston moved that he be appointed by the ‘‘ Nat! Legis-
lature,’’ instead of ‘‘ Electors appointed by the State Legislatures ’’

 

+The word “any” is omitted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Penn-
sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no—3.” :

* The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

4The words “On the question” are here inserted in the transcript.

®JIn the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Maryland, South Carolina, aye—5; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,
North Carolina, Georgia, no—5.”

*The word “should” is here inserted in the transcript.

™The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.
312 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

according to the last decision of the mode. He dwelt chiefly on
the improbability, that capable men would undertake the service
of Electors from the more distant States.

M: SpaiguT seconded the motion.

M! Gerry opposed it. He thought there was no ground to
apprehend the danger urged by M* Houston. The election of the
Executive Magistrate will be considered as of vast importance and
will excite? great earnestness. The best men, the Governours of the
States will not hold it derogatory from their character to be the
electors. If the motion should be agreed to, it will be necessary to
make the Executive ineligible a 22 time, in order to render him in-
dependent of the Legislature; which was an idea extremely repug-
nant to his way of thinking.

M: Strong supposed that there would be no necessity, if the
Executive should be appointed by the Legislature, to make him
ineligible a 2% time; as new elections of the Legislature will have
intervened; and he will not depend for his 2? appointment on the
same sett of men as? his first was rec? from. It had been suggested
that gratitude for his past appointment w? produce the same effect
as dependence for his future appointment. He thought very differ-
ently. Besides this objection would lie ag** the Electors who would be
objects of gratitude as well as the Legislature. It was of great im-
portance not to make the Gov! too complex which would be the case
if a new sett of men like the Electors should be introduced into it.
He thought also that the first characters in the States would not
feel sufficient motives to undertake the office of Electors.

M= Writuiamson was for going back to the original ground; to
elect the Executive for 7 years and render him ineligible a 2¢ time.
The proposed Electors would certainly not be men of the 1% nor
even of the 24 grade in the States. These would all prefer a seat
either * in the Senate or the other branch of the Legislature. He did
not like the Unity in the Executive. He had wished the Executive
power to be lodged in three men taken from three districts into
which the States should be divided. As the Executive is to have a
kind cf veto on the laws, and there is an essential difference of
interests between the N. & S. States, particularly in the carrying
trade, the power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to be taken
from part of the Union, to the part from which he is not taken. The
case is different here from what it is in England; where there is a

 

1The word “create” is substituted in the transcript for “excite.”
? The word “that” is substituted in the transcript for “as.”
* The word “either” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1787 313

sameness of interests throughout the Kingdom. Another objection
ag:' a single Magistrate is that he will be an elective King, and will
feel the spirit of one. He will spare no pains to keep himself in for
life, and will then lay a train for the succession of his children. It
was pretty certain he thought that we should at some time or other
have a King; but he wished no precaution to be omitted that might
postpone the event as long as possible.—Ineligibility a 2% time ap-
peared to him to be the best precaution. With this precaution he had
no objection to a longer term than 7 years. He would go as far as 10
or 12 years.

M: Gerry moved that the Legislatures of the States should vote
by ballot for the Executive in the same proportions as it had been
proposed they should chuse electors; and that in case a majority
of the votes should not center on the same person, the 1% branch of
the Nat! Legislature should chuse two out of the 4 candidates having
most votes, and out of these two, the 24 branch should chuse the
Executive.

M: Kine seconded the motion—and on the Question to postpone
in order to take it into consideration. The noes were so predominant,
that the States were not counted.

1 Question on M: Houston’s motion that the Executive be app? by ?
Na! Legislature

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cf no. N. J. ay. P® no. Del. ay. M? no.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M: L. Martin & Mt Gerry moved to re-instate the ineligibility of
the Executive a 2% time.

M: EvsEworTs. With many this appears a natural consequence
of his being elected by the Legislature. It was not the case with him.
The Executive he thought should be reelected if his conduct proved
him worthy of it. And he will be more likely to render himself,
worthy of it if he be rewardable with it. The most eminent char-
acters also will be more willing to accept the trust under this con-
dition, than if they foresee a necessary degradation at a fixt period.

M: Gerry. That the Executive sh? be independent of the Legis-
lature is a clear point. The longer the duration of his appointment
the more will his dependence be diminished. It will be better then
for him to continue 10, 15, or even 20, years and be ineligible

afterwards.

1The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

2The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no—4.”
314 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M:! Kina was for making him re-eligible. This is too great an
advantage to be given up for the small effect it will have on his
dependence, if impeachments are to lie. He considered these as
rendering the tenure during pleasure.

M: L. Martin, suspending his motion as to the ineligibility,
moved ‘‘ that the appointm! of the Executive shall continue for
‘Eleven years.

M! Gerry suggested fifteen years

M: Kine twenty years. This is the medium life of princes.*

M: Davis Eight years

M: Witson. The difficulties & perplexities into which the House
is thrown proceed from the election by the Legislature which he was
sorry had been reinstated. The inconveniency * of this mode was such
that he would agree to almost any length of time in order to get rid
of the dependence which must result from it. He was persuaded that
the longest term would not be equivalent to a proper mode of election;
unless indeed it should be during good behaviour. It seemed to be
supposed that at a certain advance of life, a continuance in office would
cease to be agreeable to the officer, as well as desireable to the public.
Experience had shewn in a variety of instances that both a capacity
& inclination for public service existed—in very advanced stages. He
mentioned the instance of a Doge of Venice who was elected after
he was 80 years of age. The popes have generally been elected at
very advanced periods, and yet in no case had a more steady or a
better concerted policy been pursued than in the Court of Rome. If
the Executive should come into office at 35. years of age, which he
presumes may happen & his continuance should be fixt at 15 years.
at the age of 50. in the very prime of life, and with all the aid of
experience, he must be cast aside like a useless hulk. What an
irreparable loss would the British Jurisprudence have sustained, had
the age of 50. been fixt there as the ultimate limit of capacity or
readiness to serve the public. The great luminary [L‘ Mansfield]
held his seat for thirty years after his arrival at that age. Not-
withstanding what had been done he could not but hope that a better
mode of election would yet be adopted; and one that would be more
agreeable to the general sense of the House. That time might be

*This might possibly be meant as a carricature of the previous motions in

order to defeat the object of them.
* Transfer hither.?

 

* Madison’s direction concerning the footnote is omitted in the transcript.
: ee word “inconveniency” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-
script.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1787 315

given for further deliberation he w4 move that the present question
be postponed till tomorrow.

M: Broom seconded the motion to postpone.

M: Gerry. We seem to be entirely at a loss on this head. He
would suggest whether it would not be adviseable to refer the clause
relating to the Executive to the Committee of detail to be appointed.
Perhaps they will be able to hit on something that may unite the
various opinions which have been thrown out.

M' Witson. As the great difficulty seems to spring from the
mode of election, he w? suggest a mode which had not been men-
tioned. It was that the Executive be elected for 6 years by a small
number, not more than 15 of the Nat! Legislature, to be drawn from
it, not by ballot, but by lot and who should retire immediately and
make the election without separating. By this mode intrigue would
be avoided in the first instance, and the dependence would be
diminished. This was not he said a digested idea and might be
liable to strong objections.

M! Gov: Morris. Of all possible modes of appointment that by
the Legislature is the worst. If the Legislature is to appoint, and
to impeach or to influence the impeachment, the Executive will be
the mere creature of it. He had been opposed to the impeachment
but was now convinced that impeachments must be provided for,
if the app! was to be of any duration. No man w’? say, that an
Executive known to be in the pay of an Hnemy, should not be
removeable in some way or other. He had been charged heretofore [by
Col. Mason] with inconsistency in pleading for confidence in the
Legislature on some occasions, & urging a distrust on others. The
charge was not well founded. The Legislature is worthy of un-
bounded confidence im some respects, and liable to equal distrust in
others. When their interest coincides precisely with that of their
Constituents, as happens in many of their Acts, no abuse of trust
is to be apprehended. When a strong personal interest happens to
be opposed to the general interest, the Legislature can not be too much
distrusted. In all public bodies there are two parties. The Executive.
will necessarily be more connected with one than with the other.
There will be a personal interest therefore in one of the parties to
oppose as well as in the other to support him. Much had been said
of the intrigues that will be practised by the Executive to get into
office. Nothing had been said on the other side of the intrigues to
get him out of office. Some leader of* party will always covet his

 

1 The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
316 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

seat, will perplex his administration, will cabal with the Legislature,
till he succeeds in supplanting him. This was the way in which the
King of England was got out, he meant the real King, the Minister.
This was the way in which Pitt [L?¢ Chatham] forced himself into
place. Fox was for pushing the matter still farther. If he had car-
ried his India bill, which he was very near doing, he would have
made the Minister, the King in form almost as well as in substance.
Our President will be the British Minister, yet we are about to
make him appointable by the Legislature. Something had been
said of the danger of Monarchy. If a good government should not
now be formed, if a good organization of the Execuve should not
be provided, he doubted whether we should not have something worse
than a limited Monarchy. In order to get rid of the dependence of
the Executive on the Legislature, the expedient of making him in-
eligible a 24 time had been devised. This was as much as to say we
sh? give him the benefit of experience, and then deprive ourselves
of the use of it. But make him ineligible a 27 time—and prolong
his duration even to 15- years, will he by any wonderful interposi-
tion of providence at that period cease to be a man? No he will
be unwilling to quit his exaltation, the road to his object thro’ the
Constitution will be shut; he will be in possession of the sword, a
civil war will ensue, and the Commander of the victorious army on
which ever side, will be the despot of America. :This consideration
renders him particularly anxious that the Executive should be prop-
erly constituted. The vice here would not, as in some other parts of
the system be curable. It is the most difficult of all rightly to balance
the Executive. Make him too weak: The Legislature will usurp his
powers: Make him too strong. He will usurp on the Legislature.
He preferred a short period, a re-eligibility, but a different mode
of election. A long period would prevent an adoption of the plan:
it ought to do so. He sh? himself be afraid to trust it. He was not
prepared to decide on M! Wilson’s mode of election just hinted by
him. He thought it deserved consideration It would be better that
chance s* decide than intrigue.

On a* question to postpone the consideration of the Resolution on
the subject of the Executive

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cf ay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. div’ M? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

 

*The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “a.”
: * In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1787 317

M: Witson then moved that the Executive be chosen every

years by Electors to be taken by lot from the Nat!

Legislature who shall proceed immediately to the choice of the
Executive and not separate until it be made.’’

M: Carron 2% the motion

M: Gerry. this is committing too much to chance. If the lot
should fall on a sett of unworthy men, an unworthy Executive must
be saddled on the Country. He thought it had been demonstrated
that no possible mode of electing by the Legislature could be a good
one.
MW Kine. The lot might fall on a majority from the same State
which wi ensure the election of a man from that State. We ought to
be governed by reason, not by chance. As nobody seemed to be
satisfied, he wished the matter to be postponed

M* Witson did not move this as the best mode. His opinion
remained unshaken that we ought to resort to the people for the
election. He seconded the postponement.

M: Gov: Morris observed that the chances were almost infinite
ag*t a majority of electors from the same State.

On a question whether the last motion was in order, it was
determined in the affirmative; 7. ays. 4 noes.

On the question of postponent it was agreed to nem. con.

M: Carron took occasion to observe that he considered the clause
declaring that direct taxation on the States should be in proportion
to representation, previous to the obtaining an actual census, as very
objectionable, and that he reserved to himself the right of opposing
it, if the Report of the Committee of detail should leave it in the
plan.

M: Gov! Morris hoped the Committee would strike out the whole
of the clause proportioning direct taxation to representation. He
had only meant it as a* bridge to assist us over a certain gulph;
having passed the gulph the bridge may be removed. He thought
the principle laid down with so much strictness, liable to strong
objections

On a ballot for a Committee to report a Constitution conformable
to the Resolutions passed by the Convention, the members chosen
were

*The object was to lessen the eagerness on one side,’ & the opposition on
the other, to the share of representation claimed by the S. Sothern States on
count of the Negroes.
a The N. B. ie be transferred hither without the N. B.?

 

1The word “for” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 Madison’s direction concerning the footnote is omitted in the transcript.
318 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Rutlidge, Mt Randolph, Mt Ghorum, M* Elseworth, M! Wil-
son— ,

On motion to discharge the Com? of the whole from the proposi-
tions submitted to the Convention by M! C. Pinkney as the basis
of a constitution, and to refer them to the Committee of detail just
appointed, it was ag? to nem: con.

A like motion was then made & agreed to nem: con: with respect
to the propositions of M* Patterson

Adjourned.

Wepnespay Juty 25. In CoNVENTION

1 Clause relating to the Executive * again under consideration.

M: ELseworts moved ‘‘ that the Executive be appointed by the
Legislature,’? except when the magistrate last chosen shall have
continued in office the whole term for which he was chosen, & be
reeligible, in which case the choice shall be by Electors appointed
by the Legislatures of the States for that purpose.’’ By this means
a deserving magistrate may be reelected without making him depend-
ent on the Legislature.*

M: Gerry repeated his remark that an election at all by the Nat!
Legislature was radically and incurably wrong; and moved that the
Executive be appointed by the Governours & Presidents of the States,
with advice of their Councils, and where there are no Councils by
Electors chosen by the Legislatures. The executives to vote in the
following proportions: viz—

M: Mapison. There are objections ag*t every mode that has been,
or perhaps ean be proposed. The election must be made either by
some existing authority under the Nati} or State Constitutions—or by
some special authority derived from the people—or by the people
themselves—The two Existing authorities under the Nat! Constitu-
tion w? be the Legislative & Judiciary. The latter he presumed was
out of the question. The former was in his Judgment liable to in.
superable objections: Besides the general influence of that mode
on the independence of the Executive, 1.* the election of the Chief
Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so much that the
public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are

 

* The word “ The” is here inserted in the transcript.

> The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.
ea s The transcript italicizes the phrase “making him dependent on the Legis-
ature.’ ,

‘The figure “1” is changed to “In the first place” in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1787 319

always apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more violent ones
by such occasions than by any others. 2.1 the candidate would in-
trigue with the Legislature, would derive his appointment from the
predominant faction, and be apt to render his administration sub-
servient to its views. 3.2 The Ministers of foreign powers would
have and* make use of, the opportunity to mix their intrigues
& influence with the Election. Limited as the powers of the Execu-
tive are, it will be an object of great moment with the great rival
powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at the
head of our Governm! a man attached to their respective politics &
interests. No pains, nor perhaps expence, will be spared, to gain
from the Legislature an appointmt favorable to their wishes.
Germany & Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the former, the
election of the Head of the Empire, till it became in a manner
hereditary, interested all Europe, and was much influenced by for-
eign interference. In the latter, altho’ the elective Magistrate has
very little real power, his election has at all times produced the most
eager interference of forign princes, and has in fact at length slid
entirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities in the States
are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appointment of the
Nat! Executive by the first, was objectionable in many points of view,
some of which had been already mentioned. He would mention one
which of itself would decide his opinion. The Legislatures of the
States had betrayed a strong propensity to a variety of pernicious
measures. One object of the Nat! Legisl?® was to controul this pro-
pensity. One object of the Nat! Executive, so far as it would have
a negative on the laws, was to controul the Nat! Legislature, so far
as it might be infected with a similar propensity. Refer the
appointm! of the Nat! Executive to the State Legislatures, and this
controuling purpose may be defeated. The Legislatures can & will
act with some kind of regular plan, and will promote the appointmt
of a man who will not oppose himself to a favorite object. Should
a majority of the Legislatures at the time of election have the same
object, or different objects of the same kind, The Nat! Executive would
be rendered subservient to them.—An appointment by the State
Executives, was liable among other objections to this insuperable one,
that being standing bodies, they could & would be courted, and in-
trigued with by the Candidates, by their partizans, and by the Min-
isters of foreign powers. The State Judiciarys had not+* & he pre-

 

1 The figure “2” is changed to “In the second place” in the transcript.
? The figure “3” is changed to “In the third place” in the transcript.
®* The word “ would” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The word “been” is here inserted in the transcript.
320 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

sumed w! not be proposed as a proper source of appointment. The
option before us then lay between an appointment by Electors
chosen by the people—and an immediate appointment by the
people. He thought the former mode free from many of the objec-
tions which had been urged ag*t it, and greatly preferable to an
appointment by the Nat! Legislature. As the electors would be
chosen for the occasion, would meet at once, & proceed immediately
to an appointment, there would be very little opportunity for cabal,
or corruption. As a farther precaution, it might be required that
they should meet at some place, distinct from the seat of Gov! and
even that no person within a certain distance of the place at the time
sh‘ be eligible. This Mode however had been rejected so recently &
by so great a majority that it probably would not be proposed anew.
The remaining mode was an election by the people or rather by the
qualified part of them, at large: With all its imperfections he liked
this best. He would not repeat either the general argum® for or the
objections ag*t thig mode. He would only take notice of two diffi-
culties which he admitted to have weight. The first arose from the
disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and
the disadvantage this wi throw on the smaller States. Great as this
objection might be he did not think it equal to such as lay ag*
every other mode which had been proposed. He thought too that
Some expedient might be hit upon that would obviate it. The sec-
ond difficulty arose from the disproportion of qualified voters in
the N. & S. States, and the disadvantages which this mode would
throw on the latter. The answer to this objection was 1.1 that this
disproportion would be continually decreasing, under the influence of
the Republican laws introduced in the 8. States, and the more rapid
increase of their population. 2.? That, local considerations must give
way to the general interest. As an individual from the S. States
he was willing to make the sacrifice.

M! ExsewortH. The objection drawn from the different sizes
of the States, is unanswerable. The Citizens of the largest States
would invariably prefer the Candidate within the State; and the
largest States wi invariably have the man.

8 Question on M? Elseworth’s motion as above.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. P® ay. Del. no. Mé ay.
Vino. N.C. no. §. C. no. Geo. no.*

 

* The figure “1” is changed to “in the first place” in the transcript.

? The figure “2” is changed to “in the second place” in the transcript.

* The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

a In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, aye—4; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1787 321

M: PINKNEY moved that the election by the Legislature be quali-
fied with a proviso that no person be eligible for more than 6 years
in any twelve years. He thought this would have all the advantage
& at the same time avoid in some degree the inconveniency,? of an
absolute ineligibility a 24 time.

Col. Mason approved the idea. It had the sanction of experi-
ence in the instance of Cong? and some of the Executives of the
States. It rendered the Executive as effectually independent, as
an ineligibility after his first election, and opened the way at the
same time for the advantage of his future services. He preferred on
the whole the election by the Nat! Legislature: Tho’ Candor obliged
him to admit, that there was great danger of foreign influence, as had
been suggested. This was the most serious objection with him that
had been urged.

M* Butter. The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at home,
& influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either if the
Election be made by the Nat! Legislature. On the other hand: The
Gov: should not be made so complex & unwieldy as to disgust the
States. This would be the case, if the election sh‘ be referred to the
people. He liked best an election by Electors chosen by the Legis-
latures of the States. He was ag*' a re-eligibility at all events. He
was also ag** a ratio of votes in the States. An equality should pre-
vail in this case. The reasons for departing from it do not hold in
the case of the Executive as in that of the Legislature.

M‘ Gerry approved of M! Pinkney’s motion as lessening the evil.

M" Gov? Morris was ag** a rotation in every case. It formed a
political School, in w we were always governed by the scholars, and
not by the Masters. The evils to be guarded ag’ in this case are
1.? the undue influence of the Legislature... 2.7 instability of Councils.
3.2 misconduct in office. To guard ag*t the first, we run into the
second evil. We adopt a rotation which produces instability of
Councils. To avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A change of men
is ever followed by a change of measures We see this fully exem-
plified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the State
of Pen? The self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread
in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate Solo-
man. 2. the Rotation in office will not prevent intrigue and depend-

 

1The word “inconveniency ” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-
script.

, The figures “1,” “2” and “3” are changed to “ first,” “secondly” and
“thirdly ” in the transcript. ;

* The figure “2” is changed to “Secondly” in the transcript.
322 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ence on the Legislature. The man in office will look forward to the
period at which he will become re-eligible. The distance of the
period, the improbability of such a protraction of his life will be
no obstacle. Such is the nature of man, formed by his benevolent
author no doubt for wise ends, that altho’ he knows his existence
to be limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were to live for
ever. But taking another supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient
will be manifest. If the magistrate does not look forward to his
re-election to the Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep in view the
opportunity of his going into the Legislature itself. He will have
little objection then to an extension of power on a theatre where
he expects to act a distinguished part; and will be very unwilling
to take any step that may endanger his popularity with the Legisla-
ture, on his influence over which the figure he is to make will depend.
3.1 To avoid the third evil, impeachments will be essential, and
hence an additional reason ags* an election by the Legislature. He
considered an election by the people as the best, by the Legislature as
the worst, mode. Putting both these aside, he could not but favor
the idea of M* Wilson, of introducing a mixture of lot. It will
diminish, if not destroy both cabal & dependence.

M! WILLIAMson was sensible that strong objections lay ag%* an
election of the Executive by the Legislature, and that it opened a
door for foreign influence. The principal objection ag*t an election
by the people seemed to be, the disadvantage under which it would
place the smaller States. He suggested as a cure for this difficulty,
that each man should vote for 3 candidates, One of these? he observed
would be probably of his own State, the other 2. of some other
States; and as probably of a small as a large one.

M: Gov? Morris liked the idea, suggesting as an amendment that
éach man should vote for two persons one of whom at least should not
be of his own State.

M' Manison also thought something valuable might be made of
the suggestion with the proposed amendment of it. The second best
man in this case would probably be the first, in fact. The only
objection which occurred was that each Citizen after hav’ given his
vote for his favorite fellow Citizen, w throw away his second on some
obscure Citizen of another State, in order to ensure the object of his
first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that the Citizens of
many States would be so sanguine of having their favorite elected,
as not to give their second vote with sincerity to the next object of

 

* The figure “3” is changed to “Finally ” in the transcript.
* The word “them” is substituted in the transcript for “ these.”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1787 323

their choice. It might moreover be provided in favor of the smaller
States that the Executive should not be eligible more than
times in years from the same State.

M: Gerry. <A popular election in this case is radically vicious.
The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set
of men dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert to delude
them into any appointment. He observed that such a Society of
men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati. They are respectable,
United, and influencial. They will in fact elect the chief Magistrate
in every instance, if the election be referred to the people. His re-
spect for the characters composing this Society could not blind him
to the danger & impropriety of throwing such a power into their
hands.

M Dickenson. As far as he could judge from the discussions
which had taken place during his attendance, insuperable objections
lay ag%* an election of the Executive by the Nat! Legislature; as also
by the Legislatures or Executives of the States. He had long leaned
towards an election by the people which he regarded as the best &
purest source. Objections he was aware lay ag*' this mode, but not
so great he thought as ag’ the other modes. The greatest difficulty
in the opinion of the House seemed to arise from the partiality of
the States to their respective Citizens. But, might not this very
partiality be turned to a useful purpose. Let the people of each
State chuse its best Citizen. The people will know the most eminent
characters of their own States, and the people of different States
will feel an emulation in selecting those of which* they will have the
greatest reason to be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus selected,
an Executive Magistrate may be chosen either by the Nat! Legisla-
ture, or by Electors appointed by it.

On a Question which was moved for postponing M* Pink-
ney’s motion; in order to make way for some such proposition
as had been hinted by M! Williamson & others: it passed in the
negative.

._ N. H. no. Mas. no. Ciay. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. no. M@ ay.
Va ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

On M: Pinkney’s motion that no person shall serve in the
Executive more than 6 years in 12. years, it passed in the
negative.

 

1 The word “whom ” is substituted in the transcript for “ which.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”
324 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no, M? no.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

On a motion that the members of the Committee be furnished
with copies of the proceedings it was so determined; S. Carolina alone
being in the negative.

It was then moved that the members of the House might take
copies of the Resolions which had been agreed to; which passed in
the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Con: ay. N.J. ay. P% no. Del. ay. Mary!
no. Vtay. N.C. ay. S.C. no Geo. no.?

M: Gerry & Mt Butter moved to refer the resolution relating to
the Executive (except the clause making it consist of a single per-
son) to the Committee of detail

M! Wiuson hoped that so important a branch of the System w!
not be committed untill a general principle sh? be fixed by a vote of
the House.

M: Lanepon, was for the Commitment—Adj?

THurspay JULY. 26. IN CONVENTION.

Col.2 Mason. In every Stage of the Question relative to the
Executive, the difficulty of the subject and the diversity of the
opinions concerning it have appeared. Nor have any of the modes
of constituting that department been satisfactory. 1.4 It has been
proposed that the election should be made by the people at large; that
is that an act which ought to be performed by those who know most
of Eminent characters, & qualifications, should be performed by those
who know least. 2.4 that the election should be made by the Legisla-
tures of the States. 3.4 by the Executives of the States. Ag** these
modes also strong objections have been urged. 4.‘ It has been proposed
that the election should be made by Electors chosen by the people
for that purpose. This was at first agreed to: But on further con-
sideration has been rejected. 5.* Since which, the mode of M? Wil-

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no—6.”

. *In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.” ,

* The word “Mr.” is substituted in the transcript for ‘“ Col.”

‘The figures “1,” “2,” “3,” “4” and “5” are changed to “ First,” “Sec
ondly,” “ Thirdly,” ete. in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1787 325

liamson, requiring each freeholder to vote for several candidates has
been proposed. This seemed like many other propositions, to carry
a plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to fatal objections.
A popular election in any form, as M? Gerry has observed, would
throw the appointment into the hands of the Cincinnati, a Society
for the members of which he had a great respect; but which he never
wished to have a preponderating influence in the Govt 6.1 Another
expedient was proposed by M! Dickenson, which is liable to so palpable
& material an inconvenience that he had little doubt of its being
by this time rejected by himself. It would exclude every man who
happened not to be popular within his own State; tho’ the causes
of his local unpopularity might be of such a nature as to recommend
him to the States at large. 7.1 Among other expedients, a lottery has
been introduced. But as the tickets do not appear to be in much
demand, it will probably, not be carried on, and nothing therefore
need be said on that subject. After reviewing all these various modes,
he was led to conclude, that an election by the Nat! Legislature as
originally proposed, was the best. If it was liable to objections, it
was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived at the same
time that a second election ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having
for his primary object, for the pole*-star of his political conduct,
the preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as an essen-
tial point, as the very palladium of Civil liberty, that the great
officers of State, and particularly the Executive should at fixed
periods return to that mass from which they were at first taken,
in order that they may feel & respect those rights & interests, which
are again to be personally valuable to them. He concluded with
moving that the constitution of the Executive as reported by the
Com? of the whole be re-instated, viz. ‘‘ that the Executive be ap-
pointed for seven years, & be ineligible a 24 time ”’

M: Davie seconded the motion

Doc! FRANKLIN. It seems to have been imagined by some that
the returning to the mass of the people was degrading the magistrate.
This he thought was contrary to republican principles. In free Gov-
ernments the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors
& sovereigns. For the former therefore to return among the latter
was not to degrade but to promote them. And it would be imposing
an unreasonable burden on them, to keep them always in a State of
servitude, and not allow them to become again one of the Masters.

 

+The figures “6” and “7” are changed to “ Sixthly” and “Seventhly ” in
the transcript.
? The word “ polar” is substituted in the transcript for the word “ pole.”
326 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

1 Question on Col. Masons motion as above; which? passed in the
affirmative

N. H. ay. Mas‘ not on floor. Ci no. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. no.
M@ ay. V2 ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M: Gov! Morris was now ag* the whole paragraph. In answer
to Col. Mason’s position that a periodical return of the great officers
of the State into the mass of the people, was the palladium of Civil
liberty he w4 observe that on the same principle the Judiciary ought
to be periodically degraded; certain it was that the Legislature ought
on every principle, yet no one had proposed, or conceived that the
members of it should not be re-eligible. In answer to Doc! Franklin,
that a return into the mass of the people would be a promotion, in-
stead of a degradation, he had no doubt that our Executive like most
others would have too much patriotism to shrink from the burden of
his office, and too much modesty not to be willing to decline the pro-
motion.

On the question on the whole resolution as amended in the words
following—‘‘ that a National Executive be instituted—to consist of a
single person—to be chosen by the Nat! legislature—for the term of
seven years—to be ineligible a 27 time—with power to carry into
execution the nat! laws—to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise
provided for—to be removeable on impeachment & conviction of mal-
practice or neglect of duty—to receive a fixt compensation for the
devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the Nat!
treasury ’’—it passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Mas. not on floor. Clay. N. J. ay. Pe no. Del. no.
M? no. V* div? M: Blair & Col. Mason ay. Gen! Washington &
M°: Madison no. M‘ Randolph happened to be out of the House.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M! Mason moved ‘‘ that the Committee of detail be instructed to
receive a clause requiring certain qualifications of landed property &
citizenship of the U. States in members of the® Legislature, and dis-
qualifying persons having unsettled Acc® with or being indebted to the

 

*The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “which” is crossed out in the transcript and “it” is written
above it. :

* In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, New Jersey, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, no—3; Massachusetts not on the floor.”

“In the transeript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, no—3; Massachusetts not on the floor; Virginia, divided [Mr.
Blair and Col. Mason, aye. General Washington and Mr. Madison no, Mr.
Randolph happened to be out of the House.] ”

* The word “ National” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1787 327

U. S. from being members of the Nat! Legislature ’’—He observed
that persons of the latter descriptions had frequently got into the
State Legislatures, in order to promote laws that might shelter their
delinquencies; and that this evil had crept into Cong? if Report was
to be regarded.

M: Pinckney seconded the motion

M* Gov! Morris. If qualifications are proper, he wi prefer them
in the electors rather than the elected. As to debtors of the U. S.
they are but few. As to persons having unsettled accounts he believed
them to be pretty many. He thought however that such a discrimina-
tion would be both odious & useless, and in many instances unjust
& cruel. The delay of settlemt had been more the fault of the
public than of the individuals. What will be done with those
patriotic Citizens who have lent money, or services or property to
their Country, without having been yet able to obtain a liquidation
of their claims? Are they to be excluded? .

M" GHorum was for leaving to the Legislature, the providing ag*
such abuses as had been mentioned.

Col. Mason mentioned the parliamentary qualifications adopted
in the Reign of Queen Anne, which he said had met with universal
approbation

M! Manison had witnessed the zeal of men having acc® with the
public, to get into the Legislatures for sinister purposes. He thought
however that if any precaution were to be? taken for excluding them,
the one proposed, by Col. Mason ought to be new* modelled. It might
be well to limit the exclusion to persons who had rec? money from
the public, and had not accounted for it.

M: Gov? Morris. It was a precept of great antiquity as well as
high authority that we should not be righteous overmuch. He
thought we ought to be equally on our guard ag‘ being wise over
much. The proposed regulation would enable the Govent to exclude
particular persons from office as long as they pleased He mentioned
the case of the Commander in Chief’s presenting his account for secret
services, which he said was so moderate that every one was aston-
ished at it; and so simple that no doubt could arise on it. Yet had
the Auditor been disposed to delay the settlement, how easily might
he‘ have effected it, & how cruel w? it be in such a case to keep a

 

The words “to be” are omitted in the transcript.
? The word “new” is crossed out and the syllable “re
* The word “of” is here inserted in the transcript.
‘The words “might he” are transposed to read “he might” in the tran-

script.

” is written above it.
828 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

distinguished & meritorious Citizen under a temporary disability
& disfranchisement. He mentioned this case merely to illustrate the
objectionable nature of the proposition. He was opposed to such
minutious regulations in a Constitution. The parliamentary quali-
fications quoted by Col. Mason, had been disregarded in practice;
and was but a scheme of the landed ag*t the monied interest.

M: Pinckney & Gen! Pinckney moved to insert by way of
amendmt the words Judiciary & Executive so as to extend the quali-
fications to those departments which was agreed to nem. con.

M: Gerry thought the inconveniency ? of excluding a few worthy
individuals who might be public debtors or have unsettled acc‘ ought
not to be put in the scale ag*t the public advantages of the regula-
tion, and that the motion did not go far enough.

M: Kina observed that there might be great danger in requiring
landed property as a qualification since it would? exclude the monied
interest, whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies to
the public safety.

M: DicKkENSON, was ag’t any recital of qualifications in the Con-
stitution. It was impossible to make a compleat one, and a partial
one w by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from sup-
plying the omissions, The best defence lay in the freeholders who
were to elect the Legislature. Whilst this Source * should remain pure,
the public interest would be safe. If it ever should be corrupt, no
little expedients would repel the danger. He doubted the policy of
interweaving into a Republican constitution a veneration for wealth.
He had always understood that a veneration for poverty & virtue,
were the objects of republican encouragement. It seemed improper
that any man of merit should be subjected to disabilities in a Republic
where merit was understood to form the great title to public trust,
honors & rewards.

M Gerry if property be one object of Government, provisions
for securing * it cannot be improper.

M! Mapison moved to strike out the word landed, before the word
‘* qualifications.’’ If the proposition s? be agreed to he wished the
Committee to be at liberty to report the best criterion they could
devise. Landed possessions were no certain evidence of real wealth.

 

ee word “inconveniency” is changed to “ inconvenience” in the tran-
script.
* The word “might” is substituted in the transcript for the word “would.”
*The word “resource” is erroneously substituted in the transcript for the
word “ source.” s
. - The words “to secure” are substituted for “for securing,” in the tran-
script.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1787 329

Many enjoyed them to a great extent who were more in debt than
they were worth. The unjust laws of the States had proceeded more
from this class of men, than any others. It had often happened
that men who had acquired landed property on credit, got into the
Legislatures with a view of promoting an unjust protection ag* their
Creditors. In the next place, if a small quantity of land should be
made: the standard, it would be no security; if a large one, it would
exclude the proper representatives of those classes of Citizens who
were not landholders. It was politic as well as just that the interests
& rights of every class should be duly represented & understood in
the public Councils. It was a provision every where established that
the Country should be divided into districts & representatives taken
from each, in order that the Legislative Assembly might equally
understand & sympathise, with the rights of the people in every part
of the Community. It was not less proper that every class of
Citizens should have an opportunity of making their rights be felt
& understood in the public Councils. The three principal classes
into which our citizens were divisible, were the landed the commer-
cial, & the manufacturing. The 2? & 34 class, bear as yet a small
proportion to the first. The proportion however will daily increase.
We see in the populous Countries in? Europe now, what we shall be
hereafter. These classes understand much less of each others in-
terests & affairs, than men of the same class inhabiting different dis-
tricts. It is particularly requisite therefore that the interests of one or
two of them should not be left entirely to the care, or the * impartial-
ity of the third. This must be the case if landed qualifications should
be required ; few of the mercantile, & scarcely any of the manufactur-
ing class, chusing whilst they continue in business to turn any part of
their Stock into landed property. For these reasons he wished if
it were possible that some other criterion than the mere possession
of land should be devised. He concurred with M! Gov! Morris in
thinking that qualifications in the Electors would be much more
effectual than in the elected. The former would discriminate be-
tween real & ostensible property in the latter; But he was aware
of the difficulty of forming any uniform standard that would suit
the different circumstances & opinions prevailing in the different
States.
M: Gov: Morrts 2% the motion.
On the Question for striking out ‘‘ landed ”’

 

1The word “of ” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”
2 The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.
330 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ciay. N. J. ay. Pe ay. Del. ay. M? no.
V? ay. N.C. ay. 8S. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

On * Question on? 1% part of Col. Masons proposition as to quali-
fication of property & citizenship,’’ as so amended

N. H. ay. Mas* ay. Ctno. N. J. ay. P?no. Del. no. M4 ay.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

‘« The 2¢ part, for disqualifying debtors, and persons having un-
settled accounts,’’ being under consideration

M: Carrou moved to strike out ‘‘ having unsettled accounts ”’

M: GHorum seconded the motion; observing that it would put
the commercial & manufacturing part of the people on a worse foot-
ing than others as they would be most likely to have dealings with
the public.

M: L. Martin. if these words should be struck out, and the re-
maining words concerning debtors retained, it will be the interest
of the latter class to keep their accounts unsettled as long as possible.

M: Wizson was for striking them out. They put too much power
in the hands of the Auditors, who might combine with rivals in delay-
ing settlements in order to prolong the disqualifications of particular
men. We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for
future generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances
of the moment. The time has been, and will again be, when the
public safety may depend on the voluntary aids of individuals which
will necessarily open aces with the public, and when such acc® will
be a characteristic of patriotism. Besides a partial enumeration of
cases will disable the Legislature from disqualifying odious & danger-
ous characters.

M: Lanepon was for striking out the whole clause for the reasons
given by M! Wilson. So many exclusions he thought too would ren-
der the system unacceptable to the people.

M: Gerry. If the argum* used to day were to prevail, we might
have a Legislature composed of public debtors, pensioners, place-
men & contractors. He thought the proposed qualifications would be
pleasing to the people. They will be considered as a security ag*
unnecessary or undue burdens being imposed on them. He moved to
add ‘‘ pensioners ’’ to the disqualified characters which was negatived.

 

“In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—10; Maryland, no.”

* The word “ the” is here inserted in the transcript.

7JIn the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no—3.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1787 331

N. H.no Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. P* no. Del. no. Mary
ay. Vino. N. C. divided. S.C. no. Geo. ay.2

M" Gov! Morris. The last clause, relating to public debtors will
exclude every importing merchant. Revenue will be drawn it is
foreseen as much as possible, from trade. Duties of course will be
bonded, and the Merch® will remain debtors to the public. He re-
peated that it had not been so much the fault of individuals as of
the public that transactions between them had not been more gen-
erally liquidated & adjusted. At all events to draw from our short &
scanty experience rules that are to operate through succeeding ages,
does not savour much of real wisdom.

On ? question for striking out, ‘‘ persons having unsettled accounts
with the U. States.’’

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.

M* ELsewortu was for disagreeing to the remainder of the clause
disqualifying public debtors; and for leaving to the wisdom of the
Legislature and the virtue of the Citizens, the task of providing
ag such evils. Is the smallest as well‘ largest debtor to be ex-
eluded? Then every arrear of taxes will disqualify. Besides how
is it to be known to the people when they elect who are or are not
public debtors. The exclusion of pensioners & placemen in Engl?
is founded on a consideration not existing here. As persons of that
sort are dependent on the Crown, they tend to increase its influence.

M: Pinkney s¢ he was at first a friend to the proposition, for the
sake of the clause relating to qualifications of property; but he dis-
liked the exclusion of public debtors; it went too far. It wi exclude
persons who had purchased confiscated property or should purchase
Western territory of the public, and might be some obstacle to the
sale of the latter.

On the question for agreeing to the clause disqualifying public
debtors

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M?@ no.
V2 no. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Maryland, Georgia,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, South Carolina, no—7; North Carolina, divided.”

? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, aye—9; New Jersey, Georgia, no—2.”

*The words “as the” are here insertel in the transcript.

5 In the transcript the vote reads: “ No:th Carolina, Georgia, aye—2; New

Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no—9.” .

 
332 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Col. Mason. observed that it would be proper, as he thought, that
some provision should be made in the Constitution ag’ choosing for
the seat of the Gen! Gov! the City or place at which the seat of any
State Gov! might be fixt. There were 2 objections ag*t having them
at the same place, which without mentioning others, required some
precaution on the subject. The 1% was that it tended to produce
disputes concerning jurisdiction. The 2? & principal one was that
the intermixture of the two Legislatures tended to give a provincial
tincture to y Nat! deliberations. He moved that the Com? be in-
structed to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the Nat! Govi
being in the same City or town with the Seat of the Gov‘ of any State
longer than untill the necessary public buildings could be erected.

M Avex. Martin 2% the motion.

M! Gov! Morris did not dislike the idea, but was apprehensive
that such a clause might make enemies of Phild? & N. York which
had expectations of becoming the Seat of the Gen! Govt

M: Lanepon approved the idea also: but suggisted the case of a
State moving its seat of Gov! to the nat! seat after the erection of
the public buildings.

M: Guorum. The precaution may be evaded by the Nat! Legislt
by delaying to erect the public buildings

M! Gerry conceived it to be the gene! sense of America, that neither
the Seat of a State Gov! nor any large commercial City should be the
seat of the Gen! Govt

M! Wiuuiamson liked the idea, but knowing how much the pas-
sions of men were agitated by this matter, was apprehensive of turn-
ing them agst the System. He apprehended also that an evasion
might be practiced in the way hinted by M! Ghorum.

M: Pinkney thought the seat of a State Gov! ought to be avoided;
but that a large town or its vicinity would be proper for the Seat
of the Gen! Govt

Col. Mason did not mean to press the motion at this time, nor
to excite any hostile passions ag%t the system. He was content to
withdraw the motion for the present.

M: Butter was for fixing by the Constitution the place, & a
central one, for the seat of the Nat! Govi

The proceedings since Monday last were referred unanimously * to
the Com® of detail, and the Convention then unanimously Adjourned
till Monday, Aug*t 6. that the Com? of detail might have time to

 

+The words “referred unanimously ” are transposed to read “ unanimously
referred ” in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1787 333

prepare & report the Constitution. The whole proceedings as re-
ferred are as follow: ‘‘ [here copy them from the Journal p. 207?

[June 20.8 I. Resotvep, That the Government of the
United States ought to consist of a su-
preme legislative, judiciary, and executive.

June 21, II. REsouvep, That the legislature consist of two
branches.

III. Resotvep, That the members of the first
branch of the legislature ought to be
elected by the people of the several states,

June 22. for the term of two years; to be paid out
of the publick treasury ; to receive an ade-
quate compensation for their services; to

June 23. be of the age of twenty-five years at least;
to be ineligible* and incapable of holding
any office under the authority of the United
States (except those peculiarly belonging
to the functions of the first branch) during
the term of service of the first branch.

June 25. IV. Resotvep, That the members of the second
branch of the legislature of the United
States ought to be chosen by the individual

June 26. legislatures; to be of the age of thirty
years at least; to hold their offices for six
years, one third to go out biennally; to re-
ceive a compensation for the devotion of
their time to the publick service; to be
ineligible to and incapable of holding any
office, under the authority of the United
States (except those peculiarly belonging
to the functions of the second branch)
during the term for which they are
elected, and for one year thereafter.

V. ReEsoiven, That each branch ought to possess
the right of originating acts.

Postponed 27. VI. Resotven, That the national legislature

July 16. ought to possess the legislative rights

July 17. vested in Congress by the confederation;
and moreover, to legislate in all cases for
the general interests of the union, and also

 

1The word “proceedings” is crossed out in the transcript and “ Resolu-
tions” is written above it.

* Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.

* The printed Journal says, page 11, that these 23 Resolutions are “col-
lected from the proceedings of the convention, as they are spread over the
journal from June 19th to July 26th.” The dates in the margin show when the
respective Resolutions were adopted. They are omitted in the transcript.

“The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.
334 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

in those to which the states are separately
incompetent, or in which the harmony of
the United States may be interrupted by
the exercise of individual legislation.

VII. Resoivep, That the legislative acts of the
United States, made by virtue and in pur-
suance of the articles of union, and all
treaties made and ratified under the au-
thority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the respective states, as far
as those acts or treaties shall relate to the
said states, or their citizens and inhabitants;
and that the judiciaries of the several
states shall be bound thereby in their deci-
sions, any thing in the respective laws of
the individual states to the contrary, not-
withstanding.

16, VIII. Resotvep, That in the original formation of
the legislature of the United States, the
first branch thereof shall consist of sixty-
five members; of which number

New Hampshire shall send three,
Massachusetts . . eight,
Rhode Island . ... one,
Connecticut . .  . five,

New York . ae ; six,
New Jersey ; ‘ , four,
Pennsylvania . : e eight,
Delaware . j 3 ‘ one,
Maryland . te. six,
Virginia. P : . ten,
North Carolina ‘ ; five,
South Carolina ew five,
Georgia : 2 : . three.

But as the present situation of the states
may probably alter in the number of their
inhabitants, the legislature of the United
States shall be authorized, from time to
time, to upportion the number of repre-
sentatives; and in case any of the states
shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by
addition of territory, or any two or more
states united, or any new states created
within the limits of the United States, the
legislature of the United States shall pos-
sess authority to regulate the number of
representatives, in any of the foregoing
cases, upon the principle of their number
of inhabitants according to the provisions
July 26.

July 21.

SESSION OF THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1787 335

XII.

hereafter mentioned, namely—Provided
always, that representation ought to be
proportioned according? to direct taxation.
And in order to ascertain the alteration in
the direct taxation, which may be required
from time to time by the changes in the
relative circumstances of the states—

RESOLVED, That a census be taken within six

years from the first meeting of the legis-
letur: of the United States, and once within
the term of every ten years afterwards, of
all the inhabitants of the United States,
in the manner and according to the ratio
recommended by Congress in their resolu-
tion of April 18, 1783; and that the legis-
lature of the United States shall propor-
tion the direct taxation accordingly.

ReEso.vep, That all bills for raising or appro-

priating money, and for fixing the salaries
of the officers of the government of the
United States, shall originate in the first
branch of the legislature of the United
States, and shall not be altered or amended
by the second branch; and that no money
shall be drawn from the publick treasury,
but in pursuance of appropriations to be
originated by the first branch.

RESOLVED, That in the second branch of the

legislature of the United States, each state
shall have an equal vote.

REsoLveD, That a national executive be in-

stituted, to consist of a single person; to
be chosen by the national legislature, for
the term of seven years; to be ineligible a
second time; with power to carry into ex-
ecution the national laws; to appoint to
offices in cases not otherwise provided for;
to be removable on impeachment, and con-
viction of mal-practice or neglect of duty;
to receive a fixed compensation for the
devotion of his time to? publick service; to
be paid out of the publick treasury.

XIII. Resouvep, That the national executive shall

have a right to negative any legislative act,
which shall not be afterwards passed, un-
less by two third parts of each branch of
the national legislature.

 

1The word “according” is omitted in the transcript.
2The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
336
18. XIV.

July 21.
18.

XVI.

XVII.

XVIII.

23, XIX.

XXI.

XXII.

DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Resotvep, That a national judiciary be estab-
lished, to consist of one supreme tribunal,
the judges of which shall be appointed by
the second branch of the national legisla-
ture; to hold their offices during good be-
haviour; to receive punctually, at stated
times, a fixed compensation for their serv-
ices, in which no diminution shall be made,
so as to affect the persons actually in office
at the time of such diminution.

Resotvep, That the national legislature be
empowered to appoint inferior tribunals.
RESOLVED, That the jurisdiction of the
national judiciary shall extend to cases
arising under laws passed by the general
legislature; and to such other questions as

involve the national peace and harmony.

REsoLveD, That provision ought to be made
for the admission of states lawfully arising
within the limits of the United States,
whether from a voluntary junction of gov-
ernment and territory, or otherwise, with
the consent of a number of voices in the
national legislature less than the whole.

Resoivep, That a republican form of govern-
ment shall be guarantied to each state; and
that each state shall be protected against
foreign and domestick violence.

Resotvep, That provision ought to be made
for the amendment of the articles of union,
whensoever it shall seem necessary.

REsoLveED, That the legislative, executive, and
judiciary powers, within the several states,
and of the national government, ought to
be bound, by oath, to support the articles
of union.

REsoLvep, That the amendments which shall
be offered to the confederation by the con-
vention ought, at a proper time or times
after the approbation of Congress, to be
submitted to an assembly or assemblies of
representatives, recommended by the sev-
eral legislatures, to be expressly chosen by
the people to consider and decide thereon.

REsoLvep, That the representation in the sec-
ond branch of the legislature of the United
States consist of two members from each
state, who shall vote per capita.

 

*The word ‘ shall” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1787 337

26. XXIII. Resoivep, That it be an instruction to the
committee, to whom were referred the pro-
ceedings of the convention for the estab-
lishment of a national government, to re-
ceive a clause or clauses, requiring certain
qualifications of property and citizenship,
in the United States, for the executive, the
judiciary, and the members of both
branches of the legislature of the United
States. ]

With the above resolutions were referred the propositions offered
by M: C. Pinckney on the 29% of May, & by M® Patterson on the
15% of June.?

Monpay Avucust 6T= In ConvENTION

M: John Francis Mercer from Maryland took his seat.

M: Rutiipce delivered in the Report of the Committee of detail
as follows: a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each
member: ?

‘* We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachussetts,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York,
New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-
Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and
establish the following Constitution for the Government of Our-
selves and our Posterity.

ARTICLE I

The stile of the Government shall be, ‘‘The United States of
America ”’

3 TI

The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive;
and judicial powers.

 

>The word “ Adjourned ” is here inserted in the transcript.

? Madison’s printed copy is marked: “As Reported by Come of Detail viz
of five. Aug. 6. 1787.” It is a large folio of seven pages. In the enumeration
of the Articles by a misprint VI. was repeated, and the alterations in Article VII.
and succeeding articles were made by Madison. In Sec. 11 of Article VI, as
it was printed, it appeared: “The enacting stile of the laws of the United States
shall be. ‘Be it enacted, and it is hereby enacted by the House of Repre-
sentatives, and by the Senate of the United States, in Congress assembled.’ ”
which Madison altered to read: “The enacting stile of the laws of the United
States shall be. ‘Be it enacted by the Senate & representatives in Congress
agsembled.’” The printed copy among the Madison papers is a duplicate of
the copy filed by General Washington with the papers of the Constitution, and
Sec. 11 is there given as actually printed. :

Madison accurately transcribed the report for his notes and it is this copy
which is used in the text.

* The word “ Article” is here inserted in the transcript.
338 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

“TIT

The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist
of two separate and distinct bodies of men, a House of Representa-
tives and a Senate; each of which shall in all cases have a negative
on the other. The Legislature shall meet on the first Monday in
December? every year.

IV

Sect. 1. The members of the House of Representatives shall be
chosen every second year, by the people of the several States com-
prehended within this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall
be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the several
States, of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures.

Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives shall be
of the age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen
in the United States for at least three years before his election; and
shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which
he shall be chosen.

Sect. 8. The House of Representatives shall, at its first forma-
tion, and until the number of citizens and inhabitants shall be taken
in the manner herein after described, consist of sixty five Members, of
whom three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire, eight in Massachus-
setts, one in Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, five in Con-
necticut, six in New-York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsyl-
vania, one in Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in
North-Carolina, five in South-Carolina, and three in Georgia.

Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different States will
alter from time to time; as some of the States may hereafter be
divided; as others may be enlarged by addition of territory; as two
or more States may be united; as new States will be erected within
the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall, in each of
these cases, regulate the number of representatives by the number of
inhabitants, according to the provisions herein after made, at the
rate of one for every forty thousand.

Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating money, and for
fixing the salaries of the officers of Government, shall originate in
the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended
by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury,
but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House
of Representatives.

Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power
of impeachment. It shall choose its Speaker and other officers.

_Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be sup-
plied by writs of election from the executive authority of the State,
in the representation from which it® shall happen.

 

* The word “ Article” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “in” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “it” is crossed out and the word “they” is written above it in
the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1787 339

1V

Sect 1. The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the
Legislatures of the several States. Each Legislature shall chuse two
members, Vacancies may be supplied by the Executive until the
next meeting of the Legislature. Each member shall have one vote.

Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six years; but imme-
diately after the first election they shall be divided, by lot, into
three classes, as nearly as may be, numbered one, two and three. The
seats of the members of the first class shall be vacated at the expira-
tion of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the
fourth year, of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so
that a third part of the members may be chosen every second year.

Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of
thirty years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States
for at least four years before his election; and shall be, at the time
of his election, a resident of the State for which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 4. The Senate shall chuse its own President and other
officers.

‘VI

Sect. 1. The times and places and manner of holding the elec-
tions of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legis-
lature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may, at
any time, be altered by the Legislature of the United States.

Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States shall have author-
ity to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each
House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem
expedient.

Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members shall con-
stitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day.

Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns
and qualifications of its own members.

Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall
not be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of the
Legislature; and the members of each House shall, in all cases, ex-
cept treason felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at Congress, and in going to and
returning from it.

Sect. 6. Hach House may determine the rules of its proceedings;
may punish its members for disorderly behaviour; and may expel
a member.

Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the Senate, when it

-shall be acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a journal of their
proceedings, and shall, from time to time, publish them: and the yeas
and nays of the members of each House, on any question, shall at
the desire of one-fifth part of the members present, be entered on
the journal.

 

1The word “ Article ” is here inserted in the transcript.
340 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the other, shall
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that
at which the two Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not
extend to the Senate, when it shall exercise the powers mentioned
in the article.

Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible to, and
incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United
States, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected:
and the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable
of holding any such office for one year afterwards.

Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive a compensa-
tion for their services, to be ascertained and paid by the State, in
which they shall be chosen.

1Sect. 11. The enacting stile of the laws of the United States
shall be. ‘‘Be it enacted by the Senate and Representatives in Con-
gress assembled.”’

Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of originating bills,
except in the cases beforementioned.

Sect. 18. Every bill, which shall have passed the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Senate, shall, before it become? a law, be pre-
sented to the President of the United States for his revision: if,
upon such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation
by signing it: But if, upon such revision, it shall appear to him
improper for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together
with his objections against it, to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal
and proceed to reconsider the bill. But if after such reconsideration,
two thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the objections of the
President, agree to pass it, it shall together with his objections, be
sent to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two thirds of the other House also, it shall be-
come a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall
be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of the persons
voting for or against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each
House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the Presi-
dent within seven days after it shall have been presented to him, it
shall be a law, unless the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent
its return ; in which case it shall not be a law.

S VII

Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have the
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the sev-
eral States;

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the
United States;

 

* Section 11 is copied in the transcript as originally printed. See foot-
note * on p. 337.

* The word “becomes” is substituted in the transcript for “ become.”

* The word “ Article” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1787 341

To coin money ;

To regulate the value of foreign coin;

To fix the standard of weights and measures;

To establish Post-offices ;

: To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of the United
tates ;

To appoint a Treasurer by ballot;

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To make rules concerning captures on land and water;

To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies com-
mitted on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the
coin of the United States, and of offences against the law of nations;

To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its
legislature ;

To make war;

To raise armies;

To build and equip fleets;

To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws
of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions ;

And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested, by this Constitution, in the government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof;

Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall consist only in
levying war against the United States, or any of them; and in adher-
ing to the enemies of the United States, or any of them. The Legis-
lature of the United States shall have power to declare the punish-
ment of treason. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on
the testimony of two witnesses. No attainder of treason shall work
corruption of blood, nor forfeiture, except during the life of the per-
son attainted.

Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated
by the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants,
of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude
for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not com-
prehended in the foregoing description, (except Indians not paying
taxes) which number shall, within six years after the first meeting of
the Legislature, and within the term of every ten years afterwards,
be taken in such? manner as the said Legislature shall direct.

Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature on
articles exported from any State; nor on the migration or importa-
tion of such persons as the several States shall think proper to admit;
nor shall such migration or importation be prohibited.

Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to
the Census hereinbefore directed to be taken.

Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without the assent
of two thirds of the members present in the each House.

 

? The letter “r” is stricken from the word “ officer” in the transcript.
>The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
342 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any title of Nobility.

tVill

The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance
of this Constitution, and all treaties made under. the authority of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the several States,
and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several
States shall be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the
Constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary not-
withstanding.

11X

Sect 1. The Senate of the United States shall have power to
make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Su-
preme Court.

Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or that
may hereafter subsist between two or more States, respecting juris-
diction or territory, the Senate shall possess the following powers.
Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive authority, or lawful
agent of any State, in controversy with another, shall by memorial to
the Senate, state the matter in question, and apply for a hearing;
notice of such memorial and application shall be given by order of
the Senate, to the Legislature or the Executive authority of the other
State in Controversy. The Senate shall also assign a day for the
appearance of the parties, by their agents, before the? House. The
Agents shall be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners
or judges to constitute a Court for hearing and determining the
matter in question. But if the Agents cannot agree, the Senate shall
name three persons out of each of the several States; and from the
list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, until
the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not
less than seven nor more than nine names, as the Senate shall direct,
shall in their presence, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose
names shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall be commissioners
or Judges to hear and finally determine the controversy ; provided a
majority of the Judges, who shall hear the cause, agree in the de-
termination. If either party shall neglect to attend at the day
assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons for not attending, or
being present shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to nomi-
nate three persons out of each State, and the Clerk of the Senate shall
strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing. If any of the
parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such Court; or shall
not appear to prosecute or defend their claim or cause, the Court
shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce judgment. The judgment
shall be final and conclusive. The proceedings shall be transmitted
to the President of the Senate, and shall be lodged among the public
records, for the security of the parties concerned. Every Commis-

; The word “ Article” is here inserted in the transcript.
The word “the” is changed to “that” in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1787 -343

sioner shall, before he sit in judgment, take an oath, to be admin-
istred by one of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of the
State where the cause shall be tried, ‘‘well and truly to hear and
determine the matter in question according to the best of his judg-
ment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward.’”

Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed under dif-
ferent grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as they
respect such lands shall have been decided or adjusted subsequent *
to such grants, or any of them, shall, on application to the Senate, be
finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before
prescribed for deciding controversies between different States.

2x

Sect. 1. The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested
in a single person. His stile shall be, ‘‘The President of the United
States of America;’’ and his title shall be, ‘‘His Excellency.’’ He
shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his office
during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second
time.

Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information to the
Legislature, of the state of the Union: he may recommend to their
consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary, and expe-
dient: he may convene them on extraordinary occasions. In case of
disagreement between the two Houses, with regard to the time of
adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper:
he shall take care that the laws of the United States be, duly and
faithfully executed: he shall commission all the officers of the
United States; and shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise
provided for by this Constitution. He shall receive Ambassadors,
and may correspond with the supreme Executives of the several
States. He shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his
pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment. He shall
be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States. He shall, at stated times,
receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be in-
ereased nor diminished during his continuance in office. Before he
shall enter on the duties of his department, he shall take the follow-
ing oath or affirmation, ‘‘T solemnly swear, (or affirm) that
that * I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United
States of America.’’ He shall be removed from his office on impeach-
ment by the House of Representatives, and conviction in the supreme
Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his removal
as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability to discharge the powers
and duties of his ‘office, the President of the Senate shall exercise
those powers and duties, until another President of the United States
be chosen, or until the disability of the President be removed.

 

 

The syllable “ly” is added in the transcript to the word “subsequent.”
2The word “ Article” is here inserted in the CoAnEGEL DE
2? The word “that” is omitted in the transcript.
344. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

1XI

Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when
necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of
the United States.

Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior
Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall,
at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to
all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United
States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and
Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers of the United States;
to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies
between two or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory
or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State, be-
tween Citizens of different States, and between a State or the Citi-
zens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of
impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, this jurisdic-
tion shall be original. In all the other cases beforementioned, it shall
be appellate, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the
Legislature shall make. The Legislature may assign any part of the
jurisdiction abovementioned (except the trial of the President of
the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which
it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute
from time to time.

Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of
impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be committed;
and shall be by Jury.

Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not extend
further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any office of honour, trust or profit, under the United States.
But the party convicted shall, nevertheless be liable and subject to
indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.

1XII

No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of marque and re-

prisal ; nor enter into any Treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor
grant any title of Nobility.

1XTiI

No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United
States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a
tender in payment of debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports;
nor keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor enter into’ any
agreement or compact with another State, or with any foreign power;

* The word “ Article” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 6, 1787 345

nor engage in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies,
or the danger of invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of delay,
until the Legislature of the United States can be consulted.

1 XIV

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States.

1XV
Any person charged with treason, felony or high misdemeanor in
any State, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in any
other State, shall, on demand of the Executive power of the State
from which he fied, be delivered up and removed to the State having
jurisdiction of the offence.

1XVI
Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legis-

latures, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts
and magistrates of every other State.

1 XVII

New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits of
the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into this
Government; but to such admission the consent of two thirds of
the members present in each House shall be necessary. If a new
State shall arise within the limits of any of the present States, the
consent of the Legislatures of such States shall be also necessary to
its admission. If the admission be consented to, the new States shall
be admitted on the same terms with the original States. But the
Legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning the
public debt which shall be then subsisting.

* XVIII

The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican form
of Government; and shall protect each State against foreign inva-
sions, and, on the application of its Legislature, against domestic
violence.

1 XIX

On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States
in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature
of the United States shall call a Convention for that purpose.

XxX

The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive and Judicial
officers of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound
by oath to support this Constitution.

 

1The word “ Article” is here inserted in the transcript.
346 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

1XxI

The ratifications of the Conventions of States shall be
sufficient for organizing this Constitution.

1XXil

This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in Con-
gress assembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this
Convention, that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention
chosen,? under the recommendation of its legislature, in order to
receive the ratification of such Convention.

1 XXIII

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Convention,
that each assenting Convention should notify its assent and ratifica-
tion to the United States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after
receiving the assent and ratification of the Conventions of
States, should appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and
appoint a place for commencing proceedings under this Constitu-
tion; that after such publication, the Legislatures of the several
States should elect members of the Senate, and direct the election
of members of the House of Representatives; and that the members
of the Legislature should meet at the time and place assigned by
Congress, and should, as soon as may be, after their meeting, choose
the President of the United States, and proceed to execute this
Constitution.’’

A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in order to give
leisure to examine the Report; which passed in the negative—
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. P* ay. M? ay. Virg. ay. N. C. no.
8. C. no.’

The House then adjourned till to morrow *11 OC.

Truspay August 7T= In ConvENTION

The Report of the Committee of detail being taken up,

M:! PINKNEY moved that it be referred to a Committee of the
whole. This was strongly opposed by M? Guorum & several others,
as likely to produce unnecessary delay ; and was negatived. Delaware
Mary‘ & Virg® only being in the affirmative.

 

* The word “ Article” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The phrase “in each State” is here inserted in the transcript.
°In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,

aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, South
Carolina, no—5.”

“The word “at” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1787 347

The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem. con. So were
Art: I & II

Art: ITI. ® * considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety of giv-
ing each branch a negative on the other ‘‘ in all cases.’? There were
some cases in which it was he supposed not intended to be given as
in the case of balloting for appointments.

M: Gov! Morris moved to insert ‘‘ legislative acts’’ instead of
‘“all cases’’

M? Wituiamson 2% him.

M! SHerman. This will restrain the operation of the clause too
much. It will particularly exclude a mutual negative in the case of
ballots, which he hoped would take place.

M: Guorvum contended that elections ought to be made by joint
ballot. If separate ballots should be made for the President, and the
two branches should be each attached to a favorite, great delay con-
tention & confusion may ensue. These inconveniences have been felt
in Masti in the election of officers of little importance compared with
the Executive of the U. States. The only objection ag* a joint ballot
is that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight; but this ought
not to prevail over the respect due to the public tranquility & welfare.

M: WILson was for a joint ballot in several cases at least; par-
ticularly in the choice of the President, and was therefore for
the amendment. Disputes between the two Houses during & con-
cern? the vacancy of the Executive might have dangerous conse-
quences.

Col. Mason thought the amendment of M! Gov? Morris extended
too far. Treaties are in a subsequent part declared to be laws, they
will be therefore * subjected to a negative; altho’ they are to be made
as proposed by the Senate alone. He proposed that the mutual nega-
tive should be restrained to ‘‘ cases requiring the distinct assent ’’
of the two Houses.

M: Gov? Morris thought this but a repetition of the same thing;
the mutual negative and distinct assent, being equavalent expres-
sions. Treaties he thought were not laws.

M: Maprson moved to strike out the words ‘‘ each of which shall
in all cases, have a negative on the other; the idea being sufficiently
expressed in the preceding member of the article; vesting the
“legislative power’’ in ‘‘distinct bodies,’’ especially as the respective

*See page 337.

? See page 338.

®The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The words “be therefore” are changed in the transcript to “therefore
be.”
348 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

powers and mode of exercising them were fully delineated in a
subsequent article.

Gen! PinKnEY 2% the motion

On question for inserting legislative Acts as moved by M! Gov:
Morris.?

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cf ay. P? ay. Del. no. Mi? no. V* no.
N. C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

On? question for agreeing to M! M’s motion to strike out &e.—

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. P2 ay. Del. ay. M? no. V% ay.
N. C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M: Mapison wished to know the reasons of the Com? for fixing
by y? Constitution the time of Meeting for the Legislature; and sug-
gested, that it be required only that one meeting at least should be
held every year leaving the time to be fixed or varied by law.

M:= Gov: Morris moved to strike out the sentence. It was im-
proper to tie down the Legislature to a particular time, or even to
require a meeting every year. The public business might not re-
quire it.

M! Pinkney concurred with M* Madison.

M: Guorum. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution, dis-
putes will arise in the Legislature; and the States will be at a loss
to adjust thereto, the times of their elections. In the N. England
States the annual time of meeting had been long fixed by their
Charters & Constitutions, and no inconveniency ® had resulted. He
thought it necessary that there should be one meeting at least every
year as a check on the Executive department.

M: ELsewortH was ag* striking out the words. The Legislature
will not know till they are met whether the public interest required
their meeting or not. He could see no impropriety in fixing the
day, as the Convention could judge of it as well as the Legislature.

M! Witson thought on the whole it would be best to fix the day.

M: Kine could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting
every year. A great vice in our system was that of legislating too
much. The most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States.

 

+The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
_ ._ 7? The phrase “it passed in the negative, the votes being equally divided,”
is here inserted in the transcript.

>In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, aye—5; Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—5.”

; ‘In i bag _the sa New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Virginia, Sou arolina, ia, 3 i
Maryland Bets Coase ee olina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut,

* The word “inconveniency ” is changed in the transcript to “ inconvenience.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1787 349

Those of the Nat! Legislature were but few. The chief of them were
commerce & revenue. When these should be once settled, alterations
would be rarely necessary & easily made.

M: Mapison thought if the time of meeting should be fixed by a
law it w* be sufficiently fixed & there would be no difficulty then as
had been suggested, on the part of the States in adjusting their elec-
tions to it. One consideration appeared to him to militate strongly
ag: fixing a time by the Constitution. It might happen that the
Legislature might be called together by the public exigencies & finish
their Session but a short time before the annual period. In this case
it would be extremely inconvenient to reassemble so quickly & without
the least necessity. He thought one annual meeting ought to be re-
quired; but did not wish to make two unavoidable.

Col. Mason thought the objections against fixing the time in-
superable: but that an annual meeting ought to be required as essen-
tial to the preservation of the Constitution. The extent of the Coun-
try will supply business. And if it should not, the Legislature, be-
sides legislative, is to have inquisitorial powers, which can not safely
be long kept in a state of suspension.

M! SHERMAN was decided for fixing the time, as well as for fre-
quent meetings of the Legislative body. Disputes and difficulties will
arise between the two Houses, & between both & the States, if the
time be changeable—frequent meetings of Parliament were required
at the Revolution in England as an essential safeguard of liberty.
So also are annual meetings in most of the American charters &
constitutions. There will be business eno’ to require it. The Western
Country, and the great extent and varying state of our affairs in
general will supply objects.

M: RanpotpH was ag* fixing any day irrevocably; but as there
was no provision made any where in the Constitution for regulating
the periods of meeting, and some precise time must be fixed, untill
the Legislature shall make provision, he could not agree to strike
out the words altogether. Instead of which he moved to add the
words following—‘‘ unless a different day shall be appointed by law.’’

M: Mapison 2% the motion, & on the question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct no. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 ay. V2 ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.t

M! Gov: Morris moved to strike out Dec? & insert May. It might
frequently happen that our measures ought to be influenced by those

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; New
Hampshire, Connecticut, no—2.”
350 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

in Europe, which were generally planned during the Winter and of
which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.

M? Mapison 2% the motion, he preferred May to Dec! because
the latter would require the travelling to & from the seat of Gov!
in the most inconvenient seasons of the year.

Mi Witson. The Winter is the most convenient season for
business.

Mz E.sreworty. The summer will interfere too much with private
business, that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature
being more or less connected with agriculture.

M= RanpotpH. The time is of no great moment now, as the
Legislature can vary it. On looking into the Constitutions of the
States, he found that the times of their elections with which the
election! of the Nat! Representatives would no doubt be made to
co-incide, would suit better with Dec? than May. And it was
adviseable to render our innovations as little incommodious as
possible.

On? question for ‘‘ May ’’ instead of ‘‘ Dect ”’

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. P2 no. Del. no. Mi no. V? no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M:! Reap moved to insert after the word ‘‘ Senate ’’ the words,
‘‘ subject to the Negative to be hereafter provided.’’ His object
was to give an absolute negative to the Executive—He considered
this as so essential to the Constitution, to the preservation of liberty,
& to the public welfare, that his duty compelled him to make the
motion.

M: Gov! Morris 2% him. And on the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. P* no. Del. ay. M4 no. V? no.
N. C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.*

M: Rutuper. Altho’ it is agreed on all hands that an annual
meeting of the Legislature should be made necessary, yet that point
seems not to be freed from doubt as the clause stands. On this
suggestion, ‘‘ Once at least in every year,’’ were inserted, nem.
con.

Art. III with the foregoing alterations was ag? to nem. con. and

 

* The word “election ” is used in the plural in the transcript.

? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “South Carolina, Georgia, aye—2; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, no—8.” ‘

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Delaware, aye—l1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—9.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1787 351

is as follows ‘‘ The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress
to consist of 2 separate & distinct bodies of men; a House of Rep!
& a Senate The Legislature shall meet at least once in every year,
and such meeting shall be on the 1:t monday in Dec? unless a different
day shall be appointed by law.’’

“* Art IV. Sect. 1.4? taken up.’’

M! Govt Morris moved to strike out the last member of the section
beginning with the words ‘‘ qualifications ’’ of Electors,’’ in order that -
some other provision might be substituted which w? restrain the
right of suffrage to freeholders.

M Firzmmons 2%? the motion

M*: WILLIAMSON was opposed to it.

M? Wison. This part of the Report was well considered by the
Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better.
It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the
States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided.
It would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons at the:
same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and
to be excluded from a vote for those in the Nat! Legislature.

M* Gov: Morris. Such a hardship would be neither great nor
novel. The people are accustomed to it and not dissatisfied with it,
in several of the States. In some the qualifications are different for
the choice of the Gov? &* Representatives; In others for different
Houses of the Legislature. Another objection ag%* the clause as it
stands is that it makes the qualifications of the Nat! Legislature de-
pend on the will of the States, which he thought not proper.

M: Exsewortu. thought the qualifications of the electors stood
on the most proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender
point, and strongly guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The
people will not readily subscribe to the Nat! Constitution if it should
subject them to be disfranchised. The States are the best Judges
of the circumstances & temper of their own people.

Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not attended to by
those gentlemen who wish for innovations on this point. Hight or
nine States have extended the right of suffrage beyond the free-
holders, what will the people there say, if they should be dis-
franchised. A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous
power in the hands of the Legislature.

M: Bururr. There is no right of which the people are more

 

1See page 338. ; .
? The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript,

® The words “of the” are here inserted in the transcript.
352 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

jealous than that of suffrage Abridgments of it tend to the same
revolution as in Holland where they have at length thrown all
power into the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies them-
selves, and form a rank aristocracy.

M:! Dickenson. had a very different idea of the tendency of vest-
ing the right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He con-
sidered them as the best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of

‘the right to them as a necessary defence ag* the dangerous influence
of those multitudes without property & without principle with which
our Country like all others, will in time abound. As to the unpopu-
larity of the innovation it was in his opinion chemirical. The great
mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will
be pleased with it.

M! EvsewortH. How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not
‘ every man who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to
levy & dispose of his money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manu-
facturers, who will bear a full share of the public burdens be not
allowed a voice in the imposition of them—taxation & representation
ought to go together.

M: Gov! Morris. He had long learned not to be the dupe of
words. The sound of Aristocracy therefore had no effect on? him. It
was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his
principal objections to the Constitution as it is now before us, is that
it threatens this * Country with an Aristocracy. The aristocracy will
grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people
who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will
be able to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the
present moment. The time is not distant when this Country will
abound with mechanics & manufactures * who will receive their bread
from, their employers. ‘Will such men be the secure & faithful
Guardians of liberty? ‘Will they be the impregnable barrier ag**
aristocracy ?—He was as little duped by the association of the words
“‘ taxation & Representation.’? The man who does not give his vote
freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates the vote. Chil-
dren do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because they
have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent can be
as little trusted with the public interest. He did not conceive the
difficulty of defining ‘‘ freeholders ’’ to be insuperable. Still less

 

* The word “upon” is substituted in the transcript for “on.”

* The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “this.”

* The word “manufacturers” is substituted in the transcript for “ manu-
factures.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1787 353

that the restriction could be unpopular. %o of the people are at
present freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As
to Merch* &c. if they have wealth & value the right they can acquire
it. If not they don’t deserve it.

Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains of antient
prejudices, and view things too much through a British medium.
A Freehold is the qualification in England, & hence it is imagined
to be the only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was that
every man having evidence of attachment to & permanent common
interest with the Society ought to share in all its rights & privileges.

Was this qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no other kind '

of property but land evidence a common interest in the proprietor?
does nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment. Ought
the merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children
whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own Country, to be viewed
as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be trusted with the com-
mon rights of their fellow Citizens

M: Mapison. the right of suffrage is certainly one of the funda-

mental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left.
to be regulated by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this’

right has been the mode in which Aristocracies have been built on the
ruins of popular forms. Whether the Constitutional qualification
ought to be a freehold, would with him depend much on the probable
reception such a change would meet with in? States where the right
was now exercised by every description of people. In several of the
States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in
its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest

depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority

of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of,
property. These will either combine under the influence of their
common situation; in which case, the rights of property & the public
liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or which ? is more probable,
they will become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which case
there will be equal danger on another side. The example of England
had been misconceived [by Col Mason]. A very small proportion of
the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders. The greatest
part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs, in many of which the quali-
fication of suffrage is as low as it is in any one of the U. S. and it
was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the Counties, that bribery

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The word “which” is crossed out in the transcript and “what” is written

above it.
354 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

most prevailed, & the influence of the Crown on elections was most
dangerously exerted.

Doc! FRANKLIN. It is of great consequence that we sh‘ not de-
press the virtue & public spirit of our common people; of which they

‘displayed a great deal during the war, and which contributed prin-
cipally to the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable refusal
of the American seamen who were carried in great numbers into
the British Prisons during the war, to redeem themselves from
misery or to seek their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of
the Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism with a
contemporary instance in which the British 'seamen made prisoners
by the Americans, readily entered on the ships of the latter on being
promised a share of the prizes that might be made out of their own
Country. This proceeded he said from the different manner in
which the common people were treated in America & G. Britain. He
did not think that the elected had any right in any case to narrow the
privileges of the electors. He quoted as arbitrary the British Statute
setting forth the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that
pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons having freeholds
of a certain value; observing that this Statute was soon followed by
another under the succeeding Parliamt subjecting the people who had
no votes to peculiar labors & hardships. He was persuaded also that
‘such a restriction as was proposed would give great uneasiness in
the populous States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being
themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at being disfranchised,
and there are a great many persons of that description.

M! Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in many points,
but in none more than the present. He objected to the footing on
which the qualification was put, but particularly to the mode of
election by the people. The people can not know & judge of the
characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice will be made.
He quoted the case of the Senate in Virg? as an example in point.
The people in Towns can unite their votes in favor of one favorite;
& by that means always prevail over the people of the Country, who
being dispersed will scatter their votes among a variety of candidates.

M: Ruruwce thought the idea of restraining the right of suffrage
to the freeholders a very unadvised one. It would create division
among the people & make enemies of all those who should be ex-
eluded.

 

1In the transcript the following footnote is here added: “See Appendix
No. — for a note of Mr. Madison to this speech.” See Appendix to Debates VII,
Nos. 1 and 2, p. 619, for notes concerning Madison’s speech of August 7, 1787.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1787 300

On the question for striking out as moved by M! Gov! Morris,
from the word ‘‘ qualifications ’’ to the end of the III article
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. P? no. Del. ay. Mé@ div’ V# no.
N. C. no. §. C. no. Geo. not prest?
Adjourned

Wepnespay AucST 8. IN convENTION

Art: IV. Sect. 1.2 ’—M! Mercer expressed his dislike of the whole
plan, and his opinion that it never could succeed.

M? Guorum. he had never seen any inconveniency* from allow-
ing such as were not freeholders to vote, though it had long been
tried. The elections in Phil? N. York & Boston where the Merchants,
& Mechanics vote are at least as good as those made by freeholders
only. The case in England was not accurately stated yesterday [by
M: Madison] The Cities & large towns are not the seat of Crown
influence & corruption. These prevail in the Boroughs, and not on
account of the right which those who are not freeholders have to
vote, but of the smallness of the number who vote. The people have
been long accustomed to this right in various parts of America, and
will never allow it to be abridged. We must consult their rooted
prejudices if we expect their concurrence in our propositions.

M: Mercer did not object so much to an election by the people
at large including such as were not freeholders, as to their being
left to make their choice without any guidance. He hinted that
Candidates ought to be nominated by the State Legislatures.

On ® question for agreeing to Art: IV- Sect. 1 it pass? nem. con.

Art IV. Sect. 2.2 ° taken up.

Col. Mason was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did
not chuse to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us &
govern us. Citizenship for three years was not enough for ensuring
that local knowledge which ought to be possessed by the Representa-
tive. This was the principal ground of his objection to so short a
term. It might also happen that a rich foreign Nation, for example

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Delaware, aye—1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, no—7; Maryland, divided; Georgia, not present.”

? See page 338. ; , :

® The words “being under consideration” are here inserted in the tran-
Pt The word “ inconveniency ” is changed to “ inconvenience ” in the transcript.
5 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The words “ was then” are here inserted in the transcript.
356 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Great Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way
into the Legislature for insidious purposes. He moved that ‘‘ seven ’’
years instead of “‘ three,’’ be inserted.

M: Gov: Morris 2%¢ the Motion, & on the question, all the States
agreed to it except Connecticut.

M SHERMAN moved to strike out the word ‘‘ resident ’’ and insert
** inhabitant,’’ as less liable to misconstruction.

M: Manison 244 the motion, both were vague, but the latter least
so in common acceptation, and would not exclude persons absent
occasionally for a considerable time on public or private business.
Great disputes had been raised in Virg? concerning the meaning of
residence as a qualification of Representatives which were deter-
mined more according to the affection or dislike to the man in ques-
tion, than to any fixt interpretation of the word.

M? Wrson preferred ‘‘ inhabitant.’’

M Gov: Morris, was orposed to both and for requiring nothing
more than a freehold. He quoted great disputes in N. York occa-
sioned by these terms, which were decided by the arbitrary will
of the majority. Such a regulation is not necessary. People rarely
chuse a nonresident—It is improper as in the 1% branch, the people
at large, not the States, are represented.

M? Rutitmce urged & moved that a residence of 7 years sh‘ be
required in the State Wherein the Member sh? be elected. An emi-
grant from N. England to S. C. or Georgia would know little of its
affairs and could not be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge
in less time.

M= Reap reminded him that we were now forming a Nati Govi
and such a regulation would correspond little with the idea that we
were one people.

M! Wuson. enforced the same consideration.

M? Mapison suggested the case of new States in the West, which
could have perhaps no representation on that plan.

MI! Mercer. Such a regulation would present a greater alien-
ship among the States? than existed under tthe old federal system.
It would interweave local prejudices & State distinctions in the
very Constitution which is meant to cure them. He mentioned in-
stances of violent disputes raised in Maryland concerning the term
“* residence ”’

M: ExsewortH thought seven years of residence was by far too
long a term: but that some fixt term of previous residence would be

 

+The phrase “among the States” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1787 357

proper. He thought one year would be sufficient, but seemed to
have no objection to three years.

M? DickENson proposed that it should read ‘‘ inhabitant actually
resident for year.1”’ This would render the meaning less
indeterminate.

M: Witson. If a short term should be inserted in the blank,
so strict an expression might be construed to exclude the members
of the Legislature, who could not be said to be actual residents in
their States whilst at the Seat of the Gen! Government.

M! Mercer. It would certainly exclude men, who had once been’
inhabitants, and returning from residence elsewhere to resettle in
their original State; although a want of the necessary knowledge
could not in such case? be presumed.

M* Mason thought 7 years too long, but would never agree to
part with the principle. It is a valuable principle. He thought it
a defect in the plan that the Representatives would be too few to
bring with them all the local knowledge necessary. If residence be
not required, Rich men of neighbouring States, may employ with
success the means of corruption in some particular district and
thereby get into the public Councils after having failed in their
own State.2 This is the practice in the boroughs of England.

On the question for postponing in order to consider M* Dicken-

sons motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. P* no. Del. no. M? ay.

Vino. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay*

On the question for inserting ‘‘ inhabitant ’’ in place of ‘‘ resi-
dent ’’—ag‘ to nem. con.

M:! Exseworto & Col. Mason move to insert ‘‘ one year’’ for
previous inhabitancy

M: WriutiaMson liked the Report as it stood. He thought ‘‘ resi-
dent ’’ a good eno’ term. He was ag** requiring any period of
previous residence. New residents if elected will be most zealous to
Conform to the will of their constituents, as their conduct will be
watched with a more jealous eye. ;

Mz Butuer & M? Rutuiwce moved ‘‘ three years ’’ instead of ‘‘ one
year ’’ for previous inhabitancy.

On the question for 3 years—

1 The transcript uses the word “year” in the plural.

2 The transcript uses the word “case” in the plural.

* The transcript uses the word “State” in the plural.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Penneylvania,

Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, no—8.”
358 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? no.
Vino. N.C.no. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.t

On the question for ‘‘1 year ”’

N. H. no—Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Péno. Del. no. M4 div?
Vino. N. C.ay. 8. C.ay. Geo. ay.?

Art. IV. Sect. 2. As amended in manner preceding, was agreed
to nem. con.

Art: IV. Sect. 3.’’* 4 taken up.

Gen! Pinkney & M! Pinkney moved that the number of rep-
resentatives allotted to S. Carol? be ‘‘ six’’ on the question,

‘ N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P? no. Delaware ay
Mi no. V2 no. N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.

The 3. Sect. of Art: IV was then agreed to.

Art: IV. Sect. 4.2 + taken up.

M: WituiaMson moved to strike out ‘‘ according to the provisions
hereinafter after made ’’ and to insert the words ‘‘ according ‘‘ to the
rule hereafter to be provided for direct taxation ’’—See Art. VII.
sect. 3.°

On the question for agreeing to M! Williamson’s amendment

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Chay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M? ay.
Viay. N.C.ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.”

M? Kine wished to know what influence the vote just passed was
meant® have on the succeeding part of the Report, concerning
the admission of slaves into the rule of Representation. He could
not reconcile his mind to the article if it was to prevent objections
to the latter part. The admission of slaves was a most grating
circumstance to his mind, & he believed would be so to a great part
of the people of America. He had not made a strenuous opposition
to it heretofore because he had hoped that this concession would
have produced a readiness which had not been manifested, to

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “South Carolina, Georgia, aye—2; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—9.”

*In the transcript tle vote reads: “New Jersey, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no—6; Maryland, divided.”

> See page 338.

‘The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

* In the transcript the vote reads: “ Delaware, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no—7.”

* See page 341.

7In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; New Jersey, Delaware, no—2.”

* The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1787 359

strengthen the Gen! Gov! and to mark a full confidence in it. The
Report under consideration had by the tenor of it, put an end to
all those hopes. In two great points the hands of the Legislature
were absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could not be pro-
hibited—exports could not be taxed. Is this reasonable? What are
the great objects of the Gen! System? 1.1 defence ag%t foreign inva-
sion. 2.1 ag’t internal sedition. Shall all the States then be bound
to defend each; & shall each be at liberty to introduce a weakness
which will render defence more difficult? Shall one part of the
U. 8. be bound to defend another part, and that other part be at
liberty not only to increase its own danger, but to withhold the com-
pensation for the burden? If slaves are to be imported shall not
the exports produced by their labor, supply a revenue the better to
enable the Gen! Gov! to defend their masters?—There was so much
inequality & unreasonableness in all this, that the people of the
Northern States could never be reconciled to it. No candid man
could undertake to justify it to them. He had hoped that some
accomodation w4 have taken place on this subject; that at least a
time w’ have been limited for the importation of slaves. He never
could agree to let them be imported without limitation & then be
represented in the Nat! Legislature. Indeed he could so little per-
suade himself of the rectitude of such a practice, that he was not
sure he could assent to it under any circumstances. At all events,
either slaves should not be represented, or exports should be taxable.
M! SuermMan regarded the slave trade as iniquitous; but the
point of representation having been settled after much difficulty &
deliberation, he did not think himself bound to make opposition; espe-
cially as the present article as amended did not preclude any
arrangement whatever on that point in another place of the Report.
ME Mapison objected to 1 for every 40,000, inhabitants as a per-
petual rule. The future increase of population if the Union sh? be
permanent, will render the number of Representatives excessive.
Mi Guorum. It is not to be supposed that the Gov? will last so
long as to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast
Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain
one nation?
M: EvsewortH. If the Govt should continue so long, alterations
may be made in the Constitution in the manner proposed in a subse-

quent article.
M: Suerman & M! Mapison moved to insert the words ‘‘ not

 

1 The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “ First” and “Secondly” in the
transcript.
360 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

exceeding ’’ before the words ‘‘1 for every 40,000, which was
agreed to nem. con.

M: Gov! Morris moved to insert ‘‘ free ’’ before the word inhabi-
tants. Much he said would depend on this point. He never would
concur in upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious institution.
It was the curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed. Com-
pare the free regions of the Middle States, where a rich & noble
cultivation marks the prosperity & happiness of the people, with the
misery & poverty which overspread the barren wastes of V? Mary?
& the other States having slaves. Travel thro’ y® whole Continent
& you behold the prospect continually varying with the appearance &
disappearance of slavery. The moment you leave yf E. Sts. & enter
N. York, the effects of the institution become visible, passing thro’
the Jerseys & entering P? every criterion of superior improvement
witnesses the change. Proceed southw*’’ & every step you take thro’
y? great region of slaves presents a desert increasing, with y° in-
creasing proportion proportion of these wretched beings. Upon what
principle is it that the slaves shall be computed in the represen-
tation? Are they men? Then make them Citizens and _ let
them vote. Are they property? Why then is no other property
included? The Houses in this city [Philad*?] are worth more than
all the wretched slaves which cover the rice swamps of South Caro-
lina. The admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly
explained comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and 8S. C.
who goes to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred
laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest
connections & damns them to the most cruel bondages,! shall have
more votes in a Govt instituted for protection of the rights of man-
kind, than the Citizen of P* or N. Jersey who views with a laudable
horror, so nefarious a practice. He would add that Domestic slavery
is the most prominent feature in the aristocratic countenance of the
proposed Constitution. The vassalage of the poor has ever been the
favorite offspring of Aristocracy. And What is the proposed com-
pensation to the Northern States for a sacrifice of every principle of
right, of every impulse of humanity. They are to bind themselves to
march their militia for the defence of the S. States; for their defence
agst those very slaves of whom they complain. They must supply
vessels & seamen in case of foreign Attack. The Legislature will
have indefinite power to tax them by excises, and duties on imports:
both of which will fall heavier on them than on the Southern inhabi-

 

* The transcript uses the word “bondages” in the singular.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1787 361

tants; for the bohea tea used by a Northern freeman, will pay more
tax than the whole consumption of the miserable slave, which con-
sists of nothing more than his physical subsistence and the rag that
covers his nakedness. On the other side the Southern States are
not to be restrained from importing fresh supplies of wretched
Africans, at once to increase the danger of attack, and the difficulty
of defence; nay they are to be encouraged to it by an assurance of
having their votes in the Nat! Gov! increased in proportion, and are at
the same time to have their exports & their slaves exempt from all
contributions for the public service. Let it not be said that direct
taxation is to be proportioned to representation. It is idle to suppose
that the Gen! Gov! can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of
the people scattered over so vast a Country. They can only do it
through the medium of exports imports & excises. For what then
are all these sacrifices to be made? He would sooner submit himself
to a tax for paying for all the negroes in the U. States, than saddle
posterity with such a Constitution.

M: Dayton 2% the motion. He did it he said that his senti-
ments on the subject might appear whatever might be the fate of
the amendment.

M:! SHERMAN. did not regard the admission of the Negroes into
the ratio of representation, as liable to such insuperable objections. It
was the freemen of the South” States who were in fact to be repre-
sented according to the taxes paid by them, and the Negroes are only
included in the Estimate of the taxes. This was his idea of the
matter.

M: Pinkney, considered the fisheries & the Western frontier as
more burdensome to the U. S. than the slaves. He thought this could
be demonstrated if the occasion were a proper one.

Mt Wiuson. thought the motion premature. An agreement to
the clause would be no bar to the object of it.

1 Question On* motion to insert ‘‘ free ’’ before ‘‘ inhabitants.’’

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. P# no. Del. no. M4 no.
Vino. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

On the suggestion of M* Dickenson the words, ‘‘ provided that
each State shall have one representative at least.’’—were added
nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 4. as amended was agreed to nem. con.

 

+The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

2The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

®In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, aye—1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10.”
3862 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Art. IV. Sect. 5.7? taken up

M' Pinkney moved to strike out Sect. 5. As giving no peculiar
advantage to the House of Representatives, and as clogging the
Gov! If the Senate can be trusted with the many great powers
proposed, it surely may be trusted with that of originating money
bills.

M Guorum. was ag** allowing the Senate to originate; but® only
to amend.

M= Gov! Morris. It is particularly proper that the Senate sh‘?
have the right of originating money bills. They will sit constantly,
will consist of a smaller number, and will be able to prepare such
bills with due correctness; and so as to prevent delay of business in
the other House.

Col. Mason was unwilling to travel over this ground again. To
strike out the section, was to unhinge the compromise of which it
made a part. The duration of the Senate made it improper. He
does not object to that duration. On the Contrary he approved of
it. But joined with the smallness of the number, it was an argument
against adding this to the other great powers vested in that body.
His idea of an Aristocracy was that it was the govern! of the few
over the many. An aristocratic body, like the screw in mechanics,
worki® its way by slow degrees, and holding fast whatever it gains,
should ever be suspected of an encroaching tendency. The purse
strings should never be put into its hands.

M* Mercer. considered the exclusive power of originating Money
bills as so great an advantage, that it rendered the equality of votes
in the Senate ideal & of no consequence.

M: Burier was for adhering to the principle which had been
settled.

M: WILson was opposed to it on its merits without regard to the
compromise

M? EvsewortsH did not think the clause of any consequence, but
as it was thought of consequence by some members from the larger
States, he was willing it should stand.

M: Mapison was for striking it out: considering it as of no ad-
vantage to the large States as fettering the Gov! and as a source
of injurious altercations between the two Houses.

On the question for striking out ‘‘ Sect. 5. Art. IV ”’

 

+See page 338.
: The words ’ was then ” are here inserted in the transcript.
The words “was for allowing it” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1787 363

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.t
‘Adj?

Tuurspay. AugsT 9. in CoNVENTION

Art: IV. Sect. 6.23 M! Ranpotpu expressed his dissatisfaction at
the disagreement yesterday to Sect. 5. concerning money bills, as
endangering the success of the plan, and extremely objectionable in
itself; and gave notice that he should move for a reconsideration of
the vote.

M? WILLIAMSON said he had formed a like intention.

M! WILSON, gave notice that he sht move to reconsider the vote,
requiring seven instead of three years of Citizenship as a qualification
of candidates for the House of Representatives.

Art. IV. Sect. 6 & 7.2 * Agreed to nem. con.

Art. V. Sect 1.°° taken up.

M* WILson objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied
by the Executives of the States. It was unnecessary as the Legis-
latures will meet so frequently. It removes the appointment too far
from the people; the Executives in most of the States being elected
by the Legislatures. As he had always thought the appointment of
the Executives? by the Legislative department wrong: so it was still
more so that the Executive should elect into the Legislative de-
partment.

M: Ranvote# thought it necessary in order to prevent incon-
venient chasms in the Senate. In some States the Legislatures meet
but once a year. As the Senate will have more power & consist of a
smaller number than the other House, vacancies there will be of
more consequence. The Executives might be safely trusted he thought
with the appointment for so short a time.

M« EvsewortH. It is only said that the Executive may supply
the ® vacancies. When the Legislative meeting happens to be near, the

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, no—4.”

2 See page 338. ; . :

2 The words “was taken up” are here inserted in the transcript.

4The word “were” is here inserted in the transcript.

5 See page 339. ‘ : ;

¢The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

7'The word “ Executives ” is in the singular in the transcript.

2 The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.
364 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

power will not be exerted. As there will be but two members from
a State vacancies may be of great moment.

M: Wiuu1amson. Senators may resign or not accept. This pro-
vision is therefore absolutely necessary.

On the question for striking out ‘‘ vacancies shall be supplied
by? Executives _

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cf no. N. J. no. P? ay. M? div? V? no.
N.C.no. §8.C. no. Geo. no.?

M? WituiAMson moved to insert after ‘‘ vacancies shall be sup-
plied by the Executives,’’ the following * words ‘‘ unless other pro-
vision shall be made by the Legislature ’’ [of the State].

M: EvsewortH. He was willing to trust the Legislature, or the
Executive of a State, but not to give the former a discretion to refer
appointments for the Senate to whom they pleased.

* Question on M? Williamson’s motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cino. N. J. no. P2 no. Méaay. V2 no. N.
C.ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

M! Mapison in order to prevent doubts whether resignations could
be made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved to
strike out the words after ‘‘ vacancies,’’ & insert the words ‘‘ happen-
ing by refusals to accept, resignations or otherwise may be supplied
by the Legislature of the State in the representation of which such
vacancies shall happen, or by the Executive thereof until the next
meeting of the Legislature ’’

M*: Gov: Morris this is absolutely necessary, otherwise, as mem-
bers chosen into the Senate are disqualified from being appointed to
any office by Sect. 9. of this art: it will be in the power of a Legis-
lature by appointing a man a Senator ag‘ his consent, to deprive the
U. S. of his services.

The motion of M! Madison was agreed to nem. con.

M* RanpoupwH called for division of the Section, so as to leave
a distinct question on the last. words ‘‘ each member shall have one
vote.’’ He wished this last sentence to be postponed until the recon-
sideration should have taken place on Sect. 5. Art. IV. concerning

oe

 

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, aye—l1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Georgia, no—8; Maryland, divided.”

* The word “following ” is omitted in the transcript.

*The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

"In the transcript the vote reads: “Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, no—6.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1787 365

money bills. If that section should not be reinstated his. plan would
be to vary the representation in the Senate.

M! Strone concurred in M? Randolphs ideas on this point

M*: Reap did not consider the section as to money bills of any
advantage to the larger States and had voted for striking it
out as being viewed in the same light by the larger States. If
it was considered by them as of any value, and as a condition of
the equality of votes in the Senate, he had no objection to its being
re-instated.

M? Witson—M! Exvsewortu & M: Mapison urged that it was of no
advantage to the larger States, and that it might be a dangerous
source of contention between the two Houses. All the principal
powers of the Nat! Legislature had some relation to money.

Doc: FRANKLIN, considered the two clauses, the originating of
money bills, and the equality of votes in the Senate, as essentially
connected by the compromise which had been agreed to.

Col. Mason said this was not the time for discussing this point.
When the originating of money bills shall be reconsidered, he thought
it could be demonstrated that it was of essential importance to re-
strain the right to the House of Representatives the immediate choice
of the people.

M: Wituiamson. The State of N. C. had agreed to an equality in
the Senate, merely in consideration that money bills should be con-
fined to the other House: and he was surprised to see the Smaller
States forsaking the condition on which they had received their
equality.

4 Question on the Section 1.? down to the last sentence

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ciay. N. J. ay. P? no* Del. ay. M4 ay.
Virg* ay N. C. no. 8. C. div? Geo. ay?

M" RanpoLpH moved that the last sentence
have one vote.’’ be postponed

Tt was observed that this could not be necessary; as in case the
section as to originating+* bills should not be reinstated, and a
revision of the Constitution should ensue, it w4 still be proper that
the members should vote per Capita. A postponement of the pre-

‘“ each member shall

*In the printed Journal Pensylvania. ay.

 

1The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

2The words “first section” are substituted for “Section 1” in the tran-
script.
5 In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye—7; Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania,* North Carolina, no—3; South Carolina, divided.”

+The word “money” is here inserted in the transcript.
366 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ceding sentence allowing to each State 2 members w? have been more
proper

M: Mason, did not mean to propose a change of this mode of
voting per capita in any event. But as there might be other modes
proposed, he saw no impropriety in postponing the sentence. Each
State may have two members, and yet may have unequal votes. He
said that unless the exclusive1 originating of money bills should be
restored to the House of Representatives, he should, not from ob-
stinacy, but duty and conscience, oppose throughout the equality of
Representation in the Senate.

M Gov: Morris. Such declarations were he supposed, addressed
to the smaller States in order to alarm them for their equality in
the Senate, and induce them ag* their judgments, to concur in re-
storing the section concerning money bills. He would declare in his
turn that as he saw no prospect of amending the Constitution of the
Senate & considered the section relating to money bills as intrinsically
bad, he would adhere to the section establishing the equality at all
events.

M: Witson. It seems to have been supposed by some that the
section concerning money bills is desirable to the large States. The
fact was that two of those States [P? & V*] had uniformly voted
ag* it without reference to any other part of the system.

M? RanpoweH, urged as Col. Mason had done that the sentence
under consideration was connected with that relating to Money
bills, and might possibly be affected by the result of the motion for
reconsidering the latter. That the postponement was therefore not
improper.

? Question for postponing ‘‘ each member shall have one vote.’’

N. H. div? Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? no.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

The words were then agreed to as part of the section.

M: Ranpo.ruH then gave notice that he should move to reconsider
this whole Sect: 1. Art. V. as connected with the 5. Sect. art. IV.
as to which he had already given such notice.

Art. V. Sect. 245 taken up.

M= Gov: Morris moved to insert after the words ‘‘ immediately

 

* The words “right of ” are here inserted in the transcript.

* The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Virginia, North Carolina, aye—2;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—8; New Hampshire, divided.”

*See page 339.

° The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1787 367

after,’ the following ‘‘ they shall be assembled in consequence of—”’
which was agreed to nem. con. as was then the whole Sect. 2.1

Art: V. Sect. 3.23 taken up.

M: Gov: Morris moved to insert 14 instead of 4 years citizenship
as a qualification for Senators: urging the danger of admitting
strangers into our public Councils. Mt Pinkney 2% him

M! ELsEwortTH. was opposed to the motion as discouraging meri-
torious aliens from emigrating to this Country.

M: Prngney. As the Senate is to have the power of making
treaties & managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and
impropriety in opening its door to those who have foreign attach-
ments. He quoted the jealousy of the Athenians on this subject who
made it death for any stranger to intrude his voice into their Legis-
lative proceedings.

Col. Mason highly approved of the policy of the motion. Were
it not that many not natives of this Country had acquired great.
merit * during the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligi-
bility into the Senate, to natives.

M! Mapison, was not averse to some restrictions on this subject;
but could never agree to the proposed amendment. He thought
any restriction however in the Constitution unnecessary, and im-
proper. unnecessary; because the Nat! Legisl"= is to have the right
of regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix different
periods of residence as conditions of enjoying different privileges of
Citizenship: Improper; because it will give a tincture of illiberality
to the Constitution: because it will put it out of the power of the
Nat! Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to confer the
full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers & because it will dis-
courage the most desireable class of people from emigrating to the
U. §. Should the proposed Constitution have the intended effect of
giving stability & reputation to our Gov® great numbers of respect-
able Europeans: men who love liberty and wish to partake its bless-
ings, will be ready to transfer their fortunes hither. All such would
feel the mortification of being marked with suspicious incapacitations
though they s? not covet the public honors He was not appre-
hensive that any dangerous number of strangers would be appointed
by the State Legislatures, if they were left at liberty to do so: nor
that foreign powers would make use of strangers as instruments for

 

The figure “2” is omitted in the transcript.

2 See page 339. ; ;
® The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

“The word “credit ” is substituted in the transcript for “ merit.”
368 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

their purposes. Their bribes would be expended on men whose cir-
cumstances would rather stifle than excite jealousy & watchfulness in
the public.

