TB B SEVENTH GREAT ORIENTAL MONARCH! THE SEVENTH GREAT ORIENTAL MONARCHY OR THE GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, AND ANTIQUITIES OF THE SASSANIAN OR NEW PERSIAN EMPIRE COLLECTED AND ILLUSTRATED FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN SOURCES BY GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A. CAMDEN PROFESSOR OP ANCIENT HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD CANON OF CANTERBURY IN TWO VOLUMES Vol. I. DODD, NEW YORK MEAD, AND 1882 COMPANY Electrotyped and Printed by Rand, Avery, <5r» Co., ny Franklin Street, Boston. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE, M.P. ETC., ETC. TO WHOM, EIGHTEEN YEARS AGO, HIS FIRST WORK WAS DEDICATED 2Ef)ts Uolume WHICH MAY BE HIS LAST IS INSCRIBED AS A TOKEN OF UNINTERRUPTED REGARD AND ESTEEM BY THE AUTHOR PREFACE. This work completes the Ancient History of the East, to which the author has devoted his main attention during the last eighteen years. It is a sequel to his 4 Parthians,' published in 1873 ; and carries down the History of Western Asia from the third century of our era to the middle of the seventh. So far as the pres- ent writer is aware, no European author has previously treated this period from the Oriental stand-point, in any work aspiring to be more than a mere sketch or outline. Very many such sketches have been pub- lished ; but they have been scanty in the extreme, and the greater number of them have been based on the authority of a single class of writers. It has been the present author's aim to combine the various classes of authorities which are now accessible to the historical student, and to give their due weight to each of them. The labours of M. C. Miiller, of the Abbe Gregoire Kabaragy Garabed, and of M. J. St. Martin have opened to us the stores of ancient Armenian literature, which were previously a sealed volume to all but a small class of students. The early Arab historians have been translated or analysed by Kosegarten, Zoten- berg, M. Jules Mohl, and others. The coinage of the vii Vlll PREFACE. Sassanians has been elaborately — almost exhaustively — treated by Mordtmann and Thomas. Mr. Fergus- son has applied his acute and practised powers to the elucidation of the Sassanian architecture. By com- bining the results thus obtained with the old sources of information — the classical, especially the Byzantine, writers — it has become possible to compose a history of the Sassanian Empire which is at once consecutive, and not absolutely meagre. How the author has per- formed his task, he must leave it to the public to judge ; he will only venture to say that he has spared no labour, but has gone carefully through the entire series of the Byzantine writers who treat of the time, besides availing himself of the various modern works to which reference has been made above. If he has been sometimes obliged to draw conclusions from his authorities other than those drawn by Gibbon, and has deemed it right, in the interests of historic truth, to express occasionally his dissent from that writer's views, he must not be thought blind to the many and great excellencies which render the c Decline and Fall ' one of the best, if not the best, of our histories. The mistakes of a writer less eminent and less popular might have been left unnoticed without ill results. Those of an historian generally regarded as an author- ity from whom there is no appeal could not be so lightly treated. The author begs to acknowledge his great obliga- tions, especially, to the following living writers : M. Patkanian, M. Jules Mohl, Dr. Haug, Herr Spiegel, Herr Windischmann, Herr Mordtmann, Canon Tris- tram, Mr. James Fergusson, and Mr. E. Thomas. He is also largely beholden to the works of M. Texier and PREFACE. ix of MM. Flandin and Coste for the illustrations, which he has been able to give, of Sassanian sculpture and architecture. The photographic illustrations of the newly-discovered palace at Mashita are due to the liberality of Mr. R. C. Johnson (the amateur artist who accompanied Canon Tristram in his exploration of the 1 Land of Moab' ), who, with Canon Tristram's kind con- sent, has allowed them to appear in the present volume. The numismatic illustrations are chiefly derived from Longperier ; but one or two have been borrowed from other sources. For his frontispiece the author is in- debted to his brother, Sir Henry Rawlinson, who has permitted it to be taken from an original drawing in his possession, which is believed to be a truthful rep- resentation of the great Sassanian building. Cantekbuky: December 1875. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. PACE Condition of the Persians under the Successors of Alexander. Under the Arsacidae. Favour shown them by the latter. Allowed to have Kings of their own. Their Religion at first held in Honour. Power of their Priests. Gradual Change of Policy on the part of the Parthian Monarchs, and final Oppression of the Magi. Causes which produced the Insurrection of Artaxerxes . 1 CHAPTER II. Situation and Size of Persia. General Character of the Country and Climate. Chief Products. Characteristics of the Persian People, Physical and Moral. Differences observable in the Race at differ- ent Periods . . . . . . . .16 CHAPTER III. Reign of Artaxerxes I. Stories told of him. Most probable Account of his Descent, Rank, and Parentage. His Contest with Artabanus. First War with Chosroes of Armenia. Contest with Alexander Severus. Second War with Chosroes and Conquest of Armenia. Religious Reforms. Internal Administration and Government. Art. Coinage. Inscriptions . . . . . .30 CHAPTER IV. Death of Artaxerxes I. and Accession of Sapor I. War of Sapor with Manizen. His first War with Rome. Invasion of Mesopo- tamia, A.i). 241. Occupation of Antioch. Expedition of Gordian to the East. Recovery by Rome of her lost Territory. Peace made between Rome and Persia. Obscure Interval. Second War with Rome. Mesopotamia again invaded, A.D. 258. Valerian takes the Command in the East. Struggle between him and xi CONTENTS. * PAGE Sapor. Defeat and Capture of Valerian, a.d. 260. Sapor invests Miriades with the Purple. He takes Syria and Southern Cappa- docia, but is shortly afterwards attacked by Odenathus. Successes of Odenathus. Treatment of Valerian. Further Successes of Odenathus. Period of Tranquillity. Great Works of Sapor. His Sculptures. His Dyke. His Inscriptions. His Coins. His Re- ligion. Religious Condition of the East in his Time. Rise into Notice of Manes. His Rejection by Sapor. Sapor's Death. His Character ........ 73 CHAPTER V. Short Reign of Hormisdas I. His Dealings with Manes. Accession of Varahran I. He puts Manes to Death. Persecutes the Mani- chaeans and the Christians. His Relations with Zenobia. He is threatened by Aurelian. His Death. Reign of Varahran II. His Tyrannical Conduct. His Conquest of Seistan, and War with India. His War with the Roman Emperors Cams and Diocletian. His Loss of Armenia. His Death. Short Reign of Varahran III. 101 CHAPTER VI. Civil War of Narses and his Brother Hormisdas. Narses victorious. He attacks and expels Tiridates. War declared against him by Diocletian. First Campaign of Galerius, a.d. 297. Second Cam- paign, a.d. 298. Defeat suffered by Narses. Negotiations. Con- ditions of Peace. Abdication and Death of Narses . . .116 CHAPTER VII. Reign of Hormisdas II. His Disposition. General Character of his Reign. His Taste for Building. His new Court of Justice. His Marriage with a Princess of Cabul. Story of his Son Hormisdas. Death of Hormisdas II., and Imprisonment of his Son Hormisdas. Interregnum. Crown assigned to Sapor II. before his birth. Long Reign of Sapor. First Period of his Reign, from a.d. 809 to a.d. 337. Persia plundered by the Arabs and the Turks. Vic- tories of Sapor over the Arabs. Persecution of the Christians. Escape of Hormisdas. Feelings and Conduct of Sapor . . 138 CHAPTER VIII. Position of Affairs on the Death of Constantine. First War of Sapor with Rome, a.d. 337-350. First Siege of Nisibis. Obscure Inter- val. Troubles in Armenia, and Recovery of Armenia by the Persians. Sapor's Second Siege of Nisibis. Its Failure. Great CONTENTS. xiii Battle of Singara. Sapor's Son made Prisoner and murdered in Cold Blood. Third Siege of Nisibis. Sapor called away by an Invasion of the Massagetse . . . . .151 CHAPTER IX. Revolt of Armenia and Acceptance by Arsaces of the Position of a Roman Feudatory. Character and Issue of Sapor's Eastern Wars. His Negotiations with Constantius. His Extreme Demands. Cir- cumstances under which he determines to renew the War. His Preparations. Desertion to him of Antoninus. Great Invasion of Sapor. Siege of Amida. Sapor's Severities. Siege and Cap- ture of Singara ; of Bezabde. Attack on Virta fails. Aggressive Movement of Constantius. He attacks Bezabde, but fails. Cam- paign of a.d. 301. Death of Constantius .... 167 CHAPTER X. Julian becomes Emperor of Rome. His Resolution to invade Persia. His Views and Motives. His Proceedings. Proposals of Sapor rejected. Other Embassies. Relations of Julian with xVrmenia. Strength of his Army. His Invasion of Mesopotamia. His Line of March. Siege of Perisabor; of Maogamalcha. Battle of the Tigris. Further Progress of Julian checked by his inabil- ity to invest Ctesiphon. His Retreat. His Death. Retreat continued by Jovian. Sapor offers Terms of Peace. Peace made by Jovian. Its Conditions. Reflections on the Peace and on the Termination of the Second Period of Struggle between Rome and Persia . . . . . . . . .191 CHAPTER XI. Attitude of Armenia during the War between Sapor and Julian. Sapor's Treachery towards Arsaces. Sapor conquers Armenia. He attacks Iberia, deposes Sauromaces, and sets up a new King. Resistance and Capture of Artogerassa. Difficulties of Sapor. Division of Iberia between the Roman and Persian Pretenders. Renewal of Hostilities between Rome and Persia. Peace made with Valens. Death of Sapor. His Coins .... 241 CHAPTER XII. Short Reigns of Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. Obscurity of their History. Their Relations with Armenia. Monument of Sapor III. at Takht-i-Bostan. Coins of Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. Reign of Varahran IY. His Signets. His Dealings with Armenia. His Death . . . . . . . .254 xiv CONTENTS. CHAPTER XIII. PAGE Accession of Isdigerd I. Peaceful Character of his Reign. His alleged Guardianship of Theodosius II. His Leaning towards Christianity, and consequent Unpopularity with his Subjects. His Change of View and Persecution of the Christians. His Relations with Armenia. His Coins. His Personal Character. His Death, 269 CHAPTER XIV. Internal Troubles on the Death of Isdigerd I. Accession of Varah- ran V. His Persecution of the Christians. His War with Rome. His Relations with Armenia from a.d. 422 to a.d. 428. His Wars with the Scythic Tribes on his Eastern Frontier. His Strange Death. His Coins. His Character .... 282 CHAPTER XY. Reign of Isdigerd II. His War with Rome. His Nine Years' War with the Ephthalites. His Policy towards Armenia. His Second Ephthalite War. His Character. His Coins . . 301 CHAPTER XVI. Right of Succession disputed between the two Sons of Isdigerd II., Perozes (or Firuz) and Hormisdas. Civil War for two years. Success of Perozes, through aid given him by the Ephthalites. Great Famine. Perozes declares War against the Ephthalites, and makes an Expedition into their Country. His 111 Success. Conditions of Peace granted him. Armenian Revolt and War. Perozes, after some years, resumes the Ephthalite War. His Attack fails, and he is slain in Battle. Summary of his Character. Coins of Hormisdas III. and Perozes. Vase of Perozes . . 311 CHAPTER XVII. Accession of Balas or Palash. His Relationship to Perozes. Peace made with the Ephthalites. Pacification of Armenia and General Edict of Toleration. Revolt of Zareh, Son of Perozes, and Sup- pression of the Revolt with the help of the Armenians. Flight of Kobad to the Ephthalites. Further Changes in Armenia. Vahan made Governor. Death of Balas; his Character. Coins ascribed to him ......... 331 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. General View of the Tak-i-Kesra or Palace of Chosroes I., at Ctesiphon (from a drawing in the possession of Sir H. Kawlinson) . . To face Title-page 2. Map of the Sassanian Empire and adjacent countries " page 1 3. Artaxerxes I. giving the crown to his son, Sapor (after Ker Porter) ..... u 64 4. Sapor I. presenting Cyriades to the Romans as their Emperor (after Flandin) 82 5. Valerian doing homage to Cyriades (after Flandin) " 91 6. Yarahran II. addressing his nobles (after Ker Porter) " 108 7. Yarahran II. receiving the submission of the Seges- tani (after Flandin) . . . . " 109 8. Bas-relief representing Sapor II. and Sapor III. (after Ker Porter) 261 WOODCUTS IN THE TEXT. PAGE 9. Ancient Persians, from a bas-relief at Persepolis (after Ker Porter) . 25 10. Earlier coins of Artaxer- xes I. . .66 11. Later Coins of Artaxer- xes I. . .67 12. Coins of Sapor I. . . 94 13. Head of Sapor I., from a gem (after Mordtmann) . 100 PAGE 14. Coin of Hormisdas I. . 103 15. Coin of Yarahran I. . 105 16. Coin of Yarahran II. . 108 17. Coin of Yarahran III. . 115 18. Head of Narses, from a bas-relief (after Flandin) 118 19. Coins of Narses . . 137 20. Head of Hormisdas II., from a gem (after Mordt- mann) . . . 138 xv. XVI LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE 21. Coin of Hormisdas II. (after Thomas) . . 138 22. Coins of Sapor II. . . 253 23. Coin of Artaxerxes II. . 262 24. Coins of Sapor III. . 263 25. Portrait of Varahran IV., from a seal (after Thomas) . . .265 26. Later seal of Yarahran IV. (after Thomas) . . 265 PAGE 27. Coin of Varahran IV. . 266 28. Coin of Isdigerd I. . . 278 29. Coin of Varahran V. . 299 30. Coin of Isdigerd II. . 310 31. Doubtful coin of Hormis- das III. . . .328 32. Coin of Perozes . . 329 33. Coin of Balas . . 33S HISTOKY OF THE SASSANIAN OK NEW PERSIAN EMPIRE. CHAPTER I. Condition of the Persians under the Successors of Alexander — under the Arsacidai. Favour shown them by the latter — allowed to have Kings of their own. Their Religion at first held in honour. Power of their Priests. Gradual Change of Policy on the part of the Parthian Mon- archs, and final Oppression of the Magi. Causes which produced the Insurrection of Artaxerxes. ' The Parthians had been barbarians; they had ruled over a nation far more civilised than themselves, and had oppressed them and their religion.' Niebuhr, Lectures on Roman History, vol. iii. p. 27(5. When the great Empire of the Persians, founded by Cyrus, collapsed under the attack of Alexander the Great, the dominant race of Western Asia did not feel itself at the first reduced to an intolerable condition It was the benevolent design of Alexander to fuse into one the two leading peoples of Europe and Asia, and to establish himself at the head of a Perso-Hellenic State, the capital of which was to have been Babylon. 1 Had this idea been carried out, the Persians would, it is evident, have lost but little by their subjugation. Placed on a par with the Greeks, united with them in 1 See, on this point, Bishop Thirl- wall's excellent remarks, Hist, of Greece, vol. vii. pp. 121-124, which are incompletely met by Mr. Grote, Hist, of Greece, vol. xii. pp. 352- 360. 2 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. I. marriage bonds, 1 and equally favoured by their common ruler, they could scarcely have uttered a murmur, or have been seriously discontented with their position. But when the successors of the great Macedonian, unable to rise to the height of his grand conception, took lower ground, and, giving up the idea of a fusion, fell back upon the ordinary status, and proceeded to enact the ordinary r6le, of conquerors, the feelings of the late lords of Asia, the countrymen of Cyrus and Darius, must have undergone a complete change. It had been the intention of Alexander to conciliate and elevate the leading Asiatics by uniting them with the Macedonians and the Greeks, by promoting social intercourse between the two classes of his subjects and encouraging them to intermarry, by opening his court to Asiatics, by educating them in Greek ideas and in Greek schools, by promoting them to high employ- ments, and making them feel that they were as much valued and as well cared for as the people of the con- quering race : it was the plan of the Seleucidse to govern wholly by means of European officials, Greek or Macedonian, and to regard and treat the entire mass of their Asiatic subjects as mere slaves. 2 Alex- ander had placed Persian satraps over most of the provinces, attaching to them Greek or Macedonian commandants as checks. 3 Seleucus divided his empire into seventy-two satrapies ; but among his satraps not one was an Asiatic — all were either Macedonians or Greeks. Asiatics, indeed, formed the bulk of his standing army, and so far were admitted to employ- ment; they might also, no doubt, be tax-gatherers, 1 Arrian, Exp. Al. vii. 4. 2 Compare the Author's Sixth Monarchy, p. 36. " Arrian, iii. 1G, 22, 23; vi. 27, 29, &c. Ch. I.J RULE OF THE SELEUCID^E. 3 couriers, scribes, constables, and officials of that mean stamp ; but they were as carefully excluded from all honourable and lucrative offices as the natives of Hin- dustan under the rule of the East India Company. The standing army of the Seleucidse was wholly officered, just as was that of our own Sepoys, by Europeans ; Europeans thronged the court, and filled every important post under the government. There cannot be a doubt that such a high-spirited and in- deed arrogant people as the Persians must have fretted and chafed under this treatment, and have detested the nation and dynasty which had thrust them down from their pre-eminence and converted them from masters into slaves. It would scarcely much tend to mitigate the painfulness of their feelings that they could not but confess their conquerors to be a civilised people — as civilised, perhaps more civilised than themselves — since the civilisation was of a type and character which did not please them or command their approval. There is an essential antagonism between European and Asiatic ideas and modes of thought, such as seemingly to preclude the possibility of Asiat- ics appreciating a European civilisation. The Persians must have felt towards the Greco-Macedonians much as the Mahometans of India feel towards ourselves — they may have feared and even respected them — but they must have very bitterly hated them. Nor was the rule of the Seleucidse such as to over- come by its justice or its wisdom the original antipathy of the dispossessed lords of Asia towards those by whom they had been ousted. The satrapial system, which these monarchs lazily adopted from their predecessors, the Achaemenians, is one always open to great abuses, 4 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. I. and needs the strictest superintendence and supervision. There is no reason to believe that any sufficient watch was kept over their satraps by the Seleucid kings, or even any system of checks established, such as the Achaemenidae had, at least in theory, set up and main- tained. 1 The Greco-Macedonian governors of prov- inces seem to have been left to themselves almost entirely, and to have been only controlled in the exer- cise of their authority by their own notions of what was right or expedient. Under these circumstances, abuses were sure to creep in ; and it is not improbable that gross outrages were sometimes perpetrated by those in power — outrages calculated to make the blood of a nation boil, and to produce a keen longing for vengeance. We have no direct evidence that the Persians of the time did actually suffer from such a misuse of satrapial authority ; but it is unlikely that they entirely escaped the miseries which are incidental to the system in question. Public opinion ascribed the grossest acts of tyranny and oppression to some of the Seleucid satraps ; 2 probably the Persians were not exempt from the common lot of the subject races. Moreover, the Seleucid monarchs themselves were occasionally guilty of acts of tyranny, which must have intensified the dislike wherewith they were regarded by their Asiatic subjects. The reckless conduct of Antiochus Epiphanes towards the Jews is well known ; but it is not perhaps generally recognised that intol- erance and impious cupidity formed a portion of the system on which he governed. There seems, however, 1 See Xen. Cyrop. viii. 0, §§ 3-16 ; and compare the Author's Herodo- tus, vol. ii. pp. 4()2-:>, 2nd ed., and his Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. p. 424, 2nd ed. 2 Arrian, Fr. 1; Zosim. i. 18; Syn- cell. p. 284, B. Compare the Au- I thor's Sixth Monarchy, p. 48. Ch. L] RISE OF THE PARTHIANS. 5 to be good reason to believe that, having exhausted his treasury by his wars and his extravagances, Epiphanes formed a general design of recruiting it by means of the plunder of his subjects. The temples of the Asiatics had hitherto been for the most part respected by their European conquerors, 1 and large stores of the precious metals were accumulated in them. Epiphanes saw in these hoards the means of relieving his own necessities, and determined to seize and confiscate them. Besides plundering the Temple of Jehovah at Jerusalem, he made a journey into the south-eastern portion of his empire, about B.C. 165, for the express purpose of con- ducting in person the collection of the sacred treasures. It was while he was engaged in this unpopular work that a spirit of disaffection showed itself ; the East took arms no less than the West ; and in Persia, or upon its borders, the avaricious monarch was forced to retire before the opposition which his ill-judged measures had provoked, and to allow one of the doomed temples to escape him. 2 When he soon afterwards sickened and died, the natives of this part of Asia saw in his death a judgment upon him for his attempted sacrilege. 3 It was within twenty years of this unfortunate attempt that the dominion of the Seleucidse over Persia and the adjacent countries came to an end. The Par- thian Empire had for nearly a century been gradually growing in power and extending itself at the expense of the Syro-Macedonian ; and, about B.C. 163, an energetic prince, Mithridates L, commenced a series of conquests towards the West, which terminated (about 1 Some were no doubt plundered remained untouched, under Alexander, and others by his 2 See Polyb. xxxi. j1 ; 1 Macab. early successors (Arrian, vi. 29, 30; vi, 1-4; Appian, Syr. p. 161, C. Polyb. x. 27, § 12; &c). But many 3 Polyb. l.s.c. 6 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. LCH. L b.c. 150) hi the transference from the Syro-Macedonian to the Parthian rule of Media Magna, Susiana, Persia, Babylonia, and Assyria Proper. It would seem that the Persians offered no resistance to the progress of the new conqueror. 1 The Seleucidas had not tried to conciliate their attachment, and it was impossible that they should dislike the rupture of ties which had only galled hitherto. Perhaps their feeling, in prospect of the change, was one of simple indifference. Perhaps it was not without some stir of satisfaction and com- placency that they saw the pride of the hated Europeans abased, and a race, which, however much it might differ from their own, was at least Asiatic, installed in power. The Parthian system, moreover, was one which allowed greater liberty to the subject races than the Macedonian, as it had been understood and carried out by the Seleucidse ; and so far, some real gain was to be expected from the change. Reli- gious motives must also have conspired to make the Persians sympathise with the new power, rather than with that which for centuries had despised their faith, and had recently insulted it. The treatment of the Persians by their Parthian lords seems, on the whole, to have been marked by moderation. Mithridates indeed, the original con- queror, is accused of having alienated his new subjects by the harshness of his rule ; 2 and in the struggle which occurred between him and the Seleucid king, Demetrius II., Persians, as well as Elymseans and Bac- trians, are said to have fought on the side of the Syro-Macedonian. 3 But this is the only occasion in 1 Compare the Author's Sixth Monarchy, p. 77. 2 Justin, xxxvi. 1, § 3. 3 Ibid. § 4, and xxxviii. 9, § 2. Ch. LJ THEIR TREATMENT OF THE PERSIANS. 7 Parthian history, between the submission of Persia and the great revolt under Artaxerxes, where there is any appearance of the Persians regarding their masters with hostile feelings. In general they show them- selves submissive and contented with their position, which was certainly, on the whole, a less irksome one than they had occupied under the Seleucidge. It was a principle of the Parthian governmental system to allow the subject peoples, to a large extent, to govern themselves. These peoples generally, and notably the Persians, were ruled by native kings, 1 who succeeded to the throne by hereditary right, had the full power of life and death, 2 and ruled very much as they pleased, so long as they paid regularly the tribute imposed upon them by the 1 King of Kings, 1 and sent him a respectable contingent when he was about to engage in a military expedition. 3 Such a system implies that the conquered peoples have the en- joyment of their own laws and institutions, are exempt from troublesome interference, and possess a sort of semi-independence. Oriental nations, having once as- sumed this position, are usually contented with it, and rarely make any effort to better themselves. It would seem that, thus far at any rate, the Persians could not complain of the Parthian rule, but must have been fairly satisfied with their condition. Again, the Greco-Macedonians had tolerated, but they had not viewed with much respect, the religion which they had found established in Persia. Alex- ander, indeed, with the enlightened curiosity which characterised him, had made inquiries concerning the 1 Strabo, xv. 3, §§ 3 and 24. I Tfirjdel^ nepalr/v nat (Spaxtova pln- 2 Ibid. § 17. BaoikevovTat vtto tetcil tuv and yevovc 6 6' uneid&v arro- \ 3 Tabari, Chronique, torn. ii. p. 5. 8 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. I. tenets of the Magi, and endeavoured to collect in one the writings of Zoroaster. 1 But the later monarchs, and still more their subjects, had held the system in contempt, and, as we have seen, Epiphanes had openly insulted the religious feelings of his Asiatic subjects. The Parthians, on the other hand, began at any rate with a treatment of the Persian religion which was respectful and gratifying. Though perhaps at no time very sincere Zoroastrians, they had conformed to the State religion under the Achsemenian kings; and when the period came that they had themselves to es- tablish a system of government, they gave to the Ma- gian hierarchy a distinct and important place in their governmental machinery. The council, which advised the monarch, and which helped to elect and (if need were) depose him, was composed of two elements — the Sophi, or wise men, who were civilians ; and the Magi, or priests of the Zoroastrian religion. 2 The Magi had thus an important political status in Parthia dur- ing the early period of the Empire ; but they seem gradually to have declined in favour, and ultimately to have fallen into disrepute. 3 The Zoroastrian creed was, little by little, superseded among the Parthians by a complex idolatry, which, beginning with an image- worship of the Sun and Moon, proceeded to an asso- ciation with those deities of the deceased kings of the nation, and finally added to both a worship of ances- tral idols, which formed the most cherished posses- sion of each family, and practically monopolised the religious sentiment. 4 All the old Zoroastrian practices 1 Having obtained the writings, Alexander is said to have burned them; but the whole character of his policy makes this incredible. 2 Strabo, xi. 9, § 3. 3 Agathias, ii. 26. 4 See the Authors Sixth Mon- archy, p. -'] ( .) ( .). Ch. L] their religious policy. 9 were by degrees laid aside. In Armenia the Arsacid monarchs allowed the sacred fire of Ormazd to become extinguished ; 1 and in their own territories the Par- thian Arsacidse introduced the practice, hateful to Zoroastrians, of burning the dead. 2 The ultimate reli- gion of these monarchs seems in fact to have been a syncretism wherein Sabaism, Confucianism, Greco- Macedonian notions, and an inveterate primitive idol- atry 3 were mixed together. It is not impossible that the very names of Ormazd and Ahriman had ceased to be known at the Parthian Court, or were regarded as those of exploded deities, whose domin- ion over men's minds had passed away. On the other hand, in Persia itself, and to some extent doubtless among the neighbouring countries, Zoroastrianism (or what went by the name) had a firm hold on the religious sentiments of the multitude, who viewed with disfavour the tolerant and eclectic spirit which animated the Court of Ctesiphon. The perpetual fire, kindled, as it was said, from heaven, was carefully tended and preserved on the fire-altars of the Persian holy places ; 4 the Magian hierarchy was held in the highest repute, the kings themselves (as it would seem) not disdaining to be Magi ; 5 the ideas — even perhaps the forms 6 — of Ormazd and 1 Moses of Chorene tells us that, when Artaxerxes conquered Ar- menia, he found the sacred fire extinguished, and caused it to be rekindled (Hist. Armen. ii. 94). 2 Herodian. iv. 30. 3 Compare the domestic image- worship, witnessed to by Joseph us (Ant. Jud. xviii. 9, § 5), with the teraphim-worsh\\d of the ancient Syrians (Gen. xxxi. 19-35). 4 The coins of the Sassanians exhibit from the first the fire-altar upon their reverse. (See below, pp. 66 and 94. ) 5 Agathias, ii. 26; Nicephorus, Hist, Eccl. i. 6; p. 55, B. 6 These forms appear on the earliest Sassanian bas-reliefs, and would scarcely have been thus used unless previously familiar to the people. 10 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. L Ahriman were familiar to all ; image-worship was ab- horred ; 1 the sacred writings in the Zend or most ancient Iranian language were diligently preserved and multiplied ; a pompous ritual was kept up ; the old national religion, the religion of the Achaeme- nians, of the glorious period of Persian ascendency in Asia, was with the utmost strictness maintained, probably the more zealously as it fell more and more into disfavour with the Parthians. The consequence of this divergence of religious opinion between the Persians and their feudal lords must undoubtedly have been a certain amount of alienation and discontent. The Persian Magi must have been especially dissatisfied with the position of their brethren at Court; and they would doubtless use their influence to^ arouse the indignation of their countrymen generally. But it is scarcely probable that this cause alone would have produced any striking result. Religious sympathy rarely leads men to engage in important Avars, unless it has the support of other concurrent motives. To account for the revolt of the Persians against their Parthian lords under Artaxerxes, something more is needed than the consideration of the religious differences which separated the two peoples. First, then, it should be borne in mind that the Parthian rule must have been from the beginning dis- tasteful to the Persians, owinc: to the rude and coarse character of the people. At the moment of Mithri- dates' successes, the Persians might experience a senti- ment of satisfaction 2 that the European invader was at last thrust back, and that Asia had reasserted herself ; but a very little experience of Parthian rule was suf- Mos. Chor. l.s.c. 2 See above, p. 6. Ch. LI THEIR GRADUAL DEGENERACY. 11 ficient to call forth different feelings. There can be no doubt that the Parthians, whether they were actually Turanians or no, 1 were, in comparison with the Per- sians, unpolished and uncivilised. They showed their own sense of this inferiority by an affectation of Per- sian manners. 2 But this affectation was not very suc- cessful. It is evident that in art, in architecture, in manners, in habits of life, the Parthian race reached only a low standard ; they stood to their Hellenic and Iranian subjects in much the same relation that the Turks of the present day stand to the modern Greeks; they made themselves respected by their strength and their talent for organisation; but in all that adorns and beautifies life they were deficient. 3 The Persians must, during the whole time of their subjection to Parthia, have been sensible of a feeling of shame at the want of refinement and of a high type of civilisa- tion in their masters. Again, the later sovereigns of the Arsacid dynasty were for the most part of weak and contemptible character. From the time of Volagases I. to that of Artabanus IV., the last king, the military reputation of Parthia had declined. Foreign enemies ravaged the territories of Parthian vassal kings, and retired, when they chose, unpunished. 4 Provinces revolted and estab- lished their independence. 5 Rome was entreated to lend assistance to her distressed and afflicted rival, and met the entreaties with a refusal. 6 In the wars which still from time to time were waged between the two empires, Parthia was almost uniformly worsted. Three 1 See, on this point, the Authors Sixth Monarchy, pp. 19-26. 2 Julian, Orat. ii. p. 63. 3 See the Author's Sixth Mon- archy, pp. 396-7 and 426-430. 4 See the Author's Sixth Mon- archy, pp. 291-2. 5 Ibid. pp. 286 and 293. y Ibid. p. 292. 12 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. I. times her capital was occupied, 1 and once her monarch's summer palace was burned. 2 Province after province had to be ceded to Rome. 3 The golden throne which symbolised her glory and magnificence was carried off. 4 Meanwhile feuds raged between the different branches of the Arsacid family ; civil wars were fre- quent ; two or three monarchs at a time claimed the throne, or actually ruled in different portions of the Empire. 5 It is not surprising that under these circum- stances the bonds were loosened between Parthia and her vassal kingdoms, or that the Persian tributary monarchs began to despise their suzerains, and to con- template without alarm the prospect of a rebellion which should place them in an independent position. While the general weakness of the Arsacid monarchs was thus a cause naturally leading to a renunciation of their allegiance on the part of the Persians, a special influence upon the decision taken by Artaxerxes is probably to be assigned to one, in particular, of the results of that weakness. When provinces long subject to Parthian rule revolted, and revolted successfully, as seems to have been the case with Hyrcania, and par- tially with Bactria, 6 Persia could scarcely for very shame continue submissive. Of all the races subject to Parthia, the Persians were the one which had held the most brilliant position in the past, and which re- tained the liveliest remembrance of its ancient glories. This is evidenced not only by the grand claims which Artaxerxes put forward in his early negotiations with 1 By Trajan a.d. 116; by Avidius Cassius a.d. 165; and by Sept. Se- verus a.d. 198. 2 Dio Cassius, lxxi. 2. :} See the Author's Sixth Mon- archy, pp. 329 and 346. 4 Ibid. p. 312. 5 Ibid. pp. 284-6. 296-7, 318, 348- 9. G See Mos. Chor. Hist. Armen. ii. 65 and 08. Ch. L] CAUSES OF ARTAXERXES' insurrection. 13 the Romans, 1 but by the whole course of Persian literature, which has fundamentally an historic char- acter, and exhibits the people as attached, almost more than any other Oriental nation, to the memory of its great men and of their noble achievements. 2 The countrymen of Cyrus, of Darius, of Xerxes, of Ochus, of the conquerors of Media, Bactria, Babylon, Syria, Asia Minor, Egypt, of the invaders of Scythia and Greece, aware that they had once borne sway over the whole region between Tunis and the Indian Desert, between the Caucasus and the Cataracts, when they saw a petty mountain clan, like the Hyrcanians, establish and maintain their independence despite the efforts of Parthia to coerce them, could not very well remain quiet. If so weak and small a race could defy the power of the Arsacid monarchs, much more might the far more numerous and at least equally courageous Persians expect to succeed, if they made a resolute attempt to recover their freedom. It is probable that Artaxerxes, in his capacity of vassal, served personally in the army with which the Parthian monarch Artabanus carried on the struggle against Rome, and thus acquired the power of esti- mating correctly the military strength still possessed by the Arsacidae, and of measuring it against that which he knew to belong to his nation. It is not un- likely that he formed his plans during the earlier period of Artabanus's reign, when that monarch allowed him- self to be imposed upon by Caracallus, and suffered 1 Herodian. vi. 6 and 11. See below, p. 42. 2 The generally historical charac- ter of Firdusi's Shalis-nameh, or ' Book of the Kings,' is well known. The best critics admit that Firdusi wrote from materials belonging to Sassanian times (Max Midler in Bunsen's Philosophy of History, vol. iii. p. 121). 14 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. L calamities and indignities in consequence of his folly. 1 When the Parthian monarch atoned for his indiscre- tion, and wiped out the memory of his disgraces by the brilliant victory of Nisibis and the glorious peace which he made with Macrinus, Artaxerxes may have found that he had gone too far to recede ; or, undazzled by the splendour of these successes, he may still have judged that he might with prudence persevere in his enterprise. Artabanus had suffered great losses in his two campaigns against Rome, and especially in the three days battle of Nisibis. He was at variance with several princes of his family, one of whom certainly maintained himself during his whole reign with the state and title of c King of Parthia.' 2 Though he had fought well at Nisibis, he had not given any indica- tions of remarkable military talent. Artaxerxes, having taken the measure of his antagonist during the course of the Roman war, having estimated his resources and formed a decided opinion on the relative strength of Persia and Parthia, deliberately resolved, a few years after the Roman war had come to an end, 3 to revolt and accept the consequences. He was no doubt con- vinced that his nation would throw itself enthusias- tically into the struggle, and he believed that he could conduct it to a successful issue. He felt himself the champion of a depressed, if not an oppressed, 4 nation- ality, and had faith in his power to raise it into a lofty position. Iran, at any rate, should no longer, he re- 1 See the Author's Sixth Mon- archy, pp. 354-G. 2 Ibid. pp. 348-350. 3 The Roman war terminated a.d. 217. The first revolt of Ar- taxerxes probably occurred ab. a.d. 220. 4 Agathangelus, the Armenian historian, makes Artaxerxes tax Artabanus and the Parthians gen- erally with cruelty and oppression (ii. § 5); but he gives no instances of either. Ch. L] HOPES OF ARTAXERXES. 15 solved, submit patiently to be the slave of Turan ; the keen, intelligent, art-loving Aryan people should no longer bear submissively the yoke of the rude, coarse, clumsy Scyths. An effort after freedom should be made. He had little doubt of the result. The Persians, by the strength of their own right arms and the bless- ing of Ahuramazda, the 1 All-bounteous, 7 1 would tri- umph over their impious masters, and become once more a great and independent people. At the worst, if he had miscalculated, there would be the alternative of a glorious death upon the battle-field in one of the noblest of all causes, the assertion of a nation's freedom. 2 1 Ahuva-mazda is ' the much-giv- ing Spirit.' Mazda, * much-giving,' was often used as a name by itself, instead of the longer Ahura-mazda. 2 Agathangelus makes Artaxer- xes say 'Op[ir]Gio[i£v TzpoQ TrapaTatjtv ' Kpeirrov yap Oavelv tj elvat dovTioi deano- tov adiKovvwc (i. 5, ad Jin.). 16 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. II. CHAPTER II. Situation and Size of Persia. General Character of the Country and Climate. Chief Products. Characteristics of the Persian People, physical and moral. Differences observable in the Race at different periods. 'H Wepoic eon noTikri fiev ev rrj Txapakia . . . iroTiv 6e fid&v tv rfj fieooyaia. Stkabo, xv. 3, § 1. Persia Proper was a tract of country lying on the Gulf to which it has given name, and extending about 450 miles from north-west to south-east, with an av- erage breadth of about 250 miles. Its entire area may be estimated at about a hundred thousand square miles. It was thus larger than Great Britain, about the size of Italy, and rather less than half the size of France. 1 The boundaries were, on the west, Elymais or Susiana (which, however, was sometimes reckoned a part of Persia) ; 2 on the north, Media ; on the east, Carmania ; 3 and on the south, the sea. It is nearly represented in modern times by the two Persian prov- inces of Farsistan and Laristan, the former of which retains, but slightly changed, the ancient appellation. The Hindyan or Tab (ancient Oroatis) seems towards 1 The area of France was esti- mated in 1868 at 213,324 square miles. It is now not much over 200,000 sq. miles. That of Great Britain is about 90,000 sq. miles; that of Italy, without the islands, under 100,000. 2 Strabo says: I'^fdov 6e ti kcu tj l>ovG/.g uepog yeyevrjraL ttjc Xlepoidoc — 'Susiana has almost become a part of Persia' (xv. 3, § 2). 3 Carmania was in ancient times reckoned a part of Persia (Herod, i. 125) ; but the later classical writers (Strabo, Arrian) and the Persian ruthoritiesforthe Sassanian period make it a distinct country. Ch. II. ] DESCRIPTION OF PERSIA PROPER. 17 its mouth to have formed the western limit. 1 East- ward, Persia extended to about the site of the modern Bunder Kongo. 2 Inland, the northern boundary ran probably a little south of the thirty-second parallel, from long. 50° to 55°. The line dividing Persia Proper from Carmania (now Kerman) was somewhat uncertain. The character of the tract is extremely diversified. Ancient writers divided the country into three strongly contrasted regions. The first, or coast tract, was (they said) a sandy desert, producing nothing but a few dates, owing to the intensity of the heat. Above this was a fertile region, grassy, with well- watered meadows and numerous vineyards, enjoying a delicious climate, producing almost every fruit but the olive, containing pleasant parks or paradises,' watered by a number of limpid streams and clear lakes, well wooded in places, affording an excellent pasture for horses and for all sorts of cattle, abounding in water-fowl and game of every kind, and altogether a most delightful abode. Beyond this fertile region, towards the north, was a rugged mountain tract, cold and mostly covered with snow, of which they did not profess to know much. 3 In this description there is no doubt a certain amount of truth ; but it is mixed probably with a good deal of exaggeration, There is no reason to believe that the 1 Arrian, Hist. Ind. xl. 1. 2 Ibicl. xxxviii. 1. 3 See Strab. xv. 3, § 1, and Nearck. ap. Arr. Hist. Ind. xl. 2-4. The latter writer says : Trjv 6e TLepoida yfjv rpixf] vevefif/adaL tcjv upsuv koyoq Karex^t. To fikv avrr/g Tcpbg ry 'Rpvdpf/ OaXdovy qlkeo^evov ufificjdtg te dvai Kal aKapnov vtto KdVfMiroc; ' to (V em if/de lj£ irpbQ UpKTOV TE KOI [30pE7}V UVFjUOV LOVTDV KakCog KEKpdadai tuv upiuv ' kol tj]V X&PV V noiudea te eIvcll Kal TiEifiibvac vdpTjXovg Kal u/itteXov -noXkr/v (pEpeiv, Kal ocjoi uXaol Kapnol TT/iyv t/iacTjg ' irapadeLGOLOL te nai'Toloioi TEdrfkkvai, Kal TcoTa/LLoioi Kadapoim SiappEEcOai tcai TlLjLLVrjGL, Kal bpVLOLV OKOOOLOLV afi6l TzoTafiovg te Kal Xi^ivaq eotI tu yOsa, ittttolgl te uyadrjv eivai, Kal toIolv akkoioiv VTTO&yloLoi vi/zeoOcu, Kal vku- 6 ELL TE TiOXkaXT} Kal TTokvBlJpOV ' TljV 7 6 irpocru ETL Fit' apKTOV iovTtov x eL i l£ P L7 l v Kal vicpETudEa. 18 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IL climate or character of the country has undergone any important alteration between the time of Near- chus or Strabo and the present day. At present it is certain that the tract in question answers but very incompletely to the description which those writers give of it. Three regions may indeed be dis- tinguished, though the natives seem now to speak of only two y 1 but none of them corresponds at all ex- actly to the accounts of the Greeks. The coast tract is represented with the nearest approach to correctness. This is, in fact, a region of arid plain, often impregnated with salt, ill- watered, with a poor soil, consisting either of sand or clay, and productive of little besides dates and a few other fruits. 2 A modern historian 3 says of it that 1 it bears a greater resemblance in soil and climate to Arabia than to the rest of Persia.' It is very hot and unhealthy, and can at no time have sup- ported more than a sparse and scanty population. Above this, towards the north, is the best and most fertile portion of the territory. A mountain tract, 4 the continuation of Zagros, succeeds to the flat and sandy coast region, occupying the greater portion of Persia Proper. It is about two hundred miles in width, and consists of an alternation of mountain, plain, and nar- row valley, curiously intermixed, and hitherto mapped very imperfectly. 5 In places this district answers fully 1 The natives speak of a ghermsir or ' warm district,' and a serdsir or 'cold region' (Kinneirs Persian Empire, pp. 54, 200; Pottinger, Travels, p. 221 ; Geograph. Journal, vol. xxvii. p. 184). The ' warm region ' is known also as the Desh- tistan, or ' low country.' 2 See Pottinger, Travels, p. 54; Fraser, Khorasan, p. 71; Kinneir, pp. 54, 70, 81, 201. 3 Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i. p. 2. 4 It is curious that Strabo should characterise the middle region as 'flat' (ntdivri). His authority, Nearchus, did not make this mis- take. 5 Contributions towards a map of Persia Proper have been made i by Mr. Abbott, General Monteith, ! the Baron do Bode, and others (see Ch. II. J MOUNTAIN-TRACT OF PEKSIA PROPER. 19 to the description of Nearchus, being 1 richly fertile, picturesque, and romantic almost beyond imagination, with lovely wooded dells, green mountain sides, and broad plains, suited for the production of almost any crops/ 1 But it is only to the smaller moiety of the region that such a character attaches ; more than half the" mountain tract is sterile and barren ; 2 the supply of water is almost everywhere scanty ; the rivers are few, and have not much volume ; many of them, after short courses, end in the sand, or in small salt lakes, from which the superfluous water is evaporated. Much of the country is absolutely without streams, and would be uninhabitable were it not for the Jcanats or Jcareezes* — subterranean channels made by art for the con- veyance of spring water to be used in irrigation. The most desolate portion of the mountain tract is towards the north and north-east, where it adjoins upon the third region, which is the worst of the three. This is a portion of the high table-land of Iran, the great desert which stretches from the eastern skirts of Zagros to the Hamoon, the Helmend, and the river of Subzawur. It is a dry and hard plain, intersected at intervals by ranges of rocky hills, 4 with a climate ex- tremely hot in summer and extremely cold in winter, incapable of cultivation, excepting so far as water can be conveyed by kanats, which is, of course, only a short distance. The fox, the jackal, the antelope, and the wild ass possess this sterile and desolate tract, Geograph. Journal, vols, xiii., xxv., and xxvii.) ; but much still remains to be done, especially towards the east and south-east. 1 See the Author's Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. p. 87, 2nd ed. 2 See Kinneir, Persian Empire, pp. 195-200; Ker Porter. Travels, vol. i. pp. 459, 472; Morier, First Journey, pp. 92, 147, 148; Geoc/raph. Journal, vol. xxv. pp. 29-78, vol. xxvii. pp. 149-184. 3 Fraser, Khorasan, p. 79; Morier, First Journey, p. 150. 4 Ker Porter, vol. i. pp. 455-463. 20 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. II. where 'all is dry and cheerless/ 1 and verdure is almost unknown. Perhaps the two most peculiar districts of Persia are the lake basins of Neyriz and Deriah-i-Nemek. The rivers given off from the northern side of the great mountain chain between the twenty-ninth and thirty- first parallels, being unable to penetrate the mountains, flow eastward towards the desert ; and their waters gradually collect into two streams, which end in two lakes, the Deriah-i-Nemek and that of Neyriz, or Lake Bakhtigan. 2 The basin of Lake Neyriz lies towards the north. Here the famous ' Bendamir ' 3 and the Pul- war or Kur-ab, flowing respectively from the north- east and the north, unite in one near the ruins of the ancient Persepolis, and, after fertilising the plain of Merdasht, 4 run eastward down a rich vale for a dis- tance of some forty miles into the salt lake which swal- lows them up. This lake, when full, has a length of fifty or sixty miles, with a breadth of from three to six. 5 In summer, however, it is often quite dry, 6 the water of the Bendamir being expended in irrigation before reaching its natural terminus. The valley and plain of the Bendamir, and its tributaries, are among the most fertile portions of Persia, as well as among those of most historic interest 7 1 Ker Porter, vol. i. p. 462. 2 Called also Lake Kheir. The name Bakhtigan, which maintains its place in our maps, is said to be at present unknown to the natives (Abbott, in Geograph. Journal, vol. xxv. p„ 71). 3 Moore, Lalla Bookh, 'Veiled Prophet,' p. 77; 'Fire-Worship- pers,' p. 232; &c. 4 Ker Porter, Travels, vol. i.p.683. r> Abbott, in Geograph. Journal, I vol. xxv. pp. 72-75. 6 Kinneir, Persian Empire, p. 60. 7 The ancient capita'!, Pasargadae, was situated in the valley of the Pulwar (or Cyrus), a tributary of the Bendamir. Persepolis, which superseded Pasargadse, was at the opening of the Pulwar into the Bendamir valley. Remains of Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, and other Achsemeniaii kings abound in these i two vales. Ch. II. ] LAKE BASINS. 21 The basin of the Deriah-i-Nemek is smaller than that of the Neyriz, but it is even more productive. Numerous brooks and streams, rising not far from Shiraz, run on all sides into the Nemek lake, which has a length of about fifteen and a breadth of three or three and a half miles. 1 Among the streams is the celebrated brook of Hafiz, the Rocknabad, which still retains 'its singular transparency and softness to the taste.' 2 Other rills and fountains of extreme clearness abound, 3 and* a verdure is the result, very unusual in Persia. The vines grown in the basin produce the famous Shiraz wine, the only good wine which is manufactured in the East. The orchards are magnifi- cent. In the autumn, L the earth is covered with the gathered harvest, flowers, and fruits ; melons, peaches, pears, nectarines, cherries, grapes, pomegranates ; all is a garden, abundant in sweets and refreshment.' 4 But, notwithstanding the exceptional fertility of the Shiraz plain and of a few other places, Persia Proper seems to have been rightly characterised in ancient times as 'a scant land and a rugged.' 5 Its area was less than a fifth of the area of modern Persia ; and of this space nearly one half was uninhabitable, consisting either of barren stony mountain or of scorching sandy plain, ill supplied with water and often impregnated with salt. Its products, conse- quently, can have been at no time either very abun- dant or very varied. Anciently, the low coast tract seems to have been cultivated to a small extent in 1 Ouseley, Travels, vol. ii. pp. 69, 70; Abbott, in Geograph. Journal, vol. xxvii. p. 151. 2 Ker Porter, vol. i. p. 686. 3 Ibid. pp. 689, 693, 697, &c. 4 Ibid. p. 709. 5 Herod, ix. 122. Compare Plat. Ler/. iii. p. 695, A; Ait. Exp. Alex. v. 4. 22 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. |Ch. II. corn, 1 and to have produced good dates and a few other fruits. 2 The mountain region was, as we have seen, 3 celebrated for its excellent pastures, for its abundant fruits, and especially for its grapes. Within the mountains, on the high plateau, assafetida (silphimri) was found, 4 and probably some other medicinal herbs. 5 Corn, no doubt, could be grown largely in the plains and valleys of the mountain tract, as well as on the plateau, so far as the kanats carried the water. There must have been, on the whole, a deficiency of timber, though the palms of the low tract, and the oaks, planes, chenars or sycomores, poplars, and willows 6 of the mountain regions sufficed for the wants of the natives. Not much fuel was required, and stone was the general material used for building. Among the fruits for which Persia was famous are especially noted the peach, 7 the walnut, and the citron. 8 The walnut bore among the Romans the appellation of 4 royal/ 9 Persia, like Media, was a good nursery for horses. 10 Fine grazing grounds existed in many parts of the mountain region, and for horses of the Arab breed even the Deshtistan was not unsuited. 11 Camels were reared in some places, 12 and sheep and goats were 1 Arrian, Hist. hid. xxxvii. 2, xxxviii. 9. 2 Ibid, xxxviii. 6; Strab. xv. 3, §1. 3 Supra, p. 19. 4 Plin. 11. N. xix. 3. 5 Ibid. xxiv. 17, xxvii. 13. 6 See Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. p. 140, note 18 . 7 Plin. xv. 13 and 14. The word 4 peach' is corrupted from the Latin persica. (Compare Germ. Pfirsche, Russ. persikie, and French peche. ) 8 Plin. II. N. xii. 3. 9 Ibid. xv. 22. 10 Arrian, Hist. Ind. xl. 4. Com- pare Herod, i. 136; Nic. Damasc. Fr. 66; Strab. xv. 3, § 18. The statement of Xenophon, that an- ciently a horse was a rarity in Persia Proper {Cyrop. i. 3, § 3), is one of the many to be found in the work known as the Cyropwdia, on which no dependence can be placed. 11 Kinneir, Persian Empire, p. 41 ; Fraser, Khorasan, p. 72. 12 Strab. xv. 3, § 1: npdg raic eoxaTialc rioiv ol Ka(j.7)?io(3onKo'i. Ch. II. I PRODUCTS. 2:5 numerous. 1 Horned cattle were probably not so abundant, as the character of the country is not favourable for them. 2 Game existed in large quanti- ties, 3 the lakes abounding with water-fowl, 4 such as ducks, teal, heron, snipe, &c. ; and the wooded por- tions of the mountain tract giving shelter to the stag, the wild goat, the wild boar, the hare, the pheasant, and the heathcock. 5 Fish were also plentiful. Whales visited the Persian Gulf, and were sometimes stranded upon the shores, where their carcases furnished a mine of wealth to the inhabitants. 6 Dolphins abounded, as well as many smaller kinds ; and shell-fish, particularly oysters, could always be obtained without difficult}'. 7 The rivers, too, were capable of furnishing fresh-water fish in good quantity, 8 though we cannot say if this source of supply was utilised in antiquity. The mineral treasures of Persia were fairly numer- ous. Good salt was yielded by the lakes of the middle region, and was also obtainable upon the plateau. Bitumen and naphtha were produced by sources in the low country. 9 The mountains contained most of the important metals and a certain number of valuable gems. 10 The pearls of the Gulf acquired early a great 1 Arrian, Hist. Ind. xxxvii. 10; Herod, i. 126. 2 Horned cattle are, however, mentioned among the domestic an- imals of Persia Proper, both by Herodotus (l.s.c.) and Nicolas of Damascus (Fr. 66). 3 Arrian, Hist. Ind. xl. 4: xupyv 7ro?iv0r)pov. 4 Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. p. 142. 5 Ibid. pp. 141-2. 6 Nearch. ap. Arr. Hist. Ind. xxxix. 4. 7 Ibid, xxxix. 5. 8 Ouseley, Travels, vol. i. pp. 261, 446, . 65. 4 Gibbon calls Babek a 4 tanner' (Decline and Fall, eh. viii. vol. i. p. 331), and De Sacy a k currier ' (corroyeur: Memoire stir les Inscrip- tions de NakhsJi-i-Rustam, p. 33, note 49). But Agathias, their authority, has okvtotouoc. 5 So Agathias, ii. p. 05, C. Ch. III.] LEGENDS CONNECTED WITH ARTAXERXES L 31 lowest class, 1 Papak, knowing by his art that the sol- dier's son would attain a lofty position, voluntarily ceded his rights as husband to the favourite of fortune, and bred up as his own the issue of this illegitimate commerce, who, when he attained to manhood, justified Papak's foresight by successfully revolting from Artabanus and establishing the new Persian monarchy. Others 2 said that the founder of the new kingdom was a Parthian satrap, the son of a noble, and that, having long meditated revolt, he took the final plunge in con- sequence of a prophecy uttered by Artabanus, who was well skilled in magical arts, and saw in the stars that the Parthian empire was threatened with destruc- tion. Artabanus, on a certain occasion, when he com- municated this prophetic knowledge to his wife, was overheard by one of her attendants, a noble damsel named Artaducta, already affianced to Artaxerxes and a sharer in his secret counsels. At her instigation he hastened his plans, raised the standard of revolt, and upon the successful issue of his enterprise made her his queen. Miraculous circumstances were freely in- terwoven with these narratives, 3 and a result was produced which staggered the faith even of such a writer as Moses of Chorine, who, desiring to confine himself to what was strictly true and certain, could find no more to say of Artaxerxes' birth and origin 1 JlavrtiTTaaL fiev uarjfioTarog. (Aga- thias, l.s.c. ) 2 Agathangelus, i. 9. 