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THE NATIONAL STATUS
OF THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA
1900-1958
DONALD E. WILLMOTT
MONOGRAPH SERIES
MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
Price — $3.00
SEAP Publications
^ile
Do not remove from room 213
640 Stewart AvenueTHE NATIONAL STATUS
>	OF THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA
1900 - 1958
Donald E. Willmott
i
MONOGRAPH SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, N®w York
Revised Edition
19614
<
© 1961 by Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
>
4111
PREFACE
In 1956, approximately a year after Professor Willmott’s
return from Indonesia, the Modern Indonesia Project published as
an Interim Report his study of the national status of the Chinese
in Indonesia. Subsequently, following helpful comments by
Indonesian and Western scholars who had read this study and after
having accumulated a considerable amount of additional data,
Dr. Willmott undertook to refine and augment his earlier study,
while also carrying it forward chronologically through 1958.
The present monograph represents, then, a substantial expansion
of his earlier Interim Report with considerable new data
relating not only to the period 1955-1958 but also to the years
1900-1955.
Dr. Willmott is particularly well qualified to undertake
this study. He was born in China, a British subject, in 1925,
living there until 1946 when he came to the United States to
enroll in Oberlin College, from which he received his B.A. in
1950. Prior to his stay in Indonesia, he spent a year of
resident graduate study at the University of Michigan and three
at Cornell University, the emphasis of his work being in socio-
logy and social psychology. He arrived in Indonesia with a
command of the Indonesian and Chinese languages and a substantial
knowledge of Indonesian and Chinese culture. His sixteen months
of field work in Indonesia (during 1954-1955) were followed by
the investigation of relevant material lodged in the Cornell
University Library.
Dr. Willmott received his Ph.D. degree in sociology from
Cornell University in 1958 His major study, based upon his
field research in Indonesia, The Chinese of Semarang, was
published by Cornell University Press in 1960. Currently he is
Research Associate at the Center for Community Studies at the
University of Saskatchewan in Canada.
Dr. Willmott’s studies are the first of several carried out
by members of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project relating to
the Chinese minority in Indonesia. Others are due to be
published during the course of the coming year.
Ithaca, New York
September 15, 1961
George McT. Kahin
Directorί
*
*
4v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER	Page
INTRODUCTION	ix
I	THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES,
1900-1941	1
Traditional Dutch Policy as a
Stimulus to Chinese Nationalism	2
Influences from China and the Rise of
Nationalism among the Indies Chinese	3
New Dutch Policy and Chinese Reactions	7
Relations between Chinese and
Indonesians under Dutch	Rule	11
II	NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE UNDER DUTCH RULE,
1850-1949	13
Early Nationality Laws	13
Preparations for Consular Negotiations
and Conflicting Citizenship Acts	13
The Consular Convention of 1911	15
Ambiguities Concerning the
Position of Peranakans	16
III	NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE UNDER THE REPUBLIC,
1945-1954	19
The Japanese Occupation	19
Chinese Reactions to the
Revolutionary War	19
Actions Taken by the
Chinese Government	22
Action^ Taken by the
Indonesian Republic	23
The Citizenship Act of 1946
25VI
CHAPTER	Page	•
Developments in Dutch-held Territory	27	
The Round Table Agreement on Citizenship	29	I
Ambiguities and Clarifications		
Concerning Citizenship	29	
Draft Citizenship Act of		
1954 and Its Opponents	34	
The 1958 Citizenship Act	40	
Status of the Pro-Kuomintang Chinese	43	
IV THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP TREATY WITH CHINA	44	
Provisions of the Treaty		
on Dual Citizenship	47	
Reactions of Various		
Parties to the Treaty	48	
Reactions of Indonesian		
Chinese to the Treaty	50	*
Exchange of Notes		
Concerning the Treaty	54	
Ratification of the Treaty	56	
Conclusions about the		
Dual Citizenship Treaty	62	
V DEMOGRAPHY OF CHINESE CITIZENSHIP	67	
Immigration and Population	67	
Options for Chinese Citizenship	68	
VI THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CHINESE IN INDONESIA	70	
Alien Control Measures	70	
Alien Press Control	72	
Control of Foreign Schools	73	
The 1957 Alien Tax
73Vll
CHAPTER	Page
Restrictions on the Economic
Activities of Alien Chinese	74
VII THE POSITION OF INDONESIAN CITIZENS OF CHINESE DESCENT	77
Government Policy Towards
Chinese-Descent Citizens	77
Legal and Political Position
of the Citizen Chinese	78
Proof of Citizenship	79
Education of Citizens
of Chinese Descent	84
Economic Measures Concerning
Citizens of Chinese Descent	87
Political Parties and
the Minority Question	90
VIII	INDONESIAN CHINESE ATTITUDES	TOWARDS CITIZENSHIP	96
Government Expectations	96
Chinese Motives in Choosing Indonesian
Citizenship in the 1949-51 Option	Period	96
The Question of Good Citizenship	97
The Question of Loyalty	99
Trends in Chinese Orientations
to Minority Group Problems	103
Summary	105
IX	CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS	107
Government Policy: Past and Future	107
Position of the Foreign Chinese	110
Position of the Citizen Chinese	111Vlll
APPENDIX
I Summary of the main provisions of the Indonesian
Citizenship Act of 1946 (Act No. 3/1946)
II Excerpt from the Round Table Agreement concerning
the Assignment of Citizens (November, 1949)
III Excerpt from the Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia (Act No. 7, Gazette No. 37,
August, 1950)
IV Excerpt from the Draft Citizenship Act of 1954
V ACT No. 62 OF THE YEAR 1958 CONCERNING REPUBLIC OF
INDONESIA CITIZENSHIP
VI AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DUAL NATIONALITY BETWEEN THE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
VII SPEECHES DELIVERED AT THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF DUAL
CITIZENSHIP BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
VIII Summary of Government Regulation No. 20, 1959,
Concerning the Implementation of the Dual Citizenship
Treaty between Indonesia and China
Page
113
115
116
117
118
130
135
137
<ix
INTRODUCTION
During the period from May, 1954, to August, 1955, the
writer was engaged in sociological research on Chinese community
life in Central Java. He was interested in cultural change and
assimilation in this minority group. It was apparent that an
understanding of assimilation would require a prior knowledge
of the national status and the national orientations of the
Chinese, and materials were gathered with this in mind. In
writing up this report, however, the author was aware that
historians, economists, and qther social scientists may also
be interested in aspects of this problem. He has therefore
endeavored to provide as broad a treatment of the subject as
his abilities and sources permit.
With fellowships from the American and the Canadian Social
Science Research Councils, the writer went to Indonesia to
gather materials for a doctoral dissertation. The present
report, however, was made possible by the financial support
of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, dqring both the field
research and the write-up periods.
Much of the present report is based on information and
impressions gained from interviews and observations made by
the writer during his stay in Indonesia. The majority of the
material, however, comes from books, documents, and periodicals,
mostly in the Indonesian language. Unfortunately, materials
originating in China itself were not available to the author.
English and Butch as well as Indonesian sources were used in
the preparation of chapters covering the historical background,
but the contemporary materials were mostly Indonesian. As may
be expected in a field so highly charged with emotion as that
of minority problems, all reports and materials are subject
to serious error arising out of the particular biases of the
sources. Statistics are no exception in this respect. Although
the writer has attempted to evaluate and cross-check materials
wherever possible, most items of information were found, in only
one or two sources. Therefore, many errors have no doubt been
included.
These various deficiencies and shortcomings should be kept
in mind while reading this report. In cases where the writer
had reason to doubt the complete reliability of a statement, he
has used such warning expressions as "probably" and "it would
seem that". But since it would be tedious to put every state-
ment of fact in tentative form, the reader is invited to be
his own skeptic and judge throughout.The revised edition of this report attempts to cover develop-
ments only up to the summer of 1958 because materials were not
available for the subsequent period. It should perhaps be men-
tioned here that two significant events have occurred in the interim.
On May 14, 1959, the Government announced that no aliens would be
permitted to engage in retail trade in small towns and villages
after January 1, 1960. As a result, a large number of alien
Chinese were forcibly moved to the larger towns and cities. Many
returned to China. The Government of the People’s Republic of
China attempted to intervene, but to no avail. The second event,
which occurred on January 20, 1960, was the exchange of ratifica-
tions of the Dual Citizenship Treaty. This means that the national
status of all of the Chinese in Indonesia (and all of their descen-
dants) will have been determined, through options, by January 20,
1962.
The romanization of Chinese names in this report follows the
general usage in Indonesia. Most Indonesian Chinese persons and
groups have adopted a Dutch romanization of their names as pro-
nounced in one of the South Chinese dialects; for example, the
Member of Parliament "Siauw Giok Tjhan", and the early Kuomintang
organization "Soe Po Sia". On the other hand, a Wade-Giles
romanization of the Kuo YU, or mandarin pronunciation, is used
by some; for example^ The "Chung Hua Hui", which is an organization
quite distinct from the "Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan”, although the cor-
responding Chinese characters are identical.
Indonesian place names are spelled according to general
usage in modern English-language publications; for example,
"Surabaja", rather than’Soerabaja". The city of Djakarta is
called by its former Dutch name, Batavia, wherever it is refer-
red to in the period before its name was officially changed.
One other problem of terminology should be mentioned
here. Many members of the Chinese minority group maintain that
such terms as "Indonesian", "native Indonesian", or "indigenous
population" should not be used to exclude inhabitants who are
of Chinese descent. They point out that the majority group
itself is not descended from the original inhabitants of the
archipelago, and that many Chinese families have been "Indo-
nesians" for hundreds of years. Thus the use of such terms to
apply to a group not including persons of Chinese descent may
be considered to be discriminatory or offensive. While the
present writer, sympathizes with this point of view and disap-
proves of all invidious distinctions, he has found it impossible
to find a suitable alternative terminology. He can only say
that in using such terms in their exclusive sense, he does not
intend to imply that Indonesian citizens of Chinese extraction
are any less Indonesian than others.
tIn fact,
contribution,
in Indonesia,
the writer hopes that this report will be a
not only to knowledge of the minority problem
but also to its solution.
Donald E. Willmott
January, 1961
«1
CHAPTER I
THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE IN
THE DUTCH EAST INDIES, 1900-1941
In 1908, the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan, a leading Chinese organiza-
tion of Batavia, was busying itself with a most unusual task.
Its president had received a letter from a certain L.H.W. van
Sandick, who had been a district officer in West Borneo and was
now in Holland preparing a book on government policy towards the
Chinese in the Netherlands East Indies. Van Sandick requested
information and opinions from the Chinese notables of the Tiong
Hoa Hwe Koan on fourteen points. Among them was the following:
"Do Chinese who have become Dutch nationals by naturalization
thereby lose their former citizenship? or does the Chinese
government continue to consider them as Chinese citizens?"
The officers of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan were no doubt impres-
sed by the generally pro-Chinese outlook expressed in van
Sandick*s letter, and glad of an opportunity to publicize the
aspirations of the Indies Chinese. To draft a reply, they ap-
pointed a special committee, including their own president,
four eminent businessmen, and two grandees of the Dutch-appointed
Chinese hierarchy. A month later the work of the committee was
accepted at an extraordinary meeting of the Board of Directors
and officers of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan. Questions about their
organization and its affiliated schools, about legal restric-
tions on Chinese residents in the Indies, and about government
policy towards the Chinese were answered at length. In each
case a general "answer" was supplemented by "further information.
On the question of citizenship, however, the reply was brief:
Answer:	Concerning this situation we are unable to give
a reply, because we do not know the existing law in China.
Further information: We cannot give any additional
information. All we can Say is: Whether a Chinese who has
been naturalized loses his former citizenship or not depends
upon the opinion of the man himself. (1)
While this reply was perhaps somewhat less than completely
candid, no one could have given a definite answer at that time.
(1) Van Sandicks’ letter and the answers given to it are found
in the following source: Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40 Taon dari
Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan-Batavia (1900-1939), Batavia, 1940,
pp. 133-140 and 228 f.2
And as we trace the history of the national status of the Indies
Chinese, we shall see that six citizenship laws and four inter-
national treaties failed to settle the matter. Until the imple-
mentation of the Dual Citizenship Treaty with China has been
completed, the status of Indonesian—born Chinese will remain
about what it was fifty years, when the venerable leaders of
the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan said that it depended "upon the opinion
of the man himself."
Traditional Dutch Policy as a
Stimulus to Chinese Nationalism
The Chinese overseas, like their ancestors in China, had
always been sharply divided by provincialism. In spite of their
much greater residential proximity in overseas communities, bar-
riers of dialect, custom, prejudice, and suspicion separated the
Chinese into more or less exclusive groupings based on the district
or even the village which was considered "home" in China proper.
In the Indies there was a further division between the "Totoks",
or recent immigrants, and the eranakans", who were local-born
Chinese, most of whose parents were also local-born. The great
majority of Peranakans had Indonesian grandmothers or great-
grandmothers, and spoke Malay or a native Indies language in
their homes.
Then, too, the overseas Chinese had never received any help
from the Imperial Government of China, and were officially con-
sidered as outlaws until 1894, as emigration had been forbidden
by law. No wonder, then, that the feeling of belonging to China
as a nation had been almost non-existent among the Chinese through-
out the several centuries of their life in the Indies.
The fact that the spirit of national solidarity spread quite
rapidly among the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies after the
turn of the century may be explained by the combined effects of
two major factors: a common dissatisfaction with the restric-
tions placed upon them by the Dutch Government, and a sudden
influx of modernist and nationalist influences from China itself.
In comparison with the indigenous population, the Chinese
enjoyed a generally privileged position in the colonial society of
the Indies. Their grievances were none-the-less keenly felt.
They were confined by law to the well-defined Chinese quarter
in each town or city, and could not trade in the countryside or
travel to another locality without requesting a pass from the
authorities on each occasion. As the Chinese quarters became
more and more crowded, they became increasingly intolerable.
They were compared, with some justice, to the ghettos of Europe.3
Although the Chinese were placed under the civil and commer-
cial law applied to Europeans, they were subject to the criminal
law and court system provided foi* the indigenous population. Among
other disadvantages which this involved, they especially resented
the politie rol, a police court in which it was difficult to
secure justice because of the wide and arbitrary powers of the
judges. Their resentment was magnified when, in 1899, the
Japanese were given full legal equality with Europeans.
Another grievance was the lack of government provision for
the education of Chinese children. Both the 1854 regulations
setting up a limited school system for the indigenous population,
and the wider educational provisions introduced with the new
"ethical policy" at the turn of the century were interpreted to
exclude the Chinese. They were admitted to European or "native"
schools only in rare cases, and were even then charged higher
school fees. Chinese schools received no subsidies. Yet the
Chinese were paying as high taxes, or, in their opinion, even
higher taxes than Europeans, for whom a separate school system
was provided. (2)
There was an even more important economic stimulus to
national solidarity, however. In 1900 the government ended
its policy of farming out the opium trade to Chinese merchants,
and instituted instead a government monopoly of opium sales and
restrictions on its use. In the same year it was decided to
extend the government monopoly of pawnshops throughout the
Indies, and to establish agricultural credit banks to provide
loans to farmers at more reasonable rates than those which the
private money-lenders, chiefly Chinese, had claimed. This
meant the loss of an important source of revenue for the wealthy
merchants, and the threat of serious competition in the money-
lending sphere for a large section of the Chinese population,
including even the small shopkeepers. These measures stimulated
unity ii the Chinese community vis-a-vis the government and, as
we shall see, encouraged them to turn to the Chinese Imperial
Government for support and protection.
Influences from China and the Rise of
Nationalism among the Indies Chinese
With the factor of common dissatisfaction latent in the
Chinese community, nationalism found fertile soil when its first
(2) Fuller accounts of these and other grievances of the Indies
Chinese may be found in the following sources:
P.H. Fromberg, "De Chineesche Beweging op Java", Verspreide
Geschriften, Leiden, 1926, pp. 405-446.
Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London,
1951, pp. 507 f., 522-24, 528.
W. de Veer, Chineezen Onder Hollandsche Vlag, Amsterdam,
1908, pp. 1-66.4
seeds were brought from China just before the turn of the century.
The humiliation of defeats and encroachments 3 first by the Euro-
pean powers, and then by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895,
had inspired modernist and reformist movements among the intelli-
gentsia in China, and contributed to anti-foreign mass movements
among the peasantry. In 1898 the young Emperor Kuang HsU, guided
by the reformists, decreed a series of sweeping changes intended
to strengthen and modernize the military, administrative, and
educational systems. These were cut short by a coup dj_etat by
the Empress Dowager, but after the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, even
she was forced to carry out many similar reforms. Meanwhile,
Sun Yat-sen was preaching nationalism and organizing revolution
both in China and among the overseas Chinese.
These developments were bound to affect the Chinese in the
Netherlands East Indies, because many of them were in constant
communication with their relatives in China and other Asian
countries, and because there was a good deal of travelling back
and forth.
By the turn of the century, newspapers, periodicals, and
books were already being published by Chinese in the Indies,
mostly in the Malay language. This activity increased rapidly
in the first two decades of the Twentieth Century. A large
proportion of the Chinese press was dedicated to reviving
interest in Chinese customs, Chinese history and culture, and
a Chinese point of view among Peranakans. As China itself
developed towards a modern national state, the Chinese press
in the Indies added more and more political nationalism to
its cultural nationalism.
Paralleling the development of the nationalist press was
the rapid growth of Chinese nationalist education in the Indies.
This began with the founding of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan in Batavia
in 1900. This organization set out to promote Chinese nationalism
on the basis of Confucianism, and to break down the barriers
which separated Peranakans from Totoks and the various speech
groups one from another. Within a few years at least a dozen
Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan organizations were established in different
parts of Java. By 1911 there were 93 of them scattered through-
out the archipelago. Their main function was to operate Chinese
schools. From the first these schools used Mandarin, or the
national dialect, as the language of instruction, and employed
teachers directly from China. They also served as wedding and
funeral societies, and generally endeavored to promote adherence
to Chinese customs, culture, and religion. Like the press, how-
ever, their orientation gradually shifted from cultural to
political nationalism, and by 1925 they were ready to eliminate
the promotion of Confucianism from their statement of purpose.(3)
(3) Nio Joe Lan, op. cit., passim.5
The Chinese nationalist movement in the Indies was greatly
stimulated by a series of visitors and emissaries from China. The
first of these was K’ang yu-wei, the leading reformist who escaped
the Empress Dowager’s purge in 1898 and thenceforth travelled
among the overseas Chinese communities preaching nationalism and
reform. His visit to Java in 1903 gave great impetus to Chinese
community solidarity and a nationalist outlook in trade, educa-
tion, and culture. In particular, he encouraged the establish-
ment of schools, and set in motion a movement to eliminate the
wearing of Javanese dress, the chewing of sirih, and other local
customs among Peranakan women.
No doubt it was the success of exiled reformists and revolu-
tionaries among overseas Chinese which awoke the Manchu Govern-
ment to the potentialities of these communities as rich sources
of political and economic support. In about 1905 the Manchu
Government initiated an active campaign to win the loyalty and
tap the wealth of the Chinese in Southeast Asia.
The first Manchu emissary to arrive in Java was Lauw Soe Kie,
an official of the Education Ministry. In 1906 he presented him-
self to Dutch authorities in the uniform of a Naval Admiral, and
then proceeded to make a survey of Chinese schools in Java. He
called together a conference of delegates from various Tiong Hoa
Hwe Koan branches, and gave impetus to plans for a federation which
would standardize and supervise Chinese education in the Indies.
When the federation was established in the following year, an
official arrived from China to take up the post of Inspector of
Schools, a post created by the federation but paid for by the
Manchu Government (4) At the same time, the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan
schools were invited to send their graduates to the Chi Nan
Hstteh T’ang, a government school in Nanking, for secondary school-
ing. Up to the time of the 1911 revolution, about 200 Chinese
from the Indies studied there, with all expenses paid by the
Imperial Government. (5)
More dramatic, however, were the visits of two Chinese naval
vessels to Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaja, in 1907, 1909, and
1911. While Peranakans and Totoks came from far and wide to
glory in the sight of modern warships manned entirely by smartly
uniformed Chinese, the emissaries from China were creating closer
political and commercial ties with local Chinese leaders. Refer-
ring to their first visit, a Peranakan newspaperman and local
historian wrote:
From the day on which that mission arrived, the feelings
of the Chinese inhabitants of the South Seas towards their
(4)	Nio Joe Lan, op. cit., pp. 80-82.
(5)	Ibid., pp. 101-107.6
fatherland became more ardent. The name of the Emperor Kuang
Hstl became ever more illustrious: he was considered to be
the first Emperor who genuinely loved his people, for no
previous Emperor had paid any attention to the overseas Chinese
(6)
These and numerous other missions from China gave great en-
couragement to the movement of leading Chinese merchants to estab-
lish Chambers of Commerce in major cities throughout the Indies
between 1902 and 1911. Although the Chinese name of these organi-
zations, "Sianghwee", literally means "commercial association",
they were by no means confined to commercial affairs only. In ;
addition to local social and welfare work and the championing of
Chinese business and community interests before Dutch government
authorities, they formed the major link between the Chinese com-
munities in the Indies and the governments of China, both Manchu
and Republican. The Sianghwee of Semarang may be taken as an
example. In the ten-year period from 1907 to 1917, it collected
substantial contributions from its members ten times for flood
relief in China and six times for direct support of the Chinese
national treasury. It helped to sell either Chinese government
bonds or shares for private enterprises in China fifteen times in
the same period. Furthermore, the Semarang Sianghwee delegated
its director to attend the 1913 conference in Peking, which chose
a number of overseas Chinese representatives to sit in the new
parliament. And on several occasions it requested the Chinese
Government to intercede with the Dutch Government on behalf of
the Indies Chinese. (7)
In 1908, Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movement was reflected
in the Indies by the founding of "Soe Po Sia" organizations in
various cities. Beginning as study clubs with evening courses on
national and international affairs, these groups became the center
of Kuomintang organization and influence among Indies Chinese
after the 1911 Revolution. In addition, a number of radical and
secret nationalist organizations became active, such as the Ten
Men League, the "Kong Tong" labor federation, the Blood and Iron
Union, and the National Salvation Brigade. These organizations
were considered dangerous by the Netherlands Indies Government.
In 1920 they were suppressed or outlawed, after a series of
violent disorders among the Chinese. Some of the leaders were
deported, and the Chinese press in general was more closely
supervised. (8)
(6)	Boekoe Peringetan 1907-1937 Tiong Hwa Siang Hwee Semarang,
Semarang, 1937, p. 6.
(7)	Ibid., pp. 6-13.
(8)	Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Semarang, Semarang, c. 1933,
pp. 247-249.7
The growth of the nationalist spirit was also evidenced in
the anti-Japanese feelings and activities of Indies Chinese com-
munities. Disturbances and boycotts against Japan began in 1912
and became more and more severe with each new Japanese infringe-
ment on Chinese sovereignty: the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, the
occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and the Sino-Japanese War begin-
ning in 1937. The Netherlands Indies Government, not wanting to
offend Japan, took vigorous action to prevent such activities,
even to the bxtent of forbidding the flying of the Chinese flag
at half mast on the anniversary of the Twenty-one Demands.
Thus we have seen the successive rise of three manifesta-
tions of the nationalist movement: educational and cultural
nationalism in the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan organizations, commercial
nationalism in the Sianghwee organizations, and political nation-
alism in the Soe Po Sia and the organizations which followed it.
All of xthese, with the support of the local Chinese press, con-
tinually urged and petitioned the Netherlands Indies Government
to improve the position of the Chinese. (9)
New Dutch Policy and
Chinese Reactions
The Netherlands Indies Government set up a Bureau of Chinese
Affairs in 1900. Officers of this Bureau, as well as such public
champions of the Chinese as van Sandick, de Veer, and especially
Fromberg, had been quick to sense that the interests of the Dutch
Government lay in winning the allegiance of the Chinese. Stimu-
lated by the counsels of these men, by fears of the growing in-
fluence of the Manchu Government, and by pressures from the
Chinese community itself, the Government embarked upon a long-range
policy of attraction. The pass system, which so limited the
Chinese in their movements, was relaxed slightly in 1904, further
slackened in 1910, and completely abolished in 1916. After 1916,
the crowded Chinese quarters of many cities were permitted to
extend their boundaries, and in 1919 in Java and 1926 in the Outer
Provinces all restriction on residence came to an end. In 1914
the hated politie rol courts were abolished. In 1917 a new
measure allowed certain individual Chinese or Indonesian subjects
to "assimilate” themselves to Dutch legal status and participate
in its privileges, but with so many qualifications that it did
not satisfy Chinese demands for legal equality.
Probably most important in the long run was the establishment
of the "H.C.S.", or Dutch-Chinese Schools, beginning in 1908. Un-
(9) A comprehensive analysis of the rise of nationalism among the
Indies Chinese may be found in the following source: Lea E.
Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the
Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 19Q0-l9l6~ Glefffcoe,
Illinois:	The Free Press, 1960.8
like most of the schools provided for the indigenous population,
the language of instruction in these schools was Dutch, and the
curriculum was the same as in the.European elementary schools.
By 1914 there were 27 Dutch-Chinese Schools, and their numbers
continued to expand throughout the period of Dutch rule. Many
of the graduates of these schools were able to continue their
education in Dutch-language secondary schools, and an increasing
number went to Holland for a university training.
A few Chinese had been appointed to Municipal Advisory
Councils ever since their establishment during the first decade
of the century, and after 1909 the Chinese community was allowed
to select some of its own representatives. In 1917 the Govern-
ment announced that it was ready to establish a national advisory
council, the Volksraad, and that Chinese would be given at least
three of the sixty-one seats. This proved to be a touchstone for
Chinese orientations.
On the initiative of H.H. Kan, a member of the Batavia
Municipal Council, a conference of Chinese was called together
in Semarang in mid-November, 1917, to discuss the question of
Chinese representation in the Volksraad. With almost 700 dele-
gates from more than 36 Chinese organizations throughout Java,
including numerous officials and other notables, this was one of
the biggest and most significant meetings ever held by the Chinese
in the Indies. The debate was long and heated. It was clear
that government policies had convinced a certain number of the
delegates that by accepting their status as Dutch citizens and
working through the advisory councils, the Chinese community
could gradually achieve a satisfactory position in the colonial
society. Opposed to this were the more ardent converts to
Chinese nationalism. They believed that it was hopeless to
expect concessions from the Dutch except through the struggle
of the Chinese community itself, with the protection and, when
necessary, the intercession of the Chinese Government. They
were opposed to participation in the Volksraad and preferred
to consider themselves as foreigners.
The conference finally decided, by majority vote, that
the Chinese community should not send representatives into the
Volksraad. This was the position which almost the entire Chinese
press had already taken. It was a measure of the success of
the Chinese nationalist movement to date. (10)
(10) Boekoe Peringetan 1907-1937 Tiong Hwa Siang Hwee Semarang,
ρΊ 17; and Liem Thian Joe, op. cit., pp. 235 f.9
Throughout the 1920‘s and 1930’s, the nationalist movement
continued to thrive. This was in part due to the failure of the
Indies Government to remove certain grievances still strongly felt
by the Chinese. Peranakans resented that fact that although they
were officially considered as Dutch subjects, most departments of
the Government continued to class them as "foreign orientals".
Because of the disabilities of the legal system provided for the
native population, the Chinese community continued to demand
total group assimilation to European legal status. The bitter-
ness of this grievance was intensified by the fact that the
Government once promised such assimilation but later announced
that it would be impossible. Furthermore, Siamese were granted
full legal assimilation in 1938, while the Japanese had enjoyed
it since 1899. The Chinese continued to be dissatisfied also
with the amount of Government education provided for their children,
and they were convined that their taxes were being assessed at
discrimatory rates. (11)
While the Chinese nationalist movement was thus nourished
by grievances imposed by the Dutch, it was also nurtured by sup-
port and direction supplied from China. Local Kuomintang as-
sociations throughout the Indies, headed by the Chinese Consul
General in Batavia, formed the leading element in the movement.
In a4dition to maintaining pressure on the Indies Government to
improve the position the Chinese, these organizations con-
stantly encouraged closer ties with China. In 1932 the Chinese
Government established an Overseas Affairs Commission to serve
as a link with the Chinese abroad. The official solicitation of
relief funds and contributions to the national treasury con-
tinued unabated. There was even an attempt to organize among
the Indies Chinese an election of representatives to the Chinese
National Congress,but this was suppressed by the Dutch authorities.
The majority of Chinese newspapers in the colony were in the
Malay language, but even these were predominantly nationalistic.
This was indication that the Chinese nationalist movement in
the Indies included not only the great majority of politically
conscious Totok^, but a large proportion of the articulate
Peranakans as well. (12)
Nevertheless, in spite of opposition from the China-
oriented group, individual Chinese continued to accept appoint-
ments to the municipal and provincial councils, and to the
Volksraad after its opening in 1918. And throughout the 1920’s,
(11) George McT. Kahin, The Political Position of the Chinese in
Indonesia (M.A. thesis, political science) Stanford
University, 1946, pp. 87-90'.
(12) Ibid., pp. 79-87.10
support for this position grew steadily. The increasing number
of Chinese who received a Dutch education were acquiring also a
Western outlook which alienated them from the Chinese nationalist
movement. Those who were able to study in Holland were zealous
Chinese nationalists while there, but on their return they usually
found that Dutch society and culture were more congenial to them
than was that of the nationalistic Totoks and their Peranakan sup-
porters. There was also a good deal of rivalry between the stu-
dents of the Chinese-language and Dutch-language schools, and
this carried over into attitudes of mutual hostility later on.
Reflecting these developments, the "Chung Hua Hui" came
into existence in 1927. This was organized and led by Dutch-
educated intellectuals—-mostly well-to-do business and profes-
sional people. The Dutch language was used in their meetings
and conferences. The organization advocated the acceptance of
Dutch citizenship, and specifically excluded Chinese Totoks from
membership. They proposed to work for the interests of the
Chinese community through political participation in the mun-
icipal and provincial councils and the Volksraad, and rejected
any dependence upon the Chinese Government. Nevertheless, they
took an interest in developments in China and remained enthu-
siastic advocates of cultural nationalism. For instance, they
demanded that Chinese history and geography be taught in the
Dutch-Chinese Schools. In 1939, the Chung Hua Hui held two
elected seats in the Volksraad. (13)
The trend away from Chinese nationalism apparent in the
Chung Hua Hui went one step farther in the "Partai Tionghoa
Indonesia" (Chinese Party of Indonesia), which was established
in 1932. To this group, Indonesia was the country of greatest
importance for the Indies Chinese. Peranakans should invest
all of their hopes in Indonesia, they said, and forget about
China. They should work side by side with the other groups
in the population, Indonesians, Eurasians and all, on the basis
of common ideals. Thus the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia was anti-
Dutch, and sought connections with the Indonesian rather than
the Chinese nationalist movement. It held one elected seat in
the Volksraad from 1935 to 1939. (14)
Thus the period of Dutch rule came to an end with three
national outlooks represented in the Chinese community. The
Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, probably the smallest in numbers,
(13)	Liem Thian Joe, op. cit., pp. 277f; and Kahin, op.cit.,
pp. 93-95.
(14)	Souw Hong Tjoen, "Kenang-Kenangan pada Djubilium Lima-
Puluh Tahun dari Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Djakarta", Hari-
Ulang Ke-50 Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan Djakarta, Djakarta, c.
1950, p. 15; and Kahin, op. cit., pp.	.11
centered all of its interest and hope in Indonesia alone. The
Chung Hua Hui group was participating politically in the colonial
society, but looking to China in cultural matters. The Chinese
nationalist movement, on the other hand, was entirely oriented
towards China in educational, cultural, and political matters.
Yet it is nevertheless probably true that the majority of Chinese
living in the Indies took no active interest in politics and did
not join any one of these three movements.
Relations between Chinese and
Indonesians under Dutch Rule
Under Dutch rule the Chinese had come to dominate the in-
ternal trade and commerce of the entire archipelago. They gath-
ered the products of the land and sold them to big Dutch trading
companies. Most of the small-scale manufacturing enterprises
of the country were owned and managed by them. Except for the
smallest shops and market stands, retailing was also largely in
their hands. And Chinese shopkeepers, traders, and usurers re-
mained the main source of credit for the Indonesian people, in
spite of their unconscionably high rates of interest. This meant
that the average Chinese was far better off than the average
Indonesian, and that there were a conspicuous number of very
wealthy Chinese, in contrast to the very few wealthy Indonesians.
Furthermore, the advantageous economic position of the Chinese
was accompanied by superiority attitudes and social exclusiveness.
The policy of the government, also, had the effect of setting
the two communities apart and sharpening the differences in their
interests. When residential segregation was finally abolished,
educational segregation took its place. The whole series of con-
cessions to the Chinese after 1900 amounted to preferential
treatment, since Indonesians participated in very few of the
new privileges. And until the last decade before World War II,
the two communities were ruled under separate administrative
systems. While the Dutch idealistically claimed that this policy
was a matter of regulating each community according to its own
customs and habits, the system was in effect a very successful
example of the colonial practice of "divide and rule."
When the Volksraad was established, the Chinese were over-
represented in comparison to their numbers in the total popula-
tion. And Chinese members of this body, chiefly of the Dutch-
oriented Chung Hua Hui group, often voted against the moderate
Indonesian nationalists represented there. Except for a relatively
small number of leftist Peranakans, and the supporters of the
Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, the Chinese showed little sympathy for
the Indonesian nationalist movement, and were therefore generally
considered to be pro-Dutch.12
Thus, although relations between Chinese and Indonesians
were generally quite smooth, there was a latent resentment against
the Chinese which could flare into violence when stimulated by
local Indonesian leaders. It was the small Indonesiari‘middle
class·—-educated and professional people, religious leaders, and
a few businessmen—among whom the position and attitudes of the
Chinese were most bitterly resented. The great Indonesian nation-
alist organization, Sarekat Islam, was originally founded ate an
association of Javanese merchants whose purpose was to resist the
competition of Chinese traders. The boycott movement which they
launched in 1912 was accompanied by violent attacks on the Chinese
quite beyond the policy of the leadership. Most serious of these
were the anti-Chinese riots in Surakarta and Surabaja. At about
the same time violence broke out between members of the Sarekat
Islam and Chinese in Tangerang, which was to be the scene of a
large-scale massacre of Chinese during the revolutionary war.
In 1918 an anti-Chinese incident involving looting, arson, and
murder occurred in Kudus, where the rivalry between Indonesian
and Chinese Kretek cigarette merchants and manufacturers was ex-
tremely bitter. (15) A similar incident occurred in Pekalongan
in 1931.	(16)
It should be emphasized that relations between the two com-
munities were generally smooth and undisturbed. Outside the towns
and cities they were often quite cordial. And everywhere there
were a certain number of Chinese whonaintained visiting relation-
ships with Indonesian friends. Nevertheless, the causes for
conflict between the two groups were deep, and when they came
to the surface, hostility, anger, and even violence could result.
It was not a propitious background for the day when Indonesians
would win the right to rule themselves—and the Chinese.
(15) Liem Thian Joe, op. cit., p. 239.
