POLITICAL TRACT NO, 2.
SEPTEMBER 1831.
OPINIONS
OP THE
VICE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES,
ON THE RELATION
OF THE
States antf tfje <&enerai GSotocrnment,
" Jlnimis Opibusque Parati
PUBLISHED BY THE STATE RIGHTS AND FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION
CHARLESTON:
PRINTED BY E. J- VAN BRCNTj
A"o. Til East Bai).
1831.
OPINIONS
of the
VICE-PRESIDENT
on the
Relation of the States and the General Government.
[from the pendleton messenger.]
Mr. Stmmes—I must request you to permit me to use
your columns, as the mediqm to make known my senti¬
ments on the deeply important question of the relation
which the States and General Government hear to each
other, and which is, at this time, a subject of so much
agitation.
It is one of the peculiarities of the station I occupy,
that while it necessarily connects its incumbent, with the
politics of the day, it affords him no opportunity officially
to express his sentiments, except accidentally, on an
equal division of the body over which he presides. He
is thus exposed, as I have often experienced, to have his
opinions erroneously and variously represented. In or¬
dinary cases, I conceive the correct course to be to re¬
main silent, leaving to time and circumstances the cor¬
rection of misrepresentations; but there are occasions
so vitally important, that a regard both to duty and cha¬
racter would seem to forbid such a course; and such I
conceive to be the present. The frequent allusions to
my sentiments will not permit me to doubt, that such al¬
so is the public conception, and that it claims the right
to know, in relation to the question referred to, the opin¬
ions of those who hold important official stations: while
on my part, desiring to receive neither unmerited praise,
nor blame, I feel, I trust, the solicitude which every hon-
3
est and independent man ought, that my sentiments
should be truly known, whether they be such as may be
calculated to recommend them to public favour, or not.
Entertaining these impressions, I have concluded that it
is my duty to make known my sentiments; and I have
adopted the mode which, on reflection, seemed to be the
most simple, and best calculated to effect the object in
view.
The question of the relation which the States and
General Government bear to each other, is not one of
recent origin. From the commencement of our system
it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention,
while the Constitution was struggling into existence,
there were two parties, as to what this relation should be,
whose different sentiments constituted no small impedi¬
ment in forming that instrument. After the General
Government went into operation, experience soon proved
that the question had not terminated with the labours of
the Convention. The great struggle that preceded the
political revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jeffer¬
son into power, turned essentially on it ; and the doc¬
trines and arguments on both sides were embodied and
ably sustained : on the one, in the Virginia and Ken¬
tucky Resolutions, and the Report to the Virginia Legis¬
lature ; and on the other, in the replies of the Legisla¬
ture of Massachusetts and some of the other States.—
These Resolutions and this Report, with the decision of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time,
(particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief
Justice M'Kean, and concurred in by the whole bench)
contain what I believe to be, the true doctrine on this
important subject. I refer to them, in order to avoid the
necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in sup-
pbrt of them, in detail.
As my object is simply to state my opinions, I might
pause with this reference to documents, that so fully and
ably state all of the points immediately connected with
this deeply important subject, but as there are many, who
may not have the opportunity or leisure to refer to them,
and as it is possible, however clear they may.be, that dif¬
ferent persons may place different interpretations on
4
their meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments maybe
fully known, and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state
summarily the doctrines, which I conceive they embrace.
Their great and leading principle is, that the General
Government emanated from the people of the several
States, forming distinct political communities, and acting
in their separate sovereign capacity, and not from all of
the people forming one aggregate political community;
that the Constitutionofthe United States is in facta com¬
pact, to which each State is a party, in the character al¬
ready described; and that the several States or parties,
have a right to judge of its infractions, and in cases of a
deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power
not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to
use the language of the Virginia Resolutions, "to inter¬
pose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for main¬
taining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights
and liberties appertaining to them." This right of interpo¬
sition thus solemnly asserted by the State of Virginia, be
it called what it may, State Right, Veto, Nullification, orby
any other name, I conceive to be the fundamental princi¬
ple of our system, resting on facts historically as certain
as our Revolution itself, and deductions as simple and de¬
monstrative as that of any political, or moral, truth what¬
ever ; and I firmly believe that on its recognition de¬
pends the stability and safety of our political institutions.
I am not ignorant, that those opposed to the doctrine
have always now, and formerly, regarded it in a very dif¬
ferent light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could I
believe such in fact to be its tendency, to me it wonldbe
no recommendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep
and sincere attachment to our political institutions, and
the Union of these States. I never breathed an oppo¬
site sentiment; but, on the contrary, I have ever con¬
sidered them the great instruments of preserving our li¬
berty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our
posterity; and next to these, I have ever held them most
dear. Nearly half my life has been passed in the ser¬
vice of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have
acquired, is indissolubly identified with it. To be too na¬
tional has, indeed, been considered by many, even of nvt
5
friends, to be my greatest political fault. With these
strong feelings, of attachment, I have examined with the
utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question; and
so far from anarchical, or revolutionary, I solemnly be¬
lieve it to be the only solid foundation of our system, and
of the Union itself, and that the opposite doctrine, which
denies to the States the right of protecting their reserved
powers, and which would vest in the General Govern¬
ment, (it matters not through what Department,) the
right of determining, exclusively and finally, the powers
delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the
States, and of the Constitution itself, considered as the
basis of a federal Union. As strong as this language
is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jef¬
ferson, who said, to give to the General Government the
final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make
" its discretion and not the Constitution the measure of its
powers and that " in all cases of compact between par¬
ties having no common Judge, each party has an equal
right to judge for itself, as well of the oppression, as of the
mode and measure of redress." Language cannot be
more explicit; nor can higher authority be adduced.
That different opinions are entertained on this subject,
I consider , but as an additional evidence of the great di¬
versity of the human intellect. Had not able, experi¬
enced and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the
highest respect, taken different views, I would have
thought the right too clear to admit of doubt; but I am
taugfit by this, as weH as by many similar instances, to
treat with deference opinions differing from my own.—
The error may possibly be with me; but, if so, I can on¬
ly say, that after the most mature and conscientious ex¬
amination, I have not been able to detect it. But with
all proper deference, I must think that theirs is the error,
who deny what seems to be an essential attribute of the
conceded sovereignty of the States ; and who attribute
to the General Government a right utterly incompatible
with what all acknowledge to be its limited and restrict¬
ed character; an error originating principally, as I must
think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of pur institu¬
tions, and on what constitutes the only rational object of
all political constitutions.