MM: Burier was decidedly opposed to the admission of foreigners
without a long residence in the Country. They bring with them,
not only attachments to other Countries; but ideas of Gov: so distinct
from ours that in every point of view they are dangerous. He
acknowledged that if he himself had been called into public life
within a short time after his coming to America, his foreign habits
opinions & attachments would have rendered him an improper agent
in public affairs. He mentioned the great strictness observed in
Great Britain on this subject.

Doct FRANKLIN was not ag*t a reasonable time, but should be
very sorry to see any thing like illiberality inserted in the Constitu-
tion. The people in Europe are friendly to this Country. Even in
the Country with which we have been lately at war, we have now &
had during the war, a great many friends not only among the people
at large but in both houses of Parliament. In every other Country
in Europe all the people are our friends. We found in the course
of the Revolution that many strangers served us faithfully— and that
many natives took part ag** their Country. When foreigners after
looking about for some other Country in which they can obtain more
happiness, give a preference to ours, it is a proof of attachment which
ought to excite our confidence & affection.

M: RanpourH did not know but it might be problematical whether
emigrations to this Country were on the whole useful or not: but
be could never agree to the motion for disabling them for 14 years
to participate in the public honours. He reminded the Convention
of the language held by our patriots during the Revolution, and the
principles laid down in all our American Constitutions. Many for-
eigners may have fixed their fortunes among us under the faith of
these invitations. All persons under this description, with all others
who would be affected by such a regulation, would enlist themselves
under the banners of hostility to the proposed System. He would
go as far as seven years, but no farther.

M: WILson said he rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar;
mentioning the circumstance of his not being a native, and the possi-
bility, if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being
incapacitated from holding a place under the very Constitution,
which he had shared in the trust of making. He remarked the
‘lliberal complexion which the motion would give to the System, & the
affect which a good system would have in inviting meritorious for-
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1787 369

eigners among us, and the discouragement & mortification they must
feel from the degrading discrimination, now proposed. He had him-
self experienced this mortification. On his removal into Maryland,
he found himself, from defect of residence, under certain legal in-
capacities which never ceased to produce chagrin, though he assuredly
did not desire & would not have accepted the offices to which they.
related. To be appointed to a place may be matter of indifference.
To be incapable of being appointed, is a circumstance grating and
mortifying.

M: Gov: Morris. The lesson we are taught is that we should be
governed as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings as
possible. What is the language of Reason on this subject? That we
should not be polite at the expence of prudence. There was a modera-
tion in all things. It is said that some tribes of Indians, carried
their hospitality so far as to offer to strangers their wives & daughters.
Was this a proper model for us? He would admit them to his house,
he would invite them to his table, would provide for them comfortable
lodgings ; but would not carry the complaisance so far as, to bed them
with his wife. He would let them worship at the same altar, but did
not choose to make Priests of them. He ran over the privileges which
emigrants would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived of
that of being eligible to the great offices of Government; observing
that they exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in any part
of the world; and that as every Society from a great nation down
to a elub had the right of declaring the conditions on which new
members should be admitted, there could be no room for complaint.
As to those philosophical gentlemen, those Citizens of the World as
they call themselves, He owned he did not wish to see any of
them in our public Councils. He would not trust them. The men
who ean shake off their attachments to their own Country can never
love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices
which uphold all Governments, Admit a Frenchman into your
Senate, and he will study to increase the commerce of France: an
Englishman, he will feel an equal biass in favor of that of England.
It has been said that The Legislatures will not chuse foreigners, at
least improper ones. There was no knowing what Legislatures would
do. Some appointments made by them, proved that every thing
ought to be apprehended from the cabals practised on such occasions.
He mentioned the case of a foreigner who left this State in disgrace,
and worked himself into an appointment from another to Congress.

 

2The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.
870 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

1 Question on the motion of M' Gov: Morris to insert 14 in place
of 4 years

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. no. M4 no.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.’

On 13 years, moved M? Gov: Morris ®

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. no. M? no.
Vino. N.C. no. 8. C.ay. Geo. ay.

On 10 years moved by Gen! Pingney 4

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. Pt no. Del. no. Mé no.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.

D! FrRaNKLIN reminded the Convention that it did not follow
from an omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution that
the persons in question wi be actually chosen into the Legislature.

M:! Rutter. 7 years of Citizenship have been required for the
House of Representatives. Surely a longer term is requisite for
the Senate, which will have more power.

M! Wituiamson. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in
this case than the other House. Bribery & cabal can be more easily
practised in the choice of the Senate which is to be made by the
Legislatures composed of a few men, than of the House of Repre-
sent® who will be chosen by the people.

M:! RanpoupH will agree to 9 years with the expectation that it
will be reduced to seven if M? Wilson’s motion to reconsider the vote
fixing 7 years for the House of Representatives should produce a
reduction of that period.

On a® question for 9 years.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. ay. M? no.
V2 ay. N. C. divi 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.®

The term ‘‘ Resident ’’ was struck out, & ‘‘ inhabitant ’’ in-
serted nem. con.

Art. V Sect. 3, as amended? agreed to nem. con.

 

*The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, New Jersey, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—7.”

*In the transcript this sentence reads as follows: “On the question for
thirteen years, moved by Mr. Gouverneur Morris, it was negatived, as above.”
The vote by States is omitted.

* The phrase “the votes were the same,” is here inserted in the transcript,
and the vote by States is omitted.

°In the transcript the word “a” is stricken out and “the” is written
above it.

° In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, New Jersey, Delaware,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Penn-
sylvania, Maryland, no—4; North Carolina, divided.”

"The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1787 371

Sect. 4.1 agreed to nem. con.”

Art. VI. sect. 1.5% taken up.

M* Mapison & Mt Gov: Morris moved to strike out ‘‘ each House ”’
& to insert ‘‘ the House of Representatives ’’; the right of the Legisla-
tures to regulate the times & places &c in the election of Senators
being involved in the right of appointing them, which was dis-
agreed to.

* Division of the question being called,® it was taken on the first
part down to ‘‘but their provisions concerning &¢c”’

The first part was agreed to nem. con.

M: Pinxney & M! RurtiipcE moved to strike out the remaining
part viz but their provisions concerning them may at any time
be altered by the Legislature of the United States.’ The States
they contended could & must be relied on in such cases.

M! GHorum. It would be as improper® take this power from
the Nat! Legislature, as to Restrain the British Parliament from
regulating the circumstances of elections, leaving this business to
the Counties themselves—

M! Mapison. The necessity of a Gen! Gov‘ supposes that the
State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the com-
mon interest at the expence of their local conveniency 7 or prejudices.
The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Represen-
tatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of the States, sup-
poses that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This
view of the question seems to decide that the Legislatures of the
States ought not to have the uncontrouled right of regulating the
times places & manner of holding elections. These were words of
great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that
might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors
should vote by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or
that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place,
sh? all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a
number allotted to the district; these & many other points would
depend on the Legislatures, and might materially affect the appoint-
ments. Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to

 

1See page 339. ;

2In the transcript this sentence reads as follows: “Article 5, Sect. 4 was
agreed to nem. con.” 2 . :

3 The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

*The word “A” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The word “for” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.

7 The word “ conveniency ” is changed to “convenience” in the transcript.
372 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations as to
favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality
of the Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would
produce a like inequality in their representation in the Nat! Legis-
lature, as it was presumable that the Counties having the power in
the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter. What
danger could there be in giving a controuling power to the Nat!
Legislature? Of whom was it to consist? 1.1 of a Senate to be
chosen by the State Legislatures. If the latter therefore could be
trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. 2.1 of Repre-
sentatives elected by the same people who elect the State Legisla-
tures; surely then if confidence is due to the latter, it must be due
to the former. It seemed as improper in principle, though it might
be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the State Legislatures this
great authority over the election of the Representatives of the people
in the Gen! Legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like
power over the election of their Representatives in the State Legis-
latures.

M: Kine. If this power be not given to the Nat} Legislature, their
right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated.
No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them.
Altho this scheme of erecting the Gen! Gov! on the authority of the
State Legislatures has been fatal to the federal establishment, it
would seem as if many gentlemen, still foster the dangerous idea.

M* Gov: Morris— observed that the States might make false returns
and then make no provisions for new elections

M! SHerman did not know but it might be best to retain the
clause, though he had himself sufficient confidence in the State Legis-
latures. The motion of M: P. & MR. did not prevail-

The word ‘‘respectively’’ was inserted after the word ‘‘State’’

On the motion of M? Read the word “ their ’’ was struck out, &
‘“ regulations in such cases ’’ inserted in place of ‘‘ provisions con-
cerning them.’’ the clause then reading—‘‘ but regulations in each of
the foregoing cases may at any time, be made or altered by the Legis-
lature of the U.S ’’ This was meant to give the Nat! Legislature a
power not only to alter the provisions of the States, but to make
regulations in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.

Art. VI. Sect. 1. as thus amended was agreed to nem. con.

Adjourned.

 

*The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “First” and “Secondly” in
the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1787 373

Fripay Aves 10. im CONVENTION

Art. VI. Sect. 2.4% taken up.

M: Pinkney. The Committee as he had conceived were in-
structed to report the proper qualifications of property for the
members of the Nat! Legislature; instead of which they have re-
ferred the task to the Nat! Legislature itself. Should it be left on
this footing, the first Legislature will meet without any particular
qualifications of property: and if it should happen to consist of rich
men they might fix such such qualifications as may be too favorable to
the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run into. He
was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic influence
in the Constitution but he thought it essential that the members of
the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges, should be possessed
of competent property to make them independent & respectable. It
was prudent when such great powers were to be trusted to connect
the tie of property with that of reputation in securing a faithful
administration. The Legislature would have the fate of the Nation
put into their hands. The President would also have a very great
influence on it. The Judges would have not only ® important causes
between Citizen & Citizen but also, where foreigners are concerned.
They will even be the Umpires between the U. States and individual
States as well as between one State & another. Were he to fix the
quantum of property which should be required, he should not think
of less than one hundred thousand dollars for the President, half
of that sum for each of the Judges, and in like proportion for the
members of the Nat! Legislature. He would however leave the sums
blank. His motion was that the President of the U. S. the Judges,
and members of the Legislature should be required to swear that
they were respectively possessed of a cleared* unincumbered Estate
to the amount of in the case of the President &c &ce.

M: Rutumce seconded the motion; observing that the Committee
had reported no qualifications because they could not agree on any
among themselves, being embarrassed by the danger on one side of
displeasing the people by making them high, and on the other of
rendering them nugatory by making them low.

 

1See page 339. ; :
2 The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The words “have not only” are transposed in the transcript to read “not

only have.”
Mi The word “clear ” is substituted in the transcript for “ cleared.”
374 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M:! ELsewortH. The different circumstances of different parts of
the U. S. and the probable difference between the present and future
circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have either wni-
form or fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the
S. States, and they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them
to the latter, and they will serve no purpose in the former. In like
manner what may be accomodated to the existing State of things
among us, may be very inconvenient in some future state of them.
He thought for these reasons that it was better to leave this matter
to the Legislative discretion than to attempt a provision for it in
the Constitution.

Doct? FRANKLIN expressed his dislike of every thing that tended
to debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the
companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar tempta-
tion, it was not less true that the possession of property increased
the desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was
ever acquainted with, were the richest rogues. We should remember
the character which the Scripture requires in Rulers, that they should
be men hating covetousness. This Constitution will be much read
and attended to in Europe, and if it should betray a great partiality
to the rich, will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal
and enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from
removing into? this Country.

The Motion of M! Pinkney was rejected by so general a na,
that the States were not called.

M: Mapison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper
& dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors
and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Gov! and
ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regu-
late those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A
Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well
by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number
authorised to elect. In all cases where the representatives of the
people will have a personal interest distinct from that of their Con-
stituents, there was the same reason for being jealous of them, as
there was for relying on them with full confidence, when they had
a common interest. This was one of the former cases. It was as
improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own
privileges. It was a power also which might be made subservient to
the views of one faction ag%t another. Qualifications founded on

 

*The word “to” is substituted in the transcript for “of.”
* The word “to” is substituted in the transcript for “into.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1787 375

artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in order to
keep out partizans of a weaker faction.

M* ELseworts, admitted that the power was not unexceptionable;
but he could not view it as dangerous. Such a power with regard
to the electors would be dangerous because it would be much more
liable to abuse.

M® Gov! Morris moved to strike out ‘‘ with regard to property ”’
in order to leave the Legislature entirely at large.

M? Wiruuiamson. This could? surely never be admitted. Should
a majority of the Legislature be composed of any particular descrip-
tion of men, of lawyers for example, which is no improbable supposi-
tion, the future elections might be secured to their own body.

M! Mapison observed that the British Parliam! possessed the
power of regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the
elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of
our attention. They had made the changes in both cases subservient
to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious parties.

2 Question on the motion to strike out with regard to property

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. no.* M4‘ no.
Vi no. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. ay.® 2

M! RutTLmMeeE was opposed to leaving the power to the Legislature.
He proposed that the qualifications should be the same as for members
of the State Legislatures.

M: Witson thought it would be best on the whole to let the
Section go out. A uniform rule would probably be never‘ fixed by
the Legislature, and this particular power would constructively ex-
clude every other power of regulating qualifications.

On the question for agreeing to Art. VI. Sect. 27-

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctno. N. J. no. P* no. Mino. V? no.
N. C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. ay.®

On Motion of M! Wilson to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 2; so as
to restore 3 in place of seven years of citizenship as a qualification
for being elected into the House of Represent*

*In the printed Journal Delaware did not vote.

 

1The word “would” is substituted in the transcript for ‘ could.”

2 The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

® In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware,* Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—7.”

‘In the transcript the words “be never” are transposed to read “ never be.”

5 In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Georgia,
aye—3; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no—7.”
376 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay. M? ay.
Viay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. not

Monday next was then assigned for the reconsideration: all the
States being ay. except Mass** & Georgia

Art: VI. Sect. 3.23 taken up.

M: Guorum contended that less than a Majority in each House
should be made of * Quorum, otherwise great delay might happen in
business, and great inconvenience from the future increase of
numbers.

M:! Mercer was also for less than a majority. So great a num-
ber will put it in the power of a few by seceding at a critical mo-
ment to introduce convulsions, and endanger the Governm! Ex-
amples of secession have already happened in some of the States.
He was for leaving it to the Legislature to fix the Quorum, as in
Great Britain, where the requisite number is small & no inconveni-
ency * has been experienced.

Col. Mason. This is a valuable & necessary part of the plan.
In this extended Country, embracing so great a diversity of interests, .
it would be dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small number
of members of the two Houses to make laws. The Central States
could always take care to be on the Spot and by meeting earlier than
the distant ones, or wearying their patience, and outstaying them,
could carry such measures as they pleased. He admitted that in-
conveniences might spring from the secession of a small number:
But he had also known good produced by an apprehension, of it.
He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia.
He thought the Constitution as now moulded was founded on sound
principles, and was disposed to put into it extensive powers. At the
same time he wished to guard ag abuses as much as possible. If
the Legislature should be able to reduce the number at all, it might
reduce it as low as it pleased & the U. States might be governed by
a Juncto—A majority of the number which had been agreed on,
was so few that he feared it would be made an objection ag*t the
plan.

M: Kine admitted there might be some danger of giving an ad-

 

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye—6; New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no—5.”

* See page 339.

* The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

“In the transcript the word “ of ” is crossed out and “a” is written above it.

; ‘ The word “inconveniency” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-
script.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1787 377

vantage to the Central States; but was of opinion that the public
inconveniency 4 on the other side was more to be dreaded.

M: Gov! Morris moved to fix the quorum at 33 members in the
H. of Rep? & 14 in the Senate. This is a majority of the present
number, and will be a bar to the Legislature: fix the number low
and they will generally attend knowing that advantage may be
taken of their absence. the Secession of a small number ought not
to be suffered to break a quorum. Such events in the States may
have been of little consequence. In the national Councils, they may
be fatal. Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break up a quorum,
they may seize a moment when a particular part of the Continent
may be in need of immediate aid, to extort, by threatening a seces-
sion, some unjust & selfish measure.

M: Mercer 2%¢ the motion

M: Kine said he had just prepared a motion which instead of
fixing the numbers proposed by M! Gov: Morris as Quorums, made
those the lowest numbers, leaving the Legislature at liberty to in-
crease them or not. He thought the future increase of members would
render a majority of the whole extremely cumbersome.

M: Mercer agreed to substitute M! Kings motion in place of
M: Morris’s.

M: ELsEwortTH was opposed to it. It would be a pleasing ground
of confidence to the people that no law or burden could be imposed
on them, by a few men. He reminded the movers that the Constitu-
tion proposed to give such a discretion with regard to the number
of Representatives that a very inconvenient number was not to be
apprehended. The inconveniency * of secessions may be guarded ag*t
by giving to each House an authority to require the attendance of
absent members.

M! Wiison concurred in the sentiments of M! Elseworth.

M: Gerry seemed to think that some further precautions than
merely fixing the quorum might be necessary. He observed that as
17 wi be a majority of a quorum of 33, and 8 of 14, questions might
by possibility be carried in the H. of Rep* by 2 large States, and in
the Senate by the same States with the aid of two small ones.—He
proposed that the number for a quorum in the H. of Rep$ should not
exceed 50 nor be less than 33, leaving the intermediate discretion to

the Legislature.
M: Kine, as the quorum could not be altered witht the concurrence

 

1The word “inconveniency” is changed to “inconvenience” in the tran-
script.
378 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of the President by less than % of each House, he thought there could
be no danger in trusting the Legislature.

VE Carrot this will be no security ag%* a continuance of the
quorums at 33 & 14. when they ought to be increased.

On? question on M! Kings motion ‘‘ that not less than 33 in the H.
of Rep? nor less than 14 in the Senate sh? constitute a Quorum, which
may be increased by a law, on additions to* members in either
House.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. P* no. Del. ay. M? no.
Vino. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

M: Ranpotpo & M™ Mapison moved to add to the end of Art. VI.
Sect 3. ‘‘and may be authorised to compel the attendance of
absent members in such manner & under such penalties as each
House may provide.’? Agreed to by all except Pen? which was
divided.

Art: VI. Sect. 3.3 agreed to as amended Nem. con.

Sect. 4.4

Sect. 5.4

M: Manpison observed that the right of expulsion (Art. VI. Sect.
6.) * was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a
quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused.
He moved that ‘‘ with the concurrence of %’’ might be inserted
between may & expel.

M: RanpoteH & M? Mason approved the idea.

M: Gov: Morris. This power may be safely trusted to a ma-
jority. To require more may produce abuses on the side of the
minority. A few men from factious motives may keep in a member
who ought to be expelled.

M: Carro, thought that the coneurrence of % at least ought to
be required.

On the question for * requiring % in cases of expelling a member.”

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P? divi Del. ay. Mé ay.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.’

| agreed to nem. con.®

 

+The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Delaware, aye—2; New
Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—9.”

* The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

* See page 339.

5In the transcript this reads as follows: “ Sections 4 and 5, of Article 6,
were then agreed to, nem. con.”

° The word “for” is omitted in the transcript.

7In the transcript the vote by States is omitted and the following sentence
is inserted: “ten States were in the affirmative, Pennsylvania, divided.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 10, 1787 379

Art. VI. Sect. 6. as thus amended? agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. Sect. 7»? taken up.

M? Govt Morris urged that if the yeas & nays were proper at all
any individual ought to be authorised to call for them: and moved
an amendment to that effect— The small States may otherwise be
under a disadvantage, and find it difficult, to get a concurrence of %

M? Ranpoipx 2%4 y? motion.

M' SHermawn had rather strike out the yeas & nays altogether.
They never have done any good, and have done much mischief.
They are not proper as the reasons governing the voter never appear
along with them.

M' ExsewortH was of the same opinion

Col. Mason liked the Section as it stood. it was a middle way
between the two extremes.

M: Guorum was opposed to the motion for allowing a single
member to call the yeas & nays, and recited the abuses of it, in
Mass 1* in stuffing the journals with them on frivolous occasions.
2° in misleading the people who never know the reasons determining
the votes.

The motion for allowing a single member to eall the yeas &
nays was disagd to nem. con.

Mz: Carrot. & M? RanpoupH moved Here insert the motion at the
bottom of page *+

*to strike out the words ‘‘ each House ’”’ and to insert the words
** the House of Representatives ’’ in Sect. 7. Art. 6. and to add to the
Section the words ‘‘ and any member of the Senate shall be at liberty
to enter his dissent.’’

M: Gov: Morris & M! Wison observed that if the minority were
to have a right to enter their votes & reasons, the other side would
have a right to complain, if it were not extended to them: & to allow
it to both, would fill the Journals, like the records of a Court, with
replications, rejoinders &e.

5 Question on M: Carrols motion to allow a member to enter his

dissent

 

1The words ‘was then” are here inserted in the transcript.
? See page 339. :
* The figures “1” and “2” are changed to “first” and “secondly” in the

transcript. ;
* Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

5 The words “ On the” are here inserted in the transcript.
380 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. no.*

M: Gerry moved to strike out the words ‘‘ when it shall be acting
in its legislative capacity ’’ in order to extend the provision to the
Senate when exercising its peculiar authorities and to insert ‘‘ except
such parts thereof as in their judgment require secrecy ’’ after the
words ‘‘ publish them.’’—[It was thought by others that provision
should be made with respect to these when that part came under con-
sideration which proposed to vest those additional authorities in
the Senate. ]

On this question for striking out the words ‘‘ when acting in its
Legislative capacity ”’

N. H. div? Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. ay. M? ay.
Ve ay. N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

Adjourned

Saturpay AueSt 11. in ConvENTION

M: Mapison & M! Rutiipee moved ‘‘that each House shall keep
a journal of its proceeding,? & shall publish the same from time to
time; except such part of the proceedings of the Senate, when acting
not in its Legislative capacity as may be judged by that House to
require secrecy.’’

M! Mercer. This implies that.other powers than legislative will
be given to the Senate which he hoped would not be given.

M: Madison & M* R’s motion. was disag? to by all the States ex-
cept Virg?

M: Gerry & M! SHarmMan moved to insert after the words ‘‘ pub-
lish them ’’ the following ‘‘ except such as relate to treaties & mili-
tary operations.’’ Their object was to give each House a discretion
in such cases—On this question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Chay. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. V4 no. N.C.
no. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, no—3; New Hampshire, divided.”

*The transcript uses the word “proceeding” in the plural.

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, aye—2;

New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 11, 1787 381

_ M*! Extsewortu. As the clause is objectionable in so many shapes,
it may as well be struck out altogether. The Legislature will not fail
to publish their proceedings from time to time. The people will call
for it if it should be improperly omitted.

M? Witson thought. the expunging of the clause would be very
improper. The people have a right to know what their Agents are
doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the Legis-
lature to conceal their proceedings. Besides as this is a clause in
the existing confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the
adversaries of the reform with a pretext by which week & suspicious
minds may be easily misled.

M! Mason thought it would give a just alarm to the people, to
make a conclave of their Legislature.

M! SHerman thought the Legislature might be trusted in this
case if in any.

1 Question on? 1%* part of the section down to ‘‘publish them ”’
inclusive: * Agreed to nem. con.

1 Question on the words to follow, to wit except such parts thereof
as may in their Judgment require secrecy.’? N. H. div’ Mas. ay.
Ct ay. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. no. M¢ a0. V? ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no.
Geo. ay.*

The remaining part as to yeas & nays,—°® agreed to nem. con.

Art VI. Sect. 8.°7 taken up.

M: Kina remarked that the section authorized the 2 Houses
to adjourn to a new place. He thought this inconvenient. The
mutability of place had dishonored the federal Gov! and
would require as strong a cure as we could devise. He thought
a law at least should be made necessary to a removal of the Seat
of Govt

M* Mapison, viewed the subject in the same light, and joined with
M: King in a motion requiring a law.

M= Govern! Morris proposed the additional alteration by insert-
ing the words ‘‘during the Session’”’ &c.”’

MM: Sparaut. this will fix the seat of Govt at N. Y. The present
Congress will convene them there in the first instance, and they will

 

1 The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

2The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The words “it was” are here inserted in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, South Carolina, no—4; New Hampshire, divided.”

5’ The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

* See page 340. : .

7™The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.
382 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

never be able to remove; especially if the Presid! should be Northern
Man.

M! Gov! Morris such a distrust is inconsistent with all Govt

ME Mapison supposed that a central place for the seat of Gov!
was so just and wi be so must insisted on by the H. of Representa-
tives, that though a law should be made requisite for the purpose, it
eould & would be obtained. The necessity of a central residence of
the Govt wi be much greater under the new than old Gov! The
members of the new Gov! wi be more numerous. They would be
taken more from the interior parts of the States; they w? not like
members of y® present Cong? come so often from the distant States
by water. As the powers & objects of the new Gov! would be far
greater y" heretofore, more private individuals wi have business call-
ing them to the seat of it, and it was more necessary that the Govt
should be in that position from which it could contemplate with the
most equal eye, and sympathize most equally with, every part of the
nation. These considerations he supposed would extort a removal
even if a law were made necessary. But in order to quiet suspicions
both within & without doors, it might not be amiss to authorize the
2 Houses by a concurrent vote to adjourn at their first meeting to
the most proper place, and to require thereafter, the sanction of a
law to their removal.

The motion was accordingly moulded into the following form—
‘* the Legislature shall at their first assembling determine on a place
at which their future sessions shall be held; neither House shall after-
wards, during the session of the House of Rep? without the consent
of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor shall they adjourn
to any other place than such as shall have been fixt by law’’

M! Gerry thought it would be wrong to let the Presid! check the
will of the 2 Houses on this subject at all

M* WILLIAMSON supported the ideas of M* Spaight

M® Carron was actuated by the same apprehensions

M Mercer, it will serve no purpose to require the two Houses
at their first meeting to fix on a place. They will never agree.

After some further expressions from others denoting an appre-
hension that the seat of Gov! might be continued at an improper place
if a law should be made necessary to a removal, and? the motion
above stated with another for recommitting the section had been
negatived, the section was left in the shape it which it was reported
as to this point. The words ‘‘during the session of the Legislature

* The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The word “after” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 11, 1787 383

were prefixed to the 8t* section—and the last sentence ‘‘But this
regulation shall not extend to the Senate when it shall exercise the
powers mention? in the article ’’’ struck struck out. The
8t section as amended was then agreed to.

M! RanpoLPH moved according to notice to reconsider Art: IV.
Sect. 5.2 concerning money-bills which had been struck out. He
argued 1.5 that he had not wished for this privilege whilst a propor-
tional Representation in the Senate was in contemplation, but since
an equality had been fixed in that house, the large States would re-
quire this compensation at least. 2.3 that it would make the plan
more acceptable to the people, because they will consider the Senate
as the more aristocratic body, and will expect that the usual guards
ag®t its influence‘ be provided according to the example in® G.
Britain. 3.5 the privilege will give some advantage to the House of
Rep’ if it extends to the originating only—but still more, if it re-
strains the Senate from amendé 4.° he called on the smaller States to
concur in the measure, as the condition by which alone the compromise
had entitled them to an equality in the Senate. He signified that he
should propose instead of the original Section, a clause specifying
that the bills in question should be for the purpose of Revenue, in
order to repel y? objection ag%t the extent of the words ‘‘raising
money,’’ which might happen incidentally, and that the Senate should
not so amend or alter as to increase or diminish the sum; in order
to obviate the inconveniences urged ag* a restriction of the Senate to
a simple affirmative or negative.

M! Wiuuiamson 2%? the motion

M: Pinkney was sorry to oppose the opportunity gentlemen asked
to have the question again opened for discussion, but as he considered
it a mere waste of time he could not bring himself to consent to it.
He said that notwithstanding what had been said as to the com-
promise, he always considered this section as making no part of it.
The rule of Representation in the 1%* branch was the true condition
of that in the 24 branch.—Several others spoke for & ag%t the recon-
sideration, but without going into the merits—On the Question to
reconsider

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N.J.* ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. M4 no.

*In the printed Journal N. Jersey—no.

 

1The word “ mentioned ” is substituted in the transcript for “ mention.”

2 See page 338. .

*The figures “1,” “2,7 “3” and “4” are changed in the transcript to
“ first,” “Secondly ” ete. .

The word “will” is here inserted in the transcript.

>The word “of” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”
3884. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. div? Geo. ay.—t Monday was then

assigned— ?
Adji

Monpay Auc§t 13. In ConvENTION

Art. IV. Sect. 2 * * reconsidered—

M: Witson & M: RanpoteH moved to strike out ‘‘ 7 years ’’ and
insert ‘‘ 4 years,’’ as the requisite term of Citizenship to qualify for
the House of Rep’ M:! Wilson said it was very proper the electors
should govern themselves by this consideration; but unnecessary &
impvoper that the Constitution should chain them down to it.

M? Gerry wished that in future the eligibility might be confined
to Natives. Foreign powers will intermeddle in our affairs, and
spare no expence to influence them. Persons having foreign attach-
ments will be sent among us & insinuated into our councils, in order
to be made instruments for their purposes. Every one knows the
vast sums laid out in Europe for secret services. He was not singular
in these ideas. A great many of the most influencial men in Mass
reasoned in the same manner.

M? WILLIAMSON moved to insert 9 years instead of seven. He
wished this Country to acquire as fast as possible national habits.
Wealthy emigrants do more harm by their luxurious examples, than
good, by the money, they bring with them.

Col. HamILTon was in general ag*t embarrassing the Gov‘ with
minute restrictions. There was on one side the possible danger that
had been suggested. On the other side, the advantage of encouraging
foreigners was obvious & admitted. Persons in Europe of moderate
fortunes will be fond of coming here where they will be on a level
with the first Citizens. He moved that the section be so altered as
to require merely citizenship & inhabitanecy. The right of deter-
mining the rule of naturalization will then leave a discretion to
the Legislature on this subject which will answer every purpose.

M: Mapison seconded the motion. He wished to maintain the
character of liberality which had been professed in all the Constitu-
tions & publications of America. He wished to invite foreigners of

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey,* Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Maryland, no—1; South Carolina, divided.”

* The words “ for the reconsideration ” are here inserted in the transcript.

* See page 338.

*The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 13, 1787 385

merit & republican principles among us. America was indebted to
emigrations for her settlement & Prosperity. That part of America
which had encouraged them most had advanced most rapidly in
population, agriculture & the arts. There was a possible danget
he admitted that men with foreign predilections might obtain appoint-
ments but it was by no means probable that it would happen in any
dangerous degree. For the same reason that they would be attached
to their native Country, our own people w? prefer natives of this
Country to them. Experience proved this to be the case. Instances
were rare of a foreigner being elected by the people within any
short space after his coming among us. -If bribery was to be prac-
tised by foreign powers, it would not be attempted among the electors
but among the elected; and among natives having full Confidence
of the people not among strangers who would be regarded with a
jeoulous eye.

M: Wrson, cited Pennsylv* as a proof of the advantage of en-
couraging emigrations. It was perhaps the youngest [except
Georgia] settlemt on the Atlantic; yet it was at least among the
foremost in population & prosperity. He remarked that almost all
the Gen! officers of the Pen® line of the late army were foreigners.
And no complaint had ever been made against their fidelity or merit.
Three of her deputies to the Convention [M!? R. Morris, M? Fitz-
immons & himself] were also not natives. He had no objection to
Col. Hamiltons motion & would withdraw the one made by himself.

M: Butter was strenuous ag admitting foreigners into our
publie Councils.

1 Question on Col. Hamilton’s Motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. P® ay. Del. no. M® ay.
Vi ay. N. C.no. S.C. no. Geo. no.’

1 Question on M? Williamson’s moution to insert 9 years instead of

seven.
N. H. ay. Masts no. Ci no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? no.

Vino. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay?
ME Witson’s renewed the motion for 4 years instead of 7. & on#

question

1The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—8.”

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
386 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. no. Pino. Del. no. M® ay.
Ve ay. N.C. no. §.C. no. Geo. no."

M: Gov? Morris moved to add to the end of the section [art IV.
S. 2] a proviso that the limitation of seven years should not affect
the rights of any person now a Citizen.

MM" Mercer 244 the motion. It was necessary he said to prevent
a disfranchisement of persons who had become Citizens under and
on? the faith & according to the laws & Constitution from being on
a® level in all respects with natives.

M: Ruruipcr. It might as well be said that all qualifications are
disfranchisem® and that to reauire the age of 25 years was a dis-
franchisement. The policy of the precaution was as great with regard
to foreigners now Citizens; as to those who are to be naturalized in
future.

M: Superman. The U. States have not invited foreigners nor
pledged their faith that they should enjoy equal privileges with
native Citizens. The Individual States alone have done this. The
former therefore are at liberty to make any discriminations they may
judge requisite.

M: Guorum. When foreigners are naturalized it wi seem as if
they stand on an equal footing with natives. He doubted then the
propriety of giving a retrospective force to the restriction.

M? Maptson animadverted on the peculiarity of the doctrine of
M: Sharman. It was a subtilty by which every national engagement
might be evaded. By parity of reason, wherever our public debts,
or foreign treaties become inconvenient nothing more would be neces-
sary to relieve us from them, than to new * model the Constitution. It
was said that the U. S. as such have not pledged their faith to the
naturalized foreigners, & therefore are not bound. Be it so, & that
the States alone are bound. Who are to form the New Constitution
by which the condition of that class of citizens is to be made worse
than the other class? Are not the States y2 Agents? will they not
be the members of it? Did they not appoint this Convention? Are
not they to ratify its proceedings? Will not the new Constitution
be their Act? If the new Constitution then violates the faith pledged
to any description of people will not the makers of it, will not the

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

? The words “and on” are omitted in the transcript.

* ‘The words “their actual” are substituted in the transcript for “being
on a.

*In the transcript the word “new” is crossed out and the syllable “re” is
written above it.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 13, 1787 387

States, be the violators. To justify the doctrine it must be said that
the States can get rid of their: obligation by revising the Constitu-
tion, though they could not do it by repealing the law under which
foreigners held their privileges. He considered this a matter of real
importance. It woud expose us to the reproaches of all those who
should be affected by it, reproaches which w4 soon be ecchoed from
the other side of the Atlantic; and would unnecessarily enlist among
the Adversaries of the reform a very considerable body of Citizens:
We should moreover reduce every State to the dilemma of rejecting
it or of violating the faith pledged to a part of its Citizens.

M: Gov? Morris considered the case of persons under 25 years,”
as very different from that of foreigners. No faith could be pleaded
by the former in bar of the regulation. No assurance had ever been
given that persons under that age should be in all cases on a level
with those above it. But with regard to foreigners among us, the
faith had been pledged that they should enjoy the privileges of
Citizens. If the restriction as to age had been confined to natives,
& had left foreigners under 25 years,” eligible in this case, the dis-
crimination w‘ have been an equal injustice on the other side.

ME PINKNEY remarked that the laws of the States had varied much
the terms of naturalization in different parts of America; and con-
tended that the U. S. could not be bound to respect them on such an
occasion as the present. It was a sort of recurrence to first principles.

Col. Mason was struck not like [M! Madison] with the pecu-
liarity, but the propriety of the doctrine of Mt Sharman. The States
have formed different qualifications themselves, for enjoying differ-
ent rights of citizenship. Greater caution w? be necessary in the
outset of the Govt than afterwards. All the great objects w’ be
then ® provided for. Everything would be then set in Motion. If per-
sons among us attached to G. B. should work themselves into our
Councils, a turn might be given to our affairs & particularly to our
Commercial regulations which might have pernicious consequences.
The great Houses of British Merchants will spare no pains to in-
sinuate the instruments of their views into the Gov!

M: Witson read the clause in the Constitution of Pen? giving to
foreigners after two years residence all the rights whatsoever of
citizens, combined it with the article of Confederation making the
Citizens of one State Citizens of all, inferred the obligation Pen?
was under to maintain the faith thus pledged to her citizens of foreign

 

1The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “ their.”
2 The words “of age” are here inserted in the transcript.
2 The words “be then” are transposed in the transcript to read “then be.”
388 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

birth, and the just complaints which her failure would authorize: He
observed likewise that the Princes & States of Europe would avail
themselves of such breach of faith to deter their subjects from emi-
grating to the U. S.

M Mercer enforced the same idea of a breach of faith.

M: Batpwin could not enter into the force of the arguments
ag*t extending the disqualification to foreigners now Citizens. The
discrimination of the place of birth, was not more objectionable than
that of age which all had concurred in the propriety of.

1 Question on the proviso of M? Gov! Morris in favor of foreigners
now Citizens

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. no. Mary?
ay. Viay. N.C. no. 8. C. no, Geo. no.’

M: Carrot moved to insert ‘‘ 5 years’”’ instead ‘‘ of seven,’’ in
Section 24 Art: IV

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. P? div? Del. no. M9 ay.
Vaay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

The Section [Art IV. Sec. 2.] as formerly amended was then
agreed to nem. con.

M! Witson moved that [in Art: V. Sect. 3.4] 9 years be reduced
to seven, which was disagi to and the 34 section [Art. V.] confirmed
by the following vote.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. ay. P2 no, Del. ay. Mé no.
V2 ay. N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

Art. IV. See 5.® being reconsidered.

M! RanpotpH moved that the clause be altered so as to read—
‘¢ Bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue or for appro-
priating the same shall originate in the House of Representatives
and shall not be so amended or altered by the Senate as to increase
or diminish the sum to be raised, or change the mode of levying it,
or the objects of its appropriation.’’—He would not repeat his reasons,
but barely remind the members from the smaller States of the com-
promise by which the larger States were entitled to this privilege.

 

1The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—7; Pennsylvania, divided.”

“See page 339.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, no—3.”

° See page 338.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 13, 1787 389

Col. Mason. This amendment removes all the objections urged
ag: the section as it stood at first. By specifying purposes of revenue,
it obviated the objection that the Section extended to all bills under
which money might incidentally arise. By authorising amendments
in the Senate it got rid of the objections that the Senate could not
correct errors of any sort, & that it would introduce into the House
of Rep? the practice of tacking foreign matter to money bills. These
objections being removed, the arguments in favor of the proposed
restraint on the Senate ought to have their full force. 1.1 the Senate
did not represent the people, but the States in their political char-
acter. It was improper therefore that it should tax the people.
The reason was the same ag*t their doing it; as it had been
ag’ Cong? doing it. *Nor was it in any respect necessary in
order to cure the evils of our Republican system. He admitted
that notwithstanding the superiority of the Republican form over
every other, it had its evils. The chief ones, were the danger
of the majority oppressing the minority, and the mischievous in-
fluence of demagogues. The Gen! Government of itself will cure
these.? As the States will not concur at the same time in their unjust
& oppressive plans, the General Gov! will be able to check & defeat
them, whether they result from the wickedness of the majority, or
from the misguidance of demagogues. Again, the Senate is not like
the H. of Rep? chosen frequently and obliged to return frequently
among the people. They are to be chosen by the Sts for 6 years,
will probably settle themselves at the seat of Govt will pursue schemes
for their own aggrandizement—will be able by weary? out the H. of
Rep’ and taking advantage of their impatience at the close of a long
Session, to extort measures for that purpose. If they should be
paid as he expected would be yet determined & wished to be so, out
of the Nat! Treasury, they will particularly extort an increase of their
wages. A bare negative was a very different thing from that of
originating bills. The practice in Engl? was in point. The House
of Lords does not represent nor tax the people, because not elected
by the people. If the Senate can originate, they will in the recess of
the Legislative Sessions, hatch their mischievous projects, for their own
purposes, and have their money bills ready * cut & dried, (to use a
common phrase) for the meeting of the H. of Rep: He compared the
case to Poyning’s law—and signified that the House of Rep: might be

 

2The figure “1” is changed to “First” in the transcript.
2The word “Secondly” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The word “them” is substituted in the transcript for “ these.”
*The word “ready” is omitted in the transcript.
390 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

rendered by degrees like the Parliament of Paris, the mere depository
of the decrees of the Senate. As to the compromise so much had
passed on that subject that he would say nothing about it. He did
not mean by what he had said to oppose the permanency of the
Senate. On the contrary he had no repugnance to an increase of
it—nor to allowing it a negative, though the Senate was not by its
present constitution entitled to it. But in all events he would con-
tend that the purse strings should be in the hands of the Representa-
tives of the people.

M: WILSON was himself directly opposed to the equality of votes
granted to the Senate by its present Constitution. At the same time
he wished not to multiply the vices of the system. He did not mean
to enlarge on a subject which had been so much canvassed, but
would remark as an insuperable objection ag’* the proposed restric-
tion of money bills to the H. of Rep’ that it would be a source
of perpetual contentions where there was no mediator to decide them.
The Presid? here could not like the Executive Magistrate in England
‘interpose by a prorogation, or dissolution. This restriction had been
‘found pregnant with altercation in every State where the Constitu-
tion had established it. The House of Rep? will insert other things
in money bills, and by making them conditions of each other, destroy
the deliberative liberty of the Senate. He stated the case of a Pre-
amble to a money bill sent up by the House of Commons in the reign
of Queen Anne, to the H. of Lords, in which the conduct of the dis-
placed Ministry, who were to be impeached before the Lords, was
condemned; the Commons thus extorting a premature judgm! without
any hearing of the Parties to be tried, and the H. of Lords being thus
reduced to the poor & disgraceful expedient of opposing to the
authority of a law, a protest on their Journals ag%t its being drawn
into precedent. If there was any thing like Poynings law in the
present case, it was in the attempt to vest the exclusive right of
originating in the H. of Rep? and so far he was ag*t it. He should
be equally so if the right were to be exclusively vested in the Senate.
With regard to the purse strings, it was to be observed that the
purse was to have two strings, one of which was in the hands of
the H. of Rep? the other in those of the Senate. Both houses must
concur in untying, and of what importance could it be which untied
first, which last. He could not conceive it to be any objection to the
Senate’s preparing the bills, that they would have leisure for that
purpose and would be in the habits of business. War, Commerce, &
Revenue were the great objects of the Gen! Government. All of them
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 18, 1787 391

are connected with money. The restriction in favor of the H. of
Represt’ would exclude the Senate from originating any important
bills whatever—

M: Gerry considered this as a part of the plan that would be
much scrutinized. Taxation & representation are strongly associated
in the minds of the people, and they will not agree that any but
their immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses. In
short the acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be
not restrained from originating Money bills.

M* Govern? Morris All the arguments suppose the right to origi-
nate money ‘ & to tax, to be exclusively vested in the Senate.—The ef-
fects commented on may be produced by a Negative only in the Senate.
They can tire out the other House, and extort their concurrence in
favorite measures, as well by withholding their negative, as by adher-
ing to a bill introduced by themselves.

M: Mapison thought If the substitute offered by M® Randolph
for the original section is to be adopted it would be proper to allow
the Senate at least so to amend as to diminish the sum? to be raised.
Why should they be restrained from checking the extravagance of
the other House? One of the greatest evils incident to Republican
Gov! was the spirit of contention & faction. The proposed substitute,
which in some respects lessened the objections ag*t the section, had
a contrary effect with respect to this particular. It laid a foundation
for new difficulties and disputes between the two houses. The word
revenue was ambiguous. In many acts, particularly in the regula-
tions of trade, the object would be twofold. The raising of revenue
would be one of them. How could it be determined which was the
primary or predominant one; or whether it was necessary that reve-
nue sh? be the sole object, in exclusion even of other incidental
effects. When the Contest was first opened with G. B. their power
to regulate trade was admitted. Their power to raise revenue
rejected. An accurate investigation of the subject afterward proved
that no line could be drawn between the two cases. The words
amend or alter, form an equal source of doubt & altercation. When
an obnoxious paragraph shall be sent down from the Senate to the
House of Rep*—it will be called an origination under the name of an
amendment. The Senate may actually couch extraneous matter

 

1The word “money” is omitted in the transcript. In Madison’s notes it
is written above the words “originate” and “&” without a caret indicating its
position. It appears to have been omitted in all previous editions.

2 The transcript uses the word “sum ” in the plural.
392 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

under that name. In these cases, the question will turn on the
degree of connection between the matter & object of the bill and the
alteration or amendment offered to it. Can there be a more fruitful
source of dispute, or a kind of dispute more difficult to be settled?
His apprehensions on this point were not conjectural. Disputes had
actually flowed from this source in Virg? where the Senate can
originate no bill. The words ‘‘ so as to increase or diminish the
sum to be raised,’’ were liable to the same objections. In levying
indirect taxes, which it seemed to be understood were to form the
principal revenue of the new Gov! the sum to be raised, would be
increased or diminished by a variety of collateral circumstances in-
fluencing the consumption, in general, the consumption of foreign or
of domestic articles—of this or that particular species of articles, and
even by the mode of collection which may be closely connected with
the productiveness of a tax.—The friends of the section had argued
its necessity from the permanency of the Senate. He could not see
how this argum! applied. The Senate was not more permanent now
than in the form it bore in the original propositions of Mt Randolph
and at the time when no objection whatever was hinted ag* its
originating money bills. Or if in consequence of a loss of the present
question, a proportional vote in the Senate should be reinstated as
has been urged as the indemnification the permanency of the Senate
will remain the same.—If the right to originate be vested exclusively
in the House of Rep either the Senate must yield ag*t its judgment
to that House, in which case the Utility of the check will be lost—
or the Senate will be inflexible & the H. of Rep* must adapt its money
bill to the views of the Senate, in which case, the exclusive right will
be of no avail_—As to the Compromise of which so much had been
said, he would make a single observation. There were 5 States which
had opposed the equality of votes in the Senate, viz. Mas* Penn? Virg?
N. Carolina & 8. Carol? As a compensation for the sacrifice ex-
torted from them on this head, the exclusive origination of money bills
in the other House had been tendered. Of the five States a majority
viz. Penn? Virg? & 8. Carol? have uniformly voted ag%t the pro-
posed compensation, on its own merits, as rendering the plan of
Govt still more objectionable. Mass‘* has been divided. N. Carolina
alone has set a value on the compensation, and voted on that prin-
ciple. What obligation then can the small States be under to concur
ag*t their judgments in reinstating the section?

M: Dickenson. Experience must be our only guide. Reason
may mislead us. It was not Reason that discovered the singular &
admirable mechanism of the English Constitution. It was not Reason
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 13, 1787 3893

that discovered or ever could have discovered the odd & in the eye
of those who are governed by reason, the absurd mode of trial by
Jury. Accidents probably produced these discoveries, and experience
has give a sanction to them. This is then our guide. And has
not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills to the
immediate representatives of the people. Whence the effect may have
proceeded he could not say; whether from the respect with which
this privilege inspired the other branches of Gov't to the H. of
Commons, or from the turn of thinking it gave to the people at large
with regard to their rights, but the effect was visible & could not be
doubted—Shall we oppose to this long experience, the short experi-
ence of 11 years which we had ourselves, on this subject. As to dis-
putes, they could not be avoided any way. If both Houses should
originate, each would have a different bill to which it would be at-
tached, and for which it would contend.—He observed that all the
prejudices of the people would be offended by refusing this exclusive
privilege to the H. of Repres? and these prejudices sh? never be dis-
regarded by us when no essential purpose was to be served. When
this plan goes forth it will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aris-
tocracy will be the watchword; the Shibboleth among its adversaries.
Eight States have inserted in their Constitutions the exclusive
right of originating money bills in favor of the popular branch
of the Legislature. Most of them however allowed the other
branch to amend. This he thought would be proper for us to
do.

M: RanpoueH regarded this point as of such consequence, that
as he valued the peace of this Country, he would press the adoption
of it. We had numerous & monstrous difficulties to combat. Surely
we ought not to increase them. When the people behold in the Senate,
the countenance of an aristocracy; and in the president, the form
at least of a little monarch, will not their alarms be sufficiently raised
without taking from their immediate representatives, a right which
has been so long appropriated to them.—The Executive will have
more influence over the Senate, than over the H. of Rep? Allow the
Senate to originate in this case, & that influence will be sure to mix
itself in their deliberations & plans. The Declaration of War he con-
ceived ought not to be in the Senate composed of 26 men only, but
rather in the other House. In the other House ought to be placed
the origination of the means of war. As to Commercial regulations
which may involve revenue, the difficulty may be avoided by restrain-
ing the definition to bills, for the mere or sole, purpose of raising
revenue. The Senate will be more likely to be corrupt than the
394. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

H. of Rep? and should therefore have less to do with money matters,
His principal object however was to prevent popular objections
against the plan, and to secure its adoption.

M: Rutuipce. The friends of this motion are not consistent in
their reasoning. They tell us that we ought to be guided by the long
experience of G. B. & not our own experience of 11 years: and yet
they themselves propose to depart from it. The H. of Commons not
only have the exclusive right of originating, but the Lords are not
allowed to alter or amend a money bill. Will not the people say
that this restriction is but a mere tub to the whale. They cannot but
see that it is of no real consequence; and will be more likely to be
displeased with it as an attempt to bubble them, than to impute it
to a watchfulness over their rights. For his part, he would prefer
giving the exclusive right to the Senate, if it was to be given ex-
clusively at all. The Senate being more conversant in business, and
having more leisure, will digest the bills much better, and as they
are to have no effect, till examined & approved by the H. of Rep? there
can be no possible danger. These clauses in the Constitutions of the
States had been put in through a blind adherence to the British
model. If the work was to be done over now, they would be omitted.
The experiment in S. Carolina, where the Senate cannot originate
or amend money bills, has shewn that it answers no good purpose;
and produces the very bad one of continually dividing & heating the
two houses. Sometimes indeed if the matter of the amendment of
the Senate is pleasing to the other House they wink at the encroach-
ment; if it be displeasing, then the Constitution is appealed to. Every
Session is distracted by altercations on this subject. The practice
now becoming frequent is for the Senate not to make formal amend-
ments; but to send down a schedule of the alterations which will
procure the bill their assent.

M! Carroy. The most ingenious men in Mary? are puzzled to
define the case of money bills, or explain the Constitution on that
point; tho’ it seemed to be worded with all possible plainness & pre-
cision. It is a source of continual difficulty & squabble between the
two houses. ;

M: McHenry mentioned an instance of extraordinary subter-
fuge, to get rid of the apparent force of the Constitution.

On? Question on the first part of the motion as to the exclusive
originating of Money bills in? H. of Rep?

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cino. N. J. no. P# no. Del. no. M4 no. Virg?

 

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1787 395

ay. M! Blair & MM. no. M? R. Col. Mason and * Gen! Washington
ay N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. not

* Question on Originating by * H. of Rep & amending by ? Senate,
as reported Art. IV. Sect. 5.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctno. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. no. Mé no.
Vit ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. no.t

? Question on the last clause of Sect: 5—Art. IV—viz ‘‘ No money
shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of
appropriations that shall originate in the House of Rep’ It passed in
the negative

N. H. no. Mas. ay Con. no. N. J. no. P*no Del. no. Mé no.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.®

Adji

 

Turspay Auc. 14. In ConvENTION

Article VI. Sect. 9.° 7 taken up.

M: Pinxney argued that the making the members ineligible to
offices was degrading to them, and the more improper as their elec-
tion into the Legislature implied that they had the confidence of
the people; that it was inconvenient, because the Senate might be
supposed to contain the fittest men. He hoped to see that body
become a School of public Ministers, a nursery of Statesmen: that
it was impolitic, because the Legislature would cease to be a magnet
to the first talents and abilities. He moved to postpone the section
in order to take up the following proposition viz—‘‘ the members of
each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the U. S.

*he disapproved & till now voted agst the exclusive privilege, he gave up
his judgment he said because it was not of very material weight with him & was
made an essential point with others who if disappointed, might be less cordial
in other points of real weight.

+In the printed Journ Virg2—no.

 

1JIn the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vir-
ginia [Mr. Blair and Mr. Madison no, Mr. Randolph, Colonel Mason and General
Washington,* aye], North Carolina, aye—4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

? The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

2 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vir-
ginia,t North Carolina, aye—4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

5 In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, aye—1; New Hampshire,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10.”

* See page 340.

7The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.
396 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

for which they or any of+ others for their benefit receive any salary,
fees, or emoluments of any kind—and the acceptance of such office
shall vacate their seats respectively’’

Gen! Mirruin 244 the motion.

Col. Mason ironically proposed to strike out the whole section,
as a more effectual expedient for encouraging that exotic corruption
which might not otherwise thrive so well in the American Soil— for
compleating that Aristocracy which was probably in the contempla-
tion of some among us, and for inviting into the Legislative Service,
those generous & benevolent characters who will do justice to each
other’s merit, by carving out offices & rewards for it. In the present
state of American morals & manners, few friends it may be thought
will be lost to the plan, by the opportunity of giving premiums to a
mercenary & depraved ambition.

M: Mercer. It is a first principle in political science, that
wherever the rights of property are secured, an aristocracy will grow
out of it. Elective Governments also necessarily become aristocratic,
because the rulers being few can & will draw emoluments for them-
selves from the many. The Governments of America will become
aristocracies. They are so already. The public measures are cal-
culated for the benefit of the Governors, not of the people. The
people are dissatisfied & complain. They change their rulers, and the
public measures are changed, but it is only a change of one scheme of
emolument to the rulers, for another. The people gain nothing by it,
but an addition of instability & uncertainty to their other evils—
Governm® can only be maintained by force or influence. The Execu-
tive has not force, deprive him of influence* by rendering the mem-
bers of the Legislature ineligible to Executive offices, and he becomes
a mere phantom of authority. The aristocratic part will not even
let him in for a share of the plunder. The Legislature must & will
be composed of wealth & abilities, and the people will be governed by
a Junto. The Executive ought to have a Council, being members of
both Houses. Without such an influence, the war will be between
the aristocracy & the people. He wished it to be between the Aris-
tocracy & the Executive. Nothing else can protect the people ag*
those speculating Legislatures which are now plundering them
throughout the U. States.

M! Gerry read a Resolution of the Legislature of Mass® passed
before the Act of Cong? recommending the Convention, in which her
deputies were instructed not to depart from the rotation established

 

*The word “of” is omitted in the transcript.
* The transcript italicizes the word “ influence.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1787 397

in the 5 art: of ! Confederation, nor to agree in any case to give to
the members of Cong? a capacity to hold offices under the Government.
This he said was repealed in consequence of the Act of Cong’ with
which the State thought it proper to comply in an unqualified man-
ner. The Sense of the State however was still the same. He could
not think with M: Pinkney that the disqualification was degrading.
Confidence is the road to tyranny. As to Ministers & Ambassadors
few of them were necessary. It is the opinion of a great many that
they ought to be discontinued, on our part; that none may be sent
among us, & that source of influence be? shut up. If the Senate were
to appoint Ambassadors as seemed to be intended, they will multiply
embassies for their own sakes. He was not so fond of those pro-
ductions as to wish to establish nurseries for them. If they are
once appointed, the House of Rep? will be obliged to provide salaries
for them, whether they approve of the measures or not. If men
will not serve in the Legislature without a prospect of such offices,
our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens are actuated
by such mercenary views, we had better chuse a single despot at
once. It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than of
many. According to the idea of one Gentleman [M? Mercer] our
Government it seems is to be a Govt of plunder. In that ease it cer-
tainly would be prudent to have but one rather than many to be em-
ployed in it. We cannot be too circumspect in the formation of this
System. It will be examined on all sides and with a very suspicious
eye. The People who have been so lately in arms ag*t G. B. for their
liberties, will not easily give them up. He lamented the evils existing
at present under our Governments, but imputed them to the faults of
those in office, not to the people. The misdeeds of the former will
produce a critical attention to the opportunities afforded by the new
system to like or greater abuses. As it now stands it is as compleat
an aristocracy as ever was framed If great powers should be given
to the Senate we shall be governed in reality by a Junto as has been
apprehended. He remarked that it would be very differently con-
stituted from Cong®- 1.3 there will be but 2 deputies from each State,
in Cong? there may be 7. and are generally 5.—2.* they are chosen
for six years, those of Cong? annually. 3.° they are not subject
to recall; those of Cong? are. 4. In Cong? 9 States* are necessary

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2The word “be” is omitted in the transcript.

* The figure “1” is changed to “In the first place” in the transcript.

‘The figure “2” is changed to “In the second place” in the transcript.

5 The figure “3” is changed to “In the third place” in the transcript.
*The phrase “And finally, in Congress nine States” is substituted in the

transcript for “4. In Congs 9 States.”

.
398 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

for all great purposes—here 8 persons will suffice. Is it to be presumed
that the people will ever agree to such a system? He moved to
render the members of the H. of Rep? as well as of the Senate in-
eligible not only during, but for one year after the expiration of
their terms.—If it should be thought that this will injure the Legis-
lature by keeping out of it men of abilities who are willing to serve
in other offices it may be required as a qualification for other offices,
that the Candidate shall have served a certain time in the Legislature.

M: Gov? Morris. Exclude the officers of the army & navy, and
you form a band having a different interest from & opposed to the
civil power: you stimulate them to despise & reproach those ‘‘ talking
Lords who dare not face the foe.’’ Let this spirit be roused at the
end of a war, before your troops shall have laid down their arms,
and though the Civil authority ‘‘ be intrenched in parchment to the
teeth ’’ they will cut their way to it. He was ag** rendering the |
members of the Legislature ineligible to offices. He was for render-
ing them eligible ag? after having vacated their Seats by accepting
office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the
people chuse to give them their confidence. There can be little danger
of corruption either among the people or the Legislatures who ara
to be the Electors. If they say, we see their merits, we honor the
men, we chuse to renew our confidence in them, have they not a
right to give them a preference; and can they be properly abridged
of it.

M*? Wiuiamson; introduced his opposition to the motion by re-
ferring to the question concerning ‘‘ money bills.’? That clause he
said was dead. Its ghost he was afraid would notwithstanding haunt
us. It had been a matter of conscience with him, to insist upon? it
as long as there was hope of retaining it. He had swallowed the vote
of rejection, with reluctance. He could not digest it. All that was
said on the other side was that the restriction was not convenient.
We have now got a House of Lords which is to originate money-
bills—To avoid another inconveniency,? we are to have a whole Legis-
lature at liberty to cut out offices for one another. He thought a
self-denying ordinance for ourselves would be more proper. Bad
as the Constitution has been made by expunging the restriction on
the Senate concerning money bills he did not wish to make it worse
by expunging the present Section. He had scarcely seen a single
corrupt measure in the Legislature of N. Carolina, which could not
be traced up to office hunting.

M! SHERMAN. The Constitution sh? lay as few tempations as

 

* The word on ” is substituted in the transcript for “upon.”
The word “ inconveniency ” is changed to “inconvenience” in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1787 399

possible in the way of those in power. Men of abilities will increase
as the Country grows more populous and, and} the means of educa-
tion are more diffused.

M: Pinkney. No State has rendered the members of the Legis-
lature ineligible to offices. In S. Carolina the Judges are eligible
into the Legislature. It can not be supposed then that the motion
will be offensive to the people. If the State Constitutions should be
revised he believed restrictions of this sort wi be rather diminished
than multiplied.

M! Witson could not approve of the Section as it stood, and could
not give up his judgment to any supposed objections that might arise
among the people. He considered himself as acting & responsible for
the welfare of millions not immediately represented in this House.
He had also asked himself the serious question what he should say
to his constituents in case they should call upon him to tell them
why he sacrificed his own Judgment in a case where they authorised
him to exercise it? Were he to own to them that he sacrificed it in
order to flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort: did you
suppose the people of Penn’? had not good sense enough to receive a
good Government? Under this impression he should certainly follow
his own Judgment which disapproved of the section. He would re-
mark in addition to the objections urged ag* it, that as one branch of
the Legislature was to be appointed by the Legislatures of the States,
the other by the people of the States, as both are to be paid by the
States, and to be appointable to State offices, nothing seemed to be
wanting to prostrate the Nat! Legislature, but to render its members
ineligible to Nat! offices, & by that means take away its power of
attracting those talents which were necessary to give weight to the
Govern: and to render it useful to the people. He was far from
thinking the ambition which aspired to Offices of dignity and trust,
an ignoble or culpable one. He was sure it was not politic to regard
it in that light, or to withold from it the prospect of those rewards,
which might engage it in the career of public service. He observed
that the State of Penn? which had gone as far as any State into the
policy of fettering power, had not rendered the members of the
Legislature ineligible to offices of Govt

Mt Euswortn did not think the mere postponement of the
reward would be any material discouragement of merit. Ambitious
minds will serve 2 years or 7 years in the Legislature for the sake of
qualifying themselves for other offices. This he thought a sufficient
security for obtaining the services of the ablest men in the Legis-

1 The word “as” is substituted in the transcript for “and.”
400 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

lature, although whilst members they should be ineligible to Public
offices. Besides, merit will be most encouraged, when most im-
partially rewarded. If rewards are to circulate only within the
Legislature, merit out of it will be discouraged.

M: Mercer was extremely anxious on this point. What led to the
appointment of this Convention? The corruption & mutability of
the Legislative Councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy
these, it will not recommend itself; and we shall not be able in our
private capacities to support & enforce it: nor will the best part
of our Citizens exert themselves for the purpose.—It is a great mis-
take to suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the U.
States? It is The men whom it will bring into the Governt and in-
terest in maintaining it that is? to govern them. The paper will only
mark out the mode & the form. Men are the substance and must
do the business. All Govt must be by force or influence. It is not
the King of France—but 200,000 janisaries of power that govern that
Kingdom. There will be no such force here; influence then must be
substituted; and he would ask whether this could be done, if the
members of the Legislature should be ineligible to offices of State;
whether such a disqualification would not determine all the most
influencial men to stay at home, and & prefer appointments within
their respective States. .

M! Witson was by no means satisfied with the answer given by
M: Elsewoth to the argument as to the discouragement of merit. The
members must either go a second time into the Legislature, and dis-
qualify themselves—or say to their Constituents, we served you be-
fore only from the mercenary view of qualifying ourselves for offices,
and havet answered this purpose we do not chuse to be again elected.

M: Gov! Morris put the case of a war, and the Citizen the? most
capable of conducting it, happening to be a member of the Legisla-
ture. What might have been the consequence of such a regulation at
the commencement, or even in the Course of the late contest for our
liberties ?

On* question for postponing in order to take up M® Pinkneys
motion, it was lost.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P* ay. Del. ay. Mé ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. divi4

 

*The word “are” is substituted in the transcript for “ is.”

> The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

“In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no—5; Georgia, divided.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1787 401

M:! Gov! Morris moved to insert, after ‘‘office,’’ except offices
in the army or navy: but in that case their offices shall be vacated.

M? Broom 2% him.

M* RanpvoupH had been & should continue uniformly opposed to
the striking out of the clause; as opening a door for influence &
corruption. No arguments had made any impression on him, but
those which related to the case of war, and a co-existing incapacity
of the fittest commanders to be employed. He admitted great weight
in these, and would agree to the exception proposed by M! Gov!
Morris.

M: Buruer & M! PINKNEY urged a general postponem! of 9 Sect.
Art. VI. till it should be seen what powers would be vested in the
Senate, when it would be more easy to judge of the expediency of
allowing the officers of State to be chosen out of that body.—a gen-
eral postponement was agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. sect. 10.1? taken up—‘‘that members be paid by their
respective States.’’

M: Exseworte# said that in reflecting on this subject he had been
satisfied that too much dependence on the States would be produced
by this mode of payment. He moved to strike * out and insert ‘‘ that
they should ’’ be paid out of the Treasury of the U. S. an allowance
not exceeding (blank) dollars per day or the present value
thereof.

M: Govt Morris, remarked that if the members were to be paid
by the States it would throw an unequal burden on the distant
States, which would be unjust as the Legislature was to be a national
Assembly. He moved that the payment be out of the Nat! Treasury;
leaving the quantum to the discretion of the Nat! Legislature. There
could be no reason to fear that they would overpay themselves.

M: Burier contended for payment by the States; particularly
in the case of the Senate, who will be so long out of their respective
States, that they will lose sight of their Constituents unless dependent
on them for their support.

Mz Lanepon was ag*t payment by the States. There would be
some difficulty in fixing the sum; but it would be unjust to oblige
the distant States to bear the expence of their members in travelling
to and from the Seat of Gov!

M: Mapison If the H. of Rep? is to be chosen biennially—and the
Senate to be constantly dependent on the Legislatures which are

 

+See page 340. : ; ;
2 The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

® The word “it” is here inserted in the transcript.
402 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

chosen annually, he could not see any chance for that stability in the
Gen! Govt the want of which was a principal evil in the State Gov®
His fear was that the organization of the Gov! supposing the Senate
to be really independ! for six years, would not effect our purpose.
It was nothing more than a combination of the peculiarities of two
of the State Gov‘s which separately had been found insufficient. The
Senate was formed on the model of that of Maryl? The Revisionary
check, on that of N. York. What the effect of a union of these pro-
visions might be, could not be foreseen. The enlargement of the
sphere of the Government was indeed a circumstance which he
thought would be favorable as he had on several occasions under-
taken to shew. He was however for fixing at least two extremes not
to be exceeded by the Nat! Legisl’® in the payment of themselves.

M! Gerry. There are difficulties on both sides. The observation
of M: Butler has weight in it. On the other side, the State Legis-
latures may turn out the Senators by reducing their salaries. Such
things have been practised.

Col. Mason. It has not yet been noticed that the clause as it
now stands makes the House of Represent? also dependent on the
State Legislatures; so that both houses will be made the instruments
of the politics of the States whatever they may be.

M: Broom could see no danger in trusting the Gen! Legislature
with the payment of themselves. The State Legislatures had this
power, and no complaint had been made of it.

M: SHERMAN was not afraid that the Legislature would make their
own wages too high; but too low, so that men ever so fit could not
serve unless they were at the same time rich. He thought the best
plan would be to fix a moderate allowance to be paid out of the
Nat! Treas’ and let the States make such additions as they might
judge fit. He moved that 5 dollars per day be the sum, any further
emoluments to be added by the States.

M: Carrou had been much'surprised at seeing this clause in the
Report. The dependence of both Houses on the State Legislatures is
compleat; especially as the members of the former are eligible to
State offices. The States can now say: if you do not comply with our
wishes, we will starve you: if you do we will reward you. The new
Gov! in this form was nothing more than a second edition of Congress
in two volumes, instead of one, and perhaps with very few amend-
ments—

M:! Dickenson took it for granted that all were convinced of
the necessity of making the Gen! Govi independent of the prejudices,
passions, and improper views of the State Legislatures. The con-
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1787 403

trary of This was effected by the section as it stands. On the other
hand there were objections ag* taking a permanent standard as wheat
which had been suggested on a former occasion, as well as against
leaving the matter to the pleasure of the Nat! Legislature. He pro-
posed that an Act should be passed every 12 years by the Nat!
Legisl": settling the quantum of their wages. If the Gen! Gov! should
be left dependent on the State Legislatures, it would be happy for
us if we had never met in this Room.

M: ELsewortH was not unwilling himself to trust the Legislature
with authority to regulate their own wages, but well knew that an
unlimited discretion for that purpose would produce strong, tho’
perhaps not insuperable objections. He thought changes in the
value of money, provided for by his motion in the words, ‘‘ or the
present value thereof.’’

M! L. Martin. As the Senate is to represent the States, the mem-
bers of it ought to be paid by the States.

M: Carrot. The Senate was to represent & manage the affairs
of the whole, and not to be the advocates of State interests. They
ought then not to be dependent on nor paid by the States.

On the question for paying the Members of the Legislature out
of the Nat! Treasury,

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. Mé ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.t

M: EvLsEwTH moved that the pay be fixed at 5 doll® or the
present value thereof per day during their attendance & for every
thirty miles in travelling to & from Congress. 2

M: Srrone preferred 4 dollars, leaving the Sts. at liberty to make
additions.

On? question for fixing the pay at 5 dollars.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci ay. N. J. no. P* no. Del. no. M#? no.
V2 ay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.’

M: DicKENSON proposed that the wages of the members of both
houses s? be required to be the same.

M: Broome seconded him.

M! Guorum. this would be unreasonable. The Senate will be
detained longer from home, will be obliged to remove their families,

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; Massachusetts, South Carolina, no—2.”

? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

?In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Virginia, aye—2; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—9.”
404 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

and in time of war perhaps to sit constantly. Their allowance should
certainly be higher. The members of the Senates in the States are
allowed more, than those of the other house.

M! DicKENSON withdrew his motion

It was moved & agreed to amend the Section by adding—‘‘ to be
ascertained by law.’’

The Section [Art VI. Sec. 10] as amended, agreed to nem. con.

Adji

Wepnespay Aucust 15. IN CONVENTION

Art: VI. Sect. 11.4% Agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI Sect. 12. 3 taken up.

Mz Srrong moved to amend the article so as to read—'‘ Each
House shall possess the right of originating all bills, except bills
for raising money for the purposes of revenue, or for appropriating
the same and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the Govt which
shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments asin other cases ”’

Col. Mason, 2% the motion. He was extremely earnest to take
this power from the Senate, who he said could already sell the whole
Country by means of Treaties.

M: Guorum urged the amendment as of great importance. The
Senate will first acquire the habit of preparing money bills, and then
the practice will grow into an exclusive right of preparing them.

M! Govern? Morris opposed it as unnecessary and inconvenient.

M: WILLIAMSON. some think this restriction on the Senate essen-
tial to liberty, others think it of no importance. Why should not
the former be indulged. he was for an efficient and stable Gov!
but many would not strengthen the Senate if not restricted in the
case of money bills. The friends of the Senate would therefore lose
more than they would gain by refusing to gratify the other side.

He moved to postpone the subject till the powers of the Senate
should be gone over.

M: Rutwivge 2% the motion.
M: Mercer should hereafter be ag returning to a reconsidera-
tion of this section. He contended, (alluding to M: Mason’s observa-

*See page 340.

a word “was ” is here inserted in the transcript.
The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1787 405

tions) that the Senate ought not to have the power of treaties. This
power belonged to the Executive department; adding that Treaties
woula not be final so as to alter the laws of the land, till ratified by
legislative authority. This was the case of Treaties in Great Britain;
particularly the late Treaty of Commerce with France.

Col. Mason. did not say that a Treaty would repeal a law; but
that the Senate by means of treaty might alienate territory &e,
without legislative sanction. The cessions of the British Islands in?
W- Indies by Treaty alone were an example. If Spain should possess
herself of Georgia therefore the Senate might by treaty dismember
the Union. He wished the motion to be decided now, that the
friends of it might know how to conduct themselves.

On? question for postponing Sec: 12. it passed in the affirma-
tive.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay Ct no. N. J. no Pen? no. Del. no Mary? no.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.—

M! Mapison moved that all acts before they become laws should be
submitted both to the Executive and Supreme Judiciary Departments,
that if either of these should object % of each House, if both should
object, %4 of each House, should be necessary to overrule the objec-
tions and give to the acts the force of law—‘*

See the motion at large in the Journal of this date, page 253, &
insert it here.’’ 5

[ ‘‘ Every bill which shall have passed the two houses, shall, before
it become a law, be severally presented to the President of the United
States, and to the judges of the supreme court for the revision of each.
If, upon such revision, they shall approve of it, they shall respectively
signify their approbation by signing it; but if, upon such revision,
it shall appear improper to either, or both, to be passed into a law,
it shall be returned, with the objections against it, to that house, in
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at
large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider the bill: but if, after
such reconsideration, two thirds of that house, when either the Presi-
dent, or a majority of the judges shall object, or three fourths, where

 

2 The transcript uses the word “treaty” in the plural.

2The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no—5.”

‘This paragraph is stricken out in the transcript.

5 Madison’s direction concerning the motion is omitted in the transcript and
the following sentence is inserted: “Mr. Madison moved the following amendment
of Article 6, Section 13.” *

° See page 340.
406 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

both shall object, shall agree to pass it, it shall, together with the ob-
jections, be sent to the other house, by which it shall likewise be re-
considered; and, if approved by two thirds, or three fourths of the
other house, as the case may be, it shall become a law.’’]

M: Witson seconds the motion

MM: Pinkney opposed the interference of the Judges in the Legis-
lative business: it will involve them in parties, and give a previous
tincture to their opinions.

M* Mercer heartily approved the motion. It is an axiom that
the Judiciary ought to be separate from the Legislative: but equally
so that it ought to be independent of that department. The true
policy of the axiom is that legislative usurpation and oppression
may be obviated. He disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges
as expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare
a law void. He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made,
and then to be uncontroulable.

M: Gerry. This motion comes to the same thing with what has
been already negatived.

1 Question on the motion of M? Madison.

N. H. no. Mass. no. Cino. N.J.no. P*no. Del. ay. Mary4 ay.
Virg? ay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

M: Gov? Morris regretted that something like the proposed check
could not be agreed to. He dwelt on the importance of public credit,
and the difficulty of supporting it without some strong barrier
against the instability of legislative Assemblies. He suggested the
idea of requiring three fourths of each house to repeal laws where
the President should not concur. He had no great reliance on the
revisionary power as the Executive was now to be constituted [elected
by the * Congress]. The legislature will contrive to soften down the
President. He recited the history of paper emissions, and the perse-
verance of the legislative assemblies in repeating them, with all the
distressing effects of such measures before their eyes. Were the
National legislature formed, and a war was now to break out, this
ruinous expedient would be again resorted to, if not guarded against.
The requiring % to repeal would, though not a compleat remedy,
prevent the hasty passage of laws, and the frequency of those repeals

which destroy faith in the public, and which are among our greatest
calamities.—

 

* The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

* In the transcript the vote reads: “Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—3;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

* The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1787 407

M? DickENson was strongly impressed with the remark of M!
Mercer as to the power of the Judges to set aside the law. He thought
no such power ought to exist. He was at the same time at a loss what
expedient to substitute. The Justiciary of Arragon he observed be-
came by degrees, the lawgiver.

M? Gov" Morris, suggested the expedient of an absolute negative
in the Executive. He could not agree that the Judiciary which was
part of the Executive, should be bound to say that a direct violation
of the Constitution was law. A controul over the legislature might
have its inconveniences. But view the danger on the other side. The
most virtuous Citizens will often as members of a legislative body
concur in measures which afterwards in their private capacity they
will be ashamed of. Encroachments of the popular branch of the
Government ought to be guarded ag** The Ephori at Sparta became
in the end absolute. The Report of the Council of Censors in
Pennsylv? points out the many invasions of the legislative depart-
ment on the Executive numerous as the latter * is, within the short
term of seven years, and in a State where a strong party is opposed
to the Constitution, and watching every occasion of turning the pub-
lic resentments ag*t it. If the Executive be overturned by the popu-
lar branch, as happened in England, the tyranny of one man will
ensue. In Rome where the Aristocracy overturned the throne, the
consequence was different. He enlarged on the tendency of the legis-
lative Authority to usurp on the Executive and wished the section
to be postponed, in order to consider of some more effectual check
than requiring % only to overrule the negative of the Executive.

M: Suerman. Can one man be trusted better than all the others
if they all agree? This was neither wise nor safe. He disapproved
of Judges meddling in polities and parties. We have gone far enough
in forming the negative as it now stands.

M: Carrou- when the negative to be overruled by % only was
agreed to, the quorum was not fixed. He remarked that as a majority
was now to be the quorum, 17. in the larger, and 8 in the smaller
house might carry points. The advantage that might be taken of
this seemed to call for greater impediments to improper laws. He
thought the controuling power however of the Executive could not be
well decided, till it was seen how the formation of that department
would be finally regulated. He wished the consideration of the mat-
ter to be postponed.

*The Executive consists at this time* of abt 20 members.

1The phrase “ consisted at that time” is substituted in the transcript for
“consists at this time.”
408 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M! GuHoruMm saw no end to these difficulties and postponements.
Some could not agree to the form of Government before the powers
were defined. Others could not agree to the powers till it was seen
how the Government was to be formed. He thought a majority as
large a quorum as was necessary. It was the quorum almost every
where fixt in the U. States.

M: Wison; after viewing the subject with all the coolness and
attention possible was most apprehensive of a dissolution of the
Govt from the legislature swallowing up all the other powers. He
remarked that the prejudices ag the Executive resulted from a
misapplication of the adage that the parliament was the palladium of
liberty. Where the Executive was really formidable, King and
Tyrant, were naturally associated in the minds of people; not legis-
lature and tyranny. But where the Executive was not formidable,
the two last were most properly associated. After the destruction
of the King in Great Britain, a more pure and unmixed tyranny
sprang up in the parliament than had been exercised by the monarch.
He insisted that we had not guarded ag*t the danger on this side by
a sufficient self-defensive power either to the Executive or Judiciary
department.

M: RutiipcE was strenuous ag% postponing; and complained much
of the tediousness of the proceedings.

M: ExvsrworrH held the same language. We grow more & more
skeptical as we proceed. If we do not decide soon, we shall be unable
to come to any decision.

The question for postponement passed in the negative: Del: &
Mary? only being in the affirmative.

M: Wituiamson moved to change ‘‘% of each House ’’ into
“< 34? ag requisite to overrule the dissent of the President. He saw
no danger in this, and preferred giving the power to the Presidé alone,
to admitting the Judges into the business of legislation.

M: Witson 2% the motion; referring to and repeating the ideas
of M:? Carroll.

On this motion for %4. instead of two thirds; it passed in the
affirmative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. N.J.no. Pen? div? Del. ay. M‘ ay.
V# ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.

M: Mapison, observing that if the negative of the President was
confined to bills; it would be evaded by acts under the form and

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—6; New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Georgia, no—4; Pennsylvania, divided.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1787 409

name of Resolutions, votes &c, proposed that or resolve’’ should
be added after ‘ bill’? in the beginning of sect 13. with an excep-
tion as to votes of adjournment &¢.— after a short and rather con-
fused conversation on the subject, the question was put & rejected, the
States? being as follows,
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ctno. N. J. no. Pen* no. Del. ay. Mé no.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.2
““Ten* days (Sundays excepted) ’’ instead of “ seven ’’ were al-
lowed to the President for returning bills with his objections N. H.
‘ & Mas: only voting ag* it.
The 13 Sect: of art. VI as amended was then agreed to.
Adjourned.

THurspay. Aucust 16. 1n CONVENTION.

M? Ranvotpa having thrown into a new form the motion, putting
votes, Resolutions &c. on a footing with Bills, renewed it as follows
““ Every order resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of the
Senate & House of Rep: may be necessary (except on a question of
adjournment and in the cases hereinafter mentioned) shall be pre-
sented to the President for his revision; and before the same shall
have force shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him
shall be repassed by the Senate & House of Rep’ according to the
rules & limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill.’’

M* Suerman thought it unnecessary, except as to votes taking
money out of the Treasury which might be provided for in another
place.

On * Question as moved by M? Randolph ®

N. H. ay. Mas: not present, Ct ay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay.
Mi ay. V* ay. N. C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.®

The Amendment was made a Section 14. of Art VI.

Art: VII. Sect. 1.%* taken up.

M: L. Martin asked what was meant by the Committee of detail

 

1 The word “votes” is substituted in the transcript for “States.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: ‘“ Massachusetts, Delaware, North Caro-
lina, aye—3; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

* The transcript does not italicize the word “ Ten.”

4The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The phrase “it was agreed to” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; New Jersey, no—1; Massachusetts, not present.”

7 See page 340.
® The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.
410 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

in the expression ‘‘ duties ’’ and ‘‘ imposts.’’ If the meaning were
the same, the former was unnecessary ; if different, the matter ought
to be made clear.

M= Witson, duties are applicable to many objects to which the
word imposts does not relate. The latter are appropriated to com-
merce; the former extend to a variety of objects, as stamp duties &e.

M: Carroti reminded the Convention of the great difference of
interests among the States, and doubts the propriety in that point of
view of letting a majority be a quorum.

M: Mason urged the necessity of connecting with the power of
levying taxes duties &c, the prohibition in Sect 4 of art VI that no
tax should be laid on exports. He was unwilling to trust to its being
done in a future article. He hoped the North? States did not mean
to deny the Southern this security. It would hereafter be as desir-
able to the former when the latter should become the most populous.
He professed his jealousy for the productions of the Southern or as he
called them, the staple States. He moved to insert the following
amendment ‘‘ provided that no tax duty or imposition shall be laid
by the Legislature of the U. States on articles exported from any
State ’’

M? SHerman had no objection to the proviso here, other than? it
would derange the parts of the report as made by the Committee,
to take them in such an order.

M* Rutumee. It being of no consequence in what order points
are decided, he should vote for the clause as it stood, but on con-
dition that the subsequent part relating to negroes should also be
agreed to.

M! GovERNEUR Morris considered such a proviso as inadmissible
any where. It was so radically objectionable, that it might cost the
whole system the support of some members. He contended that it
would not in some cases be equitable to tax imports without taxing
exports; and that taxes on exports would be often the most easy and
proper of the two.

M: Mavison 1.’ the power of taxing ® exports is proper in itself,
and as the States can not with propriety exercise it separately, it
ought to be vested in them collectively. 2.2 it might with particular
advantage be exercised with regard to articles in which America was
not rivalled in foreign markets, as Tob? &c. The contract between the

 

* The word “that” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The figures “1” and “2” are changed in the transcript to “First” and
“ Secondly.”

*The words “laying taxes on” are substituted in the transcript for
“ taxing.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1787 411

French Farmers Gen! and M! Morris stipulating that if taxes s¢
be laid in America on the export of Tob? they si be paid by the
Farmers, shewed that it was understood by them, that the price
would be thereby raised in America, and consequently the taxes be
paid by the European Consumer. 3.1 it would be unjust to the
States whose produce was exported by their neighbours, to leave it
subject to be taxed by the latter. This was a grievance which had
already filled N. H. Cont N. Jer’ Del: and N. Carolina with loud
complaints, as it related to imports, and they would be equally
authorised by taxes by the States on exports. 4.1 The South” States
being most in danger and most needing naval protection, could the
less complain if the burden should be somewhat heaviest on them.
5.2 we are not providing for the present moment only, and time will
equalize the situation of the States in this matter. He was for these
reasons ag*t the motion

M? Wiuiamson considered the clause proposed ag% taxes on
exports as reasonable and necessary.

M*: ELsewortH was ag* Taxing exports; but thought the prohibi-
tion stood in the most proper place, and was ag*t deranging the order
reported by the Committee

M: Witson was decidedly ag** prohibiting general taxes on ex-
ports. He dwelt on the injustice and impolicy of leaving N. Jersey
Connecticut &e any longer subject to the exactions of their commer-
cial neighbours.

M: Gerry thought the legislature could not be trusted with such
a power. It might ruin the Country. It might be exercised par-
tially, raising one and depressing another part of it.

M! Govt Morris. However the legislative power may be formed,
it will if disposed be able to ruin the Country. He considered the
taxing of exports to be in many cases highly politic. Virginia has
found her account in taxing Tobacco. All Countries having peculiar
articles tax the exportation of them; as France her wines and
brandies. A tax here on lumber, would fall on the W. Indies &
punish their restrictions on our trade. The same is true of live-
stock and in some degree of flour. In case of a dearth in the West
Indies, we may extort what we please. Taxes on exports are a neces-
sary source of revenue. For a long time the people of America will
not have money to pay direct taxes. Seize and sell their effects and
you push them into Revolts.

17The figures “3” and “4” are changed in the transcript to “Thirdly”

and “ Fourthly.” .
2 The figure “5” is changed in the transcript to “And finally.”
412 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M:? Mercer was strenuous against giving Congress power to tax
exports. Such taxes were+ impolitic, as encouraging the raising of
articles not meant for exportation. The States had now a right
where their situation permitted, to tax both the imports and ex-
ports of their uncommercial neighbours. It was enough for them
to sacrifice one half of it. It had been said the Southern States had
most need of naval protection. The reverse was the case. Were
it not for promoting the carrying trade of the North? States, the
South" States could let their trade go into foreign bottoms, where it
would not need our protection. Virginia by taxing her tobacco had
given an advantage to that of Maryland.

M: Suerman. To examine and compare the States in relation
to imports and exports will be opening a boundless field. He thought
the matter had been adjusted, and that imports were to be subject,
and exports not, to be taxed. He thought it wrong to tax exports
except it might be such articles as ought not to be exported. The
complexity of the business in America would render an equal tax
on exports impracticable. The oppression of the uncommercial
States was guarded agi by the power to regulate trade between the
States. As to compelling foreigners, that might be done by regulating
trade in general. The Government would not be trusted with such
a power. Objections are most likely to be excited by considerations
relating to taxes & money. A power to tax exports would shipwreck
the whole.

M: Carron was surprised that any objection should be made to
an exception of exports from the power of taxation.

It was finally agreed that the question concerning exports shi
lie over for the place in which the exception stood in the report:
Mary? alone voting ag* it

Sect: 1. [art. VII]* * agreed to: M! Gerry alone answering no.

* Clause for regulating commerce with foreign nations &.° agreed
to nem. con.

6 for coining money. ag? to nem. con,
® for regulating foreign coin. d? d?°
®for fixing the standard of weights & measures. d? d°

 

* The word “are” is substituted in the transcript for “were.”

* This phrase was erroneously copied in the transcript as “Article 1, Sec-
tion 1,” but was corrected when printed.

* The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

‘The word “The” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

°In the transcript these three lines are changed to read as follows: “ Sev-
eral clauses,—for coining money—for regulating foreign coin,—for fixing the
standard of weights and measures,—were agreed to, nem. con.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1787 413

1“* To establish post-offices.’’ M! Gerry moved to add, and post-
roads. M? Mercer 2%¢ & on? question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Cino. N.J.no. Pen? no. Del. ay. M4 ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C, ay. Geo. ay.®

M* Gov: Morris moved to strike out ‘‘ and emit bills on the credit
of the U. States ’’—If the United States had credit such bills would
be unnecessary: if they had not, unjust & useless.

M Butter, 2% the motion.

M: Mapison, will it not be sufficient to prohibit the making them
a tender? This will remove the temptation to emit them with un-
just views. And promissory notes in that shape may in some emer-
gencies be best.

M: Gov! Morris. striking out the words will leave room still for
notes of a responsible minister which will do all the good without
the mischief. The Monied interest will oppose the plan of Govern-
ment, if paper emissions be not prohibited.

M: Guorvum was for striking out, without inserting any prohibi-
tion. if the words stand they may suggest and lead to the measure.

Col.t Mason had doubts on the subject. Cong? he thought would
not have the power unless it were expressed. Though he had a
mortal hatred to paper money, yet as he could not foresee all emer-
gences, he was unwilling to tie the hands of the Legislature. He
observed that the late war could not have been carried on, had such
a prohibition existed.

M: Guorum. The power as far as it will be necessary or safe, is
involved in that of borrowing.

M* Mercer was a friend to paper money, though in the present
state & temper of America, he should neither propose nor approve
of such a measure. He was consequently opposed to a prohibition of
it altogether. It will stamp suspicion on the Government to deny
it a discretion on this point. It was impolitic also to excite the
opposition of all those who were friends to paper money. The people
of property would be sure to be on the side of the plan, and it was
impolitie to purchase their further attachment with the loss of the
opposite class of Citizens

M: EvsewortH thought this a favorable moment to shut and bar
the door against paper money. The mischiefs of the various experi-

 

2 The words “The clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

2The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: ‘‘ Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, no—5.”

*The word “ Mr.” is substituted in the transcript for “Col.”
414 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ments which had been made, were now fresh in the public mind and
had excited the disgust of all the respectable part of America. By
witholding the power from the new Govern‘ more friends of influ-
ence would be gained to it than by almost any thing else. Paper
money can in no case be necessary. Give the Government credit, and
other resources will offer. The power may do harm, never good.

M: Ranpo.eH, notwithstanding his antipathy to paper money,
could not agree to strike out the words, as he could not foresee all
the occasions which? might arise.

M Witson. It will have a most salutary influence on the credit
of the U. States to remove the possibility of paper money. This
expedient can never succeed whilst its mischiefs are remembered,
and as long as it can be resorted to, it will be a bar to other
resources.

M: Butter. remarked that paper was a legal tender in no Coun-
try in Europe. He was urgent for disarming the Government of
such a power.

M: Mason was still averse to tying the hands of the Legislature
altogether. If there was no example in Europe as just remarked, it
might be observed on the other side, that there was none in which
the Government was restrained on this head.

M: Reap, thought the words, if not struck out, would be as
alarming as the mark of the Beast in Revelations.

M: Lanepon had rather reject the whole plan than retain the
three words ‘‘ (and emit bills’’)

On the motion for striking out

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Clay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 no.
V? ay.* N.C. ay. 8S. C. ay. Geo. ay?

The clause for borrowing money,* agreed to nem. con.

Adj

* This vote in the affirmative by Virg2 was occasioned by the acquiescence
of Mr Madison who became satisfied that striking out the words would not
disable the Govt from the use of public notes as far as they could he safe &

proper; & would only cut off the pretext for a paper currency, and particularly
for making the bills a tender* either for public or private debts.

 

* The word “that” is substituted in the transcript for “ which.”

7 In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,* North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; New Jersey, Maryland, no—2.”

* The transcript italicizes the words “ paper currency” and “a tender.”

‘The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 17, 1787 415

Fripay Aveust 1772 =n ConvENTION

Art VII. Sect. 1%? resumed. on the clause ‘‘ to appoint ®
Treasurer by ballot.’’

M: GuHorum moved to insert ‘‘ joint’’ before ballot, as more
convenient as well as reasonable, than to require the separate con-
currence of the Senate.

M! Pinkney 2® the motion. M* Superman opposed it as favor-
ing the larger States.

M! Reap moved to strike out the clause, leaving the appointment
of the Treasurer as of other officers to the Executive. The Legisla-
ture was an improper body for appointments. Those of the State
legislatures were a proof of it. The Executive being responsible
would make a good choice.

M:! Mercer 2% the motion of M: Read.

On the motion for inserting the word ‘‘ joint ’’ before ballot

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctno. N. J. no. P? ay. M4 no. V% ay.
N. C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.*

Col. Mason in opposition to M? Reads motion desired it might be
considered to whom the money would belong; if to the people, the
legislature representing the people ought to appoint the keepers of it.

On striking out the clause as amended by inserting ‘‘ Joint ’’

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no P* ay. Del. ay. M4 ay. V2 no.
N. C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. no.®

&*< Mo constitute inferior tribunals ’’* agreed to nem. con.®

‘To make rules as to captures on land & water ’’- d° d°°®

&“< To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies
&e’’ &e* considered.

M: Mapison moved to strike out ‘‘ and punishment ”’ &e.1?

M: Mason doubts the safety of it, considering the strict rule of

 

+See page 340.

2? The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Maryland, no—3.”

5In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
South Carolina, aye—4+; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia,
North Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

* The words “The clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

™The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The phrase “as also the clause” is here inserted in the transcript.

°The words “do. do.” are omitted in the transcript.

4¢The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.

11Jn the transcript the following phrase is here added: “after the words,
‘To declare the law.’”
416 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

construction in criminal cases. He doubted also the propriety of
taking the power in all these cases wholly from the States.

MZ Govern! Morris thought it would be necessary to extend the
authority farther, so as to provide for the punishment of counter-
feiting in general. Bills of exchange for example might be forged
in one State and carried into another:

It was suggested by some other member that foreign paper might
be counterfeited by Citizens; and that it might be politic to provide
by national authority for the punishment of it.

M* Ranpoteu did not conceive that expunging ‘‘ the punish-
ment ’’ would be a constructive exclusion of the power. He doubted
only the efficacy of the word ‘‘ declare.’’

M? Wison was in favor of the motion. Strictness was not neces-
sary in giving authority to enact penal laws; though necessary in
enacting & expounding them.

On motion? for striking out ‘‘ and punishment ’’ as moved by
M! Madison

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct no. P? ay. Del. ay. M? no. V? ay.
N. C. ay. 8S. C. ay. Geo. ay.”

M: Gov: Morris moved to strike out ‘‘ declare the law’’ and
insert ‘‘punish’’ before ‘‘piracies.’’ and on the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 ay. V? no.
N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

M® Mapison, and Mt RanpoLtPpH moved to insert, ‘‘ define &,”’ be-
fore ‘‘ punish.”’

M: Witson, thought ‘‘ felonies ’’ sufficiently defined by common
law.

M: DicKENSON concurred with M* Wilson.

M! MeERcER was in favor of the amendment.

M: Manison. felony at common law is vague. It is also defective.
One defect is supplied by Stat: of Anne as to running away with
vessels which at common law was a breach of trust only. Besides no
foreign law should be a standard farther than ‘* is expressly adopted—
If the laws of the States were to prevail on this subject, the citizens
of different States would be subject to different punishments for
the same offence at sea. There would be neither uniformity nor

 

*The words “the question” are substituted in the transcript for “motion.”

* In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Maryland, no—3.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut,
Virginia, North Carolina, no—3.”

“The word “it” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 17, 1787 414

stability in the law—The proper remedy for all these difficulties was
to vest the power proposed by the term ‘‘ define ’’ in the Nat! legis-
lature.

M* Gov! Morris would prefer designate to define, the latter being
as he he conceived, limited to the preexisting meaning.—

It was said by others to be applicable to the creating of offences
also, and therefore suited the case both of felonies & of piracies. The
motion of Mt M. & M? R was agreed to.

M: Exsewortu enlarged the motion so as to read “‘ to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, counter-
feiting the securities and current coin of the U. States, and offences
ag the law of Nations ’’ which was agreed to nem. con.

*** To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its
legislature.’’ ?

M* PINKNEY moved to strike out ‘‘on the application of its
legislature ’’

M* Gov! Morris 2%

M: L. Martin opposed it as giving a dangerous & unnecessary
power. The consent of the State ought to precede the introduction
of any extraneous force whatever.

M? Mercer supported the opposition of M= Martin.

M: ELsewortH proposed to add after “ legislature’ ‘‘ or Ex-
ecutive.”’

M' Gov? Morris. The Executive may possibly be at the head of
the Rebellion. The Gen! Gov! should enforce obedience in all cases
where it may be necessary.

M: EtsewortH. In many cases The Gen! Gov! ought not to be
able to interpose, unless called upon. He was willing to vary his
motion so as to read, ‘‘ or without it when the legislature cannot
meet.”’

M: Gerry was ag* Jetting loose the myrmidons of the U. States
on a State without its own consent. The States will be the best
Judges in such cases. More blood would have been spilt in Mass* in
the late insurrection, if the Gen! authority had intermeddled.

M* Lanepon was for striking out as moved by M! Pinkney. The
apprehension of the national force, will have a salutary effect in
preventing insurrections.

M: RanvotpH. If the Nat! Legislature is to judge whether the
State legislature can or cannot meet, that amendment would make
the clause as objectionable as the motion of M! Pinkney.

 

+The words “ The clause” are here inserted in the transcript.
? The phrase “was next considered” is here inserted in the transcript.
418 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M= Gov: Morris. We are acting a very strange part. We first
form a strong man to protect us, and at the same time wish to tie
his hands behind him, The legislature may surely be trusted with
such a power to preserve the public tranquility.

On the motion to add ‘‘ or without it [application] when the
legislature cannot meet ’’?

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. P? div? Del. no. M? no. V? ay.
N. C. div? §. C. ay. Geo. ay.2, So agreed to—*

M! Mapison and M! DickENSON moved to insert as explanatory,
after ‘‘ State ’’—‘‘ against the Government thereof’? There might
be a rebellion ag’ the U. States—which * was Agreed to nem. con.

On the clause as amended

N. H. ay. Mas* abst Ct ay. Pen. abst Del. no. M? no. V* ay.
N.C. no. S.C. no. Georg. ay—so it was lost.®

8«¢ To make war ”’

M! PINKNEY opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature.
Its proceedings were too slow. It wi meet but once a year. The H?
of Rep? would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate
would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign
affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions, If the States are
equally represented in? Senate, so as to give no advantage to” large
States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small
have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. It
would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace.

M: Buttrr. The objections ag** the Legislature lie in® great
degree ag’t the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the Presi-
dent, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make
war but when the Nation will support it.

M: Mapison and M! Gerry moved to insert ‘‘ declare,’’ striking
out ‘‘ make ’’ war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sud-
den attacks.

M? SHarman thought it stood very well. The Executive sh? be

*In the printed Journal, Mas. no.

 

* The phrase “it was agreed to” is here added in the transcript.

_, In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, Vir-
ginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland,
no—3; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, divided.”

* The words “So agreed to” are omitted in the transcript.

“The words “The motion” are substituted in the transcript for “ which.”

fe In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, Virginia,
Georgia, aye—4; Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—4;
Massachusetts,* Pennsylvania, absent. So it was lost.”

‘The words “The clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 17, 1787 419

able to repel and not to commence war. ‘‘ Make’’! better than
‘* declare ’’ the latter narrowing the power too much.

M: Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to em-
power the Executive alone to declare war.

M: Exswortu. there is a material difference between the cases
of making war and making peace. It sh? be more easy to get out of
war, than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration. peace
attended with intricate & secret negociations.

M: Mason was ag* giving the power of war to the Executive,
because not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not
so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather
than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred
“* declare ’’ to ‘‘ make.” .

On the motion to insert declare—in place of make, it was agreed to.

N. H. no. Mas. abst. Con! no.* P* ay, Del. ay. Mi ay. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M: PinkNEy’s motion to strike out® whole clause,* disag? to
without call of States.

M But Ler moved to give the Legislature ® power of peace, as they
were to have that of war.

M: Gerry 2% him. 8 Senators may possibly exercise the power
if vested in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may con-
sequently give up part of the U. States. The Senate are more liable
to be corrupted by an Enemy than the whole Legislature.

On the motion for adding ‘‘ and peace ”’ after ‘‘ war ’’7

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. P? no. Del. no. M2? no. V® no.
N.C. no S.C. no. Geo. no?

Adjourned

*2 Qn the remark by Mt King that “make” war might be understood to
“eonduct” it which was an Executive function, Mt Elseworth gave up his
objection, and the vote of Cont* was changed to—ay.

 

1The word “is” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The transcript here inserts the following: “ Connecticut voted in the nega-
tive; but.” ; ; .

2 The words “of Cont” are omitted in the transcript. .

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut,* Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; New
Hampshire, no—1; Massachusetts, absent.” ?

®The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

° The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript. _

™The transcript here adds the following: “it was unanimously negatived.”

® The vote by States is omitted.
420 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Saturpay Aucust 18. IN CONVENTION

M= Mapison submitted in order to be referred to the Committee
of detail the following powers as proper to be added to those of
the General Legislature

‘To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U. States’’

“‘To institute temporary Governments for New States arising
therein”’

“To regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as with-
out the limits of the U. States

“(Mo exercise exclusively Legislative authority at the Seat of the
General Government, and over a district around the same, not ex-
eeeding square miles; the Consent of the Legislature of the
State or States comprizing the same, being first obtained’

‘“‘To grant charters of incorporation in cases where the public
good may require them, and the authority of a single State may be
incompetent’’

‘“‘To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited
time”’

““To establish an University’’

‘“‘To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of
useful knowledge and discoveries’’

‘To authorize the Executive to procure and hold for the use
of the U. S. landed property for the erection of Forts, Magazines,
and other necessary buildings’’ 7

These propositions were referred to the Committee of detail
which had prepared the Report and at the same time the following
which were moved by M! Pinkney: in both cases unanimously.

‘‘To fix and permanently establish the seat of Government of
the U. S. in which they shall possess the exclusive right of soil &
jurisdiction”’

‘*To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the
arts & sciences’’

“To grant charters of incorporation’”’

“To grant patents for useful inventions’’

“To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time’’

‘“‘To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for
the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades and manufactures”’
_ “That funds which shall be appropriated for? payment of pub-
lie Creditors, shall not during the time of such appropriation, be
diverted or applied to any other purpose and that the Committee pre-
pare a clause or clauses for restraining the Legislature of the U. 8.
from establishing a perpetual revenue’’

 

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 18, 1787 421

‘‘To secure the payment of the public debt’’
‘“To secure all creditors under the New Constitution from a

violation of the public faith when pledged by the authority of the
Legislature’’

“To grant letters of mark and reprisal’’
“To regulate Stages on the post roads’”’

M: Mason introduced the subject of regulating the militia. He
thought such a power necessary to be given to the Gen! Government.
He hoped there would be no standing army in time of peace, unless
it might be for a few garrisons. The Militia ought therefore to be
the more effectually prepared for the public defence. Thirteen
States will never concur in any one system, if the displining of
the Militia be left in their hands. If they will not give up the power
over the whole, they probably will over a part as a select militia. He
moved as an addition to the propositions just referred to the Commit-
tee of detail, & to be referred in like manner, ‘‘ a power to regulate
the militia.’’

