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CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 
 
 BY 
 HELEN MAUD CLARKE 
 
 THESIS PRESENTED TO THE UNIVERSITY 
 FACULTY OP CORNEI,!, UNIVERSITY IN PAR- 
 TIAL PUI,FII,I,MENT OP THE REQUIREMENTS 
 FOR THE DEGREE OP DOCTOR OP PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Reprinted from the American Journal of Psychology 
 April, 1911, Vol. XXII, pp. 214-249 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES' 
 
 By Helen Maud Clarke 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 Introduction . -214 
 
 Incidental Analyses . . . . . . . 215 
 
 1. Types of Observers . . . . 216 
 
 2. Attitudes Analysed . . ... .217 
 
 3. Gradation of Imagery . ... . 221 
 Detailed Analyses . 224 
 
 1. Explicit 224 
 
 Surprise . 225 
 
 Seeking . . . 225 
 
 Doubt, Hesitation, Uncertainty . . 227 
 
 2. Genetic . . 230 
 
 Aufgabe or Task . . 230 
 
 Recognition . ... 232 
 
 Understanding . . . 236 
 
 Relation ...... . 242 
 
 Conclusion .... . 247 
 
 The term Bewusstseinslage, in the sense of 'conscious atti- 
 tude,' was introduced into experimental psychology, at Marbe 's 
 suggestion (1901), by Mayer and Orth, who employed it to 
 characterise certain conscious phenomena, describable neither 
 as determinate ideas nor as volitions, which appeared in the 
 course of a qualitative study of association. These phenome- 
 na are referred to by Marbe himself (1901) as "obvious facts 
 of consciousness, whose contents, nevertheless, either do not 
 permit at all of a detailed characterisation, or at any rate are 
 difficult to characterise;" instances are doubt, difficulty, 
 effort, assent, conviction. Marbe offers, then, no definition 
 of the conscious attitude; he 'gives only a negative criterion 
 and a list of examples. Messer (1906) adds to the list, and at 
 the same time extends the range of the term, using it to in- 
 clude experiences of logical relation, of the meaning of words 
 and sentences, etc. Btihler (1907) restricts the attitudes to 
 the "mehr zustandlichen Erlebnisstrecken, die als Zweifeln, 
 Besinnen, Abwarten, Erstaunen, usw. beschrieben werden." 
 Marbe seems not to approve of the restriction: "die neuer- 
 dings versuchte Einschrankung des Begriffes der Bewusstseins- 
 lage entspricht nicht den Ausfiihrungen Marbes," declares 
 
 ' From the Psychological Laboratory of Cornell University. 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDSS 215 
 
 a recent writer from the Wiirzburg laboratory; and the im- 
 plication is that Marbe holds to his original ideas.' 
 
 It is clear that to attempt a definition of 'conscious attitude' 
 at the present time, would be premature. We use the phrase 
 to denote certain large and comprehensive experiences, not 
 evidently imaginal in character; and it is our aim, in this 
 study, to bring these experiences to the test of introspective 
 observation, and thus to discover whether or not they are 
 analysable. Whatever be the outcome of the discussion of 
 'imageless thought,' it is probable that the name 'conscious 
 attitude' will be retained as a descriptive term; but how the 
 attitudes are to be distinguished, anal3rtically, from 'thoughts' 
 on the one hand, and 'emotions' on the other, must be left for 
 the future to decide. 
 
 Incidental Analyses 
 
 The conscious attitude is, in general, an elusive experience, 
 which it is difficult to secure in isolation; we therefore re- 
 sorted in the main to an indirect method, and sought to arouse 
 conscious situations in which various attitudes would be likely 
 to occur. The observers were instructed to give complete 
 introspections. The stimuli in the first series of experiments 
 were letters or words which were written in the blind point- 
 alphabet, and were perceived tactually. At the first sitting 
 the observer was given a slip bearing several letters in their 
 alphabetical order, and was allowed to feel them, and to 
 associate the name to the tactual perception in any way that 
 he chose. Then letters or words were given him to be rec- 
 ognised. The experiments by this method fall into two 
 periods. Those performed during the spring term of 1909 
 were tentative, and their results were used for the improve- 
 ment of the method. The stimuli for single experiments 
 were short words or nonsense-combinations of letters. The 
 introspections were written by the observers. 
 
 When the work was taken up again in October, the method 
 was somewhat modified. Only single letters, the first ten 
 of the alphabet, were used as stimuli. The whole of a word, 
 perceived tactually, cannot be 'taken in at a glance' as in visual 
 perception. If the letters were mere nonsense-combinations, 
 each letter had to be recognised separately; the experiences 
 thus became complex, and the introspective report might be 
 incomplete. If the letters made a word, the observer tended 
 to interpret from context, which further complicated the prob- 
 lem. In the new series, the reports were dictated, and writ- 
 
 'On conscious attitudes in general, see E. B. Titchener, Exp. Psychol, of 
 the Thought-processes, 1909, 98 ff., 270, etc. ; E. von Aster, Zeits. f. Psychol., 
 xlix., 1908, 60 ff.; on Marbe's position, M. Beer, ibid., Ivi., 1910, 265. 
 
2l6 CLARKE 
 
 ten down by the experimenter. The most important change in 
 method, however, was the measurement of the reaction-time. 
 The instrument used was a Vernier chronoscope, one key of 
 which had been replaced by a lever arranged just above the 
 letter to be felt. When the observer touched the letter he 
 moved the lever, and thus broke a current and released the 
 pendulum. A finger of the left hand rested throughout on 
 the other reaction key; as soon as the observer recognised the 
 letter, he pressed this key, and released the other pendulum. 
 In these, as in the earlier experiments, the observer was given 
 the letters, in alphabetical order, to feel at the beginning of 
 every hour, unless he declared, of his own accord, that the 
 letters were clear in memory. There was constant instruc- 
 tion to reduce all experience to its lowest terms. 
 
 The observers were Dr. Pyle (P), Dr. Okabe (O), Mr. Foster 
 (F), and Miss de Vries (V). The first was at the time assist- 
 ant in psychology, and the other three were graduate students 
 of considerable experience in introspection. When the ex- 
 periments were given in their changed form. Dr. Geissler (G), 
 instructor in psychology, took the place of Dr. Pyle. Miss 
 Mary Clarke (MC) and the writer (HC) were observers in 
 some later experiments. MC was untrained in psychology, 
 though advanced in other lines. 
 
 I. Types of Observers 
 
 P is predominantly verbal in type. He reports verbal ideas 
 in sentence form, with a few visual images, sensations of strain, 
 organic sensations and feelings. Thus, CAB. cab. "I per- 
 ceived the first letter and said C, but had verbal ideas like 'I 
 am not sure whether it is or not.' " 
 
 V represents a mixed type. Visual images play a large part 
 in her consciousness, and many of these are colored. Rec- 
 ognition is often mediated by a tactual image on the finger. 
 Verbal ideas, affective processes, kinaesthetic and organic sen- 
 sations are also numerous. Thus, DC. dc. "Felt the dots and 
 said d, c. Unpleasant. Got visual image at once from the 
 feel, and then said the letter." E. e, i. 20. " Very pleasant. 
 Sensations from mouth in smiling. The dot fitted into a hole 
 in my finger which corresponded to E- Reaction automatic 
 and hardly conscious. I visualised the round dot and a printed 
 E. Smiled at the similarity of these." 
 
 O is also of a mixed type, reporting visual, verbal and audi- 
 tory images in great numbers. Organic sensations and strain 
 play a great part in his consciousness, as do also afifective 
 processes, kinaesthetic and tactual images, pain and tempera- 
 ture sensations. Thus, I. i, 5.12. "Attention well concentra- 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 2 1 7 
 
 ted and body well adjusted. When I touched the lever, shock 
 from muscular contraction. Vacant consciousness, state of 
 waiting. Organic sensation like irritation in back. Stamp- 
 ing of foot, frowning, extreme unpleasantness. Feeling of 
 motion on left finger; probably a real motion, not an image. 
 Suddenly a visual-verbal image I." 
 
 F reports verbal, visual and auditory images; more auditory 
 than any other observer except O. Kinaesthetic images and 
 organic and strain sensations are also reported, as well as a 
 few affective processes. Thus, IF. if. "The two letters 
 have different organic sensations. I cannot describe them 
 except by saying that that which is with I is long, and that 
 which is with F is broad; both are narrow, like the letters 
 themselves." 
 
 In the introspections of G, all imagery except verbal is al- 
 most entirely lacking. Sensations, both kinaesthetic and or- 
 ganic, and affective processes are prominent in conscious- 
 ness. When G felt the alphabet in order to learn the letters, 
 he described every letter aloud, and associated the verbal 
 description with the tactual perception. G reports that his 
 consciousness in general is almost without images, and his 
 memory of scenes and events is in verbal form. He places 
 things spatially by means of eye-movements, which are un- 
 accompanied by images. Thus, B. b, 4.42. "At the first 
 touch perception of a long row of dots with absolute clear- 
 ness. It confused me, that is, it excited a complex of organic 
 sensations, and the verbal idea. Why can't I tell what it is? 
 Organic sensations especially from diaphragm. I said, I have 
 to see whether there is a dot below or a changed dot at the 
 end. Then another careful touch of the letter, with the little 
 dot below most prominent. Verbal ideas: Oh, yes, that is 
 B. The whole strongly pleasant." 
 
 MC is of a pronounced visual type, but reports some imagery 
 from other senses.' Thus, Symposium. "Verbal image of 
 the word with sensations in throat. Visual image of a pic- 
 ture of a Greek symposium from a Greek history, followed 
 by image of a table with people seated around it. Image of 
 a convention and auditory image. Round table." 
 
 HC is of the same type of imagery as MC. Thus, Re- 
 liability. "Visual and verbal images of the word. Very vague 
 visual image of some kind of support bearing a heavy weight." 
 
 2. Attitiides Analysed 
 
 In going over the introspections, to discover what attitudes 
 have been analysed by the observers, we meet with some am- 
 'For the method employed with MC and HC, see p. 236 below. 
 Journal — 6 
 
2l8 CLARKE 
 
 biguity and confusion of terms. So far as attitudes have been 
 named, they have been listed under the name applied by the 
 observer. With this word of caution we proceed to consider 
 the analyses of various attitudes to be found in the reports. 
 
 Approval. V. Pleasantness, with some general kinaesthesis. 
 
 AwFULNESS. G. Once analysed as a strong unpleasantness and frown- 
 ing, and again as the same with the addition of inhibition of breathing. 
 
 Baffled Expectation. O. Visual image of face and frowning fore- 
 head. Left foot stamped. Slight burning sensation in back. Bodily 
 and mental attitude was adjusted to a more difficult letter. Partial re- 
 laxation and muscular strain in upper part of body. Organic sensation 
 and muscular strain which I could not localise. 
 
 Caution. V. Verbal idea. Be careful. 
 
 Comfort. V. Organic sensation and smiling. 
 
 Comparison. HC. The two things were side by side, visually. 
 
 Confidence. O. A good adjustment of muscles, and sensations from 
 them. Agreeable organic sensations. V. "I sat up straight and took 
 deep breaths, and had a sense of stiffness in the spine, and pleasantness." 
 
 Confusion is analysed by G as "a complex of organic sensations, and 
 verbal idea. Why can't I tell what it is?" "Unpleasantness, organic 
 attitude of inhibited movement of diaphragm and of breathing." F 
 analyses it once as a number of conflicting strains. 
 
 O reports the repeated appearance of conflicting verbal ideas: "It may 
 mean B and it may mean C," unpleasantness, and organic sensations in 
 abdomen which seemed to travel upward and to be checked by some ob- 
 stacle. "Several initial associations of auditory-kinaesthetic images. 
 Muscular strain in head, organic sensation in trunk." V reports holchng 
 of breath and blank consciousness. 
 
 Consciousness of Fitness. O. Relaxation of organic and muscular 
 strain, stretching of back, long breathing. 
 
 Consciousness that the Letter was too Small. O. Muscular strain 
 and organic sensations. 
 
 Decision. O. Slightly agreeable feeling and successive auditory images. 
 It must be so. — ^Auditory image. Kinsesthetic bodily attitude. Oganic 
 sensations. — Bodily attitude and relaxation of muscular strain. — Memory 
 image, visual or tactual or both, of E. Change of organic and muscular 
 sensations. (This attitude is analysed several times by the same observer 
 in the same way.) 
 
 Decision to Disregard the Lever. F. Visual and kinsesthetic 
 images of this action. I saw myself doing it. 
 
 Determination. G. Pleasant mood. Verbal idea, I am going to do 
 that well. F. Nodding of head toward finger, and attending to tactual 
 image of coming sensation. V. Verbal ideas, biting the teeth and jerking 
 the head. 
 
