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copyright by Cornell University Library 1993.OF THE
Commission: to Devise a Plan for
r	'
the Government of Cities in
the State of New York,
PRESENTED TO THE LEGISLATURE.
March Gth, 1877.
- NEW YORK:
Evening.Post Steam Presses, 208 Broadway, corner Fulton Street.REPORT
OF THE
COMMISSION TO DEVISE A PLAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF CITIES IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
To the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York:
The undersigned, commissioners appointed by the Gov-
ernor of this State, pursuant to a concurrent resolu-
tion of the Senate and Assembly, passed May 22d,
1875, to devise a plan for the government of cities,
and to report the same to the Legislature, respect-
• fully present the following report:
Origin‘of the Commission.
The Governor, in a special message, communicated to the
Legislature, May 22d, 1875, called, attention to the evils
of our municipal systems, and the necessity of adopting a
permanent and uniform plan for the government of the cities
of the State, and recommended the appointment of a com-
mission to consider the subject.
On the same day a concurrent resolution was introduced
in the Senate and adopted by the Senate and Assembly,
which was in these words :
“ Whereas, the Governor, in his special message of May
“ eleventh, eighteen hundred and seventy-five, called the
“ attention of the Legislature to the evils arising from our
“ unstable municipal systems, and the necessity of adopting
“ a permanent and uniform plan for the government of the
" cities of the State ; therefore2
“ Resolved (if the Assembly concur), That the governor
“ be, and hereby is, authorized to appoint a commission of
“ not more than twelve persons, whose duty it shall be to
“ consider the subject referred to in said message, to devise
“ a plan for the government of cities, and to report the same
“ to the next Legislature.
“ Resolved, That the Committee on Ways and Means report
“ a suitable appropriation to defray the actual expenses of
“ the commission, to be audited by the comptroller, provided,
“ that the commission shall receive no compensation for
“ their services.”
Twelve persons were appointed by the Governor under
the above resolution, all of whom, except President Martin
B. Anderson, of Rochester, accepted the duty thus devolved
upon them.	,
The commission organized immediately after their appoint-
ment, and the first meeting was held on the fifteenth day of
December, 1875. Mr. William M. Evarts was chosen president
of the commission. It seemed necessary to have the aid of
some suitable person, not a member of the commission, to
keep the minutes of the proceedings, conduct the correspon-
dence, and have charge of the documents of the body, and
for this purpose, Mr. Sidney De Kay, of New York, was
selected.
Its Work.
The commission proceeded at once with the performance
of their task by assigning to the several members the duty of
making investigations and reports upon particular branches
of the general subject of municipal government. They hoped
to be able to bring their labors to a conclusion in season to
present their report to the Legislature of 1876; but they
were of the opinion that but little value could be attached
to the recommendations of any such body unless preceded
by the most deliberate consideration ; and such was the
magnitude of the subject with which they had to deal, the
difficulties with which it was at every turn beset, and the
earlier diversity of opinion among themselves, that they
found it impossible to accomplish their work before the3
adjournment of 1876; and the Legislature of that year ex-
tended the time for the making of their report to the present
session.
Notwithstanding the devotion, since that period, of more
time than before to their task, it has been necessarily pro-
tracted to the present moment. It is now completed, and it
becomes the present duty of the Commission to submit to
0 your honorable bodies the results of their labors, together
with an explanation of their recommendations, and a
statement of the grounds and reasons upon which they are
founded.
The message of Governor Tilden, of May 11th, 1875, which
led to the creation of this Commission, treats, at length, of
the history and present condition of the governments of our
cities, especially that of the city of New York ; of the mis-
chiefs and public burdens, both of debt and taxation, under
which these communities now labor; and of the wide depart-
ures from sound principles of local government which have
marked the recent administration of the affairs of the Me-
tropolis. The concurrent resolution makes it the duty of
this Commission “to consider the subject referred to in said
“ message, to devise a plan for the government of cities, and
“ to report the same.”
The purpose, therefore, of the Legislature in passing the
resolution seems plainly to have been to submit the whole
subject of the local government of cities to that deliberate
review which can, it may be supposed, be best given to it
by a small number of persons specially delegated for that
purpose, to the end that some plan of administration may
be devised which may commend itself as furnishing the
promise of a permanent improvement.
The Evils Existing in the Governments of Cities.
The first step to be taken is a consideration of the evils
which infest the administration of our city governments.
No statement or illustration of these is requisite to a con-
viction of their existence. A clear perception, however, of4
these evils, and of thdir origin, causes, connections a’nd
results, is indispensable,, to. any- useful contrivance for
their redress. It will tend to distinctness, in this respect,
to begin the statement with the last results of bad adminis-
tration as they reach and become burdens upon the citizen;
and afterwards point out the causes which produce them.
First.— The accumulation of permanent municipal debt.— %
The rapid advances in this direction made within recent
years are alarming. The amount of the permanent debt
of the several cities of this State, embracing, in round
numbers, a population of two millions, is upwards of one
hundred and seventy millions of dollars, the annual
interest upon which, probably, exceeds eleven millions
of dollars. The whole amount appropriated for carrying
on the government of the State in 1875, exclusive of sums
appropriated to extinguish debt, was less than nine millions
of dollars—much less than the sum which the cities of this
State are compelled to raise to pay the interest on their local
debts. Much the larger part of this burden is the growth
of recent years. The enormous debt of the city of New
York is especially deserving of attention. It is at present,
after deducting the sinking fund, upward of one hundred
and thirteen millions of dollars, and without deducting that
fund, upward of one hundred and forty millions of dollars.
The appropriation for the present year to pay the interest
thereon is upward of nine millions of dollars; an amount
exceeding the entire sum requisite to defray all the expenses
of the State government for the present year, and exceeding
the entire expenditure of the city and county of New York
for a year so recent as 1860, when the city had a population
of 800,000.
The magnitude of this debt is even less alarming than the
rapidity of its recent increase. In 1840, the debt of the
city was about $10,000,000. In 1850, about $12,000,000; an
increase during the decade of about twenty per cent. In
1860 it was upward of $18,000,000; an increase of fifty per
cent. In 1870, it was upward of $73,000,000; an increase
of nearly four hundred per cent; and in the six years which5
have since elapsed, it has been swollen by the enormous
addition of $40,000,000. It is proper to say that this last
increase is, in large measure, due to the funding of a pre-
ceding floating debt of upward of $20,000,000; a legacy
from the corrupt cabal overthrown in 1871, and which, or most
of which, ought to be added to the amount of the debt, as
above stated, in 1870.
The magnitude and rapid increase of this debt are not
less remarkable than the poverty of the results exhibited
as the return for so prodigious an expenditure. It was
abundantly sufficient for the construction of all the public
works of a great metropolis for a century to come, and to
have adorned it besides with the splendors of architecture
and art. Instead of this, the wharves and piers are, for the
most part, temporary and perishable structures ; the streets
are poorly paved; the sewers in great measure imperfect,
insufficient, and in bad ord'er; the public buildings shabby
and inadequate, and there is little which the citizen can
regard with satisfaction, save the aqueduct and its appur-
tenances and a public park. Even these should not be said
to be the product of the public debt; for the expense
occasioned by them is, or should have been, for the most
part, already extinguished. In truth, the public debt of the .
city of New York, or the larger part of it, represents a vast
aggregate of moneys wasted, embezzled or misapplied.
•
Second.—The excessive increase of the annual expenditure
for ordinary purposes.—This evil is of similar character to
the one already dealt with, and points to like disastrous re-
sults. It would too greatly extend the length of this report
to present, under this head, the statistics of the various
cities of the State* as they are exhibited in the statement
annexed to the special message of the Governor; but
the example of the metropolis may be again referred to.
There is a fitness in such reference arising from the
consideration that New York city embraces one-half of
the urban population, and something approaching one-
half in value of the entire property of the State. Any
measure, therefore, that may be devised for improving the6
administration of cities would be wholly insufficient unless
it furnished a remedy for the abuses of misgovernment in
that city. It is believed, moreover, that an increase in the
annual expenditure similar to that which has there taken
place, characterizes the financial history of all the cities of
the State. Such increase has not, at least in most of them,
kept pace with that of the metropolis ; but it is everywhere
sufficient to justify the gravest attention.	-
Going back through a period of fifty years, we find that in
1816, when New York had a population of upward of 100,000,
and taxable property to the amount of $82,000,000, the
amount raised by taxation was $344,802.41, considerably less
than one-half of one per cent. Twenty years later, in 1836, the
population had increased to upward of 270,000, and the tax-
able property to upward of $309,000,000. The amount raised
in that year was $1,085,130.44, which was but thirty* five one-
hundredths of one per cent. The debt at that time was
$1,282,103.53, and the amount requisite to pay the interest
upon this did not much exceed $72,000. , In the sixteen sub-
sequent years, down to 1850, the population rapidly in-
creased, and the amount raised by tax to defray ordinary
expenditure increased somewhat more rapidly. In the last
mentioned year, with a population of, 515,000„ the tax levy
was $3,230,085.02. The property, however, as valued for
taxation, had not increased; indeed the estimate was less,
being something over $286,000,000, ..and consequently the
rate of taxation on that estimate was 1.13 per cent. The debt
had risen to upward of $12,000,000, and consequently made
a draft upon the annual tax levy of upward of $700,000.
During the decade between 1850 and 1860 the increase
was more rapid. In the latter year, with a population of
814,000, a tax levy of $9,758*507.86 was ordered ; an in-
crease of three hundred per cent. above that of 1850; and
notwithstanding that the valuation of property had in the
same period doubled, so as to amount to upward of
$576,000,000, the rate increased from 1.13 per cent in 1850
to 1.69 in 1860. At the same time the debt increased upward
of six millions of dollars, amounting in the year last named to
upward of $18,000,000. Observers of the local govern-7
ment and politics of the metropolis during this period will
remember that it was the time when the local managers
first organized on a large scale their schemes to control*
through compact political arrangements, the management and
distribution of the revenues of the city, which then amounted
to so large a sum ; and it may be said that from that time to
the present, with the exception of one short but memorable
period, the disposition of these revenues has remained sub-
stantially in the hands of the chiefs of trained political
organizations, which are mainly supported, in some form or
other, from this fund. When we consider what the nature of
this guardianship is, it should not excite surprise that, at the
close of the next decade, after 1860, the annual burden had
risen to the enormous figures of $23,361,674, compelling a
levy of 2.17 per cent. of the entire property of the city; while
during the same period the debt had also risen from eighteen
to seventy-three millions. As already mentioned, this
statement of the increase of the debt is far beneath the
fact, for upon the overthrow, in 1871, of the corrupt officials
then in possession of every branch of the city government,
there was found an existing floating indebtedness of some
twenty millions more, to pay which bonds were subse-
quently issued, and which constitute a large part of the
subsequent increase of the bonded debt. Since the year
1871 there has been, on the part at least of some of the city
officials, an earnest endeavor, which is still continued, to
arrest the further increase of the debt, and to out down the
annual expenditure; but these efforts, though very useful,
have been counteracted by the want of general co-operation
on the part of all officers, by the ruinous condition in which
the preceding government had left the affairs of the city,
and by the existence of laws, enacted by the Legislature,
permitting, if not requiring, extensive so-called improve-
ments to be carried on, the expense to be defrayed by the
further issue of bonds.
We, therefore, find that at the beginning of the present
year, 1877, the debt of the city has increased to the amount
of $113,000,000, and the total amount of the tax levy ordered
for the year 1877 is $28,484,269.44, which requires a rate of* 8
taxation of 2.67 per cent upon the amount of taxable prop-
erty. In addition to this, there is alse appropriated out of
the general resources of the city, receivable in 1877, from
other sources than taxation, the sum of $2,500,000, which
makes the amount of estimated expenditure $30,984,269.48;,
It is important to know how much of this vast sum is de-
voted to ordinary objects of annual expenditure.
Whole amount appropriated................. $30,984,269 48
Deduct State taxes.......... $2,658,900 00
“ Interest on debt, with
instalment of prin-
cipal.............	9,176,501 73
“ Forredemptionofspe-
cial parts of debt...	1,545,467 78
---------— 13,380,869 51
Amount applicable to annual expenditure.. $17,603,399 97
These figures are most significant. In 1810, with a popu-
lation of nearly 100,000 and* a taxable valuation of $25,000,-
000, the amount of ordinary expenditure was but $129,727.15,
or about one-half of one per cent, upon the valuation, and
about $1.25 for each inhabitant. This was a period of regu-
larity and economy. Twenty years later, in 1830, when the
population had increased to 202,000 and the taxable prop-
erty to upward of $125,000,000, the annual expenditure was
$509,178:44—about $2 to each inhabitant, and an actual
decrease of the rate of tax. Twenty years later, in 1850,
we reach a period when, as the annals of the metropolis at
that time and the recollections of those yet living, who were
thfen familiar with its affairs, will attest, a marked decline
had occurred, through a great deterioration in the standing
and character of the city officers, bringing with it waste, ex-
travagance and corruption. Still, with a population at that
time of upward of half a million, and taxable property of
upward of $286,000,000, two and a half millions sufficed for
the ordinary annual expenditure, exclusive of interest on
debt, but including all State taxes. This was $5 for each
inhabitant, and called for a tax rate of less than one per cent9
• It thus appears that the present annual expenditure for
the purpose of ordinary administration, exclusive of inter-
est upon debt, as exhibited by the annual estimate for the
purposes of determining the tax levy, amounts to more than
twenty millions of dollars, or about twenty dollars for each
inhabitant, and requires a tax rate of nearly two per cent,
upon the present valuation of taxable property.
But this apparent increase of the annual expenditure, as
shown by the annual appropriations, is far less than the
actual increase. , Enormous sums are every year exacted
from the property-owners in the form of special assessments
upon property assumed to be specially benefited which do
not appear in any form in the present general budget. The
sums thus expended are for the opening, regulating, grading
and paving of streets, and the construction of sewers, &c.,
&c. Inasmuch as this expenditure is not an annual, but a
continuous one, the yearly amount cannot be stated. It is
safe, however, to say that taking the period of the past
ten years, it has been equivalent to a yearly sum, of
millions of dollars. Some of this expenditure is fairly to be
carried to the account of capital, as being a permanent im-
provement of property; but a very large part of it belongs
to the account of ordinary repairs, and swells the true
statement of the present annual expenditure to a far greater
sum than is above set down.
