• PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN WAR 18 54-5-6 WITH aps, Ifllans, anb lEcflb <2£itgr airings W. & R. CHAMBERS EDINBURGH AND LONDON MDCCCLVI :rr HE Russian War of 1853-6 differed from all preceding wars in this among other characteristics — that it admitted, to a very remarkable |V ! degree, of historical narration during the progress of the events themselves. This facility was due to a combination of favourable circumstances. More numerously than at any former period were official documents made public by the British government, and papers relating to passing occurrences printed at the request of parliament. More fully than ever before was light thrown upon the conduct of those intrusted with the management of the War — whether political, j£sf| military, or naval — by the Reports of Royal Commissions and Parliamentary » A Committees. It is worthy of note, too, that the parliamentary debates revealed to a greater extent than usual the inner workings of government departments, in the explanations given by Cabinet Ministers consequent on the collisions of parties and the rupture of ministries. Again, the periodical press displayed an activity, and diffused an amount of information, never equalled during any other period of warfare — not only in the fulness of news obtained from all parts of the world, including translations of official documents promulgated in the chief European countries, but also by the maintenance, at the various seats of war, of skilful writers, who traced day by day the movements of armies and fleets, and vividly described battles witnessed by them under circumstances of difficulty and peril. Literary enterprise tended towards the same result, in the publication of numerous volumes by military officers, describing rapidly but faithfully such portions of the scenes and events of warfare as came under their personal observation. The facilities of the postal service contributed towards the same end, by enabling soldiers and sailors to send their simple narratives to home-friends, with a frequency which, in earlier times, would have been rendered by costly postage almost impracticable; many of these letters, made public through the medium of the newspapers, revealed truths otherwise unattainable concerning the daily duties, multiplied sufferings, and heroic endiu'ance of PREFACE. the humbler combatants. Physical science and mechanical inventions lent their aid towards the same general result, by supplying steam-ships, railways, and electric telegraphs : rendering many things possible which were impossible in former wars, and substituting celerity for slowness in many others." All these favourable circumstances combined to render practicable the writing of a History of the War during the progress, and shortly after the termination, of the war itself: leaving to a later generation that more complete analysis of events, in their causes and their consequences, which can only be wrought when generals and statesmen — by means of Memoirs, Letters, and Dispatches — have given to the world their knowledge of occurrences fully to be explained by none but themselves. The Author of the present volume has endeavoured so to avail himself of all the above-mentioned resources — augmented and in some instances corrected by private communications — as to present a truthful picture of that short, but fearful and extraordinary war. While estimating the contest conscientiously as a whole, in its national and international aspects, he has endeavoured to be — so far as such a character is possible — an impartial spectator; and while seeking to trace events up to their causes, to deduce the probable consequences, or to disentangle perplexities, he has deemed it a duty to observe caution in passing judgment on the actors in those scenes — judgment which cannot fairly be pronounced until angry controversies have been smoothed away by the lapse of time, or by the shedding of new light on transactions hitherto obscure. August 1856. G. P. CHAPTER I. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR— PAGE TRADITIONARY AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF RUSSIA, 3 THE 'HOLY PLACES' AT JERUSALEM: A SUBJECT OF CONTEST, .....•• RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, UNDER PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF, TURKISH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, UNDER OMAR PACHA, CHAPTER II. CAMPAIGN ON THE DANUBE IN 1853-4— FORCES AND STRATEGY OF OMAR PACHA, . . 30 BATTLES OF KALAFAT, OLTENITZA, CITALE, AND GIURGEVO, ....... 3G OPERATIONS IN THE DOBRUDSCHA AND AT SILISTRIA, 44 CHAPTER III. ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY- DIPLOMACY OF 1853 : THE ATTACK AT SINOPE, 56 THE 'secret correspondence' OF 1844 AND 1853, CI RUPTURE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE AVESTERN POWERS, 07 CHAPTER IV. COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES IN 1851— • FORCES AND STRATEGY OF THE WESTERN POWBBS, 7o PROCEEDINGS AT GALLIPOLI, PERA, AND SCUTARI, 84 VARNA: PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA, . 93 THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA: 1854, . 10G CHAPTER V. HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS IN 1853-4— SCHAMYL, AND THE CAUCASUS, . . . 120 CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC TURKEY IN 1854, . . 127 INTRIGUES IN NORTH-WESTEUN TURKEY, . 140 GREEK ATTACKS ON THE TURKISH BORDER, . 144 CHAPTER VI. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH IN 1854— RUSSIAN POWER IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES, . FLEETS DESPATCHED BY THE WESTERN POWERS, ....... PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALLIES IN THE BALTIC, PROCEEDINGS IN AND NEAR THE WHITE SEA, . PROCEEDINGS IN THE NORTH PACIFIC AND KAMTCHATKA, * . PAGE 152 155 162 184 188 •CHAPTER VII. CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA IN 1854— THE CRIMEA, PAST AND PRESENT, THE GREAT ARMAMENT VARNA TO THE CRIMEA, ....... THE ADVANCE TO THE ALMA — THE BATTLE, . ALMA TO BALAKLAVA THE FLANK-MARCH, SEBASTOFOL, AND ITS VICINITY, . COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE, MANOEUVRES OF THE FLEETS, THE FIRST BOMBARDMENT BY LAND, BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA, .... THE TWO BATTLES OF INKERMANN, . CHAPTER VIII. WINTER AT SEBASTOPOL AND SCUTARI, 1854-5— THE SIEGE, IN THE CLOSING WEEKS OF 1854, THE NOVEMBER HURRICANE, AND ITS EFFECTS, WINTER-LIFE IN THE TENTS AND TRENCHES, . THE SICK AND WOUNDED AT THE CAMP, THE SICK AND WOUNDED AT SCUTARI, REMEDIES : THE HOSPITAL-NURSES AT SCUTARI, REMEDIES : THE SUBSCRIBED FUNDS FROM ENGLAND, ....... REMEDIES : THE BALAKLAVA RAILWAY, . REMEDIES : OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS, OPERATIONS AT EUPATORIA DURING THE WINTER, ....... THE SIEGE, IN THE EARLY WEEKS OF 1855, 195 202 208 220 227 233 240 246 253 260 274 280 286 295 298 305 311 318 322 330 335 CONTENTS. CHAPTER IX. DIPLOMACY, FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR TO THE VIENNA CONFERENCES— THE QUESTION OF THE NATIONALITIES, . NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA ANT) PRUSSIA, THE SARDINIAN ALLIANCE, FALL OF THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY, DEATH OF THE CZAR NICHOLAS, THE VIENNA CONFERENCES, .... PAGE 345 351 358 360 365 370 CHAPTER X. PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1855— MILITIA, CAMPS, AND FOREIGN LEGIONS, . . 376 THE ARMY-WORKS AND LAND-TRANSPORT CORPS, 381 THE TURKISH AND SARDINIAN CONTINGENTS, . 384 BLACK-SEA SUBMARINE TELEGRAPH, . . 387 CHAPTER XL SEBASTOPOL: THE SIEGE, TO THE FALL OF THE MALAKOFF— ADDITIONAL WORKS OF ATTACK AND DEFENCE, 392 SORTIES : STRUGGLES FOR THE RIFLE-PITS, . 395 SECOND OR APRIL BOMBARDMENT, . . 399 CONTESTS IN MAY : CANROBERt's RESIGNATION, 403 THIRD BOMBARDMENT : CAPTURE OF THE MAMELON, ETC., ...... 409 MALAKOFF AND REDAN IN JUNE : THE REPULSE, 414 DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN : TARDINESS OF THE SIEGE, 419 THE FINAL BOMBARDMENT, AND CAPTURE, . 424 PAGE 433 437 442 449 457 4GG CHAPTER XII. CAMPAIGNS SUBORDINATE TO THE SIEGE IN 1855— OPERATIONS AT EUPATORIA, .... EXPEDITION TO KINBURN AND THE DNIEPER, BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA, .... OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF AZOF, SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF KARS, . OMAR PACHA IN MINGRELIA, CHAPTER XIII. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH IN 1855— DISCUSSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS, . . . 470 THE ALLIED FLEETS IN THE BALTIC, . . 474 PROCEEDINGS IN THE WHITE SEA, . . . 483 PROCEEDINGS IN NORTH PACIFIC & KAMTCHATKA, 484 CHAPTER XIV. A SECOND WINTER IN THE CRIMEA— THE ALLIES IN SEBASTOPOL, .... 491 THE OPPONENT ARMIES OUTSIDE SEBASTOPOLJ 495 SUBORDINATE OPERATIONS DURING THE WINTER, 502 CAMP AND HOSPITAL IMPROVEMENTS, . . 506 CHAPTER XV. DIPLOMACY— VIENNA CONFERENCES TO THE PEACE- RESULT OF THE VIENNA CONFERENCES, . STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING IN ENGLAND, PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATION, TREATY OF ALLIANCE WITn SWEDEN, . PEACE CONGRESS AT PARIS, THE PACIFICATION, .... CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS, . 512 517 522 525 528 533 538 APPENDIX. I. TREATY OF PEACE- GENERAL TREATY, SIGNED AT PARIS, MARCH 30, 1856, . 551 II. CONVENTIONS ANNEXED TO TREATY OF PEACE— 1. CONVENTION RESPECTING THE STRAITS OF THE DARDANELLES AND THE BOSPHORUS, . 554 2. CONVENTION LIMITING NAVAL FORCE IN THE BLACK SEA, ...... 555 3. CONVENTION RESPECTING THE ALAND ISLANDS, 555 III. DECLARATIONS ON MEDIATION & PRIVATEERING— 1. EXTRACT FROM PROTOCOL NO. 23, RELATING TO MEDIATION AS A PREVENTIVE OF WAR, . 555 2. DECLARATION RESPECTING MARITIME LAW, 556 IV. DECLARATIONS ON THE AFFAIRS OF EUROPE— 1. EXTRACT FROM PROTOCOL NO. 22, RELATING TO GREECE, ITALY, THE PRESS IN BELGIUM, AND THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS, . . . 557 2. SARDINIAN, MEMORIAL RELATING TO THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY, 561 V. TURKISH CHARTERS, GRANTED BY THE SULTAN— 1. HATTI-SHERIF OF GULHAOTE, 1839, . . 562 2. HATTI-SHERIF OF 1856, .... 563 VI. FRENCH OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE WAR— 1. FRENCH FLEET IN TURKISH WATERS, 1854,. 566 2. FRENCH CRIMEAN ARMY IN FEBRUARY 1855, 566 3. EMPEROR NAPOLEON'S PLAN FOR A CAMPAIGN OUTSIDE SEBASTOPOL, 566 4. CANROBERT'S MOTIVES FOR RESIGNING, . 5G8 5. STRENGTH OF SIEGE-ARTILLERY AT FINAL BOMBARDMENT OF SEBASTOPOL, . . . 568 VII. ARMY ORGANISATION— 1. ON BRITISH MILITARY HOSPITALS, . . 568 2. COMMISSARY-GENERAL FILDEr's REMARKS ON THE COMMISSARIAT OF THE WAR, . . 569 VIII. HONORARY DISTINCTIONS TO THE BRITISH SERVICES— 1. CLASPS AND MEDALS, .... 2. INSCRIPTIONS ON FLAGS, .... 3. CLASPS FOR SEAMEN, .... 4. VICTORIA ORDER OF MERIT, 5. ORDER OF LEGION OF HONOUR, AWARDED BY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH TO BRITISH SUBJECTS, . . . . . . 572 570 570 570 570 INDEX, 577 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE, 5S3 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. TAGE Illustrated Title, .... 1 Nicholas I, ... 3 Initial Letter, .... 3 Constantinople, 16 Russian Soldiers, 23 The Holy Sepulchre, 29 Initial Letter, .... 30 Turkish Soldiers, 31 Bashi-Bazouks, .... 32 Omab Pacha, 41 Bucharest, .... 52 Wallachian Peasantry, 55 Initial Letter, .... 56 Battle of Sinope, 59 Count Nesseleode, 63 Louis Napoleon, . 68 Initial Letter, .... 75 Lord Raglan, 78 Valetta, ..... 80 French Soldiers and Zouave, 83 Gallipoli, .... 85 The Bosphorus, 89 Varna, ..... 94 Himalaya Steam-ship, 96 Interior of an Officer's Tent at Varna, 101 Anapa, .... 109 Odessa, ..... 113 Destruction of the Tiger, . 115 Baltschik, .... . 119 Initial Letter, 120 Map of Caucasian Provinces and Pal •ts of Asiatic Turkey, .... . 121 SCHAMTL, .... 123 Erzeroum, .... . 129 Trebizond, .... 131 Kars, ..... 134 Montenegro, 143 Tail-piece, .... . 151 Initial Letter, 152 Sib Charles Napieb— From a Photogr *ph by Mayall, 157 Duke of Wellington Screw War-steamer, . 159 Cronstadt, .... 168 Bomarsund and Neighbourhood, . 172 Attack on Fort Tzee, . 173 tage Map of Sveaborg, ..... 179 Riga, 181 Map of Kamtchatka and Neighbouring Seas, . 193 Destruction of Kola, White Sea, by H.M.S. Miranda, 24th August 1854, 194 Initial Letter, ..... 195 Landing at Old Fort, . . . . .205 Peince Menchikoff, .... 212 Battle of the Alma, 216 Plan of the Battle of the Alma, ... 217 Marshal St Aenaud, ..... 225 Sebastopol, 229 Balaklava, ...... 233 Karniesch Bay, ..... 236 Plan of Sebastopol, with the Works of the Allies, October 17, 1854, 248 Bombardment of Sebastopol, October 17, 1854, . 249 Battle-ground of Balaklava, .... 256 Sie de Lacy Evans, .... 261 Map of Battles of Balaklava and Inkermann, . 264 Tail-piece, . . . . . . 273 Initial Letter, . . . . . .274 Winter Scene between Port and Camp, . . 289 Lord Raglan's Head-quarters, .... 293 Barrack Hospital, Scutari, . . . 300 Miss Nightingale, ..... 308 An Hospital Interior, .... 309 Railway at Kadikoi — Head-quarters of Sir Colin Campbell, 321 Eupatoria from the Sea, .... 332 Caneobeet, ...... 337 Returning to the Camp after a Reconnaissance, . 340 The Mamelon, ...... 344 The Sultan Abdul-Medjid, . . . 345 Initial Letter, ...... 345 Eael of Abeedeen, .... 361 Nicholas I., as he appeared immediately after death, 369 Sulina Mouth of the Danube, .... 373 Liitial Letter, ..... 376 Victoe Emmanuel II., King of Sardinia, . . 385 Literior of an Officer's Hut before Sebastopol, . 391 Initial Letter, 392 Bastion du Mat, or Flagstaff Battery, . . 393 Night in the Trenches, ..... 397 LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS. The Cemetery opposite the Central Bastion, . Attack by General Mayran's Division on Works near the Malakoff, . General Simpson, . General Pelissier, The Malakoff, Initial Letter, . Fort of Kinburn, Tchernaya Bridge, Entrance to the Sea of Azof, Kertch, . General Williams, Plan of Siege of Kars, Hospital at Smyrna, 'AGE 408 Initial Letter, . TAGE . 470 Gun-boat, .... 473 416 Bevel, ..... , . 475 421 Admiral Dundas, . 480 425 Map of De Castries Bay, Gulf of Tataiy, . 485 432 Burial-place of the English and French killed at 433 Petropaulovsk, in September 1854, . , . 490 440 Initial Letter, 491 444 British Military Hospital, Balaklava, . . 507 452 Camp Theatre, outside Sebastopol, 511 456 Initial Letter, .... . 512 460 Czar Alexander H., 528 464 Balaklava Harbour, . 550 469 Tail-pieces, ..... 576, 581, 582 Various Tail-pieces, Vignettes, &c. MAPS AND LITHOGRAPHED VIEWS. Sebastopol, 9th September 1855. (Facing Title-page.) Bussia in Europe in the Middle of the 15th Century, with its Extension in 16S9 and 1855 Turkey in Europe, ..... Baltic Sea, Gulf of Finland, Cattegat, &c, Cronstadt, ...... Crimea, ....... Portion of the Crimea, forming Chief Scene of Warfare, Plan of the Siege of Sebastopol, previous to Final Assault, Sea of Azof, ...... Caucasus, and Portion of Turkey in Asia, Fortifications of Sveaborg and City of Helsingfors, 24 152 167 195 232 392 449 457 479 CHAPTER I. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAIL-PREPARATIONS. UROPE might be said to have ■ been, at the beginning of 1853, in i a state of profound peace. The revolutionary agitations of 1848 and 1849 had ended in a reaction which left the old governments at case, and had fixed Louis Napoleon as Emperor of France. England, advancing under favour of free-trade and the development of her colonial gold-fields in a career of unexampled prosperity, had no serious apprehension of war, and was, on her own part, little prepared for such an event. Yet at this time, a series of comparatively obscure transactions was in progress in a remote part of Europe, which was soon to involve us in a contest of the most sanguinary character. TRADITIONARY AGGRESSIVE POLICY OP RUSSIA. If we survey the history of Europe from the commencement of the last century, and set aside from it the career of revolutionised France between 1792 and 1815, we shall be struck by nothing so CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR, much as the progress made during that time by Russia, in extent of territory and in influence over the affairs of other states. In the middle of the fifteenth century, as will be seen by a glance at the accompanying map, what is now Russia consisted only of the grand-duchy of Moscow — a limited territory in the centre of Northern Europe, scarcely known even by name in the countries of the West. From that nucleus, in pursuance of an ambitious policy, and by a scries of skilfully executed manoeuvres, it has been enlarged in all directions, till it now embraces the vast region lying between the Arctic Ocean on the north and the Black Sea on the south, with the Pacific as its eastern and the Baltic as its western boundary. Previous to the reign of Peter I., surnamed the Great, who ascended the throne in 1G89, the history of Russia presents only a succession of savage struggles with surrounding nationalities. The ruling authority had attacked and been attacked by Mongols, Tatars, Cossacks, Turks, Lithuanians, Poles, and Swedes ; and, advancing in power, had acquired the title of Czar or Emperor. Slavonic in race and language, and professing the Greek form of Christianity, the Russian people have never inter- mingled with the Western nations, but may be said, as a race, to partake of that character which wc associate with the semi-civilised inha- bitants of Asia. Amidst the rude Slavonians, Peter arose as a reformer of manners ; and not- withstanding some grave faults, deserves to be spoken of as one of the greatest men in an age prolific in distinguished persons. His personal history is well known, and need not be repeated. What concerns us at present, is his eager desire to extend as well as to consolidate the Russian power. Peter was animated with great aspira- tions. Besides desiring to civilise his people, his aim was to elevate them to the position of a leading nation ; and he lived to accomplish his purpose. Assuming the title of 'Emperor of all the Russias,' he vastly enlarged his dominions, built cities, created a navy and a well-disciplined army ; and, aiming at trade with India, pushed his conquests to the borders of the Sea of Azof. In these projects may be perceived the first encroach- ment on the Ottoman dominions, which, during a period of nearly two centuries, would appear to have been the coveted prey of Russia. In 1709, Peter established a series of posts from the Volga to the Don ; and at the mouth of this latter river built Taganrog, as a centre of intercourse on the south, whence further advances could be effected. He was, hoAvever, in 1711, obliged to relinquish Taganrog and the Sea of Azof to the Turks. Being thus shut out from Persia and India by a route westward of the Caucasus, he turned to the east. In 1717, he sent Prince Alexander BekcA T itch on an apparently friendly mission to Khiva, eastAvard of the Caspian, but with secret orders to seize certain gold-mines, in Avhose exist- ence he thought he had reason to believe ; but the Khivans were as cunning and cruel as he Avas treacherous ; they defeated his plan, and destroyed all the members of his embassy. He next sent an embassy to Persia, to open commercial relations with India ; and here Peter met with that Avhich the czars haA r e ever seemed to take delight in — a discontented tributary to a neighbouring monarch. The governor of Kandahar Avas at issue Avith his sovereign, the Shah of Persia. Persia Avas weak, and was attacked by Turks, Afghans, and Lesghis all at once. Peter, in 1722, interfered in the Avonted Russian fashion : he ' protected ' his ' old good friend the shah,' his ' great friend and neighbour,' his ' dear friend,' as he called him in a remarkable manifesto ; he sent an army of 50,000 men into Persia; and ended by conquering and appropriat- ing three Persian provinces on the shores of the Caspian. After this, the Afghans deposed one shah and set up another: this was a favourable opportunity for Russia; Peter offered his aid to the deposed monarch, on condition of certain con- cessions ; and the result was, that in a few years Russia obtained a hold on Daghestan, Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Asterabad — valuable provinces on the south-Avestern shore of the Caspian. All the ambitious proceedings of Peter in the East Avere, however, suddenly checked. The terrible Nadir, the freebooter of Khorassan, Avho made himself Shah of Persia, Avas an antagonist such as Russia had not before encountered in Asia. Nadir first attacked the Afghans, driving them from all their conquests in Persia ; then turned AvestAvard, and similarly expelled the Turks from certain provinces which they had appropriated ; and then directed his attention to Russia, Avho Avas forced to relinquish every Asiatic acquisition she had gained. Thus ended Russian aggression in the East for a time. Peter himself had departed from the scene; he died in 1725; and the treaty of 1735, Avhercby the Russians evacuated the Persian provinces, was made with one of his successors. After Peter's death, the throne Avas held by his AvidoAv Catherine. This remarkable woman had been a peasant ; her most powerful minister, Prince Menchikoff — ancestor of the prince who was concerned in the events of 1853 — had been a pastry-cook's boy in the royal kitchen ; and neither of the two could read or Avrite. Nevertheless, Russia prospered during this short reign of two years, although Catherine's foreign acquisitions Avere limited to the exaction of homage from the Kubinskan Tatars, and of allegiance from a Georgian prince. After her death, in 1727, there was a succession of feeble reigns, during which Russia Avas too much occupied Avith domestic affairs to attend much to foreign conquests ; yet she was not idle. In the triangular portion of country betAveen the Don, the Volga, and the Caucasus, Avere various tribes — Kalmuks, Nogays, and Circassians — nomad in habits, and more or less tributary to surrounding nations. Russia turned a Avistful eye upon these. She sent some AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF RUSSIA. missionaries to convert to Christianity the Osse- tians, a pagan tribe in the Caucasian mountains ; whether or not they succeeded in this, they at least made the Ossetians consent to become tributary to Russia. The Ossetian country opened a pathway to Georgia, a fertile region for which Persia and Turkey had long struggled ; and Russia turned her attention to this path. Catherine II., during her reign from 17G2 to 1796, was the great representative of Russian aggres- sion. Of her personal character, we have not here to speak ; but her conduct as an empress towards her neighbours, as of vast political importance, cannot pass unnoticed. Her tyranny over the tribes near the Caucasus, in the early years of her reign, was such, that the Circassians took refuge in the almost inaccessible fastnesses of their mountains ; the Nogays sought refuge with the Khan of the Crimea — then an independent Tatar state ; the Kabardans of Circassia abandoned Christianity for Islam, as a means of exchanging Russian for Turkish rule ; and the Kalmuks took the wonderful resolution, in 1771, of departing in a body to their own original territory in Chinese Tatary, on the borders of the Tibetan dominions. History has, perhaps, recorded nothing more striking than this voluntary journey of half a million human beings, to a distance of probably two thousand miles, as a means of escaping from Russian despotism. When, at a later date, troubles broke out in Georgia — a fertile country southward of the Caucasus, and between the Black and Caspian Seas — and Persia and Turkey struggled for its possession, Russia stepped in on her wonted footing, offered to assist the one against the other, and ultimately took Georgia itself as her reward. While these affairs were in progress in Asia, Catherine was not idle in Europe. Poland had fallen into difficulties concerning the succession to the crown, and Catherine succeeded in placing one of her dependents on the throne, and overrunning Poland with her agents. Turkey now became uneasy at the progress of the czarina, for the possession of Poland would bring Russia too near the Ottoman dominions ; and the sultan, having a stock of injuries to complain of, declared war against Russia in 1769. England assisted Russia in this war with a fleet ; and the results were so disastrous to Turkey, that she was driven to many humiliating concessions in the Treaty of Kainardji in 1774* By this treaty, Russia secured the free navigation of the Black Sea, the passage of the Dardanelles, the privilege of having one ship of war in those regions, and the acquisition of Azof, * As the treaties and conventions between Russia and Turkey will frequently be mentioned, the following list may be useful, relating to the period between 1774 and 1849 : — Treaty of Kainardji, 1774 ' Constantinople, .... 1783 » Jassy, 1792 » Bucharest 1812 ' Adrianople, .... 1829 « Unkiar-Skelessi, . . . .1833 « St Petersburg, .... 1834 » Constantinople, .... 1836 » London, 1841 » Balta-Liman, .... 1849 Taganrog, Kertch, and Kinburn ; she secured an extension of her frontier to the river Bug or Boug, assumed the sovereignty of Kabarda, near the Caucasus ; and obtained the renunciation by Turkey of suzerain power over the Khan of the Crimea — a renunciation which Russia did not fail afterwards to turn to her own advantage. These successes were not all that Catherine wished, but they paved the way for more. In 1776, she established a line of posts, including nearly thirty fortresses, from the Black Sea to the Caspian. A few years afterwards, the Christian princes of Georgia, Imeretia, and Mingrelia — all on the southern base of the Caucasus — flattered by Russian gifts, or intimidated by Russian threats, transferred their allegiance from Turkey to Russia ; as did also the chiefs of many petty principalities in the Persian dominions. The Treaty of Kainardji had rendered the Crimea independent of Turkey ; and Catherine immediately began to ' protect ' the khan in that extraordinary way so peculiar to Russia. The Russian deter- mination to obtain Constantinople, also began about this time to be openly acknowledged ; and hostilities again commenced between the Russians and the Turks. Potemkin and Suvaroff poured their troops into the Caucasian region ; while other armies, under pretext of assisting the khan against the Turks, forcibly seized the Crimea, expelled and deposed the khan, and slaughtered all the Tatar nobles who tried to maintain the independence of their sea-girt peninsula. About the same time, too, she offered her ' protection ' to the voy vodes or princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, and contrived that they should look up to her, rather than to the sultan, as a suzerain ; the Christians in Bulgaria and Servia were also encouraged to revolt, and to claim her protection whenever they pleased against the sultan — all in defiance of any pre-existing treaties. The conquest and massacre in the Crimea occurred in 1783 ; but there had previously been a treaty, signed at Constantinople in 1779, containing a few clauses which effected but little in settling the relations between the two countries. They made a commercial treaty together in 1783 ; but Catherine did not announce her determination to seize the Crimea until after this signing. The city of Kherson was built at the mouth of the Dnieper, in suspicious proximity to the Turkish frontier ; .and in 1787, Catherine made a brilliant entry into her new city, passing under a triumphal arch, on which was inscribed in the Greek tongue — ' The Way to Byzantium.' Again did Russia and Turkey go to war ; and again was the war ended by a treaty — signed at Jassy in 1792 — disastrous to the latter power : she was forced to yield the territory between the rivers Bug and Dniester ; to relinquish all control over Georgia and the neighbouring provinces ; and to give Russia a certain claim to influence in other quarters without actual sovereignty. While making these aggressions towards the south, Catherine was not less successful in extending CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. her empire towards the west. Poland suffered its first great disaster in 1772— its 'first partition.' There is much reason to believe that Prussia suggested this nefarious project— that Frederick planned it with Catherine ; and that a slice was given to Austria, as a means of winning consent to the spoliation. By the Treaty of St Petersburg, signed August 5, 1772, Russia grasped Polotsk, Vitepsk, Micislaf, and Polish Livonia ; Prussia helped herself to Malborg, Pomerania, Varmia, and portions of Culm and Great Poland ; Austria appropriated Galicia, with parts of Podolia and Sandomir ; while distracted Poland had to do as she best might with what was left to her. Russia acquired 3440 square leagues of territory, and 1,500,000 inhabitants. If Prussia suggested the first partition, assuredly Russia dictated those which followed. Exhausted alike by internal dissensions, external attacks, and foreign bribery of her subjects, Poland became yearly more and more powerless ; until at length, in 1793, the ' second partition ' took place, by which the Russian boundary was advanced to the centre of Lithuania and Volhynia ; while Prussia obtained the remainder of Great Poland and a portion of Little Poland — Austria taking no part in this spoliation. Poland was by this time reduced to 4000 square miles. The attempt of the brave Kosciusko to restore the liberties of his country was disastrous ; it brought about the ' third partition,' in 1795, which blotted Poland from the list of nations. Austria took Cracow and the country between the Pilitza, the Vistula, and the Bug ; Prussia absorbed the country as far as the river Niemen ; while Russia appropriated all the rest. The large area of these acquisitions by Russia is clearly shewn in our map. During the reigns of Paul and Alexander (1796 to 1825), Russia obtained a larger area of country from Persia than from Turkey. Paul seems to have inherited from Catherine two great desires — for a road to India through Persia, and a road to Constantinople through the Danubian provinces. Independently of these, however, the provinces between the Black and Caspian Seas were useful to Russia on other grounds. During the first quarter of the present century, there was an almost unceasing struggle between Russia and Persia, marked every now and then by the cession of provinces to the former. Thus, Georgia was perma- nently annexed in 1800 ; Mingrelia and Imeretia, in 1802; Sheki, in 1805; and various other patches of country, in 1812 and 1814. Turkey had a few years of release from open war with Russia after the death of Catherine ; but the intrigues in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, became so intolerable, that the sultan declared war upon the czar in 1S06. Turkey narrowly escaped a snare. In 1804, during the complexity of European politics, a friendly alliance was just on the point of being formed between Turkey and Russia ; but Sultan Selim luckily looked closely at one of the clauses, and found that the Czar Alexander claimed, as part of the price paid for Russian friendliness, that all the subjects of the Porte professing the Greek religion should be placed under the immediate protection of Russia. The sultan refused to concede this, and war ensued some time afterwards. Turkey was in a wretched position : Paswan Oglu, in Widdin ; Ali Pacha, in Albania ; Djezzar Pacha, in Syria ; Mehemet Ali, in Egypt ; Czerny George, in Servia ; Ypsilanti, in Moldavia — all were more or less in a state of rebellion against the sultan, obeying him or not as their inclinations varied. The Peace of Tilsit gave a short respite to Turkey ; but hostilities soon recommenced, and continued several years. When a settlement of accounts took place, by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, the czar obtained Bessarabia (by which his frontier was advanced westward from the Dniester to the Pruth) — secured the navi- gation of the Danube to merchant-ships — obtained for his ships of war a right to ascend the Pruth up to its junction with the Danube — procured an amnesty for the rebellious Servians who had aided him — and stipulated for the demolition of the fortresses recently erected by the Turks in Servia. Thus, again, was Turkey despoiled by its formidable northern neighbour. The Treaty of Tilsit sanctioned a few juggling arrangements, by which portions of Poland were bandied about from one spoliator to another ; but all these changes ended in the permanent an- nexation of the greater part of that kingdom. Sweden was destined next to suffer. Taking as a pretext the refusal of this state to close her ports against England, during a disagreement between Russia and England, Alexander suddenly despatched an army to Finland, without any declaration of war ; and when Sweden thereupon declared war, two years' hostilities ensued, which ended with the Treaty of Friedrichsham in 1809. By this treaty, Sweden surrendered Finland, the whole of East Bothnia, and a part of West Bothnia lying east of the river Tornea. With her most fertile provinces, she lost more than one-fourth of her inhabitants. These transac- tions were without sufficient warrant on any principle of justice. Alexander invaded a neigh- bour's country without declaring war ; and when the injured monarch resisted the inroad, he was punished for his resistance by a vast loss of territory. A striking parallel has been pointed out between the proclamation of General Buxhowden in Finland in 1808, and that which Prince GortchakofF issued in Moldavia forty-five years afterwards — noticed in a later page. In both places, a Russian general invaded the territories of a neighbouring power ; and in both instances the general issued a proclamation to the inhabitants. Buxhowden states, in high-sounding terms, the motives which induced the czar ' to place your country under his protection, and to take possession of it, in order to procure by these means a sufficient guarantee in case his Swedish majesty should perse- vere in the resolution not to accept the equitable conditions of peace that have been proposed to him. AGGRESSIVE POLICY OP RUSSIA. It is his imperial majesty's pleasure, that all the affairs of the country should have their ordinary course in conformity with your laws, statutes, and customs, which will remain in force so long as his imperial majesty's troops shall be obliged to occupy the country. The civil and military functionaries are confirmed in their respective employments, always excepting those who may use their authority to mislead the people, and induce them to take measures contrary to their interests. All that is necessary for the maintenance of the troops, shall be paid in ready money on the spot. All provisions shall be paid for according to an amicable agree- ment between our commissaries and those of the country.' In both cases, the reasons alleged were fallacious, and the promises were broken. The congress of Vienna, which 'settled' the affairs of Europe in 1815, left Russia in possession of the whole of her ill-acquired conquests in Poland, Finland, Turkey, and Persia. In later years, when Nicholas had succeeded to Alexander in 1825, Russia fomented disturbances in Greece ; then offered her military aid to Turkey to quell the disturbances ; and then professed to be offended at the refusal of her kind offices. Nicholas also incited Persia to attack Turkey. In July 1827, England and France, influenced doubtless by a kind wish concerning Christian interests in Turkey, signed, with Russia, the Treaty of London, binding all three to insure a settlement of the Greek affairs of Turkey. Only a few months afterwards, Russia signed the convention of Akermann with Turkey, in which Russia bound herself to a certain course, which could not possibly be reconciled with the Treaty of London. That ' untoward event,' the battle of Navarino ; the destruction of the Turkish navy ; the forced acknowledgment of the independ- ence of Greece — all strengthened the czar ; and when, after two campaigns in 1828-9, the Treaty of Adrian ople was signed, the sultan was forced to yield Anapa and Poti, with a considerable extent of coast on the Black Sea — a portion of the pachalik of Akhilska — the two fortresses of Akhilska and Akhilkillak — and the virtual possession of the islands formed by the mouths of the Danube. But this was not all. The treaty arranged for the abandonment of certain Turkish fortresses ; it stipulated that Moldavia and "Wallachia should bo governed according to arrangements which Russia had introduced when she ' protected' them ; it claimed increased immunities for Russian subjects in Turkey ; it stipulated for the payment of an immense sum, to defray the expenses of Russia in the war; and it allowed the czar to retain the Principalities and Silistria until the money was paid. About the same time, too, by the Treaty of Turcomanchai, Russia obtained immense advan- tages in Persia — immense, not so much in respect to the area of territory annexed, as in the com- mand given to Russia over the Caspian Sea and the Caucasian provinces. Russia was not yet worn out with her efforts in 'protecting' Turkey. Mehemet Ali, the Pacha of Egypt, raised a formidable revolt against, the sultan; and the latter was so ill advised as to accept the aid of Russia to quell it. The effects of this appeared in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, in 1833, when Turkey agreed to assist Russia in case of need — which Russia cared little about ; and Russia agreed to assist Turkey in case of need — Avhich Russia greatly wished. A secret article was inserted in this treaty, to the effect that Russia would forego the debt from the last war, if Turkey would close the Dardanelles against all vessels of war whatever, except those of liussia ! Russia had now attained to a dangerous position — she became the ' protector' of Turkey in gene- ral. The other states of Europe took the alarm. They did not seem to regard as important a treaty which prevented any Mohammedan from living in "Wallachia or Moldavia, or any Turkish army from remaining in those countries ; nor were they moved by the Treaty of St Petersburg in 1834, which gave increased power to Russia in Asia Minor ; but the closing of the Dardanelles alarmed them. Hence, after many contentions, an agreement was signed in London, in 1841, by Turkey, Russia, Austria, England, and France, that the Dardanelles should be closed against all ships of war so long as Turkey should bo at peace ; and that Turkey should be allowed to call in the naval aid of any one of the five, in case of attack from any of the others. This convention, as we shall see afterwards, had an important influence on the conduct of England and France in 1853. The last in this scries of treaties was the con- vention of Balta-Liman in 1849, whereby the affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia were settled ; but in such a way as to leave the sultan little control over these provinces of his empire, and allowing the czar to interfere in that 'protective' mode Avhich is so peculiarly Russian. It may be useful to sum up the gains of Russia from Turkey and Persia between 1774 and 1812, omitting all mention of those from Poland and Sweden. FROM TURKEY. Country to the north of the Crimea, . . 