 Difficulty. G. Trouble to get a verbal idea. Three ideas a, e, and 
 i were ready, but I do not know how. 
 
 Disappointment. V. Organic and verbal. I said Oh. My muscles had 
 been strained, but were now relaxed all over. Sensation from frowning. 
 Very unpleasant. 
 
 Disgust. O. Organic sensations throughout the body. Unpleasantness. 
 
 Dissatisfaction. O. Reported twice. Once not analysed. Once re- 
 ported as consisting of muscular strain, organic sensations, and unpleasant- 
 ness. 
 
 Distance and Direction. MC. In almost every experiment this ob- 
 sMver reports a sense of distance and direction towards a place that is 
 thought of. The two usually occur together, though sometimes the one 
 is reported alone. "Direction goes on in front of my head, and it feels as 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 219 
 
 if something inside of my head were moving in the given direction. I think 
 this is an image, not a real movement." "Distance is a visual image of 
 the space, boiled down, which lies between the two places. It is a schematic 
 visual image." In one case, in which the observer had been thinking of, 
 picturing, scenes in the east, these were replaced by images of places in 
 her home town, and she says: "In going from one to the other my mind 
 distinctly moved west. This movement is located in the top of the head, 
 and seems like a movement of something inside of the head." In some 
 cases MC says her mind 'flew' to a certain place, and this experience seems 
 to have been a seen motion across a visual area with some kinaesthesis. 
 
 £asB of Recognition. G. Localised once in the trunk, and again as 
 vaguely organic. 
 
 Easiness. (This is partially analysed by O fifteen times, and is men- 
 tioned without analysis four times.) Agreeableness, and motor tendency to 
 say Easy. — Motor tendency to say Quite easy. Paint but massive organic 
 sensation in background. — ^Verbal idea. This is easy, and visual image of 
 my smiling face. — Bodily attitude and relaxed muscular sensation. (In 
 the remaining analyses the same factors are repeated.) 
 
 Expectation. Analysis agrees with those of Pyle's observers (this 
 Journal, XX, 1909, 530 ff.). 
 
 Fear That I had Reacted too Quickly. F. Slight sinking in the 
 stomach or diaphragm. Lack of clearness of perception, and sensations 
 from breathing. 
 
 V reports a state which she calls Fright, and which usually occurs at 
 the beginning of an experiment. This is analysed three times as consisting 
 of a shiver down the back, and a shrinking backward. Once it consisted, 
 in addition, of holding the breath and gasping; and once it is described as 
 a feeling of nervousness and a shiver. The state of Scare, which might 
 be supposed to resemble fright, is reported only once, and is described as a 
 sudden muscular contraction. C twice reports fear as an unsteady or- 
 ganic sensation. 
 
 G-Consciousness is reported by G three times. Once it is not analysed; 
 once, said to be motor; and once, to consist of the muscular setting of the 
 tongue. 
 
 Have Finished my Work. O. Bodily attitude which cannot be local- 
 ised. Tendency to straighten up the body. 
 
 The I-Consciousnbss. C. Was a kinsesthetic sensation in the back 
 of the mouth. 
 
 I Ought to Know That. O. Organic sensation and disagreeable 
 feeling. 
 
 Impatience. O. Frowning, and the verbal idea Let 's go. 
 
 Injustice. V. Gasping for breath. I started back and threw my head 
 back. 
 
 Irritation. O. Sensation from frowning. Visual image of frowning 
 face. Tendency to lower and shake the head. Hot sensation in head and 
 back. [In the four rather full analyses that follow, the above facts are 
 repeated, and in addition strain in back and neck (three times), disagreea- 
 ble feeUng (three times), organic sensation throughout the body (three 
 times), verbal ideas This is hard (once) are reported.] 
 
 It Must be C. G. A pleasant touch-motor complex, with a horizontal 
 movement, and a downward movement at the end. In the same report, 
 this statement was followed by the attitude / had € before, which was 
 verbal-kinaesthetic. The articulation was inhibited. This again gave place 
 to the attitude That is C ail right, which was a touch-motor complex with 
 dear articulation. 
 
 Meaning. G. A single dot below the line means a broken T. This 
 is a motor complex. O. Kinsesthetic and auditory image of the letters. 
 Meaning carried by the shape of the figure itself. 
 
220 CLARKE 
 
 The Meaning op C is reported by G as an attitude, and is analysed as 
 a complex of tongue-sensations and temperature in the mouth. Tendency 
 to say the letter; pleasantness. 
 
 Newness. F. ' 'It impresses me as a cutting edge, as a bit of a knife 
 blade turned up. Definite organic sensations. The whole complex I 
 should call newness." 
 
 Non-Recognition. F. Includes vague visual image. 
 
 The Passage op Time. V describes this three times as a perception 
 resembling that of air ciurents, passing around and over the observer from 
 back to front; in one case there was the verbal idea That was slow. 
 O says that a feeling of length of time came in kinaesthetic terms, and re- 
 sembled fatigue. 
 
 Fastness. HC. The image was projected back into the past. Fast- 
 ness is more visual than anything else. It seems far away, and foreshort- 
 ened. 
 
 FowERLESSNESS. HC. This was a peculiar tingling sensation all over 
 the body, with sensations similar to fatigue, and warmtii. 
 
 Pride. O. Slight tendency to straighten up my neck and smile. Pleas- 
 ant feeling. • 
 
 The Readiness to say a Certain Word is in one case localised by G 
 in the lower part of the head, and again analysed as a disposition or set 
 of the muscles of the mouth. 
 
 HC. Reasoning that, if Canute was connected with 1026, Alfred was 
 in the loth century. This was partly represented by a visual schema of 
 the centuries. Canute was in white at 1026, Alfred in dark, therefore 
 in the loth centiuy. 
 
 ReplEction. O. Thought turned alternately from A to B. (No 
 further analysis.) 
 
 RELIEP. G. Pleasure, and disappearance of organic complex. Pro- 
 nounced exhaling. O. Consists of organic sensation. 
 
 Satisfaction. C connects this with pleasantness. O. Instantaneous 
 pleasant feeling; faint visual image of my smiling face. Organic sensations. 
 — Pleasant feeling, tendency to smile, organic sensations. — Tendency 
 to smile. Verbal ideas: Yes, it is quite sure. (These analyses are re- 
 peated a number of times, while there are also cases in which satisfaction 
 is named but not analysed.) 
 
 Security. V. Long, easy breathing and straight position of body; re- 
 laxation. 
 
 Strangeness. F. Weak organic feeling all over the body. Strain, 
 and sensations from breathing, and special sensation from diaphragm. 
 This last is not a strain. It must be one of the sensations that we get when 
 we fall in dreams. O. Insufficient adaptation of body, fingers, and hand. 
 General inhibition, which was a kind of organic sensation; inhibition of 
 arm-movement. 
 
 Tendency to Stay and Find Something Else. O. Consisted of 
 bodily attitude. 
 
 Conviction That I was Right. V. Reappearance of the verbal im- 
 age of the letter to which I had reacted. 
 
 The attitude That I Should Have Pressed Sooner, V describes as 
 a twitch in the finger, organic sensation, and catching of breath. 
 
 The conviction That it Was Not any op the Others. G. An in- 
 hibited motion of the Hps to say B, and the fact that I did not move hori- 
 zontally and therefore it could not be H. This was partly kinaesthetic, in 
 the fingers and mouth. 
 
 That it was Probably Not G. V. Verbal ideas, and visual and kines- 
 thetic images, of the other letters. 
 
 Thinking over. O. Consisted of bodily set, and of associations which 
 were not perfected. D and J were repeated several times in auditory terms. 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 221 
 
 Uneasiness. O. Reported four times. Once identified with uncer- 
 tainty. Once includes image of frowning face, and sensations in back of 
 head and neck. Once is a verbal idea, That has no meaning. Once is 
 not analysed. 
 
 Unpamiliarity. G. The touch-motor complex was unfamiliar and un- 
 pleasant. It led to movements of tongue and lips in whispering: Oh me, 
 that must be H. Organic attitude in trunk; unsteady shutting of eyes 
 and horizontal movement of eye-balls. V. Rapid mental comparison of 
 feeling of C now with feeling of C last year, though I do not remember 
 how C felt then. 
 
 The Uppbr Row was Too Short for J. O. Tactual memory of J. 
 Bodily attitude. 
 
 Waiting. O. This is described twice, in almost exactly the same words. 
 Sensation of heat in back, stamping of feet, and extreme unpleasantness. 
 
 Wondering. V. Once not analysed; once organic attitude, holding the 
 breath and strata. HC. Once merely reported ; once described as a com- 
 plex of sensations in the top of the head. 
 
 Attitudes Named but not Analysed. Besides the attitudes named, 
 there are others which are merely reported and not analysed. They include 
 one case each of identity of self with the lever (G), the motive to distinguish 
 the dots (G), the consciousness that I had reacted (G), the C-consciousness 
 (G), not being right (F), curiosity (O), relation (O), that has no meaning 
 (O), indecision (O), consciousness of an obstacle (O), unknownness (V), 
 fast reaction (V), contrast (MC), sense of past time (HC) ; and two cases 
 each of certainty (V), wondering (MC), and ownership (MC; this was at 
 least partly visual). 
 
 Many of these incidental analyses are, evidently, imper- 
 fect. Even at the best, the observers might report in large 
 and sweeping phrases, such as 'bodily attitude' or 'organic 
 sensation.' There is, however, no doubt that the reports 
 were intended at the time to represent the attitudes them- 
 selves, and not merely incidental or concomitant occurrences. 
 After the second set of experiments, the observers were con- 
 fronted with an outline of their reports upon various atti- 
 tudes, and were asked to say whether, so far as they could 
 remember, the analyses read were, as analyses, correct. The 
 regular answer was that they were correct, and in several 
 cases the observer added, of his own accord, that he could 
 reproduce the attitude, at the moment, and that it corres- 
 ponded with the analysis given. 
 
 While, therefore, we readily admit that introspective 
 analysis might, under more favorable conditions, have been 
 pushed further, we believe that the descriptions given are 
 reliable, and that more detailed work would simply resolve 
 the complexes mentioned into their elements. 
 
 3. Gradation of Imagery 
 
 Messer finds five stages in the Entfaltung of visual images: 
 (i) mere spatial direction or externality; (2) a trace of visual 
 localisation; (3) vague and schematic images; (4) images 
 just named, and not characterised as to degree; (5) very 
 
222 CLARKB 
 
 clear and strong images. In addition, he distinguishes general 
 and particular, partial, changing and moving, and symbolic 
 images. The stages found in the observers in our own ex- 
 periments are as follows: 
 
 P mentions only two stages, and these were only in visual 
 and verbal imagery. The two stages were the vague, and 
 those merely named. 
 
 F distinguishes the following stages. For visual images, mere 
 localisation, vague, and just named. For verbal images, which 
 do not lend themselves to exactly the same classification, 
 very vague, just named. Auditory images fall into the 
 same two classes. The idea of movement, which is both vis- 
 ual and kinsesthetic, is very often merely named. Organic 
 sensations were faint, and just named. 
 
 V. For visual images : faint, just named, very clear, partial 
 image, change, and movement. For verbal: faint, just 
 named, and very clear. 
 
 MC. For visual images: vague, schematic, very clear, par- 
 tial, change, generic. For verbal : vague, just named, very 
 clear, aloud, partial. For auditory: very vague, just named. 
 
 HC's images are in general much like MC's. Visual: lo- 
 calisation vague, just named, very clear, partial, change. 
 Verbal : very clear. Kinsesthetic: vague, just named. Motor: 
 very clear. Auditory: vague, just named. 
 
 O has for visual images: localisation, vague, just named, 
 clear, incomplete, movement. He also speaks on several 
 occasions of 'initial associations,' which seem to have been 
 inhibited tendencies toward the articulation of words. For 
 verbal: faint, just named, very clear, aloud, partial. Audi- 
 tory : same as the verbal, and usually connected with them. 
 Organic: faint, just named, very clear, changing, movement. 
 
 G reports for visual imagery only three cases; for kinsesthetic 
 other than verbal, five; and these are all described as vague. 
 His organic sensations are mostly merely named, but a few are 
 faint. On any page of G's reports the verbal stages just 
 named, whispered, and aloud, may be found; yet there is an 
 unmistakable general tendency which, as in the case of V, is in 
 the opposite direction to the order here given. G invariably 
 read the letters aloud when they were being felt for the first 
 time. As they recur again and again, the verbal ideas involved 
 in recognition fade out, from whispered to vaguely verbal, 
 and finally to a mere setting of the mouth or right breathing 
 for the utterance or a certain letter. 
 
 Illustrations of the Stages of Imagery. 
 