3 See Moses of Chorene (Hist. Armen. ii. 07), who declines to repeat these fables, remarking: 'Alienum estfabulas commemorare, de somnio cupidinis, de judicio, et igne ab Sasanc orlo, de grege con- cluso, atque ocnli albugine, et divinorum sen Chodiorum prcedic- tione, cseterisque quse sequuntur, nempe de stuprosa Artasiris mente, et caede, de vesana magi filiae ob vi- tulum eloquentia, &c.' Compare the story of Heftwad and the worm, related in the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh {Journal Asiatique for 1841, p. 501). 32 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. LCh. 111. than that he was the son of a certain Sasan, and a native of Istakr, or Persepolis. Even, however, the two facts thus selected as be- yond criticism by Moses are far from being entitled to implicit credence. Artaxerxes, the son of Sasan according to Agathangelus and Moses, 1 is the son of Papak (or Babek) in his own 2 and his son's inscrip- tions. The Persian writers generally take the same view, and declare that Sasan was a remoter ancestor of Artaxerxes, the acknowledged founder of the family, and not Artaxerxes 7 father. 3 In the extant records of the new Persian Kingdom, the coins and the inscrip- tions, neither Sasan nor the gentilitial term derived 1 Agathangelus, i . § 3 ; Mos. Chor. Hist. Armen. ii. 54, 66, &e. 2 De Sacy, Memoir e, &c, p. 30; Thomas, in As. Society's Journal, New Series, vol. iii. p. 269; Spiegel, Grammatik der Flu zvaresch-Sjw ache, p. 172; Haug, Old Pahlavi-Pazand Glossary, p. 5. The inscription of Artaxerxes is confirmed by those of his son, Sapor, who calls Papak (Babek) his grandfather (De Sacy, p. 31; Thomas, in Journal of the Asiatic Society, New Series, vol. iii. pp. 301, 314; Haug, Glossary, p. 46). There are also coins of Arta- xerxes which have his head on the obverse, with the legend Artahshetr, and on the other side the head of his father, with the legend Mazddisn bag Papak, ' the Ormazd-worship- ping divine Papak.' (See Mordt- mann's article in the Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenldndisclien Ge- sellschaft, vol. viii. p. 29; compare Thomas in Num. Chron. for 1872, p. 48.) 3 See Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, i. p. 89; Thomas in Num. Citron., New Series, No. xlv. p. 47. The variety, however, of the Persian accounts is almost infinite. The Lebtarikh makes Artaxerxes the son of Sasan, and calls Babek his maternal grandfather (D'Herbelot, Bibl. Orient, torn. i. p. 375). The Tarikh-Kozideh and Bina-Kiti agree on the latter point, but make Sasan the other (paternal) grandfather (ibid). The Zeenut-al-Tuarikh has two Sasan s, one of whom is the father and the other the grand- father of Babek. Macoudi gives two genealogies of Artaxerxes, each containing three Sasans, and one of them two, the other three Babeks (Prairies (f Or, torn. ii. p. 151): — Loh rasp Lohrasp Gustasp Gustasp Isfendiar Isfendiar i Bahman i Bahman i Sassan i Sassan i Dara i Mehremas Behawend i Babek i Sassan i Sassan i Babek 1 Babek 1 Sassan i Sassan Babek (Shah) i Babek 1 Ardeshir i Ardeshir Ch. III.] HIS PARENTAGE AND BIRTHPLACE. 33 from it, Sasanidae, has any place ; and though it would perhaps be rash to question on this account the em- ployment of the term Sasanidae by the dynasty, 1 yet we may regard it as really ' certain ' that the father of Artaxerxes was named, not Sasan, but Papak ; and that, if the term Sassanian was in reality a patro- nymic, it was derived, like the term 'Achaemenian, 7 2 from some remote progenitor 3 whom the royal fam- ily of the new empire believed to have been their founder. The native country of Artaxerxes is also variously stated by the authorities. Agathangelus calls him an Assyrian, 4 and makes the Assyrians play an important part in his rebellion. 5 Agathias says that he was born in the Cadusian country, 6 or the low tract south-west of the Caspian, which belonged to Media rather than to Assyria or Persia. Dio Cassius 7 and Herodian, 8 the contemporaries of Artaxerxes, call him a Persian ; and there can be no reasonable doubt that they are correct in so doing. Agathangelus allows the predominantly 1 The term seems to have been first used by the Armenian writers, who regarded Artaxerxes as the son of Sasan. (See Agathang. i. § 3, ad Jin.) Adopted from them by the Byzantines, it passed into the languages of modern Eu- rope. 2 This term (Hakhdmanishiya) was actually used by the kings of the Great Persian Empire from Cyrus to Artaxerxes Mnemon, as appears from their inscriptions. (See Sir H. Rawlinson's Cuneiform Inscriptions, vol. i. pp. 270, 271, 279, 320, 342, &c. ; and Loftus, Chaldcea and Susiana, p. 372.) It appears from the Behistun monu- ment that Darius Hystapis con- nected the name with a certain Achsemenes {Hakhdmanish), whom he regarded as his ancestor in the fifth degree. (Compare Herod, i. 125; iii. 75; vii. 11.) 3 Patkanian (Journ. Asiatiqueior 1866, p. 128) notes that, according to native Persian accounts, the first Sassan was a son of Artaxerxes Longimanus. The Sassanian kings undoubtedly claimed to descend from the Acha3menida3 ; but it is very unlikely that they could really trace their descent, nor has Sasan the form of an old Persian name. 4 'Etc rfjg Trarplac rye 'Aoovptac (i. § 3). 5 See §§ 5 and 8. 6 Sasan, according to Agathias, was travelling through the Cadu- sian country {diu tt/c Kadovoatuv Xupag) when he fell in with Babek who lived there (ii. p. 65). 7 Dio Cass. lxxx. 3. 8 Herodian, vi. 9. 34 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IIL Persian character of his revolt, and Agathias is ap- parently unaware that the Cadusian country was no part of Persia. The statement that he was a native of Persepolis (Istakr) is first found in Moses of Chorine. 1 It may be true, but it is uncertain ; for it may have grown out of the earlier statement of Agathangelus, that he held the government of the province of Istakr. 2 We can only affirm with confidence that the founder of the new Persian monarchy was a genuine Persian, without attempting to determine positively what Persian city or province had the hon- our of producing him. 3 A more interesting question, and one which will be found perhaps to admit of a more definite answer, is that of the rank and station in which Artaxerxes was born. We have seen 4 that Agathias (writing ab. a.d. 580) called him the supposititious son of a cobbler. Others 5 spoke of him as the child of a shepherd; while some said that his father was 'an inferior officer in the service of the government. 1 6 But on the other hand, in the inscriptions which Artaxerxes himself set up in the neighbourhood of Persepolis, 7 he gives his 1 Hist. Armen. ii. 66. The state- ment is repeated by Eutychius (vol. i. p. 367): 6 Anno imperii (Commo- di) decimo exorti Persae Babelem, Amidum, et Persiam occuparunt, duce nempe Ardashiro, filio Babeci filii Sasani, Estochrista,' 2 Ovrog 6 "'kpraapag Trjg rcbv 2 r ax p it uv narpldog oarpd'KrjQ V7T7/pX£V (i. 9). 3 Tabari says lie was a native of a city called Tirouze, which was in the government of Istakr. (Chro- nique, ii. p. 67.) 4 Supra, p. 30. 5 See D'Herbelot, Bibliotheque Orientate, torn. i. p. 375, ad voc. Ardschir-Babegan. 6 Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i. p. 89. Tabari calls him 4 Gov- ernor of Darab-gird.' (Chronique, torn. ii. p. 68.) 7 These inscriptions were first copied by Carsten Niebnhr, the father of the historian of Home, and are given in his Voyages, torn. ii. pi. xxvii. They may be found also in Chard in, Voyages en Perse, torn. ii. pi. lxxiii. ; De Sacy, J/e- moire, pi. i. ; Ker Porter, Travels, vol. i. pi. 23; and Flandin, Voyage en Perse, torn. iv. pi. 180. Papak is called malfra in the Persian, and [3aoi?ievc in the Greek version. Ch. III. I RANK OF HIS FATHER, PAPAK. 35 father, Papak, the title of 'King.' Agathangelus calls him a 1 noble ' 1 and 1 satrap of the Persepolitan government ; 7 2 while Herodian seems to speak of him as 'king of the Persians/ before his victories over Artabanus. 3 On the whole, it is perhaps most probable that, like Cyrus, he was the hereditary mon- arch of the subject kingdom of Persia, which had always its own princes under the Parthians, 4 and that thus he naturally and without effort took the leader- ship of the revolt when circumstances induced his nation to rebel and seek to establish its independ- ence. The stories told of his humble origin, which are contradictory and improbable, are to be paralleled with those which made Cyrus the son of a Persian of moderate rank, 5 and the foster-child of a herdsman. 6 There is always in the East a tendency towards ro- mance and exaggeration ; and when a great monarch emerges from a comparatively humble position, the humility and obscurity of his first condition are in- tensified, to make the contrast more striking between his original low estate and his ultimate splendour and dignity. The circumstances of the struggle between Ar- taxerxes and Artabanus are briefly sketched by Dio Cassius 7 and Agathangelus, 8 while they are related more at large by the Persian writers. 9 It is probable that the contest occupied a space of four or five 1 Twv fieyiGTuvcjv rig 'Apraaipat (i. 3). 2 See above, p. 34, note 2 3 Herodian, vi. 2. 4 Strabo, xv. 3, § 24; Isid. Char. §34. 5 Herod, i. 107. In an inscrip- tion of Cyrus he calls his father Cambyses 4 the powerful king ' (khshayathiya vazarka). 6 Ibid. i. 110-118. 7 Dio Cass. Ixxx. 3. 8 Agathangelus, i. §§ 8-9. The three battles are witnessed to by both writers. 9 The Persian accounts will be found condensed in Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, vol. i. pp. 90-92. Their authority is but slight. 36 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Cn. III. years. At first, we are told, 1 Artabanus neglected to arouse himself, and took no steps towards crushing the rebellion, which was limited to an assertion of the independence of Persia Proper, or the province of Fars. After a time the revolted vassal, finding himself unmolested, was induced to raise his thoughts higher, and commenced a career of conquest. Turning his arms eastward, he attacked Kerman (Carmania), and easily succeeded in reducing that scantily-peopled tract under his dominion. 2 He then proceeded to menace the north, and, making war in that quarter, overran and attached to his kingdom some of the out- lying provinces of Media. Roused by these aggres- sions, the Parthian monarch at length took the field, collected an army consisting in part of Parthians, in part of the Persians who continued faithful to him, 3 against his vassal, and, invading Persia, soon brought his adversary to a battle. A long and bloody contest followed, both sides suffering great losses ; but victory finally declared itself in favour of Artaxerxes, through the desertion to him, during the engagement, of a por- tion of his enemy's forces. 4 A second conflict ensued within a short period, in which the insurgents were even more completely successful ; the carnage on the side of the Parthians was great, the loss of the Persians small ; and the great king fled precipitately from the field. Still the resources 6f Parthia were equal to a third trial of arms. After a brief pause, Artabanus 1 Malcolm, p. 91. 2 Ibid, l.s.e. ; Tabari, ii. p. 70. Thomas (Num. Ghron. N"o. xlv., New Series, p. 54) assigns the earli- est coins of Artaxerxes to the period when he was King of Fars only, or perhaps of Fars and Kerman. 3 So Agathangelus : unl'i&io ' ApTai3dv7]g fiera HupOuv. ex^v k al o v k Tie pa a f , firj kekoi.- VG)vr}K(Wag 7?) tuv 6fi0({)v?i(jv (Sov'A?) (i. §8). 4 Ibid, l.s.c. ♦ Ch. III. J HIS CONTEST WITH ARTABANUS. 37 made a final effort to reduce his revolted vassal ; and a last engagement took place in the plain of Hormuz, 1 which was a portion of the Jerahi valley, in the beautiful country between Bebahan and Shuster. Here, after a desperate conflict, the Parthian monarch suffered a third and signal defeat; his army was scattered ; and he himself lost his life in the combat. According to some, his death was the result of a hand-to-hand conflict with his great antagonist, 2 who, pretending to fly, drew him on, and then pierced his heart with an arrow. The victory of Hormuz gave to Artaxerxes the dominion of the East ; but it did not secure him this result at once, or without further struggle. Artabanus had left sons ; 3 and both in Bactria and Armenia there were powerful branches of the Arsacid family, 4 which could not see unmoved the downfall of their kindred in Parthia. Chosroes, the Armenian monarch, was a prince of considerable ability, and is said to have been set upon his throne by Artabanus, whose brother he was, according to some writers. 5 At any rate he was an Arsacid ; and he felt keenly the diminution of his own influence involved in the transfer to an alien race of the sovereignty wielded for five centuries by the de- scendants of the first Arsaces. He had set his forces in 1 Dio Cassius (lxxx. 3) and Aga- thangelus (l.s.c) alike note the three engagements, but give no indica- tions of locality. We are indebted to the Persian writers for the men- tion of the 'plain of Hormuz.' (See Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i. p. 91.) They are not, however, all agreed upon the point, for the Modjmel -al- Tewarikh pi aces the battle at Nehavend near Ecbatana. (See the Journal Asiatique for 1841, p. 501.) 2 Metaphrastus, quoted by M. Langlois in his edition of Agathan- gelus, published in the Frar/m. Hist. Gr. of Mons. C. Midler, vol. v. pars 2nda, p. 113; Modjmfl-al-Tewarikh, l.s.c; Tabari, ii. p. 73. 3 Dio Cass, l.s.c. 4 Agathang. Pref. § 2; Hist. JRer/n. Tiridat. i. §9; Mos. Choren. Hist. Armen. ii. 65-69. 5 Agathang. Hist. i. § 9 (Greek version); Procop. Be . Ed if. Justin- ian, iii. 1. 38 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. III. motion, while the contest between Artabanus and Arta- xerxes was still in progress, in the hope of affording sub- stantial help to his relative. 1 But the march of events was too rapid for him ; and, ere he could strike a blow, he found that the time for effectual action had gone by, that Artabanus was no more, and that the dominion of Artaxerxes was established over most of the coun- tries which had previously formed portions of the Par- thian Empire. Still, he resolved to continue the struggle; he was on friendly terms with Rome, 2 and might count on an imperial contingent; he had some hope that the Bactrian Arsacidae would join him ; 3 at the worst, he regarded his own power as firmly fixed and as sufficient to enable him to maintain an equal contest with the new monarchy. Accordingly he took the Parthian Arsacids under his protection, and gave them a refuge in the Armenian territory. 4 At the same time he negotiated with both Balkh and Rome, made arrangements with the barbarians upon his northern frontier to lend him aid, 5 and, having col- lected a large army, invaded the new kingdom on the north-west, 6 and gained certain not unimportant suc- cesses. According to the Armenian historians, Arta- xerxes lost Assyria and the adjacent regions; Bactria wavered; and, after the struggle had continued for a year or two, the founder of the second Persian empire was obliged to fly ignominiously to India! 7 But this 1 Mos. Chor. ii. 08; Agathang. I.s.c. 2 Mos. Chor. ii. 09. Compare Herodian, vi. 5. 5 Mos. Chor. I.s.c. 4 Dio Cass. I.s.c. 5 According to Agathangelus (ii. § 1), Chosroes called in the aid of the Albanians, the Iberians, the Lepones, the Silvani, the Caspians, and the Huns (!). He was also helped by the Saracens (ii. § 4). 6 Agathang. ii. § Mos. Chor. ii. 09/ 7 So Moses (Hist. Arm. ii. 70. ad fin.). Agathangelus, however, the earlier writer, makes no such ex- treme assertion. According to him Ch. III.] WAR WITH CHOSROES OF ARMENIA. 39 entire narrative seems to be deeply tinged with the vitiating stain of intense national vanity, a fault which markedly characterises the Armenian writers, and renders them, when unconfirmed by other authorities, almost worthless. The general course of events, and the position which Artaxerxes takes in his dealings with Rome (a.d. 229 — 230), sufficiently indicate that any reverses which he sustained at this time in his struggle with Chosroes and the unsubmitted Arsacidse 1 must have been trivial, and that they certainly had no greater result than to establish the independence of Ar- menia, which, by dint of leaning upon Rome, 2 was able to maintain itself against the Persian monarch and to check the advance of the Persians in North-Western Asia, Artaxerxes, however, resisted in this quarter, and unable to overcome the resistance, which he may have regarded as deriving its effectiveness (in part at least) from the support lent it by Rome, determined (ab. a.d. 229) to challenge the empire to an encounter. Aware that Artabanus, his late rival, against whom he had measured himself, and whose power he had com- pletely overthrown, had been successful in his war with Macrinus, had gained the great battle of Nisibis, and forced the Imperial State to purchase an igno- minious peace by a payment equal to nearly two mil- Artaxerxes maintained the struggle, but with constant ill success, for twelve years (Hist. ii. §§ 2 and 3). Patkanian believes Chosroes to have ravaged the Persian territory as far as Ctesiphon ; to have there quar- relled with his allies, who quitted him; and after this to have had no great success, though he continued the war for ten years, from a.d. 227 to a.d. 237 (Journal Asiafique, 1806, pp. 142-3). 1 We might doubt whether any reverses at all were sustained, were it not for the statement of Dio: IttI tt/v 'Apfievlav rfhaoe, kuv- lavOa npog te tuv sfix^p'lcov xat 7rpo^ My5d)V rivCdv tuv re rov ' kprafiuvov TzatSojv TTTaLGag, Cyg fiev riveg Xeyov- olv, {(pvyev, 6g 6' trepoi, dvexcjpTjoe Tcpb^ TcapaoKevTjv dvvaueo)^ fiei&vog (lxxx. 3). 2 Mos. Chor. ii. 58-59. 40 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IIL lions of our money, 1 he may naturally have thought that a facile triumph was open to his arms in this direc- tion. Alexander Severus, the occupant of the imperial throne, was a young man of a weak character, controlled in a great measure by his mother, Julia Mamsea, and as yet quite undistinguished as a general. The Roman forces in the East were known to be licentious and insubordinate ; 2 corrupted by the softness of the cli- mate and the seductions of Oriental manners, they disregarded the restraints of discipline, indulged in the vices which at once enervate the frame and lower the moral character, had scant respect for their leaders, and seemed a defence which it would be easy to overpower and sweep away. Artaxerxes, like other founders of great empires, entertained lofty views of his abilities and his destinies ; the monarchy which he had built up in the space of some five or six years was far from contenting him ; well read in the ancient history of his nation, he sighed after the glorious days of Cyrus the Great and Darius Hystaspis, when all Western Asia from the shores of the JEgean to the Indian desert, and portions of Europe and Africa, had acknowledged the sway of the Persian king. The territories which these princes had ruled he regarded as his own by right of inheritance ; and we are told that he not only entertained, but boldly published, these views. 3 His emissaries everywhere declared that their master claimed the dominion of Asia as far as the iEgean Sea and the Propontis. It was his duty and his mission to recover to the Persians their pristine 1 See the Author's Sixth Mon- archy, p. 360. 2 They had recently murdered their general, Flavius Heracleon (Dio Cass. lxxx. 4). 3 Herodian, vi. 2; Dio Cass, lxxx* 3. Ch. III.] NEGOTIATIONS WITH ROME. 41 empire. What Cyrus had conquered, what the Per- sian kings had held from that time until the defeat of Codomannus by Alexander, was his by indefeasible right, and he was about to take possession of it. Nor were these brave words a mere brutum fulmen. Simultaneously with the putting forth of such . lofty pretensions, the troops of the Persian monarch crossed the Tigris and spread themselves over the entire Roman province of Mesopotamia, 1 which was rapidly overrun and offered scarcely any resistance. Severus learned at the same moment the demands of his adver- sary and the loss of one of his best provinces. He heard that his strong posts upon the Euphrates, the old defences of the empire in this quarter, were being attacked, 2 and that Syria daily expected the passage of the invaders. The crisis was one requiring prompt action ; but the weak and inexperienced youth was content to meet it with diplomacy, and, instead of sending an army to the East, despatched ambassadors to his rival with a letter. 1 Artaxerxes,' he said, 1 ought to confine himself to his own territories and not seek to revolutionise Asia ; it was unsafe, on the strength of mere unsubstantial hopes, to commence a great war. Every one should be content with keeping what belonged to him. Artaxerxes would find war with Rome a very different thing from the contests in which he had been hitherto engaged with bar- barous races like his own. He should call to mind the successes of Augustus and Trajan, and the trophies carried off from the East by Lucius Verus and by Septimius Severus. 7 1 Heroclian, l.s.c. Compare Lampridius (Vit. Al. Sev. § 56): 'Terras interamnanas ab impura ilia belua recepimusS 2 He rod i an. l.s c. 42 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. III. The counsels of moderation have rarely much effect in restraining princely ambition. Artaxerxes replied by an embassy in which he ostentatiously displayed the wealth and magnificence of Persia ; 1 but, so far from making any deduction from his original demands, he now distinctly formulated them, and required their immediate acceptance. 1 Artaxerxes, the Great King,' he said, 1 ordered 2 the Romans and their ruler to take their departure forthwith from Syria and the rest of Western Asia, and to allow the Persians to exercise dominion over Ionia and Caria and the other countries within the iEgean and the Euxine, since these coun- tries belonged to Persia by right of inheritance.' 3 A Roman emperor had seldom received such a message ; and Alexander, mild and gentle as he was by nature, seems to have had his equanimity disturbed by the insolence of the mandate. Disregarding the sacredness of the ambassadorial character, he stripped the envoys of their splendid apparel, treated them as prisoners of war, and settled them as agricultural colonists in Phrygia. If we may believe Herodian, he even took credit to himself for sparing their lives, which he regarded as justly forfeit to the offended majesty of the empire. Meantime the angry prince, convinced at last against his will that negotiations with such an enemy were futile, collected an army and began his march towards the East. Taking troops from the various provinces 1 Four hundred youths, selected from the tallest and most beautiful of the Persians, dressed in rich apparel, and with golden ornaments, mounted moreover on fine steeds, and armed with bows, carried the message of the Persian monarch to Rome (Herodian, vi. 4). 2 KeTtevei fieyag ftaatAevg Apm- &p$rft (KptaraaOai 'Pu/ialovg T£ not tov upxovra avrtiv Lvplag ie (ittuotjc ha'iac; re ri/g EvpuTrrj uvriKei/uevrjc. (Ibid.) 8 Elvat yap avrd Hepacbv TTpoyovLicd, KTT)fj.ara. (Ibid.) Oh. IILJ WAR WITH ROME. 43 through which he passed, 1 he conducted to Antio?h, in the autumn of a.d. 231, 2 a considerable force, which was there augmented by the legions of the East and by troops drawn from Egypt 3 and other quarters. Arta- xerxes, on his part, was not idle. According to Severus himself, 4 the army brought into the field by the Persian monarch consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand mailed horsemen, of eighteen hundred scythed chariots, and of seven hundred trained ele- phants, bearing on their backs towers filled with archers; and though this pretended host has been truly characterised as one 1 the like of which is not to be found in Eastern history, and has scarcely been imagined in Eastern romance, 75 yet, allowing much for exaggeration, we may still safely conclude that great exertions had been made on the Persian side, that their forces consisted of the three arms mentioned, and that the numbers of each were large beyond ordinary precedent. The two adversaries were thus not ill 1 Especially from Illyria, where some of the best Roman troops were always stationed to defend the frontier of the Danube. 2 There is some little doubt as to the exact chronology. I follow Clinton [F. R. vol. i. pp. 244-246). De Champagny makes Severus arrive in Antioch two years later — a.d. 233 (Les Cisars du troisieme tiiecle, torn. ii. p. 115). 3 Herodian, vi. 4, sub fin. 4 See the speech of Severus in the Senate on his return from the East, recorded by Lampridius ( Vit. Alex. Sev. § 56). 5 So Gibbon {Decline and Fall, ch. viii. vol. i. p. 253). The num- bers of the chariots and of the elephants are especially improbable. Though in the more ancient period of Oriental history we find instances of kings possessing 1,200 (Shishak, Benhadad), 1,400 (Solomon), and even 2,000 chariots (Ahab, accord- ing to the Black Obelisk), yet in later times only very moderate numbers were brought into the field. Xenophon reckons the chariots of an Oriental army at 300 [Cyrop. vi. 1, § 28); and the actual number employed at Arbela was only 200 (Arrian, Exp. Al. iii. 11; Q. 'Curt. iv. 12; Diod. Sic. xvii. 53). The Arsacid monarchs do not seem to have used chariots at all in warfare (Sixth Monarchy, p. 409). Nothing can well be more unlikely than that Artaxerxes should, within six years of his establishment as 4 great king,' have collected a force of 1,800 war chariots. On the improbability of the ' seven hundred elephants,' see the excellent note of Gibbon. 44 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. III. matched ; each brought the flower of his troops to the conflict ; each commanded the army, on which his dependence was placed, in person ; each looked to obtain from the contest not only an increase of mili- tary glory, but substantial fruits of victory in the shape of plunder or territory. It might have been expected that the Persian monarch, after the high tone which he had taken, would have maintained an aggressive attitude, have crossed the Euphrates, and spread the hordes at his disposal over Syria, Cappadocia, and Asia Minor. But it seems to be certain that he did not do so, and that the initiative was taken by the other side. Probably the Persian arms, as inefficient in sieges as the Parthian, 1 were unable to overcome the resistance offered by the Roman forts upon the great river ; and Artaxerxes was too good a general to throw his forces into the heart of an enemy's country without having first secured a safe retreat. The Euphrates was there- fore crossed by his adversary 2 in the spring of a.d. 232 ; the Roman province of Mesopotamia was easily recovered ; 3 and arrangements were made by which it was hoped to deal the new monarchy a heavy blow, if not actually to crush and conquer it. 4 Alexander divided his troops into three bodies. One 1 On the Parthian incapacity, see the Author's Sixth Monarchy, p. 406, note 4 . The early Persians had shown no such weakness (Ancient Monarchies, vol. iv. p. 180); but the warfare of the later Persians far more resembles that of the Parthians than the more scien- tific method of their own ancestors. 2 Herod i an. vi. 5. Compare Lampridius, § 55. 3 ' Terras interamnanas . . . re- cepimus.' (Sever, ap. Lamprid. § 56.) The series of Mesopotamian coins shows this boast to have been true. (See Mionnet, MMailles, torn, v. pp. 593-637; Supplement, torn, viii. pp. 391-416.) 4 Whatever judgment we form of the result of the campaign, it seems to me uncritical to set aside the rninu te details of He rod i an with respect to Alexander's plans and intentions. The fact that Lam- Ch. III. I PLANS OF ALEXANDER SEVERUS. 45 division was to act towards the north, to take advan- tage of the friendly disposition of Chosroes, king of Armenia, and, traversing his strong mountain territory, to direct its attack upon Media, into which Armenia gave a ready entrance. Another was to take a southern line, 1 and to threaten Persia Proper from the marshy tract about the junction of the Euphrates with the Tigris, a portion of the Babylonian territory. The third and main division, which was to be com- manded by the emperor in person, was to act on a line intermediate between the other two, which would conduct it to the very heart of the enemy's territory, and at the same time allow of its giving effective sup- port to either of the two other divisions if they should need it. The plan of operations appears to have been judi- ciously constructed, and should perhaps be ascribed rather to the friends whom the youthful emperor consulted 2 than to his own unassisted wisdom. But the best designed plans may be frustrated by unskilful- ness or timidity in the execution ; and it was here, if we may trust the author who alone gives us any detailed account of the campaign, 3 that the weakness pridius is completely silent with respect to all the details of the war ( ' indique aucuii des de'tails de la guerre,' De Champagny, ii. p. 122) is almost conclusive against the veracity of his story. 1 The present text of Herodian has ' north ' for 1 south ' here ; but the context clearly shows that either he or one of his copyists has made a mistake. 2 iKSljjUflSVOC OVV TOIC (j)l?ML(: EVEl/US TO GT QCLT LtOT LKOV Etg TpElC, [IQipag. (Herodian, v.i. 5.) 3 The relative credibility of Herodian and Lampridius in their respective accounts of Alexander's Persian campaign has long formed a subject of- dispute with historical critics. Among important names on either side are Gibbon and Nie- buhr for Herodian; Eckhel, Pro- fessor Ramsay, and De Champagny for his impugner. The main points in favour of Herodian are, first, his being a contemporary ; secondly, his general moderation and good sense; and thirdly, the minuteness and circumstantiality of his account, which stands in strong contrast with the vague boasts of Alexander him- self and his biographer. It is 46 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. III. of Alexander's character showed itself. The northern army successfully traversed Armenia, and, invading Media, proved itself in numerous small actions superior to the Persian force opposed to it, and was able to plunder and ravage the entire country at its pleasure. The southern division crossed Mesopotamia in safety, and threatened to invade Persia Proper. 1 Had Alexander with the third and main division kept faith with the two secondary armies, had he marched briskly and combined his movements with theirs, the triumph of the Roman arms would have been assured. But, either from personal timidity or from an amiable regard for the ahxieties of his mother Mamsea, he hung back while his right and left wings made their advance, and so allowed the enemy to concentrate their efforts on these sought to discredit Herodian by imputing to him a prejudice against Alexander; but, on the whole, his account of that prince is not an un- flattering portrait. Again, it is said (De Champagny, ii. p. 121) to be inconceivable that, if Herodian's account of the campaign had been true, the general result of the con- test should have been so absolutely without injury to Home as he him- self admits it to have been. Cer- tainly there is a difficulty here; but it is not insuperable. We, with our Western notions, should have expected Artaxerxes to have fol- lowed up his successes in a.d. 2-j2 by a great invasion of the Roman territory in a.d. 233. But we find him absolutely passive. This appears strange until we reflect that an Eastern army after a victory de- mands a time for rest and enjoy- ment ; that it has almost of necessity to be disbanded, and can only be collected again after a considerable interval. Eastern kings, moreover, are often lazy or capricious. Orodes did not follow up his victory over Crassus by any serious attack on the Roman territory until two years had passed (Sixth Monarchy, pp. 177-8). And a similar neglect of favourable opportunities is observ- able throughout Oriental history. It may be added that there is at least one expression in Lampridius which betrays the truth that he endeavours to conceal. The uni- versal cry of the Romans who ac- companied Alexander's triumphal procession from the Capitol to the Palace was, Lampridius tells us (§ 57), this — ' Rome is saved, since Alexander is safe, 9 Safety is only a subject of congratulation after imminent danger. 1 There is some difficulty in understanding Herodian here, since his geographical ideas are confused (Gibbon, ch. viii. note 51). He speaks of the second army as threat- ening both PartMa and Persia. The real Parthia, between the Caspian and Bactria, cannot, it seems to me, be intended. I sus- pect that he means by Parthia the tract about Ctesiphon, recently the head-quarters of Parthian power. Ch. III.1 FAILURE OF THE INVASION. 47 two isolated bodies. The army in Media, favoured by the rugged character of the country, was able to main- tain its ground without much difficulty ; but that which had advanced by the line of the Euphrates and Tigris, and which was still marching through the boundless plains of the great alluvium, found itself suddenly beset by a countless host, commanded by Artaxerxes in person, and, though it struggled gallantly, was over- whelmed and utterly destroyed by the arrows of the terrible Persian bowmen. Herodian says, no doubt with some exaggeration, that this was the greatest calamity which had ever befallen the Romans. 1 It certainly cannot compare with Cannae, with the disaster of Varus, or even with the similar defeat of Crassus in a not very distant region. But it was (if rightly repre- sented by Herodian) a terrible blow. It absolutely determined the campaign. A Caesar or a Trajan might have retrieved such a loss. An Alexander Severus was not likely even to make an attempt to do so. Already weakened in body by the heat of the climate and the unwonted fatigues of war, 2 he was utterly prostrated in spirit by the intelligence when it reached him. The signal was at once given for retreat. Orders were sent to the corps cTarmee which occupied Media to evacuate its conquests and to retire forth- with upon the Euphrates. These orders were executed, but with difficulty. Winter had already set in throughout the high regions ; and in its retreat the army of Media suffered great losses through the inclemency of the climate, so that those who reached 1 Me yiGTT) avrrj cv(i, noliefM*), tcpvet. Lampridius seems to have read Xty,^ for tto?le{ig). 2 The Persians had, however, lost a large number of their best troops. The Romans of the south- ern army had fought well, and their defeat had cost their enemy dear. (See Herodiau, vi. 6, sub fin.) 3 Persepolis seems to have now become the main Persian capital, under the native name of Istakr or Stakr. (Agathang. i. §9, sub fin.) It was threatened when the southern army of Severus was expected to invade Persia Proper (supra, p. 46). Ch. III. J RESULTS OF THE ROMAN WAR. 49 abandoned; and it had to be recognised that the struggle with Rome was one in which the two parties were very evenly matched, one in which it was not to. be supposed that either side would very soon obtain any decided preponderance. Under these circum- stances the grand ideas were quietly dropped ; the army which had been gathered together to enforce them was allowed to disperse, and was not required within any given time to reassemble ; it is not unlikely that (as Niebuhr conjectures 1 ) a peace was made, though whether Rome ceded any of her territory 2 by its terms is exceedingly doubtful. Probably the general principle of the arrangement was a return to the status quo ante helium, or, in other words, the acceptance by either side, as the true territorial limits between Rome and Persia, of those boundaries which had been previously held to divide the imperial pos- sessions from the dominions of the Arsacidse. The issue of the struggle was no doubt disappoint- ing to Artaxerxes ; but if, on the one hand, it dis- pelled some illusions and proved to him that the Roman State, though verging to its decline, never- theless still possessed a vigour and a life which he had been far from anticipating, on the other hand it left him free to concentrate his efforts on the reduc- tion of Armenia, which was really of more importance to him, from Armenia being the great stronghold of the Arsacid power, than the nominal attachment to the empire of half-a-dozen Roman provinces. So long 1 Lectures on Ancient History, j there having been no loss. The vol. iii. p. 278. j effigy of the Roman emperor con- 2 ' Rome must on that occasion j tinues upon the coins of the Meso- have lost many parts of her Eastern j potamian cities and states after the possessions.' (Niebuhr, l.s.c.) The . expedition of Alexander just as be- numismatic evidence is in favour of ' fore. 50 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. III. as Arsacidse maintained themselves in a position of independence and substantial power so near the Per- sian borders, and in a country of such extent and such vast natural strength as Armenia, there could not but be a danger of reaction, of the nations again reverting to the yoke whereto they had by long use become accustomed, and of the star of the Sasanidse paling before that of the former masters of Asia. It was es- sential to the consolidation of the new Persian Empire that Armenia should be subjugated, or at any rate that Arsacidae should cease to govern it ; and the fact that the peace which appears to have been made be- tween Rome and Persia, a.d. 232, set Artaxerxes at liberty to direct all his endeavours to the establish- ment of such relations between his own state and Armenia as he deemed required by public policy and necessary for the security of his own power, must be regarded as one of paramount importance, and as probably one of the causes mainly actuating him in the negotiations and inclining him to consent to peace on any fair and equitable terms. Consequently, the immediate result of hostilities ceasing between Persia and Rome w^as their renewal between Persia and Armenia. The war had indeed, in one sense, never ceased ; for Chosroes had been an ally of the Romans during the campaign of Severus, 1 and had no doubt played a part in the invasion and devastation of Media which have been described above. 2 But, the Romans having withdrawn, he was left wholly dependent on his own resources ; and the 1 Herod ian, vi. 5; Mos. Chor. ii. 69. Moses, it is true, calls the Ro- man emperor, who was the ally of Chosroes, Philip (!); but it is evi- dent that he lias been misled by a false view of Roman chronology. 2 See p. 46. Ch. III.] WAR RENEWED WITH ARMENIA. 51 entire strength of Persia was now doubtless brought into the field against him. Still he defended himself with such success, and caused Artaxerxes so much alarm, that after a time that monarch began to despair of ever conquering his adversary by fair means, and cast about for some other mode of accomplishing his purpose. Summoning an assembly of all the vassal kings, the governors, and the commandants throughout the empire, he besought them to find some cure for the existing distress, at the same time promising a rich reward to the man who should contrive an effectual remedy. The second place in the kingdom should be his; he should have dominion over one-half of the Arians; 1 nay, he should share the Persian throne with Artaxerxes himself, and hold a rank and dignity only slightly inferior. We are told that these offers pre- vailed with a noble of the empire, named Anak, 2 a man who had Arsacid blood in his veins, and belonged to that one of the three branches of the old royal stock which had long been settled at Bactria (Balkh), and that he was induced thereby to come forward and undertake the assassination of Chosroes, who was his near relative and would not be likely to suspect him of an ill intent. Artaxerxes warmly encouraged him in his design, and in a little time it was successfully carried out. Anak, with his wife, his children, his brother, and a train of attendants, pretended to take refuge in Armenia from the threatened vengeance of his sovereign, who caused his troops to pursue him, as a rebel and deserter, to the very borders of Armenia. 1 Mos. Chor. ii. 71 : 4 Ut dimidiam partem Ariorum in sua ditione tene- ret.' 2 "Ava/c in the Greek text of Aga- thangelusj* Anag in the Armenian (§ 13) ; Anacus in Winston's version of Moses of Chorene (ii. 71); Anak in Sepeos (iii. 1). 52. THE SEVENTH MONAKCHY [Cii. III. Unsuspicious of any evil design, Chosroes received the exiles with favour, discussed with them his plans for the subjugation of Persia, and, having sheltered them during the whole of the autumn and winter, proposed to them in the spring that they should accompany him and take part in the year s campaign. 1 Anak, forced by this proposal to precipitate his designs, contrived a meeting between himself, his brother, and Chosroes, without attendants, on the pretext of discussing plans of attack, and, having thus got the Armenian monarch at a disadvantage, drew sword upon him, together with his brother, and easily put him to death. The crime which he had undertaken was thus accomplished ; but he did not live to receive the reward promised him for it. Armenia rose in arms on learning the foul deed wrought upon its king; the bridges and the few practicable outlets by which the capital could be quitted were occupied by armed men ; and the mur- derers, driven to desperation, lost their lives in an attempt to make their escape by swimming the river Araxes. 2 Thus Artaxerxes obtained his object with- out having to pay the price that he had agreed upon ; his dreaded rival was removed; Armenia lay at his mercy ; and he had not to weaken his power at home by sharing it with an Arsacid partner. The Persian monarch allowed the Armenians no time to recover from the blow which he had treach- erously dealt them. His armies at once entered their territory 3 and carried everything before them. Chos- roes seems to have had no son of sufficient age to suc- ceed him, and the defence of the country fell upon the 1 Agathang. § 14. I tCw yetyvpuv tvdev kcu kvOev, mora- 2 'Ev TOlQ OTEVOiS 1T£pi,KVK?i6)aaVT£g flOppVXLOVC IZETTOiTJIiaCLV. (Ib. § 15. ) [oi GaTpuTrcu] rovg (pvyadac ev (ikou I 3 Ibid. c. iii. § 16. Ch. III.) ARMENIA SUBJUGATED. 53 satraps, or governors of the several provinces. These chiefs implored the aid of the Roman emperor, 1 and received a contingent ; but neither were their own exertions nor was the valour of their allies of any avail. Artaxerxes easily defeated the confederate army, and forced the satraps to take refuge in Roman territory. Armenia submitted to his arms, and became an integral portion of his empire. 2 It probably did not greatly trouble him that Artavasdes, one of the satraps, succeeded in carrying off one of the sons of Chosroes, a boy named Tiridates, whom he conveyed to Rome, and placed under the protection of the reigning emperor. 3 Such were the chief military successes of Artaxerxes. The greatest of our historians, Gibbon, ventures indeed to assign to him, in addition, 1 some easy victories over the wild Scythians and the effeminate Indians.' 4 But there is no good authority for this statement ; and on the whole it is unlikely that he came into contact with either nation. His coins are not found in Affghaiiis- tan ; 5 and it may be doubted whether he ever made any eastern expedition. His reign was not long ; and it was sufficiently occupied by the Roman and Arme- nian wars, and by the greatest of all his works, the reformation of religion. The religious aspect of the insurrection which transferred the headship of Western Asia from the Parthians to the Persians, from Artabanus to Arta- xerxes, has been already noticed ; 6 but we have now 1 Mos. Clior. ii. 73. Agathange- lus is silent on this point. 2 Agathang. l.s.c .; Mos. Chor. ii. 74. 3 Tacitus, according to Moses (ii. 73); but really, it is probable, the third Gordiaii. 4 Decline and Fall, ch. viii. (vol. i. p. 249). 5 Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 383. This writer notes that the assertion of Gibbon is 'somewhat unwarrantable.' G See above, pp. 8-10. 54 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. hi. to trace, so far as we can, the steps by which the religious revolution was accomplished, and the faith of Zoroaster, or what was believed to be such, estab- lished as the religion of the State throughout the new empire. Artaxerxes, himself (if we may believe Agathias 1 ) a Magus, was resolved from the first that, if his efforts to shake off the Parthian yoke succeeded, he would use his best endeavours to overthrow the Parthian idolatry and instal in its stead the ancestral religion of the Persians. This religion consisted of a combination of Dualism with a qualified creature- worship, and a special reverence for the elements, earth, air, water, and fire. Zoroastrianism, in the earliest form which is historically known to us, 2 postulated two independent and contending principles — a principle of good, Ahura-Mazda, and a principle of evil, Angro-Mainyus. These beings, who were coeternal and coequal, were engaged in a perpetual struggle for supremacy ; and the world was the battle- field wherein the strife was carried on. Each had called into existence numerous inferior beings, through whose agency they waged their interminable conflict. Ahura-Mazda (Oromazdes, Ormazd) had created thou- sands of angelic beings to perform his will and fight on his side against the Evil One ; and Angro-Mainyus (Arimanius, Ahriman) had equally on his part called into being thousands of malignant spirits to be his emissaries in the world, to do his work, and fight his battles. The greater of the powers called into being 1 Agath. ii. p. 64. 2 A critical analysis of the Zendavesta into its earlier and later portions seems to show that Dualism was a development out of an earlier Monotheism. (See the Author's Ancient Monarchies, vol iii. pp. 104-107.) But we only know the Persian religion historically from the time of Darius Hystaspis, when Dualism was cer- tainly a part of it. Ch. III.] CHARACTER OF ZOROASTRIANISM. 55 by Ahura-Mazda were proper objects of the worship of man, 1 though, of course, his main worship was to be given to Ahura-Mazda. Angro-Mainyus was not to be worshipped, but to be hated and feared. With this dualistic belief had been combined, at a time not much later than that of Darius Hystaspis, an entirely separate system, 2 the worship of the elements. Fire, air, earth, and water were regarded as essentially holy, and to pollute any of them was a crime. Fire was especially to be held in honour ; and it became an essential part of the Persian religion to maintain per- petually upon the fire-altars the sacred flame, supposed to have been originally kindled from heaven, and to see that it never went out. 3 Together with this ele- mental worship was introduced into the religion a profound regard for an order of priests called Magians, who interposed themselves between the deity and the worshipper, 4 and claimed to possess prophetic powers. 5 This Magian order was a priest-caste, and exercised vast influence, being internally organised into a hierarchy containing many ranks, and claiming a sanctity far above that of the best laymen. Artaxerxes found the Magian order depressed by the systematic action of the later Parthian princes, 6 who had practically fallen away from the Zoroastrian faith 1 Especially Mithra, the sun- god, whose worship may be traced back to the earliest Iranic times. 2 See the Author's Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. pp. 122-128. 8 Strabo, xv. 3, §§ 14 and 15 ; Dio Chrysost. Orat. Borysth. p. 449, A; Amm. Marc, xxiii. 6; Agathias, ii. 25. 4 Herod, i. 132; Strab. xv. 3, § 13; Amm. Marc, l.s.c. The early priests of the Zoroastrians were called kavij 'seers,' karapan, ' sac- ri fleers,' or usikhs, 6 wise men' (Haug, Essays on the Sacred Lan- guage, Writings, and Religion of the Par sees, pp. 245-247); never Magi. A term which some identify with Magus (maga or maghava) occurs twice, but twice only, in the Zend- avesta. (See Westergaard, Intro- duction to Zendavesta, p. 17. ) 5 Dino, Fr. 8; Schol. ad Nicandr. Ther. 613; Cic. Be Div. i. 23,41; Val. Max. i. 6. 6 Agathias, ii. p. 65. 56 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. III. and become mere idolaters. He found the fire-altars in ruins, the sacred flame extinguished, 1 the most essential of the Magian ceremonies and practices dis- regarded. 2 Everywhere, except perhaps in his own province of Persia Proper, he found idolatry estab- lished. Temples of the sun abounded, where images of Mithra were the object of worship, 3 and the Mithraic cult was carried out with a variety of impos- ing ceremonies. Similar temples to the moon existed in many places ; and the images of the Arsacidas were associated with those of the sun and moon gods in the sanctuaries dedicated to them. 4 The precepts of Zoroaster were forgotten. The sacred compositions which bore that sage's name, and had been handed down from a remote antiquity, were still indeed pre- served, if not in a written form, 5 yet in the memory of the faithful few who clung to the old creed ; but they had ceased to be regarded as binding upon their consciences by the great mass of the Western Asiatics. Western Asia was a seething-pot, in which were mixed up a score of contradictory creeds, old and new, rational and irrational, Sabaism, Magism, Zoroastrian- ism, Grecian polytheism, teraphim-worship, Judaism, Chaldee mysticism, Christianity. Artaxerxes conceived it to be his mission to evoke order out of this confusion, to establish in lieu of this extreme diversity an abso- lute uniformity of religion. 1 Mos. Chor. ii. 74. 2 Herodian, iv. 30. 8 Mos. Chor. l.s.c. ; Dio Cass, lxxv. 12. 4 Mos. Chor. l.s.c. 5 i Whether,' says Professor Max Miiller, ' on the revival of the Per- sian religion and literature, 500 years after Alexander, the works of Zoroaster were collected and restored from extant MSS. or from oral tradition, must remain uncer- tain; and the disturbed state of the. phonetic system would rather lead us to suppose a long-continued influence of oral tradition^ (Bunsen's Phi- losophy of History, vol. iii. pp. 110-7.) Ch. III.] ART A XEKXES RESTORES ZOROASTRIANISM. 57 The steps which he took to effect his purpose seem to have been the following. He put down idolatry by a general destruction of the images, which he over- threw and broke to pieces. 1 He raised the Magi an hierarchy to a position of honour and dignity such as they had scarcely enjoyed even under the later Achaemenian princes, 2 securing them in a condi- tion of pecuniary independence by assignments of lands, 3 and also by allowing their title to claim from the faithful the tithe of all their possessions. 4 He caused the sacred fire to be rekindled on the altars where it was extinguished, 5 and assigned to certain bodies of priests the charge of maintaining the fire in each locality. He then proceeded to collect the sup- posed precepts of Zoroaster into a volume, in order to establish a standard of orthodoxy whereto he might require all to conform. He found the Zoroastrians themselves divided into a number of sects. 6 Among these he established uniformity by means of a c general council, ' which was attended by Magi from all parts of the empire, and which settled what was to be regarded as the true Zoroastrian faith. According to the Ori- ental writers, this was effected in the following way : — Forty thousand, or, according to others, eighty thou- sand Magi having assembled, they were successively reduced by their own act to four thousand, to four hundred, to forty, and finally to seven, the most highly 1 Mos. Chor. l.s.c. : 4 Statuas . . . Solisque et Luiise simulachra, Arta- sires conf regit.' 2 Agathias, l.s.c. 3 Amm. Marc, xxiii. 6; p. 373. The ' Magi an lands ' mentioned in this passage may have been in the possession of the caste under the Parthians; but at any rate Arta- xerxes must have sanctioned the arrangement. 4 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. i. p. 338. * Mos. Chor. ii. 74. 6 Seventy, according to the Ori- ental writers (see Gibbon, vol. i. p. 332); but this round number, a multiple of seven, is suspicious. 58 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. |Ch. III. respected for their piety and learning. Of these seven there was one, a young but holy priest, whom the uni- versal consent of his brethren recognised as pre-emi- nent. His name was Ard&-Yiraf. 'Having passed through the strictest ablutions, and drunk a powerful opiate, he was covered with a white linen and laid to sleep. Watched by seven of the nobles, including the king, he slept for seven days and nights ; and, on his reawaking, the whole nation listened with believ- ing wonder to his exposition of the faith of Ormazd, which was carefully written down by an attendant scribe for the benefit of posterity. 7 1 The result, however brought about, which must al- ways remain doubtful, was the authoritative issue of a volume which the learned of Europe have now pos- sessed for some quarter of a century, 2 and which has recently been made accessible to the general reader by the labours of Spiegel. 3 This work, the Zendavesta, while it may contain fragments of a very ancient literature, 4 took its present shape in the time of Arta- xerxes, and was probably then first collected from the mouths of the Zoroastrian priests and published by Ard&-Viraf. Certain additions may since have been made to it ; but we are assured that ' their num- ber is small,' and that we ' have no reason to doubt 1 Milman, History of Christian- ity, vol. ii. p. 251. (Compare the dissertation of Bredow, prefixed to Syncellus, vol. ii., in the Corpus Hist. Byzant of B. G. Niebuhr, Bonn, 1821).) 2 Anqnetil Dnperron, who, to- wards the close of the last century, professed to translate the Zend- avesta into French, was incompe- tent to the task, and gave a wrong impression of the true character of the volume. Burnouf first edited with correctness a portion of the text, which has since been published in its entirety by Westergaard (1852-1854) and Spiegel (1851- 1858). 3 See his Translation of the Avesta, Berlin, 1861. 4 On this point the reader may consult Haug's Essays on the Sacred j Language . 135, A. 4 Saca-stan is ' the country of the Saka' (Sacse or Scyths). It received the name probably at the time of the great invasion of the Yue-Chi. (See the Author's Sixth Monarchy, p. 117.) 5 The subjection of the Segestani is perhaps the subject of the bas- Ch. v.] reign of VARAHRAN II. 109 desultory contest followed without definite result, which was not concluded by the year a.d. 283, when he found himself suddenly engaged in hostilities on the opposite side of the empire. 1 Rome, in the latter part of the third century, had experienced one of those reactions which mark her later history, and which alone enabled her to complete her predestined term of twelve centuries. Between the years a.d. 274 and 282, under Aurelian, Tacitus, Probus, and Cams, she showed herself once more very decidedly the first military power in the world, drove back the barbarians on all sides, and even ventured to indulge in an aggressive policy. Aurelian, as we have seen, was on the point of invading Persia when a do- mestic conspiracy brought his reign and life to an end. Tacitus, his successor, scarcely obtained such a firm hold upon the throne as to feel that he could with any prudence provoke a war. But Probus, the next em- peror, revived the project of a Persian expedition, 2 and would probably have led the Roman armies into Me- sopotamia, had not his career been cut short by the revolt of the legions in Illyria (a.d. 282). Cams, who had been his praetorian prefect, and who became em- peror at his death, adhered steadily to his policy. It was the first act of his reign to march the forces of the empire to the extreme east, and to commence in earnest the war which had so long been threatened. Led by the Emperor in person, the legions once more relief represented by Flandin (pi. 51), where the monarch wears the peculiar headdress of Varahran II. 1 The bulk of the Persian forces were ' detained on the frontiers of India' when Cams crossed the Euphrates (Gibbon, vol. ii. p. 55). 2 p r obus, in a.d. 279, dismissed a Persian embassy with threats (Yopisc. prob. § 17). Soon after- wards, however, he 'made peace with the Persians' (ibid. § 18). But a little before his death, in a.d. 282, we hear of his meditating a Persian expedition (ibid. § 20). 110 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. V. crossed the Euphrates. Mesopotamia was rapidly- overrun, since the Persians (we are told) were at va- riance among themselves, and a civil war was raging. 1 The bulk of their forces, moreover, were engaged on the opposite side of the empire in a struggle with the Indians, 2 probably those of Affghanistan. Under these circumstances, no effectual resistance was possible ; and, if we may believe the Roman writers, not only was the Roman province of Mesopotamia recovered, but the entire tract between the rivers as far south as the latitude of Baghdad was ravaged, and even the two great cities of Seleucia and Ctesiphon were taken with- out the slightest difficulty. 