THE PUTERA REPORTS
PROBLEMS IN INDONESIAN-JAPANESE
WARTIME COOPERATION
Mohammad Hatta
Translated with an Introduction
by
William H. Frederick
TRANSLATION SERIES
Modem Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14850
1971
14.00THE PUTERA REPORTS
PROBLEMS IN INDONESIAN-JAPANESE WARTIME COOPERATION
Mohammad Hatta
Translated with an Introduction
by
William H. Frederick
TRANSLATION SERIES
Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14850
1971© Cornell Modern Indonesia Project
1971PREFACE
The present translation was prepared from a typed copy of
an original manuscript that has not been available for re-check-
ing. The rather large number of typographical errors in the
copy have been corrected with Dr. Hatta's help; in the majority
of cases, a simple letter-change clarified matters, while in
several instances dropped phrases and even omitted lines had to
be filled in or bridged. In the latter circumstances especially,
Dr. Hatta's suggestions as to the intent of the original have
been carefully followed. It was not thought necessary to point
out these textual difficulties to the reader, though several
especially prominent ones are treated briefly in footnotes.
The annotations accompanying the translation are intended
to help the reader understand the text, not to go beyond or
supplement it in any meaningful or systematic way. A number of
explanatory notes benefited from the care with which Dr. Hatta
commented on the text during a series of interviews granted to
the translator in Honolulu, during August 1968. Dr. Hatta was
at that time busy completing a period of study as a Scholar-in-
Residence at the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii,
and his patience, care and time were much appreciated and
valued.
In keeping with the general aim of presenting as uncluttered
a text as possible, annotations not directly related to Dr.
Hatta's experience or special knowledge have been limited in
length and subject matter. Biographical information on many
figures mentioned in the reports is available elsewhere and has
not been included here for that reason. Likewise, no attempt
has been made to supply more than basic information on the large
number of groups and organizations mentioned. Discussion of the
governmental and administrative terminology has been avoided.
Unfamiliar terms have been italicized, translated and explained
on their first appearance in the text and at that time only.
In one case, an entire complex set of terms is handled as a unit
in a single footnote.
Matters of spelling are extraordinarily confused for the
Japanese period in Indonesia. There are at least two common
methods of romanizing the Japanese language, based upon English
practices; in the Indonesian environment these became mixed with
Dutch and Indonesian spelling principles. Furthermore, Indone-
sian spelling rules have themselves altered since the achieve-
ment of independence. The procedure followed here is as follows:
1) personal names mentioned in the text have been, if Indonesian,
left in their original, old-style spelling (thus, Soepeno, not
inSupeno); if Japanese, they have been romanized according to the
system adopted in the most recent Kenkyusha dictionary (thus,
Miyoshi, not Myoshi); 2) Indonesian place names have been given
their modern Indonesian spellings (thus, Surabaja, not Soerabaia);
Indonesian names of newspapers, books, and other materials likely
to be sought after by the historian, have been left in their
original, old-style spelling (thus, Soeara Asia, not Suava Asia);
3) Japanese titles and organization names have been romanized
according to the Kenkyusha method (thus, Jawa HQkSkai, not Djawa
Hookookai).
The documents treated in this publication were originally
located by Dr. George S. Kanahele in the course of research in
Indonesia during the years 1964-1965. I am indebted to Dr.
Kanahele for suggesting that the Putera reports be translated,
a task which he could not undertake himself because of other
pressing commitments. I am also grateful to him for much advice
and encouragement on the project, introduction to Dr. Hatta and
contact with the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, which ex-
pressed interest in publishing the materials. Dr. Kanahele has
continued to keep a live interest in the project despite an
extraordinarily demanding schedule and additional duties as
Indonesia's Honorary Consul in Honolulu.
I would also like to express my thanks to Benedict Anderson
and Elizabeth Graves, both of Cornell, whose patient editing
and nursing-along of the entire manuscript has been done with
care, persistence and goodwill.
William H. Frederick
Honolulu, February 1971
IVINTRODUCTION
Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakjat--Concentration of the People's
Power), March 1943-February 1944, was an important and in some
ways typical organization of Japanese-occupied Java. It was the
first more or less durable association of what might be called
the semi-public, semi-political type,1 2 and the best as well as
best-known example of Japanese attempts to harness Indonesian
political figures from the old Pergerakan2 to serve their needs.
Though sometimes depicted as such, Putera was neither a surro-
gate political party nor a simple propaganda arm of the military
administration. It was, instead, a complex association with un-
certain goals, varied interests and involvements, and an uneven
record of success and failure, in which Japanese and Indonesians
sometimes clashed and sometimes agreed on the goals to be pur-
sued. A scarcity of concrete and detailed information concern-
ing Putera has made its historical role difficult to assess in
any but a very general manner.
The following two documents, made public here for the first
time, do much to improve our understanding of Putera. They sup-
ply both details of the organization's structure, staff and
activities, and discussions of general problems facing it
throughout its development. The Putera reports also have much
to say about the setting in which their primary subject func-
tioned and therefore provide a valuable description of wartime
1.	The Triple A Movement (Gerakan Tiga A), which preceded Putera,
was active for only a matter of months and did not affect
all parts of Java. "Semi-public" indicates here that the
organization was neither an agency of the military adminis-
tration nor one in which the general public actually held
membership or took part. By "semi-political" is meant that
the organization, on the one hand, existed in the deliber-
ately a-political atmosphere of a military occupation under
which power and authority were unquestionably in the hands
of the government, and, on the other hand, still was in-
volved in many of the activities of political parties and
leaned heavily on the reputation and prestige of members of
a political elite.
2.	Pergerakan (literally, "movement") was loosely used from
the late 1920's on to describe the general struggle of all
groups to achieve independence for Indonesia. Sometimes
the word was used alone, sometimes with modifiers, as in
pergerakan nasional, pergerakan kebangsaan, or pergerakan
kemerdekaan.
12
Java. That they were authored principally by the well-known
scholar and political leader Mohammad Hatta and reflect both his
views and those of his subordinates, makes them of additional
interest.3 For these reasons, it is no exaggeration to say that
these lengthy reports are some of the most important of the very
few surviving documents written by Indonesians during the Japa-
nese occupation of their country.4
3.	The reports were compiled for the most part from the informa-
tion and opinions sent to Hatta's office every three months
by the head of each section. Presumably, views from local
branches were systematically fed back to Djakarta Headquar-
ters. Hatta took responsibility for the final form of the
reports and wrote the introductions and conclusions to them.
His opinions also appear clearly from time to time in the
main body of the text. (Interviews, August 1968.)
4.	Extremely little is known about the existence of documents
of this sort in Indonesia. A number are preserved in Dutch
archives, but they have not been adequately studied, either
individually or as a group. The Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogs-
documentatie, Indische Sectie, Amsterdam (whose materials
shall hereafter be identified with the abbreviation RvO-IC
and the document number) has published some shorter documents
written by Indonesians in:	I. J. Brugmans, et al. (comps.),
Nederlandsch-Indie onder Japanse Bezetting 1942-1945
(Franeker: T. Wever, 1960). Some other items from the col-
lection are:	stenographic notes on the January 8, 1945 ses-
sion of the Sanyo Kaigi (RvO-IC 036627), which have been
partially translated into English by Benedict Anderson ("The
Problem of Rice," Indonesia, No. 2 (October 1966), pp. 77-
123); stenographic notes on three meetings of the Chub Sangi
In, dated December 16 and 27, 1944, and April 6-10, 1945
(RvO-IC 036573-036677); the so-called Soebardjo reports,
short treatments of the economic situation on Java at the
end of 1943 (RvO-IC 020113-22), the youth movement from pre-
Japanese times (RvO-IC 020098-112), the setting up of the
KNI (Komitd Nasional Indonesia) in Central Java in March and
April 1942 (RvO-IC 031605-30), and the like; an anonymous
report on Indonesian opinions of Putera (RvO-IC 020169-73);
an anonymous report on Indonesian expectations after the
T5jo declaration (RvO-IC 020161-2). In the archives of the
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken in The Hague (hereafter
identified with the letters MBZ and the appropriate number)
are at least two reports of interest:	one on the Indramaju
Revolt, with excerpts and commentary on pangreh pradja re-
ports, by Prawoto Soemodilogo (MBZ series 97B, box 2, folder
17); and one on the activities of Parindra between March
and July 1942 (MBZ Indische Archieven series, group 15, box
9).3
However unusual they may be in other ways, the Putera re-
ports are not special in at least one, perhaps surprising,
respect. Like the majority of similar papers prepared for Japa-
nese use, they contain unmistakable and often sharp criticism
of a number of aspects of Japanese rule. Hatta's courage and
straightforwardness as exhibited in these reports were exemplary
but not unparalleled, and there were few Pergerakan leaders who
were abjectly subservient to the Japanese. It would hardly have
served their long-held interests to be so, and their struggles
under the Netherlands East Indies government prepared them in
important ways for dealing courageously with Japanese rule. For
their part, the new colonial administrators often mistrusted
those too eager to come to their aid and were not averse to
seeking the opinions of people who were frankly critical of one
or another aspect of the New Java.
How much effect such criticism--solicited or not--had on
the future course of events, however, is a matter of specula-
tion. In the case of the Putera reports, the Gunseikan's5 reac-
tion apparently has gone unrecorded, and Hatta remembers nothing
in this regard. From internal evidence, it may be surmised that
the first report was either ignored or was unsuccessful in having
the problems it outlined solved. The second report, completed
after Putera*s demise and the launching of the Jawa HSkSkai,6
seems to have been of small consequence to the latter's pro-
gress .7
Having his criticism and advice ignored was not a new ex-
perience for Hatta and did not prevent him from continuing to
take the kind of leader's role he had chosen at the beginning
of the occupation. This stance, which was cooperative in con-
trast to his earlier position toward the Netherlands East Indies
government and which involved holding official and semi-public
office, was the result of both pre-war ideas and assurances re-
ceived from the Japanese.
By 1940, Hatta had concluded that the only proper behavior
for Indonesians in the coming Pacific war was to pursue "the
5.	Chief of the Military Administration.
6.	The Jawa Hokbkai (Java Service Association) was a successor
association to Putera, begun on March 1, 1944.
7.	Official Indonesian advisory bodies and offices may have had
a much better record than P-utera in influencing Japanese de-
cisions. In any case, the matter of how seriously Japanese
administrators took Indonesian advice and opinions, espe-
cially in non-political or non-national affairs, remains an
obscure and little-studied aspect of the occupation period.4
hopes and interests of Indonesia herself."8 If they wished to
survive and pursue those interests, furthermore, Indonesians
must not remain passive, but must act in some way.9 With these
principles in mind, Hatta met with the Deputy Chief of Staff,
General Harada Yoshikazu, several weeks after the Japanese
landed on Java. He was assured that Japan's goal was to free
Indonesia, not to colonize it again.10 So grew the conviction
that the public leader, though under Japanese eyes, stood a
better chance of influencing the direction of change than did
the exile or the totally estranged citizen. Though his reason-
ing appears careful and clear, we may only guess what Hatta,
who ten years earlier had bitterly denounced those who cooper-
ated in any way with colonial governments,* 11 felt as he adopted
this new posture and embarked on a new course in his career.
Scattered points of emphasis in the Putera reports indi-
cate, however, that whatever other accommodations were made to
the fact of Japanese rule, Hatta's thinking on the great issues
facing his people and nation-to-be altered very little. One
reason for this is that Hatta's pre-war view of the future in-
cluded, perhaps even depended upon, a Pacific war12 and saw a
continuous progression in history toward an inevitably-free
Indonesia.13 The outlook was not as naive as a simplified ren-
dition makes it seem. While condemning fascism,14 Hatta was
8.	Mohammad Hatta, Kumpulan Karangan (Djakarta: Penerbitan dan
Balai Buku Indonesia, 1953) , I, p. 143.
9.	Ibid., p. 145.
10.	Mohammad Hatta, Verspreide Geschriften (Amsterdam: van der
Peet, 1952), p. 15. (The butch-language version of Hatta's
writings does not duplicate the one published in Indone-
sian.) Also, Bintang Timur, March 25, 1942, and the inter-
views cited in George S. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation
of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence" (Ph.D. Thesis,
Cornell University, 1967), p. 41.
11.	Hatta, Verspreide Geschriften, pp. 422 and 440-441.
12.	As early as 1926, Hatta had written that Asia could never
hope to be freed from Western imperialism without an East-
West, white-vs-colored conflict. Verspreide Geschriften,
p. 65.
13.	On the inevitable fall of imperial systems, see Kumpulan
Karangan, I, p. 27; on the "law of history" that Indonesia
would eventually be free, see ibid., p. 78.
See, for example, Kumpulan Karangan, I, pp. 142 ff., and
II, pp. 18-23.
14.5
cautious in his appraisal of other elements in the Japanese plan
for Asia. For example, he endorsed the concept of Asian soli-
darity and brotherhood in the abstract but temporarily suspended
judgment on the more concrete matter of whether the Japanese
could successfully sponsor such an ideal.15 Further, there were
no illusions as to how long the Japanese would stay in Southeast
Asia, especially the territory of the Netherlands East Indies,
if they possibly could.16 There was never any indication that
the basic goals and interests of the Pergerakan would be trans-
formed by the Japanese presence. The struggle could be aided
immeasurably by the crushing of Dutch dominance, but not con-
summated by it. For Hatta the final victory (kemenangan aohiv)
was always the achievement of a fully independent Indonesia,
not simply a decision against the West in the Greater East
Asian war.17
A second reason is that the conditions of the occupation
permitted and even encouraged Hatta*s thinking to continue to
move in the same directions it always had. The ideas of the
Pergerakan, especially those concerned with the building of
Indonesian economic and social potential, were often similar
to those of the occupation authorities. If the ultimate goals
of the Japanese and the Indonesians were not always the same,
short-term policies and approaches were very similar in a sur-
prisingly large number of cases. For the first time, Hatta and
others saw their ideas or ones like them treated seriously by
not only administrators but the public media; there is little
reason why they should have or would have wanted to stop propa-
gandizing the same programs they had pursued so hazardously and
in such limited fashion under the Dutch.
The Putera reports provide some valuable indications of
the extent to which Hatta was able to continue expressing ideas
and pressing for programs in which he had a long-standing
15.	Verspreide Geschriften, p. 67. There was particular inter-
est at this time among Indonesian intellectuals with some
knowledge of economics in the Japanese idea of an Asian
co-prosperity sphere.
16.	Kumpulan Karangan, I, p. 142.
17.	The phrase kemenangan achir was often used in the wartime
speeches of Indonesians and Japanese alike. Officially,
it referred to a Japanese victory against the Allies. For
many Indonesians it clearly must have meant Indonesian vic-
tory in the struggle for independence, the sense in which
Hatta had used it since 1923. Kumpulan Karangan, I, pp.
19-25. It is a classic example of the use of double
entendre in the speeches and writings of occupied Java.6
interest. The clearest example of a steady viewpoint is in the
field of economics. Even as a student in the Netherlands, Hatta
had blamed most of the Indonesian people's economic ills on
Western capitalism and individualism, which had brought with
them a modern exploitation far more cruel and pervasive than
any earlier system.18 One of his favorite pictures of the eco-
nomic destruction of Indonesia came from J. H. Boeke's early
writings. A quote from this source appearing in a 1933 article
by Hatta19 is precisely the same one included in the present
reports (p. 80f.) . Nor did the solutions Hatta had in mind for
aiding the economy change appreciably. He championed government
encouragement of small private businesses among Indonesians and
recommended the widespread use of cooperative societies. Both
the original analysis and the solutions to some of the problems
it outlined were quite acceptable to the Japanese, who made a
point of boosting Indonesian business activity and establishing
cooperatives throughout Java.20
Hatta’s ideas on education also coincided with many of
those of the Japanese administration. From an early point in
his career, he had bitterly criticized the Dutch approach to
educating Indonesians for being too utilitarian and, at the
same time, elitist.21 He himself, however, did not find intel-
lectuals especially useful to the Pergerakan22 and placed great
emphasis instead upon educating the masses, especially in char-
acter and practical skills, which would enable them to govern
and provide for themselves.23
18. For example, see Kumpulan Karangan, I, pp. 244-252.
19 . Ibid., p. 262.
20.	The results, however, were not entirely satisfactory from
Hatta's point of view. Indonesian enterpreneurs were en-
couraged but were at the same time strongly advised to be
loyal and obedient to government wishes. The agricultural
cooperatives established by the Japanese often were, more
than anything else, collection points for rice and some-
times labor deliveries to the government. Financial coop-
eratives that were begun in the later occupation, a highly
inflationary period, were financially unsound and often
run by unscrupulous people. The cooperative bank movement
in the post-war era had to overcome their bad reputation.
21.	Verspreide Geschriften, p. 466.
22.	Ibid., pp. 267-268.
23.
Ibid♦, p. 275.7
The Japanese subscribed to a similar view, and acted upon
it to a considerable extent. Even their well-known interest in
building semangat (spirit, enthusiasm) was not unechoed on the
Indonesian side. Hatta, for example, had long felt semangat
bangsa (nationalist or national spirit) to be one of the most
important gifts of education; both his own colleagues and other
members of the Pergerakan had spoken of the necessity of foster-
ing semangat perdguangan (the spirit or will to struggle).24
The propositions on education set out in the Putera reports
(especially on p. 85) and to the Japanese on other occasions,25
were in large measure ones which Hatta had made or considered
for many years.
One important aspect of Hatta's thinking does not appear
as clearly in his pre-war works as in the Putera documents.
The lengthy and sharp attacks in the latter against the pangreh
pradja26 (especially pp. 32-33) are unparalleled in earlier
writings and therefore give the appearance of being caused by
the new circumstances of the Japanese occupation. In a sense
this is true, though the basic enmity to the pangrbh pradja had
always existed even if explicit expression of it had not.
The pre-war Pergerakan, after all, was aimed primarily
against the Dutch colonial presence, which was thought to be
the root of all other evils. There was a clear lack of sympathy
for the regent system27 and for feudal elitism or "ningratisme"
in general,28 but the subject was not dwelt upon. Instead, a
vague belief in the masses rather than privilege and aristocracy
24.	See, for example, Daulat Rakj at, October 30, 1931, p. 10,
and June 10, 1933, p. 124. The building of semangat was
also a point of emphasis among cooperative political groups,
especially Dr. Soetomo's Parindra.
25.	Kumpulan Karangan, IV, pp. 98 ff.
26.	PangrSh pradja, literally "rulers of the kingdom," refers
to the elite Indonesian civil service through which colo-
nial rule was extended to the Javanese masses in the Dutch
and Japanese periods.
27.	For example, see Verspreide Geschriften, p. 467. Regents
were the highest-ranking members of the pangreh pradja, and
the regent system was thus connotative of the so-called
"indirect rule" by a colonial power through an indigenous
elite.
28.	For example, Kumpulan Karangan, I, pp. 78-80. The term
ningratisme (lit. ningratism) derives from the frequency
with which the suffix -ningrat is found in the names of the
upper elite or nobility, especially in Central Java.8
was assumed. Social revolution was discussed, and held to be
above political revolution in value,29 but it was virtually al-
ways explained in terms of the Western European (or Turkish)
experience and not what might happen in Netherlands East Indies
society.30 Not only was ningratism not the average Indonesian's
chief problem (capitalism was), it would disappear automatically
as the movement progressed, with the powers of the pangrlh
pradja falling into the hands of the people.31
After the arrival of the Japanese, however, Hatta was in a
position to see things from closer up and with far less detach-
ment. The Dutch were gone and required little further rhetoric.
For the first time, Hatta was personally and deeply involved in
the kinds of activity--Putera was the best example--that brought
him face to face with the pangreh pradja, allowing him to see
not only how much they opposed his theories but how effectively
they could block the implementation of programs he supported.
It is understandable that his attacks on the holders of privi-
leged civil-service positions intensified.
Besides an opportunity to continue currents of thought and
activity begun before the war, Putera offered Hatta much else
of potential value in reaching the Pergerakan's goals. Of
greatest significance was the size, structure, and even distri-
bution throughout Java which--in theory at least--made Putera
the kind of organizational source of power that was merely
dreamed about under the Dutch. As, potentially at least, an
association offering benefits and true participation to all
classes on a broad scale, as a training ground for leaders, and
as an Indonesian-manned agency involved in many aspects of im-
proving life on Java, Putera appeared to offer Hatta and his
co-workers the materials to create the "state within a state"
that had so often been discussed in pre-war days as the founda-
tion of a free Indonesia.32 The enthusiasm with which the pub-
lic seems to have greeted early announcements of the group and
its first weeks of operation must have encouraged Hatta and
29.	See Daulat Rakjat, August 30, 1934, pp. 177-178.
30.	Hatta did most of his writing from Europe, where he seldom
even saw an Indonesian-language newspaper. (Daulat Rakjat,
August 20, 1932, p. 5.) Isolation as well as temperament
led him to theorize in broad terms, and he drew examples
from European, Turkish, and occasionally Japanese experi-
ences in modernization.
31.	Daulat Rakjat, December 10, 1932, pp. 1-3.
32.	On the power of organization and the state within a state,
see Verspreide Geschriften, pp. 63-64.9
raised whatever hopes he held.33
It was not long before such expectations were trimmed back,
and, within three months, Hatta wrote that Putera’s performance
was "completely unsatisfactory." The organization's failure,
in fact, is the core subject of the reports. They contain a
sober, detailed assessment of Putera's difficulties, indicate
how complex these were, and depict clearly some of the impasses
and frustrations they caused. And although it is possible to
be misled in this regard, Putera's troubles appear in Hatta's
analysis to have been due in large measure to factors other
than Japanese-Indonesian enmity or difference in goals, neither
of which were always very strong. A special feature of the re-
ports is that an examination of some of these "other factors"
reveals much about wartime Java in general.
Obviously Putera was expected to flourish in difficult
times. A few of the crises affecting its success were lack of
rice, labor problems, and a shortage and demoralization of Indo-
nesian leadership. None of these were new to Java in 1942-1943;
they had existed in one form or another under Dutch rule. War-
time conditions altered them, sometimes to an important degree.
In the matter of food supply, production remained insuffi-
cient, especially for satisfying the requirements of the mili-
tary government.34 The Japanese policy of treating each
33.	Besides the assertions contained in the reports themselves,
there is actually little clear evidence on the existence
of public enthusiasm for Putera, or on its exact nature.
The Beppan [a Japanese intelligence group] Report (RvO-IC
005798) is very generalized and is primarily concerned with
possible objections to, rather than approval of, Putera.
The suggestion that it was a widespread opinion that Putera
would gradually replace the Japanese military government
of Indonesia (G. Pakpahan, 1261 Hari Dibawah Sinar Matahari
Terbit [Djakarta: n.p., 1947], p.	seems open to doubt.
Hatta's description of popular hopes indicates strongly
that these concerned mostly improvement of conditions and
righting of rather specific wrongs. There seems to be
little of a political nature. As for intellectuals, other
evidence (the Beppan Report cited above, and RvO-IC
020169-73) shows that they were cautious, as might be ex-
pected under the circumstances. Many, including Hatta him-
self, may have seen in Putera many possibilities, but few
could have been naive enough to confuse these very seriously
with the probabilities involved.
34.	Not enough is known about rice production on Java during
the occupation to be very certain about such judgments, but10
residency (shu) as a largely self-sufficient unit caused serious
disorders in rice distribution. To make matters worse, the con-
ditions just described coupled with the economic uncertainty of
the war economy to increase rice hoarding, encourage hidden
production, and greatly heighten speculation in rice and other
foodstuffs. Production and distribution of agricultural goods
was a persistent problem for the Japanese on Java.35 Though
various attempts were made to solve it, often utilizing plans
or concepts considered by the Dutch, these were unsuccessful.
As Hatta points out several times in the Putera reports (espe-
cially p. 67), the underlying significance of this failure was
very great to Putera, to the people of Java, and to the success
of the Japanese as governors.
Labor problems, which according to some men active in the
Pergerakan was the worst problem of the late 1930's, were given
a complicated twist by the circumstances of the occupation.
Hatta's documentation tells us that unemployment declined dra-
matically on Java by early 1944 (see especially p. 111). The
reasons for this, however--and the reports are silent here--were
not always of the sort to make Putera's job easier. The Japa-
nese placed heavy pressure on the population to be gainfully
employed, and offered few of the pre-war aids, such as public
food distribution, to those who were not. Large numbers of
semi- and non-skilled workers were taken off Java as romusha
(literally, though not generally in fact, volunteer laborers),
and others were used in local forced-labor arrangements which
went unrecorded and had little or no system. Young men with
some education were drawn into military-type service as Heihd
(army units serving with Japanese forces) and Peta (Pembela
the actual total production figure may well have been higher
in 1945 than in 1941, if Japanese estimates on the extent
of hoarding and black marketeering can be accepted (601 of the
rice crop in 1945). See RvO-IC 005374 and 051163-76. Rice
was not exported from Java to Japan, but on occasion may
have been used to boost supplies elsewhere in Southeast
Asia. The fact that the Japanese, unlike the Dutch, were
a people whose customary staple was rice meant that the
burden upon Javanese rice farmers was much greater during
the war than in earlier years. The economic dislocations
of wartime also confounded efforts to stabilize the rice
market. Before the first year of Japanese rule had ended,
rice was being imported to Java from Malaya. See Kuroda
Hidetoshi, Gunsei (Tokyo: Gakufushdin, 1952),pp. 82-83,
cited in Mitsuo Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early
Period of Japanese Occupation," Indonesia, No. 10 (October
1970) , p. 25.
35. The subject is dealt with in detail in Anderson, "The Prob-
lem of Rice."11
Tanah Air-- Indonesian Self-Defense Force) troops, and not always
with their complete consent. Idle youths often ended up with a
busy work schedule under the sponsorship of the Seinendan (Youth
Association).36 All of these programs reduced slack in the
labor market, but they seldom improved the popularity of the
government or the organizations it sponsored. The same may be
said of the related price-wage squeeze37 and the neglect of
pensioners (pp. 111-112).
The crisis in Indonesian leadership, a concomitant of the
Dutch colonial system (in which social, political and economic
initiative had to remain in Western hands and repression of
various sorts saw that it did), was altered under the Japanese,
but only to a fine degree and in a curious manner. One of
Japan’s interests in Indonesia was the encouragement of indige-
nous, as opposed to Western or Chinese, initiative in productive
economic and social endeavors. Leadership of a more political
nature was also sought out and utilized in a way it never had
been in the pre-war era. At the same time, however, the occu-
pation government demanded a high degree of control over all
activities, and in so doing often stifled the same kinds of
initiative it in other moments wished to boost.
This paradoxical state of affairs lay behind the leadership
difficulties referred to from time to time in the Putera reports.
First, there was still a shortage of Indonesian public leaders.
Though the creation of organizations like Putera offered many
positions through which new leadership could make its appearance
and grow, caution led the Japanese administration to rely on
the relatively limited number of men whose ability and, often
but not always, controllability had been proven in pre-war days.
36.	The Seinendan, though often protrayed as a para-military
organization, was in reality a far more sober, mundane
and civilian affair. Especially outside of major urban
centers, Seinendan branches spent most of their time re-
pairing roads, preparing land for cultivation, and the
like. Their members were never armed, and received only
self-defense training. Rodney de Bruin,"De Seinendan in
Indonesie" (unpublished manuscript, 1968).