(16) Boekoe Peringetan 1907-1937 Tiong Hwa Hwee Semarang,13
CHAPTER II
NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE
UNDER DUTCH RULE, 1850-1949
Early Nationality Laws
The East Indian Government Act of 1854 defined the status
of Chinese born in the Indies in two ways. On the one hand,
Article 109 put them on a level with the indigenous population
in legal and administrative matters, in contrast to the privileged
position of Europeans. On the other hand, an article limiting
government service to Dutch citizens referred to the existing
Dutch law for a definition of citizenship. According to the
civil law of the time, all persons born in the Netherlands or
its colonies of domiciled parents were considered Dutch citizens,
including persons of Chinese descent. This meant that the Indies
Chinese, and Indonesians as well, could claim all of the preroga-
tives of Dutch citizenship while abroad, even though they were
specifically excluded from them while in the colony. In Holland
they could sue in the courts as citizens, and in Siam they could
avoid the special taxes levied against the Chinese. (17)
By the citizenship law of 1892, however, the Indies Chinese
were designated as ’’foreigners”. This did not affect their
position in the colony, but it made their status abroad very un-
certain. (18)
Preparations for Consular Negotiations
and Conflicting Citizenship Acts
With the rise of nationalism among the Chinese both in the
Indies and in their home country in the first decade of the
Twentieth Century, official and unofficial proposals were made
urging the Netherlands Government to permit the stationing of
Chinese consuls in the colony. An agreement between Japan and
Holland in 1908, which provided for the opening of Japanese
consulates in the colony, gave additional impetus to Chinese
demands for consular representation. Although negotiations be-
tween the Chinese and Dutch Governments began in the same year,
(17)	Purcell, op. cit., p. 514.
(18)	Ibid.14
a consular agreement between them was not signed until 1911. The
delay was due to differences over the crucial question of the
national status of the Peranakan Chinese.
The Dutch made it clear from the beginning that they would
not give China consular rights unless China conceded Dutch juris-
diction over the Peranakan Chinese. The Manchu Government’s first
step, therefore, was to assess the relative importance to itself
of consular representation as against its claim to the allegiance
of the Peranakans. During the winter of 1908-1909, Wang Kang Ky,
secretary to Chinese Legation in Holland, toured the Indies for
this purpose, and even held a semi-official census of the Chinese
community in Surabaja. In March, 1909, the Sianghwee organiza-
tions of Semarang, Solo, and Jogjakarta undertook a census of the
Chinese in Central Java, at the request of the Chinese Legation
at the Hague. The following month the Secretary of the Peking
Departmentt of Education, Wang Ta-chen, made a tour of Java,
ostensibly to stu^y commercial conditions, but actually, according
to a Chinese source, "to survey the situation of the Chinese com-
munity". (19)
At the same time, the Manchu Government promulgated a law on
citizenship, no doubt partly to raise its bargaining power vis-a-
vis Holland. This law, which was issued on March 28, 1909, claimed
as a Chinese citizen every legal or extra-legal child of a Chi-
nese father or mother, regardless of birthplace. This was the
first official enactment of the principle of jus sanguinis, which
the Chinese had always taken for granted as the basis of citizen-
ship.
Apparently the Chinese Legation at the Hague expected to
complete the negotiations over the consular agreement in a short
time, for in November of the same year, 1909, Lu Cheng Hsiang,
head of the Legation, wrote to the Sianghwee of Semarang re-
questing them to forward to Peking a nomination for the post
of Consul General. According to his letter, the Dutch had al-
ready agreed to the opening of a Chinese consulate in the In-
dies. (20)
The Dutch, on the other hand, had everything to gain by
postponing the agreement as long as possible, for they were
gradually carrying out a policy designed to gain the allegiance
(19)	See Nio Joe Lan, op. cit., p. 127; Purcell, op. cit., p. 513;
and Boekoe Peringetan, pp. 7 and 11.
(20)	Boekoe Peringetan, p. 7.15
of as many Chinese as possible. The pass system, which had been
relaxed slightly in 1904, was further relaxed in 1910. Chinese
were appointed to municipal councils, and beginning about 1909,
each community could select its own representatives. Moreover,
the first Dutch-Chinese Schools were just beginning instruction.
It was expected that this policy, which was continued in further
concessions later on, would win at least the passive allegiance
of the Peranakan community.
On the other hand, the commercial, educational, and political
activities of the few Chinese emissaries so far admitted to the
Indies had had far-reaching effects in spreading the spirit of Chi-
nese nationalism. The Dutch therefore had good reason to fear the
consequences of allowing jurisdiction over the entire Indies Chinese
population to be transferred to the Chinese Government. Before
making a consular agreement, then, the Netherlands Government had
to establish clear legal claim to the Indies-born Chinese, in order
to counteract the effect of the newly-promulgated Chinese citizen-
ship law.
This was accomplished in the Netherlands Citizenship Act S.296,
of February 10, 1910. Instead of distinguishing only "citizens"
and "foreigners", as in the law of 1892, the "inhabitants" of the
Indies were not divided into"citizens" and "subjects". And Article 1
of the new law declared that all persons born in the Indies of"
parents domiciled there were Dutch subjects even if not Dutch
citizens. (21) This was an enactment of the principle of jus
soli, in contradiction to the Chinese principle of jus sanguinis.
It meant that the Indies-born Chinese, who had been assigned Chi-
nese citizenship by Imperial decree just a year before, now ac-
quired the status of Dutch subjects as well.
The Consular Convention of 1911
Once the obstacle of dual nationality was thus firmly estab-
lished on its double foundation, the two sides took more than a
year to come to an agreement about consular jurisdiction. Nation-
alist-minded Chinese in the Indies raised a cry against the "forced
naturalization" position of the Dutch negotiators, and demanded the
protection of Chinese consuls. At the last minute the Semarang
Sianghwee joined the Batavia Sia;nghwee in urging the Manchu Gov-
ergment not to sign any agreement requiring Chinese to become sub-
jects of another nation. (22) Nevertheless, as the price for
(21)	Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies, 2nd ed., Berkeley
1941, pp. 356ff, as cited in Purcell, op. cit., p. 506.
(22)	Boekoe Peringetan, p. 1616
consular representation in the Indies, the Chinese Government did
relinquish its claim to jurisdiction over the Peranakans.
Thus a Consular Convention was finally signed, and entered
in the Dutch statute books as S. 487, on May 8, 1911. The Conven-
tion itself merely delineated the rights and duties of Chinese con-
suls in the Indies. It was the attached notes which bore on the
question of citizenship. There it was agreed that the expression
"citizen of" should be interpreted in each case according to the
law of the country of domicile. Thus, in accordance with the Dutch
law of 1910, the Peranakan Chinese were to be considered Dutch sub-
jects as - long as they resided in the Netherlands Indies or Holland.
For most practical purposes, this ended the problem of dual
nationality. The Dutch, as well as a considerable section of the
Indies Chinese, considered that Peranakans were no longer Chinese
citizens at all. That the problem was not finally solved, however,
is evident both from a close legal analysis of the agreement and
from later developments.
An eminent Chinese lawyer, Mr. Ko Tjay Sing, has pointed
out that the notes attached to the Convention of 1911 state that
its only purpose is to define the rights and duties of Chinese
consuls. It was not intended, therefore, to define citizenship
or to solve the problem of dual nationality. According to Mr.
Ko’s analysis, the Manchu Government did not concede its claim
to the citizenship of the Peranakans, but merely agreed that the
jurisdiction of its consuls should not extend to those persons
who were also Dutch subjects according to Dutch law. (23)
Ambiguities Concerning the
Position of Peranakans
It is indeed doubtful whether Manchu-appointed consuls
actually would have limited their activities to matters con-
cerning the Totok Chinese only. But due to the revolution which
occurred in China just after the signing of the Convention, it
fell to the new Republican Government to appoint consuls to the
Indies, and it is apparent that these consuls never considered
their duties to be so limited. They continually showed a lively
interest in Chinese commerce and schools in the Indies, without
regard to technicalities pf legal jurisdiction, and the Sianghwee
organizations served as unofficial consulates in cities where no
official consul was posted. (24)
(23) Ko Tjay Sing, "De betekenis van de nota’s van 1911 met be-
trekking tot het onderdaanschap", Mededelingen Bond van
Chinese Juristen in Indonesia, Vo17 II, Nos? 1/2,1949,pp.1-12
(24) Boekoe Peringetan, pp. 19f., and Nio Joe Lan, op. cit., pp.
128 and 143.------------ -------------------------------------17
Certainly the Republican Government under Chiang Kai-shek
never conceded that the Peranakans had lost their Chinese citizen-
ship, even while residing in the colony. This was made clear by
the passing of a new Chinese citizenship act in 1929, which re-
affirmed the principle of jus sanguinis, and provided that a Chi-
nese wishing to become a national of another country could only
lose his Chinese citizenship with the permission of the Ministry
of the Interior. It was also clearly indicated by China’s at-
titude towards the Hague Convention on Citizenship, promulgated
by a conference of more than forty nations in 1930. The Chinese
Government refused to agree to Article 4, which prohibits any
state from extending its diplomatic protection to one of its
subjects living in any other state of which that person is also
a subject. (25)
On the other hand, the Hague Convention did little to
strengthen the Dutch claim. While it did affirm that every
state has the sovereign right to determine who among its in-
habitants shall be recognized as citizens, the Convention was
not binding except upon its signatories; and even one of the
great powers, the United States, refused to sign it.
The position of the Nanking Government on the question of
citizenship is also illuminated by the fact that I^ts consuls in
the Indies repeatedly attempted to register all Chinese living
there, both Totok and Peranakan. Each time the Netherlands Indies
Government protested against the registration on the grounds that
it violated the Consular Convention of 1911, the Chinese Govern-
ment would apologetically maintain that a mistake had been made,
and that the registration had been intended only for Totoks.	(26)
In fact the dual nationality impasse between Holland and
China was never solved. In May, 1945, the Netherlands and China
concluded a treaty abrogating Dutch extra-territorial rights in
China and regulating consular rights and duties. In Article 1
of that treaty, we find the two contracting parties solemnly
recognizing'pach other’s citizenship law, but politely refrain-
ing from making any provision' for the crucial cases in which
the two laws were incompatible.
What happened, then, when a Peranakan Chinese decided to
visit his ancestral home? He was issued a passport by the Dutch
authorities, who, although careful not to recognize any Chinese
jurisdiction over him, did suggest that he should obtain clear-
ance from Chinese authorities. Proceeding to the Chinese con-
(25)	Soenario, Masalah-Masalah Disekitar Soal Warganegara dan
Orang Asing~^ Djakarta, c7 1953, p. ID.
(26)	Purcell, op. cit., p. 545.18
sulate, then, he was issued a certificate in Chinese and English,
which read:
Certificate for Overseas Chinese of Dual Nationality
Returning to China
To Whom it May Concern:
This is to certify that the Bearer, M...................
(....................) in accordance with Chinese law, is
still a Chinese National. However, he/she possesses a
Netherlands Indies passport No...............due to his/her
birth in that country.
He/she is hereby permitted to return to China. (27)
(27) Ko Tjay Sing, op. cit., p. 11.19
CHAPTER III
NATIONAL STATUS OF THE CHINESE UNDER
THE REPUBLIC, 1945-1954
The Japanese Occupation
Before dealing with the main topic of this chapter, it
will be well to consider briefly the position of the Chinese
during the Japanese occupation. Soon after their invasion of
the Indies in early 1942, the Japanese interned hundreds of the
leaders of the nationalist Movement or of anti-Japanese activities
among the Indies Chinese, and closed down all Chinese organiza-
tions. They then set up a single Chinese association in every
locality, the "Hua Ch’iao Tsung Hui,” with a central headquarters
in Djakarta. Leaders of this organization were appointed by and
responsible to the local Japanese commanders and to the office
of Chinese affairs in Djakarta, the "Kakkio Han" (or, in Chinese,
the "Hua Ch’iao Pan"), which issued regulations governing the
Chinese community. Through these organizations, the Japanese
restricted the movement and activities of the Chinese, and taxed
and extorted large contributions from them for the Imperial war
treasury. They also encouraged the growth of Indonesian-owned
business at the expense of the Chinese, and removed Peranakan
teachers and pupils from government schools.	(28)
Thus the Indies Chinese, whether Peranakan or Totok, were
all considered merely as Hua Ch’iao, or "overseas Chinese", by
the Japanese. They were dealt with as a unified group separate
from native Indonesians or Europeans. Their common opposition
to and resentment towards the Japanese, and their newly-constitu-
ted monolithic community organization created a high degree of
unity among the Indies Chinese.
After the Japanese surrender, the Hua Ch’iao Tsung Hui
organizations were reorganized under the name "Chujng Hua
Tsung Hui". In small towns they often remained the only
important Chinese community organization, whereas in large
towns and cities they took the form of a central federation
of many separate organizations.
Chinese Reactions to the
Revolutionary War
In brief anarchic periods during the Japanese invasion and
(28) G. William Skinner, Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia,
Cornell University, 1950, p. 65; and Purcell, op. cit.,
pp. 551-553.20
later during the revolutionary war against the Dutch, the local
people in many parts of Java made violent attacks on the Chinese.
In some cases this took the form of looting, arising out of the
economic needs of the masses and the jealousies of traders and
small businessmen competing with the Chinese. In other cases
Orthodox religious leaders led gangs or mobs to attempt the forc-
ible conversion of the Chinese to Islam. Sometimes, too, murder
and arson were resorted to in retaliation for real or supposed
cooperation with the Dutch counter-revolutionary forces. And no
doubt in all cases the attacks were at least partly fired by the
prejudices and animosities which, as we have seen, had grown up
between Indonesians and Chinese during the years of Dutch rule.
Whatever the causes, the Chinese suffered severe losses of life
and property, and the feelings of group solidarity of the Chinese
community were further strengthened and extended. (29)
In the years 1946 to 1949 the situation in Indonesia was
indeed a confusing one for the Chinese. There was intermittent
heavy fighting between the Republican armies and the Dutch colonial
forces. The Dutch imposed a strict economic blockade around the
Republican areas, and business conditions were very unsettled.
Republican forces found it necessary to destroy a large number
of buildings, many of them Chinese, in a scorched-earth policy
employed against the advancing Dutch forces.
A certain number of Chinese profited greatly from this
situation. Some did so by supplying goods to the Dutch forces
and cooperating closely with Dutch firms. Others contributed a
good deal to the survival of the Republic (as well as to their own
affluence) by smuggling and blockade-running. Still others
worked to the detriment of both sides by hoarding and black-mar-
keteer ing. The illegal and extra-legal commerce of these people
tended to arouse resentment towards the whole Chinese community,
and their new shops, offices, warehouses, and residences gave
the impression that all Chinese were benefitting from the un-
certain conditions. Actually·, those who gained were a relatively
small minority. And since many of them had shown themselves
equally opportunistic under the Japanese occupation, they are
still looked down upon and somewhat isolated by the rest of the
Chinese community. They form a sort of nouveau riche apart.
There was also a certain group, drawn mostly from the Dutch-
trained intelligentsia and upper business circles, who were
genuinely and actively pro-Dutch, either because of their respect
for Western culture and adherence to Dutdiways, or because of
their economic ties to the Dutch colonial economy.
(29) Most of the material for this and the next two sections of
Chapter III, covering the situation during the revolutionary
war, was found in the following two sources:
Clive E. Glover, Reactions of the Indonesian Chinese to
Two years of Dutch-Indonesian Conflict^ (research paper writ-
ten for Prof. CT McT. Kahin’s seminar), Johns Hopkins
University7 1950, pp. 3-21.
Purcell, op. cit., pp. 553-568.21
For the majority of Chinese—shop-keepers, petty traders,
and others—the chaotic conditions and economic hardships of the
common people during the revolutionary years meant a slump in
business activity and a decline in income. They did not especially
like the Dutch, took almost no interest in the political issues
involved in the struggle, and little understood the historical
movement that was occurring around them. But what they wanted
most of all was a return to the personal security and relative
economic stability of pre-war times. They therefore tended to
place their hopes in the return of Dutch rule. But in practice
they tried to maintain as neutral a position as possible.
On the other hand, there was a small but not insignificant
minority of Chinese of all classes who were sincere and active
supporters of the Republican Government. Many sided with the
independence movement because of sympathies arising out of
closer contacts or friendships with the Indonesian people than
were common among the Chinese. Others were ideologically anti-
colonial, or idealistically revolutionary. A number of Certifi-
cates of Merit have been publicly presented to Peranakans who
risked their lives and fortunes helping the guerrilla forces of
the Republic. A certain number of Chinese served in the Re-
publican armed forces. There were also a.few Chinese holding
positions at all levels of the Republican Government and in
various political parties. At the time of the First Dutch
Military Action in 1947, for instance, two cabinet ministers
were Peranakans, as was also a prominent leader of the Socialist
Party, Tan Ling Djie.
Thus a wide range of attitudes towards the revolution was
to be found among the Chinese. Their actions, however, did not
always reflect their attitudes. Considerations of livelihood
and personal safety were naturally more important to most of
them than their particular orientation towards the politics of
the revolution. Thus it is not surprising that in Dutch-held
areas the Chinese acted in a generally pro-Dutch manner, while
in Republican territory the opposite was the case. At the same
time that the Chung Hua Tsung Hui (Central Chinese Association)
of Dutch-held Batavia was making outspoken public attacks on
the Republican regime for the treatment of Chinese in its
territory, the Chung Hua Tsung Hui of Jogjakarta, the Republican
capital, was collecting money and clothing for the Indonesian
Army. Similarly, Chinese newspapers adjusted their policies
to the different situations in which they found themselves.
Many well-to-do Chinese made (or paid) their way across
the lines into Dutch territory. But while there was a large-
scale exodus of Chinese from villages to towns or cities, this
was usually a case of seeking the security of a sizeable Chi-
nese community, rather than of choosing sides in the revolu-
tionary struggle. Even the mass Chinese evacuation of Jogjakartajust before the return of the Republican Government in 1949 was
not so much a sign of sympathy with the Dutch as a result of fears
greatly magnified by the activities of irresponsible Indonesian
groups who threatened the safety of the Chinese in terrorist
pamphlets and posters.
In the summer of 1947 groups of armed Chinese, known as "Pao
An Tui”, were established for the protection of Chinese communities
in many parts of Dutch-held territory. These were sanctioned by
the Dutch, and in some cases armed by them. Their central head-
quarters was in Batavia, and by February 1949 they had branch units
in at least three dozen cities and towns. Although some Republican
leaders were willing to recognize the Pao An Tui, opposition to
them came from the leftist trade unions, from the more anti-Chinese
leaders, and from leading Chinese supporters of the Republic, such
as Tjoa Sik Ien and Tan Ling Djie. (30) In any case, the Pao An
Tui were suspected of being pro-Dutch, and the Republican Govern-
ment at first took a firm stand against them. In doing so, it
pointed out their similarity to the bitterly-resented European
troops in China. However, at the beginning of 1948 it agreed in
principle to the establishment of these Chinese self-defense
units.
In the Chinese community itself there was a good deal of con-
troversy over the Pao An Tui. A minority of leftist Chinese strong-
ly opposed them, largely because of their close ties to the Kuomintang.
And even among those who favored them, there were accusations that
they were being misused for the benefit of special groups. In any
case, there were no further outbreaks against the Chinese in Java,
and the Pao An Tui were finally disbanded in the spring of 1949.
During the troubled times, however, many Chinese looked to
China for protection. Local organizations made direct appeals to
the Chinese Government for aid, and some Chinese newspapermen even
proposed that China should send troops to Indonesia for this purpose.
Actions Taken by the
Chinese Government
In view of the fact that China was engaged in a bitter civil
war and was facing tremendous problems cf reconstruction at home,
the Nationalist Government paid a surprising amount of attention
to the plight of the Indonesian Chinese.
The Chinese all over Indonesia were advised by Chinese authori-
ties to maintain struct neutrality. The Chinese Consul General at-
(30) Sin Po, Batavia, Dec. 15, 1947.23
tempted to establish "safety zones" to be respected by both sides,
where Chinese communities could assemble in times of danger. As
neither side would agree to this, the Consul General then issued
instructions to the Chinese in Republican territory to refuse to
be evacuated outside the towns in areas of military operations.
He advised them to gather in the buildings of Chinese schools or
associations instead, and to fly the Chinese and Red Cross flags.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly made
direct appeals to both the Dutch and the Indonesian Governments
to safeguard the lives and property of the Chinese. The Nation-
alist Government appropriated a large sum of money for the relief
of the Chinese victims of the war in Java. The Consul General
visited different parts of the island to investigate and report
on the situation of the Chinese in various localities. And the
Chinese delegation to the United Nations continually implied that
its support to the Republican cause was conditional on the proper
treatment of Chinese by the Republican authorities. As might be
expected, in its activities in relation to the Chinese in Indo-
nesia at this time, the Chinese Government made no distinction
between Totoks and Peranakans. The flow of commercial, educational
and political emissaries from China continued as in pre-war
times.
Actions Taken by the
Indonesian Republic~
Let us now look at the situation with regard to the Chinese
from the point of view of the Indonesian authorities. Here was
an important minority which, as we have seen, had always had a
privileged position in the colonial society. They owned and
managed almost the entire internal trade and commerce of the
nation. Even though the majority of them had settled permanently
in the Indies, and had Indonesian mothers or grandmothers, they
had clung to their own ways and looked down on their fellow
Asians. In the present situation they were an "uncertain quan-
tity". Many of them were helping the Dutch. Many felt al-r
legiance only to China and were looking to the Nationalist Gov-
ernment for protection. And most of those who were neither
Dutch co-operators nor Chinese patriots were indifferent as
well to the Indonesian struggle for independence. Few indeed
were active and loyal supporters of the Republic.
Under such circumstances it would not have been surprising
if the Republican leaders had adopted a severe policy against
the Chinese or had encouraged the attacks that were being made
on them. But humanitarian ideals and practical considerations
called for a different program. The Indonesian authorities de-
cided, instead, to try to win the allegiance of as many of the24
Chinese as possible, and to make them an accepted part of Indo-
nesian society.
When the Dutch undertook large-scale military action at the
end of July, 1947, there occurred a new series of attacks by Indo-
nesians against the Chinese. In the weeks that followed, Repub-
lican government authorities took various steps to defend and
protect the Chinese. President Soekamo made a statement guaran-
teeing their safety, and this was backed by strict orders issued
by Hatta,the Vice-President, and Sjarifuddin, Prime Minister and
concurrent Defense Minister. These orders prescribed the severest
penalties, even execution, for persons guilty of maltreating
Chinese or looting their property. Sjahrir, Sjarifuddin, and
other high Republican leaders made public speeches regretting
the anti-Chinese outbreaks and expressing sympathy for the victims
of the scorched-earth policy. The Republican Information Service
admitted the high casualties suffered by the Chinese, while
pointing out that they had occurred only in the areas of military
operations. The Government appropriated five million rupiahs for
the relief of Chinese victims. And on the anniversary of the
founding of the Chinese Republic, Chinese airplanes were permitted
to fly over Republican territory in order to drop "goodwill"
leaflets to the Chinese inhabitants.
The citizenship law promulgated by the Republican Government,
which will be dealt with in the next section, was consistent with
the policy of attracting and accepting the Chinese. Before con-
cluding the present discussion, however, it should be pointed out
that the policy was not always consistently carried out, especially
by the lower ranks of Republican officers and officials.
In the first place, the Republican Government was in an ex-
tremely difficult financial position, as the economy had been dis-
rupted by war and revolution and the Dutch had been enforcing a
stringent blockade around the Republican areas. Under these con-
ditions, it was necessary to obtain as much financial support as
possible from the Chinese, in the form of contributions, taxes,
and, in some areas, "special taxes.'.' Many Chinese felt that an
unfair and "discriminatory" amount was being required from them.
Secondly, the feelings against the Chinese arising out of
the background of hostility and prejudice which we have outlined,
often led officials and persons dealing with the Chinese to
treat them arbitrarily or harshly. Legal and economic restric-
tions intended for aliens only (or in this case, Totoks), were
sometimes applied to Peranakans. This, too, seriously jeopardized
the official policy of attraction.25
The Citizenship Act of 1946
Considering the uncertainties and divided loyalties of the
Chinese, Indonesian authorities wisely decided to allow them
freedom to choose whichever citizenship they preferred, since
any legislation with predetermined categories would either force
a certain number of China-minded Peranakans to become Indonesian
citizens, or reject the aspirations of the Indonesian-minded
group. Opinion was divided, however, as between two systems of
opting for citizenship.
1) Under the "active system", Peranakan Chinese who
wanted to be Indonesian citizens would have to make an official
declaration rejecting Chinese citizenship. Those who did not,
would remain foreigners, in the same category as the Totoks.
Proponents of this system pointed out that only those with an
earnest desire to identify themselves with Indonesia would take
the trouble to go through the;, process required to gain citizen-
ship in this manner. The indifferent would remain foreign.
This would give some assurance of the loyalty of Chinese Indo-
nesian citizens, and would promote their acceptance into Indo-
nesian society.
Some proponents of the active system saw it ^.Iso as a way
to solve another problem—the problem of bringing about a more
equal distribution of economic benefits and cipportunities be-
tween Chinese and Indonesians. This could only be done by re-
strictions on the economic activities of Chinese, and preferen-
tial treatment for an emergent Indonesian entrepreneurial class.
Such a policy might be considered racial discrimination if ap-
plied against the Chinese as citizens. But if the citizenship
law were such that most Chinese would remain Chinese subjects,
legislation against foreign business in general might go a long
way towards solving this problem.
2) Under the "passive system", all Chinese born in Indo-
nesia and still residing there would be accepted as citizens,
except those who took the trouble to make an official declara-
tion rejecting Indonesian citizenship in favor of Chinese
citizenship. This would mean that the large indifferent group,
because of their passivity, would automatically become Indo-
nesian citizens, leaving only the enthusiastically pro-Chinese
Peranakans and Totoks as foreigners.
Proponents of this system pointed out that unless an un-
justifiable mass expulsion of Chinese were resorted to, a large
number of Chinese would remain a permanent part of the popula-
tion. Such being the case, they considered it wise to extend
citizenship to as many Chinese as possible. They were confident26
that through enlightened policies the state could win the al-
legiance of the majority of the Chinese community. On the other
hand, they maintained that the active system would alienate even
those Chinese already sympathetic to the Republic of Indonesia.
Many also favored the passive system because it would minimize
the number of Chinese over whom Chinese consuls could exercise
jurisdiction, and through whom they might extend their influence
in Indonesia.
The Citizenship Act which was finally passed on April 10, 1946,
embodied the passive system. Under the term§ of this act, which
is summarized in Appendix I, Chinese who were born in Indonesia
and who had resided there continuously for five years were auto-
matically citizens of Indonesia. However, they were given the op-
tion of rejecting Indonesian citizenship in favor of Chinese
citizenship. This could be done by presenting a formal declara-
tion of repudiation to the Justice Department, through the local
district court, before April 10, 1947. The expiration date for
such options was later postponed for.a year, and finally extended
a second time to August 17, 1948. Other minor amendments were
also made, but they did not affect the substance of the Act.
It must be remembered, however, that the territory under
continuous Republican control during these years was limited to
areas comprising about half of the island of Java and about two-
thirds of Sumatra. The Chinese in these areas were faced with
the necessity of deciding between the two citizenships—a necessity
which was, however, largely mitigated by two factors. Firstly,
the press reported a statement by the Nationalist Chinese Consul
which assured the Chinese community that the acceptance of Indo-
nesian citizenship would not imply the loss of Chinese nationality.
(31) And secondly, before the final closing date for options,
most Chinese were already convinced that the Republic would join
the Dutch-sponsored Federated States in a wider Indonesian union
which would have its own citizenship law. Considering these
factors and the amount of anti-Chinese feeling at the time, it
is probable that most of the Peranakans who considered themselves
Chinese preferred not to reject Indonesian citizenship under this
Act.
A curious feature of the 1946 Citizenship Act was that it
established the principle of jus soli for determining the citizen-
ship of the Chinese (and of others of foreign descent), but the
principle of jus sanguinis for persons of Indonesian descent.
Thus, in the hypothetical case of an Indonesian family living
in China, the sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons born there
would retain Indonesian citizenship (even if their wives and mothers
(31) Sin Po, July 6, 1948.27
were Chinese), provided only that they did not choose to become
naturalized Chinese. It was just this feature in Chinese law
which raised the problem of dual nationality, and which was thus
an object of considerable criticism in Indonesia.
Developments in Dutch-held Territory
Between 1946 and 1949 the Dutch established a series of
states in East and West Java, Madura, and the other islands of
Indonesia. Each had its own elected and appointed parliament
or council, but these were given little or no power to oppose
Dutch policies. They were joined together in a federal system
for which there was a Federal Consultative Assembly made up
mostly of representatives of the participating states. Chinese
were appointed to all of these government bodies, and many
entered the civil service during this pekriod.
In early 1948 the constitutional committee of the Federal
Consultative Assembly discussed the question of citizenship. It
was agreed that all persons of foreign descent who were born in
Indonesia and had resided there for more than two years should
be considered as Indonesian citizens, but a final decision on
this matter was deferred until the opinions of the Chinese com-
munity could be ascertained. Since the proposal would not have
allowed Peranakans the option of choosing Chinese citizenship,
it doubtless received a good deal of opposition from certain
quarters. In any case, the work of the committee was superceded
and lost in the complicated constitutional developments which
followed.
In the spring of 1948 it became apparent that the future
government of Indonesia would have at least a fair measure of
independence and that it would probably include the Republic as
a component part. The Chinese press indicated a growing tendency
on the part of Chinese to believe that their interests could
only be protected by taking an active political part in the
impending all-Indonesia government. Already the Dutch authori-
tieis had introduced a policy of strong support to Indonesian
business enterprises, at the expense of the Chinese, and there
was little reason to expect a more favorable attitude from the
new government. The Chinese were ever more aware of the weak-
ness of their position as a minority, and they feared that even
as Indonesian citizens they might not be given equal rights
with the rest of the population.
As a result, a new political association was formed in
May, 1948—the "Persatuan Tionghoa", or Chinese Union. Even
the newspaper Sin Po, which had so strongly opposed the participa-
tion of the Chung Hua Hui in the Volksraad of the thirties,28
was now in favor of political participation, and gave qualified
support to the Persatuan Tionghoa. (32) The new organization
outlined its main purposes as follows: (33)
1)	To promote the progress of Indonesia and to co-operate
with other nations.
2)	To protect the interests of overseas Chinese without
sacrificing the interests of the masses.
3)	To strive for the principles of democracy.
The leaders of the Persatuan Tionghoa were convined that
only with the co-operation of the entire Chinese community,
Peranakan and Totok, could Chinese interests be defended. There-
fore, although the organization was made up mostly of Peranakans,
it made an effort to win the support of the Totoks as well. It
put forward the following proposal as one of its major policies:
Those Chinese who do not wish to accept Indonesian
nationality should be free to select one of their own
liking. China and Indonesia should sign a treaty as
soon as possible, insuring the peoples of each country
residing in the other country the treatment of the most
favored nation’s national. (34)
In general, however, the Persatuan Tionghoa proposed that
Chinese should accept Indonesian nationality and fully partici-
pate in the rights and duties of citizenship. It insisted that
the Chinese as a minority should have freedom to preserve their
own language and culture, and specifically, that they should be
allowed to maintain their own schools.
The Persatuan Tionghoa was accused of being pro-Dutch,
largely because its founder, Thio Thiam Tjong, had been a
personal friend and official advisor of van Mook, Lieutenant
Governor of the Netherlands Indies during the first years of
the revolutionary war. No doubt many other members were also
Dutch sympathizers. It should be remembered, however, that
the Chinese had already found that the policy of the post-war
Dutch Government was to favor Indonesian businessmen. There
was no longer reason to believe th&t Chinese would prosper more
under a Dutch than an Indonesian government. In any case, it
was now only political realism to accept and co-operate in the
establishment of an independent Indonesian government. This was
the stated aim of the Persatuan Tionghoa, as was also the
complete abolition of colonialism. While accepting this frame-
work, Chinese leaders, including those of the Persatuan Tionghoa,
(32)	Sin Po, May 27, 1948.
(33)	Sin Po, May 24, 1948.
(34)	Seng Hwo Pao, Batavia, Nov. 11, 1948.29
generally favored; a federal type of state, in which Chinese would
have greater political power in the smaller units, rather than a
unitary state led by the Republicans of Jogjakarta. (35) As
events turned out, however, the federal state established after
the Round Table Conference at the end of 1949 was replaced by a
unitary state before the end of 1950.
The Round Table Agreement on Citizenship
Four years of bitter struggle between Indonesia and the
Netherlands came to anend.in August 1949, when Indonesian and
Dutch delegations met in a "round table conference" at the Hague.
By the beginning of November they had worked out the terms under
which Indonesia was to become a sovereign state. These included
an agreement on citizenship which established the active system
of obtaining Indonesian citizenship for persons of: Dutch descent
and the passive system for Chinese and others. (36)
The new Republic of the United States of Indonesia in-
cluded the former Republic of Indonesia as well as the Dutch-
established federal states. With the ratification of the Round
Table Agreements by the Republican and various Federal legisla-
tures, the new citizenship agreement became the law of the land.
Under its terms, Chinese Peranakans all over Indonesia were given
a two-year period (until December 27, 1951) in which they could
reject Indonesian citizenship if they wanted to be considered
nationals of China. In effect this was the same system which had
been applied to Chinese in Republican territory between 1946
and 1948. This group was now faced with the necessity of chossing
between two citizenships for a second time.
As regards persons of Chinese descent, the only major dif-
ference between the Act of 1946 and the Round Table Agreements
was in the status of persons born abroad but naturalized in the
Indies as Dutch subjects. Under the former Act, such persons did
not obtain Indonesian nationality, while under the new Agreement,
they became Indonesian citizens if they were residing in Indo-
nesia on December 27, 1949.
Ambiguities and Clarifications Concerning Citizenship
In August, 1950, the Provisional Constitution of the new
unitary Republic of Indonesia was promulgated. In Article 5 it
(35) Glover, op. cit., p. 37, citing information obtained by
George McT. Kahin in an interview with one of the leaders
of the Persatuan Tionghoa, August 6, 1948.
(36) See Appendix II.
30
provided that matters of , citizenship and naturalization were to be
regulated by law. Article 144 stipulated that pending the promulga-
tion of a new law, Indonesian citizenship would be determined by
the provisions of the Round Table Agreement; and that anyone whose
nationality was not defined by this agreement, but who had ac-
quired citizenship under the previous law of the Republic, would
remain an Indonesian citizen. (37)
Thus the Citizenship Act of 1946, together with its amencl-
ments, was to hold for a certain number of persons who had ob-
tained Indonesian citizenship before December 27, 1949—Tor in-
stance , ^alien women who had married Indonesians, or foreigners
who had Decome naturalized in that period. This was certainly
only a very small group. But the legislation of the Republic
(confined as it was to parts of Java and Sumatra) was not gen-
erally recognized as effective after the government for the whole
of Indonesia was constituted at the end of 1949. Pending the pass-
age of a new citizenship act, then, there was no strictly legal
basis for deciding new cases which were not covered by the Round
Table Agreements. Mr. Sunario, a Member of Parliament who was to
become the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote in 1953: "It is not
known for certain whether or not the Citizenship Act of 1946 is
still in effect, and if it is, to what extent." (38) Another
official, head of the Bureau of Minority Affairs, had stated in
a radio address in 1951 that the Act on Citizenship was no longer
in effect, but he referred to it as a clear indication of the
"standpoint" of the Gbvernment on citizenship matters. (39)
Under such circumstances it is not surprising that there
was a good deal of confusion regarding the legal position of the
Chinese. In some parts of Java, for instance, local authorities
thought that a Peranakan was not to be considered a citizen
unless he could produce a certificate of citizenship. In the
Bandung area, Chinese born in Indonesia of parents who had never
obtained certificates of permanent residence during Dutch times
were officially (but mistakenly) considered as Chinese subjects,
along with their parents.
