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Garnell Gam School Library
THE

INSTITUTES

oF

JUSTINIAN.

WITH NOTES.

BY THOMAS COOPER, ESQ.

PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY, AT CARLISLE COLLEGE, PENNSYLVANIA.

THIRD EDITION,
WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES AND REFERENCES,

BY A MEMBER OF THE NEW-YORK BAR.

NEW-YORK:
JOHN S. VOORHIES, LAW BOOKSELLER & PUBLISHER.
1852.
MdL4

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two,
BY JOIN S. VOORHIES,
in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New-York.
CONTENTS.

PREFACE, . . 6 82
Dr. Harris’s Brief History of the Roman Law, .
Justinian’s Institutes with the Translation,
The 118th Novel, with Dr. Harris’s Translation,
Notes and References to the Institutes,
Appendix First.

The Law of the Twelve Tables,
Appendix Second.

Method of citation used in reference to the various parts of the

Corpus Juris Civilis, and Abbreviations,

Appendix Third.

List of Authors on the Civil Law, : :
Index to the Books, Titles and Sections of the Institutes,
Index to the Notes and References.

¥
: ix
1 to 391
893 to 400
401 to 662

663 to 671

672 to 674

674 to 677
677 to 701
703
PREFACE.

Wuen I first undertook to publish Justinian’s Institutes (that I might not
entirely renounce my accustomed studies) I contemplated nothing more than a
re-publication of Harris’s Edition, which has now become scarce ; together with
some additional notes, and a brief history of Roman Jurisprudence, by way of
preface. On reading with attention Harris’s Translation, I found the language so
verbose, that I sat down to translate the first Book of the Institutes in my own
way. It is true, my ear was better satisfied with my own performance ; but I
found so many co-incidences of expyession, and so little room to improve the fidel-
ity of Harris’s Version, that I determined to adopt it as the ground-work of the
present publication; and alter it no further, than to condense the expressions,
where they seemed to me needlessly diffuse. By so doing, I have abridged it to
the amount of about one-fifth of the whole, without sacrificing anything necessary
to the sense. Some few periphrases I have retained, and some I have added, when
the original seemed to require elucidation ; but, upon the whole, my aim has been
to render this a faithful translation, in.as few words as possible. Perhaps I may
be blamed for taking this liberty with Dr. Harris’s work. Had it been a piece of
poetry, I should have left it untouched ; but meaning to give to the public as good
a translation as I could furnish, I saw no reason why I should needlessly occupy
the time of the reader, or increase the bulk of the book, by religiously retaining
all its redundancies and imperfections.

I have inserted most of Harris’s notes, citing him where I have done so; but
they are few and meagre. I have generally consulted the paraphrase of Theoph-
ilus, the short comments to the Corpus Juris Civilis of Gothofred, the translations
and notes of Ferriere, Wood’s Institutes, and Taylor’s Elements of the Civil Law.
I would gladly have procured, if T could, more sources of information, and I have
taken much pains for that purpose, but in vain. ‘The want of books has not been
the only difficulty I have met with. All the notes and references I had collected
were consumed by fire on my road from Northumberland hither, last November.
An accident afterwards deprived me of my eye-sight for about a week, and render-
ed exertion painful to me for a considerable time. I could ill spare these defalca-
tions from the occasional leisure which my Chemical Lectures allowed me, but I
have endeavored to make the best use of the opportunities that remained.
vi PREFACE.

Unable to procure the books I sent for, I have declined for the present any histo-
ry of the Roman Law. Those who cannot resort to the more voluminous and labo-
rious works enumerated in the appendix, may collect much useful knowledge from
the shorter and more popular compilations of Ferriere, whose History of the Roman
Law was translated by Dr. Beaver, and {published in 1724—from Gibbon’s eighth
volume of his Roman History, and Butler’s ‘Hore Juridicee Subseevee : together
with the Roman Antiquities of Kennet and Adams: all of them works of merit, and
not scarce.

A knowledge of the Civil Law, sufficient for the purposes of an American Lawyer,
north of New Orleans, may be obtained from Domat and Wood, and the Treatises of
Drs. Ayloffe, Schomberg, Halifax and Browne: but neither Domat nor Wood, are
superseded by any or all the rest. Indeed, a condensed digest of the Civil Law is yet
a desideratum ; which if the present publication be approved of, I may be tempted to
undertake.

“ The civilians of the darker ages,”’ (says Gibbon, 8 Rom. Hist. 2.) ‘have esta-
blished an absurd and incomprehensible mode of quotation, which is supported by au-
thority and custom. In their references to the Code, the Pandects, and the Insti-
tutes, they mention the number, not of the book but only of the law, and content
themselves with reciting the first words of the Title to which it belongs : and of these
titles there are more than a thousand. Lwudewig, (Vit. Justiniani, p. 268,) wishes
to shake off his pedantic yoke ; and I have dared to adopt the simple and rational
method of numbering the book, title and law.”

The English writers generally follow the mode of citation recommended by Gib-
bon, and as I think it the most convenient, T have also adopted it. Thus, Inst. 4.
15. 2, means, Institutes, book 4, title 15, section 2. Dig. 41. 9. 1. 3, means Di-
gest, book 41, title 9, law 1, section 3, which the foreign jurists would cite thus,
1. 1. § 8, or § 3, 1. 1. Dig. pro dote: or f pro dote: Dig. and ff being equiva-
lent: that is, section 3 of law 1, of the book and title of the Digest or Pandects
which is entitled pro dote. The two let:ers #f, designate nothing but a careless
mode of writing the Greek letter 7, the first letter of 7u»deytov, Pandects, ‘‘ Gen-
éral Receivers ;’ which was a common title of the Greek miscellanies. Plin.
Praef. ad Hist. Natur. 8 Gibbon’s Rom. Hist. p. 37. 76.

So, D. or Dig. 18. 4. 2. 7, is the same with § 7. 1. 2. Dig. (or ff) de heredit,
vel act. Or, the 7th section of the 2d law of the book and title of the Digest or
‘Pandects, that begins De hereditate vel actione vendita.

In like manner, Cod. 7. 68.2, means the 7th book, 68th title, and 2d law of the
Justinian Code. The foreign writers would cite it, 1.2. Cod. s¢ unus ex pluribus
appellaverit. In like manner Cod. 8. 32. 1. would he cited by the civilians on the
continent of Europe, 1 1. Cod. s7 unus ex pluribus heredibus creditoris, Se.,
meaning the first law of the Codex that is entitled with those words.

Again, 1. 1. tit. £2. Cod. de his qui ante. I should cite thus, Cod. 6. 52. 1,
meaning the 6th book, 52d title, and Ist law of the Justinian Code. _

It may be noted, that the Code, the Digest, and the Institutes, form one system ;
of which the Code was first compiled, and published in the third year of Justinian.
Then the Digest was compiled, and published in the seventh year of that emperor’s
PREFACE. vil

reign ; the Institutes were compiled after the Digest, but published a month before,
to wit, 21st November, A. D. 533. Wyndham v. Chetwind, 1 Burr. Rep, 126.
The Edicta, the Novelle Constitutiones, or Authentice, the Basilica, &e. were
subsequent additions or innovations. 8 Gibb. 45, 46.

In citing the Authentics, there may appear some ambiguity. The Novels are
entitled, Authenticze, seu Novellas Constitutiones. These are cited either by the
collation, title and chapter, or by the number of the novel, or by the beginning
words of the title of the collation. Thus, Novell. 8.1. Nov. tit. 8. ch. 1. Auth.
Collat. 2.2. 1. ch. 1. tit. wt judices, Auth. Coll. 2, mean the same thing; viz.
the first chapter of the 8th Novel Constitution, being the first chapter of the second
title, (beginning wt judices) of the second collation.

But a summary of the Authentics is inserted in the Justinian Code, usually in
italic character, and these are referred to by the Code under which they are insert
ed. Thus in the instance given by Ferriere, Authentica cum testator, Codice ud
legem Falcidiam, means the summary of the Authentice beginning sed cum testa-
tor, inserted in the 50th title of the Justinian Code, ad legem Falcidiam. These
observations are necessary to an English student, in addition to Ferriere’s directions,
which I have inserted as a second appendix. The double index to the generality of
editions, will render these remarks intelligible.

As tothe Adicts of Justinian, the Zeonine Constitutions, the Basilica, and
other tracts sometimes published with the Corpus Juris, they are easily distin+
guished, by a mode of reference that involves no ambiguity.

Generally speaking, I have actually consulted all the passages referred to in the
Code and Digest by numeral figures, after the English mode of citation. The
most part of the passages referred to by the foreign mode of reference, I have tak-
en at second hand. Grenerally speaking also, the references to the English and
American reporters, have been made after actually consulting the cases, for the
point to which they are applied. as

I shall insert as an appendix, Ferriere’s Chap. on the mode of citation, and the
abbreviations in use, in order to render more intelligible to the English reader, the
references of foreign jurists.

I intended also to have inserted the Latin text of the Leges Regia, or Jus Pa-
pirianum, and the laws of the Twelve Tables. But I greatly doubt about the au-
thenticity of the Jus Papirianum ; and I incline to think with Gibbon, 8 Rom.
Hist. 5, that the Caius (Sextus) Papirius, who is said to have revised the Laws of
Numa, left nothing written; and that the Jus Papirianum of Granius Flaccus
(Lacinianus) was compiled in the time of Ceesar. Gibbon speaks very slightingly
of the attempt to restore these laws, (thirty-six altogether) by the Abbe Terasson.
Nor do I give any credit to the Tables, from whence Franciscus Balduinus, and
Paulus Manutius have given us eighteen of these laws, to which Pandulphus Pra-
teius has added six. The twelve more collected from various sources by Terasson,
I have had no opportunity of examining. Those I have mentioned, I find in =
sint Antig. Rom. Corp. quto. 1685. Amstel. page 556, who has given us a . -
lection of laws of Romulus and Numa, of no moment; and whether the collec-
she

Vil ‘ PREFACE.

tion be as complete as the sources of information will furnish, I have no means of
investigating.

The laws of the Twelve Tables are collected from scattered passages in Cicero—
Dionesius Halicarnasseus—Livy—Sextus Pompeius—Festus—Pliny—Macrobius—
Agellius—Pomponius—and from the Justinian Digests. The Latin is obsolete and
obscure, and stands in need of a good comment.

T have before me in Rosinus, the collection and arrangement of Franciscus Ho-
tomannus, and Joannes Crispinus; another of Justus Lipsius ; another of Ludo-
vicus Charondas ; and another of Theodorus Marcilius ; as well as the edition and
arrangement of the same laws by D. Gothofred at the end of his Corpus Juris
Civilis. :

That, the reader, (in the words of Gothofred) may not be entirely ignorant, ra-
ther than that he may be accurately informed what the Laws of the Twelve Tables
were, non tam ut ea Lector cognosceret, quam ne ignoraret, I shall insert Hooke’s
translation from Catrou and Rouille. It is, as the subject requires, paraphrastic ;
but after perusing the Latin text, and attending to the comments collected by Rosi-
nus, and those of D. Gothofred, I am satisfied that the text is as accurately parar
phrased as can reasonably be expected ; and therefore I have inserted the Transla-
tion in the Appendix.

Lastly, I have given a catalogue of the best writers on the Roman Law, collected
from the Bibliotheque of Camus, the notes and observations of Gibbon in his Ro-
man History, of Butler in his Hore Judice Subsecive, and my own reading.

T have. said nothing abcut the utility of a knowledge of the Civil Law. Pro-
fessional men who carefully peruse the reported cases, whether of the British or
the American courts, will find from the frequency of reference to the Justinian Col-

lections, that a ccmpetent knowledge of the general principles of the Civil Law, is
expected as a matter of course among the Bar, as.well as upon the Beneb. In-
deed the earliest authors on the Laws of England, Bracton, Fleta &c. korrew great-
ly from: the Civil Law. Irefer for instance to the first twenty or thirty pages of
Bracton, who borrows not only his arrangement, but the substance and frequently
the expressions from the Civil law. Nor can I see how any man can be consid-
ered as a well read lawyer, who is ignoramt of a system, matured by the experience of
the: most polished and powerful nation of antiquity, and which still forms the: bady of
modern Law, in almost every nation on the continent of Europe.

THOMAS COOPER.
A BRIEF ACCOUNT

OF THE

RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ROMAN LAW.

(DR. HARRIS.)

 

Tue Roman state was at first governed solely by the authority of
Romulus ; but, when the people were increased, he divided them into
thirty Curie, which he constantly assembled for the confirmation of his
laws: and this practice of consulting the people was afterwards followed
by the Roman kings, all whose laws were collected by Sextus Papirius,
and called jus Papirianum, from the name of their compiler. But, after
the expulsion of Tarquin and the establishment of the republic, the
greatest part of those regal laws soon became obsolete ; and those, which
still remained in force, related chiefly to the priesthood. It thus happen-
ed, that the Romans for many years laboured under great incertainty in
respect to law in general; for, from the commencement of the consular
state to the time of establishing the xu tables, they were not governed
by any regular system. But at length, the people growing uneasy at the
arbitrary power of their magistrates, it was resolved, after much oppo-
sition from the patricians, that some certain rule of government should

Curieg.] Vid. Pomponium, ff. 1. t. 2. short extract of 8 or 10 lines, which may

De origine juris. be read in the 3d book of Macrobius’s Sat-
urnalia, cap. 11.
Jus Papirianum.] ‘Is liber appellatur From the commencement of the consular

“ jus civile Papirianum, non quia Papirivs state.) The consular state was established
“de suo quicquam adjecit, sed quod leges in the year U. C. 245, and the laws of the
“ sine ordine latas in unum composuit.”’ vid. xii tables were not perfected, till the year
ff. 1.4.2. 1.2. This body of law isnot 304.

Now extant, nor any part of it, except a

B
x RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ROMAN LAW.

be fixed upon: and, to effect this purpose, a decemvirate was first ap-
pointed, composed solely of senators, who, partly from the laws of Greece
and partly from their own laws still subsisting, framed ten tables, which,
in the year of Rome 303, were submitted to the inspection of the people,
and highly approved of. These however were still thought to be defi-
cient; and therefore in the year following, when a new decemvirate was
appointed, which consisted of seven patricians and three plebeians, they
added two tables to the former ten: and now the whole was regarded
but as one body of law, and intitled, by way of eminence, the ¢welve ta-
bles. But, although these new collected laws were most deservedly in
the highest esteem, yet their number was soon found insufficient to ex-
tend to all matters of controversy, their conciseness was often the occa-
sion of obscurity, and their extraordinary severity called aloud for miti-

Were submitted to the inspection of the
people.] ‘‘ Tum legibus condendis opera
‘¢ dabatur, ingentique hominum expectatio-
““ne propositis decem tabulis, populum ad
‘*concionem advocaverunt ; et quod bo-
“num, faustum, felixque reipublice, ipsis,
“ liberisque eorum esset, ire et legere leges
‘ propositas jussere: se, quantum decem
‘¢ hominum ingeniis provideri potuerit, om-
*¢ nibus, summis, infimisque jura equasse ;
‘plus pollere multorum ingenia consilia-
‘‘que. Versarent in animis secum unam-
“¢ quamque rem ; agitarent deinde sermoni-
“bus; atque in medium, quid in quaque re
‘¢ plus, minusve esset, conferrent. as le-
“ges habiturum populum Romanum, quas
*€ consensus omnium non jussisse latas ma~
‘¢ gis, quam tulisse, videri posset.”” Liv. 1.
iil. cap. 33, 34.

And their extraordinary severity.] One
of the laws, here hinted at, is the following :
AST, SI PLURES ERUNT REI, TERTIIS NUNDI-
NIS PARTIS SECALTO; Si PLUS MINUSVE SE-
CUERINT, SE FRAUDE ESTO: SI VOLENT ULS
TipeRIM PEREGRE VENUNDANTO. Grav. op.
p. 284. i.e. “Ifa debtor is insolvent to
“+ several creditors, let his body be cut in
‘¢ pieces on the third market-day. Jt may
'* be cut into more or fewer pieces with im-
‘“‘ punity; or, if his creditors consent to
“it, let him be sold to foreigners beyond
“the Tyber.”” Hook's Roman Hist. vol. 1.
p. 316.

Such is the sense in which this law has
been generally understood by both ancients
and moderns. But it has lately received
quite a new construction, very much to the
honor of ancient Rome, from two authors,
not less distinguished for their abilities in
literature than their knowledge in the civil
law, who from many authorities interpret
the word secanto, as implying simply a divi-
sion, and the word partis, as denoting the
parts of the debtor’s estate, and not the
parts of his body ; so that they understand
the expression partis secanto, not asa direc-
tion, that the body of an insolvent debtor
shall be cut into pieces, but as if it meant,
that his estate and services should be divid-
ed among his creditors in proportion to their
respective claims. Vid. Bynkershoek’s
work’s, vol. 1. obs. 1. and Dr. Taylor’s com-
mentary, De znope debitore dissecando.

But the reader is left to frame his own
judgment of this interpretation, when he
has read the apology for this law, which Au-
lus Gellius has given us in the person of
Cecilias ; and also the opinion of Tertulli-
an, who was alawyer by profession. ‘ Ni-
‘hil profecto [says Cecilius] immitius, ni-
‘* hil immanius, nisi ut re ipsa apparet, eo
‘* consilio tanta immanitas peena denunciata
‘est, ne ad eam unquam perveniretur : ad-
‘* dict namque nunc et vincir? multos vide-
‘* mus; dassectum esse antiquitus neminem,
‘* equidem neque legi neque audivi.”” Axu-
RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ROMAN LAW. xi

gation. It therefore became a consequence, that the twelve tables conti-
nually received some explanation, addition, or alteration, by virtue of a
new daw, a senatorial decree or a plebiscite. And here it will be proper
to observe, how they differ : a plebiscite was an ordinance of the plebeians
or commonalty, which had the force of a law, without the authority of
the senate; and a senatus-consultwm, or senatorial decree, was an order
made by the senators assembled for that purpose; but to constitute a
law, properly so called, it was necessary, that it should first be proposed
by some magistrate of the senate, and afterwards be confirmed by the
people in general. Recourse was also had to the interpretation and de-
cisions of the learned, which were so universally approved of, that, al-
though ihey were unwritten, they became a new species of law, and
were called auctoritas prudentum and jus civile. It must here be observ-
ed, that, soon after the establishment of the twelve tables, the learned
of that time composed certain solemn formis, called actions of law, by
which the process of all courts and several other acts, as adoption,
emancipation, &c. were regulated. These forms were for above a cen-
tury kept secret from the public, being in the hands only of the priests ©
and magistrates; but about the year U. C. 448 they were collected and
published by one Flavius, a scribe; and, from him, called the Flavian
law ; for which acceptable present the people in general showed many
instances of their gratitude. But, as this collection was soon found to be
defective, another was afterwards published by Seztus Alius, who made
a large addition of many new forms, which passed under the title of jus
4ilianum, from the name of the compiler.

In process of time there also arose another species of law, called the
The Flavian Law.] ‘* Postea, cum Ap-

‘* pius Claudius proposuisset, et ad formam
“‘ rede gisset has actiones, Cneus Flavius

lus Gell. lib. xx. cap. 1. Grav. lib. vii.
cap. 72.

And Tertullian writes as follows. ‘‘ Sed

‘et, judicatos in partes secari a creditori-
“* bus, legeserant ; consensu tamen publico
‘* crudelitas postea erasa est.”” Apologet.
cap. 4.

Solemn forms.] ‘‘ Civile jus, repositam
‘in penetralibus pontificum, Cn. Flavius
“ evulgavit, fastosque circa forum in albo
‘¢ proposuit, ut, quando lege agi posset,
“ sciretur.’? Liv. lib. ix. cap. 46. ‘* Vete-
‘res qui huic scientia prafuerunt, obtinen-
“de atque augende potentie sue causa,
‘ pervulgari artem suam noluerunt, &c.”
Cic. de Orat. lib. 1. ¢. 46. ‘ Jus civile
“ per multa secula inter sacra czremonias-
“ que Deorum immortalium solisque ponti-
“ ficibus notum.”’ Val. Maz. 1. ii. c. 5.

“ scriba ejus, libertini filius, subreptum li-
‘* brum populo tradidit ; et adeo gratum fuit
“¢ id munus populo, ut Tribunus plebis fieret,
‘¢ Senator, et Aldilis curulis, &c.”’ ff. 1. t.
2. De orig. juris. Liv, lib. ix. sub. fin. Val.
Maz. lib. ii. cap. 5. Aul. Gell. lib. vi. c. 9.

Tully, in his oration for Murana, is re-
markably severe upon these forms, and treats
both them and their abettors with that just
contempt, which they most certainly de-
serve. ‘ Primum dignitas in tam tenui scien-
‘* tia quae potest esse? res enim sunt parve ;
‘* prope in singulis literis atque interpunc-
“ tionibus occupate, &c., &e. &e.”’ Pro
Murena, cap. 6. Epist. ad Att. lib, vi. ep. 1.
De oratore, lib. cap. 41.
xii RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ROMAN LAW.
preetorian edicts ; which, although they ordinarily expired with the annual
office of the praetor, who enacted them, and extended no further than
his jurisdiction, were yet of great force and authority: and many of
them were so truly valuable for their justice and equity, that they have
been perpetuated as laws.

These were the several principal parts of the Roman law, during the
free state of the commonwealth; But, after the re-establishment of mo-
narchy in the person of Augustus, the law received two additional parts ;
the imperial constitutions and the answers of the lawyers.

The constitutions soon became numerous, but were not framed into a
body, till the reign of Constantine the great; when Grregorius and Her-
mogenes, both lawyers of eminence, collected in two codes the constitu-
tions of the pagan emperors, from the reign of Adrian to that of Diocle-
sian inclusive: but these collections were not made by virtue of any
public authority, and are not now extant.

Another code was afterwards published by order of the emperor The-
odosius the younger, which contained the constitutions of all the christian
emperors, down to his own time; and this was generally received both
in the eastern and western empires.

But these three codes were still far from being perfect; for the consti-
tutions, contained in them, were often found to be contradictory; and
they wanted, but too plainly, that regulation, which they afterwards un-
derwent through the care of Justinian ; who in the year of Christ 528
ordered the compilation of a new code, which was performed and pub-
lished the year following by T'ridonian and others; the three former
codes being suppressed by the express ordinance of the emperor. When
this work was thus expeditiously finished, the emperor next extended
his care to the Roman law in general, in order to render it both concise

But, notwithstanding this, the use of par-
ticular forms was very strictly adhered to,
till the reign of Constantine the emperor,
who, to his great honour, put an end to
these subtilities. His rescript to Marcelli-
nus is in these words. ‘‘ Juris formule,
‘© aucupatione syllabarum insidiantes, cunc-
“torum actibus radicitus amputentur.’’
Cod. 2. t. 58.

Gregorius and Homogenes.] Vid Gotho-
fredi prolegom. ad cod. Theodosian, cap. 1.
et Heineccit hist. jur. civ. lib. 1. cap. 5. sec.
368, &c.

By the express ordinance.] ‘‘ Hune igi-
“ tur codicem in wternum valiturum judicio
‘¢ tui culminis intimare perspeximus, ut sci-
‘¢ ant omnes tam litigatores quam disertissi-
* mi advocati, nullatenus eis licere de cx-
‘¢ tero constitutiones ex veteribus tribus co-
‘¢ dicibus, vel ex iis, que novella constitu-
‘“ tiones ad prasens tempus vocabantur, in
“ eognitionalibus recitare certaminibus, sed
“solum, eidem nostro codici insertis, con-
‘ stitationibus necesse est uti; falsi crimini
‘* subdendis his, qui contra hoe facere ausi
‘* fuerint,’? &c. De Justinianeo codice con-
Sirmando.
RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ROMAN LAW. Rill
and perfect. "The answers and other writings of the ancient lawyers had
long since acquired the full force of a Jaw, and were now so numerous
as to consist of near two thousand volumes; from which, by command
of Justinian, the best and most equitable opinions were chosen ; and
being first corrected, where correction was necessary, were afterwards
divided into fifty books, called digests or pandects : and, that they might
be the more firmly established, the emperor not only prohibited the use of
all other law-books, but also forbad, that any comment should be written
upon these his new digested laws, or that any transcript should be made
of them with abbreviations. But, during the time of compiling the di-
gests, it was thought expedient by Justinian, for the benefit of students,
that an abridgment should be made of the whole Roman law ; which work
was soon performed in obedience to his order, and confirmed with the

digests, under the title of institutions.

Near two thousand volumes.] ‘* Postea
“vero, maximum opus aggredientes, ipsa
‘* vetustatis studiosissima opera, jam pene
** confusa et dissoluta, eidem viro excelso
‘« (Triboniano) permisimus tam colligere
“quam certo moderamine tradere. Sed,
“* cum omnia percontabamur, a przfato viro
“ excelso suggestum, duo pene millia Jibro-
‘“rnm esse conscripta, qua necesse esset
‘* omnia et legere et perscrutari ; quod ce-

“esti fulgore, et summe trinitatis favore, °

“ confectum est, secundum nostra mandata,
“ que ab initio ad memoratum virum excel-
‘*sum fecimus, et in quinquaginta libros
‘“omne, quod utilissimum erat, collectum
“ est; et omnes ambiguitates decise, nullo
‘ seditioso relicto ; nomenque libris impo-
“ suimus digestorum seu pandectarum.”
Cod. 1.t.17.1.%. De vet jur. enucl.

Prohibited the use of all other law-books.]
‘* Has itaque leges et adorate et observate,
‘‘ omnibus antiquioribus quiescentibus, ne-
“ moque vestrum audeat vel comparare eas
‘© prioribus, vel, si quid dissunans in utro-
‘que est, requirere ; quia omne, quod hic
* positum est, hoc unicum et solum obser-
“+ vari censemus ; nec in judicio nec in alio
“ certamine, ubi leges necessarie sunt, ex
“* aliis libris, nisi ab institutionibus, nostris-
“que digestis, et constitutionibus a nobis
** compositis, aliquid vel recitare vel osten-

‘¢ dere conetur ; nisi temerator velit falsita-
“‘ tis crimini subjectus una cum judice, qui
“ eorum audientiam patiatur, penis gravis-
‘« simis laborare.”? Cod. 1. t. 17. 1. 2 § 19.

“Hoc autem tempestivum nobis videtur
“ et in presenti sancire, ut nemo neque
‘* eorum, qui in presenti juris peritiam ha-
‘‘ bent, neque, qui postea fierent, audeat
‘* commentarios his Jegibus adnectere ; nisi
“« velit eas in Gracam vocem transformare
“* sub eodem ordine eademque consequen-
“ tia, sub qua et voce Romana posite sunt ;
« hoe quod Greci xaTa moda dicunt,’’ &c.

Cod 1. t. 17. 1. 2. § 21.

With abbreviations.] ‘‘ Eandem autem
‘* penam falsitatis constituimus et adversus
‘¢ eos, qui in posterum leges nostras, per
‘¢ siglorum obscuritates, ausi fuerint con-
“¢ scribere ; omnia enim, id est, et nomina
‘* prudentum, et titulos, et librorum nume-
“* ros, per consequentias literarum volumus,
“ non per sigla, manifestari.”” Cod. 1. t.17.
1, 2. § 22.

Confirmed with the Digests.] ‘* Leges
“ autem nostras, que in his codicibus, id
“ est, institutionem seu elementorum et di-
‘¢ gestorum, posuimus, suum obtinere robur
“ ex tertio nostro felicissimo sancimus con-
“ sulatu presentis duodecime indictionis,
“ tertio calendas januarias, in omne evum
“« yalituras, &.”” Cod. 1. t. 17.1, 2.§ 23.
xiv RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ROMAN LAW.

The emperor afterwards, upon mature deliberation, suppressed the
first edition of his code, and published a second, which he intitled Co-
dex repetite prelectionis, having omitted several useless laws, and insert-
ed others, which were judged serviceable to the state.

The Justinian-law now consisted of three parts, the institutions, the
digests, and the second code. But the emperor, after the publication of
the second code, continued from time to time to enact diverse new con-
stitutions or novels, and also several edicts ; all which were collected after
his decease, and became a fourth part of the law.

The 13 edicts of Justinian and most of the novels were originally con-
ceived in the Greek tongue; and so great was the decline of the Roman
language at Constantinople within forty years after the death of this em-
peror, that his laws in general were not otherways intelligible to the
major part of the people, than by the assistance of a Gireek version: but,
notwithstanding this disadvantage, they still subsisted intire, till the pub-
lication of the Basilica, by which the east was governed, till the disso-

lution of the empire.

Suppressed the first edition of his code.]
‘¢ Nemini in posterum concedimus, vel ex
‘¢ decisionibus nostris, vel ex aliis constitu-
‘* tionibus, quas antea fecimus, vel ex pri-
‘(ma Justinianei codicis editione, aliquid

‘* yecitare ; sed, quod in presenti purgaio et:

‘* yenovato codice nostro scriptum invenitur,
‘© hoc tantummodo in omnibus rebus et ju-
“ diciis et obtineat et recitetur : cujus scrip-
“© turam, ad similitudinem. nostrarum insti-
“ tutionum et digestorum, sine ulla signo-
** yum dubietate conseribi jussimus.’”? De
emendatione cod. § 5.

Basilica.] ‘‘ Versionibus juris Justinianei
‘¢ Grecis, et novellis eadem lingua scriptis,
‘¢ in foris scholisque utebantur, donec, de
‘© eo in compendium mittendo, seculo nono
“ cogitare inciperent imperatores Byzanti-
‘ni Ex his primum Basilius Macedo anno
‘* 838 ediderat 290yvergor THY YouwY, quod
¢ constabat titulis quadraginta. Deinde
** Leo cogos, patri Basilio succedens, col-
‘ Jectionem illam paternam perfecit, eam-
que sub titulo diatakewy Bacidexwy pro
‘ mulgavit, anno Christi 886. Denique sub-
‘‘secutus Leonem Constantinus, cogno-

‘mento Porphyrogeneta, paternum opus
‘© sub incudem revocavit, et libros illos
** Boathktxwy publicavit sub initium secu-
“li decimi. Et hi quidem sunt libri illi
“ Bootluoy, ex Greca institutionum, pan-
‘‘ dectarum, codicis versione, Justiniani no-
‘* vellis et edictis tredecim, nec non ex ju-
*‘ris-consultoram quorundam orientalium
‘* paratitlis, aliisque libris, quin et patribus
** et conciliis collecti ; ita tamen ut multa
‘* omissa videamus, que fortassis tum ab usu
‘“ recesserant, multas etiam leges in com-
‘* pendium contractas, multa denique ex
** posteriorum principum legibus et consti-
“* tutionibus addita animadvertamus. Opus
‘stud in sexaginta libros divisum. preter
“* pauca, que nondum integra reperiri po-
‘* tuerunt, cum glossis grace et latine edi-
“tam est a Car. Annib Fabrotto, Paris.
** 1647. fol. vol. vii.” vid. Heineccii hist.
jur. civ. }. 1. § 405.

The dissolution of the empire.] Constan-
“ tinople was taken by the Turks, and a pe-
‘* riod was put to the eastern empire in the
‘* year of Christ, 1453.
RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ROMAN LAW. XV

The laws published by Justinian were still successful in the west ;
where, even in the life-time of the emperor, they were not received uni-
versally ; and, after the Lombard invasion, they became so totally neg-
glected, that both the code and the pandects were lost, till the 12th cen-
tury; when it is said that the pandects were accidentally recovered at

Amalphi, and the code at Ravenna.

But as if fortune would make an

atonement for her former severity, they have since been the study of the
wisest men, and revered, as law, by the politest nations.

After the Lombard invasion.] The Lom-
bards entered Italy under Alboinus about
the year of Christ 568, in the reign of Jus-
tin the second, successcr to Justinian.

At Amalphi.] ‘‘ Eo tempore (Anno Dom.
‘* 1130) injustis perturbatisque comitiis, la-
‘* cerarat ecclesiam falsus pontifex Petrus
* Leonis, Anacletus secundus nuncupatus
‘‘ ab sua factione ; cujus dux erat Rogerius
‘¢ Apulie ac Sicilie comes, Regis nomine
‘* a falso pontifice donatus. Adversus Ana-
‘¢ cletum creatus rite ac solenniter fuerat In-
“* nocentius secundus, cuifavebat imperator
“ Lotharius Saxo, summa virtute atque pru-
‘¢ dentia princeps ; quo bellum gerente ad-
‘‘ versus Rogerium, Amaiphi, urbe Salerno
‘¢ proxima, (quam perperam aliqui locant
“in Apulia, Melphiam cum Amalphi con-
‘* fundentes,) inopinato reperti fuerunt di-
“ gestorum libri; quos Pisani, qui classe,
“ Lotharium contra Rogerrzum adjuverant,
“© premio bene navate opere sibi exorarunt.
“ Pisis vero post longam obsidionem a Ca-
“ ponio militie duce strenuo expugnatis,

‘* translati fuere Florentiam ; ubi, pro Au-
‘* gusta Medicez domus magnificentia, in
‘* museo magni ducis conservantur. Hine
“ promiscua Pisanarum et Florentinarum
‘*apud scriptores pandectarum appellatio.
‘« Tisdem temporibus repertum Ravenne fuit
‘*constitutionum imperialium volumen,
‘* quod codex appellatus ; indeque ceteros li-
“ bros juris, imo et digestorum aliud exem-
‘ plar in lucem aliqui rediisse putant: nec
‘“‘ mirum, cum ea urbs longo tempore Roma-
‘* nis legibus vixerit,et orlentali Romanorum
‘* imperio diu obtemperavit. Novelle vero
‘* constitutiones etiam antea per. Italiam va-
‘¢ pabantur ; utque mea fert opinio, multi
juris civilis libri, postquam incessit homi-
“nes cupido recipiendi Romani juris, agni-
‘ ti potius fuere, quam reperti: nam, et ali-
** quot ante Lotharium annis, jus civile Jus-
*¢ tiniani commemoravit Ivo Carnotensis, et
‘ libros pandectarum ; cum antea, si occur-
‘* rerent, forsan socordia et oblivione pre-
“ termitterentur.’’ vid. Gravine orig. jur.
civ. lib. 1. cap. 140. et Hein. hist. jur. civ.
lib. 1, § 412.
PROGMIUM

DE

CONFIRMATIONE INSTITUTIONUM.

 

IN NOMINE DOMINI NOSTRI JESU CHRISTI.

Imperator, Casarn FLAVIUS J USTINIANUS, Atemanicus, Gor
THICUS, FRANcicus, GERMANICUS, ANTICUS, ALANICUS, VANDALI-
ous, AFRicanus, Pius, Fenix, Inctytus, Victor ac TrrumpPH-
ATOR, SEMPER AUGUSTUS—CUPIDE LEGUM JUVENTUTI S.

 

De usu armorum et legum.

IMPERATORIAM majesta-
tem non solum armis decoratam,
sed etiam legibus oportet esse arm-
atam ; ut utrumque tempus et bel-
lorum et pacis recté possit guber-
nari: et princeps Romanus non so-
lum in hostilibus preeliis victor exis-
tat, sed etiam per legitimos tramites
calumniantium iniquitates expellat :
et fiat tam juris  religiosissimus,
quam, victis hostibus, triumphator
magnificus.

The imperial dignity should not
only be supported by arms, but
guarded by laws, that the people
may be properly governed in time of
peace as well as war; fora Roman
emperor ought not only to be victo-
rious in the hostile field, but should
take every legal course to expel the
iniquities of men regardless of law;
and become equally renowned for
a religious observance of justice, as
for warlike triumphs.

De bellis et legibus Justiniani.

$ L Quorum utramque viam cum
sumimis vigiliis, summaque provi-
dentiad annuente Deo, perfecimus:
et bellicos quidem sudores nostros
barbaric gentes, sub juga nostra
redacte, cognoscunt: et tam Afri-
ca, quam alie innumere provincie,
post tanta temporum spatia, nostris

victoriis a celesti nemine prestitis,
1

§$ 1. By our incessant labors, and
the assistance of divine providence,
we have pursued this double path:
the barbarian nations have acknow-
ledged our prowess and submitted to
our yoke; even Africa and many
other provinces, after so long an in-
terval are again added to the Roman
empire: and yet this vast people are
2 PROGMIUM

iterum ditioni Romane, nostroque
addite imperio, protestantur. Om-
nes vero populi legibus tam & nobis
promulgatis, quam compositis, re-
guntur.

governed by laws, either originally
enacted, or promulgated anew, un-
der our authority.

De compositione Codicis et Pandectarum.

§$ IL Et cum sacratissimas con-
stitutiones, antea confusas, in lucu-
lentam ereximusconsonantiam, tunc
nostram extendimus curam ad im-
mensa veteris prudentie volumina ;
et opus' desperatum, quasi per me-
dium profundum euntes, ccelesti fa-
vore jam adimplevimus.

$ 2. When we had arranged and
brought ‘into lucid harmony the
hitherto confused mass of imperial
constitutions, we then extended our
care to the numerous volumes of an-
cient law; and have now completed
through the favour of heaven (wa-
ding as it were through a vast
ocean) a work that might have been
despaired. of.

De tempore, auctoritatibus, fine et utilitate compositionis
Institutionum.

§ III. Cumque hoc, Deo propi-
tio, peractum est, Triboniano, viro
magnifico, magistro, et exqueestore
sacri palatii nostri, et exconsule,
nec non Theophilo et Dorotheo, vi-
ris illustribus, antecessoribus, (quo-
rum omnium solertiam, et legum
scientiam, et circa nostras jussiones
fidem, jam ex multis rerum argu-
mentisaccepimus, ) convocatis, man-
davimus specialiter, ut ipsi nostra
auctoritate, nostrisque suasionibus,
Institutiones componerent; ut liceat
vobis prima legum cunabula non ab
antiquis fabulis discere, sed ab im-
periali splendore appetere: et tam

-aures, quam animi vestri, nihil in-
utile, nihilque perperam positum,
sed quod in ipsis rerum obtinet ar-
gumentis, accipiant: et quod priore
tempore vix post quadriennium pri-
oribus contingebat, ut tune consti-

§ 3. So soon as by the blessing of
God this was accomplished, we sum-
moned Tribonian, our former chan-
cellor, with Theopilus and Dorothe-
us, men of known learning and tried
fidelity, whom we enjoined by our
authority to compose the following
Institutes, that the rudiments of law
might be more effectually learned by
the sole means of our imperial au-
thority; and that your minds forthe
future should not be burdened with
obsolete and unprofitable doctrines,
but instructed in those laws only
which are allowed of and practised;
and, whereas Students formerly
could scarcely sit down to the impe-
rial constitutions under four years
previous study, they may now (hav-
ing been thought worthy of our
princely care, to which they are in-
debted for the beginning and end of
DE CONFIRMATIONE INSTITUTIONUM. 3

tutiones imperatorias legerent, hoc
vos 4 primordio ingrediamini, digni
tanto honore, tantaque reperti feli-
citate, ut et initium vobis, et finis
legum eruditionis, a voce principali
procedat.

their legal erudition) apply them-
selves immediately to that course
of reading.

Diviso Institutionum.

$ IV. Igitur post libros quinqua-
ginta Digestorum, seu Pandectar-
um, (in quibus omne jus antiquum
collectum est, quod per eundem
virum excelsum Tribonianum, nec
non ceteros viros illustres et facun-
dissimos, confecimus,) in quatuor
libros easdem Institutiones partiri
juessimus, ut sint tortius legitime
scientiz prima elementa.

$ 4, When therefore, by the as-
sistance of Tribonian and other il-
lustrious persons, we had compiled
the fifty books, called Digests or
Pandects, we directed that the In-
stitutes should be divided into four
books, which serve as elements of
the science of law.

Quid in Institutionibus contineatur.

§ V. In quibus breviter exposi-
tum est, et quod antea obtinebat, et
quod postea, desuetudine inumbra-
tum, imperiali remedio illumina-
tum est.

§ 5. Wherein are briefly set forth
the laws formerly in use, and those
also, which having been oversha-
dowed by disuse, are now brought
to light by our princely care.

Ex quibus libris composite sunt Institutiones, atque
earum recognitio, et confirmatio.

§ VI. Quas, ex omnibus antiquo-
rum Institutionibus, et praecipue ex
commentariis Caii nostri, tam in-
stitutionum, quam rerum quotidi-
anarum, aliisque multis commen-
tariis compositas, cum tres viri pru-
dentes preedicti nobis obtulerunt, et
legimus, et recognovimus, et plenis-
simum nostrarum constitutionum
robur eis accommodavimus.

$ 6. The four books of Institutes
thus compiled by Tribonian, Theo-
philus, and Dorotheus, from all the
institutions of the ancient law, but
chiefly from the commentaries, insti-
tutions, and other writings of Caius,
being presented to us, we read and
diligently examined their contents;
and, in testimony of our approba-
tion, we have now given them our
fullest constitutional authority.
 

4 ~ PROCEMIUM, &c.

Adhortatio ad studium juris.

§ VII. Summa itaque ope, et ala-
cri studio, has leges nostras acci-
pite: et vosmetipsos sic eruditos
ostendite, ut spes vos pulcherrima
foveat, toto legitimo opere perfecto,
posse etiam nostram rempublicam,
in partibus ejus vobis credendis,
gubernari.

§ 7. Receive therefore and study
these our laws with diligence and
alacrity; and show yourselves so
competent therein, that when your
studies shall be finished, you may
entertain a cheering hope of having
a part of the government commit-
ted to your charge.

D. CP. XT. Kalend. Decemb. D. Justiniano PP. A. HI. COS.

Given at Constantinople on the eleventh day before the
calends of December, in the third consulate of the
Emperor Justinian, always august. (21st Nov. 533.)
INSTITUTIONUM,

SEU
ELEMENTORUM,

D. JUSTINIANI

LIBER PRIMUS.

 

TITULUS PRIMUS.

DE JUSTITIA ET JURE.

D. 1.

T. dy

 

Definitio Justitiz.

JustitT1a est constans et perpetua

Justice is the constant and peyr-

voluntas jus suum cuique tribuen- petual disposition to render every

di.

man his due.

Definitio jurisprudentie.

§ I. Jurisprudentia est divina-
rum atque humanarum rerum no-
titia, justi atque injusti scientia.

. $1. Jurisprudence is the know-
ledge of things divine and human;
the science of what is just and un.

just.

De juris methodo.

$ Il. His igitur generaliter cog-
nitis, et incipientibus nobis expo-
nere jura populi Romani, ita vi-
dentur posse tradi commodissime,
si primo levi ac simplici via, post
deinde diligentissima atque ex-
actissima interpretatione, singula
tradantur ; alioqui, si statim ab ini-
tio rudem adhuc et infirmum ani-
mum studiosi multitudine ac varie-
tate rerum oneravermus, duorum

“

$2. these definitions being pre-
mised, we shall commence our ex-
position of the Roman Law most
conveniently, if we take first the
plainest and easiest path, and then
proceed to treat each particular with
the ultmost exactness: for, if at the
beginning we overload the mind of
the student with a multitude and
variety of topics, we may cause
him either wholly to abandon his
6 LIB. I.

alterum,”aut desertorem studiorum
efficiemus, aut cum magno labore,
sepé etiam cum diffidentia, (que
plerumque juvenes avertit,) serius
ad id perducemus, ad quod, leviore
via ductus, fine magno labore et
fine ullé diffidentia, maturius pro-
duci potuisset.

TIT. [.

studies, or bring him late to that
knowledge through great labour
and diffidence, which he might
otherwise have acquired earlier
with ease and confidence.

Juris preecepta.

§ TIL. Juris precepta sunt: ho-
nesté vivere, alterum non ledere,
suum cuique tribuere.

$ 3. The precepts of the law are,
to live honestly, to hurt no one, to
give to every one his due.

De jure publico et privato.

§ IV. Hujus studii duz sunt
positiones, publicum et. privatum.
Publicum just est, quod ad statum
rei Romane spectat. Privatum est,
quod ad singulorum ultilitatem per-
tinet. Dicendum est igitur de jure
privato, quod tripertitum est: col-
lectum enim est ex naturalibus
preceptis, aut gentum, aut civili-
bus.

$ 4. The law is divided into pub-
lic and private. Public law, regards
the state of the commonwealth: but
private law, of which we shall here
treat, concerns the interest of in-
dividuals; and is tripartite, being
collected from natural precepts,
from the law of nations, and from
municipal Regulations.

—_——_—_—_—__2ee

TITULUS SECUNDUS.

DE JURE NATURALI,

GENTIUM, ET CIVILL

De jure naturali.

Just naturale est, quod natura
omnia animalia docuit: nam jus
istud non humani generis proprium
est, sed omnium animalium, quee
in celo, que in mari, nascuntur.
Hine descendit maris atque fe-
mine conjunctio, quam nos matri-
monium appellamus. Hinc libe-
rorum procreatio, hinc educatio.

The law of nature is a law not
only to man, but likewise to all other
animals, whether produced on the
earth, in the air, or in the waters.
From hence proceeds that conjunc-
tion of male and female, which we
denominate matrimony; hence the
procreation and education of chil-
dren. We perceive also, that other
LIB. I. TIT. IL. 7

Videmus enim, cetera quoque ani-
malia istius juris peritia censeri.

animals are considered as having
some knowledge of this law.

Distinctio juris gentium et civilis, a definitione et etymologia.

$I. Jus autem civile 4 jure gen-
tium distinguitur, quod omnes po-
puli, qui legibus et moribus regun-
tur, partim suo proprio, partim
communi omnium hominum, jure
utuntur: nam quod gquisque popu-
lus sibi jus constituit, id ipsius pro-
prium civitatis est, vocaturque jus
civile, quasi jus proprium ipsius
civitatis. Quod vero naturalis ratio
inter omnes homines constituit, id
apud omnes gentes pereeque custo-
ditur, vocaturque jus gentium, quasi
duo jure omnes gentes utantur: et
populus itaque Romanus, partim suo
proprio, partim communi omnium
hominum, jure utitur. Que singula
qualia sint, suis locis proponemus.

$ 1. Civil law is distinguished
from the law of nations, because
every community governed by laws,
uses partly its own and partly the
laws which are common to all man-
kind. That law, which a people en-
acts for its own government is called
the civil law of that people. But
that law, which natural reason ap-
points for all mankind, is called the
law of nations, because all nations
make use of it. The people of Rome
are governed partly by their own
laws, and partly by the laws, which
are common to all men. Of these
we shall treat separately in their
proper places.

Ab appeliatione et effectibus.

$ II. Sed jus quidem civile ex
undquaque civitate appellatur, veluti
Atheniensium: nam, si quis velit
Solonis vel Draconis leges appellare
jus civile Atheniensium, non erra-
verit. Sic enim et jus, quo Romanus
populus utitur, jus civile Romano-
rum appellamus, vel jus Quiritum
quo Quirites utuntur: Romani enim
a Romulo, Quirites a Quirino, ap-
pellantur. Sed, quoties non addimus
nomen cujus sit civitatis, nostrum
jus significamus: sicuti cum poétam
dicimus, nec addimus nomen, sub-
auditus apud Gracos egregius Ho-
merus, apud nos Virgilius. Jus
autem gentium omni humano generi
commune est: nam, usu exigente et

$ 2. Civil laws take their denom-
ination from that city, in which
they are established: it would not
therefore beerroneoustocall the laws
of Solon or Draco the civil laws of
Athens: and thus the law, which
the Roman people make use of, is
styled the civil law of the Romans,
or of the Quirites; for the Romans
are also called Quirites from Quiri-
nus. Whenever we mention the
words civil law, without addition,
weemphatically denoteour own law;
thus the G'reeks, when they say the
poet, mean Homer, and the Romans
Virgil. The law of nations is com-
mon to all mankind and all nations
have enacted some laws, asoccasion
8 LIB. I.

TIT. IL.

 

humanis necessitatibus, gentes hu-
mane .jura qu dam sibi constitue-
runt: bella etenim orta sunt, et cap-
tivitates secute, et servitutes, que
sunt naturali juri contrarize: jure
enim naturali omnes homines abini-
tio liberi nascebantur: et ex hoc
jure gentium, omnes penécontractus
introducti sunt, ut emptio et vendi-
tio, locatio et conductio, societas,
depositum, mutuum, et alii innu-
merabiles.

Divisio juris in scriptum et
juris
§ II. Constat autem jus nos-
trum, quo utimur, aut scripto, aut
sine scripto: ut apud Grecos. tw
vouwy ov mEv EYCQapoL, oF ds uyQuGoL
Scriptum autem jus, est, lex, plebis-
citum, senatus-consultum, princi-
pum placita, magistratuum edicta,
responsa prudentum.

and necessity required: for wars a-
rose and theconsequences were cap-
tivity and servitude; both which are
contrary to the law of nature; for
by that law, all men are born free.
But almost all contracts were at
first introduced by the law of na-
tions; as for instance, buying, sell-
ing, letting, hireing, partnership, a
deposit, a loan and others without
number.

non scriptum; et subdivisio

scripti.

§ 3. The Roman law is divided,
like the Grecian, into written and
unwritten. The written, consists of
the plebiscites, the decrees of the se-
nate, ordinances of princes, the e-
dicts of magistrates, andthe answers
of the sages of the law.

De lege et plebiscito.

$ IV. Lex est, quod populus Ro-
manus, senatorio magistratu inter-
rogante, (veluti consule,) constitue-
bat. Plebiscitum est, quod plebs,
plebeio magistratu interrogante (ve-
luti tribuno,) constituebat. Plebs
autem a populo eo differt, quo spe-
cies a genere; nam appellatione po-
puli universi cives significantur,
connumeratis etiam patriciis et se-
natoribus. Plebis autem, appella-
tione, sine patriciis et senatoribus,
ceteri cives significantur. Sed et
plebiscita, lege Hortensia lata, non
minus valere, quam leges, ceeperunt

$4. Alaw is what the Roman
people enact at the request ofa sena-
torial magistrate; as a consul. A
plebiscite is what the commonalty
enact, when requested by a plebeian
magistrate, asa tribune. The word
commonalty differs from people as a
species from its genus; for all the
citizens, including patricians and se-
nators, are comprehended under the
term people. The termcommonalty,
includesall the citizens, except patri-
cians and senators. The plebiscites,
by the Hortensian law, began tohave
the same force as the laws them-
selves.
LIB. L.

TIT. I.

De senatus-consulte. :

§ V. Senatus-consultum est, quod
senatus jubet atque constituit: nam,
cum auctus esset populus Romanus
in eum modum, ut difficile esset, in
unum eum convocari legis sancien-
dz causd, equum visum est, sena-
tum vice populi consuli.

$ 5. A senatorial decree is what
the senate commands and appoints:
for, when the people of Rome be-
came so increased that it was diffi-
cult to assemble them for the enact-
ing of laws, it seemed right, that the
senate should be consulted instead
of the people.

De constitutione.

§ VI. Sed et, quod principi pla-
cuit, legis habet vigorem: cum lege
regia, quee de ejus imperio lata est,
populus ei, et in eum, omne impe-
rium suum et potestatem concedat.
Quodcunque ergo imperator per
epistolam constituit, vel cognoscens
decrevit, vel edicto precepit, legem
esse constat. Heec sunt, quee consti-
tutiones appellantur. Plané ex his
queedam sunt personales, que nec
ad exemplum trahuntur, quoniam
non hoc princeps vult: nam quod
alicui ob meritum indulsit, vel si
quam penam irrogavit, vel si cui
sine exemplo subvenit, personam
non transgreditur. Alize autem,
cum generales sint, omnes procul-
dubio tenent.

§ 6. The ordinance of the prince
hath also the force of alaw; for the
people by the lex regia, make a con-
cession to him of their whole power.
Therefore whatever the emperor or-
dains by rescript, decree, or edict, is
law. Such acts are called constitu-
tions. Of these, some are personal,
and are not to be drawn into prece-

-dent; for, if the prince hath indulg-
ed any man on account of his merit,
or inflicted any extraordinary pun-
ishment ona criminal, or granted
some unprecedented assistance,
these acts extend not beyond the
individual. But other constitutions
being general, undoubtedly bind
all.

De jure honorario.

$ VII. Pretorum quoque edic-
ta non modicam obtinent juris
auctoritatem. Hoc etiam jus ho-
norarium solemus appellare: quod,
qui honores gerunt, (id est magis-
tratus,) auctoritatem huic juri de-
derunt. Proponebant et ediles
curules edictum de quibusdam cau-
sis; quod et ipsum juris honorarii

portio est.
2

$7. The edicts of the preetors
are also of great authority. These
edicts are called the honorary law,
because the magistrates who bear
honors in the state, have given them
their sanction. The curule ediles
also, upon certain occasions, pub-
lished their edicts, which became a
part of the jus honorarium.
10 LIB. I.

TIT. II.

 

De responsis prudentum.

§ VIII. Responsa prudentum
sunt sententie et opiniones eorum,
quibus permissum erat de jure res-
pondere: nam antiquitus constitu-
tum erat, ut essent, qui jura publicé
interpretarentur, quibus a Cesare
jus respondendi datum est, qui ju-
ris-consulti appellabantur: quorum
omnium sententiz et opiniones eam
auctoritatem tenebant, ut judici re-
cedere a responsis eorum non li-
ceret, ut est constitutum.

§ 8. The answers of the lawyers
are the opinions of persons arthor-
ised to give answers on matters of
law. For antiently, public Inter-
preters of the law were licenced by
the emperors and were called juris-
consulti; and their opinions ob-
tained se_great an authority, that it
was not in the power of a judge to
recede from them. -

De jure non scripto.

§ IX. Sine scripto jus venit,
quod usus approbavit ; nam diutur-
ni mores, consensu utentium com-
probati, legem imitantur.

$9. The unwritten law is that,
which usage has approved : for dai-
ly customs, established by the con-
sent of those who use them, put on
the character of law.

Ratio superioris divisionis.

§ X. Et non ineleganter in duas
species jus civile distributum esse
videtur ; nam origo ejus ab institu-
tis duarum civitatum, Athenarum
scilicet et Lacedemoniorum, flux-
isse videtur. In his enim civi-
tatibus, ita agi solitum erat, ut
Lacedemonii quidem ea, que pro
legibus observabant,m emoriz man-
darent: Athenienses verd ea, que
in legibus scripta comprehendis-
sent, custodirent.

!

$ 10. Nor is it an inelegant divi-
sion of the law, into written and
unwritten: which seems to have
taken rise from the peculiar customs
of the Athenians and Lacedemon-
dans. For the Lacodemonians trust-
ed chiefly to memory, for the pres-
ervation of their laws; but the
laws of the Athenians were com-
mitted to writing.

Divisio juris in immutabile et mutabile.

§ XI. Sed naturalia quidem jura,
que apud omnes gentes pereque
observantur, divinad quadam provi-
dentia constituta, semper firma at-
que immutabilia permanent. Ea

$ 11. The laws of nature, observed
by all nations, inasmuch as they are
the appointment of divine provi-
dence, remain fixed and immutable.
But the laws, which every city has
LIB. I.

vero, que ipsa sibi queeque civitas
constituit, sepe mutari solent, vel
tacito consensu populi, vel alia pos-
tea lege lata.

TIT. I. il
enacted for itself, suffer frequent
changes, either by tacit consent of

the people, or by some subsequent
law.

De objectis juris.

§ XII Omne autem jus, quo
utimur, vel ad personas pertinet,
vel ad res, vel ad actiones. Et
prius de personis videamus: nam
parim est jus nosse, si persone,
quarum causa constitutum est, ig-
norentur.

§ 12. All laws, relate to persons,
things, or actions. First then of per-
sons; for it would be of little pur-
pose to study the law, while ignor-
ant of persons, for whose sake the
law was constituted.

 

TITULUS TERTIUS.
DE JURE PERSONARUM..

D.

1, ‘T. 5.

Prima divisio personarum.

SUMMA itaque divisio de jure
personarum hec est: quod omnes
homines aut liberi sunt, aut servi.

The first general division of per-
sons, in respect to their rights, is
into freemen and slaves.

}:

Definitio libertatis.

$ I. Et libertas quidem (ex qua
etiam liberi vocantur) est naturalis
facultas ejus, quod cuique facere li-
bet, nisi quid vi aut jure prohibe-
tur.

Definitio

§ IL Servitus autem est consti-
tutio juris gentium, qua quis do-
minio alieno contra naturam sub-
jicitur.

§ 1. Freedom, from which we
are denominated free, is the natu-
ral power of acting as we please,
unless prevented by force, or by the
law.

servitutis

§ 2. Slavery, is when one man is
subjected to the dominion of anoth-
er, according to the law of nations,
though contrary to natural right.
12 LIB. I.

TIT. WI.

 

Servi et mancipii etymologia.

$ III. Servi autem ex eo appel-
lati sunt, quod imperatores capti-
vos vendere, ac, per hoc servare,
nec occidere solent; qui etiam
mancipia dicti sunt; eo, quod ab
hostibus manu capiantur.

§ 3. Slaves are denominated servi,
from the practice of our generals
to sell their captives, and thus pre-
serve, (servare) and not slay them.
Slaves are also called mancipia in
that they are taken from the enemy
by hand (manucapti.)

Quibus modis servi constituuntur.

§ IV. Servi autem aut nascun-
tur, aut fiunt. Nascuntur ex ancil-
lis nostris: fiunt aut jure gentium,
id est, ex captivitate; aut jure ci-
vili, cum liber homo, major viginti
annis, ad pretium participandum
sese venundari passus est.

§ 4. Slaves are born such, or be-
come so. They are born such of
bond-women : they become so either
by the law of nations, that is, by
captivity; or by the civillaw; as
when a free person, above the age of
twenty, suffers himself to be sold,
for the sake fof sharing, the price
given for him.

De liberorum et servorum divisione.

§ V. In servorum conditione
nulla est differentia; in liberis au-
tem multe : aut enim sunt ingenui,
aut libertini.

§ 5. In the condition of slaves
there is no diversity; but among
free persons, there are many; thus,
some are ingenui, or Freemen;
others libertini or Freed Men.

 

TITULUS QUARTUS.
DE INGENUIS.

C. vii.

T. 14

De ingenui definitione.

INGENUUS est is, qui statim,
ut mnatus est, liber est; sive ex
duobus ingenuis matrimonio editus
est, sive ex libertinis duobus, sive
ex altero libertino, et altero ingenuo.

A Freeman is one who is born
free, by being born in matrimony,
of parents, who are both free, or
both freed ; or of parents, one free,
the other freed. But one born of a
LIB. I. TIT. IV.

Sed et, si quis ex matre nascitur li-
bera patre verd servo, ingenuus
nihilominus nascitus: quemadmo-
dum, qui ex matre libera et incerto
patre natusest: quoniam vulgo con-
ceptusest. Sufficit autem, liberam
fuisse matrem eo tempore, quo na-
scitur, licet ancilla conseperit: et,
é contrario, si libera conceperit,
deinde ancilla facta pariat, placuit
eum, qui nascitur, liberum nasci:
quia non debet calamitas matris ei
nocere, quiin ventre est. Ex his
illud quesitum est, si ancilla praeg-
nans manumissa sit, deinde ancilla
postea facta pepererit, liberum an
servum pariat? Et Martianus pro-
bat, liberum nasci: sufficit enim ei,
qui in utero est, liberam matrem
vel medio tempore habuisse, ut li-
ber nascatur ; quod et verum est.

13

free mother, altho’ the father be a
slave, or unknown, is free: not-
withstanding he was conceived dis-
creditably. And if the mother is
free at the time of the birth, al-
though a bond-woman when she
conceived, the infant will be free.
Also if a woman, free at concep-
tion, becomes a slave and is deliv-
ered, her child, is nevertheless free
born ; for the misfortune of the
mother ought not to prejudice her
unborn infant. It has been a ques-
tion, whether the child of a woman,
who is made free during pregnancy,
but becomes bond before delivery,
would be free born? Martianus
proves the affirmative ; for he deems
it sufficient to the unborn child if
the mother hath been free at any
time between conception and deliv-
ery ; and this is true.

De erronea ingenui manumissione.

§ IL Cum autem ingenuus ali-
quis natus sit, non officit ei, in ser-
vitute fuisse, et postea manumis
sum esse: sepissimé enim consti-
tutum est, natalibus non officere
manumissionem.

§ 1. It will not injure a man
born free to have been in servitude,
and afterwards manumitted : for it
hath been often settled that manu-
mission shall not prejudice free
birth.

 

TITULUS QUINTUS.
DE LIBERTINIS.

Definitio et origo libertinorum et manumissionis.

LIBERTINI sunt, qui ex justa
servitute manumissi sunt. Manu-
missio autem est de manu datio:

Freed men are those, who have
been manumitted from just servi-
tude. Manumission, manu-datio,
14 LIB. L.

TIT. V.

 

quamdiu aliquis in servitute est,
manui et potestati suppositus est :
et manumissus liberatur 4 domini
potestate: que res a jure gentium
originem sumpsit ; utpote cum jure
naturali omnes liberi nascerentur ;
nec esset nota manumissio, cum
servitus esset incognita. Sed, post-
quam jure gentium servitus inge-
nuitatem invasit, secutum est bene-
ficium manumissionis: et, cum uno
communi nomine omnes homines
appellarentur, jure gentium tria
hominum genera esse cceperunt :
liberi; et his contrarium, servi; et
tertium genus, libertini; qui desie-
rant esse servi.

Quibus modis

$ L Multis autem modis manu-
missio procedit : aut enim ex sacris
constitutionibus in sacrosanctis ec-
clesiis, aut vindicté, aut inter ami-
cos, aut per epistolam, aut per tes-
tamentum, aut per aliam quamlibet
ultiman voluntatem. Sed et aliis
multis modis libertas servo compe-
tere potest, qui tam ex verteribus,
quam ex nostris constitutionibus,
introducti sunt.

implies the giving of liberty ; for
whoever is in servitude, is subject
to the hand and power of another ;
but whoever is manumitted, is free
from both.

Manumission took its rise from
the law of nations; for all men by
the law of nature are born free;
nor was manumission heard of
while servitude was unknown.
But when servitude, under sanction
of the law of nations, invaded lib-
erty, the benefit of manumission be-
came then a consequence. For all
men at first were denominated by
one common appellation, ’till, by
the law of nations, they began to
be divided into three classes, viz.
into liberi, or freemen, servi, or
slaves, and libertini, freed-men who
have ceased to be slaves. ~

manumittatur.

$ 1. Manumission is effected by
various ways; either in the face of
the church, according to the impe-
rial constitutions, or by the vindic-
ta, or in the presence of friends, or
by letter, or by testament, or by
any other last will. Liberty may
also be conferred upon a slave by
diverse other methods, some of
which were introduced by former
laws, and others by our own.

Ubi et quando manumitti potest.

§ IL. Servi vero 4 dominis sem-
permanumitti solent, adeo ut vel
in transitu manumittantur; veluti
cum praetor, aut preeses, aut prog
consul, in balneum, vel in thea-
trum cunt.

§ 2. Slaves may be manumitted
by their masters at any time; even
on the way, as while the preetor,
the governor of a province, or the
proconsul is going to the bath, or
to the theatre.
LIB. I.

TIT. V. 15

De libertinorum divisione sublata. ‘

$ III. Libertinorum autem status
tripertitus antea fuerat: nam, qui
manumittebantur, modo majorem
et justam libertatem consequeban-
tur, et fiebant cives Romani; modo
minorem, et Latini ex lege Junia
Norbana fiebant; modo inferiorem,
et fiebant ex lege Elia Sentia Dedi-
titii: sed quoniam Dedititiorum
quidem pessima conditio, jam ex
multis temporibus in desuetudinem
abierat ; Latinorum vero nomen
non frequentabatur ; ideoque nostra
pietas, omnia augere et in meliorem
statum reducere desiderans, dua-
bus constitutionibus hoc emendavit,
et in pristinum statum reduxit:
quia et a primis urbis Rome cuna-
_bulis una atque simplex libertas
competebat, id est, eadem, quam,
habebat manumissor ; nisi quod,
scilicet, libertinus sit, qui manumit-
titur, licet manumissor ingenuus sit ;
et Dedititios quidem per constituti-
onem nostram expulimus, quam
promulgavimus inter nostras decis-
iones; per quas, suggerente nobis
Triboniano viro excelso quzestore
nostro, antiqui juris altercationes
placavimus. Latinos autem Juni-
anos, et omnem, que circa eos
fuerat, observantiam, alia constitu-
tione, per ejusdem queestores sug-
gestionem, correximus, quz inter
imperiales radiat sanctiones ; et
omnes libertos, (nullo, nec etatis
manumissi, nec domini manumit-
tentis, nec in manumissionis modo,
discrimine habito, sicuti antea ob-
servabatur,) civitate Romana de-

§ 3. Freedmen were formerly
distinguished by a threefold divis-
ion. Those, who were manumitted,
sometimes obtained the greater lib-
erty, and became Roman citizens ;
sometimes only the lesser, and be-
came Latins, under the law Junia
Norbana ; and sometimes only the
inferior liberty, and became Ded-
witii, by the law Alia Sentia. But,
the condition of the Dedititii differ-
ing but little from slavery, has been
long disused ; neither has the name
of Latins been frequent. Our piety
therefore, leading us to reduce all
things into a better state, we have
amended our laws by two constitu-
tions, and re-established the antient
usage; for antiently liberty was
simple and undivided; that is, it
was conferred upon the slave, as
his manumittor possessed it; ad-
mitting this single difference, that
the person manumitted became only
a Freedman, although his manu-
mittor was a Freeman.

We have abolished the Deditatit
by a constitution published among
our decisions, by which, at the in-
stance of Tribonian, our Questor,
we have suppressed all disputes
concerning the antient law. We
have also, at his suggestion, altered
the condition of the Latins and
corrected the laws, which related to
them, by another constitution, con-
spicuous among the imperial sanc-
tions; and we have made all the
freed-mew in general citizens of
Rome, regarding neither the age of
16 LIB. L

TIT, YL

 

coravimus, multis modis additis,
per quos possit libertas’ servis cum
civitate Romana, que sola est in
presenti, preestari.

the manumitted, nor of the man-
umittor, nor the antient forms of
manumission. We have also intro-
duced many new methods, by
which slaves may become Roman
citizens; the only liberty that can
now be conferred.

 

TITULUS

SEXTUS.

QUI ET EX QUIBUS CAUSIS, MANUMITTERE

NON POSSUNT.
D. xi. T. 9. C. vii. T. 11.

Prius caput legis Alize, de manumittente in fraudem credi-
torum.

NON tamen cuicunque volenti
manumittere licet: nam is, qui in
fraudem creditorum manumittit, ni-
hil agit: quia lex Alia Sentia im-
pedit libertatem.

Every master may not manumit
of will: for if done with intent to
defraud his creditors, it is void.

The law Alia Sentia restraining

this liberty.

De servo instituto cum libertate.

$ I. Licet autem domino, qui sol-
vendo non est, in testamento ser-
vum suum cum libertate heredem
instituere, ut liber fiat, heresque ei
solus et necessarius, si modo ei ne-
mo alius, ex eo testamento, heres
extiterit : aut quia nemo heres scrip-
tus sit, aut quia is, qui scriptus est,
qualibet ex causa heeres ei non exti-
terit. Idque eddem lege Aslia Sentia
provisum est, et recté. Valdé enim
prospiciendum erat, ut egentes ho-
mines, quibus alius heres extiturus
non esset, vel servum suum neces-
sarium heredem haberent, qui sa-
tisfacturus esset creditoribus: aut,

§ 1. A master, who is insolvent,
may appoint a slave to be his heir
with liberty, that thus the slave may
obtain his freedom, and become the
only and necessary heir of the testa-
tor, provided no other person is also
heir by the same testament ; and this
may happen, either because no other
person was instituted heir or because
the person, so instituted, is unwilling
toact. This privilege of masters was
for wise reasons established by the
law 4tha Sentia : forit became nec-
essary to provide, that indigent men,
towhom noman would be a volunta-
ry heir, mighthaveaslave for aneces-
LIB. I. TIT. VI.

hoc eo non faciente, creditores res
hereditarias servi nomine vendant
ne injuria defunctus afficiatur.

17

sary heir to satisfy creditors ; or
that the creditors should sell the he-
reditary effects in the name of the
slave, lest the deceased should suffer
ignominy.

De servo instituto sine libertate.

§ II. Idemque juris est, etsi
sine libertate servus heeres institu-
tus est; quod nostra constitutio non
solum in domino, qui solvendo non
est, sed generaliter constituit, nova
humanitatis ratione ; ut ex ipsa
scriptura institutionis etiam libertas
ei competere videatur: cum non
sit verisimile, eum, quem heredem
sibi elegit, si preetermiserit liber-
tatis dationem, servum remanere
voluisse, et neminem sibi heeredem
fore.

$ 2. Aslave also becomes free by
being instituted an heir, although
his freedom be not mentioned : for
our constitution respects not only the
insolvent master, but, by anew act
of humanity, it extends generally;
so that the institution of an heir, im-
plies the grant of liberty. For it
is highly improbable, that a testator,
although he has omitted to mention
liberty in his will, could mean that
the person instituted, should remain

_aslave, and himself be destitute of

an heir.

Quid sit in fraudem creditorum manumittere.

§ III. In fraudem autem credi-
torum manumittere videtur, qui vel
jam eo tempore, quo manumittit,
solvendo non est; vel qui, datis li-
bertatibus, desiturus est solvendo
esse. Prevaluisse tamen videtur,
nisi animum .quoque fraudandi
manumissor habuerit, non impediri
libertatum, quamvis bona ejus cre-
ditoribus non sufficiant : spe enim
de facultatibus suis amplits, quam
in his est, sperant homines. Itaque
tunc intelligimus impediri liberta-
tem, cum utroque modo fraudantur
creditores ; id est, et consilio manu-
mittentis, et ipsa re; eo quod bona
ejus non sunt suffectura creditori-
bus.

3

§ 3. Manumission is in fraud of
creditors, if the master is insolvent,
when he manumits, or become so by
manumitting. It is however the pre-
vailing opinion, that liberty, when
granted, is not impeached, unless the
manumittor meant to defraud, al-
though his goods are insufficient for
the payment of his creditors; for
men frequently hope better, than
their circumstances really are. We
therefore understand liberty to be
then only impeded, when creditors
are doubly defrauded: by the inten-
tion of the manumittor, and in re-
ality.
18 LIB. I.

TIT. VL

 

Alterum caput legis Allie Sentize de minore viginti annis.

§ IV. Eadem lege Alia Sentia,
domino minori viginti annis non
alitur manumittere premittitur,
quam si vindicté apud consilium,
justa causé manumissionis appro-
bata, fuerint manumissi.

§$ 4, By the same law Aslia Sen-
tia, a master, under the age of twen-
ty years, cannot manumit, unless for
some good reason, to be approved
by a council; and then by the vin-
dicta.

Que sunt juste cause manumissionis.

§ V. Juste autem cause manu-
missionis sunt; veluti si quis pat-
rem aut matrem, filium filiamve,
aut fratres, sororesve naturales, aut
pedagogum, aut nutricem, aut edu-
catorem, aut alumnum alumnamve,
aut collectaneum manumittat; aut
servum, procuratoris -habendi gra-
tia; aut ancillam, matrimonii ha-
bendi causé; dum tamem infra sex
menses in uxcrem ducatur, nisi
justa causa impediat : et servus,
qui manumittitur, procuratoris ha-
bendi gratia, non minor decem et
septem annis manumittatur.

$5. Just reasons for manumis-
sion, are that the person to be manu-
mitted is father or mother to the ma-
numittor, his son or daughter, his
brother or sister, his preceptor, his
nurse, his foster child, or his foster
brother ; or to constitute him his
proctor; or his bond-woman, with
an intent to marry her, provided the
marriage is performed within six
months. Buta slave who is to be
constituted proctor, cannot bemanu-
mitted for that purpose, if under se-
venteen.

De causa semel probata.

§ VI. Semel autem causa ap-
_probata, sive vera sit, sive falsa,
non retractatur.

§ 6. A reason once admitted in
favor of liberty, be it true or false,
cannot be recalled.

Abrogatio posterioris capitis legis A.lie Sentie.

§ VII. Cum ergo certus modus
manumittendi minoribus viginti an-
nis dominis per legem liam Sen-
tiam constitutus esset, eveniebat, ut,
qui quatuordecem annos expleverat,
licet testamentum facere, et in eo
sibi heredem instituere, legataque
relinquere, posset, tamen, si adhuc
minor esset viginti annis, liberta-
tem servo dare non posset; quod
non erat ferendum: nam, cui toto-

§$ 7. When certain bounds were
prescribed by the law Zilia Sentia to
all minors under twenty, with regard
tomanumission, it was observed that
any person who hadcompleted four-
teen years, might make atestament,
institute an heir, and bequeath lega-
cies, and yet that no person, under
twenty, could confer liberty; which
was not longer to be tolerated: for
can any just cause be assigned, why
LIB. I.

rum suorum bonorum in testamen-
to dispositio data erat, quare non
similiter ei, quemadmodum alias
res, ita et de servis suis in ultima
voluntate disponere, quemadmo-
dum voluerit, permittimus, ut et li-
bertatem eis possit prestare? Sed
cum libertas inestimabilis res sit,
et propter hoc ante vigesimum eeta-
tis annum antiquitas libertatem ser-
vo dare prohibebat; ideo nos, me-
diam quodammodo viam eligentes,
non aliter minori viginti annis liber-
tatem in testamento dare servo sto
concedimus, nisi septemdecimum
annum impleverit, et octodecimum
attigerit, Cum enim antiquitas
hujusmodi eetati et pro aliis postu-
lare concesserit, cur non etiam sui
judicii stabilitas ita eos adjuvare
credatur, ut ad libertatem dandam
servis suis possint pervenire ?

TIT. VIL. 19
aman, permitted to dispose of all his
effects, by testament, should be de-
barred from enfranchising his slaves
But liberty being of inestimable va-
lue and our ancient laws prohibiting
any person to make a grant of it,
who is under twenty years of age,
we therefore make choice of a mid-
dle way, and permit all, who have
attained their eighteenth year, to
confer liberty by testament. For
since, by former practice, persons at
eighteen years of age were permit-
ed to plead for their clients, there is
no reason, why the same stability
of judgment, which qualifies them
to assist others, should not enable
them to be of service to themselves
also, by having the liberty of en-
franchising their own slaves.

 

TITULUS SEPTIMUS.
DE LEGE FUSIA CANINIA TOLLENDA.

C. vii.

LEGE Fusia Caninia, certus
modus constitutus erat in servis
testamento manumittendis; quam,
quasi libertates impedientem et quo-
dammodo invidam, tollendam esse
censuimus: cum satis fuerat inhu-
manum, vivos quidem licentiam
habere totam suam familiam liberta-
tem donare, nisi alia causa impediat
libertatem; morientibus autem hu-
jusmodi licentiam adimere.

T. 3.

By the law Fusia Caninia, mas-
ters were limited in manumitting by
testament; we have thought pro-
per to abrogate this law as odious
and destructive of liberty; judging
it inhuman, that persons in health
should have power to manumit a
whole family, if no just cause for-
bid, and that the dying should be
prohibited from doing the same.
20 LIB. I.

TITULUS

TIT. VII.

OCTAVUS.

DE HIS, QUI SUI VEL ALIENI JURIS SUNT.

D. 1.

T. 6.

Altera divisio personarum.

SEQUITUR de jure personarum
alia diviso; nam quedam persone
sui juris sunt, quedam alieno juri
subject. Rursus earum, que a-
lieno juri subjectee sunt, alie sunt
in potestate parentum, alise in po-
testate dominorum. Videamus ita-
que de his, que alieno juri subjec-
te sunt; nam, si cognoverimus,
quenam iste persone sunt, simul
intelligemus, que sui juris sunt; ac
prius inspiciamus de his, que in
potestate dominorum sunt.

We now proceed to another divi-
sion of persons; for some are inde-
pendent, and some are subject to the
power of others. Of those, who are
subject to others, some are in the
power of parents, others of their
masters. Let us then inquire, who
are in subjection to others; for, when
we shall ascertain these, we shall at
the same time discover, who are in-
dependent. And first of those, who
are in the power of masters..

De jure gentium in servos.

$ L'In potestate itaque domino-
rum sunt servi, que quidem potes-
tas juris gentium est; nam apud
omnes pereeque gentes animadver-
tere possumus, dominis in servos
vite necisque potestatem fuisse: et,
quodcunque per servum acquiritur,
id domino acquiti.

$ J. All slaves are in the power
of their masters, a power derived
from the law of nations: for it is
observable among all nations, that
masters have always had the pow-
er of life and death over their
slaves, and that whatever the slave
acquires, is acquired. for the master.

De jure civium Romanorum in servos.

$ IL. Sec hoc tempore nullis ho-
minibus, qui sub imperio nostro
sunt, licet, sine causa legibus cog-
nité, in servos suos supra modum
sevire. Nam, ex constitutione divi
Antonini, qui sine causé servum
suum occiderit, non minus puniri
jubetur, quam si alienum servum
occiderit. Sed et major asperitas

§ 2. All our subjects are now for-
bidden to inflict any extraordinary
punishment upon their slaves, with-
out legal cause. For, by a constitu-
tion of Antoninus, whoever cause-
lessly kills his own slave, is to be
punished equally asif he had killed
the slave of another. The too great
severity of masters is also restrained
LIB. 1.

TIT. VII. 21

 

dominorum, ejusdem principis con-
stitutione, coercetur: nam Antoni-
nus, consultus 4 quibusdam preesidi-
bus provinciarum de his servis, qui
ad xedem sacram vel statuam princi-
pum confugiunt, preecepit, ut, si in-
tolerabilis videatur szevitia domino-
rum, cogantur servos suos bonis
conditionibus vendere, ut pretium
dominis daretur ; et recté: expedit
enim reipublice, ne sua re quis
male utatur. Cujus rescripti, ad
lium Martianum missi, verba
sunt hee. Dominorum quidem po-
testatem in servos wlibatam esse opor-
tet, nec cuiquam hominum jus suum
detrahi. Sed et dominorum interest
ne auxilium contra sevitiam, vel fa-
mem, vel intolerabilem injuriam,
denegetur tis, qui juste deprecantur.
Ideoque cognosce de querelis eorum,
quiex familia Julii Sabiniad sacram
statuam confugerunt ; et, si vel du-
rius habitos, quam equum est, vel
infami injuria affectos esse, cogno-
veris, venire jube; ita ut in potesta-
tem domini non revertantur: quod
si mee constitutioni fraudem fecerit
sciat, me hoc admissum adversus se
severius executurum.

 

by anotherconstitution of Antoninus
who being consulted by certain go-
vernors of provinces concerning
slaves, who take sanctuary either in
temples, or at the statues of the em-
perors, Ordained, that if the severi-
ty of masters should appear exces-
sive they might becompelled to make
sale of their slaves upon equitable
terms, so that the masters might re-
ceive the value ; and properly; in-
asmuch as it is for the public good
that no one should be permitted to
misuse even his own property. The
words of this rescript, sent to Alius
Martiansus, are these.— The power
of masters over their slaves ought
to be protected: nor ought any man
to be deprived of his just right.
But it is for the interest of all mas-
ters, that relief against cruelties, the
denial of sustenance, or any other
insufferable injury, should be grant-
ed to those who justly implore it.
Therefore look into the complaints
made by the family of Julius Sabi-
nus, whose slaves took sanctuary at
the sacred statue; and, if proof be
made that they have been too hardly
treated, or greatly injured, order
them to be forthwith sold, so that
they be no longer subject to their
former master : and, if Julius Sabi-
nus attempt to evade our constitu-
tion, let him know, that I shall put
it in force against him with more
severity.
22 LIB. I.

TIT. IX.

 

TITULUS NONUS.
DE PATRIA POTESTATE.

C. viii.

T. 47.

Summa tituli.

IN potestate nostra sunt liberi
nostri, quos ex justis nuptiis pro-
creavimus. s

Our children, begotten in lawful
wedlock, are under our power.

Definitio nuptiarum,

$1 Nuptiz autem, sive matri-
monium, est, viri et mulieris con-
junctio, individuam vits consuetu-
dinem continens.

§ 1. Matrimony is a connection
between a man and woman, imply-
ing a mutual and exclusive cohab-
itation during life.

Qui habent in potestate.

$ IL. Jus autem potestatis, quod
in liberos habemus, proprium est
civium Romanorum; nulli enim alii
sunt homines, qui talem in liberos
habeant potestatem, qualem nos ha-
bemus.

§ 2. The power which we have
over our children is peculiar to the
citizens of Rome; for no other peo-
ple have the same power over their
children, which we have over ours.

Qui sunt in potestate.

$ III. Qui igitur ex te et ex uxore
tua nascitur, in tua potestate est.
Item qui ex filio tuo et uxore ejus
nascitur, id est, nepos tuus et nep-
tis, que in tud sunt potestate: pro-
nepos, et proneptis, et deinceps
ceteri. Qui autem ex filia tua nas-
cuntur, in potestate tué non sunt;
sed in patris eorum.

$ 3. The child of you and your
wife, is under your power. The is-
sue of your son and son’s wife, that
is, your grand-sons or grand-daugh-
ters are equally so; so are your
great grand-children, é&c. But chil-
dren born of a daughter are not7in
your power, but in the power of
their father or grand-father.
LIB. I. TIT. x.

23

TITULUS DECIMUS.
DE NUPTIIS.

D. xxiii. T.2. O.v.T. 4. Nov. 74,

Qui possunt nuptias contrahere.

JUSTAS autem nuptias inter se
cives Romani contrahunt, qui se-
cundum precepta legum coeunt,
masculi quidem puberes, foemins
autem viri potentes ; sive patres fa-
miliarum sint; sive filii familiarum ;
dum tamen, si filii familiarum
sint, consensum habeant parentum,
quorum in potestate sunt: nam,
hoc fieri debere, et civilis et natu-

ralis ratio suadet, in tantum, ut

jussus parentis pzecedere debeat.
Unde qesitum est, an furiosi filia
nubere, aut furiosi filius uxorem du-
cere, possit? Cumque super filio
variabatur, nostra processit decisio,
qua permissum est ad exemplum
file furiosi, filium quoque furiosi
posse, et sine patris interventu,
matrimonium sibi copulare, escun-
dum datum ex nostra constitutione
modum.

Que uxores duci possunt vel non.

The citizens of Rome contract
valid matrimony, when they fol-
low the precepts of the law; males,
when they arrive at puberty, and
females, when they attain to a mar-
riageable age. The males, whether
patres familiarum, fathers of a fa-
mily, or filii familiarum; sons of
a family; but, if they are sons
of a family, they must first obtain
the consent of the parents, under
whose power they are. For rea-
son, both natural and civil, convin-
ces us, that the consent of parents
should precede marriage; hence
arose the question, whether the son.
of a madman could contract matri-
mony? But opinions being various,
we decided thatthe son as well asthe
daughter of a madman, may marry
without intervention of the father,
provided the rules of our constitu-
tion are observed.

De cognatis, ac primum

de parentibus et liberis.

$ 1. Ergo non omnes nobis uxo-
res ducere licet: nam 4 quarundam
nuptiis abstinendum est inter eas
enim personas, que parentum libe-
rorumve locum inter se obtinent,
contrahi nuptize non possunt; veluti
interpatrem et: filiam, vel avum et
neptem, vel matrem et filium, vel a-

§$ 1. We may not marry any wo-
man; for with some, marriage is
forbidden. Matrimony must not be
contracted between parents and their
children, as between a father and
daughter, a grandfather and his
grand-daughter, a mother and her
son, a grand-mother and her grand-
24

LIB. L. TIT. X.

 

viam et nepotem, et usque in infini-
tum: et, si tales persons inter se
coierent, nefarias atque incestas
nuptias contraxisse dicuntur: et
heec aded vera sunt, ut, quamvis
per adoptionem parentum libero-
rumve loco sibi esse cceperint, non-
possunt inter se matrimonio jungi;
in tantum, ut etiam, dissoluta adop-
tione, idem juris maneat. Itaque
eam, que tibi per adoptionem filia
vel neptis esse coeperit, non poteris
uxorem ducere, quamvis eam eman-
cipaveris.

De fratribus

§$ II. Inter eas quoque personas,
queeex transverso gradu cognationis
junguntur, est queedam similis ob-
servatio, sed non tanta. Sané enim
inter fratrem sdroremqme nuptiz
prohibite sunt, sive ab eodem patre
eidemque matre nati fuerint, sive
ab altero eorum. Sed, si qua per
adoptionem soror tibi esse ceeperit,
quamdiu quidem constat adoptio,
sane inter te et eam nuptize consis-
tere non possunt; cum vero per
emancipationem adoptio sit disso-
luta, poteris eam uxorem ducere:
sed et si tu emancipatus fueris, ni-
hil est impedimento nuptiis. Et
ideo constat, si quis generum adop-
tare velit, debere eum antea filiam
suam emancipare: et si quis, velit
nurum adoptare, debere eum antea
filium suum emancipare,

son; and so on (in aright line ) iz
infinitum. And, if such persons co-
habit, they are truly said tohavecon-
tracted a criminal and incestuous
marriage; inasmuch as those, who
only hold the place of parents and.
children by adoption, cannot inter-
marry; and the same law remains
even after the adoption is dissolv-
ed. You cannot therefore take to
wife one who hath been either
your adopted daughter or grand-
daughter, although you may have
emancipated her.

et sororibus.

§ 2. Matrimony is also prohibited
between collaterals, but not so ex-
tensively. A brother and sister
are forbidden to marry, whether
they are the children of the same
father and mother, or of either. And
if a woman becomes your sister by
adoption, so long as that subsists,
no marriage may be contracted be-
tween you. But, when the adoption
is destroyed by emancipation, you
may take her to wife. Also, if you
should be emancipated, there will
then remain no impediment, al-
though your sister by adoption is
not so. Hence if a man would
adopt his son-in-law, he should
first emancipate his daughter, and
whoever would adopt his daugh-
ter-in-law, should previously em-
ancipate his son.

De fratris et sororis filia vel nepte.

$ III. Fratris verd vel sororis
filiam uxorem ducere non licet : sed

$ 3. It is unlawful to marry the
daughter or grand-daughter of a
LIB. I.

nec neptem fratris vel sororis quis
ducere potest, quamvis quarto gra-
du sint: cujus enim filiam ducere
non licet, neque ejus neptem per-
mittitur. Ejus vero mulieris, quam
pater tuus adoptavit, filiam non
videris prohiberi uxorem ducere:
quia neque naturali, neque civili,
jure tibi conjungitur.

TIT. X. 25
brother, orasister; although the last
are in the fourth degree. For
when we are prohibited to take the
daughter of any person in marriage,
we are also prohibited to take his
grand-daughter. But it doesnot ap-
pear that there is any impediment
against the marriage of a son with
the daughter of her, whom his fa-
ther hath adopted; for they bear no
relation to each other, natural or
civil.

De consobrinis.

§ IV. Duorum autem fratrum
vel sororum liberi, vel fratris et so-
roris, conjungi possunt.

$ 4. The children of two brothers
(Patrueles) or two sisters, (sobrini)
or of a brother and sister, (Conso-
brini) may be joined in matrimony.
(Such are cousins.)

De amita, matertera, amita magna, matertera magna.

§ V. Item amitam, licet adopti-
vam, ducere uxorem non licet;
item nec materteram: quia paren-
tum loco habentur. Qua ratione
verum est, magnam quoqueamitam,
et materteram magnam, prohiberi
uxorem ducere.

$5. A man may not marry his
aunt either on the father’s or the
mother’sside, although she is only so
by adoption; because they are re-
garded as [representatives of pa-
rents. For the same reason no per-
son may marry his great-aunt either
on his father’s or mother’s side.

De affinibus, et primum de privigna et nuru.

$ VL Affinitatis quoque venera-
tione, 4 quarundam nuptis abstinere
necesse est: ut ecce privignam aut
nurum ducere non licet: quia utrae-
que filize loco sunt: quod ita scili-
cet accipi debet, si fuit nurus aut
privigna tua. Nam, si adhuc nu-
rus tua est, id est, si adhuc nupta
est filio tuo, alia ratione uxorem
eam ducere non poteris: quia ea-
dem duobus nupta esse non potest.

4

$ 6. We must abstain from cer-
tain marriages, through regard to
affinity; as with a wife’s daughter,
or a son’s wife, for they are both in
the place of daughters: and thisrule
must be so understood as to include
those who have been, our daughters-
in-law. For marriage with a son’s
wife, while she continues so, is pro-
hibited on another account, viz. be-
cause she can not be the wife of two
26 LIB. I.

Item si adhuc privigna tua est, id
est, si mater ejus tibi nupta est,
ideo eam uxorem ducere non pote-
ris, duia quas uxores eodem tem-
pore habere non licet.

De socru

§ VII. Socrum quoque et nover-
cam prohibitum est uxorem ducere :
quia matris loco sunt: quod et ip-
sum, dissoluté demum affinitate,
procedit: alioquin, si adhuc nover-
ca est, id est, si adhuc patri tuo
nupta est, communi jure impeditur
tibi nubere, quia eadem duobus
nupta esse non potest. Item si ad-
huc socus est, id est, si adhuc filia
ejus tibi nupta est, ideo impediun-
tur tibi nuptie, quia duas uxores
habere non potes.

TIT. X.

at the same time. And the marri-
age of man with his wife’s daugh-
ter, while her mother continues to be
his wife, is also prohibited, because
it is unlawfui to have two wives at
once.

et noverca.

$7. A man is forbiddentomarry
his wife’s mother, and his father’s
wife, because they both hold the place
of mothers; and this, although the
affinity is dissolved: besides a fa-
ther’s wife, while she continues to
be so, may not marry, because no
woman can have two husbands at
the same time. Nor can a man mar-
ry his wife’s mother, her daughter
continuing his wife, because it is
against the law to have two wives.

De comprivignis.

§ VIII. Mariti tamen filius ex
alia uxore, et uxoris filia ex alio
marito, vel contra, matrimonium
recté contrahunt: licet habeant
fratrem sororemve ex matrimonio
postea contracto natos.

§ 8. The son of a husband by a
former wife, and the daughter of a
wife by aformer husband, and e con-
tra,(the daughterzof an husband by
a former wife and the son of a wife
by a former husband) may lawful-
ly contract matrimony, even though
a brother or sister is born of such
second marriage between their re-
spective parents.

De quasi privigna, quasi nuru, et quasi noverca.

§ IX. Si uxor tua post divorti-
um ex alio filiam procreavit, hec
non est quidem privigna tua: sed
Julianus ab hujusmodi nuptiis absti-
neri debere ait: nam constat, nec
sponsam filii nurum esse, nec patris
sponsam novercam esse : rectius ta-

§ 9. The daughter of a divorced
wife by a second husband, is not
daughter-in-law to the first hus-
band. But Julian says we ought to
abstain from such nuptials. It is
also evident, that the espoused wife
of a son, is not a daughter-in-law to
LIB. I. TIT. X.

men et jure facturos eos, qui ad
hujusmodi nuptiis abstinuerint.

27

his father; and that the espoused
wife of a father, is not a step-moth-
er to his son: but it is right to ab-
stain from such nuptials.

De servili cognatione.

§ X. [lud certum est, serviles
quoque cognationes impedimento
nuptiis esse, si forte pater et filia,
aut frater et soror, manumissi fue-
rint.

$ 10. It is clear that servile cog-
nation is an impediment to matri-
mony; as when a father and daugh-
ter, or a brother and sister, are
manumitted.

De relinquis prohibitionibus.

§ XI. Sunt et alize persone, quae
prompter diversas rationes nuptias
contrahere prohibentur, quas in li-
bris digestorum seu pandectarum,
ex jure veteri collectarum, enume-
rari permisimus.

§$ 11. There are other persons
also, who, for diverse reasons, may
not intermarry: we have caused
these to be enumerated in the di-
gests collected from the old law.

De penis injustarum nuptiarum.

§ XII. Si adversus ea, que dix-
imus, aliqui coierint, nec vir, nec
uxor, hec nuptiz, nec matrimoni-
um, nec dos intelligitur. Itaque ii,
qui ex eo coitu nascuntur in potes-
tate patris non sunt: sed tales sunt
(quantum ad patriam potestatem
pertinent) quales sunt ii, quos ma-
ter vulgo concepit. Nam nec hi
patrem habere intelliguntur, cum
et iis pater incertus sit; unde solent
spurit appellari, tag» tyy cmogxy et
anxtogpes ; quasi sine patre filii. Se-
quitur ergo, ut, dissoluto tali coitu,
nec dotis, nec donationis exactioni
locus sit. Qui autem prohibitas
nuptias contrahunt, et alias peenas
patiuntur que sacris constitutioni-
bus continentur.

'§ 12. If persons cohabit in con-
tempt of the rules thus laid down,
they shall not be deemed husband

and wife, nor shall their marriage,

or any portion given on account
thereof, be valid; and the children,
born in such cohabitation, shall not
be under the power of the father.
For, in respect to paternal power,
they resemble the children of a com-
mon woman, who are looked upon
as having no father, because it is
uncertain who he is. They are
therefore called in Latin spurii, and
in Greek apatores ; 1. e. without a
father: hence, after the dissolution
of such a marriage, no ‘portion, or
gift, propter nuptias, can legally
be claimed. They who contract such
prohibited matrimony, must under-
go the farther punishments set forth
in our constitutions.
28 LIB. I.

TIT. XI.

De legitimatione.

§ XIII. Aliquando autem evenit,
ut liberi, qui statim, ut nati sunt,
in potestate parentum non sunt,
postea redigantur in potestatem pa-
tris: qualis est is, qui dum natura-
lis fuerat, postea curiz datus, potes-
tati patris subjicitur: nec non is,
qui 4 muliere libera procreatus, cu-
jus matrimonium minimé legibus
interdictum fuerat, sed ad quam
pater consuetudinem habuerat pos-
tea, ex nostra constitutione detali-
bus instrumentis compositis, in po-
testate patris efficitur. Quod et
aliis liberis, qui ex eodem matri-
monio fuerint procreati, similiter
nostra constitutio preebuit.

$ 13. It sometimes, happens,
that children who at their birth
were not under the power of their
parents, are reduced under it after-
wards. Thus a natural son, who
is made a Decurion, becomes sub-
ject to his father’s power: and he
who is born of a free-woman, with
whom marriage is not prohibited,
will likewise become subject to the
power of his father, as soon as the
marriage instruments are drawn,
as our constitution directs; which
allows the same benefit to those,
who are born before marriage, as
to those, who are born subsequent »
to it.

 

TITULUS UNDECIMUS.
‘DE ADOPTIONIBUS.

D1.T. 7 C. viii. T. 48.

Continuatio.

NON soltm autem naturales li-
beri, secundum ea, que diximus,
in potestate nostra sunt; verum
etiam ii, quos adoptamus.

It appears from what has been
said, not only that all natural (le-
gitimate) children are subject to
paternal power, but those also,
whom we adopt.

Divisio adoptionis.

§ I. Adoptio autem duobus mo-
dis fit, aut principali rescripto, aut
imperio magistratis. Imperatoris
auctoritate adoptare quis potest eos,
casve, qui, queeve, sui juris sunt,
quee species adoptionis dicitur arro-

$ 1. Adoption is made two ways,
either by imperial rescript or autho-
rity of the magistrate. The imperial
rescript impowers us to adopt per-
sons of either sex, who are sui juris ;
(i. e. independent) and this species
LIB. 1.

ol il a, 29

 

gatio. Imperio magistratis adop-
tamus eos easve, qui queve in po-
testate parentum sunt ; sive primum
gradum liberorum obtineant, qua-
lis est filius, filia; sive inferiorem,
qualis est nepos, neptis, pronepos,
proneptis.

of adoption is called arrogation. But
it is by the authority of the magis-
trate, that we adopt persons actually
under the power of their parents,
whether they are in the first degree,
as sons and daughters; or in an in-
ferior degree, as grand-children or
great grand-children.

Qui possunt adoptare filium-familias, vel non.

$ II. Sed hodié, ex nostr4 con-
stitutione, cum filius-familias 4 pa-
tre naturali exttanes persone in
adoptionem datur, jura patris natu-
ralis minimé dissolvuntur ; nec quic-
quam ad patrem adoptivum transit,
nec in potestate ejus est: licet ab
intestato jura successionis ei 4 no-
bis tributa sint. Si verd pater na-
turalis non extraneo, sed avo filii
sui materno; vel si ipse pater na-
turalis fuerit emancipatus, etiam
avo vel proavo simili modo paterno
vel materno filium suum dederit in
adoptionem; in hoc casu, quia con-
currunt in unam personam et natu-
ralia et adoptionis jura, manet sta-
bile jus patris adoptivi, et naturali
vinculo copulatum, et legitimo a-
doptionis modo constitutum, ut et
in familia et in potestate hujusmodi
patris adoptivi sit.

$ 2. But now, by our constitution,
when the son of a family is given in
adoption by his natural father to a
stranger, the power of the natural
father is not dissolved, neither does
any thing pass to theadoptive father,
nor is the adopted son in his power,
although weallow such son, the right
of succession to his adoptive father
dying intestate. But if a natural
father should give hisson in adoption,
not to a stranger, but to the mater-
nal grandfather of such son; or if
a natural father, who has been e-
mancipated, should give his son, be-
gotten after emancipation to his pa-
ternal or maternal grandfather or
great-grandfather, in this case, the
rights of nature and adoption con-
curring, the power of the adoptive
father is established both by natural
ties and legal adoption, so that the
adopted son would be not only in
the family, but under the power of
his adoptive father.

De arrogatione impuberis.

§ III. Cum autem impubes per
principale rescriptum  arrogatur,
causa cognita, arrogatio fieri permit-
titur: et exquiritur causa arrogati-
onis, an honesta sit, expediatque

§ 3. When any one, not arrived
at puberty, is arrogated by the im-
perial rescript, inquiry is first made,
whether the arrogation be justly
founded, and expedient for pupil
30

LIB. I. TIT. XL

 

pupillo? et cum quibusdam condi-
tionibus arrogatio fit; id est, ut
caveat arrogator persone publicee,
Si intra pubertatem pupillus deces-
serit, restituturum se bona illis, qui,
si adoptio facta non esset, ad suc-
cessionem ejus venturi essent. Item
non aliter emancipare eum potest
arrogator, nisi, causdé cognita, dig-
nus emancipatione fuerit; et tunc
sua bona ei reddat. Sed et, si de-
cedens pater eum exheredaverit,
vel vivus sine justé causa emanci-
paverit, jubetur quartam partem ei
bonorum suorum relinquere; vide-
licet, preeter bona, qua ad patrem
adoptivum transtulit, et quorum
commodum ei postea acquisivit.

for such arrogation is always made
on certain conditions; the arrogator
is obliged to give caution before a
public notary, thereby binding him-
self, if the pupil should die within the
age of puberty, to restore all the pro*
perty of such pupil to those who
would have succeeded him, if no
adoption had been made. 'The arro-
gator also may not emancipate, un-
less on legal proof, that his arrogat-
ed son deserves emancipation ; and
even then he must restore the pro-
perty belonging to such son. Also
if a father, upon his death-bed, hath
disinherited his arrogated son, or
when in health hath emancipated
him, without just cause, he is com-
manded to leave the fourth part of
all his goods to the son, besides
what the son brought to him at the
time of arrogation, and acquired
for him afterwards.

De etate adoptantis et adoptati.

§ IV. Minorem natu majorem
non posse adoptare placet: adoptio
enim naturam imitatur ; et pro mon-
stro est, ut major sit filius, quam
pater. Debet itaque is, qui sibi
filium per adoptionem aut arroga-
tionem facit, plend pubertate [id
est, decem et octo annis] pracedere.

§ 4. A junior cannot adopt a se-
nior; for adoption imitates nature ;
and it seems unnatural, that a son
should be older than his father. He
therefore, who would either adopt
or arrogate, should be senior by full
puberty, that is, by eighteen years.

De adoptione in locum nepotis vel neptis, vel deinceps.

§ V. Licet autem et in locum
nepotis vel neptis, pronepotis vel
proneptis, vel deinceps, adoptare,
quamvis filium quis non habeat.

Sees

$ 5. It is lawful to adopt a per-
son either as a grand-son or grand-
daughter, great grand-son or great
grand-daughter, or ina more distant
edgree, although the adoptor hath

* no son.

(ian
LIB. I. TIT. XI. 31

De adoptione filii alieni in locum nepotis, et contra.

§ VL Et tam filium alienum quis
in locum nepotis adoptare potest,
quam nepotem in locum filii.

$ 6. A man may adopt the son of
another as his grand-son, and the
grand-son of another as his son.

De adoptione in locum nepotis.

$ VII. Sed si quis nepotis loco
adoptet, vel quasi ex filio, quem
habet jam adoptatum, vel quasi ex
illo, quem naturalem in sua potes-
tate habet, eo casu et filius consen-
tire debet, ne ei invito suus heres
agnascatur. Sed, ex contrario, si
avus ex filio nepotem det in adop-
tionem, non est necesse, filium con-
Sentire.

$ 7. Ifa man, having already ei-
ther a natural or an adopted son, is
desirous to adopt another, as his
grand-son, the consent of his son,
whether natural or adopted, ought
in this case to be first obtained, lest
a suus heres, or proper heir, should
be intruded upon him. But, on the
contrary, if a grandfather is will-
ing to give his grand-son in adop-
tion, the consent of the son is not
necessary.

Qui dari possunt in adoptionem.

§ VIII. In plurimis autem cau-
sis assimulatur is, qui adoptatus
vel arrogatus est, ei, qui ex legiti-
mo matrimonio natus est; et ided,
Si quis per imperatorem, vel apud
preetorem, vel presidem provincie,
non extraneum adoptaverit, potest
eundem in adoptionem alii dari.

§ 8. He who is either adopted or
arrogated, bears similitude in many
things to a son born in lawful ma-
trimony; and therefore, if a person
not a stranger is adopted either by
rescript, or before a pretor, or the
governor of a province, he may be
given in adoption to another.

Si is, qui generare non potest, adoptet.

§ IX. Sed et illud utriusque a-
doptionis commune est, quod et ii,
qui generare non possunt, quales
sunt spadones, adoptare possunt:
castrati autem non possunt.

$ 9. It is common to both kinds
of adoption, that such as are im-
potent [Spadones] may, but those
who are castrated, cannot adopt.

Si foemina adoptet.

§ X. Fomine quoque arrogare
non possunt, quia nec naturales li-
beros in sua potestate habent: sed,
ex indulgentia principis, ad solatium

§ 10. Nor can women adopt; for
the law does not place even their
own children, under their power:
but, when death hath deprived
32

liberorum amissorum adoptare pos-
sunt.

De liberis

§ XI. Illud proprium est adop-
tionis illius, quee per sacrum oracu-
lum fit, quod is, qui liberos in po-
testate habet, si se arrogandum de-
derit, non solum ipse potestati arro-
gatoris subjicitur, sed etiam liberi
ejus fiunt in ejusdem potestate, tan-
quam nepotes. Sic etenim divus
Augustus non ante Tiberium adop-
tavit, quam is Germanicum adop-
tasset; ut protinus arrogatione fac-
ta inciperet Germanicus Augusti
nepos esse.

LIB. 1. TIT. XI.

them of their children, they may,
by the indulgence of the prince,
adopt others, as a comfort for their

loss.

arrogatis.

$ 11. It is peculiar to adoption
by rescript, that, if a person, having
children under his power, should
give himself in arrogation, both he,
as ason, and his children, as grand-
children, would become subject to
the power of the arrogator. It was
for this reason, that Augustus did.
not adopt Tiberius, ’till Tiberius
had adopted Germanicus ; so that
Tiberius became the son, and Grer-
manicus the grandson of Augustus,
at the same instant, by arrogation.

De servo adoptato, vel filio nominato, a domino.

§ XII. Apud Catonem bené scrip-
tum refert antiquitas, servos, sia
domino adoptati sint, ex hoc ipso
posse liberari. Unde et nos erudi-
ti, in nostra constitutione, etiam
eum servum, quem dominus, actis
intervenientibus, filium suum nomi-
naverit, liberum esse constituimus :
licet hoc ad jus filii accipiendum
non sufficiat.

§ 12. The following answer of
Cato was approved of by the an-
cient lawyers, viz. that slaves, a--
dopted by their masters, obtain free-
dom by the adoption. Thus in-
structed, we have ordained, that a
slave whom any master nominates
to be his son, in the presence of a
magistrate, becomes free by such
nomination, although it does not
convey to him any filial right.
LIB: I. TIT. XIl.

33

TITULUS DUODECIMUS.

QUIBUS MODIS JUS PATRIA POTESTATIS
SOLVITUR.

D. 1.

T. 7. Nov. 81.

Scopus et nexus. De morte.

VIDEAMUS nunc, quibus mo-
dis ii, qui alieno juri sunt subjecti,
eo jure liberentur. Et quidem,
quemadmodum liberentur servi 4
potestate dominorum, ex iis intelli-
gere possumus, que de servis ma-
numittendis superius exposuimus :
hi vero, qui in potestate parentis
sunt, mortuo eo, sui juris fiunt.
Sed hoc distinctionem recipit :
nam, mortuo patre, sané omnimodo
filii, filieve, sui juris efficiuntur :
mortuo verd avo, non omnimodo
nepotes, neptesve, sui juris fiunt :
sed ita, si post mortem avi in potes-
tatem patris sui recasuri non sunt.
Itaque, si, moriente avo, pater eo-
rum vivit, et in potestate patris sui
est, tunc post obitum avi in potestate
patris sui fiunt. Si vero is quo tem-
pore avus moritur, aut jam mortuus
est, aut per emancipationem exiit de
potestate patris, tunc ii, qui in potes-
tatem ejus cadere non possunt, sui
juris fiunt.

Let us now inquire how persons
in subjection to others, can be freed.
How slaves obtain their liberty, may
be understood from what wehave al-
ready said in treating of manumis-
sion : these who are under the power
of a parent, become independent at
his death; yet this rule admits of a
distinction. When a father dies, his
sons and daughters are, without
doubt, independent ; but, by the
death of a grand-father, his grand-
children do not become independent,
unless there is an impossibility of
their ever falling under the power
of their father. Therefore, if their
father is alive at the death of their
grand-father, in whose power the
father was, they then become sub-
ject to the power of their father.
But, if their father is either dead or
emancipated before the death of their
grand-father, they then cannot fall
under the power of their father, but
become independent.

De deportatione.

$I. Cum autem is, qui ob ali-
quod maleficium in insulam depor-
tatur, civitatemamittit, sequitur, ut,
qui eo modo ex numero civium Ro-
manorum tollitur, perindé quasi eo
mortuo, desinant liberi in potestate
5

$ 1. If aman, upon conviction of
some crime, is deported into an is-
land, he loses the rights of a Roman
citizen; and it follows, that the
children of a person thus banished
cease to be under his power, as if he
34

ejus esse. Pari ratione, et si is,
qui in potestate parentis sit, in in-
sulam deportatus fuerit, desinit es-
se in potestate parentis. Sed, si ex
indulgentia principis restituti fue-
rint per omnia, pristinum statum
recipiunt.

LIB, I. TIT. VL

was naturally dead. And, by parity
of reasoning, if a son is deported, he
ceases to be under the power of his
father. But, if by the indulgence of
the prince a ciminal is wholly re-
stored, he regains his former condi-
tion.

De relegatione.

$ IL. {Relegati autem patres in in-
sulam in potestate liberos retinent,
et liberi relegati in potestate paren-
tumremanent. =  ————~—™

§ 2. A Father, who is merely ba-
nished by relegation, retains his pa-
ternal power: and ason, who is re-
legated, still remains under the pow-
er of his father.

De servitute pene.

’

$ JIL. Peene servus effectus filios
in potestate habere desinit. Servi
autem poene efficiuntur, qui in me-
tallum damnantur, et qui bestiis
subjiciuntur.

$ 3. When a man becomes the
slave of punishment, he loses his pa-
ternal jurisdiction. Slaves of punish-
ment are those, who are condemned
to the mines, or sentenced to be de-
stroyed by wild beasts..

De dignitate.

$ IV. Filius-familias, si mili-
taverit, vel si senator, vel consul
factus fuerit, remanet in potes-
tate patris :, militia enim, vel con-
sularis dignitas, de patris. potestate
filium non liberat. Sed, ex consti-
tutione nostra, summa patriciatus
dignitas illicd, imperialibus codicil-
lis preestitis, filium a patria potes-
tate liberat. Quis enim patiatur,
patrem quidem, posse, per emanci-
pationis modum, potestatis suz
nexibus filium liberare; imperato-
riam. autem, celsitudinem non va-
. Iere eum, quem, patrem sibi elegit,
ab.aliené, exim, ere potestate ?

§ 4. Although the son of a family
becomes asoldier, asenator or a con-
sul, he remains under the power of
his father, from which neither the
army, the senate, or consular digni-
ty canemancipate him. But by our
constitution the patrician dignity,
conferred by our special diploma,
shall free every son from paternal
subjection. For itis absurd, that a
parent may emancipate his son, and
that the power of an emperor should
not. suffice to make any person inde-
pendent, whom. hehath. chosen to be
a father of the: commonwealth.
LIB. I. TIT. XII.

35

 

De captivitate et postliminio.

$ V. Si ab hostibus captus fuerit
parens, quamvis servus hostium
fiat, tamen pendet jus lberorum,
propter jus postliminii: quia hi,
qui ab hostibus capti sunt, si reversi
fuerint, omnia pristina jura recipi-
unt: idcircd reversus etiam liberos
habebit in potestate : quia postlimi-
nium fingit eum, qui captus est, in
Civitate semper fuisse. Si vero ibi
decesserit, exindé, ex quo,captus
est pater, filius sui juris fuisse;vide-
tur. Ipse quoque filius, neposve,
si ab hostibus captus fuerit, simili-
ter dicimus, propter jus postlimi-
nii, Jus quoque potestatis parentis
in suspenso esse. Dictum autem
est postliminium 4 limine et post.
Unde eum, qui ab hostibus captus
est, et in fines nostros postea per-
venit, postliminio reversum recté
dicimus. Nam limina sicut in do-
mo finem quendam faciunt, sic et
imperii finem esse limen veteres
voluerunt. Hinc et limen dictum
est, quasi finis quidam et terminus.
Ab eo postliminium dictum est,
quia ad idem limen revertebatur,
quod amiserat. Sed et, qui cap-
tus victis hostibus recuperatur,
postliminio rediisse existimatur.

$ 5. If a parent is taken prisoner,
although he become a slave, he loses
not his paternal power, which re-
mains in suspense by reason of a
privilege granted to all prisoners,
namely, the right of return: for
captives, when they obtain their
liberty, are repossessed of all their
former rights, in which paternal
power is of course included ; and,
at their return, they are supposed,
by a fiction of law, never to have
been absent. If a prisoner dies
captive, the son’s independence is
reckoned from the commencement
of his father’s captivity. Also, if
a son, or grand-son, becomes a
prisoner, the power of the parent is
said, for the reason before assigned,
to be only in suspense. The term
postiminium is derived from post
and limen. We thereforeaptly use
the expression reversus postliminio,
when a person, who was a captive,
returns within our own confines.

De emancipatione item de modis et effectibus ejusdem.

§ VI. Preterea, emancipatione
quoque desinunt liberi in potestate
parentum esse. Sed emancipatio
antea quidem vel per antiquam legis
observationem procedebat, que per
imaginarias venditiones et interce-
dentes manumissiones celebraba-

$ 6. Children also cease to be un-
der the power of their parents by e-
mancipation. Emancipation was ef-
fected according to our ancient law,
either by imaginary sales and inter-
vening manumissions, or by imperi-
alrescript; but ithas been our care
36

tur, vel ex imperiali rescripto.
Nostra autem providentiad etiam
hoc in melits per constitutionem re-
formavit; ut, fictione pristinad ex-
plosd, recté vid ad competentes ju-
dices, vel magistratus, parentes in-
trent, et filios suos vel filias, vel ne-
potes vel neptes, ac deinceps, a
sud manu dimittant. Et tunc, ex
edicto preetoris, in bonis ejusmodi
filii vel filize, vel nepotis vel neptis
qui queve a parente manumissus
vel manumissa fuerit, eadem jura
prestantur parenti, que tribuuntur
patrono in bonis liberti. Et pre-
terea, si impubes sit filius, vel filia,
vel ceteri, ipse parens ex manumis-
sione tutelam ejus nansciscitur. .

LIB. I. TIT. XI.

to reform these ceremonies by an ex-
press constitution, so that parents
may now have immediate recourse
to the proper judge or magistrate,
and emancipate their children,
grand-children, &c. of both sexes.
And also, by a preetorian edict, the
parent is allowed to have the same
right in the goods of those, whom he
emancipates, asa patron has in the
goods of his freed-man. And far-
ther, if the children emancipated
are within the age of puberty, the
parent, by whom they were eman-
cipated, obtains the right of ward-
ship or tutelage, by the emancipa-
tion.

1

Si alii emacipente alii retineantur in potestatu.

§ VII. Admonendi autem su-
mus, liberum arbitrium'esse ei, qui
filium, et ex eo nepotem, vel nep-
tem, in potestate habet, filium qui-
dem de potestate dimittere, nepo-
tem vero vel neptem retinere: et,
é converso, filium quidem in potes-
tate retinere, nepotem vero vel nep-
tem manumittere: vel omnes sui
juris efficere. Eadem et de prone-
pote et pronepte dicta esse intelli-
guntur.

§ 7. A parent having a son un-
der his power, and by that sona
grand-son or grand-daughter, may
emancipate his son, and retain his
grand-son or grand-daughter in sub-
jection. He may also emancipate
his grand-son or grand-daughter,
and retain his son; or, he may
make them all independent. And
the same may be said of a great-
grand-son, or a great-grand-daugh-
ter.

De adoptione.

§ VII. Sed et, si pater filium,
quem in potestate habet, avo, vel
proavo naturali, secundum nostras
constitutiones super his habitas, in
adoptionem dederit, id est, si hoc
ipsum actis intervenientibus apud
competentem judicem manifestave-
rit, presente eo, qui adoptatur, et

$ 8. Ef a father gives his son in
adoption to the natural grand-father
or great-grand-father of such son,
adhering toour constitutions for that
purpose enacted, which enjoin the pa-
rent to declare intention beforeacom-
petent judge, in the presence of the
person to be adopted, and also in the
LIB. I. TIT. XII.

non contradicente, nec non eo pre-
sente, qui adoptat, solvitur quidem
jus potestatis patris naturalis; tran-
sit autem in hujusmodi parentem
adoptivum; in cujus persona et a-
doptionem esse plenissimam antea
diximus.

37

presence of the adoptor, then does
the right of paternal power pass
wholly from the natural father to
the adoptive, in whose person, as.
we have before observed, adoption
has its fullest extent.

De nepote nato post filium emancipatum.

§ IX. Illud scire oportet, quod
si nurus tua ex filio tuo conceperit,
et filium tuum emancipaveris, vel
in adoptionem dederis, preegnante
nuru tua, nihilominus, quod et ea
nascitur, in potestate tud nascitur.
Quod si post emancipationem vel
adoptionem conceptus fuerit, patris
sui emancipati, vel avi adoptivi,
potestati subjicitur.

§ 9. It is necessary to be known,
that, if a son’s wife hath conceived,
and you afterwards emancipate that
son or give him in adoption, his wife
being pregnant, the child will be
born under your paternal authority.
But if the conception be subsequent
to the emancipation or adoption, the
child becomes subject at his birth,
either to his emancipated father, or
his adoptive grand-father.

An parentes cogi possunt liberos suos de potestate dimittere ?

$ X. Et quidem neque naturales
liberi, neque adoptivi, ullo pene mo-
do possunt cogere parentes de po-
testate sud eos dimittere.

§ 10. Children, either natural or
adopted, can rarely compel their pa-
rents by any method to dismiss
them from subjection.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-TERTIUS.
DE TUTELIS.

D. xxvi.

T. 1.

Nov. 72.

De personis sui juris.

TRANSEAMUS nunc ad aliam
divisionem personarum. Nam ex
his personis, que in potestate non
sunt, queedam vel in tutela sunt, vel
in curatione, quedam neutro jure

Let us now proceed to another di-
vision of persons. Of those, who
are not under parental power, some
are under tutelage, some under cura-
tion, and some under neither. Let
38

LIB. I. TIT. XII.

 

tenentur. Videamus ergo de his,
quze in tutela vel curatione sunt: ita
enim intelligemus czteras personas,
que neutro jure tenentur. Ac pri-
us dispiciamus de his, qui in tutela
sunt.

us enquire then, what persons are
under tutelage and curation; for
thus we shall ascertain, who are
not subject to either. And first of
persons under tutelage.

Tutele definitio.

$ I. Est autem tutela (ut Servius
definivit) vis ac potestas in capite
libero, ad tuendum eum, qui per
ztatem se defendere nequit, jure
civili data ac permissa.

§ 1. Tutelage, as Servius has de-
fined it, is an authority and power,
given and permitted by the civil
law, over such independent persons,
as are unable, by reason of their
youth, to protect themselves.

Definitio et etymologia tutoris.

§ Il. Tutores autem sunt, qui
eam vim ac potestatem habent; ex-
que ipsa re nomen acceperunt. Ita-
que appellantur tutores, quasi tui-
tores atque defensores; sicut editui
dicuntur, qui eedes tuentur.

§ 2. Tutors are those, who have
this authority and power; and they
take their name from the nature of
their office. For they are called
tutors, quasi tuitores defenders; as
those, who have the care of the sa-
cred buildings, are called editut,
quod cedes tueantur.

Quibus testamento tutor datur: et primum, de liberis in po-
testate.

§ III. Permissum est itaque pa-
rentibus liberis impuberibus, quos
in potestate habent, testamento tu-
tores dare: et hoc in filios filiasque
procedit omnimodo : nepotibus vero
neptibusque ita demum parentes
possunt testamento tutores dare, si
post mortem eorum in potestatem
patris sui non sunt recasuri. Ita-
que, si filius tuus, mortis tue tem-
pore in potestate tua sit, nepotes ex
eo non poterunt ex testamento tuo
tutores habere, quamvis in potes-
tate tua fuerint: scilicet, quia, mor-
tuo te, in potestatem patris sui re-
casuri sunt.

$ 3. Parents may assign tutors
by testament to such of their child-
ren as are not arrived at puberty,
and are under their power. And
this privilege extends without ex-
ception over sons and daughters.
But grand-fathers can only give tu-
tors to their grand-children, when
these cannot fall under the power of
their father, after the death of their
grand-father. Hence, if your son is
in your power at the time of your
death, your grand-children by that
son cannot receive tutors by your
testament, although they were ac-
tually in your power; because at
your decease they will become sub-
ject to their father.

‘
LIB. I. TIT. XIV.

De posthumis.

§ IV. Cum autem in compluribus
‘aliis causis posthumi pro jam natis
habeantur, et in hac causa placuit
non minus posthumis, quam jam
natis tutores dari posse ; si modo
im e4 causa sint, ut, si vivis paren-
tibus nascerentur, sui heredes et in
potestate eorum fierent.

§ 4, As posthumous children are
in many cases considered as already
born before the death of their fa-
thers: therefore tutors may be giv-
en (by testament) as well to a post-
humous child, as toa child already
born, if such posthumous child, had
he been born in the life-time of his
father would have been his proper
heir and under his power.

De emancipatis.

§ V. Sed et, si emancipato filio
tutor 4 patre datus fuerit testamen-
to, confirmandus est ex sententiad
presidis omnimodo, id est, sine in-
quisitione..

—_——1«

§ 5. But, if a father gives a tu-
tor by testament to his emancipated
son, such tutor must be confirmed
by the sentence of the governor of
the province without inquisition.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-QUARTUS.
QUI TESTAMENTO TUTORES DARI POSSUNT.

D. xxvi. T. 2.

C. v. 'T. 28.

Qui tutores dari possunt.

DARI autem tutor potest testa-
mento non solum_pater-familias,
sed etiam filius-familias.

Not only the father of a family
may be appointed tutor by testament
but also the son of a family.

De servo.

§E. Sed et servus proprius, tes-
tamento cum libertate recté tutor
dari potest; sed sciendum est, et
sine libertate tutorum datum tacité
libertatem. directam accepisse vide-
ri; et per hoe recté tutorem esse:
plané,,si per errorem, quasi liber,

tutor datus:sit, aliud. dicendum est.

$1. Aman may by testament as-
sign his own slave tobe a tutor with
liberty. But note, thatifa slave be
appointed tutor by testament without
mentioning liberty, he seems tacitly
to be enfranchised, and is thus le-
gally constituted a tutor; yet, if a
testator through error, imagining his
40

LIB. I. TIT. XIV.

 

 

Servus autem alienus pure inutili-
ter testamento datur tutor: sed ita,
cum liber erit, utiliter datur. Pro-
prius autem servus inutiliter eo
modo tutor datur.

slave to be free, by testament ap-
points him, as such, to be atutor, the
appointment wiil not avail. Also
the absolute appointment of another
man’s slavetobe a tutor is altogether
ineffectual; but, if the appointment
isuponcondition that the person ap-
pointed obtains his freedom, then it
is well made: but if a man by testa-
ment appoints his own slave to bea
tutor, when he shall obtain his liber-
ty, the appointment will be void.

De furioso et minore viginti-quinque annis.

$ IL. Furiosus, vel minor viginti-
quinque annis, tutor testamento da-
tus, tutor tunc erit, cum compos
mentis, aut major viginti-quinque
annis, fuerit factus.

Quibus modis

$ IIT. Ad certum tempus, vel ex
certo tempore, vel sub conditione,
vel ante heredisinstitutionem posse
pari tutorem non dubitatur.

$ 2. Ifa madman or minor (un-
der twenty-five) is by testament ap-
pointed tutor, the one shall begin
to act, when he becomes of sound
mind, and the other, when he has
completed his twenty-fifth year.

tutores dantur.

§ 3. It is not doubted, but that a
testamentary tutor may be appoint-
either until a certain time, or from
a certain time, or conditionally, or
before the institution of an heir.

Cui dantur.

§ IV. Certz autem rei, vel cause,
tutor dari non potest: quia persone
non cause, vel rei, tutor! datur.

§ 4. A tutor cannot beassigned to
any particular thing, or upon any
certain account, but can only be
given to persons.

De tutore dato filiabus, vel filiis, vel liberis, vel nepotibus.

$ V. Si quis filiabus suis, vel fi-
liis, tutores dederit, etiam posthu-
me vel posthumo dedisse videtur :
quia, filii vel filix appellatione, et
posthumus et posthuma.continentur.
Quod si nepotes sint, an appella-
tione filiorum et ipsis tutores dati

§ 5. If a man nominates a tutor
for his sons or daughters, the nom-
‘ination extends to his posthumous is-
sue; because, under the appellation
of son or daughter, a posthumous
child is comprehended. But, are
grand-children denoted by the word
LIB. I.

sint? Dicendum est, ut et ipsis
quoque dati videantur, si modo lib-
eros dixerit ; caterum, si filios, non
continebuntur. Alitér enim filii,
alitér nepotes appellantur. Plané,
Si posteris dederit, tam filii post-

humi, quam ceteri liberi, contine-
buntur.

TIT. XV. 41
sons? we answer, that under chil-
dren, grand-children are included,
but not under sons: for son and
grand-son, differ in signification.
But, if a testator assigns a tutor
to his descendants, it is evident,
that not only his posthumous sons
are comprehended, but all his oth-
er children.

>oe

TITULUS DECIMUS-QUINTUS.
DE LEGITIMA AGNATORUM TUTELA.

D. xxxvi.

T. 4. C. v.

T. 30.

Summa.

QUIBUS autem testamento tu-
tor datus non est, his, ex lege duo-
decim tabularum, agnati sunt tu-
tores, qui vocantur legitimi.

The Agnati by a law of the twelve
tables, are appointed tutors to those,
to whom no testamentary tutor was
given; and these tutors are called
legitimi, tutors by law.

Qui sunt agnati.

$ I. Sunt autem agnati cognati,
per virils sexis cognationem con-
juncti, quasi a patre cognati: veluti
frater ex eodem patre natus, fratris
filius, neposve ex'eo: item patruus
et pratrui filius, neposve ex eo. At,
qui per foeminini sexus personas
cognatione junguntur, agnati non
sunt, sed alias naturali jure cognati,
Itaque amite tue filius non est tibi
agnatus, sed cognatus: et invicem
tu illi eodem jure conjungeris: quia.
qui ex ed nascuntur, patris, non
matris, familiam sequuntur.

$1. Agnati are those, who are
collaterally related to us by males,
as a brother by the same father, or
the son of a brother, or by him a
grand-son ; also a father’s brother,
or the son of such brother, or by
him a grand-son. But those, who
are related to us by a female are not
agnate, but cognate, bearing only a
natural relation to us. Thus the son
of a father’s sister is related to you
not by agnation, but cognation; and
you are also related to him by cogna-
tion; for the children of a father’s
sister, follow the family of their fa-
ther, and not that of their mother.
LIB. L TIT. XVI.

 

Quis dicatur intestatus.

§$ I. Quod autem lex duodecim
tabularum ab initéstato vocat ad tu-
telam agnatos, non hanc habet sig-
nificatienem, si omnind non fecerit
testamontum is, qui poterat tutores
dare; sed si, quantum ad tutelam
pertinet, intestatus decesserit : quod
tune quoque accidere imtelligitur,
cum is qui datus est tutor, vivo tes-
tatore decesserit.

§ 2. The law of the twelve tables,
in calling the agnati to tutelage in
case of intestacy, relates not solely
to persons altogether intestate, who
might have appointed a tutor, but
also to those, who are intestate only
in respect of tutelage; and this may
happen, if atutor, nominated by tes-
tament, should die in the lifetime
of the testator.

Quibus modis agnatio, vel cognatio, finitur.

§ If. Sed agnationis quidem
jus omnibus modis capitis diminu-
tione perimque perimitur: nam
agnatio juris civilis nomen est ; cog-
nationis vero jus non omnibus mo-
dis commutatur: quia civilis ratio,
civila quidem jura cerrumpere po-
test, naturalia vero, non utique.

§ 3. The right of agnation is taken
away by almost every diminution,
or change of state; for agnation is.
but a name given by the civil law;
but the right of cognation is not thus
altered; for although civil policy
may extinguish civil rights yet over
natural rights it has no such power.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-SEXTUS.
DE CAPITIS DIMINUTIONE.

D. iv.

T. 5.

Definitio et divisio.

EST autem capitis diminutio pri-

Diminution is the change of a

oris status mutatio; eaque tribus man’s former condition; and this
modis accidit: nam aut maxima est is threefold, the greater, the less,
capitis diminutio, aut minor, (quam and the least.

quidam mediam vocant,) aut mini-
ma.

De maxima capitis diminutione.

$I. Maxima capitis diminutio
est, cum aliquis simul et civitatem
et libertatem amittit; quod accidit

$1. The greater diminution is,
when a man loses both the right of a
citizen and his liberty ; as they do,
LIB. 1.

his, qui servi peene efficiuntur atro-
citate sententize ; vel libertis, ut in-
gratis erga patronos condemnatis ;
vel his, quise ad pretium partici-
pandum venundari passi sunt.

TIT. XVI.

43

who by the rigour of their sentence
become the slaves of punishment ;
and freed-men, who are condemned
to slavery for ingratitude to their
patrons; and all such, who suffer
themselves to be sold, to share the
price.

De media.

$ II. Minor, sive media capitis
diminution est, cum civitas quidem
amittitur, libertas vero retinetur ;
quod accidit ei, cui aqua et igni in-
terdictum fuerit, vel ei, qui in in-
_ Sulam deportatus est.

$2. The less or mesne diminution
is, when a man loses the rights of a
citizen, but retains his liberty;
which happens to him, who is for-
bidden the use of fire and water, or
to him who is transported into an
island.

De minima

§ Il]. Minima capitis diminu-
tio est, cum civitas retinetur et li-
bertas, sed status hominis commu-
tatur: quod accidit his, qui, cum
sui juris fuerint, ceeperunt alieno
juri subjecti esse; vel contra, ve-
luti si filius-familias 4 patre eman-
cipatus fuerit, est capite diminutus.

§$ 3. The least diminution is,
when the condition of a man is
charged without forfeiture either of
civil rights or liberty ; as when he,
who is independent, becomes sub-
ject by adoption; or when the son
of a family hath been emancipated
by his father.

De sero manumisso.

§ IV. Servus autem manumis-
sus capitenon minuitur; quia nul-
lum caput habuit.

§ 4. The manumission of a slave
produces no change of state in him,
because he had no state, or civil ca-

pacity.

De mutatione dignitatis.

§ V. Quibus autem dignitas
magis quam status permutatur, ca-
pite non minuuntur; et ideo a se-
natu motos capite non minui, con-
Stat.

$ 5. Those, whose dignity is ra-
ther changed than their state, do not
suffer diminution; hence it is not
diminution to be removed from the

senatorial dignity.
LIB. I.

TIT. XVII.

 

Interpretatio § ult. sup, tit. prox.

§ VI. Quod autem dictum est,
manere cognationis jus etiam post
capitis diminutionem, hoc ita est,
si minima capitis diminutio inter-
veniat: manet enim cognatio.
Nam, si maxima capitis diminutio
interveniat, jus quoque cognationis
perit, ut puta servitute alicujus cog-
nati; et ne quidem, si manumissus
fuerit, recipit cognationem. Sed et
si in insulam quis deportatus sit,
cognatio solvitur.

§ 6. We have said, that the right
of cognation remains after diminu-
tion, but this relates only to the least
diminution. For, by the greater di-
minution, as by servitude, the right
of cognation is wholly destroyed,
even so as not to be recovered by
manumission. The right of cogna-
tion is also lost by the less or mesne
diminution, as by deportation’into
an island.

Ad quos agnatos tutela pertinet.

§ VI. Cum autem ad agnatos
tutela pertineat, non simul ad om-
nes pertinet, sed ad eos tantum,
qui proximiore gradu sunt; vel si
plures ejusdem gradus sunt, ad om-
nes pertinet; veluti si plures fra-
tres sunt, qui unum gradum obti-
nent, paritér ad tutelam vocantur.

§ 7. Although the right of tute-
lage belongs to agnati, yet it belongs
not to all, but to the nearest in de-
gree only. But, if there be many in
the same degree, the tutelage be-
longs to all of them, however num-
erous. For example, several broth-
ers are all called equally to tutelage.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-SEPTIMUS.
DE LEGITIMA PATRONORUM TUTELA.

D. xxvi. T. 4. C.v. T. 30.

Ratio ob quam patronorum tutela dicitur legitima.

EX eddem lege duodecim tabu-
larum, libertorum et libertarum tu-
tela ad patronos liberosque eorum
pertinet, que et ipsa legitima tutela
vocatur; non quia nominatim in
e4 lege de hac tutela caveatur ; sed
quia perinde accepta est per inter-
pretationem, ac si verbis legis in-

By the same law of the twelve ta-
bles, the tutelage of freed-men and
freed-women, belongs to their pa-
trons, and to the children of such pa-
trons ; and this is tutelage by opera-
tion of law, although it existsnot no-
minally in the law; butit isas firmly
established by interpretation, as if it
LIB. I.

troducta esset. Eo enim ipso, quod
hereditates libertorum libertarum-
que, si intestati decessissent, jusse-
rat lex ad patronos liberosve eorum
pertinere, crediderunt veteres, vo-
luisse legem, etiam tutelas ad eos
pertinere ; cum et agnatos, quos ad
hereditatem lex vocat, eosdem et
tutores esse jusserit ; quia ple-
riumque, ubi successionis est emo-
lumentum, ibi et tutele onus esse
debet. Ideo autem diximus ple-
rumque, quia, si foemina impubes
manumittatur, ipsa ad hereditatem
vocatur, cum alius sit tutor.

TIT. XVII.

45

had been introduced by express
words. For, inasmuch as the law
commands, that patrons and their
children shall succeed to the inheri-
tance of their freed-men or freed-wo-
men who die intestate, the ancient
lawyers were of opinion thattutelage
also by implication should belong to
patrons and their children. And the
law, which calls agnati to the inher-
itance, commands them to be tutors,
because the advantage of succession
ought to be attended in most cases
with the burden of tutelage. We
have said in most cases, because, if
a person, not arrived at puberty, is
manumitted by a female, she is cal-
led to the inheritance, but not to
the turtelage.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-OCTAVUS.
DE LEGITIMA PARENTUM TUTELA.

EXEMPLO patronorum recep-
ta est et alia tutela, que et ipsa le-
gitima vocatur ; nam, si quis filium
aut filiam, nepotem aut neptem ex
filio, et deinceps, impuberes eman-
cipaverit, legitimus eorum tutor
erit.

Another kind of tutelage termed
legal, is received inimitation of pa-
rental:ifor, if a parent emancipate
a son, a daughter, agrand-son, or a
grand-daughter, who is the issue of
that son, or any others descended
from him by males in a right line
and not arrived at puberty, then
shall such parent betheirlegal tutor.
46

LIB. I. TIT. XIX.

TITULUS DECIMUS-NONUS.
DE FIDUCIARIA TUTELA.

Filii-familias a patre manumissi pater tutor est legitimus :
eo vero defuncto, frater tutor fiduciarius existit.

EST et alia tutela, que fiducia-
ria appellatur: nam, si parens fili-
um vel filiam, nepotem vel neptem,
vel deinceps, impuberes manu-
miserit, legitimam nanciscitur eo-
rum tutelam : quo defuncto, si libe-
ri ejus virilis sexus existant, fiduci-
arii turores filiorum suorum, vel fra-
tris, vel sororis, vel caterorum,
_ efficiuntur. Atqui, patrono legiti-
mo tutore mortuo, liberi quoque
ejus legitimi sunt tutores; quoniam
filius quidem defuncti, si non esset
a Vivo patre emancipatus, post obi-
tum ejus sui juris efficeretur, nec
in fratrum potestatem recideret,
idedque nec in tutelam. Libertus
autem, si servus mansisset, utique
eodem jure apud liberos domini
post mortem ejus futurus esset.
Ita tamen hiad tutelam vocantur, si
perfectze sint statis; quod nostra
constitutio in omnibus tutelis et cu-
rationibus observari generalitér
reecepit.

There is another kind of tutelage
called fiduciary ; for, if a parent
emancipate a son or a daughter, a
grand-son or a grand-daughter, or
any other child, not arrived at
puberty, he is then their legal
tutor; but, at his death, his male
children of age become the fiduciary
tutors of their own sons, or of a bro-
ther, a sister, or of a brother’s chil-
dren emancipated by the deceased.
But when a patron, who is a legal
tutor, dies, his children also become
legal tutors. The reason of which
difference is this : a son, although ne-
ver emancipated, becomes indepen-
dent at the death of his father; and
therefore as he falls not under power
of his brothers, he cannot be under
their legal tutelage. But the condi-
tion of a slave is not altered at the
death of his master; for he then

“becomes a slave to the children of

the deceased. None can be called
to tutelage, unless of full age; and
our constitution hath commanded
this rule to be generally observed in
all tutelages and curations.
LIB. 1. TIT. Xx.

47

TITULUS VIGESIMUS.

DE ATILIANO TUTORE, ET EO, QUI EX LEGE JULIA
ET TITIA DABATUR.

D. xxvi. T. 5. C. v. T. 34 et 36.

Jus antiquum, si nullus sit tutor.

SI cui nullus omnino tutor,fuerat,
et dabatur, in urbe quidem a pre-
tore urbano et majore parte tribu-
norum plebis, tutor ex lege Atilia:
im provinciis vero 4 presidibus pro-
vinciarum ex lege Julia et Titia.

Under the law Atilia, the praetor
of the city, with a majority of the
tribunes, might assign tutors to all
who were not otherwise intitled. In
the provinces, tutors were appointed
by the respective governors under
the law Julia and Titia.

Si spes sit futuri tutoris testamentarii.

§ I. Sed et, si in testamento tutor
sub conditione, aut ex die certo da-
tus fuerat, quamdiu conditio aut
dies pendebat, iisdem legibus tutor
alius interim dari poterat. Item si
purée datus fuerat, quamdiu ex tes-
tamento nemo heres existebat, tam-
diu ex iisdem legibus tutor peten-
dus erat, qui desinebat esse tutor,
si conditio extiterat, aut dies vene-
rat, aut heres extiterat.

§ 1. If a testamentary tutor had
been appointed conditionally, or
from a certain day, another tutor
might have been assigned by virtue
of the above named laws, while the
condition depended or until the day
came. Also if a tutor had been given
unconditionally, yet, as long as the
testamentary heir deferred taking
upon him the inheritance, another
tutor might have been appointed
during the interval. But his office
ceased, when the condition happen-
ed, the day came, or the inheritance
was entered upon.

Si tutor ab hostibus sit captus.

$ IL Ab hostibus quoque tutore
capto, ex his legibus tutor peteba-
tur; qui desinebat esse tutor, si is,
qui captus erat, in civitatem rever-
sus fuerat: nam reversus recipiebat
tutelam jure postliminii.

$ 2. By the Atilian and Julio-ti-
tian laws,if a tutor was taken by the
enemy, another tutor wasapplied for
whose office ceased, of course, when
the first tutor returned from captivi-
ty; for he then resumed the tutel-
age by his right of return.
LIB. I. TIT. XxX.

Quando et cur desierint ex dictis legibus tutores dari.

§ III. Sed ex his legibus tutores
pupillis desierunt dari, posteaquam
primo consules pupillis utriusque
sexus tutores ex inquisitione dare
coeperunt, deinde preetores ex con-
stitutionibus. Nam supradictis le-
gibus neque de cautione 4 tutoribus
exigenda, rem pupillis salvam fore,
neque de compellendis tutoribus ad
tutelee administrationem, quicquam
cavebatur.

$ 3. But these laws fell into dis-
use, first when the consuls began to
assign tutors to pupils of either sex,
on inquisition; and next, when the
preetors were invested with the same
authority by imperial constitutions.
For, by the above mentioned laws,
no security was required from the
tutors for the forthcoming of the
property, neither were they compel-
led to act.

Jus novum.

§ IV. Sed hoc jure utimur, ut
Rome quidem prefectus urbi, vel
praetor secundum suam jurisdictio-
nem, in provinciis autem presides
ex inquisitione, tutores crearent;
vel magistratus jussu preesidum, si
non sint magne pupillis facultates.

§ 4. But latterly, at Rome, the
preefect of the city, or the preetor
according to his jurisdiction, and, in
the provinces, the respective gover-
nors may assign tutors upon in-
quiry; so may an inferior magis-
trate at the command of a governor,
if the possessions of the pupil are
not large.

Jus novissimum.

$ V. Nos autem, per constituti-
onem nostram hujusmodi difficul-
tates hominum resecantes, nec ex-
pectata jussione presidum, dispo-
suimus, si facultates pupilli vel
adulti usque ad quingentos solidos
valeant, defensores civitatum und
cum ejusdem civitatis religiosissi-
mo antistite, vel alias personas pub-
licas, id est, magistratus, vel juri-
dicum Alexandrine civitatis, tu-
tores vel curatores creare; legitima
cautelé secundim ejusdem consti-
tutionis normam preestanda, videli-
cet eorum periculo, qui eam acci-
piunt.

$ 5. But for the ease of our sub-
jects we have ordained, that the
judge of Alexandria and the magis-
trates of every city, together with
the chief ecclesiastic, may assign
tutors or curators to pupils or a-
dults, whose fortunes do not exceed.
five hundred aurei, without waiting
for the command of the governor,
to whose province they belong. But
all such magistrates must, at their
peril, take from every tutor, so ap-
pointed, the security required by
our constitution.
LIB. I.

TIT. XXI.

49

Ratio tutele.

§ VI. Impuberes autem in tuteld
esse, naturali juri conveniens est ;
ut is, qui perfecte statis non sit,
alterius tutela regatur.

§ 6. It is agreeable to the law of
nature, that persons under puberty,
should be under tutelage; that all
who are not of ripe age may be un-
der the government of proper per-
sons.

De tutele ratione reddenda.

§ VIL. Cum ergo pupillorum pu-
pillarumque tutores negotia gerant,
post pubertatem tutele judicio ra-
tionem reddunt.

$7. Hence as tutors administer the
affairs of their pupils, they may be
compelled to account, by an action
of tutelage, when their pupils arrive
at puberty.

 

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-PRIMUS.
DE AUCTORITATE TUTORUM.

D. xxvi. T. 8. C.v. T. 59.

In quibus causis auctoritas sit necessaria.

AUCTORITAS autem tutoris
in quibusdam causis necessaria pu-
pillis est, in quibusdam non est ne-
cessaria: ut, ecce, si quid dari sibi
stipulentur, non est necessaria tu-
toris auctoritas; quod si aliis pro-
mittant pupilli, necessaria est tutoris
auctoritas : namque placuit, me-
liorem quidem conditionem licere
iis facere etiam siné tutoris aucto-
ritate; deteriorem vero non aliter,
quam cum tutoris auctoritate. Un-
de in his causis, ex quibus obliga-

tiones mutuz nascuntur, ut in emp-
7

The authority or confimation of
a tutor is in some cases necessary,
and in others not. When a man
stipulates tomake a gift to a pupil,
the authority of the tutor is not re-
quisite; but, if a pupil enters into
a contract, it is so; for the rule is,
that pupil may better their condi-
tion, but not impair it, without the
authority of their tutors. And there-
fore in all cases of mutual obliga-
tion, as in buying, selling, letting,
hiring, mandates, deposites, &c. he,
who contracts with a pupil, is bound
50 LIB. I.

tionibus, venditionibus, locationi-
bus, mandatis, depositis, si tutores
auctoritas non interveniat, ipsi qui-
dem, qui cum his contrahunt, obli-
gantur ; at nvicem pupilli non obli-
gantur.

TIT. XXI.

by the contract; but not the pupil,
unless the tutor hath authorised it.

Exceptio.

§ I. Neque tamen hereditatem
adire, neque bonorum possessionem
petere, neque hereditatem ex fidei-
commisso suscipere, aliter possunt,
hisi tutoris auctoritate, (quamvis
illis lucrosa sit,) ne ullum damnum
habeant.

§ 1. But no pupil, without the
authority of his tutor, can enter up-
on an inheritance, or take upon him
the possession of goods, oran inheri-
tance in trust; for, there is a possi-
bility of damage, as well as gain,

Quomodo auctoritas interponi debet,

§ II. Tutor autem statim in ipso
negotio presens debet auctor fieri,
si hoc pupillo prodesse existimave-
rit. Post tempus vero, vel per epis-
tolam, aut per nuntium, interposita
auctoritas nihil agit.

§ 2. If a tutor would authorise
any act, which he esteems advanta-
geous to his pupil, he should be per-
sonally present; for his authority
hath no effect, when given by letter,
by messenger, or after contract.

Quo casu interponi non potest.

§ III. Si inter tutorem pupillum-
que judicio agendum sit, quia ipse
tutor in rem suam auctor esse non
potest, non preetorius tutor (ut olim)
constituir, sed curator in locum ejus
datur; quo curatore interveniente,
judicitum peragitur ; et, eo peracto,
curator esse desinit.

$3. When a suit is to be commen-
ced between a tutor and his pupil,
inasmuch as the tutor cannot exer-
cise his authority, as such, against
himself, a curator, and not a preeto-
rian tutor, (as was formerly the cus-
tom,) is appointed, by whoseinven-
tion the suit is carried on; and,
when it is determined, the curator-
ship ceases.
LIB. I. TIT. XX.

51

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-SECUNDUS.
QUIBUS MODIS TUTELA FINITUR,.
C.v. T. 60.

De pubertate.

PUPILLI, pupillzque, cum pu-
beres esse coeperint, 4 tutela liberan-
tur. Pubertatem autem veteres qui-
dem non solim ex annis, sed etiam
ex habitu corporis, in masculis ssti-
mari volebant. Nostra autem ma-
jestas, dignum esse castitate nostro-
rum temporum existimans, bené
putavit, quod in feeminis etiam an-
tiquis impudicum esse visum est, id
est, inspectionem habitudinis cor-
poris, hoc etiam in masculos exten-
dere: et idco, nostra sancta consti-
tutione promulgata pubertatem in
masculis post decimum quartum
annum completum illicd initium ac-
cipere disposuimus : antiquitatis
norman in foeminis bené positam in
suo ordine relinquentes, ut post du-
odecim annos.completos, viri poten-
tes esse credantur.

Pupils, both male and female, are
freed from tutelage, when they ar-
rive at puberty. The ancients judg-
ed of puberty in males, not by years
only, but also by the habit of their bo-
dies. But our imperial majesty, re-
garding the purity of the present
times, hath thought it proper, that
the same decency, which was ever
observed towards females, should be
extended also to males: and there-

fore, by our sacred constitution, we

have enacted, that puberty in-males
should be reputed to commence im-
mediately after the completion of
their fourteenth year. But, in rela-
tien to females, weleave that whole-
someand ancient rule of law unalter-
ed by which they are esteemed mar-
riageable after the twelfth year is
completed.

De capitis diminutione pupilli.

$I. Item finitur tutela, si ar-
gati sint adhuc impuberes, vel de
portati: item si in servitum pu-
pillus redigatur, vel si ab hostibus
captus fuerit.

$1. Tutelage is determined ‘be-

‘fore puberty, if the pupil is either

arrogated, or suffers deportation,
or is reduced to slavery, or becomes
a captive.

De conditionis eventu.

$ II. Sed et, si usque ad certam
conditionem datus sit tutor testa-
mento, zeque evenit, ut desinat esse
tutor existente conditione.

$2. But, if a testamentary tutor
is given upon a certain condition,
when that condition is filled, the tu-
telage ceases. :
52 LIB. I.

TIT. XXII.

 

De morte.

$ IIL. Simili modo finitur tutela
morte pupillorum vel tutorum.

$3. Tutelage ends also by death
of the tutor, or the pupil.

De capitis diminutione.

§ IV. Sec et capitas diminutione
tutoris, per quam libertas vel civi-
tas amittitur, omnis tutela perit.
Minima autem capitis diminutione
tutoris, veluti si se arrogandum de-
derit, legitima tantum perit ; cetera
non pereunt. Sed pupilli et pupille
capitis diminutio, licet minima sit,
omnes tutelas tollit.

$4. When a tutor under the great-
er diminution of state, loses his liber-
ty and his citizenship, his tutelage
is extinguished. But, if the least
diminution only is suffered, as when
a tutor gives himself in arrogation,
then no species of tutelage is extin-
guished, but the legal. But every
diminution of state in pupils, takes
away all tutelage.

De tempore.

§ V. Preeterea, qui ad certum
tempus testamento dantur tutores,
finito eo, deponunt tutelam.

§ 5. These, who are testamenta-
ry tutors for a term only, are dis-
charged at the expiration of such
term.

De remotione et excusatione.

§ VI. Desinunt etiam tutores
esse, qui vel removentur 4 tutela ob
id, quod suspecti visit sunt; vel
qui ex justa causd se excusant, et
onus administrande tutele depo-
nunt, secundum ea, que inferius
proponemus.

$ 6. They also cease to be tutors,
who are removed on suspicion; or
excuse and exempt themselves from
the burden of tutelage for just rea-
sons; of which hereafter.
LIB. I. TIT. XXiIil.

TITULUS

53

VIGESIMUS-TERTIUS.

DE CURATORIBUS.

D. xxvii. T. 10. C. v. T. 70.
De adultis.

‘“MASCULI quidem puberes, et
foeming vira potentes, usque ad vi-
gesimum quintum annum comple-
tum curatores accipiunt; quia licet
puberes sint, adhuc tamen ejus e-
tatis sunt, ut sua negotia tueri non
possint.

Males arrived at puberty, and fe-
males marriageable, do nevertheless
receive curators, until they have
completed their twenty-fifth year :
for, they are not yet of an age to take
proper care of their own affairs.

A quibus dentur curatores.

$1. Dantur autem curatores ab
eisdem magistratibus, 4 quibus et
tutores. Sed curator testamento
non datur; datus tamen confirma-
tur decreto pretoris vel preesidis.

Quibus

$ IL. Item inviti adolescentes
curatores non accipiunt, preeter-
quam in litem; curator enim et ad
certam causam dari potest.

$ 1. Curators are appointed by the
same magistrates, who appoint tu-
tors. A curator cannot be absolute-
ly given by testament, but such
nomination must be confirmed, by
a preetor or governor of a province.

dentur.

§ 2. No adults can be obliged to
receive curators, unless ad litem ;
for a curator may be appointed to
any special purpose.

De furiosis et prodigis.

$ ILL. Furiosi quoque, et prodigi,
licet majores viginti quinque annis
sint, tamen in curatione sunt agna-
torum, ex lege duodecim tabular-
um. Sed solent Rome preefectus
urbi vel preetores, et in provinciis
presides, ex inquisitione eis cura-
tores dare.

§ 3. By law of the twelve tables,
madmen and prodigals, although
of full age, must be under duration
of their agnati. But, if there are
no agnati, or such only as are un-
qualified, then curators are appoint-
ed; at Rome, by the prefect of the
city, or the preetor ; in the provin-
ces, by the governors, after re-
quisite inquiry.
54

LIB. I. TIT. XXIII.

De mente captis, surdis, &c.

§ IV. Sed et mente captis, et
surdis, et mutis, et illis, que perpe-
tuo morbo laborant, (quia rebus suis
superesse non possunt,) curatores
dandi sunt.

§ 4. Persons deprived of their in-
tellects, deaf, mute, or subject to any
continual disorder, since they are
unable to manage their own affairs,
must be placed under curators.

De pupillis.

$V. Interdum autem et pupilli
curatores accipiunt; ut puta, si le-
gitimus tutor non sit idoneus: quo-
niam habenti tutorem tutor dari
non potest. Item, si testamento
datus tutor, vel a pretore aut
preside, idoneus non sit ad admi-
nistrationem, nec tamen fraudulen-
ter nogotia administret, solet ei cu-
rator adjungi. Item loco tutorum,
qui non in perpetuum, sed ad tem-
pus 4 tutela excusantur, solent cu-

ratores dari.

$5. Sometimes even pupils re-
ceive curators; as when the legal tu-
tor is unqualified : for a tutor must
not be given to him, who already
has a tutor. Also, if a tutor by testa-

‘ment, or appointed by a preetor, or

the goverenor of a province, appears
afterwards incapable of executing
his trust, it is usual, although he is
guilty of no fraud, to appoint a cu-
rator to be joined with him. It is also
usual to assign curators in the place
of tutors excused for a time only.

De constituendo actore.

$ VI. Quod si tutor vel adversd
valetudine, vel alia necessitate, im-
pediatur, quo minus negotia pupilli
administrare possit, et pupillus vel
absit, vel infans sit, quem velit ac-
torem, periculo ipsius tutoris, pre-
tor, vel qui provinciz preerit, de-
creto constituet.

§$ 6. If a tutor, by illness or any
other necessary impediment, should
be disabled from the execution of his
office, and his pupil should be ab-
sent, or an infant, then the preetor, or
governor of the provinceshall decree
any person, whom the tutor ap-
proves of to be the pupil’s agent, on
the responsibility of the tutor.
LIB. L. TIT. XXIV.

55

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-QUARTUS.
DE SATISDATIONE TUTORUM, VEL CURATORUM.

a

D. xxvii. T. 7. C. v. T. 57.

Qui satisdare cogantur.

NE tamen pupillorum, pupilla-
rumve, et eorum, qui queeve in cu-
ratione sunt, negia a curatoribus
tutoribusve consumantur vel dimi-
nuantur, curet pretor, ut et tutores
et. curatores eo nomine satisdent.
Sed hoc non est perpetuum; nam
tutores testamento dati, satisdare
non coguntur: quia fides eorum et
diligentia ab ipso testatore approba-
taest. Item ex inquisitione tutores
vel curatores dati, satisdatione non
onerantur, quia idonei electi sunt.

It is a branch of the preetor’s office
to see, that tutors and curators give
a sufficient security for the safety
and indemnification of their pupils.
But this is not always necessary;
for a testamentary tutor is not com-
pelled to give security, inasmuch as
his fidelity and diligence seem suf-
ficiently approved of by the testator.
Also tutors, and curators appointed
upon inquiry, are supposed to be
qualified, and therefore not obliged
to give security.

Quatenus satisdatio in iis, qui satisdare non compelluntur,
locum habere possit,

$I. Sed, si ex testamento vel in-
quisitione duo pluresve dati fuerint,
potest unus offerre satisdationde in-
demnitate pupilli vel adolescentis,
et contutori suo vel concuratori
preeferri, ut solus administret; vel
ut contutor aut concurator satis of-
ferens preponatur ei, ut et ipse solus
administret. Itaque per se non po-
test petere satisdationem a contu-
tore vel concuratore; sed offerre de-
bet, ut electionem det concuratorl
vel contutori suo, utrum velit satis
accipere, an satisdare. (Quod si
nemo eorum satis offerat; siquidem
adscriptum fuerit 4 testatore, quis
gerat, ille gerere debet; quod si non
fuerit adscriptum, quem major pars

$ 1. If two, or more, are appoint-
ed by testament, or by a magistrate,
after inquiry, to be tutors or cura-
tors, any one of them, by offering
security, may be preferred to the
sole administration, or cause his co-
tutor, or co-curator, to give security,
in order to be admitted himself to
the administration. Thus a man
cannot demand security from his
co-tutor or co-curator; but by offer-
ing it himself, he may compel his
co-tutor, or co-curator, to give or
receive security. When no securi-
ty is offered, the person appointed
by the testator must be preferred ;
but, if no such person be appointed,
then he must administer whom a
56 LIB. I.

TIT. XXIV.

 

elegerit, ipse gerere debet, ut edicto
pretoris cavetur. Sin autem ipsi
tutores dissenserint circa eligend-
um eum vel eos, qui gerere debent,
preetor partes suas inteponere de-
bet. Idem et in pluribus ex inqui-
sitione datis comprobandum est; id
est, ut major pars eligere possit, per
quem administratio fiat.

majority of the tutors shall elect,
according to the pretorian edict:
if they disagree in their choice, the
praetor may interpose. ‘The same
rule is to be observed, when many,
either tutors or curators, are nomi-
nated on inquisition by the magis-
trate, viz. that a majority determine
who shall administer.

Qui ex administratione tutele vel curationis tenentur.

§ IL Sciendum autem est, non
solum tutores vel curatores pupillis
vel adultis, ceterisque personis, ex
administratione rerum teneri: sed
etiam in eos, qui satisdationem ac-
cipiunt, subsidiariam actionem es-
se, que ultimum eis presidium
possit afferre. Subsidiaria autem
actio in eos datur, qui aut omnind
& tutoribus vel curatoribus satisdari
non curaverunt, aut non idonée pas-
si sunt caveri: que quidem tam ex
prudentum responsis, quam ex con-
stitutionibus imperialibus, etiam in
heredes eorum extenditur.

$ 2. It is to be noted that tutors
and curators are not alone subject to
an action, on account of adminis-
tering the affairs of pupils, minors,
and others under their protection.
For a subsidiary action, which is
the last remedy to be used, will also
lie against a magistrate either for
entirely omitting to take, or for tak-
ing insufficient sureties: and this
action according to the answers of
the lawyers, as well as by the im-
perial constitutions, is extended
even against the heir of such ma-
gistrate.

Si tutor vel curator cavere nolit.

§ IT. Quibus constitutionibus et
illud exprimitur, ut, nisi caveant
tutores et curatores, pignoribus cap-
tis coerceantur.

§ 3. By the same constitutions it
is expressly enacted, that tutors and
curators, who refuse to give cau-
tion, may be compelled to it.

Qui dicta actione non tenentur.

§ IV. Neque autem prefectus
urbi, neque preetor, neque preses
provinciz, neque quisqaum alius,
cui tutores dandi jus est, hac ac-
tione tenebitur: sed hi tantummo-
do, qui satisdationem exigere so-
lent.

§ A. Neither the prefect of the city,
nor the pretor, nor the governor of
a province, nor any other, who has
power to assign tutors, shall be
subject to a subsidiary action: but
those magistrates only are liable to
it, who exact the security.
LIB. I. TIT. XXVv.

57

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-QUINTUS.

DE EXCUSATIONIBUS TUTORUM VEL CURATORUM.

D. xxvii.

aD,

C.v. T. 62.

De numero liberorum.

EXCUSANTUR autem tutores
et curatores variis ex causis; ple-
rumque tamen propter liberos, sive
in potestate sint, sive emancipati.
Si enim tres liberos superstites Ro-
mez quis habeat, vel in Italia qua-
tuor, vel in provinciis quinque, 4
tutela vel cura potest excusari, ex-
emplo caterorum munerum; nam
et tutelam et curam placuit publi-
cum munus esse. Sed adoptivi li-
beri non prosunt; in adoptionem
autem dati naturali parti, prosunt.
Item nepotes ex filio prosunt, ut in
locum patris sui succedant; ex filia
non prosunt. Filii autem super-
stites tantum ad tutele vel cure
muneris excusationem prosunt: de-
functi autem non prosunt. Sed, si
in bello amissi sunt, quesitum est,
an prosint? Et constat, eos solos
prodesse, qui in acie amituntur.
Hi enim, qui pro republica cecide-
runt, in perpetuum per gloriam vi-
vere intelliguntur.

Persons, nominated. as tutors, or
curators, may, upon diverse ac-
counts, excuse themselves; general-
ly as having children, whether sub-
ject, or emancipated. For at Rome,
if a man has three children living,
in Italy four, or in the Provinces
five, he may therefore be excused
from tutelage and curation, as well
as from other employments of a
public nature; for both tutelage and
curation are esteemed public offices.
But adopted children will not avail
the adoptor; they will nevertheless
excuse their natural father, who
gave them in adoption. Also grand-
children by a son, when they suc-
ceed in place of their father, will
excuse their grand-father; but erand-
children by a daughter will not.
Those children only, who are liv-
ing, can excuse from tutelage and
curation; the deceased are of no
avail: should it be asked if a parent
can count upon sons, destroyed in
war? We must answer, he can
avail himself of those only, who
perished in battle: for those who
have fallen for the republic, are es-
teemed to live in the immortality
of their fame.
58 LIB. I.

TIT. XXV.

 

De administratione rei fiscalis.

§ I. Item divus Marcus in se-
mestribus rescripsit, eum, qui res
fisci administrat, 4 tutelaé et cura
quamdiu administrat, excusari pos-
se.

De absentia reipublice causa.

$ IL. Item, qui reipublicee causa
absunt, 4 tutelaé vel cura excusan-
tur. Sed et, si fuerint tutores vel
curatores dati, deinde reipublicee
causa abesse cceperint, a tutela vel
cura excusantur, quatenus reipub-
lice causé absunt: et interea cura-
tor loco eorum datur; qui, si rever-
si fuerint, recipiunt onus tutele:
nam nec anni habent vacationem,
ut Papinianus libro quinto respon-
sorum scripsit: nam hoc spatium
habent ad novas tutelas vocati.

$ 1. The emperor Marcus declar-
ed by rescript from his Semestriat
council, that a person engaged in
the Treasury Department 1s ex-
cused from tutelage and curation,
while so employed.

'

§ 2. Persons absent on public bu-
siness, are exempted from tutelage
and curation; and if such, who are
already assigned to be either tutors
or curators, should afterwards be
thus absent, they are excused while
they continue in public service; and
curators must be appointed in their
place; on their return, they must a-
gain take upon them the burden of
tutelage. But they are not intitled
(as Papinian asserts in the fifth
book of his answers) to the privi-
lege of a year’s vacation: for that
term is allowed to those only, who
are called to a new tutelage.

De potestate.

§ ID. Et, qui potestatem ali-
quam habent, se excusare possunt,
ut divus Marcus rescripsit: sed su-
sceptam tutelam deserere non pos-
sunt.

.§ 3. By a rescript of the emperor
Marcus, all superior magistrates
may, as such, excuse themselves;
but they cannot desert a tutelage
once undertaken.

De lite cum pupillo vel adulto.

§$ IV. Item propter litem, quam
cum pupillo vel adulto tutor vel cu-
rator habet, excusari non potest:
nisi forté de omnibus bonis vel
hereditate controversia sit.

§ 4. No tutor or curator can ex-
cuse himself by alleging a law-suit
with the pupil or minor; unless the
suit is for all the goods, or the whole
inheritance of such pupil or minor.
LIB. I.

TIT. XXV.

59

De tribus tutele et cure non oneribus.

§ V. Item tria onera tutelz non
affectatee, vel curse, preestant vaca-
tionem, quanditi. administrantur :
ut tamen, plurium pupillorumtutela
vel cura eorundem bonorum, veluti
fratrum, pro und computetur.

$ 5. Three tutelages or curator-
ships unsolicited, excuse during
their continuance, from the burden
of a fourth. But the tutelage or
curation of many pupils, as of sev-
eral brothers under one patrimony,
is reckoned as one only.

De paupertate.

§ VI. Sed et propter pauperta § 6. The divine brothers have
tem excusationem tribui, tam divi declared by their rescript, and the
fratres, quam per se divus Marcus emperor Marcus also, that poverty
rescripsit, si quis imparem se oneri isa sufficient excuse, when it can

injuncto possit docere.

be proved such, as to render a man
incapable of the burden imposed
upon him.

*

De adversa valetudine.

§ VII. Item propter adversam
valetudinem, propter quam ne suis
quidem negotiis interesse potest,
excusatio locum habet.

§ 7. Illness also, if it prevent a
man from transacting his own busi-
ness, is a sufficient excuse.

De imperitia literarum.

§ VIII. Similiter eos qui literas
nesciunt, esse excusandos, Divus
Pius rescripsit; quamvis et impe-
riti literarum possint ad administra-
tionem negotiorem suflicere.

$ 8. By the rescript of the em-
peror Antoninus Pius, illiterate per-
sons are to be excused; although in
some cases they may suffice.

De inimicita patris.

$ IX. Item si propter inimiciti-
as aliquem testamento tutorem pa-
ter dederit, hoc ipsum prestat ei
excusationem; sicut per contrari-
um non excusantur, qui, se tutelam
administraturos, patri pupillorum
promiserant.

§ 9. If a father through enmity
appoints any particular person, by
testament, the motive will afford a
sufficient excuse. Contrawise, he
who by promise hath engaged him,
self to a testator, can not be excus-
ed from the office of tutelage.
60

LIB. I. TIT. XXvV.

De ignorantia testatoris.

§ X. Non esse autem admitten-
dam excusationem ejus, qui hoc
solo utitur, quod ignotus patri pu-
pillorum sit, Divi fratres rescripse-
runt.

$ 10. The divine brothers have
enacted by their rescript, that the
pretence of being unknown to the
father of a pupil is not of itself a
sufficient excuse.

De inimicitiis cum patre pupilli vel adulti.

§ XI. Inimicitie, quas quis cum
patre pupillorum vel adultorum
exercuit, si capitales fuerunt, nec
reconciliatio intervenit, 4 tutela vel
cura solent excusare.

§ XI. A capital enmity, against
the father of a pupil or adult, un-
reconciled, is usually considered as
an excuse from tutelage or curator-
ship.

De status controversia a patre pupilli illata.

$ XIT. Item is, qui status con-
troversiam a pupillorum patre pas-
sus est, cxcusatur 4 tutela.

*

§ 12. Also he, whose condition
hath been controverted by the fa-
ther of the pupil, is excused from
the tutelage.

De etate.

§ XIII. Item major septuaginta
annis 4 tutelé et cura se potest ex-
cusare. Minores autem viginti
quinque’annis olim quidem excu-
sabantur: nostra autem constitu-
tione prohibentur ad tutelam vel
curam adspirare; aded ut nec ex-
cusaitone opus sit. Qua constitu-
tione cavetur, ut nec pupillus ad
legitimam tutelam vocetur, nec
adultus: cum sit incivile, eos, qui
alieno auxilio in rebus suis admin-
istrandis egere noscuntur, et ab

aliis reguntur, aliorum tutelam vel |

curam subire.

§$ 13. Persons above seventy
years of age, may be excused from
tutelage and curation. Also mi-
nors were formerly excusable; but,
by our constitution, they are now
prohibited from aspiring to these
trusts ; so that excuses are become
unnecessary. By the same consti-
tution, neither pupils, nor adults
shall be called even to a legal tute-
lage. For it is absurd that per-
sons, who are themselves govern-
ed, and need assistance in the ad-
minisiration of their own affairs,
should be admitted, either as tutors
or curators, to manage the affairs
of others.

De militia.

§ XIV. Idem et in milite obser-
vadum est, ut nec volens ad tutele
onus admittatur.

$ 14. Note also, that no military
persons, although willing, can be
admitted as tutor or curator. .
LIB. L.

TIT. XXV.

61

De grammaticis, rhetoribus, et medicis.

§ XV. Item Rome grammatici,
rhetores, et medici, et qui in patria
sua has artes exercent, et intra
numerum sunt, 4 tutela et cura ha-
bent vacationem.

§ 15. At Rome, grammarians,
rhetoricians, and physicians, and
they who exercise such professions
in their own country, within the
number authorised, are exempted
from tutelage and curation.

De tempore et modo proponendi excusationes.

§ XVI. Qui autem et vult excu-
sare, si plures habeat excusationes,
et de quibusdam non probaverit,
aliis uti, intra tempora constituta,
non prohibetur. Qui autem excu-
sare se volunt, non appellant, sed
intra quinquaginta dies continuos,
eX quo cognoverint se tutores vel
curatores datos, se excusare de-
bent, cujuscunque generis sint; id
est, qualitercunque dati fuerint tu-
tores, si intra centesimum lapidem
sint ab eo loco, ubi tutores dati
sunt. Si vero ultra centesimum
lapidem habitant, dinumeratione
facta viginti millium diurnorum, et
amplius triginta dierum; qui tamen,
ut Sceevola dicebat, sic debent com-
putari, ne minus sint, quam quin-
quaginta dies.

§ 16. He who can allege many
excuses, and hath failed in his proof
of some, is not prohibited from as-
signing others within the time pre-
scribed. But tutors and curators of
whatever kind; whether legal, testa-
mentary, or dative, (if desirous to
excuse themselves) ought not to
prefer an appeal from their appoint-
ment; but they should exhibit their
excuses before the proper magis-
trate, within fifty days after they
are certified of their nomination, if
they are within an hundred miles
from the place of nomination. But,
if they are distant more than an
hundred miles, they are allowed a
day for every twenty miles, and
thirty days besides; which, taken
together, ought never, according to
Scevola, to make a less number of
days than fifty.

De excusatione pro parte patrimonil.

$ XVII. Datus autem tutor ad
universum patrimonium datus esse
creditur.

§ 17. When a tutor is appointed,
he is considered as having the care
of the whole patrimony of his pupil.

De tutele gestione.

§ XVIII. Qui tutelam alicujus
gessit, invitus curator ejusdem fieri
non compellitur; in tantum ut, li-
cet pater-familias, qui testamento
tutorem dedit, adjecerit se eundem

$18. A tutor of a minor, cannot
be compelled to become his curator:
and, by the rescript of the emperors
Severus and Antoninus,although the
father of a family should, by testa-
62 LIB. I.

TIT. XXVI.

 

curatorem dare, tamen, invitum
eum curam suscipere non cogen-
dum, divi Severus et Antoninus
rescripserunt.

ment, appoint any person to be first
the tutor of his children, and after-
wards their curator, the person so
appointed if unwilling, is not com-
pellable to serve.

De marito.

§ XIX. Idem _ rescripserunt,
maritum uxori sue curatorem da-
tum excusare se posse, licet se im-
misceat.

§ 19. The same emperors have
enacted, that a husband may ex-
cuse himself from being curator to
his wife, even after he hath begun
to act.

De falsis allegationibus.

§ XX. Si quis autem falsis alle-
gationibus excusationem tutele me-
ruerit, non est liberatus onere tute-
le.

§ 20. If any man by false allega-
tions, hath merited to be removed
from tutelage, he is not therefore
freed from the burden of this office.

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-SEXTUS.

DE SUSPECTIS TUTORIBUS VEL CURATORIBUS.

D. xxvi. T. 10. C. v. T. 43.

‘Unde suspecti crimen descendat.

SCIENDUM est, suspecti cri-
men ex lege duodecim tabularum
descendere.

The accusation of a suspected
tutor, or curator, is derived from
the law of the twelve tables.

Qui de hoc crimine cognoscunt,

§ I. Datum autem est jus remo-
vendi tutores suspectos Rome pree-
tori, et in provinciis presidibus ea-
rum, et legato proconsulis.

§ 1. At Rome the power of re-
moving suspected tutors belongs to
the preetors; in the provinces to the
governors, or to the legate of a
proconsul.
LIB. I. TIT. xxvi

 

63

Qui suspecti fieri possunt.-

$ IL. Ostendimus, qui possunt de
Suspecto cognoscere; nunc videa-
mus, qui suspecti fieri possint: et
possunt quidem omnes tutores fieri
suspecti, sive sint. testamentarii,
sive non sint, sed alterius generis
tutores. Quare etsi legitimus fuerit
tutor, accusari poterit. Quid si pa-
tronus? Adhuc idem erit dicendum:
dummodo meminerimus, fame pa-
troni parcendum esse, licet ut sus-
pectus remotus fuerit.

$2. We have shewn what magis-
trates may take cognisance of sus-
pected persons: let us now inquire,
what persons may become suspect-
ed. And all tutors may become so,
whether testamentary, or other.
For even a legal tutor may be ac-
cused ; so may al patron: but] we
must remember, that, as such, his
reputation must be spared, although
he be removed from his trust, as a
suspected person.

Qui possunt suspectos postulare.

$ III. Consequens est, ut videa-
mus, qui possint suspectos postu-
lare. Et sciendum est, quasi pub-
licam esse hanc accusationem ; hoc
est, omnibus patere. Quinimo mu-
lieres admittuntur ex rescripto di-
vorum Severi et Antonini; sed he
sole, que, pietatis necessitudine
ductze, ad hoe procedunt: ut puta
mater, nutrix quoque et avia: po-
test et soror. Sed et, si qua alia
mulier fuerit, quam preetor propen-
sa pietate intellexerit, sextis verec-
undiam non egredientem, sed_pie-
tate productam, non sustinere inju-
riam pupillorum, admittet eam ad
accusationem.

$§ 3. Let us then inquire, by whom
suspected persons may be accused.
Now an accusation of this sort is of
a public nature, and open to all.
For, by a rescript of the emperors
Severus and Antoninus, even wo-
men are admitted to be accusers;
yet such only, as are induced by
their duty, or by their relation to the
minor; thus a mother, a nurse, or a
grand-mother, or a sister, may be-
come accusers. But the preetor can
at discretion admit any women, who
acting with becoming modesty, but
impatient of wrongs offered to pu-
pils, appears to have no other mo-
tive, than to relieve the injured.

An pubes vel impubes.

$ IV. Impuberes non possunt tu-
tores suos suspectos postulare: pu-
beres autem curatores suos ex con-
silio necessariorum suspectos pos-
Sunt arguere: et ita Divi Severus
et Antoninus rescripserunt.

$ 4. No pupil can bring an accu-
sation of suspicion against his tu-
tor; but adults, by the rescript of
Severus and Antoninus, are permit-
ed, when they act by advice of per-
sons related to them, to accuse their
curators. (Prochein Ami.)
64 LIB. I.

TIT. XXVI.

 

Qui dicatur suspectus.

§ V. Suspectus autem est, qui
non ex fide tutelam gerit, licet sol-
vendo sit, ut Julianus quoque scrip-
sit. Sed, et anteaquam incipiat
tutelam gerere tutor, posse eum
quasi suspectum removeri, idem
Julianus scripsit: et secundum eum
constitutum est.

De effectu

§$ VI. Suspectus autem remotus,
siquidem ob dolum, famosus est:
si ob culpam, non eque.

$ 5. Any tutor however responsi-
ble who does not faithfully execute
his trust, may, according to Julian,
be pronounced suspected. And it
is also his opinion adhered to in our
constitutions, that a tutor may be
removed from his office, as suspect-
ed, even before he has begun to
execute it.

remotionis.

$ 6. A suspected person removed,
if on account of fraud, is infamous,
if for neglect only, not equally so.

De effectu accusationis.

§ VI. Si quis autem suspectus
postulatur, quoad cognitio finiatur,
interdicitur ei administratio, ut Pa-
piniano visum est.

Quibus modis

$ VIII. Sed, si suspecti cognitio
suscepta fuerit, posteaque tutor vel
curator decesserit, extinguitur sus-
pecti cognitio.

§ 7. If any tutor is accused upon
suspicion, his administration, ac-
cording to Papinian, is suspended,
while the accusation is pending.

cognitio finitur.

§ 8. If a suspected tutor or cura-
tor should die, pending the accusa-
tion, the cognisance of it is extin-
guished.

Si tutor copiam sui non faciat.

§ IX. Si quis tutor copiam sui
non faciat, ut alimenta pupillo de-
cernantur, cavetur epistolé divorum
Severi et Antonini, ut in possessio-
nem bonorum ejus pupillus mitta-
tur; et, que moré deteriora futura
sunt, dato curatore, distrahi juben-
tur: ergo, ut suspectus, removeri
poterit, qui non preestat alimenta.

§$ 9. If a tutor fails to appear, to
avoid a decree of maintenance for
his pupil, it is provided by the con-
stitution of Severus and Antoninus,
that the pupil shall be put into the
possession of his tutor’s effects ; and
that, a, curator being appointed,
those things, which are perishable,
may be sold: and a tutor, not af-
fording maintenance to his pupil,
may be removed, as suspected.
LIB. I. TIT. XXVL

65

Si neget alimenta decerni posse, vel tutelam redemerit.

$ X. Sed, si quis preesens negat
propter inopiam alimenta posse de-
cerni, si hoc per mendacium dicat,
remittendum eum esse ad prefec-
tum urbi puniendum placuit, sicut
ille remittitur, qui data pecunia,
ministerium tutele acquisierit, vel
redemerit.

§ 10. But if the tutor appearing,
falsely avers, that the effects of his
pupil are insufficient for an allow-
ance, he shall be remitted to be the
prefect of the city, and punished in
the same manner, as one who hath
acquired a tutelage by bribery.

De liberto fraudulenter administrante.

§ XI. Libertus quoque, si frau-
dulenter tutelam filiorum vel nepo-
tum patroni gessisse probetur, ad
prefectum urbi remittitur punien-
dus.

Si suspectus satis offerat ;

§ XII. Novissimé autum scien-
dum est, eos, qui fraudulenter tute-
lam administrant, etiamsi satis offe-
rant, removendos esse 4 tutela; quia-
satisdatio tutoris propositum male-
volum non mutat, sed diutius gras-
sandi in re familiari facultatem
prestat. Suspectum etiam eum
putamus, qui moribus talis est, ut
suspectus sit. Enimvero tutor vel
curator, quamvis pauper sit, fidelis
tamen et diligens, removendus non
est, quasi suspectus.

§ 11. Also a freed-man, who is
proved to have fraudulently admin-
istered the tutelage of the son, or
grand-son of his patron, must be re-
mitted to the preefect to be punished.

et quis dicatur suspectus.

$ 12. Lastly, they who unfaith-
fully administer their trust, must be
removed from it, although they ten-
der sufficient security. For giving
security alters not the malevolent
purpose of the tutor, but procures
him a longer opportunity of de-
frauding the estate. We also deem
every man suspected, whose im-
moralities give cause for it: but a
tutor or curator who is faithful and
diligent, cannot be removed, as a
suspected person, merely on ac-
count of poverty.

~

FINIS LIBRI PRIMI.
DIVI JUSTINIANI

INSTITUTIONUM

LIBER

SECUNDUS.

 

TITULUS

PRIMUS.

DE RERUM DIVISIONE, ET ACQUIRENDO EARUM DOMINIO.

D.1.T. 8. C. xl. T. 1.

Continuatio et duplex rerum divisio,

SUPERIORE libro de jure per-
sonarum exposuimus; modo videa-
mus de rebus; que vel in nostro
patrimonio, vel extra patrimoni-
um nostrum, habentur. Quedam
enim naturali jure communia sunt
omnium, quedam publica, quedam
universitatis, quedam nullius, ple-
raque singulorum, que ex variis
causis cuique acquiruntur, sicut ex
subjectis apparebit.

We have treated of persons in the
foregoing book; let us now inquire
concerning things, which may be
divided into such as are, and such
as are not within our patrimony, for
some things are in common by the
law of nature; some are public;
some universal; and some there are,
to which no man can have a right.
But most things are the property of
individuals, by whom they are va-
riously acquired, as will appear
hereafter.

De aere, aqua profluente, mari, littore, &c.

§ I. Et quidem naturali jure
communia sunt omnium hec, aer,
aqua profluens, mare, et per hoc
littora maris: nemo igitur ad littus
maris accedere prohibetur; dum ta-
men & villis et monumentis et zdi-
ficiis abstineat: quia non sunt juris
gentium, sicut est mare.

§ 1. Things common to mankind
by the law of nature, are the air,
running water, the sea, and conse-
quently the shores of the sea; no
man therefore is prohibited from
approaching any part of the sea-
shore, whilst he abstains from da-
maging farms, monuments, edifices,
&c. which are not in common as
the sea is.
68 LIB. II.

TIT. 1

De fluminibus et portubus.

§ II. Flumina autem omnia, et
portus, publica sunt: idedque jus
piscandi omnibus commune est.in
portu fluminibusque.

§ 2. Rivers and ports are public;
hence the right of fishing in a port,
or in rivers are in common.

Definitio littoris.

§ III. Est autem littus maris,
quatenus hybernus fluctus maxi-
mus excurrit.

$3. All that tract of land, over
which the greatest winter flood ex-
tends itself, is the sea-shore.

De usu et proprietate riparum.

§$ IV. Riparum quoque usus pub-
licus est jure gentium, sicut ipsius
fluminis; itaque naves ad eas ap-
pellere, funes arboribus ibi natis re-
ligare, onus aliquod in his reponere,
cuilibet liberum est, sicut per ip-
sum flumen navigare: sed proprie-
tas earum illorum est, quorum pre-
diis herent: qua de causa arbores
quoque in eisdem nate eorundem
sunt.

§$ 4. By the law of nations the
use of the banks is as public as the
rivers; therefore all persons are at
equal liberty to land their vessels,
unload them, and to fasten ropes to
trees upon the banks, as to navigate
upon the river itself; still, the banks
of a river are the property of those
who possess the land adjoining;
and therefore the trees which grow
upon them, are also the property
of the same persons.

7

De usu et proprietate littorum.

§ V. Littorum quoque usus pub-
licus est, et juris gentium, sicut et
ipsius maris: et ob id cuilibet libe-
rum est casam ibi ponere, in quam
se recipiat, sicut retia siccare, et ex
mari deducere; proprietas autem
eorum potest intelligi nullius esse:
sed ejusdem juris esse, cujus et
mare, et, que subjacet mari, terra
vel arena.

$5. The use of the sea-shore, as
well as of the sea, is also public by
the law of nations; and therefore
any person may erect a cottage up-
on it, to which he may resort to dry
his nets, and hawl them from the
water ; for the shores are not un-
derstood to be property in any man,
but are compared to the sea itself,
and to the sand or ground which is
under the sea.

De rebus universitatis..

§ VI. Universitatis sunt, non sin-
gulorum, que in civitatibus sunt,

$6. Theatres, ground appropri-
ated for a race, or public exercise,
theatra, stadia, et his similia, et
81 qua alia sunt communia civita-
cum.

LIB. II.

TIT. I. 69

and things of this nature, which
belong to a whole city, are public,
and not private property.

De rebus nullius.

§ VII. Nullius autem sunt res
sacre, et religiose, et sanctee: quod
enim divini juris est, id nullius in
bonis est.

$ 7. Things sacred, religious and
holy, belong to no individual: for
that which is of divine right, is not
private property.

De rebus sacris.

§ VIIL. Sacra tes sunt, ques ritd
per pontifices Deo consecrate sunt;
veluti zdes sacre, et donaria, que
rité ad ministeriurn Dei dedicata
sunt; que etiam per nostram con-
stitutionem alienari et obligari pro-
hibuimus, excepta causa redemp-
tionis captivorum. Si quis autem
auctoritate sud quasi sacrum sibi
constituerit, sacrum non est, sed
profanum. Locus autem, in quo
zedes sacree sunt edificate, etiam,
diruto edificio, sacer adhuc manet,
ut et Papinianus scripsit.

$ 8. Things, which have been
duly consecrated by the pontiffs, are
sacred; as churches, chapels, and
moveables, properly dedicated to
the service of God: which we have
forbidden by our constitution to be
aliened or obligated, unless for the
redemption of captives. But, if a
man should consecrate a building
by his own authority, it would not
thus be rendered sacred; but the
ground upon which a sacred. edifice
hath once been erected, will, accord-
ing to Papinian, continue to be sac-
red,although the edifice is destroyed.

De religiosis.

§ IX. Religiosum locum unus-
quisque sud voluntate facit, dum
mortuum infert in locum suum: in
communem autem locum purum,
invito socio, inferre non licet: in
commune vero sepulchrum etiam,
invitis ceteris, licet inferre. Item,
si alienus ususfructus est, proprie-
tarium placet, nisi consentiente usu-
fructuario, locum religiosum non fa-
cere. In alienum locum, consenti-
ente domino, licét inferre; et, licet
postea ratwnit non habuerit, quam

§ 9. Any man may at his will
render his own place religious, by
making it the repository of a dead
body; yet, when two are joint pos-
sessors of ground, not before used for
such a purpose, the one cannot make
it religious without consent of the
other. But, when there is a sepul-
chre in common, any joint possessor
may use it, although the rest dissent.
And, when there is a proprietor, and
an usuftuctuary, of the same place,
the proprietor, without the consent
70 LIB. II.

TIT. 1.

 

illatus est mortuus, tamen locus re-
ligiosus fit.

of the usufructuary, cannot render
it religious. But a dead body may
be laid in a place, with consent of
the owner; who if he should after-
wards dissent, yet the place be-
comes religious.

De rebus sanctis.

§ X. Sancte quoque res, veluti
muri et porte: civitatis, quodammo-
do divini juris sunt; et ideo nullius
in bonis sunt. Ided autem muros
sanctos dicimus, quia pcena capitis
constituta est in eos, qui aliquid in
muros deliquerint. Ideo et legum
eas partes, quibus pcenas constitui-
mus adversus eos, qui contra leges
fecerint, sanctiones vocamus.

§ 10. Holy things also, as the
walls and gates of a city, are in
some sort of divine right, and there-
fore the property of noman. The
walls of a city are esteemed holy,
inasmuch as any offence against
them is punished capitally: and
therefore, all those parts of the laws,
by which punishments are inflicted
upon transgressors, we term sanc-
tions.

De rebus singulorum.

§ XI. Singulorum autem homi-
num multis modis res fiunt: quar-
undum enim, rerum dominium nan-
cisimur jure naturali, quod, sicut
diximus, appellatur jus gentium;
quarundum vero jure civili. Com-
modits est itaque a vetustiore jure
incipere. Palam est autem, vetus-
tius esse jus naturale, quod cum ip-
so genere humano rerum natura
prodidit. Civilia autem jura tune
esse coeperunt, cum et civitates con-
di, et magistratus creari et leges
scribi, ceeperunt.

$ 11. There are various means,
by which things become private pro-
perty. Ofsome we obtain dominion
by the law of nature, which (as we
have already observed) is also call-
ed the law of nations; of others by
the civil law. But it will be most
convenient to begin from the more
ancient law; that law, which na-
ture established at the birth of man-
kind; for civil laws could then only
begin to exist, when cities began to
be built, magistracies to be created,
and laws to be written.

De occupatione ferarum.

§ XII. Feree igitur bestia, et vo-
lucres, et pisces, et omnia animalia,
que mari, ccelo, et terra nascuntur,
simul atque ab aliquo capta fuerint,
jure gentium statim illius esse in-

$ 12. Wild beasts, birds, fish, and
all animals, bred either in the sea,
the air, or upon the earth, so soon
as they are taken, become by the
law of nations, the property of the
LIB. IL.

 

4

cipiunt: quod enim ante nullius est,
id naturali ratione occupanti conce-
ditur: nec interest, feras bestias et
volucres utrum in suo fundo quis
capiat, an in alleno. Plané, qui
alienum fundum ingreditur venandi
ut aucupandi gratia, potest 4 domi-
no, si is preeviderit, prohiberi, ne in-
grediatur. Quicquid autem eorum
ceperis, eousque tuum esse intelligi-
tur, donec tua custodia coercetur;
cum vero tuam evaserit custodiam,
et in libertatem naturalem sese re-
ceperit, tuum esse desimit, et rurs-
us occupantis fit. Naturalem au-
tem libertatem recipere intelligitur,
cum vel oculos tuos effugerit, vel
ita sit in conspectu tuo, ut difficilis
sit ejus persecutio.

TIT. 1. 71
captor: for natural reason gives to
the first occupant, that which had
no previous owner: and it is not
material, whether a man take wild
beasts or birds upon his own, or up-
on the ground of another: although
whoever hath entered into the
ground of another for the sake of
hunting or fowling, might have been
prohibited by the proprietor, if he
had foreseen the intent. Whatever
of this kind you take, is regarded
as your property while it remains
under your coercion; but when it
hath escaped your custody, and re-
covered its natural liberty, it ceases
to be yours and becomes the pro-
perty of the first who seizes it. It
is understood to have recovered. its
natural liberty, if it hath escaped
your sight; or although not out of
sight, yet if it cannot be pursued
and retaken without great difficulty.

De vulneratione.

$ XIII. Illud quesitum est, an
si fera bestia ita vulnerata sit, ut
capi possit, statim tua esse intel-
ligatur. Et quibusdam placuit,
statim esse tuam, et eousque tuam
videri, donec eam persequaris: quod.
si desieris persequi, desimere tuam
esse; et rursus fieri occupantis: alii
vero putaverunt, non aliter tuam
esse, quam si eam ceperis. Sed
posteriorem sententiam nos con-
firmamus. quod multa accidere so-
leant, ut eam non capias.

§ 13. It hath been questioned,
whether a wild beast belongs to
him, by whom it hath been so
wounded, that it may been taken.
And, in the opinion of some, it doth
so, as long as he pursues it; but, if
he quits the pursuit, it ceases to be
his, and again becomes the right of
the first occupant. Others have
thought, that property in a wild
beast must attach to the actual tak-
ing it. We confirm this latter opi-
nion; because many accidents hap-
pen, which prevent the capture.
72

LIB. II.

i bd &

 

De apibus.

§ XIV. Apium quoque fera na-
tura est: itaque apes, que in ar-
bore tua consederint, antequam 4
te alveo includantur, non magis
tuge intelliguntur esse, quam voluc-
res, que in arbore tua nidum fece-
rint: idedque, si alius eas incluserit,
is earum dominus erit. Favos quo-
que, si quos effecerint, eximere qui-
libet potest. Plané integra re, si
previderis ingredientem fundum
tuum, poteris eum jure prohibere,
ne ingrediatur. Examen quoque,
quod ex alveo tuo evolaverit, eous-
que intelligitur esse tuum, donec in
conspectu. tuo est, nec difficilis
persecutio ejus est; alioquin, oc-
cupantis fit.

$ 14. Bees also are wild by na-
ture: therefore, although they
swarm upon your tree, they are not
reputed, until they are hived by
you, to be more your property, than
the birds, which have nests there:
so, if any other person inclose them
in a hive, he becomes their proprie-
tor. Their honeycombs also, if
any, become the property of him
who takes them: but clearly, if you
observe any person entering into
your ground, the object untouched,
you may justly hinder him. A
swarm, which hath flown from your
hive, is still reputed to continue
yours, as long as it is in sight, and
may easily be pursued; but, in any
other case, it will become the pro-
perty of the oecupant.

De pavonibus et columbis, et czeteris animalibus mansuefactis.

§ XV. Pavonum quoque et co-
lumbarum fera natura est; nec ad
rem pertinet, quod ex consuetudine
evolare et revolare solent; nam et
apes idem faciunt, quarum constat
feram esse naturam. Cervos quo-
que quidem ita mansuetos habent,
wt in silvam ire et redire soleant,
quorum et ipsorum feram esse na-
turam nemo negat, In iis autem
animalibus, que ex consuetudine
abire et redire solent, talis regula
comprobata est; ut eousque tua esse
intelligantur, donec animum rever-
tendi haheant: nam, si revertendi
animum habere desierint, etiam tua
esse desinunt, et fiunt occupan-

§ 15. Peacocks and Pigeons are
also naturally wild; nor is it any
objection that after every flight, it
is their custom to return: for bees
that are naturally wild, do so too.
Some have had deer so tame, that
they would go to the woods, and re-
turn at regular periods; yet no one
denies, but that deer are wild by na-
ture. But, with respect to animals,
which go and return customarily,
the rule is, that they are considered
yours, as long as they retain an in-
clination to return; but, if this
ceases, they cease to be yours; and
will again become the property of
those who take them. These
: LIB. II.

tium. Revertendi autem animum
videntur desinere habere tunc, cum
revertendi consuetudinem deserue-
Tint.

De gallinis
§ XVI. Gallinarum autem et an-
serum non est fera natura: idque
eX e0, possumus intelligere, quod
alize sunt gallinee, quas feras voca-
mus; item alii sunt anseres, quos
feros appellamus: idedque, si anse-
res tui, aut galline tus, aliquo mo-
do turbati turbateve evolaverint,
licet conspectum tuum effugerint,
quocumque tamen loco sint, tui
tuzeve esse intelliguntur; et, qui luc-
randi animo ea animalia detinet,
furtum committere intelligitur.

TIT. I. 73
animals seem to have lost the in-
clination to return, when they dis-
use the custom of returning.

et anseribus.

§ 16. But geese, and fowls are not
wild by nature; and this we may
observe, because there isa kind of
fowls and geese, which in contra-
distinction we term wild; and there-
fore if your geese or fowls, being dis-
turbed and frightened, should take
flight, they are still regarded as
yours wherever found,although you
may have lost sight of them; and
whoever detains such animals, with
a lucrative view, is understood to
commit a theft. —

De occupatione in bello.

§ XVII. Item ea, que ex hosti-
bus capimus, jure gentium statim
nostra fiunt; adéo quidem, ut et li-
beri homines in servitutem nostram
deducantur; qui tamen, si evase-
rint nostram potestatem, et ad suos
reversi fuerint, pristinum statum
recipiunt.

§ 17. What we take from our
enemies in war, becomes instantly
our own by the law of nations; so
that free-men may be brought into
a state of servitude by capture;
but, if they afterwards escape, and
return to their own people, they
obtain again their former state.

De occupatione eorum, que in littore inveniuntur.

§ XVIII. Item lapilli, et gemme,
et cetera, que in littore maris in-
veniuntur, jure naturali statim in-
ventoris fiunt.

§ 18. Precious stones, gems and
other things, found upon the sea-
shore, become instantly by the law
of nations, the property of the
finder.

De feetu animalium.

§ XIX. Item ea, que ex animali-
bus dominio tuo subjectis nata
sunt, eodem jure tibi acquiruntur.

10

$19. The product of those ani-
mals, which are reduced to our
subjection, becomes by the same
law, our own.
74 LIB. II.

TIT. I.

De alluvione.

§$ XX. Preeteréa, quod per allu-
vionem agro tuo flumen adjecit,
jure gentium tibi acquiritur. Est
autem alluvio incrementum latens.
Per alluvionem autem id videtur
adjici, quod ita paulatim adjicitur,
ut intelligi non possit, quantum quo-
vue temporis momento adjiciatur.

$ 20. Moreover, that ground
which a river hath added to your
estate by alluvion, becomes your
own by the law of nations. And
that is said to be alluvion, which is
added so gradually, that no one can
judge how much is added at each
moment of time.

De vi fluminis.

§ XXI. Quod si vis fluminis de
tuo preedio partem aliquam detrax-
erit, et vicini preedio attulerit, pa-
lam est, eam tuam permanere: plané
si longiore tempore fundo. vicini tui
heserit; arboresque, quas secum
traxerit, in eum fundum radices
egerint; ex eo tempore videntur
vicini fundo acquisitz esse.

$ 21. But, if the impetuosity of a
river should sever a part of your
estate, and adjoin it to that of your
neighbour, it is certain, such part
would still continue yours; but, if
it should remain, for a long time,
joined to the estate of your neigh-
bour, and the trees, which accompa-
nied it, take root in his ground, such
trees seem, from the time of taking
root, to be acquired to his estate.

De insula.

§ XXIL. Insula, que in mari est
(quod raro accidit) occupantis fit:
nullius enim esse creditur. At in-
sula in flumine nata (quod frequen-
ter accidit) si quidem mediam par-
tem fluminis tenet, communis est
eorum,qui ab utraque parte fluminis
prope ripam preedia possident, pro
modo scilicet latitudinis cujusque
preedii, quae prope ripam sit: quod
si alteri proximior sit parti, eorum
est tantum, qui ab ea parte prope
ripam preedia possident. Quod si
qua. parte divisum sit flumen, dein-
de infra unitum agrum alicujus in
formam insule redegerit, ejusdem

§ 22. When an island rises in the
sea, (which rarely happens) the pro-
perty of it is in the occupant; for
before occupation, it isin no one.
But if an island rises in a river,
(which frequently happens) and is
placed exactly in the middle of it,
such island shall be in common to
them, who possess the lands near the
banks on each side of the river, in
proportion to the extent of each
man’s estate adjoining the banks.
But, if the island is nearer to one
side than the other, it belongs to
them only, who possess lands next
to the banks on that side, to which
LIB. II.

permanet is ager cujus et fuerat.

TIT. I. Eh

the island is nearest. But, if a river
divides itself and afterwards unites
again, having reduced a tract of
land into the form of an island, the
land still continues to be the pro-
perty of the former owner.

De alveo.

$ XXIII. Quod si, naturali alveo
-in universum derelicto, ad aliam
partem fluere ceeperit, prior quidem
alveus eorum est, qui prope ripam
ejus praedia possident; pro modé
scilicet latitudinis cujusque agri,
quee prope ripam sit; novus autem
alveus ejus juris esse incipit, cujus
et ipsum flumen est,id est, publicus :
quod si post aliquod tempus ad prio-
rem alveum reversum fuerit flumen,
rursus novus alveus eorum esse in-
cipit, qui prope ripam ejus predia
possident.

$ 23. Ifa river, entirely forsak-
ing its natural channel, hath began
to flow elsewhere, the first channel
appertains to those, who possess the
lands close to the banks of it, in pro-
portion to the extent of each man’s
estate next to such banks: and the
new channel partakes of the nature
of the river, and becomes public.
And, if after some time the river re-
turns to its former channel, the new
channel again becomes the property
of those who possess the lands con-
tiguous to its banks.

De inundatione.

§ XXIV. Alia sané causa est, si
cujus torus ager inundatus fuerit;
neque enim inundatio fundi speciem
commutat: et ob id, si recesserit
aqua, palam est eum fundum ejus
manere, cujus et fuit.

§ 24. It is otherwise as to lands,
which are overflowed only: for an
inundation alters not the face and
nature of the earth; and therefore,
when the waters have receded, it is
clear that the property will still re-
main in the same owner.

De specificatione,

§ XXV. Cum ex aliena materia
species aliqua facta sit ab aliquo,
queri solet, quis eorum naturali ra-
tione dominus sit: utrum is, qui
fecerit, an potius ille, qui materize
dominus fuerat: ut eccé, si quis ex
alienis uvis, aut olivis, aut spicis,
vinum, aut oleum, aut frumentum,
fecerit; aut ex alieno auro, vel

§ 25. When a man hath made any
species, or kind of work, with mate-
rials belonging to another, it is of-
ten asked, which ought, in natural
reason, to be deemed the master of
it; whether he who gave the form,
or he, who owned the materials? as,
if any person should make wine, oil
or flour, from the grapes, olives, or
76 LIB. Ii.

TIT. 1

 

argento, vel gre, vas aliquod fece-
rit; vel ex alieno vino et melle mul-
sum miscuerit; vel ex medicamen-
tis alienis emplastrum aut colly-
rium composuerit; vel ex aliena
lana vestimentum fecerit; vel ex
alienis abulis navem, vel armar-
ium, vel subsellia, fabricaverit. Dt,
post multam Sabinianiorum et Pro-
culianorum ambiguitatem, placuit
media sententia existimantium, si
ea species ad priorem et rudem ma-
teriam reduci possit, eum videri do-
minium esse, qui materiz dominus
fuerit; si non possit reduci, eum
potius intelligi dominum, qui fece-
rit; ut ecce, vas conflatum potest ad
rudem materiam eeris, vel argenti,
vel auri, reduci: vinum autem, vel
oleum, aut frumentum, ad uvas,
vel olivas, vel spicas, reverti non
potest: ac ne mulsum quidem ad
vinum et mel resolvi potest. Quod
si partim ex sua materia, partim ex
aliend, speciem aliquam  fecerit
quis; veluti ex suo vino et alieno
melle mulsum miscuerat; aut ex
suis et alienis medicamentis em-
plastrum aut collyrium; aut ex sud
lana vestimentum fecerit; dubitan-
dum non est, hoc casu, eum esse
dominum, qui fecerit: cum non so-
lum operam suam dederit, set ét
partem ejusdem materie prestite-
rit.

corn of another; cast a vessel out
of gold, silver, or brass, belonging
to another; make mead or mulse
with the wine and honey of another;
compose a plaster, or eye water
with another man’s medicines;
make a garment with another’s
wool; or fabricate, with the timber
of another, a bench, a ship, or a
chest? After much controversy, be-
tween the Sabinians and Procu-
lians, we were best pleased with
thé middle opinion of those who
thought that, if the species or manu-
factured article can be reduced to
its former rude materials, then the
owner of such materials is also to
be reckoned the owner of the species:
but, if the species can not be so re-
duced, then he, who made it, is un-
derstood to be the owner of it: for
example; a vessel can easily be re-
duced to the rude mass of brass,
silver,or gold,of which it was made;
but wine, oil, or flour, cannot be
converted into grapes, olives,or corn;
neither can mulse be separated into
wine and honey. But, if a man
makes any species, partly with his
own, and partly with the materials
of another: as, if he should make
mulse with his own wine, and an-
other’s honey; or a plaster or eye-
water, partly with his own, and
partly with another man’s medi-
cines; or should make a garment
with an intermixture of his own
wool with that of another; it is not
to be doubted in such cases, but
that he, who made the species, is
master of it; since he not only gave
his labour, but furnished also a
part of the materials.
LIB. II.

lb il 77

De accessione.

§ XXVI. Si tamen alienam pur-
puram vestimento suo quis inter-
texuerit, licet pretiosior sit purpura,
tamen accessionis vice cedit vesti-
mento: et, qui dominus fuit pur-
pure, adverus eum, qui surripuit,
habet furti actionem et condiction-
em, sive ipse ‘sit, qui vestimentum
fecit, sive alius: nam extincte res
licet vindicari non possint, condici
tamen 4 furibus et quibusque aliis
possessoribus possunt.

§ 26. If any man shall have in-
terwoven the purple of another into
his own vestment, then the purple,
although more valuable, appertains
to the vestment by accession: and
the owner of the purple, may have
an action of theft, and a personal ac-
tion, called a condiction, against the
purloiner; whether the vestment
was made by him, or by another:
for although things, which become,
as it were, extinct by the change of
their form, cannot be recovered
identically, yet a condiction lies for
the value of them, either against the
thief, or any other possessor.

De confusione.

§$ XXVIII. Si duorum materize
voluntate dominorum confuse sint,
totum id corpus, quod ex confusi-
one fit, utriusque commune est:
veluti si qui vina sua confuderint,
aut massas argenti vel auri confla-
verint. Sed, etsi,diversee materize
sint, et ob id propria species facta
sit, forté ex vino et melle mulsum,
aut ex auro et argento electrum,
idem juris est: nam et hoc casu,
communem esse speciem, non dubi-
tatur. Quod si fortuitd et non vol-
untate dominorum confuse fuerint
vel ejusdem generis materia, vel
diversze, idem juris esse placuit.

§ 27. If materials belonging to
two persons are mingled by mutual
consent, the whole mass, is common
to both proprietors: as if they shall
have intermixed their wines, or,
melted together their gold or silver.
The same rule obtains, if diverse
substances are so incorporated, as to
become one species : as when mulse
is made with wine and honey; or
electrum by fusing together gold
and silver: here no doubt, the spe-
cies becomes common: and so it is,
when similar or even different sub-
stances, are incorporated fortuitous-
ly, without the consent of their pro-
prietors.

De commixtione.

§ XXVIII. Quod si frumentum
Titii frumento tuo mistum fuerit,
siquidem voluntate vestra, commu-

§ 28. If the corn of Titius hath
been mixed with yours by consent,
the heap is in common; because the
78

ne est; quia singula corpora, id est,
singula grana, que cujusque pro-
pria fuerunt, consensu vestro com-
municata sunt. Quod si casu id
mistum fuerit, vel Titius id mis-
cuerit sine tué voluntate, non vide-
tur commune esse: quia singula
corpora in sua substantia durant.
Sed nec magis istis casibus com-
mune fit frumentum, quam grex in-
telligitur esse communis, si pecora,
Titii, tuis pecoribus mista fuerint.
Sed, si ab alterutro vestrum, totum
id frumentum retineatur, in rem
quidem actio pro modo frumenti
cujusque competit: arbitrio autem
judicis continetur, ut ipse estimet,
quale cujusque frumentum fuerit.

De his que solo cedunt.

LIB. II.

TIT. 1.

single bodies or grains, which were
the private property of each, are,
with your consent, intermixed. But,
if the intermixture were accidental,
or if Titius made it without con-
sent, it then seems that the corn is
not in common; because the grains
still remain distinct, and in their
proper substance; for corn, in such
a case, no more becomes in common,
than a flock would be, if the sheep
of Titius should intermix with
yours. But, if the whole quantity
of corn should be retained by either
of you, then an action in rem lies
for each man’s portion; and it is the
duty of the judge to make an esti-
mate of the quality, or value, of
each portion.

De edificatione in suo solo ex

aliena materia.

§$ XXIX. Cum in suo solo ali-
quis ex aliend materia edificaverit,
ipse intelligitur dominus eedificii:
quia omme, quod solo inedificatur,
solo cedit. Nec tamen ideo is, qui
materie dorninus fuerat, desinit do-
minus ejus esse: sed tantisper ne-
que vindicare eam potest, neque ad
exhibendum de ea re agere, propter
legem duodecim tabularum, qué ca-
vetur, ne quis tignum alienum edi-
bus suis junctum eximere cogatur,
sed duplum pro eo preestet, per ac-
tionem, quee vocatur, de tigno junc-
to. Appellatione autem tigni, omnis
materia significatur, ex qua edificia
fiunt. Quod ideo provisum est, ne
eedificia rescindi necesse sit. Quod
si aliqua ex causa dirutum sit edifi-
cium, poterit materiz dominus, si
non fuerit duplum jam consequutus,

§$ 29. If a man hath raised a
building upon his own ground with
the materials of another, he is con-
sidered the proprietor: for every
building is an accession to the
ground upon which it stands. But,
the owner of the materials, does not
lose his right of ownership; for
though he cannot demand them
specifically, or bring an action for
the exhibition of them; since it is
provided, by a law of the twelve
tables, that a person who has used
the materials of another, cannot be
compelled to separate them from
the building; yet by the action, de
tigno juncto, he may be obliged to
pay double value: (all materials for
building are comprehended under
the general term tignum.) The
above cited provision, in the law of
LIB. IL.

tua eam vindicate, etad exhiben-
dum de ed re agere.

TTE. & 79
the twelve tables, was made to pre-
vent the demolition of buildings.
But, ifit happen, that in any case, a
building should be dissevered, or
pulled down, then the owner of the
materials, if he hath not already
obtained double the value of them,
is not prohibited from claiming his
identical materials, and to bring his
action ad exhibendum.

De eedificatione ex sua materia in solo alieno.

§ XXX. Ex diverso, si quis in
alieno solo ex sua materia domum
eedificaverit, illius fit domus, cujus
et solum est. Sed hoc casu, materize
dominus proprietatem ejus amittit,
quia voluntate ejus intelligitur esse
alienta; utique si non ignorabat, se
in alieno solo edificare: et ided,
licet diruta sit domus, materiam ta-
men vindicare non potest. Certé
illud constat, si, in possessione con-
stituto eedificatore, soli dominus pe-
tat domum_ suam esse, nec solvat
pretium materiz ‘et mercedes fabro-
rum, posse eum per exceptionem
doli mali repelli; utiqué si bone
fidei possessor fuerit, qui eedificavit.
Nam scienti, solum alienum esse,
potest objici culpa, quod edificave-
rit temeré in eo solo, quod intelli-
gebat alienum esse.

§ 30. On the contrary, if a man
shall have built with his own mate-
rials upon the ground of another,
the edifice becomes the property of
him to whom the ground belongs:
in this case the owner of the mate-
rials loses his property, because he
is understood to have made a vol-
untary alienation of it, if he knew
he was building upon another’s
land; therefore, if the edifice should
fall, or be pulled down, such person
cannot, even then, claim the mate-
rials. But it is clear, that if the
builder be in confirmed possession,
and the proprietor of the ground
should claim the edifice as his, and
refuse to pay the price of the mate-
rials and the wages of the workmen,
he may be repelled by an exception
of fraud: provided the builder was
in possession bond fide. Otherwise
it might be fairly objected, ‘that he
had built rashly upon that ground,
which he knew to be the property
of another.”

De plantatione.

§ XXXI. Si Titius alienam plan-
tam in solo suo posuerit, ipsius erit;

§ 31. If Titius sets another man’s
plant in his own ground, the plant
80

LIB, II.

TIT. I.

 

et ex diverso, si Titius suam plan-
tam in Mevii solo posuerit, Mavii
planta erit; si modo utroque casu
radices egerit: ante enim quam ra-
dices egerit, ejus permanet, cujus
fuerat. Aded autem ex eo tempore,
quo radices egerit planta, proprie-

tas ejus commutatur, ut, si vicini -

arbor ita terram Titii presserit, ut
in ejus fundum radices egerit, Titii
effici arborem dicamus: ratio enim
non patitur, ut alterius arbor esse
intelligatur, quam cujus in fundum
radices egerit: et ideo, circa confin-
ium arbor posita, si etiam in vicini
fundum radices egerit, communis
fit.

will belong to Titius: on the con-
trary, if Titius shall have set his
own plant in Mevius’s ground, the
plant will belong to Mevius ; pro-
vided in either case, it hath taken
root; for, until then, the property re-
mains in him who planted it. But
from the instant it hath taken root,
the property is changed: so that, if
the tree of a neighbour borders so
closely upon the ground of Titius,
as to take root in it, and be wholly
nourished there, we may affirm, that
such tree is become the property of
Titius : for reason doth not permit,
that a tree should be deemed the
property of any other, than of him,
in whose gronnd it hath rooted:
therefore, if a tree, planted near the
bounds of one person, shall also ex-
tend its roots into the lands of ano-
ther, it will become common to both.

De satione.

§ XXXII. Qué ratione autem
plante, que terre coalescunt, solo
cedunt, eadem ratione frumenta
quoque, que sata sunt, solo cedere
intelliguntur. Ceterum sicut is,
qui in alieno solo edificavit, si ab
eo dominus petat eedificium, defendi
potest per exceptionem doli mali,
secundum ea, que diximus; ita e-
jusdem exceptionis auxilio, tutus
esse potest is, qui alienum fundum
sud impensd bona fide consevit.

§ 32. As plants appertain to the
soil, in which they have rooted, so
grain also is understood to follow
the property of that ground, in
which it is sowed. Butashe, who
hath built upon the ground of ano-
ther, may (according to what we
have said) be defended by an ex-
ception of fraud, if the proprietor
of the ground should demand the
edifice; so he, who at his own ex-
pense and bona fide hath sowed in
another man’s land, may also be
benefited by the help of this excep-
tion.

De scriptura.

§$ XXXIII. Liter quoque, licet
aures sint, perindé chartis mem-

$ 33. As whatever is built upon,
or sowed in the ground, belongs to
LIB. II.

branisve cedunt, ac solo cedere so-
lent ea, que inedificantur, aut in-
seruntur. Idedque, si in chartis
membranisve tuis carmen vel his-
toriam vel orationem Titius scrip-
serit, hujus corporis non Titius, sed
tu dominus esse videris. Sed, si
a Titio petas tuos libros, tuasve
membranas, nec impensas scripturee
solvere paratus sis, poterit se 'Titius
defendere per exceptionem doli ma-
li, utique si earum chartarum mem-
branarumve possessionem bena
fide nactus est.

TIT. 1. 81
that ground by accession; so letters
also, although written with gold,
appertain to the paper or parchment,
upon which they are written. And
therefore, if Titius shall have wvit-
ten a poem, a history, or an oration,
upon your paper or parchment, then
you and not Titius will be deemed
the owner of the written paper.
But if you demand the books or
parchments from Titius, and refuse
to defray the expense of the writing,
then Titius can defend himself by
an exception of fraud: allowing that
he obtained possession of such
papers and parchments bona fide.

De pictura.

§$ XXXIV. Si quis in aliena ta-
bula pinxerit, quidam putant tabu-
lam picture cedere: aliis videtur,
picturam (qualiscunque sit) tabule
cedere: sed nobis videtur melius
esse, tabulam picturee cedere: ridi-
culum est enim, picturam Apellis
vel Parrhasii in accessionem vilis-
simz tabule cedere. Unde, si a
domino tabule imaginem possidente
is, qui pinxit, eam petat, nec solvat
pretium tabulz, poterit per excep-
tionem doli mali submoveri. At,
si is, qui pinxit, eam possideat, con-
sequens est, ut utilis actio domino
tabule adversus eum detur: quo ca-
su, si non solvat impensam picture,
poterit per exceptionem doli mali
repelli: utique si bone fidei pos-
sessor fuerit ille, qui picturam im-
posuit. Illud enim palam est, quod

i

$ 34. If any man shall have paint-
ed upon the tablet of another, some
think, that the tablet should yield to
the picture; others, that the picture
(whatever the quality of it may be)
should accede to the tablet. ‘Tous
it seems the better opinion, that the
tablet should accede to the picture;
for it is ridiculous, that the painting
of an Apelles, or a Parrhasius,
should yield as an accession, to a
worthless tablet. But if the painter
demand the tablet, from the owner
and possessor, without offering the
price of it, then such demandant —
may be defeated by an exception of
fraud: but, if the painter is in pos-
session of the picture, the owner of
the tablet is intitled to an action
called utilis, i. e. beneficial ; in which
case, if the owner of the tablet de-
82 LIB. II.

TIT. I.

 

sive is, qui pinxit, surripuit tabulas,
sive alius, competit domino tabu-
larum furti actio.

mands it, and does not tender the
value of the picture, he may also be
repelled by an exception of fraud,
provided the painter obtaimed pos-
session fairly. But, if he, or any
other, shall have taken away the
tablet feloniously, it is evident, that
the owner may prosecute by any
action of theft.

De fructibus bona fide perceptis.

$ XXXYV. Si quis 4 non domino,
quem dominum esse crediderit, bo-
na fide fundum emerit, vel ex do-
natione, aliave qualibet justa causa,
eeque bond fide accepérit, naturali
ratione placuit, fructus, quos per-
cepit, ejus esse pro cultura et cura:
et ided, si postea dominus superve-
nerit, et fundum vindicet, de fruc-
tibus ab eo consumptis agere non
potest: ei verd, qui alienum fun-
dum sciens possederit, non idem
concessum est; itaque cum fundo
etiam fructus, licet consumpti sint,
cogitur restituere.

§ 35. If any man shall have pur-
chased or by any other means hon-
estly acquired lands from another,
whom he believed to be the true
owner, when in fact he was not, it
is agreeable to natural reason, that
the fruits, which he shall have
gathered, shall become his own, on
account of his care in the culture:
and therefore, if the true owner
shall afterwards appear and claim
his lands, he can have no action a-
gainst the bond fide possessor, for
produce consumed. But this ex-
emption is not granted to him, who
knowingly keeps possession of ano-
ther’s estate; and therefore, he is
compellable to account for all the
mesne profits together with the
lands.

De fructibus a fructuario et colono perceptis.

§ XXXVI. Is verd, ad quem usu-
fructus fundi pertinet, non aliter
fructuum dominus efficitur, quam
si ipse eos perceperit; et ided, licet
maturis fructibus, nondim tamen
perceptis, decesserit, ad heredes
ejus non pertinent, sed domino pro-
prietatis acquiruntur. Eadem feré
et de colono dicuntur.

§ 36. The usufructuary of lands
can gain no property in the fruits,
until he hath actually gathered
them; and therefore, if he should
die, while the fruits, although ripe,
are yet ungathered, they could not
be claimed by his heirs, but would
fall to the proprietor: and so in ge-
neral, as to farmers.
LIB. I.

TIT. 1 83

Que sunt in fructu.

§ XXXVII. In pecudum fructu
etiam fetus est, sicuti lac, pilus, et
lana: itaque agni, heedi, et vituli, et
equuli, et su¢uli, statim naturali ju-
re dominii fructuarii sunt. Partus
vero ancille in fructu non est; ita-
que ad dominum proprietatis perti-

-net. Absurdum enim videbatur,
hominem in fructu esse; cum om-
nes fructus rerum natura gratia ho-
minis comparaverit.

$ 37. Among the produce of ani-
mals, we not onlyreckon milk, skins
and wool but also their young; and
therefore lambs, kids, calves, colts,
and pigs, appertain by natural right
tothe usufructuary; but the offspring
of a femaleslave cannot be thus con-
sidered, but belongs to the proprietor
of such slave: for it seemed absurd
that man, should be enumerated a-
mong the articles of produce, seeing
that for his use nature hath furnish-
ed all kinds of produce.

De officio fructuarii.