37.	Strong demands for many types of labor, caused in part by
Japanese pre-emption of workers of all sorts, often pushed
wages up. At the same time, however, prices rose even
faster in the highly inflationary atmosphere, making the
economic struggle increasingly difficult for the vast
majority of people. The pangreh pradja and a few other
groups found their wages decreased from what they had been
in pre-war days, and they were thus subjected to a squeeze
of a slightly different kind.12
The same was true of the many jobs opened in the government
bureaucracy (as distinct from the administrative-type jobs of
the pangrfeh pradja). As a result, a circumscribed number of
recognized and prestigious Indonesians filled multiple positions,
often to what must have been a burdensome degree.38 It is un-
certain how severely such overloading of Indonesian leaders
affected Putera and its progress. But few new leaders were
brought to prominence, and the search for old ones slowed
Putera's establishment. There was also concern that leadership
training in the organization was insufficient for middle and low
ranking staff members and that Putera might experience difficul-
ties when current directors no longer filled their positions
(p. 75).
Second, as Putera's story shows vividly, those Indonesian
leaders who were recognized and given positions by the Japanese
often became embittered and frustrated when they discovered the
limits within which they were required to work. For political
and social activists with pre-war experience, it must have been
more aggravating to be placed close to broad opportunities and
yet restrained from taking full advantage of them, than to have
been simply refused nearly all opportunity. Although they did
not intend to do so, the Japanese often placed Indonesian lead-
ers of all types in an unstable limbo of heightened potentiality,
where, as self-awareness grew, so did dissatisfaction.
For an organization expected to survive in times character-
ized by the difficulties outlined above and more, Putera was
assigned astonishingly vague purposes. This fact is another
important key to the failure that Hatta records. While there
is little way of knowing what possibilities were discussed dur-
ing the months of Putera's formation, it seems likely that a
difficult compromise was being worked out between government
officials and Indonesians who had become engaged in the effort.39
For all the hesitation and the caution exercised, however, there
is no indication that a clearly defined agreement was reached.
The two official documents regulating Putera offer two quite
38.	For example:	R. Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso (Advisor to the
Bureau of Public Works, Advisor to Putera, important figure
in the Jawa Hbkokai, Chuo Sangi In, Barison Pelopor, and
Masjumi) and Oto Iskandar Dinata (editor of the Bandung
newspaper Tjahaja, important member of Putera, Jawa Hbkokai
and Barisan Pelopor, Advisor to the Department of Security).
The same pattern often occurred at the local level among
men of prominence, whose commitments were often varied and
extensive.
39.	The story is best and most completely told in Kanahele,
"The Japanese Occupation," pp. 72-77.13
different impressions as to the association's aims and the
methods of reaching them.40 The constitution speaks only of "a
native movement whose object shall be to create a powerful new
Java as a link in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by
extending aid and cooperation to Greater Japan for the purposes
of seeing the ultimate victory in the Greater East Asia war and
harmonizing the operation of military government," and lists a
number of obscure functions such as "cultivation of thrift" and
"betterment of the temperament of the people." Putera's Special
Regulations, on the other hand, set out more specific tasks for
each of its sections. Some of these, especially for the Cul-
tural, Health, and Physical Education sections, appeared to
give the organization responsibility for large projects on a
Java-wide basis. It is significant that in his reports Hatta
shows he looked primarily to these Special Regulations for guid-
ance in judging whether or not Putera was doing its job and
living up to its promise (pp. 58-60).
Evidence other than official pronouncements suggests a num-
ber of different interpretations of Putera's goals, none of
which however is, in itself, satisfactory. From one possible
viewpoint, for example, it could be said that Putera was de-
signed as a Java-wide cooperative effort between Indonesian
activists and the Japanese to pull the entire population behind
the war effort. The demands of wartime, the need for self-
improvement and the acceptance of greater social and economic
responsibility would be the messages stressed. Above all, as
Putera's name implied, the unity of the Indonesian peoples of
Java was foremost in the minds of the group's promoters. As
for projects, these ranged from obvious propagandizing on behalf
of the war, thrift and increased production, to administrating
substantial social welfare programs.
The above view is thoroughly orthodox in the light of
Putera's official promotion and is supported by a general exami-
nation of its top personnel and structure. The makeup of Pu-
tera's Preparatory Committee41 and Advisory Board42 shows an
40.	Both Putera's Constitution and Special Regulations may be
found translated in:	Harry J. Benda, et al., Japanese Mili-
tary Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New
Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965) , pp.
136-143.
41.	Members were as follows:	(in order of prominence) Soekarno,
Hatta, K. H. Dewantara, Mas Mansoer, Sjarifoeddin; (in al-
phabetical order) Iskandar Dinata, Samsoeddin, Sartono,
Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, Soemanang and Soetardjo. Asia
Raya, December 11, 1942.
42.	Members were as follows:	Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, Abikoesno
Tjokrosoejoso, Dr. H. Abd. K. Amroellah, Prof. H. Djajadi-14
effort to tap diverse opinion and backing from Indonesian groups
(Chinese and others were not included in Putera), and, perhaps,
to continue the move toward unity begun by the pre-war Pergera-
kan. Further, Putera was structurally designed to cover all of
Java’s residencies, led by a Central Board in Djakarta. The
first branches to be founded were purposely chosen to be evenly
spaced among the island’s population centers. It is worth con-
sidering, too, that the concept of Putera as a real and active
body for uniting and improving the lot of Indonesians was held
by Hatta himself, who could have been under few illusions as to
the intent behind the association he had agreed to lead.43
A different perspective suggests itself when Putera's at-
tempts to become established on the residency and regency (ken)
levels--amply catalogued by Hatta--are taken into account. In
it, Putera appears to have been effective primarily in the con-
text of each locality by tailoring the general programs out-
lined in Djakarta to local requirements. The function of the
Djakarta leadership would be to lend prestige to the project
and to facilitate the cooperation of local Japanese administra-
tors with Indonesians of reputation and ability. In this way,
provincial self-sufficiency would be given a boost; Indonesian
talents for development would be more effectively harnessed than
they had been before; and the all-important goals of greater
production and unity in the war effort would be brought closer.
The most obvious support for this opinion is found in the
key position given the Japanese Residents (shuahokan) in con-
ningrat, I. Kasimo, Mr. Wilopo, H. Agoes Salim, K. H.
Dewantara, Moh. Yamin, Mr. A. A. Maramis, Oto Koesoema
Soebrata, Ratulangie, Sanoesi Pane, Soebagijo, Ir. Soerach-
man, Soerjopranoto, Soetardjo, Mr. Tadjoeddin Noor, K. R.
M. H. Woerjaningrat, Dr. Wedianingrat, Dr. Samsi Sastro-
widagdo, Mr. R. Singgih, Dr. Soekiman, Soerjodiningrat, R.
P. Soeroso, Sutan Sanif, Nj. Maria Ulfah Santoso, Roedjito.
Asia Raya, May 21, 1943. There may, however, have been
several Japanese members. Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the
Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1$69) , p. 243.
43. Putera's eventual failure was by no means the first dis-
appointment for Hatta and men like him. In the first weeks
of the occupation, the Japanese had outlawed singing of the
anthem "Indonesia Raya" and disbanded all political parties.
Coming on the heels of such regulations, the efforts to
set up Putera can only have been approached with, at most,
wariness and tempered enthusiasm on the part of political
figures. See RvO-IC 020169-73 and 029680.15
trolling Putera's branches,44* and the consistent refusal of the
government to give Putera control over truly large, all-Java
groups.45 Of further significance is the relatively high per-
centage of Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya--Greater Indonesia
Party) men in the list of branch chairmen, indicating that a
premium was placed on the cooperative social activity, avoidance
of political offensiveness and local influence characteristic
of that party.46 Finally, it is possible that the expansion of
Putera in Malang and Djakarta Shu (pp. 74-75) was not simply
accidental but indicative of the fulfillment at an early date
of the long-term expectations that the organization would gradu-
ally extend its effectiveness beyond the regency level.47
According to a third view, Putera can be regarded essen-
tially as a sop to the political and social activists from the
Dutch period, who were courted by the Japanese for their popu-
lar appeal and prestige and feared by them for the same reasons
At a time when the war was threatening to take a bad turn for
44.	This was not the same thing as giving the Djakarta govern-
ment control via the shG offices. The residencies retained
their individuality throughout the occupation, usually ac-
cording to the personalities of their individual Japanese
leaders, and their economic well-being.
45.	See especially Hatta's example of Gelora (Gerakan Latihan
Olah-Raga--Sports Training Movement), p. 59. Since Hatta
bemoans limitations of this sort, it would be necessary to
believe that he was originally misinformed or misled regard
ing Japanese intentions on the local versus island-wide
effectiveness question.
46.	Of the men whose affiliations can be positively determined,
five or more had been Parindra officers, and more may have
been members. This represents 281 of the 18 actual or pro-
spective branch chairmen. Of the original seven branches,
three were headed by Parindra officers, and one by an ex-
member of Budi Utomo and officer of the Pagujuban Pasundan,
a cooperative group with a program much like that of Parin-
dra. The remaining three branches were headed by a PNI-
Partindo member, an engineer and an aristocrat of unknown
political affiliations.
47.	It seems probable that, as originally planned, Putera's
efforts were to extend over a considerable period of time.
See Hatta's own comment (p. 73) and those in the Beppan
Report (RvO-IC 005798). Note that Hatta emphasizes (p. 74)
that the guiding hand behind the expansion in Djakarta Shu
was that of a Japanese shu official. The same may have
been true in Malang Shu.16
Japan, spokesmen from the Pergerakan, beginning with Sukarno
and Hatta, were diverted from other activities by a cleverly
conducted exercise devised by the Djakarta government. For
their part, Indonesian leaders either had the program imposed
upon them or were fooled into accepting involvement with an
essentially worthless organization.
Although the "diversion" theory ignores most of the evi-
dence and reasoning used to support conflicting opinions, there
is much to recommend it. The Putera reports in particular are
filled with complaints making it difficult to believe that
Putera's meaningfulness and general viability were safeguarded
by the Japanese administration. Djakarta’s tendencies to take
workable or popular Java-wide programs out of Putera’s control
(pp. 61-62) and to allow pangreh pradja obstructionism to con-
tinue unchecked may be considered indications of the cautious,
distrustful attitude the Japanese took toward Putera and the
men in it. The same may be said of the regulations that there
be no actual members of Putera,4*8 that branch chairmen and
staffs be approved by the shuchokan and that no money from out-
side or public sources fall into the hands of the movement (pp.
106-107) .
More research and further documentation are required before
the various possible interpretations of Putera's goals can be
accurately judged and a thoroughly consistent and convincing
analysis of the movement made. At present, parts of all the
views outlined above appear to have validity, each receiving
different degrees of emphasis according to Japanese interpreta-
tions of Putera's functions during its period of operation.1*9
48.	See p. 113, and Benda, et al., Japanese Military Administra-
tion, p. 137. This is a very significant fact and sets
Putera quite apart from pre-war political parties and the
future Jawa Hokokai. Paradoxically, without members, Putera
may have to be considered in some senses a more truly "mass
organization" than the Jawa Hokokai, which after all re-
quired recommendations for membership and small monthly
dues. Putera, though run exclusively by Indonesians, was
free to be approached by anyone and attempted to affect all
groups with its propaganda and other efforts.
49.	That there was indeed a changed approach to Putera seems
clear from Hatta's remark on p. 65, and the material in
RvO-IC 030704. Most interpretations of Putera agree that
a change took place, though cause and timing are matters
for discussion. In contrast to those of the Japanese, the
hopes of Indonesians regarding Putera remained relatively
steady, a circumstance leading to increasing disappoint-
ment on both sides.17
The extent, nature and even timing of such change, however, is
very difficult to judge.
Putera was designed primarily for the Indonesian political
elite, a group which the Japanese saw separately from other edu-
cated and active segments of Java's population.50 Towards these
persons, most Japanese officials had ambiguous feelings, sup-
porting „their anti-Western drive for self-pride and freedom but
at the same time not trusting their political maturity or their
loyalty under the difficult conditions of wartime. The occupa-
tion government's preference was to accept men from the old
Pergerakan on their non-political merits, work with and give
work to all those who would accept such arrangements,51 and at-
tempt to bridge or deemphasize political differences. There
was a very clear encouragement of pride in "nation/race"
(bangsa/kebangsaan). At the same time, however, the Japanese
also realized, as had the Dutch before them, that nationalism
was more easily coped with than nationalists. There was even a
suspicion that the two were inseparable and therefore posed a
threat to the kind of New Order Japan was hoping to build on
Java.
The government's solution to this difficulty was to limit
the powers of especially the political elite in areas where they
threatened to take on a large measure of autonomy. In other
respects, Indonesians were given important roles to play. The
policy was only partly conscious, for it is a natural reflex of
a colonial regime to clip back the initiative of the colonized.
And it was not always consistently or swiftly applied, for it
was interpreted in different ways and put into effect by a some-
times loosely-directed administration.
In Putera's case, certain limitations, both explicit and
implicit, were made from the start. Hatta seems to have realized
this fact.52 Additional restraints were imposed as time went on.
50.	The view was to a large extent shared by Indonesians, though
many political figures achieved prominence first or addi-
tionally in other fields. See the divisions used in Prang
Indonesia jang Terkemoeka di Djawa (Djakarta: Office of the
Gunseikanbu, 1944) , a volume of biographies prepared by
Hatta and his staff.
51.	Almost all of the political elite were given regular posi-
tions with the government, or found work in a private capa-
city, according to their training. Few men had full-time
jobs of the type offered by Putera and even those were
only partly political in nature.
52.	The best example of an indirect limitation is given on pp. 45-
46, where Hatta indicates his awareness that some18
The most celebrated of these concerned the sports organization
Gelora, which undoubtedly was struck down primarily because the
Indonesians associated with it considered it to be an autonomous
group, with only vague ties to Putera. Even in this flagrant
conflict of interests, however, the Japanese were surprisingly
slow to act. Gelora operated and gathered steam for several
months. It even organized large soccer matches, advertising
them prominently in the newspapers, and received occasionally
elaborate coverage and praise in the press.53
With regard to the Gelora question and a host of other
limitations, it has recently been argued that, after the arrival
of Yamamoto Moichiro (the new Chief of the Department of General
Affairs) on Java in early March 1943, the administration's fig-
urative guns were turned on Putera and the political elite in
it, giving both the group and its members little chance of sur-
vival.51* Yamamoto's own relation of his activities is the prin-
cipal source for this theory.55 Hatta's reports, while seemingly
sympathetic to this approach in many places, offer cause to doubt
that it is of great importance.
To begin with, Yamamoto either was unable or did not care
to hinder Putera's development between its founding and the of-
ficial opening of its headquarters on April 16, 1943. Judging
from his commentary elsewhere in the reports, Hatta would surely
have mentioned such activity had it occurred. Second, despite
the implications of later observers,56 it is by no means clear
that the Djakarta government actively worked to ensure that the
shuchbkan and the pangreh pradja opposed Putera. It was not
part of Djakarta's policy or practice to meddle very deeply in
restraints were imposed, presumably from the start, on
Putera's involvement in education. There is nothing in
the reports that suggests Hatta's misinterpretation or
ignorance of limitations. He only stresses that even
working within the limits set was very difficult.
53.	For example, Asia Raya, May 15, 25 and 31, 1943.
54.	Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 245-248.
55.	RvO-IC 030704. This document contains material from 1946
interrogations of Yamamoto. His personal diary and memoirs
remain private.
56.	Especially Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun
(The Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1958), p. 140, a view
to which Dahm, Sukarno, p. 247, subscribes.19
shu affairs.57 Besides, the reports show that at least two
shuchokan (Malang and Jogjakarta) were enthusiastic about Pu-
tera, as were some members of the pangreh pradja (p. 63).
Third, if the Japanese were entirely convinced that Putera was
worthless and/or dangerous, why was the Pasar Malam Djakarta
(Djakarta Fair), in which Putera played a prominent role (and
occupied an elaborate new building designed in Japanese-Indone-
sian style by Soekarno and others), allowed to take place?
Finally, if Yamamoto's purpose was, as he said, to curb
the political activists and prevent them from using Putera to
their advantage (principally by stressing nationalist sentiment
and the ultimate goal of independence), why were Putera's propa-
ganda duties increased beyond the original plans (p.	90) rather
than limited more carefully? Such propagandizing was not only
difficult to control in any complete fashion, but offered polit-
ical activists great opportunities for public exposure and ex-
pression of their own, as opposed to government, ideas through
cleverly composed speeches and writings. The only logical
explanation is that, far from wishing to destroy or cripple it,
the Japanese continued to have high hopes for Putera until very
late in 1943. This was especially true in the field of propa-
ganda (for the war effort, public health, higher production
and the like), but also applied to other activities such as
collecting information on Indonesian business life and acting
as a labor clearing-house. At the same time, the potential
difficulties in controlling the political activists became in-
creasingly apparent to the Japanese administration, which
attempted to solve them without damaging the workability of
Putera as a whole. It is at least possible that the policy
might have been successful had Putera's effectiveness not been
injured far more seriously by other factors.
It seems clear, then, that whatever Yamamoto and others
did to inhibit what might be called Putera's "potential natural
growth," they cannot be held accountable for its demise. The
kind of antipathy they displayed toward Indonesian activists
was responsible for only a modest number of the organization's
difficulties. As pointed out earlier, difficult times and un-
clear purpose were also at fault. Of great consequence too
were numerous unexpected internal complications, of which the
57. Java was more decentralized in many ways under Japanese
rule than previously. Shu autarchy was insisted upon, and
Djakarta's policies on social and economic matters were
interpreted differently from shu to shQ. Unspoken unity
of purpose (aided by pressure to win the war), a good sense
of organizational structure, and a fondness of and depend-
ence on sloganized propaganda often makes the Japanese ad-
ministration on Java seem more uniform than was actually
the case.20
series of problems encountered in producing large quantities of
effective propaganda with a small staff and uninspiring issues
is the best example (p. 52).
The most important dilemma facing Putera, however, and a
major contribution to its failure, was that posed by the pangreh
pradja. Hatta levels his harshest attacks against that group,
and blames it--along with the Japanese, whose complicity is im-
plied--for placing insurmountable hurdles in Putera's path.
The reports, in fact, appear to speak of a Japanese-pangreh
pradja entente against political and social activists. This is
a very serious accusation which, especially since it is not
directly made, deserves extended comment here.
When the Japanese arrived on Java, they faced the task of
administering a colonial possession without appearing to do so
as imperial masters. The job was made especially complex by
the already difficult relations between politically and socially
progressive Indonesians and the long-entrenched administrators
of Dutch rule, the pangreh pradja. Only speculation may be made
here as to the pre-war thinking of Japanese on the subject, but
it is unlikely that they could have missed the increasing reli-
ance of the Dutch regime on the pangreh pradja in the 1930's,
or the tendency of the pangrbh pradja themselves to show signs
of adapting with unexpected success to the gradually moderniz-
ing political atmosphere of the Netherlands East Indies.58 On
the other hand, the objections of the Pergerakan, which consid-
ered the pangrbh pradja to be at least partially corrupt or
oppressive, thoroughly pro-Dutch, and symbolic of colonial rule,
were no secret either.59
58.	See Harry J. Benda, "The Pattern of Administrative Reforms
in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia," Journal
of Asian Studies, 25, No. 4 (August 1966), pp. 589-605. On
the dominance of the pangreh pradja in local elections,
especially through the Perhimpunan Pegawai Bestuur Bumiputra
(Native Civil Servants' Association), in East Java, see for
example:	MBZ Mailrapport 554 secret, 1939, letter of van
der Plas to the Director of Binnenlands Bestuur, June 9,
1938, and Het Provinciaal Blad van Post Java, 1938, pp. 1-2.
The pattern seems to have been repeated in West, and to a
lesser extent Central, Java.
59.	On Parindra's attitude to the pangreh pradja, see MBZ Mail-
rapport 1004, 1935, Bijlage IIIc. In late November 1940,
discussions in the Volksraad centered on both the unrest
among, and the undesirable activities of,the pangreh pradja.
Perhaps the most severe criticism came from Soetardjo
Kartohadikoesoemo, himself a member of the pangreh pradja.
See the reports in Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, November 26
and 27, 1940.21
At the beginning of the occupation, the main objectives of
the Japanese were to restore calm and to return to normal condi-
tions as quickly as possible. The Dutch emphasis on rust en
ovde (peace and order), which became especially great after the
fall of the Netherlands to the Germans in May 1940, was thus
continued by the Japanese, and often with Dutch help. Like-
minded Indonesians, notably but not exclusively Parindra mem-
bers, were asked for information and help in matters concerning
government employees, administrative practices and the civil
service system.60 In all this, the Japanese were sometimes sur-
prisingly non-partisan. Their greatest interest was in having
the machinery of government continue to work and daily life
(especially in its economic aspects) go on as usual. Whoever
could help accomplish these things received approval; whoever
would not, or appeared to be actively hostile, was observed
carefully.
Following the internment of Dutch civil servants in April
1942, both the activist intelligentsia and the pangreh pradja
found themselves scrutinized by the military government. The
former received a hard and partly unexpected blow in July 1942,
when it was announced that political-oriented associations would
continue to be considered illegal.61 The pangreh pradja, at
the same time they were confirmed in their positions, were sub-
jected to far less preferential handling than they had received
60.	See Afscheidswoord van het Dagelijksch Bestuur van de
Parindra, MBZ Indische Archieven series, group 15, box 9.
Not only Indonesians were asked; Dutch officials of all
types were called upon to explain their functions, the
operation of administrative systems and so forth. Most
supplied this information, having been instructed to keep
law and order and to protect the native population from
dislocation.
61.	The pre-war political parties had been banned in March,
and, on the 20th of that month, politically-oriented organ-
izations were "temporarily" disbanded. In fact, the regu-
lation was interpreted very broadly, and pressure was put
on most organizations (with the notable exceptions of the
Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadijah) to close down. In mid-
July 1942, the intentions of the government became clear.
Political and politically-oriented groups remained out of
the question, but other associations (economic, mutual aid
and so forth) could register for approval with the Poli-
tieke Inlichtingen Dienst (Political Security Police),
which continued to exist under Japanese tutelage. The
final decision in such cases rested with the shuchSkan.
Pewarta Perniagaan, August 3, 1942.22
from the Dutch.62 It is difficult to say how aware of it they
were in the early months of the occupation, but they soon dis-
covered that the Japanese, unlike the Dutch, were quite prepared
to dismiss even regents if their conduct were unsatisfactory.63
62.	Relations between the Japanese and the upper pangreh pradja,
especially in the early days of the occupation, have yet to
be studied in depth. The pangreh pradja were unquestion-
ably handled more carefully than any other group, due to
their special position both administratively and socially.
But this "careful handling" had two sides. On the one
hand, the aristocratic and often Western-style education
and manners of the pangreh pradja were not honored by the
Japanese in the same way they had been by the Dutch. As a
result, regents and others felt themselves humiliated, es-
pecially when they were called to the provincial capital
and ordered to carry out programs the Japanese had in mind.
This began early in the occupation (for example, see ac-
counts in Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, April 24 and June 16,
1942). On the other hand, with the removal of the Dutch
civil servants, the pangreh pradja gained in power at their
own level and were given greater responsibilities and free-
dom to carry them out in their own way. A short and gener-
alized, but first-hand, account of both aspects described
here is contained in:	R. A. A. S. M. Gandasubrata (trans-
lated by Leslie H. Palmier), An Account of the Japanese
Occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to August
1945 (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper
No. 10, 1953). The degree of trust between Japanese and
pangrbh pradja, basic to the approach outlined above, varied
considerably from regency to regency. Where there was no
trust between the Japanese and the pangreh pradja, the
government’s relations with the people suffered and chaos
could result. (Prawoto Soemodilogo's report on the Indra-
maju revolt, MBZ series 97B, box 2, folder 17.) Obviously,
this was an extreme case, however.
63.	In the first year and one half of Japanese rule, the re-
gents of Pamekasan, Probolinggo, Bodjonegoro, and Purwa-
karta lost their positions. (RvO-IC 032507.) Other mem-
bers of the pangreh pradja were replaced, often by individ-
uals who were neither aristocrats nor trained civil servants
(for example, M. Atik Soeardi in Djakarta Ken, and Dr.
Moerdjani in Indramaju Ken). Appointments of this sort
angered especially the middle-rank pangreh pradja. The
Dutch did on occasion dismiss regents, but rarely in the
decade before the war, and never without a great deal of
hesitation. Even criticism in the Volksraad of regents’
behavior was severely frowned upon by the Dutch members and
the government.23
After a year of working for the Japanese, regents were still
thought to require training and indoctrination,64 and indeed
neither they nor the rest of the pangrbh pradja, including vil-
lage heads (lurah), ever appeared to outgrow the need for such
instruction during the entire war period.
While most pangrbh pradja retained their positions during
the occupation,65 few came close to the ideal the government
hoped for. The extravagant praise heaped upon R. M. T. A.
Soerjo, the resident of Bodjonegoro after November 1943, not
only extolled his virtues of high moral purpose, non-elitism and
full cooperativeness for the benefit of public welfare, but im-
plied that those qualities were in short supply among the
pangreh pradja.66 Setting quite a different sort of example,
the government punished pangreh pradja suspected of anti-Japa-
nese activity severely, making it clear that they were not to
consider themselves immune from such harsh measures.67 To the
majority of the pangreh pradja lying between these two extremes
of behavior, the Japanese applied varying measures of support
and pressure to improve. There was also distrust, indicated in
the insistence that the pangreh pradja not mix in political
affairs (p. 113) or make frequent public appearances and
speeches.68
64.	For example, in Djakarta, March 1-20, 1943; in Surabaja,
November 16-26, 1943.
65.	In addition to the Japanese need to keep as much of the
civil service as possible intact, it must be remembered
that the pangreh pradja, like Dutch officials, had been
told for several years prior to the Japanese invasion that,
in case of enemy occupation,they were to remain in their
posts as long as they could, keep the peace, uphold the
law, and act as buffers between the occupying government
and the people. "Rechten en plichten van plaatselijke
overheid en bevolking in geval van vijandelijke bezetting,"
MBZ Mailrapport 1306 secret, 1939.
66.	Soeara Asia, November 24, 1943, and February 22, 1944.
67.	One of the most celebrated cases concerned a suspected plot
against the Japanese, headed by the regent of Panarukan, in
early 1944. Over 25 people, most of them Indonesian offi-
cials, were executed. There were also less spectacular af-
fairs, for example the execution of the Assistant Wedana of
Djember for making Victory signs in May 1944. De Vrije
Pers, September 1, 1949.
68.	Malang, of course, was an exception in this regard. The
pangrbh pradja appeared at functions in the early occupa-
tion, probably as legitimizing symbols for official24
Whatever "alliance” there was between the Japanese and the
pangrbh pradja--and the workability of their relationship was
indeed significant--it was neither tension-free, constantly in
force, or rooted in a mutual distaste for intellectuals and pro-
gressivists.69 The Putera reports tend to be misleading in this
regard, since they imply that the Japanese administration per-
mitted the pangreh pradja to obstruct what Hatta considered to
be positive programs and aids to both the war effort and popular
welfare. It is further suggested that the Jawa Hokokai was
formed to take power from the activists and give it to the
favored pangreh pradja, thus soothing the latter's objections
to Putera. It must be remembered, however, that the allusions
Hatta makes on these questions are extremely vague. In fact,
the Japanese are not at any point accused of intentional con-
nivance in either blocking Putera or continuing corrupt prac-
tices. Judging from the tone of the rest of the reports, Hatta
would not have hesitated long before making such a charge had
he thought it true. His argument moves, instead, in the direc-
tion of criticism for ignorance and lack of effort. None of
his analysis or advice concerning the pangreh pradja controvert
Japanese ideas and aims. Finally, it is possible that the
pangrbh pradja role in the Jawa Hokokai was created by the Japa-
nese as much for the purpose of pulling them together and influ-
encing them more heavily, as for curbing the activists.70
ceremonies, but were given much less exposure as time went
on. They were not encouraged to become spokesmen for either
the people or the government. This was somewhat in contrast
to the situation in the last years of Dutch rule. There
were, after mid-1943, several pangreh pradja in local ad-
visory councils (Sangi Kai), but they were nearly without
exception required to relinquish their civil service post
before accepting an advisor's position. This was also dif-
ferent from the Dutch practice.
