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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31 92402821 2391 
 
LORD ROBERTS IN WAR 
 
The Following Books will shortly 
 
 APPEAR 
 
 INDIA'S SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER 
 —WHAT IS IT ? and WHERE 
 IS IT ? By Colonel H. B. Hanna 
 
 Also at the end of the year 
 
 The first volume of the HISTORY OF 
 THE AFGHAN WAR By Colonel 
 H. B. Hanna 
 
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LORD ROBERTS 
 IN WAR 
 
 A STUDY FOR 
 THE DAY 
 
 Audi Alteram Partem 
 
 BY 
 
 COLONEL H. B. HANNA B.S.C 
 
 LATE COMMANDING AT DELHI, AUTHOR OF 
 "can RUSSIA INVADE INDIA?" 
 
 ^ 
 
 TO BE OBTAINED FROM 
 
 SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT & CO., Ltd 
 
 STATIONERS' HALL COURT, LONDON 
 
 And of all Booksellers 
 
 189s 
 
BoTLER & Tanner, Frome and London. 
 
LORD ROBERTS IN WAR 
 
 ERRATUM. 
 
 Page 45, for 1878 read 1879. 
 Page 54, for 1879 read 1880. 
 Page 58, for 1890 read 1S80. 
 
 the foremost place in public estimation, there 
 
 ' Even if we retire next cold season, the cost of the cam- 
 paign will probably be nearer five than two millions. 
 
 5 
 
LORD ROBERTS IN WAR 
 
 The future of Chitral is undoubtedly the question 
 of the hour. Whether it shall be permanently- 
 occupied, or whether the British Government shall 
 compel the Indian Government to rest satisfied 
 with having vindicated its ability to march thither, 
 at its pleasure and the moderate cost of two 
 millions sterling,^ must depend largely upon the 
 tone of feeling on the subject, at home and in 
 India, during the next few weeks. That tone of 
 feeling will, of course, reflect the views of those 
 to whom the majority of Englishmen chance to 
 look for guidance in such matters ; and as, among 
 the soldiers whose reputation has been made in 
 India, Lord Roberts has of late years occupied 
 the foremost place in public estimation, there 
 
 * Even if we retire next cold season, the cost of the cam- 
 paign will probably be nearer five than two millions. 
 
 5 
 
6 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 seems every probability of kis being the views 
 reflected, unless that majority can be made to 
 see that even as regards the military aspects of 
 this last development of the so-called " forward " 
 policy in Indian frontier affairs, our latest Field 
 Marshal is neither a safe nor a consistent guide. 
 
 If Lord Roberts were a peaceful veteran rest- 
 ing on his laurels, it would be a cruel and wan- 
 ton act to disturb him in their possession ; but 
 he is a living force to-day, working and fighting 
 in our midst ; and he will have no right to com- 
 plain if those who abhor the militant policy of 
 which he is the champion, try to lessen his 
 power for evil by showing that his great repur 
 tation rests on very narrow foundations. 
 
 Lord Roberts' career, so far as it is necessary 
 to retrace it for the purpose I have in view, 
 begins with the second Afghan war. Into the 
 causes of that war, and the question whether it 
 was a just or an unjust one, there is no neces- 
 sity to enter. These are controversial matters 
 on which men may, and do, differ widely ; but 
 
Lord Roberts in War 7 
 
 on one point there can be no two opinions : 
 namely, that as soon as it was evident that a 
 rupture with Afghanistan was likely to occur — and 
 that it must occur sooner or later was a fore- 
 gone conclusion from the hour of Lord Lytton's 
 landing in Calcutta with Lord Salisbury's confi- 
 dential instructions in his despatch box — it became 
 the first duty of the military authorities to be 
 prepared for hostilities, come when they might ; 
 and on no one man was that duty more incum- 
 bent than on Colonel (local Major-General) F. 
 Roberts, Quarter-Master-General in India, since 
 the department of which he was the chief has 
 under its control all arrangements connected with 
 Intelligence, Transport, Camp-followers, Camp- 
 equipage, Movements of Troops, and Plan of 
 Operations. 
 
 How was this duty fulfilled? When, on the 
 2 1st September, 1878, Sir Neville Chamberlain's 
 Mission was turned back at Ali Musjid, and the 
 Viceroy sent to the Amir an ultimatum, fixing 
 the 2 1st November as the day on which he must 
 
8 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 yield to all the British demands, or see British 
 armies cross his frontier, were our troops ready 
 to take the field ? 
 
 As regards Intelligence, there was no map 
 ready for distribution to officers, not one in a 
 hundred of whom knew anything about the 
 country they were about to invade, for the only 
 source of knowledge on the subject, Sir Charles 
 Macgregor's Gazetteer, was a sealed book to the 
 service at large ; only a limited number of copies 
 had been printed, and these, marked " Confiden- 
 tial," were kept carefully under lock and key ! 
 At the eleventh hour a few officers were, indeed, 
 told off to copy from it certain useful passages ; 
 but the troops were well on their way to Kan- 
 dahar, Jellalabad, and Kuram before they had 
 finished their task, and it is a fact that at least 
 one commander of a division began and ended 
 his campaign without ever having had either 
 map or extracts in his possession. 
 
 The Transport Service was, from the beginning 
 of the war, bad in itself, badly equipped, and 
 
Lord Roberts in War 9 
 
 utterly inadequate ; and the consequent loss of 
 baggage animals so enormous as at times almost 
 to threaten to bring the campaign to a standstill. 
 
 There was no proper shelter provided for the 
 half-clothed camp-followers, who were dragged 
 from their homes in the sunny plains of India 
 to die by thousands of fever and pneumonia 
 among the snows of Afghanistan. 
 
 It is difficult to compute the amount of suffer- 
 ing, mortality, and expense which must be laid 
 to the door of the department over which Colonel 
 Roberts had presided for nearly five years before 
 the outbreak of the second Afghan war, from 
 these two causes alone — defective transport and 
 indifference to the needs of the unhappy men 
 without whose services our armies could not 
 have advanced a single step. 
 
 Then as to Movement of Troops : early in 1878 
 it was obvious to every one in India that we 
 were fast drifting into war with the Amir of 
 Afghanistan, and yet no steps were taken to re- 
 inforce the weak and isolated post of Quetta; 
 
lo Lord Roberts in War 
 
 and it was not until the British Mission was 
 turned back at AH Musjid, that the Government 
 and its military advisers appear to have realized 
 that the little garrison was in imminent peril. 
 Then European and native troops were hurriedly 
 despatched from Mooltan, vid Dera Ghazi Khan, 
 Rajunpoor, the Dera Bughti route, and the Bolan 
 Pass — a trying march at any season, but terrible 
 in September and October ; and here again, as 
 in the matter of transport, the shortsightedness 
 and dilatoriness of the military authorities, of 
 whom Colonel Roberts was the staff officer most 
 responsible, entailed immense suffering on troops, 
 camp-followers, and baggage animals, and much 
 unnecessary expenditure of money ; whereas, if 
 reinforcements had been sent up before the hot 
 weather set in, they would have reached their 
 destination in comparative comfort, and there 
 need never have been a moment's anxiety for 
 the safety of Quetta. 
 