3 Persia Proper seemed to lie open to the invader, and Cams was preparing to penetrate still further to the east, when again an oppor- tune death checked the progress of the Roman arms, and perhaps saved the Persian monarchy from destruc- tion. Carus had announced his intention of continuing his march ; some discontent had shown itself ; and an oracle had been quoted which declared that a Roman emperor would never proceed victoriously beyond Ctesiphon. Carus was not convinced, but he fell sick, and his projects were delayed ; he was still in his camp near Ctesiphon, when a terrible thunderstorm broke over the ground occupied by the Roman army. A weird darkness was spread around, amid which flash followed flash at brief intervals, and peal upon peal terrified the superstitious soldiery. Suddenly, after the most violent clap of all, the cry arose that the Emperor was dead. 4 Some said that his tent had been struck by 1 Vopisc. Car. § 8. 4 See the letter of the secretary, 2 Gibhon, l.s.c. Julius Calpurnius, preserved by 3 Vopisc. l.s.c; Eutrop. ix. 18; Vopiscus (l.s.c), and translated by Aurel. Vict. Cces. xxxviii. Com- Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. ii. pare Mos. Chor. Hist. Arm. ii. 76. pp. 55-0). Ch. V.] WAR OF VARAHRAN II. WITH CARUS. Ill lightning, and that his death was owing to this cause ; others believed that he had simply happened to suc- cumb to his malady at the exact moment of the last thunder-clap ; a third theory was that his attendants had taken advantage of the general confusion to assas- sinate him, and that he merely added another to the long list of Roman emperors murdered by those who hoped to profit by their removal. It is not likely that the problem of what really caused the death of Carus will ever be solved. 1 That he died very late in a.d. 283, or within the first fortnight of a.d. 284, is certain ; 2 and it is no less certain that his death was most fortu- nate for Persia, since it brought the war to an end when it had reached a point at which any further re- verses would have been disastrous, and gave the Per- sians a breathing-space during which they might, at least partially, recover from their prostration. Upon the death of Carus, the Romans at once de- termined on retreat. It was generally believed that the imperial tent had been struck by lightning ; and it was concluded that the decision of the gods against the further advance of the invading army had been thereby unmistakably declared. 3 The army considered that it had done enough, and was anxious to return home ; the feeble successor of Carus, his son Numerian, if he possessed the will, was at any rate without the power 1 Gibbon seems to believe that Carus was killed by lightning (vol. ii. p. 56). Niebuhr wavers between lightning and assassination (Lectures, vol. iii. p. 305, E. T.). De Champagny says that the whole matter is shrouded in impenetrable mysterv (Cesars du 3 me Steele, torn, iii. p. 186). 2 See Clinton, F. B. vol. i. p. 324; and compare De Champagny, torn. iii. p. 186, note *. 3 It was an old Roman super- stition that 'places or persons struck with lightning were sin- gularly devoted to the wrath of heaven' (Gibbon, vol. i. p. 413). There was also a special belief that ' when the prsetorium was struck, it foreboded the destruction of the army itself (Niebuhr, Lectures, vol. iii. p. 305, E.T.). 112 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. V. to resist the wishes of the troops ; and the result was that the legions quitted the East without further fighting, 1 and without securing, by the conclusion of formal terms of peace, any permanent advantage from their victories. A pause of two years now occurred, during which Varahran had the opportunity of strengthening his position while Rome was occupied by civil wars and distracted between the claims of pretenders. 2 No great use seems, however, to have been made of this interval. When, in a.d. 286, the celebrated Diocletian deter- mined to resume the war with Persia, and, embracing the cause of Tiridates, son of Chosroes, directed his efforts to the establishment of that prince, as a Roman feudatory, on his father's throne, Varahran found him- self once more overmatched, and could offer no effec- tual resistance. Armenia had now been a province of Persia for the space of twenty-six (or perhaps forty- six) years ; 3 but it had in no degree been conciliated or united with the rest of the empire. The people had been distrusted and oppressed ; the nobles had been deprived of employment ; a heavy tribute had been laid on the land ; and a religious revolution had been 1 When Numerian is credited with Persian victories (Nemes. Cyneget. 71-2), it is on the notion that, having been associated by Cams, he had part in the successes of a.d. 283. That Numerian re- treated upon the death of his father without tempting fortune any fur- ther, is clear from Aur. Vict. Cces. xxxviii., and Vopiscus, Numer. § 11. 2 During this interval Kumerian was killed, Diocletian invested with the purple, Carinus defeated and slain, and Maximian associated. (Gibbon, vol. ii. pp. 60-66.) 3 Moses of Chorene makes the subjection of Armenia to Persia last twenty-six years (Hist. Arm. ii. 74, sub fin.). But if he is right in making Artaxerxes the king who reduced Armenia, and in stat- ing that Tiridates regained the throne in the third year of Diocletian (ii. 79), the duration of the sub- jection must have been, at least, forty-six years, since Artaxerxes died in a.d. 241, and the third of Diocletian was a.d. 286. Gh. V.] REVOLT OF ARMENIA. 113 violently effected. 1 It is not surprising that when Tiridates, supported by a Roman corps d'armee? ap- peared upon the frontiers, the whole population received him with transports of loyalty and joy. All the nobles flocked to his standard, and at once acknowledged him for their king. 3 The people everywhere welcomed him with acclamations. A native prince of the Arsacid dynasty united the suffrages of all ; and the nation threw itself with enthusiastic zeal into a struggle which was viewed as a war of independence. It was for- gotten that Tiridates was in fact only a puppet in the hand of the Roman emperor, and that, whatever the result of the contest, Armenia would remain at its close, as she had been at its commencement, a depend- ant upon a foreign power. The success of Tiridates at the first was such as might have been expected from the forces arrayed in his favour. He defeated two Persian armies in the open field, drove out the garrisons which held the more important of the fortified towns, and became undis- puted master of Armenia. 4 He even crossed the bor- der which separated Armenia from Persia, and gained signal victories on admitted Persian ground. 5 Accord- ing to the native writers, his personal exploits were extraordinary ; he defeated singly a corps of giants, and routed on foot a large detachment mounted on elephants ! 6 The narrative is here, no doubt, tinged 1 Mos. Chor. ii. 77. 2 Moses omits this feature of the struggle, but Agathangelus supplies it. (Agathang. Hist. Regn. Tiridat. C. iii. § 21 : 6 fiaoilevs tov TrjprjduTTjv, . . . OTparev/Lia elg [3ur/6eiav tyxzip'iaaQ) unehvaev etc 77/v id'tav xupav.) 8 Mos. Chor. ii. 79. 4 Agathang. iii. § 21; Mos. Chor. l.s.c. 5 Especially in Assyria. (Aga- thang. iv. § 55: u/v enapx'tav ttjc 'Aocvp'iac en('na^e deivoruraig n?i7]yai(;. Mos. Chor. ii. 79, ad fin.) G So Moses. Agathangelus, while praising highly the warlike quali- ties of Tiridates (l.s.c.), avoids these improbable details. 114 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. |Ch. V. with exaggeration ; but the general result is correctly stated. Tiridates, within a year of his invasion, was complete master of the entire Armenian highland, and was in a position to carry his arms beyond his own frontiers. Such seems to have been the position of things, when Varahran II. suddenly died, after a reign of seventeen years, 1 a.d. 292. He is generally said to have left behind him two sons, 2 Varahran and Narsehi, or Narses, of whom the elder, Varahran, was proclaimed king. This prince was of an amiable temper, but apparently of a weekly constitution. He was with difficulty per- suaded to accept the throne, 3 and anticipated from the first an early demise. 4 No events are assigned to his short reign, which (according to the best authorities) did not exceed the length of four months. 5 It is evi- dent that he must have been powerless to offer any 1 Agathias, iv. p. 134, D; Eu- tych. vol. i. p. 387. Mirkhond agrees (Histoire des Sassanides, p. 299), but notes that his authorities varied. Malcolm says that some of the native writers allow him only thirteen years (History of Persia, vol. i. p. 103, note). Ta- bari gives him no more than four! (Chronique, ii. p. 90). 2 Tabari says (l.s.c.) that Varah- ran II. had no son, but was suc- ceeded by his brother Narses. Narses himself says that he was the son of Sapor and grandson of Artaxerxes. It is thought that he may have omitted his immediate ancestors as persons of small ac- count (Thomas in Num. Chron. for 1872, p. 113); but such omission is very unusual. 3 Mirkhond, p. 300. A bas- relief at Nakhsh-i-Rustam seems to represent him as receiving the crown from his mother. (Ker Por- ter, pi. 19.) 4 The inaugural address of Va- rahran III. is reported as follows: 4 I ascend this throne by right, as the issue of your kings; but the sole end which I propose to myself in ruling is to obtain for the people who shall be subject to me a happy and quiet life. I place all my trust in the goodness of God, through whose help all things may end happily. If God preserves my life, I will conduct myself towards you in such a way that all who hear me spoken of will load me with blessings. If, on the contrary, the angel of death comes and carries me away, I hope that God will not forsake you or suffer you to perish.' (Mirkhond, Hist des Sassanides, l.s.c.) 5 Agathias, l.s.c. ; Eutych. vol. i. p. 395. So also Firdusi in the Shah-nameh. Some Oriental writers, however, gave him a reign of nine years. (Mirkhond, l.s.c.) Ch. V.] REIGN OF VARAHRAN III. 115 COIN OF VARAHRAN III. effectual opposition to Tiridates, whose forces continued to ravage, year after year, the north- western provinces of the Persian em- pire. 1 Had Tiridates been a prince of real military talent, it could scarcely have been difficult for him to obtain still greater advantages. But he was content with annual raids, which left the substantial power of Persia untouched. He al- lowed the occasion of the throne's being occupied by a weak and invalid prince to slip by. The consequences of this negligence will appear in the next chapter. Per- sia, permitted to escape serious attack in her time of weakness, was able shortly to take the offensive and to make the Armenian prince regret his indolence or want of ambition. The son of Chosroes became a second time a fugitive ; and once more the Romans were called in to settle the affairs of the East. We have now to trace the circumstances of this struggle, and to show how Rome under able leaders succeeded in revenging the defeat and captivity of Valerian, and in inflicting, in her turn, a grievous humiliation upon her adversary. 1 Agathang. iv. §§ 55 and 57. 116 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VL CHAPTER VI. Civil War of Narses and his Brother Hormisdas. Narses victorious. He attacks and expels Tiridates. War declared against him by Dio- cletian. First Campaign of Galerius, a.d. 297. Second Campaign, a.d. 298. Defeat suffered by Narses. Negotiations. Conditions of Peace. Abdication and Death of Narses. Napcrjg efidofiog avaypufcTai pacikevcai Hepetiv and 'Apra^ep^ov. Zonoras, xii. 31. It appears that on the death of Varahran III., prob- ably without issue, there was a contention for the crown between two brothers, 1 Narses and Hormisdas. 2 We are not informed which of them was the elder, nor on what grounds they respectively rested their claims ; but it seems that Narses was from the first preferred by the Persians, and that his rival relied mainly for success on the arms of foreign barbarians. 1 The relationship of Narses to his predecessor is exceedingly doubtful. He himself declares in an inscription that he was the son of Sapor and the grandson of Artaxerxes (see above, p. 114, note' 2 ); and his statement is con- firmed by the Arabian writer, Abu Obei'dah (Macoudi, torn. ii. p. 2o8), and by the Armenian historian, Sepeos. (See the Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 149.) Tabari, how- ever, makes him the son of Varah- ran I. (C/ironique, torn. ii. p. 90.) So Macoudi (torn. ii. p. 174). Agathias avoids the question of relationship. Mirkhond (p. 301) and the Persian writers generally say that he was the son of Varah- ran II. For my own part, I should incline to accept his own statement, and to suppose that, Varahran III. having died without issue, the crown reverted to his great-great- uncle, a man of years and ex- perience, who, however, was not allowed to enjoy the throne with- out a struggle with another prince of the royal house, a certain Hor- misdas. 2 This passage of history rests entirely on a single sentence in a Latin writer of uncertain date, the author of the 4 Panegyric ' quoted by Gibbon {Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 81, note 61 ). Ch. VI. ] ACCESSION OF NARSES. 117 Worsted in encounters wherein none but Persians fought on either side, Hormisdas summoned to his aid the hordes of the north 1 — Gelli from the shores of the Caspian, Scyths from the Oxus or the regions beyond, and Russians, now first mentioned by a classical writer. But the perilous attempt to settle a domestic struggle by the swords of foreigners was not destined on this occasion to prosper, Hormisdas failed in his endeavour to obtain the throne ; and, as we hear no more of him, we may regard it as probable that he was defeated and slain. At any rate Narses was, within a year or two of his accession, so firmly settled in his kingdom, that he was able to turn his thoughts to the external affairs of the empire, and to engage in a great war. All danger from internal disorder must have been pretty certainly removed before Narses could venture to affront, as he did, the strongest of existing military powers. Narses ascended the throne in a. d. 292 or 293. It was at least as early as a.d. 296 that he challenged Rome to an encounter by attacking in force the vassal monarch whom her arms had established in Armenia. 2 Tiridates had, it is evident, done much to provoke the attack by his constant raids into Persian territory, 3 1 ' Ipsos Persas ipsumque regem adseitis Saccis, et Russis, et Gellis, petit frater Ormies.' (Paneq. Vet ii. 17.) The Gelli are well identi- fied by Gibbon with the inhabitants of Ghilan, the Gela3 of earlier writers. The Saccse (Sacae) are undoubtedly Scyths. They may have dwelt on the Oxus, or pos- sibly in Afghanistan. The Russi should, by their name, be 4 Rus- sians;' but it must be admitted that we have otherwise no mention of them by the classical writers till the ninth century A.D. If, however, they are intended in Ezek. xxxviii. 2, 3, xxxix. 1 (as Gesenius and Dean Stanley argue), they may be meant also in the present pas- sage. ' A See Clinton, F. E. vol. i. p. 340, where it is proved that the first campaign of Galerius was as early as a.d. 297. If so, the move- ments which provoked it must have fallen, at the latest, in a.d. 296. 3 See above, p. 115. 118 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. VI. which were sometimes carried even to the south of Ctesiphon. 1 He was probably surprised by the sudden head of n arses (after Flandin). march and vigorous assault of an enemy whom he had learned to despise ; and, feeling himself unable to orga- nise an effectual resistance, he had recourse to flight, gave up Armenia to the Persians, 2 and for a second time placed himself under the protection of the Roman emperor. The monarch who held this proud position was still Diocletian, the greatest emperor that had occupied the Roman throne since Trajan, and the prince to whom Tiridates was indebted for his restora- tion to his kingdom. It was impossible that Diocletian should submit to the affront put upon him without an 1 Mos. Chor. ii. 79, ad fin.: 'Etiam ultra Ctesiphontem incur- siones fecit.' 2 Amm. Marc, xxiii. 5. Com- pare the treatise De Morte Perse- cutomim, § 9. Ch. VI.] WAR OF XARSES WITH ROME. 119 earnest effort to avenge it. His own power rested, in a great measure, on his military prestige ; and the unpunished insolence of a foreign king would have seriously endangered an authority not very firmly es- tablished. The position of Diocletian compelled him to declare war against Narses 1 in the year a.d. 296, and to address himself to a struggle of which he is not likely to have misconceived the importance. It might have been expected that he would have undertaken the con- duct of the war in person ; but the internal condition of the empire was far from satisfactory, and the chief of the State seems to have felt that he could not conven- iently quit his dominions to engage in war beyond his borders. He therefore committed the task of re- instating Tiridates and punishing Narses to his favourite and son-in-law, Galerius, 2 while he himself took up a position within the limits of the empire, 3 which at once enabled him to overawe his domestic adversaries and to support and countenance his lieutenant. The first attempts of Galerius were unfortunate. Summoned suddenly from the Danube to the Eu- phrates, and placed at the head of an army composed chiefly of the levies of Asia, ill-disciplined, and un- acquainted with their commander, he had to meet an adversary of whom he knew little or nothing, in a region the character of which was adverse to his own troops and favourable to those of the enemy. Narses had invaded the Roman province of Mesopotamia, had penetrated to the Khabour, and was threatening to cross the Euphrates into Syria. 4 Galerius had no 1 Aurel. Vict. Ccesar. § 39; Zonar. xii. 31. 2 Amm. Marc, xxiii. 5; Zonar. l.s.c. ; Eutrop. ix. 24; &c. 3 First at Alexandria (Aurel. Vict, l.s.c); then at Antioch (Lac- tant. De Morte Persec. l.s.c). 4 Lactant. De Morte Persecutor. § 9; Aurel. Victory De Ctesaribux, § 39. Zonaras makes him actually 120 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. LCh. VI. choice but to encounter him on the ground which he had chosen. Now, though Western Mesopotamia is ill-described as 4 a smooth and barren surface of sandy desert, without a hillock, without a tree, and without a spring of fresh water,' 1 it is undoubtedly an open country, possessing numerous plains, where, in a battle, the advantage of numbers is likelv to be felt, and where there is abundant room for the evolutions of cavalry. The Persians, like their predecessors the Parthians, were especially strong in horse; and the host which Narses had brought into the field greatly outnumbered the troops which Diocletian had placed at the disposal of Galerius. Yet Galerius took the offensive. Fighting under the eye of a somewhat stern master, he was scarcely free to choose his plan of campaign. Diocletian expected him to drive the Per- sians from Mesopotamia, 2 and he was therefore bound to make the attempt. He accordingly sought out his adversary in this region, and engaged him in three great battles. 3 The first and second appear to have been indecisive ; but in the third the Roman gen- eral suffered a complete defeat. 4 The catastrophe of Crassus was repeated almost upon the same battle- field, and probably almost by the same means. 5 But, invade Syria (rov Nupaov tolvvv tovtov ioi e ttjv Zvplav fofify/Liivov, xii. 31). 1 See Gibbon, Decline and Fall, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p. 82). On the real character of the region see the Au- thor's Sixth Monarchy, pp. 102, 103. 2 Victor expresses the commis- sion of Galerius as follows: 'Pro- vincia credita Maximiano Caesari, uti relictis flnibus in Mesopotamiam proyrederetur, ad arcendos Persa- rum impetus.' (l.s.c. ) 3 Oros. vii. 25: 4 Cum duobus jam prseliis ad versus Narseum con- flixisset, tertio inter Callinicum et Carras congressus et victus, amissis copiis, ad Diocletianum refugit. 4 Aurel. Vict. Cms. § 39; Zonar. l.s.c. ; Eutrop. ix. 24; Julian Paneg, Constant, p. 18, A. 5 Gibbon's description of the battle (l.s.c.) is wholly imaginary, no classical writer having left us any account of it. He transfers to the conflict between Galerius and Narses all that Plutarch and Dio relate of Crassus and Surenas. Ch. VI. I HIS VICTORY OVER GALERIUS. 121 personally, Galerius was more fortunate than his prede- cessor. He escaped from the carnage, and, recrossing the Euphrates, rejoined his father-in-law in Syria. A conjecture, not altogether destitute of probability, 1 makes Tiridates share both the calamity and the good fortune of the Roman Csesar. Like Galerius, he escaped from the battle-field, and reached the banks of the Euphrates. But his horse, which had received a wound, could not be trusted to pass the river. In this emergency the Armenian prince dismounted, and, armed as he was, plunged into the stream. The river was both wide and deep ; the current was rapid ; but the hardy adventurer, inured to danger and accus- tomed to every athletic exercise, swam across and reached the opposite bank in safety. 2 Thus, while the rank and file perished ignominiously, the two personages of most importance on the Roman side were saved. Galerius hastened towards Antioch, to rejoin his colleague and sovereign. The latter came out to meet him, but, instead of congratulating him on his escape, assumed the air of an offended mas- ter, and, declining to speak to him or to stop his char- iot, forced the Csesar to follow him on foot for nearly a mile before he would condescend to receive his explanations and apologies for defeat. 3 The disgrace was keenly felt, and was ultimately revenged upon the prince who had contrived it. But, at the time, its main This is scarcely an allowable mode of writing history. 1 In transferring to this occasion an anecdote related of Tiridates by Moses of Chorene, and attached by him to a defeat of Cams by the Persians, which never took place, our great historian does not per- haps transcend the limits of a sound historical criticism. 2 Mos. Chor. ii. 76. 3 Eutrop. l.s.c. ; Amm. Marc, xiv. 11. The 4 mile almost' of Ammianns becomes ' several miles ' in En tropins, Festns (§ 25), and Orosius (vii. 25); and 'several leagues' in Tillemont (Hist, des Empereurs, iv. p. 37). 122 -THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VI. effect doubtless was to awake in the young Csesar the strongest desire of retrieving his honour, and wiping out the memory of his great reverse by a yet more signal victory. Galerius did not cease through the winter of a.d. 297 to importune his father- in-law for an opportunity of redeeming the past and recovering his lost laurels. The emperor, having sufficiently indulged his resent- ment, acceded to the wishes of his favourite. Galerius was continued in his command. A new army was collected during the winter, to replace that which had been lost ; and the greatest care was taken that its material should be of good quality, and that it should be employed where it had the best chance of success. The veterans of Illyria and Moesia constituted the flower of the force now enrolled ; 1 and it was further strengthened by the addition of a body of Gothic aux- iliaries. 2 It was determined, moreover, that the attack should this time be made on the side of Armenia, where it was felt that the Romans would have the double advantage of a friendly country, and of one far more favourable for the movements of infantry than for those of an army whose strength lay in its horse. 3 The number of the troops employed was still small. Galerius entered Armenia at the head of only 25,000 men ; 4 but they were a picked force, and they might be augmented, almost to any extent, by the national militia of the Armenians. He was now, moreover, as cautious as he had previously been rash ; he advanced slowly, feeling his way ; he even personally made 1 Oros. l.s.c. : 'Per Illyricum et Moesiam undique copias contraxit.' 2 Jornandes, De Gothorum rebus gestis, c. 21. 3 Aurel. Victor, Cces. § 39: 4 Per Armenian! in hostes contendit, quae sola, seu facilior, vincendi via est.' 4 Festus, § 25. Ch. VI. ] GALERIUS DEFEATS NARSES. 123 reconnaissances, accompanied by only one or two horsemen, and, under the shelter of a flag of truce, explored the position of his adversary. 1 Narses found himself overmatched alike in art and in force. He allowed himself to be surprised in his camp by his active enemy, 2 and suffered a defeat by which he more than lost all the fruits of his former victory. Most of his army was destroyed ; he himself received a wound, 3 and with difficulty escaped by a hasty flight. Galerius pursued, and, though he did not succeed in taking the monarch himself, made prize of his wives, his sisters, and a number of his children, 4 besides capturing his military chest. He also took many of the most illustrious Persians prisoners. 5 How far he followed his flying adversary is uncertain ; 6 but it is scarcely probable that he proceeded much southward of the Armenian frontier. He had to reinstate Tiri- dates in his dominions, to recover Eastern Mesopo- tamia, and to lay his laurels at the feet of his colleague and master. It seems probable that having driven Narses from Armenia, and left Tiridates there to ad- minister the government, he hastened to rejoin Diocle- tian before attempting any further conquests. The Persian monarch, on his side, having recovered from his wound, 7 which could have been but slight, set 1 Synes. Beg. p. 19, A. Com- pare Festus, l.s.c, and Eutropius, ix. 25. 2 Festus, l.s.c. Compare Aram, Marc. xxii. 4: 'Sub Maximiano Caesare vallo regis Persarum di- repto.' 3 Zonaras, xii. 31. 4 Ibid. Compare Eutrop. ix. 25; Oros. vii. 25. 5 ' Captivos quamplurimos Per- sarum nobilium abduxit.' (Oros. l.s.c.) 6 Zonaras makes him pursue Narses ' into the inner parts of Persia ' {^XP L T VC svdorepag Hepol- dog) ; and Eutropius speaks of Narses as betaking himself to the remotest solitudes of his kingdom (ix. 25). But it may be ques- tioned whether the defeated mon- arch ever fled further than Media, where we find him when an am- bassador is sent to him by Diocle- tian (Pet. Patric. Fr. 14). 7 Zonaras, l.s.c. 124 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VI. himself to collect another army, but at the same time sent an ambassador to the camp of Galerius, requesting to know the terms on which Rome would consent to make peace. A writer of good authority 1 has left us an account of the interview which followed between the envoy of the Persian monarch and the victorious Roman. Apharban (so was the envoy named) opened the negotiations with the following speech 2 : — L The whole human race knows,' he said, c that the Roman and Persian kingdoms resemble two great lumi- naries, and that, like a man's two eyes, they ought mutually to adorn and illustrate each other, and not in the extremity of their wrath to seek rather each other's destruction. So to act is not to act manfully, but is indicative rather of levity and weakness ; for it is to suppose that our inferiors can never be of any service to us, and that therefore we had better get rid of them. Narses, moreover, ought not to be accounted a weaker prince than other Persian kings ; thou hast indeed con- quered him, but then thou surpassest all other monarchs; and thus Narses has of course been worsted by thee, though he is no whit inferior in merit to the best of his ancestors. The orders which my master has given me are to entrust all the rights of Persia to the clemency of Rome ; and I therefore do not even bring with me any conditions of peace, since it is for the emperor to determine everything. I have only to pray, on my 1 Petrus Patricius. Although this author did not write till to- wards the close of the sixth cen- tury, he is generally allowed by historical critics to be among the best authorities even for the events of three centuries previously. (See Gibbon, Decline and Fall, ch. xiii. vol. ii. p. 84, note 74 ; C. Midler, Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. iv. pp. 181-4; Niebuhr, Preface to the Bonn edition of the Excerpta de Leya- tlonibus.) 2 I have been content to translate Patricius. Gibbon, by recasting the entire oration and changing the position of all its parts, pro- duces a fine result; but I have not felt at liberty to work up the ancient materials after his fashion. Ch. VI. ] PEHSIAN EMBASSY TO GALERIUS. 125 master's behalf, for the restoration of his wives and male children ; if he receives them at your hands, he will be for ever beholden to you, and will be better pleased than if he recovered them by force of arms. Even now my master cannot sufficiently thank you for the kind treatment which he hears you have vouch- safed them, in that you have offered them no insult, but have behaved towards them as though on the point of giving them back to their kith and kin. He sees herein that you bear in mind the changes of for- tune and the instability of all human affairs. 7 At this point Galerius, who had listened with impa- tience to the long harangue, burst in with a movement of anger that shook his whole frame — L What ? Do the Persians dare to remind us of the vicissitudes of fortune, as though we could forget how they behave when vic- tory inclines to them ? Is it not their wont to push their advantage to the uttermost and press as heavily as may be on the unfortunate ? How charmingly they showed the moderation that becomes a victor in Vale- rian's time ! They vanquished him by fraud ; they kept him a prisoner to advanced old age ; they let him die in dishonour ; and then, when he was dead, they stripped off his skin, and with diabolical ingenuity made of a perishable human body an imperishable monument of our shame. 1 Verily, if we follow this envoy's advice, and look to the changes of human affairs, we shall not be moved to clemency, but to anger, when we consider the past conduct of the Persians. If pity be shown them, if their requests be granted, it will not be for what they have urged, but because it is a principle of 1 Note the absence here of any allusion to fetters, or to the em- ployment of Valerian by his captor as a horseblock; and remark that the flaying is distinctly made sub- sequent to his decease. 126 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VI. action with us — a principle handed down to us from our ancestors — u to spare the humble and chastise the proud." ' Apharban, therefore, was dismissed with no definite answer to his question, what terms of peace Rome would require ; but he was told to assure his master that Rome's clemency equalled her valour, and that it would not be long before he would receive a Roman envoy authorised to signify the Imperial pleasure, and to conclude a treaty with him. Having held this interview with Apharban, Galerius hastened to meet and consult his colleague. 1 Diocle- tian had remained in Syria, at the head of an army of observation, 2 while Galerius penetrated into Armenia and engaged the forces of Persia. When he heard of his son-in-law's great victory, he crossed the Euphrates, and advancing through Western Mesopotamia, from which the Persians probably retired, took up his resi- dence at Nisibis, 3 now the chief town of these parts. It is perhaps true that his object was ' to moderate, by his presence and counsels, the pride of Galerius.' 4 That prince was bold to rashness, and nourished an excessive ambition. He is said to have at this time entertained a design of grasping at the conquest of the East, and to have even proposed to himself to reduce the Persian Empire into the form of a Roman province. 5 But the views of Diocletian were humbler and more prudent. He held to the opinion of Augustus and Hadrian, that 1 Gibbon (l.s.c. ) has incorrectly placed the embassy of Apharban after the meeting of Galerius with Diocletian at Nisibis, and lias made both monarchs present at the inter- view. De Champagny has seen the true order of the events (Cesars du 3 me Steele, torn. iii. pp. 304-5). 2 Eutrop. ix. 25; Julian, Orat. i. p. IS, A. 8 Pet. Patric. Fr. 14. 4 Gibbon, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p. 84). 5 Aurel. Vict, l.s.c: 'Adeo vic- tor [Galerius erat], ut, ni Valerius, cujus nutu omnia gerebantur, in- certum qua causa, abnuisset, Ro- man i fasces in provinciam novam ferrentur.' Ch. VI.] KOME CONSENTS TO PEACE. 127 Rome did not need any enlargement of her territory, and that the absorption of the East was especially un- desirable. When he and his son-in-law met and inter- changed ideas at Nisibis, the views of the elder ruler naturally prevailed ; and it was resolved to offer to the Persians tolerable terms of peace. A civilian of import- ance, 1 Sicorius Probus, was selected for the delicate office of envoy, and was sent, with a train of attendants, into Media, where Narses had fixed his head-quarters. We are told that the Persian monarch received him with all honour, but, under pretence of allowing him to rest and refresh himself after his long journey, deferred his audi- ence from day to day ; while he employed the time thus gained in collecting from various quarters such a num- ber of detachments and garrisons as might constitute a respectable army. He had no intention of renewing the war, but he knew the weight which military preparation ever lends to the representations of diplomacy. Accord- ingly, it was not until he had brought under the notice of Sicorius a force of no inconsiderable size that he at last admitted him to an interview. The Roman ambas- sador was introduced into an inner chamber of the royal palace in Media, 2 where he found only the king and three others — Apharban, the envoy sent to Gale* rius, Archapetes, the captain of the guard, and Barsa- borsus, the governor of a province on the Armenian frontier. 3 He was asked to unfold the particulars of his message, and say what were the terms on which Rome would make peace. Sicorius complied. The emperors, 1 Patrieius (l.s.c.) calls him avTiypayea rf/g fivrjfiriq, a sort of 'Secretary of State.' 2 'Ev roi(; kvdoTepo Ttbv (3aoi?iELG)v. (Pet. Patric. l.s.c.) The palace seems to have been on the river As- prudis, which cannot be identified. 3 Patricins calls him * governor of Symium.' Gibbon identifies Symium with Synia, a tract east of Mount Ararat (Armen. Geograph. § 74). 128 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VI. he said, required five things : — (i.) The cession to Rome of five provinces beyond the river Tigris, which are given by one writer 1 as Intilene, Sophene, Arzanene, Carduene, and Zabdicene; by another 2 as Arzanene, Moxoene, Zabdicene, Rehimene, and Corduene ; (ii.) the recognition of the Tigris as the general boundary between the two empires ; (iii.) the extension of Arme- nia to the fortress of Zintha, in Media; (iv.) the relin- quishment by Persia to Rome of her protectorate over Iberia, including the right of giving investiture to the Iberian kings; and (v.) the recognition of Nisibis as the place at which alone commercial dealings could take place between the two nations. It would seem that the Persians were surprised at the moderation of these demands. Their exact value and force will require some discussion ; but at any rate it is clear that, under the circumstances, they were not felt to be excessive. Narses did not dispute any of them except the last; and it seems to have been rather because he did not wish it to be said that he had yielded everything, than because the condition was really very onerous, that he made objection in this instance. 3 Sicorius was fortunately at liberty to yield the point. He at once withdrew the fifth article of the treaty, and, the other four being accepted, a formal peace was concluded between the two nations. To understand the real character of the peace now made, and to appreciate properly the relations thereby established between Rome and Persia, it will be neces- sary to examine at some length the several conditions 1 Patricius, l.s.c. 2 Ammianus Marcellinus, xxv. 7. Gibbon lias strangely intermixed the statements of the two writers, ascribing the mention of Intilene to Ammianiis, and that of Rehi- mene to Patricius (vol. ii. p. 87, note 79 ), which is the reverse of the truth. 3 Pet. Patric. Fr. 14. Ch. VI. I THE CONDITIONS OF THE PEACE. 129 of the treaty, and to see exactly what was imported by each of them. There is scarcely one out of the whole number that carries its meaning plainly upon its face ; and on the more important very various interpretations have been put, so that a discussion and settlement of some rather intricate points is here necessary. (i.) There is a considerable difference of opinion as to the five provinces ceded to Rome by the first article of the treaty, as to their position and extent, and conse- quently as to their importance. By some they are put on the right, 1 by others on the left, bank of the Tigris ; while of those who assign them this latter position some place them in a cluster about the sources of the river, 2 while others extend them very much further to the southward. 3 Of the five provinces three only can be certainly named, since the authorities differ as to the two others. 4 These three are Arzanene, Cordyene, and Zabdicene, which occur in that order in Patricius. If we can determine the position of these three, that of the others will follow, at least within certain limits. Now Arzanene was certainly on the left bank of the Tigris. It adjoined Armenia, 5 and is reasonably iden- tified with the modern district of Kherzan, which lies between Lake Van and the Tigris, to the west of the Bitlis river. 6 All the notices of Arzanene 7 suit this 1 This was the view of Valesius {ad Amm. Marc. xxv. 7), of Tille- mont (Histoire des Empereurs, torn, iv. p. 40), and of most writers anterior to Gibbon. It was argued that the provinces were called 4 Trans tigritanse,' because they were •so to the Persians! 2 De Champagny places them all ' west of Lake Van and south of Armenia.' (Cesars da 3 me Steele, torn. jii. p. 305, note.) 3 As Gibbon, vol. ii. p. 87; Nie- buhr, Lectures on Roman History, vol. iii. p. 311, E. T. ; and Mr. James in Smith's Diet, of Geog- raphy, ad voc. Cordyene. 4 See above, p. 128, notes 1 and 2 . 5 Menander Protect. Fr. 55, p. 257. See Layard's Nineveh and Babylon, p. 39, and compare the map of Armenia, Assyria, and Kurdisflfh at the end of the book. 7 The most important are Eu- trop. vi. 7; Procop. Be Bell. Pers. 130 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. YL locality ; and the name 1 Kherzan ' may be regarded as representing the ancient appellation. 1 Zabdicene was a little south, and a little east of this position. It was the tract about a town known as Bezabda (perhaps a corruption of Beit-Zabda), which had been anciently called Phoenica. 2 This town is almost certainly represented by the modern Fynyk, a on the left bank of the Tigris, a little above Jezireh. The province whereof it was the capital may perhaps have adjoined Arzanene, reaching as far north as the Bitlis river. If these two tracts are rightly placed, Cordyene must also be sought on the left bank of the Tigris. The word is no doubt the ancient representative of the modern Kurdistan, and means a country in which Kurds dwelt. Now Kurds seem to have been at one time the chief inhabitants of the Mons Masius, the modern Jebel Karajah Dagh and Jebel Tur, which was thence called Cordyene, Gordyene, or the Gordiaean mountain chain. 4 But there was another and a more important Cordyene on the opposite side of the river. The tract to this day known as Kurdistan, the high mountain region south and south-east of Lake Van between Persia and Mesopotamia, was in the possession of Kurds from before the time of Xenophon, and was known as the country of the Carduchi, as Cardyene, and as Cordyene. 5 This tract, which was contiguous to i. 8; Be ^dific. iii. 2; Menand. Protect. Fr. 55, 57, and 60; Jo- hann. Epiphan. Fr. 1, § 3; Armen. Geoc/r. § 68. 1 It is remarkable that the ap- pellation has changed so little in the course of centuries. The As- syrian monarchs call the country Kirzan. 2 Amm. Marc. xx. 7. 3 Layard, Nineveh and Babylon, p. 53. 4 Strab. xi. 12, § 4, xvi. 1, § 24; Plutarch, Lumll. 26; &c. 5 Xen. Anab. iv. i, §§ 2-3; Strab. xvi. 1, § 8; Arrian, Exp. Alex. iii. 7; Pirn. H. N. vi. 15; Ptol. v. 13. Ch. VI.] POSITION OF THE CEDED PKOVINCES. 131 Arzanene and Zabdicene, if we have rightly placed those regions, must almost certainly have been the Cordyene of the treaty, which, if it corresponded at all nearly in extent with the modern Kurdistan, must have been by far the largest and most important of the five provinces. The two remaining tracts, whatever their names, 1 must undoubtedly have lain on the same side of the Tigris with these three. As they are otherwise un- known to us (for Sophene, which had long been Roman, cannot have been one of them), it is impossible that they should have been of much importance. No doubt they helped to round off the Roman dominion in this quarter ; but the great value of the entire cession lay in the acquisition of the large and fruitful 2 province of Cordyene, inhabited by a brave and hardy population, and afterwards the seat of fifteen fortresses, 3 which brought the Roman dominion to the very edge of Adiabene, made them masters of the passes into Media, and laid the whole of Southern Mesopotamia open to their incursions. It is probable that the hold of Persia on the territory had never been strong ; and in relin- quishing it she may have imagined that she gave up no very great advantage ; but in the hands of Rome Kur- distan became a standing menace to the Persian power, and we shall find that on the first opportunity the false 1 The 4 Sophene ' of Patricius may safely be set aside, since it had long been Roman. His 4 In- tilene' some would change into Ingilene, a district mentioned as 4 lying beyond Mesopotamia' by Epiphanius (Be 11 ceres, lx. vol. i. p. 505, ed Vales.). The 4 Rehi- mene ' of Ammianns is confirmed by Zosimus, who mentions 4 Re- menians ' among the tribes ceded by Jovian (iii. 31). The 'Moxoene' of Ammianns does not elsewhere occur. Is it the modern 4 district of Mokus ' (Layard, Nhi. and Bab. p. 417, note)? Zosimns has in its place 4 Zalene,' a name of which I can make nothing. 2 4 Cordnena?, uberis region is et nostra?.' (Amm. Marc. xxv. 7.) 3 Ibid. Compare Zosim. iii. 31. 132 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. VI. step now taken was retrieved, Cordyene with its ad- joining districts was pertinaciously demanded of the Romans, 1 was grudgingly surrendered, and was then firmly reattached to the Sassanian dominions. (ii.) The Tigris is said by Patricius and Festus 2 to have been made the boundary of the two empires. Gibbon here boldly substitutes the Western Khabour, and maintains that 1 the Roman frontier traversed, but never followed, the course of the Tigris.' 3 He appears not to be able to understand how the Tigris could be the frontier, when five provinces across the Tigris were Roman. But the intention of the article probably was, first, to mark the complete cession to Rome of Eastern as well as Western Mesopotamia, and, secondly, to es- tablish the Tigris as the line separating the empires below^ the point down to which the Romans held both banks. Cordyene may not have touched the Tigris at all, or may have touched it only about the 37th parallel. From this point southwards, as far as Mosul, or Nim- rud, or possibly Kileh Sherghat, the Tigris was prob- ably now recognised as the dividing line between the empires. By the letter of the treaty the whole Euphrates valley might indeed have been claimed by Rome ; but practically she did not push her occupation of Mesopotamia below Circesium. The real frontier from this point was the Mesopotamian desert, which extends from Kerkesiyeh to Nimrud, a distance of 150 miles. Above this, it was the Tigris, as far probably as Feshapoor ; after which it followed the line, what- 1 Aram. Marc, l.s.c. : 6 Petebat rex obstinatius sua dudum a Maxi- miano erepta.' 2 ' Pace facta, Mesopotamia est restituta; et super ripam Tigridis limes est confirmatus, ut (' with the further condition that') quinque gentium trans Tigridem consti- tutarum ditionem assequeremur.' (Festus, § 14.) 3 Decline and Fall, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p. 87, note 77 ). Ch. VI. 1 EXTENSION OF ARMENIA. 133 ever it was, which divided Cordyene from Assyria and Media. (iii.) The extension of Armenia to the fortress of Zintha, in Media, seems to have imported much more than would at first sight appear from the words. Gib- bon interprets it as implying the cession of all Media Atropatene, 1 which certainly appears a little later to be in the possession of the Armenian monarch, Tiridates. 2 A large addition to the Armenian territory out of the Median is doubtless intended ; but it is quite impos- sible to determine definitely the extent or exact char- acter of the cession. 3 (iv.) The fourth article of the treaty is sufficiently intelligible. So long as Armenia had been a fief of the Persian empire, it naturally belonged to Persia to exercise influence over the neighbouring Iberia, which corresponded closely to the modern Georgia, interven- ing between Armenia and the Caucasus. Now, when Armenia had become a dependency of Rome, the pro- tectorate hitherto exercised by the Sassanian princes passed naturally to the Caesars ; and with the protecto- rate was bound up the right of granting investiture to the kingdom, whereby the protecting power was se- cured against the establishment on the throne of an unfriendly person. Iberia was not herself a state of much strength ; but her power of opening or shutting the passes of the Caucasus gave her considerable im- portance, since by the admission of the Tatar hordes, which were always ready to pour in from the plains of the North, she could suddenly change the whole face 1 Decline and Fall, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p. 88). 2 Mos. Ohor. ii. 84. 3 We can only say with De Champiagny: * L'Arttieriie, vassale de Home, fut agrandie' [Cesars, torn. iii. p. 305), and that the augmentation was on the side of Media. 134 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. LCh. VI. of affairs in North-Western Asia, and inflict a terrible revenge on any enemy that had provoked her. It is true that she might also bring suffering on her friends, or even on herself, for the hordes, once admitted, were apt to make little distinction between friend and foe ; but prudential considerations did not always prevail over the promptings of passion, and there had been occasions when, in spite of them, the gates had been thrown open and the barbarians invited to enter. 1 It was well for Rome to have it in her power to check this peril. Her own strength and the tranquillity of her eastern provinces were confirmed and secured by the right w r hich she (practically) obtained of nomi- nating the Iberian monarchs. (v.) The fifth article of the treaty, having been re- jected by Narses and then withdrawn by Sicorius, need not detain us long. By limiting the commercial intercourse of the two nations to a single city, and that a city within their own dominions, the Romans would have obtained enormous commercial advan- tages. While their own merchants remained quietly at home, the foreign merchants would have had the trouble and expense of bringing their commodities to market a distance of sixty miles from the Persian frontier and of above a hundred from any considerable town ; 2 they would of course have been liable to mar- ket dues, which would have fallen wholly into Roman hands ; and they would further have been chargeable with any duty, protective or even prohibitive, which 1 Tacit. Ann. vi. 33: ' Iberi, locorum potentes, Caspia via Sar- matam in Armenios raptim effun- dunt.' Compare Dio Cass. lxix. 15. 2 Nineveh, which was now once more a place of importance (see Tac. t Ann. xii. 13; A mm. Marc, xviii. 7, ad init.; Layard, Nin. and Bab. pp. 590-1), and which was nearer Nisibis than any other Persian town of consequence, lay at the distance of nearly 120 miles. Ar- bela was nearly 60 miles further off. Cf. VI. I IMPORTANCE OF THE ROMAN , GAINS. 135 Rome chose to impose. It is not surprising that Narses here made a stand, and insisted on commerce being left to flow in the broader channels which it had formed for itself in the course of ages. 1 Rome thus terminated her first period of struggle with the newly revived monarchy of Persia by a great victory and a great diplomatic success. If Narses re- garded the terms — and by his conduct he would seem to have done so — as moderate under thecircumstances, 2 our conclusion must be that the disaster which he had suffered was extreme, and that he knew the strength of Persia to be, for the time, exhausted. Forced to relin- quish his suzerainty over Armenia and Iberia, he saw those countries not merely wrested from himself, but placed under the protectorate, and so made to minister to the strength, of his rival. Nor was this all. Rome had gradually been advancing across Mesopotamia and working her way from the Euphrates to the Tigris. Narses had to acknowledge, in so many words, that the Tigris, and not the Euphrates, was to be regarded as her true boundary, and that nothing consequently was to be considered as Persian beyond the more eastern of the two rivers. Even this concession was not the last or the worst, Narses had finally to submit to see his empire dismembered, a portion of Media attached to Armenia, and five provinces, never hitherto in dis- pute, torn from Persia and added to the dominion of Rome. He had to allow Rome to establish herself in force on the left bank of the Tigris, and so to lay open to her assaults a great portion of his northern besides 1 On the trade between Rome j for Parthian rule had made but and Parthia, see Herodian, iv. 18; | little difference in the course or and compare the Author's Sixth | character of the traffic. Monarchy, pp. 425-6. It is prob- 2 See above, p. 128. able that the exchange of Persian I 136 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VL all his western frontier. He had to see her brought to the very edge of the Iranic plateau, and within a fort- night's march of Persia Proper. The ambition to rival his ancestor Sapor, if really entertained, 1 was severely punished ; and the defeated prince must have felt that he had been most ill-advised in making the venture. Narses did not long continue on the throne after the conclusion of this disgraceful, though, it may be, neces- sary, treaty. It was made in a.d. 297. He abdicated in a.d. 301. It may have been disgust at his ill-success T it may have been mere weariness of absolute power, which caused him to descend from his high position and retire into private life. 2 He was so fortunate as to have a son of full age in whose favour he could resign, so that there was no difficulty about the succession. His ministers seem to have thought it necessary to offer some opposition to his project ; 3 but their resistance was feeble, perhaps because they hoped that a young prince would be more entirely guided by their counsels. Narses was allowed to complete his act of self-renuncia- tion, and, after crowning his son Hormisdas with his own hand, to spend the remainder of his days in retire- ment. According to the native writers, his main object was to contemplate death and prepare himself for it. In his youth he had evinced some levity of character, and had been noted for his devotion to games and to the chase ; 4 in his middle age he laid aside these pur- 1 Lac tan t. Be Morte Persec. § 9: i Concitatus domesticis exemplis avi sui Saporis, ad occupandum Orientem magnis copiis [Narses) inhiabat.' 2 The abdication of Narses rests wholly upon the authority of the Oriental writers. (See Mirkhond, Histoire des Sassanides, p. 302; Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i. p. 104.) It is accepted, however, as a fact by most moderns. (See Malcolm, l.s.c. ; Plate in Smith's Diet, of Biography, vol. iii. p. 717, &c.) 3 Mirkhond, l.s.c. 4 He is said to have been sur- named Nakhdjirkan, or 4 Hunter of Ch. VI. ] ABDICATION OF N ARSES. 137 suits, and, applying himself actively to business, was a good admimistrator, as well as a brave soldier. But at last it seemed to him that the only life worth living was the contemplative, and that the happiness of the hunter and the statesman must yield to that of the philoso- pher. It is doubtful how long he survived his resig- nation of the throne, 1 but tolerably certain that he did not outlive his son and successor, who reigned less than eight years. wild beasts' (Mirkhond, p. 303). It is remarkable that the headdress which distinguishes him on his coins is adorned with* horns, either of the ibex or the stag. COINS OF NARSES. This ornamentation is quite pe- culiar to him ; and it adds a weight to the other statements of the native writers as to his predilec- tions. 1 Dr. Plate says he died in the year that he abdicated ; but I know no authority for this. That lie did not outlive a.d. 309, the year of his son's death, seems to follow from the difficulty then felt about the succession. Perhaps it is most probable that he died in a.d. 306, since the Armenians regard him as king up to this date. (See Pat- kanian in the Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 150.) 138 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. LCh. VII. CHAPTER VII. Reign of Hormisdas II. His Disposition. General Character of his Reign. His Taste for Building. His new Court of Justice. His Mar- riage with a Princess of Cabul. Story of his Son Hormisdas. Death of Hormisdas II., and Imprisonment of his Son Hormisdas. Inter- regnum. Crown assigned to Sapor II. before his Birth. Long Reign of Sapor. First Period of his Reign, from a.d. 309 to a.d. 337. Persia plundered by the Arabs and the Turks. Victories of Sapor over the Arabs. Persecution of the Christians. Escape of Hormisdas. Feelings and Conduct of Sapor. * Regnum in Persas obtinuit Horrnoz, Narsis films.' — Eutych. vol. i. p. 396. Hormisdas II., who became king on the abdication of his father, Narses, had, like his father, a short reign. He ascended the throne a.d. 301 ; he died a.d. 309, not quite eight years later. 1 assign scarcely any events. The personal appearance hormisdas ii. (from a gem). 1 See Clinton, F. R. vol. ii. p. 260. Agathias declares that both Narses and Hormisdas reigned exactly seven years and five months (p. 135, A.). So Macoudi, ii. p. 174. Ch. VII.] REIGN OF HORMISDAS II. 139 of Hormisdas, if we may judge by a gem, was pleasing ; he is said, however, to have been of a harsh temper bv nature, but to have controlled his evil inclinations after he became king, and in fact to have then neglected nothing that could contribute to the welfare of his sub- jects. 1 He engaged in no wars ; and his reign was thus one of those quiet and uneventful intervals which, fur- nishing no materials for history, indicate thereby the happiness of a nation. 2 We are told that he had a strong taste for building, 3 and could never see a crum- bling edifice without instantly setting to work to restore it. Ruined towns and villages, so common throughout the East in all ages, ceased to be seen in Persia while he filled the throne. An army of masons always fol- lowed him in his frequent journeys throughout his empire, and repaired dilapidated homesteads and cot- tages with as much care and diligence as edifices of a public character. According to some writers he founded several entirely new towns in Khuzistan or Susiana, 4 while, according to others, 5 he built the im- portant city of Hormuz, or (as it is sometimes called) Ram-Hormuz, in the province of Kerman, which is still a flourishing place. Other authorities 6 ascribe this city, however, to the first Hormisdas, the son of Sapor I. and grandson of Artaxerxes. Among the means devised by Hormisdas II. for bettering the condition of his people, the most remark- able was his establishment of a new Court of Justice. 1 Mirkhond, Histoire des Sassa- nides, pp. 303-4. Compare Tabari, ii. p. 90. 2 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, ch. iii. (vol. i. p. 215). 3 Mirkhond, p. 304; D'Herbelol, Bibliotheque Orientate, torn. iii. p. 221. 4 D'Herbelot, l.s.c. 5 D'Herbelot quotes the Leb- tarikh and the Tarikh-Cozideh to this effect. 6 Mirkhond, p. 293; Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, vol. i. p. 100. 140 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VII. In the East the oppression of the weak by the power- ful is the most inveterate and universal of all evils, and the one that well-intentioned monarchs have to be most careful in checking and repressing. Hormisdas, in his anxiety to root out this evil, is said to have set up a court expressly for the hearing of causes where com- plaint was made by the poor of wrongs done to them by the rich. 1 The duty of the judges was at once to punish the oppressors, and to see that ample reparation was made to those whom they had wronged. To in- crease the authority of the court, and to secure the im- partiality of its sentences, the monarch made a point of often presiding over it himself, of hearing the causes, and pronouncing the judgments in person. The most powerful nobles were thus made to feel that, if they offended, they would be likely to receive adequate punishment ; and the weakest and poorest of the people were encouraged to come forward and make complaint if they had suffered injury. Among his other wives, Hormisdas, we are told, mar- ried a daughter of the king of Cabul. 