69.	The case for the Japanese-pangrbh pradja alliance has prob-
ably been overstated in recent works. See especially:
Benedict Anderson, "Japan:	'The Light of Asia,'" in Joseph
Silverstein (ed.), Southeast Asia in World War II: Four
Essays (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies,
1966), p. 18, and L. Sluimers, "'Nieuwe Orde' op Java,"
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde, 124, No. 3
(Fall 1968) , p. 350. The entire issue is, however, so
clouded and little-studied that judgment must be tentative.
70.	The pangreh pradja had been left out of both the Triple A
Movement and Putera. By mid-1943 they were proving less
malleable than the Japanese had perhaps hoped. Also, they,
rather than the political elite, were considered to be the
key to the masses, on whom new pressure to produce was being25
The relatively high incidence of criticism of the pangreh
pradja and ningratism in wartime newspapers, especially after
mid-1943, leads to the suspicion that the Japanese were never
entirely satisfied with their inherited Indonesian civil service.
Most often critiques were made in the form of advice, and the
message was uniform:	the civil service's structure would re-
main, but its spirit must change and individualism and elitism
be abandoned.71 This conviction was held with considerable
strength, though care was usually exercised in expressing it to
prevent the pangreh pradja--who were, after all, vital to the
functioning of Java--from being unnecessarily alienated or de-
moralized.72 Sometimes the ambiguities in the Japanese approach
to the pangrdh pradja became quite apparent. In Putera, for
example, although the organization was originally warned against
tampering with pangreh pradja affairs,73 local branches were
permitted to lecture to pangreh pradja groups on their responsi-
bilities in the New Java, methods for improving production and
popular support for the government, and the dangers of following
the old "Dutch" ways.71*
placed. Putera, it should be remembered, was not originally
intended to extend below the regency level. It is not
strictly true, as Hatta implies, that Putera men were gen-
erally left out of Jawa Hokokai activities. In many cases
shu HQkokai groups appear to have been made up mostly of
old Putera officers, probably out of sheer necessity, as
the number of local influential leaders willing to work
with the Japanese in this way was not large. Further, the
pangrbh pradja, even in the Jawa Hokokai, were never used
for propaganda purposes. This activity was always the spe-
cial preserve of the political elite and social activists.
71.	Soeara Asia, September 7, 1943.
72.	For a good, if rather unsoftened, example, see Soeara Asia,
January 15, 1944. Sometimes, blunt statements crept into
even official documents. See, for example:	Administrative
Order 776, dated April 25, 1944, in Benda, et al., Japanese
Military Administration, pp. 97-100. This document gives
an excellent idea of official Japanese opinion toward the
pangrbh pradja, being an adroit mixture of admonition,
flattery, threat and elaborate gesturing toward a bright
future. It also makes clear that some senior pangreh pradja
officials were causing difficulties for the Japanese.
73.	Kan Po, No. 17 (April 25, 1943), p. 16.
74.	Based on the experiences of Putera in Surabaja ShG, which
do not appear to have been extraordinary in any other way.
Soeara Asia, October 19, November 16, 21, 27 and 29, 1943.26
After January 1944, the Japanese became especially concerned
about lagging production, both of food and goods, and there was
growing anxiety over deteriorating economic and social conditions
in the Javanese countryside. The administration's attention
fell upon the lurah, who provided the all-important link between
the main body of pangreh pradja officials and the masses. Under
Japanese rule the lurah had been subjected to new pressures and
responsibilities, few of them pleasant or popular.75 As a group,
they resisted these changes as well as efforts to drain elitism
out of the civil service and to alter the bureaucratic system
so as to increase the control of the residential capitals over
village affairs. During 1944, the lurah became the objects of
an intensive campaign to break through such resistance and also
to increase production and calm the discontent of the rural
population. The upper levels of the pangreh pradja continued
to be evaluated and be given training, but were no longer of prime
interest in the government's efforts to improve administrative
control of Java.
The uncertain relationship between the Japanese and the
pangrbh pradja proved to be an unexpected complication, and one
whose solution was impossible within Putera's framework. The
old-line civil service could not be drummed out of existence,
for obvious reasons.76 But neither could it be fully approved
and supported, for it did not fill the ideal role created for
it by the designers of the New Java. As for the political
activists and progressives, they were on the one hand very use-
ful and on the other potentially dangerous; they could not be
given the responsibility of uniting and energizing the masses.77
75.	RvO-IC 032508, and Peraturan Dasar Persatuan Pamong Desa
Indonesia (Djakarta ?: PPDI, 1959?), pp. 6-7.
76.	One reason for this was that the upper pangrbh pradja had
begun to learn how to survive in the new order. A princi-
pal way in which they did so was to have their sons enter
Japanese-run schools, take qualifying examinations for
government positions, and enter various youth and military
groups. On the incidence of pangreh pradja in the Japanese-
sponsored Peta, see George D. Larson, "PETA: The Origins
of the Indonesian Army" (M.A. Thesis, University of Hawaii,
1970).
77.	The chief reason behind the Japanese opinion was probably
that they, like the Dutch before them, found the idea of
change being encouraged from outside the administrative
system rather threatening and potentially uncontrollable.
It is also possible that, again like the Dutch, they gen-
uinely questioned the sincerity and ability of politically-
inclined Indonesian intellectuals in contacting and influ-
encing the agrarian population. The Japanese had all the27
It was to a large extent this three-way tug between the Japanese
the pangreh pradja, and the men of the pre-war Pergerakan that
brought Putera to a standstill. The Jawa H5k5kai was structured
to avoid such troubles by giving the pangrbh pradja central re-
sponsibility below the regency level, and by putting Japanese,
rather than Indonesians, in top controlling positions. The
activists who had populated Putera ranks were taken into the
Jawa Hokokai, used as propagandists and advisors, and generally
kept in urban areas.
Putera's short active life--much shorter than the official
span of March 1943 to February 1944 indicates--cannot adequately
be explained as the result of a simple clash between the Japa-
nese and Indonesian activists. Nor can all of Putera's diffi-
culties be ascribed to Japanese scheming. The Japanese adminis-
tration took a number of steps, as any colonial regime might,
to contain Putera's influence, but there were many difficulties
that it did not create and that actually worked against its best
interests. One of these certainly was the reluctance of the
pangreh pradja to condone Putera's activities, especially those
of a propagandistic nature, which became for the Japanese the
chief, though not the only, value of the organization. Other
problems rose out of wartime conditions and uncertainty among
government officials.
Under such conditions, it was difficult for either the
Japanese or the Indonesians to extract from Putera a full comple
ment of benefits. On the whole, both sides were disappointed
with it, and for reasons not always entirely different. The
value of Putera's limited successes, particularly in propaganda
work but also in other efforts, were on the other hand probably
shared equally. This suggestion should not cause surprise.
Putera was, it should be remembered, a compromise, and one
arrived at with some difficulty. That each side would use the
other was no secret, nor were the processes of doing so espe-
cially mysterious. Both Japanese and Indonesians would have
had to have been considerably more naive than they were not to
realize these facts, and for present-day investigators to ignore
them seems ill-advised.
At any rate, the political details of a struggle between
the Japanese and Indonesians seeking independence are difficult
to extract with much certainty from Putera's history,78 and are
more to be wary of, as they dealt with ex-members of many
varied groups; the Dutch had only the relatively mild-
mannered Parindrists and a few others to consider.
78. Two conflicting views have recently been composed, using
similar materials. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation,"
p. 80 and pp. 241-242, suggests, though more cautiously28
certainly of lesser importance in a discussion of Hatta's re-
ports. For these reveal, rather than a political arena, a more
mundane world of economic and social concerns and activities.
In these surroundings, nationalism and politics was no issue:
all Indonesians involved looked toward the independence of their
country, and before very long realized it was being thwarted by
the Japanese. Little could be done about this situation, except
to use whatever opportunities Putera provided to further nation-
alist feeling and thinking. For the rest, and this is the ef-
fort Hatta tells us about, it was necessary to do everything
possible to promote the welfare and safety of the people of
Java. For many of its staff Putera provided the first deep and
direct involvement, as well as some obvious disappointments, in
such affairs. Its importance is thus very great in non-political
matters. Hatta's account is significant in the same way, empha-
sizing as it does the small successes, problems and overall
failure of an effort to begin various kinds of change and devel-
opment on Java. The Putera reports, in short, by focusing on
subjects other than high-level politics and nationalism, provide
a key to a better-rounded--one might almost say, more realistic
--view of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia than has been
popular in the past. Hopefully, it is a key that will not go
unused.
than previous writers, that Putera represents a major step
for Indonesian nationalists toward the goal of greater
power and eventual independence. Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 246-
247, argues that Putera's story signifies "the end of the
time of hope for the nationalists, rather than the begin-
ning of pressure against the Japanese. ..." Both views
have merit, and only an extremely detailed and sophisticated
study of Putera and similar organizations, with less empha-
sis on political matters, will be able to advance beyond
them.REPORT TO THE GUNSEIKANBU ON
THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF "PUTERA" -
April 16 to July 16, 1943
I.	Introduction
Putera1 was officially inaugurated by his Excellency the
Gunseikan2 on March 9, 19433 during a public rally held at Ikada
Square, but it did not actually begin to function until its
Headquarters opened on April 16, 1943. The time between March
9th and April 16th was spent in arranging a system of directors
for the new organization and in looking for a building to serve
as its Headquarters. This was found at Djalan Sunda, 18 [Dja-
karta] .4
On April 16, 1943, Putera Headquarters was officially
opened by the Gunseikan, His Excellency Okazaki. In his speech,
he advised Putera's leaders to be mindful of the goals and pur-
poses of the Japanese Army:	to build a Greater East Asia and,
in particular, a New Java. The SSmubucho,5 His Excellency
Yamamoto, explained how much the people wanted to assist the
1.	Putera (meaning "youth" or "prince") is an acronym for Pusat
Tenaga Rakjat (Concentration of the People's Power), the
official Indonesian name for the organization. In Japanese,
Putera was known as Jawa minshu soryoku kesshu undo (Move-
ment for the Total Mobilization of the People of Java).
2.	Chief Military Administrator.
3.	The official date of founding was March 9, 1943, but the
first announcement of Putera came a day earlier to coincide
with celebrations marking the first anniversary of the
establishment of Japanese rule on Java. A Putera-type or-
ganization had been under discussion since November 1942,
but the road to its realization was not smooth. The obsta-
cles are given detailed treatment in George S. Kanahele,
"The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia:	Prelude to Inde-
pendence" (Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1967), pp. 72-
77.
4.	The building was that of the R. K. Hogere Burgerschool
(Roman Catholic High School).
5.	Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Military
Administration.
2930
Japanese Army in the present war, which had as its goal the
destruction of English, American, and Dutch power. He also ad-
vised Putera on the nature of its responsibilities. His Excel-
lency Hatakeda, the NaimubuchS,6 spoke next. He expressed the
hope that Putera would work smoothly with all elements in the
pangreh pradja,7 and that Putera's work would progress quickly
to make the final victory possible. All that day, the new
Putera building was crowded with ordinary people (rakjat), a
sign that they looked favorably upon the founding of Putera.
Beginning the next day, April 17, 1943, Putera Headquarters
worked at full capacity; in fact, it was understaffed for the
work required of it. No one had imagined that so many people,
seeking so many kinds of aid and information, would visit Head-
quarters so soon. The Correspondence Section received a great
many letters, and, on opening day, the Public Welfare Section
received not less than seventy guests. All were people living
in miserable circumstances, and they wanted different sorts of
help. The majority were unemployed. People visited the Economic
Affairs Section seeking information on economic problems con-
cerning their own businesses. Delegates from a number of places
came to the Organization Section to ask about the structure of
Putera and to request that branches be set up soon in their
daerah.8
The other sections also worked overtime, listening and re-
plying to visitors' requests for information. Questions some-
times could not be answered satisfactorily because section offi-
cials had not yet worked out their plan of operation. The large
6. Chief of the Internal Affairs Department of the Military
Administration.
7. Literally, rulers of the kingdom, later altered to pamong
pradja (servants of the kingdom). Both terms signify an
elitist indigenous civil service.
8.
The administrative divisions of Java, and the titles of the
individuals heading them, are as follows:
Indonesian
daerah, karesidenan
(residen)
kabupaten (bupati)
kawedanan (wedana)
Japanese
shu (shtichokan)
ken (kenchS)
gun (gunchb)
ketjamatan (tjamat) son, mura
(sonchb)
kelurahan, desa	ku (kuchS)
(lurah)
English
residency (resident)
regency (regent)
district (district
head)
sub-district (sub-
district head)
village (village head)31
number of letters requiring replies made it clear by the end of
the first week that our typing staff was far from adequate.
This was quite contrary to our original estimate that at first
much of the staff would be idle. In short, Putera operated at
full capacity from the very beginning. Its work consisted mostly
of looking after details, such as passing on information, answer-
ing questions, and giving aid. But all of this showed what high
hopes the people had for Putera.
What follows below is a brief analysis of the work com-
pleted by each of Putera's sections during the past three
months. First, however, a word about some of Putera's general
characteristics.
After Headquarters was opened, the leadership9 agreed that,
if Putera were to proceed in an orderly fashion, three things
would have to be done first. These were:
1)	Establish an Advisory Council [Madjelis Pertimbangan]
in Djakarta and call its first meeting.
2)	Establish seven shu branches, distributed evenly across
Java--that is, at Djakarta, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Solo, Semarang,
Surabaja and Malang.
3)	Install the chairmen of these branches in Djakarta and
meet with them concerning the organization of their respective
branch directorates.
Contrary to the first hopes of the Putera leadership, these
matters could not be attended to very quickly. Much had to be
prepared beforehand by the Gunseikanbu1° and the individual
Shuchokan. The Shuchokan in each daerah first had to approve
whoever was to become the shd branch chairman. In this process,
the Minshu Shidobu11 acted as intermediary. The arrangement had
advantages insofar as the branch chairman would have to maintain
close ties with the Shu Office, but on the other hand, there
9.	The term is used here and throughout the reports to mean
the Empat Serangkai (literally, "The Quadrumvirate," i.e.,
the Big Four; m Japanese, shi i-inj:	Sukarno, Hatta, Ki
Hadjar Dewantara, and K. H. Mas Mansur. The group was
formed in October or November 1942, and its members later
headed Putera's four departments.
10.	Military Administration Headquarters.
11.	The People's Guidance Department, a propaganda and control
office of considerable importance but about which relatively
little is known.32
were some disadvantages. Usually the Shuchokan, being strangers,
did not know the people who were suggested as prospective Putera
branch chairmen. They were often forced to ask the advice of
the Indonesian officials under them, and these officials, espe-
cially the pangreh pradja, were often biased against people
from the Pergerakan.12 In fact, in the old days under the
Dutch, the people from the Pergerakan were regarded as enemies.
Many of these activists were well-known, but it was not always
the better-known ones who were trusted by the people. Many
leaders influential with the masses were unknown to the people
on top. These leaders had strongly resisted the Dutch colonial
government and, following their principle of non-cooperation,
had refused to work with it in any way. Their lives were ones
of sacrifice and poverty, spent in and out of jail. Yet they
came of age in the struggle; their character and intelligence
were tempered by the Movement. Generally, however, they were
considered insignificant even though their ability to lead whole
movements, or portions of them, was no less than that of the
cooperating leaders who sat in the Volksraad.13 The non-coop-
erating leaders were not famous because they had no official
ranks and lived like common people. The cooperating leaders
were well-known because they had official rank.
Since people usually measured others by their position, the
only individuals considered important were leaders with official
rank, or socially prominent occupations in law, medicine and
the like. Leaders without official rank, though better known
and liked by the masses, and also really more capable than the
others, were regarded as insignificant. Certainly they had a
low standard of living, like that of the masses whom they led.
They had no contact at all with the "big shots" since these "big
shots" were their enemies and viewed them with contempt. Unlike
the "big shots," they did not know the proper table manners,
judged according to Western standards. They did not know how
to mix in "society," and they did not even have the proper
12.	The term used here, orang-orang pergerakan, refers to those
people active in the pre-war pursuit of change, generally
in the direction of modernization and independence. The
Pergerakan (Movement) included all such activists, regard-
less of their particular social or political ideas, although
non-cooperators sometimes used it to refer exclusively to
themselves. The term "nationalist" cannot be used here,
as it suggests something too narrowly political.
13.	The People's Council announced by the Netherlands East
Indies government in 1916 and set into operation two years
later. The Volksraad had limited legislative powers and
consisted of elected and appointed members representing
major ethnic and interest groups in colonial life.33
clothing to do so anyway. For these reasons too, they were con-
sidered "nobodies," lacking the means to mingle with the "big
shots."
Thus numerous popular leaders--who truly sacrificed them-
selves for the people and knew the sentiments of the masses--
have been refused positions commensurate with their previous
contributions. Under present conditions, the Putera leadership
has felt compelled to choose only well-known people as local
leaders. Fortunately, the old pro-cooperation movement possessed
a number of widely-recognized leaders whose capabilities were
generally agreed upon, for example, Dr. Moerdjani, Soeroso,
Soedirman and others. They can now be given prominent posi-
tions as branch chairmen. A number of well-known people, how-
ever, cannot be appointed branch chairmen because they already
hold government positions. Such circumstances restrict the
efforts of Putera's leadership to find branch chairmen accept-
able to the Shuchokan.
The problem of appointing local chairmen has slowed down
the establishment of the Putera branches. Financially, the
delay can be considered beneficial. But in the light of the
essential purpose of the organization to create more effective
links between the people and government agencies, the delay has
been detrimental. Putera can become a bridge between the govern-
ment and the people. It can gradually erase the psychological
tensions between the people and the pangreh pradja. It can
check the oppression of the people by state officials with out-
moded views. Letters from all over flood Putera Headquarters,
asking that branches be set up quickly for these purposes. The
people's cry must be heeded. Otherwise, the people will become
disillusioned and be alienated from the government. And, no
matter what happens, the people will blame all their difficul-
ties on the government, since the officials receive their
authority in its name.
Thus two benefits can be realized by spreading Putera to
all shu, ken and gun on Java, as originally intended by the
organization's constitution. These two benefits are as follows:
1) The people will be brought closer to the government.
This involvement of the people is imperative in order to incul-
cate a determined spirit on the home front. If the people have
a real attachment towards the government, they will willingly
undergo whatever suffering or sacrifice the government asks of
them.
2) Putera can check the oppression of the people by offi-
cials who do not yet understand the New Spirit [Semangat Baru].
Even though Putera might not actually be able to take any action
itself, the very existence of a Putera branch would help dis-
courage local officials from abusing their power.34
Nevertheless, we are not suggesting that branches should
be set up quickly in a haphazard fashion. In these things too,
we must work slowly and in an organized manner. When a branch
is set up, it should have good leaders and an organized struc-
ture. The directors of these branches must realize at the very
outset that they face a difficult task and that they have the
heavy responsibility of furthering the unity of all groups of
people in order to provide a strong and undivided spirit behind
the Japanese Army. The goal of giving the branches a thorough
preparation can be reached gradually by the Organization Sec-
tion. Before planning branches, we must first visit the daerah,
investigate their situations and analyze their difficulties.
This job will be easier now that there are seven shu branches
to provide assistance.
The Putera leadership only hopes that the pangreh pradja
will be willing to abandon their old hostility toward the activ-
ists who used to oppose the Dutch East Indies Government. We
must try to reach an agreement with them about the men to be
appointed branch chairmen in their respective daerah. If they
take a negative attitude, no Putera branch leader will be able
to mobilize the people behind the government and give them the
spirit to support the Greater East Asian War fully.
It is easy enough to install a branch director, but what
is the use of a director whom the people neither accept nor
like, but simply tolerate for fear of Japan? A government which
is obeyed because it is feared will not come to a happy end, no
matter what sort of government it is. The experience of the
Dutch East Indies Government provides a good example in this
regard, and is one that all should keep in mind. What is needed
is a government which the people obey because they love the
ideals by which they are governed. This love cannot be kindled
now by the pangreh pradja, nor by those activists influenced by
them or given positions according to their wishes. But this
love can easily be fostered by leaders whom the people trust,
even though they may be of "low caliber."
The Putera leadership hopes very much that the Gunseikanbu
can exert its influence to insure that the pangreh pradja, with
whom Putera will always work for consensus, will demonstrate
their openmindedness and their abandonment of the old attitudes
produced by the atmosphere of the Dutch East Indies.
With the government’s consent, it was possible to hold the
inauguration and first meeting of the Advisory Board on May 26,
1943. On that evening and the one following, meetings were
held between the seven shu branch chairmen, who had been invited
to Djakarta.35
The Advisory Board was asked to discuss the problems which
most needed Putera's attention, that is, problems experienced
by the pangreh pradja and Putera in their attempts to work to-
gether. To facilitate the exchange of ideas, the Putera leader-
ship beforehand asked Soetardjo [Kartohadikoesoemo] and Hadji
Agoes Salim to prepare working papers that could serve as a
basis for discussion at the meeting. Soetardjo is a member of
the pangreh pradja, and Salim is a veteran of the Movement.
Summaries of the preliminary statements of the two gentle-
men, along with a report on the Advisory Board meeting are in
the hands of Minshu Shidobu. Therefore it is unnecessary for
me to discuss them here. It is sufficient to say that both men
thought that conflict between the pangreh pradja and the Move-
ment should cease because both groups stood squarely behind the
government.
But in practice the problem is neither as simple as it is
in theory, nor as we would like it to be. The Advisory Board
may think that conflict is unnecessary and that there is now a
basis for cooperation between the pangreh pradja and the Move-
ment, but the psychological gulf separating them has not yet
disappeared. This is demonstrated by the fact that large num-
bers of pangreh pradja officials in various parts of the
Priangan have clearly indicated they oppose Putera. One of the
bupati has said that Putera represents merely a gesture of
thanks on the Sukarno and Hatta for being freed from their Dutch
imprisonment by the Japanese Army. In the area around Tjimahi,
several lurah have said in public meetings that Putera is mean-
ingless and if its propagandists come to the village they should
be ignored. They have also said that Soekarno and Hatta are not
the leaders of the people.
Lurah never have their own ideas about government and lead-
ership; they follow the lead of their bupati. They would not
dare say such things in public if they did not have orders from
above.
It is hoped that, beginning with the establishment of the
Putera branch in Priangan Shu, which took place officially in
Bandung on July 1, 1943, the attitude of the bupati towards
Putera will gradually change. The Priangan Shu branch was
opened by the Great Leader1 ** of Putera in the presence of the
Shuchokan, and the Shuchokan himself stated his confidence in
Putera’s work. All the bupati in Priangan Shu were invited to
the inaugural ceremony; only the bupati from Garut did not
attend.
14. Pemimpin Besar (Great Leader) was Soekarno's official title
within Putera.36
Everyone knows that Putera was established by the Military
Government to help Japan wage the present Greater East Asia War
until final victory has been achieved. The Triple A Movement15
was purposely replaced by Putera in order to put the leadership
of the movement into the hands of people whose names carry in-
fluence at all levels of the population. In this way it would
be easier to interest the people in forming a solid line of sup-
port for the government and the Army. Nevertheless, the pangreh
pradja are still suspicious of Putera. Why?
We do not believe that the pangreh pradja are ignorant of
the fact that the government itself initiated the Putera move-
ment. They are not stupid. They know that there are no longer
any obstacles preventing them from working together with the
political activists; the pangreh pradja and Putera stand together
behind the government. And they also know that, in reality,
they can use Putera as an aid in carrying out their responsibil-
ities. Putera leaders, through their influence on the people,
can easily persuade them to support the pangreh pradja in their
governing tasks. The pangreh pradja know all this, especially
since the activist leaders have repeatedly offered them the
hand of friendship. Nevertheless they still distrust Putera.
What is the real reason for this?
The matter requires deeper analysis. An explanation is
easily found when we examine the pangreh pradja's position in
the Dutch period. The pangreh pradja were created and streng-
thened by the Dutch simply as an instrument through which to
govern the people. The operating philosophy of the Dutch gov-
ernment was that the people should be left under the immediate
rule of their own leaders, but that these chiefs should be con-
verted into tools useful to the colonial regime. Superficially
the people’s chiefs remained as before, but in actuality they
were changed into oppressive petty officials. In short, the
Dutch colonial government continued16 the feudal system here.
Everywhere else feudalism was swept away, but in Indonesia,
especially in Java, feudalism was strengthened. In the people’s
eyes, the bupati’s position was greatly exalted. The status of
15.	The Triple A Movement (Gerakan Tiga A; in Japanese, San
”A" Undo), begun in April 1942, was a hastily prepared and
ultimately unsuccessful propaganda effort whose purpose
was to promote Japan as the leader, protector and light
of Asia.
16.	The original reads menanam (literally, to plant, i.e., to
establish); however,on rereading the passage Hatta said the
word he intended was meneruskan (to continue). This seems
reasonable in the light of the entire paragraph and espe-
cially the wording of the following sentence.37
the pangreh pradja was constantly enhanced by comparison with
that of other government workers. Even though a doctor was
better educated than a wedana, for example, and was far more
intelligent, in practice he ranked below the wedana. The
pangreh pradja had to be elevated in the people's eyes because
they were the henchmen of the colonial government in subjugating
the people. For decades the pangreh pradja was educated on this
basis. In time, a tradition arose among the pangreh pradja that
except for themselves no other leaders of the people existed.
For that reason they automatically opposed the Movement and
suspected its leaders. They regarded the activist leaders as
their enemies because they thought of them as rivals for their
positions. And this was increasingly true as the Movement
developed and as the people came to regard the activists as
their true leaders.
Although the bupati have been confirmed in their positions
by the Japanese Military Government, and although they have
greater power than before, they still resent the fact that
others are recognized as popular leaders. For them the exist-
ence of such leaders means that they, the bupati, will lose
status in the eyes of the people. The feudal spirit requires
one leader only, not two. It is not the people's needs which
are important to the pangreh pradja, but rather their own posi-
tions, their prestige in the eyes of the population. These
sentiments are still very much alive in the hearts of most of
the pangreh pradja.
That is why they secretly oppose Putera. They realize it
would be possible to work with Putera--but Putera will create a
new class of leaders, which is exactly what the pangreh pradja
do not want. Such is the psychological explanation of the reac-
tion- -sometimes open, sometimes hidden--of the pangreh pradja.
Until their attitude changes completely--and such a change on
the part of the old guard cannot be expected to occur all at
once--opposition from the pangreh pradja will continue to exist.
Taking this into consideration, it would be best if the Shuchokan
exercised great care in accepting advice from the pangreh pradja
concerning the activist leaders to be nominated for the post of
Putera branch chairman. As for the Putera leadership, we will
not cease searching for a meeting ground between ourselves and
the pangreh pradja, nor will we cease trying to win them over.
Without pressure from the Japanese authorities, however, they
will only have smiles on their faces and burning resentment in
their hearts. So much for relations with the pangreh pradja.
