aye ve ae file 1873 Date Due NOY L957? yy Cornell University Libra Rossel’s posthumous papers. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. LONDON: ROBSON AND SONS, PRINTERS, PANCRAS ROAD, N.W, ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH. LONDON: CHAPMAN AND HALL, 193 PICCADILLY. PARIS : E, LACHAUD, 4 PLACE DU THEATRE FRANCAIS, 1372. a atl? INTRODUCTION. ———>—— THE circumstances attending the connec- tion of Captain Rossel with the Commune of Paris, and his subsequent execution in consequence of that connection, have ex- cited so much interest in England, that I trust no apolocy will be considered neces- sary for offering to the British public a translation of the Posthumous Papers con- taining his own explanation of the circum- stances which induced him to give his services to the Communists. In the letter of the 19th of March to the Minister of War, tendering his resig- nation of the post of Chief of the Corps of Engineers at the Camp at Nevers, Rossel says: ‘I have no hesitation in siding with the party which has not signed the Treaty of Peace, and which does not number Vi INTRODUCTION. amongst its adherents the generals guilty of capitulation.’ From this, and from similar passages, it is evident that when he joined the Com- mune, it was with the hope that his services would be employed, not against his own countrymen, but against the foes of his country. He reckoned upon the neutrality, if not upon the indirect assistance, of the Versailles Government, and was led away by a patriotic enthusiasm, which is one of the distinguishing features of his character, to believe that the Commune would form the nucleus of a national resistance. As impartial as he is patriotic, he has hardly been brought face to face with the Communist leaders before he admits his mistake; but he feels that he has crossed the Rubicon, and that to draw back would be dishonourable. With the whole energy of his nature he struggles against disap- pointment and humiliation, hoping against hope that he may at length be able to achieve something for his unfortunate coun- try. In the depths of his heart he feels INTRODUCTION. vil that his cause is desperate, that failure is inevitable; and yet he fights on, preferring, ‘in spite of all the disgraceful acts of the Commune, to have fought on the side of the vanquished rather than on that of the victorious party.’ Independently of the fact that Rossel’s Posthumous Papers present a complete apo- logy for his conduct from his own point of view, they are interesting in a historical sense. His appreciation of the prominent men with whom he came in contact is at once racy and profound. The passage in which he sets forth the equal difficulty of blaming or praising Gambetta, is a good specimen of the clearness of his judgment. Through all his letters to his relations there runs a vein of deep feeling; and he has an unusually clear style and simple way of telling his story, which inevitably arouses the sympathy of the reader, whe- ther he be French or English. THE TRANSLATOR. CONTENTS. LETTER To HIs FatHER Tue Tours GovERNMENT Lerrer to M. GamBetta Tue Camp at Nevers BErorE Marcu 18TH Came at NEvERs—tTHE Hrap ENGINEER OFFICER NovTEs TAKEN AT THE Camp at NEVERS Tuer SrrRuccLe To THE Datu A Letrer to M. GamBerra Tue 19TH ofr Marcu ’ : . Tue Part I pLaveD UNDER THE CoMMUNE—CLUSERET, DeELEscLuzE, &c. SUPPLEMENTARY NoTEs ‘ : , 2 THE OVERTHROW OF THE COMMUNE Some ANECDOTES CONCERNING THE TakING oF Paris Notes anp THOUGHTS . On a VIGNETTE BY GusTavE Dori Torotuy: a Fotiy For my PaREnNTs . Last WIsHES To my Fatuer, Morner, BELLa, AND SARAH ‘VIXERUNT PAGE 1 31 47 49 52 54 59 62 65 67 . 127 141 . 184 . 193 217 221 . 248 . 283 284 289 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. Letter to his Father. Carap at Nevers, Feb. 18, 1871. My DEAREST FATHER, I have really so many things to tell you, that I don’t know where to begin. I begin by what is most interesting to you. I am Acting- colonel of Engineers, and I shall never be either captain or commandant, or lieutenant-colonel, for I shall leave the service if the shameful peace with which we are threatened is concluded; and if the war continues, I shall know how to obtain for myself so clearly-defined a position, that no one will think of questioning it. You know that before the war I was already highly disgusted B 2 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. with the vast association of incapables who held high rank; and I was convinced that the most fortunate and intelligent efforts would never have any chance in this army against quiet mediocrity. T have now broken completely with the corps of Engineers and the Committee; the Frossards and Coffiniéres are sufficiently fine specimens of the system of promotion in the French army to induce me to refrain willingly from competing with them. Since the commencement of the war, I have had a sufficient number of strange adventures ; but a remarkable fact, and one which will aston- ish you, is, that I have never been ordered under fire. I have been under fire occasionally, but solely for my own satisfaction, and I have run but little danger. At Metz, I was not long in being convinced of the absolute incapacity of our chiefs, whether generals or staff-officers—a hopeless incapacity admitted by the whole army; and as I am in the habit of carrying out my conclusions to the end, even before the battle of August 14th I had planned the means of expelling the whole clique, ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 3 and the measures I had imagined were not quite impracticable. I remember one evening with my comrade—a man of generous and resolute mind, whom I had quite won over to my way of think- ing. We were walking before those noisy resid- ences of the Rue Desclercs, filled at all times with horses, carriages, and gold-laced stewards, and the whole tumult of an insolent and riotous staff. We were examining the entrances and the positions of the guards, and discussing how, with some fifty resolute men, it would be easy to carry off all those fellows. We were looking for those fifty men; but we never succeeded in finding more than ten. On the 14th of August, towards evening, we saw from the top of the Serperoix ramparts the horizon from St. Julien to Quentin lighted up by the battle-fires. On the 16th the army had crossed the Moselle, and was face to face with the enemy. As soon as I was freed from my service, as the trains of wounded who arrived announced a great battle, I hastened on horseback by Moulins and Chatel to the plateau of Gravelotte, where I wit- 4 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. nessed a portion of the action side by side with a magnificently-commanded battery of mitrailleuses. Once again, on the day of the capitulation, I saw the captain of that battery. On the 18th I went again in the evening to see the battle, and met General Grenier. He was returning after having lost his division, which was quietly dispersing, hav- ing exhausted its ammunition, and fought seven hours without being relieved. On the morrow the blockade was completed. Nevertheless I continued to seek enemies for those incapable generals. On the 31st August and 1st September they tried to give battle, and could not even manage to get their troops en- gaged. The unfortunate Lebceuf tried, it is said, to get killed, and only succeeded in getting a lot of honest men killed in the stupidest manner. On the evening of the 31st I went to see the battle at Fort St. Julien; and on the morning of Sep- tember 1st I went to the rear of the battle-field. Among others, I there saw Laillard, now a chef descadron, who was awaiting with two batteries the moment for going into action. In the after- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 5 noon, when I returned to the battle-field, they were in full retreat. Seldom have I felt a deeper mortification than when I saw our last chance of taking the offensive thus shamefully thrown away ; for each time there was fighting going on, I re- gained confidence. At last the disaster of Sedan and the pro- clamation of the Republic became known. This was about the 6th September. That evening I was at Madame Cuvier’s, and Father Prost showed great confidence in the falseness of the bad news. I was laughed at for believing in them, and looked upon as a dangerous alarmist. At last I was in- duced laughingly to express my opinion of the situation; and I told them that we should end by capitulating, fixing as the time when they would believe me the day when we should march out without arms before the Prussians. ‘What,’ said Prost, ‘won’t you even let us have our arms?’ Those who heard what I said that night have reminded me of it since. There were at Metz hardly any officers of my standing in the Engineers ; Padovani alone was of 6 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. the same promotion. Otherwise, with the aid of some of the vigorous men I know, something might have been done. But some said, ‘It is impossible.’ To which I answered, ‘Impossible perhaps, but ab- solutely necessary.’ Others imagined that Bazaine ‘had his plan,’ poor devil! Your friend Worms received my half-confidences with pleasure. His penetration led him to guess the rest, and to guess even more than I thought; but he was restrained by a good-humoured scepticism, which he has per- haps got rid of since the capitulation. Very soon Bazaine, whose relations with the Prussian head-quarters were becoming almost in- timate and full of confidence, began to enter upon his Bonapartist intrigues. I had never had the intention of doing anything of a political nature; but now Thad a fair chance in my favour, since Bazaine had not recognised the new Government of France. It was sufficient to hoist the flag of the French Government to overthrow the whole Imperialist set. Generals not disposed to coun- tenance Bazaine in his intrigues were beginning to be mentioned, and amongst them the name of ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 7 General Clinchant, who had led a brigade of Zouaves in Mexico, and now commanded two fine regiments of ‘Mexicans.’ I went to see him, making use of his remembrance of you as my in- troduction. He soon became confiding, and told me how little certainty he had of being followed by his regiments on all occasions. It was neces- sary, in his opinion, to give an appearance of legality to the overthrow of the generals; and he saw two ways of accomplishing this: first, to organise secretly the elections (which were to take place on September 16th); and to have men he was sure of, and Changarnier in particular, named as representatives. This plan might not succeed ; the men of the Liberal party in Metz, with whom I was closely connected, were neither men of cha- racter nor men of action. One alone, perhaps, had the necessary energy —Péchoutre, a shoe- maker of the Rue Téte d’Or, an exile of 1851; but he had grown old, his party had been disor- ganised by twenty years of oppression, the labour- ing classes had no energy, and had lost all political capacity; he was but a solitary individual, who 8 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. felt sadly how weak our party was. As for the bourgeoisie, twas the bourgeoisie: worthy people, good fathers of families, good husbands, and good national guards; but who, if called upon for a manly resolution, would reply, as a last argument, ‘ After all, I am married, and have a family.’ The other plan consisted in sending an emissary to Gambetta, to explain the state of affairs, and bring back full powers for General Changarnier, who was decidedly the head of the party —a head without much brain. To send a man to Gambetta was a very haz- ardous, but, above all, a very slow proceeding ; and I doubted if the strength of the army would hold out sufficiently long. At last, seeing that no one would make up his mind without the sup- port of this shadow of legality, I accepted the offers of a young pupil of the Polytechnic School, who was entirely devoted to me, and was not yet bound to the service. But before exposing him to the risks of this adventure, I wished to make sure if the stakes were worth playing for, and went to see Changarnier. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 9 I found in him an enlightened soldier, and one whom age had not deprived of a certain vig- ow. The marshals deceived him by appearing to listen to his advice, and letting him hope it would be followed ; for his part, he always believed that they were going to fight. ‘It is settled for the day after to-morrow,’ he told me with a confid- ence I was far from sharing. He would not hear of taking the lead without a government order ; his scruples were highly honourable, but I tried to prove to him that they were out of place. ‘No, said he, ‘I will not usurp the command of an army in which I serve as a volunteer. I do not wish to dishonour my gray hairs.’ When I left him, he took my hands and squeezed them, This took place about the 26th of September. On the morrow, we procured peasant’s clothes, and passed several days in seeking a favourable start- ing-point for crossing the lines and getting rapidly into Luxembourg. The undertaking was really a difficult one. About this time my friend’s father fell ill, and the plan for his departure was put off. You know hy the blockade of Paris how rarely 10 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. the Prussian lines have been crossed; let this serve as an excuse for our indecision. But I was getting impatient ; I wished to obtain certain proofs of the treachery of our general. I went to call on my old comrade Albert Bazaine, the nephew and aide-de-camp of the general, and I found such duplicity in him, and such clumsy duplicity too, that I positively resolved to sacrifice my duty as a soldier to my duty as a citizen, and to attempt to cross the lines myself; which I did on the following day, dressed in the peasant’s clothes which we had purchased for my friend of the Polytechnic School. But, either owing to ill luck or to want of skill, after several hours passed in walking in the rain and darkness, I was caught, by the light of a moon-ray, by the Prussian sen- tries, into whose midst I had fallen just as they were being relieved. Iwas taken to the advanced posts; the men were good-humoured fellows, who treated me gaily to some abominable black bread and a little brandy. The commanding officer, a young cadet, after rather a silly interrogatory in bad French, had me led to the guard-tent, whence ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 11 I was taken to the cantonment. I passed the night in the guard-house—after drying myself before a large fire, for I was shivering with cold, my poor clothes (the trousers only cost me ten- pence) having been completely soaked by the rain —and in the morning I underwent a summary examination before a superior officer, the result of which was that I was taken for some unfortunate fellow driven out of Metz by hunger. I was then led back by three grenadiers as far as the last sen- try, orders having been given to fire upon me if I looked round. The precipitated march of events prevented me from renewing this attempt, which I had made, I believe, on the 6th of October. The inaction of the army and the intrigues of the generals seemed likely to end in an early capitu- lation. Bazaine and Coffinitres began to speak openly of the impossibility of resistance ; this was nearly the most shameful moment of that shame- ful business. Before I made up my mind to undertake anything, and bring forward Changar- nier’s name, I had wished, as I have stated, to see the old general; but as I only found him resolved 12 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. upon one point, i.e. not to compromise himself, I should only have had him proposed if no other solution could be hit upon. Clinchant often sent me his aide-de-camp, Kremer, to see if no new plan had turned up. Uncertain and hesitating, he objected to taking any definite steps without the support of the population; and, on the other hand, the population would not move, unless the army took the lead. So it ended in nothing being done by anybody. But this is what happened to one of my comrades and to myself. We were actively engaged in finding the means of action against Bazaine. One Saturday Boyenyal went to see Changarnier, whilst I called upon two very intriguing generals of the Third Corps. They received me very well, and con- fided to me a whole mass of interesting things about Boyer’s mission and other occurrences ; but when I saw that they were disposed to treat with the Prussians, in order to be free to favour a poli- tical change in France, I broke off the interview rather abruptly, not wishing to have anything to do with people who were thinking of internal poli- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 13 tics when the country was invaded. I believe those fellows (Changarnier was one of them, and Aymard was the most influential after him) were either Orleanists, or predisposed in favour of ab- solute power. My long interview with Aymard was very curious. On the morrow, both my comrade and myself were denounced to Bazaine. I have since learnt, that that very day Changarnier had reopened re- lations with head-quarters. Bazaine sent for my comrade, who lost his temper, and confessed his patriotic attempts. He was then taken to a fort and shut up. I arrived at head-quarters just as Boyenval was coming out with a superior officer: he ap- peared to be protesting rather sharply. I called to him; he merely said that the marshal wished to speak to me. I then perceived that his com- panion was a general officer. I afterwards learnt that that general had made him over to an officer of gendarmerie, who had at once taken him to Fort St. Quentin. I was shown into the large study which is at 14 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. the bottom of the right-hand passage. It was well lighted up. With the general were present his two orderly officers (Mornay Soult and a tall cuirassier). The marshal is rather short than tall, and of an ordinary degree of stoutness. When he saw me in my yellow boots and military over- coat, he exclaimed with violence, “What do you mean by that dress? What do you mean by that dress?’ interrupted he when I tried to explain. ‘Thad not,’ I answered, ‘anticipated the honour of being admitted to your excellency’s presence.’ He appeared suddenly to calm down. I was standing in the middle of the office, not far from the entrance, in military posture. The marshal was walking up and down, the two officers were leaning against the chimney. The marshal ques- tioned me calinly, though perhaps with a slight tinge of irritation. I answered him with perfect self-possession, speaking very clearly, and at one moment I even perceived that the tone of my voice was much louder than it would have been in ordinary conversation. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 15 I must here observe that the marshal, like his nephews, showed but little cleverness on this oc- casion. This may astonish those who are accus- tomed to attribute more than average cleverness to people in place. But it is sufficient to observe, that if the marshal had been a man of average capacity, or if he had been surrounded by capable men, we should not have been reduced to the con- dition we are in. As for military science and the science of go- vernment, our rulers have not yet got beyond their A B C; there is, therefore, nothing aston- ishing that such should be the case where petty diplomacy and the police are concerned. If I have secrets to hide, civilised society, especially in France, has means at hand, a fearful machinery, to tear them from me. Torture is abolished; but the first camusot you meet with is more capable of drawing out a man, and disposes of more redoubtable means, than the marshal in his study. You expose to a direct interrogatory a man whom you wish to intimidate (the marshal did 16 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. not seek to intimidate me), or to gain over (he did not seek to gain me over), or a man you mean to put to death after speaking to him; but I left his head-quarters at liberty. I was not even fol- lowed. “What do you go about the camp for?’ Such was the marshal’s first question —a sufficiently vague one for me to call for explanations before answering it. But the marshal did not wish to precise matters, and on his stating that there was nothing to precise, I replied that I sometimes took a walk outside the town, and that such had always been my habit. ‘And what do you talk about when you are out walking ?” ‘I talk of all sorts of things: of the present condition of affairs, of what is going on about me.’ He wished for a more definite answer. It was really difficult, if not impossible, to give him one; for one hears and says so many things. I told him that it would take us until to-morrow to re- peat them. ‘Very well, then,’ said the marshal; ‘we will stay here until to-morrow, ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 17 When I told him, however, that I spoke of the present condition of affairs, he chose to take it as a confession, and seemed rather pleased. As he pressed me upon the subject, though without precising, I told him that I did not give my thoughts to the present condition of affairs be- cause it was the present condition of affairs, but only in the same manner as I had busied myself with the events which preceded it; that my in- terest in military science was not of recent date, and that an examination of my notes would easily convince him of the fact; that for years I had given my constant attention to the subject; that there was nothing clandestine in what I was doing. But I see that I am slightly inverting the order of the conversation. The first tolerably clear question which the marshal put to me was with the object of learn- ing if I had not called upon generals and other superior officers to talk over the present condition of affairs. I answered, that I had spoken to dif- ferent officers. ‘But you were not acquainted with them.’ C 18 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. ‘I have spoken on that subject with people whom I knew and people whom I did not know.’ ‘But you went to them on purpose.’ “On purpose for what, M. le Maréchal?’ It will be seen that my interview with the mar- shal was the result of some formal denunciation, which specified certain circumstances. I was in- debted for this, as I at once saw, to the imprudent overtures, through which I had extracted from General Aymard the details of the projected ca- pitulation. I return to my interrogatory. ‘On purpose for what?’ I asked. “On purpose to learn the intentions of those generals, and to find out what course they in- tended taking under certain circumstances.’ And a moment afterwards, to be more precise, ‘In the event,’ he said, ‘of a capitulation, of which, thank God, no one has as yet dreamt.’ I agreed respectfully to these last words by an approving nod. The marshal went up to the chimney-piece and leant against it. The officers were at the end of the room, near the desk. I ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 19 don’t remember at all how the room was lighted up; but I remember perfectly that all the faces were in the full light. The marshal persisted, and I went on defend- ing myself. ‘In your excellency’s high position,’ I con- tinued, ‘it is natural that you should receive a host of reports, with more or less truth in them, and which must be carefully examined before any faith is placed in them.’ I got the marshal to admit that he was bring- ing an accusation against me, and placed before him in a clear light the improbability of a mere captain’s going about dictating to generals the course they should take. I submitted to him a very simple means of finding out if an officer wasted his time in culpable intrigues, namely, to examine how he did his work, and how he fulfilled all the duties of his rank. The marshal having asked what mission I ful- filled in running about the camps, I answered, that I fulfilled no mission. What mission could T fulfil? 20 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. In the warmth of my defence, the conversa- tion was taking a familiar turn, and I laughed at the improbability of a captain having a mission to gain over generals. I called for an inquiry, or at least for a confrontation. It could only be a misunderstanding, a mistake as to facts, which I claimed the right of discussing. ‘Such an accusation,’ said I, ‘must be looked into in a different manner.’ ‘But, said the marshal, ‘there is no accusa- tion.’ ‘Thave only one wish, and that is to do my duty? ‘T have no doubt of it,’ said the marshal. ‘Come,’ continued he, ‘I am frank; I question you with frankness; answer me with an equal frankness.’ ‘That is what Ihave been trying to do since you have done me the honour of questioning me. Question me, and I place myself quite at your disposal, and will answer as clearly as possible.’ He agreed to this, and did not appear dis- satisfied with my tone. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 21 ‘Have you seen General Changarnier?’ asked he. ‘I have had the honour of seeing him once.’ ‘And what did you say to him?’ ‘Nothing worth repeating. I was very for- tunate to be able to meet that eminent man, of whom I had often heard in my childhood.’ ‘J have not the honour,’ said the marshal, ‘to know General Changarnier; he has only been to see me once since IJ have been here,’ The marshal perhaps thought that I was one of Changarnier’s men. ‘And what was the object of your visit ?’ Here I displayed some coyness about giving an answer, not finding it disagreeable to be soli- cited. I said I had no motive that I need hide; but such as it was, J would rather mention it in General Changarnier’s presence than in his ab- sence. At last, on being pressed by the marshal, J admitted that my visit had to do with a military memorandum which I had drawn up concerning the situation of the army (‘a situation which has much changed since that time, added I, shaking 22 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. my head), and which I had been assured the ge- neral would consent to patronise. I had, however, given up my idea; for the memorandum contained things that there was a difficulty about saying ; it existed, however, and could be consulted. ‘I do not mean to say,’ I added, ‘that my work is in a fit state to be placed before your excellency just as it stands; but I can assure you without hesitation, that it contains nothing to compromise me.’ ‘Tam far from blaming you,’ said the mar- shal, ending the conversation by a reticence. I have omitted to mention that one of the first heads of the marshal’s interrogatory which I had energetically forced him to drop, had been, that ‘I had communicated to certain generals projects contrary to discipline, and had rendered it neces- sary for them to silence me.’ I took up those last words very sharply, tell- ing the marshal that I had never placed any one in the position of silencing me. And as he re- turned to the same facts, I again stopped him by the firmness of my denial. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 23 All this went on very quietly. I was respect- ful, as it was proper I should be, and the marshal very calm. It was a superior questioning an in- ferior on matters of service, indifferent at bottom to both of them. But when I told him that I only sought to do my duty, and he answered at once that he had no doubt of it, something strange and violent remained understood between us. I wish I could reproduce the convinced firmness of my tone in pronouncing those words; and I thought I could catch a shade of sadness in his. At last, as I became more pressing, and the marshal less at his ease, as I demanded a discus- sion and an inquiry into the facts I was charged with; and as the marshal refused it, and only asked me to answer with a frankness equal to his own, he put the question to me for the last time: ‘If I had been to general officers to induce them to act in a particular manner under certain cir- cumstances?’ I answered by a very clear denial, and waited for him to give me leave to go, which he did. Once outside, I saw that night had fallen; 24 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. and fearing that the town-gates would be closed, I had one of the orderly officers called out to give me a pass. M. de Mornay Soult presented him- self, and reéntered the office to write out the pass. He treated me all throughout with a politeness quite exceptional in men obliged at all hours to get rid of persons soliciting something. I entered Metz freely. I went to dine at my ordinary, and from thence dropped in for a mo- ment at the café, where I was looked upon, as it seemed to me, like a strange animal. Boyenval not having reappeared, to avoid ac- cidents I took the measures required by prudence. I learnt, in fact, that the marshal had given orders to the generals and to the gendarmerie to take into custody, wherever they were found in the camp, two engineer officers who were going about spreading socialist doctrines in the army, and exciting a spirit of insubordination amongst the soldiers. This order left me in safety in the town, where my service was. I nevertheless kept hidden for two days, and redoubled my efforts to raise the town. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 25 But the arrest of Boyenval had cooled down many people. When, after two days, I went dis- guised to Clinchant’s camp, he would not see me, and his aide-de-camp Kremer, who received me, apprised me of the order of arrest, and of the general determination to undertake nothing. He did not, however, abandon the plan entirely; but he would have nothing to do with such compro- mising auxiliaries as ourselves, whom he had de- termined to replace by others who were incapable of compromising themselves. My immediate chiefs had long looked upon me as dangerous; they did not refer to my momentary absence. My chief of Engineers, Salanson, who belonged to the Frossard set, went sometimes to Madame Cuvier’s house, where I met him; and the chances of conversation often led me to ex- press opinions very different from his own; hence a certain hostility, disguised under the appear- ances of cordiality. He knew that my colleagues and myself would play the devil to avoid the ca- pitulation, and to carry things to extremities. From the 18th to the 20th, finding myself 26 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. completely isolated, I gave no attention to politics ; but, to get through the time, I passed a night at the outposts with a free company, who made war upon the Prussians often successfully. An enter- prising and prudent lieutenant, who was versed in nocturnal warfare, led me with a strong patrol to within forty paces of the enemy’s entrench- ments, where several times, without loss, and al- most without danger—thanks to the advantage he took of the inequalities of the ground—we were enabled to withstand a heavy fire. This is one of my pleasant remembrances, and I should have liked to have seen more service with those fine fellows. Meanwhile my service continued. It consisted in having the drawbridge and gates of the town arranged. I repaired, and even threw up anew, almost all the earthworks of Saulay; and Colonel Petit said one day, as he was walking about there, that it was certainly the spot where the defensive works were most developed. All that was only for the benefit of the Prussians. Towards the 27th, it appeared certain that the ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 27 capitulation would be signed. I had the conso- lation to learn that it had been negotiated by Changarnier at noon on the 28th. I found out by chance that a meeting of Engineer officers, to resist the capitulation, was being held at the café. A colonel—a most worthy man, sharp and intelli- gent, but incapable of a lasting resolution—stood up and spoke vigorously against the notion of a capitulation, and called upon all resolute men to combine. General Clinchant promised to take the command, if 20,000 men could be collected. The question once laid down, the deliberation grew confused; and 1 soon took the lead. On dividing the officers present according to their corps-(’armée, it was easy to perceive that but a yery small portion of the army was represented. We agreed to give notice to as many people as possible, and that the following day Clinchant would see how many men had been got together. We were to write down our names in one of the rooms of the Engineer offices, which we used as a dining-room. Neither Clinchant, nor his aide-de- camp, nor the other promoters of the meeting of 28 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. the previous day were present, but only two pupils of the Polytechnic School, with Padovani and my- self. The crowd was considerable. Many officers had their names set down, especially regimental officers. Some colonels had sent their adjutants- major; and many officers came to get informa- tion. Kremer put in an appearance in the morn- ing, and promised that Clinchant would come at one o'clock and address the officers present. After breakfast the crowd was still greater than in the morning; but every one wanted to see Clinchant ; for whom we waited in vain until 3 Pan At this moment the same colonel of Engineers who had been so fiery the previous day appeared, looking dismal and discouraged. He was of opinion that resistance was impossible, and that there was no- thing for it but to resign ourselves to cireum- stances. In the midst of the tumult which arose, certain officers began to deliberate on the possi- bility of resistance ; but nothing could be agreed upon; and this attempt ended in smoke. The cannon and arms were being given up at the arsenal. The officers called for a big epaulette ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 29 to lead them; and the big epaulettes showed the white feather, as they have done so often. In the evening I started off with my friend Padovani to find the free company I had been with some days before. We had rifles, ammuni- tion, and provisions. But the company was disbanded, and their ams given up. The most enterprising of the officers in command of it—my lieutenant of the former night had pushed a reconnaissance as far as the Prussian vanguard, had conversed with the superior officer in command, and had become convinced of the impossibility of escaping with- out exchanging shots. We returned home; and the following day I resumed my gray overcoat and round hat. Some worthy country-folks—a husband and wife—took me to their village, at the limit of the French and Prussian lines, Chatel St. Germain, which was occupied by the Prussian 84th regiment. I aroused no suspicions amongst the numerous regiments of the enemy whom we met; and Sunday October 30th, after talking with some Prussians, and learning that commu- 30 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. nications were reopened, I put a blue blouse over my clothes, and set out for the north, through fearful rain and deep mud. I arrived at Luxem- bourg November Ist, at 7 P.M, without accidents, but not without difficulties. The following day I was at Brussels. The Tours Government. Camp at Nevers, Feb. 1871. My DEAREST FATHER, During my residence at Folkestone, a letter or report, published by M. de Valcourt under the direction of Gambetta, and in which my name was mentioned, caused me to write to Gambetta to explain clearly what my course of conduct had been. That course of conduct, which may appear singular to you when you consider the nature of a subordinate officer’s duties, was dictated to me from the commencement by a. posi- tive conviction that our generals were completely ignorant of their duty, and that 7c was necessary to do everything to rescue the French army from their hands. I have staked my head upon this conviction as openly as possible. Once out of Metz, I learnt more clearly what had been going on in the world: the siege of Paris, 82 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. the pretended Republican Government which had been constructed out of the fragments of 1848. I saw that Paris would not be intelligently de- fended; and as I advanced into France, things looked less and less encouraging. What struck me first of all was the disorder of our railroads: the trains constantly stopped owing to the disor- ganisation of the service; two days to send the London courier from Dieppe to Tours; on the central-station lines at Mézidon long strings of engines laid up with fires out; carriages piled up out of the line of circulation; in short, all the signs that this powerful instrument of war was lying useless in the hands of the Government. From Mans onwards the stations were full of officers and soldiers. What soldiers! and what officers! One felt inclined to rub one’s eyes to make sure one was not dreaming. It is true that Thad fallen into the middle of a strategic move- ment, which may serve to explain the disorder I witnessed. The sight was more and more sad- dening as you approached Tours. You could fully convince yourself of the incapacity of the Govern- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 33 ment. At Tours the streets were full of queer uniforms: every one had lace on his hat, on his foraging-cap, and on his greatcoat. Undisciplined free-shooters strolled about the town. What were they doing there? One of my schoolfellows—a civil engineer, and Gambetta’s secretary —intro- duced me to the minister on my arrival, or at least on the day of my arrival. He was ordered to present me without delay when I reached Tours. Some officers who had arrived from Metz had spoken of me; and the minister on receiving me, ‘all business being interrupted,’ met me in a most flattering manner. When I had told him what I had done, and what I had desired to do, he asked me where I wished to be employed, and where I thought I should be useful. I answered simply, that I could be of use if they employed me in the organisation of armies and the direction of mili- tary movements—both of which subjects I had studied. The minister then gave me a letter to M. de Freycinet, who held the post of Delegate at the Ministry of War; and, armed with this letter, D 34 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. I managed to obtain an audience of M. de Freyci- net two days latex, at the hour at which he received the public. Strange contrast! Just as much as Gambetta had treated me as a man of importance, just so much Freycinet treated me as a place- hunter. Both of them were mistaken; for I was neither a great personage nor a place-hunter. M. de Freycinet was a grave, grayish -haired, tired- looking man. ‘Suppose,’ said he, ‘that the War Ministry had to be organised, what place would you choose?’ The question was a strange one. I had asked for nobody’s place; and, besides, I had never learnt anywhere what places a minister had in his gift. But I have already told you that M. de Freycinet treated me like a place-hunter. I did not need a place to be made for me. I had one ready-made, since I was a captain of Engineers. I only wanted them to give me state- ments of position to make out, or maps to study. I therefore replied, after having digested the dele- gate’s question a little, to see if it meant anything, ‘That if all the places were to be distributed, I should choose the sole direction of operations.” ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 35 He made me repeat my impudent answer, and it was then his turn for reflection. I fancy the re- sult of his reflection was, that he would never employ me. This is what they did under the Republic of °70 with people they did not care to employ; they gave them a mission. ‘I can’t manage to learn,’ said the delegate, ‘ what the position of the Army of the North is, and what forces are available in that region.’ And he offered me, in sufficiently seductive languagé, a mission to the north, ask- ing me at the same time what I could do there. ‘That depends, answered I. ‘Shall I have powers and credit?’ He let me know that I should have neither the one nor the other; and the mission ended by being a mission of ‘study, to inform him of what existed there, for he had not a single description of the condition of that army. It is true that Bourbaki had sent one in since he had en- tered upon his duties, but that solitary document had been lost in the ministerial offices. I shall tell you but little of that mission. I made the best of an essentially false position, knowing that 36 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. it was false, but not caring about that detail. Before starting I saw, for propriety’s sake, Gene- ral Véronique, who then constituted in his per- son the whole committee of the Engineers. He expressed to me his fear at seeing me accept functions which would place me in contact with officers of much higher standing and rank than myself, under exceptional conditions. I never liked the Committee, even when it honoured me with its favour; I therefore soothed General Véronique by assuring him that I should observe a due re- spect for my superiors. This amounted to a rup- ture with the Committee, the autocrat of the Engineers—a rupture that came all the easier to me, since I had long made up my mind for it, especially since the blockade of Metz. When I say rupture, J don’t mean to say that they would not be delighted to see an ex-colonel of the auxiliary army reénter the sheepfold; what I mean is, that I shall never have anything to hope for from the committee. And what had I to hope for before the war, excepting to have my share of danger after the favourites, my share of ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. a7 promotion after the favourites? ... Poor favour- ites! they are in Pomerania. I started for the north on the 18th of No- vember, and remained there a fortnight. I there again met my three messmates of Metz, who had escaped from the Prussians after me, the last hav- ing passed out in a coffin beside a dead body. I gathered much information and many notes; I saw very varied prefects, and very uniform gene- rals. The prefects were all lawyers, the generals all lay figures. After the first glance, I wrote to the delegate that there was nothing good there in the way of an army, and gave my reasons for thinking so. After spending some days at Lille, I went to Méziéres, which they said was block- aded by the Prussians, without meeting a single Prussian. You can’t imagine the effect produced by the ghost of a Prussian. When I returned to Lille, after four days’ travelling, the army I had seen, or rather guessed at, had just got itself beaten at Amiens. I hurried to Arras, where I arrived with the fugitives; and towards the 3d or 4th of December I returned to Tours by the 33 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. aviso on service from Boulogne or Calais to Dieppe. It was on my return that I learnt what a quaint jest those missions were. M. de Freycinet was always engaged, and always invisible. On being admitted at last with the place-hunters, I am received by the chief clerk. ‘It is hardly worth while to give an account of your mission, said he; ‘the minister has no time to see to details. I have put all your letters on his desk’ (I had given a daily account of my labours). ‘He hasn’t looked at them; see, they are still in this bundle’ I undid the bundle; they were not there. ‘It’s strange, said he. ‘He must have read them, then.’ This encouraged me to leave a ‘summary re- port’ which I had prepared the previous night. Then I took my departure, resolved to await or- ders, and not to seek them again in the ante- chambers. Meanwhile the fruit of the first affair of Or- leans—a victory obtained by an error—had just ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS, 39 been lost; the French army was retreating, and, what was worse, operating an eccentric retreat. There was a double reaction against the ignorant strategists who had directed our movements: on the one hand, Gambetta’s party, who would have wished to give that minister a more direct share in conducting hostilities, and to see him employ generals and officers of his own choosing, instead of doting generals and reactionary officers; on the other hand, the reactionary party, who were de- sirous of overthrowing Gambetta, by making him responsible for the defeats, and of taking us back to where we are now going. And meanwhile, what was Gambetta doing? I don’t know: he was rather a flag than a chief —a flag which the Government hoisted to give itself a manly and republican appearance, and of which the men of action would have wished to make use, to be manly and republican. He was a sort of Louis XII. without a Richelieu; he made and unmade prefects, whilst the fortunes of France were being staked upon loaded dice. As I was sitting in the café on the evening 40 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS, of December 6th, in came Cavalier, my senior at the Polytechnic, better known as Pipe en Bois— a journalist and an orator at public meetings, and for the moment Gambetta’s secretary. Cavalier sat down with us, and, as a member of the Go- vernment, was not long in proving to us that everything was for the best in the army of the best of republics. He found me incredulous, grew animated, discussed, harangued, and swore; and finding that I was still incredulous, began at last to take what I said as serious; and this the more readily, that he knew that at that moment the armies of the best of republics were in rather a straggling condition—the one towards the cast, another towards the west, and a third towards the south. ‘When a man has ideas of that kind,’ said he, after listening to what I had to say, ‘he should communicate them to the minister.’ And on my replying that the minister was not accessible, he laid a bet that he would get me an interview with him that very evening. It was ten P.M., and we entered the ministry. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 41 Here I am at the eleventh page of my letter, and J have skipped three-quarters of my adven- tures in telling them to you; but Destiny has played such fantastic tricks with me, and, in fact, with all of us, during the last few months, that nothing any longer as‘onishes me; and I narrate the romance of my wanderings as if it were the simplest tale in the world. But it is when I have to speak of Gambetta that I feel most embarrassed. How am I to speak ill of the energetic tribune who was the first to proclaim the downfall of the Empire, and who, during six months of a desperate crisis, was the life and soul of ourimbecile government? On the other hand, how am I to speak well of the un- decided and ignorant minister, who was unac- quainted with the condition and position of his armies, and whose barren and ill-directed activity could neither avoid disaster nor find remedies for its effects ? I sympathise with his vigour, with his aver- sion for bloodshed, with his rapid conception of facts, with his devotion to the Revolution; but I 42 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. detest his half-measures, his constantly-recurring acts of weakness, and his concessions to the men and to the things of the Empire. I had got to the evening of December 6th. We entered the room which served Gambetta for an antechamber as it were, a room inaccessible to the public, and where the minister’s private secretaries sat. They were dictating despatches, and talking and gossipping. Gambetta was close by in his study. Cavalier, and then Cendre, an- other of my seniors, begged him to grant me a hearing: he promised for the following day; but as in that country to-morrow means never, my comrades insisted all the more. Meanwhile the minister had come and established himself in an arm-chair in the large room where we were sit- ting. He was holding forth in his stentorian voice about the crimes of some sub-prefect or other; then seeing me at Cavalier’s table, he came forward to wish me a good-evening. ‘And what are you doing there?’ said he, find- ing us poring over a map of France. ‘We are making plans of campaigns, like the ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 43 rest of the world; you must have had more than enough of them.’ “Come and talk to me to-morrow,’ concluded he. But Cavalier couldn’t make up his mind to let me go. Hemanaged so well, that the minister called me into his study towards midnight, and kept me alone with him until nearly half-past two A.M, talking of war and army organisation. Knowing that I was speaking to an honest and energetic man, I did not hide the truth from him. He was specially taken by a system for combining the Mobile National Guards, the mobilised, and the troops of the line, something after the fashion of the half-brigades of 1794. He wished me to draw out the plan on the spot for the Army of the Loire; and then, being fearful of disorgan- ising that army before the enemy, he offered me the command of the camp of St. Omer to try the experiment. But it did not suit me to remove so far from the spot where the decisive cast was to be thrown. He returned to the notion of amal- gamating the Loire Army, so as to have but one 44 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. description of infantry. But this war-minister had neither statements of the condition nor of the exact position of the corps of his principal army ; and I declined to interfere with the existing or- ganisation without knowing exactly what I inter- fered with, and without having precise grounds to go upon. Perhaps with a little quackery on my part, I might have obtained a firm hold of the minister’s mind. I have sufficiently studied army organi- sation to be able to juggle with the numbers of battalions, and extemporise a system. But I had too much respect for the man with whom I was speaking, and for the interests involved. After a long conversation, during which Gambetta was really as amiable as a dictator could be to a poor devil, he fixed an hour on the morrow for studying the reorganisation of the army with me, with the aid of real positions and figures. The next day he did not receive me. Was it owing to mistrust, prejudice, or weakness? I can’t say ; but when I arrived, armed with a little sheet of tracing-paper, my comrade Cendre told me that ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 45 the minister was attending a council, which was not the case. That evening I met at the café the same General Vergne, who had offered me the place of head Engineer officer in the camp he was about to take command of; and I accepted the place, partly out of pique. I arrived at Nevers on the 18th of December, after a sojourn at Bourges, which was not without its episodes; and I have set to work at forming Engineer companies. In spite of the heedlessness which prevented the troops from reaching this camp, I have collected one by one twenty officers and 500 men. The camp is now broken up, and peace is perhaps concluded; but I have been able to convince myself that my little troop, when acting on its own resources, is much more disciplined, capable, and serviceable than the battalions whence I drew it. Peace is concluded, it is said. Then I am no longer a soldier. Before long I shall join you at Paris, and shall either go in for politics in France, or for industry in the United States; that depends 46 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. upon whether I am more or less disgusted with our wretched country. Good-bye, my dear father. Your affectionate son, ROSSEL. Letter to ML. Gambetta. December after Beaugency. You were kind enough to receive me on my return from Metz, and to promise to em- ploy me on the organisation and the movements of the armies. I had hoped that the favourable reports you received of my conduct at Metz, and the good- will I had displayed in the defence of the country, would have procured me an opportunity of dis- cussing the direction of the present war with you, and of pointing out to you the mistakes in organi- sation and strategy which were being daily com- mitted, and which were leading you to a defeat. That defeat has been suffered. Served by the same staff, and surrounded by ignorant specialists, you are hurrying to a fresh disaster; and each failure gives the enemy a shred of our territory, destroys the last remnants of our military strength, 48 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. and this until you perish in defeat, and with you the hopes of our country and of liberty. In the name of our common faith in that country and in that liberty, grant me a serious interview; give me the means of proving to you that I understand warfare, and of showing you the causes of your past defeats, and of the failures you are preparing for yourself. Is not the in- capacity of your administrators and generals suf- ficiently demonstrated to justify you in seeking, without regard to seniority, the means of con- tinuing the war with less misfortune? ROSSEL. The Camp at Nevers before March 18. Camp at Nevers, Jan. 7, 1871. My DEAR KREMER, No news from you since our adven- turous meeting at the Café de la Ville at Tours. You were beginning to succeed; you have pro- spered since then, and, in fact, I have followed your example. The proverb is right, ‘Il faut prendre du galon’ (One should wear gold lace).* Don’t you think with regret, when admiring your stars, that if, three months ago, we had been in possession of those playthings, the Metz army would be carrying on operations in France? We were only wanting in gold lace. The question of the national defence will per- haps one day be put, like the question of the de- * Quand on prend du galon, l’on n’en saurait trop pren- dre:’ a French proverb, meaning that when you do anything from interested motives, it is as well to get as much as you can for your trouble. + Rank is indicated by the number of stars. 50 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. fence of Metz; if Paris falls, we shall see one of those pretty movements of general cowardice with which we are beginning to become familiar.* IT don’t know if your opinion of me is still the same ; you used to consider me too adventurous. I should like to avoid all chances of peace, and I am engaged in communicating this impression to my friends, and in asking for their opinion. Once Paris falls, the government you have seen at Tours, and which has already negotiated three or four armistices, will perhaps be disposed to negotiate a serious one, one of those armis- tices which are fatal to the vanquished, and which follow upon great disasters. What will you do then? I really don’t know why I ask you, a * In another letter from the camp at Nevers, date Jan. 7, 1871, and addressed by Rossel to his comrade Cendre, the fol- lowing curious passage occurs : ‘I have not given up my silly plan of predicting events, and Ithink, 1. that our approaching military undertaking will end in defeat, because it has been unmasked too soon, and is too negligently conducted; 2. that Paris will fall unless she has more than three months’ provisions; 3. that at the moment of the fall of Paris, there will be a crisis of social dis- organisation, of which the reactionists and the cowards will avail themselves to swamp the national defence, ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 51 Lorrainer; I know perfectly well that you will continue the war. Write me a line on this sub- ject, if only to tell me that your ideas have not changed since Metz and Tours. You have in your neighbourhood one of my old comrades, Bourras, lieut.-col. of Engineers, who commands a corps of partisans. He is a sin- cere patriot and a true soldier. If you come across the 20th Corps, you will find in it our friend Padovani, with whom we used to work at Metz; he is still a captain of Engineers. Try to remove him, and give him troops to lead. You will rarely find a more daring fellow. I am writing to you from Bois-Vert by Magny- Cours (Niévre), I am head Engineer officer of the camp at Nevers. I have a little kernel of patriotic officers, to whom I give the mobilised to make soldiers of, or, better still, Engineers. This plan appears likely to succeed. We shall see afterwards if they will stand fire. With a good shake of the hand, Yours sincerely, ROssEL. Camp at Nevers—The Head Engineer Officer. To M. L——, LIEUTENANT COMMANDING THE 2D Company OF ENGINEERS AT Bots-VERT. Meance, January 29, 1871. THE rumour of an armistice for twenty- one days, and of elections for February 8th, is getting confirmed. Hold your company in readi- ness. Show no weakness to your men. Are you sure of them? You must not think of building barracks and ovens, but of making soldiers, men, and citizens. See to your non-commissioned officers, and give them explanations as to what you require. See that your officers look after the men, find means to act upon them, and to make use of their authority. I can’t order firmg until our armament is complete. How often have I mentioned these details to you! You have got three lazy fellows ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 53 for armourers. The arms must be ready in three days, or we shall fall out. Buy grease for the shoes; I have got shoes for you. Go into the huts on Wednesday, soldiers and officers! This is no time for shirking. When I tell you to have belts made, it is be- cause one hundred of your men are without them. Your workmen are a parcel of old women. Have less to do with carpentry. If I were addressing you as an officer under my orders, I should have no right to ask for im- possibilities. Are you here as a soldier, or as a patriot? Ifas a soldier, you are only fit to go to Germany with your three or four hundred thou- sand comrades. You are here as a patriot: I shall ask for impossibilities, and you will accomplish them. Try to get accustomed to the idea at once. Your friend, ROSSEL. Notes taken at the Camp at Nevers. MmiTary operations have been constantly unfor- tunate, owing to ignorance; the plans are always defective, and the chiefs incapable. Chanzy alone perhaps has shown any talent, and even he can only be judged when we know what forces were opposed to him; yet this general, who might have inspired confidence, was taken off the board, and engaged with insufficient forces in covering what ? —Normandy, Bretagne, and Poitou. Gambetta had rapidly become a politician ; he should have become a soldier, and that was our hope when shut up in Metz; we had penetrated the nullity of our generals. Gambetta would not follow that course; he abdicated his power in favour of ignorant specialists, thinking perhaps that war has mysteries requiring profound study, or that you must have commenced as a soldier ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 55 to understand strategy. Yet in spite of this un- fortunate determination, Gambetta has guessed much; a little study—very little indeed—would have taught him a hundred times more. Instead of having a patriot at our head for the supreme business of the defence, we have obeyed reactionists of all colours; we have been headed by all the gouty old fogies on the list. They tore their hair with terror when they ac- cepted the responsibility, and fell much more by their own impotence than by the skill of their adversaries. All the operations have been defective—all! The retaking of Orleans was the result of a childish error, classed and catalogued in all trea- tises on military art under the head of ‘concentra- tion on a point occupied by the enemy.’ The second taking of Orleans has also a name amongst grave errors. It is called a ‘divergent retreat.’ The battle of \miens may be called a ‘pas- sive defence,’ as well as the operations which pre- ceded the retaking of Orleans by the Prussians. 56 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. Bourbaki’s march towards the East was blun- dered. The crime of jamming an army up against a neutral frontier, and uncovering the whole line of operation for a distance of one hundred miles, has no name in military science. If Gambetta had acted for himself, instead of trusting to the judgment of a worn-out old soldier, who only marched against his will, the fine operation he had planned would never have ended in a shame- ful disaster. The Republic is as criminal in this respect as the Empire, for she has shown just as little intel- ligence in the choice of leaders. It is fair that the Bordeaux Government should recriminate against the Paris Government, but it is also fair that we should recriminate against the Bordeaux Govern- ment. Shall I say to what extent our organisation has been defective, and to what fresh waste we have subjected the unfortunate inheritance of the Empire? We submitted to the distinction between the Army and the Mobile, but it is we who have invented the mobilised, multiplied uniforms and ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 57 systems, and excluded married men from the de- fence of the country, under the groundless pre- text that to employ them would ruin the country. Is not the country sufficiently ruined now ? And what incapable organisers! Their one fear was, that there would be too many men to instruct; they excluded as many people as pos- sible from the recruitment. They neither knew how to collect men, to command them, nor to instruct them. And the Government multiplied the work by unreasonably creating instruction camps, the folly of which I could never get under- stood. Let us try now, however. The Government had a definite task to accomplish, with a definite period to accomplish it in, i.e. to instruct soldiers. It added to this difficult task that of creating simultaneously numerous camps. By creating new corps it rendered necessary the creation, by inex- perienced administrators, of so many new dépots ; and by isolating the mobilised outside the towns, after having taken from them all the old soldiers, they deprived them of leaders and instructors. 58 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. The artillery would not sacrifice one nail of its scientific and durable matériel. Its cannons and carriages, its ammunition carriages and harness, will last forty years, it is true, but will only be ready when the war is over. As haste was neces- sary, did we simplify our armament? No; we complicated it by the adoption of the rifled can- non. Our defeats were not caused by defective weapons; they depended upon much _ higher causes. Rifled cannon are good for cockneys; let us have smooth-bores, and know how to work them. The cavalry has proved as methodical as the artillery, and as incapable on the battle-field. The Struggle to the Death. Tue defence until death, the continuance of the struggle until victory, is no longer a utopian idea, is not an error. France still possesses an im- mense war material and a large number of sol- diers. The line of the Loire, which forms an excellent frontier, is hardly touched until Bourges is lost; but even if that town were in the hands of the enemy, an attack on the southern provinces is difficult, owing to the mountains of Auvergne, which would oblige the foe to divide his efforts between Lyons and Bordeaux. If the Prussians were checked on either of those lines, they would both be reopened. As a general rule, a defence until death can never do harm to a people. The mistake we com- mit in concluding peace is the same as that which lost Carthage: a rich and rather sceptical na- tion is always tempted to commit that fault. The 60 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. victor has then nothing to do but to go on un- dermining it until ruin ensues. Resistance, on the contrary, has often lucky chances. Remember the battle of Canne; the conquest of Holland by Louis XIV. at the head of the four most powerful armies in Europe, commanded by Turenne and Condé; the inva- sion of Spain by Napoleon in 1808. Those three situations were much more desperate and crush- ing, and left much fewer chances for a favourable issue, than our position after the fall of Paris. And yet all three led to a fortunate issue; nor is this the effect of chance, but rather of an enduring law, of which one of the distinctest cha- racters is the wasting away of victorious armies. An army carrying on an active warfare de- stroys itself, even with every facility for recruit- ment. The recruits which arrive keep up the numerical strength, but replace neither the old soldiers nor the officers it has lost. Napoleon’s army perished through want of officers; the same was the case with Hannibal’s army; the same will be the case with the Prussian army, and still ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 61 more rapidly, without considering the fact that the death of Bismarck or of Moltke may at once put an end to everything. The saying of victorious Pyrrhus is not a paradox. There is a moment which often comes to conquerors when victory contains all the germs of disaster. Canne or the Moskowa represent that moment. Why should not the same thing happen to the Prussians? It is only a question of awaiting our opportunity—of wearing them out and wearying them. Let them find Capuas in our towns; but let us never come to terms with them for our ransom. We are wanting in patience; we conclude peace as rashly as we went to war. The people are too changeable and too sceptic. Eighty years since they were capable of being roused to fana- ticism by the notions of liberty, of equalitarian propaganda, of universal democracy. What will they believe in now? ROSSEL. A Letter to M. Gambetta. February. At last you have ceased to be a minister—to be my minister. Without doubt you have been seized with disgust; or else you have grown weary of the powerless dictatorship you held; weary of all the little intellects which surrounded you, of all the petty ideas and petty anxieties which tram- melled you. Torn from the Government, where your energy was a standing reproach to every one, you are restored to the cause of the defence. No more ambitions to restrain or gratify; no more Bour- bakis to humour; no balance to be maintained any longer between your men who were reactionists and your ideas which were revolutionary. The revolution must, perhaps, be entered upon afresh. If this terrible tenure of office has not exhausted you, I trust that we shall undertake it. You are wanting in military understanding ; ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 63 that defect has proved your destruction. The decision and boldness with which you overflow are shamefully wanting in our generals; and yet those are the true gifts of military men. For my part, I could never understand what you were doing in vour study. When I think that a few hours a week sufficed for Napoleon to get through the routine work to which you were reduced, I side with the despot against you. He made war, and you let others make it. Your government has not proved a fighting govern- ment; it was too like the preceding one—a quantity of offices and a little police. Never mind; you are no longer the govern- ment. You are still the most determined and the most intelligent man our party have given birth to. For our sakes I bitterly regretted to see you abdicate, or rather to see you little by little elimi- nated from power. But the sympathy, mingled with pity, which I felt for your government leads me to excuse that fault; and I heartily desire to assist you in exerting your influence in the coun- cils which are about to be opened. 64 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. My illusions, and the hopes which I had built upon you, date from the September Revolution. Your young renown made me confident that you would overcome the impotence of your decrepit surroundings. I saw how readily you had become a politician, and I flattered myself that you would become a military man with equal rapidity. You never even tried; chance made you acquainted with some of the secrets of our profession, but their general meaning escaped you, and you placed yourself willingly in the hands of our imbecile generals. Can I not assist you? More than once The 19th of March. To THE MINISTER OF WAR AT VERSAILLES, Camp at Nevers, March 19, 1871. Mon GENERAL, I have the honour to inform you that I am about to proceed to Paris, to place myself at the disposal of the Government forces which are about to be organised there. Having learnt by a Versailles despatch, published this day, that two parties are struggling for mastery in the country, I do not hesitate in joining the side which has not concluded peace, and which does not include in its ranks generals guilty of capitulation. Whilst taking so grave and so painful a resolution, I regret to have to suspend the duties of the Engineer service of the camp at Nevers, which had been confided to me by the Govern- ment of the 4th of September. JI make over that F 66 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. service, which no longer consists in anything but the regulation of articles of expenditure, and transfer the accounts to M. F., lieutenant of Auxiliary Engineers, a man of honour and expe- rience, who remained under my orders by General Vergné’s command, in virtue of your despatch of the 5th instant. By means of a letter addressed to the Store Department, I give you a summary account of the position of the service. I have the honour to be, mon Général, Your most obedient humble servant, L. Rossen. The Part I played under the Commune— Cluseret, Delescluze, Se. Versailles Prison, June 20-24, 1871. BeroreE the 18th of March I had considered what course I should take in the event of an insurrec- tion in Paris. The condemnation to death of several men of the democratic party for a move- ment which took place during the siege, and the suppression of several newspapers, had increased my feelings of hostility towards those vanquished men who showed themselves so incapable and so humble before the enemy, and so bold and in- solent when they had to do with political parties. The journals had made out a list of the artil- lery existing in Paris; I had especially remarked more than 600 field- pieces. Small-arms and ammunition were in still greater abundance. If one knew how to make use of those enormous stores, it was possible to snatch back victory. I 68 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. wrote in this sense to an intelligent man who had taken an active part in the popular movements at Paris since the beginning of the war. He ans- wered by furnishing me with precise statements ; but the general impression produced by his reply, was the incapacity and want of organisation of the party of action, and the impossibility of a movement. His opinion on this point was final and well supported, Nevertheless, the existence of sufficient war material for a struggle, and the presence of a party disposed for it, seduced me in spite of everything. I did not foresee the possibility of a civil war which would go beyond street-fighting. On the 19th of March a despatch from M. Thiers, officially posted at Nevers, announced the evacuation of Paris by 40,000 troops in good order. Even had I not been favourable to the Revolution, this last detail would have made me side with the insurrection. The army had not undergone sufficient shame during the war; it was necessary that 40,000 men should leave Paris without fighting, without a day’s strugele, in the § 8) iy SSle, ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 69 presence of so contemptible a foe as an insurrec- tion must always be; and that too after having had the advantage of the offensive, which is the only really favourable chance for an insurrection- ary movement. That evening at dinner my host, M. de L., guessing that I had made up my mind, entered upon a conversation, in which he endeavoured dis- creetly and with the most friendly sentiments to dis- suade me from the extreme course I contemplated. If he remembers that interview, his testimony may be useful tome. What he said touched and saddened, without convincing me. I showed him that, taken as a whole, this Revolution had been made by the people—by those who suffer by the present condition of society; that the crimes and errors which stained the Revolution should not prevent men of honesty and instruction from join- ing their party at such a critical moment. In short, my departure was rather a sacrifice than anything else; and amidst the disaster and feeble- ness of the whole country, the Parisian revolu- tionary party was, in my eyes, the lesser evil. 70 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. T learnt the same evening the murder of Ge- nerals Thomas and Lecomte. Such occurrences are almost unavoidable in revolutions. I left Nevers at night, and arrived at Paris on the morning of the 20th. On the first bill I read I saw the names of Sullier and Assi. This is what caused my first sensation of discust and disappointment. I inquired where the Government sat, and went to the Hétel de Ville to have my name put down and ask for service. On the 22d of March I was presented by some friends to the Committee of the 17th district; and the same day I was named by the Central Com- mittee of the Hétel de Ville, and elected by the Committee of the 17th arrondissement, chief of the 17th legion. The first days of my command were occupied in taking measures against the reactionary move- ment, which was being got up under the orders of Admiral Saisset, and one of whose head-quar- ters was at the St. Lazare terminus, close to my district. Prisoners were brought in, who were ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 71 generally arrested in the trains starting for Ver- sailles. Much animosity was shown towards them, and I took every pains to protect them, being na- turally averse to all the violence for which revo- lutions are a pretext, and determined, whatever the consequence, not to permit any. I caused those who were detained, to be treated with hu- manity; and I delivered as many as I could, ac- companying them myself beyond the dissatisfied crowds. Those people must feel some gratitude to me, as they thought themselves very near being shot. Admiral Saisset’s retreat put an end to the hopes of the reaction. The elections for the Com- mune, directed by the care and authority of the Federation of the National Guard, took place almost immediately (March 26th), I don’t know if the Federation made the Re- volution of March 18th; but what is certain is, that it had confiscated that Revolution, and ex- cluded from all part in affairs the truest repub- licans and the most active members of the Inter- national Society, if they did not belong to the 72, ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. Federation. It is owing to this fact that disputes arose from the very commencement between the mayors and their adjoints, although both re- publican and revolutionary, of certain districts, and the battalion delegates who formed the Le- gionary Council or District Committee. These last confiscated the municipal authority in the name of the Federation, and exercised it without sagacity, and sometimes without honesty. This is what took place in the 18th district, and in the 17th, where I was. When this dispute was settled, fresh ones arose between the delegates of the Central Committee of the Federation and the District Committee concerning the elections. After the elections, it would have seemed that everything should revert to the Commune. But nothing of the sort: the same struggles continued between the Communal delegates and the District Committee (or Legionary Council). As chief of the armed force, I was constantly called upon to take part in these dissensions; and I did not spare the District Committee, which was ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 73 certainly the most idiotic little piece of despotic machinery that can be imagined. Finally, when the municipality sent by the Commune wished to establish itself, it was my duty to arrest the most autocratic of those demagogues. Whilst those quarrels were going on, I was engaged in gaining over to the cause of the Revo- lution the 33d and 90th battalions. I succeeded without violence and without accidents. I also turned my attention to the battalions in the out- skirts near my district, from St. Omer to Suresnes. The Revolution, after Admiral Saisset’s departure, had some days of real progress; and I got so far as to be able to count seventeen battalions in my district, instead of seven, which it numbered when I arrived. Some detachments of the army, left without chiefs, came over to the Federation; and I ordered elections, which led to good results. The Central Committee, during its short tenure of office, had forbidden the reélection of the whole staff of the federated battalions. This order be- came a real stumbling-block in the way of their properly-organised command. The elections were 74 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. carried on in a most unenlightened spirit; the convocations were impeded hy the military ser- vice, with which the battalions overloaded them~- selves, as if for their amusement. It was con- stantly necessary to renew the elections, which had been incomplete, irregular, or without results ; and the end of it all was, that with great difficulty, and after an infinite number of changes, chiefs were elected who had neither influence, instruc- tion, nor dignity. The staff was constantly chang- ing, and the elections recurring, until the fall of the Commune, or close to that period. Thus ended the month of March. The dele- gates of the Commune at the mayoralty of my district were Malon, Gérardin, and Varlin. They considered me capable of rendering important mili- tary services to the cause of the Revolution, and tried to get me into the Council, where military questions were decided. About this time the first engagement of the civil war took place within my district. A re- connoitering party, composed of two squadrons of cavalry, drove a detachment of a suburban bat- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 75 talion from the cross-roads of Courbevoie, and a National Guard was sabred by an officer. This reconnaissance was pushed as far