In a speech before a Chinese gathering in Surabaja in July,
1954, the Minister of Justice, Djody Gondokusomo, gave what was
publicized in the press as a "clarification" or "new interpreta-
tion" of citizenship regulations. Actually, five of the categories
(37)	See Appendix III.
(38)	Soenario, Masalah-Masalah Disekitar Soal Warganegara dan
Orang Asing, p. 9.
(39)	Soewahjo Soemodilogo, "Soal-soal disekitar Kwearganegaraan",
Siaran Kilat,No. 22,issued by the Ministry of Information,
Djakarta, c,1951,pp.3 and 8. For a careful legal analysis
demonstrating that the 1946 act was not generally in effect
after 1949,see Mr.Dr. Ko Swan Sik,”Soal Kwearganegaraan dan
Pembuktiannja", Star Weekly, No. 633, Feb. 15, 1958.31
of citizens which the Minister outlined were derived directly
from the Round Table Agreement. Only the category including
"alien women married to Indonesians after December 27, 1949,
and children born to Indonesian parents after that date” was
added to the Round Table provisions, apparently on the basis
of the Citizenship Act of 1946. However, the Minister also
stated that Chinese claiming Indonesian citizenship need only
establish the fact of their birth in Indonesia, and should not
be required to prove that their parents had resided continuously
in Indonesia for ten years. (40) In September the Cabinet
discussed and officially sanctioned the Justice Minister’s
statement. This undoubtedly helped to standardize the policies
of central and local government departments and agencies. But
since no citizenship law had yet been pased by parliament,
the Chinese entitled to citizenship continued to face questions
about their status.
In April 1955, a Dual Citizenship Treaty was signed by
the foreign minister of Indonesia and China. This treaty will
be discussed in detail in the next chapter, but we may note here
that it raised new uncertainties about the position of Chinese
citizens of Indonesia. On May 17, 1955, the periodical Utusan
National published a report that civil servants and officials
connected with agrarian affairs had stopped all land transactions
involving Chinese, pending further instructions as to the status
of citizens of dual nationality. For some time there had been a
loosening of regulations restricting the purchase and ownership
of land by citizens of Chinese descent, but officials took the
signing of the treaty as an indication that Chinese of dual
nationality might be regarded as foreigners. (41)
Of even greater concern to many Peranakan citizens was
the question as to whether they would still be allowed to vote
in the coming elections. Various newspapers and public figures,
especially those of the Opposition, had pointed out the possibility
that Chinese of dual nationality might vote in Indonesia’s
national elections and then opt for Chinese citizenship under
the provisions of the treaty. Opposition elements were concerned
about such persons having the right to vote not only because it
seemed unfair, but also because many of them might vote for the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In any case, Peranakan Chi-
nese feared that they might be denied the right to vote on the
grounds that.their citizenship status would not be certain until
the end of the option period in the treaty. They also feared
that their status would be again in doubt after the twenty-
year term of the treaty had expired.
(40) Times of Indonesia, Djakarta, July 19, 1954.
(41) Sin Min, May 25, 1955.32
An exchange of notes between the prime ministers of Indonesia
and China in June 1955 helped to dispell the uncertainties which
the signing of the treaty had raised. One paragraph of the notes
provided that once a person had chosen his citizenship under the
terms of the treaty, he would never be required to choose again.
Another paragraph guaranteed that before the end of the two-year
option period provided for in the treaty, the status of persons
of dual nationality would not change until they had made their
choice. This meant that Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent
were to have the duties and privileges of citizenship, including
the right to vote in the national elections.
In 1957, internal problems which brought Indonesia almost
to the point of civil war resulted in a Presidential decree de-
claring a state of emergency. A new extra-parliamentary "cabinet
of experts" was installed, but the military authorities gained
increasingly wide powers. On June 4, a military decree concern-
ing citizenship was issued "in the interests of public safety."
The first of its three provisions will be discussed in a later
section on proof of citizenship. The other two (as translated
by this writer) were as follows:
Section 2: A .ddtizen of the Republic of Indonesia who
possesses in his own name a passport or similar document
issued by a foreign country and still in effect is con-
sidered no longer to be a citizen of the Republic of
Indonesia.
Section 3: A foreign woman who has married a citizen of
the Republic of Indonesia since December 27, 1949, is
to be treated as a citizen of Indonesia after having
obtained confirmation from the Minister of Justice.
The wording of these provisions and the official explanation
which accompanied them made it clear that the decree was intended
only to standardize the policies of various government agencies
until such time as a citizenship law was passed by the legisla-
ture. According to the provisional constitution, citizenship
status could be regulated only by such a law. In order to quiet
certain doubts and fears which were expressed in the press
(especially the Chinese press), the Minister of Justice gave
public assurances that the new regulation would change no one’s
legal status, and that it was promulgated with the knowledge of
his Ministry. (42)
(42) Pedoman, Djakarta, June 6, 1957.33
During 1957, it became more and more disadvantageous to be
an alien Chinese in Indonesia. A large number of those who had
rejected their Indonesian citizenship in the option period 1949-
1951 began to regret it. Various Chinese newspapermen and poli-;
ticians supported a suggestion that this group be allowed to rein-
state themselves as Indonesian citizens in the option period pro-
vided for in the treaty with China. Government spokesmen made it
clear, however, that those who had chosen Chinese citizenship
would be given no opportunity to change their minds. Neverthe-
less, a certain number of Indonesia—born Chinese conveniently
discovered that the rejection of their Indonesian citizenship
(by themselves or by their parents) had not been strictly legal.
The Justice Ministry announced that such persons might apply to
the courts for reinstatement of their Indonesian citizenship.
(43)
Many of those who applied for reinstatement were Chinese
born in Indonesia after December 21, 1921. This was the group
whose citizenship status was most often confused in the nine-year
period before the passing of a citizenship law in 1958. Chinese
parents, school authorities, government officials, and even
Parliament itself demonstrated their ignorance about the status
of thjfe group.
For those born in Indonesia between 1921 and 1951, the law
was clear enough. According to the Round Table Agreement, they
were Indonesian citizens unless their parents had rejected that
citizenship on their behalf. But many alien parents, through
either ignorance or apathy, had neglected to reject their children’s
Indonesian citizenship. Others had been told by local authorities
that since they were alieps, their children were aliens also,
without the necessity of official rejections. Thus there was a
considerable number of young citizens who were generally regarded
as aliens. Their status as citizens was affirmed by the courts
(44)	and observed by the Immigration Department when it registered
aliens. When military authorities ruled that only alim Chinese
could attend Chinese schools, the Indonesia-born children of aliens
who could not show rejection papers were required to attend
national schools. (45) Yet earlier, in 1957, many aliens had
been required to pay the alien head tax for all of their children,
regardless of where or when they were born. (46) In the Alien
(43)	Hsin Pao, Djakarta, August 7 and 9, 1957.
(44)	Keng Po (city edition), Djakarta, July 10, 1954.
(45)	Sin Po, Djakarta, January 21, 1958.
(46)	Ibid.34
Tax Bill, Parliament had included the unqualified provision that
’’children still under age have the citizenship status of their
fathers. ’’
While this provision clearly violated the Round Table Agree-
ment as applied to many children born between 1921 and 1951, it was
the first legislated ruling which applied to Chinese children born
in Indonesia after 1951. This group had no legally defined status.
According to the Citizenship Act of 1946, which was supposed to be
the government ’’standpoint" even though not binding, all these
persons would be Indonesian citizens. But in practice those whose
parents were aliens were treated as aliens. The Alien Tax Bill
thus gave support to current practice and, incidentally, presaged
the Citizenship Act of 1958.
In addition to the events outlined above, other events could
be cited to demonstrate the uncertainties surrounding the citizen-
ship status of the Chinese in the years 1946-1958. These uncer-
tainties, compounded with the chronic confusion about how to prove
citizenship (which will be described in a later section), formed
the basis for a considerable amount of discrimination against
Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. Spokesmen for the latter
group, therefore, continually called for passage of a citizenship
law and execution of the Dual Citizenship Treaty with China.
Draft Citizenship Act of 1954 and Its Opponents
In August, 1953, a coalition Cabinet was formed with Ali
Sastroamidjojo as Prime Minister and the Nationalist Party (PNI)
as the major participating party. This Cabinet promised to pre-
pare a draft law on citizenship as quickly as possible, and it
appointed a committee to advise the Government in this matter.
Within a few months the committee had drafted a proposal, pre-
sumably based largely upon the Act of 1946, which incorporated
the passive system of determining citizenship for Peranakans.
Instead of presenting this draft bill to Parliament, however,
the Government let it be known that it did not entirely agree
with the draft and was studying important proposed changes.(47)
Early in 1954 the Government released a revised draft,
and in March it was submitted to Parliament. Several features
of the new plan, including substitution of a novel active
system for the passive system of opting, met strong opposition.
After a short time the Government withdrew the draft, explaining
that its consideration by Parliament was to be postponed pending
(47)	S.K., "Tentang Kewarganegaraan", Sikap, Djakarta, Vol. VII,
No. 40, October 25, 1954, p. 8.35
the outcome of negotiations with China on the question of dual
citizenship. (48)
Nevertheless, on October 9, 1954, with the authorization
of the President, the Minister of Justice officially sent the
Government’s draft bill back to Parliament, just three weeks
before the opening of preliminary negotiations with China.
Except for minor changes, the new draft bill was identical to
that withdrawn only a few months earlier. We shall here examine
only the provisions concerning the status of persons of Chinese
descent.
Aside from the naturalization provisions, Article 4 provided
that only ilforeigner who fulfilled all three of the following
conditions might obtain Indonesian citizenship: (49)
1)	He must have been born in Indonesia and must have
his residence there.
2)	His father must have been born in Indonesia, and
must have resided there continuously for at least ten
years either before or after his birth. (This provision
applied to his mother, if, at the time of his birth,
his parents were not legally married.)
3)	Within one year after reaching eighteen years of
age, he must go to the nearest Court of Justice and make
an official declaration requesting Indonesian citizenship
and repudiating his other citizenship.
These provisions were to apply only to persons born after
December 27, 1949. In effect, they would mean that only third
generation residents in Indonesia would be recognized as citizens,
and then only if they made an official statement. This was an
extension of the principle of jus soli unique in the history of
citizenship legislation. No doubt anticipating considerable op-
position on this point, the Government attached the following
explanation to the draft:
For a country which allows foreigners to become residents
in its territory, it is fitting that at a certain time the
descendants of those foreigners should be received into the
circle of its citizenry. To what extent and in what manner
jus soli should be applied to persons who are not stateless
depends upon the situation prevailing in each respective
country.
(48)	Ibid.
(49)	See Appendix IV for full text of Article 4.36
Considering our aim of achieving a homogeneous People,
this Draft does not force foreigners to become citizens.
Persons of foreign descent who may be considered to regard
Indonesia as their country, upon coming of age, are per-
mitted to declare their desire to be Indonesian citizens
and to reject their former nationality.
...jus soli extended only to the first generation gives
not the slightest assurance that persons of foreign descent
will regard Indonesia as their native land. If such persons
have resided here for generations or if they have no country
of origin, it may properly be accepted that they regard
Indonesia as their own country. (50)
The reference to stateless persons is of practical significance
here, because supporters of the Kuomintang who went to Indonesia
as refugees were accepted as "stateless" by the Government author-
ities. Since the draft bill provided that persons born in Indo-
nesia of parents having no nationality would automatically be
Indonesian citizens, the children of Kuomintang Chinese might
obtain citizenship with no problem of documentation or declara-
tion at all, while Peranakans whose families had lived in Indo-
nesia for many generations would experience considerable diffi-
culty in obtaining citizenship. The irony of this situation was
highlighted by the fact that Kuomintang Chinese were the least
likely to feel a tie to Indonesia, because they were the newest
arrivals and because Indonesia had recognized the People’s Repub-
lic of China rather than the Nationalist Regime of Chiang Kai-shek.
While this seeming injustice was pointed out by the opponents of
the bill, it may be assumed that the Ministry of Justice, in
framing the draft, had had no intention of favoring Kuomintang
Chinese. Four prominent members of the latter group were de-
ported by the Ministry of Justice about the same time that the
draft bill was being discussed in Parliament.
*
A more serious objection to the two-generation jus soli
provision was that, far from assuring loyalty, it would incon-
venience and antagonize the very group who would be expected to
take advantage of it. A prominent Chinese lawyer, Mr. Gouw Soei
Tjiang, wrote:
Frankly, I do not agree with this (the Government’s)
position, because these things (loyalties) do not depend
upon externals, such as second generation, active choice,
and so on, but upon the atmosphere and situation which
exists in a given country at a given time. If the atmos-
phere and situation in a given country are not suitable,
(50) Unofficial translation.37
an active system for second generation Residents, or any
other system for residents of any number of generations,
will not increase the homogeneity of the citizenry. But
if the atmosphere and situation are suitable, then the
first generation, or not necessarily even that, is enough
to create homogeneous conditions among the citizenry.(51)
It was the following temporary, or transitional, provision
of the draft bill, however, which aroused the most serious op-
position:
Anyone who is already a citizen of Indonesia according
to the provisions of Article 144 of the Provisional Consti-
tution shall remain a citizen.
A citizen of Indonesia who has also another nation-
ality, and who does not fulfill the qualifications of
descent laid down in Article 4, will lose his Indonesian
citizenship if within one year of the coming into effect
of this act he does not make a declaration rejecting his
other citizenship. This declaration must be made before
the Court of Justice or the representative of the Republic
of Indonesia at his place of residence. Declarations for
those under eighteen years of age will be made by their
parents or legal guardians. (52)
On the one hand, then, the new law would have confirmed the
division of citizenship already carried out under the provisions
of the Round Table Agreement. On the other hand, Chinese whose
citizenship was thus already confirmed would have lost it again
unless:
1)	they could prove that their parents were born
in the territory of Indonesia and had resided there for
at least ten years continuously, or
2)	they made an official declaration rejecting
Chinese citizenship.
Opponents of the bill were quick to point out the virtual
impossibility of providing satisfactory evidence for the first of
these conditions. Civil registration of the Chinese had not been
initiated in Java until 1919, and-in the Outer Islands not until
1926. Furthermore, registration records for many areas had been
lost or destroyed during the revolutionary war. Thus very few
Peranakans could produce birth certificates for their parents.
In some areas, officials had already required that Chinese claiming
(51)	Sin Min, Semarang, Nov. 19, 1954, pp. 2-3.
(52)	Unofficial translation.38
the privileges of citizenship should produce proof that their
parents had resided in Indonesia for ten years continuously, and
such proof had been found to be extremely difficult to provide.
This being the case, most Peranakans would have had to ap-
pear at court to make their declaration if they were to avoid
losing their Indonesian citizenship. But here the opponents of
the bill pointed out the indifference of the majority of Peranakans
to legal matters, their general ignorance of the issues involved,
and their traditional aversion to contact with government authori-
ties. They maintained that these factors would keep a very large
number of Peranakans from taking any action. Thus a sizeable
proportion of the Indonesian-born Chinese population--perhaps
several hundred thousand, it was said—would lose their Indo-
nesian citizenship by default. Whether or not such a result
was expected and desired by th§ framers of the bill, the op-
ponents of the bill never failed to mention it. Chinese critics
emphasized the loss to Indonesia of a potentially valuable sector
of the population, while both Chinese and Indonesian opponents
stressed the dangers of the much wider foreign jurisdiction and
interference which it would involve. The proposed system was
labeled "mass denationalization".
A closing article of the draft bill stated: "An Indonesian
citizen residing in Indonesia is considered not to have any other
citizenship." (53) This, of course, was directed towards the
problem of dual nationality. It is evident from the explanations
which were attached to the draft that the Government was quite
aware that declarations renouncing Chinese citizenship would not
actually nullify that citizenship under Chinese law. But for
all practical purposes tjie clause just quoted would nullify
China’s claim to jurisdiction over Chinese residing in Indonesia
who became citizens there just as the Dutch legislation of
1910 and the Consular Convention of 1911 had done.
Nevertheless, critics of this clause pointed out that the
problem of dual nationality could only be eliminated finally
through an agreement with China, and that consideration of this
bill on the very eve of negotiations with China was inopportune
if not actually detrimental to the goodwill necessary for such
negotiations.
As the new bill would not affect the status of other
minorities (Dutch, Eurasian, Arab and Indian) , but would raise
new complications and obstacles for the Chinese community, many
Peranakans considered it as a direct attack on their position.
The influential Working Committee on Citizenship in Surabaja,
claiming to represent all strata of the Chinese community in
(53) Unofficial translation.that city, made a public statement condemning the bill and calling
for a return to the spirit of the Act of 1946. (54) A special
committee of the widely-organized Peranakan political organiza-
tion, BAPERKI (Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia)
(55), issued a memorandum criticizing the draft in detail and
opposing its ’’active system” clauses. (56) The most outspoken
opponent of the bill was Siauw Giok Tjhan, Member of Parliament
and leading figure in BAPERKI. Speaking of the new transitional
clause in a press interview, he expressed the attitude of many
Peranakans when he said:
...what had already ripened has been made raw again
by these provisions. The fruits of nine years of efforts
to cultivate the feelings of true citizenship among citi-
zens of foreign descent,, especially citizens of Chinese
descent, will be ruined, and the work will have to be
started anew. The ’’minority complex" which we have tried
to eliminate will be strengthened. The reason for this
is that these provisions will raise again all the former
confusion and unrest concerning the question of who, actu-
ally, is an Indonesian citizen. (57)
The Minister of Health, Dr. Lie Kiat Teng, also stated his
opposition to the bill in a press interview, and maintained that
so far as he knew it had never been discussed or approved by the
Cabinet. Dr. Lie said that his party, the Islamic Association
Party of Indonesia (PSII), would continue to stand for the pas-
sive system as embodied in the Act of 1946. (58)
In the weeks that followed, party after party made it clear,
through press releases and official spokesmen, that they opposed
the bill. These included not only opposition parties—the Masjumi
(a major Islamic party), the Socialist Party (PSI), the Catholic
Party, and the Protestant Party (Parkindo) —but the* following
Government-supporting parties as well: the Communist Party ζΡΚΙ),
the Islamic Association (PSII), and the Indonesian People's
Union (SKI), The PKI and the SKI took the position that they
could not vote in favor of the bill before the outcome of the
negotiations with China was announced. On the other hand, no
party made an official statement in support of the bill. It
was generally supposed, however, that at least the Nationalist
Party (PNI) and the party of the Minister of Justice would back
it.
(54)	Kuangpo, Semarang, Dec. 18, 1954.
(55)	For a discussion of the character of BAPERKI, see below.
(56)	Berita BAPERKI, Djakarta, Vol.I,Nos.7/8,October-November,
1964,"pp;.'2-s:
(57)	Sin Min, Semarang, Nov. 1, 1954
(58)	Sin Min, Nov. 11, 1954.40
It was estimated that the parties opposing the bill could
muster in Parliament at least 112 votes against it if it were
put to a vote. (59) This would have been enough to make its
defeat almost certain.
The bill was discussed only in sectional meetings of the
Parliament, however, and not in full session. It was reported
that one section passed a resolution to the effect that the
majority of its members were in favor of the Government withdraw-
ing the bill, while another section proposed that consideration
of the bill should be postponed until after an agreement with
China was reached. (60) In the face of such opposition, the
Government decided to withdraw the bill. Not until three and
one half years later did Parliament again debate a citizenship
bill.
The 1958 Citizenship Act
In 1955 the Dual Citizenship Treaty with China was signed
at the Bandung Conference, but the prospect of Indonesia's first
national elections at the end of the year prevented Parliament
and the Government from taking any further action on the question
of citizenship. When the newly elected representatives gathered
for the opening of Parliament in March 1956, a coalition cabinet
had been formed, again with Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI at its
head. In December, the Minister of Justice announced that he
hoped to submit a new draft law on citizenship and naturaliza-
tion to the cabinet in January 195,7. About the same time, how-
ever, army revolts broke out in Sumatra. A cabinet crisis en-
sued. The cabinet resigned in March 1957, and President Soekarno
proclaimed a state of war and siege. In April he installed an
extra*-parliamentary cabinet of "experts", with Djuanda as Prime
Minister.
Both the Sastroamidjojo and the Djuanda cabinets sought
parliamentary ratification of the Dual Citizenship Treaty with
China, but strong forces in Parliament demanded "that a citizen-
ship law be passed first. It is likely that the Sastroamidjojo
cabinet could not agree on a citizenship bill, since the coali-
tion included parties with widely divergent views on the matter.
The Djuanda cabinet approved a bill in November 1957, and in
December forwarded it to Parliament in the middle of a debate
on the Dual Citizenship Treaty. Parliament ratified the treaty
soon after, but it did not take up the bill on citizenship and
naturalization until six months later.
(59)	Star Weekly, .Djakarta, Vol. IX, No. 465, Nov. 27, 1954.
(60)	Sin Min, Nov. 27, 1954.41
"Act No. 62 of the year 1958 Concerning Republic of Indo-
nesia Citizenship" was passed on July 1, 1958, after four days
of discussion in Parliament. Newspaper reports indicate that
there was no serious opposition to the bill, and that it passed
with only one dissenting vote. There were, however, eleven
amendments, nine of which were passed by Parliament after having
been accepted by the Government. Seven of the nine were proposed
by the Communist Party, which had had no part in drafting the bill
None of the amendments constituted a major change in the purport
of the law.
The text of the 1958 Citizenship Act may be found in Ap-
pendix V. Many of its sections involve minor technicalities or
make provision for special cases such as illegitimate or adopted
children. Here we shall^diecuss only those sections which have
general significance for the status of the Chinese in Indonesia.
The Act opens by affirming the status quo: that is, it
states that all people are Indonesian Citizens who have become
citizens under laws, agreements, or regulations which have been
promulgated since Indonesia’s independence on August 17, 1945.
Unlike the draft act of 1954, there is no requirement that per-
sons of dual nationality make a court declaration if they want
to keep their citizenship. Such a provision was made unneces-
sary, for the Chinese at least, by the ratification of the Dual
Citizenship Treaty with China, which does require active options.
Thus the Act and the Treaty, taken together, embody one of the
provisions which was strongly opposed in the 1954 debates, that is
the active option system for dual nationals who desire to main-
tain their Indonesian citizenship.
Section 4 of the 1958 Act contains a two-generation jus
soli provision similar to that in the 1954 draft bill. An alien
born and residing in Indonesia may apply for Indonesian citizen-
ship if his father was also born in Indonesia and if he divests
himself of his former citizenship. It may be noted that the
official English translation of the act says that the alien may
apply for Indonesian citizenship "if, upon the acquirement of the
Republic of Indonesia citizenship, he has no other citizenship
or if, at the time of application, he also submits a written
statement abjuring any other citizenship he may possess under
the legal provisions operative in his country of origin..."
This translation is somewhat ambiguous in that the word "abjuring"
may suggest that it is only the applicant’s sworn rejection of
his former citizenship which is required. What is actually
meant is that the applicant must submit a statement which,
under the legal provisions operative in his country of origin,
divests him of his other citizenship. Since there is no way
in which a person of Chinese descent can divest himself of his
Chinese citizenship under Chinese law, except during the option42
period provided for in the Dual Citizenship Treaty, none of the
Indonesian Chinese will be able to take advantage of this pro-
vision of the 1958 act.
The naturalization procedures outlined in Section 5 also
are available only to those who can divest themselves of their
former citizenship. Similarly, an alien woman cannot become an
Indonesian citizen by marrying a citizen unless she loses her
former citizenship. These various provisions of the 1958 citizen-
ship act assure that no alien Chinese and none of their descendants
can become Indonesian citizens after the close of the Treaty op-
tion period. This means that the only way in which the alien
Chinese population of Indonesia can be reduced will be through
measures amounting to mass deportation. Although representatives
of BAPERKI and the Catholic Party argued in Parliament for natural-
ization procedures which would be open to alien Chinese, they
were unable to suggest an alternative which would avoid the prob-
lem of dual citizenship.
The 1958 citizenship act makes it virtually impossible for
dual citizenship to arise in the future. Aside from five, minor
exceptions, it follows the principle of jus sanguinis—that is,
the principle that one’s citizenship derives from the citizenship
of one’s parents, and not from the geographical location of one's
birthplace. Unlike Chinese law, however, this act declares that
Indonesian citizenship is lost if any other citizenship is ac-
quired either through marriage or in any other voluntary maijner.
In addition to preventing dual citizenship, the act includes many
provisions designed to prevent Indonesian citizens from becoming
stateless.
It may be of interest to note that the 1958 act incorporates,
in only slightly modified form, all three provisions of the military
decree on citizenship which was issued on June 4, 1957. Anyone
who desires proof of his Indonesian citizenship is directed to
apply to the District Court in the town where he resides. Alien
women who marry Indonesians acquire Indonesian citizenship. And
any Indonesian citizenvho possesses in his own name a valid
foreign passport or similar document loses his citizenship.
In summary, it may be said that the 1958 citizenship act
confirmed the citizenship status which the Chinese had acquired
through the 1946 Act and the Round Table Agreements. Further-
more, it projected this status quo into the future by making if
impossible for Chinese aliens or their descendants to become
citizens after the option period provided for in the Dual
Citizenship Treaty with China.43
Status of the Pro-Kuomintang Chinese
Neither the 1958 citizenship act nor the Dual Citizenship
Treaty will do anything to clarify or settle the status of pro-
Kuomintang Chinese aliens.. As we have seen, members of this
group are considered ’’stateless” by government agencies. They
naturally prefer this to being considered citizens of the People's
Republic of China—which is the. only alternative in a country
which does not recognize the government of Chiang Kai-shek. Pro-
Kuomintang Chinese who were born in Indonesia did not reject
Indonesian citizenship during the 1949-51 option period, because
they feared that to do so might put them under the jurisdiction
of Communist Chinese consuls. Similarly, the Dual Citizenship
Treaty does», not give them an opportunity to reject Indonesian
citizenship in favor of Nationalist Chinese citizenship. Thus
pro-Kuomintang Chinese who are dual citizens will reject their
Chinese citizenship in the new round of treaty options. On
the other hand, the treaty does not apply to alien Kuomintang
supporters, because they are not dual nationals. The Govern-
ment has repeatedly made it clear that members of this group
will continue to be considered stateless. At least until the
end of 1958, "stateless" Chinese who wished to travel abroad
were supplied with "stateless" passports by the Indonesian
Government.
In parliamentary debates on the Dual Citizenship Treaty
and the 1958 citizenship act, BAPERKI leader Siauw Giok Tjhan
argued that under international law statelessness could not be
adopted by a person at will, and that while the Government could
offer political asylum, it could not unilaterally cancel
citizenship of a nation whose government it recognized. Siauw
repeatedly demanded, therefore, that pro-Kuomintang aliens be
forced to obtain passports from the Communist Chinese consulates.
Not even the PKI (Communist Party) supported this position, how-
ever, and it does not seem likely that it will be accepted by
the Government in the future.
While the anti-foreign measures of the Government may force
many "stateless" Chinese to seek refuge in Taiwan or other countries
their children born in Indonesia may become Indonesian citizens
under the 1958 law or, if they are old enough, by options under
the Dual Citizenship Treaty. Thus the problem of statelessness
will not last beyond the present generation of immigrants.44
CHAPTER IV
THE DUAL CITIZENSHIP
TREATY WITH CHINA
Little information reached the press concerning the diplo-
matic contacts which led up to negotiations between Indonesia and
China on the dual citizenship issue. The negotiations themselves
were held in strict secrecy, and the authorities on both sides
either denied or refused to confirm press reports and speculations
concerning them. The main outlines of the developments leading
up to the signing of the treaty, however, are fairly clear.
With the rapid rise of a powerful China under Communist
leadership, the various governments of Southeast Asia became
anxious concerning both the role that their sizeable Chinese
minorities might play, and the influence and jurisdiction over
them that the Peking Government might attempt to exercise.
The Indonesian government, therefore, proposed to the
Government of the People's Republic of China that the two
countries should negotiate a treaty to solve the problem of
dual nationality. In early 1954 China agreed, but throughout
the first half of that year the two governments could not agree on
a date. The Indonesian Government was eager to hold the nego-
tiations as soon as possible, no doubt partly because its own
controversial citizenship bill was being delayed in the hope of
an early settlement with China. On the other hand, China was
in no hurry, and the Geneva Conference seemed to be absorbing
the whole attention of its Foreign Ministry.
When Chou En-lai, Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign
Minister of the People’s Republic of China, visited India in
July, 1954, Nehru discussed the question of dual nationality with
him, probably at the request of the Indonesian Government. The
London Times correspondent in New Delhi reported that Chou as-
sured Nehru that China was neddy to give up its claim to the
citizenship of overseas Chinese of dual nationality, but this
report was denied» jjy Chinese authorities in Djakarta. (61)
During Chou’s visit to Burma, Prime Minister U Nu also raised
the question of the dual nationality of Chinese there.
At the same time, a Draft Constitution was being discussed
in China. It was adopted in September. Article 98 of this
constitution reads: ’’The People’s Republic of China protects
(61) Sin Min, Semarang, Sept. 8, 1954.45
the proper rights and interests of Chinese residents abroad."
And Article 23 provides that the National People’s Congress
shall include deputies elected by "Chinese residents abroad."
On September 23, 1954, Chou En-lai gave a report on the
work of the Government to the First National People’s Congress.
His report included these words:
For our part, we are willing to urge overseas Chinese
to respect the laws of the governments and the social
customs of the countries in which they live. It is worth
pointing out that the question of the nationality of over-
seas Chinese is one which the reactionary governments of
China in the past never tried to solve. This placed
overseas Chinese in a difficult situation and often led
to discord between China and the countries concerned.
To improve this situation, we are prepared to settle
this question, and are ready to settle it first with the
Southeast Asian countries which have established diplo-
matic relations with us. (62)
Southeast Asian governments were concerned over these
indications of China's increased interest in the Chinese residing
in their countries,. At the same time, they were anxious to find
out under what conditions China was willing to settle the ques-
tion of dual nationality. When Ali Sastroamidjojo, Prime Minister
of Indonesia, was visiting India in early October, it was re-
ported that he helped Nehru prepare the topics and questions
concerning which Nehru would seek information during his forth-
coming trip to China. One such question would be: Was China
willing to announce to Chinese living abroad, as India had done
in the case of her subjects abroad, that they would no longer
be able to have dual citizenship? (63) Thus it seems that
Nehru may have played an important part in stimulating Chinese
authorities to settle the dual nationality question in a manner
satisfactory to the Southeast Asia nations.
As the time for direct negotiations between China and Indo-
nesia drew close, two relevant pronouncements came from the
Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan. On October 25, Chiang
Kai-shek himself expressed,his hope for the loyal support of
the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia. Speaking to a corre-
spondent of the Singapore Straits Times, he said that the Chinese
in the countries of Southeast Asia should take part in the efforts
(62)	People’s China, Peking, No. 20, Oct. 16, 1954, p. 24.
(63)	Kuangpo, Semarang, Oct. 2, 1954, and Oct. 7, 1954.46
of the Kuomintang to regain mainland China. (64) The next day,
after a challenge from India on the subject of citizenship,
Kuomintang Ambassador to Canada, Liu Chieh, stated at a United
Nations committee meeting that according to present Chinese
(Nationalist) law, overseas Chinese are not considered Chinese
nationals if they obtain the citizenship of another country. (65)
Thus it was clear that the rival Chinese governments were compet-
ing not only fof the loyalty of overseas Chinese, but also for
the goodwill of the governments of Southeast Asia and favorable
public opinion the world over.
Preliminary negotiations on the Dual Citizenship Treaty
finally opened on November 2. They were carried on in Peking
until December 23, 1954^ On the basis of the work done there,
negotiations were continued in Djakarta and Bandung from March
29 to April 20, 1055, at the time of the Asian-African Conference.
The Indonesian deleggffonj) was led by Sukardjo Wirjopranoto,
head of the Asia and Pacific Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. He was assisted by two lawyers, Suhardjo and S.H.
Tajibnapis, and a secretariat consisting of Tamtomo, Tjhinhoikwet,
A. Muhardjo, and Lie Chuan Sin. The Chinese delegation included
Ambassador Huang Chen, Consul General Chao Chung Shih, and
Lin Chao Nan.
During the negotiations, Indonesian officials repeatedly
reported to the press that the talks were proceeding smoothly in
an atmosphere of friendly co-operation, and that there were no
disagreements in principle. No other details were given. At
the beginning of December, however, the correspondent of the
Times of India in Peking reported that it had already been de-
cided that Chinese of dual nationality in Indonesia would be given
a year in which to choose one citizenship or the other. Those
preferring Indonesian citizenship would be required to make a
statement repudiating their Chinese citizenship. (66)
While this did turn out to be the basic principle of the
agreement as finally adopted, the Indonesian authorities were
unwilling to confirm it at the time. It was essentially the same
principle, involving the active system of opting, which was
embodied in the Government’s^ 1954 draft citizenship bill, and
which had already aroused so much opposition. No doubt it was
considered wise to postpone further excitement on this issue until
after the Asian-African Conference in Bandung.
Through sources close to the negotiations, the present
writer learned that the Chinese delegation was originally willing
to recognize the status quo as to the citizenship of Chinese in
(64)	Suara Merdeka, Semarang, Oct. 28, 1954
(65)	Kuangpo, Oct. 29, 1954.
(66)	Sin Min, Dec. 4, 1954.47
Indonesia. That is, they would have been willing to draw up a
treaty in which China would renounce its claim to all Peranakans
who had become Indonesian citizens under the Act of 1946 or the
Round Table Agreement. It was the Indonesian side which insisted
on a new round of opting, this time according to the active system.
This was consistent with the Government’s desire to have as
citizens only those Chinese who would be willing to make an
official and public declaration repudiating their Chinese citizen-
ship .
To the Chinese delegation, on the other hand, the merits
of the passive system already carried out and those of the proposed
active system may well have appeared to be of approximately equal
value. The active system was likely to result in bringing more
Chinese under the direct jurisdiction of the Government of the
People’s Republic of China. But it was sure to disappoint or
even antagonize a good many Peranakans who were favorably
disposed to the new regime in China.
Faced with advantages and disadvantages in either course,
the Chinese side was no doubt willing to accept whichever system
was proposed by the Indonesians. Even the generally anti-
communist editors of Keng Po reported that the Chinese delegation
had "given in" to almost every proposal of the Indonesian
delegation. (67)
Negotiations were hurried to an end during the first days
of the Asian-African Conference. On April 22, 1955, before the
close of the Conference, the treaty was signed by Sunario and
Chou En-lai, Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and China.
Provisions of the Treaty on
Dual Citizenship
The purpose of the treaty was to eliminate dual citizenship
in cases where it existed and to prevent its occurrence in the
future. Most of its provisions apply to persons who are at the
same time citizens of Indonesia and of the People’s Republic of
China. This includes all persons of Chinese descent who acquired
Indonesian nationality under the passive systems of the Act of
1946 and the Round Table Agreement. It does not include those
who were born in China and were never naturalized as Dutch
subjects, or those who rejected Indonesian citizenship during the
opting periods of 1946-48 and 1949-51. These latter, being
Chinese citizens only, were given no further choice in the
matter.
(67) Keng Po, Djakarta, April 26, 1955.48
Under the terms of this treaty, (68) adults having the dual
nationality of the two countries would be given a period of two years
in which to choose the citizenship of one or the other. They would
be required either to repudiate Chinese citizenship in a declaration
before designated Indonesian authorities, or to repudiate Indonesian
citizenship before designated Chinese authorities. For the purpose
of registering such declarations, either country could set up
temporary offices in various parts of the other country after
obtaining permission from the host government.