On the evening of May 26, 1943, the meeting of the chairmen
of the Putera branches in Djakarta, Bandung, Djogja, Solo,
Semarang, Surabaja and Malang, again demonstrated to the Putera
leaders and directors that the composition of the branch direc-
torates cannot simply be left up to the local chairman alone.38
On the evening mentioned, the leaders reminded everyone that
the branch directorates should, as far as possible, represent
all the various political activist groups of pre-war days. Even
though we are not now emphasizing political parties, the goals
of all parties now being identical, the people who previously
belonged to different golongan17 still exist. It would there-
fore be desirable to have the leadership composed of members of
these various factions, which have stated they are now working
together in comradeship and unity. But since the branch chair-
men come to the central leadership with a list of directors
already made up, it is difficult to change or to revise it
according to the above-mentioned principles. It is clear that
the branch chairmen all too often choose people who were former-
ly their party associates. This is not a sign of dishonesty,
but occurs because the chairmen choose people with whom they
have already been acquainted as colleagues, people whose person-
ality and characteristics they already know. Other groups get
the impression that they have been passed over or simply for-
gotten. There are also chairmen who do not dare to work with
leaders of pre-war leftist movements such as the old Partindo18
and PNI,19 since many members of these movements have their
activities carefully watched by the Kempeitai,20 and there are
even those who have been jailed and later released.
It is not surprising that many of the leftists, who were
advocates of non-cooperation in the pre-war period, have been
imprisoned and subsequently freed. The Kempeitai had no way of
knowing about their character and activities; it did not really
know about the popular movements in the Dutch period. It took
the advice of PID21 officials who were all people from the old
days and hostile to all political activists. Thus there were
17.	Most often used in a social sense of "group" or "class,"
golongan seems to be applied here to political factions.
18.	The Partindo (an abbreviated form of Partai Indonesia, or
Indonesia Party) was a non-cooperating party founded in
April 1931.
19.	The Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Edu-
cation) was founded in 1927 and had as its platform com-
plete economic and political independence, non-cooperation
with the Dutch, and unity of all Indonesians in the inde-
pendence effort.
20.	The Japanese military police.
21.	The Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst (Political Intelligence
Service) was an information-gathering security police for
the Netherlands East Indies government.39
often mistakes whereby left-leaning activists were thrown into
jail without having done anything wrong. Among those who were
jailed and later freed were many people who had earned the
gratitude of the Japanese Army when it entered Java.
Nevertheless, there are still branch chairmen who are
frightened to take people who have been let out of jail into
their directorates. They say they are afraid of the Kempeitai.
With this in mind, the Putera leadership is of the opinion
that the composition of the branch directorates cannot be left
completely in the hands of the designated chairmen. Obviously,
appointments must be made after consultation with them, but they
should no longer be given complete freedom to establish the
directorates on their own. The Putera leadership must act as a
guide for all its organizational levels towards cooperation
among people who previously were in different groups. This
principle will be followed from now on when branch directorates
are being chosen. The policy will make additional work, to be
sure, but it is the only way we can get the results required by
the present time and circumstances.
According to their working program, the Empat Serangkai
were to have made a tour in May to propagandize and to install
the seven shfl branches mentioned earlier. These original plans
could not be carried out for several reasons, but primarily be-
cause the session of the Advisory Council meetings with the
seven shu branch chairmen could not be organized before the end
of May. After being postponed several times, the tour finally
started on June 30, 1943.
The first stop was Bandung. On the morning of July 1,
1943, the Priangan Shu branch was inaugurated, and in the after-
noon there was a rally at Tegallega Field which was attended by
tens of thousands of people, young and old, important and insig-
nificant. The theme of the meeting was "Destroy the Americans,
British and the Dutch" and it was led by the Naiseibucho22 him-
self.
On July 2nd, the group went on towards Djogja, spending
the night at Wonosobo. The next morning we arrived in Djogja
and that day were received by the Shuchokan, along with the
directors of the Djogja branch. The Djogja ShuchSkan's attitude
toward and enthusiasm for Putera were very encouraging. The
22. Chief of Internal Affairs Department at the shu level.
Sometimes used as a variant of Naimubucho, the same office
at the level of the central government.40
Putera branch there will get full support from the shu govern-
ment .
Most unfortunately, we were not able to attend the official
opening of the Djogja branch or the public rally which was held
on July 5, 1943. At noon on the 4th, we received a telephone
call from Djakarta ordering us to return quickly. We left at
dusk, and by the morning of Monday the 5th we had reached our
destination. We were called back in connection with the arrival
of Prime Minister Tojo.23
So it happened that the trip never really got going--until
very recently. The installation of our branches was left for
the respective local chairmen themselves to carry out in the
name of the Great Leader. Only in Solo was the installation en-
trusted to a member of the Advisory Council, Woerjaningrat.
The public rallies in the places we could not visit were also
held as planned.
II.	Section Reports
As has been pointed out, the work of Putera Headquarters
is carried out by twelve Sections, organized into four Depart-
ments. They may be outlined as follows:
I.	Planning and Development Department
1.	Correspondence Section
2.	Finance Section
3.	Organization Section
4.	Economic Affairs Section
II. Cultural Affairs Department
1.	Education Section
2.	Cultural Section
3.	Women's Section
III.	Propaganda Department
1.	Propaganda Section
2.	Press and Radio Section
IV.	Public Welfare Department
1.	Physical Education Section
2.	Health Section
3.	Public Welfare Section
23. T5j5 arrived in Djakarta on July 7, 1943. The visit was
requested by the Japanese authorities on Java to convince
the Indonesians of Japan's sincerity and concern for them.41
Properly speaking, each department should have been headed
by its own chief, but for the time being the four positions were
divided among the Empat Serangkai. The first department was
headed by Drs. Moh. Hatta, the second by Ki Hadjar Dewantara,
the third by Ir. Soekarno, and the fourth by Kijai H. M. Mansoer.2*
1. Correspondence Section
This section is a communications center for Putera's rela-
tions with the public. All correspondence passes through this
section. Incoming letters are sorted at this point and directed
to the leadership or to the appropriate section. Also, visitors
are received here, unless they are taken care of by the Public
Welfare Section. Each visitor is asked about his needs or
wishes and is then referred to the appropriate section.
Over the last three months, the Correspondence Section has
received 3,215 visitors, 836 of whom it handled itself. The
others were directed to appropriate sections.
Incoming letters: 1,987; outgoing letters: 1,378.
In order to show the types of things brought to Putera's
attention through the mail, it seems best to include below a
list of letters received, divided according to the section con-
cerned.
Leadership and Sections		Incoming letters	Outgoing letters
1.	Great Leader [Soekarno]	99	
2.	General Director [Hatta]	224	230
3.	Correspondence Section	95	348
4.	Finance Section	37	34
5.	Organization Section	447	49
6.	Economic Affairs Section	372	91
7.	Education Section	36	38
8.	Cultural Section	59	67
9.	Propaganda Section	125	63
10.	Press Section	105	6
11.	Women's Section	43	86
12.	Physical Education Section	140	118
13.	Health Section	68	148
14.	Public Welfare Section	126	93
24. According to Hatta, the Empat Serangkai themselves consid-
ered the appointments to be temporary. They did not expect
to be tied permanently to Putera, but thought that the Big
Four would have its own, separate life as a grouping of
leaders.42
The items taken care of by the Correspondence Section it-
self were of a general nature only, such as requests for work,
offers of services, requests for merger from other organiza-
tions,25 contributions of various kinds, and other things having
to do with administration. Items touching on other subjects
were forwarded to the appropriate section.
Besides matters related to the position, actions and com-
position of Putera, which were taken care of by the Great
Leader, the General Director, and the Organization Section, it
is clear from the above list that the problems most frequently
brought to Putera are economic ones, an indication of both the
living conditions these days and the great hopes people have
for Putera.
2. Finance Section
Information on Putera's finances through July 15, 1943 is
as follows:
Income
a)	Received from the Gunseikanbu
b)	Gifts
Total
Expenditures
Expenditures of Headquarters
a)	Headquarters preparations
b)	Wages for Directors and office staff
c)	Office expenses
d)	Inspection and tour expenses
Expenditures of Branches
a)	Branch preparations (reimbursed by
Headquarters)
b)	Expenses of individual branches (as of the
beginning of July, none were paid by
Headquarters)
Total
f.26 25,180.00
3,817.48
f. 28,997.48
f.	860.19
14,431.25
6,311.29
3,432.47
3,312.15
f. 28,347.25
25.	The original phrase reads "penjerahan perkumpulan kepada
Putera" which could also mean ^'transmittal of collected
funds to Putera," though the version given seems more likely.
26.	The currency unit was still the gulden (guilder), signified
by "f.," an abbreviation of an earlier Dutch monetary unit,
the florin.43
Regarding gifts received from the outside, the Putera lead-
ership intends to put them into a special fund for the needy.
The money will not be used to pay Putera's own expenses.
Even though Putera has never requested aid or donations,
there are people who have given gifts to it as a sign of their
regard. Among the donors are many low-ranking officials, and
their attitude must be interpreted as evidence of good will, as
is the case with those who have worked for Putera on a voluntary
basis.
3.	Organization Section
Most of the visitors received by the Organization Section
brought up questions concerning Putera*s activities, its branch-
es, and its need for additional personnel. They also passed on
the people's grievances against the pangreh pradja.
In order to study conditions and to prepare locations for
the establishment of Putera branches, representatives from the
Organization Section have made many inspection tours. During
these trips they also examine the work of branches which have
already been founded. For this task the division is always
short-handed and needs lower-ranking aides. Since the second
month of operation, two such aides have been taken on so they
may be trained and later sent out to the various branches.
4.	Economic Affairs Section
Leadership of the Economic Affairs Section originally was
given to Soeriaatmadja, who was (and still is) employed at the
Economic Office [a Military Government office]. Soewirjo was
made his deputy. But subsequently it became clear that it would
be difficult to have Soeriaatmadja released from his present
position. Accordingly the leadership was turned over to
Soewirj o.
The Section's duties can be divided into six categories:
1.	General
2.	Trade and handicrafts
3.	Agriculture and fishing
4.	Cooperatives
5.	Economic propaganda
6.	Handicrafts exhibitions
In the three months since Putera Headquarters opened, the
Economic Affairs Section has accomplished the following things:44
1)	Drew up a working plan for agriculture, fishing, stock-
breeding, handicrafts, trade, shipping and cooperatives. The
main problems have been how to achieve the necessary unification
of Indonesia27 so that the Economic Affairs Section’s activities
can be rationalized and how to find ways to increase productivity
in all fields.
2)	Made a set of regulations to serve as a model for all
kinds of economic organizations such as cooperatives, corpora-
tions and others.
3)	Gave oral and written information to people who raised
various economic questions.
4)	Acted as intermediary for those interested in getting
in touch with government agencies.
5)	Drew up a register of Indonesian associations active in
economic fields, and listed their condition.
6)	Compiled information on the financial status of Indone-
sian [business] associations, a task which had never before been
undertaken.
7)	Carried out an investigation of rice-selling in Djakarta
during April and May 1943, because of complaints from many
people.
8)	Compiled information on handicrafts, fishing and animal
husbandry in Djakarta.
9)	Collected documents concerning all aspects of the
economy.
10)	Collected works on fish culture, farming, animal hus-
bandry and handicrafts, for future printing and distribution.
The Economic Affairs section had the largest portion of
the recent exhibition given in the Putera Building at the pasar
malam,2e held from June 25 to July 15 [1943] in Djakarta. In
27.	It is only partially true that the term "Indonesia" was pro-
scribed during the occupation period; used in a vague, ab-
stract, and non-political sense, the word continued to
appear in speeches and the press. There was, of course, no
"Indonesia" in the present-day sense under Japanese admin-
istration. The old Netherlands East Indies was divided
into several distinct portions, and there was at the time
no intention of uniting them.
28.	A generic term for a market-carnival or fair held at night,
not to be confused with a specific market.45
the brochure that Putera published for the occasion, there were
several "how to" articles for the use of people in various kinds
of businesses.
As a follow-up to the exhibition the Economic Affairs Sec-
tion held a contest on the use of the planting methods demon-
strated in the agricultural area in the Putera Building during
the pasar malam.
5. Education Section
From the beginning it was apparent that people's interest
in the Education Section was enormous, and that they attached
great hopes to it as well. This division is where people come
to ask for information and help in all matters.
A great many school-teachers have come to offer their
services to Putera. Unfortunately, however, the high school
teachers in Djakarta received orders--if we are not mistaken,
from the Seinendan29 leadership--that they were to have no con-
nection with Putera. Is Putera a group of bandits capable of
corrupting teachers who come too close? If the Japanese persist
in this narrowminded attitude towards an organization which was
expressly established by the government to support the Army
behind the front lines, it will be difficult for Indonesians to
respect them.
Many people have illusions about Putera’s capacity to handle
all manner of educational questions. The various requests we
have received from visitors or in the mail make it clear that
people think Putera can help them with any conceivable problem.
For example, people have been asking:
1)	For advice on several children who cannot continue their
studies.
2)	For information on aid for the education of students in
financial straits whose parents are in the Outer Islands or are
no longer receiving their pensions.
3)	That Putera try to have the Bandung Technical Faculty
reopened.
4)	That private schools be permitted to reopen, particularly
since there is a lack of government schools and a high percent-
age of youngsters who cannot get schooling.
29. The Youth Corps, created early in 1943.46
5)	For information as to whether a private school diploma
is recognized by the government.
6)	That Putera explain its education policies in the pres-
ent period and for the future, so they can become generally
known.
The Education Section is making plans for eradicating
illiteracy; they are trying to devise an anti-illiteracy cam-
paign that can be effectively carried out despite the paper
shortage.
Even in the period of Dutch colonial rule the political
activists had an enormous interest in eliminating illiteracy.
Every party and political group gave this problem top priority
in their social programs. For this reason, the Education Sec-
tion feels very concerned lest Putera not be permitted to carry
on this noble work itself. Also, the people who have been hop-
ing for energetic leadership from Putera in this matter have
lost their earlier enthusiasm.
6. Cultural Section
The Cultural Section has also been the object of a great
deal of popular attention. In artistic circles, people are
anxious to know what Putera's aims are in the cultural field.
Generally there is a feeling that Indonesian culture now has a
fresh opportunity to be revitalized, since it has been freed
from the iron grip of Dutch culture. Which road will Putera
take? Simply imitating the culture of neighboring nations, or
building a new culture on the basis of our own national heri-
tage? This is what people repeatedly ask us at Putera.
Many people ask for information on:
1)	The origins of the artistic aspects of many kinds of
dances.
2)	Ways of putting on plays.
3)	Revitalization of the arts of singing and dancing.
Projects carried out by the Cultural Division over the past
three months include:
1)	compiling a list of people prominent in the arts through-
out Java.
2)	Collecting valuable paintings.47
3)	Writing articles on the meaning of culture as conceived
by Putera.
4)	Holding group discussions on the possibility of organiz-
ing the various arts on Java.
5)	Attempting the revitalization of a number of the Indo-
nesian arts.
6)	Cooperating with the Keimin Bunka ShidCsho.30
7)	Holding an exhibition of paintings, designs, and so
forth at Putera Headquarters and at the pasar malam. The ex-
hibit at Putera Headquarters was attended by 8,773 people.
8)	Holding performances to entertain convalescent Japanese
soldiers.
7. Women’s Section
At first the Women’s Section was unable to get underway
because it was awaiting the arrival from Semarang of Mrs.
Soenarjo Mangoenpoespito, the woman who originally had been
appointed its chairman. Apparently Mrs. Mangoenpoespito had
difficulty leaving Semarang, since her husband had a position
there and could not easily change it.
At the present time, with Mrs. Soenarjati Soekemi appointed
chairman pro tern, things have begun to be put in order. The
main aims of the Women's Section are to improve the education
of female children and to get mothers as a group to feel a sense
of responsibility to society. Women are the first educators of
children. The child's future character depends on this early
education. If mothers remain ignorant and don't know how to
train their children when they are small, people will remain in
their present downtrodden state. The Women's Section has also
been considering ways in which girls can be used in public wel-
fare projects.
In the past three months the Women's Section has done the
following:
1) Entertained soldiers in the military hospitals. The
entertainment was of three sorts:	a) giving pictures done by
30. The People's Educational and Cultural Guidance Institute,
founded in April 1943, and later taken under the Jawa
HSkSkai.48
Indonesian, Chinese and Indian children to the wounded; b) pre-
senting flower bouquets; c) holding performances of dancing and
children's singing.
2)	Held a meeting on April 21, 1943, in observance of
Kartini Day.
3)	Organized public meetings for women to develop the
"Destroy the Americans and the British" spirit. Meetings of
this sort were held jointly with the Djakarta Shu branch of
Putera in five places:	Tangerang, Bekasi, Krawang, Subang and
Purwakarta.
4)	Organized the production of socks. This work was begun
from the time Putera Headquarters was opened. There were
thirty-three teachers giving lessons. So far 830 pairs of socks
have been finished, and the women were paid f.1.25 a pair for
them. Materials were underwritten by Oei, who owns a sock fac-
tory. The work will be ended when work done directly for the
Army is begun. When this happens, sock production will be
organized in other areas.
5)	Helped the Putera exhibition at the pasar malam by hav-
ing an area for women's affairs, which included, for example:
a) an exhibit of paintings and sculpture depicting women in
various aspects of their work, with the intention of encouraging
enthusiasm for work in these times; b) an exhibit of items re-
ceived in an all-Java and Madura contest for women.
6)	Displayed examples of embroidery methods every week in
order to improve handicrafts.
The Women's Section oversees the work of the Puteri Insti-
tute, which was developed earlier by the Sendenbu31 for educat-
ing unemployed girls in various occupations. Now its supervi-
sion has been turned over to Putera.
8. Propaganda Department
The Propaganda Department has propagandized via radio, news-
papers and public rallies. An agreement has been made with the
Military Radio that Putera would hold a monthly propaganda pro-
gram called Pantjaran Kilat.
Propaganda in the newspapers is arranged by the Press Sec-
tion. Its job is to gather news of Putera which is suitable for
31. The Department of Propaganda.49
publication to the general populace, and to gather articles con-
taining guidance for the people. Shorter pieces are suitable
for use as articles in newspapers and magazines, but the longer
ones must be printed as brochures. The advantage of the latter
procedure is that materials in booklet form can easily be saved
while newspapers are frequently not saved. Now we are printing
booklets on "How to Make People's Soap," and about "Rice" and
"Ramie."
Public rallies, which the Propaganda Section helped
arrange, are as follows:
On April 29, 1943, at the Taman Raden Saleh, an event was
sponsored jointly by Putera and the Sendenbu. This meeting was
held to commemorate the Emperor's Birthday [Teneho Setsu] and
was used to awaken spirit and the will to "Destroy the Americans
and the British." Since the rally, the anti-Allied propaganda
campaign has been going along quickly and smoothly.
This meeting was led by Shimizu [Hitoshi].32 His Excel-
lency Yamamoto, head of the Propaganda Department, also spoke.
For Putera, speeches were given by Ir. Soekarno, representing
the people of Indonesia in Java, and by Kjai H. M. Mansoer,
representing the Muslim community. Other speakers were:
1.	Mr. Oei Tiang Tjoei, representing the Chinese.
2.	Mr. Akbani, representing the Indians.
3.	Mr. A. S. Alatas, representing the Arabs.
As far as the contents of the speeches at the rally are
concerned, it is unnecessary to go into them here since they
have already been reported to the Minshu Shidbbu. At the rally,
the following resolution was adopted:
On this day, April 29, 1943, we the Indonesian,
Chinese, Indian and Arab peoples living on Java pro-
claim to all the peoples of the world that:
We express our heartfelt thanks to Japan, who has
made sacrifices for the welfare of the peoples and
countries of Asia.
In the current Greater East Asian War, we are
unanimous in our determination to strengthen our
energies and will on the homefront.
We are prepared with all our hearts to join the
struggle against the Americans and the British, since
32. Shimizu was the chief of the Sendenhan, or Propaganda Divi-
sion of the Department of Propaganda.50
we fully realize that the destruction of their power
is an absolute precondition for the development of the
New Society within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere.
Therefore we stand with all our feelings and ener-
gies squarely behind the Japanese Army, aiming for the
final victory.
On the evening of June 24, 1943, at Taman Raden Saleh, a
rally was held to welcome the statement made by Prime Minister
T5jQ in the Special Session of the Diet held in Tokyo on June
15.33 This rally was led by the chairman of the Djakarta Shu
branch of Putera. Those speaking at the rally were:
1.	Kijai H. M. Mansoer, representing Islam.
2.	M. Soetardjo, representing the pangreh pradja.
3.	Dachlan Abdullah, representing the officials and inhabi-
tants of the municipality of Djakarta.
4.	Mrs. Siti Noerdjannah, representing Muslim women.
5.	Ir. Soekarno, representing the people.
Representing alien residents on Java were the following
speakers:	Mr. Isamul, representing the Indians; Mr. Oei Tiang
Tjoei, representing the Chinese; and Mr. S. A. Alatas, repre-
senting the Arabs.
Then there was also a word from a German national, who
paid his respects to the Indonesian people and praised the sin-
cerity of the Japanese Government’s policy.
This rally passed the following resolution, which was read
by the Great Leader of Putera, Ir. Soekarno:
In connection with the speech of Prime Minister
Toj5 to the Diet in Tokyo on the 16th of this month,
we at this meeting today announce the following reso-
lution:
Prime Minister Toj5 has explained in the Diet that
the political principles being followed by the Japanese
Empire remain firm and unchanged:	They are to free
all of East Asia from American and British oppression,
and to give a suitable place and position to each
country in the area. In addition, he made clear that
the necessary steps will be taken to insure that this
year we will have an opportunity to participate in
determining internal policy.
33. The correct date is June 16, 1943.51
This has caused the Indonesian people on Java,
fifty million of us, to feel deeply touched and thank-
ful from the bottom of our hearts.
Therefore we all say thank you to the Imperial
Government in Tokyo and swear to bend every effort in
aiding the Military Government, each according to his
position and capabilities, until the final victory is
achieved.
Representative of the
Indonesian People of Java,
Great Leader of Putera,
Ir. Soekarno.
The rally at Taman Raden Saleh was then followed by a mass
gathering held at Ikada Square on the occasion of Prime Minister
TojS's visit to Java. This rally took place on the afternoon
of July 7, 1943, and was attended by tens of thousands of people.
The excitement reached its peak when Prime Minister Toj5,
after giving his speech, descended from the platform and walked
past, paying his respects to the ranks of people who had gathered
to hear him talk.34
In addition to these activities, Putera*s Propaganda Divi-
sion has since the beginning of July helped the Sendenbu propa-
gandize all over Java, right down to the village level. The
Sendenbu has been showing the film "Hawaii" and others,35 and
Putera has been helping with speeches.
It is being increasingly felt that the task of the Propa-
ganda and Press and Radio Sections is a very heavy one. Propa-
gandizing is not easy, especially in war-time. Propaganda must
be based upon a knowledge of the true nature of the people at
whom it is to be directed. Therefore an investigation of the
soul and way of life of the Indonesian people should now be
undertaken. In the Propaganda Division we need a group to
34.	Hatta later recalled that this gesture was deeply impres-
sive at the time because of its drama and contrast with the
Dutch style of aloofness.
35.	Many films were dubbed or subtitled versions of works
originally intended for Japanese audiences. They were,
like the movie ''Hawaii," about the war and its inspiration-
al aspects, especially those of flying and suicide pilots.
There were several films made by Japanese companies on
Java, using Javanese actors; these stressed the struggles
and sacrifices necessary to further the national good.52
research, prepare and arrange propaganda materials so that they
will attract the people's interest. In addition, we need propa-
ganda experts who are gifted public speakers and who know how
to reach the people's hearts.
To do all this, the staff of Putera's Propaganda Division
is far from adequate and needs to be increased. The Putera
leadership is in the process of trying to find additional help,
but beyond that we need to try to educate future propagandists
by recruiting some of the spirited, activist pemuda.36 The past
experience of the Pergerakan makes it clear that many of our
pemuda know how to speak well, but lack experience and knowledge.
After receiving training or attending a course for six months
or so,they could be sent out to propagandize.
In relation to this need, the Putera leadership is now
planning a method of training such future propagandists. Hope-
fully, with the approval of the Gunseikanbu, this educational
program can be begun after Puasa [the fasting month], that is,
sometime next October [1943].
9. Physical Education Section
After Putera was set up, the Indonesian Sports League
[ISI--Ikatan Sport Indonesia] headed by Mr. Soetardjo37 subordi-
nated itself to Putera. Beginning with this merger, the direc-
tors hoped to unify all sporting associations on Java quickly.
The ISI was an association of various sports organizations
founded in the Dutch period, but it was not very strongly uni-
fied. Even the All Indonesia Soccer Association [PSSI--Persa-
toean Sepakraga Seloeroeh Indonesia] did not like the ISI very
much. Therefore the ISI directors hoped that Putera's influence
might help to unify all Indonesian sports associations on Java.
These expectations did not go unfulfilled. On April 27,
the Putera leadership empowered Mr. Oto Iskandar Dinata, who
was the head of the Physical Education Section, to organize
public athletics under a regularized leadership. Seemingly,
the desire for unity was quite strong among all athletic groups.
It was just that people had been waiting for trustworthy lead-
ers. Those appointed by Oto Iskandar Dinata received the
36.	Literally, "young man" or "youth," but since the days of
the late occupation carrying the connotation of "young
political activist" or "young patriot."
37.	Not to be confused with the Soetardjo mentioned on p. 50,
above.53
confidence of all groups, and unity was achieved in a short
time. On May 30, at the Djakarta meeting of athletic represen-
tatives from the sixteen shQ, there was born the "Athletic
Training Movement" [Gerakan Latihan Olah-Raga], abbreviated
Gelora. The decision to found Gelora was really just an unoffi-
cial one, since the organization could only operate officially
after being authorized by the Gunseikanbu. Nevertheless, it
was received by the people with extraordinary joy.
The intentions and goals of Gelora are explained in its
constitution as being to develop the bodies and souls of the
people through athletics, so that the people will have healthy
bodies and a noble spirit. A noble spirit and pure thoughts in
a healthy body--such is the founding principle in establishing
Gelora. Gelora is also intended as a direct contribution to
the government from the people. The people are organizing their
own training program and are enthusiastic about expressing their
will to stand united behind the Army. Therefore Gelora has been
planned as an autonomous body under Putera's supervision; it is
not a division of Putera, but rather an autonomous body having
connections with Putera.
Unfortunately there has been up until now no decision from
the Gunseikanbu concerning Gelora. Since its founding, Gelora
has gone ahead quietly and with dispatch. It has sponsored
several athletic contests which were held with success. In the
short time it has been in existence, it has been able to
"Gelora-fy" the people's morale, something which is certainly
necessary if the Japanese Army is to strengthen the homefront.
Whatever decision the Gunseikanbu makes regarding Gelora and
its relationship with Putera, one thing should not be forgotten:
Gelora should be allowed to remain an autonomous body of the
■people themselves, a body which will make its contribution
directly to the government. We advise strongly that the leaders
not be changed, for if there are different ones, we are afraid
that the public will be disillusioned. The damage will not be
inconsiderable. If this initiative is thwarted, the consequence
will be that morale would sag for who knows how long.
The Physical Education Section has given top priority to
trying to develop Gelora and, at the same time, to arranging
things so it will be a body organizationally and financially
capable of standing on its own two feet. Now they can be proud
to look at Gelora's progress, existing as it does all over Java,
except in Banten and Kediri.
Besides that, the Physical Education Section has given out
much information on Gelora's organization, on sports equipment
and regulations for athletic contests, and so forth. At the
Pasar Malam Building, sports equipment made in Indonesia was
exhibited. The intention was to encourage Indonesians to make
their own sporting goods, which until now have been imported.54
Every Tuesday except the second one in each month, speeches
on sports are broadcast over Military Radio.
Since July 20, taiso38 has been practiced at Putera Head-
quarters by all employees. On this matter we have received
help from Marjoen of the Office of Education [a Military Govern-
ment office].