§ XXXVIII. Sed, si gregis u-
sumfructum quis habeat, in locum
demortuorum capitum ex foetu fruc-
tuarius submittere debit, (ut et Ju-
liano visum est;) et in vinearum
demortuarum vel arborum locum
alias debet substituere. Recté enim
colere, et quasi bonus paterfamilias
uti debet.

$ 38. He, who has the ustfruct
of a flock ought (according to Juli-
an) to preserve the original number
entire, by supplying the deficiency
out of the young; in like manner he
ought to supply the place of dead
vines, or trees; and cultivate and
use the stock in all respects like a
good and fair husbandman.

De inventione thesauri.

§ XXXIX. Thesauros, quos
quis in loco suo invenerit, divus A-
drianus, naturalem sequitatem se-
quutus, ei concessit, qui eos invene-
rit; idemque statuit, si quis in sa-
cro aut religioso loco fortuito casu
invenerit. At, si quis, in alieno
loco, non data ad hoc opera, sed for-
tuito invenerit, dimidium domino
soli concessit, et dimidium invento-
ri: et convenienter, si quis in Ce-
saris loco invenerit, dimidium in-
ventoris, et dimidium esse Ceesaris,
statuit. Cui conveniens est, ut, si

$39. The emperor Adrian, in
pursuance of natural equity, allow-
ed any treasure, found in a man’s
own lands, to belong to the finder :
he ordained the same as to things
casually found, in a sacred or relig-
ious place. But, if a person, not
making it his business to search,
should fortuitously find treasure in
the ground of another, he granted
half to the proprietor of the soil, and
half to the finder. And so, if any
thing is found within the imperial
demesnes, half shall appertain to the
84

quis in fiscali loco vel publico vel
civitatis invenerit, dimidium ipsius.
esse debeat, et dimidium fisci, vel
civitatis.

De traditione.

§ XL. Per traditionem quoque
jure naturali res nobis acquiruntur
nihil enim tam conveniens est natu-
turali equitati, quam voluntatem
domini, volentis rem suam in alium
transferre, ratam haberi: et ideo,
cujuscunque generis sit, corporalis
res tradi potest, et 4 domino tradita,
alienatur: itaque stipendiaria quo-
que et tributaria predia eodem mo-
do alienantur. Vocantur autem
stipendiaria et tributaria predia,
quz in provinciis sunt: inter que
nec non et Italica preedia, ex nostra
constitutione, nulla est differentia:
sed, siquidem ex causa donationis,
aut dotis, aut qualibit alia ex causa,
traduntur, sine dubio transferuntur.

LIB. 1. TIT. £

finder and half to the emperor; like-
wise, if a man find any valuable
thing in a place belonging to the
treasury, the public, or thecity, half
shall appertain to the finder, andhalf
to the treasury, the public or the
city.

1. Regula, ejusque ratio.

§ 40. Things are also acquired
(according to the law of nature) by
tradition or livery ; for nothing is
more comformable to natural equity
than to confirm the will of him, who
is desirous to transfer his property-
to another; therefore corporeal
things of whatever kind, may be de- ©
livered; and, when delivered by the
owner, are aliened. Stipendiary
and tributary possessions, (snch as
those situated in the provinces, ) may
be aliened in the same manner; for
between these and the Italian estates
we have now taken away all distinc-
tion, so that, on account of a dona-
tion, a marriage-portion, or any
other just cause, stipendiary and tri-
butary possessions may undoubted-
ly be transferred by livery.

, 2. Limitatio.

§$ XLI. Vendite vero res et tra-
ditee, non alituremptori acquiruntur,
quam si is venditori pretium solve-
rit, vel alio modo ei satisfecerit; ve-
luti ex promissore, aut pignore dato:
quod, quamquam cavetur lege duo-
decim tabularum, tamen recté dici-
tur et jure gentium, id est, jure na-
turali, id effici. Sed, si is, qui ven-
didit, fidem emptoris sequutus fue-

§ 41. Things, although sold and
delivered, are not acquired _by the
buyer until he hath either paid or
otherwise satisfied the seller for
them; as by a bondsman or pledge.
And, although this is so ordained by
a law of the twelve tables, yet the
same rule isrightly said toarise from
the law of nations; that is from the
law of nature. But if the seller
LIB. I.

rit, dicendum est, statim rem emp-
toris fieri.

TIT. 1. 85

have given credit to the buyer, we
must affirm, that the things become
instantly the property of the latter.

3. Ampliatio.

§ XLII. Nihil autem interest, u-
trum ipse dominus tradat alicui
rem suam, an volantate ejus alius,
cui ejus ‘rei possessio permissa sit.
Qua ratione, si cui libera univer-
sorum negotiorum administratio
permissa fuerit 4 domino, isque ex
his negotiis rem vendiderit et tradi-
derit faciet eam accipientis.

§ 42. It is the same whether the
owner deliver the article himself, or
another to whom the possession of it
was entrusted, deliver it with the
owner’sconsent. Hence, if the ma-
nagement of all business be commit-
ed by a proprietor to any person,
who shall by virtue of his commis-
sion, sell and deliver goods, they
will become the property of the re-
ceiver.

De quasi traditione. Si traditio ex alia causa preecesserit.

§ XLIII. Interdim etiam, siné
traditione nuda voluntas dominisuf-
ficit ad rem transferendam; veluti
sirem, quam tibi aliquis commo-
daverit, aut locaverit, aut apud te
deposuerit, postea aut vendiderit
tibi, aut donaverit, aut dotis nomine
dederit : quamvis enim éx ea causa
tibi eam non tradiderit, eo tamen
ipso, quod patitur tuam esse, statim
tibi acquiritur proprietas, perinde
ac sieo nomine tibi tradita fuisset.

§ 43. In some cases, the consent
of the proprietor without delivery is
sufficient to transfer property ; as
when a person hath lent, hired, or
deposited in your possession any
thing, and hath afterwards sold it to
you, made a donation of it, or giv-
en it to you as a marriage portion :
for although not originally delivered
for any of these purposes, yet, as
soon as it becomrs notoriously yours
you have instantly acquired the
property: and that as fully, asif it
had actually ~been delivered as a
thing sold, a donation, or a marriage
portion.

Detraditione clavium.

§ XLIV. Item, si quis merces
in horreo depositas vendiderit, si-
mul atque claves horrei tradiderit
emptori, transfert proprietatem mer-
cium ad emptorem.

$ 44. Also if a person hath sold
merchandise, deposited in a store-
house, he is understood to have
transferred the property, on deliver-
ing the keys of the store-house to
the buyer.
LIB. II.

TIT. L

De missilibus.

§$ XLV. Hoc amplits; interdum
et in certam personam collata vo-
luntas domini transfert rei proprie-
tatem : ut eccé, preetores et consu~
les, missilia jactant in vulgus, igno-
rant quid eorum quisque sit excep-
turus: et tamen, quia volunt, quod
quisque acceperit, ejus esse, statim
eum dominorum efficiunt.

§ 45. It also sometimes happens ©
that the property of a thing is trans-
ferred, by the master of it, to an in-
certain person: as when the preetors
and consuls cast their méssilia, or
liberalities, among the people, they
know not what any particular man
will receive: yet, because it is their
will, that what every man then re-
ceives shall be his own, it instantly
becomes his property.

De habitis pro derelicto.

§ XLVI. Qua ratione verits esse
videtur, sirem pro derelicto 4 do-
mino habitam occupaverit quis, sta-
tim eum dominum effici. Pro dere-
licto autem habetur, quod dominus
e4 mente abjecerit, ut id in humero
rerum suarum esse nolit: ideoque
statim dominus ejus esse desinit.

4

§$ 46. By parity of reason it ap-
pears that whatever hath been made
a derelict by the owner, will become
the property of the first occupant.
Whatever hath been thrown away
or abandoned by the owner, with
intent, that it might no longer be
reckoned among his possessions, is
accounted a derelicti : and. ceases to
be his property.

De jactis in mare levande navis causa Item de his, que de
rheda currente cadunt,

$ XLVII. Alia sané causa est
carum rerum, que in tempestate le-
vande navis causa ejiciuntur : he
enim dominorum permanent: quia
palem est, eas non eo animo ejici,
quod quis eas habere nolit, sed quo
magis cum ipsa navi maris pericu-
lum effugiat. Qua de causa, si quis
eas fluctibus expulsas, vel etiam in
ipso mari nactus, lucrandi animo
abstulerit, furtum committit. Nec
longé videntur discedere ab his,
que de rheda currente, non intelli-
gentibus dominis, cadunt.

§ 47. But the law is not so in re-
spect of things thrown overboard in
a storm, to lighten a vessel; for they
remain the property of the owners;
seeing it is evident, that they were
not thrown away, through dislike,
but that persons in the ship might
avoid the dangers of the sea. Hence
whoever with a selfish intention,
hath taken up such goods, although
found upon the high sea, he is guil-
ty of theft. And, goods which have
dropped from a carriage in motion,
withoutthe knowledge of the owner
may be considered in the same light.
LIB. II.

TIT. I. 87

TITULUS SECUNDUS.

DE REBUS CORPORALIBUS ET INCORPORALIBUS.

Secunda rerum divisio.

QUADAM preterea res corpo-
rales sunt, quedam incorporales.
Corporales hee sunt, qua sui natura
tangi possunt; veluti fundus, ho-
mo, vestis, aurum, argentum, et
denique alize resinnumerabiles. In-
corporales autem sunt, que iangi
non possunt: qualia sunt ea, quee
in jure consistunt; sicut hereditas,
ususfructus, usus, et obligationes,
quoque modo contract. Nec ad
rem pertinet, quod in hereditate res
corporales continentur: nam et
fructus, qui ex fundo percipiuntur,
corporales sunt: et id, quod ex ali-
qua obligatione nobis debetur, ple-
rumque corporale est; veluti fun-
dus, homo, pecunia: nam ipsum
jus hereditatis, et ipsum jus uten-
di, fruendi, et ipsum jus obligati-
onis, incorporale est. Eodem nu-
mero sunt et jura prediorum urba-
norum et rusticorum, que etiam
servitutes vocantur.

Morever some things are corpo-
real others incorporeal. Things cor-
poreal are tangible; as, lands,slaves,
vestments, gold, silver, and others,
innumerable. Things incorporeal
are those, which are not tangible,
but consist in rights and privileges ;
as inheritances, usufructs, uses, and
all obligations however contracted :
nor is it an objection that things
corporeal are contained in an in-
heritance ; for fruits, gathered from
the earth, are corporeal; and that
also is generally corporeal, which is
due to us upon an obligation; as a
field, a slave, or money: for, the
right to an inheritance, the right of
using and enjoying any particular
thing, and the right of an obliga-
tion, are undoubtedly incorporeal.
To these may be added the rights,
(or qualities,) of rural and city es-
tates, termed services.
88

TITULUS

LIB. If. TIT. I.

TERTIUS.

DE SERVITUTIBUS RUSTICORUM ET URBANORUM
PRAEDIORUM.

D. viii. T. 1. et 2. C. iii. T. 34.

De servitutibus rusticis.

RUSTICORUM prediorum ju-
ra sunt hee: iter, actus, via, aque-
ductus. Iter est jus eundi, ambu-
landi, hominis; non etiam jumen-
tum agendi vel vehiculum. Actus
est, jus agendi jumentum vel vehi-
culum. Itaque, qui habet iter, ac-
tum non habet: sed, qui actum ha-
bet, et iter habet, eoque uti potest
etiam siné jumento. Via est jus
eundi, et agendi, et ambulandi:
nam iter et actum, via in se conti-
net. Aqueeductus est jus aque du-
cende per fundum alienum.

The rights or services of rural es-
tates are these; a path, Iter; a
road, actus ; an highway, vie ; and
an agueduct or free passage for
water. A path is the right of pas-
sing and repassing on foot over an-
other man’s ground, but not of driv-
ing cattle or a carriage over it, A
road implies the liberty of driving
either cattle or carriages: hence he
who hath a path, hath not a road:
but he, who hath a road, hath in-
clusively a path; for he may use
such road, when he both not drive
cattle. A highway imports the
right of passing, driving cattle, &c.
and includes in it doth a path and
aroad: and an aqueduct imports the
right of leading water, through the
grounds of another.

De servitutibus urbanis.

§$ I. Prediorum urbanorum ser-
vitutes sunt he, que sedificiis inhe-
rent; ideo urbanorum prediorum
dicts, quoniam eedificia omnia ur-
bana preedia appellamus,etsi in villa
edificata sunt. Item urbanorum
preediorum servitutes sunt he; ut
vicinus onera vicini sustineat : ut in
parietem ejus liceat vicino tignum
immittere: ut stillicidium, vel flu-
men, recipiat quis in edes suas, vel

$ 1. The services of city-estates
are such as appertain to buildings:
they are so called because we call
all edifices, city-estates, although
built upon farms or in villages. It
is required by city-services, that
neighbours should bear the burdens
of neighbours; and by such servi-
ces, one neighbour may be permit-
ted to place a beam upon the wall
of another; may be compelled to
LIB. IL.

in aream, vel in cloacam, vel non
recipiat : et ne altius quis tollat edes
suas, ne luminibus vicini officiat.

TIT. IIL. 89
receive the droppings and currents
from the gutter-pipes of another
man’s house, upon his own house,
area, or sewer; or may be exempt-
ed from receiving them; or may
be restrained from raising his house,
so as to darken the habitation of
his neighbour.

De reliquis servitutibus rusticis.

$ IL. Inter rustiorum prediorum
servitutes quidam computari recté
putant aque haustum, pecoris ad
aquam appulsum, jus pascendi,
calcis coquende, arene fodiende.

§$ 2. Some rightly judge, that,
among rural services, we ought to
reckon the right of drawing water,
watering and feeding cattle, burn-
ing lime, digging sand, &c. in the
ground of another.

Qui servitutem debere vel acquirere possunt.

§ ITI. Ideo autem he servitutes
prediorum appellantur, quoniam si-
né preediis consistere non possunt.
Nemo enim potest servitutem ac-
quirere urbani vel rustici preedii,
nisi qui habet preedium; nec quis-
quam debere, nisi qui preedium
habet.

§ 3. All these are called the ser-
vices of estates; because they can-
not be constituted without an estate
to support them; for no man can
either owe, or acquire, a rural or
city service, if he possess neither
house or lands.

Quibus modis servitus constituitur.

$ IV. Si quis velit vicino aliquod
jus constituere, pactionibus atque
stipulationibus id efficere debet.
Potest etiam quis testamento heere-
dem suum damnare, ne altius tollat
zdes suas, ne luminibus vicini of-
ficiat; vel ut patiatur eum tignum
in parietem suum immittere, stilli-
cidiumve adversus eum habere;
vel ut patiatur eum per fundum
ire, agere, aquamve ex eo ducere.

12

§ 4. When it is wished to demise
the right of a service to another, it
should be done by contract and sti-
pulation. A man may also, by tes-
tament prohibit his heir from height-
ening his house, lest he should ob-
struct the view of his neighbour; or
may oblige him to permit the rafter
of another man’s house, to be laid
upon his wall: or to receive upon
his own house the droppings of an-
other’s; or suffer any person to
walk, drive cattle, or draw water
in his grounds.
90 LIB, II.

TIT. IV.

TITULUS QUARTUS.

DE USUFRUCTU.

D. vii. T. 1.

C, iii. T. 33.

Definitio ususfructus.

USUSFRUCTUS est jus alie-
nis rebus utendi, fruendi, salva re-
rum substantia. Est autem jus in
corpore, quo sublato, et ipsum tolli
necesse est. :

Usufruct, is the right of using,
and enjoying, without consuming
or destroying, things which are the
property of another. It is a right
over a corporeal substance; if the
substance perish, the wsufruct must
cease.

Quibus modis constituitur.

§ I. Ususfructus 4 proprietate
separationem recipit, idque pluri-
bus modis accidit: ut eccé, si quis
usumfructum alicui legaverit: nam
heres nudam habet proprietatem,
legatarius vero usumfructum. Et
contra, si fandum legaverit deducto
usufructu, legatarius nudam habet
proprietatem, hzeres vero usumfruc-
tum. Item alii usumfructum, alii,
deducto eo, fundum legare potest.
Sine testamento verd si quis velit
usumfructum alii constituere, pac-
tionibus et stipulationibus id effi-
cere debet. Ne tamen in univer-
sum inutiles essent proprietates,
semper abscedente usufructu, pla-
cuit certis modis extingui usum-
fructum, et ad proprietatem reverti.

$1. The usaufruct may be in va-
rious ways separated from the pro-
perty, as when it is bequeathed:
for naked property only is then
vested in the heir, while the legatee
possesses the wsufruct; it happens
on the contrary, when a testator
hath bequeathed his lands without
the usufruct ; for then the legatee
hath only the bare property, while
the heir enjoys the profits: for the
usufruct may be bequeathed to one,
and the lands, without the wsufruct,
to another. Yet, if any man would
constitute an wsufruct otherwise
than by testament, he must do it
by pact, and stipulation. But, lest
the property of lands should be ren-
dered wholly unbeneficial by de-
ducting the usufruct for ever, it
was thought convenient, that the
usufruct should by certain means
become extinguished, and revert to
the property.
LIB. II.

TIT. Iv. 91

Quibus in rebus constituitur.

§ Il. Constituitur autem usus-
fructus non tantum in fundo et sedi-
bus, verum etiam in servis, et ju-
mentis, et ceteris rebus; exceptis
iis, quee ipso usu consumuntur :
nam he res neque naturali ratione
neque civili, recipiunt usumfruc-
tum : quo in numero sunt, vinum,
oleum, frumentum,
quibus proxima est, pecunia nume-
rata ; namque ipso usu, assidua per-
mutatione, quodammodo extingui-
tur. Sed utilitatis causa Senatus
censuit, posse etiam earum rerum
usumfructum constitui, ut tamen eo
nomine heredi utiliter caveatur:
itaque, si pecunie ususfructus lega-
‘tus sit, ita datur legatario, ut ejus
fiat; et legatarius satisdet heeredi
de tanta pecunia restituenda si mo-
rietur, aut capite minuetur. Cete-
rae quoque res ita traduntur legata-
rio, ut ejus fiant: sed eestimatis his
satisdatur, ut, si moriatur aut ca-
pite minuatur, tanta pecunia restitu-
atur, quanti he fuerint estimate.
Ergo Senatus non fecit quidem ea-
rum rerum usumfructum, (nec en-
im poterat,) sed per cautionem qua-
si usumfructum constituit.

vestimenta : -

$ 2. The usufruct not only of
lands and houses is grantable, but
also of slaves, cattle, and other
things ; except those which are con-
sumed by use; for the wsufruct of
such things is neither grantable by
civil policy, or natural reason; a-
mong these may be reckoned wine,
oil, cloaths, &c., money is nearly of
the same nature; for by constant
use, and the frequent change of own-
ers, it in a manner becomes extinct.
But the senate, through a motive of
public utility, hath ordained, that
the usufruct of these things may be
constituted, if sufficient security be
given to the heir: and therefore, if
the usufruct of money is bequeath-
ed, the money is so given to the leg-
atee as to make it instantly hisown:
but then the legatee, lest he should
die, or suffer diminution, is obliged
to give security to the heir for the
repayment of a like sum. Other
things also, are so delivered to the
legatee as to become his property ;
but in this case, after valuation, se-
curity must be given to the heir for
the payment of that amount, either
at the death of the legatee, or if he
should suffer diminution. It is not
therefore to be understood, that the
senate hath created strict usufruct
of these things, which is impossible :
but a quasi-usufruct by means of a
security.

Quibus modis finitur.

§ ID. Finitur autem ususfruc-
tus morte ususfructuarii, et duabus

§ 3. The usufruct determines by
the death of the usufructuary; and
92 LIB. IL.

capitis diminutionibus, maximé et
media, and non utendo per modum
et tempus; que omnia nostra sta-
tuit constitutio. Item finitur usus-
fructus, si domino proprietatis ab
usufructario cedatur, (nam ceden-
do extraneo nihil agitur,) vel ex
contrario, si usufructarius proprie-
tatem rei acquisiverit: que res
consolidatio appellatur. Eo am-
plius constat, si edes incendio com-
sumpte fuerint, vel etiam terre mo-
tu, vel vitio suo corruerint, extin-
gui usumfructum; et ne aresqui-
dem usumfructum deberi.

TIT. IV.

by two of the three namely, the
greatest and the middle diminution,
(or change of state; and also by not
being used, according to the manner
and during the time prescribed : all
which is set forth in our constitu-
tion. The wusufruct also determines
if the usufructuary surrender it to
the lord of the property ; for a ces-
sion to a stranger is of no avail: or
if the usufructuary hath acquired
the property, which is called conso-
lidation. And it is certain, if a
house hath been consumed by fire,
or thrown down by an earthquake,
or fallen through decay, that the
usufruct of such house is wholly de-
stroyed; and that no usufruct of
the area, or ground of it, enures to
the usufructuary.

Si finitus sit.

$ IV. Cum autem finitus fuerit
totus ususfructus, revertitur scili-
cet ad proprietatem; et, ex eo tem-
pore, nude proprietatis dominus in-
cipit plenam in re habere potesta-
tem.

§ 4. When the whole wsufruct of
a thing is determined, it then reverts
to the property ; and from that time,
the owner of the nude property be-
gins to have full power over it.
LIB. II.

TITULUS

TIT. ¥: 93

QUINTUS.

DE USU ET HABITATIONE.

D. vii. T. 8.

C. iii. T. 33.

Communia de usufructu et usu.

ISDEM iilis modis, quibus usus-
fructus constituitur, etiam nudus
usus constitui solet: iisdem illis
modis finitur, quibus et ususfructus
desinit.

The usufruct, and the naked use
of a thing, are constituted, and de-
termined by the same means.

Quid intersit inter usumhfructum et usum fundi.

§. 1. Minus autem juris est in
usu, quam in usufructu: nam is,
qui fundi nudum habet usum, nihil
ulterius habere intelligitur, quam
ut oleribus, pomis, floribus, fceno,
stramentis, et lignis, ad usum quo-
tidianum utatur: inque eo fundo
hactenus ei morari licet, ut neque
domino fundi molestus sit, neque
lis, per quos opera rustica fiunt,
impedimento: nec ulli alii jus, quod
habet, aut locare, aut vendere, aut
gratis concedere, potest; cum is,
qui usumfrnctum habet, possit hac
omnia facere.

§ 1. Less right appertains to the
use of a thing, than the wsufruct ;
for he, who has but the use of lands,
is understood to have nothing more
than the liberty of using so much of
the herbs, fruit, flowers, hay, straw,
and wood, as may be sufficient for
his daily supply : and he is permit-
ted to be commorant upon the land,
on condition that he neither becomes
troublesome to the owner, nor im-
pedes the labours of thehusbandmen.
Neither can he let, sell, or give his
right to another, which an usufruc-
tuary may.

Adium usus.

§ IL Item is, qui edium usum
habet, hactenus jus habere intelli-
gitur, ut ipse tantum inhabitet; nec
hoc jus ad aliun transferre potest :
et vix receptum esse videtur, ut
hospitem ei recipere liceat; sed cum
uxore liberisque suis, item libertis,
nec non personis aliis liberis, qui-
bus non minus, quam servis utitur,
habitandi jus habeat. Et conveni-

§ 2. He, who hath but the use of
an house, is understood to have no
other right than that of personal ha-
bitation : for he cannot transfer this
right; and it is hardly thought al-
lowable to receivea guest ora lodger.
But he may inhabit the house with
his, wife, children, freed-men, and
such other free persons as are ser-
vants, And agreably to this, if the
94 LIB. II.

TIT. V.

 

enter, si ad mulierem usus edium
pertineat, cum marito ei; habitare
liceat.

use of a house appertains to a wo-
man, she may,Jive in it with her
husband,fand her dependants.

De servi vel jumenti usu.

§ III. Item is, ad quem servi
usus pertinet, ipse tantum opera at-
que ministerio ejus uti potest: ad
alium verd nullo modo jus suum
transferre ei concessum est. Idem
scilicet. juris est in jumento.

§ 3. He also, who hath the use of
a slave, can‘benefit only by the la-
bour and service of such slave: for
it is not in the power of the usuary
to transfer his right: The same law
prevails in regard to beasts of bur-
den.

De pecorum usu.

$ IV. Sed et, si pecorum vel ovi-
um usus legatus sit, neque lacte ne-
que agnis, neque lana, utetur usua-
rius: quia ea in fructu sunt. Plané
ad stercorandum agrum suum pe-
coribus uti potest.

$ 4. If the use of cattle be devis-
ed, as of sheep: yet the usuary can
neither use thé milk, the lambs, or
the wool; for these belong to the
usufruct. But he may undoubtedly
employ the sheep in soilinghis lands.

De _habitatione.

§ V. Sed, si cui habitatio legata,
sive aliquo modo constituta sit, ne-
que usus videtur, neque ususfruc-
tus, sed quasi proprium aliquod jus:
quamquam habitationem habenti-
bus, propter rerum utilitatem, se-
cundum Marcelli sententiam, nos-
tra decisione promulgata, permisi-
mus non solum in e& degere, sed
etiam aliis locare.

§ 5. An habitation, whether giv-
en by testament, or constituted by
other means, seems neither an use
nor an usufruct, but rather a parti-
cular right. And, for public utility
and in conformity to the opinion of
Marcellus, we have decided, that he
who hath an habitation, may not
only live in it but let it to another.

Transitio.

§ VI. Hee de servitutibus, et
usufructu, et usu, et habitatione,
dixisse sufficiat. De hereditatibus
autem et obligationibus suis locis
proponemus. Exposuimus summa-
tim, quibus modis jure gentium res

$ 6. What hath been said, may
suffice concerning real services, usu-
fructs, uses and habitations. We
shall treat of inheritances and obli-
gations, in their properplaces. Hav-
ing already briefly explained how
LIB. II.

TIT. VI. 95

 

 

 

 

acquiruntur: modé videamus, qui-
bus modis legitimo et civili jure
acquiruntur.

things are acquired by the law of
nations; let us now examine, how
they are acquired by the civil law.

&

TITULUS SEXTUS.

DE USUCAPIONIBUS ET LONGI TEMPORIS PRESCRIP-
TIONIBUS.

D, xl. T. 3. C. vii. T. 31, et 33.

Precipua usucapionis requisita. 1. Bona fides. 2. Possessio

per tempus definitum continuata.

JURE civili constitutum fuerat,
ut, qui bona fide ab eo, qui domin-
us non erat, cum crederet eum do-
minum esse, rem emerit, vel ex do-
natione, alidve quavis justé causa
acceperit, is eam rem, si mobilis
erat, anno ubique uno, si immobi-
lis, biennio tantum in Italico solo,
usucapert: ne rerum dominia in
incerto essent. Et, cum hoc placi-
tum erat putantibus antiquioribus,
dominis ‘sufficere ad inquirendas res
suas preefata tempora, nobis melior
sententia resedit, ne domini matu-
rius suis rebus defraudentur, neque
certo loco beneficium hoc conclu-
datur: et ided constitutionem su-
per hoc promulgavimus, qua cau-
tum est, ut res quidem mobiles per
triemium ; immobiles vero per longi
temporis possessionem (id est, in-
ter preesentes decennio, inter absen-
tes viginti annis) usucapiantur. Et
his modis, non solum in Italia, sed
etiam in omni terra, que nostro im-

3. Justus titulus.

By the civil law, whoever had
fairly obtained a thing from one,
whom he supposed the trueowner,
(although in reality he was not)
and, if a moveable, had possessed it
bona fide for one year, either in Italy
or the provinces; or, if immoveable,
for two years within the limits of
ftaly, should prescribe to such thing
by use: and this was held to be
law, lest the dominion or property
of things, should be uncertain. But
although it was thought by ancient
legislators, that these periods were
sufficiently long to enable every
owner to search after his property,
yet a better opinion hath occurred
to us, that the true owners be not
defrauded, or too hastily excluded,
by the circumscription of time and
place, from recovering their just
due: we have therefore provided,
that things moveable may be pre-
scribed to after the expiration of
three years, and that a possession,
96 LIB. IL.

TIT. VI.

 

perio gubernatur, dominia rerum,
just& causa possessionis praecedente,
acquirantur.

during a long tract of time, will
also found a prescription to things
immoveable: that is to say, ten
years, if the parties are present, (i.
e. in the province,) and twenty
years if either of them be absent.
Property may thus be acquired ;
not only in Italy, but throughout
our dominions, if the possession was
honestly obtained at first.

De his, que sunt extra commercium.

$ I. Sed aliquando, etiamsi max-
imé quis bona fide rem possederit,
non tamen illi usucapio ullo tem-
pore procedit: veluti si quis liberum
hominem, vel rem sacram, vel reli-
giosam, vel servum fugitivum, pos-
sideat.

§ 1. But in some cases, although
there hath been possession incontes-
tably bond fide, yet no length of
time will be sufficient to found a
prescription; as when a man holds
a free person, a thing sacred or reli-
gious, or a fugitive slave.

De rebus furtivis, et vi possessis.

$ IL. Furtive quoque res, et quee
vi possess sunt, nec, si predicto
longo tempore bona fide possessz
fuerint, ususcapi possunt: nam fur-
tivarum rerum, lex duodecim tabu-
larum, et lex Atilia, inhibent usu-
capionem ; vi possessarum lex Julia
et Plautia. Quod autem dictum
est, furtivarum et vi possessarum
rerum usucapionem per leges pro-
hibitam esse, non eo pertinet, ut ne
ipse fur, quive per vim possidet,
usucapere possit, (nam his alié ra-
tione usucapio non.competit; quia
scilicet mala fide possident,) sed ne
ullus alius, quamvis ab eis bona fide
emerit, vel ex alia causa acceperit,
usucapiendi jus habeat.. Unde in
rebus mobilibus non facilé procedit,
ut bone fidei possessoribus usuca-
pio competat. Nam, quisciens ali-

§ 2. No prescription lies for things
that have been stolen; or seized by
violence; although-they have been
possessed bond _fide,during the length
of time required by our constitu-
tion: for prescription to things stolen
is prohibited by a law of the twelve
tables, and by the law Atilia ; and
the laws Julia and Plautia forbid a
prescription to things seized by vio-
lence. And it is not to be inferred
from these laws, that a thief, or dis-
seizor only, is prohibited from tak-
ing by prescription: (for such are
also prohibited because they are
fraudulent possessors;) but all
others likewise ; although they shall
have purchased such things bona
fide, or otherwise fairly received
them: hence things moveable can-
not easily be prescribed to, even by
LIB. I.

TIT. VI. O7

 

enam rem vendiderit, vel ex alia
causa tradiderit, furtum ejus com-
mittit. Sed tamen id aliquandé
aliter se habet. Nam, siheres rem
defuncto commodatam, aut locatam,
vel apud eum depositam, existi-
mans hereditariam esse, bond fide
accipienti vendiderit, aut donave-
rit, aut dotis nomine dederit, quin
is, qui acceperit, usucapere possit,
dubium nen est: quippé cum ea res
in furti vitium non ceciderit; cum
utique heres, qui bona fide tan-
quam suam alienaverit, furtum non
committat. Item, si is, ad quem
ancillze ususfructus pertinet, partum
suum esse credens vendiderit, aut
si donaverit, furtum non committit.
Furtum enim, sine effectu furandi,
non committitur. Aliis quoque
modis accidere potest, ut quis, sine
vitio furti, rem alienam ad aliquem
transferat, et efficiat, ut 4 possessore
usucapiatur. Quod autem ad eas
res, que solo continentur, expedit,
jus ita procedit, ut, si quis loci va-
cantis possessionem, propter absen-
tiam aut negligentiam domini, aut
quia sine successore decesserit, sine
vi nanciscatur, quamvis ipse mala
fide possideat, (quia intelligit, se
alienum fundum occupasse) tamen,
si alii bona fide accipienti tradide-
rit, poterit ei longa possessione res
acquiri; quia neque furtivum, ne-
que vi possessum, acceperit. Abol-
ita est enim quorundam veterum
sententia existimantium, etiam fun-
di locive furtum fieri. Et eorum
utilitati, qui res soli possident,
13

 

honest possessors : for whoever hath
knowingly sold or transferred the
goods of another upon whatever
consideration, is guilty of theft. But
this rule admits of some cases
wherein a moveable may be pre-
scribed to: thus if an heir, suppos-
ing a particular thing to be heredi-
tary, which in reality had only
been lent, let to, or deposited with
the deceased, shall have sold, be-
stowed, or given itas a portion, the
bond fide receiver may no doubt
prescribe; for this can never be re-
puted séolen, inasmuch as the heir,
who aliened it, believing it his own,
committed no theft. So if he, who
hath the usufruct of a female slave,
sell or give away her child believ-
ing it to be his property, he does
not commit theft; for theft implies
an intention to commit it. It may
also happen, by various means,
that one man may transfer the pro-
perty of another without theft, and
give a right of prescription to the
possessor. As to things immoveable
the law ordains, that, if any man
should take possession of an estate
without force, by reason either of
the absence, or negligence of the
owner, or because he died without
heirs, and (although he hath thus
possessed the land@ishonestly) shall
have made livery of it to another,
who took it bona fide, the land by
long possession may be acquired by
such taker, who took neither a thing
stolen, or seized, by violence: for
the opinion of those ancient law-
98 LIB. IL.

TIT. VI.

 

principalibus constitutionibus pro-
spicitur, ne cui longa et indubitata
possessio debeat auferri.

yers, who held, that lands and
things immoveable, might be stolen,
is now abolished : and it is provided
by the imperial constitutions, in
favour of those who possess im-
moveable property, that a long and
undoubted possession ought not to
be taken away.

De vitio purgato.

§ III. Aliquando etiam furtiva,
vel vi possessa, res usticapi potest;
veluti si in domini potestatem re-
versa fuerit: tunc enim, vicio rei
purgato, procedit ejus usucapio.

$ 3. A prescription may some-
times be founded even to things sto-
len, or possessed by violence; as,
when they fall again into the pow-
er of the true owner; for the taint
of title being removed, prescription
takes place.

De re fiscali et bonis vacantibus.

§ IV. Res fisci nostri usucapi
non potest: sed Papinianus scripsit,
bonis vacantibus fisco nondum
nuntiatis, bone fidei emptorem tra-
ditam sibi rem ex his bonis usuca-
pere posse; et ita Divus Pius, et
Divi Severus et Antoninus rescrip-
serunt.

§$ 4. Things, which appertain to
our treasury, cannot be acquired by
prescription. But, itis held by Pa-
pinian, that a bona fide purchaser
of escheats not yet certified, may
prescribe for them after delivery.
The emperors Pius Severus and
Antoninus have issued their res-
cripts, conformable to this opinion.

Regula generalis.

§ V. Novissimé sciendum est,
rem talem esse debere, ut in se non
habeat vitium, ut bonee fidei emp-
tore usucapi possit, vel qui ex alia
justa causa possidet.

$ 5. It is lastly to be observed,
that no taint of dishonesty must
attach to the article, in order to
enable a bond fide purchaser or pos-
sessor to prescribe for it.

De errore false cause.

§ VI. Error autem false caus
usticapionem non parit; veluti si
quis, cum non emerit, emisse se ex-
istimans, possideat; vel, cum ei

§ 6. A mistake of the cause of
possession shall not give rise to pre-
scription: as when the possessor
imagines, he hath purchased, when
LIB. II.

donatum non fuerit, quasi ex donato
possi deat.

TIT. VI. 99
he hath not purchased: or that the
thing was a gift, when it was not
given.

De accessione possessionis.

$ VIL Diutina possessio, quee
prodesse cceperat defuncto, et heere-
di et bonorum possessori continua-
tur, licét ipse sciat, preedium alie-
num esse. Quod si ille initium jus-
tum non habuit, heredi et bonorum
possessori, licét ignoranti, possessio
non prodest. Quod nostra consti-
tutio similitér et in usucapionibus
observari constituit, ut tempora
continuentur.

$ 7. A long possession beneficial-
ly commenced in the lifetime of the
deceased is continued in favour of
the heir or successor, although he
may know that the estate is the pro-
perty of another; but, if the posses-
sion commenced unjustly, it will a-.
vail neither the heir, nor the posses-
sor, although ignorant of any fraud.
It is in like manner enacted by our
constitution, that the time of usu-
caption shall be continued, (‘That is
from the deceased to his successor
in things moveable.)

Quando conjunguntur tempora.

§ VUI. Inter venditorem quo-
que et emptorem conjungi tempora.
divi Severus et Antoninus rescrip-
serunt.

$8. The emperors Severus and
Antoninus have enacted, that, the
possession of the’seller shall enure
to the buyer.

De his, qui a fisco, aut Imp. Augusteve domo, aliquid accepe-
runt.

§ IX. Edicto divi Marci cavetur,
cum, qui a fisco rem alienam emit,
si post venditionem quinquennium
preeterierit, posse dominum rei ex-
ceptione repellere. Constitutio au-
tem dives memorize Zenonis bené
prospexit iis, qui a fisco per venditi-
onem, aut donationem, vel alium ti-
tulum accipiunt aliquid ; ut ipsi qui-
dem securi statim fiant, et victores
existant, sive experiantur, sive con-
veniantur : adversus autem sacra-
tissimum erarium usque ad quadri-
ennium liceat iis intendere, qui pro
dominio vel hypotheca earum re-

$ 9. It is provided by an edict of
the emperor, Marcus, that, the pur-
chaser of anything from the trea-
sury, after five years possession sub-
sequent to the sale, may repel the
former owner by an exception of
prescription. But the emperor Zeno
of sacred memory, hath well provid-
ed by his constitution, that all those,
who by sale, donation, or any other
title, have received things from the
public treasury, may instantly bese-
cured in their possession, and made
certain of success, whether they be
plaintiffs or defendants: and those,
100 LIB. I.

TIT. VII.

 

rum, que alienate sunt, putaverint,
sibi quasdam competere actiones.
Nostra autem divina constitutio,
quam nupér promulgavimus, etiam
de iis, qui a nostra vel venerabilis
Auguste domo aliquid acceperint,
hec statuit, quee in fiscalibus aliena-
tionibus preefate Zenonianze con-
stitutionis continentur.

who claim either as proprietors or
mortgagees of the things aliened,
may bring suit against the treasury,
at any time within four years. Our
own sacred ordinance, lately pro-
mulged in favour of those, who re-
ceive any thing, from the private
possessions either of our-self, or of
the empress, adopts the regulations,
contained in the above mentioned
constitution of the emperor Zeno,
concerning fiscal alienations.

 

TITULUS SEPTIMUS.

DE DONATIONIBUS.

D. xxxix. T. 5. et 6. C. viii. T. 54. Nov. 162.

De donatione. ’

EST et aliud genus acquisitionis,
donatio. Donationum autem duo
sunt genera; mortis causa, et non
mortis causa.

Donation or gift, is another mode
of acquiring property ; it is of two
kinds; on account of death: and
not on account of death.

De mortis causa donatione.

$ L Mortis causé donatio est,
que propter mortis fit suspicioném;
cum quis ita donat, ut si quid hu-
manitus ei contigisset, haberet”is,
qui accipit: sin autem supervixis-
set is, qui donavit, reciperet : vel
sieum donationis penituisset, aut
prior decesserit is, cui donatum sit.
He mortis causé donationes, ad ex-
emplum legatorum redacte sunt
per omnia : nam, cum prudentibus
ambiguum fuerat, utrum donationis,

$1. A donation mortis causd, is
made under apprehension of death;
as when anything is given upon
condition, that, if the donor dies
the donee shall possess it absolutely ;
or return it, if the donor should sur-
vive; or should repent, of having
made the gift; or if the donee should
die before the donor. Donations
mortis causa, are now reduced, as
far as possible, to the similitude of
legacies: for, when it was much
LIB. IL

an legati instar eam obtinere opor-
teret, (et utriusque cause quedam
habebat insignia,) et alii ad aliud
genus eam retrahebant, 4 nobis con-
stitutum est, ut per omnia feré le-
gatis connumeretur, et sic procedat,
quemadmodim nostra constitutio
eam formavit. Et in summa mor-
tis causa donatio est, cum magis se
quis velit habere, quam eum, cui
donat; magisque eum, cui donat,
quam heredem suum. Sic et apud
Homerum Telemachus donat Pi-
T2x0.

TIT. VIL.

101

doubted by our lawyers, whcther a
donation mortis causa ought to be
reputed as a gift, or asa legacy, in~
asmuch as, in some things, it par-
takes of the nature of both, we then
ordained, that it should be consider-
ed in almost all respects as alegacy;
and be made as our constitution di-
rects. In short, a donation, mortis
causd, is then said to be made, when
a man so gives, as to demonstrate,
that he would rather possess the
thing given himself, than that. the
donee should possess it; and yet
that the donee should possess it, ra-
ther than his own heir.

The donation which Telemachus makes to Pircus in Homer is of this

species.

He (when Pireus ask’d for slaves, to bring

The gifts and treasures of the Spartan king)

Thus thoughtful answer’d :—those we shall not move,
Dark and unconscious ofthe will of Jove.

We know not yet the full event of all;

Stabb’d in his palace, if your prince must fall,

Us, and our house, if treason must o’erthrow,

Better a friend possess them, than a foe.

But on my foes should vengeance heaw’n decree,
Riches are welcome then, not else, to me ;

Till then, retain the gifts.—

Port’s Odyss. lib. 17.

De simplice inter vivos donatione.

§ If. Alize autem donationes
sunt que sine ula mortis cogitatio-
ne fiunt, quas inter vivos appella-
mus, que non omnio comparantur
legatis: qua, si fuerint perfect,
temeré revocari non possunt. Per-
ficiuntur autem, cum donator suam
voluntatem scriptis aut sine scriptis
manifestaverit. Et, ad exemplum

§ 2. Donations, made without ap-
prehension of death, called dona-
tions inter vivos, admit of no com-
parison with legacies: for, when
once perfected, they cannot be rash-
ly revoked: they are esteemed per-
fect, when the donor hath manifest-
ed his will either in writing or oth-
erwise. And it is appointed by our
102 LIB. IL

venditionis, nostra constitutio eas
etiam in se habere necessitatem
traditionis voluit, ut, etiamsi non
tradantur, habeant plenissimum et
perfectum robur, et traditionis ne-
cessitas incumbat donatori. Et,
cum retro principum dispositiones
insinuari eas actis intervenientibus
volebant, si majores fuerant ducen-
torum solidorum, constitutio nostra
eam quantitatem usque ad quingen-
tos solidos ampliavit, quam stare e-
tiam sine insinuatione statuit: sed
et quasdam donationis invenit, qua
penitus insinuationem fieri minime
desiderant, sed in se plenissimam
habent firmitatem. Alia insuper
multa ad uberiorem exitum donati-
onum invenimus, que omnia ex nos-
tris constitutionibus, quas super his
exposuimus, colligenda sunt. Sci-
endum est tamen, quod, etsi plenis-
simee sint donationes, si tamen in-
grati existant homines in quos be-
neficium collatum est, donatoribus
per nostram constitutionem licenti-
am prestitimus certis ex causis eas
revocare: ne illi, qui suas res in a-
lios contulerint, ab his quandam pa-
tiantur injuriam vel jacturam, se-
cundum enumeratos in constitu-
tione nostra modos.

TIT. VII.

constitution, that a donation inter
vivos shall, like a sale necessarily
inforce a delivery; for when things
are given, they become fully vested
in the donee, and it is incumbent
upon the donor to deliver them :
and, although it is enacted by our
predecessors, that donations, to the
value of two hundred solidi, shall
be formally registered, our ordinance
enlarges this sum to five hundred
solidi, and permits donations of less
value to be binding without insinu-
ation or inrollment ; and it notices
some donations, which are of full
force without inrollment. We have
also, for the enlargement of dona-
tions, enacted many other rules,
which may be collected from our
constitutions, on thissubject. It nev-
ertheless must be observed, that, a
donation, validiy made may be re-
voked on account of ingratitude in
the donee in some particular cases :
and this, lest a man should in any
of the instances enumerated in our
constitution, suffer injury or dam-
age from those upon whom he hath
bestowed his property.

De donatione ante nuptias vel propter nuptias.

§ III. Est et aliud genus inter
vivos donationis, quod veteribus
quidem prudentibus penitus erat in-
cognitum ; postea autem a juniori-
bus Divis Principibus introductum
est, quod ante nuptias vocabatur,
et tacitam in se conditionem habe-
bat, ut tunc ratum esset, cum ma-

§$ 3. There is another kind of do-
nations inter vivos, introduced by
later emperors, and wholly unknown
to the ancient lawyers, termed do-
nation before marriage, containing
the tacit condition, thatitshould take
effect, when the marriage was per-
formed ; these donations were pro-
LIB. ff.

trimonium esset insecutum; idéo-
que ante nuptias vocabatur, quod
ante matrimonium efficiebatur; et
nunquam post nuptias celebratas
talis donatio procedebat. Sed. pri-
mus quidem Divus Justinus pater
noster, cum augeri dotes et post
nuptias fuerat permissum, si quid
tale eveniret, et ante nuptias augeri
donationem, et constante matrimo-
nio, sua constitutione permisit: sed
tamen nomen inconveniens remane-
bat, cum ante nuptias quidem voca-
batur, post nuptias autem tale acci-
piebat incrementum. Sed nos ple-
nissimo fini tradere sanctiones cu-
pientes, et consequentia nomina re-

bus esse studentes, constituimus, ut .

tales donationes non augeantur tan-
tum, sed etiam constante matrimo-
nio initium accipiant: et non anté
nuptias, sed proptér nuptias, vocen-
tur: et dotibus in hoc exasquentur,
ut quemadmodtm dotes constante
matrimonio non solum augentur,
sed etiam fiunt, ita et istee donati-
ones, que propter nuptias introduc-
tee sunt, non solum antecedant ma-
trimonium, sed eo etiam contracto
augeantur et constituantur.

TIT. VIL 103
perly called ante nuptias, because
they could never be constituted after
the celebration of matrimony. But,

_Inasmuch as it was permitted by the
ancient law, that portions might be
augmented after marriage, the em-
peror Justin, our father, hath enact-
ed by his constitution,that donations
called ante nuptias might also be
augmented at any time during ma-
trimony: but, as it was improper,
that a donation should be still term-
ed ante nuptias, when it had te-
ceived an augmentation post nup-
tias, and we being desirous, that
our sanctions might be as perfect as
possible, and that names should be
properly adapted to things, have or-
dained that such donations may not
only be augmented, but may com-
mence also at any time during ma~-
trimony; and that for the future,
they shall not be called donations
ante nuptias, but donations propier
nuptias ; and thus they are made
equal with portions; for as portions
may be augmented, and even made,
during matrimony, so donations, in-
troduced on account of matrimony,
may now not only precede marriage,
but be augmented, or even consti-
tuted, after the celebration of it.

De jure accrescendi.

§ IV. Erat olim et alius modus
civilis acquisitionis per jus accre-
scendi, quod est tale; si, commu-
nem servum habens aliquis cum
Titio, solus libertatem ei imposue-
rit, vel vindicta vel testamento, eo
casu pars ejus amittebatur, et socio
accrescebat. Sed, cum pessimum
fuerat exemplo, et libertate servum

§ 4. There was formerly another
manner of acquiring property by
the civil law; namely by accretion;
as, if Primus holding a slave in
common with Titius had infran-
chised him, either by the vindicta or
by testament, then would the share
of Primus in that slave be lost, and
accrue to Titius. But, inasmuch as
104 LIB. IL.

TIT. VIL.

 

defraudari, et ex eo humanioribus
quidem dominis damnum inferri,
severioribus autem dominis lucrum
accedere, hoc, quasi invidia ple-
num, pio remedio per nostram con-
stitutionem mederi necessarium
duximus; et invenimus viam, per
quam manumissor, et socius ejus,
et qui libertatem accepit, nostro be-
neficio fruantur, libertate cum ef-
fectu procedente, (cujus favore an-
tiquos legum latores multa etiam
contra communes regulas statuisse
manifestum est,) et eo, qui eam
libertatem imposuit, suz liberalita-
tis stabilitate gaudente, et socio in-
demni conservato, pretiumque servi

secundum partem dominii, quod :

nos definivimus, accipiente.

it affords a bad example, that a man

should be defrauded of his liberty,

and that the most humane masters,

should suffer loss, while the most

severe receive emolument, we have

thought it necessary, to administer

a humane remedy to this grievance ;

and have devised means by which

the manumittor, his co-partner, and .
the freed person, may all partake of
our beneficence: for we have de-

creed, (and clearly our ancient leg-

islators have often set aside the

strict rules of law in favour of li-

berty,) that freedom, although

granted by one partner only, shall

immediately take effect: so that the

manumittor shall have reason to be

pleased with the validity of his gift,

if his co-partner be indemnified by

receiving his share of the worth of
the slave.

+B Oo

TITULUS

OCTAVUS.

QUIBUS ALIENARE LICET, VEL NON LICET.

De marito, qui, licet fundi dotalis dominus sit, alienare
nequit.

ACCIDIT aliquands, ut, qui do-
minus rei sit, alienare non possit:
et contra qui dominus non sit, alie-
nande rei potestatem habeat. Nam
dotale predium maritus, invita
muliere, per legem Juliam prohibe-
tur alienare; quamvis ipsius sit,
dotis causa ei datum: quod nos, le-
gem Juliam corrigentes, in melio-
rem statum deduximus. Cum enim
lex in solis tantummodo rebus

Sometimes the proprietor of a
thing may not alien it, while one
who is not proprietor, may: for ex-
ample, by the law Julia, ahusband
is forbidden to alienate lands, which
came to him in right of his wife,
without her consent; although
given to him, as a marriage portion.
But, in this respect, we have cor-
rected and amended the law Julia ;
for, as this law regards only posses-
LIB. II.

locum habebat, que Italicee friskant,
et alienationes inhibebat, quee invi-
ta muliere fiebant, hypothecas au-
tem earum rerum eteam volente ed
utrique remedium imposuimus, ut
etiam in eas res, que in provinciali
solo posite sunt, interdicta sit alie-
natio vel abligatio, ut neutrum eo-
rum neque consentientibus mulieri-
bus procedat : ne sextis muliebris
fragilitas, in perniciem substantia
earum convertatur.

TIT. VIII. 105
Sions situated in Italy, and although
it inhibits the husband to mortgage
such possessions, even with the con-
sent of his wife, yet it permits him,
with her consent to alienate, we have
provided a remedy for both cases ;
so that now, no husband can alien
or mortgage, even with consent of
his wife, any property provincial or
Italian, obtained with hey, as a
marriage portion; lest the frailty of
women should occasion the ruin of
their fortunes.

 

De creditore, qui, licet non sit dominus, tamen elienare pig-
nus potest.

$ L Contra autem creditor pig-
nus, ex pactione, quamvis ejus ea
res non sit, alienare potest. Sed
hoc forsitan ided videtur fier,
quod voluntate debitoris intelligitur
pignus alienari, qui ab initio con-
tractis pactus est, ut liceret creditori
pignus vendere, si pecunia non sol-
vatur. Sed, ne creditores jus suum
persequi impedirentur, neque debi-
tores temeré suarum rerum do-
minium amittere viderentur, nos-
tra constitutione consultum est, et
certus modus impositus est, per
quem, pignorum distractio possit
procedere: cujus tenore utrique
parti, creditorum et debitorum sa-
tis abundéque provisum est.

$ 1. But a creditor, may by com-
pact alien a pledge, although not
his own property ; yet this seems no
otherwise allowable, than because
the pledge is understood to be alien-
ed by consent of the debtor, who co-
venanted at the commencement of
the contract, that the creditor might
sell the pledge, if the loan was not
repaid. But, lest creditors should be
impeded from prosecuting their just
claims, and debtors too hastily de-
prived of their property, it is pro-
vided for in our ordinance, and a
certain method appointed, by which
the sale of pledges may be made :
and, ample care hath been taken, in
respect both of creditors and debtors,

De pupillo, qui, licet dominus, non tamen sine tutoris auc-
toritate alienare potest.

§ II. Nunc admonendi sumus,
neque pupillum, neque pupillam, ul-
lam rem siné tutoris auctoritate
alienare posse; idedoque, si lg

1

$2. It must now be observed,
that no pupil, male nor female, can
alien anything without the author-
ity of a tutor: and therefore, if a
106 LIB. II.

am pecuniam siné tutoris auctori-
tate alicui dederit, non contrahit
obligationem : quia pecuniam non
facit accipientis: idedque vindicari
nummi possunt, sicubi extant.
Sed, si nummi, quos mutuo minor
dederit, ab eo, qui accepit, bond
fide consumpti sunt, condici pos-
sunt: si mala fide, ad exhibenduns
de his agi potest.

TIT... VIII.

pupil, without such authority lend
money to any man, the pupil ac-
quires no obligation: for he cannot
vest in the receiver the property of
the money, which may be claimed
by vindication, if it still exist. But
if money, lent by a minor, be con-
sumed by the borrower, bona fide,
(i. e. believing the lender was of full
age) it may be recovered from such
borrower by condiction ; if mala
fide, an action ad exhibendum will
lie against him.

Continuatio.

§ Ill. At ex contrario omnes
res pupillo, et pupillee siné tutoris
auctoritate recté dari possunt: ide-
oque, si debitor pupillo solvat, ne-
cessaria est debitori tutoris auctori-
tas; alioqti non liberabitur. Sed
hoc etiam evidentissim4 ratione
statutum est in constitutione, quam
ad Ceesarienses advocatos ex sug-
gestione Triboniani, viri eminen-
tissimi, questoris sacri palatii nos-
tri, promulgavimus: qua disposi-
tum est, ita licere tutori vel cura-
tori debitorem pupillarem solvere,
ut prius judicialis sententia siné
omni damno celebrata, hoc permit-
tat: quo subsecuto, si et judex pro-
nunciaverit, et debitor solverit, se-
quatur hujusmodi solutionem ple-
nissima securitas. Sin autem ali-
tér quam disposuimus, solutio fac-
ta fuerit,; pecuniam autem salvam
habeat pupillus, aut ex ea locuple-
tior sit, et adhuc eandem pecunie
summam petat, per exceptionem
doli mali poterit submoveri. Quod

§ 3. On the contrary, property
may be transferred to pupils, male
or female, without the authority of
their tutors: yet, if a debtor make
payment to a pupil, he should be
warranted by the authority of the
tutor, otherwise he will not be ac-
quitted of the debt: and this, for an
evident reason, was ordained by a
constitution, which we promulged
to the advocates of Cesarea, at the
suggestion of that most eminent
man Tribonian, the questor of our
sacred palace; whereby it.is enact-
ed, that the debtor of a minor may
pay over to the tutor or curator, un-
der a judicial decree, permitting the
payment previously obtained with-
out expense to the minor: for when,

~ the debt is paid under the decree of

a judge, it is attended with the full-
est security. But, although money
hath been paid to a pupil, other-
wise than we have ordained, yet, if
he be really enriched by the pay-
ment, and hath preserved the mon-
LIB. II.

si malé consumpserit, aut furto aut
vi amiserit, nihil proderit debitori
doli mali exceptio, sed nihilomints
condemnabitur: quid temeré siné
tutoris auctoritate, et non secun-
dim nostram dispositionem, solve-
rit. Sed ex diverso, pupilli vel
pupille solvere sine tutoris aucto-
ritate non possunt: quid id, quod
solvunt, non fit accipientis: cum
scilicet nullius rei alienatio eis siné
tutoris auctoritate concessa sit.

TIT. IX. 107
ey, and should afterwards require,
that it should be repaid he might
be barred by an exception of fraud.
But, if the pupil hath squandered
the money, or lost it by theft or vi-
olence, an exception of fraud will
be of no benefit to the debtor, who
will be compelled to make a second
payment; because the first was
made inconsiderately without the
authority of the tutor, and not ac-
cording to our ordinance. Pupils
may not pay money without the
authority of their tutors; it does
not vest as the property of the re-
ceiver: for without such authority
a pupil can alien nothing.

 

TITULUS NONUS.

PER QUAS PERSONAS CUIQUE ACQUIRITUR.

C. iv.

T. 57.

Summa.

ACQUIRITUR vobis non s0-
jum per vosmetipsos, sed etiam per
eos, quos in potestate habetis:
item per servos, in quibus usum-
fructum habetis: item per homines
liberos, et per servos alienos, quos
bond fide possidetis: de quibus
singulis diligentits dispiciamus.

Things may be acquired not on-
ly by ourselves, but also by those,
who are under our power; also by
slaves, of whom we have the usu-
fruct ; by freemen; and by the
slaves of others whom we possess
bond fide. Let us diligently inves-
tigate each of these cases.

De liberis in potestate.

$ 1. Igitur liberi vestri utriusque
sexus, quos in potestate habetis,
olim quidem quicquid ad eos per-

$ 1. Anciently whatever came to
children, male or female, under
power of their parents, was acquir-
108 LIB. II.

venerat, (exceptis videlicét castren-
sibus peculiis,) hoc parentibus suis
acquirebant sine ulla distinctione :
et hoc ita parentum fiebat, ut etiam
esset iis licentia quod per unum vel
unam eorum acquisitum esset, alii
filio, vel extraneo donare, vel ven-
dere, vel quoctirnque modo volue-
rant, applicare: quod nobis inhu-
manum visum est: et generali con-
stitutione emissé, et liberis peper-
¢imus, et parentibus honorem de-
bitum reservavimus: sancitum ete-
nim a nobis est, ut, si quid ex re
patris ei obveniat, hoc secundum
antiquam observationem totum pa-
renti acquiratur : Que enim invi-
dia est, quod ex patris occasione
profectum est, hoc ad eum reverti?
Quod autem ex alia caus sibi filius-
familias acquisivit, hujus usum-
fructum patri quidem acquirat, do-
minium autem apud eum remaneat:
ne, quod ei suis laboribus vel pros-
pera fortuna accesserit, hoc, in ali-
um perveniens, luctuosum ei proce-
dat.

TIT. IX.

ed for the parents without any dis-
tinction, if we except the peculium
castrense: and this so absolutely»
that what was acquired by one
child, the parent might have given
to another, or toa stranger; or sold
it, or applied it in what manner he
thought proper: this seemed to be
inhuman; and we have therefore,
by a general constitution, mitigated
the law as it respects children, and
at the same time, supported that
honour, which is due to parents;
having ordained, that, if any thing
accrue to the son by means of the
father’s fortune, the whole shall be
acquired for the father, according to
ancient practice: (for can it be un-
just, that the wealth, which the son
hath obtained, by means of the fa-
ther, should revert to the father 7)
but that the acquisitions of the son
by any other means shall remain in
the son ; and that the father shall
be entitled only to the usufruct of
such acquisition ; lest that which
hath accrued from his labour or good
fortune, being transferred to anoth-
er should affect him as a hardship.

De emancipatione lberorum.

$ II. Hoc quoqte 4 nobis dispo-
situm est et in ed specie, ubi pa-
rens, emancipando liberos suos, ex
rebus, que acquisitionem effugie-
bant, sibi tertiam partem retinere
(si voluerat) licentiam ex anteriori-
bus constitutionibus habebat, quasi
pro pretio quodammodo emancipa-
tionis: et inhumanum ‘quiddam ac-
-eidebat, ut filius rerum suarum ex
hac emancipatione dominio pro ter-

Ԥ 2. We have made some regila-
tions also as to emancipation: fora
parent, when he emancipated his
‘children, might, according to for-
merconstitutions, have taken'tohim-
self, if so inclined, the third part of
those things, which were excepted
from paternal acquisition, as the
price of emancipation. But it ap-
peared inhuman, that the son should
be thus defrauded of the third part of
LIB. IL.

TIT. IX, 109

 

tid parte defraudaretur; et, quod
honoris ei ex emancipatione addi-
tum erat, quod sui juris effectus es-
set, hoc per rerum diminutionem
decresceret. Idedque statuimus, ut
parens pro tertid parte dominii,
quam -retinere patera, dimidiam
non dominii rerum, sed ususfruc-
tus, retineat. Ita etenim res intac-
te apud filium remanebunt, et pater
ampliore summa fruetur, pro tertid,
dimidia potiturus.

his property, and that the honour
which he had obtained by becoming
independent,should be decreased by
the diminution of his estate: we
have therefore decreed, that the pa-
rent instead of the third part of the
property, which he formerly might
have retained, shall now be entitled
to an half-share, not of the proper-
ty, but of the usufruct; so that the
property will remain intire to the
son, and the father will enjoy a
greater share; namely, half instead
of a third part.

De servis nostris.

§ III. Item vobis acquiritur, quod
servi vestri ex traditione nanciscun-
tur, sivé quid stipulentur, sive ex
donatione, vel ex legato, vel ex qua-
libet alid causa, acquirant. Hoc
enim vobis et ignorantibus et invitis
obvenit; ipse enim servus, qui in
potestate alterius est, nihil suum
habere potest. Sed, si heres institu-
tus sit, non alias, nisi vestro jussu,
heereditatem adire potest, et, si vo-
bis jubentibus adierit, vobis heredi-
tas acquiritur, perindé ac si vos ip-
si heredes instituti essetis: et con-
‘venientér scilicet vobis legatum per
eos acquiritur. Non solum autem
proprietas per eos, quos in potestate
habetis, vobis acquiritur, sed etiam
possessio: cujuscunque enim rei
possessionem adepti fuerint, id vos
possidere videmini. Unde etiam
per eos usucapio, vel longi temporis
possessio, vobis accidit.

§ 3. Whatever your slaves have
at any time acquired, whether by
delivery, stipulation, donation, be-
quest, or any other means, is acquir-
ed by you; although you may be
ignorant of or even averse to the ac-
quisition; for he, who is a slave,
can have no property. And,ifa slave
be made heir, he cannot otherwise
take upon himself the inheritance,
than at the command of his master ;
but, if commanded so to do, the in-
heritance is as fully acquired by
the master, as if he had been him-
self made heir; and consequently a
legacy, left to a slave, is acquired
by his master. Moreover, masters
acquire by their slaves not only the
property of things, but also the pos-
session; for whatever is possessed
by a slave, is deemed to be posses-
sed by his master; who may found
a prescription to it, by means of his
slave.
110 LIB. II.

TIT. IX.

De fructuariis et bona fide possessis.

§$ IV. De iis autem servis, in
quibus tantummodd usumfructum
habetis ita placuit, ut, quicquid ex
re vestra, vel ex operis suis, acqui-
runt, id vobis adjiciatur ; quod vero
extra eas causas consecuti sunt, id
ad dominum proprietatis pertineat.
Itaque, si is servus heeres institutus
sit, legatumve quid ei, aut donatum
fuerit, non usufructuario, sed domi-
no proprietatis acquiritur.

$ 4. As to slaves, of whom you
have the usufruct only, it hath
seemed right, that, whatever they
earn by means of your goods, or by
their own work and labour, apper-
tains to you: but whatever they
earn by other means, belongs to the
proprietor: therefore, if a slave be
made heir, ‘or legatee, or donee, the
inheritance, legacy, or gift, will not
be acquired for the usufructuary
master, but for the proprietor.

Continuatio.

§ V. Idem placet et de eo, qui 4
vobis bona fide possidetur, sive is
liber sit, sive alienus servus: quod
enim placuit de usufructuario, idem
placet et de bonz fidei possessore.
Itaque, quod extra istas duas cau-
sas acquiritur, id vel ad ipsum per-
tinet, si liber est, vel ad dominum,
si servus est. Sed bone fidei pos-
sessor,cum usuceperit servum, (quia
eo modo dominus fit,) ex omnibus
causis per eum sibi acquirere potest.
Fructuarius vero usucapere non po-
test: primum quia non possidet, sed
habet jus utendi, fruendi: deindé,
quia scit, servum alienum esse.
Non solum autem proprietas per eos
servos, in quibus usumfructum ha-
betis, vel quos bona fide possidetis,
aut per liberam personam, que bona
fide vobis servit, vobis acquiritur,
sed etiam possessio. Loquimur
autem in utriusque persona secun-
dum distinctionem, quam proximé
exposuimus, id est, si quam posses-

§ 5. The same rule is observed as
to the bond fide possessor of a slave,
whether he be a free-man, or the
slave of another: for the same law
prevails respecting an usufructuary
master, and a bond fide possessor ;
therefore, whatever is acquired,
otherwise than by the two causes
above-mentioned, either belongs to
the person possessed, if he be free;
or to the proprietor, if he be a slave.
But a bond fide possessor, who hath
gained a slave by usucaption or pre-
scription, (inasmuch he thus be-
comes the absolute proprietor, ) can
acquire by means of such slave, by
all manner of ways. But an usu-
fructuary master cannot prescribe;
first, because he can not be strictly
said to possess, having only the pow-
er of using: and because he knows,
the slave belongs to another. We
nevertheless may acquire not only
property, but also possession, by
means of slaves, whom we possess

‘
LIB. II.

sionem ex re vestra vel ex suis
operis, adepti fuerint.

TIT. IX. 111

bond fide, or by usufruct; and even
by a free person, of whom we have
bona fide possession. But, in say-
ing this, we adhere to the distinc-

tion, before explained, and speak of

those things only, of which a slave
may acquire the possession, either
through the goods of his master, or
by his own industry.

De reliquis seu extraneis' personis.

§ VI. Ex his itaque apparet, per
liberos homines quos neque vestro
juri subjectos habetis, neque bond
fide possidetis, item per alienos ser-
vos, in quibus neque usumfructum
habetis, neque possessionem justam,
nulla ex causé vobis acquiri posse.
Et hoc est, quod dicitur, per extra-
neam personam nihil acquiri posse ;
excepto eo, quod per liberam perso-
nam (veluti per procuratorem) pla-
cet non solim scientibus, sed et ig-
norantibus, vobis acquiri possessio-
nem, secundum Divi Severi consti-
tutionem ; et per hanc possessionem
etiam dominium, si dominus fuerit,
qui tradidit; vel usucapionem aut
longi temporis prescriptionem, si
dominus non sit.

§ 6. Hence it appears that you
cannot acquire by means of free
persons, not under your subjection,
or possessed by you bond fide ; nor
by the slave of another, of whom
you have neither the usufruct, nor
the jnst possession. And this is
meant, when it is said, that nothing
can be acquired by means of a
stranger; except indeed according
to the constitution of the emperor
Severus, that possession may be ac-
quired for you by a free person, as
by a proctor, not only with, but
even without your knowledge; and,
by this possession, the property may
by gained, if the delivery were
made by the proprietor; and an
usucaption or prescription may be
acquired,although the delivery were
made by one, who was not the pro-
prietor.

Transitio.

§ VII. Hactents tantispér admo-
nuisse sufficiat, quemadmodum sin-
gule res vobis acquirantur: nam
legatorum jus, quo et ipso singulz
res vobis acquiruntur, item fidei
commissorum, ubi singulee res vo-
bis relinquuntur opportunius inferi-
ore loco referemus. Videamus ita-

§ 7. The observations already
made, concerning the acquisition of
things, may suffice for the present;
for we shall treat more opportunely
hereafter concerning the rights of
legacies andtrusts. We now proceed
to shew, how things may be acquir-
ed per universitatem, that is, wholly
112

LIB. II.-

TIT. X.

—

 

que nunc, quibus modis per univer-
sitatem- res vobis acquirantur. Si
cui ergo heeredes facti sitis, sive cu-
jus bonorum possessionem petieri-
tis, vel si quem adrogaveritis, vel
si cujus bona, libertatum conser-
vandarum causa, vobis addicta fue-
rint, ejus res omnes, ad vos transe-
unt. Ac prits de hereditatibus
dispiciamus, quarum duplex condi-
tio est; nam vel ex testamento, vel
ab intestato, ad vos pertinent. Et
prius est, ut de his dispiciamus, que
ex testamento vobis obveniunt; qua
in re necessarium est, initium de tes-
tamentis ordinandis exponere.

and in gross by one single acquisi-
tion: for example; if you are nomi-
nated heir, or seek possession of the
goods of another, or arrogate one as
your son, or if goods are adjudged.
to you for preserving the liberty of
slaves; in all these cases, the entire
inheritance passes to you. Let us
therefore inquire into inheritances,
which are twofold; for they pro-
ceed either from a testacy, or'an in-
testacy. And first of those, which
come by testament; and herein it
will be necessary to begin by ex-
plaining the manner of making tes-
taments.

 

TITULUS

DECIMUS.

DE TESTAMENTIS ORDINANDIS.

D. xviii. T. 1.

C. vi. T. 23.

Nov. 66. 119.

Etymologia.

TESTAMENTUM ex eo appel-
latur, quod testatio mentis sit.

A testament is so called from ¢es-
tatio: because it testifies the deter-
mination of the mind.

De antiquis modis testandi civilibus.

§ IL Sed, ut nihil antiquitatis
penitis ignoretur, sciendum est,
olim quidem duo genera testamen-
torum in usu fuisse; quorum alte-
ro in pace et otio utebantur, quod
catalis comitiis appellabant ; altero,
cum in prelium exituri essent, quod
procinctum dicebatur. Accessit de-

$ 1. But, lest ancient usage should
be forgotten, it is necessary to ob-
serve, that formerly there were two
kinds of testaments; one practiced
in times of peace, and named calatis
comitiis ; because made in a full as-
sembly of the people; and the other,
when the people were going forth
LIB. II.

indé tertium genus testamentorum,
quod dicebatur per es et libram,
scilicét quod per emancipationem,
id est, imaginariam quandam ven-
ditionem agebatur, quinque testibus
et libripende, civibus Romanus pu-
beribus, presentibus, et eo, qui
familize emptor dicebatur. Sed illa
quidem priora duo genera testamen-
torum ex veteribus temporibus in
desuetudinem abierunt : quod vero
per zs et libram fiebat, licet diutius
permanserit, attamen partim et hoc
in usu esse desiit.

TIT. X. 113
to battle, and this was the procine-
tum testamentum. <A third species
was afterwards added, called per ws
et libram, being effected by emanci-
pation ; which was an alienation,
made by an imaginary sale in the
presence of five witnesses, and the
libripens or balance-holdey, all citi-
zens of Rome, above the age of
fourteen: and also in the presence
of him who was called the emptor
familie, oy purchaser. The two
former kinds of testaments, have
been disused for’ many ages: and
that, which was made per es et li-
bram, although it continued longer
in practice, hath now ceased in
part to be observed.

De antiqua testandi ratione preetoria.

$ IL. Sed predicta quidem no-
- mina testamentorum, ad jus civile
referebantur : postéa vero ex edicto
pretoris forma alia faciendorum
testamentorum introducta est. Ju-
re etenim honorario, nulla mancipa-
tio desiderabatur, sed septem testi-
un signa sufficiebant : cum. jure
civili, signa testium non essent ne-
cessaria.

§ 2. These three kinds of testa-
ment originated from the civil law ;
but afterwards another kind was
introduced by the honorary or pre-
torian edict ; whereby the signature
of seven witnesses was decreed suf-
ficient to establish a will without
any emancipation or imaginary sale;
but this signature of witnesses, was
not required by the civil law.

De conjunctione juris civilis et preetorii.

§ III. Sed, cum paulatim, tam
ex usu hominum, quam ex consti-
tutionum emendationibus, ccepit in
unam consonantiam jus civile et
pretorium jungi, constitutum est,
ut uno eodemque tempore, quod
jus civile quodammodo exigebat,
septem testibus adhibitis, et sub-
scriptione testium, quod ex consti-
tutionibus inventum est, et ex edic-

§ 3. When the civil and preetorian
laws began to be blended partly by
usage, and partly by the emenda-
tion of imperial constitutions, it be-
came a rule, that all testaments
should be made at one and the same
time according to the civillaw ;, that
they should be sealed by seven wit-
nesses according to the pretorian
law, and that they should also be

‘
114 LIB. IL.

TIT. X.

 

to preetoris, signacula testamentis
imponerentur : ita ut hoc jus triper-
titum esse videatur: et testes qui-
dem, eorumque preesentia, uno con-
textu, testamenti celebrandi gratia
a jure civili descendant: subscrip-
tiones autem testatoris et testium
ex sacrarum constitutionem obser-
vatione adhibeantur: signaculaau-
tem et testium numeros ex edicto
pretoris.

subscribed by the witnesses, in obe-
dience to the constitutions. Thus
the law of testaments seems to be
tripartite: for the civil law requires
witnesses to make a settlement va-
lid, who must all be present at the
same time without interval: the sa-
cred constitutions ordain, that every
testamentmust be subscribed by the
testator and the witnesses; and the
pretorian edict requires sealing,
and settles the number of witnesses.

Solemnitas addita a Justiniano.

§ IV. Sed his omnibus a nostra
constitutione propter testamento-
tum sinceritatem, ut nulla fraus ad-
hibeatur, hoc aditum est, ut, per
manus testatoris vel testium, no-
men heredis exprimatur, et omnia
secundum illius constitutionis te-
norem procedant.

§ 4. To all these solemnities, we
have enacted in additional security
of testaments, and for the prevention
of frauds that the name of the heir
shall be expressed, by the hand-wri-
ting, either of the testator, or of the
witnesses; and that every thing
shall be done in conformity to the
tenor of our constitution.

De annulis, quibus testamenta signantur.

§ V. Possunt autem: omnes tes-
tes et uno annulo signare testamen-
tum; (quid einm si septem annuli
una sculptura fuerint ?) secundim
quod Papiniano visum est. Sed
et alieno quoque annulo, licet sig-
nare testamentum.

$5. Every witness to a testa-
ment, according to Papinian, may
use the same signet: for otherwise,
what must be the consequence, if
seven seals should happen all to bear
the same device ? It is also allowa-
ble to seal with the signet of another.

Qui testes esse possunt.

§ VI. Testes autem adhiberi
possunt ii, cum quibus testamenti
factio est. Sed neque mulier, ne-
que impubes, neque servus, neque
furiosus, neque mutus, neque sur-
dus, neque is, cui bonis interdic-
tum est, neque ii, quos leges ju-

§ 6. Those persons are good wit-
nesses, who can legally take by tes-
tament: but no woman or minor un-
der puberty, orslave; noperson,mad
mute, or deaf; no interdicted prodi-
gal; nor any whom the laws, have
reprobated and rendered intestable,
LIB, I.

bent improbos intestabilesque esse,
possunt in numerum testium adhi-
beri.

TIT. X.

115

can be admitted a witness to a tes-
tament.

De servo, qui liber existimabatur.

§ VIL Sed, cum aliquis ex tes-
tibus, testamenti quidem faciendi
tempore, liber existimabatur, pos-
tea autem servus apparuit, tam Di-
vus Adrianus Catoni, quam postea
Divi Serverus et Antoninus rescrip-
serunt, subvenire se ex sud libera-
litate testamento ut sic habeatur
firmum, ac si, ut oportebat, factum
esset; cum, eo tempore, quo testa-
mentum signaretur, omnium con-
sensu hic testis liberi loco fuerit,
nec quisquam esset, qui status ei
queestionem moveret.

$ 7. If a witness, was regarded
as free at the time of attesting, but
afterwards appeared to have been
then a slave, the emperor Adrian,
in his rescript to Cato, and after-
wards the emperors Severus and
Antoninus by their rescript decreed,
that they would aid such a defect
in a testament, and confirm it equal-
ly as if the witness, at the time of
sealing, was, in the estimation of
all men, taken to be a free person,
no one having made a question of
his condition.

De pluribus testibus ex eadem domo.

§ VIII. Pater, nec non is, qui in
potestate ejus est: item duo fratres,
qui in ejusdem patris potestate sunt,
utique testes in uno testamento fieri
possunt: quia nihil nocet, ex una
domo plures testes alieno negotio
adhiberi.

§ 8. A father, and a son under
his power, or two brothers, under
the power of the same father, may
be witnesses to a testament: for no-
thing prevents several persons of the
same family, being witnesses to the
transaction of another person.

De his, qui sunt in familia testatoris.

§ IX. In testibus autem non de-
bet esse is, qui in potestate testa-
toris est. Sed, si filiusfamilias de
castrensi peculio post missionem
faciat testamentum, nec pater ejus
recté adhibetur testis, nec is, qui in
potestate ejusdem patris est. Re-
probatum est enim in ea re domes-
ticum testimonium.

§ 9. No person under power of
the testator can witness the testa-
ment. And if the son of a family
devise his military estate after his
dismission from the army, neither
his father, nor any one under power
of his father, can be a witness to the
will. For, in this case, the law does
not allow of a domestic testimony.
116 LIB. IL.

TIT. X.

 

De herede

§ X. Sed neque heres scriptus,
neque is, qui in ejus potestate est,
neque pater ejus, qui eum habet in
potestate, neque fratres, qui in ejus-
dem patris potestate sunt, testes ad-
hiberi possunt; quia hoc totum ne-
gotium, quod agitur testamenti or-
dinandi gratia, creditur hodie inter
testatorem et heredem agi. Licet
autem totum jus tale conturbatum
fuerat, et veteres quidem familie
emptorem, et eos, qui per potesta-
tem ei conjuncti fuerant, 4 testa-
mentariis testimoniis repellebant;
heeredi autem, et iis, qui per potes-
tatem ei conjuncti fuerant, concede-
bant testimonia in testamentis pree-
stare: licet ii, qui id permittebant,
hoc jure minimé abuti, eos debere
suadebant: tamen nos eandem ob-
servationem corrigentes, et, quod ab
illis suasum est, in legis necessita-
tem transferentes, ad imitationem
pristini familie emptoris, merito nec
heredi, qui imaginem vetustissimi
familie emptoris obtinet, neque aliis
personis, que el, (ut dictum est,)
conjuncte sunt, licentiam concedi-
mus sibi quodammodo testimonia
prestare: idedque nec ejusmodi
veteres constitutiones nostro codici
inseri permisimus.

§ 10. No heir nominated in the
will, nor any person in subjection to
him; nor his father, under whose
power he is; nor his brothers under
power of the same father, can be ad-
mitted witnesses; for the whole
business of completing a testament,
is at this day considered as trans-
acted between the testator, and the
real heir. But formerly there was
great confusion; for although the
ancients would never admit the tes-
timony of the emptor familie, (no-
minal purchaser) or the supposed
heir, nor of any one allied to him by
subjection, yet they admitted that
of the real heir, and of persons con-
nected with him by subjection; and
the only precaution taken, was, to
exhort those persons not to abuse.
their privilege. We have corrected
this practice; preventing by the co-
ercion of law, that, which the an-
cient lawyers endeavoured to pre-
vent by persuasion only: for we ad-
mit neither the real heir, who repre-
sents the emptor familie of the an-
cients, nor any person allied to him
as a witness, to the testament, by
which he is nominated. It is for
this reason, that we have not suffer-
ed the old constitutions to be insert-
ed in our Code.

De legatariis et fideicommissariis, et his, qui sunt in
eorum familia.

§ XI. Legatariis autem et fidei-
commissariis, quia non juris suc-
cessores sunt, et aliis personis eis
conjunctis, testimonium non dene-

§ 11. But we refuse not the tes-
timony of legatees and trustees, or
of persons allied to them, because
they are not successors by law: nay,
LIB. II.

gamus: imo in quidam nostra con-
titutione et hoc specialitér eis con-
cessimus; et multo magis iis, qui
in eorum potéstate sunt, vel qui eos
hhabent in potestate, hujusmodi li-
centiam damus.

TIT. X. 117
by our constitution, we have speci-
ally granted them this privilege ;
and we allow this still more readily
to persons under their subjection,
and to those, to whom they are sub-
ject.

De materia, in qua testamenta scribuntur.

§ XII. Nihil autem interest, tes-
tamentum in tabulis, an chartis,

membranisve, vel in alia materia
fiat.

$ 12. It is immaterial, whether a
testament be written upon a tablet
of wax, upon paper, parchment, or
any other substance.

De pluribus codicibus.

$ XII. Sed et unum testamen-
tum pluribus codicibus conficere
quis potest, secundum obtinentem
tamen observationem omnibus fac-
tis: quod interdum etiam necessa-
rium est; veluti si quis navigaturus
et secum ferre et domi relinquere
judiciorum suorum contestationem
velit: vel propter alias innumera-
biles causas, que humanis necessi-
tatibus imminent.

$ XIV. Sed hee quidem de tes-
tamentis, que scriptis conficiuntur,
sufficiunt. Si quis autem sine scrip-
tis voluerit ordinare jure civili tes-
tamentum, septem testibus adhibi-
tis, et sud voluntate coram eis nun-
cupata, sciat, hoc perfectissimum
testamentum jure civili firmumque
constitutum.

§ 13. Any person may execute
counter-parts of the same testament
observing the prescribed forms.
This is sometimes necessary; as
when a man going a voyage, is de-
sirous to carry his will with him,
and to leave a counter-part at home
for his better security. Innumer-
able other reasons for doing this
may arise, according to the various
necessities of mankind.

De testamento nuncupativo.

§ 14. Thus much may suffice
concerning written testaments. But
if a man wishes to dispose of his ef-
fects by a nuncupative or unwritten
testament, he may do so, if in the
presence of seven witnesses, he ver-
bally declares his will; and this
will be a valid testament according
to the civil law.
118 LIB. II.

TIT. XI.

 

TITULUS U

NDECIMUS.

DE MILITARI TESTAMENTO.

D. xxix. T. 1.

C. vi. T. 21.

In militum testamentis solemnitates remisse.

SUPRADICTA diligens obser-
vatio in ordinandis testamentis mi-
litibus, propter nimiam imperitiam
eorum, constitutionibus principali-
bus remissa est. Nam, quamvis ii
neque legitimum numerum testium
adhibuerint, neque aliam testamen-
torum solemnitatem observaverint,
recté nihilominus testantur, vide-
licét cum in expeditionibus occu-
pati sunt: quod merité nostra con-
stitutio introduxit. Quoquo enim
modo voluntas ejus suprema inve-
niatur, sive scripta, sive sine scrip-
tura, valet testamentum ex volun-
tate ejus. Illis autem temporibus,
per que, citra expeditionum neces-
sitatem, in aliis locis, vel suis eedi-
bus, degunt, minimé ad vindican-
dum tale privilegium adjuvantur.
Sed testari quidem, etsi filii-famili-
arum sint, propter militiam conce-
duntur: jure tamen communi, ed-
dem observatione et in eorum tes-
tamentis adhibenda, quam in testa-
mentis paganorum proximé expo-
suimus.

The before-mentioned strict ob-
servance of formalities, in the con-
struction of testaments, is dispensed
with by the imperial constitutions,
in favour of all military persons, on
account of their unskilfulness in
these matters. For, although they
should neither call the legal number
of witnesses, nor observe any other
solemnity, yet they may make a
good testament, if they are in actual
service. This was introduced by
our ordinance with good reason; so
that in whatever manner the testa-
ment of a military person is con-
ceived, whether in writing, or not,
it prevails according to his inten-
tion: but, when soldiers are not up-
on an expedition, and live in their
own houses or elsewhere, they are
by no means intitled to claim this
privilege; but a soldier, on account
of his profession is allowed to make
a testament, although he is the son
of a family : observing however, ac-
cording to the general law, all the
formalities, which are required of
others in this respect.

Rescriptum Divi Trajani.

$ I. Plané de testamentis mili-
tum Divus Trajanus Catilio Severo
ita rescripsit. Id privilegium, quod
militantibus datum est, ut quoquo
modo facta ab his testamenta rata

$ 1. The emperor Trajan wrote,
as follows, in his rescript to Catilius
Severus concerning military testa-
ments. The privilege, given to
military persons, that their testa-
LIB. Ii.

sint, sic intelligi debet, ut utique pri-
us constare debeat, testamentum fac-
tum esse: quod et sine scriptura, et
a non militantibus quoque, fieri po-
test. St ergo miles, de cujus bonis
apud te queritur, convocatis ad hoc
hominibus, ut voluntatem suam tes-
taretur, ita locutus est, ut declararet
quem vellet sibi heredem esse, et cut
libertatem tribueret ; potest videri si-
ne scripto hoc modo esse, testatus, et
voluntas ejus rata habenda est. Ca-
terum, si (ut plerumque sermonibus
fieri solet) dixit alicui, ego te heere-
dem faci, auz, bona mea tibi relin-
quo, non oportet hoc pro testamento
observari. Nec ullorum magis inter-
est, quam ipsorum, quibus id privi-
legium datum est, ejusmodi exemp-
lum non admitti. Alioqui non diffi-
culter post mortem alicujus militis
testes existerent, qui affirmarent, se
audisse dicentem aliquem relinquere
se bona, cui visum sit: et per hoc
vera judicia subverterentur.

TIT. XI. 119

ments, in whatever manner made,

Shall be valid, must be thus under-

stood ; it ought first to be apparent
that a testament was made in some
manner ; for a testament may be
made without writing, by persons
not military. And therefore, if it
appear, that the soldier, concerning
whose goods question is now made
before you, did, in the presence of
witnesses, purposely called, declare
what person should be his heir, and
to what slaves he should give liber-
ty, he shall be reputed to have made
his testament without writing, and
his will shall be ratified. But of it
is only proved, that he said to some
one, as it often happens in discourse,
I appoint you my heir—or—TI leave
you all my estate, such words do
not amount toa testament. Nor are
any persons more interested than
the soldiery, that words so spoken
should not amount to a will ; other-
wise, witnesses might without diffi-
culty be produced after the death of
any military man, who would af-
firm, that they had heard him be-
queath his estate, to whomever they
please; and the true intentions
might be defeated.

De surdo et muto.

$ II. Quinimo et mutus et sur-
dus miles testamentum facere po-
test.

§ 2. A soldier though mute and
deaf, may yet make a testament.

De militibus et veteranis.

§ III. Sed hactentis hoc illis 4
principalibus constitutionibus con-
ceditur, quatents militant et in cas-
tris degunt. Post missionem verd

$ 3. This privilege was granted
by the imperial constitutions to mi-
litary men, to be enjoyed only dur-
ing actual service, and while they
120

LIB. I.

TIT. XI.

 

veterani, vel extra castra alii, si fa-
ciant adhuc militantes testamen-
tum, communi omnium civium Ro-
manorum jure id facere debent. Et
quod in castris fecerint testamen-
tum non communi jure, sed quo-
modo voluerint, post missionem in-
tra annum tantium valebit. Quid
ergo si intra annum quis decesserit,
conditio autem heredi adscripta
post annum extiterit? an quasi mi-
litis testamentum valeat? Et placet
valere quasi miltis.

lived in tents. For, if veterans after
dismission, or soldiers out of camp,
would make their testaments, they
must pursue the forms required of
all the citizens of Rome. And, if a
testament be made in camp, and the
solemnities of the law are not ad-
hered to, it will continue valid only
for one year after dismission from
the army. Suppose therefore, a
soldier should die testate within a
year after his dismission, and the
condition, enjoined upon the heir
should happen after the year, would
his testament be valid? We answer,
it would prevail as a military testa-
ment.

De facto ante militiam testamento.

§ IV. Sed et, si quis ante militi-
am non jure fecit testamentum, et
miles factus, et in expeditione de-
gens, resignavit illud, et quedam
adjecit sive detraxit, vel alias ma-
nifesta est militis voluntas, hoc va-
lere volentis, dicendum est, valere
hoc testamentum, quasi ex nova
militis voluntate.

§ 4. If a man, before entering in-
fo the army, should make his testa-
ment irregularly, and afterwards,
upon an expedition, open it for the
purpose of adding, or striking out;
or if he should otherwise make
his intention manifest, that this tes-
tament should be valid, it must be
pronounced so, by virtue of this re-
publication.

De milite arrogato vel emancipato.

§ V. Denique, et si in arrogati-
onem datus fuerit miles, vel filius-
familias emancipatus est, testamen-
tum ejus quasi ex nova militis vo-
luntate, valet: nec videtur capitis
diminutione irritum fieri.

§ 5. If a soldier be given in ar-
rogation, or, being the son of a fa-
mily, be emancipated, his. testament
is equally valid, as if he had re-
published it by a new declaration:
nor is it invalidated by his chauge
of state.

De peculio quasi castrensi.

$ VI. Sciendum tamen est, quod,
cum ad exemplum castrensis pecu-
lii, tam anteriores leges, quam prin-

$ 6. Be it known, that, since the
ancient laws, as well as the later
constitutions, have, in imitation of
LIB. II.

cipales constitutiones, quibusdam
quasi castrensia dederant peculia,
et horum quibusdam permissum
fuerat etiam in potestate degenti-
bus testari, nostra constitutio, id
latius extendens, permiserit omni-
bus in hujuscemodi peculiis testari
quidém, sed jure communi. Cujus
constitutionis tenore perspecto, li-
centia est nihil eorum, quee ad pre-
fatum jus pertinent, ignorare.

TIT. XII.

121

the military estates, given to some
persons quasi military estates, and
have indulged some of these in the
liberty of making testaments, while
they were under power, our con-
stitution still extending this privi-
lege, hath permitted all persons, who
possess these estates, to make their
testaments, but according to the
common forms of law. Whoever
carefully peruses that constitution,
may fully inform himself of all that
relates to the before-mentioned priv-
ilege.

TITULUS DUODECIMUS.

QUIBUS NON EST PERMISSUM FACERE TESTAMEN-
TUM.

D. xxviii. T. 1.

C. vi. T. 22.

De filio-familias.

NON tamen omnibus licet facere
testamentum: statim enim ii, qui
alieno juri subjecti sunt, testamenti
faciendi jus non habent: aded qui-
dem ut, quamvis parentes eis per-
miserint, nihilo magis jure testari
possint : exceptis iis, quos antea en-
umeravimus, et precipué militibus,
qui in potestate parentum sunt;
quibus de eo, quod in castris acqui-
siverunt, permissum est, ex consti-
tutionibus principum, testamentum
facere. Quod quidem jus ab initio
tantum militantibus datum est, tam
ex auctoritate Divi Augusti, quam

Nervee, nec non optimi imperatoris
16

The right of making a testament
is not granted to all. Persons under
the power of others, have not this
right: so that, although parents
have given permission, this will not
enable their children to make a
valid testament; those excepted
whom we have already mentioned,
and principally sons of families en-
gaged in the army, who by our con-
stitutions may bequeath whatever
they have acquired by military ser-
vice. This permission was at first
granted by Augustus, Nerva, and
that excellent prince Trajan, to ac-
tual soldiers only; but afterwards
122

LIB. I. TIT. XIU.

 

'Franjani: postea vero subscriptione
Divi Hadriani etiam dimissis 4 mi-
litia, id est, veteranis, concessum
est. Itaque, siquidem fecerint de
castrensi peculio testamentum, per-
tinebit hoc ad eum, quem heredem
reliquerunt: si vero intestati deces-
serint nullis liberis vel fratribus
Superstitibus, ad parentes eorum,
jure communi pertinebit. Ex hoc
intelligere possumus, quod in cast-
ris acquisierit miles, qui in potestate
patris est, neque ipsum patrem ad-
imere posse, neque patris creditores
id vendere, vel alitér inquietare, ne-
que patre mortuo cum fratribus
commune esse; sed scilicét propri-
um esse ejus, qui id in castris ac-
quisierit: quanquam jure civili
omnium, qui in potestate parentum
sunt, peculia, perindé in bonis pa-
rentum computentur, ac servorum
peculia in bonis dominorum nume-
rantur: exceptis videlicét iis, que
ex sacris constitutionibus, et pree-
cipué nostris, propter diversas cau-
sas non acquiruntur. Preetér hos
igitur, qui castrense peculium vel
quasi castrense habent, si quis alius
filius-familias testamentum fecerit,
inutile est; licet suze potestatis fac-
tus decesserit.

it was extended by the emperor
Adrian to veterans, that is, to sol-
diers who had ‘received their dis-
mission : and therefore, if the son of
a family bequeath his castrensian
or military estate, it will pass to his
instituted heir: but, if such son die
intestate without children or bro-
thers, his estate will then pass of
common right to’his father, (or
other paternal ascendants.) We
may hence infer, that whatever a
soldier, although under power, hath
acquired by military service, can-
not be taken from him even by his
father; whose creditors cannot sell
it, or otherwise disturb the son in
his possession; and what is thus
acquired is not liable to be shared
in common with brothers, upon the
demise of the father, but remains
the sole property of him, who ac-
quired it: although by the civil law,
the peculia, or estates of those, who
are under power, are reckoned
among the wealth of their parents ;
in the same manner as the peculium
of a slave is esteemed the property
of his master. But those estates
must be excepted, which by the con-
stitutions of the emperors, and chief-
ly by our own, are prohibited for
divers reasons to be acquired for
parents. Upon the whole, if the
son of a family, neither possessed of
a military or quasi-military estate,
make a testament, it will not be
valid, even though he be afterwards
emancipated, and sui juris before
his death.
LIB. I. TIT. XII.

De impubere et furioso.

§ I. Prasterea testamentum fa-
cere non possunt impuberes; quia
nullum eorum animi judicium est.
Item furiosi; quia mente carent.
Nec ad rem pertinet, si impubes
‘postea pubes, aut furiosus postea
compos mentis factus fuerit, et de-
cesserit. Furiosi autem, si per id
tempus fecerint testamentum, quo
furor eorum intermissus est, jure
testati esse videntur; certé eo,
quod ante furorem fecerint, testa-
mento valente, nam neque testa-
mentum recte factum neque ullum
aliud negotium recté gestum, pos-
tea furor interveniens perimit.

$1. A person within the age of
puberty, cannot make a good testa-
ment ; because he is not supposed to
possess the requisite judgment of
mind ; so of a.madman, inasmuch
as he is deprived of his senses. Nor
is it material though the minor ayr-
rive at puberty before his death; or
the madman regain his senses, and
then die. But, if he make his will
during a lucid interval, he is a le-
gal testator ; for it is certain that.a
testament which a man hath made
before he was seized with madness,
is good: for.asubsequentfit of fren-
zy can neither invalidate a regular
testament or any other regular
transaction.

De prodigo.

§ IL. Item prodigus, cui bono-
rum suorum administratio inter-
dicta est, testamentum facere non
potest : sed id, quod anté fecerit,
quam interdictio bonorum suorum
ei fiat, ratum est.

De surdo

§ III. Item surdus et mutus non
semper testamentum facere pos-
sunt. Utique autem de eo surdo
loquimur, qui omnino non exaudit,
non qui tardé exaudit. Nam et
mutus is intelligitur, qui eloqui ni-
hil potest, non qui tardé Joquitur.
Sepé enim etiam, literati homines
variis casibus et audiendiet loquen-
di facultatem amittunt. Unde nos-
tra constitutio etiam his subvenit,
ut, certis casibus et modis, secun-

$2. A prodigal also, who is in-
terdicted from the management of
his own affairs, cannot make a tes-
tament: but if it were made before
such interdiction, it is valid.

et muto.

$3. A man deaf and dumb is not
always capable of making a testa-
ment: but this must be understood
of one, who is so deaf as to be un-
able to hear at all, and not of a mere
thickness of hearing: and of that
dumbness which prevents all utter-
ance, and not of amere difficulty of
speech : for it often happens, ‘that
men of learning lose the faculty of
hearing and speaking by various
misfortunes; therefore our consti-
124

dim normam ejus possint testari,
aliaque facere, que eis permissa
sunt. Sed, si quis post testamen-
tum factum, adversa valetudine aut
quolibit alio casu mutus aut surdus
esse coeperit, ratum nihilominus
manet ejus testamentum.

LIB. Il. TIT. XIIL

tution comes in aid of all such per-
sons, and permits them, in certain
cases to make testaments, and do
many other acts. observing the rules
therein laid down. But, if any man
after making his testament, become
deaf or mute by reason of ill health
or any other accident, his testament
will remain good notwithstanding.

De cxco.

§ IV. Cecus autem non potest
facere testamentum, nisi per obser-
vationem, quam lex Divi Justini
patris nostri introduxit.

§ 4. A blind man cannot make a
will unless observing the rules
which the law of the emperor Justin
our father, has introduced.

De eo, qui est apud hostes.

$V. Ejus, qui apud hostes est,
testamentum, quod ibi fecit, non
valet, quamvis redierit : sed quod,
dum in civitate fuerat, fecit, sive
redierit, valet, jure postliminii; sivé
illic decesserit, valet ex lege Cor-
nelia.

$5. The testament of a captive
is not valid, if made during his cap-
tivity; even although he live to re-
turn. But if made while in the city,
it is good; either by the jus postli-
mini, if the prisoner return : or
by the law Cornelia, if he die cap-
tive.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-TERTIUS.

DE EXH/REDATIONE LIBERORUM.

D. xxviii. T. 2. C. vi. T. 28, 29. Nov. 115.

Jus vetus de liberis in potestate.

NON tamen, ut omninod valeat
testamentum, sufficit hec observa-
tio quam supra exposuimus: sed,
qui filium in potestate habet, cu-
rare debet, ut eum heredem insti-

The solemnitiesof law, before ex-
plained, are not alone sufficient to
make a testament valid. For he
who has a son under his power,
should take care either to institute
LIB. II.

tuat, vel exharedem eum nomina-
tim faciat. Alioqui, si eum silen-
tio preeterierit, inutilitér testabitur :
aded quidem ut, si vivo patre filius
mortuus sit, nemo heres ex eo tes-
tamento existere possit: quia scili-
cét ab initio non constiterit testa-
mentum. Sed non ita de filiabus,
et aliis per virilem sexum descen-
dentibus liberis utriusque sexus,
antiquitati: fuerat observatum: sed,
si non fuerant scripti heeredes scrip-
teeve, vel exhzredati exheredateve
testamentum quidem non- infirma-
batur, jus tamen accrescendi eis ad
certam portionem prestabatur. Sed
nec nominatim eas personas exhx-
redare parentibus necesse erat, sed.
licebat inter czeteros hoc facere.
Nominatim autem quis exheeredari
videtur, sivé ita exheredetur, Ti-
tius filius meus exheres esto, sive
ita filius meus exheres esto, non
adjecto proprio nomine : scilicét, si
alius filius non extet.

TIT. XIII.

125

him his heir, or to disinherit him
by name : for if he passover his son
in silence, the testament will have
no effect. And even if the son die
living the father, yet no one can
take upon himself the heirship by
virtue of such a testament, inasmuch
as it was null from the beginning.
But the ancients did not observe this
rule in regard to daughters and
grand-children of either sex, though
descended from the male line; for
although these were neither institut-
ed heirs, or disinherited, yet the tes-
tament was not invalidated; be-
cause a right of accretion intitled
them to a certain portion of the in-
heritance: parents were therefore
not necessitated to disinherit these
children nominally, but might do it
inter ceeteros. A child is nominally
disinherited, if the words of the will
are let Titius my son be disinherit-
ed; or even thus; let my son be dis-
inherited, without the addition of
a proper name, provided the testa-
tor had no other son living.

De posthumis.

$I. Posthumi quoque liberi vel
heeredes instituti debent vel exhe-
redari: et in eo par omnium con-
ditio est ; quod et filio posthumo,
et quolibet ex ceteris liberis, sive
feminini sexus sive masculini pre-
terito, valet quidem testamentum,
sed postea, agnatione posthumi sive
posthume, rumpitur, et ed ratione
totum infirmatur. Idedque, si mu-
lier, ex qua posthumous aut posthu-
ma sperabatur, abortum fecerit,
nihil impedimento est scriptis he-

§ 1. Also posthumous children
should either be instituted heirs, or
disinherited: and in this the condi-
tion of all children is equal : but, if
a posthumous son, or any posthu-
mous descendant in the right line,
male or female, be pretermitted, the
testament will nevertheless be valid
at the time of making it; but, by the
subsequent birth of a child of either
sex, it will be annulled. And there-
fore, if a woman from whom a pos-
thumous child is expected, should
126 LIB. II.
redibus ad hereditatem adeundam.
Sed foeminini quidem sextis persone
vel nominatim vel’ inter ceteros ex-
heredari solebant : dum tamén, si
inter ceteros exheredarentur, ali-
quid eis legaretur, née viderentur
preeteritee esse per oblivionem. Mas-
culos vero posthumos, id est, filios
et deinceps, placuit non aliter recté
exheredari, nisi nominatim exhz-
redarentur, hoc scilicét modo, qui-
cunque mihi filius genitus fuerit,
exheres esto.

De quasi

$ II. Posthumorum autem loco
sunt et hi, qui in suiheredis locum
succedendo, quasi agnascendo,fiunt
parentibus sui heredes : ut eccé, si
quis filium, et ex eo nepotem nep-
temve in potestate habeat, quia fi-
lius gradu precedit, is solus jura
sui heredis habet; quamvis nepos
quoque et neptis ex eo in eadem po-
testate sint. Sed, si filius ejus vivo
eo moriatur, aut qualibet alia rati-
one exeat de potestase ejus incipit
nepos neptisve in ejus locum succe-
dere, et eo modo jura suorum heere-
dum quasi agnatione nanciscitur.
Ne ergo eo modo rumpatur ejus
testamentum sicut ipsum filium vel
heredem institutere vel nominatim
exheeredare debet, nenon jure faciat
testamentum ; ita et nepotem nep-
temve ex filio necesse est ei vel ha-
redem instituere vel exheredayre ;
ne forté eo vivo, filio mortuo, suc-
cedendo in locum ejus nepos, nep-
tisve, quasi agnascendo,rumpat tes-

TIT. XII.

miscarry nothing can prevent the
written heirs from entering upon
the inheritance. But posthumous
females may beeither nominally dis-
inherited, or inter coeteros by a gen-
eral clause : yet, if disinherited a-
ter ceeteros, something must be left
them to show they were not omitted
through forgetfulness. But male
posthumous children, 7. e. sons, and
their descendants in the direct line,
cannot be disinherited otherwise,
than nominally in this form; what-
ever son is hereafter born to me, I
disinhertt him.

posthumis.

$2. Those are reckoned in the
place of posthumous children, who,
succeeding in the stead of proper
heirs, become by agnation, or guasi-
birth, proper heirs to their parents:
thus, if Titius have a son under his
power, and by him a grand-son, or
grand-daughter, then would the son
because he is first in degree, have the
sole right of a proper heir, although
the grand-son, or grand-daughter by
that son, is under the same parental
power. But, if the son of Titius
should die in his father’s lifetime, or
sshould by any other means ceaseto
be under his father’s power, the
grand-son or grand-daughter would
succeed in his place; and would thus
by what may be called a quasi birth
obtain the right of a proper heir.
Therefore, as it behoves a testator
for his own security, either to insti-
tute or disinherit his son, lest his
testament should be annulled, so it
isequally necessary for him either to
LIB. I.

tamentum. Idque lege Julia Vel-

leia provisum est: in qua similis
exheredationis modus ad similitu-
dinem posthumorum demonstratur.

TIT. XII.

127

institute or disinherit his grand-son
or grand-daughter by that son, lest,
if his son should die in his (the tes-
tator’s) life-time, his grand-son or
grand-daughter, succeeding to the
place of his son, should make void
his testament by quasi agnation.
This has been introduced by the
law Julia Velleia, in which is set
forth a form of disinheriting quasi-
posthumous, like that of posthu-
mous children.

De emancipatis.

§ OI. Emancipatos liberos jure
civili neque heredes instituere, ne-
que exheredare, necesse est: quia
non sunt sui heredes. Sed preetor
omnes, tam feminini sexts quam
masculini, si heredes non institu-
antur, exheredari jubet;  virilis
sexus nominatim, foeminini vero in-
ter ceteros: quia, si neque heeredes
instituti fuerunt, neque ita (ut dix-
imus) exheredati, promittit eis
pretor contra tabulas testamenti,
bonorum possessionem.

§ 3. The civil law does not make
it necessary, either to institute em-
ancipated children heirs, or to dis-
inherit them in a testament; inas-
much as they are not sat heredes,
i.e. proper heirs. But the preetor
ordains, that all children male or
female, if they be not instituted
heirs, shall be disinherited; the
males nominally ; the females inter
eeteros : for, if children have neith-
er been insituted heirs, nor properly
disinherited in manner before men-
tioned, the preetor gives them pos-
session of the goods, contrary to the
testament.

De adoptivis.

§ IV. Adoptivi liberi, quamdit
sunt in potestate patris adoptivi,
ejusdem juris habentur, cujus sunt
justis nuptiis quesiti: itaque here-
des instituendi vel exheredandi
sunt, secundim ea, que de natura-
libus exposuimus. Emancipati ve-
ro 4 patre adoptivo, neque jure ci-
vili, neque eo jure, quod ad edic-
tum preetoris attinet, inter liberos
connumerantur. Qua ratione acci-

§ 4, Adopted children, while un-
der the power of their adoptive fa-
ther, are intitled to the rights of
children born in lawful matrimony :
and therefore they must either be
instituted heirs, or disinherited, ac-
cording to the rules laid down re-
specting natural (legitimate) child-
ren. But neither by the civil law,
or by preetorian equity, are children
emancipated by an adoptive father,
128

LIB. Il. TIT. XIIl.

 

dit, ut ex diverso, quod ad natura-
lem parentem attinet, quamdit qui-
dem sunt in adoptiva familia, extra-
neorum numero habeantur, ut eos
neque heeredes instituere, neque ex-
heeredare, necesse sit: cum verd
emancipati fuerint ab adoptivo pa-
tre, tunc incipiant in ea causa esse,
in qua futuri essent, si 4 naturali
patre emancipati fuissent.

numbered among his natural or
legitimate children, so as to partake
of their rights: hence adopted chil-
dren, while in adoption, are reputed
strangers to their natural parents,
who need not institute them heirs,
or disinherit them: but, when em-
ancipated by their adoptive father,
they are in the same state, in which
they would have been, if emanci-
pated by their natural father.

Jus novum.

§ V. Sed hee quidem {vetustas
introducebat. Nostra vero consti-
tutio, inter masculos et foeminas in
hoc jure nihil interesse existimans,
quia utraque persona in hominum
procreatione simili nature officio
fungitur, et lege antiqua duodecim
tabularum omnes similitér ad suc-
cessionem ab intestato vocabantur,
quod et preetores postea secuti esse
videntur, ided simplex ac simile
jus, et in filiis et in filiabus et in cx-
teris descendentibus per virilem
sexum personis, non solum jam na-
tis, sed etiam posthumis, introdux-
it; ut omnes, sive sui sivé emanci-
pati sint, vel heeredes instituantur,
vel nominatim exheyredentur: et
eundem habeant effectum circa tes-
tamenta parentum surorum infirm-
anda, et hereditatem auferendam,
quem filii sui vel emancipati ha-
bent, sivé jam nati sint, sive, adhuc
in utero constituti, postea nati sint.
Circa adoptivos autem filios certam
induximus divisionem, que in nos-
tra constitutione, quam super adop-
tivis tulimus, continetur.

§ 5. These were the rules of old
times. But we (not thinking, that
any distinction can reasonably be
made between the two sexes, inas-
much as they equally contribute to
the procreation of the species, and
because, by the ancient law of the
twelve tables, all children, were
equally called to the succession ab
intestato, which law the pretors
seem afterwards to have followed)
have by our constitution introduced
the same law both as to sons and
daughters, and also to all other des-
cendants in the male line, whether
in being, or posthumous: so that all
children whether they are proper
heirs or emancipated, must either be
instituted heirs or disinheirted by
name: and they possess the same
influence as to avoiding the testa-
ment of the parent, and destroying
the heirship, as the legitimate or e-
mancipated children have, whether
appointed as living or as posthu-
mous children. In respect of adopt-
ed children, we have introduced
certain regulations, which are con-
tained in our constitution of adop-
tions.
LIB. II.

TIT. XII. 129

 

De testamento militis.

§ VI. Sed, si in expeditione oc-
cupatus miles testamentum faciat,
et liberos suos jam natos vel post-
humos nominatim non exhzredave-
rit, sed silentio preeterierit, non igno-
rans, an habeat liberos, silentum
ejus pro exheredatione nominatim
facta valere, constitutionibus princi-
pum cautum est.

$ 6. If a soldier in actual service
make his testament, and neither dis-
inherit his children already born, or
his posthumous children by name,
but pass them over in silence, al-
though it be known to him, that he
has such children, it is provided by
the constitutions of the emperors,
that such silence shall be equal to
a nonimal disinherison.

\

De testamento matris, aut avi materni.

§ VIL. Mater vel avus maternus
necesse non habent liberos suos aut
heeredes instituere, aut exheredare,
sed possunt eos silentio omittere:
nam silentium matris aut avi ma-
terni, et czeterorum per matrem as-
cendentum, tantum facit, quantum
exheredatio patris. Neque enim
matri filium filiamve, neque avo
materno nepotem neptemve ex filia,
si eum eamve heredem non institu-
at, exheredare necesse est, sive de
jure civili queramus, sivé de edicto
preetoris, quo preetor preeteritis libe-
ris contra tabulas bonorum posses-
sionem promittit: sed aliud eis ad-
miniculum servatur, quod paulo
post vobis manifestum fiet.

17

§ 7. Neither a mother, nor a
grandfather on the mother’s side,
need expressly institute their child-
yen heirs, or disinherit them, but
may pass them by in silence; for
the silence of a mother, a maternal
grandfather, and of all other ascen-
dants on the mother’s side, is equi-
valent to an actual disinherison by
a father. For a mother is not ob-
liged to disinherit her children, if
she does not think proper to insti-
tute them her heirs: neither is a
maternal grandfather under a ne-
cessity of instituting or of disin-
heriting his grandson or grand-
daughter by a daughter; inasmuch
as this is not required either by the
civil law, or the edict of the preetor,
which gives possession of goods
contrary to the testament, to those
children, who have been passed
over in silence. But children, in
this case, are not without remedy
against the testament of their mo-
ther or maternal grandfather, which
shall be shewn hereafter.
130 LIB. IL

TIT. XIV.

TITULUS DECIMUS-QUARTUS.

DE H#REDIBUS INSTITUENDIS.

D. xxviii. T. 5. C. vi. T. 24.

Qui possunt heredes institui.

H/EREDES instituere permis-
sum est tam liberos homines quam
servos; et tam proprios, quam alie-
nos. Proprios autem olim quidem
secundum plurium sententias non
alitér, quam cum libertate, recté
instituere licebat: hodié verd eti-
am. siné libertate ex nostra constitu-
tione eos heeredes instituere permis-
sum est. Quod non per innovatio-
nem induximus, sed quoniam equi-
usierat, et Atilicino placuisse, Pau-
lus suis libris, quos tam ad Masuri-
um Sabinum quam ad Plautium
scripsit, refert. Proprius autem
servus etiam is intelligitur, in quo
nudam proprietatem testator habet,
alio usumfructum habente. Est
tamen casus, in quo nec cum liber-
tate utiliter servus 4 domina heres
instituitur, ut constitutione Divo-
rum Severi et Antonini cavetur, cu-
jus verba hec sunt. Servum, adul-
terio maculatum, non jure testa-
menio manumissum ante sententi-
am ab ea muliere videri, que rea
Suerat ejusdem criminis postulata,
rationis est. Quare sequitur, ut, in
eundem a domina collata, heredis
institutio mulius momenti habeatur.
Alienus servus etiam is intelligitur,
in quo usumfructum testator habet.

A man may appoint slaves, as
well as freemen, to be his heirs by
testament; and may nominate the
slaves of another as well as his
own: yet, according to the opinion
of many, no master could formerly
make his own slaves his heirs, with-
out freeing them: but, at present,
by our constitution, masters may do
this: which we have introduced,
not for the sake of innovation, but
because it seemed most just; and
because Paulus, in his comment-
aries upon Sabinus and Plautius,
affirms, that this was also the opi-
nion of Atilicinus. We callaslave
proprius servus, if the testator had
only a naked property in him, the
usufruct being in another. But, in
a constitution of the emperors Se-
verus and Antoninus, there is a case,
in which a slave was not permitted
to be instituted heir by his owner,
although his liberty was expressly
given tohim. The words are——
It is consonant to right reason, that
no slave, accused of adultery with
his mistress, shall be allowed, before
@ sentence of acquital, to be made
Sree by that mistress, who is alleged
to be a partner in the crime. Hence
if a mistress institute such a slave
to be her heir, it is of no avail.
Alienus servus is one of whom the
testator had only the usufruct.
LIB. I.

TIT. XIV.

131

 

Si servus heeres institutis in eadem causa manserit, vel non.

$I. Servus autem 4 domino suo
heeres institutus, siquidem in eaddem
causdé manserit, fit ex testamento
liber, heeresque ei necessarius. Si
vero & vivo testatore manumissus
fuerit, suo arbitrio adire heredita-
tem potest ; quia non fit heres ne-
cessarius, cum utrumque ex domi-
ni testamento non consequatur.
Quod si alienatus fuerit, jussu novi
domini adire heereditatem debet,
et e4 ratione per eum dominus fit
heres: nam ipse alienatus neque
liber, neque heeres esse potest ;
etiamsi cum libertate heres insti-
tutus fuerit: destitisse enim a liber-
tatis datione videtur dominus, qui
eum alienavit.-Alienus quoque ser-
vus heeres institutus, si in eddem
causa duraverit, jussu ejus domini
adire hereditatem debet. Si verd
alienatus fuerit ab eo, aut vivo tes-
tatore, aut post mortem ejus, ante-
quam adeat, debet jussu novi domi-
niadire. At, si manumissus est
vivo testatore, vel mortuo, ante-
quam adeat, suo arbitrio adire po-
test hereditatem.

§ 1. A slave instituted by his
master, remaining in slavery be-
comes free at the death of his master
by virtue of the testament, and his
necessary heir. But if he be manu-
mitted in the lifetime of his master,
he may accept or refuse the inheri-
tance; for he does not become ane-
cessary heir, since he does not ob-
tain both his liberty and the inheri-
tance by virtue of the testament.
But, ifhe should be aliened, he can-
not enter upon the inheritance un-
less at the command of his new
master, who though his slave may
become the heir of the testator. For
a slave aliened cannot obtain his lib-
erty, or take an inheritance to his
own use, by virtue of the treatment
of the master, who transferred him,
although his freedom was expressly
given by such testament; because
a master who has aliened his slave,
seems to have renounced the inten-
tion of enfranchising him. And,
when the slave of another isappoint-
ed heir, but remains in slavery, he
cannot take the inheritance, but by
his master’s order: and, if the slave
be aliened in the lifetime of the tes-
tator, or even after his death, before
hehas actually taken theinheritance
he must acctpt or refuse it, at the
command of his new master. But,
if the slave be infranchised, living
the testator, or after his death, be-
fore he has accepted the heirship, he
may enter upon the inheritance or
not, at his own option.
132 LIB. I.

TIT. XIV.

De servo de hereditario.

§$ II. Servus etiam alienus post
domini mortem recté heeres insti-
tuitur: quia et cum hereditariis —
servis testamenti factio est. Non-
dum enim adita hereditas, persone
vicem sustinet non heredis futuri,
sed defuncti: cum etiam ejus, qui
in utero est, servus recté heres in-
stituatur.

De servo

§ III. Servus autem plurium,
cum quibus testamenti factio est, ab
extraneo institutus heeres unicui-
que dominorum, cujus jussu adie-
rit, pro portione dominii acquirit
hereditatem.

De numero
$ IV. Et unum hominem, et plu-
res, usque in infinitum, quot quis
heeredes velit, facere licet.

$2. The slave of another may
legally be instituted an heir, after
the death of his master; for slaves
of an inheritance not entered upon,
may take by testament : for an in-
heritance, not yet entered on, repre-
sents the person of the deceased, and
notof the future heir: thus the slave
even of achild in the womb, may be
constituted an heir.

plurium.

$ 3. Ifthe slave of many masters
all capable of taking by testament,
is instituted heir by a stranger, he
acquires a part of the inheritance for
each master, who commanded him
to take it, according to the several
proportions of property.

heredum.

§ 4. A testator may appoint one
heir, or as many heirs as he pleases
in infinitum.

De divisione hereditatis.

§ V. Hereditas plerumque divi-
ditur in duodecim uncias; que as-
sis appellatione continentur. Ha-
bent autem et he partes propria no-
mina ab uncia usque ad assem; ut
puta heec, sextans quadrans, triens,
quincunx, semis, septunx, bes, do-
drans, dextans, deunx. Non autem
utique semper duodecim uncias es-
se oportet: nam tot uncie assem
efficiunt, quot testator voluerit : et,
siunum tantum quis eu semisse
(verbi gratia) heeredem scripserit

$5. An inheritance is generally

divided into twelve uncie, that is,
partsorounces, allof which are com-
prehended under one total, termed
an As: and each of these parts from
the uncia to the As, has its peculiar
name: viz.

Sextans—a sixth part, or 2ounces.

Quadrans—a fourth, or 3 ounces.

Triens—a third, or 4 ounces.

Quincunrz—five ounces.

Semis—a moiety, or 6 ounces.

Septunz—seven ounces.
LIB. H.

EE. SEL,

133

 

‘totus as in semisse erit; neque
enim idem ex parte testatus, et ex
parte intestatus, decedere potest,
nisi sit miles, cujus sola voluntas
in testanda spectatur. Et é con-
trario potest quis in quantascunque

voluerit, plurimas uncias suam hee-

reditatem dividere.

De portionibus sigulorum heredum.

Bes—two thirds, or 8 ounces ;
quasi bis triens.

Dodrans—nine ounces, or three
fourths; quasi, dempto quadran-
te, As.

Dextans—ten ounces; quasi demp-
to sextante, As.

Deunz—eleven ounces ‘out of
twelve; quasi, dempté uncia, As.
But it is not necessary, that an

As, or total, should always be divid-
ed into twelve parts: foran As
may consist of what parts the testa-
tor pleases ; and, if a man name
but one heir, and appoint him ex
semisse i. e. the heir of six parts;
yet the whole As will be included ;
for no man can die partly testate
and partly intestate, except a sol-
dier, whose intention is solely to be
regarded. And a testator may also
divide his estate into as many parts,
as he thinks convenient.

Si testator assem

non diveserit, aut partes in quorundam persona non
ultra assem expresserit.

$ VI. Si plures instituantur he-
redes, ita demum in hoc casu par-
tium distributio necessaria est, si
nolit testator, eos ex equis partibus
heeredes esse. Satis enim constat,
nullis partibus nominatis, ex zquis
partibus eos heeredes esse. Parti-
bus autem in quorundam personis
expressis, si quis alius siné parte
nominatus erit, siquidem aliqua
pars assi deerit, ex ea parte heeres
fit. Et, si plures siné parte scripti
sunt, omnes in eandem partem con-
currunt. Si verd totus As comple-
tus sit, ii, qui nominatim expressas

§ 6. If many heirs be appointed,
it is necessary to make a division of
the effects, if it be not intended, that
all should take in equal portions;
which must be the case if no distri-
bution be made. But if the shares
of some should be expressed, and a
share or shares remain undisposed
of, such share or shares will belong
equally to him or them whoseshares
are not specified. But, if a whole
As, or inheritance, be given among
some of the nominated heirs, yet
they, whose shares are mentioned,
are entitled only to a moiety, and he
134 LIB. IL.

partes habent, in dimidiam partem
vocantur ; et ille, vel illi omnes, in
alteram dimidiam. Nec interest,
primus an medius, an novissimus,
siné parte heres scriptus sit: ea
enim pars data intelligitur, quae va-
cat.

Si pars vacet,

$ VII. Videamus, si pars aliqua
vacet, nec tamen quisquam siné
parte fit heres institutus, quid juris
sit, veluti si tres ex quartis parti-
bus heeredes scripti sunt. Et con-
stat vacantem partem singulis ta-
cite pro hereditaria parte accedere,
et perinde haberi, ac si ex tertiis
partibus heeredes scripti essent : et
ex diverso, si plures heredes scrip-
ti in portionibus sint, tacité singulis
decrescere; ut, si (verbi gratid)
quatuor ex tertiis partibus heeredes
scripti sint, perindé habeatur, ac si
unusquisque ex quarta parte heeres
scriptus fuisset.

TIT. XIV.

or they, whose shares are not men-
tioned, are called to the succession
of the other moiety. And, when a
whole inheritance is not given, itis
immaterial whether an heir, whose
share is not specified, hold the first,
middle, or last place in the nomina-
tion: for he is equally intitled to
the part not bequeathed.

aut exuperet.

$ 7. Let us inquire in case a part
should remain unbequeathed, and
yet a certain portion should be given
to each nominated heir: as if three
should be instituted, and a fourth
given to each. It is clear in this
case that the undisposed part would
vest in each, in proportion to his
share bequeathed : and that each
would be reputed the written heir
of a third. And, on the contrary if
many arenominated heirs in certain
portions, so as to exceed the As,
then each heir must suffer a defal-
cation pro rati. for example, if
four are instituted, and a third be
given to each, then this disposition
would be the same as if each of the
written heirs had been instituted to
a fourth only.

 

Si plures uncize quam duodecim distribute sunt.

§$ VIL Et, si plures uncia,
quam duodecim, distribute sint, is,
qui siné parte institutus est, quod
dupondio deest, habebit. Indem-
que erit, si dupondius expletus sit.
Qua omnes partes ad assem postéa

$ 8. If more than twelve ounces
are bequeathed, then he, who is in-
stituted without any prescribed
share, shall be intitled to what re-
mains of a dupondius ; that is, of
twenty-four parts: and if more than
LIB. I.

TIT. XIV. 135

 

revocantur, quamvis sint plurium
unciarum.

De modis
§ IX. _Heeres et puré et sub condi-
tione institui potest; ex certo temp-

ore, aut ad certum tempus, non po-
test: veluti, post quinguenium,

quam moriar ; vel ex calendis illis :.

vel, usque ad calendis illa heres esto.
Denique diem adjectum haberi pro
supervacuo placet, et perindeé esse,
ac si puré heres institutes esset.

twenty-four parts are bequeathed,
then the heir, who is nominated
without any determinate share, is
intitled to the remainder of a ¢ri-
pondius, i. e. of thirty-six parts or
ounces. But all these parts are
afterwards reduced to twelve.

instituendi.

§ 9. An heir may be constituted
simply, or conditionally—but not
from oy to any certain period: as,
be my heir after five years to be
computed from my death—or—
from the calends of such a month
or——until the calends of such
amonth. For time, thus added, is
in law deemed void, and the ap-
pointment becomes ungonditional.

 

De conditione impossibili.

§ X. Impossibilis conditio in in-
stitutionibus et legatis, nec non in
fideicommissis et libertatibus, pro
non scripta habetur.

De pluribus

§ XI. Si plures conditiones in
institutionibus adscripte sunt, si-
quidem conjunctim, ut puta, si i-
lud et illud factum fuerit, omnibus
parendum est: si separatim, veluti,
si illud aut illud factum erit, cui li-
bet conditioni obtemperare satis est.

$ 10. An impossible condition in
the institution of heirs, legatees, or
trustees, or the conferring of liberty,
is treated as unwritten or void.

conditionibus.

$ 11. If many conditions be joint-
ly required in the appointment, as
if this and that thing be done, then
both must be complied with. But,
if the conditions be placed in the
disjunctive, as, if this, or that be
done, it will then be sufficient to
obey either.

De his, quos nunquam testator vidit.

§ XIL. Ti, quos nunquam testator
vidit, heredes  institui
veluti si fratris filios peregrinantes,
ignorans qui essent, heeredes insti-

possunt,.

$ 12. A testator may appoint per-
sons his heirs, whom he hath never
seen; as his brother’s sons, in a
foreign country, although he knows
136 LIB. II.

TIT. XV.

 

tuerit: ignorantia enim testantis,
inutilem institutionem non facit.

not where they are; for the want
of this knowledge will not vitiate
the institution.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-QUINTUS.

DE VULGARI SUBSTITUTIONE.

D. xxviii. T. 6. C. vi. T. 25 et 26.

De pluribus gradibus heredum.

POTEST autem quis in testa-
mento suo plures gradus heredum
facere; ut puta si ille heres non
erit, ille heres esto. Et deinceps,
in quantum velit, testator substi-
tuere potest: ut novissimo loco, in
subsidem, vel servum, necessarium
heredem instituere possit.

A man by testament may appoint
many degrees of heirs; as thus:
if Titius will not, let Seius be my
heir. And he may proceed in such
a substitution as far as he shall
think proper; and lastly, in default
of all others, he may constitute a
slave his necessary heir.

De numero heredum in singulis gradibus.

§ I. Et plures in unius locum
possunt substituti, vel unus in plu-
rium, vel singuli in singulorum, vel
invictm ipsi, qui heredes instituti
sunt.

$ 1. A testator may substitute
many in the place of one, or one in
the place of many, or one in the
place of each, or he may substitute
even his instituted heirs reciprocal-
ly to one another.

Quam partem singuli substituti accipiant, si partes in
substitutione expressz non sint.

§ II. Et, si ex disparibus parti-
bus heredes scriptos invicém sub-
stituerit, et nullam mentionem par-
tium in substitutione habuerit, eas
videtur in substitutione partes de-
disse, quas in institutione expres-

§ 2. If a testator, having insti-

‘tuted several co-heirs in unequal

portions, substitute them reciprocal-
ly the one to the other, and make
no mention of their shares of thé
inheritance in the substitution, he
LIB. Il. TIT. Xv.

sit: et ita Divus Pius rescripsit.

137

seems to have given the same shares
by the substitution, which he gave
by the institution; and thus the
emperor Antoninus ordained.

Si coheredi substituto alius substituatur.

§ HI. Sed, si instituto heredi,
coherede substituto dato, alius ei
substitutus fuerit, Divi Severus et
Antoninus siné distinctione rescrip-
serunt, ad utramque partem substi-
tutum admitti.

$ 3. If a co-heir be substituted to
an instituted heir, and a third per-
son to that co-heir, the emperors,
Severus and Antoninus, have by
rescript ordained, that such substi-
tuted person, shall be admitted to
the portions of both the co-heirs
without distinction.

Si quis servo, qui liber existimabatur, instituto substitutus
fuerit.

§$ IV. Si servum alienum quis,
patrem-familias arbitratus, heere-
dem scripserit, et, si heres non es-
set, Mevium ei substituerit; isque
servus jussu domini adierit here-
ditatem, Mevius substitutus in
partem admittitur. Ila enim ver-
ba, si heres non erit, in eo quidem,
quem alieno juri subjectum esse
testator scit, sic accipiuntur, si ne-
que ipse heres erit, neque alium he-
redem effecerit: in eo vero, quem
patrem-familias arbitratur, illud
sicnificant, si hereditatem sibi, vel
ei, cujus juri postea subjectus esse
ceperit, non acquisierit. Idque
Tiberius Cesar in persona Parthe-
nii servi sui constituit.

18

§ 4. If a testator constitute the
slave of another his heir, supposing
him free, and add, if he does not be-
come my heir, I substitute Mevius
in his place; then, if that slave
should afterwards enter upon the
inheritance at the command of his
master, Mevius the substitute,
would be admitted toa moiety. For
the words, if he do not become my
heir, in regard to him, whom the
testator knew to be under the do-
minion of another, are taken to
mean, if he will neither become my
heir himself, nor cause another to
be my heir: but in regard to him,
whom the testator supposed to be
free, they imply this condition ; viz.
if my heir will neither acquire the
inheritance for himself, nor for him
to whose dominion he may after-
wards become subject. But it was de-
termined by Tiberius, the emperor,
in the case of his own slave Parthe-
nius, that a substitute in such a
case should be admitted to a moiety.
138

LIB. I. TIT. XVI

TITULUS DECIMUS-SEXTUS.

DE PUPILLARI SUBSTITUTIONE.

D. xxviii. T. 6. C. vi. T. 26.

Forma, effectus, origo, et ratio pupillaris substitutionis.

LIBERIS — suis impuberibus,
quos in potestate quis habet, non
solim ita, ut supra diximus, sub-
stituere potest, id est, ut, si heere-
des ei non existerint, alius sit ei
heres; sed eo amplits, ut, si ha-
redes ei extiterint, et adhuc impu-
beres mortui fuerint, sit eis aliquis
heres: veluti si quis dicat hoc mo-
do: Titius filius heres mihi esto ;
et, si filius mihi heres non erit, sive
heres, erit, et prius moriatur, quam
in suam tutelam venerit, id est, ante-
quam pubes factus sit, unc Sieus
heres esto. Quo casu, siquidem
non extiterit heres filius, tune sub-
stitutus patri fit heres: si verd ex-
titerit heres filius, et ante puberta-
tem decesserit, ipsi filio fit heres
substitutus. Nam moribus institu-
tum est, ut, cum ejus etatis filii
sint, in qua ipsi sibi testamentum
facere non possunt, parentes eis fa-
ciant.

A parent can substitute to his
children, within puberty, and under
his power, not only in manner be-
fore-mentioned, as, if my children
will not, let some other person be my
heir ; but he may write if my chil-
dren become my heirs, but die with-
in puberty, let another become their
heir: for example; let Titius, my
son, be my heir; and, if he should
refuse, or if accepting, he should die
before he ceases to be under tutelage,
[ z. e. before he arrives at puberty, ]
let Seius be my heir. In this case,
if the son do not enter upon the
inheritance, or, if taking the inheri-
tance, he dies a pupil before puber-
ty, the substitute is then heir to the
son. Forcustom has ordained, that
parents may make wills for their
children, who are not of age to
make wills for themselves.

De substitutione mente capti.

§$ I. Qua ratione excitati, etiam
constitutionem posuimus in nostro
codice, qua prospectum est, ut, si
qui mente captos habeant filios, vel
nepotes, vel pronepotes, cujuscun-
que sexus vel gradus, liceat eis, etsi
puberes sint, ad exemplum pupil-
laris substitutionis, certas personas

§ 1. Reasoning in the same way,
we have provided by a constitution
inserted in our code, that, if a man
have children, grand-children, or
great-grand-children, disordered in
their senses, he may substitute to
such children, in the manner of
pupillary substitution, although
LIB. I. TIT. XVI.

substituere: sin autém resipuerint
eandem substitutionem infirmari
sancimus: et hoc ad exemplum
pupillaris substitutionis, quee, post-
quam pupillus adoleverit, infirma-
tur.

139

they are arrived at puberty. But
this species of substitution shall be
void on their recovery ; like pu-
pillary substitution, which ceases
when the minor attains to puberty.

Proprium pupillaris substitutionis.

$ IL. Igitur in pupillari substitu-
tione secundim prefatum modum
ordinata duo quodammodo sunt tes-
tamenta, alterum patris, alterum
filii; tanquam si ipse filius sibi
heredem instituisset: aut certé u-
num testamentum est duarum cau-
sarum, id est, duarum heredita-
tum.

Ԥ 2. Ina pupillary substitution,
so made, there are in a manner two
testaments, one of the father, the
other of the son; as if- the son had
instituted an heir for himself: at
least there is one testament, contain-
inga disposition of two inheritances.

Alia forma substituendi pupillariter.

§ TI. Sin autém quis ita formi-
dolosus sit, ut timeat, ne filius suus
pupillus adhuc ex eo, quod palam
substitutum acceperit, post obitum
ejus periculo jnsidarium subjaceat,
vulgarem quidem substitutionem
palam facere, et in primis testamen-
ti partibus ordinare, debet: illam
autem substitutionem, per quam, si
heres extiterit pupillus et intra pu-
bertatem decesserit, substitutus vo-
catur separatim in inferioribus par-
tibus scribere debet, eamque par-
tem proprio lino propridque cera
consignare ; et in priore parte tes-
tamenti cavere, ne inferiores tabu-
le, vivo filio et adhuc impubere,
aperiantur. Illud palam est, non
ided minus valere substitutionem
impuberis filii, quod in iisdem ta-
bulis scripta sit, quibus sibi quisque
heredem instituisset ; quamvis pu-
pillo hoc, periculosum sit.

$3. If a testator be apprehen-
sive, lest, at his death, his son, be-
ing yet a pupil, should be liable to
imposition if a substitute should be
publicly given to him, he ought to
insert a vulgar substitution in the
first tablet of his testament; and to
write that substitution, in which a
substitute isnamed, if his son should
die within puberty, in the lower
tablet, which ought to be separately
tied up and sealed: it behoves him
also to insert a clause in the first
part of his testament, forbidding the
lower part to be opened, while his
son is alive and within the age of
puberty. A substitution to a son
within puperty is valid, although
written on the same tablet, in which
the testator hath appointed him his
heir; it is however unsafe to the

pupil.
140 LIB. It.

TIT. XVI

 

Quibus substituitur.

$ IV. Non solim tamen heredi-
bus institutis impuberibus liberis
ita substituere parentes possunt, ut,
si heredes eis extiterint, et ante
pubertatem mortui fuerint, sit eis
heres is, quem ipsi voluerint ; sed
etiam exheredatis. Itaque eo ca-
su, si quid exheredato pupillo ex
heredatibus, legatisve, aut dona-
tionibus propinquorum atque ami-
corum, acquisitum fuerit, id omne
substitutum pertinebit. Quecun-
que diximus de substitutione impu-
berum liberorum vel heredum in-
stitutorum, vel exheredatorum, ea-
dem etiam de posthumis intelligi-
mus.

$4. Parents may not only sub-
stitute to their children within pu-
berty, if such children become their
heirs, and die within puberty ; but
they may substitute to their disin-
herited children; and _ therefore,
whatever a disinherited child, with-
in the age of puberty, may have ac-
quired by inheritances, by legacies,
or by the giftsof relations and friends
the whole will become the property
ofthe substitute. All we have said
concerning the substitution of pu-
pils, instituted heirs, or disinherited
children, is understood to extend al-
so to posthumous children.

Pupillare testamentum sequela paterni.

& $V. Liberis autem suis testa-
mentum nemo facere potest, nisi et
sibi faciat; nam pupillare testamen-
tum pars et sequela est paterni tes-
tamenti: adeod ut, si patris testa-
mentum non valeat, nec filii qui-
dem valebit.

Quod liberis

$ VI. Vel singulis autem liberis,
vel ei, qui eorum novissimus im-
pubes morietur, substitui potest.
Singulis quidem, si neminem eorum
intestatum decedere voluerit: no-
vissimo, si jus legitimarum here-
-ditatum integrum inter eos custodi-
Ti velit.

$ 5. No parent can make a testa-
ment for his children, unless he hath
made a testament for himself: for
the pupillary testament is a part
and consequence of the testament
of the parent, insomuch that, if the
testament of the father be not valid,
neither will that of the son.

substituitur.

$6. A parent may make a pupil-
lary substitution to each of his chil-
dren, or to him, who shall die the
last within puberty. To each, if he
be unwilling, that any of them
should die intestate; to the last who
shall die within puberty, if he wish
that they should preserve among
them the intire right of succession.
LIB. II.

TIT. XVI. 141

De substitutione nominatim aut generaliter facta.

§ VIL. Substituitur autem impu-
beri aut nominatim, veluti, Titius
heres esto: aut generalitér, ut,
Quisquis mihi heres erit. Quibus
verbis vocantur ex substitutione,
impubere mortuo filio, illi, qui et
scripti sunt heeredes, et extiterunt,
et pro qua parte heeredes facti sunt.

$ 7. A substitution may be made
toa child within puberty, by name,
as, let Titius be heir ; or general-
ly— Whoever shall be my heir, let
him be substitute to my son, if he
die within puberty. By these words,
all, who have been instituted, and
acted as heirs to the father, are call-
ed, by substitution, to the inheri-
tance of the son, if he should die
within puberty, in proportion to the
share assigned to each in the father’s
will.

Quomodo substitutio pupillaris finitur.

§ VIII. Masculo igitur usque ad
quatuordecim annos substitui po-
test : foeminze usque ad duodecim
annos. Et, si hoc tempus excesse-
rint, substitutio evanescit.

$8. A pupillary substitutionmay
be made to males, until they reach
fourteen: and to females, until they
have completed their twelfth year :
after which the substitution becomes
extinct.

Quibus pupillariter non substituitur.

§ IX. Extraneo vero vel filio pu-
beri heredi instituto ita substituere
nemo potest, ut, si heres extiterit,
et intra aliquod tempus decesserit,
alius ei sit heres: sed hoc solum
permissum est, ut eum per fidei-
commissum testator obliget alii hee-
reditatem ejus vel totam vel pro
parte restituere: quod jus quale
sit, suo loco trademus.

$9. A pupillary substitution can-
not be made either to an instituted
stranger, or instituted son, if past
the age of puberty. But a testator
may oblige his heir to give to anoth-
er a part, or even the whole of the
inheritance, by virtue of a _fidei-com-
missum, or gift in trust; which we
will treat of in its proper place.
142 LIB. IL.

TIT. XVIL.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-SEPTIMUS.

QUIBUS MODIS TESTAMENTA INFIRMANTUR.

D. xxviii.

De ds

Quibus modis testamenta infirmantur.

TESTAMENTUM jure fac-
tum usque ed valet, donec rumpa-
tur, irritumve fiat.

Quando testamentum dicatur

§ I. Rumpitur autem testamen-
tum, cum, in eodem statu manente
testatore, ipsius testamenti jus viti-
atur. Si quis enim post factum
testamentum adoptaverit sibi filium
per imperatorum eum, quiest sui
juris, aut per preetorem, secundum
nostram constitutionem, eum, qui
in potestate parentis fuerit, testa-
mentum ejus rumpitur quasi agna-
tione sui heeredis.

rumpi.

A testament, legally made, re-
mains valid, until it be either broken
or rendered ineffectual.

Primum de adoptione.

$1. A testament is broken, when
the force of it is destroyed, while
the testator still remains in the same
state. For, if, after making his tes-
tament he should arrogate an inde-
pendent person, by licence from the
emperor, or, in the presence of the
praetor should adopt a child under
the power of his natural parent, by
virtue of our constitution, then that
testament would be broken by this °
agnation or quasi-birth of a proper
heir.

De posteriore testamento.

$ IE. Posteriore quoque testa-
mento quod jure perfectum est, su-
perius rumpitur; nec interest, ex-
titerit aliquis heres ex eo, an non;
hoc enim solum spectatur, an ali-
quo casu existere potuerit. Ided-
que, si quis aut noluerit heres esse,
aut vivo testatore, aut post mortem
ejus, antequam heereditatem adiret,
decesserit, aut conditione, sub qua
heres institutus est, defectus sit, in
his casibus pater-familias intestatus
moritur. Nam et prius testamen-

$2. A former testament, may be
broken by a subsequent one legally
made, nor isit material, whether any
heir, be nominated in the latter or
not: for the only question is, whe-
ther an heir might have been made :
therefore, if an instituted heir should
renounce, or should die, living the
testator; or after his death, and be-
fore he could enter upon the inheri-
tance; or before the condition is ac-
complished, upon which he was in-
stituted; in any of these cases, the
LIB. I. TIT. XVE.

tum non valet, ruptum a posteriore;
et posterius eque nullas vires habet,
cum ex eo nemo heres extiterit.

143

testator would die intestate; for the
first testament would be invalid,
being broken by the second, and
the second would be of as little
force, for want of an heir. |

De posteriore, in quo heres certz rei institutus.

§$ HI. Sed, si quis, priore testa-
mento jure perfecto, posterius zque
jure fecerit, etiamasi ex certis rebus
in eo heeredem instituerit, superius
tamen testamentum sublatum esse,
Divi Severus et Antoninus Augus-
ti rescripserunt; cujus constitutio-
nis verba et hic inseri jussimus,
cum aliud quoque przterea in ea
constitutione expressum sit. JLmpe-
ratores Severus et Antoninus Au-
gusti Cocceio Campano. Testa-
mentum secundo loco factum, licet
in eo certarum rerum heres scrip-
tus sit, perinds jure valere, ac st re-
rum mentio facta non esset: sed et
tenerit heredem scriptum, ut con-
tentus rebus sibi datis, aut suppleta
quarta ex lege Falcidia, heredita-
tem restituat his qui in priore testa-
mento scriptt fuerant, propter in-
serta fidei-commissi verba, quibus ut
valeret prius testamentum express-
um est, dubitari non oportet. Et
ruptum quidem testamentum hoc
modo efficitur.

§$ 3. Ifa man, having duly exe-
cuted one testament, should make
another equally good, and institute
an heir in it to some particular
things only, the emperors Severus
and Antoninus have by rescript de-
clared, that, in this case, the first
will shall be considered as broken.
We have commanded the words of
this constitution to be here inserted,
as it contains a further provision.
The emperors Severus and Anto-
ninus to Cocceius Campanus. A

.second testament, although the heir

named in it, be instituted to particu-
lar things only, shall be as valid, as
if they had not been specified ; yet
doubtless, the written heir must
content himself either with the
things given him, or with the fourth
part, allowed by the Falcidian law,
and shall be bound to restore the
rest of the inheritance to the heirs
instituted in the first testament, on
account of words, denoting a trust,
inserted in the second: by which
words it is declared, that the first
testament shall subsist. And, in
this manner, a testament may be
said to be broken or cancelled.
144 LIB. Il.

,

TIT. XVII.

 

De testamento irrito ; et quibus modis fit irritum.

§ IV. Alio autem moda testa-
menta jure facta infirmantur; velu-
ti cum is, qui fecit testamentum,
capite diminutus sit: quod, quibus
modis accidat, primo libro retuli-
mus.

§ 4. Testaments, legally made,
are also invalidated, if the testator
suffer diminution, (that is, change
his condition :) in the first book (of
these institutes, ) we have shewn by
what means diminution may hap-
pen.

Cur dicatur irritum.

§ V. Hoc autem casu irrita fieri
testamenta dicuntur; cum alioqui,
et que rumpuntur, irrita fiant, et
ea, que statim ab initio non jure
fiunt, irrita sint. Sed et ea, quae jure
facta sunt, et postea per capitis
diminutionem irrita fiunt, possumus
nihilominus rupta dicere. Sed, quia
sané commodius erat, singulas cau-
sas singulis appellationibus distin-
gui, ided queedam non jure facta di-
cuntur, quedam jure facta rumpi
vel irrita fieri.

§ 5. In case of diminution, testa-
ments are said to become irvrita, (in-
effectual;) although those which
are broken, or which, from the be-
ginning, were not legal, are equally
so. We may also consider those
testaments broken, which being at
first legally made, are afterwards
rendered ineffectual by diminution.
But, as it is proper, that every par-
ticular defect should be distinguish-
ed by a particular appellation, those
testaments, which are illegal in their
formation, are termed null; those
which were at first legal, but after-
wards lose their force, by some re-
vocatory act of the testator, are said
to be rupta, or broken; and _ those,
since the making whereof, the tes-
tator hath suffered a change of state,
are irrita, or ineffectual.

Quibus modis convalescit.

§ VI. Non tamen per omnia in-
utilia sunt ea testamenta, que, ab
initio jure facta, per capitis diminu-
tionem irrita facta sunt: nam, si
septem testium signis signata sunt,
potest scriptus heres, secundum ta-
bulas testamenti, bonorum possessi-
onem agnoscere, si modo defunc-
tus et civis Romanus, et suze potes-

§$ 6. But a testament, at first le-
gally made, and afterwards render-
ed ineffectual by diminution, may
not be altogether void ; for the writ-
ten heir is intitled to the possession
of the goods, under the testament, if
it appear, that it was sealed by seven
witnesses, and that the testator was
a Roman citizen, and not under
LIB. II.

tatis. mortis tempore fuerit. Nam,
si ided irritum factum sit testamen-
tum, quia civitatem vel etiam liber-
tatem testator amissit, aut quia in
adoptionem se dedit, et mortis tem-
pore in adoptivi patris potestate
sit, non potest scriptus heeres secun-
dum tabulas bonorum possessionem
petere.

De nuda

$ VII. Ex eo autem solo non
potest infirmari testamentum, quod
postea testator id noluerit valere ;
usque adeo ut, si quis, post factum
prius testamentum, posterius facere
ceeperit, et, aut mortalitate preeven-
tus, aut quia eum ejus rei peenituit,
id non perfecerit, Divi Pertinacis
oratione cautum sit, ne alias tabu-
lee priores, jure facts, irrite fiant,
nisi sequentes jure ordinate et per-
fectee fuerint: nam imperfectum
testamentum siné dubio nullum est.

Si princeps litis causa,

TIT. XVII.

145

power, at the time of his death: but
if a testament became void, because
the testator had lost the right of a
citizen, or his liberty, or had given
himself in adoption, and at the time
of his death continued under power
of hisadoptive father, then the writ-
ten heir could not demand posses-
sion under it.

voluntate.

§ 7. A testament cannot be inva-
lidated solely, because the testator
was afterwards unwilling, that it
should subsist: so that if a man,
after making one testament, should
begin another,and by reason of death
or change of mind, shonld not pro-
ceed to perfect that testament, it is
provided by theoration of the empe-
ror Pertinax, that the first testa-
ment shall not be revoked, unless
the second is both legal and perfect;
for an imperfect testament is un-
doubtedly null.

vel in testamento imperfecto institutus

fuerit.

§ VIII. EHadem oratione ex-
pressit, non admissurum se heere-
ditatem ejus, qui litis causa princi-
pem reliquerit heredem : neque ta-
bulas non legitimé factas, in quibus
ipse ob eam causam heeres institu-
tus erat, probaturum ; neque ex nu-
da voce, heredis nomen admissu-
rum: neque ex ulla scriptura, cul
juris auctoritas desit, aliquid adep-
turum. Secundim hoc Divi Se-
verus et Antoninus seepissimeé re-
seripserunt. Licet enim, eer

$8. The emperor Pertinazx hath
declared by the same oration, that
he would nottake the inheritance of
any testator, who left him his heir,
because a law-suit was depending ;
that he would never establisha will
legally deficient in form, if he was
upon that account instituted the
heir; that he would by no means
suffer himself to be nominated heir
by parol ; and that he would never
derive emolument from any writing
not authorised by strict rules of law.
146 LIB. II.

TIT. XVIII.

 

legibus soluti simus, attamen legi-
bus vivimus. '

The emperors Severus and Antoni-
nus have also often issued rescripts
to the same purpose: “‘for although,
[say they,] we are not subject to the
laws, yet we live in obedience to
them.”

 

TITULUS

DECIMUS-OCTAVUS.

DE INOFFICIOSO TESTAMENTO.

D. v. T.2 ©. iii, T. 28.

Ratio hujus querele.

QUIA plerimque parentes sine
causa liberos suos exheredant vel
omittunt, indictum est, ut de inofli-
cioso testamento agere possint libe-
ri, qui queruntur, aut iniqué se ex-
heredatos, aut iniqué preteritos;
hoc colore, quasi non sanz mentis
fuerint, cum testamentum ordina-
rent. Sed hoc dicetur, non quasi
veré furiosus sit ; sed recté quidem
testamentum fecerit, non autem ex
officio pietatis. Nam, si veré furi-
osus sit, nullum testamentum est.

Since parents often disinherit
their children without cause, or o-
mit to mention them in their testa-
ments, it has therefore been intro-
duced, that children, who have been
unjustly disinherited, or omitted,
may complain, that such testaments
are inofficious, under colour, that
their parents were not of sane mind,
when they made them: not that
the testator was really insane, for
the testament may have been well
made ; but that it is not consistent
with the duty of a parent. For, if
a testator were really insane at the
time, his testament is null.

Qui de inofficioso agunt.

§ 1. Non autem liberis tantum
permissum est testamentum paren-
tum inofficiosum accusare, verim
etiam liberorum parentibus: soror
autem et frater turpibus personis
scriptis heredibus, et sacris consti-

$ 1. Not children only are allow-
ed to complain, that testaments are
inofficious; for parents are permit-
ted to do the same. Also the broth-
ers and sisters of a testator, by the
imperial constitutions, are preferred
LIB. Il. TIT. XVIII.

tutionibus prelati sunt; non ergo
contra omnes heredes agere pos-
sunt. Ultra fratres igitur et sorores,
cognati nullo modo aut agere pos-
sunt, aut agentes vincere.

147

to infamous persons, if any such
have been instituted heirs ; but they
are not therefore allowed to com-
plain against any heir. Collaterals,
beyond brothers and sisters, cannot
sustain a complaint in this respect
or succeed for themselves, (but
though their right of complaining
be not disputed, and the testament
be annulled, yet those only can be
benefited, who are the nearest in
succession upon an intestacy.)

Qui alio jure veniunt, de inofficioso non agunt.

§ II. Tam autem naturales liberi,
quam secundum nostre constitu-
tionis divisionem adoptati, ita de-
mum de inofficioso testamento agere
possunt, si nullo alio jure ad de-
functi bona venire possint: nam,
qui ad hereditatem totam vel par-
tem ejus, alio jure veniunt, de inof-
ficioso agere non possunt. Posthu-
mi quoque, qui nullo alio jure ven-
ire possunt, de inofficioso agere
possunt.

§ 2. Adopted as well as natural
children, according to our constitu-
tion, are admitted to complain a-
gainst a testament as inofficious, if
they can obtain the effects of the
deceased no other way ; but if they
can obtain the whole or a part of
the inheritance by any other means,
they cannot pursue this remedy,
Posthumous children also, who are
unable to recover their inheritance
by any other method, are allowed to
urge this complaint.

De eo, cui testator aliquid reliquit.

§ III. Sed hee ita accipienda
sunt, si nihil eis penitus a testatori-
bus testamento relictum est: quod
nostra constitutio ad verecundiam
nature introduxit. Sin vero quan-
tacunque pars hereditatis, vel res,
eis fuerit relicta, de inofficioso que-
relé quiescente, id, quod eis deest,

usque ad quartam legitime partis -

repleatur, licét non fuerit adjectum,

§$ 3. All this must be understood
to take place only, when nothing
hath been left by the will of the de-
ceased; and this hath been intro-
duced by our constitution, out of
respect to parental authority and

‘the ties of nature: for, if a single

thing, or the least part of an in-
heritance, hath been bequeathed,
the suit de inofficioso testamento is
148

LIB. Il. TIT. XVI.

 

boni viri arbitratu debere eam
conipleri.

barred: but their legal portion, or
fourth part, though not added by
the testator, may be completed ac- -
cording to the arbitration of some
person of approved character.

Si tutor, cui nihil a patre relictum, pupilli nomine
legatum acceperit.

§ IV. Si tutor nomine pupilli,
cujus tutelam gerebat, ex testamen-
to patris sui legatum acceperit,
eum nihil erat ipsi tutori relictum
a patre suo, nihilominus poterit no-
mine suo de inofficioso patris tes-
tamento agere.

§ 4. If a tutor should accept a
legacy in the name of his pupil, in
consequence of a bequest made in
the testament of such tutor’s father,
who left nothing to his son; the
tutor may nevertheless complain in
his own name against the testament
of his father, as inofficious (or con-
trary to parental duty.)

Si de inofficioso nomine pupilli agens succubuerit.

§ V. Sed, si é contrario pupilli
nomine, cui nihil relictum fuerat,
de insofficioso egerit et superatus
est ipse tutor, quod sibi in testa-
mento eodem relictum est, non
amittit.

§ 5. On the contrary, if a tutor
should complain in the name of his
pupil, against the testament of his
pupil’s father, who left nothing to
his son as inofficious, and this tes-
tament should be confirmed, yet the
tutor would not be barred, on ac-
count of this proceeding virtute of-
ficii, from claiming his own legacy
under the same testament.

De quarta legitime partis.

§ VI. Igitur quartam quis debet
habere, ut de inofficioso agere non
possit, sive jure hzereditario, sive
jure legati vel fidei-commissi, vel
si mortis causa ei quarta donata
fuerit, vel inter vivos in iis tantum
modo casibus, quorum mentionem
nostra facit constitutio, vel aliis
modis, qui in nostris constituti-
onibus continentur. Quod autem
de quarta diximus, ita intelligen-

$ 6. No person, entitled to a fourth
can be barred from bringing a com-
plaint (de inofficioso) of undutiful-
ness, unless he hath received it ei-
ther by being appointed heir, by hav-
ing a legacy, or by means of a trust
for his use; or unless his legal part.
hath been given him by donation
mortis causa or inter vivos, (in those
cases,noticed by our constitution) or
by any other means set forth in our
LIB.. II.

TIT. XIX.

149

 

dum est, ut, sivé unus fuerit, sive
plures, quibus agere de inofficioso
*testamento permittitur, una quarta
eis dari possit, ut ea pro rata eis
distribuatur, id est, pro virili por-
tione quarta.

ordinances. What we have said of
the fourth or legal portion, is to be
so understood, that, if there be more
persons than one, who have a right
to bring a plaint of undutifulness
against a testament, yet one fourth
will be sufficient, divided among
them all in equal portions.

TITULUS DECIMUS-NONUS.

DE HEREDUM QUALITATE ET DIFFERENTIA.

D. xxix. T. 11.

C. vi. T. 3i.

Divisio heredum.

HA:REDES autem aut necessa-
rii dicuntur, aut sui et necessarii,
aut extranei.

Heirs are divided into three sorts
necessary ; proper and necessary ;
and strangers.

De heredibus necessariis.

$ 1. Necessarius heres est ser-
vus heres institutus ; idedque sic
appellatur, quia, sive velit, sive no-
lit, omnind post mortem testatoris
protinis liber et necessarius heres
fit. Undé, qui facultates suas sus-
pectas habent, solent servum suum
primo aut secundo aut etiam ulte-
riore gradu heredem instituere; ut,
si creditoribus satis non fiat, potius
ejus heredis bona, quam ipsius tes-
tatoris, 4 creditoribus possideantur,
vel distrahantur, vel inter eos divi-
dantur. Pro hoc tamen incommo-
do illud ei commodum prestatur, ut
ea, que post mortem patroni sui si-

$ 1. Aslave instituted by his
master, is a necessary heir; and he
is so called, because at the death of
the testator he becomesinstantly free
and is compellable to take the heir-
ship; he therefore who suspects his
circumstances, commonly institutes
his slave to be his heir in the first,
second, or some other place; so that,
if he does not leave a sum equal to
his debts, the goods which are seized,
sold, or divided among his creditors,
may rather seem to be those of his
heir, than his own. Buta slave, in
recompence of this inconvenience, is
allowed whatever he hath acquired
150

LIB. 1. TIT. XIX.

 

bi acquisierit, ipsi reserventur. Et
quamvis bona defuncti non suffi-
ciant creditoribus, iterum tamen ex
e& causa res ejus, quas sibi acquisi-
erit, non veeneunt.

after the death of his patron ; for
such acquisitions are not to be sold
although the goods of the deceased
should ever be so insufficient for the
payment of his creditors.

De suis heredibus.

§ II. Sui autem et necessarii he-
redes sunt, veluti filius, filia, nepos
neptisve ex filio, et deinceps czteri
liberi, qui in potestate morientis
modo fuerint. Sed ut nepos nep-
tisve sui heredes sint, non suflicit
eum eamve in potestate avi mortis
tempore fuisse: sed opus est, ut
pater ejus, vivo patre suo, desierit
suus heeres esse, aut morte intercep-
tus, aut qualibit alia ratione libera-
tus 4 patria potestate ; tunc enim
nepos neptisve in locum patris sui
succedit. Sed sui quidem heredes
ideo appellantur, quiadomestici he-
redes sunt, et vivo quoque patre
quodammodo domini existimantur.
Undé etiam, si quis intestatus mo-
riatur, prima causa est in succes-
sione liberorum. Necessarii vero
ideo dicuntur, quia omnino, sive
velint, sive nolint, tam ab intestato
quam ex testamento, ex lege duo-
decim tabularum heredes fiunt.
Sed his praetor permittit volentibus
abstinere heereditate, ut potius pa-
rentis quam ipsorum bona simililér
4 creditoribus possideantur.

§ 2. Proper and necessary heirs,
are sons, daughters, grand-sons or
grand-daughters by a son or other
direct descendants, in the power of
the deceased at the time of his death.
To constitute grand-children proper
heirs, it does not suffice, that they
were in the power of their grand-
father at the time of his decease;
but it is requisite, that their father
should have ceased to be a proper
heir in the life-time of his father, by
having been freed, either by death
or otherwise from paternal authori-
ty; for then it is, that the grand-
son or grand-daughter succeeds in
place of their father. Heirs are call-
ed sui or proper, because they are
domestic ; and in the very life-time
of their father are reputed masters
ina certain degree. Hence the chil-
dren of an intestate are first in suc-
cession; and are called necessary
heirs, because, willing or unwilling
they beeome the heirs of their pa-
rent according to the law of the 12
tables, whether under a testament
or an intestacy. But when children
request it, the praetor permits them
to obstain from the inheritance,
that the effects of their parents,
rather than their own, may be seiz-
ed by the creditors.
\ LIB. IL.

TIT. XIx. 151

 

 

De extraneis.

$ II. Ceeteri, qui testatoris juri
subjecti non sunt, extranei heredes
appellantur; itaque liberi nostri,
qui in potestate nostra non sunt,
heredes 4 nobis instituti, extranei
heredis nobis videntur. Qué de
causa et qui heredes 4 matre insti-
tuuntur eodem numero sunt : quia
foemine, in potestate, liberos non ha-
habent. Servus quoque heres ado-
mino institutus, et post factum tes-
tamentum ab eo manumissus, e0-
dem numero habetur.

$3. All other heirs, not subject
to the power of the testator, are
called strangers : thus, children not
under the power of their father, but
who are constituted his heirs, are
strangers in a legal sense: and so
are children instituted heirs by their
mother, for a woman isnot allowed
to have her children under her own
power. A slave also, whomhis mas-
ter hath instituted by testament and
afterwards manumitted is so ac-
counted.

De testamenti factione.

$ IV. In extraneis heredibusillud
observatur, ut sit cum eis testamen-
ti factio, sivé heredes ipsi instituan-
tur, sive ii, qui in potestate eorum
sunt. Et id duobus temporibus
inspicitur ; testamenti quidem facti
tempore, ut constiterit institutio;
mortis vero testatoris, ut effectum
habeat. Hoc amplius, et cum adit
heereditatem, esse debet cum eo tes-
tamenti factio, sivé puré sivé sub
conditione heres institutus sit. Nam
jus hxeredis eo maxime tempore in
spiciendum est, quo acquirit heredi-
tatem. Medio autem tempore, inter
factum testamentum et mortem tes-
tatoris vel conditionem institutionis
existentem, mutatio juris non nocet
heredi : quia ut diximus, tria tem-
pora inspici debent. Testamenti
‘autem factionem non solum is ha-
bere videtur, qui testamentum fa-
cere potest; sed etiam, qui ex alie-
no testamento vel ipse capere po-
test, vel alii acquirere, licét non

$ 4. As to strangers, it is requi-
site, that they should be capable of
the faction of a testament, whether
instituted heirs themselves, or whe-
ther those, under their power, are
instituted. And this qualification is
required at two severaltimes; at the
making of the testament, that the
institution may be valid; and at the
testator’s death, that it may take ef-
fect; and farther, whether an heir
be appoinetd simply or conditional-
ly, yet he ought to be capable of the
faction of a testament at the time of
entering upon the inheritance; for
his right is principally regarded at
the time of acquiring the possession.
Butintermediately between the mak-
ing of the testament and the death
of the testator, or the completion of
the condition of the institution, the
heir will not be prejudiced by inca-
pacity of change of state ; because
the three points of time which we
have noted, are the times to be re-
152 LIB. IL

TIT. XIX.

 

possit facere testamentum. Et ideo
furiosus, et mutus, et posthumus,
et infans, et filius-familias, et ser-
vus alienus, testamenti factionem
habere dicuntur. Licét enim testa-
mentum facere non possint, atta-
men ex testamento vel sibi vel alii
acquirere possunt.

De jure deliberandi, et

§ V. Extraneis autem heredibus
deliberandi potestas est de adeun-
da heereditate vel nonadeunda. Sed
sivé is, cui abstinendi potestas est,
immiscuerit se bonis hereditatis,
sivé extraneus, cui de adeunda he-
reditate diliberare licet, adierit,
postea relinquendz hereditatis fa-
cultatem non habet, nisi minor sit
25 annis: nam hujusmodi etatis
hominibus, sicut in ceeteris omnibus
causis, deceptis, ita et si temeré
damnosam heereditatem susceperint
preetor succurrit. Sciendum est ta-
men, Divum Hadrianum etiam ma-
jori 25 annis veniam dedisse, cum
post aditam hereditatem grande es
alienum, quod adite hereditatis
tempore latebat, emersisset. Sed
hoc quidem Divus Hadrianus cui-
dam specialibeneficioprestitit. Di-
vus autem Gordianus postea militi-
bus tantummod6 hoc concessit. Sed
nostra benevolentia commune om-
nibus subjectis imperio nostro hoc

garded. Not only a man capable of
willing, is said to have testamenti
factionem ; but also any person ca-
pable of taking for the benefit of
himself, or of acquiring by testa-
ment for the benefit of another:
hence, persons mad, mute, or post-
humous, infants, the sons of a fam-
ily, or slaves not your own, may all
be said to have the faction of a tes-
tament (in its passive signification.)
For, although incapable of making,
they are capable of acquiring by
testament, either for themselves or
others.

de beneficio inventarii.

§ 5. Strangers, appointed heirs,
may deliberate ’ere they enter upon
an inheritance. But, if one, who
has the liberty of abstaining, or a.
stranger who is permitted to deli-
berate, should once intermeddle, it
will not afterwards be in his power
to renounce the inheritance, unless
he shall be under the age of twenty-
five years: for the preetor, in this
as in all other cases, relieves minors
who have been deceived, and who
rashly take upon themselves an inju-
rious inheritance. Here it must be
noted, that the emperor Adrian once
gave permission to a person of full
age, to relinquish an inheritance
when it appeared to be incumbered
with a great debt, which had been
concealed, until the heir had taken
upon himself the administration.
But this was granted as a special
favour. Theemperor Giordian after-
wards published a constitution for
the indemnification of heirs yet con-
LIB. II.

beneficium preestitit: et constituti-
onem tam sequissimam quam nobi-
lissimam scripsit, cujus tenorem si

observaverint homines, licét eis a-~

dire hereditatem, et in tantim te-
neri, quantim valere bona heredi-
tatis contingit, ut ex hac causa ne-
que deliberationis auxilium sit eis
necessarium, nisi, omissa observa~
tione nostre constitutionis, et deli-
berandum existimaverint, et esse
veteri gravanini aditionis suppo-
nere maluerint.

TIT. XIX. 153

fined the force of it to those only,
who were of thesoldiery. But our
extended benevolence hath rendered
this benefit common to all our sub-
jects, having dictated a constitution
just and noble, which, if heirs will
observe, they may enter upon their
inheritance, and not be chargeable
beyond the value of the estate; so
that they need not pray time for de-
liberation, unless they omit to ob-
serve the tenor of our ordinance,
choosing rather to deliberate, and
submit themselves to the risk at-
tending the acceptance under the
ancient law.

De acquirenda vel omittenda hereditate.

$ VI. Item extraneus heres tes-
tamento institutus, aut ab intestato
ad legitimam hereditatem vocatus,
potest aut pro heerede gerendo, aut
etiam nuda voluntate suscipiends
hereditatis, heres fieri. Pro here-
de autem gerere quis videtur, si
rebus hereditariis tanquam heres
utatur, vel vendendo res heredi-
tarias, vel predia colendo, locan-
dove, et quoquo modo voluntatem
suam declaret, vel re, vel verbo,
de adeunda hereditate; dummodo
sciat, eum, in cujus bonis pro heere-
de gerit, testatum intestatumve
obiissee, et se el heredem esse.
Pro herede enim gerere, ést pro
domino gerere : veteres enim, heere-
des pro dominis appellabant. Sicut
autem nud4 voluntate extraneus
heeres fit, ita contrari4 destinatione
statim ab heereditate repellitur.
Eum, qui surdus vel mutus natus,

vel postea factus est, nihil prohibet
20

§ 6. A stranger, instituted by tes-
tament, or called by law to a suc-
cession in a case of intestacy, may
make himself accountable as heir,
either by doing some act as such;
or by barely signifying his accep-
tance of the heirship. And a man
is deemed to act as the heir of an
inheritance, if he treat itas his own,
by selling any part of it, by culti-
vating the ground, or by leasing it:
or declare his consent to accept it,
either by act or speech; knowing
that the person, with whose estate
he intermeddles, is dead testate or
intestate, and that he himself is the
heir: for to act as heir, is to act as
proprietor; and the ancients fre-
quently used the term heir, when
they would denote the proprietor.
But as a stranger may become heir
by a bare consent, so on the contra-
ry, by a mere dissent, he may bar
himself from an inheritance. And
154 LIB. II.

TIT. XX.

 

pro herede gerere, et acquirere sibi
hereditatem; si tamen intelligit,
quod agit.

nothing prevents, but that a person,
who was born deaf and dumb, or
become so by accident, may, act as
heir, and acquire the inheritance, if
he know what he is doing.

——$———<— 1 a

TITULUS VIGESIMUS.
DE LEGATIS.

D. xxx. xxxi. XXXii.

C. vi. T. 37.

Continuatio.

POST heec videamus de legatis;
que pars juris extra propositam
quidem materiam videtur: nam lo-
quimur de iis juris figuris, quibus
per universitatem res nobis acqui-
runtur: sed, cum omnino de testa-
mentis et de heeredibus, qui in tes-
tamento instituuntur, loquuti simus,
non siné causd sequenti loco potest
hee juris materia tractari.

We will now make some observa-
tions upon legacies; although this
part of the law may not seem to fall
in with the subject proposed; for
we are treating of those legal me-
thods, by which things may be ac-
quired universally : but, as we have
already spoken at large of testa-
ments and testamentary heirs, we
may not improperly proceed to the
subject of legacies.

Definitio.

§ I. Legatum itaque est donatio
queedam a defuncto relicta, ab heere-
de preestanda.

$ 1. A legacy is a gift directed
by the deceased, and to be fulfilled
by the heir.

De antiquis generibus legatorum sublatis.

§ If. Sed olim quidem erant le-
gatorum genera quatuor; per vin-
dicationem, per damnationem, si-
nendi modo, per preeceptionem: et
certa quedam verba cuique generi
legatorum assignata erant, per que
singula genera legatorum significa-

§ 2. Anciently there were four.
kinds of legacies in use; namely,
per vindicationem, per damnation-
em, sinendo modo and per precep-
tionem. To each of these was
assigned a certain form of words,
by which their different species
LIB. II.

bantur : sed ex constitutionibus Di-
vorum principum solemnitas hujus-
modi verborum sublata est. Nos-
tra autem constitutio, quam cum
magna fecimus lucubratione, de-
functorum voluntates validiores es-
se cupientes, et non verbis sed vol-
untatibus eorum faventes, disposuit,
ut omnibus una sit natura, et qui-
buscunque verbis aliquid relictum
sit, liceat legatarlis id persequi,
non solum per actiones personales,
sed etiam per in rem et per hypo-
thecariam. Cujus constitutionis
perpensum modum ex ipsius tenore
perfectissimé accipere possibile est.

TIT. XX. 155
were signified; but these fixed
forms have been wholly taken away
by the imperial ordinance of the
later emperors, Constantinus, Con-
stantius, and Constans. We also,
desirous of enforcing the wills of
deceased persons, and regarding
their intentions more than their
words, have, after great study, en-
acted that the nature of all legacies
shall be the same; and legatees, by
whatever words constituted, may
sue for what is left them, not only
by a personal, but by a real or
hypothecary action. But the reader
may perfectly comprehend the well
weighed matter of this constitution,
‘from the tenor of it.

Collatio legatorum et fidei-commissorum.

§ IDL Sed non usque ad eam
constitutionem standum esse existi-
mavimus: cum enim antiquitatem
invenimus legata quidem stricté
concludentem, fidei-commissis au-
tem, que ex voluntate magis des-
cendebant defunctorum, pinguiorem
naturam indulgentem, necessarium
esse duximus, omnia, legata fidei-
commissis exequare, ut nulla sit
inter ea differentia, sed, quod deest
legatis, hoc repleatur ex natura
fidei-commissorum : et, si quid am-
plius est in legatis, per hoc crescat
fidei-commissorum natura. Sed,
né in primis legum cunabulis, per-
mistim de his exponendo, studiosis
adolescentibus quandam introduca-
mus difficultatem, operee pretium
esse duximus, interim, separatim
pris de legatis et postea de fidei-

§ 3. We have judged it expedient
that our constitution should not rest
here; for, observing that the. an-
cients confined legacies within strict
rules, but were favourable to gifts in
trust, it was thought necessary to
make all legacies equal to gifts in
trust, that no difference in effect
should remain between them; so
that whatever is deficient in the na-
ture of legacies, may be supplied by
the nature of trust, and whatever is
abundant in the nature of legacies
may become an accretion to the na-
ture of trusts. But, that we may
not raise difficulties, and perplex the
minds of young persons at their en-
trance upon the study of the law,
by explaining these things promis-
cuously, we have esteemed it worth
our pains to treat separately, first of
156 LIB. II.

TIT. XX.

 

commissis tractare; ut, natura utri-
usque juris cognita, facilé possint
permistionem eorum eruditi subti-
lioribus auribus accipere.

legacies and then of trusts, that, the
nature of both being known, the
student, thus instructed, may more
easily understand their relation and
intermixture.

De re legata. Et primum de re testatoris, heeredis, aliena,
cujus non est commercium.

§ IV. Non soltim autem testato-
ris vel heredis res, sed etiam aliena
legari potest, ita ut heres cogatur
redimere eam et prestare; vel, si
eam non potest redimere, estima-
tionem ejus dare. Sed, si talis sit
res, cujus commercium non est,
vel adipisci non potest, nec zestima-
tio ejus debetur ; veluti si quis cam-
pum martium, vel basilicas, vel
templa, vel que publico usui desti-
nata sunt, legaverit: nam nullius
momenti tale legatum est. Quod
autem diximus, alienam rem posse
legari, ita intelligendum est, si de-
funetus sciebat, alienam rem esse,
non si ignorabat. Forsitan enim,
si scivisset alienam rem esse, non
legasset; et ita Divus Pius rescrip-
sit. Et verius est, ipsum, qui agit,
id est, legatarium, probare opor-
tere, scivisse alienam rem legare
defunctum, non heredem probare
oportere, gnorasse alienam: quia
semper necessitas probandi incum-
bit illi, qui agit.

§ 4. A testator may not only be-
queath his own property, or that of
his heir, but also the property of
others; and, if the thing bequeathed
belong to another, the heir can be
obliged either to purchase and de-
liver it, or to render the value of it,
if it cannot be purchased. But, if
the thing bequeathed be not in
commerce, or cannot be purchased,
the heir is not bound to pay the
value to the legatee; as if a man
should bequeath the Campus Mar-
tius, the palaces, the temples, or any
of those things, which appertain to
the public: for such legacies can be
of no avail. But, in saying that a
testator might bequeath the goods
of another, we would be understood
to mean, that this can be done only,
if the deceased knew, that what he
bequeathed belonged to another,
and not, if he were ignorant of it;
since, if he had known, he probably
would not have left such a legacy:
and to this purpose is the rescript
of the emperor Antoninus. And it
is incumbent upon the plaintiff or
legatee to prove the deceased knew
that what he left belonged to ano-
ther; the heir is not obliged to prove,
that the deceased did not know it;
for the burthen of proof lies upon
the complainant.
LIB. II.

TIT. XX.

De re pignora a.

§ V. Sed et, si rem obligatam
creditori, aliquis legaverit, necesse
habet heres eam luere. Et in hoc
quoque casu idem placet, quod in
re aliend ; ut ita demum luere ne-
cesse habeat heres, si sciebat de-
functus, rem obligatem esse: et
ita Divi Severus et Antoninus re-
scripserunt. Si tamen defunctus
voluerit legatarium luere, et hoc ex-
presserit, non debet heres eam
luere.

§ 5. If a man bequeath that
which. he hath pledged to a creditor
the heir is under a necessity of re-
deeming it: but in this, as in the
former case, concerning the goods of
another, the heir cannot be obliged
to redeem, unless the deceased knew
that the thing was pledged; and
this the emperors Severus and Anio-
ninus have declared by their re-
script. But when it appears to have
been the express will of the deceas-
ed, that the legatee should redeem
the thing bequeathed, the heirought
not to redeem it.

De re aliena post testamentum a legatario acquisita.

§ VI. Si res aliena legata fuerit,
et ejus rei vivo testatore legatarius
dominus factus fuerit, siquidem ex
causa emptionis, ex testamento ac-
tione pretium consequi potest: si
vero ex causa lucrativa, veluti ex
donatione, vel ex alia simili causa,
agere non potest: nam traditum
est duas lucrativas causas in eun-
dem hominem et eandem rem con-
curre non posse. Hac ratione, si
ex duobus testamentis eadem res
eidem debeatur, interest, utrum
rem, an estimationem, ex testamen-
to consecutus sit : nam, si rem ha-
bet agére non potest; quia habet
eam ex causa lucrativa: si zstima-
tionem ; agere potest.

$ 6. Ifa thing bequeathed be the
property of another, and the legatee
become the proprietor of it in the
life-time of the testator by purchase,
he may recover the value, by an ac-
tion under the will; but, if he ob-
tained it as a gift, or by any lucra-
tive title, no action will lie; for it
isamaxim, that twolucrative causes
can never concur in the same person
and thing. And therefore, if the
same specific thing be left by two
testaments to the same person, the
question will be, when the legatee
sues under one of them, whether he
hath obtained the thing itself, or the
value of it, by virtue of the other ?
for, if he be already possessed of the
thing itself, the suit is at an end, be-
cause he hath received it ona lu-
crative account ; but if he hath al-
ready obtained the value of it only,
he may still sue for the thing itself.
158 LIB. IT.

TIT. XxX.

 

De his, que non sunt in rerum natura.

§ VII. Ea quoque res, que in
rerum natura non est, simodo futu-
ra est, recté legatur; veluti fruc-
tus, qui in illo fundo nati erunt, aut
quod ex illa ancilla natum erit.

$ 7. Things, which exist only in
possibility, may be bequeathed ; as
the fruits, which shall grow on such
a spot of ground: or the offspring,
which shall be born of a particular
slave.

De eadem re duobus legata.

§ VIII. Si eadem res duobus
legata sit, sive conjunctim, sive dis-
junctim, si ambo perveniant ad le-
gatum, scinditur inter eos legatum :
si alter dificiat, quia aut spreverit
legatum, aut vivo testatore decesse-
rit, vel alio quoquo modo defecerit,
totum ad collegatarium pertinet.
Conjunctim autem legatur, veluti
si quis dicat, Titio et Seio hominem
Stichum do, lego: disjunctim ita
Titio hominem Stichum do, lego :
Seio hominem Stichum do, lego.
Sed et, si expresserit ewndum hom-
inem Stichum, eque disjunctim le-
gatum intelligitur.

§ 8. When the same specific le-
gacy is left to two persons, either
conjunctively or disjunctively, and
both are willing to accept, it must
be divided between them. But,
should one of the legatees die in the
lifetime of the testator, or dislike his
legacy, or be by any means pre-
vented from taking it, the whole
vests in his co-legatee. A legacy
thus worded, is in the conjunetive,
T give and bequeath my slave Sti-
chus to Titius and Seius: but if
thus, in the disjunctive, I give and
bequeath my slave Stichus to Titius:
I give and bequeath my slave Sti-
chus to Seius. Although the testa-
tor add, that he gives the same
slave Stichus to Seius, yet the lega-
cy would be understood in the dis-
junctive.

Si legatarius proprietatem fundi alieni sibi legatis emerit et
ususfructus ad eam pervenerit.

§ TX. Si cui fundus alienus lega-
tus sit, et emerit proprietatem de-
ducto usufructu, et ususfructus ad
eum pervenerit, et postea ex testa-
mento agat, recté eum agere et fun-
dum petere Julianus ait; quia usus-
fructus in petitione servitutis locum
obtinet : sed officio judicis conti-

§$ 9. If a man bequeath ‘to any
one the ground of another, and the
legatee purchase the property with-
out the usufruct, which afterwards
accrues to him, it is said by Julian-
us, that he may sue under the tes-
tament, and demand the ground ;
because the usufruct is regarded as
LIB. Il. TIT. XxX.

netur, ut deducto usufructu jubeat
zstimationem prestari.

159
a service only. But it is the duty
of a judge, in this case, to order the
price of the property to be paid, de-
ducting the value of the usufruct.

De re legatarii.

§ X. Sed, si rem legatarii quis
ei legaverit, inutile est legatum;
quia, quod proprium est ipsius, am-
plius ejus fieri non potest: et licét
alienaverit eam, non debetur, nec
ipsa res, nec zstimatio ejus.

§ 10. A man uselessly bequeaths
to another, what already belongs to
him; for what is already the pro-
perty of a legatee, cannot become
more so. And, although the legatee
should, after the bequest, alien the
thing bequeathed, neither the thing
itself, nor the value of it, would be-
come due to him.

Si quis rem suam, quasi non suam, legaverit.

§ XI. Si quis rem suam quasi
alienam legaverit, valet legatum:
nam plus valet quod in veritate est,
quam quod in opinione. Sed et, si
legatarii esse putavit, valere con-
stat; quia exitum voluntas defunc-
ti habere potest.

§ 11. Ifa testator bequeath what
is his own, as if it were the proper-
ty of another, the bequest would be
good; for truth is more prevalent
than what is founded upon opinion
only. But although the testator
imagine, that what he bequeaths,
belongs already to the legatee, yet,
if it do not, it is certain, that such
a legacy would also be valid; be-
cause the will of the deceased can
thus take effect.

De alienatione et oppignoratione rei legate.

§ XII. Si rem suam legaverit
testator, posteaque eam alienaverit,
Celsus putat, si non adimendi ani-
mo vendidit, nihilominus deberi:
idemque Divi Severus et Antoni-
nus rescripserunt. Iidem rescrip-
serunt, eum, qui post testamentum
factum predia, que legata erant,
pignori dedit, ademisse legatum
non videri: et ideo legatarium cum
hraede ejus agere posse, ut predia

§ 12. If a testator bequeath his
own property, and afterwards alien,
it is the opinion of Celsus, that the
thing bequeathed will become due
to the legatee, if the testator did not
dispose of it, with an intention to
oust him. The emperors Severus
and Antoninus have published their
rescript to this effect ; and they have
also signified by another rescript
that a legacy afterwards pawned or
160 LIB. IL.

& ereditore luantur. Si verd quis
partem rei legate alienaverit, pars,
que non est alienata, omnino debe-
tur: pars autem alienata, ita debe-
tur, si non adimendi animo aliena-
ta sit.

TIT. XxX.

mortgaged, shall not be considered
as retracted; and that the legatee
may bring suit against the heir, and
oblige him to redeem. And, if but
a part of the thing bequeathed be
aliened, that part which remains
unaliened, is still due; and that,
which is aliened, is only due, if it
appear not to have been aliened by
the testator with a design to retract
the legacy.

De liberatione legata.

§ XIII. Si quis debitori suo li-
berationem legaverit, legatum utile
est: et néque ab ipso debitore, né-
que ab herede ejus, potest heeres
petere, neque ab alio, qui heredis
loco sit. Sed et potest 4 debitore
conveniri, ut liberet eum. Potest
etiam quis vel ad tempus jubere,
ne heeres petat.

§ 13. If a man by will discharge
his debtor, the bequest is effectual ;
and the heir can bring no suit a-
gainst the debtor, his heir or any
representative. On the contrary,
the heir of the testator may be con-
vened by the debtor, and obliged to
give him his discharge. A man
may also forbid his heir to sue a
debtor, within a time limited.

De debito legato creditori.

§ XIV. Ex contrario si debitor
creditori suo, quod debet, legaverit,
inutile est legatum, si nihil plus
est in legato, quam in debito: quia
nihil amplius per legatum habet:
quod si in diem, vel sub conditione,
debitum ei pure legaverit, utile est
legatum propter representationem.
Quod si vivo testatore dies venerit,
vel conditio extiterit, Papinianus
scripsit, utile esse nihilominus lega-
tum, quia semel constitit: quod et
verum est. Non enim placuit sen-
tentia existimantium, extinctum
esse legatum, quia in eam causam

$ 14. On the contrary, a legacy
by a debtor to his ereditor of the
money, which he owes him, is in-
effectual, if it amount merely to the
value of the debt; for the creditor
receives no benefit. But, if a debtor
bequeath simply to his creditor a
sum of money, which was to be paid
at a day certain, or which he owed
upon condition, the legacy will take
effect on account of the representa-
tion, 7. e. because it becomes due be-
fore the debt. But, according to
Papinian, if the day of payment
should come, or the event of the
LIB. IL.

pervenerit, 4 qua incipere non po-
test.

TIT. XX. 161
condition happen in the lifetime of
the testator, the legacy would never-
theless be effectual, because it was
once good; which is true. For we
are not satisfied with the opinion
that a legacy once good, may after-
wards become extinct, by falling
into a state, from which it could not
have taken a legal commencement.

De dote uxori legata.

§ XV. Sed, si uxori maritus do-
‘tem legaverit, valet legatum : quia
plenius est legatum, quam de dote
actio. Sed, si, quam non accepit,
dotem legaverit, Divi Severus et
Antoninus rescripserunt, siquidem
simplicitér legaverit, inutile csse
legatum ; si vero certa pecunia, vel
certum corpus, aut instrumenta do-
tis in preelegando demonstrata sunt,
valere legatum.

§ 15. If a man bequeath to his
wife her marriage portion, it is va-
lid; for the legacy is more benefi-
cial than the action she might main-
tain for the recovery of her portion.
But, if he bequeath to his wife, her
marriage portion, never actually re-
ceived, the emperors Severus and
Antoninus have declared by their
rescript that if it be left simply with-
out any specification of a sum‘cer-
tain, the legacy is void; but if any
sum or thing be specified, or if the
instruments, in which the exact va-
lue of the portion is mentioned, be
referred to, the legacy is valid.

De interitu et mutatione rei legate.

$ XVI. Si res legata siné facto
heeredis perierit, legatario decedit.
Et, si servus alienus legatus siné
facto heredis manumissus fuerit,
non tenetur heres. Si vero here-
dis servus legatus sit, et ipse eum
manumiserit, teneri eum, Julianus
scripsit : nec interest, sciverit, an
ignoraverit, a seeum legatum esse.
Sed et, si alii, donaverit servum, et
is, cui donatus est, eum manumise-

21

$ 16. Ifa thing bequeathed should
perish before delivery without fault
of the heir, the loss falls upon the
legatee. And, if the slave of ano-
ther, who is bequeathed, should be
manumitted the heir not being privy
to the manumission, he can be sub-
ject tono action. But, if a testator
bequeath the slave of his heir, who
afterwards manumits that slave, it
is the opinion of Jidian, that the
162

rit, tenetur heres; quamvis igno-
raverit, 4 se eum legatum esse.

LIB. I. TIT. XX.

heir is answerable; whether he
knew of the legacy or not. Also if
the heir hath made a present of a
slave bequeathed, and the donee
hath manumitted him, the heir is
liable although ignorant of the be-
quest.

De interitu quarundam ex pluribus rebus legatis.

§ XVII. Si quis ancillas cum
suis natis legaverit, etiamsi ancille
mortuze fuerint, partus legato ce-
dunt. Idem est, et si ordinarii ser-
vi cum vicariis legati fuerint: quia
licét mortui sint ordinarii, tamen
vicarii legato cedunt. Sed, si ser-
vus fuerit cum peculio legatus, mor-
tuo servo, vel manumisso, vel ali-
enato, peculii legatum extinguitur.
Idem est, si fundus instructus, vel
cum instrumento, legatus fuerit ;
nam, fundo alienato, et instrumenti
legatum extinguitur.

$17. If a testator bequeath his
female slaves and their offspring,
although the slaves die, their issue
becomes due to the legatee: and so,
if ordinary slaves are bequeathed
together with vicarial ; for although
the ordinary slaves die, yet the vica-
rial slaves will pass by virtue of the
bequest. But, where a slave is be-
queathed with his pecudium, and af-
terwards dies, or is manumitted, or
aliened, the legacy of the peculium
becomes extinct. The consequences
will be thesame, if a piece of ground
is bequeathed with the instruments
for improving it; for, if the testa-
tor aliens the ground, the legacy of
the instruments of husbandry is of
course extinguished.

De grege legato.

$ XVIII. Si grex legatus fuerit,
et postea ad unam ovem pervenerit
quod superfuerit, vindicari potest.
Grege autem legato etiam eas oves,
qué post testamentum factum gregi
adjiciuntur, legato cedere Julianus
ait. Est autem gregis unum cor-
pus ex distantibus captibus, sicut
eedium unum corpus est ex coheren-
tibus lapidibus.

§ 18. Ifa flock is bequeathed,
and afterwards reduced to a single
sheep, that sheep isclaimable; and
ifa flock receive an addition, after
it hath been bequeathed, this addi-
tion will also according tog@ulian
enure to the legatee. Fora flock is
deemed one body, consisting of se-
parate members, as a house is reck-
oned one body, composed of materi-
als, joined together and adhering.
LIB. I1.

LET. EX. 163

De edibus legatis.

$ XIX. Aidibus denique legatis,
columnas et marmora, qu post tes-
tamentum factum adjecta sunt, le-
gato decimus cedere.

!

$19. And lastly, when an house
is bequeathed, the marble or pillars
which are added after the bequest
is made, will pass under the general
legacy.

De peculio.

§ XX. Si peculium legatum fue-
rit, siné dubio quicquid peculio ac-
cedit vel decedit, vivo testatore,
legatarii lucro vel damno est. Quod
si post mortem testatoris ante adi-
tam hereditatem aliquid servus ac-
quisierit, Julianus ait, siquidém ip-
si manumisso peculium legatum fu-
erit, omne, quod anté aditam here-
ditatem acquisitum est legatario ce-
dere; quia hujusmodi legati dies ab
adita hereditate cedit: sed, si ex-
traneo peculium legatum fuerit, non
cedere ea legato, nisiex rebus pe-
culiaribus auctum fuerit peculium.
Peculium autem, nisi legatum fue-
rit, manumisso non debetur: quam-
vis, si vivus manumiserit, sufficit,
si non adimatur: et ita Divi Seve-
rus et Antoninus rescripserunt. Ii-
dem rescripserunt, peculio legato,
non videri id relictum, ut petitio-
nem habeat pecunie, quam in ra-
tiones dominicas impenderit. Ii-
dem rescripserunt, peculium vide-
ri legatum, cum rationibus red-

$ 20. When the peculium (of a
slave) is bequeathed, it is certain,
that the increase or decrease of it in
the life of the testator, becomes the
loss or gain of the legatee. And, if
the peculium of a slave be left to
him with his liberty and he increase
the peculiumsubsequent to the death
of the testator, and before the inhe-
ritance is entered upon, it is the opi-
nion of Julian, that the increase
will pass to him as legatee: for such
a legacy does not become due, but
from the day of the acceptance of
the inheritance: but should the pe-
culium of a slave be bequeathed to
a stranger, an increase, acquired
within the period above-mentioned
will not pass under the legacy, un-
less the acquisition were made, by
means of something appertaining to
the peculium ; for the peculium of
a slave does not belong to him, af-
ter he is manumitted by testament,
unless expressly given ; although,
if a master in his life-time manumit
164 LIB. IL

TIT. XX.

 

ditis liber esse jussus est, ct ex eo
reliqua inferre.

his slave, his peculiwm will pass to
him of course, if not excepted : and
such is the rescript of the emperors
Severus and Antoninus ; who have
also declared, that when a peculium
is bequeathed to a slave, it does not
seem intended that he should have
the right of demanding what he
may have expended for the use of
his master. The same princes have
farther declared that a slave seems
intitled to his peculiwm, if his liber-
ty be left him on condition, that he
will bring in his accounts, and sup-
ply any deficiency out of the profits
of his peculium.

De rebus corporalibus et incorporalibus.

§ XXI. Tam autem corporales
res legarl possunt, quam incorpo-
rales; et ided, quod defuncto debe-
tur, potest alieni legari, ut actiones
suas heres legatario preestet ; nisi
exegerit vivus testator pecuniam :
nam hoc casu legatum extinguitur.
Sed et tale legatum valet ; damnas
esto heres meus domum illius refi-
cere: vel illum cre alieno liberare.

§ 21. Things incorporeal may be
bequeathed as well as things corpo-
real: and so therefore may a debt,
due to the testator; and the heir be
obliged to transfer his right of ac-
tion to the legatee: unless the tes-
tator in his life-time received the
money due to him; for in this case
the legacy would become extinct.
Such a legacy as this, is also good;
Icommand my heir to rebuild the
house of Titius: or to free him
Srom his debts.

De legato generali.

§$° XXII. Si generalitér servus,
vel res alia, legetur, electio legatarii
est, nisi aliud testator dixerit.

y

§ XXIII. Optionis legatum, id
est, ubi testator ex servis suis vel

§ 22. If a testator bequeath a
slave, or else some particular thing
disjunctively, the right of election is
in the legatee, unless the testator
hath declared otherwise.

De optione legata.

§ 23. An optional legacy, is when
a testator directs his legatee to choose
LIB. I.

aliis rebus optare legatarium jusse-
rat, habebat olim in se conditionem :
et ided, nisi ipse legatarius vivus
optasset, ad heeredem legatum non
transmittebat. Sed ex constitutione
nostra et hoc in meliorem statum
reformatum est, et data est licentia
heeredi legatarii optare servum, li-
cét vivus legatarius hoc non fece-
rit. Et, diligentiore tractuta habi-
to, hoc in nostra constitutione ad-
ditum est, sivé plures legatarii ex-
titerint, quibus optio relicta est, et
dissentiant in corpore eligendo;
sivé unius legatarii plures heeredes
sint, et inter se circa optandum dis-
sentiant, alio aliud corpus eligere
cupiente, ne pereat legatum, (quod
plerique prudentium contra benevo-
lentiam introducebant,) fortunam
esse hujus optionis judicem, et forté
hoc esse dirimendum, ut, ad quem
sors pervenerit, illus sententia in
optione praecellat.

TIT. XX. 165
any slave, from among his slaves, or
any article from a certain class of
things; and such legacy was for-
merly presumed to imply this condi-
tion, that, if the legatee in his life-
time did not make his election, the
legacy could not be transmitted to
his heir. But, by our constitution,
this presumed condition is now
taken away, and the heir of the
legatee is permitted to elect, al-
though the legatee in his life-time
hath neglected to do it. And, upon
further consideration, we have add-
ed to our constitution, that, if there
be several legatees, to whom an
option is left, and they differ in their
choice, or if there be many heirs of
one legatee, of divers sentiments,
then Fortune must be the judge:
for, lest the loss of the legacy should
ensue, (which the generality of an-
cient lawyers, contrary to all bene-
volence, would have permitted, ) we
have decreed, that such dissensions
should be decided by lot; so that
his option, to whom the lot falls,
shall be preferred.

Quibus legari potest.

§ XXIV. Legari autem illis so-
lum potest, cum quibus testamenti
factio est.

§ 24. A legacy can be left to those
only, who have the capacity of tak-
ing by testament, (i. e. factio pas-
Siva.)

Jus antiquum de incertis personis.

§ XXYV. Incertis vero personis
neque legata neque fidei-commissa
olim relinqui concessum erat; nam
ne miles quidem incerte persone
poterat relinquere, ut Divus Hadri-
anus rescripsit. Incerta autem per-
sona debatur, quam incerta opi-

§ 25. It was not permitted for-
merly, that either legacies, or gifts
in trust, should be bequeathed to in-
certain persons; this was even pro-

“hibited to a soldier, by the emperor

Adrian. Anincertain person is one
whom the testator has figured in
166

LIB. Ii. TIT. XX.

 

nione animo suo testator subjicie-
bat, veluti, si quis ita dicat, guicun-
que filio meo filiam suam in matri-
monium dederit, et heres meus illum
fundum dato. Tlud quoque, quod
lis relinquebatur, qui post testamen-
tum scriptum primi consules desig-
nati essent, eque incerte persone
legari videbatur: et denique multz
ali hujusmodi species sunt. Li-
bertas quoque incerte persone non
videbatur posse dari, quia placebat,
nominatim servos liberari. Sub cer-
ta vero demonstratione, id est, ex
certis personis, incerta persone rec-
té legabatur: veluti, ex cognatis
meis, qui nunc sunt, si quis filiam
mean uxorem duxerit, ei heres meus
illam rem dato. Incertis autem per-
sonis legata vel fidei-commissa re-
licta, et per errorem soluta, repeti
non posse, sacris constitutionibus
cautum erat.

his imagination, without any deter-
minate knowledge; as if he should
say: whoever shall give his daugh-
ter in marriage to my son, to that
person let my heir deliver up such
a piece of ground. And, if he had
made a bequest ¢o the first consuls
appointed after his testament was
written, this also would have been
a bequest to incertain persons; and
there are other similar examples.
Freedom likewise could not be con-
ferred upon an incertain person ; for
it was necessary, that all slaves
should be nominally infranchised :
but a legacy might have been given
to an incertain person under a cer-
tain demonstration; or, in other
words, to an incertain person, being
one of a number of persons certain :
as, I direct my heir to give such a
thing to any one of my present col-
lateral relations, who shall take my
daughter in marriage. But, if a
legacy or fiduciary gift had been
paid to incertain persons by mis-
take, it was provided by the con-
stitutions, that such persons were
not compellable to refund.

Jus antiquum de posthumo alieno.

§$ XXVI. Posthumo quoque ali-
eno inutiliter antea legabatur. Est
autem alienus posthumus, qui natus
inter suos heredes testatori futurus
non est: idedque, ex emancipato
filio conceptus nepos, extraneus
erat posthumus avo.

§ 26. Formerly a legacy could
not enure to a posthumous stran-
ger: that is, to one who; if he had
been born before the death of the
testator, could not have been num-
bered among his proper heirs: and of
consequence a posthumous grand-
son, by an emancipated son, was a
posthumous stranger in regard to
his grandfather.
LIB. Il. TIT. XX.

167

Jus novum de personis incertis et posthumo alieno.

§ XXVIL Sed nec hujusmodi
pecies penitis est siné justa emen-
latione relicta, cum in nostro co-
lice constitutio posita sit, per quam
t huic parti medemur, non solim
n heereditatibus, sed etiam in lega-
is et fidei-commissis: quod evi-
lentér ex ipsius constitutionis lec-
ione clarescit. Tutor autem nec
er nostram constitutionem incer-
us dari debet: quia certo judicio
lebet quis pro tutela sux posterita-
1 cavere.

$ 27. But the ancient law hath
not been left without proper emen-
dation; for a constitution in our
collection hath altered the law con-
cerning incertain persons, not only
in respect of inheritances, but also
legacies and fiduciary bequest.
This alteration will appear from
the constitution itself; which gives
no authority to the nomination of
an incertain tutor; for it is incum-
bent upon every parent to take care
of his posterity in this respect, by a
determinate appointment.

De posthumo aliena herede instituto.

§ XXVITH. Posthumus autém
uienus heres instituti et ante po-
erat, et nunc potest; nisi in utero
3jus sit, quae jure nostro, uxor esse
10n potest.

§ 28. A posthumous stranger
could formerly, and may now be
appointed heir, unless it appear,
that he was conceived by a woman,
who could not have been legally
married to his father.

De errore in nomine legatarii.

§ XXIX. Siquidem in nomine,
sognomine, prenomine, agnomine,
legatarii testator erraverit, cum de
persona constat, nihilominus valet
egatum; idémque in heredibus
servatur; et recté: nomina enim
significandorum hominum gratia
reperta sunt; qui si alio quolibet
modo intelligantur, nihil interest.

$ 29. Although a testator may
have mistaken the nomen, cogno-
men, prenomen or agnomen of a
legatee, yet, if his person be certain,
the legacy is good. ‘The same rule
is observed as to heirs, and with
reason: for the use of names is but
to point out persons; and, if they
can be denoted by any other method,
it will make no difference.

De falsa demonstratione.

§ XXX. Huic proxima est illa
juris regula, falsa demonstratione
legatum non perimi: veluti, si
quis ita legaverit, Stichum servum

§ 30. The rule of law, which
comes nearest to the foregoing, is,
that a legacy is not rendered null
by a false description : suppose a be-
168 LIB. II.

TIT. XxX.

 

 

meum vernam do, lego. Licet enim
non verna, sed emptus sit, si tamen
de servo constat, utile est legatum.
Et convenienter, si ita demonstra-
verit, Stichum servum, quem a Seio
emi, sitque ab alio emptus, utile est
legatum, si de servo constat.

quest thus worded: I give and be-
queath Stichus my slave, who was
born in my family : in this case, al-
though Stichus was not born in the
family, but bought, yet, if there be
certainty of his person, the legacy
_is valid. And if a testator should
write: I bequeath Stichus my slave,
whom I bought of Seius ; yet, al-
though bought of another, the lega-
cy would be good, if no doubt ex-
isted as to the person of Stichus.

De falsa causa adjecta.

§ XXXI. Longé magis legato fal-
sa causa adjecta non nocet: veluti
cum quis ita dixerit: Titio, quia
me absente negotia mea curavit, Sti-
chum do, lego: vel ita, Titio, quia
patrocinio ejus, capitali crimine li-
beratus sum, Stichum do, lego. Li-
cet enim neque negotia testatoris
unquam gesserit Titius, neque pat-
rocinio ejus liberatus sit, legatum
tamen valet. Sed, si conditionali-
tér enunciata fuerit causa, aliud
juris est; veluti hoc modo, Titio,
si negotia mea curaverit, fundum
meum do, lego.

§ 31. A fortiori a legacy is not
rendered less valid, although a false
reason be assigned for bequeathing
it: as if a testator should say: I
give my slave Stichus to Titius be-
cause he took care of my affairs in
my absence: or because I was ac-
quitted upon a capital accusation,
by his protection. For although
Titius had. never taken care of the
affairs of the deceased, and although
the testator was never thus acquit-
ted by means of Titius, the legacy
will be good. But if the bequest
had been conditional, as I give to
Titius, such a piece of ground, if
it shall appear, that he hath taken
proper care of my affairs, then the
law would be different.

De servo heredis.

§ XXXII. An servo heredis
recté legemus, queritur: et constat,
puré inutilitér legari, nec quicquam
proficere, si vivo testatore de po-
testate heredis exierit: quia, quod
inutile foret legatum, si statim post

§ 32. It is doubted, whether a
testator can bequeath to the slave of
his heir; and it is settled that such
a legacy, would be of no avail, al-
though the slaves should be freed
from the power of the heir in the
LIB. I. TIT. Xx..

factum testamentum  decessisset
testator, hoc non debet ided valere,
quia diutius testator vixerit. Sub
conditione verd recté legatur ser-
vo, ut requiramus, an, quo tempore
dies legati cedit, in potestate here-
dis non sit.

169

lifetime of the testator; for a be-
quest, void if the testator had expir-
ed immediately after he had made
it, ought not to become valid, merely
because he happened to enjoy a lon-
ger life. But a testator may give a
conditional legacy to the slave, (of
his instituted heir,) which will be
good, if the slave be not under the
power of the heir when the condi-
tion is fulfilled.

De domino heredis.

§ XXXIIT. Ex diverso, herede
instituto servo, quin domino recté
etiam siné conditione legetur, non
dubitatur: nam, etsi statim post
factum testamentum decesserit tes-
tator, non tamen apud eum, qui he-
res sit, dies legati cedere intelligi-
tur ; cum heereditas 4 legato separa-
ta sit, et possit per eum servum ali-
us heres effici, si prius, quam jus-
su domini adeat, in alterius potesta-
tem translatus sit; vel manumis-
sus ipse heres efficitur : quibusca-
sibus utile est legatum. Quod si
in eddem causé permanserit, et jus-
su legatarii adierit, evanescit lega-
tum.

De modo et ratione legandi.

§ XXXIV. Ante heredis institu-
tionem inutilitér antea legabatur ;
scilicét, quia testamenta, vim ex in-
stitutione heredis accipiunt, et ob

id veluti caput atque fundamen-
22

§ 33. On the contrary it is not
doubted, but if a slave be appoint-
ed heir, that his master may take an
unconditional legacy (by the same
testament :) for, although the testa-
tor should die instantly, yet the le-
gacy does not become immediately
due from the slave whd is heir; for
the inheritance is here separate from
the legacy, and another may become
heir by means of the slave, if he
should be transferred to a new mas-
ter, before he hath entered upon the
inheritance, at the command of his
master, who is the legatee ; or the
slave himself may become heir in
his own rightby manumission; and
in these cases, the legacy would be
good. But, if the slave should re-
main in the same state, and enter
upon the inheritance by order of
his master, who is the legatee, the
legacy becomes extinct.

De ordine scripture.

§ 34. A legacy could not formerly
take effect, until the heir was insti-
tuted ; because a testament receives
its force and efficacy from the insti-
tution of the heir: by parity of rea-
170 LIB. II.

tum, intelligitur totius testamenti
heeredis institutio. Pari ratione,
nec libertas ante heredis institutio-
nem dari poterat. Sed, quia incivile
esse"putavimus, scripture: ordinem
quidem sequi, (quod et ipsi anti-
quitati vituperandum fuerat visum)
sperni autem testatoris véluntatem,
per nostrém constitutionem et hoc
vitium emendavimus, ut liceat et
ante heredis institutionem et inter
medias heredum institutiones lega-
tum relinquere, et mult magis li-
bertatem, cujus usus favorabilior
est.

De legato post mortem

§ XXXV. Post mortem quoque
heredis aut legatarii simili modo
inutilitér legabatur : veluti, si quis
ita dicat, cum heres meus mortuus
Suerit, do, lego : item pridie quam
heres aut legatarius morietur. Sed
simili modo et hoc correximus, fir-
mitatem hujusmodi legatis ad fidei-
commissorum similitudinem przes-
tantes; ne in hoc casu deterior cau-
sa legatorum, quam fidei-commis-
sorum, inveniatur.

TIT. XX.

_¥.

son the institution of an heir should
always precede the grantof freedom.
But we have thought it wrong that
the mere order of writing should be
attended to in opposition to the ex-
press intention of a testator: and the
ancients themselves seem to have
thought so: we have therefore, by
our constitution amended the law in
this point ; so that a legacy, and a
fortiori, a grant of liberty, which is
always favoured, may now be be-
queathed, before the institution of
an heir, (where there is but one;
and, either before, or between the
institutions of heirs, where there
are several.)

heredis, vel legatarii.

§ 35. A bequest, made to take
place after the death of an heir or
legatee, was also ineffectual : for, if
a testator had said, when my heir is
dead, I give and bequeath, or even
thus, I give and bequeath the day
preceding the day of the death of
my heir, or, of my legatee, the lega-
cies were void. But we have cor-
rected the ancient rule in this res-
pect, by giving all such legacies the
same validity, as gifts in trust; lest
trusts should be found to be more
favoured, than legacies.

Si pcenze nomine relinquatur, adimatur, vel transferatur.

§ XXXVI. Pen quoque no-
mine inutilitér antea legabatur, et
adimebatur, vel  transferebatur.
Poene autem nomine legari videtur,
quod coercendi heredis causa re-
linquitur, quo magis aliquid faciat,

$ 36. Also formerly, if a testator
had given, revoked, ortransferred a
legacy nomine pene, he wouldhave
acted ineffectually : and a legacy is
reputed to be bequeathed nomine pe-
ne, [i. e. as a punishment or penal-
LIB. II.

TIT. XX. 171

 

aut non faciat: veluti si quis ita
scripserit, heres meus si filians su-
am in matrimonium Titio collocave-
rit; vel ex diverso, si non colloca-
verit, dato decem aureos Seio; aut
Si ita scripserit, heres meus si ser-
vum Stichum alienaverit : vel ex di-
verso, si non alienaverit, Titio de-
cem aureos dato. Et in tantum
hec regula observabatur, ut quam
plurimis principalibus constitutio-
nibus significaretur, nec principem
agnoscere, quod ei poenee nomine le-
gatum sit: nec ex militis quidem
testamento talia legata valebant:
quamvis aliz militum voluntates in
ordinandis testamentis valdé obser-
vabantur: quinetiam nec libertates
pvense nomine dari posse placebat:
eo amplius, nec heredem poenz no-
mine adjici posse, Sabinus existima-
bat: veluti si quis ita dicat, Titius
heres esto; si Titius filiam suam
in matrimonium Seio collocaverit,
Seius quoque heres esto. Nihil
enim intererat, qua ratione 'Titius
coerceretur, utrum legati datione,
an coheredis adjectione. Sed hu-
jusmodi scrupulositas nobis non
placuit; et generalitér ea, quae re-
linquuntur, licét poenze nomine fue-
rint relicta vel adempta, vel in
alium translata, nihil distare a ce-
teris legatis constituimus, vel in
dando, vel in adimendo, vel in
transferendo: exceptis videlicét iis,
quz impossibilia sunt, vel legibus
interdicta, aut alias probrosa. Hu-
jusmodi enim testamentorum dis-

ty,] when an heir is put under the
necessity of doing or not doing
something; as if a testator had thus
written ; ¢f my heir give his daugh-
ter in marriage to Titius ; or if he
do not give her in marriage to Ti-
tius, let him pay ten aurei to Seius :
or thus, if my heir shall alien my
slave Stichus ; or, if my heir shall
not alien my slave Stichus, let him
pay ten aurei to Titius. And this
rule was so far observed, that it was
expressly ordained by many con-
stitutions, that even the emperor
could not receive a legacy, which
was bequeathed nomine pene ; nor
could a penal legacy be valid, even
when bequeathed by the testament
of a soldier; although, in every
other respect, the intention of a tes-
tator in a military testament was
scrupulously adhered to. And even
freedom could not be bequeathed,
nor, in the opinion of Sabinus could
an heir he added in a testament,
nomine pene : for, if a testator had
said, let Titius be my heir, but if
he give his daughter in marriage
to Seius, let Seius also be my heir,
the appointment of Seius would
have been void; for the manner, in
which an heir was laid under coer-
cion, whether by the gift of a lega-
cy, or by the addition of another
heir, worked no alteration in the
general rule of law. But this strict-
ness hath not pleased us, and we
have therefore ordained generally
that things left, revoked, or trans-
172

positiones valere secta meorum
temporum non patitur.

LIB. IL TIT. XX

ferred, nomine pene, should fall
under the same rules of law as other
legacies, whereof the condition is
neither impossible, prohibited by
law, or contrary to good manners,
for the morality, of the present
times, will not suffer testamentary
dispositions of this character.

 

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-PRIMUS.

DE ADEMPTIONE LEGATORUM ET TRANSLATIONE.

D. xxxiv.

T. 4

De ademptione.

ADEMPTIO legatorum,  sivé
eodem testamento adimantur, sivé
codicillis, firma est. Sed et, sivé
contrariis verbis fiat ademptio, ve-
luti si quod ita quis legaverit, do,
lego, ita adimatur, non do, non
dego: sivé non contrarii, sed aliis
quibuscumque verbis.

A revocation of a legacy is valid,
although inserted in the same tes-
tament or codicil. And it is im-
material, whether the revocation be
made in some form of words con-
trary to the bequest; as when a tes-
tator bequeaths in these terms, J
give and bequeath to Titius, and
revokes it by adding, I do not give
and bequeath to Titius: or in any
other form.

De translatione.

§ L Transferri quoque legatum
ab alio ad alium potest: veluti si
quis ita dixerit, hominem Stichum,
quem Titio legavi, Seio do, lego:
sivé in eodem testamento, sivé co-
dicillis, id fecerit: quo casu, simul
et Titio adimi videtur, et Seio dari.

$ 1. A legacy may also be trans-
ferred from one person to another;
as, I give to Seius my slave Stich-
us, whom I have bequeathed to Ti-
tius. This may be done in the
same testament or codicil; and thus
a legacy may be taken from Titius
and transferred to Sieus.
LIB. If. TIT. XXII.

173

 

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-SECUNDUS.
DE LEGE FALCIDIA.

D. xxxv. T. 2. C. vi. T. 50.

Nov. 1.

Ratio et summa hujus legis.

SUPEREST, ut de lege Falci-
dia dispiciamus, qué modus novis-
simé legatis impositus est. Cum
enim olim lege duodecim tabula-
rum libera erat legandi potestas, ut
liceret vel totum patrimonium lega-
tis erogare: quippe, cum ed lege
ita cautum esset, wti quisque legas sit
sue rei, ita jus esto, visum est hanc
legandi licentiam coarctare ; idque
ipsorum testamentorum gratia pro-
visum est, ob id, quod plerimque
intestati moriebantur, recusantibus
scriptis heredibus pro nullo aut
minimo lucro hereditates adire.
Et, cum super hoc tam lex Furia,
quam lex Voconia late sunt, qua-
rum neutra sufficiens ad rei con-
summationem videbatur, novissimé
lata est lex Falcidia, qua cavetur,
ne plus legare liceat, quam dodran-
tem totorem bonorum; id est, ut,
sivé unus heres institutus sit, sivé
plures apud eum eosve pars quarta
remaneat.

De pluribus

$I. Et, cum qesitum esset, du-
obus. heredibus institutis (veluti
Titio et Seio) si Titii pars aut tota
exhausta sit legatis, que nominatim
ab eo data sunt, aut supra modum
onerata, 4 Seio vero aut nulla rélic-

It remains to speak of the law
Falcidia, by which legacies have re-
ceived their latest regulation. By
the law of the 12 tables, uti quisque
legassit sue rei, ita jus esto, a tes-
tor was permitted to dispose of his
whole patrimony in legacies: but it
was thought proper to restrain this
licence even for the benefit of testa-
tors themselves, because they fre-
quently died intestate, their heirs
refusing to enter upon an inheritance
from which they could receive little
or no profit. And this gave rise
first to the law Furia, and after-
wards thelaw Voconia : but ueither
of these being found adequate to the
purpose, the Falcidian law was at
length enacted ; which forbidsa tes-
tator to give more in legacies, than
three fourths of all his effects; so
that, whether there be one or more
heirs, there must now remain to
him, or them, an intite fourth part
of the whole.

heeredibus.

§ 1. When two heirs are insti-
tuted, as Titius and Seius, and
Titius’s part of the inheritance is
overcharged by specific legacies ;
while Seius’s part is wholly free or
only partially incumbered ; it hath
174 LIB. IT.

ta sint legata, aut que partem ejus
duntaxat in partem diminuant, an,
quia is quartam partem totius he-
reditatis, aut amplius habet, Titio
nihil ex legatis, que ab eo relicta
sunt, retinere liceat, ut quartam
partem sue partis salvam habeat ?
placuit posse retinere. Etenim in
singulis heredibus, ratio legis Fal-
cidize ponenda est.

TIT. XXII.

been queried, whether, although
Seius hath a fourth or more of the
whole inheritance, it may not be
lawful nevertheless for Tittus to
make a stoppage out of the legacies
with which he is charged, so as to
retain a fourth part out of his own
moiety ? and it hath been determin-
ed, that he may: for the reason of
the law Falcidia extends to each
heir.

Quo tempore spectatur quantitas patrimonii, ad quam, ratio
legis Falcidie redigitur.

$ IL. Quantitas autem patrimo-
nii, ad quamratio legis Falcidie re-
digitur, mortis tempore spectatur.
Itaque, (verbi gratia) si is, quicen-
tum aureorum patrimonium in bo-
nis habeat, centum aureos legave-
rit, nihil legatariis prodest, si ante
aditam hereditatem per servos he-
reditarios, aut ex partu ancillarum
hereditarium, aut ex foetu peco-
rum, tantum accesserit heereditati,
ut, centum aureis legatorum no-
mine erogatis, heres quartam par-
tem hereditatis habiturus sit: sed
necesse est, ut nihilominus quarta
pars legatis detrahatur. Ex diver-
so, si septuaginta quinque legave-
rit, et ante aditam hereditatem in
tantum decreverint bona, (incendiis
forte, aut naufragiis, aut morte ser-
vorum) ut non amplius quam sep-
tuaginta quinque aureorum sub-
stantia vel etiam minus relinquatur
solida legata debentur. Nec ea res
damnosa est heredi, cui liberum est
non adire hereditatem: que res
efficit, ut sit necesse legatariis, ne
destituto testamento nihil conse-

$ 2. The law Falcidia looks to
the quantity of the estate at the time
of the death of the testator; and
therefore if he who is worth but an
hundred aurei at his decease, be-
queath them all in legacies, the leg-
atees must suffer a defalcation ; for
they will be entitled tono advan-
tage, although the inheritance, after
the death of the testator and before
itis entered upon, should so increase
by the acquisition of slaves, the chil-
drenof female slaves, or the product
of cattle, that after a full payment
of the 100 aurei in legacies, an in-
tire fourth of the whole estate might
remain to the heir; the legacies not-
withstanding would still be liable
to a deduction of one fourth. On the
contrary, if the same testator hath
bequeathed only 75 aurei, then, al-
though before the entrance of the
heir, the estate should so decrease
by fire, shipwreck, or the loss of
slaves, that its whole value should
not be more than 75 aurei, or less,
yet the legacies would still be due
without defalcation : nor is this law
LIB. I.

TIT. XXII.

175

 

quantur, cum herede in portione
pacisci.

prejudicial to an heir who is always
at his election either to refuse or ac-
cept an inheritance; but it obliges
legatees to compromise with the
heir, lest they should lose the whole
for want of some one to act.

Que detrahuntur ante Falcidiam.

§ If. Cum autem ratio legis
Falcidie ponitur, anté deducitur es
alienum, item funeris impensa, et
pretia servorum manumissorum:
tunc demum in reliquo ita ratio ha~
betur, ut ex eo quarta pars apud
heeredam remaneat, tres vero partes
inter legatarios distribuantur, pro
rata scilicét portione ejus, quod cui-
que eorum legatum fuerit. Itaque,
si fingamus, quadringentos aureos
legatos esse, et patrimanii quanti-
tatem, ex qua legata erogari oportet,
quadringentorum esse, quarta pars
singulis legatariis debet detrahi.
(Quod si trecentos quinquaginta le-
gatos fingamus, octava debet detra-
hi. Quod si quingentos legaverit,
initio quinta, deinde quarta, detrahi
debet. Ante enim detrahendum est
quod extra bonorum quantitatem
est, deindé quod ex bonis apud he-
redem remanere oportet.