1*
6
It has been well said by one of the most sagacious
men of antiquity, that the object of a constitution is to
restrain the Government, as that of laws is to restrain indi¬
viduals. The remark is correct, nor is it less true, where
the Government is vested in a majority, than where it is
in a single or a few individuals; in a republic, than a
monarchy or aristocracy. No one can have a higher
respect for the maxim, that the majority ought to govern,
than I have taken in its proper sense, subject to the re¬
strictions imposed by the Constitution, and confined to
subjects, in which every portion of the community have
similar interests ; but it is a great error to suppose, as
many do, that the right of a majority to govern is a nat¬
ural, and not a conventional right; and, therefore, ab¬
solute and unlimited. By nature every individual has
the right to govern himself; and Governments, whether
founded on majorities, or minorities, must derive their
right from the assent, expressed or implied, of the govern¬
ed, and be subject to such limitations as they may im¬
pose. Where the interests are the same, that is where
the laws that may benefit one, will benefit all, or the re¬
verse, it is just and proper to place them under the con¬
trol of the majority ; but where they are dissimilar, so
that the law, that may benefit one portion, may be ruin¬
ous to another, it would be, on the contrary, unjust and
absurd to subject them to its will; and such, I conceive
to be the theory on which our Constitution rests.
That such dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is im-
. possible to doubt. They are to be found in every com¬
munity, in a greater or less degree, however small, or
homogeneous, and they constitute, every where, the
great difficulty of forming, and preserving free institu¬
tions. To guard against the unequal action of the laws,
when applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is, in
fact, what mainly renders a constitution indispensable;
to overlook which, in reasoning on our Constitution,
would be to omit the principal element, by which to de¬
termine its character. Were there no contrariety of in¬
terests, nothing would be more simple and easy than to
form and preserve free institutions. The right of suf¬
frage alone would be a sufficient guaranty. It is the
7
conflict of opposing interests which renders it the most
difficult work of man.
Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and
distinct classes of the community, as is the case in En¬
gland, and was formerly the case in Sparta, Home, and
most of the free States of antiquity, the rational constitu¬
tional provision is, that each should be represented in the
Government, as a separate estate, with a distinct voice,
and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order to
check their encroachments. In England^ the constitu¬
tion has assumed expressly this form ; while in the Go¬
vernments of Sparta and Rome the same thing was ef¬
fected under different, but not much less efficacious forms.
The perfection of their organization, in this particular,
was that which gave to the constitutions of these renown¬
ed States all of their celebrity, which secured their liber¬
ty for so many centuries, and raised them to so great a
height of power and prosperity. Indeed, a constitution¬
al provision, giving to the great and separate interests of
the community the right of self-protection, must appear
to those who will duly reflect on the subject, not less es¬
sential to the preservation of liberty, than the right of
suffrage itself. They in fact have a common object, to
effect which, the one is as necessary, as the other; to
secure responsibility, that is, that those who make and ex¬
ecute the laws should be accountable to those on whom the
laws in reality operate; the only solid and durable founda¬
tion of liberty. If without the right of suffrage, pur rulers
would oppress us, so, without the right of self-protection,
the major would equally oppress the minor interests of
the community. The absence of the former would make
the governed the slaves of the rulers, and of the latter the
feebler interests the victim of the stronger.
Happily for us, we have no artificial and separate class¬
es of society. We have wisely exploded all such distinc¬
tions ; but we are not, on that account, exempt from all
contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and
dangerous condition of our country, unfortunately, but
too clearly proves. With us they are almost exclusively
geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate,
- soil, situation, industry aud production, but are not, there-
8
fore, less necessary to be protected by an adequate con¬
stitutional provision, than where the distinct interests ex¬
ist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, great¬
er as such separate and dissimilar geographical interests
are more liable to come into conflict, and more danger¬
ous when "in that state, than those of any other descrip¬
tion ; so much so, that ours is the first instance on record,
where they have not formed in an extensive territory, sepa¬
rate and independent communities, or subjected the whole
to despotic sway. That such may not be our unhappy
fate also, must be the sincere prayer of every kwerof his
country.
So numerous and diversified are the interests of Our
country, that they could not be fairly represented in a
single government, organized so as to give to each great
and leading interest, a separate and distinct voice, as in
the governments, to which 1 have referred. A plan was
adopted better suited to our situation, but perfectly novel
in its character. The powers of the government were
divided, not as heretofore, in reference to classes, but
geographically. One General Government was formed
for the whole, to which was delegated all of the powers
supposed to be necessary to regulate the interests com¬
mon to all of the States, leaving others subject to the se¬
parate control of the States, being from their local and
peculiar character, such, that they could not be subject
to the will of the majority of the whole Union, without
the certain hazard of injustice and oppression. It was
thus, that the interests of the whole were subjected, as
they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the pe¬
culiar and local interests were left under the control of
the States separately, to whose custody only, they could
be safely confided. This distribution of power, settled
solemnly by a constitutional compact, to which all the
States are parties, constitutes the peculiar character and
excellence of our political system. It is truly and em¬
phatically American, without example or parallel.