 These typical illustrations of visual imagery represent a large body of 
 similar cases, which cannot be quoted for lack of space. No one of the 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 223 
 
 observers was instructed to report on the intensity of his images; the ex- 
 perimenter had not this specific problem in mind at the time when the in- 
 trospections were taken. As the illustrations show, it is extremely di£Scult 
 to draw a sharp line between the consciousness which is rich in images and 
 that which is 'imageless.' Images may be so vague as to be noticed only 
 by the most careful introspection; and there is every reason to believe 
 that some may escape notice entirely; that, in certain cases, the intro- 
 pections even of trained observers may not be complete. 
 
 MC. 
 
 Vague. Vague image of a Massachusetts street. Vague image of a drug 
 store. Schematic. Visual schematic image of June in my representation 
 of the months. An image of an environment, a sort of mist, but very 
 vague. Very Clear. An image of the girl, including details with much 
 distinctness, such as her light, fluSy hair, bright pleasant eyes, and short 
 dresses. 
 
 Partial. Detached image of a face with no setting. Image of a man in 
 the rigging of a ship, but no setting, even of a whole ship. Change. Image 
 of the man stepping into the room from the street and looking at himself 
 in the glass. This picture was painted before me. It was not distinct at 
 first, but one part became clear and then another, till the whole was clear. 
 
 O. 
 
 Localisation. Localisation of the letter in the alphabet sUp. (This 
 is repeated many times.) Vague. Vague pyramidal image of something. 
 Just named. Image of H in point. Clear. Clear image of the letters. 
 
 Incomplete. Incomplete image of a Japanese key. Movement. Image 
 of a worm moving. 
 
 V on the recognition of A 
 
 The illustrations begin at the point where color is first associated with A. 
 Oct. 22 : Visual image of A written in red; Oct. 26: Very brilliant red; Oct. 
 28: Vivid flash of red; Oct. 30: Visual image of red A in front of me; Nov. 
 2 : A red flash and a little visual written A; Nov. 4: Visual image of A in 
 front of my eyes, and a flash of red; Nov. 6: Paint flash of red; Nov. 6, 
 later: I visuaUsed the two dots; Nov. 9: Slight red blot. After the re- 
 action, a faint visual A. (See p. 234.) 
 
 To demonstrate a series of gradual steps from clear images to 
 'imageless' thought may not prove conclusively that the latter 
 is a fiction; but, at any rate, it suggests an origin and deri- 
 vation. Imageless thought, as its name implies, is, so far 
 at least, an entirely negative concept. We perform acts of 
 thought in which we can discover no imagery in conscious- 
 ness, and hence we infer that thought may be 'imageless.' 
 Just what an imageless thought is like, or how it differs from 
 that in which images are present, has never been shown, or 
 even attempted to be shown, except by way of classifications 
 such as that of Buhler. In fact the term 'imageless' is unfor- 
 tunate; it lends itself easily to misunderstanding. 'Image,' 
 in popular parlance and often in psychology, means a cen- 
 trally aroused representation of a visual impression. We 
 must, of course, recognise also the place of auditory, tactual, 
 and kinsesthetic imagery, and theoretically of images of taste 
 and smell, though these appear to play but a small part in con- 
 sciousness. The verbal image, which is especially important 
 
224 CIvARKB 
 
 in the thought-process, may itself be visual, auditory, kinaes- 
 thetic, or mixed. Even this list, however, does not exhaust 
 the contents of thought. It is becoming increasingly apparent 
 that our conscious states take much of their peculiar quality 
 from the organic sensations, the felt bodily adjustments, 
 which enter into certain situations. The affective pro- 
 cesses are also often present, even in thought. It is obvious, 
 therefore, that the term 'imageless' is inadequate to designate 
 a thought from which all these elements are absent. Even 
 the term 'non-sensory,' which is better, disregards the part 
 played by feeling. We all know in a general way, however, 
 what sort of state is meant by 'imageless thought,' and it is 
 just this state which the above introspections tend to discredit. 
 For they show that imagery does not need to be specific 
 and elaborate in order to carry thought. We may repeat an 
 argument, or review an article, in a very small part of the words 
 used in the original, without sacrificing the essentials of the 
 content. When we are thinking in verbal images, it is by no 
 means necessary to say every word which we should use if we 
 were talking aloud. Again, just because we are not speak- 
 ing aloud, it is not necessary that every word should be clear- 
 ly articulated or completed, either in actual throat movements 
 or in images of such movements. The reports of G, especially, 
 show that the mere setting of the mouth, or the right mode of 
 exhalation, serves as well as the complete word. A young 
 child just beginning to read gets no meaning from his words 
 unless he reads them aloud. Thought consists for him in the 
 sound of his own voice or that of another, or in the feeling 
 of the throat movements involved in speaking. When he 
 first learns to read quietly, he whispers; then he confines 
 himself to a mere lip motion; and later, he can dispense with 
 this expression. The reports of our observers take up this 
 progress where the child leaves off, or from an even earlier 
 point, when the words are still spoken aloud, and show that 
 and how the suppression of sound and the shortening of the 
 total process may be carried in the adult to a stage yet more 
 remote from the starting point.' 
 
 Detailed Anai,yses 
 I. Explicit 
 The attitudes so far analysed have been those which oc- 
 curred only a few times. It shall be our task now to consider 
 
 'We are able, owing to limitations of space, to print only the few samples 
 of visual Entfaltung given in this section. We have a very considerable 
 amount of introspective material bearing upon the gradations, not only 
 of visual, but also of auditory, kinesthetic and verbal imagery, and of or- 
 ganic set or adjustment. We hope to present this material in a later article. 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 225 
 
 some of the more common attitudes in greater detail. One 
 of those which is most often reported is surprise. Surprise, 
 of course, may have various occasions, and whenever these are 
 stated by the observer, they are given in the following quo- 
 tations. 
 
 G. Surprise at the smallness of the letter. Kinaesthetic adjustment, or 
 inhibition of movement, in finger and back. 
 
 That I did not feel the letter. Organic sensation, involving inhibited 
 breathing and fixity of the diaphragm. 
 
 At not feeling the letter. Something moving along inside the body, a dull 
 pressure goiug upward from the stomach to the back of the mouth. 
 
 Check of horizontal movement and change to vertical. 
 
 Peculiar movement of mouth, dropping of jaw, and slight sensation in 
 chest. 
 
 Inhibition in diaphragm and setting of the mouth to say Oh. [This last 
 is repeated several times in almost exactly the same words. In two cases 
 the attitude is not analysed at all, and in others it is merely localised.] 
 
 O. Muscular strain and visual image of a working nerve. Unpleasant 
 feeling. 
 
 Change of position. Organic and muscular sensations somewhere, and 
 blank consciousness. 
 
 Relaxation of muscular strain, and a tendency to change the bodily 
 attitude. 
 
 V. Holding of breath and kinaesthetic sensation at finger tips. 
 
 Running of warm currents all over the body, and tingling sensation. 
 Very pleasant. 
 
 Verbal exclamation. 
 
 Kinsesthetic and verbal. I dropped my jaw, and opened my mouth. 
 Sudden muscular contraction, a gasp, and turning the head. 
 
 Muscular contraction. 
 
 Held my breath and gasped and contracted muscles. 
 
 On comparing these reports, we find that surprise is, in 
 general, an inhibition of movement, or change in its direction, 
 often accompanied by sensations from inhibited breathing, 
 organic sensations, verbal exclamations, and affective pro- 
 cesses. The important thing seems to be the change or in- 
 hibition of muscular reaction. Surprise may be called the con- 
 scious aspect of the adjustment to a new and sudden event 
 in the environment. 
 
 The consciousness of seeking for something, of trying to re- 
 member, is called by Marbe a Bewusstseinslage, and is classed 
 by Messer as an affective attitude, in which the relation of the 
 Aufgabe to the object recedes, leaving a subjective state for 
 whose solution the Aufgabe suflSces. Watt afiSrms that the 
 consciousness of seeking for the reaction-word is not present 
 in every experiment; when present, it consists of a conscious- 
 ness of direction, and an emptiness of consciousness, with 
 a repetition of the Aufgabe, and sometimes a visual image. 
 Orth says that the attitude of striving to find is a complex 
 of organic sensations, bound up with the representation or 
 immediate consciousness of a goal. Messer assumes an at- 
 
226 CLARKB 
 
 titude of seeking, which is unanalysable, but finds with this 
 in the whole situation motor processes, movements of the 
 head and eyes or representations of such movements, organic 
 sensations, strain and obstructed breathing.. All these com- 
 ponents may not be present in a given case. In his "Snap 
 Shot of a Hunt for a Lost Name," Bailey finds three stages, 
 which include visual images, kinaesthetic and organic sensa- 
 tions, and pleasure, beside several complexes such as belief.' 
 As the experiments on point-letters were not suited to 
 bring out this attitude, special introspections were taken. 
 The observers were MC and HC. Some of the analyses 
 occur in experiments given for another purpose, and in a few 
 cases the occasion for trying to recall arose incidentally, and 
 the descriptions were written down immediately. Since these 
 cases did not promise to be very numerous, however, a special 
 method was devised. The observer was shown an old and 
 almost forgotten picture of her classmates in the High School. 
 All of the picture was covered except one face, and the ob- 
 server was asked to recall who the person was. Whenever 
 the response was immediate and no seeking was required, the 
 case was thrown out, and another face exposed. 
 
 MC. Visual image of the face, and verbal idea of the name X. In trying 
 to think of the right name, I experienced a kind of working or agitation 
 localised in the top and back of the head. Several names came to conscious- 
 ness, and visual images of persons that I associate with this girl. 
 
 Visual image of the picture and also of the girl. The first glance brought 
 a verbal image of a name XY, followed by images of XY in two situations. 
 I have also a feeling of time, that is that XY was much farther back in 
 time than the subject of the pictvu'e. I do not know what this is. It 
 seems to be chiefly a series of instantaneous pictures. — 
 
 In other cases, events and scenes which might suggest the name are re- 
 called visually, laughter and voices are heard in image, and even the pe- 
 culiar carriage and gesture of the person are imaged by the observer. In 
 most of the cases recorded the attempt to recall was unsuccessful. The 
 reports contain also frequent reference to sensations from squinting and 
 closing the eyes, sensations of 'drawing' in the top of the head, 'emptiness 
 in the head caused by the inability to recall the name.' Again: "The 
 brain working seems in this case to be in the front of the head instead of 
 the back as before. Sensation in the eyes and vaguely in stomach. Peel- 
 ing of unpleasantness caused by inability to remember." 
 
 The sense of seeking for something occurs about thirty times in the same 
 observer's later introspections upon the meaning of words, and is invaria- 
 ably described as a groping feeling in the top of the head, with sometimes 
 a Imitting of the brows, wrinkling of the forehead, squinting of the eyes, 
 and sometimes a visual experience which is described as staring into a blank 
 field. Occasionally the object of search finally appears as a small object 
 in the middle of this field. Consciousness seems less rich in content in 
 these latter reports than in the earlier. 
 
 The introspections of HC were obtained under exactly the same con- 
 ditions as those already discussed. The common element in them all 
 is sensation from the diaphragm, though that from head and eyes is often 
 
 ^Journal of Philosophy, etc., iv., 1907, 337. 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 22 7 
 
 present. In the cases of seeking which occurred incidentally, the strain is 
 very often in the eyes and forehead. Visual images abound, while kinses- 
 thetic and auditory imagery is sometimes reported. 
 
 It is evident that the consciousness of seeking consists of 
 strain in the head and eyes or internal organs, and a feeling 
 of effort localised in the head, together with images of any 
 kind which have any connection with the required fact and 
 would be likely to recall it. 
 
 The attitude which occurs most often incidentally is doubt. 
 No sharp line can be drawn, it seems, between doubt, uncertain- 
 ty, and hesitation. The term used by the observer has, how- 
 ever, been preserved in the quotations, so that, if there is any 
 inaccuracy in this interchangeable use of terms, it affects the 
 deductions alone, and not the results from which they are 
 drawn. It is certain, at all events, that in many cases the 
 observers themselves did not distinguish the three attitudes, 
 and that the same kind of analysis is given under all three 
 names. 
 
 Doubt is one of the attitudes most often named by Marbe, 
 Orth, and others; and in Ach's separation of Bewusstseinslage 
 from Bewusstheit, it is included in the fotmer class. It is 
 assumed in general, all through this series of papers, that 
 doubt cannot be analysed. Thus, Orth finds doubt accom- 
 panied by sensations in the head, organic and kinaesthetic 
 sensations, images and feeUngs. "Doubt is not a feeling, but 
 a complex state, whose constitutive element is the Bewusst- 
 seinslage peculiar to it." Here is really an analysis of doubt, 
 plus the assumption that the analysis is incomplete, and that 
 there is a central thread running through the experiences, which 
 is indescribable except by the phrase that it always charac- 
 terises doubt. Whether or not there is such an element is 
 a question for introspection to decide. 
 