Persons of dual nationality who neglected to choose one
citizenship or the other within the two year period would auto-
matically acquire only the nationality of their forefathers. Those
of dual nationality who were not yet of age would have to choose
their citizenship within one year after their eighteenth birthday or
their marriage.	Before choosing, they would be considered to have
only the nationality of their fathers.
In the future, all children born in Indonesia of alien Chinese
parents would acquire Chinese citizenship, while those born in China
of Indonesian parents would be Indonesian.
A novel feature of the treaty was the absolute equality it
would provide between men and women. A choice of citizenship by a
husband of dual nationality would not apply to his wife, who, if also
of dual nationality, would have to make her own choice. In a
marriage between an Indonesian and a Chinese, neither party would
automatically acquire the citizenship of the other; they could
remain different nationalities, or either one could acquire the
citizenship of the other by applying to the proper authorities.
One of the final provisions was that each party should under-
take to instruct its own subjects residing in the territory of the
other to follow the local laws and customs, but not to take any part
in local politics. Each party also agreed to protect, according to
its own laws, the "legal rights and interests" of the citizens of the
other country residing within its borders.
Reactions of Various
Parties to the Treaty
The treaty was hailed as a great success by Government-support-
'Ing.politicians, correspondents, and editors in Indonesia. The
central council of the Nationalist Party (PNI) issued a statement
declaring their full support. Pointing out that their party is in
favor of creating a unified citizenry with no differences according
to race, they stated that the present treaty would remove the basis
for the continuing existence of minorities.
(68)	See Appendix VI for the text.
(69)	Keng Po, May 2, 1955.49
The Central Committee of the Communist Party (PKI) also issued
a supporting statement. Although the treaty was neither complete
nor perfect, they said, it would form the basis for a wise and
democratic solution of the problem. Admittedly the passive system
of options was easier and simpler than the active system provided for
in the treaty, but the passive system had neither solved the problem
of dual nationality nor the minority problems associated with it.
Charging that the fact of dual nationality had been used by certain
groups to incite discrimination and bring about racial oppression,
the statement continued:
The elimination of dual nationality will mean also
the elimination, or the great reduction, of the factors
which continually create tension between Chinese citizens
of Indonesia and other citizens.... It is certain that an
active and unconfused attitude (as would be demonstrated
in active options) will be of great help in eliminating
the prejudices of that part of the Indonesian people who
are victims of the divide-and-rule tactics of the
imperialists and their accomplices. (70)
While generally supporting the active option system, the Communist
Party statement asked that the question of who held dual citizenship
(and who would not be required to opt) should be settled by an
exchange of notes prior to ratification of the treaty.
In addition to such general support, the treaty also met with a
great deal of opposition as soon as its text was released. Even
many Government supporters criticized various aspects of the treaty.
For instance, Dr. Diapari, head of the Indonesian People’s Union
(SKI), found it far from satisfactory. He proposed consultations
among the Government parties to discuss the problems involved.'
Specifically, he did not approve of changing from a passive to an
active system, because of the likelihood that a large number of
Chinese would thereby lose their Indonesian citizenship. Dr.
Diapari expressed his concern over the possible results of having too
many foreigners living in Indonesia. (71)
The opposition parties were, of course, much more outspoken in
their criticism of the treaty. Jusuf Wibisono, speaking for the
Masjumi, expressed three major objections: the objection in
principle that the treaty was contrary to the Provisional Constitu-
tion, the Political Manifesto of 1945, the Citizenship Act of 1946,
and the Round Table Agreement of 1949; the moral objection that the
treaty would sacrifice to China many Chinese whom the Indonesian
Government had hitherto considered as friends; and the practical
objection that registration of over a million Chinese would involve
tremendous difficulties, complicated further by the likelihood
(70)	Harian Rakjat, May 17, 1955.
(71)	Keng Po, April 30, 1955.50
of a good deal of corruption in the process. (72)
The Secretariat of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) issued
a statement rejecting the treaty on grounds similar to those outlined
by Dr. Diapari and Mr. Wibisono. It maintained that Indonesia
should have demanded that China recognize the Indonesian citizenship
of Chinese who had accepted it under the passive system, and release
them from Chinese citizenship. (73)
The Catholic Party (Partai Katolik) in an official rejection of
the treaty, maintained that it was not only unconstitutional, but
that it would violate the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which had been accepted by Indonesia, and which
guarantees that no person’s citizenship may be revoked by any law or
treaty. The Catholic Party also opposed the provisions of the
treaty which would permit members of one family to have different
citizenships, especially husbands and wives. This was considered
contrary to moral principles in general and to the principle of
family unity in particular. (74)
Similarly, the Protestant Party (Parkindo), the anti-Stalinist
communist party (Murba), the Hazairin faction of the Union for a
Greater Indonesia (PIR), and other smaller parties went on record
against the treaty.
1
Beyond the objections which they stated publicly, anti-comnuir·
nist politicians were opposing the treaty partly because it would
involve the establishment throughout Indonesia of registration
offices manned by personnel of the People’s Republic of China. It
was feared that these might also be used for purposes other than
registration.
Reactions of Indonesian
(Chinese to the 'Treaty
The feelings of the Indonesian Chinese community towards the
treaty were much more complicated than they had been towards the
draft citizenship bill just a few months before. While articulate
Peranakans had been almost unanimous in opposing the draft, they were
not so sure about the treaty. Most of them still disliked the
prospect of having to go through another option period, and objected
to an active system on the grounds that it would cause a substantial
section of their community to lose their Indonesian citizenship. On
the other hand, many of the objectionable featuresof the draft bill
(72)	Keng Po,	April 27, 1955
(73)	Keng Po,	April 30, 1955
(74)	Keng Po,	May 14, 1955.51
were not to be found in the treaty, especially the two-generation
jus soli provision. Then too, the treaty seemed to promise a final
resolution of the thorny problem of dual nationality, whereas no
unilateral bill could do so. Finally, one party to the treaty was
the People’s Republic of China. As will be explained in a later
chapter, many of those who most eagerly demand only Indonesian citi-
zenship are also sympathetic towards Mao Tze-tung’s new regime in
China and proud of its accomplishments. They are eager to promote
good relations between the two countries. It would have been un-
comfortable indeed for them to oppose a treaty signed by the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and by the Indonesian
Government which had been most friendly towards that country to date
Thus many Chinese viewed the treaty with mixed feelings.
Those who supported it admitted its weaknesses. Those who opposed
it did so cautiously, and with many good words about the intentions
of the contracting parties.	Many preferred to take no stand at
all. A popular solution was to support the treaty, while
advocating radical changes in its practical execution.
Let us take, for example, the pro-Peking Semarang newspaper,
Sin Min. Thus paper had published many news articles and reports
of speeches attacking the draft citizenshi'p act of 1954, and
although its policy was generally to support the Government it had
criticized the bill editorially. On the treaty issue, however, it
took no editorial stand, but published reports of speeches by both
the supporters and the more cautious opponents of the treaty. Its
nearest approach to taking a position was in a column written by one
of its Djakarta correspondents, headed: ’’Find a simple way to carry
out the Chou-Sunario Treaty.”
In this column the writer raised no objection to the treaty.
But he dAew attention to the importance of what he called the
’’psychological factor," in the following words:
...the feelings of those who have already clearly
chosen Indonesian citizenship and who have shown their
readiness to serve the Country and the People of
Indonesia, must not be offended or injured.
...And in the execution of the Chou-Sunario treaty,
in our opinion, a simple way can still be found to
eradicate the impression that the Government is inten-
tionally making the position of Indonesian citizens of
Chinese descent more difficult. (75)
The "simple way" proposed by this columnist was to recognize
as Indonesian citizens without dual nationality all those persons
of Chinese descent who have served as Cabinet Ministers, Members of
(75) Sin Min, Semarang, May 12, 1955.52
Parliament, and government employees, as well as those who have been
registered as voters and gone to the polls. This would release a
very large proportion of the Peranakan population from the necessity
of making another option, and would thus eliminate one of the major
objections to the treaty. So far as the present writer is aware,
this was the first time that this proposal appeared in the press.
The proposal is said to have been originated by Siauw Giok Tjhan,
however. It was to be taken up seriously by the Government later
on.
The anti-communist Kuangpo, another Semarang newspaper, which
generally supports the Government, took a clear but discreet stand
against the treaty. In addition to objecting to the expected
denationalization of many passive citizens of Chinese descent, an
editorial in this paper also emphasized the psychological factor, as
follows;
We who regard the problem of choosing Indonesian
citizenship not from considerations of profit and loss,
but entirely on the basis of a realization that by force
of nature we are sons of Indonesia who for several
generations have had no legal connection with China what-
soever—we feel rather disappointed that in order to
defend our new citizenship we shall have to go through
another formality. We are not disappointed because of the
formality as such, but because we feel that, the formality
is not necessary for us, and that we have no ties with the
outside world which need to be cut off by going through
another formality. (76)
The two most important Peranakan newspapers in Djakarta took
opposite sides on this issue, as on most, others. The Sin Po, a pro-
Peking paper, generally favored the treaty. The Keng Po, which
favored neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang Tn~CEina politics
but generally sided with the opposition parties in Indonesia at that
time (Masjumi, PSI, etc.) vigorously opposed the treaty. The Keng
Po suggested editorially that revoking the Indonesian citizenship of
Peranakans who failed to repudiate Chinese citizenship would create a
serious problem of "displaced persons." (77). Two weeks later,
Mr. Yap Thiam Hin, a leading figure in Chinese Protestant circles and
an officer of BAPERKI, gave an even more alarming picture of the
possible consequences of the treaty. The Keng Po reported;
Mr. Yap...stated his opinion that the methods pro-
posed in the treaty would have grave social consequences,
which could even endanger the stability and security of
Indonesia itself. He believed that 80% of the people of
Chinese descent, who had already become Indonesian
(76)	Kuangpo, Semarang, April 27, 1955.
(77)	Keng Po, Djakarta, April 26, 195553
citizens, would now be "uprooted" like displaced persons,
because without knowing it they would become foreigners
or stateless persons if the treaty were ratified. Their
livelihood, judging from the fact that even as citizens
it had been interfered with and made difficult, would
become even harder, and this might raise criminality,
etc. Where would they be sent—thfese hundred of thoi^-
sands of farmers in Tangerang, Bekasi, Bangka,
Kalimantan, etc. who, as foreigners or stateless persons
would no longer be able to cultivate the soil because of
the difficulty of getting land or because their right to
rent land would have been snatched away? (78)
The majority of members of BAPERKI, however, took a more
moderate and realistic view of the treaty, no doubt partly because
of a general orientation more sympathetic both to the new regime in
China and to the government parties in Indonesia. BAPERKI issued a
statement (79) in which it cautiously advanced a number of critical
"impressions" of the treaty: that it seemed intended to reduce the
number of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent; that the fact
that it could be abrogated by either party after twenty years might
give citizens of Chinese descent a doubtful status which could serve
as a continuing basis for discrimination; that the treaty might
nullify the efforts of the Indonesian Government to make good citi-
zens of its subjects of foreign descent; and that it might undermine
public and international faith in the legal foundations of the
Government, since it was contrary to the constitution and the law to
date. Instead of opposing the treaty, however, the BAPERKI state-
ment called upon the Government to interpret and carry it out in
such a way as to guarantee the continued Indonesian citizenship of
all persons who had already acquired it.
The influential Working Committee on Citizenship in Surabaja
issued a stronger statement outlining similar objections to the
treaty. It included a warning about the dangers of "international
interference" if the number of Chinese subjects in Indonesia should
become too great. (This was indicative of a more critical attitude
towards the Peking regime than that of BAPERKI.) Finally, it
reported that by a majority vote the Committee had decided to oppose
the treaty, at least so long as its objectionable features were not
removed by any subsequent exchange of notes or official
clarifications. (80)
Typical of those most favorably disposed towards the treaty was
Dr. Tjoa Sik Ien, who had represented Indonesia at the United Nations
at a time when the Republic, hard-pressed by Dutch forces, was
struggling for world recognition and support. He was one of the
(78)	Keng Po, May 9, 1955.
(79)	Keng Po, April 29, 1955.
($01 z Kuangpo, Semarang, May 21, 1955.54
influential Peranakan leaders most sympathetic toward the new regime
in China. Dr. Tjoa had been opposed to the active system, but
personal discussions with Indonesian and Chinese authorities after
the treaty was signed convinced him of its desirability as a method
of minimizing prejudice and discrimination against Peranakan citizens.
In a public speech and a statement to the press, Dr Tjoa analyzed the
treaty in detail, pointing out its strengths and weaknesses. He
maintained, however, that talk of displaced persons and statelessness
was premature, and insisted upon reserving final judgment until
official clarifications had been given, particularly concerning the
question1! of who should be considered to have dual nationality. (81)
The most outstanding of the cautious opponents of the treaty
was Siauw Giok Tjhan, Member of Parliament, and head of BAPERKI.
Although Siauw ardently identifies himself with Indonesia, he is an
admirer of Mao Tze-tung’s regime and an avowed enemy of the
Kuomintang Chinese in Indonesia. In an interview with the press, he
listed eleven shortcomings of the treaty, including many which have
been mentioned above. He expressed his hope that the Indonesian
Government would establish the principle that all of its citizens of
Chinese descent should retain their Indonesian citizenship. (82)
While differing on the merits of the treaty itself, Peranakans
were unanimous in their fear that the signing of the treaty might
raise uncertainties about their rights as citizens, at least until
the end of the two-year option period They were united, therefore,
in their desire for the Government to issue a directive guaranteeing
the continuation of their full rights as citizens, in spite of the
uncertainties raised by the treaty. Siauw Giok Tjhan, in parlia-
mentary questions to the Cabinet, urged the Government to do so. (83)
Exchange of Notes
Concerning the Treaty
On June 3, 1955, during Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo's
visit to Peking, an exchange of notes concerning the Dual Citizenship
Treaty took place. Signed by the Prime Ministers of the two
countries, this document represents a supplement which was to be
ratified and to come into effect along with the treaty itself.
The content of the notes made it immediately apparent that the
two Governments were well aware of the opppsition the treaty had
aroused in various groups, and that they now intended to modify it in
such a way as to remove certain objections. It had become doubtful
(81)	Sin Min, Semarang, April 29, 1955, and May 17, 1955.
(82)	Keng Po, April 28, 1955.
(83)	Sin Min, May 25, 1955Ί55
whether the treaty could be accepted by the Indonesian Parliament,
and in any case both governments wanted to have the good will of the
Peranakan Chinese.
The first paragraph of the document restates the purposes of
the treaty, while another provides for a Joint Committee to be set up
in Djakarta for the purpose of discussing and planning its execution.
The other three paragraphs represent interpretations and elaborations
of the treaty. Two of these were designed to remove ambiguities
about the status of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent before
the option period and after the twenty-year term of the treaty, as
was explained in the previous chapter.
The most remarkable provision of the notes, however, was
Paragraph 2, which reads as follows:
The Government of the People’s Republic of China and
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia agree that
among those who are at the same time citizens of Indonesia
and of the People’s Republic of China there is a certain
group who may be considered to have only one citizenship
and not to have dual citizenship, because, in the opinion
of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, their
social and political position demonstrates that they have
spontaneously (in an implicit manner) renounced the
citizenship of the People’s Republic of China.
Persons included in the above-mentioned group,
because they have only one citizenship, are not required
to choose their citizenship under the provisions of the
dual nationality treaty. If they so desire, a certifi-
cate stating their position may be given to such
persons. (84) (Parenthesis in the original.)
When the text of the notes was released, this provision aroused
a storm of comment and speculation as to who would or should be
included among those paradoxical persons of dual nationality having
only one nationality. Newspapers went to their ’’informed sources"
and "sources near to the Cabinet" and found out that before the Prime
Minister left for China the Cabinet had discussed this problem,
probably at the insistence of the Minister of Health, Lie Kiat Teng,
who flatly refused to submit himself to another option procedure.
The sources agreed that it had been decided that Chinese-descent
Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament, and members of the Police
and Armed Forces would be released from the obligation of opting
again. Beyond this, most sources agreed that all other government
employees would also be exempted, while one source went so far as to
mention all registered voters of Chinese descent. (85) None of ·';
(84)	Unofficial translation from the Indonesian text.
(85)	Keng Po, June 16, 1955, and Sin Min, May 27, 1955.56
these reports, however, was confirmed by the Government, and no
further clarification was made.
Opponents of a new round of options immediately saw in this
new provision the possibility of converting the active system of the
treaty into 'a passive one. Referring to the words "in the opinion
of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia" in Paragraph 2 of the
notes, Siauw Giok Tjhan maintained that this meant that China was
giving the Indonesian Government complete freedom to determine who
among the dual nationals should be considered to have Indonesian
citizenship alone. He proposed that the Indonesian Parliament, when
considering the bill, should pass an amendment stipulating that the
definition of those who would automatically have only Indonesian
citizenship without further option should be as wide as possible, so
that it would, in practice, include all those who were already
citizens under the passive system of the Round Table Agreement. (86)
A few days later the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) issued a
statement incorporating the same suggestion. The Government must
take this opportunity, it said, to declare that all persons of
Chinese descent who are already citizens according to the Provisional
Constitution should not be considered to have dual nationality and
should therefore not be required to repudiate Chinese citizenship
The statement closed with the assertion that "for only a certain
group among those of Chinese descent (Ministers, Members of Parlia-
ment, etc.) to be freed from the obligation of opting again would be
in poor taste and might be considered as an invitation to the leaders
of the Peranakan community to sacrifice the fate of their group to
their own personal interests." (87) This statement gained the
support of the editors of the Semarang paper Kuangpo, and no doubt
also of a majority of the former opponents of the treaty.
Ratification of the Treaty
Up to the time of its resignation on July 24, 1955, the Cabinet
took no further action on the treaty or on the new issues raised by
the exchange of notes. The new Cabinet which took office on
August 8 was based on a coalition consisting almost entirely of
parties which had opposed the treaty. With national parliamentary
elections less than two months away, political parties were busy with
campaigning, and the Government generally attended only to what might
be considered "interim" affairs. Neither the Cabinet nor Parliament
desired to initiate consideration of the Dual Citizenship Treaty
until the formation of a new government on the basis of the newly
elected Parliament.
In March 1956, the new cabinet was installed. Led by
Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI, it was a coalition which included
(86)	Keng Po, June 16, 1955.
(87)	Keng Po, June 20, 1955.57
several of the parties which had opposed the treaty. During June
the Prime Minister put considerable effort into achieving, among the
government parties, agreement on the treaty. He held a "working
session" with the Foreign Affairs Section of Parliament but met
strenuous opposition from representatives of the Catholic and
Protestant parties. There were hints that strong pressure was being
applied to the Catholic and Protestant members of the Cabinet; and
considerable differences of opinion were evident among the leaders of
these two parties. (88)
On July 3, the coalition cabinet finally endorsed the treaty.
It was forwarded to Parliament as a draft bill in early August. A
"clarification" attached to the bill reasserted Indonesia’s right
under the Ali-Chou notes to determine who should be exempted from the
active option clause. Although it was not specifically so stated,
it was generally understood that all those who had voted in national
or local elections would be considered to have lost their Chinese
citizenship and would not be required to opt again for Indonesian
citizenship. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that the Cabinet
could have endorsed the treaty without this kind of compromise.
In December 1956, the Minister of Justice urged Parliament to
ratify the treaty soon; but it was March 1957 before sectional
meetings of the legislature began discussion of the matter. Mean-
while, the rebellion had broken out in Sumatra. The Cabinet was
divided on the issues involved and was forced to resign. In April
Parliament was recessed. About six weeks later it was reopened,
after the extra-parliamentary cabinet of Djuanda had been installed.
In August the new cabinet discussed and approved the treaty. In a
report to the Central Committee of BAPERKI in October, Siauw Giok
Tjhan blamed the changes of cabinet for Indonesia’s long delay in
ratifying the treaty. (89) A few weeks later, Foreign Minister
Subandrio wrote to Parliament urging it to give high priority to the
treaty.
The legislature finally debated ratification on November 21 and
25, 1957. The debate revolved around four points. One of these,
the status of pro-Kuomintang Chinese whom the Government was treating
as "stateless," will be discussed in Chapter VI because the treaty
does not directly concern this group.
A second issue was raised by a Masjumi member, St. Mangkuto,
who called for reconsideration (or, actually, rejection) of the
treaty on the grounds that "recognition of Chinese as Indonesian
citizens would endanger the Indonesian nation." (90) Accusing the
Chinese of a propensity for illegal activities, he alleged that they
(88)	Republik, June 20, 1956, and July 5, 1956.
(89)	Republik, October 21, 1957.
(90)	Sin Min, November 23, 1957.58
were disrupting the economy. (91) Although there were undoubtedly
many who sympathized with this position, no other legislator suppor-
ted it openly. One Moslem representative (IPKI) protested against
the speech as unworthy of a follower of Islam.
Most opponents of the treaty raised a different issue: they
demanded that debate on the treaty be postponed until after Parlia-
ment had passed a bill on citizenship and naturalization. It was
argued that Parliament might favor provisions in a citizenship law
which were incompatible with the treaty. Support for this position
came from the IPKI and PSI (Socialist Party), and the numerically
strong Nahdatul Ulama (Religious Scholars Association). Anwar
Harjono, claiming to speak for the Masjumi, also called for postpone-
ment. He said that the Masjumi had not yet determined its final
stand on the treaty. In what appeared to be an indirect repudiation
of the position taken by St. Mangkuto, he Stated that his party
regretted that the treaty had been drawn up hastily without consulta-
tion with the people most concerned, Indonesia’s citizens of Chinese
descent. (92)
Deputy Prime Minister Hardi, in his capacity as Acting Foreign
Minister, joined the debate twice to point out that there could be
no contradiction between a dual citizenship treaty which concerns
only those who already have citizenship and a citizenship law which
applies only to those who do not yet have citizenship. Speaking for
the Government, he insisted that Parliament deal with the treaty
first. (93)
It is extremely doubtful whether the Government could have won
a vote against postponement of debate on the treaty at this time.
Speakers favoring postponement represented parties with a total of
133 votes in Parliament. Parties whose spokesmen had shown a
willingness to deal with the treaty before discussing a citizenship
bill had a total of 97 votes. These figures are presented here only
as a general indication of the strength of the opposition to ratifi-
cation at this time. Actually, it cannot be assumed that those who
took a stand on the issue always represented all members of their
parties in Parliament. Furthermore, because of the conflict between
the central government and the military commanders in the Outer
Islands, many members were absent from Parliament. Thus it is
impossible to say how an actual vote would have turned out. Never-
theless, it is clear that the Government felt constrained to make a
concession regarding the postponement issue. The Cabinet quickly
agreed upon a citizenship bill and submitted it to Parliament just a
few days before debate on the treaty was scheduled to begin again.
As was shown in the previous chapter, no party had serious objections
to this new citizenship bill. Furthermore, no one found serious
(91)	Sin Min, November 27,	1957.
(92)	Republik, November 22	, 1957
(93)	Sin Po, November 23,	1957.59
contradictions between it and the treaty. Thus it became difficult
to argue that the citizenship bill should be passed first.
On December 17, 1957, the final debate on the treaty took
place. Spokesmen for the Government, supported by Siauw Giok Tjhan
of BAPERKI, urged immediate ratification. They argued that it was
desirable to settle the matter of dual citizenship as soon as
possible so that current government measures against alien Chinese
would not be applied to citizen Chinese. A Masjumi motion to post-
pone debate until after the citizenship law had been passed was
defeated by 39-110. The Masjumi and Socialist Party representatives
then walked out, and the treaty was ratified by the unanimous, vote of
the remaining delegates.
It is clear that the question of postponing debate was not a
real issue. The stand for postponement was taken by spokesmen of
parties which had serious objections to the treaty itself or which
could not agree among themselves The major issue was the type of
option system to be used and the groups which should be exempted from
making options. It was not until a compromise appeared to have been
reached on this matter that several parties abandoned their demand
for postponing debate. The developments surrounding the discussion
of this issue will now be traced.
On November 9, 1957, before the treaty was debated by Parlia-
ment, the Government submitted a paper replying to questions which
had been raised in the earlier sectional meetings. The paper
stated that those to be exempted from active options would be those
whose ’’social and political position’’ demonstrated that they had
voluntarily relinquished Chinese citizenship. The following
examples were given: those who have important roles in the political
life of the nation, those who hold important positions in the Govern-
ment or its agencies, and those who have often represented Indonesia
abroad in cultural, sports, and other matters. The Government made
it clear, however, that registration and voting were not to be taken
as proof of citizenship permitting exemption from the option
requirement. (94) This meant that the Djuanda Cabinet was not
accepting the compromise which the previous cabinet had worked out
between the PNI on one side and the Masjumi, Catholic, and
Protestant parties on the other.
When debate opened on November 21, the Communist Party (PKI),
BAPERKI, and the Catholic and Protestant parties demanded that the
Government use its right under the Chou-Ali notes to pronounce all
voters exempt from the option clause of the treaty, on the grounds
that voting amounted to a voluntary rejection of Chinese citizenship.
The Nahdatul Ulama was in favor of the treaty, but how its members
stood on the exemption issue was not generally known. The Masjumi
and the Socialist parties were opposed to any active option system.
Thus the Nationalist Party (PNI) was the only major party which
could be counted upon to support the treaty as presented by the
Government.
(94) Keng Po, November 9, 1957, and Antara, November 10, 1957.60
Before the second round of debate, the Government made the
minor concession of agreeing to include the Chou-Ali exchange of
notes in the draft bill on the treaty. (Actually, the Government
had announced earlier that this would be done. (95)) At the end of
the second day, however, Acting Foreign Minister Hardi reaffirmed the
Government’s intention not to exempt voters from opting. He said
that since all citizens, including dual citizens, were registered
voters, it would make the treaty meaningless to exempt voters. (96)
On December 5, Siauw Giok Tjhan and a group of thirteen other
Chinese-descent leaders presented a petition to the Government.
They urged that all "active" voters be considered to have only the
citizenship of Indonesia, and that they therefore be exempt from
options under the Dual Citizenship Treaty. (97) According to the
press, the petitioners included all Chinese members of Parliament,
the Constituent Assembly, and the National Council, with the sole
exception of Tony Wen of the PNI. (98) On the delegation were
representatives of the PNI, the PKI, BAPERKI, the Nahdatul Ulama, the
Masjumi, and the Catholic Party, as well as three prominent non-party
leaders. This was a striking demonstration of the united opposition
of the Chinese community to active options.
A week later, Foreign Minister Subandrio asked Parliament to
postpone discussion and action on the treaty, in order to allow the
Government "to carry on discussions for achieving a practical and
good settlement." The BAPERKI newspaper suggested that Tan Kiem
Liong of the Nahdatul Ulama and Lie Poo Yoe of the PNI had been
especially influential in gaining reconsideration of the issue by the
Government. (99) Siauw Giok Tjhan and the other petitioners were
invited to a conference with Dr. Subandrio soon afterwards.
On December 17, Parliament convened for its final debate on
the treaty. Foreign Minister Subandrio opened the session with a
statement on the option exemptions issue. According to one Chinese
newspaper, he promised that the Government would "give very careful
consideration to the possibility of accepting the suggestion of
members of Parliament who urged that...all voters of Indonesian
citizenship and Chinese descent be considered to have only one citi-
zenship, that is, Indonesian." (100)
(95)	Antara, November 10, 1957.
(96)	Sin Po, November 23, 1957.
(97)	The text of the petition may be found in Sin Min, December 14,
1957.
(98)	Sin Po, December 12, 1957.
(99)	Republik, December 13, 1957.
(100)	Sin Po, December 17, 1957.61
It seems likely that this is almost exactly what Dr. Subandrio
did say. But other pro-exemptions newspapers reported that he
included voters in the list of groups which the Government promised,
without qulification, to exempt from active options. (101)
Apparently the members of Parliament who were opposed to active
options and who favored the widest possible exemptions must also have
understood that the Government had yielded to their position. As
we have seen, the treaty was ratified unanimously and without debate
as soon as the members of the Masjumi and Socialist parties had
withdrawn. If the latter two parties had not been generally opposed
to the Djuanda Cabinet, they might also have accepted the apparent
compromise.
The Dual Citizenship Treaty was ratified by the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic
of China on December 30, 1957. Since only the formal exchange of
ratifications in Peking was now required before the treaty would go
into effect, it appeared that dual citizenship would soon be a thing
of the past. But it was not until.two years later that the exchange
finally took place.
The delay was at least partly due to the fact that the issue of
exemptions remained to be settled. In reply to a question from
Siauw Giok Tjhan, Prime Minister Djuanda told Parliament at the end
of January, 1958, that Subandrio had not promised to exempt voters;
he had only said that the Government would consider the matter and
would establish a committee to make recommendations.	(102) About
the same time, Subandrio affirmed that Chinese-descent members of
Parliament might be appointed to this committee. (103) When it was
finally established in April, however, the Interdepartmental Commit-,
tee on Dual Citizenship did not include a single member of Chinese
origin. Headed by Sudjono of the Foreign Ministry, it was made up
of fifteen members representing the Foreign, Justice, Home Affairs,
Information, and Defense Ministries, as well as the Immigration
Department, the Attorney General, and the Police Department.
In view of the composition of the committee, it is not
surprising that its recommendations, embodied a year later in a
government regulation on implementation of the treaty, did not in-
clude exemption for voters. Thus, after five years of debate,
deadlock, and unsuccessful compromise, the supporters of the active
option system finally overcame the dogged opposition of the Chinese
community and a major, if not a predominant, section of
Parliament.
(101)	Keng Po, December 17, 1957, and Republik, Harian Rakjat, and
Sin Min, December 18, 1957.
(102)	Sin Po, January 30, 1958.
(103)	Sin Min, January 24, 1958.62
Conclusions about the
Dual Citizenship Treaty
The failure of the treaty to gain the immediate approval of a
majority in Parliament, the strength of the arguments put forward by
its critics, the somehwat paradoxical way in which the exchange of
notes attempted to compromise with the oppostion, and the eventual
by-passing of the opposition, should not lead us to minimize the
positive aspects of the Dual Citizenship Treaty. The treaty is,
indeed, a historic achievement. For the first time, China has
relinquished her traditional claim that all persons of Chinese
descent remain Chinese citizens even when they acquire another citi-
zenship. Following the precedent of this treaty, other countries
with a Chinese minority, such as Burma, may also seek treaties with
China. Chou En-lai practically invited them to do so in his 1955
statement on the treaty. (104)
The treaty is a success also in that the Indonesian Government,
through careful diplomacy and protracted negotiation, was able to
achieve virtually all of its aims. Most important of these was, of
course, the elimination of the thorny legal and jurisdictional
problem of dual nationality—a goal sought by all groups. In
addition, the major procedures embodied in the treaty were those
advocated by the Indonesian side. As one legal analyst has pointed
out, the Chou-Ali exchange of notes even gave the Indonesian Govern-
ment what amounted to unilateral power to abrogate the Chinese
citizenship of any group of dual nationals. (105)
The treaty’s system of active options has a number of advan-
tages, both for the Government and for the Indonesian Chinese. Many
Indonesian leaders, even in the opposition parties, have opposed a
passive system partly because it would allow the uninformed, apathe-
tic, and uncertain dual citizens to become solely Indonesian by
default. They want assurance that those who remain Indonesian
citizens do so deliberately, and they believe that an active rejec-
tion of Chinese citizenship is the least"Indonesia might expect as a
demonstration of loyalty. Although the importance of this argument
is primarily in the area of subjective feelings, it may also have
significant consequences. Native Indonesians will be more satisfied
with an active option system. It will therefore probably improve
the attitudes of government officials and the Indonesian public
towards citizen Chinese. The latter, having actively rejected their
Chinese citizenship, may actually receive more equalitarian treatment
than they would have if they had acquired Indonesian citizenship
passively. Under the treaty’s active system, the Chinese who are
indifferent to Indonesian citizenship will become foreigners. They
will therefore be a more legitimate target for discriminatory
measures.
(104)	See Appendix VII.
(105)	Ko Swan Sik, De Meervoudige Nationaliteit, Leiden, 1957,
p.30 6.63
Another advantage of the active system is that in the option
procedure every Chinese will be provided with some sort of document /
certifying his chosen citizenship. This should end the ’’proof of
citizenship” problem which has brought considerable confusion and
frustration both to government officials and to Chinese—descent
citizens. On the other hand, it appears likely that under any passive
system (including the proposed exemption of voters) the problems of
determining and proving citizenship, along with the discrimination which
attended them, would have been extended for many years into the future.
Finally, in spite of the burden it places on the Courts (which
must hear and register declarations) the active system provides a
method of determining citizenship which is less complicated (and there-
fore less susceptible to injustice or corruption) than an alternative
passive system.
Having examined the positive aspects of the treaty, we now turn to
the arguments against it. It should be recognized, in the first place, /
that many of the objections raised against the treaty were either
exaggerated or groundless. For instance, the treaty would not create a
group of stateless or displaced persons. Those who became Chinese
subjects by default would be no more stateless or displaced than the
already large group of foreign Chinese in Indonesia. Then, too, the
treaty was attacked by one of its critics because it allowed persons who
had already chosen Chinese citizenship to have another opportunity of
choosing. Other critics, however, attacked the bill on the grounds that
it did not. Actually, since the group in question had already lost
their Indonesian citizenship, they were not included among the dual
nationals to whom the treaty gave the right of another option. This
would seem reasonable.
As we have seen, one of the major arguments against the treaty was
that its active system would ’’denationalize” a large group·; of Peranakans
who failed to make any choice. These would be the ’’little people,” the
workers and farmers and small shopkeepers, the illiterate and uninformed,
the people who for generations had lived in the villages and byways of
Indonesia. The opponents of the treaty estimated the size of this
group as anywhere from a ’’majority” to 80% of the Peranakan community,
and implied that all or most of them would lose their citizenship
without their knowledge or consent.
The present writer believes this argument to be vastly overstated.
Since the war years there has been a significant shift of the Chinese
population away from villages and into towns and cities. Today only a
small proportion of Chinese live in localities where there are less than
two hundred other Chinese. Even in small towns there is usually at
least one Chinese community organization and often a school. And
village Chinese almost invariably have extensive commercial, social, and
family contacts with Chinese of larger centers. There are few Chinese
families who do not have at least one literate member.
These facts suggest that even a moderate campaign, through posters,
press, schools, and Chinese organizations, will reach the vast majority64
of Peranakans with the basic facts about the new opting period. The
writer believes that among those who feel they have a stake in
Indonesian citizenship, very few will fail to opt for it. There will
be a small number who will do nothing. But we may assume that many
of these will be persons who are knowingly taking the easiest way to
acquire Chinese citizenship, and that most of the rest will be persons
who, although not particularly interested in Chinese citizenship, at
least know that they are acquiring it by their passivity. Thus it
seems unlikely that the active system will result in a large group of
people losing their Indonesian citizenship "unknowingly" or
"unwillingly."
In early debates on the treaty, it was argued that to revoke
any persons’s Indonesian citizenship without his concurrence would be
unconstitutional, even if he had another citizenship. This criti-
cism appears to have been well founded, because the Provisional
Constitution guaranteed that all persons who had acquired Indonesian
citizenship would retain it at least until the promulgation of a new
citizenship law. (106) The 1958 citizenship act specifically dealt
with this problem by providing, in Section 17, that citizenship can be
revoked for failing to reject a foreign citizenship when the person
concerned has an opportunity of doing so.