 And what can I say of the Plan of Campaign, 
 which was elaborated by Lord Lytton and his 
 
Lord Roberts in War ii 
 
 military advisers, except that it was the very 
 worst that could have been adopted, as it trebled 
 the cost of the war, whilst dividing by three the 
 power of our troops to bring it to a speedy con- 
 clusion. Three armies were sent into the field, 
 each army weak in itself, having a long and 
 difficult line of communications to keep open, 
 and not one of the three being able to render 
 the slightest assistance to either of the other 
 two ! ^ The reason assigned by Lord Lytton for 
 the adoption of this remarkable plan of opera- 
 tions — viz., that it compelled the Amir to divide 
 his forces — shows a total ignorance of the science 
 of war, the discredit of which must fall chiefly 
 on the Viceroy's advisers. The division of an 
 enemy's forces ought not for a moment to be 
 weighed against the advantage of concentrat- 
 ing one's own ; and this rule was of double 
 strength and validity in this particular instance, 
 where the division of Shere All's forces meant 
 an enormous increase of his power, by calling to 
 
 * Sir Frederick Haines, the Commander-in-Chief, was not, 
 I believe, consulted in regard to the Plan of Campaign. 
 
12 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 arms a host of outraged and indignant tribes- 
 men, two-thirds of whom would have stayed 
 quietly at home if Afghanistan had been in- 
 vaded by one road only. 
 
 However, three lines of invasion meant three 
 armies, and three armies meant three comman- 
 ders, of whom Colonel Roberts, promoted to 
 Major-General, and seconded in his duties as 
 Quarter-Master-General, was one. He, Colley, 
 and Lumsden were the men who had taught 
 Lord Lytton to believe that with the Kuram 
 Valley up to the top of the Shutargurdan Pass 
 in his hands, he could dominate Kabul and 
 Ghuzni ; it was natural, therefore, that the com- 
 mand of the division which entered Afghanistan 
 by the Kuram route should have been the one 
 allotted to Roberts. Of that route a year and 
 a half later he wrote in the following terms : 
 " From a political standpoint the Kuram route 
 possesses no marked advantages. It is, as it 
 were, but a by-road to Kabul or Ghuzni, and its 
 possession does not place us in a position of 
 
Lord Roberts in War 13 
 
 vantage with regard to the tribes whose districts 
 it skirts." Experience, it will be said, had opened 
 General Roberts' eyes. True ; but as Quarter- 
 Master-General, with all means of information 
 at hand, his eyes ought not to have needed 
 opening. Was not Dr. Bellew at Simla? — Dr. 
 Bellew, who had traversed this road more than 
 once, — and had he not described it as " a perfect 
 cul de sac in the hills, hemmed in by a number 
 of turbulent robber-tribes, who are under no con- 
 trol, and acknowledge ho authority. ... In 
 it we should run the risk of being hemmed in 
 by our foes in the overhanging hills around, of 
 being cut off from our communications with the 
 garrison at Kohat by the Orakzais on the one 
 side, by the Waziris on the other. . . . With 
 the Kuram in our possession, we certainly could 
 not flank either the Khyber or the Gomal Pass, 
 because between it and the one intervenes the 
 impassable snowy range of Sufed Koh, and be- 
 tween it and the other intervenes the vast route- 
 less, hilly tract of the Waziris. From Kuram 
 
14 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 we could neither command Kabul nor Ghuzni, 
 because the route to either is by a several days' 
 march, over stupendous hills and through tortu- 
 ous defiles, in comparison with which the his- 
 torical Khyber and Bolan Passes, or even the less 
 widely known Gomal Pass, are as king's high- 
 ways " ? 
 
 And as regards the campaign itself, what 
 testimony does it bear to General Roberts' claim 
 to be regarded as a great general ? From the 
 hour when he crossed the Kuram River at Thai 
 and entered Afghan territory, the movements of 
 his columns displayed his ignorance of, or con- 
 tempt for, universally accepted rules pf war. 
 Although possessing no reliable intelligence re- 
 garding the enemy, except that the British ad- 
 vance would be obstinately disputed, he pushed 
 forward his division in small and isolated bodies, 
 through a close country, admirably adapted for 
 ambuscades. He met, indeed, with no opposi- 
 tion between Thai and the Kuram Forts ; but 
 again and again he gave opportunities which an 
 
Lord Roberts in War 15 
 
 enterprising enemy would have used to his utter 
 ruin. In his hurry to snatch a victory, he gave 
 his tired troops no rest at the Kuram Forts ; but 
 the very day after Thelwall's column marched 
 in, he took his little force twenty-one miles over 
 the roughest of tracks, and then hurled a hand- 
 ful of exhausted men against an almost impreg- 
 nable position, defended by an enemy of whose 
 strength he was entirely ignorant. In his de- 
 spatches this extraordinary movement is described 
 as a reconnaissance in force ; but since when is 
 it the custom for a general to make a recon- 
 naissance of any kind with all the troops at his 
 disposal, and to order the commander of the 
 leading column to attack and follow up the 
 enemy whenever he fell in with him ; or to 
 select a camping ground, as he did on that 
 afternoon, directly under heights crowned by 
 the enemy's guns? That his little army was 
 not completely destroyed, in the retreat that 
 followed, was due entirely to the supineness of 
 the Afghans ; for in the gathering darkness, on 
 
1 6 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 a wild, narrow path hemmed in by jungle, the 
 retiring troops, mixed up inextricably with the 
 advancing baggage animals and camp-followers, 
 could have offered little organized resistance to a 
 boldly executed attack. 
 
 Four days later the real battle of the Peiwar 
 Kotal was fought and gained ; but who won it ? 
 Not General Roberts, for he was miles away 
 from the spot where the struggle was decided. 
 
 At ten o'clock on the night of the ist of De- 
 cember, Roberts started with 2,263 troops of all 
 ranks to storm the Spingawi Kotal, the extreme 
 left of the enemy's position, and from thence to 
 march on the heart of the enemy's position. 
 Cobbe, with only 868 officers and men, remained 
 behind to defend the camp, cover the communi- 
 cations with India, and deliver, the following 
 morning, the front attack on the Peiwar Kotal. 
 Toiling all night up the Spingawi nullah, the first 
 part of the operation was successfully carried out 
 at daybreak, when, with admirable gallantry, the 
 72nd Highlanders and the 5th Goorkhas captured 
 
Lord Roberts in War 17 
 
 the sungas which defended the top of the pass ; 
 but no attack was made upon the Peiwar Kotal, 
 no helping hand was held out to Cobbe, for the 
 very good reason that the ridge along which 
 General Roberts had counted on advancing was 
 cleft in two by a deep ravine, which it was found 
 impossible to traverse in the teeth of the fierce 
 fire of the Afghans, who swarmed in the forest 
 on its further side — a forest so dense that when, 
 as the consequence of a lucky accident, General 
 Roberts and his staff were at last able to cross 
 the narrow neck of land, the possession of which 
 had been so hotly contested, they were quickly 
 convinced of the hopelessness of attempting to 
 penetrate into its dark and tangled depths. 
 
 The lucky accident alluded to was brought 
 about by the movements of the 5th Punjab In- 
 fantry, one of the two regiments left with Cobbe, 
 which, in its ascent of the ridge to the right of 
 the Peiwar Kotal, got separated from the 8th 
 "King's" by the accidents of the ground, and hear- 
 ing heavy firing above it, finally dissociated itself 
 
1 8 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 from the front attack, in which it ought to have 
 taken part, and joined the turning party. In 
 doing this, its commanding officer, Major Mc- 
 Queen, caught, through an opening in the woods, 
 a glimpse of the Afghan camp. Recognising 
 the importance of this discovery, he at once 
 hastened to communicate it to Roberts, who sent 
 two guns to the spot indicated, the firing of 
 which soon carried, confusion and terror among 
 the Afghan camp-followers and baggage animals. 
 A panic ensued, which spread gradually to the 
 troops opposing Roberts' advance, a portion of 
 whom ceased firing and withdrew, leaving the 
 ravine undefended^. 
 