10. Health Section
The Health Section has worked with various government
health agencies from the very beginning. With the agreement of
the authorities, several doctors like Dr. R. Mochtar from the
Naimubu Eiseikyoku,39 Dr. Soerono from the Djakarta ShQ Eiseika,1*0
and Dr. Marzoeki from the Djakarta municipality declared their
willingness to become advisors.
In order to work up a plan for public health propaganda
among the people, instructions were sent to the seven shu
branches that were already officially open to prepare everything
necessary for discussion at the first meeting, which is to take
place this coming September. We looked for information on the
locations of doctors in private practice throughout Java. The
aim was to get them involved in public health, and not be
limited only to private practice. In this matter of looking
for information, the Health Section has also asked the Resi-
dency Health Bureaus throughout Java and Madura for assistance.
In the field of health propaganda, the following things
were done:
1)	An exhibition of Javanese folk medicines was held at
Putera Headquarters.
2)	An exhibition of cheap but healthy foods for the common
people was held at Putera Headquarters.
3)	A demonstration of how to make soap was held at Putera
Headquarters.
4)	Speeches on health were given over Military Radio.
38.	Japanese-style calisthenics.
39.	The Public Health Bureau of the Internal Affairs Depart-
ment .
40.	The Sanitation or Health Division.55
5) A public health exhibit was held in the Putera Building
at the pasar malam. It displayed:	a) materials used for ban-
daging (bandage cloth, cotton, medicine, bi-carbonate of soda,
etc.); b) foods that might be included in a rational diet suited
to the time, and plants that can be used for medicinal purposes;
c) health posters; d) how to build simple but healthy houses
with sufficient fresh air and sunlight in accordance with the
specifications of the Pest Control Agency (Djawatan Pemberantas
Penjakit Sampar).
11. Public Welfare Section
The Public Welfare Section has the closest relations with
the people of all Putera's sections. It can be likened to a
barometer for measuring the conditions among the people and
their general circumstances. Various complaints about life's
hardships come to this section. In the past three months, not
less than 828 such cases were brought to our attention, some of
them by mail.
In order to get a picture of the complaints expressed to
Putera by the people, it will be useful to state briefly the
more important types:
1)	Complaints from pensioners who are no longer receiving
their pensions.
2)	Complaints of unemployed ex-civil servants who were dis-
missed when the Japanese Army came to Java and abolished their
positions. Among these are many who do not own their own homes
and who have so far existed by selling their personal belongings
and household goods. There are those who have no relatives to
fall back on.
3)	Complaints about the harsh method of tax collection.
4)	Complaints about the severity of levies on petty traders,
for example, excise taxes, the head tax, village urwnan,41 etc.
5)	Complaints from merchants about arrests and impounding
of merchandise by the police.
6)	Complaints about the territorial limits placed on trad-
ing activities and the difficulties caused by this.
41. Literally, "contributions," usually in kind. But Hatta
has noted that during the occupation payment of these "dues"
was often made in labor, at Japanese insistence.56
7)	Complaints from people living in the former Particuliere
Landerijen.42
8)	Complaints from people living on tea, rubber, and other
plantations.
9)	Several complaints from those who have been evicted
from their houses because Japanese wanted to use them.
10)	Complaints about various regulations on the harvesting
and sale of rice, which are burdensome to the people.
11)	Complaints about the difficulty of obtaining yard
goods, cloth for shrouds, and so forth.
12)	Several requests from people wanting to be sent back
to their native areas because they have no money and no one to
turn to.
13)	Complaints about the relationships between Japanese
and Indonesian personnel in various offices.
14)	Complaints about the attitude of some Dutchmen in
several offices toward Indonesian personnel.43
15)	A number of complaints about the way the police arrest,
detain and mistreat people who are accused but whose guilt has
not been established. Also complaints about the methods employed
by the police and the pangreh pradja for interrogating suspects.
16)	Complaints about the attitude of the lower-ranking
pangreh pradja toward the people, which is now as bad as or
worse than it was earlier under the Dutch.
42.	These were privately held foreign estates dating from the
days of the Dutch East India Company. The estate owners
had immense and often oppressive powers over their tenants.
The Japanese Military Administration took over these es-
tates but did not alter the essential features of their
operation. Most of the Particuliere Landerijen were near
Djakarta and on the West Java coastal plain, though they
also existed in the areas of Pekalongan, Pasuruan, Sura-
baja and Semarang.
43.	Not all the Dutch were interned in the spring of 1942, and
a small number of men with special knowledge or willingness
to cooperate remained out of camps until late in the occu-
pation. Most Dutch women and children were not interned
until after mid-1943.57
17)	Complaints that where the people's economic activities
are not neglected by the pangreh pradja, they are actually ob-
structed.
18)	Several complaints about insults to Putera.
19)	Reports on hoarding.
Efforts to aid the unemployed have taken the following
forms:	a) collection of information on requests by factories,
offices and other enterprises for labor; b) establishment of
lines of communication with such offices, factories and enter-
prises in order to place people who have registered with us.
The effort to help the unemployed has had some results, al-
though they are not completely satisfactory. Out of 841 people
who registered, we have been able to place 279, or 30%. Con-
sidering the inadequate means at our disposal this percentage
can be termed high. The Public Welfare Section can feel justi-
fiably proud. It works hard from morning to night, receiving
visitors, helping them in their difficulties as much as possi-
ble, and making them feel as if they are getting their problem
solved.
As far as the other things brought to the Public Welfare
Section's attention are concerned, explanations are made and
the necessary course of action is pointed out whenever and inso-
far as possible. The Public Welfare Section helps to straighten
things out as much as it can. If it does not know anything
about a certain matter, the proper office or government branch
is consulted. There are also matters which are forwarded to
the Gunseikanbu with a request that they be given attention.
In particular, people's complaints about the behavior and regu-
lations of government employees are handled in this way. In
cases concerning actions of the police and pangreh pradja, the
authorities concerned are either spoken to directly or contacted
by mail. In this way the sufferings of the people receive
attention.
There were many problems which could not be solved because
they were related to the general situation prevailing at the
present time. We tried to raise the morale of people with this
sort of complaint by advising that they steel themselves to face
the difficulties they mentioned.
Quite often we had to admonish people who brought us far-
fetched stories or distorted complaints out of sheer resentment
at the general situation.
If we summarize the complaints of those who have come to
the Public Welfare Section, there are three matters which do not58
appear to be satisfactory but which could really be improved if
there were a desire to do so:
1. Relations between the pangreh pradja and the people.
2. Relations between the police and the people.
3.	The attitude of Japanese officials toward Indonesian
officials in various offices.
We admit that there are some complaints which are fabrica-
tions or which exaggerate the problems involved. But whether
they are true or not, we have come to the conclusion that rela-
tions between the above-mentioned groups must be improved.
There are complaints about the present situation, and that very
fact alone makes it clear that things are serious.
There can be only one result of the unnecessary head slap-
ping, physical ill-treatment and coercion so frequently employed
by lower level pangreh pradja officials:	alienation of the
■people from the government. Behavior of this kind cancels out
all the benefits of the propagandizing done so far. What is
the point of propaganda about cooperation and brotherhood when
the people experience exactly the opposite every day?
We always attempt to convince the people that to bear up
under all the difficulties of living is a sacrifice necessary
to achieve our high ideals. But we must ensure that they bear
these burdens willingly and wholeheartedly, which is only possi-
ble if their feelings are not upset by the wrong kinds of atti-
tudes [on the part of their leaders]. Furthermore we must never
forget that such things can be used by Allied propagandists to
alienate the people from the government.
If the government does not attend to these matters, none
of the Putera propaganda will have the slightest beneficial
effect. In fact, probably quite the opposite would be true.
Ill. Conclusion
In concluding our overview of Putera*s work in the past
three months, it must be said that its situation has been en-
tirely unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory for the leadership
and the directors, and it is unsatisfactory for the people, who
have pinned their hopes on a movement that is being directed by
the leaders in whom they once had such confidence.
The leadership and the directors feel that their freedom
of action has been extremely limited. If the actual situation
is compared with what was written about it in the Special59
Regulations,44 which were to act as a basis for Putera's work,
it becomes clear that there is a gap between theory and prac-
tice. Yet the Special Regulations were determined by the
Gunseikanbu itself.
Let us take just two examples to illustrate the point:
Article 9 of the Special Regulations says that the tasks
of the Education Section are:	a) to eliminate illiteracy; b) to
help the people educate themselves.
Every step taken to initiate this program has been blocked
by the Minshfl Shidbbu. Naturally the Education Section asks:
"What more can we do?" There certainly is plenty of work to be
done, for example, thinking through various educational prob-
lems, making plans for a number of programs which need to be
carried out, studying the different activities and wishes of
the people regarding education for the future. But only too
often nothing concrete can be achieved. Cynics frequently char-
acterize the Education Section as being a capon. This sort of
caricature, which is passed from mouth to mouth among the common
people and even discussed in the market, is not pleasant for
the director of the Education Section. In the days of the
Netherlands East Indies Government, activists strongly pressed
for popular education and the eradication of illiteracy. But
at the present time, when we might be offered much greater
opportunities, all we can do is sit with our hands in our laps.
Article 16 of the Special Regulations says that the Physi-
cal Education Section's jobs are:	a) to lead and supervise all
physical education, so that the people's bodies may be streng-
thened and their spirit hardened; b) to encourage sports for
training the bodies and spirit of village people.
But the attempts to fulfill the intention of this article
too have been frustrated. After this Section has succeeded
in founding Gelora as an autonomous body enthusiastically sup-
ported by people of all classes, government action nipped these
efforts in the bud. Gelora was forcibly disbanded. Just as
the second portion of this report was completed, it was announced
in the newspapers that the government was setting up a Jawa Tai
Iku Kai, or All Java Sports League. This movement has absolutely
44. These Regulations, along with Putera's Constitution, may
be found in translation in Harry J. Benda, et^ al. , Japanese
Administration in Indonesia:	Selected Documents (New Haven:
Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965) , pp. 136-
143. The paragraph numbers and some of the contents as
mentioned by Hatta do not match those given in the above
source.60
no connection with Putera and stands quite outside it. Yet its
purposes are identical with Gelora's. The most striking differ-
ence is that in all daerah the leadership has been turned over
to the pangreh pradja. It is not surprising that many activists
feel this to be an expression of lack of confidence. An unso-
licited contribution to the government, given openly and sin-
cerely by the people, has been transformed into a compulsory
contribution. But the course of history shows that enthusiasm
which is given freely by the people to the government is more
valuable than that which is extracted from them by the authori-
ties .
Given this situation, it is not surprising that the assist-
ant director of the Physical Education Section has raised the
question with the Putera leadership whether it would not be
better if his section were done away with altogether, since
there is no longer anything left for it to do. He said he was
ashamed to accept a salary without having anything definite to
accomplish. In this regard, we might ask here whether it would
not be better to do away with paragraph 16 of the Special Regu-
lations?
There are other sections too in Putera which cannot do
their jobs as prescribed by the Special Regulations. For exam-
ple, the Economic Affairs Section was not even permitted to pub-
lish an appeal in the newspaper calling for the registration of
Indonesian-owned businesses, a project designed to increase our
understanding of their origins and present conditions and to
permit consideration of their future reorganization.
In the villages of Priangan Shu, the Putera branch has not
been permitted to propagandize on behalf of agriculture and
handicrafts because, according to the authorities, this is the
job of the pangreh pradja. Only in Malang ShG has Putera been
given a broad leadership role in the people's economic affairs.
For the people, Putera's present situation is unsatisfac-
tory, since it was previously widely believed that Putera would
give leadership to various popular efforts. On Putera were
pinned the hopes for easing the complaints and lightening the
burdens of the people. But all these hopes have proved to be
in vain, since Putera has not been allowed to exercise any
initiative. That is why the people are bewildered. Their en-
thusiasm for Putera continues to decline as time goes on.
Whoever wishes to do so may go into the kampung [neighbor-
hoods, village communities] and marketplaces to hear for himself
people's opinions of Putera. Of course, people do not every-
where want to speak frankly, since they are afraid, but an in-
telligent person can catch the nature of their hidden feelings
from remarks that are dropped.61
Except for small groups who help Putera here and there,
people's feelings about the organization are generally cool.
What the masses are saying in the kampung and other places--
which is quite often relayed to us--is frequently not very nice.
There are some who say, "Our leaders are now living the good
life but we are just as poor as ever."
All of these are expressions of discontent. The people
hoped for leadership from those who promote Putera but they
were not able to give it. Aside from propaganda, the people
see no concrete results of their activities.
Within Putera itself the question often arises of what
more there is for Putera to do. The youth have been taken over
by the Seinendan. Women have been organized into the Fujinkai.4*5
Sports is regulated by the Jawa Tai Iku Kai. For culture there
already is the Cultural Center, or Keimin Bunka Shidosho. Effec-
tive leadership in the fields of education and economics is not
permitted. For propaganda there already is the Sendenbu. What
is the use of Putera?
If it is only a matter of propaganda, the Sendenbu should
be enough; for this there was no need to set up Putera. Our
teachers are prepared to designate activists who are good public
speakers to carry on Sendenbu propaganda work. Thus if the
idea is only to make propaganda, Putera is superfluous. A para-
lyzed body such as Putera is now can only give rise to suspicion
in various quarters. The pangreh pradja dislike it, while the
people feel disillusioned with it. The result is not enthusi-
asm, as it was at the start, but rather dissatisfaction.
Such is the atmosphere surrounding Putera after its first
three months of life. The people's first warm reception of it
has turned cold. People from many quarters are even saying,
"If this is the way it is going to be, we were better off with
the Triple A Movement." And indeed, the Triple A had more
freedom of movement.
It would be good if the government considered all of this
carefully. If things continue in this manner, Putera will be-
come the object of popular resentment rather than enthusiasm.
The primary aims of our effort and propaganda are to forge
a strong popular spirit to help Japan to achieve final victory
in the Greater East Asian War, and to reach people's hearts so
they will voluntarily accept hardship for the duration of the
conflict.
45. The Women's Association, founded in August 1943, and later
placed under the Jawa HOkokai.62
With Putera as it is now, we fear that these goals will
not be reached.
There is one additional question. What is the Advisory
Council’s job if Putera is nothing but a propaganda organiza-
tion? According to Putera's Constitution, the Advisory Council
should meet at least once every three months in Djakarta.
A meeting of the Advisory Council is long overdue but the
Putera leadership has been reluctant to convene it because there
is nothing for them to advise on. If it is simply a matter of
abstract debate, the Advisory Council will be of little use to
Putera's work. The majority of the members of the Advisory
Council are people with experience in both political activity
and their professions. Putera needs their judgment in practical
matters, not theoretical ones. Simply to invite them to Dja-
karta for a meeting would be useless, and a waste of money
besides.
Therefore in the light of Putera's present situation, the
position of the Advisory Council is up in the air. This prob-
lem should certainly receive the attention of the Gunseikanbu.
Djakarta, August 16, 1943
For the Putera leadership,
The General Director,
(signed) Moh. HattaREPORT TO THE GUNSEIKANBU ON
ONE YEAR OF PUTERA -
March 9, 1943 to February 29, 1944
I. General Introduction
As is well known, Putera began to take shape after Decem-
ber 8, 1942, when a preparatory committee under the direction
of the Empat Serangkai was established. On March 9, 1943,
Putera was officially inaugurated by His Excellency the Gunsei-
kan, Lt.-Gen. Okazaki, at an Ikada Square rally that was attended
by tens of thousands of people. But it was only on April 16,
1943, that Headquarters was ready. Its opening has already
been discussed in the report on Putera*s activities during its
first three months, dated August 16, 1943.
That report also explained the various difficulties Putera
faced, and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat them here. It
should only be said that the pangreh pradja's obstruction of
Putera did not change very much afterwards. Malang Shu alone
may be termed an exception, since the Shuchokan there helped
Putera with complete sympathy. The result was that cooperation
there between Putera and the pangreh pradja progressed very
well. It should also be mentioned that there were several
bupati who truly understood Putera*s position, and repeatedly
requested that Putera branches be set up in their daerah too.
But there were not many of these. The majority were jealous of
Putera.
The pangreh pradja's attitude was made abundantly clear
when the news broke that the government was going to set up a
new organization, and that Putera would be absorbed into it.
The pangreh pradja were very pleased with the Jawa HOkokai,1
since under it, from the kabupaten level on down, they would be
in charge. With the birth of the Hokokai, the pangreh pradja
1. The Jawa Hokokai (Java Service Association; in Indonesian,
Himpunan Kebaktian Rakjat, or People's Service Asso-
ciation) was a large organization, more directly under Japa-
nese control than Putera, and designed to succeed where the
earlier movement had failed. It was undoubtedly carefully
planned beforehand, but was first mentioned publicly in
January 1944. In February, its complete regulations were
published in newspapers, and on March 1, 1944, following
the dissolution of Putera on the day before, the Jawa
Hbkokai was officially begun.
6364
felt that their desire to become the leaders of the popular
movement had been fulfilled.
It would be fine if that were so, as long as the pangreh
pradja both understand their responsibilities in the matter of
leadership and avoid seeing the attainment of this position of
leadership as equivalent to getting special status and honors.
They must view this leadership role as one requiring them to
fulfill their responsibility to society, under the flag of the
Army. In this regard, it would be best for me to quote a por-
tion of my radio speech, given last March 5:
One of the most important things about the Jawa
Hokokai is the position of the pangreh pradja, who are
now being given the job of leading the people. Whereas
before,the pangreh pradja knew only how to give orders,
now they are responsible for giving leadership.
The gulf between the pangreh pradja and the people
exists because the pangreh pradja official was used as
a mere tool by the Netherlands East Indies Government.
He was not permitted to have individual initiative, he
simply had to do what he was ordered. Indeed his only
interest was giving orders to the people without taking
their circumstances into consideration.
This is also the reason for the conflict between
the pangreh pradja, who defended the government, and
the political activists, who defended the interests of
the people. Now this conflict no longer exists, or
should, not exist. Over the past year, Putera repeat-
edly urged cooperation on the pangreh pradja, since
the two groups generally served a single public inter-
est under the leadership of the Japanese Military
Government. At that time, Putera and the pangreh
pradja were still going their separate ways. But now
this is no longer so. The leaders of the people and
the pangreh pradja have been organized into one move-
ment, under the wing of the Jawa Hokokai (Himpunan
Kebaktian Rakjat), which is under the Gunseikan.
Although it was not stated explicitly, it was
planned from the beginning that the branches of the
Hokokai would be placed under the leadership of the
kencho, guncho, soncho and kucho. And beside them as
aides would be the political activists. Under these
new circumstances, the pangreh pradja officials would
have a greater responsibility for the direction of the
movement and for the people's welfare--which are really
the same and inseparable. The people's welfare is
important for strengthening the home front! Therefore65
one of the Hokokai's jobs in wartime is attending to
the people's well-being, and this was clearly laid
down in its original statement of purpose.
I believe that anything, no matter how difficult,
can be achieved by means of leadership. Of course
there are many things that have to be achieved simply
by giving orders. But there is a great difference
between governing simply by issuing orders and govern-
ing by exercising leadership. Rule by decree is often
resented by the people, but rule through leadership
can win the people's hearts. If people are willing
to make sacrifices, then the heaviest burdens seem
light. Isn't it the HSkSkai's prime goal to build
wholehearted commitment to service? That is why the
organization's first tasks are to promote education
and to have its officials exercise leadership in a
real spirit of service.
If what I said in the above can be fulfilled by the pangreh
pradja officials who have gained positions of leadership in the
HokSkai, then the goals of that organization can be achieved.
But of the pangreh pradja cannot change their attitudes and
spirit, and continue instead to consider themselves as being
far above the people, then the HSkokai will miss its mark. This
is especially so since leadership having direct contact with the
people is in the hands of the pangreh pradja. In the present
structure of the H5k5kai, the popular leaders no longer exercise
direct leadership but sit instead at Headquarters or in the shu
branch offices.
Although according to the original plans contained in its
Constitution and Special Regulations Putera was to have done
many things, the government decided, after Putera was under way,
that anti-Allied propaganda was to be emphasized. With this
decision, other efforts were downgraded.
Anti-Allied propagandizing was accomplished through mass
meetings and, with Sendenbu help, penetrated into the villages.
The Sendenbu contributed the films, Putera the speeches. The
shu branches propagandized energetically in their areas, and
their work was very effective.
Since September of last year, the villages were propagan-
dized intensively on the subject of increasing agricultural
production. In this campaign, Putera ran into many obstacles
because of the problems people were having with the rice supply.
This situation was exploited as counter-propaganda by Allied
agents. They influenced the village people not to increase
production, since they said that the surplus would be given to
the Japanese anyway. The Putera propagandists who went into66
the villages were constantly attacked with the same words:
"We're going to sacrifice our lives for our country all right,
but it will be by starving to death." In the Priangan, espe-
cially in Garut, Putera workers propagandizing greater produc-
tion frequently heard insinuations such as:	"You speak well,
sir, and we are willing to give our rice to the government, but
what about the present situation:	our families eat rice once a
week, while the Chinese have it three times a day."
Popular resistance is certainly related to one obvious set
of circumstances, namely, that the Chinese have been hoarding a
great deal of rice. It is generally known that the Chinese
never go hungry anywhere on Java. The trouble with this situa-
tion is its psychological effect on the population. There is a
general conviction that the Chinese are never short of food;
whereas Indonesians living in the villages often eat rice but
once a week, indeed in some cases only once a month.
That the Chinese, especially the merchants, have done a
great deal of rice hoarding can no longer be denied. It is
clear from the condition of the rice that is distributed to the
people in the big cities. Very often people get rice that is
dried out or worm-eaten. From this it is obvious that the rice
was taken from old stores and was not freshly milled. The
Chinese merchants recently got a further opportunity to hoard
rice when they found out in advance through their organizations
that regulations would be issued for compulsory delivery of
rice. These regulations were only put into effect several
months after the harvest. Thus the Chinese merchants were able
to move in quickly immediately after the harvest and buy up
rice from the farmers. When the regulations were put into
effect, the farmers had already sold all their surplus rice, and
were therefore forced to give the government the rice they had
reserved for their own consumption. It was this circumstance
that caused various rice difficulties in the villages. In addi-
tion, though it had not been publicized, the people know that
the shu governments and the Kempeitai had in several places suc-
ceeded in seizing tens of thousands of quintals [100 kilogram
measures] of rice hidden away by Chinese merchants. Indeed
about a month ago the news broke that the Djakarta Shu govern-
ment had seized 125,000 tons of rice near a Chinese mill in
Krawang.
Whether or not such things are true is not the problem.
It is only necessary to say here that news and facts of this
sort lower people's morale and increase their reluctance to act
on government appeals for increased agricultural production.
Regardless of how intense the propaganda is, if what people see
with their own eyes makes them reluctant to cooperate, the
propaganda will have no effect.67
It is this situation which caused so much difficulty for
the Putera leadership over the past few months. It wanted to
fulfill its responsibility of helping the government get the
people to increase production willingly, but the people listened
to them coolly and rejected their appeals. The Putera leadership
hoped that their propagandizing for increased production would
be effective if the distribution of rice in the villages were
regulated to insure that each person would be able to buy his
daily rice on the spot in the established amount. If a law of
this kind were enacted, the people's reluctance would undoubtedly
vanish. Of this, the Putera leadership was convinced until
their organization was brought to an end.
Besides the propaganda work against the Allies and in sup-
port of increased production, Putera succeeded in doing some
positive work after September 1943, namely training people to
spin thread and weave with various kinds of fibers. Through
this project the people's interest in Putera, which had been
growing weaker, was re-strengthened considerably. The people
also began to realize that Putera could give them leadership,
though not in all matters. Especially now, with people short
of clothing (indeed there are many who are almost naked), the
do-it-yourself spinning and weaving movement has had a great
deal of influence on the people. It has revived their faith in
their own ability.
Putera's basic idea in this direction was that clothing
can be made by the people themselves with simple tools and
minimal cash outlay.
As far as achieving a direct connection between the Putera
leadership and the organization's branches is concerned, two
methods were tried:	1) having the Empat Serangkai tour the
branches; 2) having the branch chairmen invited from time to
time to Putera Headquarters in Djakarta for consultation. The
Organization Section itself frequently invited the branch direc-
tors to Djakarta to discuss various matters concerning the
branches, and then visited those branches to take care of any
complications.
The first of the Empat Serangkai trips was described earlier
in the report entitled "The First Three Months of Putera." The
intention behind this trip was to visit all branches that had
already been set up, but upon arrival in Djogjakarta those in-
volved were called back to Djakarta in connection with the
arrival of Prime Minister T5j5. In mid-July 1943, it was planned
that the Empat Serangkai would continue their trip around to
the branches. But on account of various things having to do
with the Minshu Shidbbu, it was necessary to postpone this
second trip too.68
The intention to visit the remaining branches was carried
out on August 10, 1943, but not all the Empat Serangkai were
able to go. On the 10th, Ir. Soekarno and Ki Hadjar Dewantara
set off, accompanied by [a certain] Yamazaki. Kijai H. M.
Mansoer followed later.
It was planned that Ir. Soekarno, as Great Leader, would
speak in all the places visited. Ki Hadjar Dewantara would
speak in Semarang, Djogjakarta and Solo, while K. H. M. Mansoer
would speak in Surabaja and Malang.
Conferences for branch chairmen were held at Putera Head-
quarters three times:
1)	On May 25, 1943, when the chairmen of the seven shu
branches were simultaneously inaugurated in their posts.
2)	On October 13, 1943, when a briefing was given on the
position of the Chub Sangi In.2
3)	On February 24, 1944, when the formation of the Jawa
Hokokai, and the absorption of Putera within it, was discussed.
The result of the final deliberations at this last confer-
ence of branch chairmen was that each branch chairman would put
forward the names of Putera leaders and staff members who wished
to join the leadership of the Hokokai to the Shuchokan who was
arranging the establishment of the Hokbkai in his respective
area. In the event that the ShQchOkan could not find all appli-
cants acceptable, it was hoped that the branch chairman and the
directors would peaceably discuss who should be proposed.
Considering how things have gone so far, however, the deci-
sion taken at the February 24th meeting was useless, since the
shQ branches of the HokOkai were formed without taking any ac-
count of the positions and circumstances of the directors and
employees of the Putera branches.
Putera's Advisory Council was one group that accomplished
nothing whatsoever. According to Article 8 of Putera's Consti-
2. The Chu5 Sangi In (Central Advisory Council) and its regional
counterparts, the Shu Sangi Kai (Regional Advisory Councils),
were announced and set up between August and October 1943.
Their members were to advise the Military Government, but
they were carefully controlled and the Central Council itself
was in many ways more unsatisfactory to independence-minded
Indonesians than the Dutch-instituted Volksraad had been.69
tution, this Advisory Council was to meet at least once every
three months in Djakarta. But it only met once altogether,
namely on May 26, 1943, the date of its inauguration, as was
stated in the report entitled "The First Three Months of Putera."
Since Putera*s efforts were simply aimed at propaganda, there
was nothing of substance for the Advisory Council to discuss.
The forecast made in the report mentioned above--that the Ad-
visory Council would have nothing to do--proved to be true in
actual practice.
II. Section Reports
1. Correspondence Section
As was explained earlier in the three month report, this
section was the center of Putera's relations with the outside.
Incoming and outgoing mail passed through it, as did a large
portion of Putera*s visitors, except for those having direct
connections with the Public Welfare Section.
Visitors received by the Correspondence Section and sent
on to the leadership or to the proper section totaled 4,305
during Putera's year of existence. Letters passing through the
section totaled as follows:	a) incoming 5,888; b) outgoing
4,986. These figures are stated here to make clear the magni-
tude of the job undertaken by the Correspondence Section. Not
only were these letters registered, but short notes on their
contents were taken before they were sent to their destinations.