We are thus confronted with the alarming fact that the
increase in the annual expenditure since 1850, as compared
with the increase of population, is more than four hundred
'per cent.; and as compared with the increase of taxable
property, more than two hundred per cent. Some allowance
is doubtless to be made for the more complete provision now
made for the public wants, and for the inferior value of the
currency in which our present expenditure is stated; but
this consideration does not affect the ratio of taxation to
the value of the property taxed ; nor defeat the conclusion
that we* have during the past twenty-five years not only
made a wide departure from the economy of earlier and
better days, and have outrun all former examples of waste-
fulness, extravagance and corrupt administration.10
The significance of this rapid increase of debt and taxa*
tion must not be overlooked or misapprehended: nor its
certain consequence, if not arrested.
But the deplorable financial condition of our principal
cities/ to which we have given such prominence, has causes,
a clear perception of which must precede any intelligent
action in contriving remedies. We desire to avoid in this
division of our subject, so far as possible, all matters
upon which differences of opinion are likely to arise, and
shall therefore refer, not to the fnore remote, and, perhaps,
fundamental causes, but to those which are direct, imme-
diate and palpable, the operation of which can be clearly
pointed out.
Causes of the Existing Evils.
First.—Incompetent and unfaithful governing hoards
and officers.—We place at the head of the list of evils
under which our municipal administration labors, the
fact that, so large a number of important offices have
come to be filled by men possessing little, if any,
fitness for the important duties they are called upon to dis-
charge. This fact will hardly be questiSned by any intelli-
gent observer. We do not mean that great merits and
devotion to public duty are not in many instances, here and
there *and from time to time, exhibited in public station.
But we do mean that there is a general failure, especially
in the larger cities, to secure the election or appoinment
of fit and competent officials. The election of fit and com-
petent officers is not sought in the practices which have
long been in vogue, and which for the most part actually
govern in the choice of municipal officers. It can hardly
be expected, therefore, that such will be secured.
The various forms of mischief resulting from a public
service thus filled are numberless; but they uniformly
present the common feature of increasing either debt,
or taxation, or both. These unworthy holders of pub-
lic trusts gain their places by their own exertions. The11
voluntary suffrage of their fellow citizens would never
have lifted them into office, Animated by the expec-
tation of unlawful emoluments they expend large sums
to secure their places and make promises beforehand
to supporters and retainers to furnish patronage or place. The
money expended to secure election must be paid. The
corrupt promises must be redeemed. Anticipated gains
must be realized. Hence, old and educated subordinates
must be dismissed and new places created to satisfy the
crowd of friends and retainers. Profitable contracts must
be awarded and needless public works must be undertaken.
The forms of law are evaded, or shaped for the purpose of con-
ferring the patronage upon favorites; and the various depart-
ments of administration, instead of striving to make the burden
of government as light as possible, engage in a contention to
draw within their own control the largest possible part of
the public resources. The amounts required *fco satisfy
these illegitimate objects enter into the estimates upon
which taxation is eventually based; in fact they con-
stitute, in many instances, a superior lien upon the moneys
appropriated for government, and not until they are in some
manner satisfied, do the real wants of the public receive
attention. It is speedily found that these unlawful demands,
together with the necessities of the public, call for a sum,
which, if taken at once by taxation, would produce dissatis-
faction and alarm in the community, and bring public indig-
nation upon the authors of such burdens. For the purpose
of averting such consequences, divers pretenses are put for-
ward suggesting the propriety of raising means for alleged
exceptional purposes by loans of money, and in the end the
taxes are reduced to a figure not calculated to arouse the
public to action, and any failure thus to raise a sufficient
sum is supplied by an issue of bonds.
It may be thought that this picture of maladministration
is overdrawn. We believe it to be a just one—not, in-
deed, of the administration of all our cities, or of the admin-
istration of any of these—at all times. But it fails alto-
gether to convey an adequate notion of the elaborate systems
of depredation, which under the name of city governments,12
have from time to time afflicted our principal cities; and it
is moreover a just indication of tendencies in operation in all
our cities, and which are certain, unless arrested, to gather
increased force, and from time to time to develop to an ex-
cessive degree. It would be clearly within bounds to say
that more than one-half of all the present city debts are the
direct results of the species of intentional and corrupt mis-
‘rule above described.
But were we to leave out of view the existence of corrupt
purposes, the share of public burdens and mischiefs prop-
erly chargeable upon incompetent and unfaithful officials
would not be diminished. It would only oblige us to say
that the present volume of debt and excessive rate of
taxation has been brought about by incompetence and neg-
lect, instead of by corruption and fraud. This neither
diminishes the Svil, affects the conclusion as to the source
from which it proceeds, nor lessens the necessity for a
remedy. The exclusion of positive fraud and corruption
from civil business is by no means sufficient to secure good
administration. Human affairs nowhere take care of them-
selves. The necessary conditions of thrift in public as well
as private business are the present care, attention and skill
of those who feel that their personal interests are directly
involved in its successful management. "We do not believe
that, had the cities of this State during the last twenty-five
years had the benefit of the presence in the various
departments of local administration of the services of com-
petent and faithful officers, the aggregate of municipal debts
would have amounted to one-third of the present sum,
nor the annual taxation one-half of its present amount ;
while the condition of those cities in respect to existing pro-
visions for the public needs would have been far superior
to what is now exhibited. It may be regarded as certain
that unless some means be adopted to secure, not
occasionally and by special and spasmodic popular effort,
but permanently and in the natural and regular course of
affairs, a better class of city officers, the experience of the
past twenty-five years will be repeated in the next, possibly
not with such an enormous increase of debt and taxation,13
but the tendency will be in the same direction, and the
evils under which we suffer will not be substantially
arrested.
Second.—The introduction of State and National Politics
into municipal affairs,—This practice of our times stands
next in the order of priority as a source of mischief.
"We assign this distinction to it, not so much because it is an
evil in itself, but because in the mischievous use which is
made of it,—a use which cannot be prevented—it becomes
the most potent means by which all efforts to improve the
character of the municipal service at popular elections are
frustrated. It is the most fruitful source of the prime
evil already dealt with, namely, the presence in the civil
service of incompetent and unfaithful officers.
Party divisions arise, or, at least, properly arise, only
wThen men differ in respect to some general principles or
methods of state policy. Differences exist as to the extent
of the respective powers of the national and state govern-
ments, as to the expediency of free trade, as to the
extent to which government should limit individual
liberty, as to the general methods of administering the
large ^concerns of our national and state governments; and
similar questions, which can be settled only by the
triumph of one or the other of the contending parties.
The lormation of general parties upon such questions is
useful, or, at all events, inevitable. But it is rare, indeed,
that any such questions, or any upon which good men
ought to differ, arise in connection with the conduct of
municipal affairs. Good men cannot and do not differ
as to whether municipal debt ought to be restricted, extrav-
agance checked, and municipal affairs lodged in the hands of
competent and faithful officers. There is no more just reason
why the control of the public works of a great city should be
lodged in the hands of a democrat or a republican, than
there is why an adherent of one or the other of the great
parties should be made the superintendent of a business cor-
poration. In the case of the latter, the sole purpose of the
parties interested is to secure the services of the best man,14
and the best man is consequently secured. Good citizens,
interested in honest municipal government, can secure that
only by acting together. Political divisions separate them at
the start, and render it impossible to secure the object de-
sired equally by both. ,This truth is naturally recognized in
every emergency, when, by reason of startling abuses in
municipal affairs, the community is aroused to the neces-
sity for a change in local officers. A general outcry is at
once raised calling upon citizens to act independently of
party, and sometimes, although rarely, the shackles are
thrown off and success is achieved. This obstacle to the
union of good citizens should not exist. It paralyzes all or-
dinary efforts for good municipal government.
The motives which lead to a pushing of. these general
political divisions to their present mischievous extremes
should be clearly comprehended. They are exceedingly
powerful, and will nob yield to ordinary resistance:
1. The great prizes, in the shape of place and power,
which are offered on the broad fields of state and National
politics, offer the strongest incentives to ambition. Personal
advancement is in these fields naturally associated with the
achievement of great public objects, and neither end can be
secured except through the success of a political party
to which they are attached. The strife thus engendered
develops into a general battle in which each side feels
that it cannot afford to allow any odds to the other. If
one seeks to turn to its advantage the patronage of muni-
cipal office, the other must carry the contest into the
same sphere. It is certain that the temptation will be with-
stood by neither. It thus becomes the direct interest of the
foremost men of the nation to constantly keep their
forces in hostile array, and these must be fed by, among
other ways, the patronage to be secured by the control bf
local affairs. The concerns which fill the imaginations of
ambitious men are deemed supreme; and sufficient to justify
the partial sacrifice of subordinate and local interests. This
is a grave error, engendered by the existing political condi-
tions of city government arrangements.15
2. Next to this small number of leading men, there is a
large class, who though not dishonest.or devoid of public
spirit, are led by habit and temperament to take a wholly
partisan view of city affairs. Their enjoyment of party
struggles, their devotion to those who share with them
triumphs and defeats of the political game are so intense,
that they gradually lose sight of the object for which parties
exist, or ought to exist; and considerable proportions of
them, in their devotion to politics, suffer themselves to be
driven from the walks of regular industry, and at last
become dependent for their livelihood on the patronage in the
hands of their chiefs. Mingled with them is nearly
as large a number to whom politics is simply a mode of mak-
ing a livelihood, or a fortune, and who take part in political
contests without enthusiasm, and often without the pretence
of interest in the public welfare, and devote themselves
openly to the organization of the vicious elements of society,
in combinations strong enough to hold the balance in a
closely contested election, overawe the political leaders,
and secure a fair share of the municipal patronage, or else
extort immunity from the officers of the law.
3. The rest of the community, embracing the large
majority of the more thrifty classes, averse to engaging in
what they deem the “ low business ” of politics, or hopeless
of accomplishing any substantial good in the face of such
powerful opposing interests, for the most, part content
themselves with acting in accordance with their respective
parties. When a municipal election occurs, most of them easily
persuade themselves that, as the only question is which of
the two parties is to have the control of local affairs, it is,
of course, best that such control should be lodged with
their own; and it is some satisfaction to them, when no other
good can be achieved, to gain a small political triumph.
Others, troubled with the sense that a duty is imposed upon
them to vote for meritorious candidates feebly and vainly
labor on the morning of the election to discriminate between16
the respective merits of obscure contestants. Some few
rise to the virtue of seasonable inquiry, and congratulate
themselves upon the performance of the solemn dutjr of re-
placing a notoriously unworthy name, by some selection
of their own.—The usually meagre return of scattering
votes is the measure of the efficiency of this class of citizens.
It is through the agency of the great political parties or-
ganized and operating as above described, that our municipal
officers are, and long have been selected. It can scarcely be
matter of wonder, then, that the present condition of
municipal affairs should present an aspect so desperate.
Third.—The assumption by the Legislature of the direct
control of local affairs.—This legislative intervention lias
necessarily involved a disregard of one of the most funda-
mental principles of republican government. We entertain
no doubt that this intervention has greatly aggravated the
evils which it was in many instances designed to remove.
There are some established truths relating to this subject
of which the public needs to be reminded in order to per-
ceive what a wide and dangerous departure from sound
methods of government is thus made.
Our existing system of national and State government
stands fully accepted by us as the most perfect, and, practi-
cally, the best adapted to our wants. In any effort there-
fore to cure incidental evils arising from defects in the de-
tails of the structure, we should take care not to disturb its
foundations or endanger its perpetuity.
The system of government by municipalities is inher-
ent in our free institutions. In separate communities exist-
ing as integral parts of the commonwealth, but having local
interests which immediately concern themselves r&ther than
the State at large, the instinct of self-government has
always asserted itself in some way as the basis of their
organic life. From this vital germ have sprung the muni-
cipalities which in every civilized State have claimed and
exercised the right, sometimes granted as a concession of
sovereign power and sometimes extorted by superior force,17
of administering law and government in respect to tlieir
local affairs, while retaining their allegiance as members of
the whole nation. This element of local administration in
local affairs entered into the framework of our constitu-
tional government at the outset, and was the most marked
characteristic of the national life, reproduced and existing in
this State and in most of the States of the Union at the time
of the establishment of their independence. De Tocque-
ville, than whom no observer had been better qualified to
compare the arrangements of this country with those in
Europe, was greatly impressed with the town institutions of
New England. He regarded them as the real foundation of
American liberty. “ Assemblies of citizens, he says, consti-
tute the strength of free nations. Municipal institutions
“are to liberty what primary schools are to science—they
“bring it within the people’s reach; they teach men how to
“ use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a sys-
“ tern of free government, but without the spirit of municipal
“ institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.”
The lines which separate the functions of the central legis-
lature from those which should be discharged by local govern-
ment boards is sufficiently distinct. Whatever concerns the
rights of all the citizens of the State in respect either of person
or of property, belongs to the central authority, which is also
charged with the duty of devising uniform plans by which
the affairs of the various local divisions of the State may be
administered by the people of those divisions. The repre-
sentatives elected to the Central Legislature are chosen ex-
pressly for the purpose of attending to these general duties*
There are obvious reasons why they ought not to be
charged with the direction of the lqcal affairs of the munici-
palities.
1.—They have not the requisite time. When the impor-
tance and variety of their duties in respect to the improve-
ment and amendment of the general body of the laws, the
correction of general evils, the conduct of the great public
works of the State, and the administration of the various
departments of the State government are considered, no one*
\18
will think that they are not sufficiently burdened with these
duties, or that they can have any sufficient leisure to devote
to the special affairs of particular localities/
2.	—They have not the requisite knowledge of details.
Whether it is best in any particular city to open a street or
avenue, or construct an aqueduct, or any other public work
requiring the expenditure of money, cannot be determined
without an accurate knowledge of the affairs of the locality
—of the extent of present accommodation—of the demand
for increased facilities—of the actual wishes of the inhabitants
—of the extent of existing public burdens, and of a variety
of other details, which are usually possessed only by resi-
dents of the locality.
Consequently, when a local bill is under consideration in
the Legislature, its care and explanation are left exclusively
to the representatives of the locality to which it is appli-
cable, and sometimes by express, more often by a tacit un-
derstanding, local bills are “ logrolled” through the houses.
Thus legislative duty is delegated to the local representa-
tives, who, acting frequently in combination with the sinister
elements of their constituency, shift the responsibility for,
wrong-doing from themselves to the Legislature.