M: Gerry remarked that some provision ought to be made in
favor of public Securities, and something inserted concerning letters
of marque, which he thought not included in the power of war. He
proposed that these subjects should also go to a Committee.

M' RurtimwcE moved to refer a clause ‘‘ that funds appropriated
to public creditors should not be diverted to other purposes.”’

M! Mason was much attached to the principle, but was afraid
such a fetter might be dangerous in time of war. He suggested the
necessity of preventing the danger of perpetual revenue which must
of necessity subvert the liberty of any Country. If it be objected to:
on the principle of M: Rutlidge’s motion that public credit may
require perpetual provisions, that case might be excepted: it being
declared that in other cases, no taxes should be laid for a longer
term than years. He considered the caution observed in Great
Britain on this point as the paladium of the public liberty.

M™ Rutimwce’s motion was referred—He then moved that a
Grand Committee be appointed to consider the necessity and expedi-
ency of the U. States assuming all the State debts—A regular settle-
ment between the Union & the several States would never take place.
The assumption would be just as the State debts were contracted in
the common defence. It was necessary, as the taxes on imports the
only sure source of revenue were to be given up to the Union. It
was politic, as by disburdening the people of the State debts it would
conciliate them to the plan.

Mt Kineg and M! Pinkney seconded the motion
422 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

[Col. Mason interposed a motion that the Committee prepare a
clause for restraining perpétual revenue, which was agreed to nem.
con. ‘

ae Suerman thought it would be better to authorise the Legis-
lature to assume the State debts, than to say positively it should
be done. He considered the measure as just and that it would have
a good effect to say something about the Matter.

M: ExvsewortH differed from M! Sherman- As far as the State
debts ought in equity to be assumed, he conceived that they might and
would be so.

M: PINKNEY observed that a great part of the State debts were
of such a nature that although in point of policy and true equity
they ought, yet would they not be viewed in the light of fcederal
expenditures.

M: Kine thought the matter of more consequence than M! Hlse-
worth seemed to do; and that it was well worthy of commitment. .
Besides the considerations of justice and policy which had been men-
tioned, it might be remarked that the State Creditors an active and
formidable party would otherwise be opposed to a plan which trans-
ferred to the Union the best resources of. the States without trans-
ferring the State debts at the same time. The State Creditors had
generally been the strongest foes to the impost-plan. The State
debts probably were of greater amount than the federal. He would
not say that it was practicable to consolidate the debts, but he thought
it would be prudent to have the subject considered by a Committee.

On M' Rutlidge’s motion, that * Com? be appointed to consider of
the assumption &c ?

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. P? div’ Del. no. Mé no.
Ve ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M: Gerry’s motion to provide for public securities, for stages on
post-roads, and for letters of marque & reprisal, were® committed
nem. con.

M? Kine suggested that all unlocated lands of particular States
ought to be given up if State debts were to be assumed :—M! Wil-
liamson concurred in the idea.

 

* The words “to be” are here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript. ‘

* The transcript here adds the following: “it was agreed to.”

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, no—4; Pennsylvania, divided.”

i é Mi the transcript the word “were” is crossed out and “was” is written
above it. :
SESSION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 18, 1787 423

A Grand Committee was appointed consisting of * transfer hither
the appointment & names of the Committee. [The Com? appointed
by ballot were? M! Langdon, M" King, M! Sherman, M? Livingston,
M: Clymer, M? Dickenson, M! M°Henry, M! Mason, M! Williamson,
MC. C. Pinkney,? M? Baldwin. ]

M Rutiince remarked on the length of the Session, the prob-
able impatience of the public and the extreme anxiety of many
members of the Convention to bring the business to an end; con-
cluding with a motion that the Convention meet henceforward pre-
cisely at 10 OC. A. M. and that precisely at 4 OC. P. M. the President
adjourn the House without motion for the purpose. and that no
motion to adjourn sooner be allowed

On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. ay. P@ no. Del. ay. M4 no.
Viay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M: ELsewortH observed that a Council had not yet been pro-
vided for the President. He conceived there ought to be one. His
proposition was that it should be composed of the President of the
Senate—the Chief-Justice, and the ministers as they might be estab?
for the departments of foreign & domestic affairs, war finance and
marine, who should advise but not conclude the President.

M! PINKNEY wished the proposition to lie over, as notice had been
given for a like purpose by M? Gov! Morris who was not then on the
floor. His own idea was that the President sh? be authorised to
eall for advice or not as he might chuse. Give him an able Council
and it will thwart him; a weak one and he will shelter himself under
their sanction.

M: Gerry was ag* letting the heads of the departments, par-
ticularly of finance have any thing to do in business connected with
legislation. He mentioned the Chief Justice also as particularly ex-
ceptionable. These men will also be so taken up with other matters
as to neglect their own proper duties.

M! Dickenson urged that the great appointments should be made
by the Legislature, in which case they might properly be consulted
by the Executive, but not if made by the Executive himself—This
subject by general consent lay over; & the House proceeded to the
clause ‘‘ To raise armies.”’

1 Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.

2The phrase “The Come appointed by ballot were” is omitted in the
transcript. . :

2 The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.

“In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Pennsylvania, Maryland, no—2.”
424 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Mz Guorum moved to add ‘‘and support’’ after ‘‘ raise.’’

Agreed to nem. con. and then the clause* agreed to nem. con. as
amended

M! Gerry took notice that there was no check here ag*' standing
armies in time of peace. The existing Cong’ is so constructed that it
cannot of itself maintain an army. This w? not be the case under
the new system. The people were jealous on this head, and great
opposition to the plan would spring from such an omission. He sus-
pected that preparations of force were now making ag: it. [he
seemed to allude to the activity of the Gov' of N. York at this crisis in
disciplining the militia of that State.] He thought an army danger-
ous in time of peace & could never consent to a power to keep up an
indefinite number. He proposed that there shall? not be kept up in
time of peace more than thousand troops. His idea was that
the blank should be filled with two or three thousand.

Instead of ‘‘to build and equip fleets’’-—‘‘to provide & main-
tain a navy ’’* agreed to nem. con. as a more convenient definition of
the power.

4¢¢ To make rules for the Government and regulation of the land
& naval forces,’’* added from the existing Articles of Confederation.

M: L. Martin and M? Gerry now regularly moved ‘‘ provided
that in time of peace the army shall not consist of more than
thousand men.”’

Gen! Pinkney asked whether no troops were ever to be raised
untill an attack should be made on us?

M: Gerry. if there be no restriction, a few States may establish
a military Gov!

M? WILLIAMSON, reminded him of M? Mason’s motion for limiting
the appropriation of revenue as the best guard in this case.

M! Lane@pon saw no room for M! Gerry’s distrust of the Rep-
resentatives of the people.

M Dayton. preparations for war are generally made in * peace;
and a standing force of some sort may, for cught we know, become
unavoidable. He should object to no restrictions consistent with
these ideas.

The motion of M? Martin & M* Gerry was disagreed to nem. con.

M: Mason moved as an additional power ‘‘ to make laws for the
regulation and discipline of the militia of the several States, reserving

 

1 The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

? The word “should” is substituted in the transcript for “ shall.”
*The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The words “A clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

5 The words “time of” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 18, 1787 425

to the States the appointment of the officers.’’ He considered uni-
formity as necessary in the regulation of the Militia throughout the
Union.

Gen! PinKNEY mentioned a case during the war in which a dis-
similarity in the militia of different States had produced the most
serious mischiefs. Uniformity was essential. The States would never
keep up a proper discipline of their militia.

M: Exseworts was for going as far in submitting the militia to
the Gen! Government as might be necessary, but thought the motion
of M? Mason went too far. He moved that the militia should have
the same arms & exercise and be under rules established by the
Gen! Gov when in actual service of the U. States and when States
neglect to provide regulations for militia, it sht be regulated & estab-
lished by the Legislature of! U. S. The whole authority over the
Militia ought by no means to be taken away from the States whose
consequence would pine away to nothing after such a sacrifice of
power. He thought the Gen! Authority could not sufficiently per-
vade the Union for such a purpose, nor could it accomodate itself
to the local genius of the people. It must be vain to ask the States
to give the Militia out of their hands.

M: SHERMAN 2% the motion.

M: DicKENSON. We are come now to a most important matter,
that of the sword. His opinion was that the States never would nor
ought to give up all authority over the Militia. He proposed to re-
strain the general power to one fourth part at a time, which by
rotation would discipline the whole Militia.

M= Burtuer urged the necessity of submitting the whole Militia to
the general Authority, which had the care of the general defence.

M= Mason. had suggested the idea of a select militia. He was led
to think that would be in fact as much as the Gen! Govt could ad-
vantageously be charged with. He was afraid of creating insuperable
objections to the plan. He withdrew his original motion, and moved
a power ‘‘ to make laws for regulating and disciplining the militia,
not exceeding one tenth part in any one year, and reserving the
appointment of officers to the States.”’

Gen! PINKNEY, renewed M* Mason’s original motion. For a part
to be under the Gen! and? part under the State Gov w4 be an incur-
able evil. he saw no room for such distrust of the Gen! Gov!

Mz Lanepon 2% Gen! Pinkney’s renewal. He saw no more
reason to be afraid of the Gen! Gov! than of the State Gov’ He was

1 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
426 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

more apprehensive of the confusion of the different authorities on
this subject, than of either.

M: Mapison thought the regulation of the Militia naturally apper-
taining to the authority charged with the public defence. It did not
seem in its nature to be divisible between two distinct authorities.
If the States would trust the Gen! Govt with a power over the public
treasure, they would from the same consideration of necessity grant
it the direction of the public force. Those who had a full view of
the public situation w? from a sense of the danger, guard ag* it:
the States would not be separately impressed with the general sit-
uation, nor have the due confidence in the concurrent exertions of each
other.

M: ExseworrH. considered the idea of a select militia as im-
practicable; & if it were not it would be followed by a ruinous de-
clension of the great body of the Militia. The States will? never
submit to the same militia laws. Three or four shilling’s as a penalty
will enforce obedience better in New England, than forty lashes in
some other places.

M: Pinkney thought the power such an one as could not be
abused, and that the States would see the necessity of surrendering
it. He had however but a scanty faith in Militia. There must be
also a real military force. This alone can effectually answer the
purpose. The United States had been making an experiment without
it, and we see the consequence in their rapid approaches towards
anarchy.*

M: SHERMAN, took notice that the States might want their Militia
for defence ag%t invasions and insurrections, and for enforcing obe-
dience to their laws. They will not give up this point. In giving
up that of taxation, they retain a concurrent power of raising money
for their own use.

M: Gerry thought this the last point remaining to be surrendered.
If it be agreed to by the Convention, the plan will have as black a
mark as was set on Cain. He had no such confidence in the Gen!
Govt as some gentlemen professed, and believed it would be found
that the States have not.

Col. Mason. thought there was great weight in the remarks of
M: Sherman, and moved an exception to his motion ‘‘ of such part of
the Militia as might be required by the States for their own use.”’

M: Reap doubted the propriety of leaving the appointment of the

*This had reference to the disorders particularly which had occurred in
Massachts which had called for the interposition of the federal troops.

 

*The word “would” is substituted in the transcript for “will.” |
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1787 427

Militia officers in* the States. In some States they are elected by the
legislatures; in others by the people themselves. He thought at
least an appointment by the State Executives ought to be insisted on.
On * committing to the grand Committee last appointed, the latter
motion of Col. Mason, & the original one revived by Ge! Pinkney
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay. M3 div?
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.3
Adjourned

Monpay Aveust 20. 1n CoNVENTION,

M: PINKNEY submitted to the House, in order to be referred to
the Committee of detail, the following propositions—

‘*Hach House shall be the Judge of its own privileges, and shall
have authority to punish by imprisonment every person violating the
same; or who, in the place where the Legislature may be sitting and
during the time of its Session, shall threaten any of its members for
any thing said or done on the House—or who shall assault any of
them therefor—or who shall assault or arrest any witness or other
person ordered to attend either of the Houses in his way going or
returning; or who shall rescue any person arrested by their order.’’

‘*Each branch of the Legislature, as well as the supreme Execu-
tive shall have authority to require the opinions of the supreme
Judicial Court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn
occasions”’

‘<The privileges and benefit of the Writ of Habeas corpus shall
be enjoyed in this Government in the most expeditious and ample
manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature except upon
the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not
exceeding months.’’

‘‘The liberty of the Press shall be inviolably preserved”’

‘‘No troops shall be kept up in time of peace, but by consent of
the Legislature’”’

‘‘The military shall always be subordinate to the Civil power, and
no grants of money shall be made by the Legislature for supporting
military Land forces, for more than one year at a time’’

‘‘No soldier shall be quartered in any House in time of peace
without consent of the owner.”’

‘**No person holding the office of President of the U. 8., a Judge
of their supreme Court, Secretary for the department of Foreign
Affairs, of Finance, of Marine, of War, or of , Shall be capable

 

1The word “in” is crossed out in the transcript and “ to” is written above it.

2 The words “the question for” are here inserted in the transcript.

"In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
Connecticut, New Jersey, no—2; Maryland, divided.”
428 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of holding at the same time any other office of Trust or Emolument
under the U. S. or an individual State ’’

‘‘No religious test or qualification shall ever be annexed to any
oath of office under the authority of the U. S.’’

“‘The U. S. shall be for ever considered as one Body corporate and
politic in law, and entitled to all the rights privileges and immunities,
which to Bodies corporate do or ought to appertain”’

“The Legislature of the U. S. shall have the power of making the
great seal which shall be kept by the President of the U. S. or in
his absence by the President of the Senate, to be used by them as
the occasion may require.—lIt shall be called the great Seal of the
U. S. and shall be affixed to all laws.’’

‘‘All Commissions and writs shall run in the name of the U. S.”’

“The Jurisdiction of the supreme Court shall be extended to all
controversies between the U. S. and an individual State, or the U. S.
and the Citizens of an individual State’’

These propositions were referred to the Committee of detail with-
out debate or consideration of them, by the House.

M: Govt Morris 2% by M? PinKNEY submitted the following
propositions which were in like manner referred to the Committee of
Detail.

‘‘To assist the President in conducting the public affairs there
shall be a council of State composed of the following officers— 1.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall from time to
time recommend such alterations of and additions to the laws of
the U. 8. as may in his opinion, be necessary to the due administration
of Justice, and such as may promote useful learning and inculcate
sound morality throughout the Union: He shall be President of the
Council in the absence of the President

2. The Secretary of Domestic Affairs who shall be appointed by
the President and hold his office during pleasure. It shall be his
duty to attend to matters of general police, the State of Agriculture
and manufactures, the opening of roads and navigations, and the
facilitating communications thro’ the U. States; and he shall from
time to time recommend such measures and establishments as may
tend to promote those objects.

3. The Secretary of Commerce and Finance who shall also be
appointed by the President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to
superintend all matters relating to the public finances, to prepare &
report plans of revenue and for the regulation of expenditures, and
also to recommend such things as may in his Judgment promote the
commercial interests of the U. S.

4. The Secretary of foreign affairs who shall also be appointed
by the President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to correspond
with all foreign Ministers, prepare plans of Treaties, & consider
such as may be transmitted from abroad; and generally to attend to
the interests of the U. S. in their connections with foreign powers.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1787 429

5. The Secretary of War who shall also be appointed by the
President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to superintend every
thing relating tc the war-Department, such as the raising and
equipping of ‘troops, the care of military stores, public fortifications,
arsenals & the like—also in time of war to prepare & recommend plans
of offence and Defence.

6. The Secretary of the Marine who shall also be appointed
during pleasure—It shall be his duty to superintend every thing
relating to the Marine-Department, the public Ships, Dock-Yards,
Naval-Stores & arsenals—also in! time of war, to prepare and
recommend plans of offence and defence.

The President shall also appoint a Secretary of State to hold his
office during pleasure; who shall be Secretary to the Council of State,
and also public Secretary to the President. It shall be his duty to pre-
pare all public despatches from the President which he shall counter-
sign

The President may from time to time submit any matter to the
discussion of the Council of State, and he may require the written
opinions of any one or more of the members: But he shall in all
cases exercise his own judgment, and either Conform to such opinions
or not as he may think proper; and every officer abovementioned
shall be responsible for his opinion on the affairs relating to his
particular Department.

Each of the officers abovementioned shall be liable to impeach-
ment. & removal from office for neglect of duty malversation, or cor-
ruption’’

M: Gerry moved ‘‘ that the Committee be instructed to report
proper qualifications for the President, and? mode of trying the
Supreme Judges in cases of impeachment.

The clause ‘‘ to call forth the aid of the Militia &c. was post-
poned till report should be made as to the power over the Militia
referred yesterday to the Grand Committee of eleven.

M! Mason moved to enable Congress ‘‘ to enact sumptuary laws.”’
No Government can be maintained unless the manners be made con-
sonant to it. Such a discretionary power may do good and can do no
harm. A proper regulation of excises & of trade may do a great
deal but it is best to have an express provision. It was objected to
sumptuary laws that they were contrary to nature. This was a vulgar
error. The love of distinction it is true is natural; but the object
of sumptuary laws is not to extinguish this principle but to give it a
proper direction.

M: Etseworta. The best remedy is to enforce taxes & debts.

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
2The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.
430 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

As far as the regulation of eating & drinking can be reasonable, it is
provided for in the power of taxation.

M: Gov! Morris argued that sumptuary laws tended to create a
landed Nobility, by fixing in the great-landholders and their posterity
their present possessions.

M: Gerry. the law of necessity is the best sumptuary law.

On? Motion of M! Mason ‘“‘ as to Sumptuary laws ”’

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. ay. M4 ay.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. ay.”

3“¢ And to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by this
Constitution, in the Government of the U. S. or any department or
officer thereof.’’

M! Mapison and M PinKNEY, moved to insert between ‘‘ laws ”’
and ‘‘ necessary ’’ ‘‘ and establish all offices,’’ it appearing to them
liable to cavil that the latter was not included in the former.

M= Gov? Morris, M! Wiison, M: Rutiipce and M! EvseworrH
urged that the amendment could not be necessary.

On the motion for inserting ‘‘ and establish all offices ’’

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? ay.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

The clause as reported was then agreed to nem. con.

Art: VII sect. 2.5 concerning Treason which see.®

M!® Mapison, thought the definition too narrow. It did not appear
to go as far as the Stat. of Edw? III. He did not see why more
latitude might not be left to the Legislature. It wi be as safe as
in the hands of State legislatures; and it was inconvenient to bar
a discretion which experience might enlighten, and which might be
applied to good purposes as well as be abused.

M: Mason was for pursuing the Stat: of Edw? III

M! Gov! Morris was for giving to the Union an exclusive right to
declare what sh? be treason. In case of a contest between the U. S.
and a particular State, the people of the latter must, under the dis-
junctive terms of the clause, be traitors to one or other authority.

 

+The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

?In the transcript the vote reads: “ Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, aye—3;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, no—8.”

* The words “On the clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Maryland, aye—2; New
Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—9.”

5 See page 341.

°In the transcript the words “which see” are crossed out and the phrase |
“was then taken up” is written above them.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1787 431

M! RanpoLPH thought the clause defective in adopting the words
““in adhering ’’ only. The British Stat: adds, ‘‘ giving them aid
and comfort ’’ which had a more extensive meaning.

M‘ ELsewortH considered the definition as the same in fact with
that of the Statute.

M: Gov! Morris ‘‘ adhering ’’ does not go so far as ‘‘ giving aid
and Comfort’’ or the latter words may be restrictive of ‘‘adhering,”’
in either case the Statute is not pursued.

M? Witson held ‘‘ giving aid and comfort ’’ to be explanatory,
not operative words; and that it was better to omit them.

M: Dickenson, thought the addition of ‘‘ giving aid & comfort ’’
unnecessaty & improper; being too vague and extending too far.
He wished to know what was meant by the ‘‘ testimony of two wit-
nesses’’ whether they were to be witnesses to the same overt act or
to different overt acts. He thought also that proof of an overt-
act ought to be expressed as essential in the case.

Doc! JOHNSON considered ‘‘ giving aid & comfort ’’ as explana-
tory of ‘‘ adhering ’’ & that something should be inserted in the
definition concerning overt-acts. He contended that Treason could
not be both ag** the U. States—and individual States; being an
offence ag** the Sovereignty which can be but one in the same
community.

M: Mapison remarked that ‘‘ and’’ before ‘‘ in adhering ’’
should be changed into ‘‘ or ’’ otherwise both offences viz of levy-
ing war, & of adhering to the Enemy might be necessary to con-
stitute Treason. He added that as the definition here was of treason
against the U. S. it would seem that the individual States w! be left
in possession of a concurrent power so far as to define & punish
treason particularly ag*t themselves; which might involve double
punishm!

It was moved that the whole clause be recommitted which was
lost, the votes being equally divided.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. no. M$ ay.
V2? ay. N.C. divi S.C. no. Geo. ay.—?*

MI Witson & Doc! JoHNSON moved, that ‘‘ or any of them ”’
after ‘* United States ’’ be struck out in order to remove the embar-
rassment: which was agreed to nem. con.

M! Mapison. This had? not removed the embarrassment. The

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, Georgia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, South Carolina, no—5; North Carolina, divided.”

2 The word “has” is substituted in the transcript for “had.”
432 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

same Act might be treason ag%t the United States as here defined—
and ag* a particular State according to its laws.

M! ExsewortH. There can be no danger to the gen’ authority
from this; as the laws of the U. States are to be paramount.

Doc! JoHNSON was still of opinion there could be no Treason ag*
a particular State. It could not even at present, as the Confederation
now stands, the Sovereignty being in the Union; much less can it be
under the proposed system.

Col. Mason. The United States will have a qualified sovereignty
only. The individual States will retain a part of the Sovereignty.
An Act may be treason ag*' a particular State which is not so ag*
the U. States. He cited the Rebellion of Bacon in Virginia as an illus-
tration of the doctrine.

Doct JoHNsoN: That ease would amount to Treason ag** the
Sovereign, the Supreme Sovereign, the United States.

M: Kine observed that the controversy relating to Treason might
be of less magnitude than was supposed; as the Legislature might
punish capitally under other names than Treason.

M= Gov: Morris and M! Ranpo.pPH wished to substitute the words
of the British Statute and moved to postpone Sect 2. art VII in
order to consider the following substitute—‘ Whereas it is essential
to the preservation of liberty to define precisely and exclusively
what shall constitute the crime of Treason, it is therefore ordained,
declared & established, that if a man do levy war ag* the U. S.,
within their territories, or be adherent to the enemies of the U. S.
within the said territories, giving them aid and comfort within their
territories or elsewhere, and thereof be provably attainted of open
deed by the people of his condition, he shall be adjudged guilty of
Treason.”’

On this question

N.H. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. no. M4 no. V®* ay.
N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.2

It was* moved to strike out ‘‘ agst® United States’’ after
‘“ treason ’’ so as to define treason generally, and on this question

Mas. ay. Ctay. N.J.ay. P?ay. Del.ay. May. V2no. N.C. no.
8. C. ay. Geo. ay.4

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Virginia, aye—2; Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

* The word “then” is here inserted in the transcript.

> The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

In_the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusctts, Connecticut, New

Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Caroli i 5
Virginia, North Carolina, no—2.” aoe sisi bea a
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1787 433

It was then moved to insert after ‘‘ two witnesses ”’ the words “‘ to
the same overt act.’’

Doc! FRANKLIN wished this amendment to take place— prosecutions
for treason were generally virulent; and perjury too easily made use
of against innocence.

M: Witson. much may be said on both sides. Treason may
sometimes be practised in such a manner, as to render proof
extremely difficult—as in a traitorous correspondence with an
Enemy.

On the question—as to same overt act

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Chay. N. J. no. P* ay. Del. ay. Mé ay.
Vi no. N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M: Kina moved to insert before the word “ power ”’ the word
** sole,’’ giving the U. States the exclusive right to declare the punish-
ment of Treason.

M: Broom 2% the motion.

M? Witson in cases of a general nature, treason can only be
ag:' the U— States. and in such they sh? have the sole right to
declare the punishment—yet in many cases it may be otherwise. The
subject was however intricate and he distrusted his present judgment
on it.

M Kine this amendment results from the vote defining, treason
generally by striking out ag the U. States; which excludes any
treason ag*t particular States. These may however punish offences
as high misdemesnors.

On ? inserting the word ‘‘ sole.’? It passed in the negative

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci no. N.J.no. Pt ay. Del. ay. M? no.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. no—?

M? Witson. the clause is ambiguous now. ‘‘ Sole ’’ ought either
to have been inserted- or ‘‘against the U. 8.”’ to be re-instated.

M: Kine no line can be drawn between levying war and adher-
ing to* enemy- ag the U. States and ag*t an individual State—
Treason ag*' the latter must be so agst the former.

M: SHERMAN, resistance ag* the laws of the U. States as dis.
tinguished from resistance ag** the laws of a particular State, forms
the line.

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, no—3.” : ;

2 The words “ the question for” are here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, aye—5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no—6.” .

‘The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
434 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Erseworts. the U. S. are sovereign on their+ side of the line
dividing the jurisdictions—the States on the other—each ought to
have power to defend their respective Sovereignties.

M: DIcKENSON, war or insurrection ag** a member of the Union
must be so ag*t the whole body; but the Constitution should be made
clear on this point.

The clause was reconsidered nem. con—& then, M? Witson & M°
ELsEworTH moved to reinstate ‘‘ agst the U. S.’”’ after ‘‘ Treason ’’—
on which question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. no. Mi? ay.
Viay. N. Cray. S.C. no. Geo. ay.?

Mz Mapison was not satisfied with the footing on which the clause
now stood. As Treason ag’ the U. States involves treason ag** par-
ticular States, and vice versa, the same act may be twice tried &
punished by the different authorities. M* Gov: Morris viewed the
matter in the same light—

It was moved & 2%4 to amend the sentence to read—‘‘ Treason
ag the U. 8. shall consist only in levying war against them, or in
adhering to their enemies’’ which was agreed to.

Col. Mason moved to insert the words ‘‘ giving them aid* com-
fort,’’ as restrictive of ‘‘ adhering to their Enemies &c.’’ the latter he
thought would be otherwise too indefinite—This motion was agreed
to: Cont Del: & Georgia only being in the Negative.

M: L. Martin moved to insert after conviction &e—‘‘ or on con-
fession in open court’’—and on the question, (the negative States
thinking the words superfluous) it was agreed to

N. H: ay. Mas. no. Chay. N. J. ay. P. ay. Del. ay. M? ay.
V? ay. N.C. div’ 8. C. no. Geo. no.*

Art: VII. Sect. 2, as amended was then agreed to nem. con.

5 Sect. 3° taken up ‘‘ white & other ’’ struck out nem. con. as
superfluous.

M*! ExvsewortH moved to require the first census to be taken

 

*The word “one” is substituted in the transcript for “ their.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no—5.”

* The word “and ” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—7; Massachusetts,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—3; North Carolina, divided.”

° Jn the transcript this sentence reads as follows: “ Article 7, Sect. 3 was
taken up. The words ‘white and others,’ were struck out”. . .

* See page 341.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1787 435

within ‘‘three’’ instead of ‘‘six’’ years from the first meeting
of the Legislature—and on? question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay: Pt ay. Del. ay. M4 ay
V? ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

M? Kine asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation?
No one answ?

M® Gerry moved to add to the* 3% Sect. art. VII, the following
clause ‘‘That from the first meeting, of the Legislature of the U. S.
until a Census shall be taken all monies for supplying the public
Treasury by direct taxation shall be raised from the several States
according to the number of their Representatives respectively in the
first branch ”’

M: Lanepon. This would bear unreasonably hard on N: H. and
he must be ag* it.

M: Carrou. opposed it. The number of Rep! did not admit of a
proportion exact enough for a rule of taxation.

Before any question the House

Adjourned

Turspay August 21. In ConvENTION

Governour Livincston from the Committee of Eleven to whom
was referred the propositions respecting the debts of the several
States and also the Militia entered on the 18 inst: delivered the
following report:

“‘The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to fulfil the en-
gagements which have been entered into by Congress, and to discharge
as well the debts of the U. S. as the debts incurred by the several
States during the late war, for the common defence and general wel-
fare’’

‘*To make laws for organizing arming and disciplining the militia,
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the U. 8. reserving to the States respectively, the appoint-
ment of the officers, and the authority of training the Militia accord-
ing to the discipline prescribed by the U. States’’

M: Gerry considered giving the power only, without adopting the
obligation, as destroying the security now enjoyed by the public

 

1 The word “the ” is here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, aye—9; South Carolina, Georgia, no—2.”

*The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.
436 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

creditors of the U— States. He enlarged on the merit of this class
of citizens, and the solemn faith which had been pledged under the
existing Confederation. If their situation should be changed as
here proposed great opposition would be excited ag*t the plan. He
urged also that as the States had made different degrees of exertion
to sink their respective debts, those who had done most would be
alarmed, if they were now to be saddled with a share of the debts
of States which had done least.

M: Suerman. It means neither more nor less than the confed-
eration as it relates to this subject.

M: ExvsEwortH moved that the Report delivered in by Gov? Liv-
ingston should lie on the tablet Agreed to nem. con.

Art: VII. Sect. 3.2 resumed.—M! DickENson moved to postpone
this in order to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 4. and to limit the number of
representatives to be allowed to the large States. Unless this were
done the small States would be reduced to entire insignificancy,? and
encouragement given to the importation of slaves.

M: SHERMAN would agree to such a reconsideration, but did not
see the necessity of postponing the section before the House.—M:
DickENSON withdrew his motion.

Art: VII. Sect. 3.4 then agreed to 10 ays. Delaware alone being ®
no.

M! SHERMAN moved to add to Sect. 3. the following clause ‘‘and
all accounts of supplies furnished, services performed, and monies
advanced by the several States to the U. States, or by the U. S. to the
Several States shall be adjusted by the same rule ”’

MM: Govern? Morris 2% the motion.

M: GuHorvum, thought it wrong to insert this in the Constitution.
The Legislature will no doubt do what is right. The present Con-
gress have such a power and are now exercising it.

M* SHERMAN unless some rule be expressly given none will exist
under the new system.

M: ExsewortH. Though The contracts of Congress will be bind-
ing, there will be no rule for executing them on the States; and one
ought to be provided.

M: SHERMAN withdrew his motion to make way for one of M?
WiuiAMson to add to Sect. 3. ‘‘By this rule the several quotas of the
States shall be determined in Settling the expences of the late war.”’

> The words “which was” are here inserted in the transcript.

* The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “ insignificancy ” is changed to “ insignificance” in the transcript.

‘The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The word “being” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1787 437

M: Carrot brought into view the difficulty that might arise on
this subject from the establishment of the Constitution as intended
without the unanimous consent of the States

M* Williamson’s motion was postponed nem- con-

Art: VI Sect. 12.1 which had been postponed Aug: 15.2 was now
called for by Col. Mason, who wished to know how the proposed
amendment as to money bills would be decided, before he agreed to
any further points.

M: Gerry’s motion of yesterday that previous to a census, direct
taxation be proportioned on the States according to the number of
Representatives, was taken up. He observed that the principal acts
of Government would probably take place within that period, and it
was but reasonable that the States should pay in proportion to their
share in them.

M: EvsewortH thought such a rule unjust. there was a great
difference between the number of Represent’, and the number of in-
habitants as a rule in this case. Even if the former were proportioned
as nearly as possible to the latter, it would be a very inaccurate rule.
A State might have one Representative only that had inhabitants
enough for 1% or more, if fractions could be applied, &¢—. He pro-
posed to amend the motion by adding the words ‘‘subject to a final
liquidation by the foregoing rule when a census shall have been
taken.’’

M! Mapison. The last apportionment of Cong’, on which the
number of Representatives was founded, was conjectural and meant
only as a temporary rule till a Census should be established.

M! Reap. The requisitions of Cong? had been accomodated to
the the impoverishments produced by the war; and to other local and
temporary circumstances—

M: Wituiamson opposed M: Gerry’s motion

M! Lanepon was not here when N. H. was allowed three mem-
bers. If* it was more than her share; he did not wish for them.

M: Burier contended warmly for M: Gerry’s motion as founded
in reason and equity.

M: EvsewortH’s proviso to M* Gerry’s motion was agreed to
nem. con.

M: Kine thought the power of taxation given to the Legislature
rendered the motion of M: Gerry altogether unnecessary.

 

+See page 340. : :

2 The words “on the fifteenth of August” are substituted in the transcript
for “ Aug: 15.” 7 ;

*The word “if” is omitted in the transcript.
438 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

On M= Gerry’s motion as amended

N: H. no. Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? no.
V2 no. N. Ci. div? 8. C. ay. Geo. no.

On a question, Shall Art: VI Sect. 12. with the amendment to
it proposed & entered on the 15 instant, as called for by Col. Mason
be now taken up? it passed in the Negative.

N. H. ay. Mas no. Ctay. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no?

M: L. Martin. The power of taxation is most likely to be criti-
cised by the public. Direct taxation should not be used but in case
of absolute necessity; and then the States will be best Judges of
the mode. He therefore moved the following addition to Sect: 3. Art:
VII ‘‘ And whenever the Legislature of the U: S: shall find it neces-
sary that revenue should be raised by direct taxation, having appor-
tioned the same, according to the above rule on the several States,
requisitions shall be made of the respective States to pay into the
Continental Treasury their respective quotas within a time in the
said requisitions specified, and in case of any of the States failing to
comply with such requisitions, then and then only to devise and pass
acts directing the mode, and authorizing the collection of the same’”’

M: M°Henry 2%? the motion—there was no debate, and on the
question

N. H.no. Cino. N. J. ay. Pen? no. Del. no. Mé div? (Jenifer
& Carrol no). V2no. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

Art. VII. Sect. 4.4 5—M? Lanepon. by this section the States are
left at liberty to tax exports. N. H. therefore with other non-
exporting States, will be subject to be taxed by the States exporting
its produce. This could not be admitted. It seems to be feared that
the Northern States will oppress the trade of the South? This may
be guarded ag*t by requiring the concurrence of % or % of the legis-
lature in such cases.

M: Evsewortu. It is best as it stands. The power of regulating
trade between the States will protect them ag%t each other. Should
this not be the case, the attempts of one to tax the produce of another

 

*In the transcript the vote reads “ Massachusetts, South Carolina, aye—2;
New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, Georgia, no—8; North Carolina, divided.” é

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, Vir-
ginia, Maryland, North Carolina, aye—5; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, aye—l1; New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no—8; Maryland, divided [Jenifer and Carroll, no].”

‘See page 341.

° The words “was then taken up” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1787 439

passing through its hands, will force a direct exportation and defeat
themselves. There are solid reasons ag‘t Cong? taxing exports. 1.1 it
will discourage industry, as’ faxes on imports discourage luxury.
2.1 The produce of different States is such as to prevent uniformity
in such taxes. There are indeed but a few articles that could be
taxed at all; as Tob? rice & indigo, and a tax on these alone would
be partial & unjust. 3.1 The taxing of exports would engender
incurable jealousies.

M? Wuu1amson. Tho’ N. C. has been taxed by Virg? by a duty
on 12,000 Hhs of her Tob? exported thro’ Virg? yet he would never
agree to this power. Should it take take place, it would distroy the
last hope of an adoption of the plan.

M* Gov: Morris. These local considerations ought not to impede
the general interest. There is great weight in the argument, that
the exporting States will tax the produce of their uncommercial
neighbours. The power of regulating the trade between P* & N.
Jersey will never prevent the former from taxing the latter. Nor
will such a tax force a direct exportation from N. Jersey. The ad-
‘vantages possessed by a large trading City, outweigh the disadvantage
of a moderate duty; and will retain the trade in that channel. If
no tax can be laid on exports, an embargo cannot be laid though in
time of war such a measure may be of critical importance. Tobacco,
lumber and live-stock are three objects belonging to different States,
of which great advantage might be made by a power to tax exports.
‘To these may be added Ginseng and Masts for Ships by which a tax
might be thrown on other nations. The idea of supplying the West
Indies with lumber from Nova Scotia is one of the many follies of
lord Sheffield’s pamphlets. The State of the Country also will change,
and render duties on exports, as skins, beaver & other peculiar raw
materials, politic in the view of encouraging American Manufactures.

M:! Burtier was strenuously opposed to a power over exports; as
unjust and alarming to the Staple-States.

M! Lanepon suggested a prohibition on the States from taxing
the produce of other States exported from their harbours.

M: Dickenson. The power of taxing exports may be inconven-
ient at present; but it must be of dangerous consequence to prohibit
it with respect to all articles and for ever. He thought it would be
better to except particular articles from the power.

M: Suerman. It is best to prohibit the National legislature in
all cases. The States will never give up all power over trade. An

 

1The figures “1,” “2” and “3” are changed in the transcript to “ Firat,”
“Secondly ” and “ Thirdly.”
440 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

enumeration of particular articles would be difficult invidious and
improper.

M: Mapison .As we aught to be governed by national and per-
manent views, it is a sufficient argument for giving y® power over
exports that a tax, tho’ it may not be expedient at present, may be
so hereafter. A proper regulation of exports may & probably will be
necessary hereafter, and for the same purposes as the regulation of
imports; viz, for revenue—domestic manufactures—and procuring
equitable regulations from other nations. An Embargo may be of
absolute necessity, and can alone be effectuated by the Gen} authority.
The regulation of trade between State and State can not effect more
than indirectly to hinder a State from taxing its own exports; by
authorizing its Citizens to carry their commodities freely into a
neighbouring State which might decline taxing exports in order to
draw into its channel the trade of its neighbours. As to the fear of
disproportionate burdens on the more exporting States, it might be
remarked that it was agreed on all hands that the revenue w? prin-
cipally be drawn from trade, and as only a given revenue would be
needed, it was not material whether all should be drawn wholly from
imports—or half from those, and half from exports. The imports
and exports must be pretty nearly equal in every State—and rela-
tively the same among the different States.

M' ExseworrH did not conceive an embargo by the Congress in-
terdicted by this section.

M: M°HEnry conceived that power to be included in the power
of war.

M: Wison. Pennsylvania exports the produce of Mary’ N.
Jersey, Delaware & will by & by when the River Delaware is opened,
export for N- York. In favoring the general power over exports
therefore, he opposed the particular interest of his State. He re-
marked that the power had been attacked by reasoning which could
only have held good in case the Gen! Govt had been compelled, in-
stead of authorized, to lay duties on exports. To deny this power is
to take from the Common Gov! half the regulation of trade. It was
his opinion that a power over exports might be more effectual than
that over imports in obtaining beneficial treaties of commerce

M? Gerry was strenuously opposed to the power over exports. It
might be made use of to compel the States to comply with the will
of the Gen! Government, and to grant it any new powers which
might be demanded. We have given it more power already than we
know how will be exercised. It will enable the Gen! Gov! to oppress
the States as much as Ireland is oppressed by Great Britain.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1787 441

M: FirzimMons would be ag* a tax on exports to be laid imme-
diately ; but was for giving a power of laying the tax when a proper
time may call for it. This would certainly be the case when America
should become a manufacturing Country. He illustrated his argu-
ment by the duties in G. Britain on wool &e.

Col. Mason. If he were for reducing the States to mere corpora-
tions as seemed to be the tendency of some arguments, he should be
for subjecting their exports as well as imports to a power of general
taxation. He went on a principle often advanced & in which he con-
eurred, that ‘‘ a majority when interested will oppress the minority.’’
This maxim had been verified by our own Legislature [of Virginia].
If we compare the States in this point of view the 8 Northern States
have an interest different from the five South? States; and have in
one branch of the legislature 36 votes ags' 29. and in the other, in
the proportion of 8 ag 5. The Southern States had therefore good
ground for their suspicions. The case of Exports was not the same
with that of imports. The latter were the same throughout the States:
The former very different. As to Tobacco other nations do raise it,
and are capable of raising it as well as Virg? &c. The impolicy of taxing
that article had been demonstrated by the experiment of Virginia.

M: CiyMer remarked that every State might reason with regard
to its particular productions, in the same manner as the Southern
States. The middle States may apprehend an oppression of their
wheat flour, provisions &c. and with more reason, as these articles
were exposed to a competition in foreign markets not incident to
Tob? rice &c. They may apprehend also combinations ag%* them be-
tween the Eastern & Southern States as much as the latter can appre-
hend them between the Eastern & middle. He moved as a qualifica-
tion of the power of taxing Exports that’ it should be restrained to
regulations of trade, by inserting after the word ‘‘ duty ’’ Sect 4
art VII the words, ‘‘ for the purpose of revenue.’’

On* Question on M? Clymer’s motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M? no.
Vino. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

M! Mapison. In order to require % of each House to tax exports
—as a lesser evil than a total prohibition moved to insert the words
“unless by consent of two thirds of the Legislature.’’

M Wuson 2% and on this question, it passed in the Negative.

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript. -

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”
442 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M? no,
V? no [Col. Mason, M! Randolph, M: Blair no. Gen’ Washington &
J. M. ay.] N. C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. not

2 Question on Sect: 4. art VII. as far as to ‘‘ no tax sh’ be laid
on exports—It passed in the affirmative.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Chay. N. J. no. P@ no. Del. no. M8 ay.
V2 ay (Gen! W. & J. M. no) N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M: L. Marrin, proposed to vary the Sect: 4. art VII. so as to
allow a prohibition or tax on the importation of slaves. 1.* as five
slaves are to be counted as 3 free men in the apportionment of Rep-
resentatives; such a clause wi leave an encouragement to this trafic.
2.5 slaves weakened one part of the Union which the other parts were
bound to protect: the privilege of importing them was therefore
unreasonable. 3.° it was inconsistent with the principles of the revo-
lution and dishonorable to the American character to have such a
feature in the Constitution.

M: Rutuipce did not see how the importation of slaves could be
encouraged by this Section. He was not apprehensive of insurrec-
tions and would readily exempt the other States from the obligation
to protect the Southern against them.— Religion & humanity had
nothing to do with this question. Interest alone is the governing
principle with nations. The true question at present is whether the
South? States shall or shall not be parties to the Union. If the
Northern States consult their interest, they will not oppose the in-
crease of Slaves which will increase the commodities of which they
will become the carriers.

M: ExsewortH was for leaving the clause as it stands. let every
State import what it pleases. The morality or wisdom of slavery are
considerations belonging to the States themselves. What enriches a
part enriches the whole, and the States are the best judges of their
particular interest. The old confederation had not meddled with
this point, and he did not see any greater necessity for bringing it
within the policy of the new one:

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye—5; Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia [Col.
Mason, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Blair, no; General Washington, Mr. Madison, aye]
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

? The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

>In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland,
Virginia [Genl. Washington and Mr. Madison, no] North Carolina, South Caro-
peer Georgia, aye—7; New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
n 22

* The figure “1” is changed in the transcript to “In the first place.”

° The figure “2” is changed in the transcript to “In the second place.”

°The figure “3” is changed in the transcript to “And in the third place.”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1787 443

M: Pinkney. South Carolina can never receive the plan if it
prohibits the slave trade. In every proposed extension of the powers
of the Congress, that State has expressly & watchfully excepted that of
meddling with the importation of negroes. If the States be all left
at liberty on this subject, S. Carolina may perhaps by degrees do of
herself what is wished, as Virginia & Maryland have already + done.

Adjourned

WEDNESDAY AuGusT 22. In CONVENTION.

Art VII sect 4.” * resumed. M? Suerman was for leaving the
clause as it stands. He disapproved of the slave trade; yet as the
States were now possessed of the right to import slaves, as the public
good did not require it to be taken from them, & as it was expedient to
have as few objections as possible to the proposed scheme of Govern-
ment, he thought it best to leave the matter as we find it. He
observed that the abolition of Slavery seemed to be going on in the
U. S. & that the good sense of the several States would probably
by degrees compleat it. He urged on the Convention the necessity of
despatching its business.

Col. Mason. This infernal trafic originated in the avarice of
British Merchants. The British Gov‘ constantly checked the at-
tempts of Virginia to put a stop to it. The present question con-
cerns not the importing States alone but the whole Union. The evil of
having slaves was experienced during the late war. Had slaves
been treated as they might have been by the Enemy, they would have
proved dangerous instruments in their hands. But their folly dealt
by the slaves, as it did by the Tories. He mentioned the dangerous
insurrections of the slaves in Greece and Sicily; and the instructions
given by Cromwell to the Commissioners sent to Virginia, to arm
the servants & slaves, in case other means of obtaining its submission
should fail. Maryland & Virginia he said had already prohibited
the importation of slaves expressly. N. Carolina had done the same
in substance. All this would be in vain if 8. Carolina & Georgia
be at liberty to import. The Western people are already calling out
for slaves for their new lands, and will fill that Country with slaves
if they can be got thro’ S. Carolina & Georgia. Slavery discourages

 

1The words “have already” are transposed in the transcript to read

“already have.”

? See page 341. : ;
® The word “ was” is here inserted in the transcript.
444. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

‘ arts & manufactures. The poor despise labor when performed by
slaves. They prevent the immigration of Whites, who really enrich
& strengthen a Country. They produce the most pernicious effect on
manners. Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They
bring the judgment of heaven on a Country. As nations can not
be rewarded or punished in the next world they must be in this.
By an inevitable chain of causes & effects providence punishes
national sins, by national calamities. He lamented that some of our
Eastern brethren had from a lust of gain embarked in this nefarious
traffic. As to the States being in possession of the Right to import,
this was the case with many other rights, now to be properly given
up. He held it. essential in every point of view that the Gen’ Gov!
should have power to prevent the increase of slavery.

M: ExvswortH. As he had never owned a slave could not judge
of the effects of slavery on character: He said however that if it was
to be considered in a moral light we ought to go farther and free
those already in the Country.—As slaves also multiply so fast in
Virginia & & Maryland that it is cheaper to raise than import them,
whilst in the sickly rice swamps foreign supplies are necessary, if
we go no farther than is urged, we shall be unjust towards S. Caro-
lina & Georgia. Let us not intermeddle. As population increases
poor laborers will be so plenty as to render slaves useless. Slavery
in time will not be a speck in our Country. Provision is already
made in Connecticut for abolishing it. And the abolition has already
taken place in Massachussets. As to the danger of insurrections from
foreign influence, that will become a motive to kind treatment of the
slaves.

M: Pinxney. If slavery be wrong, it is justified by the example
of all the world. He cited the case of Greece Rome & other antient
States; the sanction given by France England, Holland & other mod-
ern States. In all ages one half of mankind have been slaves. If
the 8S. States were let alone they will probably of themselves stop
importations. He w? himself as a Citizen of S. Carolina vote for it.
An attempt to take away the right as proposed will produce serious
objections to the Constitution which he wished to see adopted.

General PINKNEY declared it to be his firm opinion that if him-
self & all his colleagues were to sign the Constitution & use their
personal influence, it would be of no avail towards obtaining the
assent of their Constituents. S. Carolina & Georgia cannot do without
slaves. As to Virginia she will gain by stopping the importations.
Her slaves will rise in value, & she has more than she wants. It
would be unequal to require 8. C. & Georgia to confederate on such
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1787 445

unequal terms. He said the Royal assent before the Revolution had
never been refused to S. Carolina as to Virginia. He contended
that the importation of slaves would be for the interest of the whole
Union. The more slaves, the more produce to employ the carrying
trade; The more consumption also, and the more of this, the more of
revenue for the common treasury. He admitted it to be reasonable
that slaves should be dutied like other imports, but should consider
a rejection of the clause as an exclusion of S. Carol? from the Union.

M: Bautpwin had conceived national objects alone to be before
the Convention, not such as like the present were of a local nature.
Georgia was decided on this point. That State has always hitherto
supposed a Gen! Governm! to be the pursuit of the central States
who wished to have a vortex for every thing—that her distance
would preclude her from equal advantage—& that she could not
prudently purchase it by yielding national powers. From this it
might be understood in what light she would view an attempt to
abridge one of her favorite prerogatives. If left to herself, she may
probably put a stop to the evil. As one ground for this conjecture,
he took notice of the sect of which he said was a respectable
class of people, who carried their ethics beyond the mere equality
of men, extending their humanity to the claims of the whole animal
creation.

M! WILSON observed that if S. C. & Georgia were themselves dis-
posed to get rid of the importation of slaves in a short time as had
been suggested, they would never refuse to Unite because the im-
portation might be prohibited. As the Section now stands all articles
imported are to be taxed. Slaves alone are exempt. This is in fact
a bounty on that article.

M: Gerry thought we had nothing to do with the conduct of the
States as to Slaves, but ought to be careful not to give any sanction
to it.

M: DIcKENSON considered it as inadmissible on every principle
of honor & safety that the importation of slaves should be authorised
to the States by the Constitution. The true question was whether
the national happiness would be promoted or impeded by the impor-
tation, and this question ought to be left to the National Gov‘ not to
the States particularly interested. If Eng? & France permit slavery,
slaves are at the same time excluded from both those Kingdoms.
Greece and Rome were made unhappy by their slaves. He could not
believe that the South? States would refuse to confederate on the
account apprehended; especially as the power was not likely to be
immediately exercised by the Gen! Government.
446 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 178%.

M! Wi.uaMson stated the law of N. Carolina on the subject,
to wit that it did not directly prohibit the importation of slaves.
It imposed a duty of £5. on each slave imported from Africa. £10 on
each from elsewhere, & £50 on each from a State licensing manu-
mission. He thought the S. States could not be members of the
Union if the clause sh? be rejected, and that it was wrong to force
any thing down, not absolutely necessary, and which any State must
disagree to.

M: Kine thought the subject should be considered in a political
light only. If two States will not agree to the Constitution as stated
on one side, he could affirm with equal belief on the other, that great
& equal opposition would be experienced from the other States. He
remarked on the exemption of slaves from duty whilst every other
import was subjected to it, as an inequality that could not fail to
strike the commercial sagacity of the North? & middle States.

M: Lanepon was strenuous for giving the power to the Gen!
Govt He c? not with a good conscience leave it with the States who
could then go on with the traffic, without being restrained by the
opinions here given that they will themselves cease to import slaves.

Gen! Pingney thought himself bound to declare candidly that he
did not think S. Carolina would stop her importations of slaves in
any short time, but only stop them occasionally as she now does.
He moved to commit the clause that slaves might be made liable to
an equal tax with other imports which he he thought right & w® wi re-
move one difficulty that had been started.

M: Rutitwer. If the Convention thinks that N. C. 8. C. &
Georgia will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import
slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The people of those
States will never be such fools as to give up so important an interest.
He was strenuous ag* striking out the Section, and seconded the
motion of Gen! Pinkney for a commitment.

M*! Gov! Morris wished the whole subject to be committed in-
cluding the clauses relating to taxes on exports & to a navigation-
act. These things may form a bargain among the Northern &
Southern States.

M: Butter declared that he never would agree to the power of
taxing exports.

M? SHERMAN said it was better to let the S. States import slaves
than to part with them, if they made that a sine qua non. He was
opposed to a tax on slaves imported as making the matter worse,
because it implied they were property. He acknowledged that if the
power of prohibiting the importation should be given to the Gen!
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1787 447

Government that it would be exercised. He thought it would be its
duty to exercise the power.

M: Reap was for the commitment provided the clause concerning
taxes on exports should also be committed,

M* SHERMAN observed that that clause had been agreed to &
therefore could not? committed.

M? RanpotPH was for committing in order that some middle
ground might, if possible, be found. He could never agree to the
clause as it stands. He w4 sooner risk the constitution. He dwelt
on the dilemma to which the Convention was exposed. By agreeing
to the clause, it would revolt the Quakers, the Methodists, and many
others in the States having no slaves. On the other hand, two States
might be lost to the Union. Let us then, he said, try the chance of
a commitment. ,

On the question for committing the remaining part of Sect. 4 & 5.
of art: 7. N. H. no. Mas. abst Cont ay N. J. ay P2 no. Del. no
Mary! ay. V* ay. N. C. ay 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.®

M PINKNEY & M: Lanepon moved to commit Sect. 6.2 as to * navi-
gation act by two thirds of each House

M: GorHam did not see the propriety of it. Is it meant to require
a greater proportion of votes? He desired it to be remembered that
the Eastern States had no motive to Union but a commercial
one. They were able to protect themselves. They were not
afraid of external danger, and did not need the aid of the South?
States.

M: Witson wished for a commitment in order to reduce the pro-
portion of votes required.

M! Exswortu was for taking the plan as it is. This widening of
opinions has ® a threatening aspect. If we do not agree on this middle
& moderate ground he was afraid we should lose two States, with
such others as may be disposed to stand aloof, should fly into a variety
of shapes & directions, and most probably into several confederations
and not without bloodshed.

On* Question for committing 6 Sect. as to* navigation act to a

 

The word “be” is here inserted in the transcript.

? See page 341. ;

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, no—3; Massachusetts, absent.”

‘The word “a” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The word “had” is substituted in the transcript for “has.”

°'The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
448 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

member from each State—N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. no.
P* ay. Del. ay. May. V? ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.’

The Committee appointed were M: Langdon, King, Johnson,
Livingston, Clymer, Dickenson, L. Martin, Madison, Williamson, C.
C. Pinkney, & Baldwin.

To this committee were referred also the two clauses abovemen-
tioned, of the 4 & 5. Sect: of Art. 7.

M: Ruriipex, from the Committee to whom were referred on the
18 & 20 instant the propositions of M: Madison & M? Pinkney, made
the Report following.—

[Here insert the Report from the Journal of the Convention of this
date.] ?

[‘‘The committee report, that in their opinion the following addi-
tions should be made to the report now before the convention
namely,

“© At the end of the first clause of the first section of the seventh
article add, ‘for payment of the debts and necessary expenses of the
United States; provided that no law for raising any branch of
revenue, except what may be specially appropriated for the payment
of interest on debts or loans, shall continue in force for more than

years.’

“* At the end of the second clause, second section, seventh article,
add, ‘and with Indians, within the limits of any state, not subject
to the laws thereof.’

“* At the end of the sixteenth clause of the second section, seventh
article, add, ‘and to provide, as may become necessary, from time to
time, for the well managing and securing the common property and
general interests and welfare of the United States in such manner
as shall not interfere with the governments of individual states, in
matters which respect only their internal police, or for which their
individual authorities * may be competent.’

‘¢At the end of the first section, tenth article, add, ‘he shall be
of the age of thirty five years, and a citizen of the United States, and
shall have been an inhabitant thereof for twenty one years.’

“¢ After the second section of the tenth article, insert the following
as a third section:

‘<The President of the United States shall have a privy council,
which shall consist of the president of the senate, the speaker of
the house of representatives, the chief justice of the supreme court,
and the principal officer in the respective departments of foreign
affairs, domestic affairs, war, marine, and finance, as such depart-
ments of office shall from time to time be established, whose duty it

 

1 In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Connecticut, New Jersey, no—2.”

? Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.

* The transcript uses the word “authorities” in the singular.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1787 449

shall be to advise him in matters respecting the execution of his
office, which he shall think proper to lay before them: but their
advice shall not conclude him, nor affect his responsibility for the
measures which he shall adopt.’

‘At the end of the second section of the eleventh article, add,
‘the judges of the supreme court shall be triable by the senate, on
impeachment by the house of representatives.’

“Between the fourth and fifth lines of the third section of the
eleventh article, after the word ‘controversies,’ insert ‘between the
United States and an individual state, or the United States and an
individual person.’ ’’] 1

A motion to rescind the order of the House respecting the hours
of meeting & adjourning, was negatived :

Mass: P? Del. Mar? ................ ay ?
N. H. Con: N. J. V2 N.C. 8.C. Geo. no?

M: Gerry & M! M‘Henry moved to insert after the 2¢ sect.
Art: 7, the Clause following, to wit, ‘‘The Legislature shall pass
no bill of attainder nor any ex post facto law.’’ *

M? Gerry urged the necessity of this prohibition, which he said
was greater in the National than the State Legislature, because the
number of members in the former being fewer ° were on that account
the more to be feared.

M: Gov: Morris thought the precaution as to ex post facto laws
unnecessary ; but essential as to bills of attainder

M: ExseworryH contended that there was no lawyer, no civilian
who would not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves.
It can not then be necessary to prohibit them.

M! WILson was against inserting any thing in the Constitution
as to ex post facto laws. It will bring reflexions on the Constitution—
and proclaim that we are ignorant of the first principles of Legis-
lation, or are constituting a Government which ° will be so.

The question being divided, The first part of the motion relating
to bills of attainder was agreed to nem. contradicente.

On the second part relating to ex post facto laws—

M* Carron remarked that experience overruled all other caleula-

* The proceedings on this motion involving the two questions on “ attainders
& ex post facto laws,” are not so fully stated in the Printed Journal.

 

* Journal, Acts and Proceedings of the Convention . . . which formed the
Constitution of the United States (1819), p. 277.

? The figure “4” ig here inserted in the transcript.

* The figure “7” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The word “of” is here inserted in the transcript.

° The word “they” is here inserted in the transcript.

*The word “that” is substituted in the transeript for “ which.”
450 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

tions. It had proved that in whatever light they might be viewed
by civilians or others, the State Legislatures had passed them, and
they had taken effect.

M! Wuson. If these prohibitions in the State Constitutions have
no effect, it will be useless to insert them in this Constitution. Be-
sides, both sides will agree to the principle, & * will differ as to its
application.

M? Wruiamson. Such a prohibitory clause is in the Constitu-
tion of N. Carolina, and tho it has been violated, it has done
good there & may do good here, because the Judges can take hold
of it.

Doc! Jounson thought the clause unnecessary, and implying an
improper suspicion of the National Legislature.

M: RurupceE was in favor of the clause.

On the question for inserting the prohibition of ex post facto
laws.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Contno. N. J. no. P? no. Del. ay. Mé ay.
Virg? ay N. C. div? S. C. ay. Geo. ay.’

The report of the committee of 5. made by M! Rutlidge, was taken
up & then postponed that each member might furnish himself with
a copy.

The Report of the Comittee of Eleven delivered in & entered on
the Journal of the 21% inst. was then taken up. and the first clause
containing the words ‘‘ The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power
to fulfil the engagements which have been entered into by Congress ”’
being under consideration,

M: EvswortH argued that they were unnecessary. The U. 8S.
heretofore entered into Engagements by Cong? who were their agents.
They will hereafter be bound to fulfil them by their new agents.

M: Ranpotpx thought such a provision necessary: for though
the U. States will be bound, the new Govt will have no authority in
the case unless it be given to them.

Mt Mapison thought it necessary to give the authority in. order
to prevent misconstruction. He mentioned the attempts made by
the Debtors to British subjects to shew that contracts under the old
Government, were dissolved by the Revolution which destroyed the
political identity of the Society.

M:! Gerry thought it essential that some explicit provision should

 

* The word “but” is substituted in the transcript for “&.”

7In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, no—3; North Carolina, divided.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1787 451

be made on this subject, so that no pretext might remain for getting
rid of the public engagements.

M* Gov! Morris moved by way of amendment to substitute~
“‘The Legislature shall discharge the debts & fulfil the engagements,
of the U. States.’’

It was moved to vary the amendment by striking out ‘‘ discharge
the debts’’ & to insert ‘‘ liquidate the claims,’’ which being
negatived,

The amendment moved by M! Gov! Morris was agreed to all the
States being in the affirmative.

It was moved & 2% to strike the following words out of the 24
clause of the report ‘‘and the authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by the U. S.’’ Before a ques-
tion was taken

The House adjourned

In CoNvENTION THuRSDAY Ava: 23. 17871

The Report of the Committee of Eleven made Aug: 21.? being
taken up, and the following clause being under consideration to wit
‘“To make laws for organizing, arming & disciplining the Militia,
and for governing such part® of them as may be employed in the
service of the U. S. reserving to the States respectively, the appoint-
ment of the officers, and authority of training the militia according
to the discipline prescribed—”’

M! SuermaAn moved to strike out the last member— ‘‘and authority
of training &. He thought it unnecessary. The States will have
this authority of course if not given up.

M: ExvsworrH doubted the propriety of striking out the sentence.
The reason assigned applies as well to the other reservation of the
appointment to offices. He remarked at the same time that the term
discipline was of vast extent and might be so expounded as to in-
clude all power on the subject.

M: Kine, by way of explanation, said that by organizing, the
Committee meant, proportioning the officers & men—by arming,
specifying the kind size & caliber of arms—& by disciplining pre-
scribing the manual exercise evolutions &e.

 

1The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

2 The words “the twenty-first of August” are substituted in the transcript
for “ Aug: 21.” ;

® The transcript uses the word “part” in the plural.
452 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: SHERMAN withdrew his motion

M: Gerry. This power in the U. S. as explained is making the
States drill-sergeants. He had as lief let the Citizens of Massachussets
be disarmed, as to take the command from the States, and subject
them to the Gen! Legislature. It would be regarded as a system of
Despotism.

M: Mapison observed that ‘‘arming’’ as explained did not did not
extend to furnishing arms; nor the term ‘‘disciplining’’ to penalties
& Courts Martial for enforcing them.

M! Kine added, to his former explanation that arming meant not
only to provide for uniformity of arms, but included? authority to
regulate the modes of furnishing, either by the Militia themselves, the
State Governments, or the National Treasury: that laws for disci-
plining, must involve penalties and every thing necessary for enfore-
ing penalties.

M: Dayton moved to postpone the paragraph, in order to take
up the following proposition

“To establish an uniform & general system of discipline for
the Militia of these States, and to make laws for organizing, arming,
disciplining & governing such part of them as may be employed in
the service of the U. S8., reserving to the States respectively the ap-
pointment of the officers, and all authority over the Militia not
herein given to the General Government”’

On the question to postpone in favor of this proposition: it
passed in the Negative

N. H. no. Mas no. Ct no. N. J. ay. P. no. Del. no. Mary!

‘ay. V?no. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. ay.?

M: Exvsworth & M! SHERMAN moved to postpone the 2% clause
in favor of the following ‘‘To establish an uniformity of arms, exer-
cise & organization for the Militia, and to provide for the Government
of them when called into the service of the U. States’? The object of
this proposition was to refer the plan for the Militia to the General
Govi but * leave the execution of it to the State Gov®

M* Lanepon said He could not understand the jealousy expressed
by some Gentleman.* The General & State Gov were not enemies
to each other, but different institutions for the good of the people
of America. As one of the people he could say, the National Gov!

 

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Jersey, Maryland, Georgia, aye—3;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, no—8.”

* The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.

“The word “gentleman” is used in the plural in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1787 453

is mine, the State Govt is mine. In transferring power from one to
the other, I only take out of my left hand what it can not so well use,
and put it into my right hand where it can be better used.

M: Gerry thought it was rather taking out of the right hand &
putting it into the left. Will any man say that liberty wili be as safe
in the hands of eighty or a hundred men taken from the whole con-
tinent, as in the hands of two or three hundred taken from a single
State.

M! Dayton was against so absolute a uniformity. In some
States there ought to be a greater proportion of cavalry than in
others. In some places rifles would be most proper, in others
muskets &e.

Gen’ Pinkney preferred the clause reported by the Committee,
extending the meaning of it to the case of fines &e.

M? Mapison. The primary object is to secure an effectual dis-
cipline of the Militia. This’ will no more be done if left to the
States separately than the requisitions have been hitherto paid by
them. The States neglect their Militia now, and the more they are
consolidated into one nation, the less each will rely on its own in-
terior provisions for its safety & the less prepare its Militia for that
purpose; in like manner as the militia of a State wquld have been
still more neglected than it has been if each County had been inde-
pendently charged with the care of its Militia. The Discipline of
the Militia is evidently a National concern, and ought to be provided
for in the National Constitution.

M: L. Martin was confident that the States would never give up
the power over the Militia; and that, if they were to do so the
militia would be less attended to by the Gen! than by the State
Governments.

M: RanpouPH asked what danger there could be that the Militia
could be brought into the field and made to commit suicide on them-
selves. This is a power that can not from its nature be abused, unless
indeed the whole mass should be corrupted. He was for trammelling
the Gen! Govt wherever there was danger, but here there could be
none. He urged this as an essential point; observing that the Militia
were every where neglected by the State Legislatures, the members
of which courted popularity too much to enforce a proper discipline.
Leaving the appointment of officers to the States protects the people
ag** every apprehension that could produce murmur.

On? Question on M? Elsworth’s Motion

 

1 The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
454 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. Mé no.
Vino. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.*

A motion was then made to recommit the 2¢ clause which was
negatived.

On the question to agree to the 1% part of the clause, namely

“To make laws for organizing arming & disciplining the Militia,
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the U. 8S.”’

N. H ay. Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. ay. Mé no.
Ve ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.’

M! Mapison moved to amend the next part of the clause so as to
read ‘‘ reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the
officers, under the rank of General officers ”’

M: Suerman considered this as absolutely inadmissible. He said
that if the people should be so far asleep as to allow the most in-
fluential officers of the militia to be appointed by the Gen’ Govern-
ment, every man of discernment would rouse them by sounding the
alarm to them. ‘

MZ Gerry. Let us at once destroy the State Gov’? have an Ex-
ecutive for life or hereditary, and a proper Senate, and then there
would be some consistency in giving full powers to the Gen' Gov!
but as the States are not to be abolished, he wondered at the attempts
that were made to give powers inconsistent with their existence. He
warned the Convention ag%* pushing the experiment too far. Some
people will support a plan of vigorous Government at every risk.
Others of a more democratic cast will oppose it with equal determina-
tion, and a Civil war may be produced by the conflict.

M? Manpison. As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the
States, it is necessary to guard ag*' it by sufficient powers to the
Common Gov! and as the greatest danger to liberty is from large
standing armies, it is best to prevent them, by an effectual provision
for a good Militia.

On the Question to agree to M™ Madison’s motion

N. H. ay: Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M®4 no.
Vino. N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo.* ay.®

*In the printed Journal, Geo: no.

 

1 In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, aye; the other ten States, no.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Connecticut, Maryland, no—2.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, South Carolina,
Georgia,* aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—8.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1787 455

On the question to agree to the ‘‘ reserving to the States the
appointment of the officers.’? It was agreed to nem: contrad:

On the question on the clause ‘‘ and the authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by the U. S—’’

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. no. M4 ay.
V2 no. N. C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

On the question to agree to Art. VII. Sect. 7.2 as reported It
passed nem. contrad :

M: Pinkney urged the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers
& other officers of the U. S. independent of external influence and
moved to insert, after Art VII Sect 7. the clause following—‘‘No per-
son holding any office of profit or trust ? under the U. S. shall without
the consent of the Legislature, accept of any present, emolument, office
or title of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State
which passed nem: contrad.

M: RuruiwcE moved to amend Art: VIII? to read as follows,

“This Constitution & the laws of the U. 8. made in‘ pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made under the authority of the U. S.
shall be the supreme law of the several States and of their citizens
and inhabitants; and the Judges in the several States shall be bound
thereby in their decisions, any thing in the Constitutions or laws of
the several States, to the contrary notwithstanding.”’

which was agreed to nem: contrad:

Art: IX? being next for consideration,

M: Gov: Morris argued ag** the appointment of officers by the
Senate. He considered the body as too numerous for the * purpose; as
subject to cabal; and as devoid of responsibility. If Judges were to
be tried by the Senate according to a late report of a Committee it
was particularly wrong to let the Senate have the filling of vacancies
which its own decrees were to create. !

M* Witson was of the same opinion & for like reasons.

The ® art IX being waived and art VII. sect 1.6 resumed,

MZ Gov't Morris moved to strike the following words out of the

 

2In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, aye—7; Dela-
ware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no—4.”

2 See page 342. 7 a

*The words “ profit or trust” are transposed to read “trust or profit” in
sas The wpe “that” ig substituted in the transcript for “ the.”

® The word “the” is crossed out in the transcript.

* See page 340.
456 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

18 clause ‘‘ enforce treaties ’’ as being superfluous, since treaties were
to be ‘‘ laws ’’— which was agreed to nem: contrad:

M: Gov: Morris moved to alter? 1: part. of ' 18. clause sect. 1.
art. VIL2 so as to read ‘‘ to provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel in-
vasions.”’ =

which was agreed to nem: contrad

On the question then to agree to the 18 clause of Sect. 1. art: 7.
as amended it passed in the affirmative nem: contradicente.

ME: C- PINKNEY moved to add as an additional power to be vested
in the Legislature of the U. S. ‘‘ To negative all laws passed by the
several States interfering in the opinion of the Legislature with the
general interests and harmony of the Union; provided that two
thirds of the members of each House assent to the same’’

This principle he observed had formerly been agreed to. He
considered the precaution as essentially necessary: The objection
drawn from the predominance of the large States had been removed
by the equality established in the Senate. M! Broome 2%? the propo-
sition.

M: SuerMan thought it unnecessary; the laws of the General
Government being Supreme & paramount to the State laws according
to the plan, as it now stands.

M= Mapison proposed that it should be committed. He had been
from the beginning a friend to the principle; but thought the modifi-
cation might be made better.

M? Mason wished to know how the power was to be exercised.
Are all laws whatever to be brought up? Is no road nor bridge to
be established without the Sanction of the General Legislature? Is
this to sit constantly in order to receive & revise the State Laws?
He did not mean by these remarks to condemn the expedient, but he
was apprehensive that great objections would lie ag* it.

M* Wiuuiamson thought it unnecessary, & having been already
decided, a revival of the question was a waste of time.

M: Wizson considered this as the key-stone wanted to compleat
the wide arch of Government, we are raising. The power of self-
defence had been urged as necessary for the State Governments. It
was equally necessary for the General Government. The firmness of
Judges is not of itself sufficient. Something further is requisite. It
will be better to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to
declare it void when passed.

 

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
? The transcript omits “sect. 1. art. VII.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1787 457

M: Rurunce. If nothing else, this alone would damn and ought
to damn the Constitution. Will any State ever agree to be bound
hand & foot in this manner. It is worse than making mere corpora-
tions of them whose bye laws would not be subject to this shackle.

M' ELsewortu observed that the power contended for wi require
either that all laws of the State Legislatures should previously to
their taking effect be transmitted to the Gen! Legislature, or be
repealable by the Latter; or that the State Executives should be ap-
pointed by the Gen! Government, and have a controul over the State
laws. If the last was meditated let it be declared.

M! PINKNEY declared that he thought the State Executives ought
to be so appointed with such a controul, & that it would be so pro-
vided if another Convention should take place.

M* Govern’ Morris did not see the utility or practicability of the
proposition of M! Pinkney, but wished it to be referred to the con-
sideration of a Committee.

M? Lanepon was in favor of the proposition. He considered it
as resolvable into the question whether the extent of the National
Constitution was to be judged of by the Gen! or the State Govern-
ments.

On the question for commitment, it passed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Mast* no. Con'no. N.J.no. Pt ay. Del: ay. M@ ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no

M* Pingney then withdrew his proposition.

The 1* sect. of art: VII * being so amended as to read ‘‘ The Legis-
lature shall fulfil the engagements and discharge the debts of the
U.S. & shall have the power to lay & collect taxes duties imposts &
excises,’? was agreed to.

M* Burter expressed his dissatisfaction lest it should compel pay-
ment as well to the Blood-suckers who had speculated on the distresses
of others, as to those who had fought & bled for their country.
He would be ready he said tomorrow to vote for a discrimination
between those classes of people, and gave notice that he should ? move
for a reconsideration.

Art IX. sect. 1.4 being resumed, to wit ‘‘ The Senate of the U. S.
shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and
Judges of the Supreme Court.’’

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Dela-

ware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,

North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.” . : 3 .
? The phrase “ The first clause of article 7. section 1” is substituted in the

transcript for “The 1st sect. of art: VII.” .
® The word “would” igs substituted in the transcript for “should.”

‘See page 342.
458 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Mapison observed that the Senate represented the States
alone, and that for this as well as other obvious reasons it was proper
that the President should be an agent in Treaties.

M: Gov: Morris did not know that he should agree to refer the
making of Treaties to the Senate at all, but for the present wi move
to add, as an amendment to the section after ‘‘ Treaties ’’—* ‘‘ but no
Treaty shall be binding on the U. 8. which is not ratified by a law.’’

M! Mapison suggested the inconvenience of requiring a legal
ratification of treaties of alliance for the purposes of war &c &c

M: Guorum. Many other disadvantages must be experienced if
treaties of peace & all negociations are to be previously ratified—
and if not previously, the Ministers would be at a loss how to pro-
ceed. What would be the case in G. Britain if the King were to
proceed in this manner. American Ministers must go abroad not
instructed by the same Authority (as will be the case with other
Ministers) which is to ratify their proceedings.

M: Gov! Morris. As to treaties of alliance, they will oblige for-
eign powers to send their Ministers here, the very thing we should
wish for. Such treaties could not be otherwise made, if his amend-
ment sh? succeed. In general he was not solicitous to multiply &
facilitate Treaties. He wished none to be made with G. Britain, till
she should be at war. Then a good bargain might be made with her.
So with other foreign powers. The more difficulty in making treaties,
the more value will be set on them.

M: Witson. In the most important Treaties, the King of G.
Britain being obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of
them, is under the same fetters as the amendment of M® Morris will
impose on the Senate. It was refused yesterday to permit even the
Legislature to lay duties on exports. Under the clause, without the
amendment, the Senate alone can make a Treaty, requiring all the
Rice of S. Carolina to be sent to some one particular port.

M: Dickinson concurred in the amendment, as most safe and
proper, tho’ he was sensible it was unfavorable to the little States;
w% would otherwise have an equal share in making Treaties.

Doc! JoHNSOoN thought there was something of solecism in saying
that the acts of a Minister with plenipotentiary powers from one
Body, should depend for ratification on another Body. The Example
of the King of G. B. was not parellel. Full & compleat power was
vested in him. If the Parliament should fail to provide the neces-
sary means of execution, the Treaty would be violated.

 

*The words “the following” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 24, 1787 459

M*® GHorum in answer to M! Gov: Morris, said that negociations
on the spot were not to be desired by us, especially if the whole
Legislature is to have any thing to do with Treaties. It will be
generally influenced by two or three men, who wi!! be corrupted by
the Ambassadors here. In such a Government as ours, it is necessary
to guard against the Government itself being seduced.

M? RanvotpH observing that almost every Speaker had made
objections to the clause as it stood, moved in order to a further con-
sideration of the subject, that the Motion of M! Gov! Morris should
be postponed, and on this question It was lost the States being
equally divided.

Mass no. Con'no. N.J.ay. Pen? ay. Del. ay. Mi ay. V? ay.
N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.

On M: Gov! Morris Motion

Mas no. Cont no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M4? no. V? no.
N. C. div? 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

_The several clauses of Sect: 1. Art IX, were then separately post-
poned after inserting ‘‘ and other public Ministers ’’ next after
‘« Ambassadors.’’

M! Mapison hinted for consideration, whether a distinction might
not be made between different sorts of Treaties—Allowing the Presi-
dent & Senate to make Treaties eventual and of Alliance for limited
terms—and requiring the concurrence of the whole Legislature in
other Treaties.

The 13 Sect art IX. was finally referred nem: con: to the com-
mittee of Five, and the House then

Adjourned

Fray Avucust 24. 1787.2 In ConvENTION

Governour Lrivineston, from the Committee of Eleven, to whom
were referred the two remaining clauses of the 4% Sect & the 5 & 6
Sect: of the 7 art:* delivered in the following Report:

“‘Gtrike out so much of the 4 Sect: as was referred to the
Committee and insert—‘‘The migration or importation of such per-

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, South

Carolina, Georgia, no—5.” 5: :
2In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, aye—1; Massachusetts,

Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina,

Georgia, no—8.” :
‘S'The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

* See page 341.
460 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

sons as the several States now existing shall think proper to admit,
shall not be prohibited by the Legislature prior to the year 1800,
but a tax or duty may be imposed on such migration or importation
at a rate not exceeding the average of the duties laid on imports.’’

‘<The 5 Sect: to remain as in the Report ”’

“¢ The 6 Sect to be stricken out ”’

M: Butter, according to notice, moved that clause 1 sect. 1.

-of Art VII, as to the discharge of debts, be reconsidered tomorrow.
He dwelt on the division of opinion concerning the domestic debts,
and the different pretensions of the different classes of holders. Gen!
Pinkney 2% him.

M:= Ranpoteu wished for a reconsideration in order to better the
expression, and to provide for the case of the State debts as is done
by Congress.

On the question for reconsidering

N. H. no. Mas: ay. Cont ay N. J. ay. Pen? absent. Del. ay
M4 no. V2? ay. N.C. absent, S.C. ay. Geo. ay."—and tomorrow
assigned for the reconsideration.

Sect: 2 & 3 of art: IX? being taken up,

M: RutuwceE said this provision for deciding controversies be-
tween the States was necessary under the Confederation, but will be
rendered unnecessary by the National Judiciary now to be established,
and moved to strike it out.

Doct Jounson 2%? the Motion

M! SuerMan concurred: so did M? Dayton.

M! WiiamMson was for postponing instead of striking out, in
order to consider whether this might not be a good provision, in cases
where the Judiciary were interested or too closely connected with the
parties.

M! Guorum had doubts as to striking out. The Judges might be
connected with the States being parties—He was inclined to think
the mode proposed in the clause would be more satisfactory than to
refer such cases to the Judiciary.

On the Question for postponing the 2? & 34 Section, it passed in
the negative

N. H.ay. Mas*no. Contno N.J.no. Pen?abs! Del.no. M¢no.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.’

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New Hampshire,
Maryland, no—2; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, absent.”

* See pages 342 and 343.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, no—7; Pennsylvania, absent.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 24, 1787 461

M: Witson urged the striking out, the Judiciary being a better
provision.

On Question for striking out! 2 & 3 Sections Art: IX

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N.J. ay. P? abst Del. ay. May.
V? ay. N.C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.*

Art X. sect. 14 ‘‘ The executive power of the U. 8. shall be
vested in a single person. His stile shall be ‘‘ The President of the-
U. S. of America ’’ and his title shall be ‘‘ His Excellency.’ He
shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his
office during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second
time.

On the question for vesting the power in a single person. It was
agreed to nem: con: So also on the Stile and title.

M: Rutiwce moved to insert ‘‘ joint ’’ before the word ‘‘ ballot,’’
as the most convenient mode of electing.

M! SHERMAN objected to it as depriving the States represented in
the Senate of the negative intended them in that house.

M*: GuHorvum said it was wrong to be considering at every turn
whom the Senate would represent. The public good was the true
object to be kept in view. Great delay and confusion would ensue
if the two Houses sh? vote separately, each having a negative on the
choice of the other.

M: Darron. It might be well for those not to consider how the
Senate was constituted, whose interest it was to keep it out of sight.—
If the amendment should be agreed to, a joint® ballot would in fact
give the appointment to one House. He could never agree to the
clause with such an amendment. There could be no doubt of the
two Houses separately concurring in the same person for President.
The importance & necessity of the case would ensure a concurrence.

M? Carrot moved to strike out ‘‘ by the Legislature ’’ and insert
“by the people.’? M! Wiuson 2%4 him & on the question

N. H.no. Mass no. Con'no. N.J.no. P?ay. Del. ay. M? no.
Vino N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.®

M? BrEaRLY was opposed to the motion for” inserting the word

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

? The word “of” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, aye—8;
North Carolina, Georgia, no—2; Pennsylvania, absent.”

*See page 343. ae

* The transcript does not italicize the word “ joint.”

°In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye—2; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—9.”

™The words “the motion for” are omitted in the transcript.
462 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

“ joint.’? The argument that the small States should not put their
hands into the pockets of the large ones did not apply in this case.

M: WILson urged the reasonableness of giving the larger States
a larger share of the appointment, and the danger of delay from a
disagreement of the two Houses. He remarked also that the Senate
had peculiar powers balancing the advantage given by a joint balot
in this case to the other branch of the Legislature.

M: Lanepon. This general officer ought to be elected by the
joint & general voice. In N. Hampshire the mode of separate votes
by the two Houses was productive of great difficulties. The negative
of the Senate would hurt the feelings of the man elected by the votes
of the other branch. He was for inserting ‘‘ joint ’’ tho’ unfavorable
to N. Hampshire as a small State.

M! Witson remarked that as the President of the Senate was to
be President of the U. 8. that Body in eases of vacancy might
have an interest in throwing dilatory obstacles in the way, if its
separate concurrence should be required.

M! Mapison. If the amendment be agreed to the rule of voting
will give to the largest State, compared with the smallest, an infiu-
ence as 4 to 1 only, altho the population is as 10 to 1. This surely
ean not be unreasonable as the President is to act for the people not
for the States. The President of the Senate also is to be occasionally
President of the U. 8. and by his negative alone can make 34 of the
other branch necessary to the passage of a law. This is another
advantage enjoyed by the Senate.

On the question for inserting ‘‘ joint,’’ it passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Mas* ay. Ctno. N.J. no. P® ay. Del. ay. M? no.
Ve ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.

M* Dayton then moved to insert, after the word ‘‘ Legislatures ’’?
the words ‘‘each State having one vote’? M! BreaRLey 2%4 him, and
on the question it passed in the negative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Chay. N. J. ay. P2 no. Del. ay. Mf? ay.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. ay.?

M! Pinkney moved to insert after the word ‘‘ Legislature ’’ the
words ‘‘ to which election a majority of the votes of the members
present shall be required’’ &

 

Ss In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—7; Connecti-
cut, New Jersey, Maryland, Georgia, no—4.”

*In the transcript the word “Legislatures” is in the singular.

In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, Georgia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—6.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 24, 1787 463

On this question, it passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N.J.no. P? ay. Del. ay. M® ay.
V2 ay. N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.

M* Reap moved ‘‘ that in case the numbers for the two highest
in votes should be equal, then the President of the Senate shall have
an additional casting vote,’’ which was disagreed to by a general
negative.

M: Gov! Morris opposed the election of the President by the
Legislature. He dwelt on the danger of rendering the Executive
uninterested in maintaining the rights of his Station, as leading to
Legislative tyranny. If the Legislature have the Executive de-
pendent on them, they can perpetuate & support their usurpations
by the influence of tax-gatherers & other officers, by fleets armies &.
Cabal & corruption are attached to that mode of election: so also? is
ineligibility a second time. Hence the Executive is interested in
Courting popularity in the Legislature by sacrificing his Executive
Rights; & then he can go into that Body, after the expiration
of his Executive office, and enjoy there the fruits of his policy.
To these considerations he added that rivals would be continually
intrigueing to oust the President from his place. To guard
against all these evils he moved that the President ‘‘shall be chosen
by Electors to be chosen by the People of the several States’’
M: Carrot 2%4 him & on the question it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M?‘ no.
V2 ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.®

M: Dayton moved to postpone the consideration of the two last
clauses of Sect. 1. art. X. which was disagreed to without a count
of the States.

M: Broome moved to refer the two clauses to a Committee of a
member from each State, & on the question, it failed the States being
equally divided

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct div? N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.*

On the question taken on the first part of M? Gov! Morris’s

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—10; New Jersey, no—1.”

2The word “also” is omitted in the transcript.

2 In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.” :

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—5; Connecticut, divided.”
464 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Motion towit ‘‘shall be chosen by electors’’ as an abstract question,
it failed the States being equally divided.

N.H. no. Mas. abst Cf divi N. Jersey ay. P? ay. Del. ay. Mé
divi V2 ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

The consideration of the remaining clauses of Sect 1. art X.
was then postponed till tomorrow at the instance of the Deputies
of New Jersey.

Sect. 2. Art: X 2 being taken up, the word information was trans-
posed & inserted after ‘‘ Legislature ”’

On motion of M!® Gov! Morris, ‘‘ he may ’’ was struck out, &
“tand’’? inserted before ‘‘recommend’’ in clause 2? sect 24 art:
X. in order to make it the duty of the President to recommend, &
thence prevent umbrage or cavil at his doing it.

M: SHERMAN objected to the sentence ‘‘ and shall appoint officers
in all cases not otherwise provided for by * this Constitution.’’ He
admitted it to be proper that many officers in the Executive Depart-
ment should be so appointed—but contended that many ought not, as
general officers in the army in time of peace &c. Herein lay the cor-
ruption in G. Britain. If the Executive can model the army, he
may set up an absolute Government; taking advantage of the close of
a war and an army commanded by his creatures. James 2? was
not obeyed by his officers because they had been appointed by his
predecessors not by himself. He moved to insert ‘‘ or by law ’’ after
the word ‘‘ Constitution.”’

On Motion of M*: Manpison ‘‘officers’’ was struck out and ‘‘to
offices ’’ inserted, in order to obviate doubts that he might appoint
officers without a previous creation of the offices by the Legislature. - °° -

On the question for inserting ‘‘or by law as moved by M: Sherman

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci ay. N. J. no. Pen® no. Del. no. M4 no.
Vino. N.C. absent. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

M Dickinson moved to strike out the words ‘‘ and shall appoint
to offices in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution”’
and insert—‘‘ and shall appoint to all offices established by this Con-
stitution, except in cases herein otherwise provided for, and to all
offices which may hereafter be created by law.’’

M? RanpDouPH observed that the power of appointments was a

>?

 

_ _In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, aye—4; New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
no—4; Connecticut, Maryland, divided; Massachusetts, absent.”

? See page 343.

* The word “in” is substituted in the transcript for “by.”

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, aye—1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—9; North Carolina, absent.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 25, 1787 465

formidable one both in the Executive & Legislative hands—and sug-
gested whether the Legislature should not be left at liberty to refer
appointments in some cases, to some State authority.

M* DicKeNson’s motion, it? passed in the affirmative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. no. M® ay.
Vi ay. N.C. abst S. C. no. Geo. ay.”

M: Dickinson then moved to annex to his last amendment “‘ except
where by law the appointment shall be vested in the Legislatures or
Executives of the several States.’? M! Ranpotpu 2%4 the motion

M! Wirson— If this be agreed to it will soon be a standing in-
struction from the State Legislatures to pass no law creating offices,
unless the app be referred to them.

M: SuHerman objected to ‘‘ Legislatures ’’ in the motion, which
was struck out by consent of the movers.

M* Gov: Morris. This would be putting it in the power of the
States to say, ‘‘ You shall be viceroys but we will be viceroys over
you 2

The Motion was negatived without a Count of the States—

Ordered unanimously that the order respecting the adjournment
at 4 OClock be repealed, & that in future the House assemble at
10 OC. & adjourn at 3 OC

Adjourned

Saturpay Avucust. 25. 1787.4. In CoNvENTION

The 1% clause of 1 Sect. of art: VIL® being reconsidered

Col. Mason objected to the term ‘‘ shall ’’—fullfil the engage-
ments & discharge the debts &e as too strong. It may be impossible
to comply with it. The Creditors should be kept in the same plight.
They will in one respect be necessarily and properly in a better.
The Government will be more able to pay them. The use of the
term shall will beget speculations and increase the pestilent practice
of stock-jobbing. There was a great distinction between original
creditors & those who purchased fraudulently of the ignorant and
distressed. He did not mean to include those who have bought

 

1The word “it” is omitted in the transcript.

2 In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye—6; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Dela-
ware, South Carolina, no—4; North Carolina, absent.”

? The letters “OC” are omitted in the transcript.

‘The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

>See page 340.
466 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Stock in open market. He was sensible of the difficulty of drawing
the line in this case, but He did not wish to preclude the attempt.
Even fair purchasers at 4. 5. 6. 8 for 1 did not stand on the same
footing with? first Holders, supposing them not to be blameable.
The interest they receive even in paper is equal to their purchase
money. What he particularly wished was to leave the door open for
buying up the securities, which he thought would be precluded by
the term ‘‘ shall ’’ as requiring nominal payment, & which was not
inconsistent with his ideas of public faith. He was afraid also the
word shall, might extend to all the old continental paper.

M: Lanepon wished to do no more than leave the Creditors in
statu quo.

M: Gerry said that for himself he had no interest in the ques-
tion being not possessed of more of the securities than would, by the
interest, pay his taxes. He would observe however that as the public
had received the value of the literal amount, they ought to pay that
value to some body. The frauds on the soldiers ought to have been
foreseen. These poor & ignorant people could not but part with their
securities. There are other creditors who will part with any thing
rather than be cheated of the capital of their advances. The interest
of the States he observed was different on this point, some having
more, others less than their proportion of the paper. Hence the idea
of a scale for reducing its value had arisen. If the public faith
would admit, of which he was not clear, he would not object to a
revision of the debt so far as to compel restitution to the ignorant &
distressed, who have been defrauded. As to Stock-jobbers he saw no
reason for the censures thrown on them. They keep up the value of
the paper. Without them there would be no market.

M: Butuer said he meant neither to increase nor diminish the
security of the creditors.

M? RanpDoLPH moved to postpone the clause in favor of the fol-
lowing ‘‘ All debts contracted & engagements entered into, by or
under the authority of Cong? shall be as valid ag%t the U. States
under this constitution as under the Confederation.’’

Doc: Jounson. The debts are debts of the U- S- of the great
Body of America. Changing the Government can not change the
obligation of the U- S- which devolves of course on the New Govern-
ment. Nothing was in his opinion necessary to be said. If any
thing, it should be a mere declaration as moved by M: Randolph.

M? Gov! Morris, said he never had become a public Creditor that

*The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 25, 1787

he might urge with more propriety the compliance with public

He had always done so and always would, and preferr’d the _
shall as most explicit. As to buying up the debt, the term shall was
not inconsistent with it, if provision be first made for paying the
interest: if not, such an expedient was a mere evasion. He was con-
tent to say nothing as the New Government would be bound of
course—but would prefer the clause with the term ‘‘shall, because it
would create many friends to the plan.

On M! Randolph’s Motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ciay. N.J. ay. P? no Del. ay. Mary’ ay
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo ay.t

M: SHERMAN thought it necessary to connect with the clause for
laying taxes duties &c an express provision for the object of the
old debts &c—and moved to add to the 1% clause of 1% sect. art
VII ‘‘ for the payment of said debts and for the defraying the
expences that shall be incurred for the common defence and general
-welfare.”’

The proposition, as being unnecessary was disagreed to, Con-
necticut alone, being in the affirmative.

The Report of the Committee of eleven [see friday the 24" in-
stant] being taken up,

Gen! PINKNEY moved to strike out the words ‘‘the year eighteen
hundred ’’ as the year limiting the importation of slaves, and to
insert the words ‘‘ the year eighteen hundred and eight ”’

M: Guorum 2%? the motion

M: Mapison. Twenty years will produce all the mischief that
can be apprehended from the liberty to import slaves. So long a
term will be more dishonorable to the National? character than to
say nothing about it in the Constitution.

On the motion; which passed in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Clay. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M¢ ay. V? no.
N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

ME Gov! Morris was for making the clause read at once, ‘‘ 4 im-
portation of slaves into N. Carolina, 8. Carolina & Georgia shall not
be prohibited &c.’? This he said would be most fair and would
avoid the ambiguity by which, under the power with regard to

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—10; Pennsylvania, no—1.”

2The word “ American” is substituted in the transcript for “National.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no—4.”

“The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
468 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

naturalization, the liberty reserved to the States might be defeated.
He wished it to be known also that this part of the Constitution
was a compliance with those States. If the change of language how-
ever should be objected to by the members from those States, he
should not urge it.

Col: Mason was not against using the term ‘‘ slaves’’ but agi
naming N. C. 8. C. & Georgia, lest it should give offence to the
people of those States.

M: Suerman liked a description better than the terms proposed,
which had been declined by the old Cong? & were not pleasing to some
people. M? Ciymer concurred with M? Sherman

M: Wi.wiamson said that both in opinion & practice he was,
against slavery; but thought it more in favor of humanity, from a
view of all circumstances, to let in S. C. & Georgia on those terms,
than to exclude them from the Union.

M! Gov? Morris withdrew his motion.

M: Dickenson wished the clause to be confined to the States
which had not themselves prohibited the importation of slaves, and
for that purpose moved to amend the clause so as to read ‘‘ The im-
portation of slaves into such of the States as shall permit the same
shall not be prohibited by the Legislature of the U- S- until the year
1808 ’’—which was disagreed to nem: cont: *

The first part of the report was then agreed to, amended as
follows.

‘‘ The migration or importation of such persons as the several
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited
by the Legislature prior to the year 1808.’’

N. H. Mas. Con. M? N.C. 8. C. Geo: ay?
Ni: Js BY Del. Vive 5 655 64% ws oGeaerene s no?

M? BaLpwin in order to restrain & more explicitly define ‘‘ the
average duty ’’ moved to strike out of the 24 part the words ‘‘ aver-
age of the duties laid on imports ’’ and insert ‘‘ common impost on
articles not enumerated ’’ which was agreed to nem: cont:

M* SHEermMan was ag*t this 24 part, as acknowledging men
to be property, by taxing them as such under the character of
slaves.

M: Kine & M? Lanapon considered this as the price of the 1%
part.

Gen! PINKNEY admitted that it was so.

*In the printed Journal, Cont Virg2 & Georgia voted in the affirmative.

> The figure “7” is here inserted in the transcript.
? The figure “4” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 25, 1787 469

Col: Mason. Not to tax, will be equivalent to a bounty on the
importation of slaves.

M*! Guorum thought that M! Sherman should consider the duty,
not as implying that slaves are property, but as a discouragement to
the importation of them.

M? Gov! Morris remarked. that as the clause now stands it implies
that the Legislature may tax freemen imported.

M! SHERMAN in answer to M! Ghorum observed that the small-
ness of the duty shewed revenue to be the object, not the discourage-
ment of the importation.

M? Manison thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the
idea that there could be property in men. The reason of duties did
not hold, as slaves are not like merchandize, consumed, &e

Col. Mason (in answ? to Gov! Morris) the provision as it stands
was necessary for the case of Convicts in order to prevent the intro-
duction of them.

It was finally agreed nem: contrad: to make the clause read ‘‘ but
a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding ten
dollars for each person,’? and then the 2% part as amended was
agreed to.

Sect 5. art. VII was agreed to nem: con: as reported.

Sect. 6. art. VII. in the Report, was postponed.

On motion of M: Mapison 2% by M! Gov! Morris Art VIII?
was reconsidered and after the words ‘‘ all treaties made,’’ were in-
serted nem: con: the words ‘‘ or which shall be made ’”’ This inser-
tion was meant to obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties
preexisting, by making the words “‘ all treaties made ’’ to refer to
them, as the words inserted would refer to future treaties,

M* Carrot & M: L. Martin expressed their apprehensions, and
the probable apprehensions of their constituents, that under the
power of regulating trade the General Legislature, might favor the
ports of particular States, by requiring vessels destined to or from
other States to enter & clear thereat, as vessels belonging or bound to
Baltimore, to enter & clear at Norfolk & They moved the follow-
ing proposition

‘< The Legislature of the U: S: shall not oblige vessels belonging to
citizens thereof, or to foreigners, to enter or pay duties or imposts
in any other State than in that to which they may be bound, or to
clear out in any other than the State in which their cargoes may be
laden on board; nor shall any privilege or immunity be granted to

 

+See page 342.
470 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

any vessels on entering or clearing out, or paying duties or imposts in
one State in preference to another ”’

M: Guorum thought such a precaution unnecessary; & that the
revenue might be defeated, if vessels could run up long rivers, through
the jurisdiction of different States without being required to enter,
with the opportunity of landing & selling their cargoes by the way.

M: MsHenry & Gen! Prvxney made the following propositions

“« Should it be judged expedient by the Legislature of the U. S.
that one or more ports for collecting duties or imposts other than
those ports of entrance & clearance already established by the re-
spective States, should be established, the Legislature of the U. 8.
shall signify the same to the Executives of the respective States,
ascertaining the number of such ports judged neccssary; to be laid
by the said Executives before the Legislatures of the States at their
next Session; and the Legislature of the U. S. shall not have the
power of fixing or establishing the particular ports for collecting
duties or imposts in any State, except the Legislature of such State
shall neglect to fix and establish the same during their first session
to be held after such notification by the Legislature of the U. S. to
the Executive of such State ”’

“* All duties imposts & excises, prohibitions or restraints laid or
made by the Legislature of the U. S. shall be uniform & equal
throughout the U. S.’’

These several propositions were referred, nem: con: to a Com-
mittee composed of a member from each State. The committee ap-
pointed by ballot were M? Langdon, M? Ghorum, M? Sherman, M*
Dayton, M! Fitzimmons, Mt Read, M: Carrol, M: Mason, M! Wil-
liamson, M? Butler, M™ Few.

On The question now taken on M! Dickinson motion of yesterday,
allowing appointments to offices, to be referred by the Gen! Legisla-
ture to the Executives of the Several States ’’ as a farther amendment
to sect. 2, art. X. the votes were, :

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. P? no. Del. no. M4 divided. V®? ay.
N.C. no. §. C. no. Geo. ay.*

In amendment of the same section,? ‘‘ other public Ministers ”’
were inserted after ‘‘ ambassadors.’’

M! Gov! Morris moved to strike out of the section—‘‘ and may
correspond with the supreme Executives of the several States ’’ as

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Virginia, Georgia, aye—3;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South
Carolina, no—6; Maryland, divided.”

? The expression “the words” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 27, 1787 471

unnecessary and implying that he could not correspond with others.
M! Broome 2%4 him.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci ay. P* ay. Del. ay. M4 no. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.t

*“* Shall receive ambassadors & other public Ministers,’’* agreed
to, nem. con.

M? SHERMAN moved to amend the “‘ power to grant reprieves &
pardon * ’’ so as to read “‘ to grant reprieves until the ensuing session
of the Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate.’’

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cf ay. P? no M? no. V2 no. N. C. no.
8. C. no. Geo. no.5

°** except in cases of impeachment ’’* inserted nem: con: after
‘* pardon ’’ 4

On the question to agree to —‘‘ but his pardon shall not be
pleadable in bar ’’®

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ci no. P? no. Del. no. Mé ay. V® no.
N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.?

Adjourned.

 

Monpay AucST 2772 1787.° In ConvENTION

Art X. Sect. 2.11 being resumed.

M: L. Martry moved to insert the words ‘‘ after conviction ’’
after the words ‘‘ reprieves and pardons ”’

M: Witson objected that pardon before conviction might be
necessary in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices. He stated

 

+In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Maryland, no—1.”

? The words “The clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The transcript uses the word “ pardon” in the plural.

°In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, aye—1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Georgia, no—8.” .

° The expression “the words” is here inserted in the transcript.

7The word “were” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The phrase “It passed in the negative” is here inserted in the transcript.

°In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, aye—4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, no—6.” ‘

1° The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

11See page 343.
472 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the case of forgeries in which this might particularly happen.—M:
L. Martin withdrew his motion.

M: SHERMAN moved to amend the clause giving the Executive the
command of the Militia, so as to read ‘‘ and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual service of the U. 8.’’ and
on the Question

N. H. ay. Mas. abst Ctay. N. J. abst P? ay. Del. no. Mf? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. abst 8. C. no. Geo. ay.t

The clause for removing the President on impeachment by the
House of Rep and conviction in the supreme Court, of Treason,
Bribery or corruption, was postponed nem: con: at the instance of
M: Gov' Morris, who thought the Tribunal an improper one, particu-
larly, if the first judge was to be of the privy Council.

M= Gov: Morris objected also to the President of the Senate being
provisional successor to the President, and suggested a designation
of the Chief Justice.

\Z Mapison added as a ground of objection that the Senate might
retard the appointment of a President in order to carry points whilst
the revisionary power was in the President of their own body, but
suggested that the Executive powers during a vacancy, be admin-
istered by the persons composing the Council to the President.

M" Wiuuiamson suggested that the Legislature ought to have
power to provide for occasional successors & moved that the last
clause [of 2 sect. X art:] relating to a provisional successor to the
President be postponed.

M: Dickinson 2% the postponement, remarking that it was too
vague. What is the extent of the term ‘‘ disability ’’ & who is to be
the judge of it?

The postponement was agreed to nem: con:

Col: Mason & M? Mapison, moved to add to the oath to be taken
by the supreme Executive ‘‘ and will to the best of my judgment
and power preserve protect and defend the Constitution of the U. 8.”’

M! Wrson thought the general provision for oaths of office, in a
subsequent place, rendered the amendment unnecessary—

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. abst Ct ay. P® ay. Del. no. M@ ay. V® ay.
N. C. abst 8. C. ay. Geo. ay?