§ 3. The Faicidian portion is not
taken until the debts, funeral ex-
penses, and the price of the manu-
mission of slaves, have been deduct-
ed; and then the fourth part of the
remainder appertains to the heir,
and the other three parts are divid-
ed among the legatees in a ratable
proportion: for example, let it be
supposed, that 400 aurei have been
bequeathed, and the estate, turns
out to be worth no more, a fourth
must be subtracted from each lega-
cy; but, if the testator gave in lega-
cies no more than 350 aurei, and
there remained after debts paid 400,
then an eighth only ought to be de-
ducted. And, if 500 aurei have
been bequeathed, and there remain
clear in the hands of the heir but
AOO, a fifth must first be deducted,
and then a fourth: but that, which
exceeds the real value of the goods
of the deceased, must first be sub-
tracted, and then follows the de-
duction of what is due to the heir.
176

LIB. IL TIT. XXi.

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-TERTIUS.
DE FIDEI-COMMISSARIIS HAREDITATIBUS.

D. xxxvi. T. 1.

Continuatio.

NUNC transeamus ad fidei-com-
missa. Sed prits est, ut de heredi-
tatibus fidei-commissariis videa-
mus.

C. vi. T, 42. et 49. Nov. 39. 108.

x

Let us now proceed to trusts;
but first, we will treat of fiduciary
inheritances.

Origo fidei-commissorum.

$ I. Sciendum itaque est, omnia
fidei-commissa primis temporibus
infirma fuisse; quia nemo invitus
cogebatur preestare id, de quo roga-
tus erat. Quibus enim non pote-
rant hereditatem vel: legata relin-
quere, si relinquebant, fidei com-
mittebant eorum, qui capere ex tes-
tamento poterant. Et ided fidei-
commissa appellata sunt, quia nul-
lo vinculo juris, sed tantim pudore
eorum, qui rogabantur, contineban-
tur. Postea Divus Augustus pri-
mus, semél interumque gratia per-
sonarum motus, vel quia per ipsius
salutem rogatus quis diceretur, aut
ob insignem quorundam perfidiam,
jussit consulibus auctoritatem su-
am interponere: quod, quia justum
videbatur et populare erat, paula-
tim conversum est in assiduam ju-
risdictionem; tantusque eorum fa-
vor factus est, ut paulatim etiam
pretor proprius crearetur, qui de
fidei-commissis jus diceret, quem
fidei-commissarium appellabant.

$ 1. It must be observed, that an-
ciently all trusts were weak and
precarious; for no man could be
compelled to perform what he was
only requested to perform. But
when testators were desirous of giv-
ing an inheritance or legacy to per-
sons, to whom they could directly
give neither, they then bequeathed
in trust to some person capable of
taking; and such bequests were
called fiduciary, because the per-
formance could not be enforced by
law, but depended solely upon the
honour of the trustee. The em-
peror Augustus, having been fre-
quently moved with compassion on
account of some persons, and detest-
ing the perfidy of others, command-
ed the consuls to interpose their an- .
thority; and this, being a just and
popular command, gave them by
degrees a continued jurisdiction ;
and in process of time, trusts be-
came so common, and were so
highly favoured, that a praetor was
purposely appointed to give judg-
ment in these cases, and was there-
fore called the commissary of
trusts.
LIB. II.

*

TIT. XXIII.

177

De fidei-commisso heredis scripti.

$ IL In primis igitur sciendum
est, opus esse, ut aliquis recto jure
testamento heres instituatur, ejus-
que fidei committatur, ut eam here-
ditatem alii restituat : aliqdi inu-
tile est testamentum, in quo nemo
heeres instituitur. Cum igitur ali-
quis scripserit, Lucius Titius heres
esto, potest adjicere, rego te, Luci
Titi ut, cum primum poteris here-
ditatem meam. adire, eam Caio Seto
reddas, restituas. Potest autem
quisque et de parte restituenda hee-
redem rogare ; et liberum est vel
pure, vel sub conditione, relinquere
fidei-commissum, vel ex certo die.

$ 2. We should first observe that
there must be an heir appointed to
every testament: to whom it is en-
trusted in confidence that he will re-
store the inheritance to some other
person ; for without an heir, a testa+
ment is ineffectual. And therefore,
when a testator says; let Lucius
Titius be my heir; he may add,
and I request you Lucius Titius,
that, so soon as you enter upon my
inheritance, you would restore it to
Caius Seius. But a testator may
request his heir to restore a part of
the inheritance only, and may make
him a trustee upon condition, or
from a day certain. <

Effectus restitutionis hereditatis.

$ IIL. Restituta autem hereditate,
is quidem, qui restituit, nihilomi-
mus heres permanet; is vero qui
recipit hereditatem, aliquandsé he-
redis, aliquando legatarii, loco ha-
betur.

§ 3. After an heir hath restored
the inheritance, he still continues
heir. But he, who hath received
the inheritance, is sometimes consi-
dered as in the place of the heir, and
sometimes of a legatee.

De senatus-consulto Trebelliano.

§ IV. Et Neronis quidem tem-
poribus, Trebellio Maximo et An-
neo Seneca coss. senatus-consul-
tum factum est, quo cautum est,
ut, si hereditas ex fidei-commissi
causa restituta sit, omnes actiones,
que jure civili heredi et in here-
dem competerent, ei et in eum da-
rentur, cui ex fidei-commisso resti-
tuta esset heereditas. Post quod
senatus-consultum, preetor utiles ac-
tiones ei et in eum, qui recepit he-

23

§ 4.In the reign of Nero, Tre-
bellius Maximus and. Anneus Sen-
eca being consuls, a decree passed
in the senate, that, when an inhe-
ritance was restored under a trust,
all actions, which by the civil law
might be brought by, or or against
the heir, should be given to and a-
gainst him, to whom the inheritance
was restored. After this decree, the
preetor began to give equitable and
beneficial actions to and against the
178 LIB. IL.

reditatem, quasi heeredi et in heere-
dem, dare cospit.

TIT. XXII.

receiver of an inheritance, as if he
were the heir.

De senatus-consulto Pegasiano.

§ V. Sed, quia heredes scripti,
cum aut totam hereditatem, aut pe-
né totam, plerumque restituere ro-
gabantur, adire hereditatemob nul-
lum vel minimum lucrum recusa-
bant, atque ob id extinguebantur
fidei-commissa : postea Vespasiani
Augusti temporibus, Pegaso et Pu-
sione consulibus, senatus censuit,
ut ei, qui rogatus esset heredita-
tem restituere, perindé liceret quar-
tam partem retinere, atque ex lege
Falcidia ex legatis retinere conce-
ditur. Ex singulis quoque rebus,
que per fidei-commissum  relin-
quuntur, eadem retentio permissa
est. Post quod senatus-consultum,
ipse heres onera heereditaria susti-
hebat: ille autem, qui ex fidei-
commisso recipiebat partem here-
ditatis, legatarii partiarii loco erat;
id est, ejus legatarii, cui pars bono-
rum legabatur ; que species legati
partitio vocabatur, quia cum heerede
legatarius partiebatur hereditatem.
Unde, qe solebant stipulationes
inter heredem et partiarium legata-
rium interponi, eedem interpone-
bantur inter eum, qui ex fidei-com-
misso recepit hereditatem et he-
redem ; id est, ut lucrum et dam-
num hereditarium pro rata parte
inter eos commune esset.

§ 5. But, when written heirs
were requested to restore the whole
or almost the whole, of an inheri-
tance, they often refused to accept
it, since they could receive but little
or no emolument; and thus trusts
were frequently extinguished. Af-
terwards, in the consulate of Pega-
sus and Pugio, in the reign of the
emperor Vespasian, the senate de-
creed, that an heir, who was re-
quested to restore an inheritance,
might retain a fourth, as in the case
of legacies by the Falcidian law.
And the same deduction is allowed
from particular things, which are
left to him as trustee. For some
time after this decree, the heir alone
bore the burden (expence and char-
ges) of the inheritance ; but after-
wards whoever had received a share
or part of an inheritance, under a
trust was regarded as a part legatee;
having a legacy of part of the prop-
erty: and this species of legacy
was called partition, because the
legatee took a part of the inheri-
tance together with the heir: thence
it arose, that the same stipulations,
which were formerly used between
the heir and legatee in part, were
also interposed between the person
benefitted under the trust and the
heir or trustee to the intent that the
profit and loss might be in common
between them in due proportion.
LIB. II.

TIT. XXIII.

179

Quibus casibus locus est senatus-consulto Trebelliano
vel Pegasiano.

$ VI. Ergé, siquidém non plus
quam dodrantém heereditatis scrip-
tus heres rogatus sit restituere, tum
ex Trebelliano senatus-consulto
restituebatur hereditas; et in u-
trumque actiones hereditariz pro
parte rata dabantur: in heredem
quidem jure civili; in eum verd,
qui recipiebat hereditatem ex sena-
tus-consulto Trebelliano, tanquam
in heredem. At, si plus quam
dodrantem, vel etiam totam here-
ditatem, restituere rogatus esset,
locus erat Pegasiano senatus-con-
sulto: et heres, qui semel adierat
hereditatem, (si modo sua volun-
tate adierat,) sivé retinuerat quar-
tam partem, sivé retinere noluerat,
ipse universa onera _ sustinebat.
Sed, quarté quidem retenta, quasi
partis et pro parte stipulationes in-
terponebantur, tanquam inter par-
tiarium legatarium et heredem: si
vero totam hereditatem restitueret,
empte et vindite hereditatis stipu-
lationes interponebantur. Sed, si
recusabat scriptus heres adire he-
reditatem, ob id, quod diceret eam
sibi suspectam esse, quasi damno-
sam, cavebatur Pegasiano senatus-
consulto, ut, desiderante eo, cui re-
stituere rogatus esset, jussu prato-
ris adiret, et restituerit heeredita-
tem; perindéque ei et in eum, qui
resciperit hereditatem, actiones da-
rentur, ac juris est ex Trebelliano
senatus-consulto; quo casu nullis
stipulationibus est opus: quia, si-
mul et huic, qui restituit, securitas

$ 6. Therefore, if a written heir,
or heir in trust, had not been re-
quested to surrender more than
three fourths of the inheritance, he
was obliged to restore so much of
it, by virtue of the Trebellian sena-
tus-consultum ; and all actions, whe-
ther in favour of, or against, the in-
heritance, were brought, or sustain-
ed, by the heir and _fidei-commissa-
ry according to their respective
shares; and this is incident to the
heir, by virtue of the civil Jaw, and,
to the fidei-commissary, by the
Trebellian decree. But, when the
written heir was requested by the
testator to restore the whole inhe-
ritance, or more than three fourths,
then. the Pegasian senatus-consul-
tum took place; for, if he had once
taken upon himself the heirship
voluntarily, he was obliged to sus-
tain all charges; and this, whether
he did, or did not, retain his fourth.
But, when the heir retained a fourth
part, the stipulations, called partis
et pro parte, were entered into, as
between a legatee in part and an
heir; and, when the heir did not re-
tain a fourth, then the stipulations,
called empte et vendite hereditatis,
were interposed. But, if the written
fiduciary heir declined, suspecting
loss from defect of assets, it was
provided by the Pegasian decree,
that the praetor at the instance of
the fidei-commissary, might compel
such heir to take upon himself the
inheritance, and then restore it;
180

datur, et actiones hereditariz ei et
in eum transferuntur, qui recipit

LIB. i, TIT. XXIII.

and that afterwards all actions
should be brought by or against the

hereditatem; utroque senatus-con- _fidei-commissary only ; as ordained.

sulto in hac specie concurrente.

by the Trebellian decree. And in
this case stipulations are not neces-
sary ; for the heir, who restores the
inheritance, is secured, and all here-
ditary actions are transferred to and
against him, by whom it is re-
ceived; there being, in this in-
stance, a concurrence of both de-
crees.

Pegasiani in Trebellianum transfusio.

§ VII. Sed, quia stipulationes
ex senatus-consulto Pegasiano de-
scendentes et ipsa antiquitati dis-
plicuerunt, et quibusdam casibus
captiosas eas homo excelsi ingenii
Papinianus appellat, et nobis in le-
gibus magis simplicitas, quam dif-
ficultas, placet, ideo omnibus nobis
suggestis tam similitudinibus, quam
differentiis utriusque senatus-con-
sulti, placuit, exploso senatus-con-
sulto Pegasiano, quod postea super-
venit, omnem auctoritatem Trebel-
liano senatus-consulto prestare, ut
ex eo fidei-commissariz heeredita-
tes restituantur; sivé habeat heres
ex voluntate testatoris quartam,
sivé plus, sivé minus, sivé nihil
penitus: ut tunc, quando vel nihil,
vel mints quart4, apud eum rema-
net, liceat ei vel quartam, vel quod
ei deest, ex nostra auctoritate reti-
nere, vel repetere solutum, quasi ex
Trebelliano senatus-consulto pro
rat& proportione actionibus tam in
heredem, quam.in fidei-commissari-
um, competentibus. Siverd totam

$ 7. But, as the stipulations, which
arose from the Pegasian decree,
were displeasing even to the an-
cients, insomuch that Papinian, a
man of sublime genius, considers
them, in some cases, as captious;
and, as we prefer simplicity to com-
plexity in matters of law, it hath
therefore pleased us, upon compar-
ing the agreement and disagreement
of each decree, to abrogate the Pe-
gasian, which was subsequent to
the Trebellian, and to transfer a
greater authority to the Trebellian
decree, by which all trust inheri-
tances shall be restored for the fu-
ture, whether the testator hath given
by his will a fourth part of his es-
tate to his written heir, or more, or
less, or even nothing; so that, when
nothing is given to the heir, or less
than a fourth part, he may be per-
mitted to retain a fourth, or as much
as will complete the deficiency, by
virtue of our authority: or to de-
mand repayment of what he hath
expended ; allactions being divided
LIB. II.

hereditatem sponte restitueritomnes
heereditarie actiones fidei-commis-
sario, et adversus eum, competant.
Sed etiam id, quod preecipuum Pe-
gasiani senatus-consulti fuerat, ut,
quando recusaret heres scriptus
sibi datam heereditatem adire, ne-
cessitas ei imponeretur totam he-
teditatem volenti fidei-commissario
restituere, et omnes ad eum, et
contra eum, transferre actiones ; et
hoc transposuimus ad senatus-con-
sultum Trebellianum, ‘ut ex hoc solo
necessitas heredi imponatur, si,
ipso nolente adire, fidei-commissa-
rius desiderit restitui sibi heeredi-
tatem, nullo nec damno nec com-
modo apud heredem remanente.

TIT. XXII.

181

between the heir and the fidei-com-
missary in a just proportion ac-
cording to the Trebellian decree.
But, should the heir spontaneously
restore the whole inheritance,
all actions must be brought either
by or against the fidei-commis-
sary. And whereas it was the
principal effect of the Pegasian de-
cree, that, when a written heir had
refused to accept an inheritance, he
might be constrained to take it, and
restore it at the instance of the fidei-
commissary, to whom, and against
whom all actions passed, we have
transferred that power tothe T're-
bellian decree; which is now the
only law compelling a fiduciary heir
to enter upon the inheritance, when
the fidei-commissary is desirous that
it should be restored ; and the heir,
in this case, can neither receive
profit, or suffer loss.

De quibus heredibus, et in quibus fidei-commissariis, supra
dicta locum habeant.

§ VIII. Nihil aditém interest,
utrum aliquis, ex asse heres insti-
tutus, aut totam hereditatem autpro
parterestituere rogatur ; an, ex par-
te heres institutus, aut totam eam.
partem, aut partem partis, restituere
rogatur. Nam et hoc casu eadem
observari precipimus, que in totius
hereditatis restitutione diximus.

§ 8. But it makes no difference,
whether an heir, who is instituted to
the whole inheritance, be requested
(by the testator) to restore the whole
or a part only, or whether being no-
minated but to a part, be requested
to testore that entire part, or only a
portion of it; for we have ordained,
that the same rule shall be observed
as in case of restitution of the whole.

De eo, quod heres voluntate testatoris deducit, preecipitve.

§ IX. Si quis, una aliqua re de-
ducté sive preecepta, que quartam
continent, (veluti fundo vel alia re, )
rogatus sit restituere hereditatem,

$ 9. Ifan heir be requested by a
testator to give up an inheritance,
after deducting some specific thing,
amounting to a fourth, as a piece of
182

simili modo ex Trebelliano senatus-
consulto restitutio fiet, perindé ac
si, quart4 parte retenta, rogatus es-
set reliquam hereditatem restituere.
Sed illud interest, quod altero casu,
id est, cum deducta sivé pracepta
aliqua re restituitur hereditas, in
solidum ex eo senatus-consulto ac-
tiones transferuntur, et res, que
onere hereditario apud eum rema-
net, quasi ex legato ei acquisita ;
altero vero casu, cum quartd parte
retenta rogatus est heres restituere
hereditatem, et restituit, scinduntur
actiones : et pro dodrante quidem
transferuntur ad fidei-commissari-
um, pro quadrante remanent apud
heredem. Quinetiam licet una ali-
qua re deducta aut precepta, resti-
tuere aliquis hzreditatem rogatus sit
in qué maxima pars hereditatis
contineatur, zqué in solidum trans-
feruntur actiones : et secum delibe-
rare debet is cui restituitur heredi-
tas, an expediat sibi restitui. Ha-
dem scilicét interveniunt, et si dua-
bus pluribusve rebus deductis pra-
ceptisve, restituere hereditatem ro-
gatus sit. Sed et, si certé summa
deducta preeceptave, que quartam
vel etiam maximam partem heredi-
tatis continet, rogatus sit aliquishe-
reditatem restituere, idem juris est.
Que autem diximus de eo, qui ex
asse institutus est eadem transferi-

LIB. I]. TIT. XXIII.

ground, &c. he may be compelled
to give it up by the Trebellian de-
cree in the same manner, as if he
had been requested to restore the re-
mainder of an inheritance, after re-
serving a fourth. But there is this
difference, that, when an heir is re-
quested to give up an inheritance,
after deducting a particular thing.
then all actions are transferred to
the fidei-commissary, and what re-
mains with the heir is free of in-
cumbrance,as if acquired by legacy ;
but when an heir is requested in ge-
neral terms to give up an-inheri-
tance, after retaining a fourth to
himself, all actions are proportion-
ably divided ; those, which regard
the three fourths of the estate, being
transferred to the fidei-commissary ;
and those, which regard the single
fourth remaining for the benefit of
the heir. And, even if an heir be
requested to give up an inheritance,
after making a deduction of some
particular thing, which amounts to
the value of the greatest part of it,
all actions, both active and passive,
are nevertheless transferred to the
Jidei-commissary, who ought al-
ways, therefore, to consider, wheth-
er it will be expedient or not, that
the inheritance should be given up
to him. So the law is, whether an
heir be requested to give up an in-
heritance after a deduction of two
LIB. II.

TIT. XXII.

183

 

mus et ad eum, qui ex parte heres
scriptus est.

or more specific things, or of a cer-
tain sum of money, which exceeds
in value the greatest part of the in-
heritance. Thus what we have said
of an heir, whois instituted to the
whole of an inheritance, holds
equally of him, who is instituted
only to a part.

De fidei-commissis ab intestato relictis.

§ X. Preeterea intestatus quoque
moriturus potest rogare eum, ad
quem bona sua vel legitimo jure vel
honorario pertinere intelligit, ut ha-
reditatem suam totam, partemve
ejus, aut rem aliquam, veluti fun-
dum, hominem, pecuniam, alicui
restituat; cum alioqui, legata nisi
ex testamento non valeant.

§ 10. Moreover a man about to
die intestate, may request the person
whom he thinks will succeed him,
either by the civil or preetorian law
to give up the whole inheritance, or
a part of it, or any particular thing,
as a piece of ground, aslave,a sum
of money, &c. (But this regards

. trusts only ;) for legacies are inva-
lid, unless bequeathed by testament.

De fidei-commisso relicto a fidei-commissario.

§ XI. Eum quoque, cui aliquid
restituitur, potest rogare, ut id rur-
sus alii, aut totum, aut partem, vel
etiam aliquid, aliud restituat.

$11. A fidei-commissary may
also himself be requested to give up
to another, either the whole, or a
part, of what he receives; or some
other thing in lieu of it.

De probatione fidei-commissi.

§ XII. Et, quia prima fidei-com-
missorum cunabula a fide heredum
pendent, et tam nomen, quam sub-
stantiam, acceperunt, ided D. Au-
gustus ad necessitatem juris ea re-
traxit. Nuper et nos, eundem prin-
cipem superare contendentes, ex
facto quod Tribonianus, vir excel-
lentissimus, questor sacri palatii,
suggessit, constitutionem fecimus,
per quam disposuimus, si testator
fidei heredis sui commisit, ut vel
hereditatem vel speciale fidei-com-

§ 12. All fiduciary bequests de-
pended formerly upon thesole faith
of the heir; whence they tookas well
their name as their essence. The
emperor Augustus was the first,
who brought them under judicial
cognisance. But we have since en-
deavoured toexceed that prince; and
at the instance of that mostexcellent
man Tribonian, the questor of our
palace we have enacted, that, if a
testator hath trusted to the faith of
his heir for the surrender of an in-
184

LIB, Il. TIT. XXII.

 

missum restituat; et neque ex
scriptura, neque ex quinque tes-
tium numero, qui in fidei-commis-
sis legitimus esse noscitur, possit
res manifestari, sed vel pauciores,
vel nemo penitus testis intervene-

rit; tunc, sivé pater heredis, si--

vé alius quicunque sit, qui fi-
dem heredis elegerit, et ab eo
restitui aliquid voluerit, si heres
perfidid tentus adimplere fidem re-
cusat, negando rem ita esse subse-
cutam ; si fidei-comissarius ei jus-
jurandum detulerit, cum prius ipse
de calumnia juraverit, necesse eum
habere, vel jusjurandum subire,
quod nihil tale a testatore audiverit,
vel recusantem ad fidei-commissi
vel universalis vel specialis solutio-
nem coarctari ; ne depereat ultima
voluntas testatoris fidei heeredis
commissa. Eadem observari cen-
suimus, etsia legatario vel fidei-
commissario aliquid similitér relic-
tum sit. Quod si is, 4, quo relic-
tum dicitur, [postquam negaverit,]
confiteatur quidem, aliquid a se re-
lictum esse, sed ad legis subtilita-
tem recurrat, omnino solvere cogen-
dus est.

heritance or any particular thing,
and this trust cannot be made man-
ifest by the depositions of five wit-
nesses, (which is known to be the
legal number in such cases, ) there
having been not so many, or per-
haps no witnesses present, the heir
at the same time perfidiously refus-
ing to make any payment, and de-
nying the whole transaction, then
the fidei-commissary, having previ-
ously taken the oath of calumny,
may put the heir although he be the
son of the testator, to his oath; and
thus force him either to deny the
trust upon oath, or comply with it,
whether the trust be universal or
particular; and this is allowed, lest
thelast will of a testator, committed
to the faith of an heir, should be de-
feated. And we have granted the
same remedy against a legatee, or
even a fidei-commissary, to whom
any thing hath been thus bequeath-
ed. And, if he, to whom some-
thing hath been so left, should con-
fess the trust, after having denied
it, but endeavour at the same time
to shelter himself under subtility of
the law, he may nevertheless be
compelled to perform his duty.
 

LIB. Il. TIT. XXIv.

185

 

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-QUARTUS.

DE SINGULIS REBUS PER FIDEI-COMMISSUM RELIC-
TIS.

Summa.

POTEST tamen quis etiam sin-
gulas:res per fidei-commissum re-
linquere ; veliti fundum, argentum,
hominem, vestem, et pecuniam nu-
meratam; et vel ipsum hezeredem
rogare, ut alicui restituat; vel le-
gatarium, quamvis é legatario le-
gari non possit.

A man may also leave particular
things in trust; as a field, silver,
cloaths, or a certain sum of money ;
and may request either his heir to
restore them, or even a legatee; al-
though a legatee cannot be made
chargeable with a legacy.

Que relinqui possunt.

§ I. Potest autem non solim
proprias res testator per fidei-com-
missum relinquere, sed et heredis,
aut legatarii, aut fidei-commissarii,
- aut cujuslibet alterius. Itaque et
legatarius et fidei-commissarius non
solum de ea re rogari potest, ut
eam alicui restituat, que ei relicta
sit; sed etiam de alia, sivé ipsius,
sive aliend sit. Hoc solum obser-
vandum est, ne plus quisquam ro-
getur alicui restituere, quam ipse
ex testamento ceperit; nam, quod
amplius est, inutiliter relinquitur.
Cum autém aliena res per fidei-
commissum relinquitur, necesse est
ei, qui.rogatus est, aut ipsam rem
redimere et preestare, aut estimati-
onem ejus solvere.

$ 1. A testator may leave in trust
not only his own property, but also
that of his heir, of a legatee, of a
jidei-commissary, or of any other:
so that a legatee or fidei-cammissa-
ry may not only be requested to
give what hath been left to him,
but what is his own, or even what
is the property of another. The
only caution necessary to be ob-
served by the testator is, that no
man be requested to give more, than
he hath received under the will; for
the excess will be ineffectually he-
queathed. And, when the property
of another is left in trust, the per-
son, requested to restore it, is ob-
liged either to obtain from the pro-
prietor the very thing bequeathed,
or to pay the value of it.

De libertate.

§$ IT. Libertas quoque servo per
fidei-commissum dari potest, ut he-
24

§ 2. Liberty may also be confers
red upon a slave§by virtue of a
186

LIB. II. TIT. XXIV.

 

res eum rogetur manumittere, vel
legatarius, vel fidei-commissarius;
nec interest, utrum de suo proprio
servo testator roget, an de eo, qui
ipsius heredis, aut legatarii, vel e-
tiam extranei sit: itaque et alienus
servus redimi et manumitti debet.
Quod si dominus eum non vendat,
(si modo nihil ex judicio ejus, qui
reliquit libertatem, perceperit,) non
statim extinguitur fidei-commissa-
ria libertas, sed differtur, quoad
possit tempore procedente, ubicun-
que occasio servi redimendi fuerit,
preestari libertas. Qui autém ex
fidei-commissi causé manumittitur,
non testatoris fit libertus, etiamsi
testatoris servus sit, sed ejus, qui
manumittit. At is, qui directo ex
testamento liber esse jubetur, ipsi-
us testatoris libertus fit; qui etiam
Orcinus appellatur: nec alius ullus
directd ex testamento libertatem
habere potest, quam qui utroque
tempore testatoris fuerit, et quo fa-
ceret testamentum, et quo morere-
tur. Directo autem libertas tunc
dari videtur, cum non ab alio ser-
vum manumitti rogat, sed velut ex
suo testamento libertatem ei compe-
tere vult.

 

trust; for an heir, legatee, or fidei-
conunissary, may be requested to
manumit: nor does it signify whe-
ther the testator request the manu-
mission of his own slave, of the
slave of his heir, of a legatee, or of
a stranger: and therefore, when a
slave is not the testator’s own pro-
perty, he must be bought, if possi-
ble and manumitted. But,if the pro-
prietor of the slave refuse to sell
him, (which he may do, if he hath
taken nothing under the will of the
testator,) yet the fiduciary bequest
is not extinguished, but deferred on-
ly, till it can be conveniently per-
formed. Note, that he, who is man-
umitted in consequence of a trust,
does not become the freeman of the
testator, although he was the testa-
tor’s own slave, but he becomes the
freeman of the manumittor: but a
slave, to whom liberty is directly
given by testament, becomes the
freeman of the testator, and is call-
ed Orcinus ; and no one can obtain
liberty directly by testament, unless
he were the slave of the testator, not
only at the time of the testator’s
death, but also at the time of mak-
ing his testament. And liberty is
understood to be directly given, not
when a testator requests, that free-
dom shall be given to his slave by
another, but when he wills it to
take place by virtue of his own tes-
tament.

De verbis fidei-commissorum.

§ III. Verba autem fidei-com-
missorum hec maximé in usu ha-
bentur; peto, rogo, volo, mando, fi-
dei tue committo: que perindé sin-

§ 3. The terms generally used in
the commitment of trusts are the
following : I request, Task, I desire,
I commit, I confide: any of them,
LIB. II.

gula firma sunt, atque si omnia in
unum congesta essent.

TIT. XXV.

187

singly taken, is as binding, as if all
were joined.

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-QUINTUS.

DE CODICILLIS.

D. xxix. T. 7. C. vi. T. 36.

Codicillorum origo.

ANTE Augusti tempora con-
stat, codicillorum jus in usu non
fuisse: sed primus Lucius Lentu-
lus, ex cujus personé etiam fidei-
commissa esse cueperunt, codicillos
introduxit. Nam, cum decederet
in Africa, scripsit codicillos testa-
mento confirmatos, quibus ab Au-
gusto petiit per fidei-commissum,
ut faceret aliquid: et, cum D. Au-
gustus voluntatem ejus implesset,
deincéps reliqui, ejus auctoritatem
secuti, fidei-commissa prestabant :
et filia Lentuli, legata, que jure
non debebat, solvit. Dicitur autem
Augustus convocasse sapientes vi-
ros, interque eos 'Trebatium quoque,
cujus tunc auctoritas maxima erat,
et quesisse, an posset recipi hoc,
nec absonans a juris ratione codi-
cillorum usus esset? et Trebatium
suasisse Augusto, quod diceret,
utilissimum et necessarium hoc ci-
vibus esse, propter magnas et lon-
gas peregrinationes, quze apud vete-
res fuissent; ubi, si quis testamen-
tum facere non posset, tamen codi-
cillos posset. Post que tempora,

It is certain, that codicils were
not in frequent use before the reign
of Augustus: for Lucius Lentu-
lus, by whose means trusts became
efficacious, was the first, who intro-
duced codicils. When dying in
Africa, he wrote several codicils,
which were confirmed by his testa-
ment; and in these he requested
Augustus to perform some particu-
lar act in consequence of a trust:
the emperor complied with the re-
quest; and many other persons in-
fluenced by the emperor’s example,
executed trusts, committed to their
charge; and the daughter of Lentu-
lus paid debts, which in strictness
of law were not due. But it is re-
ported, that Augustus, having con-
vened upon this occasion the sages
of the law, among the rest T’rebatt-
us, whose opinion was of the great-
est authority, demanded whether
codicils could be admitted and whe-
ther they were not repugnant to
the reason of the law? to which
Trebatius answered, that codicils
were most convenient, and neces-
188

LIB. Il. TIT. XXV.

 

cum et Labeo codicillos fecisset,
jam nemini dubium erat, quin codi-
cilli jure optimo admitterentur.

sary on account of the great and
long journies, which the Romans
were frequently obliged to take, so
that, where a man could not make
a testament, he might bequeath his
effects by codicil. Afterwards, when
Labeo, (a lawyer of great emin-
ence,) disposed of his own property
by codicil, it was no longer a doubt,

-but that codicils might be legally

allowed.

Codicilli fieri possunt vel ante, vel post, testamentum, imo
etiam ab intestato.

$ L Non tantim autem testa-
mento facto potest quis codicillos
facere, sed et intestatus quis decen-
dens fidei-committere codicillis po-
test. Sed, cum anté testamentum
factum codicilli facti erant, Papi-
nianus ait, non alitér vires habere,
quam si speciali voluntate postéa
confirmentur. Sed Divi Severus
et Antoninus rescripserunt, ex iis
codicillis, qui testamentum prece-
dunt, posse fidei-commissum peti,
si appareat eum, qui testamentum
* fecit, 4 voluntate, quam in codicil-
lis expresserat, non recessisse.

§ 1. Not only one who hath al-
ready made his will, may make a
codicil, but even an intestate may
raise a trust by codicil: yet, when
a codicil is antecedent to a testa-
ment, it cannot take effect accord-
ing to Papinian, unless confirmed
by the subsequent testament. But
the emperors Severus and Antoni-
nus have by rescript declared, that
a thing, left in trust in a codicil pre-
ceding a testament,may be demand-
ed by the fidei-commissary, if it ap-
pear, that the testator hath not re-
ceded from the intention, which he
at first expressed in his codicil.

Codicillis hereditas directo dari non potest.

Ԥ IL. Codicillis autem hereditas
neque dari, neque adimi, potest;
ne confundatur jus testamentum
et codicillorum: et ided nec exhe-
redatio scribi. Directé autem he-
reditas codicillis neque dari neque
adimi potest: nam per fidei-com-
missum heereditas codicillis jure
relinquitur. Nec conditionem he-
redi instituto codicillis adjicere,

§ 2. An inheritance can neither
be given nor taken away by codicil,
lest the different operations of tes-
taments and codicils be confound-
ed: of course, no heir can be disin-
herited by codicil. But although
an inheritanee can neither be given
nor taken away by codicil, in direct
terms, yet it may be legally left
from the heir in a codicil, by means
LIB. I. TIT. XXV. 189

neque substituere directd, quis po- of a (trust or) fidei-commissum.

test. No man may impose a condition
upon his heir by codicil, or substi-
tute directly.

De numero et solemnitate.

§ IIL. Codicillos autem etiam § 3. A man may make many co-
plures quis facere potest: et nullam dicils, and they require no solemni-
solemnitatem ordinationis deside- ty. :
rant.

FINIS LIBRI SECUNDI.
DIVI JUSTINIANT

INSTITUTIONUM.

LIBER TERTIUS.

 

TITULUS

PRIMUS.

DE HEREDITATIBUS, QUE AB INTESTATO DEFE-
RUNTUR.

D. xxxviii. T. 16. C. vi. T. 55 et 58. Nov. 118.

Definitio intestati.

INTESTATUS decedit, qui
aut omnino testamentum non fecit,
aut non jure fecit; aut id, quod fe-
cerat, ruptum irritumve factum est ;
aut siex eo nemo heres extiterit.

A man dies intestate, who hath
either not made a testament; or not
made one in due form of law ; or-if
his testament, though rightly made,
be cancelled, or broken ; or if no
one will become heir under it.

Primus ordo succedentium ab intestato.

§ I. Intestatorum autém heredi-

§ 1. The inheritances of intes-

tates ex lege duodecim tabularum tates, by the law of the twelve tables

primum ad suos heredes pertinent.

belong, in the first place, to the su
heredes, i. e. to the proper or do-
mestic heirs of such intestates.

Qui sunt sui heeredes.

$ II. Sui autem heredes existi-
mantur, (ut supra diximus,) qui in
potestate morientis fuerint ; veluti
filius filiave, nepos neptisve ex filio,
pronepos, proneptisve ex nepote, ex
filio nato prognatus prognatave :
nec interest, utrium naturales sint
liberi, an adoptivi. Quibus connu-

$ 2. And as we have observed be-
fore, those are sui heredes or pro-
per heirs, who at the death of the
deceased, were under his power; as
a son or a daughter, a grandson or a
grand-daughter by a son, a. great-
grandson or great-grand-daughter
by a grandson of a son, &c. Nei-
192 LIB. III.

merari necesse est etiam-eos, qui
ex legitimis quidem nuptiis vel ma-
trimoniis non sunt progeniti, curiis
tamen civitatum dati, secundim
Divalium constitutionem, que su-
per his posite sunt, tenorem here-
dum suorum jura nanciscuntur :
nec non eos, quos nostre amplexz
sunt constitutiones, per quas jussi-
mus, si quis mulierem in suo con-
tubernio copulaverit, non ab initio
affectione maritali, eam tamen, cum
qua poterat habere conjugium, et
ex ea liberos sustulerit, postea vero,
affectione procedente etiam nuptia-
lia instrumenta cum ea fecerit, et
filios vel filias habuerit, non solim
eos liberos, qui post dotem editi
sunt, justos et in potestate patris
esse; sed etiam anteriores, qui et
lis, qui postea nati sunt, occasionem
legitimi nominis preestiterunt: quod
obtinere censuimus, etsi non pro-
geniti fuerint post dotale instru-
mentum confectum liberi, vel etiam
nati ab hac luce fuerint subtracti.
Ita demtm tame! nepos neptisve,
pronepos proneptisve, suorum hee-
redum numero sunt, si precedens
persona desierit in potestate paren-
tis esse, sivé morte id acciderit,
sive alia ratione, veluti emancipa-
tione. Nam, si per id tempus, quo
quis moritur, filius in potestate ejus
sit, nepos ex eo suus heres esse non
potest : idque et in ceteris libero-
tum personis dictum intelligimus,
Posthumi quoque, qui, si vivo pa-

TIT. L.

ther is it material, whether these
children be naturalor adopted. But,
among natural children, we must
reckon those, who, not born in law-
ful wedlock, are nevertheless, ac-
cording to the tenor of the imperial
constitutions, entitled to the rights
of proper heirs, by being admitted
Decurions. Those also are compriz-
ed within our own constitutions,
which enact that, ifany person shall
keep a woman with whomhe is not
prohibited to marry, and have chil-
dren by her, and shall afterwards,
through affection, marry that “wo-
man, and have by hersons or daugh-
ters, not only these latter shall be
legitimate and in the power of their
father, but also the former, who
gave occasion to the legitimacy of
the children born afterwards. And
this law shall obtain as to children
born before marriage ; although the
children born subsequent to it, are
dead, or none such are born. But a
grandson or grand-daughter, a great
grandson or great-grand-daughter,
is not reckoned in the number of
proper heirs, unless the person pre-
ceding them in degree hath ceased
to be under paternal power, either
by death or some other means, as
by emancipation : for, if a son,when
his father died, was under the pow-
er of his father, the grandson can-
not be the proper heir of his grand-
father; and by parity of reasoning,
this rule is. understood to take place
LIB. ITE.

tre nati essent, in potestate ejus fu-
turi forent, sui heeredes sunt.

Quomodo sui

§$ III. Sui autem heredes fiunt
etiam ignorantes, et, licét furiosi,
sint, heredes- possunt existere:
quia, quibus ex causis ignorantibus
nobis acquiritur, ex his -causis et
furiosis acquiri potest. Et statim
a morte parentis quasi continuatur
dominium ; et ideo nec tutoris auc-
toritate opus est pupillis, cum eti-
am ignorantibus acquiratur suis
heredibus hereditas: nec curato-
ris assensu acquiritur furioso, sed
ipso jure.

TIT. I. 193!
in relation to all descendants in the
right line. But all ‘posthumous
children, who would have been un:
der the power of their father, if they’
had been born in hislife-time, are es-
teemed sui heredes, or proper heirs.

heeredes fiunt.

§ 3. Persons. may become pro-
per heirs, without their knowledge,
even though insane; for by whate-
ver means inheritances ‘may be ac-
quired without. our knowledge, by
the same means they may be ac-
quired by persons insane. The do-
minion of an inheritance is con-
tinued in the heir from ‘the instant
of the death of ‘his ancestor; nor is
the authority of a ‘tutor necessary;
because inheritances may -be acqui-
red by proper heirs, without’ their
knowledge: neither does a disorder-
ed person inherit by‘ assent of his
curator, but' by operation:of law:

De filio, post mortem partis, ab hostibus reverso.

§ IV. Interdim autem, licét in
potestate parentis mortis tempore
suus heeres non fuerit, tamen suus
heres parenti efficitur: veluti si ab
hostibus quis reversus fuerit post
mortem patris sui: jus enim _post-
liminii hoc facit.

§ 4. But sometimes a child be-
comes a proper heir, although he
was not under power at the death
of his parent; as when a person re-
turns from captivity after the death
of his father: the jus postliminit,
or right of return, effects this. °

De memoria patris damnata ob crimen perduellionis.

§ V. Per contrarium autem hoc
evenit, ut, licét quis in familia de-
functi sit mortis tempore, tamen
suus heres non fiat; veluti si post
mortem suam pater judicatus fuerit
perduellionis reus, ac per hoc me-

§ 5. On the contrary, it may hap-
pen, that a child, who, at the death
of his parent, was under his power,
shall not be his proper heir: as
when a parent, after his decease, is
adjudged to have been guilty of le-
194 LIB. II.

TIT. L

 

moria ejus damnata fuerit; suum
enim heredem habere non potest,
cum fiscus ei succedat: sed potest,
dici, ipso quidem jure suum here-
dem esse, sed desinere.

se-majesty, whereby his memory is
rendered infamous, and he can have
no proper heir, all his possessions
becoming forfeited to the treasury.
But a son, in this case, may be said
to have been the proper heir of his
father, and afterwards to have ceas-
ed to be so.

De divisione hereditatis inter suos hzeredes.

§ VI. Cum filius filiave et ex al-
tero filio nepos neptisve existunt,
paritér ad hereditatem avi vocan-
tur, nec qui gradu proximior est,
ulteriorem excludit: zquum enim
esse videtur, nepotes neptesve in
patris sui locum succedere. Pari
ratione et si nepos neptisve sit ex
filio, et ex nepote pronepos pronep-
tisve, simul vocantur. Et, quia
placuit, nepotes neptesve, item pro-
nepotes proneptesve, in parentis sui
locum succedere, conveniens esse
visum est, non in capita, sed in
stirpes, hereditatem dividi; ut filius
partem dimidiam hereditatis ha-
beat, et ex altero filio duo pluresve
nepotes alteram dimidiam. Itém,
si ex duobus filiis, nepotes neptesve
existant, ex altero unus aut duo
forte, ex altero tres aut quatuor,
ad unum aut duos dimidia pars
pertineat, ad tres vel quatuor al-
tera dimidia.

$ 6. A son, a daughter, and a
grandson or grand-daughter by ano-
ther son, are called equally to the
inheritance; nor does the nearest
exclude the more remote; for it
seems just, that grandsons and
grand-daughters should succeed in
the place of their father. By like
reason, a grandson or grand-daugh-
ter by a son, and a great-grandson
or great-grand-daughter by a grand-
son, are all called together. And
since grandsons and grand-daugh-
ters, great-grandsons and _ great-
grand-daughters, succeed in place
of their parent, it seemed conve-
nient, that inheritances should not
be divided into capita, but into stir-
pes: so that a son, should possess
one half, and the grand-children,
(however numerous) of another son,
the other half of an inheritance.
So, where there are grand-children
by two sons, the one son leaving one
or two children, and the other three
or four, the inheritance must belong,
half to the grand-child, or the two
grand-children by the one son, and
half to the three or four grand-chil-
dren by the other son.
LIB. III.

TIT. I. 195

 

Quo tempore suitas spectatur.

§ VIL Cum autem queeritur, an
quis suus heres existere possit, eo
tempore querendum est, quo cer-
tum est, aliquem siné testamento
decessisse ; quod accidit et desti-
tuto testamento. Hac ratione, si
filius exheeredatus fuerit et, extra-
neus heres institutus, et, filio mor-
tuo, postea certum fuerit, haredem
institutum ex testamento non fieri-
heredem, aut quia noluit esse heeres,
aut quia non potuit, nepos avo suus
heres existet : quia, quo tempore
certum est, intestatum decessisse
patrem-familias, solus invenitur ne-
pos : et hoc certum est.

$7. When it is asked, is such a
man a proper heir? we must inquire
at what time it was certain, that the
deceased died without a testament;
which happens, if his testament be
relinquished. Thus, if a son be dis-
inherited and a stranger instituted
heir, and, after the death of the son,
it becomes certain, that the instituted
heir was not in fact the heir, either
because he was unwilling, or unable
to accept the inheritance, in this
case the grandson of the deceased.
becomes the proper heir of his grand-
father: for at the time, when it was
vertain that the deceased died intes-
tate, there was no other heir, but the
grand-child ; and this is evident.

De nata post mortem avi, vel adoptato a filio emancipato.

§ VIII. Et, licet post mortem
avi natns sit, tamén avo vivo con-
ceptus, mortuo patre ejus, postea-
que deserto avi testamento, suus
heres efficitur. Plané, si et con-
ceptus et natus fuerit post mortem
avi, mortuo patre suo, desertoque
postea avi testamento, suus heres
avo non existet; quia nullo jure
cognationis patrem sui patris atti-
git: sed nec ille est inter liberos
avi, quem filius emancipatus adop-
tavit. Hi autem, cum non sint, sui
(quantum ad hereditatem,) liberi,
neque bonorum possessionem petere

§ 8. And although a child be born
after the death of his grandfather,
yet, if he were conceived in the life-
time of his grandfather, he will, at
the death of his father and after his
grandfather’s testament is deserted
by the instituted heir, become the
proper heir of his grandfather. But
a child both conceived and born af-
ter the death of his grandfather,
could not become the proper heir,
although his father should die and
the testament of his grandfather be
deserted; because he was never al-
lied to his grandfather by any tie of
196 LIB. III.

possunt, quasi proximi cognati. .

Heec de suis heredibus.

TIT. L

cognation : neither is the adopted
son of an emancipated son, to be
reckoned among the children of his
adoptive father’s father. So that
the adopted children of an emanci-
pated son, can ncither become the
proper heirs of their father’s father
in regard to the inheritance, nor de-
mand the possession of goods as
next of kin. Thus much concern-
ing proper heirs.

De liberis emancipatis. |

§ IX. Emancipati autém hberi
jure civili nihil juris habent : ne-
qué enim sui heeredes sunt, qui in
potestate morientis esse desierunt,
neque ullo alio jure per legem duo-
decim tabularum vocantur. Sed
pretor, naturali zequitate motus, dat
eis bonorem possessionem unde li-
beri, perindé ac si in potestate pa-
rentis tempore mortis fuissent; sivé
soli: sint, -sivé cum suis. heredibus
concurrant. :Itaque, duobus liberis
existentibus, emancipato uno, et. eo,
qui tempore mortis in. , potestate
fuerit,,sané quidem is, qui in po-
testate fuit, solus jure civili heres
est, et-solus suus, heres ;. sed, cum
emancipatus, beneficio pretoris, in
partem admittitur, evenit, ut suus
heres pro. parte heres fiat.

§ 9. Emancipated children by the
civil law have no right to the inheri-
tances of their parents: for those
are not proper heirs, whohave ceas-
ed to be under the power of their
parent deceased, before his death,
neither are they called to inherit by
any other right according to the law
of the twelve tables. But the pre-
tor, induced by natural equity|grants
them possession of goods, by the
edict, beginning, wade. liberi, as ful-
ly, as if they had been under power
at the death of their parent; and
this, whether they be sole, or mix-
ed with others, who are proper
heirs : therefore, when there are
two sons, one emancipated, and the
other under power at his father’s
death, the latter, by the civil law, is
alone the heir, and alone the proper
heir: but, when the emancipated
son, by the indulgence of the pre-
tor, is admitted to his share, then
the proper heir becomes the heir
only of his own moiety.

Si emancipatus se dederit in adoptionem.

§ X. At hi, qui emancipati a pa-
rente in adoptionem se dederunt,

$ 10. But they, who after eman-
cipation have given themselves in
LIB. ‘TI.

non admittuntur ad bona naturalis
patris quasi liberi, si modo, cum is
moreretur, in adoptiva familia fue-
rint: nam vivo eo emancipati ab
adoptivo patre perindé admittuntur
ad bona: naturalis patris, ac si e-
mancipati ab ipso essent, nec un-
quam in adoptivi familia fuissent :
et convenientér, quod adoptivum
patrem pertinet, extraneorum loco
esse incipiunt. Post mortem vero
naturalis patris emancipati abadop-
tivo patre, et, quantim ad hunc
adoptivum patrem pertinet, seque
extraneorum loco fiunt, et, quantum
ad naturalis patris bona pertinet,
nihilé magis liberorum gradum nan-
ciscuntur. Quod ideo sic placuit,
quia iniquum erat, esse in potes-
tate patris adoptivi, ad quos bona
naturalis patris pertineant, utrum
ad liberos ejus, an ad agnatos.

TIT. 1. 197

adoption, are not admitted, as chil-
dren, to the possession of the effects
of their natural father, if, at the
time of his death, they were in the
adoptive family. But, if in the life-
time of their natural father, they
were emancipated by their adoptive
father, they are then admitted (by
the praetor) to take the goods of their
natural father, as if they had been
emancipated by him, and had never
entered into the family of the adop-
tor : consequently, in regard to their
adoptive father they are looked up-
on as mere strangers. But those
who are emancipated by their adop-
tive father, after the death of their
natural father, are nevertheless re-
puted strangers to their adoptive
father ; and, in regard to the inher-
itance of their natural . father, they
are not at all the more intitled to re-
assume the rank of children. These
rules of law have been established,
inasmuch as it was unjust, that it
should be in the power of an adop-
tor to determine at his pleasure, to
whom the inheritance of a natural
father should appertain, whether
to his children, or to his agnates.

Collatio filioruam naturalium et adoptivorum.

§ XI. Minus ergo juris habent
adoptivi filii, quam naturales: nam-
que naturales emancipati, beneficio
pretoris gradum liberorum reti-
nent, licét jure civili perdant. A-
doptivi verd emancipati et jure ci-
vili perdunt gradum liberorum, et
& pretore non admittuntur ; et rec-
té. Naturalia enim jura civilis ra-
tio perimere non potest; nec, quia

§ 11. Adopted children have
therefore fewer rights and privile-
ges, than natural children ; who,
even after emancipation, retain the
rank of children by the indulgence
of the preetor, although they lose it
by the civil law : but adopted chil-
dren, when emancipated, lose the
rank of children by the civil law,
and are denied admittance into the
198

desinunt sui heeredes esse, possunt
desinere filii filiave, nepotes nep-
tesve esse. Adoptivi verd emanci-
pati extraneorum loco incipiunt es-
se; quia jus nomenque filii filieve,
quod per adoptionem consecuti sunt,
alia civili ratione, id est, emancipa-
tione, perdunt.

LIB. II.

TIT. 1

rank of children by the pretor; and
properly : for civil policy cannot de-
stroy natural rights; nor can natural
children ever cease to be sons and
daughters, grandsons and grand-
daughters although they may cease
to be proper heirs: but adopted chil-
dren, when emancipated, become in-
stantly strangers; for the right and
name of son or daughter,obtained by
the civil right of adoption, may be
destroyed by the civil right of eman-
cipation.

De bonorum possessione contra tabulas.

$ XII. Eadem hec observantur
et in ed bonorum possessione, quam
contra tabulas testamenti parentis
liberis preeteritis, id est, neque he-
redibus institutis, neque, ut opor-
tet, exheredatis, praetor pollicetur.
Nam eos quidem, qui in potestate,
mortis tempore fuerint, et emanci-
patos, vocat pretor ad eandem bo-
norum possessionem ; eos vero, qui
in adoptiva familia fuerint per hoc
tempus, quo naturalis parens more-
retur, repellit. Item adoptivos li-
beros, emancipatos ab adoptivo pa-
tre, sicut nec ab intestato, ita longé
minus contra tabulas testamenti, ad
bona ejus admittit ; quia desinunt
in numero liberorum ejus esse.

$ 12. The same rules are observ-
ed as to that possession of goods,
which the pretor contrary to the
testament of the parent, grants to
children, not mentioned therein :
that is, who are neither instituted
heirs, nor properly disinherited.
For the preetor calls those, who were
under power at the death of their
parents, and those also, who are e-
mancipated, to the same possession
of goods ; but he repels those, who
were in an adoptive family at the
decease of their natural parents.
And, as the pretor admits not such
adopted children, as have been e-
mancipated by their adoptive father
to succeed him ab intestato, much
less does he admit such children to
possess the goods of their adoptive
father contrary to his testament; for
by emancipation, they cease to bein
the number of his children.

Unde cognati.

§ XIII. Admonendi tamen su-
mus, eos, qui in aliend familia sunt,

§ 13. We must nevertheless ob-
serve, that, although those, who
LIB. TI.

quive post mortem naturalis paren-
tis ab adoptivo patre emancipati
fuerint, intestato parente naturali
mortuo, licet ea parte edicti, qua li-
beri ad bonorum possessionem vo-
cantur, non admittantur, alia tamen
parte vocari, scilicét, qué cognati
defuncti vocantur. Ex qué ita ad-
mittuntur, si neque sui heredes li-
beri, neque emancipati obstent, ne-
que agnatus quidem ullus inter-
veniat. Anté enim pretor liberos
vocat, tam suos heredes quam em-
ancipatos, deinde legitimos here-
des, tertio proximos cognatas.

Emendatio juris antiqui.

§ XIV. Sed ea omnia antiquitati
placuerunt: aliquam autem emen-
dationem 4 nostra constitutione ac-
ceperunt, quam super lis personis
exposuimus, que a patribus suis
naturalibus in adoptionem aliis dan-
tur: invenimus etenim nonnullos
casus, in quibus filii et naturalium
successionem propter adoptionem
amittebant, et adoptione facilé per
emancipationem soluta, ad neutri-
us partis successionem vocabantur.
Hoc, solito more, corrigentes, con-
stitutionem scripsimus, per quam
definimus, quando parens naturalis
filium suum adpotandum alii de-
derit, integra omnia jure ita servari,
atque si in patris naturalis potes-
tate permansisset,.nec penitus adop-
tio fuisset subsecuta; nisi in hoc
tantummodo casu, ut possit ab in-

TIT. L 199
were in an adoptive family, but
have been emancipated by their
adoptive father, after the decease of
their natural father, dying intestate,
are not admitted by that part of the

edict, by which children are called

to the possession of goods, yet they
are admitted by another part, by
which the cognates of the deceased
are called to the possession of his
effects. But, by this last-named
part of the edict, the cognates are
only called when there is no op-
position from proper heirs, emanci-
pated children, or agnates: for the
pretor first calls the proper heirs
with the emancipated children, then
the agnates, and lastly the nearest
cognates.

De adoptivis.

§ 14. Such were the rules that
formerly obtained; but they have
received some emendation from our
constitution, relating to persons
given in adoption by their natural
parents: for we have remarked in-
stances of sons, who by adoption
have lost their succession to their
natural parents, and who, by the
ease with which adoption is dis-
solved by emancipation, have also
lost the right of succeeding to their
adoptive parents. We therefore, as
usual correcting what is amiss, have
enacted that, when a natural father
hath given his son in adoption, the
rights of the son shall be preserved
intire, as though he had still re-
mained under the power of his na-
tural father, and there had been
no adoption; except only, that the
200 -

LIB. Ii. TIT. L

 

testato ad patris adoptivi venire
successionem. 'Testamento autem
ab eo facto, neque jure civili, ne-
que preetori, ex heereditate ejus ali-
quid persequi potest, neque contra
tabulas bonorum possessione agni-
ta, neque inofficiosi querela institu-
ta; cum nec necessitas patri adop-
tivo imponatur, vel heredem eum
instituere, vel exhzredem: facere,
utpote nullo vinculo naturali copu-
latum; neque si ex Sabiniano sena-
tus-consulto ex tribus maribus fue-
rit adoptatus: nam, et in ejusmodi
casu, neque quarta ei servatur, ne-
que ullo actio ad ejus persecution-
em ei competit. Nostra autem con-
stitutione exceptus est is, quem pa-
rens naturalis adoptandum suscepe-
rit. Utroque enim jure, tam na-
turali quam legitimo, in hanc per-
sonam concurrente, pristina jura
tali adoptioni servamus; quemad-
modum si pater-familias sese dede-
rit arrogandum: que specialitér et
singulatim ex preefate constitution-
is tenore possunt colligi.

person adopted may succeed to his
adoptor, if he die intestate. But, if
the adoptor make a will and omit to
name his adopted son, such son can
neither by the civil nor the preto-
rian law obtain any part of the in-
heritance, whether he demand pos-
session of the effects, contra tabulas,
(contrary to the letter of the testa-
ment,) or allege that the testament
is inofficious: for an adoptor is un-
der no obligation to institute, or dis-
inherit his adopted son, there being
no natural tie between them. Nor
can the adopted person, claim under
the Sabinian senatus-consulto, by
being one of three sons: for in this
case he can neither obtain the fourth
part of his adoptive father’s effects,
nor be intitled to any action upon
that account. But persons adopted
by their natural parents, (7. e. by a
grand-father or great-grand-father,
&c.) are excepted in our constitu-
tion: for, as such persons are united
together by the concurrence both of
natural.and civil rights, we have
thought proper. to retain the old law
in relation to those adoptions; in
the same manner, as when the fa-
ther of a family hath given himself
in arrogation. But all this, may
be collected from the tenor of the
above-mentioned constitution.

De descentibus ex foeminis.

$ XV. Item vetustas, ex mascu-
lis progenitos plus diligens, solos
nepotes vel neptes, qui queve ex
virili sexu descendunt, ad suorum
vocabat successionem, et jure ag-
natorum eos anteponebat; nepotes

§ 15. The ancient law, prefer-
ring descendants from males, called
only grand-children so descended,
to the succession as proper heirs, by
right of agnation; reputing grand-
children born of daughters, and
LIB. I

 

autem, qui ex filiabus nati sunt, et
Pronepotes, qui ex neptibus, cog-
natorum loco connumerans, post
agnatorum lineam eos vocabat, tam
in avi vel proavi materni, quam in
aviz vel proavie, sivé paterne sivé
materne, successionem. Divi au-
tem principes non passi sunt talem
contra naturam injuriam siné com-
petenti emendatione relinquere :
sed, cum nepotis et pronepotis no-
men commune sit utrisque, tam qui
ex masculis, quam qui ex feminis
descendunt, ided eundem gradum
et ordinem successionis eis dona~
verunt. Sed, ut amplids aliquid
sit eis, qui non solim nature, sed
etiam veteris juris, suffragiis muni-
untur, portionem nepotum vel nep-
tum, vel deinceps, (de quibus su-
pra diximus) paulé minuendam es-
se existimaverunt ; ut minus tertia
parte acciperent, quam mater eo-
rum, vel avia, fuerat acceptura, vel
pater eorum vel avus, paternus
sivé maternus, quando femina
mortua sit, cujus de hereditate
agitur ; iisque, licét soli sint, a-
deuntibus, agnatos minimé voca-
bant. Et, quemadmodim lex duo-
decim tébularum, filio mortuo, ne-
potes, vel neptes, pronepotes vel
proneptes, in locum patris sui ad
successionem avi sui vocat ; ita et
principalis dispositio in locum ma-
tris sue vel aviee eos, cum jam de-
signata partis tertie diminutione,
vocat. Sed nos, cum adhuc dubi-
tatio maneret inter agnatos et me-
moratos nepotes, quartam partem
substantiz defuncti agnatis sibi vin-

26

. TIT L

201

 

great-grand-children born of grand-
daughters, to be cognates, and pro-
hibiting them from succeeding to
their grand-father and great-grand.
father, maternal or paternal, until
after theline of agnati was exhaust-
ed. Butthe emperors Valentinian,
Theodosius and Arcadius, would
notcontinue such a violence against
nature ; and, inasmuch as the name
of grand-child and great-grand-
child, is common, as well to descen-
dants by females, as by males, they
granted an equal right of succession
in either case. But, to the end,
that those persons who have been
favoured by nature, as well as by the
suffrage of antiquity, might enjoy
some peculiar privileges, they
thought it right, that the portions of
grand-children, great-grand -chil-
dren, and other lineal descendants
of a female, should be somewhat di-
minished; and therefore they have
not permitted such persons to receive
so much by a third part, as their
mother or grand-mother would have
received ; or their father or grand-
father, paternal or maternal, at the
decease of a female; for we now
treat of inheritances, derivedfrom a
female; and, although there were
only grand-children by a female to
take an inheritance, yet the empe-
rors did not call the agnates to the
succession. And as, upon the de-
cease of a son, the law of the twelve
tables calls the grand-children, and
great-grand-children, male and fe-
male to represent their father as to
the succession of their grand-father,
202

dicantibus ex cujusdam constitutio-
-nis auctoritate, memoratam qui-
dem constitutionem 4 nostro co-
dice segregavimus, neque inseri
eam ex Theodosiano codice in eo
concessimus. Nostra autem con-
Stitutione promulgata, toti juri ejus
derogatum est : et sanximus, tali-
bus nepotibus ex filia, vel pronepo-
tibus ex nepte, vel deincéps super-
stitibus, agnatos nullam partem
-mortui successionis sibi vindicare ;
ne hi, qui ex transversd linea ve-
niunt, potiores his habeantur, qui
recto jure descendunt. Quam con-
stitutionem nostram obtinere secun-
‘dim sui vigorem et tempora et
nunc sancimus: ita tamen ut, que-
madmodim inter filios et nepotes

ex filio antiquatas statuit, non in ca-°

“pita, sed in stirpes, dividi hzeredita-
tem, similitér nos, inter filios et ne-
potes ex filia, distributionem fieri
jubeamus, vel inter omnes nepotes
et neptes, et inter pronepotes vel
proneptes, et alias deinceps, per-
sonas; ut utraque progenies ma-
tris vel patris, avie vel avi, por-
tionem sine ulla diminutione con-
sequatur: ut, si forté unus vel duo
ex und parte, ex altera tres aut qua-
tuor extent unus aut duo dimidiam,

LIB. UL.

TIT. I.

so the imperial ordinance calls them
to succession in the place of their |
mother or grand-mother, with the
before-regulated diminution of a
third part of their share. But as
there still remained matter of dispute
between the agnati and the above
named grand-children, the agnati
claiming the fourth part of the es-
tate of the deceased by virtue of a
certain constitution, we have there-
fore not permitted it to be insert-
ed into our code from that of Theo-
dosius. And further we have alter-
ed the old law by enacting that ag-
nates shall not be entitled to any
part of the goods of the deceased,
while grand-children born of a
daughter, or great-grand-children
born of a grand-daughter, or any
other descendants from a female in
the right line, are living; lest those,
who proceed from the transverse
line, should be preferred to lineal
descendants. And we now decree,
that this our ordinance shall obtain
according to its full tenor. Butas
the old law ordered, that every in-
heritance should be divided in stir-
pes and not in capita, between the
son of the deceased and his grand-
sons by a son, so we also ordain,
LIB. III.

alteri tres aut quatuor alteram di-
midiam, hereditatis habeant.

TIT. Il. 203:

that similar distribution shall be
made between sons and grandsons
by a daughter, and between grand-
sons and grand-daughters, great-
grandsons and great-grand-daugh-
ters, and all other descendants in a
right line, so that the issue, either
of a mother or a father, or of a
grand-mother or a grand-fathermay
obtain their portions without any
diminution ; and if on the one part
there should be one or two claim-
ants, and on the other part three or
four, that the greater number shall
be intitled to one half, and the less
number to the other half of the in-
heritance.

 

TITULUS SECUNDUS.

DE LEGITIMA AGNATORUM SUCCESSIONE.

D. xxxviii. T. 16. C. vi. T. 58,

Secundus ordo heredum legitimorum.

SI nemo suus heres, vel eorum,
quos inter suos heredes preetor vel
constitutiones vocant, existat, qui
successionem quoquo modo am-
plectatur, tunc ex lege duodecim
tabularum ad agnatum proximum
pertinet hereditas.

When there is no proper heir nor
any person, whom the preetor or the
constitutions would call to inherit
with proper heirs, then the inheri
tance by a law of the twelve tables
appertains to the nearest agate.

De agnatis naturalibus.

$ IL. Sunt autém agnati (ut primo
quoque libro tradidimus) cognati
per virilis sexus personas cogna-
tione conjuncti, quasi 4 patre conna-
ti. Itaque ex eodem patre nati

§ 1. Agnates, as we have observ-
ed in the first book, are those, who
are related or cognated by males,
(quasi ad patre cognati :) and there-
fore brothers, who are the sons of
204

fratres, agnati sibi sunt; qui et con-
sangumei vocantur: nec requiritur,
an etiam eandem matrem habue-
rint. Item patruus fratris filio, et
invicém is illi, agnatus est. Eo-
dem numero sunt fratres patrueles,
id est, qui ex duobus fratribus pro-
creati sunt qui etiam consobrini
vocantur. Qua ratione etiam ad
plures gradus agnationis pervenire
poterimus. Ii etiam, qui post mor-
tem patris nascuntur, jura consan-
guinitatis nasciscuntur. Non ta-
men omnibus simul agnatis dat lex
hereditatem ; sed iis,.qui tune prox-
imiore gradu sunt, cum certum es-
se ceeperit, aliquem intestatum de-
cessisse.

LIB. I. ‘TIT. ¥.

the same father, are agnates in re-
gard to each other; they are also
cansanguinei, of the same blood ;
but it is not required, that they
should have the same mother. An
uncle is also agnate to his brother’s
son, and vice versa the brother’s son
to his paternal uncle , and brothers
patruel, that is the children of broth-
ers, who are also called consobrini,
cousins are likewise reckoned ag-
nates. Thus we may enumerate
many degrees of agnation; and
even those, who are born, after the
decease of their parents, obtain the
rights of consanguinity: thelawnev-
ertheless does not grant the right of
inheritance to all the agnati, but to
those only who are in the nearest
degree, when it becomes certain,
that the deceased hath died intes-
tate:

De adoptivis.

$ II. Per adoptionem quoque
agnationis jus consistit; veluti in-
ter filios naturales et. eos, quos pa-
ter eorum adoptavit ; nec dubium
est, quin ii improprié consangui-
nei appellentur. Itém, si quis ex
ceteris agnatis tuis, veluti frater
aut patruus, aut denique is, qui
longiore gradu est, adoptaverit ali-
quem agnatus inter tuos esse non
dubitatur.

§ 2. The right of agnation arises
also through adoption ; thus the na-
tural.and adopted sons of the same
father are agnates ; but such per-
sons are without doubt improperly
called consanguinei. Also, if a bro-:
ther, a paternal uncle, or any other
of your more remote agnates, should
adopt, then the person so adopted,
is undoubtedly to be reckoned
among your agnati.

De masculis et foeminis.

$ TL. Ceeterum inter masculos
quidem agnationis jure hereditas,
etiamsi longissimo gradu sint, ul-
tte citroque capitur. Quod ad fe-

§ 3. Succession among males even

in the most distant degree proceeds
according to the right of agna-
tion. But it hath been thought right
LIB. UI.

minas vero attinet, ita placebat, ut
ipse consanguinitatis jure, tantim
capiant hereditatem, si sorores sint;
ulterius non capiant. Masculi au-
tem ad earum hereditates, (etiamsi
longissimo gradu sint,) admittan-
tur. Qué de causa fratris tui, aut
patrui tui filiz, vel amite tue, he-
reditas ad te pertinebat; tua vero ad
illas non pertinebat. Quod ided
ita constitutum erat, quia commo-
dius videbatur, ita jura constitui,
ut plerumque hereditates ad mas-
culos confluerent. Sed, quia sané
iniquum erat, in universum eas qua-
si extraneas repelli, praetor eas ad
bonorum possessionem admittit ea
parte, qua proximitatis nomine bo-
norum possessionem pollicetur: ex
qua parte ita scilicét admittuntur,
si neque agnatus ullus, neque proxi-
mior cognatus, interveniat. Et hec
quidem lex duodecim tabularum
nullo modo introduxit; sed, sim-
plicitatem legibus amicam amplexa,
simili modo omnes agnatos, sivé
masculos sivé fieminas, cujuscun-
que gradus, ad similitudinem suo-
rum, invicem ad successionem vo-
cabat. Media autem jurispruden-
tia, que erat quidem lege duode-
cim tabularum junior, imperiali au-
tem dispositione anterior, subtili-
tate quadam excogitaté, prefatam
differentiam inducebat, et penitus
eas 4 successione agnatorum repel-
lebat, omni alid successione incog-
nita donec preetores paulatim aspe-
ritatem juris civilis corrigentes,
sivé quod deerat, implentes huma-

TIT. IL. 205
that females should only inherit by
consanguinity, if sisters ; and notin
a more remote degree; though males
might be admitted in the most dis-
tant degree to inherit females: thus
in case of death, the inheritance of
your brother’s daughter, or if the
daughter of your paternal uncle or
aunt, would appertain to you; but
your inheritance would not apper-
tain to them. And this was so con-
stituted, because it seemed expedi-
ent for the benefit of society, that
inheritances should for the most
part fall into the possession of males,
But, as it was unjust, that females
should be thus almost wholly ex-
cluded as strangers, the praetor ad-
mitted them to the possession of
goods in that part of his edict, in
which he gives the possession of
goods on account of proximity: yet
they are only admitted upon condi-
tion, that there is no agnate or near-
er cognate. But the law of the
twelve tables did not introduce these
dispositions ; for that law, according
to the plainnessand simplicity which
are agreeable to all laws, called the
agnates of either sex, or any degree,
to succession, in the same manner
as it admitted proper heirs. But the
middle law, which was posterior to
the law of the twelve tables, and
prior to the imperial constitutions,
subtilly introduced the before-men-
tioned distinction, and entirely re-
pelled females from the succession
of agnates, no other method of suc-
cession being known, until the pre-
206 LIB. II.

no proposito alium ordinem suis
edictis addiderunt; et cognationis
linea, proximitatis nomine introduc-
ta, per bonorum possessionem eas
adjuvabant, et pollicebantur his bo-
norum possessionem, que unde cog-
nati appellatur. Nos verd, legem
duodecim tabularum sequentes, et
ejus vestigia hac in parte conser-
vantes, laudamus quidem preto-
res suz humanitatis, non tamén
eos in plenum huic cause mederi
invenimus. Quaré etenim, uno eo
demque gradu naturali concurrente,
et agnationis titulis tam in mascu-
lis quam in feeminis «qua lance
constitutis, masculis quidem deba-
tur ad successionem venire omni-
um agnatorum, ex agnatis autem
mulieribus nulli penitus, nisi soli
sorori, ad agnatorum successionem
patebat aditus? Ided nos, in plenum
omnia reducentes, et ad jus duode-
cim tabularum eandem dispositio-
nem exequantes, nostra constitu-
tione sancimus, omnes legitimas
personas, id est, per virilem sexum
descendentes (sivé masculini gene-
ris sivé feeminini sint) simili modo
ad jura successionis legitims, ab in-
testato vocari, secundum sui gradus
prerogativam; nec ided excluden-
das, quia consanguinitatis jura, si-
cut germanee, non habent.

TIT. Il.

tors, correcting by degrees the as-
perity of the civil law, or supplying
what was deficient, added in their
edicts a new order of succession,
being induced to it by a motive of
humanity ; and, by introducing the
line of cognation on account of prox-
imity, they thus assisted the fe-
males, and gave them the possession
of goods, which is called unde cog-
nati. But we, although strictly ad-
hering to the law of the twelve
tables in regard to females, must yet
commend the humanity of the pre-
tors, though they have not afforded
a full remedy in the present case.
But, since the same natural degree
of relation, and the same title of ag-
nation appertains as well to females
as to males, what reason can be as-
signed, that males should be permit-
ted to succeed all their agnati, and
that no means of succession should
be open to any femaleagnate, except
a sister? We therefore, reducing all
things to an equality, and making
our disposition conformable to the
laws of the twelve tables, have by
our constitution ordained, that all
legitimate persons, that is, descend-
ants from males, whether male or
female, shall be equally called to
the rights of succession ab intestato
according to the prerogative of their
degree, and be by no means exclud-
ed although they possess not the
rights of consanguinity in so near a
degree as sisters.
LIB. dII.

TIT. IL 207

 

De filiis sororum.

$ IV. Hoc etiam addendum nos-
tre constitutioni existimavimus, ut
transferatur unus tantummod6 gra-
dus 4 cognationis in legitimam suc-
cessionem; ut non solum fratris
filius et filia (secundum quod jam
definivimus) ad successionem pa-
trui sui vocentur, sed etiam ger-
mang consanguinee vel sororis
uterine filius et filia soli, et non de-
incéps persone, una cum his ad jura
avunculi sui perveniant: et, mortuo
eo, qui patruus quidem est sui fra-
tris filiis, avunculus autem sororis
suze soboli, simili modo ab utroque
latere succedant, tanquam si omnes
ex masculis descendentes legitimo
jure veniant; scilicét ubi frater et
soror superstites non sunt; (his et-
enim personis praecedentibus et suc-
cessionem admittentibus, czteri
gradus remanent penitus semoti;)
videlicet hereditate non in stirpes,
sed in capita, dividenda.

De proximis

§ V. Si plures sint gradus ag-
natorum, aperté lex duodecim ta-
bularum proximum vocat: itaque,
si (verbi gratia) sint defuncti fra-
ter, et alterius fratris filius, aut pa-
truus, frater potior habetur. Et,

$ 4. We have also thought fit to
add to our constitution, so that one
degree only is transferred from the
line of cognation to the line of legi-
timate succession, i. e. of agnation :
and not only the son and daughter
of a brother (according to our for-
mer definition of agnates) shall be
called to the succession of their pa-
ternal uncle, but the son or daugh-
ter of a sister, who is either by the
same father or by the same mother,
may also be admitted with agnates
to the succession of their maternal
uncle; but no one of the descend-
ants of the son or daughter of a sis-
ter is by any means to be admitted.
And, when a person dies, who at his
decease was both a paternal and
maternal uncle, that is, who had
nephews or nieces living both by a
brother and by a sister, then such
children succeed in the same man-
ner, as if they were all descendants
from males, when the decased leaves
no brother or sister: and they take
the inheritance not per stirpes, or
according to their respective stocks,
but per capita, i. e. by poll: but, if
there be brothers or sisters, and they
accept the succession, all others of
a more remote degree are excluded.

vel remotis.

§ 5. When there are many de-
grees of agnates, the law of the
twelve tables calls for the nearest ;
if, for example, there is a brother of
the deceased, and a son of another
brother, or a paternal uncle, the
208 LIB. Ti.

TIT. I.

 

quamvis singulari numero usi, lex
duodecim tabularum proximum vo-
cet, tamen dubium non est, quin,
si plures sint ejusdem gradus, om-
nes admittantur. Nam et proprié
proximus ex pluribus gradibus in-
telligitur; et tamen non dubium
est, quin, licét unus sit gradus ag-
natorum, pertineat ad eos heredi-
tas,

brother is preferred. But, although
the law of the twelve tables calls
the nearest agnate in the singular
number, yet doubtless, if there be
many, in the same degree, they
ought all to be admitted. And, al-
though properly by the nearest de-
gree must be understood the nearest
of many, yet, if there be but one
degree of agnates, the inheritance
must undoubtedly appertain to
those, who are in that degree.

Quo tempore proximitas spectatur.

§ VI. Proximus autem, si qui-
dem nullo testamento facto quis-
quam decesserit, per hoc tempus
requiritur, quo mortuus est is, cu-
jus de hereditate queritur ; quod si
facto testamento quisquam decesse-
rit, per hoc tempus requiritur, quo
certum esse cceperit, nullum ex tes-
tamento heredem extiturum; tunc
enim proprié quisque intestatus
decessisse intelligitur: quod qui-
dem aliquando longo tempore de-
claratur; in quo spatio temporis
spe accidit, ut, proximiore mor-
tuo, proximus esse incipiat, qui
moriente testatore non erat proxi-
mus.

§ 6. When a man dies without a
will, that person is esteemed his
nearest of kin who was so at the
time of the decease. But, when the
deceased hath actually made a test-
ament, then that person is esteemed
his nearest of kin, who was so when
it became certain, that there was no
testamentary heir: for, until then,
a man who hath made a testament,
cannot be said to have died intes-
tate: and this sometimes may not
appear for a long time; during
which the proximate kinsman dy-
ing, some one becomes the nearest
of kin, who was not so at the death
of the testator.

De successorio edicto.

§ VII. Placebat autem, in eo ge-
nere percipiendarum hereditatum
successionem non esse; id est, ut
quamvis proximus, qui secundim
ea, quee diximus, vocatur ad here-
ditatem, aut spreverit hereditatem,
aut antequam adeat, decesserit, ni-
hilé magis legitimo jure sequentes

§ 7. But it is settled, that there
is no succession among agnates ;
so that, if the nearest agnate be call-
ed to an inheritance, and hath either
refused the heirship,or been prevent-
ed by death from entering upon it,
his own legitimate heir would not
be admitted to succeed him. But
LIB. III.

TIT. I. 209

 

admittantur. Quod iter’m preeto-
res imperfecto jure corrigentes,
non in totum siné adminiculo relin-
quebant, sed ex cognatorum ordine
eos vocabant, ut pote agnationis ju-
re eis recluso. Sed nos, nihil per-
fectissimo juri deesse cupientes,
nostra constitutione, quam de jure
patronatus humanitate suggerente
protulimus, sancimus successionem
in agnatorum hereditatibus non
esse eis denegandam; cum satis
absurdum erat, quod cognatis a
pretore apertum est, hoc agnatis
esse reclusum ; maximé cum in on-
ere quidem tutelarum et primo gra-
du deficiente sequens succedit ; et,
quod in onere obtinebat, non erat
in lucro permissum.

this the preetors have in some mea-
sure corrected, and have not left the
agnates of a deceased person whol-
ly without assistance, but have or-
dered that they should be called to
the inheritance as cognates, because
they were debarred from the rights
of agnation. But we, earnestly de-
sirous to render our law as perfect
and complete as possible, have or-
dained by our constitution, which,
induced by humanity, we published
concerning the right of patronage,
“ that legitimate succession should
not be denied to agnates in the in-
heritances of agnates :’” for it was
sufficiently absurd, that a right,
which by means of the preetor was
open to cognates, should be shut up
and denied to agnates: but it was
more abundantly absurd, that, in tu-
telages, the second degree of ag-
nates should succeed upon failure of
the first; and that the same law,
which obtained in that, which was
onerous, should not also obtain in
that, which was lucrative.

De legitima parentum successione.

$ VIII. Ad legitimam succes-
sionem nihilominus vocatur etiam
parens, qui contracta fiducia filium,
vel filiam, nepotem vel neptem, ac
deinceps, emancipat. Quod ex
nostra constitutione omnino induci-
tur, ut emancipationes liberorum
semper videantur, quasi contracta
fiducia, fieri; cum apud veteres

non alitér hoc obtinebat, nisi specia-
27

§ 8. A parent, who hath emanci-
pated a son, a daughter, a grandson
a grand-daughter, or other lineal
descendant under a fiduciary con-
tract, is admitted to their legitimate
succession. But it is now effected
by our constitution, that every e-
mancipation shall for the future be
regarded, as if it had been made un-
der such a contract ; although a-
210 LIB. I.

litér contracta fiducia parens manu-
misisset.

TIT. II.

mong the ancients the parent was
never called to the legitimate suc-
cession of his children, unless he
had actually emancipated them un-
der a fiduciary contract.

 

TITULUS TERTIUS.

DE SENATUS-CONSULTO TERTYLLIANO.

D. xxxviii. T. 17. C. vi. T. 56.

De lege duodecim tabularum et jure Preetorio.

LEX duodecim tabularum ita
stricto jure utebatur, et preepone-
bat masculorum progeniem ; et eos,
qui per feeminini sexiis necessitu-
dinem sibi junguntur, adéo expel-
lebat, ut ne quidem inter matrem et
filium filiamve ultro citroque here-
ditatis capiende jus daret; nisi
quod preetores ex proximitate cog-
natorum eas personas ad successio-
nem bonorum, possessione unde cog-
nati accommodata, vocabant.

Such was the rigor of the law of
the twelve tables, that it preferred
the issue by males, and excluded
those who were related by the fe-
male line, so that the right of suc-
cession was not permitted to take
place reciprocally between a mother
and her son, or a mother and her
daughter. But the pretors, on ac-
count of the proximity of cognation,
admitted those, who were related
by the female line, to the succes-
sion, giving them the possession of
goods, called unde cognati.

ft

De constitutione Divi Claudii.

§ IL. Sed he juris angustize pos-
tea emendate sunt; et primus
quidem Divus Claudius matri, ad
solatium liberorum amissorum, le-
gitimam eorum detulit heeredita-
tem.

§$ 1. But these narrow limits of
the law were afterwards enlarged
by the emperor Claudius, who first
gave the legal inheritance of deceas-
ed children to their mothers, in as-
suasion of their grief for so great a
loss.
LIB. II.

TIT. Ti. 211

. Ad Senatus-consultum Tertyllianum. De jure liberorum.

$ IL. Postea autem senatus-con-
sulto Tertylliano, quod Divi Adri->
ani temporibus factum est, plenissi-
mé de tristi successione matri, non
etiam avis, deferenda cautum est;
ut mater ingenua trium liberorum
jus habens, libertina quatuor, ad
bona filiorum filiarumve admittatur
intestato mortuorum, licét in potes-
tate parentis sit; ut scilicét, cum
alieno juri subjecta est, jussu ejus
adeat heereditatem, cujus juri sub-
jecta est.

Qui preferuntur matri,

§ IIL. Preferuntur autem ma-
tri, liberi ‘defuncti, qui sui sunt,
quive suorum loco sunt, sivé primi
gradus, sivé ulterioris. Sed et fi-
lize suze mortue filius vel filia pre-
ponitur, ex constitutionibus, matri
defunct, id est, aviee sue. Pater
vero utriusque, non etiam avus et
proavus, matri anteponitur ; scilicéet
cum inter eos solos de hereditate
agitur. Frater autem consangui-
neus tam filii, quam filie, exclude-
bat matrem; soror autem consan-
guinea paritér cum matre admitte-
patur. Sed, si fuerant frater et so-
yor consanguinei, et mater liberis
onerata, frater quidem matrem ex-
cludebat; communis autem erat

$§ 2. Afterwards by the Tertillian
senatus-consultum,made in the reign
of the emperor Adrian, the fullest
care was taken, that the succession
of children should pass to their mo-
ther, though not to their grand-mo-
ther: so that a mother, born of free
parents, and having the right of
three children,—also a freed-wo-
man, having the right of four chil-
dren,may be admitted, although un-
der power of a parent, to the goods
of their intestate children. But, a
mother under power cannot enter
upon the inheritance of her children,
but at the command of him, to
whom she is subject.

vel cum ea admittuntur.

§ 3. The children of a deceased
son who are proper heirs, or in the
place of proper heirs, either in the
first or an inferior degree, are pre-
ferred to the mother. And the son,
or daughter, of a deceased daughter
is also by the constitutions preferred
to the mother; i.e. to their grand-
mother. Also the father of a son,
or daughter, is preferred to the mo-
ther; not so the grand-father or
great-grand-father, when the inhe-
ritance is contended for by these
only without the father. Also the
consanguine brother either of a son
or a daughter excluded the mother;
but a consanguine sister was ad-
mitted equally with her mother. if
212 LIB. TI. ‘TIT. I.

hereditas ex quis partibus fratri- there had be a brother and a sister

bus et sororibus. of the same blood with the deceas-

ed, the brother excluded his mother,

although she had children: but the

= inheritance, in this case, was equal-
ly divided between brothers and
sisters.

Jus novum de jure liberorum sublato.

§ IV. Sed hos constitutione, $ 4. But by a constitution, insert-
quam in codice, nostro nomine de- ed in the code, and honoured with
corato, posuimus, matri subvenien- our name, we have thought fit, that
dum esse existimavimus, respicien- mothers should be favoured in re-
tes ad*naturam, et puerperium, et gard to the considering natural rea-
periculum, et sepé mortem ex hoc son, the pains of child-birth, the
casu matribus illatam. Idedque danger, and death itself, which they
impium esse credidimus, casum often suffer; we therefore have es-
fortuitum in ejus admitti detri- teemedit highly unjust, that the law
mentum. Si enim ingenua ter, vel should make that detrimental,
libertina quater, non pepererit, im- which is in its nature merely fortu-
merito defraudabatur successione tous; for, if a married woman free-
suorum liberorum. Quid enim born, does not bring forth three
peccavit, si non plures, sed paucos, children, or if a free-woman does
peperit? Et dedimus jus legiti- not become the mother of four,
mum plenum matribus, sivé inge- ought they, for this reason only, to
nuis sive libertinis, etsi non ter e- be deprived of succession to their
nix fuerint vel quater, sed eum children? for how can it be imput-
tantum vel eam, qui queeve morte ed to them, as a crime? We there-
intercepti sunt, ut sic vocentur in fore, not regarding any fixed num-
liberorum suorum legitimam suc- ber of children, have given a full
cessionem. right to every mother, whether in-

genuous or freed, of being called to
the legitimate succession of her
child or children deceased, whether
male or female.

Quibus mater preponitur, et quibuscum admittitur.

§$ V. Sed, cum antea constituti- $ 5. In examining the constitu-
ones, jura legitime successionis tions of former emperors, relating to
perscrutantes, partim matrem adju- the right of succession, we observed
vabant, partim eam pregravabant, that they were partly favourable to
nec in solidum eam vocabant, sed, mothers and partly grievous; not
LIB. III.

TIT. Il. 213

 

in quibusdam casibus tertiam ei
partem absirahentes, certis legiti-
mis dabant personis, in aliis autem
contrarium faciebant, nobis visum
est, recté et simplici vid matrem
omnibus personis legitimis antepo-
ni, et siné ullA diminutione filiorum
suorum successionem accipere ; ex-
cepta fratris et sororispersona, (sivé
consanguini sint, sivé sola cogna-
tionis jura habentes) ut quemadmo-
dium eam toti alii ordini legitimo
preeposuimus, ita omnes fratres et
sorores, (sivé legitimi sint, sive
non,) ad capiendas hereditates si-
mul vocemus: ita tamen ut, siqui-
dem sole sorores, agnate vel cog-
nate, et mater defuncti vel defunc-
te supersint, dimidiam quidem ma-
ter alteram vero dimidiam partem
omnes sorores habeant. Si verd
matre superstite, et fratre vel fra-
tribus solis, vel etiam cum sorori-
bus, sive legitima sivé sola cogna-
tionis jura habentibus, intestatus
quis vel intestata moriatur, in capi-
ta ejus distribuatur hereditas.

always calling them to the intire
inheritance of their children, but in
some cases depriving them ofa third
which was given to certain legiti-
mate persons: and in other cases,
allowing a third. It hath therefore
seemed right to us, that mothers
should receive the succession of their
children without any diminution,
and that they should be exclusively
preferred before all legitimate per-
sons, except the brothers and sisters
of the deceased, whether consan-
guine, or cognate: but, as we have
preferred the mother to all other le-
gitimate persons, we are willing to
call all brothers and sisters, legiti-
mate or otherwise, to the inheritance
together with the mother; yet in
such manner, that if only the sisters
agnate or cognate, and the mother
of the deceased survive, the mother
shall have one half of the effects,
and the sisters the other. But, if a
mother survive, and also a brother
or brothers, or brothers and sisters,
whether legitimate or cognate, then
the inheritance of the intestate son
or daughter must be distributed in
capita ; i. e. into equal shares.

De tutore liberis petendo.

§ VI. Sed, quemadmodim nos
matribus prospeximus, ita eas opor-
tet sus soboli consulere ; scituris
eis quod, si tutores liberis non pe-
tierint, vel in locum remoti vel ex-
cusati intra annum petere neglexe-
rint, ab corum impuberum morien-

§ 6. Having thus taken care of
the interest of mothers, it behoves
them in return to consult the welfare
of their children. Be it known
therefore, that if a mother shall ne-
glect, during the space of a whole
year, to demand a tutor for her chil-
214 LIB. Il. TIT. IV.

tium successione meritd repellen- dren, or to require a new tutor in

tur. the place of a former, who hath ei-
ther been removed or excused, she
will be deservedly repelled from the
succession of such children, if they
die within puberty.

Do vulgo quesitis.

$ VIL. Licet autem vulgo que- § 7. Although a son or daugh-

situs sit filius filiave, potest tamen ter be of spurious birth, yet the mo-

ad bona ejus mater ex Tertylliano ther, by the Tertyllian senatus-con-

senatus-consulto admitti. sultum, may be admitted to succeed
to the goods of either.

 

TITULUS QUARTUS.
DE SENATUS-CONSULTO ORFICIANO.

D. xxxviii. T. 17. C. vi. T. 57.

Origo et summa senatus-consulti.

PER contrarium autem liberi ad
bona matrum intestatarum admit-

On the contrary children are ad-
mitted to the goods of their intestate.

tuntur ex senatus-consulto Orficia-
no, quod, Orficio et Rufo consuli-
bus, effectum est Divi Marci tem-
poribus; et data est tam filio quam
filie, legitima hereditas, etiamsi
alieno juri subjecti sint ; et praefe-
runtur consanguineis et agilatis de-
functe matris.

mothers, by the Orfician senatus-
consultum, which was enacted in
the consulateof Orficius and Rufus,
in the reign of the emperor Marcus
Antoninus ; and, by this decree, the
legal inheritance is given both to
sons and daughters, although under
power ; and they are preferred to
the consanguine brothers, and to the
agnates of their deceased mother.

De nepote et nepte.

§ I. Sed, cum ex hoc senatus-
consulto nepotes et neptes ad avie
successionem legitimo jure non vo-

§ 1. But, since grand-sons and
grand-daughters were not called by
the senatus-consultum to the legi-
LIB. IU.

carentur, postea hoc constitutioni-
bus principalibus emendatum est,
ut, ad similitudinem filiorum filiar-
umque, et nepotes et neptes vocen-
tur.

TIT. Iv. 215
timate succession of their grand-
mother, the omission was after-
wards supplied, by the imperial
constitutions; so that grand-sons
and grand-daughters were called to
inherit, as well as sons and daugh-
ters.

De capitis diminutione.

§ II. Sciendum autem est, hu-
jusmodi successiones, que ex 'Ter-
tylliano et Orficiano senatus-con-
sultis deferuntur, capitis diminu-
tione non perimi, propter illam re-
gulam, qua nove hereditates legi-
time capitis diminutione non pere-
unt; sed illee sole, quae ex lege du-
odecim tabularum deferuntur.

§ 2. But it must be observed, that
those successions, which proceed
from the Tertyllian and Orfician
senatus-consulta, are not extinguish-
ed by diminution. For it is estab-
lished rule, that legitimate inheri-
tances of late creation, are not des-
troyed by diminution ; which affects
those only that are founded on the
law of the twelve tables.

De vulgo quesitis.

$ III. Novissime sciendum est,
etiam illos liberos, qui vulo que-
siti sunt, ad matris hereditatem ex
senatus-consulto admitti.

$ 3. It is lastly to be noted, that
even spurious children are admitted
by the Orfician senatus-consultum
to the inheritance of their mother.

De jure accrescendi inter legitimos heeredes.

$ VI. Si ex pluribus legitimis he-
redibus quidam omiserint heredita-
tem, vel morte, vel alié causa, im-
pediti fuerint, quominus adeant,
reliquis, qui adierint, accrescit illo-
rum portio; et, licét ante decesse-
rint, ad heredes tamen eorum per-
tinet.

§ 4. When there are many legiti-
mate (legal) heirs, and some re-
nounce the inheritance, or are pre-
vented by death, or any other cause,
then the portions of such persons
fall by right of accretion to those,
who accept the inheritance; and,
although the acceptors happen to
die even before the refusal or the
failure of their coheirs, yet the por-
tions of such coheirs, will appertain
to the heirs of the acceptors.
216 LIB. I.

TIT. V.

TITULUS QUINTUS.

DE SUCCESSIONE COGNATORUM.

Tertius ordo succedentium ab intestato.

POST suos heredes, eosque,
quos inter suos heredes prteeor et
constitutiones vocant, et post legi-
timos, (quorum numero sunt agnati,
et hi, quos in locum agnatorum
tam supradicta senatus-consulta,
quam nostra erexit constitutio,)
proximos cognatos preetor vocat.

Qui vocantur in hoc ordine.

$ I. Qua parte naturalis cogna-
tio spectatur. Nam agnati capite
diminuti, quique ex his progeniti
sunt, ex lege duodecim tabularum
inter legitimos non habentur, sed a
preetore tertio ordine vocantur, ex-
ceptis solis tantummodo' fratre et
sorore emancipatis non etiam libe-
ris eorum; quos lex Anastasiana
cum fratribus integri juris constitu-
tis vocat quidem ad legitimam
fratris heereditatem, sivé sororis;
non equis tamen partibus sed cum
aliqua diminutione, quam facilé est
ex ipsius constitutionis verbis intel-
ligere. Aliis vero agnatis inferio-
ris gradus, licét capitis diminuti-
onem passi non sunt, tamen antepo-
nit eos, et procul dubio cognatis.

After the proper heirs and those,
whom the preetor and the constitu-
tions call to inherit with the proper
heirs, and after the legitimate heirs
(among whom are the agnate, and
those, whom the above mentioned
senatus-consulia and our constitu-
tion have numbered with the ag-
nati) the preetor calls the nearest
cognates.

De agnatis capite minutis.

§ 1. By the law of the twelve ta-
bles, neither the agnates, who have
suffered diminution, nor their issue,
are esteemed legitimate heirs; but
they are called by the preetor in the
third order of succession: but we
must except a brother and sister,
(although) emancipated, but not
their children; for the constitution
of Anastasius calls an emancipated
brother or sister to the succession of
a brother or sister, together with
those, who having not been emanci-
pated, are integri juris: but it does
not call them to an equal share of
the succession, as may easily be
collected from the words of the con-
stitution: which prefers an emanci-
pated brother or sister to other ag-
nates of inferior degree, although
unemancipated; and consequently
to all cognates.
 

LIB. Ill. TIT. v.

217

 

De conjunctis per foeminas.

$ IL. Eos etiam, qui per femini-
ni sextis personas ex transverso
cognatione junguntur, tertio gradu
proximitatis nomine, praetor ad suc-
cessionem vocat.

§ 2. Collateral relations by the
female line, are called by the pre-
tor in the third order of succession,
according to their proximity.

De liberis datis in adoptionem.

§$ IIL. Liberi quoque, qui in
adoptiva familia sunt, ad naturali-
um parentum hereditatem hoc eo-
dem gradu vocantur.

De vulgo

§$ IV. Vulgo quesitis nullos ha-
bere agnatos, manifestum est; cum
agnatio a patre sit, cognatio 4 ma-
tre: hi autem nullum patrem ha-
bere intelligantur. Eaédem ratione,
ne inter se quidem possunt videri
consanguinei esse; quia consangui-
nitatis jus, species est agnationis.
Tantim ergd cognati sunt sibi, si-
cut et matri cognati sunt. Itaque
omnibus istis ex ed parte competit
bonorum possessio, qua proximata-
tis nomine cognati vocantur.

§ 3. Children, who are in an
adoptive family, are likewise called
in the third order of succession to
the inheritance of their natural pa-
rents.

queesitis.

§ 4. Itis manifest, that spurious
children have no agnates ; inas-
much as agnation proceeds from the
father, cognation from the mother ;
and such children are looked upon
as having no father. And, for the
same reason, consanguinity cannot
be said to subsist between the bas-
tard children of the same woman ;
because consanguinity is a species of
agnation. They can therefore only
be allied to each other as they are
related to their mother, that is, by
cognation ; and it is for this reason
that all such children are called to
the possession of goods by that part
of the pretorian edict, by which
cognates are called by the right of
their proximity..

Ex quoto gradu vel agnati vel cognati succedunt.

$ V. Hoc loco et illud necessa-
rio admonendi sumus agnationis
quidem jure admitti aliquem ad
hereditatem, etsi decimo gradu sit ;

sive de lege duodecim tabularum
28

§ 5. Here it will be proper to ob-
serve, that any person by right of
agnation may be admitted to inhe-
rit, although he be in the tenth de-
gree; this is allowed both by the
218 LIB. If.

queremus, sive de edicto, quo pre-
tor legitimis heredibus daturum se
bonorum possessionem pollicetur.
Proximitatis vérd nomine iis solis
pretor promittit bonorum possessi-
onem, qui usque ad sextum gradum
cognationis sunt, et ex septimo a
sobrino sobrinaque nato nateve.

TIT. VI.

law of the twelve tables, and the
edict, by which the pretor promi-
ses, that he will give the possession
of goods to the legitimate heirs.
But the pretor promises the posses-
sion of goods to cognates, only as
far as the sixth degree of eagnation
according to their right of proximi-
ty; and in the seventh degree, to
those cognates only, who are the de-
scendants of a cousin german.

 

TITULUS

SEXTUS.

DE GRADIBUS COGNATIONUM.

D. xxxviii. T. 10.

Continuatio, et cognationis divisio.

HOC loco necessarium est ex-
ponere, quemadmddum gradus cog-
nationis numerentur. Quare in
primnis admonendi sumus, cognatio-
nem aliam supra numerari, alam
infra, aliam ex transverso, que e-
tiam a lateredicitur. Superior cog-
natio est parentum: inferior libero-
rum: ex transverso fratrum soro-
mmve, et eorum, qui queve ex his
generantur ; et convenienter patrui,
amite, avunculi, matertere. Et
superior quidem et inferior cogna-
tio 4 primo gradu incipit : atea, que
ex transverso numeratur, 4 secun-

do.

It is here necessary to explain
how degrees of cognation are to be
computed; and first we must ob-
serve, that there is one species of
cognation which relates to ascen-
dants, another to descendants, and
a third to collaterals. The first and
superior cognation is that relation,
which a man bears to his parents ;
the second, or inferior, is that,
which he bears to his children; the
third is that relation which he bears
to his brothers and sisters, and their
issue; and also to his uncles and
aunts, whether paternal or maternal.
The superior and inferior cognation
commence at the first degree; but
the transverse or collateral cogna-
tion commences at the second.
LIB. IIL

TIT. VI. 219

De primo, secundo, et tertio gradu.

$1. Primo gradu est supra pa-
ter, mater: infra filius, filia. Se-
cundo gradu supra avus, avia: in-
fra nepos, neptis: ex transverso fra-
ter, soror. 'Tertio gradu supra pro-
avus, proavia: infra pronepos, pro-
neptis: ex transverso fratris soro-
risque filius, filia: et convenientér
patruus, amita, avunculus, mater-
tera. Patruus est patris frater, qui
Gracis zoreadelpO appellatur. A-
vunculus est frater natris, qui greece
eetoaxdelgO dicitur: et uterque
promiscué deO0 appellatur. Amita
est patris soror, que grace mateea-
delpy appellatur; matertera vero
matris soror, que grace “7Teadelpy
dicitur: et utraque promiscué dea
appellatur.

Quartus

$ H. Quarto gradu supra abavus
abavia : infra abnepos, abneptis : ex
transverso fratris sororisque nepos
neptisve: et convenienter patruus
magnus, anita magna, id est, avi
frater et soror: item avunculusmag-

§ 1. A father, or a mother, is in
the first degree in the right line as-
cending: and a son, or a daughter,
is also in the first degree in the right
line descending. A grand-father, or
a grand-mother, is in the second de-
gree in the right line ascending:
and a grand-son or grand-daughter,
is in the second degree in the right
line descending : and a brother or a
sister, is also in the second degree in
the collateral line. A great-grand-
father, or a great-grand-mother, is
in the third degree in the right line
ascending: and a great-grand-son,
or great-grand-daughter, is in the
third degree in the right line des-
cending: and the son or daughter
of a brother or sister is also in the
third degree in the collateral line;
and by a parity of reasoning an
uncle, or an aunt, whether paternal
or maternal, is also in the third de-
gree. A paternal uncle, called pa-
truus, is a father’s brother; a ma-
ternal uncle, called avunculus, is 8
‘mother’s brother; a paternal aunt,
called amita, is a father’s sister;
and a maternal aunt, called mater-
tera, is a mother’ssister. And each
of these persons is called in Greek
ée0 or deve promiscuously.

gradus.

$2. A great-great-grand-father,
or a great-great-grand-mother, is
in the fourth degree in the right
line ascending; and a great-great-
grand-son, or 2 great-great-grand-
daughter, is in the fourth degree in
220 LIB. IIL.

nus et matertera magna, id est,
avie frater et soror: consobrinus,
consobrina, id est, qui quaeve ex
sororibus aut fratribus procrean-
tur. Sed quidam recté conso-
brinos eos proprié dici putant,
qui ex duabus sororibus pro-
generantur, quasi consororinos : eos
verd, qui ex duobus fratribus pro-
generantur, proprié fratres patrue-
les vocari: si autém ex duobus fra-
tribus filie nascuntur, sorores pa-
trueles appellari. At eos, qui ex
fratre et sorore progenerantur, ami-
tinos proprié dici putant. Amite
tue filiis consobrinum te appellant,
tu illos amitinos.

Quintus

§ TII. Quinto gradu supra ata-
vus, atavia: infra atnepos, atnep-
tis: ex transverso, fratris sororisque
pronepos, proneptis: et convenien-
ter propatruus, proamita, id est,
proavi frater et soror: et proavun-
culus et promatertera, id est, proa-
vie frater et soror: item fratris pa-
truelis, vel sororis patruelis, con-
sobrini et consobrine, amitini et
amitine filius, filia: propior sobri-
no, propior sobrina; hi sunt patrui
magni, amite magne, avunculi
magni, matertere magne filius,
filia.

TIT. VI.

the right line descending. Also, in
the transverse or collateral line, the
grandson, or the grand-daughter,
of a brother or a sister, is in the
fourth degree; so is a great uncle,
or great aunt, paternal or maternal
and cousins german, (consobrini).
But some have been rightly of opi-
nion, that the children of sisters
are properly consobrini, quasi
consororini ; that the children of
brothers are properly brothers pa-
truel, if males; and sisters patruel,
if females; and that, when there
are children of a brother, and chil-
dren of a sister, they are properly
amitini ; but the sons of your aunt,
by the father’s side call you conso-
brinus and you call them amitini.

gradus.

$ 3. A great-grand-father’s grand-
father, or a great-grand-father’s
grand-mother, is in the fifth degree
in the line ascending, and a great-
grandson, or a great-grand-daugh-
ter, of a grandson or a grand-daugh-
ter is in the fifth degree in the line
descending. In the transverse or
collateral line, a great-grandson, or
great-grand-daughter, of a brother
or sister, is also in the fifth degree;
and consequently so is a great-
grand-father’s brother or sister, or
a great-grand-mother’s brother or
sister. The son or daughter also
of a cousin german is in the fifth
degree: and so is the son or daugh-
ter of a great uncle or great aunt,
paternal or maternal; and such son,
or daughter is called propior sobri-
no and propior sobrina.
LIB. TI.

TIT. VI. 221

Sextus gradus.

§ IX. Sexto gradu supra tritavus
tritavia: infra trinepos, trineptis : ex
transverso fratris sororisque abne-
pos abneptis: et convenientér abpa-
truus abamita, id est, abavi frater et
soror: abavunculus, abmatertera,id
est, abavie frater et soror: item
propatrui, proamitee proavunculi,
promatertere filius, filia: item pro-
pius sobrino sobrinave filius, filia :
item consobrini consobrine nepos,
neptis : itm sobrini, sobrine ; id
est, qui queeve ex fratribus vel so-
roribus patruelibus, vel consobrinis
vel amitinis, progenerantur.

§ 4. A great-grand-father’s great-
grand-father, or a great-grand-fa-
ther’s great-grand-mother, is in the
sixth degree in the line ascending ;
and the great-grandson, or great-
grand-daughter of a great-grandson,
or a great-grand-daughter, is like-
wise in the sixth degree in the line
descending. And, in the transverse
or collateral line, a great-great-grand
son, or a great-great-grand-daugh-
ter, of a brother or sister, is also in
the sixth degree : and consequently
a great-great-grand-father’s brother
or sister, and a great-great-grand-
mother’s brother or sister, is in the
sixth degree. And the son or daugh-
ter of a great-great-uncle, or great-
great-aunt, paternal or maternal, is
also in the sixth degree ; and so al-
so is the son or daughter of the son or
daughter of a great-uncle or great-
aunt, paternal or maternal. The
grandson also, or the grand-daugh-
ter of a cousin german is in the
sixth degree; and, in the same de-
grees between themselves, we reck-
on the sobrini and the sobrine ; that
is, the sons and daughters of cous-
ins german in general, whether such
cousins german are so related by
two brothers, or by two sisters, or
by a brother and a sister.

De reliquis gradibus.

$V. Hactenus ostendisse suffi-
ciat quemadmodim gradus cogna-
tionis numerentur : namque ex his
palam est intelligere, quemadmo-
dum ultiores quoque gradus nu-

§ 5. It suffices to have shewn
thus far, how degrees of cognation
are enumerated : and, from the ex-
amples given, the more remote de-
grees may be computed ; for every
2922 LIB. Ti.
merare debeamus : quippé semper
generata persona gradum adijicit ;
ut longé facilius sit respondere,
quoto quisque gradu sit, quam pro-
pria cognationis appellatione quem-
quam denotare.

TIT. VI.

person generated always adds one
degree ; so that it is much easier to
determine, in what degree any per-
son is related to another, than to.de-
note such person by a proper term
of cognation.

De gradibus agnationis.

§ VI. Agnationis quoque gradus
eodem modo numerantur.

De gradum

$ VII. Sed, cum magis veritas
oculata fide, quam per aures animis
hominum infigatur, ided necessa-
rium duximus, post narrationem
graduum, eos etiam presenti libro
inscribi, quatenus possint et auri-
bus et oculorum inspectione adole-
scentes perfectissimam graduum
doctrinam adipisci.

$ 6. The degrees of agnation are
reckoned in the same manner.

discriptione.

$7. But as truth is fixed in the
mind much better by the eye, than
by the ear, we have thought it ne-
cessary to subjoin, to the acconnt
already given, a tablet with the de-
grees of cognation inscribed upon it;
that the student, both by hearing
and seeing, may attain a perfect
knowledge of them.

A er ee

TITULUS SEPTIMUS.

DE SERVILI

COGNATIONE.

D. xxxviii. T. 2. Covi T. 4

ILLUD certum est, ad serviles
cognationes illam partem edicti,
qué proximitatis nomine bonorum
possessio promittitur, non perti-
nere: nam nec ullé antiqua lege ta-
lis cognatio computabatur. Sed
nostra constitutione, quam pro jure
patronatis fecimus, (quod jus us-
que ad nostra tempora satis obscu-
rum atque nube plenum, et undique
confusum fuerat,) et hoc humanitate

It is certain, that the part of the
edict, in which the possession of
goods is promised, according to the
right of proximity, does not relate
to servile cognation ; which hathnot
been regarded by any ancient law.
But, by our own constitution, con-
cerning the right of patronage,
which right was heretofore obscure
and every way confused, we have
ordained (humanity so suggesting)
LIB. IH.

Suggerente concessimus, Ut, si quis,
in servili constitutus consortio, li-
beram vel liberos habuerit, sivé ex
Hiberé sive ex servilis conditionis
mulicre, vel contra, serva mulier ex
libero vel servo habuerit liberos
eujuscunque sexiis, et, ad liberta-
tem his pervenientibus, ii, qui ex
servili ventre nati sunt, libertatem
meruerimt, vel, dum mulieres libere
erant, ipsi in servitute eos habue-
rint, et postea ad libertatem perve-
nerint, ut hi omnes ad successionem
patris vel matris veniant, patrona-
tis. jure im hac parte sopito. Hos
etenim liberos non solum in suorum
parentum successionem, sed etiam
alterum’ in alterius suecessionem
mutuam, vocavimus; ex illa lege
specialitér eos vocantes, sive soli
inveniantur, qui in servitute nati et
postea manumissi sunt; sivé una
cum aliis, qui post libertatem pa-
rentum concepti sunt; sivé ex eo-
dem patre, sivé ex eadem matre,
sivé ex aliis nuptiis; ad similitudi-
flem ¢orum, qui ex justis nuptiis
procreati sunt. #

TIT. Vil. 223
that, if a slave shal: have a child,
or children, either by a free-woman,
or by a bond-woman, with whom he
lives in contubernio, and, on the
contrary, that, if a bond-woman
shall have a child, or children, of
either sex by a free-man, or by a
slave, with whom she so lives, and
such father and mother are after-
wards enfranchised, the children
shall succeed to their father or mo-
ther, without regarding the right of
patronage. We have not only cal-
led these children to succeed to their
parents, but also mutually to each
other, whether they are sole in suc-
cession, as having all been born in
servitude and afterwards manumit-
ted, or whether they succeed with
others, who were conceived after
the infranchisement of their parents;
and whether they are all by the
same father and mother, or by a
different father, or mother; and, that
children born in slavery, but man-
umitted, should succeed in the same
manner, as the issue of parents le-
gally married.

Collatio ordinum et graduum.

§ L. Repetitis itaque omnibus,
que jam tradidimus, apparet non
semper eos, qui parem gradum cog-
nationis obtinent, pariter vocari:
eoque amplius, ne eum quidem,
qui proximiore sit cognatus, sem-
per potiorem esse. Cum enim pri-
ma causa sit storum heredum, et
eorum, quas inter suos heredes
enumeravimus, apparet, pronepo-
tem vel abnepotem defuncti potio-

$1. From what hath been said,
it appears that those, who are in an
equal degree of cognation, are not
always called equally to the succes-
sion; and farther, that even the
nearest of kin, is not constantly to
be preferred. For, inasmuch as the
first place is given to proper heirs,
and to those who are numbered with
proper heirs, it is apparent, that the
great-grand-son, or  great-great-
224 LIB. II.

TIT. VIL

 

rem esse, quam fratrem, aut pa-
trem, aut matrem defuncti: cum
alioqui pater quidem et mater (ut
supra quoque tradidimus) primum
gradum cognationis obtineat, fra-
ter verd secundum, pronepos au-
tem tertio gradu sit cognationis, et
abnepos quarto : nec interest, in po-
testate morientis fuerit, an non,
quod vel emancipatus, vel ex e-
mancipato, aut fuemineo sexu, pro-
pagatus est. Amotis quoque suis
heredibus, et quos inter suos hex-
redes vocari diximus, agnatus, qui
integrum jus habet agnationis, eti-
amsi longissimo gradu sit, plerum-
que potior habetur, quam proximior
cognatus: nam patrui nepos vel
pronepos avunculo vel matertere
prefertur. Toties igitur dicimus;
aut potiorem haberi eum, qui prox-
imiorem gradum cognationis obti-
net, aut paritér vocari eos, qui cog-
nati sunt; quoties neque suorum
heeredum, quique inter suos heere-
des sunt, neque agnationis jure ali-
quis preeferri debeat, secundim ea,
que tradidimus: exceptis fratre et
sorore emancipatis, qui ad succes-
sionem fratrum vel sororum vocan-
tur; qui, etsi capite diminuti sunt,
tamen preeferuntur ceteris ulteri-
oris gradus agnatis.

grand-son, is preferred to the bro-
ther or even the father or mother of
the deceased : although a father and
mother, (as we have before observ-
ed,) obtain the first degree of rela-
tion, a brother the second, a great-
grand-son the third, and a great-
great-grand-son the fourth; neither
does it make any difference, whether
such grand-children were under the
power of the deceased, at the time
of his death, or out of his power;
either by being themselves emanci-
pated, or by being the children of
those who were so ; neither can it
be objected, that they are descend-
ed by the female line. But, when
there are no proper heirs, nor any of
those who are permitted torank with
them, then an agnate, who hath the
full right of agnation in him, al-
though he be in the most distant
degree, is generally preferred to a
cognate, who is in the nearest de-
gree; thus the grand-son or great-
grand-son of a paternal uncle is
preferred to a maternal uncle or
aunt. Hence, when theye are no
proper heirs, nor any, who are num-
bered with them, nor any, who
ought to be preferred by the right
of agnation, (as we have before not-
ed,) then the nearest in degree of
cognation, is called to the succes-
sion; andif there be many in the
same degree, they are all called e-
qually. But a brother and sister,
although emancipated, are yet call-
ed to the succession of brothers and
sisters ; for although they have suf-
fered diminution, they are neverthe-
less preferred to all agnates of a
more remote degree.
LIB. III. TIT. VI.

225

TITULUS OCTAVUS.

DE SUCCESSIONE LIBERTORUM.

D. xxxviii.

Qui succedunt.

NUNC de libertorum bonis vi-
deamus. Olim itaque licebat li-
berto patronum suum impuné testa-
mento preeterire: nam ita demum
lex duodecim tabularum ad here-
ditatem liberti vocabat patronum,
si intestatus mortuus esset libertus,
herede suo nullo relicto. Itaque
intestato mortuo liberto, si is suum
heredem reliquisset, patrono nihil
in bonis ejus juris erat. Et, si-
quidem ex naturalibus liberis ali-
quem suum heredem reliquisset,
nulla videbatur querela; si verd
adoptivus filius fuisset, aperté ini-
quum erat, nihil juris patrono su-
peresse.

T. 2.

De lege duodecim tabularum.

Let us now treat of the succession
of freed-men. A freed-man might
formerly, with impunity, omit in his
testament any mention of his pa-
tron: for the law of the twelve
tables called the patron to the inhe-
ritance, only when the freed-man
died intestate without proper heirs ;
therefore, though he had died intes-
tate, yet, if he had left a proper
heir, the patron would have receiv-
ed no benefit: and indeed, when
the natural and legitimate children
of the deceased became his heirs,
there seemed no cause of complaint ;
but, when the freed-man left only
an adopted son, it was manifestly
injurious thatthe patron shouldhave
no claim.

De jure pretorio.

$I. Qua de causa, postea, pre-
toris edicto hee juris iniquitas e-
mendataest. Sivé enim faciebat,
testamentum libertus, jubebatur ita
testari, ut patrono partem dimidiam
bonorum suorum relinqueret; et, si
aut nihil aut minus parte dimidia
reliquerat, debatur patrono contra
tabulas testamenti, partis dimidiz
bonorum possessio : sivé intestatus
moriebatur, suo heerede relicto filio

adoptivo, dabatur squé patrono
29

$1. The law was therefore af-
terwards amended by the edict of
the pretor: for every freed-man
who made his testament, was com-
manded so to dispose of his effects,
as to leave a moiety to his patron :
and, if the testator left nothing, or
less than a moiety, then the posses-
sion of half was given to the pa-
tron contra tabulas, i. e. contrary to
the disposition of the testament.
And, if a freed- man died intes-
226 EIB. IIL

TIT. VL

 

contra hune suum hzredem partis
dimidize bonorum possessio. Pro-
desse autem liberto solebant, ad
excludendum patronum, naturales
liberi, non solim duos in potestate
mortis tempore habeat, sed etiam
emancipati, et in adoptionem dati,
si modo ex aliqua parte scripti hee-
redes erant, aut preteriti contra
tabulas bonorum possessionem ex
edicto pretorio petierant. Nam
exheredati nullo modo repellebant

patronum.

tate, leaving an adopted son his
heir, the possession of a moiety was
given to thepatron notwithstanding
yet, not only the natural and law-
ful children of a freed-man, whom
he had under his power at the time
of his death, excluded the patron,
but those children also, who were
emancipated, and given in adoption,
if they were written heirs for any
part, or even although they were
omitted, if they had requested the
possession Contra Tabulas, by vir-
tue of the preetorian edict. But dis-
inherited children by no means re-
pelled the patron.

De lege Papia.

§$ I. Postea vero lege Papia
adaucta sunt jura patronorum, qui-
locupletiores libertos habebant.
Cautum enim est, ut ex bonis ejus,
qui sestertium centum millium pa-
trimonium reliquerat, et pauciores
quam tres liberos habebat, sivé is
testamento facto, sivé intestatus
mortuus erat, virilis pars patrono
deberetur. Itaque, cum unum qui-
dem filium filiamve heredem reli-
querat libertus, perindé pars dimi-
dia debebatur patrono, ac si is siné
ullo filio filidve intestatus decessis-
set: cum. vero duos duasve heere-
des reliquerat, tertia pars debebatur
patrono: si tres reliquerat, repelle-
batur patronus.

§. 2. But afterwards the rights
of patrons, who had wealthy freed-
men were inlarged by the Papian
law: which provides that he shall
have a man’s share out of the effects
of his freed-man, whether dying tes-
tate or intestate, who hath left a pa-
trimony of an hundred thousand
sestertit and fewer than three chil-
dren: so that, when a freed-man
hath left only one son or daughter,
a moiety is due to the patron, as if
the deceased had died testate with-
out either son or daughter. But,
when there are two heirs, male or
female, a third part only is due to
the patron: and, when there are
three, the patron is wholly exclud-
ed.

De constitutione Justiniani.

§ Ill. Sed nostra constitutio,

§ 3. But ourconstitution, publish-

(quam pro omni natione greca lin- ed ina compendious form, in the

gua compendioso tractatu habito

Greek language, for the benefit of
LIB. III.

composuimus,) ita hujusmodi cau-
sam definivit; ut, siquidém libertus
vel liberta minores centenariis sint,
id est, minus centum aureis habe-
ant substantiam, (sic enim legis Pa-
‘pie summam interpretati sumus, ut
pro mille sestertiis unus aureus
computetur,) nullum locum habeat
patronus in eorum successione, si
tamen testamentum fecerint; sin
autem intestati decesserint, nullo
liberorum relicto, tune patronattis
jus, quod erat ex lege duodecim
tabularum, integrum = reservavit.
Cum vero majores centenariis sint,
si heredes vel bonorum possessores
liberos habeant, sivé unum, sive
plures, cujuscumque sexts vel gra-
dis, ad eos successiones parentum
deduximus, patronis omnibus mo-
dis cum sua progenie semotis. Sin
autem siné liberis decesserint, si-
quidem intestati, ad omnem here-
ditatem patronos patronasque voca-
vimus. Si vero testamentum qui-
dem fecerint, patronos autem aut
patronas preterierint, cum nullos
liberos haberent, vel habentes eos
exheredaverint, vel mater sivé avus
maternus eos preterierint, ita quod
non possint argui inofficiosa eorum
testamenta, tunc ex nostra constitu-
tione per bonorum possessionem
contra tabulas, non dimidiam, ut
antea, sed tertiam partem bonorum
liberti consequantur ; vel quod deest
eis, ex constitutione nostra replea-
tur, si quando minus tertia parte
bonorum suorum libertus vel Jiberta
eis reliquerit : ita siné onere, ut nec
liberis liberti libertaeve ex ea parte

#

TTT. VOL. 227
all nations, ) ordained, that, if a
free-man, or free-woman, die pos-
sessed of less than an hundred aurei,
(for thus have we interpreted the
sum mentioned in the Papian law,
counting one aureus for a thousand
sestertit,) the patron shall not be in-
titled to any share in a testate suc-
cession. But, where a free-man,
or woman, dies intestate, and with-
out children, we have reserved the
tight of patronage intire, as it for-
merly was, according to the law of
the twelve tables. But, if a freed
person die worth more than an hun-
dred aurei, and leave one child, or
many, of either sex or any degree,
as the heirs and possessors of his
goods, we have permitted, that such
child or children shall succeed their
parent to the intire exclusion of the
patron and his heirs: and if any
free-persons die without children
and intestate, we have called their
patrons or patronesses to their whole
inheritances. And if any freed-per-
son, worth more than an hundred
aurei, hath made a testament, omit-
ted his patron, and left no children,
or hath disinherited them; or if a
mother, or maternal grand-father,
being freed-persons, have omitted to
mention their children in their wills,
so that such wills cannot be proved
to be inofficious, then, by virtue of
our constitution, the patron shall
succeed, not to a moiety as former-
ly but to the third part of the estate
of the deceased, by possession contra
tabulas: and, when freed-persons, |
leave less than the third part of their
228

legata vel fideicommissa preestentur,
sed ad coheredes eorum hoc onus
redundet: multis aliis casibus 4 no-
bis in preefata constitutione congre-
gatis, quos necessarios esse ad hu-
jusmodi dispositionem juris per-
speximus: ut tam patroni patrone-
que quam liberi eorum, nec non qui
ex transverso latere veniunt usque
ad quintum gradum, ad successio-
nem libertorum libertarumve vocen-
tur, siclt ex e4 constitutione intel-
ligendum est. Et, si ejusdem pa-
troni vel patrons, vel duorum dua-
rumque pluriumve, liberi sint, qui
proximior est, ad liberti vel libertee
vocetur successionem; et in capita,
non in stirpes, dividatur successio;
eodem modo et in iis, qui ex trans-,
verso latere veniunt, servando.
Pené enim consonantia jura inge-
nuitatis et libertinitatis in successio-
nibus fecimus.

LIB. Il. TIT. VIIL

effects to their patrons, our consti-
tution ordains, that the deficiency
shall be supplied; nor shall this
third part, be subject to érusts, or
legacies, even for the benefit of the
children of the deceased ; for the co-
heirs only of the patron shall bear
this burden. In the before-men-
tioned constitution, we have collect-
ed many more cases, necessary in
relation to the right. of patronage;
that patrons and patronesses, their
children and collateral relations, as
far as the fifth degree, might be cal-
Jed to the succession of their freed-
men and freed-women ; as will ap-
pear more fully from the ordinance
itself. And, if there be many chil-
dren of one, two or more patron or
patroness, the nearest in degree, is
called to the succession of his freed-
man or freed-woman; and, when
there are many in equal degree, the
estate must be divided in capita and
not in stirpes: the same order is de-
creed to be observed among the col-
laterals of patrons and patronesses :
for we have rendered the laws of
succession almost the same both as
to ingenui and lbertini.

Quibus libertinis succeditur.

§ IV. Sed hee de iis libertinis
hodie dicenda sunt, qui in civitatem
Romanam pervenerunt, cum nec
sint alii liberti, simul et Dedititiis
et Latinis sublatis, cum Latinorum
successiones nulle penitus erant;
quia, licét ut liberi vitam suam pe-
ragebant, attamén ipso ultimo spi-
ritu simul animam atque libertatem

§ 4. What we have said relates
to modern freed-men who are all ci-
tizens of Rome ; for there is now, no
other, the Dedititii and Latini be-
ing abolished: the latter of whom
never enjoyed any right of succes-
sion ; for although they led the lives
of freed-men, yet, with their last
breath, they lost both their lives and
LIB. III.

TIT. VIII. 229

 

°

amittebant: et, quasi servorum, ita
bona eorum jure quodammodo pe-
culii ex lege Junia Norbana manu-
missores detinebant. Postea verd
senatus-consulto Largiano cautum
fuerat, ut liberi manumissoris, non
nominatim exheredati facti, extra-
neis heredibus eorum in bonis La-
tinorum preponerentur. Quibus
etiam supervenit Divi Trajani edic-
tum, quod eundem hominem, si in-
vito vel ignorante patrono, ad civi-
tatem Romanam venire ex benefi-
cio principis festinarat, faciebat qui-
dem vivum civem, Latinum verd
morientem. Sed nostra constitu-
tione, propter hujusmodi conditio-
num vices et alias difficultates, cum
ipsis Latinis etiam legem Juniam,
et senatus-consultum Largianum,
et edictum Divi Trajani, in perpe-
tuum deleri censuimus, et omnes
liberi civitate Romana fruantur; et
mirabili modo quibusdam adjectio-
nibus ipsas vias, que in Latinita-
tem ducebant ad civitatem Roma-
nam capiendam transposuimus.

liberties : for their possessions, like
the goods of slaves, were detained
by their manumittor, who possessed
them, asa peculium, by virtue of
the law Junia Norbana. It wasaf-
terwards provided by the senatus-
consultum Largianum, that the
children of a manumittor, not disin-
herited by name, should be preferred
to any strangers, whom a manumit-
tor might constitute his heirs: then
followed the edict of Trajan, by
which if a slave either against the
will or without the knowledge of
his patron should obtain the free-
dom of Rome by favour of the em-
peror, such slave should continue
free, while living, but, at his death,
should be regarded only as a Latin.
But we, being averse to these chan-
ges of condition, and dissatisfied
with the difficulties attending them,
have thought proper by our consti-
tution, for ever to abolish, together
with the Latins, the law Junia, the
senatus-consultum Largianum, and
the edict of Trajan ; so that all
freed-men may become freed-men
of Rome. And we have happily
contrived by some additions, that
the manner of conferring the free-
dom of Latins should now become
the manner of conferring the free-
dom of Rome.
230 LIB. I.

TIT. IX.

 

TITULUS

NONUS.

DE ASSIGNATIONE LIBERTORUM.

D. xxxviii. T. 4.

An assignari possit, et quis assignationis effectus.

IN summa, (quod ad bona liber-
torum attinet,) admonendi sumus,
censuisse senatum, ut quamvis ad
omnes patroni liberos, qui ejusdem
gradus sunt, equalitér bona liber-
torum pertineant: tamen licere pa-
renti, uni ex liberis assignare liber-
tum, ut post mortem ejus solus is
patronus habeatur, cui assignatus
est : et czeteri liberi qui ipsi quoque
adeadem bona, nullé assignatione
interveniente, paritér admitterentur,
nihil juris in his bonis habeant ;
sed ita demum pristinum jus reci-
piant, si is, cui assignatus est, de-
cesserit, nullis liberis relictis.

De sexu assignati, et de sexu

$I. Nec tanttim libertum, sed
etiam libertam, et non tantum filio
nepotive, sed etiam filie neptive,
assignare permittitur.

Respecting the possession of freed-
men, we must remember the decree
of the senate ; whereby, although
the goods of freed-men belong equal-
ly to all the children of the patron,
who are in the same degree, yet it is
lawful for a parent to assign a freed-
man to any one of his children, so
that, after the death of the parent,
the child, to whom the freed-man
was assigned, is solely to be esteem-
ed his patron: and the other chil-
dren, who would have been equally
admitted had not this been the case
are wholly excluded; but, if the as-
signee should die without issue, the
excluded children regain their for-
mer right.

graduque ejus, cui assignatur.

§ 1. Freed-persons of either sex
are assignable ; not only toa son
or grand-son, but to a daughter or
grand-daughter.

De liberis in potestate vel emancipatis.

§ II. Datur autem hee assig-
nandi facultas ei, qui duos pluresve
liberos in potestate habebit, ut eis,
quos in potestate habet, assignare
libertum libertamve liceat. Unde
querebatur, sieum, cui assignavit,
postea emancipaverit, num evane-
scat assignatio? Sed placuit eva-

§ 2. The power of assigning
freed-persons is given to him, who
hath two ormore children un-eman-
cipated, so that a fathermay assign
a freed-man or freed-womantochil-
dren retained under his power: hence
it became a question, if a father
should assign a freed-man to his son
LIB. IIE.

TIT. X. 231

 

nescere: quod. et. Juliano: et. aliis:
plerisque: visum est.

and afterwardsemancipate that son,
whether the assignment would not
be null? which hath. been deter-
mined in the affirmative; and so
thought Julian and many others.

Quibus modis aut verbis assignatio fit : et de senatus-
consulto.

$ HE. Nec interest, an testamen-
to quis assignet, an siné testamen-
to; sed etiam quibuscunque verbis

patronis hoc permittitur facere, ex ,

ipso SC. quod Claudianis. tempori-
bus. factum est, Sabellio Rufo et
Asterio Scapula Consulibus.

§ 3. It is the same, whether the
assignment of a freed-man be made
by testament, or not; for patrons
may assign verbally; under the se-
natus-consultum, passed in the reign
of Claudian in the consulate of Sa-
bellius Rufus and Asterius Scapula.

 

TITULUS

DECIMUS.

DE BONORUM POSSESSIONIBUS.

D. xxxvii.

T. t.

Cur introductz bonorum possessiones 3 et quis sit earum
effectus.

JUS bonorum possessionis in-
troductum est 4 preetore emendandi
veteris juris gratia : nec solum in in-
testatorum heereditatibus vetus jus
eo modo pretor emendavit, sicut
supra dictum est; sed in eorum quo-
que, qui testamento facto decesse-
rint. Nam, si alienus posthumus
heres fuerit institutus, quamvis he-
reditatem jure civili adire non po-
poterat, cum institutio non valebat,
honorario tamen jure, bonorum pos-
sessor efficiebatur; videlicét cum
a pretore adjuvabatur. Sed et is

The right of succeeding by the
possession of goods, was introduced.
by the preetor in amendment of the
ancient law; which he corrected as
it regarded not only the inheritances
of intestates, (as before observed, )
but of those also who die testate ;
for, a posthumous stranger being in-
stituted heir, although he could not
enter upon the inheritance by the
civil law, inasmuch as his institu-
tion would not be valid, yet by the
(pretorian or) honorary law, he
might be made the possessor of the
232 LIB. IIL.

TIT. X.

 

4 nostra constitutione hodie recté
heeres instituitur, quasi et jure ci-
vili non incognitus. Aliquands ta-
men, neque emendandi neque im-
pugnandi veteris juris, sed majis
confirmandi gratia, pretor police-
tur bonorum possessionem: nam
illis quoque, qui, recté testamento
facto, heredes instituti sunt, dat se-
cundum tabulas bonorum possessi-
onem. Item ab intestato suos he-
redes, et agnatos, ad bonorum pos-
sessionem vocat: sed et remota
quoque bonorum possessione ad
eos pertinet hereditas jure civili.
Quos autem solus preetor vocat ad
hereditatem, heredes quidem ispo
jure non fiunt: nam pretor here-
dem facere non potest: per legem
enim tantim, vel similem juris con-
stitutionem, heeredes fiunt, vel per
senatus-consulta et constitutiones
principales: sed, cum eis pretor
dat bonorum possessionem, loco
heredum constituuntur, et vocan-
tur bonorum possessores. Adhuc
autem et alios complures gradus
preetor fecit in bonorum possessioni-
bus dandis, dum id agebat, ne quis
. siné successore moreretur. Nam,
angustissimis finibus constitutum
per legem duodecim tabularum, jus
percipiendarum hereditatum pre-
tor ex bono et equo dilatavit.

goods when hehad received theassist-
anceofthepretor. Suchstrangermay
at this time, by our constitution, be
legally instituted heir as a person
not unknown to the civillaw. But
the praetor sometimes bestows the
possession of goods, intending nei-
ther to amend nor impugn the old
law, but to confirm it: for he gives
possession secundam tabulas to
those, who are appointed heirs by
regular testament. He also calls
proper heirs and agnates to the pos-
session of the goods of intestates ;
and yet the inheritance would be
their own by the civil law, although
the preetor did not interpose his au-
thority. But those, whom the pre-
tor calls to an inheritance merely
by virtue of his office, do not be-
come legal heirs ; inasmuch as the
pretor cannot make an heir ; for
heirs are made only by_law, or by
what has the effect of a law, asa
decree of the senate, or an imperial
constitution. But, when the preetor
gives any persons the possession of
goods, they stand in the place of
heirs, and are called the possessors
of the goods. He hath also devised
many other orders of persons, to
whom the possession of goods can be
granted, so that no man may die
without a successor: and, by the

_ Tules of justice and equity, he hath

enlarged the right of taking inheri-
tances, which was bounded within
very narrow limits by the law. of
the twelve tables.
De speciebus ordinariis.

S I. Suit autém bonorum posses-
Slones ex testamento quidem he;
prima, que preeteritis liberis datur
vocaturque contra tabulas: secun-
da, quam omnibus jure scriptis he-
redibus preetor pollicetur; idedque
vocatur secundum tabulas. Et,cum
de testatis prius locutus est, ad in-
testatos transitum fecit: et primo
loco suis heredibus, et iis, qui ex
edicto prztoris inter suos heredes
connumerantur, dat bonorum pos-
sessionem, que vocatur unde liberi.
Secunda, legitimis heredibus. Ter-
tio, decem personis, quas extraneo
manumissori preeferebat. Sunt au-
tem decem persone he; pater, ma-
ter, avus, avia, tam paterni quam
materni; itém filius, filia; nepos,
neptis, tam ex filio, quam ex filia;
frater sororve, consanguinei vel u-
terini. Quarto, cognatis proximis.
Quinto tanquam ex familia. Sexto,
patrono patronzeque, liberisque eo-
rum et parentibus. Septimo, viro
et uxori. Octavo, cognatis manu-
missoris.

LIB. III.

TIT. X, 233

Jus vetus.

$ 1. The possessions of goods ot
pretorian testamentary successions,
are these. First, that which is given
to children, not mentioned in the
testament; this is called possession
contrary to the testament. The se-
cond, that which the pretor pro-
mises to all written heirs, and is
therefore called possession accord-
ing to the testament. These being
fixed he goes to intestacies; and
first he gives the possession called
unde liberi, to the proper héirs, or to
those, who by the pretorian edict
are numbered among the proper
heirs: secondly, to the legitimate
(legal) heirs: thirdly, to ten persons,
in preference to a stranger, who was
the manumittor, viz. to a father, a
mother, or a grand-father or grand-
mother, paternal or maternal; to a
son, a daughter, or to a grand-son or
grand-daughter, as well by a daugh-
ter as by a son; to a brother or sis-
ter, either consanguine or uterine:
fourthly, to the nearest: éognates :
fifthly, to those who are, as i were,
of the family : sixthly, to the patron
or patroness, and to their children,
and their parents: séventhly, to an
husband and wife: eighthly, to the
cognates of a manumittor of pa-
tron.

Jus novum.

$ IL. Sed eas quidem pretoria
introduxit jurisdictio: & nobis ta-
mén nihil incuriosum pretermiss-
um est; sed, nostris constitutioni-

bus omnia corrigentes, contra tabu-
30

§ 2. The preetor’s authority hath
introduced these successions; as to
ourselves, having passed over no-
thing negligently, we have admitted
by our constitutions the possession
234 LIB. IIL.

las quidem et secundum tabulas bo-
norum possessiones admissimus,
utpote necessarias constitutas: nec
non ab intestato, unde liberi, et un-
de legitimi, bonorum possessiones.
Que autem in pretoris edicto quin-
to loco posita fuerat, id est, unde
decem persone, eam pio proposito
et compendioso sermone superva-
cuam ostendimus. Cum enim pre-
fata bonorum possessio decem per-
sonas preponebat extraneo manu-
missori nostra constitutio, quam de
emancipatione liberorum fecimus,
omnibus parentibus eisdemque ma-
numissoribus, contracta fiducia, ma-
numissionem facere dedit; ut ipsa
manumissio eorum hoc in se habeat
privilegium, et supervacua fiat su-
pradicta bonorum possessio. Sub-
lata igitur preedicté quinta bonorum
possessione in gradum ejus sextam
antea bonorum possessionem in-
duximus, et quintam fecimus, quam
pretor proximis cognatis pollicetur.
Cumque antea fuerat septimo loco
bonorum possessio, ¢anquam ex fa-
milia, et octavo, unde patroni
patroneque, liberi et parentes eo-
rum, utramque per constitutionem
nostram, quam de jure patronatis
fecimus, penitus evacuavimus. Cum
enim, ad similitudinem successionis
ingenuorum, libertinornm succes-
siones posuerimus, quas usque ad
quintum gradum tantummod6 co-
arctavimus, ut sit aliqua inter in-
genuos et libertinos differentia,
sufficit eis tam contra tabulas bono-
rum possessio, quam unde legitimi,
et unde cognati, ex quibus possunt

TIT. X.

of goods contra tabulas and secun-
dum tabulas, as necessary ; and also
the possessions ab intestato, called
unde liberi and unde legitimi; but
we have briefly shewn, that the pos-
session, called unde decem persone,
which was ranked by the preetor’s
edict in the fifth order, was unne-
cessary: for, whereas that posses-
sion preferred ten kinds of persons
to a stranger, being the manumittor,
our constitution on that subject,hath
permitted all parents to manumit
their children, under the presump-
tion of a fiduciary contract; so that
the possession unde decem persone
is now useless. The afore-mention-
ed fifth possession being thus abro-
gated, we have now made that the
fifth, which was formerly the sixth,
by which the pretor gives the suc-
cession to the nearest cognates. .
And, whereas formerly the posses-
sion canquam ex familia, was in the
seventh place, and the possession
unde patroni patroneque, liberi et
parentes eorum, was in the eighth,
we have now annulled them both
by our ordinance concerning the
right of patronage. And having
brought the successions of the iber-
tint to a similitude with those of the
ingenut, (except, that we have li-
mited the former to the fifth degree,
so that there may still remain some
difference between them) we think,
that the possessions contra tabulas,
unde legitimi, and unde cognati
may suffice, by which all persons
may vindicate their rights; the
niceties and inextricable errors of
LIB. Hf.

sua jura vindicare, omni scrupulo-
Sitate et inextricabili errore istarum
duarum bonorum possessionum re-
soluto. Aliam vero bonorum pos-
sessionem, que unde vir et uxor
appellatur, et nono loco inter vete-
res bonorum possessiones posita
fuerat, et in suo vigore servavimus,
et altiore loco, id est, sexto, eam
posuimus: decima quoque veteri
bonorum possessione, que erat wn-
de cognati manumissoris, propter
causas enumeratas merito sublata,
ut sex tantummodo bonorum pos-
sessiones ordinarise permaneant,
suo vigore pollentes.

"TET Xx. 235
those two kinds of possessions, tan-
quam ex familia and unde patroni,
being removed. The other posses-
sion of goods, called vir et uxor,
which held the ninth place among
the ancient possessions, we have
preserved in full force and have
placed in an higher, to wit, the
sixth degree. The tenth of the an-
cient possessions, called unde cog-
nati manumissoris, being deserved-
ly abolished for causes already en-
umerated, there now remain in
force only six ordinary possessions
of goods.

Species extraordinaria.

§ II. Septima eas secuta, quam
optima ratione preetores introduxe-
runt: novissimé enim promittitur
edicto iis etiam bonorum possessio,
quibus, ut detur, lege vel senatus-
consulto vel constitutione compre-
hensum est: quam neque bono-
rum possessionibus, que ab intesta-
to veniunt, neque iis, que ex testa-
mento sunt, pretor stabili jure con-
numeraverit; sed quasi ultimum
et extraordinarium auxilium (prout
Tes exigit) accommodavit, scilicét
jis, qui ex legibus, senatus-consul-
tis, constitutionibusve principum,
ex novo jure, vel ex testamento,
vel ab intestato veniunt.

§ 3. To these a seventh posses-
sion hath been added, which the
pretors have very properly intro-
duced : for, by alate edict, this pos-
session is promised to all those, to
whom it is appointed by any law,
senatus-consultum, or constitution :
and the preetor hath not positively
numbered this possession of goods
either with the possessions of the
goods of intestate or testate persons,
but hath given it, according to the
exigence of the case, as the last and
extraordinary resource of those,who
are called to the successions of tes-
tates or intestates, by any particu-
lar law, decree of the senate, or new
constitution.

De successorio edicto.

§ IV. Cum igitur plures species
successionem pretor introduxisset,

§ 4. The pretor, having introdu-
ced in their order many kinds of
286 LIB. II.

TIT. X.

 

easque per ordinem dispossuisset,
et in unaquaque specie successionis
sepé plures extent dispari gradu
persona, ne actiones creditorum
differentur, sed haberent, quos con-
venirent, et ne facilé in possessio-
nem bonorum defuncti mitterentur,
et eo modo sibi consulerent, ideo
petendz bonorum possessioni cer-
tum tempus prefinivit. Liberis
itaque et parentibus, tam naturali-
bus quam adoptivis, in petenda bo-
norum possessione amni spatium,
ceteris autem (agnatis vel cog-
natis) centum dierum, dedit.

suceessions, and as persons of dif-

ferent degrees are often found in
one species of succession, he thought
fit to limit a certain time for de-
manding the possession of goods,
that the actions of creditors may
not be delayed for want of a proper
person against whom to bring them,
and that the creditors may not pos-
sess themselves of the effects of the
deceased too easily, and consult
solely their own advantage: there-
fore to parents and children, whe-
ther natural or adopted, he hath al-
lowed one year, within which, they
may either accept or refuse the pos-
session. ‘'T’o all other persons, ag-
nates or cognates, he allows only an
hundred days.

De jure accrescendi et iterum de successorio edicto.

$ V. Et si intra hoc tempus ali-
quis bonorum possessionem non pe-
tierit, ejusdem gradus personis ac-
crescit; vel, si nullus sit, deinceps
cxteris bonorum possessionem pe-
rindé ex successorio edicto pollice-
tur, ac si is, qui preecedebat, ex eo
numero non esset. Si quis itaque
delatam sibi bonorum possessionem
repudiaverit, non, quousque tem-
pus bonorum possessioni preefini-
tum excesserit, expectatur; sed
statim ceeteri ex eodem edicto ad-
mittuntur.

§ 5. And, if a person intitled, do
not claim possession within the time
limited, his right of possession ac-
crues first to those in the same de-
gree with himself; and, in default
of those, the pretor by successory
ediet gives the possession to the next
degree, as if he, who preceded, had
no right. If a man refuse the pos-
session of goods, when it is open
to him, there is no necessity to wait,
until the time limited is expired, but
the next in succession, may be in-
stantly admitted under that edict.

Explicatio dicti temporis.

§ VI. In petendé autem bono-
rum. possessione dies utiles singuli
considerantur.

$ 6. In applications for the pos-
session of goods, we count all the
days, which are wiles ; i. e. those
days, on which the party, having
knowledge that the inheritance is o-
pen to him, might apply to the judge.
LIB. YL.

TIT. XI. 237

 

Quomodo peti debet.

$ VII. Sed bené anteriores prin-
cipes et huic cause providerunt, ne
quis pro petendd bonorum posses-
sione curet; sed, quocunque modo
admittentis eam, indicium ostende-
rit, intra statuta tamen tempora,
plenum habeat earum beneficium.

$ 7. Former emperors, have wise-
ly provided, that no person need de-
mand the possession of goods in so-
lemn form : for, if a man has in any
manner signified his consent to ac-
cept the pretorian succession with-
in the prescribed time, he shall en-
joy the benefit of it.

TITULUS UNDEUIMUS.

DE ACQUISITIONE PER ARROGATIONEM.

Continuatio.

EST et alterius generis per uni-
versitatem successio; que neque
lege duodecim tabularum, neque
preetoris edicto, sed eo jure, quod
consensu receptum est, introducta
est.

Que hoc modo acquiruntur.

$ IL. Ecce enim, cum pater-fami-
lias sese in arrogationem dat, om-
nes res ejus corporales et incorpo-
rales, queeque ei debits sunt, arro-
gatori antea quidem pleno jure ac-
quirebantur, exceptis iis, que per
capitis diminutionem  pereunt;
quales sunt operarum obligationes
et jus agnationis: usus etenim et
ususfructus, licét his antea connu-
merabantur; attamén eapitis dimi-

There is also an universal suc-
cession of another kind, introduced
neither by the laws of the twelve
tables, nor by the edict of the pre-
tor, but by the law founded on ge-
neral consent and usage.

Jus vetus.

§ I. For example, if the father of
a family gave himself in arrogation,
his property corporeal or incorpo-
real, and the debts due to him, were
formerly acquired in full right by
the arrogator ; those things only
excepted, which perished by dimi-
nution or change of state; as the
duties of freed-men to their patrons
and the rights of agnation. But
although use and usufruct, were
238 LIB. TL

TIT. XI.

 

nutione minima eos tollj prohibuit
nostra constitutio.

heretofore numbered among those
rights which perished by diminu-
tion, yet our constitution hath pro-
hibited them from being taken a-
way by the less diminution.

Jus novum.

§$ II Nunc autem nos eandem
acquisitionem, que per arrogatio-
nem fiebat, coarctavimus ad simili-
tudinem naturalium parentum. Ni-
hil enim aliud, nisi tantummod6
ususfructus, tam naturalibus paren-
tibus quam adoptivis, per filios-fa-
milias acquiritur in iis rebus, que
extrinseciis filiis obveniunt, dominio
eis integro servato. Mortuo autem
filio arrogato in adoptiva familia,
etiam dominium rerum ejus ad ar-
rogatorem pertransit; nisi supersint
alize persone, que ex constitutione
nostra patrem in iis, que acquiri
non possunt, antecedant.

§ 2. But we have now limited the
acquisitions from arrogation, by
those of natural parentage: for no-
thing is now acquired either by
natural or adoptive parents, but the
bare usufruct of those things, which
their children possess extrinsically
in their own right: the property still
remaining intire (in the adopted or
natural child.) But, if an arrogated
son die under power of his arroga-
tor, then even the property of the
effects of such son will pass to the
arrogator in default of those. per-
sons, whom we have by our con-
stitution preferred to the father in
the succession of those things, which
could not be acquired for him.

Effectus hujus acquisitionis.

§ III. Sed ex diverso, pro eo
quod is debuit, qui se in adoptio-
nem dedit, ipso quidem jure arro-
gator non tenetur, sed nomine filii
convenitur; et, si noluerit eum de-
fendere, permittitur creditoribus,
per competentes nostros magistra-
tis, bona, que ejus cum usufructu
futura fuissent, si se alieno juri non
subjecisset, possidere, et legitimo
modo ea disponere.

§ 3. On the other hand an arro-
gator is not directly bound to satis-
fy the debts of his adopted son; but
he may be sued in his son’s name;
and, if he refuse to defend his son,
then the creditors, by order of the
proper magistrates, may seize upon
and legally sell all those goods, of
which the usufruct, as well as the
property, would have been in the
debtor, if he had not made himself
subject to the power of another.
LIB. W. TIT. xi.

239

TITULUS DUODECIMUS,

DE EO, CUI LIBERTATIS CAUSA BONA ADDI-
CUNTUR.

Continuatio.

Accessit novus casus successionis
ex constitutione Divi Marci. Nam,
Si ii, qui libertatem acceperunt a
domino in testamento, ex quo non
aditur heereditas, velint bona sibi
addici libertatum conservandarumn
causa, audiuntur.

Rescriptum

$I. Et ita Divi Marci rescripto
ad Pompilium Rufum continetur:
verba rescripti ita se habent. Si
Virginio Valenti, qui testamento suo
libertatem quibusdam adscripsit, ne-
mine successore ab intestato exis-
tente, in ea causa bona ejus esse ca-
perunt, ut venire debeant, is, cujus
de ea re notio est, aditus rationem
desiderti tui habebit, ut libertatum,
tam earum, que directo, quam ear-
um que per speciem fideicommissi
relicte sunt, tuendarum gratia ad-
dicantur tibi, si idonee creditoribus
caveris de solido, quod cuique debe-
tur, solvendo. Et ti quidem, quibus
directa libertas data est, perinde li-
beri erunt, ac si hereditas adita es-
set: ti autem, quos heres manumit-
tere rogatus est, a te libertatem con-
sequentur ; ita autem ut si non alia
conditione velis tibi bona addici,

A new species of succession hath
taken its rise from the constitution
of Marcus Aurelius. For, if those
slaves, to whom freedom hath been
bequeathed, are desirous, for the
sake of obtaining it, that the inheri-
tance, which hath not been accept-
ed by the written heir, should be
adjudged for their benefit, they shall
obtain their request.

D. Marci.

$ 1. And to the same effect is the
rescript of the emperor Marcus to
Pompilius Rufus; the words of
which are “If theestate of Virginius
“Valens, who by testament hath be-
“queathed to certain persons their
“freedom, must necessarily be sold,
“‘and there is no successor ab intes-
“tato, then the magistrate who has
“the cognizance of these affairs,
“shall upon application hear the
“merits of your cause, that, for
“the sake of preserving the liberty
“of those, to whom it was given ei-
“ther directly or in trust, the es-
“tate of the deceased may be ad-
“judged to you, on condition, that
“you give good security to satisfy
“the creditors. And all those, to
“whom freedom was directly gi-
“ven, shall then become free, as if
“the inheritance had been entered
240 LIB. III.

TIT. XII.

 

quam ut ti etiam, qui directo liber-
tatem acceperunt, tui liberti fiant:
nam huic etiam voluntati tue, si ti,
quorum de statu agitur, sonsentiant,
auctoritatem nostram accommoda-
mus. Et, ne hujus rescriptionis
nostre emolumentum alia ratione
irritum fiat, si fiscus bona agnoscere
voluerit, et ti, qui bonis nostris at-
tendunt, sciant, commodo pecuniario
preferendam esse libertatis causam,
et ita bona cogenda, ut libertas eis
salva sit, qui eam adipisci potue-
runt, ac si hereditas ex testamento
adita esset.

Utilitas

§ TI. Hoe rescripto subventum
est et libertatibus et defunctis, ne
bona eorum 4 creditoribus. posside-
antur et veneant. Certé, si fuerint
hac de causa bona addicta, cessat
bonorum venditio; existit enim de-

“aon by the written heir; but
“those whom the heir was order-
“ed to manumit, shall obtain their
“freedom from you only. And,
“if you are not willing, that the
“goods of the deceased should be
“adjudged to you on any other con-
“dition, than that even they, who
“received their liberty directly by
“testament, shall also become your
‘ freed-men, we then order, that
“your will shall be complied with,
“Cif the persons agree to it, who are
“to receive their freedom. And,
“ Jest the use and emolument of this
“our rescript should be frustrated
“by any other means, be it known
“to the officers of our revenue,
“that, whenever our exchequer
“Jays claim to the estate of a de-
‘ceased person, the cause of liber-
“ty is to be preferred to any pe-
“cuniary advantage; and the es-
“tate shall be so seized, as to pre-
“ serve the freedom of those, who
“could otherwise have obtained it:
“and this in as full a manner, as if
“the inheritance had been entered
“upon by the testamentary heir.”

rescripti.

§ 2. This rescript is calculated in
favour of liberty, and also for the
benefit of deceased persons, lest their
effects should be seized and sold by
their creditors: for it is certain,
that, when goods are adjudged to a
s LIB. Tl.

functi defensor, et quidem idoneus,
qui de solido creditoribus cavet.

TIT. XII. 241
particular man for the preservation
of liberty, a sale by creditors can
never take effect: for he to whom
the goods are adjudged, is the pro-
tector of the deceased, and must
be a person, who can give security
to the creditors.

Ubi locum habeat.

§ II. In primis hoc rescriptum
toties locum habet, quoties testa-
mento libertates date sunt. Quid
ergo, si quis intestatus decedens
codicillis libertates dederit, neque
adita sit ab intestato hereditas ?
Favor constitutionis. debebit locum
habere: certé, si testatus decesse-
rit et codicillis dederit libertatem,
competere eam, nemini dubium est.

$ IV. Tunc enim constitutioni
locum esse verba ostendunt, cum
nemo successor ab intestato exis-
tat: ergo, quamdiu incertum erit,
utrum existat, an non, cessabit
constitutio. Si verd certum esse
ceeperit neminem existere; tunc
erit constitutioni locus.

-§ V. Si is, qui in integrum res-
titui potest, abstinuerit hzereditate,
an, quamvis potest in integrum
restitui, potest admitti constitutio,
et bonorum addictio fieri? Quid er-
go, si post addictionem, libertatum,
conservandarum causa factam, in
integrum sit restitutus? Utique

31

$3. This rescript takes place,
whenever freedom is conferred by
testament. But what if a master
die intestate, having bequeathed
freedom to his slaves by codicil, and.
his inheritance be not entered upon ?
We answer, that the benefit of the
rescript shall extend to this case;
most certainly, if a master die tes-
tate, and by codicil bequeath free-
dom, the rescript shall be in force.

§ 4. The words of the rescript
shew, that it is in force, when there
is no successor ab intestato. 'There-
fore while it remains doubtful,
whether there be or be not a succes-
sor, the constitution shall not take
place; but when it is certain that
no one will enter upon the succes-
sion, it shall then have its effect.

§ 5. But, if one who has a
right to be restored in integrum
(as a minor) should delay to take
upon him the inheritance, shall the
constitution then take place, and
an adjudication of the goods pass
(to a stranger or one of the slaves 2)
And again, after an adjudication
242 LIB. IIT.

TIT. XII.

 

non erit dicendum, revocari liber-
tates ; quia semel competierunt.

has been made for the sake of lib-
erty, shall the heir be restored in
integrum? We answer, that free-
dom once obtained, shall not after-
wards be revoked.

Si libertates date non sunt.

§ VI. Hec constitutio liberta-
um tuendarum causa introducta
est; ergo, si libertates nulle sint
datz, cessat constitutio. Quid ergo,
Si vivus dederit libertates vel mor-
tis causa, et, ne de hoc queratur,
utrum in fraudem creditorum, an
non, factum sit, idcircd velint sibi
bona addici, an audiendi sunt?
Et magis est, ut audiri debeant,
etsi deficiant verba constitutionis.

§ 6. This constitution was made
for the protection of liberty: and
therefore, when freedom is not giv-
en, the constitution has no effect.
Suppose then, a master hath given
freedom to his slaves either inter
vivos, or mortis causa and to pre-
vent the creditors from complaining
of fraud, they should petition, that
the estate of the deceased may be
adjudged to them; are they to be
heard? We think they ought,
although the letter of the constitu-
tion is deficient.

De speciebus additis a Justiniano.

§ VII. Sed cum multas divi-
siones ejusmodi constitutioni dees-
se perspeximus, lata est 4 nobis
plenissima constitutio, in qué mul-
tee species collate sunt, quibus jus
hujusmodi successionis plenissi-
mum est effectum; quas ex ipsius
lectione constitutionis potest quis
cognoscere.

§ 7. But perceiving that the re-
script was deficient in many re-
spects, we enacted a very full con-
stitution, containing many cases,
which amply explam the rights of
succession ; which any person who
reads that constitution, may under-
stand.
LIB. IIL.

TIT. XII.

243

TITULUS DECIMUS-TERTIUS.

DE SUCESSIONIBUS SUBLATIS, QUE FIEBANT
PER BONORUM VENDITIONES, ET EX SENA-
TUS-CONSULTO CLAUDIANO.

C. vii.
ERANT ante predictam succes-
sionem olim et aliz per universita-
tem successiones; qualis fuerat bo-
norum emptio, que de bonis debi-
toris vendendis per multas ambages
fuerat introducta; et tunc locum
habebat, quando judicia ordinaria
in usu fuerant; sed, cum extraordi-
nariis judiciis posteritas usa est, ideo
cum ipsis ordinariis judiciis etiam
bonorum venditiones expiraverunt :
et tantummodo creditoribus datur
officio judicis bona possidere, et,
prout utile eis visum est, ea dispo-
nere: quod ex latioribus digestorum
libris perfectius apparebit. rat et
ex senatus-consulto Claudiano mi-
serabilis per universitatem acqui-
sitio, cum libera mulier, servili a-
more bacchata, ipsam libertatem
per senatus-consultum amittebat, et
cum, libertate substantiam. (Quod
indignum nostris temporibus esse
existimantes, et 4 nostra civitate de-
leri, et non inseri nostris digestis
concessimus.

T. 24.

There were many other kinds of
universal succession before that,
which we treated of in the forego-
ing title; as the bonorwm emptio ;
which was introduced with many
intricacies for the sale of debtor’s
estates, and continued as long as the
ordinary judgments were in prac-
tice; but, when the extraordinary
judgments were used, the emptio bo-
norum and the ordinary judgments
ceased together. Creditors can now
possess themselves of the goods of
their debtors and dispose of them
as they think proper, by the decree
of a judge. These points are treat-
ed of more at large in the books of
our digests. ‘There was also, by
virtue of the Claudian decree, ano-
ther universal acquisition called
miserabilis: for example, if a free-
woman had debased herself by co-
habiting with a slave, she lost her
freedom by the before named de-
cree, and, together with her free-
dom, her estate and substance.
But, this was, in our opinion, un-
worthy of our reign, and ought to
be expunged; hence, we have not
permitted it to be inserted in the di-
gests.
244 LIB. SII.

TIT. XIV.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-QUARTUS.

DE OBLIGATIONIBUS.

D. xliv. T. 7.

Continuatio

NUNC transeamus ad obliga-
tiones. Obligatio est juris vincu-
lum, quo necessitate astringimur
alicujus rei solvendse secundim
nostree civitatis jura.

C. iv. T. 10.

et definitio.

_ Let us now pass to obligations.
An obligation is the chain of the
law, by which we are necessarily
bound to make some payment, ac-
cording to the laws of our country.

Divisio prior.

$I. Omnium autem obligationum
summa divisio in duo genera de-
ducitur; namque aut civiles sunt
aut pretorie. Civiles sunt, que
aut legibus constitute, aut certo
jure civili comprobate sunt. Pree-
toriz sunt, quas praetor ex sua juris-
dictione constituit; que etiam ho-
norarice vocantur.

§ 1. Obligations are primarily
divided into two kinds, civil and
pretorian. Civil obligations, are
such as are constituted by the laws,
or by any species of the civil law.
Pretorian obligations are such as
the pretor hath appointed by his
authority ; and are also called hono-
rary.

Divisio posterior.

§ II. Sequens divisio in quantuor
species dividitur. Aut enim ex
contractu sunt, aut quasi ex con-
tractu, aut ex maleficio, aut quasi
ex maleficio. Prius est, ut de iis
que ex contractu sunt, dispicia-
mus. Harum eque quantor sunt
species. Aut enim re contrahun-
tur, aut verbis, aut literis, aut con-
sensu: de quibus singulis dispicia-
mus.

§ 2. The second or subsequent
division of obligations is four fold;
by contract, by quasi-contract ; by
malefeasance, and by quasi-male-
Jeasance. Let us first treat of those
which arise from contract; which
are also four fold: for obligations
are contracted by the thing itself,
by parol, by writing, or by consent
of parties. Let us take a view of
each of these.
LIB. III.

TIT. Xv. 245

TITULUS DECIMUS-QUINTUS.

QUIBUS MODIS RE CONTRAHITUR OBLIGATIO.

Dz xii. T. 1.

D. xii, T. 6.7. G,iv. T. 1, 23. 24, oa

De mutuo.

RE contrahitur obligatio, veluti
mutui datione. Mutui autem da-
tio in iis rebus consistit, que pon-
dere, numero, mensurdve, constant;
veluti vino, oleo, frumento, pecu-
nia numerata, ere, argento, auro,
quas res, aut numerando, aut me-
tiendo, aut appendendo, in hoc da-
mus, ut accipientium fiant. Et,
quoniam nobis non ezdem res sed
aliz ejusdem nature et qualitatis
redduntur, indé etiam mutuum ap-
pellatum est; quia ita 4 me tibi da-
tur, ut ex meo tuum fiat: et ex
eo contractu nascitur actio, que
vocatur certi condictio.

An obligation may be founded on
the thing itself; as by the delivery
of a loan or mutuum : and this may
be of any thing, having weight,
number, or measure, as wine, oil,
com, coin, brass, silver, or gold;
which being thus delivered, become
the property of the receiver: and
since the identical things lent can-
not, but others of the same nature
must be returned in lieu of them,
this loan is therefore called a mutu-
um ; for in this case I so give, that
what is mine may become yours :
From this contract arises the ac-
tion, certi condictio.

De indebito soluto.

§ L Is quoque, qui non debitum,
accepit ab eo, qui per errorem sol-
vit, re obligatur; daturque agenti
contra eum propter repetitionem
condictitia actio: nam perinde ei
condici potest, st apparet, eum dare
oportere, ac si mutuum accepisset.
Undé pupillus, si ei siné tutoris
auctoritate indebitum per errorem
datum est, non tenebitur indebiti
eonditione, non magis quam mu-
tui datione. Sed hec species obli-
gationis non videtur ex contractu
consistere; cum is, qui solvendi

$1. He also to whom another
hath paid by mistake what was not
due, is bound by the thing received,
so that an action of condiction lies
for the recovery at the suit of him,
who paid or delivered it erroneously.
And this action may be brought sz
apparet, eum dare opportere; as if
the receiver had accepted it as a
mutuum. Henze a pupil, to whom
a payment hath been erroneously
made without the authority of his
tutor, is not subject to the condictio
indebiti, any more than to the certi
246 LIB. III.

animo dat, magis voluerit negotium
distrahere, quam contrahere.

TIT. XV.

condictio. And yet this species of
obligation does not seem founded
in contract; since he, who pays in
contemplation of debt, appears more
willing to dissolve, than to make a
contract. :

De commodato.

§ II. Item is, cui res aliqua uten-
da datur, id est, commodatur, re
obligatur, et tenetur commodati
actione. Sed is ab eo, qui mutuunm
accepit, longé distat: namque non
ita res datur, ut ejus fiat; et ob id
de e& re ipsa restituenda tenetur.
Et is quidem, qui mutuum accepit,
si quolibet fortuito casu amiserit,
quod accepit, veluti incendio, rui-
na, naufragio, aut latronum hos-
tiumve incursu, nihilominuts obliga-
tus manet. At is, qui utendum ac-
cepit, sané quidem exactam diligen-
tiam custodiende rei prestare te-
netur: nec sufficit ei, tantam dili-
gentiam adhibuisse, quantam suis
rebus adhibere solitus est, si modd
alius diligentior poterat eam rem
custodire. Sed propter majorem
vim, majoresve casus, non tenetur,
si modo non ipsius culpd is casus
intervenerit: alioqui si id, quod ti-
bi commodatum est domi, peregré
tecum ferre malueris, et vel incur-
su hostium predonumve, vel nau-
fragio, amiseris, dubium non est,
quin de restituenda ea re tenearis.
Commodata autem res tunc pro-
prie .intelligitur, si nulla mercede
accepta vel constituta, res tibi uten-
da data est: alioqui, mercede inter-
veniente, locatus tibi usus rei vide-

$ 2. He also, to whom the use of
any particular thing is granted or
commodated, is bound by the deli-
very of the thing, and is subject to
the action commodataria. But such
person widely differs from him, who
hath received a mutuum : for a com-
modatum, or thing lent, is not deli-
vered, to the intent that it should
become the property of the receiver;
and therefore he is bound to restore
the identical thing received. There
is also another difference; for he
who hath accepted a mutuum, is
not freed from his obligation, if by
any accident, as the fall of an edi-
fice, fire, shipwreck, thieves, or the
incursions of an enemy, he hath lost
what he received : but he, who hath
received a commodatum, or a thing
lent for his use only, is indeed com-
manded to employ his utmost dili-
gence in keeping and preserving it;
and it will not suffice, that he hath
taken the same care of it, which he
was accustomed to take of his own
property, if it appear, that a more
diligent man might have preserved
it; yet, if the loss was occasioned
by superior force, or some extraor-
dinary accident, and not by any
fault, he is then not obliged to make
it good; but if a man choose to
LIB. III.

tur; gratuitum enim debet esse
commodatum.

TIT. XV. 247
travel abroad with that which
hath been lent him at home, and
should lose it by shipwreck, or
the incursion of enemies, or rob-
bers, itis not doubted but he is
bound to make restitution, or pay
an equivalent. <A thing is properly
said to be lent or commodated, when
one man permits another to enjoy
the use of it, and receives nothing by
way of hire: otherwise the thing is
let, and not lent; for a commoda-
tum, or loan, must be gratuitous.

De deposito.

§ Ill. Preterea et is, apud
quem res aliqua deponitur, re obli-
gatur, teneturque actione depositi ;
quia et ipse de ea re, quam accepit,
restituenda tenetur. Sed is ex eo
solo tenetur, si quid dolo commise-
rit: culpa autem nomine, id est,
desidiz ac negligentie, non tenetur.
Itaque securus est, qui parum dili-
gentér custoditam rem furto amise-
rit: quia, qui negligenti amico rem
custodiendam tradit, non ei, sed
sue facilitati, id imputare debet.

§ 3. A person intrusted with a
depdsit, is bound by the delivery of
the thing, and is subject to an ac-
tion of deposit, because he is under
an obligation of making restitution
of that very thing, which he re-
ceived. Buta depositary is only
thus answerable on account of
fraud; for where a fault only can
be proved against him, such as neg-
ligence, he is under no obligation ;
and he is therefore secure, if the
thing deposited be stolen from him,
even although it were carelessly
kept. For he, who commits his
goods to the care of a negligent
friend, should impute the loss, not
to his friend, but to his own want
of caution.

De pignore.

$ IV. Creditor quoque, qui pig-
nus accepit, re obligatur; quia et
ipse, de eA re, quam accepit, resti-
tuenda, tenetur actione pigneratitia.
Sed, quia pignus utriusque gratia
datur, et debitoris, quo magis pe-
cunia ei credatur, et creditoris, quo

$ 4. Acreditor also who hath re-
ceived a pledge, is bound by the de-
livery of it; for he is obliged to re-
store the very thing, which he hath
received, by the action called pig-
neratitia. But, inasmuch as @
pledge is given for the mutual ser-
248 LIB. IIL.

TIT. XVI.

 

magis ei in tuto sit creditum, pla-
cuit sufficere si, ad eam rem custo-
diendam, exactam diligentiam ad-
hibeat; quam si prestiterit, et ali-
quo fortuito casu rem amiserit,
securum esse, nec impediri credi-
tum petere.

vice of both debtor and creditor, (of
the debtor, that he may borrow
more readily, and of the creditor,
that repayment may be better se-
cured,) it will suffice, if the creditor
shall appear to have used an exact
diligence in keeping the thing pledg-
ed: for if so, and the pledge be lost
by mere accident, the creditor is
secure, and is not prohibited from
suing his debt.

 

TITULUS

DECIMUS-SEXTUS.

DE VERBORUM OBLIGATIONIBUS.

D. xiv. T. 1. C. viii. T. 38.

Summa.

VIRBIS obligatio contrahitur ex
interrogatione et responsione, cum
quid dari fierive nobis stipulamur ;
ex qué due proficiscuntur actiones,
tam conductio certi, si certa sit sti-
pulatio, quam ex stipulatu, si incer-
ta sit: que hoc nomine inde utitur,
quod stipulum apud veteres firmum
appellabatur, forte 4 stipite decen
dens.

A verbal obligation is made by
question and answer, when we sti-
pulate, that any thing shall be giv-
en or done; hence arise two actions,
viz. the condictio certi, when the
stipulation is certain; and the con-
dictio ex stipulatu, when it is uncer-
tain. This obligation is called a
stipulation, because whatever was
firm, was termed stipulum, by the
ancients ; probably from stirpes, the
trunk of a tree.

De virbis stipulationum.

$ I. In hac re olium talia verba
tradita fuerunt; Spondes ? Spon-
deo. Promittis ? Promitio. Fide-
promittis ? Fide-promitto. -Fide-
jubes? Fidejubeo. Dabis ? Dabo.
Facies? Faciam. Utrum autem
Latima an Greeca, vel qualibet alia,

§ 1. The following words were
formerly used in all verbal obliga-
tions.

Do you under- Spondes 2? Spon-
take ? deo.
Do you promise? Promittis 2 Pro-
mitto.
LIB. III.

lingua stipulatio concipiatur, nihil
interest; scilicdt, si uterque stipu-
lantium intellectum ejus linguee ha-
beat: nec necesse est eAdem lingua
utrumque uti, sed sufficit congruen-
ter ad interrogata respondere. Qui-
netiam duo Greci Latina lingua
contrahere obligationem possunt.
Sed hec solemnia verba olim qui-
dem in usu fuerunt; postea autem
Leonina constitutio lata est, que,
solemnitat verborum sublata, sen-
sum et consonantem intellectum ab
uraque, parte solum ‘desiderat, qui-
buscunque tandem verbis express-
um est.

Quibus modis stipulatio fit.

TIT. XVI. 249

Do you faithful- Fide -promittis?
ly promise? Fide-promitto.
Do you pledge Fide-jubes? Fi-
yourself? de-jubeo.
Will you deliver? Dabis2 Dabo.
Will you per-
form ?
And it is not material whether the
stipulation be conceived in Latin,
Greek, or any other language, if the
parties understand it: nor is it ne-
cessary that the same language
should be used by each person; for
it is sufficient, if a pertinent answer
be made to each question. So two
Greeks may contract in Latin. An-
ciently indeed it was necessary to
use those solemn words before recit-
ed; but the constitution of the em-
peror Leo was afterwards enacted,
which takes away this verbal so-
lemnity, and requires only the ap-
prehension and consent of each
party, expressed in any form of
words.

Facies? Faciam.

De stipulatione pura vel

in diem.

$ IL Omnis stipulatio aut in di-
em, aut sub conditione fit. Pure,
veluti guinque auREos dare spon-
des? idque confestim peti potest.
In diem, cum adjecto die, quo pe-
cunia solvatur, stipulatio fit; velu-
ti, decem aureos primis calendis
Martiis dare spondes? id autem,
quod in diem stipulamur, statim
quidem debetur; sed peti prius,
quam dies venerit, non potest; ac
ne eo quidem ipso dic, in quem
stipulatio facta est, peti potest;
quia totus is dies arbitrio solven-
tis tribui debet; neque enim sy

§ 2. Every stipulation is made to
be performed simply, or at a day
certain, or conditionally. Simply,
when aman says do you promise
to pay five aurei? and, in this case,
the money may be instantly de-
manded. Ata day certain, as when
the day is mentioned on which the
money is to be paid; thus, do you
promise to pay me five aurei on the
first of March? but that which we
stipulate to pay at a day certain,
though it become immediately due,
cannot be demanded before the day
comes; nor can it even then be sued;
250 LIB. HI.

tum est, eo die, in quem promis-
sum est, datum non esse, prius-
quam is dies preeterierit.

TIT. XVI.

for the whole day must be allowed
for payment; because it can never
be certain, that there hath been a
failure of payment on the day pro-
mised, until that day be expired.

De die adjecto perimende obligationes causa.

§ III. At, si ita stipuleris, decem
AUREOS annuos, quoad vivam, dare
spondes? et puré facta obligatio
intelligitur, et perpetuatur: quia
ad tempus non potest deberi; sed
heeres petendo pacti exceptione sub-
movebitur.

$ 3. But, if a man thus stipulates;
viz. do you promise to give me ten
aurEl annually, as long as I live?
the obligation is understand to be
made simply, and becomes perpetu-
ated; for it cannot remain due for a
given time only: but should the
heir demand payment, he shall be
barred by an exception of agree-
ment.

De conditione.

§ IV. Sub conditione stipulatio
fit, cum in aliquem casum differtur
obligatio, ut, si aliquid factum fue-
rit, vel non fuerit, committatur sti-
pulatio; veluti, si Titius consul fue-
rit factus, quinque auREos dare spon-
des? Si quis ita stipuletur, si in ca-
pitolium non ascendero, dare spon-
des? perindé erit, ac si stipulatus
esset, cum moreretur, sibi dari.
Ex conditionali stipulatione tanttm
spes est debitum iri; eamque ipsam
spem in heredem §transmittimus,
si prius, quam conditio extet, mors
nobis contigerit.

§ 4. A stipulation is conditional,
when an obligation is referred to an
accident, and depends upon some
thing to happen or not to happen,
before the stipulation can take ef-
fect: for instance, do you promise to
pay me five auret,if Titius be made
consul? or do you promise to pay
me five aurei, if I do not ascend
the capitol? which last stipulation
is in effect the same, as if he had
stipulated, that five aurei should be
paid to him at the time of his death.
It is to be observed, that, in every
conditional stipulation, there is only
a hope, that the thing stipulated
will become due; and this hope a
man transmits to his heirs, if he die
before the event of the condition.
LIB. III.

TIT. XVI. 251

 

De loco.

§$ V. Loca etiam inseri stipula-
tioni solent; veluti, Carthagini dare
spondes? que stipulatio, licét puré
fieri videatur, tamén re ipsa habet
tempus adjectum, quo promissor
utatur ad pecuniam Carthagini
dandam. Et ideo, si quis Rome
ita stipuletur, hodie Carthagini
dare spondes? inutilis erit stipula-
tio, cum impossibilis sit repromis-
sio.

§ 5. Even places are often insert-
ed in a stipulation; as, do you pro-
mise to give me such a particular
thing at Carthage? and this sti-
pulation, although it appear to be
made simply, yet in reality carries
with it a space of time, which the
obligor may make use of to enable
himself to pay the money promised
at Carthage. And therefore, if a
man at Rome should stipulate in
these words, do you promise to pay
me asum of money this day at Car-
thage? the stipulation would be
null, because the performance of it
would be impossible.

De conditione ad tempus presens vel preeteritum relata.

$ VI. Conditiones, quee ad pre-
sens vel preteritum tempus refe-
runtur, aut statim infirmant obliga-
tionem, aut omnind non differunt;
veluti, si Titius consul fuit, vel, si
Mevius vivit, dare spondes? nam,
si ea ita non sunt, nihil valet stipu-
latio: sin autem ita se habent, sta-
tim valet. Que enim per rerum
naturam sunt certa, non morantur
obligationem, licet apud nos incer-
ta sint.

$ 6. Conditions, which relate to
the time present or past, either in-
stantly annul or enforce an obliga-
tion. Thus, do you promise if
Titius hath been a consul? or if
Mavius be now living 2 if these are
not facts, the stipulation is void; if
they are, it is good and may be en-
forced; for events, which in them-
selves are certain, delay not the per-
formance of an obligation, although
to us they are not certain.

Que in stipulatum deducuntur.

§ VII. Non solum res in stipu-
latum deduci possunt, sed etiam
facta; ut si stipulemur aliquid fie-
ri, vel non fieri. Et in hujusmodi
stipulationibus optimum erit pe-
nam subjicere, ne quantitas stipu-
lationis in incerto sit, ac necesse sit

§ 7. Not only things, but acts,
may be the subject of stipulation ;
as when we stipulate, that some-
thing shall, or shall not be done.
And, in these stipulations, it will be
right to subjoin a penalty, lest the
value of the stipulation should be in-
252

LIB. Il. TIT. XVII.

 

actori probare, quod ejus intersit.
Itaque, si quis, ut fiat aliquid, sti-
puletur, ita adjici poena bebet, si ita
factum non erit, pene nomine de-
cem aureos dare spondes ; Sed si,
quedam fieri, quedam non fieri,
una eddemque conceptione stipule-
tur quis, clausula hujusmodi erit
adjicienda; si adversus ea factum
erit, sive quid ita factum non fuerit,
tunc pane nomine decem aureos
dare spondes ?

certain, and the demandant should
therefore be forced to prove how far
he is interested in it. Therefore, if
a man stipulate, that something
shall be done, a penalty ought to
be thus added; do you not promise
to pay me ten aurei, as a penalty, if
the act stipulated is not performed ;
But, if it be agreed in the same ob-
ligation, that some things shall be
done, and that others shall not be
done, then ought some such clause,
as the following, to be added; do
you promise to pay me ten aurei, as
a penalty, if any thing be done con-
trary to agreement ; or if any thing
be not done according to our agree-
ment?

 

TUTULUS DECIMUS-SEPTIMUS.

DE DUOBUS REIS STIPULANDI ET PROMIT-
TENDI.

D. xlv. T.2. C. viii. T. 40. Nov. 99.

Quibus modis duo rei fieri possunt.

ET stipulandi et promittendi
duo pluresve rei fieri possunt. Sti-
pulandi ita, si post omnium interro-
gationem promissor respondeat,
Spondeo ; ut puta, cum duobus se-
paratim stipulantibus ita promissor
respondeat, wtrique vestrum dare
spondeo. Nam, si prius Titio spo-
ponderit, deindé alio interrogante
spondeat, alia atque alia erit obliga-
tio, nec creduntur duo rei stipulan-

T'wo or more persons may stipu-
late, and two or more may become
obligors. The stipulating parties
are bound, if, after all questions
have been asked, the obligor an-
swer, I promise; as when, for ex-
ample, the obligor thus answers
two persons separately stipulating,
I promise to pay each of you. For,
if he first promise Titius, and after-
wards promise another, who inter-
‘LIB. III.

di esse. Duo pluresve rei promit-
tendi ita fiunt, Mevi, decem aureos
dare spondes ? et, Sei, eosdem de-
cem aureos dare spondes ? si res-
pondeant singuli separatim, Spon-
deo.

TIT. XVII. 253

rogates him there will then be two
obligations, and not two stipulators
to one obligation. Two or more be-
come obligors, if after, they have
been thus interrogated, Mevius do
you promise to pay us ten aurei ?
and, Seius, do you promise to pay
us the same ten aurei? they each of
them answer separately, I do pro-
mise.

De effectu hujusmodi stipulationum.

§$ IL Ex hujusmodi obligationi-
bus et stipulationibus solidum sin-
gulis debetur, et promittentes sin-
guli in solidum tenentur. In utra-
que tamen obligatione una res ver-
titur; et vel alter debitum accipi-
endo, vel alter solvendo, omnium
perimit obligationem, et omnes li-
berat.

De stipulatione pura 5

§ Il. Ex duobus reis promitten-
di, alius puré, alius in diem, vel
sub conditione, obligari potest; nec
impedimento erit dies aut conditio,
quo mints ab eo, qui pure obliga-
tus est, petatur.

§ 1. By these stipulations and
obligations the whole sum stipulat-
ed becomes due to each stipulator ;
and each obligor is bound for the
whole. But as one and the same
thing is due by each obligation, any
one stipulator by receiving the debt,
and any obligor by paying it, dis-
charges the obligation of the rest,
and frees all parties.

et de die et conditione.

§ 2. Where there are two obli-
gors, the one may bind himself
purely and simply, and the other
may oblige himself only to make
payment on a day certain, or upon
condition: but neither the day cer-
tain, nor the condition, will secure
the person, who is simply bound,
from being sued for the payment
of the whole.
254

LIB. Ii. TIT. XVIII.

TITULUS DECIMUS-OCTAVUS.
DE STIPULATIONIBUS SERVORUM.
D. xiv. T. 3.

An servus stipulari possit.

SERVUS ex persona domini jus
stipulandi habet; sed et heereditas
in plerisque persons defuncti vi-
cem sustinet : idedque, quod ser-
vus hereditarius anté aditam heere-
ditatem stipulatur, acquirit heredi-
tati; ac per hoc etiam heredi pos-
tea facto acquiritur.

Cui acquirat De persona, cui stipulatur.

A slave obtains the liberty of sti-
pulating from the person of his mas-
ter; but in many instances the in-
heritance represents the person of a
master deceased: and therefore
whatever an hereditary slave stip-
ulates for, before the inheritance is
entered upon, he acquires it for the
inheritance ; and of course for him,
who afterwards becomes the heir.

De stipulatione

impersonali.

$ I. Sivé autem domino, sivé
sibi, sivé conservo, suo, sivé imper-
sonalitér, servus stipuletur, domino
acquirit. Idem juris est et in libe-
ris, qui in potestate patris sunt, ex
quibus causis acquirere possunt.

§ 1. Avsslave, let him stipulate
how he will, for his master, for him-
self, for a fellow slave, or generally
without naming any person, always
acquires for his master. And the
same obtains among children, who
are under the power of their fa-
ther, in regard to those things,
which they can acquire for him.

De stipulatione facti.

§$ IL Sed, cum factum in stipu-
latione continebitur, omnimod6d per-
sona stipulantis continetur ; veluti,
Sl servys stipuletur, ut sibi ire,
agere, liceat; ipse enim tantim
prohiberi non debet, non etiam do-
minus ejus.

§ 2. But, when a fact or thing to
be done is contained in a stipulation,
the person of the stipulator is sole-
ly regarded; so that, if even aslave
stipulate, that he should be permit-
ted to pass through a field, and to
drive beasts or a carriage through
it, it isnot the master, but the slave
only, who is to be permitted to pass.
LIB. WL TIT. XEX.

255

 

De servo communi.

§ III. Servus communis stipu-
lando unicuique dominorum, pro
portione dominii, acquirit; nisi
jusstl unius eorum, aut nominatim
alicui eorum, stipulatus est; tunc
enim soli ei acquiritur. Quod ser-
vus communis stipulatur, si alteri
ex dominis acquiri non potest, soli-
dum alteri acquiritur; veluti si
res, quam dari stipulatus est, unius
domini sit.

§ 3. If aslave, who is in com-
mon to several masters, stipulate,
he acquires a share for each master
according to the proportion, which
each has in the property of him.
But if such siave should stipulate
at the command of any particular
master, or in his name, the thing
stipulated will be acquired solely for
that master. And whatever a
slave in common to two masters
stipulates for, if part cannot be ac-
quired for one master, the whole
shall be acquired for the other; as
when ihe thing stipulated already
belongs to one of the two.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-NONUS.

DE DIVISIONE STIPULATIONUM.

Divisio.

STIPULATIONUM alie sunt
judiciales, alice preetoriz, alize con-
ventionales alia communes, tam
preetoriz quam judiciales.

Some stipulations are judicial,
others praetorian, others conven-
tional, and others common ; that
is, hath pretorian and judicial.

De judicialibus stipulationibus.

§ I. Judiciales sunt duntaxat,
que 4 mero judicis officio proficis-
cuntur; veluti de dolo cautio, vel
de persequendo servo, qui in fuga
est, restituendove pretio.

§ 1. The judicial are those,
which proceed merely from the of-
fice of the judge; as when security
is ordered to be given against fraud,
or for pursuing a slave, who hath
fled, or for paying the price of him.
256

LIB. Il. TIT. XIX.

 

Do preetoriis.

§ IIL. Preetoriz sunt, quee 4 mero
pretoris officio proficiscuntur ; ve-
luti damni infecti vel legatorum.
Preetorias autem stipulationes sic
audiri oportet, ut in iis etiam conti-
neantur Addilitie; nam et he a ju-
risdictione pretoris veniunt.

§ 2. Pretorian stipulations are
those which proceed from the mere
office of the praetor; as when se-
curity is ordered pro damno infec-
to; for damage likely to happen;
or for the payment of legacies.
Under pretorian stipulations are
comprehended the Edilitian ; for
these proceed from the jurisdiction
of the preetor.

De conventionalibus.

$ III. Conventionales sunt, que
ex conventione utriusque partis
concipiuntur ; hoc est, neque jussu
judicis, neque jussu pretoris, sed
exconventione contrahentium ; qua-
rum totidem sunt genera, quot,
(pené dixerim,) rerum contrahen-
darum.

$ 3. Conventional stipulations
are those, which are made by the
agreement of parties; that is, nei-
ther by order of a judge or preetor,
but by the consent of the persons
contracting; and of these stipula-
tions there are as many kinds, as
of things to be contracted for.

De communibus.

§ IV. Communes sunt, veluti
ram salvam fore pupillo, (nam et
preetor jubet rem salvum fore’pu-
pillo caveri, et interdum judex, si
aliter hzec res expediri non potest, )
vel de rato stipulatio.

§$ 4. Common stipulations are
those, which are ordered for the
security of the effects of the pupil,
(for the preetor ordains a caution
to be given on this account, and
sometimes a judge decrees it, when
there is an absolute necessity,) or
for the ratification of a thing done
in another’s name.
LIB. III.

TIT. XX.

257

 

TITULUS VIGESSIMUS.
DE INUTILIBUS STIPULATIONIBUS.

C. viii.

T. 39.

De his, que sunt in commercio.

OMNIS res, que dominio nostro
subjicitur, in stipulationem deduci
potest, sive ea mobilis sit, sive soli.

Every thing, of which we have
the property, may be brought into
stipulation, whether it be moveable
or immoveable.

De his, que non existunt.

$ I. Atsi quis rem, que in re-
rum natura non est, aut esse non
potest, dari stipulatus fuerit, veluti
Stichum, qui mortuus sit, quem vi-
vere credebat, aut Hippocentau-
rum, qui esse non possit, inutilis
erit stipulatio.

§ 1. But, if a man hath stipu-
lated that a thing shall be given,
which does not, or cannot exist, as
that Scichus, the slave, who is dead,
but is thought to be living, or thata
Centaur, who cannot exist, should
be given to him, the stipulation is of
no force.

De his, que non sunt in commercio.

§ II. Idem juris est, si rem sa-
cram autreligiosam, quam humani
juris esse credebat, vel publicam,
que usibus populi perpetuo expos-
ita sit, ut forum, vel theatrum, vel
liberum hominem, quem servum
esse credebat, vel cujus commer-
cium non habuerit, vel rem suam
dari, quis stipuletur: nec in pen-
denti eritstipulatio ob id, quod pub-
lica res in privatam deduci, et ex
libero servus fieri potest, et com-
mercium adipisci stipulator potest ;
sed protinus inutilis est. Item con-
tra, licét initio utilitér res in stipu-
latum deducta sit, si tamen postea

in aliquam eorum causam, de qui-
33

§ 2. And the law is the same, if
a thing sacred, which was deemed
otherwise, is brought into stipula-
tion ; or some thing of constant pub-
lic use, as a forum or a theatre ; or
a free person, thought to be bond
or what cannot be acquired; or
some thing which is already his
own: nor shall any such stipulation
continue in suspense, because a
thing public may become private, a
freeman may turnslave, a stipulator
may become capable of acquiring, or
because what now belongs to the
stipulator may cease to be his; but
every such stipulation shall be in-
stantly void. And, on thecontrary,
258

bus supra dictum est, siné facto
prommissoris devenerit, extinguitur
stipulatio. At nec statim ab initio
talis stipulatio valebit, Lucium Ti-
tium, cumservus erit, dare spondes ?
et similia: que enim natura sui do-
minio nostro exempta sunt, in obli-
gationem deduci nullo modo pos-
sunt.

LIB. I. TIT. XX.

although a thing may properly be
brought into stipulation at first, yet,
if it afterwards fall under the class
of any of the things before men-
tioned without the fault of the ob-
ligor, the stipulation is extinguished.
And such a stipulation asthe follow-
ing shall never be valid: do you
promise to give me Lucius Titius
when he shall become a slave? for
those things, which in their natures
are exempt from our dominion, are
by no means to be brought into ob-
ligation.

De facto vel datione alterius.

§ ITE. Si quis alium datarum
facturumve quid promiserit, non
obligabitur; veluti si spondeat, 'Ti-
tium quinque aureos datarum; quod
si effecturum se, ut Titius daret,
spoponderit, obligatur.

$ 3. If a man promise, that an-
other shall give or do something,
such promissor shall not be bound ;
as if a man should promise, that
Titius shalt pay five aurei: but, if
he promise, that he will cause T%-
tius to pay five aurei, his promise
shall be binding.

De eo, in quem confertur obligatio, vel solutio.

$ IV. Si quis alii, quam ei, cu-
jus juri subjectus est, stipuletur, ni-
hil agit. Plané solutio etiam in
extraneam personam conferri po-
test; veluti, si quis ita stipuletur,
mihi aut Seio dare spondes? ut
obligatio quidem stipulatori acqui-
ratur, solvi tamen Seio, etiam inyi-
to eo, recté possit, ut liberatio ipso
jure contingat; sed ille adversus
Seium habeat mandati actionem.
Quod si quis sibi et alii, cujus juri
subjectus non sit, dari decem au-
reos stipulatus est, valet quidem
stipulatio. Sed, utrum totum de-

$4. Ifa man stipulate for any
other, than for him, to whom he is
subject, itis void: yet a payment of
a thing promised may be made to a
Stranger ; as if a man should stipu-
late, do you promise to make Pay
ment to me, or to Seius? for, when
the obligation is to the stipulator,
the payment may well be made to
Seius, though against his will ; and
this is allowed ixtfavor of the debtor,
that he may be legally freed from his
debt : and the stipulator, if there be
occasion, may havean action of man-
date against Seius. Ifa man, should
beatur stipulatori, quod in stipula-
tionem deductum est, an ve ro
pars dimidia, dubitatum est. Sed,
placuit, non plus, quam dimi-
diam partem, ei acquiri. Ei verd,
qui juri tuo subjectus est, si stipu-
latus sis, tibi acquiris; quia vox
tua tanquam filii intelligitur in his
rebus, quee tibi acquiri possunt.

LIB. HI. TIT. Xx.

259

stipulate, that ten aurei shall be

paid to him and to another, not un-
der his power, the stipulation would

be good: yet it hath been a doubt,

whether in this case, the whole sum

would be due to the stipulator, or

only a moiety ; and it hath been re-

solved, a moiety only. But, if you

stipulate for another, who is subject

to your power, you acquire for you-

self: for your own words are re-

puted your son’s, and your son’s
words are reputed yours, as so to
all those things, which you may

acquire.

De interrogatione et responsione.

§ V. Preetered inutilis est stipu-
latio, si quis ad ea, que interroga-
tus fuerit, non respondeat; veluti
si quis decem aureos 4 te dari sibi
stipuletur, tu quinque promittas,
vel contra: aut si ille puré stipule-
tur, tu sub conditione promittas,
vel contra: si modo scilicet id ex-
primas; id est, si cui sub condi-
tioné vel in diem stipulanti tu res-
pondeas, presenti die spondeo:
nam, si hoc solim respondeas, Pro-
mitto, brevitér videris in eandem
diem vel conditionem spopondisse :
neque enim necesse est in respon-
dendo, eadem omnia repeti, que
stipulator expresserit.

§ 5. A stipulation is void, if the
party interrogated do not answer
pertinently to the demand made;
as when a person stipulates, that
ten aurei shall be paid him, and you
answer five; or, vice versa, if he
stipulate for five, and you answer,
I promise ten. A stipulation is also
void, if a man stipulates simply, and
you promise conditionally; or the
contrary ; that is, if, when a man is
stipulating conditionally or at a day
certain, you answer him thus; Ff
promise you payment on this pre=
sent day. But, if you answer on«
ly, I promise, you seem briefly to
agree to his day or condition. For
it is not necessary, that in the an-
swer every word should be repeat-
ed, which the stipwlator expressed.

De his, qui sunt, vel habent, in potestate.

§ VL Item inutilis est, stipula-
tio, si vel ab eo stipuleris, qui tuo
juri subjectus est, vel si is 4 te sti-
puletur. Sed servus quidem non

§ 6. A stipulation is also void, if
made with one who is under your
power, or if he stipulate with you.
For a slave is incapable not only of
260 LIB. III.

TIT. XX.

 

solim domino suo obligari non po-
test, sed né quidem ulli alii; filii
verd familiarum aliis"obligari pos-
sunt.

entering into an obligation with his
master, but of binding himself to
any other person. But the son of
a family can enter into an obliga-
tion with any person, (but his fa-
ther.)

De muto et surdo.

§ VII. Mutum neque stipulari
neque promittere posse, palam est;
quod et in surdo receptum est:
quia et is, qui stipulatur, verba
promittentis, et is, qui promittit,
verba stipulantis, audire debet.
Unde apparet, non de eo nos lo-
qui, qui tardius exaudit, sed de eo,
qui omnino non audit.

§7. It is evident, that a dumb
man can neither stipulate, nor pro-
mise: and so of deaf persons; for
he, who stipulates, ought to hear the
words of the obligor; and he, who
promises, the words of the stipula-
tor. But we speak not of him, who
hears with difficulty, but of him,
who has no hearing.

De furioso.

§ VIII. Furiosus nullum nego-
tium gerere potest, quia non intel-
ligit, quod agit.

§ 8. A madman can transact no
business, because he understands
not what he does.

De impubere.

§ IX. Pupillus omne negotium
recté gerit; ita tamen ut, ubi tuto-
ris auctoritas necessaria sit, adhi-
beatur tutor; veluti, si ipse oblige-
tur; nam alium sibi obligare etiam
siné tutoris auctoritate potest.
Sed, quod diximus de pupillis, uti-
que de iis verum est, qui jam ha-
bent aliquem intellectum. Nam
infans, et qui infantiz proximus est,
non multim 4 furioso distant; quia
hujusmodi etatis pupilli, nullum
habent intellectum. Sed in proximis
infantie, propter utilitatem eorum,
benignior juris interpretatio facta
est, ut idem juris habeant, quod
pubertati proximi. Sed, qui in po-

$9. A pupil may transact any
business, if his tutor consent, where
his authority is necessary; as it is,
when the pupil would bind himself:
but a pupil can stipulate or cause o-
thers to be bound to him, without
the authority of his tutor. This
must be understood of pupils who
have some understanding; for an
infant, or one next to an infant, dif-
fers but little from a person out of
his senses: for pupils of such an age
have no understanding: but the
Jaw is construed more favourably
to those, who are but little removed
from infancy, whenever their inter-
est is concerned; for they are then
LIB. II.

TIT. XX. 261

 

testate parentis est impubes, ne auc-
tore quidem patre obligatur. .

allowed the same rights, as infants
near the age of puberty. But a son,
under power of his father, and
within the age of puberty, cannot
bind himself, even although his fa-
ther conseut

De conditione impossibili.

§ X. Si impossibilis conditio sti-
pulationibus adjiciatur, nihil valet
stipulatio. Impossibilis autem con-
ditio habetur, cui natura impedi-
mento est, quominus existat; velu-
ti si quis ita dixerit, si digito ce-
lum attigero, dare spondes? at, si
ita stipuletur, si digito ccetum non
attigero dare spondes? pure facta
obligatio intelligitur, idedque sta-
tim peti potest.

§$ 10. If an impossible condition
be added to the obligation, the stip-
ulation is null; and that condition
is reckoned impossible, of which
nature forbids the event: as, if a
man should say, do you promise, if
I touch the heavens with my finger?
but suppose a stipulation to be thus
made; do you promise, if I do not
touch the sky with my finger ? such
a Stipulation would be understood
to cause a simple obligation, the
performance of which might be in-
stantly demanded.

De absentia.

§ XI. Item verborum obligatio,
inter absentes concepta, inutilis est.
Sed, cum hoc materium litium con-
tentiosis hominibus preestabat, forté
post tempus tales allegationes oppo-
nentibus, et non presentes fuisse
vel se vel adversarios suos conten-
dentibus, ided nostra constitutio
propter celeritatem dirimendarum
litium introducta est, quam ad Ce-
sarienses advocatos scripsimus; per
quam disposuimus, tales scripturas,
quz presto esse partes indicant,
omnio esse credendas, nisi is, qui
talibus utitur improbis allegationi-
bus, manifestissimus probationibus,
vel per scripturam, vel per testes
idiones, approbaverit, toto eo die,

§ 11. A verbal obligation, made
between absent persons, is also void.
But, when this doctrine afforded mat-
ter of strife to contentious men, al-
ledging after some time elapsed,
that either they or the other parties
were not present, we issued our
constitution, addressed as a rescript
to the advocates of Cesarea, which
effectually provided for the speedy
determination of such suits: and by
this we have ordained, that full cre-
dit shall be given to those written
acts, or instruments, which declare,
that the contracting parties were
present; unless the party, who al-
ledges absence, makes it evident by
the most manifest proofs either in
262

quo conficiebantur instrumentum,
sese vel adversarium suum in aliis
locis fuisse.

LIB. lil TIT. XX.

writing or by witnesses, that either
he, or his adversary, was in some
other place, during the whole day,
in which the instrument was made.

De stipulatione post mortem, vel pridie quam alter contra-
hentium moriatur.

$ XII. Post mortem suam dari
sibi nemo stipulari poterat, non ma-
gis quam post mortem ejus, 4 quo
stipulabatur. Ac nec is, qui in ali-
cujus potestate est, post mortem
ejus stipulari poterat; quia patris
vel domini voce loqui videretur.
Sed et, si quis ita stipuletur, pridie
quam moriar, vel, pridie quam mo-
rieris, dare spondes? inutilis erat
stipulatio. Sed, cum, ut jam dic-
tum est, ex consensu contrahentium
stipulationes valeant, placuit nobis,
etiam in hune juris articulum ne-
cessariam inducere emendationem,
ut, sivé post mortem, sive pridie
quam moriaturstipulator, sive prom-
issor, stipulatio concepta sit, stipu-
latio valeat.

§ 12. Aman could formerly no
more stipulate, that a thing should
be given him after his own death,
than after the death of the obligor.
Neither could any person under the
power of another stipulate, that any
thing should be given him after his
death, because such person would
appear to speak the words of his fa-
ther or master. And, if a man
had stipulated in this manner: do
you promise to give the day before
Idie? or the day before you die?
the stipulation was also invalid.
But since all stipulations, as we
have already said, take their force
from the consent of the contracting
parties, we have thought it proper
to introduce a necessary emendation
in this respect, so that, whether it
be stipulated, that a thing shall be
given after, or immediately before,
the death either of the stipulator or
the obligor, the stipulation shall be
good.

De stipulatione prepostera.

§ XIII. Item, si quis ita stipula-
tus erat, si navis cras ex Asia vene-
rit, hodie dare spondes? inutilis
orat stipulatio, quia preeposteré con-
cepta est. Sed, cum Leo inclyte
recordationis in dotibus eandem
stipulationem, que prepostera. nun-

§ 13. Also, if a man had thus
stipulated, do you promise me mon-
ey to-day, if a certain ship should
arrive to-morrow from Asia? it
would have been invalid, because
preposterously conceived. But,
since the emperor Leo, of renowned
LIB. J, TIT XxX,

cupatur, non esse rejiciendam ex-
istimaverit, nobis placuit et huic
perfectum robur accommodare, ut
non solim in dotibus, sed etiam in
omnibus, valeat hujusmodi concep-
tio stipulationis.

263

memory, was of opinion, that such
stipulations ought not to be rejected
as to marriage portions, it hath
pleased us also to give a fuller force
to this doctrine by ordaining, that
every stipulation of like import
shall hold good not only in mar-
riage portions, but likewise in all
other contracts.

De stipulatione collata in tempus mortis.

§ XIV. Ita autem stipulatio con-
cepta, veluti si Titius dicat, cum
moriar, dare spondes ? vel eum mo-
rierta ? et apud veteros utilis erat,
et nune valet.

§ XV. Item post mortem alterius
reeté stipulamur.

$14. If a stipulation had been
thus conceived; do you promise,
when Iam about to die? or when
you are about to die ? it was good by
the ancient law, and is so now.

§ 15. We may also legally stip-
ulate, (that a thing shall be given,)
after the death of a third person.

De promissione scripta in instrumento.

§ XVI. Si scriptum in instru-
mento fuerit, promisisse aliquem,
perindé habetur, atque si interroga-
tione precedente responsum sit.

$ 16. If it be written in an act or
instrument, properly attested, that
a man hath entered into an obliga-
tion by promise, it will be presum-
ed, that the promise was in answer
to a precedent interrogation.

De pluribus rebus in stipulationem deductis.

§$ XVII. Quoties plures res una
stipulatione comprehenduntur, si-
quidem promissor simplicitér res-
pondeat dare spondeo, propter om-
nes tenetur. Si verod unam ex his,
vel quasdam, datarum se spopon-
derit, obligatio in iis, pro quibus
spoponderit, contrahitur: ex pluri-
bus enim stipulationibus una vel

$17. When many things arecom.
prehended in one stipulation, a man
binds himself to all, if he answer
simply I promise. But, if he pro-
mise to give one,orsome of the things
stipulated, an obligation is contract-
ed only in respect to those. For,
of many stipulations, it may happen
that only one, or some of them may
264 LIB. IIl.

TIT. XX.

 

quedam videntur esse perfecte;
singulas enim res stipulari, et ad
singulas respondere, debemus.

be made perfect by a separate an-
swer; and strictly we ought to sti-
pulate for everything severally, and
to answer severally.

De pena adjecta stipulationi, alii dari.

§ XVIII. Alteri stipulari (ut su-
pra dictum est) nemo potest. In-
vente enim sunt hujusmodi stipu-
lationes vel obligationes ad hoc, ut
unusquisque acquirat sibi, quod sua
interest; ceetertm, si alii detur, ni-
hil interest stipulatoris. Plané, si
quis velit hoc facere, penam stipu-
lari conveniet, ut, nisiita factum
sit, ut est comprehensum, commit-
tatur pene stipulatio etiam ei, cujus
nihil interest. Poenam enim. cum
stipulatur quis, non illud inspicitur,
quod intersit ejus, sed que sit quan-
titas in conditione stipulationis.
Ergo, si quis ita stipuletur, Titio
dari, nihil agit; sed, si adjecerit
penam, nisi dederis, tot aureos da-
re spondes? tunc committitur sti-
pulatio.

$18. No man can stipulate for
another, as we have already observ-
ed; for stipulations and obligations
have been invented, that every per-
son may acquire for his ownadvan-
tage; and, if this be given to anoth-
er, the stipulator has no interest.
But, if aman would effectually sti-
pulate for another, he should bind
the obligor to perform the covenants
under a penalty, payable to him,
who otherwise would receive no ad-
vantage from the obligation: for,
when a penalty is stipulated, the
interest of the stipulator is not so
much regarded, as the quantum of
penalty. Therefore, if a man should
stipulate, that a certain thing shall
be given to Titius it will not avail ;
but, if he add a penalty as, do you
promise to give me so many aurei,
if you do not give the thing stipu-
lated to Titius? the penalty stipula-
ted is put in jeopardy.

Si intersit ejus, qui alii stipulatur.

§ XIX. Sed et, si quis stipuletur
alii, cum ejus interesset, placuit
stipulationem valere. Nam, si is,
qui pupilli tutelam administrare
ceperat, cesserit administrationem
contutori suo, et stipuletur rem pu-
pilli salvam fore, quoniam interest
stipulatoris fieri, quod stipulatus

§$ 19. But, if any man should sti-
pulate for the benefit not merely of
another, but of himself also, it is
valid. Thus if he, who hath begun
to administer the tutelage of a pupil,
should afterwards give up the ad-
ministration to his co-tutor, and sti-
pulate for the security of the estate
LIB. IE.

est; cum obligatus futurus sit pu-
pillo, si malé res gesserit, tenet obli-
gatio. Ergo et, si quis procuratori
suo dari stipulatus sit, habebit vi-
res stipulatio. Et, si creditori suo
quis stipulatus sit quod sua inter-
est, ne forté vel pena committatur,
vel preedia distrahantur, que pig-
nori data erant, valet stipulatio.

TIT. XX. 265
of his pupil, in this case, (inasmuch
as such a stipulation is for the inter-
est of the stipulator, who is liable
for damages to the pupil, if the co-
tutor should make default,) the ob-
ligation would bind. So if aman
stipulate, that a thing shall be given
to his proctor, it willbind. A stip-
ulation made by a debtor for the
use of his creditor is good, because
it is the interest of the debtor, either
that the penalty, upon which he
borrowed, should not be exacted
from him, or that his goods, which
are pledged should not be sold.

De pena adjecta promissioni facti alieni.

§ XX. Vice versa, qui alum fac-

turum promisit, videtur in ed esse
causd, ut non teneatur, nisi penam
ipse promiserit.

§ 20. On the contrary, he, who
undertakes for the performance of
another, isnot bound unless he pro-
mises under a penalty.

De re stipulantis futura.

§ XXII. Item nemo rem suam fu-
turam, in eum casum, quo sua sit,
utilitér stipulatur.

§ 21. No man can legally stipu-
late, that a thing shall be given
him, when it’shall become his own.

De dissensu.

§ XXII. Si de alia re stipulator
senserit, de alia promissor, perinde
nulla contrahitur obligatio, ac si ad
interrogatum, responsum non es-
set; veluti si hominem Stichum a
te quis stipulatus fuerit, tu de Pam-
philo senseris, quem Stichum voca-
ri credideris.

34

§ 22. If the stipulator allude to
one thing, and the obligor to ano-
ther, no more obligation is contract-
ed, than if no answer had been
made to the interrogation; and this
would be the case, if a man should
stipulate, that Stichus should be
given to him, and the obligor should
intend to give Pamphilus, upon a
persuasion, that Pamphilus is call-

ed Stichus.
266 LIB. UL.

TIT. XXI.

De turpi causa.

§ XXIII. Quod turpi ex causa
promissum est, veluti si quis hom-
icidium vel sacrilegium se facturum
promittat, non valet.

$ 23. A promise made for a dis-

honest purpose, as, tocommit hom-

icide or sacrilege, is not binding.

De morte contrahentium.

§ XXIV. Cum quis sub aliqua
conditione stipulatus fuerit, licet an-
te conditionem decesserit, postea
existente conditione heres ejus age-
re potest. Idem est et ex promis-
soris parte.

§ 24. If the stipulator should die
pending the event of a conditional
stipulation, his heir may sue the
obligor, if the event afterwards
happen. And, should the obligor
die before the condition happens,
his heir may be sued by the stipula-
tor.

Quando agi potest ex stipulatione.

§ XXV. Qui hoc anno aut hoc
mense dari stipulatus est, nisi om-
nibus partibus anni vel mensis pre-
teritis, non recté petet. Si fundum
dari stipuleris, vel hominem, non
poteris continuo agere, nisi tantum
spatium preeterierit, quo tradito fie-
ri possit.

§ 25. Whoever stipulates, that a
thing shall be given to him this year
or this month, cannot legally sue
the obligor, until the whole year or
month, is elapsed. And, if you sti-
pulate, for a peice of ground, or a
slave, you cannot instantly sue the
obligor, but must wait until a space
of time hath past, in which a delive-
ry might reasonably have been made.

a

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-PRIMUS.
DE FIDEJUSSORIBUS.

D. xlvi. T. 1.

C. viii. T. 41.

Nov. 4.

Cur accipiuntur fidejussores.

PRO eo, qui promittit, solent
alii obligari, qui fidejussores appel-
lantur ; quos homines accipere so-

Sometimes others bind themselves
for the promissor. Such sureties
are called fide-jussors, and are gene-
LIB. WE TIT. XXI.

267

lent, dum curant, ut diligentius si- rally required by creditors for their

bi cautum sit.

greater security.

In quibus obligationibus.

$ I. In omnibus autem obliga-
tionibus assumi possunt; id est, si-
ve re sivé verbis sivé literis, sivé
consensu, contractee fuerint : ac nec
illud quidem interest, utrum civilis,
an naturalis sit obligatio, cui adjici-
tur fidejussor; adeo quidem, ut
pro servo quoque obligetur, sivé
extraneus sit, qui fidejussorem a4
servo accipiat, sivé ipse dominus,
in id, quod sibi naturalitér debe-
tur.

$ 1. Fide-jussors may be receiv-
ed in all obligations, whether con-
tracted by the delivery of the thing
itself, by words, by writing, or the
mere consent of parties: nor is it
material, whether the obligation be
civil or natural; for a man may
intervene, and oblige himself, as a
Jide-jussor or surety, even on the
behalf of a slave; and this may be
done, whether the person, who ac-
cepts the fideyusssor, by a stranger
or the master of the slave, when the
thing due is a natural debt or ob-
ligation.

De herede.

§ II. Fidejussor non tantum ip-
se obligatur, sed etiam heredem
relinquit obligatum.

§ 2. A fidezjussor is not only
bound himself, but by his death
transmits the obligation to his heir.

Si fidejussor preecedat vel sequatur obligationem.

§$ III. Fidejussor et pracedere
obligationem et sequi potest.

§ 3. A fide-jussor may be accept-
ed, either before or after an obliga-
tion is entered into.

De pluribus fidejussoribus.

§ IV. Si plures sint fidejusso-
res, quotquot erunt numero, singu-
li in solidum tenentur; itaque li-
berum est creditori, 4 quo velit, so-
lidum petere. Sed ex epistola
Divi Hadriani compellitur credi-
tor a singulis, qui modo solvendo
sunt litis contestate tempore, par-
tes petere; idedque, si quis ex fi-
dejussoribus eo tempore solvendo

§$ 4. Where there are fide-jussors,
however numerous, each is bound
for the whole debt; and the credi-
tor may choose, from whom he will
demand it. But, by a rescript of
the emperor Adrian, a creditor may
be obliged to demand separately
from every fide-jussor, who is sol-
vent at the time of the suit, his share
of the debt pro rata ; and, if any of
268
non sit, hoc czeteros onerat. Sed,
si ab uno fidejussore creditor to-
tum consecutus fuerit, hujus solius
detrimentum erit, si is, pro quo
fidejussit, solvendo non sit: et sibi
imputare debet, cum potuerit ju-
vari ex epistola Divi Hadriani, et
desiderare, ut pro parte in se de-
tur actio.

LIB. Ii. TIT. XXI1.

the fide-jussors, at the time of the
suit, is not solvent, the burden falls
upon the rest. But, if a creditor
obtain his whole demand from one
of the fide-jussors, the whole loss
shall be his, if the principal be in-
solvent: for such fide-jussor must
blame himself, since under the res-
cript of the emperor Adrian, he
might have prayed, that no action
should be given against him, for
more than his share of the debt, as
surety.

In quam summam obligatuor fide-jussor.

§ V. Fidejussores ita obligari
non possunt, ut plus debeant, quam
debet is, pro quo obligantur: nam
eorum obligatio accessio est princi-
palis obligationis; nec plus in ac-
cessione potest esse, quam in prin-
cipali re; at ex diverso, ut minus
debeant, obligari possunt. Itaque,
si reus decem aureos promiserit,
fidejussor in quinque recté obliga-
tur; contra verd obligari non po-
test. Item, si ille puré promise-
rit, fidejussor sub conditione pro-
mittere potest; contra vero non po-
test. Non solum autem in quan-
titate, sed etiam in tempore, mi-
nus aut plus intelligitur: plus enim
est statim aliquid dare, minus est
post tempus dare.

$ 5. Fide-jussors ought not to be
bound in a greater sum, than the
debtor owes; for their obligation is
an accession to the principal obliga-
tion; and an accessary debt cannot
be greater than the principal,though
it may be less. Therefore, if the
principal obligor promises ten auret,
the fide-jussor may be bound in
five; but the fide-jussor cannot be
bound in ten, when the principal
obligor is bound only in five.
Also, when the obligor promises
simply, the surety may promise
conditionally; but, if the surety is
bound simply, when the principal is
bound conditionally, the obligation
is void. And the terms greater and
less take place, not only in quantity
but also in time; for an obligation
to deliver a thing instantly is great-
er, than to deliver it after a time.
LIB. II.

De actione

§ VI. Si quid autem fidejussor
pro reo solverit, ejus recuperandi
causa habent cum eo mandati judi-
cium.

TIT. XXII.

269

fidejussoris.

$ 6. If a fide-jussor hath been
obliged to pay money for his
principal, he may have an action
of mandate to recover the sum paid.

Si fidejussor greece accipiatur.

§ VIL Greece etiam fidejussor ita
accipitur 17 éuy niger xelevo, dey,
Sed et si dixerit, delo, sive Bedouce,
sed et, pyr, pro eo erit, ac si dix-
erit, Jeyo.

$ 7. A fide-jussor may thus bind
himself even in greek; I answer or
speak solemnly upon my faith.
But, the expressions, I am willing,
or I promise, would answer the
same purpose.

Si scriptum sit, aliquem fidejussisse.

§ VIII. In stipulationibus fide-
jussorum sciendum est, hoc gene-
raliter accipi, ut, quodcunque scrip-
tum sit quasi actum, videatur eti-
am actum. Idedque constat, si
quis scripserit se fidejussisse, vide-
ri omnia solemnitér acta.

§ 8. It is a general rule in all
fide-jussorial stipulations, that what-
ever is alleged in writing to have
been done, is presumed to have been
actually done: therefore, if a man
in writing confesses, that he hath
become a fide-jussor, it is also pre-
sumed, that the necessary forms
were observed.

 

TITULUS

VIGESIMUS-SECUNDUS.

DE LITERARUM OBLIGATIONIBUS.

C. iv.

OLIM scriptura fiebat obligatio,
que nominibus fieri dicebatur;
que nomina hodie non sunt in usu.
Plané, si quis debere se scripserit,
quod sibi numeratum non est, de
pecunié minimé numerata, post
multum temporis, exceptionem op-

T. 30.

A species of written obligation
anciently prevailed, by registering
the names of the contractors; these
were called nomina, but are not
now inuse. But, if a man confess-
es in writing, that he owes, what
in reality he never received, he can-
270 LIB. Ill.

TIT. XXII.

 

ponere non potest: hoc enim se-
pissimé constitutum est. Sic fit,
ut et hodie, dum queri non potest,
scriptura obligetur; et ex e& nas-
catur condictio, cessante scilicét
verborum  obligatione. Multum
autem tempus in hac exceptione
antea quidem ex principalibus con-
stitutionibus usque ad quinquenni-
um procedebat: sed, ne creditores
diutius possint suis pecuniis for-
sitan defraudari, per constitutionem
nostram tempus coarctum est, ut,
ultra biennii metas, hujusmodi ex-
ceptio minimé extendatur.

TITULUS

not plead as an exception after a
long period, that the money was
never advanced : and this limitation
of time has frequently been pre-
scribed by the constitutions. Hence,
at this day, a man is bound by his
written note, if he cannot legally
bring an exception; and from this
written contract arises an action
called a condiction, when no verbal
obligation can be proved. Former-
ly the imperial constitutions allow-
ed a space of time, not less than five
years, in which any man might
bring an exception, pecunie non
numerate, i. e. of money not ad-
vanced. But for the safety of credi-
tors we have abridged this time,
and ordained, that such an excep-
tion shall not lie after two years.

VIGESIMUS-TERTIUS.

DE OBLIGATIONIBUS EX CONSENSU.

Continuatio.

CONSENSU fiunt obligationes
in emptionibus, venditionibus, loca-
tionibus, conductionibus, societati-
bus, mandatis: ided autem istis
modis obligatio dicitur consensu
contrahi, quia neque scriptura, ne-
que preesentid, omnimodo opus est:
ac nec dari quicquam necesse est,
ut substantiam capiat obligatio ; sed
sufficit, eos, qui negotia gerunt,
consentire: unde inter absentes
quogue talia negotia contrahuntur,

Obligations or contracts are made
by consent in buying, selling, let-
ting, hiring, partnerships and man-
dates. An obligation, thus entered
into is said to be contracted by con-
sent; because neither writing nor
the presence of parties is absolutely
requisite. Nor is delivery necessary
to make the contract take effect ; for
it suffices, that the parties consent;
hence these contracts may be enter-
ed into by absent parties, by letters,
LIB. II.

TIT. XXIV.

271

 

veluti per epistolam vel per nunti-
um. Item in his contractibus alter
alteri obligatur in id, quod alterum
alteri ex bono et wquo preestare
oportet; cum alioqui in verborum
obligationibus alius stipuletur, alius
promittat.

or messengers; and they are bound
to each other mutually to do what
is just and right; but generally in
verbal contracts one party stipu-
lates and the other promises.

 

TUTULUS VIGESIMUS-QUARTUS.

DE EMPTIONE ET VENDITIONE.

D. xviii. & xix. T. 1. C. iv. T. 38. & 40.

De emptione pura.

De pretii conventione, arrhis, et scrip-

tura.

EMPTIO et venditio contrahi-
tur, simul atque de pretio convene-
rit, quamvis nondum pretium nu-
meratum sit, ac ne arrha quidem
data fuerit: nam, quod arrhee no-
mine datur, argumentum est emp-
tionis et venditionis contract. Sed
hoc quidem de emptionibus et ven-
ditionibus, que siné scriptura con-
sistunt, obtinere oportet; nam nihil
a nobis in hujusmodi emptionibus
et venditionibus innovatum est. In
iis autem, que scriptura conficiun-
tur, non aliter perfectam esse ven-
ditionem et emptionem constitui-
mus, nisi et instrumenta emptionis
fuerint conscripta, vel manu pro-
prid contrahentium, vel ab alio qui-
dem scripta, 4 contrahentibus au-
tem subscripta; et si per tabellio-
nem fiunt, nisi et completiones ac-
ceperint, et fuerint partibus abso-

The contract of buying and sel-
ling is perfected as soon as the price
is agreed upon, although it be not
paid, nor even an earnest given;
for earnest, does not constitute a
contract, but serves only as proof
of it. And this is the law respect-
ing bargains and sales, not in writ-
ing; for herein we have made no
innovation. But where there is a
written contract, we have ordain-
ed, that a bargain and sale shall
not become absolute, unless the in-
struments of sale are written by
the contracting parties, or at least
signed by them, if written by oth-
ers; and if drawn by a public no-
tary, unless executed and delivered
complete in all their parts; for, if
any thing be omitted, there is locus
penitentig—room to retract; and
either the buyer or seller may re-
272 LIB. II.