3.	—But, what is even more important, the general
representatives have not that sense of personal interest,
and personal responsibility to their constituents, which
are indispensable to the intelligent administration of local
affairs. And yet the judgment of the local governing
bodies, in various parts of the State, and the
wishes of their constituents, are liable to be overruled by
the votes of legislators living a*t the distance of a hundred
miles.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the orig-
inal election or appointment ©f all local governing bodies,
the duty of watching or checking them, and the duty of pro-
viding, or the discretion of withholding, the supplies neces-
sary for their operations, should rest, not with the central
Legislature, but with the people of that locality.10
It would, indeed, seem scarcely necessary to argue against
this exercise by the State Legislature of inappropriate func-.
tions, when it stands deliberately condemned, not only by
the conclusions of all thoughtful writers upon republican
government, but by the people themselves in the constitution
under which we now live.
Among the mischievous consequences which flow from
this vicious practice, we may further mention the following:
4. The occupation of the central legislative body with the
consideration of a multitude of special measures relating to
local affairs, some good, probably the larger part bad, pressed
upon their attention by those specially interested in them.
The time which should be devoted to the thorough consid-
eration of measures affecting the general laws and policy of
the State is invaded and w'asted, to the manifest injury of
those general interests which it is the exclusive province of
the Legislature to defend. To this cause are to be ascribed
the haste, error and imperfection which have characterized
much of our recent legislation upon all subjects, and which
will continue to characterize it until the Legislature re-
stricts its action within its true limits.
To appreciate the extent of the mischief in this direction,
one has only to take up the Session Laws of any year, at
random, and notice the subjects to which they relate. Of
the 808 acts passed in 1870, for instance, 212 are acts
relating to cities and villages, 94 of which relate to cities,
and 36 to the city of New York alone. A still larger
number have reference to the city of Brooklyn. These 212
acts occupy more than three-fourths of the two thousand
pages of the laws of that year. If the time requisite for the
members of the Legislature to comprehend their provisions
and acquire the information necessary to form a judgment
concerning the expediency of adopting them had been given
to the work, the entire session would hardly have sufficed
for the purpose.
The multiplicity of laws relating to the same subjects,
thus brought into existence, is itself an evil of great magni-
tude. What the law is concerning some of the most import-
ant interests of our principal cities, can be ascertained only20
by the exercise of the patient research of professional
lawyers. To the citizen it is a sealed book. The officers
who are called upon to administer it, are* bewildered in
the mazes of conflicting enactments. In many instances
even professional skill is baffled. Upon this point we may
refer to a very recent declaration of the first judicial officer
in the State. Says Chief Justice Church (62 New York Re-
ports, p. 459) : “ It is scarcely safe for any one to speak con-
<c fidently of the exact condition of the law in respect to
“ public improvements in the cities of New York and Erook-
“ lyn. The enactments in reference thereto have been
“ modified, superseded and repealed so often and to such an
“ extent, that it is difficult to ascertain just what statutes
“ are in force at any particular time.” The uncertainties
arising from such multiplied and conflicting legislation lead
to incessant litigation w5 * 7ith all its expensive burdens, publio
and private. When we reflect upon these manifold mischiefs
and the heavy tax thus imposed upon the public in paying:
the expenses of prolonged legislative sessions, and support-
ing judicial tribunals to dispose of the great volume of litiga-
tion thus occasioned, we are justified in pronouncing legis-
lative interposition in the affairs of cities as an evil of the
first magnitude.
5. But this is not all, nor the worst. It may be true,,
that the first attempts to secure legislative intervention in*
the local affairs of our principal cities were made by good
citizens in the supposed interest of reform and good govern-
ment, and to counteract the schemes of corrupt officials. The
notion that legislative control was the proper remedy was a
serious mistake. The corrupt cliques and rings thus sought
to be baffled were quick to perceive that in the business of
procuring special laws concerning local affairs, they could
easily outmatch the fitful and clumsy labors of disinterested^
citizens. The transfer of the control of the municipal resources
from the localities to the capital had noteother effect than to
cause a like transfer of the methods and arts .of corruption,,
and to make the fortunes of our principal [cities the traffic of
the lobbies. Municipal corruption, previously confined within21
territorial limits, thenceforth escaped all bounds, and spread
to every quarter of the State. Cities were compelled by
legislation to buy lands for parks and places because the
owners wished to sell them ; compelled to grade, pave and
sewer streets without inhabitants, and for no other
purpose than to award corrupt contracts for the work.
Cities were compelled to purchase at the public expense
und at extravagant prices, the property necessary for streets
and avenues, useless for any other purpose than to
make a market for the adjoining property thus improved.
Laws were enacted abolishing one office and creating another
with the same duties, in order to transfer official emoluments
from one man to another : and laws to change the functions of
officers with a view only to a new distribution of patronage,
and to lengthen the terms of offices, for no other purpose
than to 'retain in place officers who could not otherwise be
•elected or appointed.
If any one questions the mischievous results of these prac-
tices he has but to note the increase of debt and taxation
in the city of New York from 1860 to the present time, dur-
ing which legislative intervention in the local affairs of that
•city has been most extensively asserted. The debt has
increased from eighteen millions to one hundred and thirteen
millions; and taxation for annual expenditures from nine to
twenty-eight millions.
Remedies of the Evils Enumerated.
We now approach the specific task set before this com-
mission, namely the methods of redress and reformation.
It will narrow the field of inquiry here, if we first exclude
those schemes of improvement, sometimes suggested, which
offer no assurance of effective relief, because they deal with
the symptoms rather than the disease, such as—
1. A carefully contrived system of laws for the punishment
of neglect or unfaithfulness in municipal officers.—This
remedy is one of the first to suggest itself. The present
difficulty, however, does not consist in the want of adequate22.
penal laws, but in the lack of ability to enforce those which
now exist. When unscrupulous men obtain the control
of the local administration and revenues of a community,
the control of the local administration of justice is apt to
follow as a consequence. But, without this, the unwilling-
ness to excite the hostility of political leaders by a public
prosecution, the difficulties of proof, the delays andvdefeats
incident to all judicial proceedings, deprive this remedy of
all virtue. Penal laws, however severe or well framed,
never correct the mischiefs of bad systems of government*
Their object is to repress, by the example of punishment,
the occasional abuses in the administration of good sys-
tems.
2.	The immediate control of local affairs by the Legisla-
ture.—It is needless to bestow further consideration upon
this plan. As already pointed out, its sure result is to
aggregate the mischiefs sought to be removed. Instead of
elevating the character of the local governing bodies, this
practice, by depriving them of their most important func-
tions, and inducing the belief that it is of little importance
to make special efforts to elect faithful and intelligent local
guardians, leads directly to still further deterioration and
decline.
3.	The withdrawal of power from local governments, or
the limitations of it by positive enactments.—Hopeless of
finding any other method of arresting the increase of debt
and taxation of cities, some have proposed that the increase
of debt beyond a certain prescribed amount should be abso-
lutely prohibited and taxation limited to a specified ration
This is the principle embodied in a proposed constitutional
amendment which received the sanction of the Legislature
at its last session. Upon mature consideration, wTe are of
opinion that this expedient is not of a remedial measure, and
that its incorporation in the constitution would be an error
The apparant prohibition, both as to taxation and the percent-
age of debt, could be readily evaded by raising the assessed
values to which the ratios of taxation and of debt would apply*
Such restrictions do not attempt to prevent wastefulness, or23
embezzlement of the public funds in any other way than by
limiting the amount of the funds subject to depredation.
The effect of such measures would simply* be4 to leave the
public necessities without adequate provision.
4.	The opposite suggestion, namely, wholly to deprive the
Legislature of the power of intervention, is equally inadmis-
sible. Should this be done, and nothing else, the cities of our
State would be left entirely unprotected against those evil
agencies which have seemed, ip many instances, to make a
resort to the central authority absolutely necessary. It
would not be possible, even in those cases of all-pervading
corruption, which, as they have already happened, may hap-
pen again, to obtain that summary relief which it is in the
power of the Legislature to afford. We cannot ignore the
lessons of the last twenty years, which teach that under our
present municipal establishments, however mischievous the
continual practice of legislative intervention may be, the
power of occasional resort to it may be absolutely necessary.
5.	To confer very extensive powers upon the Mayor.—It
has of late years frequently been suggested that the correc-
tive proposed by frequent popular elections fails of its intend-
ed effect, for the reason that, under present arrangements,
there is such a division of powers, that the people are unable
to discern the officials upon whom maladministration is really
chargeable. The remedy suggested is to clothe th& mayor
with full authority to appoint and remove all the principal
executive officers, and then to vest in the officers so ap-
pointed the control of the business of raising and ap-
propriating moneys. It is argued that under such civil
arrangements the people could always hold the mayor
responsible for wasteful or inefficient administration, and
would be sure to apply the proper remedy by changing the
head of the government.
We have no confidence in such a scheme. It finds no sup-
port in the established principles of popular representa-
tive government. The important functions of determin-
ing how much money shall be raised by tax, and of its
distribution among the various local objects and pur-24
poses are essentially discretionary, and the officers who are
to exercise them should be sensible of no obligations, re-
straints, cr fears,'except such as proceed from their convic-
tions of the public welfare. Few men deserving of public
confidence would accept such places at the hands of a mas*
ter who could make and unmake them at pleasure.
But, more than this, the scheme suggested places the con-
trol of vast sums of money—in the city of New York, thirty
millions of dollars—a larger revenue than that of some king-
doms—in the hands of a single man. No such control over
the public resources is lodged even \iith the sovereign in any
constitutional government. The disposition of such a
fund, absolute wThen once gained, would become the conten-
tion, not so frequently of those who would prove faithful to
the trust, as of those who sought it only to betray it.
The assumption that with frequent elections the people
would very soon .depose an unworthy chief officer, is alto-
gether illusory. The master of the revenues and patron-
age of a million of people might not suffer himself to be dis-
placed. The notion that the present failure of municipal elec-
tions to remove unworthy officers is mainly attributable to
an inability to trace the responsibility for maladministration
to its true source is erroneous. The real difficulty is, that
the mass of the citizens, however strongly they may be con-
vinced of the necessity of a political change, are not willing
to enter upon a campaign against thoroughly organized
political combinations, for the reason that there is no suffi-
cient prospect of success.
6. Civil Service Beform.—However desirable it may be
to introduce a reform which will change the methods of
accession to minor political offices from that of political
patronage to competitive examination, we are persuaded
that, under existing circumstances, the intensity with which
partisan strife is carried on within the limited area of a muni-
cipality forbids the hope of its successful, introduction until
the national and State governments shall have set the ex-
ample, and demonstrated the superiority of its methods.
Our municipal organization neither affords proper material25
for examining boards, nor are the defects in the municipal
clerical force at all important when compared with other
mischiefs. This reform, therefore, as applied to cities, must
appear as quite inadequate to reach the main evils that beset
us. Hence, while leaving the Legislature free to adopt such
♦Civil Service rules as in its discretion it may see fit, we have
not made any special recommendation upon the subject.
7. The possibility of finding a corrective under our present
system by increasing popular interest in the affairs of local
governments.—There are those who still insist that the
sole remedy for the evils we are dealing with is to be found
in further enlightening the mass of the population as to the
effects of misgovernment upon their own concerns, and in
arousing the public generally to the necessity of exercising
greater watchfulness over local affairs* and exerting a united
power at municipal elections.
It might be said in answer to such suggestions, that the
resolution creating this commission is itself an authoritative
declaration of the insufficiency of this supposed corrective
and that this commission, which is instructed to devise a
plan for the government of cities, need not occupy itself
with suggestions which look to agencies for relief independ-
ent of government.
The better answer* however, is that experience has proved
these agencies to be wholly inadequate. The theory of gov-
ernment under which rogues are permitted to gain posses-
sion of the public purse as an incentive to good men to
turn them out, would not be altogether absurd, if a reason-
able chance of success in baffling the reprobates were
•offered. But governments are not. created for these, or
other sentimental purposes. They are contrivances to
furnish protection to the industrious citizen, to the end that
lie maybe left to pursue his private avocations with the
minimum expenditure of time and trouble in attention to
public affairs. When these contrivances, instead of afford-
ing him this relief, become themselves the occasion of inces-
sant watchfulness and enormous expense, they fail in their
^essential purpose.26
In respect to tlie time and attention of the citizen, the same
rule obtains as in respect to his income. It is only a certain
share, and that comparatively small, of either, which even in
the most public spirited of communities, can, or will, be with-
drawn from private purposes and devoted to the public.
The people should not be called Upon to make, in addition to
the payment of burdensome taxes, a large sacrifice of time and
labor to the unattractive task of protecting the community
against the neglect or the fraud of those who are themselves
appointed to be the public guardians, and liberally paid for
their services. When this is necessary they abandon all
earnest effort for improvement, and suffer extravagance,
wastefulness and inefficiency to proceed unchecked. This
is in no small degree the actual condition of things at the
present moment in our large cities.
Even citizens of unusual public spirit and resolution who
still, notwithstanding the disheartening effect of unsuc-
cessful efforts', continue to struggle against corrupt and
inefficient local government, acknowledge the fruitlessness of
any effort for improvement through the regular instrumen-
tality of popular elections. Hence we have societies for
municipal reform, and similar voluntary combinations, which
strive unceasingly by laborious investigations of the local ad-
ministration and the publication of results, and by appeals
to the Legislature, to repress the manifold evils which
afflict the local communities. These efforts are a proof of
the existence of public spirit 'and public virtue, and at the
same time a proof of the extent to which they are crippled
in their endeavors. The activity thus exhibited should
be sufficient to accomplish its end. If our local politi-
cal systems afforded the opportunity they should afford to
such activity, the evils thus struggled against would be re-
moved by the correctives which frequent elections supply,
and without the necessity for a resort to these extraneous
methods.
We do not lightly regard the efforts of public spirited
citizens to awaken and keep alive an active interest in public
affairs. On the centrary we view them as the main
instrumentalities by which, under the existing system, the27
administration of our local governments can be pre-
served from utter disorder. The prime object of legis-
lation upon local affairs should be to devise a system
under which these agencies may operate with effect. No
fear may be entertained that any scheme can be contrived
So perfect as not to need the aid of all the vigilance of which
the best of our communities can boast.
This commission do not apprehend that there will be
any substantial difference of opinion upon the statements or
conclusions thus far in this report set forth. The actual
evils and burdens under which the people of our larger
cities labor wrill not be deemed to have been exaggerated.
The immediate causes to which they have been imputed will,
we think, be admitted to be the true ones. The inefficiency
of the various remedies to which reference has been made
can scarcely be doubted.