 The following accounts are taken from the introspections of G. Uncer- 
 tainty. Slight organic excitement in the abdominal region. Verbal 
 ideas: Well, what is that? The movement changed from the B to the C 
 movement, which was actually repeated. Long dwelling on one impression. 
 The disturbing other dot was always there. There was nothing pleasant 
 after the reaction, because I was not sure. — Suspension of verbal associa- 
 tion, or inhibition of movement in the mouth. The mouth did not set 
 itself till the recognition was complete. — Verbal idea: What the deuce is 
 that? The letter seemed too short; inhibited breathing, and pressure in 
 larynx. — Hesitation. Hesitation between B and J. I set my mouth for B, 
 then for notiing at all. Renewed touch-motor complex. — ^Familiar, then 
 imfamiliar aspect. Kept finger on letter and pressed harder on last dot. 
 
 F. I was not certain. It did not feel quite right. I compared it with the 
 tactual images. The perception had a blank place in it which did not be- 
 long to H, and the real H was in this space. — It was not a clear cut G and 
 did not come forcibly. — Doubt. A came, but it was not exactly as it ought 
 to be; E came, but I could not decide which it was. Strain from hesitation. 
 I was not sure. Kinaesthetic sensation high up in arm. Not being sure 
 was not anything in consciousness; I just did not react. — Hesitation. It 
 
2 28 CIvARKE 
 
 was not clear, and I kept feeling it. It was not H because not bulky 
 enough; I said J, but it did not seem to be J because too big. I said C, 
 but it was too big for C. Visual image of a triangle. J came, but it still 
 seemed too big. — Kinsesthetic image in forearm and finger. Tactual 
 sensation not very clear. I did not react. 
 
 It will be noticed that the element common to almost all of 
 these cases is one which may be called negative: the failure 
 to move on, and to complete the reaction. When there is no 
 doubt, the process proceeds without interruption; but in 
 doubt there is "long dwelling on one impression," "the finger 
 is kept on the letter," there is "renewed touch-motor com- 
 plex." In addition to this, there is, especially in hesitation, 
 a vacillation between two tendencies; two aspects alternate 
 in consciousness, or the mouth is set to say now one letter and 
 now another, without saying either. Verbal ideas and or- 
 ganic sensations may be present. Doubt is connected with a 
 lack of clearness of the tactual perception. As the reaction 
 is delayed, the attempt to recognise is repeated, and the re- 
 action is prepared for again and again. 
 
 O. Uncertainty. Swift succession of auditory-kinaesthetic verbal images, 
 initial movements of tongue, and faint sounds. Queer sensation from 
 bodily and facial attitude. Visual image of my face full of confusion and 
 unpleasant feeling. — Doubt. Several initial associations, consisting of sen- 
 sations from irregularly contracted muscles, and a visual image of them; 
 unpleasant feeling, organic sensation above abdomen, and sensation from 
 irregular breathing. Interruption of breathing, organic sensation in 
 chest, and pain in back of neck. Organic sensation in back and spine. — 
 The same, with verbal images. — Organic sensation in head, chest and 
 abdomen, unpleasant excitement, faint visual image of my vexed face, or- 
 ganic sensation in both shoulders, muscular strain in neck. — Auditory- 
 kinaesthetic im,ages of A, and something unclear tried to come into con- 
 sciousness but was inhibited. Organic and muscular strain in head and 
 chest. (This is practically repeated several times.) — Initial tendency to 
 produce B, C, or D. Faint verbal and auditory image of J, then "it can 
 not be," with organic sensation. (This last is often repeated, sometimes 
 with unpleasant feeling.) — Unsteady and recurring organic sensations, 
 which continued a long time. — Organic sensation like heat in the brain, 
 holding of breath, muscular sensation and pain. Absence of relief, the 
 muscular strain persisted. Verbal idea "I might be mistaken." (Almost 
 every introspection given here is reported a number of times. There are 
 three unanalysed cases of doubt.) — Hesitation. Verbal image of D and C 
 alternately. Verbal idea that the dots are very strange, disagreeable feel- 
 ing, sensation in back. (This is essentially repeated several times.) — 
 Tendency to stay and find something else. (Hesitation is once unanalysed.) 
 
 O's consciousness is made up very largely of organic sen- 
 sations and strains, and shows much more affective coloring 
 than those of G and F. Doubt and uncertainty were unpleas- 
 ant and irritating. 
 
 P gives introspective accounts of the attitudes of doubt, 
 uncertainty and hesitation; the analyses agree almost com- 
 pletely in being verbal. P's consciousness is so strongly 
 verbal that whatever else was present seems, in most cases. 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 229 
 
 to have been so far in the background as to be overlooked. 
 There are a few references to organic and kinaesthetic sensa- 
 tions, unpleasantness, holding of breath, and general strain. 
 The fingers were sometimes moved over the letter again and 
 again. 
 
 V's analyses of uncertainty are meagre. 
 
 I frowned and held my breath. — Unpleasant and annoying. — I could 
 not tell the number of dots. I tried to count them separately, but finally 
 had to rely on the image I got from the whole sensation. — Doubt. The 
 dot seemed flat and did not fit well into the finger. — The letter did not fit. 
 I held my breath and muscles stiffened. Muscular strain and verbal 
 idea, Perhaps it was D. — Frowning, vague organic complex, and verbal 
 idea: I am. not sure. (These are all repeated several times. For V the 
 doubt in tffise recognition experiments usually came after the reaction, 
 so that it could not consist in the inhibition of reaction. V's recognition, 
 whether right or wriSBg^as usually immediate, and the reaction time was 
 very short. In the few cases in which doubt occurred before the reaction, 
 the time is increased above the average. As the feeling of fitting on the 
 finger is the most common element in V's recognition, so the absence of 
 this fitting most often marks doubt, but it is very often accompanied by 
 an inhibition of breathing, muscular strains, and verbal ideas of doubt.) 
 
 Doubt does not occilr in MC's reports, and occurs only three times in 
 HC's. It is here analysed as a feeling of displeasiure, organic sensations 
 from stomach and diaphragm, and alternation of attention from one visual 
 image to another. 
 
 Although the observers differ strongly in type, it is easy to 
 see that there is a general agreement in the analyses of doubt. 
 It involves an inhibition of the reaction, a checking of the 
 habitually smooth-running process. So far, it might seem 
 that doubt and surprise are alike; but there is a difference. 
 Surprise involves a sudden checking or changing of the motion 
 begun, whatever it is. Doubt tends to check the reaction, if 
 it has not already taken place, — to lengthen the reaction time. 
 The motion involved in feeling the letter, however, is not 
 checked, but is prolonged or repeated. The observers of verbal 
 t3rpe have verbal ideas of doubt ; others have organic and strain 
 sensations, and often unpleasantness. There is a marked 
 tendency to use the term hesitation when there is a vacillation 
 from one word, image or form of reaction to another. The 
 organism meets a situation to which it is not prepared to react 
 promptly. This may be because a particular reaction is 
 begun, and then inhibited, or because several are initiated in 
 swift succession, and inhibit one ditier. We may recall 
 Washburn's derivation of the feeling of /"but." The incipient 
 movements of developed consciousness', in which the mouth 
 sets itself to say now one word, noy another, or the hand to 
 make this or tha* reaction, may be vestiges of larger move- 
 ments following cme another in swift succession and tending 
 to carry the body in opposite directions or to set it for in- 
 compatible acts. 
 
230 CI,ARKE 
 
 2. Genetic 
 
 The fact of development has already been recognised by the 
 writers on attitudes, though its whole bearing upon the 
 question has apparently not been seen. This statement holds 
 in particular of the case of the Aufgabe or task. Marbe re- 
 ports a Bewusstseinslage which the observer called 'memory 
 that it must be answered in a sentence,' and again one that the 
 observer called 'recollection of the problem.' The first of 
 these is referred to, with approval, by Orth, and is placed by 
 him in the second group of his classification. If we turn to 
 Watt's work, in which the course of the experiment is divided 
 into four parts, we find that the Aufgabe is not only clearly 
 recognised, but is also analysed and genetically developed. 
 Watt is specific upon the point that the task (or part of it) 
 gradually drops from consciousness as the series proceeds, 
 but that the degree of consciousness of the preparation has 
 no relation to its effectiveness. Messer is, in this matter, in 
 entire agreement with Watt and Ach. 
 
 The course of our own experiments was at no time divided 
 into parts, and in general little attention was paid to the con- 
 sciousness of the task. Sometimes, however, voluntary re- 
 ports were made, and at other times the observer was asked, 
 at the time of introspection, if the task had been present before 
 the reaction. The instructions were not repeated at the 
 beginning of every hour. At the time, this fact did not seem 
 worthy of notice; but we believe that they were never spe- 
 cifically repeated, to any observer, after the first hour of work. 
 The instruction to recognise a letter is so simple as not to need 
 repetition. The letters in alphabetical order were usually given 
 to the observer at the beginning of the hour; but sometimes 
 he reported, as we have remarked, that he did not need them 
 again. This reminder may have served as a renewal of the 
 general consciousness belonging to the task. Again, the 
 general position of the body must be resumed at every sitting; 
 that is, one finger must be on the reaction key, another at the 
 edge of the card holder, the eyes shut. In so far as the Auf- 
 gabe is carried by bodily position, it must always have been 
 present. 
 
 The TASK is specifically reported in a few instances. 
 
 G. Verbal ideas: I must make up my mind to react, and an uncomfort- 
 able bodily attitude, very impleasant. (This was not reported as a part of 
 the fore-period. The recognition and reaction seem to have been ddayed, 
 and the task is recalled in order to hasten reaction. This occurs in the sec- 
 ond experiment of an hour, the ten letters having been felt at the beginning.) 
 In a second case, the task is analysed as the organic setting in saying: 
 Hurry up, don't be so long. (This too is a case of delayed reaction, and 
 is the seventh of a sitting, the letters having been felt at first.) V reports 
 the task to press the button as being present in kinsesthetic terms. This 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 231 
 
 is in the fourth experiment of the first hour of the second series. The 
 recall to consciousness does not seem to have been occasioned by any 
 difficulty. In the third reaction of the next hovu- V "forgot the Aufgabe 
 to react," and therefore did not react as soon as she recognised the letter. 
 The whole present purpose was to recognise the letter, and this purpose 
 was a muscular adjustment, and concentration of attention on the finger tip. 
 In the second experiment of the next hour the task was present in motor 
 terms, and especially in a strain sensation in the finger, which relaxed 
 after the reaction. P reports what he calls the ' 'hurry-up' ' consciousness, 
 and again the Bewusstseinslage that I must do it quickly. The former is 
 analysed thus: Strain became noticeable in the abdomen, as if two sen- 
 sations came from the sides and met. The "hurry-up consciousness" is 
 mostly strain. Again: Organic sensations from diaphragm. The muscles 
 of the diaphragm seem to come up and press the lungs, and the muscles of 
 the ribs seem to tighten. (This always comes with the strain of waiting.) 
 Again: Strain when I heard some one walking. The strain meant ' 'hurry 
 up." (This is often repeated in the same terms. The "Aufgabe to do it 
 quickly' ' is described twice as consisting of muscular strain.) 
 
 Nearly all these cases occur early in the second series, and the Aufgabe 
 is not later reported by name. It does not follow, of course, that it was 
 not in consciousness at any other time, or that it was not reported in its 
 elements. The conscious contents occurring before the perception of the 
 stimulus were often complex and important, and in some cases occupied 
 much more space than the rest of the introspection. 
 
 In the early part of the series O reports sensations from the different 
 parts of the body, as the bending of the neck, stamping of the feet on the 
 floor, pressing together of the teeth, and auditory images of the sound 
 made by the finger in moving over the paper. About the middle of the 
 series he several times remarks: "I did not notice the bodily adjustment 
 of attention," and in the last thirty or more experiments the introspection 
 usually begins with the perception of the letter. If there is anything 
 before this, it is usually the auditory sensation from the rubbing of the 
 fingers over the paper. The strained condition of the body is mentioned 
 only once in the last thirty cases. In the reports of F, also, we notice a 
 marked falling-off in the number of conscious contents occurring before the 
 appearance of the stimulus. The first introspection is almost entirely an 
 account of the fore-period, and includes strain, breathing sensations, kin- 
 aesthetic, temperature, verbal and visual images, some of these occurring 
 several times. In the experiments immediately following, the contents of 
 this waiting period are only slightly decreased. Later the observer reports : 
 Kinaesthetic and visual images of moving fast over the letter. Later, 
 again: The 'ready' set me off without a conscious Aufgabe. The idea of 
 movement with the tactual image is repeated a great many times, but to- 
 ward the last is described as vague, and does not appear at all in some of the 
 latest observations of the series. 
 