A Masjumi member of Parliament maintained that it would be
"detrimental7 to the nation" to allow freedom for a husband and wife
of different nationalities to retain their separate citizenships.
(107) Presumably this provision of the treaty was originally con-
ceived in accordance with the principle of freedom of choice of
citizenship. No doubt it was China which insisted that the treaty
should assure the same rights to women as to men. In any case, the
Indonesian citizenship act of 1958 provides that in the case of an
alien woman marrying an Indonesian, she automatically acquires
Indonesian citizenship unless her husband gives up his. On this
point, then, the principles of freedom of choice and sexual equality
which are embodied in the treaty have been modified in the citizen^
ship law. Presumably common citizenship for husband and wife is* a
more importance principle to the Indonesian Government and Parlia-
ment. If a Chinese woman ever marries an Indonesian and both
parties wish to keep their own citizenship, the Courts may have to
decide which takes precedence, the treaty or the 1958 law. So far
as the writer knows, this discrepancy was not mentioned in the
Parliamentary debates on postponement.
The treaty does allow either partner in a mar iage between a
Chinese and an Indonesian to acquire voluntarily the citizenship of
the other. But it contains no other provision for naturalization.
In the concluding chapter of this report, the pros and cons of
naturalization of Chinese aliens will be discussed. It will be seen
that, from one point of view at least, the lack of a naturalization
(106)	See Appendix III.
(107)	Sin Min, November 27, 1957.65
provision in the treaty may be considered to be a notable short-
coming .
Another objection to the treaty was the claim chat its active
option system would tend to alienate, rather than to attract, the
Peranakan population. Spokesmen for virtually all sections of the
Chinese community made it quite clear, in the press, in Parliament,
and in public speeches, that they were opposed to active options.
Official government policy has always been to attract and to
assimilate Chinese-descent citizens. Because of the feelings of
the Chinese, the active option system will jeopardize this policy,
at least slightly. It was partly awareness of this fact which
caused the Government to consider exempting various categories of
Chinese from the option procedure. If all active voters had been
exempted, the problem would have been overcome, because for the
great majority of Chinese a passive system would have been in effect.
The exemptions finally allowed by the Government apply, however,
to only a relatively small number of Chinese. (108) This is likely
to be regarded as unfair and unreasonable by the majority of Chinese,
and perhaps even by many who are to be exempted. (109)
The Government maintained that to exempt all voters would make
the treaty meaningless, since all citizens were registered voters.
This position was logically sound. But Siauw Giok Tjhan replied
that, in fact, a large number of citizens had not been registered,
either because of their own indifference or because of discrimination
or misunderstanding of the law on the part of registration officials.
At this time, Siauw was asking that all registered electors be
exempted; but later demands for exemptions included only "active
voters." Siauw estimed that from 20% to 30% of citizen Chinese had
not been registered. (110) While this seems an exaggerated figure,
it is likely that at least this proportion failed to vote. Under
any exemption procedure, then, the treaty would apply to a large
number of Chinese.
There is no doubt that to exempt either registered electors or
"active voters" would have involved many injustices and difficulties.
In some areas (though not in most) many citizen Chinese had been
left off the voters lists against their will. Fortuitous circum-
stances had caused others not to vote These persons would therefore
be considered dual citizens, while others with the same legal status
would not. The writer believes, also, that either lists of electors
or local records showing which electors voted would be a very diffi-
cult and unreliable basis for determining citizenship.
No doubt those who advocated exempting voters from options
were aware of these problems. In the opinion of this writer, their
(108)	See Appendix VIII.
(109)	See, for instance, criticism by the lawyer, Ko Swan Sik, as
reported in Sin Po, February 1, 1958.
(110)	Republik, December 4, 1957.66
position must be interpreted primarily as an attempt to suggest a
compromise through which the Government might conceivably accept a
modified passive system of options. As we have seen, however, the
Government was determined to institute the active system.
In conclusion, we venture to suggest that in spite of delays
and shortcomings in the way it was brought about, the implementation
of the treaty will provide a reasonably successful solution to the
problems of dual citizenship. Its effects on the Chinese minority
problem in general will be evaluated in the final chapter.67
CHAPTER V
DEMOGRAPHY OF CHINESE CITIZENSHIP
Immigration and Population
When the Dutch arrived in the Indies at the beginning of the
seventeenth century, they found settlements of Chinese traders here
and there throughout the islands. Under the rule of the Dutch East
India Company the Chinese prospered, and their community grew fairly
rapidly. During his administration of Java from 1811 to 1816, Sir
Stamford Raffles estimated that there were nearly 100,000 Chinese in
Java and Madura. By 1900 this number had increased to about
277,000, and in the following thirty years it more than doubled,
reaching 582,000 in 1930. The Chinese population in the Outer
Islands was increasing at an equally fast rate, and the total Chinese
population for the Indies was enumerated at 1,233,000 in 1930, the
year of the last complete census. (Ill)
Since Chinese women did not emigrate to the Indies in signifi-
cant numbers until after World War I, the increase in the Chinese
population was due partly to large-scale immigration, a major part of
which was indentured plantation labor, and partly to the fact that
from the beginning immigrants had taken Indonesian wives and raised
their children as Chinese. Thus there came to exist two Chinese
communities:	the Totoks, or recent immigrants, and the Peranakans,
who were born in Indonesia and were usually the children or the
descendants of mixed marriages. Although the distinction between
these two groups is based chiefly upon birthplace, the Indies-born
children of Tokoks are often considered as Totoks if they continue to
use the Chinese language and adhere to a distinctly Chinese way of
life. Because most Peranakans have had at least one mixed-marriage
among their ancestors, the name often bears the connotation of
"mixed-blood." Roughly, however, the two terms may be used to dis-
tinguish China-born and Indies-born Chinese.
As we have seen, the Netherlands Citizenship Act of 1910
claimed as Dutch subjects jail Chinese who were born in the Indies of
domiciled parents. Thus the 1930 census figures for foreign-born
and Indies-born Chinese give us an approximate idea not only of the
numbers of Totoks and Peranakans, but also of foreigners and
subjects. In that year there were about 750,000 Indies-born
Chinese, and 450,000 Chinese immigrants. (112) This means that
almost two-thirds of the Chinese living in the Indies were Dutch
subjects.
(111)	Purcell, op. cit., pp. 443 and 449.
(112)	Ibid., p. 444.68
Taking into account actual and probable immigration figures and
birth and death rates, the writer estimates that there were some
2,100,000 Chinese in Indonesia in 1950, of whom about 1,500,000, or
over 70%, were born there. The foreign-born Chinese population,
according to the same estimate, was about 600,000. Since 1950 no
significant amount of Chinese immigration into Indonesia has been per
mitted, and the percentage of Totoks, as compared with that of
Peranakans, has been decreasing at the rate of about one per cent,
per year.
Options for Chinese Citizenship
A good deal of mystery surrounds the question of how many Chi-
nese gave up their Indonesian citizenship during the option periods
of 1946-48 and 1949-51. The present writer was unable to obtain any
figures or reliable estimates of the results of the options under the
Act of 1946. Final figures for the 1949-51 period have never been
released, and probably never can be. The Courts in many areas were
exceedingly slow in "processing" the declarations of repudiation of
Indonesian citizenship which had been made before them. The Minis-
try of Justice finally ordered all such processing to cease on
January 1, 1958. This meant that many cases of repudiation were
never officially certified. For example, it was reported that in
the municipality of Semarang from 500 to 1,000 such cases were sus-
pended before final certification of alien citizenship was
issued. (113)
Unofficial reports gave a wide range of estimates for the
numbers of 1949-51 options. An officer of BAPERKI claimed that not
more than 10% of the Peranakan Community could have chosen Chinese
citizenship. In reporting the preliminary negotiations between
Indonesia and China concerning dual citizenship, the correspondent of
the Times of India obtained the estimate in Peking that out of about
2,000,000 Chinese in Indonesia, only 800,000 were Indonesian citi-
zens. (114) These figures must have been based on the assumption
that from 35% to 40% of the Indonesian-born Chinese had rejected
Indonesian citizenship or lost it through the rejections of their
parents or husbands. Government sources in Indonesia, on the other
hand, have given unofficial estimates of about 30%.
The Government published official lists of persons who had
repudiated Indonesian citizenship, but these were far from complete.
Up until 1954 they included only 24,192 Chinese names. (115)
Unofficial repudiation figures for various localities appeared in the
(113)	Sin Min, Semarang, March 13, 1958.
(114)	Sin Min, SemarangDecember 4, 1954.
(115)	From an unpublished study on Indonesian citizenship by
H. van Marie.69
press, however. By comparing these with population statistics from
various sources, the present writer estimates the following local
percentages of Indonesian-born Chinese who repudiated their
Indonesian citizenship: Djakarta 25%; Jogjakarta, 25%; Surakarta,
20%; and Semarang, 10%. (116)
Towards the end of 1954, all foreigners residing in Indonesia
were registered by local immigration authorities. By subtracting
our estimate of the number of foreign born Chinese living in
Indonesia in 1954 from the approximate number of foreign Chinese
registered in that year, we calculate that the number of Chinese who
had lost Indonesian citizenship through repudiations must have been
between 250,000 and 350,000. Thus the proportion of Peranakans who
chose Chinese citizenship in the 1949-51 option period was most
probably between 17% and 25%. And, if our estimates are correct,
from 40% to 45% of the Chinese living in Indonesia in 1955 were con-
sidered Chinese subjects. Whether the new round of options called
for. in the Dual Citizenship Treaty will substantially change this
picture is a matter for speculation. But it appears that, under any
circumstances except mass deportation, there will soon be at least
one million alien Chinese in Indonesia.
There were a little over 300 Chinese in all Indonesia who, in
rejecting Indonesian citizenship in the 1949-51 option period, chose
to remain Netherlands subjects rather than Chinese subject^. (117)
In closing, the writer would like to emphasize that almost all
of the figures given in this section are subject to substantial
error, either because they are based partly on guesses or because
the original methods of enumeration were far from precise.
(116) These estimates are based upon figures from various news-
paper and government reports and from van Marie’s unpublished
study. They probably include many unnecessary or illegal
repudiations, since the regulations were often misunderstood
or misinterpreted.
(117) From van Marie’s unpublished study.70
CHAPTER VI
THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CHINESE
IN INDONESIA
In a series of clauses based on the United Nations’ Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the 1950 Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia guaranteed to all persons living in Indonesia,
including foreigners, a wide measure of rights and freedoms.
Article 8, for instance, provided that "all persons within the terri-
tory of the State are entitled to equal protection of person and
property," and other provisions guaranteed fundamental legal rights,
freedom of movement and residence, freedom of opinion and expression,
the right to join trade unions and to strike, and equal protection
against any discrimination. Article 33 allowed limitation of these
rights only by laws "exclusively for the purpose of securing the in-
dispensable recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and to comply with the just requirements of public order,
morality, and welfare in a democratic community."
The activities of alien Chinese were subject to very little
supervision or control before 1954. As the internal situation wor-
sened, government and public suspicion and distrust of the Chinese
deepened. Control measures were instituted as fast as they could be
enforced, or perhaps faster. There were both political and economic
reasons for this. Pro-Peking Chinese were distrusted by government
and army officials who disliked the Communist ideas and loyalties
which were being spread by the political activists among them. On
the other hand, pro-Kuomintang Chinese were accused of activities
detrimental to the state. And when the press began to report that
the Sumatra rebels were obtaining aid from Taiwan, there was a great
popular outcry. Many organizations passed resolutions urging the
Government to take more and more drastic measures against the local
pro-Kuomintang Chinese. In addition, there had always been a wide-
spread desire to curb the economic strength of the Chinese, especially
of the alien Chinese.
Alien Control Measures
I?ew immigration laws, passed in 1950, virtually prohibited any
further Chinese immigration. Only a token quota, and persons invi-
ted by the Government, such as technicians, were to be admitted.
Nevertheless, it is generally believed that clandestine immigration,
especially of well-to-do pro-Kuomintang refugees, continued in fairly
large numbers. Not a few such persons have been discovered and
deported.
Partly as a check on illegal immigrants, and partly as a means
of closer supervision over all foreigners, Alien Control Regulation71
This established an
All foreigners
PP45 was promulgated by the Government in 1954.
Alien Control Bureau under the Police Department
were required to register with local branches of this bureau within
a certain period. The regulation included also the following pro-
visions for the supervision of the movements of aliens: upon
changing residence, a foreigner must report to the police and
receive from them an official letter which he must submit to the
police at his new place of residence; upon moving, a foreigner must
also report to the nearest Immigration Office, and to the civil
authorities at both his old and new residences; upon travelling
outside his place of residence for more than thirty days, a foreigner
must report to the police and receive a travel certificate; hotels
must keep a separate register for alien guests, and must require
aliens to fill out two copies of report forms, which are to be sub-
mitted to the police daily; anyone entertaining a foreigner (whether
a member of the family or not) in his home for one or more nights
must report to the police within twenty-four hours.
This regulation was not strictly enforced at first. A police
authority stated in 1956 that there had been about thirty violations
per month in Djakarta aloqe. (118) Enforcement became more and
more stringent. Heavy fines and jail sentences were imposed upon
offending aliens in various cities from time to time.
Another 1954 ideasure was the Alien Registration Regulation
PP32, which required that all aliens register with the nearest
Immigration Offices, and thereafter report all births, deaths,
marriages, divorces, changes of occupation, and changes of address
to the same office. In the following year, a provisional law
required immigrants to renew their Entrance Permits at fixed inter-
vals during a period of fifteen years, whereupon they must apply for
a Permanent Residence Permit. A foreigner who had been in the
country for fifteen years or more was required to obtain a Certifi-
cate of Residence from the Justice Department, after payment of a
fee of 500 rupiahs (over $40), plus 300 rupiahs for his wife and for
each child. This amounted to a rather stiff head tax on the
foreign population.
Beyond these general controls, the Government was determined
to .keep foreigners from taking part in, or trying to influence
Indonesian politics. In this connection, any action or attitude
which is related to the ’’life of the state,’’ or which is intended to
influence it is considered to be political. (119) The Constitution
reserves for citizens the right to take part in government, and it
allows the Government to restrict the freedoms of foreigners (or
citizens) in the interests of the security or welfare of the state.
Government authorities have repeatedly warned aliens to refrain from
all political activity.
(118) Sin Po, May 29, 1956.
(119) Soenario, op. cit., p. 19.72
Considering the strong political currents in the Chinese com-
munity and their potential effect, not only upon Indonesian citizens
of Chinese descent, but also upon the nation as a whole, the Govern-
ment endeavored to curb political activities in the Chinese community
Restrictions fell most heavily upon Kuomintang supporters. First
their traditional annual celebrations on October 10, and other such
public activities, were forbidden. In 1958, all Kuomintang organi-
zations, including youth groups and scout troops, were banned.
Later schools and businesses with Kuomintang connections were closed,
and many of these were seized or confiscated.
In October 1954, the Justice Department deported four pomini-
nent Kuomintang Chinese on the grounds that their activities were
endangering the welfare of the nation. The exact charges against
these men were not made public. Government opponents charged that
corruption was involved, while Government supporters alleged that the
deported persons had been involved in a pl,ot to oust the Government
parties and force the resignation of the President. Either or both
of these explanations may have had some basis in reality, but it
seems equally plausible that the Government’s action was at least in
part due to the fact that leading Kuomintang businessmen had cornered
the rubber market in order to prevent the sale of rubber to Communist
China under the terms of the Indonesia-China trade agreement.
About the same time that the Justice Department was moving
against Kuomintang leaders, the Military Police arrested three
leftist Chinese. As a result of these moves, alien Chinese, espe-
cially on the Kuomintang side, became much more cautious about
indicating their political orientation in public. Nevertheless,
deportations have continued.
Alien Press Control
In 1952, a special department of the Ministry of Education was
established to regulate and supervise foreign schools, most of which
were Chinese. In trying to eliminate political teachings, it issues
periodic lists of proscribed books and texts which may not be used in
Chinese schools. Similarly, the Attorney General periodically
issues regulations banning the import or circulation of certain
foreign books.
In April 1958, a military decree banned the publication or cir-
culation of any newspapers or magazines in the Chinese language.
Thirty-four Chinese newspapers, including five in Djakarta, were
forced to close The reason given was that the military authorities
responsible for national security could not obtain personnel capable
of continuous inspection and supervision of Chinese publications.
(120) In May, the regulation was modified to allow publication of
(120) Sin Po, April 18, 1958.73
selected Chinese-language papers under close military supervision.
A preamble explained that this was to enable the Government to reach
Chinese-language readers with its information and opinions. (121)
By December, eleven Chinese newspapers were being published under
these conditions.
Control of Foreign Schools
After it was established in 1952, the Inspectorate of Foreign
Education of the Ministry of Education exercised increasing super-
vision and control over Chinese-language schools. Textbooks and
curricula were carefully regulated. In 1957, all principals and
teachers in foreign-language schools were required to take examina-
tions in the Indonesian language.
In March 1957, when the President declared a ’’state of siege”
in the country, military authorities were given supreme power. Thus
Djuanda had greater authority as Minister of Defense than he had as
Prime Minister. In November 1957, after military commanders in some
areas had already taken the initiative in closing Chinese schools,
Djuanda issued a military regulation decreeing sweeping changes in
foreign education. Foreign-language schools were to be severely
limited in number, and those remaining were to be even more strictly
regulated and supervised. All Indonesian citizens were to be
transferred into Indonesian-language schools which followed the
national curriculum. The decree left details of implementation to
the Ministry of Education.
Subsequent regulations allowed foreign schools to be maintained
in only the major cities and a handful of towns in each province,
about 150 places in all. Within six months the number of Chinese-
language schools had been reduced from over one thousand to a few
hundred.
The 1957 Alien Tax
In July 1957, the Government announced a head tax for foreig-
ners:	1500 rupiahs for each alien family head, and somewhat less
for wives and children (regardless of citizenship). The amount of
the tax was clearly exorbitant. It could not be paid without
serious hardship, except by a minority of wealthy aliens. The
Chinese ambassador and Chinese consuls in many cities called on
government officials to request reconsideration. Chinese organiza-
tions in at least two dozen cities and towns sent petitions or
delegations to govermjient authorities. Several leaders of BAPERKI
and the PKI (Communist Party) openly opposed the tax. A dozen or
(121) Sin Po, May 24, 1958.74
more suicides were attributed to the tax, in spite of newspaper
opposition to this way of dealing with the problem!
As a result of these various forms of pressure, the Government
finally announced that the tax could be paid in installments, or
that, in the case of the really poor, applications for reduction of
the tax or complete exemption might be made. No doubt the govern-
ment tax offices were flooded with such applications. Chinese
organizations in a great many towns and cities assisted aliens in
filling out the required exemption forms. Some of the applications
were granted, but many were not. The Chinese press reported that in
some localities no exemptions or reductions were allowed. (122)
Since the Provisional Constitution gives tax-levying powers only to
Parliament, the Government submitted the alien tax decree as draft
legislation in June 1958. The PKI (Communist Party) and several
niinor parties opposed the bill, calling for a progressive tax
instead. Nevertheless, the bill was passed the following month.
Restrictions on the Economic
Activities of Alien Chinese
In the economic sphere, the first move of the Government was to
put an end to the remittances which Chinese had been sending to their
families in China This policy was in part dictated by economic
necessities. Because of the difficult economic position of Indonesia
after the war years, the supply of foreign exchange was very limited,
and the Government had to insist that all available credit in foreign
currencies should be utilized in ways beneficial to the home economy.
In addition, the prohibiting of remittances to China was based upon
the understandable conviction that the profits made by foreign busi-
nessmen in Indonesia should be spent or invested in Indonesia, and
not transferred abroad.
Under each successive cabinet, policies concerning the economic
position of the Chinese were different in detail and degree of effec-
tiveness. But all were based upon the desire to build up an Indo-
nesian middle class which would come to have a position of economic
welfare and power equal to or greater than that of the Chinese.
Under Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, Minister of Economic Affairs in the
first Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, this policy was implemented with
more stringent regulations than ever before.
In the first place, foreign credit was available to businessmen
only through the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and Iskaq extended the
privileges accorded to Indonesians, as opposed to Chinese, in this
field. Foreign exchange is of crucial importance to almost all
large-scale business enterprises in Indonesia because it is the only
medium for the procurement of goods from abroad—either capital goods
to equip and maintain productive enterprises, or consumer goods for
(122) Hsin Pao, October 11, 1957, and Sin Po, January 29, 195875
sale to the general public. Thus control over the allocation of
foreign credit gave the Government wide powers over the fate of the
various sectorsf of the business community. Iskaq announced that
concerns owned by aliens would receive only 15% of the available
foreign exchange, and that only by turning over 50% of their capital
and profits to native Indonesian business partners could foreign
Chinese firms avoid this limitation. This represented a drastic
reduction in the opportunities open to foreign Chinese capital, which
had hitherto played a dominant role in handling imports from other
Asian nations.
The second means of reducing the importance of foreign Chinese
in the economy was to exclude them from certain lines of activity.
Previous cabinets had outlined certain economic activities which
would be reserved for government development alone, and others that
would be reserved for citizens. However, no serious steps had been
taken to oust foreign Chinese from fields in which they were already
entrenched.
Under Iskaq, the policy of excluding foreign Chinese from im-
portant new fields was continued. For instance, in its program to
establish new industries with imported machines, equipment, and
technical aid, the Government invited the participation only of
citizens and foreigners having "national capital." The term
"national capital" was not concretely defined, and the federation of
the Chinese Sianghwee organizations proposed that all Chinese capital
be included, since none of the profits of Chinese capital could be
transferred abroad. In practice, however, the term was interpreted
to exclude most foreign Chinese. In Central Java, for instance,
government aid in establishing industries was confined entirely to
citizens, and alien Chinese businessmen could obtain no foreign
credits for this purpose.
Iskaq's policy Was extended also to the exclusion of foreign
Chinese from lines of business where they were already active. In
1954 and 1955 licenses for the importation of textiles were granted
only to concerns or combines owned wholly or mostly by citizens.
This left a great many Chinese textile wholesalers with empty
shelves. By Government Regulations PP42 and PP60 of 1954, foreig1-
ners were forbidden to own or even to hold shares in rice mills.
This meant that about a dozen large rice mills owned by alien
Chinese in Central Java, and an even greater number in East Java and
elsewhere, had to be sold or rented to "national" concerns, while
many foreign Chinese had to sell their individual interests in a good
many others.
As a result of these and similar measures, there was a con-
siderable slump in the business activity of the foreign Chinese. A
certain number of aliens re-invested their capital in small-scale
manufacturing not requiring equipment from abroad, in the building
of theaters, hotels, and residences, and in the handling, processing
and trading of local products. Others adopted a wait-and-see
attitude, while putting their capital into real estate, Jewelry,
gold, and other non-productive savings. Some accepted native76
Indonesian business partners, at least in name. A regrettably large
number, however, were able to find either officials who could be
bribed not Jto apply the restricting regulations in particular cases,
or Indonesian ’’briefcase importers” whose sole business was to get
import licenses from the Government and sell them (illegally) to
foreign firms who could not get them otherwise. It was widely known
that many party leaders and members of Parliament were engaged in
such "national" enterprises. The extent of this kind of corruption
and manipulation was a serious limitation on the effectiveness of the
whole policy.
In September 1957, the Ministers of Industry and Trade issued a
joint decree .requiring all alien industries, trading companies, whole-
salers, and retailers to register and to submit applications for
licenses to continue operations. "Alien" enterprises were to include
all businesses owned wholly or partly by aliens. In this regulation
and subsequent ones, it was made clear that the Government intended
to move gradually towards the exclusion of aliens from all lines of
business. As a beginning, aliens were forbidden to establish any
new enterprises, or to move or expand existing ones. In 1958,
Parliament passed a bill which closed most types of small industry to
aliens and set up a Foreign Capital Investment Council empowered to
draw up lists of specifically excluded areas. The bill did guaran-
tee, however, that in certain fields, such as plantations and major
industries, foreign enterprises would not be excluded for at least
twenty or thirty years.
In January 1958, a law concerning the employment of foreign
personnel was promulgated. All employers of aliens were required to
register their names, to give exhaustive details about them and their
work, to pay 50 rupiahs for each, to request permission to continue
employing them, and to report what had been done to train Indonesian
citizens to take their places and what plans had been made for such
replacement. Permits to employ foreign personnel had to be renewed
in July 1958, and also whenever a change in position or type of work
was to occur. Needless to say, the effect of this law was to dis-
courage the employment of aliens. It may be used at any time to
eliminate foreign workers from any type of employment.77
CHAPTER VII
THE POSITION OF INDONESIAN CITIZENS
OF CHINESE DESCENT
Government Policy Towards^
Cfalnese-Descent Citizens
In its Political Manifesto of November 1, 1945, the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia declared:
In our internal policy we intend to implement the
sovereignty of our people by putting into effect citizen-
ship regulations which will in the shortest possible time
encourage all groups of European and foreign Asian des-
cent to become true Indonesians, that is, Indonesians who
love democracy and their native country. (123)
These words are continually quoted on all sides as the founda-
tion of Indonesia’s policy towards her foreign-descent minorities.
It is generally agreed that the only way to achieve this aim is to
treat minorities with absolute equality and without discrimination,
and thus to encourage them to accept Indonesia wholeheartedly as
their own country. The term "homogeneous” has been universally
adopted to epitomize the kind of nation and society that should be
striven for as an ideal.
In recent years the Government has interpreted these broad
principles to mean that the Chinese minority should be completely
assimilated into the general population, not only legally, but
socially, psychologically, and culturally as well. It is hoped that
the Chinese can gradually be led to drop all of their distinguishing
characteristics and thus to become one with the majority group in
thought, word, and deed. In this "melting pot" process, Indonesian
society and culture would be enriched by contributions from the
Chinese, but Ultimately persons of Chinese descent would be no more
characteristically Chinese than the rest of the population.
Successive Governments have repeatedly assured citizens of
Chinese descent that there would be no discrimination against them—
no distinctions between "indigenous" and "non-idigenous" citizens.
In parliamentary debate on the Dual Citizenship Treaty, Siauw Giok
Tjhan called upon the Governemtn to make clear the consequences of
choosing Indonesian citizenship, and especially to guarantee that
discrimination would cease. About two weeks later, the Minister of
Justice repeated the Government’s promise that there would be no
(123) Unofficial translation.78
discrimination against citizens of foreign descent. (124)
President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta have stood consis-
tently .against racial discrimination. Even when anti-Chinese
feeling was running high, they publicly opposed any measures against
”non-indigenous" citizens. (125)
Briefly stated, then, official policy towards citizen Chinese,
as towards other minorities, has always been: assimilation without
discrimination. In order to implement and develop this policy, and
to advise and instruct various government departments and agencies in
related matters, a Bureau of Minority and Alien Affairs was estab-
lished in the Ministry of Home Affairs. This agency was known by
its initials, UPBA. It had separate sections for the Arab, Eurasian,
and Chinese minorities. Its organization suggested to many citizen
Chinese that they were to be treated more as Chinese aliens than as
citizens. Eventually, however, the supervision and control of aliens
was removed from the jurisdiction of UPBA, and the name was changed
to the Bureau of Minority Affairs.
As was shown in Chapter I, the relations which developed
between Chinese and Indonesians in the colonial period resulted in
considerable suspicion, prejudice, and differing interests between
the two groups. Under these circumstances, the policy of assimila-
tion was exceedingly difficult to implement. The transfer of all
citizen Chinese children to national schools, which will be discussed
below, was a major step towards assimilation.. Another move in this
direction was made by the Army Chief of Staff, General Nasution, in
April 1958. In a proclamation to citizens of foreign descent, he
urged them not to mix with aliens, but to ally themselves with native
Indonesian groups and organizations. (126) This accelerated the pro-
cess of organizational sqjaration which had been going on between the
citizens and the foreigners among the Chinese.
We shall now examine various other Government regulations and
measures affecting the citizen Chinese.
Legal and Political Position
of the Citizen Chinese
Citizens of Chinese descent have, of course, the freedoms and
rights which we have cited in the previous section as prerogatives of
alien Chinese, in addition to all other rights guaranteed by the Pro-
visional Constitution to the citizenry in general. Like other
(124)	Sin Po, December 12, 1957.
(125)	For instance, see Republik, October 21, 1957, and Star Weekly,
No. 553, August 4, 1956.
(126)	Sin Po, April 17, 1958.79
citizens, they are entitled to take part in government, and have the
right to work and to receive an education. Article 25 provided that
"the authorities shall not attach any advantages or disadvantages to
the fact that citizens belong to a particular group of the popula-
tion," while Article 7 stated that "all are entitled to equal
protection against any discrimination and against the incitement to
such discrimination." (127) Finally, Article 58 guaranteed that the
Chinese minority shall have at least nine seats in the House of Rep-
resentatives, and that this quota shall be made up by appointment if
not attained by election. Representation was likewise guaranteed in
the Constituent Assembly.
In the national elections of 1955, many parties included
Chinese in their lists of candidates. In most areas of the country
there was little or no discrimination in the registration of citizen
Chinese electors. It appears that most Chinese voters supported
BAPERKI, a Peranakan political organization. In the September
elections, BAPERKI obtained almost 180,000 votes—sufficient to elect
one representative, Siauw Giok Tjhan, to the Legislature. A Chinese
candidate of the Communist Party (PKI) also won a seat. In the
December election, several Chinese were elected to the Constituent
Assembly.
In August 1956, the Government appointed seven Chinese to the
Legislature, in order to meet the constitutional guarantee for
minority representation. All but one of these were members of
Government parties. Siauw Giok Tjhan, speaking for BAPERKI and its
supporters, protested against these appointments. Pointing out
that the election law required appointments to be made in accordance
with the desires of the minority to be represented, he argued that
this requirement could not be fulfilled by the appointment of
obscure members of parties which had not received Chinese electoral
support. The twelve Chinese who were appointed seven months later
to the Constituent Assembly were chosen on a more non-partisan
basis.
Proof of Citizenship
As a result of the historic division and prejudices between
the Indonesians and Chinese, citizens of Chinese descent were fre-
quently not accorded equal treatment with other citizens after the
establishment of the Republic. Totoks and Peranakans alike were
considered as undesirable aliens by many people, even by government
officials, and regulations intended for foreigners were often applied
to citizens of Chinese descent. Partly as a solution to this prob-
lem, the Ministry of Home Affairs decided to hold a general
registration of all citizens of foreign descent, and to issue to each
one a certificate of citizenship which could be shown in support of
(127) Official translation.80
a claim to any of the nights of a citizen. A few days after this
intention was announced, the Minister of Justice wrote a letter to
the Minister of Home Affairs in which he maintained that for a
government department to institute such a registration without an act
of parliament was unlawful. (128) Various Peranakan spokesmen also
raised serious objections to the proposed registration. The head of
the Bureau of Minority and Alien Affairs (UPBA) then made a public
statement in which he maintained that the jurisdictional competence
of his Ministry in this matter was quite properly derived from the
Round Table Agreements ratified by Parliament, and from the practice
of the former Dutch regime. But he also announced that the plan
would be withdrawn, and that the proposed certificates of citizenship
would be issued only to those who requested them. (129)
Very few Chinese requested them. In Central Java, which has a
Peranakan population of over 150,000, only 8,884 certificates were
issued in almost two years. BAPERKI took a strong stand against the
certificates. Claiming that they had no legal foundation and that
they represented a form of discrimination which would increase the
’’minority complex” of citizens of Chinese descent, BAPERKI spokesmen
declared that they would only make the minority problem even more
difficult to solve. (130) In a series of parliamentary questions to
the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs, Siauw Giok Tjhan asked why
they should not be abolished altogether. (131)
Although officials of UPBA made it clear that citizens of
foreign descent were not required to obtain citizenship certificates,
various agencies in both central and local government began to demand
them as proof of citizenship. Chinese who did not have such certi-
ficates were often treated as foreigners.
Many hotels, wary of the strict provisions of the Alien Control
Act, refused accommodation to Chinese unless they could show either a
foreign passport or the citizenship certificate. The Immigration
Department in Surabaja, the Police in Wonosobo, and local officials in
certain other places undertook to register as aliens all Chinese,
including professed citizens, who did not have these certificates.
Immigration offices also required the certificate, among other docu-
ments, from Chinese requesting passports.
Chinese who applied to government offices for various permits
and privileges, such as foreign credit or recognition as "national
(128)	Berita BAPERKI, Djakarta, Vol. I, No. 3, June 26, 1954, p. 4.
(129)	Soewahjo Soemodilogo, Sedikit tentang So’al "Tanda Warga
Negara,” (statement issued by the Bureau of Minority Affairs),
Djakarta, January 15, 1953.
(130)	Berita BAPERKI, Djakarta, Vol. I, Nos. 7/8, October-November,
1954, p. 4.
(131)	Ibid.81
enterprises," were often refused unless they could show a citizenship
certificate And in a few localities, in spite of specific instruc-
tions to the contrary, the committee in charge of registering
qualified voters refused to register Chinese who could not show the
certificate.
Many of the misapplications of the regulations were rectified.
Specific instructions were sent out from Djakarta and other head-
quarters of assure that no citizens were registered as aliens.
Officials of UPBA informed various agencies that the certificate of
citizenship should not be required, but that other documents would
suffice, such as a birth certificate plus a letter from the appro-
priate Court of Justice affirming that the bearer had not rejected
Indonesian citizenship.
Nevertheless, each rectification was made only after BAPERKI
leaders or other Peranakan spokesmen investigated cases and took
specific complaints to the proper authorities. This reinforced the
impression'of many citizens of Chinese descent that it would always
be necessary to struggle for their rights as citizens—an attitude
which is not conducive to harmonious minority-majority relations.
This negative result was often mentioned by opponents of the citizen-
ship certificates. They also pointed out that the proof-of-citizen-
ship system was a major source of corruption and "demoralization" of
public officials at many levels. Bribes could be used either to
obtain the certificates or to persuade officials not to demand them.
Possibly with such considerations as these in mind, the pre-
election interim cabinet of Burhanuddin Harahap established a
committee to examine the citizenship certificate question. On the
recommendation of this committee, the Minister of Home Affairs
decreed that no further certificates would be issued after March 1,
1956. This regulation was distributed to officials in various
departments in all parts of Indonesia.
At first this appeared to be a victory for the opponents of
the proof-of-citizenship system.	It soon became apparent, however,
that the problem was not solved.	Many government agencies con-
tinued to require citizenship certificates before granting licenses
or other privileges. The head of UPBA for Central Java explained
that the Government had not "abolished'the certificates, nor had it
decided not to require them—it had merely stopped issuing them.
Thus, for about a year, citizenship certificates were unobtainable
but often required.
The legal basis for demanding the UPBA certificates was finally
eliminated by the citizenship decree of June 4, 1957, issued by the
Army Chief of Staff. This provided that:
Whoever is required by an official agency to prove
whether he is a citizen or a foreigner must request the
District Court at his place of residence to decide whether82
he is a citizen or not according to usual procedures.
(132)
In an appended "explanation," the decree further stated that:
In order that the District Courts will not be flooded
with requests to determine citizenship, the responsibility
of the District Courts to determine citizenship is limited
to those persons required to prove their Indonesian citi-
zenship by an official agency. (133)
Thus UPBA citizenship certificates were superceded by court citizen-
ship certificates. District Courts in the larger cities had to
assign special judges to citizenship affairs. In the smaller cities
and towns too, many Chinese applied for the new certificates.