as the bridge at Neuilly, but fell back on seeing the resolute atti- tude of another suburban detachment who occu- pied the tcte de pont. The following day I sent out a strong detach- ment, which occupied without resistance the cross- roads evacuated the day before; but it returned in disorder a few hours later, having been abandoned by its chiefs. The next day the enemy returned with cannon, placed a battery at the cross-roads, and cannon- aded the Neuilly bridge, which was abandoned. The shells reached the ramparts. This was pro- bably the 1st of April. I made a plan for crossing the Seine at the bridge at Asnitres the following night, to go and retake Courbevoie and the bridge of Neuilly by the line of the railroad. This would have been a very serviceable movement, and well timed up to the 15th of April, but the bad quality of the troops prevented it from ever succeeding. On the Ist of April, as well as ] can remem- 76 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. ber, I was summoned with the other chiefs of legions to a council of war at the Place Ven- déme staff-quarters. It was probably there that the march on Versailles, which cost Flourens his life, was decided upon. I remained there about two hours; but seeing that nothing of importance was being said, I went away, after having ob- tained authority to carry out my projected attempt upon Courbevoie. This attempt ended in a most thorough failure, perhaps on account of the defects in the plan it- self, but principally on account of the bad quality of the troops and officers. I started with seven battalions, numbering altogether about 2000 men, divided into three groups, under the orders of Malon, the member of the Commune, of my second in command, and of Gérardin, another member of the Commune. At least two bat- talions were completely drunk, and others com- plained of not having eaten. The vanguard, which I led, followed me in good order; but the other battalions, whose officers had no influence over their men, were not long in sitting down on the ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 77 side of the road, quarrelling and complaining. Two or three panics took place—in short, the most thorough disorder. The officers failed en- tirely in doing their duty. Malon and Gérardin exerted themselves, whilst for my part I did all I could to achieve something; until at last, con- vinced of the impossibility of leading such people against an enemy, we resolved to take them back to the town. But if it had been impossible to make them advance, it was still more painful to make them return. I passed a cruel night, and I thought it would disgust me for ever of such un- dertakings and such soldiers. I had been followed the whole night through, without my knowledge, by some of those jealous republicans who consider it their first duty to ex- ercise a rigorous control over the actions of men in office. The result of this supervision was per- fectly favourable to me, and the opinion they formed of my character, joined to the opinion of Malon and Gérardin, caused me to be chosen to serve in the Ministry of War. I was very near being shot at the bridge of Asniéres by my Na- 78 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. tional Guards. On reéntering the mayoralty, my first thought was to impose a rigorous discipline upon the legion, and to make a selection amongst the officers, so as to exclude those who were in- capable of commanding; but the first step I took towards this end awoke the susceptibilities of the District Committee, who arrested me, and three delegates took me quietly to the Préfecture of Police, where I was at once locked up. This took place on the 2d of April, about seven A.M. Iwas broken down with fatigue, and deeply disgusted with the Revolution and the revolu- tionists, with the National Guard as a body, and the National Guards as individuals. I fell asleep immediately, and was awakened at eleven o’clock by the warder, who came to let me out as hur- riedly as I had been put in. An officer who was quite unknown to me had ordered my release. I returned home, thinking only of leaving Paris, and I slept all day, to set myself up after ten days of constant fatigue. But the following day (April 3d), the same officer who had caused me to be set at liberty the day before, having ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 79 learnt my address in the office of the 17th dis- trict, arrived with a letter from Cluseret, begging me to be the head of his staff at the War Depart- ment. This is what had taken place. The military authority, which had been confided to Eudes at the end of the Government of the Central Com- mittee, had afterwards been divided between Eudes, Bergeret, and Duval. On the Ist of April those three generals had planned, in the council of war of which I have spoken, a march upon Versailles, which took place at the same time as my luckless movement upon the bridge at Asni- éres. The results are known—the death of the unfortunate Flourens and of Duval, and above all a large number taken prisoners. The very day of this scrimmage, the trio, Eudes, Bergeret, and Duval, were set aside, and the command confided to Cluseret. I have been told that my appoint- ment was forced upon him by the War Commis- sion, through the influence of the members for the 17th district; for at bottom he always seemed to entertain a certain jealousy of me, which was 80 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. mitigated by the feeling that I was necessary to him. However that may be, the letter in which he summoned me was very friendly in tone. They had been looking for me for twenty-four hours, and they had searched all the Paris prisons to find me. I obeyed the call at once, in spite of my re- pugnance for staff duties and my previous disap- pointments. I had hope in the Revolution, and besides, I did not think it becoming to refuse. From that time forward I was constantly tied down and engaged in such a multiplicity of inco- herent affairs, that it will be nearly impossible for me to remember the principal ones, and, above all, to put the dates aright. The greater part of my time, when I was chief of Cluseret’s staff, was certainly taken up by im- portunate and useless individuals; delegates of every origin, inquirers after information, inven- tors, and, above all, officers and guards, who left their posts to come and complain of their chiefs, or of their weapons, or of the want of provisions and ammunition. There were also almost every- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 81 where independent chiefs, who did not accept or did not carry out orders. Each district had a committee as useless, as quarrelsome, and as jealous as that of the 17th. The artillery was sequestered by an analogous committee, also de- pendent upon the Federation, and who formed a rare collection of incapables. Every monument, every barrack, every guard-house, had a military commandant ; that military commandant had his staff, and often his permanent guard. All those spontaneous productions of the Revolution had no other title or rule than that of their own pleasure, the right of the first comer, and the calm preten- sion to retain the place without doing anything. You might see doctors promenading with a gene- ral’s gold lace and escort; barrack doorkeepers equipped like superior officers ; and all those fel- lows had horses, rations, and money. To make up for this, the National Guard was often without chiefs. The former officers were no longer obeyed, because of the orders for reélec- tion. The rank of the new set was either dis- puted or they were not elected; this served the G 82 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. battalions as a pretext for not marching. The elections of the chiefs of battalions were very long; those of the chiefs of legions impossible. An officer was no sooner elected than protests against his election, and accusations against his character and opinions, poured into the ministerial oftices, from the committees of the Federation, of the Commune, and of all imaginable authorities. It was no child’s-play to make something out of all that, to say nothing of the serious defects in the organisation of the National Guard, the legacies of preceding governments, which would alone have sufficed to render abortive all our attempts at organisation and defence. Our Na- tional Guards had been carefully formed by des- potism and for despotism; it was impossible for us to make anything of them by liberty and for liberty ; the transition was too sudden, the neces- sity too imperious, and the events too hurried. The staff of the War Department consisted, at the beginning, of Cluseret and myself, with two or three idlers in Cluseret’s suite. I made up the necessary numbers by taking a few men of some ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 83 instruction who offered their services, and I gaye my attention specially to the organisation of the legions. The very first days it was necessary to oust Bergeret, who was commandant of the city, and would have wished to command everything. Cluseret had to have him arrested, and replaced him by Dombrowski, whose appointment I sup- ported, and who was backed by Félix Pyat. It was agreed that Dombrowski should direct the movements of the troops and the military opera- tions, whilst we organised the legions and saw to the administration. Several things prevented this idea from being carried into effect. In the first place, Dombrowski established himself at Neuilly, and paid no attention to the left bank; on the other hand, Cluseret proved himself almost imme- diately inferior to his duties, in activity, in the power of taking the lead, and in capacity for or- ganisation. The directions he gave were ill-con- ceived; he did not indicate the means of carrying them out, and, worst of all, he did not stick to his plan once he had adopted it; his fickleness and his uncertainty were great causes of difficulties. 84 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. He began by twice modifying the organisation of marching companies, reistablished by his pre- decessors; then he raised the daily pay of the artillerymen to three francs. Both these measures had unfortunate results. Other innovations he introduced also augmented the disorder. The complication of the government machinery be- came extreme. There was a commission specially charged with looking after Cluseret, of which Delescluze and Félix Pyat were the most active members. This commission ‘bothered’ Cluseret, to use the truest word, and that was all they were good for. They transmitted to us by telegraph, frivolous notices or ridiculous questions, or sent us with special recommendations, pitiful inventors or drunken delegates. The commission, as a body, often conveyed itself to the ministry, and dawdled about Cluseret’s study with a most business-like air. The organisation of the Military Court stands out alone in this chaos of remembrances. It sat for the first time on the 14th and 15th of April. This jurisdiction was constituted by the Com- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 85 mune, at the pressing instance of Cluseret. Wild acts of indiscipline and rebellion were daily com- mitted with impunity; it was necessary to have recourse to energetic measures of coercion. I was named president of that court, and filled those functions for about a week. That period is es- pecially important with regard to the part I played. In the first place, the necessity of attending the sittings of the Military Court prevented me from seeing myself to the condition of the legions, which was beginning to be more regular, and to which I attended in the morning. The sittings of the Military Court were held at night, and lasted pretty late, and on getting home I had still busi- ness to settle. I was therefore forced to confide the morning report to an officer in whom I had but little confidence, and who gave to this work of organisation, which was of capital importance, a bad direction, and perhaps one which he inten- tionally made injurious to the success of the Re- volution. Besides which, the power with which these 86 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. functions invested me, aroused the susceptibilities of the Commune, an assembly as suspicious and timid as ever democratic assembly was. Last of all, it was just at this moment that Cluseret manifested more and more clearly his intention of setting me aside in the conduct of affairs, whilst still continuing to employ me, and detaining me near him, to prevent me from being elsewhere. It is known that the service of the chief of the staff comprises the details of all the services, and that he is the necessary medium for transmitting his superior’s orders. Cluseret, on the contrary, began to conduct the principal branches of the service directly, and thus placed me ina very false position, as I was charged with the execution, explanation, and completion of orders with which I was unacquainted. I have since supposed that at that period Cluseret, whose undecided mind was subject to the wildest delu- sions, had his reasons for keeping me in the dark as to the steps he took, and for suppressing the involuntary control which a chief of the staff exercises over his general. He nevertheless con- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 87 tinued to treat me with courtesy; and he spared me no praises as to the price he attached to my services. I return to the question of the Military Court, a question which I shall treat more thoroughly perhaps, and separately, if necessary. To accept the presidency of that court was the greatest sacrifice that I made, and could make, to the Revolution. An enemy to revolu- tions, circumstances had thrown me into a revolu- tion. Whilst hating civil war, I was engaged in civil war. I was now called upon to preside at a revolutionary tribunal, a tribunal which would only pass sentences of death. If it be necessary for me to defend myself against the charge of ambition, my painful ac- ceptance of this office is perhaps the strongest argument I can adduce. What interest can an ambitious man have in soiling his hands? I must have been very foolishly ambitious, or very ignor- ant, to stain my name with blood in subordinate functions. There is only one reasonable explanation for my conduct, which was that I was sacrificing 88 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. myself to the Revolution. I had chosen none of the posts which I had filled in succession, nor had I refused to accept any post. In such moments of crisis one must display a sectarian devotion. I therefore accepted the presidency of a tribunal which I was of opinion would only return sent- ences of death, and only thought of fulfilling my duties in the manner most serviceable to the re- volutionary cause. In the same measure as the military situation grew more pressing, the indis- cipline and want of organisation of the troops became more manifest. It would be out of place to enter into full details with regard to that situ- ation; it is sufficient to state that success was hopeless as long as the troops showed no obedi- ence, and could shirk their military duties with impunity. We had abstained from giving a proper organisation to the National Guard, which would have been the best remedy; it now re- mained to be seen what could be done by repres- sion, and it was necessary that it should be prompt and real. Such was the object for which the Military ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 89 Court was constituted; its action was limited by the clause of the decree which enjoined that no execution should take place until the approval of the Executive Commission, which was the execu- tive power of the Commune, had been obtained. In its first sitting the court issued an order regulating the mode of procedure and the nature of its punishments. That order was necessary to complete the far from precise decree of the Commune; it simplified the forms of procedure, and assured to the accused the safeguards of publicity and of defence; as for the punishments, it simply laid down that the court should follow existing laws and the rules of martial juris- prudence. All the following orders were issued without bearing upon any text of the law. All the accused were federals charged with military crimes or offences. The court neither judged political cases nor cases of common law. The following day a chief of battalion, guilty of having refused to march against the enemy, was condemned to death. The Executive Com- mission commuted the punishment, at his de- 90 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. fender’s request, to imprisonment until the end of the war. The decision of the Executive Commission which commuted this first sentence enervated the Military Court. It judged three or four more affairs, of which the two most important were, the abandonment of a trench near the fort of Vanves by a battalion from the 5th district, whose officers were condemned to suffer various penalties; and the affair of the 105th battalion, which brought before the court a dozen or so officers and guards who had refused to march against the enemy, and who were guilty of mutiny and assault upon a superior in the ser- vice. This affair led to no sentence of death; there were different condemnations, and some acquittals, but no very serious consequences. The action of the Military Court made the Commune anxious; it feared this new power, which condemned the guilty without regard to their antecedents, as more or less distinguished demagogues. It so happened, in fact, that our most undoubted offenders were firm upholders of ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 91 the good cause. The commandant we had con- demned to death was a revolutionary veteran ; and the 105th battalion, which we had abused, was the pillar of the Federation in the 7th district. The Commune showed by the decree that its members were only amenable to itself— that it feared their being amenable to others. It considered as an enemy a jurisdiction which condemned, without distinction of persons, those who would not go under fire, or came out from under fire when they pleased. T have said that the 105th battalion belonged to the 7th district, which is the Faubourg St. Germain, and which stretches along the banks of the Seine towards the Champ de Mars. The Federals were few in that quarter, but the 105th was recruited at the extreme end of the district. It federated itself in part from the commence- ment, then proceeded to hold fresh elections, and was the support of the revolutionary organisation in that part of the town. The members of the Commune there elected (Parisel and Urbain) owed much to the 105th. To strike at that 92 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. battalion was equivalent to attacking the validity of their election and the support of their power. They referred the judgment of the Military Court to the Commune, and the judgment was quashed by a decree, one of the statements in which was personally offensive to me. My father, who lived in Avenue Latour Maubourg, had commanded that battalion at the period of the 4th of September; he had resigned towards the end of the siege; his successor had left Paris after the 18th of March; and the actual commandant, a certain Witt, was impli- cated in the affair, and acquitted. The Com- mune decided that my relationship with the 105th was sufficient to invalidate the judgment; and without going to the bottom of the affair, which, had