2 It was natural that, after the conquest of Seistan 3 by Varahran II., about a.d. 280, the Persian monarchs should establish relations with the chieftains ruling in Affghanistan. That country seems, from the first to the fourth century of our era, to have been under the government of princes of Scythian descent and of considerable wealth and power. 4 Kadphises, Kanerki, Kenorano, Ooerki, Bara- oro, had the main seat of their empire in the region about Cabul and Jellalabad ; but from this centre they exercised an extensive sway, which at times probably 1 D'Herbelot, l.s.c. 3 See above, p. 108. 2 Mirkhond, p. 304; Wilson, 4 See Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, Ariana Antlqua, p. 385, note 5 . pp. 347-381. Ch. VII.] HIS RELATIONS WITH CABUL. 141 reached Candahar on the one hand, and the Punjab region on the other. Their large gold coinage proves them to have been monarchs of great wealth, while their use of the Greek letters and language indicates a certain amount of civilisation. The marriage of Hormisdas with a princess of Cabul implies that the hostile relations existing under Varahran II. had been superseded by friendly ones. 1 Persian aggression had ceased to be feared. The reigning Indo-Scythic mon- arch felt no reluctance to give his daughter in marriage to his Western neighbour, and sent her to his court (we are told) with a wardrobe and ornaments of the utmost magnificence and costliness. 2 Hormisdas II. appears to have had a son, of the same name with himself, who attained to manhood while his father was still reigniug. 3 This prince, who was generally regarded, and who, of course, viewed himself, as the heir apparent, was no favourite with the Persian nobles, whom he had perhaps offended by an inclination towards the literature and civilisation of the Greeks. 4 It must have been upon previous consultation and agreement that the entire body of the chief men resolved to vent their spite by insulting the prince in the most open and public way at the table of his father. 1 The coins of Hormisdas II. not unfrequently show signs of Indian influence. On the reverses of some we see the Indian deity Siva and his Bull (Thomas in Num. Chron. vol. xv. p. 180; New Series, No. 45, p. 115), as in the coins of Kad- phises (Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, pp. 350-7). On others we observe an Indian altar (Num. Chron. vol. xv. p. 180, fig. 10). 2 Mirkhond, Hisioire des Sas- sanides, p. 304. 3 The relationship of the 4 Prince Hormisdas,' who took refuge at the court of Constantine in the year a^d. 323, to Hormisdas II. rests on the authority of Zosimus, from whom all the details here given are derived. (See Zosim. Hist. Nov. ii. 27.) The account given by Zonaras (xiii. 5) is dif- ferent. 4 The latter part of the story in Zosimus implies that he had this inclination. How offensive such tastes might be to the Asiatics, we see from the history of Vonones in Tacitus (Ann. ii. 2). 142 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VII. The king was keeping his birthday, which was always, in Persia, the greatest festival of the year, 1 and so the most public occasion possible. All the nobles of the realm were invited to the banquet ; and all came and took their several places. The prince was absent at the first, but shortly arrived, bringing with him, as the excuse for his late appearance, a quantity of game, the produce of the morning's chase. Such an entrance must have created some disturbance and have drawn general attention ; but the nobles, who were bound by etiquette to rise from their seats, remained firmly fixed in them, and took not the slightest notice of the prince's arrival. 2 This behaviour- was an indignity which naturally aroused his resentment. In the heat of the moment he exclaimed aloud that ' those who had insulted him should one day suffer for it — their fate should be the fate of Marsyas.' At first the threat was not understood ; but one chieftain, more learned than his fellows, explained to the rest that, according to the Greek myth, Marsyas was flayed alive. Now flaying alive was a punishment not unknown to the Persian law ; 3 and the nobles, fearing that the prince really entertained the intention which he had expressed, became thoroughly alienated from him, and made up their minds that they would not allow him to reign. During his father's lifetime, they could, of course, do nothing ; but they laid up the dread threat in their memory, and patiently waited for the moment when the throne would become vacant, and their enemy would assert his right to it. 1 Herod, i. 133. Compare ix. 110. 2 Compare Mordecai's treatment of Haman (Esther iii. 2, v. 9). 3 See above, p. 103. Ch. VIL] DEATH OF HORMISDAS II. 143 Apparently, their patience was not very severely taxed. Hormisdas IT. died within a few years ; and Prince Hormisdas, as the only son whom he had left behind him, 1 thought to succeed as a matter of course. But the nobles rose in insurrection, seized his person, and threw him into a dungeon, intending that he should remain there for the rest of his life. They themselves took the direction of affairs, and finding that, though King Hormisdas had left behind him no other son, yet one of his wives was pregnant, they proclaimed the unborn infant king, and even with the utmost cere- mony proceeded to crown the embryo by suspending the royal diadem over the womb of the mother. 2 A real interregnum must have followed ; but it did not extend beyond a few months. The pregnant widow of Hormisdas fortunately gave birth to a boy, and the difficulties of the succession were thereby ended. All classes acquiesced in the rule of the infant monarch, who received the name of Sapor — whether simply to mark the fact that he was believed to be the late king's son, 3 or in the hope that he would rival the glories of the first Sapor, is uncertain. The reign of Sapor II. is estimated variously, at 69, 70, 71, and 72 years; 4 but the balance of authority is 1 Some writers give him another son, the Artaxerxes who succeeded Sapor II. But it is impossible to accept this view. See below, ch. xii. 2 Agathias, iv. p. 135; Mirkhond, pp. 305-6; Tabari, torn. ii. p. 91; Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i. p. 106. Gibbon suggests that Aga- thias obtained the history from the Persian Chronicles (Decline and Fall, ch. xviii. vol. ii. p. 367, note 54 ). 3 Sapor (Shah-puhr) means ' King's son,' as has been already noted (see p. 73, note 2 ). 4 Abulpharagius in one place has sixty-nine years (p. 85), in another (p. 90) seventy. Agathias (p. 135, D) and Theophanes (p. 7) have seventy. Sir John Malcolm, following Ori- ental authorities, gives seventy-one (Hist, of Persia, vol. i. p. 110). Eutychius (vol. i. p. 472), Mir- khond (Hist des Sassanides, p. 306), Tabari (Chronique, torn. ii. p. 101), and Ma^oudi (torn. ii. p. 175) say seventy-two. 144 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VIL in favour of seventy. He was born in the course of the year a.d. 309, and he seems to have died in the year after the Roman emperor Valens, 1 or a.d. 379. He thus reigned nearly three-quarters of a century, being contemporary with the Roman emperors, Galerius, Constantine, Constantius and Constans, Julian, Jovian, Valentinian I., Valens, Gratian, and Valentinian II. This long reign is best divided into periods. The first period of it extended from a.d. 309 to a.d. 337, or a space of twenty-eight years. This was the time an- terior to Sapor's wars with the Romans. It included the sixteen years of his minority 2 and a space of twelve years during which he waged successful wars with the Arabs. The minority of Sapor was a period of severe trial to Persia. On every side the bordering nations endeavoured to take advantage of the weakness incident to the rule of a minor, and attacked and ravaged the empire at their pleasure. 3 The Arabs were especially aggressive, and made continual raids into Babylonia, Khuzistan, and the adjoining regions, which desolated these provinces and carried the horrors of war into the very heart of the empire. The tribes of Beni-Ayar and Abdul-Kais, which dwelt on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, took the lead in these incursions, and, though not attempting any permanent conquests, inflicted terrible sufferings on the inhabitants of the tracts which they invaded. At the same time a Meso- potamian chieftain, called Tayer or Thair, 4 made an 1 Abulpharagius, p. 90. 2 Mirkhond makes Sapor begin to exercise some of the offices of government at eight years (p. 307), but admits that he did not un- dertake the direction of military expeditions till he was sixteen (ibid.). So Tabari (torn. ii. p. 93). 3 Mirkhond, l.s.c. ; Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 91-2; Malcolm, vol. i. p. 106. 4 D'Herbelot, Bibliotheque Orien- tale, torn. v. p. 143; Gibbon, De- cline and Fall, ch. xviii. (vol. ii. p. 367). These writers make Thair Ch. VII. 1 MINORITY OF SAPOR II. 145 attack upon Ctesiphon, took the city by storm, and captured a sister or aunt of the Persian monarch. The nobles, who, during Sapor's minority, guided the helm of the State, were quite incompetent to make head against these numerous enemies. For sixteen years the marauding bands had the advantage, and Persia found herself continually weaker, more impoverished, and less able to recover herself. The young prince is said to have shown extraordinary discretion and intelli- gence. 1 He diligently trained himself in all manly exer- cises, and prepared both his mind and body for the important duties of his station. But his tender years for- bade his as yet taking the field ; and it is not unlikely that his ministers prolonged the period of his tutelage in order to retain, to the latest possible moment, the power whereto they had become accustomed. At any rate, it was not till he was sixteen, a later age than Oriental ideas require, 2 that Sapor's minority ceased — that he asserted his manhood, and, placing himself at the head of his army, took the entire direction of affairs, civil and military, into his own hands. 3 From this moment the fortunes of Persia began to rise. Content at first to meet and chastise the maraud- ing bands on his own territory, Sapor, after a time, grew bolder, and ventured to take the offensive. Hav- ing collected a fleet of considerable size, 4 he placed his troops on board, and conveyed them to the city of a king of Yemen or Arabia proper; but Sir J. Malcolm says he was a mere sheikh of some of the tribes of Mesopotamia (vol. i. p. 107, note). 1 Mirkhond, p. 307; Tabari, torn. ii. pp. 92-3. 2 Fourteen is generally regarded as the age of manhood in the East (Layard, Nin. and Babylon, p. 295); and minorities usually come to an end at this age. (See Malcolm, Hist of Persia, vol. i. pp. 499, 506, &c.) 3 Mirkhond, l.s.c; Tabari, p. 93; Macoudi, p. 176. 4 Mirkhond, p. 308; Tabari, p. 94. 146 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VII. El-Katif, an important place on the south coast of the Persian Gulf, where he disembarked and proceeded to carry fire and sword through the adjacent region. Either on this occasion, or more probably in a long series of expeditions, he ravaged the whole district of the Hejer, gaining numerous victories over the tribes of the Temanites, the Beni-Waiel, the Abdul-Kais, and others, which had taken a leading part in the invasion of Persia. His military genius and his valour were everywhere conspicuous ; but unfortunately these ex- cellent qualities were unaccompanied by the humanity which has been the crowning virtue of many a con- queror. Sapor, exasperated by the sufferings of his countrymen during so many years, thought that he could not too severely punish those who had inflicted them. He put to the sword the greater part of every tribe that he conquered ; and, when his soldiers were weary of slaying, he made them pierce the shoulders of their prisoners, and insert in the wound a string or thong by which to drag them into captivity. 1 The barbarity of the age and nation approved these atroci- ties ; and the monarch who had commanded them was, in consequence, saluted as Dhoidactaf, or c Lord of the Shoulders/ by an admiring people. 2 Cruelties almost as great, but of a different character, were at the same time sanctioned by Sapor in regard to one class of his own subjects — viz., those who had 1 This is Mirkhond's account. Other authorities say that he dis- located (Malcolm, vol. i. p. 107; Macoudi, vol. ii. p. 177) or broke (D'Herbelot, Bibl. Orient, torn. v. p. 141) the shoulders of his prison- ers, to disqualify them for military service. 2 Gibbon, following an apocry- phal tale related by D'Herbelot, but not adopted by him, gives the name as Dhoulacnaf, and translates it 4 Protector of the Nation ' (vol. ii. p. 307). The best authorities are, however, all agreed that the real epithet was Dhoulactaf, not Dhou- lacnaf. (See D'Herbelot, l.s.c. ; Mirkiiond, p. 308; Tabari, torn. ii. p. 91; Malcolm, vol. i. p. 107, .iote; Macoudi, torn. ii. p. 175.) Ch. VII.] SAPOK'S PERSECUTION OF THE CHRISTIANS, 147 made profession of Christianity. The Zoroastrian zeal of this king was great, and he regarded it as incumbent on him to check the advance which Christianity was now making in his territories. He issued severe edicts against the Christians soon after attaining his majority ; 1 and when they sought the protection of the Roman emperor, he punished their disloyalty by imposing upon them a fresh tax, the weight of which was op- pressive. When Symeon, Archbishop of Seleucia, com- plained of this additional burden in an offensive man- ner, Sapor retaliated by closing the Christian churches, confiscating the ecclesiastical property, and putting the complainant to death. Accounts of these severities reached Constantine, the Roman emperor, who had recently embraced the new religion (which, in spite of constant persecution, had gradually overspread the em- pire), and had assumed the character of a sort of gen- eral protector of the Christians throughout the world. 2 He remonstrated with Sapor, but to no purpose. 3 Sapor had formed the resolution to renew the contest 1 Sozomen, Hist. Eccles. ii. 9, 10. 2 Tillemont, Hist, des Empereurs, torn. iv. p. 255: 4 Constantin se regard ait comme le protecteur ge- neral de tous les serviteurs de Jesus-Christ.' 3 Eusebius ( Vit. Constant. Magn. iv. 9 et seqq.) and Theodoret (i. 25) give the terms of a letter written by Constantine to Sapor at this time in favour of the Christians. It is a verbose* production, and possesses but little interest. The greater part is an account of his own religious principles and feel- ings. The concluding portion, which alone ^touches the case of the Persian Christians, runs as follows: 'You can imagine then how delighted I am to hear that Persia too, in some of its best regions, is adorned and illustrated by this class of men, on whose be- half I write to you — I mean the Christians — a thing most agreeable to my wishes. All prosperity then be yours, and all prosperity be theirs — may both flourish alike! Thus will you make God the Father, the Lord of all, propitious and friendly towards you. These persons then, seeing that you are so great, I commend to you — I put them into your hand, seeing that you are so conspicuous for your piety. Love them with that iove which befits your known benevolence. For thus you will confer both on us and on yourself an immeasura- ble benefit.' 148 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. VII. terminated so unfavourably forty years earlier by his grandfather. He made the emperor's interference with Persian affairs, and encouragement of his Christian sub- jects in their perversity, a ground of complaint, and began to threaten hostilities. 1 Some negotiations, which are not very clearly narrated, 2 followed. Both sides, apparently, had determined on war, but both wished to gain time. It is uncertain what would have been the result had Constantine lived. But the death of that monarch in the early summer of a.d. 337, on his way to the eastern frontier, dispelled the last chance of peace, by relieving Sapor from the wholesome fear which had hitherto restrained his ambition. The military fame of Constantine was great, and naturally inspired respect ; his power was firmly fixed, and he was without competitor or rival. By his removal the whole face of affairs was changed ; and Sapor, who had almost brought himself to venture on a rupture with Rome during Con- stantine*^ life, no longer hesitated on receiving news of his death, but at once commenced hostilities. 3 It is probable that among the motives which deter- mined the somewhat wavering conduct of Sapor at thU juncture 4 was a reasonable fear of the internal troubles which it seemed to be in the power of the Romans to excite among the Persians, if from friends they became 1 Libanius, Oral. iii. pp. 118, 120; Aurel. Vict. Be Cmsaribus, § 41. 2 Compare Liban. l.s.c. with Fes- tus (§ 26) and Euseb. Vit. Con- stant, iv. 8. 3 Some writers make the hos- tilities commence in the lifetime of Constantine. (See Eutrop. x. 8; Chronic. Pasch. p. 280, C.) But Ammianus, who is almost a con- temporary, assigns the outbreak to the reign of Constantius (xxv. 4). 4 Sapor is said to have sent a friendly embassy to Constantine in a.d. 333 (Euseb. Vit. Const, iv. 8; Liban. Or. iii. p. 118). In a.d. 337 be suddenly threatened war, and demanded the restoration of the five provinces ceded by Narses (Liban. Or. iii. p. 120). Having received a refusal, he sent another embassy, about Easter, to express his desire for peace (Euseb. iv. 57). Ch. VII. I HIS GROUNDS OF QUARREL WITH ROME. 149 enemies. Having tested his own military capacity in his Arab wars, and formed an army on whose courage, endurance, and attachment he could rely, he was not afraid of measuring his strength with that of Rome in the open field ; but he may well have dreaded the arts which the Imperial State was in the habit of em- ploying, 1 to supplement her military shortcomings, in wars with her neighbours. There was now at the court of Constantinople a Persian refugee of such rank and importance that Constantine had, as it were, a pre- tender ready made to his hand, and could reckon on creating dissension among the Persians whenever he pleased, by simply proclaiming himself this person's ally and patron. Prince Hormisdas, the elder brother of Sapor, and rightful king of Persia, had, after a long imprisonment, 2 contrived, by the help of his wife, to escape from his dungeon, 3 and had fled to the court of Constantine as early as a.d. 323. He had been received by the emperor with every mark of honour and distinc- tion, had been given a maintenance suited to his rank, and had enjoyed other favours. 4 Sapor must have felt himself deeply aggrieved by the undue attention paid to his rival ; and though he pretended to make light of the matter, and even generously sent Hormisdas the wife to whom his escape was due, 5 he cannot but have been uneasy at the possession, by the Roman emperor, of his brother's person. In weighing the reasons for and against war, he cannot but have assigned considerable importance to this circumstance. It did not ultimately 1 See the Author's Sixth Mon- archy, pp. 230, 234, 256, &c. 2 If Prince Hormisdas was a son of Hormisdas II. and thrown into prison at his death (see above, p. 143), he must have passed four- teen years in confinement before he made his escape. 3 Zosim. ii. 27. 4 Ibid. ii. 27, ad. fin.; and iii. 13, ad fin. 5 Suidas ad voc. Mapavac;. 150 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. |Ch. VII. prevent him from challenging Rome to the combat ; but it may help to account for the hesitation, the delay, and the fluctuations of purpose, which we re- mark in his conduct during the four or five years 1 which immediately preceded the death of Constantine. 1 From a.d. 333 to a.d. 337. Ch. VIII. ] DEATH OF CONSTANTINE. 151 CHAPTER VIII. Position of Affairs on the Death of Constantine. First War of Sapor with Rome, a.d. 337-350. First Siege of Nisibis. Obscure Interval. Troubles in Armenia, and Recovery of Armenia by the Persians, Sapor's Second Siege of Nisibis. Its Failure. Great Battle of Singara. Sapor's Son made Prisoner and murdered in cold blood. Third Siege of Nisibis. Sapor called away by an Invasion of the Massagetce. * Constantius adversus Persas et Saporem, qui Mesopotamiam vastaverant, novem prseliis parum prospere decertavit.' — Orosius, Hist. vii. 29. The death of Constantine was followed by the division of the Roman world among his sons. The vast empire with which Sapor had almost made up his mind to con- tend was partitioned out into three moderate-sized kingdoms. 1 In place of the late brave and experienced emperor, a raw youth, 2 who had given no signs of superior ability, had the government of the Roman provinces of the East, of Thrace, Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. Master of one-third of the empire only, and of the least warlike portion, 3 Constan- tius was a foe whom the Persian monarch might well despise, and whom he might expect to defeat without much difficulty. Moreover, there was much in the cir- cumstances of the time that seemed to promise success 1 At first the partition was into Jive kingdoms; but the dominions of Dalmatius and Hannibalianus were soon absorbed into those of the sons of Constantine. 2 Constantius was not quite twenty at the death of his father. He was born in August, a.d. 317. Constantine died May 22, a.d. 337. 3 The natives of the voluptuous East were never a match for those of the hardy West. Roman legions recruited in Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt were always poor soldiers. 152 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VIII. to the Persian arms in a struggle with Rome. The removal of Constantine had been followed by an out- burst of licentiousness and violence among the Roman soldiery in the capital ; 1 and throughout the East the army had cast off the restraints of discipline, and given indications of a turbulent and seditious spirit. 2 The condition of Armenia was also such as to encourage Sapor in his ambitious projects. Tiridates, though a persecutor of the Christians in the early part of his reign, had been converted by Gregory the Illuminator, 3 and had then enforced Christianity on his subjects by fire and sword. A sanguinary conflict had followed. A large portion of the Armenians, firmly attached to the old national idolatry, had resisted determinedly. 4 Nobles, priests, and people had fought desperately in defence of their temples, images, and altars ; and, though the persistent will of the king overbore all opposition, yet the result was the formation of a discontented fac- tion, which rose up from time to time against its rulers, and was constantly tempted to ally itself with any foreign power from which it could hope the re-estab- lishment of the old religion. Armenia had also, after the death of Tiridates (in a.d. 314), fallen under the government of weak princes. 5 Persia had recovered from it the portion of Media Atropatene ceded by the treaty between Galerius and Narses. 6 Sapor, therefore, had nothing to fear on this side ; and he might reason- ably expect to find friends among the Armenians them- 1 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, ch. xviii. (vol. ii. pp. 98-100). 2 Ibid. p. 103. 3 Mos. Chor. Hist. Armen. ii. 77; Agathangelus, §§ 110-132. 4 See Milman, Hist, of Chris- tianity, vol. ii. p. 258, and the authorities there cited. 5 Chosroes II., who was placed on the throne by Rome in a.d. 316, and Tiranus, his son, who succeeded Chosroes in a.d. 325. 6 This distinctly appears from Faustus, iii. 20. The cession seems to have been made by Chosroes II. (Mos. Chor. iii. 8). Ch. VIII. ] SAPOR II. ATTACKS CONST ANTIUS. 153 selves, should the general position of his affairs allow him to make an effort to extend Persian influence once more over the Armenian highland. The bands of Sapor crossed the Roman frontier soon after, if not even before, 1 the death of Constantine ; and after an interval of forty years the two great powers of the world were once more engaged in a bloody conflict. Constantius, having paid the last honours to his father s remains, 2 hastened to the eastern frontier, where he found the Roman army weak in numbers, badly armed and badly provided, ill-disposed towards himself, and almost ready to mutiny. 3 It was necessary, before any- thing could be done to resist the advance of Sapor, that the insubordination of the troops should be checked, their wants supplied, and their goodwill conciliated. Constantius applied himself to effect these changes. 4 Meanwhile Sapor set the Arabs and Armenians in mo- tion, inducing the Pagan party among the latter to rise in insurrection, deliver their king, Tiranus, into his power, 5 and make incursions into the Roman territory, while the latter infested with their armed bands the provinces of Mesopotamia and Syria. 6 He himself was content, during the first year of the war, a.d. 337, with moderate successes, and appeared to the Romans to avoid rather than seek a pitched battle. 7 Constantius 1 See above, p. 148, note 3 ; and compare Liban. Orat. iii. p. 117, B. 2 Liban. Orat. iii. p. 121, B. 3 Julian. Orat. i. pp. 33 and 36. 4 Ibid. pp. 36-38. Among other improvements introduced by Con- stantius at this time was the equipment of a portion of the Roman cavalry after the fashion of the Persian cataphracti, or mailed horsemen. 5 Ibid. pp. 33 and 37. Compare St. Martin's additions to Le Beau, B as-Empire, vol. i. pp. 406 et seqq. 6 Julian. Orat. i. p. 37. 7 There must be some founda- tion for the statements of Libanius and Julian, that Sapor at first avoided a conflict, even though they are contained in panegyrics. (See Liban. p. 122, A : Toif dpiotg ttyzioTrjuEL rolg Uepoifcoic, iindvfxtjv aifid^ac rrjv de&av • nai 6 rbv Ovubv dei;ap,evog ovk rjv ' uXX oi rbv iroTiepov tiaayovreg kv (pvyy rbv noXefiov dteoepov, k.t.1. Julian. Orat. i. p. 154 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VIII. was able, under these circumstances, not only to main- tain his ground, but to gain certain advantages. He restored the direction of affairs in Armenia to the Roman party, 1 detached some of the Mesopotamian Arabs from the side of his adversary, and attached them to his own, 2 and even built forts in the Persian terri- tory on the further side of the Tigris. 3 But the gains made were slight; and in the ensuing year (a.d. 338) Sapor took the field in greater force than before, and addressed himself to an important enterprise. He aimed, it is evident, from the first, at the recovery of Mesopotamia, and at thrusting back the Romans from the Tigris to the Euphrates. He found it easy to over- run the open country, to ravage the crops, drive off the cattle, and burn the villages and homesteads. But the region could not be regarded as conquered, it could not be permanently held, unless the strongly fortified posts which commanded it, and which were in the hands of Rome, could be captured. 4 Of all these the most important was Nisibis. This ancient town, known to the Assyrians as Nazibina, 5 was, at any rate from the time of Lucullus, 6 the most important city of Mesopo- tamia. It was situated at the distance of about sixty miles from- the Tigris, at the edge of the Mons Masius, in a broad and fertile plain, watered by one of the affluents 7 of the river Khabour, or Aborrhas. The 39: Tcjv 7vo?.€/ll'kjv oviklc kro'XfirjGev ufivvac Tij xupa TcopOov/Ltevrj • ixavra 6e nap' ijfidg r/yero tukelvuv uyaOa ' tlov uev ovdi etc x eL P a £ isvai toTi/liuv- TUV.) 1 Julian. Orat. i. p. 37. 2 Ibid. p. 38. 3 Ibid. p. 39. 4 This is well urged by Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 372). 5 See the Assyrian Canon, pas- sim ; and compare Ancient Mon- archies, vol. i. p. 258. 6 Plutarch, Lucull. § 32. 7 This river, now called the Jerujer, anciently the Mygdonius (liver of Gozan?), joins the main stream of the Khabour in lat. 36° 20', near the volcanic hill of Koukab. (Layard, Nin. and Bab. pp. 309, 322, &c.) Cii. VIII.] FIRST SIEGE OF NISIBIS. 155 Romans, after their occupation of Mesopotamia, had raised it to the rank of a colony ; 1 and its defences, which were of great strength, had always been main- tained by the emperors in a state of efficiency. Sapor regarded it as the key of the Roman position in the tract between the rivers, 2 and, as early as a.d. 338, sought to make himself master of it. 3 The first siege of Nisibis by Sapor lasted, we are told, sixty- three days. 4 Few particulars of it have come down to us. Sapor had attacked the city, apparently, in the absence of Constantius, 5 who had been called off to Pannonia to hold a conference with his brothers. It was defended, not only by its garrison and inhabitants, but by the prayers and exhortations of its bishop, 6 St. James, who, if he did not work miracles for the deliv- erance of his countrymen, at any rate sustained and animated their resistance. The result was that the bands of Sapor were repelled with loss, and he was forced, after wasting two months before the walls, to raise the siege and own himself baffled. 7 After this, for some years the Persian war with Rome languished. It is difficult to extract from the brief statements of epitomisers, 8 and the loose invectives or panegyrics of orators, 9 the real circumstances of the 1 As appears from the coins of Nisibis (Mionnet, Description des Medailles, torn. v. pp. 625-8). 2 This is evident from the per- sistency of his attacks. Ammianus says (xxv. 8): ' Constabat orbem Eonm in ditionem potuisse transire Persidis, nisi heec civitas (sc. Nisi- bis) habili sitn et magnitudine moenium restitisset.' 3 On the date of the first siege of Nisibis, see Tillemont, Hist, des Empereurs, torn. iv. p. 668; Clin- ton, F. R. vol. i. p. 396. 4 Chron. Pasch. p. 287, B; Theo- phanes, p. 28, D. 5 So Tillemont, torn. iv. p. 319. 6 Theodoret, ii. 30. The mira- cles ascribed by this writer to St. James are justly ridiculed by Gib- bon (vol. ii. p. 372, note 65 ). 7 Chron. Pasch. l.s.c. ; Hieronym. Chron. anno 2354. 8 Eutropius, Festus, Zosimus, Zonaras. 9 The first and second speeches of Julian and the third of Libanius belong to the latter class; the 156 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. |Ch. VIII. struggle ; but apparently the general condition of things was this. The Persians were constantly victo- rious in the open field ; Constantius was again and again defeated ; 1 but no permanent gain was effected by these successes. A weakness inherited by the Persians from the Parthians 2 — an inability to conduct sieges to a prosperous issue — showed itself ; and their failures against the fortified posts which Rome had taken care to establish in the disputed regions were continual. Up to the close of a.d. 340, Sapor had made no impor- tant gain, had struck no decisive blow, but stood nearly in the same position which he had occupied at the commencement of the conflict. But the year a.d. 341 saw a change. Sapor, after obtaining possession of the person of Tiranus, had sought to make himself master of Armenia, and had even attempted to set up one of his own relatives as king. 3 But the indomitable spirit of the inhabitants, and their firm attachment to their Arsacid princes, caused his attempts to fail of any good result, and tended on the whole to throw Armenia into the arms of Rome. Sapor, after a while, became convinced of the folly of his proceedings, and resolved on the adop- tion of a wholly new policy. He would relinquish the idea of conquering, and would endeavour instead to con- ciliate the Armenians, in the hope of obtaining from Epistle of Julian to the Athenian Senate and People, and the tenth oration of Libanius, belong (so far as Constantius is concerned) to the former. The later writings of these two authors to a great extent in- validate the earlier. 1 Nine times, according to Festus (§ 27); frequently, according to Eutropius (x. 10); whenever he engaged the Persians, according to Ammianus (xx. 11, ad Jin.) and Socrates (Hist Eccles. ii. 25). 2 See the Author's Sixth Mon- arch!/, p. 406. 3 Mos. Chor. Hist. Armen. iii. 10; Faustus, iii. 21. The Persian prince seems to have been named Narses. Moses calls him Sapor's brother; but this is very improba- ble. Ch. VIII. I SETTLEMENT OF ARMENIA. 157 their gratitude what he had been unable to extort from their fears. Tiranus was still living ; and Sapor, we are told, offered to replace him upon the Armenian throne ; 1 but, as he had been blinded by his captors, and as Oriental notions did not allow a person thus mutilated to exercise royal power, 2 Tiranus declined the offer made him, and suggested the substitution of his son, Arsaces, who was, like himself, a prisoner in Persia. Sapor readily consented ; and the young prince, released from captivity, returned to his country, and was installed as king by the Persians, 3 with the good- will of the natives, who were satisfied so long as they could feel that they had at their head a monarch of the ancient stock. The arrangement, of course, placed Armenia on the Persian side, and gave Sapor for many years a powerful ally in his struggle with Rome. 4 Thus Sapor had, by the year a.d. 341, made a very considerable gain. He had placed a friendly sovereign on the Armenian throne, had bound him to his cause by oaths, and had thereby established his influence, not only over Armenia itself, but over the whole tract which lay between Armenia and the Caucasus. But he was far from content with these successes. It was still his great object to drive the Romans from Mesopota- mia ; and with that object in view it continued to be his first wish to obtain possession of Nisi bis. Accordingly, having settled Armenian affairs to his liking, he made, in a.d. 346, a second attack on the great city of Northern Mesopotamia, again investing it with a large body of 1 Faustus, l.s.c. 2 Hence the practice of blinding their near relatives upon their ac- cession which the Shahs of Persia regularly pursued till within the present century. 3 Faustus, iv. 1. 4 On the friendly relations which subsisted at this time between Persia and Armenia, see Faustus, iv. 16. 158 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VIII. troops, and this time pressing the siege during the space of nearly three months. 1 Again, however, the strength of the walls and the endurance of the garrison baffled him. Sapor was once more obliged to withdraw from before the place, having suffered greater loss than those whom he had assailed, and forfeited much of the prestige which he had acquired by his many victories. It was, perhaps, on account of the repulse from Nisi- bis, and in the hope of recovering his lost laurels, that Sapor, in the next year but one, a.d. 348, made an un- usual effort. Calling out the entire military force of the empire, and augmenting it by large bodies of allies and mercenaries, 2 the Persian king, towards the middle of summer, crossed the Tigris by three bridges, 3 and with a numerous and well-appointed army invaded Cen- tral Mesopotamia, probably from Adiabene, or the region near and a little south of Nineveh. Constantius, with the Roman army, was posted on and about the Sinjar range of hills, in the vicinity of the town of Singara, which is represented by the modern village of Sinjar. 4 The Roman emperor did not venture to dispute the passage of the river, or to meet his adversary in the broad plain which intervenes between the Tigris and the mountain range, but clung to the skirts of the hills, and com- manded his troops to remain wholly on the defensive. 5 1 Jerome says : ' Sapor tribus men- sibus obsedit Nisibin ; 9 but Theo- phanes gives the exact duration of the siege as seventy-eight days (p. 31 D). 2 Liban. Orat. iii. p. 129, A, B. 3 Ibid. p. 180, A. 4 On the position of Sinjar and the character of the surrounding country, see Layard (Nin. and Bab. pp. 246-249). 5 Liban. p. 129, D. This writer pretends that it was not through fear of meeting the enemy in the open that Constantius held back, but because he wanted to draw his adversary on and prevent him from recrossing the Tigris without fight- ing. Perhaps it is most probable that the passage of the river took Constantius by surprise, that he was too weak to prevent it, and was obliged to remain on the de- fensive until his troops could be concentrated. Cn. VIII. ] BATTLE OF SINGAKA. 159 Sapor was thus enabled to choose his position, to estab- lish a fortified camp at a convenient distance from the enemy, and to occupy the hills in its vicinity — some portion of the Sinjar range — with his archers. It is uncertain whether, in making these dispositions, he was merely providing for his own safety, or whether he was laying a trap into which he hoped to entice the Roman army. 1 Perhaps his mind was wide enough to embrace both contingencies. At any rate, having thus established a point d^appui in his rear, he advanced boldly and challenged the legions to an encounter. The challenge was at once accepted, and the battle com- menced about midday ; 2 but now the Persians, having just crossed swords with the enemy, almost immediately began to give ground, and retreating hastily drew their adversaries along, across the thirsty plain, to the vicinity of their fortified camp, where a strong body of horse and the flower of the Persian archers were posted. The horse charged, but the legionaries easily defeated them, 3 and elated with their success burst into the camp, despite the warnings of their leader, who strove vainly to check their ardour and to induce them to put off the completion of their victory till the next day. 4 A small detachment found within the ramparts was put to the sword ; and the soldiers scattered themselves among the tents, some in quest of booty, others only anxious for some means of quenching their raging 1 Libanius represents the entire arrangement as a plan carefully laid (Or at. iii. p. 130, C); Julian, on the contrary, regards the flight of the Persians as a real panic, and their victory at the camp as a mere piece of good fortune (Orat. i. pp. 42-44). 2 Liban. Orat. iii. p. 131, A. 3 Ibid. p. 131, D, and p. 132, A. Each legionary, we are told, stepped aside out of the way of the horse- man who bore down upon him, and then struck him, as he passed, with a club. 4 Julian. Orat. i. pp. 42-3 ; Liban. p. 130, D. 160 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. VIII. thirst. 1 Meantime the sun had gone down, and the shades of night fell rapidly. Regarding the battle as over, and the victory as assured, the Romans gave themselves up to sleep or feasting. But now Sapor saw his opportunity — the opportunity for which he had perhaps planned and waited. His light troops on the adjacent hills commanded the camp, and, advancing on every side, surrounded it. They were fresh and eager for the fray ; they fought in the security afforded by the darkness ; while the fires of the camp showed them their enemies, worn out with fatigue, sleepy, or drunk- en. 2 The result, as might have been expected, was a terrible carnage. 3 The Persians overwhelmed the legionaries with showers of darts and arrows ; flight, under the circumstances, was impossible ; and the Roman soldiers mostly perished where they stood. They took, however, ere they died, an atrocious re- venge. Sapor's son had been made prisoner in the course of the day ; in their desperation the legionaries turned their fury against this innocent youth ; they beat him with whips, wounded him with the points of their weapons, and finally rushed upon him and killed him with a hundred blows. 4 1 Liban. p. 132, B ; Julian, p. 44. The latter writer appears to ascribe the Roman disaster mainly to the troops exposing themevsels as they drank at the Persian cisterns (kaKKOig vAaTog h(hv evtvxovtec, rrjv liaTCkiarrjv vIktjv ddcpdeipav). 2 The Roman writers touch lightly the condition of the Roman troops when the Persians fell upon them. I follow probability when I describe them as ' sleepy or drunken.' 3 See Amm. Marc, xviii. 5 : " Apud Singaram . . . acerrime nocturna concertatione pugnatum est, nostrorum copiis ingenti strage confossis.' Compare Hieronym. anno 2364; and Liban. Oral. iii. p. 132, C. Even Julian admits that the battle was commonly re- garded as the greatest victory gained by the Persians during the war (Or at. i. p. 41). 4 Liban. p. 133, D : 'Eirtidov \oi He pom] rbv rov fiaoikEug Tralda, rbv rrjg upxVQ du'uhxov, E&yprjfiEvov, KCli /LKlGTiyoV/lEVOV, KOl KEVTOVjUEVOV , KCIL fillKpUV VOTEpOV KCLTCLKOTTTOflEVOV. Tillemont has seen that this treat- ment could not have been possible till the troops were half -maddened Ch. VIII. ] THIRD SIEGE OF NISIBIS. 161 The battle of Singara, though thus disastrous to the Romans, had not any great effect in determining the course or issue of the war. Sapor did not take advan- tage of his victory to attack the rest of the Roman forces in Mesopotamia, or even to attempt the siege of any large town. 1 Perhaps he had really suffered large losses in the earlier part of the day ; 2 perhaps he was too much affected by the miserable death of his son to care, till time had dulled the edge of his grief, for military glory. 3 At any rate, we hear of his undertaking no further enterprise till the second year after the battle, 4 a.d. 350, when he made his third and most desperate attempt to capture Nisibis. The rise of a civil war in the West, and the departure of Constantius for Europe with the flower of his troops early in the year, 5 no doubt encouraged the Persian monarch to make one more effort against the place which had twice repulsed him with ignominy. 6 He col- lected a numerous native army, and strengthened it by the addition of a body of Indian allies, 7 who brought a large troop of elephants into the field. 8 With this force he crossed the Tigris in the early summer, and, after taking several fortified posts, marched northwards with despair and fury. {Histoire des Empereurs, torn. iv. p. 347. ) 1 So much we may accept from the boasts of Julian (Orat. i. p. 45) and Libanius (Orat. in. p. 133, A), corroborated as they are by the testimony of Ammianus, who says (l.s.c.) that the Persians made no use of their victory at Singara; but it is impossible to believe the statement of Libanius, that the whole Persian army fled in dis- order from Singara and hastily recrossed the Tigris (p. 133, D). 2 Julian maintains that both sides suffered equally in the battle (p. 41). 3 Compare the grief of Orodes on the death of Pacorus (Sixth Monarchy, p. 195). 4 Jerome's statement that Amida and Bezabde were taken by Sapor shortly after the battle of Singara arises apparently from some con- fusion between the events of the year a.d. 349 and those of a.d. 359. 5 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 377. 6 Julian. Orat. i. p. 48. 7 Ibid. ii. p. 115. 8 Ibid. p. 116. 162 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. YIIL and invested Nisibis. The Roman commander in the place was the Count Lucilianus, afterwards the father- in-law of Jovian, a man of resource and determination. He is said to have taken the best advantage of every favourable turn of fortune in the course of the siege, and to have prolonged the resistance by various subtle stratagems. 1 But the real animating spirit of the de- fence was once more the bishop, St. James, who roused the enthusiasm of the inhabitants to the highest pitch by his exhortations, guided them by his counsels, and was thought to work miracles for them by his prayers. 2 Sapor tried at first the ordinary methods of attack ; he battered the walls with his rams, and sapped them with mines. But finding that by these means he made no satisfactory progress, he had recourse shortly to wholly novel proceedings. The river Mygdonius (now the Je- rujer), swollen by the melting of the snows in the Mons Masius, had overflowed its banks and covered with an inundation the plain in which Nisibis stands. Sapor saw that the forces of nature might be employed to advance his ends, and so embanked the lower part of the plain that the water could not run off, but formed a deep lake round the town, gradually creeping up the walls till it had almost reached the battlements. 3 Hav- ing thus created an artificial sea, the energetic monarch rapidly collected, or constructed, 4 a fleet of vessels, and, placing his military engines on board, launched the ships upon the waters, and so attacked the walls of the city 1 Zosimus, iii. 8. 2 Theodoret, ii. 30. 3 Julian. Orat. ii. p. ? 115: 'O TlapOvaiuv (SaoikEvc . . . ettitelx'i&v T7]V TToXeV X^^O-GIV, e\t(X EIC laVTCL dexofievog rbv Mvydoviov, Xifivriv citce- tyaivEio to Txepl tCj ugtel xupiov, nai oonep vfjGOv kv avTy ivvelxe ttjv TloklV, (XLKpOV VTTEpeXOVOUV KGt V7TEp- XdivofiEvov tC)v £7tciA.£e(*)v. Compare Orat. i. p. 49. 4 Compare Trajan's construction of a fleet in this same region in the winter of a.d. 115-116. (Sixth Monarchy, p. 310. ) Ch. VIII.] THIRD SIEGE OF NISIBIS. 163 at great advantage. But the defenders resisted stoutly, setting the engines on fire with torches, and either lifting the ships from the water by means of cranes, or else shattering them with the huge stones which they could discharge from their balistce. 1 Still, therefore, no impression was made ; but at last an unforeseen cir- cumstance brought the besieged into the greatest peril, and almost gave Nisibis into the enemy's hands. The inundation, confined by the mounds of the Persians, which prevented it from running off, pressed with con- tinually increasing force against the defences of the city, till at last the wall, in one part, proved too weak to withstand the tremendous weight which bore upon it, and gave way suddenly for the space of a hundred and fifty feet. 2 What further damage was done to the town we know not ; but a breach was opened through which the Persians at once made ready to pour into the place, regarding it as impossible that so huge a gap should be either repaired or effectually defended. Sapor took up his position on an artificial eminence, while his troops rushed to the assault. 3 First of all marched the heavy cavalry, accompanied by the horse-archers ; next came the elephants, bearing iron towers upon their backs, and in each tower a number of bowmen ; inter- mixed with the elephants were a certain amount of heavy-armed foot. 4 It was a strange column with which to attack a breach ; and its composition does not 1 Julian, l.s c. Gibbon appears to have understood Julian to state that the balistce discharging these huge stones (stones weighing more than five hundred- weight) were carried by the ships (Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 108). But Julian's meaning is clearly that stated above in the text. 2 A similar danger not unfre- quently threatens Baghdad from the swell of the Euphrates, which is brought to its walls through the Saklawiyeh canal. Mr. Loftus gives a graphic account of the risk run in May 1849 (Chaldwa and Susiana, pp. 7-8). 3 Julian, p. 116. 4 Ibid. p. 120. 164 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. VIII. say much for Persian siege tactics, which were always poor and ineffective, 1 and which now, as usually, resulted in failure. The horses became quickly entangled in the ooze and mud which the waters had left behind them as they subsided ; the elephants were even less able to overcome these difficulties, and as soon as they received ;i wound sank down — never to rise again — in the swamp. 2 Sapor hastily gave orders for the assailing column to retreat and seek the friendly shelter of the Persian camp, while he essayed to maintain his advan- tage in a different way. His light archers were ordered to the front, and, being formed into divisions which were to act as reliefs, received orders to prevent the restoration of the ruined wall by directing an incessant storm of arrows into the gap made by the waters. But the firmness and activity of the garrison and inhabitants defeated this well-iftiagined proceeding. While the heavy-armed troops stood in the gap receiving the flights of arrows and defending themselves as they best could, the unarmed multitude raised a new wall in their rear, which, by the morning of the next day, was six feet in height, 3 This last proof of his enemies' resolu- tion and resource seems to have finally convinced Sapor of the hopelessness of his enterprise. Though he still continued the siege for a while, he made no other grand attack, and at length drew off his forces, hav- ing lost twenty thousand men before the walls, 4 and wasted a hundred days, or more than three months. 5 1 See above, p. 156, The weak- ness here spoken of did not extend to the ancient Persians, who were fairly successful in their sieges {Ancient Monarchies, vol. iv. p. 130). 2 Ammianus tells ns that, either now or at some other time in the siege, the Persians suffered much by the elephants turning against their own side and trampling the footmen under their feet (xxv. 1). :5 Julian, p. 122. 4 Zonaras, xiii. 5 Chron. Pasch. p. 290, A. Julian exaggerates when he. says the time Ch. VIII. ] INVASION OF THE MASSAGETJE. 165 Perhaps be would not have departed so sOon, but would have turned the siege into a blockade, and en- deavoured to starve the garrison into submission, had not alarming tidings reached him from his north-eastern frontier. Then, as now, the low flat sandy region east of the Caspian was in the possession of nomadic hordes, whose whole life was spent in war and plunder. The Oxus might be nominally the boundary of the empire in this quarter ; but the nomads were really dominant over the entire desert to the foot of the Hyrcanian and Parthian hills. 1 Petty plundering forays into the fertile region south and east of the desert were no doubt con- stant, and were not greatly regarded ; but from time to time some tribe or chieftain bolder than the rest made a deeper inroad and a more sustained attack than usual, spreading consternation around, and terrifying the court for its safety. Such an attack seems to have occurred towards the autumn of a.d. 350. The in- vading horde is said to have consisted of Massagetae ; 2 but we can hardly be mistaken in regarding them as, in the main, of Tatar or Turkoman blood, akin to the Usbegs and other Turanian tribes which still inhabit the sandy steppe. Sapor considered the crisis such as to re- quire his own presence ; and thus, while civil war sum- moned one of the two rivals from Mesopotamia to the far West, where he had to contend with the self-styled emperors, Magnentius and Vetranio, the other was called away to the extreme East to repel a Tatar inva- wasted was ' four months ' (Orat. i. p. 51). 1 See Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 386. 2 Zonaras, xiii. 7. The original ethnic character of the Massagetae is perhaps doubtful. They may have been degenerated Arians; but in their habits they are, even from the first, scarcely to be distin- guished from the Tatar or Tura- nian hordes. By Sapors time they had probably intermixed largely with Tatars. 166 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. % [Ch. VIII. sion. A tacit truce was. thus established between the great belligerents 1 — a truce which lasted for seven or eight years. The unfortunate Mesopotamians, harassed by constant war for above twenty years, had now a breathing-space during which to recover from the ruin and desolation that had overwhelmed them. Rome and Persia for a time suspended their conflict. Rivalry, indeed, did not cease ; but it was transferred from the battlefield to the cabinet, and the Roman emperor sought and found in diplomatic triumphs a compensa- tion for the ill-success which had attended his efforts in the field. 1 Julian. Orat. i. p. 51 ; Orat. ii. I tovtov, kcu ovte opicuv ovre GvvdrjKdv p. 123. (uyei npbQ rmuq eiprjvnv en \ kdirjoev * ayana de oltcoc juwuv, kt.%.) Ch. IX. I REVOLT OF ARMENIA. 167 CHAPTER IX. Revolt of Armenia and Acceptance by Arsaces of the Position of a Roman Feudatory. Character and Issue of Sapor's EasternWars. His nego- tiations with Constantius. His Extreme Demands. Circumstances under which he determines to renew the War. His Preparations. Deser- tion to Mm of Antoninus. Great Invasion of Sapor. Siege of Amida. Sapor's Severities. Siege and Capture of Singara ; of Bezabde. At- tack on Virta fails. Aggressive Movement of Constantius. He attacks Bezabde^ but fails. Campaign of a.d. 361. Death of Constantius. Evenerat . . . quasi fatali constellatione . . . ut Constantium dirnicantem cum Persis fortuna semper sequeretur afflictior. — Amm. Marc. xx. 9, ad fin. It seems to have been soon after the close of Sapor s first war with Constantius that events took place in Armenia which once more replaced that country under Roman influence. Arsaces, the son of Tiranus, had been, as we have seen, 1 established as monarch, by Sapor, in the year a.d. 341, under the notion that, in return for the favour shown him, he would administer Armenia in the Persian interest. But gratitude is an unsafe basis for the friendships of monarchs. Arsaces, after a time, began to chafe against the obligations under which Sapor had laid him, and to wish, by taking inde- pendent action, to show himself a real king, and not a mere feudatory. He was also, perhaps, tired of aiding Sapor in his Roman war, and may have found that he suffered more than he gained by having Rome for an enemy. At any rate, in the interval 2 between a.d. 351 1 Supra, p. 157. I Rome is misdated both by Faustus 2 The alliance of Arsaces with ' and by Moses of Chorene. The 168 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. |Ch. IX. and 359, probably while Sapor was engaged in the far East, 1 Arsaces sent envoys to Constantinople with a re- quest to Constantius that he would give him in marriage a member of the Imperial house. 2 Constantius was charmed with the application made to him, and at once accepted the proposal. He selected for the proffered honour a certain Olympias, the daughter of Ablabius, a Praetorian prefect, and lately the betrothed bride of his own brother, Constans; and sent her to Armenia, 3 where Arsaces welcomed her, and made her (as it would seem) his chief wife, provoking thereby the jealousy and aversion of his previous sultana, a native Armenian, named Pharandzem. 4 The engagement thus entered into led on, naturally, to the conclusion of a formal alliance between Rome and Armenia — an alliance which Sapor made fruitless efforts to disturb, 5 and which continued unimpaired down to the time (a.d. 359) when hostilities once more broke out be- tween Rome and Persia. Of Sapor's Eastern wars we have no detailed account. They seem to have occupied him from a.d. 350 to a.d. 357, and to have been, on the whole, successful. They former places it in the reign of Valens, a.d. 364-379 (Biblioiheque, iv. 5), the latter in that of Valen- tinian L, a.d. 364-375 (Hist. Armen. iii. 21). But it is clear from Am- mianus (xx. 11), whose authority exceeds that of all the Armenian historians united, that the alliance was made with Constantius. It could not have been earlier than a.d. 351, since Constans did not die till a.d. 350; and it could not have been later than a.d. 359, since it is spoken of as existing in that year (Aram. Marc. xvii. 14). 1 That is between a.d. 350 and 357. 2 Faustus, iv. 15. 3 Amm. Marc. xx. 11; Athanas. Ep. ad Solitar. p. 856; Mos. Chor. iii. 21. 4 Pharandzem was the daughter of a certain Antor, prince of Siunia, and was first married to Gnel or Knel, a nephew of Arsaces, whom he put to death. Her jealousy impelled her to contrive the mur- der of Olympias, who is said to have been killed by poison introduced into the sacred elements at the Eucharist. (See Faustus, l.s.c. ; Mos. Chor. iii. 23, 24.) 5 Amm. Marc. xx. 11: 'Audie- bat saspius eum tentatum a rege Per- sarum fallaciis, et minis, et dolis.' Compare Faustus, iv. 16, 20. Ch. IX.] EASTERN WARS OF SAPOR II. 169 were certainly terminated by a peace in the last-named year 1 — a peace of which it must have been a condition that his late enemies should lend him aid in the strug- gle which he was about to renew with Rome. Who these enemies exactly were, and what exact region they inhabited, is doubtful. They comprised certainly the Chionites and Gelani, probably the Euseni and the Vertas. 2 The Chionites are thought to have been Hiong- nu or Huns ; 3 and the Euseni are probably the U-siun, who, as early as B.C. 200, are found among the nomadic hordes pressing towards the Oxus. 4 The Vertse are wholly unknown. The Gelani should, by their name, be the inhabitants of Ghilan, or the coast tract south- Avest of the Caspian ; but this locality seems too remote from the probable seats of the Chionites and Euseni to be the one intended. The general scene of the wars was undoubtedly east of the Caspian, either in the Oxus region, or still further eastward, on the confines of India and Scythia. 5 The result of the wars, though not a conquest, was an extension of Persian influence and power. Troublesome enemies were converted into friends and allies. The loss of a predominating in- fluence over Armenia was thus compensated, or more than compensated, within a few years, by a gain of a similar kind in another quarter. While Sapor was thus engaged in the far East, he 1 Amm. Marc. xVii. 5, §' 1 : ' Rex Persarum, in confirms agens adhuc gentium extimarum, jamque cum Chionitis et Gelanis, omnium acer- rimis bellatoribus, pignore iclo so- cietatis,' &c. 2 The Chionites are mentioned repeatedly (Amm. Marc. xvi. 9; xvii. 5; xviii. 