The conclusion can no longer be resisted that our present
course of local administration is based upon some funda-
mental errors which render it wholly inadequate to the gov-
ernment of cities, and that the work of amendment must
begin at the very foundation of the structure.
Plan of the Commission.
In dealing with the general subject committed to them, the
commission was necessarily led into an extended survey and
examination of the origin and nature of our existing munici-
pal corporations; the relations which they sustain to the,
sovereign power of the State; the character and extent of
the powers conferred upon them; and the mode in which
those powers have been exercised and regulated, both in
reference to the general functions of government, and to
those specially relating to the vital question of municipal
expenditure, debt and taxation. This survey and examina-
tion led, at an early period, to the fundamental question,
whether the general application of universal suffrage in
the election of the local guardians and. trustees of the
financial interests of these public corporations, was in
accordance with sound principles, or suitable to our28
present condition. Entertaining, however, a natural jealousy
of any suggestion which might wear the appearance of a
departure from the principles of American polity, they pre-
ferred to direct their first efforts towards the discovery of
some mode of rearranging the local administration, which,
without disturbing the elective system, should give promise
of a reform of existing abuses. As already shown, all such
efforts appeared to them, after the fullest consideration, to
be misdirected; and the question remained whether the
election by universal suffrage of the local guardians of the
financial concerns of cities can be safely retained. This report
has thus far been largely devoted to a recapitulation of the
discussions and conclusions through which they were led,
or rather forced, to a consideration of the principal ques-
tion above stated. We have pursued this method because
we recognize and appreciate the natural disinclination of
our citizens to attribute the disorders of our political system
to the operation of general suffrage. After the most careful
deliberation, our conclusion is that the choice of the local
guardians and trustees, of the financial concerns of cities
should be lodged with the taxpayers. To admit to a par-
ticipation in such choice, those who make no contribution to
the funds to be administered is not in conformity with the
principles on which human affairs are conducted, and is a
departure from the general policy of this State, as frequently
declared by the Legislature.
The Principle on which it Eests.
The distinctions between the general government of the
State and the government of its local divisions—very im-
portant to be observed—are often overlooked. We have
heretofore, in general terms, adverted to them. They
need a more pointed statement. The province of the
State government consists in laying down the general
principles and determining the civik polity of the State in
establishing the, rights of persons, determining the condi-
tions upon which property may be acquired, held and
enjoyed, and framing the governmental agencies through29
which all rights may be secured. All these matters are of
general, and not merely local, interest.* They concern all citi-
zens throughout the State in a similar manner, although some
may not concern them in an equal degree.
For the purpose of carrying out the general systems thue
established, certain powers are entrusted by the State to
local officials for special, administrative, and local purposes.
Those powers (to borrow the precise language of Governor
Tilden in the message already referred to), “ in the most
“ completely developed municipality, embrace the care of
“ police, health, schools, street cleaning, prevention of fires,
“ supplying water and gas, and similar matters, most con-
“ veniently attended to in partnership by persons living to-
“ gether in a dense community, and the expenditure and
“ taxation necessary for those objects. The rights of per-
“ sons, property, and the judicial systems instituted for their
“ preservation—general legislation—government, in its
“ proper sense ; these are vast domains which the functions
“ of municipal corporations and municipal officers do not
“ touch.”
It is next to be observed that much the larger part of this
administration of the affairs of municipalities consists in the
raising by taxation, from the owners of property therein, a
common fund for carrying, out the local purposes above re-
ferred to, and the due application of that fund.
It is this domain of government proper which constitutes
the true field for the operation of the principles and methods
of universal suffrage. It is here that all actually possess,
and feel that they possess, both a common and an individual
interest, and an interest which will not, in general, be either
bartered, betrayed or neglected, and which cannot be meas-
ured by any pecuniary standard. The rights of persons
must be equal, and though all persons have not equal rights
to property, they have equal rights to equal rules respecting
property. This equality can be secured only through a legis-
lative body in which all are represented, and can be main-
tained only when the general executive and judicial officers
are subject to responsibility to all alike. In the election of
the central Legislature, and of the general executive and
judicial officers, all citizens should therefore participate.
930
The case, in respect to the choice of the local guardians
of municipal funds is very different. In all our cities there
are many who make no direct contribution whatever to these
funds, and have no just title to say how much shall be ex-
acted from other people, and to what purposes the contribu-
tions should be applied. It may be said that the burden of
supporting government falls in some manner upon all. In a
remote and indirect way a small part of the burden of local
taxation falls upon those who do not directly contribute.
But this is so inappreciable, and by them so little under-
stood, as to be wholly immaterial to the present discus-
sion.
The main object of local government, in this respect, is to
secure faithful administration of financial trusts—to place
the control of enormous sums of money in the hands of
those who will see that they are applied to their proper uses.
Knowing, as we do, that this control is, and must necessarily
be, sought for by those whose object is to pervert it, and
who will devote themselves, with restless effort, to the
formation of powerful combinations to gain it, we deliber-
ately, under our present system, throw these enormous
prizes into the arena occupied by* the contending factions.
It would indeed be strange if the results of such a system
were other than we find them. Our object is, or should be,
to select from the community such guardians as prudent
stockholders would choose to manage the concerns of a
great corporation. The plan adopted hitherto seems no
better adapted to secure a good administration than a mode
of election in a railway corporation, by which conductors,
brakemen, truckmen, engineers and passengers, should have
an equal right with stockholders to vote for directors. In-
deed, when our present system is fairly subjected to the test
# of principle, there seems to be little room for argument. It
stands self-condemned.
Its • Accordance with the Established Policy oe the
State.
The established policy of this State, in respect to the
administration of the financial concerns of municipalities,
31
admits tlie limitation of the exercise of the right of suffrage
on questions of expenditure and taxation to the tax-paying
portion of the community.
From the fact, that in elections for city officers, all
voters participate, it has come to be a common belief that
the question of submitting the local government of cities,
in all respects, to the full operation of universal suffrage,
has, after the fullest consideration of the Legislature
and ^people of the State, been deliberately adopted.
This is an error, the correction of which we deem of great
importance; not because the question of the wisdom and
-expediency of the policy depend upon whether it has here-
tofore been established, for, if such were the fact, the policy
should be reversed, if found mischievous, but because all
considerable errors upon so important a subject greatly ob-
struct the pathway to a just conclusion.
The question to which we now draw attention, is not
whether the policy of the State has been to entrust
parts of the local governments of cities to the operation of
general suffrage, but whether such has been its policy in
relation to their financial concerns. It is important here to
consider first what a city is in respect to the question under
discussion. It is not the name or the corporate form which
gives a city its character as such ; but the fact that its in-
habitants live closely together—in other words, that the
population is urban as distinguished from rural. Wherever
the pursuits of agriculture are displaced by those of manu-
factures, trade or commerce, dense populations spring up,
which require local governments radically different from
those of the sparsely settled rural districts. The distinctions
between such populations are obvious; but the con-
sequences of such distinctions are in general not sufficiently
apprehended. Wherever a few thousand people come,
from whatever cause, to dwell in close proximity to each
other, the necessity arises for a local government framed to
'suit the needs of a compact population. The country
highways do not suffice. Streets are needed. Cleanli-
ness, comfort and health are to be attended to; the
streets must be regulated, paved and cleaned; gutters,32
sidewalks and sewers must be constructed. A conflagra-
tion would bring a common peril; and common provision
must be made for the prevention of fires. Dense popu-
lations stimulate vice, immorality and consequent turbu-
lence and crime, and provision must be made for a*
suitable police. All these interests are peculiar to .such
a population, and the necessary expense must be defrayed
by contributions levied exclusively within the area in-
habited by it. Wherever such a population exists, though
it may be very small, a government in the nature of a city
government is required.
It was remarked, by the late Mr. Justice Nelson in an
opinion, noted for its ability, delivered in the year 1835, in
the Supreme Court of this State, “ that any person who will
“ look into the powers and privileges conferred upon towns
“ and counties, and their qualified right of self government
“ in reference to their domestic relations, and into the char-
“ ters of the several cities and villages, will not fail to
“ perceive that the only essential difference which exists
“ between these corporate bodies arises mainly from the
“ difference in the extent of their territory, the density of
“ their population, and the nature of their occupation.”
In the State of New York there are some one hundred
and twenty villages, all of which possess a form of local
government which contains the general features of city
charters. In the establishment of these governments the
Legislature has had before it, in each instance, the ques-
tion to whom it should entrust the control of financial
concerns. The universal general solution given to this
question has been to entrust them to the taxpayers alone.
The village executive officers, the board of trustees, the
local legislature of the village are elected by voters pos-
sessing the ordinary qualifications; but the vote of the
taxpaying electors is, with certain exceptions presently
to be noticed, requisite to confer the authority to raise
money by taxation. In the instances of the first village
charters no tax whatever w*as permitted to be raised except
by the authority of a vote of the taxpayers; but it was
found that there were certain annually recurring expenses,.33
small in amount, and usually of about the same sum, which
it was a matter of course to supply; and the Legislature in
many instances, to save the inconvenience of a separate vote
of a separate body of electors, at a village meeting, intro-
duced into numbers of the village charters carefully guarded
provisions authorizing the boards of trustees to raise by tax
sums limited in amount, usually a few hundred, sometimes
a few thousand dollars, for these regular and inevitable ex-
penditures ; but for any unusual object requiring the expen-
diture of any considerable sum, the authority to levy a tax
was and is carefully restricted to the tax-payers; and it is
to be observed that any proposition for the raising of an un-
usual tax when submitted to the tax-payers must state the
objects and purposes to which the money is to be applied,
so that the contributors to the fund pass judgment upon
the objects of the expenditure as well as upon the amount
to be raised.
Provisions adopting the method above pointed out will
be found in the charters of all or nearly all the villages 6f
the State which were incorporated prior to the passage in
1847 of the general law for the incorporation of villages,
and the form in which they were generally embodied may
be illustrated by a citation from a village charter, selected
at random, that of the village of Geneseo, incorporated in
1845;
“ Section 6. Every person residing in the said village, and
■“ possessing the qualifications prescribed by the constitution
“ to authorize him to vote for elective officers, may vote at
4C such annual meeting for any officers to be elected thereat ;
“ but no person shall vote upon any proposition to raise
“ a tax or appropriate the same at any such meeting unless
“ he shall at the same time be liable to be assessed for such
* tax.”
The constitution of 1846 made it the duty of the Legis-
lature to provide by general law for the incorporation of *
villages, and accordingly the general act of 1847, above re-
ferred to, was passed, and continued in force until it was
superseded by the general village incorporation act of 1870.
Both these acts reaffirmed and adopted the same principle34
of discrimination in the exercise of the suffrage, giving the
election of officers to the electors generally, but committing
questions of expenditure, with the exception of small
amounts for ordinary purposes, to tax-payers alone. Many
of the cities of the State grew up out of village organiza-
tions, and their charters usually contain the same discrimi-
nation. The charters of Binghamton, Kingston, Oswego,
Ogdensburg, Elmira and Long Island City, are referred
to as instances.
This Policy Plainly Applicable to all Cities.
It may be asked why this policy of the State so frequently
declared by the Legislature in reference to all villages and
the smaller cities has not also been applied to the larger
cities? That- financial concerns should be thus carefully
placed under the control of the tax-payers in those smaller
communities, where the number of the unreflecting or vicious
population, and the facilities for successful combinations
among greedy aspirants for the control of public patronage
and plunder are comparatively small, and that these obvious
safeguards should be wholly omitted in the great cities, is a
striking anomaly. This anomaly is not, however, we are
glad to say, the result of deliberation, but rather of accident*
It should be explained.
The question whether these concerns should be en-
trusted to the control of universal suffrage or to that of
the tax-payers only, could not arise in the convention which
framed the constitution of 1821. That convention pre-
served the restriction of the right of suffrage in all cases to
owners of property. In 1826, the people of the State, by
an amendment of the constitution, almost wholly abrogated
the property qualification. The convention of 1846, did not
adequately deal with the questions arising respecting the
local government of cities and villages. At that time, as
we have already shown, the control of financial concerns
was, in all villages, and moist of the cities, lodged with the
tax-payers, through the instrumentality of a system of85
direct voting upon the questions themselves. In re-
spect to the metropolis, the Legislature itself annually
passed upon the question of all the expenditures, and
as to many of the expenditures of other large cities*
Moreover, the evils of wasteful and corrupt administra-
tion had then scarcely begun to develop themselves to a
degree sufficient to command attention; and the con-
vention contented itself with an express delegation to
the Legislature of the duty of providing by general law the
requisite legislation for cities and villages. That duty, so
far as it relates to villages, has been performed in the man-
ner already indicated. In respect to cities, especially the
larger ones, it could hardly be performed by the Legislature
alone. To commit the control of financial affairs, even in
respect*io extraordinary expenditures and debt, to a direct
vote of the tax-payers, was hardly possible. This method
is applicable only to small communities and to very simple
concerns. To extend it to great cities like the metropolis*
would be impracticable.	*
The establishment of a representative body, to be chosen
by the tax-payers is, therefore, the proper method by which
they can control the question of expenditure and taxa-
tion in large cities; but the provisions of the constitution,
declaring in effect that all elective officers are to be chosen
by universal suffrage, stands in the way of such a procedure.
The result is, that the Legislature has been compelled
to leave the great concerns of debt and taxation, for the most
part, to the municipal councils chosen by the voters at large.
That these councils, under such a system, should degenerate
into what we now find them, is inevitable under such a policy.
In answer to the earnest appeals of citizens against the pecu-
lations, wastes, malversations and disorders thus engendered,
the Legislature has in many instances taken to itself the per-
formance of local functions, and disposed of the questions, how
much money a city should raise, and to what objects it should
be applied. Evils still more alarming developing themselves
under this practice, the central authority has felt the necessity
of refraining from the discharge of functions so inappropriate,
and has again devolved them, as to the metropolis, upon the36
local authority, but this time, upon a hybrid body, com-
posed in part of heads of executive departments, of course
disinclined to enforce economy against themselves, and, con-
sequently, disqualified to impose it upon others. The com-
mission created in 1872, for the amendment of the constitu-
tion, perceived the anomaly we have pointed out, and the
-necessity of the creation in large cities of a board representa-
tive of the tax-payers, under whose guardianship the prime
matters of debt and taxation should be placed, and recom-
mended an amendment of the constitution designed to remedy
the evil. For reasons not involving, it is believed, a dissent
on the part of the Legislature from the principles thus em-
bodied, the recommendation failed to be put in the authori-
tative shape requisite for its^ubmission to the people.