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, Penn-
sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye—6; Delaware, South Carolina, no
—2; Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, absent.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Delaware, no,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, absent.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 27, 1787 473

Art: XI.1 being? taken up.

Doc! JOHNSON suggested that the judicial power ought to extend
to equity as well as law—and moved to insert the words ‘‘ both in
law and equity ’’ after the words ‘‘ U. S.’’ in the 1% line, of sect. 1.

M? Reap objected to vesting these powers in the same Court.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. absent. Chay. N.J. abst P.ay. Del. no. M¢no.
Virg? ay. N.C. abst 8S. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

On the question to agree to Sect. 1. art. XI. as amended.*

N. H. ay. Mas. abst Ctay. Ptay. N.J.abs* Del. no. M? no.
Viay. N.C. abst S.C. ay. Geo. ay.

M* DicKINSON moved as an amendment to sect. 2. art XI’ after
the words ‘‘ good behavior ’’ the words ‘‘ provided that they may
be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate and
House of Representatives. ’’

M Gerry 2%4 the motion

M® Gov? Morris thought it a contradiction in terms to say that

the Judges should hold their offices during good behavior, and yet be
removeable without a trial. Besides it was fundamentally wrong to
subject Judges to so arbitrary an authority.
_. M® SHERMAN saw no contradiction or impropriety if this were
made part of the constitutional regulation of the Judiciary establish-
ment. He observed that a like provision was contained in the
British Statutes.

M= Ruruwer. If the Supreme Court is to judge between the
U.S. and particular States, this alone is an insuperable objection to
the motion.

M! Wiison considered such a provision in the British Govern-
ment as less dangerous than here, the House of Lords & House of
Commons being less likely to concur on the same occasions. Chief
Justice Holt, he remarked, had successively offended by his inde-
pendent conduct, both houses of Parliament. Had this happened at
the same time, he would have been ousted. The Judges would be in
a bad situation if made to depend on every ® gust of faction which
might prevail in the two branches of our Govt

 

>See page 344.

? The word “next” is here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Delaware, Maryland, no—2;
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, absent.”

4 The transcript here inserts the following: “the States were the same as on
the preceding question.” The vote by States is omitted.

5 The word “any” is substituted in the transcript for “every.”
474. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: RanpoLteH opposed the motion as weakening too much the in-
dependence of the Judges.

M: DicKINSON was not apprehensive that the Legislature com-
posed of different branches constructed on such different principles,
would improperly unite for the purpose of displacing a Judge.

On the question for agreeing to M: Dickinson’s Motion *

N. H. no. Mas. abst Ctay. N. J. abst P* no. Del. no. M‘4 no.
Vino. N.C. abst 8. C. no. Geo. no.

On the question on Sect. 2. art: XI as reported. Del & Mary?
only no.

M! Mapison and M? M*Henry moved to reinstate the words ‘‘ in-
creased or ’’ before the word ‘‘ diminished ’’ in the 24 sect. art XT.

M! Gov: Morris opposed it for reasons urged by him on a former
occasion—

Col: Mason contended strenuously for the motion. There was no
weight he said in the argument drawn from changes in the value of
the metals, because this might be provided for by an increase
of salaries so made as not to affect persons in office, and this
was the only argument on which much stress seemed to have been
laid.

Gen! PrinKNEY. The importance of the Judiciary will require
men of the first talents: large salaries will therefore be necessary,
larger than the U. S. can allow” in the first instance. He was not
satisfied with the expedient mentioned by Col: Mason. He did not
think it would have a good effect or a good appearance, for new
Judges to come in with higher salaries than the old ones.

M: Gov: Morris said the expedient might be evaded & therefore
amounted to nothing. Judges might resign, and then be re-appointed
to increased salaries.

On the question

N. H. no. Ct no. P? no. Del. no. M? divi V% ay. S. C. no.
Geo. abst also Mass N. J. & N. C.8

M: RanpotpH & M? Mapison then moved to add the following
words to sect. 2. art XI. ‘‘ nor increased by any Act of the Legis-
lature which shall operate before the expiration of three years after
the passing thereof ’”’

On this question

 

*The transcript here inserts the following: “it was negatived, Connecti-
cut, aye; all the other States present, no.’ The vote by States is omitted.

*The word “afford” is substituted in the transcript for “allow.”

°In the transcript the vote reads: “ Virginia, aye—1; New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no—5; Maryland, divided.
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, absent.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, AUGUST 27, 1787 475

N. H. no. Ci no. P? no. Del. no. M4 ay. V? ay. 8. C. no.
Geo. abs’ also Mas. N. J. & N. Ct

Sect. 3. art. XI? being taken up, the following clause was post-
poned-—viz. ‘‘ to the trial of impeachments of officers of the U. 8.”
by which the jurisdiction of the supreme Court was extended te
such cases.

M* Mapison & M? Gov? Morris moved to insert after the word
‘* controversies ’’ the words ‘‘ to which the U. §. shall be a party.”
which was agreed to nem: con:

Doc! JoHNSON moved to insert the words ‘‘ this Constitution
and the ”’ before the word “‘ laws ’’

M: Mapison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend
the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising under the
Constitution & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a
Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in
cases not of this nature ought not to be given to that Department.

The motion of Doc! Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it being gen-
erally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited
to cases of a Judiciary nature.

On motion of M? Rutimeae the words ‘‘ passed by the Legisla-
ture ’’ were struck out, and after the words ‘‘ U. S’’ were inserted
nem. con: the words ‘‘ and treaties made or which shall be made
under their authority ’’ conformably to a preceding amendment in
another place.

The clause ‘‘ in cases of impeachment,’’ was postponed.

M: Gov: Morris wished to know what was meant by the words
‘* In all the cases before mentioned it [jursdiction] shall be appellate
with such exceptions &c,’’ whether it extended to matters of fact as
well as law—and to cases of Common law as well as Civil law.

“M* Wrtson. The Committee he believed meant facts as well as
law & Common as well as Civil law. The jurisdiction of the federal
Court of Appeals had he said been so construed.

M: Dickinson moved to add after the word ‘‘ appellate ’’ the
words both as to law & fact which was agreed to nem: con:

Mz Mapison & M! Govt Morris moved to strike out the beginning
of the 34 sect. ‘‘ The jurisdiction of the supreme Court ’’ & to insert
the words ‘‘ the Judicial power ’’ which was agreed to nem: con:

The following motion was disagreed to, to wit to insert ‘‘ In all

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Maryland, Virginia, aye—2; New
Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no—5; Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, absent.”

2 See page 344.
476 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the other cases before mentioned the Judicial power shall be exercised
in such manner as the Legislature shall direct’? Del. Virg? ay*
N. H Con. P. M. 8. C. Gono?

On a question for striking out the last sentence of sect. 3. ‘‘ The
Legislature may assign &e.’’$

N. H. ay. Ct ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 ay. V? ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.*

M SHERMAN moved to insert after the words ‘‘ between Citizens
of different States’’ the words, ‘‘ between Citizens of the same
State claiming lands under grants of different States ’’—according
to the provision in the 9t* Art: of the Confederation—which was
agreed to nem: con:

Adjourned

Turspay AuGust 28. 1787.5 IN CoNVENTION

M: SuEerMan from the Committee to whom were referred several
propositions on the 25‘ instant, made the following report— °®

That there be inserted after the 4 clause of 7 7" section

‘‘ Nor shall any regulation of commerce or revenue give prefer-
ence to the ports of one State over those of another, or oblige vessels
bound to or from any State to enter, clear or pay duties in another and
all tonnage, duties, imposts & excises laid by the Legislature shall
be uniform throughout the U. 8.”’

Ordered to lie on the table.®

Art XI Sect. 3% 7° It was moved to strike out the words ‘‘ it shall
be appellate ’’ & to insert the words ‘‘ the supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction,’’—in order to prevent uncertainty whether
“it”? referred to the supreme Court, or to the Judicial power.

On the question

N. H ay. Mas. ay. Chay. N. J. abst P® ay. Del. ay. Mé no.
Vi ay. NC ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.™

 

+The figure “2” is here inserted in the transcript.

? The figure “6” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The phrase “it passed nem. con.” is here added in the transcript.

*The vote by States is omitted in the transcript.

® The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

*The phrase “which was ordered to lie on the table” is here added in
the transcript.

"The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* This sentence is omitted in the transcript.

*See page 344.

*° The words “being considered” are here inserted in the transcript.

*1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Maryland, no—1; New Jersey, absent.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1787 477

Sect. 4.1 was so amended nem: con: as to read ‘‘ The trial of all
crimes (except in cases of impeachment) shall be by jury, and such
trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, then the trial
shall be at such place or places as the Legislature may direct.’’ The
object of this amendment was to provide for trial by jury of offences
committed out of any State.

M! PINENEY, urging the propriety of securing the benefit of the
Habeas corpus in the most ample manner, moved ‘‘ that it should not
be suspended but on the most urgent occasions, & then only for a
limited time, not exceeding twelve months ”’

M: Rutuipce was for declaring the Habeas Corpus inviolable.”
He did not conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary at the
same time through all the States.

M: Gov: Morris moved that ‘‘ The privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended; unless where in cases of Rebellion
or invasion the public safety may require it.’’

M: Witson doubted whether in any case a suspension could be
necessary, as the discretion now exists with Judges, in most important
eases to keep in Gaol or admit to Bail.

The first part of M! Gov! Morris’ motion, to the word ‘‘ unless ’’
was agreed to nem: con:—on the remaining part;

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M@ ay. V? ay.
N. C. no. 8S. C. no. Geo. no.:#

See. 5. of art: XI.1 was agreed to nem: con: *

Art: XII.1 being * taken up.

M! Witson & M: SHerMAN moved to insert after the words ‘‘ coin
money ’’ the words ‘‘ nor emit bills of credit, nor make any thing
but gold & silver coin a tender in payment of debts ’’ making these
prohibitions absolute, instead of making the measures allowable (as
in the XIII art:) with the consent of the Legislature of the U. S._

M: Guorum thought the purpose would be as well secured by the
provision of art: XIII which makes the consent of the Gen’ Legis-
lature necessary, and that in that mode, no opposition would be

*'The vote on this section as stated in the printed Journal is not unanimous:
the statement here is probably the right one.

 

1See page 344. .

2 The word “inviolate” is substituted in the transcript for “ inviolable.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—7; North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—3.” .

‘The word “then” is here inserted in the transcript.
478 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

excited; whereas an absolute prohibition of paper money would
rouse the most desperate opposition from its partizans.

M: SHerMan thought this a favorable crisis for crushing paper
money. If the consent of the Legislature could authorise emissions
of it, the friends of paper money, would make every exertion to get
into the Legislature in order to licence it.

The question being divided; on the 1% part—‘‘ nor emit bills of
credit ”’

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M¢ div? V? no.
N. C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

The remaining part of M:! Wilson’s & Sherman’s motion was
agreed to nem: con:

M! Kine moved to add, in the words used in the Ordinance of
Cong? establishing new States, a prohibition on the States to interfere
in private contracts.

M! Govi Morris. This would be going too far. There are a
thousand laws, relating to bringing actions—limitations of actions
& * which affect contracts. The Judicial power of the U. S. will be a
protection in cases within their jurisdiction; and within the State
itself a majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief done among
themselves.

M: SHerman. Why then prohibit bills of credit?

M? Wison was in favor of M! King’s motion.

M: Manpison admitted that inconveniences might arise from such
a prohibition but thought on the whole it would be overbalanced by
the utility of it. He conceived however that a negative on the State
laws could alone secure the effect. Evasions might and would be
devised by the ingenuity of ? Legislatures.

Col: Mason. This is carrying the restraint too far. Cases will
happen that can not be foreseen, where some kind of interference will
be proper & essential. He mentioned the case of limiting the period
for bringing actions on open account—that of bonds after a certain
lapse of time—asking whether it was proper to tie the hands of the
States from making provision in such cases?

M! Wuson. The answer to these objections is that retrospective *
interferences ® only are to be prohibited.

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—8; Virginia, no—l; Maryland, divided.”

* The character “&” is changed in the transcript to “ &c.”

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The transcript does not italicize the word “ retrospective.”

° The transcript italicizes the word “ inferences.”
SESSION OF TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1787 479

M? Manvison. Is not that already done by the prohibition of ex
post facto laws, which will oblige the Judges to declare such inter-
ferences null & void. ,

M: RutincE moved instead of M! King’s Motion to insert—‘‘ nor
pass bills of attainder nor retrospective * laws’’ on which motion

N. H. ay. Cino. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. M@ no. Virg? no.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.2

M* Mapison moved to insert after the word “ reprisal ’’ (art.
XII) the words ‘‘ nor lay embargoes.’? He urged that such acts
by the States would be unnecessary—impolitic—and unjust.

M" SHERMAN thought the States ought to retain this power in
order to prevent suffering & injury to their poor.

Col: Mason thought the amendment would be not only improper
but dangerous, as the Gen! Legislature would not sit constantly and
therefore could not interpose at the necessary moments. He en-
forced his objection by appealing to the necessity of sudden em-
bargoes during the war, to prevent exports, particularly in the case of
a blockade.

M: Gov? Morris considered the provision as unnecessary; the
power of regulating trade between State & State already vested in
the Gen! Legislature, being sufficient.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ctno. N. J. no. P% no. Del. ay. M? no.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. no?

M: Mapison moved that the words ‘‘ nor lay imposts or duties on
imports ’’ be transferred from art: XIII where the consent of the
Gen! Legislature may licence the act—into art: XII which will make
the prohibition on the States absolute. He observed that as the
States interested in this power by which they could tax the imports
of their neighbors passing thro’ their markets, were a majority, they
could give the consent of the Legislature, to the injury of N. Jersey,
N. Carolina &c-

M Wriiamson 2% the motion

M! SuermMan thought the power might safely be left to the Legis-
lature of the U. States.

Col: Mason, observed that particular States might wish to encour-

*In the printed Journal—* ex post facto.”

 

2In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut,
Maryland, Virginia, no—3.”

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Delaware, South Caro-
lina, aye—3; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”
480 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

age by import? duties certain manufactures for which they enjoyed
natural advantages, as Virginia, the manufacture of Hemp &c.

M= Mapison. The encouragement of Manufactures in that mode
requires duties not only on imports directly from foreign Countries,
but from the other States in the Union, which would revive all the
mischiefs experienced from the want of a Gen' Government over
commerce.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctno. N.J. ay. P? no. Del: ay. Mf? no.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.’

Art: XII as amended * agreed to nem: con:

Art: XIII‘ being® taken up. M? Kine moved to insert after the
word ‘‘ imports ’’ the words ‘‘ or exports ’’ so as to prohibit the
states from taxing either,—&

On this question it passed in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctno. N. J. ay. P. ay. Del. ay. M? no.
Vino. N.C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. no.®

Mt SHERMAN moved to add after the word ‘‘ exports ’’—the
words ‘‘ nor with such consent but for the use of the U. S.’’—so as
to carry the proceeds of all State duties on imports &7 exports, into
the common Treasury.

M:! Manpison liked the motion as preventing all State imposts—
but lamented the complexity we were giving to the commercial
system.

M= Gov! Morris thought the regulation necessary to prevent the
Atlantic States from endeavoring to tax the Western States—& pro-
mote their interest by opposing the navigation of the Mississippi
which would drive the Western people into the arms of G. Britain.

M: Cuiymer thought the encouragement of the Western Country
was suicide on® the old States. If the States have such different
interests that they can not be left to regulate their own manufactures
without encountering the interests of other States, it is a proof that
they are not fit to compose one nation.

 

1The word “impost” is substituted in the transcript for “import.”

? In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, New Jersey, Delaware,
North Carolina, aye—4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

* The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

* See page 344.

* The words “was then” are substituted in the transcript for “ being.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, aye—6; Connecticut, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no—5.”

7The word “or” is substituted for “&” in the transcript.

®* The words “the part of” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1787 481

M: Kine was afraid that the regulation moved by M! Sherman
would too much interfere with a policy of States respecting their
manufactures, which may be necessary. Revenue he reminded the
House was the object of the general Legislature.

On M: Sherman’s motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. ay. Ptay. Del. ay. M? no.
V? ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay2

Art XIII was then agreed to as amended.

Art. XIV ? was * taken up.

Gen! PinKNEY was not satisfied with it. He seemed to wish some
provision should be included in favor of property in. slaves.

On the question on Art: XIV.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. ay. M@ ay.
Vt ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. divided.t

Art: XV.’ being taken up, the words “‘ high misdemesnor,’’ were
struck out, and * ‘‘ other crime ”’ inserted, in order to comprehend all
proper cases: it being doubtful whether ‘‘ high misdemeanor ’’ had
not a technical meaning too limited.

M* Butter and M* Pinkney moved “ to require fugitive slaves
and servants to be delivered up like criminals.’’

M*: Wison. This would oblige the Executive of the State to do
it at the public expence.

M: SHERMAN saw no more propriety in the public seizing and
surrendering a slave or servant, than a horse.

M! Buruer withdrew his proposition in order that some particular
provision might bé made apart from this article.

Art XV as amended was then agreed to nem: con:

Adjourned

WEDNESDAY AuGust 29TH 1787.2 IN CONVENTION

Art: XVI.?;" taken up.
M: WILL1AMSoN moved to substitute in. place of it, the words

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jer-
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; Massachusetts, Maryland, no—2.”

? See page 345. . .

* The word “then” is here inserted in the transcript.

“In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
neeticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, aye—9; South Carolina, no—l; Georgia, divided.” ;

° The expression “the words” is here inserted in the transcript.

° The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript. :

7 The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.
482 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of the Articles of Confederation on the same subject. He did not
understand precisely the meaning of the article.

M: Witson & Doc! JoHNSON supposed the meaning to be that
Judgments in one State should be the ground of actions in other
States, & that acts of the Legislatures should be included, for the
sake of Acts of insolvency &c.

M: PINKNEY moved to commit art XVI, with the following prop-
osition, ‘‘ To establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies,
and respecting the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of
exchange ”’

M" Guorum was for agreeing to the article, and committing the
proposition.

M: Mapison was for committing both. He wished the Legislature
might be authorized to provide for the execution of Judgments in
other States, under such regulations as might be expedient. He
thought that this might be safely done, and was justified by the
nature of the Union.

M: RanvourH said there was no instance of one nation executing
judgments of the Courts of another nation. He moved the follow-
ing proposition:

‘“ Whenever the act of any State, whether Lezislative, Executive
or Judiciary shall be attested & exemplified under the seal thereof,
such attestation and exemplification, shall be deemed in other States
as full proof of the existence of that act—and its operation shall be
binding in every other State, in all cases to which it may relate, and
which are within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the State, wherein
the said act was done.’’

On the question for committing Art: XVI. with Mt Pinkney’s
motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Chay. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. ay. M® ay.
Vi ay. N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.2

The motion of M? Randolph was also committed nem: con:

M: Gov: Morris moved to commit also the following proposition
on the same subject.

‘Full faith ought to be given in each State to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the Legis-
lature shall by general laws, determine the proof and effect of such
acts, records, and proceedings,’’ and it was committed nem: contrad:

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—9;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, no—-2.”?
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1787 483

The committee appointed for these references, were M‘ Rutlidge,
M! Randolph, M™ Gorham, M: Wilson, & M* Johnson.

M: DickEeNSon mentioned to the House that on examining Black-
stone’s Commentaries, he found that the terms, ‘‘ ex post facto ’’ re-
lated to criminal cases only; that they would not consequently re-
strain the States from retrospective laws in civil cases, and that some
further provision for this purpose would be requisite.

Art. VII Sect. 6 by y? Committee of eleven reported to be struck
out (see the 24 instant) being now taken up,

M: PINKNEY moved to postpone the Report in favor of the fol-
lowing proposition—'‘ That no act of the Legislature for the pur-
pose of regulating the commerce of the U- S. with foreign powers, or
among the several States, shall be passed without the assent of two
thirds of the members of each House.’’ He remarked that there were
five distinct commercial interests. 1. the fisheries & W. India trade,
which belonged to the N. England States. 2.the interest of N.
York lay in a free trade. 3. Wheat & flour the Staples of the two
Middle States (N. J. & Penn*). 4 Tob? the staple of Mary’ &
Virginia & partly of N. Carolina. 5. Rice & Indigo, the staples of S.
Carolina & Georgia. These different interests would be a source of
oppressive regulations if no check to a bare majority should be pro-
vided. States pursue their interests with less scruple than individ-
uals. The power of regulating commerce was a pure concession on
the part of the S. States. They did not need the protection of the N.
States at present.

M: Martin 2%? the motion

Gen! PINKNEY said it was the true interest of the 8. States to
have no regulation of commerce; but considering the loss brought on
the commerce of the Eastern States by the revolution, their liberal
conduct towards the views * of South Carolina, and the interest the
weak South" States had in being united with the strong Eastern
States, he thought it proper that no fetters should be imposed on the
power of making commercial regulations; and that his constituents
though prejudiced against the Eastern States, would be reconciled
to this liberality. He had himself, he said, prejudices ag*' the East-
ern States before he came here, but would acknowledge that he had
found them as liberal and candid as any men whatever.

*he meant the permission to import slaves. An understanding on the two
subjects of navigation and slavery, had taken place between those parts of the

Union, which explains the vote on the motion depending, as well as the language
of Gen! Pinkney & others.

 

1The transcript uses the word “terms” in the singular.
484 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Cuvmer. The diversity of commercial interests of necessity
creates difficulties, which ought not to’ be increased by unnecessary
restrictions. The Northern & middle States will be ruined, if not
enabled to defend themselves against foreign regulations.

M: Suerman, alluding to M: Pinkney’s enumeration of particular
interests, as requiring a security ag*t abuse of the power; observed
that the diversity was of itself a security, adding that to require more
than a majority to decide a question was always embarrassing as
had been experienced in cases requiring the votes of nine States in
Congress.

M: Prnxney replied that his enumeration meant the five minute
interests. It still left the two great divisions of Northern & Southern
Interests.

M' Gov: Morris, opposed the object of the motion as highly in-
jurious. Preferences to American ships will multiply them, till they
can carry the Southern produce cheaper than it is now carried—A
navy was essential to security, particularly of the S. States, and can
only be had by a navigation act encouraging American bottoms &
seamen. In those points of view then alone, it is the interest of
the S. States that navigation acts should be facilitated. Shipping
he said was the worst & most precarious kind of property, and stood
in need of public patronage.

M! WILLIAMSON was in favor of making two thirds instead of a
majority requisite, as more satisfactory to the Southern people. No
useful measure he believed had been lost in Congress for want of nine
votes. As to the weakness of the Southern States, he was not
alarmed on that account. The sickliness of their climate for in-
vaders would prevent their being made an object. He acknowledged
that he did not think the motion requiring % necessary in itself,
because if a majority of! Northern States should push their regu-
lations too far, the S. States would build ships for themselves: but
he knew the Southern people were apprehensive on this subject and
would be pleased with the precaution.

M! SpPaIGHT was against the motion. The Southern States could
at any time save themselves from oppression, by building ships for
their own use.

M: Burtwer differed from those who considered the rejection of
the motion as no concession on the part of the S. States. He con-
sidered the interests of these and of the Eastern States, to be as
different as the interests of Russia and Turkey. Being notwithstand-

 

The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1787 485

ing desirous of conciliating the affections of the East: States, he
should vote ag*' requiring % instead of a majority.

Col. Mason. If the Govt is to be lasting, it must be founded in
the confidence & affections of the people, and must be so con-
structed as to obtain these. The Majority will be governed by their
interests. The Southern States are the minority in both Houses. Is
it to be expected that they will deliver themselves bound hand & foot
to the Hastern States, and enable them to exclaim, in the words of
Cromwell on a certain occasion—‘‘ the lord hath delivered them into
our hands. :

M! Witson took notice of the several objections and remarked.
that if every peculiar interest was to be secured, unanimity ought
to be required. The majority he said would be no more governed by
interest than the minority. It was surely better to let the latter be
bound hand and foot than the former. Great inconveniences had,
he contended, been experienced in Congress from the article of con-
federation requiring nine votes in certain eases.

M: Mapison, went into a pretty full view of the subject. He
observed that the disadvantage to the 8S. States from a navigation act,
lay chiefly in a temporary rise of freight, attended however with
an increase of South" as well as Northern Shipping—with the emi-
gration of Northern Seamen & merchants to the Southern States—&
with a removal of the existing & injurious retaliations among the
States on each other. The power of foreign nations to obstruct our
retaliating measures on them by a corrupt influence would also be
less if a majority shi be made competent than if % of each House
sh? be required to Legislative acts in this case. An abuse of the
power would be qualified with all these good effects. But he thought
an abuse was rendered improbable by the provision of 2 branches—
by the independence of the Senate, by the negative of the Executive,
by the interest of Connecticut & N: Jersey which were agricultural,
not commercial States; by the interior interest which was also agri-
cultural in the most commercial States,1 by the accession of Western
States which w‘ be altogether agricultural, He added that the
Southern States would derive an essential advantage in the general
security afforded by the increase of our maritime strength. He stated
the vulnerable situation of them all, and of Virginia in particular.
The increase of the coasting trade, and of seamen, would also be
favorable to the §. States, by increasing, the consumption of their
produce. If the Wealth of the Eastern should in a still greater

 

1The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.
486 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

proportion be augmented, that wealth w? contribute the more to the
public wants, and be otherwise a national benefit.

M: Rutuipce was ag*t the motion of his colleague. It did not
follow from a grant of the power to regulate trade, that it would
be abused. At the worst a navigation act could bear hard a little
while only on the S. States. As we are laying the foundation for
a great empire, we ought to take a permanent view of the subject
and not look at the present moment only. He reminded the House
of the necessity of securing the West India trade to this country.
That was the great object, and a navigation Act was necessary for
obtaining it.

M: RanvotPau said that there were features so odious in the con-
stitution as it now stands, that he doubted whether he should be
able to agree to it. A rejection of the motion would compleat the
deformity of the system. He took notice of the argument in favor
of giving the power over trade to a majority, drawn from the oppor-
tunity foreign powers would have of obstructing retaliating+ meas-
ures, if two thirds were made requisite. He did not think there was
weight in that consideration. The difference between a majority &
two thirds did not afford room for such an opportunity. Foreign
influence would also be more likely to be exerted on the President
who could require three fourths by his negative. He did not mean
however to enter into the merits. What he had in view was merely
to pave the way for a declaration which he might be hereafter obliged
to make if an accumulation of obnoxious ingredients should take
place, that he could not give his assent to the plan.

M: GorHam. If the Government is to be so fettered as to be
unable to relieve the Eastern States what motive can they have to join
in it, and thereby tie their own hands from measures which they
could otherwise take for themselves. The Eastern States were not
led to strengthen the Union by fear for their own safety. He dep-
recated the consequences of disunion, but if it should take place it
was the Southern part of the Continent that had the? most reason to
dread them. He urged the improbability of a combination against
the interest of the Southern States, the different situations of the
Northern & Middle States being a security against it. It was more-
over certain that foreign ships would never be altogether excluded
especially those of Nations in treaty with us.

On the question to pospone in order to take up M! Pinkney’s
Motion

 

* The word “ retaliatory” is substituted in the transcript for “ retaliating.”
* The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1787 487

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. no. Mé ay.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.t

The Report of the Committee for striking out sect: 6. requiring
two thirds of each House to pass a navigation act was then agreed
to, nem: con:

M: BuTLer moved to insert after art: XV. ‘‘If any person
bound to service or labor in any of the U. States shall escape into
another State, he or she shall not be discharged from such service
or labor, in consequence of any regulations subsisting in the State
to which they escape, but shall be delivered up to the person
justly claiming their service or labor,’’ which was agreed to
nem: con:

Art: XVII? being * taken up, M? Gov? Morris moved to strike out
the two last sentences, to wit ‘‘ If the admission be consented to, the
new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original
States. But the Legislature may make conditions with the new
States, concerning the public debt, which shall be then subsisting.’’—
He did not wish to bind down the Legislature to admit Western
States on the terms here stated.

M: Mapison opposed the motion, insisting that the Western
States neither would nor ought to submit to a union which degraded
them from an equal rank with‘ other States.,

Col: Mason. If it were possible by just means to prevent emigra-
tions to the Western Country, it might be good policy. But go the
people will as they find it for their interest, and the best policy is
to treat them with that equality which will make them friends not
enemies.

M: Gov: Morris, did not mean to discourage the growth of the
Western Country. He knew that to be impossible. He did not wish
however to throw the power into their hands.

M: SHERMAN, was ag* the motion, & for fixing an equality of
privileges by the Constitution.

M* Lanepon was in favor of the Motion, he did not know but
circumstances might arise which would render it inconvenient to
admit new States on terms of equality.

M: Wiuur1amson was for leaving the Legislature free. The exist-
ing small States enjoy an equality now, and for that reason are ad-

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no—7.”

2 See page 345. : ;

® The word “then” is here inserted in the transcript.

“The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
488 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

mitted to it in the Senate. This reason is not applicable to new
Western States.

On M= Gov? Morris’s motion for striking out.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 no
V2 no. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M: L. Martin & M? Gov? Morris moved to strike out of art XVII.
“< but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the members
present shall be necessary.’’ Before any question was taken on this
motion, ;

M! Gov: Morris moved the following proposition as a substitute for
the XVII art:

‘“‘New States may be admitted by the Legislature into this
Union: but no new State shall be erected within the limits of any of
the present States, without the consent of the Legislature of such
State, as well as of the Gen! Legislature ’’

The first part to Union inclusive was agreed to nem: con:

M: L. Martin opposed the latter part. Nothing he said would
so alarm the limited States as to make the consent of the large States
claiming the Western lands, necessary to the establishment of new
States within their limits. It is proposed to guarantee the States.
Shall Vermont be reduced by force in favor of the States claiming
it? Frankland & the Western country of Virginia were in a like
situation.

On M: Gov! Morris’s motion to substitute &c it was agreed to,
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. Mé no.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. 8S. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

Art: XVII— before the House, as amended.

M SHERMAN was against it. He thought it unnecessary. The
Union can not dismember a State without its consent.

M? Lanepon thought there was great weight in the argument of
M: Luther Martin, and that the proposition substituted by M: Gov’
Morris would excite a dangerous opposition to the plan.

M* Gov: Morris thought on the contrary that the small States
would be pleased with the regulation, as it holds up the idea of
dismembering the large States.

M: Buruer. If new States were to be erected without the con-

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Maryland, Virginia, no—2.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; New Hampshire, Connectieut,
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no—5.”

* The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 30, 1787 489

sent of the dismembered States, nothing but confusion would ensue.
Whenever taxes should press on the people, demagogues would set
up their schemes of new States.

Doc! JoHNson agreed in general with the ideas of M™ Sherman,
but was afraid that as the clause stood, Vermont would be sub-
jected to N. York, contrary to the faith pledged by Congress. He
was of opinion that Vermont ought to be compelled to come into
the Union.

M? Lanepon said his objections were connected with the case of
Vermont. If they are not taken in, & remain exempt from taxes, it
would prove of great injury to N. Hampshire and the other neigh-
bouring States

M: Dickinson hoped the article would not be agreed to. He
dwelt on the impropriety of requiring the small States to secure the
large ones in their extensive claims of territory.

M: Witson. When the majority of a State wish to divide they
ean do so. The aim of those in opposition to the article, he per-
ceived, was that the Gen! Government should abet the minority, &
by that means divide a State against its own consent.

M= Govt Morris. If the forced division of States is the object
of the new System, and is to be pointed agst one or two States, he ex-
pected, the Gentleman ' from these would pretty quickly leave us.

Adjourned

THurspay AuGcust 30T# 1787.2. IN CoNVENTION

Art XVII * resumed for a question on it as amended by M! Gov?
Morris’s substitutes.*

M: Carrot moved to strike out so much of the article as requires
the consent of the State to its being divided. He was aware that the
object of this prerequisite might be to prevent domestic disturbances,
but such was our situation with regard to the Crown lands, and the
sentiments of Maryland on that subject, that he perceived we should
again be at sea, if no guard was provided for the right of the U.
States to the back lands. He suggested that it might be proper to
provide that nothing in the Constitution should affect the Right of
the U. S. to lands ceded by G. Britain in the Treaty of peace, and
proposed a committment to a member from each State. He assured

 

1The transcript uses the word “Gentleman” in the plural.

? The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

2 The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.

+The transcript uses the word “substitutes” in the singular.
490 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the House that this was a point of a most serious nature. It was
desireable above all things that the act of the Convention might be
agreed to unanimously. But should this point be disregarded, he
believed that all risks would be run by a considerable minority,
sooner than give their concurrence.

M: L. Martin 2% the motion for a committment.

M: RutwipcE is it to be supposed that the States are to be cut
up without their own consent. The case of Vermont will probably
be particularly provided for. There could be no room to fear, that
Virginia or N. Carolina would call on the U. States to maintain their
Government over the Mountains.

M Wiuiamson said that N. Carolina was well disposed to give
up her western lands, but attempts at compulsion was? not the policy
of the U. S. He was for doing nothing in the constitution in the
present case, and for leaving the whole matter in Statu quo.

M! Witson was against the committment. Unanimity was of
great importance, but not to be purchased by the majority’s yield-
ing to the minority. He should have no objection to leaving the
ease of ? new States as heretofore. He knew of * nothing that would
give greater or juster alarm than the doctrine, that a political so-
ciety is to be torne asunder without its own consent,

On M: Carrol’s motion for commitment

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. P2 no. Del. ay. M® ay.
V2 no. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

M: SHERMAN moved to postpone the substitute for art: XVII
agreed to yesterday in order to take up the following amendment
“The Legislature shall have power to admit other States into the
Union, and new States to be formed by the division or junction of
States now in the Union, with the consent of the Legislature of such
States.’? [The first part was meant for the case of Vermont to secure
its admission. ]

On the question, it passed in the negative

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. no. P2 ay. Del. no. Mé no.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. nod

 

*In the transcript the word “was” is crossed out and “were” is written
above it.

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “of” is omitted in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye
—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, aye—5; New Jersey, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”
e

SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 30, 1787 491

Doc! JoHNSoN moved to insert the words ‘‘ hereafter formed or ”’
after the words ‘‘ shall be ”’ in the substitute for art: XVII, [the
more clearly to save Vermont as being already formed into a State,
from a dependence on the consent of N. York to+ her admission.] The
motion was agreed to Del. & M¢ only dissenting.

M® GoverN™ Morris moved to strike out the word ‘limits’ in
the substitute, and insert the word ‘ jurisdiction ’’ [This also ?
meant to guard the case of Vermont, the jurisdiction of N. York not
extending over Vermont which was in the exercise of sovereignty,
tho’ Vermont was within the asserted limits of New York]

On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N.J. no. P* ay. Del. ay. Mé ay.
V? ay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

M: L. Martin, urged the unreasonableness of forcing & guaran-
teeing the people of Virginia beyond the Mountains, the Western
people, of N. Carolina, & of Georgia, & the people of Maine, to con-
tinue under the States now governing them, without the consent of
those States to their separation. Even if they should become the
majority, the majority of Counties, as in Virginia may still hold fast
the dominion over them. Again the majority may place the seat of
Government entirely among themselves & for their own conveniency,*
and still keep the injured parts of the States in subjection, under
the guarantee of the Gen! Government ag*t domestic violence. He
wished M? Wilson had thought a little sooner of the value of political
bodies. In the beginning, when the rights of the small States were
in question, they were phantoms, ideal beings. Now when the Great
States were to be affected, political societies were of a sacred nature.
He repeated and enlarged on the unreasonableness of requiring the
small States to guarantee the Western claims of the large ones.—It
was said yesterday by M‘ Gov! Morris, that if the large States were to
be split to pieces without their consent, their representatives here
would take their leave. If the Small States are to be required to guar-
antee them in this manner, it will be found that the Representatives
of other States will with equal firmness take their leave of the Con-
stitution on the table.

It was moved by Mt L. Martin to postpone the substituted article,
in order to take up the following.

 

1The word “for” is substituted in the transcript for “to.”

2? The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—7; New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—4.” : : :

“The word “ conveniency ” is changed to “ convenience ” in the transcript.
492 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

“<The Legislature of the U. 8. shall have power to erect New
States within as well as without the territory claimed by the several
States or either of them, and admit the same into the Union: provided
that nothing in this constitution shall be construed to affect the
claim of the U. S. to vacant lands ceded to them by the late
treaty of peace. which passed in the negative: N. J. Del. & Mi
only ay.

On the question to agree to M? Gov! Morris’s substituted article
as amended in the words following,

“« New States may be admitted by the Legislature into the Union:
but no new State shall be hereafter formed or erected within the
jurisdiction of any of the present States without the consent of the
Legislature of such State as well as of the General Legislature u

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M* no.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.t

M! Dickinson moved to add the following clause to the last—

‘¢ Nor shall any State be formed by the junction of two or more
States or parts thereof, without the consent of the Legislatures of
such States, as well as of the Legislature of the U. States.’’ which
was agreed to without a count of the votes.

M: Carrot moved to add—‘ Provided nevertheless that nothing
in this Constitution shall be construed to affect the claim of the
U. &. to vacant lands ceded to them by the Treaty of peace.’’ This
he said might be understood as relating to lands not claimed by any
particular States, but he had in view also some of the claims of
particular States.

M! Witson was ag*t the motion. There was nothing in the Con-
stitution affecting one way or the other the claims of the U. S. &
it was best to insert nothing, leaving every thing on that litigated
subject in statu quo.

M: Mapison considered the claim of the U. S. as in fact favored
by the jurisdiction of the Judicial power of the U. S. over con-
troversies to which they should be parties. He thought it best on the
whole to be silent on the subject. He did not view the proviso of M*
Carrol as dangerous; but to make it neutral & fair, it ought to go
farther & declare that the claims of particular States also should
not be affected.

M: SHerMan thought the proviso harmless, especially with the

 

*In the ‘transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
—8; New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no—3.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 30, 1787 493

addition suggested by M! Madison in favor of the claims of particular
States.

M* Batpwin did not wish any undue advantage to be given to
Georgia. He thought the proviso proper with the addition pro-
posed. It should be remembered that if Georgia has gained much by
the cession in the Treaty of peace, she was in danger during the war,
of a Uti possidetis.

M? Ruriipce thought it wrong to insert a proviso where there
was nothing which it could restrain, or on which it could operate.

M? Carrot withdrew his motion and moved the following.

“‘ Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to alter the
claims of the U. 8. or of the individual States to the Western terri-
tory, but all such claims shall be examined into & decided upon, by the
Supreme Court of the U. States.’’

M'! Gov? Morris moved to postpone this in order to take up the
following.

“‘ The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other prop-
erty belonging to the U. States; and nothing in this constitution con-
tained, shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims either of the
U.S. or of any particular State.’’—The postponemt ag‘ to nem. con.

M: L. Martin moved to amend the proposition of M! Gov! Morris
‘by adding—‘‘ But all such claims may be examined into & decided
upon by the supreme Court of the U. States.’

M: Gov! Morris. this is unnecessary, as all suits to which the
U.S. are parties, are already to be decided by the Supreme Court.

M: L. Martin, it is propor in order to remove all doubts on this
point.

1 Question on M? L. Martin’s amendatory motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. Pe no. Del. no. Mé ay.
Vi no—? States not farther called the negatives being sufficient & the
point * given up.

The Motion of M* Gov? Morris was then agreed to, M? alone
dissenting.

Art: XVIII‘ being taken up,—the word ‘‘ foreign ’’ was struck
out. nem: con: as superfluous, being implied in the term ‘‘ invasion.’’

 

1The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

?Tn the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Maryland, aye—2; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,
no—6.”

* The word “being” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘See page 345.
494 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Dickinson moved to strike out ‘‘ on the application of its
Legislature, against ’’’ He thought it of essential importance to the
tranquility of the U. S. that they should in all cases suppress do-
mestie violence, which may proceed from the State Legislature itself,
or from disputes between the two branches where such exist

M! Dayron mentioned the Conduct of Rho: Island as shewing the
necessity of giving latitude to the power of the U. S. on this subject.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cino. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M? no.
Vi no. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

On a question for striking out ‘‘ domestic violence
‘¢ insurrections.’’ It passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. P* no. Del. no. M? no.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay

M: Dickinson moved to insert the words, ‘‘ or Executive ’’ after
the words ‘‘ application of its Legislature ’’—The occasion itself he
remarked might hinder the Legislature from meeting.

On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P® ay. Del. ay. M?
div? V2? no. N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

M: L. Martin moved to subjoin to the last amendment the words
‘* in the recess of the Legislature’? On which question +

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. P?2 no. Del. no. M? ay. V2 no,
N. C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.

On ® Question on the last clause as amended

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. no. M® no.
Vi ay. N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

Art: XIX 7 ® taken up. .

M: Gov? Morris suggested that the Legislature should be left at
liberty to call a Convention, whenever they please.

>? and insert

 

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: ‘“‘New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no—6.”

®In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
—8; Massachusetts, Virginia, no—2; Maryland, divided.”

*The transcript here adds the words: “ Maryland only, aye,” and omits the
vote by States.

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

"In the transcript the vote reads: ‘“‘New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Delaware, Maryland, no—2.”

7 See page 345.

*The words “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF THURSDAY, AUGUST 30, 1787 495

The art: was agreed to nem: con:

" Art: XX.+? taken up.—*<‘ or affirmation’? was* added after
oath.”’

M* PINKNEY moved to add to the art:—‘‘ but no religious test
shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust
under the authority of the U. States ”’

M* SHERMAN thought it unnecessary, the prevailing liberality
being a sufficient security ag*t such tests.

M? Gov! Morris & Gen! Pinkney approved the motion.

The motion was agreed to nem: con: and then the whole Article;
N. C. only no—& M® divided

Art: XXI.*> ° taken up. viz:7 ‘‘ The ratifications of the Conven-
tions of States shall be sufficient for organizing this Con-
stitution.’’

M* Wi:son proposed to fill the blank with ‘‘ seven ’’ that being
a majority of the whole number & sufficient for the commencement of
the plan.

M: Carron moved to postpone the article in order to take up the
Report of the Committee of Eleven (see Tuesday Aug*t 28) *—and
on the question :

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. ay. M? ay.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.®

M*: Gov! Morris thought the blank ought to be filled in a two-
fold way, so as to provide for the event of the ratifying States being
contiguous which would render a smaller number sufficient, and the
event of their being dispersed, which w? require a greater number
for the introduction of the Government.

M: SHERMAN. observed that the States being now confederated
by articles which require unanimity in changes, he thought the
ratification in this case of ten States at least ought to be made
necessary.

M: Ranpo.tes was for filling the blank with ‘‘ nine ’’ that being

 

+See page 345. 2 ;

2 The words “ was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

® The expression “the words” is here inserted in the transcript.

“In the transcript the word “was” is crossed out and “were” is written
above it.

* See page 346. : . .

°The words “ being then” are here inserted in the transcript.

7™The word “viz” is omitted in the transcript. ; .

®The words “the twenty-eighth of August” are substituted in the tran-
script for “Tuesday Augst 28.”

°In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia,

orth Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”
496 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

a respectable majority of the whole, and being a number made
familiar by the constitution of the existing Congress.

M: Witson mentioned ‘‘ eight ’’ as preferable.

Mz Dickinson asked whether the concurrence of Congress is to be
essential to the establishment of the system, whether the refusing
States in the Confederacy could be deserted—and whether Congress
could concur in contravening the system under which they acted?

M: Mapison, remarked that if the blank should be filled with
“seven”? eight, or ‘‘ nine ’’—the Constitution as it stands might
be put in force over the whole body of the people, tho’ less than a
majority of them should ratify it.

M! Wiuson. As the Constitution stands, the States only which
ratify can be bound. We must he said in this case go to the original
powers of Society. The House on fire must be extinguished, without
a scrupulous regard to ordinary rights.

M Burier was in favor of ‘‘ nine.’? He revolted at the idea, that
one or two States should restrain the rest from consulting their
safety.

Mz Carrot moved to fill the blank with ‘‘ the thirteen,’’ unanimity
being necessary to dissolve the existing confederacy which had been
unanimously established.

M: Kine thought this amendt necessary, otherwise as the Consti-
tution now stands it will operate on the whole though ratified by
a part only.

Adjourned

Frmay Aveust 318T 1787.1 In ConvENTION.

M: Kine moved to add to the end of art: XXI the words ‘‘ be-
tween the said States ’’ so as to confine the operation of the Gov't to
the States ratifying it.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctiay. N. J. ay. P? ay. M? no. Virg? ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M: Mapison proposed to fill the blank in the article with ‘‘ any
seven or more States entitled to thirty three members at least in the
House of Representatives according to the allotment made in the

 

* The year “ 1787” is omitted in the transcript.
* In place of the vote by States the transcript reads: “nine States voted in
the affirmative; Maryland, no; Delaware, absent.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 31, 1787 497

3 Sect: of art: 4.’? This he said would require the concurrence of a
majority both of the States and? people.

M: SHerman doubted the propriety of authorizing less than all
the States to execute the Constitution, considering the nature of the
existing Confederation. Perhaps all the States may concur, and on
that supposition it is needless to hold out a breach of faith.

M* CLiymer and M* Carrou moved to postpone the consideration
of Art: XXI in order to take up the Reports of Committees not yet
acted on. On this question, the States were equally divided.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct div? N.J.no. P* ay. Del. ay. M® ay.
Vino. N.C no. S.C. no. G. ay.?

M! Gov: Morris moved to strike out ‘‘ Conventions of the’’
after ‘‘ ratifications,’’ leaving the States to pursue their own modes
of ratification.

M: Carrot mentioned the mode of altering the Constitution of
Maryland pointed out therein, and that no other mode could be
pursued in that State.

M: Kine thought that striking out ‘‘ Conventions ’”’ as the requisite
mode was equivalent to giving up the business altogether. Conven-
tions alone, which will avoid all the obstacles from the complicated
formation of the Legislatures, will succeed, and if not positively re-
quired by the plan, its enemies will oppose that mode.

M! Gov: Morris said he meant to facilitate the adoption of the
plan, by leaving the modes approved by the several State Constitu-
tions to be followed.

M« Mapison considered it best to require Conventions; among
other reasons, for this, that the powers given to the Gen’ Gov! being
taken from the State Gov‘s the Legislatures would be more disin-
clined than conventions composed in part at least of other men;
and if disinclined, they could devise modes apparently promoting,
but really, thwarting the ratification. The difficulty in Maryland
was no greater than in other States, where no mode of change was
pointed out by the Constitution, and all officers were under oath to
support it. The people were in fact, the fountain of all power,
and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could
alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills
of rights, that first principles might be resorted to.

VME M’Hewry said that the officers of Gov’ in Maryland were

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Georgia, aye—5; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no—5; Connecticut, divided.”
498 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

under oath to support the mode of alteration prescribed by the Con-
stitution.

M: Guorum, urged the expediency of ‘‘ Conventions ’’ also M
PrnENEY, for reasons, formerly urged on a discussion of this question.

M: L. Martin insisted on a reference to the State Legislatures.
He urged the danger of commotions from a resort to the people &
to first principles in which the Governments might be on one side
& the people on the other. He was apprehensive of no such con-
sequences however in Maryland, whether the Legislature or the peo-
ple should be appzaled to. Both of them would be generally against
the Constitution. He repeated also the peculiarity in the Maryland
Constitution.

M: Kine observed that the Constitution of Massachussets was
made unalterable till the year 1790, yet this was no difficulty with
him. The State must have contemplated a recurrence to first prin-
ciples before they sent deputies to this Convention.

M? SHERMAN moved to postpone art. XXI1 &? take up art: XXII?
on which question,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. ay. M® ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

On M? Gov: Morris’s motion to strike out ‘‘ Conventions of the,’’
it was negatived.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M4 ay.
V2? no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.t

On? filling the blank in Art: XXI with ‘‘ thirteen’? moved by
M: Carrot & L. Martin

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cf no—all no. except Maryland.®

MM! SHerman & M? Dayton moved to fill the blank with ‘‘ ten ”’

M: Wiuson supported the motion of M2 Manison, requiring a
majority both of the people and of States.

M? Ciymer was also in favor of it.

Col: Mason was for preserving ideas familiar to the people.
Nine States had been required in all great cases under the Con-
federation & that number was on that account preferable

 

+See page 346.

? The word “to” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New J ersey, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, Vir-
ginia, South Carolina, no—6.”

* The words “the question for” are here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “all the States were no, except Maryland.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 31, 1787 499

On the question for ‘‘ ten ”’

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P* no. Del. no. M? ay.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. ay.2

On question for ‘‘ nine ’’

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. ay. M?@ ay.
Vi no. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. ay?

Art: XXI. as amended was then agreed to by all the States,
Maryland excepted, & M! Jenifer being, ay.

Art. XXII * + taken up, to wit, ‘‘ This Constitution shall be laid
before the U. 8. in Cong? assembled for their approbation; and it is
the opinion of this Convention that it should be afterwards sub-
mitted to a Convention chosen, in each State under the recommenda-
tion of its Legislature, in order to receive the ratification of such
Convention ”’

M: Gov! Morris & Mt Pinkney moved to strike out the words
‘* for their approbation ’’ On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. ay.* Pt ay. Del. ay. M4 no
Viay. N.C.ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.®

M: Gov! Morris & M! Pinkney then moved to amend the art: so
as to read

“‘ This Constitution shall be laid before the U. 8. in Congress
assembled; and it is the opinion of this Convention that it should
afterwards be submitted to a Convention chosen in each State, in
order to receive the ratification of such Convention: to which end
the several Legislatures ought to provide for the callittg Conventions
within their respective States as speedily as circumstances will per-
mit.’’—M? Gov? Morris said his object was to impress in stronger
terms the necessity of calling Conventions in order to prevent enemies
to the plan, from giving it the go by. When it first appears, with
the sanction of this Convention, the people will be favorable to it.
By degrees the State officers, & those interested in the State Gov®
will intrigue & turn the popular current against it.

M: L. Martin believed M: Morris to be right, that after a while '

*In the printed Journal N. Jersey—no.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—7.” :

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, aye—8; Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—3.”

* See e 346. :
‘ The eats “was then” are here inserted in the transcript.

5In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey,* Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,

aye—8; Massachusetts, Maryland, Georgia, no—3.”
500 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the people would be ag% it, but for a different reason from that
alledged. He believed they would not ratify it unless hurried into it
by surprize.

M: Gerry enlarged on the idea of M! L. Martin in which he
concurred, represented the system as full of vices, and dwelt on
the impropriety of distroying the existing Confederation, without
the unanimous consent of the parties to it.

1 Question on M! Gov? Morris’s & M! Pinkney’s motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctno. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 no.
Vino. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

M: Gerry moved to postpone art: XXII.

Col: Mason 2% the motion, declaring that he would sooner
chop off his right hand than put it to the Constitution as it now
stands. He wished to see some points not yet decided brought to a
decision, before being compelled to give a final opinion on this article.
Should these points be improperly settled, his wish would then be
to bring the whole subject before another general Convention.

M?= Gov: Morris was ready for a postponement. He had long
wished for another Convention, that will have the firmness to provide
a vigorous Government, which we are afraid to do.

M: Ranvoupx stated his idea to be, in case the final form of the
Constitution should not permit him to accede to it, that the State
Conventions should be at liberty to propose amendments to be sub-
mitted to another General Convention which may reject or incor-
porate them, as shall * be judged proper.

On the question for postponing

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. no. M? ay.
Vino. N. C.ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

On the question on Art: XXII

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Chay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 no.
Vi ay. N. C.ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art: XXIII ® being taken up, as far as the words ‘‘ assigned by
Congress ’’ inclusive, was agreed to nem: con: the blank having been
first filled with the word ‘‘ nine ’”’ as of course.

 

* The words “On the” are here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, aye—4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

*The word “may” is substituted in the transcript for “shall.”

“In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”

* In the transcript the vote reads: “ten States aye; Maryland no.”

° See page 346.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 31, 1787 501

On a motion for postponing the residue of the clause, concern-
ing the choice of the President &c.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. no. P* no, Del. ay. M¢ no.
V? ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.

M: Gov! Morris then moved to strike out the words ‘‘ choose the
President of the U. 8. and ’’—this point, of choosing the President
not being yet finally determined, & on this question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P* ay. Del. ay. M@ div?
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay.* Geo. ay?

Art: XXIII as amended was then agreed to nem: con:

The Report of the Grand Committee of eleven made by M! SHEr-
MAN was then taken up (see Aug: 28).*

On the question to agree to the following clause, to be inserted
after Sect. 4. art: VII. ‘‘ nor shall any regulation of commerce or
revenue give preference to the ports of one State over those of
another.’’ Agreed to nem: con:

On the clause “‘ or oblige vessels bound to or from any State to
enter clear or pay duties in another ’’

M? Mapison thought the restriction w’ be inconvenient, as in the
River Delaware, if a vessel cannot be required to make entry below
the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania.

M: Firzimmons admitted that it might be inconvenient, but
thought it would be a greater inconveniency ‘ to require vessels bound
to Philad? to enter below the jurisdiction of the State.

M: Gorpam & M! Lanepon, contended that the Govt would be so
fettered by this clause, as to defeat the good purpose of the plan.
They mentioned the situation of the trade of Mas. & N. Hampshire,
the case of Sandy Hook which is in the State of N. Jersey, but
where precautions ag?‘ smuggling into N. York, ought to be estab-
lished by the Gen! Government.

M! M°Henry said the clause would not shreen a vessel from
being obliged to take an officer on board as a security for due
entry &e.

M: Carron was anxious that the clause should be agreed to. He
assured the House, that this was a tender point in Maryland.

*In printed Journal—S. C.—no.

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Delaware, Virginia,

North Carolina, aye—4; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.” ’

? In the-transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New J ersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,* Georgia,
aye—9; New Hampshire, no; Maryland, divide we ; :

4In the transcript this date reads “the twenty-eighth of | August. .

* The word “ inconveniency ” is changed to “ inconvenience” in the transcript.
502 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: JENNIFER urged the necessity of the clause in the same point
of view.

On the question for agreeing to it

N. H. no. Cf ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. Mi ay. V2 ay.
N. C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. ay.*

The word ‘‘ tonnage ’’ was struck out, nem: con: as comprehended
in ‘‘ duties ”’

On? question on the clause of the Report ‘‘ and all duties, im-
posts & excises, laid by the Legislature shall be uniform throughout
the U. 8.’’ It was agreed to nem: con: *

On motion of M! Surman it was agreed to refer such parts of
the Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts of Reports
as have not been acted on, to a Committee of a member from each
State; the Committee appointed by ballot, being—M* Gilman, M*
King, Mz Sherman, M* Brearly, Mt Gov: Morris, M* Dickinson,
M: Carrol, M! Madison, M! Williamson, M? Butler & M! Baldwin.

[The House* adjourned]

Saturpay Sep= 1. 17875 In ConvENTION.

M' BREARLEY from the Comm’ of eleven to which were referred yes-
terday, the postponed parts of the Constitution, & parts of Reports
not acted upon, made the following partial report.

That in lieu of the 9% Sect: of art: 6. the words following be
inserted viz ‘‘ The members of each House shall be ineligible to any
civil office under the authority of the U. S. during the time for
which they shall respectively be elected, and no person holding an
office under the U. S. shall be a member of either House during his
continuance in office.’’

M: Rutuipce from the Committee to whom were referred sun-
dry propositions (see Aug: 29), together with art: XVI, reported
that the following additions be made to the Report—viz

After the word ‘‘ States ’’ in the last line on the Margin of the

*In printed Journal N. H. and 8. C. entered as* in the negative.

 

1JIn the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New, Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; New
Hampshire, South Carolina, no—2.”

? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

? The word “as” is omitted in the transcript.

4 The words “ The House” are omitted in the transcript.

° The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1787 503

3? page (see the printed Report)—add ‘‘ to establish uniform laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies.’’

And insert the following as Art: XVI viz

“* Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the
public acts, records, and Judicial proceedings of every other State,
and the Legislature shall by general laws prescribe the manner in
which such acts, Records, & proceedings shall be proved, and the
effect which Judgments obtained in one State, shall have in another.’’

After receiving these reports

The House adjourned to 10 OC. on Monday next?

Monpay Sep® 3. 1787.2. In ConvEenTION

M: Gov? Morris moved to amend the Report concerning the re-
spect to be paid to Acts Records &e of one State, in other States
(see Sept 1.) by striking out ‘‘ judgments obtained in one State
shall have in another ’’ and to insert the word ‘‘ thereof ’’ after the
word ‘“‘ effect ’’

Col: Mason favored the motion, particularly if the ‘“ effect ’’ was
to be restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings

M: Witson remarked, that if the Legislature were not allowed
to declare the effect the provision would amount to nothing more
than what now takes place among all Independent Nations.

Doct Jonnson thought the amendment as worded would authorise
the Gen! Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one
State, in another State.

M: Ranpourx considered it as strengthening the general objec-
tion ag** the plan, that its definition of the powers of the Govern-
ment was so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the
State powers. He was for not going farther than the Report, which
enables the Legislature to provide for the effect of Judgments.

On the amendment as moved by M! Gov: Morris

Mas. ay. Clay. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Mino. V2 no. N.C. ay.
8. C. ay. Geo. no?

On motion of M? Maprson,* ‘‘ ought to ’’ was® struck out, and

 

* The phrase “to 10 OC on Monday next” is omitted in the transcript.

? The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript. ;

2 In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—6; Maryland, Virginia,
Georgia, no—3.” : : ;

*The expression “the words ” is here inserted in the transcript. ;

* The word “was” is crossed out in the transcript and “were” is written

above it.
504 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

‘ shall’? inserted; and ‘‘ shall ’’ between ‘‘ Legislature ’’ & ‘‘ by
general laws ’’ struck out, and ‘‘ may ”’ inserted, nem: con:

On the question to agree to the report as amended viz “‘ Full
faith & credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records
& judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature may
by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts records &
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof’’* Agreed to
witht a count of? Sts.

The clause in the Report ‘‘ To establish uniform laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies ’’ being taken up.

Mt Syerman observed that Bankruptcies were in some cases
punishable with death by the laws of England, & He did not chuse
to grant a power by which that might be done here.

M: Govt Morris said this was an extensive & delicate subject.
He would agree to it because he saw no danger of abuse of the
power by the Legislature of the U. 8.

On the question to agree to the clause

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cf no. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Mi? ay. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

Mz PINKNEY moved to postpone the Report of the Committee of
Eleven (see Sep? 1) in order to take up the following,

‘The members of each House shall be incapable of holding any
office under the U. S. for which they or any other for their benefit,
receive any salary, fees or emoluments of any kind, and the accept-
ance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively.’’ He was
strenuously opposed to an ineligibility of members to office, and
therefore wished to restrain the proposition to a mere incompatibility.
He considered the eligibility of members of the Legislature to the
honorable offices of Government, as resembling the policy of the
Romans, in making the temple of virtue the road to the temple of
fame.

On this question

N. H. no, Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P? ay. M@ no. V® no.
N. C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

M: Kine moved to insert the word ‘‘ created ’’ before the word
** during ’’ in the Report of the Committee. This he said would

 

+The words “it was” are here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* In place of the vote by States the transcript reads: “ Connecticut alone was
in the negative.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, North Carolina, aye—2;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.” '
SESSION OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1787 505

exclude the members of the first Legislature under the Constitution,
as most of the offices w? then be created.

M: Wituiamson 2% the motion. He did not see why members
of the Legislature should be ineligible to vacancies happening during
the term of their election.

M! SHERMAN was for entirely incapacitating members of the
Legislature. He thought their eligibility to offices would give too
much influence to the Executive. He said the incapacity ought at
least to be extended to cases where salaries should be increased,
as well as created, during the term of the member. He mentioned
also the expedient by which the restriction could be evaded to wit:
an existing officer might be translated to an office created, and a
member of the Legislature be then put into the office vacated.

M: Gov? Morris contended that the eligibility of members to office
w? lessen the influence of the Executive. If they cannot be appointed
themselves, the Executive will appoint their relations & friends, re-
taining the service & votes of the members for his purposes in the
Legislature. Whereas the appointment of the members deprives him
of such an advantage.

M: Gerry. thought the eligibility of members would have the
effect of opening batteries ag*t good officers, in order to drive them
out & make way for members of the Legislature.

M: GorHam was in favor of the amendment. Without it we go
further than has been done in any of the States, or indeed any other
Country. The experience of the State Governments where there was
no such ineligibility, proved that it was not necessary; on the con-
trary that the eligibility was among the inducements for fit men to
enter into the Legislative service

M: RanpoLPH was inflexibly fixed against inviting men into the
Legislature by the prospect of being appointed to offices.

M: Baupwin remarked that the example of the States was not
applicable. The Legislatures there are so numerous that an exclusion
of their members would not leave proper men for offices. The case
would be otherwise in the General Government.

Col: Mason. Instead of excluding merit, the ineligibility will
keep out corruption, by excluding office-hunters.

ME WIson considered the exclusion of members of the Legislature,
as increasing the influence of the Executive as observed by M* Gov!
Morris at the same time that it would diminish, the general energy
of the Government. He said that the legal disqualification for office
would be odious to those who did not wish for office, but did not wish
either to be marked by. so degrading a distinction.
506 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M! Pinkney. The first Legislature will be composed of the
ablest men to be found. The States will select such to put the Gov-
ernment into operation. Should the Report of the Committee or
even the amendment be agreed to, The great offices, even those of the
Judiciary Department which are to continue for life, must be filled
whilst those most capable of filling them will be under a disquali-
fication.

On the question on M* King’s motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctno. N. J. no. P? ay. M‘@ no. V? ay.
N. C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

The amendment being thus lost by the equal division of the States,
M= WILLIAMSON moved to insert the words ‘‘ created or the emolu-
ments whereof shall have been increased ’’ before the word ‘‘ dur-
ing ’’ in the Report of the Committee

M: Kine 2% the motion, &

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cino. N. J. no. P2 ay. Mino. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. divided?

The last clause rendering a Seat in the Legislature & an office in-
compatible was agreed to nem. con:

The Report as amended & agreed to is as follows.

‘*The members of each House shall be ineligible to any Civil
office under the authority of the U. States, created, or the emolu-
ments whereof shall have been increased during the time for which
they shall respectively be elected—and no person holding any office
under the U. S. shall be a member of either House during his con-
tinuance in -office.’’

Adjourned

Turspay Sep® 4. 1787.2 In Convention

M: Brearuy from the Committee of eleven made a further par-
tial Report as follows

“* The Committee of Eleven to whom sundry resolutions &¢ were
referred on the 31% of August, report that in their opinion the

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, aye—5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Mary-
land, South Carolina, Georgia, no—5.”

2 In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, aye—5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Mary-
land, South Carolina, aye—4; Georgia, divided.”

* The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1787 507

following additions and alterations should be made to the Report
before the Convention, viz

* (1.) The first clause of sect: 1. art. 7. to read as follow— The
Legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes duties imposts &
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence &
general welfare, of the U. S.’

(2). At the end of the 2? clause of sect. 1. art. 7. add ‘ and with
the Indian Tribes.’

(3) In the place of the 9* art. Sect. 1. to be inserted ‘ The Senate
of the U. S. shall have power to try all impeachments; but no person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the
members present.’

(4) After the word ‘ Excellency ’ in sect. 1. art. 10. to be in-
serted. ‘ He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and
together with the vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected
in the following manner, viz. Each State shall appoint in such manner
as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the
whole number of Senators and members of the House of Representa-
tives to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The
Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for
two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the
same State with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the
persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which list
they shall sign and certify and transmit sealed to the Seat of the
Gen! Government, directed to the President of the Senate—The Presi-
dent of the Senate shall in that House open all the certificates; and
the votes shall be then & there counted. The Person having the
greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be
a majority of that of the electors; and if there be more than one
who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then
the Senate shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for Presi-
dent: but if no person have a majority, then from the five highest
on the list, the Senate shall choose by ballot the President. And in
every case after the choice of the President, the person having the
greatest number of votes shall be vice-president: but if there should
remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose
from them the vice-President. The Legislature may determine the
time of choosing and assembling the Electors, and the manner of
certifying and transmitting their votes.’

(5) ‘Sect. 2. No person except a natural born citizen or a
Citizen of the U. S. at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
shall be eligible to the office of President; nor shall any person be
elected to that office, who shall be under the age of thirty five
years, and who has not been in the whole, at least fourteen years a
resident within the U. 8.’ ;

(6) ‘ Sect. 3. The vice-president shall be ex officio President of
the Senate, except when they sit to try the impeachment of the

*This is an exact copy. The variations in that in the printed Journal are
occasioned by its incorporation of subsequent amendments. This remark is
appliable to other cases.
508 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

President, in which case the Chief Justice shall preside, and except-
ing also when he shall exercise the powers and duties of President,
in which case & in case of his absence, the Senate shall chuse a
President pro tempore—The vice President when acting as President
of the Senate shall not have a vote unless the House be equally
divided.’

(7) ‘Sect. 4. The President by and with the advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties; and he shall
nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
shall appoint ambassadors, and other public Ministers, Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the U. S., whose appoint-
ments are not otherwise herein provided for. But no Treaty shall
be made without the consent of two thirds of the members present.’

(8) After the words—‘ into the service of the U. S.’’ in sect. 2.
art: 10. add ‘ and may require the opinion in writing of the prin-
cipal officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject
relating to the duties of their respective offices.’

1 The latter part of Sect. 2. Art: 10. to read as follows.

(9) + ‘ He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the
House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for Treason,
or bribery, and in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence,
resignation or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his office,
the vice-president shall exercise those powers and duties until
another President be chosen, or until the inability of the President
be removed.’

The (1%) clause of the Report was agreed to, nem. con.

The (2) clause was also agreed to nem: con:

The (3) clause was postponed in order to decide previously on
the mode of electing the President.

The (4) clause was accordingly taken up.

M= GorHam disapproved of making the next highest after the
President, the vice-President, without referring the decision to the
Senate in case the next highest should have less than a majority of
votes. as the regulation stands a very obscure man with very few
votes may arrive at that appointment

M: SHERMAN said the object of this clause of the report of the
Committee was to get rid of the ineligibility, which was attached to
the mode of election by the Legislature, & to render the Executive
independent of the Legislature. As the choice of the President was to
be made out of the five highest, obscure characters were sufficiently
guarded against in that case; and he had no objection to requiring
the vice-President to be chosen in like manner, where the choice
was not decided by a majority in the first instance

 

*The figure “9” is transposed to precede the sentence beginning “The
latter” . . . in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1787 509

M! Mapison was apprehensive that by requiring both the Presi-
dent & vice President to be chosen out of the five highest candidates,
the attention of the electors would be turned too much to making
candidates instead of giving their votes in order to a definitive choice.
Should this turn be given to the business, the election would, in
fact be consigned to the Senate altogether. It would have the effect
at the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination of the can-
didates to the largest States.

M: Gov. Morris concurred in, & enforced the remarks of M!
Madison.

M? Ranvotpx & M™ Pinkney wished for a particular explanation
& discussion of the reasons for changing the mode of electing the
Executive.

M: Gov: Morris said he would give the reasons of the Committee
and his own. The 1% was the danger of intrigue & faction if the
appointm! should be made dy the Legislature. 2.1 the inconveniency ?
of an ineligibility required by that mode in order to lessen its evils.
3.° The difficulty of establishing a Court of Impeachments, other than
the Senate which would not be so proper for the trial nor the other
branch for the impeachment of the President, if appointed by the
Legislature, 4.4 No body had appeared to be satisfied with an ap-
pointment by the Legislature. 5.5 Many were anxious even for an
immediate choice by the people. 6.° the indispensible necessity of
making the Executive independent of the Legislature.—As the Elec-
tors would vote at the same time throughout the U. S. and at so
great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided.
It would be impossible also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason
for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of,
impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the
trial of the impeachment.

Col: Mason confessed that the plan of the Committee had re-
moved some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and
corruption. It was liable however to this strong objection, that nine-
teen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate,
an improper body for the purpose

M? Butter thought the mode not free from objections, but much

 

1The figure “2” is changed in the transcript to “The next was.”

2 The word “inconveniency ” is changed in the transcript to “inconvenience.”

* The figure “3” is changed in the transcript to “The third was.”

‘The figure “4” is changed in the transcript to “In the fourth place.”

* The figure “5” is changed in the transcript to “In the fifth place.”

°The figure “6” is changed in the transcript to “And finally, the sixth
reason was.”
510 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

more so than an election by the Legislature, where as in elective
monarchies, cabal faction & violence would be sure to prevail.

M: Pinkney stated as objections to the mode 1.1 that it threw the
whole appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate. 2.1 The
Electors will be strangers to the several candidates and of course un-
able to decide on their comparative merits. 3.1 It makes the Executive
reeligible which will endanger the public liberty. 4 It makes the
same body of men which will in fact elect the President his Judges
in case of an impeachment.

M! Wiiiramson had great doubts whether the advantage of re-
eligibility would balance the objection to such a dependence of the
President on the Senate for his reappointment. He thought at least
the Senate ought to be restrained to the two highest on the list

MM: Gov! Morris said the principal advantage aimed at was that
of taking away the opportunity for cabal. The President may be
made if thought necessary ineligible on this as well as on any other
mode of election. Other inconveniences may be no less redressed on
this plan than any other.

M: Batpwin thought the plan not so objectionable when well
considered, as at first view. The increasing intercourse among the
people of the States, would render important characters less & less
unknown; and the Senate would consequently be less & less likely
to have the eventual appointment thrown into their hands.

M: Wison. This subject has greatly divided the House, and will
also divide? people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of
all on which we have had to decide. He had never made up an
opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction. He thought the plan
_on the whole a valuable improvement on the former. It gets rid
of one great evil, that of cabal & corruption; & Continental Char-
acters will multiply as we more & more coalesce, so as to enable the
electors in every part of the Union to know & judge of them. It
clears the way also for a discussion of the question of re-eligibility
on its own merits, which the former mode of election seemed to forbid.
He thought it might be better however to refer the eventual appoint-
ment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a
_ smaller number than five of the Candidates. The eventual election by
the Legislature w4 not open cabal anew, as it would be restrained to
certain designated objects of choice, and as these must have had the
previous sanction of a number of the States: and if the election be

 

+The figures “1,” “2,” “3” and “4” are changed in the transcript to
“first,” “ Secondly,” ete.

?The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1787 511

made as it ought as soon as the votes of the electors are opened &
it is known that no one has a majority of the whole, there can be little
danger of corruption. Another reason for preferring the Legisla-
ture to the Senate in this business, was that the House of Rep? will
be so often changed as to be free from the influence & faction to
which the permanence of the Senate may subject that branch.

M: RanpvoutpH preferred the former mode of constituting the
Executive, but if the change was to be made, he wished to know
why the eventual election was referred to the Senate and not to the
Legislature? He saw no necessity for this and many objections to
it. He was apprehensive also that the advantage of the eventual ap-
pointment would fall into the hands of the States near the Seat
of Government.

M: Gov: Morris said the Senate was preferred because fewer
could then, say to the President, you owe your appointment to us.
He thought the President would not depend so much on the Senate
for his re-appointment as on his general good conduct.

The further consideration of the Report was postponed that each
member might take a copy of the remainder of it.

The following motion was referred to the Committee of Eleven—
to wit,—‘‘ To prepare & report a plan for defraying the expences of
the Convention ”’

* Mt PInKNEY moved a clause declaring ‘‘ that each House should
be judge of the privilege* of its own members. M! Gov: Morris
244 the motion

M: Ranpoutes & M! Mapison expressed doubts as to the propriety
of giving such a power, & wished for a postponement.

M: Gov! Morris thought it so plain a case that no postponement
could be necessary.

M:! Wuson thought the power involved, and the express inser-
tion of it needless. It might beget doubts as to the power of other
public bodies, as Courts &c. Every Court is the judge of its own
privileges.

Mz Mapison distinguished between the power of Judging of privi-
leges previously & duly established, and the effect of the motion
which would give a discretion to each House as to the extent of its
own privileges. He suggested that it would be better to make pro-
vision for ascertaining by law, the privileges of each House, than to.

*This motion not inserted? in the printed Journal.

 

1The words “is not contained” are substituted in the transcript for “not.

inserted.” 52 y.3
2 The transcript uses the word “ privilege” in the plural.
512 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

allow each House to decide for itself. He suggested also the necessity
of considering what privileges ought to be allowed to the Executive.
Adjourned

Wepnespay Szp® 5. 1787.1 IN CoNVENTION.

M BrearLey from the Committee of Eleven made a farther re-
port as follows,

(1) To add to the clause ‘‘ to declare war’’ the words ‘‘ and
grant letters of marque and reprisal ’’

(2) To add to the clause ‘‘ to raise and support armies ’’ the
words ‘‘ but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a
longer term than two years ”’

(3) Instead of sect: 12. art 6. say—‘‘ All bills for raising revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall be subject
to alterations and amendments by the Senate: no money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made
by law.’’

(4) Immediately before the last clause of sect. 1. art. 7. insert
“Mo exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such
district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may by Cession of par-
ticular States and the acceptance of the Legislature become the seat
of the Government of the U. 8. and to exercise like authority over
all places purchased for the erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
Dock-Yards, and other needful buildings ”’

(5) ‘‘ To promote the progress of Science and? useful arts by
securing for limited times to authors & inventors, the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries ”’

This report being taken up.—The (1) clause was agreed to nem:
con:
To the (2) clause M* Grrry objected that it admitted of appro-
priations to an army, for two years instead of one, for which he
could not conceive a reason. that it implied that* there was to be a
standing army which he inveighed against as dangerous to liberty,
as unnecessary even for so great an extent of Country as this, and
if necessary, some restriction on the number & duration ought to be
provided: Nor was this a proper time for such an innovation. The
people would not bear it.

M' SHERMAN remarked that the appropriations were permitted
only, not required to be for two years. As the Legislature is to be

 

*The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.
? The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The word “that” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1787 513

biennially elected, it would be inconvenient to require appropriations
to be for one year, as there might be no Session within the time
necessary to renew them. He should himself he said like a reason-
able restriction on the number and continuance of an army in time
of peace.

The clause (2) was? agreed to nem: con:

The (3) clause, M: Gov: Morris moved to postpone. It had been
agreed to in the Committee on the ground of compromise, and he
should feel himself at liberty to dissent to? it, if on the whole he
should not be satisfied with certain other parts to be settled.—M:
PINKNEY 2%¢ the motion

M: SHERMAN was for giving immediate ease to those who looked
on this clause as of great moment, and for trusting to their con-
currence in other proper measures.

On the question for postponing

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. M4 ay.
Vi no. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

So much of the (4) clause as related to the seat of Government
was agreed to nem: con:

On the residue, to wit, ‘‘ to exercise like authority over all places
purchased for forts &e.

M: Gerry contended that this power might be made use of to
enslave any particular State by buying up its territory, and that the
strongholds proposed would be a means of awing the State into an
undue obedience to the Gen! Government.

M: Kine thought himself the provision unnecessary, the power
being already involved: but would move to insert after the word
‘« purchased ’’ the words ‘‘ by the consent of the Legislature of the
State’? This would certainly make the power safe.

M: Gov! Morris 2%4 the motion, which was agreed to nem: con:
as was then the residue of the clause as amended.

The (5) clause was agreed to nem: con:

The following resolution & order being reported from the Com-
mittee of eleven, to wit,

<< Resolved that the U. S. in Congress be requested to allow and
cause to be paid to the Secretary and other officers of this Convention

 

1The word “then” is here inserted in the transcript. : J

2The word “to” is crossed out in the transcript and “from” is written
as ay the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Massachusetts, Virginia, no—2.”
514 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

such sums in proportion to their respective times of service, as are
allowed to the Secretary & similar officers of Congress.’’

‘‘ Ordered that the Secretary make out & transmit to the Treas-
ury office of the U. S. an account for the said Services, & for the
incidental expences of this Convention ”’

The resolution & order were separately agreed to nem: con:

M! Gerry gave notice that he should move to reconsider articles
XIX. XX. XXI. XXII. :

M® WILLIAMSON gave like notice as to the Article fixing the num-
ber of Representatives, which he thought too small. He wished also
to allow Rho: Island more than one, as due to her probable number
of people, and as proper to stifle any pretext arising from her
absence on the occasion.

The Report made yesterday as to the appointment of the Executive
being * taken up. M* Pinkney renewed his opposition to the mode,
arguing 1.? that the electors will not have sufficient knowledge of the
fittest men, & will be swayed by an attachment to the eminent men of
their respective States. Hence 2° the dispersion of the votes would
leave the appointment with the Senate, and as the President’s re-
appointment will thus depend on the Senate he will be the mere
creature of that body. 3.? He will combine with the Senate ag** the
House of Representatives. 4.2 This change in the mode of election
was meant to get rid of the ineligibility of the President a second
time, whereby he will become fixed for life under the auspices of
the Senate

M: Gerry did not object to this plan of constituting the Executive
in itself, but should be governed in his final vote by the powers that
may be given to the President.

M? Ruriipce was much opposed to the plan reported by the
Committee. It would throw the whole power into the Senate.
He was also against a re-eligibility. He moved to ‘postpone the
Report under consideration & take up the original plan of appoint-
ment by the Legislature, to wit. ‘‘ He shall be elected by joint
ballot by the Legislature to which election a majority of the votes
of the members present shall be required: He shall hold his office
during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second
time.’’

On this motion to postpone

 

* The word “ then ” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The figures “1,” “3” and “4” are changed to “ first,” “Thi 3
“Fourthly ” in the transcript. : i sre ere
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1787 515

N. H. div? Mas. no. Ct no. N.J.no P? no. Del. no. M? no.
Vi no. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. no.*

Col. Mason admitted that there were objections to an appoint-
ment by the Legislature as originally planned. He had not yet made
up his mind, but would state his objections to the mode proposed by
the Committee. 1.2 It puts the appointment in fact into the hands of
the Senate, as it will rarely happen that a majority of the whole
votes will fall on any one candidate: and as the Existing President
will always be one of the 5 highest, his re-appointment will of course
depend on the Senate. 2.? Considering the powers of the President &
those of the Senate, if a coalition should be established between these
two branches, they will be able to subvert the Constitution—The great
objection with him would be removed by depriving the Senate of
the eventual election. He accordingly moved to strike out the words
‘¢ if such number be a majority of that of the electors.’’

M: Wituiamson 2%4 the motion. He could not agree to the
clause without some such modification. He preferred making the
highest tho’ not having a majority of the votes, President, to a
reference of the matter to the Senate. Referring the appointment
to the Senate lays a certain foundation for corruption & aristocracy.

M: Gov! Morris thought the point of less consequence than it
was supposed on both sides. It is probable that a majority of
votes will fall on the same man. As each elector is to give two votes,
more than %4 will give a majority. Besides as one vote is to be
given to a man out of the State, and as this vote will not be thrown
away, 1% the votes will fall on characters eminent & generally known.
Again if the President shall have given satisfaction, the votes will
turn on him of course, and a majority of them will reappoint him,
without resort to the Senate: If he should be disliked, all disliking
him, would take care to unite their votes so as to ensure his being
* supplanted.

Col. Mason those who think there is no danger of there not being
a majority for the same person in the first instance, ought to give up
the point to those who think otherwise.

M: Suerman reminded the opponents of the new mode proposed
that if the small states had the advantage in the Senate’s deciding
among the five highest candidates, the large States would have in
fact the nomination of these candidates

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “North Carolina, South Carolina, aye
—2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Ji ersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, Georgia, no—8; New Hampshire, divided.” : :

2'The figures “1” and “2” are changed in the transcript to “First” and
“ Secondly.”
516 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

On the motion of Col: Mason

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctno. N.J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? ay.*
Vi no. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

M: Witson moved to strike out ‘‘ Senate ’’ and insert the word
“ Legislature ”’

M: Mapison considered it as? a primary object to render an even-
tual resort to any part of the Legislature improbable. He was appre-
hensive that the proposed alteration would turn the attention of
the large States too much to the appointment of candidates, instead
of aiming at an effectual appointment of the officer, as the large
States would predominate in the Legislature which would have the
final choice out of the Candidates. Whereas if the Senate in which
the small States predominate should have this * final choice, the con-
certed effort of the large States would be to make the appointment
in the first instance conclusive.

M! RanvotpH. We have in some revolutions of this plan made a
bold stroke for Monarchy. We are now doing the same for an
aristocracy. He dwelt on the tendency of such an influence in the
Senate over the election of the President in addition to its other
powers, to convert that body into a real & dangerous Aristocracy.

M: Dickinson was in favor of giving the eventual election to the
Legislature, instead of the Senate. It was too much influence to be
superadded to that body.

On the question moved by M? Wilson

N. H. div? Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M? no.
Vi ay. N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. no.t

M: Mapison & M? Witu1amson moved to strike out the word
‘“majority ’? and insert ‘‘ one third ’’ so that the eventual power
might not be exercised if less than a majority, but not less than %
of the Electors should vote for the same person.

M! Gerry objected that this would put it in the power of three
or four States to put in whom they pleased.

M! Wituiamson. There are seven States which do not contain
one third of the people. If the Senate are to appoint, less than one
sixth of the people will have the power.

*In printed Journal Maryland—no.

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Maryland,* North Carolina, aye; the
other nine States, no.”

* The word “as” is stricken out in the transcript.

* The word “the” is substituted in the transcript for “this.”
_ ‘In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Caro-
lina, aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, Georgia, no—7; New Hampshire, divided.”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1787 517

On the question :

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. Mé no.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no?

M* Gerry suggested that the eventual election should be made
by six Senators and seven Representatives cnosen by joint ballot of
both Houses.

M* Kine observed that the influence of the Small States in the
Senate was somewhat balanced by the influence of the large States
in bringing forward the candidates; * and also by the Concurrence
of the small States in the Committee in the clause vesting the
exclusive origination of Money bills in the House of Represen-
tatives.

Col: Mason moved to strike out the word ‘‘ five ’’ and insert the
word ‘‘ three ’’ as the highest candidates for the Senate to choose
out of.

M! Gerry 274 the motion

M*: SHERMAN would sooner give up the plan. He would prefer
seven or thirteen.

On the question moved by Col: Mason & M: Gerry

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P? no. Delaware M? no.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

M? SpaicHt and M:! Rutiince moved to strike out ‘“‘ five’’ and
insert ‘‘ thirteen ’’—to which all the States disagreed—except N. C.
&S. C.

M* Mapison & M! Wiiiiamson moved to insert after ‘‘ Electors ”’
the words ‘‘ who shall have balloted ’’ so that the non voting electors
not being counted might not increase the number necessary as a
majority of the whole, to decide the choice without the agency of
the Senate.

On this question

* This explains the compromise mentioned above? by Mr Govt Morris. Col.
Mason Mr Gerry & other members from large States set great value on this
privilege of originating money bills. Of this the members from the small
States, with some from the large. States who wished a high mounted Govt
endeavored to avail themselves, by making that privilege, the price of arrange-
ments in the constitution favorable to the small States, and to the elevation of

the Government.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Virginia, North Carolina, aye; the

ine States, no.” : . :
oe The worda “alluded to” are substituted in the transcript for “ mentioned

b - . os is 4
i at In the transcript the vote reads: “ Virginia, North Carolina, aye; nine

States, no.”
518 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pt ay. Del. no. M? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

M= DicKINSON moved, in order to remove ambiguity from the
intention of the clause as explained by the vote, to add, after the
words ‘‘ if such number be a majority of the whole number of the
Electors ’’ the word ‘‘ appointed ”’

On this motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Con: ay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Delaware
Mé ay. V2 no. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

Col: Mason. As the mode of appointment is now regulated, he
could not forbear expressing his opinion that it is utterly inad-
missible. He would prefer the Government of Prussia to one which
will put all power into the hands of seven or eight men, and fix
an Aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy.

The words ‘‘ and of their giving their votes ’’ being inserted on
motion for that purpose, after the words ‘‘ The Legislature may de-
termine the time of chusing and assembling the Electors ”’

The House adjourned.

TrurspAY Srep® 6. 1787.2 In CoNVENTION

M: Kine and M! Gerry moved to insert in the (5) * clause of
the Report (see Sep’ 4°) after the words ‘‘ may be entitled in the
Legislature ’’ the words following—‘‘ But no person shall be ap-
pointed an elector who is a member of the Legislature of the U. S.
or who holds any office of profit or trust under the U. S.’’ which
passed nem: con:

M:! GERRY proposed, as the President was to be elected by the
Senate out of the five highest candidates, that if he should not at
the end of his term be re-elected by a majority of the Electors, and
no other candidate should have a majority, the eventual election
should be made by the Legislature. This he said would relieve the

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela-
ware, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Virginia, North Carolina, no—2.”

* The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

*The word “fourth” is substituted in the transcript for “ (5),” the latter
being an error.

>In the transcript the date reads: “the fourth of September.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1787 519

President from his particular dependence on the Senate for his
continuance in office.

M: Kine liked the idea, as calculated to satisfy particular mem-
bers & promote unanimity, & as likely to operate but seldom.

M: Reap opposed it, remarking that if individual members were
to be indulged, alterations would be necessary to satisfy most of them.

M? WILLIAMSON espoused it as a reasonable precaution against
the undue influence of the Senate.

MM" SHerman liked the arrangement as it stood, though he should
not be averse to some amendments. He thought he said that if the
Legislature were to have the eventual appointment instead of the
Senate, it ought to vote in the case by States, in favor of the small
States, as the large States would have so great an advantage in
nominating the candidates.

M: Gov? Morris thought favorably of M: Gerry’s proposition.
It would free the President from being tempted in naming to Offices,
to Conform to the will of the Senate, & thereby virtually give the
appointments to office, to the Senate.

M: Wison said that he had weighed carefully the report of the
Committee for remodelling the constitution of the Executive; and
on combining it with other parts of the plan, he was obliged to con-
sider the whole as having a dangerous tendency to aristocracy; as
throwing a dangerous power into the hands of the Senate. They
will have in fact, the appointment of the President, and through his
dependence on them, the virtual appointment to offices; among others
the offices of the Judiciary Department. They are to make Treaties;
and they are to try all impeachments. In allowing them thus to
make the Executive & Judiciary appointments, to be the Court of
impeachments, and to make Treaties which are to be laws of the land,
the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers are all blended in one
branch of the Government. The power of making Treaties involves
the case of subsidies, and here as an additional evil, foreign influence
is to be dreaded. According to the plan as it now stands, the Presi-
dent will not be the man of the people as he ought to be, but the
Minion of the Senate. He cannot even appoint a tide-waiter without
the Senate. He had always thought the Senate too numerous a body
for making appointments to office. The Senate, will moreover in all
probability be in constant Session. They will have high salaries.
And with all those powers, and the President in their interest,
they will depress the other branch of the Legislature, and aggran-
dize themselves in proportion. Add to all this, that the Senate sitting
in conclave, can by holding up to their respective States various and
520 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

improbable candidates, contrive so to scatter their votes, as to bring
the appointment of the President ultimately before themselves. Upon
the whole, he thought the new mode of appointing the President,
with some amendments, a valuable improvement; but he could never
agree to purchase it at the price of the ensuing parts of the Report,
nor befriend a system of which they make a part.

M: Gov: Morris expressed his wonder at the observations of M!
Wilson so far as they preferred the plan in the printed Report to the
new modification of it before the House, and entered into a com-
parative view of the two, with an eye to the nature of M? Wilsons
objections to the last. By the first the Senate he observed had a voice
in appointing the President out of all the Citizens of the U. S: by
this they were limited to five candidates previously nominated to
them, with a probability of being barred altogether by the successful
ballot of the Electors. Here surely was no increase of power. They
are now to appoint Judges nominated to them by the President. Be-
fore they had the appointment without any agency whatever of the
President. Here again was surely no additional power. If they are
to make Treaties as the plan now stands, the power was the same in
the printed plan. If they are to try impeachments, the Judges must
have been triable by them before. Wherein then lay the danger-
ous tendency of the innovations to establish an aristocracy in the
Senate? As to the appointment of officers, the weight of sentiment
in the House, was opposed to the exercise of it by the President
alone; though it was not the case with himself. If the Senate would
act as was suspected, in misleading the States into a fallacious dis-
position of their votes for a President, they would, if the appointment
were withdrawn wholly from them, make such representations in
their several States where they have influence, as would favor the
object of their partiality.

M? Wiuiiamson. replying to M! Morris: observed that the aristo-
cratic complexion proceeds from the change in the mode of appoint-
ing the President which makes him dependent on the Senate.

M: Cymer said that the aristocratic part to which he could
never accede was that in the printed plan, which gave the Senate
the power of appointing to offices.

M? Haminton said that he had been restrained from entering
into the discussions by his dislike of the Scheme of Govt in General;
but as he meant to support the plan to be recommended, as better
than nothing, he wished in this place to offer a few remarks. He
liked the new modification, on the whole, better than that in the
printed Report. In this the President was a Monster elected for
SESSION OF THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1787 521

seven years, and ineligible afterwards; having great powers, in ap-
pointments to office, & continually tempted by this constitutional dis-
qualification to abuse them in order to subvert the Government. Al-
though he should be made re-eligible, still if appointed by the Legis-
lature, he would be tempted to make use of corrupt influence to be
continued in office. It seemed peculiarly desireable therefore that
some other mode of election should be devised. Considering the
different views of different States, & the different districts Northern
Middle & Southern, he concurred with those who thought that the
votes would not be concentered, and that the appointment would
consequently in the present mode devolve on the Senate. The nomi-
nation to offices will give great weight to the President. Here then
is a mutual connection & influence, that will perpetuate the President,
and aggrandize both him & the Senate. What is to be the remedy?
He saw none better than to let the highest number of ballots, whether
a Majority or not, appoint the President. What was the objection
to this? Merely that too small a number might appoint. But as the
plan stands, the Senate may take the candidate having the smallest
number of votes, and make him President.

Mz SpaigHt & M! WILLIAMSON moved to insert ‘‘ seven ’’ instead
of ‘‘ four ’’ years for the term of the President— *

On this motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? no.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

M: Spaicut & M? Wuiamson, then moved to insert ‘‘ six ’’ in-
stead of ‘‘ four.’’

On which motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? no.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no#

On the term ‘‘ four ’’ all the States were ay, except N. Caro-
‘lina, no.
On the question * (Clause 4. in the Report) for Appointing ° Presi-

*Transfer hither what is brackets.* : ;
[* An ineligibility wi have followed (tho’ it wi seem from the vote not in

‘the opinion of all) this prolongation of the term.]

 

1 Madigon’s direction is omitted in the transcript. — ae

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,

land, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.” : ;
Te In the transcript the vote reads: “North Carolina, South Carolina, aye
-—2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no—9.” :

*The words “on the” are here inserted in the transcript.

® The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
522 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

2?

dent by electors—down to the words,—‘‘ entitled in the Legislature
inclusive.

N. H. ay. Mas: ay. Cont ay N. J. ay. Peay. Del. ay. Mé ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. ay.*

It was moved that the Electors meet at the seat of the Gen! Gov!
which passed in the Negative. N. C. only being ay.

It was? moved to insert the words ‘‘ under the seal of the State ’’
after the word ‘‘ transmit ’’ in® 4% clause of the Report which
was disagreed to; a8 was another motion to insert the words ‘‘ and
who shall have given their votes ’’’ after the word ‘‘ appointed ’’ in
the 4% Clause of the Report as added yesterday on motion of M:
Dickinson.

On several motions, the words ‘‘ in presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives ’’ were inserted after the word ‘‘ counted ”’
and the word ‘‘ immediately ’’ before the word ‘‘ choose ’’; and the
words ‘‘ of the Electors ’’ after the word ‘‘ votes.’’

M Spaicut said if the election by Electors is to be crammed
down, he would prefer their meeting altogether and deciding finally
without any reference to the Senate and moved ‘‘ That the Electors
meet at the seat of the General Government.’’

M: Wiu1amson 2% the motion, on which all the States were in
the negative except N: Carolina.

On motion the words ‘‘ But the election shall be on the same
day throughout the U. 8.’’ were added after the words ‘‘ trans-
mitting their votes ”’

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ciay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M? ay.
Ve ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo—ay.*

On a question on the sentence in clause (4). ‘‘ if such number
be a majority of that of the Electors appointed.’’

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. ay. Mf? ay.
Vi no. N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.5

On a question on the clause referring the eventual appointment
of the President. to the Senate

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye
—9; North Carolina, South Carolina, no—2.”

* The word “then” is here inserted in the transcript.

*'The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

s In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, no—3.”

In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con:
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, no—3.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1787 523

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. ay. V® ay.
N. C. no.2 Here the call ceased.

M* Mapison made a motion requiring % at least of the Senate
to be present at the choice of a President. M! PINKNEY 244 the
motion

M: GorHam thought it a wrong principle to require more than
a majority in any case. In the present case? it might prevent for a
long time any choice of a President. On the question moved by
M M. & M: P.

N. H. ay: Mas. abst Cino. N.J.no. P#no. Del. no. M@ ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M*! WILLIAMSON suggested as better than an eventual choice by
the Senate, that this choice should be made by the Legislature,
voting by States and not per capita.

M* SHERMAN suggested the House of Rep® as preferable to the
Legislature, and moved, accordingly,

To strike out the words ‘‘ The Senate shall immediately choose
&e.’’ and insert ‘‘ The House of Representatives shall immediately
choose by ballot one of them for President, the members from each
State having one vote.’’

Col: Mason liked the latter mode best as lessening the aristo-
cratic influence of the Senate.

On the Motion of M! Sherman

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. no. M4 ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M" Gov? Morris suggested the idea of providing that in all cases,
the President in office, should not be one of the five Candidates; but
be only re-eligible in case a majority of the electors should vote for
him. [This was another expedient for rendering the President
independent of the Legislative body for his continuance in
office. ]

M: Mapison remarked that as a majority of members w? make a
quorum in the H. of Rep’ it would follow from the amendment of
M: Sherman giving the election to a majority of States, thet the

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye—7; North Carolina,
no.”

2 The word “case” is omitted in the transcript.

®In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, no—4; Massachusetts, absent.” :

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—10. Delaware, no—1.”
524 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

President might be elected by two States only, Virg? & Pen‘ which
have 18 members, if these States alone should be present

On a motion that the eventual election of Presid! in case of an
equality 1 of the votes of the electors be referred to the House of Rep?

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. Mi no. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M! Kine moved to add to the amendment of M*: Sherman “* But
a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members
from two thirds of the States,’’ and also of a majority of the whole
number of the House of Representatives.’’

Col: Mason liked it as obviating the remark of M! Madison—
The motion as far as ‘‘ States ’’ inclusive was ag? to. On the residue
to wit, ‘‘ and also of a majority of the whole number of the House
of Rep? it passed in the Negative.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. no. Ptay. Del. no. M& no.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. no.®
' The Report relating to the appointment of the Executive stands
as amended, as follows,

‘¢ He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and
together with the vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected
in the following manner.

Each State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may
direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators
and members of the House of Representatives, to which the State
may be entitled in the Legislature:

But no person shall be appointed an Elector who is a member of
the Legislature of the U. S. or who holds any office of profit or
trust under the U. S.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by
ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabi-
tant of the same State with themselves; and they shall make a list
of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each,
which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the
an of the General Government, directed to the President of the

enate.

The President of the Senate shall in the presence of the Senate
and House of Representatives open all the certificates & the votes
shall then be counted.

The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the

 

1 The transcript does not italicize the words “an equality.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, no—3.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, North Carolina, aye—5; New Hampshire, New Jersey, Dela-
ware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1787 525

President (if such number be a majority of the whole number of
electors appointed) and if there be more than one who have such
majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of
Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for
President, the Representation from each State having one vote. But
if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list,
the House of Representatives shall in like manner choose by ballot
the President. In the choice of a President by the House of Rep-
resentatives, a Quorum shall consist of a member or members from
two thirds of the States [* and the concurrence of a majority of all
the States shall be necessary to such choice.]—And in every case after
the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of
votes of the Electors shall be the vice-president: But, if there should
remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose
from them the vice-President.

The Legislature may determine the time of choosing the Electors,
and of their giving their votes; and the manner of certifying and
transmitting their votes—But the election shall be on the same day
throughout the U. States.’’

Adjourned

Frmay Sep® 7, 1787.2. In ConveNTION

The mode of constituting the Executive being resumed, M' Ran-
DOLPH moved, to insert in the first Section of the report made yes-
terday *

‘‘ The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the U. S.
shall act as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability
of the President and Vice-President; and such officer shall act accord-
ingly until the time of electing a President shall arrive.’’

M? Mapison observed that this, as worded, would prevent a supply
of the vacancy by an intermediate election of the President, and
moved to substitute—‘‘ until such disability be removed, or a Presi-
dent shall be elected.+ M= Govern? Morris 2% the motion, which was
agreed to.

It seemed to be an objection to the provision with some, that
according to the process established for chusing the Executive, there
would be difficulty in effecting it at other than the fixed periods;

*Note. This clause was not inserted on this day, but on the 7th* Sepr See

Friday the 7th? : ; Ai .
+In the printed Journal this amendment is put into the original Motion.

 

1The word “of” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The word “ inst.’ is here inserted in the transcript.

* The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript. ;

* The words “ the following ” are here inserted in the transcript.
526 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

with others, that the Legislature was restrained in the temporary
appointment to “ officers ’’ of the U. S: They wished it to be at
liberty to appoint others than such.

On the Motion of M: Randolph as amended, it passed in the
affirmative

N. H. divided. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. P? ay. Del. no.
Mé ay. Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M: Gerry moved ‘‘ that in the election of President by the House
of Representatives, no State shall vote by less than three members,
and where that number may not be allotted to a State, it shall be
made up by its Senators; and a concurrence of a majority of all
the States shall be necessary to make such choice.’’ Without some
such provision five individuals might possibly be competent to an
election; these being a majority of two thirds of the existing number
of States; and two thirds being a quorum for this business.

M: Mapison 244 the motion

M: Reap observed that the States having but one member only
in the House of Rep? would be in danger of having no vote at all
in the election: the sickness or absence either of the Representative or
one of the Senators would have that effect.

M! Mapison replied that, if one member of the House of Rep-
resentatives should be left capable of voting for the State, the
states having one Representative only would still be subject to
that danger. He thought it an evil that so small a number at.
any rate should be authorized, to elect. Corruption would be
greatly facilitated by it. The mode itself was liable to this further
weighty objection that the representatives of a Minority of the
people, might reverse the choice of a majority of the States and of
the people. He wished some cure for this inconveniency? might yet
be provided.

M? Gerry withdrew the first part of his motion; and on the,—
Question on the 2¢ part viz. ‘‘ and a concurrence of a majority of
all the States shall be necessary to make such choice ’’ to follow the
words ‘‘ a member or members from two thirds of the States ’’—It
was agreed to nem: con:

The section 2. (see Sept 4) requiring that the President should be
a natural-born Citizen, &¢ & have been resident for fourteen years,
& be thirty five years of age, was agreed to nem: con:

 

; 7In the transcript the vote reads: ‘New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware,
North Carolina, no—4; New Hampshire, divided.”

2 es 4 : : s s .
The word “inconveniency ” is changed to “ inconvenience” in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1787 527

* Section 3. (see Sep’ 4). ‘‘ The vice President shall be ex-officio
President of the Senate ’’

M: Gerry opposed this regulation. We might as well put the
President himself at the head of the Legislature. The close intimacy
that must subsist between the President & vice-president makes it
absolutely improper. He was ag%t having any vice President.

M* Gov: Morris. The vice president then will be the first heir
apparent that ever loved his father. If there should be no vice
president, the President of the Senate would be temporary successor,
which would amount to the same thing.

M SHERMAN saw no danger in the case. If the vice-President
were not to be President of the Senate, he would be without employ-
ment, and some member by being made President must be deprived
of his vote, unless when an equal division of votes might happen in
the Senate, which would be but seldom.

M* RanpouPH concurred in the opposition to the clause.

M! WiuiaMson, observed that such an officer as vice-President
was not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable
mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same
time.