TIT. XXIV.

 

luta. Donec enim aliquid deest ex
his, et pcenitentiz locus est, et po:
test emptor vel venditor siné pend
recedere ab emptioneet venditione.
Ita tamen impuné recedere conce-
dimus, nisi jam arrharum nomine
aliquid fuerit datum; hoc enim
subsecuto, sivé in scriptis, sive siné
scriptis, venditio celebrata est, is,
qui recusat adimplere contractum,
si quidem est emptor, perdit quod
dedit; si verd venditor, duplum re-
stituere compellitur ; licet super
arrhis nihil expressum sit. Preti-
autem constitui oportet; nam nul-
la emptio siné pretio esse potest.

cede without penalty, if no earnest
has been given. But, if it has,
then the buyer, whether the con-
tract was written or unwritten, if
he refuse to fulfil it, loses his earn-
est, and the seller, if he refuse, is
compellable to restore double the
value of the earnest, although no
agreement of this kind was ex-
pressly made. But the price should
be fixed; for, until then, there can
be no purchase.

De pretio certo, vel incerto, vel in arbitrium alienum collato.

$ I. Sed et certum esse pretium
debet: alioqui, si inter alioquos, ita
convenerit, ut, quanti Titius rem
estimaverit, tanti sit empta, inter
veteres satis abundéque hoc dubi-
tabatur, constaretne venditio, an
non. Sed nostra decisio ita hoc
constituit, ut, quoties sic composi-
ta sit venditio, quanti ille estimave-
rit, sub hac conditione staret con-
tractus, ut siquidem ille, qui nomi-
natus est pretium definierit, tunc
omnimodo secundem ejus zstima-
tionem et pretium persolvatur, et
res tradatur, et venditio ad effectum
perducatur ; emptore quidem ex
empto actione, venditore ex vendi-
to agente. Sin autem ille, qui no-
minatus est, vel noluerit, vel non
potuerit, pretium definire, tunc pro
nihilo esse venditionem, quasi nul-
lo pretio statuto. Quod jus, cum

§ 1. The price, ought to be cer-
tain. And formerly, when it was
covenanted, that a thing should be
sold, at whatever price Titius should
value it, the ancient lawyers much
doubted, whether such a sale was
good. But we have ordained, that
when the sale is so made as that
the price shall be fixed by a third
person, it shall be valid under that
condition ; so that, if the nominee,
or arbitrator, determine the price, it
ought to be paid accordingly, the
thing sold, delivered, and the sale
perfected; otherwise the buyer may
have an action ex empto, for the
thing bought; and the seller an ae-
tion ex vendito, for the thing sold.
But, if the arbitrator either refuse,
or is unable to determine the price,
the sale is null. And, as we have so
enacted in relation to sales, it is not
LIB. Iii.
in venditionibus nobis placuerit,

non est absurdum et in locationibus
et in conductionibus trahere.

In quibus pretium consistat.

TIT. XXIV.

273

improper that the same law should
prevail, in Jetting and hireing.

Differentia emptioniset permu-

tationis.

$ I. Item pretium in numerata
pecunia consistere debet; nam in
ceteris rebus, an pretium esse pos-
set, valdé querebatur; veluti, an
homo, aut fundus, aut toga, alterius
rel pretium esse possit. Et Sabi-
nus et Cassius etiam in alia re pu-
tabant pretium posse consistere;
undé illud, quod vulgo dicebatur,
permutatione rerum emptionem et
venditionem contrahi; eamque spe-
ciem emptionis et venditionis ve-
tustissimam esse. Argumentoque
utebantur Greco poeta Homero,
qui aliquam partem exercittis Ach-
ivorum vinum sibi comparasse ait,
permutatis quibusdam rebus, his
verbis.

Wues 0 ex Anpvow magesacay ovvoy
ayeoau,
EvGsv ag duetovto xagyxopowrtes
Ayavor,
Adhou wsv yohuw, ahhor 0? debave ovdyow
Alor Se guvots, addov 0 avtoor Boecauv,
Aliot & avdganodecar, /

Hoc est.

Naves autem et Lemno appuler-
unt vinum vehentes :

Illinc vinum emebant Achivi co-
mantes caput,

Alii quidem ere, alii antem ferro
nigro,

Alii pellibus, alii ipsis bobus,

Alii etiam mancipius.

Iliad VII.

35

§$ 2. The price of an article
bought, should be cash, or money
told; for it hath been much doubt-
ed, whether the price of goods can
be said to be paid, if any thing be
given for them but money; as, whe-
ther a slave, a piece of ground, or a
robe, can be paid as the price of a
thing. The lawyers Sabinus and
Cassius thought, that a price might
consist of any thing, and from hence
it has been commonly said, that
emptiovenditio, or buying and sell-
ing, is contracted by (barter) com-
mutation; and that this species of
buying and selling is the most an-
cient. ‘The advocates for this side
of the question quote Homer, who
relates in the following lines, that a
part of the Grecian army bought
wine by giving other things in ex-
change for it.

Wine the rest purchas’d at their
proper cost,
And well the plenteous “fright sup-
plied the host:

Each in exchange proportion’d
treasures gave,

Some brass or tron, some an ox or
slave. Pope.

But the lawyers of a different
sect maintained that commutation
was one thing, and emptio-venditio
another ; for otherwise said they, in
274

Diverse scholee auctores contra sen-
tiebant; aliudque esse existimabant
permutationem rerum, aliud emp-
tionem et venditionem ; alioqui non
posse rem expediri, permutatis re-
bus, que videatur res veenisse, et
que pretii nomine data esse; nam,
utramque videri et vaenisse et pre-
tii nomine datam esse, rationem non
pati. Sed Proculi sententia, dicen-
tis, permutationem propriam esse
speciem contracttis 4 venditione se-
paratam, merit prevaluit; cum et
aliis Homericis versibus adjuvaba-
tur, et validioribus rationibus ar-
gumentabatur: quod et anteriores
Divi Principes admiserunt, et in
nostris Digestis latius significatur.

LIB. Il. TIT. XXIV.

the commutation of any two things
it can never appear, which has been
sold, and which has been given, as
the price of the thing sold; and it is
contrary to reason, that each should
appear to have been sold, and that
each also should appear to have
been given, as the price of the other.
The opinion of Proculus, who main-
tained, that commutation is a spe-
cies of contract, separate from ven-
dition, hath deservedly prevailed:
for he is supported by other verses
from Homer, and has enforced his
opinion with strong arguments; and
this is the doctrine, which our pre-
decessors, the emperors Dioclesian
and Mazximian, have admitted, as
appears more at large in our Di-
gests.

De periculo et commodo rei vendite.

$ III. Cum autem emptio et ven-
ditio contracta sit, (quod effici dixi-
mus simul atque de pretio conve-
nerit, cum siné scripturd res agi-
tur,) periculum rei vendite statim
ad emptorem pertinet, tametsi ad-
huc ea res emptori tradita non sit.
Itaque, si homo mortuus sit, vel
aliqua parte corporis lesus fuerit,
aut des tote, vel aliqua ex parte,
incendio consumpte fuerint, aut
fundus vi fluminis totus vel aliqua
ex parte ablatus sit, sivé etiam in-
undatione aque, aut arboribus tur-
bine dejectis, longé minor aut de-
terior esse cceperit, emptoris dam-
num est; cui necesse est, licét
rem non fuerit nactus, pretium sol-
vere. Quicquid enim siné dolo et
culpa venditoris accidit, in eo ven-

§ 3. When emption and vendition
are once contracted, (which is so
soon as the price is agreed on, when
the covenant is not in writing, ) the
buyer becomes liable to the risque of
the thing sold, although it be not yet
delivered. Therefore, if a slave
should die, or be hurt, or if a build-
ing, or part of it should be consumed
by fire, or if lands sold, or any part
of them, should be washed away by
a torrent,.or damaged by an inun-
dation, or by a storm, which may
destroy the trees, the loss must be
sustained by the buyer, who must
pay the price agreed on, although
he never had possession of the
thing; for whatever the accident
be, if it happen neither by the fraud,
nor fault of the seller, he is secure.
LIB. III.

ditor securus est; sed et, si post
emptionem fundo aliquid per allu-
vionem accesserit, ad emptoris com-
modum pertinet; nam et commo-
dum ejus esse debet, cujus pericu-
lum est. Quod si fugerit homo,
qui veeniit, aut, surreptus fuerit, ita
ut neque dolus, neque culpa vendi-
toris intervenerit, animadverten-
dum erit, an custodiam ejus usque
ad traditionem venditor susceperit ;
sané enim si susceperit, ad ipsius
periculum is casus pertinet; si non
susceperit, securus est. Idem et
in ceteris animalibus ceterisque
rebus intelligimus. Utique tamen
vindicationem rei et conditionem
exhibere debebit emptori; quia
sane, qui nondum rem emptori tra-
didit, adhuc ipse dominus est. I-
dem etiam est de furti et de damni
injurize actione.

TIT. XXIV.

275

On the other hand, if, after sale, the
lands should be increased by allu-
vion, this increase becomes the gain
of the buyer; for it is just, that he
should receive the profit, who must
have sustained the loss. But, if a
slave who is sold, should run away
or be stolen, and no fraud or negli-
gence can be imputed to the seller,
it must be inquired, whether the
seller undertook the safe custody of
the slave, until delivery should be
made; if he did, he is answerable,
if not, he is secure. The same law
takes place in regard to all other
animals and things. But, the seller
should make over his right of vin-
dication and condiction to the buy-
er; for he, who has not delivered
the thing sold, is still considered as
the proprietor of it. Actions also
of theft, or damage done, must be
transferred by the seller to the buy-
er, (when the thing sold is stolen, or
damaged before delivery.)

De emptione conditionali.

§ IV. Emptio tam sub’ conditi-
one quam pure contrahi potest: sub
conditione, veluti, si Stichus intra
certum diem tibi placuerit, erit tibi
emptus aureis tot.

§ 4. A sale may be contracted
conditionally, as well as purely:
as when the seller agrees; if with-
in a certain time you shall approve
of the slave Stichus, he ‘shall be
your's for so many aurei.

De emptione rei, qu non est in commercio.

§ V. Loca sacra, vel religiosa,
item publica, (veluti forum, basili-
cam,) frustra quis sciens emit; que
tamen, si pro profanis vel privatis
deceptus 4 venditore quis emerit,
habebit actionem ex empto, quod
non habere ei liceat, ut consequatur,

§ 5. Whoever knowingly purcha-
ses a sacred, religious, or public
place, such as a Forum, or Court of
justice, itis void. But, if he pur-
chased them as profane or private,
being imposed upon by the seller,
then such purchaser, not being able
276

LIB. HI. TIT. XXVv.

 

quod sua interest,eum deceptum
non esse. Idem juris est, si homi-
nem liberum pro servo emerit.

to obtain possession, may have an
action ex empto against the seller,
and recover damage for the deceit.
The law is the same, if any person
should mistakenly buy a freeman
instead of a slave.

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-QUINTUS.

DE LOCATIONE ET CONDUCTIONE.

D. xix. T. 2. C. iv. T. 65. OC. iit. T. 70.

Collata emptionis, et locationis.

De mercedis conven-

tione.

LOCATIO et conductione prox-
ima est emptioni et venditioni,
lisdemque juris regulis consistit.
Nam ut emptio et venditio ita con-
trahitur, si de pretio convenerit,
sic et locatio et conductio ita con-
trahi intelligitur, si merces consti-
tuta sit: et competit locatori qui-
dem locati actio, conductori verd
conducti.

Location and conduction, i. e.
‘letting and hireing, are nearly alli-
ed to emption and vendition, i. e.
buying and selling ; and are govern-
ed by the same rules; for as the lat-
ter takes place so soon as the price
is agreed upon, so the former are
contracted, when the hire is once
fixed by the parties. The locator,
or person who lets, is intitled if ag-
grieved, to an actio locati, and the
conductor or hirer may have his
actio conducti, against the locator.

De mercede collata in arbitrium alienum.

§ I. Et, que supra diximus, si
alieno arbitrio pretium permissum
fuerit, eadem et de locatione et de
conductione dicta esse intelligimus
si alieno arbitrio merces permissa
fuerit. Qua de causa, si fulloni
poliendo curandave, aut sarcinatori
sarcienda, vestimenta quis dederit,
nullé statim mercede constituté, sed

§ 1. What has been said before
respecting sales, when the price is
referred to a third person, may also
be understood of location and con-
duction, when the hire is left to ar-
bitration. Therefore, if a man
send his clothes to a fuller to be
scoured, or a tailor to be mended,
and do not previously agree upon
LIB. II.

postea tantum daturus, quantum in-
ter eos convenerit, non proprié lo-
catio et conductio contrahi intelligi-
tur; sed eo nomine actio prescrip-
tis verbis datur.

In quibus rebus

_$ IL Preeterea, sictt vulgo que-
rebatur, an permutatis rebus emptio
et venditio contraheretur, ita queri
solebat de locatione et conductione,
si forté rem aliquam utendam sivé
fruendam tibi aliquis dederit, et in-
vicém 4 te utendam sive fruendam
aliam rem acceperit. Et placuit,
non esse locationem et conductio-
nem, sed proprium genus contrac-
tis; veluti, si, cum unum bovem
quis haberet, et vicinus ejus item
unum, placuerit inter eos, ut per de-
nos dies invictm boves commoda-
rent, ut opus facerent, et apud alte-
rum alterius bos perierit ; neque lo-
cati, neque conducti, neque commo-
dati competit actio: quia non fuit
commodatum gratuitum: verlm
prescriptis verbis agendum est.

TIT. XXV.

277

any price, in this case location and
conduction are not understood to be
properly contracted; but an action
on the case may be brought by ei-
ther party, prescriptis verbis, i. e.
in words adapted to the circumstan-
ces.

merces consistat.

§ 2. As it was formerly a ques-
tion whether emption and vendition
could be contracted by exchange, so
it hath also been doubted, whether
location and conduction takes place
when one man lends another a par-
ticular thing for his use; and re-
ceives in return some other thing, of
which he is also permitted to have
the use; and it hasbeen determined,
that this exchange does not consti-
tuie location and conduction, but a
distinct species of contract: for ex-
ample, if two neighbors have each
of them an ox, and each agrees to
lend his ox to the other alternately
for ten days to labour, and the ox
of the one should die in possession
of the other, in this case, he, who
has lost his ox, can neither bring
the action locati nor conducti, nor
even the action commodati ; for the
ox was not lent gratuitously: but
he may sue prescriptis verbis ; i. e.
by an action upon the case.

De Emphyteusi.

$ Ill. Aded autem aliquam fa-
miliaritatem inter se videntur habe-
re emptio et venditio, item locatio
et conductio, ut in quibusdam cau-
sis queri soleat, utrum emptio et

§ 3. Buying and selling, and let-
ting and hireing, are so nearly con-
nected, that, in some cases, it has
been difficult to distinguish the one
from the other; as when lands have
278

LIB. Tl. TIT. XXVv.

 

et venditio contrahatur, an locatio
et conductio; ut ecce de prediis,
que perpetuo quibusdam fruenda
traduntur, id est, ut, quamdiu pen-
sio sivé reditus pro his domino
prestetur, neque ipsi conductoyi,
neque heredi ejus, cuive conduc-
tor heeresve ejus id praedium vendi-
derit, aut donaverit, aut dotis no-
mine dederit, aliove quocunque mo-
do alienaverit, auferre liceat. Sed
talis contractus quia inter veteres
dubitabatur, et 4 quibusdam loca-
tio, 4 quibusdam venditio existi-
mabatur, lex Zenoniana lata est,
que emphyteuseos contractis pro-
priam statuit naturam, neque ad
lécationem, neque ad venditionem
inclinantem, sed suis pactionibus
falciendam; et, si quidem aliquid
pactum fuerit, hoc ita obtinere, ac
si naturalis esset contractus: sin
autem nihil de periculo rei fuerit
pactum, tunc, si quidem totius rei
interitus accesserit, ad dominum
super hoc redundare periculum ; sin
autem particularis, ad emphyteuti-
carium hujusmodi damnum venire;
quo jure utimur.

peen demised for ever, upon con-
dition, that if acertain yearly rent,
be paid to the proprietor, it shall
not be in his power to take these
lands from the tenant or his heirs,
or from any other person, to whom
such tenant or his heirs shall have
sold or granted or given them as a
marriage portion, orotherwise. But
when this contract, concerning
which the ancient lawyers had
great doubts, was by some regarded
as anemption and vendition, and
by others as a location and conduc-
tion, the Zenonian law was enact-
ed, which settled the proper nature
of an emphyteusis, making it to be
neither the one nor’the other, but a
contract supported by its own pecu-
liar covenants; and ordaining, that
whatever is agreed upon by the par-
ties shall take place, as a contract:
and when there is no covenant,
which declares, upon whom the loss
of the lands shall fall, that then, if
the whole estate happen to be de-
stroyed by a torrent, an earthquake,
or any other means, the proprietor
must be the sufferer; but, if a part
only be destroyed, that the loss
shall then be borne by the tenant;
and this is the law in use.

De forma alicui facienda ab artifice.

§ IV. Item queritur, si cum au-
rifice Titius convenerit, ut is ex au-
ro suo certi ponderis certeeque for-
mz annulos ei faceret, et acciperet,
(verbi gratid,) decem aureos, u-
trum emptio et venditio, an locatio
et conductio contrahi videatur?
Cassius ait, materi quidem emp-

§ 4. Also, if Titias, should pro-
mise a goldsmith ten aurei to make
a certain number of rings, of a par-
ticular size and weight, and find
the gold; it hath been a question,
whether such a contract would be
a buying and selling, or a letting
and hireing, Cassius was of opinion
LIB. I. TIT xxv.

tionem et venditionem contrahi,
opere autem locationem et conduc-
tionem ; sed placuit, tantum emp-
tionem et venditionem contrahi.
Quod si suum aurum Titius dede-
rit, mercede pro opera constituta,
dubium non est, quin locatio et con-
ductio sit.

279

that it would be a buying and sellirig
in regard to the matter, and a let-
ting and hireing in regard to the
‘work; but it is now settled, that it
would only amount to emption and
vendition. But, if Titius should
give his own gold, and agree to pay
only for the workmanship, this
would certainly be a location and
conduction.

Quid prestare debet conductor.

§ V. Conductor omnia secun-
dum legem conductionis facere de-
bet; et, si quid in lege pretermis-
sum fuerat, id ex bono et equo
prestare. Qui pro usu aut vesti-
mentorum, aut argenti, aut jumen-
ti, mercedem aut dedit aut promisit,
ab eo custodia talis desideratur,
qualem diligentissimus pater fami-
lias suis rebus adhibet; quam si
prestiterit, et aliquo casu fortuito
eam rem amiserit, de restituenda ea
re non tenebitur.

§ 5. The hirer is not only obliged
to observe strictly the covenants of
the conduction, but is also bound to
perform whatever hath been omit-
ted to be inserted, but ought reason-
ably to be done. And whoever
hath given or promised hire for the
use of clothes, silver, horses, &c. is
bound to take the same care of
them, as the most diligent master of
a family would take of hisown pro-
perty. But, if the hirer do this,
and yet lose the things hired by
some fortuitous event, he shall not
be answerable for the loss.

De morte conductoris.

$ VI. Mortuo conductore intra
tempora conductionis, heres ejus
eodem jure in conductione succedit.

$ 6. If the hirer die before the
time of hireing be expired, his heir
succeeds to his right, and is intitled
to the thing hired, for the remainder
of the term. ©
280

LIB. III. TIT. XXVI.

 

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-SEXTUS.
DE SOCIETATE. »

D. xvii. T. 2.

C. iv. T. 37.

Divisio a materia.

-SOCIETATEM coire solemus
aut totorum bonorum, quam Greci
Specialiter ovwwrer appellant; aut
unius alicujus negotiationis, veluti
mancipiorum vendendorum emen-
dorumque, aut olei, aut vini, aut
frumenti emendi vendendique.

It is common for persons to enter
either into a general partnership, or
what the Greeks call a communion
of goods; or into a particular part-
nership, respecting some single spe-
cies of commerce, as that of buying
and selling slaves, oil, wine, or corn.

De partibus lucri et damni.

$ I. Et quidem, si nihil de parti-
bus lucri et damni nominatim con-
venerit, equales scilicet partes et
in lucro et in damno spectantur ;
quod si expressz fuerint partes, he
servari debent. Nec enim unquam
dubium fuit, quin valeat conventio,
si duo inter se pacti sint, ut ad unum
quidem duz partes et lucri et dam-
ni pertineant, ad alterum tertia.

De partibus

$ II. De illé sané conventione
quesitum est, si Titius et Seius in-
ter se pacti sint, ut ad Titium lu-
cri duz partes pertineant, damni
tertia, ad Seium due partes damni,
lucri tertia, an rata debeat haberi
conventio? Quintus Mutius contra
naturam societatis talem pationem
esse existimavit, et ob id non esse

§ 1. Ifno express agreement be
made by the partners concerning
their share of profit and loss; the
loss and the profit must be equally
divided. But, if an express agree--
ment be made, it must be observed ;
for it was never yet doubted, but
that the covenant would be bind-
ing, if two persons should agree,
that two: shares of the profit and
loss should belong to one partner,
and that only the third part of both
should belong to the other.

ineequalibus.

$ 2. But it has been questioned,
if Titius and Seius should covenant
that T%tius should receive two parts
of the profit, and bear but a third of
the loss, and that Seiws should bear
two parts of the loss, and receive
but a third of the profit, whether
such an agreement would be bind-
ing? Quintus Mutius deemed such
LIB. Ill. TIT. XXVI.

ratam habendam: Servius Sulpiti-
us (cujus sententia prevaluit) con-
tra sensit; quia sepé quorundam
ita pretiosa est opera in societate,
ut, eos justum sit conditione meli-
ore in societatem admitti. Nam et
ita posse coiri societatem non dubi-
tatur, ut alter pecuniam conferat,
alter non conferat, et tamen lucrum
inter eos commune sit; quia sepé
opera alicujus pro pecunia valet.
Et aded contra Quinti Mutii sen-
tentiam obtinuit, ut illud quoque
constiterit posse convenire, ut quis
lucti partem ferat, de damno non
teneatur; quod et ipsum Servius
convenientér sibi fieri existimavit.
Quod tamen ita intelligi oportet,
ut, si in alid re. lucrum, in alia
damnum illatum sit, compensatione
facta, solum quod superest, intelli-
gatur lucro esse.

281

a covenant contrary to the nature
of partnership, and therefore ought
not to be ratified; but Servius Sule
pitius, whose opinion hath prevail-
ed, thought otherwise; because the
labour of some is so valuable, that’
they ought to be admitted into
partnership upon advantageous con-
ditions; for no man doubts, but
that a partnership may be, where-
in one only finds money; inasmuch
as it often happens, that the work,
and labour of the other, is of equal
value. And also, contrary to the
opinion of Mutius, it hath obtained
as law, that a partner may by
agreement take a share of the pro-
fit, and not be accountable for any
part of the loss; for Servius thought,
that, this likewise might be done
equitably : but it must be so un-
derstood, that, if profit accrue from
one species of things, and loss from
another, only what remains, after
the loss is compensated, shall be
considered as profit.

De partibus expressis in una causa.

$ III. Ilud expeditum est, si in
und causa pars fuerit expressa,
(veluti in solo lucro, vel in solo
damno,) in alteré vero omnissa, in
eo quoque, quod preetermissum est,
eandem partem servari.

Quibus modis societas solvitur.

$ IV. Manet autem societas eo
usque, donec in eodem consensu
perseveraverint : at, cum aliquis
renunciaverit societati, solvitur so-
cietas, Sed plané si quis callidée in
36

$ 3. It is alsoa settled point,
that, if partners expressly mention
their shares in one respect only,
either solely as to gain, or solely as
to loss, their shares of that which
is omitted, shall be regulated by
what is expressed.

De renunciatione.

§ 4. A partnership lasts so long
as the partners persevere in their
consent so to continue ; and, if one
of them renounce, the parnership,
is dissolved. But, if a man renounce
282

LIB. Ill. TIT. XXVI.

 

hoc renunciaverit societati, ut ob-
veniens aliquod lucrum solus ha-
beat, veluti, si totorum bonorum
socius, cum ab aliquo heres esset
relictus, in hoc renunciaverit socie-
tati, ut hereditatem solus lucri fa-
ceret, cogitur hoc lucrum commu-
nicare. Si quid vero aliud lucri
faciat, quod non captaverit, ad ip-
sum solum pertinet. Ei vero, cui
renunciatum est, quicquid omnino
post renunciatem societatem acqui-
ritur, soli conceditur.

with a fraudulent intent, and that
he may enjoy the sole benefit of
some future fortune, which he ex-
pects, his renunciation will not
avail: for, if a partner in common,
on being appointed heir, should re-
nounce his partnership, that he
may possess the inheritance exclu-
sively, he would nevertheless be
compelled to -divide equally with
his former partners; yet, if an in-
heritance, which he did not expect,
should by accident fall to him after
renunciation, the whole would be
his own: but those, from whom a
partner hath separated himself by
renouncing, possess solely for them-
selves whatever they acquire, after
the renunciation of that partner.

De morte.

§ V. Solvitur adhuc societas eti-
am morte socii; quia, qui societa-
tem contrahit, certam personam si-
bi eligit. Sed et, si consensu plu-
rium societas contracta sit, morte
unius socii solvitur, etsi plures su-
persint; nisi in coeunda societate
aliter convenerit.

§ 5. A partnership is also dis-
solved by the death of one of the
partners; for he, who enters into
partnership, always chooses some
known person to be his partner.
And if a partnership be entered in-
to by the consent of many, it is
dissolved by the death of one, al-
though the rest survive; unless the
original contract be otherwise.

De fine negotii.

§ VI. Item, si alicujus rei con-
tracta societas sit, et finis negotio
impositus est, finitur societas.

$ 6. Also, if a partnership be en-
tered into on account of some par-
ticular commerce, when that ceas-
es, the partnership is ended.

De publicatione.

§ VII. Publicatione quoque dis-
trahi societatem, manifestum est,
scilicet si universa bona socii publi-

§ 7. Partnership is also dissolv-
ed by the public sale or confisca-
tion of all the property of one of
LIB. I.

centur; nam, cum in ejus locum
alius cuccedat, pro mortuo habetur.

TIT. XXVI. 283

the partners ; for when another

takes his place, he is considered as
dead.

De cessione bonorum.

$ VIII. Item, si quis ex sociis
mole debiti pregravatus bonis suis
cesserit, et ideo propter publica et
privata debita substantia ejus vee-
neat, solvitur societas. Sed hoc
causa, si adhuc consentiant in so-
cietatem, nova videtur incipere so-
cietas.

De dolo et culpa

$ IX. Socius socio utrum eo
nomine tantum teneatur pro socio
actione, si quid dolo commiserit,
sicut is, qui deponi apud se passus
est, an etiam culpe, id est, desidiz
atque negligentiz nomine, quesi-
tum est? Preevaluit tamen, etiam
culpee nomine tenerieum. Culpa
autem non ad exactissimam dili-
gentiam dirigenda est ; sufficit enim
talem diligentiam communibus re-
bus adhibere socium, qualem suis
rebus adhibere solet. Nam, qui
parum diligentem socium sibi assu-
mit, de se queri, sibique hoc impu-
tare, debet.

§ 8. Also, when a man in part-
nership, being pressed by debts,
makes a cession of his goods, and
they are sold to satisfy either pub-
or private demands, the partner-
ship is dissolved. But, if the rest
should still desire to remain part-
ners, the first partnership would
not continue, but a new one would
commence.

a socia prestandis.

§$ 9. It has been a question,
whether a partner, like a deposita-
ry, is accountable for fraud only,
or also for negligence? And it
now prevails, that he is answera-
ble for all the damages, which
happen through his fault. But
though he fail in having used the
most exact diligence, such a fail-
ure, is not regarded as culpa ora
fault: for a partner is not liable to
answer damages, if it appear that
he has used the same care and dili-
gence in respect of the partnership
property as he has usually observ-
ed in keeping hisown. Whoever
chooses a negligent man for his
partner, must lay the blame upon
himself only, and impute his mis-
fortune to his own ill choice.
284

LIB. II. TIT. XXVIL.

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-SEPTIMUS.

DE MANDATO.

D. xvii. T. 1.

C. iv. T. 35.

Divisio a fine.

MANDATUM contrahitur quin-
que modis, sive sué tantim gratia
aliquis tibi mandet, sivé sua et tua,
sivé aliend tantim, sivé sua et ali-
ena, sivé tua et aliend. At, si tud
tantum gratid tibi mandatum sit,
supervacuum est mandatum; et ob
id nulla ex eo obligatio, nec man-
dati inter vos actio nascitur.

A mandate is of five kinds;
either when it is given solely for
the benefit of the mandator; or
jointly for his benefit, and that of
the mandatary; or solely for the
benefit of a third person; or jointly
for the benefit of the mandator and
a third person; or jointly for the
benefit of the mandatary and a
third person. But, if a mandate
be given solely for the sake of the
mandatary, the mandate is useless;
for no obligation can arise from it,
nor of course any action.

Si mandantis gratia mandetur.

§ I. Mandantis tantum gratia
intervenit mandatum, veluti si quis
tibi mandet, ut negotia ejus gere-
res, vel ut fundum ie emeres, vel
ut pro eo sponderes.

§ 1. A mandate is given solely
for the benefit of the mandator,
when he requires the mandatary
to transact his business, to buy
lands, or to become his surety.

Si mandantis et mandatarii.

§$ II. Tua gratié et mandantis;
veluti si mandet tibi, ut pecuniam
sub usuris crederes ei, qui in rem
ipsius mutuaretur; aut si, volente
te agere cum eo ex fidejussoria cau-
si, mandet tibi, ut, cum reo agas
periculo mandantis; vel ut ipsius

§ 2. A mandate is given partly
for the benefit of the mandator, and
partly for your benefit (the manda-
tary,) if the mandator require you
to lend money upon interest to one
who would borrow it for his use;
or if, when you are upon the point
LIB. III.

periculo stipuleris ab eo, quem tibi
deleget in id, quod tibi debuerat.

TIT. XXVII.

285

of suing a man on acount of a fide-
jussory caution, or suretyship, he
should authorise you at his own
risque to sue the principal debtor;
or if he should impower you at his
own hazard to stipulate for the
sum, which he owes you, fromsome
other person, whom he appoints.

Si aliena gratia.

$ III. Alien4 tantum caus inter-
venit mandatum; veluti si tibi ali-
quis mandet, ut Titii negotia gere-
res, vel ut Titio fundum emeres,
vel ut pro Titio sponderes.

§$ 3. A mandate is for the sole in-
terest of a third person, when the
mandator requires the mandatary
to perform some office, to buy lands,
or to become bail for that person.

Si mandantis et aliena.

$IV. Sua et aliend; veluti si de
communibus suis et Titii negotiis
gerendis tibi mandet, vel ut sibi et
Titio fundum emeres, vel ut pro eo
et Titio sponderes.

§$ 4. A mandate is for the joint
benefit of the mandator, anda third
person, when the mandator requires
the mandatary to transact their com-
mon business, to buy lands for them
both, or to be bound for them.

Si mandatarii et aliena.

$V. Tua et aliené; veluti si tibi
mandet, ut Titio sub usuris crede-
res; quia, si siné usuris pecuniam
crederes, alienaé tantum gratia in-
tercedit mandatum.

§ 5. A mandate is in favour of
the mandatary and a third person,
when the mandator requires you to
lend money to Titius, upon interest; ©
but, if without interest, it can only
be in favour of him, to whom it is
lent.

Si mandatarii.

§$ VI. Tua tantim gratia inter-
venit mandatum ; veluti si tibi man-
det, ut’ pecunias tuas in emptiones
potius prediorum colloces, quam
foeneres ; vel ex diverso, ut pecuni-
as tuas foeneres potius, quam in
emptiones prediorum colloces. Cu-

§ 6. A mandate is given solely
for your own benefit, if the manda-
tor require you rather to makea
purchase of lands, than to lend up-
on interest; or, on the contrary,
rather to lend your money upon in-
terest, than to buy lands. But as
286

LIB. Il. TIT. XXVII.

 

jus generis mandatum magis con-
silium, quam mandatum est, et ob
id non est obligatorium; quia ne-
mo ex consilio mandati obligatur,
etiam sinon expediat ei, cui man-
dabatur, cum liberum cuique sit
apud se explorare, an sibi expediat
consilium. Itaque, si otiosam pe-
cuniam domi te habentem hortatus
fuerit aliquis, ut rem aliquam eme-
res, vel eam crederes, quamvis non
expediat eam tibi emisse, vel cre-
didisse, non tamen tibi mandati te-
netur. Et adeo hec ita sunt, ut
quesitum sit, an mandati teneatur,
qui mandavit tibi, ut pecuniam Ti-
tio feenerares. Sed obtinuit Sabini
sententia, obligatorium esse in hoc
casu mandatum; quia non alitér
Titio credidisses, quam si tibi man-
datum esset.

this seems rather to be good advice
than a mandate, it is is not obliga-
tory; for no action of mandate
can be brought against a man on
account of advice, although it
has not proved beneficial to him, to
whom it was given; inasmuch as
every one is at full liberty to con-
sult his own reason, whether advice
given be expedient or not. 'There-
fore, if you should be advised to
employ your money, which now
lies dead, either by lending it at in-
terest, or in making a purchase, and
you shall become a loser by follow-
ing this advice, the adviser would
not be liable to an action. And this
is so true, that it has even been a
question, whether an action of man-
date will lie against him, who hath
required you by mandate to lend
money to T%¢ius, who is insolvent.
But the opinion of Sabinus hath ob-
tained, and a mandate in this case is
now judged to be obligatory; for
you would never have trusted Titi-
us, but in obedience to the mandate.

De mandato contra bonos mores.

§ VIL. Ilud quoque mandatum
non est obligatorium, quod contra
bonos mores est; veluti si Titius de
furto, aut de damno faciendo, aut
de injurid faciendé mandet tibi; li-
cet enim peenam istius facti nomine
preestiteris, non tamen ullam habes
adversus Titium actionem.

$ 7. A mandate contrary to good
manners is not obligatory; as if Ti-
tius should command you to com-
mit theft, or to do injury to a third
person; for, although you should
be punished in consequence, you
will not be intitled to any action
against Titius.

De executione mandati.

§ VIII. Is, qui exequitur man-

§ 8. He, who executes a mandate

datum, non debet excedere fines ought not to exceed the bounds of it;
mandati; ut ecce, si quis usquead for example, if a mandator should
LIB. III.

centum aureos mandaverit tibi, ut
fundum emeres, vel ut pro Titio
sponderes, neque pluris emere de-
bes, neque in ampliorem pecuniam
fidejubere ; alioqui non _habebis
cum eo mandati actionem: aded
quidem, ut Sabino et Cassio placue-
rit, etiamsiusque ad centum aureos
cum eo agere volueris, inutiliter te
acturum. Sed diverse schol
auctores recté usque ad centum
aureos te acturum existimant; que
' sententia sané benignior est. Quod
si minoris emeris, habebis scilicet
cum eo mandati actionem; quoni-
am, qui mandat, ut sibi centum au-
reorum fundus emeretur, is utique
mandasse intelligitur, ut minoris,
si possit, emeretur.

TIT. XXVIL.

287

require you to purchase lands, or to
be bound for Titius, to the amount
of an hundred awurei ; you ought not
to buy the lands at an higher price,
or be bound for a greater sum; o-
therwise, you will not be intitled to
an action for the excess. And Cas-
sius and Sabinus were even of opi-
nion, that, although you should
bring an action of mandate for no
more than the hundred aurei, you
could not recover them. But it was
held by the lawyers of a different
school, that the mandatory might
sue the mandator for the hundred
auret; and this appears to be the
more equitable opinion. But, if you
buy certain lands at a less price
than that, which the mandator has
allowed, you will undoubtedly be
intitled to an action of mandator:
for, if he hath ordered, that an es-
tate should be purchased for an
hundred aurei, he will certainly be
understood, that it should if possible,
be purchased at a less price.

De revocatione mandati.

§ IX. Recté quoque mandatum
contractum, si, dum adhuc integra
res Sit, revocatum fuerit, evanescit.

De morte.

$ X. Item, si adhuc integro
mandato mors alterius interveniat
id est, vel ejus, qui mandaverit, vel
illius, qui mandatum susceperit,
solvitur mandatum. Sed utilitatis
causd receptum est, si eo mortuo,
qui tibi mandaverat, tu, ignorans
cum decessisse, executus fueris

$ 9. A mandate, properly contract-
ed, becomes null, if revoked before
any act hath been done in conse-
quence of it.

ak

$10. A mandate also becomes null,
if either the mandator, or the man-
datary die, while it continues intire.
But expedience has settled, that, if
a mandator die, and the mandatary
not knowing of his death, should
afterwards execute the mandate, he
may bring his action against the
288 LIB. Il.

TIT. XXVII.

 

mandatum, posse te agere manda-
ti actione; alioqui justa et proba-
bilis ignorantia tibi damnum affe-
ret. Et huic simile est, quod pla-
cuit, si debitores, manumisso dis-
pensatore Titii, per ignorantiam
liberto solverint, liberari eos; cum
alioqui stricta juris ratione non
possent liberari: quia alii solvis-
sent, quam cui solvere debuerint.

heirs of the mandator : otherwise an
unblamable want of knowledgé
would be prejudicial. And, in a
similar case, it hath been deter-
mined, that, if the debtors of Titius,
whose steward has been manumit-
ted, without their knowledge,should
pay this freed-man what was due
to Titius, they would be cleared
from their debt; although, by the
rigour of the law, it would be other-
wise; since they had made their
payment to another than him to
whom it ought to have been made.

De renunciatione.

§ XI. Madatum non suscipere
cuilibet liberum est; susceptum
autem consummandum est; aut
quam primum renunciandum, ut
per semetipsum, aut per alium, ean-
dem rem mandator exequatur.
Nam, nisi ita renuncietur, ut inte-
gra causé mandatori reservetur
eandem rem explicandi, nihilomi-
nus mandati actio locum habet;
nisi justa causa intercesserit aut
non renunciandi, aut intempestivé
renunciandi.

De die et

§ XII. Mandatum et in diem
differi, et sub conditione fieri, po-
test.

$ 11. Every man is at liberty to
refuse a mandate; but once accept-
ed, it must be performed, or re-
nounced,as soon as possible, that the
mandator may transact the business
himself, or by another. For, if this
be not so done that the mandator
can have an opportunity of trans-
acting the business properly, an ac-
tion will lie against the mandatary,
unless he can shew good cause for
his delay in not making a timely
renunciation.

conditione.

§ 12. A mandate may be put off
to a distant day, or performed con-
ditionally, (according to the con-
tract.)

De mercede.

§ XIU. In summa sciendum
est, mandatum, nisi gratuitum sit,
in aliam formam negotii cadere:
nam, mercede constitutd, incipit
locatio et conducto esse. Et, (ut

§ 13. In fine, it must be observed,
that, a mandate not gratuitous, be-
comes another species of contract;
for, if a price be agreed upon, the
contract of location and conduction
LIB. Il. TIT. XXVIII.

generalitér dicamus,) quibus casi-
bus, siné mercede suscepto officio,
mandati sive depositi contrahitur
negotium, iis casibus interveniente
mercede locatio et conductio intel-
ligitur contrahi. Et ideo, si fullo-
ni polienda curandave quis dederit
vestimenta, aut sarcinatori sarcien-
da, nullé mercede constituta, neque
promissa, mandati competit actio.

289

commences. And in general, when

a trust or business is undertaken
without hire, the contract regards
either a mandate, or a deposit ; but,
when there is an agreement for hire,
itconstitutes location and conduction.
Therefore, if a man deliver his
clothes to a fuller to be cleaned, or
toa tailor tobe mended,, and there
isno agreement or promise made,
an action of mandate will lie.

ee er 2

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-OCTAVUS.

DE OBLIGATIONIBUS, QU QUASI EX CONTRACTU NAS-
CUNTUR.

Continuatio.

POST’ genera contractuum enu-
merata, dispiciamus etiam de iis
obligationibus, que quidem non
proprié nasci ex contractu intelli-
guntur; sed tamen, quia non ex
malcficio substantiam capiunt, qua-
si ex contractu nasci videntur.

Having already enumerated the
various kinds of direct obligations,
we will now treat of those, which
cannot properly be said to arise
from contract, but yet, as they take
not their origin from anything crim-
inal, seem to arise from an implied,
or a guasi-contract.

De negotiorum gestione.

§ I. Igitur, cum quis negotia ab-
sentis gesserit, ultro citroque inter
eos nascuntur actiones, que appel-
lantur negotiorum. Sed domino
quidem rei geste adversus eum, qui
gessit, directa competit actio; nego-
tiorum autem gestori contraria;
quas ex nullo contractu proprié
nasci manifestum est: quippe ita
nascuntur iste actiones, si sine

37

§ 1. When one person transacts
the business of another, who is ab-
sent, they reciprocally obtain a right
to certain actions, called actiones ne-
gotiorum gestorum ; i. e. on account
of business done: and it is mani-
fest, that these can arise from no
proper or regular contract ; for they
take place only, when one man as-
sumes the care of the affairs of an-
290

LIB. I. TIT. XXVIIL

 

mandato quisque alienis negotiis
gerendis se obtulerit; ex qua cau-
sa li, quorum negotia gesta fuerint,
etiam ignorantes obligantur. Id-
que utilitatis causa receptum est,
ne abseutium, qui subita festina-
tione coacti, nulli demandata nego-
tiorum suorum administratione, pe-
regré profecti essent, deserentur ne-
gotia ; que sané nemo curaturus es-
set, side eo, quod quis impendis-
set, nullam habiturus esset actio-
nem. Sicut autem is, qui utilitér
gessit negotia, dominum habet ob-
ligatum negotiorum gestorum, ita
et contra iste quoque tenetur, ut ad-
ministrationis reddat rationem ; quo
casu ad exactissimam quisque dili-
gentiam compellitur reddere ratio-
nem: nec sufficit talem diligentiam
adhibere, qualem suis rebus adhi-
bere solet ; si modo alius, diligenti-
or eo, commodius administraturus
esset negotia.

other without a mandate: and they
for whom business is transacted,
are thus bound without their know-
ledge; and this is permitted for the
public good, because the business
of persons absent in a foreign coun-
try, who have not entrusted their
affairs to any particular person,
would otherwise be totally neglect-
ed: for no man would take this
care upon himself, if he could not
afterwards bring an action to re-
cover what he had expended. But,
as the principal is bound to reim-
burse a careful agent, so is the lat-
ter bound to render a just account
of his administration to his princi-
pal. And an agent, in this case, is
obliged to use the most exact dili-
gence; for it will not suffice, that
he has taken the same care of the
affairs of his principal, which he
usually took of his own, if it ap-
pear, that a more diligent man
could have managed to more ad-
vantage.

De tutela.

$ IE Tutores quoque, qui tute-
le judicio tenentur, non proprié ex
contractu obligati esse intelligun-
tur; nullum enim negotium inter
tutorem et pupillum contrahitur.
Sed, quia sané non ex maleficio te-
nentur, quasi ex contractu teneri
videntur; hoc autem casu mutue
sunt actiones. Non tantum enim
pupillus cum tutore habet tutele
actionem; sed et contra tutor cum
pupillo habet contrariam tutele, si
vel impenderit aliquid in rem pu-
pilli, vel pro eo fuerit obligatus,

$2. A tutor, although subject to
an action of tutelage, is not consid-
ered as bound by contract; for be-
tween a tutor and his pupil there is
none. But as tutors are not sub-
ject to an action of mal-feasance,
they are understood to be bound by
an implied, or quasi-contract; and
hence the right of action is recip-
rocal; the pupil may bring an ac-
tion of tutelage against his tutor,
and a tutor, who has expended his
own money in the affairs of his pu-
pil, or has been bound for him, or
LIB. III.

aut rem suam creditoribus ejus ob-
ligaverit.

s

TIT. XXVIII.

291

has mortgaged his own possessions
to the creditors, is entitled to the
action called contraria tutele.

De rei communione.

$ HT. Item, si inter aliquos com-
munis res sit siné societate, veluti
quod pariter eis legata donatave es-
set, et alter eorum alteri ideo tene-
atur communi dividundo judicio,
quod solus fractus ex ed re percepe-
rit, aut quod socius ejus solus in
eam rem necessarias impensas fece-
rit, non intelligitur ex contractu pro-
prié obligatus esse ; quippe nihil in-
ter se contraxerunt: sed, quia ex
maleficio non tenetur, quasi ex con-
tractu teneri videtur.

De hereditatis

$ IV. Idem juris est de eo, qui
coheredi’ familie erciscunde judi-
cio ex his causis obligatus est.

$ 3. When property is in com-
mon among persons not partners,
as when the same field, or part of
an inheritance, is devised, or given
generally betweentwo; the one may
be called to answer the other
by the action communi dividundo,
either for having taken to his use
the whole produce of the ground; or
because the other hath been at the
sole expence of keeping it in good
order. But neither can properly be
said to be bound by contract, as they
made no agreement between them-
selves ; but, not being criminally li-
able, they are considered as bound
by a quasi-contract. .

communione.

§ 4. And the same law prevails
as to him, who is bound to his co-
heir under the action familie eris-
cunde, for the partition of an uni-
versal inheritance.

De aditione hereditatis.

§ V. Heres quoque legatorum
nomine non proprie ex contractu
obligatus intelligitur; neque enim
cum herede, neque cum defuncto
ullum negotium legatarius gessisse
proprié dici potest; et tamen, quia
ex maleficio non est obligatus, qua-
si ex contractu debere intelligitur.

§ 5. An heir for the same reason
cannot properly be said to be bound
by contract toa legatee, who can
not be supposed to have entered in-
to any compact either with the heir,
or the deceased: but, as the heir
cannot be prosecuted by an action
of mal-feasance, he is considered as
liable to a guasi-contract.
292

LIB. Il TIT XXVIII.

 

De solutione indebiti.

§ VI. Item is, cui quis per erro-
rem non debitum solvit, quasi ex
contractu debere videtur ; aded e-
nim non intelligitur proprié ex con-
tractu obligatus esse; ut, si certio-
rem rationem sequamur, magis (ut
supra diximus) ex distractu quam
ex contractu possit dici obligatus
esse: nam, qui solvendi animo pe-
cuniam dat, in hoc dare videtur, ut
distrahat potius negotium, quam
contrahat. Sed tamen perindé is,
qui accepit, obligatur, ac si mutuum
ei daretur; et ideo condictione ten-
etur.

$6. He, to whom another has
paid by mistake what was not due,
appears to be indebted by quasi-con-
tract ; for he is certainly not bound
by anexpress agreement: and, strict-
ly speaking, he might rather be said
(as we have before observed, ) to be
bound by the dissolution than by
the making of acontract; for he,
who paid the money with an intent
to discharge his debts, seemed ra-
ther inclined to dissolve an engage-
ment, than to contract one. But,
whoever receives money by the mis-
take of another, is as much bound .
to repayment, as if it had been
lent him; and is therefore liable to
an action of condiction.

Quibus ex causis indebitum solutum non repetitur.

§ VI. Ex quibusdam tamen
causis repeti non potest, quod per
errorem non debitum solutum sit ;
sic namque definierunt veteres, ex
quibus causis inficiando lis crescit,
ex iis causis non debitum solutum
repeti non posse; veluti ex lege A-
quilia, item ex legato: quod vete-
res quidem in iis legatis locum ha-
bere voluerunt, que certa constituta
per damnationem cuique legata fu-
erant: nostra autem constitutio, cum
unam naturam omnibus legatis et
fideicommissis indulsit, hujusmodi
augmentum in omnibus legatis et
fideicommissis extendi voluit: sed
non omnibus legatariis hoc preebuit
sed tantummodo in iis legatis et fi-
dei commissis, que sacrosanctis
Ecclesiis, et czeteris venerabilibus lo-

§ 7. In some cases, money paid
by miatake, cannot afterwards be
demanded ; for the ancient lawyers
determined, that where an action
for double the value of the debt is
given upon the denial of it, (as by
the law Agquilia, and in the case of
legacies) the debtor, who has erro-
neously made payment to whom it
was not due, shall never recover it.
But these lawyers would have this
rule to take place only in regard to
fixed and certain legacies, devised
per damnationem. But our consti-
tution, which assigns to legacies
and trusts, one common character,
hath caused this augmentation in
duplum after denial to be extended
to legacies and trusts in general:
yet the privilege of not refunding
LIB. Ill. TIT. XXIXx.

293

 

cis, quee vel religionis vel pietatis
intuitu honorantur, relicta sunt;
quee, si indebita solvantur, non rep-
etuntur.

what is paid by mistake, is by our
constitution only granted to church-
es and other holy places, which are
honoured on account of religion and
piety.

 

TITULUS VIGESIMUS-NONUS.
PER QUAS PERSONAS OBLIGATIO ACQUIRITUR.

C. iv. T. 27.

De his, qui sunt in potestate.

EXPOSITIS generibus obliga-
tionum, que ex contractu vel quasi
ex contractu nascuntur, admonendi
sumus, acquiri nobis non solum per
nosmetipsos, sed per eas quoque
personas, que in nostra potestate
sunt, veluti per servos et filios nos-
tros; ut tamen, quod per servos
nostros nobis acquiritur, totum nos-
trum fiat; quod autem per liberos,
quos in potestate habemus, ex obli-
gatione fuerit acquisitum, hoc divi-
datur secundum imaginem rerum
proprietatis, et usufructus, quam
nostra decrevit constitutio: ut, quod
ab actione commodum perveniat,
hujus usumfructum quidem habeat
pater, proprietas autem filio serve-
tur, scilicet patre actionem moven-
te, secundim novelle nostra con-
stitutionis divisionem.

Having explained the various
kinds of obligations, arising from
contracts or quasi-contracts, we
must now observe, that we acquire
obligations not only by ourselves,
but also by persons under our pow-
er; as by our slaves, and children.
Whatever is acquired by our slaves
is wholly our own; but what is ac-
quired by children, under our pow-
er, by means of their contracts,
must be divided according to our
constitution, which gives to the fa-
ther the usufruct, but reserves the
property to the son. Buta father,
in bringing an action, must act in
obedience to our novel constitution.
294 LIB. III.

TIT. XXIX.

 

De bona fide possessis.

$I Item per liberos homines et
alienos servos, quos bond fide pos-
sidemus acquiritur nobis; sed tan-
tum ex duabus causis, id est, si
quid exoperis suis, vel ex re nostra,
acquirant.

$1. We may also acquire by
means of freemen, and the slaves of
others, whom we possess bona-fide:
but this only in two cases; to wit,
when they have gained an acquisi-
tion by their labour, or by virtue of
something, which belongs to us.

De servo fructuario, vel usuario.

§ HL. Per eum quoque servum, in
quo usum fructum vel usum habe-
mus, similiter ex duabus istis cau-
sis nobis acquiritur.

De servo

$ III. Communem servum pro
dominica parte dominis acquirere
certum est excepto eo, quod nomi-
natim uni stipulando, aut per tradi-
tionem accipiendo, illi soli acquirit;
veluti cum ita stipulatur, Titio do-
mino meo dare spondes? Sed, si do-
mini unius jussu servus fuerit stip-
ulatus, licét antea dubitabatur, ta-
men post nostram decisionem res
expedita est, ut illi tantum acquirat,
qui hoc ei facere jussit, ut supra
dictum est.

§ 2. We may always acquire in
either of the above named cases, by
meanseven of those slaves, of whom
we have only the usufruct or use.

communi.

§ 3. It is certain, that a slave,
who is in common between two or
more, acquires for his masters, in
proportion to their property in him ;
unless he stipulate, or receive in
thename of one of them only; as,
do you promise to give such a
thing to Titius my master? for al-
though it was a doubt in times
past, whether a slave, when com-
manded, could stipulate for one of
his masters; yet, it is now settled
by our decision, that a slave may
acquire for him only, who hath or-
dered the stipulation.
LIB. HI.

TIT. XXX.

295

 

TITULUS TRIGESIMUS.

QUIBUS MODIS TOLLITUR OBLIGATIO.

D. iv. T. 2,3, 4. ©. viii. T. 42, 43, 44.

De solutione.

TOLLITUR autem omnis obli-
gatio solutione ejus, quod debetur;
vel si quis consentiente creditore
aliud pro alio solverit. Nec inte-
rest, quis solvat, utrum ipse, qui
debet, an alius pro eo; liberatur
enim et alio solvente, sivé sciente,
Sivé ignorante debitore, vel invito
eo solutio fiat. Item, si reus sol-
verit, etiam ii, qui pro eo interve-
nerunt, liberantur. Idem ex con-
trario contingit, si fide-jussor sol-
verit; non enim ipse solus libera-
tur, sed etiam reus.

An obligation is dissolved by the
payment of what is due; or by the
payment of one thing for another,
if the creditor consent; nor is it ma-
terial whether payment be made by
the debtor himself, or by another
for him; for the debt is discharged
when another has paid it, either
with or without the knowledge, or
even against the consent of the
debtor. So, when a debtor pays his
creditors, his sureties are freed: on
the other hand when a surety dis-
charges his obligation, he not only
becomes free himself, but he dis-
charges the principal debtor also.

De acceptilatione.

§ I. Item per acceptilationem
tollitur obligatio: est autem accep-
tilatio imaginaria solutio: quod e-
nim ex verborum obligatione Titio
debetur, id, si velit Titius remitte-
re, poterit sic fieri, ut patiatur hee
verba debitorem dicere: quod ego
tibt promisi, habesne acceptum? et
Titius respondeat, habeo. Sed et
Grecé potest acceptilatio fieri;
dummodo sic fiat, ut Latinis verbis
solet ; exerg haBuy dnvagee toou exw
daBor, Guo genere, (ut diximus,)
tantum ez solvuntur obligationes,
que ex verbis consistunt, non etiam
ceteree. Consentaneum enim visum

§ 1. An obligation is also dissolv-
ed by acceptilation or acknowledge-
ment; which is an imaginary pay-
ment: for, if Titiws be willing to
remit what is due to him by a verbal
contract, it may be done, if the debt-
or should say, do you consider what
Lf promised you, as accepted and re-
ceived? and Titius answer, I do.
An acceptilation may also be made
in Greek, if it be so worded, as to.
agree with the Latin form; do you
acknowledge to have received so
many Denarii? I do. But verbal
contracts only are thus dissolved :
and it seems proper that an obliga-
296 LIB. III.

TIT. XXX.

 

est, verbis factam obligationem aliis
posse verbis dissolvi. Sed et id,
quod alia ex causa debetur, potest
in stipulationem deduci, et per ac-
ceptilationem dissolvi. Sicut etiam
quod debetur pro parte recté solvi-
tur; ita in parte debiti, acceptilatio
fieri potest.

tion, verbally created, may be dis-
solved by other words of a contrary
import. But itis observable, that
any species of contract may be re-
duced to a stipulation, and of course
dissolved by acceptilation. As a
debt may be paid in part by money,
it may be discharged in part also by
acceptilation.

De Aquiliana stipulatione et acceptilatione.

$ IL Est autem prodita stipulatio,
que vulgo Aquiliana appellatur,per
quam contingit, ut omnium rerum
obligatio in stipulatum deducatur,
et ea per acceptilationem tollatur.
Stipulatio enim Aquiliana renovat
omnes obligationes, et 4 Gallo A-
quilio ita composita est. Quicquid
te mihi ex quacunque causa dare
Sacere oportet oportebitve, presens in
diemve, aut sub conditione ; quarum-
cunque rerum mihi tecum actio est,
queque adversus te petitio, vel adver-
sus te persecutio, est eritve ; quodve
tu meum habes, tenes, possides, do-
love malo fecisti quo minus possi-
deas ; quanti quaeque earum rerum
res erit, tantam pecuniam dari sti-
pulatus est Aulus Agerius, spopon-
dit, Numerius Nigidius. Quod
Numerius Nigidius Aulo Agerio
spopondit,id haberetne a se acceptum
Numerius Nigidius Aulum Ageri-
um rogavit: Aulus Agerius Nu-
merio Nigidio acceptum fecit.

§ 2. There is another species of
stipulation, called commonly the A-
quilian, by virtue of which every
other kind of obligation may be re-
duced to a stipulation, and may af-
terwards be dissolved by acceptila-
tion. For the Aquilian stipulation
changes all obligations,and was con-
stituted by Gallus Aquilius in the
following manner. Do you pro-
mise, said Aulus Agerius to Nu-
merius Nigidius, io pay me a sum
of money, in lieu of what you
was, or shall be, obliged to give
me, or to perform for my benefit,
either simply, at a day to come, or
upon condition ; and in lieu of those
things, which, being my property,
you have, detain, or possess; or
of which you have fraudulently
quitted the possession; and for
which I may, or shall be, intitled to
any species of action, plaint, or pro-
secution ; Numerius Nigidius an-
swered, 7 do: and, when this was
said, Numerius Nigidius asked
Aulus Agerius, if he acknowledg-
cd the money as accepted and re.
ceived, which he (Numerius) had
promised? to which Aulus Age-
rius answered, that he did so ac-
knowledge it.
LIB. III.

TIT. XXX. 297

 

De Novatione.

§$ III. Preterea, Novatione tol-
litur obligatio; veluti si id, quod
tibi Seius debebat, 4 Titio stipula-
tus sis. Nam interventu nove per-
sone nova nascitur obligatio, et
prima tollitur, translata in posterio-
rem: adeo ut interdum, licét poste-
rior stipulatio inutilis sit, tamen
prima novationis jure tollatur; ve-
luti si id, quod tu Titio debes, 4
pupillo siné tutoris auctoritate stip-
ulatus fuerit ; quo casu res amitti-
tur: nam et prior debitor liberatur,
et posterior obligatio nulla est.
Non idem juris est, si a servo quis
fuerit stipulatus: nam tunc prior
perindé obligatus manet, ac si pos-
tea nullus stipulatus fuisset. Sed,
si eadem persona sit, a qua postea
stipuleris, ita demum novatio fit, si
quid in posteriore stipulatione novi
sit; forté si conditio aut dies aut
fidejussor adjiciatur aut detraha-
tur. Quod autem diximus, si con-
ditio adjiciatur, novationem fieri,
sic intelligi oportet, ut ita dicamus
factam novationem, si conditio ex-
titerit; alioqui, si defecerit, durat
prior obligatio. Sed, cum hoc qui-
dem inter veteres constabat, tunc
fieri novationem, cum novandi ani-
mo in secundam obligationem itum
fuerat, per hoc autem dubium erat,
quando novandi animo vitetur hoc
fieri, et quasdam de hoc presump-
tiones alii in aliis casibus introdu-
cebant, ideo nostra processit con-
stitutio, que apertissime definivit,
tunc solum novationem prioris ob-

38

§ 3. An obligation is also dis-
solved by novation; as when you
stipulate with Titius to receive
from him what is due to you from
Seius. For, by the intervention of
a new debtor, a fresh obligation
arises, by which the former is dis-
charged, and transferred to the lat-
ter. Sometimes, although the lat-
ter be of no force, yet the prior
contract is discharged by the mere
act of novation: as if Titius should
stipulate to receive what I owe
him, from a pupil without authori-
ty of his tutor; here the debt is
lost, because the first’ debtor is
freed, and the second obligation is
void: but itis not so if a man con-
tract by stipulation with a slave,
(intending a novation;) for then
the first debtor remains bound, as
if there had been no second stipu-
lation. And, if you stipulate from
the same person a second time, a
novation arises, if any thing new
be contained in the latter stipula-
tion; as a condition, a day, or a
bondsman added, or taken away.
But when a condition only is add-
ed, novation does not take place,
till the event happen; and, till
then, the prior obligation contin-
ues. The ancient lawyers held
that a novation arose, when a sec.
ond contract was intended to dis-
solve a former; but it was always
difficult to know with what intent
the second obligation was made;
and for want of positive proof,
298

LIB. I. TIT. XxX.

 

ligationis fieri, quoties hoc ipsum
inter contrahentes expressum fue-
rit, quod propter novationem prio-
ris obligationis convenerunt; alio-
qui et manere pristinam obligatio-
nem, et secundam ei accedere, ut
maneat ex utraque causa obligatio,
secundim nostre constitutionis de-
finitionem, quam licet ex ipsius
lectione apertius cognoscere.

\

opinions were founded on pre-
sumptions, arising from the cir-
cumstances of each case. This
incertainty gave rise to our consti-
tution, which enacts that a nova-
tion of a former contract shall only
take place, when it is expressed by
the contractors, that they cove-
nanted with this intent; otherwise
the first contract shall continue
valid, and the second be regarded
as an accession to it; so that an
obligation may remain under both
contracts, as may be better known
by perusing our constitution on
this subject.

De contrario consensu.

§ IV. Hoc amplius, ez obliga-
tiones, que consensu contrahuntur,
contrarié voluntate dissolvuntur.
Nam, si Titius et Seius inter se
consenerint, ut fundum Tuscula-
num emptum Seius haberet cen-
tum aureis, deinde, re nondum se-
cuta, (id est, neque pretio soluto;
neque fundo tradito,) placuerit in-
ter eos, ut discederetur ab e4 emp-
tione et venditione, invicém libe-
rantur. Idem est in conductione
et locatione; et in omnibus con-
tractibus, qui ex consensu decen-
dunt, sictt jam dictum est.

§ 4. Farther, obligations con-
tracted by consent, may be dissolv-
ed by dissent. For, if T'itiws and
Seius have agreed that Seiws shall
have a certain estate for an hun-
dred aurei, and afterwards before
execution, that is, before payment,
or livery of the land, the parties
dissent from their agreement, they
are mutually discharged. The
same may be said of location and
conduction, and of all other con-
tracts, which arise from consent.

FINIS LIBRI TERTII.
DIVI JUSTINIANT

INSTITUTIONUM

LIBER QUARTUS.

 

TITULUS

PRIMUS.

DE OBLIGATIONIBUS, QUE, EX DELICTO NAS-
CUNTUR.

D. xivii. T. 2. C. vi. T. 2.

Continuatio et divisio obligationum ex delicto.

CUM sit expositum superiore
libro de obligationibus ex contractu
et quasi ex contractu, sequitur, ut
de obligationibus ex maleficio et
quasi ex maleficio dispiciamus. Sed
ille quidem, ut suo loco tradidi-
mus, in quatuor genera dividuntur ;
he vero unius generis sunt: nam
omnes ex re nascuntur, id est, ex
ipso maleficio; veluti ex furto, ra-
pina, damno, injuria.

Having explained in the preced-
ing book the nature of obligations,
which arise from contracts and
quasi-contracts, it follows, that we
should here treat of those, which a-
rise from male-feasance and quasi-
male-feasance. The former, as we
have shewn in the proper place, are
divided into four species; but the
latter are of one kind only; for they
all arise ex re, that is, from the
crime or male-feasance itself; as
from theft, rapine, damage, injury.

Definitio furti.

§ IL Furtum est contrectatio
fraudulosa, lucri faciendi gratia, vel
ipsius rei, vel etiam usts ejus, pos-
sessionisve : quod lege naturali pro-
hibitum est admittere.

$1. Theft, is the taking, using,
or possessing any thing by fraud
for the sake of gain. And this is
prohibited by the law of nature.
300

LIB. IV.

TIT. 1.

 

Etymologia.

$ IL. Furtum autem vel 4 furvo,
id est, nigro, dictum est, quod clam
et obscuré fiat, vel plerumque nocte:
vel 4 fraude: vel 4 ferendo, id est,
auferendo: vel 4 Greco sermone,
quod gweas appellant fures: imo et
Greci, do te pegerr, pwgas dixerint.

$2. The word furtum [theft] is
derived from furvum ; [black or
dark;] because theft is committed
privately, and generally in the
night: or from fraus [fraud]:
——or from ferendo, i. e. (auferen-
do) and denotes a substraction, or
taking away. Or perhaps from the
Greek ; for the Gireeks call fures,
gages from pega, to take away.

 

Divisio.

$ Ill. Furtorum autem duo
sunt genera; manifestum et nec
manifestum: nam conceptum et
oblatum species potius actionis sunt
furto coherentes, quam genera fur-
torum, sicit inferius apparebit.
Manifestus fur est, quem Greci
ex’ «vtogugw appellant: nec soluim is,
qui in ipso furto deprehenditur, sed
etiam is, qui eo loco deprehenditur,
quo furtum fit; veluti qui in domo
furtum fecit, et, nondim  egres-
sus januam, depreheusus fuerit:
et qui in oliveto olivarum, aut in
vineto uvarum, furtum, fecit, quam-
diu in eo oliveto aut vineto de-
prehensus fuerit. Imo ulterius
furtum manifestum est extenden-
dum, quamdiu eam rem fur tenens
visus vel deprehensus fuerit, sivé
in publico, sive in privato, vel 4
domino, vel ab alio, antequam eo
pervenerit, quo deferre vel depo-
nere destinasset. Sed, si pertulit,
quo destinavit, tametsi deprehen-
datur cum re furtivd, non est mani-
festus fur. Nec manifestum fur-
tum quid sit, ex iis, que diximus,
intelligitur; nam quod manifestum

$ 2. Of theft there are two kinds,
manifest and not manifest: for the
thefts,called conceptum and oblatum,
rather denote the kind of action con-
nected with theft, than-the kind of
theft; as will appear in the next pa-
ragraph. A manifest thief, whom
the Greeks call ex’ avtogagw, is he,
who is taken in the act of thieving,
or in the place, where he committed
it; asif a man, having committed a
theft within a house, should be ap-
prehended before he had passed the
outward door: or, having stolen

-grapes or olives, should be taken in

the vineyard or olive orchard. Ma-
nifest theft is also farther extended :
for, if the thief be apprehended,
while seen in possession of the thing
stolen, or if he be taken in public or
in private, by the owner or bya
stranger, at any time before his ar-
rival at the place, to which he pro-
posed to carry it, he is guilty of a
manifest theft. But if he actually
arrive, before apprehension, at the
place proposed, then, although the
thing stolen be found upon him, he
is not a manifest thief. By this de-
LIB. IV.

TIT. I. 301

 

non est, id scilicet nec manifestum
est.

 

 

scription of manifest theft, may be
understood what is theft not mani-

Jest.

De furto concepto, oblato, prohibito, non exhibito.

§ IV. Conceptum furtum dici-
tur, cum apud aliquem, testibus
presentibus, furtiva res quesita et
inventa sit: nam in eum propria
actio constituta est, quamvis fur
non sit; qua appellatur concepti.
Oblatum furtum dicitur, cum res
furtiva ab aliquo tibi oblata sit, ea-
que apud te concepta sit; utique
si ed mente tibi data fuerit, ut apud
te potius, quam apud eum, qui
dedit, conciperetur : nam tibi, apud
quem concepta sit, propria adver-
sus eum, qui obtulit, quamvis fur
non sit, constituta est actio, que
appellatur oblati. Est etiam pro-
hibiti furti actio, adversus eum, qui
furtum querere testibus presenti-
bus volentem prohibuerit. Preete-
rea pena constituitur edicte preeto-
ris per actionem furti non exhibiti
adversus eum, qui furtivam rem
apud se quesitam et inventam non
exhibuit. Sed he actiones, scilicet
concepti, et oblati, et furti prohi-
biti, nec non furti non exhibiti, in
desuetudinem abierunt. Cum enim
requisitio rei furtivee hodie secun-
dum veterem observationem non
fiat, merito ex consequentid, etiam
prefate actiones ab usu communi
recesserunt; cum manifestum sit,
quod omnes, qui scientes rem fur-
tivam susceperint, et celaverint, fur-
ti nec manifesti obnoxii sunt.

§ 4. A theft is called conceptum
[2. e. found] when a thing stolen is
searched for and found upon some
person in the presence of witnesses ;
and a particular action, called actio
concepti, lies against such possessor,
although he did not commit the
theft. A theft is called oblatum, [i.
e. offered,] when a thing stolen is
offered to Titius, and found upon
him, it having been given to him by
Seius, with intent that it might ra-
ther be found upon Titius than up-
on himself: and in this case a spe-
cial action, called actio oblati, may
be brought by Ttius against Seius,
although Seiws was not guilty of
the theft. The action, called prohi-
biti furti, also lies against him,
who prevents another from inquir-
ing of theft in the presence of wit-
nesses. And farther, a penalty was
appointed by pretorian edict to be
sued by the action furti non exhibiti
against any man for not having pro-
duced things stolen, which upon
search were found to have been in
his possession. But these four ac-
tions are become quite obsolete ; for,
since a search after things stolen is
not now made according to ancient
formalities, these actions have in
consequence ceased to be in use;
for it is a settled point, that all, who
knowingly have received and con-
cealed a thing stolen, are subject to
the penalty of theft not manifest.
302 LIB. IV.

TIT. 1

 

Pena.

$ V. Pena manifesti furti quad-
rupli est, tam ex servi, quam ex
liberi persona ; 2ec manifesti, dupli.

Quomodo furtum fit

§$ VI. Furtum autem fit, non so-
lum cum quis intercipiendi causa
rem alienam amovet; sed generali-
ter, cum quis alienam rem, invito
domino, contrectat. Itaque sivé
creditor pignore, sive is, apud quem
res deposita est, ed re utatur; sivé
is, qui rem utendam accepit, in ali-
um usum eam transferat, quam cu-
jus gratia ei data est, furtum com-
mittit; veluti, si quis argentum u-
tendum acceperit, quasi amicos ad
ccenam invitaturus, et id peregre
secum tulerit; aut si quis equum,
gestandi causid commodatum sibi,
longius aliquo duxerit: quod vete-
res scripserunt de eo, qui in aciem
equum perduxisset.

§ 5. The penalty of committing
manifest theft, is quadruple, whe-
ther the thief be bond or free; the
penalty of theft not manifest, is dou-
ble the value of the thing stolen.

; de contrectatione.

$ 6. Theft is committed not only,
when one man removes the proper-
ty of another to appropriate it to
himself, but also generally, when
one man uses the property of ano-
ther against the will of the proprie-
tor; thus, if a creditor uses a pledge,
or a depositary the deposit left with
him, or if he who hath only the use
of a thing for a special purpose, con-
verts it to other uses, a theft is com-
mitted. If any one borrows plate
under pretence of using it at an
entertainment of his friends, and
then carries it away to a foreign
country—or borrows a horse, and
rides it farther than he ought, theft
is also committed ; and the ancients
extended this to him, who rides a
borrowed horse into a field of
battle.

De affectu furandi.

§ VIL. Placuit tamen, eos, qui
rebus commodatis aliter uterentur,
quam utendas acceperint,ita furtum
committere, si se intelligant id, in-
vito domino, facere; eumque, si in-
tellexisset, non permissurum: at, si
permissurum credant, extra crimen
videri, optima sané distinctione;

$ 7. But it hath been adjudged,
that whoever applies a thing bor-
rowed to other uses than those for
which he borrowed it, is not guilty
of theft, unless the borrower knew,
that he so applied it contrary to the
will of the owner, who would not
have permitted such application, if
LIB. IV.

quia furtum siné affectu furandi
non committitur.

TIT. L. 303

he had been apprized of it. But it
should seem, that the borrower is
hot guilty, if it appear, that he re-
lied on the owner’s consent. And
this isa good distinction ; for a theft
can never be committed, unless
there appear to have been an inten-
tion of stealing.

De voluntate domini.

§ VUI. Sed et, si credat aliquis,
invito domino, se rem commodatam
sibi contrectare, domino autem vo-
lente id fiat, dicitur furtum non fie-
ri. Unde illud quesitum est, cum
Titius servum Meevii solicitaverit,
ut quasdam res domino surriperet,
et ad eam perferret, et servus id ad
dominum pertulerit; Mevius au-
tem, dum vult Titium in ipso delic-
to deprehendere, permisserit servo
quasdam res ad eum perferre; u-
trum furti, an servi corrupti, judicio
teneatur Titius, an neutro? Et
cum nobis super hac dubitatione
suggestum est, et antiquorum pru-
dentium super hoc altercationes per-
speximus, quibusdam neque furti,
neque servicorrupti, actionem pre-
stantibus, quibusdam furti tantum-
modo, nos, hujusmodi calliditati
obviam euntes, per nostram consti-
tutionem sancimus, non solum furti
actionem, sed et servi corrupti con-
tra eum dari. Licet enim is servus
deterior 4 solicitatore minimé factus
est, et ided non concurrant regule,
que servi corrupti actionem intro-
ducunt; tamen consilium corrup-
toris ad perniciem probitatis servi
introductum est, ut sit ei pcenalis

§ 8. But, if a man use a thing
borrowed against the will of the
owner, as he believes, but who in
reality consents that it should be so
used, theft is not committed ; hence
arises a question on the following
case. Titius solicited the slave of
Mevius to rob his master, and to
bring him the things stolen; of this
the slave informs his master, who,
being desirous of catching Tidws in
the fact, permitted the slave to carry
certain things to Titiws, as stolen;
will Titius be subject to an action
of theft, or to an action for having
corrupted a slave, or to neither ?
When this was proposed to us as a
matter of doubt, and we examined
the altercations of ancient lawyers
upon the point, some of them allow-
ing of neither of the before-named
actions, and others allowing an ac-
tion of theft only, we, being willing
to obviate all subtilities, decreed
that not only an action of theft
might be brought, but also the ac-
tion servi corrupti, which lies for
having corrupted a slave. For al-
though the slave became not the
worse for the solicitation, and there-
fore the causes, which introduce the
304 LIB. IV.

actio imposita, tanquam si re ipsa
fuisset servus corruptus; ne ex hu-
jusmodi impunitate et in alium ser-
vum, qui facilé possit corrumpi,
tale facinus 4 quibusdam perpetre-
tur.

Quarum rerum furtum fit.

§ IX. Interdim etiam Jiberorum
hominum furtum fit; veluti si quis
liberorum nostrorum, qui in potes-
tate nostra sunt, surreptus fuerit.

TIT. 1.

action servi corrupti, do not concur ;
yet inasmuch as such solicitation
was intended to corrupt, it hath
therefore pleased us, that a penal
action shall lie against the party so-
liciting, in the same manner as if
he had actually succeeded by cor-
rupting the slave; lest impunity
might encourage evil-disposed per-
sons to make the same attempt up-
on other slaves, who might be more
easily corrupted.

De liberis hominibus.

$9. A theft may be committed
even of free persons; as, for in-
stance, when children who are un-
der power, are surreptitiously taken
from their parents.

De re propria.

§ X. Aliquando etiam suze rei
furtum quis committit; veluti si
debitor rem, quam creditori pigno-
ris causa dedit, subtraxerit.

Qui tenentur furti.

§$ 10. A man may also commit a
theft of his own property ; as when
a debtor takes away the pledge left
with his creditor.

De eo, cujus ope, consilio, furtum

factum est.

§ XI. Interdum quoque furti te-
netur, qui ipse furtum non fecit;
qualis est is, cujus ope et consilio
furtum factumest. In quo numero
est, qui tibi nummos excussit, ut
alius eos raperet; aut tibi obstiterit,
ut alius rem tuam exciperit; aut
oves tuas, vel boves fugaverit, ut
alius eas acciperet. Et hoc peteres
scripserunt de eo, qui panno rubro
fugavit armentum. Sed, si quid
eorum per lasciviam, et non data
opera, ut furtum admitteretur, fac-
tum est, in factum actio dari debet.

$11. An action of theft will, in
some cases, lie against persons who
did not actually commit the theft:
as against those, by whose aid and
advice the theft was committed :
whoever strikes money out of your
hand, to theintent that another may
pick it up; or so obstructs you, as
to enable his accomplice to take
your sheep, oxen, or any part of
your property, must be regarded as
an aider and adviser. The ancient
lawyers also included him in this
number, who frightened away a
LIB. IV.

At, ubi ope Mevii Titius furtum
fecerit, ambo furti tenentur. Ope
et consilio ejus quoque furtum ad-
mitti videtur, qui scalas forte fenes-
tris supponit, aut ipsas fenestras vel
ostium effringit, ut aliis furtum fa-
ceret; quive ferramenta ad effrin-
gendum, aut scelas, ut fenestris
supponerentur, commodaverit Cer-
té, qui nullam opem ad furtum fa-
ciendum adhibuit, sed tantum con-
silium dedit, atque hortatus est ad
furtum faciendum, non tenetur furti.

TIT. L 305
herd from its pasture with a red
cloth. But, if a man should do
any of these acts wantonly, without
intention of thieving, then an action
can only lie in factum ; i.e. upon
the case, or the fact done: but, .
when Ti¢ius commits theft by the
aid of Mcevius, they are both sub-
ject to an action of theft. Theft
seems to be committed both by aid
and advice, when a man puts a lad-
der to a window, or breaks open a
door or window, to the intent, that
another may commit theft ; or when
one man lends another iron bars, or
ladders, knowing the bad purposes
to which they are to be applied.
But it is certain, that he, who hath
afferded no actual assistance, but
hath only given his council by ad-
vising the crime, is not liable to an
action of theft.

De his, qui sunt in potestate. Et de ope ac consilio extranei.

§ XII. Hi, qui in parentum vel
dominorum potestate sunt, si rem
eis surripiunt, furtum quidem faci-
unt, et res in furtivam causam ca-
dit; nec ob id ab ullo usucapi po-
test, antequam in domini potestatem
revertatur: sed furti actio non nas-
citur; quia nec ex alia ulla causa
potest inter eos actio nasci. Si ve-
16 ‘ope et consilio alterius furtum
factum fuerit, quia utique furtum
committitur, convenienter ille furti
tenetur; quia verum est, ope et con-
silio ejus furtum factum esse.

39

§ 12. When persons under the
power of parents or masters take
from them anything surreptitiously,
it is considered that a theft is com-
mitted; so that it cannot be pre-
scribed to, by any one, until it hath
first reverted into the power of the
owner; and yet an action of theft
will not lie; for no action lies be-
tween parents and children, or
masters and slaves. But if the
fact were done by the aid and
advice of any other, inasmuch asa
theft is committed, an action of
theft will lie against the accessary.
306

LIB. IV.

TIT. L

 

Quibus datur actio furti.

$ XIII. Furti autem actio ei
competit, cujus interest rem stlvam
esse, licét dominus non sit: itaque
nec domino aliter competit, quam
si ejus intersit, rem non perire.

$13. An action of theft may be
brought by any man, who has an
interest in the safety of the thing
stolen, although he be not the pro-
prietor; and the proprietor himself
can have no action, unless he have
an interest.

De pignore surrepto creditori.

§ XIV. Unde constat creditorem
de pignore surrepto furti actione

agere posse, etiamsi idoneum debi--

torem habeat; quia expedit ei pig-
nori potius incumbere, quam in per-
sonam agere; adeo quidem ut,
quamvis ipse debitor eam rem sur-
ripuerit, nihilominus creditori com-
petat actio furti.

$14. Hence, a creditor may
bring this action for a pledge sto-
len, although his debtor be solvent;
because it may be more expedient
for him to rely upon his pledge,
than to bring suit against his debt-
or; and, although the debtor him-
self should have purloined the
pledge, yet an action of theft will
lie against him.

De re fulloni, vel sarcinatori, vel bone fidei emptori, surrepta.

§ XV. Item si fullo polienda cu-
randave, aut sarcinator sarcienda,
vestimenta mercede certa constituta
acceperit, eaque furto amiserit, ipse
furti habet actionem, non dominus;
quia domini nihil interest, eam rem
non perire ; cum judicio locati a ful-
lone, aut sarcinatore, rem suam
persequi possit. Sed et bone fidei
emptori surrepta re, quam emerit,
quamvis dominus non sit, omnind
competit furti actio, quemadmo-
dum etcreditori. Fulloni vero et
sarcinatori non aliter furti action-
em competer placuit, quam si sol-
vendo fuerint; hoe est, si domino
sei estimationem solvere possint.
Nam, si solvendo non sint, tunc,
quia ab eis suum consequi non pos-
sit, ipsi domino furti competit ac-

$15. A fuller whoreceives clothes:
to clean, which are stolen from him,
may bring an action of theft, but
not the owner ; for the owner is not
considered as interested in their
safety, having a right of action,
called locati against the fuller. But,
if a thing be stolen from a bona fi-
de purchaser, he is intitled, like a
creditor, to an action of theft, al-
though he be not the proprietor.
But an action of theft is not main-
tainable by the fuller, or any trades-
man insimilarcircumstances, unless
he besolvent; that is, unless he be
able to pay the owner the full value
of the thing lost: for, if the fuller
be insolvent, then the owner, who
cannot recover from the fuller, is al-
lowed to bring an action of theft,
LIB. VI.

to; quia hoc causa ipsius interest,
rem salvam esse. Idem est, etsi

in parte solvendo fuerit fullo aut
Sarcinator.

TIT. I. 307

having in this case an interest.
And this although the tradesman
be partially solvent.

De re commodata.

$ XVI. Que de fullone et sar-
cinatore diximus, eadem et ad eum,
cul commodata res est, transferen-
da, veteres existimabant. Nam ut
ille fullo, mercedem accipiendo,
custodiam preestat, ita is quoque,
qui commodatum utendi causa ac-
cepit, similiter necesse habet custo-
diam preestare. Sed nostra provi-
dentia etiam hoc in nostris deci-
sionibus emendavit, ut in domini
voluntate sit, sivé comodati actio-
nem adversus eum, qui rem com-
modatum accepit, movere deside-
rat, sive furti adversus eum, qui
rem surripuit; et, alterutraé earum
electé, dominum non posse ex pe-
nitentid ad alteram venire action-
em: sed, si quidem furem eligeret,
illum, qui rem utengdam accepit,
penitus liberari; sin autem commo-
dator veniat adversus eum, qui
rem utemdam accepit, ipsi quidem
nullo modo competere posse adver-

sus furem furti actionem ; eum au-_

tem, qui pro re commodata conve-
nitur, posse adversus furem furti
habere actionem ; ita tamen, si do-
minus, sciens rem esse surreptam,
adversus eum, cui res commodata
fuerit, pervenit. Sin autem nesci-
us et dubitans, rem esse surreptam,
apud eum commodati actionem in-
stituerit: postea autem, re comper-
ta, voluerit. remittere quidem com-

§ 16. The ancients were of
opinion, that what we have said of
a tradesman is equally applicable
toa borrower. For as the fuller,
by agreeing fora certain price, is
obliged to answer for the clothes
committed to his care, so is he who
receives a loan for the sake of us-
ing it, under the like necessity of
preserving it. But we have amend-
ed the law in this point by our de-
cisions, so that it is now at the will
of the owners either to bring an
action of theft against the thief, or
an action on account of the thing
lent, against the borrower. But, if
the owner once made an election,
he cannot afterwards have recourse
to the other remedy; if he prose-
cutes the thief, the borrower is dis-
charged; if he brings suit against
the borrower, he cannot sue the
thief. But the borrower, who is
sued on account of the thing lent,
may bring an action of theft against
the thief, if the owner suing were
apprized, that the thing was stolen ;
but, if the owner, either not know-
ing or doubting of the theft, insti-
tute an action of loan against the
borrower, and afterwards upon in-
formation is willing to withdraw
it, and recur to an action of theft,
he shall have liberty, in considera-
tion of his incertainty, to prosecute
308 LIB. IV.

TIT. I.

 

modati actionem, ad furti autem
actionem pervenire, tunc licentia ei
concedatur et adversus furem ve-
nire, obstaculo nullo ci opponendo;
quoniam incertus constitutus movit
advursus eum, qui rem utendam
accepit, commodati actionem ; nisi
domino ab eo satisfactum fuerit :
tunc etenim omnino furem 4 domi-
no quidem furti actione liberari;
suppositum autem esse ei, qui pro
re sibi commodata domino satisfe-
cit; cum manifestissimum sit, eti-
amsi ab initio dominus actionem
commodati instituerit, ignarus rem
esse surreptam, postea hutem, hoc
ei cognito, adversus furem transi-
erit, omnino liberari eum, qui rem
commodatam acceperit, quemcun-
que cuasz exitum dominus adver-
sus furem habuerit: eadem defini-
tione obtinente, sivé in parte, sivé
in solidum solvendo sit is, qui rem
commodatam acceperit.

the thief without obstacle, if the
borrower has not satisfied his de-
mand; but if he has, then the thief
is freed from any action of theft by
the owner and remains subject to
prosecution of the borrower, who
hath satisfied the owner. But it is
most manifest, that if the owner of
any particular thing not knowing,
that it is stolen, should at first in-
stitute an action of loan against
the borrower, but should after-
wards, upon better information,
choose to pursue the thief by an
action of theft, the borrower is se-
cure, whatever may be the issue of
the action brought against the
‘thief. And this is law, whether
the borrower be able to answer the
whole, or a part only, of the value
of the thing.

De re deposita.

§ XVII. Sed is, apud quem res
deposita est, custodiam non pres-
tat; sed tantum in eo obnoxius est,
si quid ipse dolo malo facerit; qua
de caus, si res ei surrepta fuerit,
quia restituende ejus rei nomine
depositi, non tenetur, nec ob id ejus
interest rem salvam essé, furti age-
re non potest: sed furti actio do-
mino competit.

§ 17. A depositary is not oblig-
ed to make good the deposited, un-
less he be himself guilty of some
fraud ; aud therefore, as he is not
obliged to make restitution, when
the deposit is stolen, and has con-
sequently no interest in the preser-
vation of it, he cannot bring an ac-
tion of theft, which in this case can
only be maintained by the owner.

An impubes furti teneatur.

§ XVII. In summa sciendum
est, queesitum esse, an impubes rem
alienam amovendo furtum faciat ?

§ 18. It hath been a question
whether a person within puberty,
taking away the property of another
LIB. IV.

TIT. I. 309

 

Et placuit, quia furtum ex effectu
furandi consistit, ita demtm obliga-
ri eo crimine impuberem, si proxi-
mus pubertati sit, et ob id intelligat
se delinquere.

can be guilty of theft? And it hath
been determined, that as theft con-
sists in the intention of defrauding,
a person approaching to puberty
and sensible of doing wrong, may
be charged with theft.

Quid veniat in hanc actionem ; et de affinibus actionibus.

$ XIX. Furti actio, sivé dupli,
sivé quadrupli, tantum ad pene
persecutionem pertinet: nam ipsius
rei persecutionem extrinsecus ha-
bet dominus, quam aut vindicando
aut condicendo potest auferre. Sed
rei vindicatio quidem adversus pos-
sessorem est, sivé fur ipse possidet,
sivé alius quilibet; condictio au-
tem adversus furem ipsum, here-
demve ejus, licét non possideat,
competit.

§$ 19. An action of theft can only
be brought for the penalty, whether
double or quadruple: for the owner
may recover the thing itself, either
by vindication or condiction. An
action of vindication may be brought
either against the thief or any other
in possession; but condiction is
maintainable only against the thief
himself, or his heir; and it will lie
against either of them, whether in
possession of the thing stolen, or not.

 

TITULUS SECUNDUS.

DE VI BONORUM RAPTORUM.

D. xivii. T. 8. C. ix. T. 33.

Origo hujus actionis, et quid in eam veniat.

QUI vi res alienas rapit, tenetur
quidem etiam furti; (quis enim
magis alienam rem, invito domino,
contrectat, quam qui vi rapit ? ideo-
que recté dictum est, eum impro-
bum furem esse;) sed tamen pro-
priam actionem ejus delicti nomine
pretor introduxit, que appellatur
vi bonorum raptorum ; et est intra
annum quadrupli, post annum sim-

He who takes the property of
another by force, is liable to an ac-
tion of theft; [for who can be said
to take the property of another more
against his will, than he, who takes
it by force? it is therefore rightly
observed, that he isa thief of the
worst kind:] the praetor however,
hath introduced a peculiar action in
this case, called vi bonorum rapto-
310 LIB. IV.

pli; que actio utilis est, etiamsi
quis unam rem, licet minimam, ra-
puerit. Quadruplum autem non to-
tum peena est, siclt in actione furti
manifesti diximus; sed in quadru-
plo inest et rei persecutio; ut pe-
na tripli sit, sive comprehendatur
raptor in ipso delicto, sivé non.
Ridiculum enim esset, levioris con-
ditionis esse eum, qui vi rapit,
quam qui clam amovet.

TIT. IL

rum; which, if brought within a
year after the robbery, inforces the
payment of the quadruple value of
the thing taken; but, if brought
after the expiration of a year, then
the simple value only is claimable;
and this action may be brought for
any single thing, though of the smal.
lest value, if taken by force. But the
quadruple value is not altogether
penalty, as in an action of manifest
theft ; for the thing itself is includ-
ed, so that, strictly, the penalty
is only threefold; but then it is
inflicted without distinguishing
whether the robber was, or was not
taken in the actual commission of
the fact. For it would be ridicu-
lous, that a robber, who uses force,
should be in a better condition, than
he, who is only guilty of clandes-
tine theft.

Adversus quos datur.

$ I. Ita tamen competit hee ac-

tio, si dolo malo quis rapuerit;

nam, qui aliquo errore ductus, rem
suam esse existimans, et imprudens
juris, eo animo rapuerit, quasi do-
mino liceat etiam per vim rem suam
auferre 4 possessoribus, absolvi de-
bet: cui scilicét conveniens est,
nec furti teneri eum,-qui eodem
hoc animo rapuit. Sed, ne, dum
talia excogitantur, inveniatur via,
per quam raptores impuné suam
exerceant avaritiam, melius divali-
bus constitutionibus pro hac parte
prospectum est, ut nemini liceat
vi rapere vel rem mobilem, vel se
moventem, licét suam eandem rem
_existimet. Sed, si quis contra sta-

$1. This action is maintainable
also on the ground of fraud: but if
aman, ignorant of the law and erro-
neously deeming some particular
thing to be his own, should take it
away by force from the possessor,
upon full persuasion that he, as pro-
prietor, could justify such a proceed:
ing, he ought to be acquitted upon
this action: neither is he subject,
under these circumstances, to an ac-
tion of theft. But, lest robbers
should from hence find out a way
of practising their villanies with im-
punity, it is provided by the imperial
constitutions, that no man shall take
by force any moveable thing, or liv-
ing creature, although he believe it
LIB. IV.

 

tuta principum fecerit, rei quidem
sue dominio cadere ; sin autem alie-
ha res sit, post restitutionem ejus,
etiam estimationem ejusdem rei
prestare. Quod non solim in mo-
bilibus rebus, que rapi possunt,
constitutiones obtinere censuerunt,
sed etiam in invasionibus, que cir-
ca res soli fiunt; ut, ex hac causa,
ab omni rapind homines abstineant.

Quibus

$ II. Sané in hac actione non
utique expectatur rem in bonis ac-
toris esse; nam, sivé in bonis sit,
sivé non, si tamen ex bonis sit, lo-
cum heec actio habebit. Quare
sivé locata, sivé commodata, sive
etiam pignorata, sive deposita, sit
res apud Titium sic, ut intersit
ejus, eam rem per vim non auferri,
(veluti si in deposité re culpam
quoque promisit,) sivé bona fide
possideat, sivé usumfructum quis
habeat in ea, vel quid aliud juris,
ut intersit ejus non rapi, dicendum
est, el competere hanc actionem,
non ut dominium accipiat, sed il-
lud solum, quod ex bonis ejus, qui
rapinam passus est, id est, quod ex
substantia ejus ablatum esse pro-
ponatur. Et generaliter dicendum
est, ex quibus causis furti actio com-
petit in re clam facta, ex iisdem
causis omnes hanc habere actionem.

TIT. I. 311

 

to be his own; and that, whoever
offends by forcibly seizing his own
property, shall forfeit it; and that,
whoever forcibly takes the property
of another, imagining it to be his
own, shall be obliged not only to re-
store the thing itself, but also to pay
the value of it asa penalty. And
the emperors have thought proper,
that this should obtain, not only as
to things moveable and moving,
which may be carried away, but
also as to invasions or forcible en-
tries, made upon things immovea-
able, as lands or houses, that man-
kind may be deterred from commit-
ting any species of rapine.

datur.

$ 2. In this action, it is not con-
sidered, whether the thing forci-
bly taken be the property of the
complainant or not; for if he have
an interest in it, the action is main-
tainable: and therefore, if a thing
be let, lent, pledged, or deposited,
so that the possessor becomes inter-
ested in the preservation of it, as he
may be, if he has made himself
answerable for the deposit; or, if he
was a bond fide possessor, or intitled
to the usufruct, or has any other
right, which gives an interest, he
may bring this action, not for the
recovery of the absolute property,
but of that only, to which his in-
terest extends. And we may in
general affirm, that the same causes,
which intitle a man to an action of
theft in case of private stealing, will
also intitle him to the action vi bo-
norum raptorum, when force hath
been used.
312

LIB. IV. TIT. TI.

TITULUS TERTIUS.
DE LEGE AQUILIA.
D. ix. T.2. ©. iii, T. 35.

Summa.

DAMNI injurie actio consti-
tuitur per legem Aquiliam; cujus
primo capite cautum est, ut si quis
alienum hominem, alienamve qua-
drupedem, que pecudum numero
sit, injurid occiderit, quanti ea res
in eo amo plurimi fuerit, tantum
domino dare damnetur.

Caput primum.

The action for injurious damage
is given by the law Aquilia ; which
enacts, in the first chapter, that,
if any man injuriously kills the
slave, or the four-footed beast of an-
other, which may be -reckoned
among his cattle, he shall be con-
demned to pay the owner the great-
est price, which the slave or beast
might have been sold for, at any
time within a year preceding.

De quadrupede, que pecudum numero est.

$ I. Quod autem non precisé de
quadrupede, sed de ed tantum, quee
pecudum numero est, cavetur, eo
pertinet, ut neque de feris bestiis,
neque de canibus, cautum esse in-
telligamus; sed de lis tantum, quee
gregatim proprié pasci dicuntur;
quales sunt equi, muli, asini, oves,
boves, capre. De suibus quoque
idem placuit. Nam et sues quo-
que pecudum appellatione continen-
tur; quia et hi gregatim pascuntur.
Sic denique et Homerus in Odys-
sea ait; (sictt Alius Marciamus in
suis institutionibus refert.)
Anis tovys ovecos wagnusvoy at O8
veuovtar Ilag Koguxog wetgn, ent ty
xonvn ’ Agebson.

Hoc est,

Assidet is suibus, quarum grex

magnus in agris
Pascitur, ad Coracis saxnm, font-

emque Arethusam.

$ 1. As the law does not speak of
four-footed beasts in general, but
only of cattle, we may collect, that
wild beasts and dogs do not come
within the intendment, which can
be understood to include only those
animals, which feed in herds; as
horses, mules, sheep, oxen, goats, &c.
It hath also been determined, that
swine are comprised under the term
cattle, because they feed in herds;
and this Homer testifies in the O-
dyssey, for which he is quoted by
Atlius Marcian in his institutions.
You will find him taking care of
the swine, which feed in herds near
the Corasian roc/:, &c. Odys. b. 13.
LIB. IV.

TIT. Il. 313

De injuria.

§ IL. Injuria autem occidere in-
telligitur, qui nullo jure occidit:
itaque, qui latronem insidiatorem
occidit, non tenentur; utique si al-
iter periculum effugere non potest.

$2. A man who kills another
without proper authority, is under-
stood to kill him injuriously; but
he is not subject to the law, who
kills a robber lying in wait if there
was no other way of avoiding the
danger threatened.

Ce casu, dolo, et culpa.

$ HI. Ac ne is quidem hac lege
tenetur, qui casu occidit, si modo
culpa ejus nulla inveniatur. Nam
alioqui non minus ex dolo, quam
ex culpa, quisque hac lege tenetur.

$ 3. Nor is he liable under this law
who hath killed another by acci-
dent if no fault can be imputed to
him. But the law holds a man equs
ally liable for negligence or fraud.

De jaculatione.

§ IV. Itaque, si quis, dum jacu-
lis ludit vel exercitatur, transeun-
tem servum tuum trajecerit, cistin-
suitur. Nam, siid a milite in eo
campo, ubi solitum est exercitari,
admissum est, nulla culpa ejus in-
telligitur ; si alius tale quid admis-
erit, culpz reus est. Idem juris est
de milite, si in alio loco, quam qui
ad exercitandum militibus destina-
tus est, id admiserit.

§ 4. But, if a man, by throwing
a javelin for his diversion or exer-
cise, happen to kill a slave, who is
passing, we must, in this case, make
a distinction: for, if the slave be
killed by a soldier, while exercising
in a place appointed for that pur-
pose, the soldier is guilty of no fault;
but, if any other person should acci-
dentally killa slave, by throwing
a javelin, he is guilty; and even,
if a soldier should kill a slave acci-
dentally by throwing a javelin in
any other place, than that appoint-
ed for soldiers to exercise in, he also
is guilty of a fault (i. e. culpable
negligence. )

De putatione.

§ V. Item si putator, ex arbore ra-
mo dejecto, servum tuum transeun-
tem occiderit, si prope viam publi-
cam aut vicinalem id factum est,
neque proclamavit, ut casus evitari

40

§ 5. If a man lopping a tree,
chance to kill a slave who is pass-
ing, he is an offender if he worked
near a public road, or ina way lead-
ing to a village, without giving pro-
314 LIB. IV.

posset, culpz reus est: sed, si pro-
clamavit, nec ille curavit precave-
re, extraculpam est putator. Aiqué
extra culpam esse intelligitur, si
seorsum & via forte, vel in medio
fundo cedebat, licét non proclama-
vit: quia in eo loco nulli extraneo
jus fuerat versandi.

TIT. Il.

per warning; but, if he made due
proclamation, and the other did not
take care of himself, the lopper is
exempt from fault: and he is equal-
ly so, although he did not make
proclamation, if he worked apart
from the high road, or in the mid-
dle of a field; for a stranger has
no right of passage through such
places.

De curatione rolicta.

$ VI. Preeterea, si medicus, qui
servum tuum secuit, dereliquerit
curationem ejus, et ob id mortuus
fuerit servus, culpz reus erit.

§ 6. Also, if a surgeon having
performed an operation on a slave,
should neglect or forsake the cure,
by reason whereof the slave dies,
he is guilty of culpable negligence.

De imperia medici.

$ VII. Imperitia quoque culpe
annumeretur; veluti si medicus ideo
servum tuum occiderit, quia malé
eum secuerit, aut perperam ei med-
icamentum dederit.

$7. The want of professional
skill is also regarded as culpable:
as if a physician occasion the death
of a slave by an unskillful incision,
or arash administration of medicine.

De imperita et infirmitate mulionis, aut equo vecti.

§ VII. Impetu quoque mula-
rum, quas mulio propter imperitiam
retinere non potuit, si servus tuus
oppressus fuerit, culpz reus est mu-
lio. Sed et, si propter infirmitatem
eas retinere non potuerit, tum alius
firmior eas retinere potuisset, aque
culpz tenetur. Eadem placuerunt
de eo quoque, qui cum equo vehe-
retur, impetum ejus, aut propter in-
firmitatem, aut propter imperitiam
suam, retinere non potuerit.

§ 8. If a mule-driver, from want
of skill, is unable to manage his
mules, and a slave is run over by
them, the mule-driver is in fault;
and, if he want strength to rein
them in, when another man is able
todo it, he is then equally culpable ‘
and the same may be said of a
rider, who, through want either of
strength or skill, isnot able to man-
age his horse.
LIB. IV.

TIT. Il. 315

Quanti damnum eestimetur, et de heredibus.

§ IX. His autem verbis legis,
quanti id eo in anno plurimi fuerit,
illa sententia exprimitur, ut si quis
hominem tuum, qui hodie claudus,
aut mancus, aut luscus erit, occide-
rit, quiin eo anno integer aut pre-
tiosus fuerit, non tanti teneatur,
quanti hodie erit, sed quanti in eo
anno plurimi fuerit: ratione credi-
tum est poenalem esse hujus legis
actionem; quia non solum tanti
quisque obligatur, quantum damni
dederit, sed aliquando longé pluris.
Idedque constat, heredem eam ac-
tionem non transire, quee transitura
fuisset, si ultra damnum nunquam
lis estimaretur.

$ 9. The words of the law Aqui-
lia, let him who kills a slave, or
beast of another, forfeit the greatest
price, which either could have been
sold for in that year, mean this; if
Titius accidentally kill a slave,
who was then lame, or wanted a
limb, or an eye, but had been with-
in the space of a year perfect in all
his parts, and valuable, then Titius
shall be liable, not merely to his
value on that day, but to his high-
est value at any time within a year
preceding his death. An action
therefore, upon the law Aquilia, has
always been regarded as penal;
for it obliges a man to pay not on-
ly the full value of the damage
done, but often much more; and of
consequence can by no means pass
against the heir of the offender: but
it might legally have been transfer-
red against the heir, if the condem-
nation had never exceeded the
quantum of the damage.

Quid estimatur.

$ X. Illud non ex verbis legis,
sed ex interpretatione, placuit,
non solium perempti corporis esti-
mationem habendum esse secundum
ea, que diximus, sed, eo amplius,
quicquid preeterea, perempto eo cor-
pore, damni nobis illatum fuerit ;
veluti siservum tuum heredem ab
aliquo institutum ante quis occide-
rit, quam is jusso tuo hereditatis
quoque amissz rationem esse ha-
bendam constat. Item, si ex pari
mularum unam, vel ex quadrigis

$10. It hath prevailed by con-
struction, though not by the express
words of the law, that not only the
value of a slave is to be computed,
as we have already mentioned; but
that an estimation must be made
of whatever further damage is oc-
casioned by his death; as if your
slave should be killed just as he
was instituted heir, and before ac-
tual entry upon the heirship at your
command, for in this case, the loss
of the inheritance must be brought
316 LIB. IV.

equortm unum, quis occiderit, vel
ex comedis tnus servus occisus fu-
erit, non solum occisi fit sestimatio,
sed eo amplius'id quoque computa-
tur, quanti depretiati sunt, qui su-
persunt.

De concurso hujus

§$ XI. Liberum autem est ei, cu-
jus servus occisus fuerit, et ex ju-
dicio privato legis Aquile damnum
persequi, et capitalis criminis eum
reum facere.

TIT. Il.

into the computation. Also if a
horse, or mule be killed, by which
a pair, or set, is broken, or if a slave
be slain, who made one of a co-
medians, an estimation must be
made, not merely of the value of
that slave or animal, but of the di-
minished value of those, which re-
main.

aclionis et capitalis.

§ 11. The master of aslave, who
is killed, may bring a civil action
for damages founded upon the law
Aquilia, and at the same time pros-
ecute the offender foracapital crime.

Caput secundum.

§ XII. Caput secundum legis
Aquilee in usu non est.

Caput tertium.

§ XIII. Capite tertio de omni
cetero damno cavetur; itaque, si
quis servum, vel eam quadrupedem,
que in pecudum numero est, vulne-
raverit, sivé eam quadrupedem,
que in pecudum numero non est,
veluti canem, aut ferram bestiam,
vulnaverit aut occiderit, hoc capite
actio constituitur. In ceteris quo-
que omnibus animalibus, item in
omnibus rebus que animé carent,
damnum per injuriam datam hac
parte vindicatur. Si quid enim us-
tam, aut ruptum, aut fractum fue-
rit, actio ex hoc capite constituitur ;
quanquam poterat sola rupti appel-
latio in omnes istas causas sufficere ;
ruptum enim intelligitur, quod quo-
quo modo corruptum est; und’ non
solim fracta, aut usta, sed etiam
Scissa, et collisa, et quoquo modo

§ 12. The second chapter of the
law Aquilia is not in use.

Quod darenum vindicatur.

§ 13. By the third chapter of
this law, a remedy is given for ev-
ery other kind of damage; there-
fore, ifa man wound a slave, or
four-footed animal, whether ranked
among cattle or not, asa dog or wild
beast, an action will lieagainst him.
Reparation may also be obtained,
under this chapter, for all damage
injuriously done to animals in gen-
eral, or to things inanimate; and for
things burned, spoiled or broken.
The term ruptum would alone be
sufficient in any of these cases; for
in whatever manner a thing be da-
maged, or spoiled, it is understood
to be ruptum ; so that, whenever a
thing is broken, burned, torn, bruis- |
en, spilled, or in any manner made’
worse, it may be said to be-ruptum.
It hath also been determined that,
LIB. IV.

TIT. Il. 317

 

perempta atque deteriora facta,
hoc verbocontinentur. Denique re-
sponsum est, si quis in alienum vi-
num aut oleum id miscuerit, quo
naturalis bonitas vini aut olei cor-
rumperetur, ex hac parte legis A-
quilize eum teneri.

De dolo

§ XIV. Illud palam est, sicut ex
primo capite demum quisque tene-
tur, si dolo aut culpa ejus homo aut
quadrupes occisus occisave fuerit,
ita ex hoc capite, de dolo aut culpa,
et de cetero damno quemque teneri;
ex hoc tamen capite, non quanto in
eo anno, sed quanti in diebus tri-
ginta proximis res fuerit, obligatur
is, qui damnum dederit.

to intermix anything with the wine
or oil of another, so as to corrupt
or impair its natural goodness, ren
ders the offender liable under this
chapter of the law Aquilia.

et culpa.

§ 14. It is evident, that the first
chapter of the law subjects every
man to an action, who through de-
sign or negligence kills the slave or
beast of another, and that the third
part gives a remedy for any other
damage, so occasioned. But by
this third chapter the offender is
not liable to the highest price, which
the thing damaged might have sold
for at any time within the year, but
only at any time within thirty days
previous to the damage.

Quanti damnum estimetur.

§ XV. Ac ne plurimiquidem ver-
bum adjicitur. Sed Sabino recté
placuit, perinde habendam estima-
tionem ac si etiam hac parte pluri-
mi verbum adjectum fuisset; nam
plebem Romanum, que, Aquilio
tribuno rogante, hance legem tulit,
contentam fuisse, quod prima parte
eo verbo usa esset.

De actione directa,

§ XVI. Ceterum placuit, ita de-
num directam ex hac lege actionem
esse, si quis preecipué corpore suo
damnum dederit: idedque in eum,
qui alio modo damnum dederit,
utiles actiones dari solent ; veluti si
quis hominem alienum, aut pecus,

§ 15. There is no expression of
the highest value. But, in the o-
pinion of Sabinus, the valuation
ought to be made, as if the word
highest had been used: for, when
Aquilius, the tribune, proposed this
law, the commonalty of Rome
thought it sufficient to insert the
word highest in the first chapter.

utili, et in factum.

§ 16. It has been determined,
that, ifa man with his own hand or
body, injures another, a direct action
will lie under this law. But when
damage is.done by any other means,
as by imprisoning a slave, or im-
pounding the cattle of another, un-
318 LIB. IV.

‘TIT. Ul.

 

ita incluserit, ut fame necaretur ;
aut jumentum ita vehementer ege-
rit, ut rumperetur; aut pecus in
tantum exagitaverit, ut preecipitare-
tur; aut si quis alieno servo persu-
aserit, ut in arborem ascenderet,
vel in putem descenderet, et is as-
cendendo, vel descendendo, aut ali-
qua parte corporis lesus fuerit,
utilis actioin eum datur: sed, si
qus alienum servum aut de ponte,
aut de ripa. in flumen dejecerit, et
is suffocatus fuerit, eo quod proje-
cit, corpore suo damnum dedisse
non difficulter intelligi potest; ide-
oque ipsa lege Aquilia tenetur. Sed,
si non corpore damnum fuerit da-
tum, neque corpus lesum fuerit, sed
alio modo alicui damnum contige-
rit, cum non sufficiat neque directa,
neque utilis legis Aquilie actio,
placnit, eum, qui obnoxius fuerit,
in factum actione teneri; veluti si
quis, misericordia ductus, alienum
servum compeditum solverit, ut fu-
geret.

til they die with hunger: by driv-
ing a beast of burden so vehement-
ly as to spoil him; by chasing a
herd of cattle until they leap down
a precipice; or by persuading a
slave to climb a tree, or to go down
into a well, by which he is killed
or maimed; then the remedy by
action called wtilis, is given. If
Titius thrust the slave of another
into the water from the top of a
bridge or bank, and the slave is
thereby drowned, it is plain, that
Titius occasioned this damage with
his own hands, and he is therefore
subject under the Aquilian law, toa
direct action. But if the damage
received was not done by-the hand
or body of another, and is not cor-
poreal, so that neither a direct nor
beneficial action can be brought by
virtue of the Aquilian law, then an
action upon the case, or fact, will
lie against the offender; as if man
through compassion should unchain
the slave of another, and so pro-
mote his escape.
LIB. IV. TIT. IV.

319

 

TITULUS QUARTUS.
DE INJURIIS.

D. xivii. T. 10. C. ix. T. 35. et 36.

Verbum injuria quot modis accipitur.

GENERALITER injuria dici-
tur omne, quod non jure fit; spe-
cialiter, alias contumelia, quae a con-
temnendo dicta est, quam Greci
vforv appellant; alias culpa, quam
Graeci cdizque dicunt, sicut in lege
Aquilia damnum injurié datum ac-
cipitur; alias iniquitas et injustitia,
quam Greeci evouiay xae adixiay vo-
cant: cum enim pretor vel judex
non jure contra quem pronunciat,
injuriam accepisse dicitur.

Injuria in a general sense denotes
every unjust act; but, when special-
ly used, it is the same with contu-
melia, derived from contemno, in
greek v6ors : sometimes it signifies a
fault, called by the greeks dd:xuya
in which acceptation it is used in
the law Aquilia, when damage in-
juriously occasioned, is spoken of:
at other times it signifies iniquity or
injustice, which the greeks call
avouter and adixcay : therefore, when
the pretor or judge decides unjustly
against any person, such person is
said to be injured.

Quibus modis injuria fit.

$L. Injuria autem committitur,
non solim cum quis pugno pulsa-
tus, aut fustibus ceesus, vel etiam
verberatus erit; sed et si cui con-
vitium factum fuerit; sive cujus
bona, quasi debitoris, qui nihil de-
beret, possessa fuerint ab eo, qui
intelligebat, nihil eum sibi debere;
vel si quis ad infamiam alicujus
libellum aut carmen (aut historiam)
scripserit, composuerit, ediderit,
dolove malo fecerit, quo quid eo-
rum fieret; sivé quis matrem fami-
lias, aut pretextatum pretextatam-
ve, adsectatus fuerit: sivé cujus
pudicitia attentata esse dicetur: et
denique, aliis plurimis modis ad-
mitti injuriam, manifestum est.

§ 1. An injury may be done not
only by beating and wounding, but
also by slanderous language, by
seizing the goods of a man, as if he
were a debtor, when the person,
who seized them, well knew, that
nothing was due to him; by writing
a defamatory libel, poem or history ;
or by maliciously causing another
so to do; also by continually solicit-
ing the chastity of a boy, girl, or wo-
man of reputation; and by various
other means, too numerous to be
specified.
320

LIB. IV. TIT. IV.

 

Qui et per quos injuriam patiuntur.

De parente et liberis,

viro et uxore, soccro et nuru.

§ IL. Patitur autem quis injuri-
am non solum per semetipsum, sed
etiam per liberos suos, quos in po-
testate habet; item per uxorem su-
am; id enim magis prevaluit. Ita-
que, si filie alicujus, que Titio
nupta est, injuriam feceris, non so-
lum filiz nomine tecum injuriarum
agi potest, sed etiam patris quo-
que et mariti nomine. Contra au-
tem, si viro injuria facta sit, uxor
injuriarum agere non potest: defen-
di enim uxores 4 viris, non viros
ab uxoribus, equum est. Sed et
socer nurus nomine, cujus vir in e-
jus potestate est, injuriarum agere
potest.

§ 2. It is understood that a man
may receive an injury, not only in
his own person, but in that of chil-
dren under his power, and also in
the person of his wife; and there-
fore, if an injury be done to Seius’s
daughter married to Titius, an ac-
tion may be brought not only in the
name of the daughter, but in the
name of her father or her husband;
but, if the husband receive an in-
jury, the wife is not allowed to in-
stitute a suit in his defence; for it is
a maxim, that wives may be de-
fended by their husbands, but not
husbands by their wives. Anda
father-in-law may bring an action
for damages in the name of his son’s
wife, if her htisband be under the
power of his father.

De servo.

§ Il. Servis autem ipsis qui-
dem nulla injuria fieri intelligitur,
sed domino per eos fieri videtur:
non tamen iisdem modis, quibus e-
tiam per liberos et uxores; sed ila,
cum quid atrocius commissum
fuerit, et quod aperté ad contume-
liam domini respicit; veluti si quis
alienum servum atrociter verbera-
verit; et in hunc casum actio pro-
ponitur. At, si quis servo conviti-
um fecerit, vel pugno eum percus-
serit, nulla in eum actio domino
competit.

§ 3. An injury is never consider-
ed as done to a slave, but through
him to the master; not however in
the same manner as through a wife
or child; as when some atrocious
injury is done to the slave, mani-
festly in despite of the master; as if
any one should cruelly beat the
slave of another; in which case an
action would lie; but, if a man
should only give ill language toa
slave, or strike him with his first,
the master is entitled to no action
against him.
LIB. IV. TIT. IV.

321

De servo communi.

§ IV. Si communi servo injuria
facta sit, equum est, non pro ed
parte, qua dominus quisque est,
zstimationem injurie fieri, sed ex
dominorum persona, quia ipsis fit
injuria.

§ 4. If an injury be done to the
common slave of many masters, itis
to be estimated, not according to
their respective rights in the slave,
but according to the quality of each
master; for the injury is done to
them.

De servo fructuario.

§$ V. Quod si ususfructus in
servo Titii est, proprietas Mevii,
magis Mevio injuria fieri intelligi-
tur.

$ 5. If Titius has the usufruct of
a slave, and Mevius the property,
then any injury done to the slave,
is understood to be done to Mevius.

De eo, qui bona fide servit.

$ VI. Sed, si libero homini, qui
tibi bond fide servit, injuria facta
sit, nulla tibi actio dabitur, sed suo
nomine is expiriri poterit, nisi in
contumeliam tuam pulsatus sit;
tune enim competit et tibi injuria-
rum actio. Idem ergo est et in
servo alieno bona fide tibi servien-
te; ut toties admittatur injuriarum
acto, quoties in tuam contumeliam
injuria ei facta est.

§ 6. But, if an injury be done to
a free person in the service of ano-
ther, the servant must bring suit in
his own name,unless the person who
beat him, did it principally for the
sake of affronting his master; in
which case the master may also
bring an action of injury. And so
if your servant be the slave of ano-
ther; for as often as he receives an
injury, which was intended to in-
sult you, you may bring an action |
of injury.

Peena injuriarum ex |. xii, tabb. et ex jure pretorio.

§ VII. Pena autem injuriarum
propter membrum quidem ruptum
talio erat; propter os vero fractum
nummarie poene erant constitute,
quasi in magna veterum pauper-
tate. Sed postea pretores permit-
tebant ipsis, qui injuriam passi sunt,
eam estimare; ut judex vel tan-
ti reum condemnet, quanti inju-
riam passus zstimaverit, vel mino-

41

§ 7. The punishment of an injury,
by the 12 tables, was a return of
the like injury, if a limb was broken;
but, if a blow only was given, or a
single bone broken, then the punish-
ment was pecuniary, the ancients
living in great poverty. ‘The pra-
tors afterwards permitted the par-
ties injured to fix their damages at
a certain sum, which might serve
322

ris, prout ei visum fuerit. Sed pew-
na quidem injuriz, quee ex lege xii.
tabularum introducta est, in desue-
tudinem abiit: quam autem preto-
res introduxerunt, (que etiam ho-
noraria appellatur,) in judiciis fre-
quentatur. Nam, secundum gra-
dum dignitatis vitaeque honestatem,
crescit aut minuitur zstimatio in-
jurie: qui gradus condemnationis
et in servili persona non immeritd
servatur, ut aliud in servo actore,
alind in medii actis homine, aliud
in vilissimo vel compedito, jus es-
timationis constituatur.

De lege

§ VIII. Sed et lex Cornelia de
injuriis loquitur, et injuriarum ac-
tionem introduxit, que competit ob
eam rem, quod se pulsatum quis,
verberatumve, vel domum suam vi
introitam esse, dicat. Domum au-
tem accipimus, sive in propria do-
mo quis habitet, sive in conducta,
Sivé gratis, sivé hospitio receptus
sit.

De exstimatione

§ IX. Atrox injuria estimatur
vel ex facto, veluti si quis ab alio
vulneratus sit, vel fustibus casus;
vel ex loco, veluti si cui in theatro,
vel in foro, vel in conspectu preto-
ris, injuria facta sit; vel ex perso-
na, veluti si magistratus injuriam
passus fuerit, vel si senatori ab hu-
mili persona injuria facta sit, aut
parenti patronove fiat a liberis vel

LIP. IV. TIT. !V.

“

as a guide to the judge, but not
preclude him from lessening the
estimdte at his discretion. The spe-
cies of pecuniary punishment, which
was introduced by the law of the
12 tables, fell gradually into dis-
use, and that only which the pre-
tors introduced, termed honorary, is
now resorted to: for the estimate of
an injury is increased or diminish-
ed according to the degree and
quality of the person injured; a
gradation not improperly observed
even as to slaves; so that one esti-
mate may be adopted in the case of
a steward or agent to his master,
and a lower one in the case of an
inferior slave.

Cornelia.

§ 8. The law Cornelia speaks
also of injuries, and hath introduced
an action, which lies, when a man
alleges, that he hath been struck or
beaten, or that another hath entered
forcibly into his house; and whe-
ther he owns, or hires, or borrows,
or lives in it as a guest, it is regard-
ed as his house.

atrocis injuriz.

§ 9. An injury is esteemed atro-
cious, from the nature of the fact, as
when a man is wounded by another,
or beaten with a club—from the
place, as when an injury is doneina
public theatre, in an open market, or
in the presence of the praetor—and
sometimes from the rank of the per-
son, as when a magistrate, or a
senator, receives an injury from
LIB. IV.

libertis. Aliter enim senatoris et
parentis patronique, aliter extranei
et humilis persone, injuria sstima-
tur. Nonunquam et locus vulne-
ris atrocem injuriam facit, veluti si
in oculo quis percussus fuerit.
Parvi autem refert, utrum patri-fa-
milias, an filio familias, talis inju-
ria facta sit: nam et hee atrox in-
juria estimabitur.

TIT. IV. 323

one of mean condition, a parent
from his child, or a patron from his
freed-man ; for these cases demand
a heavier punishment, than where
an injury is done toa stranger, or
a person of low degree. Also the
part injured, may constitute an in-
jury atrocious; as if a man should
be wounded in his eye; but it is of
little consequence whether such an
injury be done to the father of a
family, or to the son of a family;
for such an injury will be consider-
ed as atrocious.

De judicio civili et criminali.

§ X. In summa sciendum est,
de omni injurid eum, qui passus
est, posse vel criminaliter agere,
vel civiliter: et, si quidem civiliter
agatur, sstimatione facté secun-
dum quod dictum est, pana reo
imponitur;;sin autem criminaliter,
officio judicis extraordinaria pena
reo irrogatur. Hoc videlicét obser-
vando, quod Zenoniana constitutio
introduxit, ut viri illustres, quique
super eos sunt, et per procuratores
possint actionem injuriarum crimi-
naliter vel .persequi vel suspicere,
secundim ejus tenorem, qui ex
ipsé manifestius apparet.

Qui tenentur

$§ XI. Non solim autem is in-
juriarum tenetur, qui fecit injuri-
am, id est, qui percussit; verum
ille quoque tenetur, qui dolo fecit
injuriam, vel qui procuravit, ut cui
mala pugno percuteretur.

§ 10. In fine, it must be ob-
served concerning every injury,
that the party injured may sue ei-
ther criminally or civilly. If civil-
ly the damage must be estimated,
and the penalty awarded as we
have before noticed: but, if he sue
criminally, it is the duty of the
judge to inflict an extraordinary
punishment upon the offender ; ob-
serving the constitution of Zeno,
which permits illustrious persons,
and those who enjoy a superior title,
either to pursue or defend criminal-
ly any action of injury by their proc.
tors; but the tenor of this law will
more fully appear by a perusal of
the ordinance itself.

injuriarum.

§ 11. An action of injury lies
not only against him, who hath
done an injury, by giving a blow,
&c. but also against him, who by
craft, or by persuasion hath caus-
ed the injury to be done,
 

324 LIB. IV. TIT. V. ;
Quomodo tollitur hec actio.
§ XII. Hee actio dissimula- $ 12. Allright to an action of

tione aboletur; et ided, si quis in-
juriam dereliquerit, hoc est, statim
passus ad animum suum non revo-
caverit, postea ex pcenitentid re-
missam injuriam non poterit reco-
lere,

injury may be lost by suppression ;
therefore, if a man takes no notice
of an injury at the time, when he
receives it, he cannot afterwards
repent of his forbearance and bring
suit.

 

TITULUS QUINTUS.

DE OBLIGATIONIBUS, QU‘ QUASI EX DELICTO NASCUN-
TUR.

1D, -xivii, Th &. GC. ix. Th 3,

Si judex litem suam fecerit.

SI judex litem suam fecerit, non
proprié ex maleficio obligatus vide-
tur: sed quia neque ex maleficio,
neque ex contractu obligatus est,
et utique peccasse aliquid intelligi-
tur, licét per imprudentiam, ided
videtur quasi ex maleficio teneri;
et, in quantum de ea re zquam re-
ligioni judicantis videbitur, penam
sustinebit.

If a judge make a suit his own,
by giving an unjust determination,
an action of mal-feasance will not
properly lie against him: but,
granting he is not subject to an ac-
tion of mal-feasance, or of contract,
yet, as he hath certainly commit-
ted a fault, although not by design,
but through imprudence and want
of skill, he may be sued by an ac-
tion of quasi-mal-feasance ; and
must suffer such penalty, as seems
equitable to the conscience of a
superior judge.

De dejectis vel effusis, et positis aut suspensis.

§ I. Item is, cujus ex ccenaculo,
vel proprio ipsius, vel conducto, vel
in quo gratis habitat, dejectum effu-
sumve aliquid est, ita ut alicui no-
ceret, quasi ex maleficio oblizatus

$ 1. The occupier of a chamber,
from which any thing hath been
thrown or spilt, whereby damage is
done, is, liable to an action of quasi-
mal-feasance; and it is not material,
LIB. IV.

TVs 325

 

intelligitur. Ided autem non proprié
ex maleficio obligatus intelligitur,
quia plerimque ob alterius culpam
tenetur, aut servi aut liberi. Cui
similis est is, qui ed parte, qua vul-
go iter fieri solet, id positum aut
suspensum habet, quod potest, si
ceciderit, alicui nocere; quo casu
poena decem aureorum constituta
est. De eo verd, quod dejectum ef-
fusumve est, dupli, quantum damni
datum sit, constituta est actio. Ob
hominem vero liberum occisum,
quinquaginta aureorum peena con-
stituitur. Si verd vivat, nocitum-
que ei esse dicatur, quantum ob
eamrem equum judici videtur, ac-
tio datur. Judex enim computare
debet mercedes medicis preestitas,
ceteraque impendia, que in cura-
tione facta sunt: preterea operas,
quibus caruit aut cariturus est, ob
id, quod inutilis est factus.

whether the chamber be his proper-
ty; whether he rents it; or inhabits
it gratis: and the reason, why such
occupier is not suable for a direct
mal-feasanee, is, because he is gen-
erally sued for the fault of another.
Any man isalso subject to the same
action, who hath hung or placed
anything in a public road, so as to
endanger passengers by the fall of
it; in which case a fine of ten au-
rei is appointed: but, when any-
thing hath been thrown or split, the
action is always for double the ac-
tual damage. Ifa freeman be kill-
ed by accident, the penalty is fifty
aurei; but, if he only receive some
hurt, the quantum of the damage
is at the discretion of the judge, who
ought to take into account the fees
of the physician, and all other ex-
penses attendant upon the cure,
over and above the time, which the
patient hath lost in his illness, or
may lose by being unable to pursue
his business.

De filio-familias, seorsum habitante a patre.

$ II. Si filius-familias seorsum 4
patre habitaverit, et quid ex cena-
culo ejus dejectum effusumve fue-
rit, sivé quid positum suspensumve
habuerit, cujus casus periculosus
est, Juliano placuit, in patrem nul-
lam esse actionem, sed cum ipso
filio agendum esse. Quod et in fil-
io-familias judice observandum est,
qui litem suam fecerit.

$2 If the son of a family live
separate from his father, and any-
thing is either thrown, or split, from
his apartment, or so hung, or plac-
ed, that the fall of it may be dan-
gerous, it is the opinion of Julian,
that no action will lie against the
father, and that the son only can ke
sued. The same rule of law is al-
so to be observed, in regard to the
son of a family, who hath given as
a judge, an unjust decision.
326 LIB. IV.

TIT. VI.

 

De damno aut furto, quod in navi, aut caupona, aut stabulo,
factum cst.

§$ I. Item exercitor navis, aut
caupone, autstabuli, dedamno aut
furto, quod in navi, aut caupona,
aut stabulo, factum erit, quasi ex
maleficio teneri videtur; si modo
ipsius nullum est maleficium, sed
alicujus eorum, quorum opera na-
vem, aut cauponam, aut stabulum,
exercet. Cum enim neque ex mal-
eficio, neque ex contractu, sit ad-
versus eum constituta hic actio, et
aliquatenus culpe reus est, quod
opera malorum hominum uteretur,
ided quasi ex maleficio teneri vide-
tur. In his autem casibus in fac-
tum actio competit; que heredi
quidem datur, adversus heredem
autem non competit.

TITULUS

$ 3. The master of a ship, tav-
ern or inn, is liable to be sued fora
quasi-mal-feasance, on account of
every damage, or theft, done or
committed in any of these places,
by himself or his servants: for al-
though no action, either of direct
mal-feasance, or of contract, can be
brought against the master, yet, as
he has, in some measure, been guil-
ty of a fault in employing dishon-
est persons as his servants, he is
therefore subject to a suit for a qua-
si-mal-feasance. But, in all these
cases, the action given is an action
upon the fact, which may be brought
in favour of an heir, but not a-
gainst him.

SEXTUS.

DE ACTIONIBUS.

D. xlvi. T. 7.

C. iv. T. 10.

Continuatio, et Definitio.

SUPEREST, ut de actionibus
loguamur. Actio nihil aliud est,
quam jus persequendi in judicio,
quod sibi debetur.

It now remains, that we treat of

actions. An action is nothing more
than the right of suing in a court
of law for our just demands.

Divisio prima.

$1. Omnium autem actionum,
quibus inter aliquos apud judices

§$ 1. All actions whatever he the

subject matter of them whether de-

arbitrosve de quacunque re queri- terminable before judges or referees
LIB. IV.

TIT. VI. 327

 

tur, summa divisio in duo genera
deducitur: aut enim in rem sunt,
aut in personam : namque agit un-
usquisque aut cum eo, qui ei obli-
gatus est, vel ex contractu, vel ex
maleficio; quo casu prodite sunt
actiones in personam, per quas in-
tendit, adversarium ei dare aut fa-
cere opportere, et aliis quibusdam
modis: aut cum eo agit, qui nullo
jure ei obligatus est, movet tamen
alicui de aliqua re controversiam ;
quo casu prodite actiones in rem
sunt: veluti si rem corporalem pos-
sideat quis, quam Titius suam esse
affirmet possessor autem, dominum
ejus se esse, dicat; nam, si Titius
suam esse intendat, in rem actio
est.

may be divided into real and per-
sonal; for the plaintiff must sue the
defendant, either because the de-
fendant is obligated to him by con-
tract, ‘or hath been guilty of some
malfeasance; and, in thiscase, the
action must be personal, in which
the plaintiff alleges, that his ad-
versary is bound to give, or to do
something for his benefit; or some
other matter, as the occasion re-
quires; or otherwise, the plaintiff
must sue the defendant, on account
of some corporeal thing, when there
is no obligation; in which case the
action must be real; as for exam-
ple, if a man possess land, which
Titius affirms to be his property,
the other denying it, Titivs must
bring a real action for the recovery.

De actione confessoria, et negatoria.

$ II. Aqué, si agat quis, jus si-
bi esse fundo forté, vel sedibus u-
tendi fruendi, vel per fundum vici-
ni eundi agendi, vel ex fundo vici-
ni aquam ducendi in rem actio est.
Ejusdem generis est actio de jure
prediorum urbanorum; veluti, si
quis agat, jus sibi esse altius ades
suas tollendi, prospiciendive, vel
projiciendi aliquid, vel immittendi
tignum in vicini xzdes. Contra quo-
que de usufructu, et de servitutibus
prediorum rusticorum, item preedi-
orum urbanorum, invicem quoque
prodite sunt actiones; ut si quis in-
tendat, jus non esse adversario uten-
di fruendi, eundi agendi, aquamve
ducendi; item altius tolendi, pros-
piciendive, vel projiciendi, immit-

§ 2. Also, if any man sue, al-
leging that he has a right to the
usufruct of a field or house, or a
right of driving his cattle, or of
drawing water in the land of his
neighbor, this isa realaction. And
an action relating to the rights of
houses or city estates, which rights
are called services, is also of the
same kind; as when a man com-
mences a suit, and alleges, that he
has aright of prospect, a right to
raise his house, aright of making a
part of it project, or of laying the
beams of his building upon his
neighbor’s walls. There are also
actions different from these, which
relate to usufructs, and the rights
of country and city estates ; as when
328 LIB. IV.

tendive: ista quoque actiones in
rem sunt, sed negative; quod ge-
nus actionis in controversiis rerum
corporalium proditum non est; nam
in his is agit, qui non possidet; ei
vero, qui possidet, non est actio
prodita, per quam neget rem actoris
esse. Sané non uno casu, qui pos-
sidet, nihilominus is actoris partes
obtinet ; sicut in latioribus digesto-
rum libris opportunius apparebit.

TIT VI.

the complainant alleges, that his
adversary is not entitled to the
usufruct of a particular ground, or
to the right of passage, &c. &e,
These actions are also real, but are
negative in their nature, and can-
not therefore be used in controver-
sies respecting things corporeal,
where the agent, or plaintiff, is the
person out of possession : for a pos-
sessor can bring no action: there
are however, many cases, in which
a possessor may be obliged to act
the part of a plaintiff; but we refer
the reader to the book of the digests.

De actionibus pretoriis realibus.

§ III. Sed iste quidem actiones,
quarum mentionem habuimus, et
si que sunt similes, ex legitimis et
civilibus causis descendunt. Alix
autem sunt, quas preetor ex sua ju-
risdictione comparatas habet, tam
in rem, quam in personam; quas
et ipsas necessarium est exemplis
ostendere; ut ecce plerumque ita
permittit preetor in rem agere, ut
vel actor dicat, se quasi usucepisse,
quod non usuceperit vel ex diver-
so possessor dicat, adversarium
suum non usucepisse, quod usuce-
perit.

§ 3. The actions just mentioned
and those of a similar nature, are
derived from the civil law; but the
preetor, by virtue of his jurisdiction,
hath introduced other actions, both
real and personal, of which it will
be necessary to give some examples:
for he often permits a real action to
be brought, either by allowing the
demandant to allege, that he hath
acquired by prescription, what he
hath not so acquired; or, on the
contrary, by permitting a former
possessor to allege, that his adver-
sary hath not acquired by prescrip-
tion, What, in reality, he hath so
acquired. .

De Publiciana.

§ IV. Namque, si cui ex justa
causa res aliqua tradita fuerit, (ve-
luti ex causa emptionis, aut dona-
tionis, aut dotis, aut legatorum,) et
necdum ejus rei dominus effectus
est, si is ejus re possessionem casu

§ 4. If anything should be deliv-
ered to or deposited with a man in
trust upon some just account, as by
reason of a purchase, a gift, a mar-
riage, or a bequest, and the trustee
should lose the possession, before he

.
LIB. IV.

amiserit, nullam habet in rem di-
rectam actionem ad eam persequen-
dam: quippe ita prodita sunt jure
civili actiones, ut quis dominium
suum vindicet. Sed, quia sané du-
rum erat, eo casu deficere actionem,
inventa est a preetore actio, in qua
dicit is, qui possessionem amisit,
eam rem se usucepisse, quam usu
non cepit, et ita vindicat suam esse:
que actio Publiciana appellatur,
quoniam primum a Publicio pretore
in edicto proposita est.

TIT. VI. 329
hath gained a property in the thing
possessed, he could have no direct
action for the recovery of it; inas-
much as real actions are given by
law for the re-vindication of those
things only, in which a man hatha
vested property or dominion. But,
it being hard, that an action should
be wanting in such acase, the pree-
tor hath supplied one, in which the
person, who hath lost his possession,
is allowed to prescribe to the thing
in question, although he did not ob-
tain it by prescription, and he may
thus recover. This action is called
actio Publiciana, because it was
first instituted by the edict of Pub-
licus the preetor.

De rescissoria.

§ V. Rursus ex diverso, si quis,
cum reipublice causa abesset, vel
in hostium potestate esset, rem
ejus, qui in civitate esset, usucepe-
rit, permititur domino, si possessor
reipublicee causd abesse desierit,
tune intra annum rescissa usuca-
pione eam rem petere, id est, ita
petere, ut dicat, possessorum usu
non cepisse, et ob id suam rem es-
se. Quod genus actionis quibus-
dam et aliis simili zquitate motus
pretor accommodat; sicutex la-
tiore digestorum seu -pandectarum
volumine intelligere licet.

42

§ 5. On the contrary, if any man,
while abroad in the service of his
country, ora prisoner in the hands
of the enemy, should gain a pre-
scriptive title to a thing, which be-
longs to another person resident at
home, then the former proprietor is
permitted within a year after the
return of the possessor from public
service, to bring an action against
him, the preseriptive title being re-
scinded; and may allege, that the
possessor hath not effectually pre-
scribed, so that the thing in litiga-
tion is his own. Under the same
motive of equity the pretor hath a-
dapted this species of action to cer-
tain other persons, as we may learn
more at large from the digests.
330

LIB. IV.

TIT. VI.

 

De Pauliana.

§ VI. Item, si quis in fraudem
creditorum rem suam alicui tradi-
derit, bonis ejus 4 creditoribus pos-
sessis ex sententid preesidis, permit-
titur ipsis creditoribus, resciss4 tra-
ditione, eam rem petere; id est,
dicere, eam rem traditam non esse,
et ob id in bonis debitoris mansisse.

$6. If a debtor deliver anything
to some person in order to defraud
his creditors, they are permitted,
notwithstanding the delivery, to
bring an action for the thing, if the
possession hath been previously ad-
judged to them by-an order of court:
that is, they are allowed to plead,
that the thing was not delivered,
and of course, that it continues to
be a part of their debtor’s goods.

De Serviana et quasi-Serviana, seu hypothecaria.

§$ VII. Item Servinia, et quasi
Serviana, (que étiam hypothecaria
vocatur,) ex ipsius pretoris juris-
dictione substantiam capiunt. Ser-
viana autem experitur quis de rebus
.coloni, que pignoris jure pro mer-
cedibus fundi ei tenentur. Quasi
Serviana autem est, qua creditores
pignora hypothecasve persequuntur.
Inter pignos autem et hypothecam,
(quantum ad actionem hypotheca-
riam attinet,) nihil interest: nam
de qua re inter creditorem et debi-
torem convenerit, ut sit pro debito
obligata, utraque hac appellatione
continetur; sed in aliis differentia
est : nam pignoris appellatione eam
proprie rem contineri dicimus, quz
simul etiam traditur creditori, max-
imé si mobilis sit: at eam, que
sine traditione nuda conventione
" tenetur, proprié hypothece appella-
tione contineri dicimus.

$7. Also the action Serviana,
and the action quasi-Serviana,
(whith is also called hypothecary,)
take their rise from the preetor’s ju-
risdiction. By the action Serviana,
a suit may be commenced for the
property of a farmer, bound for
rent. The action quasi-Serviana
is that, by which a creditor may
sue for a thing pledged or hypoth-
ecated to him; and, in regard to
this action, there is no difference
between a pledge and an hypothe-
que; though in other respects they
differ; for, by the term pledge, is
meant that, which hath actually
been delivered to a creditor, espe-
cially if the thing was a moveable;
hypothecation means the making
anything liable to a creditor by a
nude agreement only, without de-
livery.
LIB. LY.

TIT. VL

De actonibus pretoriis personalibus.

$ VII. In personam quoque ac-
tiones ex sua jurisdictione proposi-
tas habet preetor, veluti de pecunia
constitutd ; cui similis videbatur re-
ceptitia. Sed ex nostra constitu-
tione, (cum, et si quid plenius ha-
bebat, hoc in actionem pecuniz con-
Stitute transfusum est,) et ea quasi
supervacua jussa est cum sua auc-
toritate 4 nostris legibus, recedere.
Item pretor proposuit actionem de
peculio servorum, filiorumque fa-
miliarum; et eam, ex qua queritur,
an actor juraverit; et alias complu-
res.

§$ 8. Personal actions have also
been introduced by the pretors, in
consequence of their authority; as
the action de pecunid constituta ;
which much resembles that called
receptitia, now taken away by our
constitution, as unnecessary ; and
whatever advantageous matter it
contained, we haye comprised in
the action de pecunia constitutd.
The pretors have likewise intro-
duced the action concerning the pe-
culium of slaves, and the sons of
families; and also.the action where-
in the questionis, whether the plain-
tiff hath made oath of his debt;
and many others.

De constituta pecunia.

§$ IX. De constituté autem pecu-
nid cum omnibus agitur, quicunque
vel pro se, vel pro alio, soluturos se
constituerint, nulla scilicet stipula-
tione interposita: nam alioqui si
stipulanti promiserint, jure civili
tenentur.

$9. A suit may be brought de
pecunia constitutd, against any per-
son who hath engaged to pay mon-
ey, either for himself or another,
without stipulation; but, when there
is a stipulation, the promise may
be inforced by the civil law.

De peculio.

$ X. Actiones autem de peculio
ided adversus patrem dominumve
comparavit pretor, quia licét ex
contractu filiorum servorumve ipso
jure non. teneatur; equum tamen
est, peculio tenus, (quod veiuti pa-
trimonium est filiorum filiarumque,
item servorum,) condemnari eos.

$10. The pretor hath also given
actions de peculio against fathers
and masters, who although they are
not legally bound by the contracts
of their children and slaves, ought
in equality to be bound to the ex-
tent of a peculium, which is, as it
were, the patrimony, and separate
estate of a son, a daughter, or a
slave.
332 LIB. IV.

TIT. VI.

 

De actione in factum ex jurejurando.

$ XI. Item, si quis postulante

adversario juraverit, deberi sibi pe-

cuniam, quam peteret, neque ei sol-

vatur, justissim$ accommodat ei ta-

.. lem actionem, per quam non illud

queritur, an ei pecunia debeatur,
sed an juraverit.

$11. Also ifany man, calledup-
on by the adverse party, make oath
that the debt, which he sues for, is
due and unpaid, the praetor most
justly indulges him with an action
upon the fact; in which no inquiry
is made, whether the debt be due,
but whether the oath hath been
taken.

De actionibus peenalibus.

§ XII. Peenales quoque actiones
preetor pené multas ex sua jurisdic-
tione introduxit; veluti adversus
eum, qui quid ex albo ejus corru-
pisset; et in eum, gui patronum
vel parentem in jus vocasset, cum
id non impetrasset; item adversus
eum, qui vi exemerit eum, qui in
jus vocaretur, cujusve dolo alius
exemerit ; et alias innumerabiles.

‘

$12. The pretors have also in-
troduced many penal actions, by
virtue of their authority. Thus,
they have provided anaction against
him, who hath willfully damaged
or erased an edict; against an eman-
cipated son, or a freed-man, who
hath commenced suit against his
.parent or patron, without previous
permission from the proper magis-
trate; alsoagainst any person, who
by force or fraud hath hindered an-
other from appearing to the process
of a court of justice; and many oth-
ers.

De prajudicialibus actionibus.

. § XIIL Preejudiciales actiones in
rem esse videntur; quales sunt,
per quas quzritur, an aliquis liber,
an libertus sit, vel servus, vel de
partu agnoscendo. Ex quibus fe-
ré una illa legitimam causam habet,
per quam queritur, an aliquis liber
sit: caeteree ex ipsius preetoris juris-
dictione substantiam capiunt.

$13. Prejudicial actions are also
real; such as those, by which it is
inquired, whether a man is born
free, or made free; whether he bea
slave, or a bastard. But of these,
that only arises from the civil law,
by which it is inquired, whether a
man be free born: the rest origi-
nate from the pretor’s jurisdiction.
LIB. IV.

TIT. VI. 333

 

An res sua condici possit.

$ XIV. Sic itaque discretis ac-
tionibus, certum est, non posse ac-
torem suam rem ita ab aliquo pe-
tere, si paret, eum dare oportere:
nec enim, quod actoris est, id ei da-
ri oportet; scilicet, quia dari cui-
quam id intelligitur, quod ita da-
tur, ut ejus fiat: nec res, quee jam
actoris est, magis ejus fieri potest.
Plané odio furum, quo magis plu-
ribus actionibus teneantur, effectum
est, ut, extra peenam dupli aut qua-
drupli, rei recipieadse nomine, fu-
res etiam hac actione teneantur, si
appareat, eos dare oportere: quam-
vis sit adversus eos etiam hec in
rem actio, per quam, rem suam
quis esse petit.

$14. Actions being thus either
real or personal, it is certain, that a
man cannot sue for his own proper-
ty by a condiction, or a personal ac-
tion in the following form, viz. If
it appear, that the defendant ought
to give it me: for the act of giving
implies the conferring of property,
and that which is already the pro-
perty of the plaintiff, cannot by
being given to him, become more
his'own, than it is already. But, in
order to shew a detestation for
thieves and robbers, and to accumu-
late the actions to which they are
liable, it hath been determined, that,
besides the double and quadruple
penalty, they may be pursued by a
condiction for the thing taken, in the
form before recited, if it appear, that
they ought to give it. And this, al-
though the party injured may also
bring a real action against them, by
which he may demand the thing
taken, as his own.

De nominibus actionum.

§ XV. Appellamus autem in rem
quidem actiones, vindicationes; in
personam verd actiones, quibus
dare aut facere oportere intenditur,
condictiones; condicere enim est
denumtiare, priscd lingua : nunc ve-
ro abusivé dicimus, condictionem
actionem in personam esse, qua ac-
tor intendit dari sibi oportere; nul-
la enim hoc tempore eo nomine de-
nuntiatio fit.

§ 15. Real actions are called vin-
dications; and personal actions, in
which it is intended, that something
ought to be done or given, are called
condictions; for condicere, in old
language was the same with denun-
tiare to denounce: but condiction is
now improperly used for a personal
action, by which the plaintiff con-
tends, that something ought to be
given to him; for denunciations are
not in use.
334

LIB. IV. TIT. VI.

 

Divisio secunda.

§ XVI. Sequens illa divisio est,
quod quedam actiones rei perse-
quendz gratia comparate sunt,
qudam pense persequende, que-
dam mistz sunt.

§ 16. Actions are also farther di-
vided into those, which are given to
recover the specific thing in dis-
pute; those, which are given for the
penalty only: and mixed actions.

De actionibus rei persecutoriis.

§ XVII. Rei persequende causa
comparatz sunt omnes in rem ac-
tiones; earum vero actionum, que
in personam sunt, ex -quidem, que
ex contractu nascuntur, feré omnes
Tei persequendz causé comparate
videntur; veluti quibus mutuam
pecuniam, vel in stipulatum deduc-
tam, petit actor; item commodati,
depositi, mandati, pro socio, ex
empto, vendito, locato, conducto.
Plané, si depositi agatur eo nomine,
quod tumultis, incendii, ruine,
naufragii causd depositum sit, in
duplum actionem preztor reddit, si
modo cum ipso, apud quem deposi-
tum sit, aut cum herede ejus, de
dolo ipsius agitur; quo casu mista
est actio.

§ 17. All real actions are given
for the recovery of the thing in liti-
gation; which is the object also of
almost all the personal actions
which arise from contract; as the
action for a mutuum, a commoda-
tum, or on account of a stipulation,
a deposit, mandate, partnership,
buying and selling, letting and hire-
ing. But, whena suit iscommenced
for a thing deposited by reason of a
riot, a fire, or any other calamity,
the pretor always gives an action
for a double penalty, besides the
thing deposited, if the suit is brought
against the depositary himself, or
against his heir, for fraud; in which
case the action is mixed.

De actionibus pone persecutoriis.

§¢ XVUI. Ex maleficiis vero
proditee actiones, aliz tantum peene
persequendz causa comparate sunt;
ali tam poens, quam rei perse-
quendz; et ob id miste sunt. Po-
nam tantum persequitur quis ac-
tione furti; sive enim manifesti a-
gatur, quadrupli, sivé non manifes-
ti, dupli, de sold poena agitur: nam
ipsam rem propria actione perse-
quitur quis, id est, suam esse pe-
tens, sivé fur ipse eam rem possi-

§ 18. In cases of mal-feasance,
some actions are for the penalty on-
ly, and some both for the thing and
the penalty; which are therefore
called mixed actions. But, inanac-
tion of theft, whether manifest or
not manifest, nothing more is sued
for than the penalty, which, in ma-
nifest theft is quadruple, and, in
theft not manifest, double: for the
owner may recover by a separate
action what hath been stolen from
LIB. IV.

TIT. VI. 335

 

deat, sivé alius quilibet. Eo am-
plius adversus furem etiam condic-
-tlo est rei.

De mistis 5 hoc est, rei

$ XIX. Vi autem bonorum
raptorum actio mista est, quia in
quadruplo rei persecutio contine-
tur; pcena autem tripli est. Sed
et legis Aquilize actio, de damno
injurié dato, mista est; non solum
si adversus inficiantem in duplum
agatur, sed interdum etsi in sim-
plum quisque agat; veluti si quis
hominem claudum aut luscum oc-
ciderit, qui in ec anno integer et
magni pretii fuerit; tanti enim
damnatur, quanti is homo eo in
anno plurimi fuerit, secundum jam
traditam divisionem. Item mista
est actio contra eos, qui relicta sa-
crosanctis Ecclesiis, vel aliis vene-
rabilibus locis, legata vel fidei-com-
missi nomine, dare distulerint, us-
que adeo ut etiam in judicium vo-
carentur: tunc enim et ipsam rem
vel pecuniam, que relicta est, dare
compelluntur, et aliud tantum pro
pena; et idéo in duplum ejus fit
condemnatio.

him, if he demand the thing stolen
as his own, not only against the
thief, but against any other in pos-
session of his property. The thief
may also be sued by a condiction
for the thing itself. ,

et poenee persecutoriis.

§ 19. An action for goods taken
by force, is a mixed action; because
the thing taken is included under
the quadruple value to be recovered
by the action; and thus the penalty
is but triple. The action, introduc-
ed by the law Aquilia, for damage
injuriously done, is also a mixed
action; not only when given for
double value against a man deny-
ing the fact, but sometimes, when
the action is only for single value ;
as when a man hath killed a slave,
who at the time of his death was
lame, or wanted an eye, but had
within the year previous to his de-
cease, been free from any defect,
and of great price; for in this case
the defendent is obliged to pay as
much as the slave was worth at any
time within the year preceding his
death. (B. 4.1.3.) A mixed action
may also be brought against those,
who have delayed to deliver a lega-
cy, or gift in trust, given for the ben-
efit of a church, or any other holy
place, until they have been called
before a magistrate for that purpose;
for then they are compelled to deliv-
er up the thing, or to pay the mon-
ey bequeathed, and as much more, |
by way of penalty; and thus they
are condemned in a double amount.
336 LIB. IV.

De mistis 5 id est, tam in

$ XX. Quedam actiones mis-
tam causam obtinere videntur, tam
in rem, quam in personam; qualis
est familiz erciscunds actio, que
competit cohzeredibus de dividenda
hereditate ; item communi divi-
dundo, que inter eos redditur, inter
quos aliquid commune est, ut id
dividatur ; item finium regundo-
rum actio, qua inter eos agitur, qui
confines agros habent. In quibus
tribus judiciis permittitur judici
rem alicui ex litigatoribus ex bono
et equo adjudicare; et, si unius
pars pregravari videbitur, eum in-
vicem certé pecunia alteri condem-
nare.

Divisio

§ XXI. Omnes autem actiones
vel in simplum concepte sunt, vel
in duplum, vel in triplum, vel in
quadruplum; ulterius autem nulla
actio extenditur.

\

TIT. VI.

rem, quam in personam.

§ 20. Some actions, are also
mixed as proceeding against the
thing as well as against'the Person:
of this sort is the action familia er-
ciscunde, which may be brought
by co-heirs for the partition of their
inheritance; the action de communi
dividundo, given for the division of
any particular things, which, exclu-
sive of an inheritance, are in com-
mon: and likewise the action fini-
um regundorum or an action of
boundary, which takes place among
owners of contiguous estates. And,
in these three actions, it is wholly
in the power’ of the judge to give
the ground, or thing in dispute, to
either of the parties litigant, and
then to oblige that party, if neces-
sity so require, to recompense his
adversary, by paying him a sum
certain, in amends for any inequal-
ity in the adjudication.

tertia.

§ 21. All actions are for the
single, double, triple, or quadruple
value of the thing in litigation ; for
no action extends farther.

De actionibus in simplum.

§ XXII. In simplum agitur,
veluti ex stipulatione, ex mutui
datione, ex empto, vendito, locato,
conducto, mandato, et denique ex
aliis quam plurimis causis.

§ 22. The single value is sued
for, when an action is given upon
a stipulation, a loan, a mandate,
the contract of buying and selling,
letting and hireing ; and also upon
several other accounts.
LIB. IV. TIT. VI.

337

 

In duplum.

§ XXII In duplum agimus,
veluti furti nec manifesti, damni
injuriz ex lege Aquilid, depositi ex
quibusdam causis: item servi cor-
rupti, que competit in eum, cujus
hortatu  consiliove servus alienus
fugerit, aut contumax adversus do-
minum factus est, aut luxuriosé vi-
vere coeperit, aut denique quolibet
modo deterior factus sit; in qua
actione earum etiam rerum, quas
fugiendo servus abstulerit, astima-
tio deducitur: item ex legato, quod
venerabilibus locis relicttim est, se-
cundim ea, que supra diximus.

§ 23. The double value is sued
for in an action of theft not mani-
Jest, of injury, by the law Aguilia,
and sometimes in an action of depo-
sit. Also in an action brought, on
account of a slave corrupted, against
him, by whose advice such a slave
hath fled from his master, grown
disobedient, extravagant, or become
in any manner the worse; and, in
this action, an estimate is to he made
of whatever things the slave hath
stolen from his master, before his
flight. An action for the detention
of a legacy, left to an holy place, is
also given for double value, as we
have before remarked.

In triplum.

§$ XXIV. Tripli vero agimus,
cum quidam majorem vera estima-
lione quantitatem in libello con-
ventionis inserunt, ut ex hac causa
viatores, id est, executores litium
ampliorem summam, sportularum
nomine, exigerent: tune enim id,
quod propter eorum causam dam-
num passus fuerit reus, in triplum
ab actore consequetur; ut in hoc
triplo etiam simplum, in quo dam-
num passus est, connumeretur.
Quod nostra constituto introduxit,
que in nostro codice fulget, ex qua
procul dubio certum est, ex lege
condictitiam emanare.

§ 24. A suit may be brought for
triple value, when any person in-
serts a greater sum, than is due to
him, in the libel of convention, to
the intent, that the officers of any
court may exact a larger fee, or per-
quisite from the defendant; in which
case the latter may obtain the triple
value of the extraordinary fee from
the plaintiff, including the fee in the
triple value. The fees of officers
are regulated by our constitution,
and it is not to be doubted, but that
the action, called condictio er lege,
may be given by virtue of that
ordinance.

In quadruplum.

§ XXV. Quadrupli autem agi-
tur; veluti furti manifesti; item de
‘ 43

§ 25. A suit may be commenced
for quadruple value, by an action
338

LIB. IV. TIT. VI.

 

eo, quod metis causa factum sit;
deqne ea pecunia, que in hoc: data
sit, ut is, cui datur, calumniz causd
negotium alicui faccret, vel non fa-
ceret. Item ex lege condictitiad,
nostra .ex constitutione, oritur, in
quadruplum condemnationem im-
ponens iis executoribus litium, qui
contra nostreeconstitutionis normam
a reis quicquam exegerint.

for theft manifest, by an action
for putting a man in fear, and
by an action on account of mo-
ney, given to bring on a litigious
suit against some third person, or
on account of money given to desist
from it. A condiction ex lege, for
the quadruple value, arises also from
our constitution against those offi-
cers of courtsof justice, who demand
any thing from the party defendant,
contrary to the regulations of the
said constitution.

Subdivisio actionum in duplum.

$ XXVI. Sed furti quidem nec
manifesti actio et servi corrupti 4
ezteris, de quibus simul locuti su-
mus, eo differunt, quod hee actiones
omnimodo dupli sunt; at iste, id
est, damni injuriz ex lege Aquilia
et interdum depositi, inficiatione
duplicantur; in coufitentem autem
in simplum dantur. Sed illa, quae
de iis competit, qua relicta venera-
bilibus locis sunt, non solum infici-
atione duplicatur, sed etiam si dis-
tulerit relicti solutionem, usque
quo jussu magistratuum convenia-
tur: in confitentem verd, ante-
quam jussu magistratuum conve-
niatur, solventem, simpli redditur.

§ 26. But an action of theft mot
manifest, and an ‘action on account
of a slave corrupted, differ from
the others, of which we have
spoken, in that they always inforce
a condemnation in double the value;
but in an action, given by the law
Aquilia for an injury done, and
sometimes in an action of deposit,
the double value may be exacted
in case of denial; but if the defend-
ant confesses, the single value only
can be recovered. In an action
brought for a legacy to pious uses,
due to any holy place or society, the
penalty is not only doubled by the
denial of the defendant, but also by
any delay of payment, which may
be adjudged to have given a just
cause for citing the defendant before
a magistrate; but if the legacy be
paid, before any citation issues at
the command of the judge, the
single value only can be required.
LIB. IV. TIT. VI.

339

Subdivisio actionum in quadruplum.

§ XXVIT. Item actio de eo,
quod metiis causa factum sit, 4 czx-
teris, de quibus simul locuti sumus,
eo differt, quod ejus natura tacité
continetur, ut, qui judicis jussu ip-
sam rem actori restituat, absolva-
tur: quod in ceteris casibus non
cst ita, sed omnimodo quisque in
quadruplum condemnatur; quod
est et in furti manifesti actione.

$ 27. An action for putting a

‘man in fear, differs also from other

actions in quadruplum, because it
is tacitly implied in the nature of
this action, that the party, who hath
obeyed the command of the judge,
in restoring the things taken, may
be dismissed; for, in all other ac-
tions for the fourfold value, every
man must be condemned to pay
the full penalty, as in the action of
theft manifest.

Divisio quarta de actionibus bone fidei.

§ XXVIII Actionum autem
queedam bone fidei sunt, quedam
stricti juris. Bone fidei sunt he:
ex empto, vendito; locato, conduc-
to; negotiorum gestorum; man-
dati; despositi; pro socio; tutele;
commodati; pigneratitia; familie
erciscunde; communi dividundo;
prescriptis verbis, que de esti-
mato proponitur; et ea, que ex
permutatione competit; et hzeredi-
tatis petitio. Quamvis enim us-
que adhuc incertum erat, inter bo-
nx fidei judicia connumeranda he-
reditatis petitio esset, an non; nos-
tra tamen constitutio aperté, eam
esse bone fidei, disposuit.

De rei uxorie actione, in ex

§ XXIX. Fuerat antea et rei
uxorie actio una ex bone fidei judi-
ciis: sed cum, pleniorem esse ex
stipulatu actionem invenientes, om-
ne jus, quod res uxoria antea ha-

§ 28. The fourth division is into
actions of good faith, and actions of
strict right. Those of good faith
are the following; viz. actions of
buying and selling, letting and hire-
ing; of affairs transacted, of man-
date, deposit, partnership, tutelage,
loan, mortgage; of the partition of
an inheritance, or the division of
any thing or things, which belong
in common to several persons; also
actions in prescribed words, which
are either estimatory, or derived
from commutation; and lastly the
demand of an inheritance: for al-
though it hath long been doubtful to
what class this action belonged;
our constitution hath clearly num-
bered it among actions of good
faith.

stipulatu actionem transfusa.

§ 29. The action rei uwrorie for
the recovery of a marriage portion,
was formerly numbered among the
actions of good faith; but when,
upon finding the action of stipula-
340

bebat, cum multis divisionibus, in
actionem ex stipulatu, quz de doti-
bus exigendis proponitur, transtu-
lerimus, merito rei uxoriz actione
sublata, ex stipulatu actio, que pra
ea introducta est, naturam bone fi-
dei judicii tantum in exactione do-
tis meruit, ut bone fidei sit; sed
et tacitam ei dedimus hypothecam.
Preeferri autem aliis creditoribus in
hypothecis tunc censuimus, cum ip-
sa mulier de dote sud experiatur,
cujus solius providentid hoc induxi-
mus.

LIB. IV. TIT. VI.

tion to be more full and advantage-
ous, we abrogated the action rei
uxorie, and transferred all its ef-
fects, with the addition of many o-
ther powers, to the action of stipu-
lation given to recover marriage
portions, we then not only thought,
that this action of stipulation, as far
as it related to marriage portions,
deserved to be numbered with ac-
tions of good faith, but we also add-
ed to it by implication, the effect of
a mortgage: and we judged it pro-
per, that women, in whose sole be-
half we have thus ordained, should
be preferred to all other creditors by
mortgage, whenever they them-
selves sue for their marriage por-
tions.

De potestate judicis in judicio bone fidei, et de compensa-
tionibus.

§ XXX. In bone fidei judiciis,
libera potestas permitti videtur ju-
dici ex bono et xquo estimandi,
quantum actori restitui debeat. In
quo.ct illud cortinetur, ut, si quid
invicem preestare actorem oporteat,
eo compensato, in reliquum is, cum
quo actum est, debeat condemnari.
Sed et in stricti juris judiciis ex
rescripto divi Marci, opposita doli
mali exceptione, compensatio indu-
cebatur. Sed nostra constitutio
easdem compensationes, que jure
aperto nituntur, latius introduxit,
ut actiones ipso jure minuant, sivé
in rem, sivé in personam, sive alias
quascunque; excepta sola depositi
actione, cui, aliquid compensationis
nomine opponi, sané iniquum esse
credimus; ne, sub pretextu com-

§ 30. In all actions of good faith
a full power is given to the judge of
calculating, according to the rules
of justice and equity, how much
ought to be restored to be plaintiff;
and of course, when the plaintiff is
found to be indebted to the defend-
ant in a less sum, it is in the power
of the judge to allow a compensa-
tion, and to condemn the defendant
in the payment of the difference;
and, even in actions of strict right,
the emperor Marcus introduced a
compensation by opposing an ex-
ception of fraud: but we have ex-
tended compensations much farther
by our constitution, when the debt
of the defendant is evident ; so that
actions of strict right, real, personal,
or of whatever kind may be dimin-
LIB. IV.

pensationis, depositarum rerum
quis exactione defraudetur.

TIT. VI. 341

ished by compensation ; except only
an action of deposit, against which
we have not judged it proper to per-
mit any compensation to be alleged,
lest the pretence of compensation
should give color and encourage-
nient ot fraud.

De actionibus arbitrariis.

§$ XXXI. Preeterea, actiones
quasdam arbitrarias, id est, ex ar-
bitrio judicis pendentes, appella-
mus ; in quibus nisi arbitrio judicis
is, cum quo agitur, actori satisfaci-
at, veluti rem restituat, vel exhibe-
at, vel solvat, vel ex noxali causa
servum dedat, condemnari debeat.
Sed iste actiones taminrem, quam,
in personam, inveniuntur; in rem;
veluti Publiciana, Serviana de re-
bus coloni, quasi Serviana, quee c-
tiam hypothecaria vocatur ; in per-
sonam ; veluti quibus de eo agitur,
quod vi aut mettis causd, aut dolo
malo, factum est; item cum id,
quod certo loco promissum est, pe-
titur: ad exhibendum quoque ac-
tio ex arbitrio judicis pendet. In
his enim actionibus, et czeteris si-
milibus, permittitur judici ex bono
et zequo, secundum cujusque rei,
de qua actum est, naturam, esti-
mare, quemadmodum actori satisfi-
eri oporteat.

«

- § XXXII Curare autem debet
judex, ut omnind, quantum possi-

§ 31. Some actions moreover we
call arbitrary, as depending upon
the discretion of the judge: for, in
these, if the party do not at the de-
cree of.the court, exhibit whatever
is required, restore the thing in liti-
gation, pay the value of it, or give
up a slave in consequence of an ac-
tion of mal-feasance, he ought to be
condemned. Of these arbitrary ac-
tions some are real and some per-
sonal: real, as theaction Publiciana,
Serviana, and quasi Serviana, which
is likewise called hypothecary :
others are personal, as those, by
which a suit is commenced on ac-
count of something done by force,
fear or fraud; or on account of
something, which was promised to
be paid or restored in a certain
place ; and the action ad exhiben-
dum, which was given to the intent,
that something particular should be
exhibited, is also of the same kind:
in these and the like actions, the
judge may determine, according to
equity and the nature of the thing
sued for, in what manner and pro-
portion the plaintiff ought to receive
satisfaction.

Quinta divisio, de incerte quantitatis petitione.

§ 32. A judge ought, as much
as possible, so to frame his sentence,
342 LIB. IV.

TIT. VI.

 

bile ei sit, certe pecunie vel rei
sententiam ferat; etiamsi de incer-
ta quantitate apud eum actum est.

that it may be given for a thing or
sum certain; although the claim,
upon which the sentence is founded,
may be for an incertain sum or
quantity.

De pluris petitione.

§ XXXII. Si quis agens inten-
tione sud plus complexus fuerit,
quam ad eum pertineat, causa ca-
debat, id est, rem amittehat; nec
facil in integrum restituebatur a
pretore, nisi minor erat xxv annis;
huic enim, sictt in aliis causis, cau-
sa cognita, succurrebatur, si lapsus
juventute fuerat; ita et in hac cau-
si succurrisolitum erat. Sané, si
tam magna causa justi erroris in-
‘terveniebat, ut etiam constantissi-
mus quisque labi posset, etiam ma-
jori xxv annis succurrebatur ; velu-
ti si quis totum legatum petierit,
post deinde prolati fuerint codicilli,
quibus aut pars legati adempta sit,
aut quibusdam aliis legata data
sint; que efficiebant, ut plus peti-
isse videretur petitor, quam dod-
rantem; atque ided lege Falcidia
legata minuebantur. Plus autem
quatuor modis petitur ; re, tempore,
loco, et causd. Re, veluti si quis
pro decem aureis, quae ei debeban-
tur, viginti peticrit; aut si is, cujus
ex parte res est, totam eam, vel ma-
jorem partem, suam esse intende-
rit. Tempore, veluti si quis ante
diem vel ante conditionem petierit :
qua enim ratione qui tardius solvit,
quam solvere deberet, minus sol-
vere intelligitur, eddem ratione, qui
premature petit, plus petere vide-

§ 33. Formerly, if a plaintiff
claimed more than his due, he failed
in his cause; that is, he losthis debt:
nor was it easy for him to be rein-
stated by the preetor, unless he was
under the age of 25 years: for in
this, as well as in other cases, it was
usual to aid minors, if it appeared
that the error was owing to their
youth ; and if the error was such,
that a skilful person might have
been led into it, then even persons
of full age might have been aided
by the magistrate: for example, if
a legatee had demanded his whole
legacy, and codicils were afterwards
(unexpectedly) produced, by which
a part of it was: revokcd, or new
legacies bequeathed to other persons,
so that the plaintiff appeared to
have demanded more than three
fourths of his legacy ; because it
was subject to a diminution by the
law falcidia ; yet, in such case, the
legatee would be relieved. A man
may demand more than what is
due to him in four several respects,
viz. in respect to the thing itself;
to time; to place; and to the cause.
In respect to the thing; as when
the plaintiff, instead of ten aurei,
due to him, demands twenty: or
if, when he owns but part of some
particularthing, he claimsthe whole
LIB. IV.

TIT. VL 343

 

tur. Loco plus petitur, veluti cum
quis id, quod certo loco sibi dari
Stipulatus est, alio loco petit sin’
commemoratione illius loci, in quo
sibi dari stipulatus est; verba @ra-
tid, si is, qui ita stipulatus fuerit,
Eiphesi dare spondes ; Rome pur
“intendat, sibi dari oportere. Ideo
autem plus petere intelligitur, quia
utilitatem, quam haberet promissor,
si Ephesi solveret, adimit ei pura
intentione: propter quam causam
alio loco petenti arbitraria actio
proponitur ; in qua scilicet ratio ha-
betur utilitatis, quae promissori com-
petitura fuisset, si illo loco solveret,
qua se soluturum spopondit. Qu
ulilitas” pleru4mque in mercibus
maxima invenitur: veluti vino, oleo,
frumento, que per singulas regio-
nes diversa habent pretia. Sed et
pecuniz numerate non in omnibus
regionibus sub iisdem usuris foene-
rantur. Si quis tamen Ephesi pe-
tat, id est, eo loco petat, in quo, ut
sibi detur, stipulatus est, pura ac-
tione recté agit: idque etiam pre-
tor demonstrat; scilicet, quia utili-
tas solvendi, salva est promissori.
Huic autem, qui loco plus petere
intelligitur, proximusest, qui causa
plus petit: ut ecce, si quis ita a te
stipuletur, hominem Stichum, aut
decem aureos, dare spondes ; deinde
alterum petat, veluti hominem tan-
tum, aut decem aureos tantum.
Ides autem plus petere intelligitur,
quia in eo genere stipulationis pro-
missoris est electio, utrum pecuni-
am, an hominem, solvere malit:
quiigitur pecuniam tantum, vel ho-

é

ora greater share than he is entitled
to. In respect to time, as when the
plaintiff makes his demand before
the day of payment, or before the
time of the performance of a con-
dition ; for, as he, who does not pay
so soon as he ought, is always un-
derstood to pay less than he ought,
so, by parity of reasoning, who-
ever sues prematurely demands
more than his due. In respect to
place ; as when any person requires
that something stipulated to be de-
livered at a certain place, should be
delivered at some other place, with-
out noticing the place originally sti-
pulated ; as if Titius, should stipu-
late in these words ; do you promise
to give such a particular thing at
Ephesus? and should afterwards
declare upon a contract to deliver
at Rome ; for Titius would thus be
understood to demand more than his
due, byendeavonring to deprive his
debtor of the advantage he might
have had in paying or delivering at
Ephesus. It is on this account,
that an arbitrary action is given to
him, who would demand payment
in a place different from that agreed
upon; for, in that action, the ad-
vantage, which might have accrued
to the debtor, by paying his debt in
the place stipulated, is taken into
consideration. This advantage is
generally found the greatest in mer-:
chandise; as in wine, oil, corn, &c.
which, in different places, bear dif-
ferent prices; and, indeed, money
itself is not lent everywhere at the
same interest. But, if a man would
344 LIB. IV.

TIT. VI.

 

minem tantum, sibi dari oportere
intendit, eripit electionem adversa-
rio, et eo modo suam quidem con-
ditionem meliorem facit, adversarii
vero sui deteriorem. Qué de causa
talis in e@ re prodita est actio, ut
quis intendat hominem Stichum aut
aureos decem sibi dari oportere, id
est, ut eodem modo peteret, quo sti-
pulatus est. Preeterea, si quis gen-
eraliter hominem stipulatus sit, et
specialiter Stichum petat : aut gen-
eraliter vinum stipulatus sit, et spe-
cialiter campanum petat; aut gen-
eraliter purpuram stipulatus sit, de-
inde specialiter Tyriam petat; ‘plus
petere intelligitur, quia electionem
adversario tollit cui stipnlationis ju-
re liberum fuit aliud solvere, quam
quod peteretur. Quinetiam licét
villisimum sit, quod quis petat ; ni-
hilominus plus petere intelligitur ;
quia sep accidit, ut promissori
facilius sit allud solvere, quod ma-
joris pretii est. Sed hee quidem
antea in usu fuerant: postea vero

lex Zenoniana, et nostra, rem co-

arctavit. Et, si quidem tempore
plus fuerit petitum, quid statui op-
orteat, Zenonis dives memoriz lo-
quitur constitutio. Sin autem quan-
titate, vel alio modo, plus fuerit pe-
titum, in omne, si quod forté dam-
num ex hac causa acciderit ei, con-

sue the performance of a stipulation
at Ephesus, or at any other place,
where it was agreed, that it should
be performed, he may legally com-
merfte his suit by a pure action, that
is without mentioning the place;
and this the preetor allows of, inas-
much as the debtor does not loseany
advantage. Next to him, who,de-
mands more than his due, in regard
to place, ishe, who demands more
than his due, in regard to the cause;
as for instance, if Titius stipulate
thus with you: do you promise to
give either your slave Stichus or ten
aurei ? and then demand either the
slave specially, or the money spe-
cially ; in thiscase Titius would be
adjudged to have demanded more
than his due, the right of election
being in you by whom the promise
was made; and therefore, when T%-
tius sues either for the money spe-
cially, or for the slave, he takes a-
way your election, and betters his
own condition, by making yours
worse: and it is upon this account
that an action has been given, by
which the party agent or plaintiff
may make his demand conforma-
ble to the stipulation, and claim ei-
ther the slave or the money. And
further, if a man should stipulate,
generally, that wine, purple or a
LIB. IV.

 

tra quem plus petitum fuerit, com-
missa tripili condemnatione, sicit
supra diximus, puniatur.

TIT. VL. 345°
slave, should be given himy.and-
should afterwards sue for the wine
of Campania, the purple of Tyre, or
the slave Stichus in particular, he:
would then be adjudged to have de-.
manded more than his due; for the »
power of election would thusbe taken.
from the adverse party, who was not
bound by the stipulation to pay the
thing specifically demanded ; and al-

‘though, in any of these cases, thé:

thing sued for should be of little or
no value, yet the demandant-would.
be thought to claim more than his-
due; because: it is often easier for-
the debtor to pay the thing stipulat--
ed, although it may be of greater.
value than the thing - demanded.
Such was the law according to the
ancient practice, in regard to an
over-demand, viz. that the demand-
ant should lose even that which was
really due tohim. But this law has

been greatly restrained by the con-

stitution of Zeno the emperor, and
by our own; for, if more’ than is
due be demanded in respect of time,’
the judge must be directed in ‘his-
proceeding by the constitution of that”
emperor of glorious memory ; but, ‘
if in respect of quantity, or on any’
other account, then the loss suffered
by him, upon whom the demand is
made, must be recompenseéd; as we
have before declared, by a decree of”
triple damages against the plaintiff.’

De minoris summe petitione.

§ XXXIV. Si minus intentione
sud complexus fuerit actor, quam
ad eum pertineat; veluti si, cum ei
decem aurei deberentur, quinque

sibi dari opportere intenderit; aut
44

§ 34. If a plaintiff sue for less,
than he has a claim to, demanding,
for instance, only five aurei, when
ten are due; or the moiety of an es- :
tate, when the whole belongs. to”
346 LIB. IV.

TIT. VL

 

si, cum totus fundus ejus esset, par-
tem dimidiam suam esse petierit ;
siné periculo agit: in reliquum
enim nihilominus judex adversari-
um eodem judicio ei condemnat, ex
constitutione dives memoria Zeno-
nis.

Si aliud pro
§$ XXXYV. Si quis aliud pro alio
intenderit, nihil eum periclitari pla-
cet, sed in eodem ‘judicio, cognita
veritate, errorem suum corrigere ei
permittitur veluti si is, qui hominem
Stichum petere deberet, Erotem pe-
tierit ; aut si quis ex testamento dari
sibi oportere intenderit, quod ex
stipulatu debetur.

Divisio sexta.

§ XXXVI. Sunt preeterea que-
dam actiones, quibus non semper
solidum, quod nobis debetur, prese-
quimur, sed modo solidum perse-
quimur, modo minus; ut ecce, siin
peculium filii servive agamus: nam,
sinon minus in peculio sit, quam
persequimur, in solidum dominus
paterve condemnatur ; si vero mi-
cus inveniatur, eatenus condemnat
judex, quatenus in peculio sit-
Quemadmodum autem peculium
intelligi debeat, suo ordine propone-
mus.

him ; he acts safely ; ‘for the judge,
in consequence of Zeno’s constitu-
tion, may nevertheless condemn the
adverse party, under the same pro-
cess, to the payment or delivery of
all, which appears of right to belong
to the plaintiff.

alio petatur.

§ 35. When a plaintiff demands
one thing instead of another, he
risks nothing by the mistake, which
he is allowed to correct under one
and the same process: as if a liti-
gant should demand the slave Ero-
tes, instead of the slave Stichus, or
should claim, as due by testament,
what is found to be due upon stipu-
lation.

De peculio.

§ 36. There are also some actions,
by which we do not always sue for
the whole, which is due to us, but
for the whole, or less, as it proves
to be most expedient ; thus, when a
suit is brought against the peculium
of ason or slave, if the peculium
be sufficient to answer the demand,
the father or master must be con-
demned to pay the whole debt; but,
if the peculium be not sufficient,
the judge can condemn the defend-
_ants only to the extent of its value.
We will hereafter explain, in its
proper place, what we mean by the
term peculium.

De repetitione dotis.

§ XXXVII. Item, si-de dote in
judicio mulier agat, placet, eatenus
maritum condemnari debere, qua-

§ 37. Also, if a woman bring suit
for the restitution of her marriage
portion, theman must beeondemned
LIB. IV.

‘tents facere possit; id est, quate-
nus facultates ejus patiuntur. Ita-
que, si dotis quantitati concurrant
facultates ejus, in solidum damna-
tur; sin minus, in tantum, quan-
tum facere potest. Propter reten-
tionem quoque dotis -repetitio mi-
nuitur ; nam ob impensas, in res
dotales factas, marito quasi reten-
tio concessa est, quia ipso jure ne-
cessariis sumptibus dos minuitur;
sicut ex latioribus digestorum libris
cognoscere licet.

TIT. VL. 347

to pay as far as he is able; i. e. as
far as his ability or solvency will
permit: therefore, if the portion
demanded and the ability of the
man be equal, he must be adjudg-
ed. to satisfy the whole demand;
but, if his ability be less than the
claim, he must nevertheless be con-
demned to pay as much ashe is
able. But the claim of a woman
may in this case be lessened by a
retention ; for the husband is per-
mitted to retain an equivalent for
whatever he hath necessarily ex-
pended upon the estate given with
his wife, as a marriage portion;
but this will fully appear by a
perusal of the digests, to which the
reader is referred.

De actione advursus parentem, patronum, socium, et dona-
torem.,

§ XXXVII. Sed et, si quis cum
parente suo patronove agat, item si
socius cum socio judicio societatis
agat, non plus actor consequitur,
quam adversarius ejus facere po-
test. Idem est, si quis ex dona-
tione sua convenitur.

§$ 38. If any person sue his pa-

yent, patron, or partner, the plain-

tiff cannot obtain sentence for a
greater sum, than his adversary is
able to pay; itis the same when a
donor is sued on account of his
donation.

De compensationibus. :

§ XXXIX. Compensationes quo-
que opposite plerumque efficiunt,
ut minus quisque consequatur,
quam ei debeatur. Nam ex bono
et equo habita ratione ejus, quod

invicém actorem ex eddem causa

prestare oportet, poterit judex in
reliquum eum, cum quod actum
est, condemnare ; sicit jam dictum
est.

§ 39. When a compensation is
alleged by the defendant, it gener-
ally happens, that the plaintiff re-
covers less than his demand ; for it
is in the power of the judge, as we
have before declared, to give an
equitable deduction from the de-
mand of the plaintiff of whatever
he owes to the defendant, and to
condemn the defendant to the pay-
ment only of the remainder; as it
hath already been observed.
348 LIB. IV.

TIT. VIL

De eo, qui bonis cessit.

§ XL. Cum eo quoque, qui cre-
ditoribus suis bonis cessit, si pos-
tea aliquid acquisierit, quod idone-
um emolumentum habeat, ex inte-
gro in id, quod: facere potest, cre-
ditores experiunter. Inhumanum
enim erat, spoliatum fortunis suis
in solidum damnari.

 

§ 40. Creditors also, to whom
a debtor hath made a cession of
his goods, may afterwards, if he
hath gained any considerable ac-
quisition, bring a fresh suit against
him, for as much as he is able to
pay, but not more; for it would be
inhuman to condemn a man in so-
lidum, who hath already been de-
prived of his whole fortune.

 

TITULUS SEPTIMUS.

QUOD CUM EO, QUI IN ALIENA POTESTATE EST, NEGO-
TIUM GESTUM ESSE DICITUR.

D. xiv. T. 5.

C. iv. T. 16.

Scopus et nexus.

QUIA tamen superius mention-
em habuimus de actione, qua in
peculium filiorum  servorumque
agitur, opus est, ut de hac*actione
et de ceteris, quee eorundem nomi-
ne in parentes dominosve dari so-
lent, diligentius admoneamus. Et
quia, sivé cum servis negotium ges-
tum sit, sivé cum iis, qui in potes-
tate parentum sunt, eadem fere ju-
ra servantur, ne verbosa fiat dispu-
tatio, dirigamus sermonem in per-
sonam servi dominique, idem intel-
lecturi de liberis quoque et parenti-
bus, quorum in potestate sunt ;
nam, si quid in his proprié serve-
tur, separatim ostendemus.

We have already mentioned the
action which may be _ brought
against the peculium, or separate
estate of a son or slave; it is now
necessary to speak of it more fully,
and also of some cther actions,
which are allowed to children and
slaves against their parents and
masters. But, as the law is almost
the same, whether an affair be
transacted: with a slave, or with
one who is under the power of his
parent, to avoid prolixity we will
treat only of slaves and their mas-
ters, leaving what we say of them
to be understood also of parents
and children under power; for
whatever is peculiar to children
and parents, we shall point out
separately.
LIB. IV. TILT. VIL

349

De actione quod jussu.

$1. Si igitur jussu domini cum
servo negotium gestum erit, in so-
lidum pretor adversus dominum
actionem pollicetur; scilicet quia
is, qui ita contrahit, fidem domini
sequi videtur.

§ 1. For any business negotiated
by a slave acting under the com-
mand of his master, the preetor will
give an action against the master
for the whole value of the transac-
tion; for whoever contracts with a
slave, is presumed to have done it
on a confidence in the master.

De exercitaria et institoria actione.

§$ IT. Eadem ratione pretor du-
as alias in solidum actiones polli-
cetur; quarum altera exercitoria,
altera institoria, appellatur. Exer-
cioria tunc habet locum, cum quis
servum suum magistrum navi pree-
posuerit, et quid cum eo, ejus rei
gratia, cul preepositus erit, contrac-
tum fuerit. Ided autem exercito-
ria vocatur, quia exercitor is appel-
latur, ad quem quotidiamus navis
questus pertinet. Institoria tunc
locum habet, cum quis taberne
forts, aut cuilibet negotiationi, ser-
vum suum preposuerit, et quid
_ cum €0, ejtts rei causa, cui prepo-
situs erit, contractum fuerit. Ideo
autem institoria appellatur, quia,
qui negotiationibus przeponuntur,
institores vocantur. Istas tamen
duas actiones pretor reddit, et si
liberum quis hominem, aut alie-
num servum, navi aut taberne aut
taberne aut cuilibet negotiationi
preeposuerit; scilicet, quia eadem
xquitatis ratio etiam eo casu inter-
veniat.

$ 2. The pretor also gives two
other actions in solidum upon the
same motive; the one ezercitoria,
the other institoria. The action ez-
ercitoria takes place, when a master
hath made his slave commander of
a vessel, and some contract hath
been entered into with the slave in
that capacity. This action isnamed
exercitoria, because he to whom the
daily profits of a ship belong, is cal-
léd everciter. The action institoria
is made use of, when a master
hath given his slave the manage-
ment of a shop, or committed any
particular affair to his direction, on
account whereof some one hath
been induced to enter into a contract
with the slave; and this action is
called institoria, because all persons,
to whom a negotiation is committed,
are denominated institores. The
pretor hath likewise been induced,
by the same equity, to give these
two actions against any man, who
employs a free person, or the slave
of another, in the management of a
ship, a warehouse, or any particular
affair.
350

LIB. IV. TIT. VII.

 

De tributoria.

_§ TIL Introduxit et aliam ac-
tionem preetor, quee tributoria voca-
tur; namque, si servus in peculia-
ri merce, sciente domino, negotie-
tur, et quid cum eo ejus rei causa
contractum erit, ita preetor jus di-
-cit, ut, quicquid in his mercibus
erit, quodque indé receptum etit,
id inter dominum, si quid ei debe-
bitur, et cateros creditores, pro
rata portione distribuatur: et ideo
tributoria vocatur, quia ipsi domi-
no distributionem przetor permittet.
Nam, si quis ex creditoribus que-
ratur, quasi minus ei tributum sit,
quam oportuerit, hanc ei actionem
accommodat, que tributoria appel-
latur.

§ 3. The preetor hath also intro-
duced another action called tributo-
ria; for, if a slave with the know-
ledge of his master, trade upon his
peculium, and contracts are there-
upon made with him, the preetor or-
dains, that the merchandize, or mo-
ney, arising from his traffic, shall be
distributed between the master, (if
he has any just claim, ) and the rest
of the creditors in a ratable proper-
tion; and it is called ¢ributoria be-
cause the master himself is permit-
ted to make the distribution : but, if
any creditor complain, that too small
a share hath been allowed him, the
pretor will give this action, called
tributoria.

4 De peculio, et de in rem verso.

§ IV. Preterea introducta est
actio de peculio, deque eo, quod
in rem domini versum erit; ut
quamvis siné voluntate domini ne-
gotium gestum erit, tamen, sive
quid in rem ejus versum fuerit, id
totum prestare debeat; sive quid
non sit in rem ejus versum, id eate-
nus prestare debeat, quatents pe-
culium patitur. In rem autem do-
mini versum intelligitur, quicquid
necessario in rem ejus impenderit
servus, veluti si mutuatus pecuni-
am creditoribus ejus solverit, aut
eedificia ruentia fulserit, aut fami-
lie frumentum emerit, vel etiam
fundum, aut quamlibet aliam rem
necessariam mercatus erit. Ita-
que, si ex decem puta aureis, quos

§ 4. The action concerning a pe-
culium, and things converted to the
profit of the master, hath likewise
been introduced by the pretor; for
although business hath been trans-
acted by a slave, without consent of
his master, yet, where the profit aris-
ing is converted to the master’s bene-
fit, he ought to be answerable: and,
although the master should deriveno
emolument, he ought to be answera-
ble to the amount of the peculium.
Whenever any thing is necessarily
expended by a slave upon the mas-
ter’s affairs, it is understood to be a
conversion to his benefit; as if a
slave who hath borrowed money,
should pay the debts of his master,
repair his buildings, purchase an es-
LIB. IV.

TIT. VII. 351

 

servus tuus 4 'Titio mutuo accepit,

creditori tuo quinque aureos solve-

rit, reliquos verd quinque quolibet
modo consumpserit, pro quinque
quidem in solidum damnari debes ;
pro czeteris verd quinque eatenus,
quatents in peculio sit. Ex quo
scilicet apparet, si toti decem aurei
in rem tuam versi fuerint, totos de-
cem aureos 'Titium consequi posse ;
licét enim una sit actio, qua de pe-
culio, deque eo, quod in rem domini
versum sit, agitur; tamen duas ha-
bet condemnationes. Itaque judex,
apud quem de ea actione agitur,
ante dispicere solet, an in rem dom-
ini versum sit; nec aliter ad pecu-
lii eestimationem transit, quam aut
nihil in rem domini versum intelli-
gatur, autnon totum. Cum autem
queritur, quantum in peculio sit,
ante deducitur, quicquid servusdom-
ino, eivé, qui in potestate ejus sit,
debet; et, quod superest, id solum
peculium intelligitur. Aliquando
tamen id, quod ei debet servus, qui
in potestate domini sit, non deduci-
tur ex peculio; veluti si is in ipsi-
us peculio sit ; quod eo pertinet, ut,
si quid vicario suo servus debeat,
id ex peculio ejus non deducatur.

 

tate, provision, or any other useful
thing : therefore, if out of ten aurei,
borrowed by a slave, he should pay
only five to his master’s creditors,
and squander the rest, the master
would be liable to the payment in
solidum of the five aurei, but, as to
the other five, he could be obliged
to pay only so much as the peculi-
um would answer: hence it will
appear, that if all the ten aurei had
been converted to the master’s e-
molument, the lender might have
recovered the whole; for although
it is one and the same action, a-
gainst a peculium, and for the re-
covery of what a slave hath con-
verted to his master’s use, yet it
carries with it two different con-
demnations: hence, the judge does
not estimate the value of the pecu-
lium, until he has examined how
much if any hath been expended
for the service of the master: but,
when tho judge proceeds to the val-
uation of the peculium, a deduc-
tion is made of what the slave owes
to his master, or to any other under
the power of his master, and the
remainder only is considered as pe-
culium. But it sometimes happens
that what one slave owes to another

-under the power of the same mas-

ter, is not deducted; as when the
slave who is the creditor, composes
a part of his debtor’s peculium ; for,
if a slave be indebted to his vica-
rial slave, this debt cannot be de-
ducted from the peculium.

De concursu dictarum actionum.

§$ V. Ceterum dubium non est,
quin is quoque, qui jussu domini

§ 5. It is nevertheless certain
that he, who hath contracted with
352- LIB. IV.

TIT. VII.

po Gee ee

 

contraxerit, cuique institoria vel
exercitoria actio competit, de pecu-
lio, deque eo, quod in rem domini
versum est, agere possit. Sed erit
stultissimus, si, omiss4 actione, qua
facillimé solidum ex contractu con-
sequi possit, se ad difficultatem
perducat probandi, in rem domini
versum esse, vel habere servum pe-
culium, et tantum habere, ut soli-
dum sibi solvi possit. Is quoque,
cui tributoria actio competit, equé
de peculio, et de in rem verso, age-
re potest ; sed sané huic modo tribu-
toria expedit agere, modo de pecu-
lio, et de in rem verso. ‘Tributoria
ideo expedit agere, quia in ea domi-
ni conditio precipua non est; id
est, quod domino debetur, non de-
ducitur, sed ejusdem juris est dom-
inus, cujus et czeteri creditores; at,
in actione de peculio, ante deduci-
tur, quod domino debetur; et in id,
quod reliquum est, creditori domi-
nus condemnatur. Rursus de pe-
culio ideo expedit agere, quod in hac
actione totius peculii ratio habetur ;
at in tributorid ejus tantum, quo
negotiatur; et potest quisque tertia
forté parte peculii, aut quarta, vel
etiam minima, negotiari; majorem
autem .partem in preediis aut foene-
bri pecunia habere. Prout ergo ex-
pedit, ita quisque vel hancactionem,,.
vel illam,. eligere debet. Certé,
qui potest probare, in rem domini

aslave at the command of the mas-
ter and is intitled either to the action
institoria or exercitoria, is also inti-
tled to the action de peculio, and
dein rem verso: but it would be
highly imprudent in any party to
relinquish an action, by which he
could easily recover his whole de-
mand, and, by recurring to another,
reduce himself to the difficulty of
proving, that the money he lent to
the slave was converted to the use
of the master, or that the slave is
possessed of a peculium sufficient to
answer the whole debt. He also,
to whom the action ¢ributoria is
given, is equally intitled totheaction
de peculio, and de in rem verso ; but
it is expedient, in some cases, to use
the one, and in some cases the oth-
er: but the action ¢ributoria is gen-
erally preferable, because, in this,
the condition of the master is not
principally regarded; i.e. there is
no previous deduction made of what
is duc to him, his title being esteem-
ed in the same light with that of
other creditors; but, in the action
de peculio, the debt due to the mas- -
ter is first deducted, and he is con-
demned only to distribute the re-
mainder,among the creditors. A-
gain, in some cases, it may be more
convenient to bring the action de
peculio, because it affects the whole
peculium, whereas the action tribu-
LIB. IV.

versum esse, de in rem verso agere
debet.

TIT. VII. 353

toria regards only so ‘uch of | it as
hath been made use of in traffic ;
and it is possible, that a slave may
have trafficed only with a third, a
fourth, or some very small part, and
that the rest consistsof lands, slaves,
or money, lent at interest. 'There-
fore it behooves every man to chose
that remedy, which may be most
beneficial tohim ; but, if thecreditor
can prove a conversion to the use
of the master, he ought to proceed
by the action de in rem verso.

De filiis-familias.

§ VI. Que diximus de servo et
de domino, eadem intelligimus et
de filio et filia, et nepote et nepte, et
patre avove, cujus in potestate sunt.

§ 6. What we have said, con-
cerning aslave and hismaster, takes
place equally in regard to children
under power, and their parents.

De senatus-consulto Macedoniano.

§ VII. Illud proprié servatur in
eorum persona, quod senatus-con-
sultum Maeedonianum prohibuit
mutuas pecunias dari eis, qui in
potestate parentis sunt: et ei, qui
crediderit, denegatur actio tam ad-
versus ipsium filium filiamve, nepo-
tem neptemve, (sivé adhuc in po-
testate sint, sive morte parentis, vel
emancipatione, sus potestatis esse
ceperint,) quam adversus patrem
avumve, sivé eos habeat adhuc in
potestate, sivé emancipaverit. Que
ideo senatus prospexit, quia sepe
onerati zre alieno crepitarum pe-
cuniarum, quas in luxuriam consu-
mebant, vite parentum insidiaban-
tur.

De actione directa in

§$ VII. Wud in summa admo-
nendi sumus, id, quod jussu patris
45

§ 7. But children are, in some
respects, particularly regarded by
the Macedonian decree of the sen-
ate, which prohibits money to be
lent them, while under power of
their parents; for creditors are not
suffered to bring any action, either
against the children, even after they
are emancipated, or against their
parents, who emancipated them.
This caution was adopted by the
senate, because young heirs, loaded
with debts contracted for luxury,
have laid snares against the lives of
their parents.

patrem vel dominum.

$8. In ‘fine, we may observe,
that whatever hath been contracted
354 LIB. TV.

dominive contractum fuerit, quod-
que in rem ejus versum erit, direc-
to quoque posse 4 patre dominove
condici, tanquam si principaliter
cum ipso negotium gestum esset.
Ei quoque, qui exercitoria vel insti-
tutoria actione tenetur, directo pos-
se condici placet, quia hujus quoque
jussu contractum intelligitur.

TIT. VIII. °

for at the command of a parent or
master, and converted to their use,
may be recovered by a direct action
against the father or master in the
same manner, as if the contract had
been originally made with them.
And he, who is liable to the action
institoria or exhibitoria, may also
besued by a direct action, inasmuch
as the contract is presumed to have
been made at his command.

—————o. >

; TITULUS OCTAVUS.
DE NOXALIBUS ACTIONIBUS.

D. ix. T. 4. C. iii. T. 4d. :

De servis.

EX maleficiis servorum, veluti si
furtum fecerint, aut bona rapuerint,
aut damnum dederint, aut injuriam
commiserint, noxales actiones pro-
ditze sunt; quibus domino damnato
permittitur aut litis estimationem
sufferre, aut ipsum hominem noxe
dedere:

Summa.

Noxal actions are given on account
of the offences of slaves; as when
a slave commits a theft or robbery,
or does any damage or injury.
And, when the master or owner of
a slave is condemned upon this ac-
count, itis in his option either to
pay the estimate of the damage
done, or deliver up his slave asa
recompence.

Quid sit noxa et noxia.

§$ I. Noxa autem est ipsum cor-
pus, quod nocuit; id est, servus:
noxia ipsum maleficium , veluti fur- -
tum, rapina, damnum, injuria.

§$ 1. Nova is the slave, the offend-
er. Nowia is the offence, whether
theft, damage, rapine or injury.
LIB. IV. TIT. VIII.

355

 

Ratio harum actionum.

$ Il. Summa autem ratione per-
missum est noxe deditione fungi;
namque erat iniquum, nequiliam
eorum ultra ipsorum corporum do-
minis damnosam esse.

$ 2. It is reasonably permitted to
the master to deliver up the offend-
ing slave: for it would be unjust to
make the master liable, beyond the
body of the slave himself.

Effectus noxe deditionis.

§ II. Dominus, noxali judicio
Servi sui nomine conventus, ser-
vum actori nox dedendo libera-
tur; nec minus in perpetuum ejus
servi dominium a domino transfer-
tur: sin autem damnum ei, cui
deditus est, servus resarcierit que-
sita pecunia, auxilio pretoris, invito
domino, manumittetur.

De origine harum actionum.

$ IV. Sunt autem constitute
noxales actiones, aut legibus, aut
edicto pretoris; legibus, veluti
furti ex lege xii tabularum, damni
injurie ex lege Aquilia; edicto
pretoris, veluti injuriarum, et vi
bonorum raptorum.

§ 3. In a noxal action brought
against a master, he may clear him-
self by giving up his slave to the
plaintiff, in whom the property will
become absolutely vested; but, if
the slave can satisfy his new mas-
ter in money for the damage, he
may be manumitted on application
to the pretor, though his new mas-
ter should be unwilling.

'

§ 4. Noxal actions are appointed
either by the laws, or by the edict
of the pretor. By the laws, as for
theft, by the law of the twelve tables;
for injurious damage, by the law
Aquilia ; for injuries and goods
taken by force, by the praetor’s edict.

Qui conveniuntur noxali actione.

$ V. Omnis autem noxalis actio
capit sequitur; nam, si servus
tuus noxam commiserit, quamdiu
in tua potestate sit, tecum actio est:
si autem in alterius potestatem per-
‘venerit, cum illo incipit actio esse:
at, si manumissus fuerit, directo
ipse tenetur, et extinguitur noxe
deditio. Ex diverso quoque di-
recta actio noxalis esse incipit;
nam, si liber homo noxiam commi-
serit, et is servus tuus esse caepe-

§$ 5. No real actions follow the
person; thus, the master is liable
while the slave belongs to him; if
the slave become subject to a new
master, then he becomes liable; but,
if the slave be manumitted, he may
be prosecuted by a direct action; and
the noxe deditio, is extinguished.
But an action, which was at first
direct, may afterwards become nox-
al; for if a free man, guilty of mal-
feasance, become‘a slave, (and our
356

rit, (quod quibusdam casibus effici
primo libro tradidimus,) incipit
tecum esse noxalis actio, que ante
directa fuisset.

LIB. IV. TIT. VIII.

first book shews in what cases this
may happen, ) then the direct action
against the slave, is changed into a
noxal action against the master.

Si servus Domino noxiam commiserit, vel contra.

§ VI. Si servus domino noxiam
commiserit, actio nulla nascitur;
namque inter dominum et eum, qui
in potestate ejus est, nulla obliga-
tio nasci potest. Idedque, si in
alienam potestatem servus pervene-
rit, aut manumissus fuerit, neque
cum ipso, neque cum eo, cujus
nunc in potestate sit, agi potest:
unde, si alienus_ servus _ tibi
noxiam commiserit, et is postea
in potestate tud esse cceperit, in-
terdicitur actio; quia in eum ca-
sum deducta sit, in quo consistere
non potuit. Idedque, licét exierit
de tua potestate, agere non potes;
quemadmodum si dominus in ser-
vum suum aliquid commiserit, nec,
si manumissus aut alienatus fuerit
servus, ullam actionem contra do-
minum habere potest.

$6. Although a slave commit
mal-feasance against his master, yet
no action is given; for no obligation
can arise between a master and his
slave; and if the slave pass under
the power of another master, or is
manumitted, no action lies either
against him or his new master;
whence it follows, that, if the slave
of another should commit mal-feas-
ance against you, and become your
slave, the action is forbidden: for
the case has arisen in which it can-
not be brought. Therefore, al-
though a slave hath passed out of
your power, you cannot sue him:
neither can a slave, who hath been
aliened or manumitted, bring any
action against his late master.

De filiis-familiarum.

§ VII. Sed veteres quidem hoc
in filiis-familiarum masculis et foe-
minis admisere; nova autem ho-
minum conversatio hujusmodi as-
peritatem recté respuendam esse
existimavit, et ab usu communi hoc
penitus recessit. Quis enim patia-
tur, filium suum, et maxime filiam,
in noxam alii dari? ut pene per fi-
lii corpus pater magis quam filius
periclitetur; cum in filiabus etiam
pudicitiz favor hoc bené excludat.

§ 7. The ancients indeed admitted
this law of the forfeiture of the per-
son, even in cases of children, whe-
ther male or female: but later times
have rightly thought, that such ri-
gorous proceeding, ought to be ex-
ploded ; and it hath therefore passed
wholly into disuse: for who could
suffer a son, and more especially a
daughter, to be delivered up as a for-
feiture to a stranger? for, in the
case of a son, the punishment of the
LIB. IV.

Et ideo placuit, in servos tantum-
modo, noxales actiones esse propo-
nendas; cum, apud veteres legum
commentatores, invenerimus sepi-
us dictum, ipsos filios-familiarum
pro suis delictis posse conveniri.

TIT. IX. 357

father would be greater, than that
of the son; and, in the case of a
daughter, the rules of modesty for-
bid the practice. It hath therefore
prevailed, that noxal actions should
apply to slaves only: and, we find
it often laid down in the old books,
that sons of a family may be sued
for their own misdeeds.

 

TITULUS NONUS.

SI QUADRUPES PAUPERIEM FECISSE DICATUR.

D. ix. T. 1.

De actione, si quadrupes ex |. xii. tab.

ANIMALIUM nomine, que ra-
tione carent, si qua lascivia, aut
pavore, aut feritete, pauperiem fe-
cerint, noxalis actio lege xii tab.
prodita est: que animalia, si nox
dedantur, proficiunt reo ad libera-
tionem ; quia ita lex xii tabularum
scripta est, ut puta, si equus calci-
trosus calce percusserit, aut bos,
cornu petere solitus, cornu petierit.
Heec autem actio in lis, que contra
naturam moventur, locum habet;
cxterum, si genitalis sit feritas, ces-
sat actio. Denique, si ursus fuge-
rit 4 domino, et sic nocuerit, non
potest quondam dominus conveniri,
quia desiit dominus esse, ubi fera
evasit. Pauperis autem est dam-
num siné injuria facientis datum ;
nec enim potest animal injuriam

A noxal action is given by the
law of the 12 tables when damage
is done by brute animals, through
wantonness, fright, or furiousness ;
and when delivered up in atone-
ment for the damage done, the de-
fendant is cleared from the action :
for it is thus written in the law of
the 12 tables, if a horse, apt to kick,
should strike with his foot; or uf an
or, accustomed to gore, should
wound any man with his horns, Sc.
But a noxal action takes place only
when animals act contrary to their
nature; for, when the ferocity of a
beast is innate, no action can be
given ; so that, if a bear break
loose from his master, and mischief
be done, the master cannot be sued ;
for he ceased to be the master as
358 LIB. IV

TIT. X.

 

fecisse dici, quod sensu caret.
Heec quidem ad noxalem pertinent
actionem.

soon as the beast escaped. The
word pauperies denotes a damage,
by which no injury is intended; for
an animal, void of reason, cannot
be said to have committed an inju-
ry. Thus much as to noxal actions

De actione edilitia, concurrente cum actione de pauperie.

§ I Ceeterum sciendum est, edi-
litio edicto prohiberi nos canem,
verrem, aprum, ursum, leonem, ibi
habere, qua vulgo iter fit; et, si
adversus ea factum erit, et nocitum
libero homini esse dicatur, quod
bonum et exquum judici videtur,
tanti dominus condemnetur ; czte-
rarum vero rerum, quanti damnum
datum sit, dupli. Prater has au-
tem edilitias actiones, et de paupe-
rie locum habebit; nunquam enim
actiones, preesertim poenales, de ea-
dem re concurrentes, alia aliam
consumit. =

§ 1. It must be observed, that
the edict of the Edile forbids any
man to keep a dog, a boar, a bear,
or a lion, where there is a public
passage or highway: and if this
prohibition be disobeyed, and any
freeman receive hurt, the master of ,
the beast may be condemned at the -
discretion of the judge; yet, in oth-
er cases of damage, the condemna-
tion must be in double the amount.
Besides the Edilitian action, an ac-
tion for damage, called pauperies,
may also take place against the
same person: for actions, especial-
ly penal actions, may concur on
account of the same thing, without
the one destroying the other.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS.
DE IIS, PER QUOS AGERE POSSUMUS.

Per quos agere liceat.

NUNC admonendi sumus, agere,
posse quemlibet hominem aut suo
nomine aut alieno. Alieno, veluti
procuratorio, tutorio, curatorio ;
cum olim in usu fuisset, alterius

We must now remark, that any
man may commence a suit, in his
own name, or in that of another,
as of a proctor, a tutor, or a curator;
but anciently, one person could nét
LIB. IV.

nomine agi non posse, nisi pro pop-
ulo, pro libertate, pro tutela. Pre-
terea lege Hostilié permissum erat
furti agere eorum nomine, qui apud
hostes essent, aut reipublice causa
abessent, quivé in eorum cujus tute-
14 essent. Sed, quia hoc non mini-
mam incommoditatem habebat,
quod alieno nomine neque agere,
heque excipere actionem licebat,
cceeperunt homines per procuratores
litigare. Nam et morbus et etas et
necessaria peregrinatio, itemque al-
le multe cause, sepe hominibus
impedimento sunt, quo minus rem
suam ipsi exequi possint.

TIT. X. 359
sue in the name of another, unless
in a public cause, in a cause to es-
tablish. freedom, or in a cause of
tutelage. It was afterwards per-
mitted by the law Hostilia, that an
action of theft might be brought in
the names of captives: or of per-
sons absent upon the affairs of the
republic; or who were under the
careof tutors. But, as it was found
in later times to be highly inconve-
nient, that any man should be pro-
hibited, either from suing, or defend-
ing in the name of another, it by
degrees became a practice to sue by
proctors ; for illhealth, old age, the
necessity of travelling, and many
other causes, continually prevent
mankind from being able to prose-
cute their own affairs in person.

Quibus modis procurator constituatur.

$ I. Procurator neque certis ver-
bis, neque presente semper adver-
sario, imo et plerumque eo ignoran-
te, constituitur: cuicunque enim
permiseris rem tuam agere, aut de-
fendere, is tuus procurator intelli-
gitur.

§ 1_A proctor may be appointed
without any certain form of words,
nor is the presence of the adverse
party required ; indeed itis generally
done without his knowledge. Who-
ever is employed to sue or defend
for another, is understood to be a
proctor.

Quibus modis tutores vel curatores constituuntur.

$ II. Tutores et curatores que-
madmodum constituantur, primo li-
bro expositum est.

$2. We have already explained
in the first book, how tutors and
curators may be appointed.
LIB. IV. TIT. XI.

TITULUS UNDECIMUS.
DE SATISDATIONIBUS.

Dz. ii. T. 8.

C ii. T. 57.

De judicio personali.

SATISDATIONUM modus ali-
us antiquitati placuit, alium novitas
per usum amplexa est. Olim enim,
siin rem agebatur, satisdare pos-
sessor compellabatur, ut, si victus
esset, nec rem ipsam restitueret, nec
litis eestimationem, potestas esset
petitori aut cum eo agendi, aut cum
fide-jussoribus ejus ; que satisdatio
appellatur judicatum solvi: undé
autem sic appelletur, facile est in-
telligere; namque stipulabatur quis,
ut solveretur sibi, quod fuisset judi-
catum; multo magis is, qui in
rem actione conveniebatur, satis-
dare cogebatur, si alieno nomine ju-
dicium accipiebat. Ipse autem, qui
in rem agebat, si suo nomine pete-
bat, satisdare non cogebatur. Pro-
curator vero, si in rem agebat, satis-
dare jubebatur, remratam dominum
habiturum: periculum enim erat,
ne interum dominus de eddem re
experiretur. Tutores vero et cura-
tores eodem modo, quo procurato-
res, satisdare debere verba edicti fa-
ciebant. Sed aliquando his agenti-
bus satisdatio remittebatur. Hee
ita erant, si in rem agebatur.

In taking security, the ancient
practice differs from” the modem;
for merely in a real action, the de-
fendant, in possession, was compel-
led to give security, so that, if he
lost his cause, and could neither
restore the thing itself, nor pay the
value of it, the demandant might be
enabled either to sue him, or his
bail: and this species of bail is
termed jndiciatum solvi: nor is it
difficult to understand, why it is so
called; for as every demandant
stipulated, that the things adjudged
to him should be paid, it was still
more reasonable, that the person
sued in a real action should be oblig-
ed to give security, if he received
judgment in the name of another.
A plaintiff in a real action suing in
his own name, was not called to
give security : buta proctor was or-
dered to give security, that his acts
would be ratified by his principal,
rem ratam dominum habiturum ;
for the danger was, lest the client
should bring a fresh suit for the
same thing; and by the words of
the edict even tutors and curators
were compellable to give security,
as well as proctors, though it was
sometimes remitted when they were
plaintiffs. Such was the practice
in real actions.
LIB. IV. TIT. XI.

361

De judicio personali.

$1 Si vero in personam, ab ac-
toris quidem parte, eadem obtine-
bant, que diximus in actione, qua
in rem agitur; ab ejus vero parte,
cum quo agitur, siquidem alieno
Nomine aliquis interveniret, omni-
modo satisdaret; quia nemo de-
fensor in aliena re siné satisdatione
idoneus esse creditur. Quod si
proprio nomine aliquis judicium
accipiebat in personam, judicatum
solvi satisdare non cogebatur.

Jus novum.

$ II. Sed hodie hec aliter obser-
vantur. Sivé enim quis in rem ac-
tione convenitur, sivé personali, stio
nomine, nullam satisdationem pro
litis eestimatione dare compellitur;
sed pro sua tantum personé, quod in
judicio permaneat usque ad termi-
num litis; vel committitur suze pro-
missioni cum jurejurando, quam
juratoriam cautionem vocant; vel
nudam promissionem, vel satisdati-
onem, pro qualitate persone sue,
dare compellitur.

$1. The rules as to security, on
part of the plaintiff, which were ob-
served in real, obtained also in perso
nal actions; and, if the defendant
proceeded in another’s name, he was
obliged to give caution; for no one
was reputed a competent defendant
in the cause of another, unless se-
curity was given: but, whenever
another man was convened in a per-
sonal action if the defendant stood
suit in his own name he was not
compelled to give bail judi catum
solvi i. e. fully to comply with the
judgment of the court.

De reo.

§ 2. But at present a different
practice prevails; for, a defendant
sued in his own name, either in a
real or personal action, is not com-
pellable to give security for the pay-
ment of the estimation of the suit,
but only for his own person; to
wit, that he will remain in judgment
until the cause is determined; and
this security is sometimes given by
sureties; sometimes by’ a promise
upon oath, which is called a jurato-
ry caution; and sometimes by a
simple promise without oath, ac-

‘cording to the quality of the de-

fendant.

De procuratore actoris.

§ Il, Sin autem per procurato-
rem lis vel infertur vel suscipitur, in
actoris quidem person4, si non man-
datum actis insinuatum est, vel pree-
sens dominus litis in judicio procu-
ratoris sui personam cy

$ 3. But, where a suit is com-
menced or defended by a proctor, if
the proctor of the plaintiff, does not
either enrol a mandate of appoint-
ment in the acts of court, (that, is,
file his power of attorney) or cause
362 LIB. IV.

TIT. XL.

 

ratam rem dominum habiturum,
satisdationem procurator dare com-
pellitur : eodem observando et si tu-
tor vel curator, vel ali tales per-
sone, que alienarum rerum guber-
nationem receperunt, litem quibus-
dam per alium inferunt.

his client to nominate him publicly,
he is obliged to give security, that
his client will ratify his proceeding.
Such is the rule also if a tutor, cura-
tor, or agent, commences suit by a
proctor.

De procuratore rei presentis.

§ IV. Si vero aliquis convenitur,
siquidem presens procuratorem
dare paratus est, potest vel ipse in
judicium venire, et sui procurato-
ris personam per judicatum solvi
satisdationem solemni stipulatione
firmare; vel extra judicium satis-
dationem exponere, ‘per quam ip-
se sui procuratoris fidejussor exis-
tat pro omnibus judicatum solvi sa-

tisdationis clausulis: ubi et de hy--

potheca suarum rerum convenire
compellitur, sivé in judicio promi-
serit, sivé extra judicium caverit,
ut tam ipse quam heredes ejus ob-
ligentur. Alia insuper cautela,
satisdatione propter personam ipsi-
us. exponenda, quod tempore sen-
tentize recitandee in judicium veni-
et, vel, si non venerit, omnia dabit
fidejussor quz in condemnatione
continentur, nisi fuerit provocatum.

§ 4. When a party is sued, and is
ready to nominate a proctor, he may
appear in open court, and confirm
the nomination by giving the cau-
tion judicatum solvi, under the usual
stipulation; or he may appear out .
of court, and become himself the
surety, that his proctor will perform
all the covenants in the instrument
of caution; and whether this be
done in court, or out of court, he
must make his estate chargeable,
that his heirs, as well as himself,
may be bound. And a farther cau-
tion or security must be given, that
he will either appear in person at
the time of pronouncing sentence,
or that his surety, in case of non-
appearance, shall be bound to pay
whatever the sentence exacts, if no
appeal be interposed.

De procuratore rei absentis.

$ V. Si verd reus presto ex
quacunque causa non fuerit, et ali-
us velit defensionem ejus subire,
nulla differentia inter actiones in
rem vel personales introducenda,
potest hoc facere; ita tamen ut sa-
tisdationem judicatum solvi pro litis
stimatione preestet. Nemo enim

§ 5. When a defendant does not
put in an appearance, then any o-
ther person, who is willing, may
take upon himself the deferfce for
him, and this may be done either in
a real or personal action. without
distinction, if the caution judicatum

solvi be entered into for the payment
LIB. IV. TIT. XI.

363

 

secundim veterem regulam (ut
jam dictum est) aliens rei siné sa-
tisdatione defensor idoneus intelli-
gitur.

of the estimation of the suit; for no
man, according to the ancient rule
already mentioned, can be said to
defend the cause of another legally,
unless security be given.

Unde heec forma discenda.

§ VI. Que .omnia apertius et
perfectius quotidiano judiciorum
usu in ipsis rerum documentis ap-
parent.

§ 6. But such formalities may
be more perfectly learned, from the
usage and practice of courts.

Ubi heec forma observanda.

§ VII. Quam formam non so-
him in hac regia urbe, sed etiam
omnibus nostris provinciis, (etsi
propter imperitiam forté aliter cele-
bratur,) obtinere censemus: cum
necesse sit, omnes provincias caput
omnium nostrarum civitatum, id
est, hanc regiam urbem, ejusque
observantiam, sequi.

§ 7. We have judged it expedi-
ent, that these forms shall prevail,
not only in Constantinople, but also
in all our other provinces, (al-
though through ignorance they
may have practiced differently;) for
it is necessary, that all the provinces
should be guided by the example of
the capitol of our dominions, and fol-
low the practice of our royal city.

 

TITULUS DUODECIMUS.

DE PERPETUIS ET TEMPORALIBUS ACTIONIBUS, ET
QUE AD HEREDES ET IN HHREDES TRANSEUNT.

C. iv. T. 11.

De perpetuis et temporalibus actionibus.

HOC loco admonendi sumus, eas
quidem actiones, que ex lege, sen-
atusve consulto, sivé ex sacris con-
stitutionibus, proficiscuntur, perpe-

All those actions, which took their
rise from the law, the decrees of the
senate or the constitutions were
anciently considered as always in
364

LIB. IV. TIT. XII.

 

tuo solere antiquitis competere, do-
nec sacre constitutiones tam in
rem, quam in personam, actionibus
certos fines dederunt: eas vero,
que ex propria preetoris jurisdic-
tione pendent, plerumque intra an-
num vivere; nam et ipsius preto-
ris intra annum erat imperium.
Aliquando tamen et in perpetuum
extenduntur, id est, usque ad fi-
nem constitutionibus introductum ;
quales sunt ex, quas bonorum pos-
sessori, ceterisque, qui heredis
loco sunt, accommodat. Furti
quoque manifesti actio, quamvis
ex ipsius preetoris jurisdictione pro-
fiscatur, tamen perpetud datur;
absurdum enim esse existimavit,
anno eam terminari.

force; but the later emperors have
by their ordinances fixed certain li-
mits both to real and personal ac-
tions. Actions, given by virtue of
the pretor’s authority, are general-
ly limited to one year; for such is
the duration of his office; but some-
times the pretorian actions are

_made perpetual; that is they are

extended to the limits introduced by
the constitutions: such are those
actions, which the preetor gives to
the possessors of goods, and. to oth-
ers, who hold the place of heirs.
The action of manifest theft is.also
perpetual, although it proceed from
the mere authority of the pretor ;
for it was thought absurd, to limit
this action to a year.

De actionibus, que in heredes transeunt vel non.