To realize its perfection, we must view the General
Government and the States, as a whole, each in its pro¬
per sphere, sovereign and independent, each perfectly
adapted to their respective objects; the States acting se-
9
pamtety, representing and /protecting the local and pe¬
culiar interests; acting jointly, through one General Go¬
vernment, with the weight respectively assigned to each
by the'Constitution, representing and protecting the in¬
terests of the whole; and thus perfecting by an admirable
but simple arrangement, the great principle of represen¬
tation and responsibility, without which no government
can be free or just. ' To preserve this sacred distribution,
as* originally settled, by coercing each to move in its pre¬
scribed opb, is the great and difficult problem, 011 the so¬
lution ofVhich, the duration of our Constitution, of our
Union, and, in all probability, our liberty depends. How
is this to be effected 1
The question is new, when applied to our peculiar po¬
litical organization,! where the separate and Conflicting
interests of society are represented by distinct, but con¬
nected Governments; but is in reality an old question
under a new form, long since perfectly solved. When¬
ever separate and dissimilar interests have been sepa¬
rately represented in any Government; whenever the
sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the ex¬
perience and wisdom of ages have devised but one mode,
by which such political organization can be preserved ;
the mode adopted in England, and by all Governments,
ancient and modern, blessed with Constitutions deser¬
ving to be called free ; to give to each co-estate the right
to judge of its powers, with a negative, or veto on the
.abts of the others, in order to protect against encroach¬
ments, the interests it particularly represents; a princi¬
ple which all of our Constitutions recognize in the distri¬
bution of power among their respective Departments, as
essential to maintain the independence of each, but
which to all, who will duly reflect on the subject, must
appear far more essential, for the same object, in that,
great and fundamental distribution of powers between
the States and General Government. So essential is the
principle that to .withhold the right from either, where
the sovereign power is divided, is in fact to annul the di¬
vision itself, and to consolidate in the one, left in the ex¬
clusive possession of the right, all of the powers of the
government; for it is not possible to distinguish, practi-
10
cally, between a government having all power, and one
having the right to take what powers it pleases. ' Nor
does it in the least vary the principle, whether the distri¬
bution of power be between co-estates, as in England, or
between distinctly organized, but connected GovernT
ments, as with us. The reason is the same in both ca¬
ses, while the necessity is greater in our case, as the dan¬
ger of conflict is greater, where the interests of a society
are divided geographically, than in any other, as has alr
ready been shewn.
These truths do seem to me to be mcontrO^Fti^;
and I am at a loss to understand how any one, who has
maturely reflected on the nature of our institutions, or
who has read the history, or studied the principles of free
governments to any purpose, can call them in question.
The explanation must, it appears to me, be sought in the
fact, that in every free state, there are those, who look
more to the necessity of maintaining power, than guards
ing against its abuses. I do not intend reproach, but
simply to state a fact apparently necessary to explain
the contrariety of opinions, among the intelligent, where
the abstract consideration of the subject would seem
scarcely to admit of doubt. If such be the true cause,
I must think the fear of weakening the Government too
much in this case to be in a great measure unfounded, or,
at least that the danger is much less from that, than the
opposite side. I do not deny that a power of so high a
nature, may be abused by a State ; but, when I
reflect, that the States unanimously called the Gene¬
ral Government into existence with all of its pow¬
ers, which they freely surrendered on their part, un¬
der the conviction that their common peace, safety and
prosperity required it; that they are bound together by
a common origin, and the recollection of common suf-
' fering and a common triumph in the great and splendid
achievment of their independence ; and that the stron¬
gest feelings of our nature, and among them, the love
of national power and distinction, tire on the side
of the Union ; it does seem to me, that the fear which
would strip the States of their sovereignty, and degrade
them, in fact, to mere dependent corporations, lest they
11
should. abuse a right indispensable to the peaceable pro¬
tection of those interests, which tliey reserved under their
own peculiar guardianship, when they created the Gen¬
eral Government, is unnatural aud unreasonable. If
those who voluntarily created the system, cannot be
trusted to preserve it, what power can 1
So far from extreme danger, I hold, that there never
was a free state, in which this great conservative princi¬
ple, indispensable in all, was ever so safely lodged. In
others, when the co-estates, representing the dissimilar
and conflicting interests of the community came into
contact, the only alternative was compromise, submis¬
sion, or force. Not so in ours. Should the General
Government, and a State come into conflict, we have a
higher remedy; the power which called the General
Government into existence, which gave it all of its au¬
thority, and can enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers
at its pleasure, may be invoked. The States themselves
may be appealed to, three fourths of which, in fact, form
a power, whose decrees are the Constitutiou itself, and
whose voice can silence all discontent. The utmost ex¬
tent then of the power is, that a State acting in its sove¬
reign capacity, as one of the parties to the Constitutional
compact, may compel the Government, created by that
compact, to submit a question touching its infraction, to
the parties, who created it; to avoid the supposed dan¬
gers of which, it is proposed to resort to the novel, the
hazardous, and, I must add, fatal project of giving to
the General Government the sole and final right of in¬
terpreting the Constitution, thereby reversing the whole
system, making that instrument the creature of its will,
instead of a rule of action impressed on it at its creation,
and annihilating in fact the authority which imposed it,
and from which the Government itself derives its exist¬
ence.
That such would be the result, were the right in ques¬
tion vested in the Legislative, or Executive branch of the
Government is conceded by all. No one has been so
hardy as to assert, fliat Congress, or the President ought
to have the right, or to deny, that if vested finally and
exclusively in either, the consequences which I have sta-
12
ted would not necessarily follow; but its advocates have
been reconciled to the doctrine, on the supposition that
there is one Department of the General Government,
which, from its peculiar organization, affords an inde¬
pendent tribunal through which the Government may
exercise the high authority, which is the subject of con¬
sideration, with perfect safety to all.
I yield, I trust, to few in my attachment to the Judici¬
ary Department. I am fully sensible of its importance
and would maintain it to the fullest extent in its Consti¬
tutional powers and independence; but it is impossible
for me to believe that it was ever intended by the Con¬
stitution that it should exercise the power in question, or,
that it is competent to do so, and, if it were, that it would
be a safe depository of the power.
Its powers are judicial and not political, and are ex¬
pressly confined by the Constitution " to all cases in
law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws
of the United States and the treaties made, or which
shall be made, under its authorityand which I have
high authority in asserting, excludes political questions,
and comprehends those only, where there are parties
amenable to the process of the Coicrt.* Nor is its in¬
competency less clear, than its want of Constitutional
authority. There may be many and the most danger¬
ous infractions on the part of Congress, of which it is
conceded by all, the court, as a judicial tribunal, cannot
from its nature take cognizance. The Tariff itself is a
strong case in point, and the reason applies equally to
all others, where Congress perverts a power, from an object
intended, to one not intended, the most insidious and dan¬
gerous of all infractions; and which may be extended
to all of its powers, more especially to the taxing and appro¬
priating. But, supposing it competent to take cogni¬
zance of all infractions of every description, the insupera¬
ble objection still remains, that it would not be a safe tri¬
bunal to exercise the power in question.