 The conclusions to be gathered from these data are in 
 entire agreement with the findings of Watt, Ach, and Messer, 
 who offer us not only avowed analyses of the Aufgabe-con- 
 sciousness at the beginning of a series, but also repeated 
 proof that it is shortened and modified and tends entirely to 
 disappear. If any observer were stopped just before a re- 
 action, and asked to state in words what he was about to do, 
 he would doubtless be able to reply. We may reason, logic- 
 ally, that he could not state what he did not know, and 
 that here is therefore a case of 'imageless' knowledge. It 
 
232 CLARKE 
 
 may be answered: (i) that such a statement would be a clear 
 case of Kundgabe, a report of the significance of a total state 
 and not a description of contents; (2) that, even if such a 
 report be conceded to be the verbal expression of an 'im- 
 ageless' state, it is nevertheless shown to have derived by 
 direct development from a consciousness whose contents 
 could easily be isolated; and (3) that, so far from any in- 
 dication that the Aufgabe was present in other than sensory 
 terms, it is specifically said not to have been consciously there 
 at all, and yet to have been active. The reports throw us back 
 upon unconscious tendencies, but not upon an unanalysable 
 attitude or an imageless thought. 
 
 The attitude which in our experiments shows best from a 
 developmental point of view is recognition. From the na- 
 ture of the point-letter experiments, it follows that every 
 introspection is really an analysis of the recognitive conscious- 
 ness. It may not be complete, and it may on the other hand 
 contain experiences that were incidental, but in the main it 
 represents recognition. The letters were absolutely new to 
 the observers when the experiments were begun, and when 
 they were ended most of the letters were recognised both 
 accurately and promptly. Our conclusions will, however, 
 be based chiefly upon the second series, in which the time was 
 measured. To part of the observers the letters at the begin- 
 ning of this series were not entirely unfamiliar. 
 
 It is to be supposed a priori that, as the experiments pro- 
 ceed and a letter is given again and again, it becomes more 
 and more familiar. This inference is supported in a general 
 way by the curves of accuracy and of time, which show that 
 on the whole all the observers make fewer mistakes toward 
 the end of the series than toward the beginning, and that the 
 time required for reaction becomes progressively shorter. 
 Sometimes, it is true, cases of false recognition or of long 
 reaction-time occur at the end of a series. These can usually 
 be explained, however, as due to accidental causes. For 
 example, the raised letters tended to become worn off, and to 
 grow less distinct with repeated rubbing. Care was taken 
 that they should be replaced before this injury occurred, but 
 sometimes it escaped" notice. The introspections enable us 
 to trace most of the irregularities to these and other causes. 
 Even without this allowance, however, the curves show a 
 striking similarity of form, and, with one exception, an in- 
 variable tendency to decrease both of mistakes and of re- 
 action-time as the series advances. Curves of the length of 
 the introspections, in lines or words, would show the same 
 general slant from left to right. Of course, such a result 
 could have only the most general applica:tion, but the differ- 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 233 
 
 ence in length of introspections is striking, and, taken with the 
 other indications of shortening, has a certain significance. At 
 the beginning of any series there are usually one or one and a 
 half introspections to a type-written page, while at the end 
 they average from five to ten, according to the observer. 
 
 The letters chosen, which were the first ten of the alphabet, 
 turned out to vary greatly in degree of difficulty. E, being a 
 single point, was the easiest of all. F, I, and A were also easy, 
 while G, D, H, and J were difficult, and B and C stood mid- 
 way. The intermingling of these difficult and easy letters 
 brings irregularities into the times, and makes it necessary to 
 study the letters separately. 
 
 The letter which gave O the most trouble was D. The average time 
 for D was longer than that for any of the other letters, and the letter was 
 usually not correctly recognised. In fact, it was called D only once, the 
 last time that it was given. The reaction-times are very irregular, in- 
 creasing gradually from the beginning, suddenly dropping about the middle 
 of the series, and then again increasing. At first D is confused with G, 
 but later consistently with J. The niunber of elementary experiences 
 reported varies roughly with the reaction-time. When D first occurs 
 (p. j, 4.42), the introspection includes perception of shape, organic sensa- 
 tion, disagreeable feeling, and images. In the next case (D. g, 8.40) the 
 image of the reaction-letter comes verbally as well as auditorily, and there 
 is doubt. Otherwise the report is essentially the same. In the third case 
 (D. j, 11.62), consciousness is still more complex, and includes repeated 
 perception, more complex verbal images, and several visual images, of which 
 some are merely associative. In the fourth (D. j, 10.24), there are added 
 frowning, irritation, organic sensations throughout the body. "Very 
 disagreeable. So many sensations and images that I cannot remember them 
 all." In the next, there is a marked decrease. In the next three or four, 
 there is increase again; and in the final case (D. d, 15.42), the observer 
 says: ' 'Auditory image J, or D. I thought it over again and again. This 
 was bodily setting, and associations which were not perfected. The whole 
 was accompanied by strains and organic sensations, verbal and visual 
 images, and unpleasantness, especially at the last." Evidently the ob- 
 server himself was not satisfied, and the reaction to D was not a true rec- 
 ognition. 
 
 This series will serve as an example of the correspondence between 
 amount of content and reaction time. It is evident that we have not 
 here before us a growth of the recognitive consciousness. As the letters 
 in alphabetical order were given to the observer at the beginning of the 
 hour, he could not form a doser and closer association between the letter 
 D and the name J, which the repeated wrong reactions might otherwise 
 have caused. So we find irregularities, with a tendency toward increase 
 rather than decrease. The result shows, so far as one case may do, that 
 the shortening to be observed with increasing ease of recognition is not to 
 be attributed to a general habituation to this form of experiment. The 
 change due to habituation can be observed, but it occurs mostly in the 
 fore-period, and it is not sufScient to account fof the progressively shorter 
 reactions to particular stimuli. 
 
 The letter A, which for most observers was one of the easiest, was for 
 O next in difficulty to J. It shows, however, a different change in conscious- 
 ness. A is always recognised correctly except in one place, in spite of its 
 difficulty, and consciousness shows a general though very irregular prog- 
 
 JOURNAI, — 7 
 
234 CI<ARKB 
 
 ress from complexity to comparative simplicity. In the begitming (A. it 
 14.78) O reports difficulty of perception, organic sensations in abdomen, 
 spine and back, disagreeable feeling, verbal ideas, auditory-motor images, 
 and doubt, which last was a tactual memory image of the former size of 
 the dot and a comparison of this with the sensation. In an introspection 
 chosen from the latter part of the series, there are only tactual perception, 
 visual image of dots, verbal idea A, and surprise. In this case the letter 
 was rightly recognised, and the time was 2.78 sec. F and E show the 
 shortest times, but they are not very regular. Practice was not carried 
 far enough with O to reach automatic and prompt recognition. With 
 every letter except D there is a change toward simplicity of consciousness 
 and shortening of reaction time. 
 
 The letter C was one of the easiest for the observer F. The introspec- 
 tions may be compared with the time curve. C. c, 3.20. The reaction 
 was unnecessarily long, I forgot to react. Tactual images as I moved my 
 finger, especially an image of touching the lever. Sensation of strain in 
 shoulders and chest, slight interruption of breathing. Attention all on 
 tactual images. As I was moving across I had the verbal idea: Tactual 
 images. C is a movement across and down. It is kinaesthetic and tactual. 
 C came up verbally and auditorily. Saying C recalled the Aufgabe to 
 react, in what form I do not know. C. d, 3.30. Visual and kinaesthetic 
 image of movement. I said 'as before' while I was moving across. Tac- 
 tual image of a point. Touched the letter, and I came up verbally. I 
 knew that it was not clear enough; it did not fit into what I know I is. 
 The whole complex was not just right to produce reaction. I felt twice 
 more and D came up. The reaction still seems just like saying the letter. 
 'As before' meant going over it without attending to the lever. C. c, 2.16. 
 Idea of movement, partly visual and involving eye movement. D came 
 up at first; then I felt the rest of the letter, and C came up verbally and 
 auditorily. The breathing was right to say C. I was trying to catch the 
 verbal image and noticed the breathing. C. — 1.96. Strain when I heard 
 some one walking. This strain meant 'hurry-up.' I touched the letter 
 and it was not clear at first. I felt it again. It was famiUar, but I could 
 not think what it was. C. c, 2.10. I felt two dots above. Attention 
 on upper dots, then vague perception of lower one, and I moved down to 
 feel it. This motion named the letter. C. c, 0.96. Tactual and kin- 
 aesthetic image of feeling the letter. The location of the letter in advance 
 is kinaesthetic and tactual. C was visualised as a dark mark. C. — 1.16. 
 I did not recognise the letter. It was very clear. I reacted to the tactual 
 sensation. C. c, 0.62. I set myself muscularly, touched the letter, and 
 moved part way over it. F came up auditorily. I moved the rest of the 
 way and C came up. Reaction and relaxation. C. c, 0.44. Vague tac- 
 tual image and muscular set. Clear tactual and kinaesthetic sensation. 
 There is an image of the kinaesthetic sensation which enters in and makes 
 a part of the C. When I move my finger straight across, it seems as if I 
 had moved it down. This is an image. Auditory image C after reaction. 
 C. c, 0.36. Idea of movement. I felt it, and the letter C came up. 
 
 The reaction times of V are uniformly short, but show a very regular 
 decrease. There is a striking similarity among the curves, some of them 
 being scarcely distinguishable. Early in the series there are mistakes, 
 and some entire failures to recognise the letter. In far the larger number 
 of cases, however, the recognition is unerring and the reaction times are 
 short. Ithasalreadybeenshown(p.223)that thecolorimages,whichaccom- 
 pany certain letters for V, graduallyfadeout. In the introspections, of which 
 We give but the briefest sample, there is a corresponding disappearance 
 of other conscious contents. 
 
 In the case of H, V reacted to a vague mass. The voluminousness 
 seemed to be the one thing recognised; and she recognised the letter in 
 a fraction of a second just from its voluminousness, long before the shape 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 235 
 
 began to be definite. J was associated verbally at the beginning with the 
 strange thing which did not fit, but this letter too came later to have more 
 definite outUnes. 
 
 As G had done no experiments in the first series, the introspections here 
 given represent the whole course of improvement from the first presentation 
 of a letter to its almost automatic recognition. I. i, 1.86. At first a touch 
 complex which was focal. Repeated movement in the vertical direction, 
 whidi led at once to recognition and verbal idea I; movement and verbal 
 idea focal, organic complex vague. Feeling of recognition pleasant. 
 I. i, 2.82. Horizontal movement with complex touch led to no recognition 
 but to vertical movement over the dots. Visual image of I and very 
 pleasant mood> localised in trunk. This might be called ease of recogni- 
 tion. I. i, 2.60. Slight surprise, that is a dieck of the horizontal move- 
 ment, and a change into the vertical, with peculiar movement of the mouth, 
 a dropping of the lower jaw, and slight sensation in chest. The setting 
 of the mouth led involuntarily to sajring I aloud, and reaction. Last 
 sUghtly pleasant. -I. i, i . 40. I is recognised by the checking of the horizon- 
 tal movement and the substitution of the vertical. Setting of the mouth 
 to say I. Reaction automatic. I. i, 1.14. Inhibited horizontal move- 
 ment. Strong setting of the mouth to say I, which lasted after the reaction 
 and led to saying I. Slightly pleasant. I. i, 2.40. Slight setting of the 
 mouth to say I. Indifferent or slightly pleasant. I. i, i.i6. Different 
 from the usual I-consciousuess. Motion not inhibited. Vertical motion 
 replaced by tactual perception of two dots, one above the other. Slight 
 pressing down of the lower part of the mouth, vaguely localised. I. i, 1.60. 
 Movement horizontal, then vertical. Organic and affective inhibition of 
 horizontal movement. As soon as this vertical movement was established, 
 slight pressure of the larynx in setting of the mouth to say I. I. i, 2.22. 
 Touch-motor consciousness, with change from horizontal to vertical very 
 clear. Vague pressiure in back of mouth. This was the I-consciousness. 
 Slightly pleasant. I. i, 1.36. Stereotyped I-consciousness. I. i, 1.36. 
 Stereotyped I-consciousness. Kinsesthetic part in back of mouth more 
 pronoimced than usual. Auditory image: I again. I, i. 1.60. Surprise. 
 This was inhibited breathing and setting of the larynx and back of mouth 
 Later the common I-consciousness. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the introspections given, and 
 the far larger body from which they are taken, represent 
 recognition in the making. In the whole number of reports 
 there are at most only one or two cases of the comparison of a 
 percept with a memory image. There is not a single allusion 
 to a quality of knownness attaching to the perception. The 
 feeling of familiarity is reported thirty-five times, but in all 
 but four it is analysed. The introspections of any observer 
 show, in general, a dropping out of conscious contents, and a 
 shortening of reaction-time going parallel with increased ease 
 of recognition. Only one case was noted in which the process 
 was reversed; the reaction-times here become longer instead 
 of shorter, the conscious contents increase in complexity, and 
 the letter is continually mistaken for another. 
 