§ I. Non autem omnes actiones,
quee in aliquem aut ipso jure compe-
tunt, aut a pretore dantur, et in
heredem zqué competunt, aut dari
solent. Est enim certissima juris
regula, ex maleficiis poenales acti-
ones in heredem rei non compete-
re; veluti furti, vi bonorum rapto-
rum, injuriarum, damni injurie:
sed heredibus hujusmodi actiones
competunt, nec denegantur; excep-
t injuriarum actione, et si qua alia
similis inveniatur. Aliquando ta-
men, etiam ex contractu actio con-
tra heredem non competit; veluti
cum testator dolosé versatus sit, et
ad heredem ejus nihil ex eo dolo
pervenit: peenales autem actiones,
quas supra diximus, si ab ipsis
principalibus personis fuerint con-

§ 1. Not all actions in general,
which either the law, or the pretor,
allows also against a man, will be
also allowed against his heirs: for
it is a sure rule of law, that penal
actions, arising from mal-feasance,
will not lie against the heir of an of-
fender; such as theft, rapine, inju-
ry, or damage injuriously done: but
these actions will pass to heirs, and
are never denied, but in an action of
injury, and in other cases of a sim-
ilar nature. Sometimes even an ac-
tion of contract will not lie against
an heir; as whena testator acts
fraudulently, and nothing comes to
the possession of the heir by reason
of the fraud: but, if the penal ac-
tions, of which we have already spo-
ken, are once contested by the prin-
LIB. IV. TIT. XIII.

testatee, et heeredibus dantur et con-
tra heredes transeunt.

365

cipal parties concerned, they will
afterwards pass both to, and against,
the heirs of such parties.

Si, pendente judicio, reus actori satisfecerit.

§ II. Superest, ut admoneamus,
quod, si ante rem judicatam is, cum
quo actum est, satisfaciat actori,
officio judicis convenit eum absol-
vere; licet in e& causa fuisset judi-
cii accipiendi tempore, ut damnari
deberet ; et hoc est, quod antea vul-
go dicebatur, omnia judicia absolu-
toria esse.

«

§ 2. Lastly it is the duty of the
judge to dismiss the defendant, if
before sentence he should fully sat-

‘isfy the plaintiff, although pending

the suit, his cause seemed so bad,
that he deserved to be condemned ;
and upon this account it was an-
ciently a common saying, that all
actions were dismissible.

4 4 Da —

TITULUS DECIMUS-TERTIUS.

DE EXCEPTIONIBUS.

D. xliv. T. 1.

’ Continuatio.

SEQUITUR, ut de exceptioni-
bus dispiciamus. Comparate au-
tem sunt exceptiones defendendo-
rum -eorum gratid, cum quibus agi-
tur; sepé enim accidit, ut licet ipsa
persecutio, qua actor experitur, jus-
ta sit, tamen iniqua sit adversus
eum, cum quo agitur.

De exceptione quod metus

§ I. Verbi gratia, si metu coac-
tus, aut dolo inductus, aut errore
lapsus, stipulanti Titio promissisti,
quod non debueras promittere, pa-
lam est, jure civili te obligatum es-
sé, et actio, quad intenditur, dare te
oportere, efficax est; sed iniquum

C. viii. T. 36.

Ratio exceptionum.

It follows, that we should treat
of exceptions. Exceptions have
been introduced into causes for the
defence of the party cited ; for it of-
ten happens, that a suit, which in
itself is just, may yet become un-
just, when commenced against a
wrong person.

causa, de dolo, in factum.

§ 1. If you for example compelled
by fear, or induced by fraud or mis-
take, make an imprudent promise
to Titius, under stipulation; yet it
is evident, you are bound by the
civil law, and Titius may have an
efficacious action: but it may be
366

est, te condemnari: idedque datur
tibi exceptio, quod metus caus4, aut
doli mali, aut in factum, composita
ad impugnandam actionem.

LIB. IV. TIT. XIII.

unjust, that a condemnation should
follow, and therefore you are per-
mitted to plead exceptive matter
calculated to defeat the action, by
setting forth, that the promise was
extorted by fear or fraud, or other-
wise by alleging the peculiar cir-
cumstances of the case; (and these
are called exceptions in factum com-
posite ; i. e. exceptions on the fact.)

De non numerata pecunia.

§$ IL Idem juris est, si quis qua-
si credendi causé pecuniam 4 te sti-
pulatus fuerit, neque numeraverit.
Nam, eam pecuniam 4 te petere
posse eum, certum est; dare enim
te oportet, cum ex stipulatione te-
nearis. Sed, quia iniquum est, eo
nomine te condemnari, placet, ex-
ceptione pecunie non numerate, te
defendi debere; cujus tempora nos
(secundum quod jam superioribus
libris scriptum est) constitutione
nostra coarctavimus.

$ 2. So is the law in case any one
should obtain your promise to repay
money that you never received? It
is certain, he may sue you for the
money, for you are bound by the sti-
pulation. But as it would be unjust,
that you should be condemned upon
that account, you are allowed to
plead the exception pecunie non
numerate, of money not paid. But
by our express constitution we have
shortened the time allowed for bring-
ing this exception, as we have al-
ready observed in the former book.

De pacto.

§ III. Preeterea debitor, si pac-
tus fuerit cum creditore, ne 4 se pe-
cunia peteretur, nihilominus obliga-
tus manet ; quia pacto convento ob-
ligationes non omnino dissolvun-
tur; qua de causa efficax est adver-
sus eum actio, quam actor intendit,
si paret, eum dare oportere: sed,
quia iniquum est, contra pactionem
eum condemnari, defenditur per ex-
ceptionem pacti conventi.

§ 3. Moreover, although a eredi-
tor agree not to sue his debtor, yet
the debtor remains bound ; for obli-
gations are not to be wholly dis-
solved by a mere agreement: and
therefore an action in this form, si
paret, eum dare oportere, would be
efficacious against the debtor; but,
as it would be unjust, that the debt-
or should be condemned to make
payment, notwithstanding the a-
greement, he is therefore permitted
to defend himself by an exception
of compact.
LIB. IV. TIT. XIit.

367

 

De jurejurando.

§ IV. Aique, si debitor creditore
deferente juraverit, nihil se dare op-
ortere, adhuc obligatus permanet;
sed, quia iniquum est, de perjurio
queri, defenditur per exceptionem
jurisjurandi. In iis quoque actioni-
bus, quibus, in rem agitur, squé
necessarie sunt exceptiones; velu-
ti si petitore deferente possessor ju-
raverit, eam rem suam esse, et ni-
hilo minus petitor eandem rem vin-
dicet; licét enim verum sit, quod
intendit, id est, ejus esse; iniquum
tamen est, possesorum condemnari.

De re judicata.

$V. Item, si judicio tecum ac-
tum fuerit, sivé in rem, sivé in per-
sonam, nihilominus obligatio durat;
et ideo ipso jure de eddem re pos-
tea adversus te agi potest: sed de-
bes per exceptionem rei judicate
adjuvari. :

§ 4. Ifan oath be administered
toa debtor at the instance of his
creditor, and he swears, that noth-
ing is due, yet he still remains
bound: but, as it would not be
right, thatthe plaintiff should after-
wards complain of perjury, the
debtor may defend himself by al-
ledging his own oath by way of ex-
ception. Exceptions are equally ne-
cessary in real actions; as when the
party in possession at the request
of the demandant swears, that the
thing in dispute is his own, and the
demandant will nevertheless en-
deavour to recover it: for although
the demandant’s allegation be true;
viz. that the thing claimed apper-
tains to him, yet it is unjust, that
the possessor should be condemned.

’

$ 5. If you have been sued either
upon a real or personal action, the
obligation neverthelessremains; and
therefore, in strict law, you may a-
gain be sued upon thesame account ;
but you may plead the former trial
in bar, and be aided by the excep-
tion Rei judicate.

De ceteris exceptionibus.

§ VI. Hee, exempli causa, retu-
lisse sufficiat; alioqui, quam ex
multis variisque causis exceptiones
necessariz sint, ex latioribus diges-
torum seu pandectarum libris intel-
ligi potest.

§ 6. It may suffice to have giv-
en these instances of exceptions in
general; but in how many and in
what various cases they are neces-
sary, may be learned from the lar-

ger books of thedigests, or pandects.
mn
368

LIB. IV. TIT. XIII.

Divisio prima.

§$ VIL. Quarum quedam ex le-
gibus, vel iis, que legis vicem ob-
‘tinent, vel ex ipsius preetoris juris-
dictione, substantiam capiunt.

Divisio
§ VIII. Appellantur autem ex-

ceptiones alize perpetuse et peremp-
torie, alize temporales et dilitatorize.

§ 7. Some exceptions proceed
from the laws themselves, or from
regulations that hold the place of
laws; others from the authority of
the preetor.

secunda.

§ 8. Some exceptions are called
perpetual and peremptory: others
are temporary and dilatory.

De peremptoriis.

$ IX. Perpetuz et peremptorie
sunt, que semper agentibus ob-
stant, et semper rem, de qua agitur,
perimunt; qualis est exceptio doli
mali, et quod metis causé factum
est, et pacti conventi, cum ita con-
venerit, ne omnino pecunia petere-
tur.

§ 9. The perpetual and peremp-
tory are those, which always ob-
struct the plaintiff, and destroy the
force of the action—of this sort is
the exception of fraud, of fear, and
of compact, when it is agreed that
the money shall not be sued for.

De dilatoriis.

§ X. Temporales atque dilato-
riz sunt, que ad tempus nocent, et
temporis dilationem tribuunt; qua-
lis est pacti conventi, cum ita con-
venerit, ne intra certum tempus a-
geretur, veluti intra quinquennium ;
nam, finito eo tempore, non impe-
ditur actor rem exequi. Ergo ii,
quibus intra certum tempus agere
volentibus objicitur exceptio aut
pacti-conventi, aut alia similis, dif-
ferre debent actionem, et post tem-
pus agere; ideo enim dilatorise istz
exceptiones appellantur. Alioqui,
si intra .tempus egerint objecta-
que sit exceptio, neque eo judicio
quicquam consequebantur propter

$10. Temporary and dilatory
exceptions are those, which operate
for a time, and create delay; such
isan agreement not to sue within a
certain time, as five years; but at
the expiration of that time the cred-
itor may proceed: and therefore
those, against whom this exception
pacti conventi or any other similar
can be objected, must delay ' their ac-
tion, and sue when the time is ex-
pired; hence, these exceptions are
termed dilatory: and formerly, if
the plaintiff had sued before the
time, andexception was taken, it not
only barred the claim for that time,
but prevented the plaintiff from pro-
rae IV. ee XH.

exceptionem, neque pot fompuls
olim agere poterant, cum temeré
rem in judicium deducebant et con-
sumebant; qua ratione rem amitte-
bant. Hodie autem non ita stricté
hoe procedere volumus; sed eum,
qui ante tempus pactionis vel obli-
gationis litem inferre ausus sit, Ze-
noniangy constitutioni subjacere
censemus, quam sacratissimus le-
gislator de iis, qui tempore plus pe-
tierint, protulit: et inducas, quas
ipse actor sponte indulserit, vel quas
natura actionis continet, si contemp-
serit, in duplum habeant ii, qui ta-
lem injuriam passi sunt; et, post
eas finitas, non aliter litem suscipi-
ant, nisi omnes expensas litis antea
acceperint: ut actores, tali poena
perterriti, tempora litium doceantur
observare.

De dilatoriis

§$ XI. Preeterea etiam ex persona
sunt dilatorie exeeptiones, quales
sunt procuratorie; veluti si per
militem, aut mulierem, agere quis
velit: nam militibus nec pro patre,
vel maitre, vel uxore, nec ex sacro
rescripto, procuratorio nomine ex-
periri conceditur; suis vero nego-
tiis superesse siné offensé militaris
disciplines possunt. Eas vero ex-
ceptiones, quee olim procuratoribus
propter infamiam vel dantis, vel
ipsius procuratoris, opponebantur,
cum in judiciis frequentari nullo
modo perspeximus, conquiescere

47

369

weeding at the expiration of the time
agreed on; for he was reputed to
have lost his right, by having rashly
commenced suit. But we have been
willing to mitigate this rigor, so
that whoever presumes to commence
a suit before the time limited by a-
greement, shall be subject to the
constitution of Zeno concerning
those, who demand more than their
due ; and, ifa plaintiff breakin upon
the time, which he has spontane-
ously granted, or contemns the limits
which the nature of some actions
allow, the defendant thus injured,
becomes intitled to twice the time
before allowed, and, even when
that is expired, cannot be obliged to
enter an appearance, until he has
been reimbursed the whole of his
expenses ; and this we have ordain-
ed in terrorem, that plaintiffs may
be taught to observe the proper time
of commencing their suits.

ex persona.

$11. Dilatory exceptions may
also be personal, as those against
proctors, where a suiter employs a
soldier, ora woman to act for him;
for soldiers are not permitted to aet
as proctors even in behalf of a fath-
er, a mother, or a wife, although
they obtain the sanction of an im-
perial rescript; but they may su-
perintend their own affairs, without
offending against military discipline.
But we have put a stop to the ex-
ceptions of infamy, which were for-
merly made, both against proctors
and their constituents, having ob-
’

370

sancimus; ne, dum de his alterca-
tur, ipsius negotii discreptio prote-
letur.

LIB. IV. TIT. XIV.

served them to be little practised,
and fearing, lest by such alterca-
tions, an inquiry into the merits of
causes should be retarded.

—_ a

TITULUS DECIMUS-QUARTUS.
DE REPLICATIONIBUS.

De replicatione.

INTERDUM evenit, ut excep-
tio, que prima facie justa videtur,
tamen iniquée noceat : quod cum ac-
cidit, alia allegatione opus est, adju-
vandi actoris gratia; que replica-
tio vocatur, quia per eam replicatur
atque resolvitur jus exceptionis ;
veluti cum pactus est aliquis cum
debitore suo, ne ab eo pecuniam pe-
tat, deinde postea in contrarium
pacti sunt, idest, ut creditori petere
liceat : si creditor agat, et excipiat
debitor, ut ita demum condemnetur,
* si non convenerit, ne eam pecuniam
creditor petat, nocet ei exceptio;
convenit enim ita: namque nihilo-
minus hoc verum manet, licét pos-
tea in contrarium pacti sint. Sed,
quia iniquum est, creditorem exclu-
di, replicatio ei dabitur ex posterio-
re pacto convento.

Sometimes an exception, which
appears at first view to be valid, is
not so; and when this happens, an
additional allegation is necessary in
aid of the plaintiff, called a replica-
tion, because the force of the excep-
tion is replicated, that is, unfolded,
and destroyed by it; as ifa credi-
tor should covenant with his debtor
not to sue him, and the contrary
should afterwardsbeagreed between
them, in consequence of which the
creditor brings an action, to which
the debtor excepts, alleging the
agreement of his creditor not to sue:
in thiscase theexception would be of
weight, as such an agreement was
actually made, although another.
was made afterwards to a contrary
effect: but, as it would be unjust,
that a creditor should be thus con-
cluded, he is allowed to plead the
subsequent compact, by way of re-
plication.
LIB. IV. TIT. XIV.

371

De duplicatione.

$I. Rursus interdum evenit, ut
replicatio, qua prima facie justa
est, inique noceat; quod cum acci-
dit, alia allegatione opus est, adju-
vandi rei gratid; que duplicatio
vocatur.

$ 1. It also sometimes happens,
that a replication at first appears
conclusive, though it be not so; in
this case another allegation, called
a duplication, may be offered by
the defendant. (Rejoinder.)

De triplicatione.

$ II. Et, si rursus ea prima facie
justa videatur, sed propter aliquam
causam actori iniqué noceat, rur-
sus alia allegatione opus est, qua ac-
tor adjuvetur; que dicitur tripli-
catio.

§ 2. And when a duplication car-
ries with it an appearance of jus-
tice, but is wrongfully urged a-
gainst the plaintiff, he may also, in
his turn, put in another allegation,
which is termed a triplication.
(Surrejoinder. )

De ceteris exceptionibus.

$ IIL, Quarum omnium excep-
tionum usum interdim ulterius,
quam diximus, varietas negotio-
rum introducit; quas omnes aper-
tius ex digestorum latiore volumine
facile est cognoscere.

t

§ 3. But in the great variety of
business, the use of these exceptions
is extended still farther, than we
have mentioned; of which a fuller
knowledge may be obtained from
the larger volumes of the digests.
(Rebutter, Surrebutter.)

Que exceptiones fidejussoribus prosunt vel non.

§-IV. Exceptiones autem, qui-
bus debitor defenditur, plertmque
accommodari solent etiam fidejus-
soribus ejus; et recté: quia, quod
ab iis petitur, id ab ipso debitore
peti videtur; quia mandati judicio
redditurus est eis, quod ei pro eo
solverint. Qua ratione, et si de
non petendd pecunia pactus quis
cum eo fuerit, placuit, perinde suc-
currendum esse per exceptionem
pacti conventi illis quoque, qui pro
eo obligati sunt, ac si etiam cum
ipsis pactus esset, ne ab eis pecunia

§ 4. The exceptions, by which a
debtor may defend himself, are ge-
nerally and properly allowed to be
used by his bondsmen; for a de-
mand made upon them, is, as it
were, a demand upon the debtor
himself, who is compellable by an
action of mandate to pay over to
his sureties whatever they have
been obliged to pay upon his ac-
count: and therefore, if a creditor
hath covenanted with his debtor
not to sue him, the bondsmen may
be aided by an exception of com-
372

peteretur. Sané quedam excepti-
tiones non solent his accommodari.
Eece enim debitor, si bonis suis
cesserit, et cum eo creditor expe-
riatur, defenditur per exceptionem,
$i bonis cesserit: sed hee exceptio
fidejussoribus non datur; ideo sci-
licet, quia, qui alios pro debitore
obligat, hoc maximé prospicit, ut,
cum facultatibus lapsus fuerit debi-
tor, possit ab iis, quos pro eo obli-
gavit, suum consequi.

LIB. IV. TIT. XV.

pact, just as if the promise had been
made to them. But some exceptions
cannot be used in behalf of sureties ;
for although, when a debtor hath
made cession of his goods, he may
defend himself by pleading a cessio
bonorum, as an exception to a suit
brought by a creditor; the same
exception cannot aid the bondsmen ;
for whoever demands sureties al-
ways means to recover his debt from
them, in case of failure in the prin-
cipal debtor.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-QUINTUS.

DE INTERDICTIS.

D. xiii. T. 1.

Continuatio

SEQUITUR, ut dispiciamus de
interdictis, seu actionibus, que pro
his exercentur. Erant autem in-
terdicta forma atque conceptiones
verborum,quibus pretor aut jubebat
aliquid aut fieri prohibeat; quod
tunc maximé fiebat, cum de posses-
sione aut quasi possessione inter
aliquos contendebatur.

Divisio

$ I. Summa autem divisio inter-
dictorum hee est, quod aut prohi-
bitoria sunt, aut restitutoria, aut
exhibitoria. Prohibitoria sunt, qui-
bus prator vetat aliquid fieri; velu-
ti; vim siné vitio possidenti, vel
mortuum inferenti, quo ei jus erat

C. viii. T. 1.

et definitio.

We are now led to treat of inter-
dicts, or of those actions, which sup-
ply their place. Interdicts, were cer-
tain forms,of words, by which the
preetor either commanded or prohi-
bited something to be done; and
were chiefly used, when any con-
tention arose concerning possession,
or quasi-possession.

prima.

§$ 1. The first division of them is
into prohibitory, restoratory, and
exhibitory interdicts. Prohibitory
are those, by which the preetor for-
bids something to be done, as when
he forbids force to be used against a
lawful possessor; or against a per-
LIB. IV. TIT. XV.

inferendi; vel in sacro loco edifi-
cari, vel in flumine publico ripdve
ejus aliquid fieri, quo pejus navige-
tur. Restitutoria sunt, quibus re-
stitui aliquid jubet; veluti bono-
rum possessori possessionem eo0-
rum, que quis pro herede, aut pro
possessore, possidet ex e4 heredi-
tate; aut cum jubet, ei, qui vi de
possessione dejectus sit, restitui-
possessionem. Exhibitoria sunt,per
quee jubet exhiberi; veluti eum, cu-
jus de libertate agitur ; aut libertum,
cui patronus operas indicere velit;
aut parenti liberos, qui in potestate
ejus sunt. Sunt tamen, qui putent,
interdicta ea proprié vocari, que
prohibitoria sunt; quia. interdicere
sit denuntiare et prohibere; resti-
tutoria autem et exhibitoria proprieé

decreta vocari: sed tamen obtinuit,

omnia interdicta appellari; quia
inter duos dicuntur.

)

373

son who is burying another, where
he hath a right; or when he forbids
an edifice to be raised in a sacred
place, or hinders a work from being
erected in a public river, or on the
banks which may render it less na-
vigable. The restoratory, direct
something to be restored, as the pos-
session of goods to the universal
successor, who has been kept out of
possession by one, who hath no
right; or when the pretor com-
mands possession to be restored to
him, who hath been forcibly eject-
ed. And the exhibitory interdicts
are those, by which the preetor com-
mands some exhibit to be made, as
of a slave, for example concerning
whose liberty a cause is depending;
or of a free-man, from whom a
patron would exact the service due
to him; or of children to their parent,
under whose power they are. Some
nevertheless imagine, that interdicts
can with propriety be only prohibi-
tory, because the word interdicere
signifies to denounce and prohibit ;
—and that the restoratory and ex-
hibitory interdicts might more pro-
perly be called decrees: yet by us-
age they are all termed interdicts,
because they are pronounced be-
tween two, [inter duos dicuntur,]
the demandant and the possessor.

Divisio secunda.

$ II. Sequens divisio interdicto-
rum hee est; quod queedam adipis-
cendz possessionis causé compara-
ta sunt, quedam retinende, que-
dam recuperande.

§ 2. The second division of inter-
dicts is into those, which are given
for the acquisition, the retention, or
the recovery of a possession.

.
374

LIB. IV. TIT. XV.

 

De interdictis adipiscende.

§ III. Adipiscende possession-
is causa interdictum accommoda-
tur bonorum possessori, quod ap-
pellatur, Quorum bonorum ; ejus-
que vis et potestas hac est, ut, quod
ex iis bonis quisque, quorum pos-
sessio alicui data est, pro herede
aut pro possessore possideat, id ei,
cui bonorum possessio data est, res-
tituere debeat. Pro hrede autem
possidere videtur, qui putat se
heredem esse. Pro possessore is
possidet, qui nullo jure rem heere-
ditariam, vel etiam totam heeredi-
tatem, sciens ad se non pertimere,
possidet. Ided autem adipiscen-
dz possessionis vocatur interdic-
tum, quia ei tantum utile est, qui
nunc primum conatur adipisci pos-
sessionem; itaque, si quis adeptus
possessionem amiserit eam, hoc in-
terdictum ei inutile est. Interdic-
tum quogue Salvianum adipiscen-
dz possessionis causé comparatum
est; eoque utitur dominus fundi de
rebus coloni, quas is pro miercedi-
bus fundi pignori futuras pepigis-
set.

§ 3. An interdict for obtaining
possession called Quorum Bonorum,
is given to him, to whom the pretor
commits possession of the goods of a
deceased person; and it obliges all
persons, who retain goods as heirs
or possessors, to restore such goods
to those, to whom the possession
hath been committed by the magis-
trate: and note, that he is reputed
to possess as heir, who conceives
himself so to be; and he is deemed
the possessor, who without authori-
ty retains a part or the whole, of an
inheritance, knowing the possession
does not belong to him. An inter-
dict of acquisition is so called, be-
cause, it is useful to him only, who
Jirst endeavours to acquire the pos-
session; and therefore it would be
useless to one, who had acquired a
possession, and afterwards lost it.
The Salvian interdict, is also ap-
pointed for the acquisition of posses-
sion; and is used by proprietors of
farms, against goods which their
tenants have pledged, for the pay-
ment of rent.

De interdictis retinende.

§ IV. Retinende _possessionis
causa comparata sunt interdicta, Uti
possidetis, et utrubi; cum ab utr4-
que parte de proprietate alicujus
rei controversia sit, et ante quera-
tur, uter ex litigatoribus possideat,
et uter petere debeat: namque, ni-
si ante exploratum fuerit utrius
eorum possessio sit, non potest pe-
titoria acto instituti; quia et civilis

§ 4. The interdicts Uti possidetis
and Utrubi have been introduced
for the purpose of retaining posses-
sion ; for in a controversy, concern-
ing property, it is necessary to in-
quire, which of the parties is in pos-
session, and who ought to be plain-
tiff; for, until the possession be as-
certained, an action of demand can-
not be instituted ; and both civil and
LIB. IV.

et naturalis ratio facit, ut alius pos-
sideat, ‘et alius a possidente petat.
Et, quia longé commodius est, et
potius possidere, quam petere, ided
plerumque, et feré semper, ingens
existit contentio de ipsa possessione.
Commodum autem possidenti in
eo est, quod, etiam si ejus res non
sit, qui possidet, si modo actor non
potuerit suam esse probare, remanet
in suo loco possessio ; propter quam
causam, cum obscura sunt utrius-
que jura, contra petitorem judicari
solet. Sed interdicto quidem Uti
possidetis de fundi vel «dium pos-
sessione contenditur: Utrubi verd
interdicto de rerum mobilium pos-
sessione, quorum vis ac potestas
plurimam inter se differentiam apud
veteres habebat : nam Uti possidetis
interdicto is vincebat, qui interdicti
tempore possidebat; si modo nec
vi, nec clam, nec precarid, nactus
fuerat ab adversario possessionem :
etiamsi alium vi expulerat, aut
clam arripuerat alienam possessio-
nem, aut precarid rogaverat ali-
quem, ut sibi possidere liceret.
Utrubi vero interdicto is vincebat,
qui majore parte anni nec vi, nec
‘clam, nec precarid, ab adversario
possidebat. Hodie tamen aliter
observatur; nam utriusque inter-
dicti potestas (quantum ad posses-
sionem pertinet) exequata est, ut
ille vincat et in re soli, et in re mo-
bili, qui possessionem, nec vi, nec

TIT. XV. 378

 

natural law teach us that, when
one party isin possession, the other
must be claimant; but as it is more
advantageous to be possessor, than
demandant, there is generally great
contention for the possession ; for
although the possessor is not in re-
ality the true proprietor, yet the
possession will still remain in him,
if the plaintiff does not prove the
thing in litigation to be his own:
and therefore, when the rights of
parties are not clear, the sentence is
always against the demandant. By
the interdict Uti possidetis, the pos-
session of a farm or house is con-
tended for; and, by the interdict
Utrubi, the possession of things
moveable is disputed. These inter-
dicts anciently differed much in
their force ad effects; for, by Uti
possidetis, the party in possession at
the bringing of the interdict, pre-
vailed, if he had not obtained the
possession from his adversary, by
force, clandestinely, or precariously :
but it was not material in what man-
ner the possessor had obtained the
possession from any other person ;
and, by the interdict Utrubi, that
party prevailed who had been in
possession for the greatest part of
the year preceding the contest, if he
had not acquired that possession
clandestinely, precariously, or by
force. But the present practice is
otherwise ; for the force of either in-
376 LIB. IV.

clam nec precarid, ab adversario,
litis contestatze tempore, detinet.

TIT. XV.

terdict, as to possession is now made
equal; so that in any cause, either
concerning things moveable or im-
moveable, that party prevails, who
was in possession at the commence-
ment of the suit, if it be not shown
that he gained such possession by
force, by clandestine means, or pre-
cariously ; (that is under the adver-
sary himself.)

De retinenda et acquirenda possessione.

§ V. Possidere autem videtur
quisque, non solum si ipse posside-
at, sed et si ejus nomine aliquis in
possessione sit, licet is ejus juri sub-
jectus non sit; qualis est colonus et
inquilinus. Per eos quoque, apud
quos deposuerit quis, aut quibus
commodaverit, ipse possidere vide-
tur; et hoe est, quod dicitur, retine-
re possessionem posse aliquem per
quemlibet, quis ejus nomine sit in
possessione. Quinetiam animo quo-
que solo retineri possessionem pla-
cet; id est, ut, quamvis neque ipse
sit in posessione neque ejus nomine
alius, tamen si non reliquende pos-
sessionis animo, sed postea reversu-
rusindé decesserit, retinere posses-
sionem videatur. Adipisci vero pos-
sessionem per quos aliquis potest,
secundo libro exposuimus; nec illa
dubitatio est, quin animo solo adi-
pisci possessionem nemo possit.

$ 5. A man is considered in pos-
session, not only when he is himself
so, but when any other person, al-
though not under his power, holds
possession in his name ; as a farmer,
ora tenant. A man may also pos-
sess, by means of those, to whom he
hath committed the thing in litiga-
tion, either as a deposit or a loan;
and this ismeant when it is said that
aman may retain possession by
means of another, who possesses in
his name. ‘It is moreover held, that
a possession may be retained, by the
mere intention only; for, although
a man is neither in possession him-
self, nor any other for him, but has
quitted the possession of certain
lands with an intent to return to
them again, he shall nevertheless be
deemed to continue in possession.
We have already explained, in the
second book, by what persons aman
may acquire possession; and, al-
though it may be retained by inten-
tion only, yet this is not sufficient
for the acquisition of possession.
LIB. IV. TIT. XV.

377

De interdicto recuperande, et affinibus remediis.

§$ VI. Recuperandz possessionis
.causa solet interdici, si quis ex pos-
sessione fundi vel edium vi dejec-

tus fuerit; nam ei proponitur inter-.

dictum Unde vi, per quod is, qui
dejecet, cogitur ei restituere pos-
sessionem, licét is ab eo, qui vi de-
jecit, vi, clam, vel precarid, posside-
at. Sed ex constitutionibus sacris,
(ut supra diximus,) si quis rem per
vim occupaverit, siquidem in bonus
ejus est, dominio ejus privatur; si
aliena, post ejus restitutionem, etiam
zestimationem rei dare vim passo
compellitur. Qui autem aliquem
de possessione per vim dejecerit,
tenetur lege Julia de vi privata, aut
de vi publica. Sed de vi privata,
si siné armis vim fecerit ; sin autem
armis eum de possessione vi expu-
lerit, de vi publica tenetur. Armo-
rum autem appellatione non solim
scuta et gladios et galeas, sed et
fustes et lapides, significari intelli-
gimus.

$ 6. The interdict for recovery
of possession is generally employed,
when any one hath been forcibly
ousted from the possession of his
house or estate; who then becomes
entitled to the interdict Unde vi, by
which the intruder is compelled to
restore him to possession, although
he, who had been thus forcibly oust-
ed, was himself in possession by
clandestine means, by force, or pre-
cariously. But, as we have said be-
fore, the imperial constitutions pro-
vide, that, whoever seizes a thing
by force, if it be his own, he shall
lose his property in it; and, if it be-
long to another, he shall be compel-
led not only to make restitution,
but to pay the full value to the par-
ty, who suffered the force. But
whoever ousts another out of pos-
session by force, is likewise subject
to the law Julia de vi privata or de
vi publica ; if the seizing or intrusion
was effected without weapons, then
the offender is only liable to the law
de vi privata ; but, if by an armed
force, he is then subject to the law
de vi publici. We comprehend not
only shields, swords, and helmets
under the term arms, but also clubs
and stones.

Divisio tertia.

§ VII. Tertia divisio interdicto-
rum est, quod aut simplicia sunt,
aut duplicia. Simplicia sunt, velu-
ti in quibus alter actor, alter reus
est; qualia sunt omnia restitutoria,
aut exhibitoria ; nam actoris est, qui

48

$7. The third division of inter-
dicts is into simple and double : the
simple are those, in which there is
both a plaintiff and a defendant;
and of this sort are all restoratory
and exhibitory interdicts: for the
378 LIB. IV.

TIT. XV.

 

desiderit aut exhiberi aut restitui;
reus autem is est, 4 quo desideratur,
ut restituat, aut exhibeat. Prohib-
itoriorum autem interdictorum alia
simplicia sunt, alia duplicia. Sim-
plicia sunt, veluti cum pretor pro-
hibet in loco sacro, vel in flumine
publico, ripave ejus, aliquid fieri:
nam actor est, qui desiderat, ne
quid fiat; reus est, qui aliquid fa-
cereconatur. Duplicia sunt, velu-
ti Uti- possidetis interdictum, et
Utrubi. Ided autem duplicia vo-
cantur, quia par utriusque litigato-
ris in his conditio est; nec quis-
quam preecipué reus vel actor intel-
ligitur, sed unusquisque tam rei,
quam actoris partes sustinet.

3

plaintiff, is he, who requires some-’
thing to be exhibited or restored;
and the defendant is he, from whom
the exhibition or restitution is re-

quired. But of the prohibitory in-

terdicts some are simple, some
double; simple, when the praetor
forbids sowething to be done ina
sacred place, on a public river, or
upon the banks of it; and the de-
mandant, actor or plaintiff, is he,
who desires, that some act should
not be done, and thedefendant is he,
who endeavors to doit. The in-
terdicts Uti possidetis and Utrubi
are instances of the double inter-
dicts; double, because in these the
condition of either litigant is equal,
the one not being understood to be
more particularly the plaintiff or
the defendant, than the other : inas-
much as each sustains the part of
both.

De ordine et vetere exitu.

$ VIII. De ordine et vetere ex-
itu interdictorum supervacuum est
hodie dicere ; nam quoties extra or-
dinem jus dicitur, (qualia sunt ho-
die omnia judicia,) non est necesse
reddi interdictum: sed perindé ju-
dicatur siné interdictis, ac si utilis
actio ex causa interdicti reddita fu-
isset.

§ 8. It would be superfluous at
this day to speak of the order, and
ancienteffect of interdicts ; for when
judgments are extraordinary, (as
all judgments now are) an interdict
becomes unnecessary. Judgments
are therefore now delivered with-
out interdicts, in like manner, as if
a beneficial action were given in
consequence of an interdict.
LIB. IV. TIT. XVI.

TITULUS

379

DECIMUS-SEXTUS.

DE PENA TEMERE LITIGANTIUM.

De penis
NUNC admonendi sumus, mag-
nam curam egisse eos, qui jura sus-
tinebant, ne facile homines ad_liti-
gandum procederent; quod et no-
bis studio est. Idque eo maximé
fieri potest, quod temeritas tam a-
gentium, quam eorum, cum quibus
agitur, modo pecuniaria pena, mo-
do jurisjurandi religione, modo in-
famice metu coerceatur.

in genere.

Our magistrates have ever been
careful to hinder men from engag-
ing inconsiderately in law suits:
and it hath been our study also.
The better to prevent such suits,
the rashness of both plaintiffs and
defendants hath been properly re-
strained, by pecuniary punishments,
the coercion of an oath, and the
fear of infamy.

De jurejurando et pena pecuniaria.

$1. Ecce enim jusjurandum om-
nibus, qui conveniuntur, ex consti-
tutione nostra defertur; nam reus
non aliter suis allegationibus utitur,
nisi prius juraverit, quod, putans se
bona instantié uti, ad contradicen-
dum pervenit. At, adversus infici-
antes, ex quibusdam causis dupli
actio constituitur; veluti si damni
injurie, aut legatorum locis vener-
abilibus relictorum, nomine agatur.
Statim autem ab initio pluris quam
simpli est actio; veluti furti mani-
festi, quadrupli; nec manifesti, du-
pli: nam ex his, et aliis quibus-
dam causis, sivé quis neget, sive fa-
teatur, pluris quam simpli est actio.
Item actoris quoque calumnia coer-
cetur; nam etiam actor pro calum-
nid jurare cogitur ex nostra con-
stitutione, quod non calumniandi
animo litem miovisset, sed existi-
mando, se bonam causam habere.

$ 1. By virtue of one of our con-
stitutions, an oath must be admin-
istered to every man against whom
an action is brought; for a defend-
antmay not plead, until hehath first
-sworn, that he proceeds upon a firm
belief that his cause is good. But
actions lie, in particular cases, for
doubleand triple value against those
who deny the cause of action ; as
when a suit is commenced on ac-
count of injurious damage, or for
a legacy left to a sacred place, as a
church, hospital, &c. There are
also actions, upon which more than
the simple value is recoverable at
the time of their commencement ;
as upon an action of theft manifest,
which is for fourfold the value; an
action of theft not manifest, for
double the value; because in these,
and some other cases, the action: is
at first given for more than the
380

LIB. IV. TIT. XVI.

 

Utriusque etiam partis advocati jus-
jurandum subeunt, quod alia nostra
constitutione comprehensum est.
Hee autem omnia pro veteri cal-
umnie actione introducta sunt, que
in desuetudinem abiit ; quia in par-
tem decimam litis actores multabat,
quod nusquam factum esse inveni-
mus: sed pro his introductum est
et prefatum jusjurandum, et ut im-
probus litigator et damnum et im-
pensas litis inferre adversario suo
cogatur.

simple value, whether the defend-
ant denies or confesses the charge
brought against him. The calum-
ny of the plaintiff is also under re-
straint; for he too is compelled by
our constitution to swear, that he
did not commence the suit with an
intention to calumniate: but upon
thorough confidence that he had a
good cause: and, the advocates on
both sides are likewise compellable
to take a similar oath, the substance
of which is set forth in another of
our constitutions. This practice
hath been introduced in the place
of the ancient action of calumny,
which compelled the plaintiff to pay
the tenth part of his demand as a
punishment, but is now disused ;
and, instead of it, we have intro-
duced the before-mentioned oath,
and have ordained, that every rash
litigant, who hath failed in his
proof, shall be compelled to pay his
adversary the damages and costs of
suit.

De infamia.

§ I. Ex quibusdam judiciis
damnati ignominiosi fiunt; veluti
furti, vi bonorum raptorum injuria-
rum, de dolo; item tutele, manda-
ti, depositi, directis, non contrariis
actionibus : item pro socio, quse ab
utraque parte directé est; et ob id
quilibet ex sociis, eo judicio dam-
natus, ignomihid notatur. Sed fur-
ti quidem, aut vi benorum rapto-
rum, aut injuriarum, aut de dolo,
non solum damnati notantur igno-
minid, sed et pacti; et recté: plu-
rimum enim interest, utrim ex de-

$2. In some cases the parties
condemned become infamous, as
in actions of theft, rapine, injury,
or fraud. Also in an action of tu-
‘telage, mandate, or deposit, if it be
a direct, and not a contrary action.
An action of partnership has also
the same effect; for it is direct in
regard to all the partners; and
therefore any one of them, who is
condemned in such action, is brand-
ed with infamy. Not only those,
who have been condemned in an
action of theft, rapine, injury, or
. LIB. IV. TIT. XVI.

licto aliquis, an ex contractu, debi-
tor sit.

381

fraud, are rendered infamous; but
those, also, who have bargained to
prevent a criminal prosecution; and
this is a right; for there isa wide
difference between a debtor, on ac-
count of a debtor upon contract.

De in jus vocando.

$ IT. Omnium autem actionnm
instituendarum principium ab ea
parte edicti proficiscitur, qua pre-
tor edicit de in jus vocando. Uti-
gue enim in primis adversarius in
jus vocandus est; id est, ad eum
vocandus, qui jus dicturus sit. Qua
parte preetor parentibus et patronis
item parentibus liberisque patrono-
rum, et patronarum, hunc prestat
honorem, ut non alitér liceat liberis
liberisque eos in jus vocare, quam
siid ab ipso preetore postulaverint
et impeneiraverint. Et si quis ali-
tér vocaverit, in eum penam suli-
dorum quinquaginta constituit.

§ 3. All actions take their rise
from that part of the preetor’s edict,
in which he treats de in jus vocando
of calling parties into court: for the
first step in matters of controversy,
is to cite the adverse party to ap-
pear before the judge, whois to de-
termine the cause. In the same
part of the’ edict the pretor hath
treated parents and patrons, and
even the parents and children of pa-
trons and patronesses, with so great
respect, that he does not suffer them
to be called into judgment by their
children or their freedmen, until ap-
plication hath been first made to
him, and leave obtained; and, if
any man presume to cite such per-
son otherwise, he is subject toa
penalty of fifty solidi.
382

LIB. IV. TIT. XVII. 2

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-SEPTIMUS.
DE OFFICIO JUDICIS.

De officio judicis in genere.

SUPEREST, ut de officio judi-
cis dispiciamus. Et quidem in pri-
mis illud observare debet judex, ne
aliter judicet, quam legibus, aut con-
stitutionibus, aut moribus, proditum
est.

It remains, that we inquire into
the office and duty of a judge; whose
first care it ought to be not to de-
termine otherwise, than the laws,
theconstitutions, or the customs and **
usages direct.

De judicio noxali.

§$ I. Idedque, si noxali judicio
aditus est, observare debet, ut; si
condemnandus videtur dominus,
ita debeat condemnare: Publium
Mavium Lucio Titio in decem aure-
os condemno ; aut noxam dedere.

$ 1. And therefore, if a suit be
commenced by a noxal action, the
judge ought always to observe the
following form of condemnation, if
the defendant ought to be condem-
ned: e. g. I condemn Publius Ma-
vius to pay Lucius Titius ten aurei,
or to deliver up the slave, who did
the damage.

De actionibus realibus.

$ II. Et, si in rem actum sit eo-

ram judice, sivé contra petitorem

judicaverit, absolvere debet pos-
sessorem ; sivé contra possessorem,
jubere ei debet, ut rem ipsam
restituat cum fructibus. Sed si
possessor neget, in preesenti se res-
tituere posse, et siné frustratione vi-
debitur tempus restituendi causa
petere, indulgendum est ei; ut ta-
men de litis estimatione caveat
cum fidejussore, si intra tempus,
quod ei datum est, non restituerit.
Et, si hereditas petita sit, eadem

§ 2. When a real action is
brought before a judge, and he pro-
nounces against the demandant, the
possessor ought then to beacquitted;
if against the possessor, he must be
admonished to restore the very thing
in dispute, together with all its pro-
duce. But, if the possessor should
allege, that he is unable to make im-
mediate restitution, and petition for
longer time, without any seeming
intention to frustrate the sentence,
he is to be indulged; provided he
gives security for the full payment
LIB. IV. TIT. XVI.

circa fructus interveniunt, que dix-
imus intervenire de singularum re-
rum petitione. Illorum autem
fruetuum quos culpa sud possessor
hon perceperit, sivé illorum, quos
perceperit, in utraque actione ea-
dem ratio pené habetur, si prado
fuerit. Si -verd bone fidei posses-
sor fuerit, non habetur ratio neque
consuptorum, neque non percepto-
rum. Post inchoatam autem pe-
titionéin etiam illorum fructuum
ratio habetur, qui culpd possesso-
ris percepti non sunt, vel percepti
consumpti sunt.

383

of the condemnation and costs of
suit, if he should fail to make resti-
tution within the time appointed.
And, if an inheritance be sued for,
a judge ought to determine in the
same manner as to the profits, as he
would in a suit for some particular
thing only ; for, if the defendant ap-
pear to have been a possessor mala
Jide, then almost the same reasoning
prevails in both actions as to the
profits, whether they were taken or
neglected by the possessor: but, if
the defendant be a possessor bond
Jide, then no account is expected,
either of produce consumed or not
collected before the suit. But all
produce must be accounted for from
the date of the action, whether used
or neglected.

De actione ad exhibendum.

§ IIE. Si ad exhibendum ac-
tum fuerit, non sufficit, si exhibeat
rem is, cum quo actum est; sed
opus est, ut etiam rei causam de-
beat exhibere, id est, ut edm cau-
sam habeat actor, quam habiturus
esset, si, cum primum ad exhiben-
dum egisset, exhibita res fuisset:
idedque, si inter moras exhibendi,
usucapta sit res 4 possessore, nihi-
lominus condemnabitur. Preeterea
fructuum medii temporis, id est,
ejus, quod post acceptum ad exhi-
bendum judicium, ante rem judica-
tam, intercesserit, rationem ha-
bere debet. judex. Quod si neget
reus, cum quo ad exhibendum ac-
tum est, in presenti se exhibere
posse, et tempus exhibendi causa

§ 3. If a man proceed by an ac-
tion ad exhibendum, it is not suffi-
cient, that the defendant should ex-
hibit the thing in question, but he
must also be answerable for all pro-
fits and emoluments accruing from
it; that the plaintiff may be in the
same state, as if his property had
been restored to him when he first
brought his action: and therefore,
if the possessor, during his delay to
surrender the thing in dispute, shall
gain a prescriptive title to it, he
shall nevertheless be condemned to
restitution. Morever it is the duty
of the judge to take an account of
the mesne profits accruing between
the suit and the sentence. But,
when the defendant declares, that
384

LIB. IV. TIT. XVII.

 

petat, idque siné frustratione pos-
tulare videatur, dari ei debet, ut
tamen caveat, se restituturum.
Quod si neque statim jussu judi-
cis rem exhibeat, neque postea se
exhibiturum caveat, condemnan-
dus sit in id, quod actoris intere-
rat, si ab-initio res exhibita esset.

he is not able instantly to produce
the thing adjudged, and prays a
farther time, without apparent af-
fectation of delay, time should be
allowed, on his giving security for
restitution. But, if he neither obey
the command of the magistrate by
instantly producing the thing ad-
judged, nor in giving sufficient se-
curity for the production of it at a
future day, he must be condemned
in the full damages, which the plain-
tiff hath sustained by not having
the article delivered to him at the
commencement of the suit.

Familie erciscunde.

$ IV. Si familize erciscunds ju-
dicio actum sit, singulas res singu-
lis heredibus adjudicare debet; et,
si in alterius persona pregravare
videatur adjudicatio, debet hunce in-
vicem coheredi certaé pecunia (si-
cuti jam dictum est) condemnare.
Eo quoque nomine coheredi quis
que suo condemnandus est, quod
solus fructus hereditarii fundi per-
ceperit, aut rem hereditariam cor-
ruperit, aut consumperit. Que
quidem similiter inter plures quo-
que quam duos coheredes subse-
quuntur.

Communi

§ V. Eadem interveniunt, esti
communi dividundo de pluribus
yebus actum sit. Quod si de und
re, veluti de fundo; siquidem ste
fundus commodé regionibus divi-

§ 4. When a suit is commenced
for the partition of an inheritance,
.the judge must decree to each heir
his respective portion; and, if the
partition, when made, be more ad-
vantageous to the one than to the
other, the judge ought as we have
before observed, to oblige him, who
has the largest part, to make a full
recompense in money to his co-
heir : it therefore follows, that every
co-heir, who hath taken the profits
of an inheritance to his sole use, and
consumed them, is liable to be com-
pelled to make restitution. And
this is the law whether there are
two heirs, or many.

dividundo.

$ 5. The law is the same, when
a suit is brought communi dividun-
do, for one particular thing only,
it being but a part or parcel of an
inheritance, as a field, or any piece
LIB. IV. TIT. XVIL

sionem recipiat, partes ejus singulis
adjudicare debet: et, si unius pars
pregravare videtur, is invicém cer-
ta pecunia alteri condemnandus
est. Quod si commode dividi non
possit, vel si homo forte aut mulus
erit, de quo actum sit, tunc totus
uni adjudicandus est, et is invicem
alteri certé pecunia condemnandus
est.

385

of ground, which, if it can be con-
veniently divided, ought to be ad-
judged to each claimant in equal
portions ; and if the share of one
be larger than the others, the party
having the largest portion, must be
condemned to make a recompense
in money. But, if the thing sued
for be of such a nature, that it can-
not be divided, as a slave, or a
horse, it must be given entirely to
one of the co-partners, who must
be ordered to make satisfaction in
money to the other.

+

Finium regundorum.

§ VI. Si finium regundorum
actum fuerit, dispicere debet judex,

an necessaria sit adjudicatio; qua

sané uno casu necessaria est, si evi-
_dentioribus finibus distingui agros
commodius sit, quam olim fuissent
distincti: nam tunc necesse est, ex
alterus agro partem aliquam alte-
rius agri domino adjudicari; quo
casu conveniens est, ut is alteri cer-
ta pecunia debeat condemnari.
Eo quoque nomine condemnandus
est quisque hoc judicio, quod forté
circa fines aliquid malitiosé com-
misit; verbi gratia, quia lapides fi-
nales furatus est, vel arbores fina-
les excidit, Contumacie quoque
nomine quisque eo judicio condem-

49

§ 6. When the action finiwm re-
gundorum is brought for the deter-
mination of boundaries, the judge
ought first to examine, whether it
be absolutely requisite to proceed to
an adjudication; in one case it is
undoubtedly so; viz. when it be-
comes expedient, that grounds
should be divided by more conspic-
uous boundaries than formerly; for
necessity then requires, that a part
of one man’s ground should be ad-
judged. to another, in which case it
is incumbent upon a judge to con-
demn him, whose estate is enlarg-
ed, to pay out an equivalent to the
other, whose estate is diminished.
By this action, that any one may
386 LIB. IV. TIT. XVIII.

 

natur; veluti si quis jubente judice be prosecuted, who hath commit-
meturi agros passus non fuerit. ted fraud in relation to boundaries,
either by removing stones, or cut-
ting down trees, which were land-
marks. The same action will also
subject any man to condemnation
on account of contumacy, if he re-
fuse to suffer his lands to be mea-
sured at the command of a judge.

De adjudicatione.

$ VII. Quod autem istis judiciis § 7. Whatever is adjudged to

alicui adjudicatum fuerit, id statim a party in any of these actions, in-

ejus fit, cui adjudicatum est. stantly becomes the property of
him, to whom it was adjudged.

 

TITULUS DECIMUS-OCTAVUS.
DE PUBLICIS JUDICIIS.

De differentia a privatis.

PUBLICA judicia neque per ac- Public judgments are not intro-
-tiones ordinantur; neque omnind duced by actions; nor are they in
quicquam simile habent cum cete- any thing similar to the judgments,
ris judiciis, de quibus locuti su- of which we have been treating.
mus: magnaque diversitas eorum They also differ greatly from one
est et in instituendo et in exercen- another in the manner of being in-
do. stituted and prosecuted.

Etymologia.

§ I. Publica autem dicta sunt, § 1. They are called public,
quod cuivis ex populo executio eo- because they may be sued to exe-
rum plerumque datur. cution by any of the people.

Divisio.
§ I. Publicorum judiciorum que- $§ 2. Of these judgments some are

dam capitalia sunt, quedam non capital, others not. We term those
capitalia. Capitalia dicimus, que capital, by which a criminal'is pro-
LIB. IV. TIT. XVII.

ultimo supplicio afficiunt homines,
vel etiam aque et ignis interdic-
tione, vel deportatione, vel metaillo.
Cetera, si quam infamiam irrogant
cum damno pecuniario, hac publi-
ca quidem sunt, sed non capitalia.

De

$ IIL. Publica autem judicia hee
sunt. Lex Julia majestatis, que
in eos, qui contra imperatorem vel
rempublicam aliquid moliti sunt,
suum vigorem extendit. Cujus
pena anime amissionem sustinet, et
memoria rei etiam post mortem
damnatur.

Exempla.

387

hibited from fire and water, or con-
demned to death, to banishment, or
to the mines. Others, by which
men fined and rendered infamous,
are public indeed, but not capital.

lesa majestate.

§ 3. The following are public
judgments. The law Julia majes-
tatis extends its force against those,
who have undertaken any enter-
prize against the emperor or the re-
public. “The penalty is the loss of
life, and the memory of the offender
becomes infamous after his death.

‘De adulteriis.

§ IV. Item lex Julia de adulte-
riis coercendis, que-*non solim
temeratores alienarum nuptiarum
gladio punit, sed et eos, qui cum
masculis nefandam libidinem exer-
cere audent.
etiam stupri flagitium punitur, cum
quis siné vi vel virginem vel vidu-
am honesté viventum stupraverit.
Penam autem eadem lex irrogat
stupratoribus; si honesti sunt, pub-
licationem partis dimidiz bonorum ;
si humiles, corporis coercitionem
cum relegatione.

Sed eddem lege-

$4. The law Julia, for the sup-
pression of adulteries, not only pun-
ishes with death those who vielate
the marriage bed of others, but those
also, who. commit acts of detest-
able lewdness with persons of their
own sex. It also inflicts punish-
ment upon all who are guilty of the
crime called stuprum: that is, the
debauching a virgin, or a widow of
honest fame, without force. The
punishment of this crime in persons
of condition is the confiscation of a
moiety of their possessions; offend-
ers of low degree, undergo corporal
chastisement with relegatiop:

we

De sicariis.

$ V. Item lex Cornelia de sicariis,
que homicidas ultore ferro perse-
quitur, vel eos, qui hominis occi-
dendi,caus&é cum telo ambulant.

§$ 5. The law Cornelia de sicariis
punishes those, who commit mur-
der, with death, and those also, who
carry weapons, with intent to kill.
388 LIB. IV.

TIT. XVII.

 

Telum autem, ut Cajus noster ex
interpretatione Jegum duodecim
tabularum scriptum reliquit, vulgd
quidem id appellatur, quod arcu
mittitur; sed et nunc omne signifi-
cat, quod manu cujusque jacitur.
Sequitur ergo, ut lignum, et lapis,
et ferrum, hoc nomine continean-
tur; dictum ab eo, quod in longin-
quum mittitur, a Greca voce tle
figuratum. “Et hance significatio-
nem invenire possumus et in Greeco
nomine; nam, quod nos telum ap-
pellamus, illi Bedcs appellant azo te
Balleodor. Admonet nos Xeno-
phon; nam ita scribit: Kae to Pedy
Ous Epegeto, hoy ya,tokevuata ,operdovar,
mwcor de xat dor, Sicarii autem ap-
pellantur a sicd, quod significat fer-
reum cultrum. Eadem lege et
venefici capite damnantur, qui ar-
tibus odiosis, tam venenis, quam
susurris magicis, homines, occide-
rint; vel mala medicamenta publicé
vendiderint. -

The term delum, according” to
Caius’s interpretation, commonly
signifies an arrow made to be shot
from a bow, but it is now used to
denote any missile weapon, or what-
ever is thrown from the hand ; hence
a club, a stone, or a piece of iron,
may be comprehended under that
appellation. The word ¢elum is
evidently derived from the Greek
adverb tye, procul, because thrown
froma distance. And we may trace
the same analogy in the Greek word
Gelos for what we call zelum, the
Greeks term Behos, from Bodheodas
to throw; and of this we are in-
formed by Xenophon, who writes
thus: Darts also were carried,
spears, arrows, slings and a multi-
tude of stones. Assassins and mur-
derers are called sicarii from sica,
which signifies a short crooked
sword or ponyard. The same law
also inflicts a capital punishment
upon those, who practice odious
arts, or sell pernicious medicaments,
occasioning the death of mankind,
as well by poison, as by magical
incantations.

De parricidiis.

§ VI. Alia deinde lex asperri-
mum crimen nova pcend persequi-
tur, que Pompeia de parricidiis vo-
catur; qua cavetur, ut, si quis pa-
rentis aut Gli, aut omnind affec-
tionis ejus, que nuncupatione pa-
rentum continetur, fata praeparave-
rit, (sive clam, sivé palam, id au-
sus fuerit,) ne¢ non is, cujus dolo
malo id factum est, vel conscius

§$ 6. The law Pompeia inflicts a
new punishment upon those who
commit parricide, the most execra-
ble of allcrimes. ‘This law ordains
that whoever, either publicly or pri-
vately, hastens the death of a parent
or a child, or of any person com-
prized under the tye, or denomina-
tion of a parent, shall be punished as
a parricide; and he also, who
criminis existit, licét: extraneus sit.
pena paricidii puniatur; et neque
gladio, neque ignibus, neque ulli
solemni pcens subjiciatur, sed in-
sutus culeo cum cane, et gallo gal-
linaceo, et vipera, et simid, et inter
eas ferales angustias comprehensus,
(secundum quod regionis qualitas
tulerit,) velin vicinum mare, vel in
amnem projiciatur ; ut omnium el-
ementorum usu vivus carere incipi-
at, et ei celum superstiti, et terra
mortuo, auferatur. Si quis autem
alias cognatione vel affinitate per-
sonas conjunctas necaverit, penam
legis Cormeliz de sicariis sustinebit.

LIB. IV. TIT. XVUL

389

hath advised, or been privy to the
transaction, although a stranger.
A criminal, in this case, is not put
to death by the sword, by fire, nor
by any ordinary punishment; the
law directs, that he shall be sewed
up in a sack, with a dog, a cock, a
viper, and an ape, and, being put up
in this horrid enclosure, shall be
‘thrown either into the sea, or an
adjacent river, according to the sit-
uation of the place, where the pun-
ishment is inflicted: thus he is de-
prived of the very elements, while
living; so that his living body is
denied the benefits of the air, and
his dead body the use of the earth.
But, if a man be guilty of the mur-
der of any other person, related to
him, either by cognation or affinity,
he is only subject to the punishment
inflicted by the law Cornelia de sar-
carits.

De falsis.

$ VII. Item lex Cornelia de fal-
sis, que etiam testamentaria voca-
tur, poenam irrogat ei, qui testamen-
tum vel aliud instrumentum falsum
scripserit, signaverit, recitaverit,
subjecerit, vel signum adulterinum
fecerit, sculpserit, expresserit, sciens,
‘dolo malo. Ejusque legis peena, in
servos ultimum supplicium est;
quod etiam in lege Cornelia de si-
cariis et veneficis servatur: in lib-
eros vero deportatio.

De

$ VU. Item lex Julia de vi pub-

§ 7. The law Cornelia de falsis,
which is also called testamentaria,
punishes those who fraudulently
write, sign, recite, or clandestinely
offer for signature a false will, or
any other instrument; or make, en-
grave or stamp, or in any manner
counterfeited the. seal of another.
The punishment by this law upon
slaves is death; as it is by the law
Cornelia concerning assassins and
poisoners; upon freemen, deporta-
tion.

Vi.

§ 8. The law Julia, concerning
390

LIB. IV. TIT. XVIII.

 

lica seu privata adversus eos exori-
tur, qui vim vel armatam, vel siné
armis, commiserint; sed, siquidem
armata vis arguatur, deportatio ei
ex lege Julia de vi publica irroga-
tur; si verd sine armis, in tertiam
partem bonorum suorum publicatio
imponitur. Sin autem per vim rap-
tus virginis, vel viduze, vel sancti-
monialis, vel alterius, fuerit perpe-
tratus, tunc et raptores, et ii, qui
opem huic flagitio dederunt, capite
puniuntur, secundim nostre con-
stitutionis definitionem, ex qua hoc
apertius possibile est scire.

public and private force, take place
against all, who use force, whether
armed or unarmed; but, if proof
be made of an armed force, the
punishment is deportation by that
law ; and, if the force be not accom-
panied with arms, the penalty is
confiscation of one third part of
the offender’s goods: nevertheless,
if a rape be committed upon a vir-
gin, a widow, a nun, or upon any
other person, both the ravishers and
their accomplices are all equally
subject to capital punishment, ac-
cording to the decision of our con-
stitution ; from which more may
be known of this subject.

De peculatus.

$ 1X. Item lex Julia peculatis
eos punit, qui publicam pecuniam,
vel rem sacram,vel religiosam, fu-
rati fuerint. Sed, siquidem ipsi ju-
dices tempore administrationis pub-
licas pecunias subtraxerint, capitali
animadversione puniuntur; et non
solim hi, sed etiam qui ministerium
eis ad hoc exhibuerint, vel qui sub-
tractas ab his susceperint. Alii ve-
ro, qui in hance legem inciderint,
pene deportationis subjugentur.

$9. The law Julia de peculatu
punishes those, who have been
guilty of theft, in regard to public
money, or anything, which is sa-
cred; but if judges themselves,
while in office commit a theft of
this kind, their punishment is capi-
tal; and so is the punishment of
those, who assist in such a theft,
or knowingly receive the money
stolen. But all other persons, who
offend against this law, are only
subject to deportation.

De plagiariis.

§$ X. Est et inter publica judicia
lex Fabia de plagiariis, que inter-
dum capitis panam ex sacris con-
stitutionibus irrogat, interdum le-
viorem.

§ 10. The law Fabia against
plagiaries, ranks also among pub-
lic judgments; but by the imperial
constitutions, offenders against this
law, are sometimes punished with
death, and sometimes by a milder
punishment. ¢
LIB. IV. TIT. XVIII.

391

De ambitu, repetundis, annona, residuis.

$ XI. Sunt preeterea publica ju-
dicia: lex Julia de ambitu, lex Ju-
lia repetundarum, et lex Julia de

annona, et lex Julia de residuiis,-

que de certis capitulis loquuntur, et
anime quidem amissionem non irro-
gant; aliis autem peenis eos subjici-
unt, quipreceptaearum neglexerint.

$11. There are also other pub-
lic judgments; such are the Julian
laws de ambitu, repetundarum, de
annonda, de residuis ; which do not
punish with death, but inflict other
punishmentsupon those, who offend.

Conclusio.

§ XII. Sed de publicis judiciis
heec exposuimus, ut vobis possibile
sit summo digito, et quasi per indi-
cem, ea tetigisse; alioqui diligen-
tior eorum scientia vobis, ex latiori-
bus digestorum seu pandectarum
libris, Deo propitio adventura est.

$ 12. Thus much we have stated.
on the subject of public judgments,
as an index, to give a general idea
of that knowledge, which, through
the blessing of God, may be most
fully and particularly obtained by
perusing the digests with a diligent
attention. ‘

FINIS

LIBRI QUARTI ET ULTIMI INSTITUTIONUM.
NOV. OXVIII.

KE®. A.
Hept d:adoxn§ trav Kxatiovrey.

Ex ‘Tis TOWUY TwY KaTLovTeY Dretn To adia-
dera TedeuvTncarrt, oiagdnmore hucews 7 Bab-
pov, ere é& dppevoyonas, eire €x Onhuyomas
karayopevos, kat eire adrefovatos cite bme£ou-
clos ein, TavT@Y TaY ayLovT@Y Kat TOV ek m)a-
yrou ovyyever mpotipaca. Kady yap 6 tedeu-
tyoas érepov ime£ovatos Hv, Guws Tovs aitou
maiSas, dtacdymore dv dot puoews 7 Badpou,
Kat aiTav Tay yoveay mpotiwacbat Kedevoper,
dv tre€ouctos nv 6 TeAevTyCas, én’ Exewvors dy-
Aady Tos mpaypacw, driva, Kara Tous d\dous
pay vopous, Tors maTpagw ov mpoomopierat *
émt yap Tt] XpyoEe Tov mpaypaTay ToUTwY,
dherhoven mpoomopiCecOatn pudarrec Oat, ros
MEPL TOUT@Y UL@Y VOHOUS rots yovevot pudarro-
" pev ovT@ pevrorye ooTe, ef Twa ToOUT@Y Top
xartovrey maiOas KaTaXumrovra TehevTNO AL TUpe
Bawy, Tous éxetvou vious 7 Ovyarepas 7) Tous dh-
Rous Katiovras eis Tov Tov idiov yovews Tomov
brewovevat, eire tre~ovoro. TH TeAevTNTAYTL,
eire abreEovoror edpeerey * TorouToy ek THs KAN-
povopias Tou TehevTycavTos AapPavovras pe-
pos, door dyrore dv dow, doov 6 abreay yo-
veus, et mepinv, éxopitero* qv tiva Siadoxny
in stirpes

€

% dpyaorns ékadecev: emt Tav-

ms yap ths Ta£ews Tov Babpov (nrevaOac ov

Bovdopeba+ GAXa pera Tov viv Kat Tov
Ovyarepwv Tous ék Tov mporeheuTnaavros viou
4 Ovyarpos eyyovous KaderoOar Oeomfoper -
>
ovdepias eloayoperns Staopas, cite dppeves
>, 3 ‘ 2. z 2 ?
ire Ondevat dot, kat eire €£ dppevoyouas eire

éx Ondvyonas karayavrat, eire breLovarot, Esre

50

CAP. I.
De descendentionum successione.

SI quis igitur descendentium fue-
rit ei, qui intestatus moritur, cujus-
libet nature aut gradus, sive ex mas-
culorum genere sive ex feminarum
descendens, et sive sue potestatis,
sive sub potestate sit, omnibus as-
cendentibus et ex latere cognatis
preponatur. Licet enim defunctus
sub alterius potestate fuerit, tamen
ejus liberos, cujuslibet sexus sint aut
gradus, etiam ipsis parentibus pre-
poni precipimus, quorum sub potes-
tate fuerit, qui defunctus est, in illis
videlicet rebus, quee, secundum nos-
tras alias leges, patribus non acquir-
untur; nam in usu harum rerum, qui
debet acquiri aut servari, nostras de
his omnibus leges parentibus custo-
dimus: sic tamen, ut, si quem horum
descendentium filios reliquentem mo-
ri contigerit, illius filios aut filias, aut
alios descendentes, in proprii paren-
tis locum succedere, sive sub potes-
tate defuncti, sive suze potestatis in-
veniantur ; tantam de hereditate mori-
entis accipentes partem, quanticun-
que sint, quantam eorum parens, si
viveret, habuisset ; quam successio-
nem i stirpes vocavit antiquitas: in
hoc enim ordine gradum queri nolu-
mus; sed, cum filiis et filiabus, ex
preemortuo filio aut filia nepotes vo-
394

 

 

cari sancimus; nulla introducenda
differentia, sive masculi sive femi-
nz sint, et seu ex masculorum seu
foeminarum prole descendant, sive
sue potestatis, sive sub potestate
sint constituti. Et hec quidem de
succssionibus descendentium dispos-
uimus.

nav abre€soroe éinoay, Kav tavie per

WEQL TNS THY xaTLovTMY Ovadoyns éetUnW-
oopsr,

CHAPTER I.
Of the succession of descendants.

If a man dies intestate, leaving a descendant of either sex or any degree,
such descendant, whether he derives his descent from the male or female
line, or whether he is under power or not, is to be preferred to all ascend-
ants and collaterals. And, although the deceased was himself under pater-
nal power, yet we ordain, that his children of either sex or any degree shall
be preferred in succession to the parents, under whose power the intestate
died, in regard to those things, which children do not acquire for their pa-
rents, according to our other laws: for we would maintain the laws in re-
spect to’the usufruct, which is allowed to parents: so that, if any of the
descendants of the deceased should die leaving sons or daughters or other
descendants, they shall succeed in the place of their own father, whether
they are under his power or swe juris and shall be entitled to the same
share of the intestate’s estate, which their father would have had, if he had
lived ; and this kind of succession has been termed by the ancient lawyers
a succession 77 stirpes: for in the succession of descendants we allow no
priority of degree, but admit the grandchildren of any person by a deceased
son or daughter to be called to inherit that person together with his sons
or daughters, without making any distinction between males and females,
or the descendants of males and females, or between those, who are under

power, and those, who are not.

These are the rules, which we have estab-

lished, concerning the succession of descendants.

Eitic tocvvy. Si quis igitur.] The three

first chapters of this novel constitution deserve
the attentive consideration of the reader, not
only because they contain the latest policy of
the civil law in regard to the disposition of the
estates of intestates ; but because they are the
foundation of our statute Jaw in that respect.
Vid. Holt’s cases, p. 259. Peere William’s
rep. p. 27. Prec. in chan. p. 593. Sir Thom,
Raymond’s rep. p. 496. And they are still
almost of continual use, by being the general
guide of the courts in England, which hold
cognizance of distributions, in all those cases,
concerning which our own laws have either
been silent, or not sufficiently express.

Els tov t# idee yovews. In proprii paren-
tis locum succedant.] Nothing is more clear in
the civil law, than that grandchildren, even
when alone, (although they descend from va-
rious stocks and are unequal in their numbers, )
would take the estate of their deceased grand-
father per stirpes, and not per capita. Suppose
therefore that Titius should die, leaving grand-

children by three different song, already dead ;
to wit, three by one son, six by another, and
twelve by another; each of these classes of
grandchildren would take a third of the estate
without any regard to the inequality of the
numbers in each class. But, as to this point
in England, the law reports mention no judi-
cial determination ; yet it seems probable that
the courts, in which the distributions are cog-
nizable, would order the division of an estate
in such a case to be made per capita;
and this, partly from a motive of equity, and
partly froma consideration of the intent of
the statute, relating to the estates of intes-
tates ; for the statute directs an equal and just
distribution : and, when the act mentions rep-
resentation, it mnst be understood to refer to
it, in those cases only, where representation is
necessary to prevent exclusion, but not to refer
to it, in those cases, where all the claimants
are in equal degree, and therefore can take
suo quisque jure, each in his own right. Vid.
23, 24, Gar, 2. cap. 10. Lib, 3. Inst. p. 4.
395

KE®, B.
Tlept tov avovrav d:adoxns.

Ex row 6 Te\evTHOas KaTiovras pey py Ka-
TaXurot KAnpovopous, marnp de 7 pntnp 7] GA-
Rot yovers atta émi(noovot, mavTav Tev €K
mAaylov ovyyevay TovTous mporiwacOat Oec-
miCopev, €Enpypevar povav adeApav é& éxate-
pov yovews cvvaTrTopevay Tw TehevTNTAYTL, OS
Oia tov éEns Syr@Onoera. Ei Se woAXor tov
GvovTay meptetat, TouTOUS mpoTipacOat KeAEvO-
per, of tives eyyutepot To Babu edpebecer,
dppevas te kat Ondewas, cite mpos pytpos
eire mpos mratpos elev. Ex b€ tay adtoy éxou-
ot Babpov, 2& tons eis abrous 7 KAnNpovojua
StarpeOnoerar, Sore To pev tptov apBavew
mavras Tovs mpos matpos dyovras, dooe dy-
mote av Oove To Se UmoNouToy HyLov Tous
mpos pntpos avovras, 6gous Symore ay avrovus
evpeOnvar ovpBan. Es de pera tov amovtwy
evpebwow adehgor 7 adeAhar && Exatepwv yo-
veov cuvaTTopevor TH TeMEUTNTAVTL, ETA TOY

eyyvtepav to Babuq dvovray KAnOncovrat, et

CAP. II.
De ascendentium successione.

Sl igitur defunctus descendentes
quidem non relinquat heredes, pater
autem aut mater aut ali} parentes ei
supersint, omnibus ex latere cognatis

hos preeponi sancimus, exceptis solis

fratribus ex utroque parente conjunc-

tis defuncto, sicut per subsequentia

declarabitur. Si autem plurimi as-
cendentium vivunt, hos preeponi ju-
bemus, qui proximi gradu reperiun-
tur, masculos et feminas, sive pater-
ni, sive materni sint. Si autem eun-
dem habeant gradum, ex equo inter
eos hereditas dividatur, ut medieta-
tem quidem accipiant omnes a patre
ascendentes, quanticunque fuerint; -
iedietatem vero reliquam a matre
ascendentes, quantoscunque eos in-
venire contigerit. Si vero cum as-
cendentibus inveniantur fratres aut

kat marnp } pyTnp einoav + Suaipouperys els dv- sorores eX utrisque parentibus con-
rous 8ydady rns KAnpovowias Kara Tov roy juncti defuncto, cum proximis gradu
mpocwray dpiOpuor, iva kat Tov dvovrey xa ascendentibus vocabantur, si et pa-
tay ddeApav éxactos logy éxor poupay, odde- ter aut mater fuerint; dividenda in-
puav xpyow éx ms Tav viev 4 Ovyarepay ter eos quippe hereditate secundum
potpas ev route To Oepare Suvapevou Tou maTpos personarum numerum, uti et ascen-
autre mavredas éxdixew, émetdn dvte ravTns dentium et fratram singuli equalem
TS Xpyoeas pepos aire THs KApovowias Kat habeant portionem ; nullum usum ex
kara Seomoreias Scxatoy bia Tou wapovros Se Filiorum aut filiarum portione in hoc
Seoxaper vouov, ovdenias pudarroperns Siaho- casy valente patre sibi penitus vin-
pas perafy Toy mpocwTay TovTaY, eive On- dicare, quoniam, pro hac usus por-
Reva etre dppeves einoay of mpos Tv KA7nPO- tione, hereditatis jus et secundum
voplay Reaneaees Oy kat elre i arene 7 Gq- proprietatem per preesentem dedimus
Aews i Saco ee 8 Kat €lTE avreg- legem ; differentia nulla servanda
ovotos etre UreLovatos nv, dv Siadexovrat. inter personas istas, sive fomine
sive masculi fuerint, qui ad heredi-
tatem vocantur; et sive per masculi
sive per femine personam copulan-
tur; et sive suze potestatis sive sub
potestate fuerit is cui succedunt.
396

 

CHAPTER II.

Of the succession of ascendants.

But, when the deceased leaves no descendants, if a father or mother, or
any other parents, grand-fathers, great-grand-fathers, &c. survive him, we
decree, that they shall be preferred to all collateral relations, except broth-
ers of the whole blood to the deceased, as shall hereafter be more particu-
larly declared. But, if many ascendants are living, we prefer those, who
are in the nearest degree, whether they are male or female, paternal or ma-
ternal ; and, when several ascendants concur in the same degree, the in-
heritance of the deceased must be so divided, that the ascendants on the
part of the father may receive one-half, and the ascendants on the part of
the mother the other half, without regard to the numberof persons on either
side. But, if the deceased leaves brothers and sisters of the whole blood
together with ascendants, these collaterals of the deceased shall be called
with the nearest ascendants, although such ascendants are a father or moth-
er; and the inheritance must be so divided according to the number of
persons, that each of the ascendants, and each of the brothers, may have
an equal portion ; nor shall the father in this case take to himself any usu-
fruct of the portions belonging to his sons and daughters, because by this
law we have given him the absolute property of one portion: and we suffer
no distinction to be made ‘between those persons, who are called to an in-
heritance, whether they are males or females, or related by males or fe-
males, or whether he, to whom they succeed, was,'or was not, under pow-

er, at the time of his decease.

El xot watyg i Metyg ONOGY. Si et pater
aut mater fuerint.] By the law of England,
when a person dies intestate, leaving a father,
the father is solely entitled to the whole per-
sonal estate of the intestate, exclusive of all
others ; and anciently, [i.e. in the reign of
Henry the first, vid. Il. Hen. primi, Wilkins
editore, p. 266 ] a surviving father, or mother,
could have tuken even the real estate of their
deceased child. But this law of succession
was altered soon afterwards ; for we find by
Glanville, that, in the time of Henry the second,
a father or mother could not have taken the
real estates of their deceased children, the in-
heritance being then carried over to the collat-
eral line. Vid. Glanville, lib 7, cap. 1, 2, &e.
1 Peere Williams 50. And it has ever since
been held as an inviolable maxim, that an in-
heritance cannot ascend. Co. Litt. 11. a.
But this alteration in the law, made since the
reign of Henry the first, did not extend to per-
sonal estate, so that, before the statute of the
first of James the second, if a child had died
intestate without a wife, child, or father, the
mother would have been entitled to the whole
personal estate, exclusive of the brothers and
sisters of the intestate ; but it is enacted by
that statute, “that if, after the death of a
“« father, any of his children shall die intestate,
‘« without wife or children, in the lifetime of
‘© the mother, every brother and sister, and

“¢ their representatives, shall have an equal
‘share with her.” 1 Jac, 2. cap. 17. § 6.

But, should it here be asked, whether the
brother of an intestate would exclude the
grand-father by the civil law? the novel ap-
pears at first sight to answer it very fully in the
negative by enacting, <‘ that, ifthe deceased
“ Jeaves brothers and sisters together with as-
‘< cendants in the right line, these collaterals
“ shall be called with the nearest ascendants,””
&c. And indeed the generality of writers,
namely, Gudelin, Forster,- Ferriere, Domat,
and others, all understand this passage, as ad-
mitting ascendants and brothers to take jointly;
yet a contrary interpretation hath been given
by some civilians, of whom Voet is the prin-
cipal, whose argument in support of it are
therefore here copied at large.

‘«llud non satis expeditum est, an etiam
* eum ovo aut proavo, ubi alius proximior as-
** cendens non est, fratres germani ejus, qui
‘« defunctus est, concurre debeant, an magis
** avo proavove preeferendisunt, eosque exclu-
‘“« dant? Concursum enim ascendentium natu-
‘‘ yaliter gradu remotiorum, quos nullus inter-
‘* medius existens excludit, cum fratribus ger-
‘‘manis defuncti turentur plerique, moti eo,
‘© quod cum proxime ascendentibus fratres ve-
**niunt, Vid. novel. 118. Proximus autem
*© sit,.quem nemo antecedit.”

‘Sed juris rationibus convenientus videtur,
397

‘“avum proavumve defuncti a fratribus ejus
** sermanis in successione excludi ; quia impe-
‘* rator in dicta Novella 118. emphatice dixit,
“fratres et sorores cum proximis gradu as-
** cendentibus vocari; qualis mentio proximo-
*‘ rum gradu inutilis plane ac superflua essct,
si non per gradu proximos denotarentor illi,
‘© qui in primo linew ascendentis gradu sunt 5
*© cum juris certi atque indubitati sit, nunquam
** in ascendente linea locum esse, juri reprae-
** sentationis, per quod remotior subintraret in
locum proximioris defancti ; atque adeo suf-
‘© fecisset, si generaliter expressum esset, fra-
** tres cum ascendentibus voeari. Ne dicam
‘hoc ipso, quo in linea ascendente represen-
‘“tatio persone proximioris admissa non est,
** fieri non posse, ut avus vel proavus defuncti,
*€ quia patre vel matre defucti certo certius ex-
“ cluditur, concurreret cum fratribus, qui cum
‘* patre matreque defuncti concurrunt. Qui-
*“ bus accedit, quod sententia, de avo defuncti
“cum germanis ejus. fratribus concurrent, ad
«* absurda ducit. Si enim verum est, quod in
“casu quo fratres et sorores cum proximis
“gradu ascendentibus ita concurrant, ut he-
‘© reditas inter eos secundum personarum nu-
“merum dividenda sit, ac ascendentium et
‘ fratram singuli sequalem habeant portionem
“secundum d. Nov. 118. eveniret necessario
‘“ ut remotiores ascendentes ob nefectum prox-
“ imiorum cum fratribus defancti concurrentes
** plus fratribus nocturi essent, quarh proximi-
‘© ores ; dam, positis duobus fratribus germa-
‘© nis defuncti, pater et mater concurrens duas
‘* tantum partes equales auferrendo efficerent,
‘ul fratres singuli quartam hereditatis frater-
“ nee partem capiant ; quatuor autem avi avi-
‘© eque existentes, viriles totidem partes oc-
‘© cupando, non nisi sextam singulis defuncti
“ fratribus relicturi essent ; sicuti tantum par-
‘‘ tem decimam duo fratres singuli essent hab-
‘* ituri, si cum proavis atque proaviavus (qua-
‘* Jes octo esse pnssunt) deberent concurrere.
“ Quam autem a ratione id alienum sit, ut ma-
‘‘ gis aliis concursu suo noceant remotiores,
“quam qui ejusdem linee proximiores sunt,
‘nemo, ut opinor, non sponte satis agnoscit.
** Denique tantum concursum esse fratrum
‘* cum patre et matre, nen vero cum aliis as-
‘© cendentibus remotidribus, ubi pater mater-
‘© que deficit, aperte probant verba Novellz
«© 118. dum illic diserte cautum), si cum ascen-

‘‘dentibus inveniuntur fratres aut sorores ex

‘© utrisque parentibus conjuncti defuncto, eos

“cum proximis gradu ascendentibus vocari,

‘si aut paler aut mater fuerint; unde sequi-
‘* tur, eos non omni casu, nee promiscue cum

‘© omuibus ascendentibus, venire ; sed st paler
“ aut mater fuerint : ideoque mox igitur sub-
* jicitur, in hoc casu patrem nullam usum ex

‘‘filiorum aut filiarum portione, posse sili
“ penilus vindicare, nulla avi facta mentione;
“cum tamen id avo equa interdicendum fu-
‘« jsset, si et avus cum defuncti nepotis fra-

“* tribus succedere potuisset, dum fratres suc-'
“ cedentes eque potuissent in avi quam in pa-

‘* tris potestate esse. Ut proinde nihil in con-

trarium efficiat, quod, in jure, proximus

‘¢ dicatur, quem nemo anteccdit ; cum id tum

“demum admitti debeat quando nulla inde

‘* absurditas profluit ; prout in hoc casu futu-

‘© rum, supra monstratum est.’? Vid. Joannis

Voet. com. ad Pandectas, tom. 2. lib. 38, t.

17 § 13.

But this question seems now to be settled in
England, in consequence of three determina-
tions; the first of which was given in the Ex-
chequer, in the case of Poole v. Wilshaw, on
the 9th of July, 1708 :—the second in the case
of Norbury v. Vicars, before Mr. Fortescue,
master of the rolls, in November 1749 :—and
the third was delivered on the 14th January,
1754, in the case of Evelin v. Evelin, by the
lord chancellor, who decreed in favour of the
brother in exclusion of the grand-father, hav-
ing founded his opinion partly in deference to
the former determinations : partly in cunsider-
ation of the present common Jaw computation
of degrees, relative to real estates ; and partly
upon the benefit, which must accrue to the
public by preferring a younger man to an older,
the brother of a deceased person to the grand-
father, propter spem accrescendi.

And it was also declared to be the opinion
of the court, that, ifthe point in question had
been res integra, und solely determinable by
the Roman law, the decree would still have
been the same ;_ which declaration, from so
high an authority, must have great weight in
ascertaining of the Novel, and must incline
civilians in general to think mere favourably
for the future of Voet’s arguments, which were
particularly quoted and much relied upon by
the court.
398

KE®. Tr,

Tlept diadoyns tov éx mayiov kaTiovray.

Ex Towuy 6

Se dvovras

tedeuTnoas pnde Katiovras pn-

katadewyn, mpwrovs mpos THY
kAnpovopuay kat
tas adekas

™s avtns pntpos texOevras, ovs Kat peta

kadovpey tovs ddeAdous
tous ék Tov avrov matpos Kat
Tov TarTepwy mpos tv KAnpovojiay éka-
Aecapev. Tovrwy de py vrovrav, év Sevtepa
taker éxewous Tous ddeAdous mpos THY KANpo-
vopay Kadoupey, of twes e& évos yoveas ov-
vanrovrat T@ TedevTHGavTt, cite Sia Tov Ta-
tTpos povou, etre dia THs pytpos. Ex de ro
Teheutnoavte adeAhor vretnoay, Kat Eérepov
adedpov 7 ddeAdns mporedeutncavtwy mavdes,
kAnOnoorrat mpos THY KAnpovopLay ovTOL peTa
Ta@v mpos maTpos Kat mpos pytpos Oerwv dp-
pevoy te kat Ondewwv: Kat, doou Symorn dy
ot, rocoutoy ék THs KAnpovopuas AnYpovrat jie
pos, dcov 6 altar yoveus nucdde AapBavew,
ei eme(noev. Obey dxodovboy éorw, iva, ef Tu-
xov 6 mporerevtnoas adehpos, ob of maides
meptetot, Oi ExaTepov yovews TH vuy TedeUTY-
Se mepiovres
TUXOV, 7) TNS
pNTpos, avr@ ovvnmrovtTo, mpotiynOwow of

CavTe TPOT@T® TvvyimarTeEeTo, ol

adekpor Sia Tov marpos povov

> >
toutov trades tav idiov Oerwv, ei Kar TpLTOU
: 3.
clot Badyov, elre mpos marpos cite mpos py-
A >
Tpos elnoav of Oevot, Kat etre appeves cite
Onde, aomep 6 adrav yorcus mpoeTiparo,
ei mepinv. Kau ek tw evartioy, et 6 pev mre-
; 1g ¢
ptoy adedAdos €& Exarepov yovews ouvanrerat
¢ rs
T@ TedeuTncarTt, 6 Se mporehevTnaas Si Evos
yoveas cuvymtero, Tous Tovrou matdas ék THS
kAnpovopas drrokhevopev, omep Kat avTos,

el mepinv, €exdeveTo. To de Tovovroy mpovopu-

CAP. ITI.
De successione ex latere venientum.

SI igitur defunctus neque descen-
dentes neque ascendentes reliquetit,
primos ad hereditatem vocamus fra-
tres et sorores ex eodem patre et ex
eadem matre natos, quos etiam cum
patribus ad hereditatem vocavimus.
His autem non existentibus, in se-
cundo ordine illos fratres ad he-
tredi atem vocamus, qui ex uno
parente conjuncti sunt defuncto,
sive per patrem solum, sive per
matrem. Si autem defuncto fra-
tres fuerint, et alterius fratris aut
sororis premortuorum filii, vocaban-
tur ad hereditatem isti cum de patre
et matre thiis, masculis et feminis :
et, quantjcunque fuerint, tantam ex
hereditate percipient portionem,
quantam eorum parens futurus esset
accipere, 8i superstes esset. Unde
consequens est, ut, si forte preemor-
tuus frater, cujus filii vivunt, per
utrumque parentem nunc defuncte
persone jungebatur, superstites au-
tem fratres patrem solum forsan aut
matrem ei jungebantur, preponantur
istius filii propriis thiis, licet in tertio
sint gradu, (sive a patre sive a ma-
tre sint thii, et sive masculi sive fe-
mine,) sicut eorum parens prepone-
retur, si viveret. Et ex diverso, si-
quidem superstes frater ex utroque
parente conjungitur defuncto, pree-
mortuus autem per unum parentem

ov év ravty ty Taker THs ouyyevetas povos jungebatur, hujus filios ab hereditate

id. Xr 2 2 6
mapexopev Tos tov adeApay, dppevov 7 Oy-
Rear, viows 7 Ovyarpacw, iva eis ta Tov

Biwv yoveav Sikaa trecedoow* ovdert de

exclubimus, sicut ipse, si viveret, ab
hereditate excludebatur. Hujusmo-
di vero privilegum in hoc ordine
399

 

>

Gro wartekos mpoowmw, €k TavTys THs
ta£ews épxopevw, TouTo To Sikaoy ocvyxo-
poupev.
ov mace Tore TavTyY THY elepyectay mape-

"ANAa Kat aiTois Tos Tov ddedA-

xouev, dre peta Tov idiwy Kpwovrar Oevov,

dppevov te kat Ondewwv, eire mpos marpos jus largimur.

eire mpos pintpos elev. Ex Se peta tay dded-
boy tov TedevTyGaYTOs Kat dmovres, ws 75H
Mpoeurouev, mpos THY KAnpovoytay KaXovvTat,
ovden. tpom@ mpos thy e& adiaberou Siadoxny
Tous. rou ddeApov 7 THs adeAdys maidas Ka-
AecoOar cvyxwpouper+ odde ef && Exatepou yo-
yeas 6 adT@Y TaTNp i) LTH TUYATTETO TH TE-
AevtngavTt. “Orore Towvy tos Tou ddeApou
kat Tns AdeAQys waroe ToLovTo mpovoptoy Sedo-
kapev, iva Tov Tay yovewy UmewctovtTes TOTO,
povot tpitov dvres BaOpov, pera Tay ek Sev-
tepov Baduou mpos tnv KAnpovoytay KadwrTat -
‘ékecvo mpodndov eat, éTt Twv Oewwy Tov Te-
Aevryoartos dppevav Te kat Onevwy, etre mpos
matpos eite mpos pntpos einoay, mpotipevrat,
ei Kat ékewwou TpiToy dpows ovyyeveras Bab-
ploy éxouev.

Ei Se pyre adeAdous, pyre madas ddeA-
ov, as cipneapev, 6 TeAevTnoas Karadewet,
mavras Tous éheéns ek mAayov ovyyevets mpos
TY KAnpovomiay Kaoupev, Kata THY évos Exa-
arou Babpou mpotinow, iva of éyyurepon Te
Babpe abror roy AouTov wporipwvra ei be
moNXoat Tov altov BaOpov evpeOwou, kara Tov
Tov mpocumayv apiOyov peragy avtwy 7 KAn-
povoua StarpeOyoerar- Smep in capita of
Hpetepot Aeyougs vopos.

cognationis solis prebemus fratrum
masculorum et feeminarum filiis aut
filiabus, ut in suorum parentum jura
succedant; nullii enim alii omnino
persone, ex hoc ordine venienti, hoc
Sed et ipsis fratruum
filiis tunc hoc beneficium conferimus,
quando cum propriis judicantur thiis,
masculis et feeminis, sive paterni si-
ve materni sint. Si autem cum fra-
tribus defuncti etiam ascendentes,
(sicut jam diximus) ad hereditatem
vocantur, nullo modo ad successio-
nem ab intestato fratris aut sororis
filios vocari permittimus ; neque si ex
utroque parente eorum pater aut ma-
ter defuncto jungebatur. Quando-
quidem igitur fratris et sororis filis
tale privilegium dedimus, ut, in pro-
priorum parentum succedentes lo-
cum, soli in tertio constituti gradu,
cum iis, qui in secundo gradu sunt,
ad hereditatem vocentur; illud palam
est, quia thiis defuncti masculis et
feminis, sive a patre sive a matre,

preeponuntur, si etiam ili tertium cog-
nationis similiter obtineant gradum.

Si vero neque fratres, neque filios

fratrum, sicut diximus, defunctus re-
liquerit, omnes de inceps a latere

cognatos ad hereditatem vocamus,
secundum uniuscujusque gradus pre
rogativam, ut viciniores gradu ipse
reliquis preponantur. Siautem pluri-
miejusdem gradus inveniantur, se-
cundum personarum numerum inter
eos hereditas dividatur; quod in
capita nostre leges appellant.

CHAPTER III.
Of the succession of collaterals.

Ifa man leaves neither descendants nor ascendants at the time of his
death, we first call his brothers and sisters of the whole blood, whom we
have also called to inherit with the fathers of deceased persons.

But, when there are no brothers of the whole blood with the deceased,
we call those, who are either by the same father only, or by the same mother.
400

 

And, if the deceased leaves brothers and also nephews by a deceased '
brother or sister, these nephews shall be called to succeed with their un-
cles and aunts of the whole blood to the deceased; but, however numerous
these nephews are, they shall be entitled only to that share, which their pa-
rent would have taken, if alive. From whence it follows, that, ifa man
dies and is survived by the children of a deceased brother of the whole
blood, and also by brothers of the half blood, then his nephews, (that is,
children of his brother, by the whole blood,) are to be preferred to their un-
cles and aunts; for, although such nephews are themselves in the third de-
gree, yet they are preferred, as their parent.would have been, if living.
And, on the contrary, ifa man dies, and is survived by a brother of the
whole blood, and by children of a brother of the half blood deceased, these
nephews are excluded, as their father would have been, if he had lived.
But among collaterals we allow the privilege of representation to the sons
and daughters of brothers and sisters, and no farther; and we grant it only
to brothers and sisters’ children, when they concur with their uncles or
aunts, paternal or maternal: for, when ascendants are called to inherit, we
by no means permit the children of a deceased -brother or sister to share in
the succession ; although the father or mother was of the whole blood with
the deceased brother.. But we have so far allowed the right of represen-
tation to brothers and sisters’ children, that, being only in the third degree,
they are called to inherit with those, who are in the second; and this is ev-
ident, because brothers and sisters’ children are preferred to the uncles and
aunts of the deceased, paternal as well as maternal; although they are all
in the third degree of cognation.

But, if a deceased person leaves neither brothers nor brothers’ children,
we then call all the other collaterals according to the prerogative of their
respective degrees, preferring the nearer to the more remote; and, if many
are found in the same degree, the inheritance must be divided according to
the number of persons; and our laws distinguish this manner of dividing
an inheritance, by calling it a division 7 capita.

to an equal share of the intestate’s estate, with

ITewten wgos yy uhngdvouay, Primos
ad hereditatem vocamus.]-We must here ob-
serve in relation to the distinction between the
whole blood and half blood, that in England
the rules of law are different, according ‘to the
nature of the estate which is to be taken; for,
in case of lands the whole blood is always
preferred, and the half blood is no klood in-
heritable by descent. 1 Co. inst. 14 a. But,
in respect to personal estate, the law has not
always been fixed and certain ; inasmuch as
the statute of the 23d of Car. II. (for the bet-
ter settlement of the estates of intestates,)
takes no notice of this distinction between
the whole blood and the half-blood, but di-
rects, that distribution shall be made among
all those, who are in equal degree of kindred
to the intestate. But, it being certain, that
brothers and sisters of the half blood are in
the same ‘degree with brothers and sisters of
the whole blood, it hath been the general
opinion, that brothers and sisters of the half
blood were entitled, by virtue of the statute,

the brothers and sisters of the whole blood, al-
though there are several precedents of judg-
ments given, since the statute, allowing the
half blood to have but an half share. But the
law in this respect has been fully settled ever
since the decree of the house of lords in the
case of Watts and others versus Crooke, upow
an appeal from a decree in chancery, which
had been given in favor of the half blood, and
was affirmed by the house. Vid. Shower’s cas-
es in Par. 108, and Strahan’s Domat. 683. 2
Mod 204. Harris.

Ovdeve tQ07H Nullo modo.] “ Sancimus,
‘ut, si quis moriens relinquat ascendentium
“aliquem et fratres, qui possint, cum _parenti-
** bus vocari, et alterius preemortui fratris fili-
*¢ os, cum ascendentibus et fratribus vocentur
“etiam premortui fratris filii, et tantum ac-
“cipiant portionem, quantum eorum futurus
“ erat pater accipere, si vixisset.’? Vid. Noy.
exxvii. cap 1. Harris.

END OF THE INSTITUTES. 1
NOTES

AND

REFERENCES.

PREMIUM, OR PREFACE.

DE CONFIRMATIONE INSTITUTIONUM naanks Page 1.

THIS amounts to an imperial constitution, giving a Sanction, to. this
compilation by Tribonian and his associates.

In nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi. This is elsewhere used, as in
the second and third confirmations of the digests, in the confirmation ef
the code, and of several of the novels. In nomine Domini nostri Jesu
Christi, ad omnia consilia omnesque actus semper progredimur. Cod.
1. 27. 2. pr. Hence the usual solemn form of beginning last wills and
testaments, In THE NamE oF Gop, Amen. That the ancient Romans, sel-
dom entered on a business of importance sine consilio deorum et ope in-
vocata, J am aware; but I suspect this practice, was rather of Christian
origin: 3 Coloss.17. ‘Whatever ye do in word or deed, do all in the
name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God, and the father by him.”
See Dr. Taylor’s observations on the proemium of the Institutes, Elem.
Civ. Law. qto. 28. This form of testamentary introduction, cannot be
necessary, unless under some precise and positive institution; of which
I know none in the English or American law. I refer to Taylor, (loc.
cit.) for a full dissertation on the titles assumed by the emperor, of which
the following is a concise account.

Emperor. Imperator. Originally conferred on victorious generals,
but first assumed as an imperial title by Augustus Cesar.

Cesar. A name that belonged to the family of Julius Cesar asa
Cognomen; and adopted by the emperors from Augustus to Nero. . It
was then given to the next in succession (destinati imperio) who were
denominated nobilissimi Cesares : it was reasstmed by the emperors, on
the removal of the government from Rome to Byzantium.

Flavius. Borrowed from the Vespasian family, and retained by many

51
402 NOTES.

of the emperors after Vespasian; it was then dropt for some time, and
reassumed by the fourth predecessor of Justinian.

Justinian. 'The proper name of the emperor.

Allemanicus, G'eticus, §-c. From the nations he claimed to have sub-
dued.

Pius. A sir-name or agnomen, first imagined for Tiberius, the heir
of Augustus, but not assumed. It was afterwards used by Antoninus
and his successors.

Feliz. A name which Sylla first took to himself after the death of
the younger Marius: among the emperors, first assumed by Commodus.

Triumphator. From having triumphed in consequence of victories
over the Persians and Vandals. Victor and Triumphator, were titles
commonly assumed from the time of Constantine the Great. Justinian
was also often in camp, saluted Cattmicus by acclamation: a greek title
of the same import as victorious. 'Triumphator, was never given for
the recovery of territory, but only when there was accession by conquest.
So Q. Fulvius and L. Opimius were denied a triumph, because they
only recovered Capua, and Fragelle. 2 Val. Max. 8. 4.

Augustus. A question arose in the senate, (anno urb. cond. 727)
whether the title Romulus, or Augustus, should be conferred on Octavi-
an. From 63 Dion. Cassius, it should seem, he would have preferred
the former title, but on the motion of Munatius Plancus, the name Au-
gustus was preferred; and adopted by his successors. Though it was
also assumed by several of the imperial family (as by Germanicus) who
were not emperors. After the time of Diocletian, it was changed into
Semper Augustus.

De usu Armorum et legum. Imperiam Majestatem. Maijestas, dur-
ing the time of the republic, meant somewhat like the modern phrase,
the majesty of the people: implying the ultimate source of political
power. It was afterwards applied to delegated authority, as that of
preetors, judges, &c. ‘Then to parental authority when it included the
power of life and death: Majestas Patria. xxxiv. Livy. 2. has majestas
matronarum: Pliny ix. 60 majestas pueritize. When the people by the
lex regia conferred all power on the emperor, the word majestas was
applied to the authority they delegated; as majestas Augusti, Tiberii,
&c. Imperatoria majestas, was introduced by Galienus, and from his
time continued. (Taylor.)

§ 1. De belhs et legibus, §c. Barbarice gentes. A name given by
the Romans to all other nations but themselves and the Greeks. The
five provinces of Africa here alluded to, have been possessed by the Van-
dals ninety-five years. Cod. 1. 27. de off. Praef. Prat. Af.

§ 2. De Compositione Codicis et Pandectarum. In the second year
of his reign, A. D. 528, Justinian began his reformation of the law.
NOTES. : 403

 

The Justinian code was finished by Tribonian 529. A new edition
(Codex repetite prelectionis) was published by Justinian in 534. In
530, the Digest was begun. On the 16th December 533 it was finished.
The digest is also called the Panvects from ey and deyouar to include all.
Hence the usual reference to the digest ( ff): being a careless writing of
the Greek letter 7. On the 2ist Nov. 533, the Institutes appeared in
their present form.

Quasi per medium profundum euntes. The books then published on
the Roman law, amounted to upwards of two thousand ax@os xoiuqhoy
nollwy : many camel loads.

$ 3. De tempore, auctoritatibus, §-c. magistro et exqueestore sacri pala-
tii nostri. Magister Palatii or Officiorum, was an officer, somewhat,
like the lord Chamberlain, or perhaps Master of the Household of Eng-
land. The officers of the lower ages of the empire were generally call-
ed magistri, as magistri libellorum, scriniorum, officiorum. Hence the
master of the rolls, masters in chancery, master of the Crown office, &c.
of the English system. The great officers of the republic, and of the
early times of the empire, are described in several titles of the first book
of the digest: the officers of the lower empire, in the first and last book
of the code.

Exquestore, is an undeclinable ablative: the other cases, exquestor,
exquestoris, exconsulis, é&c. do not appear to be used. The questor of
the Palace, was somewhat like the lord Chancellor, os wnperatoris, ar-
marium legum, §c. That is under the emperors: for the office of quees-
tor at first, was of the same kind with our secretary of the treasury.
(Taylor 38. 228.) Constantine instituted the office of Questor Palatii.
The Quesitores or Inquisitors, were magistrates long known, whose ju-
risdiction embraced only criminal cases. (Zozimus and Procopius de
bello Persico.) Antecessor, a teacher and professor of law: the Jurispe-
riti, were practitioners.

Post Quadriennium. Five years, seem formerly to have been the
term usually (indeed universally) allowed for the study of the law.
For the instructions, as to the division of time allotted for studying the
various parts of the civil law, viz. the Dupondii, Edictales, Papinianistee,
Lyte, and Prolyta, see the constitution (omnem republice nostre, &§c.)
prefixed to the digests.
 § 6. Ex quibus libris Noster Caius. Caius lived under the emperor
Marcus Aurelius, and his institutes were read in the schools. Beside the
institutes of Caius, there were the institutes of Paulus, of Ulpian, of Cal-
listratus, Florentinus, and Marcian. There were also prior codes, and
digests: as the digests of Alfenus, Julianus, Celsus, Marcellus, Ulpian,
the Pandects of Modestinus, &c.

Constitutional authority. I have retained Harris’s expression, al-
404 NOTES.

though there may be some ambiguity attached to it in this country,
where the term implies something founded on our written constitutions,
or fundamental laws, paramount to legislative acts: a distinction, that
does not seem likely to last very long, in states where the power of the
legislature like the power of the British parliament, is omnipotent. But
in this passage, the word must be understood secundum subjectam mate-
riem, as alluding to a particular species of Roman law. Inst. L. 1 Tit.
2. $ 6. page 9. of the present work.

L. 1. (page 5.) Deriirio Justitie. Justice, is used, not only for the
disposition to render every man his due, but sometimes also for the act
by which this is done: as when we do a man justice.

$ 1. Definitio Jurisprudentie. This definition is very convenient for
the alliance between church and state: an alliance that I hope will nev-
er take place in these states. I know of no things that ought to be kept
thore distinct, because they are so, than the affairs of this world, and
those of the world to come: nor do I know of any two things that des-
potism has so sedulously laboured to intertwine. I would not so con-
strue the old advice, Deorwm Injurie Diis cure, as to protect gross vio-
lations of public decorum on religious subjects, or to pass over, irritating
and offensive outrages against the religious opinions, or ceremonies of
any persuasion. The defendant in The people against Ruggles, 8 John-
son’s New York reports, 290, deserved to be punished; but the doctrine
laid down in that case by the court, may be carried to a length, that
would authorize any species of ecclesiastical tyranny, and prohibit any
kind of religious discussion. Nor is it strengthened by citing cases from
the jurisprudence of a country where there is a religion by law estab-
lished; or by quoting the present passage from the civil law. It will
have little weight with those who have perused the ecclesiastical history
of. the times of Justinian, and the three or four centuries immediately
preceding, and subsequent. Are we at this day, to regulate the rights
of conscience, and modify our system of religious toleration, by the no-
tions of a Roman emperor of the 6th century ? or adopt the church-and-
State law of Great Britain?

Tit. 2. De jure naturali. Jus, here, is taken for the general system
of natural, national and civil law, in contra-distinction, to the positive
laws of each species. I consider all law, of whatever kind, as deduced,
either from extensive and long-adopted usage, furnishing presumptive
evidence of general expedience—or from reasonings founded on the na-
ture and circumstances of human society, and pointing out the conclu-
sions best adapted to general expedience.

Jus, Jussum, Jura, Jussa, mean a rule of action including an obliga-
tion, or duty to conform to it: therein differing from advice.

‘Or, it thay mean an attribute or quality of actions or persons; what
NOTES. 405

 

we use synonymously sometimes with right: as the rights of a conque-
ror, the rights of war and peace; the right of using, enjoying, suing,
defending, &c. the rights of persons, the rights of things, all of which
are called Jura. Under this meaning, may be included the rights be-
longing to particular situations in life, as the rights of magistrates and of
citizens, master and servant, parent and child, husband and wife, &c.

Or, among the Romans, it might mean the administration of justice.
De in jus vocando.

The other subordinate varieties of meaning of the word Jus, appear
to me, all referable to those above enumerated.

The law of nature, and of nations, is collected from, Ist the practice
of civilized nations, 2dly the opinions of the best writers on the subject.
The writers usually cited in the British and American courts, are Albe-
ricus Gentilis, Puffendorf, Grotius with the annotations of Barbeyrac,
Vattel, Burlamaqui, Heineccius, Bynkershoek and Rutherforth.

$2. Ab appellatione et effectibus, page 7. Quirinus. From the Sabine
word Quiris, a spear: or from Quiris, Mars, reputed father of Romu-
lus: or from Cures, Quires a Sabine city, which furnished Rome with
early settlers. Ovid Fasti II. 475.

§ 3. Divisio Juris. See Pandects or Digest 1. 6. 1. de Just. et Jure.
Alterum enim expresse sancitur, et scripto promulgatur : alterum tacito
populi consensu introducitur. See also ff de leg. as to written and com-
mon law. ll this is conformable to the doctrine of the English and
American writers. For even in this country, we adopt in every state,
all our legal maxims and institutions not contained in constitutional or
legislative acts, as the common law of the state. Nor can common law
be entirely dispensed with even in the code of the United States,
notwithstanding the very able opinions of Mr. Madison and Judge
Chase.

The Romans had six kinds of law; Lex, Presiscrrum, Senatus-Con-
suLTUM, ConstiTuTIONES Princiris, Epicta Macistratuum, Responsa Prv-
DENTUM.

The Ler, was a Populiscitum; or decree of the people, on the mo-
tion of a senator, in a meeting of the comitia curiata, or the comitia cen-
turiata.

The Plebiscituwm, was a decree of the Plebian order, as distinguished
from the Patrician, on the motion of a tribune of the people, in the co-
mitia tributa. Plebs was a part only of the people.

Senatus Consultum : this was originally either an order, vote or reso-
lution, on business appertaining to the senatorial body: or some act
of the senate confirming some act of the people; or latterly under the
emperors, when the comitia were transferred e campo (martis) ad Pa-
tres, these senatorial acts, were the only remains of legislation left to the
senate.
A06 NOTES.

 

Constitutiones Principes. Placita. Decreta. Imperial constitutions.

Augustus Cxsar, having contrived to make not only all actual autho-
rity, but almost all offices centre in his own person, became at length
the sole lawgiver. Sezxto demum consulatu (a. u. c. 725.) potenti: secu-
rus, dedit jura, queis pace et principe uteremur III. Tacit. Ann. 28.

Sometimes the imperial constitutions were promulgated, mediante se-
natu; this was the general course taken by Augustus, at the advice of
Mecenas; in which he was followed by Tiberius. The mode was, to
suggest the law, in an oration to the senate. Hence, for some years,
the senatus consulta, under the emperors, were, Jura, orationibus Prin-
cipum constituta. From the time of Augustus, the Leges, the Plebisci-
ta, and the Senatus-Consulta, properly so called, as originating with the
senate, were known no more. After Vitellius, the emperors were accus-
tomed to appoint a Questor to make the suggestion in a speech to the
senate. What the senate complaisantly decreed upon these suggestions,
became a law. After a time, the emperor in lieu of calling upon the
senate to decree, claimed the right of decreeing or enacting upon his
own authority, the resolutions passed in the senate, on the suggestion
contained in the imperial or questorial orations: and this was the last
stage, the expiring embers of the senatus consulta; in whose place were
substituted the edicts of the emperors.

The emperors, enacted laws either by E’pistole or rescripts, by Decre-
ta, by Edicta, or by Constitutions.

The Epistole, were imperial opinions upon cases of difficulty submit-
ted from the provinces or elsewhere.

The Decreta, were judgments given by the emperor in person, in
court. Augustus and Claudius, used to sit frequently and long for this
purpose.

Edicta, were laws voluntarily enacted by the emperors, sine Senatu,
but they were generally such as had been sanctioned by usage, or de-
creed also by the senate.

Mandates, were directions to particular persons.

Interpretations of laws, were also arrogated as within their jurisdic-
tion by the emperors. The two last are of the nature of edicts.

The Imperial Constitutions, derived their force at first from the powers
conferred on Augustus in 735 A. U. C.: extended afterward to Vespa-
sian and his successors ; and about the reign of the Antonines known as
the Lex Regia ; by which the will of the sovereign duly promulgated,
was declared to have the force and effect of law. 1 Inst. tit. 2 $6.
The distinction there taken of constitutions, is into personal and gene-
ral. The personal constitutions, were properly privileges, Lex priva.
These were forbidden by the twelve tables; Privilegia ne irrogantor.
The same maxim obtained during all the times of the republic, Vetant
NOTES. 407

 

leges sacrate, vetant 12 tabule, leges privatis hominibus irrogari. Cic.
pro Dom. $17. These privileges or personal constitutions, were some-
times annexed to the person, and sometimes were real, as relating to
some property or estate: so the right accorded to executors under the
Roman law, of paying funeral expences in the first place, was consider-
ed as a real, not a personal right, being allowed ex intuitu cause, non
persone.

Harris’s note on the Jer regia is as follows. (p. 9 of his translation.)
“There has been much controversy concerning this law: vid. Grav. de
Rom. imp. lib. sing. c. 24 and Hopp. in Inst. 1h. t. but the following
seems at least to be a probable conjecture. The senate and people con-
ferred various honours on Augustus at different times. In the year 724
(A. U. C.) they made him tribune for life. In 727 they exempted him
from the coercion of the laws. In 731 he was created perpetual con-
sul: and in 735 a power was given to him either of amending or mak-
ing whatever laws he thought proper. These and other decrees in fa-
vour of Augustus, were afterwards generally renewed at the commence-
ment of the reign of every new emperor, as appears plainly from Taci-
tus, tum senatus, omnia principibus solita, Vespasiano decrevit Tacit.
Hist. 11.3. Thus in time, all the several decrees of the senate, by be-
ing frequently renewed together, became as it were, one law, and were
called Lex Imperii or Regia: and they probably gained this title in imi-
tation of the ancient lex regia, by which the Romans conferred the su-
preme power upon Romulus in the infancy of their state, Liv. lib. 34.c¢
6. Elementa Juris per Rob. Eden. p. 17.”

Edicta magistratuum ; seu Pretorum ; jus honorarium. Preetor was
at first a word synonymous with chief or commander (Cor. Nepos in
Miltiade.) The office of Pretor (partaking of the English offices of
mayor and recorder) was first created A. U. C. 387. This was the
Preetor urbanus, or city magistrate. In the year A. U. C. 511. A Preetor
peregrinus, was appointed, after the model of the Athenian Moleuugyos
to decide causes, wherein aliens were concerned : though sometimes one
man, held both offices either by original election, or subsequent delega-
tion, or by substitution in case of death. (Taylor 211.) The branches
of law, were afterwards so divided and subdivided certainly not without
reason and foresight, that the Pretors amounted to eighteen in number.
They had for the most part equitable jurisdiction. Jus preetorium, ad-
juvandi vel supplendi, vel corrigendi juris civilis gratia, propter utilita-
tem publicam introductam, Dig. 1. 1. 7. 1.

It was also their duty, at the annual commencement of their office,
to publish the forms of proceeding, and the rules of court, (if I may so
say) which should operate during their Pretorship. For I do not un-
408 NOTES.

 

derstand this practice to extend to the legal maxims, by which their de-
cision should be guided.

Hence, the actionis civiles, were not the same with the actionis preto-
ric. In the time of the emperor Hadrian, Ann. 884, a selection from
Pretorian determinations was made, called the Perpetual edict, and
enacted as part of the Roman law: not from its own authority as jus
honorarium magistratuum, but under the sanction of the imperial con-
stitution.

The Preetorian annual edicts or forms of proceeding, were published,
on a Tabula gypso dealbata, or Album; a board plaistered with gypsum
yunow alnliuperos (the gypsum of the Greeks and Romans was the same
with our plaister of Paris, that is a sulphat of lime.)

These Leges annue, according as their expedience was discovered
were continued ; and then became edicta translatitia. Occasionally also,
the Curule Addiles published edicts, which as their expedience seemed
to merit, were also incorporated in the jus honorarium. See dig. de
Aldilito edicto. 31. 1. 1. 38. 40. 41. 42.

Responsa prudenium. Many lawyers whose particular application
and abilities, had rendered them eminent in the profession, undertook to

give answers to such questions as were proposed to them.
[ *409 ] But *these answers were of no weight in the time of the Re-

public, nor even under Augustus, who empowered the law-
yers to give their opinions, by a general commission; which yet did not
procure them any great authority, Dig. 1. 2. 2. 46. But their opinions
grew into considerable credit in the reign of Tiberius, who prohibited
any person from presuming to give an opinion in matters of law, with-
out a special licence. Still the answers of the lawyers had not the force
of the laws, for Tiberius in his licences, laid no injunction upon his
judges, to regard these answers. It is therefore highly probable that the
answers of the lawyers were first considered as law, under Valentinian
the third ; because he confirmed the writings of Gaius, Ulpian, Paul,
Papinian, and others, nominally ; and forbad the judges to swerve from
the opinions of these lawyers in points of law: and because many in-
conveniences arose from the various opinions which even these lawyers
gave on the same question, the emperor ordained that the judges should
be governed by a majority, and that in case of an inequality they should
follow the opinion of those to whom Papinian adhered, ubi diverse sen-
tentie proferuntur, potius numerus vincat auctorum: vel si numerus
equalis sit, ejus partis precedat auctoritas in qua excellentis ingenii vir
Papintanus emineat. Cod. 1 Theod. t. 4. 1 un. de responsis prudentum.
(Harris in loc.)

The Patroni were for a long time Patricians; gratis advocates, and
agents. Their clients were bound to relieve them from captivity if taken,
NOTES. 409

 

and to portion their daughters. Hence at first, the fee of a lawyer, as
the fee of a counsel anda physician yet is, in England, was quiddam
honorarium : afterwards, it became a profession, and fees were taken,
which were regulated by the Lex Cincia.

From their vigilant watching over the cases of their clients, they were
called cautores. Hence Dr. Taylor after Scaliger, fancifully ae
Cavilling, Cavillari, Cavilatio, from Cavere.

Such are the various kinds of the Roman or civil law; of which the
present book is a summary, containing the general principles that per-
vade it. Great indeed have been the obligations that Justinian’s posteri-
ty owed to that emperor, for the laborious, and invaluable digest of law
compiled under his auspices. A work that no succeeding age has hith-
erto equalled. The Russian code drawn up under the directions of the
empress Catharine, and the Tuscan code of Leopold, have merit indeed,
but they are trifles compared to the great work now under consideration.
Something approaching to it, has been attempted by the em-
peror Napoleon ; and the code Napoleon as *well as the in- [ *410) }
troductory orations in defence of the leading articles contain-
ed in it, have great merit.

The authors or redacteurs of the Code civil Napoleon, where Por-tron-
chet, Bigot-Preameneu, and Maleville, as appears by the Discours Preli-
minaire to the ‘“ Projet de Code civil,” presented by those gentlemen as
a committee ‘appointed by government on the 24th Thermidor, year 8,
and published the year after. Cambaceres indeed reported a project of a
code civil to the convention some years before, which, although Portalis
and the others praise sufficiently, they adopt sparingly. Cambaceres
was consul in the year 9.

The British, and of course the American code, is now becoming what
the Roman code was, previous to the labours of 'Tribonian and his coad-
jutors :-oxOog xouwyloy nollav, many cart loads. Cannot the same con-
densed view be taken of our law, as was taken by Justinian of the Ro-
man, and by Napoleon of the French code? I suspect the generality of
the profession are of opinion this cannot be done: Iam not so. Half a
dozen men of talents dividing the labour, under the superintending guid-
ance of some one person to whom the pen should be ultimately commit-
ted, might finish the work in four years, according to my view of the
subject: and a consummation it would indeed be, devoutly to be wished.

Tit. 3. De jure personarum. Aut liberi sunt aut Serui. It would
require a volume to enter into the great question of slavery, which has
been well discussed of late years. I would observe briefly,

That throughout the whole of the Jewish History, from the days of
Nimrod downwards, there was no controversy, but that captives taken
in war could be made slaves, and that their posterity were considered as
410 NOTES.

 

slaves also. All the patriarchs counted their slaves, among their goods
and chattels, among their oxen, their horses, their camels, &c.

Slavery among the Jews took place

1. When a man sold himself through poverty, 25 Lev. 39.

2. When a father sold his children, 21 Ex. 7.

3. When creditors seized and sold their insolvent ee or their
children, 2 Kings ¢. 4. v. 1.

4. A thief was sold when he could not pay. his fine, 22 Ex. 3, 4.

5. Prisoners of war.

6. A Hebrew slave ransomed from a Gentile might be sold to another
Hebrew by his master.

But the Hebrews were slaves to the Hebrews for six years only, or
until the sabbatical jubilee. 21 Ex. 2. If a slave married however, he
could not take away with him his wife and children, which belonged to
the master. 21 Ex. 4. If from attachment to the family, the slave re-
fused to be freed at the end of six years, or at the sabbatical year, then
his master might bore his ears with an awl before the magistrate, and
the slave became bound for life. The Hebrew slaves were treated more
as hired servants by the Jews: not so the bondmen procured from among
the heathen. But even from the heathen, they were forbidden to ac-

quire a slave by stealth. See 21 and 25 Levit.
[ *411 ] *The Phenicians, Carthaginians, Egyptians, Greeks, and
Romans, all practised slavery without any doubt being en-
tertained of its propriety.
Vendere cum possis Captivum, occidere noli. Hor.

The situation of slaves was very bad in early times. Hector tells
Andromache that she will be condemned on the fall of Troy to draw
water as a slave: so Euripides introduces Hecuba as chained to the gate
of Agamemnon. The Phenicians seem to have been first in the prac-
tice of kidnapping; see 14th Odyss. All nations, trading in slaves seem
prone to mean and clandestine villanies; it is this spirit that has tempt-
ed the British slave traders to practice and encourage the same base
method of procuring cargoes. Slaves were very il treated among the
Carthaginians. 'The abject state of the Helotes among the Lacedemoni-
ans has become proverbial.

Slaves were also in a bad state among the Romans. They were
frequently chained to the gate of a great man’s house as porters.

I copy the following summary of the circumstances of their condi-
tion from Dr. Taylor (Elem. civ. Law 429); the authorities are accu-
' rately cited. s

“Slaves were held pro nullis: pro mortuis: how this is to be under-
« stood consult A. Faber (and Gothofred ad Dig. 50. 17. 32. 209.) pro
 Quadrupedibus : nay, were ina much worse state than any cattle
NOTES. All

 

‘* whatsoever, as the same author (Faber) has shewn. They had no
‘head in the state, no name, title, or register: they were not capable of
“being injured: nor could they take by purchase or descent: they had
‘no heirs, and therefore could make no will: exclusive of what was
“called their peculium, whatever they acquired was their master’s:
“they could not plead nor be pleaded for, but were excluded from all
“civil concerns whatever: they could not claim the indulgence of ab-
““ sence reipublicee causa: they were not entitled to the rights and con-
‘ siderations of matrimony, and therefore had no relief in case of adul-
“tery: nor were they proper objects of cognation or affinity, but of qua-
“ si-cognation only: they could be sold, transferred or pawned, as goods
“ or personal estate ; for goods they were, and as such they were esteem-
“ed: they might be tortured for evidence: punished at the discretion of
“‘ their lord, or even put to death by his authority: together with many
“ other civil incapacities which I have not room to enumerate.”

The first law in their favour was the lex Cornelia de sicariis, by which
the killing even of a slave became punishable. Dig. 48. 8.

The jus vite et necis claimed by the master, was restrained by Claudi-
us the successor of Caligula. See also Dig. 48. 8. 2.

*In 813 abu. cond. Nero by the lex Petronia, deprived [ *412 ]
masters of the power of sending their slaves to fight wild
beasts at the public shews.

The Emperor Adrian, prohibited generally cruel treatment toward
slaves; and he banished Umbricia a lady of quality, for five years, guod
ex levissimis causis suas ancillas atrocissime tractasset.

Antoninus Pius, applied the Lex Cornelia de sicariis, specifically to
the masters of slaves: and the same law was strengthened by Severus
and by Constantine. Cod. L. 1. de emendant. serv.

Slaves might always induce an investigation by flying to the statues
of the princes. Cod. L. 1 de his qui, &c.

The prevalence of christianity, though neither Christ nor his apostles
have condemned slavery, (4 Philem. 11.) contributed gradually but
greatly to amend the condition of slaves.

Athenzeus (L, c.) says there were several persons at Rome who had
ten and twenty thousand slaves: and in VI. 20 he states that at a time
when the citizens of Athens were only 21,000, the slaves amounted to
400,000, and that the small-Island of Aégina contained 470,000. In Af-
rica, slavery has been established from time immemorial: the Arabs had
African slaves, long before the settlements of the Portuguese: and though
some additional aggravations have occurred from kidnapping, and incur-
sions made for the express purpose of procuring cargoes, still the Afri-
cans, like all the nations of antiquity, were from the earliest ages in the
412 NOTES.

 

practice of making slaves of prisoners of war: I forbear any discussion
of the right of slavery, as a question too metaphysical and abstruse, to
be entered upon here. Nor will my view of it, coincide equally with
the sentiments of the middle and northeastern, and those of the southern
states. In England, the inexpedience of the practice is considered as
settled, and there appears but one opinion in that nation on the general
subject of the slave trade, which is, that it ought to be abolished. ‘The
law respecting slavery is alsonow fixed. ‘The case of Somerset the ne-
gro has determined that no man of whatever colour can be held as a
slave in that country. But the abstract question—that which respects
the right of reducing a human creature to slavery under any circumstan-
ces, has not yet been investigated so profoundly as its importance de-
serves. But this is not the place to investigate it, nor would it be easy
shake off the bias of previous habits and prejudgments.

After the travels of Park and Hornemann, no man can reasonably
pretend that the Africans have a right to complain, who from one end to
the other of that quarter of the world, have exercised from the begin-

ning, and still do exercise the right of reducing each other to
[ *413 ] slavery, *with concomitant practices full as bad as any that

the West Indies can furnish. Knowing these things, I can-
not be greatly interested in favour of the blacks.

But I exceedingly regret the prevalence of slavery and the slave
trade. All absolute power, has a direct tendency, not only to detract
from the happiness of the persons who are subject to it, but to deprave
the good qualities of those who possess it. I have no right to say that
it makes men careless, unfeeling, and unjust, as to the sufferings of a fel-
low creature, because these dispositions are very frequently indeed coun-
teracted by the natural good qualities of the master, and by the general
manners of civilized society, at a period when Idndners and humanity
are fostered and respected by public opinion: but the whole history of
human nature, in the present and every former age, will justify me in
saying that such is the tendency of power on the one hand and slavery
on the other. Nor can any country be so well cultivated by slave labour,
as by the labour of freemen, fairly recompensed; nor can industry be
the character of such a state of society ; nor can there be any permanent
feeling, either of individual or of public security. Hence, I cannot but
approve of the prohibition of the slave trade, as one of the steps toward
a gradual abolition of the whole system of slavery ; a system that great-
ly detracts from the industry, the improvement, the security, and the
happiness of society, wherever it prevails.

In England, the species of slavery termed Villenage, was abolished
by 12 Ch. 2. The last case concerning villenage in the books, is that of
Crouche, 10th Eliz. Dyer 266. C. pl. 11. So are the Serfs par naissance
NOTES. 413

 

in France: but under the old regime, there were Serfs held by Mort-
main, and Serfs who became so by loss, of their heritage: that is un-
der one or other of the signoral customs, or droits feodaux. Such Serfs
could not aliene their Serf-tenements, unless to a Serf of the same lord:
they could not marry a free person, or the Serf of another lord: they
could not put their sons into the clerical profession : they could not make
a will to the prejudice of their lord, &c. See 1 Ferviere’s Justinian 76.
Somewhat of the same kind obtained in Germany, and still more in Po-
land. At present I apprehend this class of society no longer exists in
Europe.

There is no where in the scriptures that I recollect, any direct prohi-
bition of slavery, except as to the bondage of the Jews among them-
selves; but there can be no doubt, of its being contrary to the gene-
ral spirit and precepts of christianity, which has contributed not.a lit-
tle to the abolition of villenage, as well as of slavery. In the year 1514,
Henry 8th manumitted two of his villains in the following
form, ‘“‘*Whereas God created all men free, but afterwards [ *414 ]
“the laws and customs of nations, subjected some under
“ the yoke of servitude, we think it pious and meritorious with God to
“ manumit Henry Knight, a Taylor, and John Hule a Husbandman,
“ our natives, as being born within the manor of Stoke Clymmysland,
“in our county of Cornwall, &c.” See Barrington’s observations on
the statutes, 2nd edition, 249. ‘So, Fitzherbert, in his readings on 4
Edw. Ist, Extenta Manerii, after giving the-state of villenage in Henry
8th’s time, says that it then began to decrease in all parts of England ;
and he thinks that no men should be bound but unto God, and that it is
contrary to the principles of Christianity. Barrington 251. Robertson,
in his hist. of Charles the 5th, v. 1 p. 324, gives a great number of in-
stances and quotations, to prove the frequency of manumission, from a
religious principle, together with the forms used on such occasions. In-
deed Christianity, greatly contributed in the middle ages, to soften the
barbarous manners of the times. Thus a law of Bavaria, for the pro-
tection of foreigners in Lindebrouge’s collection says, Si autem aliquis
tum presumptuosus fuerit ut peregrinis nocere voluerit, 14 solid. mulcte-
tur. Deus nam dixit (Exod. 21,) peregrinum et pauperem non contrista-
bis de rebus suis. Barrington, 22. See, also the interesting account of
the Trevca vet. in 1. Robertson’s Ch. 5 p. 343—356. Hence, seems to
be derived the clause in our indictment for assault, that the Prosecutor
was in the peace of God, and the King.

Sir Thomas Smith, who was secretary of state to Edward 6, and
then to Elizabeth, observes that he never knew of any villains in gross,
in his time, and that villains appendant to manors (villeins regardant:
glebse adscriptitii) were but very few in number: that since England had
Al4 NOTES.

 

received the christian religion, men began to be affected in their con-
sciences at holding their brethren in servitude; and that upon this
scruple in process of time, the holy fathers, monks and friars, so bur-
thened the minds of those whom they confessed, that temporal men
were glad to manumit all their villains. But he adds, the holy fathers
themselves did not manumit their own slaves, and the bishops behaved
like the other ecclesiastics. But at last some bishops enfranchised their
villains for money, and others on account of popular outcry: and at
length the monasteries falling into lay hands, were the occasion that al-
most all the villains in the kingdom were manumitted. ‘Smith’s repub.
ch. 10. Harris.

In England, although it was determined that trover would not lie for
a negro, because the owner had not such an absolute property in his ne-

gro that he might kill him; (Salk. 666. Ld. Ray. 1274,
[ *415 ] Smith v. *Gould) yet trespass per quod servitium amisit

would lie; and if property were proved in the negro, he
would not have been able to maintain his liberty by baptism or residence
in England (5 Mod. 182 Chamberline v. Harvey) until the great case of
Somerset the negro, by which it was determined that there could be no ‘
slavery in England. See the argument of Mr. Hargrave in that case,
in the last volume of his edition of the state trials. Of the supposed effi-
cacy of baptism formerly, the reader may find a very curious case in 3
Mod. 120. Sir Thomas Grantham’s case.

Villains (hinds) could acquire no property, for quicquid acquiritur ser-
vo, acquisitur domino, says my Lord Coke. Co. Litt. 117. C. As to the
distinctions relating to the right of the master to wages or earnings ac-.
quired by servants or apprentices, see the notes on the above cited passa-
ges in Harg. Co. Litt. and 1 Campb. Rep. Nis. Prius 527, Thompson v.
Havelock. Lord Coke in his-note on villenage, deduces (after St. Am-
brose) the origin of slavery from the introduction of wine: non esset ho-
die servitus, si ebrietas non esset: Canaan being condemned to bondage
for exposing the nakedness of his father Noah.

$ 4. Quibus modis servi, §c. Venundari passus est. This was per-
mitted also by a senatus consultum in the time of Claudian, though
manifestly contrary to the general rule that no man can change his con-
dition on his own authority. Dig. 40. 12. 37. In such cases the person
selling himself was required, Ist to be of 20 years of age at least. Ib.
L. 7. and Dig. 40. 13. 2dly with certain knowledge of his birth and con-
dition Ib. tit. 14. and Dig. 40. 12 L. 14. et seq. 3dly The purchaser
also must act bond fide Ib. L. 16. par. 2. and L. 7. par. 2. Athly.
That the price paid was completely at his disposal, L. 1. and 5. Cod.
de liber caus. Dig. 40. 13. Dig. 28. 3. L. 6. Cujus adds another condition,
5thly That he should neither be filius familias or manumitted, for he
NOTES. ALS

 

cannot injure the rights of the Paterfamilias or of the Patron. Dig. 40.
12 L. 1. Leo Philosophus abrogated this senatus consultum by his
Novel 59.

A freeman might also become a slave, by ingratitude towards his pat-
ton, by condemnation to the mines or wild beasts, and so becoming ser-
vus Pene. By asenatus consultum Claudianum, a free woman indulg-
ing in servile amours might lose her freedom.

Nascuntur ex ancillis nostris. Cujas gives a fanciful analogy. Ho-
dem jure ex ancillis nati servi sunt, quo sata cedunt solo. Mater enim
solo comparatur, vis patris sato.

$ 5. De liberorum et Servorum Differentia. In England the people
are divided into Ist The King and heir apparent. 2dly The
nobility or *peerage (a) temporal, consisting of dukes, mar- [ *416 ]
quisses, earls, viscounts and barons, (b) spiritual, consist-
ing of archbishops and bishops. 3ldy The commonalty: consisting
of baronets whose titles are hereditary; knights, whose titles are per-
sonal only and not hereditary ; esquires or gentlemen, acquired by birth,
by office, by profession, or by courtesy ; yeomanry, tradesmen, artificers,
and. labourers.

In this country, the title of ‘‘excellency” sometimes given to the Pre-
sident of the United States, and to governors of states, as well as the
title “honourable” bestowed on judges and members of Congress, and
“esquire” applied to justices of peace and practioners at law, I regard.
as founded on courtesy and custom only. The practice of addressing
the president, a governor, or a judge, as an esquire, certainly arises
from neglecting the old adage that omne majus continet in se minus.

Tit. 4. De ingenui definitione p. 12. By the civil law, children born
in wedlock (as in England) followed the condition of the fathers, Dig.
5. 19. If born out of wedlock (contubernio) they follow the condition
of the mother. In England, a bastard being nullius filius is in all ca-
ses free, the presumption being in favour of liberty: so if aman marry
a Nef, she becomes free forever after: and a child born in such wed-
lock is also free. See all the learning on this subject in Harg. Co. Litt.
123. b.

Tit. 5. Definitio et origo Libertinorum, §c. p. 13. In the early times
of the republic Libertus was a freed man, and Libertinus his descend-
ant. Suet. Claud. 24. 8. Isid. 4. But this distinction fell into disuse.

$ 1. Quibus modis manumittitur, p. 14. Liberty could anciently be
conferred but three ways, viz. by testament: by the census : and by the
vindicta, or lictor’s rod. This is evident from the following passages in
Tully : si neque censu, neque vindicta, neque testamento, liber factus est,
non est liber. In Top.
416 NOTES.

A man was said to be liber censu, when his name was inserted in the
censor’s roll, with the approbation of his. master at the public census.
But the method of acquiring liberty by the vindicta, was more solemn
and formal. For it, was necessary that the master placing his hand
upon the head of the slave, should say in the presence of the pretor,
hunc hominem liberum esse solo: to which the preetor always replied,
dico eum liberum esse more Quiritum. Then the lictor or serjeant re-
ceiving the vindicta or rod from the pretor, struck the new freed man
several blows with it upon the head, face, and back, after which his
name was registered in the roll of freedmen, and his head being close

shaved, a cap was given to him as a token of liberty. Harris.
[ *417 ] *This is not quite accurate. The lictor gave the slave, a

gentle blow on the head with the vindicta, and a box on the
ear, and made him tum round thrice. Afterward under the latter empe-
rors, in lieu of the census, the master made a public declaration of his
intention to free the slave, in church. Slaves were also manumitted by
letter, signed by the master in presence of five witnesses: or before his
friends, five witnesses being present at the declaration. The enfran-
chisement by vindicta, might take place before a consul as well asa
preetor; and in the provinces before a proconsul, his legate, or deputy.
See dig. 1. 16. 2. cod. 7. tit. 6: de lat. lib. toll. Ib. 1. 1.$ 2. de his qui in
eccles. and Sigonius |. 1. de antiq. Jur. Civ. Rom.

The ancient form of manumitting villains, was thus. “If any person
* be desirous to enfranchise his slave, let him with his right hand deliv-
“ er the slave to the sheriff in a full county, proclaim him exempt from
“ the bond of servitude by manumission, shew him open gates and
“ ways, deliver him firearms, to wit, a lance and a sword, whereupon
“he becomes a free man.’ Harris, from Wilkins’ leges anglo-saxo-
nics. Afterwards, manumission of villains was conferred by grant and
release, of which Harris has given a form from the complete Clerk,
1676.

Alius multis modis. Enumerated cod. 7. tit. 6 de lat. lib. tollenda.

Tit. 5. § 3. De libertinorum divisione sublata. The three classes of
freed men, here mentioned, had different rights attached to their respec-
tive conditions.

‘1st. Freed men ef the greater liberty, were Roman citizens with all
privileges, but they were obliged to leave a part of their property by
will to the patron. They were required to be thirty years of age, and
their masters twenty, at the time of their manumission by the law Mlia
Sentia ; and all the usual and prescribed forms were to be strictly ob-
served. If any of these requisites were wanting, the slave became only,
2dly Latinus Junianus, under the law Junia Norbana, enacted 771 in the
consulship of Junius Silanus, and Norbanus Balbus; which confined

 
NOTES. A17

the right of being considered as freedmen of the greater liberty, to those
who had been enfranchised, by will, by census, or by the vindicta.
These Latini, were not Roman citizens, they died slaves, but during life
they enjoyed the other privileges of freemen, see 3 Instit. 8. 3dly, The
Dedititii, were persons who, while slaves, had suffered corporeal punish-
ment for some crime, and were named after some tributaries to the Ro-
man people, who had revolted and were compelled to lay down their
arms. Dedititii, quia se suaque omnia dedicerunt. They

could never become Roman citizens. All *these distinctions [ *418 ]
were destroyed by the constitutions of Justinian. Cod. 7. tit.

5.1. 1 and tit. 6.1.1. Harris. Ferriere. :

Tit. 6.$1. De servo instituto, §c. Injuria defunctus officiatur, p.
16. It was ignominious for the goods of the deceased to be sold at pub-
lic auction for debts, see Cic. orat. pro. Quintio.

Tb. $ 3. Quid sit in fraudem, §c. The fraudulent intent may lose
its effect in this case: a man knowing himself insolvent, enfranchises his
slave: by subsequent acquisition he becemes solvent: the slave in this
case continues free.

In the following case, the creditors may lose the slave, although there
was no fraud accompanying his manumission. A master enfranchises
during known and acknowledged solvency. His house and goods are
afterwards consumed by fire. The manumission cannot be set aside, for
it was fair and legal when made. Ferriere.

In England, there are two statutes made to protect creditors against
fraudulent conveyances and devises, 27 Eliz. ch. 4. and 3 W. and M. ch.
14, see Wilson v. Knubley, 7 East, 128.

Ib. $ 5. Que sunt juste cause. See the 9th and six following laws
of the digest, de manum vindic. and the 21st law of the digest qui et a
quibus manum that is dig. 40. 3 and dig. 40. 9.

A son might become master of his father, if he had been left heir by
a testator, to whom the whole family belonged.

Procurator. Cujas thinks this is only procurator ad lites, not adjnego-
cia. L. 22 observ. c.16. A mere agent ad negocia, might be under the
age of 17. see L. 3. $ ult. de minor. (dig. 4, 4) and dig. 14. 3. de Instit.
actione.

Tit. 7.$ 1. De lege Furia Caninia. This is a law passed in the time
of Augustus to prevent the city being crowded with idle and disorderly
persons. Suet. Aug.

Tit. 8. § 2. De Jure civ. Rom. in servos. Ihave already treated of
the condition of slaves among the Romans.

Ad sacram statuam. It was anciently the policy of almost all king-
doms to allow of sanctuaries or places of refuge, and they are said to
have been permitted in ee as soon as Christianity was re-
418 NOTES, _

ceived. In the i cles year of Henry 8th; the following points (which
will ¢ give the reader some idea of the power of sanctuaries) were affirm-
ed and resolved in the cas¢ of Savage, to wit: That in England the
pope without the king could not make a sanctuary: that sanctuaries
must commence with a grant from the king, and then be confirmed by
the pope: but that if they began by a bull from the pope, it would
be itisufficient, although they were afterwards confirmed by
[ *419 ] *the king : that the general words Ambitus, Precinctus,
Clausura, in such grants, whether papal or regal, did only
include the church, loiter dormitory and church yard, but did not ex-
tend to the gardens, barns, stables and the like: that sanctuary de jure
communi was only for forty days (which was a privilege belonging to
all parochial churches and church yards) and that sanctuary for life, or
as long as the person pleased (which was an usual privilege of religious
houses) depended upon special grants, which were to be well proved, or
otherwise were null and void. Keilway 188. Gibson’s Codex 1188.

Sanctuary never extended farther in civil cases, than to save the body
from execution. In criminal cases, it did not extend to treason; but it
did to murder and other felonies. 2 Hawk. Pl. Cr. 32.

Sanctuaries lost much of their privileges by 22 Hen. 8. ch. 19. 27 H.
8. ch. 19. 32 Hen. 8 ch. 12. and ch. 20. and they were entirely abo-
lished by 21 James 1. ch. 28. See Middleton’s letter from Rome, 113.
(Harris).

Major asperitas dominorum. In England the lord might rob, beat
and chastise his villain at will, but was not allowed.to maim him: for
then, the villain might have had an appeal of mayhem against him.
Le seigneur ‘poit rob, naufrer, et chastiser son villein @ son volunt. Salve
qwil ne poit lui maim, car donques il avera appel de mayhem envers lui.
Termes de la Ley.

Tit. 9. De patria potestate, p. 22. Anciently fathers had the power of
life and death over their children. This was restrained by Trajan who
directed emancipation in cases of great severity. Z. 1 of the Dig. sia
parenti: and by Adrian ‘ZL. 5 of the Dig. de Leg. Ponip. de parricid:
and by Alexander Severus, L. 3. Cod. de patria potest: so Ulpian de
Adulieris : Inauditum filium pater occidere non potest, sed accusare eum
apud, preefectum, preesidemve provinciee debet.

A man might acquire the rights of a father by marriage, legitimation
and adoption.

As to the right of a father to the acquisitions of his child, See post.
Inst. 1. 2. tit. 9.

Tit. 9. $1 Definitio nuptiurum. Marriage in this passage is term-
ed indiscriminately. nuptice and matrimoniium. There ate other terms
NOTES. 419

also applied to marriage, as Connubium, Conjugium, Consortium, Con-
tubernium, Concubinatus.

Matrimonium, originally meant the union of male and female for the
purpose of procuring offspring. Maris et famine conjunctio, as the
2nd Tit. of the Institute has it. Nuptie strictly means, the marriage
ceremony. Hence the expressions Justwm matrimonium,

“* Juste nuptie, meaning that kind of marriage and marriage [ *420 J
ceremony, which was conducted according to law: and this

was matrimony at’ efoxny, matrimonium and nuptie soon became the
popular expressions for lawful marriage.

Connubium, conjugium, consortium, are metaphorical synonymies for
lawful matrimony. Connubiwm, a mutual submission to the marriage
ceremony, from nwbendo i. e. eden j it being the custom of the bride
to cover her head with the flammeum or veil. Dr. Taylor deduces it
without sufficient reason as I think, more distantly from a Hebrew root
used 27. Is. 6. signifying procreation, production. Conjugiwm, a mutual
yoke. Consortium, a mutual lot in life ; for better for worse, as the En-
glish Church ceremony, properly states it

The Contuberniwm was the matrimony of slaves, a permitted cohabi-
tation; not partaking of lawful marriage, which they could not contract.
It was ‘ applied also to other kinds of unlawful connection. Cod. 2. 21,
4. Cod. 5.5.3. Cod. 5.5.9. Cod. 6.59. 9. Hence there was no pro-
cess of adultery in favour of a slave. Cod. 9.9.23. Dig. 48. 5.6.
But although civil forms might be disregarded in Contuberniis, the laws
of nature as to incestuous commerce, were held in full force, for the rea-
son assigned in Inst. 1. 15. 3. See also dig. 23. 2. 14. 2.

Concubinatus. Semi-matrimonium ; conjugium inequale. A full de-
scription of this may be seen in the last title of dig. 25. The Greeks
also allowed of this left-handed marriage, as I believe it is called in Eu-
rope: yuyauos. Not. ad Demosth. C. Nearchi T. III. p. 624. Concubi-
nage was entered into before witnesses, otherwise it became prostitution,
dig. 25. 7.3. The parties might dlissotve the contract and cohabitation
at pleasure, dig. 25.7.1. Itdid not admit of adultery. Dig. 25. 7. 3.
As marriage was discouraged between officers of state in the provinces,
and female inhabitants of the same province, they were permitted to
take concubines ‘of the province. Ib. 1. 5. dig. 23, 2. 38 and 57. and ‘Cod.
si quacumque predict potest.

-Concubinage was regulated by Constantine. Cod. 5. 26. unie.7. 15
ult. and Justinian, Nov. 18. 74. and 89. Concubina est mulier libera in-
upta.quam vir celebs domi concubinatus causa solam habet. That the
man should be unmarried, was not required by the old or prior | laws _Te-
lating to. concubinage, but the woman only. All that was formerly | re-
quired of the man, was, that he should be at least twelve years ¢ of, age,
420 NOTES.

 

dig. 25. 7. 1. and that he should not have more concubines than one.
Concubinage was abolished by the emperor Leo. Nov. Leo. 91.

[A concubine did not mean in the civil law a harlot; the concubine
was a person taken to cohabit in the manner, and under the character,
of a wife, but without being authorized thereto by a legal marriage.
Concubinage was confined to a single person, was of perpetual obliga-
tion as much as marriage itself; was a society recognized by the laws,
and in general entered into between persons who, by laws of policy,
were forbidden by the state to marry together for want of quality or for-
tune ; the concubine might even be accused of adultery. ‘Those charac-
ters show how widely mistaken we should be if we annexed the idea of
immodesty and contempt to the name of concubine among the ancients,
as we doin modern times. See 1 Brown’s Civil Law, 80. 81. 5 Gib-
bon’s Hist. 399, 400, 8vo. 1828.]

Concubinage, I understand, obtained not many years ago

[ *421 ] in Germany, *if it does not at this day. Ido not enter at

large into the marriage ceremonies of the Romans, they may

be sought in modern compilers, Rosinus, Adams; but after Dr. Taylor,
I shall notice the three kinds of lawful marriage among that people.

Marriages were solennes, solemn; or minus solennes, less solemn.
The solennes were either Usu, Farre, oR CoEMPTIONE.

Marriage, Usu, by prescription, is briefly described by Servius, in his
commentary on-1 Virg. Georg. 31. and 18 Aul. Gell.6. When a woman
cohabited with aman for a whole year, with a view to matrimony,
(matrimonii ergo,) she became his property by prescription, under a law
of the 12 Tables. ‘Till the year was expired, she was uxor, matrona,
but not materfamilias. An absence of three nights would break the
prescription, or usucapion ; this interruption was usurpatio.

This seems to have been the oldest form of Roman marriages.

Marriage, Farre: Confarreatio. This was the most solemn form of
marriage among the Romans: by it, a woman became copartner with
her husband in all his sacred rites, and in all his substance, and was his
sole heir at his death, if he died without children. Dion. Halic.1.c. If
he left children, she succeeded to equal portions of his estate. The chil-
dren were patrimi, and matrimi, and had peculiar privileges; certain
priests, and the vestal virgins being chosen’from among them. 4 'Tacit.
ann. 16. 1. Aul. Gell. 12. The ceremony could not be performed with-
out the presence of the Pontifex maximus, or the Flamen Dialis: Ser-
vius in 1 Georg. It was attended with the ceremony of the parties mu-
tually breaking together a cake, Farra, Panis farreus. Ten witnesses
were necessary. Ulpian, tit.9.$§1. It was dissolved by a similar cere-
mony, Diffarrsatio. It fell into disuse, about the time of Tiberius, 4
Tac. ann. 16.
NOTES. 421

 

Marriage, Coemptione: or by mutual purchase. The man and the
woman delivered to each other a small piece of money. Servius ad 4.
Virg. Mneid. 103. Cic. orat. 1.57. The man asked the woman, will
you become to me the mother of the family? To which she replied, I
will. In her turn, she asked, will you become to mea father of the
family ? and he answered, I will. ‘The woman then delivered her piece
of money and herself, into the hands of the man. Until this period,
and preceding the Domi ductio, the woman was sponsa only: after the
Domi ductio, the marriage was completed. Dig. 35. 1. 15.

Coemptio, was also called conventio in manum. The wife stood in
point of heirship to the husband, in place of a daughter.

Among the Romans, the foundation of marriage was the

consENT of *the parties. Consensus, non Concubitus, facit [ *422 ]
nuptias. Dig. 50.17.30. Dig. 35. 1.15. Dig. 24. 1. 32. 13.
But this consent, must have been between parties willing to contract, of
proper age, (that is 14 for the male, 12 for the female,) free from disabi-
lities of relationship, able to contract, free from precontract, from legal
disability, and that consent must have been ratified also by the consent
of the parent. Instit. 1.10. pr. which given afterward by Ratihabitio,
would not answer the purpose of confirming the marriage. Dig. 1. 5,
11. Tb. 23. 2.65.1. Ib. 48. 5.13.6. But latterly a subsequent confir-
mation seems to have been valid: Cod. 4. 28.7. Without this consent,
the issue were illegitimate. Inst. 1. 11.7. In cases of insanity or cap-
tivity, the consent of the parents was not necessary. L. 35. Cod de
nupt. L. 28. Cod. de Episcop. aud.

In England both by the canon law, (canons of 1603. Can. 62, 63. 100,
101.) and the statute law, the consent of parents is required: the want
of it indeed, did not avoid the marriage, but the minister who married
them was punished by 7 and 8 W. 3. ch. 35. But by the marriage act
of 26 Geo. 2. ch. 33. beside punishing the minister, the marriage is de-
clared void in many cases where the requisites of that act are not com-
plied with. The general train of chancery decisions, is also much in fa-
vour of devises on condition of marriage with consent of Guardians, &c.
See 1 Fonb. 246. Ist n. edit. or L. 1. ch. 4. $ 10. n.

The legal prohibitions were Parentace, (Parentela) Rearion-
sup, Pustic Decorum, Rank, Power and Ace: of which in their
order.

Parentage : Cognation: Consanguinity. The connection of persons
descended from a common parent or stock. Strictly, Cognati, are rela-
tions by the mother’s side: Agnati relations by the father’s side. Adg-
nati, or Agnati, include Cognati, but not vice versa. Dig. 38. 10. 10.
Dig. 38.7.5. So Arrogati include the Adoptaii, but not vice versa.
422 NOTES.

 

This cognation may be either natural, or civil, arising from adoption ; or
mixed; of this, more in L. 3. tit. 6. post.

Relationship or affinity. Is the connection between the husband and
his wife’s parents, and the wife and her husband’s parents. Adjfineg
sunt viri et uxoris cognati; dicto ab eo, quod duc cognationes que diver-
se inter se sunt, per nuptias copulantur ; et altera ad alterius cognationss
Jinem accedit: namque conjungende adfinitatis, causa fit ex nuptiis.
Dig. 38. 10. 4, 3. There are no degrees, strictly speaking, in affinity, as
there are in parentage or consanguinity ; but I am considered as related
to the parents of my wife, in the same degree that she is. Although

affinity takes place between me and my wife’s parentage,
[ *423 ] and *between my wife and mine, yet this does not induce

any kind of relationship or affinity, between our respective
parents or consanguinei ; for their situations in society, ought not to be
affected by our contracts. Hence comprivigni may intermarry. Dig.
23. 2. 34. 3. Affinity therefore can only affect the man and woman con-
tracting. Affinis mei affinis non est mihi affinis as North said in Oxen-
ham et ux. v. Gayre, C. B. cited Bac. Ab. tit. Marr. A, 529.

Formerly the Roman law prohibited marriage between persons in
direct affinity only, Dig. 38. 10 4. 6—7. L. 17. Cod. de nupt. but after-
ward the imperial constitutions forbad it between a brother-in-law, and
a sister-in-law in the collateral line. L. 5. and 8. Cod. de Incest. et
Inut. Nupt. 1.

The general rule is, Quocunque gradu, quis uni conjugum junctus est
consanguinitate, eodem gradu junctus est alteri affinitate. 'Thus, I can-
not marry my wife’s daughter or my wife’s mother, because they are to
my former wife in the ascending and descending line of consanguinity ;
and therefore to me in the ascending or descending line of affinity.

Perhaps the prohibitions of the civil. and of the canon law, may-he
explained in a short compass.

Co ey} EH} I Og
In this straight line, the letters respectively over and under each other,
denote parent and child: within this line, all intermarriages are forbid-
den (by the law of nature as is generally agreed) whether ascending or
descending. D. cannot marry either A, Bor C, or E, F or G. Dig. 23.
2. ult. By this rule, all marriages are forbidden between those who are
in pareniuim numero.

*The next rule is, that all marriages are forbidden be- [ *424 ]
tween those collaterals who are in parentum Loco. This is
the respectum Parentela.

A

 

e— D— FI CO
ROHR

C and D, E and F, G and H, &c. are collaterals.

Of these collaterals, those who are immediately under the common
stock, cannot marry any person in the opposite collateral line.

Thus D is immediately under, or next to the common stock B. Hence
D cannot marry with C, EH, GorI. For like reason C cannot marry
with D, F, H or K.

The next rule is that with respect to other collaterals as E and F, G
and H, I and K, they may marry after the third degree, counted by the
civil law mode of computation: which begins not with, but from the
party in question on the one side, and counts through the common stock,
to the party in question, on the other side; or leaving out the common
stock, and including the parties on both sides. Thus, in what degree of
relation are E and F’, who are first cousins? In the fourth: and they
may marry. For C counts one; B two; D three;-F four. In what
degree of relationship are] and H? Answer, G one; E two, C three;
B four; D five; F six; H seven. The prohibitions of intermarriage
between collaterals, extend by the civil law to the fourth degree, ExcLu-
sive, according to the above mode of counting. Hence first cousins by
the civil law, being in the fourth degree may intermarry.

The Canon law computes, not by counting upwards, then through the
common stock, and then downwards to the propositus—but beginning at
the common stock, counts ‘downward on either line, taking the longest
when one is longer than the other. Thus E and F, or first cousins, are
in the third degree: Bone; C two; E three; or, Bone; Dtwo; F
three. Hence marriage between first cousins is forbidden by the Canon
424 NOTES.

law, whose prohibition extends to the fourth degree of Canon law com-
putation incLusive. Of course, not only first, but second cousins are
forbidden to intermarry by that law. The more numerous the prohibi-
tion, the more profitable were dispensations. Hence the
[ *425 ] present mode of *computing canonical degrees was introduc-
ed by pope Alexander 2nd. By the old canon law and the
early decretals, marriages were forbidden as far as the seventh degree,
answering to the 12th of the civil law: this was reduced to the fourth
degree of canon law computation (inclusive) by the council of Lateran,
1215. But Dr. Taylor says it was so in England, as appears by some
constitutions he examined of Oswald, archbishop of York, in the 10th
century. The English, and we after them, adopt generally the civil
law regulations on this head. Blackstone’s table of consanguinity, L.
2. ch. 14. P. 203. is well calculated to illustrate the comparison of the
two modes of computation.
The following table, is taken from Burn’s ecclesiastical law, tit. mar-
riages.
A man may not marry his
Secundus gradus in linea recta

ascendente,
Cons. Avia. 1 Grandmother.
Affin. Avi relicta. 2 Grandfather’s wife.

Affin. Prosocrus, vel socrus magna. 3 Wive’s grandmother.
Secundus gradus inequalis in li-
nea transversali ascendente,

Cons. Amita. 4 Father’s sister.
Cons. Matertera. 5 Mother’s sister.
Affin. Patrui relicta. 6 Father’s brother’s wife.
Affin. Avunculi relicta 7 Mother’s brother’s wife.
Affin. Amita uzxoris. 8 Wife’s father’s sister.
Affin. Matertera uxoris. 9 Wife’s mother’s sister.
Primus gradus in linea recta as-
cendente,
Cons. Mater. 10 Mother.
Affin. Noverca. 11 Step mother.
Affin. Socrus. 12 Wife’s mother.
Primus gradus in linea recta de-
scendente,
Cons. Filia. 13 Daughter.
Affin. Privigna. 14 Wife’s daughter.

Affin. Nurus. 15 Son’s wife.
NOTES.

Primus gradus equalis in linea
transversali,
Cons. Soror.
Affin. Soror uxoris.
Affin. Fratris relicta. ‘
*Sécundus gradus in linea recta
descendente,
Cons. Neptis ex filio,
Cons. Neptis ex filia.
Affin. Pronurus, i. e. relicta nepotis
ex filio.
Affin. Pronurus, i. e. relicta nepotis
ex filia.
Affin. Privigni filia.
Affin. Privigne filia.
Secundus gradus ineequalis in
linea transversali descendente,
Cons. Neptis ex fratre.
Cons. Neptis ex sorore.
Affin. Nepotis ex fratre relicta.
Affin. Nepotis ex sorore relicta.
Affin. Neptis uxoris ex fratre.
Affin. Neptis uxoris ex sorore.

A woman may not marry with her

1 Grandfather.
2 Grandmother’s husband.
3 Husband’s grandfather.

4 Father’s brother.

5 Mother’s brother.

6 Father’s sister’s husband.

7 Mother’s sister’s husband.

8 Husband’s father’s brother.
9 Husband’s mother’s brother.

10 Father.
11 Step-father.
12 Husband’s father.

16 Sister.
17 Wife’s sister.
18 Brother’s wife.
[ *126 ]

19 Son’s daughter.
20 Daughter’s daughter.
21 Son’s son’s wife.

22 Daughter’s son’s wife.

23 Wife’s son’s daughter.
24 Wife’s daughter’s daughter.

25 Brother’s daughter.

26 Sister’s daughter.

27 Brother’s son’s wife.

28 Sister’s son’s wife.

29 Wive’s brother’s daughter.
30 Wife’s sister’s daughter.

Secundus gradus in linea recta
ascendente,

Cons. Avus.

Affin. Avice relictus.

Affin. Prosocer, vel socer magnus.
Secundus gradus ineequalis in li-
nea transversali ascendente,

Cons. Patruus.
Cons. Avunculus.

‘ Affin. Amite relictus.

Affin. Matertere relictus.
Affin. Patruus mariti.

Affin. Avunculus mariti.
Primus gradus in linea recta

ascendente,
Cons. Pater.
Affin. Vitricus.
Affin. Socer.
426 NOTES.

 

7 Primus gradus in linea recta
descendente,
13. Son. Cons. Filius.
14 Husband’s son. Affin. Privignus.

[ *427 ] *15 Daughter’s husband. Affin. Gener. —
Primus gradus eequelis in

lina transversali,

‘16 Brother. Cons. Frater.
17 Husband’s brother. Affin. Levir.
18 Sister’s husband. Affin. Sororis relictus.

Secundus gradus in linea rec-
ta descendente,

19 Son’s son. Nepos ex filio.

20 Daughter’s son. Cons. Nepos ex filia.

21 Son’s daughter’s husband. Affin. Progener, 1. e. relictus neptis
ex filio. ‘

22 Daughter’s daughter’s husband. Affn. Progener, t. e. relictus neptis
ex filia.

23 Husband’s son’s son: Affin. Privigni filius.

24 Husband’s daughter’s son. Afin. Privigne filius.

Secundus gradus ineequalis in
linea transversali descen-

dente,

25 Brother’ son. Cons. Nepos ex fratre.

26 Sister’s son. Cons. Nepos ex sorore.

27 Brother’s daughter’s husband.  Affin. Neptis ex fratre relictus.

28 Sister’s daughter’s husband. Affin. Neptis ex sorore relictus.

29 Husband’s brother’s son. Affin. Leviri filius, i. e. nepo sma-

riti ex fratre.
30 Husband’s sister’s son. Affin. Goris filius, i. e. nepos ma-

ritt ex sorore.

The Levitical degrees are to be found in the 18th and 20th chapters of
Leviticus, and: they are these; see Haines v. Jescott, 5 Mod. 168. 1 Ld.
Ray. 68. where the Levitical degrees are tabulated in a somewhat diffe-
rent order, following lord Coke.

A man may not marry
His mother
His sister
His son’s daughter
His daughter’s daughter
His father’ wife’s daughter
His father’s sister
His mother’s sister
NOTES. 427

 

His father’s brother’s wife

His son’s wife

*His brother’s wife [ *428 ]
His wife’s daughter

His wife’s sister.

The preceding are the prohibitions of the 18th chapter.

The following are from the 20th chapter, and may be intended to em-
brace second marriages.

His father’s wife

His wife’s mother

His father’s or mother’s daughter
His father’s or mother’s sister
His uncle’s wife

His brother’s wife.

The above-mentioned table of kindred and affinity, (from Burns)
therefore, is made. up, not from the specific enumeration of prohibited de-
grees in the book of Leviticus, but from the principle that seems to guide
the Jewish prohibition, viz. to the third degree of the Jewish and civil
law computation inclusive: for the Jews calculated degrees in the same
way as the Romans did, viz. from the propositus exclusive, up to and
through the common stock, and down to the other party in question, in-
elusive. 1 Selden’s uxor Hebraica, ch. 4. The English law allows
marriage at the fourth degree, as computed by the Jewish and the civil
law. Harison et ux. v. Dr. Burwell, Vaug. 206. 2 Ventr. 9. Gibs.
Cod. 412. The prohibited degrees are not specified in 32 Hen. 8. ch. 38.
which declares that all persons may lawfully marry, except such as are
prohibited by God’s law, but they are in the preceding statutes of 25 H.
8. c. 22. and 28 H. 8.c. 7. but Burns Eccles. Law II. 405. doubts whe-
ther the two last statutes are in force since 32 H. 8. ch. 38. The spiri-
tual courts are confinéd to the Levitical degrees, Vaugh. 206. Harison
et ux. v. Burwell.

[By a Statute of the State of New York, marriages between parents
and children, including grand-parents and grand-children of every de-
gree, ascending and descending, and between brothers and sisters of the
half, as well as of the whole blood, are declared to be incestuous and ab-
solutely void. The prohibition against such marriages, extends to ille-
gitimate, as well as legitimate children and relatives. Such incestuous
marriages, and also adultery and fornication, committed by such rela-
tives with each other, are made indictable offences, and punishable by
imprisonmeut in a State prison for a term not exceeding ten years. 2
R. 8. 3d ed. p. 199. 773. This is also the law in Massachusetts. Mass.
Revised Statutes, 1835, part 4, tit. 1. ch. 130.] °
428 NOTES.

I have made a doubt whether a man may marry his wife’s sister, his
wife being dead, from the expression in the passage in Levit. “ Thou
shalt not take a wife to her sister to ver her, but in Hill v. Good, Vaugh.
302. and Carth. 271, 3 Keble, 166. Gibs. 412. it was determined that
this case fell under the general prohibition of verse 6. including all that
are near of kin: a decision indirectly confirmed by Collet’s case, 'T.
Jones, 213. Nelson’s Ab. tit. Marr. 1158, 1159. 15 Vin. 256. and lately
by the court of arches in England, (1811,) agreeably to former cases.
Indeed the cases where marriage with a wife’s sister’s daughter has been
deemed incestuous, are numerous. Most of them are collected in 4 Bac.

Ab. 529. See Mr. Butler’s note, Co. Litt. 235.2. 2 Burns
[ *429 ] *Eccles. law, 414. et seq. But it is not forbidden by the law
of Pennsylvania, see act of 1705 as to Incest.

Mr. Christian in his note 4. to 2 Blacks. 206. is right when he says
‘<T do not know a single instance in which we have occasion to refer to
the canon law: but the civil law computation is of great importance in
ascertaining who are entitled to administration, and the distributive
shares of intestate property.” See also 2 Bl. Comment. 504.

The following terms of affinity, collected in one view, may assist the

_reader’s recollection.

Socer: a wife’s father: Beau Pere.

Socrus : a wife’s mother: Belle Mere.

Noverca: a step-mother: a father’s second wife: Belle Mere.

Vitricus : a step-father : a mother’s second husband: Beau Pere.

Nurus : a daughter-in-law : a son’s wife: Bru.

Gener: a son-in-law: a daughter’s husband: Gendre.

Camprivigni: children by a former marriage.

Privignus : son of a wife by a former marriage: Beau fils.

Privigna: daughter of my wife by a former marriage: Beau fille.

Uxoris fratri: wife’s brother: brother-in-law: Beau frere. ss

Uxoris soror: sister-in-law : wife’s sister: Belle sceur.

Fratria: brother’s wife: sister-in-law: Belle seur.

Levir : brother-in-law to the wife: Beau frere. dave.

Giles: sister-in-law to the wife: Belle sceur. yedwe.

Pater: Mater: father: mother.

Avus: Avia: grand-father: grand-mother.

Proavus: Proavia: great-grand-father : great-grand-mother.

Abavus: Abavia: great-grand-father’s father: great-grand-father’s
mother. '

Atavus: Atavia: great-great-father’s grand-father: great-great-
father’s grand-mother.

Tritavus: Tritavia: great-great-father’s great-grand-father : great-
great-father’s great-grand-mother.

\

Linea ascendens
NOTES. 429

 

( Filius: Filia: son: daughter.
Nepos: Neptis : linealis: grand-son: grand-daughter.
te ! proneptis : linealis : great-grand-son : great-grand-daugh-
Abnepos: Abneptis: linealis : son or daughter of the above.
Atnepos : Atneptis: linealis: son or daughter of the above.
Trinepos : Trineptis : linealis: son or daughter of the
| above. ;
( Patruus: uncle by the father’s side: father’s brother.
sees : father’s sister: aunt by the father’s side.
airuus ma, : 3
Ajnita. Ma. eo . great-uncle: great-aunt by the father’s side.
Propatruus magnus :
Pro-amita magna:
Abpatruus magnus: ) grand-father and grand-mother of the great
Abamita magna: uncle and great-aunt on the father’s side.
Patrueles : (a patruo) sons and daughters, cousin-germans on the
father’s side. :
Amitini: (ab amitd) the same descended of the father’s sister.
( Avunculus : Matertera: mother’s brother: mother’s sister: mater-
| nal uncle and aunt.
Avunculus magnus : maternal great-uncle.
Matertera magna : materna! great-aunt. :
Proavunculus magnus : great-uncle’s father on the mother’s side.
Promatertera magna: great-uncle’s mother, on the mother’s side.
Ab avunculus mugnus : grand-uncle’s grand-father, / on the mo-
Ab materera magna: grand-uncle’s grand-mother ther’s side.
Avunculini :
| Materterini :
Nepos and Neptis are properly grand-children: but these terms are
also applied to nephews and nieces: Preeterea, nepotem ex patre aut ex
sorore, a Juris-peritis imperite dici, admonent eruditi; nam fratris aut
sororis filius dici solet e doctis, nepos autem respectu avi, ut filius respectu
patris dicitur. Joh. Calvini Lexicon Juridicum sub voce Nepos. ‘ In this
imperitiore sensu, Lord Coke uses it: see his table of consanguinity and
affinity. Co. Litt. 18. Hence
Nepos: Neptis : ;
Pronepos : Proneptis : Mean nephews and_ nieces
Abnepos: Abneptis : | collateralis : and their lineal descend-

Lin. descendens.

father and mother of the above.

Adgnati.

 

Cognati.

 

cousin-germans on the mother’s side.

Atnepos: Atneptis : ants.

Trinepos: Trineptis :

This application of the term Nepos, may perhaps be authorized by the
expression of Caius, Dig. 26. 4.7. and in L. nemini 17. Cod. de nupt.
but in both passages it is ambiguous.

The distinction of linealis and collateralis, takes away the ambiguity.
No doubt, the more accurate expression for a nephew or niece, is fratris
vel sorosis filius vel filia.
430 NOTES.

 

The next in number among the legal prohibitions to marriage among
the Romans, was, offence against Public decorum.

Justinian post. $ 9. states three cases of prohibition, Ist, The daugh-
ter of your wife after divorce. 2ndly, The affianced wife of a son, though
not a daughter-in-law : for the Romans had their sponsalia or pre-con

tracts, as well as marriage contracts. ‘The consensus spon-
[ *431 ] salitiles was one thing: the consensus matrimonialis another.

Taylor, 303. 3dly, The affianced wife of a father, though
not a mother-in-law. These were, guasi privigna, quasi nurus, quast
noverca. 'These cases are taken from Dig. 23. 2.12. 'To these enume-
rated by Justinian, may be added, 4thly, an adopted daughter or grand-
daughter emancipated. Dig. 23. 2.55. 5thly, Between an adoptive
emancipated son, and a woman who has been the wife of the adoptive
father. Dig. 23.2.14. 6thly, An adopted son, and the mother of an
adopted father, so long as the adoption continues. Ib. L. 55. par. 1.

Another head of legal prohibition was Rank, of which see post. $ 11.
As if a senator should contract matrimony with a manumitted slave, a
stage player, or any other person of lost reputation. Dig. 23. 2. 44. but
this was abrogated by Justinian, Nov. 78. c. 3.

Another subject of prohibition was Power. As in the cases of, Ist,-A
tutor and his female pupil: a curator and his female minor. Dig 23. 2.
59, et seg. and Cod. de interd. Matr. 2ndly, A governor of a province
and a female native resident therein. Dig. 23. 2. 38 and 57. and Cod. si
quacunque przedit. potest.

The last prohibition arose from Age. As marriage between a man of
60 and a woman of 50. Dig. 1. 7.15.2. Dig. 19. 1.21. Cod. 6. 58.
12. See hereon, Heineccius ad Leg. Jul. et Pap. Popp. But these pro-
hibitions were much moderated by Justinian, except as to widows. Cod.

5. 4.27. Cod. 6. 58. 12.
_ Polygamy, common among the barbarous nations of antiquity (barba-
rous in the Greek and Roman sense of the word) the Germans except-
ed, Tacit. de Mor. Germ. ch. 18. was also, occasionally permitted among
the Greeks, when necessity seemed to require it; as in the case of the
detachment of young men from the army of Tacedomon, mentioned by
Plutarch; and by the Athenians dia czar» avdgunuy propter hominum
infrequentiam. Arist. de Nobilit. ex Athen. 80. L. 13. inti. and by the
Tuscans, 12 Athen. 3. and it was defended by Eurip. in Ino. trageed.
and by Plato, whose doctrine was rather a community of wives like that
of the Arreoi in Otaheite, than a plurality; see also Aul. Gell. xv. 20.
xviii. 2, Aristotle well considers Plato’s doctrine in his politics, book 2.
$2.4. “A work (as I most cordially agree with Dr. Taylor) which I
“« will venture to pronounce one of the most sterling productions of anti-
‘quity, and a most inexhaustible treasure to the statesman, the lawyer

\
. NOTES. 431

 

‘and the philosopher.” (Taylor, 342.) The English reader is much
indebted to Dr. Gillies for his view of Aristotle’s philosophy.

Socrates indulged in two wives, if not in pederasty which
he is *introduced as speaking of in Xenophon’s memorabilia, [ *432 ]
in his conversation with Alcibiades, as a thing of common
course. he general reputation of this man, ranks with me among the
literary paradoxes: but I most wonder at the praise bestowed on him by
my deceased friend (the first man of his day in the philosophical and
literary world) Dr. Priestly.

That the Jews practised polygamy, and that their laws regulated it, is
well known. Deut. 21.15.17. In the year 1780, the Rev. Martin Ma-
dan published his “‘ THEtyprHora ;” in which, taking for granted that
the axiom of the canonists, Concubitus non consensus facit nuptias is
founded on scripture, he proposed the introduction of licensed polygamy
in cases of female seduction, asa remedy for prostitution. He was a
man of learning, but a religious fanatic, of the sect of Calvinist-metho-
dists. His arguments are deduced principally from 21 Deut. 15. 18. 22.
Deut. 28, 29. 22 Ex. 16,17. He notices very truly that marriage was
first introduced among the Sacraments, and put under the custody of the
priesthood, by Pope Innocent the third. He refers particularly to the
cases of Hannah, Rachel and Bathsheba, who are mentioned in the bi-
ble in terms of respect, as well as Joseph, Samuel, and Solomon, who
were the issue of polygamous marriages. Madan built and officiated at
the lock chapel which was annexed to the Lock hospital for venereal
patients, near Hyde-park corner, in London. He was the composer of
that fine tune ‘“‘ Before Jehovah’s awful throne:” and the compiler of
the best collection of popular church music now known, for the’ use of
‘that chapel.

The civil law forbad polygamy. Inst. 1.10.6. Dig. 3. 2. 1. par. 8.
Dig. 40. 2.15. L. 2. Cod. de incest. et inut. nupt. Cic. de orat. 40. and
even bina sponsalia, Dig. 3. 2.1. fin. Polygamy was introduced by Va-
lentinian first, as appears from Socrates, Nicephorus, Paulus Diaconus,
and Jornandes, see the citations in Taylor, 347: but it did not continue
long. But licensed concubinage amounted to it, which seems to have
continued for many years. Heinecc. ad leg. Jul. et Pap. Poppoam,
Dig. 25. 2. 11. sub. fin. and Julius Czsar is said by Suetonius to have
instigated Helvius Cinna the tribune to introduce a law in favour of un-
limited polygamy. Suet. in Jul. Ces. $ 52. ;

Concubinage however was discouraged by the digest, 32. 49. 4. and
the law prohibited concubinage, at the same time with matrimony, as
well as more concubines at a time than one. Dig. 45. 1. 121. Cod. 5.
26. unic. Cod. 7. 15. ult. Nov. 18. 74 and 89. _

Christianity has settled the question of polygamy among Christians,
432 NOTES. ‘

 

notwithstanding the practices recorded in the old testament. 1 Corinth.

ch. 7. and has settled also the subordinate situation of the
[ *433 ] wife: *herein conforming to the law of nature as it appears

to me. For generally speaking, there is a natural prevalence
of mental energy, as well as of corporeal force in favour of the man in-
dependent of the means of acquired knowledge. But by discouraging
fornication, and by denouncing polygamy and concubinage, christianity
has greatly tended to ameliorate the situation of women in society, and
thereby to civilize society itself. Iam glad to see the wavering decis-
ions of the British courts brought to something like system by the case
of Marshall and Rutton, 8 Term Rep. 545. I consider the very able ar-
gument of judge Hide in Manby v. Scott, 1 Mod. 129. (notwithstanding
some harsh observations) as embracing the soundest principles upon this
subject, and placing the relative situation of the two parties upon the
best footing for each of them, and as being most in unison with the law
of England, the precepts of christianity, and the dictates of natural rea-
son and civilized expedience. I apprehend it also to be conformable to
the general spirit of the laws throughout this country. In Great Britain,
the courts, as I think, instead of looking with a jealous eye upon every
kind of pre-contract that tends to impair the unity of interest between
married people, and the dependance of the wife upon the husband, have
leaned somewhat too strongly in favour of pre-contract by marriage-set-
tlement, trust estates, testamentary powers to be exercised by the wife,
and by enforcing equivalent settlements on, the receipt after marriage of
a wife’s property. ;

[In the State of New York, by a Statute passed in April, 1848, and
amended in 1849, the real and personal property of any female thereaf-
ter married, and owned by her at the time of marriage, and the rents,
issues and profits thereof, are not subject to the disposal of her husband,
nor liable for his debts, but continue her sole and separate property, as
if she were a single female. , 7

Any married female may take by inheritance, or by gift, grant, devise
or bequest, from any person other than her husband, and hold to her
sole and separate use, and convey and devise real and personal property,
and any estate or interest therein, and the rents, issues and profits thereof
in the same manner and with like effect as if she were unmarried, and
the same are not subject to the disposal of her husband, nor liable for
his debts. |

As to marriage contracts of infants, and espousals per verba de pre-
senti, et per verba de futuro, and Scotch and other foreign marriages, see

*Harg. Co. Litt. 80.a.n. 2H. Blacks. 147. 10 East, 286. and 1 Johns.
cases in N. York, 424. 2 Burr. 1079. and 2 Burs Eccles. Law, 401.
420. where the subject is discussed at length.
NOTES. 433

[The age of consent to marriage, by the civil, as well as the common
law, is fixed at fourteen in males, and twelve in females. In the states
of Ohio, Indiana and Michigan the age of consent fixed by statute is
eighteen in males, and fourteen in females; and in Massachusetts and,
Illinois, it is seventeen in males, and fourteen in females.

No peculiar ceremonies are requisite, either by the common law, or by.
the ancient canon-law, to the valid celebration of marriage; the consent
of the parties being the essence of the contract, nothing more is required.
But in the year 1563 the Council of Trent made a decree, that for the
future no marriage should be effectual, unless celebrated duly in facie
ecclesic, that is, in the presence of the parish priest and two witnesses.
(Concil. Trident. Sessio xxiv. Decretum de reformatione Matrimonii
Cap. 1.) This decree was adopted by the King of Spain in his Europe-
an dominions, but was not extended to the colonies. In them, the rule

_established by the Partidas, that consent, joined with the will to marry,
was sufficient to constitute a valid matriage, was permitted to remain
unchanged. (Hallett v. Collins, 10 Howard U.S. Rep. 174. Patton
v. Philadelphia, 1 Louisiana Annual Rep. 98.)

By the law of England, until the year 1836, the intervention of a
priest was always indispensable to constitute a perfect marriage. In
that year the statute of 6 and 7 Will. 4. c. 85, commonly called Lord
John Russel’s Act, enabled parties desirous of entering into wedlock to
complete the contract, without any appeal to spiritual authority. Such
persons therefore as object to be married by a priest may now repair to
the Registrar of Marriages of the District in which they reside; and
upon giving the notice and procuring the certificates prescribed by the
statute, may be matried, either before that officer by a verbal declara-
tion ; or in the registered places appointed for the purpose, may solem-
nize their marriage according to any form or ceremony they please; tak-
ing care, however, whichever mode they resort to, that two witnesses be
present, and that the proceeding be completed with open doors between
the hours of 8 and 12 in the forenoon.

In New York and South Carolina, as in Scotland, the intervention of
a priest is not necessary to constitute a marriage. The deliberate con-
sent of parties entering into a present agreement to take each other for
husband and wife, may be declared before a magistrate, or simply before
witnesses, or subsequently confessed or acknowledged ; or the marriage
may be inferred from continual cohabitation, and reputation as husband
and wife, except in cases of civil actions for criminal conversation, and
in public prosecutions for bigamy. (See 2 Kent’s Commentaries, 86, 87.
A Johns. N. Y. Rep. 52. 7 Wend. 47. 1 Hill’s N. Y. Rep. 270. 2
Greenleaf on Evidence, 376. Poynter on Marriage & Divorce, 17.

; ns)
434 NOTES.

 

Burge’s Comm. on Colonial & Foreign Laws, Vol. I. 172, 173, 174.
Bell’s Principles of the Law of Scotland, sect. 1506.)

In Maine, Massachusetts and Connecticut, it is required by Stat-
ute, that there be a publication of banns previous to the marriage ;
that it be solemnized by a clergyman or magistrate; and if the
male is under twenty-one, or the female under eighteen, the consent
of thé parents or guardian must be given. In the State of New York,
if the female be under the age of fourteen, the consent of the father,
mother, or guardian is required. Similar legislative regulations exist in
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Kentucky, and other States. The most-
eminent Jurists, however, concur in the opinion, that a marriage made
according to the common law, without observing any of the statute reg-
ulations, would be valid. (See 2 Kent’s Comm. 90, 91.)

Although in the State of New York, it is not necessary that a clergy-
man or magistrate should be present to give validity to a marriage; yet
marriages can be registered and authenticated according to the provis-
ions of the Revised Statutes, only when solemnized by one of the follow-
ing persons; ministers of the gospel, and priests of every denomination ;
Mayors, Recorders and Aldermen of cities; County Judges, and Justices
of the peace.]

In speaking of marriage, it may not be improper to say a few words
on the subject of Divorce among the Romans. Justinian in this section
of the Institutes, defines marriage to be Viri et mulieres conjunctio indi-
viduam vite consuetudinem continens: in conformity to the digest 23. 1.
1. Conjunctio maris et Famine ; consortium omnis vite ; divini et hu-
mani juris communicatio. Expressions, which must be referred to the
intent of the parties at the time. It was (so far as I know) reserved for
the English law to take cognizance of a pre-contract, in which the par-
ties contemplate the possibility of a separation in express terms, and
make it one of the considerations of the Deed. This was done in Rex
v. Meade, 1 Burr. 542, and Rodney v. Chambers, 2 East, 283. I am sin-
cerely glad these cases have been shaken by the lord chancellor in St.

John v. St. John, 11 Ves. Jun. 526.
[ *434 ] *I am well aware, that different states of civilization re-

quire different principles of legislation on this, as well as on
every other subject; that the considerations arising from the Institutions
of hereditary rank, the privileges of primogeniture, and the importance
attached to accumulated property, may require the admission of mar-
riage settlements, jointures, trust-estates, and most of the many other
complicated regulations which crowd the law books of England; but I
know of no state of society in which the laws ought to weaken the pub-
lic sentiment of the indissolubility of the marriage contract, unless upon
urgent necessity, grounded upon facts judicially established. But to
NOTES. 435

 

sanction the foresight of adultery, cruelty, or desertion, upon the very.
face of the marriage contract, is to sanction the crimes themselves.

Upon the subject of divorce, see Dig. 24.2. Cod. 5. 17. and 24. and
Nov. 22. and 117. Caus. 28. Quest. 1 and 2. Grotius IL 5.9. Puf-
fend. VI. 1.21 et seq. Selden’s Uxor Hebraica. See also Code Civil
Napol. avec les Discours, Rapports, et Opinions, &c. Tom. 1. from page
329 to 432. where the subject is well discussed.

It has been said that Repudium is the proper expression for the ew:
lution of the sponsal contract or espousals; and Divortium for the disso- '
lution of the Marriage contract. Dig. 50. 16. 101. and 191; but Repu-
dium is used synonymously with divorce in Dig. 24. 2. 2. as it appears
to me from the expressions employed; and certainly in Cod. 5. 17. 8. and
Nov. 22. 15. and elsewhere. ,

Divorce, seems not properly applicable to a judicial decree declaring
an unlawful marriage, void ab initio; for persons cannot well be said to
be divorced, who were never legally married. But it is used exclusive-
ly in this sense in the English law, wherein divorce a vineulo matrimonii |
can only take place by authority of the courts, in cases where the mar-
riage was originally void from objections of consanguinity, affinity, or
impotence: for by the marriage act of 26 Geo. 2. precontract has ceased
to be of the number of causes that would induce a Divorce a Vinculo
Matrimonii. \ The other divorces for matter subsequent to marriage, op-
erate only a separation a mensa et thoro. In cases even of Adultery, the
party complaining is driven to parliament for redress.

[In the States of New York and Vermont, on a suit properly brought,
the marriage contract may be declared void in tke following cases; 1. If
either of the parties, at the time of the marriage, had not attained the
age of legal consent. 2. If the former husband or wife of the party was
living, and the marriage in force. 3. If one of the parties was an idiot
or lunatic. 4, If the consent of one of the parties was obtained by force
or fraud. 5. If one of the parties was physically incapable of entering
into the marriage state. But a marriage cannot be annulled for the first
cause above mentioned, or the application of a party who was of legal
age at the time of the marriage, or if the parties, after they had attained
the age of consent, had for any time frecly cohabited as husband and
wife. It may be annulled for the second cause on the application of
either party during the life of the other, but if it was contracted in good
faith, and with the full belief of the parties that the former husband or
wife was dead, the issue thereof shall be entitled to succeed to the estate
of the parent, equally as legitimate children. It may be annulled for
the third cause, on the application of any relative of the idiot or lunatic
interested to avoid the marriage, or by his next friend. But any free coe
habitation of husband and wife after the lunacy has ceased, will be a
436 NOTES.

 

bar to the divorce; and the children of a marriage annulled on the ground
of lunacy or idiocy, are entitled to succeed, as legitimate children. A
marriage may be annulled for the fourth cause above mentioned, during
the life of the parties, ontthe application of the party whose consent was
unduly obtained, provided there has been no subsequent voluntary co-
habitation as husband and wife. The custody of the issue of sucha
marriage is to be given to the innocent parent, and a provision for their
education and maintenance may be made out of the estate of the guilty
party. A marriage is to be annulled for the fifth and last cause above
mentioned, only on the application of the injured party, and the suit
must be brought within two years from the solemnization of the mar-
riage.

For Adultery committed by either husband or wife, a divorce a vincu-
lo matrimonii can be obtained in New York in three cases, and in those
only; 1. If the married parties are inhabitants of the state at the time
of thecommission of the adultery: 2. If the marriage took place in the
state, and the party injured be an actual resident at the time of the adul-
tery committed, and at the time of commencing the suit for divorce: 3.
If the adultery was committed within the state, and the injured party,
at the time of commencing the suit, be an actual inhabitant of the state
If the defendant puts in an answer denying the charge, a feigned issue is
to be awarded, to try the truth of the charge before a jury; and upon
the trial of the issue, the fact must be sufficiently proved by testimony,
independent of the confession of the party. But although the fact of
adultery be established, the court may deny a divorce in the following
cases: 1. Where the offence has been committed by the procurement, or
with the connivance, of the complainant: 2. Where ithas heen forgiven
by the injured party, and such forgiveness is proved by express proof, or
by the voluntary cohabitation of the parties, with the knowledge of the fact :
3. Where the suit has not been brought within five years after the know-
ledge of the adultery: 4. Or where the complainant has been guilty of
the same offence.

In New York, the jurisdiction of the Court as to absolute divorces, for
causes subsequent to the marriage, is confined to the single case of adul-
tery; but in most of the other States of the Union, in addition to adul-
tery, intolerable ill-usage, or wilful desertion, or unheard-of absence, or
habitual drunkenness, or some of them, will authorize ‘a decree for a di-
vorce a vinculo, or from bed and board, under different modifications and
restrictions. See New York Revised Statutes, Part 2, Chap. 8, Tit. 1.
Revised Statutes of Vermont, 1839, p 322. Revised Statutes of Massa-
chusetts, 1835, chap. 75 and 76.]

In the time of Romulus, if we may believe Plutarch (in vit.) a hus-
band might dismiss his wife at pleasure; and in the case of adultery, or
NOTES. 437

 

intoxication, he had the power of putting her to death, as was done by
Egnatius Mercenius, who was acquitted by Romulus for it; not pardon-
ed (condonatus) but acquitted, (absolutus.) Nay, it seems to

have been a just cause of divorce if the wife drank *any [ *435 ]
strong liquor. Hence perhaps the custom of “saluting the

bride:” for Tertullian in his apologet. P. 7. fol. says Idcirco et oscula
offerre necessitas erat ut spiritu judicarentur (i. e. Uxores.) 'To this pur-
pose there are many authorities.

Anciently, the husband alone enjoyed the privilege of divorce; forbid-
den by Romulus to wives. In the time of Cicero however, and proba-
bly long before (Juv. Sat. 9. and Mart. 1. Ep. 41.) the wives appear to
have exercised this right; thus Ceelius writes to Cicero that Paula Vale-
ria had divorced herself from her husband, the day of his return from
the Province, and was to be married to D. Brutus: this too without as-
signing any reason, sine causa. 8. Famil. 7.

For a long time, the disputes between husband and wife were settled
on a hearing before mutual relations. Dion. Halic. II. 25. Valer. Max.
II. 1. 8. Suet. Tib. 35. &c. This kind of interposition sometimes took
place on the exercise of paternal jurisdiction. Liv. II. 41. Val. Max. V.
8.2. V.Y. 1. &c. &e.

It is said on many authorities (Dion. Halic. II. 25. Aul. Gell. Noct.
Att. IV. 3. Plutarch in Numa et Lycurgi. Vit. et in Quest. Rom. 14.)
that no divorce took place at Rome, from the founding of the city for
420 years till Spurius Carvilius Ruga, divorced his wife for barrenness:
for which he was much blamed. . The practice of divorce however, for
good causes, for trifling causes, and for ‘no cause at all, soon became
common. Sulpicius Galltis divorced his wife hecause he had seen her
abroad with her head uncovered, Val. Max: VI. 3. 10. Pub. Sempronius
Sophus, because his wife had been at a shew without his knowledge. Ib.
n. 12. Quint. Antistius Verus, because he saw his wife conversing with
a woman of low condition. Ib. n. 11. Mare Antony because he suspect-
ed his wife of an intrigue. Plut. in Vit. Ant. Julius Cesar, because he
would not have his wife to be suspected. Plut. in Vit. Jul. Ces. August-
us, because he did not like his wife’s temper. Suet. in vit. Another wife,
because he quarrelled with her mother. Ib. Claudius dismissed one, for
trifling faults, Jevibus offensis. Suet. in Vit. Presently it became the fash-
ion both with husbands and wives, to dismiss each other without assign-
ing any reason. These were relations and divorces bona gratia; sine
causa ; sine querela ; sine causa sontica. Dig. 24. 1. 62. Dig. 40. 9. 14.
4, Nov. 22. 4. and 98. 2. 2. see also, cases relating to the wife’s fortune,
where the woman procured the divorce in Dig. 24. 3. 4. and 38. This
practice was attempted to be restrained by Augustus (Suet. in vit.) but
without effect. Seneca III. de Benef. 16. says that women now reckon
438 NOTES.

 

their age, not by their years, but by their husbands, and
[ *436 ] Juvenal (*no friend to the sex) fiunt octo mariti quinque per
autumnos VI. 228.

Divorces however, by the law Julia de Adulteriis, required to be made

with certain formalities certo modo, Dig. 38. 11. and. were to be attested
by seven witnesses of the age of puberty, Dig. 24. 2, 9. and certain forms
of words were employed. J foras mulier. Twas res tibi habeto, agito.
Aidibus facessi. so Juvenal, Collige sarcinulas (dicit libertus) et exi. VI.
146. Bag and Baggage, according to the homely expression of the Eng-
lish. See Dig. 24. 2. 2. 1 and 2.
_ In the Repudium, the words were Condicione tua non utor. Dig. ub.
sup. Conditio, is properly applicable to some state or condition previous
to marriage: and sometimes for a treaty of marriage, as Dr. Taylor has
shewn in several instances. Justinian prohibited all divorces unless on
account of chastity, Nov. 17. 10. and ordained that the children should
not be prejudiced, Nov. 117.7.8. By what forms (certis modis) the mar-
riage that took place Ab Usu, by a year’s cohabitation, was dissolved, I
do not find. The marriage by Confarreatio, was dissolved by Diffar-
reatio. The separation in consequence of divorce, was Discidium; and
the tabule nuptiales (attestation of the marriage as I construe it) and
Dotales (marriage articles, settlement of jointure) were broken: the keys
taken from the wife (Claves adimebantur) and the forms of expression
above stated or some of them were used toward her. If the husband
was absent, he sent his wife a bill of divorce muncium remittebat: this
was matrimonit RENUNCIATIO. Divorces were recorded in the public re-
gisters (Acta. )

Widows could not marry within ten months of their husband’s de-
cease. L. 2. Cod. de sec. Nuptiis. See Taylor’s elements. Civ. Law. 348.
et seq. and Adam’s Roman Antiquities 468. where the preceding and
additional authorities are collected.

The following causes of divorce I have translated from Cod. 5. 17. 8.
Nov. 22. 15. and 117. 8.

A man may repudiate his wife, if she be 1st an adultress, 2dly a sorce-
ress, 3dly a man slayer, 4thly a kidnapper, 5thly a robber of sepulchres,
or 6thly of churches, 7thly if she harbours thieves, Sthly or goes feasting
with strangers, without the knowledge or against the consent of the hus-
band, 9thly or walks out at night, against his inclination without justifia-
ble reason, 10thly if she frequents the cireus, the theatres, or the places
where combats of wild beasts are shewn, against the directions of her
husband, 11thly if she attempts her husband’s life, by weapons or by poi-
son, 12thly if she conceals treason, or 13thly commits perjury (or brings
false accusation) against her husband, or 14thly attempts to beat him.
NOTES. 439

 

*So far the Theodosian code, confirmed by the 22nd Novel, [ *437 ]
ch. 15. The 117th novel ch 8. adds as causes of repudiation

—if the wife bathes with strangers without the knowledge of her hus-
band, or goes to public places of amusement without his knowledge, or
absents herself from home against his consent, unless at the house of her
parents.

A woman may repudiate her husband, Ist For adultery, 2dly Homicide,
3dly Sorcery 4thly, Treason, 5thly Perjury, (crimen falsitatis) 6thly Rob-
bery of sepulchres, 7thly or Churches, Sthly Theft, 9thly Harboring thieves,
10thly Bringing home prostitutes, 13thly attempting his wife’s life, 14thly
Beating (Flogging, FVagellis) her. The 117th novel ch. 9. adds, If the
husband conceals his.knowledge of any other person attempting her life:
if he be accessary to another’s attempt to debauch her: if he accuse
her of adultery and fail in the proof.

The crime of drinking wine, seems to have been abandoned at this
time as a cause of divorce: nor is any mention made -of impotence on
the one hand, or sterility on the other: or of ‘age, disease, banishment,
vows of chastity, or monastic orders. In Nov. 22. 13. Deportation, and
interdiction from fire and water, are declared not sufficient causes for
dissolving matrimony: in the succeeding chapter is also condemned the
licence of a wife to take a second husband, if her first being in the army
has sent her no information respecting himself during four years. This
term is extended to ten years; and she is required to have made diligent
enquiries after him.

I say nothing of the laws of Greece on this subject; except generally
that in Sparta, divorces were very difficult, in Athens very easy. [ re-
fer to the Greek antiquities of Potter and Du Bos. Among the Jews ac-
cording to Selden’s uxor Hebraica, III. 17. old age, ugliness, and ill hu-
mour, were causes of divorce in a wife: so according to 24 Deut. 1, was
uncleanness. That people did not permit the privilege of divorce to
wives. 15. Jos. antig. 11 and 18 Ib. 7 and 20 Ib. 15. In England, di-
vorces are reasonably difficult, but the rights of infants seem to me super-
abundantly attended to, when the issue of an adulterous commerce,
whereon divorce is adjudicated by the legislature, is still considered legiti-
mate as to all the rights of succession to the estate of the injured father.

It is very much the fashion, (not void of foundation indeed) to abuse
Napoleon Buonaparte. It were much to be wished that the fashion
equally prevailed of imitating the many wise acts of that extraordinary
man. The subject of divorce appears to me to be better settled in the
Code Napoleon, than in any other system of laws ancient or modern;
and the general subject is well handled in the preliminary
*discourses of the orators on the occasion. [Soon after the [ *438 ]
restoration of the Bourbon dynasty the law of divorce in
440 NOTES.

 

France was changed, and in 1816 it was confined to. a judicial sentence
of separation from bed and board.] In this country, the facility of di-
vorce by management, is almost equal to that under the Government of
France during the revolution. The case of Jackson v. Jackson, 1 John-
son’s New-York Rep. 424 is warranted by sound law, and public ex-
pedience.

In Pennsylvania, the legislature of late years, have not only miserably
wasted their time in debating and deciding on particular cases (such as
convicted felons) which might easily be embraced by a general law, but
they have deliberately interfered with cases (ill usage for instance) no-
toriously within the jurisdiction of established courts. This wanton
waste of the time and money of the people, this needless interference
with judicial authority, and this facility given to applications for divorce,
appear to me great public evils: and arising from a deeper and more
systematic plan of absorbing all kind of jurisdiction, and of course all
power into the legislative, than is consistent with honest views to the
public good. Some of the cases in which this interference has taken
place, are irresistibly ludicrous: see for instance the act to dissolve the
marriage between Jacob Mayer and Catharine his wife, passed 28 March,
1808, which I presume the compiler of the index was ashamed to insert
under the usual head of divorces.

$ 3. Qui sunt in potestate. In what cases the court will interfere to
deliver a child whether bastard or legitimate into the custody of the fa-
ther or the mother, see the King v. Soper. 5. Term Rep. 278. The King
v. de Manneville, 5 East, 221. The King v. Mosley, 5 East 224. note.
The King v. Hopkins and wife, 7 East 579.

Lib. 1. Tit. X. De nuptiis page 23. In the last note but one, I have
nearly exhausted all I had to observe on marriage relationship and di-
vorce: to which I refer.

§ 2. De fratribus et sororibus. p. 24. See 18. Lev. 19. Deut. ch. 27. L.
17. Cod. h. t. Dig. 45. 1. 35. 1. The Athenians and Egyptians, permitted
the marriage of brothers and sisters Cor. nep. in Cim.

Filium emancipare. Otherwise the marriage would be dissolved, as
brothers and sisters cannot marry. Theophr.

$ 3. De fratris et sororis filia vel nepte. The prohibition extends in
England and here also I presume, to marriage generally with an illegi-
timate relation within the levitical degrees. Haines v. Jeffel or Jescott
1 Ld. Ray. 68. 5 Mod. 168. Comb. 356. This was the case of a bastard
daughter of a sister: and it falls within the reason of the case of the
daughter of a divorced wife by a second husband in section 9. of this

title.
[ *439 ] Cujus enim filiam, fc. Quere, I may not marry my *aunt,
my grand-mother’s daughter, but I marry my cousin who is

i
NOTES. 441

 

her daughter. Hence these-words must be understood as cujus enim
Sratris vel sororis filiam. Ferriere in loc.

$ 4. De Consobrinis. P. 25. The marriage of cousin-germans (sobri-
narum) diu ignorata says Tacitus, in the speech he puts in the mouth
of Vitellius, whom Claudius employed to defend his marriage with his
neice Agrippina. 12 Ann. 6. But this was not true: see the case of
Ligustinus 42 Liv. 34. Theodosius the great, forbad the marriage of
cousin-germans by a constitution not extant, which was confirmed in
substance by Arcadius law 5. of the Theodosian code de incertius nup-
éiis, who afterwards repealed his own and his father’s law by L. cele-
brandis 19. Cod. de nuptiis. In the west, Honorius forbad the marriage
of cousin-germans L. 7. Cod Theod. Si nupt. ex rescript. pet. After
the death of Justinian, the law of Theododsius was established again.
Hence the law celebrandis 19. Cod de nuptiis has been retrenched from
the Theodosian Code. These fluctuations of the principle, that the 4th
degree is not prohibited, most probably depended on the foresight of the
benefit of dispensations.

§ 5. De Amita 25. The aunt by the father’s side, matertera being
the aunt on the mother’s side. In this section, the adoptive paternal
aunt is forbidden, but not the adoptive maternal aunt. The reason is,
that adoption being the work of the paternal father only, it draws with
it agnation or relationship on the father’s side only. Dig. 38.8.1. 4
and dig. 1. 7. 23. nee avunculus nec matertera per adoptionem fiert pos-
sunt Dig. 23. 2.12.4. Hence aman might marry the daughter of an
adoptive sister, but not of adoptive brother. For the former follows the’
family of the natural father of the sister, but the father of the latter
hath become allied by adoption. Matertera in Dig. 23. 2. 55. 1. should
be struck out. Ferriere.

§ 12. De penis injustarum nuptiarum. Constitutionibus. Decuri-
ons because the curia or senate of the Colonies was supposed to consist
of the tenth part of the people: that is at the beginning. Dig. 50. 16.
239. Harris.

The Decurions were a kind of provincial senators and regulated all
the public business of the place they lived in. It was an honourable,
but an expensive and troublesome employ. This legitimation per obla-
tionem curie introduced by Theodosius the younger, entitled the son to
succeed to the father, but did not draw with it agnation. Lex. 3. Cod.
de natur. lib. L. 9. Cod. eod. Nov. 89 ch. 2 cum seq. The last sentence
of this section is of difficult meaning, for where was the ne-

‘cessity of granting by law the rights of litigation to *legiti- [ *440 ]
mate children? Ferriere thinks it relates only to the case
of achild in ventre sa mere, at the time of marriage; which otherwise
would have taken its civil state from the time of conception.

56
ne NOTES.

A third method of legitimation by imperial rescript, was introduced
by Justinian, Nov. 74. c. 2 and 89 and c. 9 and 10.

Nec non is, qui, §c. By a constitution or canon of Pope Ale ae
the third, it was enacted, “that children born before the solemnization
‘fof matrimony might nevertheless become legitimate by the subsequent
“ marriage of their parents. And in consequence of this canon, all the
“ bishops of England in the reign of Hen. 3rd, petitioned the lords, that
“they would consent that all such who were born before matrimony,
“should be legitimate, as well as those who were born after matrimony,
“tin respect of hereditary succession, inasmuch as the church aecepteth
“all such as legitimate.” But all the earls and barons with ene vole
answered that they would not change the laws of England, which had
hitherto been used and approved. Stat. Mert. 20 Hen. 3 Co. Litt. 245.
or 2 Co. Inst. 97.

Tit. XI. $1. Devisio adoptionis p. 28. Adoption was of two
kinds, 1st. simple adoption of a filius familias, 2dly, adoption by rogation
of a pater familias; so called because the parties were asked rogantur,
if they were content sotodo. The former took place before magistrates,
Dig. 1. 7 de adoptionibus, Aul. Gell. noct. att. L.5.c.19. The latter
by imperial letters Dig. 1. 7. 1 Aul. Gell. ub. sup. Cod. 8. 48. Ferriere.
(Ferriere’s other references to the Digest and the Code, do not support
this position.) Adoption forms no part of the law of England: but if
a person takes the child of another to bring it up, and (in popular lan-
guage) adopts it as part of the family, the person thus adopting stands
in loco parentis. Thus in Edmonson v. Machell 2 Term Reports 4. an
aunt recovered damages per quod servitium amisit for debauching her
niece. So also in Irwin y. Dearman 11 East 23. damages of the same
kind were given toaman who had brought up the daughter of his
friend. This may be called a quasi adoption. Bracton L. 3. ch. 29.
mentions another kind, viz. where a husband rears and educates his
wife’s bastard, he shall be considered as heir to the husband on pre-
sumption that he might have been legitimate: heres Jjudicabitur, e
quod nascitur de uxore, dum tamen presumi possint quod poterit ipsum
genuisse. :

§ 2. Ex nostra constitutione. Vid. Cod. 5.27.10. De naturalibus
liberis.

Non extraneo. That is, any person out of the direct line: for persons
adopted by an uncle or great uncle, are considered in the same light-as

if adopted by a stranger. Vinnius.
[ *441 ] *$ 3. De arrogatione impuberis, p. 29. Bonorum means
not merely goods and chattels, but estate and property, Law
208. Dig. de verbor. signif. and L.2. Cod. eod. This fourth part became
due as a debt after the decease of the adoptive father, and might be re-

xandcr,
NOTES. 443

covered by a condictio de lege, Dig. 37. 6. 1.21. The adoption of im-
puberes was first allowed by Antoninus Pius, provided it was under the
authority of imperial letters. By Jmpuberes are here meant, not boys
under 14 and girls under 12, when they were at liberty to contract ma-
trimony, but the ages of 14 and 18. See post. § 4 of this Title.

$9. Sits qui generare, §c. Spado, is one who is incapable of pro-
creation; and the disability may arise either from a permanent cause, as
castration, or a temporary one. Dig. 23. 3. 39.1. Dig. 28.2.9. The pro-
hibition in the other case, founded on the silly reason that a man who
could not naturally be a father, could not be so by adoptive fiction, was
abrogated by Leo, Nov. 36. | ,

$ 10. Si femina adoptet. They might be arrogated by imperial re-
script. Dig. 1.7.21. But the adoptive fiction was restrained here also
at first: because even children by marriage could not take the name or
come under the power of the mother. The emperor Leo, Nov. 26, per-
mitted women who never had children, and even unmarried women to
adopt.

$ 12. De servo adoptato. Nostra constitutione: viz. Cod. 7. 6. 10. de
lat. libert. tollend.

Tit. 12. Quibus modis jus patrie potestatis solvitur, p. 33. There
are some curious cases in the English books on the doctrine of filial
emancipation, as connected with parochial settlement. The King v.
Tottington, Caldecot. Sett. Cas. 287. The King v. Broad-Hembury.
H. 25 Geo. 3.2 Const. 55. 10 East, 91. The King v. Witton cum
Twambrooke, 3 Term. Rep. 355. wherein Lord Kenyon’s opinion is
corrected in 10 East, 90. Rex v. Sowerby, 2 East, 276. The ISing v.
Roach, 6 Term Rep. 247. Rex v. Woburn, 8 Term Rep. 479. The
King v. the Inhabitants of Cowhoneyborne, 10 East, 88.

$ 1. De deportatione. Deportation was banishment for life: attended
with the loss of civil rights and forfeiture of property. Relegation, was
banishment for years, without the loss of civil rights. Dig. 48. 22.
throughout. And so is the law of England, vid. Co. Litt. 133, through-
out.

In what cases the replication of Exile, Relegation, Banishment or
Abjuration, on the part of a woman suing as feme sole is necessary, see
Bagget v. Frier et al. 11 East, 301, where the principle of Marshall and
Rutton, 8 Term Rep. 545. aud Chambers and Donaldson, 9
East, *471. are recognized. The terms exile, relegation, and [ *442 ]
banishment however, are not to be found but in the marginal
abstract.

§ 3. De servituie pena, p. 34. Slaves of punishment, as having no
certain or specified master. This kind of servitude was abolished by
Justinian, Nov. 22. 8.
444 NOTES.

 

§ 4. De dignitate. See Cod. 12. 3. 5 de Consulibus. Nov. 70. by
which emancipation was annexed to the consular, episcopal and some
other dignities. :

Patriciatus dignitas. In Livy’s time, this belonged to the children
of ancient senatorial families: but on the removal of the seat of govern-
ment to Byzantium, this title was confined to persons chosen by the
emperors as counsellors of state after having been Curule Adiles.

$5. De Captivitate et postliminio, p. 35. The paternal power was
only suspended during captivity. Dig. 14.6. ult. Dig. 49. 15. 12. 1.
The captives had aright to two fictions of law in their favour. 1st
The jus postliminii ; by which the period of captivity was merged, and
the captive on his return, entered into all his rights, as if he had never
been absent. Dig. 38.16.15. Dig. 14.6.1.1. Dig. 26.1.6.ult. But
he could not change or set aside, acts legally performed in his absence.
Dig. 4.6.19. 2dly The Lex Cornelia, regarded those who diedjin captivi-
ty, as having died the moment preceding their captivity. L. 6. Cod. de
poss. rev.

§ 6. De emancipatione, p. 35. By the law of the 12 Tables, a son
was free when his father had sold him three times. Si pater filium ter
venumduit, filius a patre liber esto. The three-fold sale was thus con-
ducted. The father sold his son toa mutual friend, who paid him a
piece of money (Ses¢ertius) in the presence of five witnesses, and of the
Libripens or scale-holder. The purchaser then held the son as a slave.
He then enfranchised him by the Vindicta; whereupon the son being
free from slavery, again returned’ under power of his father, who in the
same manner sold him a second time. He was then enfranchised a
second time; sold a third time to the father (for otherwise, the seller had
he manumitted him, would have been entitled to the rights of a patron)
who liberated him in the usual manner.

- The parties to this proceeding (Emancipatio per es et libram) were
the father Pater: the friend, Pater fiduciarius: the Libripens ‘or ba-
lance-holder : the Antestator, or person who summoned the witnesses &c.
1 Hor. Sat. 9. v. 76: the witnesses Testes. he process mancipatio;
manu traditio; by the words mancupo tibi hune filium qui meus est.
The purchaser holding up the money, said hunc ego hominem er jure
Quiritium meum esse aio, isque mihi emptus est hoc ere,
[ *443 ] aneague libra *(brazen scales) and striking the scales with
the money, paid it over to the pater or natural father. When .

all was ended, the son became libra et ere libraius, Liv. VI. 14, and sui
juris. Before coin was common, money was weighed out, and assis, es,
was a pound weight, Liv IV.60. In emancipating a daughter or grand-

child, the same formalities were repeated but once. This process was
NOTES. 445

 

 

so troublesome, that at length Anastasius dispensed with the fiduciary
sale, and Justinian abolished the ceremony altogether, Cod. 8. 49. 6.

§ De nepote nato post filium emancipaium, p. 37. By the civil law,
second marriages were discountenanced, but not fordidden. A widow
was obliged to wear mourning for*her husband ten months, which was
the extent of the year under Romulus. Ovid. Fast. 1.27. The year
was extended by Numa to 12 months. Plut. in Vit. But the prohibi-
tion in cases of widowhood extended only to 10 months notwithstand-
ing; that being the period in which it was supposed a posthumous child
might be born: Ov. Fast. I. 33. By the constitutions however of several
emperors (Gratianus, Valentinian, Theodosius, &c.) widowhood was ex-
tended to the year, and if a widow married infra annum luctus, she lost
her share of her husband’s effects, Cod. 5. 9. unless in case of a dispen-
sation from the Emperor, Dig. 3. 2. 10. But widows were not compel-
lable to mourn for their husbands: that is as I understand it, not to wear
mourning, or to go through any forms or ceremonies for that purpose,
Dig. 3. 2. 9. the prohibition of marriage under the stated penalties con-
tinued nevertheless. The year of mourning, was also the time adopted
_ before the conquest, Co. Litt. 8. a. and by the Saxons: Leges Anglo-Sax.
Wilk. 109. 122. 144. But there is no prohibition of marriage to widows
at any time after their husband’s decease, either by the divine law, the
canon law, or the present law of England. 2 Burn Ecc. law, 416.

As to the law in favour of the heir, providing against a spurious post-
humous offspring, De ventre in possessionem mittendo, et curatore ejus,
see Dig. 27.9. As to the English law de ventre inspiciendo,and the time
at which a child may be born after access by the English law, to wit,
forty weeks, it is fully discussed in Co. Litt. 123. and the notes of the
editor thereupon. ‘

$10. An parentes cogi possunt, §c. p. 37. Emancipation might be
compelled by the son, 1st on account of improper severity on part of the
father: 2dly If the father ordered the son to do any indecent act: or
3dly If he refused proper nourishment. Dig. 1. 7. 32. Dig. 35. 1. 50.
Dig. 37. 12.5. Cod. 1. 4. 12.

*And a father might force his son to be emancipated in all [ *444 ]
cases which would justify disinherison. Dig. 45, 1. 132.with
the commentary of Bart. and Mynsych.

Lib. 13. De Tutelis. p. 37. Males under 14, and females under 12,
(impuberes) were Pupills and under Tutors. Minors under 25 (which
was adult age by the civil law) were under Curators: even though the
males were Patres familias. The father’s power extended throughout
adult age. :

The English law respecting guardians (which does not like the civil
446 NOTES.

law, appoint Curators for minors as a separate office) may be found ful-
ly and learnedly discussed in Co. Litt. 85 to 90. with Hargreave’s notes.

$ 3. Quibus testamento tutor datur, p. 38. Tutores dare, Because af-
ter puberty, curators only can be appointed. :

$5. De emancipatis, p. 39. Because the father having exercised his
judgment and discretion, it is deemed evidence of sufficiency. So in
- England it will require a strong case to authorize the appointment ofa
receiver against an executor, which however is sometimes done, sce 12
Vez. 4 Anonymous. and 13 Vez. 266. Middleton v. Dodswell, and tne
cases there cited. 'The first of these, determines, that poverty alone is
not a sufficient ground to authorize the appointment of a receiver over
an executor.

Tit. 14. Qui tutores, §c. p. 39. This seems contrary to the rule, Dig.
A8. 5. 21. by which those who are in the power of another cannot have
others under their power. But this must be understood of the same
kind of power. A /filius familias under the power of his father, cannot
at the same time have parental authority: but other kinds of authority
he may have. It may be enquired, if the son of a family, may be ap-
pointed, where is the security, for the faithful discharge of his duty?
Answer: Ist, the effects of the filius familias, are always bound. 2dly,
If the father assent to the tutelage, undertaken by the son, the father is
bound. Dig. 26.1.7. and 26. 7.21. 3dly. If the law casts the tutel-
age, security is required: if it be conferred by testament the testator is
deemed a‘competent judge, in a case, where he is so much concerned on
account of his children. Women could not be appointed, except mo-
thers and grand-mothers by special rescript. Dig. 26. 1. 18. Cod. 5. 35.
2, and Nov. 118. 5. In England women may be appointed.

$ 5. De tutore dato. See Dig. 26. 2.6. It is an established rule that

words are to be understood in their common and obvious
[ *445 ] meaning, *unless the context absolutely requires another.
Dig. 50. 16. 201. Dig. 14.6.14. Dig. 23. 2. 59.

This section of Justinian, is referred to by Foster Justice, in Rex v.
Taunton, St. Mary Magdalen, cited 4 Term. Rep. 798. Whether child
includes grand-children, must depend upon the context: it does not ap-
pear to me that there is any rule precisely settled about it. In Wythe
v. Thurlston, Amb. 555. Hussey v. Dillon, Ib. 604, and Gall v. Bennet,
Ib. 681. bequest to child, was held to include grand-child. But in
Cooke v. Brooking 2 Vern. 107. where there was a child and several
grand-children, the latter were held not to fall under the term of the
bequest. The King v. Taunton, St. Mary Magdalen, which was a case
under the certificate act relating to the settlement of paupers, Burr. 402,
was set aside by Lord Kenyon, in the King v. the inhabitants of Dar-
NOTES. aay
lington, 4 Term Rep. 799. ind in Radcliffe, and Buckley, where the
modern cases are considered, 10 Vez. 195:: it is there decided that under

“a bequest to’ children, grand-children are not entitled unless the will
_ would be inoperative without them; a point before determined by Lord

Alvanley in Reeves v. Brymer, 4 Vez. 698.

The other cases relating to the construction of words of this class, in
a devise are collected by Roper on Legacies, 8 et seq. and in 6 Cruise
on real property, 183, 187.

Tit. 15.$ 1. Qui sunt agnati. Agnati, relations by the male side:
Cognati, by the female side. Change of civil condition might destroy
agnation, Dig. 26. 4.7. and L. 4. $ ult. Cod. de leg. tut. Dig. 38. 10.
10. 2. Dig. 38. 16.2. 1. The difference between agnati and cognati was
done away by Justinian Nov. 118. 4. 5.

By a law of the twelve tables, if a man died intestate without chil-
dren, the law cast the inheritance wpon the agnati. If he left a child,
the agnati were called to the tutelage by operation also of law; for the
Romans were of opinion the next heir to the pupil was the properest
person to take care of the estate, being most interested in it. By alaw
of Solon, the next in succession was excluded from the tutelage, from
suspicion that the pupil was not safe under his care. So by the English
law, guardian in socage must be next of blood who cannot inherit. Co.
Litt..88. A hard rule. Dormer’s case, 2 P. W. 263.

Tit. 19. De fiduciaria Tutela, p. 46. Perfecte sint atatis. That is
25 years of age.

Age has been well enough divided into

- Infantia 1—7 Infancy
Minority. Pueritia 7—14 Childhood
Pubertas 14—25 Puberty

Juventus 25—50 Youth
* Majority. Virilitas 50—70 Manhood [ #446 ]
Senium 70—&c. Old-age.

According to modem notions however, youth can hardly be extended
to fifty. YetI recollect that Julius Cesar at the age of fifty, is some
where called vearroxos a young man. The ancients seem to have extend-
ed the nominal period of youth longer than the moderns, thus Aristotle
regards the age of 37 as the proper time for a man to marry.

The different privileges of different ages by the law of England, is
well expressed by Blackstone in his Commentaries. ‘The Mate at 12
may take the oath of Allegiance: at fourteen is at years of discretion,
and may therefore consent or disagree to marriage; may choose his
Guardian, and if his discretion be actually proved, may make his testa-
iment of his personal estate; at seventeen may be an executor; and at
twenty-one is at his own disposal, and may aliene his lands, goods and
448 NOTES.

 

chattels. A Frmate, also at seven years may be betrothed or given in
marriage ; at nine is entitled to Dower; at twelve is at years of maturi-
ty, and therefore may consent or disagree to marriage; and if proved to.
have sufficient discretion may bequeath her personal estate ; at fourteen
is at years of legal discretion, and may choose a Guardian: at seven-
teen may be executrix; and at twenty-one may dispose of herself and
her lands; so that the full age in male and female is 21 years; which
age is completed on the day preceding the anniversary of a person’s
birth, who till that time is an Infant, and so styled in law.”

Minority by the French Code, extends also to the age of 21 years. I
confess this appears to mea period upon the whole too early to puta
young man in possession of all the rights belonging to adult age. Still
more objectionable are the privileges given by the English law to inter-
vening ages; as that a boy and a girl of 14 and 12 may consent to mar-
riage; which however is the regulation of the civil law also. \

The French provisions as to minority; tutelage, and emancipation
are to be found in the 11th law or title, of the code Napoleon.

Tit. 20. De'Atiliano Tutore, §c. 47, The law Attilia was a plebis-
cite passed 444. U. C. of the law Julia and Titia there is no certain ac-
count. This legal appointment of a Tutor, is somewhat like the ap-
pointment of Guardians by application to the Court of Chancery, Ab.
ca. in Eq. 260: and the like practice obtains in Pennsylvania. It took
place either when there was no legal, or no testamentary tutor, or when
the latter had only conditional and qualified powers, or wished to be

excused for good reasons, or suffered a change of state, or if
[ *447 ] the *tutor died, or if he or the pupil were taken captive.

Marcus Aurelius appointed two Preetors, whose sole occupa-
tion was the appointment of tutors. Capitolin. in Divo Marco ch. 10.
But I apprehend, this was in defect not only of testamentary tutors, but
where in cases of intestacy the Tudela legitima did not take place for
want of a near agnate on whom it should fall by law.

§ 7. De Tutele ratione reddenda. By the civil Jaw, an action of
Tutelage could not be sustained till the Tutelage expired. Dig. 27. 3.
4. But in England a minor may oblige his guardian to account by pro-
chein ami. ;

Tit. 21. In quibus causis auctoritas sit necessaria, p. 49.

The general rules of the Civil law and of the English law for the
protection of Infants, proceed on the same obvious principle, that no one
shall be permitted to take advantage of the want of experience to which
an infant is necessarily subject. But the English law or rather the

feudal law, certainly goes to the utmost verge of reason and justice, when
it stops the progress of a suit wherein a minor is a party and claims by
descent, or defends in debt as heir, by suffering the parol to demur until
NOTES. 449

x

the minor arrive at full age. This was unknown to the civil law where
the guardian (whether tutor or curator) might conduct the cause—where
a curator might be appointed compulsorily for the management of a suit
on behalf of an infant—and where the infant when of age had a,remedy
against his tutor for fraud or negligence, and a minor had the same right
of suing his curator even during his minority. This indeed is the case
in England, where also the Guardian may be sued by prochein ami.
See 14. Vin. Ab. 198. 2. Cro. 640. Simpson and Simpson v. Jackson,
wherein it was determined that an infant may sue by prochein ami, but
must defend by guardian. The same right of suit in favour of infants
obtains in this country also. See Parsons v. Mills et al. 2 Massach.
Rep. 80.