From this review of the policy of the State we §re justi-
fied in affirming that the people and the Legislature, while
providing for the organization of dense populations under
corporate forms enabling the people to govern themselves*—
and while entrusting to the electors, without discrimination,
the election of the chief magistrates, and of the local legisla-
tures, whose province it was to provide for the common
welfare—have at the same time committed the control of the
expenditure of money to the body of voters from whom the
money to be expended must be raised. The deviations from
this practice have arisen from causes which the Legislature
could not control, and constitute an anomaly which is the
real source of our existing disorders.
In recommending, as we do, the establishment of a uniform
system based upon the fundamental principle of representa-
tive government, that the assembly which votes the taxes
should be elected by those who contribute towards the taxes
imposed, we remove an anomaly, but suggest no innovation.
On the contrary, we recognize and extend the established
policy of the State, and provide a mode by whieh it can
everywhere be conveniently administered.
Some Objections Considered.
Before leaving this subject, a few observations may be37
made to meet some probable objections. 1. The fact that
the sums raised for town purposes are voted upon by
all the electors may be suggested as qualifying our state-
ment respecting the policy of the State. This circum-
stance really constitutes no ground for such a qualifica-
tion. The present mode of voting the town taxes was
adopted at a time when none but taxpayers voted. And #
after the property, qualification was modified by the consti-
tutional amendment of 1826, no evil of sufficient magnitude
displayed itself to suggest expediency of a change in this
particular. All our observations have been confined to the
question of expenditure as it arises in connection with dense
populations, as in the cases of cities and villages. The
density and magnitude of tjie population form the con-
trolling consideration. In this respect there is a distinc-
tion between rural and urban communities. In the
former the proportion of the proprietors to the whole pop-
ulation is much larger than in the latter; and when we
include with the proprietors, the voting members of their
families, and others whose interests are so closely identified
with theirs as to be incapable of separation, we find that in
committing questions of expenditure to the voters at large
they remain practically within the control of the taxpayers.
Again, in rural communities the reckless and vicious part of
the population is small, separated and comparatively inca-
pable of being organized and led by unscrupulous political
managers seeking control of the common fund, and that fund
itself is, in general, so small as to offer little temptation to
greed. An additional safeguard is found in the free and
open discussion of the town meeting. These#conditions
seem to so far diminish the dangers of abuses in the manage-
ment of town expenditures as to render unnecessary any
discrimination between the control of expenditures and the
other objects of the local government.
Even here, however, it is to be observed that the Legisla-
ture, when providing for the raising and outlay of con-
siderable sums, has reaffirmed the fundamental distinction
we have insisted upon. It has also incorporated it in the
free school system of the State by provisions securing the38
control of the expenditures of each district to the taxable
inhabitants of such district, to whom the annual budget is
submitted, and who vote upon it in detail. So also with
the numerous laws permitting towns to borrow money for
aiding in the construction of railroads and other similar pur-
poses. Those only who are liable as taxpayers to- pay the
debt are permitted to have a voice on the question of its
creation.
2. It may be said that the discrimination insisted upon
should, if a just one, be applied to the general government
of the State, and the control of the State expenditures be
confined to those who contribute to them. But here the
discrimination is not practicable. Those expenditures must
necessarily be regulated by th£ general legislature; and, as
this body has the general function of determining the rights
of all the citizens, and the rules by which every member of
the community is to be governed, popular government re-
quires that it should be the representative of the whole
population. Fortunately, State expenditure, though large,
is small when compared with the aggregate sums raised for
local purposes, and the members of the central legislature
occupy a position of influence and responsibility wider than
members of municipal boards. As to such State expendi-
tures, the Constitution of 1846 has made detailed and wise
provisions, both as to their purposes and the increase of the
debt, which have proved of such efficacy that the burdens
they impose are easily borne, and the sinking fund will, in a
few years, entirely relieve us from a State debt. Moreover,
the objects to which the State funds are applied are widely
distributed; and the facilities for combinations to control
them greatly diminished. The administrative precautions
and methods which we recommend are those which the
natural laws underlying human affairs demand. These laws
cannot be disregarded by society any more than by indi-
viduals, without disaster.
3. It may be suggested, even by those who agree with the
views we have expiessed as to the necessity in our cities,
of a body representative of the taxpayers, that, by reason39
of a papular belief, however unfounded, that such a measure
would be an encroachment upon the principle of universal
suffrage, it will be impossible to procure its adoption.
We have not overlooked this suggestion. It would be a
sufficient answer to it to say that this commission was
constituted for the purpose of devising a plan of local
government calculated to reach and remove those evils
wThich have assumed alarming proportions. It would be a
wholly inadequate discharge of this grave duty if we should
hesitate to give effect to our deliberate convictions because
of apprehensions that they may arouse prejudices and even
meet with serious resistance. To recommend a system in
accordance with sound principles of government, and neces-
sary to the preservation of our municipal institutions, is our
plain duty. The responsibility of accepting or rejecting it
rests upon the Legislature and the people. But it is a better
answer to say, that this measure is, in our opinion, a just
one, and must sooner or later be accepted and adopted.
All that is needed to bring the public mind to an accep-
tance of these conclusions, is to secure its attention to the
overwhelming importance of the subject. Hitherto it has
received no adequate public discussion. A full comprehen-
sion of the vast interests at stake must overcome this
indifference. The twenty-four cities of the State exhibited,
according to the census of 1875, a population of 2,213,373,
while the entire population of the State was 4,330,210.
The assessed aggregate value of the property subject to taxa-
tion in these cities was $1,516,449,596, while the assessed
value of the whole property in the State at the same time
was, in round numbers, $2,000,000,000. The vast financial
concerns of these great communities, representing one-half
of the population, and three-fourths of the property of the
State, cannot, without ruin to the general interests, be sur-
rendered to the control of contending factions, organized for
political and personal aggrandizement.
When the question is fairly met, without reference to
party interests, it will, we think, be clearly perceived that
objection to it, founded upon any supposed violation of the
principle of general suffrage, proceeds from a total miscon-40
ceptibn. It is not proposed to interfere with that principle
in any particular affecting legislation which establishes the
general rights or obligations of citizens. The choice of all
State officers, of members of the Legislature, of the chief
executive officers of cities, of the local bodies, which frame the
ordinances providing for the public health, peace and order,
is left wholly untouched. All that is proposed to be done, is to
place the concerns of local taxation and expenditure within
the control of those who contribute to the local funds to
be raised and expended : and this, as already shown, is not
in violation of the principle of popular suffrage, but in strict
conformity to it, and also in conformity to the general policy
of this State, as repeatedly declared.
The measure we recommend is not in opposition to the
principle of general suffrage, but in support of it—as much
s© as if the sole duty of this commission had been to consider
how that principle could be best preserved and perpetuated.
No surer method could be devised to bring the principle of
universal suffrage into discredit, and prepare the way for its
overthrow, than to pervert it to a use for which it was never
intended, and subject it to a service which it is incapable of
performing.
Even now sarcasm and ridicule are frequently levelled
against the system of universal suffrage, as if it were a con-
trivance unsuited to any department of human affairs. Such
criticism seems wholly misdirected. This principle, justly
applied, is the true foundation of our government, and a
leading source of our strength and prosperity as a nation.
It is not the use, but the abuse of the principle that can ever
bring it into contempt or endanger its preservation. To ex-
pect frugality and economy in financial concerns from its
operations in great cities, where perhaps half of the inhab-
itants feel no interest in these duties, is to subject the prin-
ciple to a strain for which it is not designed, and which it
cannot bear. All true friends of the system should unite in
rescuing it from such perils.
Enough has now been said to vindicate the conclusion of
this commission that a body, representative of the taxpayers,
is necessary as an integral part of the local government of
cities. Inasmuch as this conclusion enters into the plan41
to be proposed by them as a fundamental element, it has
seemed to us best that a vindication of it should precede the
statement of the scheme.
Details of the Plan of the Commission.
In the preparation of the plan proposed, the Commission
have endeavored to keep constantly in view the distinction:
between what can be accomplished by legislation and what
cannot be so accomplished. Power bestowed will sometimes
be abused, and checks against such abuse must be employed ^
at the same time the introduction, of too numerous
checks tends to cripple the beneficial exercise of power. AIL
useful efforts for improvement in local government fall,
within three general divisions :
1.	The mode by which the most competent and faithful
local governing bodies and executive officers can be chosen.
2.	The vesting in these governing bodies ample powers
for the public welfare.
3.	The interposition of checks to prevent the possible
abuse of powers bestowed.
Guided by these general views the Commission propose at
framework for the local government of cities to be incorpor-
ated in the Constitution of the State, of which the following
are the principal features :
First.—The delegation of the entire business of local ad-
ministration to the people of the cities, free from Legislative
interference therewith; reserving to the State its functions of
making the general laws under which the local affairs are
to be administered, and also a supervision of the manner of
administration.
Second.—A chief executive officer, clothed with the
authority of general supervision, and with the unfettered
power to appoint the other principal executive officers,.42
except those two (the chief financial and chief law officers)
whose duties immediately affect the matter of the public
expenditures, and with the power of removal, subject, how-
ever, to the approval of the Governor.
Tim'd.—A Board of Aldermen, clothed, as now, with all
the legislative powers, except such as relate to taxation and
expenditure, and elected, as at present, by the people.
*
Fourth.— A separate body, called the Board of Finance,
to be eleeted by tax and rent payers, with such powers only
as relate to taxation, expenditure, and debt, its principal
functions being to determine the amount of the annual ex-
penditure, and to appropriate it to its various objects and
purposes. The assent of this body is made requisite to the
appointment of the chief financial and law officers.
Fifth.—A detailed plan, designed to be complete in itself,
for securing efficiency, order and frugality in the financial
administration, and to be executed by the Board of Finance.
Its main features are—
1.	The determination, in each year, of the sum of money
requisite to be expended for all objects and purposes, and
what part thereof is to be raised by taxation, and the levy-
ing of the latter sum.
2.	The appropriation, at the same time, of the whole sum
to be expended to the several objects and purposes.
3.	The certain realization of the entire amount appropri-
ated, by compelling the relevying of deficiencies in the col-
lection of taxes.
4.	The prohibition of any expenditure beyond the sums
appropriated, by making all contracts or engagements in
excess thereof void.	^
Sixth—A further enforcement of the maxim “ pay as
you go,” by a prohibition against borrowing money or incur-
ring debt, except under certain specified conditions, not
likely to arise often.43
Necessity for Constitutional Amendment.
The grounds upon which the incorporation of the entire
plan in the constitution has been deemed essential must now
be stated.
A principal reason is the necessity of stability. Our
experience has shown that even a good law requires
time to test its merits. In the first instance, any change
brings with it incidental inconvenience, although such
change is from a worse to a better system; additional diffi-
culties arise from ignorance and misapprehension of its pro-
visions. And such inconveniences and difficulties lead to
impatient amendments, which, in their turn, become the
source of further amendments; and thus, in a short time,
the whole law becomes honeycombed by exceptions, pro-
visos and changes, which make it inoperative for good.
Any mere legislative enactment, however carefully framed,
embodying the principles which are contained in the plan
herein proposed, would annually inevitably excite contention
in the legislative halls between the friends of good govern-
ment and the sinister interest excluded from future direct
participation in the fruits of taxes. Specious arguments
and political exigencies for patronage would in themselves,
in the future, as in the past, be a fruitful source of change
in the administrative departments of local government; and
parts of the plan, however harmonious, would be compelled
to give w:ay to the pressure of party or personal interests.
These views are well expressed by Governor Tilden in his
message of the 11th of May, 1875. and his opinion seems to
have been accepted by the Legislature in the concurrent
resolution providing for the creation of this commission by
referring to instability as the source of our evils.
To the extent that the evils arise from instability they can
be remedied only by giving any plan, whatever it may be,
the protection from the encroaching spirit of restless change,
which the constitution alone affords. Entertaining these
views, we have studied to reduce the plan proposed to the
most concise and compact form, and to exclude from it all
details of administration, except where such details were44
necessary to its completeness and efficiency. It is believed
that little of superfluity either in substance or expression
will be found in it.
Another object to be attained is uniformity. This is de-
clared, in the preamble to the joint resolution of the Senate
and Assembly creating this commission, to be a necessity.
As all the provisions of the plan proposed are capable of ap-
plication to all the cities of the State, the condition of uni-
formity is fully complied with. In conforming the various
charters of different cities to these provisions, changes in
their details will undoubtedly be necessary; but the plan
proposed is uniform, and all that will be required to give it
effect is to adapt the existing charters of city governments
to the general provisions of the article.
It may be added as a further reason for incorporating the
plan in the Constitution, that it is only by a constitutional
provision that the change proposed in the method of elect-
ing the Board of Finance can be accomplished. *In the case
of villages and of small cities the limitation of the exercise of
the right of suffrage is made applicable by the Legislature
by provisions relating to the direct vote of the taxpaying elect-
ors upon questions of debt and expenditure without interfer-
ing wilh the methods prescribed by the Constitution for elect-
ing the officers by whom the expenditure is to be made. In
the case of large cities it would be manifestly impracticable
to submit such questions to the vote of the taxpayers, and
the necessity of confiding the financial administration of the
city to a board of elective officers cannot be seriously ques-
tioned. A change of the Constitution in this important par-
ticular was therefore, in any event, necessary, and as the other
provisions of the plan are framed, to a large extent, with refer-
ence to and in aid of the Board of Finance and its administra-
tion of the finances of the city, it is essential to the proper
working of the plan that all these provisions should be in-
cluded in the proposed constitutional amendment.
It may be thought that inasmuch as the carrying of the
scheme into full operation will require further legislation, it
would have been a useful supplement to the principal work
of the commission, if it had drawn what might be deemel a45
model charter applicable to all cities, or forms of general
laws designed to give full effect to the plan proposed. This
matter was attentively considered by the commission, and
the conclusion reached that neither of these attempts on
their part would be expedient. The cities of our State ex-
hibit such differences in magnitude, in the nature of the
populations, their pursuits, and other leading features, that
no single charter embracing the provisions usually contained
in such instruments could be well contrived. Provisions
-quite necessary for one city would be useless or worse than
useless in another. The devising of a general plan applicable
to all cities was the duty devolved upon this commission;
and they are of the opinion that in constructing such general
plan it would be hazardous to enter upon more minute details
than are exhibited by the one here proposed. Similar obser-
vations may be made in respect to the suggestion of general
laws designed to carry the scheme into full effect. It would
be premature to present any such laws in advance of the
adoption of the proposed constitutional amendments, and
they could not be adequately framed except by a body hav-
ing before it the representatives of the different local
governments, to the end that their varying needs might be
the. better ascertained and accommodated to the change m
the fundamental lavr.