A second military decree, announced by the Minister of Defense
in August 1957, required very high fees for the court citizenship
certificates:	1,000 rupiahs for adults, 500 rupiahs for each child,
and 750 rupiahs for foreign women who married Indonesian citizens
after December 1949. Because the decree was retroactive, those who
had already obtained court certificates were also required to pay the
fee. Exemption from payment was to be granted to those "clearly"
unable to pay.
As was to be expected, the new regulation aroused strong pro-
tests from the citizen Chinese community. Since fees for various
other licenses and permits were relatively low--a passport, for
instance, required only 15 rupiahs—-and since the Government had
justified the fee on the grounds that the current national emergency
required increased revenues, the "fee" appeared to be an exorbitant
tax. Furthermore, the fee was announced shortly after a similarly
hea\vy head tax had been levied against foreigners (mostly Chinese),
and it therefore appeared that the Government was attempting to tax
a racial (ethnic) group in a discriminatory manner. Finally, it was
pointed out that even under emergency conditions, the Government had
no constitutional power to levy taxes without parliamentary assent.
At the end of August, Siauw Giok Tjhan met with Prime Minister
Djuanda to discuss the fee. Afterwards Siauw announced that an
"understanding" had been reached. According to him, Djuanda had
stated that the court certificate would be required only of those
whose citizenship was in real doubt, and that proof of having parti-
cipated in the national elections would ordinarily be considered
sufficient proof of citizenship. Djuanda had assured Siauw that the
regulation had no discriminatory intent whatsoever, since it could be
applied also to "those who are usually called native" if their citi-
zenship were in doubt. He had also maintained that the fee was
(132)	Unofficial translation.
(133)	Unofficial translation.83
never intended as a method of raising money, and had promised to
correct those aspects of the regulation which suggested it.	Pre-
sumably this referred to the statement in the preamble which
mentioned the need for revenue, and possibly also to the fact that a
man had to pay a fee for his wife and each of his children, even
though their citizenship would not be in question. (134)
The Government appointed a committee to study the fee regula-
tion. It was a month and a half before a revision was ready for
publication. In the meantime, confusion and misapplications of the
regulation occurred widely. For instance, newspapers reported that
all citizen Chinese in the transport business in West Java were
required to obtain court certificates within thirty days, and Chinese
applying for or renewing driving licenses in Malang likewise had to
show the certificates. In Djakarta, between ten and twenty citizen
Chinese were served with alien tax notices; it was reported that
they could only avoid the tax by showing court certificates which
would cost almost as much to obtain. Another newspaper reported the
case of a Chinese who possessed proof of not having rejected	j
Indonesian citizenship, who had voted in the national elections, and
who had been issued an Indonesian passport; when he applied for
renewal of his passport, he was told that he must show the new court
certificate. A duly elected Chinese representative in a district
council was not admitted to his seat because he ’’could not show
adequate proof of citizenship."
On October 10, 1957, the revised fee regulation was issued.
It established a complicated procedure for obtaining the citizenship
certificate—one in which the applicant had to appear before four
different government officials> The fee was still to be 1,000
rupiahs, but there was no mention of fees for wives and children.
Those unable to pay were required to provide supporting statements
from a local civil servant and a local finance inspector. They also
had to register their inability to pay with the clerk of the court.
If at any time within five years their economic situation should im-
prove, they would have to pay the fee.
The new regulation repeated the stipulation that the court
certificate could only be required in cases of real doubt. It did
not specify, however, what documents might be considered to prove
citizenship beyond doubt. The Third Deputy Prime Minister later
announced that each agency might establish its own requirements, and
that proof of having participated in the elections would not neces-
sarily be sufficient. (135) Later still, Djuanda, the Prime
Minister, stated that a valid passport would ’’generally" be conside-
red sufficient proof of citizenship, but that a certificate of not
having rejected Indonesian citizenship would not. (136). The latter
(134)	Sin Po and Keng Po, August 31, 1957.
(135)	Sin Po, October 28, 1957.
(136)	Keng Po, January 30, 1958.84
document, issued by local Courts of Justice, had been recognized by
the Ministry of Education as the only valid proof.
The October revised regulation contained one provision which
was welcomed by the Chinese. It specified that no government agency
could require proof of citizenship unless it was enforcing regula-
tions which distinguished between citizens and foreigners. Another
provision allowed a person possessing legal proof of citizenship to
have it investigated and validated by the District Court—without
payment of the high feee. Thus court certificates or other court
validated proofs continued to be necessary in obtaining various
licenses and permits not available to aliens, but they were not
legally required in other official matters, such as applying for
driving licences.
In March 1958, all military decrees issued under the "state of
emergency" expired. The June 1957 decree placing the responsibility
for determining citizenship with the courts was renewed, but the
August and October decrees which established exorbitant fees for the
court certificates were not. Thereafter only a fee of sixty rupiahs,
to cover court expenses, was required.
In view of the history of this contentious proof-of-citizenship
issue, it seems likely that there will be no satisfactory solution
until every Chinese has received a certificate Showing his declared
citizenship under the provisions of the Dual Citizenship Treaty with
China. Even then, many citizen Chinese will continue to resent
having to show certificates which are not expected of other citizens.
Education of Citizens
of Chinese Descent
Although no exact figures are available, it appears that in the
early 1950's more than one-half of the children of Peranakans went to
Chinese-language schools, another large fraction went to Catholic and
Protestant schools, and only a minority attended government schools.
This meant that the segregated school system established by the Dutch
and even more strongly enforced by the Japanese had been continued to
a large extent in the post-war period.
This situation was considered highly undesirable by the Govern-
ment. In the Chinese schools the pupils did study the Indonesian
language, but they spent more time on Chinese. History, geography,
and social studied were concerned more often with China than with
Indonesia. Furthermore, the friendships, attitudes, and loyalties
which a child developed in Chinese-language schools were not condu-
cive to good Indonesian citizenship. Government authorities, there-
fore, repeatedly declared that it was not fitting for citizens to
attend foreign schools, and one of the duties of the Inspectorate of
Education for Foreigners was to encourage the transfer of Chinese
Indonesian citizens to government schools. However, there was85
little incentive to push this program, because, in spite of remark-
able progress in the expansion of the public school system, the
number of government schools was far from adequate even to fulfill
the needs of the indigenous population.
As another approach to this problem, the Department of Educa-
tion established several Experimental Elementary Schools especially
for Indonesian citizens of foreign descent. In schools of this kind
for the children of Peranakans, the Chinese language was taught as a
second language, and courses included material on Chinese history and
culture. While this must be viewed as a positive and constructive
step forward, it did not provide an adequate solution to the problem
of education for citizen Chinese. There were never enough such
schools to accommodate more than a minute fraction of Peranakan
children, and insufficient financial resources made it difficult to
assure a standard of teaching equal to that in many Chinese schools.
There was also the theoretical objection that although the schools
provided a "national education," they could contribute little towards
assimilation as long as they remained segregated.
The issue of Chinese education was dramatically brought into
the open in July of 1954, when the Djakarta Municipal Council
unanimously passed a resolution urging the Government to prohibit
Indonesian citizens from attending foreign schools and to convert
foreign schools to national schools in cases where the proportion of
pupils of Indonesian citizenship exceeded 25%. The originator of
this motion was Takdir Alisjahbana, an outstanding literary figure
and a member of the Socialist Party (PSI). In presenting his
motion, he stated that some 200,000 Indonesian citizens of Chinese
descent were attending foreign schools, and emphasized the disadvan-
tages to Indonesia of this system.
This event created considerable consternation in the Peranakan
community, partly because most of them opposed the substance of the
motion, but also because they feared that it would give a false or
prejudicial impression of their position. It might commonly be
deduced, for instance, that Peranakans are, as a group, more loyal
to China than to Indonesia. The fact that a large number of
Peranakan children (perhaps as many as 50,000) (137) did attend
government schools was not mentioned. Also overlooked were some of
the most important reasons why there were so many in Chinese schools.
Government schools were overcrowded, and Chinese had often met with
resistance or obstruction when trying to have their children ad-
mitted to them. Furthermore, many of the Chinese schools were able
to maintain higher standards than government schools, because of
greater financial resources for salaries, equipment, buildings and
so on.
There were a certain number of nationalist-minded Peranakans
who wanted their children to have a purely Chinese education. Another
(137) M. Hutasoit, Compulsory Education in Indonesia, (a UNESCO
publication printed in the Netherlands), 1054, p. 81.86
group, perhaps equally large, wanted only to give their children the
best education they could afford, regardless of whether the oreinta-
tion was Chinese, Dutch, religious, or Indonesian nationalist. The
majority, however, would probably have preferred an education in
which language and curriculum were adjusted to life in Indonesia, but
which also included courses giving a general knowledge of China’s
cultural heritage, including language, literature, history, and
philosophy.
In a public statement concerning Takdir Alisjahbana’s motion,
BAPERKI defended the constitutional rights of citizens to a free
choice of education, and of minority groups to the perpetuation of
their own cultures. (138)
In May, 1955, BAPERKI held a special conference to discuss edu-
cation and culture. In a public statement embodying its decisions,
the conference urged the Government to speed up the expansion and
improvement of the public school system, to increase its efforts to
prevent discriminatory practices in the schools, to eliminate preju-
dicial materials from textbooks and teaching materials, and to offer
Chinese and other Asian languages in public schools. The conference
further proposed that until such time as the schools could meet the
educational needs of the whole population, the Government should give
as much aid as possible to private schools, and should reject all
proposals to exclude citizens from foreign schools. The conference
went on record against all schools conducted exclusively for specific
groups, including both foreign Chinese schools and the Government’s
experimental schools for Chinese. Finally, it was decided that
BAPERKI itself should establish, or co-operate in establishing,pri-
vate Indonesian-langu^-ge schools open to all, and should gather funds
for teacher-training, advanced scholarships, and city dormitories for
students from towns where no secondary schooling was available. (139)
During 1956 and 1957, BAPERKI branches did establish a few
mixed schools with a "national" curriculum. Newspapers reported the
opening of BAPERKI schools, for instance, in Tjilamaja, Kediri,
Tanggerang, Bagan Siapi-api, and Kudus. Through Chinese-Indonesian
co-operation, similar schools were set up in Jogja and Tandjung
Priok. Like the government experimental schools, however, the
numbers of mixed schools which were organized privately were too few
to offer a satisfactory solution to the problem of Chinese education.
During this period, the Ministry of Education was proceeding with
discussions and investigations directed towards a policy of providing
a national education for all citizen Chinese.
In the summer of 1957, before a national policy had been estab-
lished, the military commanders of East Indonesia and Central Java
took decisive actiQn. In Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, and Celebes, all
(j.38) Berita BAPERKI, Vol. I, No. 4, July 26, 1954, pp. 2-3.
(139) Kuangpo, Semarang, June 1, 1955.87
foreign Chinese schools were closed. Of the forty-seven schools
involved, seven were eventually permitted to reopen, but for foreign
students only. Citizen Chinese children were transferred into state
schools and newly established private schools with a national curric-
ulum. In Macassar the Government opened a new experimental school,
but most of the one thousand citizen Chinese pupils who had been
studying in foreign schools were distributed among fifty different
national schools. The commander of the armed forces in Central Java
took similar action.
The policy of the military commanders was quickly adopted by
the Ministry of Education. In one area after another, foreign
schools were closed and citizen Chinese children were redistributed
to national schools. In many cities and towns special committees
were set up to assist in providing for the ousted pupils. BAPERKI
and other Chinese organizations took an active part in the process.
Many of the closed foreign schools were converted to state or
private "national" schools—for instance, fifteen in Medan and twenty
in Djakarta. Some of the larger foreign schools were split in half,
with one section for foreign pupils and one for citizens. Many
Peranakan children were transferred to regular state schools, but
the majority remained segregated not only from alien Chinese but
also from Indonesian children. The Ministry of Education permitted
Chinese to be taught as a foreign language in the unsubsidized
schools, and even allowed them to retain foreign teachers. But by
the end of 1957, virtually all citizen Chinese children were in
schools teaching the national curriculum in the Indonesian language.
These changes caused disruption and consternation in the
Chinese community. There was considerable dissatisfaction and com-
plaint about the "method" the Government employed to achieve its
end. But neither the Chinese press nor the public spokesmen of the
Chinese community questioned the goal: the elimination of foreign-
litnguage, foreign-content education for citizens of Indonesia.
Economic Measures Concerning
Citizens of Chinese Descent
As we have seen, under Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo the Ministry of
Economic Affairs undertook a vigorous policy intended to reduce the
importance of Chinese in the economy of Indonesia.	The program was
not confined to restrictions upon foreign Chinese.	Citizens of
Chinese descent were also subject to considerable limitation in their
economic opportunities.
The Government’s position on this matter was that a program
intended to build up an Indonesian entrepreneurial class could not
be called discriminatory. The aim was to create a"harmonious"
middle class in which Chinese and Indonesians would co-operate on an
equal basis and for the common welfare. In the past, Indonesians
had not taken their rightful place in business enterprise because88
of tradition and because of restrictions placed upon them by the
colonial regime. As a result the economy had come to be controlled
entirely by non-Indonesians, and the Indonesians themselves were
known as a "nation of coolies and a coolie among nations." Under
such circumstances, it was only fitting that the Government should do
everything in its power to enable Indonesians to acquire the quali-
ties and attributes (including capital) of entrepreneurs. (140)
The Ministry of Economic Affairs, therefore, proposed that
Chinese entrepreneurs, of whatever citizenship, should find Indonesian
business partners, and make them co-directors and joint-owners of
their firms. The statutes of such firms should guarantee that at
least fifty per cent, of the company's shares should be owned by
native Indonesians. In most cases, however, the Indonesian partner
WQUld not have sufficient initial capital, and therefore should be
given one half of the company's shares at the outset, with the under-
standing that he would gradually pay for them out of his share of the
profits. Furthermore, existing Chinese firms should reorganize
their management staff in such a way as to allow the participation of
native Indonesians, and Chinese-owned factories should offer facili-
ties for training Indonesian technicians. In these ways the Chinese
business community was called upon to aid the Government's program of
creating a middle class in which Indonesians would play their just
part.
The program was to be voluntary, but in practice the Government
had considerable power to enforce it. Iskaq, the Minister of
Economic Affairs, announced that foreign credits were to be divided
as follows: 15% to foreign concerns, 15% to "non-indigenous"
Indonesian concerns (that is, Peranakan concerns), and 70% to
"national" concerns. The privileged category of "national" concerns
included firms in which up to 50% of the capital was owned by foreigi-
ners or citizens of foreign descent. In connection with every
economic opportunity which the Ministry of Economic Affairs made
available to private businesses—«credit facilities, import licenses,
wholesale rights, foreign exchange, and so on—applicants were re-
quired to give information on the ownership of their firms, and
priorities were given to those in which native Indonesian capital
played the largest part.
As in the case of foreign-Chinese businessmen, citizens of
Chinese descent found their enterprises hard hit by the new program,
and they reacted in the same variety of ways. Some found new out-
lets for their capital in fields not dependent on imports and foreign
exchange. Others put their capital largely into non-productive
savings, in the hope that a change of Government would bring better
times. And a certain number resorted to bribery or the illegal buy-
ing of licenses from Indonesian "front" enterprises. However, a
fairly large number did establish new firms jointly-owned with
Indonesian partners.
(140) Times of Indonesia, July 19, 1954.89
Beyond encouraging the joint-ownership of new and existing
firms, the Ministry of Economic Affairs stimulated and aided the
establishment of independent native-Indonesian enterprises. In May,
1954, Iskaq issued a circular urging local authorities to canalize
industries into the hands of native Indonesian entrepreneurs. In
some cases this was done at the expense of the Chinese. For
instance, in West Borneo, where coconut-oil factories were entirely
in the hands of foreign and foreign-descent Chinese, one-half of
these enterprises were turned over to native Indonesian entrepre-
neurs, and the Head of the provincial Department of Industry stated
that the production of rubber, soap, and other commodities would also
be transferred in due time. (141)	' ?
In June, 1954, the Government issued Regulation PP42, concern-
ing the control of rice mills. According to Article 10 of this
decree, "persons having a citizenship other than Indonesian citizen-
ship" were prohibited from ownership, part-ownership, or even
shareholding in rice-milling enterprises. Such persons were
required to sell or rent their entire rice-mill interests to native
Indonesian entrepreneurs within a period of nine months.
In Java, the main rice-producing island of Indonesia, there
were 508 rice-mills in 1954.
citizens of Chinese descent,
and native Indonesian owners
About 400 of these were owned by
and the rest divided among foreigners
The question arose as to whether the
prohibition of ownership was intended to apply only to foreigners,
or also to Chinese-descent citizens of Indonesia. Technically,
since the latter were still also Chinese citizens under Chinese law,
they did "have a citizenship other than Indonesian." If the regula-
tion were not intended to apply to them, the simple word "foreign"
would have been used instead of the complicated and ambiguous longer
phrase. It seemed certain that the Government intended to eliminate
all persons of Chinese descent from this field of economic activity.
The regulation aroused vigorous criticism from the Chinese
press, and BAPERKI mobilized a campaign against it. The Catholic
Party issued a public statement strongly condemning the regulation
as a form of discrimination, and politicians of other parties ex-
pressed their disapproval. Either because the Government was
impressed by the extent of the opposition, or because the plan proved
to be impracticable, Iskaq finally announced in September that the
prohibition was not intended to apply to Chinese-descent citizens,
but only to foreigners.
In early 1956, the Government announced a new policy affecting
Peranakan firms. In order to qualify for the privileges reserved
for "national" importers, all of the owners of an enterprise would
have to be Indonesian citizens Whose parents were born in Indonesia.
This superceded Iskaq*s requirement that 50% of the capital of a
"national" firm must be owned by "indigenous" Indonesians. The
(141) Times of Indonesia, July 19, 1954.90
Chinese press welcomed the elimination of racial discrimination in
this respect, but pointed out that very few Chinese were in a posi-
tion to prove the birthplace of their parents.
Under the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, the same defini-
tion of "national" enterprises was applied, but among the national
firms, those owned by "indigenous" Indonesians were given preference.
Minister of Trade Sunardjo of the Djuanda cabinet extended this
policy. In a public statement, he referred to "indigenous" busi-
nessmen as the "favorite child" of the Government. (142)
A large number of Chinese have gradually come to believe that,
in spite of its protestations to the contrary, the Govenment intends
to discriminate against them whether they are Indonesian citizens or
not. In addition to the policies outlined above, one other impor-
tant law leads them to this conviction. The Dutch law of 1875 which
prohibits the alienation of nativb-owned land to persons of foreign
descent has been perpetuated by the Indonesian Government. This
means that with fe^ exceptions Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent
cannot buy farmiland today. Most Chinese do not care to buy such
land, and many admit that without the law a highly undesirable prob-
lem of Chinese landlordism might arise. Nevertheless, they consider
the law to be a touchstone of Government attitude. If the Govern-
ment were really non-discriminatory, they say, it would protect the
farmer from the danger of losing his land to native Indonesian land-
lords as well as to Chinese.
In reply to this objection, Government authorities maintain
that it takes a long time to change a whole system of laws, especial-
ly where there is a shortage of legal experts and a large number of
urgent legal and legislative problems, as in Indonesia. Therefore,
they say, discriminatory laws inherited from Dutch times should not
be blamed on the present Government; and as for the measures
initiated by the Government, their purpose is not to discriminate,
but to bring about a more just distribution of wealth and income
among all groups of the population.
Political Parties and
The Minority Question
From about 1953 to 1957 or 1958, the Government’s minority
policy and its attitude on various minority issues were primarily a
reflection of the position of the major Government party during this
period, the Nationalist Party (PNI). Although the Government-
supporting parties had much the same outlook, they did not join the
PNI in taking public responsibility for Government minority policy.
Spokesmen for the PNI, including Iskaq and other Government officials
of that party, publicly explained and defended the economic
(142) Republik, September 25, 1957.91
regulations, the citizenship certificates, and other measures
unpopular with the Chinese. It is probable that their arguments
and attitudes obtained considerably approval, even among Government
opponents who were publicly more favorable to the Chinese minority.
The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), although generally supor
ting the PNI-led cabinet, occasionally expressed its disagreement on
minorities policy. In the view of the PKI, Indonesian citizens of
Chinese descent were to be considered a national force necessary to
Indonesia in its struggle against imperialist capital. Therefore,
there was no reason to try to substitute native Indonesians for
citizens of Chinese descent in various positions; but, on the con-
trary, the Government should also protect the latter against the
competition of the big European companies. (143)
In August, 1954, the central council of the Catholic Party
issued a public appeal for the recognition of equal rights for all
citizens regardless of religion, race, or locality. Among its
specific recommendations were the following: The state should not
discriminate between native and foreign-descent citizens in economic
matters, such as the allocation of licenses, recognition of import
firms, industrial development, and so on. All schools must be open
to any Indonesian citizen without exception. Appointments to any
type of position should be based solely upon ability, and not upon
native origin. The discriminatory colonial agrarian law should be
abrograted. (144)
Although explicitly interested primarily in the welfare of the
Arab minority, the modernist Islamic party, the Masjumi, issued a
statement in April, 1955, calling for the immediate elimination of
all discriminatory government measures such as travel permits and
citizenship certificates. It also urged its members to do every-
thing in their power to avert anything which might be considered dis
criminatory in social life and interrelationships between groups.
(145)
The Socialist Party (PSI) opposed the minorities policy of the
Government on the grounds that it was a violation of the principle
of absolute equality of rights for all citizens. The Government’s
economic measures, they said, had created a class of economic para-
sites instead of a "national middle class." Worse yet, the
Government’s efforts had only made the minority problem more diffi-
cult. One Socialist writer described the situation as follows:
(143)	This is the position stated by PKI leader Sudjito at a mass
rally in Surab^a on July 4, 1954, as reported in Keng Po,
Djakarta, July 6, 1954.
(144)	Sin Min, Semarang, August 24, 1954.
(145)	Kuangpo, Semarang, April 15, 1955.92
Indonesians,who were treated as a minority by the
Dutch dominant group before the revolution, have now be-
come the dominant group themselves. And this new dominant
group, which holds political power, wants to use its
political position to achieve a pre-eminent position in
social and economic fields as well.
Thus the Government is stimulated to carry out dis-
crimination against groups of citizens who are not
considered to be pure Indonesians. The weaker the Govern-
ment, the greater is, its tendency to yield to popular
prejudice, and especially when, in reality, such sentiments
find approval in the Governments own inner feelings. As
a result, devious methods and legal artifices are found by
which to carry out discriminatory practices against the
minority, which increasingly feels itself to be treated
unjustly.
The reaction on the side of the minority will cer-
tainly be to unite itself in minority-type organizations,
to increase mutual co-operation, land to struggle against
discrimination. This reaction will raise further preju-
dice on the side of the majority, and will be considered
as grounds for increasing discrimination. Thus occurs a
reciprocal division and discord which has no end and which
greatly worsens the situation. (146)
Thus the opposition parties were able to point out many injus-
tices and undesirable results arising from the Government’s
minorities policy. How different the general policy might have been
under a cabinet comprised of the opposition parties, however, is open
to question. The certificates of citizenship condemned by the
Masjumi were originally initiated in a Home Affairs Ministry headed
by a prominent member of the Masjumi. Under a Socialist Minister,
the Economic Affairs Ministry had also planned measures to give
special aid to the disadvantaged native Indonesian group. And the
proposal to prohibit citizens of foreign descent from attending
foreign schools, which was originated by a member of the PSI, did
more to alienate the Chinese minority than the Government's educa-
tional policies had done.
Two events in 1956 brought the Chinese minority question more
directly into the political field: the "Han-Harjono affair” and the
"Assaat Movement.” The first of these, which originated in a street
fight between a Chinese and an Indonesian army officer, rapidly be-
came a national issue. Feelings of hostility and outrage were
directed not only against Han, who was accused of trying to use
bribes in the legal proceedings which followed the incident, but
against all Chinese. Threatening leaflets were distributed and
(146) S. K. , ’’Tentang Kewarganegaraan, ” Sikap, Vol. VII, No. 41,
November 1, 1954, p. 2.93
posted throughout the predominantly Chinese quarters of several
cities. Strongly anti-Chinese statements were made in public and
reported in the press. Several incidents of violence occurred,
including the bombing of a Chinese store. Commenting on the reasons
why so many Indonesians seemed to approve of such action, an army
officer said in a public statement:
The explosion of the bomb in a car store, which con-
stituted an extra-legal act by the people, did not raise
any feeling of regret or horror, but instead it raised
laughter and scorn. All of this was because the destruc-
tion of the store did not cause any disruption or injury
to their own interests, because the group which owned the
store is very far from their lives and from the world of
their thoughts. (147)
This officer went on to say that the distance between the two groups
was due to inequality, with ’’extraordinary poverty, sorrow, and
suffering” on one side, and "wealth and happiness unlimited" on the
other. The one side, he asserted, may be said to live off the
garbage thrown away by the other. (148)
The Han-Harjono affair brought anti-Chinese feeling to its
highest point since Indonesian independence. It not only encouraged
people to speak out against the Chinese, but undoubtedly also con-
tributed to the influence of Assaat, a veteran politician, who was
leading a campaign for increased economic discrimination against the
Chinese. It was only a few months after the Han-Harjono incident
that Assaat and his supporters convinced the All-Indonesian National
Economic Congress (KENSI) to adopt a resolution urging that all
foreign and "non-indigenous" enterprises be transferred as soon as
possible to "indigenous" businessmen. (149) Many other Indonesian
organizations,especially those concerned with business and trade,
went on record in support of Assaat. In some places, "Assaat
Associations" were formed.
Among the political parties, the Masjumi was most affected by
the Assaat movement. It moved away from its anti-discrimination
stand of 1955, and called for aiding the "economically weak" against
the "economically strong." The Masjumi Congress of December 1956
urged that citizens of Arab descent be considered "indigenous,"
thus exempting them from the discrimination proposed for other
foreign-descent citizens—that is, for the Chinese. (150) Two
Masjumi representatives in Parliament (though not speaking for the
(147)	Indonesia Raja, July 12, 1956.
(148)	Ibid.
(149)	Times of Indonesia, August 14, 1956.
(150)	Ibid., January 3, 1957.94
party.) attacked the Chinese as having no morals in economic matters
and as being ’’oppressors, extortionists, and smugglers” who were im-
peding national development. (151)
The Socialist Party (PSI) was also influenced by the Assaat
Movement. It issued a confidential statement on the matter, inten-
ded for members only. The document leaked to the left-wing press,
however, and became a public issue. The full text was finally
printed in the Peranakan paper Keng Po. Although the statement
supported the anti-discriminatory stand which the PSI had taken, it
took an equivocal position with regard to the Assaat Movement. Des-
cribing the movement as "understandable" and "natural," it stated
that it would constitute "no problem" if PSI members participated in
the Assaat Movement "when they felt that circumstances called for
it." In closing, it said, "In general we as socialists defend and
side with groups which are economically weak." (152)
The PSI’s private position, as revealed in this document,
reflected an ambivalence in attitudes and a divergence of member
alignments which undoubtedly existed in other parties as well. The
1956 PNI Congress in Semarang publicly opposed discrimination (153);
yet that party had been responsible for many discriminatory measures
when it was in power. Other parties which took public stands
against the policies which were being advocated by Assaat were: the
Nahdatul Ulama (the major Islamic rival of the Masjumi), the Catholic
Party, the Communist Party (PKI)> and the Murba Party (leftist).
(154)	In addition, several national organizations and a number of
prominent leaders—Islamic, Christian, socialist, and communist—
publicly opposed Assaat policies. (155)
Thus Assaat failed to win sufficient political support to
change government policy. During 1957 his movement waned, and in
1958 his leadership of pro-discrimination forces came to an end when
he defected to the Sumatra rebels. The influence of the Masjumi
party, which was accused of being sympathetic to the rebels, also de-
clined. Subsequent conferences of the All-Indonesian National
Economic Congress took a more moderate stand on the issue of economic
discrimination. (156)
(151)	Suluh Indonesia, November 13, 1957; and Republik, November
22, 1957.
(152)	Keng Po, November 10, 1957.
(153)	Berita BAPERKI, October 15, 1956.
(154)	Ibid.
(155)	Ibid., and Republik, October 23, 1957.
(156)	Antara, October 13, 1958; PIA, April 10, 1958; and PIA,
November 2, 1958.95
In summary, it may be said that all major political parties in
Indonesia espouse equality and justice for citizen minorities. They
agree with government pronouncements that, in order to spleed the
assimilation process towards a ’’homogeneous" society, policy should
be directed towards winning the loyalty of minorities. On the
other hand, all parties favor special measures to assist the econo-
mically weak and to limit the strong. Except in the view of the
most left-wing parties, which are not interested in developing a
native capitalist class, "assisting the economically weak" means
privileges for indigenous Indonesians which are not open to citizen
Chinese. Furthermore, no party is completely free from historic
anti-Chinese prejudices. Thus policy towards minorities, under any
Indonesian government, will be a compromise between a desire to avoid
racial discrimination and a desire to restrict the Chinese in such a
way as to promote long-range economic equality for the majority.
The Possibility of Severe Persecution
The sociologist cannot help but observe that there still
exist in Indonesia many of the factors which could provoke outright
persecution of the Chinese minority. Economic competition,
prejudice, hostility, and considerable segregation provide a situa-
tion in which drastic measures or violent actions might be expected.
In addition, Indonesia has passed through periods of economic and
military crisis in which scapegoats would have been welcome. It is
of interest, therefore, to consider the reasons why severe persecu-
tion has not occurred (at least not since the end of the
revolutionary war), and to reflect on whether it could occur in the
future.
Factors which have prevented persecution may be outlined
briefly as follows: 1) Acceptance of humanitarian, equalitarian, and
scientific ideals makes the display of racial prejudice unacceptable
to many Indonesians·. 2) There is widespread concern to have Indo-
nesia accepted internationally as a democratic and progressive
nation. 3) The most respected national leaders, Soekarno and Hatta,
as well as some less well-known leaders, have consistently opposed
racial discrimination. 4) The powerful left-wing parties oppose
anti-Chinese action, not ortly because they are against racism but
because they want to maintain friendly relations with Communist
China. 5) Many influential political leaders have close ties with
Chinese businessmen. 6) Continued opposition to the Dutch has mini-
mized the need for any other scapegoat»
In the opinion of the writer, the number of these factors
which are likely to continue to exist will be sufficient to avert
drastic persecution in the foreseeable future. If, however, an
anti-democratic and anti—Communist regime should ever come to power
in Indonesia, drastic measures against the Chinese might be taken or
allowed by the government.96
CHAPTER VIII
INDONESIAN CHINESE ATTITUDES
TOWARDS CITIZENSHIP
Government Expectations
In a radio speech to all foreigners during the option period
1949-51, the Head of the Bureau of Minorities Affairs said, in part:
....tlhose who intend to choose Indonesian citizenship
must wholeheartedly love the country and the people that
they are about to choose, because it is love for the
country and its people that must be the primary basis and
most important element in deciding to choose or to reject
in this case. More rational calculations also should not
be neglected. But such considerations must not be made
basic. (157)
A spokesman of the Nationalist Party (PNI), in a public speech
before a Peranakan group, maintained that citizenship cannot mean
mere residence in a certain country based upon considerations of per-
sonal interest, but must also involve responsibilities, especially
the responsibility to do everything possible to serve the interests
of the nation. (158)
Chinese Motives in Choosing Indonesian
Citizenship in the 1949-51 Option Period
While Indonesian nationalists would like to have Chinese choose
Indonesian citizenship only for idealistic reasons, we must assume
that in the great majority of the 1949-51 options the motives were
otherwise. Divisions and prejudices dating from Dutch times, and
fears arising out of the tragedies of revolutionary times left few
Chinese with reason to be enthusiastic about the new Indonesia.
Nevertheless, almost all Peranakans regarded Indonesia as their
home. Most of them had spent their entire lives there, and had
naturally come to love their surroundings as well as their way of
life there. For sentimental reasons, many would have liked to "see”
China again, or even to die there. But very few had any desire to
go back to China to live. They knew that the people and their ways
there would be unfamiliar to them. The majority had no desire to
(157)	Soewahjo Soemodilogo, "Soal-Soal disekitar Kewarganegaraan,"
Siaran Kilat, No. 22, issued by the Ministry of Information,
Djakarta, c.1951, p. 5.
(158)	Suara Merdeka, Semarang, September 27, 1954.97
live under a Communist government. Furthermore, returning to China
was out of the question for most of them because they could not
speak Chinese. So the choice before Peranakans was whether to be a
citizen or a foreigner in Indonesia.
There was reason to believe that citizenship would involve
better relations with the Indonesian Government and people, and
better assurances of legal rights anjd safeguards than could be expec-
ted under foreign status. Stringent measures had already been
introduced against foreign businesses. But although general dis-
crimination still existed in many cases, such as land ownership, the
announced Government policy towards foreign-descent citizens was
favorable. And the Provisional Constitution included clear guaran-
tees of equality and freedom for minorities. On the other hand,
the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, which was established
in Djakarta more than a year before the end of the option period,
showed signs of being more interested in winning the goodwill of the
Indonesian Government and the people in general than in defending the
commercial and legal rights of special groups of Indonesian Chinese.
Finally, although it was not often mentioned publicly, a good
many Peranakans no doubt realized that even in accepting Indonesian
citizenship they would not be forfeiting Chinese citizenship. If
conditions should demand drastic action, therefore, they might hope
to obtain the intervention and protection of the Chinese government.
Thus the situation during the option period was such that the
self-interests of the Peranakan community, though not entirely clear,
appeared to lie in accepting Indonesian citizenship. In the case
of those who chose Chinese citizenship, emotional attachments must
have outweighed personal interest, except among a small number who
intended ultimately to return to China. However, the fact that
self-interest was the major motive in choosing Indonesian citizenship
should not be considered a condemnation of the Chinese. The history
of their position in Indonesia, as we have seen, had given them
little reason to be enthusiastic citizens. And it must be remem-
bered that, in spite of this, there was a small but significant
number of Chinese who wholeheartedly identified themselves with the
revolutionary cause and with the new nation.
Those who passively chose Indonesian citizenship in the 1949-51
option period must now make an active choice under the terms of the
Dual Citizenship Treaty with China. This time the penalties for
choosing Chinese citizenship are greater, but the future of
Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent is still very uncertain.
Therefore we may expect options to be made with the same range of
motives-—mostly practical considerations—as before.
The Question of Good Citizenship
Chinese who have chosen to become Indonesian citizens have many
of the attributes of good citizenship as well as certain short-
comings. As mentioned above, they are emotionally tied to the98
country and to their way of life there. They often express the
feeling that, for better or for worse, their destiny lies with Indo-
nesia. Thug they already have one of the indispensable ingredients
of patriotism.
The Chinese community in Indonesia has a generally good record
for law-abidingness. Its delinquency and crime rates are low, and
the community is. usually self-disciplined and orderly. On the other
hand, in the unusual economic conditions of the past few years, there
has been among Chinese an alarming amount of violation or evasion of
Government financial and economic regulations. While the proportion
of those who are willing to use dishonest methods is probably about
the same among other businessmen in Indonesia today, the Chinese are
under the heaviest economic restrictions, and are therefore more fre-
quently guilty of business irregularities.
The Chinese have always shown a good deal of public spirit.
They have responded quite generously to appeals for contributions to
various government and nationalist projects, such as the building of
national monuments, municipal stadiums, and so on. Their clinics
and hospitals serve a large number of Indonesians as well as Chinese.