6; xix. 1, 2, &c); the Vertfe twice (xix. 2 and 5); the Euseni and Gelani once each (xvi. 9, and xvii. 5). It is not distinctly safd that the Euseni or VertiE had fought against Sapor. 3 Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 3S6. 4 Ibid. p. 30?>. Compare the Author's Sixth Monarch]/, p. 115. 5 So Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 408, note 58 ). 170 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. LCh. IX. received letters from the officer whom he had left in charge of his western frontier, 1 informing him that the Romans were anxious to exchange the precarious truce which Mesopotamia had been allowed to enjoy during the last five or six years for a more settled and formal peace. Two great Roman officials, Cassianus, duke of Mesopotamia, and Musonianus, Praetorian prefect, un- derstanding that Sapor was entangled in a bloody and difficult war at the eastern extremity of his empire, and knowing that Constantius was fully occupied with the troubles caused by the inroads of the barbarians into the more western of the Roman provinces, had thought that the time was favourable for terminating the provis- ional state of affairs in the Mesopotamian region by an actual treaty. 2 They had accordingly opened negotia- tions with Tamsapor, satrap of Adiabene, and suggested to him that he should sound his master on the subject of making peace with Rome. Tamsapor appears to have misunderstood the character of these overtures, or to have misrepresented them to Sapor ; in his despatch he made Constantius himself the mover in the matter, and spoke of him as humbly supplicating the great king to grant him conditions. 3 It happened that the message reached Sapor just as he had come to terms with his eastern enemies, and had succeeded in inducing them to become his allies. He was naturally elated at his success, and regarded the Roman overture as a simple acknowledgment of weakness. Accordingly he an- swered in the most haughty style. His letter, which was conveyed to the Roman emperor at Sirmium by 1 Amm. Marc. xvii. 5. 2 Ibid. xvi. 8. 8 Ibid. : ' Tamsapor . . . refert ad regem, quod acerrimis bellis Con- stantius implicatus pacem postulat precativam.' Compare xvii. 5. Ch. IX.] LETTER OF SAPOR TO CONSTANTIUS. 171 an ambassador named Narses, 1 was conceived in the following terms : 2 — 4 Sapor, king of kings, brother of the sun and moon, and companion of the stars, sends salutation to his bro- ther, Constantius Cassar. It glads me to see that thou art at last returned to the right way, and art ready to do what is just and fair, having learned by experience that inordinate greed is ofttimes punished by defeat and disaster. As then the voice of truth ought to speak with all openness, and the more illustrious of mankind should make their words mirror their thoughts, I will briefly declare to thee what I propose, not forgetting that I have often said the same things before. Your own authors are witness that the entire tract within the river Strymon and the borders of Macedon was once held by my ancestors ; if I required you to restore all this, it would not ill become me (excuse the boast), in- asmuch as I excel in virtue and in the splendour of my achievements the whole line of our ancient monarchs. But as moderation delights me, and has always been the rule of my conduct — wherefore from my youth up I have had no occasion to repent of any action — I will be content to receive Mesopotamia and Armenia, which was fraudulently extorted from my grandfather. We Persians have never admitted the principle, which you proclaim with such affrontery, that success in war is always glorious, whether it be the fruit of courage or trickery. In conclusion, if you will take the advice of one who speaks for your good, sacrifice a small tract of territory, one always in dispute and causing continual bloodshed, in order than you may rule the remainder securely. Physicians, remember, often cut and burn, 1 Pet. Patric. Fr. 17. Ammia- dus calls the ambassador Narseus. The Persian name was Narsehi. 2 See Amm. Marc. xvii. 5. 172 THE SEVENTH MONARCH V. [Cu. IX. and even amputate portions of the body, that the pa- tient may have the healthy use of what is left to him ; and there are animals which, understanding why the hunters chase them, deprive themselves of the thing coveted, to live thenceforth without fear. I warn you, that, if my ambassador returns in vain, I will take the field against you, so soon as the winter is past, with all my forces, confiding in my good fortune and in the fairness of the conditions w^hich I have now offered.' It must have been a severe blow to Imperial pride to receive such a letter ; and the sense of insult can scarcely have been much mitigated by the fact that the missive was enveloped in a silken covering, 1 or by the circumstance that the bearer, Narses, endeavoured by his conciliating manners to atone for his master's rude- ness, 2 Constantius replied, however, in a dignified and calm tone. 3 4 The Roman emperor,' he said, 1 victorious by land and sea, saluted his brother, King Sapor. His lieutenant in Mesopotamia had meant well in opening a negotiation with a Persian governor ; but he had acted without orders, and could not bind his master. Never- theless, he (Constantius) would not disclaim what had been done, since he did not object to a peace, provided it were fair and honourable. But to ask the master of the whole Roman world to surrender territories which he had successfully defended when he ruled only over the provinces of the East was plainly indecent and absurd. He must add that the employment of threats was futile, and too common an artifice ; more especially as the Persians themselves must know that Rome always 1 Themistius, Orat. iv. in laudem somewhat abbreviated the reply of Constanta, p. 57, B. Constantius, but have endeavoured 2 Pet. Patric. l.s.c. to preserve all the points which 3 A mm. Marc, l.s.c. I have are of any importance. Ch. IX. I REPLY OF CONSTANTIUS. 173 defended herself when attacked, and that, if occasion- ally she was vanquished in a battle, yet she never failed to have the advantage in the event of every war.' Three envoys were entrusted with the delivery of this reply 1 — Prosper, a count of the empire ; Spectatus, a tribune and notary ; and Eustathius, an orator and phi- losopher, a pupil of the celebrated Neo-Platonist, Jam- blichus, 2 and a friend of St. Basil. 3 Constantius was most anxious for peace, as a dangerous war threatened with the Alemanni, one of the most powerful tribes of Germany. 4 He seems to have hoped that, if the unadorned language of the two statesmen failed to move Sapor, he might be won over by the persuasive eloquence of the professor of rhetoric. But Sapor was bent on war. He had concluded ar- rangements with the natives so long his adversaries in the East, by which they had pledged themselves to join his standard with all their forces in the ensuing spring. 5 He was well aware of the position of Constantius in the West, of the internal corruption of his court, and of the perils constantly threatening him from external enemies. A Roman official of importance, bearing the once honoured name of Antoninus, had recently taken refuge with him from the claims of pretended creditors, and had been received into high favour on account of the information which he was able to communicate with respect to the disposition of the Roman forces and the condition of their magazines. 6 This individual, en- nobled by the royal authority, and given a place at the royal table, gained great influence over his new master, 1 Amm. Marc. xvii. 5, sub Jin. j Ammianus (xvii. 6-10) and Gibbon 2 Eunap. Vit. Jamblich. p. 23. j (Decline and Fall, vol. ii. pp. 412- 3 Basil. Ep. i. (Opera, vol. iii. j 418). pp. 69, 70). 5 Amm. Marc. xvii. 5, and xviii. 4. 4 See the history of the war in Ibid, xviii. 5. 174 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IX. whom he stimulated by alternately reproaching him with his backwardness in the past, and putting before him the prospect of easy triumphs over Rome in the future. He pointed out that the emperor, with the bulk of his troops and treasures, was detained in the regions adjoining the Danube, and that the East was left almost undefended ; he magnified the services which he was himself com- petent to render ; 1 he exhorted Sapor to bestir himself, and to put confidence in his good fortune. He recom- mended that the old plan of sitting down before walled towns should be given up, and that the Persian monarch, leaving the strongholds of Mesopotamia in his rear, should press forward to the Euphrates, 2 pour his troops across it, and overrun the rich province of Syria, which he would find unguarded, and which had not been in- vaded by an enemy for nearly a century. The views of Antoninus were adopted ; but, in practice, they were overruled by the exigencies of the situation. A Roman army occupied Mesopotamia, and advanced to the banks of the Tigris. When the Persians in full force crossed the river, accompanied by Chionite and Albanian allies, 3 they found a considerable body of troops prepared to resist them. Their opponents did not, indeed, offer battle, but they laid waste the country as the Persians took possession of it ; they destroyed the forage, evacu- ated the indefensible towns 4 (which fell, of course, into the enemy's hands), and fortified the line of the Eu- phrates with castles, military engines, and palisades. 5 Still the programme of Antoninus Avould probably have been carried out, had not the swell of the Euphrates 1 4 Ipse quoque in multis ac ne- cessariis operam suam fideiiter pro- mittens.' (Amra, Marc, xviii. 5, ad fin. ) 2 Ibid, xviii. 6. 3 Ibid. Ammianus himself wit- nessed the passage of the river. 4 Carrhae alone is expressly men- tioned. r ° Aram. Marc, xviii. 7. Ch. IX. 1 GREAT INVASION OF SAPOR. 175 exceeded the average, and rendered it impossible for the Persian troops to ford the river at the usual point of passage into Syria. On discovering this obstacle, Antoninus suggested that, by a march to the north-east through a fertile country, the Upper Euphrates might be reached, and easily crossed, before its waters had attained any considerable volume. Sapor agreed to adopt this suggestion. He marched from Zeugma across the Mons Masius towards the Upper Euphrates, defeated the Romans in an important battle near Amida, 1 took, by a sudden assault, two castles which defended the town, 2 and then somewhat hastily re- solved that he would attack the place, which he did not imagine capable of making much resistance. Amida, now Diarbekr, was situated on the right bank of the Upper Tigris, in a fertile plain, and was washed along the whole of its western side by a semi- circular bend of the river. 3 It had been a place of considerable importance from a very ancient date, 4 and had recently been much strengthened by Constantius, who had made it an arsenal for military engines, and had repaired its towers and walls. 5 The town contained within it a copious fountain of water, which was liable, however, to acquire a disagreeable odour in the sum- mer-time. Seven legions, of the moderate strength to which legions had been reduced by Constantine, 6 de- fended it ; and the garrison included also a body of 1 Amm. Marc, xviii. 8. 2 Ibid, xviii. 10. 3 ' A latere austral i, geniculate) Tigridis meatu subluitur' (ibid, xviii. 9). The plan given by the elder Niebuhr in his Voyaqe en Arable (torn. ii. pi. xlviii.) shows tli is bend very clearly. The modern town, however, is not washed by the river. 4 It is often mentioned in the Assyrian inscriptions. (Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii. pp. 345, 371, &c. ) Its prefect appears as eponym in the Assyrian Canon frequently. 5 Amm. Marc, l.s.c. 6 The legion of Constantine con- tained from 1,000 to 1,500 men. Seven legions would therefore give a force of from 8,000 to 9,000. 176 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. |Cn. IX. horse-archers, composed chiefly or entirely of noble foreigners. 1 Sapor hoped in the first instance to terrify it into submission by his mere appearance, and boldly rode up to the gates with a small body of his followers, expecting that they would be opened to him. But the defenders were more courageous than he had imagined. They received him with a shower of darts and arrows, that were directed specially against his person, which was conspicuous from its ornaments ; and they aimed their weapons so well that one of them passed through a portion of his dress and was nearly wounding him. 2 Persuaded by his followers, Sapor upon this withdrew, and committed the further prosecution of the attack to Grumbates, the king of the Chionites, who assaulted the walls on the next day with a body of picked troops, but was repulsed with great loss, his only son, a youth of great promise, being killed at his side by a dart from a balista? The death of this prince spread dismay through the camp, and was followed by a general mourning ; but it now became a point of honour to take the town which had so injured one of the great king's royal allies ; and Grumbates was promised that Amida should become the funeral pile of his lost darling. 4 The town was now regularly invested. Each nation was assigned its place. The Chionites, burning with the desire to avenge their late defeat, were on the east ; the Vertae on the south ; the Albanians, warriors from the Caspian region, on the north ; the Segestans, 5 who 1 Amm. Marc, xviii. 9, sub fin. 2 ' Parte indumenti tragnlae ictu discissa ' (ib. xix. 1). I do not know why Gibbon speaks of the dart as 4 glancing against the royal tiara' (Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 407). ;{ Amm. Marc. xix. 1. 4 Ibid. xix. 2 : ' Agitata gumma consiliorum placuerat, busto urbis subversae expiare perempti juvenis manes.' 5 Inhabitants of Seistan, proba- bly of Scythie origin. (See above, p.' 108.) Ch. IX. 1 SIEGE OF AMIDA. 177 were reckoned the bravest soldiers of all, and who brought into the field a large body of elephants, held the west. A continuous line of Persians, five ranks deep, surrounded the entire city, and supported the auxiliary detachments. The entire besieging army was estimated at a hundred thousand men j 1 the besieged, including the unarmed multitude, were under 30, 000. 2 After the pause of an entire day, the first general attack was made. Grumbates gave the signal for the assault by hurling a bloody spear into the space before the walls, after the fashion of a Roman fetialis? A cloud of darts and arrows from every side followed the flight of this weapon, and did severe damage to the besieged, who were at the same time galled with discharges from Roman military engines, taken by the Persians in some capture of Singara, and now employed against their former owners. 4 Still a vigorous resistance con- tinued to be made, and the besiegers, in their exposed positions, suffered even more than the garrison ; so that after two days the attempt to carry the city by general assault was abandoned, and the slow process of a regu- lar siege was adopted. Trenches were opened at the usual distance from the walls, along which the troops advanced under the cover of hurdles towards the ditch, which they proceeded to fill up in places. Mounds were then thrown up against the walls ; and moveable towers were constructed and brought into play, guarded 1 Amm. Marc. xix. 6. 2 Ibid. xix. 2, sub Jin. The legionaries were about 8,000 or 9,000 (see above, p. 175, note 6 ) ; the other soldiers and the unarmed multitude were reckoned at 20,000. 3 The comparison is made by Ammianus : * Ubi Grumbates has- tam infectam sanguine ritu patrio nostrique more conjecerat fetialis.' 9 (xix. 2.) 4 Ibid, l.s.c. It is not clear when this capture took place; but it can scarcely have been in this vear, since Rome holds Singara in A.D. 300. 178 THE SEVENTH MONAKCHY. [Ch. IX. externally with iron, and each mounting a balista. 1 It was impossible long to withstand these various weapons of attack. The hopes of the besieged lay, primarily, in their receiving relief from without by the advance of an army capable of engaging their assailants and har- assing them or driving them off ; secondarily, in suc- cessful sallies, by means of which they might destroy the enemy's works and induce him to retire from before the place. There existed, in the neighbourhood of Amida, the elements of a relieving army, under the command of the new prefect of the East, Sabinianus. Had this officer possessed an energetic and enterprising character, he might, without much difficulty, have collected a force of light and active soldiers, which might have hung upon the rear of the Persians, intercepted their convoys, cut off their stragglers, and have even made an occa- sional dash upon their lines. Such was the course of conduct recommended by Ursicinus, the second in command, whom Sabinianus had recently superseded ; but the latter was jealous of his subordinate, and had orders from the Byzantine court to keep him unem- ployed. 2 He was himself old and rich, alike disinclined to and unfit for military enterprise ; 3 he therefore abso- lutely rejected the advice of Ursicinus, and determined on making no effort. He had positive orders, he said, from the court to keep on the defensive, and not en- danger his troops by engaging them in hazardous ad- ventures. Amida must protect itself, or at any rate not look to him for succour. Ursicinus chafed terribly, it is said, against this decision, 4 but was forced to submit 1 Amm. Marc. xix. 5, ad init. 2 Ibid. xix. 3. 3 Ibid, xviii. 5. 4 ' Visebatur ut leo magnitudine corporis et torvitate terribilis, in- clusos inter retia catulos periculo Ch. IX.] INACTION OF SABINIANUS. 179 to it. His messengers conveyed the dispiriting intel- ligence to the devoted city, which learned thereby that it must rely wholly upon its own exertions. Nothing now remained but to organise sallies on a large scale and attack the besieger's works. Such at- tempts were made from time to time with some success ; and on one occasion two Gaulish legions, banished to the East for their adherence to the cause of Magnentius, penetrated, by night, into the heart of the besieging camp, and brought the person of the monarch into danger. This peril was, however, escaped; the legions were repulsed with the loss of a sixth of their num- ber ; 1 and nothing was gained by the audacious enter- prise beyond a truce of three days, during which each side mourned its dead, and sought to repair its losses. The fate of the doomed city drew on. Pestilence was added to the calamities which the besieged had to en- dure. 2 Desertion and treachery were arrayed against them. One of the natives of Amida, going over to the Persians, informed them that on the southern side of the city a neglected staircase led up from the margin of the Tigris through underground corridors to one of the principal bastions ; and under his guidance seventy archers of the Persian guard, picked men, ascended the dark passage at dead of night, occupied the tower, and when morning broke displayed from it a scarlet flag, as a sign to their countrymen that a portion of the wall was taken. The Persians were upon the alert, and an instant assault was made, But the garrison, by extra- ordinary efforts, succeeded in recapturing the tower ereptum ire non audens, unguibus ademptis et dentibus.' (Amm. Marc. xix. 3, ad Jin.) 1 Four hundred were killed out of probably about 2,500. (Ibid, xix. 6.) 2 Ibid. xix. 4. 180 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IX. before any support reached its occupants ; and then, directing their artillery and missiles against the assailing columns, inflicted on them tremendous losses, and soon compelled them to return hastily to the shelter of their camp. The Vertae, who maintained the siege on the south side of the city, were the chief sufferers in this abortive attempt. 1 Sapor had now spent seventy days before the place, and had made no perceptible impression. Autumn was already far advanced, 2 and the season for military oper- ations would soon be over. It was necessary, therefore, either to take the city speedily or to give up the siege and retire. Under these circumstances Sapor resolved on a last effort. He had constructed towers of such a height that they overtopped the wall, and poured their discharges on the defenders from a superior elevation. He had brought his mounds in places to a level with the ramparts, and had compelled the garrison to raise countermounds within the walls for their protection. He now determined on pressing the assault day after day, until he either carried the town or found all his resources exhausted. His artillery, his foot, and his elephants were all employed in turn or together ; he allowed the garrison no rest, 3 Not content with di- recting the operations, he himself took part in the supreme struggle, exposing his own person freely to the enemy's weapons, and losing many of his attend- ants. 4 After the contest had lasted three continuous days from morn to night, fortune at last favoured him. One of the inner mounds, raised by the besieged behind their wall, suddenly gave way, involving its defenders 1 Aram. Marc. xix. 5, ad Jin. I (Ibid. xix. 7.) 2 Ibid. xix. 9, ad init. 4 Ibid, sub Jin. * * Nulla quies certaminibus data/ Ch. IX.] FALL OF AM1DA. 181 in its fall, and at the same time filling up the entire space between the wall and the mound raised outside by the Persians. A way into the town was thus laid open, 1 and the besiegers instantly occupied it. It was in vain that the flower of the garrison threw itself across the path of the entering columns — nothing could withstand the ardour of the Persian troops. In a little time all resistance was at an end ; those who could quitted the city and fled — the remainder, whatever their sex, age, or calling, whether armed or unarmed, were slaughtered like sheep by the conquerors. 2 Thus fell Amida after a siege of seventy-three days. 3 Sapor, who on other occasions showed himself not defi- cient in clemency, 4 was exasperated by the prolonged resistance and the losses which he had sustained in the course of it. Thirty thousand of his best soldiers had fallen ; 5 the son of his chief ally had perished ; 6 he himself had been brought into imminent danger. Such audacity on the part of a petty town seemed no doubt to him to deserve a severe retribution. The place was therefore given over to the infuriated soldiery, who were allowed to slay and plunder at their pleasure. Of the captives taken, all belonging to the five provinces across the Tigris, claimed as his own by Sapor, though 1 Gibbon says ' a largo breach was made by the battering-ram ' {Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 409); but he has apparently confused the capture of Singara, related by Ara- mianus (xx. 6), with that of Amida, which is expressly ascribed to the spontaneous crumbling of a mound in bk. xix. ch. viii. ('diu laborata moles ilia nostrorum, velut terrae quodam tremore quassata, procu- buit'). 2 ' Pecorum ritu armati et im- belles sine sexus discrimine truci- dabantur.' (Amm. Marc, l.s.cj 3 Ibid. xix. 9, sub fin. 4 As when, on the capture of one of the fortified posts outside Amida, he sent the wife of Crau- gasius unharmed to her husband, and at the same time ordered a number of Christian virgins, found j among the captives, to be protected I from insult and allowed the free | exercise of their religion. (Ibid xix. 10, sub fin. ) 5 Ibid. xix. 9. 6 See above, p. 176. 182 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IX. ceded to Rome by his grandfather, were massacred in cold blood. The Count JElian, and the commanders of the legions who had conducted the gallant defence, were barbarously crucified. Many other Romans of high rank were subjected to the indignity of being manacled, and were dragged into Persia as slaves rather than as prisoners. 1 The campaign of a.d. 359 terminated with this dearly bought victory. The season was too far advanced for any fresh enterprise of importance ; and Sapor was probably glad to give his army a rest after the toils and perils of the last three months. Accordingly he retired across the Tigris, without leaving (so far as appears) any garrisons in Mesopotamia, and began pre- parations for the campaign of a.d. 360. Stores of all kinds were accumulated during the winter ; and, when the spring came, the indefatigable monarch once more invaded the enemy's country, pouring into Mesopotamia an army even more numerous and better appointed than that which he had led against Amida in the pre- ceding year. 2 His first object now was to capture Sin- gara, a town of some consequence, which was, however, defended by only two Roman legions and a certain number of native soldiers. After a vain attempt to persuade the garrison to a surrender, the attack was made in the usual way, chiefly by scaling parties with ladders, and by battering parties which shook the walls with the ram. The defenders kept the scalers at bay by a constant discharge of stones and darts from their 1 Amm, Marc. xix. 9, mb init. | equal to the unbounded views of 2 Gibbon conjectures that Sapor's j his ambition ; ' but Ammianus tells allies now deserted him (l.s.c), | us that he crossed the Tigris in and says 4 the spirit as well as the I A.D. 360 ' armis multiplicatis et strength of the army with which j viribus ' (xx. 6, ad init. ). he took the field was no longer i Ch. IX.J CAPTURE OF SINGARA. 183 artillery, arrows from their bows, and leaden bullets 1 from their slings. They met the assaults of the ram by attempts to fire the wooden covering which protected it and those who worked it. For some days these efforts sufficed ; but after a while the besiegers found a weak point in the defences of the place — a tower so recently built that the mortar in which the stones were laid was still moist, and which consequently crumbled rapidly before the blows of a strong and heavy batter- ing-ram, and in a short time fell to the ground. The Persians poured in through the gap, and were at once masters of the entire town, which ceased to resist after the catastrophe. This easy victory allowed Sapor to exhibit the better side of his character ; he forbade the further shedding of blood, and ordered that as many as possible of the garrison and citizens should be taken alive. Reviving a favourite policy of Oriental rulers from very remote times, 2 he transported these captives to the extreme eastern parts of his empire, 3 where they might be of the greatest service to him in defending his frontier against the Scythians and Indians. It is not really surprising, though the historian of the war regards it as needing explanation, 4 that no attempt was made to relieve Singara by the Romans. The siege was short ; the place was considered strong ; the nearest point held by a powerful Roman force was Nisibis, which was at least sixty miles distant from Sin- gara. The neighbourhood of Singara was, moreover, 1 'Glandes.' (See Amra. Marc, xx. 6.) 2 See Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii. pp. 397, 410, 423, 528; vol. iii. pp. 496, 497 ; vol. iv. pp. 440, 448, &c. The practice was common to the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Achaemenian Persians. 3 ' Ad regiones Persidis ultimas sunt asportati.' (Amm. Marc, l.s.c.) The regions ' furthest ' from Mes- opotamia would be those of the extreme East. 4 See the remarks of Ammianus at the close of bk. xx. ch. 6. 184 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IX. ill supplied with water ; and a relieving army would probably have soon found itself in difficulties. Singara, on the verge of the desert, was always perilously sit- uated. Rome valued it as an outpost from which her enemy might be watched, and which might advertise her of a sudden danger, but could not venture to under- take its defence in case of an attack in force, and was prepared to hear of its capture with equanimity. From Singara, Sapor directed his march almost due northwards, and, leaving Nisibis unassailed upon his left, proceeded to attack the strong fort known indif- ferently as Phoenica or Bezabde. 1 This was a position on the east bank of the Tigris, near the point where that river quits the mountains and debouches upon the plain ; 2 though not on the site, 3 it may be considered the representative of the modern Jezireh, which commands the passes from the low country into the Kurdish moun- tains. Bezabde was the chief city of the province, called after it Zabdicene, one of the five ceded by Narses and greatly coveted by his grandson. It was much valued by Rome, was fortified in places with a double wall, and was guarded by three legions and a large body of Kurdish archers. 4 Sapor, having reconnoitred the place, and, with his usual hardihood, exposed him- self to danger in doing so, sent a flag of truce to demand a surrender, joining with the messengers some prisoners of high rank taken at Singara, lest the enemy should open fire upon his envoys. The device was successful ; but the garrison proved staunch, and determined on 1 Amm. Marc. xx. 7. Compare ch. 11. 2 See above, p. 130. 3 Some geographers identify Be- zabde with Jezireh (Diet, of Gk. and Roman Geography, sub voc. Bezabda); but the name Fynyk is almost certain evidence of the real site. Fynyk is about ten miles from Jezireh to the north-west. 4 Amm. Marc. xx. 7. Ch. IX.] FALL OF BEZABDE. 185 resisting to the last. Once more all the known resources of attack and defence were brought into play ; and after a long siege, of which the most important incident was an attempt made by the bishop of the place to in- duce Sapor to withdraw, 1 the wall was at last breached, the city taken, and its defenders indiscriminately mas- sacred. Regarding the position as one of first-rate im- portance, Sapor, who had destroyed Singara, carefully repaired the defences of Bezabde, provisioned it abun- dantly, and garrisoned it with some of his best troops. He was well aware that the Romans would feel keenly the loss of so important a post, and expected that it would not be long before they made an effort to re- cover possession of it. The winter was now approaching, but the Persian monarch still kept the field. The capture of Bezabde was followed by that of many other less important strongholds, 2 which offered little resistance. At last, towards the close of the year, an attack was made upon a place called Virta, said to have been a fortress of great strength, and by some moderns 3 identified with Tekrit, an important city upon the Tigris between Mosul and Baghdad. Here the career of the conqueror was at last arrested. Persuasion and force proved alike unavailing to induce or compel a surrender ; and, after 1 ' Christians legis antistes exire se velle gestibus ostentabat et nutu, &c.' Ammianus afterwards calls him ' episcopum,' and says that his intercession brought on him an unjust suspicion of collusion with the enemy, (l.s.c. ) 2 6 Interceptis aliis castellis vilio- ribus.' (Anim. Marc. xx. 7, sub Jin.) 3 As D'Anville {Geor/raphie An- cienne, torn. ii. p. 201), Gibbon {Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 410, note 61 J7 and Mr. E. B. James {Diet, of Gk. and E. Geoaraphy, ad voc. Biktha). It is difficult, however, to suppose that a position so low down the Tigris as Tekrit was held by the Romans. I am almost inclined to suspect that the Virta of Ammianus is Bir on the Euphrates (lat. 37° 5 7 , long. 38° 5'), and that, when he speaks of it as situated in the remotest part of Mesopotamia, he means the part most remote from Persia. 186 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IX. wasting the small remainder of the year, and suffering considerable loss, the Persian monarch reluctantly gave up the siege, and returned to his own country. 1 Meanwhile the movements of the Roman emperor had been slow and uncertain. Distracted between a jealous fear of his cousin Julian's proceedings in the West, and a desire of checking the advance of his rival Sapor in the East, he had left Constantinople in the early spring, 2 but had journeyed leisurely through Cap- padocia and Armenia Minor to Samosata, whence, after crossing the Euphrates, he had proceeded to Edessa, and there fixed himself. 3 While in Cappadocia, he had summoned to his presence Arsaces, the tributary king of Armenia, had reminded him of his engagements, and had endeavoured to quicken his gratitude by bestowing on him liberal presents. 4 At Edessa he employed him- self during the whole of the summer in collecting troops and stores ; nor was it till the autumnal equinox was past 5 that he took the field, and, after weeping over the smoking ruins of Amida, marched to Bezabde, and, when the defenders rejected his overtures of peace, formed the siege of the place. Sapor was, we must suppose, now engaged before Virta, and it is probable that he thought Bezabde strong enough to defend itself. At any rate, he made no effort to afford it any relief ; and the Roman emperor was allowed to employ all the resources at his disposal in reiterated assaults upon the walls. The defence, however, proved stronger than the attack. Time after time the bold sallies of the be- 1 Amm. Marc. xx. 7, ad Jin. 2 Ibid. xx. 8. 3 We find him at Csesarea Ma- zaca about the middle of the year (ib. xx. 9), then at Melitina {Mala- tiyeh), Lacotina, and Samosata (ib. xx. 11); finally at Edessa (ibid.). 4 Ibid. xx. 11, ad but. 5 ' Post equinoctium egreditur autumnale.' (Ibid.) Ch. IX.] ROMAN ATTACK ON BEZABDE FAILS. 187 sieged destroyed the Roman works. At last the rainy season set in, and the low ground outside the town became a glutinous and adhesive marsh. 1 It was no longer possible to continue the siege ; and the disap- pointed emperor reluctantly drew off his troops, re- crossed the Euphrates, and retired into winter quarters at Antioch. The successes of Sapor in the campaigns of a.d. 359 and 360, his captures of Amida, Singara, and Bezabde, together with the unfortunate issue of the expedition made by Constantius against the last-named place, had a tendency to shake the fidelity of the Roman vassal- kings, Arsaces 2 of Armenia, and Meribanes of Iberia. Constantius, therefore, during the winter of a.d. 360-1, which he passed at Antioch, sent emissaries to the courts of these monarchs, and endeavoured to secure their fidelity by loading them with costly presents, 3 His policy seems to have been so far successful that no revolt of these kingdoms took place ; they did not as yet desert the Romans or make their submission to Sapor. Their monarchs seem to have simply watched events, prepared to declare themselves distinctly on the winning side so soon as fortune should incline unmis- takably to one or the other combatant. Meanwhile they maintained the fiction of a nominal dependence upon Rome, 4 1 ' Assiduis imbribus ita imraa- duerat solum, ut luti glutinosa mollities per eas regiones pinguis- simi csespitis omnia perturbaret.' (Amm. Marc. xx. 11.) 2 According to Moses of Chorene, Tiranus was still king at the time of the invasion of Julian (Hist. Armen. iii. 15), and Arsaces (Ard- shag) did not succeed him till after the death of Jovian (iii. 17). But Amm i anus calls the king contem- porary with the later years of Con- stantius, Arsaces (xx. 11; xxi. 6). So also Sozomen (Hist, Eccles. vi. 1). 3 Amm. Marc. xxi. 6. 4 Faustus makes Arsaces lend aid to Sapor in one of his attacks on Nisibis (iv. 20), and declares that he completely defeated a large Roman army in the immediate 188 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IX. It might have been expected that the year a.d. 361 would have been a turning-point in the war, and that, if Rome did not by a great effort assert herself and re- cover her prestige, the advance of Persia would have been marked and rapid. But the actual course of events was far different. Hesitation and diffidence char- acterise the movements of both parties to the contest, and the year is signalised by no important enterprise on the part of either monarch. Constantius reoccupied Edessa, 1 and had (we are told) 2 some thoughts of re- newing the siege of Bezabde ; actually, however, he did not advance further, but contented himself with sending a part of his army to watch Sapor, giving them strict orders not to risk an engagement. 3 Sapor, on his side, began the year with demonstrations which were taken to mean that he was about to pass the Euphra- tes ; 4 but in reality he never even brought his troops across the Tigris, or once set foot in Mesopotamia. After wasting weeks or months in a futile display of his armed strength upon the eastern bank of the river, and violently alarming the officers sent by Constantius to observe his movements, 5 he suddenly, towards autumn, withdrew his troops, having attempted nothing, and quietly returned to his capital ! It is by no means difficult to understand the motives which actuated Constantius. He was, month after month, receiving intelligence from the West of steps taken by Julian which amounted to open rebellion, and challenged him to engage in civil war. 6 So long as Sapor threatened invasion, he did not like to quit Mes- vicinity of the place. But the entire silence of Ammianus renders his narrative incredible. 1 Amm. Marc. xxi. 7, ad Jin. 2 Ibid. xxi. 13. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. xxi. 7, ad init. 5 Ibid. xxi. 13. G See Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. iii. pp. 102-118). Ch. IX. 1 INACTION OF SAPOR IN A.D. 361. 189 opotamia, lest he might appear to have sacrificed the interests of his country to his own private quarrels ; but he must have been anxious to return to the seat of em- pire from the first moment that intelligence reached him of Julian's assumption of the imperial name and dignity ; and when Sapors retreat was announced he naturally made all haste to reach his capital. Mean- while the desire of keeping his army intact caused him to refrain from anv movement which involved the slightest risk of bringing on a battle, and, in fact, re- duced him to inaction. So much is readily intelligible. But what at this time withheld Sapor, when he had so grand an opportunity of making an impression upon Rome — what paralysed his arm when it might have struck with such effect — it is far from easy to understand, though perhaps not impossible to conjecture. The his- torian of the war ascribes his abstinence to a religious motive, telling us that the auguries were not favourable for the Persians crossing the Tigris. 1 But there is no other evidence that the Persians of this period were the slaves of any such superstition as that noted by Ammianus, nor any probability that a monarch of Sapor's force of character would have suffered his mili- tary policy to be affected by omens. We must there- fore ascribe the conduct of the Persian king to some cause not recorded by the historian — some failure of health, or some peril from internal or external enemies which called him away from the scene of his recent 1 Amm. Marc. xxi. 13 : ' Tar- | divination — that by means of the dante trans Tigridem rege dam \ barsom or divining-rod (Ancient moveri permitterent sacra;' and Monarchies, vol. iii. pp. 130-1); again, further on in the same chap- j but on no other occasion do we ter: 'Kuntiatur regem ad propria ; find it even said that their military revertisse, auspiciis dirimentibusS operations were dependent on i aus- It must be admitted that the Per- pices.' sians were believers in a sort of , 190 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. IX. exploits, just at the time when his continued presence there was most important. Once before in his lifetime, an invasion of his eastern provinces had required his immediate presence, and allowed his adversary to quit Mesopotamia and march against Magnentius. 1 It is not improbable that a fresh attack of the same or some other barbarians now again happened opportunely for the Romans, calling Sapor away, and thus enabling Constantius to turn his back upon the East, and set out for Europe in order to meet Julian. The meeting, however, was not destined to take place. On his way from Antioch to Constantinople, the unfortunate Constantius, anxious and perhaps over- fatigued, fell sick at Mopsucrene, in Cilicia, and died there, after a short illness, 2 towards the close of a.d. 361. Julian the Apostate succeeded peacefully to the empire whereto he was about to assert his right by force of arms ; and Sapor found that the war which he had provoked with Rome, in reliance upon his adver- sary's weakness and incapacity, had to be carried on with a prince of far greater natural powers and of much superior military training. 1 See above, p. 165. 2 Amm. Marc. xxi. 15 ; Aurel. Vict. Epit. § 42. Some writers substitute Mopsuestia for Mopsu- crene (Mos. Chor. iii. 12 ; Johann. Mai. ii. p. 14 ; Patkanian in the Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 151). Ch. X-l JULIAN SUCCEEDS CONSTANTIUS. 191 CHAPTER X. Julian becomes Emperor of Rome. His Resolution to invade Persia. His Views and Motives. His Proceedings. Proposals of Sapor re- jected. Other Embassies. Relations of Julian with Armenia. Strength of his Army. His Invasion of Mesopotamia. His Line of March. Siege of Perisabor ; of Maogamalcha. Battle of the Tigris. Further Progress of Julian checked by his Inability to invest Ctesiphon. His Retreat. His Death. Retreat continued by Jovian. Sapor offers Terms of Peace. Peace made by Jovian. Its Conditions. Reflections on the Peace and on the Termination of the Second Period of Struggle between Rome and Persia. * Julianus, redacta ad unum se orbis Roraani curatione, gloriae nimis cupidus, in Persas proficiscitur.' — Aurel. Yict. Epit. § 43. The prince on whom the government of the Roman empire, and consequently the direction of the Persian war, devolved by the death of Constantius, was in the flower of his age, 1 proud, self-confident, and full of energy. He had been engaged for a period of four years 2 in a struggle with the rude and warlike tribes of Germany, had freed the whole country west of the Rhine from the presence of those terrible warriors, and had even carried fire and sword far into the wild and savage districts on the right bank of the river, and com- pelled the Alemanni and other powerful German tribes to make their submission to the majesty of Rome. Per- sonally brave, by temperament restless, and inspired 1 Julian was born in the latter half of the year a.d. 331, and was therefore under thirty at his acces- sion in a.d. 360. (See Tillemont, Hist, des Empereurs, torn. iv. p. 198; and Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 386.) 2 From a.d. 356 to 359. (Gib- bon, Decline and Fall, vol. ii. pp. 414-421.) 192 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. X. with an ardent desire to rival or eclipse the glorious deeds of those heroes of former times who had made themselves a name in history, he viewed the disturbed condition of the East at the time of his accession, not as a trouble, not as a drawback upon the delights of empire, but as a happy circumstance, a fortunate opportunity for distinguishing himself by some great achievement. Of all the Greeks, Alexander appeared to him the most illustrious ; 1 of all his predecessors on the imperial throne, Trajan and Marcus Aurelius were those whom he most wished to emulate. 2 But all these princes had either led or sent 3 expeditions into the far East, and had aimed at uniting in one the fairest prov- inces of Europe and Asia. Julian appears, from the first moment that he found himself peaceably estab- lished upon the throne, 4 to have resolved on under- taking in person a great expedition against Sapor, with the object of avenging upon Persia the ravages and defeats of the last sixty years, or at any rate of ob- taining such successes as might justify his assuming the title of 1 Persicus.' 5 Whether he really entertained any hope of rivalling Alexander, or supposed it possible that he should effect 4 the final conquest of Persia,' 6 may be doubted. Acquainted, as he must have been, 7 1 See his Ccesares, passim. But compare the Or at. ad Themlst., where the palm is assigned to Socrates over Alexander (Op. p. 264). 2 This appears from the position assigned to these two emperors in the ' Caesars.' 3 The expedition of L. Verus (a.d. 162-164) was sent out by M. Aurelius. (See the Author's Sixth Monarchy, p. 325.) 4 Ammianus tells us that soon after his arrival at Constantinople, on being asked to lead an expe- dition against the Goths, Julian replied ' hostes quserere se me- liores ' (xxii. 7) — an expression which clearly points at the Persians. 5 Ammianus says ' Parthicus ' (xxii. 12). But Julian himself would scarcely have made this confusion. 6 See Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. iii. 181. 7 Compare the Ccesares, p. 324, C, where Alexander is made to ob- serve that the Romans, in a war of 300 years, had not subdued the single province of Mesopotamia. Ch. X.J HE PREPARES TO IKVADE PERSIA. 193 with the entire course of Roman warfare in these parts from the attack of Crassus to the last defeat of his own immediate predecessor, he can scarcely have regarded the subjugation of Persia as an easy matter, or have expected to do much more than strike terror into the ' barbarians ' of the East, or perhaps obtain from them the cession of another province. The sensible officer, who, after accompanying him in his expedition, wrote the history of the campaign, regarded his actuating motives as the delight that he took in war, and the desire of a new title. 1 Confident in his own military talent, in his training, and in his power to inspire en- thusiasm in an army, he no doubt looked to reap laurels sufficient to justify him in making his attack ; but the wild schemes ascribed to him, the conquest of the Sas- sanian kingdom, and the subjugation of Hyrcania and India, 2 are figments (probably) of the imagination of his historians. Julian entered Constantinople on the 11th of Decem- ber, a.d. 361 ; he quitted it towards the end of May, 3 a.d. 362, after residing there less than six months. During this period, notwithstanding the various impor- tant matters in which he was engaged, the purifying of the court, the depression of the Christians, the restora- tion and revivification of Paganism, he found time to form plans and make preparations for his intended eastern expedition, in which he was anxious to engage as soon as possible. Having designated for the war 1 Ammianus says: ' Urebatur bellandi gemino desiderio: primo, quod impatiens otii lituos somnia- bat et proelia: dein, quod . . . . ornamentis illustrium gloriarura inserere Parthici cognomentum ar- debat ' (xxii. 12). 2 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 209. 3 Tillemont, Hist, des Empereurs, torn. iv. p. 213. 'After May 12' (Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 448). 194 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. such troops as could be spared from the West, he com- mitted them and their officers to the charge of two generals, carefully chosen, Victor, a Roman of distinc- tion, and the Persian refugee, Prince Hormisdas, 1 who conducted the legions without difficulty to Antioch. There Julian himself arrived in June or July, 2 after having made a stately progress through Asia Minor ; and it would seem that he would at once have marched against the enemy, had not his counsellors strongly urged the necessity of a short delay, 3 during which the European troops might be rested, and adequate prepa- rations made for the intended invasion. It was espe- cially necessary to provide stores and ships, 4 since the new emperor had resolved not to content himself with an ordinary campaign upon the frontier, but rather to imitate the examples of Trajan and Severus, who had carried the Roman eagles to the extreme south of Mesopotamia. 5 Ships, accordingly, were collected, and probably built, 6 during the winter of a.d. 362-3 ; pro- visions were laid in ; warlike stores, military engines, and the like accumulated; while the impatient monarch, galled by the wit and raillery of the gay Antiochenes, 7 chafed at his compelled inaction, and longed to exchange the war of words in which he was engaged with his 1 See Zosimus, iii. 11; and, on the subject of Prince Hormisclas, compare above, p. 149. 2 Gibbon places his arrival in August (Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 1S1); but Tillemont argues strongly in favour of July (Hist, des Empereurs, torn. iv. p. 297, note vi. upon the reign of Julian). Clinton shows that he was certainly at Antioch before August 1 (F. B. vol. i. p. 448). He concludes, as most probable, that he arrived at Antioch 4 about Midsummer. ' 3 Amm. Marc. xxii. 12. 4 Zosim. iii. 12, ad init., and 13. 5 See the Author's Sixth Mon- archy, pp. 311-4 and 339-344. G Both Trajan and Severus had had to build ships. (Dio Cass, lxviii. 26; lxxv. 9.) It seems scarcely possible that Julian should have collected the number that he did (at least 1,100) without build- ing. (See Zosim. iii. 13; and Amm. Marc, xxiii. 3, ad fin.) 7 Amm. Marc. xxii. 14; Zosim. iii. 11 ; Libanius, Orat. x. p. 307, B. Ch. X.] PROPOSALS MADE BY SAPOR. 195 subjects for the ruder contests of arms wherewith use had made him more familiar. It must have been during the emperor's stay at An- tioch that he received an embassy from the court of Persia, commissioned to sound his inclinations with regard to the conclusion of a peace. Sapor had seen, with some disquiet, the sceptre of the Roman world assumed by an enterprising and courageous youtl^ inured to warfare and ambitious of military glory. He was probably very well informed as to the general condition of the Roman State 1 and the personal charac- ter of its administrator ; and the tidings which he re- ceived concerning the intentions and preparations of the new prince were such as caused him some apprehen- sion, if not actual alarm. Under these circumstances, he sent an embassy with overtures, the exact nature of which is not known, but which, it is probable, took for their basis the existing territorial limits of the two countries. At least, we hear of no offer of surrender or submission on Sapor's part ; and we can scarcely sup- pose that, had such offers been made, the Roman writers would have passed them over in silence. It is not sur- prising that Julian lent no favourable ear to the envoys, if these were their instructions ; but it would have been better for his reputation had he replied to them with less of haughtiness and rudeness. According to one authority, 2 he tore up before their faces the autograph letter of their master ; while, according to another, 3 he responded, with a contemptuous smile, that 4 there was 1 The employment of spies by the Persians is often noticed by the Oriental historians (Tabari, torn. ii. p. 96; Mirkhond, p. 311). The tale that Sapor disguised himself and visited Constantinople in per- son (Tabari, ii. p. 99 ; Macoudi, ii. p. 181) is, of course, not true; but we may well believe that his emis- saries went as far as that city. 2 Libanius, Or at. viii. p. 245, A. 3 Socrat. Hist. Eccles. iii. 19, ad fin. 196 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. no occasion for an exchange of thought between him and the Persian king by messengers, since he intended very shortly to treat with him in person.' Having received this rebuff, the envoys of Sapor took their departure, and conveyed to their sovereign the intelligence that he must prepare himself to resist a serious invasion. About the same time various offers of assistance reached the Roman emperor from the independent or semi-independent princes and chieftains of the regions adjacent to Mesopotamia. 1 Such overtures were sure to be made by the heads of the plundering desert tribes to any powerful invader, since it would be hoped that a share in the booty might be obtained without much participation in the danger. We are told that Julian promptly rejected these offers, grandly saying that it was for Rome rather to give aid to her allies than to receive assistance from them. 2 It appears, how- ever, that at least two exceptions were made to the general principle thus magniloquently asserted. Julian had taken into his service, ere he quitted Europe, a strong body of Gothic auxiliaries ; 3 and, while at An- tioch, he sent to the Saracens, reminding them of their promise to lend him troops, and calling upon them to fulfil it. 4 If the advance on Persia was to be made by the line of the Euphrates, an alliance with these agile sons of the desert was of first-rate importance, since the assistance which they could render as friends was considerable, and the injury which they could inflict as enemies was almost beyond calculation. It is among 1 Amm. Marc. xxii. 2, ad init. 2 Ibid.: 4 Principe respondente, Nequaqnam decere adventiciis ad- jumentis rein yindicari Roman am, cujns opibns foveri eonveniat ami- cos et soeios, si auxilium eos ade- gerit necessitas implorare.' 3 Ibid, xxiii. 2 ; Zosim. iii. 25. Tabari calls these auxiliaries Kha- zars (vol. ii. pp. 95-97). 4 Amm. Marc, xxiii. 5, ad init. ; Julian, Ep. ad Liban. p. 401, D. Ch. X.J JULIAN OFFENDS ARSACES. 197 the faults of Julian in this campaign that he did not set more store by the Saracen alliance, and make greater efforts to maintain it ; we shall find that after a while he allowed the brave nomads to become disaffected, and to exchange their friendship with him for hostility. 1 Had he taken more care to attach them cordially to the side of Rome, it is quite possible that his expedition might have had a prosperous issue. There was another ally, whose services Julian re- garded himself as entitled not to request, but to com- mand. Arsaces, king of Armenia, though placed on his throne by Sapor, had (as we have seen) transferred his allegiance to Constantius, and voluntarily taken up the position of a Roman feudatory. 2 Constantius had of late suspected his fidelity ; but Arsaces had not as yet, by any overt act, justified these suspicions, and Julian seems to have regarded him as an assured friend and ally. Early in a.d. 363 he addressed a letter to the Armenian monarch, requiring him to levy a con- siderable force, and hold himself in readiness to execute such <3rders as he would receive within a short time. 3 The style, address, and purport of this letter were equally distasteful to Arsaces, whose pride was out- raged, and whose indolence was disturbed, by the call thus suddenly made upon him. His own desire was probably to remain neutral ; he felt no interest in the standing quarrel between his two powerful neighbours ; he was under obligations to both of them ; and it was for his advantage that they should remain evenly balanced. We cannot ascribe to him any earnest reli- 1 See below, p. 231. 2 Supra, p. 168. 3 Amm, Marc, xxiii. 2 : i Solum Arsacem monuerat, Armenia? re- gem, ut collectis copiis validis ju- benda opperiretur, quo.tendere, quid deberet urgere, propere cogniturus.' 198 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. |Ch. X. gious feeling ; x but, as one who kept up the profession of Christianity, he could not but regard with aversion the Apostate, who had given no obscure intimation of his intention to use his power to the utmost in order to sweep the Christian religion from the face of the earth. The disinclination of their monarch to subserve the designs of Julian was shared, or rather surpassed, by his people, the more educated portion of whom were strongly attached to the new faith and worship. 2 If the great historian of Armenia is right in stating that Julian at this time offered an open insult to the Armenian religion, 3 we must pronounce him strangely imprudent. The alliance of Armenia was always of the utmost im- portance to Rome in any attack upon the East. Julian seems to have gone out of his way to create offence in this quarter, 4 where his interests required that he should exercise all his powers of conciliation. The forces which the emperor regarded as at his dis- posal, and with which he expected to take the field, were the following. His own troops amounted to 83,000 or (according to another account) to 95,000 men. 5 They consisted chiefly of Roman legionaries, horse and foot, but included a strong body of Gothic 1 According to the Armenian historians, Arsaces was cruel and profligate. He put to death, with- out reason, his relations and satraps, persecuted the ecclesiastics who reproved him, and established an asylum for criminals. (Mos. Chor. iii. 20-32; Faustus, iv. 13-50.) 2 Faustus, iii. 13. 8 Mos. Chor. iii. 13. Moses says that Julian required the Ar- menian monarch to hang up in the chancel of the metropolitan church a portrait, which he sent him, of himself, containing also 4 repre- sentations of devils' — i.e. of the heathen gods. It was pointed out by the Armenian patriarch that this was an insult to Christianity (iii. 14). 4 The letter ascribed to Julian on this occasion (Fabric. Bibliothec Grwc. vol. vii. p. 86) may not be genuine, although it is accepted by St. Martin (Notes on Le Beau, vol. iii. p. 37). But, even apart from this, the insolent tone of Julian towards the Armenian king is sufficiently apparent. 5 Zosimus is the only writer who gives an estimate of the whole force, which he makes to consist Ch. X.] HE MARCHES THROUGH MESOPOTAMIA. 