It is an universal and fundamental political principle,
# I refer to the authority of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of
Jonathan Rohbins. I have not been able to refer to the case and
sneak from memory.
13
that the power to protect, can safely be confided only to
those interested in protecting, or their responsible agents,
a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs.—
The danger in our system is, that the General Govern¬
ment, which represents the interests of the whole, may
encroach on the States, which represent the peculiar
and local interests, or that the latter may encroach on
the former. In examining this point, we ought not to
forget, that the Government through all of its Depart¬
ments Judicial, as well as others, is administered by de¬
legated and responsible agents; and that the power
which really controls ultimately all the movements is not in
the agents, but those who elect or appoint them. To un¬
derstand then its real character, and what would be the
action of the system in any supposable case, we must
raise our view from the mere agents, to this high con¬
trolling power which finally impels every movement of
the machine. By doing so, we shall find all under the
control of the will of a majority, compounded of the ma¬
jority of the States, taken as corporate bodies, and the
majority of the people of the States estimated in federal
numbers. These united constitute the real and final
power, whieh impels and directs the movements of the
General Government. The majority of the States elect
the majority of the Senate ; of the people of the States,
that of the House, of Representatives; the two united,
the President; and the President and a majority of the
Senate appoint the Judges ; a majority of whom, and a
majority of the Senate and the House with the Presi¬
dent, really exercise all of the powers of the Government,
with the exception of the cases where the Constitution
requires a greater number than a majority. The Judg¬
es are, in fact, as truly the Judicial Representatives of
this united majority, as the majority of Congress itsebf,
or the President, is its legislative, or executive representa¬
tive ; and to confide the power to the Judiciary to deter¬
mine finally and conclusively, what powers are delegated,
and what reserved, would be in reality to confide it to the
majority, whose agents they are, and by whom they can
be controlled in various ways ; and, of course, to subject,
(against the fundamental principle of our system, and all
2
14
sound political reasoning,) the reserved powers of the
States, with all of the local and peculiar interests, they
were intended to protect, to the will of the very majority,
against which the protection was intended. Nor will the
tenure by which the Judges hold their office, however
valuable the provision in many other respects, materially
vary the case. Its highest possible effect would be to re¬
tard and not finally to resist., the will of a dominant major-
ity.
But it is useless to multiply arguments. Were it pos¬
sible that reason could settle a qnestion where the pas¬
sions and interests of men are concerned, this point would
have been long since settled forever by the ;State of Vir¬
ginia. The report of her Legislature, to which I have
already referred, has really, in my opinion, placed it be¬
yond controversy. Speaking in reference to this subject
it says : "it has been objected" (to the right of a State
to interpose for the protection of her reserved rights)
" thatthe Judicial auffiority is to be regarded asthe soleex-
positor of the Constitution ; on this objection it might be
observed, first, that there may be instances of usurped
powers, which the forms of the Constitution could never
draw within the control of the Judicial Department; se¬
condly, that if the decision of the Judiciary be raised
above the sovereign parties to the constitution, the deci¬
sions of the other departments, not carried by the forms
of the Constitution before the Judiciary, must be equally
authoritative and final with the decision of that Depart¬
ment. But the proper answer to the objection is, that
the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those
great and extraordinary cases, in which aff of the forms
of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against infrac¬
tions dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it.
The resolution supposes that dangerous powers, not dele¬
gated, may not only be usurped and exercised by the oth¬
er departments, but that the Judicial Department may
also exercise, or sanction dangerous powers beyond the
grant of the Constitution, and consequently that the ulti¬
mate right of the parties to the Constitution to judge
whether the Compact has been dangerously violated,
must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as
15
well as by another—by the Judiciary, as well by the Ex¬
ecutive or Legislative."
Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to
me, it is objected, that if one party has the right to judge
of infractions of the Constitution, so has the other, and
that consequently in cases of contested powers between
a State rind the General Government, each would have
a right to maintain its opinion, as is the case when sove¬
reign powers differ in the construction of treaties or com¬
pacts, and that of course, it would come to be a mere
question of force The error is in the assumption, that
the General Government is a party to the Constitutional
Compact. The States, as has been shewn, formed the
compact, acting as sovereign and independent commu¬
nities. The General Government is but its creature;
and though in reality a government with all the rights
and authority which belong to any other government,
within the orb of its powers, it is, nevertheless, a govern¬
ment emanating from a compact between sovereigns,
and partaking in its nature and objects, of the character
of a joint commission, appointed to superintend and ad¬
minister the interests in which all are jointly concerned,
but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power
than if did riot exist. To deny this would be to deny the
most incontestible facts, and the clearest conclusions ;
while to acknowledge its truth is to destroy utterly the
objection, that the appeal would be to force, in the case
supposed. For if each party has a right to judge, then
under our system of government, the final cognizance of
a question of contested power would be in the States, and
not in the General Government. It would be the duty
of the latter, as in all similar cases of a contest between
one or more of the principals and a joint commission or
agency, to refer the contest to the principals themselves.
Such are the plain dictates of reason and analogy both.
On no sound principle can the agents have a right to
final cognizance, as against the principals, much less to
use force against them, to maintain their construction of
their powers. Such a right would be monstrous ; and
has never, heretofore, been claimed in similar cases.
That the doctrine is applicable to the case of a con-
16
tested power between the States and the General Gov¬
ernment, we have the authority not only of reason and
analogy, but of the distinguished statesmen already re¬
ferred to. Mr. Jefferson, at a late period of his life, after
long experience and mature reflection, says: "With re¬
spect to our state and Federal Governments, I do not
think their relations are correctly understood by foreign¬
ers. They suppose the former subordinate to the latter.