1774 The Crimea, 1783 Country between the Caspian and the Sea of Azof, 1783 Country round Odessa, . . . . 1792 Bessarabia, 1812 FROM PERSIA. Georgia, 1800 Mingrelia, 1802 Imeretia, 1802 Ganja, 1803 Shelri, 1805 Kara-bagh, 1805 Shirvan, 180G Talisb, on the Caspian, .... 1812 Since that date, Russia has obtained from Persia the cession of Erivan, Mount Ararat, Etchmiazin, and Akalzia ; while from Turkey she has obtained important posts on the east, north, and west shores of the Black Sea, a commanding influence at tho 8 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. mouths of the Danube, and an irritating kind of influence in nearly all the provinces still left to the sultan, leaving it doubtful how far the latter is master in any part of his dominions. We should form an inadequate idea of Russian capacity, if we imagined that these acquisitions were gained exclusively by the valour of soldiers and the skill of generals. Since the reign of Peter I., Russia has effected some of the greatest designs by adroitness in diplomacj^. Scheming and far- sighted, and sparing no means to attain any desired end, this remarkable power has established agents in every coi-ner of Europe and Asia, and, it may be added, America — male and female, open and avowed, secret and furtive, commercial and mili- tary, princely and plebeian, literary and scientific, connected with the press as Avell as with the recesses of private life. Some of this extraordinary army of agents are accredited to foreign courts, for ostensible purposes ; some arc merely spies, appointed to detect and report on the ' nakedness of the land,' moral or material ; while others appear to have a mission combining the powers of the envoy and the spy. Brilliant, fluent, accomplished, polished — the Russian agents are difficult to resist, and as difficult to match ; while, if occasion seem to need it, these fascinating qualities can quickly be exchanged for a kind of overbearing audacity, which scares the timid into submission. Sparing no expenditure of means to accomplish an object, and unrestrained by constitutional forms, the ruling power in Russia pursues a steady omvard progress of deceit and aggression, as if governed by but one principle — that of aiming at universal empire. The policy of other European nations may at various times have been aggressive, but that of Russia stands apart ; it has peculiarities of its own, and those peculiarities impart to it a character which other nations will do well to study. The policy is traditionary, or rather hereditary ; it is handed down from father to son, from one generation to another. Alexander has promised to his subjects, that he will carry out the plans of his father Nicholas ; Nicholas remembered Catherine ; Catherine bore in mind the conquests of Peter. The Greek priests have instilled into the minds of the people a belief that the favoured Russian nation must and will one day possess Constantinople ; and the half-savage serfs who are driven into battle, enter- tain an obscure notion that they are fighting, in part for this object, in part for their demi-god the czar. As for this demi-god, it is scarcely conceivable to what an extent the blasphemous teachings of the priests have extended. The fol- lowing two questions, with their answers, are extracted from the new catechism prepared for the use of schools and churches in the Polish provinces of Russia — literally translated : — ' Question. How is the authority of the emperor to be considered in reference to the spirit of Christianity ? Answer. As proceeding immediately from God. Q. What are the supernaturally revealed motives for this worship (of the emperor) 1 A. The supernaturally revealed motives are — that the emperor is the vicegerent and minister of God to execute the divine commands, and consequently disobedience to the emperor is iden- tified with disobedience to God himself ; that God will reward us in the world to come for the worship and obedience we render to the emperor, and punish us severely to all eternity should we disobey or neglect to worship him. Moreover, God commands us to love and obey from the inmost recesses of the heart every authority, and particularly the emperor — not from worldly con- siderations, but from apprehensions of the final judgment.' It was especially towards the late Czar Nicholas that this excess of reverential submission was demanded and shewn. Sir John M'Neill places in a striking light the mode in which the great Russian Colossus has stridden over surrounding nations : ' The acquisi- tions she has made from Sweden are greater than what remains of that ancient kingdom ; her acquisitions from Poland are as large as the whole Austrian Empire ; the territory she has wrested from Turke} r in Europe is equal to the dominions of Prussia, exclusive of her Rhenish provinces ; her acquisitions from Turkey in Asia are equal in extent to all the smaller states of Germany, the Rhenish provinces of Prussia, Belgium, and Hol- land, taken together ; the country she has con- quered from Persia is about the size of England ; and her acquisitions in Tatary have an equal area to Turke}'' in Europe, Greece, Italy, and Spain.' * Again referring to our coloured map, these vast acquisitions, which enlarged . the population of Russia from fourteen millions in 1722, to sixty- five millions in 1850, are rendered appreciable to the eye. Since the comparatively recent year 1772, Russia has acquired territory greater in extent and importance than the whole empire she had in Europe in that year ! Since then, ' she has advanced her frontier 850 miles towards Vienna, Berlin, Dresden, Munich, and Paris ; she has approached 450 miles nearer to Con- stantinople ; she has possessed herself of the capital of Poland ; and has advanced to within a few miles of the capital of Sweden, from which, when Peter the Great mounted the throne, her frontier was distant 300 miles. Since that time, she has stretched herself forward about 1000 miles towards India, and the same distance towards the capital of Persia. The regiment that is now stationed at her furthest frontier post on the western shore of the Caspian, has as great a distance to march back to Moscow as onward to Attock on the Indus ; and is actually further from St Petersburg than from Lahore, the capital of the Punjab. The battalions of the Russian Imperial Guard that invaded Persia found, at the termination of the war, that they were as near to Herat as to * Progress and Present Position, of Russia in the Hast. THE 'HOLY PLACES.' the banks of the Don; that they had already accomplished half the distance from their capital to Delhi ; and that therefore, from their camp in Persia, they had as great a distance to march back to St Petersburg as onward to the capital of Hindostan.' The circumstance especially needing attention, is not merely that these acquisitions are vast in area, but that they have all been made in the steady pursuance of one fixed policy. There is, indeed, something remarkable in the methodic system of Russian aggression, which presents almost the precision of a science. The authority just quoted has pointed out — what, indeed, may be gathered by any impartial reader of the past history of Russia — that this code or system presents four stages, which may be indicated by the words disorganisation, occupation, protection, and incorporation. First, by means of innumerable agents, Russia sows discord in a neighbouring country; she observes whether there are rival sects, rival races, rival claimants to the throne, rival parties in the legislature, rival interests in towns, discontents between the nobles and the peasants, discontents between the taxed and the untaxed ; and by means of subtle and well-schooled agents, often supplied with 'material' arguments in great plenty, she encourages internal dissensions, which weaken the stability of a state. If her agents are detected a little too soon, she scruples not to sacrifice them ; but if the agency be not very apparent, then comes the next stage. She occupies some of the provinces, kindly intent upon preA'cnting the dissentients from injuring each other, and from injuring her own subjects by a pernicious example. Then, having planted a foot firmly, matters are ripe for a display of mag- nanimity ; she offers protection ; she undertakes to shield the sovereign of the distracted country from his disorderly subjects ; she asks no money for this ; she requires only to be allowed to do good, but makes it a condition that her military forces shall hold undisturbed possession of the protected country. The fruit ripens ; the province is found, by degrees, to be unsatisfactorily placed under this divided allegiance ; and it requires only a very easy logic to shew that the protector, hale and strong, must necessarily be a better governor than the protected, sick and weak ; and then arrives the fourth stage — incorporation. Epigrammatic as this statement of the case may seem, it is no more than the simple truth. In Poland, in the Crimea, in Georgia, in Imcretia, in Mingrclia, all these four stages have been fulfilled ; in Moldavia and Wallachia, Russia has more than once arrived at the third stage, protection, after the second, or stage of occupation; and it is difficult to see how the manoeuvres of the ' Russian party ' — for there is a Russian party in almost every country — in Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Greece, and Persia, can be explained on any other principle than that of disorganisation — the first stage in a significant march towards annexation. Thus, a summary has been presented of the aggressive achievements of Russia down to the period when, in 1853, Nicholas I., following the hereditary policy of his house, and more accomplished than his predecessors, prepared to make a final clutch at what remained in Europe of the once great Turkish Empire. An excuse for this movement, as will be immediately shewn, was not wanting. THE 'HOLY PLACES' AT JERUSALEM: A SUBJECT OF CONTEST. It is a well-known principle in political govern- ment, that an independent power shall not be embarrassed by foreign interference. The equivo- cal right to protect Greek Christians in Turkey, granted or implied under treaties with Russia, was at variance with this sound maxim ; for it furnished the czar with a plausible reason for encroachment. One of the treaties which seemed to sanction this exercise of authority by Russia, was that of Kainardji.* On the general ground of protecting the members of the Greek Church in Turkey, a cause of quarrel was easily found ; but there was a more special reason at hand. It was the method of managing what are called the ' Holy Places,' which was alleged to be opposed to the rights of Russia. The Holy Places or Sanctuaries, at Jerusalem and Bethlehem, are certain buildings and frag- ments of buildings which — as is alleged by eccle- siastics of the Latin and Greek Churches — refer to the time of our Saviour, and were concerned in some of the momentous events of his ministry. Many recent writers reject as insufficient the evidence on which the location is inferred ; but this does not in any way disturb the faith of the thousands of pilgrims who visit the spot. As the * A careful perusal of the Treaty of Kalnardji will shew that, out of the twenty-eight clauses, there are only three which touch upon the liberties and privileges of Christians "in the Ottoman Empire, as follow : — ' Article VII. The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches ; and it also allows the ministers of the Imperial Court of ltussia to make, upon all occa- sions, representations, as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made in Art. XIV., as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such repre- sentations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly power. Art. VIII. The subjects of the ltussian Kmpire, as well laymen as ecclesiastics, shall have full liberty and permission to visit the Holy City of Jerusalem, and other places deserving of attention. No charatsch, contribution, duty, or other tax shall be exacted from those pilgrims and travellers by any one whomsoever, either at Jerusalem or elsewhere, or on the road ; but they shall be provided with such passports and firmans as are given to the subjects of the other friendly powers. During their sojourn in the Ottoman Empire, they shall not sutler the least wrong or injury ; but, on the contrary, shall be under the strictest protection of the laws. . . Art. XIV. After the manner of the other powers, permission is given to the High Court of Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the minister's residence, to erect in one of the quarters of Galata, in the street called Bey Oglei, a public church of the Greek ritual, which shall always be under the protection of the ministers of that empire, and secure from all coercion and outrage.' Groundless as are the vast protective claims of Russia, based on these three simple clauses, they are not strengthened by anything contained in the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), which merely states [Art. XV.) on this subject, that all former agreements remain in force, unless otherwise specified. 10 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. capital of the Hebrew kingdom, the Jews hold Jerusalem in high veneration ; as the chief scene of Christ's career, the Christians also venerate it ; and even the Mohammedans regard it with interest and respect. In so far as concerns the pilgrimages and the monastic services of Christians, they refer to the supposed sites of the ancient buildings; for none of the buildings of the New-Testament period actually remain, except a few ill-defined substruc- tures or foundations. The chief object of interest to Christian pilgrims, is the church which contains the alleged sepulchre of Christ — the ostensible, if not the real, source of solicitude to the Crusaders. This church, built by the Empress Helena fifteen centuries ago, is so large, and of such an oblong figure, and has so many projections or bays in particular parts, that the builder contrived to include within its walls various spots alleged to be connected with the death and burial of Christ — not merely the sepulchre itself, but also the scene of the crucifixion. This church, the work of the mother of Constantine the Great, was partly destroyed by fire in 1808 ; it was rebuilt with attention to the same included area, but with inferior materials. It is quite extraordinary to see how little change a century or two makes in bigotry : the Latins and Greeks quarrel about these Holy Places now, just as they quarrelled when Maundrell visited Jerusalem. As an example of contrast in time, but not in conduct, it may be well to give here Maundrell's account, written in 1697, of the sanctuary and its devotees : it will prepare us for the transactions of 1850. ' The Church of the Holy Sepulchre is founded upon Mount Calvary ; is less than 100 paces long, and not more than 60 wide, and yet is so contrived, that it is supposed to contain under its roof twelve or thirteen sanctuaries, or places con- secrated to a more than ordinary veneration, by being reputed to have had some particular actions done in them, relating to the death and resurrec- tion of Christ. As, first, the place where he was derided by the soldiers ; secondly, where the soldiers divided his garments; thirdly, where he was shut up, whilst they digged the hole to set the foot of the cross in, and made all ready for his crucifixion ; fourthly, where he was nailed to the cross ; fifthly, where the cross was erected ; sixthly, where the soldier stood who pierced his side ; seventhly, where his body was anointed, in order to his burial ; eighthly, where his body was depo- sited in the sepulchre ; ninthly, where the angels appeared to the women after his resurrection ; tenthly, where Christ himself appeared to Mary Magdalene. The places where these and many other things relating to our blessed Lord are said to have been done, are all supposed to be contained within the narrow precincts of this church, and are all distinguished and adorned with so many several altars. In galleries round about the church, and also in little buildings annexed to it on the outside, are certain apartments for the reception of friars and pilgrims ; and in these places almost every Christian nation anciently maintained a small society of monks, each society having its proper quarter assigned to it by the appointment of the Turks; such as the Latins, Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, Abyssinians, Georgians, Nestorians, Cophtites, Maronites, &c, all which had anciently their several apartments in the church. But these have all, except four, forsaken their quarters, not being able to sustain the severe rents and extor- tions which their Turkish landlords impose upon them. The Latins, Greeks, Armenians, and Coph- tites keep their footing still ; but of these four, the Cophtites have now but one poor representative of their nation left ; and the Armenians have run so much in debt, that it is supposed they are hastening apace to follow the example of their brethren who have deserted before them. Besides their several apartments, each fraternity have their altars and sanctuary, properly and distinctly allotted to their own use ; at which places they have a peculiar right to perform their own divine service, and to exclude other nations from them But that which has always been the great prize contended for by the several sects, is the command and appropriation of the Holy Sepulchre — a privilege contested with so much unchristian fury and animosity, especially between the Greeks and Latins, that in disputing which parties should go into it, to celebrate their mass, they have some- times proceeded to blows and wounds, even at the very door of the Sepulchre, mingling their own blood with their sacrifices ; an evidence of which fury the father-guardian shewed us, in a great scar upon his arm, which, he told us, was the mark of a wound given him by a sturdy Greek priest in one of these unholy wars The daily employment of the recluses inhabiting this edifice is, to trim the lamps, and to make devotional visits and processions to the several sanctuaries in the church. Thus they spend their time, many of them for four or six years together ; nay, so far are some transported with the pleasing contempla- tion in which they here entertain themselves, that they will never come out, to their dying day — burying themselves, as it were, alive in our Lord's grave.' Similar disputes respecting the same localities continued to scandalise and disgrace the Christian world ; for although the fire in 1808 destroyed much of that which Maundrell describes, the monks fought as fiercely as ever for possession of, or control over, the sites reputed holy. The successive sultans have repeatedly issued firmans and hatti-sherifs* respecting the Holy Places at Jerusalem — sometimes as a matter of favour ; sometimes as a means of allaying disputes between the Latin and Greek Christians. When the Saracens conquered Jerusalem, 621 a.d., the * The difference between these two kinds of Turkish documents seems to be this — a firman is a government order or permission, issued from any one of many different offices ; whereas a halti- sherif {sheriff, shereef, scherif) emanates more directly from the sultan, and is a result of his individual will and pleasure. THE 'HOLY PLACES.' 11 victor, Hazret-Omar-Hatap, placed the Holy Sepul- chre and its dependencies under the control of the Greek patriarch; and all other Christian bodies were rendered subordinate to him. During the eight centuries which next followed, and which witnessed so many conquests and reconquests of Jerusalem — Saracens, Turks, Tatars, and Crusaders, all gaining the ascendancy by turn — the Moham- medan regulations of the place cannot very clearly be traced ; but when the Sultan of the Turks became master both of Constantinople and of Jerusalem, the exercise of the Christian rites in the latter- named city became immediately dependent on the good-will of the Ottoman potentate ; and such has continued to be the case during the last 400 years. Sultan Mehemet, soon after the conquest of Constantinople, gave into the hands of the Greek patriarch a hatti-sherif, confirming the Greek Christians in all their rights of possession and immunities in regard to the Holy Places at Jerusalem. In the sixteenth century, two similar hatti-sherifs were granted by Sultans Selim and Suleiman ; in the seventeenth century, three more by Sultans Murad, Ibrahim, and Mehemet ; in the eighteenth century, four or five by Mehemet, Sulei- man, Osman, and Mustapha; while hatti-sherifs have, in later years, been issued by Sultans Selim, Mahmoud, and especially Abdul-Medjid. Some of these grants related to the Greek Church alone ; but in most cases they took cognizance of the wrangles between the Latin and Greek Christians. Thus, in 1G65 and 1668, Sultan Murad IV. issued two hatti-sherifs, ( one against the Armenians, and the other against the Papists, when the latter endeavoured to expel the Greeks from certain holy places of which they formerly held posses- sion.' Two other hatti-sherifs soon afterwards were strongly condemnatory of certain preten- sions put forth by the Latins and Armenians, leaving the Greek Church in full favour at Jerusalem. The emperors of Russia, during the last century and a half, have steadily kept in view these maxims or propositions, and have endeavoured to impress them on the minds of the sultans — that the Greek Church has always been more favoured than the Latin by the sultans ; that the czar is the recog- nised head of the Greek Church ; and that the czar has hence a right to interfere in all that concerns the Holy Places at Jerusalem. On the other hand, France insists that the Latins have always had privileges at Jerusalem, and that the kings of France have been recognised as 'protectors' of those Latins. For instance, a treaty between the sultan and Francis I., in the early part of the sixteenth century, consigned the Holy Places, and the monks who took care of them, to the protection of France. This treaty appears to have been the cause of numerous disputes — the Greeks refused to yield to the Latins ; and many of the hatti-sherifs adverted to in the last paragraph had for object the healing of feuds between the two bodies of Christians. In 1757, these disputes became so intolerable, that the Divan issued an ordinance expelling the Latins altogether from the Church of Bethlehem and the Church of the Tomb of the Virgin, leaving them access to other of the Holy Places, but placing the whole under the care of the Greek monks. In the year 1808, the Holy Sepulchre, as noticed above, was partly destroyed by fire ; and the Porte, in granting permission for rebuilding, gave this into the hands of the Greeks rather than the Latins ; and on this ground the Greeks afterwards claimed additional rights and prerogatives. There were prolific elements of discord here ; for the sultans, despising both the Latin and the Greek Christianity, cared little as to which should triumph over the other ; while the ordinances or hatti-sherifs, in giving custody of the Ploly Places, neglected to desig- nate those places by name ; and each body of monks succeeded in finding something 'holy' which had not been given over to the other. Scandals continued to arise so frequently, and Christianity became thereby so brought into con- tempt in the East, that Russia and France thought it proper to interfere — the one, as the protector of the Greek Christians ; the other, of the Latin. M. Dashkoff was sent from Russia, and M. Marcellus from France, in 1819, to make personal inquiries at Jerusalem concerning the state and occupancy of all the sacred buildings. The two envoj's made a minute examination, and sent in reports to their respective governments. It was hoped that the foundation was laid for an amicable settlement of the whole subject : but shortly after this, the troubles broke out between Turkey and Greece ; and troubles in other directions kept the subject in abeyance until the year 1850. Now, laying aside all doubts concerning the localities, a rational curiosity may arise to know the nature and number of the sacred buildings, or parts of buildings, in respect to which Christendom is thus divided. A document, drawn up by M. Marcellus in 1820, gives a list of these ; and it will be admitted, that the list bears no small resem- blance to the items in an auctioneer's catalogue — so much is the spirit of the subject frittered down by a string of petty details. There is a list, first, of the Sanctuaries or Holy Places, which, as France alleges, were possessed exclusively by the Latins in 1740 in Jerusalem, and outside Jerusalem ; next, of the Sanctuaries, both within and without Jerusalem, possessed by the Latins in common with other Christians in 1740; next, of the Sanc- tuaries whence the Latins had been altogether excluded by the events which occurred shortly before 1820 ; and, lastly, of the Sanctuaries which, exclusively belonging to the Latins in 1740, were shared by other bodies in 1820. The list is worth recording, as an example of the trifling matters which will sometimes plunge great nations into war. The original document was in French ; but the official translation, prepared for tho Parliamen- tary Papers on Eastern Affairs, assumes the form 12 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. here given in a note * M. Marcellus, at the same time, enumerated twenty-one ■ prerogatives' which he claimed for the Latins at Jerusalem, as follow : — ' 1. The fathers of the Holy Land, Latin monks, alone to possess the keys of the gates of the con- vents or sanctuaries above mentioned, and parti- cularly the three keys of the Altar of the Manger at Bethlehem. 2. They have a right to guard those places, to repair, maintain, decorate, and light lamps there. 3. To celebrate Holy Mass there, and to exercise the rites and ceremonies of their worship. 4. To take the lead over all other nations in their visitation of the pilgrimages of the Holy Places. 5. They have a right to visit the half of Mount Calvary which does not belong to them ; to celebrate mass on the aforesaid half ; and to light lamps there. 6. The Frank monks have an exclusive right to exercise their worship in the lower part of the cave of the Great Church of Bethlehem. 7. To prevent other nations from lighting lamps there, to celebrate their offices, * ' SANCTUARIES POSSESSED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE LATINS IN 1740. At Jerusalem — 1. The Holy Sepulchre ; that is to say, the grand cupola, called the Leaden Cupola, and the small cupola, situated under the larger one, and covering the tomb itself. The entire court -which sur- rounds the tomb, and the circular space between the pillars of the dome and the wall, now occupied by the chambers built by the Greeks after the fire. 2. The Grand Arch which separates the Greek Church from the dome, and which serves for the choir for the Latins when they perform their ceremonies before the tomb. 3. The Stone of Unction and the court which surrounds it, as far as the door of the church and the chamber now occupied by the Greeks. 4. The southern half of Calvary, that on which our Saviour was crucified ; the four interior arches which compose Adam's Chapel, in front of which are the tombs of Godfrey of Bouillon and of Baudouin, destroyed in 1811 ; as well as five other royal tombs, situated at the foot of the wall of the Greek choir ; the chamber at the side of Adam's Chapel. 5. The Grotto of the Invention of the Holy Cross, and of the staircase leading to it. 6. The entire court and the altar of the Church of the Magdalene ; the seven contiguous arches, called the Arches of the Virgin, below as well as above ; and the chapel called the Prison Chapel. 7. The small church situated at the side of that of the Magdalene ; the convent of the Latin Monks, with half of the gallery of the great cupola ; the adjoining chambers, the cistern, the gallery above the Seven Arches of the Virgin, and a covered passage leading to the cupola. 8. The chapel called the Holy Virgin's, outside the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, to the south of Calvary, and the entire space before the door of the church. 9. The Convent of the Holy Saviour, with the places appertaining to it, the church, gardens, &.C. Outside Jerusalem — 10. The Cemetery of Mount Sion. 11. The Tomb of the Holy Virgin, with the altars of St Joseph, St Joachim, St Anne. The keys of the church were in the hands of the Latins, who had the exclusive custody of them. Other nations, nevertheless, had each an altar in the church, but they could not perform service at them without the permission of the Latins, and the Tomb of the Holy Virgin itself was exclusively reserved for the latter. 12. The Grotto of Gethsemane, with the olive-trees and the adjoining grounds. 13. The Grand Church of Bethlehem altogether, excepting the baptistry ; the Grotto of the Manger, and the two staircases which lead to it. The Latin monks alone possessed the three keys — one of the door of the church, and the other two for each of the side-doors of the grotto. Masters of the church, they could freely enter, and there perform all the ceremonies of their religion at the high-altar of the church, as well as at the two altars situated in the grotto— that of the Nativity and that of the Manger. A silver star, bearing a Latin inscription, was fastened on the marble, on the spot where our Saviour was born. A piece of tapestry, bearing the arms of the Holy Land, and belonging to the Lathi3, covered the walls of the grotto. The Latin monks possessed, besides, at Bethlehem the square before the church, the entire cemetery, and the buildings known as those of the Old Mill. 14. The convent situated by the side of the Grand Church of Bethlehem, with the small Church of St Catherine, and all the grounds which extend as far as the Grotto of the Nativity, and and to exercise their religious worship there. 