 The cases of reported familiarity almost all occur in the 
 first half of a series. Their analyses show that they are complex 
 states, consisting mostly of strain and organic sensations, 
 with some affective processes and accidental associations. 
 
236 CIvARKB 
 
 Among the final experiments of most series, where we may 
 assume that complete recognition occurs, we find cases in 
 which the reaction is said to be automatic, and the letter may- 
 be represented in consciousness by a setting of the mouth to 
 say it, a visual image, a flash of color, or by nothing at all. 
 
 If the terms 'familiarity' and 'recognition' are used inter- 
 changeably by writers on the subject, it may well be that they 
 were also confused by our observers. We should not lay too 
 great stress upon the names applied to the attitude. 
 With all allowance made for inaccuracy, however, there are 
 suggestions here for the arrangement of familiarity and rec- 
 ognition along a scale of continuously varying complexity.' 
 
 If recognition has received considerable attention from 
 psychologists, so also has understanding. In fact, the two 
 approach each other so closely in experience that it is impossible 
 sharply to distinguish them. Our own experiments combined 
 the methods of Ribot, Binet and Taylor. The stimuli were 
 words, 'sentences, and paragraphs cut from magazines, which 
 were read sometimes to the observer, sometimes by her. The 
 stimuli were varied in two directions, from simplicity to com- 
 plexity by means of the length of the passage to be read, and 
 from sense to nonsense, some of the stimuli being strange 
 or impossible words. If there is a special consciousness of 
 understanding, it ought to stand out, by contrast, in a series 
 in which part of the stimuli are not understood. The ex- 
 periments were performed during the summer of 1909 with 
 the observers MC and HC. The latter wrote introspections 
 on only 100 single words; MC was given the same number of 
 words and, in addition, 50 sentences and 20 paragraphs. The 
 general procedure was that the observer drew a slip from an 
 envelope, read the stimulus, and wrote the introspection. 
 When the report was dictated, or the stimulus read by the 
 experimenter, the fact is noted. The words used include 
 nouns, both abstract and concrete, and various other parts 
 of speech. In almost every case MC reports verbal and visual 
 images of the word as the first thing in consciousness; and 
 sometimes, if the word is not very familiar or is one whose 
 meaning does not easily appear in visual images, it is repeated 
 several times. 
 
 MC. It was invariably the case that, if the word was unknown to the 
 observer, she immediately associated it verbally to some known word of 
 similar somid, and the other contents of consciousness referred to the 
 meaning of the known word. Sometimes only a part of a word was con- 
 
 »Lack of space, again, forbids a discussion, in this and the following sec- 
 tions, of the views and results of earlier investigators. General reference 
 may be made to Titchener, Exp, Psychol, of the Thought-processes. We 
 hope to recur to the theory of recognition, in particular, in a later article. 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 237 
 
 cerned in this association. Metappos. Visual image of Italy and Switz- 
 erland on the map, accompanied by sense of direction. Verbal image of 
 the words Matterhom and Metaphysics. FrosHlla. Visual image of a 
 frosted cake, then of frost on a window pane. I do not know the meaning 
 of the word, but think it may apply to some kind of extract. 
 
 Even when the word was understood, it was sometimes associated to 
 others of similar sound, or divided into parts and then connected with 
 images which referred to but a single part. This verbal association oc- 
 cured most often when the word was a pronoun or preposition whose 
 meaning was hard to grasp apart from context. Display. Visual image 
 of the two syllables separately, and of a stage at the theatre. Later visual 
 image of a woman overdressed, not very distinct. Which. Verbal image 
 Witch, with visual image of a volume of Scott and of Meg Merrilies. 
 Then repeated verbal image of the stimulus word, with slight groping in 
 miiid, followed by image of a page in a grammar. 
 
 By far the greater number of meanings were represented by visual 
 images, and these were most likely to occur with words denoting concrete 
 objects, though they were not confined to them. Compartment. Image 
 of a train, and of the words 'train' and 'European.' Sense of direction 
 and distance. Visual image of some pigeon-holes. 
 
 The contents of consciousness were usually far poorer in the understand- 
 ing of such words as prepositions, which have little meaning apart from 
 context. From. Repeated visual and verbal images of the word. Sense 
 of distance and direction in going from one place to another. Visual 
 image of a country road between two familiar places. The, Visual image 
 of the word, then again in big letters at the top of a newspaper; no par- 
 ticular one. Then a blank. I shut my eyes and looked into a blank field. 
 Consciousness of 'seeking,' but nothing came. 
 
 Sometimes the setting which the word called up was verbal rather than 
 visual, and sometimes the verbal ideas constituted a definition. Adjacent. 
 Word at first seen sidewise and not recognised. The J was most con- 
 spicuous, and this came as a visual image, followed by verbal image; Dr. 
 Jekyl and Mr. Hyde. Then visual and verbal image of the word, the latter 
 many times repeated, and a sense of groping and looking into a lalank field, 
 though less blank than usual. It seems at times to be dotted with con- 
 spicuous black letters such as made up the stimulus word. Later verbal 
 idea: Things close to each other. Marvelous. Visual image of a house 
 occupied by Prof. M (name similar in sound to stimulus). Later verbal 
 image: Wonderful. Rose. Visual image of a rosebush, and of two girls 
 named Ross. Verbal idea: Roman de la Rose. Images were unusually 
 numerous here, and I cannot recall the others. They seemed to be present 
 all at once. 
 
 As might be expected, there are cases reported in which the word was 
 understood, but the observer could not analyse the understanding. There 
 are, however, only seven or eight of these among the hundred words, and 
 in most of the exceptional cases there is some indication that sensations 
 or images were present. Right. An immediate consciousness of the idea 
 'to do right.' ' 'This was partly verbal, but I seemed also to see something 
 of a schematic nature. I looked downward to see this." (Whatever the 
 observer looked down to see must have been of a visual nature.) In- 
 iividuals. Image of a light place (probably an after-image) with the word 
 in it. It all seemed to be inside my head, then I seemed to try to get it 
 out. Paralysed feeling. I knew what the word meant, but it did not 
 suggest anything. Then visual image of individual people walking. They 
 bowed. Knowing what it meant was a kind of comfortable feeHng, a feel- 
 ing that I could define the word. This was in the back of the head and 
 throat. (The feeling that she could define the word, localised in the back 
 of the throat, was probably the setting of the vocal cords to. articulate the 
 definition.) 
 
238 CLARKE 
 
 These introspections, like those of Binet, Ribot, and Bagley, show cases 
 in which the images were inadequate or contradictory to thought. Noise- 
 less. Visual image of a house, of a very noisy family of boys who occupy 
 it, also an auditory image of the noise of those children. This was ac- 
 companied by a sense of contrast, but I am too tired to analyse this. 
 Electric. Visual image of a park that I once visited which, however, was 
 not electric. There seemed to be in the background images of several 
 electric parks but the other was more distinct. 
 
 In the next series, of 50 experiments, the stimuli were sentences of va- 
 rious lengths. Here, too, the meaning is most often represented by visual 
 images, if the sentence describes a visible object or a scene. In such cases 
 the whole scene may be painted before the observer's eyes, a part at a 
 time, as the words come. The engineer and fireman and one or two 
 ethers were standing by the engine staring at it; and so they hastened thither, 
 well ahead of the outpour of people behind them. (Read by E.) The series 
 of visual images came during the reading. Verbal images of first two or 
 three words. Visual images of engineer, fireman, engine and crowd. 
 He climbed up the straight iron steps to the gangway. Visual image of iron 
 filigree work. Verbal image of whole sentence. Image of a person going 
 up a gangplank in the Brooklyn Navy Yards. Second verbal repetition 
 of the whole sentence. 
 
 For this observer all sentences, even of an abstract nature, arouse visual 
 images which represent, more or less schematically, the meaning of the 
 whole or of single words. Sentences which are not descriptive may never- 
 theless be represented visually. Every vigorous state pursues two principal 
 aims: to enlarge its dominions and to preserve its independence. Visual and 
 verbal images of sentence. Words 'principal,' 'territory,' and 'independ- 
 ence' stood out most prominently. Even while I read, I connected it 
 with my history work. Visual image of table at which I work, and a 
 'feeling' that the sentence belonged to me. Visual image of the Mississippi 
 valley, schematic and a good deal in the background. The country was 
 being extended into this valley. Sense of distance and direction to Atlan- 
 tic states. The word 'independence' meant the Revolution. This was 
 mostly direction and distance, and a schematic image of the Revolution. 
 Independence Hall was included. 
 
 Some sentences arouse very little imagery, and yet are understood. 
 Life is ruled by the power of the deed. 'Deed' was at first read as 'dead,' 
 and gave an image of Egypt and some mummies. When I read it again, 
 I knew what it meant, but it was not as clear as usual. Slow repetition 
 of the sentence. Emphasis on 'life', 'rules', power', and 'deed'. 'Life' 
 called up an image of a Chicago street. 'Deed' gave an image of myself 
 doing something. 
 
 The third series was similar, except that the stimuli were whole para- 
 graphs, varying in length, but all longer than the sentences. Here again 
 a description of anything which could have been seen is very fully illustrated 
 by visual images. In some cases these are added as the words come, and 
 make a whole picture; in others the images seem to refer to individual 
 meanings of the words, and not to the whole situation. An arduous task 
 must have been that of the first ministers of the Jamestown Church. A part 
 of religious services enjoined were as follows: on week days, early in the morn- 
 ing, the captain sent for tools in place of arms, when the 'serjeant-major' or 
 captain of the watch, upon their knees, made public and faithful prayers to 
 Almighty God for His blessings and protection to attend them in their busi- 
 ness for the whole day after succeeding. Visual image of some ministers. 
 Sense of distance and du-ection to Jamestown, visual image of the town, 
 a^d vaguely of a church. At 'religious services,' image of a church. 
 'Early in the morning' gave an image which seems to grow or develop. 
 First there was what I call the representation of a morning, which was partly 
 visual but included other sensations, such as the pressure of air on the 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 239 
 
 face. Visual images of captain, tool, army, etc. 'Upon their knees,' 
 image of people praying. — Even when the meaning is abstract, there is 
 still imagery. 
 
 The second series shows an interesting case of the process by which a 
 visual image becomes stereotyped and loses its particular quaUty as it re- 
 curs repeatedly in the same connection. Several of the sentences were 
 from an article on Buddhism, and this word called up the same association 
 each time, with some modification, as follows, (i) Visual image of the 
 word Buddhism and of a Dr. X whom I once heard lecture on this subject. 
 Visual image of something brown, which represents India, and contains an 
 idol. (2) 'Buddhist' gave image of Dr. X. A long row of idols and 
 something brown. (3) Image of a sort of conventionalised Dr. X. Any 
 reference to Buddhism always calls up Dr. X, and this has happened so 
 often that the image seems to have ceased to be personal. (4) Visual 
 image of Dr. X; it was rather an image of an image. (5) Schematic image 
 of Dr. X. 
 
 The 100 introspections written by HC on the understanding of single 
 words need not be discussed in detail. Some of the reports show that the 
 meaning of a word may be carried, in whole or in part, by a motor image 
 or an organic sensation. Grip. Visual image of a hand reached out to 
 grasp something, and muscular image of the sensation in right arm and hand 
 when something is grasped. Approval. Image of a person vaguely seen 
 nodding his head and smiling. This was accompanied by motor images 
 of the action, which were much stronger than the visual, and yet the latter 
 was not of myself. Stroke. Swift motor image of striking something. 
 Wanted. Organic sensation in stomach. 
 
 Several of these reports show well how the mind goes from one to another 
 of several possible meanings when the word is presented without context. 
 Glasses. Visual image of spectacles alone, then on a person. Then of 
 tumblers on a table. Reproduced. Verbal image of the word. Visual 
 image of my abbreviation for 'reproductive tendencies,' then of some eggs, 
 then of two sheets of typewritten matter with a carbon sheet between. 
 Verbal image 'manifold.' 
 
 Perhaps this is the least inappropriate place to say a few 
 words about a series of experiments which do not belong ex- 
 clusively to the discussion of any particular attitude, and yet 
 throw some light upon the whole subject. Their only con- 
 nection with the preceding is the fact that they were per- 
 formed by the same observer (MC) at about the same time; 
 their bearing is rather on imageless thought than on the at- 
 titudes proper. It will be remembered that Marbe used the 
 Ausfragemethode, and that his questions were criticised upon 
 the ground that they were too simple, and could be answered 
 merely associatively, without any thought. Biihler avoided 
 this danger by giving aphorisms, which offered some difficulty 
 to understanding, or asking questions, which required, for 
 instance, the consideration of whole periods in the history of 
 philosophy in a brief time. 
 