This is not the case. They are co-ordinate departments
of one simple and integral whole. But you may ask if
the two departments should claim each the same object
of power, where is the umpire to decide between them 1
In cases of little urgency or importance, the prudence of
both parties will keep them aloof from the questionable
ground ; but if it can neither be avoided nor compromised,
a convention of the States must be called, to ascribe the
doubtful power to that department which they may think
best." It is thus that our Constitution by authorizing a -
mendments, and by prescribing the authority and mode
of making them, has by a simple contrivance, with its
characteristic wisdom, provided a power which in the
last resort, supercedes effectually the necessity, and even
the pretext for force; a power to which none can fairly
object; with which the interests of all are safe; which
can definitely close all controversies in the only effectual
mode, by freeing the compact of every defect and un¬
certainty, by an amendment of the instrument itself. It
is impossible for human wisdom, in a system like ours, to
devise another mode which shall be safe and effectual,
and at the same time consistent with what are the rela¬
tions and acknowledged powers of the two great depart¬
ments of our government. It gives a beauty and security
peculiar to our system, which, if duly appreciated, will
transmit its blessings to the remotest generations ; but if
not, our splendid anticipations of the future will prove but
an empty dream. Stripped of all its covering, and the
naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consoli¬
dated government; a constitutional or absolute one ; a
government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the
sovereignty of the states, or on the unrestrained will of a
majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited
17
ones, in which injustice and violence, and force must
finally prevail. Let it never be forgotten that where the
majority rules the minority is the subject; and that if we
should absurdly attribute to the former* the exclusive
right of construing the Constitution, there would be in
fact between the sovereign and subject, under such a
government, no constitution, or at least nothing deserving
the name, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred
an instrument.
How the States are to exercise this high power of in¬
terposition which constitutes so essential a portion of their
reserved rights that it cannot be delegated without an entire
surrender of their sovereignty, and converting our system
from a federal into a consolidated government, is a ques¬
tion, that the states only, are competent to determine.
The arguments which prove that they possess the power,
equally prove, that they are, in the language of Jefferson,
" the rightful judges of the mode and measure of redress,"
But the spirit of forbearance, as well as the nature of
the right itself, forbids a recourse to it, except in cases of
dangerous infractions of the Constitution; and then only
in the last resort, when all reasonable hope of relief, from
the ordinary action of the government, has failed ; when
if the right to interpose did not exist, the alternative would
be submission to oppression on one side, or resistance
by force on the other. That our system should afford,
in such extreme cases, an intermediate point between
these dire alternatives, by which the government may be
brought to a pause, and thereby an interval obtained to
compromise differences, or, impracticable, be compelled
to submit the question to a constitutional adjustment,
through an appeal to the states themselves, is an evidence
of its high wisdom; an element not, as is supposed by
some, of weakness, but of strength, not of anarchy or
revolution, but of peace and safety. Its general recogni¬
tion ivould of itself, in a great measure, if not altogether,
supercede the necessity of its exercise, by impressing on the
movements of the government, that moderation and justice so
essential to harmony and peace, in a country of such vast ex¬
tent, and diversity of interests as ours; and would, if con-
troversv should eome, turn the resentment of the aggriev-
2*
18
ed, from the system, to those who had abused its powers,
(a point all important,) and cause them to seek redress,
not in revolution or overthrow, but in reformation. It is, in
fact, properly understood, a substitute were the alternative
would be force, tending to prevent, and if that fails, to correct
peaceably, the aberrations to which all political systems are
liable, and which, if permitted to accumulate, without cor¬
rection, must finally end in a general catastrophe.
I have now said what I intended in reference to the
abstract question of the relation of the states to the gen¬
eral government, and would here conclude, did I not be¬
lieve that a mere general statement on an abstract ques¬
tion, without including that which may have caused its
agitation, would be considered by many imperfect, and
unsatisfactory. Feeling that such would be justly the
case, I am compelled, reluctantly, to touch on the Tariff,
so far, at least, as may be necessary to illustrate the opin¬
ions which I have already advanced. Anxious, however,
to intrude as little as possible, on the public attention, I
will be as brief as possible; and with that view, will, as
far as may be consistent with my object, avoid all debate-
able topics.
Whatever diversfy of opinion may exist, in relation to
the principle, or the effect on the productive industry of
the country, of the present, or of any other Tariff of pro¬
tection, there are certain political consequences flowing
from the present, which none can doubt, and all must
deplore. It would be vain to attempt to conceal, thateit
has divided the country into two great geographical divi¬
sions, and arrayed them against each other, in opinion at
least, if not interests also, on some of the most vital of
political subjects; on its finance, its commerce, and its
industry; subjects calculated, above all others, in time
of peace, to produce excitement, and in relation to which,
the Tariff has placed the sections in question in deep and
dangerous conflict. If there be any point on which the
(I was going to say Southern section, but to avoid, as
far as possible, the painful feelings such discussions are
calculated to excite, I shall say) weaker of the two sec¬
tions is unanimous, it is that its prosperity depends, in a
great measure, on free trade, light taxes, economical,
11)
and, as fur as possible, equal disbursements, of the public
revenue, and an unshackled industry, leaving them to pur¬
sue whatever may appear most advantageous to their in¬
terests. From the Potomac to the Mississippi, there are
few indeed, however divided on other points, who would
not, if dependent on their volition, and if they regarded
the interest of their particular section only, remove from
commerce and industry every shackle, reduce the reve¬
nue -to the lowest point that the wants of the government
fairly required, and restrict the appropriations to the most
moderate scale, consistent with the peace, the security,
and the engagements of the public; and who do not be¬
lieve that the opposite system is calculated to throw on
them an unequal burthen, to repress their prosperity, and
to encroach on their enjoyment.
On all these deeply important measure^, the opposite
opinion prevails, if not with equal unanimity, with at least
a greatly preponderating majority, in the other and stron¬
ger sections, so much so, that no two distinct nations
ever entertained more opposite views of policy than
these two sections do, on all the important points to
which I have referred. Nor is it less certain that this
unhappy conflict, flowing directly from the Tariff, has
extended itself to the halls of legislation, and has conver¬
ted the deliberations of Congress into an annual struggle
between the two sections; the stronger to maintain and
increase the superiority it has already acquired, and the
other to throw off, or diminish its burdens; a struggle in
which all the noble and generous feelings of patriotism
are gradually subsiding into sectional end selffish attach¬
ments.* Nor has the effect of this dangerous conflict
ended here. It has not only divided the two sections on
the important point already stated, but on the deeper and
more dangerous questions, the constitutionality of a pro¬
tective Tariff, and the general principles and theory of
* The system if continued, must end, not only in subjecting the
industry and property of the weaker section to the control of the
stronger, but in proscription and political disfranchisement It
must finally control elections and appointments to offices, as well as
acts of legislation, to the great increase of the feelings of animosity,
and of the fatal tendency to a complete alienation between the sec¬
tions.