8. To oppose the visits of other nations to the Holy Places possessed by them, the Frank monks. 9. The actions at law brought against the Frank monks shall not be submitted to the authorities of the country, but referred to the Sublime Porte at Constantinople. 10. The Mogrebins are forbidden to offer any violence to the Frank monks at Aining'arim, under any pretext. 11. The Turkish custom-officers are forbidden to search the baggage of the monks, or Catholic pilgrims, Avhich had been searched in the Levant, where they landed. 12. It is likewise forbidden to take or delay the clothes of the monks, or the ornaments of the Latin churches. 13. To compel the monks to receive base coin. 14. To take money from them. 15. It is forbidden to demand the smallest fee from the Frank monks for the privilege of burying their dead. 16. To ill treat the monks who bring the usual tribute from Europe, in case they arrive too late. 17. To disturb in any manner the monks in which are the Sanctuaries of St Joseph, of the Holy Innocents, of St Eusepius, of Saints Paul and Eustasia, of St Jerome, of the adjoining garden, and of another garden situated near the grotto called the Grotto of Milk. 15. The Grotto of the Shepherds, and the grounds which surround it. 1G. The Church of St John the Baptist, in the village of Aiakarem, with the convent and the garden. 17. The spot where the Holy Virgin visited St Elizabeth, near the village of St John (Aintharem), and the Grotto of St John in the Desert. SANCTUARIES POSSESSED BY THE LATINS IN COMMON WITH OTHER NATIONS IN 1740. 1. The half of Calvary, which properly belongs to the Greeks — that on which the cross was placed. The Latins possessed, and still possess, the right of having a ceremony there on Holy Thursday. 2. The Church of the Tomb of the Virgin, on this understanding — that the other nations should each have an altar there, and per- form their ceremonies there, with the permission, and under the surveillance, of the Latin monks. SANCTUARIES AND POSSESSIONS FROM WHICH THE LATINS ARE NOW ALTOGETHER EXCLUDED. Jerusalem — 1. The Seven Arches of the Virgin, and the Chapel of the Prison. 2. The two interior arches of Calvary, the chapel in front, and the chamber which is by the side. The Tombs of Godfrey of Bouillon and of Baudouin have been destroyed. 3. A portion of the court surrounding the Stone of Unction, that part where the other tombs were which have been destroyed, the Greeks having pushed forward the wall in order to enlarge their church. The chamber on the right has likewise been taken possession of by the Greeks. 4. The space situated between the pillars of the cupola, and between the pillars of the wall, which the Greeks have filled up by building chambers there. They have likewise usurped about four "pics" of space under the great arch, by pushing forward, in order to enlarge their church, the wall which separates it from the cupola. Outside Jerusalem — 5. The entire church which encloses the Tomb of the Holy Virgin, and the garden by the side of it. The Latins can no longer perform their ceremonies there, nor even enter, without the permission of the Greeks, who have the keys. G. The Grand Church of Bethlehem altogether ; the two stair- cases which lead to the grotto ; the Altar of the Nativity in that grotto. The silver star has been carried off: there no longer remains anything but a few tatters of the tapestry belonging to the Latin monks. The three keys are at the present time in the hands of the Greeks. 7. The half of the two gardens of the convent at Bethlehem. 8. The place and the store known as that of the Old Mill. 9. The Grotto of the Shepherds, and the surrounding grounds. SANCTUARIES BELONGING IN 1740 EXCLUSIVELY TO THE LATINS, IN THE ENJOYMENT OP WHICH OTHER NATIONS NOW PARTICIPATE. 1. The Holy Sepulchre, and the court which surrounds it under the grand cupola. 2. The Stone of Unction. 3. The Grotto of the Manger at Bethlehem. The Greeks and the Armenians perform their ceremonies there at the Altar of the Nativity, and the Latins at the Altar of the Manger.' THE 'HOLY PLACES:'— 1850-1. 13 and pilgrims of the Holy Land, in the course of their visitations or pilgrimages. 18. To disturb them at any time in the exercise of their religious worship, so long as that worship out of doors is not contrary to the Mussulman laws. 19. The Turkish authorities arc forbidden to pay more than one visit each year to the Holy Sepulchre. 20. To compel the Frank monks to purchase damaged wheat. 21. The Latin fathers possess an exclusive right to send members of their com- munities or couriers to Constantinople, on business, without opposition.' Thirty years after these monkish trifles were thus recorded by M. Marcellus, troubles concerning them recommenced. In the beginning of 1850, the pope, and many Roman Catholic sovereigns, agreed to assist France in endeavouring to obtain a settlement of this knotty question ; urging that the Greeks had usurped property belonging to the Latins at Jerusalem, and had purposely allowed some of the chapels and monuments to fall into decoy. General Aupick, the French ambassador at Constantinople, formally made certain demands from the Porte ; but M. Titoff, the Russian ambas- sador, resisted them, insisting that the Greeks were in the right, and that Russia was their protector. Our ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, since become Lord Stratford de Redcliffc, at once saw that serious consequences might spring out of this simple matter, and counselled the Porte to be cautious of offending either party by conceding too much to the other. The Porte then proposed to appoint a commission, to examine all the firmans or hatti-sherifs which the Ottoman government had at any time given to any of the Christian communities at Jerusalem, with a view- to make arrangements in conformity with them. The sultan was much embarrassed by the urgent claims of the two great Christian poAvers ; and there can be no question, that he would honestly and in good faith have dealt equitably by them, had he seen his Avay clearly, for he had no sympathy with either in preference to the other. The British ambassador Avas fully alive to the difficulty of the sultan's position. In one of his dispatches to the home-government, he said : ' General Aupick has assured me, that the matter in dispute is a mere question of property, and of express treaty stipulation ; but it is difficult to separate any such question from political considerations, and a struggle of general influence, especially if Russia, as may be expected, should interfere in behalf of the Greek Church.' On another occasion, speaking of the Greek interest, he said: 'No one seems to doubt that every nerve will be strained by that church and nation to maintain their present vantage- ground, and that Russian influence, however masked, Avill be vigorously exerted, as on former occasions, to defeat the attack of the Latin party. He expressed an opinion that the Porte, 'in its embarrassment between the tAvo conflicting interests animated by religious zeal, Avould no doubt be glad to find an issue in some private arrangement betAveen the parties more immediately concerned ' — a Avish in Avhich he fully sympathised. The year 1850 passed aAvay in these discussions ; and 1851 commenced Avith a strong demand from General Aupick, urged by dispatches from Paris to insist on a restitution of the state of matters Avhich existed at Jerusalem in 1 740 ; Avhile M. Titoff, stimu- lated by dispatches from St Petersburg, insisted that no change whatever should be made at Jerusalem. The poor sultan was thus placed betAveen tAvo angry claimants, each of AA r hom would be offended by any concessions made to the other. In May, M. Lavalette succeeded General Aupick as French ambassador at Constantinople, and renewed the Latin claims in A'ery importunate terms. In July, the Porte appointed a commission to examine all the documents : and the report of the commis- sion Avas so far favourable to the Latins, that M. Lavalette thought himself entitled to raise his tone ; he said, that ' if the moderation of his government, in seeking only a joint participation of the Holy Places, Averc not appreciated, the claim of undivided possession by the Latins Avould be urged Avith all the Aveight of a demand Avar- ranted by treaty.' At this very time M. Titoff declared to the Porte, that he and his legation Avould immediately quit Constantinople, if the status quo of the sanctuaries Avas in any degree unsettled ! It is easy to picture the embarrass- ment of the sultan and his ministers at such a dilemma. The year 1851 passed away like that which preceded it, still leaving the French and Russian ambassadors striving which could extract most concessions from the Porte concerning the Holy Places, and still leaving the Porte uncertain Iioav to please both parties. Early in 1852, the Turkish ministers flattered themselves on the formation of an excellent plan : they offered to the Latins ' the right of officiating in the Shrine of the Virgin near Jerusalem, together with keys to the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem ; ' Avhile they offered to the Greeks ' the right of officiating, on certain occasions, in the mosque of Mount Olivet.' But, alas ! Lavalette spurned the concessions to the Latins, as being too insignificant, and Titoff equally spurned those on the part of the Greeks ; and the peaceful Avish of the Moslem Avas again frustrated. The British ambassador stated, in a dispatch to Earl Granville, that M. Titoff' ' expressed himself with unusual vehemence, and no small degree of irritation, against the proposed arrangement.' At length, on 19th March 1852, the British ambassador Avas enabled to transmit to his govern- ment a copy of a firman which the sultan had just issued, in relation to the Holy Places. It may be well to give this firman in full, in a note;* * ' FIRMAN. To thee, my A'izier, Ahmed Tacha, Governor of Jerusalem ; to thee, Cadi of Jerusalem ; and to you, members of the Mcdjliss. The disputes which, from time to time, ari>c between the Greek and Latin nations, respecting certain Holy Places which exist both within and without the city of Jerusalem, have now been again revived. A commission has, in consequence, been formed, composed of 14 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. because it presents some curious information con- cerning the actual state of those sanctuaries, and because it was itself a subject of renewed dispute afterwards. The month of August had scarcely- arrived, when M. Lavalette was found quarrelling with the Porte concerning the smallness of the con- cessions made to the Latins. The conciliatory spirit of the Porte is shewn in a remarkable way by the ' blessings ' called down upon the names of the sacred personages of Christianity in the firman ; so different from the generally conceived notion of the bigoted intolerance of the Mussulmans. But this concilia- tory spirit availed nothing as between the rival claims of the two Christian churches. The firman was considered to be more favourable to the Greek than to the Latin Church; and hence M. Lavalette was more dissatisfied with it than M. Titoff. The British consul at Jerusalem, in a dispatch to Lord Malmesbury, dated October 27, gives a curious account of one month's proceedings between certain ' Christian ' dignitaries in that city. It appears that they met by appointment, to settle matters of detail on the spot. There were M. Basily, M. Marabutti, and Prince Garari, as representatives of the Russian or Greek party ; M. Botta and Count Pizzamano, as representatives of the French or Latin party ; Afif Bey, and a suite of local effendis, as commissioners from the Turkish government ; together with the three patriarchs, Greek, Latin, and Armenian. The Russian agents arrived first. ' They were received with extraordi- nary honours ; refreshments awaited them at three different stations between Jaffa and Jerusalem ; the Greek patriarch went out to meet them ; and certain mucliirs and distinguished men of the law, and of other persons, to examine this question thoroughly; and this is the result of the researches and of the investigations of that commis- sion, and of those of the cabinet-councils held after the commission. The places in dispute between the two rites are — the great cupola cf the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; the little cupola, which is above the spot called the Tomb of Jesus, on whom may the blessing of God rest, and which is in the church before mentioned ; the lladjir-el-Moughtesil; Golgotha, which is also within the enclosure of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre ; the Arches of the Holy Mary ; the Great Church, which is in the village of Bethlehem ; as well as the Grotto, which is the true spot where Jesus — may the blessing of God be upon him ! — was born, and which is situated below that church ; and the Tomb of the Blessed Mary, whom may God bless. Seeing that the great cupola above mentioned applies to the entire church, the Latins have no right to claim exclusive posses- sion either of that cupola, or of the lesser cupola, or of the Hadjir- el-Moughtesil, or of Golgotha, or of the Arches of the Holy Mary, or of the Great Church of Bethlehem, or of the Holy Manger ; all these places must be left in their present state. In former times, a key of the two gates of the Great Church of Bethlehem and of the Holy Manger was given to each of the Greek, Latin, and Armenian nations — a measure which was also confirmed by the firman delivered to the Greek nation in the year of the Hcgira 1170; and that arrangement shall still continue. But as it does not follow from this, that it is permitted to alter the existing state of things in that church, or to prevent the Latins from officiating there, or, in short, to make any new arrangement calculated to incommode other sects, either in the passage from the church to the Holy Manger, or in other respects ; the smallest pretension in regard to this shall not be allowed or entertained, On the part of any one whatsoever. No change shall be made in the present state of the gates of the Church of Bethlehem. As, according to ancient and modern documents, the two gardens belonging to the Frank convent at Bethlehem, to which the Latins have also laid claim, are under the superintendence of both parties ; they shall remain as at present. The Latins, on the ground of certain firmans of which they are in possession, have advanced the pretension that the Tomb of the Blessed Mary belongs exclusively to them ; but they are not right in this either. Only since the Greeks, the Armenians, the Syrians, and the Copts at present exercise their worship within this holy they entered the city with an escort of 100 irregular cavalry, drums beating, and muskets firing.' After some days, the whole of them met ■ in the Church of the Resurrection, just in front of the Holy Sepulchre itself, and under the great dome; there they were regaled with sherbets, confectionaries, and pipes, at the expense of the three convents, who vied with each other in making luxurious display on the occasion.' Afif Bey made an oration, and announced the sultan's intention to repair the dome of the church at his own expense. The Russian or Greek party then waited impatiently for the reading of a firman which, as they sup- posed, would consign to their keeping the whole of the Christian sanctuaries of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Afif Bey read an order of the sultan, permitting the Latins to celebrate mass once a year, but requiring the altar and its ornaments to remain undisturbed. ' No sooner were these words uttered, than the Latins, who had come to receive their triumph over the Orientals, broke out into loud exclamations of the impossibility of cele- brating mass upon a schismatic slab of marble, with a covering cf silk and gold instead of plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before a crucifix which has the feet separated, instead of one nailed over the other.' It appears, from the details entered into by Mr Consul Finn, that each party attended in the full expectation of overthrowing the other; but that the Porte, in its vacillation, had issued contradictory orders, which could not possibly be reconciled. One of the sources of trouble was a certain ' silver star, which had been stolen in 1847, and which, the firman declared, tomb ; that is to say, as the exercise of worship is not confined to a single rite, it has been declared just to uphold and to confirm on behalf of the Roman Catholic Christians the permission which they possess ah antiquo, of exercising their worship in a spot where various nations exercise theirs, but upon condition that they shall make no alteration cither in the administration or in the present condition of that monument As this decision confirms and consolidates the rights which have been granted to the Greek subjects of my empire by my august ancestors, and confirmed by firmans invested with hatti- sherifs issued from my imperial throne — it has accordingly obtained my sovereign assent, as I have much at heart to maintain the above-mentioned rights. None of the parties shall allow themselves to contravene this decision. Furthermore, the Latins at the present day perform service once a year, on Ascension Day, in an oratory at Jerusalem, called Couhet- el-Messad, which is situated on Mount Olivet ; and the Greeks perform their devotions outside that oratory. Now, this oratory is a Mohammedan temple, and it consequently does not belong exclu- sively to any Christian sect; and I do not consider it right that the subjects of my empire who profess the Greek faith should be deprived of the power of worshipping in the interior of the above- named oratory. The Greeks shall, therefore, not be prevented from exercising their worship in the interior of the Couhct-el-Mcssad (the Cupola of the Ascension), on condition that they make no alteration in the present condition of that oratory, and that there shall be a Mohammedan porter at the door, as "heretofore. This measure shall be recorded at the head of the copy of the imperial firman, dated the month of Sheval 1254 (December 1838). Such is my decided and sovereign will ; and in conformity with the orders which I have in consequence given, the present firman, which is furnished with a hatti-sherif, and issued from my imperial Divan, has been delivered to the Greek nation. As soon as my sovereign orders shall become known to you, you will take every care that henceforward my decision and my commands above mentioned shall not in any way be contravened, either by those who profess the Greek, Armenian, Syriac, and Copt religions, or by the Latins. You will take care to have the present imperial edict recorded in the archives of the Mehkeme, to serve constantly, and for ever, as a permanent rule. Understand this ; and give heed to the noble signature with which it is decorated. Issued about the end of the month of Djemadi-ul-evel 12G8 (February 1852).' THE 'HOLY PLACES :'— 1852. 15 was to be replaced at the Latin expense. It was supposed to be brought on this occasion, having been approved of in Constantinople ; but on inquiry, it was found that no one had brought it, or knew where it had been left behind.' The close of the year 1852 was marked by a continuance of the same disputes as before at Constantinople, between Russia and France, but rendered more serious by mutual irritation. If a sultan's order or firman were issued, confirming the arrangements of 1740, it offended the Russian or Greek party ; if it departed from that arrange- ment, it offended the French or Latin party. Colonel Rose, in a dispatch to Lord Malmesbury on 20th November, stated, that the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre had for a length of time been in decay ; that the Greeks and Latins had disputed so violently who should repair it, that nothing was done; that the sultan had hereupon undertaken to repair it at his own expense ; but that further collisions were even then expected, concerning the question whether the inscriptions round the cupola should be in Greek or in Latin, and whether the sacred images in it should be made and habited according to the Greek or the Latin fashion ! The attempt seems almost hopeless to reconcile Chris- tian bodies who could thus wrangle in the sight of the Moslem — degrading the Cross not a little in tho sight of tho Crescent. Turkey promised Russia that the Latins 'should not be allowed to pass through the great door of tho Church of Bethlehem ;' but France threatened that, unless this privilege were conceded, a French fleet should enter the Dardanelles ; and so it was that the Turkish government, bandied about from the one to the other, knew not what course to adopt for the best. The British representatives, in con- formity with instructions from home, remained neutral, ready to aid in healing the differences, if opportunity arose. Colonel Rose represented this state of things forcibly, in a dispatch written to Lord Malmesbury on 20th November : ' The Porte's position is most disadvantageous. Against all her wishes and interests, she has been dragged into a most dangerous and difficult dispute between the great powers, who found their respective claims on contradictory documents, which date from remote and dark ages. The Porte, a Mohammedan power, is called upon to decide a quarrel which involves, ostensibly, sectarian Christian religious feeling; but which, in reality, is a vital struggle between France and Russia for political influence, at the Porte's cost, in her dominions. The sultan is required to be a judge, and to decide this dispute ; but so far from having judicial independence and immunity, his majesty is coerced, and humiliated before his subjects by menaces, forced to give contradictory and dishonouring decisions, and then accused of perfidy by those who have driven him into it.'* Just before the close of the year, tho much-talked -of silver star was brought in great pomp from Jaffa, and deposited in its proper place * Parliamentary Tapers on Eastern Affairs. Tart I. p. 46. in the Holy Sepulchre, and new keys for two of the buildings were made for the Latin monks. Thus the eventful year 1853 approached. There would be something merely ludicrous in the con- duct of these many grave men concerning such trifles, were it not that political ambition lurked behind the scene. The British ambassador at St Petersburg ascertained that the czar had com- menced warlike preparations at the beginning of 1853, or towards the close of 1852. The answer given to his inquiries was, that those preparations bore relation to the threats of France ; that if France adopted a hostile tone to the Porte in the interest of the Latin Christians, Russia would do the same on the part of the Greek Christians ; but that beyond this, she had no unfriendly intentions towards Turkey. In a dispatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow,* January 14, 1853, the Russian ambassador in London was urged to explain to the Earl of Aberdeen's government, as he had to that of the Earl of Derby, that the czar's only solicitude with Turkey had relation to the fulfilment of promises concerning the Holy Places. He complained that tho sultan's firman had not been read at Jerusalem ; that it had been treated with derision by tho Turkish officials ; that tho key — that unfortunate key! — of the Church of Bethlehem had been made over to the Latins ; and that tho Greek Christians had been grievously offended thereby. In another dispatch, from Count Nesselrodo to M. Kisscleff, at Paris (8th February), the gateway grievance is thus dilated upon: 'Matters at Jerusalem have got into such a state of confusion and disorder, that whilst a Catholic prelate, supported by the French consul, called in the assistance of the locksmiths of the town to open for him the great gate of the Church of Bethlehem, although he could have entered by the two other side-gates — Cyril, the patriarch of Jerusalem, a A r enerable old man, and generally remarkable for his conciliatory disposi- tion and for the moderation of his character, was compelled to protest, in writing, against these acts of violence, and to set out for Constantinople, in order to lay his complaints, and those of his nation, before the sultan.' It was now that Russia, on pretence that a charge d'affaires, such as had previously been at the Turkish capital, was not of sufficiently high rank to conduct such important negotiations, despatched Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople. The Russian grandee seems to have been purposely chosen from among the most arrogant and influential of the czar's favourites. The first Menchikoff, adverted to in a former page, was one of the creations of Peter the Great. First, a pastry-boy, who hawked about pics in the streets of Moscow, he was raised, step by step, into favour, until at length he became a major-general in the army, a prince of the empire, and governor of Ingria. The first advance was due to his intelligence in discovering a plot for poisoning Peter with some pastry, and his * Parliamentary Tapers. Tart I. p. 81. 1G CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. subsequent promotions were earned by mingled skill and cunning. Still greater was his power under Catherine, whom he assisted in gaining the throne after the death of Peter; he became first senator and field-marshal, albeit he could neither read nor write. From the powerful family thus founded, sprang the prince who acted as envoy from Nicholas to Abdul-Medjid in 1853. Prince Menchikoff came to Constantinople with all the halo which surrounds one high in favour with a powerful sovereign. He was one of the wealthiest men in Russia ; his estates were immense, and his serfs numerous ; his palaces were more than princely ; he had been made Minister of Marine ; he had had the important government of Finland placed under his control ; he had long been regarded as one of the chiefs of the Muscovite or old Russian party — a party which sets up Moscow Constantinople. against St Petersburg, and Slavonism against Germanism, and which works all the engines for the acquisition of power over the Ottomans. It is true that, in the external politics of Russia, Prince Menchikoff had taken little part. He had been a subaltern in the artillery ; then an emploj'e at the war-office; then an unsuccessful envoy to the court of Persia at Teheran; then a military officer at the siege of Varna in 1828; then an admiral of the Russian fleets; then chief of the censorship, by which any intellectual food for the Russians is either tamed down or removed altogether ; but in all these strangely incon- gruous positions, he had been very little known beyond the limits of his own country. High in favour, great in power, arrogant in bearing, he was a man to be dreaded at Constantinople — not so much for Avhat he had done, as for what he had been made. Full well did Colonel Rose appreciate the meaning and importance of the impression which Menchikoff desired to make. The British charge d'affaires was told in due form by the officials at the Russian mission, before the prince arrived, that that nobleman was about to land from Odessa ; that he had the title of ' Altcsse Serenissime ;' that he was an admiral, and the governor-general of Finland ; and that he was as high in rank and in the imperial estimation as Count Nesselrode, Prince Paskevitch, Prince Voronzoff, and Count Orloff— all of which was, perhaps, equivalent to saying : ' Tremble at the approach of so great a man !' As if to frighten the timid and embarrassed sultan still further, by the ostentatious magnificence of his display, Prince Menchikoff was accompanied by Count Demitri Nesselrode, son of the Chancellor of the Empire, Prince Galatzin, General Nikapotchinski, and Admiral Korniloff. Such was the Imperial envoy, whose hauteur was soon displayed. When received by the grand vizier on the 2d of March (1853), he used peremptory language; and on being invited to visit, as was customary, the minister for foreign affairs, Fuad Effendi, he at once refused, on the ground that Fuad had advocated measures hostile to Russia. The galling nature of this insult cannot be fully understood, without bearing in mind the importance of cere- monials in the eye of an Oriental. Colonel Rose THE 'HOLY PLACES:'— 1853. 17 describes this momentous visit in a dispatch •written 7th March, a few days after MenchikofFs arrival. He plainly saw that it was a had omen for Turkey. ' Prince Menchikoff, with his whole embassy, waited on the grand vizier at the Porte. It is an invariable rule, that a new ambassador makes the second visit of ceremony to the minister of foreign affairs ; but Prince Menchikoff, after leaving the grand vizier, although invited by Kiamil Bey, the Introducteur dcs Ambassadeurs, to visit Fuad Effendi, whose apartment adjoins those of the grand vizier, declined to do so. Prince Menchikoff, passing by the line of troops and Kavasses, and the very door of Fuad Effendi, which had been opened to receive him, left the Porte. The affront was the more galling, because great preparations had been made, for the purpose of receiving the Kussian ambassador with marked honours ; and a great concourse of people, particu- larly Greeks, had assembled, for the purpose of witnessing the ceremony. The incident made a great and most painful sensation. The grand vizier expressed to me his indignation at the premeditated affront which had been offered to his sovereign ; and the sultan's irritation was excessive. M. Benedetti and myself at once saw all the bearing and intention of the affront. Prince Menchikoff wished, at his first start, to create an intimidating and commanding influence ; to shew that any man, even a cabinet minister, who had offended Russia, would be humiliated and punished, even in the midst of the sultan's court, and without previous communication to his majesty.' The immediate consequence of the insult was, that Fuad Effendi resigned. By the sultan, anxious for conciliation, though greatly offended, the resigna- tion was accepted, and Rifaat Pacha was appointed as foreign minister. At this time Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador to the Sublime Porte, was absent in London ; but his place was filled by Colonel Rose, who seems to have had a shrewder sense of the designs of Russia than his principal. To him the conduct of Prince Menchikoff appeared in so serious a light, that, much to the surprise of quiet people in England, he sent a dispatch to Admiral Dundas at Malta, requesting him to send a squadron to the Dardanelles, as a check to Russian influence. This order the admiral did not feel at liberty to obey; and the home- government afterwards approved of his decision. The French authorities took a different view of the matter ; M. Benedetti, charge d'affaires at Constan- tinople, summoned a French fleet from Toulon, and the Emperor Napoleon sanctioned this arrangement. On the 8th of March, Prince Menchikoff had a formal audience of the sultan ; and soon after- wards the prince disclosed his views to Rifaat Pacha. There are many proofs that at that time the British government ill understood the state of affairs, and had very imperfectly plumbed the depths of the czar's schemes. The Earl of Clarendon wrote a dispatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour, British ambassador at St Petersburg, dated 23d March, in which he expressed himself as follows : — ' The reports current in Constantinople with respect to the real objects of Prince Menchikoffs mission, the alarm of the Divan, and the resignation of Fuad Effendi, the rumoured advance of a large Russian force to the Turkish frontier, the request made for the approach of the British fleet, and the orders given for the sailing of the French fleet, have naturally excited great alarm, both in England and France, with respect to the fate of Turkey, and the events of European importance that might at any moment occur in the East. Her Majesty's government have felt no alarm, and have not shared the apprehensions which the rumours and facts above alluded to might appear to justify ; for, on more than one occasion, they have received the personal assurances of the Emperor of Russia, that it was his determination to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire ; and that, should the views of his majesty undergo any change upon that important question, they should frankly be made known to Her Majesty's government. No such communication having been received, Her Majesty's government felt secure, that, whatever might be the objects of Prince Menchikoffs mission, neither the authority of the sultan nor the integrity of his dominions Avas exposed to danger.'* The sequel shewed how little value was to be placed on the 'personal assurances' of the czar. Prince Menchikoff had interviews with Rifaat Pacha on the 17th and 22d of March; and Colonel Rose soon ascertained that Menchikoff Avas endea- vouring to draw Turkey into a secret treaty with Russia, unknown to England or France. Some days later, the Russian envoy requested Rifaat Pacha to give a promise that the English and French ambas- sadors should not be informed of the nature of a secret treaty which Russia would propose. As Menchikoffs conduct had been marked by mingled arrogance and vagueness, Rifaat Pacha refused to give the required pledge ; the negotiation referred openly and ostensibly to the ' Holy Places ' at Jerusalem ; but it seemed as if the secret treaty was intended to mask some further inroad upon the independence of the Ottoman Empire. On the 1st of April, a further conference revealed the fact, that the czar demanded an unconditional control over all the Greek and Armenian subjects of the sultan ; offering, in return, ' to put a fleet and 400,000 men at the service of the sultan, if Turkey should ever need aid against any Western power whatever.' This complete system of ' protection ' would have been exactly Russian in both its clauses. The grand vizier refused the treaty, refused to keep the knowledge of it from France and England, and greatly offended Menchikoff; but Rifaat Pacha seemed disposed to have yielded to the Russian demands, had he not been controlled by a superior minister. * Parliamentary Tapers on the Eastern Question, 1S.54. Part I. p. 91. 