 The object of the present series was to combine these meth- 
 ods into a differential or contrast method in order to bring out 
 the difference in consciousness between the answer which re- 
 quired thought and that which did not. The subject chosen 
 was history, because this was of special interest to the obser- 
 
240 CLARK© 
 
 ver. She was asked 50 questions, chosen indiscriminately 
 from many periods of general history, and ranging in diffi- 
 culty from "When was America discovered?" to "What 
 were the constitutional difficulties in the way of reconstruc- 
 tion after the Civil War?" 
 
 We find that visual images play an important part in this observer's 
 memory of history. Centuries and special dates within them are seen sche- 
 matically and often in colors, while persons and events are assigned to 
 certain periods because they are seen to be in them or like them in color. 
 Name the first five presidents of the United States. Answer: Washington, 
 J. Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe. Visual image of each man as his 
 name was given. Jefferson was especially dear. With Adams, image of 
 date 1 801. Schematic image of length of terms. It was dark colored and 
 had some spaces marked off, twice as much for two terms as for one. In 
 connection with Madison, image of War of 181 2 and of an old book on the 
 subject. Adams seemed to stand in a comer, a turn between two centuries. 
 
 The facts of history as well as their dates are in many cases apparently 
 read off from visual images which had represented them in the past. Was 
 there any connection between the French and American Revolutions'! Answer: 
 Yes. The French assisted the American Revolution and are said to have 
 incited it. The French Revolution was influenced by the example of the 
 American. Visual image of a book on the subject. Image of the American 
 Revolution and of arms and anmiunition on a ship being sent by the French 
 to America. Then of a Frenchman sitting in a coffee-house finding out 
 public opinion about the Revolution. I seemed to see the two wars at the 
 same time, and to know that the American happened first and was an ex- 
 ample. What became of the Celts when the Teutons invaded England? 
 Answer: They were partly absorbed, partly exterminated, partly pushed 
 into Wales. Image of Wales and of Celts and Teutons fighting. Then 
 of the whole coimtry with some Celts and Teutons intermingled. This is 
 what made me say 'absorbed.' 
 
 Sometimes the answer is so familiar and comes so readily that there is 
 very little else in consciousness. When was America discovered! Answer: 
 1492. Visual image of the date with a red halo, also of Colimibus in Spain 
 with distance and direction to Spain. Who first sailed around the globe! 
 Answer: Magellan. Visual image of Straits of Magellan, of the man, and 
 later of the name. When was (he fall of Rome? Answer: 476. Image of 
 date, and of Rome surrounded by barbarous hordes. 
 
 Let us summarise the facts which the two hundred and 
 seventy introspections show in regard to the understanding 
 of words and sentences. 
 
 (i) A word which is not familiar calls up others which are 
 similar to it in sound, and the images are appropriate to these 
 familiar words. (2) Words like 'to,' 'which,' 'of,' which do 
 not ordinarily occur without context and do not refer to an 
 object that can be represented by an image, also show to some 
 extent the tendency toward mere auditory association. Their 
 appearance in this strangely unconnected position is usually 
 followed by groping or blankness of consciousness. They often 
 form a context for themselves, by verbal association with some 
 word which could grammatically follow them. (3) Words 
 which refer to objects of sense, visual or otherwise, are often 
 represented by images. (4) Words which are capable of more 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 24 1 
 
 than one interpretation usually excite in quick succession 
 images appropriate to the different meanings. (5) In com- 
 paring the average length of the introspections on words, sen- 
 tences, and paragraphs, we find that they are in no sense pro- 
 portional to the length of the stimulus; on the contrary, they 
 are all of about the same length. 
 
 The very fact that the single words stood alone, out of all 
 connection, introduced an unfamiliar element, and gave 
 opportunity for all sorts of associations. Experiments upon 
 single words are, in fact, comparable to 'free associations.' 
 When a word comes without context, and the time which the 
 introspection is to cover is not definitely limited, the images, 
 visual, verbal and other, which are aroused, are likely to be 
 numerous and varied. Most of them refer in some way to 
 some meaning of the word, or to its connection with events 
 of our own lives; but some may be irrelevant. If now, we 
 read the same word as part of a short sentence, we get some- 
 what the same effect as when an association is guided by a word 
 just heard, or when the observer adds to the Aufgabe an ad- 
 ditional self-imposed condition. The Aufgabe now is not 
 "Get any meaning of the word," but "Get a meaning which 
 goes with these other words." Moreover, the time is short- 
 ened; the words follow one another in quick succession. This 
 limitation in time tends to inhibit part of the images, and the 
 context determines which of them shall be suppressed. 
 
 It may be objected that it is not always the wrong associa- 
 tion that is inhibited. Our introspections, as well as those 
 of previous writers, show that often the images are inad- 
 equate, irrelevant, or even contradictory. So far as inad- 
 equacy is concerned, however, we have no criterion, save the 
 facts themselves, by which we can decide how clear or com- 
 plete an image must be in order to carry a meaning. Again, 
 the image which is logically contradictory may yet have enough 
 in common with the meaning of the word to be psychologically 
 adequate to this meaning. Two words cannot, indeed, be 
 spoken of as contradictory, unless they have something in 
 common; they must at least belong to the same universe of 
 discourse, to the same context; and it is just this context 
 which, recalled in any form whatever, constitutes a more or 
 less general meaning. Logically, it is not easy to see why a 
 bird, described as white with a black ring around its neck, 
 should be imaged in its ordinary colors; or why a description 
 of dogs carried in a basket should give rise to images of cats 
 jumping out of a panier. Our own experiments are not free 
 from such anomalies. The word 'noiseless' arouses an image 
 of some particular noisy children; 'electric' is followed by an 
 image of a park which is not electric; 'home' recalls France, 
 
242 CLARKE 
 
 and the idea that the language of that country has no word of 
 the same meaning. In every one of these cases, however, 
 there is sufficient connection between the logical meaning 
 of the word, and the ps3^chological content of the act of under- 
 standing, for the latter to carry a general meaning. 
 
 The third case, that in which the imagery is neither inade- 
 quate nor contradictory, but irrelevant, is less easy to ex- 
 plain. It is a fact of observation that the wrong meaning 
 is not always inhibited by the setting and the additional 
 Aufgabe, but runs along parallel with the understanding of the 
 sentence. Every word, however, is not of equal importance 
 for the understanding of the whole; and even if a single word 
 is given a wrong interpretation at the time of reading, the 
 meaning of the whole may be fairly clear. The introspections 
 show cases in which the word was seen only in part, or was 
 at first misread, and the context of the wrong reading immedi- 
 ately appeared in consciousness. This often occurs in every- 
 day experience, without attracting attention. The mistake 
 is corrected as we go on, and the wrong image is replaced by 
 others which are more consistent with the meaning of the 
 situation. 
 
 These attempts at explanation are tentative only. We 
 have the fact that understanding may at times be mediated, 
 psychologically, by images which logically are inadequate, 
 irrelevant or directly unsuited to their office. The road to 
 final explanation lies through a detailed study of the condi- 
 tions under which such representations of the act of under- 
 standing take shape. Their appearance in experiments like 
 our own probably depends, in many cases, upon ingrained 
 habits of reproductive tendency, which by lapse of time are 
 inaccessible to introspection. Our aim must be to catch 
 them in the making, — either by casual observation in every- 
 day life, or by way of specially shaped observations in the 
 laboratory. 
 
 Unanalysable feeUngs of relation have been postulated 
 by various writers. Woodworth, in particular, has made 
 experiments with words and with papers of diflferent colors 
 and shapes, arranged according to the rule of three, which, as 
 he believes, show that a relation is sometimes conscious as an 
 'imageless' thought. His verbal stimuli were presented in 
 the form London: England : : Paris: X. The observer 
 was to supply the fourth term of the proportion, and to give 
 a complete introspection. The reports fall into four classes, 
 (i) When the relation is easy to grasp and the missing term 
 is readily found, very little consciousness appears. "There 
 was nothing in my mind," said one of the subjects, "except 
 that I wanted to answer your question right." The answer 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 243 
 
 comes immediately, on the hearing of the three given terms. 
 (2) When there is more .diflSculty, the relation sometimes re- 
 ceives a name before the answer is found. (3) Sometimes 
 the relation is pictured, in some form of imagery. (4) Some- 
 times the subject reports that he felt the relation, but did not 
 name it or have an image of it. 
 
 Unfortunately, the author does not tell us what fraction of 
 the whole number of experiments belongs to the fourth class. 
 If the reports of this group were numerous, they might offer 
 some evidence for the existence of unanalysable feelings of 
 relation. If they were not, they may well be explained by 
 the incompleteness of introspection. All observers probably 
 fail at times to analyse into simplest terms, or to report all the 
 contents of consciousness. 
 
 We have ourselves made several series of experiments on 
 this subject, all of which, in form at least, are based on those 
 of Woodworth. In the first series, the stimulus consisted of 
 three words in the form of a proportion with the fom-th to be 
 supplied, exactly as in Woodworth's experiments. In fact, 
 a few of the examples were taken bodily from his paper. The 
 observers were V, G, and F. 
 
 The relation is sometimes present in consciousness as a word. 
 
 V. A book: a magazine: : a chair: a stool. Visual image of a red book and 
 a magazine side by side. At hearing the word 'chair' great surprise, — a 
 muscular contraction and a gasp. I looked at a chair in the room, then 
 at a table. Tendency to say 'table,' because I had a kinaesthetic idea that 
 a book is squarer and higher than a magazine. Same of table and chair. 
 This was inhibited, I don't know how. Visual image of a footstool. 
 Then I said 'less than a chair.' Then said 'stool' aloud. No balance. 
 The whole took effort. 
 
 F. Red: blue:: green: yellow. I started to say this automatically. Then 
 I repeated the stimulus and said 'intermediate' verbally. Some kind of 
 consciousness that meant 'principal colors'. I did not say 'principal.' 
 
 G. Family : individual : tree : fruit. Verbal completion in background. 
 Said 'group to one.' When you said 'tree,' I said 'tree is individual itself.' 
 This was in the background. Articulated 'Tree produces what? Fruit.' 
 There was no association ready, and I had to make one by making a new 
 sentence. 'Species' also present verbally. Verbal part in background. 
 
 Sometimes the relation is represented visually, as in Wood- 
 worth's third division. 
 
 P. Book: chair :: table: floor. I saw a chair with a book on it. Visual 
 image of a table on the floor. The relation was kinaesthetic and visual. 
 
 V. Man: boy :: woman: girl. Visual image of a small boy in a blue 
 sailor suit. Meaning of 'woman' carried by a vague image of a red plaid 
 skirt. Then a blank. I said 'girl,' but I don't know why. I was surprised 
 when I said it. This was vaguely organic, and a little gasp occurred. The 
 relation between man and boy was one of height, — a tall and a short line 
 side by side. Just after I finished, I thought perhaps I should have said 
 'little girl.' This was vaguely verbal. 
 
 By far the larger number of relations which were carried 
 in sensory terms could not be put strictly in either of these 
 
244 CLARKE 
 
 classes, but were combinations of images from different sense 
 departments. Organic sensations were prominent for all the 
 observers. 
 
 V. London: England :: Paris: France. I did not think of London till 
 I heard 'England.' Vague image of the map of England with a black 
 dot standing for London. Kinaesthetic image of drawing a circle and 
 putting a dot inside it. At 'Paris' I had a kinaesthetic image of making a 
 dot, and visual image of a black dot. Without any effort I said 'France,' 
 and had image of drawing a circle around the dot. Very pleasant. The 
 pleasantness included a kind of balance which was vaguely visual and 
 organic. At 'London' image of a capital L, and at 'France' image of a 
 capital F. 
 
 P. To: fro :: back: front. Repeated the stimulus twice. Organic and 
 kinaesthetic images or sensations of swinging arm in a circle while saying 
 'to and fro.' I marked the rhythm with words and breathing. Very 
 vague visual images. A thin black thing which was moving like a pendu- 
 limi. I could not see the whole pendulum, but only the arc that it described. 
 Organic sensations with the pendulum. Suddenly 'back' coincided with 
 one swing, and 'front' with the return swing. The visual part was six 
 or eight feet off and below me. 
 
 G. /; we :: he: they. This was kinaesthetic. I put 'I' in the first line, 
 'we' in the fourth, he (he, she, it) in the third, and 'they' in the sixth. 
 This was the declension in an old grammar. I did not see 'he, she, it,' 
 but the line was long kinsesthetically, while 'I' and 'they' were dots. 
 
 Woodworth's fourth class, of cases in which the relation was 
 present in consciousness but not analysable into sensory or 
 affective terms, — the class upon which he bases his whole con- 
 clusion, — reduces, in our own experiments, to two equivocal 
 instances. 
 