20
the Constitution.itself; the stronger, in order to maintain
their superiority, giving a construction to the instrument,
which the other believes would convert the General Go¬
vernment into a consolidated, irresponsible government,
with the total destruction of liberty; and the weaker
seeing no hope of relief with such assumption of powers,
turning its eye to the reserved sovereignty of the states,
' as the only refuge from oppression. I shall not extend
these remarks, as I might, by shewing that while the ef¬
fect of the system of protection was rapidly alienating
one section, it was not less rapidly* by its necessary op¬
eration, distracting and corrupting the other; and be-
tweeen the two, subjecting the administration to violent
and sudden changes, totally inconsistent with all stability
and wisdom in the management of the affairs of the na¬
tion, of which we already see fearful symptoms. Nor do
I deem it necessary to enquire whether this uphappy
conflict grows out of true, or mistaken, views of interest
on either, or both sides. Regarded in either light, it
ought to admonish us of the extreme danger to which
our symtem is exposed, and the great moderation and
wisdom necessary to preserve it. If it comes from mis¬
taken views, if the interests of the two sections as affec¬
ted by the Tariff, be really the same, and the system in¬
stead of acting unequally, in reality diffuses equal bles¬
sings, and imposes equal burdens on every part, it ought
to teach us how liable those, who are differently situated,
and who view their interests under different aspects, are
to come to different conclusions, even when their inter¬
ests are strictly the same ; and consequently, with what
extreme caution any system of policy ought to be adop¬
ted, and with what a spirit of moderation pursued, in a
country of such great extent and diversity as ours. But
if on the contrary, the conflict springs really, from con¬
trariety of interests, if the burden be on one side, and
the benefit on the other, then are we taught a lesson not
less important, how little regard we have for the interests
of others, while in pursuit of our own, or at least, how
apt we are to consider our own interest, the interest of
all others; and of course how great the danger in a
country of such acknowledged diversity of interests, of
21
the oppression of the feebler by the stronger interest, and
in consequence of it, of the most fatal sectional conflicts.
But whichever may be the cause, the real, or supposed
diversity of interest, it cannot be doubted, that the politi¬
cal consequences of the prohibitory system, be its effects
in other respects, beneficial, or otherwise, are really such
as I have stated; nor can it be doubted, that a conflict
between the great sections on questions so vitally impor¬
tant, indicaies a condition of the country, so distempered
and dangerous, as to demand the most serious and prompt
attention. It is only, when we come to consider of the
remedy, that, under the aspect, in which I am viewing
the subject, there can be, among the informed and con¬
siderate, any diversity of opinion.
Those, who have not duly reflected 011 its dangerous
and inveterate charater, suppose that the disease will cure
itself; that events ought- to be left to take their own
course; and that experience, in a short time, will prove,
that the interest of the whole community, is the same, in
reference to the Tariff, or, at least, whatever diversity
there may now be, time will assimilate. Such has been
their language from the begining, but unfortunately the
progress of events has been the reverse. The country
is now more divided than in 1824, and then, more than in
1816. The majority may have increased; but the oppo¬
site sides are beyond dispute more determined and exci¬
ted, than at any preceding period. Formerly the system
was resisted mainly, as inexpedient; but now, as uncon¬
stitutional, unequal, unjust and oppressive. Then relief
was sought exclusively from the General Government;
but now, many driven to despair, are raisng their eyes
to the reserved Sovereignty of the States, as the only
refuge. If we turn from the past and present, to the fu¬
ture, we shall find nothing to lessen, but much to aggra¬
vate the danger. The increasing embarrassment and
distress of the staple States, the growing conviction, from
experience, that they are caused by the prohibitory sys¬
tem principally, and that, under its continued operation,
their present pursuits must become profitless, and that their
great and peculiar agricultural capital, cannot be diverted
from its ancient and hereditary channels, without ruinous
24
the illustrious example which could not fail-to prove most
favourable to the great cause of liberty every where, of
a nation the freest, and, at the same time, the best and
most cheaply governed; of the highest earthly blessing,
at the least possible sacrifice. As the disease will not,
then, heal itself, we are brought to the question, can a
remedy be applied, and, if so, what ought it to bel-
To answer in the negative, would be to assert, that
our union has utterly failed; and that the opinion, so
common before the adoption of our Constitution, that a
free Government could not be practically extended over
a large country, was correct—and that ours had been
destroyed by giving it limits so great as to comprehend,
not only dissimilar, but irreconcilable interests. I am
not prepared to admit a conclusion that would cast so
deep a shade on the future, and that would falsify all the
glorious anticipations of our ancestors while it would so
greatly lessen their high reputation for wisdom. Noth¬
ing but the clearest demonstration, founded on actual
experience, will ever force me to a conclusion so abhor¬
rent to all of my feelings. As strongly as I am impress¬
ed with the great dissimilarity, and I must add, as truth
compels me to do, contrariety of interests in our country,
resulting from the causes already indicated, and which
are so great, that they cannot be subjected to the un¬
checked will of a majority of the whole, without defeat¬
ing that justice which the great end of government, and
without which it is a curse ; yet I see in the union, as ordain¬
ed by the Constitution, the means, if wisely used, not
only of reconciling all diversities, but also the means
and the only effectual means of securing to us justice,
peace and security at home and abroad, and with
them, that national power and renown, the love of which
Providence has implanted, for wise purposes, so deeply in
the human heart; in all of which great objects every
portion of our country,widely extended and diversified as
it is, has a common and identical interest. If we have
the wisdom to place a proper relative estimate on these
more elevated, and durable blessings, the present and
every other conflict of like character, may be readily
terminated; but if, reversing the scale, each section
25
■should put a higher estimate on its immediate and pecu¬
liar gains : and acting in that spirit, should push favour¬
ite measures of mere polic}r, without regard to peace,
harmony or justice, our sectional conflicts would then,
indeed, without some constitutional check, become in¬
terminable, except by the dissolution of the Union itself.