I apprehend that strictly, the law of Pennsylvania, will admit the
parol to demur in the same cases with the English law. For although
in suits where an infant is defendant and no guardian appointed, the
court on motion will appoint the clerk of the court, or any indifferent
person a Guardian pro lite, yet this no more interferes with the law
respecting the parol demurring, than the same practice in England under
Shipman and Stevens, 2 Wils. 50. Moreover, I apprehend the general
law of England on this head, is judicially recognized in Pennsylvania,
as the judges of the supreme court have adopted one of the exceptions
to it, to wit, 6 Edw. 1ch.2: but they have not noticed
*another, viz. the stat. of west. lst: 3 Edw. 1 ch.46. See3 [ *448 ]
Binn. 601. 662. app.

Even by the old law, the parol did not demur, in dower, or quare
impedit, or waste, where the remedy was required to be speedy, nor in
partition, where no title was involved: and until the act of assembly of
Pennsylvania, giving new form and substance to the action of ejectment,
it might have been doubted, whether any suit in this state could arise,
wherein the question could be made whether the parol should demur.
But now by act of 21 March, 1806, the action of ejectment is so formed,
that it differs only from a real action, in as much as one verdict is not
eonclusive.

As to the appointment of guardians pro lite, it might be made a ques-
tion whether the laws establishing the orphan’s court enable the bench
there to appoint compulsorily a guardian pro lite to appear in another
court, and whether any other court has power to appoint to such .a
guardian. But the practice seems to authorize it.

With respect to the other states, I am not able to give precise infor-
mation on this. head.

In Virginia indeed, it is declared by an express law of 1797, ch. 98.
that the parol shall not demur in any suit on account of infancy. 3

56
450 NOTES.

Tucker’s Blackstone, p. 300. n. Their practice in common cases is to
appoint a guardian pro dite on motion, with notice to the infant. Fox v.
Cosby, 2 Call’s Virginia reports, p. 1.

The cases relating to the privilege of infancy, may be collected from
that title in Co. Litt. with Hargreave and Butler’s notes, and Williams’s
Saunders, as to real property. ‘The cases bearing on their civil con-
tracts, are well collected by Bacon, in his abridgment; by Espinasse, in
his Digest; and in Comyn’s law of contracts. The body of chancery
decisions, must be sought for in the ch. reports under that head, where
among other cases relating to infancy, the rights of wards in chancery
and female infants generally, are protected with an assiduous severity,
carried to the full length of public expedience. If the hands of hus-

~bands be so tied up by chancery, as effectually to prevent their wasting
the property acquired through the wife, their exertions for the improve-
ment of their common fortune, are also cramped—creditors are misled
by the appearance of opulence to trust the husband beyond the funds
they can ultimately apply to—and women are carefully instructed in
tights and interests, separate from those of their husbands. The state
of society may require these protections and precautions, but it is a state
of society not to be envied, in this respect at least.
[ *449 ] *Since the preceding compilations, it seems to be decided
in Williamson v. Watts, 1 Camp. C. Rep. et Nis. Pri. 552.
That although an infant may give a single bill without a penalty for
necessaries and bind himself, he cannot give a bill of exchange. Al-
though the single bill is out of use in England, it is not so here.

The provisions of the French code, respecting tutelage and the in-
terests of infants, will be found in the references under the article Mi-
nour. Recueil. Tom. 2. Titres 8, 9 & 10.

The following are the principal cases I have found in American re-
porters, as to the contracts of infants. ‘

In 1 Dall. 166. Silver v. Shelback: it was decided that the appear-
ance of an infant to a suit brought against him, is not a judicial act,
and is fatal on error: and unless in certain cases of real actions, judg-
ment against an infant will be reversed at full age.

Stansbury v. Marks, 4 Dall. 130. Infancy may be given in evidence
on non assumpsit in Pennsylvania, owing to the intermingling of com-
-mon law and equity jurisdictions in that state.

Hart v. Hosack, 1 Caines N. Y. Rep. 26. An infant of 14 years put
on trial with a physician, cannot at his own will become a student, so
as to charge his parent with the student’s fee.

Court will not discharge an infant out of custody on that ground
only, where no fraud is suggested; but will leave him to use infancy in
his defence. Clemson v. Bush, 3 Binn. 413.
NOTES. 451,

Weed v. Ellis, 3 Caines, 253. The Saeed of an ‘inant may abitrate
on behalf of his ward: and the plea of performance will bar the infant
at full age.

Van Winkle v. Ketcham, 3 Caines, 323. The note of an infant-given
in course of trade cannot be enforced against him.

Conroe v. Bridshall, 1 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 123. An infant at the time
of executing a bond, alleged he was full age: yet the bond was held
void as against him.

Jackson ex dem. Renselear v. Whitlock, Ib. 213. Whether an infant
can be disseized, and then bound to bring his action within ten ae of
his coming of age?

The plea of infancy can be pleaded by or on behalf of the infant on-
ly: it is a personal privilege. Van Bramer v. Cooper impleaded with
Van Bramer, 2 Johns. N. Y. Rep. Same point decided in Hartness v.
Thompson and others, 5 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 160. In such a case where
there are several defendants: and one of them an infant, the plaintiff
may enter nol pros. against the infant and proceed against the rest, or
the jury may find for the infant, and against the other de-
fendants.

* Whether the deed of land by an infant to A, is avoided by [ *450 ]
his deed for the same land to B, when he is at full age?

Jackson ex dem. Dunbar et al. v. Todd, 6 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 257.
Knapp v. Crosby. 1 Massach. Rep. 476. Judgment cannot be taken
against an infant who does not appear by Guardian.

In re Augustus le Forrestiere. 2 Mass. Rep. 419. Can an infant be
naturalized in this country on his own petition? or on that of his
guardian ?

1 Washington’s Virg. Rep. 299, Buckner v. Smith. An infant gave a
bond for a gaming debt: on arriving at full age he promised to pay it:
held that he was bound. 2 Hening and Munford’s Vir. Rep. 289. Fitz-
hugh v. Anderson et al. Infancy does not stop the act of limitations.

Tabb et al. v. Archer et al. 3 Hen. and Mun. 400. Infants may con-
tract by marriage articles which they cannot set aside on arriving at
full age. Indeed, those articles enure to the benefit of the children who
may be the first of that marriage. Harris and M‘Henry’s Maryland
Reports, Vol. 1. p. 459. Lane and Gover. Infant defendant appearing,by
guardian, in ejectment, is liable to process for costs.

Ib. p. 67. Infant, and those claiming under him, not diverted by the
’ cancelling of a part in chancery, if he was not made a party.

Ib. 152. Infant not barred by an adverse twenty years possession.
Cheseldine v. Brewer.

Ib. 568. Infant feme sole bound by a marriage'settlement at semble.

Tit. 23. De Curatoribus, p. 53. These agreed with tutors in that

 

 
‘

452 NOTES.

 

they might be appointed by the same magistrates, were held to security,
might be excused or removed for good reasons, assigned. They differed
from tutors, in that a tutor might be appointed without the consent
of the pupil, which generally speaking, a curator could not be. A
tutor was appointed principally to the care of the person, a curator to
the care of the property. A father could not appoint a curator by will;
he might declare a testamentary tutor. A tutor could not be sued by
the pupil till afler tutelage, a curator might be sued by the minor during
his curatorship. In these several respects, the office of curator approach-
ed nearer to that of our Guardian, than a tutor. See Cujacius, observ.
L.17.ch. 7. A curator might be appointed compulsorily ad lites, in case ©
of a payment made. by a debtor to a minor creditor. Dig. 4. 4.7. 2. or
where a tutor gave in his account. L. 7. Cod. qui petant Tut. -

Until the time of Caracalla and Justinian, from the difficulty that
minors experienced in getting possession of their property, they were

induced to apply to the courts, to have curators appointed,
{ *451 ] Dig. 4.4. *1.3. Dig. 26.6.2.4and 5. But those emperors

relaxed the practice and exonerated persons from compulsory
curatorship.

Masculi quidem puberes. By the civil law, males of twenty five
years of age, and females of eighteen having given sufficient proof by
five or more witnesses of their prudence and morality, might obtain a
licence from the emperor enabling them to manage their own affairs,
under proper restrictions. F'or minors are not permitted by this licence
to aliene, or even to mortgage their immoveable possessions, without a
special decree for this purpose. Cod. 2.45. 1, 2,3. De his qui ven.
etat, impetr.

$ 1. A quibus dentur curatores. Testamento non dantur. For a fa-
ther cannot dispose of the goods of his son arrived at puberty, who at
that age may make a will for himself, Dig. 28.6. But the magistrates
usually appointed the curator recommended by the father, Dig. 26. 1.
39. 1.

$2. Quibus dentur. Item inviti adolescentes.| Ravardus and others
have accused Tribonian, as guilty of an error, in saying, that minors,
after fourteen, could not be obliged to receive curators.— And, in sup-
port of their accusation, they allege the opinion of Ulpian, whose words
are these.— Hodie in hance usque etatem adolescentes curatorum aucilio
reguniur, nec ante rei suc administratio eis committi debebit, quamvis
bene rem suam gerentibus. ff. 4.t. 4.1. 1. But it must be observed,
that, with regard to minors after puberty the Roman law has frequently
been altered. By the law Letoria, ann. urb con. 550. such adults only,
who behaved ill, were obliged to receive curators after proof had been

 

 

 

oa
NOTES. 453

 

‘made of their ill behavior. But afterwards it was enacted, by a con-

stitution of Marcus Antoninus, Ut omnes adulti, curatores acciperent, non

redditis causis: which must mean, that adults might be obliged to re-

ceive curators, although nothing could be alleged against their conduct;

for it is certain, that adults might voluntarily receive curators, even be-

fore the law Letoria. And, when Ulpian wrote, the constitution of

Marcus Antoninus was as yet unrepealed; but afterwards, in the latter

part of the reign of Antoninus Caracalla, it appears from Cod. 5. ¢.31. 1. 1.

that the Roman law was again altered, and that curators could not be
given, but to such minors as were willing to receive them, unless ad
litem.

And in this, thelaw of England may be said to agree in general with
the civil law: for, with us, guardianship regularly determines, when the
minor has completed his fourteenth year; except, where there is a guar-
dian by nature, or when the father of a minor has specially appointed
a guardian either by deed, or will, to continue for a longer
*time. And therefore a minor, after fourteen, being of course [ *452 ]
freed from custody, is at liberty, if willing, to put himself a
second time under guardianship, until he is of full age. But, if a minor,
being an adult, does not consent to receive a new guardian, then-no
court would appoint a guardian, unless ad litem.

But, if a testator nominates a guardian, till his son arrives at full age,
then the son, although above fourteen, is compelled to receive the guar-
dian, who is thus expressly appointed for a certain time; but, if no cer-
tain time is mentioned, there is then no guardianship, if the minor is an
adult. Vaugh. 185. (Harris.)

§ 3. De furiosis et prodigis. 'The text is here deficient and the trans-
lation follows the pharaphrase of Theophilus.

In England, whose decisions I believe are generally adopted in this
country, lunatics are put into commission under chancery jurisdiction :
and lunacy is held to extend not merely to strict insanity, but to all
cases of mental imbecility or incapacity from any cause, as disease, ha-
bitual intoxication, &c. Ridgeway v. Darwin, 8 Vez. 65. ex parte Cran-
mer, 12 Vez. 445. How far the court of chancery will interfere in the
disposal of a lunatic’s estate, what nature and extent is conceded toa
commission of lunacy, and to what controul they are subject, will be
found under this head in each of the volumes of Vezey, junior, from 8.
to 14.

In Holland I believe curators are appointed to take care of the estate
of prodigals. See the cases cited in the notes to Folliot v. Ogden. 1
Henry Blackstone’s Rep. 131.

The chancery jurisdiction in cases of idiocy and lunacy in England,
454 NOTES.

 

arises from the fiction that the king is the guardian of all such persons.
4 Co. Rep. 125.

Tit. 24. Qui satisdare cogantur, p. 55. This was done by joint se-
curity; fide-jussore. Dig. 46. 6. pass. except in testamentary curator-
ships, for the same reason that we do not compel an executor, although, -
we compel an administrator to give security. Guardians appointed by
the court, were sometimes exempted. Dig. 26.2.17.19. L. penult
Cod. de tut. et cur. qui non statisd. L.7.$ 5. Cod. de curat. fur.
Dig. 26. 5. 13 et ult.

§ 2. Qui ex administratione. Sciendum. Various remedies are given
to pupils and minors, who have received any damage by the male-ad-
ministration or negligence of their tutors or curators. _

The personal actions, to which minors are intitled, against their tu-
tors or curators, are called Actiones tutele@ and negociorum gestorum utiles.
Quicquid tutoris dolo vel lata culpa aut levi, seu curatoris,
[ *453 ] *minores amiserint, vel, cum posseni, non acquisiserint ; hoc

in tutele seu negotiorum gestorum utile judicium venire, non
est incerti juris.

 

Cod. 5. t. 51. 1-7.

And the heirs of tutors and curators are also liable to the same ac-
tions 0b dolum et latam culpam. Cod. 2. t. 19. 1. 17.

Pupils or minors may also sue the sureties of their tutors or curators,
(and even their heirs) by an action arising from the stipulation entered
into by such sureties. D. 27. t. 7. Il. 3, 5., Col. 5. t. 57. ll. 1, 2.

And lastly, as their dernier resort, minors have a right to an action
called subsidiary, against any magistrate, who hath neglected to do his
duty, either by taking no security, or what was not sufficient. D. 27. t.
8.1.1. §. 6.

But the heirs of tutors, curators, sureties and magistrates, are only
suable in cases of fraud in themselves, or in those, to whom they are
heirs; but not merely on account of negligence. D. 27.t. 7.1.4. ©.5.
t. 75. 1. 2. Claude Ferriere, h. t. (Harris.)

[Constitutionibus] Cod 5, t. 43. 1. 3.

Cicero mentions the judicium tutele, orat. pro Roscio 6. Delinquent
tutors were sometimes severely punished : See Suet. in Galb.

$ 3. Si tutor vel curator cavere volit. LL. 3. Cod de suspect tut.

§ 4. Qui dicta actione non tenentur. Evigere solent. The action
of caution was the business of inferior magistrates: of the scribes at
Rome, and of the Duumviri in the provinces. Cod. 5.75. ult. Dig. 27.
8. 1. Dig. 15.1.1. (Harris.)

Tit. 25. Denumero Liberorum. p. 57. Excusantur autem. There
is no compulsory guardianship either in England, or this country,
NOTES. 455

 

$ 1. De administratione rei fiscalis. In semestribus. 'The semesire
concilium was a privy counsel, composed of a certain number of sena~-
tors chosen by lot, and changed every six months. This council was
first appointed by Augustus Cesar, that he might diminish the power of
the senate and increase hisown. Suet. in Aug. ch. 35. Dion. L. 53.
Dig. 27.1. 41. Cod. 5. 62. 10. 25.

§ 4. Delite cum pupillo, &c. p.58. This law is now useless, for
by the 72nd Novel, Justinian prohibited the debtors and creditors of mi-
nors from being tutors or curators. (Harris.)

— § 5. De tribus tutele et cure oneribus. See Dig. 27. 1. 31.

§ 6. De paupertate. Divi fratres. The emperors were stiled divi,
or divine, because they were considered in every respect as gods, after
the ceremony of their apotheosis had been performed. Herod. Lib. 3.
The divi fratres here spoken of, are conjectured by Vinnius
to *have been Marcus Aurelius, and Alius Verus, the sons [ *454 ]
of Antonius Pius.

§$ 11. De Inimicitiis, &c. p. 60. By a capital enmity, is understood
such as might arise from a public accusation, affecting the life, liberty,
and good name of the party accused. Dig. 50. 16.103. But even such
an accusation would not excuse a testamentary tutor, inasmuch as the
appointment would imply the testator’s forgiveness, unless it appeared
that he acted upon another motive, and intended only to lay a burden
upon the person, whom he had nominated. Heinecc. Vinn.

§ 14. De Militia. But if he had voluntarily acted, he would be
subject to the action negotiorum gestorum. Cod. 5. 33. 4. Cod. 6.
36. 8.

§$ 16. De tempore et modo proponendi, &c. p. 61. Non appellant.
That is, they should not appeal from the appointment, but from the de-
cision by which their excuses were rejected. Dig. 49. 4. 1.

Tit. 26. Unde suspecti: p. 62. Crimen here means an accusation.
So it is rendered by Theophilus zege 170 xateyoguae, So Cicero pro Ro-
scio; ‘“ Roscius appears to me to have three obstacles to contend with,
Crimen adversariorum, et audacia, et Potentia.” (Harris.)

§ 2. Qui suspecti fieri possunt, p. 63. Et possunt quidem omnes.
Guardians at common law may be removed or compelled to give secu-
rity, if there appears any danger of their abusing either the person or
the estate of the minor. Stiles, 456. Hard. 96. 3 Chan. rep. 58. 1
Sid. 424. #

But there is no instance of the removal of a statute guardian. Yet
terms have frequently been imposed, so as effectually to prevent such
guardian from doing any act to the prejudice of the minor. But quare
whether causes may not arise for which a statute or testamentary guar-
456 NOTES.
dian may be totally removed, notwithstanding the statute; as if he be-
came lunatic, &c. for a guardianship being a personal is not an assign-
able office; nor can it go to executors ‘or adiinistrators.. Vaugh. 180.
Cas. in eq. ab. 261. So far Harris. That guardianship is not assign-
able, 9 Mod. 90. Reynolds v. Lady Tenham. Mellish v. Da Costa, 2
Atk. 14. It was decided in Foster v. Denny, 2 Cas. in ch. 237. that al-
though a guardian at common law might be removed, a statute guardian
could not. But I doubt whether this be law, see the cases of Roach »v.
Garvan, 1 Vez. Sen. 160. Duke of Beaufort v. Berty, 1.P. Will. 704.
O‘Keefe v. Casey, 1 Sch. and Lefroy, 106.
Guardians under the English law, were either guardians, Ist, By
chivalry: or 2dly, By socage: or 3dly, By nature, as the
[ *455 ] parent: or *4thly By nurture, which is nearly the same: or
5thly, By statute’(to wit, by 4. and 5 Ph. and. Mary Ch. 8
and 12 Ch. 2 ch. 24. which enables a father to appoint a testamentary
guardian: or 6thly, By custom. Co. Litt. 88.b. To which may be
added after Hargreave in his notes thereon, 7thly, By election of the in-
fant; before a judge on the circuit, or by deed, as in the case of lord
Baltimore for the custody of his Maryland estate: or 8thly, By appoint-
ment of the chancellor :. or 9thly, By the ecclesiastical court: or 10thly,
Ad litem.

In Pennsvlyania, we have no chivalry: nor as I incline to think any
tenure in the socage since the revolution, notwithstanding the terms of
Penn’s charter. Our tenure, being free of any rent or service, but what
the state (i. e. the great mass of citizens) imposes by common consent,
seems to be, allodial. We acknowledge guardianship of parents, and
guardians appointed by will of the parents, and guardianship by ap-
pointment of the orphans court, without the consent of the minors if
under 14 by petition of the mother or prochein ami, and with the con-
sent of the minors if above 14, signified in open court. Our laws also,
compel guardians and executors of whatever description to give security,
if good cause be shown; and for like cause I apprehend they are also
compellable to give additional security, or may be removed: see the laws _
of this state relating to the power and duties of the orphan’s court.

Curators are appointed to minors by the code Napoleon; which also
adopts the provision of the civil law for curators ad custodiam ventris,
in favour of the heir.

Fama patroni parcendum. 'The action was directed to be an action
on the case, in factum, in which no suggestion of fraud was permitted.
Dig. 4. 3. 11.

$ 5. Qui dicatur suspectus, p. 64. Cod. 5. 43, 23.

$12. Si suspectus satis offerat, et quis dicatur suspectus, p. 64. The
NOTES. | 457

 

provisions of the latter part of this section are supported by Rex #. Sir
Richard Haines, 1 Lord Ray. 361. and 12 Mod. 205. and Hill v. Muls, 1
Show. 293. and 12 Mod. 9. Anonymous, 12 Vez. 4. Generally although
the court of chancery_on cvidence of misapplication of assets, or dauger
of the estate will appoint a recciver over an executor, it niust be a strong
case, Middleton v. Dodswell, 13 Vez. 266.

Liper 2. Tit. 2. De fluminibus et portubus, p. 68. see Hargreave’s
law tracts de portibus maris; and the cases of Cortelyon v. Van Brundt,
2 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 360. and a full discussion of the right of fishery in
Pennsylvania, in Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binney 475.

§ 4. De usu et proprietate riparum. Sce farther on this subject Dig.
43. 12. 3. and 41. 1. 15. 30.

*The law of Pennsylvania on this subject will’ be found [ *456 J
in part in the case of Carson v. Blazer, above cited’ from 2
Binn. 465. As to the law of England consult the 6th chapter of Sir
Mathew Hale’s treatise, de portibus maris, published by Hargreave
among his law tracts: the case of Young v. , 1 Ld Raymond, 726,
which determines that at common law, the public ate entitled to towing
paths along the banks of navigable rivers; also again determined by
Holt, in Domina regina v. the Inhaktitants of Cluworth, 6 Mod. 163
oveiru'ed in Ball v. Herbert, 3 Term Rep. 253, where the question is dis-
cussed at length. The case of the London wharves, 1 Sir W. Black.
583, determined that commissioners appointed by the king to lay out
wharves, could only lay them out in places unbuilt on and open. As‘ to
the right of taking fish on the sea shore between high water mark and
low water mark, see Bagott v. Orr, 2 Bos. and Pull. 472.

$ 10. De rebus sanctis. p. 70. Res suncte, that is, res sancite: san»
tione aliqua munite: protected specially. I have translated it holy, as
Harris has done; but the meaning may be different from Res sacre,
and Res religosee, which were set apart for religious purposes, and were
divini juris: so in the same sense, the persons of princes and embas-
sadors were sancte. Liv. IJI.55. Magistrates, &c. Dig. 1.8.8.1. But
res sancte also.include the res sacre and religiose. Gaius in Dig. 1. 8;
1. pr. Sanctum esse interdum idem quod sacrum, idemque quod religios-
um: interdum aliud, hoc est nec sarcum nec religiosum. Macrob. E. c.

$ IL De reb. singulorum. p. 70. Dominium is divided into three
kinds by the civilians. It is either, Ist directum dominium, or usufruc-
tuary. dominion. Dominium utile, as between landlord and tenant. Or:
it is 2dly full property and simple property. ‘The former is such.as:be-
longs to the cultivator of his own estate, the other is the property of a-
tenant. 3dly Dominion acquired by the law of. nations, and dominion
acquired by municipal law. By the law of nations. property: may be’

58

 
458 a3 NOTES.

 

acquired by occupation, by accession, by commixtion, by use or the
pernancy of the usufruct, and by tradition or delivery.

As to the dominiwm eminens, the right.of the public in cases of
emergency to seize upon the property of individuals, and convert it to -
public use; and the right of individuals in similar cases to commit tres-
pass on the persons and properties of others, see the opinion of chief
justice M‘Kean, in Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dallas, 362, and the case
of Vanborne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. Rep. 304. I am not convinced by
Judge Patterson in that case, that a just compensation must always be

a money price.
[ *457 ] *See further as to dominium eminens, or the right of the

community to take at a fair price the property of individuals
for public use, the supplement of 1802 to the Pennsylvania compromis-
ing law respecting the Wyoming controversy. Vattel.L. I. ch 20. $244
—248. Bynkershoek, Lib. 2. ch. 15. Rosseau’s social compact, ch. 9.
Domat, L. 1. tit.8. $1. p. 381. fol. ed. De Tott's mem. the case of a
Jew, whom the grand Signor was compelled by the Mufti to purchase
out: cited in Lindsay et al. v. the commissioners, 2 Bay. South Carolina
rep. 41. $ 13. De vulneratione. In Sutton and Moody, 1 Salk. 556. -1
Lord Ray. 250. Comyns, rep. 34. cited in Vere v. Lord Cawdon, 11
East. 570, if one start a hare in my close and kill her there, itis my hare,
otherwise if he hunt her into the ground of another; for then it is the
hunter’s. Though this indeed is not exactly the case of the text.

In Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines N. Y. Rep. 175. the question is very fully
discussed, with references to the civil law doctrine, and the law as laid
down by Puffendorf and Barbeyrac, and Fleta, and Blackstone; and de-
termined that wild animals, feree nature (this was the case of a fox) be-
come the subjects of occupancy, only when they are either taken, or so
disabled or circumvented as to render their capture certain: and there-
fore, that no action will lie against B. for killing such an animal, origi-
nally started and pursued by the plaintiff A. who was on the point of
taking it. That a foxis always so considered is ceriain, see the opinion
of the court, in Respublica v. Sparhawk, late above quoted.

I confess I do not consider the subject exactly in the same point of view.
It appears to me that the question is not merely whether the animal pur-
sued be ferze nature or not, but whether it be wild and noxious, without
being valuable. A fox, a bear, a stag, a beaver, a raccoon, an otter, &c.
are clearly wild animals; but the skin of them may be of more value
than the flesh of a tame animal of equal size. If I pursue the creature
for profit, I am entitled to it, if I have so conducted the chase as to put
the animal in my power: any other person coming in between me and
manucaption in such a case, cannot be considered as entitled to any part
NOTES. 459

of theprey. Just as if a ship of war of a belligerent, pursues an enemy’s
vessel, and so gains upon her, being of superior force also, that the cap-
ture is certain, in such a case, another vessel of the same belligerent as-
sisting, would not be entitled to any share of the prize money: but if
the latter vessel, rendered a doubtful chance certain, and contributed to
take a prize which probably would not have been taken without such
assistance, then the prize cannot be claimed in toto by the first pursuer.

But if the wild animal be pursued not for profit but extir-
pation, *then, any intervenient person, may asI suppose, [ *458 ]
lawfully assist; and no action lies against him for killing it,
though started and chased by another, as was determined in Pierson v.
Post. Still, a distinction may reasonably suggest itself, when the animal
ir pursued not for the mere purpose of extirpation, but for the pleasure
of hunting, according to the usual rules and practice of those who follow
that amusement. I well remember that in my time and in my immedi-
ate neighborhood in Cheshire in England, foxes were regularly imported
from France to supply the demands of the Hunt. The sudden shoot-
ing of a fox just ran down after a day’s chase, would in that part
of the kingdom be regarded as an outrage upon the rights of the pursu-
ers, and upon the rules of good manners, not tamely to be borne. But
the law has hitherto it seems, refused to recognize the rights of Fox-
hunters.

$14 De Apibus, p.72. In conformity to the doctrine here laid down,
itis decided in Gillet v. Mason, 7 John’s. N. York Rep. 16, that Bees
are fere nature, and until hived and reclaimed, no property can be ac-
quired in them: and that the finding a Bee-tree on the land of another,
and marking it with the initials of the finder’s name, is not suchian ap-
propriation as will be a substitute for the actual reclaiming of them:
nor can the finder maintain trespass against any other person who under
these circumstances cuts down the tree and takes the honey.

In Wallis v. Mease, 3 Binney, 546, it was determined that wild bees
remaining on the tree where they have hived, notwithstanding the tree
is upon the land of an individual, and he has confined them in it, are
not the subjects of felony. This section of Justinian is there cited and
assented to by Judge Brakenridge, who enters at some length into the
reason of the doctrine: see 2 Blacks. Comm. 392. Bro. Abs. title Pro-
perty, 37. .

§ 18. De occupatione eorum, p. 73. Found—means, not merely dis-
covered, but taken up. Dig. 41. 2. 1. 1.

$19. De fetu animalium, p. 73. That is by accession: which is 1st
by increment of stock. 2dly By alluvion. 3dly An article manufactured
out of materials belonging to us. 4thly By the annexation or junction
to our property, of something belonging to another.
469 NOTES.

 

$20. De alluvione, p.74. This doctrine of alluvion is the law of
England also: See 2 Black. Comm. .261. Adams v. Frothingham, 3
Massach. Rep. 352.

§ 21. Devi fluminis. p.74, Dig. 41. 1.7.1. Dig. 39.°2. 9.2. But

‘if I leave it till it can no more be separated, I have a right to

[ *459 ] nothing *but an action for the value. Dig. 6. 1. 23. 3. and

6.1.5.3. Dig. 41.1.9. Lord Ray. 737 Waterman v. Soper.

$ 22. De insula, p.74. The law of England is different, b¥ which

it belongs to the kings. 2 Black. Comm. 261. Some of the principles
on this subject are touched in Carson v. Blazer. 2 Binn. 485.

§ 23. De alveo, p. 75. Dig. 43.12.1.7. Dig. 7. 4.24. Dig. 41. 1.
7. &:

§ 25. De specificatione p. 75. Sabinianorum et Proculianorum.] The
two sects of Sabinians and Proculians took their rise in the reign of
Augustus, but were not distinguished by any particular appellation till
long afterwards: for the Sabinians obtained their name from Sabinus,
who was a favourite of the emperor Tiberius: and the Proculians were
socalled from Proculus, who flourished under Vespasian. Itis generally
held, that Atteins Capito, who lived in the Augustan age, and was a
person remarkable for his great attachment to precedents and old cus-
toms, was the chief of the Sabinians; and that Antistins Labeo, his co-
temporary, who did not confine himself wholly to rules, but followed
principally the dictates of reason and his own understanding, was the
head of the Proculian sect. ‘These sects continued in vogue to the reign
of Marcus Aurelius, till which time, the students of the law generally
attached themselves to cither the one or the other. But the lawyers of
that reign affected neither party in particular; for at different times they
dispassiouately approved the opinicns of either sect, as they judged
them more or less agreeable to justice and right reason: and they gen-
erally endeavoured by an equal temperature, to avoid the absurdities,
into which both parties, by reason of their great dislike and opposition
to each other, had frequently fallen. ff. 1. de origine juris. Hist. du
droit Romain, par Claude Ferriere.

These lawyers (who from their conduct were denominated E’rciscun-
di, from the old verb erciscere to divide) are the persons, hinted at by
Justinian in this paragraph ; as observing a just mean between the two
parties. (Harris. ) ¥

This is somewhat like the old question of the schools, an formia, dat
esse rei: Which Proculus determined in the affirmative. Dig. 41. 1. 7.
7. Sezon this subject Touson v. Collins, L Sir W. Bl. 307 and the refer.
rences to Puffend. aud Selden’s Mare claus.

§ 26. De accessiune, p. 77. Dig. 6. 1. 23. 5 and 6. 1. 26. 1 Dig. 34. 2.
19. 13. :
NOTES. 461

 

The Condictio lies against the heirs of the purloiner; Dig. 13. 1. 5.
Against other possessors, the action ad exhibendum lies, to ascertain
Whether the two materials can be separated. Dig. 10. 4. 6
and 7. *Dig. 1. 23. If it cannot, then the action ¢riticaria [ *460 ]
lies: Dig. 12.3. 1. or the action on the case (in factum)

Dig. 6. 1. 5.

§ 27. De confusione, p. 77. Electrum, seems to be Amber in 4 Plin.
16 and 37. Plin. 2. But in 33. Plin. 9. itis a metal, as itis here. Plati-
na? See Thomson’s Chemistry, Platina.

$ 29. De his qui solo cedunt, p. 78. Dig. 41.1.7. 10. Dig. 6. 1. 7. 11.
and 6. 1.23 ult. Dig. 41. 2. 30. Dig. 41.3.24. As to the action de Tigno
juncio, see Dig. 41.1..70.1. Dig. 6. 1. 23.6. Dig. 47.3. 1. and 47. 3, 2.

§$ 30. De edificatione ex sua materia, p. 78. Dig 41. 7. 12. Dig. 6.1.7.
et seq. L. 2 and 5. Cod. eod. Dig. 6. 1. 38. Dig. 50. 17. 203.

§ 31. De Plantatione, p.79. But the owner of the tree may recover
its value. Dig. 6. 1. 5. 3. and 6. 1. 23. 5.

Confinium. The Romans required five feet to be left between farm
and farm as a boundary: or rather, between the trees of your neighbour
and your own; except in the case of an olive ora fig, when they re-
quured a space of nine feet between: agreeable to a law of Solon, quot-
ed Dig. 10. 1. 13.

$ 32. De satione, p. 80. Dig. 6. 1. 23. 3. Dig. 41. 3. 25. Dig. 41. 1. 9.

§$ 33. De scriptura, p. 80. I apprehend this would not now be con-
sidered as law, the value of the paper being so much more easily paid
than the writing; conformably to the principle of the next section de
pictura. Herein agrecing with the argument of Sir W. Blackstone
against Thurlow in the great case of literary property; Tonson v. Col-
lins, 1 Sr. W. Bl. 324. 307.

§ 35. De fructibus bona fide perceptis, p. 82. Dig. 41. 3. 45. Dig. 41. 1.
4. Dig. 41. 3. 4. 19.

$ 37. Qua sunt in fructu, p. 83. Dig. 22.1. 38.5. Dig. 41. 3. 28. 1.
Dig. 7. 1. 68. .

But although the child may not strictly be called rectus, which is
applied rather to natural productions by way of accession, and a female
slave caunot be said naturally to be destined to produce bond children
Dig. 21. 1. 44, such offspring is nevertheless a species of revenue, Dig.
41. 3. 8, and 14, Dig. 35. 2. 24. 1. Dig. 30. 1. 91. 7.

§ 38. De officio fructuarii, p. 83. A flock is a noun aggregate, and
therefore must be restored asa flock by the usufructuary; but if each
sheep of the flock had been specifically bequeathed in usufruct, the usu-
fructuary would not be bound to replace those who died. Dig. 7. 1. 70.
3. See some observations on usufructuary rights in Putnam v. Wylic,
8 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 433.
462 NOTES.

 

[ *461 ]  * De inventione Thesauri, p. 83. By a treasure is meant

something of which the owner is absolutely unknown, else
Revendication would attach. Dig. 6.1.6. Dig. 10. 4.15. Treasure
trove, under some of the Emperors, belonged entirely to the treasury,
Lib. 15. Tacit. Annal. L. 1. Cod. Theodos. de 'Thesaur. Adrian (accord-
ing to his life by Spartian) gave the treasure exclusively to the finder, if
found on his own grounds, or in any religious or sacred place. But if
found on another man’s ground, it was divided between the finder and
the owner of the ground.

Marcus Antoninus and Verus, directed, that if found in a fiscal, relig-
ous, or sacred place, one half should go to the treasury. Dig. 49. 14. 3
penult. Leo, decided according to the opinion of Hadrian (Adrian). L-
un. Cod. Thesaur. and so did Justinian in the present section.

As to mines. Formerly the owner of the land had the exclusive right.
Dig 7. 1. 13. 5. latterly the emperor exacted a toll. L. land2. Cod.
de metall. .

Thesauros.| Treasures naturally belong to the finder; that is, to him,
who moves them from the place where they are, and secures them; yet
nothing forbids but that the laws and ‘customs of any country may or-
dain otherwise. Plato was desirous, that notice should be given to the
magistrates, and that the oracle should he consulted: and Apollonius,
looking upon a treasure found as a particular blessing from heaven, ad-
judged it to the best man. The Hebrews gave it to the owner of the
ground where it was found, as may be gathered from Christ’s parable,
Matt. xiii. 44. and, that the Syrians did the same, we may infer from a
story in Philostratus, lib. vi. cap. 16. “The laws of the Roman emperors
are very various upon this subject, as appears partly from their constitu-
tions, and partly from the histories of Lampridus, Zonarus and Cedrenus.
The Germans awarded treasures found, and indeed all other edeoaore
(i. e. things without an owner,) to their prince; which is grown so com-
mon, that it may pass for the law of nations; for it is now observed in
Germany, France, Spain, Denmark, and England; where treasure-trove
is understood to be any gold or silver, in coin, plate or bullion, which
hath been of ancient time hidden; and wheresoever it is found, if no
person can prove it to be his property, it belongs to the king, or his gran-
tee. A concealment of treasure-trove is now only punished by fine and
imprisonment; but it appears from Glanville and Bracton, that occwltatio
thesauri inventi fradulosa was formerly an offence punishable with death,
3 Co. Inst 132, 133. Custom de Norm. cap. 18. Grot. de jur. bell. et

pac. 1. 2. cap. 8. sect. 7. Harris. ;
[ *462 ] ~ *$ 40. De traditione, p. 84. Stipendiaria ; paid tribute
to the people; Zvribudaria, to the prince.

Tradition, or delivery, is either real, as of a piece of goods to the pur-
NOTES. 463

chaser, or symbolical, as the keys of a house ; “or with us, a ship’s papers.
Dig. 18. 1. 74.

§$ 41. Limitatio, p. 84. Ex promissor, bondsman: one who makes
himself originally liable for the debtor. Ad promissor, a guarantee, or
surety.

- By the civil law, goods sold and delivered might be reclaimed if not
duly paid for. Dig. 18. 1. 19. and 53. Dig. 14. 4.5 penult. Dig. 19.
1. 11. 2.

It is with this modification that the civil law doctrine is to be under-
stood, that the obligation of the contract emptio venditio arises not from
the delivery of the goods to the vendee, but upon the mutual consent of
the parties, the one to sell, and the other to buy. Ut primum de re et
pretio convenit, Emptio perfecta intelligitur quamvisnec res traditur, nec
pretium numeratum, nec arrha data sit. Atque in contractibus qui con-
sensu perficiuntur, distinguenda perfectio contractis, 4 consummatione
sive implemento. Emptionem et venditionem perficit solus consensus de
re et pretio; consummat rei traditio et pretii numeratio, qui -extremas est
contrahentium finis. Simulatque autem emptio perfecta est, nascitur
utrinque obligatio, teneturque emptor actione ex vendito ut, nummes
quos prettii nomine pro re vendita promisit, solvat: venditor actione ex-
empto, ut rem venditam tradat emptori. Vinn. 1. 3. tit. 24. To this
general doctrine, an exception was allowed in cases where earnest was
given: in those cases, if the buyer repented, he forfeited his earnest
money, and was free from the contract; if the seller repented, he for-
feited the earnest money paid, andas much more. See also Inst. 2. 1. 4.

,Formerly, by the general law of France, the seller might seize the
thing sold, and not paid for, if he could find it in the possession of the
buyer, and need not have shared it with the other creditors: and in some
places of France, the seller might even pursue the article in possession of
a subsequent purchaser. See Domat’s Civil Law, book 4, tit. 5. sect. 2.
art. 3., with the notes on that article, and on book 3. tit. 1. sect. 5. art. 3.
But this right by the new commercial code of France, art. 576, 577, et
seq. is confined to stoppage in transitu, under provisions very similar to
our own law. See Mr. Du Ponceau’s translation of the commercial code,
2 Walsh’s Review, p. 191, 192.

In England, before the statute of frauds, 29 Ch. 2. chap. 3. $ 17,
(which enacts, that “no contract for the sale of goods, wares, and mer-
‘‘ chandise, for the price of ten pounds sterling or upwards, shall be al-
‘‘ lowed to be good, except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so
“sold and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to
“‘ bind the bargain, or in part payment, or that some note or memoran-
“dum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties
“charged by such contract or their agents thereunto lawfully author-
464 NOTES.

 

“jzed”’) no bargain for goods was valid without earnest, delivery, or
payment, except a contract to deliver at a future day appointed, and for
a settled price; which might have been supported. Since that statute no
verbal contract of bargain and sale unaccompanied by delivery or part

delivery, payment or part payment, or earnest money (which may or.

may not be a part of the price, according to the intention of the parties;
Pinnel’s case, 5 Rep. 177., Pordage v. Cole, 1 Saund. 319., Manning v.
Western, 2 Vern. 606., and Harnersly v. Knowlys, 2 Esp. N. Pr. Cas.
666., which are comments on the rude, quicquid solvitur, solvitur ad mo-
dum solventis) can be supported. It was for some time thought that ex-
ecutory contracts might be taken out of it; but all that class of cases re-
Jates to those sales only where the goods to be delivered are not finished,
and cannot be delivered at the time of the contract; not to those which
exist in solido, and are capable of present delivery. See Rondeau »v.
Wyatt, 2 H. BI. 63, and Cooper v. Elston, 7 Term Rep. 14.

Thursby’s assignees v. Gray’s administrators. Debt on bond. Com.
Pleas, Northumberland county, 1808. Spring, a storekeeper, purchased
goods at public auction belonging to Thursby, and gave bond for the
payment of the amount in six months; in which bond, Gray joined as
surety. The bond was not demanded at the expiration of the six months
either from Spring or from Gray: it thus lay till Spring became insol-
vent about two years from the date of the bond. It did not appear that
payment had ever been demanded, either from Spring or Gray. Spring’s
insolvency began to be suspected.about a twelvemonth before he actually
failed. Previous to that time, and for a twelvemonth or more from the
date of the bond, it might have been received on demand, or recovered
at law, without doubt. Spring lived in Northumberland town, and Gray
in Sunbury, about two miles off. Sometime after Spring’s fuilure the
assignees of Thursby brought suit on the bond against the administra-
tors of Gray. I charged the jury that the administrators of Gray under
* these circumstances, were not liable. The jury brought in a verdict
accordingly.

This case came on to be argued in the supreme court of Pennsylvania

sitting at Sunbury in June, on the ground of. misdirection of the judge

in point of law, and it was held that the doctrine aid down by judge
Cooper was not supported to this extent, by any case in the English
books, and the verdict was set aside. ‘This case is not reported in Bin-
ney ; 1 am therefore unable to state the precise grounds of decision of
the supreme court. But asa view of the leading cases of suretyship
may be of use to a student, I have collected them. ‘Surety re-
“ lieved in equity where a bond was continued in use without his privity,
“he thinking the same to be paid. Bullock and Pope, 11 Car. 1. Tot-
* hill’s reports:in chancery, p. 180.

‘
NOTES. 465

aoe same point (equally broad) in Saunders v. Churchill and Smith.

*The same point, in Moile v. Roberts, Ib. 182. [ *463 ]

The same point, in Hare v. Mitchell, Ib. 81.

The same point, Carey’s Chancery Reports, p. 1 and 2.

The leading principle of the following cases, is, that “the contract of
“a surety shall be construed according to the letter, strictly and in his
‘favour: and shall not be extended by implication.” A doctrine in-
deed, laid down as the result of all the cases of sutetyship, nearly in
the same words by Lord Mansfield in Dance et al. v. Girdler, 4 Bos. and
Pull. 34. and by Buller, in Stratton v. Rastall, 2 Term Rep. 370, and by
Spencer and Thompson Justices, in Ludlow v. Simond in error, 2 New
York, cases in error, 29. 57.

Lord Arlington v. Merrick, 2 Saund. 411.

Horton v. Day, Ib. in notis,

Wright v. Russel, 3 Wils. 430. 2 Black, Rep. 934.

Skip v, Hay, 3 Atk. 91.

Barker v. Parker, 1 Term Rep. 287.

Barclay v. Lewis, Ib. in not.

Stratton v. Ralston, 2 Term Rep. 366.

1 Barns, 214.

Nesbitt v. Smith et al, 2 Prr. Ch. Cas. 579.

Rees v. Barrington, 2 Vez. junr. 540.

Law v. East India Comp. 4 Vez. 824.

Dance v. Girdler, 5 Bos. and Pull. 34.

Liverpool Comp. v. Atkinson, 6 East, 509.

To these may be added the analogy of all the cases, relating to the
holding over a negotiable security as a bill of exchange. See also the
People v. Jansen et al. 7. Johns. 332.

The above case however, of Thursby’s Assignees v. Gray’s adminis-
trators, seems to settle the law in Pennsylvania, that no surety in a bond
can discharge himself, but by payment of principal and interest.

The case of the United States v. the administrators of Hillegas, in the
Circuit Court of the United States, for the district of Pennsylvania, 3
Wash. C. C. BR. 70, reviews all the authorities, and settles, that a surety
is discharged by indulgence given to the principal on a new security.
Add to the cases on Surety, 10 East, 39. 1 Bos. and Pull. 419. 4 Dall.
135:

This 41st Section is discussed in Ludlow v. Brown and Eddy, 1 Johns,
N. Y. Rep. p. 17. which in part is a case of stoppage in transitu; a branch
of law connected with, and it seems to me arising out of the doctrine
laid down in the first sentence of this section, though somewhat modi
fied. The general principle involved in the right of stoppage in transi-

59
466 NOTES.

 

tu, is, that goods being ordered by a customer, and packed up and sent
off to be delivered according to that order by the merchant may be stopt
in their way or passage to the place of delivery if the merchant has rea-
son to suspect the solvency of the consignee, or purchaser.
[ *464 ] *The first case reported in the books on this subject
wherein the right of stoppage in transitu was allowed, is
Wiseman v. Vandeput, 2 Vern. 203. which was confirmed orbiter in Snee
and Baxter v. Prescott et al. 1 Atkins, 249. and in Birkitt » Jenkins
cited in Vale v. Bayle, Cowp. 296.

In Hodgson v. Loy, 7 Term Rep. 440, Lord Kenyon, and in ex parte
Gwynne, 12 Ves. 382, Lord Erskine, state, that the right of stoppage
in transitu is not founded on the right of the vendor to rescind the con-
tract, but on an equitable lien, indulged to the vendor, from motives of
reasonable expedience in the case of bargain and sale. To me, this
right appears to have been suggested by the provisions of the civil law.

I believe it is considered that delivery to a common carrier, is such a
delivery to the consignee, as to take away any right in the consignor to
rescind the contract, though it leaves unimpaired the right of stopping
in transitu ere the goods arrive at their place of destination. In thecase
of Walter and Fillis v. Jenks, Judge Washington determined that a ven-
dor had a right in case of insolvency to seize his goods on board a gene-
ral vessel, to which they were sent by the purchaser who had not paid
for them, and for whose use they were ostensibly shipped, without any
assignment of the bill of lading, though they were in fact in-
tended for the use of a distant creditor of the purchaser: for under the
circumstances they remained completely in the power of the purchaser
who shipped them, and who could at any time alter their place of des-
tination.

In the case of a sale of land, where the purchase money is not paid,
the Court of Chancery considers the purchase a trustee for the seller.
Pollexfen v. Moore, 3 Atk. 272., Blackburn v. Groson, 1 Brown’s Ch.
Rep. 420.

Add to the cases of stoppage in transitu, Stubbs v. Lund, 7 Mass. Rep.
452, an instructive case, decided by a judge of nocommon talent. Gar-
son v. Green, 1 Johns Ch. Rep. 308.

The cases are very numerous on this head, and it would immoder-
ately extend this note, to abridge them all; but the leading principles al-
ready settled, are, that as between vendor or consignor, and vendee or
consignee, the property of goods ordered and sent, is not altered till ac-
tual delivery; and the vendor hasa right to stop them in transitu: but
Ist, This is a right that exists only between the consignor and the con-
signee; and cannot be defeated, by the contracts, or proceedings of third
persons, excepting those who claim by bona fide purchase and sale under
NOTES. Ab7

the consignee. 2ndly. It can be exercised only during the transit : thus
goods may be stopped in the hands of a carrier: but if delivered into the
possession of the agent: or of the accustomed wharfinger of the con-
Sighee: or if to any wharfinger, who makes an entry of them in the
name of the consignee, and charges him with wharfage: or if the con-
Signor charges ware-house-room after they are packed up: or if the as-
signee of the consignee puts his mark upon them and exercises owner-
ship over them: or if they ‘are directed to be sent and are sent to. any
particular place, though short of the place of abode of the consignee,
who then exercises the right of ordering them to an ulterior destination :
(but compare Stokes v. Riviere, cited 2 Term Rep. 466, & 1 Campb. 282,
with 5 Hast, 175,) or though there be only apart delivery to, or an ac-
tual occupancy of a part only by the consignee, his agent or his as-
signee, it stands for a delivery and occupancy of the whole, and destroys
the right of stoppage in the transitu. But part payment does not take
away this right; nor is the vendor affected by any agreement between
the consignee and the carrier, or by any lien of the latter, but the ven-
dor may pay the carriage and retake the goods; and hold them on his
own account, or may again tender them to the vendee and bring suit
thereupon for the amount, if no loss or damage hath arisen from the de-
tention. 3dly, The assignment of a bill of lading divests the vendor of
this right, as it was held at first to do in Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 Term
Rep. 63, overruled in error in the exchequer chamber, 1 Hen. Blacks. 357
and finally settled as at first decidec, 6 Term Rep. 20. Newson v. Thorn-
ton: for the bill of lading is now considered in the light of a negotiable
instrument. So, where the vendor gives an order to the vendee, who
thereupon procures an entry of them to’be made in his name
as owner; *or becomes liable for ware-house-room or wharf- [ *465 ]
age; or on the strength of that order, sells them to a third .
person bona fide; or where they by any means came into possession of
a bona fide purchaser under an act of ownership of the first vendee, in
all these cases, the vendor’s right of stopping in transitu is divested.
Athly. As to suits of trover against carriers, or assumpsit by them.
Carriers are liable to trover by the vendor; for goods while in their pos-
session are in transit: when once delivered according to order, the car-
riers are discharged. As to their right of action for the carriage. It
seems that unless the general rule be modified by some special agree-
ment, the consignee is liable for freight and carriage: they are delivered
to the carrier as being the goods of the consignee to be delivered to him.
Hence the consignee may sue the carrier for loss or damage, for on deli-
very to the carrier, the property vests in the consignee, subject only to
the right of the consignor to stop them in transitu. 3 Bos. and Pull. 48.
119. and Dutton v. Solomonson, ib. 582. Coxe v. Harden, 4 Hast, 211.
468 NOTES.

 

1 Johns. N. Y. Rep. Ludlow v. Bowne and Eddy. Patter v. Lansing,

1 Johns. Rep. 215.

5thly. The bankruptcy of the vendee, does not of itself operate as

a countermand of the order, or avoid the sale.

The French law as laid by Pothier in his Traitt du Contrat de Vente.

n. 332, is conformable to this section of the Institutes: viz. that even
though the goods be delivered to the purchaser, the property is not out
of the owner till they are paid for, unless under a special contract of
selling them on credit.

The following list of cases on the subject of stoppage in Transitu,
may be of use, as I do not know where else they are collected.

Wiseman v. Vandeput, 2 Vern. 203. A. D. 1690.

Snee and Baxter v. Prescott et al. 1 Atk. 246. A. D. 1743.

‘Fearon v. Bowers, cited 1 Hen. Blacks. 364: A. D. 1753.

Burghall v. Howard, cited in the same case. 32 Geo. 2.

Birkit v. Jenkins in Vale v. Bale, Cowp. 246. :

2 Term Rep. (Durn. and Hast,) 63.
1 Hen. Blacks. 357.
Lickbarrow v. Mason, { 2 Hen. Blacks. 211.
5 Term Rep. 683.
6 Term Rep. 20.

Solmons v. Nissin, 2 Term Rep. 674. |
Kinlock v. Craig, 3 Term Rep. 119.
Ellis v. Hunt, 3 Term Rep. 464.
Newson v. Thornton, 6 Term Rep. 20.
Owenson v. Morse, 7 Term Rep. 65.
Hodgson Loy, 7 ‘Term Rep. 441.
Daws v. Peck, 8 Term Rep. 330.

Sweet v. Pym, 1 East, Rep. 4. {
Inglis v. Usherwood, Ib. 515.

Feize v. Wray, 3 East, 93.

Walley v. Montgomery, 3 East, 583.
Dixon v. Baldwin, 5 East, 175.
Newson v. Thornton, 6 East, 20.
Cuming v. Brown, 9 "East, 506.

Slubey et al. v. Heyward et al. 2 Hen. Blacks. 504.

Mills v. Ball, 2 Bosangq. and Pull. 457. Openheim v. Russel, 3 Bos.
and Pull. 42. Richardson v. Goss, 3 Bos. and Pull. 119. ‘Scot v. Petit,
3 Bos. and Pull. 469. Hammon ». Anderson, 4 Bos. and Pull. (New
rep.) 69.

Northie v. Cragg, 2 Esp. rep. 613. Wright v. Lawes, 4 Esp. rep. 85.

Kymer v. Sowercropp, 1 Campb. rep. at Nis. Prius, 109. Smith ».
Goss, 1 Campb. 282. Harvy v. Mangles, Campb. 452. Harman v.
Anderson, 2 Campb. 243.

I have met with but the following three cases, among the American

Reporters, Hollingsworth v. Napier, 3 Caines N. Y. rep. 182. Ludlow

~

 
NOTES. 469.

v. Bowne and Eddy, 1 Johns. N. Y. rep. 1 in error. [Subbs v. Lund, 7
Mass. Rep. 452, decided by a judge of no common talent. ]

§ 43. De quasi traditione, p. 85. Acquiritur proprietas. 'This is call-
ed fictio brevis manus: which takes place when goods are put into the
possession of some person by way of deposit or loan, and are afterwards
given or sold to the same person, he being already’ the possessor. Dig.
23. 3. 43. Harris.

§ 44. De traditione clavium, p. 85. The spirit of this section would
embrace our law as to the delivery of possession by the delivery of do-
cuments and muniments of title.

§ 46. De habitispro derelicto, p. 85. The English law of waifes, I
presume does not extend to this country: in that country waifes, bona
waiviata belong to the prince by prerogative, 1 Blacks. Comm. 297.

§ 47. De jactis in Mare levande navis causa. Item. Sc. p. 86. As
to things Jetsam, Flotsam and Ligan, see 1 Black. Comm. 293.

Furtum committit.| None of those goods, which are called Jetsam,
(from being cast into the sea while the ship is in danger) or those called
Flotsam (from floating after shipwreck) or those called Ligan, (that is,
goods sunk in the sea, but tied to a buoy, that they may be found) are
to be esteemed wreck, so long as they remain in the sea. And by 3
Edw. 1 cap. 4. it is enacted— That if a man, cat, or dog, escape alive
out of the ship, whereby the owner of the goods may be known, neither
the vessel, nor any thing therein, shall be adjudged wreck ; but shall be re-
stored to the owner, if he claims within a year *and a day.

A man, cat, or dog, are only put for examples; but all other [ *467 J
living things are to be understood ; and, if the owner of the

ship should die within the year and a day, his executors or administra-
tors may make proof. 2. Co. Inst. 167, 168. Wood's Inst. 214. If the
goods are taken away by wrong-doers, the owner may have his action:
and, if the wrong-doers are unknown, he may have a commission of
oyer and terminer, to inquire what persons committed the trespass, and
make restitution. Harris.

Tit. 2. De servitutibus, p. 87. Servitus est jus quo res alterius, rei vel
persone servit, Dig. 8. 1. 1. Nemini res sua servit, Dig. 8. 2. 26. Dig.
7.6.5. Servitus, a service, is a right by which one thing is subjected to
the use or convenience of another thing or person, contrary to common
right; and not where one person is subject to another person; which is
servitude, though sometimes called servitus: as, servitus uterina, Tay-
lor, 426. 411. 407. Inst. 1. 3. 2. Dig. 1.5, 4.1. In translating this
word by the word services I follow Wood’s civil law, Taylor’s Elem.
civ. law, and Harris. Iam aware that lord Mansfield in Waring v.
Griffith et al. 1 Burr. 443, translates it Servirupe. But, he was more
intent upon the substance, than the expression, and I prefer Taylor’s
470 NOTES.

 

authority as a critic, to lord Mansfield’s. Cambaceres has Servitudes ou
Services. Code civil Nap. Art. No. 526.

[In preferring, of the several translations, the word “ services,” I have
against me, besides Lord Mansfield in the case cited from 1 Burr. 443,
but also Gibbon, 8 Rom. Hist. 73; Mr. Du Ponceau of Philadelphia,
whose opinions, on subjects of the civil law, I hold in great respect ; and
Mr. Jefferson, in his late learned and elaborate defence of the proceed-
ings of the United States, in respect of Mr. Ed. Livingston’s claim to
the New Orleans Batture. In this tract the reader will meet with much
collateral information on alluvion, servitudes, predia rustica et urbana,
and other points connected with the civillaw. All these learned men
translate servitudo by servitude. But to my ear, the last word seems
exclusively appropriated in common language, to the situation of ser-
vants and slaves. ]

§ 1. De servitibus urbanis, p. 88. In the Roman law, all houses and
buildings whether in town or country are called Predia Urbana: and
all lands, whether meadow, arable, or vineyard, are called Predia Rus-
tica: Dig. 50. 16. 198.

Predia urbana, city services; are affirmative or negative.

Affirmative: as that I may- rest my beam on my neighbour’s wall:
that my house shall in part rest on his wall: that my house may project
so as to throw the path upon the premises: that my eaves may overhang
upon his side: that my sink or gutter may pass through his ground:
that I may put out lights that overlook him: that my prospect shall be
uninterrupted, by his buildings, &c. all of which are noticed in the eighth
book of the Digests.

Negative services are, that his eaves shall not drop upon my ground:
that he shall not build so as to darken my lights, or hinder my prospect:
that he shall not put out a window to overlook. me: that he shall not
raise his house without my permission.

Predia rustica:,raral services; are a right of passing over the
grounds of another, by foot path, horse path, or carriage way: Iter, Ac-

tus, Via or Aditus. Aqueducts, a right of water course: a
{ *468 ] right *of drawing water, watering cattle, hunting, fishing,
making lime, digging gravel, &c.

Others are personal services, such as the rent services of the feuda}
times.

The word service in the English law, answers perhaps more properly
to Easement, than any other synonyme, and indeed is used synonymous-
ly. Jacob’s Law Dict. voce Easement.. But on reflection I have pre-
ferred, service. As to the law on this subject, see Reynolds v. Clarke, 2
Lord Raym. 1899. Str. 634, Peppin v. Shakespear, 6 Durn. and East,
748. Allen v. Ormond, 8 East, 4. The pleading is required to be
strict.
NOTES. 471

I collect the following observations from the notes of Ferriere in
Loco.

Services, are incorporeal rights incident to rural or city estates. 'They
do not lie in livery. Dig. 41. 1. 43. 1. Dig. 8. 2. 32.1. Dig. 8.1. 14.
17. They cannot therefore be acquired by usucapion, which applies to
things in possession only. But they can be prescribed for, and 10 years
gives a title between parties present, and 20 years against absentees.
But the original title must be bona fide, nec vi, nec clam, nec precario,
otherwise the prescription must go beyond 100 years according to Cuja-
cius ad Leg. 14 ff. de servitut. These services might depend on stipula-
tion and contract. A right of way could not be for a way of less than
eight feet when straight, and sixteen when crooked. Dig. 8. 3. 8.

Tit. 4.$ 1. Quibus medis constituitur, p. 90. In England there
are no usufructs, under that name. Estates at will and for years how-
ever are of the same nature, and usufructs might doubtless be created
by compact. The usr of the old English law previous to the statute
for transferring uses into possession, 27 Hen. 8. ch. 10. were, as Black-
stone observes, 2 Comm. 327, more analogous to the fidei-commissum
or testamentary trust-estate of the Romans, than to the usufruct of an
estate.

$ 2. Quibus in rebus constituitur, p. 91. Senatus censuit. Dig. 7.
5. 1. 2.

Quasi-usufruct may be of certain cloaths, as vestes seniles et funera-
les, or what our New England people: would call a go-to-meeting coat:
which is used so sparingly that it is long before it is destroyed by use.

§ 3. Quibus modis finitur, p. 91. Statuit constitutio, viz. Cod. 3.
23. 16.

It may cease by non-user for one year in respect of things
moveable, *and two as to things immoveable. Dig. 8.1.4. [ *469 ]
but by an ordinance of Justinian, three years as to things
moveable.

Qua res consolidatio appellatur. 'This is similar to merger.

Tit. 5. § 1. Quid intersit inter usufructum, &c. p. 93. Use differs
from usufruct. Ist. The latter may be divided, the former is indivisible,
L. 5. ff. de usufruct. L.19. fh. 1. 2ndly. The usufruct extends to
all the fruit or produce of the object, the use only to the immediate want
of the user. L. 12. $. 1. et seq. fh. 1. 3rdly. The usufructuary can
lend, sell, &c. which is not an incident of use. 4thly, The usufructuary
is bound to repairs and replacements, which the heir is not. Ferriere in
loc.

Minus autem.] An Use, by the laws of England, is of as great an
extent, as an wsufruct by the Roman law. And by 27 H.8. He, who
hath the use of land, is deemed to have the land itself. But as to such
472 NOTES.

 

uses and rights of habitation, which were among the Romans, though
our laws have not treated of them in any particular manner, yet they
may certainly be granted and acquired by special covenants and agree-
ments, as was said of usufruct. Usus apud nos eque late extenditur,
atque ususfructus apud authores juris civilis; sed non video, cur idem
jus tam de usu, ut ili eum intelligunt, quam de habitatione, apud nos
non teneat, quod olim inter Romanos tenebat. Cowel, h. t. Wood’s imp.
Law. 151. Harris.

Nudum habet usum.| An usufruct is a right of enjoying all the fruits
and revenues, which ‘the estate, subject to it, is capable of producing;
but an use consists only in a right to take out of the fruits of the ground
what is necessary for the person, who has the use, or what is settled by
his title; and the surplus belongs to the proprietor of the estate: thus
those, who have the right of use in a forest or copice, can only take
what is necessary for their use, or is regulated by their title. And he,
who has the use of any other ground, can only take out of it what shall
be necessary to supply the occasions he shall have for those kinds of
fruits, which the ground produces: or the use may even be restrained to
certain kinds of fruits, or revenues, without extending it to others.
Thus we see in the Roman law, that he, who had only the simple use
of a piece of ground, had no share of the corn or oil, which grew in it;
and that he, who had the use of a flock of sheep, was restrained only to
make use of them for dunging his grounds, and had no share either in
the wool or lambs: and even of the milk, it is said in some places, that
the usuary could take but a very small portion; and in others, that he
had no right to any of it. ff. 7. ¢.8.2.12. Domat. lib. 1. ¢.

2. sect. 2. Harris. :
[ *470 ] *§ 2. Adium usus, p. 93. No doubt the right to assign
the usufruct of a house, might be the subject of special con-
tract under the Roman law.

In what cases a clause in a lease, prohibiting assignment or underlet-
ting, shall rank under usual and proper covenants, see Vere v. Loveden,
82 Vez. 179, and the cases there cited; also Jones v. Jones, Ib. 186. and
Weatherall v. Gearing, Ib. 511. Waston v. The master of Hemsworth

_ Hospital, 14:-Vez. 333. Buta prohibition of assigning without licence,
ceases on licence once granted. Brummel v. Macpherson, Ib. 173, and
Jones v. Jones, 12 Vez. 191.

Such a prohibiting clause however, becomes void on the bankruptcy
of the lessee. Weatherall v. Gearing, 504. Agreement to let, not held
a lease if any thing executory remained. 12 Vez. 413.

Nostra decisione.] Whoever hath a right of habitation in a house, or
in a part of it, may assign over and let out his right to another, unless
the instrument, from which he derives his title, bears some condition to
NOTES. 473

the contrary: and the right of habitation, as well as that of use, if
simply given, continues during the life of him, who possesses it, Cod. 3.
t. 33. 1. 13. de usufructu et habitatione. ff. 7. t. 8. 1. 10. sect. 3. Harris.

$4. De Pecorum usu, p. 94. Pindar v. Wadsworth, 2 East, 155, is
an action by a commoner for taking away the dung from a common: it
was found that the plaintiff’s injury would not amount to more than a
farthing: held that the action would lie.

$6. Fransitio, p. 94. By the civil law in Justinian’s there were
three modes of acquiring title in common use: to wit, legal adjudication :
transfer by operation of law: and usucapion including prescription.
Transfer by mancipation, and by legal cession were out of use. L. 11.
Cod. de usucap. transf. Cujas ad loc. Ulpian fragm. tit. 19. Ferriere.

Tit. 6. Precipua usucapionis requisita. viz §c. p. 95. Sec 2 Blacks.
Comm. 263. ‘

Et ideo constitutionem.] vid. Cod. 7. t. 31. l. un. De usucaptione
transformanda, et de sublata differentia rerum mancipi et nec mancipi.
By the common law of England the time of prescription is that time,
of which there is no memory of man, or record, to the contrary; for if
there is any sufficient proof of a record or writing to the contrary, al-
though it exceeds the memory or proper knowledge of any man living,
yet it is deemed to be within the memory of man: and this is the reason,
that regularly a man cannot prescribe or allege a custom against an act
of parliament, because it is the highest proof and matter of
record *in the law. Co. Litt/115. But, although a prescrip- [ #471 ]
tion is said to be constituted by a portion of time, which ex- ‘
ceeds the memory of man, yet this is not always true; for our laws ad-
mit a great variety of prescriptions; which for the sake of order may be
divided into two sorts; into those, which secure us from loss and
punishment; and into those, which enable us to acquire a property.

The statute of the 31st of Eliz. cap. 5. bars all popular actions on ac-
count of offences by a prescription of two years, in the case of the king,
and by a prescription of one year, when there is an informer. Other
penal statutes allow different periods to prescribe in as one year ;
(3H. 7.c. 1. 21 Eliz. ¢. 4.) six months; (5 Eliz. c. 5.)
three months; (1 Edw. 6. c. 1.) one month ; (23 Eliz. c. 1.) &c.
&c. &e. — and, by the common law, if a man is acquitted upon an
indictment of murder, he may after a year and a day plead prescription
against any appeal brought'by the wife, or the next of kin to the party
killed. Natura brevium, 624. G. Things immoveable also, whe-
ther corporeal or incorporeal, are variously prescribed to. ‘The most
usual prescription is that, which is called emphatically the longest, and
extends beyond the memory of man; for whoever will prescribe against
another in regard to the maintenance of a chaplain to celebrate divine

60

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
474 NOTES.

 

service, the repairs of a church, an annuity, or any service in his fee, he
must prove them to have been time cut of mind, or he does nothing.
But there are prescriptions of a shorter time, as of 40 years in the case
of predial tithes, by the 2nd and 3rd of Ed. VI.—of five years for lands
and tenements, when a fine hath been lawfully acknowledged with the
due proclamations. (4 Hen. 7. c. 24.) of three years, when lands
and tenements, gotten by forcible entry, have been so long held in quiet
possession; (8 H. 6. c. 9.) of a year and a day for a villein to assert
his liberty against his lord, if the villein has continued so long in antient
demesne, or in any of the king’s cities and towns, without being claimed
or molested. —— of a year and a day for the confirmation of any deed
made by one, who is in prison, unless he.who made it, doth in the inte-
rim revoke it. Also of a year and a day, to hinder the entry of him,
who, having omitted to make continual claim, endeavours, after a de-
scent cast, to recover lands and tenements, of which he hath been un-
justly disseized. Co. 1. inst. page 250, &c. of continual claim. But pre-
scriptions do not take place in all things. No man can prescribe, for ex-
ample, to things not in commerce, nor to those, of which the king is
properly the sole lord; nor to a custom, which is repugnant to reason or

good manners. Co. Litt. lib. 2d. sect. 212. of villenage. And
[ *472 ] it isa known maxim, in the *laws of England, “that no

prescription in lands maketh a right.” Doct. and Stud. Dial.
1. cap. 8. Cowel’s inst. h. t. Wood’s inst. 297, 298.

The following observations extracted from Ferriere, are worth atten-
tion; Blackstone in his note f.2 Comm. p. 264, is accurate, when hée
speaks of usucapion being the same with prescription, but the observa-
tion is true under the Justinian code only.

Usucapion is the right acquired by the long possession of any thing
substantial and corporeal to the exclusion of the real owner, or of a cre-
ditor by pledge. Usucapion arose from the law of the 12 tables. Pre-
scription was, in its origin, a creature of preetorial edict. Usucapion,
was perfected by one year’s possession of a moveable, and two years of
an immoveable chattel: prescription required ten years as against par-
ties present, and twenty years as against parties absent. Usucapion did
not, while prescription did, take place as to incorporeal hereditaments, as
services incident to estates. Usucapion transferred the property of the
thing itself. Prescription operated only in bar of the right of the owner
or mortgager. Justinian however seems to have converted usucapion
into prescription, and action therefore lies under the Justinian code, to
recover the possession of prescriptive property. Cod. de usucap. trans-
form. An original, fair and bona fide possession by the prescriber, was
necessary to-support this title, without knowledge at the time of any
fraud or deceit upon the real owner: though if such knowledge aceru-

 

 

 
NOTES. 475

 

ed afterwards, the usucaptor or prescriber, was not therefore bound to
give up the property, if he originally came by it honestly on his part,
Nor could this kind of title, support a right to things originally stolen, or
forcibly acquired. Nor in certain cases to fiscal or imperial property.
Cod. ne rei. domin. Lex 18 ff. de usurp. et usucap. Lex. 96. $ 1 ff. de
Legat. Lex penult. Cod. de preepos. sac. cub.

§ 2. De rebus furtivis et vi possessis, p. 96. Aliis quoque modis. See
Dig. 17.1.57. Dig. 41. 3.36.1. Dig. 41. 7. 3.

Quod autem ad eas que solo contenentur. See Cod. de prescrip. long.
temp. et de prescrip. 30 vel 40 ann.

The English law respecting goods purchased out of market overt, will
coincide with the doctrine here laiddown. How far sale in market overt
protects property, and concerning the restrictions attending the sale and
purchase of horses particularly see 2 Blacks. Comm. 449, and Wood’s
inst. of the laws of England, 210,211. In Wilkinson v. King, 2 Campb.
335. it was determined that the owner of goods having sent some lead
to a wharfinger’s in Southwark, where lead was accustomed.
to be sold, *and the wharfinger sold it to a bond fide purcha-  [ *A73
ser, without authority from the owner, the latter might bring
trover against the purchaser: because a wharf where goods of various
kinds are deposited, cannot be considered as market overt for the pur-
chase and sale of goods.

I observe the judges of the supreme court have not adopted the stat-
utes of England as to the sale of horses, as part of the law of Pennsyl-
vania. Nor do I find any reported decisions upon the subject. Hence
I presume the general principles of the English law will prevail here:
viz. that every fair is market overt for the property, for the sale whereof,
the fair is held under the law authorizing it. That every store is mar-
ket overt for the goods usually sold at such store, unless the sale be toa
person cognizant of fraud in the storekeeper, to an infant, or to a feme co-
vert of goods not usually purchased by feme coverts. Provided also,
the sale be made in all respects in the accustomed manner.

The other part of this section contains the principles that relate to
pond fide purchasers without notice; see the cases collected in 2 Fon-
blanque, 151. and Sugden, (law of vendors) 119. 476-479, 458. to which
add 2 Vez. jun. 458. Jerrard v. Saunders. 9 Vez. 24. Walwyn v. Lee.
The following cases determine that notice of an act illegal or not legally
conducted, will not affect the purchaser, Tonkins v. Ennis, 1 Eq. Ca.
Ab. 334. 5 Co. Rep. 60. Chapman v. Emery, Cow. 280. Doe v. Rut-
ledge, Ib. per lord Mansfield 7}. Bushel ». Bushel, 1 Schoales and Lef-
roy’s Rep. 92-103. Latouche v. Lord Dusany, Ib. 137. 157.

Aliis quoque modis, p 98. Dig. 17. 1. 57. Dig. 41. 3.36.1. Dig.
Al. 7. 2.
A76 NOTES.

 

Quod autem ad eas que solo continentur, Cod. de prescrip. long. temp.
et de preescrip. 30. vel 40. ann.

$ 6. De errore false cause, p.98. Dig. 41. 3.27. Dig. 41. 6. 1.
Dig. 22.6.4. Dig. 41. 4.11. Dig. 41. 10. ult. 1.

$ De accessione possessionis, p. 98. Quod nostra constitutio, Cod. 7.
31. lex unic. de usucap. transf. ~

Yet in chancery the taking of an estate with notice of prior title is
dolus malus, Dig. 4.3. Le Neve v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 654. Amb. 446.
S. C. and to the same purpose.

$ 8. Inter venditionem quoque et emptorem, &¢. p. 99. Dig. 41. 3.
14. Dig. 44.3.5. Dig. 41. 2.13.4. But if the possession of the sel-
ler was fraudulent, though that of the buyer was fair, the times could
not be joined. Dig. 41. 2.13.1. but the buyer must take commence-

ment from his own fair purchase. Dig. 44.3.5. Still if the
[ *474 ] *purchase being with knowledge was fraudulent, the buyer

could take no benefit by prescription. These rules were not
so strict in cases of heirs, who took the titles of the deceased such as
they were. Dig. 5U. 17. 59. :

$9. De his qui a fisco aut Imp. &c. p.99. Edicto Divi Marci.
Cod. 2. 37. 3.

Constitutio autem. Cod. 7. 37. 2. exception as to the property of mi-
nors.

Divina Constitutio. Cod. 7. 36. 3.

Lib. I. = Tit.7.$ 1. De mortis causa donationibus, p. 100. By the
civil law, donations mortis causa required three circumstances to accom-
pany them; Ist. They should be made under expressed apprehension
of death: 2ndly. In the presence of the donee: 3rdly. They were re-
vocable on the recovery of the sick person. A filius familias, might
with the consent of his father, make a donation mortis causa, though he
could not make a will. Dig. 19. 6.25. As to their revocation, see Dig.
34. 5.19 & 22 & 23 & 12. de rebus dubiis. These donations were in-
valid as against creditors: sicut legat non debentur, nisi deducta ere ali-
eno aliquid supersit, nec mortis causa donationes debentur, sed infirman-
tur per es alienum. Dig. 35. 2. 66. 1. herein agrees the English law,.
Drury v. Smith: Smith v. Casen, 1 P. Wms. 405. Sce further as to do-
nations mortis causa, Lawson v. Lawson, 1 P. Wms. 441. Mil-
ler v. Miller et al. 3 P. Wms. 357. Allen v. Arme, 1 Vern. 365.
Douglas v. Ward, 1 Ch. Ca. 99. Ward v. Turmer, 1 Vez. sen. 431. and
the cases therein cited. Blount v. Burrow, 1 Ves. jun. 536, same case
in 4 Br. Ch. Ca. 78. Hughes v. Hughes, Finch’s prec. in chan. 269.
Jones v. Selby, Ib. 300. Hassel v. Tynte, Campb. 318. Ward v. Tur-
ner, 1 Dick. 171. Whether a donation mortis causa may be by deed
without delivery, see Johnson v. Smith, 1 Vez. sen. 314, compared with
NOTES. 477

Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Vez. jun. 111. 4 Br. Ch. Ca. 286, and the observa-
tions of the Chancellor in Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Vez. 41. By the civil
law such a gift might be by writing.

[The requisites of a valid donation, mortis causa, are collected in a
learned note to the case of Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swanston, 106, where it
is stated and proved, that it requires delivery of the property or the doc-
umentary evidence of it—that it is revocable by the donor—that it is re-
voked by the death of the donee during his life—that it is subject to the
claims of creditors—and that, on the death of the donor, the property
vests absolutely in the donee and no probate is required, and the wife
may~be that donee.

Bonds, mortgages, bills of exchange, promissory notes and other cho-
ses in action are all considered proper subjects of a valid donation causa
mortis as well as inter vivos. But that the donor’s own promissory note,
payable to the donee, can be the subject of a donation causa mortis, is
denied by the court in the case of Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 207, and
also in the case of Harris v. Clark, 3 Comstock, 93, which overrules
Wright v. Wright, 1 Cowen’s Rep. 598.

In Louisiana, no disposition mortis causa can be made, otherwise than
by last will or testament. Civil Code, Art. 1563. Nor can donations
inter vivos or mortis causa exceed two thirds of the property of the dis-
poser, if he leaves at his decease a legitimate child, or a father or moth-
er: one half if he leaves two children; and one third, if he leaves three
or more. Civil Code of Louisiana, Art. 1480, 1481.]

$ 2. De simplice inter vivos donatione. Not only notorious ingrati-
tude would give a right to reclaim the gift, Cod. de revocat. donat. but
the subsequent birth of children, Dig. 35. 1. 102. It might be by writ-
ing. 2Just.Inst.1.7.2. Cod. 8.54. 3.& 35. $ 5. Delivery is inci-
dent to a gift, 2 Blacks. Comm. 441. If unaccompanied by delivery it
amounts only to a contract, and this requires a consideration to support
it. Ib. See also Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Vez. jun. 111. 4 Br. Ch. Ca. 286,
and the Chancellor’s observations on Dig. 39. 6. 27. page 293 of that
case in Brown. See also the case of Hassel v. Tynte, Am-
bler, *318, and Kent’s remarks in Noble v. Smith et al. 2 [ *475 ]
Johns N. Y. Rep. 55, who observed very .truly that the dic-
tum ascribed to lord Coke in Wortes v. Clifton, 1 Roll’s Rep. 61. that by
the civil law a gift of goods was not valid without delivery, but that it
was valid by the English law, is untenable in both respects.

[Delivery is essential, both at law and in equity, to the validity of a
parol gift of a chattel or chose in action; and it is the same whether it
be a gift inder vivos, or causa mortis. There must be an actual delivery
to the donee, or it must be placed in his power by delivery of the means
of obtaining possession. If the thing be not capable of actual delivery,
478 NOTES.

 

there must be some act equivalent to it. "The donor must part not only
with the possession, but with the dominion of the property. If the
thing given be a chose in action, the law requires an assignment, or
some equivalent instrument, and the transfer must be actually executed.

In Harris v. Clark, 3 Comstock 93, it was deciled by four judges of
the N. Y. Court of Appeals against three, that a draft of the donor, not
accepted, for a specific sum, upon a third person who has in his posses-
sion funds of the donor, does not operate as an assignment or appropria-
tion to the donee of the sum mentioned in the draft, and therefore is not
valid as a gift mortis causa.

When the gift is perfect, by delivery and acceptance, it is then, by the
English law, irrevocable, unless it be prejudicial to creditors, or the
donor was under a legal incapacity, or was circumvented by fraud. By
the civil code of Louisiana, art. 1484, 1485, the donation would be void
if the donor divested himself of all his property, and did not reserve
enough for his own subsistence ; and he cannot deprive heirs of the por-
tion of his estate reserved for them by law, except in cases where he
has a just cause to disinherit them. Art. 1482. It is liable also to be
revoked or dissolved for certain causes specified in the Code, among
which are, ingratitude of the donee, and the donor’s having children
after the donation. Art. 1546 &c.]

§ 3. De donatione ante nuptias vel propter nuptias, p. 102. These
were of two kinds, marriage presents, sponsalia largitas, and gifts in
some sort by way of jointure, dotis compensande causa. Formerly
(that,is in early periods of the Roman law) these could only be made
before marriage, Cod. L. 17. de donat. ante nupt. and Cod. L. 8. de re-
pud: but Justinian permitted this second kind, to be made also after
marriage. Ler ult. Dig. de eodem.

How far such donations will be supported as against creditors see
Randall v. Morgan, 12 Vez. 74. and the cases there referred to: also
Kidney v. Coussmaker, 12 Vez. 155.

[Antenuptial settlements, as also settlements after marriage, if made
in pursuance of an agreement in writing entered into prior to the mar-
riage, are valid, both against creditors and purchasers. Such a settle-
ment is not void as a fraud upon creditors, unless both parties should
concur in, or have cognizance of the intended fraud. If the settlor
alone intend a fraud, and the other party be innocent of it, she is not,
and cannot be affected by it. The marriage is itself a valuable consid-
eration and sufficient to support the settlement. (Magniac v. Thomp-
son, 7 Peters U.S. Rep. 348.) But voluntary settlements after mar-
riage upon the wife or children without any valid agreement previous to
the marriage to support them, are void as against creditors existing
when the settlement was made. Such settlements however are valid
NOTES. 479

against subsequent creditors, if made without any fraudulent intent, by a
person not indebted at the time. (Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns, 3 Ch.
Rep. 481. Sexton » Wheaton, 8 Wheaton 229.) In North and South
Carolina and Tennessee, the registration of marriage settlements and
contracts is required by statute, in order to render them valid as a lien
on the property of the settlor as against creditors. }

§ 4. De jure accrescendi, p.103. See post. Inst. TIL. 4.4. In Grant v.
Kearne, in the common pleas at Northumberland, a case of a tract of
land taken up in the joint mames of William M‘ Murray and George
Grant, I held that the doctrine of survivorship did not apply. These
cases seemed to me, cases of partnership, rather than joint-tenancy. In
June 1812, the supreme court, to which Grant v. Kearne, was removed
by error, agreed in opinion with the court bclow, and held that the right
of survivorship did not attach upon property so held. In wills, the
court of chancery leans against the Jus accrescendi. 4, Vez. 551. Russel
v. Long. ‘

See 1 Cod. de comm. serv. Manumitt. and Dig. 18. 1. de contr. empt.

Tit. 8. Quibus alienare licet, p.104. Consult on the right of the
husband to aliene, Cod. de rei vendic. Cod. de jur. dot. Cod. de rei.
uxor. act. Dig. 23.3. Dig. 23.5. Dig. 23. 4.

Remedium imposuimus. Cod. 5. 13. 1. unic.

See Woollands v. Crowcher, 12 Vez. 174. as to the necessity of the
wile’s consent and the mode of taking it. Also Murray v. Lord Eli-
bank, 13 Vez. 1. and Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Vez. 190. and Essex v. Atkins,
14 Vez. 547. where the court at last determined that a married woman
may bind her separate property, without the assent of her trustees, un-
less their assent be made necessary in the trust deed.

§ 1. De creditore qui licet non sit dominus, §c. p. 105. Constitutione
consultum est. Cod. 8. 34. 3. de jur. dom. impetr. see also post Inst. IIT.
154. Dig. 13. 7. 9.

As to the difference between a pledge and a mortgage, and in what
cases the creditor may dispose of the pledge, see De Main-
bray v. Metcalfe, *Prec. in ch. 419. and 2 Vern. 691. Jones [ *476 ]
vy. Smith, 2 Vez. jun. 378. and Cortelyou v. Lansing, 2 Caines’
cases in error 202. A mortgage isa pledge, of which the absolute in-
terest vests in the creditor ata fixed time, if the debt be not satisfied.
A pledge cannot be sold even during the lifetime of the debtor, unless
after previous demand, and reasonable notice by the creditor, who has -
not the property in the pledge, but a lien only on it.

[A mortgage of goods differs from a pledge or pawn in this, that the
mortgage is a conveyance of the title upon condition, and it becomes an
absolute interest in law, if not redeemed by a given time. Another
respect in which they differ, is, that delivery accompanies a pledge, and
480 NOTES.

 

is essential to its validity, whereas a mortgage may, in certain cases, be
valid without actual delivery.

The pledgee may, by bill in equity, bar the debtor’s right of redemp-
tion, and have the chattel sold. But without any bill to redeem, the
creditor, on a pledge or mortgage of chattels, may after first demanding
payment of the debtor, sell at auction, or giving reasonable opportunity
to the debtor to redeem, and apprizing him of the time and place of sale.
The creditor will be held at his peril to deal fairly and justly with the
plelge, both as to the time of the notice, and the manuer of the sale,
which can only be at public auction, unless there be an express stipula-
tion authorising a private sale.

All kinds of property that are vested and tangible, and also negotia-
ble paper, may be the subject of pledge; and choses in action, resting
on written contract, may be assigned in pledge. The assignment of
shares in joint stock companies, such as hanks, insurance and rail-road
companies, by way of pledge or security for monies loaned, or advances
made, is usually affected by delivery of the certificate of the company
for the shares appertaining to the assignor, with a power of attorney to
the assignee to make the actual transfer in the books of the company, or
even by merely affixing, upon the back of the certificate, the signature
and seal of the assignor which will authorise any subsequent holder of
the certificate to write an assignment and a power of attorney over the
signature. (Kartright v. Buffalo Commercial Bank, 20 Wendell’s Rep.
91. & 22 Ib. 348.)

In Huntington v. Mather, 2 Barbour’s Sup. Court. Rep. 538, the Su-
preme Court of New York held, that where stocks are deposited with
the lender of money, as collateral security for the loan, with authority
to the lender to sell, on the nonpayment of the sum borrowed; the
transaction is a mortgage, and not a pledge; and on default of aa
ment, the title to the stocks become absolutely vested in the lender, and
the borrower has only a right of redemption, which right may be
barred by the statute of limitations, or the lapse of time. But in the
later case of Wilson v. Little, 2 Comstock’s Rep. 433, the Court of Ap-
peals of the same state held, that such a transaction was a pledge, and
not a mortgage of the stock; and thatthe transfer of the legal title is not
inconsisteht with a pledge, if the debtor has a right to the restoration of
the property, on payment of the debt at any time, although after it falls
due. ]

§ 2. De pupillo qui licet Dominus, &c. p. 105. The law of England
is the same with that here laid down, Ifan infant deliver money toa
person, it may be recovered inan action of account. See the authorities
collected in 1 Com. on Contracts, 148.

$3. Continuatio, p. 106. The reason of the law here laid down re-
NOTES. 481

 

Specting tutors and pupils, extends to minors and curators. L. 5. Cod.
de in integr. test. minor. Dig. 45.1.6. Dig. 26. 5. 8. 3.

As to the consequences of pupillage by the civil law.

Ist. The pupil is not entitled to an obligation for money lent by him,
because he cannot transfer the property of the loan to the borrower. Dig.
26.8.9. Hence the borrower becomes liable to the condictio certi quasi
ex mutuo, Dig. 12.1.11.$ ult. Dig. 12.1.12. Dig. 12.1.19.1. If
the borrower had spent it mala fide, the action ad exhibendum lay, in
which damages beyond the principal might be recovered, $ infra de off.
jud. Dig. 12, 3.3. 2ndly. Neither could the pupil pay a debt; but if
the creditor received the money bona fide, he was answerable. Dig.
46. 3.14. ult. and 26.8.9.2. 3rdly. A doctor could not pay his pupil
creditor, unless under the authority of the tutor. Dig. 46.3. 15. But
if the money either remained, or was expended by the pupil in necessaries,
it could not be demanded a second time: the debtor might plead in bar,
exception of fraud. Dig. 44.4.15 and 44.4.4.4. Dig. 46. 3, 47 and
56. 3. 66. But Justinian required a judgment to authorize the payment
even under the authority of the tutor, in cases above a certain sum. L.
25 and L. 27. Cod. de adminstr.

Tit. 9. $1. De liberis in potestate, p. 107. Peculiwm fis the private
property, that slaves or sons of families might acquire independent of
the master or father. .

Peculium castrense, was the acquirements of the son during actual
military service.

Peculium quasi castrense, was the acquirements of the son in militia
togata et inermi, or in the imperial household, or by means of some ec-
clesiastical benefice, or legal employ.

*Peculium adventitium, was the property acquired by the [ *477 ]
son by his own industry, by bequests on the maternal side,
or by the liberality of friends.

Peculium profectitium, was the gain made by the son, on the father’s
stock or capital.

The father’s absolute authority over the property of the son was first
taken away with respect to the peculiwm castrense. Dig. 37. 6. ¥. 5.
Dig 39. 17. de castr. pec.

Next as to the peculium quasi castrense. Cod. de castr. omn. palat.
pecul. see also post Inst. 2. 11. 6.

As to the peculiwm adventitium, it was modified by the Theodosian
Code, de matern. bon. and de bon. qu. liber. and by the Justinian Code
of the same title.

The peculium: profectitium, remained subject to the father’s claim ac-
cording to the present section.

61
482 NOTES.

 

By the Code Civil Nap. Fathers have a right to the property of their
children until the age of eighteen, or previous emancipation: that pro-
perty excepted which was acquired by the personal industry of the child.
Art. 372. 384. 387. f ,

In England and in this country the father is entitled only to the earn-
ings of the child until he be of full age. If any property descend or be
given to the child, the father is no more than a trustee and must account
when the son is of age. 1 Bl. Comm. 453.

$2. De emancipatione liberorum, p. 108. Ex anterioribus constitutiont-
bus. lex. 1. and lex. 2. Cod. Theod. de maternis bonis.

Ideoque statuimus. Cod. 6. 61. 6.

The French code allows of emancipation by the father, or by. the
mother if the father be dead, at the age of fifteen. But a son deprived
of father and mother cannot be emancipated till eighteen. An eman-
cipated minor-can do no acts but such as are merely administrative: he
cannot borrow without the advice of family counsel: his bargains may
be moderated when excessive. He is considered as of age as to his trad-
ing, if he enters into trade. Art. 476. 487.

§ 3. De servis p. 108. The history of slavery in England and the

. history of villeinage as connected with it, is well treated in Hargreave’s
argument in the case of James Somerset, the negro, X1. State trials
p. 339. He was a heathen or unbaptized negro. I have already referred
to the supposed efficacy of baptism in Sir Thomas Grantham’s case, 3
‘Mod. 120; a superstition very creditable to the christian religion. Even
so late as 5 William and Mary in the case of Gelly v. Cleve, cited in

Chamberlain v. Hervey. 1 Lord Raym. 146. it was decided
{[ *478 ] *that trover would lie for a negro boy, for they are heathens
and therefore a man may have property in them.

Since the decision of Somerset, the cases relating to slavery are few.
In 3 Espinasse’s Nisi Prius Reports, p. 3. Easter term, 1799, I find the
case of Alfred v. the Marquis of Fitzjames. Assump. for servants
wages. Plaintiff proved the time he had served, and relied on a quant.
mer. Lord Kenyon determined, that unless there was an agreement for
wages during the time of his service in England, the negro could recover
none.

I have thought it expedient to add here, the reported cases respecting
slavery in the American books, (except 2 Bay’s S. Carolina Rep.)
From which some idea may be obtained of the legal situation of negro
slaves. I have not the opportunity of referring to the various acts of
assembly passed on this subject in the several states to the southward of
Pennsylvania, and the present notices on the subject will of course be
defective, but they will be relevant so far as they extend. In the pre-
NOTES. 483

ceding part of the notes pages 410. I have treated at some length the
general subject of slavery; to which this note may be considered as an
addition.

To the northward and eastward of New York and Pennsylvania,
slavery is so nearly abolished, that I do not think it necessary to trace
the laws concerning it. In Massach. Rep. 123. Winchendon and Hat-
field, and Ib. 539. Dighton v. Freetown, there are some cases as to the
township settlement of slaves, but of no importance.

By an act of the general assembly of the state of New York, 22 Feb.
1788, and by another act of April, 1801, persons bringing slaves into the
state of New York, are prohibited under a heavy fine from selling or
transferring’ them as slaves, or for any period whatever. Under these
acts in the case of Link v. Beuner, 3 Cains 325. A. D. 1805. a transfer
of the time of a slave for 2U years, the slave to be manumitted at the
age of thirty eight, was held to be a transfer of the slave himself, and in-
valid. This was agreeable to a former decision in Fish v. Fisher, there
cited, and to one of the points in Sable v. Hitchcock, 2 Johnson’s cases,
79. confirmed in error in 1802. But persons acting merely in the capac-
ity of executors, trustees, assignees of insolvent debtors, sheriffs, é&c.
would not be liable to the penal clause of the act. The same point was
decided in Fish v. Fisher, Ib. 89, which was the case of a slave running
away from his master living in New Jersey, and pursued into New
York, where he was sold: on the principle, -that this might lead to the
evasion of tlie act, which was designed to stop the importation of slaves
into New York state.

*In the case of Tom a negro, the owner gave hima certi- [ *479 ]
ficate in writing stating that from and after the decease of the
owner, Tom was manumitted. After this, the owner sold and de-
livered the slave for a valuable consideration. Held, that notwith-
standing this transfer, the negro became free at the death of his former
owner, who gave him the certificate. 5 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 355.
Same point settled afterward in Ketletas and Fleet. 7 Johns. N. Y. Rep.
324. In Hart v. Cleiss, 8 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 41. - Where a slave is ex-
ported or attempted to be exported by a stranger, without the privity of
the master, the slave does not become free, but the stranger is liable to
the penalty of 250 dollars.

In Pennsylvania, by the acts of 1 March, 1780, and 29 March, ‘1788,
all the negroes born within the state since the first of these acts, can only
be held in servitude till the age of 28. Persons claiming slaves born be-
fore that act, were required to register them. Strangers, persons not in-
habitants of Pennsylvania, nor meaning to become resident therein, pass-
ing through the state are protected in their rights to their attendant
slaves for a period of six months. But all slaves imported into Pennsyl-
484 NOTES.

 

vaiia by persons inhabitants of or resident within this state, or who
shall come with an intention of residing in Pennsylvania, cannot claim
the benefit of this clause, but their slaves on arriving here, become free.
No- negro or mulatto slave shall be removed, by force, or seduced out
of the state, without his consent, under a penalty of two hundred
dollars against the offender, with confinement to hard labour for 12
months. No husband, wife, parent or child, during the allowed term
of servitude, shall be transferred, &c. so as to be separated more than
ten miles.

On these acts, and the general doctrine of slavery the following de-
cisions have taken place in Pennsylvania.

As villeinage never existed in Pennsylvania, no part of the doctrine.
founded on that condition is applicable here, 1 Dallas Rep, 167.
Hence the common law doctrine that the child follows the condition
of the father, and therefore that a bastard is always free, being found-
ed upon the old English law respecting villeinage, is not applicable
here. We follow the civil law rule, that partus sequitur ventrem. -
Chief Justice M’Kean noticed a species of slavery in England distinct
from villeinage mentioned by Swinburne, 6th edit. 84. And this be-
ing the case of a slave born and purchased in Maryland, he support-
ed the docirine of the lex loci; agreeably to Smith v. Gould, 2 Salk.
666. in which there is much curious matter as to slaves, and villeins,

but it does not support the chief justice’s position as to the
: *480 ] lex loci: nor is the *report of the same case more in point

in 2 Lord Ray. 1274, and it is not supported by Pearne
v. Lisle, Ambler, 76, or Chamberlain v. Hervey, 1 Ld. Raym. 146.
But I think the application of lex loci, was perfectly right in the Penn-
sylvania case. In Smith v. Gould, Lord Ray. 1274, it is said that if A.
takes B. a Frenchman captive in war, he cannot maintain his action
quare cepit B. captivum suum gallicum, which may bear upon the right
of slavery as deduced from the rights attached to taking captives.

Property in a negro may be obtained by bona fide purchase without
deed, see M’Kean, in the above case of Pirate al Belt v. Dalbey, 1 Dall.
Rep. 169. A negro born before 1st March, 1780, and not recorded agree-
ably to the provisions of that act, is absolutely free. Respublica v. ne-
gro Betsey, 1 Dall. Rep. 469. 7

Where the jury make the price of a negro slave, the measure of dam-
ages in a writ of homine replegiando, if it be accepted by the master, it
will in equity, and perhaps by operation of law also, emancipate the ne-
gto. Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 Dall. Rep. 57.

In Jack v. Eales, 3 Binney, 101, the court decided that an omission ot
mistake by the clerk, in the record of entry of a negro or mulatto, might
be rectified according to the verdict of a jury on hearing evidence of the
NOTES. 485

fact. This does not go quite so far as the case of the Commonwealth v.
Blaine, wherein the entry follows the written return signed by the defend-
ant herself; and which is under a different act of assembly. ‘The own-
er ought not to be damnified by any mistake of a public officer, but’ in
the latter case, the court decided she could not be damnified by her own,
but might be allowed to set it right by testimony. The case is not yet
reported, but I understand it was in substance, as follows, viz. The
Commonwealth v. Sarah E. Blaine, in error determined at Chambers-
burgh, before Tighlman, Yeates, and Brackenridge, Sept. term, 1811.

Habeas corpus for a negro boy: defendant claimed him as her slave
regularly registered under the act of assembly. It appeared that the
slave was registered on the 26th June, 1807, and the affidavit accompa-
nying the return was dated on the same day; but both in the registry
and return, the slave was stated to be born on the 2nd of January, 1808,
six months after the registry took place. It was contended on the part of
the slave, that this registry was not within the letter or spirit of the act,
which intended a record that should supercede the necessity of parol
proof as to the period of the commencement of the servitude: it was
meant as a protection to the slave from imposition. The time of birth
of a negro child being in its nature a fact of no great notori-
ety, could *scarcely be expected to be ascertained by parol [ *481 ]
at the distance of 28 years, when it would be impossible for
the slave to find the witnesses, or know who they were if they still sur-
vived.—Hence, the necessity of recording the true period of time. The
record in the present case, is untrue on the face of it; nor can it be good
in part and bad in part: if the mistress can hold the slave under it, she
can oblige him to serve until 28 years have elapsed from the period men-
tioned in the registry, which would be manifestly unjust —If the only
operation of the act, is to oblige the master to make a registry of some
sort no matter whether true or false, within six months after the birth,
what was originally meant as a substantial benefit to the slave, may be
turned into a matter of form and idle ceremony. The slave has a
vested interest in his freedom, if every thing required be not compli-
ed with by the master. And farther, that agreeably to the spirit of the
act, and the liberality of the times, a doubtful claim should be construed
in favorem libertatis. |

On the other hand it was argued, that the act in question did not
change the nature of the property: that the slave was still the
property of the owner; a chattel: and that everything done or to be
done, respecting him, must be construed agreeably to the analogy of all
laws relating to property: that a manifest ambiguity or mistake on the
face of the instrument, might be explained and set right by testimony :
486 NOTES.

 

in the present case, no more was asked, than that an impossible date
should be corrected by the real fact.

The court coinciding with this reasoning, remanded the slave into the
custody of his mistress ; and observed, that the registry was not conclu-
sive on either party, but might at any time be rectified according to the
true state of the facts, whether brought forward by the claimant or by the
negro : andif the latter, after having served out his 28 years counting from
the true time, could make out by parol or any other proof that might be
in his power, that he was born at a period earlier than that mentioned
in the registry, the court would discharge him. Judge Yeates said, the
first decisions on the act of assembly went the length of liberating nearly
all the slaves registered under it; but that the current of late decisions
set entirely the other way, and that everything like strictness of form
was dispensed with, to get at the merits.

The various acts of assembly of the state of Pennsylvania, respecting
the class of servants called German redemptioners, (2 Smith’s Pennsyl-
vania laws, p. 329.) hardly fall under the subject now in discussion.

The legatee of slaves for life, is entitled to the issue born during the
life estate, Scott v. Dobson, 1 Harris and M‘Henry’s Maryland Rep.

160.
[ *482 ] *The issue of slave goes to the person to whom the use is
limited. Somerville v. Johnson, Maryl. Rep. 348.

How far manumitted slaves may inherit, and whether slaves are capa-
ble of a legal marriage? Dulany’s opinion. Ib. Appendix. 557.

Under the Maryland law of 1663, by which the issue of a freeborn
white woman intermairying with a slave, shall be slaves, and under the
act of 1681, ch. 4. repealing thatlaw, it was held, that issue born after
the repealing law were slaves, if the marriage took place before the re-
peal. Butler v. Boarman. Ib. 371.

Money directed by will to be laid out in slaves, and annexed to lands
devised in tail by the same will, is to be considered in the same light as
slaves and will go with the-land. Dade v. Alexander, 1 Wash. 30.

As to Indian slaves: what Indians could be made slaves and what
couldnot. Jenkins v. Tom. 1 Wash. 123,

Since 1705 no American Indian could be made a slave in Virginia : but
foreign Indians might. Dick v. Coleman, 1 Wash. 239.

Slaves are chattels, and assets for the payment of debts, where there
is a deficiency of other personal estate. Walden v. Payne, 2 Wash. 7.

Slaves are real estate only in particular cases such as descents. Ib.

Nor is an executor bound by order of a county court directing a dis-
tributive division of a testator’s estate, to deliver up the slaves without
reserving a sufficiency to pay debts, or taking refunding bonds. Ib,
NOTES. 487

 

Where white persons, or native American Indians or their descendants
in the maternal line, are claimed as slaves, the onus probandi lies on the
claimant. Hudgins v. Wrights, 1 Hening and Munford, 134. Other-
wise with respect to native Africans and their descendants. ,

No native American Indian could be made a slave in Virginia since
1691. Ib.and Pallas et al. ». Hill etal. 2 Hen. and Munf. 149.

A negro claiming freedom under the law of 1792, on the ground: of
having been brought into this state, it must appear that he was detained
by compulsion and contrary to law, Henderson v. Allens, 1 Hen. and
Mun. 235. .

Slaves emancipated by a last will and testament, may be sold for a
term ef years to satisfy the debts of the testator, if there be not sufficient
assets without: Patty, &c. v. Colin, &c. 1 Hen. and Mun. 519—531.

If a slave hired for a year, be sick or run away, the tenant must pay
the hire; otherwise if the slave die without any fault on part of the ten-
ant: in which case, the owner loses the hire from the time of the slave’s
death. George v. Elliot, 2 Hen. and Mun. 5.

*If an executor sells the slaves of a testator, without any ~[ *483 ]
necessity for so doing induced by debts, and buy them him-
self, the slave may be set aside. Anderson and Starks v. Fox, 2 Hen.
and Mun. 245.

A father possessed of ample fortune, having sent several slaves to his
daughter, soon after her marriage, which slaves continued with her and
her husband till the father’s death, twenty eight months afterwards, they
were held to be a gift in consideration of marriage, and the husband en-
titled to keep them against the creditors of the father. Hen. and Munf.
ub. sup. s

Three witnesses are necessary in deeds of trust, or mortgage of slaves,
unless the same be acknowledged by the party. Meores’s Exor. v. the
Auditor, Ib. 232.

Construction of the stat. of frauds and perjuries as to the loan of
slaves, Beasly v. Owen, Ib. 449.

In order to annex slaves to land, it was necessary that co-extensive
estates should be given in both. Dunn v. Bray, 1 Call’s Virginia Rep.
338.

Slaves recovering their freedom, are not entitled to damages for de-
tention. Pleasants v. Pleasants, 2 Call’s Rep. 319.

Evidence of a parol gift of slaves cannot be given, under the act of
1758, but such testimony may be received to prove a five year’s posses-
sion, so as to bar a plaintiff’s demand. Jordan v. Murray, 3 Call’s Rep.
85.

2 Cranch, Adams qui tam v. Woods, 336 and the United States v. the
488 NOTES.

 

schooner Sally, are eases under the act of Congress of March, 1794,
abolishing the slave trade in 1808.

Scott v. the Negro London, 3 Cranch, 324. A slave brought into the
state of Virginia, by an Act of 17 Dec. 1792, and kept there a year,
shall be free, unless the owner within 60 days of his arrival in the state,
shall make oath that he did not remove thither, or bring slaves there
with intent of evading the laws of Virginia, as to the importation of
slaves. A slave brought there, and detained for more than a twelve
month, by a person claiming him, but who was not the true owner, shall
not acquire his freedom by this means, to the injury of his true owner.

Spiers v. Willison, 4 Cranch, 398, and Ramsey v. Lee. Ib. 401. By
act of Virginia, 1758, and by the law as it stood in 1784, no gift of a
slave was valid, except made in writing and recorded.

Five years possession of a slave, will entitle the plaintiff in detinue

to recover, but without prejudice to the titles of those who
[ *484 ] were not *parties to the suit, Newby’s admrs. v. Blakey. 3

Hen. and Mun. 57. And so in trespass, Brent v. Chapman,
5 Cranch, 358.

A person convicted under the negro act of South Carolina, of killing
a negro, and committed for the forfeiture of 700]. currency, is not en-
titled either to prison bounds, or the insolvent debtor’s Act. The State
v. Gee, 1 Bay’s Rep. 163.

By another act of South Carolina, if any slave shall suffer in life or
limb, when no white person is present, the owner or other person who
shall have the care of, or in whose possession or power such slave shall
be, shall be deemed guilty of such offence, and proceeded against ac-
cordingly, without further proof, unless such owner or other person, do
make the contrary appear by evidence, or exculpate himself by oath.
Per Cur: this permission of exculpating by oath, is given by the act on-
ly to masters, overseers and others, having negroes under their care.
They held it did not extend to the master of a vessel, who had taken
up the negro on some pretext or other, and to prevent the negro’s escap-
ing, had thrown a lead line about his neck, by which he was strangled.
Defendant was convicted of manslaughter and fined 501. sterling. The
State v. Welch, 1 Bay’s Rep. 172.

A master permitting a negro wench to work for herself, or hire herself
out, paying him certain stipulated wages, who by her industry and
frugality saves as much money as enables her to purchase a negro girl
in order to give her freedom, such negro girl shall be deemed free, and
not the property of the miaster. The guardian of Sally a negro v. Beat-
ty, 1 Bay’s Rep. 261. The defendant’s case was argued on the grounds
ef the civil law, by which as Blackstone alleges, even the price paid to
NOTES. 489

the person, becoming by contract for a certain price a slave { for life, be-
longs to the master. 1 BI. Com. 425. A doctrine however, which could
not be supported on principle, even where slavery. such as among the
Romans was prevalent; for the slavery of the party depending « on the
consideration of the price given, the instant the master forcibly deprived
the slave of the price, the slavery would cease. The condition i in which
the seller put himself, was that he might, have the free use of the sum
stipulated as the purchase money, and this being seized on by the mas-
ter, the contract itself i is put an end to. .

A negro found by accident on leased premises. is not liable to be dis-
trained for rent. Bull v. Horlbeck, 1 Bay’ s Rep. 301.

A negro with two white men, though under their controul, is a person
in law who may be deemed a rioter. The state v. 'Thackan ‘and Mason.
1 Bay’ s Rep. 358.

In addition, to the Pennsylvania cases, relating to negroes
and slaves, *the reader i is referred to 1 Smith’s Edit. of the [ +485 ]
laws of Pennsylvania, 497.

In 1798, or thereabout, Judge Riish, at Sunbury, determined j in the
case of the negro Tash, that thie ae probandi, of proving his freedom
lay on the negro aiine! asa slave. This would be good. law i in the
southern states, but I doubt it in Pennsylvania, where the laws provide
so sedulously for the emancipation of ae

$ 4. De fructuariis et bona fide, &c. p. 110. see Dig. Al, 1. 10. 3 wat
4, _ Subject however to Dig. 7. 1. 21. et seq. and Dig. Al. 2. 45. et ult.

$ De reliquis seu extraneis personis, p.111. Divi severi constitutio-
nem, Cod. 7. 32. 1.

Tit. 10. De testamentis ordinandis, p. 112. _ es

I consider the right of conveying by devise, asa creature of positive
law, to be permitted or modified in harmony with the institutions of the
country, and according to the spirit and knowledge of the times. What
right has a man over property when he is no more? or whence does he
derive it? or how is he to enforce it? The earth, the air, the water,
vegetables, and minerals, are manifestly placed here. for common benefit.
Man can | but enjoy the usufruct of them while he lives ; owl en] e ceases
to live, he can neither derive enjoyment from them, or exercise controul
over them. He found them here, subservient to his convenience ; and
when dead, he must leave them to the convenience and controul at those
who come after him.

All that a man can claim the right of devising, if he can claim any
right at all, is the additional value he has bestowed upon natural objects,
by the exertion of his skill and industry upon them ; but even this he
has no means of enforcing after death : and if he calls upon society tc to
enforce the right, it must be on such terms as society thinks fit to im-

62
490 NOTES.

 

pose. This subject is put in a strong light in Dr. Ogilvie’s tract on the
right to property in land: and the discourse of Bigot-Premeneu on Do-
nations inéer vivos, and the theory of the law of last wills, is well worth
perusing. It contains also a good exposition of the reasons whereupon
the French code has varied in some respects from the Roman, as in the
rejection of Substitutions and Fidei Commissa. 2 Recueil, 361.
Society, however, has generally sanctioned the right of making last
wills and testaments, 1st, From a wish to indulge the voice of nature
which calls upon the dying to provide for the comforts of near and dear
relations by the bequest of that property which can no longer contribute
to their own enjoyment. 2ndly, To encourage industry ; by
[ *486 ] allowing the industrious to dispose by will of the fruits of
their industry, and protecting that disposal, when made in
conformity to the directions of law. These motives of permission, will
leave great latitude as to the restrictions that may be thought necessary
to fulfil the public views. Thus in a country like England, where insti-
tutions partake of the spirit of the feudal times, and where primogeni-
ture calls for exclusive privileges, the law will be favourable to accumu-
lations dt the expence of the younger branches of a family: in such a
government as ours, where no reason of this kind prevails, we might
properly direct or restrict the general licence of testamentary dispositions,
upon principles more agreeable to natural equity. Solon first permitted
the Athenians to make a will; from whom the Romans borrowed the
law of the twelve tables, Pater familias, uti legassit super familia pecu-
niaque sua, ita jus esto. The modification of this rule by the Ler Fal-
cidia, which permitted a testator to dispose arbitrarily but of three
fourths or one half of his property, has been imitated, and properly as I
think, by most of the civilized nations of Europe. Indeed when we
consider the many capricious, not to say sénseless and unjust disposi-
tions of property that take place in countries where an unlimited right of
devising is permitted—the neglect of children and,relations for the sake
of gratifying a selfish vanity, or a death-bed superstition—the culpable
fondness of power that would extend for a century or two, or perpetuate
if possible, the controul of a weak and dying man over property that he
can no longer enjoy. as in the will of Mr. Thelusson—when we consid-
er further, that those whom we bring into existence, have a right to call
upon us to make that existence as comfortable as we are able, without
unreasonably sacrificing our own comforts—we shall probably incline to
think that some restrictions on the right of devising are neither inexpe-
dient or unjust. Our German ancestors, refused the right altogether.
Heeredes successoresque sui cuique liberi, et nullum testamentum, says Ta-
citus, De Mor. Germ: and such was the law of Greece before Solon,
and of Rome till the period of the twelve tables.
NOTES. 491

$ De etymologia, p. 112.  Testamentum ex eo appeltatur, gc. Be-
sides this, several definitions are given of a last will: Ulpian defines et,
mentis nostree justa contestatio, in id solemniter facta, ut post mortem nos-
tram valeat. The definition of Modestinus is not unlike that. Domat
defines a testament, to be the appointment of an executor or testamenta-
ry heir, according to the formalities prescribed by law. Dom. L. 1.
tit. 1. sect. 1. But this is merely describing the person who is to put
the will into execution, rather than the will itself. Aulus

Gellius, *and Laurentius Valla laugh at the definition of Jus- [ *487 ]
tinian, and say that festamentum is no more derived from

mens, than calceamentum, ornamentum, salsamentum, Sc. See enough
of all this in the marginal annotations to Swinburne oni wills, p. 2. The
only defect I see, is, that the definition given in the text, will apply to a
codicil also. In a will, there must be an executor: there need not in a
Codicil. Swinburne’s book contains a laborious collection of references
to civil law writers on this subject; and to use his own expression (pref.)
‘‘ May in some sort be profitable to those Justinianists or young students
of the civil law, who do intend to bestow the fruit of their study in the
practice thereof.”

Quinque verbis potest quis facere testamentum, ut dicat Lucius Titius
mihi heres esto. Dig. 28. 5. 1 Swinburne, 3, 4, 5.

1. De antiquis modis testandi civilibus. p. 112. All these ancient
methods are enumerated by Ferriere in loco, but they are of no further
importance at present, excepting to shew how long it was, before a little
common sense took place of the absurd fictions on which the ancient
customs were grounded.

Per es et libram. Cujas is of opinion that this kind of last will was
abrogated by Constantines Cod. 6. 23. 15.

Attamen partim. In part only : because the same number of witnes-
ses were still necessary. For though the civil law required but five wit-
nesses, yet the balance holder and the purchaser made seven: and it
was to supply the place of these, that the pretorian law added two
witnesses to the number required by the civil law. Harris.

§ 3. De conjunctione juris civilis et pretorii. p. 113. Thata will
should be made at one sitting as it were, does not imply that acts of ne-
cessity might not intervene, as the giving of physic, &c. but, that there
should be no intervention in the nature of business, as buying, selling,
&e. 1. 28. Cod. h. tit.

A nostra constitutione. See Cod. 6. 23. 29 jubemus. Nov. 119 ch. 9.

§ 4. Solemnitas addita a Justinio. p. 114. This solemnity introduced
by ler consultissima, Cod. h. tit. was again altered by the novel 129. ch.
9. by which he permitted the name of the heir to be written by another,

Hence a wili required,
we NOTES.

 

1st. That it should be made without the intervention of other business,
either by the’ testator or the witnesses, while it was drawing, up °

* tidy. That it should be executed in the presence of seven witnesses

vn ee ' specially convened for this purpose. ‘
[ *488 ] *3rdly. That they should ‘severally ‘s seal either the will it-
; * self, or the envelope. =<

Athly. That they and the testator should subscribe it.

5thly: That the name of the heir should be written either by the tes-
tator, or by some person at his request.

Gilily. That the wimesses should be such as were capable of being
heirs or legatees, (testamentio factio activa) but liable to the exceptions
contained in the sixth section of, this title. As, women, slaves, minors
under puberty, persons deaf, dumb, insane, or legally disqualified, as
persons convicted of libellous verses, ‘&e. Dig. 22, 8. 21: Dig. 28, 3.
5.9." And Swinburne | on wills, 345. ‘Persons who had refused when
éalled on ‘to’ bear testimony. Aul. Gell. Lib. 5. ch. 23. and latterly,
heretics lex. 4. “Cod. de heretic. lex 3. Cod. de Apost.

‘These witnesses if unimpeachable at the’ time of the will being made, -

were ‘unimpeachable afterward, Dig. 28. 1. 22. Several witnesses might
be taken from the same family, but not out of the family of ‘the testator:
though the heir might be a witness, and so might a father to the will of
his emancipated son, Dig. 28. 1. 20. or to the will of his ; son, respecting
his peculium castrense.. Dig. 29,1. 23. 11. " Legatees also might be wit-
nésses, Dig. 28. 1. 20. though: these j provisions seem contrary to the rule,
thal rio one shall bea witness in his own cause. Dig. 22. 5. 20. The
notary might be a witness, but he could not receive a legacy i in that case,
Suet. Nero. 17. Dig. 48. 10. 22.6 &e. Dig. 34.8. 5. ,
“"8 5. De annulis quibus lestamention signatur. p. 114. An inconve-
nient dissonance takes place in the United States, as to the necessity of
actually sealing an insttument supposed to be sealed, In Pennsylvania
and Virginia, a scroll with a pen, and the word seal; or the letters L. S.
written therein, is held equivalent to actual ‘sealing. It is not so in New
York state. “See the subject discussed in Warren v. Lynch, 5 John’s N.
Y. Rep. 239. “This was the case of a note drawn in Virginia, but made
payable in New York, and therefore the Lex Loci of New- York guided
tlie decision ‘ according to the principle of Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr.
1077. ‘“Lhdlow et al.’ Van Rensselaer. 1 Johns. N. Y- Rep. 94 and
‘Tiidmpson v. Ketcham, 4 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 285.

[Atcommon law, a seal is an impression upon wax or wafer, or some
other ‘tenacious substance, capable of being impressed. In Vermont, an
impression of an ‘official seal, made upon paper alone, is sufficient. (Re-
vised . Statutes of Vermont, 1839, p. 53.) In New York, it has been

endéted, that ih ‘all cases where’a seal of any Court, 0 or of any ‘public
FU
NOTES. 493

officer, ‘shall be authorized | or “required | by law, the same may be affixed
by making an impression dircetly on the paper, which shall be as valid
as if made on a wafer or on Wax ; ‘but that private seals shall be made
as heretofore, on. wafer, wax, or acme similar substance. (2 R. S. 404,
sec. 61, 62. 3 Hill. 493. This statute, however. has been held not to
apply to the seals of courts or public officers of another state. 2 Hill.
227. 1 Denio, 376. In New Hampshire, it has been held, that a dis-
tinct impression of the seal upon paper, is sufficient without wax or
wafer. (Carter v. Burley, 9 N. H. Rep. 558.) In Maryland, a scroll has
been considered a seal from the earliest period of its judicial history. In
Virginia and Alabama, there must be evidence of an intention to substi-
tute the scroll for’a seal. Bat i in Alabama, the scroll is now unnecessary,
provided the deed or contract imports on its face, to be made under seal.
In New Jersey, in instruments for the payment of money, but not in
other cases, a scroll will supply the place of a seal. In Delaware, Vir-
ginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri and Ten-
hessee, there are statutes authorizing the subatihatien of a scroll for a
seal; but in Mississippi, deeds and conveyances of lands are required to
be a writing, signed, sealed and delivered. See 4 Kent’s Commenta-
ries, 452. Many obligors may adopt one seal or one scroll; and the
question whether the instrument is a sealed or an unsealed instrument
is one of intention, and the onus lies on the plaintiff to prove that the
party adopted the seal or scroll. ‘ Hollis v. Pond, 7 Humphrey’s (Ten-
nessee ) Rep. 222.] . -

$ 6. Qui testes esse possunt, p. 114, Testamenti factio, is either
factio activa, which is the right of making a will: or factio passiva, the
right of taking by will: the latter is the meaning here as I think, on com-
paring this section with Tit. 19 sec. 4. p. 151, 152. Har-
ris *translates the passage, ‘‘ who are themselves legally ca- [ *489 ]
pable of taking by testament.”

‘Sed neque ‘mulier.| Women may be admitted witnesses, by the civil
law in all matters, whether civil or criminal, when the nature of the.case
is such, that other evidence cannot be abtained: but, when the choice
of witnesses is altogether voluntary, as in making testaments, and doing.
many other acts, the civil law will not receive the testimony of a
woman. Domat. lib. 3.t.1. The Romans had also another reason for
rejecting women as witnesses to wills; namely, because women were
never suffered to be present at public assemblies, where all wills and
testaments were formerly made. But to use the words of Swinburne ;
us whatsoever diverse do write, that a woman is not without all excep-
“tion, because of the inconstancy and frailty of the feminine sex,
aS whereby they may the sooner be corrupted ; yet I take it, that their
a testimony 1 is so good, that a testament may be proved by two women
494 NOTES.

“alone, being otherwise without exception. Swin. of Testaments,
‘part IV. sect. 24.” And, by the laws of England in general, women
may be witnesses, sureties, guardians, d&c. in all cases, as well as men.
Harris.

For a list of civil law authors on the law of evidence, see Hargreave
and Butler’s Notes to Co. Litt. Index voce authors.

§ 7. De servo qui liber existimabatur, p. 115. Adrianus Catoni Cod. 6.
23.1. How far the court of chancery will go in aiding powers defec-
tively executed see Holmes v. Coghill, 12 Vez. 206, where most of the
cases are cited.

§$ 8. De pluribus testibus ex eadem domo, p. 115. This does not
mean, of the family of the testator, otherwise it would be contrary to
the spirit of Dig. 22.5.6. Idonei non videntur esse testes quibus imperare
potest ut testes fiunt: to which agrees the following. §$ 9. De his qui
sunt in familia testatoris.

§ 11. De legatariis et fidei commissariis, p. 116. see the note to $ 4.
above.

Legatariis autem.] Although it was a general rule in the Roman
law, that no one should be permitted to bear testimony in his own
cause, Cod. 4. t. 20. 1.10. yet legataries were allowed to give evidence
upon this distinction; that they were particular, and not universal suc-
cessors ; and that a testament would be valid without legataries. The
difficulty also, which must frequently have occurred, in obtaining so
great anumber of witnesses, as seven, might probably induce the Ro-
mans to be less strict, as to the persons, whom they admitted upon this

occasion. Qui testamento heres instituitur, says ULPIAN, in
[ *490 ] eodem *testamento testis esse non potest : quod in legatario, et

in-eo, qui tutor scriptus est, contra habetur. Hi enim testes
possunt adhiberi, si aliud eos nihil impediat ff. 28.t.1.1.20. But by
the practice of the ecclesiastical courts of this kingdom, which have the
sole cognisance ‘of the validity of all wills, as far as they relate to per-
sonal] estate, no legatee, who is a subscribed witness to the will, by
which he is benefitted, can be admitted to give his testimony in foro
contradictorio, as to the validity of that will, ’till either the value of his
legacy hath been paid to him, or he hath renounced it; and, in case of
payment, the executor of the supposed will, must release all title to any
future claim upon such supposed legatee, who might otherwise be oblig-
ed to refund, if the will should be set aside; and a release in this case
is always made, to the intent, that the legatee may have no shadow of
interest at the time of making his deposition. Swinb. 397. The same
practice also prevailed at common law in regard to witnesses, who were
benefited under wills, disposing of real estate. And, if a legatee, who
was a witness toa will, had refused either to renounce his legacy, or
NOTES. 495

to be paid a sum of money in lieu of it he could not have been com-
pelled by law to divest himself of his interest; and, whilst lis interest
continued, his testimony was useless: and this was determined in the
case of Ansley vers. Dowsing in easter term, 19 Geo. 2. Str. Rep. 1254.

But this very singular case, and the unanimous opinions of the
judges upon the meaning and intent of the statute of the 29th of Charles
the second, called the statute of frauds, gave rise to the following act of
parliament, made in the 25th year of Geo. the second: by which it is
enacted ; “‘ that if any person shall attest the execution of any will or
“codicil, which shall be made after the 24th of June, 1752, to whom
“‘any beneficial devise, legacy, estate, interest, gift, or appointment, of
‘or affecting any real or personal estate (charges on lands, tenements,
“or hereditaments for payment of debts excepted) shall be thereby giv-
“‘en, &c. the devise shall, so far only as concerns such person, or.any
“claiming under him, be void, and he shall be admitted a witness to
“the execution of such will.’ 25 Geo. 2d. Harris. See Twaites v.
Smith, 1 P. Wms. 10. 1 Lord Ray. 85. where it is said that by the spir-
itual law the son of a legatee is not a competent witness, but by the
common law he is.

In quandum nostra constitutione.] Not extant.

See further on witnesses to a bill by the law of England, Swinburne,
343, whose notes embrace also the spiritual and the civil law doctrine
on this subject. ‘

In Pennsylvania, we require but two witnesses to a will. |
Act of 1705. *See the exposition of this, in Hight v. Wil- [ *491 ]
son, 1 Dall. Rep. 94, and Lewis v. Maris, Ib. 278, and the
notes of Mr. Smith, 1 Smith’s Penn. laws. 38.

$ 14. De testamento nuncupativo, p. 117. By the civil law, the wit-
nesses (in number seven, Cod. 6. 23. 21. 2.) were required within a
reasonable time after the death of the nuncupatory testator, to go before
a magistrate, and giving an account of what took place, to have a for-
al statement drawn out and signed. L. ult. si vero Cod. de test.

_ On the English law of nuncupative wills, see 29. Ch. 2. Ch. 3. Swind.
355. [By the Statute 1 Victoria, ch. 26, it is declared that every will of
real or personal estate must be in writing, and signed by the testator, or
by some other person in his presence and by his direction, in the pres-
ence of two witnesses at one time; though soldiers and mariners in act-
ual service may dispose of personal estate as before: and such signature
must be made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of the
witnesses, and the witnesses are to attest and subscribe the will in the
presence of the testator, but no form of attestation is necessary, and
every will thus executed is declared to be valid without any other pub-
lication thereof. This statute put an end to nuncupative wills, in Eng-
%
alana

496 _ NOTES:

land, with the reservation only of the two excepted cases, and before
this statute the doctrine of the English courts was, that the evidericé fo
prove a nuncupative will must be strict and stringent; that the requisi-
tions of the statute, 29 Ch. 2 ch. must be strictly complied with i in every
single particular, and especially as to the rogatio testium. 'The deceased
himself was required by the statute to bid the persons present bear wit-
ness. Bennett v. Jackson 1 Phillemore 190. Lemann v. Bonsall; 1 Ad-
dams’ Rep. 389. Some of the American cases seem to have indillged i in
a considerable relaxation of this just and iecessary ‘requisition of the
statute. Mason v. Dunman, 1 Munford, 456. Parsons %. Parsons, 2
Greenleaf, 298.] For the laws of Pennsylvania relating to wills general-
ly, and to nuncupative wills, see 1 Smith’s edition of the Pennsylvania
laws, p. 33—43, where the chief cases decided in this state; will be found
in the notes.

The cases under the head of last wills in the Americati Reporters of
other states, are too numerous to be digested here.

Tit. 11. De militari testamento, p. 118. The privilege given to a
soldier was merely as to the formal part of his will. If meaning to
make a will in the common form though in actual service, but leaving
it incomplete, his privilege extended to making it valid, so far as the
rules of military testaments applied: Dig. 29. 1. 3 and 38. Hence also
he might die, partly testate. L. 6 eodem. or make a relegated person
his heir, L. 13. § 2 Dig. eod. or make a conditional heir, L. 17 and 41.
Dig. eod. or a heir by codicil, L. 36. Dig. eod. or a pupil at the expira-
tion of his pupillage, Dig. 28. 6. 15. L. 8. Cod. de impub. et allis sub-
stitut. All that was necessary seemed to be, that the real will of the
testator should sufficiently appear. But by virtue of this privilege, the
soldier could not bequeath his peculium adventitium, and still less his
peculium profectitium ; nor could he enfranchise his slaves to the injury
of his creditors, against the law Alii Sentia. Dig. de milt. test. L.
15, 28, and 41. ae

This military privilege was confined by Justinian to the time of ac-
‘tual warfare in camp or in a besieged place. It did not take place in
winter quarters, or in a garrison town. Lex penul. Cod. hoc tit. Tes-
taments of this nature held good for a year after dismission, Dig. 29. 1.
21 and 26. The dismissals were, missio causaria on account of inabili-
ty: from infirmity: missis honesta, when the term of service was ex-
pired, emeritus. Missio ignominiosa, for some disreputable cause.
They had also of course, the missio temporaria commeatus, or furlow,
but I find no provison made for this.

The Testamentum in procinctu was introduced by Julius Cesar, and

allowed for a limited time. Trajan made it perpetual, Cicero
[ *492 J mentions *the testamentim in procinctu, De nat. De or. Il.
3. De orat. I. 53.
NOTES. 497

$ In militum testamentis solemnitatcs remisse, p. 118. Quod nostra
constitutio. Cod. 6. 21. 17.

; he Rescriptum Divi Trajani. p- 118. Trajanus Catilio. Dig. 29.
$ 2. De surdo e¢ muto, p. 118. This means accidentally so; for per-
sons born deaf or dumb could not at any time make a will. Ferriere.

This was a privilege peculiar to soldiers, till Justinian’s time, who
granted this privilege to all his subjects in general. Cod. 6. 22. 10.
Harris.

$6. De peculio quasi castrense p. 120. Cujus constitutionis. Cod.
3. 28. 37. The Roman youth, qui togatas et civiles militias exercebant
were entitled to a peculium, quasi castrense, but they could not formerly
devise it, unless by imperial permission. Dig. 36. 1. 1. 6. Dig. 37. 13.
3.5. Dig. 37. 6. 1. 15. this privilege was extended by Constantine.
Cod. de castr. omn. palet. parul. by Leo, and by Anthemius, to sons of
families engaged in ecclesiastical avocations, L. 34. Cod. de episcop. et
cleric. and lastly by Justinian L. ult. Cod. qui test. fac. poss. L. 7. Cod.
de assess. L. 4. Cod de advoc. divers. jur.

Tit. 12. Quibus non est permissum, p. 121. and $1. De impubere et
furioso, p. 123. As Ihave before observed, the making of a will, is in
fact the making of a law to regulate after death the property acquired
during life time. This is not a natural right, for no dead man can have
any rights. 'The human race are by nature usufructuaries only. It is
society alone, that creates and protects the right of making a will. This
right by a law of the 12 tables was exclusively given to fathers of
families. Cic. ad Herem. L. 1. Under the term pater familias, for this
purpose, were included women not in the power of any person. Dig.
50. 16. 1.

The privilege as before remarked was extended to the military and
quasi-military property of persons in the army, and in certain public
employments. In other cases, even the consent of the father was in-
sufficient; for the right was grantable, not by private persons, but by
the public will. Dig. 19. 6. 25-1. But the donations mortis causa were
as much of the nature of contracts as legacies, and to these, the assent
of the pater familias could give validity. Dig. 2.14.18. Dig. 44. 7.
39, A will made on the last day of the 14th year was good; quia
favore supremarum voluntatum, dies inceptus habetur pro completo.
Vestals also impuberes, might make a will. Hence probably the permis-
sion given to the christian vestals or nuns, and other females
under *vows of celibacy, Aul. Gell. noct. attice. 1 ch. 12, [ *493 ]
Sozom. Hist. eccles. L. 1 c. 9: but Leo the philosopher re-
pealed this permission, Nov. 26.

63
498 NOTES,

 

As to insane persons, see Dig. 27. 10. juncta glossa. L. 9. Cod. hoc. tit.
Valer. Max. L. 7. ch. 8. Dig. 28.3. 6. 5. et seq. our law is as here laid
down. Swinburne, 79. 7 Bac. Ab. 301.

[Upon the question as to the degree of mental capacity necessary to
make a will, the following cases may be referred to: Bennett's case, cit-
ed in 9 Vesey, 185; Shelfordon Lunacy, 179: Ingram v. Wyatt, 1 Hag-
‘gard’s Ecclesiastical Rep. 384; Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. Rep.
148; 1 Haggard’s Ecclesiastical Rep. 227. The provisions of the will
itself are always examined with reference to the testamentary capacity:
If these are all rational and consistent with each other, that capacity
will be the more readily presumed.

Mere imbecility of mind, however great, will not avoid a will or deed,
.provided the party be not an idiot ora lunatic. Stewart's Executor v.
-Lispenard, 26 Wendell’s Rep. 258. Blanchard v. Nestle, 3 Denio, 37.
But although the mental weakness may be insufficient of itself to inca-
pacitate, yet it lays a foundation for the admission of proof of fraud,
management, and undue influence; and evidence of that character taken
in connection with mental weakness, may be sufficient to invalidate an
act, though the same evidence might be deemed insuflicient in the case
of a sound mind. Odell v. Buck, 21 Wendell’s Rep. 142. Jackson »v.
King, 4 Cowen’s Rep. 207.]

Non possunt impuberes.| The rules of civil law take place in Eng-
land, in regard both to the capacity and incapacity of minors to make
wills as far as those wills relate only to personal estate: so that, if a boy,
not arrived at the age of fourteen, or a girl, not arrived at the age of
twelve, makes a will of personal estate, it will not be good; although
such boy or girl, was doli capex at the time of making the will, and capa-
ble of discerning right from wrong: neither will a testament, made by a
male infant under fourteen, or a female under twelve, become good, with-
out a republication, although such infant should afterwards arrive at the
proper age. But it hath been allowed in the case of Hide and Hide, that
a male infant of 14, and a female of 12, might make a will of personal
estate; and it was said to have been so agreed by lord keeper Wright,
in the case of Sharpe and Sharpe, in which the court followed the civil
law of Justinian, which permits minors to consent to marriage at such
their respective ages. Gilbert's Repts. page 74.—Swinb. fol. 74. But,
in regard to a willof real estate, it was enacted in the reign of Hen. 8.
that wills or testaments made of aiy manors, lands, tenements, or oth-
“ ey hereditaments, by any woman covert, or person within the age of
** one and twenty years, idiot, or insane, shall-not be good or effectual
“in law.” 34H. 8. cap. 5. sect, 14.

And it hath been adjudged, that, if a minor under twenty-one makes
his will, and devises his lands, and afterwards attains the full age of

‘
NOTES. 499

twenty-one years, but dies without making any new publication of his-
will, the will is void. 1 Sid. 162, And. 182. Dyer, 143. Raym. 84:

Furiosi autem. ‘“ Mad folks and lunatics, during the time of their in-
“ sanity, cannot make a testament, nor dispose of any thing by will, not
“even to pious uses. The reason is, because they know not what they
“do; for, in making a will, integrity and perfectness of mind, and not
“health of body is required: and thereupon arose that common clause
“ used in every testament; sick in body, but of perfect mind and memo-
“ry. It was therefore determined by the judges, in Combe’s case in the
“ Star-Chamber, (Moor, 759.) that sane memory for making a will isnot
“at all times, when the party can speak yea or no, or hath life in him,
“‘nor when he can answer to any thing with sense; but he
‘ought to have judgment to discern, and to be of *perfect [ *494 ]
“memory, otherwise the will is void. And so strong is this
‘impediment of insanity, that, if the testator makes his testament after
“ the furor hath overtaken him, and whilst it as yet possesses his mind,
‘‘ albeit the furor afterwards departs, and the testator recovers his for-
“mer understanding, yet doth not the testament, made during his former‘
“ fit, recover any force or strength thereby. Howbeit if these mad or
“lunatic persons have clear and calm intermissions, then during the
“the time of such their freedom of mind, they may make their tes-
“taments; so that neither the furor going before, nor following the
‘making of the testament, doth hinder the same begun and finished
“in the mean time.” Swinburne of test. part 2. sect. 3. Cod. 6. t. 22.
1.9. Harris.

See further on this subject, Swinburne on wills, 74. et seq. and Co.
Litt. 89. b. with Hargreave’s note 6 therein, as to the dissonance of
opinion at what time an infant may make a will. It seems now to be
settled that this is 14 in males and 12 in females for personal estate.
Ex-parte Holyland, 12 Vez. junr. 11. Judge Wilson’s Bacon’s Ab. v. 7
p. 300.

The stat. 32 and 34 Hen. 8. on this subject are not adopted by the
judges of the supreme court of Pennsylvania in their Report. See 3
Binney’s Rep. append. But I apprehend the law of Pennsylvania nev-
ertheless is, that a minor cannot make a will of lands; for such was
the law at the time of our act of assembly concerning wills, 1705, and
no alteration has been since made in this respect. The wills therein
spoken of, must be taken as meaning such wills as could then be legally
made. ;

[The general rule, in England and in the United States, is, that all
persons of sound mind are competent to devise real estate, with kee ae
ception of infants and married women. A married. woman is consi see
to’ be incapable of’ making a valid will of lands, even with the: consen
500 NOTES."

 

of her husband, and without any statute prohibition’ to that effect. Os-
good v. Breed, 12 Mass. Rep.'225. Marston v. Norton, 5 N. H. Rep.
_ 205. West v. West, 10 Serg. & Rawle, 445. But in Louisiana, the wife
may make a will without the authority of her husband. And by stat-
ute, in New York, Connecticut and Illinois, married women may dis-
pose of their estates, real and personal, by will, in the same manner as
other persons. And where a feme covert is incompetent to devise real
estate, she may, by deed of settlement made prior to her marriage, and
vesting her estate in trustees, be clothed with a testamentary disposition
of her lands; and a court of chancery will enforce such a power made
during coverture, under the name of.an appointment or declaration of
trust. She may, if not under twenty-one years of age, devise by way
of execution of a power. But the will that she makes, in such a case,
must be executed with the same solemnities, as if she had executed the
deed while sole.

Testaments of chattels might, at common law, be made by infants of
the age of fourteen, if males, and twelve, if females. This was the
rule in England until the statute of Victoria, and the testamentary power
of infants is now abolished there. The laws of the several States are
not uniform on this point. In Virginia, no person under eighteen years
of age can make a will of chattels; and in New York, the age to make
a will of personal estate is raised up to eighteen in males and sixteen in
females. At common law, a married woman cannot make a testament
of chattels, any more than of lands, except under a power, or marriage
contract, or by her husband’s license. ]

§ 2. De prodigo, p.123. The law of England takes no notice of
prodigals.

§ 4. De ceco, p. 124. Formerly the blind were permitted to make a
will. Paul. L. 3 sentent. tit. 3. $ 4. and the comments on Dig. 28. 1. 22.
6. which permits a will to be signed at night. But when the emperors
Diocletian and Maximinian ordained that a testator should see and be
seen by his witnesses, this permission was virtually repealed. 9. 12 Cod.
de testament, Justinian regranted this privilege.

In England the testator and the witnesses to a written will, must be
within sight of each other at the time of executing and witnessing the
will; Longford v. Eyre, 1 P. Wms. 740. Gryle v. Gryle, 2 Atk. 176.
Casson v. Dade, 1 Br. ch. ex. 99. but a blind man may make a nuncu-
pative will, or may acknowledge a written will in presence of witnesses.

Swinb. 96.
[ *495. ] *$ 5. De eo qui est apud hostes, p. 124. Although a cap-
tive could not make a will, his codicils might be rendered
valid by a subsequent will after his return. Dig. 49. 15. 12. 5.
Tit. 13. De exrheredatione liberorum, p. 124. Under the civil law,
NOTES. 501

the appointment of an heir, isan essential part of a will. If the son,
under power of the father, be passed over and not named, the will is
void. He must be simply and unconditionally disinherited. Dig. 28. 2.
3.1, Dig. 28.5.4. Dig. 35. 1. 83. L. 4. Cod. de inst. et subst. L. 15.
Cod de condit. inst. nor could disinherison take place by codicil: $2
Inst. de Codic. Nor though the unnamed son should die before his
father, would this give validity to the instrument originally defective in
its formation, Dig. 28.2.7. Dig. 28. 3. 12. 17. joining Ulpian, tit. 33.
§ 6. But the will would not be invalid by the preterition of daughters,
or grand-children, Dig. 28. 3.8.1.; but they had their portion though
omitted to be named. Thus, if heirs were instituted from among the
children of the testator, the daughter, and grand-children would
have equal parts with each of the heirs: as if there were three
heirs, each heir would have three ounces, and the omitted daughter or
grand-son three ounces, the estate being divided into twelve. If the heirs
were three strangers, they would have six ounces, and the omitted daugh-
ter or grand-son six. Nam scriptis heredibus, accrescebant suis in virilem
(a man’s share) extraneis vero in semissem. Justinian took away these
distinctions, and nullified the will if any of the offspring of the testator,
and in his power, were omitted. For the causes of disinherison see
Nov. 115. which also requires, that it shall be express and by name, and
cum elogio, or stating some one of the 14 allowed causes, in all cases of ~
legitimate children born.

in England, the law is not so. A testator may disinherit his own
children, by express words, or by omission. But the practice of leaving
a shilling to a child intended to be disinherited, seems to have originated
in the above doctrine of the civillaw. Swinburne, part 5. $1. But
semble that asa general doctrine, an heir cannot be disinherited by im-
plication : yet in Trent v. Hanning, three judges, dissentiente Lawrence,
went very near if not quite that length; 7 East. 106. see Piggot v. Pen-
rice, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 138. Johnson v. Haines, 4 Dall. Rep. 64. Cresoe v.
Laidley, 2 Binney, 279. In England, the heir is a favourite upon feudal
principles, and as connected with the institution of primogeniture, which
does not operate in this country; but the general rule above laid down is
in unison with the dictates of natural justice.

*$ 1. De posthumis, p. 125. A posthumous child not [ *496 ]
named might have set the will aside: but it was not void if
the offspring was born dead. Dig. 37. 6. ult. Posthumous children
were so called when born after executing the will, as appears by the
1st Chap. of the Lex Vellea. Gaires 6. lib. 2. Inst. tit. de exhered. lib.
2.$ 2.

Children born after the death of the parent and within ten months
502 NOTES.

 

were accounted his. As to the English law on this subject, see Har-
greaves’ Co. Litt. 86 and 123. b. with the notes.

By the present French code, the subsequent birth of a legitimate child
revokes a will.

Agnatione posthumi.| The rights of posthumous children seem to be
regulated by the rights of those who are born in the life-time of their pa-
rents. Thus the civil law permits the birth of a posthumous child to an-
nul a testament;. because it is by that law in the power of any child,
who hath been omitted in his father’s testament, or disinherited ‘nominally
Without cause, to set that testament aside; and where preterition is a
sufficient reason to destroy a will, at the instance of a child born in the
life-time of his father, it would be extremely hard not to allow this rea-
son at least an equal force, in regard to a posthumous child. But by
the law of England the birth of a posthumous child does not affect the
testament of the father in any degree: which is in appearance a very
rigid doctrine: but with us the testament of the parent cannot be an-
nulled on account of the preterition, or causeless disinherison of a child,
born in his life-time; for the law permits every man to dispose of his
fertune, as he pleases: and therefore, if a posthumous child was allowed
to annul a will, it must follow, that such child would have a greater right
than if he had been born in his father’s life-time: namely, the right of
anoulling his father’s will on account of preterition. And, if the law
was to pursne a middle war, and admit a posthumous child to takea
share of the deceased’s estate without annulling the whole testament,
this would be in effect to make a new will for the deceased, and to rem-
edy a less evil by the introduction of a greater, in countenancing a prac-
tice so very dangerous. and contrary to that established rule of law,
which gives every man an uncentrouled power in the disposition of his

own fortune. Vy hat has been here said is intended only in regard to wills
of personal estate: for, in respect to the wills of real estate, there are,
besides the statute of frauds, many other reasons, which might be urged
t) evince, that the birth of a posthumous child cannot be allowed to op-
erate as a revocation. Harris.
[ 497 ] ~The English law seems now settled that marriage alone
does not, but that marriage and birth of a child, even a pos-
thumous child, does amount to a revocation of a prior will. The reader
will find all the older cases cited in some or other of the following more
modern ones, which may slightly assist those who may have occasion
to trace the history of this question in England. The civillaw doctrine
is discussed in Lord Kenyon’s argument in Lancashire v. Lancashire, 5
Term Rep. 59. His Lordship highly approves of the rejection of the
civil law regulations respecting the Testamentum inofficiosum, wherein
NOTES. 503

I confess Ican hardly coincide; but in conformity to prior decisons, he
auopts their rule of revocation on marriage and ithe birth even of a pos-
‘thumous child.

Forse v. Hembling: 4 Co. Rep. 60.

Overbury v. Overbury, 2 Show. 242.

‘See the cases referred to in the note of ‘Mr. ‘Leach, on this case.

‘Brown v. Thompson, 1 Eq. Ca. ab. 413.

Ib. cited by Swinburne, 535.

Pg v. Oakley, otherwise 1 P. Wms. 304.
yre v. Eyre, F

Christopher v, Christopher, 4 Burr. 2182. n.

Wellington v. Wellington, 4 Burr. 2171.

Brady v. Cubit, Doug. 37. n.

Same, 5 T. Rep. 58.

Lancashire v. Lancashire, 5 T. Rep.58. >
this seems the latest and leading case, in which the authorities are fully
discussed.

The decisions proceed on the principle, that as wills are ambulatory
till the death of the testator, Lord Beauclerk v. Dr. Mead, 2 At. 167.
any intermediate act, or any change of circumstances, inconsistent with
the will, amounts to an implied revocation. Gilbert on devises, 93.
Christopher v. Christopher, 2 Dickens, Ch. Rep. 447. But an implied re-
vocation may be rebutted by evidence of circumstances that imply oth-
erwise: and where the subsequent change of situation of the testator is
not inconsistent with the provisions of the will, there may be a revoca-
tion in part only. Kennebel v. Scrafton, 2 Hast, 530. 5 Vez. 663, Expte
Ilchester, 7 Vez. 348. Whether the birth of more children after the exe-
cution of the will, and the testator’s second marriage after that, amount
to a revocation, see Gibbons v. Gaunt, 4 Vez. 840.

[The English law, as it stood prior to the statute of 7 William IV. and
1 Vict. ch. 26, (referred to below) was declared in Marston v. Roe, 8
Adolph. and Ellis, 14, the Exchequer Chamber, to be, that ifan unmar-
ried man without any child by a former wife, devised his estate, and left
no provision for any child by a future marriage, notwithstanding he
might have made provision therein for a future wife, the law annexed a
tacit condition to such a will, that if he afterwards married, and had a
child, the will should be revoked, and evidence was not admissible to re-

“but that presumption, or destroy that condition. And by the statute of
1 Victoria, ch. 26, it is declared, that all wills made by a man or-woman
are revoked by marriage, except when made in exercise of a power,
where the property appointed would not, in default of such appointment,
pass to the heir, executor, or next of kin. No will is to be revoked by
presumption of an intention from alteration of circumstances. No will
504 NOTES.

 

 

is to be revoked otherwise than by another will or codicil, or by writing
executed like a will, or by destruction with intention to revoke; and no
alteration made after execution to have any effect unless executed as a
will. No will in any manner revoked to be revived otherwise than by
re-execution, or a codicil to revive it; and if a part has been revoked,
and afterwards the whole, such part shall not be revived by a revival of
the whole, unless an intention to revive that part be shown. No convey-
ance made or act done subsequently to the execution of a will, except
it amount to a revocation, shall prevent the operation of the will with
respect to such estate as the testator has power to dispose of at the time
of his death. And a will shall be construed to speak and take effect
from the death of the testator. Thus, where a devise was of a remain-
der to the sons of A., who had three sons when the will was made, and
five at the testator’s death, it was held that the devise was to the five
sons. See King v. Bennet, 4 Meeson and Welsby, 35.]
The law of Pennsylvania has as I think been very judiciously altered
by the acts of 23 March 1764 and 19 Ap. 1794; which
[ *498 ] enact that a *testator having made his will, and afterwards
married, and then dying and leaving a widow, ora child
born subsequent to the will, it shall amount to a revocation as to them ;
and they shall be in the same situation as if he had made no will. On
these acts the following decision has taken place.

In Coates v. Hughes, 3 Binney, 498, it was determined that a subse-
quent marriage and birth of a posthumous: child do not amount by the
law of Pennsylvania to a total revocation of a will even where the sub-
sequent issue is the testator’s only child. They amount to a revocation
pro tanto, namely, so far as regards the widow and the child, but not as
to the appointment of executors, nor-as toa power to sell for the pay-
ment of debts. The-reader will find most of the learning of the books
collected briefly in this case; which turned upon the expressions of the
acts of assembly on this subject.

In 1 Washington’s Virg.Rrep. 140. Wilcox v. Rootes, et. ai. it is taken
for granted by the court, that a subsequent marriage and birth of a
child is an implied revocation of a former will. This was in 1792; but
in 1802 came on the case of Yerby v. Yerby, 3 Call’s Virg. Rep. which
was this:

A man married and had six children: he made a will in 1785. His
wife dying, he married again in 1790, and had two children, to wit, the
present plaintiffs, by his second wife.

It appeared in evidence, that previous to his second marriage he had
promised that the children he might have by his last wife, should be as
well provided for, as those he had by his first wife. It appeared fur-
ther in evidence, that during his last iliness, it was proposed to him to
NOTES. 505

alter his will and provide for the present plaintiffs: but he refused, say-
ing he wished some alterations to be made, and when he got well he
would have them made. He appeared much distressed, and wished to
evade the conversation.

This case was argued against an implied revocation on the following
grounds,

Istly, The Virginia act of assembly provides only for posthumous
children pretermitted : the court cannot go farther : they cannot by ex-
tention make a new law.

2dly, This is not the case of a testamentary disposition in favour of
strangers, which is required to be revoked, but of children, who had at
least as strong a claim as the plaintiffs.

3dly, Implied revocations may be rebutted, by expressions in the will,
or by circumstances, 1 Lord Ray. 441. Doug. 31. and a reference to a
will as a subsisting one, rebuts the presumption of revoca-
tion. *Doug. 31. An expression of an intention to revoke a [ *499 J
will hereafter, does not operate as a revocation. Pow. Dev.

534, much less an expression of a mere intention to alter it. The court
unanimously confirmed the will; and I think the law was with them;
but is it possible to read such a case as this, without regretting the want
of the civil law principle de inofficioso testamenio? The unfeeling ex-
clusions, imperiously demanded by the institution of primogeniture, are
sufficiently odious, but they fall far short of such a case as this, under
the republican laws of Virginia. :

By an act of Massachusetts, 1700, and Feb. 6. 1784, a child not men-
tioned in the will of his parent, shall be entitled to such distributive
share as he would have had by law, had the parent died intestate: but
in Terry v. Foster, Mass. Rep. 146, and in Church v. Crocker, 3 Mass.
Rep. 17. the court held it sufficient to bar the claim of a child to a dis-
tributive share, if noticed by name in the will, though a small legacy or
even no legacy, were bequeathed to such child. ;

The other points appertaining to the law of revocations, are not sufii-
ciently connected with the subject of this section to be dwelt on.

$2. De quasi posthumis, p. 126. If a grandfather passed over his
grandson being his proper heir at the time of making the testament, it
might be done designedly to exclude him from the possession, and the
will might nevertheless be valid. But if the grandson was not the pro-
per heir at the time, the father being alive, the grandfather was not pre-
sumed to have passed him by, with intent of disinherison, but that the
father would regularly succeed in the first place. In this case therefore
the will might be broken. Dig. 28. 3.15. Cujus comment. ad Dig. 28.
2. Now by Nov. 115 and 1. 3. Cod. de post. hered. inst. the passing
over any children of the testator is fatal to the will, except only that

64
506 NOTES.

 

posthumous children not named must be born alive for that purpose.
See on the subject of this section 1. 3 Cod. de. post. heered. inst. Dig. 37.
4.8.4. As to the law Velleia, see Dig. 28. 2. 29.

$ 4. De adoptivis, p. 127. We have no adopted children in the
Roman sense of the word.

Que de naturalibus, §c. Natural children, in the phraseology of the
English and American law, are children born out of wedlock, and are
contra-distinguished from legitimate children: but in the language of
the civil law, natural are contra-distinguished from adoptive children;
that is, they are the children of, the parents spoken of by natural pro-
creation. z

$5. Jus novum, p. 128. Nostra vero constitutio. Cod.

6. 28. 4.

[ *500 ] *In nostra constitutione. Cod. 8. 48. 10.

; Tit. XIV. De heredibus instituendis, p. 130. Formerly all
legacies and provisions in a will that preceded the nomination of the heir
were void, so necessary was such an appointment to the validity of the
will itself. Ulp. tit.24. § 14 and tit. 25.$ 6. Juncto Paulo 1. 2. sentent.
6.$1. But by Ll 15 and 24. Cod. de test. this precision was rendered
unnecessary, and if by apt and intelligible words, a heir was named in
any part of the will, it sufficed. It was necessary that the will should
comprehend the whole of the testator’s property, for he could not die in-
“testate for one part, and testate as to another. If the heir was nomina-
ted of the first degree, he was instituted, if one more remote, he was
substituted. ,

Qui possunt heredes institui, p. 130. Ex nostra constitutione. Cod.
6. 27. 5.

§ 2. De servo hareditatio, p. 132. For this translation of the testa-
menti factio, see Inst. Lib. 1. Tit. 19. $ 4. Hereditariis servis testamenti
factio est: that is, not factio activa, the right of making a will, but factio
passiva, the right of taking by will.

§ 4. De numero heredum, p. 132. Usque in infinitum, means as
many as he pleases within reasonable bounds. For instance, all the in-
habitants of China, would be plainly absurd. He may appoint a cor-
poration or community if he pleases. 1. hereditas, Cod. h. tit.

§ 5. De divisione hereditatis, p. 132. Heres ex asse,a whole and
sole heir. As, among the Romans was an unit.

Ex parte testatus, et ex parte intestatus. In England; this is other-
wise. If a testator disposes of only half his estate, he will be deemed
intestate as to the rest, which will go according to the statute of dis-
tributions.

§ 8. Si plures uncie quam duodecim, §c. p. 134. Suppose THREE
heirs: to the first is left four ounces; to the second three ounces; to the
NOTES. 507

third, two ounces. Then three ounces will remain undisposed of. These
are to be divided into nine parts; of which the first heir will be entitled
to four, the second to three, the third to two.

Again suppose Turze heirs: to the first is left eighé ounces, to the se-
cond six ounces, to the third fowr ounces, in all eighteen ounces. Each
heir must suffer a deduction in proportion to his share. Thus: if 18—
12—8? Answer, 5} If 18—12—6? Answer, 4. If 18—12—4? An-
swer, 22 That is, the first devisee will be entitled to 53 ounces, the se-
cond, to 4 ounces, and the third to 23 ounces, or twelfth parts of the es-
tate devised.

If nine ounces be left specifically indifferent proportions
among three *heirs, and ¢hree ounces are left generally to [ *501 ]
three others, the last will share in equal portions.

Suppose a testator to institute six heirs, bequeathing to three of them
portions amounting to a whole as: siz ounces for instance to one, four
to another, and do toa third, and the other three are named heirs sim-
ply without any specific assignment of portion. In this case, the estate
will be divided into two asses, of which the three specific devisees will
take one in their respective proportions, and the three others another as
in equal proportions.

Butif the first three had specifically assigned to them eighdeen ounces,
then the puronpium or double as would again take place; and the estate
being divided into two asses or 24 ounces, the three heirs nominated sim-
ply, without assignment of shares, would divide between them in equal
portions siz asses. Ferriere in loco.

§ 9. De modis instituendi, p. 135. None but a military man could
by the Roman law, be partly testate, and partly intestate. Dig. 50. 17.
7 and 29. 1. 41. But where the condition annexed is in itself incertain,
the event must be waited for; and if the condition should not take place
the will is void. If it do take place, then the heir is considered as in
from the death of the testator, quia dies incertus retrotrahitur ad initium.
Dig. 28. 6, 33.

In England, an executor, who may be considered as quasi heres may
be appointed from a certain time, or until a certam time, and the next
of kin may be appointed administrator as to the vacant term. Swin-
burne, 310.

$ 10. De conditione impossibili, p. 135. Impossible conditions are
regarded as not seriously meant by the parties Dig. 44. 7. 31. Possi-
ble conditions may be casual, or potestative, or mixt. Thus, I appoint
Titius my heir, if my ship arrives from Asia. This isa casual condi-
tion. With this condition, a stranger may, but a proper oF domestic
heir, cannot be appointed heir. Dig. 28.5.4 and 86. 1.4 Cod. inst, et
subs. A mixt condition is partly casual, and partly potentative, as pro-
508 NOTES.

 

vided he shall go to the capitol, as soon as Mevius becomes Consul.
Mavius never may become Consul. In this case, a stranger may, but a
proper heir cannot be instituted. If an heir be appointed, provided that
immediately after my decease, he shall go up to the capitol, this is po-
testative and valid, because the nominee may at his own pleasure putan
end to the condition.

Impossibilis conditio.] “ Although impossible conditians, whether |
“« they are so by nature or by law, do not hinder the effect of the dispo-

“ sition, being reputed asif they were not written or uttered ;
{ *502 ] “‘yet, *if a testator supposes a condition to be passible,

“ which isin reality impossible or illegal, then such condition
“Cis not void, but will render the disposition void, to which it is added:
“as for instance ; if the testator makes Titius his executor, or gives him
“ an hundred patinds if he marries his, the testator’s daughter; suppos-
‘* ing her to be living, when she is dead: in this case, the condition is
‘impossible; and yet T'idius cannot become executor, or obtain the le-
“ acy ; because it isnot probable, that the testator would have made
“ him executor, or given him an hundred pounds, if he had known, or
‘believed his daughter to have been dead.” Swinb. part 4. sect. 6.

§ 11. De pluribus conditionibus, p. 135. See Dig. 35. 1. 6. as to joint
conditions.

In alternativis, suficit alterum adimpleri.

Tit. XV.$ 1. De numero heredum, p. 136. Thus: let Primus and
Secundus be my heirs. If default should take place in case of Primus,
let Tertius be my heir in his room. Or if Primus and Secundus refuse,
let Tertius, or Tertius and Quartus, become my heirs.

Plures in unius locum.| ‘This kind of substitution, which is called
ordinary or vulgar, is of no small use in England, and we do therein,
for the most part, follow the precepts and rules of the civil law: for it is
nothing else but the adding a condition, which we commonly call ¢ai/ in
the case of lands; namely, a limitation of heirs, to whom a testator in-
tends, that his lands should descend. Strahan on Domat. vol. 2. p. 221.
Cowel’s inst. tit 15. Harris.

Substitutions are rejected by the code Napoleon. Art. 896.

$ 2. Quam partem singuli, $c. p. 136. Suppose Primus, Secundus,
and Tertius, are heirs and reciprocally substituted each for the other:
Primus, having assigned to him one ounce, Secundus eight ounces, and
Tertius three ounces. If Primus resigns, his ounce must be divided
into eleven parts, of which Secundus takes eight, and Tertius three parts.
Ferriere.

fta Divus Pius. Cod. 6. 26.1. Dig. 28. 6. 24.

§$ 3. Si coheredi substituto, p.137. If Primus and Secundus, are
appointed heirs, and Secwndus substituted to Primus, and Tertius to
NOTES. 509

 

Secundus, then if Primus, and Secundus, both die, Tertius is consider-
ed as entitled to the heirship of Primus, as well as of Secundus, and the
share of Prinius, does not escheat to the treasury. ,

If Secundus should die, and Tertius succeed to him, and then Pri-
mus should die, a question arose whether the treasury or Tertius should
succeed to the share of Primus. It should seem at first that the decis-
ion was in favour of the treasury from Dig. 28. 6.27. But
*it appears that Severus and Antoninus, leaned against the [ *503 ]
claim of the treasury. Mysinger. h. 1. Whether the same
doctrine takes place in pupillary substitution, see Cujas on Dig. 28. 6.
4}. and Ferriere in loco.

$ 4. Si quis servo; qui liber existimabatur, &c. p. 137. In this case,
the heirship was divided, from the total incertainty of what the testator
might have willed had he not been mistaken. In dubiis enim causis, ad

judicum rusticum esse recurrendum, ipsa ratio suadeét ; et in ambiguis,
quod minimum est, sequimur. Neither is this opposed to Cod. de he-
redib. instit. 1. 3, where it is said to be a question of inclination: for
this question can only arise where there is room for rational conjec-
ture.

Cujus corrects Dig. 28. 5. 40. from ia ut alter semis, to ita ut As: and
as Ferriere supposes, rightly ; scribes.frequently making mistakes by their
abbreviated characters, Sigle.

Tit. XIV. De pupillari substitutione p. 138. This could not be exer-
cised by the parent over a son emancipated, whether at the execution of
the will, or the death of the testator. Dig. 28. 6.2 and 41. Nor could
the mother exercise this right over her son, being as yet impuber. Nor
is this contrary to Dig. 28.6. 33. because this last is a mere case, not of
pupillary, but of common substitution, for the hetitage does not attach
till the son arrives at fourteen years of age. This is the tabula pupilla-
ris, of the jurisconsults,-and an heir may be appointed for a future time.
Sup. inst. heredib. inst. tit. 14.$ 9. But then such an appointment by
that section of the institutes, is directed to take place immediately, not-
withstanding the limitation. Or if it be considered as incertain whether
the impyber will arrive at puberty, then the condition being incertain,
the validity or nullity of the will depends upon that event. Dies vero
incertus vim habet conditionis et perinde ad initium potest retrahi. Cod.
de hered. inst. 1. 9..and this seems to be the true light.

$ 1. De substitutione mente capti, p. 138:  Infirmari sancimus, Cod.
6. 26.9. Dig. 28. 6. 43.

§ 2. Proprium pupillaris substitutionis, p. 139. Quodam modo duo
testamenta. Duplices Tabule,as they are called, Dig. 35. 2. 70. Dig.
18. 4. 2. $illud. The father might make a substitution to his son being
impuber, after having made his own will, and before other witnesses,
510 NOTES.

 

Dig. 28. 6. 16, but a mother could not. Sup. Still, these being in fact
the will of one person, viz. the father, they were regarded conjointly as
one will, Ib. 1.2. $ 4 and 1. 20. and Dig. 42. 5. 28. | Where
[ *504 ] a father *substitutes to a disinherited son, he must make his
own will first, and so must be understood. Dig. 28. 6. 2. 2.
Ferriere.

If a child, not arrived at puberty, do not fall within some one of the
causes of disinherison stated in Nov. 115, he may effectually prefer the
allegation of invalidity from neglect of natural duty; (inofficiosi testa-
menti) against the will. These causes are briefly as follows: all com-
prehended under the general denomination of ingratitude; so that it
seems a commentary upon the old adage, ingratum quem dixeris om-
nia dicis.

Istly, If the child hath assaulted the parents: or 2ndly, inflicted upon
them a great and dishonorable injury: or 3dly, accused them of a crime,
except where the emperor or state was concerned: or 4thly, practised
sorcery: or 5thly, attempted the life of either of his parents by poison,
or any other secret means: or 6thly, debauched his stepmother, or his
father’s concubine: or 7thly, turned informer against his parents, and
thus put them to expence: or 8thly, if he do not attempt to relieve his
parent out of prison, by offering so far as he can, to become security :
or 9thly, if he should unfairly prevent his parents from making a will:
or 10thly, if he has joined a company of gladiators, (arenarii) or stage
’ players, (mimi,) or 11thly, if a daughter should refuse to marry a hus-
band provided by the parent, who is also willing to bestow on her a rea-
sonable portion, but chooses to live a libertine single life. However, if
the parent hath not taken care to provide her a-proper husband before
the age of 25, and she should then have a child, it is the fault of their
neglect, and no cause of disinherison: or 12thly, if the child should
neglect to succour and take care of a parent, who may become lunatic
or insane: or 13thly, should neglect to exert himself honestly to redeem
his parent from captivity: or 14thly, if being brought up by his pa-
rents, in the orthodox doctrine of the church, he should swerve from
the catholic faith. This last to be sure, might be converted into a fruit-
ful source of complaint.

§ 5. Pupillare testamentum sequela paterni, p. 140. Pupillary sub-
stitution is founded on the will of the father: so that if this be set aside,
the pupillary substitution falls with it. Dig. 28.6. Dig. 50. 17. 129.1.
and 1. 17. 6. ib. So the pupillary substitution holds good in the same
manner as the will holds good. Dig. 29. 2. 4. 1.

$ 6. Quot liberis substituitur, p. 140. In this case, the substitute
cannot succeed till the death of the last child under age.

Ferriere puts the case: A father making his will appoints Primus Se-
NOTES. bil

 

eundus and Tertius Patres familias, Quartus an impuber, and Quintusa
slave, his heirs, with assignment of various portions. He

disinherits *his son not of age, and appoints as substitutes [ *505 ]
in case of his son’s death before puberty, such of the five

persons as may become heirs to himself. Primus declines: Secundus
and Tertius accept: so does Quartus at command of his father ; so does
Quintus at command of his master. Secundus dies: Quartus becomes
filius familias and is emancipated : Quintus is manumitted. Who shall
be the substitute? shall Primus? shall the heir of Secundus? shall thé
father of Quartus? or the master of Quintus? It is answered, that the
substitution applied to the persons of ihe substitutes, not to the repre-
sentatives: to those who had actually been the heirs of the father, as
well as the instituted heirs: and therefore the substitution fell to 'Terti-
us, Quartus, and Quintus in the respective proportions of their original
shares under the will of the father.

$ 7. De substitutione nominatim aut in genere, p. 141. See on this
section the paraphrase of Theophilus, which is of great authority.
‘Moreover I may substitute to a minor within puberty, by name, and’
‘‘say, if my son should be my heir and die within puberty, let Titius
‘be my heir. And I may substitute to him generally, as when I in-
“stitute many persons as heirs together with my son, or by instituting
“many heirs, I disinherit my son. I may so substitute generally, by
“saying, whoever shall be heir to me the father, 1 substitute him to my
“son if he should die before puberty. By which form of words those
‘who are the written heirs and remain so at the time, will by substitu-
“tion become heirs also to the son dying within puberty. For if the
‘persons instituted reject the heirship as to the greater part, they will
‘take nothing by the pupillary substitution; for the pupillary heirship
‘will be divided between them, in the proportion of the original heir-
“‘ship, that is according to the portion they were respectively entitled to
‘under the father’s institution of them as heirs to him.” __

T have already mentioned (Tit. 15, $ 1) that substitutions are abolish-
ed in France by the Napoleon code.

‘So detrimental has an unqualified and unlimited power of settlement
‘‘been found, even in France, that it has been made a question there,
‘‘whether it would not be for the advantage of the nation at large, that
‘‘all settlements and trusts should be abrogated. This question so far
“as it related to moveables, was by the order of Louis 15, proposed in
“the year 1744 by the chancellor D‘Aguesseau to all the parliaments
‘“‘and superior councils of France, See Questions concernant les substitu-
“¢ions, avec les Responses de touts les Parliamens, et cours souverains
“du Royaume, et les abservations de M. L. Chancelier D'Aguesseau

i
512 NOTES.

 

“sur les dits responses. Toulouse, 1770. And see also
i[ *506 ] “‘ Commentairs *de I‘Ordonance de Louis 15. sur les substi-

“tutions per M.-Feugole. Paris, 1767. Butler’s elaborate
note on the doctrine of uses, Co. Litt. 272. a. sub finem, 279, a. See
Code civil Nap. ou Recueil. Tom. 2. p. 429.

Tit. X VIL. $1. Quando testamentum dicatur rumpi, p. 142. Secun-
dum nostram constitutionem, Cod. 8. 48. 10.

Not only in the cases mentioned in the text, but by the birth of a
child subsequent to the will. Formerly the adoption of a son set aside
the will, Dig. 28. 3. 7. if he was not instituted heir therein. Dig. 28. 3.
18. Dig. 37. 4. 8. 7. but by this law of Justinian, an adopted son, does.
not invalidate the will, unless he be a pater familias, or if being a filius
familias he be adopted by some relation paternal or maternal in the as-
cending line. Cod. de adopt. lex penult.

As to the general doctrine of revocations, see Viner’s Ab. under this
head, and the note 4 of Serjeant Williams to page 276 of Saunders’ Re-
ports, and the cases there referred to, particularly Bridges v. The Dutch-
ess of Chandos, 2 Vez. Jun. 417. and Goodtitle v. Otway, 7 Term Rep.
399. The following cases on the subject have occurred since that note.

Cave v. Holford, 3 Vez. 650. Revocation by subsequent convey-
ance.

Lord Temple v. Dutchess of Chandos. Ib. 685. By a mortgage, or
a conveyance in fee of a devised estate for the payment of debts, the
will is revoked pro tanto only.

Hinckley v. Simmons, 4 Vez. 160. Mutual wills by two uumarried
sisters under twenty-one, the marriage of one does not revoke the will
of the other.

Crosbie v. Macdonald, 4 Vez. 610. All codicils are part of the will:
therefore a codicil for a particular purpose only, does not revive a part of
the will revoked by a former codicil.

Ib. T'wo inconsistent wills: a codicil referring to the first by date as
the last will, revokes the immediate will.

Gibbons v. Caunt, 4 Vez. 840. Quere, whether by the birth of more
children subsequent to the will, and the testator’s second marriage after
the birth of those children, but no issue by that marriage, the will is re-
voked ?

Lord Carrington v. Payne, 5 Vez. 404. A codicil applying to a partic-
ular part of the will only, was considered as a substitution for, and not
a revocation of that particular part.

Knollys v. Alcock, Ib. 634. A contract for sale revokes a devise of the
land. But it is not revoked by’a mortgage in fee to the devisee. Bax-
ter v. Dyer, Ib. 656.
NOTES. 513

*Kennebel v. Scrafton, Ib. 663. Marriage and birth of a [ *507 ]
child, (ut semble) does not revoke a will made in contempla-
tion of such marriage and issue by it,

Harmood v, Oglander, 6 Vez. 199. Devise revoked by a conveyance
in trust, operating beyond the mere purpose of securing a mortgage.

At law, the courts only consider the great question whether the inter-
est remains the same in the devisor, as it did at the date of the will; if
not, whether the charge be for a general ora partial purpose, itis a legal
revocation of the devise ; but at equity, if the deed be only for a partial
purpose, introducing only a particular charge or incumbrance, and not
otherwise affecting the interest of the devisor; there, the use that would
enure to the testator and his heirs, if alive, after that partial purpose was
effected, will be held by equity to enure to the devisee if the testator be
dead. Hence, a devise is not revoked by a mortgage in fee, or by a
conveyance in fee for the payment of debts. Ib, A court of law, looks
at the deed only, and compares the interest at the date of the will, with
the alteration made in it by the deed: but equity looks also at articles,
at covenants, and at the real intent of the transaction connected with
the deed.

Equity controuls the law in cases of revocation under the two follow-
ing circumstances only. Ist. Where the beneficial interest is devised,
distinct from the legal estate, and the testator afterwards takes the legal
estate without any modification or alteration. 2ndly, Where having the
legal as well as the beneficial estate at the date of the will, he divests
himself of the former, but retains the latter: as in the case of a mort-
gage, or conveyance for the payment of debts. Ib.

Ellison v. Ellison, Ib. p. 656. Ellison in 1791 conveyed leasehold es-
tate in trust to Wren: in 1786 he made his will, devising his personal
estate, &c. In 1797 he took a conveyance to himself from Wren of the
trust estate. Held this was no revocation; especially as no intent to re-
voke appeared in the proceedings.

Ex pte. Ilchester, 7 Vez. 370. Montague v. Jeffereys, Moore, 4. An
act inconsistent with the will, though by accident not carried into effect,
is a revocation: as a covenant with letter of attorney to make livery,
though no livery made. Inchoate acts inconsistent with the will amount
to revocation if accompanied with power to destroy the provisions of the
will. See further in Lord Alvanly’s argument as to the effect of parol
and inchoate revocations previous to and under the statute of frauds.

Where the instrument inconsistent with the will is complete in itself
to show the intention, it is a revocation, though something fur-
ther remains *to be done-to give it legal effect in favour of [ *508 ]
the person to whom it is made, as a bargain and sale with-

65

,
514 NOTES.

 

out enrollment: a feoffment without livery, &c. but a second will unat-
tested, 1s incomplete, and therefore cannot revoke.

Agreeable to the rule of the civil-law, tunc prius testamentum rumpi-
tur cum posterius perfectum est, which in Limbery v. Mason, Comyn.
Rep. 451, is laid down as the English law. Dig. 28. 3. 2.

Knollys v. Aleock, 7 Vez. 564, and Attorney General v. Vigor, 8 Vez.
281. Maundrel v. Maundrel, 10 Vez. 256. Mere partition, whether by
compulsion or agreement is not a revocation: but the slightest addition,
aS a power of appointment to the limitation of uses is sufficient. In
what case an instrument abandoned ceases to be a revocation.

A codicil reciting a specific and limited purpose will revoke the whole
devise, declaring the trusts again with the proposed alterations, and will
confirm the will in all particulars not revoked. 'The omission of a trust
though against the intention of the testator,’cannot be supplied. Holder
v. Holder, 8 Vez. 97.

Harmood v. Oglander, 8 Vez. 126. There is no instance of a revoca-
tion at law, not being a revocation in equity, where the partial particular
purpose was not for charges, or incumbrances, or to pay debts.

Rose v. Cuninghame, 11 Vez. 554. Where an agreement for the pur-
chase of an estate has been executed, the purchaser may devise it, and
the subsequent conveyance of the mere legal estate, will not be a revo-
cation of the will, while the equitable estate remains. Doe ». Pott,
Doug. 684. Watts v. Fullerton, Doug. 891.

Pemberton v. Pemberton, 13 Vez. 297. Duplicates of a will. The
presumption is, that cancelling one of the duplicates amounts to cancell-
ing the other, though both are in the testator’s possession, and the can-
celled instrument had heen altered.

Charman v. Charman, 14 Vez. 580. Devise of real estate not revok-
ed by bankruptcy.

5 Term Rep. 124. Shove v. Princk. An imperfect and inefficient
deed, evidencing an intention to revoke, revokes a will.

1 Bos. and Pull. 576. Goodtitle v. Otway. No man has a right to
devise an estate of which the title is not in him at the time of the de-
vise: it must be his own: legally, according to the doctrines of the courts
of law; equitably at least, if not legally, according to the doctrines of
the courts of equity: no subsequent acquisition of the title, will make
that will good which was bad when it was executed. This appears
from Butler and Baker’s case, 3 Co. Rep. 30. b. Sparrow v. Hardcastle,

3 At. 803. per Lord Trevor in Fitzg. 240.
[ *509 ] * Hence in Swift ex dem. Neale and Roberts, Burn 1497,
Lord Mansfield denied that a joint tenant could devise his
estate, either by law or by statute. For by the express words of the
NOTES. 515

Statute of 34 and 35 Hen. 8, a devisor must have the estate he pretends
to devise: and an after-purchased estate will not pass. A will under the
Roman law, essentially consisted in the appointment of anheir : in Eng-
land it is ambulatory, and revocable, and more in the nature of a dona~
tio mortis causa.

. And this estate must continue in the devisor till the time of his death;
for if, by any form of conveyance, he passes away the whole estate, al-
though he takes it back again instantaneously by another conveyance,
and whether this be done animo revocandi or not, the retaking is a new
estate; it is not the same estate, and the former will without republica-
tion, does not pass it; for a will cannot operate upon an estate which a
man has wholly conveyed away. Lord Mansfield, in Roe ex dem. No-
den v. Griffith, 4 Burr. 1960, laments this: but the law was so settled in
Lord Lincoln v. Rolls, Show. Parl. Cases 154, and 1 Ab. Ca. in Eq. 411.
to the same purpose, are, Sparrow v. Hardcastle, sup. and Parsons v.
Freeman, 3 At. 740. and the other decisions cited by Buller, and by Eyre,
in the present case of Goodtitle v. Otway, which is very instructive.
Eyre however, like Lord Mansfield, seems to me to regret that this rule
of positive law, was ever carried further, than that a disposition of the
whole estate, amounted to evidence of an intention to revoke, which
might of course be rebutted. But so the law is. This law is no other-
wise modified by equity, (which doubtless cannot supercede the statute)
than by protecting those equitable interests, which a man reserves by ar-
ticles and covenants thata court of law cannot investigate; and by de-
claring that when the legal conveyance is only a mere matter of form
with a view of charging or incumbering the estate for the purpose of
paying debts or otherwise, it cannot be considered as exhausting the fee
—as amounting to a conveyance of the WHOLE estate.

3 Bos. and Pul. Larkins v. Larkins, a devise to two as joint tenants.
Devisor afterwards strikes out the name of one. This is only a revoca-
tion pro tanto.

As to the decisions in Pennsylvania.

A second will containing an express clause of revocation, revokes the
first. 2 Dall. Rep. 268, Boudinot v. Bradford. -

Where a second will is destroyed without more, the preceding will not
having been cancelled, generally speaking is ipso facto reviv-
ed. Ib. and *evidence will be admitted to show whether the [ *510 ]
testator cancelled the second ,with an intent to revive the first
will, or to die intestate. Ib. aan

The mere act of making a second will, is a revocation of the former,
as to the personal estate, the law throwing that on the executor as trus-
tee. Ib.
516 NOTES.

 

A will revoked by a subsequent will, but not cancelled, is re-estab-
lished by cancelling the second will. 2 Dall. Rep. 289. Lawson v Mor-
rison.

A will in writing revoking a will in writing, must be attended with all
the solemnities necessary to the first will, Presumptive and implied re-
vocations from change of state, or acts inconsistent with the will, may
be rebutted by counter evidence. Ib.

A will in writing may be revoked by the parol republication of a for-
mer will in writing. Andif the republished will cannot be found, its
contents may be proved. 2 Binney, 406, Havard v. Davis.

A subsequent marriage and birth of a child, under the acts of Penn-
sylvania, operate as a revocation pro tanto only. 3 Binney; 498, Coates
v. Hughes.

I have found nothing as to the revocation of wills in the New York
decisions, nor in the Southern cases, other than I have already referred
to.

§ 2. De posteriore testamento, p. 142. By Dig. 28. 3. and Cod. de tes-
tam. 27, itis said to be sufficient if the revocation be made before three
witnesses, 10 years after the first will.

Theodosius and Valentinian, declared a will revoked, at the end of
ten years from its execution, although the testator should have shewn no
change of disposition. Cod. Theod. de testam. 6. But Justinian re-
quired a formal revocation as above, in presence of three witnesses.

$ 3. De posteriore in quo heres certe rei, §c. p. 143. see Dig. 28. 3.
12. 1. see Havard v. Davis, 2 Binn. 406.

In ea constitutione. Dig. 36. 1. 29.

Ex lege Falcidia. vid. Title 22 of this book of the institutes.

$ 4. De testamento irrito, p. 143. Even the lowest diminution as if a
pater familias became adopted, his former will was annulled. For his
rights are thus merged in his situation as adopted son, and belong to his
adopted father. Dig. 28. 3. 6. cum ,seq. Dig. 29. 7. 9.3. But this
would not be the case with a military will. Dig. 4.5. 1. ult. nor witha
testamentary disposition of the peculium castrense of a son before eman-
cipation. Dig. 28. 3. 1. ult.

$6. Quibus modis convalescit, p. 144. Per omnia: that is, not through-

out, but, not always, or not in all cases. ‘Thus a will made
[ ¥*511 ] *ineffectual, (érritum) by captivity, may be restored on re-

turn by the jus postliminit, or by the fiction of the lex cornelia,
by which his death is considered as having happened at the moment pre-
ceding captivity. So the diminution by deportation, may admit of com-
plete reinstatement by the imperial decree. Dig. 28.3. 6. 12. So in the
smaller diminution by adoption of a pater familias, his will made as pa-

Lets

?
NOTES. | 517

 

ter familias, might be re-established before the pretor, provided, 1st, It
was in writing: for the pretor took no cognizance of nuncupative wills.
2ndly, ‘That the pater familias, becoming by adoption filius familias, re-
gained his quality of pater familias, and died in that state. ordly, That
he declared his desire that his former testament should stand good, by
codicil to that purpose. Dig. 37. 10. 1.2 and 3.

§ 7. De nuda voluntate, p.145. Pertinacis Oratione. I have alrea-
dy observed, that the emperors sometimes in person, and sometimes by
their queestors, addressed orations to the senate, proposing the laws they
wished to be adopted. Dig. 23.2. 16. Vinn.

The law of England is the same with that here laid down, viz. that
if a testamentary paper is begun, but left unfinished, and the party lives
a sufficient time to have finished it if he chose, the law presumes either
-that he did not choose to finish it, or had not made up his mind concern-
ing it. Cranvell v. Sanders, Cro. Ja. 497. Burton et al. v. Gowell, Cro.
El. 306. Powel on Dev. 534. Matthews v. Warner, 4 Vez. 197. Grif-
fin v. Griffin, Ib. in not.. Thomas ex dem. Jones v. Evans, 2 East, 488.
See also Cogbill v. Cogbill, 2 H. and Mun. 467.

§ 8. Si princips litis causa, vel in testamento imperfecto, ge. p. 145.
Dig. 1.3. 31. Cod. de testam. 1. 3. Cod. de legib. 1.4. Digna vor est
majestate regnantis, legibus alligatum se principem profiteri. Adeo de
auctoritate juris nostra pendet auctoritas. Et revera majus imperio est
submittere legibus principatun. Et oraculo presentis edicti, quod nobis li-
cere non patimur, aliis indicamus. :

Domitian declared, the emperor might accept the heirship of one of
his subjects, if any one witness should prove that the deceased had made
him his heir: but according to Suetonius, he was obliged to repeal this
decree.

Tit. XVIII. De inofficiiso testamento, p. 146. The allegation of in-
validity as being contrary to the duties of his station in life, lay against
the testament of a testator, who unnaturally disinherited his natural heir
without sufficient cause. This allegation, was not, properly speaking
an action, nor a suit to recover the heirship, for the will is set aside.
The process was, by notice to the instituted heir by the legitimate heir,
and the cause was usually carried from the magistrate or
*court below to the Centumvirs. Dig. 5.2.13.17. The [ *512 ]
suit turned upon proof of some one or other of the fourteen
causes or reasons of disinherison included in the 115th Novel; the onus
probandi, being thrown upon the instituted heir. Hence, it was in the
nature of our motion for a rule toshow cause. I have already abridged
the fourteen causes of disinherison in that novel, but they are also brief-
ly comprized in the following verses.
518 NOTES.

 

Bis septem ex causis exheeres filius esto:
Si patrem ferit; vel maledicat ei:

Carcere detrusum, si negligat, aut furiosum :
Criminis accuset, vel paret insidias :

Si dederit damnum grave; si nec ab hoste redemit :
Testarive vetet; se societve malis.

Si mimos sequitur; vitietve cubile paternum :
Non orthodoxus ; filia si meretrix.

The last cause however, was insufficient, if the parent did not provide
her a husband before she arrived at the age of twenty-five.

I have already mentioned the English law of revocations: and the
rule that the heir shall not be disinherited by implication. To the same
principles may be referred the rule that a wife shall not be deprived. of
dower by implication. Webb v. Evans, 1 Binn. 565.

Quia plerumque parentes.| The plaint, or action, in the.case of an °
undutiful testament, which civilians call testamentum inofficiosum, is not
in use in England; where, by the common law, all persons intitled to
make a will, have ever had a free power of bequeathing their goods and
chattels, in whatever manner they thought best; and it was only by the
particular custom of some places, that this power was restrained: so
that the writ called breve de rationabili parte bonorum, which the wife or
children of the deceased had against the executors for the recovery of
part of the goods, was not general throughout the kingdom, but peculiar
to certain countries, where the custom was, that, debts being paid, the
remainder should be divided into three equal parts; viz. one to the wife,
another to the children, and a third to attend the will of the testator.
Cowel lib, 2. t. 18. ,

The custom of reserving a reasonable part of the goods for the widows
and children of testators is still in force in the city of London, as to the
widows and children of freemen; but in other parts of the kingdom,
where this custom did formerly —— it has been abolished by act of
parliament; see 4 and 5 Will. and Mary, cap. 6. The inhabitants of
‘the province of York, are also empowered to dispose of their person-

al estates by their wills, notwithstanding the custom of that
[ *513 ] *province, as to the reasonable part claimed by widows and

children; but the act excepts the cities of York and Ches-
ter; yet the same liberty was afterwards extended to the freemen of the
city of York, by the statute of the 2nd and 3rd of Queen Anne. And
by the 7th and 8th of William the 3rd, cap. 38. the same custom was
abolished in the principality of Wales. See Dr. Strahan’s notes on Do-
mat, vol. 2. p. 109.—But by the law of Scotland, a testator cannot by
testament deprive his wife or children of their legitimate or reasonable
part. Stair’s Inst. lib. 3. t. 8. Mackenzie’s Inst. lib. 3. t. 9. p. 251.
NOTES. 519°

Hoc colore.| This pretext was made use of to avoid the appearance
of impugning the testament of a man in his senses, contrary to the au-
thority of the 12 tables, which give all persons, capable of making a
will, a free and uncontrolled power of bequeathing their effects just as
they think proper. ‘ Verbis legis 12 tabulorum his, uti legassit suze rei,
“ita jus esto. latissima sotestas tributa videtur, et heredis instituendi, et
“ et legata et libertates dandi, tutelas quoque constituendi ; sed id interpre-
“ tatione coangustatum est, gc. ff. 50. ¢. 16. 1. 120. de verb. sign.”
Harris.

§ 1. Qui de in officioso agunt, p. 145.  Conititutionibus, Cod. 3. 28.
21 and 27.

Aut agentes vineere, Dig. 5. 2. 6.

The eight causes for which a parent might be disinherited, are includ-
ed in the following verses, and may be found in Nov. 115. ch. 4.

Si capitis natum pater accusaverit; ejus
Aut vite insidias, clamve palamve struat:
Si vetuit cupidum secreta novissima mentis
Prodere ; nec veritys sit temerare nurum :
Si pater et genetrix sibi fata scelesta minentur :
Fulcra non ad nati clausa furentis eant :
Filius auxilio si non patris hostica linquit
Limina : si genitor numen inane colit

That is, parents are not to be pretermitted, or disinherited by name,
unless for one or other of the following causes specifically alleged.

1st, If the parent hath by accusation put in jeopardy the son’s life,
unless in case of treason: 2ndly, or attempted it by poison or by sorce-
ry: or 3rdly, debauched the wife ‘or concubine of his son: or 4thly,
prevented the lawful exercise of the son’s right of devising: or 5thly,
been convicted of attempting by poison or otherwise the life of his wife ;
or the life of her husband: or 6thly, refused to take care of any of their
children who might be deprived of reason: or 7thly, neglect-
ed *to redeem a child from captivity: or 8thly, abandoned [ *514 ]
the orthodox faith.

The allegation of inofficiousness was extended in favour of brothers
and sisters; Cod. h. t. 21. 27. Cod. Theodos. eod. Dig. 5. 2. 14. 1. and
Tb. 1. L. 24. 25.

§ 2. Qui alio jure veniunt et de inofficioso non agunt, p. 147. This al-
legation did not lie, in favour of ;

1st, A son omitted in his father’s will; for this would suffice to nulli-
fy it. .

Saas Daughters or grand-children omitted: for they had a remedy
under the constitution of Marcus Antoninus.

3rdly, Emancipated children omitted : for they might be called to the

2
520 NOTES.

 

possession by the praetor, per possessionem bonorum contra tabulas. Dig.
5. 2.23. Yet the father of an emancipated son, seems to have both
these remedies; Dig. 37. 12. 1. ult.

Athly, An omitted posthumous child; for he can break the will. Dig.
5. 2. 6.

5thly, An adrogated minor under fourteen, disiherited by his adoptive
father : for he is entitled to his fourth part, under the law of Antoninus
Pius. Dig. 5. 2. 8. 15.

6thly, A child to whom his father has left his portion. Dig. 5. 2. 25.
Cod. eod. 1. 30.

The right to urge this complaint, (which must be brought in five
years, Dig. 37. 4. 4 and 37. 4.8.1. Cod. eod. tit. 28. 1. 3. § 24.) passes
by a decree of Justinian to the immediate legitimate heirs of the per-
son, who might have urged it during life. Cod. eod. si quis, &c. and
scimus, &c.

§ 3. De eo cut testator aliquid reliquerit, p 147. The action to recover
the legal portion, or the difference between the bequest and the fourth
part, was entitled condictio ex lege; and egured to the heirs of the per-
son originally entitled to bring it. Nor was it renounced by implica-
tion: it must have been expressly given up, if at all. Peregrinus fidei

-comm. Art. 36. num. 93. Cod. de inoflicioso test. 1. 30.

$ 6. De quarta legitime partis, p. 148. See Cod. 3. 28. 35.

I have already mentioned, that, in my opinion, the right of bequeath-
ing by will, is no natural right: it is the creature of society, and may
fairly and prudently be limited.

Plato considers a man’s property as belonging to his family, lib. xi. de
leg. which was the Roman doctrine of switas. In Greece, Solon first in-
troduced the right of devising. Plut. in Solon. Demosth. adv. Lept.

The law of the 12 tables on this subject was imported from
[ *515 ] *Athens. But the Romans made frequent attempts to re-

strain the right. 'Thus the Lex Furia, a plebiscitum, A. U.
C. 570. restricted the amount of legacies to other persons than the heir,
at a thousand Asses’; and the legatee receiving it, was subject to a pen-
alty. The Lex Voconia, A. U. C. 584, enacted that no legatee should
receive more than the heir. The Lex Falcidia, under Augustus, secur-
ed to the heir a fourth part of the estate, by restraining the testator from
bequeathing in legacies ultra dodrantem or nine ounces. Justinian, by
the 18th novell. assigned one third of all the goods of the testator to the
children if they amounted to four or fewer, and one half if they were
more than four. Thus éwo children would divide between them four
ounces, five children six ounces ; agreeably to those verses.

Quatuor aut infra dant natis jura 'Trientem :

Semissem vero dant natis quinque vel ultra.
NOTES. 521

See on this subject, Dig. 48. 20.7. Cod. de inoffic. testam. 36. Nov.
1. princip. et $1. Cod. de inoff. test. 31. Cod. ad leg. Jul. majest. 5. $
8. Nov. 66. ch. 92.

The children excluded from this legitima pars, or share of the pater-
nal property thus secured to them by law, whether excluded by volun-
tary or legal reasons, do not on this account augment the quarta pars or
legal portion of the rest. As if one out of five children were disinherit-
ed for just cause, or took the veil, the other four would not be entitled to
six ounces, for the legal portion was founded on the right of heirship or
succession.

Grand children were reckoned per stirpes, by stock: thus all the chil-
dren of a son counted as the son.

In cases of dispute as to the mode of division or remuneration, it was
usually referred to arbitration; arbitrio boni viri. Cod. 1. 3. tit. 28.
§ 36.

The action for the recovery of the supplement, or difference between
a legacy bequeathed and the legal portion, enured to the heirs of those
who hada right to sue. It‘*was even assets to the creditors, although
the heir should have renounced. Cod. de repud. bon. possess. l. 2. Dig.
38. 9. 1. 7.

Previous to the 115th novel. whatever the heir had received whether
as heir, as legatee, mortis causa, or by way of trust, was considered as
advancement, and deducted from his portion or fourth part; except a
donation inter vivos, or gift with actual transfer by the testator in his
lifetime. After this novel. the heir entitled to his legal portion became
entitled without these deductions as it should seem; see Cujas in Dig.
35. 2. 15. penult. and perhaps reasonably, for the legal por-
tion is due *by the settled provisions of positive law; the [ *516 ]
gifts and legacies arise from the casual inclination of the tes-
tator; who therefore could neither transfer or burthen with debts, usu-
fructs, or trusts, even for pious purposes, the portion cast by operation of ,
law. Cod. de inoffic. test. 1. 36.

In the modern French code (art. 913. of Code civ. Nap.) the Quotite
or portion of disposable property is limited in favour of the children.
“ Les liberalites soit par actes entre vifs, soit par testament, ne pourront
“ exceder la moite des biens du disposant s’il ne laisse a son deces qu'un
“ enfant legitime ; le tiers s’il laisse deux enfants ; le quart s'il laisse
“ trois ou un plus grand nombre.”

In England the law permitted devises of personal property time out of
mind: 2 Fonbl. B. 4 pt. 1 ch.1$1. n. (a): but devises of land were
first allowed by Stat. 32, 34, 35 Hen. 8. See Hungerford v. Nosworthy,
Show. P. ©. 147. As to the civil and canon law authority in the eccle-
siastical courts on the subject of legacies, see 2 Fonbl. Ib. $ 4. note.

66
52% NOTES.

 

By the law of England, and most part of the American states (New-
Orleans I believe adopting the principle if not the regulations of the
Code Napoleon) there is no restriction on the permitted right of bequeath-
ing. Doubtless the parent ought to retain some check on the misbehav-
ior of children, and so I think ought the laws on the caprice, the injus-
tice or the dotage of parents. In Holland, Germany and Spain, and
as I have understood in other parts of Europe, the principles of the Fal-
cidian law more or less limited or extended, have been generally adopt-
ed; and it is worthy of notice, that the experience of the Empire from
the time of Augustus to that of Justinian, led to a gradual extension of
those principles. »

The civil law doctrine of advancement by gift to children, during the
life-time of the testator, briefly laid down in this section, gave birth to
the modern law of England respecting the satisfaction of portions by
legacies, and the ademption of legacies by the advancement of portions:
concerning which, the cases are numerous and complicated.* Ellison

v. Cookson, 1 Vez. jun. 105.
[ *517 ] *Where a parent is under covenant to provide portions for
children, provision by will shall be held to go in satisfaction
unless the contrary appear: and legacies shall be adeemed, by portions
advanced during ‘the testator’s life-time, unless the terms or circumstan-
ces of the legacy negative this implication. For it shall not be intended
that a parent means to give any child a double portion.
Jenkins v. Powel, 2 Vern. 115.
Thomas v. Keymish, 2 Vern. 348.
Brown v. Dawson, Ib. 498.
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 2 Vern. 538.

 

* The general doctrine of satisfaction, relates either to children: to hus-
band and wife: or to strangers. The first class only, is immediately con-
nected with the subject of the present section; but it may be useful to re-
fer shortly to the leading cases of the two other classes.

As to husband and wife. 1 Vez. sen 323. 2 Vez.sen. 409. 1 Eq. Ca.
ab. 203. Finch’s Prec. Ch. 240. 2 Vern. 498. 555. 709. 724. 1 P. Wms.
824. 2P. Wms. 341.614. 3 P. Wms. 15. 228.353. 3 Atk. 419. 1 Br.
ch. ca. 82.129. 2 Br. ch. ca. 95. 1 Vez. jun. 257. 2 Vez. jun. 463. 644.
4 Vez. 391. 5 Vez.382. 6 Vez. 385. 10 Vez. 1.17.18. 5 Br. Par. Ca.
567. 7 Br. P. Ca. 12. compared with 2 Vern. 504. Ambl. 466. 682. 730.

As to relations and strangers. 1 Vez. sen. 126. 263. 519. 636. Finch’s
Py. Ch. 236. 394. 2 Vern. 478.8.C. 1 Eq. Ab. 203.5. C. 2 Eq. Ab.
352. Salk. 155.508. 1P. Wms. 408. 2 P. Wms. 132. 343. 553. 3 P.
Wuns. 226. 353. 1 Atk. 426. 2 Atk. 300. 493. 519.632. 3 Atk. 65. 96.
Gilb. Ch. 324. Gilb. Eq. Rep. 89. 15B.ch.ca. 170. 3 Br. ch. ca. 192.
3 Vez. jun. 529. 561. 564. 4 Vez. jun. 483. 574. 5 Vez. 369, 382. (cases
of double legacies. )
NOTES. 523

A Bt ea
=
Phinney v. Phinney, 2 Vern, 638.
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 1 Vez. Sen. 262.
Graham v. Graham, 1 Vez. Sen. 263.

Barret v. Beckford, 1 Vez. Sen. 520.

Blois v. Blois,
Pyne’s Case, { 2 Ventr. 347.

Ward v. Tank Finch’s Prec. Ch. 183.

Hoskins v. Hoskins, Ib. 263.

Hartop v. Whitmore, Tb. 541. (and 1 P. Wms. 681. but incorrect,
see 1 Br. Ch. Ca. 306.)

Bromley v. Jefferies, Ib. 138.

Copeley v. Copeley, 1 P. Wms. 147.

Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle, 3 P. Wms. 211.

Graves v. Boyle, 1 Atk. 509.

Biggleston v. Grubb, 2 Atk. 48.

Rosewell v. Bennet, 3 Atk. 77 e. con. 1 Eq. Ab. 204.

Clark v. Sewell, 3 Atk. 98.

Lee v. Cox, and D’Aranda, Ib. 419.

Upton v. Price, Cas. Temp. Talb. 71.

Watson v. Earl of Lincoln, Ambl. 325.

Richman v. Morgan, 1 Br. Ch. Ca. 63. and 2 Br. Ch. Ca.
394.

*Moulson v. Moulson, 1 Br. Ch. Ca. 82. [ *518 ]

Warren v. Warren, 1 Br. Ch. Ca. 305.

Ackworth v. Ackworth, Ib. 307.

Finch v. Finch, 4 Br. Ch. Ca. 38.

Hinchcliffe ». Hinchcliffe, 3 Vez. jun. 516.

Sparks v. Cator, Ib. 530.

Tolson v. Collins, 4 Vez. 491.

Leake v. Leake, 10 Vez. 489.

On these cases it may be observed

1st. That the intent and meaning of the testator is to be sought, and
parol evidence may be admitted to discover it. Deacon v. Smith, 3 Atk.
326. Ellison v. Cookson, 3 Br. Ch. Ca. 61. Mascal v. Mascal, 1 Vez.
sen. 323. Rosewell v. Bennet, 3 Atk. 77. 1g. Ca. Ab. 204. Chap-
man v. Salt, 2 Vern. 646.

Rosewell v. Bennet, 3 Atk. 77. All these cases go generally to the
admissibility of evidence, whether to aid or rebut a presumption. But
in Freemantle v. Banks, 5 Vez. 79. and Eden v. Smith, Ib. 341. and
Trimmer v. Bayne, 7 Vez. 508, it is laid down that parol evidence ought
only to be admitted to rebut an equity or presumption. In Pole v. Lord
Somers, 6 Vez. 321, the doctrine is discussed. I incline to think that pa-
524 NOTES.

=

rol evidence ought not to be originally admitted to establish a presump-
tion, but the question seems not perfectly at rest.

‘Qndly. There seems to bea distinction between ademption or satisfac-
tion, and performance ; though this is rather discountenanced by Prime
vy. Stebbing, 2 Vez. Sen. 411. But it seems to me that the more modern
rule is reasonable; viz. that where the question is, whether a legacy shall
be considered as the performance of a covenant, more strictness is re-
quired, than where the question is, whether a portion shall adeem a le-
gacy. The first has parties, and is more in the nature of a debt: the
second moves from the parent alone, and the only difficulty arises from
the appearance of a double bounty, and family partiality. See Clark v.
Sewell, 3 Atk.98. Trimmer v. Bayne, 7 Vez. 515.

3rdly. Courts disincline to extend the doctrine of satisfaction, and
therefore take hold of circumstances that will reasonably enable them to
consider a legacy asa bounty. Clark v. Sewell, 3 Atk. 98. TTolson v.

Collins, 4 Vez. 483. Rickets v. Livingston, 2 Johnson’s Cases, N. Y.
101.

Hence it has been decided,
That the devise of a residue is not a satisfaction, for it is uncertain.
Alleyn v. Alleyn, 2 Vez. Sen. 37.
[ *519 ] *That a legacy is no satisfaction of an open account. Chan-
cey’s case, 1 P. Wms. 408.

That a legacy is no satisfaction if it be less in amount; Eastwood ».
Vincke, 2 P. Wms. 6.14. Phipps v. Annesley, 2 Atk. 57. Nichols v.
Judson, 2 Atk. 300. But in some cases, a legacy has been decreed a
satisfaction pro tanto, Jesson v. Jesson, 2 Vern. 255. Thomas v. Key-
mish, Ib. 348. Bruen v. Bruen, Ib. 439. Warren v. Warren, 1 Br. ch.
ca. 305. Sparkes v. Cator, 3 Vez. 530. Graham v. Graham, 1 Vez. sen.
263.

That a legacy depending upon a contingency is no satisfaction. Jea-
cock v. Falkner, 1 Br. ch. ca. 295. Bellasis v. Uthwaite, 1 Atk. 426.
Spinks v. Robins, 2 Atk. 491. Clarke v. Sewel, 3 Atk. 98.

That money and lands are not mutually satisfactions. Eastwood v.
Vincke, 2P. Wms. 614. Chaplain v. Chaplain, 3 P. Wms. 245. Cran-
mer’s case, 2 Salk. 508: and generally, that the presumed satisfaction
should be of the same nature, extent, and certainty, as the covenant or
obligation. Barret v. Beckford, 1 Vez. 519. Hanbury v. Hanbury, 2
Pr. ch. ca. 352. 549. Powell v. Cleaver, 2 Br. ch. ca. 499. Baugh ».
Read, 3 Br. ch. ca. 192. 1 Vez. jun. 247. Smith v. Strong, 4 Br. ch. ca.
493. Grave v. Salisbury, 1 Br. ch. ca. 425.

That where the legacy is disadvantageous as to its time of payment,
it is no satisfaction in case of a debt: as a legacy made payable in a
month; where the debt is due presently. Clarke v. Sewell, 3 At. 97.

\
NOTES. 525

 

Though this is not held so strictly in cases of portions, Jesson v. Jesson,
2 Vern. 255.

That a sum arising from distribution under an intestacy, is no satis-
faction, Twisdey’v. Twisden, 9 Vez. 4. 25.

That legacies or beneficial interests, bequeathed by, or proceeding
from strangers, are no satisfaction of a covenant entered into by the tes-
tator. Hanbury v. Hanbury, 2 Br. ch. ca. 352. 549.

That a legacy is not prima facie a satisfaction of the testator’s cove-
nants by settlement or otherwise to provide for his family, wherever the
claims are protected by securities strictly legal, as bonds. Couch v.
Stratton, 4 Vez. junr 491. Tolson v. Collins, Ib. 483. Kirkman v.
Kirkman, 2 Br. ch. ca. 95. Jeacock v. Falkener, 1 Br. ch, ca. 295.
Haynes v. Mico, 1 Br. ch. ca. 129, 133.

That a legacy is not a satisfaction for monies received by the testator
in trust for his children. Chidley v. Lee, Finch. 228. Meredyth »v.
Wynn, ib. 3p. (Sed vid. Seed v. Bradford, 1 Vez. 591.) or generally, of
claims arising aliunde. Baugh v. Reed, 3 Br. ch. ca. 192.

That where an express fund is pointed out, or an ex-
press direction *given for payment of debts and legacies, the: [ *520 ]
court will infer that both are to be paid. Chancery’s case,
1P. Wms. 408. Richardson v. Greese, 3 Atk. 65.

These are the leading principles, and distinctions that occur to me on
this prolific subject.

As to the release of debts by legacies, the intention of the testator must
be clear, or the inference will not take place. See hereon, Brown »v. Sel-
wyn, Cas. Temp. Talb. 240. Sibthorp v. Moxon, 1 Vez. 49. Wilmot v,
Woodhouse, 4 Br. ch. ca. 227.

Tit. XIX. § 2. De suis heredibus, p. 150. Sed his preetor permittit.
But not after they have begun to act; immiscere se. Cod. de repud. vel.
abst. heredit. land 2. Dig. 29.2. 20. 21.

Immiscere se, means to act as heir. ? These are expressions appertain-
Abstinere, to decline the heirship. ing to the heir.

Adire, to approach : to act in succession. Are expressions appro-
Pro herede res genere, to transact business priate to the heres

as heir. ; extraneus, or stran-
Repudiare, to renounce the succession. J ger.

$ 4. De testamenti factione,p. 151. Testamenti factio activa; the
right of devising. Testamenti factio passiva ; the right of taking by de-
vise. Testamenti factio, also sometimes means the capacity of being a
witness to the last will of another.

Qui ut dizimus tua tempora inspici debent. See Dig. 28. 5. 49. 50.
Dig. 28. 1.16. This relates to stranger heirs. The heredes sui, proper
or domestic heirs, are only required to possess the right of taking (¢eséa-
meni factio passiva) at the death of the testator.
526 NOTES.

 

$5. De jure. deliberandi, p. 152. By the ancient law no time was
limited for deliberation. Sometimes testators assigned a period of 100
days. When they did not, the preetor on application of a substitute or a
creditor, would himself assign a time, usually 100 days at least. Dig.
28. 8.1. 2. cum seq. Cod de jure delib. 1.19. Dig. 29. 2.28. Justinian
extended it to one year. Cod. eod.1. 19. afterwards he abridged this pe-
riod to three months, Cod. eod. 1. ult. unless under peculiar circumstan-
ces, wherein the praetor might extend it to a year, and an inferior magis-
trate to nine months. Cod de jur. delib. 1. ult.

But minors, from their inexperience in business, were allowed to re-
nounce, Cod. si minor, ab hered. abst. 1.1. Dig. 4, 4. 7. 1. unless where
it became insolvent by accident after he took it. Dig. 4. 4. 11. 24. -$ 2.
Cod. de. integ. rest. minor. 1. ult. :

Sed nostra benevolentia, §c. In Ferriere and others, this passage be-

gins another section, relating to the privilege of inventory.
[ *521 ] *The inventory by which the claims upon te heir were

to be bound, required Ist. To be commenced within one,
and finished within three months, from the death of the testator.
Cod. de jur. delib. 1. ult. 2dly. It was to be made out in the presence of
creditors and legatees duly notified, Novell. 1 ch. 2.$ 2. Ib. 119. ch. 6.
3dly. It was to contain a full and fair account of all the property of the
deceased real and personal, Cod. de jur. delib. 1. ult. $ 10. 4thly. It
was to be signed by the heir claiming under it. Beyond this inventory
the heir was not liable, unless he had thought fit to ask time to delibe-
rate, which was considered as a waiver of inventory. Cod. eod. 1. ult.

$ 6. De acquirenda vel omittenda, Sc. p. 153. Strangers might accept

three ways:

Ist, By Adition: (adire magistratum) and formally declare their in-
tention of accepting the heirship: this must be simply and uncondition-
ally, without power of subsequent renunciation. Dig. 29. 2. 51. et ult.
1. 80. eod. $ 2. 1. 90. eod. $ 3.

2dly, By Cretion: declaration being made before the magistrate with- ©
in the time limited by the testator. From Crevi, a cernere, to decree.

3dly, Pro herede gestio: Acting as heir. Dig. 29. 2. 20. et seq. Ib.
1. 88. § 7.

They might renounce,

1st, By repudiation before a magistrate.

2dly, By any expression or act implying renunciation. Dig. 29. 2. 95.

3dly, By omitting to take up the heirship within the limited period.

After the time of Theodosius the younger, and Justinian, Adition,
Cretion and Repudiation, were laid aside. Heirships were accepted in
two ways only, pro herede gestione, and agnatione nuda. Cod. de jur.
delib. 1. 6.12 and 17. Cod. Theod. de bon. mat. 1.1.4 and 8. Ib. de
NOTES. 527

 

Cretion. Ib. et bonor. possess. sublat. Cod. qui admitt. ad bonor. pos-
sess. Scrupulosam cretionum solemnitatem hac lege penitus amputari
decernimus. Cod. 6. 30. 17.

Liem extraneus heres.| The law of England takes no notice of pro-
per or domestic heirs, and therefore can make no distinction between
sui heredes and extranei ; but in England, if an executor, [who may be
regarded as the heir of personal estate] once intermeddles with the es-
tate of the testator,-he will not afterwards be permitted to renounce his
executorship; and yet he is not liable de bonis propriis to pay more than
he has received, unless in some particular cases, as when he hath wasted
the estate of the deceased, or acted otherwise improperly
*and dishonestly—and even an executor-de son tort will in [ *522 |
general be charged only to the amount of the goods wrong-
fully administered by him. 1 Mod. 213. Parten v. Baseden.—Swinb.
337. Harris.

Tit. XX.$ 1. Legatum itaque est donatio, p. 154. In England under
the word /egacy, land may be included. Doug. 40. Brady »v. Cubitt,
and the cases cited in the note. Also Hardacre et al. v. Nash et al. 5
Term Rep. 716.

It is truly said here that a legacy is a gift, a bounty. This is certain-
ly the prima facie intention of the testator: hence it is, that the courts
rather lean against the doctrine of ademption and satisfaction as to
debts: for it is converting a gift into a payment. See in addition to the
cases already cited lately, 1 Brown’s civil law, 304. 3 Woodeson, 538.
2 Fonb. 320. 2 Johnson’s New York cases, 101.

§ 2. De antiquis generibus legatorum sublatis, p. 154. Sed ex consti-
tutionibus. Cod. 6. 37.21. Nostra autem constitutio. Cod. 6. 43. 1.

The forms thus abrogated were, Ist, Per vindicationem. As, I give
and bequeath, positively. 2dly, Per damnationem. I direct my heir to
deliver over and pay. 3dly, Sinendi modo. My will is that Titius be
permitted to take, &c. 4Athly, Per preceptionem. Let Titius take so
much of such a thing, or such a thing, except, &c. The first and fourth
amounted to a transfer in full right, and were recoverable under the ac-
tion familie erciscunde. 'Vhe two others allowed only of a personal ac-
tion ex testamento. Under the later ordinances, the legatee might have
his action against the heir or any other possessor of the thing devised :
and an hypothecary action for immoveable or real propery, so termed,
under the fiction that all the goods of the testator were hypothecated or
pledged for the delivery of each legacy from the time of his death. But
co-heirs were not bound beyond their proportion. Cod. comm. de legat,
L 1.

It may be remarked, that the courts in England, after having been
long tramelled by particular decisions, and technical constructions, have
528 NOTES.

 

adopted the golden rule of this section for the expounding of last wills
and testaments, viz. that whatever be the form of words made use of,
the intention of the testator must govern if it can be gotten at, even in
opposition to partial expressions; unless that intention militates against
some known rule of positive law, as in creating a mortmain or a per-
petuity.

§ 3. Collatio legatorum, Sc. p. 154. See Cod. Commun. de legat. 2.
The passages to the same purpose, to wit, that legacies are in all respects

likened to trusts in Dig. 30. 1. only as to the deduction under
[ *523.] *the Falcidian law of the fourth or legal portion, according
to Cujus, 1. 8. observat. ch. 4. *

$ 4. De re legata, p.156. See Dig. 30.14.1. Dig. 30. 67. 1. and
Dig. 30. 71. 3, as to paying over thevalue. If a specific legacy can be
reasonably obtained by purchase, it is of no consequence, whether the
testator knew it to be the property of another or not. Dig. 30. 49.
3. The onus probandi was thrown on the legatee. Dig. 22.3. 21. Cod.
eod. 1. 23.

$ 5. Dere aliena post testamentum a legatario acquisita, p. 157.

Nam traditum est, duas lucrativas causas, §c. See Dig. 44. 7. 17.
Dig. 30. 82. As to the latter part of this section see Dig. 30. 34. 8. and
30. 84. 2. juncto Cujacio, Dig. 50. 16. 88. Dig. 4. 4. 35.

Nam traditum est.| When it is said, that two lucrative titles can
never concur in the same person on account of the same thing, this must
be understood in regard only to something certain and determinate, as a
particular purse of money, an horse, a diamond, &c. for the maxim does
not hold in general with respect to things, which consist in quantity, and
may be numbered, weighed or measured.—Possunt enim duce cause lu-
crative in eandem personam et candem. quantitatem concurrere, quia quan-
titates per rerum naturam multiplicantur ; licet enim eadem res mea se-
pius fieri non possit, eadem tamen quantitas possit quia res eadem non
videtur. Cujacius; Ferriere. Harris.

Agere potest : In England no suit lies for a legacy at common law.

The mayor of Southampton v. Graves, 8 Term. Rep. 593. Unless
upon the express promise of the executor in consideration of assets, At-
kyns v. Hill, Cowp. 284. Hawkes v. Saunders, Ib. 289. But the case
of Deeks v. Strutt, negatives an implied assumpsit by virtue of assets.
Whenever the executor assents, the legacy vests from that moment.
Doe v. Guy, 3 Hast, 120.

In Pennsylvania, by act of 21 March, 1772, legatee may bring suit af-

‘ter reasonable demand, and offer of sufficient security in double amount,
conditioned to refund if necessary.

§ 10. Dere legatarii, p. 159. Et licet alienaverit eam. 'That is ac-
cording to the old Cantonian rule; and also guod ab initio vitiosum est,
‘NOTES. 529

 

fractu temporis non. potest convalescere, Dig. 50. 17. 29. but this rule does
not apply to conditional legacies, Dig 34. 7. 1. ¢ ult.

$ 12. De alienatione et oppignoratione, §c. p. 159. As in this case
the heirs could object to paying the value of, or redeeming the thing be-
queathed, on the ground that the testator, by his alienation, had in fact
repealed the bequest, he will be bound to make out this plea. The con-
trary, however, seems intimated in Dig. 34. 4. 15. but in this last case,
the plea is put in by the legatee, that the desire of bequeath-
ing *returned upon the testator. Sane si probet legatarius [ *524 ]
novam voluniatem testatoris non submovebitur.

It should seem that if the testator hath only mortgaged or pledged the
thing bequeathed, this does not amount to an evidence of a change of
intention. Precisely the rule adopted by the English court of chancery
as to a devise of lands, or any other specific property. But it would be
otherwise had he sold it or given itaway. Dig. 34.1.18. And so is
the law of England.

~$ 14. De debito legato creditori, p. 160. This case involves the con-
flictions of two rules apparently opposite. Qu semei-utiliter constituta
stint, durant licet ille casus ertiterit a quo initium capere non potuerunt.
Dig. 35. 2.5. And the rule negotium extinguitur, cum is casus postea
incidit unde incipere non poterat. Dig. 30.1. 82. Concerning which see
Dig. 50. 17. 85. 1. where this latter rule is repeated: and Dig. 50. 16. 98.
with the note of Vinnius.

I have already stated most of the cases, where a legacy will be con-
sidered as an extinguishment of a debt. The general rule doubtless is
that a legacy equal to the debt or exceeding it, shall be considered as a
satisfaction ; see the cases before cited hereon; and Roper on legacies,
163, where also many of them are collected: and Gibson et ux. v. Scud-
amore, Moseley’s Rep. 7. but if less than the debt, it shall not be satis-
faction, Minuel v. Sarrazine, Mosely’s Rep. 295. 1 Vez. sen. 263. Finch
394. Nor unless the bequest be at least equally beneficial. Roper on
leg. 165. Nor if the bequest be not ejusdem generis. Garret v. Evers, .
Mosely’s Rep. 364. Nor if the debt be contracted subsequent to the date
of the will. 2Salk. 508. Cranmei’s case. Thomas v. Bennet, 2 P.
Wnus. 343. and Fowler v. Fowler, 3 P. Wms. 353. See also the obser-
vations of Lord. Thurlow in Haynes v. Mico, 1 Br. ch. ca. 130, express-
ing strong leaning against any extension of the doctrine of satisfaction.

§ 15. De dote uzori legata, p. 161. The dower or marriage portion
was payable in three annual payments only, annua, bina, trina die.
Hence, if it was bequeathed also, it became due from the day of the tes-
tator’s death, and bore interest from that time. Cod. de rei uxor. act.

I have already referred to the cases wherein question has arisen
whether the interest of a wife by settlement or otherwise is satisfied by

67
4
530 “ NOTES.

 

legacy. Neither in England, nor in Pennsylvania, can a husband ‘de-
prive the wife of her election to take under the wills or to resort to, or
forego her dower.

$ 16. De interitu et mutatione rei legate, p. 161. If a testator be-

queath generally a cask of wine, and all his wine by acci-
[ *525 ] dent runs out, *the heir will be bound to pay the legacy :

but if he should bequeath by description, some particular
wine in the cellar, and it runs out, the loss falls on the legatee. Dig. de
legat. 34. $3. Cod si certum petat. 1. 11.

§ 18. De grege legato. p. 162. Ten sheep make a flock. Dig. 47.
14. ult. Dig. 7.4. Grege autem legato, §c. Dig. de legat. 1.21. Jef-
ferys v. Jefferys, 3 Atk. 121.

§$ 19.‘ De edibus legatis. p. 163. As to what things ‘will pass by the
words house, furniture, goods, &c.; see the cases collected by Roper on
Leg. 136. et seq. add to these cases, as to plate: Phillips v. Phillips,
2Freeman 11. Flay v. Flay, Ib. 64. Kelly v. Pawlet, 1 Dick. ch.
Rep. 359.

As to books: Allen v. Allen, Moseley 112. Kelly v. Pawlet, Ambl.
605.

As to apparel: L’Farrant v. Spencer, 1 Vez. Sen. 97. Hunt. v. Hort,
3 Br. ch. ca. 311.

As to the general exposition of what passes by particular expres-
sions, see the cases of Stuart v. Earl of Bute, 11 Vez. 657, and Kelly »
Pawlet, Dickens ch. Rep. 359, and Ambl. 605.

The general doctrine of fixtures is discussed in Hilwes v. Maw, 3
East, 38.

If a testator having bequeathed ground, afterwards builds upon it, the
building will fall to the legatee, as an accessary. Dig. de legat. 39. 44.