Col: Mason, thought the office of vice-President an encroachment
on the rights of the Senate; and that it mixed too much the Legis-
lative & Executive, which as well as the Judiciary departments,’
ought to be kept as separate as possible. He took occasion to ex-
press his dislike of any reference whatever of the power to make
appointments to either branch of the Legislature. On the other
hand he was averse to vest so dangerous a power in the President
alone. As a method for avoiding both, he suggested that a privy
Council of six members to the president should be established; to be
chosen for six years by the Senate, two out of the Eastern two out of
the middle, and two out of the Southern quarters of the Union, & to
go out in rotation two every second year; the concurrence of the
Senate to be required only in the appointment of Ambassadors, and
in making treaties, which are more of a legislative nature. This
would prevent the constant sitting of the Senate which he thought
dangerous, as well as keep the departments separate & distinct. It
would also save the expence of constant sessions of the Senate. He
had he said always considered the Senate as too unwieldy & ex-

 

 

1 Thi aph is changed in the transcript to read as follows: “The
third cation, the Vice-President shall be ex-officio President of the Senate’

i idered.” : }
ne The letter s » ig stricken from the word “ departments ” in the transcript.
528 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

pensive for appointing officers, especially the smallest, such as tide
waiters &c. He had not reduced his idea to writing, but it could be
easily done if it should be found acceptable.

On the question shall the vice President be ex officio President of
the Senate?

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci ay. N. J. no. P* ay. Del ay. Mas no.
Vi ay. N.C. abst 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.*

The other parts of the same Section (3) * were then agreed to.

The Section 4.—to wit, ‘‘ The President by & with the advice
and consent of the Senate shall have power to make Treaties & ’’®

M: Wison moved to add, after the word ‘‘ Senate ’’ the words,
‘‘ and House of Representatives.’’ As treaties he said are to have
the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also.
The circumstance of secrecy in the business of treaties formed the
only objection; but this he thought, so far as it was inconsistent
with obtaining the Legislative sanction, was outweighed by the neces-
sity of the latter.

M! SHERMAN thought the only question that could be made was
whether the power could be safely trusted to the Senate. He thought
it could; and that the necessity of secresy in the case of treaties
forbade a reference of them to the whole Legislature.

M: Frrzimmons 244 the motion of M! Wilson, & on the question

N. H.no. Mas. no. Cino. N.J.no. P? ay. Del. no. Mino. V2
no. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.*

The first sentence as to making treaties was then Agreed to: nem:
con:

5«< He shall nominate &c Appoint Ambassadors &¢.’’

M! Witson objected to the mode of appointing, as blending a
branch of the Legislature with the Executive. Good laws are of no
effect without a good Executive; and there can be no good Executive
without a responsible appointment of officers to execute. Responsi-
bility is in a manner destroyed by such an agency of the Senate.
He would prefer the council proposed by Col: Mason, provided its
advice should not be made obligatory on the President.

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
New Jersey, Maryland, no—2; North Carolina, absent.”

? The figure “3” is omitted in the transcript.

* The phrase “was then taken up” is here added in the transcript.

“In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, aye—1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10.”

* The words “On the clause” are here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1787 529

M* PINKNEY was against joining the Senate in these appoint-
ments, except in the instance of Ambassadors whom ? he thought ought
not to be appointed by the President

M®= Gov: Morris said that as the President was to nominate, there
would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there
would be security. As Congress now make appointments there is
no responsibility.

M! Gerry. The idea of responsibility in the nomination to offices
is chimerical. The President can not know all characters, and can
therefore always plead ignorance.

M: Kine. As the idea of a Council proposed by Col. Mason has
been supported by M* Wilson, he would remark that most of the
inconveniencies charged on the Senate are incident to a Council of
Advice. He differed from those who thought the Senate would sit
constantly. He did not suppose it was meant that all the minute
officers were to be appointed by the Senate, or any other original
source, but by the higher officers of the departments to which they
belong. He was of opinion also that the people would be alarmed
at an unnecessary creation of new Corps which must increase the
expence as well as influence of the Government.

On the question on these words in the clause viz—‘‘ He shall nomi-
nate & by & with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
ambassadors, and other public ministers (and Consuls) ? Judges of
the Supreme Court ’’* Agreed to nem: con: the insertion of ‘‘ and
consuls ’’ having first taken place.

On the question on the following words ‘‘ And all other officers
of* U. 8.”

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. ay. Pt no. Del. ay M? ay.
Viay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay?

On motion of M? Spaigut—‘‘ that the President shall have power
to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the
Senate by granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of the
next Session of the Senate ’’ It was agreed to nem: con:

4 Section 4. ‘‘ The President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate shall have power to make Treaties ’’—‘‘ But no treaty

 

1The word * who” is substituted in the transcript for “ whom.”

2 The word “and” is here inserted in the transcript.

® The words “it was” are here inserted in the transcript.

‘The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; Pennsylvania, South Carolina, no—2.”
530 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members
present ’’—this last * being before the House.

M: Witson thought it objectionable to require the concurrence
of % which puts it in? the power of a minority to controul the will
of a majority.

M: Kine concurred in the objection; remarking that as the
Executive was here joined in the business, there was a check which
did not exist in Congress where The concurrence of % was required.

M: Mapison moved to insert after the word ‘‘ treaty ’’ the words
“* except treaties of peace ’’ allowing these to be made with less diffi-
culty than other treaties—It was agreed to nem: con:

M: Manison then moved to authorise a concurrence of two thirds
of the Senate to make treaties of peace, without the concurrence of

g gthe President.’’—The President he said would necessarily derive so

uch power and importance from a state of war that he might be

tempted, if authorised, to impede a treaty of peace. M! BuTLER
244 the motion

M* GorHam thought the precaution * unnecessary as the means of
carrying on the war would not be in the hands of the President,
but of the Legislature.

M: Gov! Morris thought the power of the President in this case
harmless; and that no peace ought to be made without the concur-
rence of the President, who was the general Guardian of the National
interests.

M: Butwer was strenuous for the motion, as a necessary security
against ambitious & corrupt Presidents. He mentioned the late
perfidious policy of the Statholder in Holland; and the artifices of
the Duke of Marlbro’ to prolong the war of which he had the man-
agement.

M: Gerry was of opinion that in treaties of peace a greater rather
than less proportion of votes was necessary, than in other treaties.
In Treaties of peace the dearest interests will be at stake, as the
fisheries, territory &c. In treaties of peace also there is more dander
to the extremities of the Continent, of being sacrificed, than on any
other occasions.

M: Wru1amson thought that Treaties of peace should be guarded
at least by requiring the same concurrence as in other Treaties.

On the motion of M? Madison & M= Butler

 

a The words “being considered, and the last clause” are substituted in the
transcript for “ this last.”

* The word “into” is substituted in the transcript for “in.”

*In the transcript the word “precaution” is stricken out and the word
“security ” is written above it.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1787 531

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. Pno. Del. no. M? ay.
Vi no. N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.2

On the part of the clause concerning treaties amended by the
exception as to Treaties of peace,

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. no. P* no. Del. ay. M4 ay.
Vi ay. N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.

5“ and may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer
in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to
the duties of their respective offices,’’ being before the House

Col: Mason * said that in rejecting a Council to the President we
were about to try an experiment on which the most despotic Gov-
ernments had never ventured. The Grand Signor himself had his
Divan. He moved to postpone the consideration of the clause in
order to take up the following

“* That it be an instruction to the Committee of the States to pre-
pare a clause or clauses for establishing an Executive Council, as a
Council of State, for the President of the U. States, to consist of six
members, two of which from the Hastern, two from the middle, and
.two from the Southern States, with a Rotation and duration of
office similar to those of the Senate; such Council to be appointed
by the Legislature or by the Senate.”’

Doctor FranKiin 2% the motion. We seemed he said too much
to fear cabals in appointments by a number, and to have too much
confidence in those of single persons. Experience shewed that caprice,
the intrigues of favorites & mistresses, &c* were nevertheless the
means most prevalent in monarchies. Among instances of abuse in
such modes of appointment, he mentioned the many bad Governors
appointed in G. B. for the Colonies. He thought a Council would not
only be a check on a bad President but be a relief to a good one.

M: Gov! Morris. The question of a Council was considered in
the Committee, where it was judged that the Presid! by persuading
his Council, to concur in his wrong measures, would acquire their
protection for them.

*In the printed Journal, Mr Madison is erroneously substituted for Col:
“Mason.

 

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
—8; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, no—8.” -

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—8;
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no—3.” é :

* The words “The clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

‘The character “&c” is omitted in the transcript.
532 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Witson approved of a Council in preference to making the
Senate a party to appointm’s

M: DickENson was for a Council. It w4 be a singular thing if
the measures of the Executive were not to undergo some previous
discussion before the President.

M! Mapison was in favor of the instruction to the Committee
proposed by Col: Mason. :

The motion of Mi? Mason was negatived. Mary4 ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay— N.H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no P? no. Del. no.
V2 no. N C no?

On the question,? ‘‘ authorising the President to call for the
opinions of the Heads of Departments, in writing ’’: it passed in the
affirmative, N. H. only being no.*

The clause was then unanimously agreed to—

Mz Wrouiamson & M! Spaicut moved ‘‘ that no Treaty of Peace
affecting Territorial rights sh? be made without the concurrence of
two thirds of the members of the Senate present.

M Kine. It will be necessary to look out for securities for some
other rights, if this principle be established; he moved to extend the
motion—‘‘ to all present rights of the U. States.”’

Adjourned

SaturDAay SEPTEMBER 87! IN CONVENTION

The last Report of Committee of Eleven (see Sep™ 4) was
resumed.

M: Kine moved to strike out the ‘‘ exception of Treaties of peace ”’
from the general clause requiring two thirds of the Senate for
making Treaties

M: Witson wished the requisition of two thirds to be struck out
altogether If the majority cannot be trusted, it was a proof, as
observed by M? Ghorum, that we were not fit for one Society.

A reconsideration of the whole clause was agreed to.

M: Gov: Morris was ag* striking out the ‘‘ exception of Treaties

* Not so stated in the Printed Journal; but comformable to the result after-
wards appearing.

 

*The word “Col.” is substituted in the transcript for “Mr.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, no—8.”

* The word “for” is here inserted in the transcript.

«The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1787 533

>

of peace ’’ If two thirds of the Senate should be required for peace,
the Legislature will be unwilling, to make war for that reason, on
account of the Fisheries or the Mississippi, the two great objects
of the Union. Besides, if a majority of the Senate be for peace,
and are not allowed to make it, they will be apt to effect their
purpose in the more disagreeable mode, of negativing the supplies
for the war.

M: WILLiaMson remarked that Treaties are to be made in the
branch of the Gov! where there may be a majority of the States
without a majority of the people. Eight men may be a majority of
a quorum, & should not have the power to decide the conditions
of peace. There would be no danger, that the exposed States, as
8. Carolina or Georgia, would urge an improper war for the West-
ern Territory.

M: Wuson If two thirds are necessary to make peace, the
minority may perpetuate war, against the sense of the majority.

M: Gerry enlarged on the danger of putting the essential rights
of the Union in the hands of so small a number as a majority of the
Senate, representing, perhaps, not one fifth of the people. The
Senate will be corrupted by foreign influence.

M: SHERMAN was ag*' leaving the rights established by the Treaty
of peace, to the Senate, & moved to annex a ‘‘ proviso that no such
rights sh? be ceded without the sanction of the Legislature.

M? Gov: Morris seconded the ideas of M? Sherman.

M: Mapison observed that it had been too easy in the present Con-
gress to make Treaties altho’ nine States were required for the
purpose.

On the question for striking? ‘‘ except Treaties of peace ”’

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. no. Pt ay. Del. no. M? no
Vi ay. N.C. ay. 8S. C. ay. Geo. ay.”

M: Witson & M* Dayton move to strike out the clause requiring
two thirds of the Senate for making Treaties——on which,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct div? N. J. no. P2 no Del. ay. M? no.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no?

M: Ruruipce & M? Gerry move that ‘‘ no Treaty * be made with-

 

1The word “out” is here inserted in the transcript.

2In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
—8; New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no—3.” é

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Delaware, aye—1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—9; Connecticut, divided.” :

‘The word “shall” is here inserted in the transcript.
534 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

out the consent of % of all the members of the Senate ’’—according
to the example in the present Cong:

MM Guorum. There is a difference in the case, as the President’s
consent will also be necessary in the new Gov:

On the question

N. H. no. Mass. no. (M® Gerry ay) Ci no. N. J. no. P? no.
Del. no. Mino. V2? no. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.

M: Suarman mov? that no Treaty 2? be made without a Majority
of the whole number of the Senate. M! Grrry seconded him.

Mt Witu1amson. This will be less security than % as now re-
quired.

M: SHerman. It will be less embarrassing.

On the question, it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N.J. no. P2 no. Del. ay. M? no.
Vi no. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.’

M? Mapison mov! that a Quorum of the Senate consist of % of
wll the members.

M: Gov! Morris—This will put it in the power of one man to
break up a Quorum.

M: Mapison, This may happen to any Quorum.

On the Question it passed in the negative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P no. Del. no. M? ay.
Ve ay. N. C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M Wituiamson & M! Gerry, mov! ‘‘ that no Treaty sh? be made
witht previous notice to the members, & a reasonable time for their
attending.’’

On the Question

All the States no, except N. C. 8S. C. & Geo. ay.

On a question on® clause of the Report of the Com® of Eleven
relating to Treaties by % of the Senate. All the States were ay—
except P? N. J. & Geo. no.

M: Gerry mov! that no officer? be app? but to offices created by

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: ‘“ North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts (Mr. Gerry, aye), Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no—8.”

? The word “shall” is here inserted in the transcript.

* In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—6.”

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no—6.”

° The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1787 535

the Constitution or by law’’—This was rejected as unnecessary by
six no’s & five ays;?

The Ayes. Mas. Ct N. J. N. C. Geo.—Noes. N. H. P*: Del. M? V?
8. C2?

The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments ag**
the President, for Treason & bribery, was taken up.

Col. Mason. Why is the provision restrained to Treason &
bribery only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach
many great and dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty of
Treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason
as above defined. As bills of attainder which have saved the British
Constitution are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend: the
power of impeachments. He mov? to add after ‘‘ bribery ’”’ “‘ or
maladministration.’? M= Gerry seconded him.

M! Mapison’ So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure dur-
ing pleasure of the Senate.

M* Gov? Morris, it will not be put in foree & can do no harm.
An election of every four years will prevent maladministration.

Col. Mason withdrew ‘‘ maladministration ’’ & substitutes ‘‘ other
high crimes & misdemesnors ag* the State ’’

On the question thus altered

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. no. Mo? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay.* Geo. ay.®

M! Mapison, objected to:a trial of the President by the Senate,
especially as he was to be impeached by the other branch of the
Legislature, and for any act which might be called a misdemesnor.
The President under these circumstances was made improperly de-
pendent. He would prefer the Supreme Court for the trial of im-
peachments, or rather a tribunal of which that should form a part.

M: Gov: Morris thought no other tribunal than the Senate could
be trusted. The supreme Court were too few in number and might
be warped or corrupted. He was ag** a dependence of the Executive
on the Legislature, considering the Legislative tyranny the great dan-
ger to be apprehended; but there could be no danger that the Senate
would say untruly on their oaths that the President was guilty

*In the printed Journal, 8. Carolina—no.

 

1The words “by six no’s & five ayes” are stricken out in the transcript.

2 In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no—6.” :

®In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,* Georgia, aye—8;
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no—3.”
536 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of crimes or facts, especially as in four years he can be turned out.

M: Pingney disapproved of making the Senate the Court of Im-
peachments, as rendering the President too dependent on the Legis-
lature. If he opposes a favorite law, the two Houses will combine
ag him, and under the influence of heat and faction throw him
out of office.

M! WituiaMmson thought there was more danger of too much lenity
than! too much rigour towards the President, considering the number
of cases in which the Senate was associated with the President.

M SuHerman regarded the Supreme Court as improper to try the
President, because the Judges would be appointed by him.

On motion by M?= Manison to strike out the words—‘‘ by the
Senate ’’ after the word ‘‘ conviction ”’

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pt ay. Del. no. M? no.
Vi ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.?

In the amendment of Col: Mason just agreed to, the word
“* State ’’ after the words ‘‘ misdemeanors against ’’ was struck out,
and the words ‘‘ United States ’’ inserted unanimously,’ in order to
remove ambiguity.

On the question to agree to* clause as amended,

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont ay N. J. ay. P2no. Del ay M? ay.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

On motion ® ‘‘ The vice-President and other Civil officers of the
U. S. shall be removed from office on impeachment and conviction as
aforesaid ’’ was added to the clause on the subject of impeach-
ments.

The clause of the report made on the 5"7 Sept & postponed was
taken up, to wit—‘‘ All bills for raising revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives; and shall be subject to alterations and
amendments by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.’’

It was moved to strike out the words ‘‘ and shall be subject to
alterations and amendments by the Senate ’’ and insert the words

+The word “of” is here inserted in the transcript.

?In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, Virginia, aye—2; New

Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—9.”

*The words “inserted unanimously” are transposed in the transcript to
read “ unanimously inserted.”

* The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—10; Pennsylvania, no—1.”

° The words “the following” are here inserted in the transcript.

‘The word “ of” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1787 537

used in the Constitution of Massachussetts on the same subject— +
“but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in
other bills "—which was agreed too nem: con:

On the question On the first part of the clause— “ All bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the house of Representatives ”’ *

N. H. ay. Mas, ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay P* ay. Del. no. Mé no.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M=: Gov! Morris moved to add to clause (3) * of the report made
on Sep? 4.° the words ‘‘ and every member shall be on oath ’’? which
being agreed to, and a question taken on the clause so amended viz—
“The Senate of the U. S. shall have power to try all impeach-
ments; but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two thirds of the members present; and every member shall be on
oath ”’

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. ay. M@ ay.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.®

M: Gerry repeated his motion above made on this day, in the
form following ‘‘ The Legislature shall have the sole right of estab-
lishing offices not herein’ provided for,’’ which was again nega-
tived: Mas. Cont & Geo. only being ay.

M: M‘Hewry observed that the President had not yet been any
where authorised to convene the Senate, and moved to amend Art. X.
sect. 2. by striking out the words ‘‘ he may convene them [the Legis-
lature] on extraordinary occasions ’’ & insert ‘‘ He may convene
both or either of the Houses on extraordinary occasions.’’ This he
added would also provide for the case of the Senate being in Ses-
sion at the time of convening the Legislature.

M: Witson said he should vote ag*t the motion, because it im-
plied that the senate might be in Session, when the Legislature was
not, which he thought improper.

* This was a conciliatory vote, the effect of the compromise formerly alluded
to. See Note Wednesday Sept 5.?

 

1The word “viz” is here inserted in the transcript.

>The words “Wednesday, Sept 5,” are stricken out in the transcript and
“page —” is inserted in their place. :

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Delaware, Maryland, no—2.” . :

*The words “the third clause” are substituted in the transcript for
“clause (3).”

: The a ails “the fourth of September” are substituted in the transcript
for “ Sepr 4.”

. in the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye—9; Pennsylvania, Virginia, no—2.” . -

T The word “heretofore” is substituted in the transcript for “herein.”
5388 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. ay. Pt no. Del. ay. M? ay.
V2 no. N. C. ay. 8S. C. no. Geo. ay.t

A Committee was then appointed by Ballot to revise the stile of
and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House.
The committee consisted of M? Johnson, M: Hamilton, M! Gov
Morris, Mt Madison and M: King.

M: Wi.iamson moved that previous to this work of the Com-
mittee the clause relating to the number of the House of Representa-
tives sh? be reconsidered for the purpose of increasing the number.

M: Mapison 2% the Motion

M SHERMAN opposed it. he thought the provision on that sub-
ject amply sufficient.

Col: Hamimron expressed himself with great earnestness and
anxiety in favor of the motion. He avowed himself a friend to a
vigorous Government, but would declare at the same time, that? he
held it essential that the popular branch of it should be on a broad
foundation. He was seriously of opinion that the House of Represen-
tatives was on so narrow a scale as to be really dangerous, and to
warrant a jealousy in the people for their liberties. He remarked
that the connection between the President & Senate would tend to
perpetuate him, by corrupt influence. It was the more necessary on
this account that a numerous representation in the other branch of
the Legislature should be established.

On the motion of M* Williamson to reconsider, it was negatived

*N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. Pay. Del. ay. May.
Ve ay. N.C.ay. S.C.no. Geo. no.*

Adj

 

Monpay Sep? 10. 17874 In ConvENTION

M: Gerry moved to reconsider Art XIX. viz. ‘‘ On the applica-
tion of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for

*This motion & vote are entered on the Printed journal of the ensuing
morning.

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no—4.”

? The word “that” is omitted in the transcript.

_ ,' In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

* The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1787 539

an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the U. 8. shall
call a Convention for that purpose.’’ [see Aug. 6.] *

This Constitution he said is to be paramount to the State Constitu-
tions. It follows, hence, from this article that two thirds of the States
may obtain a Convention, a majority of which can bind the Union
to innovations that may subvert the State-Constitutions altogether.
He asked whether this was a situation proper to be run into.

M: Hamitron 2° the motion, but he said with a different view
from M: Gerry. He did not object to the consequence stated by M?
Gerry. There was no greater evil in subjecting the people of the
U. S. to the major voice than the people of a particular State. It
had been wished by many and was much to have been desired that
an easier mode for? introducing amendments had been provided by
the articles of ? Confederation. It was equally desireable now that
an easy mode should be established for supplying defects which will
probably appear in the New System. The mode proposed was not
adequate. The State Legislatures will not apply for alterations but
with a view to increase their own powers. The National Legislature
will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity
of amendments, and ought also to be empowered, whenever two thirds
of each branch should concur to call a Convention. There could be
no danger in giving this power, as the people would finally decide
in the case.

M™ Mapison remarked on the vagueness of the terms, ‘‘ call a
Convention for the purpose,’’ as sufficient reason for reconsidering
the article. How was a Convention to be formed? by what rule de-
cide? what the force of its acts?

On the motion of M Gerry to reconsider

N. H. div? Mas. ay. Ctay. N.J. no. P?ay. Del. ay. M? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

M! SHERMAN moved to add to the article ‘‘ or the Legislature may
propose amendments to the several States for their approbation, but
no amendments shall be binding until consented to by the several
States. ”’

M: Gerry 2%! the motion

Mz Wison moved to insert ‘‘ two thirds of ’’ before the words

 

1In the transcript the date reads: “the sixth of August.”

2 The word “of” is found in the transcript in place of “ for.”

®'The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

“In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—9; New Jersey, no—l; New Hampshire, divided.
540 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

‘* several States’’—on which amendment to the motion of M
Sherman

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay. M? ay.
Va ay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

M* Witson then moved to insert ‘‘ three fourths of ’’ before ‘‘ the
several Sts ’’ which was agreed to nem: con:

M? Mapison moved to postpone the consideration of the amended
proposition in order to take up the following,

‘““The Legislature of the U. S. whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of
the Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to
this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as
part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths
at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may
be proposed by the Legislature of the U S:’’*

M: Hamitton 2% the motion.

M' Rutwince said he never could agree to give a power by which
the articles relating to slaves might be altered by the States not
interested in that property and prejudiced against it. In order to
obviate this objection, these words were added to the proposition: *
‘* provided that no amendments which may be made prior to the
year 1808, shall in any manner affect the 4 & 5 sections of the VII
article ’’—The postponement being agreed to,

On the question on the proposition of M! Madison & M: Hamilton
as amended

N. H. div? Mas. ay. Ctay. N. J. ay. Pay. Del. no. M® ay.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. 8S. C. ay. Geo ay?

M: Gerry moved to reconsider art: XXI and XXII. from the
latter of which ‘‘ for the approbation of Cong?’’ had been struck
out. He objected to proceeding to change the Government without
the approbation of Congress, as being improper and giving just
umbrage to that body. He repeated his objections also to an annul-
ment of the confederation with so little scruple or formality.

*The Printed Journal makes the succeeding proviso as to sections 4 & 5.
of art: VII’ moved by Mr Rutlidge, part of the proposition of Mt Madison.

 

‘1In the transeript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.” ;

: 2 The words “the fourth and fifth sections of the seventh article” are sub-
stituted in the transcript for “sections 4 & 5. of art: VII.”
>In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
—9; Delaware, no—1; New Hampshire, divided.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1787 541

M! Hamitton concurred with M! Gerry as to the indecorum of
not requiring the approbation of Congress. He considered this as a
necessary ingredient in the transaction. He thought it wrong also
to allow nine States as provided by art XXI. to institute a new
Government on the ruins of the existing one. He wi propose as a
better modification of the two articles (KXI & XXII) that the plan
should be sent to Congress in order that the same if approved by
them, may be communicated to the State Legislatures, to the end
that they may refer it to State Conventions; each Legislature de-
elaring that if the Convention of the State should think the plan
ought to take effect among nine ratifying States, the same sh? take
effect accordingly. .

M: Gornam. Some States will say that nine States shall be
sufficient to establish the plan, others will require unanimity for the
purpose. And the different and conditional ratifications will defeat
the plan altogether.

M: Hamitton. No Convention convinced of the necessity of the
plan will refuse to give it effect on the adoption by nine States. He
thought this mode less exceptionable than the one proposed in the
article, and? would attain the same end.

M: Firzimmons remarked that the words ‘‘ for their approba-
tion ’’ had been struck out in order to save Congress from the neces-
sity of an Act inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation under
which they held their authority.

M: Ranpoupx declared, if no change should be made in the? this
part of the plan, he should be obliged to dissent from the whole of it.
He had from the beginning he said been convinced that radical
changes in the system of the Union were necessary. Under this
conviction he had brought forward a set of republican propositions
as the basis and outline of a reform. These Republican propositions
had however, much to his regret, been widely, and in his opinion,
irreconcileably departed from. In this state of things it was his idea
and he accordingly meant to propose, that the State Conventions
sh? be at liberty to offer amendments to the plan; and that these
should be submitted to a second General Convention, with full power
to settle the Constitution finally. He did not expect to succeed in
this proposition, but the discharge of his duty in making the attempt,
would give quiet to his own mind.

M: Witson was against a reconsideration for any of the purposes
which had been mentioned.

 

+The words “while it” are substituted in the transcript for “and.”
*The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.
542 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Kine thought it would be more respectful to Congress to
submit the plan generally to them; than in such a form as expressly
and necessarily to require their approbation or disapprobation. The
assent of nine States he considered as sufficient; and that it was more
proper to make this a part of the Constitution itself, than to provide
for it by a supplemental or distinct recommendation.

M: Gerry urged the indecency and pernicious tendency of dis-
solving in so slight a manner, the solemn obligations of the articles
of confederation. If nine out of thirteen can dissolve the compact,
Six out of nine will be just as able to dissolve the new one hereafter.

M:! SHERMAN was in favor of M! King’s idea of submitting the plan
generally to Congress. He thought nine States ought to be made
sufficient: but that it would be best? to make it a separate act and
in some such form as that intimated by Col: Hamilton, than to make
it a particular article of the Constitution.

On the question for reconsidering the two articles, XXI & XXIJ—

N. H. div’ Mas. no. Ctay. N.J. ay. P? no. Del. ay. M4 ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.?

M: Hamiuton then moved to postpone art XXI in order to take
up the following, containing the ideas he had above expressed, viz

Resolved that the foregoing plan of a Constitution be trans-
mitted to the U. 8. in Congress assembled, in order that if the same
shall be agreed to by them, it may be communicated to the Legisla-
tures of the several States, to the end that they may provide for its
final ratification by referring the same to the Consideration of a Con-
vention of Deputies in each State to be chosen by the people thereof,
and that it be recommended to the said Legislatures in their re-
spective acts for organizing such convention to declare, that if the
said Convention shall approve of the said Constitution, such appro-
bation shall be binding and conclusive upon the State, and further
that if the said Convention should be of opinion that the same upon
the assent of any nine States thereto, ought to take effect between the
States so assenting, such opinion shall thereupon be also binding
upon such State, and the said Constitution shall take effect between
the States assenting thereto ”’

M: Gerry 2% the motion.

M* Witson. This motion being seconded, it is necessary now to
speak freely. He expressed in strong terms his disapprobation of
the expedient proposed, particularly the suspending the plan of

 

*The word “best” is crossed out in the transcript and “better” is written
above it.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Massachusetts, Pennsy)-
vania, South Carolina, no—3; New Hampshire, divided.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1787 543

the Convention on the approbation of Congress. He declared it to
be worse than folly to rely on the concurrence of the Rhode Island
members of Cong? in the plan. Maryland has voted on this floor;
for requiring the unanimous assent of the 13 States to the proposed
change in the federal System. N. York has not been represented
for a long time past in the Convention. Many individual deputies
from other States have spoken much against the plan. Under these
circumstances can it be safe to make the assent of Congress neces-
sary. After spending four or five months in the laborious &
arduous task of forming a Government for our Country, we are our-
selves at the close throwing insuperable obstacles in the way of its
success.

M: Cuiymer thought that the mode proposed by M: Ham-
ilton would fetter & embarrass Cong? as much as the original
one, since it equally involved a breach of the articles of Confed-
eration.

M: Kine concurred with M: Clymer. If Congress can accede to
one mode, they can to the other. If the approbation of Congress be
made necessary, and they should not approve, the State Legislatures
will not propose the plan to Conventions; or if the States themselves
are to provide that nine States shall suffice to establish the System,
that provision will be omitted, every thing will go into confusion,
and all our labor be lost.

M: RuriipGe viewed the matter in the same light with M* King.

On the question to postpone in order to take up Col: Hamilton’s
motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. no. Pt no. Del. no. M? no.
Vino. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.*

A Question being then taken on the article XXI. It was agreed
to unanimously.

Col: Hamitton withdrew the remainder of the motion to post-
pone art XXII, observing that his purpose was defeated by the
vote just given;

M Wiu1amson & M! Gerry moved to re-instate the words ‘‘ for
the approbation of Congress ’’ in art: XXII which was disagreed to
nem: con:

M! RanpoPxH took this opportunity to state his objections to the
System. They turned on the Senate’s being made the Court of Im-
peachment for trying the Executive—on the necessity of % instead

 

2In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, aye—1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10.”
544 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of % of each house to overrule the negative of the President—on
the smallness of the number of the Representative branch,—on the
want of limitation to a standing army—on the general clause con-
cerning necessary and proper laws—on the want of some particular
restraint on navigation acts—on the power to lay duties on exports—
on the Authority of the General Legislature to interpose on the appli-
cation of the Executives of the States—on the want of a more definite
boundary between the General & State Legislatures—and between
the General and State Judiciaries—on the the unqualified power of the
President to pardon treasons—on the want of some limit to the
power of the Legislature in regulating their own compensations.
With these difficulties in his mind, what course he asked was he to
pursue? Was he to promote the establishment of a plan which he
verily believed would end in Tyranny? He was unwilling he said
to impede the wishes and Judgment of the Convention, but he yaust
keep himself free, in case he should be honored with a seat in the
Convention of his State, to act according to the dictates of his judg-
ment. The only mode in which his embarrassments could be removed,
was that of submitting the plan to Cong? to go from them to the
State Legislatures, and from these to State Conventions having
power to adopt reject or amend; the process to close with another
General Convention with full power to adopt or reject the altera-
tions proposed by the State Conventions, and to establish finally
the Government. He accordingly proposed a Resolution to this
effect.

Doct FranKuin 2%? the motion

Col: Mason urged & obtained that the motion should lie or the
table for a day or two to see what steps might be taken with regard
to the parts of the system objected to by M! Randolph.

M: Pinkney moved ‘‘ that it be an instruction to the Committee for
revising the stile and arrangement of the articles agreed on, to prepare
an Address to the People, to accompany the present Constitution, and
to be laid with the same before the U. States in Congress.’’

* The motion itself was referred to the Committee, nem: con:

*M= RanpoLpH moved to refer to the Committee also a motion
relating to pardons in cases of Treason—which was agreed to nem:
con:

Adjourned

* These motions? not entered in the printed Journal.

 

1The word “are” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1787 545
Turspay Sup? 11.1787. In ConvEenTION

The Report of the Committee of Stile & arrangement not being
made & being waited for,

The House Adjourned

 

WEDNESDAY Sep? 12. 1787.1. In ConvENTION

Doc: Jounson from the Committee of stile &c. reported a digest
of the plan, of which printed copies were ordered to be furnished
to the members. He also reported a letter to accompany the plan,
to Congress. (Here insert a transcript of the former from the an-
nexed sheet as printed * and of the latter from the draft as finally
agreed. to.?

WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UniTep STATES, IN ORDER TO FORM a more
perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for
the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Con-
stitution for the United States of America.

Articue I.

Sect. 1. AUL legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.

Sect. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members
chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors
in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the state legislature.

No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the
age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he
shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free
persons, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration

*«This is a literal copy of the printed Report. The Copy in the printed
Journal contains some of the alterations subsequently made in the House.2

 

1 The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript. ’

* No transcript of the report was, however, made by Madison, but it was
copied by Payne and inserted in this place in the Payne transcript. The text
here printed is a copy of the printed report accompanying Madison’s notes.
The letter is printed at page 553. : ‘

3 Madison’s direction concerning the report is omitted in the transcript.
546 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the
United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner
as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed
one for every forty thousand, but each state shall have at least one repre-
sentative: and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of New-
Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-
Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six,
New-Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Deleware one, Maryland six, Virginia
ten, North-Carolina five, South-Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the
Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other
officers; and they shall have the sole power of impeachment.

Sect. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years:
and each senator shall have one vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first
election, they shall be divided * [by lot] as equally as may be into three
classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated at the
expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the
fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so
that one-third may be chosen every second year: and if vacancies happen by
resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of any state,
the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next
meeting of the Legislature.

‘No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of
thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall
not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice-President of the United States shall be, ex officio’ President of
the senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President pro
tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the
office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When
sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath. When the President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honor, trust or profit under the United States: but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punish-
ment, according to law.

Sect. 4. The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators
and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature
thereof: but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such
regulations.

* The words, “by lot,” were not in the Report as printed; but were inserted
in manuscript, as a typografical error, departing from the text of the Report
referred to the Committee of Style & arrangement.

 

* The words “ ex officio” are omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1787 547

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting
shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint
a different day.

Sect. 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute
a quorum to do business: but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day, and may be authorised to compel the attendance of absent members, in
such manner, and under such penalties as each house may provide.

Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings; punish its mem-
bers for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel
a member.

Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require
secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any
question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the
journal.

Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent
of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than
that in which the two houses shall be sitting.

Sect. 6. The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation
for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of
the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach
of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session
of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned
in any other place.

No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have
been encreased during such time; and no person holding any office under
the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance
in office.

Sect. 7. The enacting stile of the laws shall be, “Be it enacted by the
senators and represertatives in Congress assembled.”

All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives:
but the senate may propose or coneur with amendments as on other bills.

Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives and the
senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president of the
United States. If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it,
with his objections to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
If after such reconsideration two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both
houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons
voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house
respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten
days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same
shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by
548 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate
and House of ‘Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being dis-
approved by him, shall be repassed by* three-fourths of the Senate and
House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed
in the case of a bill.

Sect. 8. The Congress may by joint ballot appoint a treasurer. They
shall have power

To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts
and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United
States.

To borrow money on the credit of the United States.

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes.

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix
the standard of weights and measures.

To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and
current coin of the United States.

To establish post offices and post roads.

To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.

To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court.

To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and + [punish] offences against the law of nations.

To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules
concerning captures on land and water.

To raise and support armies: but no appropriation of money to that
use shall be for a longer term than two years.

To provide and maintain a navy.

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces.

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions.

To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers,
and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress.

*In the entry of this Report in the printed Journal “two thirds” are sub-
stuted for “three fourths.” This change was made after the Report was
received.*

+ [punish] a typographical omission.”

 

* This is a mistake on Madison’s part.
? The words “in the printed Report” are here added in the transcript.
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1787 549

To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district
(not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States,
and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the? government of the
United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by
the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for
the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful
buildings—And

To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitu-
as = the government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.

Sect. 9, The migration or importation of such persons as the several
states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a
tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars
for each person.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto law.

No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census herein
before directed to be taken.

No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.

No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of
appropriations made by law.

No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States. And no person
holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of
the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind
whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.

Sect. 10. No state shall coin money, nor? emit bills of credit, nor? make
any thing but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, nor? pass any
bill of attainder, nor ? ex post facto laws, nor ? laws altering or impairing the
obligation of contracts; nor? grant letters of marque and reprisal, nor? enter
into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, nor? grant any title of nobility.

No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or duties
on imports or exports, nor? with such consent, but to the use of the treasury
of the United States. Nor? keep troops nor? ships of war in time of peace,
nor? enter into any agreement or compact with another state, nor? with any
foreign power. Nor? engage in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded
by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of
delay until the Congress can be consulted.

II.

Sect. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a president of the United
States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years,
and, together with the vice-president, chosen for the same term, be elected
in the following manner:

 

1 The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.
2 The word “or” is substituted in the transcript for “nor,” the letter “n

having been crossed off in Madison’s printed copy.

”
550 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may
direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and
representatives to which the state may be entitled in Congress: but no
senator or representative shall be appointed an elector, nor any person
holding an office of trust or profit under the United States.

The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for
two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same
state with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted
for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and
certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the general government, directed
to the president of the senate. The president of the senate shall in the
presence of the senate and house of representatives open all the certificates,
and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number
of votes shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such
majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the house of representa-
tives shall immediately chuse by ballot one of them for president; and if no
person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the said house
shall in like manner choose the president. But in choosing the president,
the votes shall be taken by states and not per capita, the representation
from each state having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist
of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of
all the states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice
of the president by the representatives, the person having the greatest number
of votes of the electors shall be the vice-president. But if there should
remain two or more who have equal votes, the senate shall choose from them
by ballot the vice-president.

The Congress may determine the time of chusing the electors, and the
time in which they shall give their votes; but the election shall be on the
same day throughout the United States.

No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States,
at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office
of president; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall
not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years
a resident within the United States.

In case of the removal of the president from office, or of his death,
resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office,
the same shall devolve on the vice-president, and the Congress may by law
provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the
president and vice-president, declaring what officer shall then act as president,
and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or the
period for chusing another president arrive.

The president shall, at stated times, receive a fixed compensation for
his services, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the period
for which he shall have been elected.

Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following
oath or affirmation: “T , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, and will to the
best of my judgment and power, preserve, protect and defend the constitution
of the United States.”

 
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1787 551

Sect. 2. The president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy
of the United States, and of the militia of the several States:1 he may
require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive
departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective
offices, when called into the actual service of the United States,! and he shall
have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United
States, except in cases of impeachment.

He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate,
to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and
he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the
supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for.

The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen
during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire .
at the end of their next session.

Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of
the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient: he may, on extraordinary occa-
sions, convene both houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement
between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such time as he shall think proper: he shall receive ambassadors
and other public ministers: he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.

Sect. 4. The president, vice-president and all civil officers of the United
States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of
treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

III.

Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity,
shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of
the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour,
and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, both in law and
equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. To all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. To all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. To controversies to which the United
States shall be a party. To controversies between two or more States;
between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different
States; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different States, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign

States, citizens or subjects. ee
In eases affecting ambassadors, other publie ministers and consuls, and

‘when called into the actual service of the United States” is

+The phrase * ,
an transcript so that it follows the words “several States. @

transposed in the
552 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

those in which a state shall be party, the supreme court shall have original
jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme court
shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such excep-
tions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

The trial of all crimes, except in eases of impeachment, shall be by jury;
and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall
be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony
of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but
no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood nor forfeiture, except
during the life of the person attainted.

IV.

Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress
may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states.

A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who
shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of
the executive authority of the state from which he fied be delivered up, and
removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.

No person legally held to service or labour in one state, escaping into
another, shall in consequence of regulations subsisting therein be discharged
from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party
to whom such service or labour may be due.

Sect. 3. New states may be admitted by the Congress into this union;
but no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any
other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states,
or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states con-
cerned as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States: and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state.

Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union
a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against
invasion; and on application of the legislature or executive, against domestic
violence.

Vv.

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem necessary,
or on the application of two-thirds of the legislatures of the several states,
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1787 553

shall propose amendments to this constitution, which shall be valid to all
intents and purposes, as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified
by three-fourths at least of the legislatures of the several states, or by
conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratifica-
tion may be proposed by the Congress: Provided, that no amendment which
may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the

and sections of 2 article

VI.

All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption
of this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States under this
Constitution as under the confederation.

This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

The senators and representatives beforementioned, and the members of
the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or
affirmation, to support this constitution; but no religious test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United
States.

VII.

The ratification of the conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for
the establishment of this constitution between the States so ratifying the same.

LETTER

We hcve now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United
States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which has appeared to us the
most adviseable.

The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power
of making war, peace and treaties, that of levying money and regulating
commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities should

 

1The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript. .

2 The draft of the letter accompanied the draft of the Constitution reported
on this date, but was not printed with it. The Journal says: “The draft of a
letter to Congress being at the same time reported, was read once throughout;
and afterwards agreed to by paragraphs.” (See Journal of the Federal Con-
vention (1819), page 367.) The letter does not appear to have caused debate.
Having been accepted September 12th, it was printed with the final Constitution
September 17th. The text here used is that of the final print, which was also
copied by Payne for the transcript. The letter is printed in full, infra, page 639.
554 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the Union: but
the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is
evident—Hence* results the necessity of a different organization.

It is obviously impracticable in the foederal government of these States
to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for
the interest and safety of all—Individuals entering into society must give
up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice
must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to
be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line
between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be
reserved; and on the present oceasion this difficulty was encreased by a
difference among the several States as to their situation, extent, habits, and
particular interests.

In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that
which appears? to us the greatest interest of every true American, the
consolidation of our union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity,
safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seri-
ously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each State in the Convention
to be less rigid on? points of inferior magnitude, than might have been
otherwise expected; and thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the
result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which
the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensible.

That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not
perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless consider, that had her
interest alone been consulted, the consequences might have been particularly
disagreeable or * injurious to others; that it is liable to as few exceptions as
could reasonably have been expected, we hope and believe; that it may
promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure
her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish.

M"™ WiLuiaMson moved to reconsider the clause requiring three
fourths of each House to overrule the negative of the President, in
order to strike out % and insert %. He had he remarked himself
proposed % instead of %, but he had since been convinced that the
latter proportion was the best. The former puts too much in the
power of the President.

M:! SHERMAN was of the same opinion; adding that the States
would not like to see so small a minority and the President, prevail-
ing over the general voice. In making laws regard should be had
to the sense of the people, who are to be bound by them, and it was
more probable that a single man should mistake or betray this sense
than the Legislature

 

*The word “Thence” is substituted in the transcript for “Hence.”

? The word “ appeared” is substituted in the transcript for “ appears.”
* The word “in” is substituted in the transcript for “on.”

‘The word “and” is substituted in the transcript for “or.”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1787 555

M* Gov? Morris. Considering the difference between the two
proportions numerically, it amounts in one House to two members
only; and in the other to not more than five; according to the
numbers of which the Legislature is at first to be composed. It is
the interest moreover of the distant States to prefer % as they will
be oftenest absent and need the interposing check of the President.
The excess rather than the deficiency of laws was to be dreaded.
The example of N. York shews that % is not sufficient to answer
the purpose.

M: Hamitton added his testimony to the fact that % in N. York
had been ineffectual either where a popular object, or a legislative
faction operated; of which he mentioned some instances.

M: Gerry. It is necessary to consider the danger on the other
side also. % will be a considerable, perhaps a proper security. %
puts too much in the power of a few men. The primary object of
the revisionary check of the President is not to protect the general
interest, but to defend his own department. If % be required, a
few Senators having hopes from the nomination of the President
to offices, will combine with him and impede proper laws. Making
the vice-President Speaker increases the danger.

M* WILLIAMSON was less afraid of too few than of too many laws.
He was most of all afraid that the repeal of bad laws might be ren-
dered too difficult by requiring %4 to overcome the dissent of the
President.

Col: Mason had always considered this as one of the most excep-
tionable parts of the System. As to the numerical argument of
M= Gov! Morris, little arithmetic was necessary to understand that
% was more than %4, whatever the numbers of the Legislature might
be. The example of New York depended on the real merits of the
laws. The Gentlemen citing it, had no doubt given their own opin-
ions. But perhaps there were others of opposite opinions who could
equally paint the abuses on the other side. His leading view was to
guard against too great an impediment to the repeal of laws.

M" Gov! Morris dwelt on the danger to the public interest from
the instability of laws, as the most to be guarded against. On the
other side there could be little danger. If one man in office will not
consent where he ought, every fourth year another can be substituted.
This term was not too long for fair experiments. Many good laws are
not tried long enough to prove their merit. This is often the case
with new laws opposed to old habits. The Inspection laws of Vir-
556 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787.

ginia & Maryland to which all are now so much attached were un-
popular at first.

M: PINKNEY was warmly in opposition to % as putting a dan-
gerous power in the hands of a few Senators headed by the President.

M! Mapison. When % was agreed to, the President was to be
elected by the Legislature and for seven years. He is now to be elected
by the people and for four years. The object of the revisionary
power is twofold. 1.1 to defend the Executive Rights 2.1 to prevent
popular or factious injustice. It was an important principle in
this & in the State Constitutions to check legislative injustice and
incroachments. The Experience of the States had demonstrated that
their checks are insufficient. We must compare the danger from the
weakness of 3% with the danger from the strength of %. He thought
on the whole the former was the greater. As to the difficulty of
repeals, it was probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon
take place of limiting the duration of laws so as to require renewal
instead of repeal.

The reconsideration being agreed to. On the question to insert
%4 in place of %.

N. H. div? Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. ay. P% no. Del. no. M? ay.
M= M*Henry no. V? no. Gen! Washington M! Blair, M? Madison no.
Col. Mason, M? Randolph ay. N.C. ay. 8S. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M= Wiuiamson, observed to the House that no provision was yet
made for juries in Civil cases and suggested the necessity of it.

M! GorHam. It is not possible to discriminate equity cases from
those in which juries are proper. The Representatives of the people
may be safely trusted in this matter.

M Gerry urged the necessity of Juries to guard ag corrupt
Judges. He proposed that the Committee last appointed should be
directed to provide a clause for securing the trial by Juries.

Col: Mason perceived the difficulty mentioned by M‘ Gorham.
The jury cases can not be specified. A general principle laid down
on this and some other points would be sufficient. He wished the
plan had been prefaced with a Bill of Rights, & would second a
Motion if made for the purpose. It would give great quiet to the
people; and with the aid of the State declarations, a bill might be
prepared in a few hours.

 

+The figures “1” and “2” are changed in the transcript to “first” and
* secondly.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland
[Mr. McHenry, no.], North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Massa-
chusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia [General Washington, Mr. Blair, Mr.
Madison, no; Col. Mason, Mr. Randolph, aye], no—4; New Hampshire, divided.”
SESSION OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1787 557

M: Gerry concurred in the idea & moved for a Committee to
prepare a Bill of Rights. Col: Mason 2é¢ the motion.

M! SHERMAN, was for securing the rights of the people where
requisite. The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by
this Constitution; and being in force are sufficient. There are many
cases where juries are proper which can not be discriminated. The
Legislature may be safely trusted.

Col: Mason. The Laws of the U.S. are to be paramount to State
Bills of Rights.

On the question for a Com% to prepare a Bill of Rights

N. H. no. Mas. abst Ci no. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. no. M4 no.
Vino. N.C.no. S.C. no. Geo. no.t

The Clause relating to exports being reconsidered, at the in-
stance of Col: Mason, who urged that the restriction on the States
would prevent the incidental duties necessary for the inspection &
safe-keeping of their produce, and be ruinous to the Staple States,
as he called the five Southern States, he moved as follows—‘‘ provided
nothing herein contained shall be construed to restrain any State
from laying duties upon exports for the sole purpose of defraying
the charges of inspecting, packing, storing and indemnifying the
losses, in keeping the commodities in the care of public officers,
before exportation.’’ In answer to a remark which he antici-
pated, towit, that the States could provide for these expences, by
a tax in some other way, he stated the inconveniency? of requiring
the Planters to pay a tax before the actual delivery for expor-
tation.

M: Manpison 2% the motion. It would at least be harmless; and
might have the good effect of restraining the States to bona fide duties
for the purpose, as well as of authorising explicitly such duties; tho’
perhaps the best guard against an abuse of the power of the States
on this subject, was the right in the Gen! Government to regulate
trade between State & State.

M: Gov! Morris saw no objection to the motion. He did not con-
sider the dollar per Hhd laid on Tob? in Virg? as a duty on exporta-
tion, as no drawback would be allowed on Tob? taken out of the
Warehouse for internal consumption.

M: Dayron was afraid the proviso wi enable Pennsylv* to tax

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye—5; Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—5; Massachusetts, absent.” This was the copyist’s
error as Madison’s original notes agree with the Journal, which reads: “ Which

passed unanimously in the negative.” : =
2 The word “ inconveniency ” is changed in the transcript to “ inconvenience.
558 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. Jersey under the idea of Inspection duties of which Pen? would
Judge.

M: GorHam & M! Lanopon, thought there would be no security
if the proviso sh? be agreed to, for the States exporting thro’ other
States, agst the+ oppressions of the latter. How was redress to be
obtained in case duties should be laid beyond the purpose expressed ?

M: Mapison. There will be the same security as in other cases.
The jurisdiction of the supreme Court must be the source of redress.
So far only had provision been made by the plan ag* injurious acts
of the States. His own opinion was, that this was insufficient. A
negative on the State laws alone could meet all the shapes which
these could assume. But this had been overruled.

M* Firzimmons. Incidental duties on Tob? & flour, never have
been & never can be considered as duties on exports.

M? Dickinson. Nothing will save? States in the situation of N.
Hampshire N Jersey Delaware &c from being oppressed by their
neighbors, but requiring the assent of Cong? to inspection duties.
He moved that this assent sh‘ accordingly be required.

M: Butier 2% the motion.

Adjourned

TuHurspay Sep? 13. 1787.2 In CoNnveENTION

Col: Mason. He had moved without success for a power to make
sumptuary regulations. He had not yet lost sight of his object.
After descanting on the extravagance of our manners, the excessive
consumption of foreign superfluities, and the necessity of restricting
it, as well with economical as republican views, he moved that a
Committee be appointed to report articles of association for encour-
aging by the advice the influence and the example of the members
of the Convention, economy frugality and american manufactures.

Doc! Jounson 2%4 the motion which was without debate agreed
to, nem: con: and a Committee appointed, consisting of Col: Mason,
Doc: Franklin, M? Dickenson, Doc? Johnson, and M? Livingston.*

Col: Mason renewed his proposition of yesterday on the subject

* This motion & appointment of the Comittee, not * in the printed Journal.
No report was made by the Come

 

*The word “these” is substituted in the transcript for “the.”

>The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

*The words “do not appear” are substituted in the transcript for “not.”
SESSION OF THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1787 559

of inspection laws, with an additional clause giving to Congress a
controul over them in case of abuse—as follows,

‘‘ Provided that no State shall be restrained from imposing the
usual duties on produce exported from such State, for the sole pur-
pose of defraying the charges of inspecting, packing, storing, and in-
demnifying the losses on such produce, while in the custody of public
officers: but all such regulations shall in case of abuse, be subject to
the revision and controul of Congress.’’

There was no debate & on the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. P% no. Del. no. M@ ay. V? ay.
N. C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.t

The Report from the Committee of stile & arrangement, was taken
up, in order to be compared with the articles of the plan as agreed
to by the House & referred to the Committee, and to receive the final
corrections and sanction of the Convention.

Art. 1. sect. 2. On motion of Mt RanpouPH the word “‘ servitude ”’
was struck out, and ‘‘ service’’* unanimously inserted, the former
being thought to express the condition of slaves, & the latter the
obligations of free persons.

M: Dickenson & M! Witson moved to strike out ‘‘ and direct
taxes,’’ from sect. 2. art. 1. as improperly placed in a clause relating
merely to the Constitution of the House of Representatives.

M: Gov: Morris. The insertion here was in consequence of what
had passed on this point; in order to exclude the appearance of
counting the negroes in the Representation. The including of them
may now be referred to the object of direct taxes, and incidentally
only to that of Representation.

On the motion to strike out ‘‘ and direct taxes ’’ from this place

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. ay. Pt no. Del. ay. M? ay.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no?

Art. 1. sect. 7 ‘‘—if any bill shall not be returned by the presi-
dent within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him &c ”’

M Mapison, moved to insert between ‘‘ after ’’ and ‘‘ it ’’ in Sect.
7, Art. 1 the words ‘‘ the day on which,’’ in order to prevent a

*See page 372 of the printed Journal.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Pennsylvania,
Delaware, South Carolina, no—3.”

2%In the transcript the vote reads: “New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye
—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.”
560 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

question whether the day on which the bill be presented, ought to
be counted or not as one of the ten days.

M! RanpoupH 2%? the motion.

M:! GoveRNU! Morris. The amendment is unnecessary. The law
knows no fractions of days.

A number of members being very impatient & calling for the
question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M? ay.
Viay. N.C.no §.C.no. Geo. no—?

Doc! JoHNSON made a further report from the Committee of stile
&e of the following resolutions to be substituted for 22 & 23 articles

‘* Resolved that the preceding Constitution be laid before the U.
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the opinion of this Con-
vention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of
Delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof, under the
recommendation of its Legislature, for their assent & ratification; &
that each Convention assenting & ratifying the same should give
notice thereof to the U. S. in Cong? assembled.

“* Resolved that it is the opinion of this Convention that as soon
as the Conventions of nine States, shall have ratified this Constitu-
tion, the U. S. in Cong? assembled should fix a day on which electors
should be appointed by the States which shall have ratified the same;
and a day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the
President ; and the time and place for commencing proceedings under
this Constitution—That after such publication the Electors should be
appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That the
Electors should meet on the day fixed for the election of the Presi-
dent, and should transmit their votes certified signed, sealed and
directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the U.
States in Cong? assembled: that the Senators and Representatives
should convene at the time & place assigned; that the Senators should
appoint a President for the sole purpose of receiving, opening, and
counting the votes for President, and that after he shall be chosen,
the Congress, together with the President should without delay pro-
ceed to execute this Constitution.’’

Adjourned

Fripay Sep 1472 1787.2 In Convention

The Report of the Committee of Stile & arrangement being re-
sumed,

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye
—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.” !

*The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.
SESSION OF FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1787 561

M* WiLuiAmson moved to reconsider in order to increase the
number of Representatives fixed for the first Legislature. His
purpose was to make an addition of one half generally to the number

allotted to the respective States; and to allow two to the smallest
States.

On this motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P? ay. Del. ay. M? ay.
Vi ay. NC. ay. 8. C. no. Geo. no?

Art. 1. sect. 3-the words * ‘‘ by lot ’’ were struck out nem: con:
on motion of M? Manison, that some rule might prevail in the rotation
that would prevent both the members from the same State from going
out at the same time.

‘* Ex officio ’’ struck out of the same section as superfluous: nem:
con: and ‘‘ or affirmation.’’ after ‘‘ oath ’’ inserted also unanimously.

M:! RutiipcE and M: Gov! Morris moved ‘‘ that persons im-
peached be suspended from their office* until they be tried and
acquitted ”’

M: Mapison. The President is made too dependent already on
the Legislature, by the power of one branch to try him in conse-
quence of an impeachment by the other. This intermediate suspen-
sion, will put him in the power of one branch only. They can at
any moment, in order to make way for the functions of another who
will be more favorable to their views, vote a temporary removal of
the existing Magistrate.

M: Kine concurred in the opposition to the amendment

On the question to agree to it

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. P? no. Del. no. M? no.
Vi no. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.*

Art. 1. sect. 4. ‘‘ except as to the places of choosing Senators ’’>5
added nem: con: to the end of the first clause, in order to exemp}
the seats of Gov! in the States from the power of Congress.

** By lot” had been re-instated from the Report of five made Aug. 6. as a
correction of the printed report by the Come of stile & arrangement.?

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: ‘“ Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6.”

2 In the transcript this note reads as follows: “ ‘By lot,’ had been reinstated
from the Report of the Committee of five made on the sixth of August, as a cor-
rection of the printed Report by the Committee of style, &c.”

* The transcript uses the word “ office” in the plural.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—8.”

* The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.
562 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Art. 1. Sect. 5. ‘‘ Each House shall keep a Journal of its pro-
ceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may in their judgment require secresy.”’

Col: Mason & M! Gerry moved to insert after the word ‘‘ parts ”’
the words ‘‘ of the proceedings of the Senate ’’ so as to require pub-
lication of all the proceedings of the House of Representatives.

‘It was intimated on the other side that cases might arise where
secresy might be necessary in both Houses. Measures preparatory to
a declaration of war in which the House of Rep? was to concur, were
instanced.

On the question, it passed in the negative

N. H.no. (Rh.I abs) Mas.no. Con: no. (N.Y. abs) N. J. no.
Pen. ay. Del. no. Mary. ay. Virg. no. N. C. ay. 8. C. div?
Geor. no.?

M! Batpwin observed that the clause, Art. 1. Sect 6. declaring
that no member of Cong? ‘‘ during the time for which he was elected;
shall be appointed to any Civil office under the authority of the
U. S. which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall
have been increased during such time,’’ would not extend to offices
created by the Constitution; and the salaries of which would be
ereated, not increased by Cong’ at their first session. The members
of the first Cong? consequently might evade the disqualification in
this instance—He was neither seconded nor opposed; nor did any
thing further pass on the subject.

Art. 1. Sect. 8. The Congress ‘‘ may by joint ballot appoint a
Treasurer ”’

M! RutwipcE moved to strike out this power, and let the Treasurer
be appointed in the same manner with other officers.

M! Gornam & M! King said that the motion, if agreed, to would
have a mischievous tendency. The people are accustomed & attached
to that mode of appointing Treasurers, and the innovation will
multiply objections to the System.

M: Gov! Morris remarked that if the Treasurer be not appointed
by the Legislature, he will be more narrowly watched, and more
readily impeached.

M: SHerman. As the two Houses appropriate money, it is best
for them to appoint the officer who is to keep it; and to appoint him
as they make the appropriation, not by joint but several votes.

Gen! Pinkney. The Treasurer is appointed by joint ballot in

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela-
ware, Virginia, Georgia, no—7.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1787 _—-563

South Carolina. The consequence is that bad appointments are made,
and the Legislature will not listen to the faults of their own officer.

On the motion to strike out

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. ay. P? no. Del. ay. M® ay.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.t

Art I. sect. 8.2 ‘‘ but all such duties imposts & excises, shall be
uniform throughout the U. S.’’ was? unanimously annexed to the
power of taxation.

*To define & punish piracies and felonies on the high seas, and
‘* punish ’’ offences against the law of nations.

M! Gov! Morris moved to strike out ‘‘ punish ’’ before the words
“* offences agit the law of nations,’’ so as to let these be definable
as well as punishable, by virtue of the preceding member of the
sentence.

M! Wison hoped the alteration would by no means be made.
To pretend to define the law of nations which depended on the
authority of all the civilized nations of the world, would have a look
of arrogance, that would make us ridiculous.

M: Govt® The word define is proper when applied to offences in
this case; the law of nations being often too vague and deficient to
be a rule.

On the question to strike out the word ‘‘ punish ’’ it passed in
the affirmative

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Cfay. N.J. ay. P? no. Del. ay. M? no.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.®

Doct FRaNKLIN moved * to add after the words ‘‘ post roads ”’
Art I. Sect. 8. ‘‘ a power to provide for cutting canals where deemed
necessary ”’

M: Witson 2° the motion

M= SHERMAN objected. The expence in such cases will fall on the
U. States, and the benefit accrue to the places where the canals may

be cut.

*This motion by Dr Franklin not stated in the printed Journal, as are
fome other motions.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8;
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, no—3.” : '

2 The expression “ the words” is here inserted in the transcript.

2 The word “was” is changed in the transcript to “ were.”

4The words “ On the clause” are here inserted in the transcript.

5 The name “Morris” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—6; Massachusetts, Penn-

sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no—5.”
564 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

M: Wuson. Instead of being an expence to the U. S. they may
be made a source of revenue.

MM! Mapison suggested an enlargement of the motion into a power
‘‘to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the
U. S. might require & the legislative provisions of individual States
may be incompetent.’’ His primary object was however to secure
an easy communication between the States which the free inter-
course now to be opened, seemed to call for. The political obstacles
being removed, a removal of the natural ones as far as possible ought
to follow. M! RanpotpH 2% the proposition

M: Kine thought the power unnecessary.

M: Witson. It is necessary to prevent a State from obstructing
the general welfare.

M: King. The States will be prejudiced and divided into parties
by it. In Philad? & New York, It will be referred to the establish-
ment of a Bank, which has been a subject of contention in those
Cities. In other places it will be referred to mercantile monopolies.

M: WILson mentioned the importance of facilitating by canals,
the communication with the Western Settlements, As to Banks he
did not think with M? King that the power in that point of view
would excite the prejudices & parties apprehended. As to mercantile
monopolies they are already included in the power to regulate trade.

Col: Mason was for limiting the power to the single case of
Canals. He was afraid of monopolies of every sort, which he did
not think were by any means already implied by the Constitution as
supposed by M! Wilson.

The motion being so modified as to admit a distinct question
specifying & limited to the case of canals,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. Pt ay. Del. no. M? no.
V2? ay. N.C. no. 8. C no. Geo. ay.

The other part fell of course, as including the power rejected.

M! Mapison & M: Pinkney then moved to insert in the list of
powers vested in Congress a power—‘‘ to establish an University, in
which no preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account
of Religion.’’

M? Witson supported the motion

M* Gov! Morris. It is not necessary. The exclusive power at the
Seat of Government, will reach the object.

On the question

 

* In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia, aye—3;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, no—8.”
SESSION OF FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1787 565

N. H. no. Mas. no. Con! div? D! Johnson ay. M? Sherman no.
N. J. no. P? ay. Del. no. M?@ no. V# ay. N.C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.

Col: Mason, being sensible that an absolute prohibition of stand-
ing armies in time of peace might be unsafe, and wishing at the
same time to insert something pointing out and guarding against the
danger of them, moved to preface the clause (Art I sect. 8) ‘* To
provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia & ’’ with
the words ’’ ‘‘ And that the liberties of the people may be better
secured against the danger of standing armies in time of peace ”’
M: RanpotPy 24 the motion

M? Mapison was in favor of it. It did not restrain Congress
from establishing a military force in time of peace if found neces-
sary; and as armies in time of peace are allowed on all hands to be
an evil, it is well to discountenance them by the Constitution,
as far as will consist with the essential power of the Gov't on that
head.

M! Gov: Morris opposed the motion as setting a dishonorable
mark of distinction on the military class of Citizens

M: Pinkney & M! Beprorp concurred in the opposition.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cino. N.J.no. P? no. Del. no. Mary? no
Vi ay. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. ay.?

Col: Mason moved to strike out from the clause (art I sect 9.)
“‘No bill of attainder nor any expost facto law shall be passed ’’ the
words ‘‘ nor any ex post facto law.’’ He thought it not sufficiently
clear that the prohibition meant by this phrase was limited to cases
of a criminal nature, and no Legislature ever did or can altogether
avoid them in Civil cases.

M Gerry 2% 4 the motion but with a view to extend the prohibi-
tion to ‘‘ Civil cases,’’ which he thought ought to be done.

On the question; all the States were—no

M: Pinkney & M* Gerry, moved to insert a declaration ‘‘ that
the liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed.’’

M: SHERMAN. It is unnecessary. The power of Congress does
not extend to the Press. On the question, it passed in the negative

1In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, Georgia, no—6; Connecticut, divided [Dr. Johnson, aye; Mr. Sher-
no]. ;
spa Ts transcript the vote reads: “ Virginia, Georgia, aye—2; New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—9.”
566 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

N. H. no.* Mas. ay. Ct no. N.J.no. P? no. Del. no. M® ay.
V2 ay. N.C. no. 8. C. ay. Geo. no.*

Art. I. Sect. 9. ‘‘ No capitation tax shall be laid, unless &c ”’

M: Reap moved to insert after ‘‘ capitation ’’ the words, “‘ or
other direct tax ’’ He was afraid that some liberty might otherwise
be taken to saddle the States, with a readjustment by this rule, of
past requisitions of Cong:—and that his amendment by giving another
cast to the meaning would take away the pretext. M* Wintiamson
244 the motion which was agreed to, On motion of Col: Mason?
“or enumeration ’’? inserted after, as explanatory of ‘‘ Census ”’
Con. & S. C. only, no.

* Here insert the amendment added in the lateral margin.*

* At the end of the clause ‘‘ no tax or duty shall be laid on articles
exported from any State ’’ was added the following amendment con-
formably to a vote on the day of 5 viz—no preference
shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the
ports of one State over those of another: nor shall vessels bound to or
from one State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another.

Col. Mason moved a clause requiring ‘‘ that an Account of the
public expenditures should be annually published’? M% Gurry 2%
the motion

M: Gov! Morris urged that this wi be impossible in many cases.

M: Kine remarked, that the term expenditures went to every
minute shilling. This would be impracticable. Cong? might indeed
make a monthly publication, but it would be in such general state-
ments as would afford no satisfactory information.

M: Mapison proposed to strike out ‘‘ annually ’’ from the motion
& insert ‘‘ from time to time,’’ which would enjoin the duty of fre-
quent publications and leave enough to the discretion of the Legis-
lature. Require too much and the difficulty will beget a habit of
doing nothing. The articles of Confederation require half-yearly
publications on this subject. A punctual compliance being often im-
possible, the practice has ceased altogether.

*In the printed Journal N. Hampshire ay.

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: ‘“ Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, aye—4; New Hampshire,* Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no—7.”

* The expression “the words” is here inserted in the transcript.

* The word “ were ” is here inserted in the transcript.

* Madison’s direction concerning the amendment is omitted in the transcript.

* The date “thirty-first of August” is supplied in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1787 567

M' Wison 2% & supported the motion. Many operations of
finance can not be properly published at certain times.

M PINENEY was in favor of the motion.

M Firzmmons. It is absolutely impossible to publish expendi-
tures in the full extent of the term.

M* SHERMAN thought ‘“‘ from time to time ’’ the best rule to be
given.

** Annual ’’ was struck out—& those words—inserted nem: con:

The motion of Col: Mason so amended was then agreed to nem:
eon: and added after—‘‘ appropriations by law as follows—‘‘ and a
regular statement and account of the receipts & expenditures of all
public money shall be published from time to time ”’

Here insert the Amendment at the foot of the page?

* The first clause of Art. I Sect 10—was altered so as to read—
“No State shall enter into any Treaty alliance or confederation ; grant
letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit;
make any thing but gold & silver coin a tender in payment of debts;
pass any bill of attainder, ex post? law, or law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.’

M: Gerry entered into observations inculcating the importance of
public faith, and the propriety of the restraint put on the States
from impairing the obligation of contracts, alledging that Congress
ought to be laid under the like prohibitions, he made a motion to that
effect. He was not 2%

Adjourned.

Saturpay Sep? 15TH 1787.3 In ConvENTION

M: Carrot reminded the House that no address to the people
had yet been prepared. He considered it of great importance that
such an one should accompany the Constitution. The people had
been accustomed to such on great occasions, and would expect it on
this. He moved that a Committee be appointed for the special pur-
pose of preparing an Address.

M: RutLepGE objected on account of the delay it would produce
‘and the impropriety of addressing the people before it was known
‘whether Congress would approve and support the plan. Congress,

 

1 Madison’s direction concerning the amendment is omitted in the transcript.
? The word “facto” is here inserted in the transcript.
* The year “ 1787” is omitted in the transcript.
568 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

if an address be thought proper can prepare as good a one. The
members of the Convention can also explain the reasons of what has
been done to their respective Constituents.

M SHERMAN concurred in the opinion that an address was both
unnecessary and improper.

On the motion of M: Carrol

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P2 ay. Del. ay. M4 ay.
Vi ay. N. C.* abst 8. C.* no. Geo. no?

M:! Lanepon. Some gentlemen have been very uneasy that no
inerease of the number of Representatives has been admitted. It
has in particular been thought that one more ought to be allowed
to N. Carolina. He was of opinion that an additional one was due
both to that State & to Rho: Island, & moved to reconsider for that
purpose.

M: SHERMAN. When the Committee of eleven reported the ap-
portionment—five Representatives were thought the proper share of
N. Carolina. Subsequent information however seemed to entitle
that State to another.

On the motior to reconsider

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pen. divi Del. ay.
M4 ay. V2 ay. N. C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

M: Lanepon moved to add 1 member to each of the Representa-
tions of N. Carolina & Rho: Island.

M: Kine was ag* any change whatever as opening the door for
delays. There had been no official proof that the numbers of N. C.
are greater than before estimated, and he never could sign the Con-
stitution if Rho: Island is to be allowed two members that is, one
fourth of the number allowed to Massts, which will be known to
be unjust.

M: Pinkney urged the propriety of increasing the number of
Rep allotted to N. Carolina.

M: Beprorp contended for an increase in favor of Rho: Island,
and of Delaware also

On the question for allowing two Rep? to Rho: Island, it passed
in the negative

*In the printed Journal N. Carolina—no & S. Carol: omitted.

 

_ In the transcript the vote reads: “ Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, South
Carolina,* Georgia, no—6; North Carolina,* absent.”

*'In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Connecticut, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, no—2; Pennsylvania, divided.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1787 569

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P* no. Del. ay. M? ay.
Vino. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay

On the question for allowing six to N. Carolina, it passed in the
negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctno. N. J. no. P* no. Del. no. Mé ay.
Viay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.?

Art 1. Sect. 10. (paragraph 2). ‘‘ No State shall, without the
consent of Congress lay imposts or duties on imports or exports;
nor with such consent, but to the use of the Treasury of the U.
States.’’

In consequence of the proviso moved by Col: Mason: and agreed
to on the 13% Sep!, this part of the section was laid aside in favor
of the following substitute viz. ‘‘ No State shall, without the consent
of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, ex-
cept what may be absolutely necessary for executing its Inspection
laws; and the nett produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any
State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of
the U. S; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and
controul of the Congress ”’

On a motion to strike out the last part ‘‘ and all such laws shall
be subject to the revision and controul of the Congress ’’ it; passed
in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P? divi Del. no. M? no.
V2 ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo. ay.t

The substitute was then agreed to: Virg? alone being in the
negative.

The remainder of the paragraph being under consideration—
viz—‘‘ nor keep troops nor ships of war in time of peace, nor
enter into any agreement or compact with another State, nor with
any foreign power. Nor engage in any war, unless it shall be
actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so im-
‘minent as not to admit of delay, until Congress can be consulted ’’

Mi M° Henry & M* Carrot moved that ‘‘ no State shall be re-

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no—6.” ;

2In the transcript the vote reads: “Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no—6.”

* The word “of” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘In the transcript the vote reads: “Virginia, Nor.u Carolina, Georgia, aye
—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Mary-
land, South Carolina, no—7; Pennsylvania, divided.”
570 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

strained from laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing
harbours and erecting light-houses.’’

Col. Mason in support of this explained and urged the situation
of the Chesapeak which peculiarly required expences of this sort.

M: Gov? Morris. The States are not restrained from laying ton-
nage as the Constitution now Stands. The exception proposed will
imply the contrary, and will put the States in a worse condition than
the gentleman [Col Mason] wishes.

M: Mapison. Whether the States are now restrained from lay-
ing tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power ‘‘ to regu-
late commerce.’? These terms are vague, but seem to exclude this
power of the States. They may certainly be restrained by Treaty.
He observed that there were other objects for tonnage Duties as the
support of Seamen &c. He was more & more convinced that the
regulation of Commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to
be wholly under one authority.

M! SuermMan. The power of the U. States to regulate trade being
supreme can controul interferences of the State regulations when*
such interferences happen; so that there is no danger to be appre-
hended from a concurrent jurisdiction.

M: Lanepon insisted that the regulation of tonnage was an
essential part of the regulation of trade, and that the States ought
to have nothing to do with it. On motion ‘‘ that no State shall
lay any duty on tonnage without the Consent of Congress ’’

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct div? N. J. ay. P no. Del. ay. Mf? ay.
V2 no. N.C. no. S.C. ay. Geo. no.?

The remainder of the paragraph was then remoulded and passed
as follows viz—‘‘ No State shall without the consent of Congress,
lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of
peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State,
or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded,
or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.’’

3 Art II. sect. 1. (paragraph 6) ‘‘ or the period for chusing
another president arrive ’’ was changed into ‘‘ or a President shall
be elected ’’ conformably to a vote of the day of

 

+In Madison’s notes the word “when” is written above “which.” The
transcript uses “ when.”

?In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, aye—6; Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, Georgia, no—4; Connecticut, divided.”

_ .*In the transcript this paragraph reads as follows: “Article 2, sect. 1, (the
sixth paragraph) the words ‘or the period for choosing another President ar-
rive,’ were changed into, ‘or a President shall be elected,’ conformably to a vote
of the seventh of September.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1787 571

M* RutumweE and Doc! FRaNKLIN moved to annex to the end of
paragraph 7. Sect. 1. art II—‘‘ and he [the President] shall not
receive, within that period, any other emolument from the U. 8.
or any of them,’’ on which question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci no. N. J. no. P* ay. Del.no. M¢ ay.
Vi ay. N.C. no. §. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art: II. Sect. 2. ‘‘ he shall have power to grant reprieves and
pardons for offences against the U. S. &e’”’

M: RanpotPH moved to ‘‘ except cases of treason.’? The pre-
rogative of pardon in these cases was too great a trust. The Presi-
dent may himself be guilty. The Traytors may be his own in-
struments.

Col: Mason supported the motion.

M? Gov? Morris had rather there should be no pardon for treason,
than let the power devolve on the Legislature.

M: Witson. Pardon is necessary for cases of treason, and is
best placed in the hands of the Executive. If he be himself a party
to the guilt he can be impeached and prosecuted.

M* Kine thought it would be inconsistent with the Constitutional
separation of the Executive & Legislative powers to let the pre-
rogative be exercised by the latter. A Legislative body is utterly
‘unfit for the purpose. They are governed too much by the pas
sions of the moment. In Massachussets, one assembly would have
hung all the insurgents in that State: the next was equally dis-
posed to pardon them all. He suggested the expedient of requiring
the concurrence of the Senate in Acts of Pardon.

M? Mapison admitted the force of objections to the Legislature,
but the pardon of treasons was so peculiarly improper for the
President that he should acquiesce in the transfer of it to the
former, rather than leave it altogether in the hands of the latter.
He would prefer to either an association of the Senate as a Council
of advice, with the President.

M: RanpoteH could not admit the Senate into a share of the
Power. the great danger to liberty lay in a combination between
the President & that body.

Col: Mason. The Senate has already too much power. There
can be no danger of too much lenity in legislative pardons, as the
Senate must con concur, & the President moreover can require % of

both Houses.
1In the transcript the\vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn-

sylvania, Maryland, Virgini South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, no—4.”

 
572 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

On the motion of M? Randolph

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct div? N. J. no. Pino. Del. no. M? no.
Ve ay. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. ay.

Art II. Sect. 2. (paragraph 2) To the end of this, Mt Govern?
Morris moved to annex ‘‘ but the Congress may by law Vest the
appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of Depart-
ments.’’? M= SHerman 2%! the motion

M: Mapison. It does not go far enough if it be necessary at all.
Superior officers below Heads of Departments ought in some cases
to have the appointment of the lesser offices.

MM! Gov! Morris There is no necessity. Blank commissions can
be sent—

On the motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ci ay. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. no. M? div?
V2 no. N.C. ay. SC no. Geo. no.?

The motion being lost by the? equal division of votes, It was
urged that it be put a second time, some such provision being too
necessary to be omitted, and on a second question it was agreed to
nem. con.

Art II. Sect. 1. The words, ‘‘and not per capita ’’—were
struck out as superfluous—and the words ‘‘ by the Representatives ”’
also—as improper, the choice of a* President being in another mode
as well as eventually by the House of Rep?

Art. II. Sect: 2. After? ‘‘ officers of the U. 8S. whose appoint-
ments are not otherwise provided for.’’ were added the words ‘‘ and
which shall be established by law.’’

Art III. Sect. 2. parag: 3. M: Pinkney & M! Gerry moved to
annex to the end, ‘‘ And a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual
in civil cases.’’

M: Gornam. The constitution of Juries is different in different
States and the trial itself is usual in different cases in different
States.

M: Kina urged the same objections

 

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Virginia, Georgia, aye—2; New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no—8; Connecticut, divided.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, aye—5; Massachusetts, Delaware, Vir-
ginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no—5; Maryland, divided.”

* The word “an” is substituted in the transcript for “ the.”

‘The word “a” is omitted in the transcript.

°The expression “the words” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1787 573

Gen! Pinkney also. He thought such a clause in the Constitu-
tion would be pregnant with embarrassments.

The motion was disagreed to nem: con:

Art. IV. Sect 2. parag: 3. the term ‘“‘ legally ’’ was struck out,
and* “‘ under the laws thereof ’’ inserted after the word ‘‘ State,”’
in compliance with the wish of some who thought the term legal ”
equivocal, and favoring the idea that slavery was legal in a moral
view.

Art. IV. Sect 3. ‘‘ New States may be admitted by the Congress
into this Union: but no new State shall be formed or erected within
the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the
consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Cong? ”’

M* Gerry moved to insert after ‘‘ or parts of States ’’ the words
“or a State and part of a State ’’ which was disagreed to by a
large majority; it appearing to be supposed that the case was com-
prehended in the words of the clause as reported by the Committee.

Art. IV. Sect. 4. After the word ‘‘ Executive ’’ were inserted
the words ‘‘ when the Legislature can not be convened.’’

Art. V. ‘‘ The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the
Legislatures of the several States shall propose amendments to this
Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as
part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths
at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification
may be proposed by the Congress: Provided that no amendment
which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner
affect the 1 & 4 clauses in the 9. section of article 1 ”’

M:! SHerman expressed his fears that three fourths of the States
might be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolish-
ing them altogether or depriving them of their equality in the
Senate. He thought it reasonable that the proviso in favor of the
States importing slaves should be extended so as to provide that no
State should be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its
equality in the Senate.

Col: Mason thought the plan of amending the Constitution ex-
eeptionable & dangerous. As the proposing of amendments is in

 

1The expression “the words” is here inserted in the transcript.
? The transcript italicizes the word “ legal.”
574 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

both the modes to depend, in the first immediately, in the sec-
ond, ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper kind
would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should
become oppressive, as he verily believed would be the case.

M: Gov! Morris & M*? Gerry moved to amend the article so as
to require a Convention on application of % of the Sts.

M: Mapison did not see why Congress would not be as much
bound to propose amendments applied for by two thirds of the
States as to call a call a Convention on the like application. He saw no
objection however against providing for a Convention for the pur-
pose of amendments, except only that difficulties might arise as to
the form, the quorum &c. which in Constitutional regulations ought
to be as much as possible avoided.

The motion of M? Gov! Morris & M! Gerry was agreed to nem:
con: [see the first part of the article as finally past] +

M! Suerman moved to strike out of art. V. after ‘‘ legislatures ’’
the words ‘‘ of three fourths’’ and so after the word ‘‘ Conven-
tions ’’ leaving future Conventions to act in this matter, like the
present Conventions? according to circumstances.

On this motion

N. H. div? Mas. ay. Ci ay. N. J. ay. P* no. Del. no. Mé no.
V2 no. N.C. no. 8. C. no. Geo. no.?

M: Gerry moved to strike out the words ‘‘ or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof ’’

On this * motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ctay. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. no. Mé no.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no?

M' SHerMan moved according to his idea above expressed to
annex to the end of the article a further proviso ‘‘ that no State
shall without its consent be affected in its internal police, or de-
prived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.’’

M* Mapison. Begin with these special provisos, and every State
will insist on them, for their boundaries, exports &e.

On the motion of M? Sherman

 

* Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.

* The transcript uses the word “Conventions” in the singular.

* In the transcript the vote reads: “ Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
aye—3; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no—7; New Hampshire, divided.”

* The word “which” is substituted in the transcript for “ this.”

*In the transcript the vote reads: “ Connecticut, aye—l; New Hampshire,

Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10.”
SESSION OF SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1787 575

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ciay. N. J. ay. P* no. Del. ay. Mé no.
Vino. N. C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no.t

M* SHERMAN then moved to strike out art V altogether

M: Brearuey 2%4 the motion, on which

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. ay. Pt no. Del div’ M4 no.
Vino. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no?

M: Gov? Morris moved to annex a further proviso—‘‘ that no
State, without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in
the Senate ”’

This motion being dictated by the circulating murmurs of the
small States was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or
on the question, saying no.

Col: Mason expressing his discontent at the power given to
Congress by a bare majority to pass navigation acts, which he said
would not only enhance the freight, a consequence he did not so
much regard—but would enable a few rich merchants in Philad*
N. York & Boston, to monopolize the Staples of the Southern States
& reduce their value perhaps 50 Per Ct—moved a further proviso
‘‘that no law in? nature of a navigation act be passed before the
year 1808, without the consent of % of each branch of the Legis-
lature ’’’ On this* motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ci no. N. J. no. P2 no. Del. no. M? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. abst 8. C. no. Geo. ay.®

M* RanpoLpH animadverting on the indefinite and dangerous
power given by the Constitution to Congress, expressing the pain
he felt at differing from the body of the Convention, on the close
of the great & awful subject of their labours, and anxiously wish-
ing for some accomodating expedient which would relieve him
from his embarrassments, made a motion importing ‘‘ that amend-
ments to the plan might be offered by the State Conventions, which
should be submitted to and finally decided on by another general
Convention ’? Should this proposition be disregarded, it would he
said be impossible for him to put his name to the instrument.
Whether he should oppose it afterwards he would not then decide

 

1In the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, aye
—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8.” :

2TIn the transcript the vote reads: “Connecticut, New Jersey, aye—2; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no—8; Delaware, divided.” _

*'The word “the” is here inserted in the transcript.

‘The word “which” is substituted in the transcript for “ this.”

5In the transcript the vote reads: “ Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye—3;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, South Carolina, no—7; North Carolina, absent.”
576 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

but he would not deprive himself of the freedom to do so in his
own State, if that course should be prescribed by his final
judgment.

Col: Mason 2%4 & followed M! Randolph in animadversions on
the dangerous power and structure of the Government, concluding
that it would end either in monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy ;
which, he was in doubt, but one or other, he was sure. This Con-
stitution had been formed without the knowledge or idea of the
people. A second Convention will know more of the sense of the
people, and be able to provide a system more consonant to it. It
was improper to say to the people, take this or nothing. As the
Constitution now stands, he could neither give it his support or?
vote in Virginia; and he could not sign here what he could not sup-
port there. With the expedient of another Convention as proposed,
he could sign.

M Pinzney. These declarations from members so respectable
at the close of this important scene, give a peculiar solemnity to
the present moment. He descanted on the consequences of calling
forth the deliberations & amendments of the. different States on
the subject of Government at large. Nothing but confusion & con-
trariety could? spring from the experiment. The States will never
agree in their plans, and the Deputies to a second Convention com-
ing together under the discordant impressions of their Constituents,
will never agree. Conventions are serious things, and ought not
to be repeated. He was not without objections as well as others to
the plan. He objected to the contemptible weakness & dependence
of the Executive. He objected to the power of a majority only of
Cong? over Commerce. But apprehending the danger of a general
confusion, and an ultimate decision by the sword, he should give
the plan his support.

M: Gerry, stated the objections which determined him to with-
hold his name from the Constitution. 1. the duration and re-
eligibility of the Senate. 2. the power of the House of Representa-
tives to conceal their journals. 3. the power of Congress over the
places of election. 4 the unlimited power of Congress over their
own compensations. 5.3 Massachusetts has not a due share of Rep-
resentatives allotted to her. 6.8 % of the Blacks are to be represented
as if they were freemen. 7.2 Under the power over commerce,
monopolies may be established. 8. The vice president being made

 

>The word “or” is changed in the transcript to “nor.”
* The word “ will” is substituted in the transcript for “could.”
*The word “that” is here inserted in the transcript.
SESSION OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 517

head of the Senate. He could however he said get over all these, if
the rights of the Citizens were not rendered insecure 1.4 by the
general power of the Legislature to make what laws they may please
to call necessary and proper. 2.? raise armies and money without limit.
3.3 to establish a tribunal without juries, which will be a Star-chamber
as to Civil cases. Under such a view of the Constitution, the best
that could be done he conceived was to provide for a second gen-
eral Convention.

On the question on the proposition of M! Randolph. All the
States answered—no

On the question to agree to the Constitution, as amended. All
the States ay.

The Constitution was then ordered to be engrossed.

And the House adjourned.

Monpay Ssp® 17. 1787:4* In ConvENTION

The engrossed Constitution being read,

Doc! FRANKLIN rose with a speech in his hand, which he had
reduced to writing for his own conveniency,’ and which M? Wilson
read in the words following.

M: President

I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which
I do not at present approve, but IJ am not sure I shall never approve
them: For having lived long, I have experienced many instances
of being obliged by better information, or fuller consideration, to
change opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought
right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I
grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay
more respect to the judgment of others. Most men indeed as well
as most sects in Religion, think themselves in possession of all truth,
and that wherever others differ from them it is so far error. Steele
a Protestant in a Dedication tells the Pope, that the only difference
between our Churches in their opinions of the certainty of their
doctrines is, the Church of Rome is infallible and the Church of
England is never in the wrong. But though many private persons

 

The figure “1” is changed in the transcript to “ first.”

? The figure “2” is changed in the transcript to “secondly, to.”

* The figure “3” is changed in the transcript to “ thirdly.”

*The year “1787” is omitted in the transcript.

*'The word “conveniency” is changed in the transcript to “convenience.”
578 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

think almost as highly of their own infallibility as of that of their
sect, few express it so naturally as a certain french lady, who in a
dispute with her sister, said ‘‘ I don’t know how it happens, Sister
but I meet with no body but myself, that’s always in the right—
Tl n’y a@ que moi qui a toujours ratson.’’

In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all
its faults, if they are such; because I think a general Government
necessary for us, and there is no form of Government but what may
be a blessing to the people if well administered, and believe farther
that this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and
ean only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it,
when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Gov-
ernment, being incapable of any other. I doubt too whether any
other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better Con-
stitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the
advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those
men, all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion,
their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an assembly
can a perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes me,
Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does;
and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with con-
fidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of the
Builders of Babel; and that our States are on the point of separa-
tion, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another’s
throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect
no better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the best. The
opinions I have had of its errors, I sacrifice to the publie good. I
have never whispered a syllable of them abroad. Within these
walls they were born, and here they shall die. If every one of
us in returning to our Constituents were to report the objec-
tions he has had to it, and endeavor to gain partizans in sup-
port of them, we might prevent its being generally received, and
thereby lose all the salutary effects & great advantages result-
ing naturally in our favor among foreign Nations as well as among
ourselves, from our real or apparent unanimity. Much of the
strength & efficiency of any Government in procuring and securing
happiness to the people, depends, on opinion, on the general opinion
of the goodness of the Government, as well as well as of the wisdom and
integrity of its Governors. I hope therefore that for our own sakes
as a part of the people, and for the sake of posterity, we shall act
heartily and unanimously in recommending this Constitution (if
approved by Congress & confirmed by the Conventions) wherever
SESSION OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 579

our influence may extend, and turn our future thoughts & en-
deavors to the means of having it well administred.

On the whole, Sir, I can not help expressing a wish that every
member of the Convention who may still have objections to it, would
with me, on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and to
make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this instrument.—

He then moved that the Constitution be signed by the members
and offered the following as a convenient form viz. ‘‘ Done in Conven-
tion by the unanimous consent of the States present the 17% of
Sep! &c—In Witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our
names.”’

This ambiguous form had been drawn up by M! G. M. in order to
gain the dissenting members, and put into the hands of Doc! Frank-
lin that it might have the better chance of success.

M? GorHam said if it was not too late he could wish, for the
purpose of lessening objections to the Constitution, that the clause
declaring ‘‘ the number of Representatives shall not exceed one for
every forty thousand ’’ which had produced so much discussion,
might be yet reconsidered, in order to strike out 40,000 & insert
‘‘ thirty thousand.’’ This would not he remarked establish that as
an absolute rule, but only give Congress a greater latitude which
could not be thought unreasonable.

M: Kine & ME Carrot seconded & supported the ideas of M
Gorham.

When the Present rose, for the purpose of putting the ques-
tion, he said that although his situation had hitherto restrained
him from offering his sentiments on questions depending in the
House, and it might be thought, ought now to impose silence on him,
yet he could not forbear expressing his wish that the alteration
proposed might take place. It was much to be desired that the
objections to the plan recommended might be made as few as pos-
sible. The smallness of the proportion of Representatives had been
considered by many members of the Convention an insufficient
security for the rights & interests of the people. He acknowledged
that it had always appeared to himself among the exceptionable
parts of the plan, and late as the present moment was for admitting
amendments, he thought this of so much consequence that it would
give? much satisfaction to see it adopted *

*Transfer the remarks in brackets, to the bottom margin.’

*[This was the only occasion on which the President entered at all into
the discussions of the Convention].

 

1 The word “ him” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 Madison’s direction is omitted in the transcript.
580 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

No opposition was made to the proposition of M! Gorham and
it was agreed to unanimously.

On the question to agree to the Constitution enrolled in order
to be signed. It was agreed to all the States* answering ay.

M: RanpotPu then rose and with an allusion to the observations
of Doct Franklin apologized for his refusing to sign the Constitu-
tion notwithstanding the vast majority & venerable names that
would give sanction to its wisdom and its worth. He said however
that he did not mean by this refusal to decide that he should oppose
the Constitution without doors. He meant only to keep himself free
to be governed by his duty as it should be prescribed by his future
judgment. He refused to sign, because he thought the object of the
Convention would be frustrated by the alternative which it presented
to the people. Nine States will fail to ratify the plan and con-
fusion must ensue. With such a view of the subject he ought not,
he could not, by pledging himself to support the plan, restrain him-
self from taking such steps as might appear to him most consistent
with the public good.

M: Gov! Morris said that he too had objections, but consider-
ing the present plan as the best that was to be attained, he should
take it with all its faults. The majority had determined in its
favor and by that determination he should abide. The moment
this plan goes forth all other considerations will be laid aside, and
the great question will be, shall there be a national Government or
not? and this must take place or a general anarchy will be the
alternative. He remarked that the signing in the form proposed
related only to the fact that the? States present were unanimous.

M: WiLuiAMson suggested that the signing should be confined to
the letter accompanying the Constitution to Congress, which might
perhaps do nearly as well, and would he found be * satisfactory to some
members * who disliked the Constitution. For himself he did not
think a better plan was to be expected and had no scruples against
putting his name to it.

M: Haminron expressed his anxiety that every member should
sign. A few characters of consequence, by opposing or even refus-
ing to sign the Constitution, might do infinite mischief by kindling
the latent sparks which‘ lurk under an enthusiasm in favor of the

* He alluded to Mr Blount for one.

 

* The word “States” is italicized in the transcript.

* The transcript italicizes the word “the.”

* The words “be found” are substituted in the transcript for “he found be.”
*The word “which” is changed in the transcript to “ that.”
SESSION OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 581

Convention which may soon subside. No man’s ideas were more
remote from the plan than hist were known to be; but is it
possible to deliberate between anarchy and Convulsion on one side,
and the chance of good to be expected from the plan on the other.

M* Buount said he had declared that he would not sign, so as to
pledge himself in support of the plan, but he was relieved by the
form proposed and would without committing himself attest the
fact that the plan was the unanimous act of the States in Con-
vention.

Doct FRANKLIN expressed his fears from what M! Randolph had
said, that he thought himself alluded to in the remarks offered
this morning to the House. He declared that when drawing up
that paper he did not know that any particular member would
refuse to sign his name to the instrument, and hoped to be so under-
stood. He professed a high sense of obligation to M: Randolph for
having brought forward the plan in the first instance, and for
the assistance he had given in its progress, and hoped that he
would yet lay aside his objections, and by concurring with his
brethren, prevent the great mischief which the refusal of his name
might produce. os

M: RanDOLPH could not but regard the signing in the proposed
form, as the same with signing the Constitution. The change of
form therefore could make no difference with him. He repeated
that in refusing to sign the Constitution, he took a step which
might be the most awful of his life, but it was dictated by his
conscience, and it was not possible for him to hesitate, much less,
to change. He repeated also his persuasion, that the holding out
this plan with a final alternative to the people, of accepting or
rejecting it in toto, would really produce the anarchy & civil con-
vulsions which were apprehended from the refusal of individuals
to sign it.

M: Gerry described the painful feelings of his situation, and
the embarrassment * under which he rose to offer any further ob-
servations on the subject w® had been finally decided. Whilst the
plan was depending, he had treated it with all the freedom he
thought it deserved. He now felt himself bound as he was dis-
posed to treat it with the respect due to the Act of the Conven-
tion. He hoped he should not violate that respect in declaring on
this occasion his fears that a Civil war may result from the present
crisis of the U. S. In Massachussetts, particularly he saw the dan-

1The word “own” is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The transcript uses the word “ embarrassment” in the plural.
582 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ger of this calamitous event—In that State there are two parties,
one devoted to Democracy, the worst he thought of all political
evils, the other as violent in the opposite extreme. From the
collision of these in opposing and resisting the Constitution, con-
fusion was greatly to be feared. He had thought it necessary, for
this-& other reasons that the plan should have been proposed in a
more mediating shape, in order to abate the heat and opposition of
parties. As it has been passed by the Convention, he was per-
suaded it would have a contrary effect. He could not therefore by
signing the Constitution pledge himself to abide by it at all events.
The proposed form made no difference with him. But if it were
not otherwise apparent, the refusals to sign should never be known
from him. Alluding to the remarks of Doc’ Franklin, he could
not he said but view them as levelled at himself and the other
gentlemen who meant not to sign;

Gen! PINKNEY. We are not likely to gain many converts by
the ambiguity of the proposed form of signing. He thought it
best to be candid and let the form speak the substance. If the
meaning of the signers be left in doubt, his purpose would not be
answered. He should sign the Constitution with a view to support
it with all his influence, and wished to pledge himself accordingly.

Doct Franguin. It is too soon to pledge ourselves before Con-
gress and our Constituents shall have approved the plan.

M: Incersot did not consider the signing, either as a mere
attestation of the fact, or as pledging the signers to support the
Constitution at all events; but as a recommendation, of what, all
things considered, was the most eligible.

On the motion of Doc! Franklin

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ci ay. N. J. ay. Pt ay. Del. ay. M? ay.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. S.C. divt* Geo. ay?

M:= Kine suggested that the Journals of the Convention should
be either destroyed, or deposited in the custody of the President.
He thought if suffered to be made public, a bad use would be
made of them by those who would wish to prevent the adoption
of the Constitution.

*Gen! Pinkney & Mr Butler disliked the equivocal form of the’ signing,

and on that account voted in the negative.
* To be transferred hither.’

 

* The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.

*In the transcript the vote reads: “New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Caro-
lina, Georgia, aye—10; South Carolina,* divided.”

* Madison’s direction concerning his note is omitted in the transcript.
 

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SESSION OF MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 583

M? WILson prefered the second expedient, he had at one time
liked the first best; but as false suggestions may be propagated it
should not be made impossible to contradict them. ;

A question was then put on depositing the Journals and other
papers of the Convention in the hands of the President, on which,

N. H. ay. M8 ay. Ctay. N.J.ay. Pentay. Del. ay. M‘* no.
Vi ay. N.C. ay. 8. C. ay. Geo. ay.?

The President having asked what the Convention meant should
be done with the Journals &c, whether copies were to be allowed
to the members if applied for. It was Resolved nem: con: ‘‘ that
he retain the Journal and other papers, subject to the order of
the * Congress, if ever formed under the Constitution.

The members then proceeded to sign the instrument.*

5 Whilst the last members were signing it ® Doct! FranKiin look-
ing towards the Presidents Chair, at the back of which a rising
sun happened to be painted, observed to a few members near him,
that Painters had found it difficult to distinguish in their art a
rising from a setting sun. I have said he, often and often in the
course of the Session, and the vicisitudes of my hopes and fears
as to its issue, looked at that behind the President without being
able to tell whether it was rising or setting: But now at length I
have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting Sun.

5 The Constitution being signed by all the members except M=
Randolph, M! Mason, and M! Gerry who declined giving it the
sanction of their names, the Convention dissolved itself by an
Adjournment sine die—

™The few alterations and corrections made in these debates which
are not in my hand writing, were dictated by me and made in my
presence by John C. Payne. James Mapison.

* This negative of Maryland was occasioned by the language of the instruc-
tions to the Deputies of that State, which required them to report to the
State, the proceedings of the Convention.

* Transfer.*

 

1Madison’s direction concerning his note is omitted in the transcript.

?In the transcript the vote reads: “ New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye—10; Maryland,* no—1.”

® The word “the” is omitted in the transcript.

‘In place of the word “instrument,” the transcript inserts the following
words: “Constitution, as finally amended, as follows.” The Constitution is then
inserted.

* These two final paragraphs of Madison’s notes are transposed in the tran-
script to follow the signatures to the Constitution.

® The word “it” is omitted in the transcript.

7 This statement and Madison’s signature are omitted in the transcript.
APPENDIX I

No. 1. Extract or Lerrer rrom Genrran Knox To GENERAL
WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 23, 1786}

- + + + Our political machine constituted of thirteen independent
sovereignties, have been constantly operating against each other,
and against the federal head, ever since the peace. The powers of
Congress are utterly inadequate to preserve the balance between the
respective States, and oblige them to do those things which are
essential to their own welfare, and for the general good. The human
mind in the local legislatures seems to be exerted, to prevent the
federal constitution from having any beneficial effects. The machine
works inversely to the public good in all its parts. Not only is State
against State, and all against the federal head, but the States within
themselves possess the name only, without having the essential con-
comitant of government, the power of preserving the peace; the
protection of the liberty and property of the citizens.

On the first impression of Faction and licentiousness the fine
theoretic government of Massachusetts has given way, and its laws
arrested and trampled under foot. Men at a distance, who have
admired our systems of government, unfounded in nature, are apt to
accuse the rulers, and say that taxes have been assessed too high and
collected too rigidly. This is a deception equal to any that has
hitherto been entertained. It is indeed a fact, that high taxes are the
ostensible cause of the commotions, but that they are the real cause
is as far remote from truth as light from darkness. The people who
are the insurgents have never paid any, or but every little taxes. But
they see the weakness of government; They feel at once their own
poverty, compared with the opulent, and their own force, and they are
determined to make use of the latter, in order to remedy the former.
Their creed is ‘‘ That the property of the United States, has been
protected from the confiscation of Britain by the joint exertions of
all, and therefore ought to be the common property of all. And he
that attempts opposition to this creed is an enemy to equity and
justice, and ought to be swept from off the face of the earth.’’ In a
word they are determined to annihilate all debts public and private
and have agrarian Laws, which are easily effected by the means of
unfunded paper money which shall be a tender in all cases whatever.

The numbers of these people may amount in Massachusetts to
about one fifth part of several populous counties, and to them may be
collected, people of similar sentiments, from the States of Rhode
Island, Connecticut and New Hampshire, so as to constitute a body
of 12 or 15000 desperate & unprincipled men. They are chiefly of
the young and active part of the community, more easily collected

 

The text of the above letter is printed from the original among the
Washington manuscripts in the Library of Congress.
585
586 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

than perhaps kept together afterwards— But they will probably
commit overt acts of treason which will compell them to embody for
their own safety—once embodied they will be constrained to submit
to discipline for the same reason. Having proceeded to this length
for which they are now ripe, we shall have a formidable rebellion
against reason, the principle of all government, and the very name
of liberty. This dreadful situation has alarmed every man of prin-
ciple and property in New England. They start as from a dream,
and ask what has been the cause of our delusion? what is to afford
us security against the violence of lawless men? Our government
must be braced, changed, or altered to secure our lives and property.
We imagined that the mildness of our government and the virtue
of the people were so correspondent, that we were not as other nations
requiring brutal force to support the laws— But we find that we are
men, actual men, possessing all the turbulent passions belonging to
that animal and that we must have a government proper and ade-
quate for him. The people of Massachusetts for instance, are far
advanced in this doctrine, and the men of reflection, & principle, are
determined to endeavor to establish a government which shall have
the power to protect them in their lawful pursuits, and which will
be efficient in all cases of internal commotions or foreign invasions.
They mean that liberty shall be the basis, a liberty resulting from the
equal and firm administration of the laws. They wish for a general
government of unity as they see the local legislatures, must naturally
and necessarily tend to retard and frustrate all general government.