199 auxiliaries. Armenia was expected to furnish a con- siderable force, probably not less than 20,000 men; 1 and the light horse of the Saracens would, it was thought, be tolerably numerous. Altogether, an army of above a hundred thousand men was about to be launched on the devoted Persia, which was believed unlikely to offer any effectual, if even any serious, resistance, The impatience of Julian scarcely allowed him to aw&it the conclusion of the winter. With the first breath of spring he put his forces in motion, 2 and, quit- ting Antioch, marched with all speed to the Euphrates. Passing Litarbi, and then Hierapolis, he crossed the river by a bridge of boats in the vicinity of that place, and proceeded by Batnae to the important city of Carrhae, 3 once the home of Abraham. 4 Here he halted for a few days and finally fixed his plans. It was by this time well known to the Romans that there were two, and two only, convenient roads whereby Southern Mesopotamia was to be reached, one along the line of the Mons Masius to the Tigris, and then along the banks of that stream, the other down the of 65,000 taken with him by Julian, 18,000 detached to act under ■ Procopius. Total 83,000 Sozomen raises the number of the forces under Procopius to 4 about 20,000' (Hist. Eccles. vi. 1), and Ammianus to 30,000 (xxiii. 3). Libanius says 20,000 (Orat. x. p. 312), John of Malala 16,000 (p. 328). If we add the 30,000 of Am in i anus to the 65,000 who ac- companied Julian, we get a total of 95,000, which is Gibbon's esti- mate (Decline and Fall, vol. iii. pp. 189, 190). 1 Armenia furnished 7,000 foot and 6,000 horse to Antony (Plut. Anton. § 37). It was calculated that the horse might have been increased to 16,000 (ibid. § 50). 2 Julian left Antioch on March 5, a.d. 363. (See Ammianus, xxiii. 2: 4 Tertio Nonas Martias profectus.') 3 Ainm. Marc, xxiii. 2, 3. Zosi- mus makes him visit Edessa from Batnge (iii. 12); but the expression used by Ammianus ('venit cursu propero Carrhas') conradicts this. 4 The identity of Carrhse with the Haran of Genesis is allowed by almost all critics. I 200 THE SEVENTH MONAKCHY. [Ch. X. valley of the Euphrates to the great alluvial plain on the lower course of the rivers. Julian had, perhaps, hitherto doubted which line he should follow in person. 1 The first had been preferred by Alexander and by Trajan, the second by the younger Cyrus, by Avidius Cassius, and by Severus. Both lines were fairly practicable ; but that of the Tigris was circuitous, and its free em- ployment was only possible under the condition of Ar- menia being certainly friendly. If Julian had cause to suspect, as it is probable that he had, the fidelity of the Armenians, he may have felt that there was one line only which he could with prudence pursue. He might send a subsidiary force by the doubtful route, which could advance to his aid if matters went favourably, or remain on the defensive if they assumed a threatening aspect ; but his own grand attack must be by the other. Accordingly he divided his forces. Committing a body of troops, which is variously estimated at from 18,000 to 30,000, 2 into the hands of Procopius, a connection of his own, and Sebastian, Duke of Egypt, with orders that they should proceed by way of the Mons Masius to Ar- menia, and, uniting themselves with the forces of Arsa- ces, invade Northern Media, ravage it, and then join him before Ctesiphon by the line of the Tigris, 3 he reserved for himself and for his main army the shorter and more open route down the valley of the Euphrates. Leaving Carrhse on the 26th of March, after about a week's 1 Ammianus says that he had carefully provisioned the line of the Tigris in order to make the Persians think that it was the line which he intended to follow (xxiii. 3); but it is perhaps as probable that he wished to be able to pursue the Tigris line if circumstances proved favourable. 2 Zosimus says 18,000 (iii. 12); Sozomen (vi. 1) and Libanius (Orat. Funebr. p. 312, A) say 20,000; Ammianus says 30,000 (l.s.c. ). 3 See Amm. Marc, l.s.c. Zosi- mus regards the force as left merely for the protection of Koman Meso- potamia. Ch. X. J JULIAN AT CIKCES1UM. 201 stay, he marched southward, at the head of 65,000 men, by Davana and along the course of the Belik, to Calli- nicus or Nicephorium, near the junction of the Belik with the Euphrates. Here the Saracen chiefs came and made their submission, and were graciously received by the emperor, to whom they presented a crown of gold. 1 At the same time the fleet made its appear- ance, numbering at least 1,100 vessels, 2 of which fifty were ships of war, fifty prepared to serve as pontoons, and the remaining thousand transports laden with provisions, weapons, and military engines. From Callinicus the emperor marched along the course of the Euphrates to Circusium, or Circesium, 3 at the junction of the Khabour with the Euphrates, ar- riving at this place early in April. 4 Thus far he had been marching through his own dominions, and had had no hostility to dread. Being now about to enter the .enemy's country, he made arrangements for the march which seem to have been extremely judicious. The cavalry was placed under the command of Arinthaeus and Prince Hormisdas, and was stationed at the extreme left, with orders to advance on a line parallel with the general course of the river. Some picked legions under the command of Nevitta formed the right wing, and, resting on the Euphrates, maintained communication with the fleet. Julian, with the main part of his troops, occupied the space intermediate between these two extremes, marching in a loose column which from front to rear covered a distance of above nine miles. A fly- 1 Amm. Marc, l.s.c. 2 This is the estimate of Am- miaims. Zosimus makes the num- ber considerably exceed 1,150 (iii. 13). ' 6 Circesium is the ordinary form. and is that given by Zosimus; but xVmmianus has 'Circusium' (xxiii. 5) ; and so the Nubian Geography. 4 6 Principio meiisis Aprilis.' (Amm. Marc, l.s.c.) 202 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. X. ing corps of fifteen hundred men acted as an avant- guard under Count Lucilianus, and explored the country in advance, feeling on all sides for the enemy. The rear was covered by a detachment under Secundi- nus, Duke of Osrhoene, Dagalaiphus, and Victor. 1 Having made his dispositions, and crossed the broad stream of the Khabour, on the 7th of April, by a bridge of boats, which he immediately broke up, 2 Julian con- tinued his advance along the course of the Euphrates, supported by his fleet, which was not allowed either to outstrip or to lag behind the army. 3 The first halt was at Zaitha, 4 famous as the scene of the murder of Gor- dian, whose tomb was in its vicinity. 5 Here Julian en- couraged his soldiers by an eloquent speech, 6 in which he recounted the past successes of the Roman arms, and promised them an easy victory over their present adversary. He then, in a two days' march, reached Dura, 7 a ruined city, destitute of inhabitants, on the banks of the river ; from which a march of four days more brought him to Anathan, 8 the modern Anah, a strong fortress on an island in the mid-stream, which 1 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 1. Com- pare Zosim. iii. 14. 2 Amm. Marc, xxiii. 5: 'Pontem avelli jussit, ne cui militum ab ag- minibus propriis revertendi fiducia remaneret.' 3 i Classis, licet per flumen fere- batur assiduis flexibus tortuosum, nec residere, nee praecurrere sine- batur.' (Ibid. xxvi. 1.) 4 Called Zautha by Zosimus (iii. 14), perhaps the Asicha of Isidore (Mans. Part//. § 1). 5 Zosimus places the tomb at Dura, two days' march from Zaitha (Amm. Marc. xxiv. 1); but Am- miauus, who accompanied the army, can scarcely have been mistaken in the fact that the tomb was at any rate distinctly visible from Zaitha. 6 Gibbon supposes the speech to have been made as soon as the Khabour was crossed (Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 191); but Am- mianus makes Zaitha the scene of it. In the course of it Julian used the expression: ' Gordianus, cujus monumentum nunc vidimus '(Amm. Marc, xxiii. 5). 7 ' Emenso itinere bidui civita- tem venimus Duram ' (ib. xxiv. 1). 8 ' Dierum quatuor itinere levi peracto.' (Ibid.) Anathan was known to the Assyrians as Anat, to the Greeks of Augustus's time as Anatho (see Isid. Char. Mans. Forth. § 1). It is perhaps the < Hena' of Isaiah (xxxvii. 13). Ch. X.j SURRENDER OF ANATHAIST. 203 was held by a Persian garrison. An attempt to sur- prise the place by a night attack having failed, Julian had recourse to persuasion, and by the representations of Prince Hormisdas induced its defenders to surrender the fort and place themselves at his mercy. 1 It was, perhaps, to gall the Antiochenes with an indication of his victorious progress that he sent his prisoners under escort into Syria, and settled them in the territory of Chalcis, at no great distance from the city of his aver- sion. Unwilling further to weaken his army by de- taching a garrison to hold his conquest, he committed Anathan to the flames before proceeding further down the river. 2 About eight miles below Anathan, another island and another fortress were held by the enemy. Thilutha is described as stronger than Anathan, and indeed as almost impregnable. 3 Julian felt that he could not attack it with any hope of success, and therefore once more submitted to use persuasion. But the garrison, feeling themselves secure, rejected his overtures ; they would wait, they said, and see which party was superior in the approaching conflict, and would then attach themselves to the victors. Meanwhile, if unmolested by the invader, they would not interfere with his advance, but would maintain a neutral attitude. Julian had to determine whether he would act in the spirit of an Alexander, 4 and, rejecting with disdain all compro- mise, compel by force of arms an entire submission, or whether he would take lower ground, accept the offer made to him, and be content to leave in his rear a cer- iii. 15: (ppovpiu noXopKOv/ievoL . . . ug&uTitl) [julovg TTLTTVpu/ieVOVC Yj KOVT l(0V . 4 Liban. Orat. Funebr. p. 317, D; Amm. Marc. xxiv. 4; Zosim. iii. 21 ; p. 155. 5 The Mattiarii, the Laccinarii, and the Victores. (Zosim. iii. 22; p. 156.) Ch. X.1 FALL OF M AO G AM ALCH A. 211 through the mine suddenly showed themselves in the town itself, and rendered further resistance hopeless. Maogamalcha, which a little before had boasted of being impregnable, and had laughed to scorn the vain efforts of the emperor, 1 suddenly found itself taken by assault and undergoing the extremities of sack and pil- lage. Julian made no efforts to prevent a general mas- sacre, 2 and the entire population, without distinction of age or sex, seems to have been put to the sword. 3 The commandant of the fortress, though he was at first spared, suffered death shortly after on a frivolous charge. 4 Even a miserable remnant, which had con- cealed itself in caves and cellars, was hunted out, smoke and fire being used to force the fugitives from their hiding-places, or else cause them to perish in the dark- some dens by suffocation. 5 Thus there was no extrem- ity of savage warfare which was not used, the fourth century anticipating some of the horrors which have most disgraced the nineteenth. 6 Nothing now but the river Tigris intervened between Julian and the great city of Ctesiphon, which was plainly the special object of the expedition. Ctesiphon, indeed, was not to Persia what it had been to Parthia ; but still it might fairly be looked upon as a prize of 1 Liban. p. 317, B; Zosim. l.s.c. 2 The Sophist of Antioch en- deavours to defend his hero from the charge of cruelty by taxing the soldiers with disobedience to their general's orders (Or. Funebr. p. 318, C); but the narratives of Ammianus and Zosimus contradict him. 3 ' Sine sexus discrimine vel setatis, quidquid impetus reperit, potestas iratorum absumpsit'(Amm. Marc, l.s.c). Tovg kv x e P GLV 6' rjv Trig dvvdfx?G)g to ix\tov, avTeAeye). Compare Zosim. iii. 25 with Amm. Marc. xxiv. 0. 216 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. had not Julian, with admirable presence of mind, ex- claimed aloud — 1 Our men have crossed and are masters of the bank — that fire is the signal which I bade them make if they were victorious.' Thus encouraged, the crews plied their oars with vigour, and impelled the remaining vessels rapidly across the stream. At the same time, some of the soldiers who had not been put on board, impatient to assist their comrades, plunged into the stream, and swam across supported by their shields. 1 Though a stout resistance was offered by the Persians, it was found impossible to withstand the im- petuosity of the Roman attack. Not only were the half-burned vessels saved, the flames extinguished, and the men on board rescued from their perilous position, but everywhere the Roman troops made good their landing, fought their way up the bank against a storm of missile weapons, and drew up in good order upon its summit. A pause probably now occurred, as the armies could not see each other in the darkness; but, at dawn of day, 2 Julian, having made a fresh ar- rangement of his troops, led them against the dense array of the enemy, and engaged in a hand-to-hand combat, which lasted from morning to midday, when it was terminated by the flight of the Persians. Their leaders, Tigranes, Narseus, and the Siirena, 3 are said 4 to 1 Ammiaims alone (l.s.c.) men- tions this fact, which he compares with the swimming of the Rhone by Sertorius. 2 Ammiaims makes the battle begin with the dawn and last all the day. Zosimns says it lasted from midnight to midday. We may best reconcile the two by sup- posing that the passage of the Tigris and the landing were at midnight — that then there was a pause — that the battle recommenced at dawn — that at midday the Per- sians were beaten and took to flight — and that then the pursuit lasted almost to nightfall. 3 The names are uncertain. In- stead of Tigranes and Xarseus, Zosimus has Pigraxesand Anareus. Some MSS. of Ammianus have Pigranes. 4 Zosim. ii. 25: Tr/g (pvyrjg yyijGauivDV rC)v orpaTTjyCjv. Ch. X.] DEFEAT OF THE PERSIANS. 217 have been the first to quit the field and take refuge within the defences of Ctesiphon. The example thus set was universally followed ; and the entire Persian army, abandoning its camp and baggage, rushed in the wildest confusion across the plain to the nearest of the city gates, closely pursued by its active foe up to the very foot of the walls. The Roman writers assert that Ctesiphon might have been entered and taken, had not the general, Victor, who was wounded by a dart from a catapult, recalled his men as they were about to rush in through the open gateway. 1 It is perhaps doubtful whether success would really have crowned such audacity. At any rate, the opportunity passed — the runaways entered the town — the gate closed upon them ; and Ctesiphon was safe unless it were reduced by the operations of a regular siege. But the fruits of the victory were still considerable. The entire Persian army collected hitherto for the defence of Ctesiphon had been defeated by one-third of the Roman force under Julian. 2 The vanquished had left 2,500 men dead upon the field, while the victors had lost no more than seventy-five. 3 A rich spoil had fallen into the hands of the Romans, who found in the abandoned camp couches and tables of massive silver, and on the bodies of the slain, both men and horses, a profusion of gold and silver ornaments, besides trap- pings and apparel of great magnificence. 4 A welcome supply of provisions was also furnished by the lands 1 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 6: Rufus, § 28; Li ban ins, Or. Funebr. p. 822, A. 2 The fleet was formed in three divisions, and only one had crossed. The rest of the army passed the river on the day after the battle and the day following (Zosim. iii. 26). 3 These are the numbers of Zosi- mus (iii. 25. sub Jin). Ammianus agrees as to the Persians, but makes the Roman loss only seventy (i.s.c. ). Libanius raises the loss on the Persian side to 6,000 (Oral. Funebr. p. 322, A). 4 Zosim. I.s.c. 218 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. and houses in the neighbourhood of Ctesiphon ; and the troops passed from a state of privation to one of extreme abundance, so that it was feared lest they might suffer from excess. 1 Affairs had now reached a point when it was neces- sary to form a definite resolution as to what should be the further aim and course of the expedition. Hitherto all had indicated an intention on the part of Julian to occupy Ctesiphon, and thence dictate a peace. His long march, his toilsome canal-cutting, his orders to his second army, 2 his crossing of the Tigris, his engage- ment with the Persians in the plain before Ctesiphon, were the natural steps conducting to such a result, and are explicable on one hypothesis and one hypothesis only. He must up to this time have designed to make himself master of the great city, which had been the goal of so many previous invasions, and had always fallen whenever Rome attacked it. But, having over- come all the obstacles in his path, and having it in his power at once to commence the siege, a sudden doubt appears to have assailed him as to the practicability of the undertaking. It can scarcely be supposed that the city was really stronger now than it had been under the Parthians ; 3 much less can it be argued that Julian's army was insufficient for the investment of such a place. It was probably the most powerful army with which the Romans had as yet invaded Southern Mesopotamia; 1 Eimapius, p. OS, ed. Niebuhr. 2 Supra, p. 200. 3 Ammianus speaks of Ctesiphon as 6 situ ipso inexpugnabilis ' (xxiv. 7, ad init.) ; but it occupied a piece of alluvial plain, and had been taken three times by the Romans. Gibbon says: ' It is not easy for us to conceive by what arts of fortifi- cation a city thrice besieged and taken by the predecessors of Julian could be rendered impregnable against an army of 60,000 Romans ' (Decline end Fall. vol. iii. p. 205). 1 should doubt if any special pains had been taken by the Persians to strengthen the defences. Ch. X.] JULIAN DECLINES TO BESIEGE CTESIPHON. 219 and it was amply provided with all the appurtenances of war. If Julian did not venture to attempt what Trajan and Avidius Cassius and Septimius Severus had achieved without difficulty, it must have been because the circumstances under which he would have had to make the attack were different from those under which they had ventured and succeeded. And the difference — a most momentous one — was this. They besieged and captured the place after defeating the greatest force that Parthia could bring into the field against them. Julian found himself in front of Ctesi- phon before he had crossed swords with the Persian king, or so much as set eyes on the grand army which Sapor was known to have collected. To have sat down before Ctesiphon under such circumstances would have been to expose himself to great peril ; while he was intent upon the siege, he might at any time have been attacked by a relieving army under the Great King, have been placed between two fires, and compelled to engage at extreme disadvantage. 1 It was a considera- tion of this danger that impelled the council of war, whereto he submitted the question, to pronounce the siege of Ctesiphon too hazardous an operation, and to dissuade the emperor from attempting it. But, if the city were not to be besieged, what course could with any prudence be adopted ? It would have been madness to leave Ctesiphon unassailed, and to press forward against Susa and Persepolis. It would have been futile to remain encamped before the walls without commencing a siege. The heats of summer 1 That it was the fear of attack from Sapor's army which caused the retreat of Julian is confessed by Ammianus. ( 4 Itum est in sen- tential! quorundam, f acinus audax et importunum noscentium id ag- gredi, quod et civitas situ ipso in- expugnabilis defendebatur, et cum metuenda multitudine protinus rex affore credebatur, 1 l.s.c.) 220 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. had arrived, 1 and the malaria of autumn was not far off. The stores brought by the fleet were exhausted ; 2 and there was a great risk in the army's depending wholly for its subsistence on the supplies that it might be able to obtain from the enemy's country. Julian and his advisers must have seen at a glance that if the Romans were not to attack Ctesiphon, they must re- treat. And accordingly retreat seems to have been at once determined on. As a first step, the whole fleet, except some dozen vessels, 3 was burned, since twelve was a sufficient number to serve as pontoons, and it was not worth the army's while to encumber itself with the remainder. They could only have been tracked up the strong stream of the Tigris by devoting to the work some 20,000 men ; 4 thus greatly weakening the strength of the armed force, and at the same time ham- pering its movements. Julian, in sacrificing his ships, suffered simply a pecuniary loss — they could not pos- sibly have been of any further service to him in the campaign. Retreat being resolved upon, it only remained to determine what route should be followed, and on what portion of the Roman territory the march should be directed. The soldiers clamoured for a return by the way whereby they had come ; 5 but many valid objec- tions to this course presented themselves to their com- manders. The country along the line of the Euphrates had been exhausted of its stores by the troops in their 1 It was already the month of June (Clinton, F. B. vol. i. p. 450). 2 Libanius confesses the want of provisions (Orat. Funebr. p. 320, C). Ammianus does not distinctly mentionit ; but his narrative shows that, from the time of the passage 4 Amm, Marc. xxiv. 7 of the Tigris, Julian's army de- ' 5 Ibid. xxiv. 8. pended mainly on the food which it took from the enemy. (Amm. Marc. xxiv. 7.) 3 Twenty-two, according to Zosi- mus (iii. 26) ; but Ammianus twice sives the number as twelve. Ch. X.] HE DETERMINES ON RETREAT. 221 advance ; the forage had been consumed, the towns and villages desolated. There would be neither food nor shelter for the men along this route ; the season was also unsuitable for it, since the Euphrates was in full flood, and the moist atmosphere would be sure to breed swarms of flies and mosquitoes. Julian saw that by far the best line of retreat was along the Tigris, which had higher banks than the Euphrates, which was no longer in flood, 1 and which ran through a tract that was highly productive and that had for many years not been visited by an enemy. The army, therefore, was ordered to commence its retreat through the country lying on the left bank of the Tigris, and to spread itself over the fertile region, in the hope of obtaining ample supplies. The march was understood to be directed on Cordyene (Kurdistan), a province now in the pos- session of Rome, a rich tract, and not more than about 250 miles distant from Ctesiphon. 2 Before, however, the retreat commenced, while Julian and his victorious army were still encamped in sight of Ctesiphon, the Persian king, according to some writers, 3 sent an embassy proposing terms of peace. Julian's successes are represented as having driven Sa- por to despair — c the pride of his royalty was humbled in the dust ; he took his repasts on the ground ; and the grief and anxiety of his mind were expressed by the 1 Gibbon overstates the case when he says 6 The Tigris over- flows in March, the Euphrates in July ' (Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 208, note 84 ). The Tigris flood does indeed begin in March, but it is greatest in May ; and the river only returns to its natural level about the middle of June. The Euphrates is in full flood from the middle of June to the middle of July, but begins to swell before the end of March. (See the Author's Ancient Monarchies, vol. i. p. 12.) 2 This is allowing Cordyene to have extended southwards as far as the point where the Greater Zab issues from the mountains. 3 Libanius, Orat. Funebr. p. 301, A, B; p. 322, D; Socrates, Hist. Eccles. iii. 21. 222 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. X. disorder of his hair.' 1 He would, it is suggested, have been willing c to purchase, with one half of his kingdom, the safety of the remainder, and would have gladly subscribed himself, in a treaty of peace, the faithful and dependent ally of the Roman conqueror.' 2 Such are the pleasing fictions wherewith the rhetorician of Anti- och, faithful to the memory of his friend and master, consoled himself and his readers after Julian's death. It is difficult to decide whether there underlies them any substratum of truth. Neither Ammianus nor Zosimus makes the slightest allusion to any negotia- tions at all at this period; and it is thus open to doubt whether the entire story told by Libanius is not the product of his imagination. But at any rate it is quite impossible that the Persian king can have made any abject offers of submission, or have been in a state of mind at all akin to despair. His great army, collected from all quarters, 3 was intact ; he had not yet con- descended to take the field in person ; he had lost no important town, and his adversary had tacitly confessed his inability to form the siege of a city which was far from being the greatest in the empire. If Sapor, there- fore, really made at this time overtures of peace, it must have been either with the intention of amusing Julian, and increasing his difficulties by delaying his retreat, or because he thought that Julian's consciousness of his difficulties would induce him to offer terms which he might accept. The retreat commenced on June 16. 4 Scarcely were 1 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 206. 2 Ibid. 3 Tabari says it was gathered from all parts of Irak, Persia, and Khorassan {Chroriique, vol. ii. p. 97). Gibbon tells us that 6 the satraps, as far as the confines of India and Scythia, had been ordered to as- semble their troops' (vol. iii. p. 205). 4 Amm. Mare. xxiv. 8. Some Ch. X.] JULIAN IN DIFFICULTIES. 223 the troops set in motion, when an ominous cloud of dust appeared on the southern horizon, which grew larger as the day advanced ; and, though some suggested that the appearance was produced by a herd of wild asses, and others ventured the conjecture that it was caused by the approach of a body of Julian's Saracenic allies, the emperor himself was not deceived, but, understanding that the Persians had set out in pursuit, he called in his stragglers, massed his troops, and pitched his camp in a strong position. 1 Day-dawn showed that he had judged aright, for the earliest rays of the sun were re- flected from the polished breastplates and cuirasses of the Persians, who had drawn up at no great distance during the night. 2 A combat followed in which the Persian and Saracenic horse attacked the Romans vigorously, and especially threatened the baggage, but were repulsed by the firmness and valour of the Roman foot. Julian was able to continue his retreat after a while, but found himself surrounded by enemies, some of whom, keeping in advance of his troops, or hanging upon his flanks, destroyed the corn and forage that his men so much needed ; while others, pressing upon his rear, retarded his march, and caused him from time to writers, as Tillemont (Hist, des Emperears, torn. iv. p. 543) and Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 206), interpose at this point an expedition on the part of Julian into the interior provinces of Persia, with the object of meeting Sapor and forcing him to an engagement, which they consider to have been frustrated by the treachery of his guides. No doubt there are in Libanius, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Sozomen, statements on which such a view may be based — and we cannot but suppose some founda- tion for the story of the treacherous guides — but the plain narratives of Ammianus and Zosimus, and considerations of time, preclude the possibility of anything im- portant having been undertaken between the battle of the Tigris and the commencement of the re- treat. Some raids into the rich country on either side of the Diyaleh, with the object of obtain- ing provisions, seem to have been all that Julian really attempted in this short interval. 1 Amm. Marc, l.s.c. 2 Ibid. xxv. 1. 224 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. time no inconsiderable losses. 1 The retreat under these circumstances was slow ; the army had to be rested and recruited when it fell in with any accumulation of provisions ; and the average progress made seems to have been not much more than ten miles a day. 2 This tardy advance allowed the more slow-moving portion of the Persian army to close in upon the retiring Romans ; and Julian soon found himself closely followed by dense masses of the enemy's troops, by the heavy cavalry clad in steel panoplies, and armed with long spears, by large bodies of archers, and even by a powerful corps of elephants. 3 This grand army was under the com- mand of a general whom the Roman writers call Me- ranes, 4 and of two sons of Sapor. It pressed heavily upon the Roman rearguard ; and Julian, after a little while, found it necessary to stop his march, confront his pursuers, and offer them battle. The offer was ac- cepted, and an engagement took place in a tract called Maranga. 5 The enemy advanced in two lines — the first composed of the mailed horsemen and the archers inter- mixed, the second of the elephants. Julian prepared his army to receive the attack by .disposing it in the form of a crescent, with the centre drawn back considerably ; but as the Persians advanced into the hollow space, he suddenly led his troops forward at speed, allowing the 1 Zosiinus, iii. 26-7; Amni. Marc, l.s.c. ; Greg. Naz. p. 154, B. 2 The distance from Ctesiphon to Samarah, a little south of which Julian died, is, by the shortest route upon the eastern side of the Tigris, about 100 miles. The route followed was probably somewhat longer; and the march appears to have occupied exactly ten days. 3 Amm. Marc. xxv. 1. 4 Ibid. Some suppose Meranes not to be a name, but (like Surena) a title. See Dr. W. Smith's note in his edition of Gibbon's Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 210, and com- pare Procop. Be Bell. Pers. i. 13; p. 62. 5 ' Cum ad tractum Maranga no- minatum omnis venisset exerci- tus.' (Amm. Marc, l.s.c.) Zosimus changes the ' tract called Maranga ' into a 4 village called Maronsa' (iii. 28). Ch. X.J BATTLE OF MARANGA 225 archers scarcely time to discharge their arrows before he engaged them and the horse in close combat. A long and bloody struggle followed ; but the Persians were unaccustomed to hand-to-hand fighting and dis- liked it ; they gradually gave ground, and at last broke up and fled, covering their retreat, however, with the clouds of arrows which they knew well how to dis- charge as they retired. The weight of their arms, and the fiery heat of the summer sun, prevented the Romans from carrying the pursuit very far. Julian recalled them quickly to the protection of the camp, and sus- pended his march for some days 1 while the wounded had their hurts attended to. The Persian troops, having suffered heavily in the battle, made no attempt to storm the Roman camp. They were content to spread themselves on all sides, to destroy or carry off all the forage and provisions, and to make the country, through which the Roman army must retire, a desert. Julian's forces were already suf- fering severely from scarcity of food ; and the general want was but very slightly relieved by a distribution of the stores set apart for the officers and for the members of the imperial household. Under these cir- cumstances it is not surprising that Julian's firmness deserted him, and that he began to give way to melan- choly forebodings, and to see visions and omens which portended disaster and death. In the silence of his tent, as he studied a favourite philosopher during the dead of night, he thought he saw the Genius of the State, with veiled head and cornucopia, stealing away through the hangings slowly and sadly. 2 Soon after- wards, when he had just gone forth into the open air 1 ' Triduo indutiis destinato, dum suo quisque vulneri medetur vel proximi. 1 (Airmi. Marc. xxv. 2, adinit.) 2 Ibid. 226 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. to perform averting sacrifices, the fall of a shooting star seemed to him a direct threat from Mars, with whom he had recently quarrelled. 1 The soothsayers were con- sulted, and counselled abstinence from all military movement ; but the exigencies of the situation caused their advice to be for once contemned. It was only by change of place that there was any chance of obtain- ing supplies of food ; and ultimate extrication from the perils that surrounded the army depended on a steady persistence in retreat. At dawn of day, 2 therefore, on the memorable 26th of June, a.d. 363, the tents were struck, and the Roman army continued its march across the wasted plain, having the Tigris at some little distance on its left, and some low hills upon its right. 3 The enemy did not anywhere appear ; and the troops advanced for a time without encountering opposition. But, as they drew near the skirts of the hills, not far from Samarah, suddenly an attack was made upon them. The rear- guard found itself violently assailed ; and when Julian hastened to its relief, news came that the van was also engaged with the enemy, and was already in difficulties. The active commander now hurried towards the front, and had accomplished half the distance, when the main Persian attack was delivered upon his right centre, 4 and to his dismay he found himself entangled amid 1 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 6, ad fin. On account of unpropitious omens Julian had sworn that he would never sacrifice to Mars again. 2 'Exorto jam die.' (Ibid. xxv. 2, ad fin. ) 3 Ammianus calls them ' lofty hills' ('celsos colles'); but there are none such in the vicinity of Samarah. 4 Ammianus is confused on this point, in one place making it the right, in another the left wing that suffered (xxv. 3: 'sinistro cornu inclinato . . . exercitus cornu clextero defatigato ' ). I conceive that the entire attack was made from a line of low hills, perhaps the embankment of an old canal, on Julian's right, and that it was therefore on this side that his army suffered its main losses. Ch. X.j BATTLE OF SAMARAH. DEATH OF JULIAN. 227 the masses of heavy horse and elephants, which had thrown his columns into confusion. The suddenness of the enemy's appearance had prevented him from don- ning his complete armour ; and as he fought without a breastplate, and with the aid of his light-armed troops restored the day, falling on the foe from behind and striking the backs and houghs of the horses and ele- phants, the javelin of a horseman, after grazing the flesh of his arm, fixed itself in his right side, pene- trating through the ribs to the liver. 1 Julian, grasping the head of the weapon, attempted to draw it forth, but in vain — the sharp steel cut his fingers, and the pain and loss of blood caused him to fall fainting from his steed. His guards, who had closed around him, care- fully raised him up, and conveyed him to the camp, where the surgeons at once declared the wound mortal. The sad news spread rapidly among the soldiery, and nerved them to desperate efforts — if they must lose their general, he should, they determined, be avenged. Striking their shields with their spears, 2 they every- where rushed upon the enemy with incredible ardour, careless whether they lived or died, and only seeking to inflict the greatest possible loss on those opposed to them. But the Persians, who had regarded the day as theirs, resisted strenuously, and maintained the fight with obstinacy till evening closed in and darkness put a stop to the engagement. The losses were large on both sides; the Roman right wing had suffered greatly; 1 Libanius, Orat. Funebr. pp. 303-4; Amm. Marc. xxv. 3. It is curious what different accounts are given of Julian's wound. Zosi- mus says, n'ArjTreTaL ij'i&ei (iii. 29); Aurelius Victor, ' conto percuti- tur ' (Epit. 43). Libanius in one place declares that the blow was not dealt by one of the enemy, but by a Christian of Julian's army (Orat. Funebr. p. 324). But this is a manifest calumny. 2 Amm. Marc, l.s.c. : ' Hast as ad scuta concrepans, miles ad vindic- tam . . . involabat.' 228 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. its commander, Anatolius, master of the offices, was among the slain, and the prefect Sallust was with dif- ficulty saved by an attendant. 1 The Persians, too, lost their generals Meranes and Nohodares ; and with them no fewer than fifty satraps and great nobles are said to have perished. 2 The rank and file no doubt suffered in proportion ; and the Romans were perhaps justified in claiming that the balance of advantage upon the day rested with them. But such advantage as they could reasonably assert was far more than counterbalanced by the loss of their commander, who died in his tent towards midnight on the day of the battle. 3 Whatever we may think of the general character of Julian, or of the degree of his intellectual capacity, there can be no question as to his excellence as a soldier, or his ability as a commander in the field. If the expedition which he had led into Persia was to some extent rash — if his preparations for it had been insufficient, and his conduct of it not wholly faultless — if consequently he had brought the army of the East into a situation of great peril and difficulty — yet candour requires us to acknowledge that of all the men collected in the Roman camp he was the fittest to have extricated the army from its embarrassments, and have conducted it, without serious disaster or loss of honour, into a position of safety. No one, like Julian, possessed the confidence of the troops ; no one so com- bined experience in command with the personal activity and vigour that was needed under the circumstances. When the leaders met to consult about the appointment of a successor to the dead prince, it was at once appar- 1 Zosim. iii. 29-30; Aniin. Marc. I 8 Mexpi vvktos /lieotic aptdoag xxv. 3. unedavev. (Zos. iii. 29.) 2 Anmi. Marc, l.s.c. I On. X.] JOVIAN MADE EMPEROR. 229 ent how irreparable was their loss. The prefect Sal- lust, whose superior rank and length of service pointed him out for promotion to the vacant post, excused himself on account of his age and infirmities. 1 The generals of the second grade — Arinthasus, Victor, Ne- vitta, Dagalaiphus — had each their party among the soldiers, but were unacceptable to the army generally. None could claim any superior merit which might clearly place him above the rest ; and a discord that might have led to open strife seemed impending, when a casual voice pronounced the name of Jovian, and, some applause following the suggestion, the rival gen- erals acquiesced in the choice ; and this hitherto insig- nificant officer was suddenly invested with the purple and saluted as c Augustus ' and ' Emperor. 1 2 Had there been any one really fit to take the command, such an appointment could not have been made; but, in the evident dearth of warlike genius, it was thought best that one whose rank was civil rather than military 3 should be preferred, for the avoidance of jealousies and contentions. A deserter carried the news to Sapor, who was now not very far distant, and described the new emperor to him as effeminate and slothful. 4 A fresh impulse was given to the pursuit by the intelligence thus conveyed ; the army engaged in disputing the Roman retreat was reinforced by a strong body of cavalry ; and Sapor himself pressed forward with all haste, resolved to hurl his main force on the rear of the retreating columns 5 1 Amm. Marc. xxv. 5. 2 Ibid, l.s.c. Zosimus gives no details, but simply says that the council by common consent elected Jovian (iii. 30). 3 Jovian was ' first of the domes- tics,' or Comptroller of the Royal Household. His military rank was perhaps that of tribune. ^ (See Zonaras, xiii. p. 29: 'lo(3iavdg ek ttjv avrapKtav TTpOKEKpirai, tote x L ^ ta P- X u v • ) 4 * Inertem et mollem.' (Amm. Marc-, l.s.c. mb Jin.) 5 Ibid. 230 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. It was with reluctance that Jovian, on the day of his elevation to the supreme power (June 27, a.d. 363), quitted the protection of the camp, 1 and proceeded to conduct his army over the open plain, where the Per- sians were now collected in great force, prepared to dis- pute the ground with him inch by inch. Their horse and elephants again fell upon the right wing of the Romans, where the Jovians and Herculians were now posted, and, throwing those renowned corps 2 into disorder, pressed on, driving them across the plain in headlong flight and slaying vast numbers of them. The corps would probably have been annihilated, had they not in their flight reached a hill occupied by the baggage train, which gallantly came to their aid, and, attacking the horse and elephants from higher ground, gained a signal success. 3 The elephants, wounded by the jave- lins hurled down upon them from above, and maddened with the pain, turned upon their own side, and, roaring frightfully, 4 carried confusion among the ranks of the horse, which broke up and fled. Many of the frantic animals were killed by their own riders or by the Per- sians on whom they were trampling, while others suc- cumbed to the blows dealt them by the enemy. There was a frightful carnage, ending in the repulse of the Persians and the resumption of the Roman march. Shortly before night fell, Jovian and his army reached Samarah, 5 then a fort of no great size upon the Tigris, 6 1 Aram, Marc. xxv. 6, ad init. 2 The 'Jovians' and * Herculians' had been instituted by Diocletian, and received their names from the titles 4 Jovius ' and ' Herculius ' assumed by that emperor and his son-in-law, Galerius. 3 Zosimus (iii. 30) is here fuller and more exact than Ammiamis. His narrative has all the appearance of truth. 4 MetcI (3pvxv0uoi\ (Zosim. l.s.c.) 5 Amm. Marc. xxv. 6: ' Prope confinia noctis, cum ad castelluni Sumere nomine citis passibus ten- deremus.' Zosinius seems to intend the same place by his Zovpa to (ppovpiov, which, however, lie makes the Romans pass early in the day. 6 Samarah became a flourishing Ch. X.] DIFFICULTIES OF THE ROMAN RETREAT. 231 and, encamping in its vicinity, passed the hours of rest unmolested. The retreat now continued for four days along the left bank of the Tigris, 1 the progress made each day being small, 2 since the enemy incessantly obstructed the march, pressing on the columns as they retired, but when they stopped drawing off, and declining an engagement at close quarters. On one occasion they even attacked the Roman camp, and, after insulting the legions with their cries, forced their way through the prsetorian gate, and had nearly penetrated to the royal tent, when they were met and defeated by the legion- aries. 3 The Saracenic Arabs were especially trouble- some. Offended by the refusal of Julian to continue their subsidies, 4 they had transferred their services wholly to the other side, and pursued the Romans with a hos- tility that was sharpened by indignation and resent- ment. It was with difficulty that the Roman army, at the close of the fourth day, reached Dura, a small place upon the Tigris, about eighteen miles north of Sa- marah. 5 Here a new idea seized the soldiers. As the Persian forces were massed chiefly on the left bank of and important city under the Caliphs of the Abasside dynasty. The 8th Caliph of this line, Al- Motassem-Billah, made it his capital. It is now once more re- duced to insignificance. 1 Zosim. iii. 30: ' H/uipag reaaepaq TrpoE'AOovreg. 2 As Dura (Bur) is but eighteen miles above Samarah, the average progress per day must have been under five miles. Ammianus gives the last day's march as thirty stades, or little more than three miles (xxv. 6). 3 Amm. Marc, l.s.c. 4 Julian had subsidised them for a time, but, finding that his supply of cash was becoming ex- hausted, stopped the customary payment. The Saracens complained, whereupon he replied that he had no more gold, but plenty of steel, at their service. 5 There can be no doubt of the identity of Dura (Aoupa) with the modern Dur, a small place on the Tigris between Tekrit and Sama- rah. (Rich, Kurdistan, vol. ii. ch xviii. ; Layard, Nineveh and Baby- lon, p. 469.) It was a town of some importance in the wars of the successors of Alexander (Polyb. v. 48 and 52). 232 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. the Tigris, and might find it difficult to transfer them- selves to the other side, it seemed to the legionaries that they would escape half their difficulties if they could themselves cross the river, and place it between them and their foes. They had also a notion that on the west side of the stream the Roman frontier was not far distant, but might be reached by forced marches in a few days. 1 They therefore begged Jovian to allow them to swim the stream. It was in vain that he and his officers opposed the project; mutinous cries arose; and, to avoid worse evils, he was compelled to consent that five hundred Gauls and Sarmatians, known to be expert swimmers, should make the attempt. It suc- ceeded beyond his hopes. The corps crossed at night, surprised the Persians who held the opposite bank, and established themselves in a safe position before the dawn of day. By this bold exploit the passage of the other troops, many of whom could not swim, was ren- dered feasible, and Jovian proceeded to collect timber, brushwood, and skins for the formation of large rafts on which he might transport the rest of his army. 2 These movements were seen with no small disquie- tude by the Persian king. The army which he. had regarded as almost a certain prey seemed about to escape him. He knew that his troops could not pass the Tigris by swimming ; he had, it is probable, brought with him no boats, and the country about Dura could not supply many ; to follow the Romans, if they crossed the stream, he must construct a bridge, and the con- 1 Amm. Marc. xxv. 6: 'Fama circumlata, fines baud procul limi- tum esse nostrorum.' 2 Ibid. Rafts of tliis description bad been nsed on tbe Mesopotamia!) rivers from very early times. They are represented frequently in the Assyrian sculptures. (See Layard, Monuments of Nineveh, Second Series, pi. 13; Nineveh and Baby- lon, p. 231; &c.) Ch. X.] NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCE. 233 struction of a bridge was, to such unskilful engineers as the Persians, a work of time. Before it was finished the legions might be beyond his reach, and so the campaign would end, and he would have gained no advantage from it. Under these circumstances he de- termined to open negotiations with the Romans, and to see if he could not extract from their fears some im- portant concessions. They were still in a position of great peril, since they could not expect to embark and cross the stream without suffering tremendous loss from the enemy before whom they would be flying. And it w T as uncertain what perils they might not encounter beyond the river in traversing the two hundred miles that still separated them from Roman territory. 1 The Saracenic allies of Persia were in force on the further side of the stream ; 2 and a portion of Sapor's army might be conveyed across in time to hang on the rear of the legions and add largely to their difficulties. At any rate, it was worth while to make overtures and see what answer would be returned. If the idea of nego- tiating were entertained at all, something would be gained ; for each additional day of suffering and pri- vation diminished the Roman strength, and brought nearer the moment of absolute and complete exhaus- tion. Moreover, a bridge might be at once commenced at some little distance, 3 and might be pushed forward, 1 The distance from Dur to Sin- jar (Singara), the nearest Roman post, is, as the crow flies, about 175 miles. Slight deflections from the straight line, necessitated by the position of the wells upon the route, would raise the distance to 200 miles. 2 Amm. Marc. xxv. 8, ad in it. 3 This is not stated by the au- thorities; but, after the peace was made, we hear of a bridge which the Persians were accused of con- structing in order to pursue Jovian and break the terms of the treaty. (See Amm. Marc. xxv. 8.) As Sapor, if wicked enough, can scarcely have been foolish enough, to contemplate breaking the very advantageous treaty which he had just concluded, I suspect that the bridge was begun while the nego- tiations were in progress, to be used if they failed. 234 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. X. so that, if the negotiations failed, there should be no great delay in following the Romans across the river. Such were probably the considerations 1 which led Sapor to send as envoys to the Roman camp at Dura the Surena and another great noble, who announced that they came to offer terms of Peace. 2 The great king, they said, having respect to the mutability of human affairs, was desirous of dealing mercifully with the Romans, and would allow the escape of the rem- nant which was left of their army, if the Caesar and his advisers accepted the conditions that he required. 3 These conditions would be explained to any envoys whom Jovian might empower to discuss them with the Persian plenipotentiaries. The Roman emperor and his council gladly caught at the offer ; and two officers of high rank, the general Arinthaeus and the prefect Sallust, were at once appointed to confer with Sapor's envoys, and ascertain the terms on which peace would be granted. They proved to be such as Roman pride felt to be almost intolerable ; and great efforts were made to induce Sapor to be content with less. The negotiations lasted for four days ; 4 but the Persian monarch was inexorable ; each day diminished his adversary's strength and bettered his own position ; 1 I have given the considerations which, it seems to me, must have weighed with Sapor. Ammianus represents him as impelled to desire peace: 1, by the losses that he had sustained; 2, by fear of what the Roman army might do if driven to desperation; and 3, by a general dread of the Roman power and a special fear of the army of Meso- potamia under Procopius. He ad- mits, however, that the successful passage of the river by the 500 Gauls and Sarmatians was the circumstance which principally moved him: * Super omnia hebe- tarunt ejus anxiam mentem . . . quingenti viri transgressi tumidum flumen incolumes,' &c. (Amm. Marc. xxv. 7.) 2 Ibid, l.s.c. ; Zosim. iii. 31. 3 ' Humanorum respectu reliquias exercitus redire sinere clemen- tissimum regem, qua? jubet si im- pleverit cum primatibus Caesar.' (Amm. Marc, l.s.c. \ * Ibid, l.s.c. Ch. X.] THE TERMS OF PEACE, 235 there was no reason why he should make any conces- sion at all ; and he seems, in fact, to have yielded nothing of his original demands, except points of such exceed- ingly slight moment that to insist on them would have been folly. 1 The following were the terms of peace to which Jovian consented. First, the five provinces east of the Tigris, which had been ceded to Rome by Narses, the grandfather of Sapor, after his defeat by Galerius, 2 were to be given back to Persia, with their fortifications, their inhabitants, and all that they contained of value. The Romans in the territory were, however, to be allowed to withdraw and join their countrymen. Sec- ondly, three places in Eastern Mesopotamia, Nisibis, Singara, and a fort called 1 the Camp of the Moors,' were to be surrendered, but with the condition that not only the Romans, but the inhabitants generally, might retire ere the Persians took possession, and carry with them such of their effects as were movable. 3 The surrender of these places necessarily involved that of the country which they commanded, and can scarcely imply less than the withdrawal of Rome from any claim to dominion over the region between the Tigris and the Khabour. 4 Thirdly, all connection between Ar- menia and Rome was to be broken off ; Arsaces was to be left to his own resources ; and in any quarrel between him and Persia Rome was precluded from lending him aid. On these conditions a peace was 1 The only concessions made were the permission of withdrawal given to all the inhabitants of Nisibis and Singara, and the allow- ance of a similar right to Roman citizens located in any part of the ceded territories. 2 See above, pp. 129-132 3 This is not distinctly stated as a condition, but appears from what is related of the actual evacuation (Amra. Marc. xxv. 9). 4 Orosius sees this, and therefore says: 'Nisibin oppidum, et partem superioris Me sop ot amice, Persis con- cessit ' (vii. 31 ). 236 THE SEVENTH M0NAKCHY. [Ch. X. concluded for thirty years ;* oaths to observe it faith- fully were interchanged ; and hostages were given and received on either side, to be retained until the stipu- lations of the treaty were executed. The Roman historian who exclaims that it would have been better to have fought ten battles than to have con- ceded a single one of these shameful terms, 2 commands the sympathy of every reader, who cannot fail to rec- ognise in his utterance the natural feeling of a patriot. And it is possible that Julian, had he lived, would have rejected so inglorious a peace, and have preferred to run all risks rather than sign it. But in that case there is every reason to believe that the army would have been absolutely destroyed, and a few stragglers only have returned to tell the tale of disaster. 3 The alternative which Ammianus suggests — that Jovian, instead of negotiating, should have pushed on to Cor- dyene, which he might have reached in four days — is absurd ; 4 for Cordyene was at least a hundred and fifty miles distant from Dura, and, at the rate of retreat which Jovian had found possible (four and a half miles a day), would have been reached in three days over a month ! The judgment of Eutropius, who, like Am- mianus, shared in the expedition, is probably correct — that the peace, though disgraceful, was necessary. 5 Unless Jovian was prepared to risk not only his own 1 Aram. Marc. xxv. 7, ad fin.; Zosim. iii. 31. 2 i Cum pugnari decies expediret, ne horum quidquam dederetur.' (A mm. Marc. xxv. 7.) 3 This point is well argued by Tillemont (Hist, des Empereurs, torn. iv. p. 583). It is slurred over by Gibbon, who blames Jovian, but leaves it doubtful what he would have had him do (Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 219). 4 Gibbon admits as much in a note (note no ), but in his text re- produces the absurdity of Ammia- nus. 5 Eutrop. Breviar. x. 17, § 9 : ' Pacem fecit necessarian! quidem, sed ignobilem.' Compare Orosius, vii. 31 : ' Fcedus, etsi parum putaret dignum, satis tamen necessarium, pepigit.' Cu. X.| TIIE TERMS OF PEACE EXECUTED. 237 life, but the lives of all his soldiers, it was essential that he should come to terms; and the best terms that he could obtain were those which he has been blamed for accepting. It is creditable to both parties that the peace, once made, was faithfully observed, all its stipulations being honestly and speedily executed. The Romans were allowed to pass the river without molestation from Sapor's army, 1 and, though they suffered some what from the Saracens when landing on the other side, 2 were un- pursued in their retreat, 3 and were perhaps even, at first, supplied to some extent with provisions. 4 After- wards, no doubt, they endured for some days great privations ; but a convoy with stores was allowed to ad- vance from Roman Mesopotamia into Persian territory, 5 which met the famished soldiers at a Persian military post, called Ur or Adur, 6 and relieved their most press- ing necessities. On the Roman side, the ceded prov- inces and towns were quietly surrendered ; offers on the part of the inhabitants to hold their own against the Persians without Roman aid were refused ; 7 the Roman troops were withdrawn from the fortresses ; and the Armenians were told that they must henceforth rely upon themselves, and not look to Rome for help or 1 Ammianus graphically describes the passage (xxv. 8). Its difficul- ties showed that, had the Persians been hostile, it would have been impossible. 2 Ammianus says 4 a Saracenis vel Persia caedebantur ; ' but it is not clear that there were really any Persians on the right bank of the river. 3 Zosim. iii. 33; Amm. Marc, l.s.c. 4 Gibbon denies this (p. 221, note 116 ); but it seems to me that the statements of Rufinus (ii. 1 ; p. 177) and Theodoret (iv. 2 ; p. 661, B) have some weight. 5 Amm. Marc. xxv. 8. The im- portant words 6 Persicum castellum ' have not generally been noticed. A reader of Gibbon would suppose 4 the castle of Ur ' to be a Roman post. 6 The MSS. vary between 4 ad Ur nomine Persicum venere castellum ' and 4 Adur nomine Persicum v. cast.' Ammianus commonly omits 4 ad ' after 4 venio.' 7 Amm. Marc. xxv. 9; Zosim. iii. 33, sub Jin. 238 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. |Ch. X. protection. Thus Jovian, though strongly urged to fol- low ancient precedent, 1 and refuse to fulfil the engage- ments contracted under the pressure of imminent peril, stood firm, and honourably performed all the conditions of the treaty. The second period of struggle between Rome and Persia had thus a termination exactly the reverse of the first. Rome ended the first period by a great vic- tory and a great diplomatic success. 2 At the close of the second she had to relinquish all her gains, and to draw back even behind the line which she occupied when hostilities first broke out. Nisibis, the great stronghold of Eastern Mesopotamia, had been in her possession ever since the time of Verus. 