 As we have seen, this unexpected stroke of luck 
 was of no use to the turning party, but it brought 
 good fortune to the 400, men of the 8th " King's," 
 who, gallantly led, first by General Cobbe and, 
 after he had been wounded^ by their own com- 
 manding officer. Colonel Barry-Drew, worked 
 their way from spur to spur of the Peiwar Moun- 
 tain, to a point whence they could pick off the 
 
Lord Roberts in War 19 
 
 Afghan gunners on the summit of the pass. 
 When the last of these lay dead beside his silent 
 gun, Drew led his little band downi into the 
 Peiwar road, and placing himself at its- head, 
 dashed up to the Kotal, to find, himself,, at two 
 o'clock in the afternoon, in possession of an aban- 
 doned camp, whence he had' the. satisfaction of 
 sending the news of his success to General 
 Roberts ; who, completely baffled' in his attempt 
 to reach the key of the Afghan, position, was 
 falling back on the Spingawi. plateau in the very 
 hour of his lieutenant's victory. From the Spin- 
 gawi plateau the turning party descended into 
 the Huriab Valley, with the object of getting 
 into the enemy's rear ; but the utter exhaustion 
 of the troops, who had been marching and fight- 
 ing incessantly for eighteen consecutive hours, 
 obliged it to bivouac about four o'clock in the 
 afternoon, 9,400 feet above the level of the sea, in 
 the bitter cold of a December night, without food, 
 water, shelter, or warm clothing, and in total 
 ignorance of the position of the enemy, and of 
 
20 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 the fate which might in the meanwhile have 
 overtaken the little band, on which so heavy a 
 task had been imposed. This uncertainty must 
 have been more painful to commander and men 
 than the privations of their position, and the 
 arrival of Barry-Drew's pencil note at eight p.m. 
 would be an inexpressible relief to one and all. 
 The attack on the Peiwar was badly con- 
 ceived, and rash in the extreme. The turning 
 party, led by Roberts himself and amounting to 
 nearly three-quarters of the whole of his force, 
 abandoned its communications with India and 
 with the remaining quarter, on which fell, as we 
 have said, not only the heavy responsibility of 
 covering the line of retreat in case of a reverse, 
 but also the duty of delivering the front attack 
 on a position of extraordinary strength. Even if 
 Roberts had had double the number of troops, so 
 that his communications with India on the one 
 hand, and with Cobbe's little force on the other, 
 could have been maintained, the distance to the 
 Peiwar Kotal by the Spingawi Pass (about twelve 
 
Lord Roberts in War 21 
 
 miles) was unreasonably long for a flank move- 
 ment, especially in a country in which difficulty 
 doubled distance. 
 
 And there was no real need to attack the 
 Peiwar Kotal at all. Roberts' orders expressly 
 forbade his advancing beyond the Shutargurdan. 
 His duty was to hold the enemy's troops in 
 play, and to keep them from reinforcing the de- 
 fenders of the Khyber route. By breaking them 
 up in the way he did, he simply drove them 
 back upon Kabul. Had he halted at some well- 
 chosen spot, possibly at the village of Peiwar, 
 where there is a stretcK of open ground, and 
 drawn the Afghans on to attack him, as Sir 
 Charles Gough so ably drew the Khugianis from 
 their strong position on the hills above Futteh- 
 abad, the Afghan army would have been de- 
 stroyed, not merely dispersed ; and few fugitives 
 would have crossed the mountains to reinforce 
 their comrades on the other side. But if he 
 must needs attack, he should have, at least, 
 waited till the reinforcements, which he knew to 
 
2 2 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 be coming up, had joined him, and have used 
 the interval in really careful reconnoitring, which 
 would have saved him from the humiliation of 
 having to fall back when he thought himself 
 within striking distance of the enemy's main 
 position. 
 
 If the action on the Peiwar Kotal reflects little 
 credit on Roberts as a military leader, the sub- 
 sequent raid into the Khost Valley has left a 
 deep slur on his reputation as a statesman. 
 The Khost Valley lies quite off the road to 
 Kabul ; its inhabitants, practically independent 
 tribes, had remained quietly in their villages and 
 had not hampered our advance up the Kuram 
 Valley, as they might have done, by attacking 
 our long and unprotected line of communica- 
 tions. The Viceroy's proclamation had assured 
 all the inhabitants of Afghanistan that the Indian 
 Government had no quarrel with them, and that 
 so long as they stayed peaceably in their homes, 
 those homes should be safe from harm ; yet, for 
 no reason, except a desire to find out whether 
 
Lord Roberts in War 23 
 
 it would be possible to attack the Waziris by- 
 way of Khost, General Roberts broke into that 
 country, and on the first sign of the very natural 
 displeasure and alarm of its inhabitants — the 
 mere fact of their assembling together in their 
 villages — for there is no mention in the de- 
 spatches of their having committed any so-called 
 outrages on their invaders — he carried fire and 
 sword through the land, from which, in the end, 
 he had to retire in haste, glad to get his troops 
 safely out of the hornets' nest which he had 
 brought about his ears ; for all the mountain 
 tribes round about, roused to fierce anger by his 
 cruel treatment of their neighbours, had flown to 
 arms, and were threatening him on every side ; 
 whilst the Waziris, the weak point in whose line 
 of defence he was trying to discover, as a direct 
 consequence of his unsuccessful raid into Khost, 
 made a very successful one into our own terri- 
 tories on the other side of the hills.' 
 
 ' See Sir George Campbell's undelivered speech on the 
 Afghan Frontier — pages 48, 49 and 50. Edward Stanford, 
 55, Charing Cross, S.W. 
 
24 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 There is one other matter in connection with 
 this Khost expedition to which I must refer ; 
 namely, the dismissal of Mr. Malcolm Macpher- 
 son, the Special Correspondent of the Standard, 
 for having in his letters exposed and severely 
 criticised the manner in which it had been un- 
 dertaken and conducted. This incident throws 
 an instructive light upon General Roberts' high- 
 handed conduct, his aversion to the expression 
 of any independent opinion on his doings, and 
 his disobedience to the rules of the service to 
 which he belonged, when those rules were op- 
 posed to his interests or his inclinations. It is 
 impossible to go into the details of the corre- 
 spondence between the general and his critic, 
 which was published in extenso by the latter ; 
 but the last letter written by Mr. Macpherson 
 is well worthy of reproduction : — 
 
 " On the whole. Sir, I am not sorry that my 
 connection with the Kuram Field Force has 
 come to an end. I have been over and over 
 again disgusted with the way in which my tele- 
 
Lord Roberts in War 25 
 
 grams were treated, and with the extraordinary- 
 violation, which was permitted by Major-General 
 Roberts, of the rule, referred to recently in the 
 House of Commons, prohibiting staff officers 
 from acting as press correspondents. Before I 
 received the order to retire, at least three of 
 the London daily newspapers and the principal 
 Indian newspapers were deriving their informa- 
 tion about the Kuram Field Force from mem- 
 bers of Major-General Roberts' own staff; and 
 so eager, apparently, was he to have the whole 
 of the London daily press in his power, that 
 even before the only independent correspondent 
 with the Force had been formally dismissed, he 
 had 'appointed' (I use his own expression) Cap- 
 tain Pretyman, his own aide-de-camp, to act in 
 future as the Standard's correspondent. No- 
 thing unpleasant about the Kuram Field Force 
 can now be published ; and however soothing 
 such a state of matters may be to Major- 
 General Roberts, I cannot but regard it as a 
 grave public scandal." 
 