We have arrived at that point of time in which we are forced to
see our national humiliation, and that a progression in this line,
cannot be productive of happiness either public or private. Something
is wanting and something must be done or we shall be involved in all
the horror of faction and civil war without a prospect of its termina-
tion. Every tried friend to the liberties of his country is bound to
reflect, and to step forward to prevent the dreadful consequences
which will result from a government of events. Unless this is done
we shall be liable to be ruled by an arbitrary and capricious armed
tyranny, whose word and will must be law. . . .

No. 2. Extract orf LETTER FROM JOHN JAY TO GENERAL
WASHINGTON, JUNE 27, 17861

. ... Our affairs seem to lead to some crisis—some Revolution—
something that I cannot foresee, or conjecture. I am uneasy and
apprehensive—more so, than during the War. Then we had a fixed
object, and tho the means and time of attaining it were often proble-
matical, yet I did firmly believe that we should ultimately succeed,
because I was convinced that Justice was with us. The case is now

 

_ _* The text of the above letter is printed from the original among the Wash-
ington manuscripts in the Library of Congress. See also Correspondence of the
American Revolution, Sparks, Editor, Vol. IV (1853), pp. 135, 136; The Cor-
ee el and Public Papers of John Jay, Johnston, Editor, Vol. III (1891),
pp. -205.
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 587

altered—we are going and doing wrong, and therefore I look forward
to Evils and calamities, but without being able to grasp at the Instru-
ment Nature or measure of them. That we shall again recover, and
things again go well, I have no Doubt—such a variety of circumstances
would not almost miraculously have combined to liberate and make
us a nation for transient & unimportant Purposes. I therefore be-
lieve we are yet to become a great and respectable People—but when
or how, the Spirit of Prophecy only can discern.

There doubtless is much Reason to think and to say that we are
woefully and in many Instances wickedly misled. private Rage for
Property suppresses public considerations, & personal rather than
national Interests have become the great objects of attention. Repre-
sentative Bodies will ever be faithful copies of their originals, and
generally exhibit a chequered assemblage of virtue and vice, of abili-
ties and weakness. The Mass of Men are neither wise nor good—and
the virtue like the other Resources of a country can only be drawn
to a point by strong circumstances ably managed, or strong govern-
ment ably administred. New Governments have not the aid of
Habit and hereditary Respect; & being generally the Result of
preceding Tumult and confusion, do not immediately acquire Stability
or Strength. Besides, in times of commotion some men will gain
confidence & Importance who merit neither; and who like political
mountebanks are less sollicitous about the Health of the credulous
Crowd, than about making the most of their Nostrums & Prescriptions.

New York was rendered less federal, by the opinions of the late
President of Congress. This is a singular tho’ not unaccountable
Fact—indeed human actions are seldom inexplicable. What I most
fear is, that the better kind of People (by which I mean the People
who are orderly and industrious, who are content with their situations,
and not uneasy in their Circumstances,) will be led by the Insecurity
of Property, the Loss of Confidence in their Rulers, & the Want of
public Faith & Rectitude, to consider the charms of Liberty as
imaginary and delusive. A State of uncertainty and Fluctuation must
disgust and alarm such men, and prepare their minds for almost any
change that may promise them Quiet & Security... .

No. 3. Extract or Lerrer From GENERAL WASHINGTON
To JoHN Jay, Auaust 1, 1786+

. .. . Your sentiments, that our affairs are drawing rapidly to
a crisis, accord with my own. What the event will be is also beyond
the reach of my foresight. We have errors to correct; we have
probably had too good an opinion of human nature in forming our
confederation. Experience has taught us, that men will not adopt
& carry into execution, measures the best calculated for their own
good, without the intervention of a coercive power. I do not conceive

 

1The text of the above letter is printed from Washington’s letter book,
Washington manuscripts in the Library of Congress. See also The Writings of
George Washington, Ford, Editor, Vol. XI (1891), pp. 53-56; The Correspondence
and Public Papers of John Jay, Johnston, Editor, Vol. III (1891), pp. 207-209.
588 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

we can exist long as a nation without having lodged somewhere a
power which will pervade the whole union in as energetic a manner,
as the authority of the State Governments extends over the several
States. To be fearful of investing Congress, constituted as that body
is, with ample authorities for national purposes, appears to me the
very climax of popular absurdity & madness. Could Congress exert
them for the detriment of the public, without injuring themselves
in an equal or greater proportion? Are not their interests inseparably
connected with those of their constituents? By the rotation of
appointment must they not mingle frequently with the mass of
Citizens? Is it not rather to be apprehended, if they were possessed
of the powers before described, that the individual members would be
induced to use them, on many occasions, very timidly & inefficaciously
for fear of losing their popularity and future election? We must
take human nature as we find it: perfection falls not to the share of
mortals. Many are of opinion that Congress have too frequently
made use of the suppliant humble tone of requisition, in applications
to the States, when they had a right to assert their imperial dignity
and command obedience. Be that as it may, requisitions are a perfect
nihility, where thirteen sovereign, independent, disunited States are in
the habit of discussing & refusing compliance with them at their
option. Requisitions are actually little better than a jest & a bye
word throughout the land. If you tell the Legislatures they have
violated the Treaty of Peace, & invaded the prerogatives of the con-
federacy they will laugh in your face. What then is to be done?
Things cannot go on in the same train forever. It is much to be
feared, as you observe, that the better kind of people being disgusted
with the circumstances, will have their minds prepared for any
revolution whatever. We are apt to run from one extreme into
another. To anticipate & prevent disastrous contingencies, would
be the part of wisdom & patriotism.

What astonishing changes a few years are capable of producing.
I am told that even respectable characters speak of a monarchical
form of Government without horror. From thinking proceeds speak-
ing, thence to acting is often but a single step. But how irrevocable
& tremendous! what a triumph for our enemies to verify their pre-
dictions—what a triumph for the advocates of despotism to find that
we are incapable of governing ourselves, & that systems founded on
the basis of equal liberty are merely ideal & fallacious! Would to
God that wise measures may be taken in time to avert the consequences
we have but too much reason to apprehend.

Retired as I am from the world I frankly acknowledge I cannot
feel myself an unconcerned spectator. Yet having happily assisted
in bringing the Ship into Port & having been fairly discharged; it
is not my business to embark again on a sea of troubles. Nor could it
be expected that my sentiments and opinions would have much weight
on the minds of my Countrymen;—they have been neglected, tho’
given as a last legacy in the most solemn manner :—I had then perhaps
some claims to public attention—I consider myself as having none
at present. ...
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 589

APPENDIX II

No. 1. Exrract or Lerrer From James Mapison To
THOMAS JEFFERSON

New York, March 19, 1787.
Dear Sir

My last was of the 11% of Feb’, and went by the packet. This
will go to England in the care of a French gentleman, who will con-
sign it to the care of M' Adams.

The appointments for the Convention go on auspiciously. Since
my last, Georgia, S. Carolina, N. York, Mass's and N. Hampshire,
have come into the measure. The first and the last of these States
have commissioned their delegates to Congress as their representatives
in Convention. The deputation of Mass‘ consists of Mess® Gorham,
Dana, King, Gerry, and Strong. That of N. York, Mess"® Hamilton
Yates & Lansing. That of S. Carolina, Mess’ J. Rutlidge, Laurens,
Pinkney, (General) Butler, and Cha’ Pinkney, lately member of Con-
gress. The States which have not yet appointed are R. Island, Con-
necticut, and Maryland. The last has taken measures which prove
her intention to appoint, and the two former it is not doubted will
follow the example of their neighbours. I just learn from the
Governor of Virginia that M: Henry has resigned his place in the
deputation from that state, and that Gen! Nelson is put into it by
the Executive, who were authorised to fill vacancies. The Governor,
ME Wythe, & M: Blair will attend, and some hopes are entertained
of Col. Mason’s attendance. Gen! Washington has prudently au-
thorised no expectations of his attendance, but has not either pre-
cluded himself absolutely from stepping into the field if the crisis
should demand it.

What may be the result of this political experiment cannot be
foreseen. The difficulties which present themselves are on one side
almost sufficient to dismay the most sanguine, whilst on the other
side the most timid are compelled to encounter them by the mortal
diseases of the existing Constitution. These diseases need not be
pointed out to you, who so well understand them. Suffice it to say,
that they are at present marked by symptoms which are truly alarm-
ing, which have tainted the faith of the most orthodox republicans,
and which challenge from the votaries of liberty every concession in
favor of stable Government not infringing fundamental principles,
as the only security against an opposite extreme of our present
situation. : :

I think myself that it will be expedient in the first place to lay
the foundation of the new system in such a ratification by the people
themselves of the several States as will render it clearly paramount
to their Legislative authorities. 2° Over & above the positive power

 

1 The text of the above letter is printed from the original among the Madison
manuscripts in the Library of Congress. See also, The Writings of James Madi-
son, Hunt, Editor, Vol. II (1901), pp. 324-328.
590 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of regulating trade and sundry other matters in which uniformity is
proper, to arm the federal head with a negative in all cases whatso-
ever on the local Legislatures. Without this defensive power experi-
ence and reflection have satisfied me that however ample the federal
powers may be made, or however clearly their boundaries may be
delineated, on paper, they will be easily and continually baffled by
the Legislative Sovereignties of the States. The effects of this pro-
vision would be not only to guard the national rights and interests
against invasion, but also to restrain the States from thwarting and
molesting each other, and even from oppressing the minority within
themselves by paper money and other unrighteous measures which
favor the interest of the majority. In order to render the exercise
of such a negative prerogative convenient, an emanation of it must
be vested in some set of men within the several States, so far as to
enable them to give a temporary sanction to laws of immediate neces-
sity. 3% To change the principle of Representation in the federal
system. Whilst the execution of the acts of Cong? depends on the
several Legislatures, the equality of votes does not destroy the in-
equality of importance and influence in the States. But in case of
such an augmentation of the federal power as will render it efficient
without the intervention of the Legislatures, a vote in the general
Councils from Delaware would be of equal value with one from
Mass® or Virginia. This change, therefore, is just. I think, also, it
will be practicable. A majority of the States conceive that they will be
gainers by it. It is recommended to the Eastern States by the actual
superiority of their populousness, and to the Southern by their ex-
pected superiority. And if a majority of the larger States concur, the
fewer and smaller States must finally bend to them. This point being
gained, many of the objections now urged in the leading States ag**
renunciations of power will vanish. 4% To organize the federal
powers in such a manner as not to blend together those which ought
to be exercised by separate departments. The limited powers now
vested in Cong? are frequently mismanaged from the want of such
a distribution of them. What would be the case, under an enlarge-
ment not only of the powers, but the number, of the federal Rep-
resentatives?—These are some of the leading ideas which have oc-
curred to me, but which may appear to others as improper as they
appear to me necessary. . .

No. 2. Extract or Lerrer From JAMES Mapison To
Epmunp RanpboLPH ?
April 8, 1787.

. . ._. Tam glad to find that you are turning your thoughts
towards the business of May next. My despair of your finding the
necessary leisure as signified in one of your letters, with the proba-
bility that some leading propositions at least would be expected from
Virg* had engaged me in a closer attention to the subject than I

 

* The text of the above letter is printed from the original among the Madison
manuscripts in the Library of Congress. See also, The Writings of James Madi-
son, Hunt, Editor, Vol II (1901), pp. 336-340.
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 591

should otherwise have given. I will just hint the ideas which have
occurred, leaving explanations for our interview.

I think with you that it will be well to retain as much as possible
of the old Confederation, tho’ I doubt whether it may not be best to
work the valuable articles into the new System, instead of engrafting
the latter on the former. I am also perfectly of your opinion that in
framing a system, no material sacrifices ought to be made to local or
temporary prejudices. An explanatory address must of necessity
accompany the result of the Convention on the main object. I am
not sure that it will be practicable to present the several parts of the
reform in so detached a manner to the States as that a partial adop-
tion will be binding. Particular States may view the different articles
as conditions of each other, and would only ratify them as such,
others might ratify them as independent propositions. The conse-
quence would be that the ratifications of both would go for nothing.
I have not however examined this point thoroughly. In truth my
ideas of a reform strike so deeply at the old Confederation and lead
to such a systematic change, that they scarcely admit of the expedient.

I hold it for a fundamental point that an individual independence
of the States is utterly irreconcilable with the idea of an aggregate
sovereignty. I think at the same time that a consolidation of the
States into one simple republic is not less unattainable than it would
be inexpedient. Let it be tried then whether any middle ground can
be taken which will at once support a due supremacy of the national
authority, and leave in force the local authorities so far as they can
be subordinately useful.

The first step to be taken is I think a change in the principle of
representation. According to the present form of the Union, an
equality of suffrage if not just towards the larger members of it, is
at least safe to them, as the liberty they exercise of rejecting or
executing the Acts of Congress, is uncontroulable by the nominal
sovereignty of Congress. Under a system which would operate with-
out the intervention of the States, the case would be materially altered.
A vote from Delaware would have the same effect as one from Mass‘?
or Virg?

ie us national Government be armed with a positive & compleat
authority in all cases where uniform measures are necessary. As in
trade &c. &c.—Let it also retain the powers which it now possesses.

Let it have a negative in all cases whatsoever on the Legislative
Acts of the States as the K. of G. B. heretofore had. This I conceive
to be essential and the least possible abridgement of the State Sov-
ereignties. Without such a defensive power, every positive power
that can be given on paper will be unavailing. It will also give
internal stability to the States. There has been no moment since the
peace at which the federal assent wd have been given to paper
money &c. &ce.

Let this national supremacy be extended also to the Judiciary
departm: If the judges in the last resort depend on the States & are
bound by their oaths to them and not to the Union, the intention of
the law and the interests of the nation may be defeated by the ob-
592 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

sequiousness of the Tribunals to the policy or prejudices of the
States. It seems at least essential that an appeal should lie to some
national tribunals in all cases which concern foreigners, or inhabitants
of other States. The admiralty jurisdiction may be fully submitted
to the national Government.

A Government formed of such extensive powers ought to be well
organized. The Legislative department may be divided into two
branches; one of them to be chosen every years by the Legis-
latures or the people at large, the other to consist of a more select
number, holding their appointments for a longer term and going out
in rotation. Perhaps the negative on the State laws may be most
conveniently lodged in this branch. A Council of Revision may be
superadded, including the great ministerial officers.

A National Executive will also be necessary. I have scarcely ven-
tured to form my own opinion yet either of the manner in which
it ought to be constituted or of the authorities with which it ought
[to be] cloathed.

An article ought to be inserted expressly guarantying the tran-
quility of the States ag*t internal as well as external dangers:

To. give the new system its proper energy it will be desirable to
have it ratified by the authority of the people, and not merely by.
that of the Legislatures.

I am afraid you will think this project, if not extravagant, abso-
lutely unattainable and unworthy of being attempted. Conceiving
it my self to go no farther than is essential, The objections drawn
from this source are to be laid aside. I flatter my self however that
they may be less formidable on trial than in contemplation. The
change in the principle of representation will be relished by a majority
of the States, and those too of most influence. The Northern States
will be reconciled to it by the actual superiority of their populous-
ness: the Southern by their expected superiority in this point. This
principle established, the repugnance of the large States to part with
power will in a great degree subside, and the smaller States must ulti-
mately yield to the predominant will. It is also already seen by many
& must by degrees be seen by all that unless the Union be organised
efficiently on Republican principles, innovations of a much more ob-
jectionable form may be obtruded, or in the most favorable event,

the partition of the Empire into rival & hostile confederacies will
ensue... .

No. 3. Lerrer From JAMES Mapison To GroRGE WASHINGTON ?

Dear Sir New York April 16 1787.

I have been honoured with your letter of the 31 of March, and find
with much pleasure that your views of the reform which ought to
be pursued by the Convention, give a sanction to those which I have
entertained. Temporising applications will dishonor the Councils
which propose them, and may foment the internal malignity of the

*The text of the above letter is printed from the original among the
Washington manuscripts in the Library of Congress. See also, The Writings of
James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol. II (1901), pp. 344-349.
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 593

disease, at the same time that they produce an ostensible palliation
of it. Radical attempts, although unsuccessful, will at least justify
the authors of them.

Having been lately led to revolve the subject which is to,undergo
the discussion of the Convention, and formed in my mind some out-
lines of a new system, I take the liberty of submitting them without
apology, to your eye.

Conceiving that an individual independence of the States is utterly
irreconcileable with their aggregate sovereignty; and that a consoli-
dation of the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient
as it is unattainable, I have sought for some middle ground, which
may at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and
not ons the local authorities wherever they can be subordinately
useful.

I would propose as the ground-work that a change be made in the
principle of representation. According to the present form of the
Union in which the intervention of the States is in all great cases
necessary to effectuate the measures of Congress, an equality of suf-
frage, does not destroy the inequality of importance, in the several
members. No one will deny that Virginia and Mass* have more
weight and influence both within & without Congress than Delaware
or Rho. Island. Under a system which would operate in many essen-
tial points without the intervention of the State Legislatures, the
ease would be materially altered. A vote in the national Councils
from Delaware, would then have the same effect and value as one
from the largest State in the Union. I am ready to believe that such
a change will not be attended with much difficulty. A majority of
the States, and those of greatest influence, will regard it as favorable
to them. To the Northern States it will be recommended by their
present populousness; to the Southern by their expected advantage
in this respect. The lesser States must in every event yield to the
predominant will. Br‘ the consideration which particularly urges a
change in the representation is that it will obviate the principal ob-
jections of the large: States to the necessary concessions of power.

I would pror<:e next that in addition to the present federal
powers, the national Government should be armed with positive and
compleat authority in all cases which require uniformity ; such as the
regulation of trade, including the right of taxing both exports &
imports, the fixing the terms and forms of naturalization, & &c.

Over and above this positive power, a negative in all cases what-
soever on the legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by
the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely necessary, and
to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions.
Without this defensive power, every positive power that can be given
on paper will be evaded & defeated. The States will continue to
invade the National jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of
nations & to harass each other with rival and spiteful measures dic-
tated by mistaken views of interest. Another happy effect of this
prerogative would be its controul on the internal vicisitudes of State
policy, and the aggressions of interested majorities on the rights of
594 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

minorities and of individuals. The great desideratum which has not
yet been found for Republican Governments seems to be some dis-
interested & dispassionate umpire in disputes between different pas-
sions & interests in the State. The majority who alone have the
right of decision, have frequently an interest real or supposed in
abusing it. In Monarchies the sovereign is more neutral to the
interests and views of different parties; but, unfortunately he too
often forms interests of his own repugnant to those of the whole.
Might not the national prerogative here suggested be found sufficiently
disinterested for the decision of local questions of policy, whilst it
would itself be sufficiently restrained from the pursuit of interests
adverse to those of the whole Society? There has not been any mo-
ment since the peace at which the representatives of the Union would
have given an assent to paper money or any other measure of a
kindred nature.

The national supremacy ought also to be extended as I conceive
to the Judiciary departments. If those who are to expound & apply
the laws, are connected by their interests & their oaths with the
particular States wholly, and not with the Union, the participation
of the Union in the making of the laws may be possibly rendered
unavailing. It seems at least necessary that the oaths of the Judges
should include a fidelity to the general as well as local constitution,
and that an appeal should lie to some National tribunals in all cases
to which foreigners or inhabitants of other States may be parties.
The admiralty jurisdiction seems to fall entirely within the purview
of the national Government.

The national supremacy in the Executive departments is liable to
some difficulty, unless the officers administering them could be made
appointable by the supreme Government. The Militia ought certainly
to be placed in some form or other under the authority which is
entrusted with the general protection and defence.

A Government composed of such extensive power should be well
organised and balanced. The legislative department might be
divided into two branches; one of them chosen every years by
the people at large, or by the Legislatures; the other to consist of
fewer members, to hold their places for a longer term, and to go
out in such a rotation as always to leave in office a large majority
of old members. Perhaps the negative on the laws might be most
conveniently exercised by this branch. As a further check, a council
7 ae including the great ministerial officers might be super-
added.

A National Executive must also be provided. I have scarcely
ventured as yet to form my own opinion either of the manner in
which it ought to be constituted or of the authorities with which it
ought to be cloathed.

An article should be inserted expressly guarantying the tran-
quility of the States against internal as well as external dangers.

In like manner the right of coercion should be expressly declared.
With the resources of Commerce in hand, the National administration
might always find means. of exerting it either by sea or land. But
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 595

the difficulty & awkwardness of operating by force on the collective
will of a State, render it particularly desireable that the necessity
of it might be precluded. Perhaps the negative on the laws might
create such a mutuality of dependence between the General and par-
ticular authorities, as to answer this purpose or perhaps some defined
objects of taxation might be submitted along with commerce, to the
general authority.

To give a new System its proper validity and energy, a ratifica-
tion must be obtained from the people, and not merely from the
ordinary authority of the Legislatures. This will be the more essen-
tial as inroads on the existing Constitutions of the States will be
unavoidable. . . .

APPENDIX III

LETTER FROM MERCHANTS, TRADESMEN, ETC., OF PROVIDENCE, RHODE
ISLAND, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERAL CONVENTION ?

GENTLEMEN PROVIDENCE, May 11 1787.

Since the Legislature of this State have finally declined sending
Delegates to Meet you in Convention for the purposes mentioned in
the Resolve of Congress of the 21*%* February 1787, the Merchants,
Tradesmen and others of this place, deeply affected with the evils of
the present unhappy times, have thought proper to communicate in
writing thier approbation of your Meeting, And their regret that it
will fall short of a Compleat Representation of the Federal Union.—

The failure of this State was owing to the Nonconcurrence of the
Upper House of Assembly with a Vote passed in the Lower House,
for appointing Delegates to attend the said Convention, at thier
Session holden at Newport on the first Wednesday of the present
Month.—

It is the general Opinion here and we believe of the well informed
throughout this State, that full power for the Regulation of the
Commerce of the United States, both Foreign & Domestick ought to
be vested in the National Council.

And that Effectual Arrangements should also be made for giving
Operation to the present powers of Congress in thier Requisitions
upon the States for National purposes.—

As the Object of this Letter is chiefly to prevent any impressions
unfavorable to the Commercial Interest of this State, from taking
place in our Sister States from the Circumstance of our being unrep-
resented in the present National Convention, we shall not presume to
enter into any detail of the objects we hope your deliberations will
embrace and provide for being convinced they will be such as have
a tendency to strengthen the Union, promote Commerce, increase the
power & Establish the Credit of the United States.

1The text of the above letter is printed from the original among the manu-
scripts of the Constitution in the Department of State. See also Documentary
History of the Constitution, Vol. I (1894), pp. 275-276.
596 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

The result of your deliberations tending to these desireable pur-
poses we still hope may finally be Approved and Adopted by this
State, for which we pledge our Influence and best exertions.—

In behalf of the Merchants, Tradesmen &e

We have the Honour to be with perfect Consideration & Respect

Your most Obedient &
Most Humble Servant’s

JoHN Brown JABEZ BOWEN

Tro? Luoyp Hatszey NicHo? BRowN

Jos. NIGHTINGALE JOHN JENCKES Q
Levi Hau WELCOME ARNOLD 5
Puiu ALLEN Wrou1am Russeuu e
Paunt ALLEN JEREMIAH OLMY, :

WILLiAM Barton
The Hone the Chairman of the General Convention
PHILADELPHIA

APPENDIX IV

THE PINCKNEY PLAN PRESENTED TO THE CONVENTION
AT ITS SESSION OF MAY 29, 1787

No. 1. OUTLINE oF THE PLAN?

1. A Confederation between the free and independent States of
N. H. ete. is hereby solemnly made uniting them together under one
general superintending Government for their common Benefit and for
their Defense and Security against all Designs and Leagues that may
be injurious to their Interests and against all forc[e] [or foes?] and
Attacks offered’ to or made upon them or any of them.

2. The Stile.

 

1 Reprinted from Professor McLaughlin’s Sketch of Pinckney’s Plan for a
Constitution, 1787, The American Historical Review, IX, 1904, 735, 741-747.

Professor J. Franklin Jameson had previously identified among the manu-
script papers of James Wilson, deposited in the Pennsylvania ‘Historical Society,
certain extracts in Wilson’s hand as taken from Pinckney’s original draft.
See J. Franklin Jameson, Studies in the History of the Federal Convention of
1787, Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1902, I, pp. 128,
132; and for an analysis of Pinckney’s views, pp. 111, 128, other than those
derived from the extracts.

Professor Jameson thus states his views in the light of his studies and his
remarkable discovery:

“ Concluding that to a considerable extent, and with more or less confidence,
we can reconstruct the actual plan which Pinckney laid before the Convention
on May 29, we may now turn, finally, to the question, If the document which
Pinckney sent to John Quincy Adams was not his original draft, what was it?
The question is really not a very difficult one. The similarity of the supposed
draft to the final Constitution has constantly been noticed. Its resemblance to
the report of the Committee of Detail is still closer. . . . Practically, in other
words, the so-called Pinckney plan consists of the report of the Committee of
Detail, as brought in on August 6, minus some of its lesser features, and plus
some of those of his real plan. It is not possible to say that Pinckney answered
Adams’ request by sitting down and copying the printed report of the Com-
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 597

3. Mutual intercourse—Community of Privileges—Surrender of
Criminals—Faith to Proceedings ete.

4. Two Branches of the Legislature—Senate—House of Delegates
—together the U. 8. in Congress assembled.

H. D. to consist of one Member for every thousand Inhabitants
% of Blacks included.

Senate to be elected from four Districts—to serve by Rotation of
four Years—to be elected by the H. D. either from among themselves
or the People at large.

5. The Senate and H. D. shall by joint Ballot annually [sep-
tennially] chuse the Presid‘ U. 8. from among themselves or the Peo-
ple at large.—In the Presd! the executive authority of the U. 8. shall
be vested.—His Powers and Duties—He shall have a Right to advise
with the Heads of the different Departments as his Council.

6. Council of Revision, consisting of the Presid‘. 8. [ecretary]
for for.[eign] Affairs, S. of War, Heads of the Departments of Treas-
ury and Admiralty or any two of them tog" w' the Presidt,

7. The members of S. and H. D. shall each have one Vote, and
shall be paid out of the common Treasury.

8. The Time of the Election of the Members of the H. D. and of
the Meeting of U. S. in C. assembled.

9. No State to make Treaties—lay interfering Duties—keep a
naval or land Force Militia excepted to be disciplined ete. according
to the Regulations of the U. 8S.

10. Each State retains its Rights not expressly delegated—but no
Bill of the Legislature of any State shall become a law till it shall
have been laid before S. and H. D. in C. assembled and received their
Approbation.

11. The exclusive Power of S. and H. D. in C. Assembled.

12. The 8S. and H. D. in C. ass. shall have exclusive Power of
regulating trade and levying Imposts—EHach State may lay Embar-
goes in Times of Scarcity.

 

mittee of Detail, paraphrasing to a small extent here and there, and inter-
weaving as he went along some of the best-remembered features of his own
plan. But it is possible to declare that if he had done this the result would
have been precisely like that which in fact he sent on to Washington... .
It is perhaps sufficient to remark, in conclusion, that as a maker of the Con-
stitution Charles Pinckney evidently deserves to stand higher than he has stood
of late years, and that he would have a better chance of doing so if in his old
age he had not claimed so much.” Sears

Professor A. C. McLaughlin found among the same papers one likewise in
Wilson’s hand which he identified as Wilson’s summary of the original Pinckney
Plan made on its reading in the Session of May 29, 1787, or made by him as
a member of the Committee of Detail when the original plan was before that
committee. ; :

Professor McLaughlin’s conclusions are, “ By help of the condensation of
the plan which Professor Jameson discovered and from the light thrown on
the problem by the document printed below, we can say that Pinckney sug-
gested some thirty-one or thirty-two provisions which were finally embodied in
the Constitution; of these, about twelve were originally in the Articles of Con-
federation, . . .” . eee

For an elaborate defense of Pinckney and the enclosure in his letter of 1818,
see The Mystery of the Pinckney Draught (1908), by Charles C. Nott, formerly
Chief Justice of the United States Court of Claims.
598 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

13. of establishing Post-Offices.

14. §S. and H. D. in C. ass. shall be the last Resort on Appeal in .
Disputes between two or more States; which Authority shall be ex-
ercised in the following Manner etc.

15. §S. and H. D. in C. ass. shall institute offices and appoint
officers for the Departments of for. Affairs, War, Treasury and
Admiralty.

They shall have the exclusive Power of declaring what shall be
Treason and Misp. of Treason agt U. S.—and of instituting a federal
judicial Court, to which an Appeal shall be allowed from the judicial
Courts of the several States in all Causes wherein Questions shall
arise on the Construction of Treaties made by U. S.—or on the Laws
of Nations—or on the Regulations of U. S. concerning Trade and
Revenue—or wherein U. 8. shall be a Party—The Court shall consist
of Judges to be appointed during good Behaviour—S. and H. D. in
C. ass. shall have the exclusive Right of instituting in each State a
Court of Admiralty, and appointing the Judges ete of the same for
all maritime Causes which may arise therein respectively.

16. S. and H. D. in C. Ass shall have the exclusive Right of
coining Money—regulating its Alloy and Value—fixing the Standard
of Weights and Measures throughout U. S.

17. Points in which the Assent of more than a bare Majority
shall be necessary.

18. Impeachments shall be by the H. D. before the Senate and
the Judges of the federeal judicial Court

19. S. and H. D. in C. ass. shall regulate the Militia thro’
the U. 8.

20. Means of enforcing and compelling the Payment of the
Quota: of each State.

21. Manner and Conditions of admitting new States.

22. Power of dividing annexing and consolidating States, on
the Consent and Petition of such States.

23. The assent of the Legislature of States shall be suffi-
cient to invest future additional Powers in U. S. in C. ass. and shall
bind the whole Confederacy.

24. The Articles of Confederation shall be inviolably observed,
and the Union shall be perpetual: unless altered as before directed.

25. The said States of N. H. ete guarrantee mutually each other
ane their Rights against all other Powers and against all Rebel-
10n ete.

 

No. 2. Lerrers rroM CHaries PINCKNEY To JoHN Quincy ADAMs,
SECRETARY OF State, RELATING TO THE ALLEGED PINCKNEY PLAN

a WINGAW NEAR GEORGETOWN December 12 1818
ir

I have just had the honour to receive your favour—Being at
present absent from Charleston on a visit to my planting interest in
this neighbourhood T shall in consequence of your letter shorten my
stay here considerably & return to Town for the purpose of complying
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 599

with your request as soon as possible—From an inspection of my old
papers not long ago I know it was then easily in my power to have
complied with your request—I still hope it is & as soon as I return to
my residence in Charleston will again, or as quickly as I can write you
on it to prevent delay.

The Draught of the Constitution proposed by me was divided
into a number of articles & was in complete detail—the resolutions
offered by Mt Randolph were merely general ones & as far as I recol-
lect they were both referred to the same Committee.

With great respect & esteem &e.#
Sir?

On my return to this City as I promised I examined carefully all
the numerous notes & papers which I had retained relating to the
federal Convention—among them I found several rough draughts of
the Constitution I proposed to the Convention—although they differed
in some measure from each other in the wording & arrangement of
the articles—yet they were all substantially the same—they all pro-
ceeded upon the idea of throwing out of view the attempt to amend
the existing Confederation (then a very favorite idea of a number) &
proceeding de novo—of a Division of the Powers of Government into
legislative executive & judicial & of making the Government to operate
directly upon the People & not upon the States- - My Plan was sub-
stantially adopted in the sequel except as to the Senate & giving more
power to the Executive than I intended—the force of vote which the
small & middling states had in the Convention prevented our obtain-
ing a proportional representation in more than one branch & the
great powers given to the President were never intended to have been
given to him while the Convention continued in that patient & coolly
deliberative situation in which they had been for nearly the whole of
the preceding five months of their session nor was it until within the
last week or ten days that almost the whole of the Executive Depart-
ment was altered—I can assure you as a fact that for more than Four
mouths & a half out of five the power of exclusively making treaties,
appointing for the Ministers & judges of the Supreme Court was given
to the Senate after numerous debates & consideration of the subject
both in Committee of the whole & in the house—this I not only aver
but can prove by printed Documents in my possession to have been
the case—& should I ever have the pleasure to see you & converse
on tke subject will state to you some things relative to this business
that may be new & perhaps surprising to you—the veil of secrecy
from the Proceedings of the Convention being removed by Congress &
but very few of the members alive would make disclosures now of the
secrets there acted less improper than before—With the aid of the
journal & the numerous notes & memorandums I have preserved
should now be in my power to give a View of the almost insuperable

 

1The text is reprinted from The Writings of James Madison, Hunt, Editor,
Vol. III (1902), p. 22. .

2 The text is printed from the original among the manuscripts of the Con-
stitution in the Department of State. See also Documentary History of the
Constitution, Vol. I (1894), pp. 309-311.
600 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

difficulties the Convention had to encounter & of the conflicting opin-
ions of the members & I believe should have attempted it had I not
always understood M‘ Madison intended it—he alone I believe pos-
sessed & retained more numerous & particular notes of their pro-
ceedings than myself. I will thank you sir to do me the honour to
send me or to get the President to direct a copy of the Journal of the
Convention to be gent me as also of the Secret Journals of Congress
should it be considered not improper in me to make the request.

I have already informed you I have several rough draughts of the
Constitution I proposed & that they are all substantially the same
differing only in words & the arrangement of the Articles—at the dis-
tance of nearly thirty two years it is impossible for me now to say
which of the 4 or 5 draughts I have was the one but enclosed I send
you the one I believe was it—I repeat however that they are sub-
stantially the same differing only in form & unessentiais—It may be
necessary to remark that very soon after the Convention met I changed
& avowed candidly the change of my opinion on giving the power to
Congress to revise the State Laws in certain cases & in giving the ex-
clusive Power to the Senate to declare War thinking it safer to refuse
the first altogether & to vest the latter in Congress—I will thank you
to acknowledge by a line the receipt of the Draught & this.

With very great respect & esteem
I have the honour to be your most
Obedient servant
CHARLES PINCKNEY.
December 30 1818
In Charleston.

No. 3. TExtT oF THE ALLEGED PLAN SUBMITTED BY PINCKNEY TO
JOHN Quincy Apams 1

We the People of the States of New Hampshire Massachusetts
Rhode Island & Providence Plantations—Connecticut New York New
Jersey Pennsylvania Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina
South Carolina & Georgia do ordain, declare & establish the following
Constitution for the government of ourselves & Posterity.

ARTICLE 1:

The Stile of this Government shall be The United States of
America & the Government shall consist of supreme legislative Execu-
tive & judicial Powers.

 

‘Printed from the original among the manuscripts of the Constitution in
the Department of State. See also Documentary History of the Constitution,
Vol. I (1894), pp. 312-321.

___ The plan is written upon the same paper as the letter transmitting it and
with the same ink and the paper in each case bears the watermark of 1797.
Therefore the draft transmitted to Secretary Adams cannot have been written on
this paper before 1797—some ten years after the Convention. The letter and the
draft appear to have been written in 1818 the year of Adams’ request to Pinckney
to furnish a copy of the Pinckney Plan.
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 601

2

The Legislative Power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of
two separate Houses—one to be called the House of Delegates & the
other the Senate who shall meet on the Day of

in every year.

3

The members of the House of Delegates shall be chosen every
year by the people of the several States & the qualification
of the electors shall be the same as those of the Electors in the several
States for their legislatures—each member shall have been a citizen
of the United States for years—shall be of
years of age & a resident in the State he is chosen for Until
a census of the people shall be taken in the manner herein after men-
tioned the House of Delegates shall consist of
to be chosen from the different States in the following proportions—
for New Hampshire, ; for Massachusetts for
Rhode Island, for Connecticut, for New York
for New Jersey, for Pennsylvania, for
Delaware, for Maryl? for Virginia, for
North Carolina, for South Carolina, for Georgia,
& the Legislature shall hereafter regulate the number of
delegates by the number of inhabitiants according to the Provisions
herein after made, at the rate of one for every thousand.—
All money bills of every kind shall originate in the house of Delegates
& shall not be altered by the Senate. The House of Delegates shall
exclusively possess the power of impeachment & shall choose it’s
officers & vacancies therein shall be supplied by the executive authority
of the State in the representation from which they shall happen.

4

The Senate shall be elected & chosen by the House of Delegates
which house immediately after their meeting shall choose by ballot
Senators from among the Citizens & residents of New Hamp-
shire from among those of Massachusetts from
among those of Rhode Island from among those of Con-
necticut from among those of New York from
among those of New Jersey from among those of Penn-
sylvania from among those of Delaware from
among those of Maryland from among those of Virginia
from among those of North Carolina from among.
those of South Carolina & from among those of Georgia—
The Senators chosen from New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode
Island & Connecticut shall form one class—those from New York
New Jersey Pennsylvania & Delaware one class—& those from Mary-
land Virginia North Carolina South Carolina & Georgia one class.
602 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

The House of Delegates shall number these Classes one two & three
& fix the times of their service by Lot—the first class shall serve for

years—the second for years & the third for
years—as their times of service expire the House of Dele-
gates shall fill them up by elections for years & they shall

fill all vacancies that arise from death or resignation for the time
of service remaining of the members so dying or resigning.

Each Senator shall be years of age at least—shall have
been a Citizen of the United States 4 years before his election &
shall be a resident of the State he is chosen from. The Senate shall
choose it’s own Officers.

5

Each State shall prescribe the time & manner of holding elections
by the People for the house of Delegates & the House of Delegates
shall be the judges of the elections returns & Qualifications of their
members.

In each house a Majority shall constitute a Quorum to do business
—Freedom of Speech & Debate in the legislature shall not be im-
peached or Questioned in any place out of it & the Members of both
Houses shall in all cases except for Treason Felony or Breach of the
Peace be free from arrest during their attendance at Congress & in
going to & returning from it—Both Houses shall keep journals of
their Proceedings & publish them except on secret occasions & the
yeas & nays may be entered thereon at the desire of one of
the members present: Neither house without the consent of the other
shall adjourn for more than days nor to any Place but where
they are sitting

The members of each house shall not be eligible to or capable of
holding any office under the Union during the time for which they
have been respectively elected nor the members of the Senate for one
year after—

The members of each house shall be paid for their services by the
States which they represent—

Every bill which shall have passed the Legislature shall be pre-
sented to the President of the United States for his revision—if he
approves it he shall sign it—but if he does not approve it he shall
return it with his objections to the house it originated in, which
house if two thirds of the members present, notwithstanding the
President’s objections agree to pass it, shall send it to the other
house with the President’s objections, where if two thirds of the mem-
bers present also agree to pass it, the same shall become a law—&
all bills sent to the President & not returned by him within
days shall be laws unless the Legislature by their adjournment prevent
their return in which case they shall not be laws.

6

The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay
& collect Taxes Duties Imposts & excises
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 603

si a regulate Commerce with all nations & among the several
ates—

To borrow money & emit bills of Credit

To establish Post offices.

To raise armies

To build & equip Fleets

To pass laws for arming organizing & disciplining the Militia of
the United States

To subdue a rebellion in any State on application of its legislature

To coin money & regulate the Value of all coins & fix the Standard
of Weights & measures

To provide such Dock Yards & arsenals & erect such fortifications
as may be necessary for the United States & to exercise exclusive Juris-
diction therein

To appoint a Treasurer by ballot

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court

To establish Post & military Roads

To establish & provide for a national University at the Seat of the
Government of the United States

To establish uniform rules of Naturalization

To provide for the establishment of a Seat of Government for the
United States not exceeding miles square in which they
shall have exclusive jurisdiction

To make rules concerning Captures from an Enemy

To declare the law & Punishment of piracies & felonies at sea &
of counterfieting Coin & of all offences against the Laws of Nations

To call forth the aid of the Militia to execute the laws of the
Union enforce treaties suppress insurrections & repel invasions.

And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing powers into ex-
ecution—

The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power to de-
clare the Punishment of Treason which shall consist only in levying
War against the United States or any of them or in adhering to their
Enemies.—No person shall be convicted of Treason but by the testi-
mony of two witnesses.—

The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole
number of inhabitants of every description which number shall within

years after the first meeting of the Legislature & within the
term of every year after be taken in the manner to be
prescribed by the Legislature

No Tax shall be laid on articles exported from the States—nor
capitation tax but in proportion to the Census before directed.

All Laws regulating Commerce shall require the assent of two
thirds of the members present in each house—The United States
shall not grant any title of Nobility—

The Legislature of the United States shall pass no Law on the
subject of Religion, nor touching or abridging the Liberty of the
Press nor shall the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus ever be
suspended except in case of Rebellion or Invasion.

All acts made by the Legislature of the United States pursuant to
604 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

this Constitution & all Treaties made under the authority of the
United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land & all Judges
shall be bound to consider them as such in their decisions.

7

The Senate shall have the sole & exclusive power to declare War
& to make treaties & to appoint Ambassadors & other Ministers to
foreign nations & Judges of the Supreme Court.

They shall have the exclusive power to regulate the manner of
deciding all disputes & controversies now subsisting or which may
arise between the States respecting Jurisdiction or Territory.

8

The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America which shall be his stile
& his title shall be His Excellency. He shall be elected for
years & shall be reeligible.

He shall from time to time give information to the Legislature of
the state of the Union & recommend to their consideration the
measures he may think necessary—he shall take care that the laws of
the United States be duly executed: he shall commission all the officers
of the United States & except as to Ambassadors other ministers &
Judges of the Supreme Court he shall nominate & with the consent of
the Senate appoint all other officers of the United States—He shall
receive public Ministers from foreign nations & may correspond with
the Executives of the different States. He shall have power to grant
pardons & reprieves except in impeachments—He shall be Commander
in chief of the army & navy of the United States & of the Militia of
the several States & shall receive a compensation which shall not be
increased or diminished during his continuance in office. At enter-
ing on the Duties of his office he shall take an oath to faithfully
execute the duties of a President of the United States.—He shall be
removed from his office on impeachment by the house of Delegates
& Conviction in the Supreme Court of Treason bribery or Corruption
—In ease of his removal death resignation or disability the President
of the Senate shall exercise the duties of his office until another
President be chosen—& in case of the death of the President of the
Senate the Speaker of the House of Delegates shall do so.

9

The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power & it
shall be their duty to establish such Courts of Law Equity & Admiralty
as shall be necessary—The Judges of the Courts shall hold their offices
during good behaviour & receive a compensation, which shall not be
increased or diminished during their continuance in office—One of
these Courts shall be termed the Supreme Court whose jurisdiction
shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of the United States
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 605

or affecting ambassadors other public Ministers & Consuls—to the
trial of impeachments of officers of the United States—to all cases of
Admiralty & maritime jurisdiction—In cases of impeachment affecting
ambassadors & other public Ministers this Jurisdiction shall be
original & in all the other cases appellate—

All criminal offences (except in cases of impeachment) shall be
tried in the State where they shall be committed—the trials shall be
open & public & be by Jury.

10

Immediately after the first census of the people of the United
States the House of Délegates shall apportion the Senate by electing
for each State out of the citizens resident therein one Senator for
every members such State shall have in the House of Dele-
gates—Each State however shall be entitled to have at least one mem-
ber in the Senate.

11

No State shall grant letters of marque & reprisal or enter into
treaty or alliance of confederation nor grant any title of nobility nor
without the Consent of the Legislature of the United States lay any
impost on imports—nor keep troops or Ships of War in time of peace
—nor enter into compacts with other States or foreign powers or emit
bills of Credit or make any thing but Gold Silver or Copper a tender
in payment of debts nor engage in War except for self defence when
actually invaded or the danger of invasion is so great as not to admit
of a delay until the Government of the United States can be informed
thereof—& to render these prohibitions effectual the Legislature of
the United States shall have the power to revise the laws of the several
States that may be supposed to infringe the Powers exclusively dele-
gated by this Constitution to Congress & to negative & annul such
as do.

12

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges &
immunities of Citizens in the several States—Any person charged with
Crimes in any State fleeing from justice to another shall on demand
of the Executive of the State from which he fled be delivered up
& removed to the State having jurisdiction of the offence.

13

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legisla-
ture & to the records & judicial Proceedings of the Courts & magis-
trates of every State.

14

The Legislature shall have power to admit new States into the
Union on the same terms with the original States provided two thirds
of the members present in both Houses agree.

‘
606 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

15

On the application of the legislature of a State the United States
shall protect it against domestic insurrection.

16

If two thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the same
the Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for the
Purpose of amending the Constitution—or should Congress, with the
Consent of two thirds of each house, propose to the States amendments
to the same—the agreement of two thirds of the Legislatures of the
States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments parts of the
Constitution.

The Ratification of the conventions of States shall be
sufficient for organizing this Constitution.

No. 4. Mapison’s Note on THE PINCKNEY PLAN APPARENTLY
WRITTEN TO ACCOMPANY HIS DEBATES +

The length of the Document laid before the Convention, and other
circumstances having prevented the taking of a copy at the time,
that which is inserted in the debates was taken from the paper fur-
nished to the Secretary of State, and contained in the Journal of
the Convention published in 1819 which it being taken for granted
was a true copy was not then examined. The coincidence in several
instances between that and the Constitution as adopted, having at-
tracted the notice of others was at length suggested to mine. On
comparing the paper with the Constitution in its final form, or in
some of its Stages; and with the propositions, and speeches of M!
Pinckney in the Convention, it was apparent that considerable errour

 

1The above document was evidently intended by Madison as a note to his
debates of the Session of May 29, 1787. It is here printed from the original
manuscript. See also Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. V (1905),
pp. 417-419.

For an Editorial Note prepared for the above paper, and so entitled by
Madison, see Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States,
Vol. V (1905), pp. 419-432; see also the analysis of the Pinckney plan
made by Madison in 1835, in The Writings of James Madison, Hunt, Editor,
Vol. IX, pp. 558-567 n.

For further expressions of views concerning the authenticity of the Pinck-
ney draft, see letter of James Madison to Jared Sparks, June 27, 1831, in Life
and Writings of Jared Sparks, Herbert B. Adams, Editor, Vol. II, 1893, pp.
227-229, The Records of the Federal Convention, Max Farrand, Editor, Vol. III
(1911), pp. 502-503; to Jared Sparks, November 25, 1831, in The Writings of
James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol. IX, 1910, pp. 464-468, The Records of the
Federal Convention, Vol. III, pp. 514-515; to Thomas S. Grimke, January 6,
1834, in Writings of James Madison, Vol. IX, pp. 528-532, The Records of the
Federal Convention, Vol. III, pp. 531-532; to W. A. Duer, June 5, 1835, in The
Writings of James Madison, Vol. IX, pp. 553-558, The Records of the Federal
Convention, Vol. III, pp. 534-537.
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 607

had crept into the paper; occasioned possibly by the loss of the
Document laid before the convention (neither that nor the Resolu-
tions offered by M: Patterson being among the preserved papers)
and by a consequent resort for a copy to the rough draught, in
which erasures and interlineations following what passed in the Con-
vention, might be confounded in part at least with the original text,
and after a lapse of more than thirty years, confounded also in the
memory of the author.

There is in the paper a similarity in some cases, and an identity
in others, with details, expressions, and definitions, the results of
critical discussions and modifications in the Convention that could not
have been anticipated.

Examples may be noticed in Article VIII of the paper; which is
remarkable also for the circumstance, that whilst it specifies the func-
tions of the President, no provision is contained in the paper for the
election of such an officer, nor indeed for the appointment of any
Executive Magistracy ; notwithstanding the evident purpose of the
author to provide an entire plan of a Federal Government.

Again, in several instances where the paper corresponds with the
Constitution, it is at variance with the ideas of M! Pinckney, as de-
cidedly expressed in his propositions, and in his arguments, the former
in the Journal of the Convention, the latter in the report of its de-
bates: Thus in Art: VIII of the paper, provision is made for removing
the President by impeachment ; when it appears that in the convention,
July 20, he was opposed to any impeachability of the Executive Magis-
trate: In Art: III, it is required that all money-bills shall originate
in the first Branch of the Legislature; which he strenuously opposed
Aug: 8 and again Aug: 11: In Art: V members of each House are
made ineligible to, as well as incapable of holding, any office under
the Union &c. as was the case at one Stage of the Constitution ; a dis-
qualification highly disapproved and opposed by him Aug: 14.

A still more conclusive evidence of errour in the paper is seen in
Art: III, which provides, as the Constitution does, that the first Branch
of the Legislature shall be chosen by the people of the several States;
whilst it appears that on the 6!" of June, according to previous
notice, too, a few days only, after the Draft was laid before the Con-
vention, its author opposed that mode of choice, urging & proposing
in place of it, an election by the Legislatures of the several States.

The remarks here made tho’ not material in themselves, were due
to the authenticity and accuracy aimed at, in this Record of the pro-
ceedings of a Publick Body, so much an object, sometimes, of curious
research, as at all times, of profound interest.
608 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

APPENDIX V

Hamitton’s DRAFT OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES

Copy of a paper communicated to J. M. by Col. Hamilton, about the
close of the convention in Philad*, 1787, which he said delineated
the constitution which he would have wished to be proposed by
the Convention. He had stated the principles of it in the course
of the deliberations: See

The people of the United States of America do ordain & establish
this Constitution for the government of themselves and their posterity.

ARTICLE I

§ 1. The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct bodies
of men, one to be called the Assembly, the other the Senate, subject
to the negative hereinafter mentioned.

§ 2. The Executive power, with the qualifications hereinafter
specified, shall be vested in a President of the United States.

§ 3. The Supreme Judicial authority, except in the cases other-
wise provided for in this Constitution, shall be vested in a Court to
be called the SuprEME Court, to consist of not less than six nor more
than twelve Judges.

ARTICLE IT

§ 1. The Assembly shall consist of persons to be called repre-
sentatives, who shall be chosen, except in the first instance, by the
free male citizens & inhabitants of the several States comprehended
in the Union, all of whom of the age of twenty one years & upwards
shall be entitled to an equal vote.

§ 2. But the first Assembly shall be chosen in the manner pre-
scribed in the last article and shall consist of one hundred members
of whom N. Hamshire shall have five, Massachussets thirteen, Rhode
Island two, Connecticut seven, N. York nine, N. Jersey six, Pennsyl-
vania twelve, Delaware two, Maryland eight, Virginia sixteen, N.
Carolina eight, S. Carolina eight, Georgia four.

§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of
Representatives, apportioning them in each State, from time to time,
as nearly as may be to the number of persons described in the 4§
of the VII article, so as that the whole number of Representatives
shall never be less than one hundred, nor more than hundred.
There shall be a Census taken for this purpose within three years
after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within every successive
period of ten years. The term for which Representatives shall be
elected shall be determined by the Legislature but shall not exceed
three years. There shall be a general election at least once in three

 

*The text of the draft is printed from Madison’s copy accompanying his
notes of the debates. See also Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol.
III (1900), pp. 771-788.
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 609

years; and the time of service of all the members in each Assembly
shall begin, (except in filling vacancies) on the same day, and shall
always end on the same day.

§ 4. Forty members shall make a House sufficient to proceed to
business; but their number may be increased by the Legislature, yet
so as never to exceed a majority of the whole number of Repre-
sentatives. :

§ 5. The Assembly shall choose its President and other officers,
shall judge of the qualifications & elections of its own members,
punish them for improper conduct in their capacity of Representatives
not extending to life or limb; and shall exclusively possess the power
of impeachment except in the case of the President of the United
States; but no impeachment of a member of the Senate shall be by
less than two thirds of the Representatives present.

§ 6. Representatives may vote by proxy; but no Representative
present shall be proxy for more than one who is absent.*

§ 7. Bills for raising revenue, and bills for appropriating monies
for the support of fleets and armies, and for paying the salaries of
the officers of Government, shall originate in the Assembly ; but may
be altered and amended by the Senate.

§ 8. The acceptance of an office under the United States by a
Representative shall vacate his seat in the Assembly.

ARTICLE III

§ 1. The Senate shall consist of persons to be chosen, except in
the first instance, by Electors elected for that purpose by the Citizens
and inhabitants of the several States comprehended in the Union who
shall have in their own right, or in the right of their wifes, an
Estate in land for not less than life, or a term of years, whereof at
the time of giving their votes there shall be at least fourteen years
unexpired.

§ 2. But the first Senate shall be chosen in the manner prescribed
in the last Article and shall consist of forty members to be called

Senators, of whom N. Hampshire shall have Massi*

R. Island Connecticut N. York N. Jersey
Pen? Delaware Maryl! Virg*
N. Carol? 8. Carol. Geo.

§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of
Senators, for which purpose the States respectively, which have more
than one Senator, shall be divided into convenient districts to which
the Senators shall be apportioned. A State having but one Senator
shall be itself a district. On the death, resignation or removal from
office of a Senator his place shall be supplied by a new election in the
district from which he came. Upon each election there shall be
not less than six nor more than twelve electors chosen in a district.

§ 4. The number of Senators shall never be less than forty, nor
shall any State, if the same shall not hereafter be divided, ever have
less than the number allotted to it in the second section of this

*Quere, ? (to provide for distant States).
610 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

article; but the Legislature may increase the whole number of
Senators, in the same proportion to the whole number of Representa-
tives as forty is to one hundred; and such increase beyond the present
number, shall be apportioned to the respective States in a ratio to
the respective numbers of their representatives.

§ 5. If States shall be divided, or if a new arrangement of the
boundaries of two or more States shall take place, the Legislature
shall apportion the number of Senators (in elections succeeding such
division or new arrangement) to which the constituent parts were
entitled according to the change of situation, having regard to the
number of persons described in the 4. §. of the VII article.

§ 6. The Senators shall hold their places during good behaviour,
removeable only by conviction on impeachment for some crime or
misdemeanor. They shall continue to exercise their offices when
impeached untill a conviction shall take place. Sixteen Senators
attending in person shall be sufficient to make a House to transact
business; but the Legislature may increase this number, yet so as
never to exceed a majority of the whole number of Senators. The
Senators may vote by proxy, but no Senator who is present shall be
proxy for more than two who are absent.

§ 7. The Senate shall choose its President and other officers;
shall judge of the qualifications and elections of its members, and
shall punish them for improper conduct in their capacity of Senators;
but such punishment shall not extend to life or limb, nor to expulsion.
In the absence of their President they may choose a temporary Presi-
dent. The President shall only have a casting vote when the House is
equally divided.

§ 8. The Senate shall exclusively possess the power of declaring
war. No Treaty shall be made without their advice and consent;
which shall also be necessary to the appointment of all officers, except
such for which a different provision is made in this Constitution.

ARTICLE IV

§ 1. The President of the United States of America, (except in
the first instance) shall be elected in manner following—The Judges
of the Supreme Court shall within sixty days after a vacancy
shall happen, cause public notice to be given in each State, of such
vacancy, appointing therein three several days for the several purposes
following, to wit, a day for commencing the election of electors for
the purposes hereinafter specified, to be called the first electors, which
day shall not be less than forty, nor more than sixty days, after the
day of the publication of the notice in each State—another day for the
meeting of the electors not less forty nor more than ninety days from
the day for commencing their election—another day for the meeting
of electors to be chosen by the first electors, for the purpose herein-
after specified, and to be called the second Electors, which day shall
be not less than forty nor more than sixty days after the day for the
mecting of the first electors.

§ 2. After notice of a vacancy shall have been given there shall
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 611

be chosen In each State a number of persons, as the first electors in
the preceding section mentioned, equal to the whole number of the
Representatives and Senators of such States in the Legislature of the
United States; which electors shall be chosen by the Citizens of such
State having an estate of inheritance or for three lives in land, or
a clear personal estate of the value of one thousand Spanish milled
dollars of the present Standard.

§ 3. These first electors shall meet in their respective States at
the time appointed, at one place; and shall proceed to vote by ballot
for a President, who shall not be one of their own number, unless
the Legislature upon experiment should hereafter direct otherwise.
They shall cause two lists to be made of the name or names of the
person or persons voted for, which they or the major part of them
shall sign & certify. They shall then proceed each to nominate
openly in the presence of the others, two persons as for second electors,
and out of the persons who shall have the four highest numbers of
nominations, they shall afterwards by ballot by plurality of votes
choose two who shall be the second electors, to each of whom shall be
delivered one of the lists before mentioned. These second electors
shall not be any of the persons voted for as President. A copy of
the same list signed and certified in like manner shall be transmitted
by the first electors to the Seat of the Government of the United
States, under a sealed cover directed to the President of the Assembly,
which after the meeting of the Second electors shall be opened for
the inspection of the two House of the Legislature.

§ 4. The second electors shall meet precisely on the day appointed
and not on another day, at one place. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, or if there be no Chief Justice, the Judge senior in
office in such Court, or if there be no one Judge senior in office, some
other Judge of that Court, by the choice of the rest of the Judges or
of a majority of them, shall attend at the same place and shall
preside at the meeting, but shall have no vote. Two thirds of the
whole number of the Electors shall constitute a sufficient meeting
for the execution of their trust. At this meeting the lists delivered
to the respective electors shall be produced and inspected, and if there
be any person who has a majority of the whole number of votes
given by the first electors, he shall be the President of the United
States; but if there be no such person, the second electors so met
shall proceed to vote, by ballot, for one of the persons named in
the lists who shall have the three highest numbers of the votes of
the first electors; and if upon the first or any succeeding ballot on
the day of their meeting, either of those persons shall have a number
of votes equal to a majority of the whole number of second electors
chosen, he shall be the President. But if no such choice be made on
the day appointed for the meeting either by reason of the non-
attendance of the second electors, or their not agreeing, or any other
matter, the person having the greatest number of votes of the first
electors shall be the President. A .

§ 5. If it should happen that the Chief Justice or some other
Judge of the Supreme Court should not attend in due time, the
612 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

second electors shall proceed to the execution of their trust without
him.

§ 6. If the Judges should neglect to cause the notice required
by the first section of this article to be given within the time therein
limited, they may nevertheless cause it to be afterwards given; but
their neglect if wilful, is hereby declared to be an offence for which
they may be impeached, and if convicted they shall be punished as
‘in other cases of conviction on impeachment.

§ 7. The Legislature shall by permanent laws provide such
further regulations as may be necessary for the more orderly election
of the President; not contravening the provisions herein contained.

§ 8. The President before he shall enter upon the execution of
his office shall take an oath or affirmation, faithfully to execute the
same, and to the utmost of his Judgment & power to protect the
rights of the people, and preserve the Constitution inviolate. This
oath or affirmation shall be administered by the President of the
Senate for the time being in the presence of both Houses of the
Legislature.

§ 9. The Senate and the Assembly shall always convene in Ses-
sion on the day appointed for the meeting of the second electors and
shall continue sitting till the President take the oath or affirmation of
office. He shall hold his place during good behavior, removeable only
by conviction upon an impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor.

§ 10. The President at the beginning of every meeting of the
Legislature as soon as they shall be ready to proceed to business, shall
convene them together at the place where the Senate shall sit, and
shall communicate to them all such matters as may be necessary
for their information, or as may require their consideration. He may
by message during the Session communicate all other matters which
may appear to him proper. He may, whenever in his opinion the
public business shall require it, convene the Senate and Assembly,
or either of them, and may prorogue them for a time not exceeding
forty days at one prorogation; and if they should disagree about
their adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think
proper. He shall have a right to negative all bills, Resolutions or
acts of the two Houses of the Legislature about to be passed into
laws. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He
shall be the commander in chief of the army and Navy of the United
States and of the Militia within the several States, and shall have
the direction of war when commenced, but he shall not take the
actual command in the field of an army without the consent of the
Senate and Assembly. All treaties, conventions and agreements with
foreign nations shall be made by him, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. He shall have the appointment of the prin-
cipal or Chief officer of each of the departments of war, naval Affairs,
Finance and Foreign Affairs; and shall have the nomination; and by
and with the consent of the Senate, the appointment of all other
officers to be appointed under the authority of the United States,
except such for whom different provision is made by this Constitu-
tion; and provided that this shall not be construed to prevent the
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 613

Legislature, from appointing by name, in their laws, persons to
special & particular trusts created in such laws; nor shall be con-
strued to prevent principals in offices merely ministerial, from
constituting deputies.—In the recess of the Senate he may fill vacan-
cies in offices by appointments to continue in force until the end of
the next Session of the Senate, and he shall commission all officers.
He shall have power to pardon all offences except treason, for which
he may grant reprieves, untill the opinion of the Senate & Assembly
can be had; and with their concurrence may pardon the same.

§ 11. He shall receive a fixed compensation fot his services to
be paid to him at stated times, and not to be increased nor diminished
during his continuance in office.

§ 12. If he depart out of the United States without the Consent
of the Senate and Assembly, he shall thereby abdicate his office.

§ 13. He may be impeached for any crime or misdemesnor by
the two Houses of the Legislature, two thirds of each House con-
eurring, and if convicted shall be removed from office. He may be
afterwards tried & punished in the ordinary course of law. His
impeachment shall operate as a suspension from office until the deter-
mination thereof.

§ 14. The President of the Senate shall be vice President
of the United States. On the death, resignation, impeachment,
removal from office, or absence from the United States, of the Presi-
dent thereof, the Vice President shall exercise all the powers by this
Constitution vested in the President, until another shall be appointed,
or untill he shall return within the United States, if his absence was
with the consent of the Senate and Assembly.

ARTICLE V

§ 1. There shall be a chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who
together with the other Judges thereof, shall hold their offices during
good behaviour, removeable only by conviction on impeachment for
some crime or misdemeanor. Each Judge shall have a competent
salary to be paid to him at stated times, and not to be diminished
during his continuance in office.

The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all causes
in which the United States shall be a party, in all controversies be-
tween the United States, and a particular State, or between two or
more States; except such as relate to a claim of territory between the
United States, and one or more States, which shall be determined in
the mode prescribed in the VI article; in all cases affecting foreign
Ministers, Consuls and Agents; and an appellate jurisdiction both
as to law and fact in all cases which shall concern the Citizens of
foreign nations, in all questions between the Citizens of different
States, and in all others in which the fundamental rights of this
Constitution are involved, subject to such exceptions as are herein
contained and to such regulations as the Legislature shall provide. ©

The Judges of all Courts which may be constituted by the Legis-
lature shall also hold their places during good behaviour, removeable
614 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

only by conviction on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor,
and shall have competent salaries to be paid at stated times and not
to be diminished during their continuance in office; but nothing
herein contained shall be construed to prevent the Legislature from
abolishing such Courts themselves.

All crimes, except upon impeachment, shall be tried by a Jury of
twelve men; and if they shall have been committed within any State,
shall be tried within such State; and all civil causes arising under
this constitution of the like kind with those which have been hereto-
fore triable by Jury in the respective States, shall in like manner
be tried by jury; unless in special cases the Legislature shall think
proper to make different provision, to which provision the concur-
rence of two thirds of both Houses shall be necessary.

§ Impeachments of the President and and Vice President of the U.
States, members of the Senate, the Governours and Presidents of the
several States, the Principal or Chief Officers of the Departments
enumerated in the 10, §. of the 4 Article, Ambassadors and other
like Public Ministers, the Judges of the Supreme Court, Generals,
and Admirals of the Navy shall be tried by a Court to consist of
the Judges of the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice or first or
senior Judge of the superior Court of law in each State, of whom
twelve shall constitute a Court. A majority of the Judges present
may convict. All other persons shall be tried on impeachment by a
court to consist of the Judges of the Supreme Court and six Sen-
ators drawn by lot, a majority of whom may convict.

Impeachments shall clearly specify the particular offence for
which the party accused is to be tried, and judgment on conviction
upon the trial thereof shall be either removal from office singly, or
removal from office and disqualification for holding any future office
or place of trust; but no Judgment on impeachment shall prevent
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law; provided
that no Judge concerned in such conviction shall sit as Judge on the
second trial. The Legislature may remove the disabilities incurred
by conviction on impeachment.

ARTICLE VI

Controversies about the right of territory between the United
States and particular States shall be determined by a Court to be
constituted in manner following. The State or States claiming in
opposition to the United States as parties shall nominate a number
of persons, equal to double the number of the Judges of the Supreme
Court for the time being, of whom none shall be citizens by birth
of the States which are parties, nor inhabitants thereof when nom-
inated, and of whom not more than two shall have their actual
residence in one State. Out of the persons so nominated the Senate
shall elect one half, who together with the Judges of the Supreme
Court, shall form the Court. Two thirds of the whole number may
hear and determine the controversy, by plurality of voices. The
States concerned may at their option claim a decision by the Supreme
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 615

Court only. All of the members of the Court hereby instituted, shall,
prior to the hearing of the Cause take an oath impartially and accord-
ing to the best of their judgments and consciences, to hear and
determine the controversy.

ARTICLE VII

§ 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have power to
pass all laws which they shall judge necessary to the common defence
and general welfare of the Union: But no Bill, Resolution, or act of
the Senate and Assembly shall have the force of a law until it shall
have received the assent of the President, or of the vice-President
when exercising the powers of the President; and if such assent
shall not have been given within ten days, after such bill, resolution
or other act shall have been presented to him for that purpose, the
same shall not be a law. No bill, resolution or other act not assented
to shall be revived in the same Session of the Legislature. The mode
of signifying such assent shall be by signing the bill act of resolution,
and returning it so signed to either House of the Legislature.

§ 2. The enacting stile of all laws shall be ‘‘ Be it enacted by
the people of the United States of America.’’

§ 3. No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto
law; nor shall any title of nobility be granted by the United States,
or by either of them; nor shall any person holding an office or place
of trust under the United States without the permission of the Legis-
lature accept any present, emolument office or title from a foreign
prince or State. Nor shall any Religious Sect, or denomination, or
religious test for any office or place, be ever established by law.

§ 4. Taxes on lands, houses and other real estate, and capitation
taxes shall be proportioned in each State by the whole number of
free persons, except Indians not taxed, and by three fifths of all other
persons.

§ 5 The two Houses of the Legislature may by joint ballot
appoint a Treasurer of the United States. Neither House in the
Session of both Houses, without the consent of the other shall adjourn
for more than three days at a time. The Senators and Representatives
in attending, going to and coming from the Session of the respective
houses shall be privileged from arrest except for crimes and breaches
of the peace. The place of meeting shall always be at the seat of
Government which shall be fixed by law.

§ 6. The laws of the United States, and the treaties which have
been made under the articles of the confederation, and which shall be
made under this Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Land,
and shall be so construed by the Courts of the several States.

§ 7. The Legislature shall convene at least once in each year,
which unless otherwise provided for by law, shall be the first monday
in December. ;

§ 8. The members of the two Houses of the Legislature shall
receive a reasonable compensation for their services, to be paid out
of the Treasury of the United States and ascertained by law. The
616 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

law for making such provision shall be passed with the concurrence
of the first Assembly and shall extend to succeeding Assemblies; and
no succeeding assembly shall concur in an alteration of such provision,
so as to increase its own compensation; but there shall be always a
law in existence for making such provision.

ARTICLE VIII

§ 1. The Governour or President of each State shall be appointed
under the authority of the United States, and shall have a right to
negative all laws about to be passed in the State of which he shall be
Governour or President, subject to such qualifications and regulations,
as the Legislature of the United States shall prescribe. He shall in
other respects have the same powers only which the Constitution of
the State does or shall allow to its Governour or President, except as
to the appointment of Officers of the Militia.

§ 2, Each Governour or President of a State shall hold his office
until a successor be actually appointed, unless he die, or resign or be
removed from office by conviction on impeachment. There shall be
no appointment of such Governor or President in the Recess of the
Senate.

The Governours and Presidents of the several States at the time
of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue in office in the
same manner and with the same powers as if they had been appointed
pursuant to the first section of this article.

The officers of the Militia in the several States may be appointed
under the authority of the U. States; the Legislature whereof may
authorize the Governors or Presidents of States to make such
appointments with such restrictions as they shall think proper.

ARTICLE TX

§ 1. No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the
United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or here-
after be born a Citizen of the United States.

§ 2. No person shall be eligible as a Senator or Representative
unless at the time of his election he be a Citizen and inhabitant of
the State in which he is chosen; provided that he shall not be deemed
to be disqualified by a temporary absence from the State.

§ 3. No person entitled by this Constitution to elect or to be
elected President of the United States, or a Senator or Representative
in the Legislature thereof, shall be disqualified but by the conviction
of some offence for which the law shall have previously ordained the
punishment of disqualification. But the Legislature may by law
provide that persons holding offices under the United States or either
of them shall not be eligible to a place in the Assembly or Senate,

and shall be during their continuance in office suspended from sitting
in the Senate.
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 617

§ 4. No person having an office or place of trust under the
United States shall without permission of the Legislature accept any
present emolument office or title from any foreign Prince or State.

_§ 5. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to the rights
privileges and immunities of Citizens in every other State; and full
faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records
and judicial proceedings of another.

§ 6. Fugitives from justice from one State who shall be found in
another shall be delivered up on the application of the State from
which they fled.

§ 7. No new State shall be erected within the limits of another,
or by the junction of two or more States, without the concurrent
consent of the Legislatures of the United States and of the States
concerned. The Legislature of the United States may admit new
States into the Union.

§ 8. The United States are hereby declared to be bound to guar-
antee to each State a Republican form of Government, and to protect
each State as well against domestic violence as foreign invasion.

§ 9. All Treaties, Contracts and engagements of the United
States of America under the articles of Confederation and perpetual
Union, shall have equal validity under this Constitution.

§ 10. No State shall enter into a Treaty, Alliance, or contract
with another, or with a foreign power without the consent of the
United States.

§ 11. The members of the Legislature of the United States and
of each State, and all officers Executive & Judicial of the one and
of the other shall take an oath or affirmation to support the Con-
stitution of the United States.

§ 12. This Constitution may receive such alterations and amend-
ments as may be proposed by the Legislature of the United States,
with the concurrence of two thirds of the members of both Houses,
and ratified by the Legislatures of, or by Conventions of deputies
chosen by the people in, two thirds of the States composing the
Union.

ARTICLE X

This Constitution shall be submitted to the consideration of Con-
ventions in the several States, the members whereof shall be chosen
by the people of such States respectively under the direction of their
respective Legislatures. Each Convention which shall ratify the
same, shall appoint the first representatives and Senators from such
State according to the rule prescribed in the § of the
Article. The representatives so appointed shall continue in office
for one year only. Each Convention so ratifying shall give notice
thereof to the Congress of the United States, transmitting at the
same time a list of the Representatives and Senators chosen. When
the Constitution shall have been duly ratified, Congress shall give
notice of a day and place for the meeting of the Senators and Repre-
sentatives from the several States; and when these or a majority of
them shall have assembled according to such notice, they shall by
618 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

joint ballot, by plurality of votes, elect a President of the United
States; and the Constitution thus organized shall be carried into

effect.

APPENDIX VI

RANDOLPH’S PROPOSED COMPROMISE TO THE SMALL StTaTEs?
JuLy 10, 1787

1. Resolv4 that in the second branch each State have one vote in
the following cases,
1. in granting exclusive rights to Ports.
2. in subjecting vessels or seamen of the U. States to ton-
nage, duties or other impositions.
3. in regulating the navigation of Rivers.
4. in regulating the rights to be enjoyed by citizens of one
State in the other States.
5. in questions arising on the guarantee of territory.
6. in declaring war or taking measures for subduing a
Rebellion.
7. in regulating Coin.
8. in establishing & regulating the post office.
9. in the admission of new States into the Union.
10. in establishing rules for the government of the Militia.
11. in raising a regular army.
12. in the appointment of the Executive.
18. in fixing the Seat of Government.

That in all other cases the right of suffrage be proportioned accord-
ing to an equitable rule of representation.

2. that for the determination of certain important questions in
the 24 branch a greater number of votes than a mere majority be
requisite.

3. that the people of each State ought to retain the perfect right
of adopting from time to time such forms of republican Government
as to them may seem best, and of making all laws not contrary to the
articles of Union; subject to the supremacy of the General Govern-
ment in those instances only in which that supremacy shall be
expressly declared by the articles of the Union.

4. That altho’ every negative given to the law of a particular
State shall prevent its operation, any State may appeal to the national
Judiciary against a negative; and that such negative if adjudged to
. a to the powers granted by the articles of the Union, shall

e void.

5. that any individual conceiving himself injured or oppressed
by the partiality or injustice of a law of any particular State may
resort to the National Judiciary, who may adjudge such law to be
void, if found contrary to the principles of equity and justice.

 

*The text of the proposal is printed from Mr. Madison’s copy “ communi-
cated by Mr. Randolph July 10, as an accomodating proposition to small States.”
See also Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. V (1905), pp. 437-438.
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 619

APPENDIX VII

SUBSEQUENT NOTES AND REMARKS BY MADISON
TO HIS SPEECH OF AUGUST 7, 1787 ON THE
QUESTION OF SUFFRAGE

No. 1. (NOTE TO SPEECH oF J[AMES]. M[apIson]. IN CoNVENTION
or 1787, Aucus 7T# 2

As appointments for the General Government here contemplated
will, in part, be made by the State Gov!® all the Citizens in States
where the right of suffrage is not limited to the holders of property,
will have an indirect share of representation in the General Govern-
ment. But this does not satisfy the fundamental principle that men
can not be justly bound by laws in making which they have no part.
Persons & property being both essential objects of Government, the
most that either can claim, is such a structure of it, as will leave a
reasonable security for the other. And the most obvious provision,
of this double character, seems to be that of confining to the holders
of property the object deemed least secure in popular Gov‘, the
right of suffrage for one of the two Legislative branches. This is not
without example among us, as well as other constitutional modifica-
tions, favoring the influence of property in the Government. But the
U. S. have not reached the Stage of Society in which conflicting feel-
ings of the class with, and the class without property, have the opera-
tion natural to them in Countries fully peopled. The most difficult
of all political arrangements is that of so adjusting the claims of the
two classes as to give security to each, and to promote the welfare of
all. The federal principle—which enlarges the sphere of power with-
out departing from the elective bases of and controuls in various ways
the propensity in small republics to rash measures & the facility of
forming & executing them, will be found the best expedient yet tried
for solving the problem.

No. 2. Nore To THE SPEECH OF J[AMES]. M[ADISON]. ON THE
[77H] Day or [AucusT] ?

These observations [in the Speech of J. M. See debates in the
Convention of 1787. on the day of ] do not convey the
speaker’s more full & matured view of the subject, which is sub-
joined. He felt too much at the time the example of Virginia.

The right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in Republican Con-
stitutions. The regulation of it is, at the same time, a task of peculiar
delicacy. allow the right exclusively to property, and the rights of
persons may be oppressed. The feudal polity alone sufficiently proves

 

1The text is printed from the original accompanying Madison’s notes to
the debates. See also Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. V (1905),
. 439-440.
~ The text is printed from the original accompanying Madison’s notes to the
debates. See also Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. V (1905), pp.
440-449.
620 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

it. Extend it equally to all, and the rights of property or the claims
of justice may be overruled by a majority without property, or inter-
ested in measures of injustice. Of this abundant proof is afforded
by other popular Gov and is not without examples in our own, par-
ticularly in the laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

In civilized communities, property as well as personal rights is an
essential object of the laws, which encourage industry by securing
the enjoyment of its fruits: that industry from which property re-
sults, & that enjoyment which consists not merely in its immediate
use, but in its posthumous destination to objects of choice and of
kindred affection.

In a just & a free, Government, therefore, the rights both of
property & of persons ought to be effectually guarded. Will the
former be so in case of a universal & equal suffrage? ‘Will the latter
be so in case of a suffrage confined to the holders of property ?

As the holders of property have at stake all the other rights com-
mon to those without property, they may be the more restrained from
infringing, as well as the less tempted to infringe the rights of the
latter. It is nevertheless certain, that there are various ways in
which the rich may oppress the poor; in which property may oppress
liberty; and that the world is filled with examples. It is necessary
that the poor should have a defence against the danger.

On the other hand, the danger to the holders of property can not
be disguised, if they be undefended against a majority without prop-
erty. Bodies of men are not less swayed by interest than individuals,
and are less controlled by the dread of reproach and the other mo-
tives felt by individuals. Hence the liability of the rights of prop-
erty, and of the impartiality of laws affecting it, to be violated by
Legislative majorities having an interest real or supposed in the in-
justice: Hence agrarian laws, and other leveling schemes: Hence the
cancelling or evading of debts, and other violations of contracts. We
must not shut our eyes to the nature of man, nor to the light of
experience. Who would rely on a fair decision from three individuals
if two had an interest in the case opposed to the rights of the third?
Make the number as great as you please, the impartiality will not
be increased, nor any further security against injustice be obtained,
than what may result from the greater difficulty of uniting the wills
of a greater number.

In all Gov’ there is a power which is capable of oppressive exer-
cise. In Monarchies and Aristocracies oppression proceeds from a
want of sympathy & responsibility in the Govi towards the people.
In popular Governments the danger lies in an undue sympathy
among individuals composing a majority, and a want of responsi-
bility in the majority to the minority. The characteristic excellence
of the political System of the U. S. arises from a distribution and
organization of its powers, which at the same time that they secure
the dependence of the Govt on the will of the nation, provides better
guards than are found in any other popular Govt against interested
combinations of a Majority against the rights of a Minority.

The U. States have a precious advantage also in the actual dis-
tribution of property particularly the landed property; and in the
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 621

universal hope of acquiring property. This latter peculiarity is
among the happiest contrasts in their situation to that of the old
world, where no anticipated change in this respect, can generally
inspire a like sympathy with the rights of property. There may be
at present, a Majority of the Nation, who are even freeholders, or
the heirs, or aspirants to Freeholds. And the day may not be very
near when such will cease to make up a Majority of the community.
But they can not always so continue. With every admissible sub-
division of the Arable lands, a populousness not greater than that
of England or France, will reduce the holders to a Minority. And
whenever the Majority shall be without landed or other equivalent
property and without the means or hope of acquiring it, what is to
secure the rights of property agst the danger from an equality & uni-
versality of suffrage, vesting compleat power over property in hands
without a share in it: not to speak of a danger in the mean time from
a dependence of an increasing number on the wealth of a few? In
other Countries this dependence results in some from the relations
between Landlords & Tenants in others both from that source, & from
the relations between wealthy capitalists & indigent labourers. In
the U. S. the occurrence must happen from the last source; from the
connection between the great Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce
and the numbers employed by them. Nor will accumulations of
Capital for a certain time be precluded by our laws of descent & of
distribution ; such being the enterprize inspired by free Institutions,
that great wealth in the hands of individuals and associations, may
not be unfrequent. But it may be observed, that the opportunities,
may be diminished, and the permanency defeated by the equalizing
tendency of the laws.

No free Country has ever been without parties, which are a
natural offspring of Freedom. An obvious and permanent division
of every people is into the owners of the Soil, and the other in-
habitants. In a certain sense the Country may be said to belong to
the former. If each landholder has an exclusive property in his
share, the Body of Landholders have an exclusive property in the
whole. As the Soil becomes subdivided, and actually cultivated by
the owners, this view of the subject derives force from the principle
of natural law, which vests in individuals an exclusive right to the
portions of ground with which they have incorporated their labour
& improvements. Whatever may be the rights of others derived from
their birth in the Country, from their interest in the high ways &
other parcels left open for common use, as well as in the national
Edifices and monuments; from their share in the public defence, and
from their concurrent support of the Govt, it would seem unreasonable
to extend the right so far as to give them when become the majority,
a power of Legislation over the landed property without the consent
of the proprietors. Some shield ag:* the invasion of their rights
would not be out of place in a just & provident System of Gov!
The principle of such an arrangement has prevailed in all Gov
where peculiar privileges or interests held by a part were to be
secured ags' violation, and in the various associations where pecuniary
622 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

or other property forms the stake. In the former case a defensive
right has been allowed; and if the arrangement be wrong, it is not
in the defense, but in the kind of privilege to be defended. In the
latter case, the shares of suffrage, allotted to individuals have been
with acknowledged justice apportioned more or less to their respective
interests in the Common Stock.

These reflections suggest the expediency of such a modification of
Gov! as would give security to the part of the Society having most
at stake and being most exposed to danger. Three modifications
present themselves.

1. Confining the right of suffrage to freeholders, & to such as hold
an equivalent property, convertible of course into freeholds. The
objection to this regulation is obvious. It violates the vital principle
of free Govt that those who are to be bound by laws, ought to have
a voice in making them. And the violation w? be more strikingly
unjust as the lawmakers become the minority: The regulation would
be as unpropitious also as it would be unjust. It would engage the
numerical & physical force in a constant struggle agst the public
authority ; unless kept down by a standing army fatal to all parties.

2. Confining the right of suffrage for one Branch to the holders of
property, and for the other Branch to those without property. This
arrangement which w4 give a mutual defence, where there might be
mutual danger of encroachment, has an aspect of equality & fairness.
But it w? not be in fact either equal or fair, because the rights to
be defended would be unequal, being on one side those of property
as well as of persons, and on the other those of persons only. The
temptation also to encroach tho’ in a certain degree mutual, w* be
felt more strongly on one side than on the other; It wi be more likely
to beget an abuse of the Legislative Negative in extorting concessions
at the expence of property, than the reverse. The division of the
State into the two Classes, with distinct & independ! Organs of power,
and without any intermingled Agency whatever, might lead to con-
tests & antipathies not dissimilar to those between the Patricians &
Plebeians at Rome.

3. Confining the right of electing one Branch of the Legislature
to freeholders, and admitting all others to a common right with
holders of property, in electing the other Branch. This w4 give a
defensive power to holders of property, and to the class also without
property when becoming a majority of electors, without depriving
them in the mean time of a participation in the public Councils. If
the holders of property would thus have a twofold share of repre-
sentation, they wi have at the same time a twofold stake in it, the
rights of property as well as of persons the twofold object of political
institutions. And if no exact and safe equilibrium can be introduced,
it is more reasonable that a preponderating weight sh? be allowed
to the greater interest than to the lesser. Experience alone can decide
how far the practice in this case would accord with the Theory. Such
a distribution of the right of suffrage was tried in N. York and has
been abandoned whether from experienced evils or party calculations,
may possibly be a question. It is still on trial in N. Carolina, with
APPENDIX TO DEBATES 623

what practical indications is not known. It is certain that the trial,
to be satisfactory ought to be continued for no inconsiderable period ;
untill in fact the non freeholders should be the majority.

4. Should Experience or public opinion require an equal & uni-
versal suffrage for each branch of the Gov!, such as prevails generally
in the U. S., a resource favorable to the rights of landed & other
property, when its possessors become the Minority, may be found in
an enlargement of the Election Districts for one branch of the Legis-
lature and a prolongation of its period of service. Large districts
are manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respecta-
bility, and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over com-
petitors depending on the personal solicitations practicable on a con-
tracted theatre. And altho’ an ambitious candidate, of personal
distinction, might occasionally recommend himself to-popular choice
by espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely happen
to many districts at the same time. The tendency of a longer period
of service would be, to render the Body more stable in its policy, and
more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction,
till reason & justice could regain their ascendancy.

5. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inad-
missible, and universal suffrage and very short periods of elections
within contracted spheres be required for each branch of the Govt,
the security for the holders of property when the minority, can only
be derived from the ordinary influence possessed by property, & the
superior information incident to its holders; from the popular sense
of justice enlightened & enlarged by a diffusive education; and from
the difficulty of combining & effectuating unjust purposes throughout
an extensive country; a difficulty essentially distinguishing the U. S.
and even most of the individual States, from the small communities
where a mistaken interest or contagious passion, could readily unite
a majority of the whole under a factious leader, in trampling on the
rights of the Minor party.

Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the
Mass of Citizens should not be without a voice, in making the laws
which they are to obey, & in chusing the Magistrates, who are to
administer them, and if the only alternative be between an equal &
universal right of suffrage for each branch of the Gov! and a con-
finement of the entire right to a part of the Citizens, it is better that
those having the greater interest at stake namely that of property &
persons both, should be deprived of half their share in the Govi; than,
that those having the lesser interest, that of personal rights only,
should be deprived of the whole.

No. 3. Gen! Remarks ON THE CONVENTION +

For case of suffrage see Deb: Aug. 7. — ; ;
1. Its Members of the most select kind & possessing particularly
the confidence of y? Constituents
+The text is printed from the original accompanying Madison’s notes to the

debates. See also Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. V (1905), pp.
465-466.
624 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

2. do generally of mature age & much political experience.

3. Disinterestedness & candor demonstrated by mutual conces-
sions, & frequent changes of opinion

4, Few who did not change in the progress of discussions the
opinions on important points which they carried into the
Convention

5. Few who, at the close of the Convention, were not ready to
admit this change as the enlightening effect of the discus-
sions—

6. And how few, whose opinions at the close of the Convention,
have not undergone changes on some points, under the more
enlightening influence of experience.

7. Yet how much fewer still who, if now living, with the recol-
lection of the difficulties in the Convention, of overcoming
or reconciling honest differences of opinion, political biasses,
and local interests; and with due attention to the varieties
& discords of opinion, the vicisitudes of parties, and the col-
lisions real or imagined of local interests, witnessed on the
face of the Nation, would not felicitate their Country on
the happy result of the original Convention, and deprecate
the experiment of another with general power to revise its
work.

8. The restraining influence of the Consti? on the aberrations of
the States of great importance tho’ invisible. It stifles
wishes & inclinations which w? otherwise ripen into overt &
pernicious acts. The States themselves are unconscious of
the effect. Were these Constitu! and insuperable obstacles
out of the way—how many political abuses might not have
sprung up where not suspected. The Propensities in some
cases, as Mas: Kent? &¢ have not been altogether contrould,
and but for foreseen difficulties might have been follow?
by greater.
PART III

THE CONSTITUTION, ITS RATIFICATION
AND AMENDMENTS
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES?

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, pro-
vide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.

Article. I.

Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives.

Section. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several

the
States, and the Electors in each State shall have ~ Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature. :

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have at-
tained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be
an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union, ac-
cording to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by
adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those
pound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration
shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the
Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term
of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The
Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty
Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative;
and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hamp-
shire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-

 

1 This is a literal copy of the engrossed Constitution as signed. It is in
four sheets, with an additional sheet containing the resolutions of transmittal.
The note indented at the end is in the original precisely as reproduced here.

627
628 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-
York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one,
Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina
five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State,
the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to
fill such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and
other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section. 8. The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof,
for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of
the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into
three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall
be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second
Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class
at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be
chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resigna-
tion, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any
State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments
until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such
Vacancies. ;

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the
Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that
State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President
pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall
exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.

is tried,
When the President of the United States ~ the Chief Justice shall
preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence
of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict-
ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 629

Section. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and

such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they
shall by Law appoint a different Day.
Section. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall
constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may
adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the
Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such
Penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members
of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of
those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Com-
pensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out
of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, ex-
cept Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in
any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of
the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during his Continuance in Office.

Section. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with

Amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
630 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if
not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their
Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsidera-
tion two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that
House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of
both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names
of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on
the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be
returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after
it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their
Adjournment prevent its Return in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except
on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President
of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall
be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be re-
passed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a
Bill.
Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States ;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sey-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States ;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin,
and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities
and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads ;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries;
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS _ 631

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water ;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; |

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat
of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Maga-
zines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings ;—And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry-

ing into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.
Section. 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not
be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight
hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Im-
portation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Pro-
portion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to

be taken.
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any

State.
632 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall
Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or
pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement
anc Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money
shall be published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And

no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall,
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolu-
ment, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince,
or foreign State.
Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Con-
federation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit
Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender
in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any
Title of Nobility. the

No State shall, without the Consent of ~ Congress, lay any Im-
posts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net
Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States;

and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul
the

of ~. Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty
of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Article. IT.

Section. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the
Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen
for the same Term, be elected as follows

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Num-
ber of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS _ 633

entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Per-
son holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States,
shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by
Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an In-
habitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make
a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes
for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed
to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having
the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number
be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if
there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal
Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall imme-
diately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person
have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said
House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing
the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation
from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall
consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and
a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In
every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice Presi-
dent. But if there should remain two or more who have equal
Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors,
and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall
be the same throughout the United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall
be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be
eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of
the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the
Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer
634 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished dur-
ing the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not
receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United
States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the

following Oath or Affirmation:—‘‘ I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States.’’
Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the sev-
eral States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;
he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to
the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may

happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress In-
formation of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Con-
sideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient;
he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either
of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect
to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as
he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,
and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS — 635

Section. 4. The Presidert, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.

Article ITI.

Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of
the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Con-
tinuance in Office.

Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority ;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls ;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction ;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party ;—to Controversies between two or more States ;—between a
State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different
States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases be-
fore mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Juris-
diction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall

be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the
Congress may by Law have directed.
Section. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,
or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.
686 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Article. IV.

Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Man-
ner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.

Section. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,
shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the

Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or
Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom
such Service or Labour may be due.
Section. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the
Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Con-
sent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all

needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Con-
stitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State.
Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legisla-
ture, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be con-
vened) against domestic Violence.

Article. V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 637

Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior
to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of
the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of it’s equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Article. VI.

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United
States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution ;
but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States.

Article. VII.

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the
States so ratifying the Same.

The Word, “the,” being inter- done in Convention by the Unani-
lined between the seventh and mous Consent of the States present
eighth Lines of the first Page, the Seventeenth Day of September in

The Word “Thirty” being
partly written on an Erazure in the Year of our Lord one thousand

the fifteenth Line of the first seven hundred and Highty seven
Page, The Words “is tried” be- and of the Independance of the
ing interlined between the thirty United States of America the
second and thirty third Lines of myelfth In witness whereof We

the first Page and the Word .
“the” being interlined between have hereunto subscribed our Names,

the forty third and forty fourth G? WasHineton—Presid!
Lines of the second Page. and deputy from Virginia

Attest Wmiam Jackson Secretary
638 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

New Hampshire JoHN Lanapon |

NicHoLas GILMAN
NATHANIEL GORHAM
Rurus Kine
: WY Sam’ JoHNSON
Connecticut
| Roger SHERMAN
New York . . ALEXANDER HAMILTON
Wi: Livincston
Davm BREARLEY.
W# Paterson.
Jona: Dayton
( B FRANKLIN
THomas MIFFLIN
Rost Morris
Gro. CLYMER
Tuo’ FrrzSimons
JARED INGERSOLL
JAMES WILSON
| Gouv Morris
( Gro: Reap
Gunnine Beprorp jun
Delaware 2 JoHN DICKINSON
RicHarp BaAssEettT
| Jaco: Broom
See M°HENRY
Dan or S™ THo® JENIFER
Dan” CaRROLL
JOHN Biarr—
JaMES MapIson Jr.

Massachusetts

New Jersey

Pensylvania

A

 

Maryland

Virginia

Hu WmuiaMson

J. RUTLEDGE

CHarLES CoTESworTH PINCKNEY
CuarLEg PINCKNEY

Prerce Burtier.

Wiitim Few

ABR BaLDWIN

South Carolina

W Biount
North Carolina 4 Ricu”? Dopss Spaicur.
Georgia j
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 639

LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION, DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 1787, TO THE
PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS, TRANSMITTING THE CON-
STITUTION.2

In Convention, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787.2
Sir,

We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the
United States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which has ap-
peared to us the most adviseable.

The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the
power of making war, peace, and treaties, that of levying money and
regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial
authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the general gov-
ernment of the Union: But the impropriety of delegating such exten-
sive trust to one body of men is evident—Hence results the necessity
of a different organization.

It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these
states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet
provide for the interest and safety of all: Individuals entering into
society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The
magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and cir-
cumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult
to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be
surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the present
occasion this difficulty was encreased by a difference among the sev-
eral states as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular interests.

In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view,
that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American,
the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity,
felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important con-
sideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each state
in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than
might have been otherwise expected ; and thus the Constitution, which
we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual
deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situa-

tion rendered indispensible.

 

1 Reprinted from Docwmentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),

. 1, 2.
ia 2’ From Washington’s copy of the Journal of Congress (Vol. XII, p. 164), the
original not having been found among the papers of the Continental Congress

up to the time of going to press.
640 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state is
not perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless consider, that had
her interest been alone consulted, the consequences might have been
particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is liable to as
few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we hope and
believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that country so
dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most
ardent wish.

With great respect, We have the honor to be, Sir,

Your Excellency’s
most obedient and humble servants,
GEORGE WASHINGTON, President.
By unanimous Order of the Convention.
His Excellency the PresmEnt of ConaREss.

RESOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION SUB-
MITTING THE CONSTITUTION TO CONGRESS, SEPTEM-
BER 17, 1787.1

In ConvENTION Monpay SEPTEMBER 17 1787.

Present

The States of

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mt Hamilton from New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved,

That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United States
in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Conventich,
that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates,
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the Recommenda-
tion of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each
Convention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice
thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.

Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as soon as
the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution, the
United States in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Elec-
tors should be appointed by the States which shall have ratified the
same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the
President, and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under

 

oe from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 20, 21.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 641

this Constitution. That after such Publication the Electors should be
appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That the
Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the Presi-
dent, and should transmit their Votes certified, signed, sealed and
directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United
States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives
should convene at the Time and Place assigned; that the Senators
should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose of re-
ceiving, opening and counting the Votes for President ; and, that after
he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should,
without Delay, proceed to execute this Constitution.

By the Unanimous Order of the Convention

: G° WasHING@TON Presidt
W. Jackson Secretary.

RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1787,
SUBMITTING THE CONSTITUTION TO THE SEVERAL
STATES.

Fray Sepr 28. 1787 2

Congress assembled present Newhampshire Massachusetts Con-
necticut New York New Jersey Pensylvania, Delaware Virginia North
Carolina South Carolina and Georgia and from Maryland M' Ross

Congress having received the report of the Convention lately as-
sembled in Philadelphia

Resolved Unanimously that the said Report with the resolutions
and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to the several legis-
latures in Order to be submitted to a convention of Delegates chosen
in each state by the people thereof in conformity to the resolves of
the Convention made and provided in that case.

 

> Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),

» 22,
oa From the “ Rough” Journal of Congress (No. 1, Vol. 38).
642 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

CIRCULAR LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF CONGRESS
DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1787, TRANSMITTING COPY OF
THE CONSTITUTION TO THE SEVERAL GOVERNORS.*

(Circular) ?
Office of Secretary of Congress
Sept 28% 1787—
Sir
In obedience to an unanimous resolution of the United States in
Congress Assembled, a copy of which is annexed, I have the honor to
transmit to Your Excellency, the Report of the Convention lately
Assembled in Philadelphia, together with the resolutions and letter
accompanying the same; And have to request that Your Excellency
will be pleased to lay the same before the Legislature, in order that it
may be submitted to a Convention of Delegates chosen in Your State
by the people of the State in conformity to the resolves of the Con-
vention, made & provided in that case.—
with the greatest respect
I have the honor &ec—
Cc: T—
transmitting the
Report of the coateattak f

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE SEVERAL
STATES, ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF THEIR RATIFI-
CATION.

State oF DELAWARE ®

We the Deputies of the People of the Delaware State, in Conven-
tion met, having taken into our serious consideration the Feederal
Constitution proposed and agreed upon by the Deputies of the United
States in a General Convention held at the City of Philadelphia on the
seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand
seven hundred and eighty seven, Have approved, assented to, ratified,
and confirmed, and by these Presents, Do, in virtue of the Power and
Authority to us given for that purpose, for and in behalf of ourselves

 

3s Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),

; em the recorded letters of the “ Office of Secretary of Congress” (No. 18,
p. 3

A from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
Pp. 40-20.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 643

and our Constituents, fully, freely, and entirely approve of, assent to,
ratify, and confirm the said Constitution.

Done in Convention at Dover this seventh day of December in
the year aforesaid, and in the year of the Independence of the United
States of America the twelfth. In Testimony whereof we have here-
unto subscribed our Names—

Sussex County Kent County New Castle County
JoHN INGRAM NicHotas RiGELEy JaS Latimer, President
JOHN JONES RicHarp SmirH JAMES BLACK
Wriam Moore GrorGE Truitt JN° JAMES
Winuiam Hau RicHarp Bassett GuNNING BEpForp Sent
Tuomas Laws JAMES SYKES KENSEY JOHNS
Isaac Cooper ALLEN M°Lane THoMAS WATSON
Woopman Storgity Danie, Cummins sent Sotomon MaxwELu
JoHN Laws JOSEPH BARKER NicHoLas Way
THomMas Evans Epwarp WHITE Tuomas DuFF
IskaEL HoLuanp GrorcE ManLove Gunn® Beprorp Jun

To all whom these Presents shall come Greeting, I Thomas Collins

President of the Delaware State do hereby certify, that the above in-

—strument of writing is a true copy of the original ratification of the

Federal Constitution by the Convention of the Delaware State, which

“original ratification is now in my possession. In Testimony whereof I
have caused the seal of the Delaware State to be hereunto an’exed.
THo® CoLLINs

a

State oF PENNSYLVANIA !

In the Name of the People of Pennsylvania.

Be it Known unto all Men that We the Delegates of the People of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in general Convention assembled
Have assented to, and ratified, and by these presents Do in the Name
and by the authority of the same People, and for ourselves, assent to,
and ratify the foregoing Constitution for the United States of America.
Done in Convention at Philadelphia the twelfth day of December in
the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and
of the Independence of the United States of America the twelfth. In
witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our Names.

Freperick Augustus MUHLENBERG President

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. Il (1894),
pp. 44-45.
JN° ALLISON
JONATHAN ROBERTS
JOHN RICHARDS
James Morris
TimMoTHY PICKERING
Beng ELuiot—
STEPHEN BALLET

_ JOSEPH HorsFIELD
Davip DASHLER
WILLIAM WILSON
JOHN Boyp

Tuo Scorr

JouHn NEVILL
JASPER YEATES,
HeEn® SLAGLE
THomas CAMPBELL
Tuomas HarTLEY
Davin GRIER
JOHN BLACK
BENJAMIN PEpAN
JoHN ARNDT
WILLIAM GIBBONS
RicHarp DOWNING

644 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Tuomas CHEYN-
JoHn Hannum
STEPHEN CHAMBERS
RosBert COLEMAN
SEBASTIAN GRAFF
JOHN HUBLEY
SaMUEL ASHMEAD
Enocu Epwarps
Henry WYNKOOP
JOHN BARCLAY
Tuo’ YARDLEY
ABRAHAM STOUT
THomas BuLL
ANTHONY WAYNE
GeroRGE LATIMER
Bens® RusH
Himary BAKER
JAMES WILSON
Tuomas MCKEAN
W MacrPHERson
JoHN HuNN
GEORGE GRAY

Attest JAMES CAMPBELL Secretary

Stare or New Jersey!
In Convention of the State of New Jersey.

Whereas a convention of Delegates from the following States,
Vizt. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia, met at Philadelphia for the purpose of
deliberating on, and forming a constitution for the United States of
America, finished their Session on the seventeenth day of September
last and reported to Congress the form which they had agreed upon, in
the words following, Viz'— ‘

And Whereas Congress on the arent eighth day of September
last unanimously did resolve ‘‘ that the said report with the Resolu-
tions and letter accompanying the same, be transmitted to the sev-

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 46, 61-64.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 645

eral Legislatures, in order to be submitted to a convention of Dele-
gates, chosen in each State by the People thereof, in conformity
to the Resolves of the convention made and provided in that
case.

And Whereas the Legislature of this State did on the twenty ninth
day of October last Resolve in the words following, Vizt—‘‘ Resolved
unanimously, That it be recommended to such of the Inhabitants of
this State as are entitled to vote for Representatives in General As-
sembly, to meet in their respective counties on the fourth Tuesday in
November next, at the several places fixed by law for holding the an-
nual elections, to choose three suitable persons to serve as Delegates
from each County in a State Convention, for the purposes herein
before-mentioned, and that the same be conducted agreeably to the
mode, and conformably with the Rules and Regulations prescribed
for conducting such Elections.’’