18 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe arrived at Constan- tinople on the 5th of April, and resumed the exercise of that great influence which he had long held over the Ottoman Porte. He was speedily immersed in the diplomacy of the time and place. His advice to the Porte was, to keep the question of the Holy Places separate from any other question concerning the Greek Chris- tians of Turkey generally— to be conciliatory on the former, hut to be on their guard against any promises to Russia regarding the Greek Christians. Prince Menchikoff, on the other hand, evidently wished to insinuate the second question as a conse- quence of the first. There was about this time an extraordinary system of double-dealing on the part of the Russian government. Baron Brunnow, in reply to the Earl of Clarendon, and Count Nessel- rode, in reply to Sir Hamilton Seymour, protested over and over again that the armaments of Russia meant nothing, or nothing that should alarm the Turkish or other courts ; and yet there was a con- tinued pouring down of troops towards the Turkish frontier on the Pruth, and an evident augmentation of naval power in the Black Sea. Prince Menchi- koff, too, in reply to questions from the grand vizier and Rifaat Pacha, evaded any direct expla- nations concerning the purport of these warlike manifestations. The eagerness of Prince Menchikoff for a secret treaty, and the extensive arrangements for secret arming, indicate plainly that Russia had objects in view concerning which it desired that England and France should be hoodwinked. Sir Hamilton Seymour was evidently much struck with this fact. In one of his dispatches, he states that, in conversation with Count Nesselrode respect- ing the augmentation of troops, 'the subject was one upon which it was manifest that the chancellor was unwilling to be questioned ; and that, as I really believe, because he was unable to return a satisfactory answer.' * This dispatch was dated 19th April. On the next day, he reported another conversation with the veteran diplomatist, during which Sir Hamilton asked for explanation concern- ing the rumoured secret treaty. Count Nesselrode ' denied the correctness of the rumour ; and after some little hesitation, said that he did not know what objects could be derived from an offensive alliance with Turkey. Having thus changed the form of my inquiry, the chancellor replied that he would again state that the report was incorrect, but that it was true that the emperor had caused it to be intimated to the sultan, that he might count upon the protection and aid of Russia in case of an attack,' &c. — a most fatherly care, certainly, often proffered during the last fifty years, and in most cases disastrous to Turkey if accepted. On the 13th of April, Prince Menchikoff received a communication from St Petersburg, complaining of the slowness of his proceedings, and ordering him to demand peremptorily the assent by the Porte to all the czar's demands. There was an urgent desire to conclude the whole before France or England * Parliamentary Papers. Part I. p. liO. could have any chance of interfering ; and Rifaat Pacha was perplexed by the impetuosity of the prince. It appears, at the same time, that Men- chikoff was conciliatory and courteous in all his interviews with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who only intimates, in his dispatches, ' a mystery that hangs over the intentions of Russia,' and a dis- crepancy between the conduct of the prince and 'the military demonstrations and movements of Russian partisans.' What, above all, lulled the English representatives at the five great capitals into security, was the fact that the disputes regarding the Holy Places were actually reaching a conclusion. France had become conceding, and Turkey was enabled to give what appeared full satisfaction to Russia, so far as this matter was concerned. On the 5th of May, appeared the firman of the sultan, completely settling the question. We do not transcribe it, simply because, though im- portant, it involves the same kind of petty details as all the documents concerning these Holy Places — the key of the Sepulchre-gate ; the right of Greeks and Latins to use the key; the right of joint or separate worship ; the right (or the wrong) of the Greek door-keeper to shut out the Latin monks; the ownership of the new silver star in the Grotto of the Sepulchre ; the hours at which the Greeks, Latins, and Armenians may severally worship at the Sepulchre, in order that three bodies of Christians may not be mutually contaminated by worshipping together ; the repair of the dilapidated cupola by the sultan, to allay the quarrels of the Christians, who disputed which fraternity should undertake this duty ; the blocking up of some windows which looked upon the church of the Holy Sepulchre — such were the matters on which the firman dwelt. But this progress towards, and final attainment of, an accommodation on the old subjects of dispute, seems to have been precisely what Russia did not want, and what impelled her to be pressing with her new and secret demands. Strange to say, it was on the same day which witnessed the issue of the conclusive firman, that Prince Menchikoff sent in an official 'note' to Rifaat Pacha, so exigeant in its tone as thoroughly to alarm Lord Stratford. The sultan was ill at the time ; and Rifaat Pacha, troubled at his position, requested the full advice of the British and French ambassadors. It soon appeared that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, M. de la Cour, Rifaat Pacha, and the grand vizier were of one mind, that the demands of Russia could not be acceded to — claiming, as she did, the 'protectorate' of eleven millions of the Christian subjects of the sultan ; in other words, a share of the sovereignty of Turkey. In the dispatches of the Earl of Clarendon, written in the months of May and June, it is made evident that the British government had placed faith in the declarations made by Count Nesselrode and Baron Brunnow : they had thought that the settle- ment concerning the Holy Places would comprise all the matters in dispute ; and they were wholly unprepared for the news which Lord Stratford RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR :— 1853. 19 had now to transmit to them. A sudden change of ministry took place at Constantinople ; Reshid Pacha, Mustapha Pacha, and others assumed important offices ; and the tone employed against Russia became more decided. Menchikoff de- manded from Reshid Pacha, the new minister for foreign affairs, an immediate answer to the ' note.' The last scene in this act of the Turkish drama occurred on the 21st of May, when Prince Menchikoff departed from Constantinople, and the imperial arms were withdrawn from the Russian embassy. Count Nesselrode wrote to Reshid Pacha, stating that Menchikoff would remain at Odessa a short time, and that if Turkey sent in its adhesion within a week, all might yet be well. Turkey did not send in its adhesion ; and thus the end of May witnessed the termination of the eventful Menchikoff mission. RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, UNDER PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF. A phrase, used by an English statesman in parliament, concerning ' drifting into war,' might be applied to Turkey at this time. It is a term that presupposes a sort of vacillation and timidity, rather than a bold pursuit of a clearly defined object. Turkey drifted into war, much against the wish of its own sultan, and also of the European powers generally. It earnestly begged and prayed its haughty neighbour Russia to be conciliatory, less exacting, more disposed to do unto others as it would itself be done unto. But Russia deemed herself strong, and Turkey weak. While the diplomatists were, on every hand, covering the Turkish question with a profusion of documents ; while the names of Nesselrode, Drouyn de Lhuys, Manteuffel, Buol, Stratford de Redcliffe, Clarendon were in every one's mouth — Russia was silently but vigorously bringing *her vast forces to concentrate upon the Princi- palities of Moldavia and Wallachia, evidently aiming at that ' material guarantee ' which she afterwards attempted to exact. These military preparations were in progress from the time when Prince Menchikoffs mission seemed likely to fail, perhaps still earlier. The whole of the southern provinces of Russia were alive with soldiers for many weeks, corps d'armce and regiments descend- ing from the regions of the Don, the Dniester, and the Dnieper, towards the Pruth — ready to cross over into Moldavia as soon as the word of command should arrive. The die was cast ; the aggression occurred in the beginning of July 1853. On the 2d of that month, one corps d'armce crossed the Pruth under General Liiders ; and on the following day, another con- siderable force crossed under General Dannenberg. Nearly one -third of these united forces was cavalry, and they were provided with seventy-two guns of large calibre. A pro-Russian party had already been organised in the Principalities ; and Gortchakoff introduced himself and his mission to the inhabitants in a flaming proclamation. The general who was called upon to lead the first attack against the Turks in this war, is liable to be confounded with another Russian of the same name. Prince Gortchakoff* the soldier, is the brother of Prince Gortchakoff the diplo- matist, who conducted the negotiations at Vienna on the part of Russia during the subsequent Con- ferences. Born in or about the year 1792, Prince Michael Dmitrivich Gortchakoff has been known to the rest of Europe only as a highly rewarded general, not as one who has achieved great exploits. He first served in the artillery of the Imperial Guard, and was an officer of artillery during the siege of Silistria in 1828-9 ; during this siege, he is said to have embarrassed the operations of his commander by running his guns into a deep fosse, where they stuck fast, and could not be fired. In 1831, he took part in the war in Poland, on the staff of Count Pahlen. Some accounts give a dis- paraging view of his exploits there, but others speak of the good service rendered by his artillery ; and, at anyrate, the czar raised him to a higher rank in the army when the Polish insurrection was quelled. In 1843, he was appointed general of artillery, and soon afterwards military governor of Warsaw. When Austria obtained the aid of Russia during the Hungarian campaign, Gortchakoff was * Much confusion exists in the current orthography of Russian and Turkish names. A few words, therefore, may not be inappro- priate here concerning tho diversities in the current modes of spelling these names. The letters of the Russian alphabet are not only, for the most part, different in form from those in the Roman, but in many cases different in jtowcr also. Hence, when a Russian name has to be expressed in English, it becomes a question what combination of English letters will best convey the IJussian sound of the syllables ; and different persons judge differently on this point. This is especially observable in respect to the uncertain usage of b and r, of v and / or ff, of v and w, of ch and tch or tsch, of cz and ts. Moreover, many of the consonants and diphthongs have, in English, sounds differing a little from those which they bear in French, German, and Italian ; and on this ground alone a foreigner would be prone to spell Russian names in a way different from an English writer. Hence such discrepancies as the following : — Azof, Azof, Asoph ; Oczakmv, Otchakof; Menchikoff, Metudhihoff, Meittschikoff, Menzikoff; Gorchakoff, Gortchakoff, Gortschakoff; Woronzav, Voron- zof; Smvarrotc, Suvarof; Crimen, Krimea ; Balaclava, Salaklara ; Sebastopol, Sevastopol ; Wallachia, Valaehia ; Sivcahurg, Sveaborg. Some think that the doubling of the final / is quite superfluous ; and that Orlof and Ycrmolof, as English forms of Russian names, are more consistent than Orloff and Yermoloff. There is no authority empowered to settle these differences ; and the differences will probably continue. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in his diplo- matic dispatches, spells Russian names with more simplicity of structure than many other writers ; and his example in these cases will be generally followed in the present work. In the Turkish language, in like manner, there are sounds of letters and diphthongs concerning which the most fitting English equivalents are by no means determined. Hence the following groups of uncertainties: — Reshid, Rescind, Redshid, Redschid ; Omar, Outer ; Pasha, Pacha; Sherif, Scherif, Sheriff, Shereef ; Redif, Red iff, Redeef ; Vizir, Vizier, Vizcer, Wuzeer ; and others of similar character. So perplexed have many wTiters been concerning Oriental orthography, that in a History of Hindostan, written half a century ago, the name of the famous Asiatic conqueror Ghengis Khan is spelled in no less than seven different ways, without any apparent consciousness of the discrepancy on the part of the author. To this uncertainty of English equivalents for Oriental sounds may perhaps, in great part, be attributed the diverse names of Mahomet, Mahommeil, Mahmttd, Maltmood, Malimot/d, Mehemet, Mchmet, Mohammed, and Muhummed. Within the last few years, a tendency has been shewn to make great changes in the English orthography of Oriental names ; the heroes of our boyish days, Aladin and Saladin, are scarcely to bo identified in their modern dresses of 'Ala-ud-dln and Satah-ud-din. The reader must, therefore, consider this evil, of uncertain orthography in respect to Russian and Turkish names, as one not at present to be cured. 20 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. one of the generals present ; but his name meets with little attention in the histories of that remark- able war. Whatever may be his military status, his late imperial master seems to have showered down a profusion of favours on him : aid-de- camp-general, general of artillery, chef d'etat major, governor of Warsaw, lieutenant-general of Poland — these are, or ought to be, positions of reward for high services. Gortchakoff was the representative of the czar in London on occasion of the funeral of the Duke of Wellington in 1852. The Russian troops, when the Danubian campaign of 1853 commenced, are said to have wished that their leader had been Liiders rather than Gortchakoff. The latter has been severely handled by the foreign correspondents of some of the newspapers. ' Though of gainly person and aristocratic bearing, he is not able to look you full in the face with honest frankness ; but, when speaking, eyes you askance, and turns away if you look on him. This peculiarity is very painful to Englishmen ; but nothing is more common in Russia It is generally his lot to be defeated in every combat ; but, with sublime impudence, he claims the victory, and sings a Te Dcum for it. He oppresses the people in whose country he is in the most atrocious way ; yet makes them sign addresses, expressing profound gratitude for his humanity. He robs and pillages by wholesale, and yet pomp- ously announces that his mission is to " protect" his victims. He audaciously accuses the enemy of needless severity, and yet issues orders of the day in which he recommends his men to be ruthless in slaughter. He pretends to despise religious fanati- cism, and yet makes his brutal army believe that St Sergius and the Panagia are leading them to victory. He affects a scrupulous love of truth, and yet gravely tells his men that if they are killed for the orthodox faith, they will rise again after three days in their native villages.' Severe as this language is, still the prince's conduct in the Principalities afterwards afforded justification for portions of it. Gortchakoff's proclamation on entering Mol- davia, adverted to in a former paragraph, was neither better nor worse than those which the elder Napoleon was wont to issue when he invaded the territories of others. An aggressor easily finds language to justify his aggression : — ' His majesty the emperor, my august lord and master, has ordered me to occupy your country with the armies the command of which he has deigned to confide to me. ' We come among you neither with projects of conquest nor with the intention to modify the institutions under which you live, or the political position which solemn treaties have guaranteed to you. ' The provisional occupation of the Principalities which I am ordered to effect, is for no other pur- pose than that of an immediate and efficacious protection in grave and unforeseen circumstances, when the Ottoman government, distrusting the numerous proofs of a sincere alliance which the imperial court has never ceased to give it since the conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople, replies to our most equitable proposals with refusals, and opposes the most offensive suspicions to our disinterested advice. ' In his magnanimity, in his constant desire to maintain peace in the East as well as in Europe, the emperor will avoid an aggressive war against Turkey, so long as his dignity and the interests of his empire shall permit him to do so. ' On the day on which he obtains the reparation which is due to him, and the guarantees which he has a right to claim for the future, his troops shall return within the frontiers of Russia. ' Inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia, I also execute an order of his imperial majesty in declaring to you, that the presence of his majesty's troops in your country shall not impose on you any fresh charges or contributions ; that the forage and rations for the troops shall in due time, and at a rate appointed and agreed on in advance by your governments, be paid for from our military treasury. ' Look tranquilly to the future ! Engage with security in your agricultural labours and commercial speculations ! Be obedient to the laws under which you live, and to the established authorities. It is by the faithful discharge of these duties that you will acquire the best claim to the generous solicitude and the powerful protection of his majesty the emperor.' By reference to a map, it will be seen that the Danube separates the two Turkish provinces of Bulgaria and Wallachia throughout a distance of from 400 to 500 miles, from Orsova to Galatz ; that the remaining course of the Danube, to the Black Sea, separates the Dobrudscha or Dobrudja district of Bulgaria from Moldavia and from the Russian province of Bessarabia ; and that the Pruth enters the Danube near Galatz. In the first instance, the Russians did not cross the Danube into the Dobrudscha, but crossed the Pruth into Moldavia. The passages were made near the villages of Skouliany and Leova ; and the troops quickly marched to Jassy or Yassy, the capital of Moldavia. The Czar Nicholas had armed himself to the adoption of this step by the publication of a manifesto (June rrj-),* in which he gives quite a religious tone to the motives which actuated his conduct. He professes his obligation, as head of the Greek orthodox church, to adopt stern measures against the sultan, on account of certain alleged infractions of agreements with the Christian sub- jects of the Porte ; ambition, he declares, has no influence with him, nor does Russia either seek or need conquests. It was a manifesto calculated to rouse the religious fanaticism of his people ; and in what this fanaticism consisted, may be seen from a * It is frequently necessary, in Russian documents, to give a double date. This arises from the fact, that Russia still retains the Old Style, which England abandoned in 1752, and which has been abandoned by most other nations. June 14, in Russia, corresponds with June 26 in England. In any double date, the earlier of the two dates is Russian. A want of attention to these facts, gives rise to frequent mistakes on the part of English writers. RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR :— 1853. 21 popular song which appeared at St Petersburg about that time, called the Song of a Russian Warrior. The following has been given as a pi-ose translation of a part of this effusion : — ' From the summit of the Balkan our brethren stretch out their hands to us with hope and prayer. Their sufferings are not unfelt by us. Russia has compassion on them, and goes forth to combat for them. It is there that our ancestors received the holy baptism, which rescued them from the darkness of idolatry. There is the sanctuary of our faith. It is there that the chalice of salvation restored them to life. The mother of orthodox Russia, Kief, holy and sublime city — is she not the god-daughter of Constantinople 1 Those traditions are sacred to us. They contain the pro- mise and the pledge of destinies which are gathering strength in silence. We go forth to chastise the proud, to avenge our altar, insulted by the impious. Burst forth, then, holy war ! Let our cry, the precursor of victory, be raised ! That cry is : " All for the God of Russia, for the Czar of the Russians !" ' This may be said at once — that if the Russians were not destined to vanquish the Turks, it was through no want of fiery impulse given by the priesthood of the Russian Church ; and it is equally apparent, from events which transpired about the same time on the other side of the Danube, that the Turks were in like manner worked up to excitement by the priests of Islam;* so much did this contest partake of the characteristics of that most sad of all conflicts — a religious war. When the Russians entered Jassy, they found that much had been done to smooth their path — an address of homage to the czar had been pre- pared by the Russian emissaries in the city ; and the Hospodar of Moldavia, Prince Ghika, was very lukewarm in his allegiance towards his master the sultan. In like manner, when Prince Gortchakoff, towards the close of July, made a journey of 160 miles from Jassy to Buchai-est, the capital of Wallachia, he was received by a deputation of bishops and nobles, with obsequious- ness and adulation. Whatever may be the state of opinion among the mass of the people, it is evident that the late czar — by means of stars, ribbons, snuff-boxes, swords, and pecuniary trea- sures more immediately useful — exercised a power- ful influence over the minds of official persons in nearly all the countries which bordered his vast dominions ; and, in respect to the Principalities, community of religious belief came in aid of this patronising spirit. Before the Russians encountered any Turkish forces, they effected their worst in spoiling the mouth of the Danube. Of all the channels by which this river empties its waters into the Black Sea, the channel known as the Sulina Mouth is the only one practicable for large shipping. It was one of the evil consequences of the Treaty of Adrianople, signed in 1829, that the Sulina Mouth was made over by Turkey to Russia, with power * Islam (' salvation') is the name which Mohammedans give to their religion ; it is their equivalent for our word Mohammedanism. to establish a quarantine station. This quarantine station has been so managed as to give Russia an effective control over the trade of the Danube. The Danube is the outlet for Austrian trade with the Black Sea and Constantinople ; and Austria, interested in the maintenance of a clear channel, agreed to the possession by Russia of the Sulina Mouth, on condition that a sand-bar across the mouth should be kept constantly dredged and deepened. This condition Russia repeatedly evaded ; and it had for years become pretty evident, that she was willing enough to benefit Odessa and the Dniester by contributing to stag- nate Galatz and the Danube. Austria had long had much to complain of in this respect ; but when Gortchakoff entered the Principalities, still more arbitrary measures were adopted to check the trade of the Danube. Although corn was sent down that river in such large quantities in July and August, that more than a thousand vessels were required for its further removal, yet these vessels were checked by Russian obstructions, and by the middle of Sep- tember, a vast quantity of corn Avas accumulated, useless both to buyers and sellers. Meanwhile the Russians assumed complete governing control in the Principalities ; ordered the two hospodars, Ghika and Stirbey, to obey the czar and not the sultan ; made contributions on the inhabitants ; forced some of the younger men to serve in the Russian army ; issued proclama- tions and decrees in the czar's name ; and punished those who persisted in faithful allegiance to their Ottoman master. The czar, having gone too far to recede, made arrangements for strengthening his armies by a new levy of 7 in the 1000 ; and Gortchakoff" assured of reinforcements, became more and more arrogant in his proceedings. While at Bucharest, he issued a proclamation, in which it is difficult to see what difference was made between the Deity and the czar : ' Russia is called to annihilate paganism ; and those who would oppose her in that sacred mission, shall be anni- hilated with the pagans! Long life to the czar! Long life to the God of the Russians /' Giurgevo, on the north bank of the Danube, opposite Rustchuk, was selected as the chief Russian camp ; and by the months of September and October, many indica- tions were presented of an intention on the part of the Russians to cross the Danube into Bulgaria. In consequence of the proceedings of the Turkish government — presently to be noticed — Omar Pacha received orders to summon the Russian army to quit the Turkish territories. Accordingly, on or about 8th October, Omar Pacha wrote thus to Prince Gortchakoff: ' While the Sublime Porte has exhausted all means of conciliation to obtain at once peace and its own independence, the court of Russia has not ceased to raise difficulties in the way of any such settlement, and has ended with the violation of treaties — invading the two Principalities <>f Moldavia and Wallachia, integral parts of the Ottoman Empire. 22 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. * True to its pacific system, the Porte, instead of exercising its right to make reprisals, con- fined itself even then to protesting, and did not deviate from the way that might lead to an arrangement. ' Russia, on the contrary, far from evincing corresponding sentiments, has ended hy rejecting the proposals recommended by the august mediating courts — proposals which were alike necessary to the honour and to the security of the Porte. There only remains for the latter the indispensable necessity of war. But as the inva- sion of the Principalities, and the violation of treaties which has attended it, are the veritable causes of the war, the Sublime Porte, as a last expression of its pacific sentiments, proposes to your excellency, by my intervention, the evacuation of the two provinces ; and grants for your decision a term of fifteen days, to date from the receipt jf this letter. If within this interval a negative answer shall reach me from your excellency, the commencement of hostilities will be the natural consequence.' Prince Gortchakoff's reply to Omar Pacha's missive was brief enough ; it simply announced that the prince 'had no orders to commence hostilities, nor to conclude peace, nor to evacuate the Principalities.' It was tantamount to a refusal to discuss such matters with the Turkish generalissimo. It now becomes necessary to consider what was the military position of Russia at that period ; what amount of force she had poured into the Principalities, to secure her 'material guarantees ;' what reserves were in store ; and on what principle of organisation her military system was conducted. The most discordant accounts have been written concerning the numerical strength of the Russian armies — some writers magnifying the force to nearly 1,500,000 men ; while others enumerate so many causes of weakness, as to bring down the effective number to something under 400,000. As in most similar cases, the truth probably occu- pies a middle position between these extremes. The main bulk of the army is entirely recruited from serfs. When once a levy is made, and a peasant drawn for the army, the chances of his return to his native village in life and health are so few, that his relations take leave of him as one about to be removed from them for ever ! His term of service is long, and during this term his hardships are many ; for blows and scanty food, piercing cold and stagnant marshes, are too often the return for his fidelity to the czar his master. The infantry are formed into regiments of the line, the Guards, and the Grenadiers. These regiments are larger than with us, comprising frequently four battalions of 1000 men each. A Russian account, drawn up in 1853, gives the infantry of the active army at about 504,000 ; the cavalry, 63,000 ; the artillery, 20,000 ; the engineers, 13,000 ; besides this active or movable army of 600,000, there were enumerated the corps of invalids and criminals in the garrisons and hospitals, forming a stationary force of 90,000 ; the reserve of 250,000, formed to fill up gaps in the active army, and 60,000 irregulars. All these would form a military force of above 1,000,000, provided the numbers are not modified to suit the imperial views. Under ordinary circumstances, vacancies are filled up by an annual levy of 5 in 1000 of the male inha- bitants within certain limits of age ; these recruits are intended to replace those who faU in war, and those also — a mere fraction — who live to be discharged from the army after their term of service. But in times of exigency, such as those which occurred in 1853-4-5, the levies are more extensive and more frequent. A diplomatic paper of some value gives the numbers and positions of several corps of the Russian army just before the Russians and Turks were about to come in collision. It was written by Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador at St Petersburg, apparently in reply to queries forwarded by the Earl of Clarendon. It is dated October 27, 1853 ; and the following is a portion of its contents : — ' The disposition of the Russian forces, according to an account which your lordship may rely upon, is as follows. The fourth corps, composed of four divisions under the orders of Prince GortchakoiF and General Dannenberg, are quartered at and about Bucharest. This force hardly exceeds 60,000, comprising detached bodies of troops en- gaged in guarding the line of the Danube some 200 leagues in extent, from Widdin to Ismail. The three points of the Danube which are the most closely observed, as those at which the passage of a Turkish army is the most to be apprehended, are Widdin, Nicopoli, and Silistria. Prince Gort- chakofFs reserves, formed of the third corps of 60,000, under the command of General Baron Osten-Sacken, are in cantonments between Kieff and the Pruth. The fifth corps, 60,000 strong, under General Liiders, are quartered about Odessa and in Bessarabia ; it was the third division of this corps which was lately disembarked at Soucoum Kale. The sixth corps, another body of 60,000 men, are at present quartered at Moscow. Two corps of cavalry of the reserve remain among their colonies at Krumenshuk and Khai'koff. The second corps, commanded by General Paniutine, is stationed in Poland. The first corps, under the orders of General Sievers, occupies the Baltic provinces and Lithuania. The Corps de la Garde, and that of the Grenadiers, each of 40,000 men, are quartered in the capital, at Novogorod, and Narva. The corps of the Caucasus, with its reserve division stationed at Taganrog, forms a force of 80,000 men. The troops in Mingrelia, under the command of General Beboutoff, which are destined to operate in Asia Minor, amount at present to 25,000. This force, however, can at any time be reinforced by detachments from the army of Prince Woronzow. I will only observe that the above statements, although meagre and incomplete, TURKISH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR :— 1853. 23 are, as far as they go, worthy of confidence.' * To render some of these details intelligible, it may he well to remark that the Russian military forces are mostly grouped in corps, army corps, or corps d'armee, each comprising about 60,000 men, and each forming a complete and distinct army, with its due proportion of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, guns, and stores of every kind. According to the best accounts, the Russian troops which crossed the Pruth in July 1853 were the following : — 3 Infantry Divisions, of 1C,000 men each, = 48,000 2 Cavalry Divisions, = 8,000 1 Infantry Brigade, . = 8,000 1 Battalion Chasseurs, = 4,000 10 Cossack Regiments, of GOO men each, = 6,000 Total, 74,000 An infantry division in the Russian army, it may here be observed, has two brigades, each brigade two regiments, and each regiment 4000 men. Each regiment has a battery of 12 guns ; so that the above force was probably accompanied by about 260 guns. A few thousands more crossed the Pruth in August, making the total number about 80,000 — that is, supposing the regiments had their full complement, and making no deductions for those who fell by the way, under the influence of cholera and fever. The troops belonged chiefly to the fourth army corps ; and the principal officers under Prince Gortchakoff were Liiders, Dannenberg, Simonoff, Perloff, Liprandi, Nirod, Sixtel, Mbller, Engelhardt, and Fischbach. These names will shew how largely the Russian army is officered by Germans, and may serve to explain the leaning of German military men towards the czar and Russia. The Russian soldiers, it is easy to conceive, have few home-sympathies to warm their hearts after they once enter the army. They are drawn for twenty-five years of service ; but after ten or fifteen years, they are withdrawn from the active to the reserve battalions or squadrons of their regi- ment. As a reserve, they are restored to a certain amount of liberty ; but the old ties have been severed, the poor men lead a vagabond sort of life, and they are liable to be called upon for further service in times of exigency. Germain de Lagny says : ' When a man is once enlisted, the brutality of his instructors, the cruelty of his officers, the privations of every description which he has to undergo, and the passive, animal-like submission to the requirements of a torturing system of discipline, soon reduce him to the level of a mere walking-machine. At the expiration of twenty-five years' service the state owes him nothing, and gives him nothing, except the liberty of providing, in any manner he can, for his own support and that of his family. If he is merely lame or deaf, he becomes a fireman or a breaker * Parliamentary Papers on Eastern Affairs. Part II. p. 212. of stones upon the highways Most of the men, on their discharge, become ostlers, porters, or beggars. Some drag out a miserable existence of suffering along the public roads, in the endeavour to regain the village in which they were born.'