26 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 After the Gandamak treaty had been signed, 
 General Roberts proceeded to Simla, but he was 
 destined soon to take the field again. Early in 
 September his Division in the Kuram was under 
 orders for Kabul, to avenge the massacre of the 
 British envoy, Sir Louis Cavagnari. The in- 
 efficient state of the transport rendered the 
 operation a very difficult one; but with his usual 
 energy General Roberts pressed steadily on, his 
 leading brigade under Baker fighting the battle 
 of Charasiah by the way, and on the 9th of 
 October entered Kabul, unopposed. Having es- 
 tablished his little army at Sherpur, the Afghan 
 cantonments constructed by Shere AH for his 
 troops only a short time before his flight from 
 his capital, he proceeded to appoint a Commis- 
 sion to try the instigators and perpetrators of 
 the murder of Cavagnari and his party. No 
 exception can be taken to the powers of this 
 Commission so far as they were conferred for 
 this purpose, but the obligation laid upon it to 
 pass sentence of death on any Afghan who 
 
Lord Roberts in War 27 
 
 could be proved guilty of having offered armed 
 resistance to our advance on Kabul, was as im- 
 politic as it was cruel ; for where all had been 
 more or less concerned in opposing the invaders 
 of their country, the order carried to every 
 mind a deep sense of personal insecurity. The 
 almost daily executions which followed, though 
 intended to strike terror linto the hearts of the 
 people, only succeeded in filling them with a 
 burning desire for revenge. Another cause in- 
 creased this feeling. Far and wide detachments 
 of General Roberts' force scoured the country, 
 sweeping into cantonments the stores of grain 
 which had been laid in by the people for winter 
 consumption. Liberal payment was, indeed, 
 offered in the first instance; but when, as fre- 
 quently happened, the villagers refused to part 
 with food that they needed for themselves, 
 troops were sent against them, and, to use 
 the words of an officer belonging to one of 
 Baker's foraging parties, in speaking of Bahadar 
 Khan's villages, "We destroyed them all, and 
 
28 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 left the valley full of smoking ruins and blazing 
 stacks." 
 
 The natural consequences of such barbarous 
 proceedings were not slow to follow. Alarming 
 rumours of large tribal gatherings in the im- 
 mediate neighbourhood of Kabul began to be 
 reported, and on the 8th December General 
 Roberts determined to take the field. As usual, 
 he began his operations by scattering his troops 
 broadcast over the district, courting disaster from 
 every quarter. On the afternoon ' of the 8th 
 December, General Macpherson's Brigade occu- 
 pied the village of Aushur, about three miles 
 west of Sherpur. On the 9th he halted, and em- 
 ployed the day in reconnoitring. On the same 
 day Baker's Brigade marched to Maidan, a place 
 lying about twenty-six miles south-west of Sher- 
 pur. On the loth Macpherson was directed by 
 Roberts to leave the principal part of his cavalry 
 and his four guns Royal Horse Artillery at 
 Aushur, and proceed with his infantry and 
 mountain guns to the village of Mir Karez, 
 
Lord Roberts in War 29 
 
 situated about ten miles north-west of Sherpur, 
 for the purpose of dispersing a large gathering 
 of tribesmen whom his reconnaissance of the 9th 
 had discovered. Macpherson successfully attacked 
 and defeated the Kohistanis, and bivouacked for 
 the night. In the meantime the cavalry which 
 he had left at the village of Aushur were re- 
 inforced, which brought the force up to three 
 weak squadrons of cavalry and four Horse Artil- 
 lery guns, General Massy being sent from can- 
 tonments to command them. 
 
 I must now trouble the reader, with the aid of 
 the attached sketch, to examine the dispositions 
 of the Kabul Field Force. On the nth De- 
 cember, 1879, Macpherson is ten miles north- 
 west, and Baker twenty-six miles south-west of 
 Sherpur. If you draw a line from Macpherson 
 to Sherpur, join Sherpur with Baker, and Baker 
 with Macpherson, you will have nearly a right- 
 angled triangle, the hypothenuse of which is the 
 distance between Baker and Macpherson, about 
 twenty-seven miles as the crow flies. Now join 
 
30 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 Massy with Sherpur, and you will find that this 
 line, three miles long, bisects the right angle. 
 The country lying between Macpherson and 
 Baker was of a rugged, hilly nature, quite im- 
 practicable for wheeled carriage. Massy was in 
 the Chardeh Valley, which was open, but much 
 cut up by water-courses. Separating Massy 
 from Macpherson was a high range of hills, only 
 passable at certain points. About two miles on 
 Massy's left lay the road to Maidan and Ghuzni. 
 The Sherpur cantonments, with a perimeter of 
 more than four miles, in a most defenceless con- 
 dition, and containing all our sick, wounded, 
 spare transport, commissariat stores and ammu- 
 nition, had been most dangerously denuded of 
 troops ; but Hugh Gough, a brave and experi- 
 enced soldier, was in command — a fortunate cir- 
 cumstance, as subsequent events showed. 
 
 Meantime, Mahomed Jan, the ablest of the 
 Afghan leaders, with 10,000 men at his back, lay 
 hidden among the hills which separated Baker 
 from Macpherson, an unsuspected spectator of 
 these extraordinary tactics. On the morning of 
 
Lord Roberts in War 31 
 
 the nth December, seeing that Roberts' force 
 was sufficiently scattered for his purpose, and 
 Sherpur dangerously weakened, he secretly took 
 up a strong position on the Maidan road, within 
 eight miles of the British cantonments, thereby 
 severing Baker's communications, and securing a 
 point from which he could spring upon Sherpur. 
 At 9 o'clock on the morning of the nth 
 December, in obedience to General Roberts' 
 orders. Massy, with his four Horse Artillery guns, 
 two squadrons 9th Lancers, and one squadron 
 14th Bengal Cavalry, quite unconscious of the 
 enemy's close proximity, moved towards the 
 Maidan road. He had scarcely marched three 
 miles, when his scouts, falling in with Jan 
 Mahomed's advanced troops, were driven in on 
 their main body. Massy, a gallant officer, did 
 the best he could under the circumstances. He 
 brought his guns quickly into action to try to 
 hold the enemy in check, but without success. 
 The steady advance of the tribesmen and their 
 overwhelming numbers obliged him to give way. 
 At that very moment Roberts rode up and 
 
32 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 ordered the 9th Lancers to charge, supported 
 by the squadron 14th Bengal Cavalry. A more 
 spirited charge was never made. But what im- 
 pression could 200 sabres make on a compact 
 body of 10,000 determined men ? By Roberts' 
 directions the guns again came into action, and 
 another charge was made, but to no purpose ; 
 the Afghans would not be denied. To be brief, 
 Mahomed Jan swept everything before him, and 
 captured the guns, which were afterwards gal- 
 lantly recovered by Colonel C. M. MacGregor.^ 
 In the meantime Roberts, with commendable 
 presence of mind, called up three companies of 
 the 72nd Highlanders from Sherpur to occupy 
 the Deh Masung defile, through which ran one 
 of the roads to Sherpur, and on which the dis- 
 comfited cavalry were retiring. The pass was 
 safely reached by the fugitives ; but the enemy 
 continued to move steadily forward, till suddenly 
 
 ^ The credit of rallying the fugitives in this part of the 
 field is due to Captain (now Colonel) T. Deane, who, 
 with Lieutenant A. F. Liddell, R.H.A., and Mr. (now Sir 
 Mortimer) Durand, accompanied MacGregor. 
 