Resolved unanimously, That the Persons so Elected to serve in
State Convention, do assemble and meet together on the second Tues-
day in December next, at Trenton, in the County of Hunterdon, then
and there to take into Consideration the aforesaid Constitution; and
if approved of by them, finally to Ratify the same in behalf and on
the part of this State; and make Report thereof to the United States
in Congress assembled, in Conformity with the Resolutions thereto
annexed.’’

‘‘ Resolved, That the Sheriffs of the respective Counties of this
State shall be, and they are hereby required to give as timely Notice
as may be, by Advertisements to the People of their Counties of
the time, place and Purpose of holding Elections as aforesaid.’’

And Whereas the Legislature of this State did also on the first
day of November last make and pass the following Act, Vizt—‘‘ An
Act to authorize the People of this State to meet in Convention, delib-
erate upon, agree to, and ratify the Constitution of the United States,
proposed by the late General Convention. Be it Enacted by the
Council and General Assembly of this State, and it is hereby enacted
by the Authority of the same, That it shall and may be lawful for
the People thereof, by their Delegates, to meet in Convention, to delib-
erate upon, and, if approved of by them, to ratify the Constitution for
the United States, proposed by the General Convention, held at Phila-
delphia, and every Act, matter and clause therein contained, conform-
ably to the Resolutions of the Legislature, passed the twenty ninth day
of October, Seventeen hundred and eighty seven, any Law, Usage or
Custom to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding.’’
646 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Now be it known that we the Delegates of the State of New-Jersey
chosen by the People thereof for the purposes aforesaid having ma-
turely deliberated on, and considered the aforesaid: proposed Consti-
tution, do hereby for and on the behalf of the People of the said State
of New-Jersey agree to, ratify and confirm the same and every. part
thereof.

Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of the members
present, this eighteenth day of December in the year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and eighty seven, and of the Independence
of the United States of America the twelfth—In Witness whereof we
have hereunto subscribed our names.

Note, Before the signing hereof, the following words, viz, ‘‘Cession
of’’ were interlined between the fifteenth and sixteenth lines on the
second sheet.
JOHN StEvENs President—
and Delegate from the County of Hunterdon

JOHN FELL
PETER ZABRISKIE
CoRNELIUS HENNION

{ JOHN CHETWOOD

County of Bergen.......

SAMUEL Hay
Davip CRANE

JOHN NEILSON
JOHN Beatty
BENJAMIN MANNING

{sis LAWRENCE

Middlesex ..............

SAMUEL BREESE
WILLIAM CRAWFORD

JN° WITHERSPOON
Somersett ......0.ceeeees JacoB R HarpENBERGH
FRED: FRELINGHUYSEN

THomAs REYNOLDS
Burlington ............-. GEO. ANDERSON
JosHuA M. WaLLAce
(R° Howes
Gloucester ..........000- ANDW HUNTER
BENJAMIN WHITALL
Wuitten Cripps
EDMUND WETHERBY
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 647

Jesse Hanp
County of Cape-May..... JEREMIAH ELDREDGE
MattHew WHILLDIN

Davip BREARLEY
JosHUA CoRSHON

( WILLIAM WINDES
hea da teatepascnierere cases Wiuuiam WooDHULL
JOHN JAcoB FAESCH

Dav? PorrTer
Cumberland ............ JONATHAN BOWEN
Et ELMER

RoBeRT OGDEN
SUSSEX? 4 i/o-044 deus Kean Tuom’ ANDERSON
Rost Hoops

Attest. Sam! W. Srocgxron Sec’.

State or Groraia 1

In Convention; Wednesday, January the second, one thousand seven
hundred and eighty eight:

To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting.

‘; Whereas the form of a Constitution for the Government of the

4 United States of America, was, on the seventeenth day of September,

Zz one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, agreed upon and re-

& ported to Congress by the Deputies of the said United States con-

4 vened in Philadelphia; which said Constitution is written in the

4 words following, to wit;

“4, And Whereas the United States in Congress assembled did, on
the twenty-eighth day of September, one thousand seven hundred and
eighty-seven, Resolve, unanimously, That the said Report, with the
resolutions and letter accompanying the same, be transmitted to the
several Legislatures, in order to be submitted to a Convention of
Delegates chosen in each State by the People thereof, in conformity to
the Resolves of the Convention made and provided in that case.

And Whereas the Legislature of the State of Georgia did, on the
twenty-sixth day of October, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-
seven, in pursuance of the above recited resolution of Congress,

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 65-66, 82-84.
648 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Resolve, That a convention be elected on the day of the next Gen-
eral Election, and in the same manner as representatives are elected;
and that the said Convention consist of not more than three members
from each County. And that the said Convention should meet at
Augusta, on the fourth Tuesday in December then next, and as soon
thereafter as convenient, proceed to consider the said Report, letter
and resolutions, and to adopt or reject any part or the whole thereof.

Now Know Ye, That We, the Delegates of the People of the State
of Georgia in Convention met, pursuant to the Resolutions of the
Legislature aforesaid, having taken into our serious consideration the
said Constitution, Have assented to, ratified and adopted, and by
these presents DO, in virtue of the powers and authority to Us given
by the People of the said State for that purpose, for, and in behalf
of ourselves and our Constituents, fully and entirely assent to, ratify
and adopt the said Constitution.

Done in Convention, at Augusta in the said State, on the sec-
ond day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and eighty eight, and of the Independence of the United
States the twelfth. In Witness whereof we have hereunto sub-
scribed our names.

JoHN WeRgEaT. President

and Delegate for the County of Richmond.

W: STEPHENS

JosEPH HaABERSHAM

JENKINS DAVIS

N BrowNnson

s Epw? TELFAIR

H. Topp

WILLIAM Few

JAMES M°NEIL

Gro MaTHEWS

Frior°2 SuLLIvAN

Joun Kina

JAMES. POWELL

JOHN ELLIOTT

JAMES MaxWwELL

* Gro: HaNDLEY.
CHRISTOPHER HILLARY
J: Mason.

Chatham

38970V
o ty
E

Richmond

Liberty

Areyaioeg ‘soplug OVVST

Glynn

Fe
a
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS

649

Henry OsBorNne

JAMES SEAGROVE

Camden

JacoB WEED

JARED IRWIN
JoHN RuTHERFORD

{ Washington

Rost Curistmas

THomas DaNIELL

Greene

R Mwv.eton

State or Connecticut !

In the Name of the People of the State of Connecticut.

We the Delegates of the People of s? State in general Convention
assembled, pursuant to an Act of the Legislature in October last, Have
assented to and ratified, and by these presents do assent to, ratify and
adopt the Constitution, reported by the Convention of Delegates in
Philadelphia, on the 17 day of September AD. 1787. for the United

States of America.

Done in Convention this 9 day of January AD. 1788. In witness

whereof we have hereunto set our hands.

MarttHew Griswoip President:
JERE! WADSWORTH
JESSE Root

Isaac Ler

SELAH Heart

ZEBULON PECK ju
EuisHa Pitkin

Erastus Woucotr

JOHN WATSON

JOHN TREADWELL
WILLIAM JUDD

JOsEPH MosELyY

Wait GoopricH

JOHN CURTISS

Asa Barns

STepHEN Mrx MitcHenu
JOHN CHESTER

Ourv ELLswortH

Roger NEWBERRY
Roger SHERMAN
Prerpont Epwarps
SAMUEL BEACH
Dante HouBrRook
JoHN Ho.LBrook
GipEon BucKINGHAM
Lewis Mauuet J*
JosEPH HopxKINs
JOHN WELTON
Ricw? Law

AmasA LEARNED
Sam’ HuntTINGTON
JED HUNTINGTON
Isaac HuntINGTON
Ropert Rossins,
Dan"= Foor

 

+ Reprinted from Dooumentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),

pp. 87-89.
Ext Hype

JOSEPH WOODBRIDGE
STEPHEN BILLINGS
ANDREW LEE
Wituiam Noves
JosHua RayMonp Jun"
JER? HatsEy
WHEELER Colt
CHARLES PHELPS
NATHANIEL MINoR
JONATHAN STURGES
THADDEUS Burr
ELisHA WHITTELSEY
Jos—EPH Moss WHITE
Amos Mzrap

JaBez Fircu
NEHEMIAH BEARDSLEY
JAMES POTTER
JOHN CHANDLER
JOHN BEACH

Herz Rogers

Lem’ SaNFORD
Wiu1sAm Heron
Pump Burr BRADLEY
NatHan Daucuy
JAMES DAVENPORT
JOHN DavENPoRT Jun!
W™ Sam" JoHNSON
ExisHa Minus
ELEPHT DyzER

JED4 ELDERKIN
SIMEON SMITH
HENpDRICK Dow
Sety Paine

AsA WITTER

Moszs CLEAVELAND
Sampson Howe
Wirt” DanireLson
W” WILLiaMs
JAMES BRADFORD
JosHuUA DUNLOP
DanreEL LEARNED

650 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Moses ‘CAMPBELL
BENJAMIN Dow
OuiveR WoLcoTtT
JEDEDIAH STRONG
Moses Hawiey
CHARLES BURRALL
NatHan Hare
DanreL MILES
AsaPH Hau
Isaac BuURNHAM
JOHN WILDER
Mark PRINDLE
JEDIDIAH HUBBEL
AARON AUSTIN
SAMUEL CANFIELD
DanreEL EVERITT
Hez: Fircu
JOSHUA PoRTER
Beng§ Hinman
EpapHras SHELDON
EvLEazer Curtiss
JOHN WHITTLESEY
Dan" Natu" BrinsMADE
THomas Fenn
Davip Smite
Ropert M°Cane
DanreL SHERMAN
SAMUEL ORTON
ASHER MILLER
Sam” H. Parsons
Exsen® WHITE
Hez# Gooprica
Dyar THROOP
JABEZ CHAPMAN
CorNELIus Hiaeins
HEZEKIAH BRAINERD
THEOPHILUS Morgan
Herz? Lane
WrtuiaAM Hart
Sam! Suipman
JEREMIAH WEST
SAMUEL CHAPMAN
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 651

IcHaBop WaRNER Isaac Foor
SAMUEL CARVER ABIJAH SESSIONS
JEREMIAH RIPLEY Cates Hour
Epuraim Roor SetH CROCKER

JOHN PHELPS

State of Connecticut, ss. Hartford J. anuary ninth, Anno Domini one
thousand, seven hundred and eighty eight.
The foregoing Ratification was agreed to, and signed as above, by one
hundred and twenty eight, and dissented to by forty Delegates in Con-
vention, which is a Majority of eighty eight.
Certified by Marrnzw Griswotp President.
Teste JepipIaH StRone Secretary—

j
State or MassacHusetts 1 “

In Convention of the delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts February 6 1788

The Convention have impartially discussed, & fully considered the
Constitution for the United States of America, reported to Congress
by the Convention of Delegates from the United States of America,
& submitted to us by a resolution of the General Court of the said
Commonwealth, passed the twenty fifth day of October last past, &
acknowledging with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme
Ruler of the Universe in affording the People of the United States in
the course of his providence’an opportunity deliberately & peaceably
without fraud or surprize of entering into an explicit & solemn Com-
pact with each other by assenting to & ratifying a New Constitution
in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
Domestic tranquillity,’provide for the common defence, promote the
general welfare & seciire the blessings of Liberty to themselves & their
posterity ; Do in the name & in behalf of the People of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts assent to & ratify the said Constitution for
the United States of America.

And as it is the opinion of this Convention that certain amend-
ments & alterations in the said Constitution would remove the fears
& quiet the apprehensions of many of the good people of this Com-
monwealth & more effectually guard against an undue administration
of the Federal Government, The Convention do therefore recommend

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 93-96.
652 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

that the following alterations & provisions be introduced into the
said Constitution.

First, That it be explicitly declared that all Powers not expressly
delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several
States to be by them exercised.

Secondly, That there shall be one representative to every thirty thou-
sand persons according to the Census mentioned in the Constitution
until the whole number of the Representatives amounts to Two
hundred.

Thirdly, That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them
by the fourth Section of the first article, but in cases when a State
shall neglect or refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned or
shall make regulations subversive of the rights of the People to a
free & equal representation in Congress agreeably to the Constitution.
Fourthly, That Congress do not lay direct Taxes but when the Monies
arising from the Impost & Excise are insufficient for the publick exi-
gencies nor then until Congress shall have first made a requisition
upon the States to assess levy & pay their respective proportions of
such Requisition agreeably to the Census fixed in the said Constitu-
tion; in such way & manner as the Legislature of the States shall
think best, & in such case if any State shall neglect or refuse to pay
its proportion pursuant to such requisition then Congress may assess
& levy such State’s proportion together with interest thereon at the
rate of Six per cent per annum from the time of payment prescribed
in such requisition

Fifthly, That Congress erect no Gineane of Merchants with exclu-
sive advantages of commerce.

Siathly, That no person shall be tried for any Crime by which he
may incur an infamous punishment or loss of life until he be first in-
dicted by a Grand Jury, except in such cases as may arise in the
Government & regulation of the Land & Naval forces.

Seventhly, The Supreme Judicial Federal Court shall have no juris-
diction of Causes between Citizens of different States unless the mat-
ter in dispute whether it concerns the realty or personalty be of the
value of three thousand dollars at the least. nor shall the Federal
Judicial Powers extend to any actions between Citizens of different
States where the matter in dispute whether it concerns the Realty or
personalty is not of the value of Fifteen hundred dollars at the least.
Eighthly, In civil actions between Citizens of different States every
issue of fact arising in Actions at common law shall be tried by a
Jury if the parties or either of them request it.

Ninthly, Congress shall at no time consent that any person holding
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS = 653

an office of trust or profit under the United States shall accept of a
title of Nobility or any other title or office from any King, prince or
Foreign State.

And the Convention do in the name & in behalf of the People of
this Commonwealth enjoin it upon their Representatives in Congress
at all times until the alterations & provisions aforesaid have been con-
sidered agreeably to the Fifth article of the said Constitution to exert
all their influence & use all reasonable & legal methods to obtain a
ratification of the said alterations & provisions in such manner as
is provided in the said Article.

And that the United States in Congress Assembled may have due
notice of the Assent & Ratification of the said Constitution by this
Convention it is, Resolved, that the Assent & Ratification aforesaid
be engrossed on Parchment together with the recommendation & in-
junction aforesaid & with this resolution & that His Excellency John
Hancock Esq’ President & the Hon” William Cushing Esq’ Vice
President, of this Convention transmit the same, counter-signed by
the Secretary of the Convention under their hands & seals to the
United States in Congress Assembled

JoHN Hancock President
W™ Cusuinea Vice President
Georee RicHarps Minor, Secretary.

Pursuant to the Resolution aforesaid Wr the President & Vice
President abovenamed Do hereby transmit to the United States in
Congress Assembled, the same Resolution with the above Assent and
Ratification of the Constitution aforesaid for the United States, And
the recommendation & injunction above specified.

In Witness whereof We have hereunto set our hands & Seals at
Boston in the Commonwealth aforesaid this Seventh day of February

~ Anno Domini, one thousand Seven Hundred & Eighty eight, and in
the Twelfth year of the Independence of the United States of America.
Joun Hancock President [SBAL. ]
W™ CusHine Vice President [SEAL.]

Strate or Maryuanp! ra

In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the State of Mary-
land 28 April 1788.

We the Delegates of the people of the State of Maryland having fully
considered the Constitution of the United States of America reported

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 121-122.
654 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

to Congress by the Convention of Deputies from the United States
of America held in Philadelphia on the seventeenth Day of Septem-
ber in the Year Seventeen hundred and eighty seven of which the
annexed is a Copy and submitted to us by a Resolution of the Gen-
eral Assembly of Maryland in November Session Seventeen hundred
and eighty seven do for ourselves and in the Name and on the behalf
of the People of this State assent to and ratify the said Constitution.

In Witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our Names—

Rico? Barnes
CHARLES CHILTON
N Lewis SEwAuu
W™ TingHMan.
DoNALDSON YEATES
Isaac PERKINS
WILLIAM GRANGER
JOSEPH WILKINSON
CHARLES GRAHAME
JN° CHESLEY Jun"
W. Smite

G. R. Brown

J ParNnHAM

ZEPH. TURNER.
MiIcHAEL JENEFER STONE
R. GotpsBoroueH junr
Epw? Luoyp

JOHN STEVENS
GEORGE GALE
HENRY WacgGAMAN
JOHN STEWART
JOHN GALE

NS HamMonpD
Danteu SULLIVAN
JAMES SHAW

Jos: GILPIN

H Ho.iuinesworth
James Gorpon HEron
Sam! Evans
FIevper Bow
Oss Spriea

Attest—W™ Harwoop Clk.

Gro: Puater President—
BENJAMIN Hau
GeEorGE DiagEs,
NiIcHOLAS CARROLL.
A C. Hanson

JA. TILGHMAN
JN° SENEY

JAMES HoOLLYDAY
WILLIAM HEMSLEY
PETER CHAILLE
JAMES MARTIN
WiuuiaM Morris
JOHN DoNE

Tu’ JOHNSON
Tuo. S. Lee
RicHarD Ports
ABRAHAM Faw
W” Paca

J RicHARDSON
WiiuiaM RICHARDSON
Mart: Driver
Peter EDMONDSON
JAMES MCHENRY
JOHN COULTER
THOMAS SPRIGG
JOHN STULL
Moses RAWLINGS
Henry SHryvock
THo®’ CRAMPHIN
Rico? Tuomas
Witt Deaxins Junt
Ben: EpWwarbs
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS — 655

7

In Convention of the people of the state of South Carolina by their
Representatives held in the city of charleston on Monday the twelfth
day of May and continued by divers Adjournments to friday the
twenty third day of May Anno Domini One thousand seven hundred
and eighty eight, and in the twelfth Year of the Independence of the
United States of America.

The Convention having maturely considered the constitution or
form of Government reported to Congress by the Convention of Dele-
gates from the United states of America and submitted to them by a
Resolution of the Legislature of this State passed the seventeenth and
eighteenth days of February last in order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, ensure Domestic tranquillity, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare and secure the blessings
of Liberty to the people of the said United States and their posterity
DO in the name and behalf of the people of this State hereby assent
to and ratify the said Constitution.

Done in Convention the twenty third day of May in the Year
of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and eighty eight,
and of the Independence of the United States of America the
twelfth.— Tuomas PINCKNEY

President [ SEAL. ]

State oF SoutH Carouina 1

Attest
JoHN SANDFORD Dart

Secretary [SEAL. ]

And Whereas it is essential to the preservation of the rights re-
served to the several states, and the freedom of the people under the
operations of a General government that the right of prescribing
the manner time and places of holding the Elections to the Federal
Legislature, should be for ever inseperably annexed to the sovereignty
of the several states. This convention doth declare that the same
ought to remain to all posterity a perpetual and fundamental right in
the local, exclusive of the interference of the General Government
except in cases where the Legislatures of the States, shall refuse or
neglect to perform and fulfil the same according to the tenor of the

said Constitution.

 

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 138-140.
656 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

This Convention doth also declare that no Section or paragraph
of the said Constitution warrants a Construction that the states do
not retain every power not expressly relinquished by them and vested
in the General Government of the Union.

Resolved that the general Government of the United States ought
never to impose direct taxes, but where the monies arising from the
duties, imposts and excise are insufficient for the public exigencies
nor then until Congress shall have made a requisition upon the states
to Assess levy and pay their respective proportions of such requisi-
tions And in case any state shall neglect or refuse to pay its propor-
tion pursuant to such requisition then Congress may assess and levy
such state’s proportion together with Interest thereon at the rate of
six per centum per annum from the time of payment prescribed by
such requisition—

Resolved that the third section of the Sixth Article ought to be
amended by inserting the word ‘‘ other ’’ between the words ‘‘ no ’’
and “‘ religious ”’

Resolved that it be a standing instruction to all such delegates as
may hereafter be elected to represent this State in the general Gov-
ernment to exert their utmost abilities and influence to effect an Al-
teration of the Constitution conformably to the foregoing Reso-
lutions.

Done in Convention the twenty third day of May in the year
of our Lord One thousand Seven hundred and eighty eight and
of the Independence of the United States of America the
twelfth Tuomas PINCKNEY
President [ SEAL. ]
Attest
JoHN Sanrorp Dart

Secretary [SEAL.] i

Strate or New Hampsuire.?

In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the
{sEau.] State of New-Hampshire June the Twenty first 1788.

The Convention haveing Impartially discussed and fully con-
sidered the Constitution for the United States of America, reported

 

ioe from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp- -144.

It will be observed that New Hampshire was the ninth State in order of time
to ratify the Constitution, which thereupon, in accordance with Article VII
thereof, became binding upon the nine States which ratified it—Delaware, Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, South
Carolina, and New Hampshire.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 657

to Congress by the Convention of Delegates from the United States
of America & submitted to us by a Resolution of the General Court of
said State passed the fourteenth Day of December last past and
acknowledgeing with gratefull Hearts the goodness of the Supreme
ruler of the Universe in affording the People of the United States in
the Course of his Providence an Opportunity, deliberately & peace-
ably without fraud or surprize of entering into an Explicit and
solemn compact with each other by assenting to & ratifying a new
Constitution, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Jus-
tice, Insure domestick Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
themselves & their Posterity—Do In the Name & behalf of the Peo-
ple of the State of New-Hampshire assent to & ratify the said Con-
stitution for the United States of America. And as it is the Opinion
of this Convention that certain amendments & alterations in the said
Constitution would remove the fears & quiet the apprehensions of
many of the good People of this State & more Effectually guard
against an undue Administration of the Federal Government—The
Convention do therefore recommend that the following alterations &
provisions be introduced into the said Constitution.—

First That it be Explicitly declared that all Powers not expressly &
particularly Delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to
the several States to be, by them Exercised.—

Secondly, That there shall be one Representative to every Thirty
thousand Persons according to the Census mentioned in the Consti-
tution, untill the whole number of Representatives amount to Two
hundred.—

Thirdly That Congress do not Exercise the Powers vested in them,
by the fourth Section of the first Article, but in Cases when a State
shall neglect or refuse to make the Regulations therein mentioned,
or shall make regulations Subversive of the rights of the People to a
free and equal Representation in Congress. Nor shall Congress in
any Case make regulations contrary to a free and equal Represen-
tation.—

Fourthly That Congress do not lay direct Taxes but when the money
arising from Impost, Excise and their other resources are insufficient.
for the Publick Exigencies; nor then, untill Congress shall have first
made a Requisition upon the States, to Assess, Levy, & pay their re-
spective proportions, of such requisition agreeably to the Census fixed
in the said Constitution in such way & manner as the Legislature of
the State shall think best and in such Case if any State shall neglect,
then Congress may Assess & Levy such States proportion together with
658 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

the Interest thereon at the rate of six per Cent per Annum from the
Time of payment prescribed in such requisition—

Fifthly That Congress shall erect no Company of Merchants with ex-
elusive advantages of Commerce.—

Sixthly That no Person shall be Tryed for any Crime by which he
may incur an Infamous Punishment, or loss of Life, untill he first be
indicted by a Grand Jury except in such Cases as may arise in the
Government and regulation of the Land & Naval Forces.—

Seventhly All Common Law Cases between Citizens of different
States shall be commenced in the Common Law-Courts of the re-
spective States & no appeal shall be allowed to the Federal Court
in such Cases unless the sum or value of the thing in Controversy
amount to three Thousand Dollars.—

Highthly In Civil Actions between Citizens of different States every
Issue of Fact arising in Actions at Common Law shall be Tryed by
Jury, if the Parties, or either of them request it—
Ninthly—Congress shall at no Time consent that any Person holding
an Office of Trust or profit under the United States shall accept any
Title of Nobility or any other Title or Office from any King, Prince,
or Foreign State.—

Tenth,

That no standing Army shall be Kept up in time of Peace unless
with the consent of three fourths of the Members of each branch of
Congress, nor shall Soldiers in Time of Peace be quartered upon pri-
vate Houses without the consent of the Owners.—

Eleventh

Congress shall make no Laws touching Religion, or to infringe the
rights of Conscience—
Twelfth

Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have
been in Actual Rebellion.—

And the Convention Do. In the Name & behalf of the People of this
State enjoin it upon their Representatives in Congress, at all
Times untill the alterations and provisions aforesaid. have been
Considered agreeably to the fifth Article of the said Constitu-
tion to exert all their Influence & use all reasonable & Legal
methods to obtain a ratification of the said alterations & Pro-
visions, in such manner as is provided in the said article—And
That the United States in Congress Assembled may have due
notice of the assent & Ratification of the said Constitution by
this Convention.—It is resolved that the Assent & Ratification
aforesaid be engrossed on Parchment, together with the Recom-
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 659

mendation & injunction aforesaid & with this Resolution—And
that John Sullivan Esquire President of Convention, & John
Langdon Esquire President of the State Transmit the same
Countersigned by the Secretary of Convention & the Secretary
of the Stafe under their hands & Seals to the United States in
Congress Assembled.—
Jn° Suuuivan presidt of the Convention [SEAL. ]
Joun Lanepon Presidt of State [ SEAL. ]
By order
JOHN CaLFE Sec’ of Convention
JOSEPH PEaRson Sec’ of State

STATE oF Virani !

Virginia to wit

We the Delegates of the People of Virginia duly elected in pur-
suance of a recommendation from the General Assembly and now met
in Convention having fully and freely investigated and discussed the
proceedings of the Federal Convention and being prepared as well
as the most mature deliberation hath enabled us to decide thereon Do
in the name and in behalf of the People of Virginia declare and make
known that the powers granted under the Constitution being derived
from the People of the United States may be resumed by them when-
soever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression and
that every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their
will: that therefore no right of any denomination can be cancelled
abridged restrained or modified by the Congress by the Senate or
House of Representatives acting in any Capacity by the President or
any Department or Officer of the United States except in those in-
stances in which power is given by the Constitution for those pur-
poses: & that among other essential rights the liberty of Conscience
and of the Press cannot be cancelled abridged restrained or modified
by any authority of the United States. With these impressions with
a solemn appeal to the Searcher of hearts for the purity of our inten-
tions and under the conviction that whatsoever imperfections may
exist in the Constitution ought rather to be examined in the mode
prescribed therein than to bring the Union into danger by a delay with
a hope of obtaining Amendments previous to the Ratification, We the
said Delegates in the name and in behalf of the People of Virginia do

 

‘Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 145-146, 160, 377-385.
660 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

by these presents assent to and ratify the Constitution recommended
on the seventeenth day of September one thousand seven hundred and
eighty seven by the Federal Convention for the Government of the
United States hereby announcing to all those whom it may concern
that the said Constitution is binding upon the said People oe
to an authentic Copy hereto annexed in the Words following;

Done in Convention this twenty Sixth day of June one

thousand seven hundred and eighty eight
By Order of the Convention
Epm? PENDLETON President [SEAL.] . .

Virginia towit:

Subsequent Amendments agreed to in Convention as necessary to
the proposed Constitution of Government for the United States,
recommended to the consideration of the Congress which shall first
assemble under the said Constitution to be acted upon according to
the mode prescribed in the fifth article thereof:

Videlicet ;

That there be a Declaration or Bill of Rights asserting and se-
curing from encroachment the essential and unalienable Rights of the
People in some such manner as the following;

First, That there are certain natural rights of which men, when
they form a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity,
among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and ob-
taining happiness and safety. Second. Thaf all power is naturally
vested in and consequently derived from the people; that Magistrates,
therefore, are their trustees and agents and at all times amenable to
them. Third, That Government ought to be instituted for the com-
mon benefit, protection and security of the People; and that the doc-
trine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is
absurd slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.
Fourth, That no man or set of Men are entitled to exclusive or sep-
erate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in
Consideration of public services; which not being descendible, neither
ought the offices of Magistrate, Legislator or Judge, or any other
publie office to be hereditary. Fifth, That the legislative, executive,
and judiciary powers of Government should be seperate and distinct,
and that the members of the two first may be restrained from op-
pression by feeling and participating the public burthens, they should,
at fixt periods be redueed to a private station, return into the mass of
the people; and the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elec-
tions; in which all or any part of the former members to be elegible
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 661

or ineligible, as the rules of the Constitution of Government, and the
laws shall direct. Sixth, That elections of representatives in the
legislature ought to be free and frequent, and all men having suf-
ficient evidence of permanent common interest with and attachment
to the Community ought to have the right of suffrage: and no aid,
charge, tax or fee can be set, rated, or levied, upon the people without
their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor can
they be bound by any law to which they have not in like manner as-
sented for the public good. Seventh, That all power of suspend-
ing laws or the execution of laws by any authority, without the con-
sent of the representatives of the people in the legislature is injurious
to their rights, and ought not to be exercised. Eighth, That in all
capital and criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the
cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers
and witnesses, to call for evidence and be allowed counsel in his favor,
and to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial Jury of his vicinage,
without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, (ex-
cept in the government of the land and naval forces) nor can he be
compelled to give evidence against himself. Ninth. That no free-
man ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, lib-
erties, privileges or franchises, or outlawed or exiled, or in any man-
ner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the
law of the land. Tenth. That every freeman restrained of his liberty
is entitled to a remedy to enquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to
remove the same, if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be
denied nor delayed. Eleventh. That in controversies respecting
property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by
Jury is one of the greatest Securities to the rights of the people, and
ought to remain sacred and inviolable. Twelfth. That every free-
man ought to find a certain remedy by recourse to the laws for all
injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property or char-
acter. He ought to obtain right and justice freely without sale, com-
pleatly and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that all
establishments or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive
and unjust. Thirteenth, That excessive Bail ought not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted. Fourteenth, That every freeman has a right to be secure
from all unreasonable searches and siezures of his person, his papers
and his property; all warrants, therefore, to search suspected places,
or sieze any freeman, his papers or property, without information
upon Oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of tak-
ing an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive ;
662 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

and all general Warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend
any suspected person, without specially naming or describing the
place or person, are dangerous and ought not to be granted. Fifteenth,
That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to con-
sult for the common good, or to instruct their Representatives; and
that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to the legislature
for redress of grievances. Sixteenth, That the people have a right to
freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their Sentiments;
but the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty
and ought not to be violated. Seventeenth, That the people have a
right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated Militia composed
of the body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural and
safe defence of a free State. That standing armies in time of peace
are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far
as the circumstances and protection of the Community will admit; and
that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to
and governed by the Civil power. Highteenth, That no Soldier in
time of peace ought to be quartered in any house without the consent
of the owner, and in time of war in such manner only as the laws
direct. Nineteenth, That any person religiously scrupulous of bear-
ing arms ought to be exempted upon payment of an equivalent to
employ another to bear arms in his stead. Twentieth, That religion
or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of dis-
charging it can be directed only by reason and conviction, not
by force or violence, and therefore all men have an equal,
natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion ac-
cording to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular re-
ligious sect or society ought to be favored or established by Law
in preference to others.

Amendments to the Body of the Constitution.

First, That each State in the Union shall respectively retain every
power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this Constitution dele-
gated to the Congress of the United States or to the departments of
the Federal Government. Second, That there shall be one representa-
tive for every thirty thousand, according to the Enumeration or Cen-
sus mentioned in the Constitution, until the whole number of repre-
sentatives amounts to two hundred; after which that number shall
be continued or encreased as the Congress shall direct, upon the prin-
ciples fixed by the Constitution by apportioning the Representatives
of each State to some greater number of people from time to time as
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 663

population encreases. Third, When Congress shall lay direct taxes
or excises, they shall immediately inform the Executive power of each
State of the quota of such state according to the Census herein di-
rected, which is proposed to be thereby raised; And if the Legislature
of any State shall pass a law which shall be effectual for raising such
quota at the time required by Congress, the taxes and excises laid by
Congress shall not be collected, in such State. Fourth, That the mem-
bers of the Senate and House of Representatives shall be ineligible to,
and incapable of holding, any civil office under the authority of the
United States, during the time for which they shall respectively be
elected. Fifth, That the Journals of the proceedings of the Senate and
House of Representatives shall be published at least once in every
year, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances or mili-
tary operations, as in their judgment require secrecy. Sixth, That
a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of
all public money shall be published at least once in ‘every year.
Seventh, That no commercial treaty shall be ratified without the con-
eurrence of two thirds of the whole number of the members of the
Senate; and no Treaty ceding, contracting, restraining or suspending
the territorial rights or claims of the United States, or any of them
or their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in the American
seas, or navigating the American rivers shall be but in cases of the
most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty be rati-
fied without the concurrence of three fourths of the whole number
of the members of both houses respectively. Eighth, That no naviga-
tion law, or law regulating Commerce shall be passed without the
consent of two thirds of the Members present in both houses. Ninth,
That no standing army or regular troops shall be raised or kept up
in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of the members
present in both houses. Tenth, That no soldier shall be inlisted for
any longer term than four years, except in time of war, and then for no
longer term than the continuance of the war. Eleventh, That each
State respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing,
arming and disciplining it’s own Militia, whensoever Congress shall
omit or neglect to provide for the same. That the Militia shall not
be subject to Martial law, except when in actual service in time of
war, invasion, or rebellion; and when not in the actual service of the
United States, shall be subject only to such fines, penalties and pun-
ishments as shall be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own State.
Twelfth That the exclusive power of legislation given to Congress
over the Federal Town and its adjacent District and other places pur-
chased or to be purchased by Congress of any of the States shall ex-
664 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

tend only to such regulations as respect the police and good govern-
ment thereof. Thirteenth, That no person shall be capable of being
President of the United States for more than eight years in any term
of sixteen years. Fourteenth That the judicidl power of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such courts of
Admiralty as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish
in any of the different States: The Judicial power shall extend to all
cases in Law and Equity arising under treaties made, or which shall
be made under the authority of the United States; to all cases affect-
ing ambassadors other foreign ministers and consuls; to all cases of
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the
United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or
States, and between parties claiming lands under the grants of dif-
ferent States. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign min-
isters and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the
supreme court shall have original jurisdiction; in all other cases be-
fore mentioned the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
to matters of law only.: except in cases of equity, and of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, in which the Supreme Court shall have appel-
late jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make. But the judicial
power of the United States shall extend to no case where the cause
of action shall have originated before the ratification of this Constitu-
tion; except in disputes between States about their Territory, dis-
putes between persons claiming lands under the grants of different
States, and suits for debts due to the United States. Fifteenth, That
in criminal prosecutions no man shall be restrained in the exercise of
the usual and accustomed right of challenging or excepting to the
Jury. Sixteenth, That Congress shall not alter, modify or interfere
in the times, places, or manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives or either of them, except when the legislature of
any State shall neglect, refuse or be disabled by invasion or rebellion
to prescribe the same. Seventeenth, That those clauses which declare
that Congress shall not exercise certain powers be not interpreted in
any manner whatsoever to extend the powers of Congress. But that
they may be construed either as making exceptions to the specified
powers where this shall be the case, or otherwise as inserted merely
for greater caution. Eighteenth, That the laws ascertaining the com-
pensation to Senators and Representatives for their services be post-
poned in their operation, until after the election of Representatives
immediately succeeding the passing thereof; that excepted, which
shall first be passed on the Subject. Nineteenth, That some Tribunal
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 665

other than the Senate be provided for trying impeachments of Sen-
ators. Twentieth, That the Salary of a Judge shall not be encreased
or diminished during his continuance in Office, otherwise than by
general regulations of Salary which may take place on a revision of
the subject at stated periods of not less than seven years to commence
from the time such Salaries shall be first ascertained by Congress.
And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the People of this
Commonwealth enjoin it upon their Representatives in Congress to
exert all their influence and use all reasonable and legal methods to
obtain a Ratification of the foregoing alterations and provisions in
the manner provided by the fifth article of the said Constitution; and
in all Congressional laws to be passed in the mean time, to conform
to the spirit of those Amendments as far as the said Constitution will
admit.
Done in Convention this twenty seventh day of June in the
year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty eight.
By order of the Convention.
Epo? PENDLETON President [sEau.]

State of New York!

WE the Delegates of the People of the State of New York, duly
elected and Met in Convention, having maturely considered the Con-
stitution for the United States of America, agreed to on the seven-
teenth day of September, in the year One thousand Seven hundred
and Eighty seven, by the Convention then assembled at Philadelphia
in the Common-wealth of Pennsylvania (a Copy whereof precedes
these presents) and having also seriously and deliberately considered
the present situation of the United States, Do declare and make known.

That all Power is originally vested in and consequently derived
from the People, and that Government is instituted by them for their
common Interest Protection and Security.

That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness
are essential rights which every Government ought to respect and
preserve.

That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the Peo-
ple, whensoever it shall become necessary to their Happiness; that
every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said Consti-
tution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States,
or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the People

 

? Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 190-203.
666 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

of the several States, or to their respective State Governments to
whom they may have granted. the same; And that those Clauses in
the said Constitution, which declare, that Congress shall not have or
exercise certain Powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to
any Powers not given by the said Constitution; but such Clauses are
to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified Powers, or
as inserted merely for greater Caution.

That the People have an equal, natural and unalienable right,
freely and peaceably to Exercise their Religion according to the
dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society ought
to be favoured or established by Law in preference of others.

That the People have a right to keep and bear Arms; that a well
regulated Militia, including the body of the People capable of bearing
Arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State;

That the Militia should not be subject to Martial Law except in
time of War, Rebellion or Insurrection.

That standing Armies in time of Peace are dangerous to Liberty,
and ought not to be kept up, except in Cases of necessity; and that
at all times, the Military should be under strict Subordination to the
civil Power.

That in time of Peace no Soldier ought to be quartered in any
House without the consent of the Owner, and in time of War only by
the Civil Magistrate in such manner as the Laws may direct.

That no Person ought to be taken imprisoned. or disseised of his
freehold, or be exiled or deprived of his Privileges, Franchises, Life,
Liberty or Property but by due process of Law.

That no Person ought to be put twice in Jeopardy of Life or Limb
for one and the same Offence, nor, unless in case of impeachment, be
punished more than once for the same Offence.

That every Person restrained of his Liberty is entitled to an
enquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof
if unlawful, and that such enquiry and removal ought not to be
denied or delayed, except when on account of Public Danger
the Congress shall suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus.

That excessive Bail ought not to be required; nor excessive Fines
imposed; nor Cruel or unusual Punishments inflicted.

That (except in the Government of the Land and Naval Forces,
and of the Militia when in actual Service, and in cases of Impeach-
ment) a Presentment or Indictment by a Grand Jury ought to be
observed as a necessary preliminary to the trial of all Crimes cogniz-
able by the Judiciary of the United States, and such Trial should
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS _ 667

be speedy, public, and by an impartial Jury of the County where the
Crime was committed; and that no person can be found Guilty with-
out the unanimous consent of such Jury. But in cases of Crimes not
committed within any County of any of the United States, and in
Cases of Crimes committed within any County in which a general In-
surrection may prevail, or which may be in the possession of a for-
eign Enemy, the enquiry and trial may be in such County as the Con-
gress shall by Law direct; which County in the two Cases last men-
tioned should be as near as conveniently may be to that County in
which the Crime may have been committed. And that in all Criminal
Prosecutions, the Accused ought to be informed of the cause and
nature of his Accusation, to be confronted with his accusers and the
Witnesses against him, to have the means of producing his Witnesses,
and the assistance of Council for his defense, and should not be com-
pelled to give Evidence against himself.

That the trial by Jury in the extent that it obtains by the Com-
mon Law of England is one of the greatest securities to the rights of
a free People, and ought to remain inviolate.

That every Freeman has a right to be secure from all unreason-
able searches and seizures of his person his papers or his property, and
therefore, that all Warrants to search suspected places or seize any
Freeman his papers or property, without information upon Oath or
Affirmation of sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive; and that
all general Warrants (or such in which the place or person suspected
are not particularly designated) are dangerous and ought not to be
granted.

That the People have a right peaceably to assemble together to
consult for their common good, or to instruct their Representatives ;
and that every person has a right to Petition or apply to the Legis-
lature for redress of Grievances. That the Freedom of the Press
ought not to be violated or restrained.

That there should be once in four years an Election of the Presi-
dent and Vice President, so that no Officer who may be appointed by
the Congress to act as President in case of the removal, death, resigna-
tion or inability of the President and Vice President can in any case
continue to act beyond the termination of the period for which the
last President and Vice President were elected.

That nothing contained in the said Constitution is to be construed
to prevent the Legislature of any State from passing Laws at its dis-
eretion from time to time to divide such State into convenient Dis-
tricts, and to apportion its Representatives to and amongst such
Districts.

 
668 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

That the Prohibition contained in the said Constitution against
ex post facto Laws, extends only to Laws concerning Crimes.

That all Appeals in Causes determineable according to the course
of the common Law, ought to be by Writ of Error and not otherwise.

That the Judicial Power of the United States in cases in which a
State may be a party, does not extend to criminal Prosecutions, or to
authorize any Suit by any Person against a State.

That the Judicial Power of the United States as to Controversies
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States is not to be construed to extend to any other Con-
troversies between them except those which relate to such Lands, so
claimed under Grants of different States.

That the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States,
or of any other Court to be instituted by the Congress, is not in any
case to be encreased enlarged or extended by any Fiction Collusion
or mere suggestion;—And That no Treaty is to be construed so to
operate as to alter the Constitution of any State.

Under these impressions and declaring that the rights aforesaid
cannot be abridged or violated, and that the Explanations aforesaid
are consistent with the said Constitution, And in confidence that the
Amendments which shall have been proposed to the said Constitution
will receive an early and mature Consideration: We the said Delegates,
in the Name and in the behalf of the People of the State of New York
Do by these presents Assent to and Ratify the said Constitution. In
full Confidence nevertheless that until a Convention shall be called
and convened for proposing Amendments to the said Constitution, the
Militia of this State will not be continued in Service out of this State
for a longer term than six weeks without the Consent of the Legisla-
ture thereof ;—that the Congress will not make or alter any Regula-
tion in this State respecting the times places and manner of holding
Elections for Senators or Representatives unless the Legislature of
this State shall neglect or refuse to make Laws or regulations for
the purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable of making the
same, and that in those cases such power will only be exercised until
the Legislature of this State shall make provision in the Premises ;—
that no Excise will be imposed on any Article of the Growth produc-
tion or Manufacture of the United States, or any of them within this
State, Ardent Spirits excepted; And that the Congress will not lay
direct Taxes within this State, but when the Monies arising from the
Impost and Excise shall be insufficient for the public Exigencies, nor
then, until Congress shall first have made a Requisition upon this
State to assess levy and pay the Amount of such Requisition made
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 669

agreably to the Census fixed in the said Constitution in such way and
manner as the Legislature of this State shall judge best, but that in
such case, if the State shall neglect or refuse to pay its ffroportion pur-
suant to such Requisition, then the Congress may assess and levy this
States proportion together with Interest at the Rate of six per Centum
per Annum from the time at which the same was required to be paid.
Done in Convention at Poughkeepsie in the County of Dutchess
in the State of New York the twenty sixth day of July in
the year of our Lord One thousand Seven hundred and

Eighty eight.

By Order of the Convention.

GEO: CLINTON President
Attested

JoHN M°KeEsson Seas
As B. Banoxsr f oCTetates—

Anp the Convention do in the Name and Behalf of the People of
the State of New York enjoin it upon their Representatives in the
Congress, to Exert all their Influence, and use all reasonable means to
Obtain a Ratification of the following Amendments to the said Con-
stitution in the manner prescribed therein; and in all Laws to be
passed by the Congress in the meantime to conform to the spirit of
the said Amendments as far as the Constitution will admit.

That there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand
Inhabitants, according to the enumeration or Census mentioned in
the Constitution, until the whole number of Representatives amounts
to two hundred; after which that number shall be continued or en-
creased but not diminished, as Congress shall direct, and according
to such ratio as the Congress shall fix, in conformity to the rule
prescribed for the Apportionment of Representatives and direct
Taxes.

That the Congress do not impose any Excise on any Article
(except Ardent Spirits) of the Growth Production or Manufacture
of the United States, or any of them.

That Congress do not lay direct Taxes but when the Monies
arising from the Impost and Excise shall be insufficient for the
Public Exigencies, nor then until Congress shall first have made a
Requisition upon the States to assess levy and pay their respective
proportions of such Requisition, agreably to the Census fixed in the
said Constitution, in such way and manner as the Legislatures of
the respective States shall judge best; and in such Case, if any State
shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion pursuant to such Requi-
670 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

sition, then Congress may assess and levy such States proportion,
together with Interest at the rate of six per Centum per Annum, from
the time of Payment prescribed in such Requisition.

That the Congress shall not make or alter any Regulation in any
State respecting the times places and manner of holding Elections
for Senators or Representatives, unless the Legislature of such State
shall neglect or refuse to make Laws or Regulations for the purpose,
or from any circumstance be incapable of making the same; and
then only until the Legislature of such State shall make provision
in the premises; provided that Congress may prescribe the time
for the Election of Representatives.

That no Persons except natural born Citizens, or such as were
Citizens on or before the fourth day of July one thousand seven
hundred and seventy six, or such as held Commissions under the
United States during the War, and have at any time since the
fourth day of July one thousand seven hundred and seventy six be-
come Citizens of one or other of the United States, and who shall
be Freeholders, shall be eligible to the Places of President, Vice
President, or Members of either House of the Congress of the
United States.

That the Congress do not grant Monopolies or erect any Com-
pany with exclusive Advantages of Commerce.

That no standing Army or regular Troops shall be raised or kept
up in time of peace, without the consent of two-thirds of the Senators
and Representatives present, in each House.,

That no Money be borrowed on the Credit of the United States
without the Assent of two-thirds of the Senators and Representatives
present in each House.

That the Congress shall not declare War without the concur-
rence of two-thirds of the Senators and Representatives present in
each House.

That the Privilege of the Habeas Corpus shall not by any Law
be suspended for a longer term than six Months, or until twenty
days after the Meeting of the Congress next following the passing
of the Act for such suspension.

That the Right of the Congress to exercise exclusive Legislation
over such District, not exceeding ten Miles square, as may by cession
of a particular State, and the acceptance of Congress, become the
Seat of the Government of the United States, shall not be so exercised,
as to exempt the Inhabitants of such District from paying the like
Taxes Imposts Duties and Excises, as shall be imposed on the other
Inhabitants of the State in which such District may be; and that
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 671

no person shall be privileged within the said District from Arrest
for Crimes committed, or Debts contracted out of the said District.

That the Right of exclusive Legislation with respect to such
places as may be purchased for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, Dockyards and other needful Buildings, shall not authorize
the Congress to make any Law to prevent the Laws of the States
respectively in which they may be, from extending to such places
in all civil and Criminal Matters except as to such Persons as shall
be in the Service of the United States; nor to them with respect to
Crimes committed without such Places.

That the Compensation for the Senators and Representatives be
ascertained by standing Laws; and that no alteration of the exist-
ing rate of Compensation shall operate for the Benefit of the Repre-
sentatives, until after a subsequent Election shall have been had.

That the Journals of the Congress shall be published at least
once a year, with the exception of such parts relating to Treaties
or Military operations, as in the Judgment of either House shall
require Secrecy; and that both Houses of Congress shall always keep
their Doors open during their Sessions, unless the Business may in
their Opinion requires Secrecy. That the yeas & nays shall be
entered on the Journals whenever two Members in either House
may require it.

That no Capitation Tax shall ever be laid by the Congress,

That no Person be eligible as a Senator for more than six years
in any term of twelve years; and that the Legislatures of the
respective States may recal their Senators or either of them, and
elect others in their stead, to serve the remainder of the time for
which the Senators so recalled were appointed.

That no Senator or Representative shall during the time for
which he was elected be appointed to any Office under the Authority
of the United States.

That the Authority given to the Executives of the States to fill
the vacancies of Senators be abolished, and that such vacancies be
filled by the respective Legislatures.

That the Power of Congress to pass uniform Laws concerning
Bankruptcy shall only extend to Merchants and other Traders; and
that the States respectively may pass Laws for the relief of other

Insolvent Debtors.
That no Person shall be eligible to the Office of President of the

United States a third time.
That the Executive shall not grant Pardons for Treason, unless

with the Consent of the Congress; but may at his discretion grant
672 DEDATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Reprieves to persons convicted of Treason, until their Cases, can be
laid before the Congress.

That the President or person exercising his Powers for the time
being, shall not command an Army in the Field in person, without
the previous desire of the Congress.

That all Letters Patent, Commissions, Pardons, Writs and Process
of the United States, shall run in the Name of the People of the United
States, and be tested in the Name of the President of the United
States, or the person exercising his powers for the time being, or the
first Judge of the Court out of which the same shall issue, as the
case may be.

That the Congress shall not constitute ordain or establish any
Tribunals or Inferior Courts, with any other than Appellate Juris-
diction, except such as may be necessary for the Tryal of Causes
of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction, and for the Trial of Piracies
and Felonies committed on the High Seas; and in all other Cases
to which the Judicial Power of the United States extends, and in
which the Supreme Court of the United States has not original
Jurisdiction, the Causes shall be heard tried, and determined in some
one of the State Courts, with the right of Appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, or other proper Tribunal to be established
for that purpose by the Congress, with such exceptions, and under
such regulations as the Congress shall make.

That the Court for the Trial of Impeachments shall consist of
the Senate, the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States,
and the first or Senior Judge for the time being, of the highest
Court of general and ordinary common Law Jurisdiction in each
State;—that the Congress shall by standing Laws designate the
Courts in the respective States answering this Description, and in
‘States having no Courts exactly answering this Description, shall desig-
nate some other Court, preferring such if any there be, whose
Judge or Judges may hold their places during good Behaviour—
Provided that nd more than one Judge, other than Judges of the
Supreme Court of the United States, shall come from one State—
That the Congress be authorized to pass Laws for compensating the
said Judges for such Services and for compelling their Attendance—
and that a Majority at least of the said Judges shall be requisite
to constitute the said Court—that no person impeached shall sit as a
Member thereof. That each Member shall previous to the entering
upon any Trial take an Oath or Affirmation, honestly and impartially
to hear and determine the Cause—and that a Majority of the Mem-
bers present shall be necessary to a Conviction.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS _ 673

That persons aggrieved by any Judgment, Sentence or Decree of
the Supreme Court of the United States, in any Cause in which that
Court has original Jurisdiction, with such exceptions and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make concerning the same,
shall upon application, have a Commission to be issued by the
President of the United States, to such Men learned in the Law as he
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and consent of the Sen-
ate appoint, not less than seven, authorizing such Commissioners,
or any seven or more of them, to correct the Errors in such Judg-
ment or to review such Sentence and Decree, as the case may be, and
to do Justice to the parties in the Premises.

That no Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States shall
hold any other Office under the United States, or any of them.

That the Judicial Power of the United States shall extend to
no Controversies respecting Land, unless it relate to Claims of Terri-
tory or Jurisdiction between States, or to Claims of Land between
Individuals, or between States and Individuals under the Grants of
different States.

That the Militia of any State shall not be compelled to serve
without the limits of the State for a longer term than six weeks,
without the Consent of the Legislature thereof.

That the words without the Consent of the Congress in the seventh
Clause of the ninth Section of the first Article of the Constitution, be
expunged.

That the Senators and Representatives and all Executive and
Judicial Officers of the United States shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation not to infringe or violate the Constitutions or Rights of
the respective States.

That the Legislatures of the respective States may make Pro-
vision by Law, that the Electors of the Election Districts to be by
them appointed shall chuse a Citizen of the United States who shall
thave been an Inhabitant of such District for the Term of one year
immediately preceeding the time of his Election, for one of the Repre-
sentatives of such State.

Done in Convention at Poughkeepsie in the County of Dutchess
in the State of New York the twenty sixth day of July in
the year of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and Eighty
eight.
By Order of the Convention.
Kttested— Gro: CumvTon President

JOHN M°KESSON { Seoretaries—
Ap” B. BANCKER )
674 .DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

j
Strate or Norta Carouina? ~“

In Convention, August 1, 1788.

Resolved, That a Declaration of Rights, asserting and securing
from encroachment the great Principles of civil and religious Liberty,
and the unalienable Rights of the People, together with Amend-
ments to the most ambiguous and exceptional Parts of the said
Constitution of Government, ought to be laid before Congress, and
the Convention of the States that shall or may be called for the
Purpose of Amending the said Constitution, for their consideration,
previous to the Ratification of the Constitution aforesaid, on the
part of the State of North Carolina.

Declaration of Rights

1st That there are certain natural rights of which men, when
they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity,
among which are the enjoyment of life, and liberty, with the means
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.

2d. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently
derived from the people; that magistrates therefore are their trustees,
and agents, and at all times amenable to them.

3d. That Government ought to be instituted for the common
benefit, protection and security of the people; and that the doctrine
of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd,
slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind.

4th That no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or
separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but
in consideration of public services; which not being descendible,
neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator or judge, or any
other public office to be hereditary.

Sth. That the legislative, executive and judiciary powers of gov-
ernment should be separate and distinct, and that the members of
the two first may be restrained from oppression by feeling and par-
ticipating the public burthens, they should at fixed periods be re-
duced to a private station, return into the mass of the people; and
the vacancies be supplied by certain and regular elections; in which
all or any part of the former members to be eligible or ineligible,

 

* Reprinted from Doowmentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 266-275, 276, 290.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 675

as the rules of the Constitution of Government, and the laws shall
direct.

6th. That elections of Representatives in the legislature ought
to be free and frequent, and all men having sufficient evidence of
permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community,
ought to have the right of suffrage: and no aid, charge, tax or fee can
be set, rated, or levied upon the people without their own consent,
or that of their representatives, so elected, nor can they be bound by
any law, to which they have not in like manner assented for the
public good.

7th. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of
laws by any authority without the consent of the representatives, of
the people in the Legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought
not to be exercised.

8th. That in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man hath
a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be con-
fronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence and be
allowed counsel in his favor, and to a fair and speedy trial by an
impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent
he cannot be found guilty (except in the government of the land and
naval forces) nor can he be compelled to give evidence against
himself.

9th That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized
of his freehold, liberties, privileges or franchises, or outlawed or exiled,
or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty, or prop-
erty but by the law of the land.

10th. That every freeman restrained of his liberty is entitled
to a remedy to inquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove
the same, if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be denied
nor delayed.

11th. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits be-
tween man and man, the ancient trial by jury is one of the greatest
securities to the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and
inviolable.

12th. That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by
recourse to the laws for all injuries and wrongs he may receive in his
person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice
freely without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and
without delay, and that all establishments, or regulations contraven-
ing these rights, are oppressive and unjust.

13th. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor eruel and unusual punishments inflicted,
676 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

14. That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unrea-
sonable searches, and seizures of his person, his papers, and property:
all warrants therefore to search suspected places, or seize any freeman,
his papers or property, without information upon oath (or affirma-
tion of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal
and. sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive, and all general war-
rants to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected
person without specially naming or describing the place or person,
are dangerous and ought not to be granted.

15th. That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together
to consult for the common good, or to instruct their representatives ;
and that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to the Legis-
lature for redress of grievances.

16th. That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of
writing and publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the
press is one of the greatest bulwarks of Liberty, and ought not to
be violated.

17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that
a well regulated militia composed of the body of the people, trained
to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free state. That
standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to Liberty, and
therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and pro-
tection of the community will admit; and that in all cases, the military
should be under strict subordination to, and governed by the civil
power.

18th. That no soldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any
house without the consent of the owner, and in time of war in such
manner only as the Laws direct

19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms
ought to be exempted upon payment of an equivalent to employ
another to bear arms in his stead.

10. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men have an
equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion
according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular
religious sect or society ought to be favoured or established by law
in preference to others.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS = 677

Amendments to the Constitution.

I. THAT each state in the union shall, respectively, retain every
power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this constitution dele-
gated to the Congress of the United States, or to the departments of
the Federal Government.

II. That there shall be one representative for every 30.000, ac-
cording to the enumeration or census, mentioned in the constitution,
until the whole number of representatives amounts to two hundred;
after which, that number shall be continued or increased, as Con-
gress shall direct, upon the principles fixed in the constitution, by
apportioning the representatives of each state to some greater num-
ber of people from time to time, as population encreases.

III. When Congress shall lay direct taxes or excises, they shall
immediately inform the executive power of each state, of the quota
of such State, according to the census herein directed, which is
proposed to be thereby raised: And if the legislature of any state
shall -pass a law, which shall be effectual for raising such quota at
the time required by Congress; the taxes and excises laid by Congress
shall not be collected in such state.

IV. That the members of the senate and house of representatives
shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any civil office under
the authority of the United States, during the time for which they
shall, respectively, be elected.

V. That the journals of the proceedings of the senate and house
of representatives shall be published at least once in every year, except
such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military opera-
tions, as in their judgment require secrecy.

VI. That a regular statement and account of the receipts and
expenditures of the public money shall be published at least once in
every year.

VII. That no commercial treaty shall be ratified without the
concurrence of two-thirds of the whole number of the members of
the Senate: And no treaty, ceding, contracting, or restraining or
suspending the territorial rights or claims of the United States, or
any of them or their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing
in the American seas, or navigating the American rivers shall be
made, but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity; nor
shall any such treaty be ratified without the concurrence of three-
fourths of the whole number of the members of both houses re-

spectively.
678 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

VIII. That no navigation law, or law regulating commerce shall
be passed without the consent of two-thirds of the members present
in both houses.

IX That no standing army or regular troops shall be raised or
kept up in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of the
members present in both houses.

X. That no soldier shall be enlisted for any longer term than four
years, except in time of war, and then for no longer term than the
continuance of the war

XI. That each state, respectively, shall have the power to provide
for organizing, arming and disciplining its own militia whensoever
Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same. That the
militia shall not be subject to martial law, except when in actual
service in time of war, invasion or rebellion: And when not in the
actual service of the United States, shall be subject only to such fines,
penalties, and punishments as shall be directed or inflicted by the
laws of its own state.

XII. That Congress shall not declare any state to be in rebellion
without the consent of at least two-thirds of all the members present
of both houses.

XIII. That the exclusive power of Legislation given to Congress
ever the federal town and its adjacent district, and other places, pur-
chased or to be purchased by Congress, of any of the states, shall
extend only to such regulations as respect the police and good gov-
ernment thereof.

XIV. That no person shall be capable of being president of
the United States for more than eight years in any term of sixteen
years.

XV. That the judicial power of the United States shall be vested
in one supreme court, and in such courts of admiralty ‘as Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish in any of the different
states. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and
equity, arising under treaties made, or which shall be made under
the authority of the United States; to all cases affecting ambassadors,
other foreign ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty, and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States
shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states, and
between parties claiming lands under the grants of different states.
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls,
and those in which a state shall be a party; the supreme court shall
have original jurisdiction, in all other cases before mentioned; the
supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to matters of
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS _ 679

law only, except in cases of equity, and of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, in which the supreme court shall have appelate juris-
diction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make. But the judicial power of
the United States shall extend to no case where the cause of action
shall have originated before the ratification of this constitution, except
in disputes between states about their territory; disputes between
persons claiming lands under the grants of different states, and
suits for debts due to the united states.

XVI That in criminal prosecutions, no man shall be restrained in
the exercise of the usual and accustomed right of challenging or
excepting to the jury.

XVII. That Congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the
times, places, or manner of holding elections for senators and repre-
sentatives, or either of them, except when the legislature of any
state shall neglect, refuse or be disabled, by invasion or rebellion, to
prescribe the same.

XVIII. That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not
exercise certain powers, be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever
to extend the powers of Congress; but that they be construed either
as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be
the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution.

XIX That the laws ascertaining the compensation of senators and
representatives for their services be posponed in their operation,
until after the election of representatives immediately succeeding
the passing thereof, that excepted, which shall first be passed on the
subject,

XX. That some tribunal, other than the senate, be provided for
trying impeachments of senators.

XXI That the salary of a judge shall not be increased or dimin-
ished during his continuance in office, otherwise than by general
regulations of salary which may take place, on a revision of the
subject at stated periods of not less than seven years, to com-
mence from the time such salaries shall be first ascertained by
Congress.

XXII. That Congress erect no company of merchants with ex-
clusive advantages of commerce.

XXIII. That no treaties which shall be directly opposed to the
existing laws of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be
valid until such laws shall be repealed, or made conformable to such
treaty; nor shall any treaty be valid which is contradictory to the
constitution of the United States.
680 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

XXIV. That the latter part of the fifth paragraph of the 9th
section of the first article be altered to read thus,—Nor shall vessels
bound to a particular state be obliged to enter or pay duties in any
other; nor when bound from any one of the States be obliged to clear
in another.

XXV. That Congress shall not directly or indirectly, either by
themselves or thro’ the judiciary, interfere with any one of the
states in the redemption of paper money already emitted and now in
circulation, or in liquidating and discharging the public securities of
any one of the states: But each and every state shall have the exclusive
right of making such laws and regulations for the above purposes as
they shall think proper.

XXVI That Congress shall not introduce foreign troops into the
United States without the consent of two-thirds of the members
present of both houses.

: Sam JoHNSTON President,
By order
J Hunt Secretary 3

In Convention Whereas The General Convention which met in Phila-
delphia in pursuance of a recommendation of Congress, did recom-
mend to the Citizens of the United States a Constitution or form
of Government in the following words Viz*. :

Resolved, that this Convention in behalf of the freemen, citizens
and inhabitants of the State of North Carolina, do adopt and ratify
the said Constitution and form of Government. Done in Conven.
tion this 21 day of November 1789.

Sam JOHNSTON, President of the
Convention -
J Hunt :
Secretaries
JAMES Tibetn /

State oF RuHope Isuanp.2

Fatification of the Constitution, by the Convention of the State of
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations.

We the Delegates of the People of the State of Rhode-Island,
and Providence Plantations, duly elected and met in Convention,
having maturely considered the Constitution for the United States
of America, agreed to on the seventeenth day of September, in the

 

* Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 310-320.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 681

year one thousand seven hundred and eighty sevén, by the Con-
vention then assembled at Philadelphia, in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (a Copy whereof precedes these presents) and having
also seriously and deliberately considered the present situation of
this State, do declare and make known

1% That there are certain natural rights, of which men when they form
a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among
which are the enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the means of
acquiring, possessing and protecting Property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.

2¢ That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived
from the People; that magistrates therefore are their trustees and
agents, and at all times amenable to them.

3? That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people,
whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness:—That the
rights of the States respectively, to nominate and appoint all State
Officers, and every other power, jurisdiction and right, which is not
by the said constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the
United States or to the departments of government thereof, remain
‘to the people of the several states, or their respective State Govern-
ments to whom they may have granted the same; and that those
clauses in the said constitution which declare that Congress shall
not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply, that Congress is
entitled to any powers not given by the said constitution, but such
clauses are to be construed as exceptions to certain specified powers,
or as inserted merely for greater caution.

4% That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and con-
viction, and not by force or violence, and therefore all men, have an
equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious
sect or society ought to be favoured, or established by law in prefer-
ence to others.

5th That the legislative, executive and judiciary powers of govern-
ment, should be separate and distinct, and that the members of the
two first may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and partici-
pating the publick burthens, they should at fixed periods be reduced
to a private station, return into the mass of the people, and the vacan-
cies be supplied by certain and regular elections, in which all, or
any part of the former members, to be eligible or ineligible, as the
rules of the constitution of government and the laws shall direct.
t That elections of representatives in legislature ought to be free
682 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

and frequent, and all men having sufficient evidence of permanent
common interest with, and attachment to the community ought to
have the right of suffrage, and no aid, charge tax or fee can be set,
rated or levied upon the people, without their own consent or that
of their representatives so elected, nor can they be bound by any
law, to which they have not in like manner assented for the publick
good.

7% That all power of suspending laws or the execution of laws, by
any authority without the consent of the representatives of the
people in the legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to
be exercised.

8b That in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to
demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted
with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence and be allowed
counsel in his favour, and to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial
jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot
be found guilty; (except in the government of the land and naval
forces) nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself.

9 That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or disseised of
his freehold, liberties, privileges, or franchises, or outlawed, or. exiled,
or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property
but by the trial by jury, or by the law of the land.

10 That every freeman restrained of his liberty, is intitled to a
remedy, to enquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the
same if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be denied or
delayed.

11" That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between
man and man the antient trial by jury, as hath been exercised by
us and our ancestors, from the time whereof the memory of man is
not to the contrary, is one of the greatest securities to the rights of
the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolate.

12% That every freeman ought to obtain right and justice, freely and
without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without
delay, and that all establishments or regulations contravening these
rights, are oppressive and unjust.

13" That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive ‘fines
imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.

14 That every person has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seisures of his person, his papers or his property, and
therefore that all warrants to search suspected places or seise any
person, his papers or his property, without information upon oath,
or affirmation, of sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive, and
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS _ 683

that all general warrants (or such in which the place or person
suspected, are not particularly designated,) are dangerous, and ought
not to be granted.

15" That the people have a right peaceably to assemble together,
to consult for their common good, or to instruct their representatives ;
and that every person has a right to petition or apply to the legis-
lature for redress of grievances.

16 That the people have a right to freedom of speech and of writing,
and publishing their sentiments, that freedom of the press is one of
the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated.

17" That the people have a right to keep and bear arms, that a well
regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing
arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free state; that
the militia shall not be subject to martial law except in time of war,
rebellion or insurrection; that standing armies in time of peace, are
dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up, except in cases
of necessity; and that at all times the military should be under
strict subordination to the civil power; that in time of peace no
soldier ought to be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the owner, and in time of war, only by the civil magistrate, in such
manner as the law directs.

18% That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, ought
to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent, to employ another
to bear arms in his stead.

Under these impressions, and declaring, that the rights afore-
said cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations afore-
said, are consistant with the said constitution, and in confidence that
the amendments hereafter mentioned, will receive an early and
mature consideration, and conformably to the fifth article of said
constitution, speedily become a part thereof; We the said ‘delegates,
in the name, and in the behalf of the People, of the State of Rhode-
Island and Providence-Plantations, do by these Presents, assent to,
and ratify the said Constitution. In full confidence nevertheless,
that until the amendments hereafter proposed and undermentioned
shall be agreed to and ratified, pursuant to the aforesaid fifth article,
the militia of this State will not be continued in service out of this
State for a longer term than six weeks, without the consent of the
legislature thereof; That the Congress will not make or alter any
regulation in this State, respecting the times, places and manner
of holding elections for senators or representatives, unless the legis-
lature of this state shall neglect, or refuse to make laws or regu-
lations for the purpose, or from any circumstance be incapable of
684 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

making the same; and that in those cases, such power will only
be exercised, until the legislature of this State shall make provision
in the Premises, that the Congress will not lay direct. taxes within
this State, but when the monies arising from the Impost, Tonnage
and Excise shall be insufficient for the publick exigencies, nor until
the Congress shall have first made a requisition upon this State
to assess, levy and pay the amount of such requisition, made agree-
able to the census fixed in the said constitution, in such way and
manner, as the legislature of this State shall judge best, and that
the Congress will not lay any capitation or poll tax.

Done in Convention, at Newport in the County of Newport, in
the State of Rhode-Island and Providence-Plantations, the
twenty ninth day of May, in the Year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and ninety, and in the fourteenth
year of the Independence of the United States of America.

By order of the Convention,
DaniEL OweEN President
Attest, DaniEL Uppike Sec¥

And the Convention, do in the name and behalf of the People of
the State of Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, enjoin it
upon their Senators and Representative or Representatives, which
may be elected to represent this State in Congress, to exert all their
influence, and use all reasonable means to obtain a ratification of the
following Amendments to the said Constitution, in the manner pre-
scribed therein, and in all laws to be passed by the Congress in the
mean time, to conform to the spirit of the said amendments, as far
as the constitution will admit.

Amendmenis.

1%* The United States shall guarantee to each State its sovereignty,
freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right,
which is not by this constitution expressly delegated to the United
States.

2% That Congress shall not alter, modify or interfere in the times,
places or manner of holding elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, or either of them, except when the legislature of any state
shall neglect, refuse or be disabled by invasion or rebellion to pre-
scribe the same; or in case when the the provision made by the states,
is so imperfect as that no consequent election is had, and then only
until the legislature of such state, shall make provision in the premises.
3° It is declared by the Convention, that the judicial power of the
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 685

United States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does not
extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any
person against a State; but to remove all doubts or controversies
respecting the same, that it be especially expressed as a part of the
constitution of the United States, that Congress shall not directly
or indirectly, either by themselves or through the judiciary, inter-
fere with any one of the states, in the redemption of paper money
already emitted and now in circulation, or in liquidating or dis-
charging the publick securities of any one state: that each and
every state shall have the exclusive right of making such laws
and regulations for the before mentioned purpose, as they shall
think proper.

4% That no amendments to the constitution of the United States
hereafter to be made, pursuant to the fifth article, shall take effect,
or become a part of the constitution of the United States after the
Year one thousand seven hundred and ninety three, without the
consent of eleven of the states, heretofore united under one con-
federation.

5% That the judicial powers of the United States shall extend
to no possible case, where the cause of action shall have originated
before the ratification of this constitution, except in disputes be-
tween states about their territory, disputes between persons claim-
ing lands under grants of different states, and debts due to the
United States.

6 That no person shall be compelled to do military duty, other-
wise than by voluntary enlistment, except in cases of general inva-
sion; any thing in the second paragraph of the sixth article of the
constitution, or any law made under the constitution to th: contrary
notwithstanding.

7 That no capitation or poll-tax shall ever be laid by Congress.
8th In cases of direct taxes, Congress shall first make requisitions
on the several states to assess, levy and pay their respective propor-
tions of such requisitions, in such way and manner, as the legisla-
tures of the several states shall judge best; and in case any state
shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion pursuant to such requi-
sition, then Congress may assess and levy such state’s proportion,
together with interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, from
the time prescribed in such requisition.

9 That Congress shall lay no direct taxes, without the consent of
the legislatures of three fourths of the states in the Union.

10 That the journals of the proceedings of the Senate and house of
Representatives shall be published as soon as conveniently may be,
686 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

at least once in every year, except such parts thereof relating to
treaties, alliances or military operations, as in their judgment require
secrecy.
11 That regular statements of the receipts and expenditures of all
publick monies, shall be published at least once a year.
12% As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty
and ought not to be kept up, except in cases of necessity; and as at
all times the military should be under strict subordination to the
civil power, that therefore no standing army, or regular troops shall
be raised, or kept up in time of peace.
13 That no monies be borrowed on the credit of the United States
without the assent of two thirds of the Senators and Representatives
present in each house.
14 That the Congress shall not declare war, without the concur-
rence of two thirds of the Senators and Representatives present in
each house.
15" That the words ‘‘ without the consent of Congress ” in the sev-
enth clause in the ninth section of the first article of the constitution
be expunged.
16 That no judge of the supreme court of the United States, shall
hold any other office under the United States, or any of them; nor
shall any officer appointed by Congress, or by the President and
Senate of the United States, be permitted to hold any office under
the appointment of any of the states.
17% As a traffick tending to establish or continue the slavery of any
part of the human species, is disgraceful to the cause of liberty and
humanity, that Congress shall, as. soon as may be, promote and
establish such laws and regulations, as may effectually prevent the
importation of slaves of every description into the United States.
18 That the State Legislatures have power to recall, when they
think it expedient, their federal senators, and to send others in
their stead.
19% That Congress have power to establish a uniform rule of in-
habitancy, or settlement of the poor of the different States through-
out the United States.
20% That Congress erect no company with exclusive advantages of
commerce.
21* That when two members shall move or call for the ayes and
nays on any question, they shall be entered on the journals of the
houses respectively.

Done in Convention at Newport, in the County of Newport in

the State of Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, the
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS _ 687

twenty ninth day of May, in the year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and ninety, and the fourteenth
year of the independence of the United States of America.
By order of the Convention,
DanizEL Owen President.
Attest Danie Uppres, Sect”,

RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS DATED JULY 2, 1788, SUB-
MITTING RATIFICATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION TO
A COMMITTEE.

WEDNESDAY JULY 2. 17882

Congress assembled present Newhamshire Massachusetts Rhodeisland
Connecticut New York New J ersey, Pensylvania Virginia North Car-
olina South Carolina & Georgia & from Maryland M* Contee

* * * * *

The State of Newhampshire having ratified the constitution trans-
mitted to them by the Act of the 28 of Septt last & transmitted to
Congress their ratification & the same being read, the president re-
minded Congress that this was the ninth ratification transmitted &
laid before them.
Whereupon

On Motion of M* Clarke seconded by M Edwards

Ordered That the ratifications of the constitution of the United
States transmitted to Congress be referred to a com® to examine the
same and report an Act to Congress for putting the said constitution
into operation in pursuance of the resolutions of the late federal Con-

vention.
On the question to agree to this Order the yeas & nays being re-

quired by M* Yates

Newhampshire M? Gilman ay

M’ Wingate ay [ 2Y
Massachusetts M" Dane ay

M Otis ay ay

 

2 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),

i -162.
PP cis the “ Rough” Journal of Congress (No. 1, Vol. 39.)
688 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Rhodeisland - 3 ‘excused
Connecticut [ar Edwards a ss
M” Huntington ay
New York M L’Hommedieu a d
M* Yates no
New Jersey M? Clarke ay
M Elmer ay p4Y
M Dayton ay
Pensylvania M Bingham ay fey
M Reid ay
Maryland M™ Contee ay | x
Virginia M’ Griffin ay
M Carrington ale
M’ Brown ay
South Carolina M* Huger ay
M’ Parker ay pay
M Tucker ay
Georgia M Few ay
M Baldwin a

RESOLUTION OF THE CONGRESS, OF SEPTEMBER 13, 1788,
FIXING DATE FOR ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT, AND
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION, IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK."

Saturpay Sept 13. 1788 2

Congress assembled present New hampshire Massachusetts Con-
necticut New York New Jersey Pensylvania Virginia North Caro-
lina South Carolina & Georgia & from Rhodeisland M" Arnold & from
Delaware M' Kearny.

‘Whereas the Convention assembled in Philadelphia pursuant to
the resolution of Congress of the 21% of Feb’ 1787 did on the 17%
of Sept in the same year report to the United States in Congress
assembled a constitution for the people of the United States, Where-
upon Congress on the 28 of the same Sept did resolve unanimously

 

* Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 262, 263-264.
* From the ‘ Rough” Journal of Congress (No. 1, Vol. 39.)
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS _ 689

“‘That the said report with the resolutions & letter accompanying the
same be transmitted to the several legislatures in order to be sub-
mitted to a convention of Delegates chosen in each state by the people
thereof in conformity to the resolves of the convention made and pro-
vided in that case’? And whereas the constitution so reported by the
Convention and by Congress transmitted to the several legislatures
has been ratified in the manner therein declared to be sufficient for
the establishment of the same and such ratifications duly authenticated
have been received by Congress and are filed in the Office of the Secre-
tary therefore Resolved That the first Wednesday in Jan’ next
be the day for appointing Electors in the several states, which before
the said day shall have ratified the said Constitution; that the first
Wednesday in feb’ next be the day for the electors to assemble in
their respective states and vote for a president; And that the first
Wednesday in March next be the time and the present seat of Con-
gress the place for commencing proceedings under the said con-
stitution—

RESOLUTION OF THE FIRST CONGRESS SUBMITTING
TWELVE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.*

Congress of the United States,
begun and held at the City of New-York, on
Wednesday the fourth of March, one thousand seven hun-
dred and eighty nine.

THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time
of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to
prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declara-
tory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the
ground of public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the
benificent ends of its institution:

RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both
Houses concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to the
Legislatures of the several States, as Amendments to the ‘Constitution
of the United States, all or any of which Articles, when ratified by
three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and
purposes, as part of the said Constitution ; viz*

1 Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. II (1894),
pp. 321-324.
690 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by
the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of
the original Constitution.

Article the first...After the first enumeration required by the first
Article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for
every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hun-
dred, after which, the proportion shall be so regulated by Con-
gress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives,
nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand persons,
until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred,
after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that
there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more
than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.

Article the second...No law, varying the compensation for the serv-
ices of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an
election of Representatives shall have intervened.

Article the third. ..Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.

Article the fourth...A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.

Article the fifth...No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war,
but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Article the sixth...The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Article the seventh. ..No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;

-
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 691

nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

Article the eighth...In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Article the ninth...In Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.

Article the tenth. ..Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Article the eleventh...The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people.

Article the twelfth. ..The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people.

Freperick Aucustus MUHLENBERG Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
JoHN Apams, Vice-President of the United States,
and President of the Senate.

ATTEST,

Joun Becx.ey, Clerk of the House of Representatives.
Sam. A. Ot1s Secretary of the Senate.

 

1 The proposed amendments were transmitted to the legislatures of the sev-
eral States, upon which the following action was taken:

By the State of New Hampshire—Agreed to the whole of the said amend-
ments, except the 2d article. :

By the State of New York.—Agreed t. the whole of the said amendments,

+ the 2d article.
ee the State of Pennsylvania.—Agreed to the 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th,

10th, 11th, and 12th articles of the said amendments.
By the State of Delaware.—Agreed to the whole of the said amendments, ex-

1st article.
oie State of Maryland.—Agreed to the whole of the said twelve amend-

ey the State of South Carolina.—Agreed to the whole said twelve amend-

2 the State of North Carolina.—Agreed to the whole of the said twelve

amendments.
692 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

THE FIRST TEN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE I.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

ARTICLE II.

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.

ArticieE ITI.

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, with-
out the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner
to be prescribed by law.

ARTICLE IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

ARTICLE V.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor

 

By the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations.—Agreed to the
whole of the said twelve articles.

By the State of New Jersey.—Agreed to the whole of the said amendments,
except the second article.

By the State of Virginia.—Agreed to the whole of the said twelve articles.
(Elliot’s Debates, Vol. I, pp. 339-340.)

No returns were made by the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Georgia
and Kentucky.

‘The amendments thus proposed became a part of the constitution—the first
and second of them excepted; which were not ratified by a sufficient number of

‘ne legislatures. (Journal of the Federal Convention, 1819, Supplement,
p- :
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 693

shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.

ARTICLE VI.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.

ArtIcLE VII.

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.

ArticLe VIII.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

ARTICLE IX.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

ARTICLE X.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.
694 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XI.1

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.

ARTICLE XII2

The Electors shall meet, in their respective states, and vote by
ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall
not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall
name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in dis-
tinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall
make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all
persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for
each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to
the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate ;—The President of the Senate shall, in the presence
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates
and the votes shall then be counted ;—The person having the greatest
number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number
be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no
person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President,
the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the
President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by
states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum
for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds
of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a
choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a Presi-
dent whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the
fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act
as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional dis-
ability of the President. The person having the greatest number of

 

+The eleventh amendment was declared in a message from the President to
Congress, dated the 8th of January, 1798, to have been ratified by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the States.

? The twelfth amendment, in lieu of the original third paragraph of the first
section of the second article, was declared in a proclamation of the Secretary of
State, dated the 25th of September, 1804, to have been ratified by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the States.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS = 695

votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number
be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no
person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President ; a quorum for the pur-
pose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and
a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But
no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall
be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

ARTICLE XIII.!

SEcTion 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
Appropriate legislation.

ARTICLE XIV.?

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the sev-
eral States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the mem-
bers of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of

age in such State.

4 The thirteenth amendment was declared, in a proclamation of the Secretary
of State, dated the 18th of December, 1865, to have been ratified by the legis-

f twenty-seven of the thirty-six States. :
cae fourteanth amendment was, in a proclamation of the Secretary of State,

dated the 28th of July, 1868, declared to have been ratified by the legislatures of
thirty of the thirty-six States.
696 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

Szction 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Con-
gress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who,
having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or
as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Con-
stitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, re-
move such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion,
shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insur-
rection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and
claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.

ARTICLE XV.!

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by

appropriate legislation.
ARTICLE XVI?

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the sev-
eral States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

ARTICLE XVII?

) The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Sena-
tors from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and

 

*The fifteenth amendment was declared, in a proclamation of the Secretary
of State, dated March 30, 1870, to have been ratified by the legislatures of twenty-
nine of the thirty-seven States.

* The sixteenth amendment was declared in an announcement by the Secre-
tary of State, dated February 25, 1913, to have been ratified by the legislatures
of thirty-eight of the forty-eight States.

* The seventeenth amendment was declared, in an announcement by the Secre-
tary of State, dated May 31, 1913, to have been ratified by the legislatures of
thirty-six of the forty-eight States.
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION, AMENDMENTS 697

each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the State legislatures.

) When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in
the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of
election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any
State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appoint-
ments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature
may direct.

‘) This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the elec-
tion or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part
of the Constitution.

ARTICLE XVIII.

Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within,
the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have con-
current power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have
been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of
the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years
from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

 

1 The eighteenth amendment was declared, in an announcement by the Acting
Secretary of State, dated January 29, 1919, to have been ratified by the legisla-
tures of thirty-six of the forty-eight States.
INDEX
INDEX

Account of expenditures, proposed to be
published, 566; from time to time
agreed to, 567.

Acts of States, mutual recognition of,
by States, committed, 482.

Adams, John Quincy, letters to, from
Charles Pinckney, relating to the
Pinckney plan, 598; text of plan
submitted to, by Charles Pinckney,
600.

Address to people, referred to Com-
mittee on style, 544; proposed,
567; rejected, 568.

Adjournment of legislature, provision
for, 381.

Admission of new States, 58, 573; de-
bated, 487; agreed to, 488; not to
be made out of old States, 488;
clause agreed to, 492.

Admission of States, basis for, 213.

Amendments to constitution, provision
for, postponed, 58; agreed to, 304;
method of making, agreed to, 495;
convention for, reconsidered, 539;
clause agreed to, 540, 573.

Appointments, power to make, 529;
motion that none be made to any
offices not created by law, lost,
535; to be referred to State execu-
tives, rejected, 470; to office, by
Senate, 455; may be vested in
lower officers, 572.

Armies, power to raise, debated, 423;
limit in time of peace, rejected,
424; appropriation for, to be
limited, 512; precaution against,
rejected, 565.

Baldwin, Abraham, Ga., attends con-
vention, 84; thinks nee should
represent property, 190; on com-
catites on deprasentation in Senate,
205; favors ineligibility of mem-
bers of legislature to offices, 505;
thinks members of first Congress
may create offices for themselves,
562; would ere cle
foreigners, 388; on grand commit-
tee a assumption of State debts,
423; defends slavery, 445; on com-
mittee on navigation acts, 448
moves amendment relative to im-
posts, 468; clause to Western coun-

701

try, 493; on committee on post-
poned measures, 502; approves
pues of election of President,
510.

Bankruptcies, uniform laws, 482, 503,
clause agreed to, 504.

Bassett, Richard, Del., attends, 17.

Bedford, Gunning, Del., attends, 18;
favors short term for executive,
40; favors removal of executive on
petition of State legislatures, 46;
opposes restrictions on legislature,
53; opposes power of legislature
to negative State laws, 78; in-
sists on rights of small States,
198; on committee on representa-
tion in Senate, 205; moves defini-
tion of power of legislature, 265;
would increase representation,
568; denies desire for foreign
help, 210; opposes appointment of
judges by executive, 276; opposes
provision against. army, 565.

Bill of Rights, proposed, 556; re-
jected, 557.

Bills of attainder, 449; forbidden to
States, 567.

Bills of credit, 478; forbidden to States,
567

Bills_ for revenue, to originate in
House, 512.

Bills, originating, 404; question post-
poned, 438

Bills, return of, ten days allowed,
amendment lost, 559.

Blair, John, Va., attends, 17.

Blount, William, N. C., attends, 131;
announces he will sign constitu-
tion, 581.

Brearley, David, N. J., attends, 17;
seconds resumption of clause re-
lating to rule of suffrage in
legislature, 80. moves New Hamp-
shire be urged to send delegates,

* 190; on committee on representa-
tion, « 226; opposes election of
President by joint ballot, 461;

, on committee on postponed mea-
sures, 502; reports from committee
on postponed measures, 502;*
reports from committee of eleven,
. 5063 512; would strike out clause
for amendments, 575..
702

Broome, Jacob, Del., attends, 17; favors

INDEX

term during good behavior for
executive, 271; seconds election of
executive by electors, 287; moves
ratio electors be committed, 289;
seconds motion to postpone ques-
tion of ineligibility of executive
for second term, 315; moves to
refer term and duties of President
to committee, 463; thinks executive
may correspond with States, 470;
seconds motion for nine years for
Senate, 167; favors equal vote in
Senate, 230; thinks legislature
may pay themselves, 402; seconds
motion to make wages same for
both branches of legislature, 403;
seconds motion for sole power over
treason and legislature, 433; sec-
onds power in legislature to nega-
tive State laws, 456; opposes ad-
journment, 262.

Butler, Pierce, S. C., attends, 17;

favors single executive, 49; op-
poses absolute negative of execu-
tive on laws, 53; moves power of
executive to suspend laws, 55;
opposes short term for executive,
288; favors election of executive
by electors, 321; moves to commit
clause relating to executive, 324;
approves mode of election of
President, 509; thinks election by
people to legislature impracticable,
33; asks ratio of representation
in Senate, 70; opposes power of
legislature to negative State laws,
79; favors wealth as basis of
Tepresentation, 84, 214, 2265
moves addition of quotas of con-
tribution to motion relating to
representation, 88; postponed, 88;
moves that Senate members serve
without salary, 96; rejected, 96;
moves national compensation of
legislature, 149; thinks ineligibility
of members of first branch of
legislature to offices necessary, 152;
moves to consider representation

equal in labor to freemen, 234;
insists blacks be counted in repre-
sentation, 241; seconds proposition
of three-fifths blacks in representa-
tion, 243; insists on security for
slaves, 250; opposes inferior tribu-
nalg in national judiciary, 61;
sees no necessity for inferior
judicial tribunals, 278; approves
money bills originating in Senate,
97; opposes originating money
bills in first branch of legislature,
208; favors money bills in first
branch, 362; opposes power to emit
bills of credit, 413; opposes paper
money, 414; moves rule for atten-
dance of members and secrecy, 21;
is willing to give power to national
government, 28; moves to consider
national government, 28; asks
extent of limitation of States, 34;
fears powers of States may be de-
stroyed, 36; thinks fit persons for
offices will be found, 154; moves
increase in representation from
South Carolina, 228; asks defini-
tion of power to legislate where
States are incompetent, 260; thinks
capital should be fixed in constitu-
tion, 332; opposes restriction of
franchise, 351; would bar foreign-
ers; 385; opposes war power in
Senate, 419; favors power over
militia, 425; favors taxation by
representation, 437; opposes power
over exports, 439; opposed to taxa-
tion of exports, 446; fears pay-
ment of debts to holders of certifi-
eates, 457; would preserve value
of debts, 466; on committee on
imposts, 470; moves fugitive
slaves be delivered up, 481; would
allow navigation acts by majority,
484; opposes creation of new
States within old, 488; favors
nine States for ratification, 496;
on committee on postponed mea-
sures, 502.

in Senate, 164; opposes ineligibility Canals, power to cut, proposed, 563;
of Senators to State offices, 173; rejected. 564.

proposes three years’ inhabitancy Capital. See Seat of government.

for members of legislature, 357; Capitation tax, referred to committee,
would exclude foreigners from 448; proposed to prohibit, 566.
Senate, 368; moves  postpone- Captures on land and water, rules
ment of question of eligibility of agreed to, 415.

members of legislature, 401; favors Carroll, Daniel, Md., attends, 223;

payment of legislature by States,
401; agrees treaties of peace ought
to be made with majority of Sen-
ate, 530; thinks Congress should
consent to inspection duties, 558;
insists blacks should count equally
with whites, 233; insists slaves

seconds motion for election of
electors for executive by lot, 317;
moves election of President by
the people, 461; seconds motion
that President be elected by
electors chosen by the people,
463; on committee on representa-
INDEX

tion, 226; doubts propriety of
vote per capita in Senate, 310;
thinks two-thirds should expel
members of legislature, 378; pro-
poses five years’ citizenship for
first branch of legislature, 388;
lost, 388; opposes compensation of
members of legislature by States,
402; thinks Senate ought not to
be dependent on States, 403;
favors increased representation,
579; favors protecting States
against violence, 281; opposes di-
rect taxation by representation,
317; would disqualify debtors from
office, 330; moves right of dissent
in legislature, 379; fears New York
will be seat of government, 382;
thinks money bills produce con-
troversy in legislatures, 394;
moves postponement question of
negative on laws, 407; thinks more
than a majority necessary to lay
taxes, 410; favors tax on exports,
412; opposes taxation by represen-
tation, 435; provision against ex
post facto laws necessary, 449;
moves impartial treatment of ports,
469; on committee on imposts,
470; thinks new States may be
created in old, 489; moves to pre-
serve national right to Western
country, 492; moves to postpone
ratification clause, 495; thinks
unanimous vote necessary to ratify
constitution, 496; insists vessel
must clear from its own State,
501; on committee on postponed
measures, 502; proposes address
to people, 567; moves power of
State to lay duties on tonnage,
569.

Census, proposed as basis for repre-
sentation, 231; periodical discussed,
231; periodical agreed to, 240,
260; approved, 238; six years
agreed to, 245; 20 years rejected,
245; 10 years agreed to, 245; first,
434.

Clymer, George, Penn., attends, 18; on
grand committee on assumption
of State debts, 423; proposes taxa-
tion on exports for revenue, 441;
on committee on navigation acts,
448; objects to use of word
“ slaves,” 468; opposes encourage-
ment of western country, 480;
favors navigation acts, 484; favors
ratification by majority, 498; ob-
jects to Senate’s power, 520;
thinks Congress need not approve
constitution, 543.

Coining, power of, agreed to, 412.

Commerce, regulation of, agreed to,

703

412; discussed, 501; clearance of
vessels agreed to, 502.

Commissions, 428.

Committee of detail, resolutions refer-
red to, 332; report, 337; report
debated, 346.

Committeé of whole, meets, 27.

Committee on style, report, 545; re-
pe compared with plan agreed
0,

Congress, See also Legislature; con-
tinuing of, agreed to, 58; continu-
aa of, debated, 280; disagreed to,

Constitution, provision for amending,
discussed, 89; postponed, 90;
members of State governments to
give oath to observe, considered,
90; agreed to, 91; to be referred
to people for ratification, agreed to,
91; committee, 311; committee on
detail, 317; referred to committee
on detail, 332; to be supreme Jaw,
agreed to, 455; to be laid before
Congress, 499; when to go into
effect, 501; mode of ratification,
clause agreed to, 543; as reported
by committee on style, 545; pro-
vision for ratification, 560; en-
grossed, read, 577; signing by
States, agreed to, 582; signing of,
583; copy of paper sent to James
Madison by Alexander Hamilton,
embodying the latter’s principles
for a, 608.

Contracts, impairment of, forbidden
to States, 567; proposed to be
forbidden to Congress, 567.

Controversies betwean States, provi-
sion for, considered, 460.

Convention, meets, 17; rules, 18;
goes into committee of whole, 27;
longer sessions agreed to, 423;
hours of meeting, 449; hours of
meeting changed, 465; expenses
of, 511, 513; second, rejected, 577;
adjourns, 583.

Copyright, power of, 420.

Copyrights and patents, 512; clause
agreed to, 513.

Council of State, proposed, 428.

Council, privy, for President, provided,
448.

Counterfeiting, punishment for, 416.
Credit bills, power objected to, 413.
Creditors, regulation, 421.

Davie, William Richardson, N. C., at-
tends, 17; moves impeachability
of executive, 48; favors impeach-
ability of executive, 290; proposes
eight years’ term for executive,
314; favors seven years’ term for
executive and ineligibility, 325;
704 INDEX

thinks Senate too large, 195; on
committee on representation in
Senate, 205; favors wealth and
members as basis of representa-
tion, 215; insists on representation
for blacks, 242.

Dayton, Jonathan, N. J., attends, 139/
opposes election of President by
ballot, 461; moves vote for Presi-
dent by States, 462; opposes com-
pensation of Senators by States,

.172; thinks voting in legislature
should be by States,“176; opposes
proportional representation, 198>

opposes slave representation, 361;

favors army, ‘424; moves partial

national control over militia, 452;*

opposed to uniformity in militia,

453; on committee on imposts, -

470; moves ratification by ten

States, 498; opposed to requiring

two-thirds of Senate to make

treaties, 533; opposes motion to
permit States to lay export duties

to pay charges, 557.

Debtors, disqualification for office, 327,
330; rejected, 331.

Debts, assumption of State, grand com-
mittee on appointed, 423; assump-
tion of authorized, 435; provision
for payment, 448; discharge of,
considered, 460; payment of, 465;
validity of, agreed to, 467; pay-
ment of old, rejected, 467.

Delaware, credentials of deputies, 18;
delegates threaten to withdraw, 30;
forbids delegates changing rule of
suffrage in Congress, 30; attitude
discussed, 30, 31.

Delivery up of persons bound to service,
agreed to, 488.

Departments, heads of, to give opinions
to President, 531, 532

Dickinson, John, Del., attends, 21; pro-
poses removal of executive on peti-
.tion from State legislatures, 46;
moves removability of executive
by legislature on request of State
legislatures, 47; favors election of
executive by people, 323; moves to
restrict President’s power of ap-
pointments, 464; objects to Presi-
dent of Senate as successor to
President, 472; favors eventual
election of President by the legis-
lature, 516; moves that vote of

‘

first branch, 84; favors three
years’ term for service in first
branch of legislature, 144; pro-
poses residence for brief period for
members of legislature, 357; pro-
poses one representative for each
State at least, 361; proposes fixing
compensation of members of legis-
lature at intervals, 402; moves
wages of both branches of legis-
lature be the same, 403; proposes
limitation of representation, 436;
favors national judiciary, 61; op-
poses joining judiciary with execu-
tive in revisionary power, 68;
thinks judges should not have
power to set aside laws, 407;
moves power to remove judges,
473, 474; approves power of legis-
lature to negative State laws, 77;
proposes revision of articles of
confederation, 111; motion rejected,
120; opposes qualifications for
office, 328; favors franchise for free-
holders, 352; favors restricting
money bills to first branch of legis-
lature, 392; thinks definition of
felonies unnecessary, 416; on grand
committee on assumption of State
debts, 423; thinks legislature
should make great appointments,
424; favors power of States over
militia, 425; on definition of trea-
son, 431; favors sole power over
treason in nation, 434; favors tax
on exports, 439; opposes slave
trade, 445; on committee on navi-
gation acts, 448; favors inclusion
of President in treaty making, 458;
moves to confine slave trade to
States already permitting it, 468;
wants further provision on ew
post facto laws, 483; thinks new
States may be created within old,
489; moves that combination to
create new States be forbidden,
492; moves protection of State
from domestic violence, 494; asks
if Congress must consent to con-
stitution, 496; on committee on
postponed measures, 502; thinks
Congress should consent to in-
spection duties, 558; on committee
on sumptuary laws, 558; moves
amendment relative to direct taxa-
tion, 559.

presidential electors be from all Domestic violence, guarantee against,

who are appointed, 518; favors

clause amended, 573.

executive council, 532; favors elec- Duties, power to lay, 409; to be uni-

tion of one branch of legislature

form, 502.

by the people, 65; moves election Duties on imports or exports, States

of Senate by State legislatures, 69;

not to lay, 569.

favors large Senate, 72; approves Duties on tonnage, moves States may

wealth as basis of representation in

lay, 569; forbidden to States, 570.
“Electors of executive.

INDEX 705

See E ti
electors, 294. esa

Ellsworth, Oliver, Conn., attends, 18;

moves election of executive by elec-
tors, 286; proposes six years’ term
for executive, 288; proposes ratio
electors for executive, 289; favors
eligibility of executive for sec-
ond term, 313; favors election of
executive by legislature, 318; op-
poses election of executive by
electors, 320; seconds motion that
each State should have one vote
in second branch, 89; rejected, 89;
moves members of first branch be
elected annually, 91; proposes legis-
lative power remain in Congress,
109; moves supreme government
instead of national, 131; favors
short term for service in first
branch, 144; favors State compen-
sation of legislature, 146; favors
election to Senate by State legis-
latures, 163; favors compensation
for Senators, 172; proposes com-
pensation of Senators by States,
172; hopes for good favor of gov-
ernment, 184; moves equal vote
by States in Senate, 189; urges
equal vote by States in Senate, 191,
193; insists Connecticut is federal,
195; insists upon preservation of
States, 199; on committee on re-
presentation in Senate, 205; favors
compromise on representation, 210;
moves postponement of money bills,
222; opposes increase in represen-
tation, 229; moves three-fifths of
blacks in representation, 243;
wishes legislature to arrange basis
of representation, 244; favors
representation by members, 247;
thinks equal vote in Senate safe,

payment of members of legislature
by nation, 401; favors fixing com-
pensation for legislature, 403;
moves $5 per day as payment for
members of legislature, 403;
favors appointment of judges by
Senate with consent of executive,
301; moves ratification by State
legislatures, 305, 307; on commit-
tee of detail, 318; opposes disquali-
fication of debtors, 331; favors
franchise based on taxation, 352;
thinks constitution may be altered,
359; opposes tax on exports, 411;
would render issue of paper money
impossible, 413; proposes power
to suppress rebellion on applica-
tion of executive, 417; thinks debts
will be assumed, 422; moves coun-
cil for executive, 423; thinks
States should have power over
militia, 425, 426; thinks taxation
may cover sumptuary laws, 429;
on definition of treason, 413; would
allow State power over treason,
434; moves to postpone question
of State debts, 436; favors rule
for levying contributions by States,
436; opposes taxation by repre-
sentation, 437; thinks government
may regulate trade between States,
438; thinks Congress may lay em-
bargo, 440; would permit importa-
tion of slaves, 442; would permit
slave trade, 444; wishes naviga-
tion act provision to stand, 447;
ex post facto laws void, 449; thinks
provision to fulfill engagements of
old government unnecessary, 450;
favors State power over militia,
451; moves uniformity for militia,
452; opposes negative on State
laws, 457.

Emit bills, power to, agreed to, 414.
Enacting clause for laws, adopted, 404.
Executive, national, considered, 37, 286;

258; favors fixing time for meet-
ing of legislature, 348; proposes
one year inhabitancy for members

of legislature, 357; thinks either
house may originate money bills,
362; thinks vacancies in Senate
may be filled by executive, 363;
would not give legislature power
to arrange to fill vacancies im
Senate, 364; opposes provision for
money bills, 365; opposes fourteen
years’ citizenship for members of
Senate, 367; thinks property quali-
fication for legislature should not
be fixed, 374, 375; thinks quorum
should not be fixed, 377; thinks
yeas and nays unnecessary, 3793
on journals of legislature, 381;
thinks members of legislature may
be appointed to offices, 399; favors

agreed to, 39, 326; qualifications
for, committed, 328; title, 461.

Age, 448, 507.

Citizenship, 507.

Compensation of, discussed, 43, 571;
agreed to, 294.

Correspondence with States, dis-
cussed, 470; struck out, 471.

Council for, considered, 50, 423, 448;
negatived, 532.

Election of, diseyssed, 40, 41, 42,
324, 514; appoimtment by States,
discussed, 79; rejected, 80; to be
chosen by legislature, passed, 270;
by people rejected, 270; by electors,
rejected, 270; proposed to be
chosen by electors, 285, 286; car-
706

ried, 287; to be chosen by legisla-
ture, considered, 267, 287; ratio
postponed, 287; six years’ term
carried, 288; ratio considered, 288;
ratio rejected, 289; ratio of elec-
tors considered, 288; qualification
of electors considered, 294; pay-
ment of electors, 294; election by
electors reconsidered, 310; election
by electors debated, 311; by State
legislatures agreed to, 313; elec-
tion of electors by lot, considered,
317; question of election postponed,
317; election by legislature con-
sidered, 318; rejected, 320; election
by legislature, 461; by joint ballot
agreed to, 462; each State to have
one vote, rejected, 462; by ma-
jority, agreed to, 463; to be elected
by electors chosen by people, re-
jected, 463, 464; mode of elec-
tion reported, 507; eventual elec-
tion by legislature. rejected, 516;
by less than one-third, rejected,
517; by six Senators and seven
Representatives rejected, 517; elec-
tion of, by electors, debated, 517;
eventual election limited to three
candidates, rejected, 517; thirteen,
rejected, 517; electors to be at seat
of government, proposed, 522; how
vote is to be counted, debated,
522; eventual election by House if
vote equal, agreed to, 523; quorum
in voting fixed, 524; mode of elec-
tion agreed to, 524; vacancy to be
filled by legislature, 525; majority
of States necessary to elect, 526.