—That we have in fact so reversed the estimate, is too
certain to be doubted, and the result is our present dis¬
tempered and dangerous condition. The cure must
commence in the correction of the error, and not to ad¬
mit we have erred, wouldbe the worst possible symptom.
It would prove the disease to be incurable through the
regular and ordinary process of legislation ; and would
compel, finally, a resort to extraordinary, but I still trust,
not only constitutional, but safe remedies..
No one would more sincerely rejoice than myself, to
see the remedy applied from the quarter, where it could
be most easily and regularly done. It is the only way
by which those who think that it is the only quarter from
which it can constitutionally come, can possibly sustain
their opinion. To omit the application by the General
Government, would compel even them to admit the truth
of the opposite opinion ; or force them to abandon our
political system in despair; while on the other hand, all
their enlightened and patriotic opponents would rejoice
at such evidence of moderation and wisdom on the part
of the General Government, as would supersede a resort
to what they believe to be the higher powers of our po¬
litical system, asvindicating a sounder state of public sen¬
timent than, has ever heretofore existed in any country,
and thus affording the highest possible assurance of the
perpetuation of our glorious institutions to the latest gen¬
eration. For as a people advance in knowledge, in the
same degree they may dispense with mere artificial re¬
strictions in their government: and we may imagine,
(but dare not expect to see it,) a state of intelligence so
universal and high, that all the guards of liberty may be
dispensed with, except an enlightened public opinion,
acting through the right of suffrage ; but it pre-supposes
a state where every class and every section of iff? com¬
munity are capable of estimating the effects of every
26
measure, not only as it may affect itself, but every other
class and section; and of fully realizing the sublime
truth, that the highest and wisest policy consists in main¬
taining justice and promoting peace and harmony ; and
that compared to these, schemes of mere gain are but
trash and dross. I fear experience has already proved
that we are far removed from such a state, and that we
must consequently rely on the old and clumsy, but ap¬
proved mode of checking power in order to prevent, or
correct abuses; but I do trust that though far from per¬
fect, we are at least so much so as to be capable of re¬
medying the present disorder in the ordinary way; and
thus to prove that with us public opinion is so enlightened,
and our political machine so perfect, as rarely to require
for its preservation the intervention of the power that cre¬
ated it. How is this to be effected 1
The application may be painful, but the remedy, 1
conceive, is certain and simple. There is but one effec¬
tual cure, an honest reduction of the duties to a fair sys¬
tem of revenue, adapted to the just and constitutional
wants of the Government. Nothing short of this will
restore the country to peace, harmony, and mutual af¬
fection. There is already a deep and growing convic¬
tion in a large section of the country, that the impost,
even as a revenue system, is extremely unequal, and that
it is mainly paid by those who furnish the means of pay¬
ing the foreign exchanges of the country, on which it is
laid ; and that the case is not varied, taking into the esti¬
mate the entire action of the system, whether the produ¬
cer or consumer pays in the first instance.
I do not propose to enter, formally, into the discussion
of a point so complex and contested; but as it has ne¬
cessarily a strong practical bearing on the subject under
consideration, in all its relations, I cannot pass it without
a few general and brief remarks.
If the producer in reality pays, none will doubt, but
the burden would mainly fall on the section it is supposed
to do. The theory that the consumer pays in the first
instance, renders the proposition more complex, and will
require, in order to understand where the burden in real¬
ity ultimately falls on that supposition, to consider the
27
protective, or as its friends call it, the American System,
under its three-fold aspect, of taxation, of protection, and
of distribution; or as performing at the same time the se¬
veral functions of giving a revenue to the government, of
affording protection to certain branches of domestic in¬
dustry, and furnishidg the means to Congress of distribu¬
ting large sums through its appropriations ; all of which
are so blended in their effects, that it is impossible to un¬
derstand its true operation, without taking the whole into
the estimate.
Admitting then, as supposed, that he who consumes
the article pays the tax in the increased price, and that
the burden falls wholly on the consumers, without affect¬
ing the producers as a class, (which, by the by, is far from
being true, except in the single case, if there be such a
one, where the producers have a monopoly of an article,
so indispensable to life, that the quantity consumed can¬
not he affected by any increase of price,) and that consi¬
dered in the light of a tax, merely, the impost duties
fall equally on every section, in proportion to its popu¬
lation, still when combined with its other effects, the bur¬
den it imposes as a tax, may be so transferred from one
section to the other, as to take it from one, and place it
wholly on the other. Let us apply the remark first to
its operation as a system of protection.
The tendency of the tax, or duty, on the imported arti¬
cle is not only to raise its price, but also, in the same pro¬
portion, that of the domestic article of the same kind, for
which purpose, when intended for protection, it is in fact
laid ; and of course, in determining where the system ul¬
timately places the burden in reality, this effect also, must
be taken into the estimate. If one of the sections exclu¬
sively produces such domestic articles, and the other
purchases them from it, then it is clear that to the amount
of such increased prices, the tax or duty on the con¬
sumption of the foreign articles, would be transferred
from the section producing the domestic articles to the
one that purchased and consumed them, unless the lat¬
ter in turn, be indemnified by the increased price of the
objects of its industry, which none will venture to assert
to be the case with the great staples of the country,
28
which form the basis of our exports, the price of which is
regulated by the foreign and not the domestic market.-—
To those who grow them, the increased price of the fo¬
reign and domestic articles both, in consequence of the
duty on the former, is in reality, and in the strictest
sense, a tax, while it is clear that the increased price of
the latter acts as a bounty to the seetion producing them,
and that as the amount of such increased prices, on what
it sells to the other section, is greater or less than the du¬
ty it pays on the imported articles, the system will in fact
operate as a bounty or tax ; if greater, the difference
would be a bounty ; if less, a tax.
Again, the operation may be equal in every other re¬
spect, and yet the pressure of the system, relatively, on
the two sections, be rendered very unequal by the appro¬
priations, or distribution. If each section receives back
what it paid into the Treasury, the equality, if it previ¬
ously existed, will continue; but if one receives back
less, and other proportionally more than it paid, then
the difference in relation to the sections will be to the
former a loss, and to the latter a gain ; and the system
in this aspect would operate to the amount of the differ¬
ence, as a contribution from the one receiving less than it
paid, to the other that receives more. Such would be,
incontestibly, its general effects, taken in all its different
aspects, even on the theory supposed to be most favoura¬
ble to prove the equal action of the system, that the con¬
sumer pays in the first instance the whole amount of the
tax.