The following is the text of the plan which this commis-
sion recommends in the form of an addition to the Constitu-
tion :46
ARTICLE............. ...
Section 1. The power of the Legislature to provide
for the organization and government of cities shall be
exercised in accordance with the provisions, and sub-
ject to the limitations and restrictions hereinafter con-
tained, and the powers and franchises of every exist-
ing city government must be exercised in conformity
therewith. The Legislature hall at its first session
after the adoption of this article provide by law
for carrying into effect all the provisions contained
therein.
Sec. 2. City elections shall be held separately from
the State and National elections, and in March or
April.
Sec. 3. The legislative power conferred on any city
shall be vested in a Board of Aldermen, to be elected
by the electors qualified under Article Second of the
Constitution, which shall be the Common Council of
such city ; but no power hereinafter vested in the
Board of Finance shall be conferred on or exercised
by the Board of Aldermen. In case of a veto of any
legislative act of the Board of Aldermen by the maj or,
the board shall have power to pass the same, notwith-
standing the mayor’s veto, by a recorded vote of two-
thirds of all the members elected, provided that such
vote be taken at the next meeting of the board after
the communication of the veto.47
Sec. 4. The executive power of every city shall be
vested in the mayor and in snch executive officers and
departments as may be created by law. The mayor shall
be the chief executive officer of the eity, and he shall
see to the faithful performance of their duties by the
several executive officers and departments thereof.
He shall be elected by electors qualified under Article
Second of the Constitution, for such term, and he shall
receive such compensation as the Legislature may pre-
scribe. He shall nominate, and with the consent of
the Board of Finance, appoint the chief officer or head’
of the financial department, and the chief law officer
or head of the law department; and he shall have-
power to appoint the head or chief officers of the
other executive departments. With the written ap-
proval of the governor, the mayor may remove the
head or chief officers of any executive department.
He shall have power to investigate their accounts and
proceedings ; have access to all books and documents
in their offices, and may examine them and their sub-
ordinates, under oath, as to all matters relating to the
performance of their official duties. He shall also have
power to veto any legislative act of the Board of
Aldermen. The mayor may be removed by the gov-
ernor for cause, as in the case of sheriffs ; and in case
of such removal, the governor shall appoint a mayor
to fill the vacancy, who shall hold office until the next
succeeding city election, at which election a mayor
shall be elected for the full term of the office. The Leg-
islature shall provide for the filling of a vacancy in
the office of mayor, otherwise occurring, until the next
succeeding city election, and also for the discharge of
the duties of the mayor during his temporary absence
or disability. Heads of departments shall have power48
to appoint and remove their subordinate officers and
employees, but the Legislature may regulate by law
the qualifications for such appointments, and the con-
ditions of such removals.
Sec. 5. There shall be elected in every city of this
State a Board of Finance, to consist of not less than
six, nor more than fifteen members. In cities having
a population, according to the State census next pre-
ceding the election, of over one hundred thousand in-
habitants, the Board of Finance shall be elected by
the electors of the city (otherwise qualified under Ar-
ticle Second of the Constitution), who shall, for two
years next preceding the election, have paid an annual
tax on property owned by them, and officially assess-
ed for taxation in such city , of the assessed value of
not less than five hundred dollars, or shall have
actually paid during the same period a yearly rent for
premises in said city occupied by them for purposes
of residence or lawful business, of not less than two
hundred and fifty dollars.
In cities having a population, according to the State
census next preceding the election, of not more than
one hundred thousand inhabitants, the Board of Finance
shall be elected by the electors of the city (otherwise
.qualified under Article Second of the Constitution),
■who shall, for two years next preceding the election,
have paid an annual tax on property owned by them
and officially assessed for taxation in such city, or shall
have actually paid during the same period a yearly
rent for premises in said city, occupied by them for
purposes of residence or lawful business, of not less
.than one hundred dollars.	*
In cities having a population, according to the State49
census next preceding the election, of not more than
twenty-five thousand inhabitants, the board shall con-
sist of six members. In cities having a population of
over twenty-five thousand inhabitants, and not more
than fifty thousand, it shall consist of nine members.
In cities having a population of over fifty thousand in-
habitants, and not more than one hundred thousand, it
shall consist of twelve members ; and in cities having
a population of over one hundred thousand inhabitants,
it shall consist of fifteen members..
. At the first election one-third of the board shall be
elected for a term of one year, one-third thereof for a
term of two years, and one-third thereof for a term of
three years; and thereafter the term of office shall be
three years. The existence of any vacancy in the board
shall not of itself suspend the exercise of its powers
and duties.
The Legislature shall, at its first session after the
adoption of this article, and thereafter, from time to
time, as may .be necessary, provide by general law for
the registration in every city, of .electors qualified to
vote for the Board pf Finance, and for filling vacan-
cies in said board, and may ; change the number of
members of which the said board shall consist in any
city, provided that the number shall not, in any case,
be less than six, and that one-third of the board shall
be elected annually.
Sec. 6. The Board of Finance shall, in every fiscal
year, make estimates of the sums of money necessary
for the proper administration of the city government
during the next fiscal year, and which are tpbe raised
by taxation or supplied by the revenue of the city de-
4 '50
rivable from other sources, and applicable to general
purposes.
Such estimates shall include the sums requisite for
the payment of the interest on bonds or other city
debts drawing interest, the principal of any debts
payable during the year, judgments against the city,
the sums sufficient to make good all deficiencies in the
payment of taxes on' personal estate for the last preced-
ing year, and any deficiencies in the collection of taxes
on real estate for any preceding 'year which may be
found by the board to be uncollectible, and also any
deficiencies in the collection of the estimated revenues
from other sources, and all other sums required by
law to be raised by taxation.
The estimates shall also separately state the aggre-
gate amount of moneys in the treasury or receivable
during the next fiscal year, applicable to general pur-
poses, in which may be included any prior unexpended
appropriations which, in the judgment of the board,
may not be required to meet existing liabilities ; and
shall, in like manner, separately state the aggregate
amount to be raised by taxation.
The board shall submit, the estimates, when com-
pleted, to the mayor, who shall, within ten days there-
after, return the same to the board, with his approval,
or with his objections, if any he have, in writing,
specifying the items objected to ; and the items thus
objected to, but no others, shall be reconsidered and
finally determined by the board. The board shall,
after the return of the estimates by the mayor, and the
action of the board upon the items objected to, if any,
or in the event of a failure of the mayor to return the
same as above required, proceed by resolution to de-
clare the estimates to be final and adopted, and the51
several sums of money therein estimated as necessary,
shall become and be appropriated to and for the de-
partments dnd officers therein mentioned, and for the
objects and purposes therein mentioned. The ag-
gregate amount to be raised by taxation shall be
stated in such resolution, and shall thereupon be levied
and collected in the manner provided by law for the
levying and collecting of the city taxes.
The Board. of Finance may, during any current
fiscal , year, by a unanimous vote, and with the ap-
proval of the mayor, in case of pestilence, conflagra-
tion or other unforseen public calamity, transfer sums
of money appropriated to one department, object or
purpose, and not required to satisfy existing liabilities,
to another department, object or purpose.
A vote of a majority of the entire board shall be
necessary to the passage of any measure or resolution;
and a vote of two-thirds of the entire board shall be
necessary to the adoption of the estimates hereinbefore
provided for, or any item thereof, or to authorize the
issue of any stock or bonds, and in such other cases
as are hereinafter specified.
It shall be the duty of the several departments,
boards, and officers, and the Common Council, to fur-
nish all such statements and accounts as the Board of
Finance may require, and at such times and in such
manner as the said board may prescribe; and the
Board of Finance shall also have power to examine
the books and papers of the several executive depart-
ments and officers, and to examine such officers upon
oath, concerning their official business.
Sec. 7. No debt or liability shall be incurred by
any department, board, or officer in any city, unless52
there shall be at the time an unexpended appropria-
tion applicable thereto sufficient to satisfy the same
and all debts and liabilities previously incurred1 and
payable out of such appropriation; and all con-
tracts and engagements in contravention hereof shall
be void. Nor shall any debt or liability of the City
be paid, except out of money in the treasury appro-
priated to the purpose of paying such debt or liability.
No city government, or any department thereof, shall
grant any extra compensation to any officer*, servant,
agent, contractor, or employee.
Sec. 8. The Legislature shall itself have no power
to pass any law for the opening, making, paving,
lighting, or otherwise improving or maintaining
streets, avenues, parks, or places, docks or wharves,
or for any other local work, or improvement in or for
a city, but all authority necessary for such purposes
shall be by law conferred on the city government;
nor shall the Legislature impose any charge on any
city or civil division of the State containing a city,
except by a vote of two-thirds of all the members
elected to each house.
Any local work or improvement in or fora city,
the cost of which is to be wholly paid by the city at
large, must be authorized by resolution, passed by the
vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to the
Board of Aldermen and Board of Finance respectively.
Any such work or improvement, the cost of which
is to be wholly paid otherwise than by the city at
large, must be authorized by the vote of two-thirds of
all the members elected to the Board of Aldermen,
with the Consent of a majority in interest, to be ascer-
s53
tained in such manner as the Legislature may prescribe,
of all the owners of land within the district of assess-
ment limited for the cost of such work or improve-
ment,
Any such work or improvement, the cost of which
is to be paid in part by the city at large, and in part by
local assessment, must be authorized by a resolution
passed by the vote of, two-thirds of all the members
elected to the Board of Aldermen and Board of Finance
respectively, with the consent of a majority in in-
terest, to be ascertained as hereinbefore directed, of
all the owners of the land within the prescribed district
of assessment.
Sec. 9. No money shall be borrowed by any city
government for the purpose of defraying any of the ex-
penses of the city for which an appropriation has been
made, except in anticipation of the revenue of the
year in which the same may be borrowed, applicable
to such purposes ; and all moneys so borrowed must
be. paid out of such revenue, or out of revenues spe-
cially provided to supply any deficiency in the collec-
tion thereof. Provided, however, that temporary
loans, in anticipation of taxes, may be renewed, so far
as such taxes may hot have .been collected, when the
same are, in the opinion of the board, fully secured by
valid liens on real estate. No city shall borrow any
money for any other purpose, except under and in ac-
cordance with the following conditions and limitations
in addition to any other conditions and limitations
contained in the Constitution:
1. The debt must be for some single work or object
only, and must be authorized by a resolution passed54
by a vote of two-thirds of all members of the Board
of Finance, and approved by the mayor, distinctly
specifying Such work or object, and the amount of the
debt to be incurred.
2. The Legislature must, before the creation of sttch
debt, assent thereto by a law passed by a vote of two-
thirds of all the members elected to each House: Such
law shall also distinctly specify the single work or ob-
ject for which the debt is created, and the amount of
the debt authorized, and shall contain provisions for a
sinking fund to meet the same at maturity, and re-
quiring at least ten per cent, of the principal to be
annually raised by taxation and paid into the sinking
fund.
Sec. 10. Except as prescribed by the first section
of this article, no change in the organization of, or in
the distribution of powers in, a city government, or
in the terms or tenure of office therein, shall b,e made
by the Legislature, unless by an act passed upon the
application of the city made by resolution both of
the Board of Aldermen and of the Board of Finance
respectively, approved by the mayor, or by an act
which shall have received the sanction of two succes-
sive Legislatures.55
REMARKS ON THE FOREGOING ARTICLE.
Section 1—Legislative Power of the State.
This section declares that the legislative power to provide
for the organization and government of cities, which has
hitherto been little qualified by any constitutional restric-
tion, shall hereafter be exercised in accordance with the.
provisions, and subject to the .limitations contained in the
succeeding sections of the article.
It also provides that the powers and franchises of every
existing city government must be exercised in conformity
with the provisions, limitations and restrictions contained
in the article.
This section strikes at the root of one of the main evils of
our existing municipal system—improvident legislative con-
trol and interference, but, at the same time, recognizes and
asserts the power of the Legislature over all municipal cor-
porations, subject to the express provisions of the article
now proposed.
“All legislative power is conferred on the Senate and As-
“ sembly, and if an apt is within the legitimate exercise of
“ that power, it is valid, unless some restriction or limitation
“ can be found in the Constitution itself. The distinction
“between the United States, Constitution and our State
“ Constitution is, that the former confers upon Congress
“ certain specified powers only, while the latter confers upon
“ the Legislature all legislative power. In the one case the
“ powers specifically granted can only be exercised. In the
“other, all powers not prohibited, may be exercised.”
People v. Magg, 46 N. ¥., 401, page 404. The Legislature is
left free to grant, alter or amend city charters, as heretofore,
except that as to the particulars provided for by the express
terms of this article every charter granted, or to be granted
by the Legislature, must be made to conform thereto.56
No political powers are intended to be vested in the cities
as against the State (see People v. Morris, 13 Wend., 325);
but the exercise of those powers is intended to be controlled
and regulated according to the provisions of this article.
Existing city governments must adopt their administra-
tion to the requirements of the article, in such. manner as
the Legislature may direct, where the article itself does not
furnish the rule of action..
The general design of this article, together with the sub-
sequent provisions relative to the power of the State may be
thus briefly expressed:
First.—To remit the business of local administration to
the people of the localities.
Second.—To reserve to the State its proper function of pro-
viding the general methods for the conduct of such business,
and exercising a supervision, when necessary, over such
conduct.
Section JJ.—Ghabteb Elections.
These are to be held separately from the State and
National elections, and in March or April.