* Russian Soldiers. Bad as this system may be, it behoves Englishmen to be cautious in condemning it, until the dis- charged soldiers of their own country are better provided for than has hitherto been the case. At the end of October, the Russian troops had spread throughout the two Principalities, and had penetrated to the north bank of the Danube. Here wc must leave them a while, and attend to the course of events in the trans -Danubian provinces. TURKISH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, UNDER OMAR PACHA. While Gortchakoff was thus advancing to the Danube, many agitating scenes were occurring in the Turkish metropolis. The departure of Prince Menchikoff from Con- stantinople, with all the indications of offended hauteur and disappointed diplomacy, was of course a grave event in the eyes of the Turkish ministers and their sultan, and not less so in the estimation of the ambassadors from the different European courts. All felt that there was a machine under their * The Knout and the £ussians, p. 35. 24 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. guidance in a very fragile and dislocated condition ; that this machine would be sadly shaken by any actual conflict with so powerful a neighbour as Russia ; that it would be desirable to stave off the evil day as long as possible ; and that it would be a duty to allay, rather than excite the passions of the people. Many writers have since asserted, that if the Turkish government had been left to itself untrammelled by advice from the Allied ambassadors, Menchi- koff's demands would probably have been complied with. It may be so ; but Turkey would in that case have assuredly been more bound in shackles than ever, and the Russian Colossus would have made one more step towards the planting of his foot upon Constantinople* It soon appeared, that had the mild-tempered sultan been ever so peacefully disposed at that period, he would scarcely have been permitted to succumb : his own subjects would have risen against him. On the 28th of May — Menchikoff having departed on the 21st — the Turkish government sent an official note to the several embassies of the foreign powers, explaining the circumstances which had arisen. The note expressed the sultan's acquiescence in the Menchikoff demands respecting the Holy Places ; it announced the sultan's deter- mination to issue a firman, consolidating and securing the privileges of the Greek Church throughout the Turkish Empire; it stated that Russia had insisted upon an express treaty with her, and her alone, binding the sultan to these new arrangements ; but it shewed how inconsistent this would be with the dignity and independence of the empire. ' However great,' the note argues, ' may be the desire of the porte to cherish and pre- serve more and more the most amicable relations with Russia, she can never engage herself by such a guarantee towards a foreign government, either concluding with it a treaty, or signing a simply official note, without compromising gravely her independence and the most fundamental rights of the sultan over his own subjects.' The sultan shewed his good faith by issuing, a few days later, the firman in question, addressed to the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople, and confirming certain rights and immunities to the Christian subjects of the Porte. A diplomatic correspondence ensued between Reshid Pacha on the part of Turkey, and Count Nesselrode on the part of Russia ; but it soon became evident that the departure of Menchikoff was a sign of warlike intentions. It was in Nesselrode's note, of the 31st of May, that ' material guarantees ' were spoken of as the only means of averting war : and it is now known that warlike preparations had been commenced even before that date. When the crossing of the Pruth by the Russians became known at Constantinople, the news caused * ' Quand le Colosse Russe aura un pied aux Dardanelles, un autre sur le Sund, le vieux monde sera esclave, la liberte aura fui en Amerique : chimere aujourd'hui pour les esprits bornes, ces tristes previsions seront un jour cruellement realises ; car l'Europe, maladroitement divisee, comme les villes de la Grece devant les rois do Macedoine, aura probablemcnt le meme sort.' — Thiers, J)u Consulat et tie VEmpire. great excitement. Reshid Pacha and Mustapha Pacha, two ministers who had endeavoured to bring about a peaceful result by negotiation, became at once unpopular ; the sultan was urged to dismiss them, and was only prevented from so doing by the strong expostulations of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The Porte issued (14th July) a formal protest against the invasion of the Princi- palities, characterising that invasion as a virtual declaration of war, and refusing to submit to it as a menace. The war-party in the Divan, or Grand Council at Constantinople, headed by Mehemet Ali the seraskier, were desirous to precipitate matters, against the advice of Reshid Pacha and the peace-party. It may be useful here to explain, that the terms ' Divan,' ' Porte,' ' Sublime Porte,' are used conven- tionally for the great council of the empire, or for the ministry, as we should call it in England. This council is formed by the grand vizier, the Sheikh- ul-Islam, the seraskier, the capudan pacha, and other great officers of state, equivalent in some respects to the members of the Privy Council in England. These dignitaries meet twice a week, in ordinary times, at the house and under the presi- dency of the grand vizier, who may be regarded as the prime-minister, to discuss and settle the general affairs of the government ; but on special occasions, some of the higher members form a secret or cabinet council, to decide matters of urgencj r . There are ten subordinate councils, presided over respectively by the Ministers of Instruction, Justice, War, Foreign Affairs, &c. ; and each comprising several members ; but the principal ministers alone form the Grand Council, or Divan. On one occasion, after the rupture, but before the declaration of war, the council was assembled, when a body of about forty softas, or students of the Koran, appeared and demanded admis- sion to the council-chamber. On being admitted, they presented a petition asking for war : it was in some sort a fanatic petition, for it was signed by ulemas and softas — Moslem haters of all forms of Christianity. It has been one of the unhappy features of this war, that however just as between the sultan ' and his woidd-be oppressor the czar, it has roused the fiery zeal, and has indeed been in great part caused by the fiery zeal, of the followers both of the Crescent and the Cross. The petition presented to the council contained many quotations from the Koran, enjoining Avar against the enemies of Islam ; and its prayer hinted at threats of disturb- ance, if war were longer delayed. If any of the ministers expostulated, they were met with the ansAver : ( Here are the Avords of the Koran. If you are Mussulmans, you are bound to obey. You arc noAV listening to foreign and infidel ambassadors, Avho are the enemies of the faith ; we are the children of the Prophet ; we have an army, and that army cries out with us for Avar, to avenge the insults Avhich the giaours have heaped upon us.' A grand council of a special nature Avas • TURKISH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR:— 1853. 25 summoned, to be held at the sultan's palace on the 25th of September, composed of the chief notabilities of the empire. It was called upon to decide, whether a mode of mediation, proposed by the ambassadors — the celebrated ■ Vienna Note,' which will come under consideration in a later page — should be accepted or rejected. The decision was unanimous, that the Divan should take what may be called a high tone in the matter ; and this decision was communicated to the representatives of the four powers. On the next day, the council again met, and presented to the sultan a series of resolute decisions, tending to bring matters to a crisis with Russia. The state of feeling in Constantinople at that time was, indeed, one of great excitement; and the sultan was forced onward by a pressure too strong to be resisted. Abdul-Medjid has few of those characteristics which correspond with the popular notion of a Turk : he is a quiet, some- wbat indolent, well-meaning man, who would fain allow the world to go on smoothly without much interference on his part. The Earl of Carlisle, who saw the sultan in 1853, says of him : ' He looks pale, old for his age — about thirty-one, I believe — and he has lately grown corpulent. The impression his aspect conveys is of a man gentle, unassuming, feeble, unstrung, doomed ; no energy of purpose gleamed in that passive glance ; no augury of victory sat on that still brow.'* The sultan, as suzerain over the Pacha of Egypt, had called upon bim for his con- tingent of troops; and this call bad been responded to many weeks before the actual commencement of hostilities. An Egyptian fleet arrived at Con- stantinople as early as the middle of July, with a force of 12,000 troops. Turcoman chiefs had arrived, also, from Asia Minor, roused by tbe apprehended danger to Islam, and had offered to bring vast reinforcements of the wild and turbu- lent spirits whom they had under their command. Day after day, assemblages of the people took place in tbe streets and squares of the metropolis ; and warlike cries were echoed from one to another. On one occasion, the ulemas and softas excited the people to such a degree that the sultan became alarmed ; he feared for the safety of himself and his capital ; and he requested the English and French ambassadors to send for two or three of their ships, which were at that time stationed a little without or southward of the Dardanelles. This was done; and there was presented the strange spectacle of six war-frigates, three French and three English, moored in the Bosphorus, and intended to protect an unwarlikc sultan from his warlike subjects. With or without the desire of the sultan, war approached. A levy of 80,000 men was made early in September ; and troops gradually concentrated in great number in and near Constantinople. Under the old Turkish system, before Sultan Mahmoud, • Diary in Turkish and Greek Waters, \>. Ci. father of Abdul-Medjid, had begun to introduce his army reforms, whenever the Porte declared war, all the inhabitants of each district, between the ages of sixteen and sixty, were summoned to join the standards of their respective pachas, and to ren- dezvous at a certain place. Those who liked the war, and liked their commanders, joined the army, but were under no obligation to serve throughout a campaign ; they remained, or returned home, as their inclination directed. Even the Janissaries did the same ; and also the Spahis, or cavalry. This, in truth, is the very spirit of Oriental war- fare. Under the modern system, however, by which a standing army has been formed on the European model, a levy or conscription is conducted on definite rules, and each soldier becomes bound for a certain time. At length, on the 4th of October, the sultan issued a manifesto ; aud on the following day, a declaration of war against Russia was published in Constan- tinople. In this declaration, all the main points of the quarrel are touched upon — the desire of Turkey to remain at peace ; the demands of Russia con- cerning the Holy Places ; the unreasonable tone in which those demands were made ; the founding of new claims respecting the Greek Church, after the question of the Holy Places had been appa- rently settled ; the seizure of the Principalities as a ' material guarantee ; ' the ' Vienna Note,' and its conditions ; the evident desire of Russia that the terms of that note should be left vague, in order that she might interpret them as she pleased ; and the necessity thence arising that Turkey should repel aggression by force of arms. A singular proof was afforded of the degree in which Turkey now conforms to the usages of European nations, in comparison with the system of past days. Sir James Porter was British ambassador at Constan- tinople exactly a century ago; and Sir George Larpent, in his recent publication of Porter's manuscripts,* gives the ambassador's account of the Turkish mode of declaring war in those days : ' When the Turks have formed a resolution to declare war against any power, they discover their resentment immediately by their treatment of its minister; they imagine that, by insulting his person, they affront the crowned head that has offended them ; and consider him an hostage in their hands, whom they must secure. Their constant practice has been to imprison them in the Seven Towers.' Compare the above with the following paragraph, in the declaration of war in 1853 : — ' It is distinctly to be understood, that should the reply of Prince Gortchakoff (to the demand for the evacuation of the Principalities) be negative, the Russian agents are to quit the Ottoman states, and that the commercial relations of the respective subjects of the two governments shall be broken off. At tha same time, the Sublime Porte will not consider it just to lay an embargo upon Russian merchant- vessels, as has been the * Turkey ; its History and Progress. 26 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR. practice. Consequently, they will be warned to resort either to the Black Sea, or to the Mediter- ranean Sea, as they shall see fit, within a term which shall hereafter be fixed. Moreover, the Ottoman government, being unwilling to place hinderances in the way of commercial inteixourse between the subjects of friendly powers, will, during the war, leave the straits open to their mercantile marine.' No sooner was war thus declared, than Constan- tinople became wild with excitement. The decla- ration or manifesto was read in all the mosques, and was received with great enthusiasm. Wealthy Turks at once made large contributions to the national treasury, to enable the sultan to bear the expenses of the war ; and some offered to clothe and equip bodies of troops. The Bosphorus was alive with caiques, or boats, bringing over Turcomans and Bashi-Bazouks from Asia — pic- turesque ragged rascals, who would certainly fight for Islam, but who had a keen eye for plunder whenever opportunity should offer. It was a strange sight at Constantinople in October ; Turcomans, Koords, Arabs, armed with scimitars, bows and arrows, and lances, roamed about the streets, bringing back the past scenes of the fifteenth century, when the Osmanli* conquered Constantinople ; and these contrasted with the picturesque Albanian, and the Europeanised Nizam, or regular troops. It now becomes necessary to notice the Turkish army, its numbers and its organisation. Russia, as has been seen, has at command an armed force of vast amount, even if Ave take the lowest of many different estimates ; and it is interesting to know how far Turkey is capable of meeting her formid- able neighbour in the field. Turkey, besides difficulties of other kinds, has had to contend with that of substituting a European for an Asiatic organisation of her armies. The modern reforms, or attempts at reform, in Turkey, are closely associated with the terrible massacre of the Janissaries in bygone years — that coup d'e'tat which, like some other coups d'etat, has been often regarded as a necessary though violent cure for a social malady. The Janissaries were, for the most part, chosen from the robust Moslems of Bosnia and Albania ; and they gradually acquired, through the favour of successive sultans, such an enormous military power, as virtually to rule the whole empire; for the Janissaries had more con- cern than any other persons in the setting up and pulliug down of sultans. The existence of this troop of body-guards rendered the Turkish govern- ment unfitted for any amalgamation with the powers of Christian nations. The Divan could promise nothing with certainty, for the Janissaries could revoke its decisions ; and it could accomplish no reforms which interfered with the immunities, or offended the prejudices, of this powerful body. They usurped the chief appointments of the * Osmanli and Ottoman are nearly equivalent terms, derived from Osma/i or Othman, -who founded the present Turkish dynasty ahout a century before the Turks captured Constantinople. government, holding or conferring them nearly as they pleased ; and they inspired much terror in the population by their lawlessness and cruelty. When, therefore, the late Sultan Mahmoud began to play the part of an Osmanli Peter the Great, reforming and civilising his subjects whether they would or not, he found the Janissaries the first great bar to his progress. These men were medieval rather than modern soldiers, and they gradually found themselves eclipsed in strategy and tactics by soldiers who had studied the modern art of war. The sultan resolved on the re-organisation of his army on the European model ; the Janis- saries refused to submit ; and hence arose a choice between two evils — either to see the state crumble to pieces, or to crush this unmanageable body. The sultan chose the latter alternative, and achieved his work in a tragical way : he caused nearly the whole of the Janissaries, 25,000 in number, to be massacred in June 1825 ; and thus ended a military corps which had existed during four centuries and a half. The Nizam Djedid, or Europeanised troops, triumphed over the Janissaries, who refused to be Europeanised. Most writers agree in opinion that this destruction, terrible though it was, has been salutary to Turkey. The road was cleared for the introduction of mea- sures which could alone secure the existence of a tottering empire. Since this change, the Turkish troops, if well commanded, have shewn that they can adapt themselves to European discipline with- out losing their old bravery. The Divan regained the power, which it had so long virtually lost by the arrogant assumption of the Janissaries, of guiding its own councils, and organising its own army. But Turkey has, nevertheless, suffered in many ways by this sudden and startling act. As soon as the Janissaries were despatched, Sultan Mahmoud resolved to carry out his schemes of reform in costume, usages, tactics, and conscription. These reforms were repugnant to Moslem feeling. The Osmanli saw no reason why he should not continue to fight the infidel in the same manner as before, and he long and stubbornly resisted the sultan's European tendency. The new regulations were often enforced at the point of the bayonet, and many a bloody scene was the consequence. It is, moreover, to be observed that, after the massacre of the Janissaries, there was scarcely a Mussulman family in Bosnia and Albania who had not to deplore the loss of some relative ; and there thence arose a deadly hatred against the government in those pachaliks. How that hatred shewed itself, may be easily explained. Whatever may have been the despotic arrogance of the Janissaries, they were always ready to defend the Ottoman Empire from enemies, whether Russian or any other. When, however, the tragedy had been fulfilled, the state of things became changed. The few who fled, and saved their lives, raised to a greater pitch of fury the relatives of those who had fallen ; while a host of fanatic Mussulman priests went about everywhere exciting the people to vengeance TURKISH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR :— 1853. 27 against the reforming sultan. When the Russians invaded Turkey in 1828-9, the fruit of these dis- contents shewed itself plainly ; for the sultan in vain endeavoured to persuade the Mussulmans of Bosnia and Albania to take up arms against the giaour — the Czar of Russia ; for they deemed the sultan himself little better than a giaour — an enemy to the true faith. Much of Omar Pacha's military skill has been exerted in quelling disturbances among these people ; and Turkey yet feels the opposition of those Moslems who, being what we might term Tories in their creed, have never relished the Radical or reforming tendencies of Sultan Mahmoud. It is one of the many strange things in Turkey, that the Slavon Moslems of Bosnia — those who were Slavonic Christians a few centuries ago — are more bigoted in their faith and usages than even the regular Turks themselves — the Moslems of the race of Osman. The old or unreformed Turkish army comprised the Spahis and the Janissaries, highly favoured cavalry and infantry bodies ; together with a larger number of troops of inferior grade. The campaigning tactics were based on the plan of sending forth the humbler troops to bear the burden and bloodshed of the contest, and then winning the day by a terrible onslaught with the Spahis and Janissaries, avIio came fresh upon an exhausted enemy. It was this impetuous mode of attack with the choice reserve corps which gained so many victories for the Osmanlis in past ages. When the modern European infantry system became perfected, and a line of troops steadily met with the bayonet the fierce attack of any horse-troops Avhatevei", then did the Oriental system of the Turks cease to produce its wonted and wonderful results. Under the influence of the reforms wrought by Sultans Mahmoud and Abdul-Medjid, the Turkish army has assumed a state partaking both of the European and the Oriental. In the first place, the bulk of the active army is grouped in six ordus, or divisions, each of which constitutes a kind of small army in itself. In a state of peace, these six divisions are located in as many different parts of the wide-spreading empire — from the Hungarian frontier in the north-west, to Mesopo- tamia in the south-east ; but, in a state of war, these locations would of course be modified. The division stationed at or near Constantinople is treated as a kind of Imperial Guard, and is better trained, clothed, and armed than the rest. This organisation into six camps, army corps, or divi- sions, was completed in 1843 ; and the six armies so formed constitute the Nizam, or regular troops. The men are engaged for five years, after which they may retire to their homes ; but at any time during the next seven years, they are liable to be called out to active duty as a reserve corps, under the name of the Redif. It will be useful to bear in mind this relation between the Nizam and the Redif. The government provides directly for all the wants of the soldiers ; and, according to M. Ubicini, each man receives, in addition to the different articles necessary for his equipment, daily rations of the following amounts : — 300 dirhems, = 2h lbs. bread, 80 . = 8£ oz. meat, 15 a = lj oz. butter, 23 . = 2§ oz. rice, 6 = ^ oz. salt, 1 lb. vegetables Each ordu, or army, is commanded by a mushir (field-marshal) ; it has two corps, each under a ferik (general of division) ; each corps has three brigades, under as many livas (generals of brigade). The seraskier pacha is commander-in-chief of the whole six ordus collectively. Each ordu com- prises 6 regiments of infantry, 4 of cavalry, and 1 of artillery; and amounts, when complete, to about 21,000 men. Each infantry regiment has 4 battalions, of 8 companies each ; the colonel of each regiment is a mir ala'i, while the com- mandant of each battalion is called a bin-basM. The cavalry regiments consist of 6 squadrons each. The artillery regiments each comprise 70 guns. So far as the theory of this organisation is concerned, it seems to be well conceived. Each ordu, or complete army, has its own distinct store of materiel ; besides its tents and stores, it has a triple supply of ammunition. The Redif is divided into ordus as well as the Nizam ; each army corps of active troops having its own reserve or redif, marshalled into regiments, battalions, squadrons, and companies, and commanded by a staff of officers. The redif assembles once a month at the head-quarters of its ordu ; and its officers are under the direct control of the mushir of the ordu. Hence it follows, that the redif is nearly equivalent to another army, and raises the total force of each ordu or army to something like 40,000 men. But the nizam and the redif do not constitute the whole force of the Turkish army. There are four central corps of artillery, together about 5200 strong ; there is a brigade of engineers, about 1600 ; there are detached corps at Crete, Tripoli, and Tunis, 1G,000; there are the Auxiliary troops, which vary in amount according to the willingness of the pachas of the respective provinces to assist their sultan in times of difficulty ; there are the Irregular troops, consisting of the semi-barbarous Bashi-Bazouks and other wild adventurers, who are with difficulty brought under subjection to European discipline. It is a remai-kable element in the recent reforms, too, that a very efficient Turkish constabulary or police has been formed. They serve as a permanent guard whenever the ordu has to leave its appointed location. The Avhole constabulary is divided into brigades ; each brigade into companies, officered by captains ; and each company into detachments, under sergeants. The territorial arrangement is such,, that every ej/alet, or great division of the empire, has a constabulary brigade ; every province in each eyalet has a constabulary company ; and every 28 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR, department in each province has a constabulary detachment. The constables are all well mounted and armed, and they form collectively a valuable body of 30,000 men — presenting some points of resemblance to the constabulary force in Ireland. A rough estimate has been made, that these several bodies of armed defenders of the Ottoman Empire may, in their fullest organisation, present something like the following numbers : — The Nizam, . = 150,000 » Bedif, = 150,000 » Auxiliaries, . = 120,000 « Irregulars, = 90,000 <, Constabulary, . = 30,000 Total, .... 540,000 But this, like many other armies on paper, differs widely from the number which the sultan could actually make available at any given time. The sultan would have as much difficulty in raising and maintaining 300,000 as the czar in raising and maintaining 1,000,000 — perhaps more. The Ottoman government made two levies during the course of the summer and autumn of 1853, and called upon its various tributary pachas to come forth in defence of Islam. Troops gradually concentrated towards the Danube, as the line of operation most threatened by Russia; and an endeavour was made to mark out a course of strategy for the defence of the principal towns in Bulgaria. What attitude England and France assumed at this time, with their powerful fleets near at hand but doing nothing, will come for consideration in a future chapter. All we have at present to bear in mind is, that Turkey entered upon the contest single-handed. Who was the general selected by the czar to manage the Danubian campaign, has been stated ; and it now becomes desirable to glance similarly at Gortchakoff's antagonist, Omar Pacha, a much more remarkable man — remarkable for his change of nationality, his change of religion, his cool bravery, his unquestioned skill as a military leader, and the success which, has almost uniformly attended his movements in the field. Omar Pacha's career has indeed been a strange one. Born at the village of Vlaski, in Croatia, in 1801, he was an Austrian subject. His name was Lattas, and his father was administrator-general of the circle of Ogulini. He studied while a youth in the school of mathematics at Thurin, in Transyl- vania ; and then entered the Austrian military corps of Ponts et Chaussees. The young man, Michael Lattas, wrote well and quickly, and had a competent knowledge of mathematics ; but after filling a clerkship in two government offices, he quarrelled with his rulers and his religion ; passed over the frontier into Turkey in 1830, and became a Mohammedan. The reasons for these changes do not appear to be well known. He became clerk to a Turkish trader at Widdin ; and under the Oriental name of Omar, he next became tutor in a wealthy family — his knowledge of the Servian, Italian, and German languages being of great service to him. When his patron removed to Constantinople, Omar gradually learned the Turkish language, and by degrees became ac- quainted with military men. He obtained a situation in one of the military schools established by the late Sultan Mahmoud; and in this situation he attracted the attention of Khosrou Pacha, the sultan's right-hand man in the military reforms then in progress. The old pacha admitted him into the army, made him his aid-de-camp, and got him the appointment of writing-master to the future sultan, Abdul-Medjid, then a boy. Omar soon afterwards married Khosrou's ward — a daughter of one of the last of the Janissaries. He threw himself energetically into the army reforms planned by the sultan, first as chief of battalion, and then as aid-de-camp and interpreter to General Chzanowski, who instructed the Turkish troops in European tactics at Constantinople. Ever active, he was next employed in superintending a topo- graphical survey in Bulgaria and Wallachia — an apprenticeship which proved to be of immense service to him when he had to manage a Danubian campaign in later years. He was a lieutenant- colonel when Abdul-Medjid came to the throne in 1839 ; but he was rapidly promoted to the offices of colonel and major-general. Up to this time he had seen no service in the field ; but between 1840 and 1847, he was employed in quelling insurrec- tions in Syria, Albania, and Bosnia — insurrections from which Turkey is seldom free more than a few months at a time. His services in this way brought him the honours of lieutenant-general and pacha. In 1848, he had a delicate mission, partly military and partly diplomatic, in the Princi- palities ; and his imperial master signified his approval of his services, by conferring on him the dignity of mushir. In 1851, when the Moslem inhabitants of Bosnia refused to bend to the reforming tendencies of the sultan, Omar — now Omar Pacha — was sent against them ; and both in Bosnia and Montenegro he displayed great mili- tary abilities. When the troubles broke out with Russia in 1853, Omar was appointed generalissimo of the Turkish army ; and worthy did he after- wards prove himself of the choice. There is a remarkable mixture of the Oriental and the culti- vated European in Omar. The author of the Frontier Lands of the Christian and the Turk thus speaks of Omar and his famity, whom he met during the Bosnian campaign of 1851 : ' I stayed the whole day at the camp with his officers, who shewed me every possible attention in their tents. When the retreat was beat, the whole troops turned out, and gave three cheers of, " Padishah chok yasha!" and I then returned to town. On my way, I met Omar Pacha in a small open carriage, drawn by four very handsome Hungarian horses, with his little daughter Eminc on his knee, and a brilliant staff following him on horseback. His wife and her mother occupied a chariot-and-four ; and a caleche came next, with the daughter's French governess, the wife's German lady's-maid, TURKISH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR :— 1853. 