Impeachability of, discussed, 48, 275,
289, 290; carried, 293.

Ineligibility for second term, con-
sidered, 48, 270, 274, 282, 287,
313; rejected, 271, 287; agreed to,
325; for continuous reelection, con-
sidered, 323; rejected, 323.

Negative, power of, debated, 51; to
negative legislative acts proposed,
51; absolute negative on laws lost,
55; negative on acts agreed to,
274; absolute negative proposed,
350; rejected, 350; absolute nega-
tive on laws proposed, 407; power
to negative bills, 408; two-thirds
vote to overrule negative proposed,
510; agreed to, 554.

Oath of, 472.

Powers of, 39; council of revision
considered, 51; revisionary power
overruled by two-thirds of legis-
lature, agreed to, 55; power to
suspend laws considered, 55; lost,
55; revisionary power with judici-
ary, considered, 56, 294; power of

INDEX

appointment, considered, 57; power
of appointment, agreed to, 529; as-
association of judiciary in revision-
ary power, considered, 67; revision-
ary power with judiciary, rejected,
69; to execute laws agreed to, 270;
to appoint to office agreed to, 270;
qualified vote agreed to, 300;
power of appointment, 464; re-
stricted, 465; to appoint public
ministers, 470; to receive ambas-
sadors, agreed to, 471; power to
pardon, agreed to, 471; impeach-
ment excepted, 471; power over
militia, 472; impeachment post-
poned, 472; to make treaties, 528,
530, 531; including House, re-
jected, 528; to fill vacancies, 529;
to require opinions of heads of
departments, 531; power to par-
don, 571; except in treason cases,
rejected, 572.

Removal of, discussed, 46.

Single, proposed, 39, 48; agreed to,
51, 267, 461.

Succession, postponed, 472; president
of Senate to succeed, 472.

Term of, 40; seven years agreed to,
41; seven years, postponed, 270;
considered, 270, 271; during good
behavior, rejected, 273; seven years
agreed to, 274; seven years re-
jected, 288; discussed, 314; re-
ported, 507; debated, 521.

Export duties, States may levy to pay
charges, 557; agreed to, 558; not
to be laid and no preference among
States, 566.

Exports, tax on, 410; question post-
poned, 412; power to tax, 479.

Ex post facto laws, discussed, 449, 483;
provision discussed, 565; clause re-
seed 565; forbidden to States,

Few, William, Ga., attends, 17; on com-
mittee on imposts, 470.
Fitzsimmons, Thomas, Penn., attends,
17; favors tax on exports, 441; on
committee on imposts, 470; thinks
vessel must clear from its own
State, 501; regards publication of
expenditures as impossible, 567.
Forts, ete., jurisdiction over, 513.
Franklin, Benjamin, Penn., attends, 18;
opposes salary for executive, 43;
opposes negative of executive on
laws, 52; opposes executive power,
54; seconds motion to give execu-
tive power to suspend laws, 55;
favors impeachability of executive,
290, 292; thinks executive servant
of people, 325; favors executive
INDEX

council, 531; moves to limit Presi-
dent’s emoluments, 571; opposes
two branches of national legislature,
31; on basis of representation in
legislature, 85; suggests elimina-
tion of “liberal” from amendment
regarding compensation of members
of legislature, 93; seconds motion
to give Senate no salary, 171; pro-
poses proportion for Senate, 196;
on committee on representation in
Senate, 205; opposes property
qualifications for legislature, 374;
thinks members need not pledge
themselves, 582; wishes judiciary
appointed neither by executive nor
legislature, 57; thinks salaries of
-judges may be increased, 277;
thinks money bills may originate
in first branch of legislature, 218;
agrees to provision for money bills,
365; proposes prayers in conven-
tion, 181; favors sermon on 4th of
July, 182; insists on compromise,
216; favors free franchise, 354;
favors liberal policy towards for-
eigners, 368; favors two witnesses
to treason, 433; favors second con-
vention, 544; on committee on
sumptuary laws, 558; moves power
to cut canals, 563; pleads for
unanimous approval, 578; pleads
with Randolph to sign constitu-
tion, 581; utters prophesy, 583.
Franklin, William Temple, nominated
for secretary of convention, 18.
Fugitive slave clause, amendment, 573.

Georgia, representation from, 228.
Gerry, Elbridge, Mass., attends, 21; dis-
likes election by people, 33; favors
council for executive, 38; opposes
election of executive by legislature,
42; proposes executive power to
negative legislative acts, 51; fa-
‘vors qualified negative on laws of
executive, 52; opposes power in
executive to suspend laws, 55;
moves reconsideration of mode of
appointing executive, 79; moves
that executive be elected by execu-
tives of States, 79; opposes popu-
lar election of executive, 286, 323;
favors election of executive by
electors, 287; moves ratio of elec-
tors for election of executive, 289 ;
urges necessity of impeachability
of executive, 291; moves qualifica-
tion of electors, 294; moves elec-
tion of executive by State legis-
latures, 312; opposes election of
electors for executive by State legis-
latures, 312; insists on ineligibility

707

of executive to second term, 313;
moves ineligibility of executive for
second term, 313; suggests fifteen
years’ term for executive, 314; sug-
gests eligibility of executive for
second term be committed, 315;
opposes choosing electors for ex-
ecutive by lot, 317; moves election
of executive by governors of States,
318; favors ineligibility of execu-
tive for continuous reelection, 321;
moves to commit clause relative to
executive, 324; opposes executive
council, 423; fears a few States
may choose President, 516; moves
eventual election of President by
six Senators and seven Representa-
tives, 517; seconds motion that
eventual election of President be
limited to three candidates, 517;
moves change of clause for reelect-
ing President, 518; moves that
electors be not office holders, 518;
thinks States must have increased
representation to vote for President,
526; proposes majority of States
to elect, 526; thinks President will
not be responsible for appoint-
ments, 529; favors elections to first
branch of national legislature on
nominations by the people, 62; fa-
vors election of Senate by State
legislatures, 71; opposes power of
legislature to negative State laws,
76; moves to exclude blacks from
rule of representation, 88; ap-
proves electing members of first
branch annually, 91; opposes equal
suffrage by States in legislature,
188; favors commitment of ques-
tion of representation in Senate,

-205; on committee on representa-

tion in Senate, 205; reports from
committee on representation in
Senate, 206; explains report, 206;
favors compromise on representa-
tion, 211; favors numbers and
wealth as basis of representa-
tion, 214; favors increase in re-
presentation, 229; favors counting
blacks as three-fifths, 233; pro-
poses vote per capita in Senate,
253; favors fixing quorum, 377;
on journals of legislature, 380;
moves discretion in publishing
journals of legislature, 380; thinks
legislature may fix seat of govern-
ment, 382; favors ineligibility of
members of legislature to office,
396, 505; thinks question of com-
pensation of members of legislature
difficult, 402; opposes power of
peace in Senate, 419; opposes Vice
708

INDEX

President for president of Senate,
527; fears treaties of peace may be
too easily made, 530; seconds mo-
tion that treaties require a ma-
jority of whole Senate, 534; moves
that treaties shall require two-
thirds of whole Senate, 533; moves
notice of treaties be sent to Sena-
tors, 534; moves legislature have
sole power to create offices, 537;
thinks Congress must agree to con-
stitution, 540, 542; favors two-
thirds vote to set aside President’s
negative, 555; proposes Congress be
forbidden to impair contracts, 567;
opposes judicial power of revision
of laws, 51; opposes association
of judiciary with executive in
revisionary power, 68; opposes re-
visionary power of judiciary, 296,
406; moves power of removal by
judges, 473; thinks provision for
juries necessary, 556; insists on
jury trial in civil cases, 572;
doubts powers of convention, 28;
on. evils of democracy, 32; fears
ratification of constitution by peo-
ple, 59; thinks commercial and
moneyed interests secure in State
legislatures, 73; opposes requiring
oaths from members of State gov-
ernments to observe constitution,
90; moves that Senate be re-
strained from originating money
bills, 97; urges agreement, 170;
thinks originating money bills in
first branch of legislature a con-
cession from small States, 217;
favors money bills from _ first
branch of legislature, 391; insists
on national plan, 220; moves con-
sideration of general powers, 221;
moves to consider basis of taxa-
tion, 246; fears power of West,
251; favors discrimination against
West, 252; insists on concessions,
254; opposes adjournment, 262;
moves oath to support national
government, 304; opposes ratifica-
tion by people, 306; moves com-
mitment of constitution, 311; op-
poses exciusion of public debtors
from office, 328; property an object
of government, 328; favors qualifi-
cations for legislature, 330; moves
to disqualify pensioners, 330; capi-
tal should not be at State capital
or large city, 332; would exclude
foreigners from government, 384;
opposes tax on exports, 411; op-
poses taxing power, 412; moves
power to establish post roads, 413;
opposes power to suppress rebel-

lion without State’s request, 417;
wants action in favor of public
securities, 421; opposes armies in
time of peace, 424; moves to limit
army in time of peace, 424; favors
State control of militia, 426, 452;
moves mode of impeachment, 429;
proposes taxation according to
representation, 435; opposes as-
sumption of State debts, 435; fa-
vors taxation by representation,
437, 438; opposes power over ex-
ports, 440; would not sanction
slavery, 445; opposed to bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws,
449; thinks provision to fulfill en-
gagements of old government neces-
sary, 450; fears national control
of militia, 453; supports State gov-
ernments, 454; thinks debts should
be paid, 466; opposes constitution.
500; objects to appropriations for
army for two years, 512; objects to
authority over forts, 513; moves
reconsideration of articles concern-
ing amendments, oaths, and rati-
fication, 514; moves no one be ap-
pointed to offices not created by
law, 534; moves to reconsider
clause relating to amendments,
538; approves amendments pro-
posed by legislature to States, 539;
favors Bill of Rights, 557; thinks
ex post facto laws should be ex-
tended to civil cases, 565; pro-
poses clause for liberty of the
press, 565; favors publication of
accounts of expenditures, 566;
moves amendment for State ad-
mission, 573; wishes amendments
by convention, 574; favors second
convention, 530; states why he will
not sign, 576; does not sign, 583.

Gilman, Nicholas, N. H., attends, 303;

on committee on postponed meas-
ures, 502.

Gorham, Nathaniel, Mass., attends, 18;

thinks legislature may name time
of elections, 371; favors election of
President by ballot, 461; thinks
majority of Senate may elect Presi-
dent, 523; opposes State compen-
sation of legislature, 146; opposes
ineligibility of members of first
branch cf legislature to office, 150;
proposes compromise on  repre-
sentation in Senate, 162; suggests
four years for Senators, 165; moves
six years for Senate, 166; asks °
explanation of report of committee
on representation, 206; opposes fix-
ing representation in first branch
of legislature, 213; on committee
INDEX 709

on representation, 215; explains
ratio of Tepresentation, 224; fa-
vors counting blacks as three-fifths,
233; thinks standard of representa-
tion must be fixed, 235; favora,
numbers as basis of representation,
239; wishes two Senators from
each State, 310; would leave quali-
fications to legislature, 327; favors
fixing time of meeting of legisla-
ture, 348; suggests Senate amend
money bills, 362; favors less than
a majority for a quorum, 376; op-
posed to yeas and nays at request
of one member, 379; would pay
Senate more than first branch, 403;
thinks Senate should not have power
for money bills, 404; favors ma-
jority for quorum, 408; thinks
legislature can fix scale of contri-
butions, 436; favors settlement of
State controversies by Senate, 460;
thinks Congress may name ports of
entry, 470; opposes ineligibility of
members of legislature to offices,
505; opposes treaties of peace with
majority of Senate, 530; asks for
increased representation, 579;
thinks executive must be elected
by joint ballot of legislature, 347;
approves of appointment of judges
by executive, 274, 275, 276; with
consent of Senate, 277; favors in-
ferior judicial tribunals, 279; op-
poses revisionary power for judges,
299; thinks provision for juries
not necessary, 556; chairman, com-
mittee of whole, 27; seconds su-
preme government instead of na-
tional, 131; discusses rights of
States, 183; favors general prin-
ciples in constitution, 260; favors
guaranteeing republican govern-
ment, 281; thinks oath to support
constitution proper, 304; opposed
to ratification by legislatures, 306;
on committee of detail, 318; would
disqualify debtors from office, 330;
opposes franchise for freeholders,
355; thinks nation will not last,
359; naturalized foreigners on
same footing with natives, 386; op-
poses power to emit bills of credit,
413; moves appointment of treas-
urer by joint ballot, 415; moves
power to support armies, 424; says
motives of east are commercial,
447; objects to ratification of
treaties, 458; seconds motion for
slave trade till 1808, 467; thinks
duty on slaves a discouragement to
importation, 469; on committee on
imposts, 470; thinks paper money

may be necessary, 477; on commit-
tee on mutual recognition by
States of public acts, 482; insists
on navigation acts, 486; favors
ratification by conventions, 498;
thinks vessel need not clear from
its own State, 501; opposes mode
of choosing Vice President, 508;
favors appointment of treasurer by
legislature. 562.

ee of three parts agreed to,
47.

Grand committee on assumption of
State debts, 423, 435, 436.

Great seal, 428.

nase corpus, writ of privilege, 427,

477.

Hamilton, Alexander, N. Y., attends,
17; moves absolute negative of ex-
ecutive, 51; thinks President may
be elected by,plurality of electors,
520; moves fepresentation by popu-
lation, 30; moves rule of suffrage
in second branch should be the
same as in first, 89; passed, 89;
opposes elections to legislature by
State legislatures, 142; urges three
years’ term for first branch of
legislature, 145; opposes State
compensation of legislature, 147;
opposes ineligibility of members of
first branch of legislature to office,
150; moves citizenship and in-
habitancy for legislature, 384; re-
jected, 385; favors reconsideration
of number of representatives, 538;
nominates William Jackson for
secretary of convention, 18; on
committee on rules, 18; seconds
motion against salaries, 46; sup-
ports national government, 111;
plan, .118, 120n.; discusses na-
tional government, 129, 131; urges
strong government, 169; doubts
wisdom of prayers in convention,
182; discusses rights of States,
186; on committee on style, 538;
favors easier mode of amendment,
539; seconds mode for amendments,
540; submits plan for ratification,
542; lost, 543; thinks Congress
must agree to constitution, 541;
hopes every member will sign con-
stitution, 580; copy of paper sent
to James Madison, embodying
Alexander Hamilton’s principles
for a constitution, 608.

Hay, John, extracts of letters to George
Washington, 586, 587.

House of Representatives, See Legis-
lature, House of Representatives.

Houston, William Churchill, N. J., at-
710

tends, 17; moves question of elec-
tion of executive, 310.

Houstoun, William, Ga., attends, 37;
moves postponement of term for
executive, 270; moves eligibility of
executive to second term, 270; sec-
onds motion for increase ratio of
electors, 289; moves election of elec-
tors for executive by State legisla-
tures, 311; on committee on repre-
sentation, 226; moves increase in
representation of Georgia, 228;
does not wish to perpetuate exist-
ing constitutions, 281.

Impeachments, provision struck out,
279; mode of, 429; of judges, 449;
of President, question postponed,
472; power of, 535; to high crimes
and misdemeanors, agreed to, 535;
motion not to try in Senate, lost,
537; clause agreed to, 537; to in-
clude other civil officers, 537; pro-
posed to suspend persons im-
peached, lost, 561.

Imports, tax on, 479. :

Imposts, power to lay, 409; to be uni-
form, 470, 563.

Incorporation, power of, 420; charters
for, proposed, 564.

Indian affairs, 420.

Ingersoll, Jared, Penn., attends, 18;
does not regard signing constitu-
tion as pledge to support it, 582.

Invasion, guarantee against article,
agreed to, 493.

Inventions, power to encourage, 420.

Jackson, William, elected: secretary of
convention, 18.

Jefferson, Thomas, extract of letter
from James Madison, 589.

Jenifer, Daniel of St. Thomas, Md.,
attends, 41; moves members of first
branch be elected every three years,
91; favors ineligibility of mem-
bers of legislature to offices, 154;
moves postponement of question of
money bills, 216; insists vessel
must clear from its own State,
501.

Jersey plan. See Patterson’s plan.

Johnson, William Samuel, Conn., at-
tends, 41; favors preserving States,
139; thinks State governments
must be preserved, 164; thinks
States must be preserved, .182;
favors wealth and numbers as basis
for representation, 242; on defini-
tion of treason, 431; insists of-
fense against nation, 432; on com-
mittee on navigation acts, 448;
thinks provision against ex post

INDEX

facto laws umnecessary, 450; op-
poses ratification of treaties, 458;
thinks provision for State con-
troversies unnecessary, 460; insists
on validity of debts, 466; suggests
judicial power extend to equity,
473; moves jurisdiction of supreme
court extend to cases under consti-
tution, 475; on committee on mu-
tual recognition by States of pub-
lic acts, 483; thinks Vermont must
come into the Union, 489; moves
admission of States already
formed,. 491; on committee on
style, 538; submits report of com-
mittee on style, 545; favors power
to pass sumptuary laws, 558; on
committee on sumptuary laws, 558;
reports provision for ratification,
560.

Journals of convention, disposition of,
582.

Journals of legislature, publication of,
380, 381; secrecy only in Senate,
proposed and rejected, 562.

Judiciary, national, agreed to, 56;
single court proposed, 57; changes
in clavse relating to, made, 96;
to be bound by national law, 266;
qualifications for, committed, 328.

Appointment by legislature consid-
ered, 56; mode considered, 57, 58;
by Senate, 97, 274, 303; by execu-
tive, 277; by executive with con-
sent of Senate, 277, 300, 303.

Compensation, 58, 277, 474; not to
be changed during office, 277; may
be increased, 278; may be changed,
474,

Impeachment of, 449, 475; removal
of, rejected, 474.

Inferior tribunals, considered, 60,
279; provision for, struck out, 61;
legislature to have power to insti-
tute, 61, 62; agreed to, 279, 415.

Jurisdiction discussed, 97, 279, 449;
power to declare laws unconstitu-
tional, discussed, 51; power to de-
clare law void, denied, 406, 407;
supreme court, 428; to extend to
equity, 473; appellate jurisdiction,
475; to extend to cases under con-
stitution, 475.

Juries, crimes to be tried by, 477;
in civil cases, 556; trial by, to be
preserved, rejected, 573.

Revisionary power, as council of re-
vision, 51; revisionary power, 300,
405; with executive, 51, 56, 67, 69,
294; negatived, 406.

Supreme tribunal, agreed to, 274;
tenure of office of, 58, 277, 474.

Juries in civil cases, 556.
INDEX
King, Rufus, Mass., attends, 17; fa-

vors revisionary power of executive,
68; moves reconsideration of mode
of appointing executive, 79; fa-
vors eligibility of executive for
second term, 285, 314; fears short
term for executive, 288; opposes
impeachability of executive, 291,
293; thinks State legislatures may
vote for executive, 313; suggests
twenty years’ term for executive,
314; wishes to postpone question
of election of executive, 317; moves
that electors be not office holders,
518; favors change of clause rela-
tive to reelection of President, 519;
thinks President should have par-
doning power over treason, 571;
on principle of representation, 29;
thinks choice of members of sec-
ond branch of legislature by State
legislatures impracticable, 34;
. Moves right of suffrage in first
branch should be based on equitable
ratio, 84; passed, 88; opposes elec-
tion to first branch of legislature
by legislatures, 143; opposes State
compensation of legislature, 147;
opposes ineligibility of members of
first branch of legislature to office,
150, 152; opposes fixing representa-
tion, 214; on committee on repre-
sentation, 215, 226; thinks South
entitled to representation for
slaves, 226; reports on representa-
tion, 226; objects to basis of
representation, 235; opposes blacks
as three-fifths in representation,
239; would not tie legislatures in
fixing representation, 244; favors
limiting representation, 251; moves
vote per capita in Senate, 309;
thinks legislature need meet ‘sel-
dom, 348; opposes slave representa-
tion, 358; thinks legislature should
regulate elections, 372; favors less
than a majority for a quorum,
377; agrees to number for a
quorum, 377; moves sole power
over treason in legislature, 433;
moves ineligibilty of members of
legislature to new offices, 504;
lost, 506; seconds motion for in-
eligibility of members of_ legisla-
ture for new or increased offices,
506; moves legislature consent to
purchase forts, 513; thinks influ-
ence of small States balanced, 517;
defends Senate, 529; opposes change
in representation, 568; favors in-
creased representation, 579; op-
poses power of judiciary to nega-
tive legislative acts, 51; favors

711

inferior tribunals in national legis-
lature, 61; objects to rule for yeas
and nays, 18; favors ratification of
constitution by conventions, 59;
discusses national government,
130; expects delegates from New
Hampshire, 190; opposes State
sovereignty, 197; censures Bed-
ford, 200; favors admission of new
States, 214; thinks New Hamp-
shire will increase, 226; says gov-
ernment will act on people, 254;
favors ratification by conventions,
308; opposes landed property as
qualification for office, 328; moves
seat of government be fixed, 381;
favors assumption of State debts,
421; thinks unlocated lands should
be given up, 422; on grand com-.
mittee on assumption of State
debts, 423; thinks definition of
treason unimportant, 432; asks
definition of direct taxation, 435;
thinks taxation by representation
unnecessary, 437; opposes slavery
provision, 446; on committee on
navigation acts, 448; explains
power over militia, 451; thinks
slave trade dependent on naviga-
tion laws, 468; thinks new States
must observe contracts, 478; op-
poses power to tax exports with
consent of States, 481; favors rati-
fication by all States, 496; favors
ratification by conventions, 497;
on committee on postponed meas-
ures, 502; moves limitation on
treaties affecting rights, 532;
moves to strike out provision con-
cerning treaties of peace, 532; on
committee on style, 538; would
submit constitution to Congress,
542; thinks Congress need not ap-
prove constitution, 543; opposes
Suspension from office of persons
impeached, 561; favors appointment
of Treasurer by legislature, 562;
thinks power to grant charters of
incorporation unnecessary, 564;
thinks publication of expenditures
impracticable, 566; suggests dis-
posal of journals of convention,
582.

Knox, Henry, extract of letter to

George Washington, 585.

Lands, fund from western, 162; power

over, 420.

Langdon, John, N. H., attends, 303;

favors committing question of ex-
ecutive, 324; President ought to be
chosen by general voice, 462;
moves to strike out clause dis-
712

qualifying debtors, 330; thinks

seat of government should not be

at State capital, 332; opposes pay-

ment of legislature by States, 401;

opposes paper money, 414; favors

power to suppress rebellion, 417;

on grand committee on assumption

of State debts, 423; has no fear
of army, 424; insists on power over
militia, 425; opposes taxation by
representation, 435; favors reduc-
tion of New Hampshire’s repre-
sentation, 437; opposes power to
tax exports, 438, 439; opposes slave
trade, 446; on committee on navi-
gation acts, 448; favors federal
control of militia, 452; thinks

State executives ought to be ap-

pointed by general government,

457; would pay debts fairly, 466;

thinks provision for slave trade

dependent on navigation laws, 468;

on committee on imposts, 470;

would admit new States only on

conditions, 487; thinks new States
may be created within the old,

488; thinks Vermont should come

into the Union, 489; thinks vessel

need not clear from its own State,

501; moves additional representa-

tion, 568; insists States can not

lay duties on tonnage, 570.

Lansing, John, Jr., N. Y., attends, 41;

supports Patterson’s plan, 104; op-

poses national government, 132;

moves single legislature, 132;

thinks voting in legislature should

be by States, 176; would permit
commitment of question of repre-

sentation in Senate, 205.

Laws, general, power to make, 430.

Legislature, each house to originate
acts, 174; rule of suffrage con-
sidered, 174; clause agreed to, 350;
yeas and nays discussed, 379; ad-
journment of, 381; seat of govern-
ment, 381, 382.

Attendance of members, 378; agreed
to, 378.

Compensation to be paid from na-
tional treasury, 93; considered,
146; to be fixed by legislature, dis-
agreed to, 148; adequate compensa-
tion agreed to, 148; national com-
pensation, disagreed to, 149; by
States proposed, 401; by nation,
agreed to, 403; rate discussed, 403;
$5.00 per day, rejected, 403; $4.00,
rejected, 403; equal, 403; higher
for Senate proposed, 403.

Disqualifications, members to be in-
eligible for State offices, rejected,
93; to be ineligible to office under

INDEX

national government for one year
after terminaton of term, 94;
of members to offices, debated,
395.

Elections, mode of, 140, 371; agreed
to, 371; joint ballot favored, 347.
Expulsion of members considered,
378; by two-thirds agreed, 378.
Journal of proceedings, debate on,
380, 381; publication permitted,

381.

Money bills, debated, 362, 365; to
originate in first branch, rejected,
363; reconsidered, 363; provision
for, agreed to, 365; exclusive con-
trol in first branch rejected, 395;
Senate to amend, rejected, 395.

Negative State laws considered, 75,
265; rejected, 79, 267; mutual
negative of branches considered,
347; power to negative State laws,
456.

Power of, debated, 36, 347; general,
263, 265; of confederation, 260; to
legislate where States incompetent,
considered, 36, 260; to use force
against delinquent States, 37;
to provide for amending con-
stitution, without consent of, dis-
cussed, 89; postponed, 90; to origi-
nate bills agreed to, 404; to revise
acts by executive and legislature
proposed, 405; rejected, 406; to
tax, 410; agreed to, 412; to tax
exports, discussed, 438; to tax ex-
ports prohibited, 442; to tax with
consent of States, rejected, 481;
to tax by requisition, 438; to tax
imposts, 479; clause agreed to, 479,
480; to lay taxes, clause reported,
507; to emit bills agreed to, 414;

. to borrow money agreed to, 414; to
define piracies, etc., agreed to, 416;
to appoint Treasurer, 415; struck
out, 563; to provide for appoint-
ments by lower officers, 572; to
suppress rebellion, discussed, 417;
agreed to, 418; defined, 418; re-
jected, 418; war power considered,
418; agreed to, 419; of peace
agreed to, 419; over incorpora-
tion, 420; to grant charters for
incorporation proposed, 564; re-
jected, 564; over seat of govern-
ment, 420; over copyrights, 420;
over invention, 420; over forts,
etc., 420; over public lands, 420,
493, 494; over Indians, 420; over
militia, 421, 425, 435, 451, 456, 565;
to raise armies, 423; to maintain
navy, agreed, 424; over debts, 421,
435, 457, 465; to secure creditors,
421; to regulate stages, 421; to
INDEX

grant letters of mark, 421; to re-
quire opinions of judges, 427; to
judge privileges of members, 427,
511; to make sumptuary laws, pro-
posed, 429, 558; to define treason,
430; to make laws, 430; to establish
offices, rejected, 430; to take census
within three years, 435; where
States not competent, 448; to ful-
fill engagements of old government,
450; over bills of credit, 478; to
pass navigation acts, 483; agreed
to, 487; to admit new States, 487;
clause agreed to, 492; to regulate
commerce, 501; to establish bank-
ruptcy laws, 503, 504; to make
treaties, 507; to convene either
house in extraordinary session,
agreed to, 5387; to cut canals, 563;
rejected, 564; to create university,
rejected, 565; not to pass ex post
facto laws, 565; prohibition on im-
pairment of contracts negatived,
567.

Property qualifications, considered,
373; agreed to, 373; clause struck
out, 375; in representation, dis-
cussed, 212; disagreed to, 213.

Quorum, discussed, 376; number
rejected, 378.

Qualifications for members, post-
poned, 34; discussed, 327; eligibil-
ity of members postponed, 401;
eligibility of members to civil of-
fice, 502; members to hold no other
office, rejected, 504; to hold no
other federal office, agreed to, 506.

Representation, proportional, pro-
posed, 29; discussed, 80, 84;
passed, 88; both branches to have
equal representation, passed, 89;
equal vote of States rejected, 188;
uestion of representation com-
mitted, 215; representation by
wealth and numbers reconsidered,
248; wealth as a basis for repre-
sentation struck out, 251; repre-
sentation considered, 263.

Term for members of first branch
considered, 91; triennial election
agreed to, 92.

Time of meeting, 348; date for meet-
ing, 349; annual meeting, 351;
discussed, 370; agreed to, 371.

Two branches agreed to, 31, 142; dis-
cussed, 132; single chamber re-
jected, 139. .

House of Representatives, compensa-
tion for members discussed, 92; to
be fixed by legislature, agreed to,
93; word “ liberal ” struck out, 93;
equal vote of States in, rejected,
188; representation considered,

713

211; ratio of representation dis-
cussed, 213; ratio of representa-
tion, 224; postponed, 224; to be
regulated by legislature, 224;
representation committed, 226; in-
crease in representation disagreed
to, 230; apportionment agreed to,
230; proportion of blacks in repre-
sentation, 233; equal rejected, 234;
representation by wealth rejected,
238; census approved, 238; blacks as
three-fifths considered, 239; reject-
ed, 240; census agreed, 240; equal
representation of blacks rejected,
245; three-fifths proposition agreed
to, 246; representation agreed to,
259; representation by taxation
agreed to, 358; representation by
slaves debated, 360; by free in-
habitants rejected, 361; one at least
agreed to, 361; motion for recon-
sideration of representation, lost,
538; motion to reconsider repre-
sentation, lost, 560; representation
reconsidered, 568; representation
changed, 580; election to, consid-
ered, 31, 60; election to, by people,
agreed to, 33, 144; election by
State legislatures, 62, 67; clause
prohibiting reelection for period
of years, struck out, 94; age limit
of members struck out, 92; age of
members discussed, 149; twenty-
five years for first branch agreed
to, 149; eligibility of members to
office discussed, 150; ineligibility
of members of legislature to
offices, discussed, 150; disagreed
to, 151; ineligibility during term
and for one year discussed, 152;
ineligibility of members to of-
fices during term and for one
year disagreed to, 154; ineligibility
agreed to, 155; ineligibility during
term agreed to, 155; for one year
thereafter disagreed to, 155; resi-
dence of members debated, 356;
seven years proposed, 356; short
gperiod rejected, 357; inhabitant
substituted for resident, 357; one
year proposed, 357; rejected, 358;
three years rejected, 358; repre-
sentation in, 358; three years’ citi-
zenship required, 375; term of citi-
zenship for service in, considered,
384; Hamilton’s motion rejected,
385; nine years rejected, 385; four
years rejected, 386; those already
citizens eligible, 386; motion lost,
388; five years proposed, 388; lost,
388; term discussed, 144; two
years’ term for first branch agreed
to, 146; money bills in, 216, 383;
714

INDEX

money bills, reconsidered, 384, 388;
to originate revenue bills, clause
agreed to, 537; first branch, amend-
ment relative to direct taxing
power, lost, 559.

Senate, motion to consider, rejected,
41; considered, 162; election to,
considered, 34, 69; by State legis-
latures disagreed to, 35; by State
legislatures, carried, 74; age and
citizenship agreed to, 94, 388; term
agreed to, 96; to serve without
salary, rejected, 96; seven years
agreed to, 96, 166; six years dis-
agreed to, 166; term considered,
166; nine years rejected, 171; six
years agreed to, 171; compensation
considered, 96, 165, 171; by States
rejected, 172; eligibility to State
offices considered, 173; ineligibil-
ity to be same as for first branch,
96; ineligibility to national offices
agreed to, 173; to State offices re-
jected, 174; term agreed to, 367;
citizenship of members, 367; four-
teen years’ citizenship for members
rejected, 370; thirteen years re-
jected, 370; ten years rejected,
370; nine years agreed to, 370; in-
habitants agreed to, 370; clause
agreed to, 371; rule of suffrage
discussed, 89, 188; vote in, con-
sidered, 191, 215, 246, 253, 365;
equal vote by States rejected, 201;
equal vote in, carried, 221; ques-
tion of one vote for each State,
219; two from each State agreed
to, 310; vote in per capita, de-
bated, 309, 365; vote in, per
capita agreed to, 310, 366; mem-
bers to be chosen by legislatures,
agreed, 165; age, 30 years, agreed,
165; term of, considered, 165;
representation in, moved, 165; post-
poned, 165; question of representa-
tion committed, 205; committee on
representation, 205; report of com-
mittee on representation, 206;
representation proposed, 253; mem-
bers from each State, debated, 310;
right to enter dissent, 379; motion
lost, 380; appointments by, 455;
power to make treaties, 457;
power to settle State controversies,
considered, 460; impeachment
power, 507, 535; mode of impeach-
ment, 508; clause agreed to, 537;
to make treaties, clause reported,
508; appointment to office, 508;
ask opinion, heads of departments,
508; to participate in treaty mak-
ing, 530; power to originate money
bills, negatived, 99; money bilis,

considered, 207, 253; money bills,
to amend, 404; question postponed,
404; Franklin’s plan, 196; Pinck-
ney’s proposition rejected, 259;
equal vote agreed to, 259; secret
journals, 380; vacancies to be ar-
ranged by legislatures rejected,
364; to be filled by legislatures or
executives, agreed to, 364; vacan-
cies considered, 363; to be filled by
executives, agreed to, 364; quorum
to be two-thirds, rejected, 534.

Letter to accompany constitution, 553.

Liberty of the press, 427; to be ob-
served, 565; clause rejected, 566.

Livingston, William, N. J., attends, 563.
on grand committee on assump-
tion of State debts, 423; delivers
report of grand committee, 435;
on committee on navigation acts,
448; presents report of committee
of eleven, 459; on committee on
sumptuary laws, 558.

Madison, James, Va., attends, 17; on
powers of executive, 39; opposes
removability of executive by State
legislatures, 47; insists on inde-
pendence of executive, 271, 285;
favors varying ratio for electors,
for executive, 288; favors im-
peachability of executive, 291; fa-
vors election of executive by elec-
tors, 318; favors idea voting
for two men for executive, 322;
thinks President should make
treaties, 458; objects to Senate’s
power in choosing President, 462;
moves President only fill exist-
ing offices, 464; moves modifica-
tion of oath for President, 472;
objects to president of Senate to
succeed President, 472; objects to
election of President by majority
vote, 509; favors eventual elec-
tion of President by Senate,
516; moves eventual election of
President when less than one-third
vote for one man, 516; moves that
electors not voting be not counted,
517; moves two-thirds of Senate
be present when voting for Presi-
dent, 523; insists on increase in
representation of States to vote
for President, 526; favors execu-
tive council, 532; opposes inpeach-
ment for maladministration, 535;
objects to trial of President by Sen-
ate, 535; thinks President should
not have pardoning power over
treason, 571; on principle of repre-
sentation, 29; opposes equal repre-
sentation, 30; thinks election of
INDEX 715

large branch of legislature by peo-
ple essential, 33; on elections to
Senate, 35; on definition of powers
of national legislature, 36; con-
siders election of one branch of
legislature by the people necessary,
64; favors small Senate, 70; op-
poses election of Senate by State
legislatures, 73; seconds motion
to elect members of first branch
every three years, 91; moves legis-
lature fix compensation for mem-
bers, 92; passed, 93; approves seven
years as Senate term, 95; opposes
annual elections for first branch
of legislature, 145; favors national
compensation of legislature, 147;
wants compensation of legislature
fixed in constitution, 148; moves
ineligibility of members of first
branch of legislature during term
and for one year, 152; opposes
absolute ineligibility of members
of legislature to offices, 153; pro-
poses rule of voting in Senate, 164;
seconds motion to consider repre-
sentation in Senate, 164; explains
object of Senate, 167; opposes
compensation of Senators by
States, 172; objects to equal vote
of States in legislature, 177; con-
tends for proportional representa-
tion in Senate, 193; insists on
proportional representation in Sen-
ate, 198; opposes commitment of
question of representation in Sen-
ate, 205; insists that representa-
tion of States be considered, 221;
proposes numbers as basis of
representation in first branch of
legislature and wealth for Senate,
225; on committee on representa-
tion, 226; moves increase in repre-
sentation, 229; favors fixing
standard of representation, 236;
favors Pinckney’s proposition for
Senate, 254; insists on propor-
tional representation, 256; favors
continuance of Congress, 280;
would exclude debtors from legis-
lature, 327; suggests annual meet-
ing of legislature, 348; wishes
legislature to meet in May, 350;
favors inhabitants for members of
legislature, 356; opposes seven
years’ residence in State for mem-
bers of legislature, 356; objects to
rule of representation, 359; moves
to limit representation, 359; moves
vacancies in Senate be filled by
legislatures or executives, 364;
thinks legislature can fix question
of citizenship for Senate, 367;

moves first branch of legislature
name time of meeting, 371; thinks
legislature should regulate elec-
tions, 371; thinks qualifications
for legislature should be fixed, 374,
375; moves legislature compel at-
tendance, 378; moves expulsion of
members of legislature, 378; on
journals of legislature, 380; in-
sists on compensation of members
of legislature by nation, 401;
moves power of legislature to de-
clare war, 418; representation only
temporary, 437; proposes two-
thirds of Senate for quorum, 534;
seconds motion for reconsideration
of number of representatives, 538;
doubts if legislature should judge
privileges of members, 511; thinks
Congress can propose amendments,
574; moves revision of acts by
executive and judiciary, 56, 405;
favors appointment of judiciary
by Senate, 57; favors inferior tri-
bunals in national judiciary, 60;
moves legislature have power to
institute inferior tribunals, 61; fa-
vors association of judiciary with
executive in revision of laws, 67,
295, 298; moves that judges of
national judiciary be appointed by
Senate, 97; agreed to, 97; moves
that jurisdiction of national ju-
diciary should extend to cases in.
volving revenue and impeachment,
97; agreed to, 97; suggests ap-
pointment of judges by executive
and Senate, 276; moves -appoint-
ment of indges by executive with
two-thirds’ of Senate, 277; favors
appointment of judges by execu-
tive with consent of Senate, 301,
$02; thinks salaries of judges
should not be increased, 277, 474;
doubts if jurisdiction of judiciary
should extend to cases under con-
stitution, 475; moves for term
“judicial power,” 475; favors
qualified negative of executive on
laws, 53; favors negative on State
laws by legislature, 75, 78, 266,
478, 558; favors qualification
mutual negative of both branches
of legislature, 347; moves nega-
tive extend to resolutions, 408;
favors negative on State laws,
456; favors three-fourths vote to
set aside President’s negative, 556;
defends taxation by representation,
247; favors tax on exports, 410,
440; proposes taxation of exports
by two-thirds vote, 441; insists
on power of legislature to tax
716

imports, 479; opposes power of
States to tax imports, 480; thinks
States may levy export duties to
pay charges, 557; favors power
over militia, 426; explains power
over militia, 452; favors national
control of militia, 453; thinks good
militia necessary, 454; moves
State appointment of officers of
militia, 454; favors having money
bills originate in Senate, 97; op-
poses originating money bills in
first branch of legislature, 207; op-
poses provision for money bills,
362, 365; thinks Senate may dimin-
ish money bills, 391; objects to
ratifications of treaties, 458; sug-
gests distinction in power to make
treaties, 459; moves amendment to
treaty clause, 469; proposes treat-
ies of peace by majority of Senate,
530; opposes power to use force
against a State, 37; favors rati-
fication of constitution by conven-
tions, 59, 308; moves words “on
partition” be added to resolution
guaranteeing republican govern-
ment and territory to each State,
89; passed, 89; supports conven-
tion’s powers, 120; against Pat-
terson’s plan, 120; thinks States
will increase on national govern-
ment, 141; discusses rights of
States, 184; moves guaranteeing
States against violence, 281; favors
property qualification for office,
328; favors franchise for freehold-
_ers, 353; thinks seat of govern-
ment must be fixed, 382; favors
liberal policy towards foreigners,
384; thinks obligations" States
are obligations of Union}v.386;
thinks bills of credit should” nu
be tender, 413; moves to strike out
punishment with reference to
piracies, 415; moves power to de-
fine piracies, etc., 416; proposes
power over lands, new States, In-
dians, seat of government, incor-
porations, copyright, university,
inventions, forts, 420; moves power
to create offices, 430; favors
power to define treason, 430;
thinks it should be confined to
nation, 431; favors restriction of
treason, 434; on committee on
navigation acts, 448; thinks pro-
vision to fulfill engagements of
old government necessary, 450; ob-
jects to slave trade, 467; opposed
to idea that there can be property
in men, 469; would prohibit viola-
tion of contracts, 479; thinks

INDEX

States should not lay embargoes,
479; thinks commercial system too
complex, 480; moves legislature
provide for execution of judgments,
482; favors navigation acts by
majority, 485; insists new States
shall be admitted on equality, 487 ;
opposed to mention of Western
country, 492; thinks ratification
must come from majority, 496;
favors conventions to ratify, 497;
thinks vessels may clear in dif-
ferent States from that to which
it is bound, 501; on committee
on postponed measures, 502; on
committee on style, 538; moves
mode of amendment, 540; opposes
suspension from office of persons
impeached, 561; proposes univer-
sity, 564; proposes power to grant
charters, 564; favors precaution
against army in time of peace,
565; proposes account of expendi-
tures be published from time to
time, 566; thinks commerce ought
to be under one authority, 570;
extract of letter to Thomas Jeffer-
son, 589; extract of letter to Ed-
mund Randolph, 590; letter to
George Washington, 592; note on
the Pinckney plan, 606; remarks
on question of suffrage, 619.

Manufacturers, encouragement of, by

imposts, 479.

Mare and reprisal, letters of, 421.
Martin, Alexander, N. C., attends, 17;

Martin,

seconds motion of ineligibility of
members of first branch of legis-
lature and for one year, 152;
seconds motion against seat of gov-
ernment at State capital, 332.

Luther, Md., attends, 79;
moves election of executive by elec-
ters, 270; moves to consider eligi-
bility of executive to second term,
274; favors ineligibility of execu-
tive for second term, 282; moves
ineligibility of executive for sec-
ond term, 287, 313; moves ratio
of electors be committed, 289;
proposes term of eleven years for
executive, 314; seconds election to
legislature by State legislatures,
142; on committee on representa-
tion in Senate, 205; wants report
of committee on representation
voted on, 206; asks basis of ratio
of representation, 224; opposes vot-
ing per capita in Senate, 310;
thinks Senate should be paid by
States, 403; insists on appoint-
ment of judges by Senate, 275; op-
poses inferior judicial tribuals,
INDEX

278; opposes revisionary power of
judiciary, 297; moves supreme
court have jurisdiction over land
cases, 493; moves postponement of
question of money bills, 216;
wishes to consider money bills and
vote in Senate together, 252; op-
poses requiring oaths from mem-
bers of State government to ob-
serve constitution, 90; discusses
national government, 130; insists
on sovereignty of States, 136;
thinks general government must
operate through State governments,
174; thinks States equal, 188; in-
sists on equal rights of small
States in Senate, 201; favors com-
promise, 218; wishes compromise
considered, 251; moves supremacy
of national law, 267; thinks States
should suppress rebellions, 281;
would disqualify debtors for office,
330; asks meaning of duties and
imposts, 409; opposes power to sup-
press rebellion in State, 417;
moves to limit army in time of
peace, 424; moves confession as
ground for conviction for treason,
484; favors taxation by requisi-
tion, 438; proposes tax on impor-
tation of slaves, 442; on commit-
tee on navigation acts, 448; favors
state control of militia, 453;
moves impartial treatment of ports
of entry, 469; moves pardon after
conviction, 472; withdraws motion,
472; moves to admit new States
on two-thirds vote, 488; thinks
new States may be created within
old States, 488; moves to commit
question of making new _ States
within old, 490; thinks Western
country may separate from old
States, 491; moves power to create
States, 491; insists on ratification
by State legislatures, 498; op-
poses constitution, 499.

Mason, George, Va., attends, 17; favors

seven years as term for executive,
40; favors election of executive by
people, 41; opposes dependence of
executive upon legislature, 46; op-
poses executive power, 54; thinks
executive should be protected
against legislature, 68; thinks peo-
ple can not elect executive, 269;
opposed to term of executive dur-
ing good behavior, 272; favors im-
peachability of executive, 290;
favors ineligibility of executive for
continuous reelection, 321; favors
election of executive by legislature,
324; favors seven years and in-

717

eligibility, 325; moves modifica-
tion of oath for President, 472;
thinks President will be elected by
Senate, 509; objects to election of
President by legislature, 515;
moves eventual election of Presi-
dent be limited to three candidates,
517; thinks system of electors
autocratic, 518; proposes executive
council, 531; rejected, 532; thinks
President should not have pardon-
ing power over treason, 571; ob-
jects to rule for yeas and nays, 19;
favors election of larger branch of
legislature by people, 32; favors
election to Senate by State legisla-
tures, 74; opposes consent of legis-
lature to be necessary to amend
constitution, 89; consideration
postponed, 90; opposes legislature
to fix compensation for members,
92; urges election to legislature by
people, 143; favors biennial elec-
tions for first branch of legislature,
145; moves twenty-five years as
age of members of first branch,
149; favors ineligibility of mem-
bers of first branch of legislature
to office, 150, 152; thinks fit charac-
ters for offices will be found, 154;
suggests property qualification for
Senators, 172; on committee on
representation in Senate, 205; in-
sists on accommodation on repre-
sentation, 211; moves to consider
vote in Senate, 215; favors increase
of representation, 226; thinks
basis of representation should be
fixed, 231/ thinks slaves entitled
to representation. 234; opposes
wealth as basis of representation,
235; favors fixing standard of rep-
resentation, 238; thinks three
Senators from each State too
many, 310; moves qualifications for
legislature, 326; favors qualifica-
tions for legislature, 327; would
exclude debtors, 327; favors an-
nual meeting of legislature, 349;
favors seven years’ citizenship for
members of legislature, 355; in-
sists members of legislature must
be residents of States, 357; pro-
poses one year, 357; favors vote
per capita in Senate, 366; favors
long term citizenship for members
of Senate, 367; favors majority
for a quorum, 376; approves ex-
pulsion of members of legislature,
378; favors yeas and nays at re-
quest of one-fifth, 379; on publicity
in legislature, 381; thinks mem-
bers of legislature should be inelig-
718

ible to office, 396; thinks legis-
lature should have power to emit
bills of credit, 413; thinks treas-
urer ought to be appointed by
legislature, 415; favors power to
prescribe punishment for piracies,
415; thinks legislature must have
power over funds, 421; thinks Sen-
ate has too much power, 571; ob-
jects to appointment of judges by
executive, 274; objects to appoint-
ment of judges by Senate, 275;
thinks inferior judicial tribunals
necessary, 279; favors judiciary
with executive in  revisionary
power, 296, 298; opposes appoint-
ment of judges by executive, 303;
favors fixed compensation for
judges, 474; proposes regulation
of militia, 421; moves power over
militia, 424; favors limited power
over militia, 425, 426; thinks
money bills should originate in
first branch of legislature, 217;
insists Senate may not originate
money bills, 362; favors provision
for money bills, 365; would elimi-
nate Senate from money bills, 389;
favors Senate power of amendment
of money bills, 404; brings up
question of money bills, 437;
thinks government should operate
on individuals, 28; new govern-
ment to operate on people, 63;
does not see necessity for pro-
vision for amending constitution,
89; thinks State governments must
have power of defense, 164; favors
admission of new States on equal
terms, 213; urges comp+omise, 216;
favors census, 248; favors guar-
antee of republican constitution to
States, 280; favors ratification by
people, 305; opposes seat of govern-
ment at State capital, 332; with-
draws motion, 332; opposes mutual
negative of branches of legislature,
347; opposes restriction of fran-
chise, 353; counsels caution in ad-
mitting foreigners, 387; thinks
treaties may alienate territory,
405; opposes tax on exports, 410;
thinks government should have
power to issue paper money, 414;
on grand committee on assumption
of State debts, 423; moves power
to make sumptuary laws, 429;
definition of treason, 430; thinks
treason may be against a State,
432; moves restriction, 434; op-
poses tax on exports, 441; de-
nounces slave trade and slavery,
443; opposes power to negative

INDEX

State laws, 456; thinks legislature
will pay debts, 465; opposes con-
fining slave trade to three States,
468; opposes encouragement of
slave trade, 469; on committee on
imposts, 470; thinks States may
make contracts, 478; thinks States
may lay embargoes, 479; thinks
States may tax imports, 480; fa-
vors two-thirds vote for navigation
acts, 485; favors equality of West-
ern country, 487; favors ratifica-
tion by nine States, 498; opposes
constitution, 500; would exclude
office seekers, 505; opposes creation
of Vice President, 527; would ex-
tend reasons for impeachment,
535; would make repeal of laws
easy, 555; favors Bill of Rights,
556, 557; moves power to pass
sumptuary laws, 558; on commit-
tee on sumptuary laws, 558; moveg
States have power to lay duties
on exports for inspection, 558;
fears monopolies, 564; regards
armies as dangerous in time of
peace, 565; would strike out ex
post facto, 565; proposes expendi-
tures be annually published, 566;
favors power of State to lay du-
ties on tonnage, 570; opposes plan
for amendment, 573; favors two-
thirds vote for navigation acts,
575; lost, 575; seconds motion for
second convention, 576; does not
sign, 583.

McClurg; James, Va., attends, 17;

moves for executive during good
behavior, 271; insists on inde-
pendence of executive, 273; favors
guaranteeing States against vio-
lence, 281; asks what force execu-
tive is to have, 294.

McHenry, James, Md., attends, 18; on

grand committee on assumption of
State debts, 423; favors taxation
by requisition, 438; thinks em-
bargo permitted, 440; opposed to
bills of attainder and iex post
facto laws, 449; proposes State
consent to ports of entry, 470; in-
sists compensation of judges shali
not be changed, 474; moves Presi-
dent have power to convene either
house of Congress in extraordinary
sessions, 537; moves power of State
to lay duties on tonnage, 569.

Mercer, John Francis, Md., attends,

337; opposes free franchise, 354;
opposes plan, 355; thinks candi-
dates should be nominated by
State legislatures, 355; opposes
seven years’ residence in State for
INDEX

members of legislature, 356; op-

poses residence as necessary for

members of legislature, 357; thinks

Senate powerless, 362; favors less

than a majority for a quorum, 376;

seconds motion fixing quorum,

377; hopes Senate will only have

legislative power, 380; thinks

legislature can not agree on seat
of government, 383; moves those
already citizens be eligible for legis-
lature, 386; insists on good faith
towards foreigners, 388; thinks
members of legislature may hold
offices, 396; opposes ineligibility of
members of legislature to offices,

400; opposes power of Senate over

treaties, 404; denies power of ju-

diciary to declare a law void, 406;

favors revisionary power for

judges, 406; opposes tax on ex-
ports, 412; seconds motion to es-
tablish post roads, 413; favors
paper money, 413; favors appoint-
ment of Treasurer by executive,

415; favors power to define crimes,

416.

Merchants, tradesmen, etc., of Provi-
dence, R. I., letter of, to chairman
of convention, May 11, 1787, 595,

Mifflin, Thomas, Penn., attends, 18;
seconds motion concerning eligi-
bility of members of legislature to
office, 396.

Military power to be subordinate to
eivil, 427.

Militia, power to regulate, 421; dis-
cussed, 424; power over, referred
to grand committee, 427; legisla-
ture to have power over, 435; au-
thority over, 451; partial federal
control rejected, 452; uniformity
in regulations, rejected, 454; clause
agreed to, 454; State appointment
of lower officers, 454; rejected,
454; all officers agreed to, 455;
training by United States agreed
to, 455; to be called out, 456;
power of President over, 472.

Minutes, committee to superintend, 21.

Money, borrowing power, agreed to, 414.

Money bills, originating, 207, 216; in
first branch agreed, 219, 260; ques-
tion postponed, 222; discussed,
362; considered, 365; reconsidered,
383, 384, 388; exclusive control of,
in first branch of legislature re-
jected, 395; Senate to amend, re-
jected, 395; Senate to amend, 404;
question postponed, 404; question
discussed, 437. - é

Morris, Gouverneur, Penn., attends, 17;
opposes legislature choosing execu-

719

tive, 267; favors election of execu-
tive by people, 267, 268; favors
eligibility of executive for second
term, 270; favors term for good
behavior for executive, 271; op-
posed to monarchy, 273; thinks im-
peachment of executive ought not
to be tried by judges, 275; favors
eligibility of executive for second
term, 282; favors short term for
executive, 288; opposes impeacha-
bility of executive, 290; thinks
causes of impeachability of execu-
tive should be given, 291; thinks
impeachability of executive neces-
sary, 293; moves qualifications of
electors, 294; opposes rotation in
executive, 321; favors idea of vot-
ing for two persons for executive,
322; favors long tenure for execu-
tive, 326; would give executive ab-
solute negative, 350; opposes elec-
tion of President by legislature,
463; moves that the President be
required to recommend and report
to legislature, 464; thinks execu-
tive may correspond with States,
470; objects to president of Sen-
ate as successor to President, 472;
explains mode of election of Presi-
dent, 509; objects to election of
President by majority vote, 509;

. favors eventual election of Presi-

dent by Senate, 511; defends mode
of election of President, 515; fa-
vors separate provision for reelec-
tion of President, 519; defends
system of electors, 520; favors in-
clusion of Senate in appointing,
529; opposes executive council,
531; thinks election of President
will prevent maladministration,
535; thinks President’s negative
may be set aside by majority, 555;
favors appointment of Treasurer
by executive, 562; wants Senate
elected by the people, 70; favors
independent Senate, 202; opposes
report of committee on representa-
tion, 208; favors property qualifi-
cation for representation, 211;
moves commitment question of rep-
resentation, 213; on committee on
representation, 215; reports on
ratio of representation, 223; moves
postponement of question of ratio
of representation, 224; explains
representation of Georgia, 225; on
committee on representation, 226;
thinks southern States have too
much representation, 228; opposes
basis of representation, 234; thinks
basis of representation should not
720

be fixed, 236; thinks West should
not be represented equally, 236;
opposes representation of blacks,
242; objects to counting negroes in
representation, 249; moves con-
sideration of representation, 263;
opposes quotas, 264; approves
definition of powers of legislature,
265; opposes negative on State
laws by legislature, 265, 266;
thinks Congress ought not to be
continued, 279; moves vote per
capita in Senate, 309; moves three
Senators from each State, 310;
opposes election of executive by
legislature, 315; on qualifications
for legislature, 327; would not ex-
clude debtors from legislature, 327;
would modify mutual negative of
branches of legislature, 347; op-
poses stated meeting of legislature,
348; moves legislature meet in
May, 349; favors seven years’ citi-
zenship for members of legislature,
356; opposes inhabitants for mem-
bers of legislature, 356; opposes
slave representation, 360; objects
to vacancies in Senate being filled
by executive, 363; favors motion
that vacancies in Senate be filled
by legislature or executive, 364;
proposes fourteen years’ citizenship
for members of Senate, 367; moves
thirteen years’ citizenship for
members of Senate, 369; moves
first branch of legislature name
time of meeting, 371; opposes prop-
erty qualification for legislature,
375; moves number for quorum,
377; thinks majority may expel
members of legislature, 378; moves
that one member call for yeas and
nays, 379; on right of dissent in
legislature, 379; moves those al-
ready citizens be eligible for legis-
lature, 386; opposes ineligibility of
members of legislature to offices,
398, 400; moves eligibility of mem-
hers of legislature to army or navy,
401; opposes payment of legisla-
ture by States, 401; opposes ap-
pointments by Senate, 455; opposes
treaty power of Senate, 458;
moves power of legislature over
public lands, 493; suggests legis-
lature may call convention to
amend constitution, 494; thinks
ineligibility of members of legis-
lature to offices will be evaded, 505;
thinks legislature should judge
privileges of members, 511; opposes
originating revenue in House, 513;
favors Vice President for presi-

INDEX

dent of Senate, 527; opposes treat-
ies of peace with majority of Sen-
ate, 530; favors impeachment
trials by Senate, 535; motion that
no State be deprived of equal vote
in Senate, agreed to, 575; seconds
motion for appointment of judges
by executive, 275; thinks salaries
of judges may be increased, 277;
seconds motion of appointment of
judges by executive, with two-
thirds of Senate, 277, 278; favors
inferior judicial tribunals, 279;
favors appointment of judges by
executive, 302; favors permanent
tenure of judges, 473; would al-
low increase in judges’ salaries,
474; would preserve habeas corpus,
477; thinks money bills may origi-
nate in either branch of legislature,
216; opposes originating money
bills in first branch of legislature,
217; favors power to originate
money bills in Senate, 362, 404;
opposes provision for money bills,
366; favors participation of Sen-
ate in money bills, 391; objects to
committee to superintend minutes,
22; moves consideration of national
union, 27; suggests consideration
of national government, 27; ex-
plains “federal,” “national,” “su-
preme,” etc., 28; asks Delaware
delegates not to withdraw, 30;
urges national considerations, 221;
thinks mode of census should not be
fixed, 231; thinks South will insist
on slave trade, 240; moves commit-
ment of question of slave trade,
446; would confine slave trade to
Carolinas and Georgia, 467; with-
draws motion, 468; favors direct
taxation by representation, 241,
242, 247; favors federal power of
police, 264; objects to guarantee-
ing State governments, 280; shows
separation of powers, 299; thinks
legislature should not ratify, 307;
moves ratification by one conven-
tion, 309; would strike out clause
relating to direct taxation, 317;
favors property qualification for
office, 329; opposes disqualification
of debtors, 331; thinks Philadel-
phia or New York may be seat of
government, 332; favors restricted
franchise, 352; favors restrictive
policy towards foreigners, 369;
opposes State regulation of elec-
tions, 372; thinks seat of govern-
ment should be fixed, 381; on obli-
gations to foreigners, 387; insists
upon revisionary power, 406; pro-
INDEX

poses absolute negative on laws for
executive, 407; favors tax on ex-
ports, 410, 411; objects to power
to emit bills of credit, 413; op-
poses paper emissions, 413; favors
punishment for counterfeiting,
416; moves power to punish for
Piracies, 416; favors power to sup-
press rebellion without application
of State legislature, 417; proposes
council of State, 428; opposes
sumptuary laws, 430; thinks trea-
son should be defined, 430; favors
British definition of treason, 432;
favors restriction, 434; favors gen-
eral contributions of States accord-
ing to representation, 436; favors
tax on exports, 439; approves
power to tax exports with consent
of States, 480; thinks ex post facto
laws unnecessary, 449; opposed to
bills of attainder, 449; moves
provision requiring new govern-
ment to fulfill engagements of old
government, 451; explains treaties
are laws, 455; moves power to call
out militia, 456; does not wish too
many treaties, 458; insists on pay-
ment of debts, 466; thinks legis-
lature may not tax freemen im-
ported, 469; thinks States may
regulate contracts, 478; moves for
mutual recognition by States of
acts, 482; opposes navigation acts,
484; moves that new States be ad-
mitted under conditions, 487;
moves to admit new States by two-
thirds vote, 488; not to be created
from old States, 488; thinks States
ean not be divided, 489; makes
motion in favor of Vermont, 491;
approves forbidding religious test,
492; thinks contiguous States may
ratify constitution, 495; favors
having State choose mode of rati-
fication, 497; thinks constitution
need not have approval of Con-
gress, 499; favors convention, 499;
favors second convention to make
another constitution, 500; on com-
mittee on postponed measures, 502;
moves amendment clause relating
to validity of acts of States, 503;
favors federal bankruptcy laws,
504; on committee on style, 538;
wishes law to be stable, 555;
thinks States may Jay export du-
ties to pay charges, 557; explains
direct taxation provision, 559; pro-
poses suspension from office of per-
sons impeached, 561; would de-
fine law of nations, 563; thinks
power to create university unneces-

721

sary, 564; opposes discrimination
against army, 565; thinks publi-
cation of expenditures impossible,
566; thinks States may lay duties
on tonnage, 570; moves lower of-
ficers may make appointments,
572; wishes amendments by con-
vention, 574; wants all States to
sign constitution, 580.

Morris, Robert, Penn., attends, 17;
nominates George Washington for
president of convention, 17; sec-
onds motion for life term for Sena-
tors, 165.

Name of government agreed to, 347.
National government considered, 27, 28,
29, 129, 131; agreed to, 29.
Navigation acts, by two-thirds vote,
412; referred to committee, 413;
debated, 483; clause agreed to,
487; motion to require two-thirds

vote, lost, 575.

Navy, power to raise, agreed to, 424.

Negative, to extend to resoiutions re-
jected, 409; agreed to, 409; power
of legislature to negative State
laws, proposed, 456; rejected, 457.

Negative of bills, ten days allowed for,
409.

Negative of executive, overruled by
three-fourths, agreed to, 408.

Negative on laws, plan, 407.

New Hampshire, moved to send for
delegates from, 190; rejected, 191;
representation of, discussed, 226;
not reduced, 228.

New States, government, 420.

North Carolina, representation of, 569.

Oath to support national government,
provision postponed, 59; to support
Union, debated, 304; agreed, 304;
for President, 472; to support con-
stitution, affirmation permitted,
4965.

Pardons, reprieves, power to grant, 471;
impeachments excepted, 471; be-
fore conviction, 471.

Pardoning power, President to have,
over treason cases, 572.

Patterson’s plan, text, 102; debated,
104, 120; representation plan post-
poned, 127; referred to committee
of detail, 318, 337.

Patterson, William, N. J., attends, 17;
moves resumption of clause relat-
ing to rule of suffrage in legisla-

* ture, 80; opposes proportional rep-
resentation in legislature, 81;
moves question of representation
be postponed, 83; proposes plan,
101; supports his plan, 105; sec-
722 INDEX

onds motion to urge New Hamp-
shire to send delegates, 190; on
committee on representation in
“Senate, 205; thinks small States
have been treated badly, 211} in-
sists on equal vote of States in
Senate, 221; opposes numbers and
wealth as basis of representation,
225; favors adjournment, 262;
proposes election of executive by
electors, 285.

Peace, power of, discussed, 419.

Pennsylvania, opposes two branches of
national legislature, 31.

Pensioners, disqualification rejected,
331.

Pierce, William, Ga., attends, 31;
favors election of one branch of
legislature by the people, 66; moves
that wages of members of legisla-
ture be paid from national treas-
ury, 93; passed, 93; moves three
years for Senate term, 96; thinks
State distinctions must be sacri-
ficed, 187.

Pinckney, Charles, S. C., attends, 17;
on powers of executive, 39; pro-
poses seven years’ term for execu-
tive, 40; favors single executive,
37, 48; thinks executive may con-
sult heads of departments in re-
visionary power, 68; favors elec-
tion of executive by legislature,
268; thinks executive should not be
impeachable, 290, 291; thinks pow-
ers of executive should be circum-
scribed, 293; proposes executive
be ineligible for continuous re-
election, 321; opposes executive
council, 423; moves President be
elected by majority vote, 462;
thinks Senate will elect President,
510; objects to eventual election
of President by Senate, 514; seconds
motion that two-thirds of Senate
be present when voting for Presi-
dent, 523; moves to strike out
nomination to Senate by State
legislatures, 35; objects to powers
of national legislature to cases
where State legislatures are in-
competent, 36; proposes first
branch of national legislature be
elected by State legislatures, 62;
wants proportional representation
in Senate, 74; moves negative of
national legislature on State laws,
75; moves States be divided into
classes as basis for representation,
79; seconds motion for ratio of
Tepresentation to be in proportion
to all free inhabitants and three-
fifths others, 88; passed, 88;
moves elimination of clause pro-

hibiting reelection into first branch
for number of years, 94; agreed to,
94; opposes elections to legislature
by State legislatures, 142; favors
four years for Senate, 166; opposes
equal votes in Senate, 201; thinks
numbers best basis for representa-
tion, 215; thinks Congress has no
right to admit new States, 215;
favors equality of blacks in repre-
sentation, 245; proposes propor-
tional representation in Senate,
253; favors negative on State laws
by legislature, 266; seconds motion
of qualifications for legislature,
327; moves increase in represen-
tation of South Carolina, 358; de-
fends slave representation, 361;
approves fourteen years’ citizen-
ship for members of Senate, 367;
thinks States should name time of
elections to legislature, 371; thinks
property qualification for legisla-
ture should be fixed, 373; opposes
ineligibility of members of legisla-
ture to offices, 395, 399, 504, 506;
Moves postponement of question of
eligibility of members of legisla-
ture, 401; opposes war power for
legislature, 418; favors power in
Senate, 418; rejected, 419; moves
power to fix seat of government,
establish seminaries, charters, pat-
ents, copyrights, inventions, 420;
payment of debt, public credit, let-
ters of mark, stages, 421; favors
power over militia, 426; moves
power in legislature to negative
State laws, 456; moves legisla-
ture judge privileges of members,
511; opposes Senate as court of
impeachment, 536; opposes three-
fourths vote to set aside President’s
negative, 556; opposes appoint-
ment of Treasurer by legislature,
562; would increase representa-
tion of North Carolina, 568; op-
poses appointment of judiciary by
legislature, 58; opposes revisionary
power in judiciary, 68; moves
judges of national judiciary be ap-
pointed by legislature, 97; with-
drawn, 97; wishes judges appointed
by Senate, 301; opposes judiciary
in revisionary power, 406; to re-
quire opinions of judges, to pre-
serve writ of habeas corpus, 427;
would preserve habeas corpus,
477; insists on jury trial in
civil cases, 572; thinks originating
money bills no concession, 217;
opposes money bills in first branch
of legislature, 383; insists on slave
trade, 443; defends slavery, 444;
INDEX

says South Carolina insists on
slave trade, 446; asks for slave
trade till 1808, 467; moves fugi-
tive slaves be delivered up, 481; on
committee on rules, 18; moves com-
mittee to superintend minutes, 21;
introduces draft of government,
26; asks if State governments are
to be abolished, 27; upholds powers
of convention, 109; speech, 155;
moves commitment of qualifications
for office, 328; opposes disqualifi-
cations of debtors, 331; thinks
capital may be in large town, 332;
thinks new naturalization laws
necessary, 387; favors appoint-
ment of Treasurer by joint ballot,
415; favors power to suppress re-
bellion without application of
State legislature, 417; favors as-
sumption of State debts, 421;
proposes clause for liberty of the
press, 427, 565; moves power to
establish offices, 430; moves prohi-
bition of acceptance of presents
from foreign governments, 455;
thinks State executives ought to
be appointed by general govern-
ment, 457; moves to establish laws
of bankruptcies, 482; moves regu-
lation of commerce, foreign and
domestic, by two-thirds vote, 483;
favors power to pass navigation
acts, 483; moves religious tests be
forbidden, 495; thinks constitu-
tion need not have approval of Con-
gress, 499; would exclude Senate
from appointing power, 529; moves
an address to people, 544; pro-
poses university, 564; opposes pro-
vision against army, 565; favors
occasional publication of expendi-
tures, 567; opposes second conven-
tion, 576; plan of, presented to
convention, May 29, 1787; 596;
letters from, to John Quincy
Adams, relating to the Pinckney
plan, 598; text of plan submitted
by, to John Quincy Adams, 600;
note of James Madison, on plan of,
606.

Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth, S. C.,
attends, 17; thinks elections to
national legislature by the people
impracticable, 66; opposes ineligi-
bility of members of first branch
of legislature, 151; proposes Sen-
ate have no salary, 171; thinks
Senate should be paid by States,
173; proposes compromise on vote
in Senate, 201; favors reduction
of representation of New Hamp-
shire, 226; wishes increase in rep-
resentation of southern States,

723

227; moves increase in representa-
tion of Georgia, 228; moves in-
crease in representation of South
Carolina, 228, 358; moves ten
years’ citizenship for members of
Senate, 370; thinks salaries of
judges may be changed, 474;
thinks provision for jury trials un-
necessary, 573; thinks Senate may
originate money bills, 98; thinks
originating money bills in first
branch no concession, 219; insists
blacks should count equally with
whites, 233; insists on security for
slaves, 311; admits slave trade is
price of navigation laws, 468;
wishes provision in favor of prop-
erty in slaves, 481; doubts powers
of convention, 28; moves to con-
sider more effective government,
28; favors retention of State power,
143; favors taxation by representa-
tion, 241; thinks rule of wealth
should be fixed, 243; favors census
in six years, 245; opposes adjourn-
ment, 261; moves qualifiaations
for office, 328; on grand commit-
tee on assumption of State debts,
423; favors army, 424; favors
power over militia, 425, 453; on
committee on navigation acts, 448;
approves forbidding religious test,
495; announces support of consti-
tution, 582.

Pickney plan, referred, 27; outline,

'  26n.; referred to committee of de-
tail, 318, 337.

Piracies and felonies, law and punish-
ment debated, 415; punishment
struck out, 416, 563; agreed to,
416, 417; power to define, 416.

Ports of entry, State consent to, ‘pro-
posed, 470; regulation of, 501.

Post offices, power agreed to, 413.

Prayers in convention proposed, 181.

Preamble agreed to, 347.

Presents from foreign governments

prohibited, 455.

Privileges, equal, for citizens of States,
clause agreed to, 481.

Property qualification for office, agreed
to, 330.

Public acts of one State valid in
another, clause agreed to, 504.

Public debt, power to regulate, 421.

Quorum, less than a majority proposed,
376; number, rejected, 378; con-
sidered, 407; of Senate, two-thirds
rejected, 534.

Randolph, Edmund, Va., attends, 17;
opening speech, 22; opposes single
executive, 38, 48; opposed to execu-
724

tive being appointed by executives
of States, 80; opposes eligibility of
executive for second term, 284;
seconds motion restricting Presi-
dent’s power of appointment, 464;
objects to mode of election of Presi-
dent, 509; thinks eventual election
of President should be in legisla-
ture, 511; thinks President should
not have pardoning power over
treason, 571; favors small Senate,
34; will not give indefinite powers
to national legislature, 36; ap-
proves seven years’ for Senate term,
95; favors two years for service in
first branch of legislature, 144; op-
poses State compensation for legis-
lature, 147; suggests rotation in
Senate, 165; favors commitment of
question of representation, 204,
225; on committee on representa-
tion, 215; wishes legislature to ar-
range basis of representation, 243;
moves reconsideration of question
of representation, 248; opposes
police power of legislature, 265;
opposes fixing time for meeting of
legislature, 349; thinks vacancies
in Senate may be filled by execu-
tive, 368; moves to postpone ques-
tion of vote in Senate, 364, 365;
thinks vote in Senate should be
postponed, 365; opposes fourteen
years’ citizenship for Senate, 368;
agrees to nine years’ citizenship
for Senate, 370; moves legislature
compel attendance, 378; approves
expulsion of members of legisla-
ture, 378; thinks one member may
call for yeas and nays, 379; pro-
poses four years’ citizenship for
first branch of legislature, 384;
agrees to allow eligibility of mem-
bers of legislature to army or
navy, 401; favors ineligibility of
members of legislature to offices,
565; doubts if legislature should
judge privileges of members, 511;
opposes Vice President for presi-
dent of Senate, 527; would exclude
Senate from pardoning power,
571; moves that jurisdiction of
national judiciary should extend
to cases involving revenue and im-
peachment, 97; agreed to, 97;
favors appointment of judges by
Senate, 276; favors inferior judi-
cial tribunals, 279; favors appoint-
ment of judges by executive with
Senate, 301; favors fixed compen-
sation. for judges, 474; moves to
reconsider question of money bills,
863; favors money bills in first

INDEX

branch of legislature, 383; opposes
amendment of money bills by Sen-
ate, 388; insists on restricting
money bills to first branch of legis-
lature, 393; moves to extend nega-
tive to resolutions, 409; moves to
consider clause for national govern-
ment, 27, 28; opposes consent of
legislature to be necessary to
amend constitution, 90; considera-
tion postponed, 90; opposes requir-
ing oaths from members of State
governments to observe constitu-
tion, 90; upholds national plan,
109: accepts supreme government
instead of national, 132; proposes
sermon on 4th of July, 182; thinks
new States should not be discrim-
inated against, 213; urges com-
promise, 216; opposes reduction of
representation of New Hampshire,
228; moves census as basis for
representation, 230; favors census,
233; explains adjournment pro-
posal, 262; favors guarantee of re-
publican constitution, 280; moves
that States must have republican
government, 281; opposes ratifi-
cation by legislatures, 305; de-
fines treason, 413; moves power to
define piracies, etc., 416; favors
power to punish piracies, 416;
favors British definition of trea-
son, 432; favors commitment of
question of slave trade, 447; thinks
provision to fulfill engagements of
old government necessary, 40;
favors national control of militia,
453; moves provision for State
debts, 460; moves validity of
debts, 466; moves mutual accept-
ance of States of public acts,
482; on committee on_mutual rec-_

ognition of public acts by States,
483; finds odious features in con-
stitution, 486; proposes nine
States may ratify constitution,
495; thinks State conventions
should amend constitution, 500;
thinks powers too lossely defined,
503; wants second convention, 841,
544, 575; states objections to consti-
tution, 543; moves to strike out
servitude, 559; favors power to
grant charters of incorporation,
564; regards armies as dangerous
in time of peace, 563; states why
he will not sign constitution, 580,
581; does not sign, 583; extract of
letter from James Madison, 590.

Ratifying constitution by conventions,

discussed, 59, 460; by plurality of
States, proposed, *60; by nine
INDEX

States, proposed, 60; clause post-
poned, 60; by nine States agreed
to, 499; by legislature, rejected,
309; by conventions agreed to, 309;
mode debated, 304, 495, 560; mode
agreed to, 500; by conventions, 460.

Read, George, Del., attends, 17; would
give executive absolute negative,
350; proposes casting vote for
President in president of Senate,
463; opposed to separate provision
for reelection of President, 519;
thinks small States may have no
vote for President, 526; moves
postponement of question of repre-
sentation, 30; motion agreed to,
31; favors fair representation in
Senate, 162; proposes life term
for Senators, 165; proposes nine
years for Senate, 167; on com-
mittee on representation, 226; fa-
vors increase in representation,
230; would not shackle legislature,
235; opposes seven years’ residence
in State for members of legislature,
356; thinks money bills may origi-
nate in Senate, 365; objects to
judiciary power extending to
equity, 473; moves to consider
more effective government, 28;
wishes strong national govern-
ment, 66; opposes guaranteeing
territory to States, 89; wishes to
extinguish State attachments, 169;
discusses rights of States, 184;
wishes representation of Delaware
increased, 225; opposes taxation
by representation, 247; opposes
paper money, 414; favors appoint-
ment of Treasurer by executive,
415; wishes executives of States to
appoint officers of militia, 426;
would combine slave trade and
tax on exports, 447; proposes no di-
rect taxes, 566; on committee on
imposts, 470.

Rebellion in State, power to subdue,
discussed, 417; agreed to, 418; re-
jected, 418. '

Religious test, 428; forbidden, 495.

Representation, national, proportional,
considered, 30, 80, 84; postponed,
31; passed, 88; limitation of, pro-
posed, 436. 7

Representatives, House of. See Legisla-
ture, House of Representatives.

Republican constitution, guarantee of,
debated, 280.

Republican government for States,
clause postponed, 58.

Revenue bills, clause agreed to, 537.

Revision of acts, proposed by executive
and judiciary, 405.

725

Rhode Island, letter from, 20; repre-
sentation of, 568; letter from
merchants, tradesmen, etc. of
Providence, to chairman of con-
vention, May 11, 1787, 595.

Rules for convention, 18; reported, 18;
added to, 21.

Rutledge, John, S. C., attends, 17;
seconds nomination of George
Washington for president of con-
vention, 17; favors single execu-
tive, 37; suggests election of execu-
tive by Senate, 41; moves single
executive, 48; insists on election
of executive by electors, 287;
wishes President elected by ballot,
461; wants President elected by
legislature, 514; moves eventual
election of President limited to
thirteen candidates, 517; moves to
limit President’s emoluments, 571;
objects to powers of national legis-
lature where State legislatures are
incompetent, 36; favors election to
first branch of national legislature
by State legislatures, 62; moves
States be divided into classes as
basis for representation, 79; fa-
vors wealth as basis of representa-
tion in first branch, 84; moves ad-
dition of quotas of contribution to
motion relating to representation,
88; postponed, 88; moves members
of first branch be elected every two
years, 91; moves Senate members
serve without salary, 96; rejected,
96; favors election to legislature
by State legislatures, 143; favors
ineligibility of members of first
branch of legislature to offices, 152;
moves to consider rule of suffrage
in legislature, 174; on committee
on representation in Senate, 205;
favors property qualification for
representation, 212; moves post-
ponement of question of ratio of
representation, 224; on committee
on representation, 215, 226; moves
reduction in representation of New
Hampshire, 226; opposes increase
in representation, 230; insists on
wealth as basis of representation,
235; moves reconsideration of
money bills and equal votes in
Senate, 252; wants powers of legis-
lature defined, 260; wishes seven
years’ residence in State for mem-
bers of legislature, 356; proposes
three years’ inhabitancy for mem-
bers of legislature, 357; favors
long term of citizenship for Sen-
ate, 370; thinks States must name
time of election to legislature, 371;
726

INDEX

thinks property qualifications for
legislature should be fixed, 373;
moves qualifications for legislature
to be the same as for State legis-
latures, 375; on journals of legisla-
ture, 380; thinks Senate should
participate in money bills, 394;
seconds motion to postpone ques-
tion of money bills, 404; wishes
one supreme court, 57; opposes in-
ferior tribunals in national ju-
diciary, 60; opposes revisionary
power for judges, 300; objects to
power of removal of judges, 473;
opposes sending for delegates from
New Hampshire, 190; opposes ad-
journment, 262; thinks provision
against domestic violence unneces-
sary, 281; on committee of detail,
318; delivers report of committee
of detail, 337; opposes franchise
limited to freeholders, 354; thinks
foreigners should not hold office,
386; favors measure to guard
funds, 421; moves committee to
consider State debts, 421; moves
assumption of State debts, 421;
moves longer sessions of conven-
tion, 423; opposes tax on impor-
tation of slaves, 442; insists on
slave trade, 446; introduces addi-
tions to report, 448; moves con-
stitution be supreme law, 455; op-
poses negative on State laws, 457;
thinks provision for controversies
between States unnecessary, 460;
would prohibit retrospective laws,
479; would preserve habeas corpus,
477; on committee to consider mu-
tual recognition of public acts by
States, 483; favors navigation acts,
486; says States can not be divided
without their consent, 490; pro-
poses bankruptcy laws, 502; moves
treaties shall require two-thirds of
whole Senate, 533; opposes power
to amend clause relating to slav-
ery, 540; thinks Congress need not
approve constitution, 543; pro-
poses suspension from office of per-
sons impeached, 561; moves Treas-
urer be appointed by executive,
oe opposes address to the people,

Seat of government, provision for, dis-

cussed, 332; jurisdiction over, 420,
512; clause agreed to, 513.

Senate. See Legislature, Senate.
Sherman, Roger, Conn., attends, 27;

thinks executive must carry out
will of legislature, 38; favors elec-
tion of executive by legislature,

40, 267; favors three years’ term
for executive, 40; thinks national
legislature should remove executive
at pleasure, 46; proposes executive
council, 50; seconds motion for
eligibility of executive for second
term, 270; opposes tenure during
good behavior for executive, 271;
objects to election of President by
ballot, 461; objects to President’s
power of appointment, 464; favors
eventual election of President from
seven candidates, 517; thinks
greater powers for Congress neces-
sary, 28; opposes election to first
branch of legislature by people, 31;
favors election of one member of
Senate by each State legislature,
35; seconds motion to elect Senate
by State legislatures, 69; thinks
proportion of suffrage in first
branch should be based on free in-
habitants, 84; moves each State
should have one vote in second.
branch, 88; rejected, 89; opposes *
requiring oaths from members of
State governments to observe con-
stitution, 90; moves members of
first branch be elected annually,
91; approves five years for Senate
term, 95; favors single legislative
assembly, 136; prefers election to
legislature by State legislatures,
143; accepts biennial elections to
first branch of legislature, 145;
favors State compensation for legis-
lature, 147; opposes ineligibility of
members of first branch of legis-
lature to offices, 151, 153; seconds
motion for six years for Senators,
165; opposes seven years for Sena-
tors, 166; favors frequent elec-
tions, 168; thinks States have
equal rights, 180; thinks Congress
needs more power, 195; favors com-
mitment of question of representa-
tion in Senate, 202; favors equal \
vote in Senate, 220; opposes ratio

of representation, 223; on commit-

tee on representation, 226; opposes

increase in representation, 229;

would not shackle legislature, 231;

favors numbers as basis of repre-

sentation, 235; favors representa-

tion proposed, 239; thinks legis-

lature should fix representation,

247; insists on equal vote in Sen- *
ate, 254; thinks legislature will

require quotas from States, 259;

wishes powers of legislature de-

fined, 264; thinks time for meeting

of legislature ought to be fixed,

349; wishes members of legislature

©

be
INDEX

to be inhabitants, 356; moves to
limit representation, 359; thinks
legislature may regulate elections,
372; thinks yeas and nays unneces-
sary, 379; on journals of legisla-
ture, 380, 381; favors ineligibility
of members of legislature to offices,
398; thinks nation and State may
pay members of legislature, 402;
thinks members of legislature in-
eligible to offices with increased
salaries, 505; thinks when legis-
lature votes for President it should
vote by States, 519; favors includ-
ing Senate in treaty making power,
528; moves treaties require ma-
jority of whole Senate, 534; op-
poses reconsideration of representa-
tion, 538; moves amendments by
legislature proposed to States, 539;
thinks Congress has no power over
press, 565; opposes inferior tri-
bunals in national judiciary, 61;
wishes power to remain with State
governments. 63; moves that
judges of national judiciary he
appointed by legislature, 97; with-
drawn, 97 ; insists on appointment of
judges by Senate, 275; favors ap-
pointment of judges by Senate, 276 ;
wishes State tribunals to be used
when possible, 279; favors power of
removal of judges, 473; moves to
extend judicial powers to land
cases, 476; appellate jurisdiction
of supreme court, 476; trial by
jury, 477; thinks supreme court
should not try President, 536;
moves postponement of question of
money bills, 222; wishes to con-
sider money bills and vote in Sen-
ate together, 252; favors originat-
ing money bills in House, 513;
defends slave representation, 359,
361; would permit slave trade, 443,
446; objects to use of word
“ slaves,” 468; opposes delivering
up of fugitive slaves, 481; opposes
negative of executive on laws, 52;
power of legislature to negative
State laws, 76; opposes negative on
State laws by legislature, 265, 266;
favors mutual negative by both
branches of legislature, 347; op-
poses negative on laws for judges,
407; thinks negative on State laws
unnecessary, 456; favors two-
thirds vote to overrule President’s
negative, 554; opposes power of
direct taxation, 264; thinks ex-
ports should not be taxed, 412;
opposed to tax on exports, 439;
objects to taxing men as property,

727

468; says tax on slaves not a dis-
couragement to importation, 469;
Moves power to tax exports with
consent of States, 479; would leave
power to tax imports with legis-
ture, 479; opposes ratification by
conventions, 59; thinks constitu-
tion can be ratified by State legis-
latures, 59; favors prayers in con-
vention, 182; would not discrimi-
nate against West, 252; thinks
United States under no obligations
to foreigners, 386; objects to ap-
pointment of Treasurer by joint
ballot, 415; favors appointment, of
Treasurer by legislature, 562; to
authorize legislature to assume
State debts, 422; on grand com-
mittee on assumption of State
debts, 423; opposes assumption
State debts, 436; moves payment of,
old debts, 467; thinks States should
control militia, 425, 426, 451;
moves uniformity for militia, 452;
opposes State appointment of lower
militia officers, 454; favors State
power over treason, 433; moves
general contributions of States
according to representation, 436;
thinks provision for State contro-
versies unnecessary, 460; on com-
mittee on imposts, 470; proposes
regulation of commerce, 476; moves
prohibition of paper money, 478;
thinks States may lay embargoes,
479; favors navigation acts, 484;
favors equality of new States, 487;
thinks a State can not be dismem-
bered, 488; moves admission and
formation of new States, 490; on
claims to Western country, 492;
thinks religious test unnecessary,
495; thinks ten States may ratify
constitution, 495; thinks all States
must agree to constitution, 497;
moves ratification by ten States,
498; brings in report on com-
mercial regulations, 501; moves
committee to consider postponed,
propositions, 502; on committee on
postponed measures, 502; opposes
federal bankruptcy laws, 504; fa-
vors mode of electing Vice Presi-
dent, 508; wants army limited, 512;
favors Vice President for president
of Senate, 527; would submit con-
stitution to Congress, 542; thinks
State bills of rights still in force,
557; objects to power to cut canals,
567; favors occasional publication
of expenditures, 567; opposes ad-
dress to people, 568; thinks power
of nation supreme in regulating
728

trade, 570; agrees appointments
may be made by lower officers, 572;
fears power of amendment, 573;
motion lost, 575; would strike out
clause for amendments, 575; mo-
tion lost, 575.

Slavery, word “servitude” struck out,
559.

Slaves, importation of, 442, 459; im-
portation tax on, agreed to, 469;
delivery up of fugitive, moved,
481.

Slave trade, till 1808 proposed, 467;
confined to States already permit-
ting it, 468.

South Carolina, representation from,
228, 358.

Spaight, Richard Dobbs, N. C., attends,
17; moves rule allowing revision
of questions, 21; moves question of
election of executive, 310; favors
election of electors for executive
by State legislatures, 312; moves
eventual election of President be
limited to thirteen candidates, 517;
Moves seven years’ term for execu-
tive, 52; moves six years’ term
for President, 521; moves electors
meet at seat of government, 522;
favors representation by popula-
tion, 30; thinks members of second
branch should be chosen by State
legislatures, 19; withdraws mo-
tion, 34; moves term of members
of Senate be seven years, 94;
agreed to, 96; fears seat of gov-
ernment will be in New York, 381;
favors navigation acts, 484; pro-
poses limitation on treaties of
peace, 532.

Stages, power to regulate, 421.

States, admission of, agreed to, 58, 279;
republican constitution to be
guaranteed to each State, passed,
89; assumption of debts of, pro-
posed, 42].

Strong, Caleb, Mass., attends, 18; sec-
onds one year for service in legis-
lature, 144; favors commitment of
question of representation in Sen-
ate, 204; favors equal vote in
Senate and money bills in first
branch of legislature, 255; thinks
executive may be elected by State
legislatures, 312; proposes $4 per
day as compensation for members
of legislature, 403; moves Senate
have power to amend money bills,
404.

Style and arrangement, committee on,
appointed, 538.

Suffrage, restraint of, 351; limitation
to freeholders, rejected, 355; de-

INDEX

bated, 355; remarks of James Madi-
son on question of, 619.
Sumptuary laws proposed, 429; re-
jected, 430; committee on, ap-
pointed, 558.
Surrender of criminals by States,
clause agreed to, 481.

Tax on exports, 438; for revenue, re-
jected, 441; by two-thirds, re-
jected, 442; prohibited, 442; re-
ferred to committee, 448.

Taxation, direct, by representation,
agreed to, 242, 248; according to
representation, rejected, 248; di-
rect considered, 264, 265; meaning,
435; apportionment considered,
317; proportioned upon representa-
tion, 437; proportion agreed to,
436; by representation rejected,
438; by requisitions, proposed,
438; rejected, 438.

Taxation and slave trade, committed,
447.

Taxes, power to lay, 409.

Treason, definition, 430; motion to re-
commit, lost, 431; British defini-
tion, rejected, 482; general defini-
tion, agreed to, 432; two witnesses,
agreed to, 433; sole power over,
433; rejected, 433; against United
States, agreed to, 434; on confes-
sion, 434; clause agreed to, 434.

Treason, pardons, referred to committee
on style, 544.

Treasurer, power to appoint, 415; ap-
pointment by joint ballot, agreed
to, 415; to be appointed by legisla-
ture, 562; struck out, 563.

Treaties, power of Senate over, opposed,
404; to be laws, 456; power to
make, 457, 458, 528; power in
Senate, confirmed, 459; question
committed, 459; Senate’s partici-
pation in, 529; of peace, by ma-
jority, rejected, 531; clause recon-
sidered, 532; two-thirds of Senate
to agree if affecting territorial
Tights, 532; reconsidered, 532; may
be made by majority of Seuate,
533; motion not to require two-
thirds of Senate, lost, 533; to re-
quire consent of two-thirds of
whole Senate, rejected, 534; to re-
quire majority of whole Senate,
lost, 534; previous notice to Sen-
ate, lost, 534; with consent of two-
thirds agreed to, 534; forbidden to
States, 567.

University, power to establish, 420;
lost, 565.
Vermont, admission of, 480, 491.
INDEX

Vice President, powers of, reported,
507, 508; mode of choosing, 509;
to be president of Senate, debated

_ 527; agreed to, 528. :

Virginia plan, 22; debated, 27; com-
rina as whole, report on, 99 -
‘avora reported, 127; =
a ae Pp 27; as report

Voting, right of. See suffrage.

War, power to make, discussed, 418;
to declare, agreed to, 419; clause
to include letters of marque,
an 3 States may not engage in,

Washington, George, Va., attends, 17;
elected president of convention, 17;
speaks for increased representation,
579; extract of letter from Gen.
Knox, 585; extracts of letters from
John Hay, 586, 587; letter from
James Madison, 593.

Weights and measures, power to fix,
agreed to, 412.

Western country, representation of,
249; dangers from, 250; discrimi-
nation against, rejected, 252; en-
couragement of, opposed, 480;
claim to, 492.

Western States, admission of, 487.

Williamson, Hugh, N. C., attends, 17;
opposes election of executive by
electors, 42; moves impeachability
of executive, 48; seconds motion
for ineligibility of executive for
second term, 287; favors six years’
term for executive, 288; proposes
electors for executive based on
number of representatives, 289;
proposes seven years’ term of in-
eligibility for reelection for execu-
tive, 312; favors election of execu-
tive by the people, 322; moves
postponement of question of suc-
cessor to President, 472; objects to
election of President by Senate,
510, 515; moves eventual election
of President when less than one-
third vote for one man, 516; moves
that electors not voting be not
counted, 517; favors separate pro-
vision for reelecting President,
519; moves six years’ term for
executive, 521; moves seven years’
term for executive, 521; seconds
motion that electors meet at seat
of government, 522; proposes two-
thirds vote of legislature for effec-
tive acts, 69; favors small Senate,
70; approves proportional repre-
sentation in legislature, 83; favors
State compensation of legislature,
146; favors preserving State gov-

729

ernments, 164; suggests six years
for Senators, 165; favors compen-
sation to Senators, 172; brings up
question of eligibility of Senate to
offices, 173; opposes ineligibility of
Senators to State offices, 173; con-
tends for equal sovereignty of
States, 176; favors compromise on
question of representation in Sen-
ate, 204; opposes report of commit-
tee on representation, 210; favors
numbers as basis of representation,
224; on committee on representa-
tion, 226; thinks Southern repre-
sentation too small, 227; approves
counting blacks as_ three-fifths,
234; thinks representation of New
Hampshire too high, 246; favors
small Senate, 310; opposes require-
ment of previous residence for
members of legislature, 357; moves
Tepresentation by taxation, 358;
thinks executive may fill vacancies
in Senate, 364; proposes vacancies
in Senate be arranged by legisla-
tures, 364; favors long term citi-
zenship for Senate, 370; favors
property qualification for legisla-
ture, 375; proposes nine years’
citizenship for service in legisla-
ture, 384, 385; opposes eligibility
of members of legislature to offices,
398; insists on powers of legisla-
ture to tax imports, 480; agrees to
ineligibility of members of legisla-
ture to new offices, 505; moves
ineligibility of members of legis-
lature to new or increased offices,
506; motion lost, 506; thinks
representation too small, 514;
moves reconsideration of number of
representatives, 538; move" recon-
sideration of representation, 561;
opposes power of legislature to
negative State laws, 76; would
modify mutual negative of both
branches of legislature, 347; moves
three-fourths of legislature to
overrule President’s negative, 408;
opposes negative on State laws,
456; moves two-thirds to overrule
negative of President, 554; thinks
money bills should originate in
Senate, 217; moves to reconsider
question of money bills, 363; fa-
vors provision for money bills,
365; favors money bills in’ first
branch of legislature, 383; moves
to postpone money bill question,
404; suggests convention has no
funds to pay clergyman, 182; fa-
vors census, 232; suggests oath to
support State governments, 304;
730

favors ratification by conventions,
307; thinks passions are excited
over question of capital, 332; op-
poses New York for seat of gov-
ernment, 382; opposed to tax on
exports, 411, 439; thinks unlocated
lands should be given up, 422; on
grand committee on assumption of
State debts, 423; would limit ap-
propriations for army, 424; pro-
poses State quotas by representa-
tion, 436; opposes taxation by
representation, 437; opposes pro-
hibition of slave trade, 446; on
committee on navigation acts, 448;
provision against ex post facto
laws necessary, 450; thinks pro-
vision for State controversies may
be necessary, 460; opposed to slav-
ery, 468; on committee on imposts,
470; favors two-thirds vote for
navigation acts, 484; says North
Carolina is disposed to give up
Western lands, 490; on committee
on postponed measures, 502; op-
poses creation of Vice President,
527; proposed limitation on treaties
of peace, 532; proposes notice of
treaties be sent to Senators, 534;
fears too many laws, 555; pro-
poses juries in civil cases, 556;
would prohibit direct tax, 566;
suggests that letter be signed in-
stead of constitution, 580.

Wilson, James, Penn., attends, 17; pro-

poses single executive, 38, 39, 49;
seconds motion on powers of execu-
tive, 39; favors election of execu-
tive by people, 40, 41, 268, 285;
proposes three years’ term for ex-
ecutive, 40; proposes executive
council, 50; moves revisionary
power over laws in executive and
judiciary, 56, 294, 406; favors im-
peachability of executive, 290, 293;
wishes long term for executive,
314; suggests electors for execu-
tive by lot, 315; wishes to post-
pone question of election of execu-
tive, 317; insists on fixing prin-
ciples of executive, 324; favors
joint ballot legislature for execu-
tive, 347; qualifications for elec-
tors, 351; seconds motion for elec-
tion of President by the people,
461; thinks larger States should
have power in choosing President,
462; objects to Senate’s power in
choosing President, 462; thinks
election of President most difficult
question, 510; would leave even-
tual election of President to legis-
lature, 516; thinks eventual elec-
tion of President by Senate dan-
gerous, 519: approves of executive

INDEX

council, 532; would allow Presi-
dent pardoning power over trea-
son, 571; favors election to larger
branch of legislature by people, 32;
thinks members of both branches
of legislature ought to be elected
by people, 34; favors election to
first branch of legislature by the
people, 62; wants Senate elected
by the people, 70, 73; approves
proportional representation in
legislature, 83, 84, 88; passed, 88;
moves right of suffrage in first
branch should be based on equi-
table ratio, 84; passed, 88; moves
ratio of representation to be in
proportion to all free inhabitants
and three-fifths others, 88; passed,
88; moves rule of suffrage in sec-
ond branch should be the same as
in the first, 89; passed, 89; urges
two branches of legislature, 138;
favors election to first branch of
legislature by the people, 143; fa-
vors one year for service in first
branch of legislature, 145; opposes
fixed compensation of legislature,
147; favors national control of
compensation of legislature, 148;
opposes twenty-five years as age for
members of first branch of legis-
lature, 149; favors ineligibility of
members of first branch of legis-
lature to offices, 152; opposes elec-
tion to Senate by State legislatures,
162; seconds motion of six years
for Senate, 166; powers of Senate,
170; thinks Senate should be sepa-
rated from States, 173; opposes
equal vote of States in legislature,
180; opposes equal suffrage by
States in Senate, 191; proposes
proportion for Senate, 196; opposes
commitment of question of repre-
sentation in Senate, 205; thinks
committee on representation ex-
ceeded powers, 206; favors commit-
ment of question of representation,
215; moves to consider vote in Sen-
ate, 215; insists on proportional
representation, 220; opposes wealth
as basis of representation, 235; op-
poses blacks in representation,
239; insists on proportional repre-
sentation in Senate, 252, 257; fa-
vors definition of powers of legisla-
ture, 264; favors continuance of
Congress, 280; favors fixing time
for meeting of legislature, 348; fa-
vors meeting of legislature in win-
ter, 350; favors inhabitants for
members of legislature, 356; op-
poses seven years’ residence in
State for members of legislature,
356; wishes short residence for
INDEX

members of legislature, 357; moves
to reconsider seven years’ residence
for members of legislature, 363;
thinks qualifications for legislature
should not be fixed, 375; thinks
quorum should not be fixed, 376;
on right of dissent in legislature,
379; on journals of legislature,
381; proposes four years’ citizen-
ship for first branch of legislature,
384, 385; proposes nine years’ citi-
zenship for Senate, 388; opposes
equal votes in Senate, 390; favors
eligibility of members of legisla-
ture to offices, 399, 400; favors
Tevisionary power over acts, 408;
opposes appointments by Senate,
455; opposes Senate power to
make treaties, 458: opposes in-
eligibility of members of legisla-
ture to offices, 505; thinks legis-
lature is judge of privileges of
members, 511; wishes council to
share in making appointments,
528; would include House in treaty
power, 528; thinks majority of
Senate may agree to treaties, 530;
wants treaties agreed to by ma-
jority of Senate, 532; opposes
power to convene either house of
Congress, 537; proposes amend-
ments agreed to by two-thirds of
States, 539; proposes judiciary
with executive to have revisionary
power, 56, 294, 406; opposes ap-
pointment of judiciary by national
legislature, 56; moves _legisla-
ture have power to institute in-
ferior tribunals, 61; favors ap-
pointment of judges by executive,
275; insists on revisionary power
for judges, 300; epposes power of
removal of judges, 473; favors ab-
solute negative of executive on
laws, 51, 53; approves power of
legislature to negative State laws,
76; agrees to three-fourths of legis-
lature to overrule President’s nega-
tive, 408; favors negative on State
laws, 456; thinks money bills may
originate in either branch of legis-
lature, 216, 217; favors publicity
in money bills, 218; wishes Senate
to originate money bills, 362; op-
poses provision for money bills,
365, 366; favors ratification of
constitution by a plurality of
States, 60; proposes seven States
may ratify constitution, 495;
thinks majority necessary for rati-
fication, 498; proposes eight States
may ratify constitution, 496;
thinks only ratifying States will
be bound, 496; thinks assent of

731

Congress to constitution unneces-
sary, 542; favors taxation by
representation, 244; favors tax on
exports, 411, 440, 441; moves
amendment relative to direct taxa-
tion, 559; nominates Temple
Franklin for secretary of conven-
tion, 18; wishes to preserve the
States, 66; contrasts Virginia and
Jersey plans, 107; discusses na-
tional government, 129, 130;
thinks States will encroach on na-
\tional government, 140; opposes
sending for delegates from New
Hampshire, 190; supports rights of
West, 250; favors guarantee of re-
publican constitution to States,
280; moves guarantee of republi-
can government and against re-
bellion in States, 281; government
to act separately, 299; does not
favor oath to support government,
304; on committee of detail, 318;
would disqualify debtors for office,
330; favors liberal policy to for-
eigners, 368; favors immigration,
385; on naturalized citizens in
Pennsylvania, 387; defines duties
and imposts, 410; opposes paper
money, 414, 477; thinks definition
of felonies unnecessary, 416; favors
striking out punishment for pira-
cies, 416; on definition of treason,
431; thinks proof of treason diffi-
eult, 433; favors sole power in
legislature, 433; opposes slave
trade, 445; favors navigation acts
by majority, 447, 485; opposes
mention of ex post facto laws, 449;
moves pardon before conviction,
471; would not allow new States
to violate contracts, 478; opposes
delivery up of fugitive slaves, 481;
on committee on mutual recogni-
tion by States of public acts, 482;
opposes power to divide a State,
489; thinks States can not be di-
vided, 490; opposes motion on
Western country, 492; would not
define law of nations, 563; favors
power to cut canals, 564; favors
university, 564; favors occasional
publication of accounts of expendi-
tures, 567; proposes to hand jour-
_.2ls to President, 583.

Wythe, George, Va., attends, 17; on

committee on rules, 18; reports
rules, 18, 21.

Yeas and nays in legislature considered,

379; by one member, rejected, 379.

Yates, Robert, N. Y., attends, 17; on

committee on representation, 205,
226.
  
 
   

  
         
 
    
 
          
     

  

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