New York, Brooklyn and Buffalo are the only cities in the
State in which the charter elections are held simultaneously
with the general elections. In a majority of the other cities
the charter elections are held in the spring, and either in
March or April. This section is designed to secure uniform-
ity in respect to time, and, so far as possible, the perma-
nent divorce of municipal elections from the annual State
elections in all the cities of the State. The question of the
separation of the elections in the city of New York has been
a fruitful source of debate and experiment. From 1834: to
1849, the charter election was held in the spring. From
1850 to 1856 it was held in the fall, simultaneously with the
general election. From 1857 to 1869 it was held in Decem-
ber. Under the existing charter of 1870 the election is
held simultaneously with the State election in November.57
The reasons which have prevailed during the greater part of
the thirty-three years, covered by the dates just given, to
separate the municipal election from the general election,
have seemed to the Commission to apply with special force
tit this time. In entering on a new era of municipal govern-
ment, it is certainly to be expected that our citizens will
take a new interest in the administration of local affairs,
and that the newly aroused activity of our people for
the prevention of abuses and the permanent good man-
agement of municipal finances, will manifest itself in
every canvass and electiop. To ensure the maximum of
intelligent interest in regard to the nomination and
election of municipal officers, there must be the mini-
mum admixture of other political elements, and this can
only be attained by a permanent separation of the char-
ter election from the National and State elections. It is a
mistake to suppose that the municipal elections fail to bring
out a full vote in the large cities. A careful comparison of the
votes cast in the city of New York at the charter elections
and the general elections during all the years from 1834 to
1874, discloses the fact, that in many years the number of
votes cast at the spring charter election was larger than the
number cast at the fall general election; and that when the
elections were held simultaneously, the votes cast for the
political candidates on State or National tickets, largely ex-
ceeded those cast for the mayoralty candidates. In sixteen
elections, from 1834 to 1849, the aggregate of the votes cast
for political officers was 9,985 larger than those cast in the
same year for the mayoralty candidates, while the whole
number of votes cast at fifteen elections, from 1850 to 1874
(both years included), when v the general elections were
held simultaneously with the charter election, or a few weeks
later, shows a much larger preponderance of the votes given
for political officers, the votes cast at those fifteen elections
for the highest political officer being 54,525 in excess of the
votes given for the mayoralty candidates at the same time.
It should be observed, however, that the last named period
embraced a Presidential election, at which the vote was un-
usually large.58
Section 3 —Legislative Power op Cities.
Whatever legislative power the Legislature of the State
may grant to any city must be vested in a single board, to
be elected by general suffrage as now provided by the Con-
stitution.
A single Board of Aldermen, to be elected either from
the wards of the city or by general ticket as the several city
charters may prescribe is deemed the best depository of leg-
islative powers. And all. governing power requiring local
legislation for its due administration is to reside in the Board
of Aldermen, except as to the special incidents of expendi-
ture and the provisions therefor which are confided to the
Board of Finance.
“No power hereinafter vested in the Board of Finance
shall be conferred on or exercised by the Board of Alder-
men.” This is essential to the objects for which the Board
of Finance is created, and imposes upon that board the sole
responsibility for its action in respect to the trust devolved
upon it.
The power of the Board of Aldermen to pass any legisla-
tive act notwithstanding a veto by the Mayor, is regulated
by requiring a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected,
to be recorded, and making it imperative that such vote be
taken at the next meeting of the board after the communica-
tion of the veto. The provision as to the time of the over-
ruling vote is designed both to secure reflection, and also to
prevent the “ log-rolling” practices which are facilitated by a
holding, in suspense, of the overruling power.
Section 4.—The Executive Power.
The design of this section is :
1. To separate the exercise of executive from legislative or
discretionary power. The discretion which passes upon the
expediency of measures, especially those involving expendi-
ture, should have no connection with the steps, such as thq
making of contracts, requisite to carry them into effect.59
These inconsistent functions may, in very small communities,
be united without danger. In large ones the union can-
not fail to result in extensive abuse and mischief. Execu-
tive offices or departments are therefore essential.
2i In respect to the Mayor, to mark, as nearly as possible
the line of prudence between the extremes of giving too
much and too little p^wer. To bestow upon him the abso-
lute power of appointment and removal of all the principal ex-
ecutive officers would, in the great cities, render him an auto-
crat. Responsibility for maladministration would, it is true,
be easily fastened upon him; but to apply the remedy of
deposition from power at an election would be a difficult task.
To put into the hands of a single man the control o f twenty
millions of dollars, with liberty to use it to keep himself in
place, would be suicidal.
On the other hand, to require the concurrence of the Al-
dermen in appointments, is to divide and to destroy the re-
sponsibility. The analogies of the federal and state govern-
ments are not very useful here. The senates in both are
filled by a higher order of men, but even there mischievous *
bargaining cannot wholly be prevented. We think it easiest
to give the/Mayor the unfettered power of appointment, ex-
cept in two instances, and the power to remove, with the ap-
proval of the governor. The case would be rare when a re-
moval is really demanded for which the Governor’s approval
could not be obtained, and the exercise of this function by
the governor is a part of that prudential supervision which
rightly belongs to the central authority. This oversight of
local administration is a familiar and useful part of our present
civil establishment. It has rarely, if ever, been abused.
The two officers whose conduct immediately relates to
the questions of expenditure and debt are excepted from the
Mayor’s general power of appointment. The best efforts of
the Board of Finance might b4e crippled by the presence
of unworthy occupants of these places.. We think it highly
useful to give that board a check upon improper selections.
3. We think also, that the power to remove the mayor now
reserved to the Governor, should be continued. The Legis-60
lature may make-Ms term of office a long one, and the plan
proposed confers upon him a much larger authority than such
officers at present exercise. Such removal might prove a
very inadequate relief were it merely to create a vacancy to
be filled by some designated officer chosen for very different
purposes. In case of removal, therefore, the governor should
fill the office by a temporary appointment until an election
by the people could be held.	*
4. Heads of executive departments hold important places.
They should be held rigidly responsible for an efficient dis-
charge of their duties. Until some useful and practicable
rules of “ civil service ” can be devised, no better method
can be suggested than that of allowing these officers to
select their own subordinates. Full authority is reserved to *
the Legislature to prescribe such rules of “ civil service.”
Section 5.—The Board of Finance.
This section provides for the creation of the Board. Its
, duties and powers are subsequently specified. The objects
sought to be accomplished by this section are as follows:
1. To create a body representative, exclusively, of those
who contribute an appreciable share towards the public ex-
penditure. Considering the extent to which the burden
of taxation in our cities is imposed upon houses and lands,
the constituency might have been limited to those who pay
such taxes, and many conveniences would have thereby been
saved, aud with moderate restrictions as to the value of real
estate requisite for qualification, abuses could very easily be
prevented. But the true principle of representative govern-
ment is that in the choice of a body which is to control the
public moneys, all who contribute to the fund should have
a voice.
We have, therefore, included in the constituency those who
pay rent above a certain amount, even though they pay no
direct taxes. To what extent taxes upon houses fall Upon
the occupier instead of the landlord, even when paid by the
latter, is a disputed question in political economy ; but it can61
scarcely be doubted that this burden does, to some extent,
fall upon tenants.
It is to be apprehended that upon the adoption of the plan
proposed, efforts may at once be made, by contending fac-
tions struggling for the control of the municipal power, to
manufacture votes, b/making tax-payers of persons who
own no property. * Such a danger must be guarded against,
otherwise this main feature of the plan of local government
at once will become a dead letter. Such has been the
case in Pennsylvania, where the payment of a tax is, by the
constitution, made a qualification to the exercise of the
privilege of suffrage. This requirement has been held to
be satisfied by the payment of a poll-tax, and it is a matter
of course for the political parties or others desiring to carry
an election, to pay the tax for such of theirjollowers as will
not pay it themselves. It is needless to say that such a
practice in our large cities would certainly result in the cre-
ation of a Board of Finance in no respect superior to the
worst examples of Boards of Supervisors or Aldermen which
our municipal history exhibits, and we should have all those,
evils thrust back upon us from which escape has been
sought by legislative intervention. The discretionary power
to raise money by taxation must be lodged somewhere.
By the scheme proposed, it is intrusted to the body repre-
sentative of the tax-payers. This will be found to be a safe
repository, if it is made really representative of the bona
fide tax-payers, but not otherwise.
- To prevent abuse, therefore, we have introduced a pro-
vision restricting the qualification, in cities having a popu-
lation of over one hundred thousand, to those who have for
two years paid an annual tax on not less than five hundred
dollars of property, or a yearly rent of not less than two
hundred and fifty dollars. This restriction is not a depart-
ure from the principle that all who contribute should have
a voice. It is a precaution absolutely necessary to preserve
the efficiency of the principle. It will, it is believed, enable
all, with some exceptions, to vote for members of the Board,
who now pay taxes, and many others besides. It will ex-
clude very few, if any, bona fide tax-payers. The provision62
as to rent-payers will at once be recognized as an extension
and not a restriction of the principle by which the vote is
secured to the tax-payers, and, to this extent, is in the direp-
tion of universal suffrage. It admits to a voice in the gov-
ernment of cities a class who, though not directly tax-pay-
ers, appreciably feel the burdens of taxation.
The precaution of specifying the amount of tax has not
been applied to the smaller cities. In this omission we have
been moved by the consideration that the temptation in
these smaller communities to create voters is much less, as
well as by the fact that in many of these cities, as well as
in villages where; the payment of taxes is now a qualification
for voting upon questions of expenditure, no minimum is
fixed. The additional requirement of a successive payment
of taxes for two# years is designed to further mark out the
class of regular tax-payers, to the exclusion of those follow-
ers of some faction for whom a tax may be paid in order to
make them voters at a special election.
2.	That feature of this board which limits the annually
outgoing members to one-third is designed to secure! the
possession of that knowledge of details so necessary to the
successful administration of financial concerns, and which
can be acquired only by . actual experience.
3.	The provisions respecting this board are designed to be
self-execufing. Further legislation Will indeed be required
for the adoption of a suitable system of registration and for
other purposes. But it is believed to be expedient that in
case the plan should be adopted by the people, it should go
into operation without awaiting the aid of legislation. To
accomplish this result, it is necessary that the number of
members should be, in the first instance, determined; but
experience may show that the views of the commission as
to numbers may not, in all instances, best suit the public
needs, and power is, therefore, reserved to the Legislature
to change the nuinbers.
* /63
Section 6.—Principal Function of the Boabd of
Finance.
The fruitful sources of much, if not the most, of our
municipal debts are : First, the failure to impose a tax
levy sufficient to answer contemplated purposes. Second,
the failure to collect the taxes imposed. Third, the
incurring of obligations without any appropriation
applicable to these payments. The uniform result of
each of these practices is the accruing of a distinct cata-,
logue of arrears followed by the specious resort of funding
by an issue of bonds. Irregular expenditure, extravagant ex-
penditure, and debt are inseparable companions. This sec-
tion has been carefully elaborated to prevent both extrava-
gance and debt, by checking the tendencies or first ap-
proaches to them.
1.	It requires an estimate to be made by the board before
the beginning of each financial year of the aggregate amount
of money necessary to be expended during the year, and to
be supplied by the general unappropriated revenue of the
city, if any, and by taxation. All such moneys and no
others are subject to appropriation.
The board is required to specify the objects and pur-
poses for which the estimated sums are necessary, and to
appropriate the whole of them. This method is designed to
secure, beforehand, a full provision for the results of the
city, and nothing more. It makes provision for no surplus.
The existence of any surplus is a temptation to irregular and
excessive expenditure;
2.	To insure a full provision, the board is required to in-
clude in these estimates sums sufficient to satisfy every legal
obligation, and the most prominent of these are enu-
merated.
3.	The next requisite is to secure the raising of the
money. This is .accomplished by deducting from the aggre-
gate amount required to be expended all general revenue
receivable from other sources than taxation, and requiring
the residue to be raised by taxation.	%64
4.	The next step is to insure the collection of the amount
directed to be raised by tax. There must always be defi-
ciencies here, and it is essential that full provision be made
to cover them. These deficiencies may arise in these ways:
First, by failure to collect the taxes on personal estate. To
meet this the Board is required to treat all such taxes of the
previous year as may not have been collected as uncollectible,
and to relevy the whole deficiency thus caused. Second, by
failure to collect the taxes on real estate. These taxes are,
in general* fully secured, both as to principal and interest, by
the lien on the property taxed, and will, sooner or later, be
paid in full. So far as they are thus fully secured there is
do danger of arrears. The liberty allowed to anticipate
these collections by the temporary borrowing of money on
revenue bonds or certificates, if prudently guarded, leads to
no abuse. The taxes, as they come in, extinguish both the
principal and interest of the bonds. But, in certain cases,
taxes may be erroneously assessed and omissions made, and
rebates on payments in adv ance will lead to some failure to
bring the receipts of the tax levy up to the nominal amount.
The Board is required each year to find the amount of such
deficiencies for any preceding year, and cause these to be
relevied.
5.	_ Unforeseen emergencies. Inasmuch as the policy of
having no unappropriated surplus in the treasury requires
that the whole amount of the contemplated expenditure
should at the outset of the year be appropriated to the
various objects and purposes of the government, in case any
unforeseen calamity should absolutely require the expendi-
ture of money for other purposes, there would be no fund to
resort to. There are two modes of meeting such a contin-
gency ; one is by giving authority to borrow which increase
by exactly the sum borrowed, the amount of actual expen-
diture. The other is by calling upon the board to cut down
some appropriations already made where the objects are
not of such immediate and pressing necessity, and apply
the sums thus released to the new emergency : the objects
thus postporffed could be fully met the next year. The65
commission prefers the latter method. The former mode
would tend to insufficient original appropriations in the be-
ginning of the year. The disposition in such cases always
is to make the tax levy appear as small as possible, and the
liberty to borrow during the year in case of an emergency,
would encourage the practice of treating many things as
emergencies, which should have been contemplated at the
start; and thus the amount of the tax levy originally order-
ed, would fail of being what it should be, the full measure
of the burden to be imposed. We think the provision re-
quiring the unanimous consent of the board, and the ap-
proval of the Mayor to any transfers of appropriations will
be a guaranty against abuse. As the occurrence for such
transfers is the existence of some extraordinary emergency
which could not be foreseen, a fictitious refusal of a single
member need not be apprehended.
6.	In matters of such importance as the expenditure of
money, the inclination should be towards restraint. It seems
prudent, therefore, to require a two-thirds vote for such
item.
7.	The other provisions of this* section carry their own
explanation.
Section 7.—Restriction on Debt.
This section is the necessary supplement to the system
of order and economy contained in section 6. Similar pro-
visions are now to be found in most city charters. They are
absolutely essential to the prevention of extravagance and
debt.
Without such provisions the whole financial system is at
the mercy of the heads of departments. Contractors must
thoroughly understand that the power of these agents to
charge the public are limited. To prevent cases of hardship
provision should be made whereby the fact whether an un-
expended-appropriation exists may be duly certified. Such
provision is the proper subject of a law.
966
Section 8.—Local Works and Improvements.