This helped the leadership keep track of the activities being
undertaken by Putera*s sections.
The Correspondence Section was made up of three organiza-
tional components, namely:
1)	Director, who guided the section's work.
2)	Administration, which handled incoming and outgoing
mail, archives and inventory.
3)	Documentation, which was set up on January 1, 1944, at
a time when there was a reorganization of the leadership to
rationalize Headquarters activities. This sub-section was taken
over by Mrs. Soekanti Soerjotjondro, assisted by Miss Mariati,
both of whom were transferred from the Women's Section. Unfor-
tunately, however, this sub-section was not able to get off the
ground before Putera was absorbed into H5k5kai. The intention
behind putting this sub-section under control of the Correspond-
ence Section was to centralize Putera's documentation activi-
ties .70
2. Finance Section
The amounts received by the Finance Section
year of operation were:
a)	Received from the Gunseikanbu
i)	Deposited in the Bank of Taiwan
ii) Interest on the above
b)	Public contributions
Expenditures were:
A. Headquarters expenditures
1)	For setting up Headquarters
a)	Direct expenditures
b)	Kanrikodan3 expenses
billed to Headquarters
2)	Wages of directors and staff
3)	Lebaran [end of fasting period]
bonus to the above
4)	Office expenses:	materials and
repairs
5)	Expenses of tours and
inspections
6)	Job-training program
B. Branch expenditures
1)	Expenses for preparations
(all branches reimbursed)	f. 10,315.00
2)	Expenses of each branch
a)	Djakarta
b)	Priangan
c)	Djogjakarta
d)	Solo
e)	Semarang
f)	Surabaja
g)	Malang
h)	Pekalongan
i)	Kedu
j)	Kediri
k)	Djakarta City
l)	Banten
m)	Tjirebon
n)	Madiun
total
f. 860.19
2,339.23
total
during Putera's
f. 250,000.00
26.89
6,045.03
f. 256,071.92
f. 3,199.42
56,586.70
3,058.50
27,610.61
3,806.49
18,924.60
f. 113,186.32
f. 19,250.50
15.276.50
10.704.50
11.690.50
14.010.50
14,822.20
18,730.00
2.500.00
2.500.00
2.800.00
225.00
300.00
750.00
1,000.00
f.114,559.70
f. 227.746.02
3. This office remains unidentified. The
"Control Bureau," but the reference is
name given here means
obscure. There were71
A more complete report on financial matters made by the Finance
Section is appended. [Appendix missing, ed.]
Because of the volume of Putera's financial activities, an
additional employee, Mrs. R. A. Kartimi, moved from the Pegang-
saan Timur Office [of the Kikakuka* * * 4] to Putera.
3. Organization Section
The special concern of the Organization Section was super-
vising the preparations for the branches by looking for people
considered suitable for and capable of holding positions as
directors and staff members. Besides that, it exercised some
supervision over branches that were already set up by making
inspection tours. Altogether there were twenty-two such trips
made by various of the Organization Section directors. On these
inspection trips the general atmosphere prevailing in the dif-
ferent daerah was also examined and reported on to the Empat
Serangkai.
The Organization Section's external relations were carried
on as usual in two ways.
One was receiving visitors and handing out information to
them. The number of visitors to the Organization Section from
April 16, 1943 to the end of that year was 534, including some
from the branches. They came for the following reasons:
a)	To discuss the preparations for setting up a branch.
b)	To confer on matters concerning the structure of a
branch and its job.
a number of offices and departments in the Japanese adminis-
tration having kanrikodan or the related kanrikyoku in their
titles.
4. The Kikakuka (Planning Section), under the direction of the
Somubu (Department of General Affairs), was an important
policy-designing section of the Military Government. Housed
along with it, but not an integral part of it, was Hatta's
own office, designated the Kantor Penasehat Umum (Office of
the General Advisor). Hatta was invited by General Harada
Yoshikazu, the Deputy Chief of Staff, to act as an independ-
ent advisor to the government. He had his own staff, and
his office received the additional appellation of Gunseikanbu
Daiichi Bunshitsu (First Annex to Military Administration
Headquarters).72
Visitors from outside the Putera organization, who came
from all over Java and Madura, did so for a variety of reasons,
such as:
a)	To offer their services to Putera.
b)	To suggest people who would be suitable as Putera
directors.
c)	To urge that a Putera branch be set up their own area.
d)	To ask for information about the Putera movement.
e)	To ask Putera's help in suggesting various things to
the government which might lighten the people's burdens and ex-
pedite governmental operations.
It is obvious from the purposes stated by visitors from
outside that Putera Headquarters became a place on which people
depended and to which people came to ask for help.
The second connection with the outside was the usual one--
through correspondence. The number of letters was:	a) incoming
2,603; b) outgoing 2,133.
So much for the scope of the operations carried on by the
Organization Section, besides receiving visitors and carrying
out ordinary organization work.
The inauguration of the Putera branches took place as
follows:
1. Djakarta ShQ: June 4, 1943. Chairman: Ijos Wiriaatmadja.
2. Priangan Shu: July 1, 1943. Chairman: Dr. Moerdjani.
3.	Djogjakarta Shu: July 5, 1943. Chairman: Pangeran
Soerjodiningrat.
4.	Semarang Shu: July 8, 1943. Chairman: Mr. Soejoedi.
5.	Surabaja ShQ: July 20, 1943. Chairman: Soedirman.
6.	Solo ShQ: July 26, 1943. Chairman: Dr. Kartono.
7.	Malang ShQ: August 18, 1943. Chairman: R. P. Soeroso.
By "date of inauguration" is not meant the day on which the
new branches began actual operation. The seven branches started
working earlier, after their chairmen were officially installed
in Djakarta on May 25, 1943. The inaugurations referred to
above served only as official functions for the benefit of the
public.
The full organizational scheme of the branches is attached
to this report as Appendix II. [Appendix missing, ed.]73
With these seven branches, Putera began working and propa-
gandizing all over Java. But it became obvious that the seven
branches alone did not have the staff necessary to carry out
such a huge task. This was especially true in the case of the
Malang branch, which had been active from the beginning and had
taken on such heavy responsibilities in a number of areas, that
it was forced to set up sub-branches from the ken to the gun
level, earlier than the other shu branches.
In December 1943, three more branches were inaugurated:
8.	Pekalongan Shu: December 8, 1943. Chairman: Kromolawi.
9.	Kediri Shu: December 11, 1943. Chairman: Sidik Djojo-
soekarto.
10.	Kedu Shu: December 28, 1943. Chairman: Soeprodjo
Prodjowidagdo, member of the Chuo Sangi In.
There were four additional branches in preparation, whose
chairmen had already been approved by the respective Shuchokan:
1.	Madiun Shu. Chairman: Soeradji.
2.	Tjirebon Shu. Chairman: Dr. Soedarsono.
3.	Bodjonegoro Shu. Chairman: Fathurrachman, member of
the Chuo Sangi In.
4.	Banten Shu. Chairman: Harsono Tjokroaminoto.
Also in preparation, with their proposed chairmen were:
5.	Djakarta City. Proposed chairman: Mr. Wilopo.
6.	Bogor Shu. Proposed chairman: Mohammed Sanoesi.
7.	Banjumas Shu. Proposed chairman: Njonoprawoto, from
Headquarters, Organization Section.
8.	Madura. Proposed chairman: Roeslan Wongsokoesoemo,
member of the Chuo Sangi In.
In preparation, but still without proposed chairmen were:
1.	Pati Shu.
2.	Besuki Shu.
According to the plans, the Putera leadership was to have
had branches ready in every shu in Java and Madura, if possible
by March 9, 1944. But lo and behold, on January 8, 1944, came
the Saiko Sikikan's5 decree ordering the Gunseikan to develop a
new organization by combining all existing bodies and movements
into one! According to His Excellency's order, Putera was to
be absorbed into this new organization. So all Putera's prepara-
tions came to a halt.
5. Commander of the Osamu Group (16th Army, Java).74
As was said earlier, the Malang Shu branch had sub-branches
down to the ken and gun level. Those at the ken level were:
1.	Pasuruan Ken, inaugurated November 15, 1943.
2.	Probolinggo Ken, inaugurated November 16, 1943.
3.	Lumadjang Ken, inaugurated November 17, 1943.
Sub-branches at the gun level were:
1.	Turen Gun.
2.	Pogok Gun.
3.	Tumpang Gun.
4.	Singosari Gun.
5.	Pudjon Gun.
6.	Bululawang Gun.
7.	Kepandjen Gun.
Besides the Malang Shu branch, only the Djakarta Shu branch
had sub-branches reaching down to the ken level. And this would
not have occurred without the urging of Kawazue, who used be the
Naiseibucho in the shtichokan’s office. These three sub-branches
at the ken level were:
1.	Tangerang Ken, inaugurated November 22, 1943.
2.	Djatinegara Ken, inaugurated November 24, 1943.
3.	Krawang Ken, inaugurated November 25, 1943.
To get a better idea of Putera's entire organization, it
seems best to list below the numbers of directors, aides and
office staff involved:
Office
Branch	Directors	Aides	Staff	Total
Headquarters (including directors	35	26	56	117
and office staff involved in preparations for the Djakarta City branch) Shu				
Djakarta (including the Chairman	10	15	10	35
of the Banten Shu branch, who was originally vice-chairman of the Djakarta Shu branch)				
Priangan	8	13	7	28
Dj ogj akarta	9	13	6	28
Semarang	10	15	13	38
Surabaj a	9	12	10	31
Solo	6	14	12	32
Malang	10	8	9	27
Pekalongan	4	8	7	19
Kediri	7	7	6	20
Kedu	6	8	7	2175
Office
Branch	Directors	Aides	Staff	Total
Ken				
Dj atinegara	5	1	4	10
Krawang	5	1	4	10
Tangerang	5	2	3	10
Pasuruan	5	1	4	10
Probolinggo	5	1	2	8
Lumadjang Gun	5	1	3	9
Turen	5	_	-	5
Pogok	5	-	-	5
Tumpang	5	-	-	5
Singosari	5	-	-	5
Kepandj en	4	-	-	4
Pudj on	5	-	-	5
Bululawang In preparation, already approved by the respective shuchokan:	5			5
Banten	1	-	-	1
Tj irebon	6	1	-	7
Madiun	5	5	-	10
Bodj onegoro	1	-	-	1
Totals	191	152	163	506
It should be said here that at Headquarters the difference
between aides and office staff was very small. Among those
listed as office staff are many who worked as aides to the
directors, while many of those listed as aides were only tempo-
rarily in that position so as to get training for later place-
ment as branch directors.
At one time there was a plan to train all office staff
without regard to their positions, so that in time they might
gain sufficient knowledge and the right spirit to someday fill
the position of director. The principle behind this plan, which
I myself suggested, was that the special responsibility of
leadership is to prepare for change in its ranks so that work
can continue without interruption when the original leaders are
no longer there. The intention was to carry out this basic
idea in an organized manner starting in 1944, but since Putera
was now disbanded it was not done. Hopefully the Hokokai will
accept the principle and put it into practice.
Under such a principle, every employee, even messenger
boys, would work hard since he would have before him the hope
of promotion. And all the while their sense of responsibility
would become deeper and deeper. The knowledge that they do not76
have to be messenger boys forever, or secretaries or typists,
will give people the will and energy to discipline and streng-
then themselves. The feeling that a person's fate is in his
own hands, that he himself, through his own diligence, can do
something to improve his situation, always strengthens the
desire to work. Only those with no desire at all for improve-
ment would be left behind.
The meetings that were held at Putera Headquarters, or,
when necessary, in rented locations, were as follows:
1)	On March 14, 1943, a meeting during which the Putera
Worker's Corps [Barisan Pekerdja Putera] was formed was held at
the Greater Asian Auditorium [Balai Pertemuan Asia Raja], Gambir
Barat, 7. This Putera Worker's Corps was a volunteer corps to
aid Putera in various matters, e.g., helping to prepare for
public rallies, providing supervision and maintaining order at
such rallies, and drafting propaganda materials.
2)	On April 16, 1943, there was a meeting at which Putera
Headquarters was opened. About three hundred people were in-
vited. The speakers and their functions were:
a.	Ir. Soekarno opened the meeting.
b. His Excellency the Gunseikan gave advice.
c. His Excellency the Somubuchb gave advice.
d.	His Excellency the Naiseibucho gave advice.
e.	B. D. Abdullah gave his congratulations.
f.	Moh. Hatta concluded.
3)	On May 13, 1943, a meeting about the pasar malam project
was held at Putera Headquarters and led by the General Director.
This meeting was held with several staff members from the
Central Economic Office [a branch of the Gunseikanbu] and the
Economic Division of the Djakarta Shu Office [a government de-
partment, not a Putera branch]. Their purpose was to help
Putera's activities at the Pasar Malam.
4)	On May 15, 1943, another meeting on the pasar malam pro-
ject was held, in continuation of the first, this time led by
Soewirjo, head of the Economic Affairs Section at Putera Head-
quarters .
5)	On May 23, 1943, a meeting was held to install the
chairmen of the seven shu branches of Putera. It was [also]
attended by officials from the Minshu Shidobu.
6)	On the morning of May 26, 1943, the Advisory Council [of
Putera] was inaugurated, with the Somubucho representing the
Gunseikan, and in the evening there was a meeting of this group.
It also was attended by officials from the Minshu Shidobu.77
7)	On June 1, 1943, there was a meeting at which the Empat
Serangkai got together with the students of the Ika Dai Gakko
[Medical College] in connection with its opening. The event was
held at Putera Headquarters and led by Soepeno. At the meeting
the Empat Serangkai gave the students advice on their responsi-
bilities in carrying on the present Greater East Asia War.
8)	On June 5, 1943, there was a gathering of leaders and
staff in the Advisory Council Room to commemorate the death of
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. Ir. Soekarno spoke. Everyone ob-
served a moment of silence.
9)	On September 18, 1943, Putera workers were gathered at
the back of Headquarters, where the General Director gave a
speech explaining the duties that all workers had to themselves
and to society. Ir. Soekarno also gave some advice and sugges-
tions and urged all employees at Putera Headquarters to work
more energetically and with a greater sense of responsibility.
10)	On October 4, 1943, there was an Idul Fitri Day Cele-
bration [a feast day at the end of the fasting month] for the
Headquarters community and the shu branches. It was held at
Headquarters. The Empat Serangkai spoke and gave some advice
on people's individual duties in carrying out the Greater East
Asia ideal, based on mutual prosperity.
11)	On October 7, 1943, observance of Lebaran was held by
the Women's Section by entertaining and giving encouragement to
mothers who did volunteer teaching and sock-making for Putera.
12)	On October 13, 1943, there was a meeting of the Putera
leadership with representatives from the seven shu branches.
Also attending were officials from the Minshu Shiddbu, namely
Miyoshi, Shimizu, Yamasaki and Mizuno.
13)	On December 5, 1943, there was a meeting of the Putera
Worker's Corps at 8:30 in the evening to discuss holding a mass
rally at Ikada Square on December 8.
14)	On December 20, 1943, there was a Women's Section con-
ference, attended by delegates from the Women's Sections of the
following shu branches:	Djakarta, Priangan, Semarang, Djogja-
karta, Solo, Surabaja, Malang, Kediri and Kedu. This meeting
was also attended by Mizuno,6 a representative from the Jtimin
j imukyoku.7
6.	It is unknown whether this is the same Mizuno as mentioned
earlier in connection with the Minshu Shidobu.
7.	A "Bureau of Native Affairs." The old Dutch office of this
function, known as the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken, was78
15) On December 31, 1943, there was a meeting of the Putera
Worker’s Corps at Headquarters to discuss how it could help the
victims of the Tanah Tinggi fire. It was decided that this
should be discussed with city officials to insure coordination
of their efforts.
4. Economic Affairs Section
The Economic Affairs Section underwent several changes in
its directorship and staff of aides during its year of opera-
tion. As was mentioned earlier in the three month report,
Soeriaatmadja, who was originally to have taken the position of
Chief of the Economic Affairs Section, was unable to do so.
Therefore the job of heading the Economic Affairs Section was
turned over to Soewirjo.
Originally the working sub-sections of the Economic Affairs
Section were as follows:
1.	Chief, and also in charge of Cooperatives: Soewirjo.
2.	Handicrafts: Moh. Sanoesi.
3.	Agriculture and Livestock: Moh. Sajoeti.
4.	Trade and Propaganda: Ma'mun al Rasjid.
As mentioned in the three month report, the Economic Affairs
Section made plans from the beginning to do certain things it
thought suitable, and later carried out whichever of those it
was permitted to. Its field of activity ranged widely, espe-
cially in propagandizing and in giving training for and collect-
ing samples of handicrafts in order to get an idea of the present
level of achievement and find out how progress might be made in
an orderly way.
Therefore in May 1943, the directors were given three young
aides who had been trained at the Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia
["New Generation" Dormitory]--Soetarjo, Ibnoe and Hoesin.
Hoesin was afterwards moved at his own request to the Public
Welfare Section, since they were short-handed there and could
not manage all the people coming to ask for aid. As a replace-
ment, at the beginning of June, another young Asrama student,
Salam Siswapi, was placed in the Economic Affairs Section and
given control over documentation.
called in Japanese, Genjumin jimukyoku, and the version
given here was considered more polite and wary of Indonesian
sensitivities. Genjumin means something like "native" while
jumin is closer to "indigene."79
After receiving several months' training, in October Salam
Siswapi was moved to the Semarang Shu branch of Putera, since
they were short-handed there. In the same month the Putera
leadership was able to get Soemarno out of the Surakarta Handi-
crafts Center [Pusat Perdagangan Hasil Keradjinan Surakarta]
and into Putera Headquarters as the director of the Handicraft
Training Sub-section. With his arrival the training work, which
had at first been faltering, was carried through quickly and
efficiently--so much so that it attracted many people's atten-
tion. From all daerah and several neighborhoods around Djakarta,
people came to be trained in various kinds of jobs, especially
the spinning of thread from cotton and kapok.
People were also taught how to weave with various kinds of
fibers, even those from a type of banana, and how to use the
simplest sort of tools, such as could be made by any village
workman. To meet the need for these tools, carpentry training
for building spinning and weaving equipment was instituted at
Headquarters. A kind of cooperative was [to have been] started
for carpenters who finished this training course. They were
[to be] grouped together in a cooperative so they could work
and sell together and regulate and divide the work among them-
selves. Without a cooperative of this sort, their skills can
be exploited by the large-scale Chinese craftsmen and they can
end up working for the Chinese rather than working individually
at filling the needs of the villages. Soon the Chinese are
able to have a monopoly on making spinning and weaving equip-
ment for the villages. It is most unfortunate that the goal of
establishing this cooperative was not reached because there was
a lack of time and awareness on the part of the people involved.
The training period was too short.
Besides spinning thread from kapok and weaving with differ-
ent fibers, attempts were made at fashioning cigarette paper
out of aren-palm leaves, manufacturing lathes, and so forth.
Experiments in making blackboard chalk and strong thread were
carried out.
When the Pegangsaan Timur Office [of the Kikakuka] closed
[in September 1943], Soepranoto was moved to Putera Headquarters
to be an aide in the Economic Affairs Section and to direct the
administration of the sub-section. Soetarjo, who had been
responsible for that job until that time, went to help Soemarno
with Handicraft Training.
At the end of December 1943 and the beginning of January
1944, there were additional changes among the directors. Ma'mun
al Rasjid resigned his position and was temporarily replaced by
Tobing, who was actually supposed to be an aide in the future
Djakarta municipal branch. As part of an effort to rationalize
the work of Headquarters, sock-making was transferred from the80
Women's Section to the Economic Affairs Section. Therefore Mrs.
Soekemi, who had headed the activity, and her aide Miss Soeratmi
moved to the Economic Affairs Section too. With this change,
all activities having to do with sock manufacture were central-
ized in the Economic Affairs Section. Along the same lines,
Soepangat, an aide in the Health Section and involved in soap-
making, was moved to the position of permanent aide with the
Handicraft Training Sub-section.
After January 1944, the organization of directors was as
follows:
1.	Head: Soewirjo.
2.	Handicrafts: Moh. Sanoesi.
3.	Handicrafts Training: a. Soemarno (Head)
b.	Soetarjo (Aide)
c.	Soepangat (Aide)
4.	Trade and Show Room:	a. Ibnoe (Aide)
b. Tobing (Aide)
5.	Agriculture, Fishing and Livestock: Moh. Sajoeti.
6.	Sock-making: a. Mrs. Soekemi
b. Miss Soeratmi
7.	Administration: Soepranoto
So much for the changes in the leadership of
Affairs Section during its year of existence.
the Economic
A word or two above was devoted to Handicraft Training,
which we considered to be the most important part of Putera's
work, aside from propagandizing for increased agricultural pro-
duction, simple and thrifty living, and so forth. From the
outset, the Economic Affairs Section hoped not only to help the
government but to improve the Indonesian people's economy , which
is as run down as it is because of Dutch colonialism. In order
to develop an awareness of how difficult it is to re-build the
people's economy, we always kept before us an image of the
Westerners' destruction of Indonesian society and way of life
on Java. We took as our starting point the clear and accurate
picture provided by Professor Boeke. In his words:
Liberal principles, which emphasized the individual
as the basis of economic enterprise, and the onslaught
of capitalism, which to a far greater degree than in
Europe destroyed the communal basis of society, dragged
the weakest sectors of society into the misery of the
social struggle. We all know that mature capitalism
came to Indonesia as a robber and subjugated it in only
a few decades. Far more cruelly than in Europe, the
colonies have been scarred by a policy oriented to the
needs of those who already possessed an advanced tech-
nology, a high level of education, and a constant81
readiness for struggle. The economic policy which
opened Indonesia's doors to the hard-hearted capitalist,
the communications policy which brought close every-
thing that had been far away and broke down the walls
of isolation, the principle of free trade which opened
the door to foreign competitors, the open market which
sharpened the isolation of domestic trade, the laws on
paying taxes which as time went on were figured more
and more in cash terms and which were increasingly im-
posed on the individual, the laws and justice of the
West, the educational policy--all these destroyed the
order of native society and its members so that the
masses, who were in a weak position, were unable to
protect themselves. The existing social unity was
smashed and was not replaced by anything new, it was
destroyed without having anything put up in its stead;
poverty was created, but no new energies were aroused.
And the consequence was the brutalization of the human
spirit.8
This picture makes us conscious of what a difficult task it
is to develop the economy of the people of Java. We consider
the Japanese arrival on Java to be an opportunity for gradually
rebuilding the people's economy. And the method for organizing
a healthy people's economy to be put into operation gradually
consists of:
1)	Giving information to Indonesians about the economic
difficulties they face daily.
2)	Organizing Indonesian economic and trade associations
so that the people will not continue to be victims of the
capitalists as they have been for hundreds of years.
3)	Encouraging increased production so as to aid the mili-
tary and fulfill the needs of the people as far as clothing and
purchasing power are concerned.
People's interest in Putera's Economic Affairs Section was
very great ever since it was first set up. After Headquarters
was opened on April 16, 1943, the Economic Affairs Section was
flooded with visitors from Java and even the Outer Islands ask-
ing for information, advice and guidance on cooperatives, trade,
agriculture, fishing, industry and retail distribution--in
8. Hatta, in his Kumpulan Karangan (Djakarta: Penerbitan dan
Balai Buku Indonesia, 1953-54), Vol. I, p. 262, uses the
identical quote, citing J. H. Boeke, "Auto-activiteit naast
autonomie," p. 53. It was not possible to identify or
locate this source.82
short, asking questions on everything related to general economic
affairs.
The number of visitors who came from April 16, 1943, to
January 16, 1944, was 740.
Those who were unable to come to Putera Headquarters in
person asked for information by mail. The correspondence han-
dled by the Economic Affairs Section through January 16, 1944,
was as follows:	a) incoming letters 536; b) outgoing letters
406.
In order to devise a working plan for the Economic Affairs
Section, it was necessary to gather full information on coopera-
tives, trade, agriculture, and other things. From April to May
1943, this information was sought from government officials as
well as private firms. In May, an appeal was placed in the
newspapers asking that Indonesian organizations active in the
economic field should register their names with Putera Head-
quarters. This appeal attracted considerable interest. In only
a half-month period, 198 cooperatives, cooperative centers,
Indonesian commercial firms, limited liability and limited part-
nership companies and other groups registered. In addition,
out of the thirty-two organizations asked to list their finan-
cial assets, the majority sent in the information.
One way of promoting local industry is to have an exhibi-
tion of handicrafts and hand-manufactured goods. On May 21,
1943, at Putera Headquarters, there was an exhibit of rubber
goods made by the Leuwiliang Rubber Cooperative. From the end
of June to the beginning of July, Putera co-sponsored an exhibit
of goods for handicrafts, fishing, agriculture and animal hus-
bandry held at the Rakutenchi Pasar Malam. These sample goods
came from Indonesian industries all over Java. A certificate
was presented to those manufacturers who sent goods of high
quality. There were forty-three such certificates, among them
a special commendation given to the Kantjil Mas Company, whose
demonstration of cotton thread making attracted an extraordinary
amount of interest.
In order to increase interest in agriculture, a farming
contest with cash prizes was co-sponsored by the Economic Affairs
Section of Putera Headquarters and the Asia Raya and Pembangoenan
newspapers.
Following the pasar malam exhibit, the items on show were
not returned to the owners but kept in a Sample Showroom so we
could watch our progress from time to time. Aside from this
intention, the Sample Showroom was devised so that businessmen
who needed a particular item could get the address of the company
manufacturing it from Putera Headquarters, Economic Affairs
Section.83
In November 1943, the Economic Affairs Section put out a
small book on padi, written by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan Sanif.
This book explained in simple terms the best method of planting
rice and increasing production. The first printing was 3,000
copies, which were sold out in a short time. The second print-
ing- -which, since many people asked for the book, was to be
10,000 copies--has not yet come out. A small book on basketry
was completed and ready for publishing, but printing was post-
poned on account of the paper shortage.
In connection with the difficulty people experienced in
buying rice and because of the chaos in the rice purchasing pro-
gram, in December 1943, all information, regulations, reports
and complaints on the subject were gathered from all over Java
to be presented to the government by Putera's leaders. The
Djakarta City Council suggested a method of selling rice to the
inhabitants without dishonesty, chaos or harm to either the
government or the people.
Besides the work mentioned above, the Economic Affairs
Section of Putera has looked into various industries in several
parts of Java. It has also succeeded in settling some disputes
between several cooperatives.
Now a word about the efforts make by the branches. Since
they didn't have the authority to undertake economic activity
themselves, the Economic Affairs Sections of Putera branches
did the following things:
Gave information to the people about various economic
matters and about the government economic regulations; eased
the relations between government offices; suggested several
things needed by the people to the appropriate government
office, especially in the matters of rice and clothing distribu-
tion; and proposed several new kinds of industries to the people.
Propaganda for greater agricultural production and more saving
was pushed intensively. In addition, the branches imitated the
activities of Headquarters by compiling a list of Indonesian
firms and having Sample Showrooms. Where there was the oppor-
tunity to do so, the branches helped set up several industries.
For example, the Solo branch successfully helped establish a
soap company which in a very short time was producing 5,000 bars
a day. It is true that small industries such as this are not
very significant economically, but their psychological influence
is very great indeed. With a small factory run by Indonesians,
the price of soap very quickly fell from 12% cents a bar to 5%
cents. There was also a paint company, a corn-flour and "Asia
flour"9 mill, a company making paper and cartons--all these
things came about at Putera's suggestion.
9. A Japanese-inspired euphemism for cassava flour.84
The Pekalongan branch followed the example of Headquarters
in developing the spinning and weaving industry.