Lord Roberts in War 33 
 
 within a quarter of a mile of the British position, 
 the left of Mahomed Jan's long deep line began 
 strangely to waver, and, shortly after, his whole 
 force took ground to the right, the huge column 
 — that was the formation it had assumed — head- 
 ing towards the high hills on the left of Deh 
 Masung Pass, where General Roberts was anxi- 
 ously watching its movements. To explain this 
 sudden change in the enemy's tactics we must 
 return to Macpherson at Mir Karez. On this 
 momentous morning, rather more than an hour 
 before Massy left Aushur, this fine soldier struck 
 his camp, and, in accordance with Roberts' in- 
 structions, proceeded across the hills to join 
 Baker ; but before long the sound of Massy's 
 guns reached him, and suspecting something 
 wrong, he wheeled to the left, crossed the range 
 of hills which bounds the north of the Chardeh 
 Valley, and his skirmishers were soon engaged 
 with the left rear of Mahomed Jan's army. But 
 for Macpherson's opportune arrival, Sherpur must 
 have fallen into the enemy's hands, for Roberts' 
 
 C 
 
34 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 little force of between 400 and 500 men, half 
 being cavalry, armed with carbines and without 
 artillery, must have been swept away by sheer 
 weight of numbers.* 
 
 Such is a plain and unvarnished account of 
 the proceedings which led up to the investment 
 of Sherpur. The reverses of the nth of Decem- 
 ber were due solely to General Roberts' stra- 
 tegic blunders-, and Mahomed Jan's quickness in 
 taking advantage of them ;. yet shortly after- 
 wards telegrams appeared in the English and 
 Indian papers attributing the disaster to General 
 Macpherson. These untrusthful statements were 
 all the more galling to Macpherson as it was 
 he who had saved the little body of cavalry, of 
 which Roberts himself had assumed command, 
 from total annihilation^ and hindered the capture 
 of Sherpur. How it was such damaging telegrams 
 were published by the press has to this day 
 never been explained ; but no telegram, unless 
 countersigned by General Roberts himself or 
 
 ' The author was present at this action, and took part 
 in the subsequent operations round Kabul, and in the de- 
 fence of Sherpur. 
 
Lord Roberts in War 35 
 
 one of his own staff officers, was allowed to leave 
 Kabul. It was notorious that all press tele- 
 grams were carefully perused by Roberts, who, 
 if the contents were not to his mind, would 
 either call upon the correspondents to revise 
 them, or would alter them himself This fact is- 
 fully proved in the long correspondence between 
 General Roberts and the Special Correspondent 
 of the Standard, to which reference has already 
 been made. 
 
 However these false reports about Macpherson 
 may have originated, there is no doubt that 
 General Roberts did try, and for the moment 
 successfully, to shift the blame for this disaster 
 from his own shoulders to those of General 
 Massy ; for in order to screen himself, and divert 
 public attention from his blunders. General 
 Roberts gave, in his official telegrams and 
 despatches regarding the loss of the guns, so 
 disingenuous an account of General Massy's 
 proceedings, that that distinguished officer was, 
 in the end, severely censured and removed from 
 his command. I am quite aware that in writing 
 
36 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 this I am bringing against Lord Roberts a 
 charge so grave that only the amplest proof can 
 justify it, but such proof is forthcoming. 
 
 The orders that Massy received from General 
 Roberts have been published, and the manner in 
 which he carried them out is a matter of his- 
 tory ; and any unbiassed person, carefully ex- 
 amining one and the other, cannot but be 
 convinced that the former officer was not 
 responsible for the fiasco. Massy was ordered — 
 
 (i) "To advance from Aushur by the road 
 leading directly from the city of Kabul towards 
 Arghandeh and Ghuzni" [the Maidan road]. 
 
 (2) "To communicate with General Macpher- 
 son, and to act in conformity with that officer's 
 movements." 
 
 (3) " To proceed cautiously and quietly, feel- 
 ing for the enemy, but on no account to commit 
 himself to an action until General Macpherson 
 had engaged the enemy." 
 
 General Roberts, in referring to (i) order, says 
 
Lord Roberts in War 37 
 
 in his despatches, " instead of gaining the Ghuzni 
 road" [the Maidan road] "by the ordinary 
 route, General Massy started across country, 
 intending to strike that road beyond the village 
 of Killa Kazi." The contention is vague and 
 misleading ; for Massy, to gain the Maidan road 
 from the village of Aushur, was obliged to start 
 "across country." {Vide; sketch.) The village 
 of Aushur, it will be seen, is at its nearest 
 point two miles from the Maidan road ; and 
 Massy, who was bound, as far as possible, to 
 obey the (2) order — " to communicate with 
 General Macpherson," etc. — very properly moved 
 diagonally across the Chardeh Valley, keeping 
 nearly parallel with Macpherson, and thus acting 
 "in conformity with that officer's movements." 
 Had he struck the Maidan road at its nearest 
 point, he would have turned his back on Mac- 
 pherson, increased the interval between himself 
 and that general by several miles, and hence 
 reached the spot where he came into collision 
 with the Afghan army at least an hour later, 
 
38 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 by which time the whole of Macpherson's force 
 wouid have passed the gap, by which alone it 
 could debouche into the Chardeh Valley, and 
 would have continued its march into the hills, 
 quite unconscious of the extreme peril which 
 was threatening not only General Massy and 
 his cavalry, but also Roberts and Sherpur it- 
 self. 
 
 The (2) order given to Massy was really quite 
 
 impracticable, since on the morning of the nth 
 
 he was nine miles from Macpherson, a high 
 
 range of hills completely separating them. To 
 
 maintain nine miles of lateral communications 
 
 in a mountainous region, with a few weak 
 
 squadrons of cavalry, and at the same time to 
 
 advance in another direction, feeling cautiously 
 
 for an enemy, every step taken still further 
 
 increasing the difficulties of keeping up the 
 
 communications, was an impossible task. Massy, 
 
 anxious to comply with his instructions, did 
 
 detach a troop of the 9th Lancers, regarding 
 
 which General Roberts naively writes that "it 
 
Lord Roberts in War 39 
 
 did not again join General Massy " ! Of course 
 not ; and what better proof can there be that 
 communications between the two forces could 
 not be maintained ? 
 
 That Massy did carefully feel for the enemy 
 is fully demonstrated by the fact that on 
 approaching Killa Kazi his advanced guard re- 
 ported to him that the enemy were in consider- 
 able force on the hills flanking the Maidan 
 road, some three miles in his front. Wishing, 
 however, to ascertain, if possible, the nature and 
 strength of the Afghan force, he continued his 
 cautious advance — a decision in which he was 
 fully justified, as his troops were composed 
 entirely of cavalry and horse artillery, and the 
 valley through which he was advancing, though 
 rough, was practicable for those arms. But to 
 read General Roberts' despatches, one might fancy 
 that he expected Massy to turn tail and gallop 
 back into Sherpur, leaving the enemy to follow 
 up at his heels. That Mahomed Jan would have 
 done so, there can be no doubt ; for Massy had 
 
40 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 only proceeded a short distance when the tribes- 
 men streamed down into the plain to attack him, 
 advancing towards him at a steady trot of some 
 four or five miles an hour. Massy saw that the 
 affair was going to be serious, and, acting like a 
 good soldier, directed the horse artillery to open 
 fire, " in order to check the enemy's advance, 
 and detain them until he could hear something 
 of Macpherson's column " (Roberts' Despatches). 
 Had not Massy on that day brought his guns 
 into action, a terrible disaster would have once 
 again befallen the English in Afghanistan ; for, 
 as I have already said, but for the sound of 
 those guns Macpherson would have passed on 
 across the hills to meet Baker, where, entangled 
 in a difficult country, he would have been beset 
 on every side, while Sherpur, depleted of its 
 troops, would have fallen an easy prey to 
 Mahomed Jan. 
 
 As I have stated, it was just when it became 
 clear that the guns could not keep back the 
 Afghans, that General Roberts, with his staff. 
 