they done, the sentence would have appeared manifestly equitable and moderate, it quashed the judgment. The decree had been made out by Léo Meillet. The order had been issued on the night of the 22d April; it was quashed on the 25th or 26th. I learnt it by the Offciel, and at once ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS, 93 resigned my posts as president of the Military Court and as chief of the staff to Cluseret. For the second time my good fortune offered me an easy opportunity and good and valid reasons for abandoning, for detesting, that dis- jomted Revolution —my bad fortune carried the day. I must go back a little, to speak of the events which led to Cluseret’s arrest, and of that which followed it. Cluseret, after having shown, during the first moments of his tenure of the ministry, an exces- sive activity, had been completely mastered by the course of events. Some attempts he had made to shake off the Commune had made him neglect his daily business still more; he had come out from those struggles vanquished and lowered. Pyat and Delescluze, who were then the most active members of the Executive Com- mission, tormented him by their supervision, their questions, and their childish anxieties. On the other hand, he neither enjoved my sympathy nor (so far as capacity went) the confidence of the 94 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. officers employed at the ministry. I have said that his character was undecided, and his mind open to the grossest errors. I could bring for- ward facts, which would show that between him and me there was more than the germs of dis- sension. When I was named, on Cluseret’s pro- posal, to the presideney of the Military Court, I was obliged to leave, as I have already noticed, the duty of making out the reports to an officer not wanting in special knowledge, but whose character inspired me with no confidence what- soever. That officer availed himself of the op- portunity to obtain from Cluseret, who had, how- ever, been forewarned by me, the exclusive care of the organisation of the legions; he conferred numerous appointments, and surrounded himself by a complete staff, and sent in daily reports to Cluseret of a very summary nature, and quite insufficient for ordering the service. By these and other means he had arranged for himself completely independent duties. This may appear strange, but the whole truth was still stranger; for such attempts at autonomy amongst the lowest ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. Qo officials, far from being exceptional, recurred daily everywhere. After Cluseret had tolerated several of them, I offered him my resignation for the first time, grounded upon the repugnance which the despotic and unintelligent policy of the Commune inspired me with. Shortly afterwards I offered it to him again with sufficient persistence for him to accept it; but he begged me, at the same time, to continue in the exercise of my duties until he could find me a successor. At last, after the decree of the Commune quashing the order of the AMlitary Court, I ceased all service on the 27th of April. Men are soon worn out in revolutionary pe- riods. After a month of power, and, above all, of struggling, Cluseret was completely worn out — exhausted, in spite of the concessions of every kind which he had constantly made to every one. At first he had wished to be that which the military chief in a besieged place, in an army, in a camp, should be; that is to say, an absolute, undisputed, and uncontrolled chief. He had com- pletely failed with the Commune, and had erred 96 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. in retaining the command after that check. He had at first undergone the assiduous control of the Executive Commission, chiefly represented by Pyat and Delescluze; then one of the numerous Palace revolutions which occurred in the Com- mune caused the Executive Commission to be composed of all the delegates to the different ministries, and a special War Commission to be named, to look after Cluseret in the discharge of his duties. Suspicions were accumulating against him, and several times already the question of his arrest had been raised. Such was the situation of affairs when I ceased to be at the head of the staff for carrying on the war. My resignation pained such of the sin- cere revolutionists as knew me. Gérardin, who from the commencement had despised the Byzan- tine discussions of the Commune—Gérardin, who, on account of his continual presence at the ad- vanced posts, had a much clearer idea of the falseness of the situation than the folks at the Hotel de Ville—confided to me a plan which he had conceived for nullifying the Commune, by ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 97 having the power transferred to the hands of a Committee of Public Safety, or some other Execu- tive Committee, composed of young and resolute members of the Commune, whom he named, and in which I should share with Dombrowski the conduct of military operations. In the mean time the members of the War Commission chose me for the confidant of their anxieties; and even sys- tematic Republicans, who had not participated in the proceedings of the Commune, offered me spon- taneously their systems and their support. I thus found myself the centre of an incoherent and varied movement, whose unconscious watchword was to ‘save the Revolution by annulling the Commune.’ T let things take their course. I was as much the enemy of the Commune as the sensible Re- publicans were; yet I still thought that the Com- mune could and ought to be beneficial. Through Gérardin I was sure of the support of the ener- getic and intelligent members of the Commune ; others, whom I refrain from naming, because they have not appeared on the revolutionary scene, H 98 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. offered their financial experience ; and finally the generals obeyed me willingly. Under such cir- cumstances success was not impossible, and the Revolution might save the country. On the evening of the 29th I was summoned before the Executive Commission. It was not concealed from me that they would have no more to do with Cluseret, and they put to me several questions on the situation and on my own ideas. I stated my opinion of the situation, which was becoming more and more involved. The defence was a mere nothing, and the attack being inde- pendent of the plans of the enemy’s generals, and solely dependent on the talent of the subordinate officers of Engineers and the courage of the rank and file opposed to us, would necessarily make continuous progress until the town fell. There was no hope of success, save in a sweeping reform in the system of salary (which, as at present or- ganised, placed the people, combatants and non- combatants, in the pay of the Commune); in the reéstablishment of discipline by means of severe examples, made chiefly amongst officers of high Pies; A 5 2) ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 99 rank; finally, in the immediate organisation of a small corps @armée, capable of acting in the open country and of taking the offensive. When I left, my appointment as provisional War-dele- gate was signed by the Commission; it was an- nounced to me the following day, at the same time that Cluseret was arrested at the Commune. I must here observe that I defended Cluseret against the press and the Commune, from the vulgar accusation of treason. This change was the result of the efforts of the War Commission, whose duty being to divide the management of war business with Cluseret, and who, considering that Cluseret neither did nor chose to do anything—which was true enough —had sought a successor for him, and had made me acceptable to the Executive Commission. Both the Commissions promised me their full support, which consisted in good sentiments on the part of the Executive and good-will on the part of the War Commission. But neither the one nor the other had broad ideas enough, nor sufficient capacity, nor aptness for such excep- 100 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. tional and revolutionary work as that which pre- sented itself to us. Simultaneously with this change, the idea of which Gérardin had spoken to me, had been car- ried into execution by the overthrow of the Execu- tive Commission, and the creation of a Commit- tee of Public Safety, which was elected May Ist, with the difference that in this Committee, in- stead of resolute and intelligent men, Gérardin was associated with the pitiful Félix Pyat, with Léo Meillet, and two other stopgaps whose names I don’t remember. This fiasco deprived me of the support of the Executive Commission, and placed on a pinnacle Félix Pyat, whose blunder- ing activity would have rendered any undertaking abortive, and whose brain—devoid of judgment —was the receptacle of all the impure and un- wholesome ideas that ferment in a revolution. I learnt this news by an avalanche of despatches which fell upon the War Department during the night of the Ist of May, and by which he dis- arranged all the military measures I had taken. As soon as I reéntered the Department on ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 101 the evening of April 30th, I set to work at the most urgent measures. It is not a matter of in- difference to state, that during the night of the 29th a trench situated to the right of Fort Issy had been surprised by the enemy with the battery which held it. Mégy, the incapable commander of the fort, seeing the enemy stretching out on his right, had taken fright, and evacuated the fort with the garrison. Cluseret, at this news, had started for Issy, and, collecting some troops, had led them back to the fort, which he had been the first to enter. It was on his return from this expedition that the Commission had had him arrested. For my part, I confined Mégy, and sent General Eudes to Issy, the importance of which position he did not understand, and he therefore proceeded thither much against his will. I have said that the most pressing questions were the pay, discipline, and the organisation of active forces. It was indeed a pressing matter to put an end to the crying abuses which obtained under the existing system of payments. I will give an 102 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. idea of them by stating that the same useful re- sults might have been insured for a twentieth part of the sum. On the Ist of May, having convoked the Executive Commission, the War Commission, and the general officers to a council of war, I agreed with Jourde, the Finance dele- gate, that we would study together that very evening, a plan for reducing the allowance made to the National Guard to the same rate as the pay of the army, with something over, and for allowing to women and children, by way of assist- ance, a sum superior to the seventy-five centimes hitherto allotted to the women, and this by way of compensation, and to cause the reduction in the pay of the National Guards to be admitted. Jourde engaged moreover to find and to set at work the necessary employds for distributing and recularising the allotments of pay and for con- trolling the disposal of the funds. Forty active and honourable accountants were wanted at once. Neither of the above plans came to anything. The Executive Commission having been dethroned in the same day’s sitting, Jourde struggled for ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 103 two days at the Commune against the creation of the Committee of Public Safety; and the pay question stood as it was when I arrived. I had a commission of three members nomi- nated to judge Mégy. Dombrowski, Eudes, and Bergeret were those three members. The com- mission never met. On the 30th of April I drew up a plan for a tactical and administrative group of five battalions, commanded by a colonel and two lieutenant-colo- nels, to serve as a basis for the organisation of an active army. I instructed Bergeret to choose five battalions, which were known to him, of from 400 to 500 effective men each, to form a regiment. Eudes was to form two regiments likewise in Paris. Dombrowski agreed to form three, and then a fourth, within the limits of his command. La Cecilia, who was going to take the command of the centre, asked also for a regiment to form. Each of those regiments was to return the nu- merous flags and pennons of which the Federals made such an abuse, and receive in exchange a four-pounder gun or a mitrailleuse per battalion. 104 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. Thus I had put on the stocks, as far back as May Ist, eight regiments, which were in reality active brigades, of about 2000 men each, and forty field- pieces. At the same time I destined to Wrob- lewski, who commanded the left wing, all the available cavalry, unfortunately but few in num- ber. Although I endeavour to exclude from this memorandum all considerations of military art and of politics, I must here observe, that this attempt at organisation, destined to permit me to give battle before Paris, was the sole chance of success for the defenders. In confining oneself to a pas- sive defence, one could only delay the fall of the fortifications—the inevitable conclusion of a re- gular attack. As for the mode of organisation which I had adopted, let the purists in military art decide whether it was fitted to the character of the troops at my disposal, and to other circum- stances. I had projected to add to it a battery of twelve or sixteen cannon of the largest bore. Whilst I was taking these measures, I divided amongst the members of the War Commission the ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 105 principal services of the department. Avrial had already taken charge of the artillery; Bergeret, instead of Delescluze, who was ill, had charge of the clothing; at the same time he set afoot the manufacture of earth-bags for the defence, and of provision-bags for the marching battalions. Arnold undertook to institute an examining com- mittee for the office, in order to get rid of all the useless and ignorant wearers of lace who encum- bered the town. Tridon, the most capable and the most respected of them all, but whose ruined health did not admit of regular work, took charge of all that concerned the commissariat, and began by imprisoning the brothers May, who were carry- ing on that service. I must say, that all these functions, accepted without hesitation, were exer- cised with much lukewarmness. T have said that I had sent Eudes to the fort of Issy. The revolutionary notoriety of the man had led me to make that choice. He had every interest in defending the Revolution, and would be nothing without it. I thought him too promi- nently placed to show want of spirit. He went to 106 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. his post with regret on the Ist of May, leaving at Paris the chief of his staff, Collet, and a portion of his numerous staff itself, to organise his regi- ments. No sooner was he arrived at the fort of Issy, than his sole thought was how to get away from it. He sent to the Commune, to the Com- mittee of Public Safety, to the town, and to the Ministry, despatches, in which he expressed in warm terms, the impossibility of holding out any longer, and the necessity for having reinforce- ments, provisions, ammunition, clothes, tobacco, cannons, &e. Pyat, who was in all the fervour of his first day’s government, answered him by send- ing me pressing despatches: ‘Preserve Fort Issy at any cost.’ The 2d of May Gérardin informed me of the assumption of power by the Committce of Public Safety, and invited me to attend at the Commune, after which I should dine with the new Govern- ment. To describe that day’s business, it would be necessary frankly to adopt the humorous style which is suited to a tale at once grave and gro- tesque. Let it suffice to say, that I brought down ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 107 volleys of applause from that tetchy assembly, which was not insensible to truth spoken without respect of persons and straightforwardly. I passed the evening at the Hotel de Ville, with the mem- bers of the Committee of Public Safety. I believe those gentlemen expected me to submit to them a plan of organisation or defence; and Félix Pyat in particular spoke profusely on military matters, which he viewed in the narrowest light. At last one of the other members of the Committee hav- ing spoken of the measures he was taking in his district to establish the National Guard and re- form abuses, ‘You, at least,’ said I, ‘are reason- able. Pyat inquired sharply if J meant to say that he was not so. I began laughing, and we were mortal enemies. The following day Eudes became more and more pressing, and his urgent despatches made me determine to go to Fort Issy, and make an effort to relieve him. I took with me a part of the battalion on guard at the department, which was to wait for me at Vanves; but divers acci- dents, and in particular a fall from my horse, de- 108 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. layed me so much, that I could only reach the fort at night with three battalions which I had picked up on the road, and whose presence served to renew the courage of the defenders, I gave some important instructions to Eudes, who had taken up his quarters in the darkest and least-exposed casemate of the fort, and who still complained of the danger. One only of all my instructions was carried out, and procured us a success. But what was strangest in this adventure was my meeting at the fort, Dombrowski, to whom I had long since assigned the command of the right bank, and who was as astonished by my arrival as I had been by his presence; for he had just received from the Committee of Public Safety an order investing him with the command of all the active forces, but leaving me the Ministry of War. We were— Dombrowski and I—on the most amicable terms. He therefore told me, whilst we were eating a piece of bread in Eudes’ casemate, not to interrupt my organising labours any more; and that he would, in virtue of his new powers, undertake all the active work. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 109 I agreed with him, and told him that when we had settled what operations were to be under- taken, I should be very happy to confide their execution to him. Already, in the course of the month of April, Dombrowski had received full powers to direct all the operations; but he had established himself in Neuilly without giving a thought to the southern line. The experiment had, therefore, been tried; and I did not see any reason for confiding the whole length of the line to him. On returning to the department, I wrote to Gérardin, to reproach him for this surprise. The next day I explained my motives, and the inop- portuneness of a single military command. The first decree was revoked, and Dombrowski again became the commander of the attacked points of the right bank. I cannot here fully discuss the causes of my determination. It is certain that these successive decrees were the cause of jealousy between Dombrowski and myself. Pyat’s government did not stop there. He sent an order to Wroblewski, who commanded the 110 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. left wing from the Biévre to the Seine, to go to the assistance of Fort Issy. Wroblewski, a care- ful and methodical man, complained of receiving orders from all quarters, but thought himself ne- vertheless bound to obey the Committee of Public Safety. He passed the night of the 3d at Issy; and during his absence, the redoubt of Moulin Saquet, which depended upon his command, was surprised by the enemy, and the cannons carried off. There was a stampede, a panic and emotion in the town; and Wroblewski, in accounting to me for the event, excused himself by his absence, and the impossibility he had laboured under of exerting his usual supervision over the advanced posts. In fact, he was, as I have said, very careful; and at all events, if he could not have prevented the accident, his presence would have diminished its effects. Thad another cause of complaint against the Committee of Public Safety. On the 2d of May a Prussian, bearing a flag of truce, had come to the Hotel de Ville, where I had seen him, to bring a letter from his general to complain to the Com- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 111 mune of the arming of the fort of Vincennes, and claiming the right to visit the fort the next day at two P.M. This arming was the work of a blundering commandant, and I immediately gave orders in consequence. I sent back without an answer the truce-bearer, who had orders to wait for one, and I suggested to Paschal Grousset, the Foreign Affairs delegate, the sense of the answer he was to give. He communicated to me during the night the very proper letter he had addressed to the Prussian general, in which he begged him to observe that a general officer had no right to correspond with the sovereign As- sembly of Paris, but must communicate with the military authorities. After this reminder as to international propriety, he told him that the officer whom the Prussians would send the following day would be admitted and receive satisfaction. The officer did come; but instead of referring to the orderly officer whom I had sent, he found two officers of the National Guard, under the direct orders of Paschal Grousset, who showed him what- ever he wished to see in the fort of Vincennes. 112 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. All those encroachments of the civil authority, or rather all that disorder, had serious consequences. The direct orders given by the Committee of Pub- lic Safety paralysed and thwarted the action of the war-delegate, who had no reason for existing if every one save him directed operations. This is what I went and told the Commune on the 4th; and I especially attached myself to Félix Pyat, reproaching him with the despatches with which he overwhelmed the individual commanders, with- out warning me, and making him answerable for all the evil results which might follow. Pyat de- fended himself like a pitiful fellow, and formally denied ever having signed such order ; which state- ment obliged me to produce the originals, and es- pecially the order which had displaced Wroblewski from his command. Those orders were produced next day in the Commune by the members of the War Commission, and obliged Félix Pyat to offer his resignation as member of the Committee of Public Safety. All this constitutes a complicated narrative, and one rather difficult to follow; but I have still ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 113 more intrigues and complications to tell of, and I am certain that at the same time many others were going on of which I had no knowledge. The Central Committee of the Federation of the National Guard—that same Central Com- mittee which had managed the Revolution at the beginning, though much enfeebled by the election of its most influential member to the Commune— still continued to exist, and had not ceased to give underhand orders, to receive appeals and com- plaints, and to proceed to elections. It considered that the part it played in a revolution of which it held itself to be the father, the guardian, and the legitimate owner, was a very petty one. It therefore availed itself of the change of system which took place at the end of April to offer its support to the new Government; and at the mo- ment when I was speaking against Félix Pyat in the Commune, the deputies of the Central Com- mittee were awaiting the decision of the Committee of Public Safety, who had made an appointment with them to settle the question at issue. When I left the Commune, Gérardin took me I 114 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. to the Committee of Public Safety, and the de- cision to be taken was left to me. There was some discussion. The deputies of the Central Committee, who were really the most intelligent and the most resolute members of that assembly, laid stress upon their power of acting upon the National Guard, and the facility with which they could cause to be accepted and carried out the measures which passed through their hands. As I pressed them with inquiries as to whether they had enough resolute and experienced men to di- rect the different branches of the service, ‘We have felt our pulse, said one of them; ‘and we are up to the mark.’ I therefore consented to make over to them the administrative branch and the organisation services dependent upon my department, for the following reasons. It was impossible for me to seek support from the Commune, whose resolutions were constantly fluctuating, and who showed but little inclination for business, but exhausted themselves in barren discussions and quarrels. The Executive Com- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 115 mission, formed of delegates for the different branches of the service, was without power and without will, since it had been thrust into the background by the invention of the Committee of Public Safety. The War Commission was com- posed of five members, of whom three alone did any work, and even their labours were unpro- ductive, on account of their want of capacity for government. In their situation, it was less a question of working themselves than of making others work; and I believe that Tridon alone might have had that gift. As for the Committee of Public Safety, it was only the ghost of a power. All those people never understood the old Revo- lution; they never saw deeper than its rind, and had no idea of the immense labour which insured the success of the Revolutionists of 1793. I had therefore nothing serious to lean upon: the re- form of the pay-roll, and the mobilisation of an army—the two things necessary to achieve suc- cess—were set aside or adjourned; and I resolved, as a last chance, to employ the Central Com- mittee. 116 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. It is with unfeigned disgust that I return to the rapid events of that short period, and this sentiment prevents me, I fear, from giving all the necessary details. The remembrance of all those presumptuous revolutionists, devoid of study and of energy, capable, perhaps, of a sudden stroke, but not of exerting will and keeping to a purpose,—their remembrance, I repeat, is a night- mare for me. The Central Committee of the Federation was incapable of managing anything. Powerful to impede and disorganise, because of the league of which it was the centre, it proved absolutely in- competent to create. The 5th and 6th I saw some of its members; they were the most willing (and, indeed, only the most capable were sent to me), and had divided themselves into com- missions for the different branches of the service ; but the time for action was taken up by the confused sittings of the Assembly, and, con- sidered as a whole, the mass of the Committee were neither intelligent nor enlightened. Fort Issy was still the most threatened point ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS, 117 of the outworks. Eudes had abandoned it, leay- ing it in charge of Collet, the chief of his staff, a man of small merit. To make up for this I had sent there an Engineer of talent and of courage, who took advantage of every moment’s respite left him by the enemy to repair the forti- fications. I went twice again to this point of attack, but without succeeding in getting the troops to execute a movement. At last, on the 7th May, I had become convinced that I should not succeed in collecting a sufficient number of capable men for the department, and that the Committee of Public Safety would or could not assist me, either through want of energy or of confidence. There was only one chance left of improving the position of military affairs, which was becoming very threatening, and that was suddenly to take the offensive, with the troops just as they were, to interrupt the progress of the attack by inspiring the enemy with serious anxiety. My attempt at organising active troops had meanwhile begun to be carried out, but it had 118 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. everywhere been met by obstacles. The name of regiments, which I had adopted instead of that of brigades, not to increase the number of gene- rals, had given umbrage to the chiefs of legions, who feared that arrangement would deprive them of their authority. The officer whose duty it was to report upon the ministerial legions, and to centralise all that concerned the organisation, fomented this mis- trust to such an extent as to impede the com- pletion of several regiments. I have said how much I suspected that officer; I learnt at last that he had, without orders, convoked the chiefs of the legions and the heads of their staffs; upon which I had him arrested. A commission of the Central Committee undertook his duties. It was probably on the 7th of May that I paid my last visit to Fort Issy; I will speak of it with some detail, and shall take this opportunity of mentioning certain circumstances which may prove serviceable for my defence. General La Cecilia commanded at Little Van- ves, where I had withdrawn, several days before, ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 119 the troops destined for the defence of the village of Issy, so that they might rest with security. Always anxious to attack the enemy’s posts, which was the only way of rendering the defence effec- tive, I had sent La Cecilia an order to collect his troops at three or four o’clock in the morning. I arrived at Little Vanves at the hour agreed upon, but the troops were not assembled. It is a serious business to collect National Guards at a given time, and I was several hours with General La Cecilia without his being able to assemble his men. Whilst one battalion was arriving, another disappeared. It was there that I inflicted punishment on several National Guards who had deserted their post; an inoffensive punishment, but one which made a deep impression upon them. I had their right sleeves cut off, commencing with the offi- cers. They were all sobbing, and the guard which surrounded them was, perhaps, more af- fected than it would have been for a capital execution. I will say, with reference to this, that, thanks to a strange chance much more 120 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. than to the effect of my will, I have never caused the death of a man. I pronounced before the Military Court a sentence of death, but it was commuted without my interference. As great an enemy to killing as to warfare, I nevertheless accept all the consequences of the situations in which I am placed. On the 7th of May I had not sufficient faith in the efficiency of our re- sistance to resort to repressive measures. The same day I visited Fort Issy, which was cruelly bombarded by the enemy. It rarely takes place during a war, that the firmg should be so violent as that which for a fortnight was poured into that miserable building. I passed several hours there in order to be acquainted with every- thing. Collet then commanded, and his character id not permit me to hope for a prolonged de- fence. I had ordered intrenchments to be dug at the Issy Lyceum, which occupies a very good posi- tion to the rear of the fort. I had hoped that it would be possible to detain the enemy there some time after the fall of the fort, and I had sent ROSSEL'S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 121 out several detachments of barricade-makers, who were navvies, or other workmen of the same class; but they could not make up their mind to work under fire, and my instructions were not carried out. I have come at last to the end of my story. On the 8th of May the chiefs of legions assembled to protest against the formation of regiments. Several of them, who were sent to me to discuss the subject, affirmed that their authority was suf- ficiently well established to enable them to take the field at once, and they promised me for the morrow twenty-five battalions of 500 men each. I had but little faith in this; but as a success was essential, if only to give time for the defence, I resolved, if they brought me a few battalions in good order, to take them out and fight. I also ordered out Bergeret’s regiment, which was more advanced than the others. Bergeret promised it to me, but excused himself at the last moment for three battalions, who refused to march for want of I don’t know what appurtenances. Seve- ral chiefs of legions also came to tell me in the 122 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. evening that they would be unable to furnish the troops they had promised. It was then that I dictated my resignation, of which I sent copies to the most widely-circulated newspapers. A moment afterwards I learnt that the tricolor flag was flying from Fort Issy, which had been abandoned the day before by its garri- son, and which I had vainly tried to have reoccu- pied. I went afterwards, to satisfy my conscience, to see the troops which the chiefs of legions had collected, and I had them counted exactly. They did not amount to 5000 men—and those were pitiful troops. The Commune, on receiving my letter, sent me two successive deputations to beg me to withdraw my resignation. On my re- fusal, it ordered the War Commission to take the direction of the war delegation, and to arrest me. At the same time the Central Committee, which was sitting at the Ministry of War, was sending me deputation after deputation to ask me to attend its sitting. I had to give way to this im- portunity, and I gave them the information they ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 123 asked me for, explaining to them that I could not do the whole work—be at once corporal and general, and run right and left to bring back under fire people who were tired of fighting; whilst all those who ought to have been at work were occupied in very ill-timed deliberations. The Central Committee was stupefied. After leaving them I went to dine with Dombrowski, where I received an envoy from the Central Com- mittee, informing me that they were going to ask the Commune to grant me full powers. At about ten o'clock I returned to the Minis- try, where it was not long before I received the whole War Commission, backed up by Jo- hannard and Deleseluze. After the first com- pliments Delescluze reproached me for having posted up the fall of Fort Issy. I answered sharply enough that the people should be the first to get news of such importance. We argued this point some time, as it was the most serious grievance the Commune had against me; and the Commission, which had brought the order of my arrest, went away without communicating it 124 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. to me, and begged me to continue in the exercise of my functions until the next day; which I only consented to do on the condition that one of the members of the Commission should remain in my office, so that J should have nothing to sign. The following morning the Commission, much embarrassed at not having executed its formal mandate, sent me two of its members to beg me to accompany them to the Hotel de Ville in my carriage; and I remained at the Questure until five o’clock, neither free nor a prisoner. At five o'clock Gérardin came and joined me with the intention of demanding to be imprisoned with me. The sitting of the Commune had been tumul- tuous. No explanation was listened to, and a decree of accusation had been passed against me. A court-martial, of which Collet was to be presi- dent, had even been named. I could not bear the idea of appearing as an accused before that Collet, whom I had seen cowering before the shells at Issy, and it was then that I determined to evade the justice of the Commune. I took Geérardin in my carriage, which transported us ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 125 to the Boulevard St. Michel, and each of us went in search of a hiding-place. The new Committee of Public Safety, on which figured the names of Arnaud, Billioray, Eudes, and Gambon, did not cease until the last day of their authority to attribute the fall of Fort Issy to my treachery. Félix Pyat and Vallés honoured me by opening the case against me in the columns of their papers, and I was even the subject of several leading-Pyats, in which it was demonstrated that I had aspired to tyranny. Last of all, a Versailles newspaper (Paris Journal) pub- lished a fictive act of accusation against me, in which it was established when, how, and through whom, I had received 500,000 francs for perpe- - trating that act of treachery. Iam now at the end of the task I had un- dertaken—to relate the part played by me in the insurrection ; a task which has not been wanting in bitterness; for I have had to go over again, one by one, all my lost illusions, my disappointments, and my unrealised hopes. I served the Revolution faithfully, blindly, 126 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. until the day when I had experienced for myself ‘all the vanity of the hopes I had based on that experiment. The Commune had no statesmen and no soldiers, and did not wish to have any. It surrounded itself with ruins, without having either the power or the desire to create anew. An enemy of publicity because it knew its own folly, an enemy of liberty because it was so feebly balanced that the least movement would upset it, that oligarchy was the most odious despotism imaginable. With but one process of govern- ment, which consisted of keeping the people in its pay, it squandered by its prodigality the savings of democracy and its hopes, because it rendered the people unaccustomed to work. When I saw that the evil was hopeless — that every effort, every sacrifice, would be fruitless—the part I had to play in it ended. Supplementary Notes. J ONLY wore uniform when it was strictly neces- sary. I have even visited the forts and points of attack in plain clothes. Up to the Ist of May I had only once put on my uniform, for a sitting of the Military Court. I had presided at the other sittings in plain clothes, dressed as I am at pre- sent, My staff was composed only of subaltern offi- cers; it was the least numerous of all, although my functions were the most important. I never took an escort, but only, when neces- sary, platoons on horseback, without arms, to hold the horses, and to carry the field-glasses and the maps. Rather a singular fact, which I remarked several times—when the troops or Federal guards saluted me as I passed with the cry of ‘ Long live 128 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. the Commune!’ I replied by a wave of the hand ; sometimes also by crying, ‘Long live the Com- mune! But the officers of my staff never ans- wered otherwise than ‘Long live the Republic! The Military Court, in spite of what the Report* says, never pronounced but one sentence of death, which was not carried out. It is false that my orders were in perfect agree- ment with the Commune. On the contrary, it was the constant and incurable disagreement be- tween my orders and the system of the Commune which brought on my resignation. If there had been perfect agreement between us, I should not have left the Commune, and the Commune would not have proscribed me. The need for a democratic revolution certainly exists. The inferior classes are too powerful not to make their weight felt in the government of the country, and too dissatisfied to refrain from * This is the Report on which were founded the accusations brought against him before the Versailles Court-martial. It was in reply to this Report that Rossel drew up the preceding memorandum and the greater part of the accompanying notes, J. A. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 129 claiming at every opportunity a larger share in it. The well-to-do class, which has withheld the power from them by means of the elective seats on the one hand, and of the dynasties of officials drawn from their body on the other, has made use of this power in a manner most disastrous to the public interest, by throwing the heaviest burdens on the inferior classes. For instance, amongst the direct taxes, trading licenses are so organised as to favour the great manufacturing interest; amongst indirect taxes, necessaries bear the burden rather than articles of luxury. But J am better acquainted with the military laws than with other branches of the subject. The degenerate condition of our army is caused by the alterations in our military institutions, which have been incessantly introduced since 1830. The wealthy classes, constantly favoured by the law of substitutes, are withdrawn from the defence of the country, which has been confided to the indigent and to mercenaries. To recruit officers from the ranks has become difficult, and non-commissioned K 130 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. officers impossible. The army has degenerated little by little. The events of the past year are the result of forty years’ misgovernment. When I saw the Bor- deaux Assembly tending violently towards the past, I thought that the fantastic future dreamt of by the Paris democrats could not prove more per- nicious than a retrograde movement. It is a remarkable fact, and one not beside the question, that the Commune constantly chose its agents out of the minority, or what might be termed the opposition. And this because the ma- jority contained no capable, cultivated, or special men. Jourde, Delescluze, and Varlin belonged to that minority which rendered itself indispensable by its estimable character and its knowledge, but which was constantly envied and assailed, and which, on the other hand, did not spare the ma- jority. It was only after I was proscribed that the majority came into power by the renewal of the Committee of Public Safety (Eudes is the most characteristic name on the new committee), and ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS, 181 later by that of the War Commission. It was then that the agitation rose to the pitch of in- sanity. For my part, I was brought forward and sus- tained by the minority, which, to speak truth, was deficient in men of capacity since the Avrials and the Arnolds, men of little science and little cha- racter, held the highest rank in it. I was always opposed to the line of policy taken by the Com- mune; it was at my suggestion, and by the pres- sure I exercised through the Pere Duchéne, that the publicity of its sittings was obtained. I often told the members of the Commune who came across me, that the people had not made the Re- volution to be governed by the Commune, but to govern themselves. I favoured publicity as much as I could, and I never contributed to the publica- tion of the false statements which were brought forward by the Offciel. The journalists who ap- plied to me—and they were principally the Eng- lish, the Americans, and the ‘Sociale’-—had the authentic despatches communicated to them. Pub- -licity could only do us good. 132 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. Since I have known the Commune, I have never hoped that the Revolution would triumph by means of the Commune, but in spite of the Commune. ‘Avrial is a dangerous dog,’ that trembler of a Regére was wont to say; ‘but you have got a firm hold on him.’ This is Avrial: ‘I enlisted at nineteen, I don’t know why; I became a non-commissioned officer, and took to thinking and meddling with politics. Naturally I was ill-thought of in the army. At twenty-five I left the service, also without know- ing why. It was necessary to get a living: I returned to my old trade as an engineer. And fancy my folly! six months afterwards I married. At the same time I went into business; but was unfortunate, and after six months had lost 4000 francs. My wife had fortunately brought me something—some 10,000 francs. But I also in- vented things. I have invented a gas-machine which is at Lyons at M. X.’s. ‘Ten months after my marriage all my furni- ture and all my clothes were in pawn. I worked ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 133 five years before I could take them out again. My furniture, though not costly, was pretty and very neat, All this time I lived on the sixth floor, sleeping on a mattress supported by chairs. No- body entered my room, and the key was always in my pocket, that it should not be seen. ‘I then worked at a gas machine, Lenoir’s engine. It has often happened to me on Satur- days, or even on Fridays, the eve of pay-day, not to stay at home for breakfast, knowing that there was barely enough for my wife and child. I went out for a walk, and strolled about whilst the others were breakfasting. ‘T worked hard at that time; I read everything T could lay my hands on.’ Avrial was of herculean build; he was a mem- ber of the War Commission, and from the first had taken charge of the artillery. He followed slowly but exactly all the suggestions I made to him, but nothing more. The day before yester- day evening in he comes, with the remainder of the Commission, the order for my arrest in their pockets, and they go away without executing it, 134 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. leaving the decision and signature of all military measures still in my hands. Yesterday morning Avrial comes up again with Johannard, and they tell me the history of the order for my arrest, and how embarrassed they felt—placed as they were between the positive orders they had received, and their equally positive resolution not to put them into execution. They add, that all the members of the Commission were as anxious as themselves to have the honour of making this communication to me, and that they all join in begging me to repeat to the Commune the ex- planation I furnished them with yesterday. Upon this, I get up, give them breakfast, have the horses put to, and drive them to the Hétel de Ville; where we learn that the Commune has adjourned its sittings from ten to one, and then from one to two o’clock. We go down to the ‘Chambre a coucher de Valentine,’ where Eudes and another member of the Committee of Public Safety are breakfasting. I stretch myself on a sofa, and am soon left alone, now with Johannard, and now with Avrial, who ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 135 have certainly declared that I am free to go if I please; but who nevertheless consider themselves to some extent responsible for my safe custody. Twas there I talked at length with Avrial on the social question ; and I am not sorry to put upon paper the ideas of a man who has had bitter op- portunities of studying the subject, and who has had the privilege of seeing his theories put into practice. We talked of savings, salaries, tools, and capital. Then he spoke to me of his studies, his attempts, the money he had spent to buy books or to found workmen’s associations, sometimes taking pride in the partial success achieved, sometimes pretending that their success was impossible. ‘T have founded three,’ he said; ‘and one still exists —the Association of Working Engineers. Unfortunately, we began during the siege, only ten ounces of bread were allowed, and we could not produce anything. Then we were stopped by the want of money—10,000 francs from the Gov- ernment, and 4000 francs some one had advanced to me, were swallowed up by the larger implements; 136 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. we had to find the smaller ourselves.’ Then speak- ing with greater confidence: ‘The same thing takes place in those associations as in the National Guard; the overseer and director are elected, a meeting takes place on Thursday, speeches are made, and the director is changed. Look at the workshops belonging to the Commune at the Louvre, for repairing arms; they have elected their third director, and they do nothing. They came to the Association of Working Engineers whenever they chose, talked a good deal, and did no work. There were one hundred wheels to be greased, the engine eating coal and water at the rate of one hundred workmen, instead of the fifty who worked. They always answered, “Tl make up for it afterwards ;” but they could not under- stand that they would not be able to make up the general expenditure. They have no head for accounts. Do you know how many muskets we made during the siege? Here he mentioned an absurd figure—at the rate of one musket for from thirty to fifty days’ work ! ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 137 ‘The other day,’ he added, ‘they went to Issy to unspike the cannon, and asked for eightpence each for the hour. I have still some influence over them, so J told them that no one earns eight- pence like that nowadays—the National Guards get 1s. 3d. a day, and you are National Guards. But as you may have been put to some expense out there, here’s 4s. for you. Well, ’'m sure they have a grudge against me for it.’ All this was not said without sadness. This proves more against the Paris workmen than against the doctrine of workmen’s associa- tions; at all events, it is worth taking note of, for it is the fruit of a bitter experience. The quarrelsome soldier who has become a member of the Commune of Paris, after feeling an inventor’s inspiration and the anguish of the father of a family who cannot get bread, must know a good deal about the social theory—especially when, as is the case with Avrial, he has swallowed up a portion of his salary in the purchase of those in- toxicating and perfidious books which promise an easy success, as the result of a lame and fallacious 138 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. system; and has given up his time and life to the construction of workmen’s associations, to end with me on this trembling scaffolding of the French Revolution. ‘Communism, he said, ‘is humbug. The workers must not feed the idlers; he who earns twelve should receive twelve, and he who earns six should receive six. When I enter into an association, either in America or elsewhere, it shall be with one, two, or three friends, whom I know well, and not with the first comers.’ May 11, 1871, Midnight. MEGY was a stupid workman. It was the 30th of April; Cluseret had left the Ministry to go to Fort Issy, whence he was to go to Mazas.* I was told that Mégy had arrived. I had him brought into the Minister’s room, where Seguin came with me, and asked for an account of what had caused him to evacuate the fort he com- * A prison. ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 1389 manded. J could only get a few meaningless words out of him: seeing that the enemy’s fire silenced his artillery, he had spiked the cannon, hidden the breech-pieces, sent out the garrison, and had himself been the last to leave the fort. He had stopped neither at the village of Issy nor at the ramparts, and had reéntered the town, aban- doning both the fortress and the garrison. As he was trying to explain to me that it was impossible to hold out, I reminded him of the instructions I had given him by letter the day he assumed command, and told him that I regretted that he had not answered me as I had asked him to do, for I might have explained obscure or uncertain points. ‘For my part,’ said he, ‘I took it as a joke. You spoke to me as one speaks to a child.’ This acknowledgment of a letter in which I had treated that doubtful hero with a kind of defer- ence, wounded me deeply. Mégy maintained the same level during the remainder of the conver- sation, pluming himself on a sort of resolution to abide by all the consequences of his deeds. He then remained confined to the Ministry, whence 140 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. Eudes took him to Issy. He is rather a hand- some fellow, dark and young; he wears the dis- guise of a colonel. If you ask me, ‘ Which is preferable, Mégy or Gallifet?’? I vote for Mégy, who after all has a better right to be wanting in feeling. May 11, 1871, Midnight. THOSE fellows are not courageous. I think there is but little courage amongst the wearers of gold Jace. Real soldiers and real democrats—I have seen some from time to time — despise death, and even despise gold Jace. I could quote pretty examples of timidity, cowardice, indiffer- ence to duty, and mean and silly passions. The Overthrow of the Commune. THE rumour of the entrance of the regular troops into Paris spread the same evening, and was con- firmed the next morning. A kind of stupor seemed to have fallen upon every one, and it is probable that the army, by pushing forward, could in the morning have occupied the town itself.. The first story was that the St. Cloud gate had been surprised, or given up; the 93d battalion of the National Guard was mentioned. The be- sieger had made astounding progress in the south- western district ; at the same time with the fall of the outer line, we had been informed of the occupation of the Trocadero, the Military School, and the Invalides. Razoua and Vinot had fled without fighting. The War Department had been evacuated. The military leaders of the Commune had 142 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. inherited from their regular predecessors that mania for administrative centralisation which has so often proved fatal to us. As despotic and cen- tralising a Government as the foregoing one, the Commune had left the almost exclusive monopoly of furnishing bread to the soldiers to the estab- lishment of the Quai de Billy. This was one of the few services conducted by conscientious and capable agents. The army found 40,000 loaves, or 80,000 rations, at the establishment. Colonel Henry had striven to collect the whole matériel of the artillery at the Military School; but the jealousy of the different leaders, the small- ness of the means of action, and the personal opposition of Colonel Rossel, who was formally opposed to all centralisation, were so many ob- stacles which prevented Colonel Henry from car- rying out his plan. Ever since the beginning of the insurrection there had been at the school itself a considerable number of large-bore cannon, mortars on their stands, 24-pounders, smooth-bored and rifled, on stands or trucks, and mitrailleuses of different ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 148 systems. At the Champ de Mars there was a park of artillery-carriages, sufficiently numerous to constitute, with the corresponding cannon, the military wealth of a nation. The people, less jealous of those appliances than of the cannon themselves, had treated them with contempt. There were numerous files of caissons, forges, battery-chariots, and siege-carts, a great number of loaded wagons, some of which bore a new set of half-pontoons: there were also some caissons on two wheels, and some baggage-wagons of the auxiliary train. A certain appearance of order reigned in that immense artillery-park, of which the insurrection was incapable of making use. The first progress of the army in Paris made over to them, therefore, a large portion of the resources centralised by the insurrection. The riding ground of the Military School, the out- buildings of the school, the dépét of the Rue Beethoven at Passy, were ammunition magazines containing great wealth. These last stretched, it is said, under a great portion of the Trocadéro ; it was a succession of vaults, and the inventory of 144 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. the ammunition they contained was never made. At the school and the outbuildings, conscientious officials had preserved order in the midst of the squandering of the national wealth. The per- sonnel of the artillery was also to have been cen- tralised at the Military School; the cavalry and the train artillery had their offices there. By a strange touch of irony, of which similar instances have often recurred in the irregular disasters of our poor France, the Commune newspapers pub- lished, the day after the fall of the Military School, an official notice from Citizen Assi, to the effect that ammunition should henceforward only be made over on the receipt of orders viséd at'the Military School. The two banks had been penetrated at the same time, and the first accounts related the ad- venturous advance of a sergeant with four men, who had crossed the viaduct at Auteuil, and had advanced a good way on the left bank, talking with the population, resting from their fatigues, and receiving a glass of wine from some woman. There is no better proof of the incurable ineffi- ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 145 ciency of the National Guard for regular service, than this peaceful stroll of an enemy’s patrol within the menaced ramparts. The army’s first object seems to have been to stretch out along the ramparts; it appears to have made specially rapid progress on the right bank; for it was soon announced that it had turned the Montmartre mounds by the north, having thus occupied the ramparts of the 16th, lith, and 18th districts. Towards midday, a certain activity replaced the previous stupor. Paris was being covered with barricades! But the barricade of 1871 is really but a poor fortification. It is a wall of paving-stones, from 5 feet to 6 feet in height, and from 3 feet 4 inches to 5 feet in thickness, sometimes faced and sometimes battlemented with paving-stones. Once taken, this miserable in- trenchment is turned against its defenders, as both sides are alike. To construct them, the passers-by were stopped, a battalion of National Guards occupied the spot, and the sentinels called upon the stroller, nolens volens, to furnish L 146 ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. his paving-stone for the defence. This was 2 vexatious and ineffectual proceeding: if the Na- tional Guards themselves had set to work, in spite of their laziness it would have got on much faster and much better. It gave rise to scenes of different characters. ‘Now then, citizen,’ would a sentry say, ‘a paving-stone for yourself and one for your wife.’ And the man called upon would divest himself briskly of his coat, put it on his wife’s arm, and furnish his share of work. There were also those who resisted, and the Federals were sometimes as many as eight to escort one of those obstinate ones. The night of the occupation was spent in col- lecting all the forces of the Commune. The drum beat all night; in the morning the bat- talions began to assemble, and the imminence of the danger restoring a little energy to the de- fenders of the Commune, they were more numer- ous than usual; the most Inkewarm had been threatened and pointed out, and did not dare to evade the call. On the other hand, the equip- ment was more varied than ever, and more than ROSSEL’S POSTHUMOUS PAPERS. 147 ever the question presented itself as to what had become of the military clothing profusely dis- tributed by the Commune.