3 Repeatedly attacked by Parthia and Persia, it had never fallen ; but once, after which it had been soon recovered ; and now for many years it had come to be regarded as the bulwark of the Roman power in the East, and as carrying with it the dominion of Western Asia. 4 A fatal blow was dealt to Roman prestige when a city held for near two hundred years, and one honoured with the name of ' colony,' was wrested from the empire and occupied by the most powerful of its adversaries. Not only Amida and Carrhse, but Antioch itself, trem- 1 The reproach addressed by the Parthian chief to Crass us, 4 You Romans are not very apt to re- member your engagements' (Plut. Crass. § 31), was well deserved, and is echoed by the general voice of history. It is saddening to find a modern writer and an Englishman approving the ordinary Roman practice, and suggesting that Jovian ought to have ' redeemed his pusillanimous behaviour by a splen- did act of patriotic perfidy' (Gib- bon, Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 223). 2 See above, p. 135. 3 Zosimus maintains (iii. 32) that Rome never gave up Nisibis from the time of its capture by Lucullus (B.C. 68). And it may be true that she never relinquished it by treaty. But Nisibis and Mesopotamia generally were Par- thian until the'great expedition of Avid ins Cass i us (a.d. 165). 4 ' Constabat orbem Eoum in ditionem potuisse transire Persidis, nisi luec civitas habili situ et moe nium magnitudine restitisset.' (Amm. Marc. xxv. 8.) Ch. X.| general results of the war. 239 bled at a loss which was felt to lay open the whole eastern frontier to attack, 1 and which seemed ominous of further retrogression. Although the fear generally felt proved to be groundless, and the Roman posses- sions in the East were not, for 200 years, further cur- tailed by the Persians, yet Roman influence in Western Asia from this time steadily declined, and Persia came to be regarded as the first power in these regions. Much credit is due to Sapor II. for his entire conduct of the war with Constantius, Julian, and Jovian. He knew when to attack and when to remain upon the defensive, when to press on the enemy and when to hold himself in reserve and let the enemy follow his own devices. He rightly conceived from the first the importance of Nisibis, and resolutely persisted in his determination to acquire possession of it, until at last he succeeded. When, in B.C. 337, he challenged Rome to a trial of strength, he might have seemed rash and presumptuous. But the event justified him. In a war which lasted twenty-seven years, he fought numerous pitched battles with the Romans, and was never once defeated. He proved himself greatly superior as a general to Constantius and Jovian, and not unequal to Julian. By a combination of courage, perseverance, and promptness, he brought the entire contest to a favourable issue, and restored Persia, in a.d. 363, to a higher position than that from which she had descended two generations earlier. If he had done nothing more than has already come under our notice, he would still have amply deserved that epi- thet of 1 Great ' which, by the general consent of histo- Zosini. iii. 34, sub init. ; Johann. Ant. Fr. 181. 240 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. LCH. N. rians, has been assigned to him. He was undoubtedly among the greatest of the Sassanian monarchs, and may properly be placed above all his predecessors, and above all but one 1 of those who succeeded him. 1 Chosroes Anushirwan, who reigned from A.D. 531 to a.d. 579. Oh. XL] AFFAIRS OF ARMENIA. 241 CHAPTER XI. Attitude of Armenia during the War between Sapor and Julian. Sapor's Treacher?/ towards Arsaces. Sapor conquers Armenia. He attacks Iberia, deposes Sauromaces, and sets up a new King. Resistance and Capture of Artogerassa. Difficulties of Sapor. Division of Iberia between the Roman and Persian Pretenders. Renewal of Hostilities between Rome and Persia. Peace made ivith Valens. Death of Sapor. His Coins. 4 Rex Persidis, longaevus ille Sapor, post imperatoris Juliani excessum et pudendae pacis icta foedera . . . injectabat Arinenige man urn.' Amm. Marc, xxvii. 12. The successful issue of Sapor's war with Julian and Jovian resulted in no small degree from the attitude which was assumed by Armenia soon after Julian com- menced his invasion. We have seen that the emperor, when he set out upon his expedition, regarded Arme- nia as an ally, and in forming his plans placed consider- able dependence on the contingent which he expected from Arsaces, the Armenian monarch. 1 It was his in- tention to attack Ctesiphon with two separate armies, acting upon two converging lines. While he himself advanced with his main force by way of the Euphrates valley and the Nahr-Malcha, he had arranged that his two generals, Procopius and Sebastian, should unite their troops with those of the Armenian king, and, after ravaging a fertile district of Media, make their way towards the great city, through Assyria and Adiabene, 2 along the left bank of the Tigris. It was a bitter dis- 1 See above, p. 200. 2 Zosim. iv. 4. 242 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XI. appointment to him when, on nearing Ctesiphon, he could see no signs and hear no tidings of the northern army, from which he had looked for effectual aid at this crisis of the campaign. 1 We have now to consider how this failure came about, what circumstances in- duced that hesitation and delay on the part of Sebas- tian and Procopius which had at any rate a large share in frustrating Julian's plans and causing the ill-success of his expedition. It appears that the Roman generals, in pursuance of the orders given them, marched across Northern Meso- potamia to the Armenian borders, and were there joined by an Armenian contingent which Arsaces sent to their assistance. 2 The allies marched together into Media, and carried fire and sword through the fruitful district known as Chiliacomus, or 4 the district of the Thousand Villages.' 3 They might easily have advanced further; but the Armenians suddenly and without warning drew off and fell back towards their own country. According to Moses of Chorine, their general, Zurseus, was actu- ated by a religious motive ; it seemed to him monstrous that Armenia, a Christian country, should embrace the cause of an apostate, and he was prepared to risk offending his own sovereign rather than lend help to one whom he regarded as the enemy of his faith. 4 The Roman generals, thus deserted by their allies, differed as to the proper course to pursue. While one was still desirous of descending the course of the Tigris, and making at least an attempt to effect a junction with Julian, the other forbade his soldiers ,to join in the 1 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 7, ad fin, original plan. (See Anim. Marc. 2 Mos. Chor. Hist. Armen. iii. 15; xxiii. 3.) That it was executed ap- Amm. Marc. xxv. 7. pears from the same writer (xxv. 7). 3 This was part of Julian's 4 Mos. Chor. iii. 15. Ch. XL] SAPOR'S PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARSACES. 243 march, and insisted on falling back and re-entering Mesopotamia. 1 As usual in such cases, the difference of opinion resulted in a policy of inaction. The attempt to join Julian was given up ; and the second army, from which he had hoped so much, played no further part in the campaign of a.d. 363. We are told 2 that Julian heard of the defection of ' the Armenians while he was still on his way to Ctesi- phon, and immediately sent a letter to Arsaces, com- plaining of his general's conduct, and threatening to exact a heavy retribution on his return from the Per- sian war, if the offence of Zurseus were not visited at once with condign punishment. Arsaces was greatly alarmed at the message ; and, though he made no ef- fort to supply the shortcomings of his officer by leading or sending fresh troops to Julian's assistance, yet he hastened to acquit himself of complicity in the mis- conduct of Zurseus by executing him, together with his whole family. 3 Having thus, as he supposed, se- cured himself against Julian's anger, he took no fur- ther steps, but indulged his love of ease and his distaste for the Roman alliance by remaining wholly passive during the rest of the year. But though the attitude taken by Armenia was thus, on the whole, favourable to the Persians, and undoubt- edly contributed to Sapor's success, he was himself so far from satisfied with the conduct of Arsaces that he resolved at once to invade his country and endeavour to strip him of his crown. As Rome had by the recent treaty relinquished her protectorate over Armenia, and bound herself not to interfere in any quarrel between 1 Liban. Oral. Funehr. p. 301, D. pins and Sebastian. The passage is obscure, but appears 2 Mos. Chor. l.s.c. to refer to the troops under Proco- 3 Ibid. 244 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XL the Armenians and the Persians, an opportunity was afforded for bringing Armenia into subjection which an ambitious monarch like Sapor was not likely to let slip. He had only to consider whether he would em- ploy art or violence, or whether he would rather pre- fer a judicious admixture of the two. Adopting the last-named course as the most prudent, he proceeded to intrigue with a portion of the Armenian satraps, while he made armed incursions on the territories of others, and so harassed the country that after a while the satraps generally went over to his side, and repre- sented to Arsaces that no course was open to him but to make his submission. Having brought matters to this point, Sapor had only further to persuade Arsaces to surrender himself, in order to obtain the province which he coveted, almost without striking a blow. He therefore addressed Arsaces a letter, which, according to the only writer who professes to give its terms, 1 was expressed as follows: — 1 Sapor, the offspring of Orrnazd, comrade of the sun, king of kings, sends greeting to his dear brother, Arsa- ces, king of Armenia, whom he holds in affectionate remembrance. It has come to our knowledge that thou hast approved thyself our faithful friend, since not only didst thou decline to invade Persia with Csesar, but when he took a contingent from thee thou didst send messengers and withdraw it. 2 Moreover, we have not forgotten how thou actedst at the first, when thou didst prevent him from passing through thy territories, as he wished. Our soldiers, indeed, who quitted their 1 Mos. Chor. iii. 17. Moses makes ! Arsaces ordered his genera] to with* the letter to be addressed toTiranus; \ draw the troops, but, that he might but lie ceased to reign a.d. 341. I not be compromised, made him pre- 2 Some think that this is the I tend to act on his own authority, true account of the matter — that I * Ch. XL] ARSACES SEIZED AND BLINDED. 245 post, sought to cast on thee the blame due to their own cowardice. But we have not listened to them : their leader we punished with death, and to thy realm, I swear by Mithra, we have done no hurt. Arrange matters then so that thou mayest come to us with all speed, and consult with us concerning our common advantage. Then thou canst return home.' Arsaces, on receiving this missive, whatever suspi- cions he may have felt, saw no course open to him but to accept the invitation. He accordingly quitted Armenia and made his way to the court of Sapor, where he was immediately seized and blinded. 1 He was then fettered with chains of silver, according to a common practice of the Persians with prisoners of dis- tinction, 2 and was placed in strict confinement in a place called 1 the Castle of Oblivion.' 3 But the removal of their head did not at once pro- duce the submission of the people. A national party declared itself under Pharandzem, the wife, and Bab (or Para), the son of Arsaces, who threw themselves into the strong fortress of Artogerassa (Ardakers), and there offered to Sapor a determined resistance. 4 Sapor committed the siege of this place to two renegade Ar- menians, Cylaces and Artabannes, while at the same time he proceeded to extend his influence beyond the limits of Armenia into the neighbouring country of Iberia, which was closely connected with Armenia, and for the most part followed its fortunes. 1 Aram. Marc, xxvii. 12. The seizure is also recorded by the Armenian historians, Faustns (iv. 54) and Moses (iii. 34); and also by Procopius '{Bell. Pers. i. 5). 2 ' Vincttim catenis argenteis, quod apud eos honoratis vanum suppliciorum sestimatur esse sola- tium.' (Aram. Marc. I.s c. ) Moses, however, gives him fetters of iron (iii: 35). 3 Mos. Chor. iii. 35; Faustns, iv. 54; Procop. 7?. P. i. 6, p. 29. 4 Mos. Chor. l.s.c. ; Aram. Marc, xxvii. 12; Faustns, iv. 55. 246 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XL Iberia was at this time tinder the government of a king bearing the name of Sauromaces, who had received his investiture from Rome, and was conse- quently likely to uphold Roman interests. Sappr in- vaded Iberia, drove Sauromaces from his kingdom, and set up a new monarch in the person of a certain Aspacures, on whose brow he placed the coveted dia- dem. 1 He then withdrew to his own country, leaving the complete subjection of Armenia to be accom- plished by his officers, Cylaces and Artabannes, or, as the Armenian historians call them, Zig and Gar en. 2 Cylaces and Artabannes commenced the siege of Ar- togerassa, and for a time pressed it with vigour, while they strongly urged the garrison to make their sub- mission. But, having entered within the walls to ne- gotiate, they were won over by the opposite side, and joined in planning a treacherous attack on the besieging force, which was surprised at night and compelled to retire. Para took advantage of their retreat to quit the town and throw himself on the protection of Valens, the Roman emperor, who permitted him to reside in regal state at Neocaesarea. Shortly afterwards, however, by the advice of Cylaces and Artabannes, he returned into Armenia, and was accepted by the patriotic party as their king, Rome secretly countenancing his proceed- ings. 3 Under these circumstances the Persian monarch once more took the field, and, entering Armenia at the head of a large army, drove Para, with his counsellors Cylaces and Artabannes, to the mountains, renewed the siege of Artogerassa, and forced it to submit, captured the queen Pharandzem, together with the treasure of 1 Amm. Marc, xxvii. 12. 2 Faustus, iv. 55. 5 ' Per Terentium ducezn Para reducitur in Armeniam.' (Amm. Marc, l.s.c. Compare Faustus, v. 1.) Ch. XL] SUBMISSION OF PARA. 247 Arsaces, 1 and finally induced Para to come to terms, and to send him the heads of the two arch- traitors. The resistance of Armenia would probably now have ceased, had Rome been content to see her old enemy so aggrandised, or felt her hands absolutely tied by the terms of the treaty of Dura. But the success of Sapor thus far only brought him into greater difficulties. The Armenians and Iberians, who desired above all things liberty and independence, were always especially hostile to the power from which they felt that they had for the time being most to fear. As Christian nations, they had also at this period an additional ground of sympathy with Rome, and of aversion from the Persians, who were at once heathens and intolerant. 2 The patriotic party in both countries was thus violently opposed to the establishment of Sapor's authority over them, and cared little for the artifices by which he sought to make it appear that they still enjoyed freedom and autonomy. Above all, Rome, being ruled by monarchs 3 who had had no hand in making the disgraceful peace of a.d. 363, and who had no strong feeling of honour or religious obligation in the matter of treaties with barbarians, was preparing herself to fly in the face of her engagements, and, re- garding her own interest as her highest law, to inter- fere effectually in order to check the progress of Persia in North- Western Asia. Rome's first open interference was in Iberia. Iberia had perhaps not been expressly named in the treaty, 1 Amin. Marc, xxvii. 12; Faus- tus, iv. 55; Mos. Chor. iii. 35. 2 See above, p. 147. 8 Valentinian and Valens. Jovian had died in a.d. 364, after a reign of little more than eight months. Valentinian had been elected his successor, and had associated his brother Valens in the empire. To Valens had been assigned the government of the eastern prov- inces. t 248 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XL and support might consequently be given to the ex- pelled Sauromaces without any clear infraction of its conditions. The duke Terentius was ordered, therefore, towards the close of a.d. 370, to enter Iberia with twelve legions and replace upon his throne the old Roman feudatory. 1 Accordingly he invaded the country from Lazica, which bordered it upon the north, and found no difficulty in conquering it as far as the river Cyrus. On the Cyrus, however, he was met by Aspacures, the king of Sapor's choice, who made proposals for an accommodation. Representing himself as really well- inclined to Rome, and only prevented from declaring himself by the fact that Sapor held his son as a hostage, he asked Terentius' consent to a division of Iberia be- tween himself and his rival, the tract north of the Cyrus being assigned to the Roman claimant, and that south of the river remaining under his own government. Terentius, to escape further trouble, consented to the arrangement; and the double kingdom was established. The northern and western portions of Iberia were made over to Sauromaces ; the southern and eastern contin- ued to be ruled by Aspacures. When the Persian king received intelligence of these transactions, he was greatly excited. 2 To him it ap- peared clear that by the spirit, if not by the letter, of the treaty of Dura, Rome had relinquished Iberia equally with Armenia ; 3 and he complained bitterly of the division which had been made of the Iberian territory, 1 Aram. Marc, xxvii. 12: * Sau- 1 included in Armenia. When Rome romaces, pulsus . . . Hiheriae reg- j replaced Sauromaces upon the Ibe- no, cum duodecim legionibus et Terentio rem i Hit nr.' 2 4 His percitus Sapor, pali se indigna clamans,' &c. {Ibid, l.s.c.) 3 Sapor seems to have considered that, in a certain sense, Iberia was rian throne, he complained that ' the At men las were assisted against the text of the treaty.' (Ibid, l.s.c.) Rome, no doubt, contested this interpretation. Ch. XI. 1 WAR BETWEEN SAPOR AND VALENS. 249 not only without his consent, but without his knowl- edge. He was no doubt aware that Rome had not really confined her interference to the region with which she had some excuse for intermeddling, but had already secretly intervened in Armenia, and was intend- ing further intervention. The count Arinthseus had been sent with an army to the Armenian frontier about the same time that Terentius had invaded Iberia, and had received positive instructions to help the Armenians if Sapor molested them. It was in vain that the Per- sian monarch appealed to the terms of the treaty of Dura — Rome dismissed his ambassadors with con- tempt, and made no change in her line of procedure. Upon this Sapor saw that war was unavoidable ; and accordingly he wasted no more time in embassies, but employed himself during the winter, which had now begun, in collecting as large a force as he could, in part from his allies, in part from his own subjects, re- solving to take the field in the spring, and to do his best to punish Rome for her faithlessness. 1 Rome on her part made ready to resist the invasion which she knew to be impending. A powerful army was sent to guard the East under count Trajan, and Vadomair, ex-king of the Alemanni ; 2 but so much regard for the terms of the recent treaty was still felt, or pretended, that the generals received orders to be careful not to commence hostilities, but to wait till an attack was made on them. They were not kept long in expectation. As soon as winter was over, Sapor crossed the frontier (a.d. 371) with a large force of native cavalry and archers, supported by numerous auxiliaries, 3 and attacked the Romans near a place called Vaga- 1 Arum. Marc, xxvii. 12, ad Jin. 2 Tbitl. xxix. 1. 3 Ibid. 250 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XL banta. The Roman commander gave his troops the order to retire ; and accordingly they fell back under a shower of Persian arrows, until, several having been wounded, they felt that they could with a good face de- clare that the rupture of the peace was the act of the Persians. The retreat was then exchanged for an ad- vance, and after a brief engagement the Romans were victorious, and inflicted a severe loss upon their adver- saries. 1 But the success was not followed by results of any importance. Neither side seems to have been anxious for another general encounter ; and the season for hostilities was occupied by a sort of guerilla war- fare, in which the advantage rested alternately with the Persians and the Romans. 2 At length, when the summer was ended, the commanders on either side entered into negotiations ; and a truce was made which allowed Sapor to retire to Ctesiphon, and the Roman emperor, who was now personally directing the war, to go into winter quarters at Antioch. 3 After this the war languished for two or three years. 4 Valens was wholly deficient in military genius, and was quite content if he could maintain a certain amount of Roman influence in Armenia and Iberia, while at the same time he protected the Roman frontier against Per- sian invasion. Sapor was advanced in years, and might naturally desire repose, having been almost constantly engaged in military expeditions since he reached the age of sixteen. Negotiations seem to have alternated 1 See Amm. Mare. xxx. 2 : ' Sa- por vero, post suorum pristinam cladem.' 2 ' Tentatis aliquoties levibus prse- 1 iis, varioque finilis eventu.' (Ibid, xxix. 1.) 3 Ibid. Compare Zosiui. iv. 13. 4 Into this interval fell the death of Para, whom the Persians en- trapped and murdered (Amm. Marc. xxx. 1 * Faustus, v. 32). Ch. XL] PEACE MADE : ITS TERMS. 251 with hostilities 1 during the interval between a.d. 371 and 376 ; but they resulted in nothing, until, in this last-named year, a peace was made, 2 which gave tran- quillity to the East during the remainder of the reign of Sapor. The terms upon which this peace was concluded are obscure. It is perhaps most probable that the two contracting powers agreed to abstain from further in- terference with Iberia and Armenia, and to leave those countries to follow their own inclinations. Armenia seems by the native accounts to have gravitated towards Rome under these circumstances, 3 and Iberia is likely to have followed her example. The tie of Christianity attached these countries to the great power of the West ; and, except under compulsion, they were not likely at this time to tolerate the yoke of Persia for a day. When Jovian withdrew the Roman protection from them, they were forced for a while to submit to the power which they disliked ; but no sooner did his successors reverse his policy, and show themselves ready to uphold the Armenians and Iberians against Persia, than they naturally reverted to the Roman side, and formed an important support to the empire against its Eastern rival. The death of Sapor followed the peace of a.d. 376 within a few years. He died 4 a.d. 379 or 380, after having reigned seventy years. It is curious that, although possessing the crown for so long a term, and enjoying a more brilliant reign than any preceding 1 Amm. Marc. xxx. 2. 2 Zosim. iv. 21, sub init. Com- pare Amm. Marc. xxxi. 7. 3 Mos. Choi*, iii. 40; Faustus, v. 34. 4 Clinton places his death in a.d. 379 (F. R. vol. i. p. 356) ; but Patkanian (Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 234) and Thomas (Num. Chron. for 1872, p. 45) prefer the date a.d. 380. 252 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XI. monarch, he neither left behind him any inscriptions, nor any sculpturedmemorials. The only material evidences that we possess of his reign are his coins, which are exceedingly numerous. According to Mordtmann, 1 they may be divided into three classes, corresponding to three periods in his life. The earliest have on the reverse the fire-altar, with two priests, or guards, looking towards the altar, and with the flame rising from the altar in the usual way. The head on the obverse is archaic in type, and very much resembles that of Sapor I. The crown has attached to it, in many cases, that c cheek-piece ' which is otherwise confined to the first three monarchs of the line. These coins are the best from an artistic point of view ; they greatly re- semble those of the first Sapor, but are distinguishable from them, first, by the guards looking towards the altar instead of away from it ; and, secondly, by a greater profusion of pearls about the king's person. The coins of the second period lack the L cheek-piece,' and have on the reverse the fire-altar without supporters ; they are inferior as works of art to those of the first period, but much superior to those of the third. These last, which exhibit a marked degeneracy, 2 are especially dis- tinguished by having a human head in the middle of the flames that rise from the altar. Otherwise they much resemble in their emblems the early coins, only differ- ing from them in being artistically inferior. The ordi- nary legends upon the coins are in no respect remark- able ; 3 but occasionally we find the monarch taking 1 Zeitschrift d. deutsckes more/ en- land. Gesellschafti vol. viii. pp. 46-7. 2 M. Longperier agrees with Mordtmann on this point. (See his Medailles des Sassanides, p. 42.) 3 They are commonly either * Mazdisn bag Shapuhri malkan malkaS or ' Mazdisn hag Shapuhri malkan malka Airan ve Aniran.' Ch. XL I COINS OF SAPOR IL 253 the new and expressive epithet of Toham, 1 the Strong. 71 COINS OF SAPOR II. 1 Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p. 47. Toham is the Sassanian equivalent of the Zend takhma, * strong/ which is found also in Achaemenian Persian. 254 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. XIL CHAPTER XIL Short Reigns of Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. Obscurity of their His- tory. Their Relations with Armenia. Monument of Sapor III. at Taklit-i-Bostan. Coins of Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. Reign of Varahran IV. His Signets. His dealings with Armenia. His Death. 'ApTa&p h?] 6' ■ 2a/?wp, vibg 'ApTa^p, irrj i • Ovapapavrjg hi] id. Syncellus, Chronographia, p. 360, C. The glorious reign of Sapor II., which carried the New Persian Empire to the highest point whereto it had yet attained, is followed by a time which offers to that remarkable reign a most complete contrast. Sapor had occupied the Persian throne for a space ap- proaching nearly to three-quarters of a century ; the reigns of his next three successors amounted to no more than twenty years in the aggregate. 1 Sapor had been engaged in perpetual wars, had spread the terror of the Persian arms on all sides, and ruled more glori- ously than any of his predecessors. The kings who followed him were pacific and unenterprising ; they were almost unknown to their neighbours, 2 and are anions: the least distin crushed of the Sassanian monarchs. More especially does this character attach to the two 1 See the passage of Syncellns at the head of the chapter. Aga- thias agrees (iv. 26), as do Tabari {Chronique, vol. ii. pp. 102-3), Macoudi (Prairies J)' Or, vol. ii. pp. 189-190) and the Motljmel-al- Tewarikh. (See the Journal Asia- tique for 1841, p. 513.) 2 Faustus does not mention any Persian king by name after Sapor II. The Roman writers do not seem even to know the name of the prince who sent the embassy of a.d. 384. (See Oros. vii. 34; Pacat. Paneq. xxii. § 4; Socrat. //. E. v. 12; &c) Ch. XII. ] REIGN OF ARTAXERXES II. 255 immediate successors of Sapor II. , viz. Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. They reigned respectively four and five years ; 1 and their annals during this period are almost a blank. Artaxerxes II., who is called by some the brother of Sapor II., was more probably his son. 2 He succeeded his father in a.d. 379, and died at Ctesiphon 3 in a.d. 383. He left a character for kindness and amiability behind him, and is known to the Persians as Nikoukarf or 1 the Beneficent,' and to the Arabs as Al Djemil? 'the Virtuous.' According to the l Modj- mel-al-Tewarikh,' he took no taxes from his subjects during the four years of his reign, and thereby secured to himself their affection and gratitude. He seems to have received overtures from the Armenians soon after his accession, 6 and for a time to have been acknowledged by the turbulent mountaineers as their sovereign. After the murder of Bab, or Para, the Romans had set up, as king over Armenia, a certain Varaztad (Pharasdates), a member of the Arsacid family, but no near relation of 1 All the authorities assign four years to Artaxerxes II., except the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, which gives * four or live, or twelve ' {Journ. Asiat. for 1S41, p. 513). Some of the Armenian writers give Sapor III. no more than two years (Pat- kanian in the Journ. Asiat. for I860, p. 157). 2 Artaxerxes is made to be Sapor's brother by Agathias (iv. 26), Mir- khond (Hist, des Sassanidcs, p. 318), Tabari (Chronique, ii. p. 102), Ma- coudi {Prairies cTOr, ii. p. 189), and the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh (p. 513). The Armenian writers alone make him Sapor s son. (See Mos. Chor. iii. 51, and compare Patkanian in Journ. As. for 1866, p. 155.) The history of the mode in which Sapor II. became king (supra, p. 143), and the great length of his reign, make it very improbable that he was succeeded by a brother. Add to this that the coins of Artaxerxes II. bear the head of a youngish man. 3 Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, l.s.c. 4 Ibid. 5 Mirkhond, Hist, des Sassanides, p. 317, note. Malcolm has, by mis- take, transferred these qualities to his successor (Hist, of Persia, vol. i. p. 112). b The Armenian synchronisms are exceedingly doubtful; but, on the whole, it seems to me that the expulsion of Varaztad by Manuel must have happened about five years after the death of Para. If that event occurred, as Ammianus (xxx. 1) places it, in a.d. 374, the revolution effected by Manuel (Faustus, v. 37) must belong to the year a.d. 379, which is the year of Artaxerxes' accession, probably. 256 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Cii. XII. the recent monarchs, assigning at the same time the real direction of affairs to an Armenian noble named Moushegh, who belonged to the illustrious family of the Mamigonians. 1 Moushegh ruled Armenia with vigour, but was suspected of maintaining over-friendly relations with the Roman emperor, Valens, and of designing to undermine and supplant his master. Varaztad, after a while, having been worked on by his counsellors, grew suspicious of him, and caused him to be executed at a banquet. 2 This treachery roused the indignation of Moushegh's brother Manuel, who raised a rebellion against Varaztad, defeated him in open fight, and drove him from his kingdom. 3 Manuel then brought forward the princess Zermanducht, widow of the late king Para, together with her two young sons, Arsaces and Valar- saces, and, surrounding all three with royal pomp, gave to the two princes the name of king, while he took care to retain in his own hands the real government of the country. Under these circumstances he naturally dreaded the hostility of the Roman emperor, who was not likely to see with patience a monarch, whom he had set upon the throne, deprived of his kingdom by a subject. To maintain the position which he had assumed, it was necessary that he should contract some important alliance ; and the alliance always open to Armenia when she had quarrelled with Rome was with the Persians. It seems to have been soon after Artaxerxes II. succeeded his father, that Manuel sent an embassy to him, with letters and rich gifts, offering, in return for his protection, to acknowledge him as lord-paramount of Armenia, and promising him un- 1 Faustus, v. 34. 2 Ibid. c. 35. 3 Ibid. c. 37. Ch. XII. I FRESH TROUBLES IN ARMENIA. 257 shakable fidelity. 1 The offer was, of course, received with extreme satisfaction ; and terms were speedily arranged. Armenia was to pay a fixed tribute, to re- ceive a garrison of ten thousand Persians and to pro- vide adequately for their support, to allow a Persian satrap to divide with Manuel the actual government of the country, and to furnish him with all that was necessary for his court and table. On the other hand, Arsaces and Valarsaces, together (apparently) with their mother, Zermanducht, were to be allowed the royal title and honours ; Armenia was to be protected in case of invasion ; and Manuel was to be maintained in his office of Sparapet or generalissimo of the Armenian forces. 2 We cannot say with certainty how long this arrangement remained undisturbed ; most probably, however, it did not continue in force more than a few years. 3 It was most likely while Artaxerxes still ruled Persia, that the rupture described by Faustus occurred. 4 A certain Meroujan, an Armenian noble, jealous of the power and prosperity of Manuel, per- suaded him that the Persian commandant in Armenia was about to seize his person, and either to send him a prisoner to Artaxerxes, or else to put him to death. Manuel, who was so credulous as to believe the infor- mation, thought it necessary for his own safety to an- ticipate the designs of his enemies, and, falling upon the ten thousand Persians with the whole of the Armenian 1 Faustus, c. 38. 2 Ibid, l.s.c. 8 The death of Para (a.d. 374) and the conclusion of the treaty with Rome (a.d. 384) are two fixed dates known positively from the Roman writers. Into the ten years between these events must fall the entire reign of Varaztad (four years according to Moses of Chorene, iii. 40), the revolt of Manuel, the joint reign of Arsaces and Valarsacesfone year, Mos. Chor. iii. 41), and the sole reign of Arsaces from his brother's death to the partition of Armenia (five years, Mos. Chor. iii. 46). 4 I.e. between a.d. 379 and a.d. 383. 258 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XII. army, succeeded in putting them all to the sword, except their commander, whom he allowed to escape. 1 War followed between Persia and Armenia with varied suc- cess, but on the whole Manuel had the advantage ; he repulsed several Persian invasions, and maintained the independence and integrity of Armenia till his death, without calling in the aid of Rome. 2 When, however, Manuel died, about a.d. 383, Armenian affairs fell into confusion; the Romans were summoned to give help to one party, the Persians to render assistance to the other ; 3 Armenia became once more the battle-ground between the two great powers, and it seemed as if the old contest, fraught with so many calamities, was to be at once renewed. But the circumstances of the time were such that neither Rome nor Persia now desired to reopen the contest. Persia was in the hands of weak and unwarlike sovereigns, and was perhaps already threatened by Scythic hordes upon the east. 4 Rome was in the agonies of a struggle with the ever-increas- ing power of the Goths ; and though, in the course of the years a.d. 379-382, the Great Theodosius had estab- lished peace in the tract under his rule, and delivered the central provinces of Macedonia and Thrace from the intolerable ravages of the barbaric invaders, 5 yet the deliverance had been effected at the cost of introducing large bodies of Goths into the heart of the empire, 6 while still along the northern frontier lay a threatening cloud, from which devastation and ruin might at any 1 Faustus, v. 38. 2 Ibid. v. 39-43. 3 Ibid. vi. 1. Compare Mos. Chor. iii. 42. 4 Faustus, v. 37. The * Kou- shans ' of this passage are probably Scyths or Tatars of the Oxianian or Transoxianian country. (See M. Vivien St. Martin's essay, en- titled Les Huns Blancs ou Eph- thalites, pp. 48-52.) 5 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. iii. pp. 346-350. 6 Ibid. pp. 352-5. Ch. XII.] ARMENIA DIVIDED BY ROME AND PERSIA. 259 time burst forth and overspread the provinces upon the Lower Danube. Thus both the Roman emperor and the Persian king were well disposed towards peace. An arrangement was consequently made, and in a.d. 384, five years after he had ascended the throne, Theo- dosius gave audience in Constantinople 1 to envoys from the court of Persepolis, and concluded with them a treaty whereby matters in Armenia were placed on a footing which fairly satisfied both sides, and the tran- quillity of the East was assured. 2 The high contracting powers agreed that Armenia should be partitioned be- tween them. After detaching from the kingdom various outlying districts, which could be conveniently absorbed into their own territories, they divided the rest of the country into two unequal portions. The smaller of these, which comprised the more western districts, was placed under the protection of Rome, and was com- mitted by Theodosius to the Arsaces who had been made king by Manuel, the son of the unfortunate Bab, or Para, and the grandson of the Arsaces contemporary with Julian. The larger portion, which consisted of the regions lying towards the east, passed under the suzerainty of Persia, and was confided by Sapor III, who had succeeded Artaxerxes II. , to an Arsacid, named Chosroes, a Christian, who was given the title of king, and received in marriage at the same time one of Sapor's sisters. Such were the terms on which Rome and Persia brought their contention respecting Armenia 1 See the Chronicles of Matins and Marcellinus, and compare Chron. Pasch. p. 304, D; Socrat. IL E. v. 12: Oros. vii. 34; and Pacat. Paneg. xxii. 3-5. 2 The terms of the treaty are given with unusual accord by Moses (in. 42) and Faustus (vi. 1). The latter writer is somewhat the fuller and more exact of the two. Pro- copius {Be ^Ed Justinian, iii. 1) has quite a different account of the matter; but, as he writes a century and a half after Faustus, we can- not accept his narrative against that of the earlier writer. 2G0 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XII. to a conclusion. Friendly relations were in this way established between the two crowns, which continued undisturbed for the long space of thirty-six years (a.d. 384-420). 1 Sapor III. appears to have succeeded his brother Artaxerxes in a.d. 383, the year before the conclusion of the treaty. It is uncertain whether Artaxerxes vacated the throne by death, or was deposed in conse- quence of cruelties whereof he was guilty towards the priests and nobles. Tabari and Magoudi, who relate his deposition, 2 are authors on whom much reliance cannot be placed ; and the cruelties reported accord but ill with the epithets of ' the Beneficent ' and 4 the Virtuous,' assigned to this monarch by others. 3 Per- haps it is most probable that he held the throne till his death, according to the statements of Agathias and Eutychius. 4 Of Sapor III., his brother and successor, two facts only are recorded — his conclusion of the treaty with the Romans in B.C. 384, and his war with the Arabs of the tribe of Yad, 5 which must have followed shortly afterwards. It must have been in consequence of his contest with the latter, whom he attacked in their own country, that he received from his countrymen the appellation of 'the Warlike,' 6 an appellation better deserved by either of the other monarchs who had borne the same name. Sapor III. left behind him a sculptured memorial, 1 Orosius, writing in a.d. 417, says : * Ictum tunc foedus est, quo universns Oriens usque ad nunc tranquillissime fruitur.' (l.s.c.) The peace lasted only three years longer. (See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 590. ) 3 See above, p. 255. 4 Agath. iv. 26, ad init.; Eutych. vol. i. p. 399: ' Regnavit post ip- sum in Persas Alius ipsius Ardshir Saporis filius annos quatuor ; dein mortmis est.' 5 Macoudi, vol. ii. p. 189. 2 Tabari, Chronique, ii. p. 102 ; | 6 Mirkhond, Histoire des Sas- Macoudi, Prairies d'Or, ii. p. 189. I sanities, p. 319. Ch. XII. ] INSCRIPTIONS OF SAPOR III. 261 which is still to be seen in the vicinity of Kermanshah. It consists of two very similar figures, looking towards each other, and standing in an arched frame. On either side of the figures are inscriptions in the Old Pehlevi character, whereby we are enabled to identify the individuals represented with the second and the third Sapor. 1 The inscriptions run thus : — 1 Pathkeli zan% mazdisn shahia Shahpnhri, malkan malka A llan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan, bari mazdisn shahia Auhrmazdi, malkan malka Allan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan, napi shahia Narshehi malkan malka ; 1 2 and 4 Pathkeli mazdisn shahia Shahpuhri, malkan malka Ailan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan, ban mazdisn shahia Shahpuhri, malkan malka Allan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan, napi shahia Auhrmazdi, mal- kan malka. 1 They are, it will be seen, identical in form, with the exception that the names in the right- hand inscription are L Sapor, Hormisdas, N arses,' while those in the left-hand one are ' Sapor, Sapor, Hor- misdas.' It has been supposed 3 that the right-hand figure was erected by Sapor II., and the other after- wards added by Sapor III. ; but the unity of the whole 1 De Sacy read Varahran for Shahpuhri in the third line of the right-hand inscription, and con- cluded that the right-hand figure was that of Varahran IV. (Memoir e, p. 263). Many writers have copied this mistake. (Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, vol. i. p. 258; Clinton, F. li. vol. ii. p. 260, note 12 ; Patkanian in the Journal Asiatique for 1S66, p. 159, note K) 2 See Thomas in the Journal of the li. Asiatic Society, New Series, vol. iii. p. 343. The meaning is — * This is the image of the Ormazd- worshipping kingly Sapor, king of the kings of Iran and Turan, heaven-descended of the race of the gods, son of the Ormazd-worship- ping kingly Hormisdas, king of the kings of Iran and Turan, heaven- descended of the race of the gods, grandson of the kingly Narses, king of kings.' The other inscription is identical except in the names, and the omission of the second word. zani, 4 this.' 3 So Thomas in the number of the Journal of the E. Asiatic Society, quoted above (p. 346). Ker Porter ascribed the erection of the monu- ment to Varahran IV. (Travels. vol. ii. p. 190). But the only basis of this is the local tradition, a very insecure foundation. 262 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XII. sculpture, and its inclusion under a single arch, seem to indicate that it was set up by a single sovereign, and was the fruit of a single conception. If this be so, we must necessarily ascribe it to the later of the two mon- archs commemorated, i.e. to Sapor III., who must be supposed to have possessed more than usual filial piety, since the commemoration of their predecessors upon the throne is very rare among the Sassanians. The taste of the monument is questionable. An elaborate finish of all the details of the costume com- pensates but ill for a clumsiness of contour and a want of contrast and variety, which indicate a low condition of art, and compare unfavourably with the earlier per- formances of the Neo-Persian sculptors. It may be doubted whether, among all the reliefs of the Sassa- nians, there is one which is so entirely devoid of artistic merit as this coarse and dull production. The coins of Sapor III. and his predecessor, Arta- xerxes II., have little about them that is remarkable. Those of Artaxerxes bear a head which is surmounted with the usual inflated ball, and has the diadem, but is without a crown — a deficiency in which some see an indication that the prince thus represented was regent rather than monarch of Persia. 1 The legends upon the coins are, however, in the usual style of royal epigraphs, running com- monly 2 — L Mazdisn bag Artahshetri malkan malka Airan ve AniranJ or ' the Ormazd-worshipping divine Artaxerxes, king of the kings of Iran - :siI and Turan.' They are easily dis- tinguishable from those of Arta- COIN OF AKTAXEKXE 1 Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p. 51. 2 Ibid. pp. 51-2. Ch. XII. 1 COINS OF ARTAXERXES II. AND SAPOR III. 263 xerxes I., both by the profile, which is far less marked, and by the fire-altar on the reverse, which has always two supporters, looking towards the altar. The coins of Sapor III. present some unusual types. On some of them the king has his hair bound with a simple dia- dem, without crown or cap of any kind. 1 On others he wears a cap of a very peculiar character, which has been compared to a biretta, 2 but is really altogether sui generis. The cap is surmounted by the ordinary inflated ball, is orna- mented with jewels, and is bound round at bottom with the usual dia- dem. 3 The legend upon the obverse of Sapor's coins is of the customary character ; but the reverse bears usually, besides the name of the king, the word atm\ which has been sup- posed to stand for Aturia or Assyria ; 4 this explana- tion, however, is very doubtful. 5 The coins of both kings exhibit marks of decline, especially on the reverse, where the drawing of the figures that support the altar is very inferior to that which we observe on the coins of the kings fropi Sapor I. to Sapor II. The characters on both obverse and reverse are also carelessly rendered, and can only with much difficulty be deciphered. COINS OF SAPOR III. 1 Longperier, Medailles ties Sas- sanides, pi. 7, fig. 4. 2 Mordtmann, ZeitscJirift, vol. viii. p. 52. a Longperier, pi. 7, fig. 5; Mordt- mann, pp. 52-7. 4 Mordtmann, p. 53. The old Persian name for Assyria was Athura, whence probably the Aturia {'Arovpta) of the Greeks (Strab. xvi. 1, § 2 ; Steph. Byz. ad voc. N/7'oc,- &q. ). 5 The term atur, or aturi, is found occasionally in combination with decided mint-marks, denoting places, as Baba, 'The Porte,' i.e. Ctesiphon (Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift Nos. 108 and 134) ; Kir, for Kirman (ibid. No. 114) ; and As, which is probably for Aspadan or Ispahan (Nos. 101, 110, and 144). And these places are not in Assyria. 264 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. xir. Sapor III. died a.d. 388, after reigning a little more than five years. 1 He was a man of simple tastes, 2 and is said to have been fond of exchanging the magnifi- cence and dreary etiquette of the court for the free- dom and ease of a life under tents. On an occasion when he was thus enjoying himself, it happened that one of those violent hurricanes, to which Persia is sub- ject, arose, and, falling in full force on the royal en- campment, blew down the tent wherein he was sitting. It happened unfortunately that the main tent-pole struck him, as it fell, in a vital part, and Sapor died from the blow. 3 Such at least was the account given by those who had accompanied him, and generally believed by his subjects. There were not, however, wanting per- sons to whisper that the story was untrue — that the real cause of the catastrophe which had overtaken the unhappy monarch was a conspiracy of his nobles, or his guards, who had overthrown his tent purposely, and murdered him ere he could escape from them. The successor of Sapor III. was Varahran IV., whom some authorities call his brother and others his son. 4 This prince is known to the oriental writers as ' Varah- ran Kerman-shah,' or 4 Varahran, king of Carmania. 1 Agathias tells us 5 that during the lifetime of his father he was established as governor over Kerman 1 Five years, according to Aga- thias (iv. 26) and Mirldiond (p. 319); four years and Jive months, according to Eutycliius (vol. i. p. 472), Tabari (vol. ii. p. 102), and Macoudi (vol. ii. p. 189). 2 Mirkhond (p. 820): ' Schapour etait un roi d'une simplicite ex- treme.' 3 So Macoudi (l.s.c. ). Tabari assigns his death to a revolt of his troops; Mirkhond to accident, or to a conspiracy among his chief officers (p. 319). 4 Varahran is made the son of Sapor III. by Agathias (l.s.c), the son of Sapor II. and brother of Sapor III. by Tabari and Mirkhond. Eutycliius and Macoudi leave the point doubtful. Patkanian {Journal Asiatiqae for I860, p. 158), follow- ing Armenian authorities, mentions both views, but inclines to believe him Sapor III.'s brother. 5 Agathias, iv. 26; p. 136, C. Ch. XII. ] SEALS OF VARAHRAN IV. 265 or Carmania, and thus obtained the appellation which pertinaciously adhered to him. A curious relic of antiquity, fortunately preserved to modern times amid so much that has been lost, confirms this statement. It is the seal of Varahran before he ascended the Persian throne, and contains, besides his portrait. portrait of varahran iv. (from a seal). beautifully cut, an inscription, which is read as fol- lows : 1 — ' Varahran Kermaii malka, bari mazdisn bag Shahpiihri malkan malka Air an ve Aniran, minuchitri mm yazdanj or L Varahran, king of Kerman, son of the Ormazd-worshipping divine Sapor, king of the kings of Iran and Turan, heaven-descended of the race of the gods. 7 Another seal, belonging to him probably after he had become monarch of Per- contains his full-length sia por LATER SEAL OF VARAHRAN IV. Compare Tabari, vol. ii. p. 103; Mirkhond, p. 320; and the Modj- mel-al-Tewarikh (Journ. As. 1841, p. 513). Varahran, we are told, gave his name of Kerman-shah to a town which he built in Media, and which still bears the appellation (Malcolm, Hist of Persia, vol. i. p. 113; Ker Porter, Travels, vol. ii. p. 190). 1 Thomas in Journal of B. As. Society, New Series, vol. hi. p. 350. 266 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XII. trait, 1 and exhibits him as trampling under foot a pros- trate figure, supposed to represent a Roman, 2 by which it would appear that he claimed to have gained vic- tories or advantages over Rome. It is not altogether easy to understand how this could have been. Not only do the Roman writers mention no war between the Romans and Persians at this time, but they ex- pressly declare that the East remained in profound re- pose during the entire reign of Varahran, and that Rome and Persia continued to be friends. 3 The diffi- culty may, however, be perhaps explained by a con- sideration of the condition of affairs in Armenia at this time ; for in Armenia Rome and Persia had still con- flicting interests, and, without having recourse to arms, triumphs might be obtained in this quarter by the one over the other. On the division of Armenia between Arsaces and Chosroes, a really good understanding had been estab- lished, which had lasted for about six years. Arsaces had died two years after he became a Roman feuda- tory ; 4 and, at his death, Rome had absorbed his terri- tories into her empire, and placed the new province under the government of a count. 5 No objection to the arrangement had been made by Persia, and the 1 This seal is without inscription, but is identified by the headdress, which is the same as that upon Varahran' s coins. COIN OF VARAHRAN IV. 2 Thomas in R. As. Soc. J. p. 352. 3 Oros. vii. 34. Compare Mos. Choren. Hist. Arm. iii. 51: 'Pax fuit inter Veramum (qui Cermanus appellatus est) et Arcadium.' 4 Mos. Chor. iii. 46. 5 Ibid. ; and compare Procop. I)e A, D), and others. See Clinton, F. E. vol. i. p. 546. 2 Socrat. H. E. vii. 18; Theo- doret, H. E. v. 39. 3 Socrates speaks of rtfiDptac ml OTpcSTiag Hepo Ltcac 6 ca (popovs. Theodore t is painfully diffuse on the subject. 4 Socrat. H. E. l.s.c. Ch. XIV. J WAK KENEWED WITH ROME. 285 mines, and had hired experienced persons from the Romans, whose services they found so valuable that when the period of the hiring was expired, they would not suffer the miners to quit Persia and return to their homes. They are also said to have ill-used the Roman merchants who traded in the Persian territories, and to have actually robbed them of their merchandise. 1 These causes of complaint were not, however, it would seem, brought forward by the Romans, who contented themselves with simply refusing the demand for the extradition of the Christian fugitives, and re- frained from making any counter-claims. But their moderation was not appreciated; and the Persian monarch, on learning that Rome would not restore the refugees, declared the peace to be at an end, and im- mediately made preparations for war. The Romans had, however, anticipated his decision, and took the field in force before the Persians were ready. The command was entrusted to a general bearing the strange name of Ardaburius, 2 who marched his troops through Armenia into the fertile province of Arzanene, 3 and there defeated Narses, 4 the leader whom Varahran had sent against him. Proceeding to plunder Arzanene, Ardaburius suddenly heard that his adversary was about to enter the Roman province of Mesopotamia, which was denuded of troops, and seemed to invite 1 Socrat. H. E. l.s.c. 2 This is the first that is heard of Ardaburius. He was of Alanian descent, and was afterwards em- ployed to put down the pretender, Johannes (Socr. vii. 24 ; Olym- piodor. ap. Phot. Blbliothec. p. 197; Philostorg. H. E. xii. 13), whom he made prisoner (a.d. 425). In a.d. 427 he was consul. 3 The form used by Socrates is Azazene; but Theophanes has 4 Ar- zane ' (p. 74, A), whence we may conclude that the district intended was that called Arzanene by Am- mianus (xxv. 7), which has been already identified with the modern Kherzan. (See above, p. 129.) 4 The name is given as Arses (Arsseus) by Theophanes (l.s.c), but as Parses (Narsyeus) by Soc- rates. Tabari says that Narses was a brother of Varahran ( Chro- niqite, vol. ii. pp. 119 and 125). 286 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XIV. attack. Hastily concluding his raid, he passed from Arzanene into the threatened district, and was in time to prevent the invasion intended by Narses, who, when he found his designs forestalled, threw himself into the fortress of Nisibis, and there stood on the defensive. Ardaburius did not feel himself strong enough to invest the town ; and for some time the two adversaries re- mained inactive, each watching the other. It was during this interval that (if we may credit Socrates) the Persian general sent a challenge to the Roman, inviting him to fix time and place for a trial of strength between the two armies. Ardaburius prudently de- clined the overture, remarking that the Romans were not accustomed to fight battles when their enemies wished, but when it suited themselves. Soon afterwards he found himself able to illustrate his meaning by his actions. Having carefully abstained from attacking Nisibis while his strength seemed to him insufficient, he suddenly, upon receiving large reinforcements from Theodosius, changed his tactics, and, invading Per- sian Mesopotamia, marched upon the stronghold held by Narses, and formally commenced its siege. Hitherto Varahran, confident in his troops or his good fortun e, had left the entire conduct of the military operations to his general ; but the danger of Nisibis — that dearly won and highly prized possession 1 — seri- ously alarmed him, and made him resolve to take the field in person with all his forces. Enlisting on his side the services of his friends the Arabs, under their great sheikh, Al-Amundarus (Moundsir), 2 and collecting to- 1 See above, pp. 235-238. 2 Moundsir was at the head of the Mesopotainian or Saracenic Arabs at this time, according to the Oriental writers (Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 110-116; Mirkhond, p. 328, who gives the name as Mondar, a form easily traceable in Al-Amun- darus). Ch. XIV.] SIEGES OF NISIBIS AND THEODOSIOPOLIS. 287 gether a strong body of elephants, 1 he advanced to the relief of the beleaguered town. Ardaburius drew off on his approach, burned his siege artillery, and retired from before the place. Nisibis was preserved ; but soon afterwards a disaster is said to have befallen the Arabs, who, believing themselves about to be attacked by the Roman force, were seized with a sudden panic, and, rushing in headlong flight to the Euphrates (!), threw themselves into its waters, encumbered with their clothes and arms, and there perished to the number of a hundred thousand. 2 The remaining circumstances of the war are not re- lated by our authorities in chronological sequence. But as it is certain that the war lasted only two years, 3 and as the events above narrated certainly belong to the earlier portion of it, and seem sufficient for one campaign, we may perhaps be justified in assigning to the second year, a.d. 421, the other details recorded — viz., the siege of Theodosiopolis, the combat between Areobindus and Ardazanes, the second victory of Arda- burius, and the destruction of the remnant of the Arabs by Vitianus. Theodosiopolis was a city built by the reigning emperor, Theodosius II., in the Roman portion of Armenia, near the sources of the Euphrates. 4 It was defended by strong walls, lofty towers, and a deep ditch. 5 Hidden channels conducted an unfailing sup- 1 Socrat. H. E. vii. 18, sub fin. 2 This tale is related both by Socrates (l.s.c.) and by Theophanes (p. 74, B). It must have had some foundation; but no doubt the loss is greatly exaggerated. 3 See the Chronicle of Marcelli- nus, p. 19; and compare Theophanes (pp. 74-5), who, however, makes the war last three years, and Socrat. H. E. vii. 18-20. 4 Mos. Chor. iii. 59. 5 The authority of Moses as to the strength of Theodosiopolis {Hist Ann. l.s.c.) is preferable to that of Procopius, who wrote a cen- tury later. Procopius makes the place one of small account in the time of Theodosius (Be ^Eld, Jus- tinian, iii. 5). 