Lord Roberts in War 41 
 
 rode up and assumed command of the troops ; 
 and for all subsequent events, the two cavalry 
 charges and the second advance of the guns, he 
 alone must be held responsible. In the face of 
 such facts, w^as it not cruel injustice to publicly 
 censure and remove General Massy for a disaster 
 which was entirely due to the rashness and lack 
 of military knowledge of his superior officer ? 
 Fortunately for Massy, the Duke of Cambridge, 
 whose strong sense of justice has so often been 
 exercised in righting individual wrongs, did not 
 take the same view of the matter as the authori- 
 ties in India, and Massy was soon re-appointed 
 to a brigade. 
 
 Baker's position at Maidan was a very critical 
 one. On the morning of the nth December, in 
 total ignorance of Mahomed Jan having inter- 
 rupted his communications, he began leisurely to 
 carry out his part of the programme, which was 
 to advance towards Kabul to meet Macpherson, 
 who would, so he expected, strike the Maidan 
 road at Arghandeh. No news of Macpherson's 
 
42 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 change of direction or of the disaster in the 
 Chardeh Valley having reached him, Baker de- 
 cided to halt at Arghandeh for the night. The 
 next day, continuing his march, he succeeded in 
 fighting his way to Sherpur; but Macpherson's 
 Brigade, isolated and unsupported, was still at 
 the Deh Masung Pass, the city and a high range 
 of hills lying between it and Sherpur. On the 
 1 2th, 13th, and 14th, Roberts still further dis- 
 persed his small forces, in the vain attempt to 
 dislodge Mahomed Jan's ever-increasing hordes 
 of wild tribesmen from the Asmai heights, which 
 overlook the city of Kabul and the Sherpur 
 cantonments — a position especially favourable to 
 an Afghan, who on a hillside is a formidable 
 antagonist. The situation culminated on the 
 14th December in another signal disaster, one 
 detachment being overwhelmed, with the loss of 
 two mountain guns. This second defeat de- 
 termined General Roberts "to withdraw from all 
 isolated positions " [the italics are mine], " and to 
 concentrate the whole force at Sherpur, tkus 
 
Lord Roberts in War 43 
 
 seatring the safety of our large cantonments, and 
 avoiding what had now become a useless sacrifice 
 of life" (Roberts' Despatches). Baker's and other 
 "isolated" detachments were soon safely within 
 the cantonments, but Macpherson's Brigade only- 
 regained that shelter on the evening of the 14th, 
 and, but for the courage and skill of the com- 
 mander and the steadiness of the troops, it 
 would assuredly have been cut off from Sherpur 
 — a separation which would have had the most 
 serious consequences, not only for itself, but also 
 for the force within the cantonments, which 
 would have been too weak to hold in check an 
 enemy, computed by General Roberts to be 
 6o,ocx> strong. 
 
 Sherpur, now closely invested, was in a most 
 untenable condition. Hitherto no steps had 
 been taken to put the place into a proper state 
 of defence, although, early in November, Colonel 
 Enaeas Perkins, the commanding engineer, had 
 submitted specifications and plans. Even after 
 the reverse of the nth of December, so con- 
 
44 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 fident was Roberts of his ability to disperse the 
 huge gathering of Afghans which hemmed him 
 in, that nothing was done to render his position 
 more secure. If during those days Mahomed 
 Jan had only been aware of Sherpur's condition, 
 he could have made short work of its garrison, 
 which was out of all proportion small, compared 
 to the size and strength of the fortifications it 
 had to defend ; whilst numerous villages and 
 enclosures close up to its wall would have afforded 
 the necessary shelter in which to make his pre- 
 parations for the attack. 
 
 The reader, remembering Khost and the ruined 
 houses and blazing stacks of Bahadar Khan's 
 villages, will be surprised to learn that General 
 Roberts excused his supineness in demolishing 
 buildings which threatened the safety of his can- 
 tonments, on the ground that he was " unwilling, 
 by what might have appeared unnecessary harsh- 
 ness in the destruction of villages and orchards, 
 to give rise to any ill-feeling on the part of the 
 people of Kabul " (Roberts' Despatches). 
 
Lord Roberts in War 45 
 
 The continued existence of these villages 
 having become a question of life and death, 
 General Roberts could no longer be guided by 
 his humane feelings, and every available man in 
 the garrison was set to work to put the Sherpur 
 defences into proper order. Villages and walled 
 enclosures, in dangerous proximity to the can- 
 tonments, were blown up or levelled ; the village 
 of Bamaru and many detached buildings on the 
 eastern and weakest face of Sherpur were loop- 
 holed and rendered defensible ; batteries were 
 erected, and, where necessary, the place was still 
 further fortified by ditch and breast works, while 
 fruit trees were felled for abattis and dragged 
 into their places, and wire entanglement was 
 widely laid down. It is not necessary to enter 
 here into the particulars of the siege, which 
 lasted from the 14th to the 23rd December, 
 1878. It will be sufficient to say that during 
 those ten days the troops, both British and 
 Native, displayed the greatest alacrity and cheer- 
 fulness, and that no one set a finer example of 
 
46 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 calm and confident courage than Sir Frederick 
 Roberts himself. 
 
 Still the position was a very critical one, and 
 the arrival of Sir Charles Gough, whom Roberts 
 had summoned by telegraph, was eagerly looked 
 for. The telegram which reached Gough at Jug- 
 dallak on the evening of the 14th ran as fol- 
 lows : " March to Kabul as soon as you can, and 
 bring Latabund detachment with you. Hold on 
 to all posts that are strong enough to resist 
 attack, others I would withdraw from. It is very 
 probable that the Gilzais will rise. We have 
 had hard fighting, and have withdrawn our posts 
 from neighbouring hills, and force is now col- 
 lected at Sherpur, where we shall be more than 
 a match for the enemy. They numbered nearly 
 30,cxx) to-day. / will look out for you and assist 
 you on road from Butkhak, or Latabund if pos- 
 sible!' [The italics are mine.] " Try and keep me 
 informed of your movements." To this telegram 
 Gough replied : " Have just arrived at Jugdallak. 
 Have only SCX) men with me. Will advance as 
 
Lord Roberts in War 47 
 
 soon as I possibly can." Shortly after this tele- 
 gram was despatched and acknowledged, the 
 wires were cut. On the 19th Roberts succeeded 
 in sending the following heliogram to Colonel 
 John Hudson ^ at Latabund, an isolated post be- 
 tween Kabul and Jugdallak : " Order Gough to 
 advance without delay. This order is imperative, 
 and must be obeyed. There is no enemy to stop 
 him" ^ 
 
 This message, which Hudson entrusted to the 
 hands of an Afghan non-commissioned officer of 
 his own regiment, reached Gough on the 20th 
 December, and the same day that officer, having 
 managed with much difficulty to scrape together 
 about 1,500 men and 4 mountain guns, and 
 relying on Roberts' assurances of co-operation, 
 determined to advance the next morning to the 
 relief of the beleaguered garrison. The resolu- 
 
 * The late Sir John Hudson, Commander-in-Chief of 
 Bombay, who was recently killed by a fall from his horse, 
 and whose death was an irreparable loss to the army. 
 
 ' The italics are mine. 
 
48 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 tion was a bold and gallant one, especially as 
 General Bright, an officer of great experience, 
 who commanded the line of communication, was 
 quite opposed to the perilous attempt with such 
 an inadequate force. He wished Gough to wait 
 until more troops had been collected, and his 
 opinion was unquestionably based on sound mili- 
 tary grounds. Gough would have been perfectly 
 justified in waiting for reinforcements. He had 
 to traverse an exceptionally difficult country, in- 
 habited by the powerful and hostile tribe of Gil- 
 zais. The distance was about sixty miles. For 
 the first forty miles one dangerous pass succeeded 
 another; and despite General Roberts' assurance 
 that there was no enemy in the way, 60,000 
 Afghans lay between him and Sherpur. On the 
 22nd Gough reached Latabund safely, where he 
 picked up Hudson's detachment, which brought 
 up his strength to 2,000 infantry and six guns. 
 Here also he was joined by Major Green, who 
 had just arrived from Sherpur with two squad- 
 rons of the 1 2th Bengal Cavalry. Officers, men. 
 