The most successful branch with respect to stimulating the
people's economy was the one in Malang, since it was given the
opportunity to do so by its Shuchbkan. To increase the farmers'
enthusiasm, Putera helped the government Agricultural Office to
develop community rice barns and peasant organizations. On July
29, 1943, at Putera's suggestion, a Peasants' Cooperative Center
[Pusat Rukun Tani] was set up in Tumpang Gun. The center's pur-
pose was to act as a coordinating body for all the peasant coop-
eratives in the area. The establishing of these peasant coopera-
tives developed rapidly in Malang Shu. But from September 1943,
the Shuchokan prohibited Putera from sponsoring them because the
government itself planned to have a similar organization called
the "Agricultural Cooperative" or Nogyo Kumiai. The Peasants'
Cooperative was disbanded. By now there is an Agricultural
Cooperative in each of the ninety-six son of Malang Shu.
In order to make rice distribution easier, the Malang Shu
branch of Putera succeeded in setting up the Indonesian Mer-
chants' Union [Perserikatan Pedagang-Pedagang Indonesia, or
PPPI]. Through this group Indonesian merchants were able to
unify and cooperate among themselves more easily than before.
The organization was also able to teach Indonesian businessmen
to place the public welfare ahead of their own individual inter-
ests .
Besides the Indonesian Merchants' Union, Putera in Malang
Shu also set up an Indonesian Handicrafts Center [Pusat Keradji-
nan Indonesia, or PKI], which became a center for various kinds
of Indonesian handicrafts. The name of the center was good
enough, but its abbreviation could have caused misunderstanding
among those who were not acquainted with it, since in the past
the initials PKI have been best known as those of the Indonesian
Communist Party [Partai Komunis Indonesia]. It would have been
better if the name had been changed.
The Semarang branch had a plan for 1944 to bring all iron-
smiths together into a regular organization so that their efforts
could be coordinated and available for the government to use if
necessary. Another reason for bringing them together was to
keep the spirit of good workmanship alive and to insure that the
skills would not disappear due to lack of materials.
Aside from these things, it can be said that all branches
suggested the daerah governments do something to improve rice
distribution if they wished to calm the people's restlessness.
Without such tranquility, it would be very difficult to propa-
gandize about increasing agricultural production and so forth.85
5. Education Section
There was no practical task for Putera's Education Section
to undertake, since Putera was not itself permitted to submit
plans or lead the campaign for eradicating illiteracy. So the
affairs of this section were such that they could be handled
by a single person, Joesoef Jahja, who served concurrently as
secretary to [Putera's] Cultural Affairs Department, that is,
as the deputy of Ki Hadjar Dewantara.
The only special job of the Education Section was to receive
various people’s objections to and desires concerning educational
affairs. The majority of complaints were about the lack of ele-
mentary and secondary schools and the fact that private secondary
schools are no longer permitted by the government. Many requests
have been received to permit reopening the private secondary
schools (such as those run by Muhammadijah and Taman Siswa to
correspond to government junior high schools) as long as the
government does not have enough replacements available.
Above all, the Osamu Decree #22, which prohibits privately-
run secondary schools and states that elementary schools may
only be run by a Legal Body, caused great distress among those
who had been directing private schools. People did not under-
stand what a Legal Body was. Ki Hadjar Dewantara himself came
to ask about this at the Office of Education [of the Military
Government], but there too people were uncertain as to what a
Legal Body was. Taman Siswa and Muhammadijah had been energetic
in developing schools. But the question remained, could Taman
Siswa be regarded as a Legal Body? The Office of Education
could not give a definite reply. Ki Hadjar Dewantara was simply
told that the two groups should continue functioning as usual.
But this advice did not settle the question of Legal Body.10
In connection with Osamu Decree #22, there was a meeting
at Putera Headquarters on August 9, 1943, between the Empat
Serangkai and delegates from Muhammadijah and Taman Siswa to
hear the latter's complaints.
According to the information received by Ki Hadjar Dewan-
tara, the government's intention is to decrease the present num-
ber of schools because these schools merely teach intellectual-
ism, which does not result in the improvement of society. This
difficulty has also been experienced in Japan. By way of re-
placement, vocational secondary schools will be increased. It
is in this connection that private individuals are prohibited
from opening secondary schools like the public junior high
10. In fact, in most areas the schools were not permitted to
continue.86
schools, whose curriculum is exclusively intellectual in char-
acter .
The result of the talks with the Taman Siswa and Muhammadi-
jah representatives was an acknowledgment of the truth of the
government’s position on the present-day secondary schools. It
was also stated that the government’s opinion was identical with
that expressed by Mohammad Hatta earlier at a meeting of the
Committee for the Study of Adat and Public Institutions.11 He
too has suggested that what Indonesia needed most was vocational
secondary schools of two types:	1) vocational secondary schools
which could act as a bridge to tertiary levels and institutions;
2) vocational elementary schools whose goal would simply be to
give technical knowledge for practical use in life.
As a result of these talks, it was decided not to object
to the government program in general. There would be an objec-
tion only if the junior high schools were closed down all at
once, since if that happened many students would be left high
and dry. In the Taman Siswa junior high schools alone there
were 2,480 students. Where would they go if Taman Siswa had to
close down? The same was true of the students in the Muhammadi-
jah secondary schools. Therefore the consensus was that Ki
Hadjar Dewantara should suggest to the government that the junior
high schools not be closed down all at once, but gradually, for
example, by not permitting any students in class 1 the first
year, none in class 2 the second year, and so on until, by the
end of the third year, the junior high schools would have been
phased out of existence. It was also hoped that the government
would be willing to place private school teachers in the govern-
ment schools, especially since their service to society has been
great, as was their commitment to promoting popular education,
proven by their willingness to accept low salaries as teachers
in private schools.
If junior high schools were disbanded in a gradual manner
such as this, there would be no stranded students, except those
who were not promoted to the next class. It was hoped that this
system would be accepted by the Office of Education.12
11.	In Indonesian, Panitia Pemeriksa [or Komisi Menjelidiki]
Adat-istiadat dan Tata-negara; in Japanese, Kytikan seido
chosa kai. This committee was established by the Military
Government in November 1942, and its purpose was to investi-
gate local institutions of all kinds with an eye to dis-
covering which ones might be used as a basis for the kind
of regime the Japanese desired. Ten Indonesians and thir-
teen Japanese members served the Gunseikan in a direct ad-
visory capacity.
12.	The plan was not accepted.87
Another problem brought to the attention of Putera's Educa-
tion Section concerned the fate of the students in the teachers'
training school [Hogere Inlandse Kweekschool or HIK] who in the
Dutch period were in the senior class but were not appointed as
teachers because their grades in Dutch language courses were no
higher than five [50%]. In other subjects these students' knowl-
edge was adequate. It is astonishing that the Office of Educa-
tion still uses the old criteria and will not appoint these
students as teachers because their Dutch language is not good
enough. Is Dutch still to be the measure of one's ability? To
our way of thinking, it certainly should not be, since we no
longer live in the Dutch colonial era. But if there are still
officials in the Department who think this way, then it would
be a good idea-if there were admonitions from above. It is true
that many people find it difficult to free themselves of tradi-
tion, but in a time of change such as the present, all traditions
smelling of the Netherlands East Indies must be broken down. We
are convinced that in view of the present shortage of teachers
the former pupils of the HIK who sat in the senior class and had
acceptable knowledge in everything except Dutch language study
should be given the opportunity to become teachers.
The Education Section of Putera also devised several easy
systems of eradicating illiteracy despite the present paper
shortage. In the instructions of July 2, 1943 to all branches,
it was suggested that every device possible be used to carry on
the anti-illiteracy campaign in spite of the lack of paper.
For example, bamboo could be used for writing on, as could
thick leaves. It was also suggested that all Putera people and
their aides volunteer their help in eradicating illiteracy.
Wherever they were needed, they should offer their help to the
pangreh pradja in charge of the anti-illiteracy drive. It was
also pointed out that the eradication of illiteracy was very
important to the achievement of victory in the present Greater
East Asia War. Government instructions must be carried out
quickly, and illiteracy can be a great obstacle to understanding
things suggested by the government.
Besides that, the Education Section urged the Economic
Affairs Section to encourage and teach people how to make paper
so the anti-illiteracy drive could be carried out quickly and
efficiently.
Earlier, the Education Section had spoken with the Minshu
Shidobu about the importance of having a location for a Youth
Job Training Course [Latihan Pekerdja Pemuda], so that youths
who had graduated from school but were unemployed could get job
training and vocational instruction in an orderly, disciplined
fashion. The Minshu Shidobu found ideals of this sort appealing.
In practice, however, it seems that they have not yet been prop-
erly carried out.88
6. Cultural Section
Since its beginning, the Cultural Section faced several
difficulties on account of the limits placed upon its activities.
It could not sponsor training or instruction in cultural affairs,
though a great many people had originally hoped that Putera would
be able to do this kind of thing. Furthermore, after Putera was
planned, a People's Educational and Cultural Guidance Institute
[Keimin Bunka Shidosho] was set up to take care of cultural mat-
ters. A second difficulty was how to harmonize the bases of
culture with the war atmosphere, so that the Cultural Section
could make a contribution to strengthening the martial spirit.
The prerequisites for a war-time culture are as follows:
1)	To inculcate the spirit of struggle and reconstruction,
and give hope for future progress. Art that teaches a sense of
beauty and purity must be able to guide the soul.
2)	Destruction of everything that has hindered the progress
of Indonesian culture, and crushed popular creativity for so
long. In short, the liberation--as soon as possible--of Indone-
sian culture from the bonds of the colonial mentality which was
nurtured for hundreds of years by the Netherlands East Indies
Government.
It is in connection with the above that the Cultural Sec-
tion adopted the following platform:
The goals of the Cultural Section of Putera are to
advance, to nurture, and to expand all things which
form the foundation of a national culture, to collect
and improve all those materials and principles in Asian
culture in general and Indonesian culture in particular
which are in accordance with the pure ideals that
through the course of history have clearly given all
the peoples of Asia,-especially the people of Indonesia,
a holy and glorious character. In this way, the Indo-
nesian people eventually will achieve a cultural syn-
thesis of their own and will contribute to the growth
of an international culture in which each nation will
participate "as in a family."
That is the principle which guided Putera's Cultural Sec-
tion in its work.
The activities of the Cultural Section were few. To refine
artistic sensitivities and increase interest in culture, there
were several art exhibits in the back gallery of Putera Head-
quarters, each one featuring the paintings of different indivi-
dual artists. In the Culture Room itself, several pictures were89
painted that drew on the demands of the times for thematic mate-
rial. The plastic arts, such as sculpture, were energetically
pursued by the Cultural Section, though the personnel and equip-
ment have been far from ideal.
There was also a plan to encourage the writing of sjair13
that exhibited spirit and the ability to lead people to the new
way, but because personnel was lacking it remained only a plan.
There were quite a few visitors to the Cultural Section of
Putera, though unfortunately the number was not recorded. Gen-
erally those who came were art lovers who wanted to discuss
various things and to express their ideas on Indonesian culture
in general and Central Javanese culture in particular.
7. Women's Section
The Women's Section underwent several changes in its direc-
torship since it was set up. Mrs. Soenarjo Mangoenpoespito, who
was appointed chairman of the Women's Section when Putera was
first established, did not take up her post until October 15,
1943. Before that time she was represented by Mrs. Soekemi.
Since there was a government-run Women's Association that
carried on miscellaneous activities related to women's wartime
duties, there was almost nothing left of a practical nature for
Putera's Women's Section to do. The only thing remaining was
to train people to knit and make socks for the Army. In this
project Putera's Women's Section was aided by twenty-four knit-
ting teachers. The practical advantage to be gained from the
knitting and sock-making was that the techniques could be spread
among the women of each daerah. This could not only give hun-
dreds of women a new source of livelihood but also could in-
crease the general knowledge of a skill which used to be prac-
ticed by Indonesian women in every household, but which has
recently been neglected because of oppression, poverty and the
influence of technology.
In connection with Putera's aim of promoting work that is
not only practical but also suitable for women, the knitting
and sock-making was transferred from the Women's Section to the
Economic Affairs Section after January 1, 1944.
Besides taking the lead in sock-making, the Women's Section
had an information branch for ladies (a Consultation Bureau) to
deal with the marriage and divorce problems that often create
13. A traditional verse form, using quatrains of one rhyme.90
difficulties for Indonesian women. Actually, this should have
been part of the Public Welfare Section, but because ladies pre-
fer to tell their troubles and grief in divorce matters to mem-
bers of their own sex, this branch of the Women’s Section was
set up; it was run by Mrs. Soekemi, assisted by Mrs. Soerjo-
t j ondro.
The work of the Women's Section is clear from the corre-
spondence:	a) incoming letters 381; b) outgoing letters 471.
In contrast to all other divisions of Putera, the Women's Sec-
tion sent more letters than it received, since it made more
suggestions that it had questions to answer. Twice the Women's
Section held rallies at Taman Raden Saleh:
1)	On April 21, 1943, a public rally commemorating R. A.
Kartini.
2)	On December 2, 1943, a public rally with the theme "The
Women of Greater East Asia and their relation to the Greater
East Asia War." The rally was [also] attended by women from
Chinese, Indo-European and Arab groups.
At Headquarters the Women's Section held a conference from
December 20 to 22, 1943, which was attended by women representa-
tives from all existing branches. The purpose of the conference
was to lay down guidelines for the work to be done by all women's
sections in Putera. But as fate would have it this meeting,
which was supposed to plan practical work for the future, in
actuality turned out to be a farewell event for Putera women.
Not long afterwards the decision came that Putera would be dis-
solved and absorbed in the Jawa HokSkai.
8. Propaganda Section
The Propaganda Section can be said to have been the most
important part of the Putera movement. Since it had such a
large job to do, very often young people who were in training
were used as additional staff. Propagandizing was often done
with the help of Putera staff-members and other sections.
At first its direction was set up with Sajoeti Atmoprasodjo
and Soepeno working as vice-chairmen of the Office of Press and
Propaganda [of the Military Government] under Mr. Soemanang.
The original intention was that the Propaganda Section at
Headquarters would only be involved in planning, while the ac-
tual propagandizing would be done by the branches. But it turned
out in practice that Headquarters also carried on intensive
propaganda work. Therefore the staff of directors was increased91
by three people, namely Ahmad Soemadi, Asmara Hadi and Mrs.
Trimurti, while the number of aides was also increased by three,
namely, Soemarno, Loekman and Qosim. These junior aides worked
on administrative affairs of all kinds.
On January 1, 1944, Mrs. Trimurti was moved to the Women's
Section. Most unfortunately, Qosim was ill for a long time and
has still not recovered. May God restore the health of this
promising young man.
In connection with the lack of propaganda staff all over
Java, Putera Headquarters intended to have a continuing course
in Propaganda Training, with each session lasting one or two
months. The first session was to have been from the end of
October to the end of December 1943. Most unfortunately, this
first training course was interrupted because Ir. Soekarno and
Mohammad Hatta were sent to Japan after the course had begun.11*
The second course was to have begun this past January [1944] ,
but was discontinued because of Putera's proposed absorption
into the HokSkai.
Propagandizing was often carried out jointly with the
Sendenbu. The points which were emphasized in the propaganda
were:	a) Destroy the Allies; b) Increase agricultural produc-
tion .
It is unnecessary to analyze the Propaganda Section's work
at great length. A chronological account of propagandizing done
since the opening of Headquarters, as given below, will be suf-
ficient .
April 24, 1943--Rally at Taman Raden Saleh with the theme
of "Destroy the Allies."
June 5 to 10, 1943--Malang Shu Putera's Propaganda Section
held rallies in Malang, Lumadjang and Probolinggo at which
pangreh pradja people gave speeches.
June 21, 1943--"Destroy the Allies" propaganda rally in
Tangerang.
14. In November 1943, Soekarno and several other Indonesian
national figures were invited to go to Tokyo. The ostensi-
ble purpose for the trip was to thank the Japanese Govern-
ment for the August 1, 1943 announcement that Indonesians
would be permitted greater participation in their govern-
ment. A more important motive, however, seems to have been
to impress the Indonesian visitors with Japanese industrial
strength and advancement.92
June 24, 1943--Mass rally at Taman Raden Saleh welcoming
Prime Minister Tojo’s statement in the Special Diet Session in
Tokyo about Indonesian participation in governing the country.
July 1, 1943--Mass rally in Bandung, at which the Empat
Serangkai spoke on "Destroy the Allies" and "Live Simply and
Increase Agricultural Production."
July 2, 1943--Public rally in Padang (Bodjonegoro), supple-
mented with a film from the Sendenbu.
July 5, 1943--Mass rally in Djogjakarta on "Destroy the
Allies" and "Increase Agricultural Production." The Empat
Serangkai were scheduled to speak but they were called back to
Djakarta before they could do so.
July 6, 1943--Mass rally at Tuban with the theme "Destroy
the Allies."
July 7, 1943--Mass rally at Ikada Square to greet Prime
Minister Tojo.
July 13, 1943--Public rally in Lamongan held by Putera,
with the help of the Sendenbu.
July 20, 1943--Public rally in Kediri held by Putera and
the Sendenbu.
July 28 to August 2, 1943--Rallies throughout the Princi-
pality of Dj ogj akarta with the theme "Destroy the Allies."
August 6, 1943--Public rally in Pamekasan held by Putera
and the Sendenbu.
August 7, 1943--Public rally in Sumenep held by Putera and
the Sendenbu.
August 8, 1943--Public rally in Kalianget held by Putera
and the Sendenbu.
August 11, 1943--Public rally in Madiun held by Putera and
the Sendenbu.
August 11 to 14, 1943--Public rallies in the Priangan,
namely at Garut, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis and Sumedang.
August 18, 1943--Mass rally in Surabaja on the themes
"Destroy the Allies" and "Propagandize for Putera" at which Ir.
Soekarno and Kijai Mansoer spoke.
August 26, 1943--Public rally held at Probolinggo with the
help of the Sendenbu.93
August 26 to 31, 1943--Public rallies in Klaten, Wonogiri,
Bojolali and Sragen.
September 3, 1943--Public rally on "Destroy the Allies" in
Djember.
September 7, 1943--Public anti-Allies rally at Banjuwangi.
September 11, 1943--Beginning of a week-long anti-Allies
propaganda campaign covering all of Besuki Shu.
November 3, 1943--Mass rally at Ikada Square to promote
Peta.15
December 8, 1943--Mass rally at Ikada Square to commemorate
the start of the Greater East Asia War.
9. Press and Radio Section
The activities of the Press and Radio Section of Putera
Headquarters should not [really] be considered separately from
those of the Propaganda Section. As was mentioned in the Spe-
cial Regulations, Article 14, the job of the Press and Radio
Section was:
1)	To act as guide in matters of the press and broadcasting.
2)	To bring about closer relations between the Putera move-
ment and each of the various newspapers.
Because it held this position, all news releases from all
sections of Putera passed through the Press and Radio Section.
Three copies of each release were sent to every newspaper; for
newspapers outside Djakarta the releases were sent via the Domei
News Agency.
The number of press releases released by Putera Headquarters
was as follows:
15. Peta is an acronym for Barisan Sukarela (or Tentara Suka-
rela) Pembela Tanah Air (Volunteer Corps [Volunteer Army]
of Defenders of the Fatherland). This Japanese-sponsored
version of a "national army" was founded officially on
October 3, 1943.
April 1943
May 1943
June 1943
13 press releases
26
3194
July 1943	10 press releases
August 1943	14
September 1943	11
October 1943	26
November 1943	19
December 1943	18
Total	168
Often, too, the Press and Radio Section prepared material
for speeches by the Great Leader and for Putera's propagandists.
In all matters of external communications, including speeches
to be given at rallies or over the radio by Putera leaders, the
Press and Radio Section kept in touch with the civilian and
military censors. Besides issuing press releases, the Press
and Radio Section also had pamphlets printed for distribution
to the people through Putera. Titles distributed were:
1)	People’s Soap by Dr. Moetiono, 9,000 copies sold at 6
cents each.
2)	Padi by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan Sanif, sold at 10 cents
each.
3) Pasar Malam Program (June 21 to July 15, 1943), contain-
ing articles on:	a) "Guidelines for Raising Carp in the Paddy
Fields" by Odjoh and Charidji; b) "The Mudjair Fish" by Odjoh
and Charidji; c) "The Castor Oil Plant" by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan
Sanif; d) "Cotton" by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan Sanif; and
e) "Rosella"16 by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan Sanif. The program was
distributed free.
Books in the process of being translated from English into
Indonesian by the Propaganda Section with the help of the Press
and Radio Section, were:	a) Japanese Education; b) The Tea Cult
of Japan; c) The Japanese National Character', d) Japanese Bud-
dhism. The original goal was to have these printed when they
were finished being translated. Besides those mentioned above,
we were going to publish the book entitled Food for the People
by Dr. Soetarman. Plans on getting paper for printing these
books had already been drawn up by Mr. Soemanang, head of the
Press and Radio Section, and are now in the hands of the Minshu
Shidobu.
The nature of the books we planned to print points out the
fact that in all communications to the people, priority was giv-
en to building up the spirit of struggle and service and to urg-
ing increased agricultural production.
16. An annual herb, used as a hemp substitute.95
The news releases and announcements made by the branches
were supervised by the Headquarters Press and Radio Section,
which saw to it that it received a copy of every press release
made by the branches to the local newspapers.
The Press and Radio Section had its own documentation sec-
tion. From the time Putera Headquarters was set up, the Press
and Radio Section tried to collect the newspapers printed since
the Japanese Army began to govern here. In this effort, it re-
ceived help from Asia Raya and Pembangoenan newspapers and now
has a complete collection of these newspapers. In addition,
the Press and Radio Section itself subscribed to the newspapers
published throughout Java.
Newspapers and magazines received by the Press and Radio
Section were as follows:
A.	Published on Java
1.	Asia Raya--3 copies, of which 1 was at half price.
2.	Rung Yung Pao'i7--2 copies, both at half price.
3.	Tjahaja--2 copies, both at regular price.
4.	Sinar Matahari--3 copies, 2 free except for mailing
cost, and 1 at regular price.
5.	Sinar Baroe--3 copies, of which 2 were free, and 1
at regular price.
6.	Soeara Asia--3 copies, all at regular price.
B.	Published on Sumatra
1.	Nippon Palembang Shinboen--! copy, free.
2.	Kita Soematera Shinboen--! copy, free.
C.	Magazines received
1.	Pandgi Poestaka--2 copies, both at regular price.
2.	Dgawa Baroe--2 copies, both at regular price.
3.	Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia--2 copies at regular
price, also several free copies.
One copy of each of the above newspapers and magazines was given
to the Propaganda Section, one clipped for documentation, and
one stored for the archives.
News items in the papers were clipped and indexed to make
it easy to find any news release when necessary. Besides col-
lecting newspapers, the Press and Radio Section also tried to
collect all books printed since the Japanese Army landed, and
had 101 volumes at last count.
Correspondence of the Press and Radio Section was as
follows:	a) incoming letters 261; b) outgoing letters 159.
17. This was the only Chinese-language newspaper permitted to
continue publishing during the occupation period.96
The Press and Radio Section did not receive visitors, ex-
cept for reporters from outside the city or from overseas.
10. Physical Education Section
As has been explained in the three-month report, the Physi-
cal Education Section was at first able to work energetically
and succeeded in founding Gelora, with the aim of making a
direct contribution by building the people's enthusiasm for the
government. With the advent of Gelora, public enthusiasm was
truly aroused. Energy and enthusiasm for physical training was
in evidence everywhere, and public morale was high.
But after the government decided that Gelora had to be
abolished and replaced by the Jawa Tai Iku Kai under the direc-
tion of the Department of Education, the lively enthusiasm
turned cold and disappeared.
On August 23, 1943, the Jawa Tai Iku Kai was established.
It was responsible for all athletics in Java, including physical
education in the schools, offices and industry, and other kinds
of sports.
No matter how hard the Jawa Tai Iku Kai has tried, it has
not yet been able to revive the earlier enthusiasm. By starting
Gelora, Putera was able to stimulate a sense of satisfaction
rising directly from the hearts of the people themselves. The
Tai Iku Kai could only achieve things by ordering them to be
done, orders which the people obeyed because they were afraid.
The basis of the Tai Iku Kai's strength is simply discipline.
Gelora's strength was in the voluntary response of the people
themselves, and its discipline arose from the sporting code it-
self.
After Gelora was dissolved on August 3, 1943, the work of
Putera's Physical Education* Section was hamstrung. For the
dissolution meant the elimination of a very broad field of
activity, and all that remained was propaganda work. Although
there was much to be done even in that field, many of Gelora's
directors were disillusioned and reluctant to give it much
thought. This was a loss to athletics in general.
Propaganda work continued as usual. Every Tuesday,except-
ing the second of each month (later changed to Wednesday), Army
Radio reserved time for the Physical Education Section to dis-
cuss athletic matters. This opportunity was used to give view-
points on the significance and uses of sports, the techniques
of various sports, etc. The revival of the ancient Indonesian
sports, which we inherited from our ancestors, was also encour-
aged .97
Together with Putera's Health Section, the Physical Educa-
tion Section helped the Medical Workers' Service Organization
[Iji Hokokai] promote People's Health Day by making speeches on
the meaning and importance of sports and by giving lessons in
tais5 to the people.
In connection with Osamu Decree #44, which offered Indone-
sians the opportunity to become members of Peta? an organization
which Putera strongly supported, considerable financial contri-
butions were received from the people. The job of handling
these monetary gifts was turned over to the Physical Education
Section. After the Peta and Heiho Assistance Association [Tata
Usaha Pembantu Peradjurit Pembela Tanah Air dan Heiho] was
founded, the business of receiving such funds was turned over
to it. The amount of money received and forwarded by Head-
quarters to Peta was f. 1,896.02.
Contributions received by the branches were also turned
over to the proper authorities, namely the Soldiers' Aid Organi-
zation [Badan Pembantu Peradjurit] in each daerah. The Semarang
branch forwarded f.3,383.36, and the Malang branch sent
f. 2,979.07%.
A great many people came to Putera in order to enlist as
recruits for Peta, even though they knew that the recruiting
list had to be made at the Shuchbkan's office or through the
individual kuch5. This proves that the people took great in-
terest in Putera as the promoter of Peta.
To help Peta, Putera branches were encouraged to hold
sports contests, the net proceeds from which could be turned
over to that organization.
More recently the Physical Education Section did research
on various types of native sports still practiced by the people.
It turned out that the majority of these old Indonesian sports,
which now do not attract much attention, are forms of self-
defense. For example, there is the s'Ll at of the Minangkabau,
pentjak of various kinds, okol, bendjang, udjungan, main panah,
lawung, bondobojo,18 and others. It would be excellent if all
these were revived and people trained in them systematically,
since they all are fundamental to arousing enthusiasm and build-
ing martial character.
11. Health Section
Putera's Health Section was clearly devised for propaganda
purposes only. For practical health matters, there is the
18. All traditional Indonesian martial or semi-martial arts.98
Military Government's Office of Public Health, in whose opera-
tions Putera could play no part. Therefore Putera's Health
Section's work centered around propagandizing for the following:
1.	Ways of protecting physical health.
2.	Healthy and practical foods.
3.	Planning improvements in people's dwellings from the
point of view of health.
The Health Section tried to mobilize private doctors to
help in this work. Also the aid of several specialists was
asked. Happily we can state here that Dr. Kodijat and Dr. R.
Mochtar from the Eiseikyoku [Public Health Bureau] and Dr.
Soerono, the Djakarta Shu Eiseikacho [Chief of the Sanitation
Division], were ready to help and were also willing to sit on
the Health Section Advisory Board.