 G. Color: brightness :: tone: intensity. (G thought of intensity as an 
 attribute.) Short period of confusion, which was muscular contraction. 
 I repeated verbal stimulus and completed it ahnost automatically. Back- 
 ground filled with vague memories, in visual images and eye-movement, 
 of experiments and discussions on brightness and intensity. 
 
 F. London: England :: Paris: France. I fell into the swing as soon 
 as you started to read. It was familiar. This was a real change of muscular 
 attitude, a sort of relaxation. 
 
 Woodworth's first class, in which the relation is not present 
 in consciousness in any form, is abundantly illustrated. 
 
 G. Father: son : : mother: daughter. Purely verbal. The vaguest ar- 
 ticulation of 'mother.' No relation about it. 
 
 G. Red: blue : : green: yellow. No relation. I was listening to the 
 colors, and added the one you did not name, as I should have been ready 
 to mention any one. 
 
 F. Is: are :: was: been. Verbal rhythm. I used to say 'is, are, was, 
 been.' There was just the swing. 
 
 F. Boy: man :: girl: woman. Verbal. No image. 
 
 V. Is: are:: was: {am) were. Strong tendency to say 'am,' though I 
 knew it wasn't right. This was kinsesthetic. When the stimulus was 
 repeated, the 'r' in 'are' caused me to say 'were,' the two r's balanced. I 
 did not think of the meaning till afterwards. 
 
 These seemed to be cases of mere association, in which the 
 relation had no part. In order to test this conclusion, the 
 method was slightly modified in two ways. Mingled with the 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDRS 245 
 
 other stimuli were proportions made of pairs of familiar ex- 
 pressions, in which there was either no relation or one that 
 could be recognised only with some ingenuity. The question 
 implied was, whether these pairs would be replied to as prompt- 
 ly as the true relation pairs. Almost invariably this was the 
 case. The other modification was the introduction of pro- 
 portions in which the relation was reversed, that is, in which 
 the third term really corresponded with the second and the 
 fourth (to be supplied) with the first. In a few cases the ob- 
 server refused to react; but this inhibition occurred only after 
 such a proportion had already been given, and automatically 
 reacted to. After the reaction, the observer sometimes saw 
 that the order was wrong, and was therefore more careful the 
 next time. In some instances, the change was never dis- 
 covered at all. The following will illustrate the reactions to 
 familiar phrases. 
 
 V. Up: down :: out: in-. I responded immediately without reason- 
 ing, then wondered aloud why this was right. Felt tired. 
 
 G. Loud: soft :: dark: light. Almost reflexly. A little pause of hesi- 
 tation during which I quickly went over the whole again in abbreviated 
 form. No relation conscious. 
 
 F. Live: die :: sink: swim. Mere verbal association. When I stop 
 to think, there is opposition, but this was not conscious. (F. can repeat the 
 quotation from which this proportion is ^taken, but was not conscious of 
 it when the reaction was made.) 
 
 Some of the wrong proportions were reacted to as follows: 
 
 F. Father: mother :: aunt: uncle. Quite verbal. I don't know whether 
 the answer is right or not. 
 
 F. Day: night :: winter: summer. It is a muscular attitude which 
 makes me answer. I was set for the rhjrthm, and reacted just as I should 
 fill out an incomplete line of metre. The word came up of itself; winter 
 and summer go together. 
 
 V. Day: night :: winter: summer. I said 'summer' because it seemed 
 to belong there. I heard myself saying it before I said it. Later had a 
 kinesthetic feeling that it was backwards, — lack of balance and a feeling 
 of twisting around. 
 
 A few experiments were performed, with the same obser- 
 vers, by means of little slips of colored paper. Three colors 
 were given, and a fourth was to be added that would have the 
 same relation to the third as the first to the second. The 
 relations were not complicated by the introduction of different 
 shapes and sizes. The method was not promising, and was 
 soon discarded. When three of the four principal colors of the 
 spectrum were given, the fourth was added without any 
 'feeling of relation.' It was simply the 'filling out of the 
 series.' In the remaining cases, the relation was represented 
 visually, verbally, or kinaesthetically. 
 
 The next series was intended to approach the problem of 
 relation from a genetic standpoint. The purpose was to 
 
246 CLARKE 
 
 establish some arbitrary relation, and to observe what took 
 place in consciousness as it became more and more familiar. 
 
 The observer was told that 
 S is the cause of T 
 H" " " " K 
 L " " " " M 
 The proportions then combined three of the letters, in various ways, and 
 the observer was asked to add the fourth term. The association was 
 made by G originally from the written page. He was given the above 
 statement to read and fix in mind. He disregarded the word 'cause' en- 
 tirely, and remembered the letters as related merely by spatial arrangement, 
 not visually, but by eye-movement. A movement of the eyes across and 
 down must be followed by another in the same direction in order to make 
 the relation correct. When the proportion H:M::S:? was given, G reacted 
 with K because this reply made two parallel diagonal lines. Although the 
 proportions were too easy at the start to give the method a fair trial, the 
 76 experiments done with G show some effect of habit. At the beginning, 
 the whole relation was carried by eye-movement; it was movements that 
 were equated and that therefore represented the relation. Verbal ideas 
 sometimes entered in. As early as the fourth experiment, H: K :: L: M, 
 G reports: * I did not jump to L. I went down from K to M.' Abbrevia- 
 tion is beginning. From the twenty-eighth, the verbal reactions are nu- 
 merous, though the eye-movement continues to some extent to the end. 
 When H: K :: L:? was given, G simply went down the alphabet automat- 
 ically. 
 
 In order to prevent this unforeseen possibility, different letters were given 
 to F. 
 
 D is the cause of E 
 
 R " " •■ " L 
 
 m (, <« 14 It ^ 
 
 The statement was read to him, in order that a merely spatial relation 
 might not fix itself in the mind. Nevertheless, this result appeared, to 
 a certain extent; the causal idea was entirely forgotten. Two letters of 
 a pair were associated, and at first F did not distinguish the first from the 
 second. If both numbers of one pair were given and only one of another, 
 the missing term was immediately added. F also tended to read meanings 
 into the letters. These methods of association made the reaction so easy 
 that it was automatic, and conscious content was lacking from the first. F 
 explained his reactions by sajring that they 'just go together.' As the series 
 offered no chance for improvement, it was abandoned after the nineteenth 
 experiment. 
 
 The same letters were read to V. She visualised the top pair with 
 'cause' written between them, and the others below withr ditto marks 
 under the 'cause,' though she had not seen the paper. Sometimes the re- 
 actions were merely read off from this image. The fourth term was often 
 supplied because it went with the third; there was no reference to what had 
 come before. Only fifteen tests were given. 
 
 In all the experiments by this method, there is not a single 
 case of a relation being consciously carried in non-sensory 
 terms. Either it is definitely describable, or it is not conscious 
 at all and the reaction is automatic. In the latter case it 
 was usually immaterial to the observer whether the answer 
 was right or not. Sometimes it was worked out carefully 
 afterwards, and judged as to correctness; but in that event 
 the relation was represented in some form of imagery. 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 247 
 
 As this method had proved too easy to exhibit the automatic 
 reaction in process of development, another was devised. 
 This time the stimuU belonged to three sense-orders, auditory, 
 tactual and kinaesthetic. The observer sat with his right 
 arm on a Sanford elbow-board, and the index-finger of his 
 left hand on a small lever which moved up and down. The 
 tactual stimuli, large and small pieces of sand-paper and of 
 felt, were presented by being laid under the fingers of the right 
 hand on the arm rest. A low and a high tuning-fork stood 
 near by. The observer was told that the low tone was to be 
 thought of as large, the high as small, while each one might 
 be either strong or weak. The sand-paper was intended to 
 represent strength or harshness, the felt weakness or softness; 
 each might be either large and small. The arm movement was 
 large, the finger movement small, while each might be either 
 strong or weak. This arrangement was, no doubt, arbitrary, 
 but it was arbitrary for a purpose. Easily perceived re- 
 lationships had proved inadequate, and it was hoped that the 
 artificiality of these new ones would make the reactions sufi&- 
 ciently diflBcult. Only G and V took part in this series of 
 experiments. 
 
 G's reactions were at fifst almost without exception mediated by verbal 
 expressions of the relation. He would say 'loud-soft' or 'strong- weak,' 
 and the reaction followed. The verbal ideas were sometimes more com'- 
 plex than this, or the relation was partly kinaesthetic. It will give some 
 idea of the progress of mechanisation if we fractionate the results. In the 
 first 24 experiments there is not a single automatic reaction. The relations 
 are carried in verbal terms. From the twenty-fifth to the forty-eighth 
 there are 1 1 automatic reactions, in which the relation was not conscious. 
 From the forty-ninth to the seventy-second there are 13, and from the seven- 
 ty-third to the ninety-sixth, 17. The reactions are most often automatic 
 when the three given stimuli are from the same sense department. There 
 were only four possible variations in one sense department, and when 
 three were given the fourth followed automatically. The series was 
 carried so far, however, that even proportions between stimuli of different 
 sense orders were sometimes reacted to automatically. 
 
 V made 40 experiments by this method but with no new result. The 
 relation was usually verbal, once or twice kinaesthetic, and several times 
 purely associative. 
 
 When we consider all of the relation experiments, we see 
 that by far the larger part of the reactions were accompanied 
 by some 'consciousness of relation' in terms of sensory or 
 verbal images, and that the rest prove to be mere associations 
 or else tendencies to fill out a group, by adding the inevitable 
 fourth member, without any consciousness. Woodworth's 
 fourth group is not paralleled in our experiments. 
 
 CONCI,USION 
 
 In conclusion, we may attempt to sum up the arguments 
 which make against the simplicity of the 'conscious attitude' 
 
248 CliARKS 
 
 and the existence of 'imageless' thought. These may be 
 divided into the negative or critical, and the positive or those 
 based upon our own experimental work. Under the former 
 head the following may be noted: 
 
 (i) Having been named and negatively defined by Marbe, 
 the Bewusstseinslagen are henceforth taken for granted. 
 They are reported, along with sensation and image and feeling, 
 in the analyses of complex states, and little or no attempt is 
 made to analyse them. 
 
 (2) Nevertheless, they are, on several occasions, at least 
 partly analysed, as witness Orth's account of doubt, Messer's 
 and Watt's of trying to remember, and the discussions of the 
 Aufgabe, which show it to be an attitude derived by practice 
 from an analysable situation. 
 
 (3) The cases in which thought-elements or imageless 
 thoughts or attitudes are reported as the 'consciousness that,' 
 etc., are cases not of psychological description, but of the 
 translation into words of the meaning of a conscious state 
 (Kundgabe). 
 
 (4) Our own conclusions are based upon the introspec- 
 tions of seven observers, of whom all but one had had several 
 years of psychological training. These observers were not 
 all of one type, but ranged from the strongly visual to one 
 who almost never has visual images, and from those who al- 
 most never report kinaesthetic sensations to those for whom 
 these sensations and images are essential. These seven 
 persons wrote, altogether, somewhat more than fourteen 
 hundred introspections. In the series with point-letters 
 alone, over four hundred cases of attitude are specifically 
 reported, — aside from recognition, which is assumed to be 
 present in all observations. Of these four hundred, about 
 one fourth were merely named, while the remaining three 
 foiu'ths are more or less completely analysed. When the 
 attitudes occur often enough to give a basis for generalisation, 
 there is striking agreement between different observers and 
 for the same observer at different times, and we are thus able 
 to pick out, with a fair degree of assurance, the pattern of con- 
 sciousness which represents a given situation. The introspec- 
 tions of any one observer show different stages of clearness 
 and intensity of imagery, which allow us to connect, by a 
 graded series of intermediate steps, a complex of vivid and 
 explicit imagery with a vague and condensed consciousness 
 which we suppose to represent what is called 'imageless' 
 thought. The Aufgabe, recognition, and the feeling of relation 
 are shown to be capable of development, by a process of 
 change and mechanisation, from states which are obviously 
 complex and imaginal. 
 
CONSCIOUS ATTITUDES 246 
 
 It may, we think, be fairly said that the attitudes here ana- 
 lysed are t3rpical of the whole class; they are certainly among 
 those most often mentioned by writers on the subject. But, 
 if part of the class can be reduced to simpler terms so often, so 
 definitely, and so uniformly, there is every reason to believe 
 that the rest will show themselves similarly complex, when they 
 are subjected to the same analytical treatment. The general 
 conclusion to be drawn from the sum of our results is that 
 conscious attitudes can be analysed into sensations and 
 images and feeUngs, or traced genetically to such analysable 
 complexes, and therefore do not warrant th^ proposal of an 
 additional conscious element. 
 
 JOURNAI, — 8 
 
Cornell University Library 
 BF323.C5 C59 1911 
 
 Conscious attitudes 
 
 olln 
 
 1924 029 037 716