29 and two female slaves; and the cortege was closed by armed retainers of the pacha on horse- back, and a half squadron of lancers. They were taking their usual evening exercise " on the slopes." Emine is a pretty child of nine years old, already betrothed to the son of a distin : :•) nearly 70,000, of whom nearly one-half were on the : bank of the river, while tke rest were in the islands and on the opposite shore. The fort Abdul- Medjid. or Medjidie Tabia. v. ng to be -ilistria at this time were quite extraordinary for their magnitude. There was a bridge of boats across the Danube; there were batteries on two islands in the river; and there were numerous batteries on the south side of the river, eastward of the town. The ian covered-ways extended their zigzags for some miles, the nearest at about .50, and the furthest at alx»ut 3 yards from the Arab I There was an encampment in a hoUow beyond, and this encampment was defended by numerous small forts, some as far distant as seven miles from the town. The Turks met with a sad loss in Captain Butler, who was wounded on the 13th, while making a reconnoissance of the enemy's position for a proposed sortie. He was struck in the forehead by a ball ; and although there was no apparent da he sank eight days afterwards. Yet the Turks, although they had I Pacha and Captain Butler, did not relax their defensive operations for an instant. Xot only were the Russians defeated on the 13th, but an immense portion of their - works was destroyed. On the 15th, the Turks .ed the offensive: they made a sortie; they drove the Russians across the Danube ; they gained access to the islands ; they turned the gun; in these islands against the "Wallachian shore; and they erected new batteries of their own on the Danube front of Silistria. At length, on the 23d of June, after a close i of forty-five days, the Russians had the humiliation of retiring from their work, beaten at all points. In every particular, the Turks had o'ertopped them in glory. The Russian army was many times as large as the Turkish, yet not one of its assaults had been successful. There " -ians left killed or wounded ou ria ; whi; hospitals on the "Wallachian side are said to have received as many as 30,000 invalids, who had suffered in various ways during the siege. The conflict on the earthworks was often quite remarkable : when the walls and embrasures were knocked to pieces, the Turks would burrow in passages beneath their redoubts, wait tiU the cannonading was suspended, watch for the ap- proach of the storming-parties, rush out of their places of concealment, and fall upon the Russians with inconceivable fury, overthrowing and repulsing them by their impetuosity. The defence '.istria has attracted much attention from those engineers who advocate earthwor of masonry for fortifications. It was right that the Turks should honour the memory of Captain Butler. Omar Pacha wrote a letter to Lord Raglan, dated 1st July, in which he said : ' Parmi les braves qui ont pris part a la defense glorieuse de Sikstrie. se trouvaicnt deux officiers Anglais, dont je ne dois oublier les noms. Lejeune Capitaine Butler, arrive pendant l'hiver avec M. Hasmyth au Quartier General de Shumla, etait a Silistrie au moment ou les K commencaient l'attaque contre la place. Tons lea 50 CAMPAIGN ON THE DANUBE. deux pouvaient se retirer, mais, la voix de l'honneur parlant haut chez eux, ils prefererent de rester, dans l'idee d'etre utile dans la lutte qui se pre- parait. Leur exemple, leur conseil, ont puissamment contribues a la conservation des forts attaque"s. . . . Malheureusement, M. Butler, blesse d'un balle au front, a trouve la une mort glorieuse ; mais sa memoire ne pe"rira pas dans l'armee Ottoman©.' Lord Raglan, in a dispatch to the Duke of New- castle, spoke of Captain Butler as an officer who 1 had so greatly distinguished himself, and had in all he had done shewn so much prudence, courage, and ability, that his death cannot be too deeply lamented.' Lord Hardinge, when the news reached England, wrote a generous and feeling letter to Lieutenant-general Butler, concerning the death of his young and heroic son, who, although only twenty-seven years of age, had served against the Kafirs, and for several years in Ceylon. In the course of the letter, his lordship said : ' During the whole of the siege, your son displayed very rare qualities, combining with the skill and intelligence of an accomplished officer, the intrepidity of the most daring soldier ; at one moment gaining the confidence of the garrison — over which he had only the authority of a very young volunteer — by the example of his personal valour ; at another, prolonging the defence of the place by the prudence and firmness of his counsel ; and, on all occasions, infusing into those around him that spirit of heroic resistance which led to its triumphant defence.' A letter from the seat of war stated, in reference to Butler, 'there can be no doubt that he and Lieutenant Nasmyth have been the mainstay of the place ; as, had it hot been for their energetic remonstrances on the 25th May, the outwork of Arab Tabia would have been abandoned.' It is said that Omar Pacha was more affected by the death of Captain Butler than by any other event in the course of the campaign. The young Englishman was attended to the grave, in the Armenian cemetery at Silistria, by officers from every company in the Turkish army. A correspondent of one of the London news- papers, by permission of Omar Pacha, visited Silistria immediately after the siege. He said : * The street through which we passed was broken every few yards by large holes, five feet deep and three wide, in which were the remnants of Russian shells. The roofs of the houses were all more or less pierced by the passage of these terrible balls, and the party-walls were full of holes. The mina- rets in many places were pierced into steeples a rjiomo; but though many were much damaged, none had fallen. Nor had the houses crumbled to the ground under the fire, but stood bravely up under their wounds ; it seemed, in truth, as if the edifices of Silistria had partaken of the spirit of its defenders, and had determined, like them, not to fall at any price. It is almost needless to say, that in Silistria no inhabitants had remained — i they had all taken refuge in caves scooped out of the earth at the side of the hills, where they lay safely ensconced, suffering no doubt from want of motion, and sometimes from want of food, but safe. The soldiers alone remained in this place, sleeping at their posts by the walls, where they could man them at a moment's notice.' There was a spot where, during the siege, the Russians imagined the Turks had hidden in underground passages. ' Upon this spot they had thrown thousands of shells. The places where they exploded harmlessly, were marked by little sticks planted there by the Turks ; they were willow- wands, which, if they were to grow, would make a small forest. To the right of this favourite spot, no less than 2000 unexploded shells were picked up during the progress of the siege. This may give a faint idea of the warmth, more than tropical, there during several weeks.' Lieutenant Nasmyth — who was raised to the rank of major by his own government, decorated with the Cross of the Legion of Honour by the French, and with that of the Medjidie" by the Turks — commented, with some severity, in a letter in the Times, on the Russian tactics at Silistria. ' The Turkish army,' he says, ' may well talk with pride. Their opponents had an army on the right bank of the Danube, which at one time amounted to 60,000 men. They had GO guns in position, and threw upwards of 50,000 shot and shell, besides an incalculable quantity of small-arm ammunition. They constructed more than three miles of approaches, and sprang six mines. Yet during forty days, not one inch of ground was gained ; and they abandoned the siege, leaving the petty field-work against which their principal efforts had been directed, a shapeless mass from the effects of their mines and batteries, but still in possession of its original defenders.' We are now in a position to gather up the scattered threads of the Danubian campaign. When once the Turks had succeeded in making a passage from Widdin to Kalafat, all attempts of the Russians to dislodge them from the last-named town proved unavailing ; and, as was narrated in a former page, the Russians found it necessary to retreat across the Aluta towards Bucharest, as summer approached. The various contests at Oltenitza, and other parts on the north side of the Danube, in the wide extent between Kalafat and Rassova, were desultory, so far as regards any permanent advantage of one army over the other. The Russian occupation of the Dobrudscha, too, became nearly fruitless, as long as they were prevented from passing out of that district towards the south or west. Thus it arose that the siege of Silistria became the turning-point of the whole campaign : if the Russians had gained it, the command thence obtained over Bulgaria would have given them great advantages in respect to any future proceedings; but the utter failure of the siege rendered the position of Paskevitch and Gortchakoff very embarrassing. It was immedi- ately after this failure at Silistria, that the Turks OPERATIONS IN THE DOBRUDSCHA AND AT SILISTRIA :— 1853-4. 51 crossed the Danube, and fought the battle of Giurgevo, as already narrated. Omar Pacha crossed the Danube when the last Russian soldier had left the neighbourhood of Silistria ; and the battle of Giurgevo was only one among many conflicts which then occurred in Wallachia. The two extreme points in the Russian line of operations — Lesser Wallachia on the west, and the Dobrudscha on the east — were necessarily affected by the turn which affairs were taking at Silistria. By degrees, Krajova, Radovan, Ternova, Karakal, and Slatina, were abandoned in the one ; and Rassova, Hirsova, Matchin, Isakcha, and Tultcha, in the other : one Russian army retired through Upper Wallachia towards Bucharest ; and a second re-crossed the Danube at various points into Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia. The Danubian shores became an unfitting locality for the Russians by the end of July. The siege of Silistria raised, Giurgevo and its island abandoned, both banks of the river near that town held in great force by Omar Pacha, — Gortchakoff found his position at Bucharest untenable, at a distance of only thirty-five miles from Giurgevo. The Russian general made a virtue of necessity : he issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, telling them that the all-puissant czar had ordered the troops to quit the unhealthy regions of the Danube for a brief season ; but promised to return and deliver them from the barbarian Turks, as soon as a more healthy time arrived. He left the city with his army on the 28th of July ; and on the 8th of August, the Turks entered it with colours flying, drums beating, and trumpets sounding. Christians as the Wallachians are, they had tasted the bitters of Muscovite ' occupation ' so keenly, that they welcomed the Mussulman Turks as being less objectionable than the Christian Russians. Halim Pacha issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, running thus : ' Inhabitants of Bucharest ! the troops of your sovereign have entered this city to maintain good order, and the respect due to all established authority. Let no one presume to take the initiative in committing any violence tending to produce any change whatever. At the moment of their retreat, the Russian troops confided to our care the sick, whose weak state did not permit their removal. We will shew that we are worthy of this confidence, and that, until such time as our hospitals shall be established in tins city, they shall be treated in the houses where they now are, with all the anxious attention demanded by the love of our neighbour, and by humanity ; for two empires, enemies at this moment, may be friends to-morrow, and ought to respect each other even amidst the horrors of war. Such are our wishes ; the Walla- chians, by conforming to them, will prove the gratitude and respect they owe to their all-power- ful sovereign.' Whether this document had been peculiarly worded to suit the position and tastes of the Moldo-Wallachians, certain it is that a spirit of enlarged liberality and charity is manifested in it, for which we should search in vain in any of the Russian proclamations, high-flown as they may be. The Moslem has not much to learn from the Muscovite in this matter. The present Chapter has been purposely kept free from the intricacies of diplomacy, because it has had to deal with the stern events of actual war. But there was one ambassadorial proceeding which must not be left unnoticed — exercising, as it unquestionably did, a marked influence on the close of the campaign. This was the treaty between Turkey and Austria. Without previous concert with England and France, the Porte con- cluded a treaty with the court of Vienna — a treaty which, fair on the surface, was much canvassed afterwards. By this treaty, Austria undertook to occupy the Principalities as against Russia : it was ' signed on 14th June, and runs thus : — ' His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, fully recog- nising that the existence of the Ottoman Empire within its present limits is necessary for the maintenance of the balance of power between the States of Europe, and that, specifically, the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities is one of the essential conditions of the integrity of that empire ; being, moreover, ready to join, with the means at his disposal, in the measures proper to insure the object of the agreement established between his Cabinet and the High Courts represented at the Conference of Vienna ; His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having on his side accepted this offer of concert, made in a friendly manner by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria ; It has seemed proper to conclude a Convention, in order to regulate the manner in which the concert in question shall be carried into effect.' Then, after two or three merely formal para- graphs, the articles of the treaty run thus : 'Art. I. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria engages to exhaust all the means of negotiation, and all other means, to obtain the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the foreign army which occupies them, and even to employ, in case they are required, the number of troops necessary to attain this end. Art. II. — It will appertain in this case exclusively to the Imperial Commander-in-chief to direct the operations of his army. He will, however, always take care to inform the Commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army of his operations in proper time. Art. III. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria undertakes, by common agreement with the Ottoman Government, to re-establish in the Principalities, as far as possible, the legal state of things such as it results from the privileges secured by the Sublime Porte in regard to the administration of those countries. The local authorities thus reconstituted, shall not, however, extend their action so far as to attempt to exercise control over the Imperial army. Art. IV. — The Imperial Court of Austria further engages not to enter into any plan of accommodation with the Imperial Court of Russia which has not for its basis the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, as well as the integrity of his Empire. Art. V. — As soon as the object of the present Con- vention shall have been obtained by the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between the Sublime Porte and the Court of Kussia, His Mpjesty the Emperor of Austria will immediately make arrangements for withdrawing his forces with the least possible delay from the territory of the Principalities. The details respecting the retreat of the Austrian troops shall form the 52 CAMPAIGN ON THE DANUBE. object of a special understanding with the Sublime Porte. Art. VI. — The Austrian Government expects that the authorities of the countries temporarily occupied by the Imperial troops will afford them every assistance and facility, as well for their march, their lodging or encampment, as for their subsistence and that of their horses, and for their communications. The Austrian Government likewise expects that every demand relating to the requirements of the service shall be complied with, which shall be addressed by the Austrian com- manders, either to the Ottoman Government through the Imperial Internunciate at Constantinople, or directly to the local authorities, unless more weighty reasons render the execution of them impossible. It is understood that the commanders of the Imperial army will provide for the maintenance of the strictest discipline among their troops, and will respect, and cause to be respected, the properties as well as the laws, the religion, and the customs of the country. Art. VII. — The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Vienna in the space of four weeks, or earlier if possible, dating from the day of its signature. In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it, and set their seals to it. Done in duplicate, for one and the same effect, at Boyadji-Keuy, the fourteenth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four. (L.S.) V. Bruok. (L.S.) Rbshid.' It belongs not to the present chapter to touch upon the complaints which the Moldo-Wallachians, with too much justice, made at a subsequent period, concerning the mode in which the Austrians conducted themselves during this occupancy. The occupancy itself, as a historical event, simply offers itself for notice here. An Austrian force was placed under the command of Count Coronini ; and this force crossed the Carpathians from Transylvania into Wallachia on the 20th of August. The Austrians entered Bucharest on the 6th of September. Coming, as they did, as the allies and defenders of Turkey, arrangements were made to afford them a kind of triumphant entry. Omar Pacha, with a Turkish division and a detachment of Wallachian militia, went out at the principal gate of the city ; near which Avere assembled the members of the administration, several of the boyars or nobles, a large number of priests of the Greek and Latin churches, and a vast con- course of people. Count Coronini was then conducted in form into the city, at the head of his army. Dervish Pacha, Ottoman commissioner in Wallachia, issued the following proclamation, explanatory of the objects for which the Austrians had entered the Principalities : — ' The Sublime Porte having entered into a convention with his Imperial Apostolic Majesty, as previously with the governments of France and England, it is my duty to make known to you, that in accordance with that convention, the Imperial Austrian troops will provisionally occupy both Principalities. The presence of these troops in Wallachia need cause no uneasiness to you, for they enter the country as one of the friendly powers allied with the Sublime Porte. These troops will be in noway a burden to you, for they will pay for everything purchased with ready money. After the Russians have positively evacuated the Principalities, the former government of the country will be restored. OPERATION'S IN THE DOBRUDSCHA AND AT SILISTRIA :— 1853-4. Your ancient privileges are and will be scrupulously preserved.' These unfortunate Principalities ! Turned over to the 'protection' of different powers in succession ; overrun with the armies of Turkey, Russia, and Austria, as the fluctuations of diplomacy or war may determine ; controlled now by the Moslem creed, now by the adherents of the Greek Church, now by the believers in Latin Christianity ; deprived of the exercise of manly spirit, which self-depend- ence and self-government afford — the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia are seldom allowed long to remain at peace. In 1849, a Russian army and a Turkish army were watching each other's movements here ; the Wallachians having to feed both. In 1853, the Russians unceremoniously walked into their houses, reaped their corn, took their cattle. When the Turks drove out the Rus- sians in 1854, Wallachian corn and cattle had to feed the Osmanlis ; and when the Austrians succeeded the Turks, still were the inhabitants of the Prin- cipalities made to feel that they could only be nominally their own masters. The provinces are on the confines of three great empires ; and hence these experiences. Ivan Golovin speaks strongly on this point : ' If there be a wretched people, it is the Moldo-Wallachian people, partitioned into three like Poland and like Armenia. The Bukovina belongs to Austria, Bessarabia to Russia, and Moldavia and Wallachia to Turkey. The Russian spirit has already penetrated into the admini- stration of the Principalities. The construction and repair of roads, the magazines of corn, the recruitment, and the law, are only so many means of venality for the officials. The extra- ordinary taxes already exceed the legal obliga- tions ; the expenses exceed the receipts ; and the Russian decorations and titles serve to foster servility.'* This is an anti-Russian account: the Moldo-Wallachians could probably bring forth grievances anti-Turkish and an ti- Austrian. The best mode of dealing with these provinces has occupied much attention on the part of the several courts of Europe. About a year after the signing of the Treaty of Boyadji-Keuy, between Austria and Turkey, Lord Palmerston, in reply to a sug- gestion tha,t the Principalities should be declared neutral, said : 'I am not disposed to attach any great importance to this proposition. In the first place, whenever a quarrel has arisen, and when it became desirable for the belligerent powers to possess the neutral territory, that neutrality has never been very religiously respected. Besides, are the Principalities, if declared neutral, to be con- tinued as a portion of the Ottoman Empire ? If they are not, then they would soon share the fate of Poland ; if they are, then the moment hostilities break out, Russia would cease to respect their neutrality ; for war dissolves all treaties.' This seems rather a fatal dilemma for the Moldo- Wallachians. His lordship, however, proceeded as * TJie Nations of Russia and Turkey, p. 46. follows : — ' But the interests of the Principalities have not been neglected. It has been proposed to put them under the protection of the Five Powers, and to establish a system of internal defence ; a force would thus be established which, if not at once sufficient to resist a Russian inva- sion, would supply the foundation for a national defence.' * There are peculiarities in the Principalities which offer many inducements to speculate on their future fortune. The inhabitants are neither Russians nor Turks, neither Slavons nor Magyars ; they are descendants of the ancient Dacians, who intermarried with Roman colonists established by Trajan. They have a sufficiency of Roman blood in them to obtain the national designation of Romani or Roumani or Daco-Romans, although more usually called Wallacks ; and their language contains many words of Latin origin. Their country, in past ages, comprised not only Wallachia and Moldavia ; but Bessarabia, now. Russian; the Buckowine or Bukovina, Transylvania, and the Banat, now Austrian ; and Bulgaria, now Turkish. Unfortunately, Dacia, if we give this name to the whole country, lay in the route of the fierce tribes who entered Western Europe from Asia — Goths, Huns, Avars, Bulgars, Scythians, all desolated those fertile plains in turn. After many disloca- tions and curtailments of territory, the nation settled down into two independent princedoms or hospodaratcs— Wallachia and Moldavia. Four centuries ago, they were so far conquered by the Osmanlis as to become tributary states ; but only to the extent of paying an annual sum of money to the sultan. About a century and a half ago, the Moldo-Wallachians were deprived of the power of choosing their own princes : the Porte usually granting that dignity to some Greek who would pay highly for the honour, and who took care to reimburse himself by the most grinding exactions on the people. In other matters, the Porte does not appear to have ill used the Moldo- Wallachians ; but there Avas here quite sufficient to tempt the czars and czarinas to interfere. Reign after reign has increased the power of Russia in the Principalities, until both national independence and Turkish supremacy have nearly disappeared. The events of 1854 developed many schemes for restoring the nationality of this people, who, in the various provinces above named, amount in all to nearly 10,000,000 souls. A map of ' Europe as it will be ' appeared about that time, in which, among other liberties taken with our familiar political geography, a hcav state is laid down under the title of Rumania, containing such provinces of three empires as are inhabited by the Daco-Romans or Wallacks or Roumani. In view of the complicated relations of European politics, the English premier could scarcely hold out encourage- ment to any such development of ' nationalities ' in those regions. * Speech in the House of Commons, June S, ISoj. 54 CAMPAIGN ON THE DANUBE. That Bucharest (Bukhorest), the capital of Wal- lachia, should present many of the strange diversi- ties occasioned by these conflicting nationalities, might reasonably be expected. Jassy, the capital of Moldavia, is a much less important place : if ' Rumania ' be ever formed, Bucharest will doubt- less be its metropolis. Bucharest is a medley of nations, among whom Russians, or Greeks in Russian interest, contrive to hold the upper place. Considered as a town, it contains the hospodar's palace, the residences of the boyars or feudal nobles, the metropolitan church, about sixty other churches, about twenty monasteries and con- vents, Roman Catholic and Lutheran churches, a Jewish synagogue, a large bazaar, several hospitals and infirmaries, a lyceum or university, and several consular residences. Regarded as the residence of the prince or hospodar of Wallachia, the seat of the divan or council, the see of an archbishop, and the head-quarters of the foreign envoys or consuls, Bucharest might be expected to present the aspect of a fine town; yet the bulk of the 50,000 or 60,000 inhabitants live in a heap of wretched brick or mud cabins, ranged along lines of streets either unpaved or covered with trunks of oaks. The town contains an immense number of coffee- houses, almost every one of which has a gambling or billiard table. The inhabitants are fond of outward display, and of public festivals, drinking, music, and dancing ; and when assembled on their favourite Corso, or public mall, their dress and appearance present a singular admixture of the European and the Oriental. Bucharest has been somewhat hastily set down as ' the most dissolute town in the world ;' but those who know Wal- lachia best, assert that the immorality is mostly among the extra-national or Russian employes ; that the native inhabitants would fairly stand comparison in this respect with those of more western cities. Reverting to the Danubian campaign — the last scene now approached. The Austrians entered Bucharest on the 6th of September ; and the rear corps of the Russians recrossed the Pruth into their own dominions about the middle of the same month. This campaign, as the course of the present chapter will have sufficiently shewn, redounds solely to the credit of the Turks. The knowledge that the English and French forces were not far removed, undoubtedly affected the Russian plans as summer approached; and the Austrian intervention precipitated the retreat of the Russians ; but the Turks formed their own strategy— selected, in most cases, their own battle- fields — fought their own battles — and certainly achieved more victories than their opponents, albeit inferior in numbers. Sir George Larpent, writing his volumes about the time when the Danubian campaign ended, thus comments on it: 'Omar Pacha has most brilliantly refuted the croaking predictions of the friends of Russia. His position, from the Black Sea to the Austrian frontier, has gained the appro- bation of all military men. How correctly he judged when he selected Little Wallachia as the point of attack, and made Kalafat the tite de pont of Widdin, is proved by the desperate exertions made by the Russians to regain this position. There is a certain touchstone, by which it can be discovered which of two commanders is superior in talent : it is the one who, through his operations, undertakes the management of the war, and forces his opponent to follow his movements. Omar Pacha has undoubtedly acted this part. In another point he has also shewn his superiority : he has never suffered himself to be deceived by pretended attacks, which was frequently the case on the Russian side, more especially when Omar Pacha intended to take up his permanent position at Kalafat, and crossed the Danube and attacked the Russians at other points; so that they neglected the position which it was so important to their clever opponent to obtain. In addition to this, his management of the war is based on a very correct estimate of what the troops on either side are able to do. He chooses those modes of fighting in which the Turks are superior to the Russians. The Turkish soldier is a good tirailleur, which the Russian never learns, for he is nothing but a machine. The Turkish soldier defends walls and intrenchments with a love of the sport, in which he is only probably surpassed by the Spaniards ; while the Russian is perfectly helpless in an attack on strong places. In accordance with these qualities of the opposed troops, Omar Pacha regu- lates his plan of campaign, carries on an interrupted little war, and intrenches himself when larger bodies are marched against him.'* This language is in some parts perhaps exaggerated ; but never- theless the fact is certain, that the Russians fight best in masses, while the Turks prefer those more detailed tactics in which each soldier feels the value of his own individual exertions towards the attainment of the one common end. This quality is in some degree expressed by the French military term tirailleur. Kalafat and Silistria will ever be ranked as the chief memorials of the Danubian campaign in 1853-4. Oltenitza and Giurgevo brought a share of honour to the Turks, and the Russians had a few gleams of success in the Dobrudscha ; but the defence of Kalafat and Silistria shewed sufficiently that the Osmanli is not yet utterly effete in presence of the Muscovite. The operations of this campaign have also attracted much attention in connection with the relative merits of earthwork and masonry in fortifications ; and it is believed that subsequent operations in the war were based on the experience hence derived. The battle of Oltenitza has been characterised as one fought quite as much with the spade as the musket : it shewed how important to raw troops even the slightest breast-work * Turkey : Us History and Progress, ii. 330. OPERATIONS IN THE DOBRUDSCHA AND AT SILISTRIA :— 1853-4. 55 is, when they are called upon to resist the dis- ciplined masses of a regular army. When the Turks crossed the Danube, they began immediately to trench or defend themselves by mounds of earthwork ; and behind these defences they resisted every attack which the Russians could bring against them. Again, at Kalafat ; the Turks so quickly and so effectually threw up defences of earthwork, that all attempts of the Russians to overcome the resistance were frustrated ; and any passage across the Danube into the western parts of Bulgaria was rendered abortive by this one work ; for the Russians dared not leave in their rear a place so defended. Again, at Silistria ; the defence was essentially an affair of earthworks, supported by the heroic courage of a small body of men. The tabias were field-works on elevated spots commanding the town ; they consisted of trenches, ditches, and parapets, all formed by the spade, and mounted with cannon. It was these simple earthworks which the Russians so long and fiercely attacked, and which the Turks so pertinaciously and success- fully defended. When the Russians found they could effect nothing by assault, they mined under- neath ; but the Turks, listening attentively to the miners, abandoned the front works, and hastily threw up new works in the rear ; whereby the Russians, when their mines were exploded, found that the Turks were beyond reach, and that the work had to be commenced de novo. The calcu- lations of the Russian engineers were repeatedly overturned ; and the Turkish defence of Silistria has almost assumed the rank of a new discovery or invention in the art of war. Wallachian Peasantry. CHAPTER III. ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. 3} NVOLVLNG as it did different nations in hostilities, and appealing to the honour and interests of those nations on different grounds, the war grew in magnitude as time advanced. At first, it appeared little else than a dispute on a trifling question at Jerusalem ; then it extended to exciting discussions and hostile threats at Constantinople ; then it 'amplified into formidable battles and desperate sieges on the banks of the Danube ; and finally it drew into its vortex the "Western Powers — England with her powerful navy, France with her magnifi- cent army. So important is it, to a due compre- hension of the rationale of the war, to know the exact grounds whereon England and France were impelled into a conflict which cost them millions of treasure and thousands of lives, that it will be necessary here to enter somewhat fully on this matter, before tracing the advance of the British and French armies to Gallipoli and Varna. Clear- ness of arrangement will be obtained by noticing in succession the diplomacy of the statesmen and ambassadors, the celebrated ' Secret Correspond- ence,' and the actual declaration of war, with its accompanying pi'oceedings. DIPLOMACY OF 1853: THE ATTACK AT S I N O P E. It was the policy of England to remain neutral in respect to the question of the Holy Places ; peacefully advising all parties, nut claiming no right of interference. When, however, the de- mands made at Constantinople became imperious ; and when Sir H. Seymour obtained unquestionable proofs, from his position as British ambassador at St Petersburg, that the Emperor Nicholas was pouring down vast bodies of troops towards the Turkish frontier — then did the British government feel that this neutrality must have an end. England was bound by treaties which she could not suffer to fall into oblivion at such a time. When Lord Stratford dc Redcliffe returned to his embassy at Constantinople, in April 1853, he was struck with the fact that Prince Menchikoff disliked to be questioned concerning any ulterior designs of Russia, after the difficulty of the Holy Places should have been settled; and this made the ambassador fear that those designs might be perilous to the welfare of Tui'key. Baron Brunnow, on May -if, sent a long document to the Earl of Clarendon, justifying everything the emperor had done, and denying the allegations concerning any ulterior views. The earl, never- theless, on hearing of the threatening departure of Menchikoff from Constantinople, wrote to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on the 31st May, empower- ing him to order up the British fleet from Malta towards the Dardanelles, there to be employed as his judgment might suggest. 'A declaration of war by Russia against Turkey,' said his lordship, ' the embarkation of troops at Sebastopol, or any other well-established fact denoting intentions of unmistakable hostility, would, in the opinion of her majesty's government, entirely justify your excellency in sending for the fleet, which, however, would not pass the Dardanelles except on the express demand of the sultan.' This ' passing of the Dardanelles ' has been intertwined in all the diplomacy respecting Turkey for many generations past. It means this — that as Turkey possesses both the European and the Asiatic sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, she commands the entrances through those straits into the Black Sea ; and, for her own protection, she has always insisted that no ships of war shall pass through those straits without her permission. In 1840, when the sultan was threatened by his rebellious vassal, Mehemet Ali, he placed the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus under the joint 'protection' — an ominous word — of England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia ; but in the convention of the 15th of July in that year, he expressly stipulated, in Article IV., for the mainte- nance of his ancient rights over the straits. Turkey claimed, and the five powers agreed, that this protection ' shall be considered only as a measure of exception, adopted at the express demand of the sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above mentioned ; but it is agreed, that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has in all times been prohibited for DIPLOMACY OF 1853: THE ATTACK AT SINOPE. 