Lord Roberts' in War 49 
 
 and horses, however, were quite worn out, having 
 had a long and terrible night march. Green, 
 with his two squadrons, had been put outside 
 the walls of Sherpur the previous evening — the 
 weather being bitterly cold and the ground 
 covered with snow — with orders to make the 
 best of his way to Butkhak, about twenty miles 
 south of cantonments. In the darkness of a De- 
 cember night, the little party had great difficulty 
 in getting across the Logar River, where they 
 were fired upon by an enemy's picket. They 
 missed the ford, and in trying to climb the oppo- 
 site bank, which was steep and slippery, some 
 of the men fell back into the icy cold water, and 
 were drenched to the skin. At Butkhak they 
 were again attacked, and to escape total destruc- 
 tion had to strike across country. Luckily, one 
 of the native officers, an Afghan himself, knew 
 the region well and guided them in safety, by a 
 mountain track, to Latabund. 
 
 At Budkhak Gough heliographed to Roberts 
 to say he would advance to the Logar bridge ; 
 
 D 
 
50 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 but, although his heh'ogram was acknowledged, 
 no reply came, for at that instant heavy clouds 
 arising blotted out the sun. About one o'clock 
 Gough's advanced guard occupied the bridge ; but 
 as it was not till long after sunset that his rear 
 guard arrived, and no orders were received from 
 Sherpur, he continued to hold that position dur- 
 ing the night, in ignorance of the fact that early 
 on the morning of that same day, the 23rd, 
 Mahomed Jan, influenced no doubt by the news 
 of the near approach of Gough's relieving force, 
 had made a determined attack on the Sherpur 
 cantonments. Repulsed at all points, about one 
 o'clock he withdrew his discomfited troops out 
 of action. Some of the tribesmen left Kabul 
 at once, but large numbers occupied the city 
 till after nightfall, when they too dispersed so 
 completely, that by sunrise on the 24th, not 
 a single man of that vast gathering was within 
 miles of its, walls. 
 
 I have dwelt on this episode of Sir Charles 
 Gough's relief of Sherpur, because the story and 
 
Lord Roberts in War 51 
 
 its sequel bring out two very marked traits in 
 Lord Roberts' character — his unscrupulousness 
 where he has an end of his own to serve, and 
 his lack of gratitude towards those to whom he 
 is most deeply indebted. Was it justifiable to 
 send to an officer, whom he knew to be weak in 
 troops and still weaker in transport, an impera- 
 tive order to advance, at the same time deceiving 
 him as to the strength and position of the 
 Afghans ; for what was it but a deception to give 
 Gough the assurance that there was no enemy 
 in his road, whilst he, Roberts, knew well that 
 Mahomed Jan's army, numbering at the lowest 
 computation 60,000 men, lay between the reliev- 
 ing force and Sherpur ? The fact that Gough was 
 not attacked, in no way diminishes the great 
 wrong done to him by Roberts' misleading mes- 
 sage. At the time it was sent, the Afghans held 
 a position from which, without relaxing their hold 
 on the garrison of Sherpur, they could have 
 thrown against Gough's 2,000 men a force large 
 enough to overwhelm and annihilate it. That 
 
52 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 they did not do so, was due not to any help 
 rendered by General Roberts — for, despite the 
 latter's promises of aid, not a man was sent out 
 to meet the former, except Green's two squad- 
 rons of cavalry, which really added nothing to 
 his strength — but to want of generalship in the 
 Afghan commander, or, more probably, to lack 
 of discipline among his wild and self-willed 
 hordes. 
 
 I am quite aware that the lay-reader, judging 
 only by the result, will be more inclined to 
 praise Roberts for foresight than to blame him 
 for his want of candour ; but military men will 
 certainly agree with me that, to an officer in 
 Cough's case, the truth, and nothing but the 
 truth, was due. A man of well-known courage 
 and enterprise, thefe was no fear that he would 
 shirk the task laid upon him, on account of its 
 magnitude, if he saw the least chance of being 
 able to perform it ; and to deceive him as to the 
 resistance he might expect to encounter, was to 
 run the risk of inspiring him with that undue 
 
Lord Roberts in War 53 
 
 confidence which had led Roberts himself, through 
 neglect, to disaster. Fortunately Gough was as 
 cautious as he was brave, and made his advance 
 with exactly the same care as if Roberts' helio- 
 gram had never been received ; but had the 
 respective positions of these two officers been 
 reversed, should we have been able to say the 
 same ? 
 
 And how was the man, who ran so great a 
 risk at General Roberts' bidding, rewarded for 
 the great service that he had rendered to him 
 and his beleaguered troops — for it was entirely 
 due to his approach that the Afghans abandoned 
 the siege of Sherpur? Sir Frederick Roberts' 
 original despatch, giving an account of the events 
 I have just been narrating, mentions the fact of 
 Gough's arrival at Sherpur without the addition 
 of one word of acknowledgment or praise. In a 
 subsequent despatch, he does, indeed, just admit 
 that thanks are due to Charles Gough ; but that 
 general's own account of his exploit was re- 
 written before being submitted to the Com- 
 
54 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 mander- in -Chief, and the only thing that he 
 seems to have gained by his heroic conduct was 
 the pleasure of being called to account by 
 Government for the loss of sundry tents and 
 broken-down Deccan ponies which he abandoned 
 in his rapid advance. 
 
 I come now to the events on which Lord 
 Roberts' reputation really rests — the march to 
 Kandahar and the victory which crowned it. 
 
 General Stewart, with his division, had arrived 
 at Kabul in April, 1879, and assumed command 
 of all the troops in Northern Afghanistan. In 
 August news reached him of the disaster at 
 Maiwand and the investment of Kandahar, and 
 he at once equipped a magnificent force of 
 10,000 fighting men and 18 mountain guns for 
 the relief of that city, and put Sir Frederick 
 Roberts at its head. 
 
 I have no wish to depreciate Lord Roberts' 
 one great achievement. The advance on Kanda- 
 har was a splendid soldiers' march, fully testing 
 the endurance and spirit of the veteran troops 
 
Lord Roberts in War 55 
 
 who took part in it ; and the battle of Kandahar 
 was the battle of a good tactician, since, for 
 once, General Roberts kept his troops well in 
 hand, every division, brigade and regiment mutu- 
 ally supporting each other ; but the circumstances 
 of both march and battle require to be known 
 and weighed before its true value can be as- 
 signed to either. As regards the former, I will 
 not say a word of my own, but simply tran- 
 scribe a passage dealing with it from a lecture 
 by Captain C. Hoskins, R.E. : — 
 
 "He (Roberts) had admirable transport His 
 chief of the Staff, Lieut.-Colonel Chapman, R.A., 
 knew the road intimately, as he had just marched 
 up with General Stewart. The time of the 
 year was also propitious, as the harvest had lately 
 been gathered in, and supplies were ample on 
 the road. . . . General Roberts had not a 
 wheel in his division, and left Kabul without a 
 single camel. . . . General Stewart, on the 
 contrary, left Kandahar for Ghuzni with a heavy 
 
56 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 battery, one battery Horse Artillery, one battery 
 Field Artillery, the road having to be repaired 
 on the way for artillery. The country was more 
 or less unknown to him. He had camel-carriage, 
 elephants, and bullocks ; for some sixty miles 
 the villages were absolutely deserted, and the 
 difficulties of getting supplies great. He fought 
 a general action at Ahmed Kheyl, and on the 
 20th day from Kandahar, took Ghuzni. I would 
 ask military critics in what particulars the march 
 from Kabul to Kandahar was per se a more 
 brilliant operation than that of General Stewart's 
 to Ghuzni? It is easy to understand why the 
 British public think so. The General Election 
 absorbed public attention during General Stewart's 
 march. General Roberts was more fortunate ; 
 he had the eyes of the world turned upon him. 
 The disasters of Maiwand and the siege of 
 Kandahar had tarnished the honour of the 
 British flag, and the rapid and completely suc- 
 cessful way in which the stain was wiped off 
 
Lord Roberts in War 57 
 
 on the 1st September was received with ac- 
 clamation by the whole British nation." 
 