To show how, on this supposition, the burden and ad¬
vantages of the system would actually distribute them¬
selves between the sections, would carry me too far into
details ; but I feel assured, after full and careful exami¬
nation, that they are such as to explain, what otherwise
would seem inexplicable, that one section should consid-r
er its repeal a calamity, and the other a blessing; and
that such opposite views should be taken by them, as to
place them in a state of determined conflict, in relation
to the great fiscal and commercial interests of the coun¬
try. Indeed were there no satisfactory explanations, the
opposite views that prevail, in the two sections, as to the
29
effects of the system, ought to satisfy all of its unequal
action. There can be no safer, or more certain rule,
than to suppose each portion of the country equally ca¬
pable of understanding their respective interests; and
that each is a much better judge of the effects of any sys¬
tem of measures or its peculir interest, than the other can
possibly be;
But whether the opinion, of its unequal action, be
correct, or erroneous, nothing can be more certain than
that the impression is widely extending itself, that the
system, under all its modifications, is essentially unequal;
and if to that be added a conviction still deeper, and
more universal, that every duty imposed for the purpose
of protection, is not only unequal, but also unconstitutional,
it would be a fatal error to suppose, that any remedy,
short of that which I have stated, can heal our political
disorders.
In order to understand, more fully, the difficulty of ad¬
justing this unhappy contest, on any other ground, it may
not be improper to present a general view of the consti¬
tutional objection, that it may be clearly seen, how hope¬
less it is to expect that it can be yielded by those who have
embraced it.
They believe that all the powers, vested by the Con¬
stitution in Congress, are not only restricted by the limi¬
tations expressly imposed, but also by the nature and ob¬
ject of the powers themselves. Thus though the power
to impose duties on imports be granted in general terms,
without any other express limitations, but that they shall
be equal, and no preference shall be given to the ports of
one State over those of another, yet as being a portion of
the taxing- power, given with the view of raising revenue,
it is from its nature restricted to that object, as much sO
as if the Convention had expressly so limited it; and that
to use it to effect any other purpose, not specified in the
Constitution, is an infraction of the instrument, in its most
dangerous form j an infraction by perversion more easily
made, and more difficult to resist, than any other. The
same view is believed to be applicable to the power of re¬
gulating commerce, as well as all the other powers. To
surrender this important principle, it is conceived, would
St)
be to surrender all power, and to render the Government
unlimited and despotic ; and to yield it up, in relation to
the particular power in question, would be in fact to sur¬
render the control of the whole industry and capital of the
country to the General Government; and would end in
placing the weaker section, in a colonial relation with the
stronger. For no distinct things are more dissimilar in their
nature, or may be more unequally affected by the same
laws, than different descriptions of labour and property ,
and if taxes, by increasing the amount and changing the
intent only, may be perverted, in fact, into a system of
penalties and rewards, it would give all the power that
could be desired, to subject the labor and property of the
minority to the will of the majority, to be regulated with¬
out regarding the interest of the former, in subserviency
to the will of the latter. Thus thinking, it would seem
unreasonable to expect, that any adjustment, based on
the recognition of the correctness of a construction of
the Constitution, which would admit the exercise of such
a power, would satisfy the weaker of the two sections,
particularly with its peculiar industry and property, which
experience has shewn may be so injuriously affected by
its exercise. Thus much for one side.
The just claims of the other ought to be equally re¬
spected. Whatever excitement the system has justly
caused, in certain portions of our country, I hope and
believe, all will conceive that the change should be made
with the least possible detriment to the interests of those
who may be liable to be affected by it, consistently with
what is justly due to others and the principles of the Con¬
stitution. To effect this will require the kindest spirit of
conciliation, and the utmost skill; but, even with these,
it will be impossible to make the transition without a
shock greater or less; though I trust, if judiciously ef¬
fected, it will not be without many compensating advan¬
tages. That there will be some such, cannot be doubt¬
ed. It will, at least, be followed by greater stability,
and will tend to harmonize the manufacturing with all
of the other great interests of the country, and bind the
whole in mutual affection. But these are not all.—
Another advantage of essential importance to the ulti-
31
mate prosperity of our manufacturing industry will fol¬
low. It will cheapen production ; and, in that view, the
loss of any one branch will be nothing like in proportion
to the reduction of duty on that particular branch.—
Every reduction will, in fact, operate as a bounty to
every other branch, except the one reduced; and thus
the effect of a general reduction will be to cheapen, uni¬
versally, the price of production, by cheapening living,
wages, and materials ; so as to give, if not equal profits
after the reduction, profits by no means reduced propor¬
tionally to the duties; an effect, which, as it regards the
foreign market, is of the utmost importance. It must be
apparent on reflection, that the means adopted to se¬
cure the home market, for our manufactures are precise¬
ly the opposite of those necessary to obtain the foreign.
In the former the increased expense of production in
conseqnence of a system of protection may be more
than compensated by the increased price at home of the
article protected; but, in the latter this advantage is lost,
and as there is no other corresponding compensation,
the increased cost of production must be a dead loss in
the foreign market. But whether these advantages and
many others, that might be mentioned, will ultimately
compensate to the full extent, or not, the loss to the man¬
ufacturers on the reduction of the duties, certain it is,
that we have approached a point at which a great change
cannot be much longer delayed; and that the more
promptly it may be met, the less excitement there will
be, and the greater leisure and calmness for a cautious
and skilful operation in making the transition; and which
it becomes those more immediately interested duly to
consider. Nor ought they to overlook, in considering
the question, the different character of the claims of the
two sides. The one asks from the Government no ad¬
vantage, but simply to be let alone in the undisturbed
possession of their natural advantages, and to secure
which, as far as was consistent with the other objects of
the Constitution, was one of their leading motives in en¬
tering into the Union ; while the other side claims, for
the advancement of their prosperity, the positive interfe¬
rence of the Government I" such cases, on every
34
which, however interesting to me individually, are of too
little importance to be taken into the estimate, where the
liberty and happiness of our country are so vitally invol¬
ved.
JOHN C. CALHOUN.
Fort Hill, July 26th, 1831.