57 ships of war of foreign powers to enter the straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.' Again, in a convention signed at London on the 13th of July 1841, hetween the representatives of the six powers, it was demanded by the sultan that his right should be admitted, of prohibiting the passage of ships of war through the straits ; and this right was formally conceded by England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. During the month of May (1853), it was ascer- tained, by diplomatic correspondence, that Austria and Prussia, as well as England and France, agreed that Russia's demands upon Turkey were indefen- sible, and could not be submitted to without injury j to the Ottoman authority. So far there was agreement ; but the almost interminable negotia- ! tion which followed, shewed that there was not so much unity of opinion concerning the course to be adopted towards Russia. In June, the French government sent orders to their fleet, under Admiral de la Susse, to join the English fleet, under I Admiral Dundas, at Besika Bay — immediately outside or southward of the Dardanelles — there to await further orders from the two ambassadors at Constantinople. One circumstance presents itself to view throughout the voluminous correspondence of that summer and autumn — that all the ministers | and all the ambassadors of England, France, Austria, and Prussia, so far as their opinions found expression in dispatches, condemned the conduct of the czar in picking a new quarrel with Turkey after the question of the ' Holy Places ' had been : settled. Clarendon, Stratford de Redcliffe, West- moreland, Cowley, Bloomficld, Seymour, Drouyn de Lhuys, Walewski, De la Cour, Buol, Colloredo, Manteuffel, however they may have differed as to the means of healing the wound, agreed as to the wound itself. This was important : for it amounted nearly to a vote passed by united Europe against Nicholas, and weakened his power of appealing to any of his neighbours against the rest. On the 12th of June, the Russian government published a circular addressed to all its ministers at foi'eign courts, explanatory of the reasons which had actuated the czar in his pi-ocecdings. This circular elicited many replies and counter-state- ments ; and England and France became more and more decided in their reprobation of the Russian schemes. Just about the time when Russia advanced to the Principalities, Austria concentrated troops near the Servian frontier ; i and this circumstance for a time excited uneasi- ness ; but no further progress was made in that direction, and Austria continued to act with the Western Powers in an endeavour to obviate war by diplomatic means. In July, the first of many ' Conferences ' met at Vienna, attended by the representatives of England, France, Austria, and Prussia ; these representatives proposed, with the sanction of their respective governments, to prepare a ' note,' or schedule of agreement, which should be se.it to St Petersburg and Constantinople ; and that the four powers should use their best energies to obtain the assent of the two belligerent powers to the terms therein imposed. Another confer- ence on the same subject was held towards the close of the same month, during which the terms of the proposed note were determined on. This note, as drawn up on the 26th of July, and as transmitted to Constantinople, assumed the form of a declaration from the sultan to the czar. The sultan, after expressing his ' unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally/ declared that he ' will remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion ; and that his majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice, either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by his majesty's august ancestors to the orthodox Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by him ; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement.' There were comprised in the note, also, a few minor declarations respecting pilgrims at Jerusalem, a Russian church and hospital in or near the same city, and an increase of power to the Russian consuls in Palestine. This ' Vienna Note' — the first of that name — was the main subject of European diplomacy during the latter half of 1853. The reader will remember that, in a former page, reference was made to the note, as exemplifying the importance of attending to the phraseology of any documents to which Russia is a party. The Turkish ministers saw that — whether the note had or had not been drawn up with the connivance of Russia — it was worded in such a way as might leave an opening for a Russian interpretation injurious to Turkey at some future time. More than once has it occurred, in the past relations of Russia with other countries, that if two or three short words Avcre susceptible of a double meaning, or two or three apparently insig- nificant words omitted, a claim of startling import was afterwards founded, to which the other con- tracting party had not originally intended to assent. In the case now under notice, the czar, early in August, accepted the Vienna Note with a promptness which was in itself suspicious ; and later in the same month, the sultan signified also his acceptance, but with the ' modification' of a few words. This modification was to define the meaning of terms otherwise too undefined; but, nevertheless, it proved to be the rock on which the whole negotiation split. The Allies were willing to accept the amendments made by Turkey, and even acknowledged that those amendments were just • in themselves, how- ever lamentable it might be that peace should be disturbed by small changes. But the czar refused his assent ; and this refusal offers much justification to the conduct of Turkey, since it shews that the czar regarded the altered words as important in the very sense that Turkey had suspected. There 58 ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. were only two paragraphs of the Vienna Note thus altered, and altered in only three places; and it may be desirable to transcribe them here, if only to shew how mighty are the political results which sometimes spring from the turn of an expression. Of the six paragraphs of the Vienna Note, the most important were the two following : — ' If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused again to confirm them* by solemn acts testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects. 'The undersigned has in consequence received orders to declare by the present note, that the Government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the pro- tection of the Christian religion, and t tbat His Majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice, either now or hereafter, the enjoy- ment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by His Majesty's august ancestors to the orthodox Eastern Church, which are maintained and confirmed by him ; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement? % Turkey proposed to substitute for the words printed in italics, those given in the foot-notes ; and the rejection of these substitutions by Russia rendered ineffectual all the subsequent labours of the diplomatists. It will be seen, on carefully perusing the above, that the pith of the amend- ments consists in the declaration, that the Porte will both concede and protect, in respect to the Christians of Turkey ; whereas the original clauses would have afforded a loophole for the czar to enter in his assumed capacity as 'protector of Greek worship.' Protection to Greek Christians might be well ; but protection by the czar was the point yearned for by Russia. September approached ; a month during which Besika Bay and its vicinity become dangerous for shipping lying at anchor. The Allied governments were exceedingly urgent that Turkey and Russia should arrive at an amicable conclusion, in order that the fleets might be withdrawn to safer quarters ; but, pending the negotiations, such withdrawal would not be expedient. France pro- posed that the fleets should enter the Dardanelles, with the consent of Turkey; but England proposed a further delay, to afford the czar time to signify * ' the orthodox Greek Church and worship, the Sultans have never ceased to provide for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities -which at different times they have spontaneously granted to that religion and to that church in the Ottoman Empire, and to confirm them ' + ' to the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the pi - otection by the Sublime Porte of the Christian religion ; and he is moreover charged to make known ' % ' granted, or which might be granted, to the other Christian communities, Ottoman subjects.' his assent to the altered terms of the Vienna Note. But this assent was never given. The court of St Petersburg stated in writing the reasons why Russia could not accept the amended note ; and the Earl of Clarendon promptly pointed out that the reasons thus assigned were such as to justify Turkey in the suspicions which the original note had excited; that, in fact, 'it would not be fair to urge the Porte to sign a document which would give Russia such advantages as it was now clear the Russian government expected from it.'* It was, indeed, throughout, a most unfortunate achievement in diplomacy, and seems to indicate that a pro-Russian pen had traced the terms of the Vienna Note ; for the Earl of Clarendon, after stating the sense in which England and France understood the original note, declared that it would now be ' highly dishonourable to press its acceptance on the Porte, when they have been duly warned by the power to whom the note is to be addressed that another and a totally different meaning is attached to it by that power' (p. 124). The month of October .brought the first ominous reference to possible collisions in the Black Sea between the several fleets. Admiral Dundas received orders to inform the Russian admiral commanding at Sebastopol, 'that if the Russian fleet should come out of that port for the purpose of landing- troops on any portion of the Turkish territory, or of committing any act of overt hostility against the Porte, his (Admiral Dundas's) orders are to protect the sultan's dominions from attack.' The English government became more and more distrustful of Russia : they declined to urge Turkey to accept the Vienna Note; they declined to accede to a new note prepared at Olmiitz by Austria; and they now refused to permit Russian ships of war to roam over the Black Sea. Turkey declared war early in the month ; and the Allied fleets soon afterwards passed through the Dardanelles. Vain attempts were made at further agreements. The original Vienna note had been rejected by Turkey; the amended note had been rejected by Russia; the Olmiitz proposition was rejected by England; Lord Stratford de Redcliffe prepared a plan, which was rejected by Austria ; and now the Earl of Clarendon prepared a plan, which was suddenly cut short by the passing of the Danube at the end of the month, and the virtual commencement of hostilities. The* earl issued a circular-letter to all the British ministers abroad, dated 7th November, in which the imminency of approaching war was touched upon. Meanwhile, the Russian proceedings in the Danubian Princi- palities had become so audacious, that even the Prussian court was alarmed at them. Baron Manteuff'el told the British ambassador at Berlin, that ' Prince Urusoff (a Russian general) had taken the entire government of the province of Moldavia into his own hands ; and that his language towards the inhabitants was as insulting as his acts were * Parliamentary Papers on Eastern Affairs, ii. p. 113. DIPLOMACY OF 1853: THE ATTACK AT SINOPE. 59 oppressive. On one occasion, some Jews were called into his presence; and on his accosting them in his customary hard language, they claimed the privileges of Austrian suhjects ; on which the prince ordered them to leave at once for Lemherg.'* At length came the terrible news of the battle, or rather slaughter, at Sinbpe, which was effectual, more than anything else, in rousing a spirit of indignation throughout Western Europe. The news reached London and Paris on 11th December. The two governments Avere chagrined that such a destructive act should have been permitted at a time when Turkey was nominally under the protection of the English and French fleets. An investigation of all the circumstances was made by the English ships Retribution and Mogadore, sent to Sinope for that purpose immediately after the catastrophe ; and the following is the substance of the information obtained : — On 13th November, a Turkish flotilla anchored in the Bay of Sinope. This town is on the south shore of the Black Sea, 350 miles east of Constan- tinople, and 200 miles south-easj; of Sebastopol. The flotilla consisted of seven frigates, three corvettes, and two steamers. On the 21st, a Russian squadron appeared off the mouth of the bay, reconnoitred the Turks, and established a blockade. Some of the Turkish officers thought it would be well to Battle of Sinope. break the blockade, and engage in a running-fight ; but Osman Pacha, the commander of the flotilla, unfortunately determined to remain at anchor, and to await the attack from the Russians. On the 30th, the Russian squadron, consisting of three three-deckers and three two-deckers, under Admiral Nachimoff, stood in for the bay under full sail before the wind, and took up a position close alongside the Turkish ships ; while two frigates and three steamers remained outside to cut off' the retreat of any Turkish vessel attempting to escape. Osman Pacha immediately gave the signal for a determined and energetic defence. About noon, the Russians opened fire, and for an hour or two the conflict was fearful. The Naviek frigate, commanded by Ali Bey, when just about being boarded by a huge three-decker, was heroically blown up by her commander, thereby consigning himself and crew to destruction. Some of the * Parliamentary Papers, ii. 272. Turkish ships were burned by the enemy's red-hot shot; others blew up; and the rest, whose sides were literally beaten in by the enormous weight of the Russian metal, slipped their cables, and drifted on shore. The Russians now manned their yards, and cheered in honour of their bloody victory, if victory it can be called. They then recommenced firing upon the helpless wrecks, which still kept up a feeble but unyielding resistance, and did not cease until the work of ruin and death was achieved. Out of the whole Turkish flotilla, one vessel alone escaped : this was the steamer Taif, which slipped her cable shortly after the commencement of the battle, and after forcing her way at some risk through the force cruising outside, brought the first news of the fatal encounter to Constantinople. The land-batteries at Sinope fired in aid of the Turks ; but the aid was inconsiderable, partly because the guns were light, and partly because the Turkish ships intervened between the Rus- sians and the batteries. The town of Sinope was 60 ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. completely destroyed, and the whole coast strewed with dead bodies. Of the ships, nothing was left but heaps of fragments ; and of the crews, only 1500 remained alive out of 4500. The ships were the following : — Guns. Men. Naviek, . . 52 500 — blown up. Nezim, . . 52 500— destroyed. Farsli, . . S8 400— destroyed. Gullu Sent, . 24 200— destroyed. Aon Illah, . . 3G 400— taken. Damietta, . 5G 500— destroyed. Nedji Feshir, . 24 200— on shore. Kaid, . . 50 500— blown up. Nezemiah, . . CO 600— blown up. Falsi Marbout, 22 240— destroyed. Iregli, . . 4 150— steamer, 150 b. p.— destroyed. Taif, . . 16 300— do. 300 h. p.— not engaged. Total, . 434 4490 Osman Pacha, the commander in the Aon Illah, was wounded, then taken prisoner, and afterwards died in captivity ; Ali Bey, of the Navicl, was blown up with his ship ; Hassan Bey was killed in the Nezim ; Ali Maher Bey in the Farsli; Sadi Bey in the Gullu Sefit; Hussein Pacha and Kadi Bey in the Nezemiah; and Izet Bey in the Faisi Marbout. The Russians themselves suffered considerably, through the indomitable courage of their antagonists. They are believed to have had about 600 large pieces of cannon engaged — 6S-pounders,42-pounders, and 32-pounders. Admiral Nachimoff returned to Sebastopol before the Allied ships reached Sinope. The emperor, willing to catch at every trifle which might afford an opportunity for addressing his subjects in magniloquent language, sent an autograph-letter to Prince Menchikoff, glorifying Russia for the victory at Sinope : — ' St Petersburg, ot ' " ' 1S53. The victory of Sinope proves evidently that our Black Sea fleet has shewn itself worthy of its destina- tion. With hearty joy, I request you to communicate to my brave seamen, that I thank them for the success of the Russian flag on behalf of the glory and honour of Russia. I perceive with satisfaction that Tchesme' has not been forgotten in the Russian navy, and that the grandsons have proved themselves worthy of their grandsires. I remain, always and unalterably, your well-inclined and grateful Nicholas.' St Petersburg was thrown into an ecstasy of delight ; illuminations, balls, festivals, health- drinkings, succeeded each other for many days ; and the Battle of Sinope was played, with variations d la Husse, at the theatres. It is difficult to mark clearly the difference between a fair and an unfair attack during war ; but the point at which Russia and the Allies diverged in their interpretation of the Sinope catas- trophe was as follows : — Russia asserted that the Turkish flotilla had on board troops and ammuni- tion destined to aid rebellious tribes in an attack on Secoum-Kale, a Russo-Circassian town on the north-east of the Black Sea ; and that Russia was justified in destroying the flotilla under such circumstances. Turkey and her Allies, on the other hand, asserted that the flotilla was only charged with provisions for Batoum, a Turkish town near the Russian frontier of the Black Sea ; and that the destruction of a Turkish flotilla in a Turkish harbour was virtually a defiance to the Allies, who had undertaken to defend Turkey. In the correspondence between the various courts, the affair at Sinope was treated by the Allies — not so much as a breach of the recognised rules of honour in war, as a disregard of the efforts of the Allies to bring about peace ; but the general impression produced in England and France, as well as in Turkey, was one of indignation, and which unquestionably tended to weaken the efforts of the peace-makers. It is indeed undeniable that the conflict was rather a slaughter than a fight ; for the Russians, departing from the usages of civilised Europe, poured forth a burning torrent of grape and canister-shot upon the hapless wretches, who, escaping from the burning and sinking ships, sought to gain the shore. The close of the year was marked by the issue of circulars from the English and French govern- ments to their ministers abroad, narrating the proceedings which had taken place, lamenting the failure of all attempts to preserve peace, and announcing that the Allied fleets would at once enter the Black Sea, and assume an attitude that would prevent such another calamity as that at Sinope. The year 1853 did not pass awaj', how- ever, without one more effort to preserve peace. The ambassadors of England, France, Austria, and Prussia, at Constantinople, presented to the sultan, on the 12th of December, an 'Identic Note,' or proposal in which all agreed, containing the basis for a settlement of the difficulties between Turkey and Russia. The sultan assented to this on the 31st of December, and proposed that forty days should be allowed for the czar to signify his assent ; after which all the six powers should confer, at Vienna or some other central city, and agree on an amicable settlement of the various points at issue. All the four powers were satisfied with this accept- ance by the sultan, as maintaining the dignity and independence of Turkey, Avhile at the same time meeting every demand that Russia was entitled to make. The year 1854 opened amid busy attempts on the part of the four powers to obtain the assent of Russia to the terms of the Identic Note ; but when the Allied fleets actually entered the Black Sea — which they did on the 4th of January — and when the czar was informed of this fact, his irritation rendered him indisposed to accede to peaceful diplomacy. An angry correspondence ensued at St Petersburg, London, and Paris, between Russia on the one side, and England and France on the other ; the Identic Note was forgotten or laid aside ; and, early in February, the Russian ambas- sadors were withdrawn from London and Paris, and the English and French ambassadors from St Petersburg. Between the leading states of Europe, the with- drawal of ambassadors is the immediate forerunner of war, unless some special intervention occurs. THE 'SECRET CORRESPONDENCE' OF 1844 AND 1853. 61 No such intervention presented itself in this case ; and thus it arose that the month of March 1854, witnessed the formal rupture of peaceful relations between England and France on the one hand, and Russia on the other — on grounds which especially concerned Turkey in the first instance, hut which would have been dangerous to the welfare of Europe generally, if the designs of Russia had been quietly submitted to. M. Kossuth, in one of his speeches made while in America, spoke energeti- cally to the effect, that nations cannot with profit isolate themselves — cannot afford to be selfishly indifferent to the assaults of a strong power upon a weaker. ' Even your own peculiar interests,' he said to his transatlantic auditors, 'are best served when your foreign policy rests, not on transitory considerations, but on everlasting principles. Even in private life, no man can entirely cut himself off' from others. A man willing to attempt it, would be an exile at home : just so with nations, which in the larger family of man are individual members. In a nation, the consequence of total isolation is not felt as soon, but it will at length be felt as surely. The hours of nations are counted hy years; yet the secluded nation, self-exiled from mankind, dwindles away. Wo to the people whose citizens care only for their own present, and not for the future of their country ! ' * The exiled Magyar had sympathy with Hungary in his thoughts when he made this speech ; but his exhortations apply also to the case of Turkey, as oppressed by Russia. At one time, most of the nations of Europe had to rise to stem the claim of Turkey for almost universal dominion ; then against Spain ; then France; and in 1854, the time seemed to have arrived when something similar must be effected against Russia, and for similar reasons. Thus, then, were all the labours of European statesmen and ambassadors rendered of non-effect. The Vienna Note, the amended note, the Identic Note, the protocols, the proceedings at the con- ferences, the dispatches — documents which fill many hundred folio pages of close print — were fruitless, in so far as regarded the maintenance of peace between Russia and the Western Powers. the 'secret correspondence' op 1844 and 1853. But while these open and avowed negotiations were going forward, there was a remarkable under-current of 'secret correspondence,' of which the world knew nothing until twelve months after it occurred ; a correspondence in which two of the great powers of Europe interchanged opinions without the cognizance of the others. The secret correspondence between the English and Russian governments respecting Turkey and its future fate, constituted, indeed, a remarkable * Speech at Baltimore, December 27, 1851. episode in the history of the Avar. It was complete in itself — begun, continued, and ended separately and distinctly from the acknowledged diplomacy of the period. Episode though it be, however, it was of grave import ; for it unquestionably encou- raged the Emperor Nicholas in the pursuance of those schemes which superinduced the war. It was grave in another sense, for it exemplified the entanglements into which a nation might be brought, unknown to and unsanctioned by the people, by unacknoAvledged though well-meant diplomacy on the part of its ministers. Not only was there a secret correspondence, but another involved in it — a wheel within a Avheel — a Chinese ball-puzzle translated into English; for the corre- spondence of 1853 involved that of 1844, and both Avere alike unknown to the English parliament and the English nation until the spring of 1854. It is true that the English diplomatists did not assent to any spoliation schemes — did not countenance any line of conduct which AA r ould be injurious to Turkey ; but the rejection was Avorded in such courtly phrases, the moral scorn of injustice Avas so feebly expressed, the compliments paid to the czar had so much of fulsome flattery in them, that the diplomatists afforded a handle which the czar did not afterwards fail to apply to his oAvn purposes. This correspondence subsequently formed the theme of a remarkable article in the Westminster Review* under the title of ' International Immo- rality ;' in which the writer sought to sheAv the ill consequences which result to nations from a want of sincerity on the part of diplomatists, a tendency on their parts to call things by the wrong names, and to adopt crooked means for obtaining that which might be a worthy and proper end. This correspondence was remarkable also in another particular — the mode in which it was discovered or made public. For aught that can now be seen, it might have remained yet many more years in the archives of the Foreign Office, had not one of the diplomatists made use of lan- guage inconsistent with that used by him during the correspondence itself. Hoav this lapsus dreAV forth the truth, bit by bit, it Avill be desirable here to shew ; for the episode is of a kind which can best be understood by tracing the steps of the discovery, and thus, in some sort, travelling backward. Lord John Russell, the Journal de St Petersburg, the Times, the Earl of Derby, and the Earl of Aberdeen, Avere the instruments a\ hereby the nation became conversant with a correspondence which cither ought not to have taken place at all, or ought to have been known much earlier. It Avas on the 17th of February 1854, when Mr Layard brought on a discussion in the House of Commons concerning Eastern affairs, that Lord John Russell commented in terms of great severity on the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas. He said : ' There were concealment and deception on the part of Russia towards the government of this * New Series, No. XV. 62 ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. country ; but, while we gave credit to the assurances of the Russian government, we were not blind to the possibility that it might be deceiving us.' How one party can 'give credit' to another with such a proviso, is not easy to see. His lordship expressed his belief, that the emperor's object was ' to endea- vour in the present year to degrade Turkey still more than she has been before degraded, by successive wars and treaties on the part of Russia ; and it was hoped that by means of force, or of costly and lavish diplomacy, to obtain terms from the sultan which would render him completely subject to Russia; so that, if at any time he should attempt to throw off his chains, his prostrate and helpless condition would make the conquest of the country an easy task. Such I believe to have been the policy of Russia.' In respect to the rejection by the czar of the Vienna proposals, Lord John said that ' the course adopted by the Emperor of Russia shewed a total disregard of the peace of Europe, an utter contempt of the opinion of Europe, and a disregard of those sovereigns with whom he had been allied.' The war was characterised as a guarantee to mankind of ' the peace of Europe, of which the Emperor of Russia is the wanton dis- turber ; and it is for mankind to throw upon the head of that disturber the consequences which he has so flagrantly, and, I believe, so imprudently evoked. And it is to mankind the independence not only of Turkey, but of Germany, and of all European nations. The state of Germany for the last few years has been one, if not absolutely of dependence upon the Emperor of Russia, at least one in which independence has not been very loudly asserted.' It would be difficult to employ language more severe and galling to Russia; and as it corresponded with the prevailing opinion in England on the subject, the speech was received with general favour. This speech roused the Russian government. No newspapers are free in that country; but the Journal cle St Petersburg is believed to be employed as an organ through which the opinions of the government are promulgated in a non-official form. On the 2d of March, a leading-article appeared, evidently emanating from high quarters, concerning Lord John Russell's speech. That speech is charac- terised as a 'brutal outrage' against the emperor. England, it is asserted, should least of all nations misconstrue the emperor's intentions ; for c the emperor had spontaneously explained himself with the most perfect candour to the queen and her ministers, with the object of establishing with them a friendly understanding even upon the most important result which can affect the Ottoman Empire.' The emperor, foreseeing that Turkey must crumble one day, had sought an interchange of opinions with England concerning that im- pending catastrophe ; and the result shewed itself in ' a correspondence of the most friendly character between the present English ministers and the imperial government.' Finally, after adverting to the correspondence as a collection of non-official documents, which could not rightly be divulged, the newspaper writer advised Lord John Russell ' to reperuse that correspondence, in which he was the first to take part, before ceding to the Earl of Clarendon the direction of foreign affairs* Let him consult his conscience, if the passion which leads him astray permit him to recognise its voice. He can decide now whether it be really true that the emperor has been wanting in frankness towards the English government.' The next link in the chain was furnished by the Times — that extraordinary journal which knows every one's business, dives into every secret, sends commissioners to inquire into every abuse, braves the anger of governments, parliaments, classes, and corporations, and puts forth a flood of articles which occupy a place among the highest specimens of English composition. On the 11th of March, an article appeared, commenting on the semi- official manifesto from St Petersburg ; and in the course of the argument appeared these words : ' We have not now to learn for the first time that, before the Emperor Nicholas entered upon these extraordinary transactions, he had attempted at various times, and in different forms, to lure almost every court in Europe to share in the plunder of Turkey. As long ago as his own visit to this couutry, he held the same language, and it may have been repeated in greater detail in the course of last winter. But ivhat answer did he get to these overtures? What answer did he get when he sounded Lord John Russell, of all men in the world, on the subject of an eventual partition of Turkey 1 We confidently reply, that he was met by an indignant refusal on the part of the British government. He was told, if we are not greatly mistaken, that this country could entertain no proposal in any form which pre-supposed the dismemberment of an empire the integrity of which we had frequently engaged to respect and even to protect.' After further revelations, under cover of the words ' if Ave are not mistaken,' the Times ended by saying : ' Lord John Russell's answer to the Russian overture will do him no dishonour ; and although in time of peace it might have been inconvenient to lay bare the pretensions Russia has sometimes indicated, our present relations are not likely to suffer from an " indiscretion " she herself has provoked ; and we trust the whole correspondence will be immediately produced.' The scene changes, and the actors also. On the 13th of March, the Earl of Derby, in the House of Lords, requested from the Earl of Aberdeen an explanation concerning the Russian allegations, and concerning the knowledge which the Times appeared to have possessed of some secret corre- spondence not known to parliament. His lordship said : ' This is not the first time, by many, within the last few months, that the Times newspaper has professed to have, and has proved to be in possession * Lord John Russell was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during about three months, from December 1852 to March 1853. THE * SECRET CORRESPONDENCE ' OF 1844 AND 1853. 