Their contributions to the relief of victims of floods and volcanic
eruptions, and to other charitable causes outside the Chinese
community have always been substantial. While it is true that such
contributions are motivated partly by the desire to assuage prejudice
against them as a minority, they also represent an extension of the
traditional Chinese feelings of communal responsibility for those in
distress.
The Provisional Constitution stated that every citizen had the
right and duty to take part in national defense. Military life is
traditionally abhorrent to the Chinese. In 1912, in spite of great
community enthusiasm over the recent establishment of a Republican
Government in China, the Indies Chinese turned a cold shoulder to the
request of the new Government for recruits for its navy. (159) A
few years later, when it appeared that the Netherlands Indies might
have to defend itself in World War I, a civil defense movement
obtained virtually no support from the Chinese. (160) The obliga-
tion to fulfill military service if required was one of the
conditions of individual assimilation to European legal status which
made such assimilation unpopular among the Chinese.
During the war against Japan and the revolutionary war against
the Dutch, a certain number of Chinese did serve with the Indonesian
forces. In more recent years, BAPERKI has promoted the idea that
citizen Chinese should be willing to give military service and that
the Armed Forces should be willing to recruit them (161) BAPERKI’s
(159)	Boekoe Peringetan 1907-1937 Tiong Hwa Siang Hwee Semarang,
Semarang, 1937, p. 87
(160)	Liem Thian	Riwajat Semarang, Semarang, c. 1933, pp. 232f.
(161)	See, for instance, Sin Po, November 20, 1957.99
youth organization has called upon its members to join in the
struggle to regain West New Guinea from the Dutch "by whatever means
possible." (162) Thus there appears to be at least a minority of
Chinese who would fight for Indonesia if called upon. Many others,
perhaps most, would not serve unless conscripted. This does not
constitute a problem, however, so long as there has been no need and
no desire to recruit Chinese for the Armed Forces.
The Question of Loyalty
Among Indonesian nationalists there is a tendency to question
whether the Chinese who have adopted Indonesian citizenship are
really loyal to Indonesia. On national holidays they see the Red
Chinese flag flying alongside the Indonesian flag in front of many
shops and residences. Chinese newspapers in the Indonesian language
carry frequent articles about China, mostly favorable to the new
regime. Chinese schools seem to have pictures of Mao Tse-tung or
Sun Yat-sen hanging on every wall. Bookstores are full of transla-
tions from Chinese literature, books about China, and comic-books
depicting the exploits of Chinese heroes. On the national holidays
of the Peking and Taiwan regimes, October 1 and 10 respectively,
there used to be rival celebrations in the Chinese community, with
decorations, flags, meetings, speeches, and sports events. As we
have seen, Kuomintang celebrations have been banned in recent years.
Chinese eager to defend the loyalty of Peranakans claim that
these manifestations of Chinese nationalism arise almost entirely
from the foreign Chinese community, that the Indonesian-language
Chinese papers carry very little more news about China than many non-
Chinese papers, and that an interest in Chinese culture indicates
nothing about loyalty.
The truth about the orientation of the Indonesian Chinese lies
somewhere between these two views. Loyalties are, of course, ex-
tremely difficult to assess, and the present writer is well aware
that his own conclusions are highly speculative and impressionistic.
However, rather than omitting them altogether, or stating them in
such general terms as to avoid all possibility of error, the writer
will give them in as concrete form as possible, in the hope that they
will help the interested reader to come to his own conclusions by
comparisons with the statements of other observers.
In trying to get a realistic view of this problem, it will be
helpful to distinguish between various kinds of nationalism, and to
try to estimate to what extent different groups are characterized by
each. For the purposes of this analysis, the present writer will
make his own definitions of what appear to him to be three different
types of loyalty or nationalism. These three types are not mutually
(162) Sin Po, January 22, 1958.100
exclusive, and may be combined in the outlook of one person. How-
ever, each may also be found alone; therefore separate definitions
are justified.
1)	Political Nationalism is the self-identification of an in-
dividual with a nation state. The individual supports the
government system of the state, adopts its official ideology, and
tends to be willing to sacrifice personal interests to national ones.
2)	Cultural Nationalism is the self-identification of an indi-
vidual with the cultural tradition of a nation or people. The
individual generally tries to perpetuate the language, literature,
philosophy, religion, customs, and habits which he believes to be
characteristic of his people. Although he may respect other cul-
tures, he has a strong preference for his own. Political changes
within the area of the national culture may be of no concern to him.
3)	Racial Nationalism is the self-identification of an indi-
vidual with what he believes to be a certain racial group. The
individual is keenly aware of his membership in this racial group,
and ascribes to it certain characteristics, mostly favorable.
Although he may respect other races, he prefers his own. He tends
to restrict his social relations to it, and to disapprove of inter-
marriages with persons outside it. Political and cultural changes
within his racial group may be of no concern to him.
The Chinese nationalist movement which we have described in
previous chapters created many political nationalists among the
Indies-born Chinese. Perhaps as many as half of all Peranakans con-
sidered the Nationalist Government of China as their government
during the thirites and forties. And no doubt the majority of
Peranakan young people who went to Chinese schools at least passively
accepted the ideology of Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I, or Three Prin-
ciples of the People. The civil war in China and the establishment
of the rival regimes in Peking and Taiwan, however, divided and
partly dispelled political nationalism in the Peranakan group. A
small and diminishing number remained loyal to the Kuomintang Govern-
ment. Probably a great number, disapproving of Communism and dis-
illusioned with the Kuomintang, gave up political nationalism.
Although these were likely to remain cultural nationalists, this was
no bar to their developing political loyalty to Indonesia.
Perhaps the largest sector of the former political nationa-
lists—say, one-quarter of the total Peranakan population—transferred
their loyalty to the People’s Republic of China. Since the greater
part of the 1949-51 option period was after Indonesia’s recognition
of the Peking Government, it may be assumed that virtually all of the
Chinese who rejected Indonesian citizenship belonged to this group.
However, not all of the pro-Peking Peranakans rejected Indonesian
citizenship.
The extent of political nationalism in the Chinese community is
often over-estimated because it is confused with cultural and racial101
nationalism, which are still very widely prevalent. Racial nationa-
lism can produce pride where it does not produce allegiance; thus
there are a great many Indonesian Chinese who take pride in the
social, economic, and military achievements of the Chinese people
under the new regime. And cultural nationalism can produce interest
where it does not produce political loyalty; therefore the classical
and modern books, magazines, and art reproductions coming out of
Communist China are quite popular among the Indonesian Chinese. Yet
the majority of racial and cultural nationalists would not feel any
obligation to follow any instructions the Chinese Government might
give to its citizens abroad, nor would they be willing to contribute
money to any project of that Government. As businessmen and
traders, they are not at all attracted to the ideology of Communism,
and many of them are strongly opposed to it.
Let us now look at the national orientation of various groups
among the Indonesian Chinese, beginning with what we shall call the
"passivists." This group, comprising the majority of the Chinese
community, is largely made up of shopkeepers, petty traders, and
employees of various factories and businesses. Most of these
people are apolitical: they believe that it is not wise to get
"mixed up" in politics. They intend to be law-abiding Indonesian
citizens, but they have no particular feelings of loyalty either to
the Indonesian or to the Chinese Government. Cultural nationalism,
though common among them, is diminishing slowly. Most of them can
speak no more than a few words of Chinese. Western and modernist
influences are modifying their family system, and ancestor worship
is dying out. Racial nationalism, however, is still relatively
strong in this group.
A much smaller, yet significant, group of "passivists" is made
up of disillusioned intellectuals. The idealism and modern ideas
of these people had to some extent broken down their racial
nationalism, while their Western educations had made inroads on
their cultural nationalism. Originally they identified themselves
with the revolution, or at least placed high hopes in the future of
the Indonesian Republic. But the hard realities of the post-
revolutionary period have disappointed them, especially the fact
that they have not been treated with full equality. Since their
Western outlook precludes loyalty to Communist China, they have no
strong national allegiance.
We come now to the "participationists." This group includes
the majority of the formal and informal leaders of the Indonesian
Chinese community, most newspaper editors and correspondents, a
large section of the more well-to-do businessmen, and a representa-
tion from other groups as well. Motivated to some extent by broad
idealism, but more often mainly by minority group interests, these
people have decided to participate actively in Indonesian politics
and citizenship. There area few among them who are politically
loyal primarily to the Peking Government, and to the Indonesian
Government only in so far as the two loyalties do not conflict.
The majority, however, are non-Communist or anti-Communist, and give102
no allegiance to China. President Soekarno’s Pantjasila, the
official ideology of the Indonesian state, is congenial to their way
of thinking, and they favor parliamentary democracy. On the other
hand, their feelings towards any particular Administration tend to
depend largely upon its policy towards the Chinese. There is a good
deal of racial and cultural nationalism among them.
Finally, there are the "assimilationists. ” This is perhaps
the smallest group. Assimilationists are found at all levels of
the Chinese community, but chiefly among those who have attended
Dutch- or Indonesian-language schools. The fundamental belief of
this group is that the Chinese community must endeavor to merge
itself into the society and culture of the majority of Indonesian
citizens as rapidly as possible. Some assimilationists are would-be
Chinese racial or cultural nationalists who believe that the only way
for Chinese to survive in the new society is to give up their
"Chineseness.” Others are those who have already identified whole-
heartedly with the Indonesian people and have no Chinese nationalist
tendencies. Both agree that the "participationists," by defending
the rights and perpetuating the distinctness of their own group,
only increase the prejudices of the majority and make the minority
problem even more difficult to solve. The assimilationists believe
that instead of trying to improve their position through their own
organizations, Chinese-descent citizens should join and work through
the political parties of the majority. Many are already doing so.
Passivists, participationists, and assimilationists are loyal
in the sense that they all recognize the authority of the Indonesian
Government and of none other. Among the last two groups, there is
a minority who are loyal also in the sense of positive feelings of
attachment, affinity, and responsibility. At the other extreme
there is a fourth group who give allegiance to the Peking or the
Taiwan Government. Most of these are alien Chinese. A large pro-
portion of alien Chinese, however, are either apolitical or
deliberately neutral.
The majority of Chinese schools, at least until 1957, promoted
loyalty to one Chinese government or the other, with flags, emblems,
pictures, songs, and textbooks attuned to this purpose. It is
estimated that in the four years 1951-54, some 12,000 students left
Indonesia for China, with no expectation of ever returning. Most
Totok associations, including those supposedly based only on local or
provincial place of origin in China, gave their allegiance to either
Mao Tse-tung or Chiang Kai-shek. The majority of Peranakan associa-
tions attempted to remain neutral, but they were often identified as
- being pro-Peking or pro-Taiwan depending upon which side had won most
of the leading positions.
As we have seen, openly prO-Kuomintang schools and organiza-
tions were suppressed and disbanded during the Sumatra revolt.
Communist China, on the other hand, has continued to win the loyalty
of new "converts" every year, primarily among young people. This
is probably due as much to pressures within Indonesia as to103
attraction from China itself. The pro-Peking group, however, is
more or less regularly depleted by ’’return" emigration to China.
Trends in Chinese Orientations
to Minority Group Problems"
Let us now consider the recent history of Chinese minority
group organization. When the Persatuan Tionghoa was formed in 1948
its whole emphasis was on defending the position of the Chinese
minority. Although the membership was almost entirely Peranakan,
they believed in the necessity of unity within the entire Chinese
community, and defended the right of Totoks to treatment as favor-
able as that given to the subjects of any other foreign country.
Their defense of the right of minorities to preserve their own
language and culture and to maintain their own schools was an indi-
cation of strong cultural nationalising
Not long afterwards, the Persa'tuan Tionghoa was reorganized as
a political party, the”Rartal Democrat Tionghoa Indonesia," or the
Democratic Party of Indonesian Chinese. Its major mission was to
achieve equal rights for Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent and
to oppose discrimination. Thus it was wholly what we have called
"participationist1. ” But this party received little support from
the Chinese community, and was able to establish only about twenty
branches in six years. The main reason for this was the traditi-
tional political apathy of the Chinese. But there was a growing
feeling among Chinese leaders that the minority group could not
improve its position through an organization which was exclusively
Chinese and which worked solely for the interests of the minority.
As a result, a conference of representatives from the Partai
Democrat Tionghoa Indonesia and several other Chinese minority
organizations met in Djakarta in March, 1954, to establish a new
political organization with brohder aims. Thus BAPERKI (Badan
Permusjawaratan Kewanganegaraan Indonesia) came into existence, and
the previous parties and organizations were officially disbanded.
Literally translated, BAPERKI’S full name means "Consultative Body
on Indonesian Citizenship." This name was intended to indicate
that it was not just another political party, nor an exclusively
Chinese organization. In terms of our analysis, it was an attempt
to unite participationists and assimilationists in one organization.
BAPERKI was still participationist in that it was primarily a
minority group organization which would struggle against all forms
of discrimination and would put up its own candidates for the new
Parliament. On the other hand, it represented a certain shift of
opinior| and practice towards the assimilationist point of view.
Membership was opened to persons of all national origins, and a few
non-Chinese did participate. The chairman of the Surakarta branch,
for instance, was a native Indonesian. Then too>: BAPERKI included
a number of Chinese assimilationists who were already active members104
of major political parties, and it supported their candidacy in the
national elections. While working for the achievement of the rights
of citizenship, the new organization also stressed the fulfillment of
the duties of citizenship and the incorporation of the minority group
into the general body politic.
BAPERKI’s 1955 stand on education was an example of the
attempt to combine "participationism" and "assimilationism." On the
one hand, it proposed that minority group citizens should be allowed
to send their children to foreign schools, at least for an interim
period, and that the Chinese language (and other Asian languages)
should be offered in the government schools. On the other hand, it
opposed all exclusive schools, and proposed to help in building up a
national school system in which children of Indonesian and Chinese
descent would learn to be good Indonesian citizens in the same class-
rooms .
In spite of these compromises with "assimilationism," BAPERKI
did not go far enough to suit most assimilationists. Even within
BAPERKI the issue was far from settled. The large Surabaja branch
split over the question of whether the organization should run its
own candidates for election. Many considered that the constitu-
tional guarantee of a certain number of parliamentary seats for
minority group members tended to perpetuate rather than to alleviate
the minority problem. And the 1955 BAPERKI conference on education
and culture did not reach any conclusion as to whether a minority
group should aim to perpetuate and develop its own culture, or shake
it off in favor of the majority culture. There were Chinese cul-
tural nationalists in BAPERKI, as well as assimilationists.
As we have seen, anti-Chinese feeling increased in 1956 and
1957, and the Government instituted several decisive measures, such
as the redistribution of citizen Chinese pupils in "national"
schools. These events convinced more and more Chinese that rapid
voluntary assimilation would be the only way to minimize discrimina-
tion. Virtually the entire Peranakan press supported the aims of
the new national education policy. Several Chinese newspapers,
including the influential Keng Po, opposed special minority group
representation in Parliament ancTthe Constituent Assembly on the
grounds that it would aggravate rather than reduce hostility between
groups. And although BAPERKI spokesmen urged the Government to
appoint BAPERKI candidates to the minority seats, they declared that
they had never asked for guaranteed representation for minority
groups.
Trends toward assimilationist thinking and toward an Indonesian
rather than a Chinese orientation were also evident in the field of
voluntary associations. Increasingly, Chinese spokesmen and editors
were advocating the transformation of specifically Chinese organiza-
tions operating in the public realm, such as the Chinese Chambers of
Commerce, the Chung Hua Tsung Hui federations, and Chinese student
associations. They suggested that Indonesian names should be sub-
stituted for the Chinese names of these organizations, and that105
native Indonesians should be encouraged to become members in place
of alien Chinese. Accordingly, many commercial, professional, and
sports organizations did change their names and open their member-
ships to non-Chinese. For instance, in 1957 the Chinese university
students’ Ta Hsueh Hsueh Sheng Hui became the Perhimpunan Mahasi'swa
Indonesia, and the secondary school students’ Chung Lien Hui became
the Perkumpulan Peladjar Sekolah Menengah Indonesia. Such changes
were probably somewhat accelerated by the Army Chief of Staff’s
proclamation urging citizen Chinese not to mix with alien Chinese
but with native Indonesians in their social and organizational life.
The habits of segregation are strong, however, and some of the
reasons for it still exist. It seems likely, therefore, that the
number of genuinely mixed organizations is still rather small.
A further indication that the orientation of many Chinese-
descent citizens has been turning away from China may be seen in the
growing number of Chinese who have joined Christian churches. In
the city of Semarang, for instance, where there were very few
Chinese Christians three decades ago, almost 10% of the Chinese
population is now either Catholic or Protestant, and the rate of
increase considerably accelerated in the post-revolutionary years.
For these people, joining a church is a sOre indication of the
absence of political loyalty to Communist China. Although Chinese
Christians may be cultural or racial nationalists, they are not
likely to be political nationalists.
While the Catholic church is broadly tolerant of cultural
differences, the Protestant church has a stronger tendency to draw
its Chinese converts away from cultural nationalism. Chinese
Christians may remain "passivists" with regard to Indonesian citi-
zenship, but their churches place a steady pressure upon them to
become politically active by supporting the Protestant and Catholic
political parties. These two parties are the best examples of
Chinese-Indonesian political co-operation to date. On the other
hand, while there are many individual assimilationists among Chinese
Christians, the policy of the churches has not been assiAilationist.
Unlike the Catholic Church,, the Chinese and Indonesian Protestant
Churches are entirely separate. Occasionally even in the Catholic
Church the lay organizations are segregated.
Summary
In this survey of the attitudes of the Indonesian Chinese, we
have found only a small number who are primarily loyal to either the
Peking or the Taiwan Government. There is likewise only a small
number who give wholehearted allegiance to the Indonesian Government
Most Chinese are racial and cultural nationalists, but not political
nationalists. Between the Indonesian patriots on the one hand and
the partisans of Peking and Taiwan on the other, there is a very
large group of citizen Chinese who accept the jurisdiction of the
Indonesian Government. This group comprises those whom we have106
called "passivists," "participationists," and "assimilationists.”
Because of the sharpening of political issues both internationally
and locally, the number of passivists, who have no positive national
loyalties, is diminishing. A growing number of Chinese see no
alternative but to accept their Indonesian citizenship seriously.
Many of these do so with a determination to participate as a separate
group in Indonesian society, while opposing discrimination. Others
believe that rapid voluntary assimilation is the only way to avoid
discrimination or even persecution. In recent years, there has been
a trend towards the assimilationist point of view as well as an
increase in manifestations of loyalty. But discrimination and public
condemnation, as well as traditional segregation and prejudice on
both sides, have greatly impeded progress towards assimilation and
wholehearted allegiance.107
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
Government Policy: Past and Future
Our detailed review of government policy towards the
Indonesian Chinese, of the statements of government spokesmen and
the measures of government agencies, has shown a somewhat bewilder-
ing picture. On the one hand, the Government has appeared
dilatory, disingenuous, and discriminatory in its treatment of the
Chinese. Heavy pressure has been applied against the alien
Chinese. Citizen Chinese have often found themselves treated as
aliens or "second-class citizens." With regard to national status,
proof of citizenship, and various forms of economic discrimination,
the Indonesian Chinese have gone through long periods of uncertainty
and frustration. On the other hand, declared policy has always
been against racial discrimination. The legal and constitutional
rights of the Chinese are comparable to those of minorities in the
most progressive countries. The extent to which Chinese have been
permitted to take part in politics has been commendable. Short-
sighted or discriminatory policies, at both the national and the
local levels, have frequently been withdrawn or modified when
opposed by the Chinese community.
Before attempting to interpret and assess this dualism in
policy, we may note that it has two consequences which are undesir-
able from the Government's point of view. Firstly, economic dis-
crimination and administrative harassment tend to alienate the
citizen Chinese, thus jeopardizing the goals of assimilation and
allegiance. Secondly, repeated changes, modification, and rectifi-
cations of policy encourage the Chinese not to comply with
discriminatory or burdensome regulations when they are first issued;
there is a tendency to "wait and see."
In order to interpret this dualism in policy, we shall consider
four major factors: government structure, public and official
attitudes, the passage of time, and the nature of alternative poli-
cies. With regard to structure, it is significant that policy
affecting the Chinese has been made by many different governmeiit
bodies acting separately. The Army, the Legislature, the Bureau of
Minority Affairs, the Police Department, the Inspectorate of Foreign
Education, the Immigration Department, the Alien Control Bureau, and
at least four different ministries have promulgated regulations con-
cerning the Chinese. It is apparent that this has usually been
done with little mutual consultation and without co-ordination at
the cabinet level. As a result, many decisions have been made
which later had to be modified or reversed in order to reconcile
them with national policy or the policies of other agencies.108
A second structural reason for inconsistent policies is that
regional, district, and local government bodies have had sufficient
autonomy or lack of supervision to allow them to initiate their own
policies towards the Chinese.	Again and again, official actions at
the local level have required modification or rectification at higher
levels. The fact that there has been inadequate communication and
co-ordination between national government bodies, and between these
bodies and local agencies, accounts for much of the dualism in policy.
With regard to treatment of the Chinese, then, the Government should
not be thought of as a monolithic body which cannot make up its mind.
It is an exceedingly complex structure, with many minds.
Turning now to public and official attitudes, it must be recog-
nized that Indonesians, as individuals, are not single-minded in
their view of the Chinese. Having felt the stigma of racial infe<-
riority under colonial rule, and having fought a revolution at least
partly for democratic and humanitarian ideals, most Indonesians are
ideologically opposed to racial discrimination. But as we have seen
in Chapter I, the colonial regime bred social exclusivenesss and
superiority feelings among the Chinese, and allowed them to take a
dominant position in the economy. As a result, the great majority
of Indonesians have feelings of dislike, resentment, or hostility
toward the Chinese. They cannot regard with indifference the fact
that the majority of wealthy people in Indonesia are of Chinese
origin.
This dualism in attitudes is sometimes reflected in dualism of
policy. It appears that policies are sometimes made primarily on
the basis of anti-Chinese feeling, and without sufficient fore-
thought. When the consequences of such policies become apparent,
they may be modified in accordance with humanitarian or non-discrimi-
natory principles. The eventual removal of the experimental schools
for citizep Chinese from the jurisdiction o‘f thQ inspectorate of
, Foreign'Education is-an example of this kind of reversal. A more
striking example is the 1958 discontinuation of the exorbitant fees
for court certificates of citizenship.
Apparent inconsistencies in policy are also a result of the
fact that, with the passage of time, Governments change and ministers
and department heads come and go. Such changes, along with the
pressures of urgent problems such as the Sumatra revolt and the abro-
gation of the Round Table Agreements with Holland, have caused many
delays in the solution of problems concerning the Chinese.
In the opinion of the writer, inconsistencies and delays are
due also to the fact that the alternative solutions to the "Chinese
problem" would both involve certain measures which the Government
does not wish to take. One solution which has been proposed is
"Indonesianization."	This would involve the assimilation of the
greatest possible number of Chinese into Indonesian society. Alien
Chinese who intend to reside permanently in Indonesia would be
encouraged to become citizens, and citizen Chinese would be encoura-
ged to identify themselves with the Indonesian nation and people.109
Such a policy would be extremely difficult for any Indonesian Govern-
ment to put into practice, however, because of the widespread
feelings against the Chinese and the desire of most organized groups
for economic discrimination against them.
The alternative solution is to maximize the number of alien
Chinese, to expel them from the country and to press the citizen
Chinese either to emigrate or to give up their favorable position in
the economy. This policy, too, would be extremely difficult to put
systematically into effect, mainly because Indonesia wants to remain
a democratic country in the eyes of the world and to maintain
friendly relations with China.
Caught between the problems involved in these alternatives,
successive Indonesian Qovernments have vacillated between them with-
out a commitment to either. As we have seen, announced policy has
generally followed the first alternative (accepting and assimilating
the Chinese), but actual policy has often been closer to the second
(expelling and discriminating against the Chinese).
We have now outlined four major factors which have contributed
to dualism in policy towards the Indonesian Chinese. Let us con-
sider future possibilities. With regard to government structure,
it may well be that the form of "guided democracy" which is
emerging under Soekarno’s leadership will make possible better co-
ordination of policy and fewer inconsistencies due to changing
personnel at the policyr-making level. The tension between ideals
and prejudices will doubtless remain, however, as will the obstacles
to both alternative policies. It seems likely, therefore, that the
dualism in policy will continue. A consistent policy of attraction
and assimilation is now virtually impossible not only because of
persisting hostility and desires for "economic protection of the
weak against the strong," but also because the Dual Citizenship
Treaty maximizes the number of Chinese aliens and provides no
opportunity for their future naturalization. A consistent policy
of discrimination and expulsion would be possible only if an
Indonesian Government came to power which was willing to renounce
democratic principles and to defy the Government of China.
In the opinion of the writer, it is still possible that a com-
promise policy could be carried out cons is tent ly-^-one which would
gradually minimize the number of alien Chinese by progressively
increasing pressure, and which would gradually Indonesianize the
citizen Chinese by encouraging assimilation while systematically
reducing racial discrimination. In view of the magnitude and
number of the problems which the Indonesian Government is facing,
however, it seems unlikely that policy toward the Chinese will
receive the attention and the vigorous leadership which would be
required for success. On the basis of this assumption, let us look
at the situation with regard to alien and citizen Chinese
separately.110
Position of the Foreign Chinese
Until recent years, the foreign Chinese residing in Indonesia
held a strong position in the internal economy and predominated in
trade with other Asian countries. With their own press, schools,
and organizations, they formed a community quite distinct even from
the Peranakan community. Although a large proportion of them were
apolitical, many were active supporters of either the Peking or the
Taiwan Government.
In recent years, government regulations have closed one field
of economic activity after another to the alien Chinese. Their
schools and newspapers have been severely limited in numbers and are
now closely controlled and supervised. They have been heavily taxed
Pro-Huomintang organizations and activities have been banned.
It appears that, implicitly at least, the policy of the Govern-
ment has always been to force as many as possible of the alien
Chinese to leave the country. This policy was clearly stAted by
the Minister of Economic Affairs, Iskaq, in 1954:
We must fight against tihe capital of foreigners, and
we must make every effort to expel them from Indonesia and
put Indonesian citizens in their places. If necessary
their expulsion must be forced, so that we ourselves can
operate their enterprises. (163)
And in. November 1957, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Subandrio,
said in Parliament:
Of course it is the intention of the Government to
prepare a law which will fix the maximum number of foreig-
ners who may reside permanently in Indonesia. (164)
In view of the nature of government policy, it seems probable
that only a very small number of Indonesia-born Chinese will choose
Chinese citizenship in the present option period. We have seen that
there is a certain number of. citizen Chinese whose real allegiance is to
Peking. We have surmised that this number is being augmented by
converts who have been attracted to the Communist regime or who have
become disillusioned with their status in Indonesia. Probably most
such persons will opt for Indonesian citizenship, however, unless
they plan to emigrate to China in the very near future. Under the
provisions of the treaty, dual nationals who opt for Indonesian citi-
zenship can later regain Chinese citizenship by establishing
permanent residence in China.
(163)	Suara Merdeka, September 27, 1954.
(164)	As reported in Antara, November 22, 1957, and Sin Po,
November 23, 1957.Ill
For these reasons, it is unlikely that the present option
period will result in any substantial change in the proportions of
citizen and foreign Chinese. There will be close to a million
Chinese aliens in Indonesia. The size of this number makes the
expulsion policy an extremely difficult one to carry out.
Especially for the large number of aliens who have objections
against returning to China, expulsion would mean considerable, and
sometimes severe, hardship. To this writer it appears unlikely
that the present Indonesian Government would risk the disapprobation
of world public opinion and the opposition of Communist China which
a forced mass expulsion ptlilicy would entail. Therefore Indonesia
faces the prospect of a large alien Chinese population for many
years to come.
Discrimination and pressure will convince many alien Chinese
to emigrate. Others will desire naturalization. Even in 1958,
many foreign Chinese were requesting naturalization. Many of their
descendants, born in Indonesia, will also desire Indonesian citizen-
ship. Since assimilation might be a more feasible solution than
expulsion in the case of many aliens and their descendants, it is
perhaps unfortunate that naturalization is not possible. But
Indonesian law does not allow the naturalization of persons who
would not thereby lose their former citizenship, and Chinese law
does not revoke the citizenship of persons who acquire a second citi-
zenship. Therefore the naturalization of alien Chinese in Indonesia
could only be made possible by a treaty between the two countries.
At the time of the 1955 treaty, the policy of the Indonesian Govern-
ment was to maximize the number of alien Chinese, so there was no
reason to ask China for naturalization provisions. It is question-
able whether China would have agreed, in any case.
It is now clear that both the mass expulsion and the assimila-
tion solutions to the alien Chinese problem are impossible or
extremely unlikely in the near future. The prospect is for a pro-
tracted period in which economic pressure and residential
restrictions will drive many aliens back to China while many others
remain to intensify the problem.
Position of the Citizen Chinese
Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent form a community large-
ly separate from both the native Indonesians and the foreign Chinese.
Side by side with the latter, they have held a dominant position in
the internal economy of Indonesia. They have exercised their
political and legal rights as citizens but have been discriminated
against economically and have been subject to a series of administra-
tive harassments (primarily with regard to proving their citizen-
ship) . Their children are no longer permitted to attend Chinese-
language schools.
A small proportion of the citizen Chinese are primarily loyal
to one or other of the two rival Chinese Governments. The great112
majority, however, recognize the sole jurisdiction of the Indonesian
Government. Many feel little positive loyalty towards Indonesia,
but a significant number identify themselves politically with the new
nation and intend to carry out the responsibilities and to win the
rights of full citizenship. There is also a growing number who
believe that complete assimilation into Indonesian society and cul-
ture is desirable. Nevertheless, most Peranakans are what we have
called "racial and cultural nationalists," though not "political
nationalists."
Experience in other parts of the world suggests that racial and
cultural group feelings in a minority group are not necessarily in-
compatible with loyalty to a new nation. Theoretically, the
Indonesian Government could win the allegiance of its Chinese-descent
citizens without first breaking down their racial and cultural
nationalism. Presumably this would be done through a policy of
attraction based upon equal treatment for the Chinese minority and a
generous attitude towards them. On the other hand, racial discrimi-
nation or attacks on their cultural group interests would be expected
to reduce the chances of winning their allegiance.
But it is not only allegiance which the Indonesian people want
from the Chinese minority. In practice, the Government must take
into account other demands as well. As we have seen, native
Indonesians want to share in economic well-being on a basis equal
with the Chinese. Many demand a leveling process which would allow
native Indonesians to take a predominant position in the business
class. In addition, they want the Chinese to give up their supe-
riority attitudes, their social exclusiveness, and their distinctive
ways. They want total assimilation.
The Government, therefore, has the task of reconciling three
aims in its minority policy: allegiance, assimilation, and economic
leveling. But measures intended to bring about the latter jeopar-
dize the former two, and attempts to speed assimilation tend to
alienate loyalty. As we have seen, commitment to a single consis-
tent policy has been impossible.
It is conceivable that "protection of the economically weak
against the strong" could be carried out without racial discrimina-
tion, as has been proposed by Soekarno and Hatta. Presumably this
would mean assistance to all small businessmen (except aliens), and
restrictions on all large-scale businessmen, regardless of racial
origin. In addition, it would involve other measures to raise the
general standard of living of the people. While such a policy would
alienate the wealthiest Chinese (and Indonesians), it would be no
obstacle to the assimilation of the rest. But the irrational fac-
tors and deep prejudices which have operated in the past still exist.
As suggested in the first section of this chapter, dualism in policy
is likely to persist for some time to come. Discriminatory measures
will continue, as will efforts to conciliate and attract the citizen
Chinese. Therefore we can expect only slow progress, with consider-
able friction and many setbacks, on the road towards the integration
of citizen Chinese into Indonesian society.113
APPENDIX I
Summary of the main provisions of the Indonesian Citizenship Act of 1946
(Act No. 3/1946);.
1.	Citizens of Indonesia are:.
a.	Descendants, through both parents, of the original inhabitants of the
territory of Indonesia.
b.	Persons not belonging to the group mentioned above, but with one
parent who does, who were born and have their residence in
Indonesia; and persons not belonging to the group mentioned above,
but who were born in the territory of Indonesia and have resided
there for the last five years continuously; provided that such per-
sons do not reject Indonesian citizenship on the grounds of being
citizens of another country.
c.	Persons who have gained citizenship through naturalization.
d.	Legitimate, legally-recognized, or adopted children whose parents
are Indonesian citizens.
2.	A woman's citizenship follows that of her husband as long as she is
married. Upon the death of her husband or her divorce from him, she
may regain her former citizenship by making an official declaration to
the proper authorities.
3.	The obtaining or losing of Indonesian citizenship by a man or a widow
applies also to his or her unmarried children under twenty-one years of
age. However, the children of a woman whose citizenship changes be-
cause of a second marriage retain their former citizenship.
4.	Persons in category 1. b. above who wish to reject Indonesian citizen-
ship must submit a formal declaration, along with supporting personal
documents, to the Justice Department (through their local Court of
Justice) within one year after this act comes into effect (April 10, 1946
to April 10, 1947--but later extended to August 17, 1948).
5.	Persons who are at least twenty-one years of age or who are married,
and who have resided continuously in Indonesia for five years and are
able to speak Indonesian may apply for naturalization. Among the
facts that they must be able to document is the following: that the laws
of their former country constitute no obstacle to this naturalization.
6.	When a child who has lost or obtained Indonesian citizenship as a re-
sult of the naturalization of his father or mother reaches the age of
twenty-one or before that age is married, he may reject his new
citizenship within the one year following, and thus retain his former
citizenship.114
7. Indonesian citizenship is lost:
a.	if the citizenship of another country is obtained, or
b.	if one becomes a soldier or a government employee of another country
without the previous consent of the President of Indonesia.115
APPENDIX II
Excerpt from the Round Table Agreementconcerning the Assignment of
Citizens (November, 194$): (1)
Article 5
Persons who, immediately before the transfer of sovereignty, are
of age and are Netherlands subjects of foreign-origin-non-Netherlanders
(uitheemse Nederlandse onderdanen-niet-Nederlanders) and who were born
in Indonesia or reside in the Republic of the United States of Indonesia shall
acquire Indonesian nationality but may, within the time limit therefor stip-
ulated, reject Indonesian nationality.
If, immediately before the transfer of sovereignty, such persons
had no other nationality than the Netherlands nationality, they shall regain
Netherland nationality.
If, immediately before the transfer of sovereignty, such persons
possessed simultaneously another nationality, they shall, when rejecting
Indonesian nationality, regain Netherlands nationality only on the strength
of a statement made by them to that effect.
(1) United Nations Commission for Indonesia, Appendices to the Special
Report to the Security Council on the Round Table Conference, United
Nations Security Council publication S/ldlV/Add. 1, 14 November
1949, p. 84.116
APPENDIX III
Excerpt from the Provisional Constitution oi the Republic of Indonesia
(Act No. 7, Gazette No. 37, August, 1950):
Article 144
Pending the promulgation of the regulations on citizenship by the law
referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 5,* all persons who have acquired Indonesian
nationality according to or on the basis of the Agreement on the Division of
Citizens, attached to the Agreement of Transfer, and those whose nationality
has not been determined by said Agreement and who on 27th December, 1949,
had acquired Indonesian citizenship according to the law of the Republic of
Indonesia prevailing on that date, shall be citizens of the Republic of Indonesia.117
APPENDIX IV
Excerpt from the Draft Citizenship Act of 1954 (2)
(unofficial translation):
Article 4
A foreigner born and having hie residence in the territory of the
Republic of Indonesia whose father or mother, in accordance with the specifi-
cations of Article 1 paragraph a, was also born in the territory of the Republic
of Indonesia and at the time of his birth or later resided continuously in the
territory of the Republic of Indonesia for a period exceeding ten years, obtains
Indonesian citizenship if and when he makes a declaration that he desires
Indonesian citizenship and rejects his other citizenship.