§ 21. De rebus corporalibus et incorporalibus. p. 165. This is agreea-
ble to the English law, by which a possiblility may be bequeathed.
Bank notes whether considered as cash, or securities for cash? 11 Vez.
662. Chapman v. Hart, 1 Vez. sen. 273.

There is some difficulty in the English law, as to bequests over, and
limitations of personal estate: the general rule is that no remainder
over of personal estate can be devised: but there are many distinctions
taken as to the operation of words of limitation, in bequests of personal
estate: see Roper on Leg. 202. et seq. and Cambridge v. Rous, § Vez.
24,

$ 22. De legato generali, p. 164. This abrogates the law, conse-
quent upon the bequest per damnationem which gave the election to the
heir, see tit. XX. ante.

§ 23. De optione legata, p. 164. Sed ex constitutione. Cod. 6. 43.
ult.
NOTES. 531

§$ 25. Jus antiquam de incertis personis, p. 165. Sacris consitutioni-
bus. These are not extant.

$ 29. De errore in nomine legatarii, p. 167.

Nomen, was the family name.

* Cognomen, the name of that branch of the family placed [ *526 ]
after the nomen.

Preenomen, the name of the individual prefixed to the nomen.

Agnomen, a name assumed from some particular circumstance.

Thus, Publius, Cornelius, Scipio, Africanus: Caius Julius Cesar:
here Cornelius and Julius were the nomina, the family names.

Scipio and Cesar were the cognomina, the one of the gens or family
Cornelia; the other of the gens Julia.

Publius and Caius designated the individuals. The individuals in
respect of the original family or clan, were agnati; in respect of the
particular branch of the family, they were gendiles.

The rule here laid down as to the name, holds also under the civil
law, as to the thing. Although it may be miscalled, yet if the descrip-
tion or appellation be sufficient to designate the article or person intend-
ed, it is sufficient. Dig. de legat.1. Dig. 33. 10.7.2. Dig. 34. 5. 3.

As to mistakes and incertainty in a bequest under the English law,
see Roper on leg. 157. et seq. and the following cases Thomas v. Thom-
as, 6 Term Rep. 671. Doe ex dem. Hayter v. Joinville e¢ al. 3 East,
172. Earl of Scarborough v. Parker, 1 Vez. Jun. 267. Parsons v. Par-
sons, Ib. 266, and the cases in the note, p. 267, which bear upon the
present section. See also Ex parte Wallop, 4 Br. ch. ca. 90 and Kennel
v. Abbot, 4 Vez. 802, where a legacy given to a person under a particu-
lar character, which he has falsely assumed, and which moved the tes-
tator to the bequest, the rule of the civil law is adopted, and the legacy
fails. Dig. 35. 1.72.6. Cod. 6. 42. 27. cited. See Swinburne, 473,
et seq.

$ 30. De falsa demonstratione, p. 167. Dig. 35. 1. 19. 34. Dig. 12.
1.6. But this rule could not apply to a legacy of a thing that did not
exist, for of this there could be no delivery. Dig. de legat. 73. 1 and 2.
Lex eod. 103, $10. See 5 East, 51. Roe on the demise of Connolly v.
Vernon and Vyse.

$31. De falsa causa adjecta, p. 168. Dig. de legat. J. 17, $ 2. cum
seq. First, because the legacy is fairly referrable to the good will and
intention of the testator, which remain at all events. Secondly, the
legacy itself, and not the reason of it, attaches to the legatee.

$ 32. De servo heredis, p. 168. The legacy has relation to the time
of the testament, and it was then clearly void : for a slave could acquire
only for the use of his master; i. e. as a general rule. Hence the dic-
532 NOTES.

 

tum of Cato applies, guod ab initio vitiosum est, tractu temporis non po-
test convalescere. Dig. de diversis reg. jur. 29.
[ *527 ] *Quearitur.] If a testator gives a legacy to the slave of
his heir without annexing any condition, such a legacy is
void; for a bequest, made to the slave, is in effect made to the heir; and
it would be highly absurd in a testator to command his heir to pay a
legacy to himself. And although the slave of the heir should after-
wards cease to be under the power of his master in the life-time of the
testator, either by passing to another master, or by obtaining his free-
dom, yet this would give no force to the legacy; for it is laid down as a
rule by Cato; quod, si testamenti facti-tempore decessit testator, inutile
Soret ; id legatum, quandocunque decesserit, non valere. ff. 34. t.7. But
when ipeacies are conditional, this rule is not observed; for in such be-
quests nothing is regarded but the event of the condition. Harris.

§ 33. De domino haredis, p. 169. The legacy cannot belong to the
slave as heir: for it is evident the master may prohibit him from becom-
ing heir, or sell him to another master.

§$ 34. ‘De Legato post mortem heredis, p. 169. ee as has been
already remarked, the institution of an heir was so necessary to a testa-
ment, that any bequest in a will previous to such institution was void.
By degrees the prators excepted Trusts, (fidei-commissa.) Ulp. in frag.
tit. 24, § 12; and tit. 25, $ 6, Juncto Paulo, 1. 3 sentent. tit. 6, $1. Jus-
tinian abolished this strictness, and gave validity to hequests, whether
placed before or after the clause by which the heir was appointed. Cod.
de testament. 1. ambiguitas.

§ 36. Si pence nomino relinquatur, p.170. Antoninus Pius first raised
an objection to these conditions nomine pence: thinking that a legacy
ought to be founded simply on the kindness and good opinion of the tes-
tator concerning the legatee; and that burthening a legacy with any
thing like a penal condition, was contrary to the fair and reasonable in-
tent of a gift. Ulpian in frag. tit. 24,25, $13. Justinian reinstated the
old law. Cod. de his que pene caus. reling.

The very fruitful subject of conditions, is no farther related to the
present section, than as it embraces testamentary conditions. The
doctrine of conditions, says Mr. Butler in his note to Co. Litt. 201. 6. is
derived to us from the feudal law. Doubtless much of that doctrine so
far as relates to tenures, services, and rents, is so. But as much of it, is
derived to us from the civil law: see beside the present section concern-
ing testamentary conditions, Inst. 2.14.11. Inst. 3. 16. 4, 5 and 6.
Dig. 26. 7. 5.8. Dig. 28.7.1.1.3.14. Dig. 30.1.7.9. Dig. 35.1.
1.1. 7. 17. 22. 31. 41. 62. 64. es 79. Dig. 36.2.4. Dig. 44.7. 31.
Dig. 50.17. 77.174. Cod. 6. 25.1. Cod. 6. 40. authent. cui relict.
NOTES. 533

 

Cod. 6. 46 4. and the summary of the French *law of con-
ditions in Pothier on obligations, ch. 3. articles 1 and 2. [ *528 ]
(page 118—135. of the American translation. Newbern, N.
C.) which is the same with the civil law on the same subject.

By the civil law, all conditions imposing celibacy, or widowhood,
unless till the puberty of the orphan children were void: but legacies

might be well given on the condition of marrying or not marrying such

aperson. Dig. 35. 1. 22. 62. 63. 64. 72. 100. But whether by ampli-
ation this is to be contrued against any conditional reséraint of marrying
a particular person? Swinb. 282,

As to the (English) common law doctrine of conditions, generally, see
Butler’s notes, Co. Litt. 201—207. and 213. 237. Comyn’ s Dig. tit.
Conditions.

As to conditions precedent and subsequent, and covenants dependant
and independant in contracts, see the useful note of Serjeant Williams
to Pordage v. Coke, 1 Saund. Rep. 319. which includes the cases to Trin-
ity term, 1799; also 1 Fonbl. ch. 6, $ 1 and 2. p. 349. 388. 391.

The ieadine case as tO DEPENDANCE OF INDEPENDANCE of covenants, is
Kingston v. Preston, quoted in Jones v. Berkely, Doug. 689. As to the
doctrine of compensation, Boone v. Eyre, 1 Hen. Bl. 273. Campbell ».
Jones, 6 Term Rep. 573. Hall v. Cazanove, 4 East. 477.

Add to the cases cited in Williams’s Saunders, Glazebrook v. Wood-
row, 8 Term Rep. 366. Hall v. Cazanove, 4 East. 477. Martin v.
Smith, 6 East. 555. Smith v. Wilson, 8 East. 437. Haveléck v. Ged-
des, 10 East. 555. Smith v. Woodhouse, 2 Bos. and Pull. New. rep.
233. Bornmann v. Tooke, 1 Camb. N. P. Rep. 377.

When equity will relieve the breach of a condition: see 1 Fonb. 209.
220. 387. 391.

As to the subject immediately connected with the present section, viz.
conditions in restraint of marriage; the cases are well collected and the
general principles arranged by Fonb. vol. 1. p. 245. See also Rop. on
leg. 59—66.

I add the following references on the same subject.

Randall v. Payne, 1 Br. ch. ca. 5. Scot. v. Tyler, 2 Br. ch. ca. 431.
See Lord Thurlow’s opinion and decree in this case at full length in 2
Dicken’sCh. Rep. 712. The general law before this was, that conditions
in restraint of marriage, were to be considered as in derrorem only, it not
being to be presumed, that for a breach of duty of this pardonable na-
ture, the parent would incurably deprive the child of an intended provi-
sion. Harvey v. Aston, Forrester’s Rep. 212.1 At. 361. Comyn’s Rep.
726. Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330. Elton wv. Elton, 1 Wils. 159. Long
v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052. In which Lord Mansfield *began
by saying, ‘‘ Conditions in restraint of marriage are odious, [ *529 |
534 NOTES.

 

and “are therefore held to the utmost rigour and strictness. They

.are “contrary to sound policy. By the Roman law they are all
void.” 'That is to be understood however, under the restrictions I have
above laid down; to wit, the conditional injunction of celibacy—of wi-
dowhood, unless till the children arrive at puberty—of not marrying
without the consent of some other person—or by ampliation of not mar-
rying some particular persou, was void: and the legacy was demandable
free from the condition; Dig. 35. 1. 106: but the marrying of A. B. or
C. might be made a condition precedent. Swinb. 281. |

Besides this notion of conditional restraints against marriage heing in
terrorem only, the courts had also laid it down, that unless there wasa
devise over, so that some other person had an interest in the performance
of the condition, the condition annexed to personal legacies, in any man-
ner restraining marriage was void. Bellasis v. Ermine, 1 Ch. ca. 22.
Semple v. Bayley, Finch. Prec. in Ch. 562. Pulling v. Reedy, 1 Wilson,
21. Wheeler v. Birgham, 3 Atk. 365, and the other cases collected in
the instructive note of Mr. Williams to Hervey v. Aston, in his edition of
Forrester’s Cases temp. Talbot, 216, and even in case of a devise over
of residue, it had been held doubtful or even void. Garret v. Pretty, 2
Vern. 293. 2 Freem. 220. Wheeler v Birgham, 3 Atk. 365. Paget v.
Haywood, cited 1 Atk. 378. Eastland v. Reynolds, 1 Dickens, Ch.
Rep. 320.

Lord Thurlow in Scot v. Tyler, combated the doctrine of legacies in
terrorem, and decided that wherever the residue was devised over, it sup-
ported the condition.

The general law, (civil and canon) respecting legacies in restraint of
marriage, is elaborately discussed by Swinburne in his chapter on that
subject, p. 282. Having made these remarks on the law as settled in
Scot v. Tyler, I proceed to add a reference to the few subsequent cases of
conditions in restraint of marriage.

Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Br. ch. ca. 128. Dashwood v. Lord Bulke-
ly, 10 Vez. 230. Eastland v. Reynolds, 1 Dicken’s ch. Rep. 317. Knight
v. Cameron, 14 Vez. 289.

All conditions of whatever nature, are liable to be avoided, or con-
trouled, if they be absurd, or impossible, or contrary to the precepts of
religion, or positive law, or public safety, or public decorum, or grossly

unjust. And it will be frequently regarded as sufficiently ful-
[ *530 ] filled, if it be *substantially so, according to the intent and
meaning of the contract or devise, though not formally so.

And where circumstances unavoidably prevent its being perfectly and
completely fulfilled, equity will support the partial fulfillment of it, if
compensation can be made for the omission of the remainder: or if the
NOTES. : 535

 

partial fulfillment of the verbal direction, be a reasonable fulfillment of ©
the intent,

And further, where circumstances unavoidably prevent its being per-
fectly and completely fulfilled, equity will consider it as fulfilled, if all
be done that could reasonably be expected, under the doctrine of Cy-
pres, concerning which see the following cases and references. 1 Pow.
Contr. 448, Attorney General v. Guise, 2 Vern. 266. Attorney General
v. Green, 2 Br. ch. ca, 492. Freke v. Lord Barrington, 3 Br. ch. ca. 281.
Routledge v. Dorrill, 2 Vez. jun. 357. Attorney General v. Boultbee, Ib.
380. Bristow v, Ward, Ib. 336. Attorney General v. Whitchurch, 3
Vez. 141. Attorney General v. Boultbee, Ib. -220. on appeal from the
former case before the master of the rolls: Attorney General v. Andrew,
Ib. 633. 645. Attorney General v. Bowyer, Ib. 714. Attorney General
v. Minshull, 4 Vez. 14. Corbyn v. French, Ib. 418. Brown v. Higgs,
Ib. 713. The Bishop of Hereford v. Adams. Lady Twisden v. Adams,
7 Vez. 324. Andrew v. Trinity Hall, Cambridge, 9 Vez. 525. Attorney
General v. Whiteley, 11 Vez. 251.

The case of the Holland Company against the intruders on lands
north and east of the Alleghany and Monewag0, was also a case of Cy-
pres. 4 Dall. 170.

Tit X XI. De ademptione legati, p. 172. A legacy might be revoked
under the Roman law, by word, or by act. -Asin the latter case, if a
Testator having bequeathed the debt to the Debtor, should afterward
sue him: or if having bequeathed a specific article, he should afterwards
sell or give itaway. ‘There was this difference between the express and
tacit revocation of a legacy, that in the former case it became void, in
the latter only voidable. Though the demand might be repelled by the
circumstances of a tacit revocation. Ulp. in Frag. 24, $ 22: and arg.
ad 1.17. Dig. de adimend. legat. Dig. eod. J. 3, $ ult. and J. 22.

I have already spoken of the ademption of legacies; and of the satis-
faction of legacies; in the note referring to those decisions that related to
satisfaction in cases of mere relations, and of strangers.

Where a devisee shall be put to his election, see Judge Wilson’s edi-
tion of Bacon’s abridgment, Appendix, title ELEcTIon.

*As to the general doctrine of Revocation whether express [ *531 ]
or implied, it is a subject too copious to be treated of at the
length it requires, in these notes. The reader may consult Swinburne
524—536 : Judge Wilson’s or Gwillim’s Bac. Ab. under the last section
of the title Wills, and 2 Fonbl. 357. I shall refer generally to the later
cases in East, Bosanquet and Puller, Vezey, jun. Dickens, and some
American cases, thinking such a reference may assist the reader’s re-
searches.

Revocations may be express, or implied, or intended so to be.
536 NOTES.

 

An express revocation may be complete (a): or incomplete (b): or
partial, pro tanto. (c) .

An implied revocation may be from change of state (d): so far as
this relates to marriage and birth of a child by a man, or marriage by a
woman, the casus have already been referred to in these notes; or it
may be from acts on the part of the testator inconsistent with the be-
quests of his will (e): or from the testator parting with the whole es-
tate, or article bequeathed. (f)

The following are decisions that bear upon the class of cases. (a)

Ellis v. Smith, 1 Vez. jun. 11. Dickens, 225. Buckram v. Ingram, 2
Vez. jun. 652. (wherein also, a legacy charged on a real estate by a will
duly attested, may be revoked by an unattested instrument.) Harrison
v. Foreman, 5 Vez. 207. Humphrey v. Taylor, Dickens 257. Havard
v. Davis, 2 Binney Rep. 406. (a case of parol revocation.) Bates v.
Holman, 3 Hening and Munford, 502. Cogbill v. Cogbill, 2 Hening
and Munford, 467. ’

Class (b). -'Thomas v. Jones et al. 2 East. 488. Short ex dem. Gas-
rell v. Smith et al. 4 East. 419. Bowes v. Bowes, 2 Bosanq. and Pull.
500. (a case of after purchased lands.) Maggison v. Moore, 2 Vez. jun.
630. Cave v. Holford, 3 Vez.-640. Crosbie v. Macdonal, 4 Vez: 610.
Lord Carrington v. Payne, 5 Vez. 633. Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Vez. 656.
Holder v..Howel, 8 Vez. 97. Pemberton v. Pemberton, 12 Vez. 290.
310. Dufour v. Pereira, Dickens 419. Boudinot v. Bradford, 2 Dall. Rep.
266. Lawson v. Morrison, 2 Dall. Rep. 286. Cogbill v. Cogbill, 2 Hen-
ing and Munford, 467. Bates v. Holman, 3 Hen. and Munf. 562.

As to the cases. (c) Larkins v. Larkins, 3 Bos. and Pull. 16. 109.
Earl Temple v. Dutchess of Chandos, 3 Vez. 685. Williams v. Owens,
2 Vez. jun. 595. Cave v. Holford, 3 Vez. 680.

As to the cases. (d) Charman v. Charman, 14 Vez. 580.

As to the cases. (e) Selwood v. Mildmay, 3 Vez. 310. Hinkley v.

Simmons, 4 Vez. 160. Knollys v. Aleock, 5 Vez. 648. 7. Vez.
[ *532 ] 558. *Baxter v. Dyer, 5 Vez. 656. (which contains also a

case of marriage with birth of a child under peculiar circum-
stances.) Ex parte Lord Ilchester, 7 Vez. 348—381. much at length.
Ex parte Fearon, 5 Vez. 633. Attorney General v. Vigor, 8 Vez. 256.
Maundrel v. Maundrel, 9 Vez. 256. Sparrow v. Hardcastle, Dickens
257. Digby v. Legard, Ib. 500. Peach v. Philips, Ib. 538. Arnold v.
Arnold, Ib. 645.

As to cases. (f) Goodtitle v. Otway, 1 Bos. and Pull. 576. the lead-
ing cases. Doe ex dem. Dilnot v. Dilnot, 5 Bos. and Pull. 401. Perry v.
Philips, 1 Vez. jun. 255. (a case of after purchased lands; a possibility
deviseable.) Brydges v. Duke of Chandos, 2 Vez. jun. 417. (this is
also a leading case; and includes after purchased lands, and the distinc- ~
NOTES. " 537
tion. thereon between the Civil and the English law.) William 2.
Owens, 2 Vez. 595. Stewart v. Titchbone, 2 Vez. 602. Cave v. Hol-
ford, 3 Vez. 650. Harmood v. Oglander, 6 Vez. 199. 8 Vez. 106.
Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Vez. 656. Attorney General v. Vigor, 8 Vez. 256.
Rose. », Cunningham, 11 Vez. 554. Darley v. Darley, Dickens, 397.
Mayer v. Gowland Ib. 563.

$ 1. De translatione, p. 172. A legacy is also said to be transferred
when it is appointed to be paid by one heir and afterward by another.
Dig: 34. 4.6. There was some nicety depending on the form of words
used in transferring bequests. Thus, I give and bequeath to Meevius,
the legacy I before gave to Titius. This is a legacy transferred. Dig.
34, 4.5. I give and bequeath to Sempronius the same share that I
have already given to Seius: this is an additional legacy to the same
amount, for there is no clear and positive exclusion, no undoubted speci-
fication of intention. I institute Sempronius as heir to the same portion
wherewith I have instituted Seius; This is an appointment of co-heir-
ship Dig. 285.15. Dig. 50. 16. 142.

Tit. XXII. De lege Falcidia, p.173. have already noted the
Lex Furia, and the Ler Volconia, which were superceded by the Lex
Falcidia, enacted on the motion of Falcidius, a tribune of the people,
under the sanction of Augustus, 714, A. U.C. By this law a testator
was obliged to leave one fourth of his property to his heir; he could not
bequeath wltra dodrantem, beyond nine ounces out of the twelve which
made up the As, or whole estate. This law was, in fact, equally bene-
ficial to testators and to heirs, because it ensured the execution of the
will, by ensuring a competent reward to the heir who had the trouble.
The Lex Falcidia, at first regarded legacies only: it was afterwards
very properly extended by ampliation and legal construction to trusts:
or, aS some say, it was thus extended by the Senatus consultum Pegasi-_
anum. ‘Trusts were certainly included within the equity
*of it. By a constitution of Antonine, it was then extended [ *533 ]
to intestacies, and by Severus to donations mortis causa.

Cod. de legat. 1. 5. and 12.

$1. De pluribus heredibus, p. 173. Suppose Titius and Seius, two
heirs; Titius’s moiety is charged with legacies nearly to the amount of
the whole; and Seius’s moiety is uncharged; and the moiety of Titius
should, by death, dereliction or otherwise, accrue to Seius; he would
hold it under the right of deducting from the legacies, so as to leave one
fourth clear. Dig. de legat.1. 78. 1.1.$ 13,14. But if the unburthened
part of Seius should accrue to Titius, the legatees of 'Titius’s part would
be benefitted, for the Falcidian retrenchment would not take place. The
reason is, that Seius takes the share of Titius, of course, with all the
rights of Titius attached to it; he stands in the place of Titius. Where-

68
638 NOTES.

 

as if Titius succeeds to the share of Seius, the reason of the Lex Fal-
cidia fails; for Titius‘in this case, will have his fourth clear, notwithstand-
ingtheover charge of legacies onhis own share. Cujasl. 4. obs. ch. 35, 36.

$ 2. Quo tempore spectetur, Sc. p. 174. The death of the testator is
the period that fixes the relative situations of the legatees and heir. If
in the intervening time between the making of the will and the decease
of the devisor, the estate should be increased, the legatees are exonerated
from deduction in proportion. If it hath decreased, the instituted heir
may renounce. Dig. de leg, 30.73. Cod de caduc. tabl. 11. Dig de
legat. 1. 1. $17. 1. 43. $35. 1. 22.$ 3. Dig. 36. 1. 14. 5, 6.

§ 3. Que detrahuntur ante Falcidiam, p.175. The retrenchment of
legacies by the civil law was pro rata; except perhaps as in our law, as
to the case of specific legacies: see Vinnius in loco, and Paulus l. 4. sen-
tent. tit. de senat. consult. Pegasiano.

The lex Falcidia, might be made inoperative, Ist. By the express
declaration of the testator, that it shall be so. Authent. sed cum testat.
Cod. h.t. from novel. 1. 2ndly, When the heir acted without an inven-
tory, for then it is to be presumed that he knew the Falcidian defalcation
would be unnecessary. 3dly, When the heir pays all the legacies with
knowledge, that the Falcidian law might have been brought to bear upon
them.

Tit. XXIII. De fidei commissariis hereditatibus, p. 176. Trusts
are universal or particular: universal, when the estate, or some portion
of it is charged: particular, when the heir or some legatee is charged in
favour of the person to be benefitted by the trust. The present title re-

lates to universal, the next to particular trusts.
[ *534 ] *§$ 1. Origo fider commissorum, p. 176. Cod. de delat. 1.

1. Dig de legat.1.1.103. Dig. 284 Ulp. in frag. tit. 25, §
1. Dig. 50. 16. 178. 2. juncto Quintiliano, lib. 3. Inst. orat. ch. 6.
Justinian puts legacies and trusts on the same footing. Cod. commun.
de legat. 1.1. And this he was induced to do from the complexity and
difficulties of the practice under the senatus consulta Trebellianum, in
the reign of Mero, and Pegasium, in the reign of Vespasian. By the
first, the instituted heir being indemnified, gave up to the person to whom
the trust was bequeathed, either a part or the whole of the heirship, ac-
cording to the nature and extent of the trust created. So that the Pretor
gave to the cestui que trust, all the actual rights and privileges of an
heir, with a power to commence suits, and liability to actions in that ca-
pacity: and the instituted heir was discharged either in whole, ‘or pro
tanto according to his renunciation. He was thus released from loss,
but was entitled to no recompence. Hence the senatusconsultum Pega-
sianum was enacted, by which two points were established, 1st, the heir
might act if he pleased and retain his fourth: and 2ndly, if he did not
choose to act, he might, on request made by his universal fidei commis-
NOTES. 539.

sary, or cestui que trust, and at his risk, be compelled to take it and per-
form the duties: the fidei commissary bearing all the expences. In this
case the heir was not entitled to his fourth. This alteration again brought
into play the stipulations empte et venditee hereditatis between the heir
and the fidei commissary. Dig. 15. 1.37. Dig. 50.16. 59.1. And
also the stipulation partis et pro-parte, where there was a partial trust
of the heirship. See the Jurisconsult Paul. lib. 4. sentent. tit.3. Ul-+
pian in fragm. tit. 26. and the paraphrase of Theophilus on this title.

The stipulation partis et pro parte took place between the fidei com-
missary and the heir, when the latter acted under the senatus consultum
Trebellianum, and took his remuneration of a fourth, or as it might hap-
pen to be. The stipulation empte et vendite hereditatis took place when
the proceedings were under the senatus consultum Trebellianum, and
the whole duties and privileges fell on the fidei commissary. These stip-
ulations indeed were in use before the senatus consultum Trebellianum,
but were brought up again by the senatus consultum Pegasianum.

Under these senatus consulta, the heir had his action of warranty
against the fidei commissary er stipulatu. But this occasioned so much
controversy, that it gave rise to the ordinance of Justinian hereafter to
be noticed under section 7 of this title.

§ 2. De fidet commisso heredis scripti, p. 177. Vel pure,
vel subconditione, Sc. *This might be done in case of a [ *535 ]
trust, because the heir nominally instituted, was sufficient to -
support the will. :

Heres instituatur. In England, the appointment of an executor, is
as essential to a will, as the appointment of anheir under the Roman
law. A will without an executor, will render necessary an administra-
tion cum testamento annexo. Swinburne, part 4. sect. 2.

No particular form of words are required to create a trust in a will.
I will, I desire, I request, &c. are imperative. Sce the note to Vandycke
y. Vanbeuren, 1 Caine’s N. York Rep. 85.

§ 4. Desenatusconsulto Trebelliano, p. 177, Utiles actiones, Inst. 4.6.16.

$5. De senatus consulto Pegasiano, p. 177.

Post quod senatus consultum ipse heres. | The best way to explain
this section, will be to transcribe a passage from the paraphrase of 'The-
ophilus, asit is translated by Gul. Otto Reitz; to whom the literary
world is much obliged, for his late most complete edition of Theophilus
in Greek and Latin, to which is added a great variety of notes by the
editor and others. This edition consists of two volumes in 4to. and
was published at the Hague, in the year 1751. ‘“ Post hoc autem heres
‘ solus subjacebat oneribus heereditatis, non vero fidei-commissarius :
“« sed denique placuit, fidei-commissarium vicem obtinere legatiaril par-
“ tiarii, id est, partem dimidiam accipientis. Quondam enim quintum

.
540 NOTES.

 

“genus legati-erat, dicebaturque partitio, et relinquebatur hoc modo:
“ Titius mihi heres esto, et cum Seio hereditatem dividito in dimidia
*¢ nortione. Porro igitur hujusmodi inter eos stipulationes fiebant. Ha-
“yes legatarium sic interrogabat ;—spondes, legatarie, si ego conventus
“ viginti aureos solvero, eorum mihi semissem dare? et dicebat, spon-
“ deo. Rursusque legatarius heredem sic interrogabat;—spondes, si ab
“ hereditario debitore viginti aureos acceperis, semissem mihi dare, i. e.
“ decem? et dicebat, spondeo: atque hec stipulatio vocabatur Partis er
“ pro parte. Ad exemplum igitur legatarii partiarii stipulatio procede-
“ bat hxredem inter et fidei-commissarium: et interrogabat heres fidei-
* eommissarium sic ; spondes, fidei-commissarie, si yuadraginta au-
* reos poscar a creditore hereditario, dare mihi triginta? et heeres inter-
 yogabatur a fidei-commissario; spondes, heres, si a debitore heredita-
“ rio quadraginta aureos acceperis, triginta mihi dare? et dicebat, spon-
deo. Atque hoc modo fidei-commissarius universalis vicem obtinebat
 legatarii: oportebatque commune esse pro rata, fidei-commissarium in-
‘* ter et heeredem, lucrum et damnum.” Theoph. h. t. Harris.
[ *536 ] *$ 6. Quibus casibus locus est senatus consulto, §c. p.
179. See 2 Black. Comm. p. 328.

$7. Pegasiani in Trebellianum, transfusio, p. 180. Justinian hav-
ing thus blended the two senatus consulta, it followed, 1st, that although
the heir was required to give up to the fidei commissary an heirship but-
thened with trust legacies beyond the dodrans or three fourths, still the
heir might retain his fourth, improperly called the Quartum Trebellia-
num: for it was the Falcidian fourth extended to trusts, not by the Tre-
bellian, but the Pegasian senatus consultum. 2ndly, All actions were
divided in proportion to their shares: if the nominated or instituted heir
retained his fourth, he bore one fourth of the expence: if he restored the
whole heirship to the fidei commissary he bore no-part. 3rdly, If he re-
fused to take upon himself the duties of the heirship, he might be com-
pelled so to do, on being indemnified by the fidei commissary.

Quam in fidei-commissarium.] 'The term cestui que trust, used at
present in our own law, seems in general to convey the meaning of the
word fidei-commissarius ; but yet not precisely : it was therefore thought
most proper to anglicise it in the translation, as we have no single Eng-
lish word, adequate to the sense of it: fora fidei-commissary, in the
Roman law, denotes a person, who has a beneficial interest in an estate,
which for a time is committed to the faith or trust of another. Harris.

§ 10. De fidei commissis ab intestato relictis, p. 183. Cum alioqui le-
gata. That is, according to the former law: for by the law of Justini-
an, Cod. 6. 43. which puts legacies and trusts on the same footing, a le-
gacy bequeathed by codicil, or otherwise included in the present section
is good asa trust if not as a legacy.

 
NOTES. 5Al

$12. De probatione fidei-commissi, p. 183. De calumnia juraverit.
Cod. 6. 42. 32.

Tit, XXIV. De singulis rebus per fidei-commissum, p. 185. The
former title, as was observed, related to universal, the present relates to
particular trusts. But since the ordinance of Justinian, the distinction
is not of much import.

Quomvis a legatario.| This was the ancient law; but by Justinian’s
constitution [Cod. 6. t. 43.] legacies, and gifts in trust, are allowed to
come in aid of each other reciprocally : so that, to use the words of the
ordinance, omnia, que naturaliter insunt legatis, et fidet commissis inhe-
‘rere intelligantur ; et contra, quicquid fidei committitur, hoc intelligatur
esse legatwin—from which it follows, that a legatary may now be charg-
ed with the payment of a legacy. Harris.

*§ 3. De verbis fidei commissorum, p. 186. See the above [ *537 ]
cited note to 1 Caines’s N. York Rep. 85. and the note to Doe
v. Aldridge, 4 Term Rep. 265.

Tit. X XV. Codicillorum origo, p. 187. Formerly codicils made be-
fore a will were void. After trusts began to be favoured, they were
considered as sufficient to support a trust; if not actually repealed by a
subsequent will. But when Justinian put legacies and trusts on the
same footing, either the one or the other might be given by a codicil
whether before or after a will, or by an intestate. But the institution of
an heir can only be by will.

Codicillorum jus.| The word codicillus, or codicil, js a diminutive
from codex, a book; and denotes any unsolemn last will, in which no heir
or executor is named. ‘Codicilli dicti sunt parvi codices; id est, tabel-
“le ex codicibus aut lingo. Itaque, quemadmodum testamentum coder,
“ appellatur,

: “* Codice sevo

“: Heeredes vetat esse suios, gc. Juv. Sat. 10. quia testamentum in
“godicibus tantum scribebatur, sive tabulis grandioribus, ita voluntas
‘““suprema, minus solemnis aut plena, codicilli, et aliquando numero
“ynitatis codicillus ; propterea quod scribi solita erat in codicillis, id est,
“tabulis brevioribus et tenuioribus, ita factis, ut facile quo cuique com-
‘“modum esset, circumferri possent. Heineccio autem judice, codicil
‘“apud veteres sunt epistolae vel scripture ad alios misse: quia ergo
“eodicilli plerumque perscribebantur in forma epistolarum, hinc et no-
‘men retinuerunt.” Vinn.

$ 1. Codicilli fieri possunt, vel ante, vel post, Sc. p. 188.

Non tantum testamentum.| ‘It is granted of all, [says Swinburne]
“that a codicil may be made either by him, who died intestate, or by
“him, who died with a testament. If the codicil is made by a person,
‘who dies intestate, the legacies therein must be paid by him, who shall

©
542 NOTES. re

“have the administration of the goods of the deceased, with the codicil
“Cor testamentary schedule annexed. And, if a codicil is made by him,
‘who hath also made a regular testament, then, whether it was made
‘before or after the testament, it is to be reputed as part and parcel of
“the testament, and it is to be performed as well as the testament; un-
“less, being made before the testament, it appears to be revoked by the
“testament, or to be contrary to that, which is contained in the testa-
“ment.”  Swtn. part. 1. sec. 5.

“Codicilli et ab intestate confici possunt, et facto testameuto. Ab
‘“‘intestato facti suis ipsis viribus nituntur et vicem testamenti exhibent:

“ proinde quicunque intestati successor erit, sive legitimus,sive
[ *538 ] *“‘honorarius etiam postea natus, codicillis relicata prestabit.

“Testamento autem condicto, codicilli, quocunque tempore
“facti-fuerint, ad testamentum pertinent, viresque ex eo capiunt, etiamsi
‘in eo confirmati non sint; et infirmato testamento codicilli concidunt.
“‘Tllud vero interest inter codicillos testamento nominatim confirmatos et
“non confirmatos, quod illis relicta etiam directo jure valent, veluti lega-
“ta et libertates directo date; perindeque omnia habeantur, ac si m tes-
“tamento scripta essent, excepta causa hereditatis; at, que codicillis
“non confirmatis relicta sunt, sive verbis‘directis sive precariis, debentur
‘jure fidei-commissi. Sed non est, quod de his amplius dicamus; cum
‘enim confusa nunc sit legatorum et fidei-commissorum natura, dubit-
‘‘andum non est, quin legata, codicillis etiam non confirmatis data di-
“recto, nunc vajeant.” Vinn.

§ 2. Codicillis hwreditas directo dari non potest, p. 153.

But it can be given indirectly: as if a testator by codicil, charges his
testamentary heirs to renounce in favour of the fidei-commissary of his
codicil: Dig. de hered. inst. 77. Dig. de condit. instit. 10. And in one
case there may be a direct substitution by codicil, as in Dig. ad senat.
consult. Trebell. 76, where a direct pupillary substitution is converted
into a trust benignainterpretatione. Heirship then, as it cannot regular-
ly be given, cannot be taken away by codicil, which does not suffice for
disinherison direct or conditional.

Codicillis autem hereditas. Groenewegen, in his book of abrogated laws,
says, that the distinctions between testaments and codicils have now
ceased to be observed almost every where. Handem enim or ordina-
tionis solemnitatem requirunt, atque ita suprema Hollandie curia censuit ;
et confusis eorum nominibus heredi institutionem ad substantiam testa-
menti necessariam esse negant pragmatici ; hine quoque codicillis heredi-
tatem directo dari et adimi, ideoque et exhwredationem scribi, moribus
nostris nil vetat. Gyroenew. de ll. abr. in Inst. 2. t. 21.

In England the appointment of an executor makes the only difference
between a testament and a codicil; and this difference is little more than
NOTES. 543

 

~ nominal; for whatever may be done by the one, may be also done by the
other; so that a condition may be imposed, an estate may be given, or
an heir disinherited, as well by codicil as by testament; and even lands
may be disposed of by a codicil, if it is signed by the deceased, and at-
tested by three witnesses in his presence, though the deceased left no
testament; (for a codicil, in its true sense, denotes any testamentary
schedule, anid may stand singly, without relation to any other paper;)
and, even where there is a testament, disposing of real estate, that testa~
ment may be altered or revoked by a codicil properly *exe-
cuted. And, where personal estate only is bequeathed, the [ *539 ]
same degree of proof, (and it has already been said what de-
gree of proof is sufficient,) will establish either a testament or a codicil;
and the one may revoke or confirm the other, either wholly or in part,
according to its respective contents. Harris.

$ 3. De numero et solemnitate, p. 189.

A will, by the Roman law, is revoked by a subsequent will: a codicil
is not revoked by a subsequent codicil. Hence there may be many va-
lid codicils if they be not contradictory. A will is necessary to an heir,
and an heir to a will, but it is not so with a codicil. The latter also re- _
quired fewer ceremonies than a will. But a woman could ot witness a
codicil any more than a will.

Nullam solemnitatem. When it is said, that no solemnity is required
in making a codicil, the compilers of the institutions must be understood
to mean no extraordinary solemnity, as that of bringing seven witnesses
to subscribe it, as in case of a testament: for it is necessary by the civil
law, that a codicil should be supported by five witnesses: Cod. 6. t. 36.
1. 8, which is the ordinary number required to attest several other trans-
lations. Cod. 4. t. 20. 1.28. But, in England, there is in this respect no
distinction between a testament and a codicil; for either may be sup-
ported by an equal number of witnesses: two are regularly requir-
ed to a testament, and the same number is also required to a codicil;
but, if either a testament or a codicil, contains a devise of a real estate,
three witnesses are indispensably necessary by act of parliament. Vid.
29 Car. 2. cap. 3. Harris.

Lr. lik = itul. E De hereditatibus, que ab intestato deferantur, p.
191.

The preceding book treats of Wills: the present of Intestacies ; and
the order of Succession, in cases where a man dies leaving property, but
no will.

The 118th Novel, which still remains a part of the law of England on
this subject, in cases not otherwise decided or provided for, has altered
the doctrine laid down in this book of the Institutes; so that a brief his-
tory of the changes which the Roman law has undergone on the subject

 
y

544 NOTES.

 

of successions ab intestato, will be more than expedient. Jam chiefly
indebted for the present preliminary remarks, to those which Ferriere
has prefixed to the third book of the Institutes.

By the law of the 12 tables, there were but two classes of legitimate
heirs: sui heeredes, or proper heirs, and agnati, or paternal heirs, last

succeeding only in default of the others.
[ *od0 | *A suus heres, was required to be a descendant in the
first degree from the intestate in a direct line, and to have
been in the power of the intestate, at the time of his decease; hence the
children of a deceased son who shared with the uncle, were swi heredes
to the uncle by representation only. $ de heredit. que ab intest. defer.

The preetors and the emperors altered the law of the twelve tables.
The preetors called to the succession emancipated children per bonorum
possessionem unde liberi, on condition that they brought into hotchpot the
property acquired during emancipation ; so that the whole might be sub-
ject to an equal division among all the children of the deceased. $9
cod tit.

The imperial constitutions placed the children of deceased daughters
in the rank of proper heirs, on condition that when they shared with
proper heirs, they should take one third part less, and when with agna-
tes, a fourth part less. $ ult. ibid.

In default of proper heirs, agnates or collaterals on the male side,
were called: as consanguine brothers, (born of the same father) pater-
nal uncles and grand uncles, and their children, and other descendants
of the paternal line, who had not quitted the ‘amily by any change
of state.

Hence, in defect of proper heirs, the law of the twelve tables called
the nearest agnate to the succession, without distinction of sex: herein
observing, that there was no right of representation among agnates, but
the nearest excluded all the rest; and also, that if the nearest agnate re-
nounced, the succession did not go to the next in order, but escheated to
the treasury.

The jurisprudence of the middle age, retrenched from the disposition
of the 12 tables, excluding all females from the succession, except sis-
ters, and preferring more distant males. Vid. Vinn. $ 3. de legitima ag-
nat. success,

As the law of the 12 tables called up the nearest agnate only, if there
were none such; or he renounced, the property escheated. But the pra-
torian law, moderated this rigour, and in these last mentioned cases, ad-
mitted the nearest cognates per bonorum possessionem, unde cognati:
and still further, in defect of agnates and cognates, the husband or wife
surviving, succeeded to the exclusion of the treasury, per bonorum pos-
sessionem unde vir et uxor.
NOTES. B45

According to the above account, the father was not considered as ag-
nate to his emancipated son; but Justinian by the last law of Cod. de
emancip. liber. disregarded the circumstance of emancipation. Also the
mother could not rank with the agnates of the son, nor the
*daughter with the agnates of the mother; but the praetor [ *541 ]
admitted them reciprocally to succession ex ordine cognato-
rum puta per bonorum possessionem unde cognati. But by the Senatus
Consultum Trebellianum, a mother of several children was ranked in
the first degree of assignation to herson, in default of Ist, proper heirs
of the deceased : 2ndly, the father of a deceased son or daughter: 3rdly,
the consanguine brother of the deceased, i. e. by the same father: the
mother was admitted jointly with a consanguine sister, (a sister by the
same father) ; but this underwent some changes, which will be noted.

Finally, by the orphitian Senatus Consultum, under Marcus Aure-
lius, the sons and daughters of a mother, were preferred to all the ag-
nates of the mother, without excepting even brothers born of the same
fathers.

These Senatus Consulta, regarded also the claims of children born out
of wedlock.

These remarks relate to the five first titles of the present Book of the
Institutes.

We come next to succession in cases of Intestacy, under the 118th
Novel, which establishes three degrees of legitimate succession, descend-
ants, ascendants, and collaterals. And first of Descendants.

‘It calls to the succession all legitimate children without distinction ; so
that sons and daughters, grand-sons and grand-daughters exclude uncles
or others in the ascending line, except as to the property acquired by the
deceased for the father by virtue of the paternal power: for the usu-
fruct granted to the father of certain property acquired by and belong-
ing to the son, was preserved to the father. Without considering also
any difference of state or quality of such children, whether under power
or not at the death of the deceased; without regard to difference of sex
or age, and of course neglecting all consideration of primogeniture.
Without regard also, whether the descendants claimed from the male or
female side, and without consideration of degree; enquiring only, whe-
there they were in the direct line descending.

This Novel altered the former law in the following points.

1st. In making no difference, whether the deceased were under power
as a filius familias, emancipated, or pater familias, at the time of his de-
cease : under the previous law, the uncle succeeded to an intestate filius
familias, in-exclusion of the children, except in military and quasi mili-
tary property ; peculiam castrense et quasi castrense ; as the Institute re-
marks in the title Quibus non est permissum facere testamentum: and

69
646 NOTES.

 

all adventitious property belonged by right of peculium to
[ *542 ] *the father of the deceased, though he left children. This

Novel, cut off the claim of the uncle except as to the mere
usufruct of adventitious property.

Zndly. In admitting to equal participation, male and female children
without distinction: though. this change, as to emancipated children,
consisted in making this admission a part of the civil law instead of the
pretorian law, which admitted them per bonorum possessionem unde li-
beri cum onere collationis.

3rdly. In admitting equally descendants -from the intestate, whether
in the male or female line; and taking away the diminution of share
before required from the latter, when they were called in conjunction
with proper heirs: and directing this succession to be, not per capita but
per stirpes.

As to-the fourth and last point, the admission of descendants without,
regarding the prerogative of degree; this does not differ from the former
practice respecting the legitimate succession of descendants. The right
of children to represent or stand in the place of their deceased parent,
having been allowed before that Novel was enacted.

As to the right of representation, which was never limited in the di-
rect line, it may be observed,

Ist, That the children of one who has renounced the succession to his
father, or been disinherited, could not succeed to the uncle, who left chil-
dren of the first degree, or grand-children from a child deceased: for
this right of representation is derived through the father, where it is cut
off. But when the uncle leaves no children or grand-children, then the
nephews and nieces do not succeed in the right of their father, but their
own. 2ndly, ‘The children of a person civiliter mortuus succeed to an
uncle, although they share with their uncles and aunts in the succes-
sion. Dig. 1.6.7. 3rdly, Children in the first degree succeed to equal
portions.

-The next chapter of the 118th Novel, relates to the succession of As-
cendants, and embraces two cases. Ist, whete fathers and mothers alone
succeed to their children. 2ndly, Where the deceased hath left relations
in the ascending line, with brothers and sisters of the whole blood, or
connected by each side: ex utriusque parentibus conjuncti.

As to the first case. ‘Pathers and mothers and all ascendants, exclude
all collaterals, except brothers and sisters; although such oollesterals may
be in a nearer degree: partly in Gonaidaravion that they gave existence
to the deceased; partly from considerations of natural reverence ( pieta-

tis intuitu ;) and partly as some consolation for the loss. The
{ *543 ] paternal ascendants were preferred by the Trebellian *senatus
consult; but by this Novel, ascendants on the one side and
NOTES. 547

 

the other were equally admitted. If there was a father only, or a mo-
ther only, such would succeed in exclusion of an ascendant in a more
distant degree. Also, if there were no fathers or mothers, but several
ascendants in equal degree, the property wag not therefore always equal-
ly divided between them: but one half was given to the ascendants be-
ing representatives of the father, whatever their number, and the other
half to the ascendants representing the mother. For had father and
mother been living, they would have succeeded equally. Thus an un-
cle on the father’s side, will take as much as an uncle and an aunt to-
gether on the maternal side. ‘

Hence where succession is regulated by this chapter of the Novel, no
distinction it made between property that came by the father’s side or
by the mother’s: and the rule paierna paternis, materna maternis does
not hold: but a maternal uncle will succeed to property descended
from or bestowed by the father, equally with an uncle on the paternal
side.

Nor is difference of sex regarded under this rule of succession.

As to the second case under this second chapter, where ascendant
relations concur with brothers and sisters of the whole blood, they suc-
ceed with them per capita: and it is only brothers and sisters thus doub-
ly connected, on each side, that do partake with near ascendants, excep-
tis inquit Justinianus solis fratribus ex utroque parente conjunctis. The
father in this case acquiring his own proportion in full right, cannot claim
the usufruct of his children’s portion. But when there is no father or
mother, brothers and sisters do not exclude uncles or aunts or other as-
cendants in default of uncles and aunts, but concur with, or partake in
the succession with them, per capita.

Suppose three brothers of the deceased; an uncle and aunt on the pa-
ternal side; and an uncle on the maternal side; each brother will have
a sixth; the paternal uncle and aunt a sixth and a half between them,
and the ascendants the other half between them.

Ascendants a second or third degree distant, exclude brothers and sis-
ters connected on one side only, or the half blood. ‘This is a conclusion
from the passage of the text s¢ vero eum ascendentibus taventuntur fratres
et sorores ex utitusque parentibus conjunetis (of the whole blood) cum-
proximis gradu ascendentibus vocabantur. Of course, if these only are
called, the half blood are not called. ,

According to this second chapter of the 118th Novel, nephews of the
whole blood, do not partake with ascendants, when the father of the de-
ceased is dead, although there should be brothers of the
whole *blood. This however was changed by the firstchap- [ *544 ]
ter of the 127th Novel, which enacted that when there were
brothers of the whole blood, the nephews of the whole blood might be

 
548 NOTES.

 

admitted to concur with such brothers and with ascendants. But as
they come in only as representing their father, they take not per capita
but per stirpes; and succeed to that portion only which their father
would have claimed, if he had been alive.

As to the third chapter of the 118th Novel on the succession of Col-
laterals.

1st, If the deceased leave neither descendants nor ascendants, the suc-
cession falls to his brothers and sisters of the whole blood, in exclusion
of the half blood. See Nov. 84. But in case of brothers and sisters of
the half blood only, they are admitted to equal shares. >

2ndly, Nephews of the whole blood succeed with their own uncles
and aunts of the whole blood (germani:) but by stock only per stirpes :
for they succeed solely as representatives of their parent.

8rdly, Nephews of the whole blood, exclude those of the half blood,
as a brother of the whole blood would exclude nephews and nieces of
the half blood.

Athly, Nephews exclude uncles and aunts of the deceased, though
each are in the third degree. Filit fratrum in hoc casu  representationis
jure finguntur esse in gradu secundo, et sie patruos excludunt. On the
principle also, that collateral descending, should be preferred to collate-

ral ascending relations; quia hereditas naturaliter descendit potius quam
ascendit.

5thly, If the deceased left neithér brothers oor sisters, nephews or
nieces, the other collateral relations are admitted in the order and degree
of their relationship, without regard to sex. The ancient difference be-
tween agnation and cognation in this respect being abrogated by the 4th
chap. of this Novel.

The right of representation granted by this third chapter of the 118th
Novel to nephews and nieces, and to no other collaterals, takes place in
the three following cases only.

Ist, When nephews and nieces concur or share with a brother ot sis-
ter of their deceased uncle or aunt: in this case they succeed per stirpes.
The former law admitted a right of representation among collaterals, in
no case. See § 4 of Instit. de legitim. agnat. success. This being in

‘fact a new law, was construed strictly. Hence, when nephews of dif-
ferent brothers and sisters succeeded to their uncle or aunt who had left
neither brother or sister, the division was made per capita, and not per

stirpes.
[ *545 ] *And as itis usually held, representation does not take
place in the collateral line, unless in favour of the children
of brothers and sisters, when they share in the succession with their
uncle or aunt, the brother and sister of the deceased.

2dly, Representation takes place when the nephews of the whole
NOTES. 549

 

blood, are preferred to brothers and sisters of the half blood: which
could not take place but by representation ; for a nephew is in the third
degree, and brothers and sisters in the second.

3dly, When there is an uncle and a nephew of the deceased. Hence
by the 3rd chap. of the 118th Novel, Justinian would have the nephew
exclude the uncle, which could only be done under the privilege of
representation, which brings the nephew a degree nearer than the great
uncle, who is but uncle to the deceased. This also is an innovation on
the former law.

Tne preference of the whole blood, isa privilege accorded by this
Novel, to certain collateral relations, and no doubt a reasonable one.
Duplex enim vinculum quod est in fratre germano fortius est unico ilo
quod intercedit inter fratres consanguineos aut uterinos. The fourth
chapter takes away the distinction between agnates and cognates.
When an unmarried person dies without relations ascending, descend-
ing, or collateral, his property escheats to the public treasury. Buta
legitimate unbroken marriage, protects the succession to the survivor.
This privilege of the Exchequer or public treasury proceeds from the
want of an heir, Cod. 10.10.1.4. Creditors in this case have a lien.
on the property. Dig. 49. 14.11. If the deceased died a member of
any lawful company or college, that shall succeed before the exchequer.
Cod. 6. 62. t.

Succession being not a natural but a civil right, varies in almost eve-
ry country. The rule paterna paternis, materna maternis, was adopted
in France, Loix civiles. Tom. 3 pref. § 4..and in England 1 Co.
Litt 13. a. :

So in England, the whole blood universally excludes the half blood,
and succession ascending by right line takes place in no instance. It is
of little consequence what regulations society adopts on this subject,
provided they be clear, and of easy application. The variation in Eng-
land dependant upon feudal principles whose reason has long ago ceas-
ed to operate—and upon the right of primogeniture which, in this coun-
try, we have discarded, still gives a perceptible tinge to much of the
law of descent and succession on this continent. Though it must be
allowed that the statute of distributions of this state, is founded as
much on principles of natural equity, as can reasonably be
expected. *For common cases, the state of Pennsylvania [ *546 ]
has made as fair and judicious a will, as men usually make
for themselves.

The 118th Novel will be found at the end of the text, and I shall in-
sert at the close of this note, a translation of those sections of it, that
bear immediately on the present subject.

In the mean time, however, I am strongly tempted to insert. the fol-
550 , NOTES.

 

 

lowing entertaining and useful remarks of Dr. Taylor (Civ. Law, p
537.) on the subject of succession ab intestato : an author, who, thougl
he may be desultory and immethodical, as Gibbon complains he is, pre-
sents his reader notwithstanding, with notes of great learning, grea’
taste, and great instruction.

“The succession into the estates of intestates is one of the most un-
certain ‘points of law. Icall it uncertain, Ist, because there are nol
found perhaps two nations. upon earth, that have fixed upon the same
method of conveyance: and 2dly, because there is scarce one, but what
has at some time or other differed even from itself. With the Romans
particularly, the distribution, which prevailed for some time, took a dif-
ferent turn, even while the ‘Emperoe was compiling his body of Law,
and the system of the Novels (the CXVIHth particularly) entirely de-
feats the doctrine laid down in several titles of the third Book of the
Institutes, where that matter was considered, and meant to be establish-
ed. With the Novels it was settled.

To contemplate therefore this question, the stream of nature conducts
us first to view succession in the order of :

Descendants. 'This was the natural course, and the general direction
of Providence. And be it observed, that Natural Law is said by some
to be interested no farther, that in the succession of those, who claim
from under us: and that Ascendants and collaterals are called in by Civ-
ilLaw. Which yet by others is denied, and, I think, with sufficient
reason. However the primary distribution of nature is very apparent.

Cum Ratio Naturalis, quasi Lex quacdam tacita, liberis parentium he-
reditatem addiceret velut ad debitam successionem eos vocando, propter quod
et in Jure Civili suorum heredem nomen eis inductum est, ac ne judicio
parentis, nist meritis de sausis summovert ab ea successione possunt. D.
48. 20. 7.

The great rule of succession among the Romans, in the method which
lies before us, viz. the succession of descendants, is comprised in these
few reflections; Z%at (1) descendants, while they last, exclude all other
relations whatsoever: That (2) there is no respect had to primoge-

niture, and (3) no preference in regard to sex: That there
[ *547 ] *is (4) no exclusion of any ever so remote degree: and last-

ly (5) That the estate of the intestate makes so many gene-
ral shares, as that there are distinct heads in his immediate descend-
ants.

I. For, as this downward direction was the primary and principal re-
commendation of natural law, it followed, that inheritances could never
revert, or be thrown upwards (inter Ascendentes), nor be turned aside
(inter Collaterales), as long as any were to be found in the line below, or
that of descendants, tn infinitum. For the principle, upon which this
NOTES. 551

 

succession rested, was the Jus Repraesentationis, which cannot be fairly
or reasonably imagined in any other line than in that, to which we give
existence. There is something of successive in the idea of representa-
tion, something which looks like keeping up an order or a series; and
though to brothers it may be applied in some sense, to fathers and
grandfathers it can be applied in little or none.

Il. IL. The second and third particulars, viz. the disregard of sex and
primogeniture, in which these people differed from most others, as well be-
fore, as after them, are of that arbitrary consideration, that little remains
to be observed upon that disposition. But natural equity has a great
stroke in the two last, and calls for some regard:

IV. V. That descendants of the second, third or fourth degree, should
be raised to a kind of level with those of the first, and not stand ex-
cluded, even while some of the first remain: That children of a remote
descent should inherit along with the immediate one (I suppose the way
cleared before them) is agreeable to truth and justice. The grandchild-
ren etc. of Sempronius by a son that is gone, stand to Sempronius in the
place of that son. They would have had their shares ¢hrowgh that fa-
ther, if he had lived; and represent him therefore, or succeed to his
rights, now he is removed.

And hence, because many children may succeed into one father’s
rights, it follows, that the Jus Repraesentationis, which transmits the
estate of Sempronius to his immediate descendauts, shall undergo a con-
siderable alteration in those descents or generations that follow after.
Though Sempronius may be represented by any number of children in-
differently and cut into so many shares accordingly, yet will each of
those children be represented by their whole families; not by so many
distinct heads of children, as Sempronius was, but by all their children
collectively (let their number be what it will) laying, as it were, their
heads together to form one common stock. For all those grandchildren
gregatim, have that right in common, not separate to each
*which their father had to himself. And this is called swcces- [ *548 |
sio in stirpes: the other when all share alike, in Capita.

Thus in the scheme, :

A

— SS

B Cc
—Se oe
D. E

The estate of Sempronius A will be divided into two equal parts, and B
and C will each be heirs er semisse. But supposing that C is gone be-
fore his father, then shall B still be heres ex semisse, and D and E ex
quadrante, each. Or put the case

/
552 NOTES.

 

A.
SS
B C.
Set
D. E
eo”.
F. G. H

that C and D should both be gone, and D be represented by F G and H
then will B as before be heres ex semisse, E ex quadrante, and F O and
H will succeed each of them ex uncia. Or put the case, that E is dead,
without issue also, then will F, G, and H, be each of them heres ex sexz-
zante.

But, taking leave of descendants, supposing that)Sempronius dies in~
testate, without heirs of his body, we are then directed to the consider-
ration of

Ascendants, Though this may be against natural order, it is not
against natural affection. And I think therefore that doctrine is not to be
admitted, which maintains, that parents have no right to the goods of
their children, dying childless and intestate, unless they had been re-
lieved by the civil law. We have seen what title the indigent father
has to a maintenance, and the same way of reasoning will serve in the
one case as well as the other. See Gothofred. ad Nov. 1 Praef $ 2.

And when St. Paul said, 2 Cor. XII. 14. The children ought not to
lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children, it is spoken with
a view to the ordinary course of providence. It is the rule, without
regard to the exception.

But I observed, that this is up the stream, and against the common
order of succession. And the ancients always gave it that melancholy
consideration. We find it a constant matter of complaint in their fu-

neral sorrows, when such calamities befell them. Turbato
[ *549 ] ordine mortalitatis—*parentes filio contra -ordinem—et quod

miserrimum est mater fecit filiae—ordine retrogado defuncto
—parentes male ivdicantibus fatis supertites—memoriam posuerunt con-
tra votum—quod filius patri facere debuerat ipse fecit—aequivs enim fu-
erat vos hoc mihi fecisse—quae prior debui mori DCLXXXVI. 9—are
the common expressions upon the occasion.

To give these considerations some little attention :

This is the language of the Poet Ovid. 1. Heriod. 101.

Di precor hoc jubeant, ut, euntibus ordine fatis,
Lile meos oculos comprimat, ille tuos.
And of the lawyer also: D. 5, 2. 15. pr.
Nam etsi parentibus non debetur filiorum hereditas, propter vetum
parentium, et naturalem erga filios caritatem, turbato tamen
NOTES, 553

 

ordine mortalitatis, non minus parentibus, quam liberis pie re-
lingui debet.
Thus the inscriptions:
ANTONINUS SEVERUS AQUILA HIC JACET
SINE ANIMA MISERABILI FATO QUI VIXIT
ANNOS BISSENOS ET SEX MENSES CUI VOTA
ERANT UT PARENTIBUS ISTA PARARET
SET MORS IMMATURA FECIT UT FACERENT
PARENTES FILIO CONTRA ORDINEM.
Gruter. DCOXLIX. 4.

Another remarkable expression is contra votum, as we have just seen
from Papinian, D. 5. 2. 15. pr. Add. 29. 4. 26. 1.—38. 6. 7. 1—38. 2. 50.
2. And so the inscriptions run.

MOTARIAE P. F. PIISS.

MASCELLIO F. FELIX ET

TUTATIA CRISPINA

FILIO DULCISSIMO

MEMORIAM POSUERUNT

CONTRA VOTUM. Gruter. DCXCVL 10.
Thus we read in Plutarch in Vita Catonis Maj.

Htste wytng KATAPAN, ex EYXHN yyeitae 16, tetov ume Ans amohiery,

Hujus, Mater, exsecrationem, non votum, duxit, ipsum superstitem re-
linquere.

And it is not to be doubted, but that, from this strain of affection, and
this parental superstition, that very word has gained its signification.

Qui totos dies precabantur, et immolubant, ut sui sibi libert supersti-

tes essent, superstitiosi sunt appellati, quod nomen postea latius pa-
éuit Cic. II. de N. D. 28.

*L. SPERATI DESIDERATI ADULESCEN [ *550 ]
TIS SPEI ET PIETATIS INCOMPARABI
LIS SPERATI HERMODORUS ET IVLIA
NA PATRES MALE INDICANTIBUS
FATIS SUPERSTITES POSUERUNT. Gruter. DCCVII. 5.
Non est ignotum, qualem te in personum patris tui gesséris: quem non
minus quam liberos dilexisti: excepto eo, quod non optabas super-
stitem Senec. de Consolat. ad Marciam. init.
Flautus begins his Asinaria with a memorable passage:
Sicut tuum vis unicum gnatum tus
Superesse vite, sospitem et saperstitem !
Ita te obtestor, per senectutem tuam.
Perque illam, quam tu metuis, uxorem tuam,
Siquid med erga tu hodie falsum dixeris,
Ut tibi superstes uxor etaiem siet,
Atque illa viva vivus ut ie oppetas.
554 NOTES.

 

The superstition in this passage, between the case of the son, and of the
wife, is considerably different.

And lastly, this leads me to recommend a new word to the Lexicons,
(I do not recommend the age of it):

M.L. FLORUS M. FL. F. M. L. FL. PRONEPOS INFELI

CISS. PARENS AFFLIGTUS PRAEPOSTERITAE

NAT. HV. FILLIUM VN. H. COND. QUEM IMPORTUNA

MORS ADEMIT PRAEREPSITQUE SENII BACULUM

CUI JAM DEFESSA AETAS ADNITENS PERBREVES

ANNOS SS. ALLEVABAT. HUNC, ANTE MORS ADSE-

QUITUR
QUAM TRISTES LACHRIMAE DESERVERINT |
NOTA POST. Gruter DCLXXXIV. 6.

Preposteritas is a very uncommon expression, and I believe a barbar-
ous one. But the idea it represents, is very suitable to our subject.

It is upon all these accounts, that the succession of the parent into the
estate of the child is always attended with these unfavourable expres-
sions, Luctuosa Hereditas, C. 6. 25.9. Luctuosa Portio, C. 3. 28. 28.
Triste Lucrum, C. 6. 59. 11. Durae Fortune solatium, C. 6. 56. 4.
Tristis Successio, Inst. 3. 3.2. And it was imagined by- lawyers to pass
in Orbitaiis solatium 'There isa law often quoted upon this occasion:

Non sie Parentibus Liberorwm, ut Liberis Parentium debetur Hereditas :
Parentesad bona liberorum Ratio miserationis admittit, liberos naturaesimul
et parentium commune votum. D. 38. 6. T. 1.

To settle therefore the rule of successions in Linea Ascendente, there

are two cases to be supposed possible.
[* 551 ] *I, Either there are no collaterals besides, II. or there are.
: I. If there are no collaterals, then the succession of the in-
testate’s estate, dying, as we suppose, childless, reverts in that melan-
choly order, we have been just observing, and-falls to his father and
mother, or to either of them surviving, to the exclusion of everybody
above.

For it must be observed, that here is no Jus repraesentationis ; which
Tobserved followed the order of nature and of blood, and is constantly
imagined downwards. ‘Therefore, contrary to what was found to be the
rule in descendants, here every nearer degree excludes the remoter, and
even the mother shall exclude the grandfather.

II. But if we suppose collaterals to be left along with ascendants, the
succession shall be divided. And put the case, that there is left a father
and mother, a brother and sister, all the four shall succeed in equal por-
tions. However, some caution is necessary to be observed, and these
tules are not to be forgotten:

(1). Collaterals never can exclude ascendants, even in the remotest
NOTES. 555

degree. For the preference is with the ascendants; and collaterals can
only share, not exclude. ;

(2) The collaterals that share with thedefendants must be brothers, or
brothers’ children at farthest. No one can be admitted to a dividend
beyond that degree. For, as before, the preference ig properly with the
ascendants; brothers were not called in till iate in law, viz. by the
CXVIIIth Novel, and brothers’ children still later, viz. by the CX X VIth.

(3) The succession of aScendants alone, of ascendants joined ‘with
brothers and sisters of the whole blood (for the half blood is excluded)
is, as was observed, in Captta: but the succession of brothers and sisters
children, in concurrence, is in Stirpes, because they represent their pa-
renti, and many may represent one.

The last consideration regards
Collaterals. And here we suppose, that no one is left either in the ascend-
ing or descending line whatever. I can imagine

1. Brothers and sisters alone.

2. Brothers and sisters together with brothers and sisters children.

3. Brothers and sisters children alone.

1. Brothers and sisters alone, of the whole blood, succeed in Capita,
to the exclusion of, the half blood,

2. Brothers and sisters children, concurring with brothers and sisters,
succeed in siirpes.

3. Nephews alone succeed in Capita, non in Stirpes: for they succeed
(now) in their own right, and not by representation.

*The half-blood succeeds for want of the whole blood, [ *552 ]

regularly and uniformly, in the manner of the whole blood.
And because the half-blood is called into the succession in failure of the
whole, it will follow, that a nephew of the half-blood shall exclude an
uncle of the whole. Because the uncle’s right only commences, when
representation ceases.

In a concurrence of half-blood, viz. when brothers, etc. by the father’s
side succeed along with brothers by the mother’s side, the rule of law is,
that they succeed separately into the goods of the separate sides: and
into the common goods in common.

If none of these are given, then the next relation indifferently, suc-
ceeds in order of proximity. For the Jus Repraesentationis is specific,
not general: it is extended to brother’s children, but goes no further.
Thus the uncle of the intestate would be excluded by the nephew, be-
cause the nephew by this right of representation is, as it were, in the
entail: But the uncle of the intestate would not be excluded by a son
of thatnephew. For the right of representation being now aie the
uncle is nearer in degree, than the brother’s grandson.
556 NOTES.

 

If there be two next kindred of equal degree, they are equally enti-
tled to the succession, whether on the father’s side, or on the mother’s and
succeed in capita. ,

These are the general principles of Justinian’s last regulation upon
this head. But in many of these distributious which stand so far re-
moved from natural right: where the stream of blood must run but cool
and languid: where it is impossible to balance the affection towards one
relation with the affection towards another, by principles of nature;
there, human invention has insinuated its assistance, and that is one
great reason of what I have observed above, viz. that no two nations
can ever be found that agree in these delicate circumstances.

In the English law again, a greatdeal depends upon the distinction
into real and personal estates, which the Roman law knew nothing of.
This was agreeable to the genius of our ancestors, who distributed their
lands in fee, and expected some emolument in return. As the Saxons
therefore were perpetually loading descents with services, and of conse-
quence were led to direct those descents where those services were likely
to be mvintained with rhe greatest vigor and advantage: This, I say, is
the fairest reason, and looks likely to be the true one, why the father can-
not succeed (in this kingdom) into the landed estate of his son. Be-
cause he cannot be supposed to be in a condition to perform the
service that is expected from it. It was one reason given in the feudal
law, for the exclusion of daughters. Quia Filie@ servitia prestare non

possunt.
[ *553. ] *I have here exhibited what I professed, viz. an account

how this distribution stood by civil law: I am sensible it de-
serves a fuller consideration, and it might be useful, to bring it into com-
parison with the distribution of other states, who have laid themselves
out upon the equity of assigning the order’ of successions; In which
some have been pretty successful. But of this hereafter; if that here-
after should ever come, when I shall be called upon to improve these ele-
ments into a system, and these institutes into a digest. Taylor.

NOVEL 118th.

Prerace: Declaring the provisions of former laws on this subject, con-
solidated and re-enacted in the present Novel, under the heads of the
succession of relations in the descending line; the succession of relations
in the ascending line: and the succession of collateral relations.

Cuap. 1. Of the succession of, descendants. .

Every relation of a deceased person in the (tight) line descending, of
whatever sex or degree, whether related by the father’s or by the moth-
er’s side, whether under power or free, is preferred to every relation in
the ascending line, or collateral. Although the deceased were himself
under power, yet his children, of whatever sex or degree, shall be pre-
NOTES. 55%

t

ferred to the parent under whose power the deceased was, in respect of
that property which, by our laws, was not acquired for the parent. For
the usufruct of such property we reserve to the parent; but with this
proviso, that if any such descendant should die leaving children, such
children or other descendant shall succeed in place of their proper parent,
whether they be under power of the deceased at the time of his death,
or not; taking in such case, that portion of the property of the deceased
intestate, which their own parent would have been entitled to, had he
been living; which succession our predecessors have denominated per
stirpes, or by stock. ($6. Inst. de heredit. ab intestato. 2Gaius8. $7.
Cod. de suis. 1.2.) In this order of succession we make no enquiry as
to the degree, but call up grand-children generally to the succession con-
currently with the sons and daughters of a son or a daughter previously
deceased; and this without consideration of sex, or whether they sprang
from the paternal or maternal side, whether they be free (sui juris,) or
still under power. Thus we have enacted as to descendants, and we
now proceed to ascendants. (N. B. By throwing aside all considera-
tions whether the claimants in succession sprang from the male or female
side, the old law was changed. Nov. 18. 4. ult.—Cod. de suis. 9. 13.
which is thus repealed. Inst. de heredit. ab intest. $ 4.—Cod. Theod.
de legit. hered.

*Cuap. 2. Of the succession of ascendants. [ *554 ]

If the deceased hath left no descendants, his father or
mother, or any other surviving relatives, in the right line ascending, shall
succeed in preference to all collaterals, except brothers of the whole blood,
as shall be noticed presently. If there be many ascendants, let the near-
est in degree be preferred, whether male or female, whether descended
from the paternal or maternal line. If there be many in the same dc-
gree, let the inheritance be equally divided between them, so as that the
heirs on the paternal side, however numerous, shail receive the one half,
and those on the maternal side the other half. Should there be brothers
and sisters of the deceased living, connected with him by descent from both
parents,* as well as ascendant relations, let them be concurrently called to
the succession. If the ascendants should be father or mother, let the in-
heritance be divided between them and brothers (and sisters) that each
shall have an equal part. Nor shall the parent claim an usufruct of the
portion assigned to the brothers and sisters,+ for in lieu thereof we have

 

* aupOalers adekpot brothers of the whole blood: germant. ouonatgie by
the. some father; consanguinet [and sometimes improperly germani.]
ououyteroe by the same mother, wterinz.

+ This repeals Cod. de legitim. heredit. 1. 13. and Cad. com. success. |.
ult. in fin, es
558 NOTES.

 

by the present law assigned him his own share of the succession in full
property. No distinction is to be made between persons thus called t
the inheritance, whether they be male or female, or connected with the
deceased by the father’s or mother’s side: or whether the deceased were
sui juris or under power when he died. We proceed therefore to the con-
sideration of collateral succession, which relates either to agnates or cog-
nates.

Cuar. 3. On the succession of collaterals. If therefore the deceased
hath left neither descendant or ascendant relations, we first call to the
inheritance brothers and sisters born of the same father and the same
mother, (i. e. of the whole blood,) whom we before called in concur-
rence with the parent.

If brothers and sisters of the whole blood be wanting, we call in bro-
thers (and sisters) of the half blood, whether on the father’s side or the
mother’s side.

But if the deceased left brothers, and also the children of a decéased
brother or sister, these last will be called to the inheritance concurrently

with their uncle or aunt of the whole blood, and will be en-
[ *555 ] titled *to the same portion whatever it be, that their parent
would have been entitled to if alive.

Hence, if a brother be dead, leaving children, and he was of the
whole blood, while the living brothers may be of the half blood only,
those children are preferred to their uncles, although they are in the third
degree ; and this whether the surviving uncles (or aunts) be connected
in ‘relationship with the deceased, by the father’s side, or the mother’s
side; in like manner as their parent, if living, would have been prefer-
red. Contrariwise, if the living brother be of the whole blood to the de-
ceased, and the dead brother be a half brother only, the children of the
latter are excluded, as their parent also would have been if alive. For
the privilege of representation thus given, is conceded only to this class
of relations, and extended no farther, than that the children of the de-
ceased brothers or sisters, may succeed to that which their parent, if liv-
ing, would have been entitled to. We confer this benefit on the children
of brothers, when brought into consideration with their own uncles and
aunts, whether of the paternal or maternal side.

If surviving relations in the ascending line should be called to the in-
heritance conjointly with brothers and sisters of the deceased, in that
case we do not permit the children of a deceased brother or sister to be
called in, even although their parent was of the whole blood.

Whenever, therefore, this privilege of representation is given to the
children of a (deceased) brother or sister, that they should succeed in
the place of their parent, and being in the third degree should be called
concurrently with those who are in the second degree, it is manifestly
NOTES. 559

for this reason, because they are preferred to uncles or aunts of the de-
ceased, whether paternal or maternal, who also count no higher than the
third degree.

If the deceased hath left neither brothers, nor the children of a broth-
er, collaterals are called to the inheritance according to the respective de-
gtees they occupy, the nearest in degree being preferred to the more re-
mote. If many persons be found related in the same degree, let the in-
heritance be divided equally between them according to their number,
which our laws denominate, a division‘ per capita.

Cuap. 4, Takes away the distinction between agnates and cognates.

Cuar. 5, Relates to the legitimate tutelage of children.

Cuar. 6. On the authority of this law.

C sent to Philadelphia the pages of Harris’ edition that contained the
118th Novel, to have the Greek printed there. Hence, not having it be-
fore me, I inadvertently translated that novel anew.) _

Alterations made by the 127th Novel.

We never regret any alteration in our laws, that may be of benefit
to our subjects. | We remember to have enacted (by the 118th Novel)
that if a deceased person left brothers alive, and also children
of a brother *who died before him, those children should be [ *556 ]
called to the inheritance equally with their uncles, filling the
place of their father, and entitled to his portion. But that if the deceas-
ed left any relations in the (right or direct) ascending line, together with
brothers of the whole blood, and also children of a brother previously
deceased, we directed the brothers of the deceased to be called to the in-
heritance concurrently with the surviving relations in the (right) line as-
cending, and excluded the dead brother’s children.

Cuar. Ist. For the purpose of correcting this, we enact, that if a de-
ceased person shall leavea living relation in the (right) ascending line,
and brothers also who may be called concurrently with such relation,
and children also of a brother previously deceased, the latter shall be
called in, concurrently with the rest, and succeed to the portion that their
own parent, if alive, would have been entitled to. This we decree in
respect of the children of a previously deceased brother of the whole
blood: directing that they shall occupy the same rank, whether called
concurrently with their uncles only, or with their uncles concurrently
with a parent of the deceased in the ascending line.

The rest of the Novel does not relate to this subject.

Lis. Ill. Titul. 1. Definitio intestati, p. 191. Heirship is the succes-
son to the universal right of the deceased. Dig. 50. 62. A testamenta-
ry heirship takes effect presently on the death of the testator: a legiti-
mate or lawful heirship, (cast by operation of law) takes place so soon
as it is ascertained that the deceased died intestate.
560 NOTES.

 

An heir under the Roman law, is properly likened to an executor un-
der our law, but executors separate from heirs were also known under
the later periods of the civil law, and their history is slightly but well
touched by Dr. Brown. 1 Civ. Law, 310:

§ 1. Primus ordo succedentium, Sc. p. 191. This law of the twelve
tables is not extant.

$ 2. Qui sunt sui heredes, p.191. Naturalis sint. Natural children,
do not, in the expressions of the Roman law, mean bastards, but the ac-
tual children by procreation of the person spoken of, in contradistinction
to adopted children. Cod. de natur. lib. 1. 1.10.11. Natural or illegiti-
mate children, in the English sense of the word, could not be proper
heirs, quia pater eorwm incertus est, and pater est quem juste nuptie de-
monstrant,

Hlegitimate children, born of a concubine, not of promiscuous copula-
tion, or of adulterous or incestuous commerce, might, under the twelve _
tables, be instituted heirs by the will of the father to whatever portion

he thought fit: this was afterwards restrained to cases where
{ *557 ] *no lawful wife or legitimate children were left, and coifin-

ed to a sixteenth of the whole estate, between the mother
and the children. Arcadius and Honorius, directed that where a deceas-
ed left a wife and legitimate children, he could not dispose by will of
more than one ounce among his illegitimate children, or a twelfth of the
As, or whole estate: but if the lawful wife and children were dead, he
might bequeath one fourth of the whole among the concubine and her
children by him. But this also, was altered by Justinian. Ferriere.

$ 3. Quomodo sui heredes fiunt, p. 193.

A morte parentum.| Persons are said to be sui heredes, or proper
heirs, quod non alienarum sed suarum, sive propriarum, quodammodo re-
rum heredes esse videantur; i. e. because they seem to be the heirs of
their own property, and not the heirs of another’s: for a proper heir is,
in the life time of his parent, the co-heir or partner with that parent in
his possessions: so that a son, who is a proper heir, does not ‘acquire a
new property at the death of his father, but only possesses in a fuller
manner what was before vested in him. Vinny, h.¢. Harris.

Hence, sui heredes are seized ipso jure on the decease of the parent,
and if they die before they act, their rights are transmitted to their own
heirs; whereas in other cases the rule is, that hereditas nondum adita
non transmittitur. ‘They were also, not only proper sui, but necessary
heirs, heredes necessarit; for they became so of course, without any
previous consent of their own. See Instit. lib. 2. tit. 19. $ 2. together
with Dig. 28. 5. and Dig. 29. 2.

An heir who has once acted in that capacity, becomes always liable
after that to the creditors of the estate. Dig. 28. 5. 88.
NOTES. 561

 

$ 4. De filio post mortem patris, ab hostibus reverso, p. 193. As to the
Jus Postliminii, see lib. 1. of the instit. tit. 12. parag. 5. Dig. 49. 15.
De captivis et Postliminio at length. 2 Dall. Rep. 4. Miller, libellant v.
Miller. Wade v. Barnewell, 2 Bays S. Car. Rep. 229. 1 Brown’s civil
and admiralty law, 127. and 2 Ib. 266. under the title recapture and
salvage, to which the modern cases of postliminy principally apply. See
also the head of Jus postliminii in Grotius, book 3. ch. 9. and in Vattel.
But particularly in Mr. Du Ponceau’s valuable translation of Bynker-
shoek’s treatise on the law of war, with the notes 36—44. and 113—122.
Postiminium fingit eum qui captus est, in civitate semper fuisse. Instit.
ub. sup. Jus quo perinde omnia restituuntur jura, de si captus ab hosti-
bus non esset. Dig. ub. sup.

$ 6. De divisione hereditatis inter suos heredes, p. 194.

ltem ex duobus filiis.| By the civil law, representation takes place in
infinitum in the right line descending; and therefore it fol-
lows, according *to that law, that, when any person dies, [ *558 ]
leaving grand-children by sons or daughters, who died in his
life-time, such grand-children, though equal in degree. and unequal in
their number in regard to their respective stocks, will divide the estate
of their grand-father per stirpes, 7. e. according to their stocks: for ex-
ample, if A die worth nine hundred auwrei, and intestate, leaving only
grand-children by three sons, already dead, to wit, three grand-children
by one son, five by another, and six by another, then each of these
classes of grand-children would be intitled to a third; that is, to three
hundred aurei, no regard being paid to that class, in which there were
most persons. Jn hoc casu, (says Vinnius,) maxime conspicua est vis re-
preesentationis ; licet enim omnes hic pari gradu sint, ut proprio singult
jure succedere posse videatur, tamen postquam semel ‘placuit, nepotes in
locum patris sui demortui, aliave ratione exuti jure sui heredis, succedere,
non debuit hoc jus ex accidenti aliquo variari, puta ut soli nepotes ex di-
versis filiis et numero inegquales, ceu pauciores cum pluribus ex hac vel
illa stirpe concurrentes, in capita hereditatem dividerent. Cod. 6. t. 55.
1.2. Quare sic in universum recte definiemus, descendentes ex masculis
omnes, qui sunt diversarum stirpium, quantumvis ejusdem omnes grad-
us, in stirpes, non in capita, succedere. But, in England, although Te-
presentation may also be said to extend in infinitum in the right line
descending, yet this I apprehend must be understood to be in those cases
only, where representation is absolutely necessary to prevent the exclu-
sion of grand-children, great-grand-children, gc. For example there-
fore, if Titius dies leaving a son, and D, E, F, his grand-children by
‘another son, who died before Titius, then the surviving son would take
one moiety, and the grand-children D, E, F, would take the other, as
the representatives of their deceased father: for in this case representa-

71
562 NOTES.

tion would be necessary ; because, if representation was not allowed, the
grand-children of Titius, being in a more remote degree, than his son,
would be totally excluded; which would be highly unjust. But, if T%-
tius dies, and leaves only grand-children by two sons, already dead;
e. g. three grand-children by one son, and six by the other, then repre-
sentation would not only not be necessary, (as all the persons are in the
same degree, so that none of them can be excluded;) but it would occa-
sion a very unequal distribution of the effects; namely, of only half the
estate to six of the grand-children, and of half to the other three, which
does not seem agreeable either to the sense, or even the words of the
statute. See 22, 23, Car. 2, cap. 10. Harris. j

This section in some editions of the institutes is entitled Quomedo sus

heredes succedunt.
f *559 ] *§ 8. De nato post mertem avi, &c. p. 195.
Plane si et conceptus etnatus.] ‘Sunt, qui velint hunc

* nepotem, etsi ad heereditatem avi jure suo non veniat, posse nihilominus
‘jure paterno eam adipisei: etenim certum est, liberos parentum heredi-
tatem, quantumvis non acquisitam, ad liberos suos transmittere.” Cod.
6. 7.51.24. sect.5. Cod. 6. ¢. 52. 1 1. “Filius porro in proposita
‘‘facti specie, si adhuc viveret, posset patris hereditatem-acquirere; sic
“agitur ad filium suum posthumum, etsi post avi mortem’ conceptum,
“hereditatem ejus transmittere posse putant. Pileus nepoti huie, per
“ Novellam 118, succursum esse censet, ut suo jure avo suecedere possit ;
“et hoc quidem suadet zquitas; sed non favent satis perspicue verba le-
“eum.” Doujacius. Harris.

Dig. 1. 5. 7 and 26. Dig. 38. 16. 7 and 8.

§ 9. De liberis emancipatis, p. 196. It may be remarked that the
preetorian bonorum-possessio, is not synonymous with possessio bonorum.
The latter consists of two words, and means the actual possession of
goods, the former is one word, and means an order of court conveying
the right of possession of the goods to the person in whose favour it is
issued. Dig. 37. 1. 3. 1.

$ 10. Si emancipatus se dederit in adoptionem, p. 196. Dig. 38. 8. 4.

Ad liberos, an ad agnatos.| For the arrogator, by retaining under
his power the emancipated son of the deceased, might make room for
the agnati of the deceased; or, by emancipating his arrogated. son, who
was the natural son of the deceased, the arrogator might exclude the
agnati; so that thus the right of inheritance would depend upon the
will and pleasure of a stranger, which the law would not permit.
Harris.

The pretorian fiction cannot extend to one person belonging at the
same time to two families, Cod.. de adopt. 1. penult.

$ 11. Collatio filiorum naturalium et adeptivorum, p. 197. In some
NOTES. 563

 

editions this section is entitled Differentia filiorum naturalium et adop-
tivorum, post quam fuerint emancipati. See Dig. 38. 6. 4.

$ 12. De bonorum possessione contra tabulas, p. 198. See Dig. 37. 4.

$ 14. De Emendatio juris antiqui. De adoptivis, p. 199.

Constitutionem scripsimus, Cod. 8. 48.10. De adoptionibus.

Ez Sabiniano, senatus consulte. By this law, a man who adopted one
of the three sons of another person, was compelled to leave him a fourth
part of his property. As by the constitution of Antoninus Pius, a fourth
part also was to be left to a boy under puberty, taken into a family by
arrogation. Vinn.

*§ 15. Descendentibus ex faminis, p. 200. Neither the [ *560 ]
law of the twelve tables nor the pretorian law, admitted
descendants by the female line to the succession of a natural grand-fa-
ther, or other maternal ascendant: for never having been under power of
such ascendant they could never have been proper heirs. Nor could the
pretors assist them as he did emancipated children bonorwm possessione
unde liberi, which proceeded on the fiction that emancipated children re-
mained under power of their natural father: this fiction could not be ex-
tended to females, for the rule was, that children guoad nomen et famili-
am, followed the condition of the father. Hence natural grand-children
were only called to the succession of their grand-father as cognates, and
after the agnates were exhausted ; this was the case, even after the Orphi-
tian senatus-consult, had called sons and daughters to the legitimate
succession of their mother.

The emperors mentioned in the text, admitted grand-children of either
sex to the succession, whether descended ex filio or ex filia. Cod.
Theod. de legit. heredit. 1. 4. copied nearly by Justinian. Cod. de suis
et legit. hered. 1.9. These emperors, however, so far leaned toward
ancient usage, that they defalked the portion of natural grand-children,
by making that portion one third less than their parent would have had,
when they were called conjointly with sons and daughters. And as
persons frequently died, without leaving either proper heirs by the law
of the twelve tables, or by the preetorian fiction, or legitimate heirs un-
der the Orphitian law, if the question was as to a succession to a de-
ceased person of the maternal side, the agnates with whom the cognates
concurred, were entitled to a fourth part of the property of the succes-
sion. This was corrected by Justinian. Cod. de suis et legit. hered.
who put agnates and cognates on the same footing.

As to the defalcation of a third from the portion of cognates, when
the grand-children descended from a daughter, succeeded concurrently
with sons and daughters to a deceased in the maternal line, that was not
corrected till the 118th Novel, ch. 1. by which children were called with-
564 NOTES.

 

out distinction to the succession of their relations in the ascending line,
and to the exclusion of all others.

Sed ut amplius aliquid. Suppose a man deceased had left a son, and
a grand-child by a daughter, who died before the deceased, that grand-
child would have only four ounces, and the son eight; less by a third
than the daughter, if living, would have been entitled to: suppose a wo-
man deceased, Icft a son or a daughter, and a grand-son or grand-daugh-

ter by a deceased son or daughter; the son ‘or daughter
[ *561 ] *would be entitled to eight ounces, the grand-son or grand-
daughter to four ounces.

Portionem nepotum vel neptum. Descendants by a female, were after-
wards exempted by Nov. 18, from defalcation, when they concurred with
descendants from a male. Nov. 18, ch. 4. and Nov. 118.

Ex cujusdam constitutionis auctoritate. Cod. Theod. de legit. hered.
1. 4. compared with Cod. 6. 55. 12. de suis et legit. heered.

Nostra autem constitutione. Cod. 6. 45. 12. which forbids agnates to
claim the fourth, granted to them by Cod. Theod. 1. 4. de legit. he-
red. ;

Sine ulla diminutione. Quarte silicet agnatorum ; tertice enim deduete-
onem tributam tis, qui etiam juris veteris suffragatione nituntur, intactam
reliquit: sed jure novissimo par est omnium liberorum conditio. Vinn.
Nov. 118, ch. 1.

Sed nos cum adhuc dubitatio maneret, p.201. In some editions a six-
teenth section commences at these words, entitled, Al/era emendatio juris
antiqui circa nepotes aut pronepotes ex filia.

Titul. IT. De legitunma agnatorum successione, p. 203.

The law of the twelve tables says, Ast si quis moritur intestatus, cui
suus heres non est, proxzimus agnatus familiam habeto. Hence, if a
suus heres renounced, the agnati could not succeed, but the estate es-
cheated ; for the swws heres remained, and the agnates were excluded.
This gave rise to the praetorian law, which let in agnates and cognates
by the bonorum possessio unde legit. and unde cognati. Cujus in paritit.
Cod. de usucap. pro herede. This was extended by the senatus consul-
tum Tertyllianum. Dig. 38. 17. 2.8 and 10. and by the emperors Dio-
clesian and Maximinian, Cod. de leg. hered. 1. 3. and lastly, Justinian
admitted the agnates fully in default of sui hwredes, or their not acting
in the succession.

$1. De agnatis naturalibus, p. 203. Agnates are relations of the
same family on the male side, and who have suffered no diminution of
state (rank.) Cognates are relations on the female side, or who have
lost the right of agnates by diminution. Vinn. h. t.

Illegitimate children can have no agnates. Quia neque'gentem neque
familiam habent.
NOTES. 565

 

Consobrini. Strictly speaking, consobrini, (consororini) are sisters’
children.

Quia post mortem patris nanciscuntur. Dig. 38. 7. ult. and 38. 16. 1.
penult.

§ 2. De Adoptivis, or, as it is sometimes entitled, De agnatis per adop-
tionem, p. 204. Adoption joins the adopted son to all the ag-
nates *of the father: adopted children, like proper heirs, are [ *562 ]
technical descriptions, and the creatures of the civil law.

Dig. 38. 10. ult. 4. Dig. 38. 16. 2, 3. They are improperly called con-
sanguine, inasmuch as this is strictly applied to natural relationship.
Dig. 38. 16. penult.

$ 3. De masculis et feminis, p. 204. This is otherwise entitled, Ag-
nati, ad legitimam successionem abintestato admittuntur absque ullo sex-
us discrimine. '

By the old law of the twelve tables, the female line was excluded.
Cognates yielded to agnates.

By the middle law, sisters of the same father were admitted ; consan-
guine sisters: and the preetor called women to the succession when they
‘were related by the male line, but only in virtue of the right of proxim-
ity; ex tertio nimirum ordine, per bonorum possessione unde cognati.
Hence they succeeded after agnates.

Justinian called all agnates, male and female, indiscriminately to the
succession.

Germane ; of the whole blood; consanguinee: by the same father ;
uterine : of the same mother. Consanguinei, and consanguinee, are
expressions relating to brothers and sisters only ; not beyond.

Nostra constitutione sancimus : Cod. 6. 58. penult.

§$ 4. De filiis sororum, p. 207. By the old law (i.e. the law of the
twelve tables) if there were no agnates, the estate escheated. To avoid
this, the pretor called in cognates per bonorum possessionem unde cogna-
ti: afterwards the emperor Anastasius, directed that emancipation per
rescriptum principis, should not take away the right of agnation between
brothers and sisters, if inserted in the rescript. Cod. de legit. heered. 1.
11. Then maternal brothers and sisters, and their children, were ranked
among the agnates, if the deceased left no brothers and sisters, or if they
rejected the succession: and nephews, of different branches, were order-
ed to succeed per capita, and not per stirpes, hic, et Cod. de legit. heered.
1.14.$1. Finally, all these differences were abolished by the 118th
and 127th Novels. The last direction of the present section of the In-
stitutes is not altered by the Novels.

Non in stirpes sed in capita.] It appears from this section, that as yet
brothers’ children were not allowed to represent their parents: for in-
566 NOTES. 7

 

stance; if Sempronius had died intestate, leaving a brother, and chil-
dren by two other brothers deceased; then, if the surviving brother had
accepted the succession, the children of the deceased brothers, (i. e. the
nephews of Sempronius) would have been entirely ousted ; but, if the

surviving brother of Sempronius had declined the inheri-
[ *563 ] tance, *the children of the two deceased brothers would have

been entitled to a distributive share of their uncle’s estate per
capita, that is, by poll; because they would then take suo quisque jure
each in his own right and not by representation. But by Nov. 118. cap.
3. and Nov. 127. cap. 1. brothers’ and sisters’ children are allowed to
represent their parents; and yet this representation is only permitted by
the civil law to prevent exclusion, when the party deceased leaves a bro-
ther, and nephews by another brother; and then the uncle and nephews
take per stirpes; for, when there are only nephews, there is no represen-
tation; and the distribution of the estate is consequently made per capi-
ta, each person taking in his own right. This is also the certain rule of
distribution in England in the case of collaterals. Vid. 22. 23. Car. 2.
Bacon’s Abr. verb. executors and administrators. Abridgment of cas.
in eq. page 249. Walch v. Walch. Harris.

See the ‘case of Carter -v. Crawley, in prohibition. B. R. 1681. Sir
Thomas Raym. 496. in which the question was this: A man died,
leaving no relations alive, save an aunt, and the children of another
aunt deceased in his life time—shall the children succeed jure represen-
tationis ? This was a case on the construction of the Stat. of Distribu-
tions, 22. and 23. Ch. 2 ch. 20. and appears to have been decided in
favour of the right of representation in the children. The opinion of
civilians given at the end of this case is as follows: “In making distri-
“butions of intcstate estates amongst collaterals, our civil law and the
“ practice of the ecclesiastical courts have constantly observed these two
“rules : o

“The first is, Representatio in filius fratrum et sororum tantum locum
“ habet, ad ulteriores vero collaterales non extenditur.

“The second is that in case there be no brothers nor brothers’ child-
“ren, vocantur ad suecessionem reliqui collaterales quicumque in gradu
“ sint proximiores, remotioribus exclusig. Ita quod infallibiter semper
“prior in gradu sit potior in successione, whereby representation must
“needs be out of doors; the next of kin, whether one or more being
‘only admitted to the distribution.”

ROBERT WISEMAN,
THOMAS EXTON,
RICHARD LLOYD,
EDWARD MASTER,
10 May, 1681, WILLIAM TRUMBAI..
NOTES. 567

 

$ 5. De proximis vel remotis, p. 207. Otherwise entitled de agnatis
diversi gradus. /

*As the law of the 12 tables called in the nearest agnate [ *564 ]
only, it left no room for representation. Ulp. in frag. tit. 26.
$ 3. The 118th Novel, admits nephews to the succession of their
uncles, or aunt’s estate, conjointly with the brothers and sisters of the
“deceased.

§ 6. Quo tempore proximitas spectatur, p. 208. See Dig. 38. 16. 2. 4.
5, and 6.

§ 7. De successorio edicto, p. 208. Otherwise entitled successio in
agnatorum hereditatibus, a Justiniano introducta.

Suecessionem non esse.]. Veluti; decessit aliquis intestatus, extante
Fratre, extante et patruo: frater vocabatur, nimirumut proximus ; si igitur
contingat ut frater, aut, antequam adeat, decedat, aut hereditatem repudt-
et, patruus aut agnatus venire non poterit propterea quod lex duodecim
tabularum successionem nesciat ; hereditas igitur ad fiscum deferebatur.
Theoph. h. J. = ;

Nostra constitutione.| This constitution is not to be found; nor
would it be of use, if it was still extant, since the 118th Novel. hath
destroyed all distinction between agnutes and cognates, and put them
upon an equality. Harris.

The law of the 12 tables (proximus ag‘natus familiam habeto) called
only the nearest agnate. If he died or renounced, the other agnates
were excluded, and the estate escheated. Ulp. in frag. Tit. 26. $ 4.
Dig. 38. 16.2. Paulus Lib. 4. sentent. Tit.$: The praetor corrected
this in some degree by calling in the second agnate, when the first died
without accepting or renounced; but he called them in the order of cog-
‘nates. Dig. 38. 9.1.6. The constitution mentioned in the text, as well
as the law of the text, was rendered null by the provisions of the 118th
Novel.

§ 8. De legitima parentum successione, p. 209. Formerly a father
emancipating a child pacto contracte fiducie@, became legitimate heir to
the child, under a supposed analogy of a master and an emancipated
slave. Sce Inst. Lib. 1. Tit. de legitima parentum tutela. But Justini-
an by his constitution, Cod. 8. 49. 6. de emancipationibus liberorum, re-
duced all emancipations to that of contracte fiducie ; and the father
succeeded to an emancipated son, asa patron did to his freed man. But
all this was again altered by the 118th Novel. But the parents of a
child dying without descendants, succeed per stirpes.

Tit. HL. De senatus consulto Tertulliano, p. 210. Justinian says, this
law was made by Adrian, but Zonaras, Lib. 2. says it was made in the
time of Antoninus Pius, called also Adrian, as being the adopted son of
568 NOTES.

 

Adrian. ‘Tiberius Claudius Cesar, began to reign A. C. 16, and Adrian -
began A. C. 120.

[ *565 ] $ 1. De constitutione Divi Claudii, p. 210. It is probable
according to Vinnius and Heineccius, that this indulgence

extended only to the mothers of children who fell in battle. Sueton. in

Vita. ch. 19. Claudius jus quatuor liberorum feminis dedit.

§ 2nd. Senatus consultum Tertullianum, p. 211. This privilege
granted to the mother to succeed to her children, was not conceded by
positive law to uncles; but they were called in by Pretorian law per bo-
norum possessionem unde cognati, so that a consanguine sister being re-
garded as an agnate was preferred to them.

$3. Qui preferuntur matri vel cum ea admittuntur, p. 211. Mater
liberis onerata. Cujas in ulp. frag. Tit. ult. for onerata read honerata.
‘The Claudian law gave them as we have just seen the jus quatuor libe-
rorum ; hence children were an honour and a credit, not a burthen.

By this section, the mother was postponed to a suus heres, (a proper
or domestic heir) to the father, and to the consanguine brother.

As to the suus heres. Domestic heirs in power, or emancipated, or
persons considered as sui heredes, excluded the mother ; but children giv-
en in adoption, and in power of their adoptive father, at the decease of
their natural father, did not. But by a constitution of Antoninus, they
were admitted concurrently with the mother, per bona poss. unde cognati,
which in this case excluded the bonorum possessionem unde legitimi,
Dig. 38. 7. and Dig. 38. 8.

Further by the Tertyllian senatus consultum, children were not admit-
ted to the succession of their mother, in preference to their grandmother,
the senatus consulium Orphitianum, made about twenty years afterward,
called them in. Hence a conflict arose between claimants under these
decrees, the mother of the deceased, claiming under the Tertyllian, and
the children of the deceased under the Orphitian decrees. This was at
length decided in favour of the children. Dig. 38. 16. 11.

Secondly, the father was preferred to the mother, in military property,
in adventitious property, and in respect of emancipated children how-
ever emancipated.

Thirdly, the consanguine brother was preferred to the mother. Cod.
Theod. de inofficioso, testamento, 1. 2. The consanguing sister was
called in concurrently with the mother. But Justinian introduced many
alterations. At first, when the deceased left a mother, with consanguine
or uterine brothers, or with sisters, the mother was admitted in equal
proportion. Cod.h. Tit. 1. ult, when the mother was found with sisters
only, she succeeded to half the property. Ib. Afterward by Nov. 22.
A7. 2. when the mother was left with sisters of the deceased, they inher-
NOTES. 569

 

ited in equal portions: finally by Novel. 118. ch. 2. fathers
*and mothers, were preferred to all collaterals, save brothers [ *566 J
and sisters of the whole blood.

Suorun: loco sunt.] Emancipated children by the preetorian law, and
by the constitutions grand-children and great-grand-children by a daugh-
ter, are numbered in loco suorum, i. e. in the place of proper heirs. Vide
t. 1. sect. 15. of this book. Harris.

Ex constitutionibus.] St, matre superstite, filius vel filia, qui queve
moritur, filios, dereliquerit, omnimodo patri suo, matrive sua, ipso jure suc-
cedant ; quod sine dubio et de pronepotibus cbservandum esse censemus.
Cod. 6.454. 1 11. Cod. 6. t. 57.1. 4. ad senatus-consultum Orficia-
num. Harris.

Frater autem consanguineus.] ‘Porro, cum fratres duntaxat et soro-
“yes hoc loco matri objiciantur, existimandum est, cateris a latere veni-
“ entibus, sive aynatis sive cognatis, matrem preferri. Sed et, quia con-
“ sanguineorum tantum mentio fit, credibile est, fratres et sorores uteri~
“ nos senatus-consulto fuisse exclusos: caeterum Justinianus hos etiam
“eum matre admisit, vid. sect. 5. Novella autem, 118 totum hoc jus
mutatum est.”’ Vinn. Harris.

$4. Jusnovum de jure liberorum sublato. p. 212. Constitutione. Cod.
8. 59. 1.1. and 1. 2. and Cod de infirm. pen. celib. et orbit. 1. 1. by which
it will appear, that Constantine first abrogated the law inflicting penalty
on celibacy : Honorius extended to every one, the privileges of those who
had children; and Justinian accorded to all mothers, the jure triwm aut
quatuor liberorum.

§$ 5. Quibus mater proponitur et quibus admittitur, p. 212.

This section is also entitled Abrogatio eorum in quibus constitutiones
partim matrem adjuvebant, partim pregravebant. ’ :

Cum antea constitutiones.] vid. ll. 1, 2. et penult. Cod. Theod. de legit.
hered.

Partim matrem.] Exempli gratia; “si contigisset, ut quis decederet
‘‘yelinquens matrem, jure liberorum cohonestatem, superesset autem et
“ patruus, qui est legitimus, aut patrui filius, mater octo capiebat uncias,
“ sive bessem hereditatis; patruus autem aut ejus filius trientem: hoc
‘est, quatuor uncias. Quod si ex contrario jus liberorum mater non
‘‘ habuisset, tune patruus aut filius ejus bessem hereditatis capiebat, at
‘mater trientem solum.” Theoph. h. t.

Ita tamen, &c.] ‘“ Quee sequuntur pertinent ad modum succedendi,
“¢ give rationem distribuendse heereditatis inter matrem defuncti, ejusque
“ fratres et sorores. Constituit autem imperator, ut, si cum matre con-
‘‘eurrant sorores sole, sive consanguinex sive uterine, duo semisses
“ fiant, quorum unum mater, alterum sorores capiant; sin
“ fratres, *sive soli, sive etiam cum soribus, in capita hered- [ *567 ]

72
570 NOTES.

 

“itas dividatur, totque partes fiant, quot sunt persons succedenti-
“um. Cod. 6. t. 56. 1 7, Hee iterum mutata sunt Novel. 118.
‘‘ qua fratres et sorores omnes, ex uno tantum latere defuncto conjuncti,
‘‘ tam a matre, “ quam a fratribus utrinque conjunctis, excluduntur ; ma-
“ter cum his ex equis partibus succedit. Vinn.h.1. But in England
the civil law takes place almost in the same manner, as it prevailed be-
fore the Novel constitution: for brothers and sisters by the half blood
take equally with brothers and sisters by the whole blood: so that, if a
man, whose father is dead, dies intestate, and is survived by a mother
and by brothers and sisters, or by brothers only, or sisters only, then the
mother, and the brothers and sisters, will all be entitled to take an equal
share per capita, whether such brothers and sisters were related to the
deceased by the whole blood, or by the half blood only. Smith’s case, 1
Mod. 209. 1 Jac.2. cap. 17. Harris.

Tit. IV. De senatus consulio Orphitiano, page 214. This was enacted
in 930 ab urb. cond. in the time of the emperor Aurelius; 20 years after
the Tertyllian senatus consult. .

§$ 1. De nepote et nepto, p. 214.

Constitutionibus principalibus.] The Tertyllian decree conferred upon
mothers the right of legitimate succession to their children; and the Or-
fician decree gave children the same right in regard to their mothers:
but neither of these decrees went farther out of reverence to the old law;
so that hitherto grand-mothers were called to the succession of their grand-
children ; and grand-children to the succession of their grand-mothers,
by the indulgence of the pretor only; i.e. per bonorum possessionem un-
de cognati, and in default of agnates. ff. 38. t. 8. But the emperors, Va-
lentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius, called grand-sons and grand-daugh-
ters to the succession of their grand-mothers; prohibiting them neverthe-
less to take more than two thirds of that sum, to which their father or
mother would have been entitled. 1. 4. Cod. Theod. de legit. hered. But
the emperor Justinian, by his 118th Novel, cap. 1. makes the condition
of all children equal, when they succeed their parents upon an intestacy.
And, by the 2nd chapter of the same novel, the emperor calls also the
grand-mother to the succession of her grand-children. Harris.

$2. De capitis diminutione. page 215. Otherwise entitled, successio-
nes que ex illis senatus consultis deferuntur, non perimuntur, minima cap-
itis diminutione.

See Dig. 38. 16. 11 and 28. 17.1. 8.
[ *568 ] *§ 3. De vulgo quesitis, page 215. Otherwise naturales
liberi mater succedunt.

Qui vulgo quesiti sunt. The vulgo quesiti are those, whom the law
emphatically calls spurious, their father being incertain and not known;
but the mother, who is always certain, is allowed to succeed even her
spurious issue; which is not permitted in England, where a bastard is
NOTES. 57k

 

rotary ood er mn Be
Sanguine relations, except his aiien = = ray ee
to civil purposes ; fie a to moral Be oe eo ]
cendants and coll t Is is 1 sre ee ae a enn
men 4 ne 8 is regarded by the law, which will not suffer

person to marry his mother, or his base sister. The Queen v.
Chafin, 3 Salk. 66. 67.

Ad matris hereditatem.] The vulgo quesiti or spurious children, are
allowed to succeed their mother, unless she is a person of illustrious birth,
having lawful children ; for, if she has no lawful children, her illegiti-
mate issue will succeed her. Cod. 6. t. 57.1.5. Andin general spuri-
ous children will succeed their mother equally with those, who are legiti-
mate: and, even if spurious children are pretermitted in the testament
of their mother, they may by the civil law complain of that testament as
inofficious and undutiful. De inofficioso testamento matris spurit quoque
Sulit dicere possunt. ff. 5. t.2.1.29. Yet spurious children are not in
like manner entitled to succeed to the possessions of their father, whom
the law does not regard, but supposes to be unknown. * Children never-
theless, who are born of a concubine, when their father is certain, and
dies without a wife or lawful issue, are entitled, together with their moth-
er, to the sixth part of their father’s inheritance, which is to. be divided
among them per capita, or by poll. Nov. 18. t. 5.cap. 5. But bastards,
begotten in adultery or incest, are wholly incapable of succeeding to
their father’s or mother’s estate. Nov. 89. cap.15. But in England
bastards are not distinguished into species, being all regarded in the same
light, and esteemed equally incapable of succeeding to the personal es-
tate of their intestate parents, being feigned to be nullius filit; so that no
illegitimate child can take any part either of his father’s or mother’s es-
tate upon an intestacy; neither can an ordinary or ecclesiastical judge
grant the administration of an intestate’s estate to the base-born issue of
that intestate. Swinb. 373. Yet any person, although he hath legiti-
mate children may by the law of England, bequeath any part, or the
whole of his estate without controul, and may consequently benefit his
illegitimate children, or their mother, in what manner he pleases; for such
persons are not incapable of taking by purchase, gift, or tes-
tament: *and in this respect the law of England is more fa- [ *569 ]
vourable to natural children, than the civil law; for, by that
law, a man, who had lawful children, could not bequeath more than a
12th part of his possessions to his illegitimate issue. Nov. 89. cap. 12.
It is also observable, that, though the law of England pays no regard
immediately to bastards, yet it favours their issue under particular cir-
cumstances, in respect to real estates; insomuch that the issue of a bas-
tard eigne, who died seized, shall bar the right of a mulier puisne. For
572 NOTES.

example; if a man dies seized of certain lands in fee, leaving two sons,
by the same woman, and his eldest son is a bastard, being born before
his father’s marriage, and the younger is a mulier, (that is, legitimate,)
in this case, if the hastard enters upon the land, claiming as heir to his
father, and occupieth it all his life without any interruption or entry
made upon him by the mulier, and the bastard hath issue and dies seized
of such estate in’ fee, and the land descends to that issue, then the mulier
will be without remedy. For he may not enter, nor have any action to
recover the land, because there is an ancient law[in this case used;
namely, Justum non est aliquem post mortem facere bastardum, qui toto
tempore vite sue pro legitimo habebatur. See Coke’s first inst. sect. 399,
&c. Bridal’s lex spuriorum, pag. 100. Here note, that the term mulier
is used, by the writers upon the common law, to denote either a son or
a daughter lawfully begotten; but, how they came to apply the word
mulier so very fancifully or rather perversely, it is hard to say, and im-
material to inquire; the most probable conjecture seems to be, that mu-
lier is a corruption of melior or the French word melieur. Vide Ferms
de la ley, and Godolphin’s repertorium. Harris.

§ 4. De jure accrescendi inter legitimos heredes, p. 215.

Survivorship under the Roman law takes place among legitimate, and
among testamentary heirs; and the share of those who renounce, will
even fall to the heirs of those who accept. Survivorship, is real, at-
tached to the estate, not to the person like substitution. Dig. de usu-
fructu. 1. 36. Dig. 38.16. 9. It was allowed, lest the testator should
die partly testate and partly intestate, partly represented and partly un-
represented.

Under the English law survivorship takes place only when a legacy
is given in joint tenantcy; and is allowed by the courts of equity, but
not by the ecclesiastical courts. See on this subject Humphrey v. Tay-
leur, Ambl. 137. Mosley v. Bird, 3 Vez. jun. 628. Russel v. Long, 4

Vez. 551. Bolger v Mackell, 5 Vez. 509. In which it is
{ *570 } laid down *that a legacy to two or more share and share
alike, is a legacy in common, with no survivorship.

The jus accrescendi has already been touched upon in another connec-
tion ante ad Instit. Lib. 2. Tit. 7. $ 4.

Tit. V. De successione cognatorum. p. 216.

Post suos heredes.| ‘ Lex antiqua duodecim tabularum duos tantum
‘‘ heredum ab intestato ordines fecit, suorum et agnatorum. Nove le-
“ ges et senatus-consulta non-addiderunt quidem ordinem novum, sed
personas quasdam, que nec sui heredes, nec agnati, revera sunt, suo-
“rum heredum et agnatorum numero esse voluerunt, atque in ordine
‘“ suorum vel agnatorum una cum veré suis heredibus aut agnatis, ad
‘“‘ hereditatem intestati admitti. Inter suos heredes nove leges nume-
NOTES. 573

 

“ yant, suisque per omnia exeequant, liberos legitimatos; inter eosdem
** quoque, et simul cum lis, vocant nepotes et pronepotes ex sexu femi-
‘‘neo: in agnatorum ordinem senatus-consulta transtulerunt matrem
‘et liberos: Justinianus fratres et sorores uterinos, eorumque et soro-
‘rum consanguinearum filios et filias: Anastasius fratres et sorores
““emancipatos. Preetor vero tres succedentium ab intestato ordines fe-
“eit; primum diberorum ; (non dixit suorum, quia ex liberis vocat eti-
“am non suos;) alterum legitimorum, in quo vocantur agnati et jura
‘* agnationis habentes, ex posterioribus legibus aut ex senatus-consul-
“ tis; tertium cognatorum, in quo admisit omnes, quos sola sanguinis
“ratio vocat ad hereditatem, licet jure civili deficiant ; item eos, qui,
“ quod prioribus ordinibus exclusi essent, ex nullo alio capite venire
“ poterant. Tandem Justinianus cognatos omnes etiam heredes le-
“ gitimos fecit, adempta agnatis omni prerogativa.” Nov. 118. Vinn.
Harris. ‘

See as to the pretorian law calling in cognates in default of proper
and legitimate heirs, Cod, de legit. hered. 1. 5. and Dig. 38. 8. 1 and seq.
Cognates are maternal relations. Legitimate heirs are agnates, and oth-
ers considered as agnates, and called to the succession by the Tertyllian
and Orphitian senatus-consults, and the imperial constitutions, as a mo-
ther in respect of her children, children in respect of a mother consan-
guine brothers and sisters emancipated by rescript, uterine sisters, and
the children of emancipated brothers and sisters. Cod. de legit. haered.
1. penult. $ 1 and 1. ult. § 2.

$1. Qui vocantur in hoc ordine, &c. p. 216.

Quos lex Anastasiana.] ‘This constitution is not now extant; it was
nevertheless without doubt inserted in the first edition of the Code, be-
cause it is here referred to; but it was probably omitted in the Codex
repetitee preelectionis, on account of the last law in Cod. 6, t.

58. delegit. *hered. Qua plenius fratribus et sororibus [ *571 ]
emancipatis consulitur, et eorum quoque filiis ac filiabus jus
legitime successionis datur. Tarris.

Non equis tamen partibus. Theophilus says that emancipated bro-
thers and sisters received one half less than those under power: that a
brother capite diminutus should receive but four ounces while a brother
integri. juris should have eight: but by Cod. de leg. hered. 1. ult. § 1.
emancipated brothers, and those under power were placed on a footing.

Aliis vero agnatis. If the deceased left an emancipated brother, and
an uncle, the former would succeed in exclusion of the latter.

$2. De conjunctis per feeminas, p, 217. The 118th Novel. has super-
ceded this section.

$4. De vulgo quesitis, p. 217. The mother only is considered as re-
lated to a spurious child; hence they were permitted to succeed to the
574 NOTES.

 

mother, if they were not the issue of adultery or incest. Justinian how-
ever admitted them to a share in the succession ab intestato to their fa-
ther, if ‘there were no lawful progeny, and the bastards were the off-
spring of a concubine. Dig. 38. 8. 4. compared with Dig. 1. 5. 19 and
23. Dig. 1.5.19 and 24. Cod. de natural. lib. By the 118th Novel.
they were admitted to share in their mother’s estate with legitimate
children,

$ 5. Ex quoto gradu vel agnati vel cognati succedunt, p. 217.

Usque ad sextum gradum cognationis.] It is not easy to determine
what should induce the preetor to fix upon the sixth rather than the fifth
or any other degree; and, concerning this, the writers have differed
much in their opinions. But all, except Hoffman, agree, that the differ-
ence in the limits of succession between agnates and cognates hath ceas-
ed, since the distinction between agnation and cognation was abolished
by Novel. 118. Taking it then for granted, that cognates can be called
in as distant a degree as agnates, the next question will be whether ag-
nates, can succeed in a more distant degree, than the tenth; which some
deny; and urge, that Justinian would not have named the 10th degree,
if agnates could have been admitted ina degree beyond it and
that, unless some period had been put to the succession of agnates, the
third and the fourth order of succession, in which are husband and wife,
could never or very rarely be admitted; and from hence they conclude,
that, though in consequence of the 118th Novel. both agnates and cog-
nates must now be admitted without distinction, according to their prox-
imity, yet this must be in the 10th degree, and not beyond it; and of
this opinion are Mynsinger, Faber, Wesembecius, and others. But the
words of Justinian, in the 3rd _ sect. of the 2nd title of this book, very

strongly evince the contrary. v. g. Inter masculos quidem agna-
[ *572 ]  tionis *jure hereditas etiamsi, longissimo gradu sint, ultro ctt-

roque capitar, &c. And again, in paragraph the Ist, tit. 7. of
this book, the emperor writes thus—Amotis suis heredibus, agnatus, eti-
amsi longissimo gradu, plerumque potior habetur, quam proximior cogna-
tus. it. 7. de servili cognatione. This is also the doctrine of the law
of the twelve tables, which declares generally, without specifying any
limits, that upon a failure of proper heirs, the nearest agnate shall suc-
ceed. And, as to the before-mentioned arguments, they may be answer-
ed without much difficulty ; for we may safely pronounce, that the words
decimo gradu are not here used determinately, but merely for the sake of
giving anexample. Non enim (says Vinny) eodem modo de agnatis et
cognatis imperator loquitur ; de agnatis non loquitur determinative, sed
ait, eos succedere, etsi decimo gradu sint, utens rotundo et certo numero
pro incerto. De cognatis contra loquitur determinative ; ait enim, eos
succedere usque ad sextum gradum. And, to the second argument, it may

 
NOTES. 575
be answered, that a deceased person may leave no agnates by means of
emancipation, or that his agnates, as such, may be ousted of their suc-
cession, by the death or refusal of the nearest agnate. See sect. 7.
t. 7. lib. 3. So that there is no great reason to fear, that the third
and fourth order of succession would have been always excluded by
allowing agnates to succeed in the most distant degree. It therefore
follows upon the whole, that cognates and agnates are now called to.suc-
ceed equally, according to their proximity, and without any limitation.
Harris.

Tit. VI. De gradibus cognationum, p. 218. See on this subject the
note to Justin. Inst. Lib. 1: tit. 9, § 1. Definitio nuptiaram, ante.

$ 1. De primo secundo et tertio gradu, p. 218. see Blackborough v. Da-
vies, 1 Lord Raym. 684. 12 Mod. 619. but best in 1 P. Wms. 41. where-
in it was determined that the grandmother was nearer of kin than the
aunt. Woodroff v. Wickworth, Prec. in ch. 527. 1 Eq. ca. ab. 249. In
England all relationship respecting personal estate, is settled according
to the civil law computation.

ber, T'hit: the Greeks called their parents dses, divinities; and ap-
plied the term divine, even to those who held the place of parents.
Hence come the Italian words Zio, Zia, and the Spanish, Zio, Tva,.
(Ferriere makes three sections, of this first section.)

$2. Quartus gradus, p. 219.

Consobrinus esnsobrina.] It will be necéssary to explain the follow-
ing terms of relation before we proceed.— Consobrini and Consobrine
denote cousins german in general; i. e. brother’s and sister’s children.
—Fratres patrueles and sorores patrueles signify cousins ger-
man, when *they are the sons or daughters of brothers.—Con-  [ *573 ]
sobrint and consobrine in a limited and strict sense denote
cousins german, who are the children of two sisters, quasi consororini.
___—-Amitini and amitine are cousins german, who are the children of a
brother on the one side and a sister on the other.——Sobrini and Sobri-
nee denote the children of cousins german in general. Propior sobrino
and propior sobrina denote the son ot daughter of a great-uncle or great-
aunt, paternal or maternal. Harris.

§ 4. Sextus gradus, p. 221. This section seems to distinguish inter
filium propriore sobrini, and nepotem sobrini; which however have
the same meaning. Hence Vinnius thinks that the words item proprius
sobrino sobrinave filius should be omitted. II est vrai (says Ferriere)
que si mon cousin issu de germain m/’est parent au sixieme degre, son
fils ne m’est parent qu’au septieme: c’est aussi ce qui est dit dans le. $
5. du titre precedent. Mais Justinien ne le compare pas ici avec mol,
qui suis le cousin issu de germain son pere, car nous serions au septie-
me; mais il le compare avec mon pere, qui lui est parent d’un degre plus

 
576 NOTES.

 

proche que moi, et qui est par consequent a son egard, parent au sixieme
degre. ‘

Tit. VIL. De servili cognatione, p. 222. Nostra constiutione: this is
not extant.

Tit. VIL § 2. De lege Papia, 226. This law was passed A. U. C.
761, in the consulship of M. Papius Mutilus, and Q. Poppzeus Secundus.
Hence it is sometimes called Ler Papia Poppea.

$ 3. De constitutione Justiniani, p. 226. Nostra constitutio. Not ex-
tant. Ex constitutione nostra repleatur. 1. omnimodo. Cod. 3. 28. de
inoff. testam. .

§$ 4. Quibus libertinis succeditur, p. 228. Nostra constitutione. Cod.
7, 6. de latina libertate tollenda.

Tit. IX. De assignatione libertorum, p. 230.

Censuisse senatum. Under Claudian, A. U. C. 798.

Tit. X. De bonorum possessionibus, p. 231.

This is a branch of the pretorian law, by which a right of succession
was granted, to all the property, estate, goods, chattels, rights and credits
of the deceased. Qua propter plurimum differt bonorum possessio a pos-
Sessione seu corporali detentione rerum, que facti est.1. 2.1. Dig. hoc.
tit. 1. 208. Dig. de verb. signif. Sed bonorum possessio tota juris est.

The bonorum possessio, was of various kinds, according to the condi-
tion and exigency of the claimants. Bonorum possessio, UNDE LIBERI:

UNDE LEGITIMI: UNDE COGNATI: SECUNDUM TABULAS: CONTRA
[ *574 ] *Tazutas: UNDE DECEM PERSONA: TANQUAM EX FAMILIA: unde

vir ET uxor:; confirming, supplying, correcting, or controvert-
ing the civil law.

The bonorum possessio, did not constitute an heir. Inst. 3. 10. 2.
The heir, is a creature of the civil, not of the pretorian law; though the
person so called to the succession by the pretor, had many of the rights
of an heir. But the heir under the civil law, held in absolute proprie-
torship, Inst. 2. 19. 7: the praetorian successor had the possession, and
the dominium utile, but not the dominium direction. 1. 1. cum. seg. Dig.
hoc titulo. 1.117. Dig. de reg. juris. 1.138. Dig. de verb. signif. It
was the right of claiming and recovering, and of retaiing the effects of
the deceased. Dig. h. tit. 1.3.§2. It might be demanded by Proctor,
which a heirship could not. Dig. 29. 2. 90. where for curatorem, read
procuratorem.

Succession per bonorum possessionem, must have been demanded of
the prestor: this was not necessary in case of heirship, wherein it was
only necessary to act. A heirship might be entered upon within 30
years. A preetorian succession must be claimed within one year by des-
cendants and ascendants, and a hundred days by other persons: Inst. 3.
10. 5. Succession per bonorum possessionem, was part of the equitable
: NOTES. B77

jurisdiction of the pretor. Thus by possession unde liberi, he aided the
rights of emancipated children ; calling them to the succession (cum onere
collationis) together with proper heirs, by unde cognati, he assisted the
natural pretensions of cognates who were before excluded: by secundum
tabulas, he supported a testament otherwise void by the civil law, by
calling in a posthumous stranger: contra tabulas, when a child was call-
ed to the succession, whose natural claims had been neglected and pass-
ed over by his father the testator: wnde vir et wxor, by which the surviv-
ing husband or wife succeeds in defect of kindred: unde legitimi when
parents or children (agnates) were called in, who would otherwise have
been excluded. Tanquam ex familia; to the patron, or his agnates.
Unde -decem persone, the enumeration of ten persons preferred by the
preetor to a stranger who had manumitted a filius familias under the an-
cient forms of contract and sale. Unde patroni patroneque, when pa-
trons were specifically called in to the succession of freed men: unde
cognati manumissoris: when cognates of a patron manumittor were ad-
mitted. Hence there are two pretorian successions in case of a testacy,
and eight in case of an intestacy. Concerning all of which see post
Inst. lib. IIL. tit. 10. $ 2 and 3.

Justinian abolished, wnde decem persone, tanquam ec familia, unde
patroni, and unde cog. manumitioris.

In the case of possession granted contra tabulas, the claimant, to whom

the succession was granted, was called upon to bring into
hotch *pot or common stock, all the property he had at any [ *575 |
time received of the testator by way of advancement; Cod.
6. 21. 12.16. This was the Corratio: bonorum possessio contra tabulas
cum onere collationis. Dig. 37.6.1. This Collatio, might have been
exacted also in cases of intestacy from descendants, whether of the male
or female side, (Nov. 18. 6.) but not from ascendants, collaterals, or mere
legatees. Cod. 6. 21.16. This was an exception to the general rule,
inter diverso jure succedentes, non est locus collationis.

“ Regularly those goods are brought into Collation or common fund,
(Cod. 6. 21. 12 and 16.) which came from the ascendant, while alive,
for the maintenance or provision of the descendant. But not gifts or
rewards for services, Cod. 6. 21. 10. and 20. 1. Nor the price of ransom
from captivity in war, Cod. 8. 51. 17. Though money paid for a fine,
or to save one from punishment, ought to be brought into contribution,
for the fault of one, ought not to be prejudicial to another. So the por-
tion, the jewels, the precious garments, the gold chains given to a daugh-
ter at marriage, Cod. 6. 21. 5. but not the expences of the marriage feast,
for that seems to be given for the credit of the father and not as a por-
tion; nor the charge of necessary education, for every child hath already

73
578 NOTES.

 

had such a share, nor the charge which a father hath been at in books
for his son, Dig. 10. 2. 50. Nor the charge that a father laid out for the
son that he might take,a degree, or acquire any other honourable title,
Dig. 37. 6. 16. for if the son dies, his successor can derive no advantage
by it. On this account, therefore, the cost expended in equipage for a son
to go to the wars, shall come to the common contribution, because he
receives pay from the public. Cod. 6.21.20.” Wood’s Inst. civ. law,
fol. 200. 201. ;

As to ApvancemenT, I have already referred to all the principal Eng-
lish cases on the subject. As to Horcn: pot, Collatio bonerum. In
partem positio, see Co. Litt. 177. Phiney v. Phiney, 2 Vern. 638. Ed-
wards v. Freeman, 1 Eq. Ca. ab. 249 —254. and 2 P Williams 445.
Hedges v. Hedges, Finch Pre. ch. 269. Hume et ux. v. Edwards ex.
&e. 3 Atk. 450. Finner v. Longland, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 253. Northey v.
Stranger, 1 P. Williams 340. and the Stat. of Distributions, 22 and 23
Ch. 2. ch. 10.

Jus bonorum possessionis.| ‘The bonerum possessio is not now in use
even in those countries, where the civil law prevails: for succession by
testament, or by law, comprehends every case. ‘Jus civile et pre-
*torium hodie in unam consonantiam redactum est; ideoque hujus tituli
“‘nullus amplius est usus: entenim, qui aliis ex testamento et ab intesta-

“to succedunt, in universum heredes appellari solent.”

[ *576 ] Groenewegen, *de legibus abrogatis h.t. In England, es-
tates in general, may be divided into two sorts, real and per-

sonal ; and successions to these two different kinds of estates are govern-
ed by different rules of law. But it is necessary to premise, that by
real estate is not commonly meant an estate in land in fee, i. e. descendi-
ble from a man to his heirs for ever, and that by personal estate are
meant estates in land, determinable upon years, money in the funds or
upon mortgages, plate, jewels, &c. and that such personal estate is gene-
rally comprehended, in technical and artificial language, under the terms
goods and chattels. Now in real estates there is no room for the bono-
rum possessio of the Roman law to take place in England ; for all such.
estates vest in and descend instantly to the heir, at the death of his an-
cestor; but in regard to goods and chattels the office of the ordinary or
ecclesiastical judge seems to be similar to that of the Roman pretor in
granting the possession of goods. For, when a man dies, who has dis-
posed of his personal estate by testament, the heirs or executors, ap-
pointed by that testament, must prove it before an ecclesiastical judge,
who by granting probate gives the possession of goods to the executors
secundum. tabulas, according to the will, or at least confirms them in the
possession already taken. Cowell, h. 1. And, when any person dies in-
NOTES. 579

 

testate, the ordinary (by virtue of 31 Edw. 3. chap. 11, and 21 Henry
8. chap. 5) grants the possession and administration of the intestate’s
goods to the widow or next of kin to such intestate, or to both, at his
direction. And by the 22d and 23d of Charles the second, cap. 10. it is
enacted, ‘‘that all ordinaries and ecclesiastical judges may call adminis-
“trators to an account and order pisTrtBuTion, after debts and funeral
‘expences are paid; to wit, one third to the widow of the intestate, and
“the residue among his children and those who legally represent them,
“if any of them are dead: that, if there are no children, or legal repre-
“sentatives of them, one half the intestate’s estate shall be allotted to
“the widow, and the residue to the next of kindred to the intestate in
‘equal degree, and those, who represent them: that no representation
“shall be admitted among collaterals after brothers and sisters children ;
“Cand that, if there is no wife, all shall be distributed among the child-
“ren; and if no child, tothe next of kin to the intestate in equal degree
‘“‘and their representatives.” And by 1 Jac. 2 cap. 17. it is enacted,
“that, if a brother or sister dies, each brother and sister, and their re-
‘‘ presentatives, shall have an equal share with the mother.” From all
which the analogy, between the civil law and the law of England, is
very observable. Harris.

*The Proem, Cur introducte bonorum possessiones; con- [ *577 ]
tains in Harris’s edition, the first section of Feérriere’s : which
begins at Quos auiem solus Pretor, &c. p. 232. of the present edition,
prope mediam paginam. :

$1. De speciebus ordinariis. Jus vetus, p. 233.

A nostra constitutione.| This constitution is not extant.

Extraneo manumissori.] ‘‘ Extraneus manumissor erat, qui non con-
tracta fiducia emancipasset.”. Mynsinger. h. 1.

Tanquam ex familia.| ‘ Puto familiam signifieari patroni ; i. e. hac
bonorem possessione vocari patroni agnatos.” Vinn. Harris.

$ 2. Jus novum, p. 233.

I have already dwelt sufficiently on the different kinds of bonorum
possessiones in the note to the beginning of this title.

Nostra constitutio.| Cod. 8. t. 49. 1. ult.‘ Haec constitutio, quam de
« emancipationibus conscripsit, imperator, omnibus parentibus et ma-
“ numissoribus presumptionem contracte fiducie admisit, ut ipsa
“ emancipatio tacité id in se habeat; meritd igitur preefata bonorum
*¢ possessio pro supervacua habenda est, cum extraneus posthac manu-
“ missor nullus inveniatur.” Theoph.

Per constitutionem nostram.] ‘ Hee est eadem greca constitutio, cu-
‘jus superius quoque aliquoties meminit imperator; et qua totam se
““eausam successionis libertorum plene definivisse testatur: non extat

~
580 NOTES.

 

“‘ hee constitutio, sed epitonem ejus nobis ex Basilicis representat Cuja-
“cius.” Lib. 20. obs. 34. Harris. ~ 7

The Basilica, were the new ordinances and code in Greek, began by
Leo Philosophus in 886, and finally published by Constantine Porphy-
rogoneta, in 920.

§ 4. De successorio edicto, p. 235. Certum tempus. Dig. 38.9. De
succ. edicto.

§ 5. De jure accrescendi et iterum, §c. p. 336. Ex successorio edicto.
Dig. 38. 9.

$ 5. Explicatio dicti temporis, p. 236.

Dies utiles.] “ Dies in jure nostro alii sunt continui, alii utiles. Con-
“tinui, qui siné interruptione, nullisque exceptis, currunt: utiles sunt
‘‘illi duntaxat, quibus experiundi sui juris potestas est; et hi neque ig-
“ noranti, neque agere non valenti, currunt, ff. 44. t. 3.1. 1 Vinn. The-
“oph. h. t.”’ Harris.

Tit. XT. De acquisitione per adrogationem, p. 237.

Formerly under the acquisition by adrogation, the adoptive father

succeeded to all the property of the son who was adopted
[ *578 ] by adrogation, *and died in that state. But latterly, the fa-

ther succeeded to the usufruct only, unless when the son died
impuber, and without children, and under power of his adoptive father.
$ 1. et ult. Cod. commun. de success.

$1. Quce hoc modo acquiruntur. Jus vetus, p. 237. ‘This is entitled
in Ferriere, Quceenam olim acquirebantur per adregationem.

Prohibuit nostra constitutio. Cod. 3. 33.16. De usufructu.

Freed men, were generally bound in services of labour to their pat-
rons, fabriles seu artificiales opere, which might be prolonged or com-
muted; and the right passed to the heir of the patron. Dig. 31. 10. 6.
Dig. 33. 2. 2. So duties of personal respect on account of the gift of lib-
erty conferred: these were attached to the person of the patron only.
Dig. 31. 10. 9. 1. juncto Cujacio, lib. 17.ch. 14. These did not cease on
the smaller change of state.

$ 2. Jus novium, p. 238. Ex constitutione nostra. Cod. 6. 59. ult.
Comm. de success. This section is entitled Quenam jure novo per adro-
gationem acquiruntur, in Ferriere. Justinian in this section has proper-
ly limited the rights of adoptive by those of natural parents; except in
the cases already mentioned of decease within puberty, without chil-
dren, and under power of the adoptive father.

Tit. XI. De eo cui libertatis causa bona addicuntur, p. 239.

$1. Rescriptum Divi Marci, p. 239. This requires, Ist, That the
application and adjudication shall be judicial. 2ndly, That there shall
be no heirs or persons called to the succession, civil or pretorian. 1. 1.
Cod. fideicom, libert. 3rdly, That the person petitioning, shall give se-
NOTES. 581

 

 

curity, if the adjudication be in his favour. 4thly, Thisrelates to liber-
ty given by testament.

§ 3. Ubi locum habeat, p. 241. This section is otherwise headed,
Quibus casibus huic rescripto locus est.

From the 4th circumstance just above mentioned, Cujas appears to be
right in supposing that instead of certe si intestatus decesserit, we ought
to read certe si testatus decesserit.

$7. De speciebus additis a Justiniano, p. 242.

Plenissima constitutio, Cod. 7. 2. 15. de test. manumiss.

Tit. XII. De successionibus sublatis, &c. p. 243. This section is
divided by Ferriere, at the words Erat et ex senatus consullo Claudi-
ano, &c.

Qualis fuerat bonorum emptio.| “ Bona debitoris, postquam aliquan-

““diu celeberrimis in locis proscripta pependissent, ex edicto prosideri ju-
‘“‘bebantur; de inde magister postulabatur et creabatur, per
“quem *distrahebantur et emptori addicebantur, quiomnibus [ *579 ]
“in solidum satisfaciebat: aut, antequam emeret, cum cre-
“ ditoribus de certa parte decidebat.’} Vid Theophilum in hunc locum,
“et Heineccii antiq. Rom. jur. lib. 2. tit. 17. This exact species of sale
is not in use in England; but there is a sale not very unlike it in the
case of bankrupts, whose estates and goods are sold and divided among
their creditors by commissioners, appointed for that purpose. Vid. 13
Eliz. cap. 7. 1 Jac. 1.cap.15. 21 Jac. 1. cap.19. 10 Ann. cap. 15.
7 Geo. 1. cap. 31. 5 Geo. 2. cap. 20.

Ex latioribus digestorum libris.| D. 42. t.5. Defrebus auctoritate
judicis possiendis. D.45.t. 4. Quibus ex causis in possessionem eatur.

Quod indignum nostris temporibus.] vid. Cod. 7. t. 24. De senatus-
consulto Claudiano tollendo. Harris.

Tit. XIV. De obligationibus, p. 244.

Justinian begins first with obligation, and then proceeds to those con-
tracts and agreements, from whence obligation arises. He confines it
within the bounds of practice, namely to that motive of action which the
sanction of the law presentsto us. The civil law indeed treats of duties
of imperfect obligation, but so far only as they are aided by the sanction
which the legislative or judicial authority may annex to them. Z

Obligation may be divided into moral obligation, or that which receives
its sanction foro conscientie alone: and civil obligation, or that which
receives its sanction from the positive law of political communities.

The true source and foundation of moral obligation, has long been a
diu vexata questio. With me it is settled: it has but one rational source
and foundation, self interest: our own happiness: our greatest and most
permanent good upon the whole.
582 NOTES.

I considered this subject at full length formerly, in an essay published
among a collection of essays on ethical and metaphysical subjects (1787):
and as I have had no reason hitherto to alter my opinion, I shall briefly
abridge that essay, and adopt the same view of' the argument here.

It is universally allowed, that in certain cases, I ought (morally speak-
ing) to act in a certain manner. But why ought I todo so? What is
the ultimate reason or motive which on an attentive consideration of the
subject should induce me to act in this, rather than in that manner?

Because, say some, :
'£ *580 ] *I. It is agreeable to the will of God. a ;
IL. To the eternal and necessary fitness and congruity of
things. 6

III. It is the dictate of the moral sense. ¢

IV. It is the dictate of common sense: of the jower evrvoces Ad

V. You are conscious of a sensation that impels you to do so. é

VI. Your understanding represents such an action to you as right,
and of course that you ought to do so. f

VII. It is agreeable to right reason. ¢

VUI. It is agreeable to the truth of things. A

IX. It is conducive to general utility. ¢

X. It is conducive to the bene esse, to your own greatest good upon the
whole. &

The above is the substance of the answers which the authors in the
notes may be supposed to give to the question.

 

a Acquinas, Occam, Scotus, Suarez, Hobbes, Leibnitz, Barbeyrac,
Warburton.

6 Grotius, Rust, Clarke, Balguy.

ce Hutcheson.

d Lord Herbert, Reid, Beattie and Oswald.

e Ellis.

J Cudworth, Butler, Adams, Price.

g Burlamagqui.

A Wollaston.

a Hume.

k Gastrell, Cumberland, Puffendorf,* Noitis,t Gay,f Turnbull, Ruthet-
forth,|| Soame Jenyns,{ Dr. Johnson.**,

* Law of N and N. book I. ch. iv. § 5 and the note thereon of Barbeyrac.

t Miscellanies, p. 214.

+ Preliminary Dissertation, and note to King’s Origin of Evil, p. 66.
quarto edit.

§ Note to Heineccius, p. 16.

\| Essay on Virtue, ch. vii. .

7 Origin of Evil, Letter IV.

** Review of Soamie Jenyn’s Origin of Evil, in the Miscellanies pub-
lished by Davies, 3 vols.
NOTES. 583

 

Each of these hypotheses, ‘except the last, admit of a further question.
You tell me I ought to act agreeably to the will of God—to the eternal
fitness of things—to the dictate of the moral sense, &c. &c? why ought
I todo so? It is evident that this question may be put rea-
sonably : *if so, the solution lies deeper than the hypothesis [ *681 ]
that admits of the question.

This question cannot reasonably, or consistent with common sense be
put on the 10th or last hypothesis, It is manifestly, palpably absurd to
ask, why ought I to pursue my own happiness? why ought I to follow
that course of conduct which upon the whole of my existence will most
effectually afford me the greatest sum of happiness? For in fact, are
not all our motives of action, founded upon this consideration? Does it
not arise from the very nature and constitution of man ?

Why should I obey the commands of God? Because it is my inter-
est so to do: I shall be happy if Ido, and miserable if Ido not. But
put the case, that any clear and precise command of the creator, would
upon the whole of my existence and all things considered, afford not a
balance of happiness but of misery, can I be under any obligation to
pursue it?—The controversy then, can only be settled, by an answer,
that does not reasonably admit of any further question; and this is it.

But in the course of education in civilized society, we are taught in-
cessantly by our parents and tutors, we hear in their conversations, and
in discourses from the pulpit, and we learn from our intercourse with
society even from our childhood, that certain conduct ought to be pursu-
ed, and certain actions ought to be shunned. That we should obey and
reverence our parents, love our kindred, perform acts of kindness to our
neighbours, speak truth, pay our debts, perform our promises, &c. &c. :
these complex associations give rise at length to that feeling that we call
conscience, and to the ideas of obligation and duty, which are associat-
ed with many actions that positive law cannot expediently embrace.
Actions that mankind generally agree, ought to be performed or abstain-
ed from, when not sanctioned by the laws of society, give rise to ¢mper-
fect obligations: actions that are enjoined or forbidden by those laws, are
called actions or duties of perfect obligation.

By the civil law, rights and duties of imperfect obligation, such as
arose from the acknowledged precepts of natural law, or the dictates of
conscience, or ex nudo pacto, (naked promises not binding for want of
consideration, ) although they could not of themselves support an action,
might be brought in aid of the law in certain cases. They gave rise to
compensation, or set off; to detention of a pledge; to fide jusston or ac-
tion against a guarantee to a constitutum, or promise founded on natur-
al obligation ; to nowaeions and to retention of money paid under a mis-
taken notion of its being legally due.
584 NOTES.

 

To instance each of these. As to compensation: A. owes B.a hun-
dred dollars, on a legal claim. B. owes A. fifty dollars, on a
[ *582 ] eongidieration *founded in morality, but not furnishing srountl
for suit: A, can set this off. Dig. 16, 2. 6. de compensatio- -

nibus.

Usury (interest for money) was not supported by the Roman law, un-
less where the loan had furnished a profit; Cod. 4. 32.26. Cod. 4. 34.
4, or where it was judicially decreed nomine pene for improper deten-
tion of the sum lent, or on account of fraud. Dig. 22. 1. 1. and 22. 1.
17. 3. Suppose, however, A. lends B. a hundred dollars upon interest,
and B. pledges a diamond ring for repayment: the promise to pay inte-
rest simply would be nude pact, but still as- promises ought to be per-
formed. Dig. 2.14.1. A. may retain the diamond, till interest as well
as principal be paid. Cod. de usuris. 1. 4.

As to fide jussion. An infant almost of age makes a promise, unsanc-
tioned by his tutor: this would support no action. A friend of. the in-
fant becomes his security for the performance. Here, notwithstanding
the maxim accessorium sequitur suum principale, the fide jussor or guar-
antee, is liable, because it is the dictate of natural equity that a promise
should be kept, although positive law will not enforce it. Dig. 46.
1. 2 and 6.

Constitutum, is a promise before the pretor to pay what was previ-
ously due, either by the promissor, or some other person for whom he
becomes surety. ° Such-a promise so solemnly made, was supported by
the pretorian action De pecunia constituta, Dig. 13. 5. 1. 7. quia grave
est fidem fallere, maxime ubi geminata fides est.

Novation. Dig. 46.2.1. [This is somewhat allied to the English
doctrine of extinguishment.]

Novation, is the transferring or conversion of one obligation into anoth-
er obligation, or from one person to another person. Thus, A. owes B.
a hundred dollars: this debt is transferred by consent to a pupil who
promises without authority of the tutor: ishe bound? Yes: for the
promise of the pupil though it will not support a suit, is founded upon a
promise that would support one: and this natural obligation of the pupil
to pay, is converted into a civil obligation, by being substituted for a
civil one: notwithstanding, Dig. 46. 2.20. which though it seems to look
the other way, does not furnish an objection. Pupillus quod sibi debe-
tur, non potest sine tutoris auctoritate novare ne scilicet conditionem suam
deteriorem faciat: but this is for his own sake,-and does not apply to a
case when the legal right of a third person is involved in the pact.

Repetition, or redemand of money paid without regular compulsion of
law, is prohibited where an imperfect obligation intervenes. Dig. 44. 7.
10. <A. by nude pact, promises to pay me a hundred dollars; he pays it
NOTES. 585

to me; but repenting, sues for the recovery, by condictio indebiti (action
for money had and received.) He cannot recover it, for he

*ought to keep his promise, and he has put me in possession ;, [1 *483 ]
of the money which he was under a natural obligation to

give me, though not a legal one. Dig. 12. 6.14 and 66. For the con-
ditio indebiti would not avail against money paid, which ex equo et bono
ought to have been paid. Dig. ub. sup.

This is like the cases of Brown v. M’Kinnally, 1 Esp. Ca. at N. P.
279. Burdon v. Webb, Ib. 528. Cartwright v. Rowley, Ib. 723.
Whether an express promise founded on an antecedent moral obligation
will support an assumpsit is discussed at length in note (a) to Wennall
v. Adney, 3 Bos. and Pull. 249. This doctrine of the Roman law is
adopted by Lord Mansfield, in Moses v. M’Farlane, 2 Burr. 1005. Dale
v. Sollet, Burr. 2133. and though the particular case of Moses v. M’Far-
lane, has been shaken by Marriot v. Hampton, 7 Term Rep. 269, yet
the general doctrine has never been denied. .

$1. Divisio prior. p. 244. The pretorian, is as much a part of the
Roman law, as the civil law. By the latter, technically speaking, is
meant the law of the 12 tables, the Plebiscites, the senatus consulta, the
imperial constitutions, and the responsa prudentum. ‘The pretorian

‘law, jus honorarium, is composed of the equitable decrees of the praetors
at various times: to which we owe many obligations not strictly com-
prehended in the above named sources of the civil law, such as the con-
stitutum, hypothecation, &c. ;

§ 2. Devisio posterior. p. 244.

By the Roman law there are two grand divisions of private conven-
tions, to wit, Conrracrs and Pacts. Contractus est Conventio habens
certum nomen, vel causam, sua natura obligationem ad agendum, effica-
cem producens. Dig. 2. 14. 7. 1 and 2.

Contracts between parties are so numerous, and so various, that the
civil law, unable to assign a specific denomination to every one, classed
by appropriate and distinct names, those contracts only which were
most generally in use in society. Hence contracts were divided into
nominate and innominate. Nominate contracts were such as the Com-
modatum,* Matuum,*Depositum, Pignus, Stipulatio, Emptio Venda-

 

* Commodatum: the loan of a specific thing, of which the ownership is
not changed, to be returned in good plight: as of a house, a horse ora
book. Matuum: a loan to be returned in kind, as money, grain, fruit, &c.
Depositum : bailment of a thing to be kept without reward for keeping it,
and to be returned in good plight. Pignus: a pawn of a moveable for
security of a creditor. Hypotheca : is a mortgage of the right to real

74
586 NOTES.

 

[ *584 ] tio, *Locatio, Conductio, Emphyteusis Societas, Mandatum,

fc. all which will be noticed in their turn. These had
their appropriate remedy by action founded upon them, Some of them
derived their obligation from natural, some from civil, and some from
pretorian law.

Nominate contracts -had also a four-fold classification. Ist, Ex re,
from something done. 2dly, Ez verbis, from something said. 3dly,
Ex literis, from something written. 4thly, Ex consensu, from something
agreed to.

In contracts also were considered the substance, the nature, and the
accidental parts of the contract; but I do not find any important con-
clusion dependant on this division.

Contracts were also divided into equitable contracts, ex @quo et bono,
and contracts stricti juris. Thus, if I sell an estate and deliver posses-
sion and the money is not paid me till long after it is due, I have a right
not merely to the principal, but also to interest for the detention of it.
To this class of contracts may be referred those of our own law that
admit of compensation when not literally fulfilled, and the cases of Cy
pres performance. Contracts of strict construction, are those where the
terms are precisely settled by the parties themselves; as the cases of
damage liquidated by the previous agreement of the parties, as so much
per acre for the ploughing up of meadow land, &c.

Innominate contracts, are those innumerable agreements, that depend
upon and include the peculiar circumstances that form the object of
them, and for which no certain or precise remedy was appointed but a
general action on the case only: actio in factum prescriptis verbis. Dig.
2.14.7.2. Dig. 19. 4. and Dig. 19. 5.

But for the more convenient division of this kind of contracts they
were classed thus. Do ut des: I give that you may give. Do wt faci-
as: I give that you may perform. Facto wt des: I perform that you
may give. Facio wt facias: I perform that you may perform.

The first is sale and barter: the second payment for work and labour
to be done, or services to be performed: the third work and labour, or
services, to receive payment: the fourth work and labour performed, or
services, rendered, for work and labour to be performed or services ren-
dered. This last had the remedy by action de dolo malo, annexed to it.
Dig. 4. 3. 18.

 

property, or things incorporeal; the debtor continuing in possession. Stip-
ulatio; a verbal contract by question and answer. Emptio Venditio:
buying and selling. Locatio Conductio: letting and hiring. Emphyteu-
sis: an improving lease. Mandatum: a commission or power. Societas :
partnership.
NOTES. 587

*In all these innominate contracts, the obligation to per- [ *585 ]
formance on one side, is founded on actual performance by
the other. Otherwise it amounts to no more than a mere promise, a
covenant, an agreement, a Pact, which the parties may be under a na- ~
tural, but under no civil obligation to perform. Dig. 2. 14. 7. 4. such a
pact is called nude (nudum pactum) when no consideration (causa) at-
taches to it; but obligation arises, when the one side by performance in
conformity to the agreement, suffers a loss, privation or inconvenience,
or the other side by accepting becomes benefitted and a gainer, either as
principal or surety.

Thus, 1 promise to give you one horse in exchange for another. This
is not binding on either side, till one of us perform his part of the agree-
ment. Then and then only, a consideration attaches to the pact, and an
obligation arises thereupon coextensive with the consideration. This is
like our doctrine of conditions precedent, where performance, or tender
of performance with a touts tems prest, must be set out.

In all these innominate contracts and nude pacts, time was allowed to
the parties to reconsider their agreement: locus penitentie. 'Thus, if I
tender my horse in lieu of a horse agreed to be given me by my neigh-
bour, and he takes no step thereupon to perform his part of the agree-
ment, I can send for my horse back and refuse to accede to the bargain.
In contractibus nominatis, penitentia locus est, rebus saltem integris, ita
ut is qui debit ob causam, alium statim obliget, ipse vero ei non obligatur
priusquam alter conventionem impleverit. Quapropter rebus integris
quod debit potest repetere, per condictionem causa data causa non secuta.
Que quidem actio non nascitur ex contractu, sed ex naturali equitate que
non patitur rem meam esse penes alium sine causa. Cod. de condict.
causa data, causa non secuta. Dig. 12.7.

There are some good observations on the locus penitentie in Lord
Kaimes’s principles of equity, Book 1. part 2. sect 7. and many cases
put where it appears to one that in equity it ought to be allowed.

Pacts, are divided into civil, pretorian and simple. Civil were. those
to which a civil right of action was subsequently attached, as to the
Donatio inter vivos by Justinian. Preetorian, such as the pretor gave
aright of action upon, as the Hypotheca, and the constitutum. Simple,
such as raised a natural obligation only to performance.

The doctrine of Nudum pactum has been long recognized in the Eng-
lish law. Bracton (who as Justice Wilmot says, interwove a great
many things out of the Roman law) divides pacta, conventa, into nuda
pacta and pacta vestita. Ch. 1. de actionibus. See also Br. ab. tit. ac-
tion sur le case. 40. Ib. Dette pl. 36. 79. 206. 11 H. 4, 32. a.

9. H.5.*14. 3H.6.36. 44F.3.21. Sharrington and [ *586 ]
588 NOTES.

 

Pledall v. Strotton Plow. 302. 308. 309. 7 and 8 El. Joselyn v. Laciere.
12 Mod. 295.

Wilmot in Pillans and Rose v. Van Mierop and Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1663,
inclines to think that where an obligation is deliberately entered into by
writing, that there can be no nudum pactum. The good. sense of this
opinion is rather pettishly contradicted by Skinner in his argument be-
fore the lords in Rann v. Hughes, reported in Br. Parl. Ca. and in the
note to Mitchinson v. Hewson, 7 Term Rep. 350. a. which settles -the
technical distinction of contracts, into contracts by parol (ineluding un-
sealed written contracts) and’ contracts by specialty. It is of no conse-
quence how the law is, when it is once known; but it was surely an al-
lowable mistake to suppose that a contract deliberately put down in
writing, was not a parol contract. Wilmot seems to have had in his
mind the obligatory effect given by the Roman law where the prescribed
forms of verbal stipulations were observed. See post. Inst. 3. 16. 1.
De verbis stipulationum. But among the Romans, the practice was to
put all nominate contracts and stipulations in writing, which when car-
ried to a magistrate were inserted inter acta, registered or recorded; and
the parties had a copy delivered to them under seal. ‘This was not the
case with mere pacts or promises, which might intervene by means of

any informal words, and between absent parties. Justice Wilmot’s opi-.

nion I apprehend is law in most nations on the continent. See the re-
ferences in Wood civ. law 206.

Although in the words of the lord chancellor in Middleton v. Kenyon,
2 Vez. junr. 408. ‘A bargain without consideration is a contradiction
in terms and cannot exist;” yet in England this does not apply to Ist,
Bargains entered into by writing under seal. 2dly, Mercantile or rather
negotiable paper when once negotiated by indorsement: for as between
the maker of a note and the payee, and the drawer of a bill and the
payee, equitable defences may be set up. The exception depends upon
its negotiability, and that negotiability is given by its being put into cir-
culation by indorsement. :

With respect to other parol contracts, whether verbal or written, we
have adopted in substance the civil law doctrine on this subject, and the
want of consideration will defeat a contract: but

Any labor, loss or inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff at the re-
quest of the defendant—any express promise to pay or perform what the
promissor was under a moral obligation of paying or performing; where-
on see Wennal v. Adney, 3 Bos. and Pull. 247. Any promise made
upon the strength of a consideration already passed, but originally enter-

ed into at the request of the promissor—or in consideration
[ *587 ] of services *to be rendered on a future day—or in considera-

 

é
NOTES. 589

 

tion of any permission given by which the promissor is benefitted—
or any voluntary performance of an act beneficial to the promis-
sor, which the performer was legally compellable to perform, as in
case of a surety—will support:an action of assumpsit.

But though natural affection, be sufficient to raise a use, aid a trust, or
support a deed, (Myddleton ». Lord Kenyon, ub. sup.) it will not sup-
port an assumpsit: nor will love between the sexes.

But considerations founded on promise of marriage, will support a
subsequent promise. Argenbright v. Campbell, and wife, 3 Hen. and
Munf. 184. Cro. El. 59.

See on all the points, and the other parts of the doctrine of considera-
tion when coupled with assumpsit, the modern compilers. Comyns. Dig.
Powel on contracts, Espinasse and Selwyn’s, law of nis. pri.: and
Comyns, on contracts.

The subject is but meagerly treated in Pothier. The equitable nature
of the action for money had and received, is treated in Moses v. M’Far-
lane, 2 Burr. 1005. Hawkes v. Saunders, Cowp. 290.4

I think the following rules collected by Wood (p. 207) for the con-
struction of contracts, worth inserting in this place.

These rules ought to be observed in the interpretation of contracts.

b The agreement in a eontract is the law of it.

c The beginning -and consideration of every contract is to be consid-
ered.

d If the sense of the contract is obscure, that sense must be followed
which is most likely and probable, or most according to common prac-
tice.

e In doubtful cases the mildest interpretation is the safest.

*f All parts of the contract ought to be explained, the one [ * 578 ]
by the other, and regard ought to be had to the preamble
of it.

 

b Contractus legem ex Conventione accipiunt. D. 16. 3. 1. 6.

c Uniuscujusque contractus initium spectandum est, et causa. D. 17. 1.
8. Hoc servabitur quod initio convenit. D. 50.17.23. Cujusque Rei po-
- tissima pars Principium est. D. 1. 2. 1.

d Jn obscuris inspici solere quod verisimilius est, aut quod plerumque
fieri solet. D. SC. 17. 114.

e Semper in dubiis benigniora preferenda. D. 50. 17. 56.

In re dubia benigniorem interpretationem sequi non minus justius est,
quam tutius. D. 50.17. 192.1. Semper in obscuris quod minimum est,
sequimur. D. 50. 17.9. Eligendum est quod minimum habet iniquitatis.
D. 50. 17. 200.

f Plerunmque ea que in prefactionibus convenisse concipiuntur, etiam in
stipulationibus repetita creduntur. D. 45. 1, 134. 1.
590 _ NOTES.

 

g If the intention of the Parties does evidently appear, the intention
ought to be followed rather than the words or literal sense ; and some-
times regard ought to be had to the custom of the country.

h If the terms of a contract are equivocal, that meaning ought to be
followed which relates to the subject of the agreement.

i Interpretation onght to be in favour of him that is to be obliged by
the covenant. For he that is obliged may be presumed that he designed
to perform the least. And it was the other’s fault that he did not express
himself in better terms.

k If an agreement is in the disjunctive, he that is to be bound hath his
election.

1 Sometimes conjunctive words are to be taken disjunctively, where
the sense leads to it.

m Those expressions which cannot be understood in any sense ought
to be rejected, as if they had never been written.

n Superfluous words do not make a writing void.
[ *589 ] *o Express words sometimes are prejudicial, which, if omit-
ted, had done no harm,

 

g Inambiguis orationibus maxime sententia spectanda est ejus qui eas
protulisset. D. 50.17.96. In conventionibus ‘tontrahentium voluntatem
potius quam verba spectari placuit. D. 50. 16. 219.

Semper in Stipulationibus et in ceteris contractibus id sequimur quod
actum est. Aut si non appareat quid actum est, sequamur quod in Regi-
one, in qua actum est, frequentatur. D. 50. 17. 32.

h Quoties idem sermo duas sententias exprimit, ea potissimum accipia-
tur que rei gerendz aptior est. D. 50.17.67. Quoties in Stipulationibus
ambigua Oratio est, commodissimum est id accipi, quo res de qua agitur in
tuto sit. D. 41. 1. 80.

i In Stipalationibus cum queritur quid actum sit, verba contra stipula-
torem interpretanda sunt. D. 45.1. 38.18. Pactio obscura vel ambigua
Venditori et qui locavit nocere placet, in quorum fuit potestate legem aper-
tius conscribere. D. 2. 14. 39.

k Ubi verba conjuncta non sunt, sufficit alterutrum esse factum. D. 50.
17, 110, 3. °

1 Conjunctio nonnunquam pro disjunctione accipitur. D. 50. 16. 21.

m Que ita sunt scripta ut intelligi non possunt, perinde sunt ac si scrip-
ta non essent. D. 50. 17. 73. 3.

n Non solent que abundant vitiare scripturas. D. 50. 16.94. Que du-
bitationis tollendz causa contractibus inseruntur, Jus commune non ledunt.
D. 50. 17. 81.

o Expressa nocent, non expressa non nocent. JD. 50. 17. 195.
NOTES. 591

 

p If the error of the notary in writing is apparent, the contract ought
to be supported.
q In all contracts, where no day of performance is added, the perform-
ance ought to be presently.
rt He that is to pay, or deliver, is in no delay, till after the last moment
of the day appointed.
s A time is fixed for the sake of him that is to be obliged.
‘t No one ought to be answerable for inevitable accidents, unless he
entered into covenant to stand to them.
u Everything may be dissolved by an act contrary to that which at
first made it.
w No one can do an act to himself; as one cannot mortgage to him-
self, or buy, &c. what is his own. ie
x The agreements of private persons are not valid, if they are derog-
atory to the public interest.
y Those that do mistake do not consent.
*z What is prejudicial to the Parties contracting, is preju- [ *590 ]
dicial to their heirs or successors.
a No Man is cheated that knows it and consents to it.

 

p Si Librarius in transcribendis Stipulationis verbis errasset, nihil nocet.
D. 50. 17. 92.

q In omnibus obligationibus in quibus dies non ponitur, presenti die de-
betur. D. 50. 17. 14.

r Totus dies arbitrio solventis tribui debet. I. 3. 16.2.

s In stipulationibus promissoris gratia tempus adjicitur. D. 50. 17. 17.

t Que sine culpa accidunt a nullo prestantur. D. 50. 17. 23.

u Nil tain naturale est quam eo genere quodque dissolvere, quo coliga-
tum est. D. 50. 17.35. Omnia que jure contrahuntur contrario jure pere-
unt. D. 50.17. 100. Fere quibus cunque modis obligamur in contrarlum
actis, liberamur, et cum quibus modis acquirimus, jisdem in contrarium ac-
tis amittimus. D. 50. 17. 153. ;

w. Neque pignus, neque depositum, neque precarium, neque emptio, ne-
que locatio rei sue consistere potest. D. 50. 17. 46. |

x Privatorum conventio Juri publico non derogat. D. 50 17.45. 1—
Utilitas publica preefertur contractibus privatorum. D. 12. 63. 3.

y Non videntur, qui errant, consentire. D. 50.17. 116. 2. In omnibus
Rebus que Dominium transferunt, concurrat opportet Affectus ex utraque
parte contrahentium. OD. 44. 7. 56.

z Quod ipsis qui contraxerunt obstat, et successoribus eorum obstabit.
D. 50. 17. 148. Non debeo melioris Conditionis esse quam auctor meus.
D. 60. 17.175.1.

a Nemo videtur fraudare eos qui sciunt et consentiunt. D. 50. 17. 145.
592 NOTES.

 

b An obligation to perform what is impossible is void.
c. He that is to bear the loss of any thing, ought to receive the profit:
of it.
d He that contracts with another, ought to know who he deals with
his state and condition.
e An agreement to cheat is not valid.
f No one ought to enrich himself by doing injustice to others.
*No man shall take a benefit of his own wrong.
g Contracts against law and good manners are not to be observed.
h No one ought to be suffered to act against his own agreement.
i If one confirms what has been done in his name, he shall be esteem
ed to have given a commission for it.
[ *591 J *k The solemn form of contracts cannot be altered by pri-
vate agreement, though the accidental circumstances may bi
altered.
1 A legal contract may continue in force, though a case afterward:
happens from whence it could not commence.

 

b Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. D. 50. 17..185. Ea que dari im
possibilia sunt, vel que in rerum natura non sunt, pro non adjectis haben
tur. D. 50. 17. 135. vid. D. 50. 17. 182. and 188.

c Secundum naturam est commoda cujusque Rei eum sequi quem se
quvntur incommoda, et e contra. D. 50.17.10. Ex. qua persona quis lu
crum capit, ejus factum prestare debet. D. 50. 17. 149.

d Qui cum alio contrahit vel est, del esse debet, non ignarus conditioni:
ejus. D. 50. 17. 19.

e Non valet si convenerit ne Dolus prestetur. D. 50. 17. 23.

f Jure nature equum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri locu.
pletiorem. D. 50..17. 206.

* Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam Conditionem facere potest. D
50. 17. 134. 1.

g Pacta que turpem causam continent non sunt observanda. D.2. 14
27. 4.

h Nemini licet adversus pacta sua venire et contrahentes decipere. C
2. 3. 29.

i Si quis ratam habuerit quod gestum est, obstringitur mandati actione
D. 50. 17.60. Ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato comparatur. X. dk
Reg. Juris. 10.

k Nec ex pretorio nec ex solenni Jure privatorum conventione quicquan
immutandum est, quamvis obligationum cause pactione possunt immutar
et ipso Jure. D. 50. 17. 27.

1 Non est novum ut que semel et utiliter constituta sunt, durent licet ille
casus extiterit, a quo initium capere non potuerunt. D. 50. 17. 85. 1.
NOTES. . 593

‘m A debtor is rather to be favoured than a creditor.

n Creditors upon good consideration ought to be paid before those that
claim by gift, &c.

o He that has been forgiven a debt may be supposed to have received
so much money.

p It is one thing to sell, and another thing to consent to a sale ; where
there is a different reason for it, or where the consent is to be from a dif-
ferent person.

q He that may alienate may consent to the alienation, where there is
the same reason for the one as well as the other.

r He that may give a thing, may sell it, unless a particular law for-
bids it.

s No one takes away a thing by force that pays the full price of it.

t The creditor of my creditor cannot make a demand of me by pay-
ing my debt.

*u He that delays to pay what is due, pays lessthanis [ *592 ]
due.

w He ceases to be a debtor that has a good exception or plea in his
defence. :

x He does not delay payment who is willing and urgent to try the
right.

 

m Favorabiliores Rei potius quam Actores habentur. D. 50. 17. 38.
Cui damus Actiones, eidem exceptionem competere multo magis quis
dixerit. E. 50. 17. 156. 1.

n In re obscura melius est favere repetitioni quam adventitio lucro. D.
50. 17. 41. 1.

o Si quis obligatione liberatus sit, potest videri cepisse. D. 50. 17, 115.

p Aliud est vendere, aliud vendenti consentire. D. 50. 17. 26.

q Cum quis alienare, p oterit et alienationi consentire. D. 50. 17. 165.

x Cujus est donandi, eidem et vendendi et concedendi jus est. D. 50.
17. 163.

s Nemo predo qui pretium numeravit.. D. 50. 17. 126.

t Nemo ideo obligatur quia recepturus est ab alio quod prestiterit. D.
50. 17. 171.

u Minus solvit qui tardius solvit. Nam et tempore minus solvit. D.
50. 16. 12. 1. Plus est statim dare, minus est post tempus dare.. I. 3.
.20. 5.

w Desinit Debitor esse is qui nactus est exceptionem justam, nec ab
zquitate naturali abhorentem. D. 50. 17. 66.

x Qui sine dolo malo ad Judicium provocat, non videtur moram facere.
D. 50. 17, 63. ‘

 

75
594 NOTES.

y The creditors are not defrauded if a debtor does not improve his e:
tate, but when he alienates a part of it.

z He isdefrauded who is hindered from advantages that might hav
been made, as well as from present profit. :

a In buying and selling, the law of nature connives at some cunnin;
and over-reaching in respect of the price.

b No one is supposed to be deceived while he acts according to law

c The same thing cannot be demanded twice of the same person b
virtue of the same obligation.

d In contracts the heir is answerable for the frauds of the decease:
where there is a covenant to bind him. ;

e No one can havea title by the fraud of another that acts fi
him.
[ *593 ] *f Fraud is not to be judged of by the event only, bi
also by the design.

g He who is persuaded that he has a right, may be guilty of a mi
take, and not of deceit.

h He that promises to pay, must have so much time allowed for pa:
ment, as the distance of the place, or the nature of the thing promise
does require.

 

y Non fraudantur Creditores cum quid non acquiritur a Debitore, s¢
cum quid de bonis diminitur. D. 50. 17. 134.

z Generalitur cum de Fraude disputatur non quod habeat Actor, sed qu
per Adversarium habere non potuit, considerandum. D. 50. 17. 78.

a In pretio emptionis et venditionis naturaliter licet contrahentibus ;
circumvenire. D. 4. 4. 16. 4.

b Non capitur qui Jus publicum sequitur. D. 50. 17. 116. 1.

c Bona fides non patitur ut bis idem exigatur. D. 50.17.57. Quoti
concurrunt plures Actiones ejusdem rei nomine, una quis experiri debi
D. 50. 17. 43. 1. ;

d In contractibus quibus Doli pretatio vel bona fides inest, Heres in so
dum tenetur. D. 50.17. 152. In contractibus successoris ex dolo eoru
quibus successerunt, non tantum in id quod pervenit, verum etiam in, so
dum tenentur. D. 50. 17. 157. 2.

e Alterius circumventio alii non prebet auctionem. D. 50. 17. 49.

f Fraudis interpretatio semper in Jure Civili non ex eventu duntaxat si
ex consilio quoque consideratur. D. 50. 17. 79.

g Nemo videtur dolo exequi, qui ignorat causam cur non debeat pete
D. 50. 17. 177. 1.

h Nihil peti potest ante id tempus quo per rerum naturam persolvi po
sit. D. 50. 17. 186.
NOTES. 595

 

iA madman cannot contract at all, no, not with the consent of his
guardian ; but a minor above seven years of age may contract by him-
self, where it is to his own advantage; and in all cases with the consent
of his guardian when he is above that age.

Thus far of obligations, covenants and contracts in general.

Tit. XX. $1. De mutuo, p. 245. Loan. This is a nominate con-
‘tract, stricti juris, unilateral. The remedy is by personal action: certi
condictio. Dig. 12. 1.

Hence interest is not due unless by express stipulation, or agreement.
Dig. 22.1.3 and 30. Dig. 16. 3.261. It relates to perishable articles
chiefly; res fungibiles ; quarum una alterius vice fungitur, as wine for
wine: grain for grain: money for money.

The borrower has the property in the thing lent: herein the mutuum
differing from the commodatum. Mutuwm, as the civilians say quaintly,
quia ex meo tuum fit.. Herein, it is required, 1st, that the loaner should
own the commodity with power of disposal: 2ndly, in case of loss, it
falls on the borrower.

§ 2. De indebito soluto p. 245. This is agreeable to the general prin-
ciple, In re obscura melius est favere repetitioni quam adventitio lucro.
It is more expedient to favour the Plaintiff in re-demanding what ought
not to have been received, than the accidental or adventitious gain of
the defendant. See further on the subject of this section, post. Inst. 3.
28. 6 & 7.

*The condictio indebiti, approaches more nearly than any [ *594 ]
other form of action in the Roman law, to our action for
money had and received; and the leading principle of that action is
stated in the present section, viz. si adparet cum dare opportere ; if the
defendant ought, as an honest man, to pay the money.

The law laid down in the present section, that money paid by Mis-
TAKE whether of fact or law may be re-demanded (repetita) if in justice
it ought to be repaid, is acknowledged not only in Tomkins v. Barnet,
1 Salk. 22. Moses v. M‘Farlan, 2 Burr. 1012. Farmer v. Arundel, 2
Sir W. Black. Rep. 824 Bize v. Dickason, 1 Term Rep. 286. Buller v.
Harrison, Cowp. 565. Stevenson v. Mortimer, Cowp. 806, but in the
later decisions also of the English law. Thus, in Townson v. Wilson,
et al., 1 Camp. N. P. Rep. 396, assumpsit lies against Parish officers by
the putative father of a bastard child, to recover the surplus of money
paid to them as an indemnification for expences, the child soon after dy-

 

i In negoiiis contrahendis alia causa habita est Furiosorum, alia eorum
qui fari possunt, quamvis Actum rei non intelligerent. Nam Furiosus nul-
lum negotium contrahere potest: Pupillus omnia Tutore authore agere po-
test. D. 50. 17, 5.
596 NOTES.

 

ing. So, no action can be maintained upon a note given by such puta-
tive father, beyond the amount of damnification. Cole v. Gower, 6
East, 110. Wild v. Griffin, 5 Esp. Ca. 141,: agreeable to the rule of the
Roman law, that condictio indebiti non datur ultra quem locupletior fac-
tus est qui accepit. Dale v. Sollet, 3 Burr. 2133.

So in Buck v. Buck, 1 Campb. 547, the ground whereon the court
nonsuited the plaintiff was the illegality of the transaction, and plain-
tiff and defendant being in pari delicto, there was no reason to contra-
vene the rule melior est conditio possidentis: this conforms with Tom-
kins v. Bennet, cited 1 Viner, 269: see also Howson v. Hancock, 8 Term
Rep. 575. ;

So in Rogers v. Kelly, 2 Campb. 123. The same principle was con-
tended for, viz. that money mistakenly paid may be recovered: but the
nonsuit proceeded on the action being brought against the wrong per-
son.

The general principle is also laid down by Shippen in Levy v. B. of
U. States, 1 Binn. 27.

Bur were both parties are under a common mistake, the one can-
not recover of the other, if the person suing has derived any benefit
whatever from the transaction. Taylor v. Hare, 1 New Rep. (4 Bos. &
Pul.) 260. ; /

Nor can money paid with full knowledge at the time of all the cir-
cumstances of law and fact, be recovered back. Bilbie v. Lumley and
others, 2 East, 4, 69. Cartwright v. Rowley, 2 Esp. Rep. 723. Knibs
v. Hall, 1 Esp. Rep. 84. Brown v. M‘Kinally, [b. 279.

Nor can money be redemanded, if it be paid where the law would not

eompel payment, but where natural equity would dictate it.
[ *595 ] Bize v. *Dickinson, 1 Term Rep. 286. Astley v. Reynolds,

Str. 915. Farmer v. Arundell, 2 Sir W. Bl. Rep. 824. Mo-
ses v. M‘Farlan, 2 Burr. 1012.

Were money is paid by a person deceived, he may recover it. Has-
ser v. Wallis, 1 Salk. 28. 289. Thomas v. Whip, Bull. N. P. 130. 35.

Wuere money has been paid under judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction, it cannot be recovered. The great case of Moses and Mac-
ferlan, 2 Burr, 1005, in which Ld Mansfield traced the liberal principles
that ought to govern the action for money had and received, has not met
with the perfect sanction of the profession. It was shaken in principle
by Marriot v. Hampton, 7 Term Rep. 269. and Brown v. M’Kinally, 1
sup. and Ch. J. Eyre strongly combats the form of action in Philips v.
Hunter, 2 Hen. Black. 416. The old cases are discordant; see Barebone
v. Brent; Mead v. Death and Pollard; and Sir Rich. Newdigate v. Davy,
cited by Viner, 1 Vin. ab. 268. 269. from Vern. 176. 1 Salk. 22. Lord
Ray. 742. I fully concur with the principles of Lord Mansfield’s deci-
NOTES. 597

 

sion in Moses v. Macfarlan. ‘The court of conscience determined, that
they were not competent to enter into a consideration of the agreement
set up as a defence against the indorsements. The money therefore, was
not recovered by Macfarlan against Moses by the judgment of “a court
of competent jurisdiction :” else, I allow, it would be conclusive. If my
suit depends upon considerations, which the court before whom J am
brought, is prohibited from discussing, surely my case has not been de-
termined by their passing upon evidence incomplete and imperfect, not
from any fault or neglect in me, but incapacity in them. The form of
‘ action, in my opinion, sufficiently embraces the principle of the case.

Wuere money has been paid on a void authority it may be recovered.
Lamine v. Dorrell, 2 Lord Raym. 1216. Sir Rich. Newdigate v. Davy,
1 Lord Ray. 742. Bull. N. P. 133, which was for money formerly re-
covered in the high court of commissioners temp. Jas. 2: Feltham v.
Terry, Cowp. 419. Lot 207. where money was paid to an overseer on a
conviction afterwards quashed. Jacob v. Allen, 1 Salk. 27. where the
attorney of an administrator improperly appointed, was held liable to an
Executor.

But see the following cases which are at first sight adverse to these
last mentioned decisions. Pond v. Underwood, 2 Lord Ray. 1210.
Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1986. Allen v. Dundas, 3 Term Rep. 125.
The question is, whether the person or the court who gave the authori-
ty, were competent to give it, at the time when it was given. If so, mo-
ney received under such an authority is not recoverable again by the
person paying it: otherwise it is.

*Money paip on a consideration that has failed, or on a [ *596 ]
contract not performed, may be recovered, per Ashurst in
Stratton v. Rastall,2 Term Rep. 369.

So in cases of contracts for the sale of houses and lands, where they
are not completed, or where the title is defective. The cases herein ci-
ted by Comyns (on contr. 2d Vol. p. 52. N. seq.) I shall merely enu-
merate for the present, Burrough v. Skinner, 5 Bur. 2. 2639. Flurean
v. Thornhill, 2 BL Rep. 1078. Richards v. Barton, 1 Esp. N. P. Rep.
268. Camfield v. Gilbert, 4 Esp. N. P. Rep. 223. Chambers v. Griffiths,
et al. 1 Esp. N. P. Rep. 150. compared with Johnson v. Johnson, 3. Bos.
and Pull. 162. Hunt v. Silk, 5 East 449, Farru v. Nightingal, 2 Esp.
N. P. Rep. 629. Elliot ». Edwards, 3 Bos. and Pull. 181. Alpass v.
Watkins, 8 Term Rep. 516. Bree v. Holbeach, Doug. 654. Cripps v
Reade, 6 Term Rep. 606. Robinson v. Anderton, Peake’s N. P. Ca. 94.
Gunnis et al. v. Erheart, 1 Hen. Bl. Rep. 289. All these cases are cited
in the same order by Comyns. :

I forbear to notice here the question of damages in case of eviction,
because although connected with this part of the subject, it may be more

 
598 NOTES.

eee 3 eS ee
properly treated under the head of bargain and sale, or the action ex
empto. Ae

This Action lies in England for money paid on purchase of annuities,
where title is not ready to be tendered on the day agreed on. See the
cases in 2 Comyns Contr. 66. .

Cases where this action has been brought to recover money received
on contracts, rescinded or not performed, depend upon the actual rescind-
ing or putting an end to the contract itself. If one of the parties is
empowered to do this, or if both parties consent that it shall be done,
then the action for money had and received may be brought: but if the
contract still continue open, the remedy is an action for damages, where-
in the contract must be stated and breaches assigned. ‘Towers v. Bar-
rett, 1 Term Rep. 134. 1 Com. Dig. 134. citing 3 Lev. 364. Weston v.
Downey, Doug. 23. Power v. Wills, Cowp. 818. Payne v. Whale, 7
East. 274. Cooke v. Munstone, 4 Bos. and Pull. 351. Dutch v. War-
ren, Str. 406. 2 Burr. 1010. Holmes v. Hall, 6 Mod. 161. Hogan »v.
Shee, 2 Esp. Rep. 522. Giles v. Edwards, 7 Term Rep. 181. Dewbury
v. Chapman, Comber. 341. Holts’ Rep. 35.

Comyns under this head states the case of fee received by counsel for
business not performed, which are not considered as recoverable in this
action.

Notwithstanding a dictum in Marsh v. Kavenford, Cro. El. 59 and a

case in 2 Leon. 111. fee to counsel are now considered as
[ *597 |] quiddam *honorarium ; a present, not a payment; and they

are not recoverable by legal suit if not paid, nor subject to
repetition when they have been paid. Thornhill v. Evans, 2 At. 332. 3
Bl. Comm. 28. Turner v. Philips, Peake’s cas. N. P. 122. Chorley v.
Bolcott, 4 Term Rep. 317. The fees of physicians are on the same foot-
ing; but this rule does not extend to surgeons, apothecaries, attorneys,
solicitors or proctors, who may demand by this action pay for their ser-
vices. In the courts of Pennsylvania the practitioners act in the capa-
cities of attorneys and counsel also, and can demand fees as I apprehend,
in the former capacity only. But if a fee be given as a consultation fee,
a retaining fee, or for legal advice, these will be sufficient considerations
to prevent the repetition of it. That a fee may be recovered from an
attorney in whatever capacity acting, paid beforehand for the perform-
ance of business not subsequently performed, has been directly deter-
mined in our courts. [In England, no action will lie by a counsellor at
law, to recover fees for his services. But in Pennsylvania and in New
York, it has been expressly decided, that a counsellor may bring his ac-
tion for the recovery of a compensation for his services, the same as an

attorney or solicitor. 2 Penn. Rep.75. Adams v. Stevens, 26 Wendell
451.]

 
NOTES. 599

 

At Rome, the counsel (Defensores) were the Patroni, who were the
orators and pleaded the cause : Advocati, assistant counsel : Procuratores,
proctors, managed the affairs of absent clients, under special authority :
the Negotiorum: Gestores, were agents, or attornies in fact, under a gen-
eral appointment: Cognitores, transacted the business of clients who
were on the spot. For a long time the patroni, received no fee as such
for any particular cause; but it was the custom for their clients to make
them presents, and bequeath them legacies. Cicero mentions it to the
honor of Lucullus, that he received great sums in this way; and boasts
that he himself had gained by this single article about £200,000 sterling.
Nepos also mentions the sums so given to Atticus, as much to his credit.
Middleton’s life of Cicero, V. 2. p. 514. In the time of Cicero, only one
counsel was allowed on a side: hence he occupied four days in his ora-
tion pro Cluentio, according to Pliny, Ep. L. 1 Ep. 20.

In the time of Pliny the younger, there were two allowed in cases of
impeachment: but they had their portion of time assigned to them.
Plin. Ep. L. 2 Ep. and Lib. 4. Ep. 9. In his time also, they received
fees; and the senior counsel were accustomed to take into causes, the
younger members of the bar. Ib. Lib. 6. Ep. 23. But by some of the.
later emperors the practice of taking fees, was strictly prohibited. In
Justinian’s time the fee Prenium Honorarium, was not to exceed 100
aurei, foreach cause. Dig. 50. 13.1.12. But if nothing was given or
promised, they might sue for a reasonable compensation. Their office
was publici juris, and they might be compelled to act. Cod. 2. 6. 7.
Cod. 1.16.7. Dig. 3.1.4. Students underwent an exam-
ination. *Cod. 2.8.3. Cod. 2. 7.8. and 17. If counsel [ *598 ]
used abusive language, or defended their client by false state-
ments, or betrayed his cause, (Prevaricatores) they were suspended, re-
moved or otherwise punished. Cod. 2.6.6. Dig. 48.10.13. 1. Cod.
3.1.14. Cod. 2.7.1. There was a treasury advocate, similar to our
attorney general; a salary officer, employed in public prosecutions. Cod.
2.9. 4. and 10. 11. 5.

Notorious criminals were not allowed advocates. Cod. 3. 12. 8. this
seems to be the origin of the English practice, where counsel allowed to
a defendant in a criminal cause, is er gratia. Criminals were bound to
appear. Dig. 48. 1. 3.

In England, and in this country also, as I presume, the Courts inter-
fere in a summary way respecting’ the conduct of the bar. ‘Turner »,
Philips, ub. sup.

Money had and received will lie for premiums paid on marine insur-
ance, in cases dependant upon condition—where no risk has been run
—é&c. &c. whereon consult 2Comyns contr. 86. and the compilers on in-
surance for reference to the cases, Park, Marshall, &c.
600 NOTES.

Z

The action lies to recover back money paid on an illegal contract not
executed, and when the suit aids the spirit of the law, by proceeding in
disaffirmance of the contract. See the cases collected by Comyns, 2
Com. Contr. 108. et seq.

Sometimes the right to an office may be tried by indebitatus assump-
sit against the present holder of it, to recover the legal fees received: and
here also I refer to Comyns’s collections of the cases; which I have
adopted, not for the purpose of borrowing from a book that descrves to be
popular among the profession, but because his arrangement gives me an
opening for observations that I can the more appropriately introduce.

I wish money had and received, had been brought long ago for fees,
in case of removals from office, by the governors of this state; for there
are so many objections to the practice, that I cannot consider the right of
removal as fully settled even at this day. It is indeed a crying evil;
tending in the last degree to degrade and demoralize the political charac-
ter of the citizens; exciting and fostering an inexorable spirit of political
party, of selfish and insidious hostility, of avaricious and ambitious tur-
bulence, destructive of private harmony and public confidence, and it’
threatens to fill the offices that ought to be the rewards of knowledge,

experience, and good character, with men who have nothing
[ *599 ] to recommend them but noisy insolence and servile *igno-

rance. I most sincerely wish the constitution itself could be
freed from the imputation of giving sanction to this practice. Therefore,
whatever may be the result of the attempt, I shall offer a few considera-
tions to show that some doubts may be entertained, whether a fair con-
struction of that instrument will justify the practice in question.

By Section 8. Article 2. of the constitution of Pennsylvania, the
governor has a general power of appointing ‘‘all officers, whose offices
are established ‘by that constitution, or shall be established by law, and
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.”’

Can he make an appointment for a less term than for life, under the
power thus given to him by the constitution? For he has no other
power in this respect, than what he derives from the words above quot-
ed. The law of April 3, 1804, ch. 2501, contains nothing to affect this
question.

The constitution is a part of the law of the land; and must be con-
strued according to the common rules of construing all legal instruments
assigning powers, conferring privileges, or enjoining duties; to wit, in
the way most likely to promote the public good, and least likely to in-
fringe on the liberties of the people. The governor of the state is (not
the servant, but) the agent of the people: and his powers, privileges,
and duties, are to be construed, not in the way most servicable to his
NOTES. 601

interest, but to their’s. Premising these observations, I submit to the
reader, that

Ist, A power to appoint to an office that is vacant, does not imply a
power to remove from an office that is filled.

2dly, A power to appoint to public offices becoming vacant, is neces-
sary to the public good, which requires them to be filled: but the power
to remove a deserving officer, may serve to gratify private animosity,
‘or promote electioneering interests, or remunerate electioneering services,
but it is not necessary for the public good. The puddic interest requires
no other condition to the appointment, than dene se gesserit, so long as
the person appointed shall behave himself well. 2 Anstruth. Rep. 620.
621. Deverell’s case.

3dly, A power to appoint generally, does not imply a power of re-
moval according to modern as well as ancient decisions. Co. Litt. 233.
a. b. 1 Sid. 74. 2. Anstr. 619. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 157. et
seq.: this latter case seems to me to afford strong reasons in favour of
my position. See also 3 Mass. Rep. 160.

Athly, A power to appoint generally, will not authorize a special ap-
pointment. This follows from the known doctrine of the law, that
every power and authority vested in an individual by law,
must be *strictly pursued, and strictly construed: and the [ *600 ]
mode of appointment (where power of appeintment is given)
must follow the terms of the power. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
157. 162. 174. Com. Dig. Poiar.

5thly, A power to appoint generally, amounts to a power to appoint
for life, or guam dui bene se gesserit. For if no term of limitation be
made, how can the office legally terminate, but by death or misbeha-
viour? This indeed, seems to follow of course. The law expressly is,
that grant of an office quam dui bene se gesserit, and grant for life,
amount to the same. Oo. Litt. 42. 3 Inst. ch. 12. p. 117. 1 Show. Rep.
510. 523. 531. 536. Harcourt v. Fox.

6thly, A power to appoint either for years or durante bene placito,
implies a coextensive power of removal, ex vi termini. For the same
reason, a general power of appointment, so far from implying, negatives
such a power of removal. More especially as it is the settled legal con-
struction of such a general power, that when executed it is for life, or
which is the same, during good behaviour.

7thly, The constitution furnishes no words that clearly give an un-
controlled power of removal. If it be not given, it cannot be taken.
Powers cannot be assumed by construction, or implication, unless
where they are absolutely necessary to effectuate the purpose enjoined
by the instrument conferring them: and even this case admits of some

76
602 NOTES.

 

doubts. In the case before us, if an office be already filled by 2 eony
tent officer, the purpose of the constitution is fully answered. ‘The pub-
lic good requires no further interference. ;

This reasoning holds stronger in the case of an executive
of a republic, whose powcrs and privileges should be cautl
ed, and strictly construed in favorem libertatis. 1 know of no encroach-
ments so dangerous, as constructive powers.

8thly, I would urge, that every office is an estate, a freehold : of
which according to the known principles of law, no.man can be legally
deprived but for some cause known to the law. This is considered as a
point settled in Harcourt v. Fox, 1 Show. ub. sup.

9thly, This practice, is contrary to all the analogy of offices, conser
ing which the governor has not this power. For misdemeanor in office,
a judge may be impeached. For gross misconduct out of office, ascer-
tained by verdict in court—for mental or bodily incapacity, he may be
removed by address. Conviction by indictment of an infamous offence
will furnish cause to displace a justice of the peace. But no conviction,
no offence is so eflicacious to remove an officer of the land office, a Pro-
thonotary, a Clerk of the Sessions, of the Orphans Court,
[ *601 ] *of the Supreme Court, a Register, or a Recorder, as an of-

fence against the good will and pleasure of the governor for

the time being. Nor can any degree of knowledge, capacity, industry
or integrity, retain such a man in office, who happens to have exercised
his indubitable right of suffrage against the opinion of a successful chief
magistrate. surely, it could not have been intended that the innocent
or conscientious exercise of the most important right that a freeman
possesses in a representative government, should be convertible into a
crime sufficicnt to divest him suminarily of his vested freehold, and de-
prive him and his family of their support, without accusation, without
proof, without trial, at the arbitrary will and pleasure of a governor.
And this is not an imaginary case; but what happens almost universal-
ly on a contested clection for a governor; and is become so common,
that the depravity of public opinion begins to consider as right, this ini-
quitous system of political warfare and corruption.

1Gthly, In every grant, whether of a chattel, a landed estate, or an of-
fice, the grant is to be construed favourably to the grantee.

llthly, In offices that relate to the administration of justice, or that
require much skill and experience, (as all those do, which I have enu-
merated) the bearing of the law founded on public expedience, is toward
appointment for life, or during good behaviour. Harcourt ». Fox, 1
Show. ub. sup. and 4 Mod Rep. 169. 174. 9 Co. Rep. 97. Sir George

Reynel’s case: the reasoning arguendo in Veale »v. Priour, Hardress, 351.
Deverell’s case, in 2 Anstr. 620, 621,

e magistrate
ously defin-
NOTES. _ 603

That most of the offices I have enumerated, are considered as of great
public conseyuence, appears from the requisites by law annexed to them.
They require bond to be entered into for the due performance of the du-
ties: previous residence within the county or district is required of the
candidate: they are declared incompatible with the holding of offices
under the United States. Would a man be required to have these qual-
ifications, and to make these sacrifices for a tenure that may be put an
end to at any moment? Moreover in the case of a Prothonotary or
Clerk of a court, it is often three or four years before he can receive fees
enough to support his family: they lie over till the event of the suit. Is
it reasonable that a man should take an office of this description pro hac
vice? In the case of Avery v. The Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass.
Rep. 160, the court unanimously held that the contract with a- minister
for an indefinite period, was a contract for life with the usual condition
of good behaviour, and that he could not be turned out at will. Other-
wise, no man of education would accept the office.

*In England all officers of justice, have a freehold for life [ *602 ]
in their offices, and cannot be removed but for misdemean-
ors; see all this strongly laid down in Judge Wilson’s Bacon Ab. Vol. 5.
p. 200, and the cases there cited. Nor can the king himself grant an of-
fice, but according to ancient usage, (Ib. 199:) nor can he appoint an
incompetent person as prothonotary, or master, or clerk of a court; oth-
erwise, the court may refuse to admit him, or may remove him for incom-
petency, (Ibid. 203.) It would be very well for the state, if such were
the settled law at the present day.

12thly, If power be given to appoint for life, or during good behav-
iour, or what is the same, to appoint generally, the law is, that any lim-
itation is void; and the officer is in, not by the limitation, but by the
prerogative, statute, Instrument, or custom, that confers the power of ap-
pointment. The wording of the commission therefore is of no impor-
tance. Hunt v. Ellisdon, et al. Dyer, 152. cited and confirmed by Jus-
tice Eyres, 1 Show. 517. Colt v. Glover, Hob. 153. cited and confirmed
by Holt, 18h. 555. Harcourt v. Fox, 12 Mod. 43. 200. Saunders v.
Owen, 5 Mod. 386.

I do not again touch on the public good so manifestly requiring this
construction, or en the public evils so strongly marking the prevailing
practice: but I quit this side of the argument with observing, that in
a doubtful case the construction is by law in favour of the grantee.

Iam well aware that formidable considerations arrange themselves on
the opposite side of the question.

Tus practice has been acquiesced in during the whole of the admi-
nistrations of Gov. M‘Kean, and Gov. Snyder, and in two cases under
604 NOTES.

 

Gov. Mifflin, Scott vice Redick, and Ross: vice Jacks. ButI do ules
wonder at this. All parties agree in the practice, as necessary to reward
their partizans; and the officer removed, expects of course to be me
stated, when his faction shall again succeed to their opponents 1n po .
tics. During the proprietary government, no man was ever remove
from office compulsorily.

Tur question, I have been told, has been agitated in New York state,
and the officer left without remedy: but I am not acquainted with
the case, or its circumstances. At any rate, we are not bound by the
precedent.

It has been urged, that the officers subjected to this power of removal,
have no punishment for delinquency, or incapacity annexed to them, and
therefore that such a discretion is necessarily invested in the governor
for the time being: but the legislature by annexing penalties to offences,

as in the ease of dueling, or by declaring the causes of a mo-
[ *603 ] tion, can take away this necessity whenever they *please.

In the mean time the officer for misuser or non-user is open
to indictment, and his bonds are liable to be put in suit.

TuE constitution it is said, ought to be construed popularly, and not
by the rules of strict law: but I do not know how to define a popular
construction ; and the rules of law are founded not merely on experi-
ence, but on considerations also of. general expedience.

Tue people (it is said) by the governor, their agent, have a right to
resume ad libitum powers conferred for a certain time: to which I re-
ply, that powers so conferred have always been construed appointments
for life, with the usual implied condition of good behaviour. Nor have
the people or their agent, any right to interfere in the construction o!
powers given by the constitution, while that constitution continues in
existence. The incumbent once appointed, must be displaced by legal
adjudication.

Tue spirit of the English constitution leans to permanent appoint-
ments, whereas frequent changes, and even exclusion by rotation best
harmonize with the spirit of a republican constitution.

Still, removals ought to be subject to some .rule founded on the

_terms of the power given: nor is it a very republican construction,
that converts the chief magistrate into an arbitrary tyrant, that exone-
rates him from responsibility, and authorizes him to punish his poli-
tical opponents as criminals, and substitute private rancour for public
justice.

My construction it may be said, would deprive a governor of the
choice of his confidential officers, such as a secretary of state, and com-
pel him to retain his political or personal enemy in such a station. Bui
NOTES. 605

this would seldom happen if the office were for life; and at all events,
the officer is compellable to do his duty, and obey the directions of the
chief magistrate, who may choose his advisers where he pleases.

Tue most permanent objection to my reasoning is, the undisputed
practice under the constitution of the United States, wherein the words
of the power are almost the same with those above quoted.

But I cannot think the analogy of the two cases will hold, consider-
ing that under the constitution of the United States, the exercise of the
right of removal is subject to the formidable check of the senate’s con-
currence in the successor nominated by the President. <A difference so
important, as to destroy the force of all reasoning from the one to the
other. A power in every instance controlled in its exercise by the senate,
cannot be compared with a power in every instance uncontrolled; and
exercised as the caprice of the governor for the. time being, heated by
recent opposition, and goaded by revenge, may dictate.

*I do not pretend to urge these reasonings as conclusive, [ *604 ]
but I cannot help thinking that under the magnitude of the
evil, they are worth discussing. I state them with hesitation, but not
without hope, that a similar view of the subject may be taken by some
person more competent than myself to bring the subject into full day.

Under the mild administration of Gov. Mifflin, there was not much to
complain of on this subject. The personal virulence indulged in, against
Thomas M‘Kean, (upon the whole, the most able and independent Gov-
ernor this state has yet known) might excuse many of his removals,
even where reasonable objections to the officer in other respects, would
not justify them. But the power itself, is not necessary to the public in-
terest; it affords too much temptation to the exclusive gratification of
private feeling; and its exercise of late years, has not tended to lessen
the slightest of the objections to which it is liable.

As to the other cases wherein the action for money had and received
will lie, I refer to 2 Comyns, 1—137, Selwyn and Espinass’s Nisi Prius
compilations, and Evans’s Essays on this action.

§ 2. De commodata, p. 246. According to Ferriere and Lord Holt,
not merely exactam but exaclissimam diligentiam is required. Coggs v.
Bernard.

$ 3. De deposito, p. 247. This section is copied in substance by
Bracton, lib. 3. ch. 2. 99. b. and adopted by Lord Holt in the leading
case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord Pay. 925. I refer generally on all the
doctrine of bailments, to Mr. Balmanno’s edition of Sir W. Jones’s trea-
tise.

$4. De pignore, p. 247. Dig. 13.7.4. Tb. 13.7.6. Tb. 13.7. 9. 3.
Ib. 13. 7. 40. 2. This is a nominate contract bone fidei. 'The correspon-
dent remedial action. is actio pignoratitia. Tt lies for the debtor to re-
606 NOTES.

2

cover the goods pledged or pawned, and for the creditor for expenses, 1n-
terest, &c. i. ec. Damages, where the thing pawned did not belong to the
debtor. Dig. 13.7.3. 8and 9. The pawnee may retain his debt out of
the value of the thing pawned before any other creditor. Dig. 20. 1 10.
The creditor is bound to exact diligence; for diligence. may be classed.
under the strictest care; strict care; ordinary care; slight negligence ;
gross negligence. The application of these shades of difference will
be found exemplified in Sir W. Jones’s treatise and the cases referred to
in Balmanno’s edition. Strict care being required, the bailee will be lia-
ble for the consequences even of slight negligence.

Pignus, is the pledge of goods capable of delivery: Hypotheca, 13
the mortgage of real property, or of rights not capable of delivery.

Judge Burnet, enquires into this subject at some length in
[ *605 ] Ryall v. *Rolle, 1 Atk. 165. and determines that under the

Roman law actual delivery was not always necessary in ca-
ses of pawn; but in the English law it is. See on the same subject Cor-
telyon v. Lansing, 2 Caines’ N. Y. ca. in error, 22. and Jones v. Smith,
2 Vez. jun. 278.

Tit. XVI. De verborum obligationibus, p. 248.

Leonima constitutio. Cod. 8. 33. 10.

Stipulation, is a nominate contract, stricti juris ; for the party promis-
ing only, is bound; and is bound only, according to the terms of his pro-
mise. The correspondent actions, are certi condictio, and ex stipulatu.
The former being the remedy when some specific thing is the subject of
the contract, the latter when there is no specific thing stipulated for. You
promise to deliver me your brown gelding on sucha day. Here the rem-
edy is certi condictio. You promise to deliver meon such a day a sound
horse of such a valve. Here it is er stipulatu. See Dig. 45.1. 74 and
73.

For acommentary on the law of England as relating to this section, I
refer to the case of Brymer v. Atkyns, 1 Hen. Bl. Rep. 175.

$ 2. Quibus modis stipulatio fit, p.249.

Prinsquam is dies preterierit : so in our law, if mortgage-money be to
be paid by various installments, the mortgage cannot be sued till the day
of the last installment be expired. °

§ 3. De die adjecto perimende obligationis causa, p. 250.

Paceti exceptione submovebitur. Id est pacti conventi.

$4. De conditione, p. 250. A bond is not due till the event of the
condition either by the Roman or the English law. Dig. 50. 16. 24 and
50. 16.113. Bacon’s Ab. Debt. B.

The chance is transmissible. Dig. 45. 1. 57, Dig. 44.7. 44. .Condi-
tional legacies might be received in preesenti by giving the Mutian secu-
rity against the condition. Dig. 35. 1. 7. 35.—1. 8. 35.11. 79. 2.
NOTES. 607

All the learning of conditional bonds, will be found in Serjeant Wil-
liams’s note 1, page 66 to Butter v. Wigg, 1 Saunders, 66: and to Fowel
v. Forrest, 2 Saund. 48. and to Holdipp v. Otway, 2Saund. 108: to which
may he added when there are several alternatives in a condition, option
is with him who is to performthe act. Dong. 14. Layton v. Pearce.

If Defendant is the catisé why acondition precedent is not performed,’
it is to him tantamount to performance. 1 Powell. 372. Sir Rd. Ho-
tham v. East I. Comp. 1 Term Rep. 638.

If obligor renders the performance of the condition impossible, the
bond is forfeited. Secusas to the act of God, the act of the law, or the
act of the obligee. Halbut v. Watts. et ux. 1 Ld. Ray. 112.

Co. Litt. 206. *But it was decided in South Carolina, 2 [ *606 ]
Bay’s 108, that if subsequent to a contract for the delivery of

slaves, an act of the legislature forbids the delivery, the contractor is li-
able for their value in money.

§ 5. De loco, p. 250. So, bills of exchange are frequently drawn and
accepted payable at a particular place.

$ 7. Que in stipulatun. doducuntur, p. 251. The damages here noticed
under the form of a penalty for non-performance, seem liable to our
equity decision, necosse est actori probare, quod ejus intersit.

The following references on the subject of damages, may be of use.

Cases of damage assessed and stipulated by the contract itself? 16.
Tin. 58. Lowe v. Peers, 5 Burr. 2228. Stinton v Hughes, 6 Term Rep.
413. Orr v. Churehill, 1 Hen. Black. 222. Astley v. Weldon, 2 Los. and
Pull. 346. Smith v. Dickenson, 3 Bos. and Pull. 630. Brangwin v. Per-
rot, 2 Sir W. BL. 1190.

Wherever damages are clearly assessed by consent of parties, a court
of equity will not interfere on either side, but leave the party to his legal
remedy. Lowe v. Peeres 5 Burr. ub,sup. Woodward v. Gyles, 2 Vern.
119. Rolfe v. Peterson, 2 Br. Parl. ca. 436. Ponsonby v. Adams, Ib.
431. Black v. East India Comp. Finch. 117. Roy ». D. of Beaufort, 2
Atk. 190, Small v. Williams, Pree. in Chan. 100. But in all cases,
where the penalty can reasonably be construed into a mere security
against contingent damages, equity will relieve: in the spirit of the words
of this section above cited. Benson v. Gibson, 3 Atk. 395. 1 Fonb. Eq.
212.156. 2 Ib. 423, 424.

Damages are sometimes given beyond the penalty. Br. ca. in Parl. 16,
Elliot v. Davis, Bunb. 23. Hugh Audeley v. , Hard. 136. 1 ch.
ca. 226. 271. Yea v. Lethbridge, 4 Term Rep. 433 compared with Cac-
aven v. Lethbridge, 2 Hen. BL: 36. and Evans v. Brander, Ib. 547. as to
the case of a sheriff. Lord Lonsdale v. Church, 2 Term Rep. 388, which
overrules White v. Sealy, Doug. 49 and Brangwine v. Perrot, 2 Sir W.
BI. 1190, which two last however are conformable to Wilde v. Clarkson,

 
608 NOTES.

6 Term Rep. 303. Hobson v. Trevor, 2 P. W.191. 1 Str. 533. 10
Mod. 511. Blunden v. Barker, 10 Mod. 462. Perit v. Wallis, 2 Dall
Rep. 252. Graham v. Bickham, 4 Dall. 149. Smeedes v. Hoogtaling,
‘et al. 3 Caines N. Y. Rep. 48. M‘Clure v. Dunkin, 1 East. 436. But
see the case of Clarke v. Seton, 6 Vez. 411.

Damages include debt, costs, and interest, Holdipp ». Otway, 2 Saund,
107. Blackmore »v. Plemine 7 Term Rep. 447. Phillip v. Bacon, 9 East.
298 and 304. ;

That the Court may assess damages on a judgment by default in plain

cases without a writ of enquiry, or refer them to the protho-

[ *607 ] notary *wherever they are easily liquidated or depend on cir-

culation, see Serj. Williams’s note 2, to Holdipp ». Ot

way, 2 Saund. 107. to which add the following references. Buthen v.

Street, 8 Term Rep. 326. Nelson v. Sheridan, 1b. 395. Byrom v. John-

son, Ib. 410. Maunsel v. Ld. Masareene, 5 Term Rep. 87. Thelusson

v. Fletcher, Doug. 302. Rashleigh v. Salmon, 1 H. Bl. 252. Andrews

v. Blake, Ib. 529. Longman v. Fenn, Ib. 541. 7 Vin. Abr. 301—308.
Bailey on bills of exch. 66, 67. App. 5. Kidd. on bills of exch. 155.

The practice of the exchequer is contra. 1 Anstr. 249. Chilton v.
Harborn.

As to the American cases to this point, see Brown v. Van Braam, 3
Dall. Rep. 355. Purviance v. Angus, 1 Dall. Rep. 185. Graham »v.
Bickham, 4-Dall Rep. 149.

In England the arrears of an annuity are not allowed beyond the pen-
alty of the bond; nor interest; unless in very special cases. Mack-
worth v. Thomas, 5 Vez. 329. Indeed the whole doctrine of interest
beyond the penalty, even in cases of bond, where the penalty is the debt,
is shaken by Clarke v. Seton, 6 Vez. 411. but aliter where the action is
on the judgment. .

The cases respecting damages on eviction by title paramount, I will
briefly refer to here, but I shall have occasion to discuss that question
hereafter. That damages in this case are not recoverable beyond the
purchase money and interest, Staats v. Executors of Ten Eyck, 3
Caines N. Y. Rep.111. Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 4.
4 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 18. Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 49. Ben-
der v. Fromberger, 4 Dall. Rep. 441. Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. Rep.
433. Gore v. Brasier, 3 Mass. Rep. 523. Semble, Nelson v. Matthews,
2 Hen. and Mum. 164.

The contrary doctrine is held, Kirkby’s Connect. Rep. 3. and in Lim-
ber and wife v. The Executors of Parsons, 1 Bays South Car. Rep. 19.
Executors of Guerard v. Rivers, Ib. 265. andl 4 Massach. Rep. 108.

But one damages for one injury. You may sue several, and without
entering up judgment, elect de melioribus dampnis. Bull. N P. 7. 19.
NOTES. 609

 

11 Co. Rep. 6.7. Roll. ab. 31. 1 Com. Dig. 125. Burr. 1423. Cro.
Jac. 118. 1Salk.10. 1 Lord Ray. 370. 2 Bac. 9. Esp. Dig. N. P.
318.518. 1 Johns. N. Y. Rep. 290, I Hen. and Munf, 488. 2 Hen.
and Munf. 38. 355.

These are some of the more general heads of the doctrine of damages,
which I have thus referred to, because I do knot now where the cases
appropriated to them are elsewhere co!lected. The technical doctrines
on this subject are beside the purpose of these notes.

{In regard to the rule or measure of damages, in actions at law, for a
compensation for civil injuries to the person, or property, er character,
the reader will find extensive and valuable information in Mr. Theodore
Sedgwick’s “Treatise on the Measure of Damages: New York, John-
S. Voorhies, 1847 ;” in which, said Chancellor Kent, the subject is dis-
cussed with superior learning, ability and candour, The general rule is,
that if a case be free from fraud, malice, wilful negligence or oppression,
the compensation is taken strictly for the real injury or actual pecuniary
loss to the party, and perhaps the natural and legal consequences of the
act complained of, and the actual costs and expenses sustained. But
if fraud, malice, or mala mens mingle in the controversy, the claim goes
beyond absolute compensation, and punitive, vindictive, or exemplary
damages by way of punishment and fer example’s sake, seem jto be ad-
mitted in the jurisprudence of England and of this country. 2 Wils.
205. 31b.18. Meeson & W. 47. 1 Washington C. C. U. S. R. 152.
3 Johns. Rep. 56.54. 141d. 352, 2 Mason R. 120. 10 New Hamp.
Rep. 130. 15 Conn. Rep. 225. 267. Story, J., 3 Wheaton 546. Bald-
win, J., 1 Baldwin Rep. 138. It follows necessarily that, except in mat-
ters of contract, the amount of damages when bad passions or motives
are intermixed, must be left to the sound discretion of a jury, to be exer-
cised according to the circumstances, and under the wise superintendence
of the court. See Measure of Damages, by Sedgwick, p. 27—46, p. 75,
76. and ch. 3. and ch. 18. of that treatise. In trespass, when the party
wantonly violates the law, ‘“ the jury should not be sparing in the dam-
ages.” Lord Abinger, 1 Meeson & Welsby, 342. But in cases of loss
without aggravation or intentional wrong, the law confines itself to a
complete indemnity without adding exemplary damages or estimated pro-
fits, or remote consequences. 2 Dallas, 333. 2 Wheaton, 327. 3 Ib.
546. 17 Pick. 543. 2 Taunt. 314. 23 Wend. 425. Sedgwick’s Trea-
tise, p. 88—93. It is difficult to deduce any precise measure of damages
from the numerous cases, but the courts have in these cases discounte-
nanced the idea of speculative or remote damages, though it ic imnossi-
ble to ascertain any certain rule from the numerous cases wk

ably illustrate “the oscillations of the judicial pendv!~
; 77
610 NOTES.

 

 

 

under the head of remote and consequential damages, are most industri-

ously collected by Mr. Sedgwick, in the third chapter of his treatise, to
which the reader is referred. ]

[ *608 ] * The damages here alluded to by Justinian for the pur-
pose of covering a breach in the stipulation, do not apply to

the damages arising from injuries done, or reasonably expected; which

will be treated Lib. IV. tit. XV. de obligationibus que quasi ex delicio

oriuntur.

Tit. XVII. $ De stipulatione pura, p. 253. See Dean v. Newhall, 8
Term Rep. 168. Nadin v. Battie and Wardle, 5 East. 147.

Tit, XIX.$1. De judicialibus stipulationibus, p.255. Judicial and
pretorian stipulations agree in this, that they are both compulsory on the
party. They differ, in as much as, Ist, The judicial relate to the yuris-
diction of the judge, the preetorian are confined to subjects and persons
under the jurisdiction of the praetor. 2dly, The judicial stipulations,
are subsequent to the hearing of the cause, quia tum demum judex quis
esse incipit. Cod de lite contest. Praetorian on the contrary takes place
previous to or, pending a case; etiam lite non contestata. Dig. 3. 2. 40.
penult. 3dly, Judicial stipulations act upon the party only, and do not
require sureties or pledges, while the Pretorian, always require security.
Dig. 46. 5. 7.

§ 2. De pretoriis, p. 255.

Ut in iis contineantur A:dilitie. Aidilitie stipulationes sunt, quibus
venditor cavet de morbis etvitiis rerum venalium : puta rem morbosam non
esse: servum fugitivium non esse: et de ceteris, que edicto eediliunt pro-
mittuntur. Dig. 21. 1.

Pretoris ergo vocabulum hic in sensu latissimo, accipi videtur pro quo-
vis magistratu cui est jurisdictio. Heinece.

An instance of these Pretorian stipulations, is our writ of Estrepement.

In Jefferson v. The Bishop of Durham et al. 1 Bos. and Pul. 108. it
was determined that no court of law, had the power of issuing a writ
of prohibition to prevent a bishop from committing waste: and it was
not settled whether the court of chancery had. In Williams?. Macnam-
ara, 8 Vez. 70. injunction against cutting trees that ‘contribute to orna-
ment.’ In Smith v. Collyer, 8 Vez. 89. injunction against cutting tim-,
ber was refused, where the title was disputed, because it was trespass
and not waste. It would have been betterhad the law been otherwise,
for the reason of the thing is clearly with the applicants.

These Aidilitian stipulations, were the warranties of sound commodi-
ty and good title, exacted of every seller in favour of every buyer.

The old Zdilitian law was very strict, and required the seller not only
to declare all the faults of the slave, the animal, the commodity, he sold,
NOTES. 61t

 

but held him bound even for those faults he did not himself

know. *Thus Dig. 21.1.1.2. Causa hujus edictit propo- [ *609 ]}
nendi est ut occuratur fallaciisvendientium et emptoribus succur- :
ratur, quicunque decepti a venditoribus fuerint. Dummodo sciamus ven-
ditorem etiam si ignorarit ea, que A:diles prestari Jjubent, tamen tenert
debere. Nec est hoc iniquem. Poterit enim ea nota habere venditor : nec
interest emptoris cui fallatur ignorantia venditoris an calliditate, ‘To
remedy these cases of fraud or of ignorance on the part of the seller,
they gave the action guanti minoris, the action redhibitoria, and the ac-
tion ex emptio.

The action quanti minoris, was given to a purchaser who was induced
to pay an extravagant price for a commodity, beyond its value. Cer-
tainly rejected with great propriety in modern times, as an inconvenient
practice, encouraging law suits without number.

The actio redhibitoria compelled the seller to take back the commodity
and return the price, where the quality was worse than might reason-
ably be expected, and rendered the article purchased unfit for the pur--
poses of the purchaser. In some cases of refusal on part of the seller,
this was an actio in duplum, compelling the seller to pay double the
original price.

The actio er empto, was given on defect of title, and in cases of evic-
tion; of which hereafter.

The civil law maxim doubtless is, that a sound price. warrants a
sound commodity: 1 Domat. 80. and so it has been determined in
Whitefield v. M’Cleod, 2 Bays, 380: and so indeed it seems to me the
case ought to be determined. But this is not the law of England or of
Pennsylvania, where the maxim is Caveat Emptor, and where in com-
mon cases, the seller warrants nothing but his title to the commodity
sold. Nor has the purchaser any remedy on discovery that his purchase.
is defective or unsound, unless he made a previous and special stipula-
tion, that the seller should stand to all defects. The cases in England
establish these principles.

Ist That the seller is bound by his warranty of title at or just before
the sale. But he is not bound by a warranty made after the sale is com-
pleted. Finch’s law, 289.

2dly That a warranty given at one time, when no sale takes place,
does not bind even between the same parties, at a subsequent time, when
a new contract with sale take place, 1 Str. 414. anonymous.

3dly that no action lies as to the quality of the thing sold, unless there
was fraud or deceit in the conduct of the seller at the time, or unless
there was on his part an express warranty of the quality. If the plain-
612 Suet

 

tif proceeds on the ee of fraud, he must prove that it
[ *610 ] was with *knowledge in the seller at the time, scienter ; and
: this must be laid and proved in an action of trespass on the
case.

If he proceeds on an express warranty, he may bring assumpsit for
the money, but he must distinctly prove such a warranty.

Athly That where there is no deceit, or no warranty pretended, the
seller is without remedy as to the quality.

5thly That the sale of a personal chattel raises an implied warranty
of title, has been decided in Defrees v. Trumper, | Johns. N. Y. Rep.
after 2 BI. Comm. 451. and the civil law: that it is sufficient to support
assumpsit for the price paid.

6thly But no action of deceit will lie against the seller who sells with-
out title unless a scienter be proved: Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Lord Ray.
593. Nor even then, if the seller was out of possession; for that ought
to have put the purchaser on his guard. Ib. and Roswell v. Vaughan,
Cro. Jac. 196.

That there is no implied warranty of quality, appears from the fol-
lowing cases. Co. Litt. 102. 1 Fonb. 109. 371. 373. n. k. 2 Bl. Com. 451.
Gov. and Co. of the B. of England v. Neuman, 1 Lord Ray. 442. Price
vo. Neal, 3 Burr. 354. Steuart v. Wilkins, Doug. 20. Bree v. Holbeck,
Doug. 630. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 57. per Buller. Fenn v.
Harrison, 3 Term Rep. 757. Mead v. Young, 4 Term Rep. 28. Fydell
v. Clark, 1 Esp. Rep. 447. Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 448. Park-
inson v. Lee, 2 Hast, 314. a leading case. Dunlop v. Waugh, Peake’s
Ca. N. P. 123.

Musgrove v. Gibbs, 1 Dall. 217. Moses Levy, v. Bank of the U.S,
4 Dall. 434. 1 Binn. 27. Seixas v. Wood, 2 Caine’s N. Y. Rep. 48.
Snell et al. v. Moses. et al. 1 Johns. N. Y. 96. Perry v. Aaron, Ib. 129.
Defrees v. Trumper, Ib. 274.

This seems to me a most demoralizing principle of decision. I know
of no argument, that can be adduced to prove, that if I give a hundred
dollars for a commodity that ought to be worth a hundred dollars, I am
defrauded if it be worth only ten. You say the seller knew nothing of
it. My answer is, that before he took a hundred dollars from me, he
ought to have known that the thing he pretended to sell was reasonably
worth that price. He had every means of knowing this; and to sell it
for a hundred dollars without knowing it, is as much a fraud as if he
had asked a thousand. Generally, the buyer relies on the seller. Nor
can the buyer cheat the seller; whereas, the seller under our law, in
nine instances out of ten, may cheat his buyer with impunity. The
tule of caveat emptor, ought to be changed into caveat venditor. Itisa
NOTES. . 613

 

disgrace to the law that such a maxim should *be adopted,
and I rejoice to see that the good sense of the South Carolina [ *611 ]}
bench has revolted at it.

The chancery cases in support of this rule, ought to be classed as ca-
ses in support of falsehood and fraud. Oldfield v. Round, 5. Vez. 508.
Shirley v. Davis, cited 6 Vez. 678. . Dyer v. Hargrave, 10 Vez. 505.
Bowles v. Atkinson, Sugd. 199. Anon. in Chan. 1803. Ib.214. Not-
withstanding some gleams of common honesty appear in Mellish v. Mot-
teux, Peak’s Ca. 115. compared with Oldfield v. Round, 5 Vez. 508.

[On the subject of implied warranty of quality, the doctrine now held
by the English courts appears to be, 1, That in the simple sale of goods
and merchandise, there is, in general, no such implied warranty—2.
That from usage of the particular line of trade, a warranty may be im-
plied: as, for example, where, in the sale of a commodity, the custom of
trade is to specify whether it has received sea damage, the omission to

_ State this fact raises an implied warranty that it is undamaged—3. That

the executory contract with, or order to, a manufacturer, implies a war-
ranty that the article shall be fit for the purpose of the order. These
seem to be the only relaxations of the old rule of law, that the seller is
not responsible for the quality or goodness of the article sold, unless he
expressly warranted it to be sound and good, or unless he has made a
fraudulent representation or used some fraudulent concealment concern-
ing it, and which amounts to a warranty in law.

In the state of New York, the Supreme Court has strongly enforced
the distinction between executed and executory contracts. In the ease
of Howard v. Hoey, 23 Wendell’s Rep. 350, it declared, that in a con-
tract of sale of an article of merchandise at @ future day, where there is
no selection or setting apart at the time of specific articles, so as to pass
the property in presenti, merchantable quality bringing the average mar-
ket price is intended. In the case of an executed sale, where there is
neither fraud nor express warranty, the general rule is, that the purcha-
ser takes the property at his own risk, as to its quality and condition.
Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio’s Rep. 378. The case ofa sale by sample,
forms an exception to this general rule. There a warranty is implied,
that the bulk of the article corresponds in quality with the sample exhi-
bited. Another exception is, that where provisions are sold for domestic
use, there is an implied warranty that they are wholesome. But where
provisions are sold as merchandise, and not for immediate consumption
by the purchaser, there is no implied warranty of soundness. Van
Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. Rep. 468. Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio’s Rep.
378.]

That it is the duty of the seller to declare the faults of the commodi-
ty before sale, is not only conformable to the Addilitian injunctions, but
614 NOTES.

is sanctioned by Cicero, Grotius, Puffendorf and Valer. Maximus. See
the reference in Sugden’s law of Vendors and Purchasers, page 1.