288 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XIV. ply of water into the heart of the place, and the public granaries were large and generally well stocked with provisions. 1 This town, recently built for the defence of the Roman Armenia, was (it would seem) attacked in a.d. 421 by Varahran in person. 2 He besieged it for above thirty days, and employed against it all the means of capture w T hich were known to the military art of the period. But the defence w^as ably conducted by the bishop of the city, a certain Eunomius, who was resolved that, if he could prevent it, an infidel and per- secuting monarch should never lord it over his see. Eunomius not merely animated the defenders, but took part personally in the defence, and even on one occa- sion discharged a stone from a balista with his own hand, and killed a prince who had not confined himself to his military duties, but had insulted the faith of the besieged. The death of this officer is said to have induced Varahran to retire, and not further molest Theodosiopolis. 3 While the fortified towns on either side thus main- tained themselves against the attacks made on them, Theodosius, we are told, 4 gave an independent command to the patrician, Procopius, and sent him at the head of a body of troops to oppose Varahran. The armies met, and were on the point of engaging when the Persian monarch made a proposition to decide the war, not by a general battle, but by a single combat. Pro- copius assented ; and a warrior was selected on either side, the Persians choosing for their champion a certain Ardazanes, and the Romans 4 Areobindus the Goth,' count of the ' Foederati.' In the conflict which followed the Persian charged his adversary with his spear, but 1 Mos. Chor. iii. 59. ' 2 Theodoret, TL E. v. 37. I 3 Ibid. I 4 Joliann. Malal. xiv. p. 25, A. Ch. XIV. J VARAHRAN MAKES PEACE WITH ROME. 289 the nimble Goth avoided the thrust by leaning to one side, after which he entangled Ardazanes in a net, and then despatched him with his sword. 1 The result was accepted by Varahran as decisive of the war, and he desisted from any further hostilities. Areobindus 2 re- ceived the thanks of the emperor for his victory, and twelve years later was rewarded with the consulship. But meanwhile, in other portions of the wide field over which the war was raging, Rome had obtained additional successes. Ardaburius, who probably still commanded in Mesopotamia, had drawn the Persian force opposed to him into an ambuscade, and had de- stroyed it, together with its seven generals. 3 Vitianus, an officer of whom nothing more is known, had extermi- nated the remnant of the Arabs not drowned in the Euphrates. 4 The war had gone everywhere against the Persians ; and it is not improbable that Varahran, before the close of a.d. 421, proposed terms of peace. 5 Peace, however, was not actually made till the next year. Early in a.d. 422, a Roman envoy, by name Maximus, appeared in the camp of Varahran, 6 and, when taken into the presence of the great king, stated that he was empowed by the Roman generals to enter into negotiations, but had had no communication with the Roman emperor, who dwelt so far off that he had not heard of the war, and was so powerful that, if he knew of it, he would regard it as a matter of small ac- count. It is not likely that Varahran was much im- 1 These details are given by Johan. Malal. only; but the com- bat is mentioned also by Socrates (H. E. vii. 18, ad fin.). 2 Socrat. l.s.c. ; Marcellin. Chro- nicon, p. 23. 3 Socrat. l.s.c. 4 Ibid. 5 John of Malala makes Varah- ran propose peace immediately after the single combat. Theodoret makes peace follow from the re- pulse suffered at Theodosiopolis. 6 Socrat. vii. 20. 290 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. XIV. pressed by these falsehoods ; but he was tired of the war ; he had found that Rome could hold her own, and that he was not likely to gain anything by prolonging it; and he was in difficulties as to provisions, 1 whereof his supply had run short. He was therefore well in- clined to entertain Maximus's proposals favourably. The corps of the 4 Immortals,' however, which was in his camp, took a different view, and entreated to be allowed an opportunity of attacking the Romans un- awares, while they believed negotiations to be going on, considering that under such circumstances they would be certain of victory. Varahran, according to the Ro- man writer who is here our sole authority, 2 consented. The Immortals made their attack, and the Romans were at first in some danger; but the unexpected arrival of a reinforcement saved them, and the Immor- tals were defeated and cut off to a man. After this, Varahran made peace with Rome through the instru- mentality of Maximus, 3 consenting, it would seem, not merely that Rome should harbour the Persian Chris- tians, if she pleased, but also that all persecution of Christians should henceforth cease throughout his own empire. 4 The formal conclusion of peace was accompanied, and perhaps helped forward,by the well-judging charity of an admirable prelate. Acacius, bishop of Amida, pitying the condition of the Persian prisoners whom the Romans had captured during their raid into Arzanene, 1 Socrat. vii. 20. 2 Socrates. The destruction of the i Immortals ' is mentioned also by Theophanes (p. 74, B), but vaguely and without any details. 3 The actual negotiator was, ac- cording to Socrates, Maximus only. Others mention, as concerned in the negotiations, Helion, Anatolius, and Procopius. (See Theophan. p. 75, B; Cedren. p. 341, D; Sidon. Apollin. Paneg. Anthem. 1. 75.) 4 Theophan. l.s.c. ; Socrat. H. E. vii. 21. Ch. XIV.] CONDUCT OF BISHOP ACACIUS, 291 and were dragging off into slavery, interposed to save them ; and, employing for the purpose all the gold and silver plate that he could find in the churches of his diocese, ransomed as many as seven thousand captives, supplied their immediate wants with the utmost ten- derness, and sent them to Varahran, 1 who can scarcely have failed to be impressed by an act so unusual in ancient times. Our sceptical historian remarks, with more apparent sincerity than usual, that this act was calculated 4 to inform the Persian king of the true spirit of the religion which he persecuted,' and that the name of the doer might well 'have dignified the saintly calendar.' 2 These remarks are just ; and it is certainly to be regretted that, among the many unknown or doubtful names of canonised Christians to which the Church has given her sanction, there is no mention made of Acacius of Amida. Varahran was perhaps the more disposed to conclude his war with Rome from the troubled condition of his own portion of Armenia, which imperatively required his attention. Since the withdrawal from that region of his brother Sapor 3 in a. d. 418 or 419, the country had had no king. It had fallen into a state of complete anarchy and wretchedness ; no taxes were collected; the roads were not safe ; the strong robbed and oppressed the weak at their pleasure. 4 Isaac, the Armenian patriarch, and the other bishops, had quitted their sees and taken refuge in Roman Armenia, 5 where they were 1 Socrat. l.s.c. 2 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. iv. p. 167. 3 See above, p. 277. 4 Mos. Chor. iii. 56: ' Fiebat ut regio nostra, propter tumultuosa atque turbulentissima tempora, per tres annos ab rectore vacua fuerit, et mi sere spoliata, adeo ut vecti- galia regia defieerent, et plebis itinera intercluderentur, omnisque omnium re rum ordo perturbaretur.' (Whiston's translation.) 5 Ibid. iii. 57. 292 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XIV received favourably by the prefect of the East, Anato- lius, who no doubt hoped by their aid to win over to his master the Persian division of the country. Varah- ran's attack on Theodosiopolis had been a counter movement, and had been designed to make the Romans tremble for their own possessions, and throw them back on the defensive. But the attack had failed; and on its failure the completeloss of Armeniaprobablyseemed imminent. Varahran therefore hastened to make peace with Rome, and, having so done, proceeded to give his attention to Armenia, with the view of placing matters there on a satisfactory footing. Convinced that he could not retain Armenia unless with the good-will of the nobles, 1 and believing them to be deeply attached to the royal stock of the Arsacids, he brought forward a prince of that noble house, named Artases, a son of Varahran-Sapor,and, investing him with the ensigns of royalty, made him take the illustrious name of Arta- xerxes, and delivered into his hands the entire govern- ment of the country. These proceedings are assigned to the year a.d. 42 2, 2 the year of the peace with Rome, and must have followed very shortly after the signa- ture of the treaty. It might have been expected that this arrangement would have satisfied the nobles of Armenia, and have given that unhappy country a prolonged period of re- pose. But the personal character of Artaxerxes was, unfortunately, bad; the Armenian nobles were, perhaps, capricious ; and after a trial of six years it was resolved that the rule of the Arsacid monarch could not be en- 1 Mos. Chor. iii. 58: ' Rex Per- sarum Veramus, sine satrapis Ar- meniis regionem earn se tenere non posse intelligens, de pace egerat.' 2 See St. Martin, Memoir es sur V Armenie, vol. i. p. 410; Notes to Le Beau's B as-Empire, vol. vi. p. 32. Gh. XIV. 1 ABSORPTION OF PEKS ARMENIA INTO PERSIA. 293 dured, and that Varahran should be requested to make Armenia a province of his empire, and to place it under the government of a Persian satrap. 1 The movement was resisted with all his force by Isaac, the patriarch, who admitted the profligacy of Artaxerxesand deplored it, but held that the rule of a Christian, however lax he might be, was to be preferred to that of a heathen, how- ever virtuous. 2 The nobles, however, were determined; and the opposition of Isaac had no other result than to involve him in the fall of his sovereign. Appeal was made to the Persian king ; 3 and Varahran, in solemn state, heard the charges made against Artaxerxes by his subjects, and listened to his reply to them. At the end he gave his decision. Artaxerxes was pronounced to have forfeited his crown, and was deposed ; his prop- erty was confiscated, and his person committed to safe, custody. The monarchy was declared to be at an end ; and Persarmenia was delivered into the hands of a Persian governor. 4 The patriarch Isaac was at the same time degraded from his office and detained in Persia as a prisoner. It was not till some years later that he was released, allowed to return into Armenia, and to resume, under certain restrictions, his episcopal functions. 5 The remaining circumstances of the reign of Varah- 1 Mos. Chor. iii. 63. 2 The reply of Isaac to the nobles is not ill rendered by Gibbon: ' Our king is too much addicted to licen- tious pleasures; but he has been purified in the holy waters of bap- tism. He is a lover of women; but he does not adore the fire or the elements. He may deserve the reproach of lewdness; but he is an undoubted Catholic, and his faith is pure though his manners are flagitious. I will never con- sent to abandon my sheep to the rage of devouring wolves; and you would soon repent your rash ex- change of the infirmities of a be- liever for the specious virtues of a heathen.' (Decline and Fall, vol. iv. p. 169.) 3 Mos. Chor. iii. 64. 4 Ibid. The name of the first governor, according to Moses, was Vi miner-Sapor. 5 Ibid. iii. 65. 294 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XIV. ran V. come to us wholly through the Oriental writers, amid whose exaggerations and fables it is very difficult to discern the truth. There can, however, be little doubt that it was during the reign of this prince that those terrible struggles commenced between the Per- sians and their neighbours upon the north-east which continued, from the early part of the fifth till the middle of the sixth century, to endanger the very exist- ence of the empire. Various names are given to the people with whom Persia waged her wars during this period. They are called Turks, 1 Huns, 2 sometimes even Chinese ; 3 but these terms seem to be used in a vague way, as 1 Scythian ' was by the ancients ; and the special ethnic designation of the people appears to be quite a different name from any of them. It is a name the Persian form of which is Haithal or Hai- atlMeli* the Armenian Hephthaghf and the Greek c Ephthalites,' or sometimes 4 Nephthalites.' 6 Different conjectures have been formed as to its origin ; but none of them can be regarded as more than an ingenious theory. 7 All that we know of the Ephthalites is, that 1 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 119; Macoudi, vol. ii. p. 190; Mirkhond, p. 335; Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, p. 516. 2 Procop. Be Bell. Pers. i. 3; Cosmas Indicopleust. in Montfau- con's Collectio nova Patrum, torn. ii. pp. 337-9; Abulpharag. Chronicon, torn. ii. p. 77; Elisee, p. 12. 3 Mirkhond calls the invader ' the Khacan of China ' (p. 334), though he speaks of the army as composed of Turks. 4 Mirkhond, p. 343; Modjmel-al- Tewarikh, p. 517; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 128. 5 Mos. Chor. Geogr. Armen. § 92. I take this form from M. Vivien St. Martin, to whose little work on the Ephthalites (Les Huns Blancs ou Ephthalites, Paris, 1849) I own myself much indebted. Whiston's translation gives the word as Heph- thal [ii]. Both readings occur in the MSS. of Procopius. (See the note of Dindorf in the edition of Nie- buhr, p. 15.) Theophanes has Nffpda'Mrai only (Chronograph, pp. 105-6). NeydaXlrai is also the form used by Agathias (iv. 27). Menan- der Protector has 'EpValirai (Frs. 9 and 18). 7 M. Vivien St. Martin seeks to identify the Ephthalites with the Yue-chi, one form of whose name he believes to have been Yi-ta, or Fe- tha (Les Huns Blancs, pp. 37-69). Others, e.g. Deguignes, have seen Ch. XIV.] COMMENCEMENT OF EPHTHALITE WARS. 295 they were established in force, during the fifth and sixth centuries of our era, in the regions east of the Caspian, especially in those beyond the Oxus river, and that they were generally regarded as belonging to the Scythic or Finno-Turkic population, which, at any rate from B.C. 200, had become powerful in that region. They were called L White Huns 1 by some of the Greeks ; 1 but it is admitted that they were quite distinct from the Huns who invaded Europe under Attila ; 2 and it may be doubted whether the term L Hun ' is more appro- priate to them than that of Turk or even of Chinese. The description of their physical character and habits left us by Procopius, who wrote when they were at the height of their power, is decidedly adverse to the view that they were really Huns. They were a light- complexioned race, whereas the Huns were decidedly swart ; 3 they were not ill-looking, whereas the Huns were hideous ; they were an agricultural people, while the Huns were nomads ; they had good laws, and were tolerably well civilised, but the Huns were savages. It is probable that they belonged to the Thibetic or Tur- kish stock, which has always been in advance of the Finnic, and has shown a greater aptitude for political organisation and social progress. We are told that the war of Varahran V. with this people commenced with an invasion of his kingdom by their Khacan, or Khan, 4 who crossed the Oxus with an in the word Ephthalite a root Tie-le, which they regard as equiva- lent to Turk. 1 As Procopius (l.s.c), Theo- phanes (p. 105, C), and Cosmas (l.s.c). 2 Procop. l.s.c 3 Jornandes, De Gothorum rebus (j est is, § 35. 4 ' Khan ' is the modern con- tracted form of the word which is found in the middle ages as Khagan or Chagan, and in the Persian and Arabic writers as Khakan or Kha- can. Its original root is probably the Khakj which meant ' King ' in ancient Susianian, in Ethiopic (Tir- hakah), and in Egyptian (Uyk-sos). 296 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. XIV. army of 25,000 (or, according to others, of 250,000) men, 1 and carried fire and sword into some of the most fertile provinces of Persia. The rich oasis, known as Meru or Merv, the ancient Margiana, is especially men- tioned as overrun by his troops, 2 which are said by some to have crossed the Elburz range into Khorassan and to have proceeded westward as far as Rei, or Rhages. 3 When news of the invasion reached the Per- sian court, the alarm felt was great ; V arahran was pressed to assemble his forces at once and encounter the unknown enemy ; he, however, professed complete indifference, said that the Almighty would preserve the empire, and that, for his own part, he was going to hunt in Azerbijan, 4 or Media Atropatene. During his absence the government could be conducted by Narses, his brother. All Persia was now thrown into conster- nation ; Varahran was believed to have lost his senses ; and it was thought that the only prudent course was to despatch an embassy to the Khacan, and make an ar- rangement with him by which Persia should acknowl- edge his suzerainty and consent to pay him a tribute. 5 Ambassadors accordingly were sent ; and the invaders, satisfied with the offer of submission, remained in the position which they had taken up, waiting for the trib- ute, and keeping slack guard, since they considered that they had nothing to fear. Varahran, however, was all the while preparing to fall upon them unawares. He had started for Azerbijan with a small body of 1 The moderate estimate of 25,000 is found in Mirkhond (p. 334) and in the Rozut-ul-Suffa (Malcolm, vol. i. p. 117). Tabari (vol. ii. p. 119) and the Zeenut-al-Tewarikh have 250,000. 2 Mirkhond, pp. 334 and 336. 3 Ibid. p. 334. Compare Ma- coudi, vol. ii. p. 190. 4 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 119; Modj- mel-al-Teivarikh, p. 516; Mirkhond, p. 334. 5 Tabari, l.s.c. ; Mirkhond, p. 335. Ch. XIV.] VARAHRAN DEFEATS THE EPHTHALITES. 297 picked warriors ; 1 he had drawn some further strength from Armenia ; 2 he proceeded along the mountain line through Taberistan, Hyrcania, and Nissa (Nishapur), 3 marching only by night, and carefully masking his movements. In this way he reached the neighbour- hood of Merv unobserved. He then planned and exe- cuted a night attack on the invading army which was completely successful. Attacking his adversaries sud- denly and in the dark — alarming them, moreover, with strange noises, 4 and at the same time assaulting them with the utmost vigour — he put to flight the entire Tatar army. The Khan himself was killed ; 6 and the flying host was pursued to the banks of the Oxus. The whole of the camp equipage fell into the hands of the victors ; and Kh&toun, the wife of the great Khan, was taken. 6 The plunder was of enormous value, and com- prised the royal crown with its rich setting of pearls. 7 After this success, Varahran, to complete his victory, sent one of his generals across the Oxus at the head of a large force, and falling upon the Tatars in their own country defeated them a second time with great slaughter. 8 The enemy then prayed for peace, which was granted them by the victorious Varahran, who at 1 Tabari makes the number only 300 (vol. ii. p. 119); but Mir- khond gives the more probable figure of 7,000 (p. 336). 2 Mirkhond, p. 335. 3 Ibid. p. 336. 4 The noise was made, we are told, by filling the dried skins of oxen with pebbles, and attaching them to the necks of the horses, which, as they charged, made the stones rattle (Mirkhond, l.s.c. ; Malcolm, vol. i. p. 118). Some authors make Varahran catch a number of wild beasts and let them loose upon the Tatars iModjmel-al Tewarikh, p. 517). 5 Macoudi, vol. ii. p. 190; Mir- khond, p. 337. Tabari, vol. ii. p. 121. 7 According to Tabari (p. 120), the crown was ornamented with several thousands of pearls. Com- pare the pearl ornamentation of the Sassanian crowns upon the coins, especially those of Sapor II. 8 Tabari, l.s.c; Modjmel-al-Te- warikh, p. 517. The latter work expressly calls this an invasion of the country of Heyathelah (i.e. of the Ephthaiites). 298 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XIV. the same time erected a column to mark the boundary of his empire in this quarter, 1 and appointing his brother Narses governor of Khorassan, ordered him to fix his residence at Balkh, and to prevent the Tatars from making incursions across the Oxus. 2 It appears that these precautions were successful, for we hear nothing of any further hostilities in this quarter during the remainder of Varahran's reign, The adventures of Varahran in India, and the en- largement of his dominions in that direction by the act of the Indian king, who is said to have voluntarily ceded to him Mekran and Scinde in return for his ser- vices against the Emperor of China, 3 cannot be re- garded as historical. Scarcely more so is the story that Persia had no musicians in his day, for which reason he applied to the Indian monarch, and obtained from him twelve thousand performers, who became the an- cestors of the Lurs. 4 After a reign which is variously estimated at nine- teen, twenty, twenty-one, and twenty-three years, 5 Va- rahran died by a death which would have been thought incredible, had not a repetition of the disaster, on the traditional site, been witnessed by an English traveller in comparatively recent times. The Persian writers state that Varahran was engaged in the hunt of the wild ass, when his horse came suddenly upon a deep 1 Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, p. 517 ; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 120 ; Mirkhond, p. 337. 2 Tabari, l.s.c. 3 Ibid. vol. ii. pp. 124-5. Com- pare Macoudi, vol. ii. p. 191; Modj- mel-al-Tewarikh, p. 516; Mirkhond, pp. 337-340. 4 Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, p. 515. 5 Eutycbius (vol. i. p. SO) says eighteen years and eleven months; the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh mentions nineteen years, but prefers twenty- three (p. 514); Agathias (iv. 27), Theophanes (p. 71, D), and Abnl- pharagius (p. 91) say twenty; Pat- kanian (Journ. Asiatique for 1866, p. 161) prefers twenty-one; Ma- coudi (vol. ii. p. 190) and Tabari (vol. ii. p. 126) agree with the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh in giving the number as twenty-three. Ch. XIV.] DEATH OF VARAHRAN V. — HIS COINS. 299 pool, or spring of water, and either plunged into it, or threw his rider into it, with the result that Varahran sank and never reappeared. 1 The supposed scene of the incident is a valley between Ispahan and Shiraz. Here, in 1810, an English soldier lost his life through bathing in the spring traditionally declared to be that which proved fatal to Varahran. 2 The coincidence has caused the general acceptance of a tale which would probably have been otherwise regarded as altogether romantic and mythical. The coins of Varahran V. are chiefly remarkable for their rudeand coarse workmanshipandforthe numberof the mints from which they were issued. The mint-marks include Ctesiphon, Ecbatana, Isaphan, Arbela, Ledan, Nehavend, Assyria, Chuzistan, Media, and Kerman, or Carmania. 3 The ordinary legend is, upon the obverse, Mazdisn bag Varahran malka, or Mazdisn bag Varahran rasti malka, and on the reverse, ' Varahran,' together with a mint-mark. The head-dress has the mural crown in front and behind, but interposes between these two detached fragments a crescent and a circle, emblems, no doubt, of the sun and moon gods. The reverse shows the usual fire-altar, with guards, or attendants, watching it. The king's head ap- pears in the flame upon the altar. According to the Oriental writers, Varahran V. was one of the best of the Sassanian princes. He carefully administered justice among his numerous subjects, re- mitted arrears of taxation, gave pensions to men of 1 Tabari, p. 126; Mirkhond, p. | vol. i. p. 121, note. 341. 3 Mordtmann, in the Zcitschrift, 2 Malcolm, History of Persia, | vol. viii. pp. 68-70. COI!S r OF VARAHllAN V 300 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Cii. XIV. science and letters, encouraged agriculture, and was extremely liberal in the relief of poverty and distress. 1 His faults were, that he was over-generous and over- fond of amusement, especially of the chase. The nick- name of 1 Bahram-Gur,' by which he is known to the Orientals, marks this last-named predilection, transfer- ring to him, as it does, the name of the animal which was the especial object of his pursuit. 2 But he was almost equally fond of dancing and of games. 3 Still it does not appear that his inclination for amusements ren- dered him neglectful of public affairs, or at all interfered with his administration of the State. Persia is said to have been in a most flourishing condition during his reign. 4 He may not have gained all the successes that are ascribed to him ; but he was undoubtedly an active prince, brave, energetic, and clear-sighted. He judi- ciously brought the Roman war to a close when a new and formidable enemy appeared on his north-eastern frontier ; he wisely got rid of the Armenian difficulty, which had been a stumbling-block in the way of his predecessors for two hundred years ; he inflicted a check on the aggressive Tatars, which indisposed them to renew hostilities with Persia for a quarter of a cen- tury. It would seem that he did not much appreciate art ; 5 but he encouraged learning, and did his best to advance science. 6 1 Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, p. 515; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 118; Mirkhond, pp. 332-3; Macoudi, vol. ii. p. 190. 2 The wild ass is called by the Persians guv or gour. Eutychius, in speaking of Varahran V., writes the word jaur (vol. ii. pp. 80 and 83). *» Mirkhond, p. 334. 4 Ibid. p. 333; Tabari, p. 118. 5 The sculptures which Ker Porter assigned to this prince (Travels, vol. i. pp. 533-540) have nothing that really connects them with him. In none of them is the head-dress of the king that which appears on the coins of Varahran V. e Mirkhond, p. 332. Ch. xv.j accession of ISDIGEKD II, 301 CHAPTER XV. Reign of Tsdigerd FT. His War with Rome. His Nine Years' War with the Ephthalites. His Policy towards Armenia. His Second Eph- thalite War. His Character. His Coins. Ovapapavqc . . . izapadiduoi, ttjv ^aatKuav '[Gdiyepdy darepG) tgj oike'll) Txaidi. Agathias, iv. 27; p. 137, C. The successor of Varahran V. was his son, Isdigerd the Second, who ascended the Persian throne without op- position in the year a.d. 440. 1 His first act was to declare war against Rome. The Roman forces were, it would seem, concentrated in the vicinity of Nisibis ; 2 and Isdigerd may have feared that they would make an attack upon the place. He therefore anticipated them, and invaded the empire with an army composed in part of his own subjects, but in part also of troops from the surrounding nations. Saracens, Tzani, Isau- rians, and Huns (Ephthalites ?) served under his stand- ard ; 3 and a sudden incursion was made into the Roman territory, for which the imperial officers were wholly unprepared. A considerable impression would prob- ably have been produced, had not the weather proved exceedingly unpropitious. Storms of rain and hail hindered the advance of the Persian troops, and allowed 1 See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 546. Mordtmann puts his accession in a.d. 444 (Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p. 70) ; Patkanian {Journ. Asia- tique, 1866, p. 167) in a.d. 438. But a comparison of Marcellinus (p. 25) with Moses of Chorene (iii. 67, ad init.) shows Clinton to be right. 2 Mos. Chor. l.s.c. 3 Marcellinus, Chron. l.s.c. 302 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XV. the Roman generals a breathing space, during which they collected an army. 1 But the Emperor Theodosius was anxious that the flames of war should not be re- lighted in this quarter ; and his instructions to the prefect of the East, the Count Anatolius, 2 were such as speedily led to the conclusion, first of a truce for a year, and then of a lasting treaty. Anatolius repaired as ambassador to the Persian camp, on foot and alone, so as to place himself completely in Isdigerd's power — an act which so impressed the latter that (we are told) he at once agreed to make peace on the terms which Ana- tolius suggested.* The exact nature of these terms is not recorded ; but they contained at least one unusual condition. The Romans and Persians agreed that neither party should construct any new fortified post in the vicinity of the other's territory — a loose phrase which was likely to be variously interpreted, and might easily lead to serious complications. It is difficult to understand this sudden conclusion of peace by a young prince, evidently anxious to reap laurels, who in the first year of his reign had, at the head of a large army, invaded the dominions of a neigh- bour. The Roman account, that he invaded, that he was practically u nopposed, and that then, out of polite- ness towards the prefect of the East, he voluntarily retired within his own frontier, c having done nothing disagreeable,' 4 is as improbable a narrative as we often meet with, even in the pages of the Byzantine historians. 1 Theodoret, H. K v. 37. The invasion is wrongly assigned by this writer to the reign of Varahran V., which was just ended. 2 Procop. Be Hell. Pers. i. 2. Anatolius is also mentioned as con- cluding the peace by Marcellinus (l.s.c). 3 Procop. l.s.c: Tyv dpyvjjv ZvvEXuprjoev ovrcoc cjancp ' kvaroTiioQ TTpOf aVTOV £XPy& V ' 4 *Edpaoe 6e ovdev uxapi. (Procop. l.s.c.) Ch. XV.] HIS ROMAN WAR. 303 Something has evidently been kept back. If Isdigerd returned, as Procopius declares, without effecting any- thing, he must have been recalled by the occurrence of troubles in some other part of his empire. 1 But it is, perhaps, as likely that he retired, simply because he had effected the object with which he engaged in the war. It was a constant practice of the Romans to ad- vance their frontier by building strong towns on or near a debatable border, which attracted to them the submission of the neighbouring district. The recent building of Theodosiopolis 2 in the eastern part of Ro- man Armenia had been an instance of this practice. It was perhaps being pursued elsewhere along the Per- sian border, and the invasion of Isdigerd may have been intended to check it. If so, the proviso of the treaty recorded by Procopius would have afforded him the security which he required, and have rendered it unnecessary for him to continue the war any longer. His arms shortly afterwards found employment in another quarter. The Tatars of the Transoxianian regions were once more troublesome ; and in order to check or prevent the incursions which they were always ready to make, if they were unmolested, Isdigerd under- took a long war on his north-eastern frontier, which he conducted with a resolution and perseverance not very common in the East. Leaving his vizier, Mihr-Narses, to represent him at the seat of government, he trans- ferred his own residence to Nishapur, 3 in the moun- tain region between the Persian and Kharesmian deserts, and from that convenient post of observation directed the military operations against his active 1 So Tillemont suspects {Hist, des Empereurs, torn. vi. pp. 39-40). 2 See above, p. 287. 3 Patkanian in the Journal Asia- tique for 1866, pp. 164-6. 304 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XV. enemies, making a campaign against them regularly every year from a.d. 443 to 451. In the year last mentioned he crossed the Oxus, and, attacking the Ephthalites in their own territory, obtained a complete success, driving the monarch from the cultivated por- tion of the country, and forcing him to take refuge in the desert, 1 So complete was his victory that he seems to have been satisfied with the result, and, regarding the war as terminated, to have thought the time was come for taking in hand an arduous task, long contemplated, but not hitherto actually attempted. This was no less a matter than the forcible conver- sion of Armenia to the faith of Zoroaster. It has been already noted 2 that the religious differences which — from the time when the Armenians, anticipating Con- stantine, adopted as the religion of their state and nation the Christian faith (ab. a.d. 300) — separated the Armenians from the Persians, were a cause of weak- ness to the latter, more especially in their contests with Rome. Armenia was always, naturally, upon the Roman side, since a religious sympathy united it with the court of Constantinople, and an exactly opposite feeling tended to detach it from the court of Ctesiphon. The alienation would have been, comparatively speak- ing, unimportant, after the division of Armenia be- tween the two powers, had that division been regarded by either party as final, or as precluding the formation of designs upon the territory which each had agreed should be held by the other. But there never yet had been a time when such designs had ceased to be enter- tained ; and in the war which Isdigerd had waged with 1 Patkanian in the Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 164. 2 Supra, p. 251. Ch. XV.] HIS POLICY IN ARMENIA. 305 Theodosius at the beginning of his reign, Roman in- trigues in Persarmenia had forced him to send an army into that country. 1 The Persians felt, and felt with reason, that so long as Armenia remained Christian and Persia held to the faith of Zoroaster, the relations of the two countries could never be really friendly ; Per- sia would always have a traitor in her own camp ; and in any time of difficulty — - especially in any dif- ficulty with Rome — might look to see this portion of her territory go over to the enemy. We cannot be surprised if Persian statesmen were anxious to termi- nate so unsatisfactory a state of things, and cast about for a means whereby Armenia might be won over, and made a real friend instead of a concealed enemy. The means which suggested itself to Isdigerd as the simplest and most natural, was, as above observed, the conversion of the Armenians to the Zoroastrian religion. In the early part of his reign, he entertained a hope of effecting his purpose by persuasion, and sent his vizier, Mihr-Narses, into the country, with orders to use all possiblepeacefulmeans — gifts, blandishments, promises, threats, removal of malignant chiefs — to induce Arme- nia to consent to a change of religion. 2 Mihr-Narses did his best, but failed signally. He carried off the chiefs of the Christian party, not only from Armenia, but from Iberia and Albania, telling them that Isdigerd required their services against the Tatars, and forced them with their followers to take part in the Eastern war. 3 He committed Armenia to the care of the Mar- grave, Vasag, a native prince who was well inclined to 1 The entrance of the army is noted by Moses of Chorene (Hist. Armen. iii. 6S). We can scarcely be mistaken in regarding its en- trance as required on account of Roman intrigues. 2 St. Martin, Becherches sur VArmenie, torn. i. p. 322. 3 Ibid. p. 323. 306 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XV. the Persian cause, and gave him instructions to bring about the change of religion by a policy of conciliation. But the Armenians were obstinate. Neither threats, nor promises, nor persuasions had any effect. It was in vain that a manifesto was issued, painting the religion of Zoroaster in the brightest colours, and requiring all persons to conform to it. It was to no purpose that arrests were made, and punishments threatened. The Armenians declined to yield either to argument or to menace ; and no progress at all was made in the direction of the desired conversion. In the year a.d. 450, the patriarch Joseph, by the general desire of the Armenians, held a great assembly, at which it was carried by acclamation, that the Arme- nians were Christians, and would continue such, what- ever it might cost them. If it was hoped by this to induce Isdigerd to lay aside his proselytising schemes, the hope was a delusion. Isdigerd retaliated by sum- moning to his presence the principal chiefs, viz., Vasag, the Margrave ; 1 the Sparapet, or commander-in-chief, Vartan, the Mamigonian ; Vazten, prince of Iberia ; Vatche, king of Albania, &c. ; and having got them into his power, threatened them with immediate death, unless they at once renounced Christianity and made profession of Zoroastrianism. The chiefs, not having the spirit of martyrs, unhappily yielded, and declared themselves converts ; whereupon Isdigerd sent them back to their respective countries, with orders to force everywhere on their fellow-countrymen a similar change of religion. Upon this, the Armenians and Iberians broke out in 1 The Armenian term is Marz- pan, 4 Protector of the Border,' with which Patkanian well com- pares * Margrave ' (Journ. Asia- tique, I860, p. 114). Ch. XV.] ARMENIAN WAR OF RELIGION. 307 open revolt. Vartan, the Mamigonian, repenting of his weakness, abjured his new creed, resumed the pro- fession of Christianity, and made his peace with Joseph, the patriarch. 1 He then called the people to arms, and in a short time collected a force of a hundred thousand men. Three armies were formed, to act separately under different generals. One watched Azerbijan, or Media Atropatene, whence it was expected that their main attack would be made by the Persians ; another, under Vartan, proceeded to the relief of Albania, where proceedings were going on similar to those which had driven Armenia into rebellion ; the third, under Vasag, occupied a central position in Armenia, and was in- tended to move wherever danger should threaten. 2 An attempt was at the same time made to induce the Roman emperor, Marcian, to espouse the cause of the rebels, and send troops to their assistance ; but this attempt was unsuccessful. Marcian had but recently ascended the throne, 3 and was, perhaps, scarcely fixed in his seat. He was advanced in years, and naturally unenterprising. Moreover, the position of affairs in Western Europe was such, that Marcian might expect at any moment to be attacked by an overwhelming force of northern barbarians, cruel, warlike, and un- sparing. Attila was in a.d. 451 at the height of his power ; he had not yet been worsted at Chalons ; 4 and the terrible Huns, whom he led, might in a few months destroy the Western, and be ready to fall upon the 1 St. Martin, Becker dies, p. 324. 2 Ibid. p. 326. 8 Marcian became emperor in August, a.d. 450. The application to him for aid was made, according to St. Martin, towards the end of A.D. 450, or early in a.d. 451. 4 The battle of Chalons was fought in the autumn of a.d. 451 (Clinton, F. B. vol. i. p. 642). On the power of Attila at this time, see Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. iv. pp. 231-6). 308 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ICh. XV. Eastern empire. Armenia, consequently, was left to her own resources, and had to combat the Persians single- handed. Even so, she might probably have succeeded, have maintained her Christianity, or even recovered her independence, had her people been of one mind, and had no defection from the national cause manifested itself. But Vasag, the Marzpan, had always been half- hearted in the quarrel; and, now that the crisis was come, he determined on going wholly over to the Persians. He was able to carry with him the army which he commanded ; and thus Armenia was divided against itself: and the chance of victory was well-nigh lost before the struggle had begun. When the Per- sians took the field, they found half Armenia ranged upon their side ; and, though a long and bloody con- test followed, the end was certain from the beginning. After much desultory warfare, a great battle was fought in the sixteenth year of Isdigerd (a.d. 455 or 456), be- tween the Christian Armenians on the one side, and the Persians, with their Armenian abettors, on the other. The Persians were victorious ; Vartan, and his brother, Hemaiag, were among the slain ; and the patriotic party found that no further resistance was possible. 1 The patriarch, Joseph, and the other bishops, were seized, carried off to Persia, and martyred. Zoroastri- anism was enforced upon the Armenian nation. All accepted it, except a few, who either took refuge in the dominions of Rome, or fled to the mountain fast- nesses of Kurdistan. 2 The resistance of Armenia was scarcely overborne, when war once more broke out in the East, and Isdi- gerd was forced to turn his attention to the defence of 1 St. Martin, Recherches sur UAnnenie, vol. i. p. 327. 2 Ibid. Ch. XV.] SECOND WAR WITH THE EPHTHALITES. 309 his frontier against the aggressive Ephthalites, who, after remaining quiet for three or four years, had again flown to arms, had crossed the Oxus, and invaded Khorassan in force. 1 On his first advance, the Persian monarch was so far successful, that the invading hordes seem to have retired, and left Persia to itself ; but when Isdi- gerd, having resolved to retaliate, led his own forces into the Ephthalite country, they took heart, resisted him, and, having tempted him into an ambuscade, suc- ceeded in inflicting upon him a severe defeat. Isdi- gerd was forced to retire hastily within his own borders, and to leave the honours of victory to his assailants, whose triumph must have encouraged them to continue year after year their destructive inroads into the north-eastern provinces of the empire. It was not long after the defeat which he suffered in this quarter, that Isdigerd's reign came to an end. He died a.d. 457, after having held the throne for seven- teen or (according to some) for nineteen years. 2 He was a prince of considerable ability, determination, and courage. That his subjects called him 1 the Clement 7 3 is at first sight surprising, since clemency is certainly not the virtue that any modern writer would think of associating with his name. But we may assume from the application of the term, that, where religious con- siderations did not come into play, he was fair and equitable, mild-tempered, and disinclined to harsh punishments. Unfortunately, experience tells us that 1 Patkanian, in the Journal A sia- tique for 1866, p. 165. 2 Tabari (vol. ii. p. 127) says he reigned eighteen years; Macoudi (vol. ii. p. 195) nineteen; Agathias (iv. 27) seventeen. The statement of Agathias is preferred by Clinton (F. R. vol. i. p. 546); that of Macoudi by Patkanian (p. 167) and Thomas (Num. Chron. New Series, No. xlv. p. 45). All moderns agree that he died a.d. 457. 8 So Tabari, l.s.c. 310 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XV. natural mildness is no security against the acceptance of a bigot's creed ; and, when a policy of persecution has once been adopted, a Trajan or a Valerian will be as unsparing as a Maximin or a Galerius. Isdigerd was a bitter and successful persecutor of Christianity, which he — for a time at any rate — stamped out, both from his own proper dominions, and from the newly- acquired province of Armenia. He would have pre- ferred less violent means ; but, when they failed, he felt no scruples in employing the extremest and severest coercion. He was determined on uniformity ; and uni- formity he secured, but at the cost of crushing a peo- ple, and so alienating them as to make it certain that they would, on the first convenient occasion, throw off the Persian yoke altogether. The coins of Isdigerd II. nearly resemble those of his father, Varahran V., differing only in the legend, and in the fact that the mural crown of Isdigerd is complete, 1 The legend is remarkably short, being either Masdisn kadi Yezdikerti, or merely Kadi Yezdikerti — i.e. 4 the Or- mazd-worshipping great Isdigerd ; ' or 1 Isdigerd the Great,' The coins are not very numerous, and have three mint-marks only, which are interpreted to mean 'Khuzistan,' c Ctesiphon,' and 1 Nehavend.' 2 COIN OF ISDIGERD II. 1 See Mordtmann in the Zeit- schrifty vol. viii. pp. 70-1. Long- perier has mistakenly assigned to Isdigerd I. two coins (PI. viii., ISos. 3 and 4) which really belong to Isdigerd II. 2 'Mordtmann, l.s.c. Ch. XVI. ] ACCESSION OF HORMISDAS 111. 311 CHAPTER XVI. Right of Succession disputed between the two Sons of Isdigerd II., Perozes (or Firuz) and Hormisdas. Civil War for two years. Success of Perozes, through aid given him by the Ephthalites. Great Famine. Perozes declares War against the Ephthalites, and makes an Expedition into their Country. His ill success. Conditions of Peace granted him. Armenian Revolt and War. Perozes, after some years, resumes the Ephthalite War. His attack fails, and he is slain in battle. Summary of his Character. Coins of Hormisdas III. and Perozes. Vase of Perozes. * Yazdejerdo e medio sublato, de regno contenderunt duo ipsius filii, Phiruz et Hormoz, aliis a partibus Firuzi, aliis ab Hormozi stanti- bus. ' — Eutych. vol. i. p. 100. On the death of Isdigerd II. (a.d. 457), the throne was seized by his younger son, 1 Hormisdas, who appears to have owed his elevation, in a great measure, to the partiality of his father. That monarch, preferring his younger son above his elder, had made the latter gov- ernor of the distant Seistan, and had thus removed him far from the court, while he retained Hormisdas about his own person. 2 The advantage thus secured to Hor- misdas enabled him when his father died to make him- self king ; and Perozes was forced, we are told, to fly the 1 The Armenian historians make Hormisdas the elder, and Perozes the younger son (Patkanian in the Journal Asiatiqne for 1866, p. 169); but Tabari (Chronique, vol. ii. p. 127), Mirkhond (p. 342), and the Persian writers generally, declare the reverse to have been the case. They give details which support their view. 2 Tabari, l.s.c. Mirkhond says that Isdigerd regarded Hormisdas as better qualified to govern than Perozes, since he had more sweet- ness, modesty, and intelligence, whereas in favour of Perozes were only his age and his advantages of person (pp. 342-3). 312 THE SEVENTH MONAKCHY. [Ch. XYL country, and place himself under the protection of the Ephthalite monarch, who ruled in the valley of the Oxus, over Bactria, Tokaristan, Badakshan, and other neighbouring districts. 1 This king, who bore the name of Khush-new&z, 2 received him favourably, and though at first, out of fear for the power of Persia, he declined to lend him troops, was induced after a while to adopt a bolder policy. Hormisdas, despite his epithet of Ferzan, 4 the Wise,' 3 was soon at variance with his subjects, many of whom gathered about Perozes at the court which he was allowed to maintain in Taleqan, one of the Ephthalite cities. Supported by this body of refugees, and by an Ephthalite contingent, 4 Perozes ven- tured to advance against his brother. His army, which was commanded bv a certain Raham, or Ram, a noble of the Mihran family, attacked the forces of Hormisdas, defeated them, and made Hormisdas himself a prisoner. 5 The troops of the defeated monarch, convinced by the logic of success, deserted their late leader's cause, and went over in a body to the conqueror. Perozes, after somewhat more than two years of exile, was acknowl- edged as king by the whole Persian people, and, quit- ting Taleqan, established himself at Ctesiphon, or Al Modain, which had now become the main seat of gov- ernment. It is uncertain what became of Hormisdas. According to the Armenian writers, 6 Raham, after .de- feating him, caused him to be put to death ; but the native historian, Mirkhond, declares that, on the con- 1 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 137. 2 The Greeks shortened the name into Cunchas (Kovyxag). See Pris- cus Panites, Fr. 33. 3 So explained by Mirkhond (p. 344). 4 Amounting, according to Mir- khond to no fewer than 30,000 men (ibid.). 5 Patkanian in the Journal Asia- tique for 1866, p. 168. Elisee, p. 153; Moyse de Ka- ghank, i. 10. These writers are supported by Tabari, who says briefly, ' Firouz combattit son frere Hormouz, etle tua' (p. 128). Ch. XVI.] HORMISDAS III. SUCCEEDED BY PEROZES. 313 traiy, Perozes forgave him for having disputed the suc- cession, and amiably spared his life. 1 The civil war between the two brothers, short as it was, had lasted long enough to cost Persia a province. Vatche, king of Aghouank (Albania), 2 took advantage of the time of disturbance to throw off his allegiance, and succeeded in making himself independent. 3 It was the first object of Perozes, after establishing himself upon the throne, to recover this valuable territory. He therefore made war upon Vatche, though that prince was the son of his sister, and with the help of his Ephthalite allies, and of a body of Alans whom he took into his service, defeated the rebellious Albanians and completely subjugated the revolted country. 4 A time of prosperity now ensued. Perozes ruled with moderation and justice. 5 He dismissed his Eph- thalite allies with presents that amply contented them, 6 and lived for five years in great peace and honour. But in the seventh year T from the death of his father, the prosperity of Persia was suddenly and grievously inter- rupted by a terrible drought, a calamity whereto Asia has in all ages been subject, and which often produces the most frightful consequences. The crops fail ; the earth becomes parched and burnt up ; smiling districts are changed into wildernesses ; fountains and brooks cease to flow ; then the wells have no water ; finally 1 Mirkhond, p. 344. 2 On the identity of Aghouank with Albania, see St. Martin's Re- cherches sur VArmenie, torn. i. p. 214, and torn. ii. pp. 358-9. 3 Patkanian, p. 168. 4 Ibid. p. 170. 5 Mirkhond, p. 345; Tabari, p. 128. " Mirkhond, p. 344; Tabari, l.s.c. 7 So Tabari. The statement is confirmed by the remarkable fact that his coins, which are abundant up to his seventh year, then fail entirely for five years, after which they reappear and are once more plentiful. (See Thomas in Numis- matic Chronicle for 1873, vol. xiii., No. 51, p. 224.) 314 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XVI. even the great rivers are reduced to threads, and contain only the scantiest supply of the life-giving fluid in their channels. Famine under these circumstances of neces- sity sets in ; the poor die by hundreds ; even the rich have a difficulty in sustaining life by means of food imported from a distance. We are told 1 that the drought in the reign of Perozes was such that at last there was not a drop of water either in the Tigris or the Oxus ; all the sources and fountains, all the streams and brooks failed ; vegetation altogether ceased ; the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air perished ; nowhere through the whole empire was a bird to be seen ; the wild animals, even the reptiles, disappeared altogether. The dreadful calamity lasted for seven years, 2 and under ordinary circumstances the bulk of the population would have been swept off ; but such were the wisdom and the beneficence of the Persian monarch, that during the entire duration of the scourge not a single person, or, according to another account, but one person, 3 perished of hunger. Perozes began by issuing general orders that the rich should come to the relief of their poorer brethren ; he required the governors of towns, and the head-men of villages, to see that food was supplied to those in need, and threatened that for each poor man in a town or village who died of want, he would put a rich man to death. At the end of two years, finding that the drought continued, he declined to take any revenue from his subjects, remitting taxes of all kinds, whether they were money imposts or con- tributions in kind. In the fourth year, not content 1 Tabari, Chronique, ii. p. 130. 2 Ibid. Compare Mirkhond, p. 345. 3 Tabari says in one place that no one died of want during the famine (ii. p. 130) ; but in another, admits that one died (ib. p. 129). So Mirkhond, p. 346. Ch. XVX] GREAT FAMINE IN PERSIA. 315 with these measures, he went further ; opened the tr eas- ury doors and made distributions of money from his own stores to those in need. At the same time he im- ported corn from Greece, from India, from the valley of the Oxus, and from Abyssinia, obtaining by these means such ample supplies that he was able to furnish an adequate sustenance to all his subjects. 1 The result was that not only did the famine cause no mortality among the poorer classes, but no one was even driven to quit the country in order to escape the pressure of the calamity. Such is the account which is given by the Oriental authors of the terrible famine which they ascribe to the early part of the reign of Perozes. It is difficult, however, to suppose that the matter has not been very much exaggerated, since we find that, as early as a.d. 464-5, when the famine should have been at its height, Perozes had entered upon a great war and was hotly engaged in it, his ambassadors at the same time being sent to the Greek court, not to ask supplies of food, but to request a subsidy on account of his military ope- rations. 2 The enemy which had provoked his hostility was the powerful nation of the Ephthalites, by whose aid he had so recently obtained the Persian crown. According to a contemporary Greek authority, more worthy of trust than most writers of his age and nation, 3 the origin of the war was a refusal on the part of the 1 See Tabari, ii. pp. 129, 130. 2 Priscus Panites, Fr. 31. 3 On the superiority of Priscus to the general run of Byzantine his- torians, see the remarks of Niebuhr in his collection of the Byzantine historians (Bonn, 1829) : " * Longe optimus omnium sequioris sevihis- toricorum [Priscns] ; ingenio, fide. sapientia, nulli vel optimorum post- habendus: elegans quoque et ser- mone satis puro usns, laudem atque gloriam quum aptid cosevos turn inter postero merito adeptus est; cui etiam a Valesio etGibbono, sum- mis viris, laudari contigit.' Com- pare Smith's Diet, of Biography, vol. iii. p. 526. 316 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [Ch. XVI. Ephthalites to make certain customary payments, which the Persians viewed in the light of a tribute. 1 Perozes determined to enforce his just rights, and marched his troops against the defaulters with this object. But in his first operations he was unsuccessful, and after a time he thought it best to conclude the war, and con- tent himself with taking a secret revenge upon his enemy, by means of an occult insult. He proposed to Khush-new&z to conclude a treaty of peace, and to strengthen the compact by adding to it a matrimonial alliance. Khush-new&z should take to wife one of his daughters, and thus unite the interests of the two reigning families. The proposal was accepted by the Ephthalite monarch ; and he readily espoused the young lady who was sent to his court apparelled as became a daughter of Persia. In a little time, however, he found that he had been tricked : Perozes had not sent him his daughter, but one of his female slaves ; 2 and the royal race of the Ephthalite kings had been disgraced by a matrimonial union with a person of servile condition. Khush-new&z was justly indignant ; but dissembled his feelings, and resolved to repay guile with guile. He wrote to Perozes that it was his inten- tion to make war upon a neighbouring tribe, and that he wanted officers of experience to conduct the military operations. The Persian monarch, suspecting nothing, complied with the request, and sent three hundred of his chief officers to Khush-new&z, who immediately seized them, put some to death, and, mutilating the re- mainder, commanded them to return to their sovereign, and inform him that the king of the Ephthalites now 1 Priscus Panites, Fr. 39. | been played off by Amasis upon 2 Compare with this trick the j Cambyses (Herod, iii. 1). somewhat similar one said to have \ Ch. XVI. J EPHTHALITE EXPEDITION OF PEROZES. 317 felt that he had sufficiently avenged the trick of which he had been the victim. 1 On receiving this message, Perozes renewed the war, advanced towards the Eph- thalite country, and fixed his head-quarters in Hyrca- nia, at the city of Gurg&n. 2 He was accompanied by a Greek of the name of Eusebius, 3 an ambassador from the Emperor Zeno, who took back to Constantinople the following account of the campaign. When Perozes, having invaded the Ephthalite terri- tory, fell in with the army of the enemy, the latter pre- tended to be seized with a panic, and at once took to flight. The retreat was directed upon a portion of the mountain region, w^here a broad and good road led into a spacious plain, surrounded on all sides by wooded hills, steep and in places precipitous. Here the mass of the Ephthalite troops was cunningly concealed amid the foliage of the woods, while a small number remain- ing visible, led the Persians into the cul-de-sac, the whole army unsuspectingly entering, and only learning their danger when they saw the road whereby they had entered blocked up by the troops from the hills. The officers then apprehended the true state of the case, and perceived that they had been cleverly entrapped ; but none of them, it would seem, dared to inform the monarch that he had been deceived by a stratagem. Application was made to Eusebius, whose ambassadorial character would protect him from an outbreak, and he was requested to let Perozes know how he was situated, 1 Priscus Panites, Fr. 33. 2 Called Gorgo by Priscus (l.s.c.) and Procopius (Bell. Peru. i. 4). The old Persian Varkana and the Greek Hyrcania are variants of the same word. Some ruins of Gurgan still exist in the valley of the Gur- gan river (lat, 37°20 / , lon