 As regards the battle, though, as I have said, 
 well planned and well fought, there could be 
 no doubt as to its result. Where over 12,000 
 British troops, of whom nearly one -third are 
 Englishmen,^ are pitted against 12,800 Afghans, 
 or any other Asiatics, victory must and will 
 remain with the former. 
 
 It is fair to Lord Roberts to say that, under 
 the discipline of experience to which he was sub- 
 jected at Kabul, he showed himself as quick to 
 learn in questions of policy as in matters of war. 
 Just as at Kandahar he avoided all the mistakes 
 which hitherto had made his tactics more 
 dangerous to his friends than to his foes, so 
 when called upon in the spring of 1880 to 
 advise the Indian Government with regard to 
 the future of Afghanistan, he displayed a grasp 
 
 ' These figures do not include the Bombay troops gar- 
 risoning Kandahar. 
 
58 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 of the situation, as between ourselves and that 
 country on the one hand, and ourselves and 
 Russia on the other, and an appreciation of its 
 strong as well as of its weak points, which must 
 have been a surprise to the Viceroy who had 
 listened in former days to very different language 
 from his lips. Weary of barren strife and of 
 equally barren victories, convinced by the testi- 
 mony of his own eyes that Eastern Afghanistan 
 was a prize which no nation need covet, and its 
 inhabitants a wild, fiercely independent people, 
 who might be beaten, but could not be tamed, 
 Roberts pronounced boldly for a speedy retire- 
 ment to our original frontier both in the Kuram 
 and on the Khyber side, and for a complete 
 abandonment of the "forward" policy so far as 
 these two routes were concerned, and he sup- 
 ported his advice by reasons of which Lawrence 
 himself might have been proud. 
 
 In an elaborate report, addressed to the Vice- 
 roy and Governor-General, and dated Kabul, 
 May 29, 1890, after entreating his Excellency 
 
Lord Roberts in War 59 
 
 " to bear in mind that no one has been a 
 more zealous supporter of the present policy, 
 and that no one has more strongly advocated 
 an unsparing reduction of the military power of 
 Afghanistan, than I have " ; and after confessing 
 that he had come to the conclusion " that the 
 less the Afghans see of us, the less they will dislike 
 us" and that "if we cannot settle matters with 
 the Afghans at this season of the year, when 
 everything is in our favour, we shall certainly 
 not be able to do so in winter, when the difficulties 
 of our occupation are immeasurably increased," 
 he went on to advocate a withdrawal of our 
 troops within our original frontier, and to give 
 two reasons for the suggestion — the one that it 
 would be impolitic to require our native troops 
 to remain away from their own country any 
 longer ; the other that " should Russia in future 
 years attempt to conquer Afghanistan or invade 
 India through it, we should have a better chance of 
 attaching the Afghans to our interests if we avoid 
 all interference with them in the meantime" 
 
6o Lord Roberts in War 
 
 Sir F. Roberts' recommendations did not 
 cease here. He who in 1895 finds it impossible to 
 comprehend how "any one conversant with our 
 position in India can arrive at any other con- 
 clusion than that Chitral" — an insignificant little 
 town 185 miles from Peshawur, and a thousand 
 miles from any place which can be regarded as 
 the possible base of Russian operations against 
 India — " is of great strategical importance," boldly 
 pressed upon the Indian Government in 1880, 
 the abandonment of Jumrood, the strong position 
 which gives us the command of the Khyber — the 
 reduction of the garrison of Peshawur " to the 
 lowest possible strength," and "withdrawing all, 
 or nearly all, the European troops" to healthier 
 situations on the left bank of the Indus ; and 
 this not only to ensure "a serviceable force, fit 
 to take the field at any time of the year," but 
 because "the longer and more difficult the line 
 of communication is, the more numerous and 
 greater the obstacles which Russia would have 
 to overcome, and, so far from shortening one 
 
Lord Roberts in War 6i 
 
 mile of the road, I would let tlie webs of diffi- 
 culties extend to the very mouth of the Khyber 
 Pass." 
 
 Had the salutary impression made upon Sir F. 
 Roberts by the events which marked his short 
 tenure of supreme power at Kabul, proved as 
 lasting as, for the moment, they were deep, this 
 study of an episode in Lord Roberts' career would 
 never have been written, for he would to-day be 
 straining every nerve to prevent his countrymen 
 from committing, on a large scale, the blunders 
 of which, within a restricted area, he himself had 
 once reaped the bitter fruits. When, precisely, his 
 views began to return into what, I think, I may 
 call their natural channel, I am unable to say ; 
 but by 1885, when he succeeded Sir D. Stewart, 
 as Commander-in-Chief in India, he had gone 
 back to the standpoint and to the convictions of 
 Lord Lytton and Sir Peter Lumsden, and had 
 well-nigh forgotten that he had ever looked at 
 India's frontier policy with the eyes of a Lawrence 
 
62 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 or a Mansfield. From that time to this, he has 
 been the chief instrument in decreasing " the web 
 of difficulties" spread by nature herself in the 
 way of a Russian advance, and the main cause 
 of those financial troubles which are slowly un- 
 dermining our hold upon the good-will of the 
 Indian peoples. 
 
 His administrative record as Commander-in- 
 Chief reflects the story of his conduct, in the 
 Kuram and Kabul campaigns, with all the dif- 
 ference which lies between the possibilities of 
 evil open to the commander of a few thousand 
 men, and those enjoyed by the head of India's 
 military forces. 
 
 In every direction he pushed troops far up 
 into the hills, scattering them over an enormous 
 area in small isolated bodies. At this moment 
 there is hardly a post, throughout the sixty or 
 seventy thousand square miles which he has 
 added to the British Empire, which is strong 
 enough to hold its own, were the danger to 
 
Lord Roberts in War 63 
 
 avert which it was established, really to arise, 
 and scarcely two that could give support to each 
 other in the hour of need. Lord Roberts has 
 smoothed Russia's path into India, supposing 
 her to wish to tread it, literally, by constructing 
 roads where the absence of roads was India's 
 best security, and, metaphorically, by making 
 enemies of numberless tribes who now, on occa- 
 sion given, will turn to her for deliverance ; as, 
 had we left them undisturbed and she had been 
 the invader, they would have turned to us for 
 assistance. His personal reign in India is over, 
 but his spirit still rules her destinies, and his 
 hand points the way to the Hindu Kush. Shall 
 we go whither he bids us, or resolutely turn our 
 backs upon his promised land of security and 
 prosperity — the actual bog of difficulty and 
 desert of deficits, desert large enough and dry 
 enough to swallow up all the streams of India's 
 wealth, however lavishly she may pour them 
 forth — and return to a policy of sober, dutiful 
 
64 Lord Roberts in War 
 
 attention to the needs and aspirations of the 
 280,000,000 inhabitants of administrative India, 
 in whose contentment lies our strength, and in 
 whose alienation we shall find our ruin ? 
 
 Butler & Tanner, Frome and London. 
 
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