Tit. XX. De inutilibus stipulationibus, p. 257. Things to which no
title can be made, are not the subjects of stipulation. But if they be
sold by contract, the purchaser thus deceived has his action ex empto.
Dig. 18. 1.25.1. Dig. 18.1.4.5. Dig. 18. 1. 62. 1.

$2. De facto vel datione alterius. p. 258. Ido not see the valid rea-
son of this; for if A. promise that his debtor B. shall pay C. a hundred
dollars, and C. gives a fair consideration, relying on the promise, it is
in fact the promise of A. to pay the money: there is an implied
guaranty.

§ 4. De eo in quem confertur obligatio vel solutio, p. 258. This is head-
ed in Ferriere, Alteri stipulari non licet.

To the doctrine of this section there are three exceptions: a father
may stipulate for his son, or vice versa: a debtor may stipulate in fa-
vour of his own agent, or his creditor: where the promissor is bound in
a penalty wherein the stipulator is interested.

§ 10. De conditione impossibilt, p. 261. I have already treated of im-
possible conditions. By the English law, a bond with an impossible
condition, is a single bond. Co. Litt. 206. 209. But if a possible con-
dition be made void by the act of God, the act of the law, or the act of
the obligee, the obligation is saved. In Tuteng v. Hubbard, 3 Bos. &
Pull. 291. a Sweedish vessel freighted by a British subject was embar-
goed: held that the freight could not be carried by proceeding after the
embargo was taken off when the goods embarked would have been out
of season. The reason of this section will apply to immoral and illegal
conditions.

$11. De absentia, p. 261. nostra constitutione, Cod. 8. 38. 14.

$ 12. De stipulatione post mortem, p. 261. Because it may
[ *612 ] enure to *the heir. See a case somewhat like this, Burgh et
al. v. Preston, 8 Term Rep. 483.

§ 16. De promissione scripta in Instrumenio, p. 263. _ This is analogous
to justice Wilmot’s idea, that there can be no nude pact, if deliberately
written. 5

Tit X XI. De fide jussoribus, p. 266. That stipulation and promises
may be more certain, Caution and Sureties may be added to them. Fide

Jussor, a surety, called otherwise repromissor, adpromissor, sponsor, pre-
des, vades, is one who binds himself in the same contract conjointly with
the debtor, for the greater security of the creditor or stipulator.

Fide-jussor, differs somewhat from Expromissor, who discharges the

’ first debtor, and assumes the debt. Dig. 12.4.4. Fide jussio differs
from Constitutum, which is a promise on a nude pact without stipula-
tion. Inst. 4. 6. 9.
NOTES. 615

 

Dr. Wood, from whom I have taken the above, adds gravely, “It is
‘* made a question whether our Saviour was fide jussor, or sponsor only,
“‘ or expromissor for the Fathers under the old testament.” A question
that may safely be left to the Canonists to discuss.

The obligation of a surety binds his heirs, though no mention be made
of them. Inst. 3.21.2. In England, the executor is, but the heir is
not so bound. 1 Inst. 209. a. 210. b.

If there be more sureties than one, each is bound in solidum, Inst. 3.
21. 4. whether it is agreed or not; but by the later law, they are allowed
three advantages, viz.

1. Beneficium ordinis, sive excussionis, seu discussionis : by which he
may compel the creditor to sue the principal debtor, first. 1 Nov. 3. c.
1. Unless security be given judicially in a cause pending against the
principal.

2. Benificium divisionis. Inst. 3. 21. 4. by which a creditor is driven
to resort to each surety for his proportional share only.

3. Beneficium cedendarum actionum. By which a surety sued for the
whole debt, can demand of the creditor to transfer over, ‘this actions
against the other sureties, before he shall recover the whole from the one
sued.

The surety becomes bound co-extensively with the debtor, in respect
both of sum and time. Nor can he bind himself beyond that. Inst. 3.
21.5. Dig. 46.18. 7. If the surety isin danger, he may sue before
the time of payment, or demand indemnification. Dig.17.1. 38.1. If
the surety being sued, makes a bad defence, the debtor may except to
paying him. Dig. 17. 1.8. 8. and 29. 4.

Minors, Inst. 3. 20. 9. and Soldiers, Cod. 4. 65. 31. are pro-
hibited *from being sureties. So are women, under the se- [ ¥*483 ]
natus consultum Villeianum, Dig. 16.1. pr. Wood. civ. 1.

226, 227.

The judiciary cautions or securities belong to another place.

The common fide jussion, is an accessary stipulation. Dig. 45. 1.
5. 2.

Fide jussors might be taken in cases ex delicto ex quasi ex delicto.
Dig. 45. 1. 8. 5. and 45. 1. 70. but in respect. of pecuniary penalties and
punishments only.

Fide jussors bind their heirs, because the latter receive the benefit
of all the civil contracts of the decedent. Dig. 44. 7. 49. Dig. 50.
17. 59.

In a former part of the notes, I gave an account of the case of Thurs-
by v. Gray’s administrators, at the court of common pleas, Northum-
berland county; vide ante, p. 462. Since writing that note I have
had occasion to enquire further concerning that case: and I find by
616 NOTES.

my friend, Mr. Watts, who took the exception to my charge, that al-
though the case was but slightly argued either before me, or before
the supreme court, the substance of his objections to my opinion, was
as follows:

That as the seller did not choose to sell his goods on the credit of the
purchaser alone, but thought fit to insist on two persons to be jointly
bound, he had a right so to do: therefore as to him, they were both prin-
cipals; though with respect to each other, they might stand in the rela-
tion of principal and surety. Of their contracts, interest, or motives, he
could not have, and need not have any knowledge: all he was to look
to, was, two securities equally and jointly bound; and such were Spring
and Gray. They might dispose of the goods between them as they
pleased : the one might be a nominal, the other a real purchaser ; or they
might be joint purchasers; or neither might be the real purchaser; but
both become joint and equal obligors. His right therefore was against
both and either.

The cases of negotiable notes do not apply: for the course of mer-
cantile transactions, require that mercantile paper should be current on
the faith of each and every name that appears upon it: for one man
may prefer it for one name, another for another.

Every indorser is a fresh drawer, and every name on the paper a prin-
cipal. The reason of speedy notice is, that the person who has pass-
ed the note, and to whom notice is to be given, has put the right of
calling for payment out of his own power, and transferred it to the
holder.

The cases of security for the performance of services, have no rela-

tion to the present case.
[ *614 ] *Here, both parties undertake the performance of the con-
dition of the bond; in the cases of services to be performed,
one only is to perform them: and if he neglects the duty, his employer
alone can know it, and alone can give notice of the neglect.

I do not know what answer to give to this argument, conclusive to
my own mind :, and I incline therefore to agree with the decision of the
court. Nesbit v. Smith, would go near to bear out my charge; but in
that case the surety gave notice to the obligee to sue, who afterward gave
time at his own risk. The early chancery cases go the full length
of my doctrine; but they are too brief, and too loosely reported to
be relied on. ‘To the list of references that requires strict construc-
tion in favour of sureties, add ex parte Rushworth, 10 Vez. 409. Ed-
dowes v. Neill, 4 Dall. 133. and Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Caine’s cases in er-
ror. N. Y. pages 29 and 57. I have dwelt the longer on Thursby v.
Gray’s Adm’rs. because I regard it as a case of great practical impor-
NOTES. 617

 

tance, and which I hope to see more fully reported with the reasons of
the decision at length. a:

$4. De pluribus fide jussoribus, p. 267. In Cowell v. Edwards, 2

Bos. and Pull. 268. and the next case, Sir Edward Deering v. Lord Win-
chelsea, it was determined that one of many co-sureties paying the whole
debt, could only sue each of the other co-sureties for his ratable propor-
tion. ‘These cases are commented on with some disapprobation by the
Lord Chancellor in Craythorne v. Swinburne. They appear however to
be conformable to the civil law doctrine; and are well founded in equi-
ty, though perhaps not in public expedience, inasmuch as they no doubt,
tend to the multiplication of suits.

To this title respecting fide jussion, should be’ added Inst. lib. 4. tit.
14.9 4. Que erceptiones fide jussoribus prosunt vel non, wherein the
general rule is laid down, that sureties may avail themselves of all the
defences which their principal might have used.

Tit. XXIL. De literarum obligationibus, p 269.

Ex principalibus constitutionibus. See the constitution of the Empe-
rors Honorius, Theodosius, and Constantine, in the second book of the
Codex Theodosianus, title Si certaum.

Per nostram constitutionem. Cod. 4.'30. 14.

‘This proceeds on the principle of our limitation acts,

Tit, XXII. De obligationibus ex consensu, p. 279. These differ
from stipulations wherein the presence of the parties was necessary.
Dig. 44. 7. 2.

Tit. XXIV. De emptione et venditione, p. 271. This is a nominate
‘contract confirmed by the civil law. It supercedes Barter
and Exchange, *the most ancient mode of traffic. It gives [ *615 ]
rise to the action er vendito against the buyer, for the price
agreed on; and to the action ex empto against the seller, in case of de-
fective title or non-delivery in the thing sold. Dig. 18. 1.28. The buy-
er bringing the action er empto must tender the price, and the seller su-
ing ex vendito must tender the thing sold.

Hence, nothing forbids that one man should sell the property of ano-
ther: he does so at the risk of the action ex empto, in case of eviction.
Dig. 18. 1. 28.

The seller is considered as in all cases warranting the title. After the
bargain is completed, the purchaser stands to all losses. Even an ex-
press agreement, that the seller should not warrant the title against his
own act, was void, as encouraging fraud. Dig. 2. 14. 7. 7.

Warranty under the Roman law, is either express or implied. It is
implied in every case, but may be enlarged or restrained by express
covenant. Dig. 19. 1. 11. 18. unless the warranty be so restrained, the
seller is bound to answer not only the price paid but the damages.

78 :

‘
618 NOTES.

 

evicta re, non ad pretium dumtazxat recipiendum, sae nid i quod interest
. competi ; ergo et si minor (minoris pretii) esse cepit, damnum emptoris
est. Dig. 21.2. 70. This is fair reciprocity. The value is considered,
not at the time of the sale, but at the time of eviction, and each party
runs his chance of’ what value the article may then be. Dig. ub. sup.
Dig, 19. 1. 45. Sub init. and Dig. 21. 2. 66. 3. in fin. “If one hath built,
or planted on an estate, and is evicted, either the person recovering or
the person who made sale without title, must stand to the damages sus~
tained by the bona fide purchaser. Illud erpeditius videbatur: si mihi
alienam aream vendideris, et in eam ego edi ficavero, atque ita eam do-
minus evincit. Nam, quia possim petentem dominium, nisi impensam
_ Bdificiorum solvat, dolo malo exceptione summovere ; magis est ut res ad
periculum venditoris non pertineat. Quod et in servo dicendum est, si in
servitutem, non in libertatem evinceretur, ut dominus mercedes et impensas
prestare debeat. Quod si emptor non possideat edificium vel servum, ex
empto habebit actionem ; in omnibus tamen his casibus, si sciens quis ali-
enum vendiderit omnimodo teneri debeat. Dig. 19.1. 45.1. It appears
“to me that both cases should be put on the ground of the scienter: viz.
if the owner knew the building was proceeding, he ought to pay the
value to the person evicted; if the seller Anew he had no title, the whole
damages ought to fall on him. And such I apprehend would be the law
even in Pennsylvania and New York, in cases of eviction from real pro-
perty by title paramount. If the seller Anew his defect of title, he ought
to be liable not merely to principal and interest, but to all
[ *616 ] *damage. The buyer was liable for mesne profits, and if
es the improvements exceeded the mesne profis, the buyer had
the advantage. Dig. 6.1.48. If the buyer makes a weak defence, and
does not vouch the seller to warranty, the latter is discharged. . Dig. 21.
_ 2.53. When the buyer has given notice to the seller of the adverse
suit, the latter is bound to attend to the defence. Dig. 21. 2.63.1. The
buyer might bring ex empto on discovery that his title was bad, even be-
fore suit brought by the real owner. Dig. 19. 1. 30. 1.
_ There was no distinction as to warranty, between real and personal
property. Cod. 8. 45. 6.
Under the Roman law, the contract by mutual consent of the parties
constituted the L’mptio eenditins which was completed by delivery.on
one side, and payment on the other.. The payment of the stipulated
price, or even of earnest money (Arrha), was not of the essence of the -
contract: it was binding by mutual consent alone. It was consummated
indeed by payment and delivery, but its obligatory nature existed before.
‘The arrha (earnest) was evidence only of the contract, argumentum
emptionis et venditionis contracte. "The Locus Penitentia, was allowed,
‘while the mutual assent was as yet incomplete i in point of form; ; (section
NOTES. 619

 

1 of this title) and if exercised, was exercised on the terms prescribed. in
this section. But the emptio venditio, did not require the verbal forms
prescribed in the contract ex stipulatur, as Roberts on the statute of -
frauds (note 84) erroneously supposes.

By that statute, the Bargain and Sale has different features from the
Emptio venditio, and the earnest is a part, and not evidence only of the
contract; and furnishes the right of action, but not without tender of the
price on one-side, or of the commodity on the other. Longfort v. Ad-
ministratrix, of Tyler, 1 Salk. 113. Hob. 41.

“If a man by word of mouth sells me his horse or any other thing,
‘Cand 1 promise nothing for it, this is void and will not alter the property
“of the thing sold. But if one sell me a horse, or any other thing for
“money or other valuable consideration, and the same thing is to be
‘“‘delivered to me at a day certain, and by our agreement a day is ap-
“pointed for the payment of the money—or all or part of the money is
“paid in hand—or ! give earnest money to the seller—or I take the thing
“bought by agreement into my possession, where no money is paid,
“earnest given or day appointed for the payment, in all these cases
‘there is good bargain and sale of the thing to alter the property there-
“of. And in the first case I may have an action for the thing, or the
“seller for his money: (upon tender that is): in the second case I may
“sue for and recover the thing bought: in the third case I
“may sue for the *thing bought, andthe seller for the re- [ *617 ]
‘‘covery of his money: in the fourth case where earnest is
“ given, we may have reciprocal remedies against each other: and in the
“last case, the scller may sue for his money.” Sheph. Touch. of
Comm. Ass. 222.

But, notice of readiness to receive the goods, and to pay the price atthe
time agreed on, is equivalent to tender: and will be a sufficient averment
to support the declaration : for the terms on each side are concurrent con-
tracts. Rawson v. Johnston, 1 East. 203, and the cases therein cited.

Bargain and sale may be rescinded by mutual consent before the
rights of other persons are concerned, but not afterward. Smith v.
Field, 5 Term Rep. 403.

“In Cooke v. Oxley, 3 Term Rep. 653. it was determined that though
the seller give time to the proposed buyer to deliberate upon the purchase,
and the latter within the time agrees to buy, yet, if no consideration in-
tervene, the seller may refuse to sell, The same principle in Hanson v.
Meyer, 6 Hast, 614.

‘See further on this subject, the cases digested by the compilers, Sug-
den, 174. 1 Com. Contr. 83. 89. 90. 2 Com. Contr. 210. Bailey and
Bogert v. Ogden and Ogden, 3 Johnston, N. Y. Rep. 399, also contains a
good investigation of some of the pcints first above noticed.
620 NOTES.

 

The doctrine of sales dependent upon market overt, is not adopted in
New York state, so as to give title to a bona fide purchaser to goods
which he bought of A. but which at the time belonged to B, and A had
no title to, or right to sell. So that here, where there is no market overt,
a bona fide sale does not change the property as against the rightful
owner. See Kent’s observations in Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 John-
son’s N. Y. Rep. p. 479, 480, who cites the civil law maxim, nemo plus
juris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet ; Pothier Traite de vente,
part 1. 7. 2 Erskine’s Inst. of the law of Scotland, 481. and Lord
Kaime’s His. law tracts, tit. History of Property.

Iam not at present aware of any other case on this point, in this
country, except Cheriot v. Foussat, 3. Binn. 220. 258.

[The civil law maxim mentioned above, is equally a maxim of the
common law; and a sale imports nothing more than that the bona fide
purchaser succeeds to the rights of the vendor. In the Courts of Massa-
chusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio, Kentucky, and Louisiana, as
well as in the state of New York, and in the Supreme Court of the Uni-
ted States, it has been held that the Saxon Institution of markets overt
had not been adopted in this country; and consequently, as a general
rule, the title of the true owner cannot be lost without his own free act
and consent. Ventress v. Smith, 10 Peters U. S. Rep. 161. Hoffman v.
Carow, 22 Wendell’s Rep. 285.. In that case it was adjudged by the
Court of Errors, that an auctioneer who had sold stolen goods was liable
to the owner in’an action of trover, notwithstanding that the goods were
sold by him, and the proceeds paid over to the thief, without notice of
the felony. In the same Court, in Salters v. Everett, 20 Wendell’s Rep.
267, it was held, that the doctrine that possession carries with it the ev-
idence of property, so as to protect a person acquiring property in the
usual course of trade, is limited to cash, bank bills, checks and notes
payable to the bearer or transferrable by delivery; and that when the
owner of personal property has not conferred upon the vendor the ap-
parent right of property or right of disposal, a purchaser is not protected
against the claims of the owner, though such purchaser acquire the pro-
perty fora fair and valuable consideration, in the usual course of trade,
and without notice of any conflicting claim, or of suspicious circumstan-
ces calculated to awaken inquiry, or put him on his guard. The owner
confers such apparent right of property upon the vendor when he sells
goods and delivers possession thereof, although they were in fact obtain-
ed from him fraudulently; and he confers the apparent right of dis-
posal when he furnishes the vendor with the external indicia of
such right, as where a bill of lading is sent to a consignee with the
power of transfer, An authority to sell may be implied, as well as be
NOTES. 621

express, as where goods are placed by the owner in the custody of a per-
son whose common business it is to sell goods. ]

In Pennsylvania, by act of 28th May, 1715. $6. “The words grant,
bargain, sale, shall be adjudged an express covenant to the grantee, that
the grantor was seized of an indefeasible estate in fee freed from in-
cumbrances done or suffered from the grautor, and also for quiet enjoy-
ment against the grantor, his heirs and assigns. These words however
do not amount toa general warranty. 2 Binney, 95. Lessee of Gratz
v. Ewalt.

[This decision will equally apply in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Mis-
souri, Mississippi and Alabama, each of which states has a statute sim-
ilar to the Pennsylvania statute of 1815. (4 Kent’s Commentaries,
473.) In New York, it was decided, that the words “grant, bargain,
sell, alien and confirm,” did not imply a covenant of title in a convey-
ance in fee; though the word ‘grant,’ or the word “demise,” would
imply a covenant of title in a lease for years: and that the word “ give,”
would amount to an implied warranty during the life of the feoffor.
(Frost v. Raymond, 2 Caines Rep. 188. Grannis ». Clark, 8 Cowen’s
Rep. 36.) his doctrine, which was fully proved by an examination of
the authorities, is applicable in those states which continue to be govern-
ed on this point by the common law. In North Carolina and Alabama,
the words ‘give, grant, bargain, sell, &c. do not imply any warranty of
title. (Prickets v. Dickens, 1 Murphy’s Rep. 343. Powell v. Lyles, ib.
348. Koabuck v. Dupray, 2 Alabama Rep. N. 8. 535.) And now, in
New York, the Revised Statutes have given to deeds of conveyance of
the inheritance of freehold, the denomination of grants ; and though
deeds of bargain and sale, and of lease and release, may continue to be
used, they are to be deemed grants, and no greater estate or interest
passes by any grant or conveyance than the grantor himself possessed at
the delivery of the deed, or could then lawfully convey, except that ev-
ery grant is conclusive as against the grantor and his heirs claiming from
him by descent. (N. Y. Revised Statutes, Vol. 1. p. 728. sec. 137, 138,
142, 143.) So, in Tennessee, the statutory deed operates as a grant to
pass nothing but what the bargainor may lawfully sell, and the title
passes, not by force of the Statute of Uses, but of the registered deed.
Miller v. Miller, 1 Meigs’ Rep. 484.]

[have already stated the civil Jaw, and our law on the
general subject *of the sale of chattels, under the Adilitian [ *618 ]
regulations. The case of eviction from real property under
an ejectment with verdict aud judgment in favour of title paramount, is
by no means settled by uniformity of decision in this country.

As to the measure of damages to be allowed to a bona fide purchaser
of land under a warranty, or covenant of seisin in the seller, or covenant
622 NOTES.

for quiet enjoyment, where the purchaser is afterward evicted by title
paramount, and where no fraud is alleged against the seller, different
courts have considered the subject differently.

Neither in Pennsylvania, or in England, has it ever been held that the
real owner recovering his possession, was in any way liable to pay for
the improvements made on hisland. If indeed he lay by, and concealed
his title, while those improvements were carrying on with his knowledge,
he ought not to recover at all. East India Company v. Vincent, 2 Atk.
83. Anonymous, Bunb. 53. Savage v. Forster, 9 Mod. 37. Hanning
v. Ferrers, 2 Eq. Ca. ab. 357. Anonymous, 3 Eq. Ca. ab. 522, 523.
Rex v. Inhabitants of Butterton, 6 Term Rep. 554. Doe on demise of
Winckby v. Pye, 1 Esp. Rep. N. P, 364. Fowkes v. Joyce, Prec. Ch.
7. Keech v. Hall, Doug. 22. Weakley v. Bucknell, Cowp. 473. Isus-
pect we do not know enough of the circumstances under which the suc-
cessful owner was held liable to the value of improvements under the
civil law.

In England, the measure of damages, was the value of the land at the
time when the deed with warranty was executed. For which in our
American cases, the following authorities have been cited: Bracton, 384.
19 Hen. 6. 46. a. 61. a. Bro. ab. tit. Voucher, pl. 69. Ib. tit. Recouver
in value, pl. 59. 22 Vin. Ab. 144, 145, 146. Ib. pl. 1, 2.9. Ib. 1, 2,3.
1 Reeves’ history of the English law, 448. Glanville,G. 3.ch. 4. Bal-
lot v. Ballot, Godbold, 151.

Such was the determination in New York: (to wit, that however the
land might have risen in value, or whatever improvements the purchaser
might have made, yet that) the measure of damages was the purchase
money and interest. Staats v. Executors of Ten Eyck, 3 Cains 111.
Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. Rep. 1. Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. Rep.
49. From this doctrine Judge Spencer dissented, 4Johns. Rep 18; hold-
ing that the purchaser was entitled to the value of the land with the im-
provements at the time of eviction.

In Massachusetts, Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. Rep. 407. and in Black-
ford v. Page, Ib. 455. Parsons, Ch. J., lays down the old English method
of proceeding by vouching the warrantor, or bringing warrantie chartse

upon the warranty; and declares the law to be, in the case
[ *619 ] *before the court, that the measure of damages was the consid-

eration money paid and interest; that being the amount of
the plaintifi’s actual loss, who received no estate by the conveyance to
him: but gave no opinion what the damages would be, where a grantee
actually seized by virtue of the conveyance, was ousted by a paramount
title: probably in that case a different rule would obtain. This question
afterward came before the court in Caswell v. Wendell, 4 Mass. Rep.
108. (Anno 1808) Parker, Judge on the circuit, on covenant for breach
NOTES. 623

of warranty, had directed the jury, that the measure of damages was

the value of the land at the time of eviction. The supreme court say,
the direction was right; and that the value of the landat the time when
“the covenant was broken, (to wit, when the conveyance was executed,)
as agreed by the parties, was the proper measure of damages: wherein
there is something like a dissonance.

That the value of the land at the time of the eviction, is the measitre

of damages in an action of covenant broken, was also determined in

Massachusetts, in Gore v. Brasier, 3 Mass. Rep. 523.

The same point was also determined in Connecticut. Kirkby’s Conn.
Rep. 3.

The same point was determined in South Carolina, Liber and Wie
v. Parsons, 1 Bay’s, 19. and in Guerand’s Executors v. River, Ib. 265.

Domat also assents to this being the doctrine of the civillaw. 1 Dom.
77. sect. 15, 16.

In Penndylyania: the supreme court have decided in conformity to the
“New York cases, in Bender v. Fromberger, 4 Dall. Rep. 441. An. 1806,
which settles the law in this state.

In 1804, a case came before me at Chambersburg, in Franklin county,
of the same kind; wherein I charged the jury, that the measure of dam-
ages was the improved value of the land, together with the value of such
improvements as had been made for the better and more effectual enjoy-
ment of the land itself, as fences, barns, stables, &c., conceiving, that a
man being evicted after having spent some of the best years of his life
in directing and superintending reasonable and suitable improvements,

- was entitled to all the increase of value, which was little enough too,

So thought the jury, and brought in a verdict accordingly, and the decis-
ion was acquiesced in. But in Glen’s Executors v. Washmood, tried in
Cumberland county, 9th May, 1806, the court (whose opinion was not

given till above a twelve month after,) adopted the rule in Fromberger’s

case, and on special verdict whereby the measure of damages was left
as a legal point for the court to decide on, directed the average _
purchase money per acre, with interest from the time of evic-  [ *620 ]
tion to be allowed for 23 acres, 128 perches, recovered by
title paramount. The purchase money was 3l. 15s. per acre, and the
land would have sold, at the time of eviction, for four times as much.
Upon the rule of caveat emptor, adopted by the English, and some of
the American states, all this is just. Noman ought to be bound beyond
the value he receives for a commodity, valued by the mutual consent of
buyer and seller. He cannot, it is said, be bound by possibility for
£1000, in consequence of selling that for which he receives but a hun-
dred. The answer is, that he ought not to warrant generally, that which
he is not quite sure belongs to him. Every body who buys in this coun-
624 NOTES.

 

try, buys with an expectation that his land will rise in value, and is ca-
pable of improvement. These are qualities attached to every American
purchase; and if a man is induced to spend much time and much mon-
ey in confidence of the title conveyed to him, and warranted to him, he
ought to be remunerated, as I think, at the expence of the negligent or
dishonest seller. Ido not know a more goodly and comfortable doctritie
for the land-jobbers of this country than caveat emptor. Doubtless, if
the purchaser can taint the sale with fraud, or prove a scienter of bad.
title on part of the seller, the latter would be liable to full damages in
covenant, in this state, and to an action on the case for deceit, where the
English law prevails. Co. Litt. 384. 1 Fonb. 366. Com. Dig. 236. a.
8. 4 Johns. Rep.12. But how seldom can this be done, in Pennsylva-
nia at least, where a patent itself is nothing more than prima facie evi-
dence of title ?

In Virginia, Nelson v. Matthews, 2 Hen. and Munford, 164, the same
measure of damages is adopted as in New York and Pennsylvania.
(See in that case a discussion of the meaning of the words more or
less, in a deed.)

De cimptione pura. 271.

In iis autem.] vid. Cod. 4.7,21. De fide instrumentorum.

By the civil law all covenauts of sale were good, whether written or
unwritten, to whatever value they extended. But in England, it hath
been enacted by 29 Car. cap. 3. sect. 17. ‘* That no contract for the sale
“of any goods, wares, and merchandize for the price of ten pounds ster-
“ling or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer shall
“ accept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or
‘ give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part of payment,

“ or unless some note, or memorandum in writing of the said
[ *621 ] ‘bargain be made and signed by the parties to be *charged

“by such a contract; or their agents thereunto lawfully
“ authorized.” 29 Car. 2. °

$1. De pretio certo. p. 272. Sed nostra decisio. Cod. 4. 38. 15. -

§ 2. In quibus pretium consistat. p. 273. In nostris digestis. Dig.

18.1. De contrahenda emptione.
‘ $3. De periculo et commodo rei vendite, p. 274. The doctrine here
laid down as to the purchaser bearing the risk, isacknowledged in Phil-
limore v. Barrey, 1 Camp. N. P. Rep. 513. Sugd. L. of Vend. a Purch.
176. 177.

Tit. XXV. De locatione et conductione, p.276. Thiscontract is more
extended than our letting and hiring; including as in the next section, a
quantum meruil, for work and labor. :

§ 1. De mercede collata in arbitrium alienum. p. 276.

Actio prescriplis verbis. p. 277. Dicta est actio PRESCRIPTIS VERBIS, eZ
NOTES. 625

€0 qnod prescriptis verbis rem gestam demcnstrat. Ob eandem quoque
causam, heee actio dicitur IN FacTUM; et interdum plena oratione acTIo
UTILIS PRESCRIPTIS VERBIS IN FacTUM. Vinn,

$ 3. De emphyteusi, p. 277.

E'mphyteuseos contractus. An emphyteusis (from euputevey to plant)
is a contract made by consent, by which houses or lands are given to be
possessed forever, or at least for a long term, upon condition, that the
land shall be improved, and that a small yearly rent or pension shall be
paid to the proprietor. And this pension, rent or canon, may be paid in
money, grain, or any other thing. The perpetuity, or long term, granted,
distinguishes this contract from letting and hiring: for an emphyteusis
was originally made on account of barren lands, which no person would
take for a short time, through a fear of the charge of cultivation; but
afterwards the best lands were often granted out’ upon this emphyteuti-
eal contract; the nature.of which was first fixed by the emperor Zeno,
who determined it to be a distinct contract from buying und selling, let-
ting and hireing. vid. Cod. 4. t. 66. De jure emphyteutico. For some
thought it to be the contract of hireing, when they considered, that a
rent was paid for it to the proprietor; and others imagined it to be the
contract of buying, when they saw the tenant had a perpetuity, or at
least a very long time, and a sort of property in it: but the tenant had
only udile dominium, not a direct dominion; and therefore the contract
was distinct from buying and selling. .

The tenant is called emphyteuta, being under an obligation to plant

and improve the land: and he has such an interest, that he may sell the
profits of his right in the estate to another, with the consent
of the *proprietor, to whom two months must be allowed to [ *622 ]
determine whether he will himself become the purchaser.
But, when there isa new tenant, a laudimium, (which is almost the
same asa relief, and generally amounts to the value of the 50th part of
the estate,) must be paid to the proprietor by the new tenant, as an ac-
knowledgment for being put into possession. Cod. 4. t. 66. 1. 3.

There is also a pension or rent called a canon, which must be paid an-
nually, as an acknowledgment of a superior title; and this canon is
always due every year, whether the tenant receives any profits or not:
for it is not paid, in consideration of profits received, but as an acknow-
ledgment of the tenure.

The emphyteusis of the Roman law seems to have given rise to our fee-
farm and copyhold estates in England. Harris.

§$ 4. De forma alicui facienda ab artifice, p. 288. This section seems
intelligible only on the supposition, that the labor of the workman 1s con-
sidered as let out by him, and hired by his employer. Hence, Hesketh:
and Blanchard, 4 East, 144, where, a man contracts to give another half

79
626 NOTES.

 

the profits of a concern for managing it, would be a Locatio Conductio,
as well asa partnership.

Tit. XXVI. De societate, p. 280. As to the general doctrine of part-
nerships, and sleeping partners, see Coope et al. v. Eyre, et al. 1 Hen. BI.
37. and Waugh ». Carver, et al. 2 Hen. Bl. 235. in which cases, the
civil law doctrine of partnership, is also touched upon, as to what con-
stitutes partnership. See to the same purpose, Bond v. Gibson, 1 Camph.
N. P. Rep. 1 £5. Dry». Boswell, Ib. 329. Wist v. Smali, Tb. 331. N.
Alderson v. Pope, Ib. 404. N. Peacock v. Peacock, 2 Camb. N. P. Rep.
45. Guiden v. Robson, Ib. 302. Neersome v. Coles, Ib.617. Barton v.
Harrison, Ib. 97. 2 Taunt. 49.

The French Commandite, where a party in a concern is liable only in
respect of the share he brings into partnership, is not known in England.
But it appears to be introduced in the banking establishments of this
country ; with what legal success is yet somewhat dubious.

I borrow the following note from Mr. Du Ponceau, to whom the bar
are obliged for the uséful translation of the French commercial code in
the second volume of Walsh’s Review, and very ably elucidated by the
notes he has added to it.

Sotiete en commandite. Our language has no corresponding words to
express this technical phrase, nor that of associe comniandataire which
is derived from it. We are therefore obliged to adopt the French words
themselves as well as we can to our own idiom, with some variations
for the sake of euphony and analogy, as far as these can be obtained.

This species of partnership, like the greatest part of the mercantile
customs of Emrope draws its origin from Italy. Hence the words com-
mandite and commanditarie are derived from the Italian commaudo, which
itself takes its derivation from the latin mandatum. Societe en comman-
dite is as it were, societas cum mandato, a contract of partnership coupled
with a contract of mandatum or bailment. Such a partnership is com-
posed of one or more acting and responsible, and one or more dormant
partners; the latter of whom are not bound by the acts of their associ-
ates, beyond the amount they bring into the general stock. They merely
place their funds in the hands of others, tobe employed in trade for their
benefit ; and therefore these different partners, not only as between each
other, but as between them and the rest of the world, stand together in
the relatton of principal and factor: mixed, indeed, with some of the
circumstances attending ordinary partnerships, but only in a certain de-
gree, and to a limited extent. From this mixture of relative rights and
duties, this species of contract has received its denomination.

These partnerships are useful in countries, where there are great cap-
italists, who wish to employ a part of their money in trade, without ex-
posing themselves to unlimited risks. They furnish employment for
NOTES. 627

funds, which could otherwise remain inactive. The laws of America
and Great Britain however do not recognize such associations.

[Since the publication of this work, partnerships en commandite, or, as
they are styled in Louisiana, in commendam, have been introduced into
most of the states of the Union. They have been authorized by statute
in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan and California. By the New York statute, it isdeclared, that
a limited partnership for the transaction of any mercantile, mechanical,
or manufacturing business within the state, (the business of banking and
insurance excepted), may consist of one or more persons jointly and sev-
erally responsible, according to the existing laws, who are called general
partners, and one or more persons who furnish certain funds to the com-
mon stock, and whose liability shall extend no further than the fund fur-
nished, and who are called special partners. The names of the special
partners are not to be used in the firm, which shall contain the names
of the general partners only, without the addition of the word “ compa-
ny,” or any other general term; nor are they to transact any business
on account of the partnership, or be employed for that purpose as agents,
attorneys, or otherwise; but they may, nevertheless, advise as to the
management of the partnership concern. Before such a partnership can
act, a registry thereof must be made in the clerk’s office of the county,
with an accompanying certificate, signed by the parties, and duly ac-
knowledged, and containing the title of the firm, the general nature of
the business, the names of the partners, the amount of capital furnished
by the special partners, and the period of the partnership. The capital
advanced by the special partners must be in cash, and an affidavit filed -
stating the fact. Publication must likewise be made for at least six weeks _
of the terms of the partnership, and due publication for four weeks of
the dissolution of the partnership by the act of the parties prior to the
time specified in the certificate. No such partnership can make assign-
ments or transfers, or create any lien with the intent to give preference
to creditors. ‘The special partners may receive an annual interest on the
capital invested, provided there he no reduction of the original capital; but
they cannot be permitted to claim as creditors, in case of the insolvency
of the partnership. (N. Y. Revised Statutes, Vol. p. 764.) The pro-
vision for limited partnerships in the other states where they are author-
ized, is essentially the same as that in New York.]

Commandite, sometimes signifies partnership, where one advances
money, and the other skill. Expte. Garland, 10 Vez. 114, from the Dic-
tionaire de l’ Academie Francoise.
628 NOTES.

 

§$ 8. De cessione bonorum, p. 283.

See on the effect of cessio bonorum, Expte. Burton, 1 Atk. 255. Bal-
lantine v. Golding, Cooke’s B. Law, 522. Warring v. Knight, Ib. 373.
Quin v. Keefe, 2 H. Bl. 553. Robinson v Bland, 1 Sir W. BL 258. 2
Burr. 1078. Mulloy v, Barker, 5 East. 319. Hunter v. Potts, 4 Term

Rep. 182. Sill v. Worswick, 1 Hen. BL 665. Smith v. Bu-
[ *623 ] chanan, 1 East 6. Follict v. Ogden, 1 Hen. BI. 123. Potter

v. Brown, 5 East, 124. Cornelius Van Raugh v. John Van
Arsdaln, 3 Caine’s N. Y. Rep. 154.

The cases under the insolvent debtors acts, of New York state, are of
such frequent occurrence, that I must decline a reference even to their
names, referring to the indices in Caines and Johnson.

In Pennsylvania, see James v. Allen, 1 Dall. Rep. 188. Miller v. Hall,
1 Dall. Rep. 228. Thompson v. Young, 3 Dall. Rep. 294. Gorgerat 2.
Murray, Ib. 356. Harris v. Mandeville, 2 Dall. Rep. 256. Emory v,
Greenough, 3 Dall. Rep. 369. Baker’s case, 1 Binn. 462. Croxall’s
case, Ib. 589, and as to the mutual operation of cessio bonorum, Smith
v. Brown, 3 Bipn. 201, confirming Donaldson v. Chambers, 2 Dall. 100.
and Miller v. Hall, 1 Dall. 228.

If defendant pleads a discharge as a certificated bankrupt, in a for-
e'gn country, he must prove that the cause of action arose in that coun-
try, Green v. Sarmiento, April sessions, 1811, coram Washington, in
Philadelphia.

The mode of distributing an insolvent’s estate in Virginia will be
found in Anderson v. Anderson, 1 Hening and Munford, 12. and Finsley
v. Anderson, 3 Call’s Rep. 329.

As to the effect of the insolvent laws of Virginia, on the future proper-
ty of the debtor, (which is not protected by those laws.) See Payne v.
Dudley, 1 Washington, 198. ,

On the effect of the insolvent laws of Maryland, see Reily ». Lamar,
2 Cranch. 344. On the effect of the prior lien of the United States, see
M’Lean v. Rankin, and Heyer, 3 Johnson’s N. Y. Rep. 369. and United
States v. Fisher et al. 2 Cranch, 358. and United States 2. Hooe, 3
Cranch, 73.

In the Massachusetts Reports, in Bays, and in MW Henry. I can find
nothing of moment to the present purpose.

In Simms x. Slacum, 3 Cranch, 300 A discharge under an insol-
vent law obtained by fraud, was decided to be a discharge in due course
of law.

[The cessio bonorum of the Roman law, which prevails at present in
most parts of the continent of Europe, only exempted the person of the
debtor from imprisonment. It did not release or discharge the debt, nor
exempt the future acquisitions of the debtor from execution for the debt.
NOTES. ‘629

The English Statute of 32 Geo. I, commonly called the Lords’ Act, and
the more recent English statutes of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, 2 & 3 Vict c. 39,
5 & G Vict. c. 116, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, have gone no further than to
discharge the debtor’s person. The cession under the Roman law did
not extend to protect the debtor from personal responsibility, for penalties
es on the commission of crimes. Sv in wre non habeat. in pelle
wit.

§ 9. De dolo et culpa a socio prestandis, p. 283. See on this subject
the case of Thomason and Hipgip v. Frere, 10 East, 418. The Ameri-
can editor has added a note to this case, including the American decis-
ions on this point up to 1810.

Tit. XX VIL, De mandato, p. 281. This title has reference to the
general principles of the prolific head of powers; which is too extensive
to be treated here. 1 must refer to Powell, and the chancery decisions
on this subject since his book. If the person empowered, is
*paid for his services, the contract is not mandatum, but lo- [ *624 ]
catio conductio.

§ 13. De mercede, p. 288. This is another instance wherein the hire
of the labour and service of another, whatever is to be performed, is
ranked under the locatio conductio of the civil law.

Tt. XXVHE De obligationibus que Quasi ex contractu nascuatur,
p. 289. ‘These are obligations that arise on account of services rendered
for a person, without his express command or direction. As when one
manages the affairs of an absentce, for his benefit, without his know-
ledge: negotiorum gestiv: which gives the action negotiorum gestorum.
2dly, Guardianship: ¢utele administratio. 3dly, Where business 1s
transacted for common benefit by one joint tenant, tenant in common, or
co-partuer. Communio bonorum. This is connected with the actions,
Samilice erciscunde ; and de communi dividundo; which being for com-
mon benefit, the expences are proportionably divided. 4thly, Judicium
finium regundorum, under the laws for keeping up common fences, and
boundaries. 5thly, Aditio hwreditatis, by which the heir is bound to
pay the legatces; who cannot be said to’ have any contract, either with
him or the deceased. Though the creditors have. 6thly, Solutio inde-
biti, where money is paid by mistake; of whichI have treated in speak-
ing of the action de condictione indebiti, or money had and received.
See also Cod. 4. 5. hoc titulo.

The money must not be due; and it must be paid by mistake, not
knowing the circumstances; otherwise it is tantamount toa gift. Dig.
12. 6. 1—12. 6. 24—12. 6. 26—12. 6. 62—12. 6. 52—12. 6. 65. 2—5V.
17. 53. This quasi contract, includes our action of trover as to its form.
If money be unlawfully paid, as to a woman with intent to seduce her;
it cannot be recovered. If it be unlawfully received, as by duress, fraud
630 NOTES.

 

or extortion, it may be recovered. If unlawfully paid and received, as
the wages of prostitution, bribes, &c. it cannot be recovered. 7thly, By
accidents, as when a man interferes to repair or prevent some sudden
misfortune happening to another: or finds the property of another and
recovers it. Dig. 47. 2. 43. 4. So in England, if a man at the moment
.of necessity relieves a pauper maimed, and who cannot be conveyed
safely to his settlement. 8thly, Fraud creates a quasi contract in all
cases, in favour of the injured party.
$ 6. De solutione indebiti, p. 292. Sec Taunton’s Rep. 359.
$7. Quibus ex causis indebitum solutum non repetitur, p. 292. vide
ante, Lib. 3. Tit. 15. $ 1. and the notes thereto: and Havelock v. Rock-
wood, 7 Term Rep. 268.
Lz lege Aquilia. Dig. 9. 2. 9. 10.
[ *625 ] Nostra aulem constitutis. Cod. 6. 43. 2. which puts lega-
cies and trusts on the same footing. But the constitution
here particularly referred to, is not extant. _
Tit. XXIX. Per quas personas obligatio acquiritur, p. 293.
Quam nostra decrevit constitutid. Cod. 6. 61. 6. cum oportet, &ec.
Novella constitutionis, Cod. 6. 61. 8.
§ 3. De servo communi, p. 294.
Per nostrum decisionem. Cod. 4. 27. 3. si duo, &c.
Tit, XXX. Quibus modis tollitur obligatio, p. 295.
De acceptilatione, p. 295. This is a verbal discharge or release.
Liner IV. Tit. L. De obligationibus ex delicto, p. 299.
$ 1. Definitio furti, p. 299. See the case of the King v. Eggington
etal. 2 Bos. and Pull. 511. wherein it was argued by Clifford, with
some appearance of law in support of the petition, that it is of the
essence of the offence that the articles should be taken against the will
of the owner; invito domino. Bracton de leg. 3. 2. 32. p. 150. b. and
the King v. Donally, 1 Leach, 222. But surely this may well be pre-
sumed, from the taking being fraudulent and without the knoweldge of
the owner. This however tallies with the civil law. See post. $ 7 of
the present title.
$ 3. Divisio, p. 300. Furtum manifestum, is the same as when the
thief is taken with the mainour; or the thing stolen in his hand or pos-
session.
§ 4. De furto concepto, oblato, prohibito, non exhibito, p. 301.
* Requisitio rei furtive. This inquiry after things stolen, was made
anciently, Lance ef Licio; and is noticed in the 12 Tables. Aul. Gell.
Noct. Att. Lib. 11. ch. 18. and Lib. 16. ch 10. With their loins girded
with a thin cloth, and a metal plate, dish or shield before their eyes.
For they were required to go otherwise naked to search for stolen goods:
and the Lanz and Lictum were used lest they should happen to meet
NOTES. 631

Wwomer. See 8 Gibb. Rom. Hist. 9.22. I follow him in adopting the
explanation of Heineccius.

$ 5. Pena, p. 302. Sometimes corporal punishment was added to
the fine: but this was altered by Justinian, Novell. 124. ch. 13. de pan-
narum moderatione. I fancy itis a general rule that punishments are
milder, as knowledge and civilization advance: but this would be a
change for the worse, if they were uot encreased in certainty on sufli-
cient proof given, as they decreased in severity.

Jonathan Wild, the notorious receiver of stolen goods, was convicted
and executed on the clause in 4 Geo. 1 ch. 11. which makes it capital to
Teceive a reward on pretence of helping another to recover
*stolen goods, unless he also caused the thief to be appre- [ *626 ]
hended and tried. . Hale’s Hist. Fl. Cor. 626.

The party robbed may bring his action for restitution, after having
done his duty by prosecuting criminally; but not before. Hale, Pl.
Cor. 546. See post Inst. 3. $ 11.

§ 7. De affectu furandi, p. 302.

Si se inielligant id invito domino faccre. This with us and in Eng-
land, would not amount to a criminal offence.

Furtum sine affectu furandi non committitur. Hence with us, we
must lay the action as having been done felonice, feloniously.

§ 8. De voluntate Domini, p. 303. Per nostrum constitutionem.
Cod. 6. 2. 20.

A bare intention to commit a crime unaccompanied by an overt act,
was not punishable: nemo ¢ogitationis penam patitur. Dig. 48. 19. 18.
but in England, to solicit a servant to steal his master’s goods is an
indictable misdemeanour, although the goods were actually not stolen.
The King v. Higgins. 2 East, 5. So the endeavour to provoie another
to commit a misdemeanour, as to fight a duel, is indictable; for in these
instances there isan overt act. 2 East, 614. The King v. Phillips.
The case put by Justinian in this section, will be found in The King v.
Eggington, et al. 2 Bos. and Pull. 508.

§ 9. Quarum rerum furtum fit, p. 304. Widnapping: Ler Fabia,
Plagium: Plagiarii: manstealing. Dig. 48. 15. 1—48. 15.3 & 4&7.
Cod. 9. 20.7 and 16. 4 Black. Comm. 219. Literary thieves, Plugia-
rii, are noticed by Martial, Lib. 1. Ep. 53. See also Cic pro Rabirio:
and ad Quinctil. I. 2.

$ 11. Qui tenentur furti: De eo cujus ope, consilio, furtum factum’
est, p. 304. This includes the doctrine of accessaries. Qui hortatus
est ad furtum faciendum, non tenetur furti; is otherwise by the law of
England according to the cases quoted just above, under § 8 of this
title.

-$ 12. De his qui sunt in potestate, p. 305. Action of theft was not
632 NOTES. é

 

allowed against children and slaves, on account of the power the master
had over them. Dig 47. 2. 17.

$ 18. Quibus datur actio furti, p. 506. Indictment lies for stealing
the property Cujusdam ignoti. Hale Hist. Pl. Cor. 512.

$ 18. An impubes furti teneatur, p. 308. The only question with us,
is, whether the child had sufficient knowledge of the nature of the —
action he was about deliberately to commit, and that it was a crime.
Hist. Pl. Cor. 26, 27. 4 Blacks. Comm. 22, 23. Perhaps no evidence
would amount to proof that a child was doli capar under seven years of

age.
[ *627 ] Tit. IT. § 1. Adversus quos datur, p. 310. Sit ab omni
rcpina. Dig. 4.2.13. Cod. 8. 4.7. Our laws against for-
cible entry and detainer, are founded on similar considerations.

Tit. I. De lege Aquilia, p. 312. This was a plebiscite, proposed
by Aquilius a tribune of the people. A. U.C. 572. Almost all the
causes of action damni injurie under the Lex Aquilia, are also the sub-
jects of our action of Trespass on the Case. .

A great deal of nice distinction has been employed in ascertaining
whether Trespass vi et armis, or Trespass on the Case should be
bronght, for an injury done. See Pourdon v. Alloway, 11 Mod. 180.

For some time the criterion was thought to be, whether the act was
done wilfully or negligently. ripe et al. v. Potter, and Ogle v. Barnes,
cited in Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 595. At present, the criterion adopted
is, whether the injury complained of ensues directly and immediately
from the act of the defendant, or is only a consequence of such act and
collateral to it, and which might or might not have happened. Thus,
I forcibly or carelessly throw, or negligently let fall, or by not securing
as 1 ought I permit to fall, a log into the street; whereby one passenger
is wounded, and an honr or two afterward another passenger by stum-
bling over the log, is lamed. Here, the first man if he sue me, must
bring trespass z¢ e¢ armis, and the second man, Case.

So, a New England schooner on a West India voyage, was fired into,
and her crew so disabled, that unable to preceed on her voyage, she
turned back. The owner brought case for loss of freight and profit on
the voyage. The Court determincd at once, that this was case. Adams
and others v. Hemingway, 1 Mass. Rep. 145.

The Court of King’s Bench, say, the criterion by which we are to
“decide, is, whether the injury is immediately and directly connected
with the action or an accidental consequence only. 'To which purpose
the chief or leading cases are, Reynolds v. Clarke, 8 Mod. 272. 1
Strange 638. 2 Lord Raym. 1402; Scot v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 503;
Day v. Edwards, 5'Term Rep. 649; Weaver v. Wood, Hob. 134.
Leame v. Bray, 3 East 593. where all the cases were considered : this
NOTES. 633

 

 

was in 1803. But in Rogers v. Imbleton, 5 Bos. and Pull. 117 Anno
1806. Sir James Mansfield, put the Criterion on the point of wilfulness
or negligence; and intimated that Leame »v. Bray, was not settled law.
That court did so again in Haggett v. Montgomery, Trin. 1807. 5 Bos.
and Pull. 446,

The court of king’s bench however, decided Covali v. Laming 1 Campb.
N. P. Rep. 497. Mich. 1808, according to Leame v. Bray: And declar-
ed somewhat sharply in Lotan v. Cross, 2 Campb. N. P.

*Rep. 464. Ann. 1810, that they should not permit the prin- [ *628 Jj
ciple of Leame v. Bray, to be canvassed in a motion for a
new trial. ‘The question must be raised if at all, upon the record.

The principle of Leame v. Bray, has been recognized in Virginia,
Taylor v. Rainbow, 2 Hen. and Munf. 423. and in the case before cited
in Massachusetts, viz. Adams et al v. Hemingway, 1 Mass. Rep. 145,
In New-York Vail v. Lewis et al. 4 Johns. 450. In Hughes ». Heiser,
1 Binney, 463. action on the case for a nuisance: held sufficient though
the damage was consequential. Judge Blackstone in Scot v. Shepherd
laid down a very convenient doctrine on this subject, which I think
may be considered as law at this day; to wit, that where the injury is
immediate, plaintiff may bring trespass vi et armis, with a per quod for
the consequential damage, or, bring case for the consequential damage
alone and pass over the immediate injury, 2 Sir W. Bl. Rep. 197. which
doctrine is like Pitts v. Gaince, 1 Salk. 10.

But where the injury is both immediate and wilful, the better way is
to bring trespass vi et armis. Leame v. Bray, Sup. Ogle et al. v. Barnes’
et al. 8 Term Rep. 188.

The difficulty suggested by Le Blanc in Leame v. Bray, as to cases
where vessels run foul of: each other, the immediate agent being the
winds and the waves, is settled by Lord Ellenborough in Covall v.
Laming, who very properly states that the helms-man ought to be an-
swerable; that is I presume, in common cases, not in violent storms.
See further on this subject Savignac v. Roome, 6 Term Rep. 125. Mac-
manus v. Cricket, 1 East, 106. and Morley v. Gainsford, 2 H. Bl. 442.
Chitty has also taken some pains on the question in the first volume of
his pleadings p. 122. on actions in form cx Delicto.

Injuria oceiderit. By 33 Ch. 2. ch. 7. treble damages are given for
maliciously maiming cattle, destroying a plantation of trees, or throw-
ing down an inclesure.

In eo anno. vid. post. § 9 of this title.

See further respecting actions on the case under the civil law, the
last section (16th) of this title, De actione directa, utili, et in factum.

$ 1. De Quadrupede, que pecudum numero est, p. 312. Neque de

80
634 NOTES.

 

Canibus.” By the English and our law, damages are recoverable for
wantonly killing a dog, Hale’s Pl. Cr. 5. 12. Townsend v. Wathen, 9
East, 277. So for wild creatures reclaimed. Ib. and felony may be
committed by stealing them. Hawk. Pl. Cr. Lib. 1 ch. 34.

$ 2. De injuria, p. 313. 24 Hen. 8 ch. 10. 1 Hale PI. Cr. 448.

$ 6. De curatione relicta, p. 314. see 3 Bl. Comm. 157. 263. Seare v.

Prentice, 8 East, 348. where it is held, that an action on the
[ *629 ] case *lies against a surgeon, not only for negligence, but
gross ignorance and want of skill.
- §9. Quanti damnum estimatur, et de heredibus, p. 315. The general
principle of our law is, that actio personalis moritur cum persona: and a
bad principle it is. For, if my father was maimed or slavghtered, or my
sister seduced, what good reason is there that the offender should escape
from danraces under this maxim? Sce post Inst. 4, 12. 1.
— § 11. De concursu hujus actionis et capitalis, p. 316. Uf a felon should
be pardoned, or be allowed his clergy, or be burned in the hand, he may
afterward be sued civilly. 1 Bac. ab. 64. but not pending the Indictment.
Style 346. Ante, tit. 2, $5.

Tit. IV. $1. Quibus modis injuria fit, p. 319. .

Quasi debitoris qui nihil deberet. See Page v. Wipple, 3 East. 314. no
action will lie for permitting and suffering the plaintiff to be arrested,
after he had paid debt and costs. Malice, is the gist of all these aotidns.
Hence, case does not lie against a plaintiff who brings a vexatious suit.
Pacton v. Honnor, 1 Bos. and Pul. 205. Savill v. Roberts, Salk. 13. for
Plaintiff may be amerced pro falso clamore suo, and is liable to costs.

But it will lie when a man is maliciously sued for a greater debt than
he owes, and thereby held to excessive bail. Daw v. Swaine, 1 Sid.
424. Skinner v. Gunton, et al. 1 Saund. 228. But there must be a sci-
enter that so much is not due. Jackson v. Burleigh, 3 Esp. Rep. 34. But
if plaintiff having no cause of action do not hold defendant to unreas-
onable bail, the action will not lie. Neal v. Spencer, cases in K. B. 257.
If A bring this action against B, and prove that B. was largely indebted
to him on balance, the suit will lie, although A might be indebted in a
small sum to B on their running account Wetherden v. Embden, 1
Campb. N. P. 295. Wilkinson v. Mawbry, Ib. 297. But knowledge and
malice must be shewn, Sebiel v. Fairbain, 1 Bos. and Pull. 388. Gibson
v. Charters, 2 Bos. ane Pull. 129.

As to Libel, “ Libellum aut Carmen aut Historiam.” ” The civil law
was very severe against this offence.

A libel was regarded as with us, more serious than slander. The au-
thor, the Transcriber, the Publisher, the Seller, were all liable to pun-
ishment, whether it was anonymous or not. Dig. 47. 10.5 and 29. Cod.
9. 36. abusive pictures, statues, inscriptions, &c. are libellous. Dig. 47.
10. 5. 10. like the case of Philip Thicknesse, wherein the sending a
NOTES. 635

wooden gun to Lord Orwell, was held to be a libellous reflection on his
military character. The falsely charging a man with a capital crime
was punished even with death. Cod. 6. 36. See the case de libellis fa-
mosis. 5 Co. Rep. 125.

*I hardly know any subject so important as the liberty of [ *630 ]
the Press, and the right of discussion. All the difficulties in-
volved in it, relate either to political questions, to religious questions, or
to questions respecting private character.

Political questions relate either to the investigation of political Theo-
ries, or the examination of the measures of government, or the charac-
acter and capacities of our actual rulers. I donot know a plainer posi-
tion than this: a government that forbids the investigation of the prin-
ciples on which it is founded, mnst feel that they will not bear, (and for
that very reason the public good requires) such an investigation. In
England I know of no objection to the temperate discussion of the pref-
erence of a republican to a monarchical form of government, where it is
not a cover to incite insurrection. No prosecution was set on foot against
the innumerable disquisitions on the inadequacy of parliamentary repre-
“sentation : the republican sentiments of Dr. Price, Dr. Priestly, and Mr.
Goodwin, were allowed without molestation. In my own case, Sir John
Scott, then attorney general, took a distinction that I had no right to
complain of: ‘continue if you please to publish your reply to Mr.
“ Burke in an octavo form, so as to confine it probably to that class of
“ readers who may consider it coolly : so soon as it is published cheaply
“ for dissemination among the’ populace, it will be my duty to prosecute.”
It was on the same principles that Paine and Jordan were prosecuted for
dispersing in a cheap form, the Rights of Man. A defensive measure
on the part of government, certainly excusable, probably justifiable. In
this country, a defence of monarchical government would be borne with
less patience than a defence of republics in England. But if the man-
ner be decent and temperate, such discussions ought to give offence in
neither country: but if in either country they should be merely the cov-
er for exciting to civil commotion, let a jury judge of the mtent and the
author, and publisher proceed at their peril.

So in discussing the actual measures of a government, or the capaci-
ties of those who direct it, the temper and manner of the discussion, will
always furnish a clue to the design of the author. It isa farce to talk
of freedom in a country, where the public characters and public conduct
of public men, are shielded from investigation. Hence the injustice, the
absurdity, the tyranny of the sedition law under the administration
of the president Adams. There should be no previous restrictions on
the press. The public are deeply interested in having every public meas-
ure, and every public character, sifted to the bottom. The people are
636 NOTES.

 

[ *631 ] deeply interested that such investigations honestly *conduc-

ted, should incessantly take place. But if the charges be
founded on falsehood or forgery, if there should be groundless insinua-
tion of base and unworthy motives, or needless and malignant attacks
upon private character, under cover of public discussion, let the hand of
justice fall heavy on the offender. The only way to preserve the liberty
of the press, is to punish its prostitution.

Hereon it may be observed that the doctrine advanced by Judge Chase,
(a man of admirable talent, but whose political opinions from the bench
were neither dictated by wisdom or by virtue) is strongly to be reproba-
ted. Namely,that a political writer should be prepared with legal proof
of every fact he means to advance, before he publishes. It was a doc-
trine calculated, as he well knew, to prohibit all political discussion
whatever.

No man will venture to publish, who is required before a court in
Massachusetts, to prove that the Sun shone at mid day in South Caroli-
na; or that Mr. Pickering, with the knowledge-of Mr. Adams, wrote to
Judge Bee on the case of Jonathan Robbins, previous to the trial. In
political prosecutions, a defendant ought to be allowed to introduce what-
ever evidence he pleases of the facts he has published, and submit it (not
to a court guided by the technical rules of evidence, as to meum and
tuum, but) to the jury, whether it was reasonably sufficient to justify
the assertion in the extent to which it was made. In writing upon pop-
ular and public facts, popular documents and common fame may fairly
be resorted to, provided the mode of stating the fact be commensurate
with the proof relied on. Indeed no writer ought to be called upon for
proof of such facts, till they are denied upon affidavit.

The president Adams, was not singular in wishing the sentiments of
government to be communicated to the judiciary on a political question.
That has been done in England during Mr, Pitt’s administration, and
since: at least the particulars detailed in a public paper as matters of no-
toriety, have not to my knowedge been denied. In fact, what individ-
ual or what set of men does not feel averse to be dragged before the tri-
bunal of public opinion, in cases where they feel conscious of misdeed ?
But in that country, the high character and station of the judges, and
the great confidence so universally (and a few instances excepted,) so
dersevedly reposed in them, and the attention due to the opinion of the
bar, as well as of the bench—form a public safeguard of great practical -
importance: a much more efficacious one, than the farce of a written
constitution in this country ; which every party, bold and unprincipled
in proportion to its ignorance, construes and misconstrues, uses and

abuses, as the temptation of the moment may happen to dic-
[ *632 ] tate. *Self-preservation, the first law of our nature, will
NOTES. 637

always raise the arm of power, where it can descend with impunity and
effect : but if in England, as well as in this country, interferences on po-
litical questions now and then take place, which neither law nor right
can fully justify, that country at least does not tolerate jn any formida-
ble extent, the abominable nuisance so prevalent here, of tyingup to the
stake, the private character and domestic life of every political opponent,
to be exposed to the calumnies of the vulgar, and worried by every
mongrel description of slanderers and libellists. Yet the public taste of
this country seems gratified by the practice ; whereas the intermixture of
rersonal slander with public discussion, ought to be regarded as full and
complete evidence, that the writer was not actuated by motives of the
public good. Among the ancient Democracies of Greece, every man of
superior station, wealth, talent, or character, was considered as a fair
object for popular calumny: from which, no public or private virtue
could effectually shield him. This was carried to a prodigious excess:
nor can any man peruse the history of those turbulent republicans, with-
out strongly feeling that the character of their governments, gave to the
people themselves, a character of cruel, unfeeling, insolent injustice; of
ferocious and ambitious rapacity; anda morbid jealousy of the most
honorable evidences of superiority, that furnish little cause for regret, if
such democracies be extinguished to flourish no more.

In New York, and some other of our states, something like,law on
this subject still holds its place in public estimation: but every where
there is too much rancorous abuse of every political opponent, and the
most flagrant imputation of corrupt and sinister motive on surmises too
slight for a cool observer to consider of any weight. Almost every where
among us, the ancient hatred, not merely to the aristocracy of rank
and the azistocracy of wealth, but to the aristocracy of talent also,
strongly prevails; and the licentiousness of publication almost univer-
sally indulged in, renders it doubtful, whether the freedom of the press
itself, may not be purchased at too high a price.

In this state, the dread of infringing on personal liberty hasbeencarried
toa morbid extent; in so much, that in many casesof injury even the ver-
dict of a jury will afford neither present compensation, or future security.
An insolent or unprincipled disturber of the public peace or domestic in-
tercourse, seduces your wife, debauches your daughter, maims your per-
son, or defames your character. You put yourself to the trouble and
expence of suing him for the injury committed: the jury find
a verdict against him, andallow youa compensation in *dam- [ *633 ]
ages. He goes to jail for a week or two, applies for the ben-
efit of the insolvent act, is discharged from prison, and laughs in your
face. : ‘

You indict him for the offence; and he is convicted. But he is a
638 NOTES.

 

noisy partizan of the prevailing politics whatever they may be. His
fellow brawlers send round a petition; the governor is urged by politi-
cal adherents, a pardon puts an end to the punishment, and the insol-
vent act pays the costs.

There is no reply to be made to the arguments in favor of Republican-
ism over Monarchy: in theory they are triumphant. But in practice,
there are objections that may give occasion to a considerate man to pause :
especially, where under the influence of universal suffrage, the igno-
rance of the community is almost exclusively represented, and wisdom
and wealth, are held in equal distrust.

With respect to religious discussion, long experience has now shewn,
that the less opposition is given, the more peaceably such controversies
proceed, and the less mischief they produce. Complete toleration on the
_part of the government, and the laws, is the parent of mutual toleration
among the people. The more the public is accustomed to dissonance of
opinion on these subjects, the more clearly will it be seen, that a man
may be a good child, a good father, a good husband, a kind friend, and
a good citizen, under any and every system of religious faith, however
rigid, or however lax: and if a man possesses these qualifications, it is
all that society can require. Nor is it easy to draw the line between
questions of this description which shall be included, or those that shall
be excluded from the index expurgatorius : every man will be apt to con-
sider his own creed, as all-important to society ; and experience will con-

. sider none of them as of consequence, except as they tend to make a
man a good citizen in the points above mentioned ;. and each stands for-
ward with similar pretensions, and perhaps with nearly equal merits.
On the subject of private character, I have said sufficient. It is never
attacked from the press with a good motive. If the statements be true,
the laws are open for conviction, and punishment : if dubious, they ought
not to be advanced; if false, the calumniator ought himself to be con-
sidered as a public nuisance. The absurd privilege*of giving the truth
in evidence on an indictment, only increases the mischief, and gives a
legal sanction to the practice itself. In a civil action, the first principles
of justice require that a man shall not ask damages for calumny, of
which he is afraid to meet the proof.
I shall not dwell upon the law of libels in England, which may be
well gathered from the popular compilations: but it may be useful to
notice the principal cases that have occurred here.
[ *634 ] *By an act of Pennsylvania of 16th March, 1809, which

if not renewed will expire by its own limitation in April,
1813, the truth is allowed to be given in evidence on every prosecution
for libel. I believe this doctrine is adopted no where but in this state,
and in New York state, nor oughtitto be. The public have nothing to do
NOTES. 639

with the truth or falsehood of a libel on a private individual. Has he
been guilty of a crime? Indict him. Otherwise it is reasonable to con-
clude that your own bad passions gave rise to the publication.

[The constitutions of several of the United States have made special
provision in favor of giving the truth in evidence, in public prosecutions
for libels. In the constitutions of Pennsylvania, Delaware, Tennessee,
Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, it is declared, that in prosecutions
for libels on men in respect to their public official conduct, the truth may
be given in evidence, when the matter published was proper for public
information. In the constitutionsof Mississippi and Missouri, the exten-
sion of the right to give the truth in evidence is more large, and applies
to all prosecutions or indictments for libels, without any qualifications an-
nexed in restraint of the privilege. By the constitution of New Jersey,
(1844) it is declared, that ‘‘in all prosecutions or indictments for libel,
the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to
the jury, that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was publish-
ed with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquit-
ted, and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.”
The New York Constitution, adopted in 1846, contains a similar clause
differing only by the insertion of the word ‘‘ criminal,” so that the pro-
vision does not affect civil actions for libel. In such actions the truth
may, in all cases, be pleaded by way of justification, as well as in an
action for slanderous words. 2 Kent’s Commentaries, 24.]

The cases of libel hitherto reported in the U. States, so far as I have
met with them, are mostly conformable io the: principles of the English
decisions.

1 Binney, 393. Kennedy v. Lowry. It is sufficient to lay the sub-
stance of the words spoken, and prove it.

1 Binney, 601. Respub. v. Duane, in which the above-mentioned act
of Assembly, was held to put an end to an indictment for libel, commen-
ced before that act passed.

2 Binney, 34. Brown v. Lamberton. Words are to be taken according
to their plain and obvious meaning. :

2 Binney, 514. Respub. v. Sharf, wherein judgment was reversed,
in consequence of the finding of the jury not corresponding to the in-
dictment. :

Green v. Long, 2 Caines, 91. “ He is perjured.” It is sufficient to
prove that the words were spoken of the plaintiff, in allusion to an oath
taken in court. If the court was incompetent to administer it, Defend-
and must shew this. :

The People v. Freer, 1 Caines, 485. The intent of a writer of a libel
on the court, is of no consequence, if the court {are of opinion It isa
libel.
640 NOTES.

 

Lyle v. Clason, 1 Caines, 581, sending a sealed libel to the plaintiff, is
not a publication, sufficient to ground a civil prosecution: but it may a
criminal one. Hick’s case, Poph. 139.

Clason v. Gould, 2 Caines, 47. Inlibel there must be affidavit of spe-
cial cause to hold to bail. Nor will the court change the Venue on the
the comnion affidavit, Clinton v. Craswell. 2 Caines, 245.

- Foot v. Tracy, 1 Johns. Rep. 46. Can defendant give in evidence on
the general issue, the general character of the plaintiff in mitigation of
damages?

Hotchkiss v. Lothrop, I Johns. 286. A libel by the plaintiff on the
defendant may be given in evidence in explanation, but not in justifica-
tion.

Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56. Judgment by de-

[ *635 ] fault admits *the fact of the publication and the truth of the

inuendos. Nor can defendant give a former recovery in dam-

ages by the same plaintiff in mitigation, although. it was for part of the

words charged in the second suit. ‘The one publication being on the 3d,

and the other on the 17th of the month; and they might go into differ-
ent hands.

Clinton v. Mitchell. 3 Johns. 144. If defendant gives notice of cer-
tain facts on which he means to rely, he shall not withdraw that notice,
unless on affidavit that the facts so stated, are stated without sufficient
grounds. 'This is founded on the practice of New-York state, where
defendant may plead the general issue to this action, and give notice of
special matter to be used in his defence.

Lewis v. Few. 5 Johns. 1. U. States, is sufficient to support United
States.

It is no justification that Defendant signed the libel as Chairman of a
public meeting.

Whether the plaintiff was the person meant to be libelled, is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. Van Vechten v. Hopkins. Tb. 211.

Witnesses are not admissible to prove that on reading the libel they
understood by it that the plaintiff was the person meant. An innuendo
cannot be proved; but extrinsic matter introduced by an averment or
colloquium may be proved.

Where one count is bad for want of sufficient averments, and entire
damages assessed on the whole declaration, judgment must be set aside.
Cheetham v. Tillotson, in error, 5 Johns. 430. Sed vide, Kennedy »v.
Lowry, 1 Binney, 397. Neal v. Levis, 2 Bays, 204. and Nelson v. Em-
erson, 2 Bays, 439.

A petition of divers inhabitants to the authority under which a dis-
trict attorney is appointed, and by which he may be removed, charging
: NOTES, 641
him with improper motives of conduct, is not a libel. Thorn v. Blan-
chard in Error. 5 Johns. 508. The English authorities are well con-
sidered in this case, and the cause was decided in error against the
opinion of the law characters on the Bench. The Court of errors in
New-York consisting of the Chancellor, and of senators who are not
lawyers. :

Thomas v. Rumsey, 6 Johns. 26. One satisfaction for one injury, B
and C being partners in a newspaper, A brought suit against B for
libel: and then against C: against whom he recovered. B pleaded this
recovery puis darein continuance and well: Genet v. Mitchell, 7 Johns.
120. Plaiutiff may abandon one count of his declaration, and use the
libel therein stated but abandoned, in erplanation of another count. A
jury may decide under the circumstances, whether a public
*minister publishing his instructions, has thereby traitorous- [ *636 ]
ly betrayed the secrets of his government.

Andries v. Wills. Ib. 261. Action for libel lies against the proprietor
of a Gazette, edited by another, though the proprietor did not know of
the publication.

But where the proprietorship is cast upon a person by operation of
law, he does not become thus liable.

Thomas 7. Croswell. 1b. 264. To publish of a member of congress
that he is a fawning sycophant, and has abandoned his post in pursuit
of office, is libellous: and of this, the jury may decide.

Quere, whether words charged in the declaration, and in themselves
likellous, can be admitted to show malice in other words relied on ?
Meade v. Daubigny, Peake’s N. P. Ca. 125. A man may publish a
plain and fair account of proceedings in a court of justice, but not ac-
companied with comments and insinuations against the characters of
the parties concerned.

Brooks v. Eemiss, 8 Johns. 455. Defendant stated that this was not
the first time that falsehood had been associated with the plaintiff, in
the minds of many honest men. Evidence that seven persons and
others believed the plaintiff not to be a man of truth, is not admissible:
for it leads to vague and additional calumny. The fact of falsehood
must be proved. -

Commonwealth v. Crips, 4 Mass. Rep. 163. The truth of the words
is no justification in a criminal prosecution for libel.

[It was so again held in the case of The Commonwealth v. Blanding,
3 Pick. Rep. £04; but after that decision, the legislature of Massachu-
setts by an act passed in 1827, allowed the truth to be given in evidence
in all prosecutions for libels, but with a proviso that such evi lence
should not be a justification, unless it should be made satisfactorily to

81
642 NOTES.

 

appear upon the trial that the matter charged as libellous was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends. ]

I find nothing to the purpose in 5 and 6 Mass. Rep. in 1 M‘Henry ;
1 and 2 Washington; 1, 2, 3 Call; 1, 2,3 Henning and Munford; or 1
—6 Cranch. But lately, (21 Jan. 1811) it was decided in the supreme
court at Charleston, S. C. The State v. Thomas Lehre, that the truth of
the libel could not be given in evidence on an indictment. Judge
Waties, in delivering the opinion of the court, cites the present section
of the institutes. Shaw v. M‘Combs 2 Bays 232. Verdict in slander
on Sunday void. Sunday is not dies juridicus.

Sive quis inatrem familias aut pretertatum pretexiatamve adsectatus
JSuerit. The same law in Rigaut v. Gallisard, 7 Mod. 78. It is strange
how slight the crime of pederasty was regarded among the ancients.
_ Virgil’s Formosum pastor Corydon ardcbat Aleair, and his Nisus amore
pio pueri, are instances. A quarrel between two men about a youth, is
also the subject of one of Lysias’s orations, containing no remark in
disfavour of the practice.

$ 2. Qui et per quos injuriam patiuntur, p. 320.

Soa husband may have assault and battery against one
[ *637 ] who *commits adultery with his wife, though with her con-
sent. 7 Mod. 81. per Holt.

8 Mod. 26. Read v. Marshall. Husband alone may have an action
for beating his wife. But husband and wife cannot join in an action
for battery on them both. They may join for battery commit'ed on the
wife alone; for the damages in this last case survive to the wife. New-
ton et ux. v. Hatter, Lord Ray. 1208. Hoffin v. Byles, 1 Sid. 387. In
an action for negligence, whereby plaintiff’s wife was killed, he is not
entitled to any damages for the loss of her society, or for his mental suf-
ferings on her aceount, after the moment of her death. Baker v. Bol-
ton, et al. 1 Campb. N. P. Rep. 493.

Damages beyond the mere loss of service given for debanching
plaintiff’s daughter. Irwin v. Dearman, 11 East, 23. In such an ae-
tion the daughter cannot be a witness to prove a previous promise of
marriage in aggravation of damages, for she has a right to her own ac-
tion for breach of that promise. Foster v. Scofield, 1 Johns. N. Y. Rep.
297.

§ 7. Pena injuriarum ex 12 tabulis p. 321. Aulus Gellius, Lib. 20.
Ch. 1. says: that retaliation was never enforced, in as much as the pun-
ishment might be commuted for money. ‘The law of the 12 Tables ac-
cording to him was, si injuriam faxit alteri 25. eris pene sunte.

$ 8. Delege Cornelia, p. 322. Passed under Sylla: Ler Cornelia
de injuriis. See Dig. 47. 10. 5.

$ 9. De estimatione atrosis injuria, p. 322. The Locus injuria, is
NOTES. 643

recognized also by the English law, in the doctrine of Mayhem, the
oe Act, &c. See also 5 Hen. 4. Ch. 5. and 22 and 23. Ch. 2.

§ 10. De judicio civili et criminali, p. 323. Zenoniana constitutio +
See Cod. 9. 35. 11. and 12. 8. 2. ut dignitatum ordo servetur. :
Tit. a De obligationibus que ex quasi delicto nascuntur, p. 324. Si
judex litem suam fecerit. 'The judge below was liable to damages in
such acase. Dig. 50.13. lex ult. De var et exrtraor. cognit. and Cod.
7. 49,

Judges of courts of record are not liable to actions, on account of
their decisions. See Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johnson’s N. Y. Rep. 282.

[But a Judge is liable to an action, for an act done by his command
and authority, when he has no jurisdiction. Houlden v. Smith, 14 Ju-
rist. 598.]

§ 1. De dejectis vel effusis, &c. p. 324. Dig. 9. 3.1. This section in-
cludes our law respecting nuisances that work injury to individuals. If
damage was apprehended only, there was a writ, nuntiatio novi operis,
or Cautio de damno infecto. Dig. 39. 1.1.1. and 17—39. 1. 5. 3. and
30. 2. 2. and 4. 3.

*§ 3. De damno aut furto &c. p. 325. An Innkeeperis [ *638 J
liable if he be,

1st. The keeper of a common Inn. Mason v. Grafton, Hob. 245.

2. To a guest or traveller, using the house as an Inn. Calye’s case, 8
Rep. 32.

3. And received as such by the Innkeeper, Bird v. Bird, 1 And. 29.
Anon. Moore 78. Bennet v. Mellor, 5 Term Rep. 273. Dig. 49. 7.

4. Frovided the loss happen, by the act or neglect of the Innkeeper,
or his servants. Calye’s case. Co. Rep. Ub. Sup.

5. Respecting goods deposited in the house. Ib.

6. But not if the Innkeeper requests and enables the traveller to keep
them under lock-and key, and he omits so to do. Brand v. Glass,
Moore, 158. Dyer 206.

7. Where the Innkeeper receives no profit, he is liable to no risk.
Dig. 4. 9. 3.2: as if a traveller leaves his trunk, and promises to come
again at a future day. Gelley v. Clark, Cro. Jac. 188.

But this does not relate to a short absence for an hour or two: or toa
horse, by which profit is made. Sandy’s case, Cro. Jac. 189. York v.
Grindestone, 1 Salk. 388.

8. Nor is it an excuse that the Innkeeper is sick: for he ought to
keep servants. Cross v. Andrews. Cro. El. 622.

9. The liability does not extend toa personal injury, done to the
guest.

10. A master may bring this action, if his servant was robbed at the

\
644 NOTES. .

 

Inn, of goods belonging to the master. Beedle v. Morris, Cro. Jac. 224.
Yelv. 172.6. Drope v. Thayne, Noy 79. Popham 179.

By the civil law, if the loss happened by means of the Innkeeper or
his servants, the action brought on double damages: but if done by a
stranger, the damages were single only. Dig. 4. 9. 8—47. 5. 6.

Tit. VI. De actionibus, p. 326. § 1. Divisio prima. p. 326.

Judices, arbitrosve. The Judices decided upon actions stricti juris,
the A,ditri, upon actions bone fidei. The referees chosen by consent
of the parties, were sometimes called Arbitri, but more properly Com-
promissarii.

§ 6. De recissoria, p. 329. Cod. 8.51.18. See the acts of parlia-
ment protecting the rights of absentees. 5 Hen. 4ch. 14. 4 Hen. 7.
ch. 24, &c. Co. Litt. sect. 436—440. Continual claime. Harris.

§ 6. De Pauliana, p. 330. This is the principle of the English law
against secret conveyances to defraud creditors, 13 Eliz. ch. 5. For the
cases illustrative of this statute, see Roberts on fraudulent conveyances,

and the references in Cooper’s bankrupt law, 144—151.
[ *639 ] *How far a voluntary conveyance, of a debtor’s property
for the benefit of his creditors generally, or of such as will
assent to the deed, is valid, does not appear to meas yet completely
settled under all its distinctions, cither in England or here.

An assignment of all a trader’ s eflects and property is an act of bank-
ruptcy; though for the general benefit of the creditors. 2 Vez. Sen. 19.
Clavey v. How, Burr. Rep. 476. 829—S33. 2241. Sir W. BI. Rep. 1862.
Bull. N. P. 40.

In Eastwick v. Caillaud, 5 Term. Rep. 420 a deed of part of a debt-
or’s property to certain creditors was held good, where there was no
fraudulent intent, and where the other property remained.

Inglis v. Grant, 5 Term Rep. 630. a deed in trust for the benefit of
creditors made in India, was supported, and declared not an object of
the bankrupt laws in England. Soin Alexander v. Vaughan, Cow.
402. an act of bankruptcy committed abroad, cannot be a foundation
for a commission at home.

But in Eckhardt v. Mellish, 8 Term Rep. 142. the court said that an
assignment by deed, by traders of all their effects, unless all their credi-
tors concurred was not only fraudulent and void as against creditors
who did not concur, but was an act of bankruptcy. Soin Echardt v.
Wilson, 8 Term Rep. 140. Tappenden v. Burgess, 4 East, 232.

In Nunn v. Wilsmore, 8 Term Rep. 521. the deed of all the effects
was supported, because there appeared to be a solvency.

Meux v. Howel, 4 East Rep. 1. the transaction was supported, being
honest and well intended for the common benefit of creditors, though
some of them might be delayed.
NOTES. 645

Burd v. Smith, Lessee of Fitsimmons, however, 4 Dal. 76. has decid-
ed in Pennsylvania that a voluntary conveyance made bona fide in
favour of such creditors as would accede to the terms of it within nine ~
months, was good. Something like the same principle was also held in
Wilt v. Franklin, 1 Binn. 502. But in Bown’s executors v. Burrell,
Amn. 1751, and Hovey v. Clark, 1788, Root’s Rep. 252. a general con-
veyance of all a man’s interest for the benefit of his creditors, was held
fraudulent and void as against those who did not agree to it. See also
Leech v. Leech, 1 Ch. cases, 249.

[It is now well settled in this country, that a debtor in failing circum-
stances may assign his property in trust for the payment of his debts ;
and may by such assignment, if made in gocd faith, prefer one creditor -
or set of creditors in exclusioy of his other creditors, when no bankrupt
or other Jaw prohibiting such prefereuces, (as in New Jersey, Georgia,
and Ohio,) and no legal lien binding on the property assigned, exist.
But such assignment must te absolute and unconditional; it must con-
tain no power to revoke the conveyance, or to change the trusts, nor
any reservation or condition for the benefit of the debtor; it must not
be made to an insolvent or infant, or other unfit person, nor exempt the
assignee from any portion of his proper legal responsibility ; it must
devote the whole of the assigned property to the payment of the assign-
o1’s just debts; and it must be accompanied by immediate delivery,
either actual or implied, to the assignee. 5 Johns. Rep. 335, 14 Ib. 458,
20 lb. 442. 5 Cowen 547. 6 Cowen 287. 11 Wendell 187. 5 Paige
€2. 8 Ib. 417. 6 Hill 438. 1 Barbour S.C. Rep. 210. 2 Ib. 9. 307.
4 Ib. 332. 546. 9 1b. 255. 1Sandf. Ch Rep. 483. 251. 21b. 595. 3
Ib. 545. 2 Comstock 365. 4 Ib, 211.]

§ 7. De Serviana et quasi Serviana seu hypothecaria, p. 330. The
first part of this section is in principle the same as our suit for rent.
The last part is the foundation of maritime hypothecation and bottom-
ry.

The Servian action was introduced by the Preetor Servius, in Cicero’s
time. The quasi Serviana, by subsequent pretors, or the
practice *of the bar. The Servian action, was a pretorian, [ *640 ]
real, action; given to landlords, for the recovery of rent of
farms, Predia rustica ; not for the rent of houses, Predia urbana. It
lay against the property whereon by previous contract, the landlord had
a lien for rent in arrear, but the tenant kept the possession and use of it.
The lien held good, in whosesoever hands the property was found.
Tribuit enim hec conventio domino fundi jus in re quod cum re ambulat,
et semel quasitum perpetuum est nce mutatione dyminii extinguitur.
The property might be redeemed by tendcring the demand.

Hypotheca, means sometimes the right of the Pawnee, and sometimes
646 NOTES.

 

the thing pawned or hypothecated, as in the digest and code, de pigno-
ribus et hypothecis. Nig. 20. 1.

[The term hypotheca is used, when real estate is mortgaged; and
pignus, when movables are pledged or pawned. |

A pledge, requires delivery of the article into the possession of the
creditor: an hypotheca, is the subject of contract only, and remains
with the debtor; but is liable to the lien of the creditor in whosesoever
hands it may be found. Dig. 20. 1. 2. 2. sometimes the contract was
tacit. Dig. 20. 2. 4. and 20. 2. 7.

[By our law, all kinds of personal property that are vested and tangi-
ble, and also negotiable paper, may be the subject of pledge; and
choses in action, resting on written contract, may be assigned in pledge.
It is not in all cases necessary that the possession of the pledge should
be actual. Stocks, and it would seem equitable interest, may be pledg-
ed; and it will be sufficient, if, by a proper transfer, the property be
put within the power and control of the pledgee. [Wilson v. Little,
2 Comstock’s Rep. 443. Story on Bailments, $ 297. Dykars ¥. Allan,
7 Hill N. Y. Rep. 497.) After the debt is due, the creditor may sell
the pledge at auction, or giving reasonable opportunity to the debtor to
redeem, and apprising him of the time and place of sale. But the
creditor will be held at his peril to deal fairly and justly with the pledge,
both as to the time of the notice, and the manner of the sale. The
holder of hypothecated stock cannot, on default, have it sold at the
board of brokers, or otherwise at public auction and on reasonable
notice, unless there be an express stipulation authorizing it. (Castello
v. City Bank of Albany, 1 N. Y. Legal Observer 25.) If the debt be
payable on demand, a demand must be made before a sale-of the pledge.
(Wilson v. Little, 1 Sandf. Superior Ct. Rep. 351. Stearns v. Marsh,
4 Denio Rep. 227.) While the debtor’s right in the pledge remains
unextinguished, he may sell or assign it, subject to the rights of the
pawnee, or it may be sold on execution; and the purchaser, like any
other purchaser or assignee of the interest of the pawnor, succeeds to
all his rights, and becomes entitled to redeem. So the pawnee may
assign over the pawn, and the assignee will take it under all the respon-
sibility of the original pawnee.

The distinction between a pledge and a mortgage of chattels is prin-
cipally this; by a mortgage the legal zitle passes to the mortgagee with
a condition of defeasance upon the payment of the debt; but a pledge
gives to the pledgee a mere right of possession with an authority to sell
in case of default of payment. (Dykars v. Allan, 7 Hill N. Y. Rep.
498. Brownell v. Hawkins, 4 Barb 8. C. Rep. 491. Wilson v. Little,
2 Comstock Rep. 443. Houser v. Kemp, 3 Barr’s Rep. 208.) The
mortgage being a conditional sale, it follows that upon the failure of the
NOTES. | 647

mortgagor to perform the condition, the mortgagee acquires an absolute
title to the property. Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wendell Rep. 80. Hunting-
ton v. Mather, 2 Barb. 8. C. Rep. 238.) Another distinction is, that a
pledge of moveables, unaccompanied by delivery, is void as against cred-
itors; but in many of the States of the Union, the retaining of possession
by the mortgagor does not invalidate the mortgage, if it be made a matter
of public record. In 1832, the legislatures of Massachusetts and New
Hampshire passed acts, declaring that no mortgage of personal property
thereafter made, should be valid except as to the parties, unlcss possession
be delivered to and retained by the mortgagce, or unless the mortgage be
recorded in the Clerk’s Office of the town where the mortgagee resides.
In New York also, in 1833 provision was made by law, for filing in the
‘town clerk’s office, as matter of public record, mortgages of chattels,
and every such mortgage, unless the samé ora true copy thereof be
_filed, or be accompanied by immediate delivery, and followed by an
actual and continued change of possession, was declared to be void as
against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith. Under
that act is has been held, that if a mortgage of personal property be
duly recorded a change of possession need not be made. In Kentucky,
by Statutes passed in 1820, 1837, and 1839, no mortgage or deed of
trust of real or personal estate, is good against a purchaser, for valuable
consideration, or against a creditor, unless it be duly deposited for re-
cording in the county clerk’s office. In Georgia, Tennessee, Indiana
and Virgmia, mortgages of personal property are to be proved and re-
corded like mortgages of land, in order to make them secure against
bona fide creditors and purchasers. Statutes of Georgia 1827, Tennessee,
1831, Indiana 1838, Virginia 1791 & 1819. The statute of Tennessee
applies to all bills of sale as well as mortgages and deeds of trust of
real and personal property; all deeds of gift; all powers of attorney,
concerning the conveyance of real or personal property; all marriage
contracts, and all agreements for the conveyance of real or personal
property. In Mississippi, by Statute in 1822, deeds respecting the title
to personal property, are to be recorded in the county where the proper-
ty is; and if it be removed to a different county, to he recorded within
twelve months; and if not recorded, they are void as to purchasers for
a valuable consideration without notice, and as to creditors. 1 Smedes
& Marshall 122. Soin Alabama, deeds of trust, including mortgages
of personal property, are to be recorded within thirty days, otherwise
they are void as against creditors and subscquent purchasers without
notice. But the statute does not apply to choses in action. Aikin’s Dig.
208. p.5. 4 Alabama R. N.S. 263. 469. In Connecticut, there may
be a mortgage of manufacturing machinery, without the real estate to
which it is attached, and the mortgage is effectual, though the mort-
648 NOTES.

 

gagor retain possession of the machinery. Such machinery may also
be attached, without being removed, and sold on execution. Statutes
of Connecticut 1838 pp. 72. 73. But in Vermont, no mortgage of any
machinery, used in a factory, shop or mill, is good except between the
_ parties, unless possession be deliverel to and retained by the mortgagee.
Revised Statutes of Vermont 1839, p. 317.

In California, no mortgage of personal property is valid against any
other persons than the parties thereto, unless possession of the mort-
gaged property be delivered to and retained by the mortgagee. Statutes
of California 1850, p. 267.] ;

The action for a pledge was pignoratitia: it was a civil action: hy-
pothecaria, was a pretorian action. Pignoratitia, was personal, hypotli-
ecaria, Was real. Pignoratitia, lay against the creditor, holding the
pledge when the debt was paid. Hypothecaria, lay against the article
subjected to lien by the contract, to compe! the payment of the debt.
Pignoratitia lay, though the pledge did not belong to the debtor, for it
was grounded on his delivery to the creditor, who was bound to retain
it no longer than till payment. Hypothecaria, could not be supported in
rem, if the thing hypothecated by the debtor, did not belong to him.

Hypothecation, was subject to a limitation of suit: viz. it was. to be
brought within 30 years, against a possessor mala fide: 10 years if bona
fide: and 20 years in cases of absence.

§$ 8. De actionibus pretoriis personalibus, p.331. Receptitia. An ac-
tion to recover money deposited with a banker.

Ex nostra constitutione, Cod. 4, 18. 2.

§$ 9. Actio de constitutio pecunia, p. 331. Dig. 13. 5.1land 14. A
personal pretorian action, founded on a promise, or a contract, constitu-
tum, to pay what might be due from the proprietor himself, or any per-
son for whom he chose thus to become guarantee.

$11. De actione in factum ex jure jurando, p 332. This is some-
what like the ancient practice of compurgators, or modern practice of
swearing in this country to a book account.

$13. De prejudicialibus actionibus, p. 332. These are ac-
[ *641 ] tions, as *Bracton says, (who describes them in the same
manner, L. 3.ch.4.n.9.) Preejudiciales, quia prius judican-

tur quam actio principalis.

$ 15. De nominibus actionum, p. 333. Condicere, prisca lingua sig-
nificat denuntiare ; nam qui olim cum aliquo litem habebat, denuntiabat ei,
UT ILLO DIE AD JUDICIUM ACCIPIENDUM ADESSET. Hodie vero per abusionem,
condictio, dicitur actio quam actor intentans dicit, st PARET HUNC DARE
oporTERE. Nulla enim hoc tempore adversario fit denuntiatio. Theoph.
in loc. Sir W. Bl. Rep. 391. Price v. Neal: this isthe action condictio
indebiti, for money had and received.
NOTES. 649

 

$ 16. Divisio secunda, p. 334. The first part of the division, is eur
action in detinet. a

$ 20. De mistis, p. 336. Hlerciscere, an old word, meaning to div'da,
from egxo:, a hedge or inclosure. Cic. de orat. 1.1. Heius. syntag, |. 3.
tit. 18. The writs in England that answer the purpose of the fumilice
erciscunde, the de communi divid indo, aud the Jinium regundorum, are
the writs de parlitione facierda—de rationalibus divisis—de perambula-
fee fuciends—de curia claudenda—de reparatione Sucienda. Fitz. nat.

rev.

§ 21. Divisio tertia, p. 336. In some actions in England, double and
triple damages are given: and by 38 Ed. 3. ch. 12. tenfold damages
are recoverable against a juror who receives a bribe for bringing ina
verdict.

§ 25. In quadruplum, p 337. Extortion.

§ 28. Divisio quaria, p. 339, Cod. 3. 31.3. To the 14 actions herg
enumerated as hone fidei, may be added actio ex stipulatu de date, of the
next section.

§$ 29. De rei urorie actione, §c. p. 339. Cod. 5. 13.,

§ 39. De potestate judicis, §c. Et de compensationibus, p. 340. This
is the foundation of all our law of defalcation or set off: first given by
2 Geo 2. ch. 22, aud t Geo. 2. ch. 4. In Pennsylvania by act of assem-
bly, a defendant is required to bring forward every set off he may have
against the plaintiff, otherwise he is barred from any future action. This
seems however by the hundred dollar law of March 181U, to be confined
to suits originally brought before a justice of the peace. See post $ 39
of this title. Nostra censtitutio. Cod. 4. 31. 14.

, § 3L. De actionibus arbitrarits, p. 341. We have nosuch action. All
actions bone fidei, belong to our equitable jurisdictions, whether at law
_ (as money had aud received) or in ch mcery.

$ 33. De pluris petitiune, p. 342. Lege fulcidia. vide Lib. 2. Tit. 22,
of the Instit. Lex Zenonia et nostra. These constitutions are not ex-
tant,

*Swancott v. Westgarth, 4 East, 75. was an action for [ *642 ]
goods sold and delivered on credit, and the question was, whe-
ther the action was commenced before the credit had expired. Held
not; inasmuch as though the writ was issued before, the bill was filed
after the credit had expired; but if defendant had been actually arrest-
ed, semble he would have been entitled to damages.

In Mussen v. Price et al. 4 East, 147. Credit for three months and then
payment by a bill at two months, was held a credit for five months; and
assumpsit could not be maintained at the end of three months, on neg-
lect of paying by a two months bill, but the remedy was a special action

on the case for damages. =
650 NOTES.

Dann v. Spurrier, 3 Bos. and Pull. 399. A lease granted for 7, 14, or
21 years; Lessee has his option at which of the periods the lease shall
determine. ’

$40. De eo qui bonis cessit, p. 348. By Cod. 7. 71. 1. and 8. and by
Dig. 42. 3. 4. it should appear, that though the person of a debtor is dis-
charged by a cessio bonorum, his property subsequently acquired is not.
But this I apprehend is to be understood with the limitation stated in this
section of the institutes, which is also confirmed by the provisions of
Dig. 42. 3. 6—42. 1. 17 and 39—42. 1. 19. 1—42. 1. 16. and Nov.
135. provisions which are similar in principle, to the English law, that
forbids the tools and instruments of a man’s trade to ke seized. The
creditors might either allow the debtor five years to pay his debts in, or
take his property and discharge his person. Cod. 7. 7. 8.

It would hea judicious regulation in my opinion, if future exonera-
tion were denied to tradesmen, who neglected to keep fair and regular
books of account, or who could not explain clearly the causes of their
failure, and deficiency.

As to the question about cutting a debtor in pieces, de debitore in par-
tes secando, notwithstanding Bynkershoek’s observations and Dr. 'Tay-
lor’s dissertation, doubt yet remains whether the literal be not the true
sense. Probably it was a law in terroremozly. Aul. Call. Lib. 20. Ch.
1—S. Gibbon’s Rom. Hist. p. 93. n. The semote auni cruciatu, of the
Code 7. 7. 8. is an expression of late date, that supports the cruelty of
the literal meaning in the law of the 12 tables.

Tit. VIL Quod cum eo qui in aliena potestate est, negotium gestum
esse dicetur, p. 348. This title relates for the most part to cases not very
prevalent here, except so far as they may be analogous-to the law, how
far a master is answerable for the contracts of his servant, for which see
the head of master and servant in Espinasse’s Dig of N. P. and Comyn’s

( on contracts, where the cases are well collected.
[ *643 ] *S 4. De peculio et in rem verso, p. 350.

Aliquando tamen. When an action de yeculio is brought
for the full value of a pecudium, which is worth, for example, an hun-
dred aurei, and the slave, to whom the peculiwm belongs, owes 50 aurei
to the son of his master, or to some other slave under the power of the
same master, the judge must then deduct those fifty aurei ; so that the
plaintiff can only receive the remaining fifty. But, when a suit is com-
menced for 100 aurei against a peculium, which is worth but 100 aurei,
and the slave, to whom this peculium, or separate estate belongs, is in-
debted in 50 auret to another slave, who is under the same master, but
yet makes a part or parcel of the peculium, by being appendant to it, in
this case the judge is not authorized to order the 50 aurei, due to this vi-
carial or suLordinatz slave, to be deducted, but must cause the payment
NOTES. 651

 

ef the 100 aurei, i. e. of the whole value of the peculium, to be made
to the plaintiff ; and the reason, assigned for this by Theophilus, is the
following: ef, cum ita se res habeat, non potest vicarius, cujus estimatione
peculium augelur, et ipse illud minuere, eo nomine, quod sibi aliquid de-
beatur ; ne eadem persona duas contrarias habere functiones videatur, ut
simul et augeant et minuat peculium. h. t. Harris.

$7. De senatus-consulto Macedoniano, p. 353.

Senatus-consultum Macedonianum.] 'This decree was called Macedo-
nian from Macedo, the name of the person, who gave rise to it; but,
whether this Macedo was a young patrician under the power of his fa-
ther, or an old usurer, the learned commentators are in very great doubt;
and they ave even far from being unanimous, as to the time when this
decrce was first made. But it is certain, that the emperor Claudius pub-
lished a law, by which, to use the words of Tacitus; he restrained the
cruelty of creditors; Strvitiam creditorum coercuit; ne in mortem paren-
tum pecunias filiis-familiarum feenori dareut. Tac. lib. 11. annalium.
And this law is conjectured to have been the Macedonian Senatus consul-
tum ; which, inorder to reconcile the two historians, Tacitus and Seuto-
nius, is supposed by some to have-grownobsolete in the reign of Nero, and
afterwards to have been revived by Vespasian; for Suetonius writes as
follows in the life of that emperor, viz. Auctor seratui fuit Vespasianus
decernendi, ne filiorum-fam. feneratoribus exigendi crediti jus unquam
esset, hoc est, né post patris quidem mortem. Those, who have time and
inclination to rcad more upon this subject, are referred to the Syntagma
of Heinneccius, lib. 4. t. 7. but particularly to Peter Faber’s Semestrium,
lib. 1. cap. 25. Harris.

Upon the subject of the Macedonian decree, and catching bargains,
where heirs bargain on the eredit of their expectancies, the
leading *cases are Chesterfield and Jansen, 1 Atk. 301—355. [ *644 ]
and Gwynne z. Heaton, 1 Brown’s Ch. Ca. 1. I refer to Fon-
blanque’s references, 1 Fonb. 124, 125. to which add Berney v. Tuson,
2 Ventr. 259. Fairfax v. Trigg, Cas. Temp. Finch, 314.

Chancery also applies the principle of the Macedonian decree, to con-
tracts for the prize money of sailors, Baldwin et al. v. Rochford, 1 Wils.
929. Taylor v. Rochford, 2 Vez. 281. How v. Weldon, 2 Vez. 516.
This last class of bargains however were made void by 20 Geo. 2.
Ch. 24.

It is also cxtended in some degree to contracts between Parent and
Child, Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Vez. 400. Young v. Peachy, 2 Atk. 254.
and Glisson v. Ogden, there cited, p. 258. Heron v. Heron, 2 Atk,
159. Blunden v. Barker, 1 P. Wms. 639. Hawes v. Wyatt, 3. Br.

Ch. Ca. 156. ;
Also to cases of Guardian and Ward, Trustee and Cestul que trust,
652 NOTES.

Purse v. Waring, 1 P. Wms. 120. Coxe’s note. Hilton v. Hilton, 2 Vez.
547. Grav. Mansfield, 1 Vez. 379. Hamilton v. Mohun, 1 P. W. 118.
Osborne v. Chapman, 2Ch. Ca. 157. Hatch » Hatch, 9 Vez. junr. 292.
a strong case in point of time, for 24 years had elapsed. See also as to
time elapsed, Randall v. Eunington, 10 Vez. 423.

Analagous to these, are the cases of sales made by trustees and pur-
chasers for themselves: concerning which the doctrine seems nearly set-
tled, that no person, whether guardian, trustee, attorney, solicitor, or as-
signee interested to scll, can be permitted to buy: Bovey v. Smith, 1
Vern. 69. Whelpdale v. Cookson, 1 Vez. Sent. 9. confirmed in ex pte.
James, 8 Vez. junr. 349. Fox ». Macreath, 4 Br. Ch. Ca. 326. 425.
Crowe ». Ballard, 3 Br. Ch. Ca. 120. Whichote v. Lawrence, 3 Vez.
junr. 750. (the rule Somewhat narrowed). Lord Hardwicke v. Vernon,
4 Vez. 411. In Campbell v. Walker, 5 Vez. 680. Sir W. Grant, M. R.
lays down the rule, that a trustee so purchasing, purchases under the
liability of the sale being set aside by cestuique trust. It would be tet
ter to stick to Lord Thurlow’s rule in Crowe ». Ballard a person em-
poyed to sell, should not be permitted to buy even with knowledge of
the party selling. Though Sir W. Grant, denies there ever was such a
tule. In ex pte. Reynolds, 5 Vez. 707. assignces of a bankruptey were
discharged, because one with knowledge of the other purchased at aue-
tion, part of the bankrupt's estate. :

The estates were directed to be resold, expte Lacey, 6 Vez. 25. Ex
pte. Hughes, Ib. 617. Lister v. Lister, 1b. 631. :

So purchase of a bankrupt’s estate by the solicitor to the commission,

set aside ex pte. James, 8 Vez. 343. wherein the Chancellor
[ #645 ] goes *far to confirm Thurlow’s fosition. ce also Coles v.

Trecothick, 9 Vez. 247. Expte. Bennet, 10 Vez. 363. Morse
v. Royal, 12 Vez. 264. and Wright v. Proud, 13 Vez.1(8. Sngd L. Ven.
and Fur. 331 to 367. In Campbell ». Walker, 5 Vez. 681. Sir W.
Grant, M. R. who seems inclined somewhat to relax the rule, says ‘the
“only thing a trustce can do to protect his purchase, is, if he sees it is
“absolutely necessary the estate should be sold, and he is ready to give
“more than any one else, that a bill should be filed, aud he should apply
“to the court to become a purchaser.” This may be convenient occa-
sionally ; still Lord Thurlow’s rule is the best upouthe whole. It closes
at once, all the doors against fraud.

So trustee whether sole or joint cannot te receiver,
Vez. 72.

The general principle of the Macedonian decrce, viz. the protecting
from fraud, those who by reason of inexperience, or want of knowledge,
are unable sufficiently to protect themselves, has also been adopted in
other cases in England. Cleveland v. Osmond, 3 P. Wms. 129. Griffin

 

v. Tolland, 8
NOTES. 653

v. Deveuille, cited 3 P. Wms. 131. Bridgeman »v. Green, 2 Vez. 627.
Nantes v. Currock, 9 Vez. 182.

So in case8 of attorney and client, any undue advantage of superior
knowledge, confidence reposed, or fear excited, will be suppressed,
Walmsley v. Booth, 2 Atk. 25.27. Draper’s company ». Davis, 2 Atk.
294. Saunderson v. Glass, Ib. 295. Newman v. Payne, 2 Vez. Jun. 199.
Middleton v Wills, 4 Br. Par. Ca. 245. Gibson v. Jayes, 6 Vez. 266.
Beaumont v. Boltbee, 5 Vez. 485. 7 Vez. 599. So counsel are forbidden
to make conditional bargains. Shapholone v. Hart, Rep. Temp. Finch.
477. 1 Eq. Ca. ab. 86. All there cases relate to the continuance of the
relationship between attorney and client : otherwise they do not apply;
Oldham v. Hand, 2 Vez. 259. The practices of administrators in this
state, render the application of these cases, too often necessary.

Tit. VI. Denoralibus actionibus, p. 354.

Ex maleficiis sercorum.] The action noxalis, which lies against mas:
térs for the crimes of their servants, was always unknown in England ;
for even villeins, before the tenures in villenage were abolished, might
have been convened for their own crimes. Cow. inst. ].4.t.8. But
there is something in the law of England similar to a noxal action, in
regard to animals and things inanimate, by which the death of a man is
occasioned ; for if a vicious horse, or bull, or a cart drawn by horses or
oxen, occasions the death of any person, the thing or animal, which did
the mischief, becomes, as it were, sacred, and is called a Deo-
dand; *(i. e.a thing given to God;) because it was soldin [ *646 ]
ancient times by the king’s alrnoner, who distributed the mo-
ney to pious uses. But, in regard to Deodands, the law makes many
distinctions; e. g. if a ship or boat is laden with merchandise, and aman
is killed or drowned by the motion, yet the merchandise are no Deo-
dand, though the accident happened in fresh water: but if any particu-
lar merchandise fal's upon a man, and kills him, that merchandise shall
be Deodand, but not the ship. See Hale’s Hist. of the pl. of the
Crown. Vol. 1. p. 422. Hawk. pl. of the Crown. lib. 1. cap. 26. Har-
ris. -

Iam answerable for the misconduct, unskilfulness or negligence of
those whom Iemploy. Sarvis v. Hayes, 2 Str.1004. Anon. 1 Lord
Ray, 739. 2 Salk. 441. Bush v. Stainman, 1 Bos. and Pull. 404.
Stoue v. Cartwright, 6 Term Rep. 411. Brucker v. Fromont, 6 Term
Rep. 659. Hugget v. Montgomery, 2 Bos. and Pull. New Rep. 446.
Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 Dall. 2U6. Snell v. Rich, 1 Johns. Rep. 305. 1
Canip. N. P. 497. But not where the injury arises from wilful violence
or gross negligence, not reasonably connected with the duty in which I
employ him, and in my absence. Savignac v. Roome, 6 Term Rep.

 
654 NOTES.

125. M’Manus ». Cricket, 1 East, 106. Morley v. Gaisford, 2 Hen. El.’
442. 2 Bays, S. Car. 345.

Tit. IX. Si quadrupes pauperiam fecisse dicatur, p. 357.

The point here made, of eguus calcitrosus, a horse accustomed to kick
—bos cornu petere solitus, an ox accustomed to run at people, is adopted
in modern decisions. So case lies against the owner of a dog accustoin-
ed to bite; and of this the owner must have notice. Sec Tason v- Keel-
ing, 1 Lord Raym. 606. Buxenden v. Shary, 2 Salk. 662. Smith »v.

’Pelah, 2 Str. 1264. Brook v. Copeland, 1 Esp. N. P. Rep. 203. Bolton
v. Banks, Cro. Car. 254. Kinnion v. Davis, Cro. Car. 487. Jenkins v.
Turner, 1 lord Ray. 118.

§ 1. De actione cedilitia, concurrente crm actione de pauperie, p. 358.

De eadem re concurrentes.| The same doctrine is delivered by Ulpi-
an, ff. 44. t. 7.1. 60. ff. 50. t. 17.1. 139. which doctrine we must un-
derstand to regard penal actions, concurring on account of the same
thing, but yet arising from different facts and offences; as for instance,
if a man steals a slave, and afterwards murders him, such a criminal
may be doubly prosecuted, for theft and injuriousdamage; for as the
actions of theft and injurious damage would arise in this case from dif-
ferent offences, the one will not bar the other: but, on the contrary, if
two penal actions, concurring on account of the same thing, should
arise from the same offence, the one would destroy the other; and there-
fore the plaintiff must make his election. Vid. Cuj. observ. lib. 8. c. 24.

Hotom. illust, quest. 29. Harris. ;
[ *647 ] *Tit. X. De iis per quos agere possumus, p. 358.

Aut suo nomine aut alieno.| In England the liberty of
constituting an attorney to prosecute suits is given chicfly by the statute
Jaw. vid. 20. H.3.cap. 10. 12 Edw. 2.cap.1. 15 Edw. 2. cap. 1.
7 Ric. 2 cap. 14. 7 Hen. 4. cap. 13. 29 Eliz. cap. 5. For by the
cominon law, the plaintiff or defendant, demandant or tenant, could nnt
appear by attorney without the kirg’s writ, or letters patent, but ought
to follow his suit in his own proper person. Adnsion est [says the
author of the Mirror] @ reteiner atterney sans breve de la chancerie. Co.
Litt. 128. a. Harris. ~

In cases requiring corporal punishment, a proctor was not allowed.
Dig. 48. 1. 13.

A proctor in England must file his power by 4 and 5 Ann. ch. 16.

Mandamus will not lie to reinstate a proctor. Leigh’s case, 3. Mod.
332.

When a proctor ceases to be so, and in what cause, see Hall’s prac-
tice of the court of admiralty, p. 20. A letter of attorney is only a
power to transact business ad negotia: a warrant of attorney is ad
litem. See an instructive case as to the acts of an attorney, and the
NOTES. 655

distinction between our attorneys at law, and the proctors of the Roman
ale Denton v. Noyes, 6 Johns. Rep. N. Y. 302. et seq.

Vit. XI. De satisdutionibus, p. 360. Dig. 46. 7.9. and 46. 7. 20.
Dig. 2.8. The securities or cautions judicially required, are, jrudicio
sist’: to attend and appear during pendency of-the suit. De rato: to
confirm the acts of his attorney or proctor. Judicium solvi: to pay the
sum adjudged against him.

These were taken either by sureties, Cautso fide jussoria. By depo-
sit, Cautio pignoratitiu. By oath, juratoria: and in scme cases by Lare
promise only, nudi promissoria.. See an useful book, Hall’s admiralty
practice. p. 13.

Lhe plaintiff also is required, by the civil Jaw generally, to find cau-
tion, to prosecute the suit; to pay costs if the judgment be against him,
and to confirm the acts of his attorney; See Nov. 33. 1. and 2. Nov.
96. 2. Nov. 112. 2 and Edict. 7. Justiniani.

Lut. XID. De peryetuis et temporalibus actionibus, p. 363.

Perpeétuo.solere. Astothe English acts of limitation, see Co, Litt.
118. a. 2 Co. Inst. 94, 65. 32 Hen. Sch. 2. 21 Ja.1ch. 16. General-
ly in England this act must be pleaded: in New-York the limitation act
may be given in evidence under the general issue and notice. In Penn-
sylvania, it is pleaded, except in ejectment.

Constitutionibus introductum. Cod. 7.39.4 and 5. Cod. [ *648 ]
7. 40. Dig. 5. 5.

§ 1. De actionibus quee in heredes transeunt vel non, p. 364.

In England, and generally in America, Actio personalis moritur eum
persona. This ought not to be the case in several kinds of action, as
battery, mayhem, seduction &c. Under the Roman law,, actions for
torts descended to the heirs, but did not survive against the heirs. Dig.
50. 16. 38. Dig. 2.10.1. Dig. 4. 7. 4. and 5.

Tit. X. De exceptionibus, p. 365. This isa general view of what
may be called the special pleading of the Roman law.

§ 6. De ceteris exceptionibus, p. 367. Exlatioribus digestorum libris.
Dig. 4. 1.

§ 10. De dilatoriis, p. £68. Subjacere cencemus. Neither the consti-
tution of Zeno or of Justinian here referred to, is extant.

§ 11. De dilatoriis ex persona, p. 869. Pleas in abatement.

Tit. XIV. De replicationibus, p. 370. Rejoinders, surrejoinders, re-
butters, surrebutters.

$ 4. Que exceptiones fidejussoribus pro sunt vel non, Pp. 371.

See ante Inst. 3. 21. dé fide-jussor:ibus : and Inst. 4. 13. 3.

On the subject of mutuality between principal and surety, see ex-
parte Gifford, 6 Vez. 805. and Wright v. Morely, 11 Vez. 12. 22.

Tit. XV. De interdictis, p. 372. Interdicts are now out of use.
656 NOTES,

 

There is no difference between interdicts and actions. See the Sth
section of this title.

§ 3. De interdictis adipiscende, p. 347. The Salvian interdict was
drawn up by Salvius Julianus at the order of the empercr Adrian.
Dig. 43. 33

§ 4. De interdietis retinenda, p. 374. This section advances the
common legal maxim of our law, in eguali jure, melior est cunditio pos-
sidentis.

Uti possidetis. Dig. 43.17. Ulp. Lib. 63. Cod. 8. 6.

Utrubi. Dig. 43. 31.

§ 6. De interdicto recuperande, p. 377. Sed ex constitutionibus,
Cod. 8.4. Tenentur lege Julia. Dig. 43.16. Dig. 47. 1.

Tit. XVI. De pena temere litigantium, p. 379.

§ 1. De jurejurando et pena pecuniaria, p. 379.

This includes our Pennsylvania practice, of an affidavit of defence, an
affidavit that a certiorari is not taken out for the purpose of delay &c.
The ancient action of calumny, was similar to our action on the case for
malicious prosecution. As to amerciament in respect of suits, misert-
cordia, and the capiatur pro fine of the English practice, see Serjeant

Williams's note 1. to Mortlake v. Charlton, 2 Saund. 193.
[ *649 ] *Ex constitutione.| The oath of calumny was in use

long before the reign of Justinian, as appears from many
passages in the digests; ff. 10. t. 2.1. 44. ff. 12. t. 2. Il 16.34. ff 39. t.
2.1.13. § 3. Qui damni infecti caveri sibi postulat, prius de calumnia
jurare debet. And in section 4 of the same book are these words——Si
alieno nomine caveri mihi danini infecti postulem, jurare debeo, NON CAL-
UMNLE CAUSA ID EUM, CUJUS NOMINE CAUTUM POSTULO, FUISSE PCSTULATURUM.
Ulpian.

But the oath seems afterwards to have fallen into desuetude, and to
have been only revived by the constitution referred to; part of which
is conceived in the following terms. Actor quidem jurat, NON CaLUM-
NIANDI ANIMO LITEM SE MOVISSE SED ESTIMANDO BONAM CAUSA HABERE.

Reus autem non aliter suis allegationibus utatur, nisi prius et ipse ju-
raverit ;—-QUOD, PUTANS SE BONA INSTANTIA UTI, AD RELUCTANDUM PREVE-
NeRIT. Cod. 2. t. 59. 1. 2.

The canon law permits even a proctor to swear in animan domini
sui, vid. decret. Greg. ix. lib. 2. t. 7. And this was formerly the prac-
tice in all the ecclesiastical courts in England, vid. ord. judicicaum. tit
99. and 110.—canon 132.—But the oath of calumny is now disused rot
only in England, but also in those countries, where the canon law is in
full force, and where the civil law is the law of the land, vid. La juris-
prudence du Code conferee avec les ordnances Rayiur de F'rance. tom.
1. p. 297 Groenw. de ll. abr. in 4tam. inst. t. 16.—Philiberii Bugni-
on Ul. abr. tractatus lib. 1 cap. 3. Harris.

 

 
NOTES. 657

 

Alia nostra constitutione.] vid. Cod. 3. t. 2. 1. ‘14, et novellam. Pa-
éront autem causarum, &c. Harris.

$ 2. De infamia, p. 380. Ignominiosi Siunt, Dig. 3.2. Cod. 2. 12.

Non coniraris actionibus. Nam in contrartis judiciis de dolo cut per-
Jidia non agitur ; sed tantum de calculo et supputatione ejus, quod con-
trario judicio agenti abest., Vinn.

Pennsylvania, to the infinite disgrace of her jurisprudence, makes
no difference between a debtor on account of crime, and a debtor on
account of contract: under the insolvent laws, a convicted criminal is
permitted to defraud the officers of court of their fees; and though in
Jail for damages given for the most atrocious injuries to person or char-
acter, this isno bar to his deliverance. Under the practice of the in-
solvent laws of this state, they appear to be enacted for the protection
of criminals, and swindlers, as the favourites of the legislature: and
this, under the notion, that all imprisonment on account of pecuniary
obligation, is contrary to the mild character required in the laws of a
democracy.

*$ 3. De in jus vocando, p. 381. Dig. 2. 4. Cod. 2. 2. [ *650 ]

Tit. X VIL. De officio Judicis, p. 382.

§ 4. Familie erciscunde, p. 384. This is our suit by writ of parti-
tion. See acts of assembly of Pennsylvania digested by Purdon tit. Par-
tition, and Walker v. Dilworth et al. 2 Dall. 257. and M‘Kee et al. v.
Straub et al. 2 Binn. 1. by which it was settled that 8 and 9 W. 3 ch.
31. concerning partitions, does not extend to this state.

§ 6. Finium regundorum, p. 385.

St finium regundorum| 'The writs de perambulatione faciendo, and ~
de rationalibus divisis, are ofthe same use in the law of England, as the
judicium finium regundorum in the Roman law.

The writ de perambulatione lies, when two lordships are near each
other, and some encroachment hath been made; for then, by assent of
both lords, the sheriff shall take with him the parties and their neigh-
bours, and shall make perambulation, and fix the bounds, as they were
before. But, if one lord encroaches upon another, and will not agree to
a perambulation, the party aggrieved shall have the writ rationalibus
divisis against the other. vid. Terms de la ley, and Fitzherbert’s nat.
brev. p. 303. 809. Harris.

Tit. XVID. De publicis Judiciis p. 386.

$ 3. Exempla. De lesa majestate, p. 387. ~

Lex Julia magistratis.| v. d. ff. 48. t. 4. and Calvin’s lexicon juridi-
cum. é

In England the stated judgment for high treason, in all cases except
counterfeiting the coin, is, that the offender shall be drawn to the place
of execution, and there hanged by the neck and cut down alive; that

83 ,

 
658 NOTES.

his entrails shall be taken out and burned, his head cut off, his body
quartered, and his head and quarters put up, where the king shall di-
rect. The judgment in the case of a woman is, ‘that she shall be
drawn and burned.”

In this judgment is implied, the forfeiture of all the offender’s manors,
lands, tenements, and hereditaments: his wife loses her dower: his
children become base and ignoble: he loses his posterity ; for his blood
is stained and corrupted. All his goods and chattels are likewise for-
feited. 3 Co. Inst. 200, 211. Strahan’s Domat. supp. Hale’s pl. of the
crown, 268. Harris.

$ 4. De adulterits, p. 387.

Lex Julia vid. ff. 48. t. 5. ad leyem Juliam de adulteriis coercendis.

Gladio punit.| In England, and most other countries at this day,
adulterers are punished by fine.

Cum masculis nefandum libidinem.] The crime here meant is bugge-

ry or sodomy ; under which words all unnatural carnal cop-
[ *651 ] ulations are *to be understood. The ancient English law-

yers all agree, that it ought to be punished with death, ulti-
mo supplicio; though they differ, as to the manner of inflicting it. Brit-
ton say, that Sodomites and miscreants shall be burned :—F'leta writes,
that they shall be buried alive ; pecorantes et sodomite in terra vivi con-
fodiantur—The author of the mirror also delivers himself much to the
same purpose; and adds, that Sodomie est crime de majestie vers le roy
celester. At this day by 25 Hen. 8. cap. 6. and 5 Eliz. 17. the commit-
ters of this crime, whether male or female, are no otherwise punishable,
than as common felons, who are denied the benefit of the clergy. 3 Co.
Inst. cap. 10. Hawk. pl. of the crown, lib. 1 cap. 4. But it was
doubted by some of the judges in the 4th year of Geo. 1. (though with
little reason according to Fortescue) whether a man, indicted for bug-
gery with a woman, could legally be convicted upon the above men-
tioned statute of 25 H. 8. See the King v. Wiseman, Fortescue’s Repts.
91. Harris.

See the notes of 8 Gibb. R. Hist. 19.

Stuprum. In Dean v. Peel, 5 East, 45. it was decided, that a father
could not have per quod servitium amisit, if his daughter, though a mi-
nor lived at the time of the seduction in another person’s family but re-
turned to her father who maintained her. This is something like a sac-
tifice of justice ‘to form.

$5. Lex Cornelia de sicariis, p. 387. vid. ff. 48. t. 8. ad lezem Cor-
neliam de sicariis et veneficis. ;

Venefici capite damnatur. | In England, all persons suspected of con-
juration, witchcraft, or inchantments, were anciently cited into the spirit-
’

NOTES. 659

ual courts, where, if they were found guilty, sentence was pronounced ;
upon which the aid of the secular power was demanded by the ecclesi-
astical judge, and the supposed delinquents were burned, as heretics, by
virtue of the writ de heretico comburendo ; which was taken away by
the 29th of Charles the 2d, cap. 9. Vid. 3 Co. Inst. 44, 45.

Thus the ecclesiastical judges had the entire jurisdiction in respect to
sorceries and enchantments, which were all ranked under the general
term heresies, till the statute of the 33 H. 8. which was the first statute,
by which any of these offences were made felony: but this act was re-
pealed by the Ist. of Edward VI. cap. 12.

Conjuration and the invocation of wicked spirits were afterwards made
felony by 5 Eliz. cap. 16. And again, by a statute in the first year of
James the first, by which the 5th of Eliz. is repealed.

The Ist of-Jac. 1. cap. 12. is to the following purport.

“That the act of 5 Eliz. against conjurations, inchantments, and
“ witchcrafts, be ulterly repealed That if any person or
‘¢ persons *shall use, practice, or exercise any invocation or [ *652 ]
“ conjuration of any evil and wicked spirit; or shall consult,

“ covenant with, entertain, employ, feed or reward any evil and wicked
“¢ spirit, to and for any intent or purpose ; or take up any dead man,
“woman or child, out of his, her, or their grave, or any other place,
“ where the dead body resteth, or the skin, bone, or any other part of
* any dead person, to be employed in any manner of witchcraft, inchant-
‘* ment, charm or sorcery, whereby any person shall be killed, destroy-
“ed, wasted, consumed, pined or lamed in his or her body, or any part
‘thereof; that then every such offender, or offenders, their aiders,
“ abettors, and counsellors being guilty of any of the said offences, duly
“ and lawfully convicted, shall suffer pains of death, as a felon or felons,
“‘ and shall lose the benefit of clergy and sanctuary.

“ And further, to the intent that all manner of practice, use or exer-
‘“ cise of witchcraft, inchantment, charm or sorcery, should be from
“ henceforth utterly abolished, be it enacted, that, if any person or per-
“ sons, shall from and after the feast of St Michael next coming, take
‘upon him or them by witchcraft, inchantment, charm or sorcery, to
“ tell or declare in what place any treasure might be found, or where
“< goods, or things lost or stolen, should be found, or to the intent to pro-
“yoke any person to unlawful love; or whereby any cattle or goods of
“ any person, shall be destroyed, wasted or impaired; or to hurt or a
‘¢ stroy any person in his or her body, although the same be not effected;
« that then all persons, so offending, and being convicted, shall mee
‘year’s imprisonment, and. stand in the pillory once every Cael e
“« six hours, and there openly confess his or her error, and offence. e
second offence is felony. 1 Jac. 1. cap. 12.

 

 
660 NOTES.

 

Lord Coke hath written. a learned comment upon this statute, in which
he declares, that it would be a very great defect in government, to suffer
so great an abomination, as conjuration, witchcraft, and sorcery, to pass
with impunity, 3 Inst. 44,

But the tendency of the statute of the Ist of James the Ist, may best
appear from the cheats, perjuries, and various other mischiefs, which it
produced, to the ruin of many innocent persons; all which are but too
well known to require any particular mention. Vid. Mather’s Hist. of
New England; and Salmon’s Universal Traveller. vol. IL. p. 695. This
act nevertheless continued to be a scandal and reproach to the good sense
of the nation, till the 9th year of George the 2d, when it was enacted by
parliament——“ That the statute, made in the first year of king James
“the first, intitled, An act azainst conjuration, witchcraft, and dealing

“with evil and wicked spirits, shall be repealed and utterly
[ *653 ] ‘ *void, except so much as repeals the statute of the 5th of

“‘ Blizabeth, intitled an act against conjuration, &c. &ce.—
“' that an act passed in Scotland, in the ninth parliament of Queen Ma-
‘“ry, intitled Anentis witchcrafts, shall be repealed and that from the
24th of June no prosecution, suit or proceeding, shall be carried on
‘against any person for witchcraft, sorcery, inchantment, or conjura-
“tion, or for charging another with any such offence, in any court
“whatsoever in Great Britain but that any person, pretending to
“exercise witchcraft, : tell fortunes, or discover stolen goods, shall suffer
“imprisonment for one whole year, stand in the pillory once every quar-
‘ter for an hour; and if the court shall think proper, be obliged to give
“‘ sureties to behave well for the future.” 9 Geo. 2. Harris.

This far Harris: to whose note add Cod. 9. 18. Those who desire
further information on the practical comments that have taken place, on
that notable passage in the old Testament, ‘“‘ Thou shalt not suffer a
witch to live,” may consult Sir James Melville’s memoirs as to the exam-
ination of the witches before James 6th of Scotland: the trial of Amy
Duny and Rose Cullender, widows, both of Leystoff, in Suffolk, before
Sir Matthew Hale, on the 10th of March, 16th Ch. 2nd. at Bury St. Ed-
monds, where says the account, “in conclusion, the judge and all the
‘court were fully satisfied with the verdict, and thereupon gave judg-
“ment against the witches that they should be hanged. They were
“ much urged to confess, but would not: on the 17th of March follow-
“ing, they were executed ;” much to the credit of Sir Matthew Hale!
See also the statements which Ch. Justice Marshall in his life of Wash-
ington Vol. 1. Appendix page 9, gives of the proceedings of the bigots
of New England in 1692, from Hutchinson ; and Dr. Feriar’s essay on
popular illusions in the Manchester transactions.

$ 6. De parracidiis, p. 388. Vide Dig. 48.8 and 9. Dod. 9. 16 and

 

 
NOTES. 661

17. De lege Pompeia de porracidiis. On the laws de sicariis et parrici-
diis, see further Cod. Theodos. 9. 14 and 15. with Godefroy’s commenta-
ry, V. 3. p. 84118.

$7. De falsis, p.389. Dig. 48.10. 5 Eliz. ch.14. 8Geo. 1. ch.
22. 12 Geo. 1. ch. 22. 2 Geo. 2. ch. 25, &c. Our Pennsylvania act
respecting forgery.

§ 8. De vi, p. 389. Dig. 48.6. 7. Cod. 9. 13.

$ 9. De peculatus, p. 390. A pecore, in which wealth chiefly consisted
in early times. Dig. 48. 13.

$10. De plagiariis, p. 390. Dig. 48. 15. Cod. .9.20. I have al-
ready spoken of kidnapping, at sect. 9. of Tit. 1. of this book of the In-
stitutes.

*$ 11. De ambitu, p. 391. [ *654 ]

Lex Julia de ambitu.| Vid. ff. 48. t. 14.

The crime, which the Romans call ambitus, is committed by procur-
ing any public office with money, or other gifts; and it seems to be the
same offence in regard to temporal offices, as simony is in regard to
Spiritual preferment. Decret. Greg. ix. Lib. 5. t. 3.

But ambitus, or the buying and selling of offices, ceased to be crimi-
nal, and became common among the Romans, soon after the demolition
of the republic; and this practice continued, till Justinian, becoming
sensible of its evil tendency, enforced the ancient laws in order to restrain
it. Nov. 8. cap. 1. 7.

In France, judicial offices are publicly set to sale, and generally sold
to the highest bidder; and perhaps, as Tinney observes, there may be
less reason to prohibit this species of commerce in a monarchy, than in
a democracy.

But in England the statute of the 5th and 6th of Edw. VI. restrains
‘‘ all persons, under pain of forfeiture and disability for the future, from
“‘ buying certain offices, which concern the king’s revenue, and the ex-
“ ecution of justice.’ And under these offices not only that of the chan-
cellor of a diocess is comprehended, but also that of a commissary and
register; for it was resolved in the case of doctor Trevor, the chancellor
of a diocess in Wales, that both the offices of chancellor, and register,
are within the statute, because they concern the administration of jus-
tice. 3 Co. Inst. 148. 12 Co. Rep. 78,79. 3 Lev. 289. Woodward
v. Fox. Harris.

Lex Julia repetundarum.] This law forbids all persons in public of-
fices to take money or presents, either for administering justice, or com-
mitting injustice. Lega Julia repetundarum [pecuniarum] tenetur, qui,
cum aliquam potestem haberet, pecuniam ob judicandum decernendumve
acceperit. ff. 48. t. 11.

Fortescue, on the laws of England, declares ‘ bribery to be a great

\

,
662 NOTES.

 

‘ misprision, which is committed, when any man ina judicial place,
“ takes any fee or pension, robe or livery, gift, reward or brocage of any
‘person who hath to do with him in any way, for doing his office, or
‘by color of his office, but of the king only, unless it be of meat and
“ drink, and that of small value. cap. 51.” 3 Co. Inst. 145. Harris.
De anona]. The crime fraudate anone is that of abusing the mar-
kets, by raising the price of provisions, forestalling, monopolizing, &c.
This offence is punishable in England by imprisonment and forfeiture
of the goods or merehandize forestalled. See 25 Ed. 3. cap. 3. 2 Ric.
2, cap.2. 27 Ed. 3. cap. 11.5, 6 Edw. 6. cap. 14. 3 Co. Inst. p. 195.
* De residuiis.| Crimen residui is committed by retaining
[ *655 ] the public money, or converting it to other uses than those,
to which it was appropriated. Lege Julia de residuis tene-
tur, qui publicam pecuniam delegatam in usum aliquem retinust, neque
tn eum consumpsit. ff. 48. t. 13. Harris.

END OF THE NOTES.
APPENDIX I.

 

FRAGMENTS

OF THE

TWELVE TABLES,

FROM FATHERS CATROU AND ROUILLE.

Hook’s Rom. Hist. Vol. 2. p. 314. 8vo.

TABLE L.

OF LAW SUITS.

I. Law. Go immediately with the person who cites you before the
judge.

If. Law. If the person you cite refuses to go with you before the judge,
take some that are present to be witnesses of it, and you shall havea
right to compel him to appear.

Ill. Law. If the person cited endeavors to escape from you, or puts
himself into a posture of resistance, you may seize his body.

IV: Law. If the person prosecuted be old, or infirm, let him be car-
ried ina Jumentum, or open carriage. But if he refuse that, the pros-
ecutor shall not be obliged to provide him an Arcera, or covered car-
riage.

Vv. Law. Butif the person cited find a surety, let him go.

VI. Law. Only a rich man shall be security fora rich man. But any
security shall be sufficient for a poor man.

VI. Law. The judge shall give judgment according to the agreement
made between the two parties by the way.

VIII. Law. If the person cited has made no agreement with his ad-
versary, let the Pretor hear the cause from sun-rising till noon; and
let both parties be present when it is heard, whether it be in the Forum,
or Comitium.

IX. Law. Let the same Preetor give judgment in the afternoon, though
but one of the parties be present.

X. Law. Let no judgments be given after the going down of the
sun.
664 APPENDIX I.

»

XI. Law. When the parties have pitched upon a judge or arbitra-
tor by consent, let them give securities that they will appear. Let
him who does not appear in court, pay the penalty agreed upon, unless
he was hindered by some great fit of sickness, or by the performance of
some vow, or by business of state, or by some indispensable engagement
with a foreigner. If any one of these impediments happen to the judge
or arbitrator, or either of the parties, let the hearing be put off to another
day.

XIL Law. Whoever shall not be able to bring any witnesses to prove
his pretensions before the judge, may go and make a clamour for three
days together, before his adversary’s house.

TABLE IL.

OF ROBBERIES.

I. Law. He that is attacked by a robber in the night, let him not be
punished if he kills him.

Il. Law. If the robbery be committed by day, and if the robber be
taken in the fact, let him be beaten with rods, and become the slave of
him whom he robbed. If the robber be a slave already, let him be
beaten with rods, and thrown down headlong from the top of the capi-
tol. If he be a child, under the age of puberty, let him be corrected, ac-
cording to the Preetor’s diecretion,, and let reparation be made to the in-
jured party. ‘

TI. Law. When robbers attack any person with arms, if the person
attacked has cried out for help, he shall not be punished if he kill the
robbers.

IV. Law. When upon a legal search any stolen goods are found in a
house, the robbery shall be punished upon the spot, as if openly and
publicly committed.

V. Law. For robberies committted privately, the robber shall be con-
demned to pay double the value of the things stolen.

VI. Law. Whosoever shall cut down trees, which do not belong to
him, he shall pay 25 Asses of brass, for every tree so felled.

VII. Law. If any one comes privately, by night, and treads down
another man’s field of corn, or reaps his harvest, let him be hanged up,
and put to death, as a victim devoted to Ceres. But if he be a child,
under the age of puberty, let the Pretor order him to be corrected as he
shall think fit, or let double satisfaction be made for the damage he has
done.

s
APPENDIX I. 665

VIII. Law. If a robber and the person robbed agree together upon
terms of restitution, no farther action shall lie against the robber.

IX. Law. Prescription shall never be pleaded as a right to stolen
goods, nor shall a foreigner have a right to the goods of any Roman cit-
izen, by the longest possession.

x. Law. If any one betrays his trust, with respect to what is de-
posited in his hands, let him pay double the value of what was so depo-
sited, to him who entrusted him with it.

XI. Law. If any one finds any of his goods in another man’s posses-
sion, who became possessed of them by a breach of trust, let the Pre-
tor nominate three arbitrators to judge of it. And let the wrongful
et pay double the value of what he has gained’ by detaining

em.

XI. Law. If a slave has committed a robbery, or done any dam-
age, with the privity, and at the instigation of his: master, let the

master deliver up the slave to the person injured, by way of compensa-
tion.

TABLE III.

OF LOANS, AND THE RIGHT OF CREDITORS OVER THEIR DEBTORS.-

I. Law. Let him who takes more than one per cent. interest for mo-
ney, be condemned to pay four times the sum lent. me

IL Law. When any person acknowledges a debt, or is condemned to
pay it, the creditor shall give his debtor thirty days for the payment of
it: After which he shall cause him to be seized, and brought before a
Judge.

Il. Law. If the debtor refuses to pay his debt, and can find no secu-
rity, his creditor may carry him home, and either tie him by the neck,
or put irons upon his feet, provided the chain does not weigh above fif-
teen pounds: but it may be lighter, if he pleases.

IV. Law. If the captive debtor will live at his own expense, let him ;
if not, let him who keeps him in chains allow hima pound of meal a
day, or more, if he pleases.

V. Law. The creditor may keep his debtor prisoner for sixty days.
If in this time the debtor does not find means to pay him, he that de-
tains him shall bring him out before the people three market-days, and
proclaim the sum, of which he has been defrauded.

VI. Law. If the debtor be insolvent to several creditors, let his body
be cut in pieces on the third market-day. It may be cut into more or
fewer pieces with impunity: Or, if his creditors consent to it, let him be
sold to foreigners beyond the Tiber.

84
666 APPENDIX L

‘TABLE IV.

OF THE RIGHTS OF FATHERS OF FAMILIES.

I. Law. Let a father have the power of life and death over his legiti-
mate children, and let him sell them when he pleases.

Il. Law. But if a father has sold his son three times, let the son then
be out of his father’s power.

Ill. Law. If a father has a child born, which is monstrously deform-
ed, let him kill him immediately.

IV. Law. Let not a son, whose father has so far neglected his educa-
tion as not to teach him a trade, be obliged to maintain his father in
want; otherwise let all sons be obliged to relieve their fathers.

V. Law. Let not a bastard be obliged to work to maintain his fa-
ther.

TABLE V.

OF INHERITANCES AND GUARDIANSHIPS.

I. Law. After the Death of a father of a family, let the disposition be
made of his estate, and his appointment concerning the guardianship of
his children be observed.

Il. Law. If he dies intestate, and has no children to succeed him, let
his nearest relations be his heir; if he has no near relation, let a man of
his own name be his heir. /

Til. Law. When a freed-man dies intestate, and without heirs, if his
patron be alive, or has left children, let the effects of the freed-man go to
the family of his patron.

IV. Law. After the death of a debtor, his debts shall be paid by his
heirs, in proportion to the share they have in his inheritance. After this
they may divide the rest of his effects, if they please, and the Pretor
shall appoint three arbitrators to make the division.

V. Law. If a father of a family dies intestate, and leaves an heir un-
der age, let the child’s nearest relation be his guardian.

VI. Law. If any one becomes mad, or prodigal, and has no-body to
take care of him, let a relation, or if he has none, a man of his own
name, have the care of his person and estate.

TABLE VI.

OF PROPERTY AND POSSESSION.

I. Law. When a man conveys his estate to another, let the terms of
the conveyance create the right.
APPENDIX I. 667

tL. Law. If a slave, who was made free on condition of paying a
certain sum, be afterwards sold, let. him be set at liberty, if he pay the
person who has bought him, the sum agreed upon.

TI. Law. Let not any piece of merchandize, though sold and deliv-
ered, belong to the buyer, till he has paid for it.

IV. Law. Let two years’ possession amount toa prescription for lands,
and one for moveables.

V. Law. In litigated cases the presumption shall always be on the
side of the possessor: And in disputes about liberty or slavery the pre-
sumption shall always be on the side of liberty.

TABLE VIL

OF TRESPASSES AND DAMAGES.

I. Law. If a beast does any damage in a field, let the master of the
beast make satisfaction, or give up his beast.

Il. Law. If you find a rafter or a pole which belongs to you, in ano-
ther man’s house or vineyard, and they are made use of, do not pull
down the house, or ruin the vineyard; but make the possessor pay dou-
ble the value of the thing stolen; and when the house is destroyed, or
the pole taken out of the vineyard, then seize what’s your own.

TI. Law. Whoever shall maliciously set fire to another man’s house,
or an heap of corn near his house, shall be imprisoned, scourged, and
burnt to death. If he did it by accident, let him repair the damage:
And if he be a poor man, let him be slightly corrected.

IV. Law. Whoever shall deprive another of the use of a limb, shall
be punished according to the law of retaliation, if the person injured
does not agree to accept some other satisfaction.

V. Law. If he has only dislocated a bone, let him pay three hundred
pounds of brass if the sufferer be a freed-man, and a hundred and fifty
if he bea slave.

VI. Law. For common blows with the fist, and injurious words, the
punishment shall be twenty-five Asses of brass.

VII. Law. Whoever slanders another by words, or defamatory ver-
ses, and injures his reputation, shall be beaten with a club.

VIII. Law. Let him who has once been a witness, and refuses to bear
witness again, though a public person, be deemed infamous, and made
incapable of bearing witness any more.

IX. Law. Let every false witness be thrown down headlong from the
Capitol.
668 s APPENDIX 1.

X. Law. Whoever shall wilfully kill a freed-man or shall make use
of magical words to hurt him, or shall have prepared poison for him, or
given it to him, shall be punished as an homicide.

XI. Law. Let all Parricides be thrown into the river, sewed up in a
leather bag, and with their heads veiled.

XII. Law. The guardian who manages the affairs of his ward ill,
shall be reprimanded; and if he be found to have cheated him, he shail
restore double.

XIU. Law. A patron who shall have defrauded his client, shall be
execrable.

TABLE VIII.

OF ESTATES IN THE COUNTRY.

I. Law. Let the space of two feet and an half of ground be always
left between one house and another.

Il. Law. Societies may make what by-laws they please among them-
selves, provided they do not interfere with the public laws.

TI. Law. When two neighbours have any disputes about their
bounds, the Pretor shall assign them three arbitrators.

IV. Law. When a tree planted in a field does injury to an adjoining
field by its shade, let its branches be cut off fifteen feet high.

V. Law. If the fruit of a tree falls into a neighbouring field, the own-
er of the tree may go and pick it up.

VI. Law. If a man would make a drain, to carry off the rain-water
from his ground to his neighbour's, let the Pretor appoint three arbitra-
tors to judge of the damage the water may do, and prevent it.

VII. Law. Roads shall be eight feet wide, where they run strait, and
where they turn, sixteen.

VIII. Law. If a road between two fields be bad, the traveller may
drive through which field he pleases.

TABLE IX.

OF THE COMMON RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE.

I. Law. Let not privilege be granted to any pérson.

Il. Law. Let both debtors who are got out of slavery, and strangers
whohave rebelled, and returned to their duty, be restored to their an-
cient rights, as if they never offended.
APPENDIX I. 669:

III. Law. It shall be a capital crime for a judge or arbitrator to take
money for passing judgment.

IV. Law. Let all causes, relating to the life, liberty, or rights of a
Roman citizen, be tried only in Comitia by Centuries.

V. Law. ‘Let the people appoint Questors, to take cognizance of all
capital cases.

VI. Law. Whoever shall hold seditious assemblies in the city by
night, shall be put to death. ;

VIL. Law. Let him who shall have solicited a foreigner to declare
himself against Rome, or shall have delivered up a Roman citizen to a
foreigner, lose his life.

VIII. Law. Let only the last laws of the people be in force, [i. e. det
the last supercede all former ones, in the same case made and provided.]

TABLE X.

OF FUNERALS AND ALL CEREMONIES RELATING TO THE DEAD.

I. Law. Let no dead body be interred, or burnt within the city.

II. Law. Let all costliness and excessive wailings be banished from
funerals.

III. Law. Let not the wood, with which funeral piles are built, be cut
with a saw. ;

IV. Law. Let the dead body be covered with no more than three
habits, bordered with purple; and let no more than ten players upon the
flute be employed in celebrating the obsequies.

V. Law. Let not the women tear their faces, or disfigure themselves,
or make hideous outcries.

VI. Law. Let not any part of a dead body be carried away, in order
to perform other obsequies for the deceased, unless he died in war, or out
of his own country.

VII. Law. Let no slaves be embalmed after their death; let there be
no drinking round a dead body ; nor let any perfumed liquors be poured
upon it.

VIL. Law. Let no crowns, festoons, perfuming-pots, or any kind of
perfume, be carried to funerals.

IX. Law. If the deceased has merited a crown in the public games,
by any exploit of his own, or the expertness of his slaves, or the swift-
ness of his horses, let his panegyrick be made at his funeral, and let
his relations have leave to put a’crown upon his head, as well during
670 APPENDIX I.

the seven days he remains in the house, as when he is carried to be
buried.

X. Law. Let no man have more than one funeral made for him, or
more than one bed put under him.

XI. Law. Let no gold be used in any obsequies, unless the jaw of the
deceased has been tied up with a gold thread. In that case the corpse
may be interred or burnt with the gold thread.

XII. Law. For the future, let no sepulchre be built, or funeral pile
raised, within sixty feet of any house, without the consent of the owner
of the house. ’

XIII. Law. Prescription shall never be pleaded against a man’s right _
to his burial-place, or the entrance to it.

TABLE XI.

OF THE WORSHIP OF THE GODS, AND OF RELIGION.

I. Law. Let all persons come with purity and piety to the assemblies
of religion, and banish all extravagance from thence. If any one does
otherwise, may the Gods themselves revenge it.

II. Law. Let no person have particular Gods of his own; or worship
any new and foreign ones in private, unless they are authorized by pub-
lic authority.

III. Law. Let every one enjoy the temples consecrated by his fore-
fathers, the sacred groves in his fields, and the oratories of his Lares.
And let every one observe the rites used in his own family, and by his
ancestors, in the worship of his domestic Gods.

IV. Law. Honour the Gods of Heaven, not only those who have
always been esteemed such, but those likewise whose merit has raised
them thither, as Percules, Bacchus, Afsculapius, Castor, Pollux, and
Romulus. ie /

V. Law. Let those commendable qualities, by which heroes obtained
Heaven, be ranked among the Gods, as Understanding, Virtue, Piety,
Fidelity ; and let temples be erected to them. But let no worship ever
be paid to any vice.

VI. Law. Let the most authorized ceremonies be observed.

VII. Law. Let law-suits be suspended on festivals, and let the slaves
have leave to celebrate them after they have done their work. That
it may be known on what days they fall, let them be set down in the
calendars.

VIII. Law. Let the Priests offer up in ‘sactifice to the Gods, on cer-
tain days, the fruits of the earth, and berries: And on other days abun-
APPENDIX L. - 671

dance of milk, and young victims. For fear this ceremony should be
omitted, the Priests shall end their year with it. Let them likewise
take care to chose for every God the victim helikes. Let there be priests
appointed for some Gods, Flamines for others, and Pontifices to preside
over them all.

IX. Law. Let no woman be present at the sacrifices which are offer-
ed up in the night, except at those which are made for the people, with
the usual ceremonies. Nor let any one be initiated into the mysteries
brought from Greece, but those of Ceres.

X. Law. If any one steals what belongs, or is devoted to the Gods,
let him be punished as a parricide.

XI. Law. Leave perjury to be punished with death by the Gods, and
let it be punished with perpetual disgrace by men.

XI. Law. Let the Pontijfices punish incest with death.

XIII. Law. Let every one strictly perform his vows: But let no wick-
ed person dare to make any offerings to the Gods.

XIV. Law. Let no man dedicate his field to the service of the altar:
and let him be discreet in his offerings of gold, silver, or ivory. Let
no man dedicate a litigated estate to the Gods: if he does, he shall pay
double the value of it to him whose right it shall appear to be.

XY. Law. Let every man constantly observe his family-festivals.

XVI. Law. Let him who has been guilty of any of those faults,
which made men execrable, and are not to be atoned for by expiations,
be deemed impious. But let the priests expiate such as are to be expi-
ated.

~

TABLE XII.

OF MARRIAGES, AND THE RIGHT OF HUSBANDS.

I. Law. When a woman shall have cohabited with aman fora whole
year, without having been three nights absent from him, let her be deem-
ed his wife.

Il. Law. If a man catches his wife in adultery, or finds her drunk,
he may, with the consent of her relations, punish her even with death.

It. Law. When a man will put away his wife, the form of doing it
shall be by taking from her the keys of the house, and giving her what
she brought. This shall be the manner of a divorce.

IV. Law. A child born of a widow, in the tenth month after the de-
cease of her husband, shall be deemed legitimate.

V. Law. It shall not be lawful for the Patricians to intermarry with
the Plebians.
APPENDIX II.

FROM BEAVER’S TRANSLATION OF FERRIER’S HIS-
_ TORY—Page 166.

‘

OF THE QUOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.

As it is necessary in the first place, to know how to make use of the
quotations which we meet with in the books of the civil law ; and to find
out the several Jaws quoted by authors; I thought it my business to lay
down some rules for that purpose.

The body of the civil Jaw, as we said before, is composed of four parts,
the digest, code, institutes and novels. : :

The laws of the digest, are generally quoted by the first word, and
number of the Jaw ; for instance, Dege si quis tertia Digestis de jure
codicillorum ; sometimes the number only, or the first word of the daw
from whence the quotation is taken, is set down.

When a law is divided into several paragraphs, after the number of
the law, that of the paragraph, or the first word of it, is set down; for
example, Lege 32.$ 11. Digestis de donationibus inter virum et uxo-
rem.

Sometimes a law of a title in the digest, is quoted by the first word
only, with the zitle, without mentioning whether it be out of the digest
or code ; and in that case, it is an indication that the Jaw quoted is in the
collection before spoken of; that is, in the digest or code, according as
they were before mentioned.

g The laws of the code are quoted after the same manner as those of the
igest.

The paragraphs of the institutes, are quoted after the same manner
as the dats of the digest or code ; thus a paragraph of the institutes is
quoted, by shewing the number, and mentioning the first word of the
paragraph, or by either; but the ¢éde under which the paragraph is,
must always be mentioned, as thus, paragrapho testes 14. Institutiont-
bus, or else apud Justinianum de testamentis ordinandis. .

The novels are quoted by their number, with that of the chapter and
the paragraph : For example, Novella Justiniani, 185. Capite 2. Para-
grapho 4. or else a Novel is quoted by the Collation, and by the Title,
chapter and paragraph, after this manner, in Authentico, Collatione, 1.
Titulo 1. Cap. 281.

As to the Authenticks, they are quoted by the first words of them, af-
ter which is set down the didle of the code under which they are placed;
for example, Authentica cum testator, Codice ad legem falcidiam.

This being laid down, let us now see how we shall go about to find
out a quotation in the body of the daw.

If the passage quoted is taken {rom the digest or the code, it will be
best for beginners to turn to the alphabetical table of the titles, at the

_ beginning of the body of the daw ; where having found the title mention-
ed‘in the quotation, they must then look in it for the daw; by the num-
ber of first word.

If the quotation is taken from the Institutes, they must likewise have
APPENDIX II. 673

recourse to the table of éitles ; and after havin 5 i i
it r look ee i se and then the naa ee ae Goa
we wou nd out a Novel, there i i
to look after it by the number it is aiden Pan tuovestt Se bis, Wen
_If it be an Authentick, we must look in the table of the Code, for the
ditle under which it is placed: It is so much the more easily found, be-
cause all the Authenticks are inserted in the Code in a different letter.
To conclude, as those who have a mind to look after any daw, waste
a great deal of time in turning over the table or index they may save
themselves that trouble, by rendering the titles of the body of the law fa-
miliar, and getting them by heart, by which means, they will acquire a
general notion of the places where every particular matter is treated of,
and without the least difficulty, be able to find out any law they have
occasion to consult.
To complete these instructions for young students how to find out
the quotations in our books, it remains only that I explain the abbrevi-
ations.

ABBREVIATIONS,

AP. JUSTIN. Apud Justinianum, in Justinian’s institutes.

ARG. or AR. Argumenio, by an argument drawn from such a law.

AUTH. Authentica, in the Authenticé ; that is to say, the Summary
of some of the emperor’s Novel constitutions inserted in the Code under
such a ¢idle.

Cap. Capite or Capitulo, in the chapter of such a Novel.

C. or COD. Codice, in Justinian’s code.

C. THEOD. Codice Theodosiano, in the Theodosian code.

COL. Columna, in the first or second column of the book quoted.

COLL. Collation, in the collation of such or such a Novel.

C.or CONT. Contra, this is generally used to denote a contrary ar-
gument.

D. Dicto or Dieta, that is, the aforesaid, or law or chapter before quo-
ted.

D. Digestis, or in the Digest.

E. or EOD. Under the same title.

F. Finalis, the last or latter part. .

Jf. in the Pandects or Digest. ‘The Grecians having made use of the
Letter 7, to signify Pandects, the Romans changed them into two f’s
joined together. Digestorum liber ideo duplici ff. signatur, quod gract
pandectas per x cum accentu circumflexo notabant, sub quibus, et Digesto-
rum libri comprehensi sunt, unde facili litera vin ff Latine inolevit, says
Calvin in his Lexicon Juris.

GL. Gilossa, the Gloss.

H. Hic, here, in the same ¢itle, law, or paragraph.

H. TIT. Hoc titulo, in this title.

J. or INF. Infra, beneath or below.

J. Glo. Juncta Gilossa, the gloss joined to the text quoted.

IN AUTH. COLL. 1. In authentico, collatione, 1. in Justinian’s Novels,
part or section 1, &c. :

IN F. In fine, at the end of the ditle, law or paragraph quoted.

85
674 APPENDIX IU.

IN PR. In principio, in the beginning, and before the first paragraph
of a law.

IN F. PR. In fine principii, toward the end of a beginning of a law.

IN SUM. In summa, in the summary.

L. Lege in such a law.

LI. or LIB. Libro, in the first or second book, &e.

NOV. Novella, in such a Novel.

PAR. Paragrapho, in such a paragraph or article of the law, or of a
Title in the Institutes.

PR. or PRIN. Principium, the beginning of a Title or a law.

u. Pandectis, in the pandects.

Penuilt. The last but one.

Q. QU. or QUES. Questione, in such a Question.

RU. or RUB. In sucha Rubrick or Title. The Titles were called
Rubricks, from their being formerly written in red letters.

SC. or SCIL. Seilicet, that is to say.

SOL. Solutio, the answer to an objection.

SUM. Summa, the summary of a law.

§ Paragrapho, in such a paragraph.

T. or TIT. Titulus, Titulo, Title.

T. or V. Versiculo, in such a verse, which is a part of a paragraph.

ULT. Ultimo, Ultima, the last Title, Paragraph or Law.

 

—- + 2

APPENDIX Mi.

AUTHORS ON THE CIVIL LAW.

1st. Such as treat on the law previous to Justinian.

2dly. Such as treat historically on the Roman law generally.
3dly. The principal editions of the Corpus Juris Civilis.
Athly. Commentators on the Corpus Juris Civilis.

5thly. Compilations on the civil law.

First. Historical treatises on the Leges Regie, Jus Papirianum, Du-
odecim Tabule, and the laws and collections intervening between them
and Justinian.

Franciscus Balduinus. Libri duo in leges Romuli et duodecim tabu-
larum. The third edition is the best. Basil. 1559. 8vo,

Pardulphus Prateius. Jurisprudentia vetus: sive Draconis et Solo-
nis, nec non Romuli Romanorum regis, ac 12 tabularum leges collectz
interpretateeque. Leyden. 1557.

J. Gothofred. Quatuor fontes juris civilis: sive leges 12 tabularum
cum earundem historia, &c. Legis Julie et Papie fragmenta: edic-
ae perpetuum : librorum Sabiniorum ordo et series. 4to. Genev.

53.
APPENDIX IIL. 675

Rosinus also mentioris seve

1 ral of the le i i

Manutius. Rosinus himself gives a rie Pe

on g very brief and abridged account of

history of the Roman law from Pomponius, which i h
Rosing Artin ® ; ch is worth perusal.
1 Antiq Kom. quto. Amstelod. 1685. p. 554. On th

laxes of the ievel r . -p. : n the subject of the
e twelve tables in particular, he refers to the collections and

comments of Julius Pacius, Antonius Augustinus, Joannes Oldendorpi-

uss Joannes Crispinus, Antonius Contius, Fr. Hottomannus Dloriesua

othofredus, Stephanus Pighius, Fr. Balduinus, Hadrianus Turnebus

one ens Justus Lipsius, and Theodorus Marcilius: of

olcaaa, Penis oe by Camus in his Lettres sur la Profession

The edition of J. Gothofred, in t i
CC , in the book above cited, Quatuor fontes,
_ Autores et fragmenta veterum jurisconsultorum, de origine et progressu
juris romani, cum notis Arnoldi Vinnii ct variorum. Ex edit. Sim. Van
Leewen, Leyden, 1671. Jena, 1697. 8vo.

J urisprudentia vetus ante Justinianea. Ex recens. et cum not.
ee Leyden, 1717. Leipsic, 1737. qto. This comprehends the
ee om of Gaius, Paulus, Ulpian, and other jurisconsults preceding

J: Gothofredus. Codex Theodosianus, cum amplissimo commentario,
studio Antonii Marvilii. Leyden, 1665. 6 vol. fol.

Seconpiy. Historical treatises on Roman Jurisprudence generally.

J. Gothofredi. Manuale juris 12mo. Several editions.

_Jo. Vin. Gravina. Origines juris civilis, seu de ortu et progressu _ju-
ris civilis. With the annotations of Mascou. Leipsic, 1737. qto. Ven.
1739 to 4. 7
Hen. Chr. Hausotter. Historia legum romanarum. Leipsic. 1758.

vo.

Jo. Gol. Heineccius. Antiquitatum romanarum jurisprudentiam il-
lustrantium Syntagma. This is comprehended in the Geneva edition of
his works in 8 vols. qto. 1743 and 1748. But there are also several sep-
oie editions; the best at Strasburg (Argentor.) in 1734, 1741, and in2
vol. 8vo. 1755.

Ejusdem historia juris civilis, 8vo the best edition is Ritter’s, publish-
ed at Strasburgh. ‘This and the preceding treatise form the fourth vol-
ume of his works, in qto.

Buochard Gotthelf Struvius. Historia juris romani, 4to. Jena, 1718.

Jo. Fr. Eisenhardt. Wistoria juris literaria. Svo. Helmstadt. 1752,

1763.
Jo. Donatii. Historia juris civilis romanorum. Paris, 1678. 12mo.

Spanheim. Orbis Romanus.

Thomasius. Delineatio histori juris Romani et Germaniei. Erfurt.
8vo. 1750. Neevorum jurisprudentiz roman, lib. duo. Hal. Magd.
1707.

Brunquellus. Historia juris Romano-Germanici. 8vo. Amstel. 1730.
Gravina, Heineccius, Struvius and Brunquellus, may be considered as
the best of this class of writers.

Histoire du droit romain par Claude Joseph de Ferriere. 12 mo.
Paris, 1718. This is taken chiefly from Gravina. Dr. Beaver has
translated it, and added Duck’s treatise de usu et auctoritate Juris civilis,
676 APPENDIX III.

Ant. Terasson. Histoire de la Jurisprudence Romaine. Paris, 1750,
in folio. Compiled at the direction of Chancellor D’Aguessau. A work,
says Mr. Gibbon, of more promise than performance. It. contains
however, a curious and interesting collection of ancient documents and
fragments.

Dr Beaver’s history of the legal polity of the Roman state. 4to, 1781.

Dr Taylor's elements of the civil law, 4to. 1755. There is an anon-
ymous abridgement of this desultory but very’ interesting book, by the
Rev. Mr. Ellis, with a preface on the nature of moral obligation.

Bouchaud’s Recherches historiques sur les-edits des Magistrats Ro-
mains in tom. 41. page 1. of the Memoires de Academie Francoise.

Tupiy. The principal editions of the Corpus juris civilis.

Corpus juris civilis cum glossis. Genev. 1614. 4 vol. qto. .

Idem cum notis D. Gothofredi. Paris. Vitary 1628.2 vol. fol. This
is the edition I have employed.

Idem. Daniel Elzevir. 1664. 2 vol. 8vo. Amst.

Idem. Elzevir et Bleau, 1681. 1700. 2 vol. 8vo.

Corpus juris civilis academicum. Col. Mum. 1759. 1 vol. qto.

The editions of the Institutes, are too numerous to catalogue. There
are also about a dozen editions of the Paraphrase of the Institutes, by
Theophilus, in Greek and Latin, and in Latin.
aoe Commentators on the Corpus juris, or particular parts
of it.

These may be reduced to the works of Cajacius, Vinnius, Voetius,
Noodt, and Bochmer. Harris quotes Joachim Mysinger frequently. I
am not acquainted with any work of Mysinger’s but his commentary on
the title, de fide instrumentorum lib. 2 decretalium, Helmst. 1589, in fol.
and Marp. 1602, 8vo. I have found the brief notes of D. Gothofred to
his edition of the Corpus Juris civilis, worth attention.

Firtaty Compilations on the civil law.

I possess a great number of them, but I know of few worth noticing,
except the following. ,

Cujacii Paratitla in pandectas et Codicem: of which there are about
eight editions in 12mo. and 8vo. separate from the general collection of
his works. :

Heineccit Elementa juris secundum ordinem Institutionum.

Idem secundum ordinem Pandectarum.

Of these there are several editions in 8vo. and 12mo. separate from his
works.

Barriga de Montvallon. Epitome juris et legum Romanorum. 8vo.
Paris, 1756.

Claude Jos de Ferriere. Nova et methodica juris civilis tractatio. 2
vol. 12mo. Paris. 'The last of four editions is in 1734.
Ferriere. La Jurisprudence du Code de Justinian,
du Digest. 1688. 6 vol. in qto.

des Novelles.

Ihave freely used the Nouvelle traduction des Institutes de l’Empi-
reur Justinian of the same author, with notes, in 6 vol. 8vo. Paris. 1787.

Pothier’s Pandecte Justiniane. 3 v. fol. 1748.

Jean Domat. Les Loxi civiles dans leur ordre naturel. 5 vol. 8vo.
and with a supplement by D’Hericourt in 2 vol. fol. Paris, 1724.
APPENDIX III. 677

This has been edited in English by Strahan; and is the book general-
ly used in England on this subject; though Wood’s Institutes of the
civil law (fol.) is a very useful digest upon the whole.

Ayloffe’s Pandect of the Roman civil law, fol. 1734, is a work not de-
ficient in learning, but too desultory and short.

Inconvenient brevity, also renders the following works of less value
than they might be, though they are not destitute of merit.

Schomberg’s Elements of the Roman Law. 8vo. 1780.

Dr. Halifaz’s Analysis of the civil law, a pamphlet. 1775.

Dr. Arthur Brown’s Elements of the civil and Admiralty law; Dub-
lin, and London, 1802, is commonly used among the bar in this country,
and therefore I have purposely omitted many observations, that may be
found also in that book; which though far too brief, deserves to be popu-
lar.
INDEX

AD

LIBROS, TITULOS ET SECTIONES INSTITUTIONUM.

Premium de confirmatione Institutionum.

De usu armorum et legum.

1.
2.
3.

ae

7.

De bellis et Legibus Justiniani.

De compositione codicis et pandectarum.

De tempore, auctoritatibus, fine et utilitate composi-
sitionis institutionum.

Divisio institutionum.

. Quid in institutionibus contineatur.

Ex quibus libris composite sunt institutiones atque
earum recognitio et confirmatio.
Adhortatio ad studium juris.

Lib. 1. Tit. 1. De Justitia et Jure.
Definitio justitie.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Lib. 1. Tit. 2.

Definitio jurisprudentiz.
De juris methodo.

Juris preecepta.

De jure publico et privato.

De Jure naturali Gentium et Civili.

De jure naturali.

1.

wo

Distinctio juris gentium et civilis, a definitione et ety-
mologia.

. Divisio juris in scriptum et non scriptum ; et subdivisio

juris scripti.
De lege et plebiscito.

. De senatus-consulto.

De constitutione.

. De jure honorario.

De responsis prudentum.
De jure non scripto.

. Ratio superioris divisionis.
. Divisio juris in immutabile et mutabile.
. De objectis juris.
680

INDEX.

Lib. 1. Tit. 3. De Jure Personarum.

Prima divisio personarum.

. Definitio libertatis.

. Definitio servitutis.

. Servi et mancipii etymologia.

. Quibus modis servi constituuntur.

. De liberorum et servorum divisione.

Ar wn

Lib. 1. Tit. 4. De ingenuis.

De ingenui definitione.
1. De erronea ingenui manumissione.

Lib. 1. Tit. 5. De Libertinis.

Definitio et origo libertinorum et manumissionis.
1. Quibus modis manumittatur.
2. Ubi et quando manumitti potest.
3. De libertinorum divisione sublata.

Lib. 1. Tit. 6. Qué et quibus causis manumittere non possunt.

Prius caput legis Allie Sentiz de manumittente in fraudem
creditorum.

. De servo instituto cum libertate.

. De servo instituto sine libertate. i

. Quid sit in fraudem creditorum manumittere.

. Alterum caput legis Alize Sentize. de minore viginti

annis.

5. Que sunt juste cause manumissionis.

6. De causa semel probata.

7. Abrogatio posterioris capitis legis lie Sentie.

Pr wn

Lib. 1. Tit. 7. De lege Fusia Caninia Tollenda.

Lib. 1. Tit. 8. De his qui sui vel alient juris sunt.

Altera divisio personarum.
1. De jure gentium in servos.
2. De jure civium Romanorum in servos.

Lib. 1. Tit. 9. De Patria Potestate.

Summa tituli.
1. Definitio nuptiarum.

2. Qui habent in potestate.
3. Qui sunt in potestate.

Lib. 1. Tit. 10. De Nuptiis. :

Qui possunt nuptias contrahere.
1. Que uxores duci possunt vel non. De cognatis, ac pri-
mum de parentibus et liberis.
2. De fratribus et. sororibus.
1

11.
12.
13.

Lib. 1. Tit. 11.

SCHOMDWMAAK

INDEX. 681

. De fratris et sororis filia vel nepte.
De consobrinis.
. De amita matertera, amita magn4, materterd magna,
. De affinibus et primum de privigna-et nuru.
. De socru et noverca.
. De comprivignis.
. De quasi privigna, quasi nuru, et quasi noverca.
. De servili cognatione.
De reliquis prohibitionibus.
De peenis injustaru:n nuptiarum.
De legitimatione.

De Adoptionibus.

\

Continuatio.

Lib. 1. Tit. 12

PS emnoanpoene

Divisio adoptionis.

. Qui possunt adoptare filium familias, gel non.
. De arrogatione impuberis.

De etate adoptantis et adoptati.

De adoptione in locum nepotis vel neptis, vel deinceps.
De adoptione filii alieni in locum nepotis et contra.

De adoptione in locum nepotis.

Qui dari possunt in adoptionem.

Si is, qui generare non potest, adoptet.

. Si feemina adoptet.

. De liberis arrogatis.
12.

De servo adoptato, vel filio nominato, @ domino.

. Quibus modis jus patric potestatis solvitur.

Scopus et nexus. De morte.

SOMABRAL OVE

. De Derortatione.
. De relegatione.

De servitute pena.

De dignitate.

De captivitate et postliminio.

De emancipatione, item de modis et effectibus ejusdem.
Si alii emancipentur, alii retineantur in potestate.

. De adoptione. a
. De nepoto nato post fillum emancipatum.
. An parentes cogi possunt liberos suos de potestate di-

mittere?

Lib. 1. Tit. 13. De Tutelis.
De personis sui juris.
1. Tutele definitio.

2.

Definitio et etymologia tutoris.

3. Quibus testamento tutor datur: et primum de liberis in

otestate.
86
682

INDEX.

4. De posthumis.
5. De emancipatis.

Lib. 1. Tit. 14. Qui testamento tutores dare possuni.
Qui tutores dari possunt.

AP WON

. De servo.

. De furioso, et minore viginti quinque annis.

. Quibus modis tutores dantur. .

. Cui dantur.

De tutore dato filiabus, vel filiis, vel liberis, vel nepotibus.

Lib. 1. Tit. 15. De legitima agnatorum tutela.
Summa.
1. Qui sunt agnati.
2. Quis dicatur intestatus.
3. Quibus modis agnatio vel cognatio finitur.

Lib. 1. Tit. 16. De capitis diminutione.
Definitio et divisio.

NAAPYenye

De maxima capitis diminutione.

. De media.

De minima. , 7

De servo manumisso.

De mutatione dignitatis.

. Interpretatio sectionis ult. sup. tit. prox.
. Ad quos agnates tutela.

Lib 1. Tit. 17. De legitimi patronorum tutela.
Ratio, ob quam patronorum tutela dicitur legitima.

Lib. 1. Tit. 1S. De legitima parentam tutela.

Lib. 1. Tit. 19. De fiduciaria tutela.
Filii familias a patre manumissi, pater tutor est legitimus ; eo

vero defuncto, frater tutor fiduciarius existit.

Lib. 1. Tit. 20. De Atiliano tutore, et eo, qui ex lege Julia et Titié

dabatur.

Jus antiquum, si nullus sit tutor.
1. Si spes sit futuri tutoris testamentaril.
~2. Si tutor ab hostibus sit captus.

3
4
5.
6
7

. Quando et cur desierint ex dictis legibus, tutores dari.
. Jus novum,

Jus novissimum.

. Ratio tutele.

. De tutele ratione reddenda.
INDEX. 683
Lib. Tit. 21. De auctoritate tutorum.

n quibus causis auctoritas sit necessaria.
1. Exceptio.
2. Quomodo auctoritas interponi debet.
3. Quo casu interponi non potest.

Lib. 1. Tit. 22, Quibus modis tutela Jinitur.
De pubertate.
1. De capitis diminutione pupilli.
2. De conditionis eventu.
3. De morte.
4, De capitis diminutione.
5. De tempore.
6. De remotione et excusatione.

Lib. 1. Tit. 23. De curatoribus.

De adulltis.

1. A quibus dentur curatores.

. Quibus dentur.
. De furiosis, et prodigis.
. De mente captis, surdis, &c.
. De pupillis.
6 De constituendo actore.

,

ar wD

Lib. 1. Tit. 24. De satisdatione tutorum vel curatorum.
Qui satisdare cogantur.
1. Quatenus satisdatio in iis, qui satisdare non compellun-
tur, locum habere possit.
2. Qui ex administratione tutele vel curationis tenentur.
3. Si Tutor vel curator cavere nolit.
4. Qui dicta actione non tenentur. © ,
Lib. 1. Tit. 23. De excusationibus tutorum vel curatorunte
De numero liberorum.
. De administratione rei fiscalis.
. De obsentia reipublice causa.
. De potestate.
De lite cum pupillo vel adulto.
. De tribus tutele et cure oneribus.
De paupertate.
De advers4 valetudine.
De imperitia literarum.
» De inimicitia patris.
. De ignorantia testatoris.
. De inimicitiis cum patre pupilli vel adulti.
12. De status controversia & patre pupilli illata.
De etate.

=
SCHUMNMNAGDF HOWE

=
rary

an
ed
Lib. 1. Tit.

14.
15.
16.

17,
18.

19.

20.

26

INDEX.

De militia. Z
De grammaticis, rhetoribus et medicis.

De tempore et modo proponendi excusationes.
De excusatione pro parte patrimonil.

De tutele gestione.

De marito.

De falsis allegationibus.

. De suspectis tutoribus vel curatoribus.

Unde suspecti crimen descendat.

Lib. 2. Tit.

—

11.
te:

1.

SCHON AARYN

Qui de hoc crimine cognoscunt.

Qui suspecti fieri possunt.

Qui possunt suspectos potulare.

Ad pubes vel impubes.

Qui dicatur suspectus.

De effectus remotionis.

De effectu accusationis.

Quibus modis cognitio finitur.

Si tutor copiam sui non faciat.

Si neget alimenta, decerni posse vel tutelam redemerit.
De liberto frandulenter administrante.

Si suspectus satis offerat ; et quis dicatur suspectus.

 

De rerum divisione, et acquirendo earum dominio.

Continuatio et duplex rerum divisio.

Bee ee Ee
AP WDE

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

\
SHDNARARWNYE

. De aére, aqua profluente, mari, littore, &c.
. De fluminibus et portubus.

. Definitio littoris.

. De usu et proprietate riparum.
De usu et proprietate littorum.
De rebus universitatis.

. De rebus nullius.

. De rebus sacris.

. De religiosis.

. De rebus sanctis.

. De rebus singulorum.

. De occupatione ferarum.

. De vulneratione.

. Deapibus.

. De pavonibus et columbis, et ceteris animalibus man-

suefactis.
De gallinis et anseribus.
De occupatione in bello.
De occupatione eorum que in littore inveniuntur.
De fetu animalium.
De alluvione.
21.
22.
23.
24,
26.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Al.
42.
43.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Lid. 2. Tit. 2.

INDEX. 685

De vi fluminis.

De insula.

De alveo.

De inundatione.

De specificatione.

De accessione.

De confusione.

De commixtione.

De his que solo cedunt. De edificatione in suo solo,
ex aliena materia.

De edificatione ex sua materia in solo alieno.

De plantatione.

De statione.

De scriptura.

De pictura.

De fructibus bona fide perceptis.

De fructibus a fructuario et colono perceptis.

Que sunt in fructu.

De officio fructuarii.

De inventione thesauri.

De traditione. 1. Regula ejusque ratio.

Limitatio.

Ampliatio.

De quasi traditione. Si traditio ex alia causa preces-

serit.

De traditione clavium.

De missilibus.

De habitis pro derelicto.

De jactis in mare levande navis causa: Item de his,
que de rheda currente cadunt.

De rebus corporalibus et incorporalibus. ,

Secundum rerum divisio.

Lib. 2. Tit. 3.

De servitutibus rusticorum et urbanorum prediorum.

De servitutibus rusticis.

1.
2.
3.

4.

De servitutibus urbanis.

Dereliquis servitutibus rusticis.

Qui servitute debere vel acquirere possunt.
Quibus modis servitus constituitur.

Lib. 2. Tit. 4. De Usufructu.

Definitio usufructis.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Quibus modis constituitur.
Quibus in rebus constituitur.
Quibus modis finitur.

Si finitus sit.
686

Lib. 2. Tit. 5.

INDEX. .

De Usu et Habitatione.

Communia de usufructu et usu.

Lib. 2. Tit. 6.

. Quid intersit inter usufructum et usum fundi.
. AAdium usus.

. De servi vel jumenti usu.

anprene

De pecorum usu.
De habitatione.

. Transitio.

De Usucapionibus et longi temporis preescriptionibus.

Precipua usucapionis requisita. 1. Bona fides. 2. Posses-

CONAMARONVE

sio per tempus definitum continuata. 3. Justus titulus.

. De his, que sunt extra commercium.
. De rebus furtivis et vi possessis.
. De vitio purgato.

De re fiscali et bonis vacantibus.

. Regula generalis.

De errore false cause.
De accessione possessionis.

- Quando conjunguntur tempora.
. De his qui a fisco, aut imp. Augusteve domo, aliquid

acceperunt.

Lib. 2. Tit. 7. De Donationibus.

De donatione.

1.

2.
3.
4.

Lib. 2. Tit. 8.

De mortis causa donatione. °
De simplice inter vivos donatione.

De donatione ante nuptias vel propter nuptias.
De jure accrescendi.

Quibus alienare licet vel non licet.

De marito, qui, licet fundi dotalis dominus sit, alienare nequit.

1.

2.

3.

De creditore qui, licet non sit dominus, tamen alienare
pignus potest.

De pupillo, qui, licet dominus, non tamen sine tutoris
auctoritate alienare possit.

Continuatio.

Lib. 2. Tit. 9. Per quas Personas cuique acquiritur.
Samma.

Ae Oe

. De liberis in potestate.

De emancipatione liberorum.
De servis nostris.

. De fructuariis et bona fide possessis.
. Continuatio.
INDEX. 687

6. De reliquis sui extraneis personis.
7. Transitio.

Lib. 2. Tit. 10. De Testamentis ordinandis.
Etymologia.
De antiquis modis testandis civilibus.
De antiqua testandi ratione pratoria.
De conjunctione juris civilis et pratorii.
- Solemnitas addita a Justiniano.
De annulis, quibus testamenta signantur.
Qui testes esse possunt.
. De servo qui liber existimabatur. (
De pluribus testibus ex eadem domo.
De his qui sunt in familia testatoris.
. De herede.
. De legatariis et fidei commissariis, et his, qui sunt in
eorum familia.
12. De materia, in qua testamenta scribuntur.
13. De pluribus codicibus.
14. De testamento nuncupativo.

Lib. 2 Tit. 11. De militari Testamento.
In militum testamentis solemnitates remissa.

. Rescriptum Divi Trajani.
. De surdo et muto.
. De militibus et veteranis.
. De facto ante militiam testamento.

De milite arrogato vel emancipato.
. De peculio quasi casirensi.

$08 COE GR OUR O29

ee
- ©

Ant wW NE

Lib. 2. Tit. 12. Quibus non est permissum facere Testamentum.
De filio-familias.

De impubere et furioso.

De prodigo.

De surdo et muto.

. De ceco.:

. De eo qui est apud hostes.

Lib. 2. Tit. 18. De Exheredatione Liberorum.
Jus vetus de liberis in potestate.
De posthumis.
. De quasi posthumis.
De emancipatis.
. De adoptivis.
. Jus novum.
. De testamento militis.
7, De testamento matris aut avi materna.

oP ewe

anFrFwonwner
688

INDEX.

Lib. 2. Tit. 14. De Heeredibus instituendis.

Qui possunt heredes institui.

1.

Par ww

7
8.
9
10.

11.
12.

Si servus heres institutus, in eadem causa manserit vel
non.

. De servo hereditario.
. De servo plurium.

De numero heredum.

De divisione hereditatis.

De portionibus singulorum heredum, si testator assem
non diviserit, aut partes in quorundam persona, non
ultra assem expresserit.

. Si pars vacet aut exuperet.

Si plures-uncie quam duodecim distribute sunt.

. De modis instituendi.

De conditione impossibili.
De pluribus conditionibus.
De his quos nunquam testator vidit.

Lib. 2. Tit. 15. De vulgari Substitutione.
De pluribus gradibus heredum.

1.
2.

wo

Lib. 2. Tit. 16.

De numero heredum in singulis gradibus.

Quam partem singuli substituti accipiant | si partes in
substitutione non express sint.

Si coheredi substituto alius substituatur.

Si quis servo, quo liber existimabatur, instituto substi-
tutus fuerit. ,

De pupillari Substitutione.

. Forma, effectus, origo, et ratio pupillaris substitutionis.

CHNAANAEWNE

De substitutione mente capti.

. Proprium pupillaris substitutionis.

. Alia forma substituendi pupillariter.

. Quibus substituitur.

. Pupillare testamentum sequela paterni.

. Quot liberis substituitur.

. De substitutione nominatim aut generaliter facta.
. Quomodo substitutio pupillaris finitur.

. Quibus pupillariter non substituitur.

Lib. 2. Tit. 17.

Quibus modis Testamenta in firmantur.

Quibus modis testamenta infirmantur.

i.

Arp WW

Quando testamentum dicatur rumpi: primum do adop-
tione.

. De posteriore testamento.

De posteriore, in quo heres certe rei institutus.

. De testamento irrito; et quibus modis fit irritum.
. Cur. dicatur irritum.

Quibus modis convalescit.
7. De nuda voluntate.

INDEX. 689

-:

8. Si princeps litis causa, vel in testamento imperfecto in-

Lib. 2. Tit. 18

stitus fuerit.

. De inofficioso Testamento.

Ratio hyjus querele.
1. Qui de inofficioso agunt.
2. Qui alio jure veniunt, de inofficioso non agunt.
3. De eo cui testatur aliquid reliquit.

4.

Si tutor, cui nihil a patre relictum pupilli nomine lega-
tum acceperit.

5. Si de inofficioso nomine pupilli agens succubuerit.

6.

De quarta legitime partis.

Lib. 2. Tit. 19. De heredum. qualitate et differentia.
Divisio heredum.

‘Li .
. De suis heredibus.
. De extraneis.

QAnp ww

De heredibus necessariis.

. De testamenti factione.

. De jure deliberandi, et de beneficio inventarii.

De acquirenda vel omittenda hereditate.

Lib. 2. Tit. 20. De legatis.
Continuatio. -
Definitio.

2.
3.
4,

OW DIDRH

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

De antiquis generibus Iegatorum sublatis.

Collatio legatorum et fidei commissorum.

De re legata. Et primum de re testatoris, heredis, ali-
ena cujus non est commercium.

De re pignorata.

Le re aliena post testamentum & legatario acquisita

. De his que non sunt in rerum natura.

De eadem re duobus legata.

. Si legatarius proprietatem fundi alieni sibi legati emerit
et usus fructus ad eum pervenerit.

De re legataru.

Si quis rem suam, quasi non suam legaverit.

De alienatione et oppignoratione rei legate.

De liberatione legata.

De debito legato creditori.

De dote uxoni legata.

De interitu et mutatione rei legate.

De interitu quarundam ex pluribus rebus legatis.

17.
18. De grege legato.
19. De edibus legatis. ‘

87
690

20.
ai.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
. Jus novum de personis incertis et posthumo alieno.
. De posthumo alieno herede instituto..
. De errore in nomine legatarii.
. De falsé demonstratione.
. De fals4 causa adjecta.
. De servo heredis.
. De domino heredis.
34.
35.
36.
Lib. 2. Tit. 21.

INDEX.

De peculio.

De rebus corporalibus et incorporalibus.
De legato generali.

De optione legata.

Quibus legari potest.

Jus antiquum de incertis personis.

Jus antiquum de posthumo alieno.

De modo et ratione legandi x de ordine scripture.
De legato post mortem heredis, vel legatarii.
Si pene nomine relinquatur, adimatur, vel transferatur.

De Ademptione legatorum et translatione.

De ademptione.

1.

Lib, 2 ik 22;

De translatione.

De lege Falcidd.

Ratio et summa hujus legis.

13
2.

3.
Lib. 2. Tit. 25.

De pluribus heredibus.

Quo tempore spectatur quantitas patrimonii, ad quam
ratio legis Falcidie redigitur.

Que detrahuntur ante Falcisiam.

De fidet commissarits heereditatibus.

‘ Continuatio.

1.
2:
3.
4.
5.

6.

hs
8.

9:

10.

Origo fidei commissorum. .

De fidei commisso heredis scripti.

Effectus restiiutionis heereditatis.

De senattis consulto Trebelliano.

De senatis consulto Pegasiano.

Quibus casibus locus est senatus consulto Trebelliano
vel Pegasiano. ,

Pegasiani in Trebellianum transfusio.

De quibus heredibus, et in quibus fidei commissariis,
supra dicta locum habeant.

De eo, quod heres voluntate testatoris deducit, preci-
pitve.

De fidei commissis ab intestato relictis.

' 11. De fidei commisso relicto & fidei commissario.

12.

De probatione fidei commissi.

Lib 2. Tit. 24. De singulis rebus per fidet commissum relictis.
Summa.
INDEX. 691

1. Que relinqui possunt.
2. De libertate.

3. De verbis fidei commissorum.
Lib. 2. Tit. 25. De Codicillis.
Codicillorum origo.
1. Codicilli fieri possunt vel ante, vel post testamentum,
imo etiem ab intestato.

2. Codicillis hereditas directo dari non potest.
3. De numero et solemnitate.

ete

Lib. 8. Tit. 1. De hereditatibus que ab intestato deferuntur.
Definitio intestati.

Primus ordo succedentium ab intestato.

. Qui sunt sui heredes.

. Quomodo sui heeredes fiunt.

De filio post mortem patris, ab hostibus reverso.

. De memoria patris damnata ob crimen perduellionis.

. De divisione hereditatis inter suos heredes.

- Quo tempore suitas spectatur.

. De nato post mortem avi, vel adoptato a filio emancipato.

. De liberis emancipatis.

Si emancipatus se dederit in adoptionem.

. Collatio filiorum naturalium et adoptivorum.

2. De bonorum possessione contra tabulas.

. Unde cognati.

. Emendatio juris antiqui. De adoptivis.

. De descendentibus ex feeminis.

COMMA NF WW

Fah tek pe
He 09 Ir oO

Lal
On

Lib. 8. Tit. 2. De legitima agnatoruim sucessione.

Secundus ordo heredum legitimorum.

. De agnatis naturalibus.

De adoptivis.

. De masculis et foeminis.

. De filiis sororum.

De proximis vel remotis..

Quo tempore proximitas spectatur.
De successorio edicto.

De legitima parentum successione.

ONRAR ONE

Lib. 8. Tit. 8. De senatus consulto Tertylliano.
De lege duodecim tabularum ct jie preetoria.
1. De constitutione divi Claudii.
2. Ad senatus consultum Tertyllianum. De jure liberorum.
3. Qui preferuntur matri, vel cum e4 admittuntur.
692 INDEX.

4. Jus novum de jure liberorum sublato.

5. Quibus mater preponitur et quibuscum admittitur.
6. De tutore liberis petendo.

7. De vulgo quesitis.

Lib. 3. Tit. 4. De senatus consulto Orficiano.
Origo et summa senatus consulti.
1. De nepote et nepte. -
2. De capitis diminutione.
3. De vulgo quesi‘is.
4. De jure accrescendi inter legitimos heredes.

Lib. 8. Tit. 5. De successione cognatorum.
Tertius ordo succedentium ab intestato.
1. Quivocanturin hoc ordine. De agnatis capite minutis.
De conjunctis per feeminas.
De liberis datis in adoptionem.
. De vulgo quasitis.
Ex quoto gradu vel agnati vel cognati succedunt.

ap wP

Lib. 8. Tit. 6. De gradibus cognationum.
Continuatio, et cognationis divisio. ©

De primo, secundo et tertio gradu.

. Quartus gradus.

. Quintus gradus.

. Sextus gradus.

.. De reliquis gradibus.

. De gradibus agnationis.

. De graduum descriptione.

UA HAKRWNE

Lib. 3. Tit. 7. De servilt cognatione.
Collatio ordinum et gradum.

Lib. 3. Tit. 8. De successione libertorum.
Qui succedunt, de lege duodecim tabularnm.
1. De jure pretoria.
2. De lege Papia.
3. De constitutione Justiniani.
4. Quibus libertinis succeditur.

Lib. 3. Tit. 9. De asstgnatione libertorum.
An assignari possit, et quis assignationis effectus.

1. De sexu assignati, et de sexu graduque ejus, cui assig-
natur.

2. De liberis in potestate vel emancipatis.

3. Quibus modis aut verbis assignatio fit: et de senatus
consulto.
INDEX. 693

Lib. 3. Tit. 10. De bonorwm possessionibus.
Cur introducte bonorum possessiones; et quis sit earum ef-
fectus.
. De speciebus ordinariis. Jus vetus.
Jus novum.
Species extraordinaria.
. De successorio edicto. ;
. De jure accrescendi et iterum de successorio edicto.
Explicatio dicti temporis.
. Quomodo peti debet.

Naar woner

Lib. 3, Tit. 11. De acquisitione per arrogationem.
Continuatio.
1. Quee hoc modo acquiruntur. Jus vetus.
2. Jus novum.
3. Effectus hujus acquisitionis.

Lib. 3. Tit. 12. De eo, cui libertatis causa bona addicuntur.
Continuatio.

Rescriptum D. Marci.

Utilitas rescripti.

. Ubi locum habeat.
_& * * *

2:
3
4
5. * * * *
6.
7

ray

Si libertates datee non sunt.
. De speciebus additis & Justiniano.

Lib. 3. Tit. 13. De successionibus sublatis, que fiebant per bonorum
venditiones, et ex senatus consulto Claudiano.

Lib. 3. Tit. 14. De obligationibus.
Continuatio et definitio.
1. Divisio prior.
2. Divisio posterior.

Lib. 3. Tit. 15. Quibus modis re contrahitur obligatio.
De mutuo.
1. De indebito soluto.
2. De commodato.
3. De deposito.
4. De pignore. ©

Lib. 3. Tit. 16. De verborum obligationibus.
- Summa.
1. De verbis stipulationum.
2. Quibus modis stipulatio fit. De stipulatione pura velin
diem.
3. De die adjecto perimende obligationis causa. gs
694 INDEX.

4. De conditione.

5. De loco. 3

6. De conditione ad tempus presens vel preteritum relata.
7. Que in stipulatum deducuntur.

Lib. 3. Tit. 17. De duobus reis stipulandi et promittendi.
Quibus modis duo rei fieri possunt.
1. De effectu hujusmodi stipulationum.
2. De stipulatione pura; et de die et conditione.

Lib. 3. Tit. 18. De stipulationibus servorum. ’
An servus stipulari possit. ;
1. Cui acquirat. De persona cui ‘stipulatur. De stipula-
tione impersonali.
2. De stipulatione facti.
3. De servo communi.

Lib. 3. Tit. 19. De divisione stipulationum.
' Divisio.
1. De judicialibus stipulationibus.
2. De pretoriis.
3. De conventionalibus.
4. De communibus.

\

Lib. 3. Tit. 20. De inutilibus stipulationibus.
De his que sunt in commercio.
1. Dehis que non cxistunt.
2. De his que non sunt in commercio.
. De facto vel datione alterins.
De eo, in quem confertur obligatio vel solutio.
. De interrogatione et responsione.
. De his qui sunt vel habent, in potestate.
. De muto et surdo.
. De furioso.
. De impubere.
19. De conditione impossibili.
11. De absentia.
12. De stipulatione post mortem, vel pridie quam alter con-
trahentium moriatur. , ;
13. De stipulatione preepostera.

14. De stipulatione collatain tempus mortis.
15. * x & & # % *

‘

ODAIAA S

16. De promissione seripta in instrumento.
17. De pluribus rebus iv stipulatione deductis.
18. De pena adjecta stipulationi, alii dari.

19. Siintersit ejus, qui alii stipulatur.
20.
21.'
22.
23.

24

26.

INDEX. 695

De pena adjecta promissioni faeti alieni.
De re stipulantis futura, ;

De dissensu.

De turpi causa.

De morte contrahentium.

Quando agi potest ex stipulatione.

Lib. 8. Tit. 21. De fidijussoribus.

Cur accipiuntur fidejussores.

1.

Eagan & Ww

@

In quibus obligationibus.
. De herede.

. Si fidejussor precedat vel sequatur obligationem.

. De pluribus fidejussoribus.

. In quam summam obligatur fidejussor.
. De actione fidejussoris.

. Si fidejussor grecé accipiatur.

Si scriptum sit, aliquem fidejussisse.

Lib. 3. Tit. 22. De Utcrarum obligationibus.

Lib. 3. Tit. 23

. De obligationibus ex consensu.

Lib. 38. Tit. 24. De emptione et venditione.

De

=

~

aA

emptione pura. De pretii conventione, arrhis, et scrip-
tura.
. De pretio certo, vel incerto vel in arbitrium alienum col-
lato.
In quibus pretium consistat. Differentia emptionis et
permutationis. 7
. De periculo et commodo rei vendite.

. De emptiune conditionali.
. De emptione rei, que non est in commercio.

Lib. 8. Tit. 25. De locatione et conductione.
Cullatio emptionis, et locationis. De mercedis conventione.

1.
. In quibus rebus merces consistat.

. De Emphyteusi.

. De forma alicui facienda ab artifice.

ankww

Div
1,

De mercede collata in arbitrium alienum.

Quid prestare debet conductor.

. De morte conductoris.

Lib. 8 Tit. £6.

De socictate.
isio a materia.
De partibus lucri et damni.

2. De partibus inequalibus.
3. De partibus expressis in und causa.

4.

Quibus modis societas solvitur. Do renunciatione
696

DIA

INDEX.

. De morte.
. De fine negotii.
. De publicatione.

De cessione bonorum.

. De dolo et culpaa socio prestandis.

Lib. 8. Tit. 27.

De mandato.

Divisio a fine.

1.
. Si mandantis et mandatarii.
. Si aliena gratia.

. Si mandantis et aliena.

eee
wre

SGORMAAE WYN

Si mandantis gratia mandetur.

Si mandatarii et alien4.

Si mandatarii.

De mandato contra bonos mores.
De executione mandati.

. De revocatione mandati.
. De morte.

. De renunciatione.

. De die et conditione.
13.

Lib. 3. Tit. 28.

De mercede.

De obligationibus que quasi ex contractu nascuntur.

Continuatio.

Lib. 3. Tit. 29.
De his qui sunt in potestate.
1.
2.
3.

Lib. 8. Tit. 30.

‘

Saar wonre

. De negotiorum gestione.

. De tutela.

. De rei communione.

. De hereditatis communione.

De aditione hereditatis.

. De solutione indebiti.

Quibus ex causis indebitum solutum non repetitur.

Per quas personas obligatio acquiritur.

De bona fide possessis.
De servo fructuario, vel usuario.
De servo communi.

Quibus modis tollitur obligatio.

s De solutione.

1.
2.
3.
4,

De acceptilatione.

De Aquiliana stipulatione et acceptilatione.
De novatione. :

De contrario consensu.

Lib. 4. Tit. 1. De Obligationibus, que ex delicto nascuntur.
Continuatio et divisio obligationum ex delicto.

1.

Definitio furti.
oy om oe
w vo Fe OOM

ms
oe

16.
17.
18.
19.

WAgR wD

INDEX 697

. Etymologia.

Divisio.
De furto concepto, oblato, prohilbito, non exhibit.
Pena. ,

. Quomodo furtum fit; de contrectatione.

De affectu furandi.

. De voluntate domini.

. Quarum rerum furtum fit. De liberis hominibus.

. De re propria.

. Qui tenentur furti. De eo, cujus ope, consilio furtum

factum est.

. De his, qui sunt in potestate. Et de ope ac consilio ex-

tranel.

. Quibus datur actio furti.
. De pignore surrepto creditori.
. De re fulloni, vel sarcinatori vel bone fidei emptori sur-

repta

De re commo:lata.

De re deposita.

An impubes furti teneatur.

Quid veniat in hanc actionem; et de affinibus actioni-
bus.

Lib. 4. Tit. 2. De vi bonorum raptorum.
Origo hujus actionis, et quid in eam veniat.

ale

Adversus quos datur.

2. Quibus datur.
Lib 4. Tit. 3. De lege Aquilia.

Summa. Caput primum.

ee
won oO

ODMIAAR YN

. De quadrupede, qua pecudum nu:ncro est.
. De injuria.

De casu, dolo, ct culpa.
De jaculatione.

. De putatione.

De curatione relicta.

De imperitia medici.

De imperitia et infirmitate mulionis aut equo vecti.
Quanti damnum wsumetur et de heredibus.

Quid exstimatur.

_ De concursu hujus actionis et capitalis.

Caput secundum.

. Caput tertium. Quod damnum vindicatur.
14.
15.

De do!o et culpa.
Quanti damnum estimatur.

De actione directa, utili, et in factum.
88
698

INDEX.

Lib. 4. Tit. 4. De injuriis.
Verbum injuria quot modis accipitur.

1.
2.

SoDrtans gs

Quibus modis injuria fit.

Qui et per quos injuriam patiuntur. De parente et li-
beris, viro et uxore, socero et nuru.

De servo.

De servo communi.

De servo fructuario.

. De eo qui bona fide servit.

Pena injuriarum ex x1 tab. et ex jure pretorio.

. De lege Cornelia.

. De estimatione atrocis injurie.
10.
11.
123

De judicio civili et criminali.
Qui tenentur injuriarum.
Quomodo tollitur hee actio.

Lib, 4. Tit. 5. De Obligationibus, que quasi ex delicto nascuntur.
Si judex litem suam fecerit.

1.
2.
3.

De dejectis vel effusis, et positis aut suspensis.

De. filio familias, seorsum habitante & patre

De damno aut furto, quod in navi aut caupon4, aut sta-
bulo factum est.

Lib. 4. Tit. 6. De Actionibus.

Continuatio et definitio.

1.
. De actione confessoria et negatoria.
. De actionibus pretoriis realibus.

LOR No No a
Yr CO OANANFWNHY OO

ODIAARRwWD

Divisio prima.

De Publiciana.
De rescissoria.

. De Pauliana.

De Serviana et quasi Serviana seu hypothecaria.

. De actionibus pretoriis personalibus.

. De constituta’ pecunia.

. De peculio.

. De actione in factum ex jure jurando.

. De actionibus penalibus.

. De prejudicialibus actionibus.

. An res sua condici possit.

. De nominibus actionum.

. Divisio secunda.

. De actionibus rei persecutoriis.

. De actionibus pene persecutoriis.

. De mistis ; hoc est, rei et pene persecutoriis.
. De mistis ; id est, tam in rem quam in personam.
. Divisio tertia.

. De actionibus in simplum.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.

29.

30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.

Lib. 4. Tit. 7.

INDEX. 699

In duplum.

In triplum.

In quadruplum.

Subdivisio actionum in duplum.

Subdivisio actionum in quadruplum.

Divisio quarta de actionibus bone fidei.

De rei uxoriz actione, in ex stipulatu actionem trans-
fusa.

De potestate judicis in judicio bone fidei, et de com-
pensationibus.

De actionibus arbitrariis.

Quinta divisio, de incertee quantitatis petitione.

De pluris petitione.

De minoris summe petitione.

Si aliud pro alio petatur.

Divisio sexta. De peculio. *

De repetitione notis.

De actione adversus parentem, patronum, socium, et do-
natorem.

De compensationibus.

De eo, qui bonis cessit.

Quod cum eo, qui in aliend potestate est, negotium ges-
tum esse dicitur.

Scopus et nexus.

is

PrAanPrwn

De actione guod jussu.

De exercitaria et institoria actione.
De tributoria.

De peculio, et de in rem verso,

. De concursu dictarum actionum.
. De filiis familias.

De senatus-consulto Macedoniano.
De actione directa in patrem vel dominium.

Lib. 4. Tit. 8. De noxalibus actionibus.
De servis. Summa.

1.

Stas Oye g9

Quid sit noxa et noxia.

Ratio harum actionum.

Effectus noxe deditionis.

De origine harum actionum.

Qui conveniuntur noxali actione.

Si servus dominio noxiam commiserit vel contra.
De filiis famiiarum.

Lib. 4. Tit. 9. Si guadrupes pauperiam fecisse dicatur.
De actione, si quadrupes ex 1, xii. tab.

1.

Deactione adilitia, concurrente cum actione de pauperie.
700 INDEX.

Lib. 4. Tit. 10. De iis, per quos agere possumus.
Per quos agere liceat.
1. Quibus modis procurator constituatur.
2. Quibus modis tutores vel curatores constituuntur.

Lib. 4. Tit. 11. De satisdationibus.
De judicio personali.
. De judicio personali.
. Jus novum. De reo.
De procuratore actoris. :
De procuratore rei preesentis.
. De procuratore rei absentis.
. Unde heec forma discenda.
. Ubi hee forma observanda.

UAAPWNE

Lib. 4. Tit. 12. De perpetuis et temporalibus actionibus et que ad he-
redes et in haredes transeunt.
De perpetuis et temporalibus actionibus.
1. Deg actionibus, que in heredes transeunt vel non.
2. Si pendente judicio reus actori satisfecerit.

Lib. 4, Tit. 128. De Exceptiontbus.

Continuatio. Ratio exceptionum.
1. De exceptione, quod metus causa, de dolo, in factum.

. De non numerata pecunia.

De pacto.

. De jurejurando.

De re judicata.

De ceteris exceptionibus.

. Divisio prima.

Divisio secunda.

De peremptoriis.

. De dilatoriis.

11. De dilatoriis ex persona.

Lib. 4. Tit. 14. De Replicationibus.
De replicatione.
1. De duplicatione.
2. De triplicatione.
3. De ceteris exceptionibus.
4. Quee exceptiones fide jussoribus prosunt vel non.

Lib. 4. Tit. 15. De interdictis.
Continuatio et definitio.
1. Divisio prima.
2. Divisio secunda.
3. De interdictis adpiscenda.
4. De interdictis retinenda.

DMNIAARwWH

_
Oo
INDEX. 701

5. De retinenda et acquirenda possessione.

6. De interdicto recuperande et affinibus remediis.
7. Divisio tertia.

8. De ordine et vetere exitu.

Lib. 4. Tit. 16. De pend temer: litiguntium.
De penis in genere.
1. De jurejurando et pena pecuniaria.
2. De infamia.
3. De in jus vocando.

Lib. 4. Tit. 17. De Officio Judicis.

De officio judicis in genere.
De judicio noxali.
De actionibus realibus.
De actione ad exhibendum.
. Familie erciscunde.
Communi d:vidundo.
Finium regundorum.
De adjudicatione.

Lib. 4. Tit. 18. De publicis Judiciis.
De differentia a privatis.

Etymologia.
Divisio.
. Exempla. De lesa majestate.
. De adulteriis.

De Sicariis.
. De parracidiis.

De falsis.
. De vi.
. De peculatis.

De plagiariis.
. De ambitu, repetundis, annona, residuis.
. Conclusio.

aAAaArR YN

Panaanrvonr

_ —
bio
INDEX

TO THE

NOTES AND REFERENCES.

[ After ante, page 400, the figures refer to the original pages as indented in the margin.]

A

337. 641., locati 306., miste 641.,
negotiorum gestorum 4852. 624,,

Accession 459
Actions : : . 638
Actiones,—Arbitrarii 641., ad exhi-

noxales 645., pauliana 638., de
pauperie 646., pehe persecutorie
334., pignoratilie 604. 640., perso-

bendum 383. 459., edilitie 358.
646., bone fidei et stricti juris 339.
340. 584. 641., capitales 316., ci-
viles 408., communi dividundo
384. 650., confessorie 327., consti-
tute pecunie 640., damni inju-
tie 312., direct 317., directe in
patrem, &c. 353.,de damno aut
furto 638., exercitorie 349.,exemp-
to 609. 615., ex stipulatu 641., ex
vendito 609. 615., familie ercis-
cunde 384. 641. 650., finium re-
gundorum 384. 650., furti 304.,
furti manifesti 310., hypothecarie
640., incitorie 349., injurie 323., in
heredes transeuntes 648., in fac-
tum (on the case) 305. 318. 627.,
in factum jurejurando 640., in sim-
plum 336., in duplum 337. 609., in
triplum 337. 641.,in quadruplum

nales 328. 331., perpetue 647., pe-
nales 332., prejudiciales, 640., pre-
torie 408., publiciane 328., private
ex lege aquilia 316., de peculio 331.
346. 643, quasi ex maleficio 324.,
quanti minoris 609., quod jussu
349., reales 328. 333. 382., redhibi-
torie 609., recissorize 329 ,de in rem
verso 350., rei persequende 334.,
repetitione dotis 346., rel uxorie
641., serviana, quasi serviana 639.,
ser- vi corrupti 303., si quadrupes
357., subsidiary 453., temporales
647., tributorie 350., tutele 452., ex
tes- tamento 522., vi bonor. rapto-
rum 309., utiles 317. 621.

Abjuration, 441
Acts of limitation, 647
Adoption 440, 561
Adopted child, 499
704

INDEX.

Ademption of legacies, 516, 530 Bastard, 416
Adition, 521 Bees, : 458
Ad promissor 462 Beneficium ordinis, 612
Adrogation, 441, 577 discussionis, 612
Advocate, 597 cedendar. action, 612
Advancement 515,575 Bequests over, 522. 525
és ct libra 443,487 Bonorum possessio, 659. 573. 575
Affinity, 442 Bon. poss. unde liberi, 540. 573
Age, . 2 A431 legitimi, 565. 573
Agnates, 430, 445, 539, 561, 564. cognati, 540. 562,
570, 571 565. 567. 573
Agnatio nuda, 621 vir et uxor, 540
Agnomen, 526 573
Albercus Gentilis, 405 decem persone, 573
Alfenus, 404 secundum tabulas, 573,
Alcibiades, 432 contra tabulas, 573
Alexander ( Papa.) 325 tanquem ex familia 573
Alluvion, 458 Books, 525
Amber, 460 Boundary, 460
Amita, 439 Bracton, 440
Antestator, 442 Bribery, (Ambitus,) 654
Anastasiana, : 670 Burlamaqui, . 405
Animals mischievous, 646 Bynkershoek, 405. 557

Antistius Labeo,’® 459

Apparel, 525 C.

Apothecary, 596
Aqueduct, 467 Cains, 404
Arrha, (earnest) 616 Callistratus, 404
Arreoi, 431 Capiatur pro fine, 649
Aristotle, 431 Captive, 495
Arbiter, 638 Captivity, 442
Assignment, : 470 Captive joint, 457
Ascendants. See succession. Case, action on, 627
Atteius Capito, : 459 Caveat emptor, 610, 620
Attorney, ; 507. 645.647 Cavillatio, 409
Caution ; 452, 647
B. Cautio de damno infecto, 637
Cautores, 409
Bank notes, 625 Celsus,. 404
Banishment, 441 Census, 416
Barbeyrac, 405 Certi condictio,. . 693
Bargain and Sale, 616. 617. Cessio bonorum, 622, 642
Bargains catching, 642-3. 645 Chamberlain, 403
Barrington’s Observ. 414 Child, 445
Basilica, 677. Child posthumous, 496
INDEX.

Christianity,

432
Code Justinian, 403
Theodosian, 614
Tuscan, 409
Russian . 409
Napoleon, 509
Codicil, 537, 539
Cognitores 597
Cognomen : 526
Cognates, 430, 445, 561, 57C. 572
Collaterals, see Succession.

Collation, (Hotchpot) . 575
Commandite, 622, 672 a
Compensation, (set off,) 347, 528
Compromissor, : 638
Commodatum, 583, 584, 593
Coemptio, 421
Comprivigni 423
Concilium semestre 453
Concubinatus, 420, 432
Conditions, * 501, 529, 605, 611
impossible 501
precedent, 528
testamentary, 528

in restraint of mar-
rage, . 528
Confarreatio, 421, 436
Conjugium, 420
Consanguinity, 422, 562
Consortium, . 420
Contubernium, 416, 420
Consensus, 422
Consensus sponealitius, 430
matrimonialis, 430
Consobrini. consororini, 439,561, 562
Constitutum, 581, 612
Constitutions, 406
Contracts, 583
nominate, 583
innominate, 583
stricti juris 584
bone fidei, 338, 338, 584,
641
parol, 586
written, 586

" gg

unilateral,

Contracts, construction of, 3

Conventio in manum,
Covenants,

Counsel,

Cretion,

Crimen, ; 3
Cypres, ‘ =

.

Cum elogio, (a specification)

Curator,
Cures,

Damages,

Debtor,

Decurions

Decreta,

Decree Macedonian,
Dedetitii,

705

593
587
421
528
597
521
454
530
495

444, 450, 454, 476

405

606, 637, 641

Delivery of documents,

Denunciations,
Defalcation,
Defensores (counsel, )
Depositum, ,
Detention of a pledge,
Deportation,
Degrees levitical,
Devises of land,
Digest,
Diffarreatio,
Discidium
Disinherison,
Dies utiles,
Divi fratres
Divorce,
Domi ductio
Doli capax,
Dolus malus,
Dogs, ;
Donatio mortis causa, .
inter vivos,
ante nuptias,

Do ut des,

facias,

642
439
407
643
417
466
333
560
597

583, 584

581
441
427
517
403
436
436

495, 504, 513

577
453

433, 434, 438

421
626
573
629
474
474
474
584
584
706.
Du Ponceau, Mr, 557,671, 672, 672 a
Dupondium, 404, 501
Dower, . 624
Dominium eminens, 456, 457
utile, 456
jura nature, 456
jure civili, 456
: E.
Easement, 468
Edicta, 406, 407
pretorum, 408
Edictales, 404
Election, 530
Electrum, 460
Emancipation, 421, 443, 477
Emperor, 402
Emptio bonorum, 578
; venditio, 614, 616, 583, 584
Emphyteusis, 583, 584, 621, 622
Enmity, 459
Enfranchisement, A1T7,
Epistole, . 406, 407
Erciscunda, 384, 641, 650
Erciseundi, 459
Erciscere, 641
Ilerciscere, 641
Eogxos 641
Esquire, 416
Excellency, 416
Extranei, 440
Exile, 441.
Executor, 501
Exqueastor, 403
Expromissor, . 462
Ex empto G09, 615
Ex vendito, 615
Eviction, 607, 615
F.
Facio ut des, . 584
facias, 584 |
Fabia lex, ‘ : , 626

INDEX:

Familie erciscunde, 384, 522, 641,

650

Falsa causa, 526
Farre, . z 421
Fees to Counsel, 596
Physicians, 597

of office, 598
Females, 446
Fere nature 5 457
Fictio brevis manus. - 466

Fide jussion,
Fide jussor,

Fidei commissa,

\ 452, 581, 612, 614
505, 634, 536

Filius familias, 444, 541,
Fishery, 455
Fixtures, 525 -
Flamen dialis, 421
Florentinus, 404.
Freedman, 417, 578
Furniture, 525

Forestalling (fraudate annonez), 654

G.
Germani, 562
Gillies, Dr. 431
Goods, 525
Grotius, 405
Grandchild, 445
Guardian 445, 454, 644
Guarantee, 452
Gypsum, 408
H.

Heineccius, . ‘ . 405
Heirs, domestic or sui, 520, 539,
556, 570

stranger, extranei, 621
instituted, 500, 520
substituted, . 500, 520
necessary, 557

ex asse, 500, 520
Heirship, , oSkU8 556
Helots, ‘ we? ww ae
INDEX.

Herciscere, G41
Ilinds, 414
Honourable, 416
Tlonorarium, 597
Uotchpot (collatio), . 875
ilypothcea, 683, 584, 604, 640

L
Jetsam, Flotsam, &c. . 466
Imperator, z . 402
Impuber, 441, 493, 626
Innkeeper, ; 638
Inquisition, inquisitors, . 403
Infantia, 455, 448, 449, 476
Insolvency, 623
Interpretationes, 407
Interdicts, 648
Intention, criminal, 636
Tutestacy, 539
Islands, . 459
Julianus, 404
Julius Cesar, . 446
Jura, 404
personarum, . 410
Judges, when liable 637, 638
Jurisprudentia, 404
Jus. Jussum. Justitia, 404
Jus vitee et necis, ‘ . Add
postliminii, 442, 511, 557
accrescendi, 569

K.
Kidnapping, 626, 653

L.
Lanx et Licio, 625
Latini, 417
Sateran Council, 425
Lease, , . 470
Legacy, . 616, 522, 527
Leges annue, . 408
Legitimation, 439, 440
Legitima pars, . 514
Lex, . 405

“107

Lex Anastasiana, 570. Aquilia, 627.

Altilia, 446.

Cincia, 409.

Cor-

nelia, 411, 637, 651. Fabia, 626.

Falcidia, 515, 532, 533.

Furia,

418, 515, 532. Julia, 650, 655. Pe-

tronia, 412.
gia, 407.
nia, 641.
Libertus, Libertinus,
Liber eensu,
Libripens, :
Libel, . ‘ ‘
Limitation,
of a legacy,
acts of
Linea ascendens,
descendens,
collateralis,
Lindebrogue,
Loan,
Locus injuria .
penitentia,
Locatio conductio,
Lyte,

Voconia, 532,

M.

Macedonian decree,
Madmen,
Madan Martin,
Majestas,
Magister,
Palatii,
Ro‘ulorum,
Malicious prosecution,
Males, their privileges,
Mancipation,
Mandatum, Mandata, 407,
Marcian,
Marcellus,
Manumission,
Manstealing,
Market overt,
Marriage, i
forbidden,

Pauliana, 638.

Re-
Zeno-

416
416
442
629
471
525
647
429
429
429
414
593
637

. 585
583, 584
404

643

452

432

402

403

403

403

629

448
442, 470
683, 584
404

404
417,418
- 626

» 472
419, 420
425
409
505
412
422
422
424
584
541
442
460
597
544
225
525
525
541
541
491
491
651
598
640
653
697
648
406
408
557
496
432
455
431
418
597
598
526
424
404
407

459
550
640
640

708. INDEX.
Marriage, second, 443 Papinian.
Scotch and foreign, 443 Papinianiste,
contract, 434 Park,
Mayer Jacob’s case, 438 Parentage,
Mars, ‘ 405 Parentela, :
Master and servant, 647 respectum,
Mines, 461 Partnership, 583,
Minor, 446,453,476 Pater familias,
Misericordia, 649 fiduciarius, , :
Missio causaria 491 Path, . ; ‘ 5
honesta, 491 Patron, 409, 454, 578,
ignominiosa, 491 Per capita. per stirpes, 542,
temporaria, ‘5 491 vindicationem, . 2
Money had and received, 594 damnationem, .
Matuum, -. 683, 584, 593 preceptionem, :
Peculium castrense, 476,
N. quasi castrense, 492,
anventitium, 477,
Natural children, 499, 556 profectitium, 477,
Negotiarum gestores, . . 6597 Pedeyrasty, 431, 636,
Negro slavery, . 478,484 Pennsylvania offices, . 5
Naif, 416 Pignus, 475, 583, 584, 604,
Nomen, 626 Plagiarius, 626,
Nomine pene, . 627 Physicians,
Novel, 118, 127, 544,553 Pleas and Pleading,
Novation, 581 Plebiscitum,
Nude pact, 581, 585 Polemarch,
Nuptie, 419 Postliminy, 442, 511,
Posthumous children, .
O. Polygamy, 431,
Ports,
Oblatio Curie, 439 Power,
Obligation, 579 Procurator,
Offices in Pennsylvania, 598 Premium,
Orphitian sen. consult. 560, 565, 567 Proevaricator,
Orationes principis, 406,511 Proenomen,
Oswald, ; 4 - 425 Propositus,
Otahete, | ; ; ~. 431  Prolyte,
Privileges,
P. Principal and surety, see surety.
Proculians,
Pacts, civil, pretorian, simple, Preeposteritas, ; .
nuda, vestitia, 585 Proedia rustica, 467,
Parracide, 653 urbana, 467,
Pandects, 403 Prescription,

471
INDEX.

Prodigals, 452, 494
Proctor, 647
Puberty, 445
P uveritia, . 445
Public decorum, 422, 430
Purchaser without notice, 473
Puffendorf, . 405
Pupils, 444, 453
Punishment, 625
Q.
Quartrum trebellianum, 536
Quasi contract, 524
posthumous, 499
privignus, 431
nurus, 431
noverca, 431
serviana,
ex maleficio,
usufruct, 468
Quiddam honorarium, 597
Quires, 404
Quirinus, 405
Questor, 403
Quotite, 416
R.
Rank, 422, 431
Ratahabitio, 422
Relationship, 422
Relegation, 441
Repudium, 434, 521
Renunciation, 436, 521
Representation, 539, 546, 558
Res fungibiles, 593
Responsa, . 408
Respectum parentele, 424
Rescript,

Divi Marci, 578
Retention, 581
Revocation testamentary, 497, 539
Rivers, . 455, 456

709
Road, ? ; 467
Rutherforth, . ‘ 405
s.
Sabinians, 459
Sailors, ‘ . 644
Satisfaction, of proportions, of dow-
er of debts, of legacies, 516, 530
Sanctuaries, ‘ 419
Scotch marriages, - 433
Seal, . 488
Selden, : 428
Security, Surety, 452, 462, 613,
648
Senium, 446
Serfs, ; ‘ 413
Servi: Slaves, slavery, 410
Servi pena, 415, 442
Services: Servitudes, . 467
Seduction, 636, 651
Semi matrimonium, . 420
Senatus-consultum, 406, 541
Pegasianum, 532 536
Sabinianum, 558
Trebellianum, 541
Tertyllianum, 564, 567
Orphitianum, 565, 567
Set-off, (Compensation) 581
Sestertium, 442
Settlement, 505
Sicle, 503
Sinendi modo, 525
Slavery. See servi.
Somerset, the negro case, 414
Socage, , 454
Sontica causa, 435
Socrates, 431
Solicitor, ‘ 597, 644
Sodomy, , : 636, 651
Societas, (Partnership) 583, 584,
672 a
Spurious children, 568, 571
Spado, 441
710 INDEX.
‘Sponsalia, 430, 432 Trustees, : . . 644
Stoppage in transitu, 463 Trusts, ; 536, 534, 644
Stuprum, (Seduction) 536,651 ‘Tutelage: Tutor, 444,447
Stipend, . ; » 462
Stipulation, 583, 584, G05 U.
partis et pro parte, 534
judicial, prectorian Ulpian, - 404
‘edilitian, . 608 Umbricia, 512
Substitution, 502, 505 Uncie, . ‘ 500, 520
pupillary, 503 Use: Usufruct, 469
Succession ab intestato, 539, 546 Usucapion, 472
Suitas, 614 Uterini, 562
Surgeons, 597
Vv.
Ty
Vattel, 405
Taylor, Dr. 546 Ventre mittendo, 443
Tabule, ‘ . 603 inspiciendo, 443
Testament, 416, 485, 492, 510 Victor, . 402
military, . 491 Villenage, 413, 417, 479, 481
in procinctu, 491 Vinculo matrimonii, 434
inofficious, 407, 504 Vindications, 333
611,514 Vindic‘a, 416, 417
irritum, 510 Vinilitas, 446
Testamenti factio, 488, 500, 520 Vulgo questi, (bastards) ' 568
Testes, 442
Tertullian, : 435 Ww.
Thelypthora, : 432
Theft, 625 Waif, 466
Thii, 572 Warranty, 609, 615, 620
Towing path, 456 Way, . 467
Transfer, 470 Widow, 436, 443
Tribute, 462 Will. See Testament, 485, 492
Treasure trove, 461 Wild creatures reclaimed, 629
Triumphator, ‘ . 402 Wild, (Jonathan) 625
Trespass, vi et armis on the Witche:.aft, 651
case, 627 Witnesses testamentary, 488, 494
ee

= es