This declaration must be made within one year after the person con-
cerned becomes eighteen years of age, at the Court of Justice of his place of
residence.
(2) The full text of the draft act and its accompanying explanations may be
found in Berita BAPERKI, Djakarta, Vol. I, Nos. 7/8, October-November,
1954, pp. 9-IT.118
APPENDIX V
ACT NO. 62 OF THE YEAR 1958 CONCERNING REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
CITIZENSHIP (official translation)--------------------------------
Section 1.
A Republic of Indonesia citizen shall be:
a.	a person who by virtue of laws, agreements and/or regulations operative
since the proclamation of Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945,
have become Republic of Indonesia citizens;
b.	a person who at birth has legal family relations with his/her father who is
a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia, on the understanding that his/her
Republic of Indonesia citizenship shall commence at the moment when the
afore-mentioned legal family relationship comes into force, and that such
relationship shall be entered into before the person concerned has attained
eighteen years of age or has married under the age of eighteen;
c.	a child born within 300 days after the decease of its father, if the father
was a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia at the time of decease;
d.	a person whose mother was a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia at the time
of his/her birth, if at that time the person concerned had no legal family
relationship with his/her father;
e.	a person whose mother was a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia at the
time of his/her birth, if his/her father has no citizenship or so long as
the citizenship of the father is unknown;
f.	a person born within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia insofar as
the two parents are unknown;
g.	a foundling abandoned within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia inso-
far as the two parents are unknown;
h.	a person born within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia in case the
two parents are devoid of any citizenship or in case the citizenship of the
two parents is unknown;
i.	a person born within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, who at the
time of his/her birth did not acquire the citizenship of his/her father or
mother, and so long as he/she has not acquired the citizenship of his/her
father or mother;
j.	a person who has acquired Republic of Indonesia citizenship under the
provisions of the present Act.119
Section 2.
(1)	An alien child under five years of age who is adopted by a citizen of the
Republic of Indonesia, shall acquire Republic of Indonesia citizenship if such
adoption is validated by the District Court of Justice in the town where the
adopting person resides.
(2)	The validation referred to in the foregoing paragraph shall be applied
for by the adopting person within one year after the adoption or within one year
after the present Act has come into operation.
Section 3.
(1)	In case a child born out of wedlock from a mother who is a citizen
of the Republic of Indonesia, or a child born in wedlock but by a judicial
divorce decree given into the custody of the mother who is a citizen of the
Republic of Indonesia, follows the citizenship of its father who is an alien, such
child shall be permitted to apply to the Minister of Justice for Republic of
Indonesia citizenship, if, upon the acquirement of the Republic of Indonesia
citizenship, it has no other citizenship or attaches a statement abjuring the
other citizenship in the manner legally provided for by its country of origin
and/or in the manner provided for by an agreement for the settlement of dual
citizenship between the Republic of Indonesia and the country concerned.
(2)	The application referred to above shall be made to the Minister of
Justice, through the intermediary of the District Court or the Representative
Office of the Republic of Indonesia in the town where the applicant resides,
within one year after the applicant has attained eighteen years of age.
(3)	With the approval of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Justice
shall allow or refuse such application.
(4)	Republic of Indonesia citizenship acquired through application, shall
come into effect on the day when the relative decree of the Minister of
Justice is promulgated.
Section 4.
(1) An alien born and residing within the territory of the Republic of
Indonesia, whose father--or mother, in case there is no legal family relation-
ship with the father--was also born in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia
and is a resident of the Republic of Indonesia, can apply to the Minister of
Justice for acquiring Republic of Indonesia citizenship, if, upon the acquirement
of the Republic of Indonesia citizenship, he has no other citizenship or if, at
the time of application, he also submits a written statement abjuring any other
citizenship he may possess under the legal provisions operative in his country
of origin, or under the provisions of an agreement in settlement of dual citizen-
ship entered into between the Republic of Indonesia and the country concerned.120
(2)	The application referred to above shall have been submitted to the Mini-
ster of Justice, through the intermediary of the District Court in the town where
the applicant resides, within one year after the applicant has attained eighteen
years of age.
(3)	With the approval of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Justice
shall allow or refuse such application.
(4)	Republic of Indonesia citizenship acquired through such application shall
come into effect on the day when the relative decree of the Minister of Justice is
promulgated.
Section 5.
(1)	Republic of Indonesia citizenship through naturalization shall have been
acquired by the operation of fee Minister of Justice's decree granting such natur-
alization.
(2)	To qualify for an application for naturalization,
(a)	the applicant must have attained twenty-one years of age;
(b)	the applicant must be born within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia
or, at the time of application, must have been residing uninterruptedly in
that area for at least the last five years, or, when interrupted, for 10 years
in all;
(c)	the applicant must have the consent of his wife/wives, in case he is a mar-
ried man;
(d)	the applicant must be sufficiently proficient in the Indonesian language, have
a fair knowledge of Indonesian history, and never have been sentenced for a
criminal offence to the prejudice of the Republic of Indonesia;
(ej the applicant must be mentally and physically sound;
(f)	the applicant must pay into the Exchequer an amount varying between Rp.
500 and Rp. 10, 000, --, the definite size of which shall be determined by the
Revenue Office in his town of residence, on the basis of his actual monthly
income, with the proviso that the afore-mentioned amount shall not be
higher than his actual monthly income;
(g)	the applicant must have a permanent source of income;
(h)	the applicant must have no citizenship, or have lost his citizenship upon
acquiring Republic of Indonesia citizenship, or attach a statement abjuring
his other citizenship under the legal provisions of his country of origin or
under the provisions of an agreement in settlement of dual citizenship con-
cluded between the Republic of Indonesia and the country concerned.
So long as a woman is married, she shall not be permitted to apply for
naturalization.121
(3)	An application for naturalization shall be written on stamped paper,
and be submitted to the Minister of Justice, through the intermediary of the
District Court of the Republic of Indonesia Representative Office in the town
where the applicant resides.
The application shall be written in the Indonesian language, and shall be
submitted together with documents in evidence of the matters referred to in
paragraph (2) excluding item d.
The District Court or the Republic of Indonesia Representative Office con-
cerned shall verify the correctness of the documentary evidence, and test
applicant as to his/her proficiency in the use of the Indonesian language and
his/her knowledge of Indonesian history.
(4)	With the approval of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Justice
shall allow or refuse applications for naturalization.
(5)	The decree of the Minister of Justice granting naturalization, which
becomes effective on the day when the applicant takes the oath, or makes the
promise, of allegiance before the District Court or the Republic of Indonesia
Representative Office in his town of residence, shall be retroactive to the day
when the afore-mentioned decree is promulgated.
The oath or promise of allegiance shall run as follows:
"I swear (promise) that I abjure all allegiance to any alien authority; that
"I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Republic of Indonesia,
"and that I shall remain loyal to it; that I shall uphold and seriously serve the
"Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Indonesia; that I shall readily
"bear this responsibility without any qualification whatsoever. "
(6)	Upon the applicant having taken the oath, or made the promise, of
allegiance referred to above, the Minister of Justice shall announce the
naturalization by publishing the decree to that effect in the State Gazette.
(7)	In case the oath or promise of allegiance is not made within three
months after the issue of the decree of the Minister of Justice, the decree
shall automatically become void.
(8)	The amount of money referred to in paragraph 2 shall be refunded, if
the application for naturalization is not allowed.
(9)	In case an application for naturalization is refused, the applicant
shall be permitted to lodge a second application.
Section 6.
With the approval of the House of Representatives, the Government can
also grant naturalization on the ground of serving the interests of the State or
on the ground of meritoriousness towards the State.122
In such a case, only the provisions o£ paras 1, 5, 6 and 7 of section 5 shall
apply.
Section 7.
(1)	An alien woman married to a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia, shall
acquire Republic of Indonesia citizenship if and when she makes a statement to
that effect within one year after the conclusion of the marriage, unless she is
still in possession of another citizenship at the time when she acquires the Re-
public of Indbnesia citizenship. In the latter case she shall not be permitted to
make the statement.
(2)	Subject to the exception referred to in para 1, an alien woman married
to a Republic of Indonesia citizen shall also acquire Republic of Indonesia citizen
ship in one year after the conclusion of the marriage in case within that year
her husband does not make a statement to abjure his Republic of Indonesia
citizenship.
Such a statement can only be made, and shall only result in the loss of the
Republic of Indonesia citizenship, in case such loss does not render the husband
devoid of any citizenship.
(3)	No other statement shall be permitted to be made in case either state-
ment referred to in para 1 or 2 above has been made.
(4)	Such statement shall be made to the District Court or the Republic of
Indonesia Representative Office in the town where the person concerned resides.
Section 8.
(3Q A Republic of Indonesia citizen of the female sex who is married to an
alien, shall lose her Republic of Indonesia citizenship if and when she makes a
statement to that effect within one year after the conclusion of her marriage,
unless the loss of the Republic of Indonesia citizenship should render her devoid
of any citizenship.
(2) The statement referred to in para 1 shall be made to the District Court
or the Republic of Indonesia Representative Office in the town where the person
concerned resides.
Section 9.
(1) The Republic of Indonesia citizenship acquired by a husband shall auto-
matically apply to his wife, unless the wife is still in possession of another
citizenship upon the acquirement of the afore-mentioned Republic of Indonesia
citizenship.123
(2) The loss of Republic of Indonesia citizenship by a husband shall
automatically apply to his wife, unless such loss should deprive the wife of
any citizenship.
Section 10.
(1)	A married woman shall not be permitted to make the application re-
ferred to in sections 3 and 4.
(2)	The loss of the Republic of Indonesia citizenship by a wife shall auto-
matically apply to her husband, unless such loss shall deprive the husband of
any citizenship.
Section 11.
(1)	A person who because, or in consequence, of marriage has lost his/
her Republic of Indonesia citizenship, shall recover that citizenship if and when
the person concerned makes a statement to that effect after the dissolution of
the marriage. Such statement shall be made to the District Court or the Re-
public of Indonesia Representative Office in the town where the person concerned
resides, within one year after the dissolution of the marriage.
(2)	The provision of para 1 shall not apply in case the person concerned is
still in possession of another citizenship after the recovery of the Republic of
Indonesia citizenship.
Section 12.
(1)	A woman who because, or in consequence, of her marriage has acquired
Republic of Indonesia citizenship shall lose that citizenship if and when she makes
a statement to that effect after the dissolution of the marriage. Such statement
shall be made to the District Court or the Republic of Indonesia Representative
Office in the town where the person concerned resides, within one year after
the dissolution of the marriage.
(2)	The provision of para 1 shall not apply in case the loss of the Republic
of Indonesia citizenship shall deprive the person concerned of any citizenship.
Section 13.
(1) An unmarried person under 18 years of age, who had legal family rela-
tions with his/her father before the father acquired Republic of Indonesia
citizenship, shall also acquire the Republic of Indonesia citizenship after he re-
sides and stays in Indonesia. The statement concerning residence and stay in
Indonesia shall not apply to a child in case its father's acquirement of Republic
of Indonesia citizenship should deprive it of any citizenship.124
(2) The Republic of Indonesia citizenship acquired by a mother shall also
apply to her unmarried children under 18 years of age, who have no legal family
relations with their father, upon their residence and stay in Indonesia.
In case the Republic of Indonesia citizenship is acquired through naturaliza-
tion by a mother who has become widowed by the decease of her husband, the un-
married children under 18 years of age who had legal family relations with the
afore-mentioned husband, shall also acquire Republic of Indonesia citizenship
upon their residence and stay in Indonesia. The statement concerning residence
and stay in Indonesia shall not apply to children in case their mother’s acquire-
ment of Republic of Indonesia citizenship should deprive them of any citizenship.
Section 14.
(1)	Upon attaining twenty-one years of age the child referred to in sections
2 and 13 shall lose its Republic of Indonesia citizenship if and when they make a
statement to that effect. Such statement shall be made to the District Court or
the Republic of Indonesia Representative Office in the town where it resides,
within one year after the attainment of twenty-one years of age.
(2)	The provision of para 1 shall not apply in case the loss of its Republic
of Indonesia citizenship shall render it devoid of any citizenship.
Section 15.
(1)	The loss of Republic of Indonesia citizenship by a father shall also apply
to the unmarried children under 18 years of age who have legal family relations
with him, unless such loss shall render the children devoid of any citizenship.
(2)	The loss of Republic of Indonesia citizenship by a mother shall also
apply to her children who have no legal family relations with the father, unless
such loss shall render the children devoid of any citizenship.
(3)	In case a mother has lost her Republic of Indonesia citizenship because
of naturalization abroad, and in case she has become widowed through the de-
cease of the husband, the provision of para 2 shall also apply to the children who
have legal family relations with the husband, upon their residence and stay
abroad.
Section 16.
(1) A child that has lost its Republic of Indonesia citizenship because of the
loss of such citizenship by its father or mother, shall recover the Republic of
Indonesia citizenship upon attaining eighteen years of age, if and when he makes
a statement to that effect. Such statement shall be made to the District Court or
the Republic of Indonesia Representative Office in the town where it resides,
within one year after its having attained eighteen years of age.125
(2) The provision of para 1 shall not apply in case the child is still in
possession of another citizenship upon acquiring the Republic of Indonesia
citizenship.
Section 17.
The Republic of Indonesia citizenship shall be lost:
a.	upon the acquirement of another citizenship by a person's own will, on the
understanding that in case the person concerned is in the territory of the
Republic of Indonesia upon acquiring the other citizenship, his Republic of
Indonesia citizenship shall not be considered lost until the Minister of
Justice, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, declare the loss of
such Republic of Indonesia citizenship, either of the Minister's own volition
or at the request of the person concerned.
b.	in case the person concerned, when afforded the opportunity, does neither
abjure nor reject another citizenship;
c.	in case an unmarried person under 18 years of age is acknowledged as a
child by an alien, unless the loss of the Republic of Indonesia citizenship
should deprive the person concerned of any citizenship.
d.	in case a child is legally adopted by an alien before it has attained five years
of age, and if the loss of the Republic of Indonesia citizenship shall not
render it devoid of any citizenship;
e.	in case a person at his request shall be declared to have lost his citizenship
by the Minister of Justice with the approval of the Council of Ministers, if
the person concerned has attained 21 years of age, resides abroad and has
not been rendered devoid of any citizenship by the loss of his Republic of
Indonesia citizenship.
f.	in case a person enters the service of a foreign armed force without prior
consent of the Minister of Justice;
g.	in case a person, without prior consent of the Minister of Justice, enters
the service of a foreign country or an international organization of which
the Republic of Indonesia is no member, if, under the enactments and pro-
visions of the Republic of Indonesia, such office in the service of a country
can only be held by a citizen of that country, or if the holding of such office
in the service of the international organization requires an oath or promise
of office;
h.	in case a person swears or promises allegiance to a foreign country, or
part thereof;
i.	in case a person, without being required to do so, takes part in the election
of anything related to the political affairs of a foreign country;
j.	in case a person is in possession of a valid foreign passport, or document
having the character of a passport, written out in his name;
k.	in case a person, for other reasons than the public service, resides abroad
for five consecutive years, without stating his wish to retain his Republic
of Indonesia citizenship before the expiry of the above mentioned five-year
period, and afterwards before the expiry of every two years. Such wish
shall be made known to the Republic of Indonesia Representative Office in
his town or residence. For a. Republic of Indonesia citizen under eighteen126
years of age, the afore-mentioned five-year and two-year periods shall not apply
until he has attained eighteen years of age, unless he is or has been married.
Section 18.
A person who has lost his Republic of Indonesia citizenship under section 17,
item k, shall recover his Republic of Indonesia citizenship in case he resides in
Indonesia by virtue of an Entry Permit and makes a statement to that effect.
Such statement shall be mad® to the District Court of his town of residence, with-
in the first year of his residence in Indonesia.
Section 19.
A Republic of Indonesia citizenship granted or acquired on the ground of
false statements can be revoked by the office that has granted the citizenship or
by the office that has received such statements.
Section 20.
A person not in possession of Republic of Indonesia citizenship is an alien.
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS.
Section I.
A woman who under section 3 of the Military Authority Ordinance No. Prt/
PM/09/1957 and section 3 of the Central War Authority Ordinance No. Prt/
Peperpu/014/1958 has been treated as a Republic of Indonesia citizen, shall be-
come a Republic of Indonesia citizen unless she is in possession of another
citizenship.
Section II.
A person who upon the commencement of the present Act is in the position
referred to in section 7 or section 8, can make the statement referred to in the
afore mentioned sections within one year after the commencement of the present
Act, with the proviso that the husband of a woman has become a Republic of
Indonesia citizen under the provision of section I of the Transitory Provisions
shall not be permitted to make again the statement referred to in section 7 para 2.
Section III.
A woman who under the laws operative before the commencement of the pre-
sent Act would automatically be a Republic of Indonesia citizen if she were not
married, shall acquire Republic of Indonesia citizenship if and when she makes
a statement to that effect to the District Court or the Republic of Indonesia127
Representative Office in her town of residence, with,in one year after the dissolu
tion of her marriage or within one year after the commencement of the present
Act.
Section IV.
A person who has not acquired Republic of Indonesia citizenship together
with his/her father or mother by the making of a statement under the laws opera
tive before commencement of the present Act, because such person was a major
at the time when his/her father or mother made the afore mentioned statement,
while such person was not allowed to make a statement to the effect of choosing
the Republic of Indonesia citizenship, shall be a Republic of Indonesia citizen in
case he/she is not in possession of another citizenship under this provision or
previously. The Republic of Indonesia citizenship acquired by such person
shall be retroactive to the time when his/her father or mother acquired the
Republic of Indonesia citizenship.
Section V.
Deviating from the provisions of section 4 paras 1 and 2, the opportunity
is afforded to children whose parents rejected for them the Republic of
Indonesia citizenship in the period December 27, 1949--December 27, 1951,
to apply for Republic of Indonesia citizenship to the Minister of Justice
through the intermediary of the District Court in the town where he resides,
within one year after the present Act becomes operative, in case he is under
28 years of age; for the rest, section 4 paras 3 and 4 shall apply.
Section VI.
An alien who, before the commencement of the present Act, served in the
armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia and meets the conditions to be laid
down by the Minister of Defence, shall acquire Republic of Indonesia citizen-
ship in case he makes a statement to that effect to the Minister of Defence or
to the official appointed thereto by the Minister of Defence. The Republic of
Indonesia citizenship acquired by such person shall be retroactive to the time
when he entered the service of the Republic of Indonesia armed forces.
Section VII.
A person who before the commencement of the present Act serves in a for-
eign armed force as referred to in section 17 item f, or who is in the service
of a foreign country or an international organization as referred to in section
17 item g, can apply for the consent of the Minister of Justice within one year
after the commencement of the present Act.128
FINAL PROVISIONS.
Section I.
A Republic of Indonesia citizen who is in the territory of the Republic of
Indonesia is considered to possess no other citizenship.
Section II.
The term citizenship includes all kinds of protection by a state.
Section III.
For the purposes of the present Act, an unmarried person under eighteen
years of age shall be considered to reside with his/her father or mother under
the specifications referred to in section 1, items a, b, c and d.
Section IV.
Anyone who is in need of evidence that he is a Republic of Indonesia citizen
and who cannot produce documents in proof of the fact that he possesses, has ac-
quired, or shares in the possession or acquirement of the afore mentioned
citizenship, can apply to the District Court in the town where he resides, for a
decision whether or not he is a Republic of Indonesia citizen under the ordinary
civil procedure.
This provision shall not prejudice the extraordinary provisions referred to
in, or based on, other laws.
Section V.
The official concerned shall submit copies of the statements causing the ac-
quirement or loss of Republic of Indonesia citizenship, to the Minister of Justice.
Section VI.
The Minister of Justice shall announce the names of the persons who have
acquired or lost their Republic of Indonesia citizenship, in the State Gazette.
Section VII.
Any matter required for the implementation of the provisions of the present
Act shall be regulated by Government Ordinance.
Section VIII.
The present Act shall come into effect on the day of promulgation, with the
proviso that the provisions of section 1, items b to j, section 2, section 17,
items a, c and h, shall be retroactive to December 27, 1949.129
In order that everyone can take cognizance, this Act shall be promulgated
by publishing same in the Republic of Indonesia Gazette.
Sanctioned in Djakarta,
on the 29th day of July, 1958,
The President of the Republic of Indonesia,
/s/ SOEKARNO.
The Minister of Justice,
/s/G. A. MAENGKOM.
Promulgated
on August 1, 1958.
The Minister of Justice,
/s/G. A. MAENGKOM.
STATE GAZETTE No. 113 OF THE YEAR 1958.130
APPENDIX VI
AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF DUAL NATIONALITY BETWEEN THE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA*
(Translation)
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the
People’s Republic of China, on the basis of the principles of equality, of mutual
benefit, and of non-interference in domestic policies of each other's country;
desirous of settling in the best possible way and through friendly cooperation the
dual nationality of persons who have at the same time the citizenship of the Re-
public of Indonesia and of the People's Republic of China, decide to enter into
this agreement and have for this purpose appointed their plenipotentiaries:
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia:
Η. E. SUNA RIO,
Foreign Minister;
and
The Government of the People's Republic of China:
Η. E. CHOU EN-LAI,
Foreign Minister,
who, after having communicated to each other their full powers and found them in
good and due form, agree to the following provisions:
Article I
The contracting parties agree that anybody who at the same time has the
citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia and of the People's Republic of China
shall choose between the two citizenships on the basis of his or her own will.
A married woman with a dual nationality shall also choose one of the two
citizenships, on the basis of the will of the person concerned.
Article II
Anybody having dual nationality as mentioned under Article I, who is already
of age at the time this agreement comes into force, shall choose one of the two
citizenships in two years' time after ratification presumably.
Persons considered of age under this agreement are those who are fully
eighteen years of age, or those who are not yet fully eighteen but already
married.
Text as given in Asian-African Conference:
Speeches and Communiques^
Ministry of Information. Republic of Indonesia
(Mimeo. , Djakarta, May, 1955).131
Article III
Anybody with dual nationality as mentioned under Article I who wishes to
retain his or her Indonesian citizenship shall state his or her desire to abandon
the citizenship of the People's Republic of China to the officers of the Republic
of Indonesia in charge. After having expressed this desire the person is con-
sidered to have chosen the citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia on his or
her own will.
Anybody with dual nationality as mentioned under Article I who desires to
retain the citizenship of the People's Republic of China shall state his or her
desire to abandon the Indonesian citizenship to the officer of the People's
Republic of China in charge. After having stated this desire the person is con-
sidered to have chosen the citizenship of the People's Republic of China on his
or her own will.
Officers of the Republic of Indonesia in charge are: in the Republic of
Indonesia: officers appointed by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia;
in the People's Republic of China: the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia
and the Consulates of the Republic of Indonesia in the People's Republic of
China--if they exist--and temporary offices which on the basis of their being
needed are established by the Embassy or Consulates concerned and staffed
by their officers. For the establishment of the temporary offices the agree-
ment of the Government of the People's Republic of China shall be obtained.
Officers of the People's Republic of China in charge are: in the People's
Republic of China: officers appointed by the Government of the People's Re-
public of China; in the Republic of Indonesia: the Embassy of the People's
Republic of China and the Consulates of the People's Republic of China in the
Republic of Indonesia, and temporary offices which on the basis of their being
needed are established by the Embassy or Consulates concerned and staffed by
their officers. For the establishment of the temporary offices the agreement
of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall be obtained.
To enable persons with dual nationality to choose their citizenship the two
contracting parties promise to agree to a simple expression of the desire.
Provisions for choosing the citizenship laid down under this Article basically
also apply to persons with dual nationality as mentioned under Article I residing
outside the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and the People's Republic of
China.
Article IV
The two contracting parties agree that anybody with dual nationality as
mentioned under Article I who has chosen the citizenship of the Republic of
Indonesia according to the provisions of this agreement shall automatically lose
the citizenship of the People's Republic of China, and that anybody with dual
nationality as mentioned under Article I who has chosen the citizenship of the
People's Republic of China according to the provisions of this agreement shall
automatically lose the citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia.132
Article V
The two contracting parties hereby agree that anybody with dual nationality as
mentioned under Article I who does not express the choice of citizenship within two
years as stipulated under Article II shall be considered to have chosen the citizen-
ship of the Republic of Indonesia when his or her father's side is of Indonesian
descent, and shall be considered to have chosen the citizenship of the People's
Republic of China when his or her father's side is of Chinese descent.
When the person concerned has no legal relation with his or her father or
when the father's citizenship is unknown, the person shall be considered to have
chosen the citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia when his or her mother from
the father's side is of Indonesian descent, and the person shall be considered to
have chosen the citizenship of the People's Republic of China when his or her
mother from the father's side is of Chinese descent.
Article VI
Anybody with dual nationality as mentioned under Article I who is not yet of
age at the time the agreement comes into force, shall choose his or her citizen-
ship within one year after coming to age.
While still under age, the person concerned shall be considered to have the
citizenship of his or her parents' choice or of his or her father's choice according
to the provisions of this agreement.
When the person concerned has no legal relation with his or her father or
when his or her father has died before declaring his choice of citizenship within
the stipulated period or when his or her father's citizenship is unknown, the per-
son shall be considered to have the citizenship of his or her mother's choice
according to the provisions of this agreement.
Article VII
Anybody with dual nationality as mentioned under Article I who has adopted
the citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia and has lost the citizenship of the
People's Republic of China, shall automatically lose his or her citizenship of
the Republic of Indonesia when such a person, after leaving the territory of the
Republic of Indonesia, has established permanent residence outside the territory
of the Republic of Indonesia and has regained the citizenship of the People's
Republic of China on his or her own will.
Anybody with dual nationality as stipulated under Article I who has adopted
the citizenship of the People's Republic of China and has lost his or her citizen-
ship of the Republic of Indonesia, shall automatically lose his or her citizenship
of the People's Republic of China when the person, after leaving the territory of
the People's Republic of China, has established permanent residence outside the
territory of the People's Republic of China and has regained the citizenship of
the Republic of Indonesia on his or her own will.133
Article VIII
Children born within the territory of the People's Republic of China possess
the citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia as from the dates of their births
when their parents or only their father possess the citizenship of the Republic
of Indonesia.
Children born within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia possess
the citizenship of the People's Republic of China as from the dates of their,
births when their parents or only their father possess the citizenship of the
People's Republic of China.
Article IX
A child, citizen of the People's Republic of China, legally adopted by a
citizen of the Republic of Indonesia while still under five years of age, shall
by virtue of this be considered a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia and
shall lose his citizenship of the People's Republic of China.
A child, citizen of the Republic of Indonesia, legally adopted by a citizen
of the People's Republic of China while still under five years of age, shall by
virtue of this be considered a citizen of the People's Republic of China and
shall lose his citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia.
Article X
When a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia marries a citizen of the People's
Republic of China, each respectively shall retain his or her citizenship before
the marriage unless one of them by his or her own will applies and obtains
citizenship of the other. When he or she obtains the citizenship of the other,
automatically he or she shall lose his or her original citizenship.
Application for citizenship as mentioned above shall be made to the legal
authorities of the country concerned.
Article XI
The two contracting parties agree in the interest of the welfare of their
respective citizens residing in the country of the other contracting party, to
urge the party's respective citizens residing in the country of the other con-
tracting party, namely, the citizens of the Republic of Indonesia residing in
the territory of the People's Republic of China and the citizens of the People's
Republic of China residing in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, to
abide by the laws and customs of the State in which they reside and not to
participate in political activities of the country in which they reside.
The two contracting parties agree to give mutual protection according to
the laws of the respective country, to the legal rights and interests of the
respective citizens residing in the country of each contracting party.134
Article XII
The two contracting parties agree that exchange of mind between the two
partied shall be made regarding questions of implementation which are not pro-
vided in this agreement.
Article XIII
The two contracting parties agree that any disagreement arising out of the
interpretation and implementation of the agreement shall be settled through
negotiation between the two contracting parties.
Article XIV
This agreement shall be ratified by the two contracting parties in accordance
with their respective constitutions and shall come into force as from the day of
exchange of the instruments of ratification which shall take place in Peking.
This agreement shall be in force for the duration of twenty years and shall
continue to be in force unless one of the contracting parties desires to annul it.
Such desire shall be notified in writing to the other contracting party, following
which the agreement shall expire within one year after the notification is made.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the plenipotentiaries have signed this agreement
and have affixed thereto their respective seals.
Done in duplicate in Bandung, on April 22nd, 1955, in the Indonesian and
Chinese languages, both texts being equally valid.
For the Republic of Indonesia,	For the People’s Republic of
China,
/s/Sunario
Foreign Minister
/s/Chou En-lai
Foreign Minister135
APPENDIX VII
SPEECHES DELIVERED AT THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF DUAL
NATIONALITY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. *
Dr. Sunario, Foreign Minister, Republic of Indonesia:
Your Excellency, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China,
May I first, in the name of my Government of the Republic of Indonesia,
express happiness at the fact that agreement has been reached between our
Government and Your Excellency's Government as regards a settlement of the
question of dual nationality between our two States. The reaching of agreement
is clear from the signing of the text of the Treaty just now.
The signing of this Treaty is an event of the greatest importance not only
for our State and People but also fbr the State and People of Your Excellency.
For is it not true that this Treaty opens up the possibility of putting an
end to a situation which has gone on for years and years, but which we now
regard as no longer fitting?
Our Government is happy too because this signing has come at the very
time of the holding of the Asian-African Conference, which is also an event of
historic importance in the relations between the States of Asia and Africa.
Everything can go smoothly when an atmosphere of neighbourliness pre-
vails, which it is to be hoped will always prevail between the State of the
Republic of Indonesia and the State of the People's Republic of China.
Thank you.
Mr. Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister, People's Republic of China:
Your Excellency our respected Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Sunario,
Gentlemen,
It is a great privilege for me to sign today on behalf of the People's Re-
public of China "The Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the
Republic of Indonesia concerning the question of Dual Nationality. " Allow me
to extend on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China our
sincere congratulations to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and to
Your Excellency Foreign Minister Sunario.
*Text as given in Asian-African Conference: Speeches and Communiques,
Ministry of Information. Republic of Indonesia (Mimeo. , Djakarta, May,
1955).136
The Republic of Indonesia and our country have always maintained good
neighbourly relations. Our two countries have always respected and have been
friendly to each other. The question of dual nationality is a question left to us
by the past. Now it is reasonably settled through friendly negotiations between
the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with
the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect.
We know that some other countries are likewise concerned about this ques-
tion. It is of great significance that this question is solved during the time of
the Asian-African Conference. This is another good example of solving diffi-
cult questions between us Asian and African countries in a spirit of friendly
negotiation.
I guarantee that the Government of the People's Republic of China will firmly
carry out the Treaty signed today. I hope that persons of Chinese origin with
dual nationality as a result of past history will, after making their choice of
nationality in accordance with their own will, strictly abide by the letter and
spirit of this Treaty and increase their sense of responsibility towards the
country the nationality of which they have chosen. I hope that persons who
choose either the nationality of the People's Republic of China or the nationality
of the Republic of Indonesia will join their efforts in promoting friendly and
neighbourly relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic
of Indonesia.
I congratulate the ever strengthening of the friendly relations between the
People's Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia!137
APPENDIX VIII
Summary of Government Regulation No. 20, 1959, Concerning the
Implementation of the Dual Citizenship Treaty between Indonesia and China*
Article I
1.	Rejection of Chinese citizenship must be made at the District Court in
one's place of residence in Indonesia, or at an Indonesian consulate or embassy
if one is overseas.
2.	Rejection of Chinese citizenship may be oral or written. There will be
no tax or fee. Oral rejection will be on a specified day. If too many people
come to Court on that day, they will be registered and will be invited to return
later to complete arrangements.
3.	(This section lists the various forms, documents, and procedures re-
quired for written renunciations. )
4.	If the court official who receives a renunciation believes that it is not
allowable, the letter of renunciation may be returned with reasons for its re-
jection. Letters of renunciation may also be returned for correction or addition
of omitted information. A person whose renunciation is rejected will have four
months in which to prove his right to renounce Chinese citizenship.
5.	- 7. (Procedural technicalities. )
8.	A person's certified copy of his letter of renunciation becomes his
proof of citizenship. "This certificate loses force as proof of citizenship if it
is declared invalid by the Minister of Justice or a judge of a District Court. "
9.	The Minister of Justice will declare a registration as invalid if the
person concerned did not have the right to reject Chinese citizenship.
10.	- 11. (Procedural technicalities. )
Article II
12. Those who will be considered already to have rejected their Chinese
citizenship (and hence will be exempt from the option requirement^ are as
follow s:
a. persons who have already sworn allegiance to Indonesia as a
member of some official body
*This regulation was dated May 26, 1959, and made law on June 1, 1959, but
it did not come into effect until January 20, I960. The present summary is
based upon the text as reported in Pos Indonesia, July 15, 1959.138
b.	members of the Armed Forces, or those honorably discharged
therefrom
c.	members of the Police Forces, or those honorably discharged
therefrom
d.	veterans
e.	civil servants and civil servant pensioners
f.	civil servants of autonomous areas and pensioners
g.	persons who have more than once represented the Government of
Indonesia in the political field, and who afterwards have never
represented the Government of China.
h.	persons who have more than once represented the Government of
Indonesia in the field of economics, and who afterwards have never
represented the Government of China.
i.	persons who have more than once represented Indonesia in the field
of culture or of sports in international competition, and who after-
wards have not represented China.
j.	farmers whose way of life and relations with native Indonesian
people demonstrate that they are natives themselves, in the opinion
of the Ministers of Home Affairs, Justice,and Agriculture.
No one will be considered to fall into any of the above categories who has shown
disloyalty to Indonesia.
13.	Also not included among non-opters are women who at the time the
treaty comes into effect are «harried, and children who at the time the treaty
comes into effect are minors, if the husband or father or mother whose citizen-
ship they follow has dual citizenship but does not fall into any of the categories
listed above.
14.	Wives and children of those who are considered to have already given
up Chinese citizenship automatically acquire Indonesian citizenship also.
15.	As soon as possible after the treaty comes into effect, lists will be
made of those who are considered to have given up Chinese citizenship. The
lists will be drawn up by the following officials for the respective categories
listed above:
a.	the heads of official bodies
b.	the Minister of Defense
c.	the Head of State Police
d.	the Minister of Veterans Affairs
e.	the respective Ministers
4139
f.	the Heads of Autonomous Areas
g.	the Minister of Foreign Affairs
h.	the Minister of Economic and Industrial Affairs
i.	the Minister of Education, Teaching, and Culture
j.	the Minister of Home Affairs
16.	The Minister of Justice will be given a copy of this list.
17.	Those listed will receive certificates of Indonesian citizenship.
18.	Those listed as having lost their Chinese citizenship may regain it
and give up Indonesian citizenship by so stating within one year. This also
applies to those mentioned in (14).
19.	- 22. (Procedural technicalities. )
Article III
A prison sentence of one year and/or a 100, 000 rupiah fine is provided
for not returning a certificate when asked, or for giving false information.
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