This section deals with local works and improvements
so far as it is expedient to deal with them by constitutional
provisions. It would be quite desirable in many respects
to have a law, uniform in its operations, relative to taking
lands for public purposes, and also in relation to the ex-
pense of opening, regulating and paving streets, construct-
ing sewers, &c. The framing of such a law requires, how-
ever, a careful consideration of the varying conditions exist-
ing in different cities, and the representatives of the several
cities should be heard upon the question. This commission
have not the powers requisite to compel the necessary infor-
mation. They can deal only with the general, principles.
The section aims at the following objects:
1. To remove all immediate interference by the Legisla-
ture in these local works. It is here that such interposition
has been most fruitful in extravagant expenditure and mu-
nicipal debt. That private individuals interested in develop-
ing their own property or contractors seeking profitable jobs
should be able to secure against the will of the people of a
locality a mandate for the execution of expensive local
works, often miscalled improvements, and to charge the ex-
pense upon property owners vainly struggling to resist the
imposition, is a not unfrequent feature of recent legislation.
Such practices should not be permitted. We have endeav-
ored to place this branch of administration upon what is
believed to be the just principle, namely, that those who pay
for the work should have a voice in determining whether it
should be undertaken. The initial steps in ordering im-
provements are as heretofore to be taken by the aldermen.
The possible cases are three in number, and the principle
above mentioned is applied as follows :
First.—When the work is to be paid for by the city at
large the Board of Finance represents the body of contrib-
utors to it, and the assent of that board is required.
Second.—When it is to be paid for by special assess-
ment upon property supposed to be benefited, the as-67
sent of a majority in interest of the owners of such prop-
erty is requisite.
Third—When it is to be paid for partly by the city at
large and partly by special assessments upon property ben-
efited, both such consents are requisite.
2.—Another provision of this section is designed to pre-
serve and at the same time to regulate the power of the
Legislature to impose special ^charges upon cities for pur-
poses other than local. The object here is to leave, ac-
cording to the present policy of the State, the business of
providing for such objects as the support of the poor,
maintaining a sufficient police, enforcing the local admin-
istration of justice, supporting schools, &c., in the hands
of the people of the localities. But these objects are not
purely local. The people of the whole State have an in-
terest in them; and it is the function of the central au-
thority to secure their just accomplishment. The super-
visory function of the State is therefore preserved, and it
may itself, in case of need, assume the control of these
branches of the administration and charge the expense on
the localities. Such an emergency, however, not likely to
occur, may reasonably require to be evidenced by a two-
thirds vote.
Section 9.—Further Eestrictions on Debt.
Other provisions of our plan are aimed to prevent the
creation of those debts which may be called involuntary,
because they arise, not from direct design, from a loose
and irregular financial administration. The present section
is designed to prevent voluntary indebtedness, save in very
exceptional instances. The incurring of debts in other ways
than by borrowing money has already been prohibited by
those provisions preventing the incurring of obligations in
the ordinary course of administration, unless there is an ex-
isting appropriation sufficient to satisfy them. Borrowing
money is here particularly dealt with.
It is allowed for the purpose of anticipating revenue. No68
*
evil can come from this permission, if the methods provided
by Section 6 for securing the full collection of every tax levy
are carried out. The revenue bonds or certificates will be
extinguished, principal and interest, by the taxes as they come
in; and as no taxes can remain permanently uncollected, no
revenue bonds can remain permanently outstanding.
Borrowing money for other purposes is absolutely pro-
hibited, except in rare instances, and under such conditions
and safeguards as will* effectually prevent any burdensome
accumulation of debt. These conditions and safeguards are
so explicit as to need little explanation. The provision re-
quiring an annual contribution of ten per cent. to a sinking
fund is of great importance. The present generation is
disposed to regard needed improvements as designed more
for posterity than for themselves, and thus to rid itself of
much which ought to be the subject of annual expenditure.
This tendency we have endeavored to check by this pro-
vision.
Section 10.—Changes in the Organization of City
Governments.
Large powers being still possessed by the Legislature in
reference to the framework of city governments, it is very
important to prevent those sudden enactments which are
frequently allowed in the press of legislative business, to
pass, without sufficient consideration. Sudden legislation is
apt to be mischievous, and often has its origin in unworthy
and merely personal motives. If immediate action is really
demanded for the public welfare, the local governing bodies
will be the first to ask for it. Proposed laws for which they
do not ask, must be of a questionable character. It is very
suitable that upon such measures the judgment of two suc-
cessive Legislatures should be had.
Proposed Amendments of the Constitution in aid of the
General Plan.
Besides the additional constitutional article proposed andexplained as above, the Commission recommend as neces-
sary, in order to give full effect to the existing provisions of
the Constitution in harmony with the requirements of the
new article, an amendment of the 22d section of Article III.
This section, as it now stands, is as follows:
“ Sec. 22; There shall be in the several counties, except in
“ cities whose boundaries are the same as those of the county,
“ a Board of Supervisors, to be composed of such members
“ and elected in such manner and for such period as is or
“ may be provided by law. In any such city the duties and
“ powers of a Board of Supervisors maj be devolved upon
“ the Common Council or Board of Aldermen.”
The city of New York is the only city whose boundaries
are co-terminous with those of a county. As the law now
stands the functions of boards of supervisors in respect to
that city are conferred upon the Board of Aldermen. This
is*well enough, except in those particulars which involve
expenditure; and those#are quite important. The existence
of a separate authority in. the Board of Aldermen, to subject
the people to expense under the name of county charges,
would be wholly inconsistent with the scheme of the Board
of Finance. The authority of this board should extend to
all matters which form the subject of expenditure. The
commission therefore recommend that the 22d Section of
the Third Article of the Constitution should be so amended
as to stand and be read as follows:
Sec. 22. There shall be in the several counties, except in
cities whose boundaries are the same as those of the county,
a Board of Supervisors, to be composed of such members
and elected in such manner and for such period as is or may
be provided by law.
In any such city the duties and powers of a Board of Su-
pervisors may be devolved upon the Board of Aldermen
thereof; except such duties and powers as involve the making
of contracts, procuring supplies, creating, auditing or allowing
county charges, all which duties and powers, whether now exist-70
mg or hereafter to he created, shall he exercised and performed
exclusively hy the Board of Finance.
Another additional amendment is designed to remove a
supposed constitutional impediment in the way of the adop-
tion by the Legislature of a plan calculated to test the
merits of what is known as minority representation.
In respect to this plan the Commission remark that there
was too great diversity of opinion in their body as to the
expediency of the adoption of the principle itself, which
would ‘of course have been intensified in recommending any
special scheme from among the many which have, for vari-
ous reasons, commended themselves to the judgments of
those conversant with the subject. In any event, the ideas
underlying this question are as yet too novel and too little
understood by the public to justify their enforcement by
constitutional amendment.
It is suggested, however, that the Constitution, at present
does not permit the trial of the experiment of minority
representation in the local government of cities, and that
even the very crude attempts in this direction already made
in this State may, for this reason, prove invalid. In view
of the confident opinions of many distinguished writers that
this scheme will furnish substantial relief against many
existing mischiefs, and as it is not inconsistent with the
plan recommended by this commission, while we are not
united in an approval of these opinions, we do not think it
wise that the Legislature should be debarred from making
the experiment.
It is therefore recommended that a concurrent resolution
be passed for the submission to the people of a proposition
so to amend the first section of the Second Article of the
Constitution that it shall stand and be read as follows:
Section 1. Every male citizen of the age of twenty-one
years, who, shall have been a citizen for ten days and an
inhabitant of this State one year next preceding an elec-
tion, and for the last four months a resident of the county,
and for the last thirty days a resident of the election dis-71
trict in which lie may offer his vote, shall be entitled to vote
at such election in the election district of wrhich he shall at
the time be a resident, and not elsewhere, for all officers that
now are, or hereafter may be, elective by the people, and
upon all questions which may be submitted to the vote of
the people ; but the Legislature may provide that elections for
members of city boards shall be so regulated as to give to minori-
ties a proportionate share of representation therein. Provided
that in time of war $o elector in the actual military service
of the State, or,of the United States, in the army or navy
thereof, shall be deprived of his vote by reason of his ab-
sence from such election district; and the" Legislature shall
have powTer to provide the manner in which, and the time
and place at which, such absent electors may vote, and for
the return and canvass of their votes in the election districts
in which they respectively reside.
Concluding Remarks.
The submission of this report completes the task assigned
to the Commission. The amount of time, labor and thought
bestowed upon the work are not to be measured by the mere
text of the amendments to the Constitution which are pro-
posed, or by the summary of views and conclusions therewith
presented. The whole system of municipal establishments,
its nature, its objects, its defects, the experiments to which
it has been subjected, the present condition which it exhibits,
and the means of its improvements, have been the subject
of continuous and earnest investigation, and have been
discussed at length, in written papers and orally at the
regular meetings of the Commission. Many subjects which
have received a large degree of attention are omitted as not
necessary, in view of the results arrived at; no small part
of the labor has consisted in reducing the text of the proposed
amendments to the smallest possible compass, while em-
bracing within it all the elements essential to completeness.
The force and meaning of the particular terms employed, as
well as the scope and purport of every general provision,72
have been carefully considered; and while it is impossible
to present by reports of the debates and deliberations, the
course of the arguments and decisions of the Commission,
in the same manner as those of more popular bodies, it
is none the less true that they have covered the wide range
which it was necessary to explore in order to arrive at the
results embodied in this report. In these results the under-
signed member of the Commission concur, and they may
be permitted to close their labors w^h the expression of
the hope that the plan which they propose, if it shall be ap-
proved by. the Legislature and adopted by the people, may
secure those public benefits which have been the sole aim
of the Commission.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
Dated New York, 24th February, 1877.
Wm. M. Evarts,
Saml. Hand,
E. L. Godkin,
John A. Lott,
Joshua M. Van Cott,
Jas. C. Carter,
Oswald Ottendorfer,
Wm..Allen Butler,. -
Simon Sterne,
.	Henry F. Dimock.
Nota Bene.—I concur in the results of the foregoing re
port, except as to qualifications of voters for th$ Board of
Finance, and the powers of that Board to appoint the law7
and financial officers. I think the qualifications of voters
for the large cities should be the same as those prescribed
for the smaller cities, and that the Board of Finance should
have no appointing power.
Samuel Hand,TAXPAYERS’ MEETING, OCTOBER %% 1377.
ADDRESS AND RESOLUTIONS.
In all the great cities of this State, the evils arising from bad and dis-
honest government have been of recent years keenly felt. On the citizen
of New York they have long pressed with a peculiar burden, until taxation
and debt have reached that point at which municipal bankruptcy stares us
in the face. Seven years ago, when this great commercial community lay
helpless in the grasp of a band of confederated thieves, our case appeared
to be absolutely without hope. A great popular "uprising drove them from
office, but did not put an end to the causes which had produced their power.
These have their roots deep-seated in the existing system of city govern-
ment, and to remove them, and thus secure the fruits of our victory over
the public enemy, a radical change in that system, by means of laws—wise,
fundamental, permanent—is needed.
To secure this, a commission selected from both political parties, and
chosen solely with reference to the wisdom and fitness of its members, was
appointed two years ago by Governor Tiiden. Appointed in accordance
with a resolution of the Senate and Assembly, it was thus called into exist-
ence by the united action of both the executive and legislative branches of
the government of the State.; This commission was directed to devise a
general plan for the government of cities, and, after long deliberation
and debate, reported a plan of a simple and at the same time thorough
character.
Their report recognizes as the two great evils of city government, the
accumulation of permanent debt and the startling increase of current ex-
penditure. As to the latter of these two, the current expenditure of this
city alone has increased since 1850, as compared with the increase in popu-
lation, more than 400 per cent.; as to the other, the permanent debt, which
was in 1840 $10,000,000, is to-day (so far as the taxpayers are permitted to
know its actual amount) $120,000,000, exclusive of a large floating debt;
while, in the language of the commission, ‘‘the magnitude and rapid
increase of this debt are not less remarkable than the poverty of the results
exhibited as the return for so prodigious an expenditure. It was abundantly
sufficient for the construction of all the public works of a great metropolis
for a century to come, and, to have adorned it besides with the splendors of
architecture and art. Instead of this, the wharves and piers are for the
most part temporary and perishable structures; the streets are poorly
paved ; the sewers in great measure imperfect, insufficient, and in bad
order; the public buildings shabby and inadequate; and there is little
which the citizen can regard with satisfaction save the aqueduct and its
appurtenances and a public park. Even these should not be said to be the
product of the public debt; for the expense occasioned by them is, or should
have been, for the most part already extinguished. In truth, the public
debt of the city of New York, or the larger part of it, represents a vast
aggregate of moneys wasted, embezzled, or misapplied.”
rhe'cau3es-o| these ,evils the commission find to be—first, incompetent
and unfaithful governing boards and officers ; second, the introduction of
State and national politics, into municipal affairs ; third, the assumption by
the legislature of the direct control of local affairs. The plan adopted by
them recommends the passage of amendments to the constitution of the
State embodying the following features :
First. The delegation of the entire business of city government to the
cities themselves, free from legislative control.
Second. The appointment by the mayor alone of heads of departments.
Third. A board of aldermen elected by universal suffrage.
. Fourth. A board of finance, to be elected by tax and rent payers, with
such powers only as relate to expenditure and debt.
This scheme has passed one legislature, and must be passed by a second
before it is submitted to the people. Unscrupulous and designing politi-
cians of both political parties, who are justly afraid of open discussion, and
who loath all measures of reform which threaten to deprive them of their
ill-gotten power, propose to stifle these amendments in the legislature, and
thus to prevent the people from voting on them. To frustrate this wicked
scheme, which shows how little confidence the loudest-mouthed demagogues
have in a really unfettered exercise of the suffrage, a union without regard
to party of all those in favor of the submission of these amendments to the
people is necessary. By this'means the election of members of the legisla-
ture who are favorable to allowing the people to vote upon the question
may be secured, and the outrage of a nullification of them by the body which
is responsible for half the existing evils be prevented.
It is therefore proposed, as the sense of this meeting, that the following
resolutions be adopted :
“ Resolved, That a committee of fifty be appointed by the chairman of
this meeting, who shall be one of the number, to unite all citizens, irre-
spective of party, at the coming election, in favor of such candidates for the
legislature only as are in favor of submitting the proposed constitutional
amendments for the better government of cities to the people ; and to take
such further steps to secure such submission to the people as may seem to
them advisable.
“ Resolved, That the committee of fifty may, in its discretion, unite with
similar bodies, having the same object in view, in other cities, and shall
have power to fill vacancies and add to its number.”