On July 10, 1943, instructions were sent to all shu branches
of Putera to send their plans concerning public health to Head-
quarters for discussion at the first meeting of the Health Sec-
tion Advisory Board, which was to be held in September. Since
the Medical Workers' Service Organization was founded on Septem-
ber 1, 1943, however, the meeting never took place; we assumed
that all public health matters would be turned over to this new
organization as its special concern. Putera would help as much
as it could.
The practical work done by the Health Section was as
follows:
1)	Set up a permanent exhibition on hygiene, using pic-
torial instructions giving pointers on cleanliness and hygiene.
This exhibit was also at the Rakutenchi Pasar Malam.
2)	Propagandized about nutritious but inexpensive food-
stuffs. For example, a diet using ontjom19 as its chief ingre-
dient was suggested. Food of this sort is nutritious but inex-
pensive and can also be prepared in an appetizing manner. There
was a demonstration at Putera Headquarters of how to cook it
this way.
Most unfortunately the Chinese merchants, whose only desire
is for profit, used this opportunity to further their own ends.
They bought up all the ontjom and sold it to the people at a
high price. The price rose from 7 cents to 14 cents or more.
Therefore Putera's promotion had unfortunate results.
3)	Because soap was as much as 40 cents a bar, people were
taught at Putera Headquarters and several other places how to
19. A kind of tempe (soy bean cake).99
make soap using ashes instead of caustic soda. Soap-making
according to the method of Dr. Moetiono was propagandized and
taught, and also printed up in booklet form. As a result, the
price of soap fell back to 5 cents a bar, which was a great ad-
vantage for the people. But again the Chinese took the oppor-
tunity to fill their own pockets. Since they had capital, they
went into soap-making, and as a result the price of soap went
up again. Now the price is back up to 21h cents a bar.
There was even a daerah government regulation prohibiting
people from making soap without a permit, but again it was the
Chinese with capital who got the chance to have soap factories.
This is quite clear from the fact that the Soap Manufacturers'
Association [Persekutuan Perusahaan-Perusahaan Membuat Sabun]
in Djakarta City, which was just recently set up on the encour-
agement of the city government, has only one Indonesian among
its members, the rest being Chinese.
4)	In connection with the scarcity of patent medicines,
the Health Section of Putera propagandized about using various
herbs as substitutes. Herbs have been used by Indonesians as
medicine from ancient times, and many are famous for their
efficacy. But, influenced by patent medicines, people have
forgotten about such pharmaceuticals. Putera's intention was
to remind Indonesians to return to their original medicines.
5)	The Health Section eagerly helped with the propaganda
for People's Health Days held by the government on the 8th, 9th,
and 10th of every month. With the agreement of the Eiseikyoku
and the Iji Hokokai, the Health Section made propaganda posters,
and their cost was divided between the three organizations.
The cost was as follows:
a.	Posters for the first People's Health Day,
on the theme of hygiene; 20,000 copies	f. 1,000.00
b.	For the second People's Health Day;
15,000 copies	f. 750.00
[total f. 1,750.00]
The Eiseikyoku paid f. 500.00, the Iji Hokokai paid f. 500.00,
and the greater share, f. 750.00, was paid by Putera. From
then on, Putera's Health Section was permitted to spend f.500 a
month on health propaganda such as the above.
The correspondence was as follows:	a) incoming letters
216; b) outgoing letters 457. Outgoing letters mostly contained
instructions to the branches.
There were 360 visitors to the Health Section during the
past year, and they can be categorized as follows:100
1)	Those who came to look at the exhibition of pictures
depicting aspects of good health and at the model house showing
the best possible health safeguards.
2) Those who came to look at the medicinal herb exhibit.
3) Those who came to ask for information on food, since
the rice ration of 200 grams a day was not enough for the masses.
People wanted to know what they should supplement their rice
with in order to keep healthy.
12. Public Welfare Section
As was explained in the three-month report, the Public Wel-
fare Section could be considered a barometer for gauging the
atmosphere prevailing among the general populace. In the Public
Welfare Section's three-month report to the General Director on
its work, the Section Head, Mr. Samsoedin, wrote as follows:
Article 18 of Putera's Special Regulations includes
mention of the jobs to be carried out by the Public
Welfare Section as follows:
1.	Study the best ways to care for orphans, the
destitute, and old people without anyone to look
after them.
2.	Encourage the spirit of cooperation.
3.	Aid the unemployed.
4.	Lead, develop and unify all public welfare
activities.
The public interpreted my division's work much more
broadly than Article 18, above.
The public believed that anything they felt to be
unjust, wrong or unsatisfactory could be brought to
the attention of the Public Welfare Section:	all com-
plaints, whether from peasants, workers or civil serv-
ants; all kinds of desires of various groups; and,
especially, matters touching on the relationship be-
tween the people and the pangreh pradja, between the
people and the police, between the Japanese and Indo-
nesians, and so on.
As a matter of fact, when the Public Welfare Section
was first founded, we had to feel out the directions in
which our work could actually be developed, in relation-
ship to the most urgent current social problems. It has
been clearly proven that an especially important condition101
for developing the desire to exert energy in forming a
new society is the true unity of all levels of society:
between Japanese and Indonesians as well as--and this
is very important--between the people and the pangreh
pradja and the police, and also between the departments
of the government itself. The conclusion drawn from
all our work and experience is that the relations be-
tween these groups are still very far from perfect.
This matter was given top priority by the Public Wel-
fare Section, since no matter how good the format of a
cooperative activity is on paper, when put into prac-
tice it will not be able to pass the acid test, since
the work is only cooperative in name and not entered
into with any real, sincere commitment. In short, our
effort has been to insure that all groups face up to
the ideals and the duties of the present time not just
on the surface but also deep down inside. Under the
present wartime conditions, every effort to build en-
thusiasm for working toward the new society must be
preceded by a sincere effort to achieve spiritual
unity.
The portion of the three-month report just quoted is clearly
still of value, and it remained a guide for the Public Welfare
Section's work until the end.
Since the basis of every social endeavor must be the prior
development of unity, and since unity is something which cannot
be developed if serious efforts are not first made to create
the conditions for that unity, the Public Welfare Section gave
top priority to negotiating and, as far as possible, settling
all matters, conditions and problems which hamper the develop-
ment of unity. Thus the section's field of operations was ex-
tremely broad and often gave the false impression that Putera
was interfering in affairs that were clearly the province of
particular government departments, whereas our intention was,
in the broadest possible sense, to link them together.
It is understandable that the path we had to travel in
order to carry on this work was full of thorns and pitfalls;
it was work that attracted abuse from the left and right.
Nevertheless, there are listed below the various problems
which the Public Welfare Section tried to handle.
A. Problems concerning the pangreh pradja and the police:
1)	Difficulties with the transportation of rice from one
kampung to another.
2)	Problems about the illegal seizure of official permits
needed to bring rice into a kampung.102
3)	Complaints from KeibSdan20 and Seinendan trainees.
4)	Problems with the pekan perkawinan21 and so forth.
5)	Matters concerning Indonesians working on Dutch sawah.22
6)	Problems of detention, looting and arrest or beating by
the police and pangreh pradja.
7)	Various complaints from the people about the activities
of the pangreh pradja.
8)	The problem of getting permission from the kucho of a
particular daerah to till the soil and then having the permis-
sion revoked and being forbidden to carry on tilling.
9)	Problems connected with sawah and houses and their yards
10)	Matters concerning the moving of the inhabitants of
several villages.
11)	The unsatisfactory method of distributing and selling
land.
12)	The gathering of village dues and contributions by the
kuchS and lower-ranking pangreh pradja in various districts.
13)	The problem of unsatisfactory distribution of ration
cards for daily necessities.
14)	The problem in several daerah of buying and selling rice
15)	Requests for information about the Keibbdan, Seinendan,
Heih5,23 and the Peta.
20.	Literally, '’volunteer guard"; it was a kind of auxiliary
police, concerned mostly with air defense, tracking down
of spies, enforcement of rice regulations, and so forth.
21.	Literally, "marriage market." The reference is obscure,
but Hatta said he believed it concerned the new regulations
placed on marriage registration, requiring more elaborate
paper-work and higher fees.
22.	The reference is probably to unauthorized Indonesian squat-
ters on former Dutch lands.
23.	HeihS were auxiliary Indonesian troops for Japanese forces.
They usually remained on Java, but a number were sent to
fight in New Guinea, the Solomons and elsewhere.103
16)	Impediments to the distribution of the MIAI [Madjlisul
Islamil A’laa Indonesia, or Great Islamic Council of Indonesia]
magazine in several daerah.
17)	Difficulties and obstacles faced by Putera people in
carrying out their work in several daerah.
18)	Unsatisfactory choice of members for the Sangi Kai in
some daerah and the consequences thereof.
19)	A bill for making wooden planks that is still unpaid
by the government.
20)	About the distressing methods of collecting coolie
laborers for other daerah.
21)	About several arrests.
22)	Requests for irrigation of sawah that are not attended
to by the lower-ranking pangreh pradja.
23)	Matters concerning the collection and selling of rice.
24)	Requests that the produce tax be lowered.
25)	Unfair distribution of merchandise by the government
in one area to a small shop cooperative which it organized and
the consequences thereof.
26)	Request for information on how to apply for permission
to use unoccupied lands.
27)	The problem of requests to continue working the land.
28)	Several actions taken by the police against petty
traders.
29)	The problem of the export of leather to the Outer
Islands and its consequences.
30)	Accusations of false reporting.
31)	Problems of sending "volunteers" to areas outside Java.2**
32)	Insults to Putera's Great Leader in several daerah.
24. A reference to the rSmusha, forced laborers, of whom there
were as many as 2,000,000. Not all of these were unskilled
workers, for carpenters, mechanics, cooks and so forth
were in demand.104
33)	Problems of having to pay excise duties in kind rather
than money.
34)	The problem of swindlers who used documents from a sec-
tion of Putera Headquarters.
35)	Requests for protection from constant harassment by
lower-ranking pangreh pradja and police.
36)	About the raising of market taxes.
37)	Reports of hoarding.
38)	Behavior of the Dutch that still goes on.
39)	Actions on the part of the police and Keibodan in the
rice problem.
B. Problems concerning labor:
1)	Requests for work, either by letter or through a per-
sonal appearance.
2)	Matters concerning dismissals.
3)	Complaints of foremen about officials.
4)	Requests for help in returning to work at jobs held
previously.
5)	Complaints about not getting a Lebaran bonus.
6)	Requests for help in getting back wages paid up quickly
7)	Requests for information on becoming religious teachers
8)	Complaints of low'level workers about their wages,
which they need.
9)	Requests for guidance on making equipment for Peta.
10)	Dismissals in contravention of "contracts."25
11)	Disturbances of people at prayer by officials of one
of the regional offices.
25. It had become common practice for employees to ask for and
receive "contracts" covering their work, giving them a
measure of security. The system was apparently resorted to
increasingly, especially in urban areas, during the occupa-
tion .105
12)	Expressions of thanks for our help.
13)	Problems concerning pensions and pension funds.
C.	Problems concerning business:
1)	About letters of permission for buying and selling goods.
2)	About arrests and the looting of goods.
3)	Mediating requests for permission to leave goods in the
marketplace overnight.26
4)	Requests for information on problems in business and
business firms.
5)	About arrests related to the price of goods being sold.27
6)	Complaints about the directors of the economy and the
sale of rice, oil, and other things in several daerah.
7)	Requests for guidance on how to get permission to trans-
port goods to Sumatra and other islands.28
8)	Problems of getting permission to transport agricultural
products from one place to another.
D.	Problems concerning debts and credit:
1)	Problems regarding pawning and unconditional sales.
2)	Problems regarding debts and credit.
3)	Problems regarding debts and credit accepted without
written contract.
26.	One Japanese regulation that was particularly burdensome to
small businessmen was that requiring them to remove all
goods from their marketplace establishments for the night.
The purpose of the law was to curb looting and theft.
27.	Especially during the first two years of the occupation,
the Japanese carried out a vigorous campaign against infla-
tion, with varying degrees of success. Chinese tradesmen
were the most frequent targets of price investigations.
28.	There were limitations on movements between the three Japa-
nese administrative units in the archipelago, and travel
between them was minimal after the first half year of occu-
pation. Apart from security regulations, the lack of trans-
portation facilities made inter-island travel difficult.106
4)	Idjon [buying rice when it is still unripe and unhar-
vested] and other practices.
E. Other problems:
1)	Requests for help in becoming Indonesian citizens again.29
2)	Turning in [old political] identification papers.
3)	Distribution of clothing material.
4)	Guidance in setting up associations.
5)	Requests for help in returning home to Sumatra and other
places outside Java.
6)	Miscellaneous.
Charity work. When Putera Headquarters was first set up,
the Public Welfare Section received several citizens' donations
for charity work. This money was used to help deserving people,
for example, people in dire straits, their husbands having died
or been in accidents; people in Djakarta who were unable to get
work and wanted to return to their villages; people who wanted
to visit their families because of pressing needs but who were
prevented from doing so because of lack of funds; and so forth.
But in light of the view that Putera should not be engaged in
collecting contributions from the public, at first no effort
was made to collect any money for charitable purposes.
Because of the earthquake which shook almost all of Java
in June 1943 and caused many casualties, with the permission of
His Excellency the Gunseikan, Putera appealed to all the inhabi-
tants of Java to contribute to the aid of victims through Putera
Headquarters and also branches in Djakarta, Bandung, Semarang,
Djogjakarta, Surakarta, Surabaja and Malang.
The amounts of the donations received between August 1,
1943, and September 10, 1943, were as follows:
29. The reference is primarily to Eurasians who, during the
period of Dutch rule, had taken out Dutch citizenship, in
most cases to better their social and political status.
During the occupation, however, it became advantageous
to sever attachments to the old European regime, and many
attempted to shed their Dutch citizenship. According to
Hatta, relatively few were successful in doing so.107
Received directly by Headquarters
Received by the Djakarta branch
Received by the Priangan branch (contri
butions for Headquarters, forwarded
by Priangan)
Received by the Malang branch
Received by the Surabaja branch
f. 3,882.77%
294.63%
12.15
3,086.79
7,586.08
Total f. 14,862.43
It should be noted here that the Priangan Shu branch of Putera
was not permitted to accept donations for the above cause, while
the branches in Djogjakarta, Solo and Semarang received amounts
totaling as follows:
Djogjakarta (to September 7, 1943)	f. 913.71
Solo (to September 2, 1943)	2,635.22
Semarang (to September 1, 1943)	158.42
The above three branches were obliged to turn over the donations
they received to committees in their localities. Thus Putera's
attempt to collect as many contributions as possible was severely
limited. Limited first because it could only carry out fund
raising in daerah where Putera branches were already established
(it was not permitted to do anything outside these areas);
second, several branches were not permitted to collect contri-
butions for this charitable purpose.
These are the reasons why the number of contributions col-
lected was actually not very large.
The distribution of the above-mentioned money was mostly
undertaken by the head of the Public Welfare Section of Putera
Headquarters, Mr. Samsoedin himself, in West and Central Java.
The rest was sent by mail through the individual shuchokan. It
also should be explained that contributions totaling f. 174.80
for Ponorogo Ken have not yet been sent to the Madiun Shuchokan
because there was no response from him to our letter on the sub-
j ect.
In order to deliver the donations, the head of the Public
Welfare Section took a trip to the areas of Pekalongan, Pema-
lang, Brebes, Tegal, Purwokerto, Tjilatjap, Magelang, Purworedjo,
Kutoardjo, Kebumen, Tasikmalaja, and other places. This trip
was also used to look into all matters related to public welfare
in those areas. In the course of the trip, the section head ac-
quired a great deal of information and material of real import-
ance to future efforts. The conclusions drawn from the thoughts
gathered on that trip are presented as the basic points of this
report.108
Although donations for earthquake victims were no longer
received after September 10, 1943, Putera Headquarters continued
to receive donations for other charitable purposes to the amount
of f. 2,508.87. Out of this sum, we spent f. 554.38 on deserv-
ing individuals, leaving a balance of f. 1,954.49.
Following these efforts to aid victims of the earthquake
and floods,and other small-scale charity efforts, after December
1943 plans were made for a drive to bring clothing to every per-
son on Java and Madura. This project came about after the head
of the Public Welfare Section heard about or personally saw the
lack of clothing suffered by people in the villages and mountain
areas of several daerah, especially in Central and East Java.
Hopefully this will be one program that is put into operation
immediately by the Hokokai, so that private charity (not the
government) can give help to those who are forced to go stark
naked, half naked or dressed in rags that are really no longer
fit to be worn by human beings. The clothing distribution car-
ried out last March 9 to benefit peasants who were genuinely
working hard in their fields certainly has reduced the difficul-
ties mentioned above. However, because this distribution of
clothing reached only 10% of the population, many more clothing
shortage problems require the Hokokai's attention.
Projects in the field of labor. The results of work done
in connection with labor really have been very satisfactory.
Satisfactory especially when one considers the lack of equip-
ment and personnel with which this work had to be accomplished.
When Putera Headquarters was first opened, there were many
visits from unemployed people who were only looking for a job
with Putera. The number of visits paid by those seeking work
grew as time went on. To help these people, an attempt was
made to set up connections between the Public Welfare Section
and both government and private offices. The establishment of
these connections had excellent results for placing the unem-
ployed.
Included below are a number of firms, offices and so
forth maintaining very good relationships with Putera in help-
ing the unemployed find jobs:
1.	Office of the R.S.K. Auto Repair Shop
2.	Office in charge of the Public Corporation for Planta-
tions, Military Administration
3.	Office of Irrigation and Communications
4.	Social Division of the Office of Special Municipalities
5.	Office of the Naval Engineering Department
6.	Djakarta Bureau of Passenger Transportation
7.	The Tiga Pindo Trading Company
8.	Diesel Automobile Company Ltd.109
9.	Java Bay Stevedoring Company
10.	Maritime Bureau Office
11.	Office of the Southern Territories Development Company
and other offices at Tandjung Priok
12.	Association of Djakarta Municipal Public Transportation
Enterprises
13.	Statistics Office
14.	Printing Office, Java Military Administration
15.	Malaria Eradication Branch, Bureau of Hygiene, Depart-
ment of Internal Affairs, Military Administration
16.	Public Corporation for the Control of Private Estates
17.	Kantor Korra [?]
18.	Navy Office
19.	Mediation Office, "Eswe" Trading Company [?]
20.	Public Corporation of Plantations
21.	Office of S.S. Djakarta and Manggarai [?]
22.	Post Offices in Djakarta Municipality, Pasar Baru and
Harmoni
23.	The Saleh Store
24.	Dai Ni [?] Office
25.	Bus Department of the General Bureau of Land Trans-
portation
26.	Bodjong Gedeh Private Estate
27.	Office of the Department of General Affairs
28.	The Bata Shoe Factory
29.	Tandjung Advertising Company
30.	Office of the Asia Raya Newspaper
31.	Office of the Department of Education
32.	Office of Porti [?]
Besides the above, there were many other firms who have
given help in placing the unemployed.
The success of these efforts can be read below:
Period of time	Number of people who registered with Headquarters, Public Welfare Sec.	Number of people who were helped to get jobs	
April 19-May 1, 1943	218	-	
May 1-May 8, 1943	25	-	
May 9-May 15, 1943	80	-	Total for
May 16-May 22, 1943	68	9	April 19-
May 23-May 29, 1943	52	17	May 29: 26
May 30-June 5, 1943	81	65	
June 6-June 12, 1943	96	55	
June 13-June 19, 1943	55	57	
June 20-June 26, 1943	43	72	Total for
June 27-July 3, 1943	45	12	June: 261110
Number of people
who were helped
to get jobs
Period of time	Number of people who registered with Headquarters, Public Welfare Sec.		] 1
July 4-July 10, 1943		66	25
July 11-July 17, 1943		62	27
July 18-July 24, 1943		77	29
July 25-July 31, 1943		77	46
August 1-7, 1943		138	68
August 8-14, 1943		83	67
August 15-21, 1943		100	73
August 22-28, 1943		137	68
August 29-September 4	, 1943	181	89
September 5-12, 1943		147	47
September 13-18, 1943		103	137
September 19-25, 1943		57	237
September 26-October	2, 1943	15	68
October 3-9, 1943		152	104
October 10-16, 1943		133	266
October 17-23, 1943		138	199
October 24-31, 1943		192	94
November 1-7, 1943		117	247
November 8-14, 1943		176	157
November 15-21, 1943		129	55
November 22-28, 1943		106	136
November 29-December	5, 1943	99	130
December 6-12, 1943		82	71
December 13-19, 1943		49	99
December 20-26, 1943		55	144
December 27-31, 1943		41	147
January 3-9, 1944		86	49
January 10-16, 1944		66	104
January 17-23, 1944		31	152
January 24-30, 1944		54	266
Added by the writer30		245	
Total for
July: 127
Total for
August: 276
Total for
September: 578
Total for
October: 663
Total for
November: 595
Total for
December: 591
Total for
January: 571
Total, April 19, 1943-
January 31, 1944
4,001
3,688
30. The original has tjatatan dari penulis but the meaning is ob-
scure. Hatta remarked that, since his reports were drawn up
from materials compiled by the various Putera section heads,
"the writer" was probably the Head of the Economic Affairs
Section, but the intent of the notation remained unclear.Ill
The above list proves that the results of this activity
were exceedingly satisfactory. Out of 4,001 who signed up,
3,688, or 921, were given help.
It should perhaps be noted that from our books one can tell
who, when, and what sort of job was obtained by each individual
being helped. It should also be explained that there were many
kinds of jobs involved. Not only were there jobs for houseboys,
maids, day laborers, foremen and chauffeurs, but also many
skilled-labor jobs for ironsmiths, carpenters and mechanics.
There were also office jobs of many kinds in many varieties of
offices, whose requirements ranged from an elementary school
education to a senior high school certificate.
In this labor work, it was also necessary to guard against
situations among laborers which might have had unfortunate re-
sults. In such cases, the Public Welfare Section acted as a
mediator between laborers and management. For this work, at-
tempts were made to set up connections with the government Labor
Bureau. Talks were very frequently held with this office on
labor matters.
The atmosphere in the field of labor, as far as we were
able to gather from what was brought before us and from what we
picked up here and there and in the daerah, is as follows:
In general there is no longer any unemployment. It is not
the people who need jobs3 but the jobs that need people. The
exception to this is the pensioners, whose pensions have dis-
appeared, but who are too old to go back to work in an atmos-
phere that requires more than the usual effort and strength.
Also, these pensioners generally have large family responsibili-
ties. Contributions from charity groups and friends are not
enough, and usually they are forced to sell their household
goods and other things little by little. Inevitably their
standard of living has declined steadily. The fate of the pen-
sioners requires quick attention and improvement.
As has already been stated, at this time jobs are not being
sought, but do the seeking. So at present the size of the work-
ing population is greater than ever before. Therefore we have
to become more deeply acquainted with the laborer and pay more
attention to his position and fate.
In places where there were large concentrations of day
laborers, we often heard reports that considerable improvement
was required for medical protection against malaria, dysentery,
typhus, etc. We urge the government to undertake a comprehen-
sive investigation of this problem. Aside from this health
question, the government should also pay attention to the prob-
lem of wages, especially the wages of day laborers. A day112
laborer's wages should cover the costs of his daily needs.
Here and there one hears talk that wages are not really in step
with the rising cost of living. This also requires the imme-
diate attention and supervision of the government.
Another problem in the field of labor needing investigation
is that of the so-called "Employment Service" of the government.
As everyone knows, there has been a great deal of uncultivated
brushland opened up for the purpose of growing food. This work
should certainly get support from all levels. But frequently
things happen which do not benefit the people but do exactly
the opposite.
For example, in one daerah some land was opened up. If
those who were obliged to do this work had been only people
from villages nearby, in general this program would not have
disrupted the ordinary activities and source of livelihood of
these people. But very often people from villages 30 to 50
kilometers away, bringing their own food, were forced to work
on the land that was being cleared. It is perhaps unnecessary
to explain that such things do not benefit the people, but do
exactly the opposite.
III. Conclusion
It seems proper to analyze at the end of this report a
problem which surprised those who did not really understand the
organizational complexities of Putera.
People often asked, "Why are there so many directors and
other office personnel connected with Putera? At Headquarters
alone there are 112 people, and in the daerah there is not one
branch with less than 30. If this is compared with the situa-
tion of the activist associations under the Dutch, it is larger
by an extraordinary degree. In those days the general director
and his staff numbered perhaps no more than fifteen people,
branch directors between five and ten people, and sometimes
under five. Isn't the present composition of Putera excessively
bulky?"
Comparisons of this sort are very unbalanced, because the
activists' efforts earlier were quite different from those of
Putera. In addition, the activist groups had members in the
tens of thousands. Besides the directors, there were people
called "cadres" who had previously been given special training.
They were enthusiastic in helping the directors in their work.
Also among the members were a great many who helped as propa-
gandists and so forth. All these staff members were helpful to
the directors, and should therefore really be counted as aides.113
In this connection, in order to lighten the financial strain on
the organization, one or two of the directors did not work full
time, and only came to the office at night. During the day he
did his regular job as a government worker, as an employee of a
private firm or as a journalist.
With Putera it was quite different. Putera had no members
to help it carry on its organizational activities. Therefore,
everyone who worked for Putera had to do so as a leader, aide,
or staff worker. The number of aides and staff was unusually
large not only because their help was required for everyday
work, but also because they had to be trained to be competent
in carrying out the responsibilities of a branch director at a
later date. When they were thought to be capable of this, they
were placed in the various branches.
The government did not permit its civil servants to become
members of the Putera directorates. Therefore these directorates
had to be chosen from groups of activists who were not govern-
ment employees. For that reason they had to be given wages out
of Putera coffers so they could earn a living.
There were several difficulties as far as setting their
wages was concerned. Among them were some who had lived lives
of sacrifice and unreserved service to their native land, re-
fusing official rank and living in poverty. If their talents,
which had been developed in the practical work of the activist
movement, were no less than those of civil servants--even though
they did not graduate from colleges--must they still be asked
to sacrifice themselves for pittances of f. 15, f. 20, or f.25?
Clearly not, since today their responsibilities to the
government are really no different from those of ordinary civil
servants. Why should civil servants, who previously made no
sacrifices and lived in comfort like the Dutch, get more than
those who made sacrifices before and now are helping the Japa-
nese Government? Granted, a diploma deserves respect; but on
the other hand, skills and knowledge that are gained in the
struggle and through independent study deserve no less respect.
So even though there were, among the activists (who in the
old days never received a salary and lived in poverty), some
who received between f. 100 and f. 150, on the average the
salaries in Putera were still far lower than the base pay estab-
lished by the government [for its workers]. There were even
Putera directors who gave up rank or good positions to contrib-
ute their energies to Putera activities for salaries which were
far lower than what they received before, sometimes only as
much as two-thirds.
So much for explaining why Putera had a large number of
salaried aides and staff.114
On balance, Putera accomplished a number of things, but
there also was much that it could not do satisfactorily. The
reasons for this were that its scope was very limited and its
personnel quite insufficient. With a staff of only a little
more than 500, it was supposed to unite the people behind the
government in order to achieve the final victory in the present
Greater East Asia War.
The disbanding of Putera after a year of activity has deeply
saddened the Putera people themselves, and created a state of
bewilderment in some quarters among the people. People are ask-
ing themselves, "Where do we go from here?" That is why the
Jawa HSkOkai has generally received a very cool reception.
On the other hand,nobody regrets Putera's dissolution very
deeply. There is only a vague sadness that Putera was never
able to give the people what they hoped for.
Djakarta, March 25, 1944
Former General Director of Putera,
(signed) Moh. Hatta