63 of, secret and exclusive information, which ought and was supposed to have been known only to the cabinet ; also to have possession of, and access to, papers and documents refused to both Houses of Parliament ; and to be at liberty, and apparently authorised, to make public these documents, pre- viously refused even to parliament itself. The noble earl may disclaim, if he pleases, any com- munication, cither direct or indirect, with the Times newspaper, or that he ever personally in any way communicated with that journal ; but all his disclaimer cannot persuade me, or any other human being, I believe, in the country, that the Times newspaper could convey such informa- tion, or insert such an article as I have just read to the House, without being informed by some person who had official information on these matters, and one who, in conveying such informa- tion, betrayed that which ought to be considered as a cabinet secret.' The Earl of Aberdeen, in reply, stated that a secret correspondence had certainly been carried on between England and Russia in the early spring of 1853 ; that this correspondence had not been printed, out of Covnt Nesselrode. delicacy to the emperor, on so confidential a subject ; but that the reference to it in the St Petersburg newspaper absolved England from further secrecy, and that the correspondence should forthwith be presented to the House. The earl next stated, that when the Emperor of Russia was in England in 1844, many conversations were held between the emperor, the earl, the Duke of Wellington, and Sir Robert Peel, respecting the probable future fate of Turkey ; that Count Nessel- rode drew up an account of those conversations ; that he — the Earl of Aberdeen — had not seen that document during the intervening ten years ; but that it should be sought for, and presented to the House. Here, then, was a solution of one mystery — the existence of secret correspondence referring to the years 1844 and 1853 ; but another yet remained. How had the Times obtained an insight into these matters? The Earl of Aberdeen, the prime-minister himself, was wholly and entirely unable to answer the question. He had never, he said, either directly or indirectly, sanctioned any breach of trust in such a matter; and lie could only surmise that a junior clerk in the Foreign Office had been betrayed into a departure from the strict line of duty in this respect. This accusation brought about an indignant denial from the person accused ; which denial the Earl of Aberdeen felt it incum- bent on him to accept. But there the mystery remained. The Times assumed a haughty tone ; denied that it had bribed any of the underlings of office ; claimed the right of determining when and how it would make public any early or peculiar 64 ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. information possessed by it; and vouchsafed no explanation whatever. The peers abandoned further search, with a significant reminder by the Earl of Malmesbury of Sancho Panza's theorem— that ' a cask may leak at the top just as well as at the bottom.' The Secret Correspondence was printed and presented to parliament shortly afterwards — both that of 1844 and that of 1853. It appears that when the Emperor Nicholas returned to St Petersburg, from his visit to London in 1844, he put Count Nesselrode in possession of the out- lines of the conversations he had had with the English statesmen ; and from these outlines a document was drawn up, designated a ' Memo- randum by Count Nesselrode, delivered to Her Majesty's Government, and founded on Commu- nications received from the Emperor of Russia subsequently to His Imperial Majesty's visit to England in June 1844.' This memorandum consists of twenty-eight paragraphs. Four of these assert that Russia and England are interested in the maintenance of Turkey as she is ; three relate to a tendency, of which Turkey is accused, to evade treaties ; six relate to religious difficulties in Turkey ; and then comes the important part of the memorandum : ' However, they [Russia and England] must not conceal from themselves how many elements of disso- lution that empire contains within itself. Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall, without its being in the power of the friendly cabinets to prevent it. As it is not given to human foresight to settle before- hand a plan of action for such or such unlooked-for case, it would be premature to discuss eventualities which may never be realised. In the uncertainty which hovers over the future, a single fundamental idea seems to admit of a really practical application: it is that the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished, if, in the event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common. That understanding Avill be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already an entire conformity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey, in a common interest of conservatism and of peace. In order to render their union more efficacious, there would remain nothing to be desired but that England should be seen to associate herself thereto with the same view. The reason which recommends the establishment of this agreement is A r ery simple. On land, Russia exercises, in regard to Turkey, a preponderant action. On sea, England occupies the same position. Isolated, the action of these two powers might do much mischief. United, it can produce a real benefit : thence, the advantage of coming to a previous under- standing before having recourse to action. This notion was in principle agreed upon during the Emperor's last residence in London. The result was the eventual engagement, that if anything unforeseen occurred in Turkey, Russia and England should previ- ously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common. The object for which Russia and England will have to come to an understanding may be expressed in the following manner : — 1. To seek to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present state, so long as that political combination shall be possible. 2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists, and in conjunction with each other to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of that empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own states and the rights which the treaties assure to them respectively, or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. For the purpose thus stated, the policy of Russia and of Austria, as we have already said, is closely united by the principle of perfect identity. If Eng- land, as the principal maritime power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St Petersburg, London, and Vienna. Conflict between the Great Towers being thus obvi- ated, it is to be hoped that the peace of Europe will be maintained even in the midst of such serious circum- stances. It is to secure this object of common interest, if the case occurs, that, as the Emperor agreed with Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers during his residence in England, the previous understanding which Russia and England shall establish between themselves must be directed.' The remarkable features in this agreement, if agreement it may be called, are these — that Russia, by looking so confidently at the future dissolution of Turkey, was more likely to bring about than to retard that event ; that the connivance of England with Russia was to be kept quiet ; that Austria would do and think exactly as Russia might suggest; that France would be compelled to agree to any settlement of Turkish difficulties which the other three powers had previously agreed upon ; and that Prussia was ignored altogether, as if her wishes and opinions Avere not of the smallest importance. Such, then, was the Memorandum of the con- fidential conversations held in 1844 ; and uoav avc come to the Secret Correspondence of a later period. This correspondence commenced on the 11th of January 1853, and ended on the 21st of April. It consists of tAvelve dispatches from Sir Hamilton Seymour at St Petersburg, four enclosures in those dispatches, one dispatch from Lord John Russell to Sir Hamilton, and two from the Earl of Clarendon — the office of foreign secretary in England having changed hands during this interval. Sir H. Seymour, in his first dispatch, stated that the Emperor of Russia, on the 9th of January, expressed his pleasure that the Earl of Aberdeen had succeeded to office — the Derby ministry having been broken up in the previous month — and his hope that the ministry would be of long duration. ' His imperial majesty desired me particularly to convey this assurance to the Earl of Aberdeen, with whom, he said, he had been acquainted for nearly forty years, THE 'SECRET CORRESPONDENCE' OF 1844 AND 1853. 65 and for whom he entertained equal regard and esteem. His majesty desired to be brought to the kind recollection of his lordship.' It would be unjust to blame a statesman simply because a foreign sovereign respected and esteemed him ; but there can be little doubt, that the emperor's senti- ments towards the Earl of Aberdeen induced him to bring forward projects which would have been kept yet longer in abe3'ance if any other statesman had been premier of England. The emperor spoke of the value he attached to alliance with England, and used these remarkable words : ' When we are agreed (d'accord), I am quite without anxiety as to the west of Europe ; it is immaterial what the others may think or do.' This was a side-blow at France. Sir H. Seymour endeavoured to draw the emperor into some explanation of his suspicious proceedings in regard to Turkey ; and it was then that the phrase concerning the ' sick man ' was " first used. The emperor said : ' Tenez. Nous avons sur les bras un homme malade — un homme grave- ment malade ; ce sera, je vous le dis franchement, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous echapper, surtout avant que toutes les dis- positions necessaires fussent prises.'* To which Sir H. Seymour replied : ' Votre majeste est si gracieuse, qu'elle me permettra de lui faire encore une observation. Votre majeste" dit que l'homme est malade ; e'est bien vrai ; mais votre majeste daignera m'excuser si jc lui fair observer, que e'est a l'homme genereux et fort de manager l'homme malade et faible.'t On the 14th, Sir H. Seymour had another conversation with the emperor. The emperor still harped upon the ' sick man.' He spoke of the probable downfall of Turkey, and then said: 'Now, I desire to speak to you as a friend and as a gentleman : if England and I arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest it matters little to me ; it is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly, that if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly. For my part, I am equally disposed to engage not to establish myself there, as proprietor that is to say, for as occupier I do not say. It might happen that circumstances — if no previous provision were made, if everything should be left to chance — might place me in the position of occupying Constantinople.' In the conversation that ensued, the emperor dwelt on what would have to be done if the 'sick man' should die; whereas the British ambassador dwelt rather on the desirability of curing the 'sick man' if possible * ' Stay. We have on our hands a sick man — a very sick man ; it will he, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away from us, especially before nil necessary arrangements were made.' t ' Your majesty is so gracious, that you will allow me to make one further observation. Your majesty says the man is sick ; it is very true ; but your majesty will deign to excuse mo if I remark, that it is the part of a generous and strong man to treat with gentleness the sick and feeble man.' — a difference too characteristic to be regarded as unimportant. The emperor stated that he had expressed his views on these points to the Duke of Wellington, when in England in 1844. Lord John Russell, as secretary of state for foreign affairs, replied to Sir H. Seymour (9th February), that the emperor's remarks concerning the 'sick man' were unsatisfactory, because any agreement between Russia and England ought to refer to some particular time that could be guessed at, at least, within a few years ; whereas the ' sick man' might live twenty — fifty — a hundred years. His lordship proceeded to remark : ' In these cir- cumstances, it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings towards the sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion. Besides this consideration, however, it must be observed, that an agreement made in such a case tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to provide. Austria and France could not, in fair- ness, be kept in ignorance of the transaction ; nor would such concealment be consistent with the end of preventing a European war. Indeed, such concealment cannot be intended by his imperial majesty. It is to be inferred that, as soon as Great Britain and Russia should have agreed on the course to be pursued, and have determined to enforce it, they should communicate their intentions to the great powers of Europe. An agreement thus made, and thus communicated, would not be very long a secret ; and while it would alarm and alienate the sultan, the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his enemies to increased violence and more obstinate conflict.' He further stated, that the emperor, as occupier of Constanti- nople, would be exposed to numberless temptations to go one step further, and make himself proprietor at last. In two further conversations, held on 20th and 21st February, the emperor learned from Sir H. Seymour that the English government deemed it better to tiy and support the ' sick man,' than to dwell so much on his prospective death ; and that that death did not, after all, appear to be so very near. ' Then,' rejoined the emperor, ' I will tell you, that if your government has been led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of existence, your government must have received incorrect information. I repeat to you that the sick man is dying; and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding; and this we should do, I am convinced, if I could hold but ten minutes' conversation with your ministers — with Lord Aberdeen, for instance, who knows me so well, who has full confidence in me, as I have in him.' Following up the conversation, which became a matter of delicacy and difficulty to the British ambassador, the emperor, in reply to a question, said: ' You must understand, that when I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well; what 66 ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. suits the one, suits the other; our interests, as regains Turkey, are perfectly identical.' When pressed for some explanation of his views con- cerning Turkey, he said: 'In the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, I think it might he less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than is commonly believed. The Principalities are, in fact, an independent state under my protection : this might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of government. So, again, with Bulgaria: there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent state. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia: that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.' All this struck Sir H. Seymour as being ominous and alarming. In writing home concerning it, he said : ' It can hardly be otherwise but that the sovereign who insists with such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighbouring state, must have settled in his own mind that the hour, if not of its dissolution, at all events for its dissolution, must be at hand. Then, as now, I reflected that this assumption would hardly be ventured upon unless some, perhaps general, but at all events intimate, understanding existed between Russia and Austria. Supposing my suspicion to be well founded, the emperor's object is to engage her majesty's government, in conjunction with his own cabinet and that of Vienna, in some scheme for the ultimate partition of Turkey, and for the exclusion of France from the arrangement.' That a secret understanding between the Emperors of Russia and Austria concerning Turkey had been arrived at during their meeting at Olmiitz in 1852, was a probability which Sir H. Seymour frequently insisted on in the course of his dispatches. A few days after these important conversations, the emperor dictated to Count Nesselrode the wording of a ' memorandum,' which should embody the heads of the conversations; because as only two persons were present, those two alone could narrate what had passed. The count gave a copy of the memorandum to Sir Hamilton, who sent home another copy to the English government. The memorandum was chiefly a recapitulation of what had been said ; but while Count Nesselrode, on the part of the emperor, wished the matter to be carried on further in the same secret way, the British ambassador, on the part of his court, urged that the sooner such a mode of discussing such delicate affairs was put an end to the better. The Earl of Clarendon, on taking the seals of the foreign office, replied fully to Sir H. Seymour's several dispatches, and discussed at some length (23d March) all the points of the emperor's memorandum. He stated that England had still faith in the vitality of Turkey ; that nothing can be more fatal to that vitality, than the assumption of its rapid and inevitable decay; that if the emperor's opinion on this point were made known, it would hasten rather than retard the catastrophe ; that no sound government for Turkey can at present be devised, if the Moslem rule should cease ; that England desires no such aggrandisement of territory as the emperor had hinted at in respect to Egypt ; that England must refuse to make any agreement on such matters with Russia, unknown to the other powers of Europe; that the fall of Turkey can be followed only by a general European congress, such as that of 1815; that a congress would develop such a stream of hostile rivalries, that the longer it can be postponed the better ; and that a considerate forbearance on all sides towards Tm-key, would be better than any reite- rated assertion of her approaching downfall. His lordship came in strong collision with the emperor in the following passage : — ' Nor can we admit that the signs of Turkish decay are now either more evident or more rapid than of late years : there is still great energy and great wealth in Turkey ; a disposition to improve the system of government is not wanting; corruption, though unfortunately great, is still not of a character, nor carried to an extent, that threatens the existence of the state; the treatment of Christians is not harsh ; and the toleration exhibited by the Porte towards this portion of its subjects, might serve as an example to some governments who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous power.' A few more dispatches passed ; but the one just noticed, from the Earl of Clarendon, was the last which contained any definite explanations of views. The remainder was chiefly a string of courtly phrases, in which each party expressed satisfaction at being so well understood by the other. It is impossible, nevertheless, not to feel that the whole subject was left in a nebulous state — nothing being cleared up. Such, by fatality or by design, has been the character of many diplomatic discussions in which Russia has been concerned. It is almost inconceivable that, after the indication of Russian views thus given, the Earl of Clarendon, in a dispatch dated 5th of April, should have spoken of the Nesselrode memorandum of the conversations in the following terms : — ' It is my duty to inform you, that that important and remarkable document was received by her majesty's government with feelings of sincere satisfaction, as a renewed proof of the emperor's confidence and friendly feelings.' The English statesmen blew hot and cold in this matter — used too many honeyed phrases to sweeten their censure ; and it can bardly be wondered at if the Emperor of Russia, in the prosecution of his schemes, afterwards insisted upon the honey rather than upon the censure. The results of secret diplomacy were frequently illustrated during the progress of the war — or rather, the existence of state documents was fre- quently ascertained, of which the nation had been RUPTURE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS :— 1854. 67 entirely ignorant. Thus, the Earl of Aberdeen remained for a quarter of a century under the imputation of having connived at the Treaty of Adrianople — the most disastrous which Turkey was ever called upon to make with Russia. He had been secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1829, when that treaty was signed ; and when, in 1854, as prime minister, he bore the responsibility of war with Russia, he was frequently charged in the House of Lords with entertaining pro-Russian views, and with having, in 1829, been instrumental in fixing Russian shackles upon Turkey. To defend himself from these charges, the Earl of Aberdeen moved for the production of a state document — namely, a dispatch, dated October 31, 1829, from himself to Lord Heytesbury, British ambassador to the court of St Petersburg. This dispatch announced the receipt, by the English government, of the information that the Treaty of Adrianople had been signed. It expressed regret and alarm at the terms of that treaty. It passed in review the numerous disadvantages accruing to Turkey from the treaty — the cession of Asiatic fortresses ; the insinuation of Russia like a wedge between the Turkish and Persian empires ; the protectorate by Russia of Wallachia and Mol- davia; the intermeddling of Russia in the affairs of Servia ; the power acquired by the czar over the mouths of the Danube ; the encroachment on the power of the sultan in the Dardanelles — all were touched upon in the dispatch ; and the carl forcibly expressed his apprehensions at the con- sequences of a treaty so disastrous to Turkey. The dispatch, which was directed to be read to Count Nesselrode, was not unworthy of an English states- man ; but it is strange that the Earl of Aberdeen, writing thus in 1829, should have alloAved himself to be hoodwinked by the czar in 1844, and again in 1853. RUPTURE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS. The diplomacy, whether secret or avowed, failed to heal the wounds which distracted Europe ; and war against Russia was declared by England and France in March 1854. England and France re- garded it as a political war — a war to preserve the balance of power in Europe by preventing Russia from crushing Turkey ; but Russia chose to give it a religious aspect, as if the existence of the orthodox faith were imperilled. Sir G. Larpent remarks on this point : ' If the Emperor of Russia has the right to attack a foreign state, because he believes his co-religionists are oppressed there, then we must concede a similar right to other nations. Are not the Catholics and Protestants who live under the sceptre of the czar in a far more hopeless condition than the Christians in Turkey ? Has not the Russian government forced millions, by every description of cruelty and treachery, to give up the belief of their fathers ? If these are notorious facts, it necessarily follows, from the premises of the Russian court, that all the Catholic states of Europe have the right to invade the Russian territory, and to regain for their co-religionists those liberties of which they have been robbed, in contradiction to morality and in the face of the most solemn compacts. Russia will not grant such a right to the Catholic and Protestant states ; and for that very reason she ought to refrain from such injustice herself.' * Two of the documents which were made public shortly before the commencement of the war, are of remarkable character, in respect to the imperial position of the writers. These were — a letter from the Emperor Napoleon to the Emperor Nicholas, and the reply. After the bold seizure of power in 1851 by the then President of the French Republic, Prince Louis Napoleon, followed by the assumption of the imperial title in 1852, the small states of Europe hesitated whether or not to recognise the new Emperor of the French : they waited for a sign from the great continental leader — the Czar Nicholas. Nicholas gave that qualified assent which is typified by the appellation of 'good friend ' to the person addressed, instead of ' brother' — a difference which is understood to have a definite meaning in royal circles. The Emperor Napoleon, thus admitted to a sort of equality with the czar, wrote an autograph letter to Nicholas, dated 29th January 1854— intended as a last attempt to induce the czar to listen to reasonable terms of accommodation. Copies of this letter were pro- fusely distributed throughout France, as if to notify to the French nation that their emperor would not unnecessarily or wantonly plunge into war. The letter passed in review all the cir- cumstances of the quarrel between Russia and Turkey, and the obligations of England and France towards Turkey; and it then sketched a proposal, that an armistice should be signed forthwith ; that the Russian troops should be with- drawn from the Principalities ; that the English and French fleets should be withdrawn from the Black Sea ; that Russia and Turkey should appoint two plenipotentiaries ; and that these should agree upon a convention to be submitted to the four powers. The letter ended by the declaration, that it was written by ' Your Majesty's good friend, Napoleon.' The reply from the czar, dated ^ ^ 1854, was courteously worded, but non-effective towards the maintenance of peace. It exonerated Russia, and threw all the blame on Turkey and her Allies. It proposed that the Allies should withdraw the fleets before he was to be called upon to withdraw his armies ; and that Turkey should send an ambassador to St Petersburg to sue for peace. The letter contained these words : 'Whatever your majesty may decide, menaces will not induce me to recede ; my confi- dence is in God and in my right ; and Russia, as * Turkey : its History and Progress, ii. 414. 68 ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. I can guarantee, will prove herself in 1854 what she was in 1812.' This allusion to the disasters at Moscow was very galling, and was perhaps intended so to be, to the French. The correspondence took place without previous concert with the British sovereign or government ; whether it would have been approved beforehand, has not been stated ; but the English ministers afterwards expressed their assent to what the Emperor of the French had advanced. Another effort to preserve peace, and one of a singular character, was made in a non-official quarter. The members of the Society of Friends have ever been remarkable for the consistency with which, through good report and evil report, they have deprecated war in all its forms ; and they resolved on an attempt to move the mighty czar, who would not be moved by the united voice of Europe. On the 20th of January, three Quakers — Henry Pease, of Darlington ; Joseph Sturge, of Louis Napoleon. Birmingham; and Robert Charlton, of Bristol — set out on a winter-journey from London to St Petersburg, by way of Berlin, Konigsberg, and Riga. The route from Riga to St Petersburg was traversed by means of sledges ; and no fewer than 300 horses were required for this service, by successive relays on the road. Considering the great amount of snow which had fallen, however, and the extent of the journey, the travellers reached their destina- tion with less discomfort than they had expected. On their arrival at the Russian capital, they obtained an introduction to a gentleman who had resided in Russia for forty years, and who, it was thought, would be of service to them in their delicate mission. He advised them to solicit an interview with Count Nesselrode, chancellor or prime minister of the empire. This they did, stating that they had not deemed it advisable to apply to their own ministers, or to the Russian ambassador in London ; and that, for the same reasons, they had preferred applying to Count Nesselrode direct, for the purpose of securing his assistance in the presentation of the Society's address to the emperor. They waited on the count, and left him a French copy of the address for the emperor's perusal. As a consequence, they were admitted to an audience of the emperor on the 10th. They read an Address from the Society of Friends, praying the emperor, in the name of that Christianity which was alike his religion and theirs, to avert the horrors of war by adopting some other means than those of bloodshed to heal the wounds between him and other sovereigns. He received them kindly, and then spoke at some length, throwing the whole blame of the war upon others — as was his wont whether in speaking or writing. He then introduced them to the empress and the Grand-duchess Olga — daughter of the czar, RUPTURE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS :— 1854. 69 and Princess-royal of Wurtemberg— by whom tbey were courteously received. The emperor sent a written reply by the three deputies to the Society of Friends in England ; and thus ended an attempt, fruitless in result, but respectable for the singleness of purpose and the unselfishness which had suggested it. The proceeding, however, did not pass without strictures in parliament. It was urged in many quarters that private indi- viduals, however excellent their motives, could not thus assume the management of international disputes, without incurring a risk of embarrassing the government on whom the responsibility of public affairs rested. At a somewhat later period in the history of the war, Frederika Bremer, the Swedish authoress, sought to apply her womanly gentleness towards the maintenance of peace — not, as the Quakers had done, by a direct appeal to the czar individu- ally, but by appealing to European sympathies generally. She prepared an address, for publica- tion in the English, American, French, Russian, Swedish, and German newspapers ; and, as might have been expected, selected the Times as the representative of the English press. The address was an invitation to a Peace Alliance, among the women of all nations. It commenced thus : — ' At a time like this, when the Powers of the West arm themselves against those of the East, and enter into a struggle threatening to spread over several of the countries of Europe like a large bleeding wound, tearing men from their homes, leaving thousands of widows and fatherless children, destroying harvests, burning cities, filling hospitals, calling up bitter and hateful passions, laying shackles on commerce, imbittering life in many thousand quiet, industrious families : a struggle, the sorrowful effects of which possibly may be felt by most of the nations of the earth — at such a time we have ventured a thought, a hope, that through woman a peaceful alliance might be concluded, embracing the whole earth — an alliance opposing the direful effects of war, and contributing by united and well-directed efforts, under the blessing of God, to the development of a state of peace, love, and well- being, to come forth when once the terrors of war shall be over, and the time of devastation has passed away.' The project consisted in an attempt to combine all the benevolent societies of women in all countries into one great alliance : to enable those who- heal the sick, educate the young, shelter the houseless, feed the hungry, clothe the naked, reform the vicious, raise the fallen, to combine their efforts to yet greater purpose during a time of war — if not to stem the warfare itself, at least to mitigate its horrors. Addressing the benevo- lent women of all countries, the writer, or perhaps writers said : ' We ought now to tell you who they are who thus address you. We are Swedish women, united for the care of poor orphans and destitute families in Stockholm, the capital of Sweden. We can rejoice in the co-operation of our queen, and the humblest woman can join us, and taking care of a family or a single child, rise to the dignity of its guardian-angel on earth. We have recently entered into connection with the societies of women, daily becoming more numerous, in different parts of this country, in order thereby to strengthen and encourage each other. We are a little flock, and belong to a small nation ; but we rejoice that from this nation have risen great men and benefactors to humanity.' Generous as was the intention, all-womanly the feeling, the project was not of a practicable character. The Times, in a friendly editorial article, pointed out this to Miss Bremer, and added : ' The influence of women is boundless in the world : as mothers, wives, sisters, daughters, we have to thank them for well-nigh every particle of real happiness we enjoy in our passage from the cradle to the grave. Wherever misfortune falls or calamity oppresses, or sickness chains the limbs of a sufferer to his bed of pain, there they will be found, with pity in their glances, comfort in their touch, and charity in their hearts. But we have a very strong belief that a woman must be left to select the objects of her sympathy for herself, and that any attempt to drill her into the measured step of a battalion of charity, march- ing to the relief of the world in general, would most signally break down. In benevolence, as in all things else — if we may argue from the practice of the best and kindliest among them — women shew to most advantage in the quiet of their own homes. Leave it to them to find out the poor neigh- bour, and the poor neighbour's sick child, and to administer relief in their own way. As many as step out of this sacred circle, are not altogether so admirable as those who remain within it. We have never heard of any real advantage to humanity which has resulted from high-soaring female endeavours to regenerate mankind.' To revert to the course of public affairs. The withdrawal of the Russian ambassadors from London and Paris, after the failure of the corre- spondence between the two emperors, was quickly followed by the issuing of the following manifesto by the czar : — ' We, Nicholas I., &c— We have already informed our beloved and faithful subjects of the progress of our disagreements with the Ottoman Porte. Since then, although hostilities have commenced, we have not ceased sincerely to wish, as we still wish, the cessation of bloodshed. We entertained even the hope that reflection and time would convince the Turkish government of its misconceptions, engendered by treacherous instigations, in which our just demands, founded on treaties, have been represented as attempts upon its independence veiling intentions of aggrandise- ment. Vain, however, have been our expectations so far. The English and French governments have sided with Turkey, and the appearance of the combined fleets off Constantinople served as a further incentive to its obstinacy ; and now, both the Western Powers, without previously declaring war, have sent their fleets into the Black Sea, proclaiming their intention to protect the Turks, and to impede the free navigation of our vessels of war for the defence of our coasts. After a course of proceeding so unheard of among 70 ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. civilised nations, we recalled our embassies from England and Trance, and have broken off all political intercourse with those powers. Thus, England and France have sided with the enemies of Christianity against Russia combating for the orthodox faith. But Russia will not betray her holy mission ; and, if enemies infringe her frontiers, we are ready to meet them with the firmness bequeathed to us by our forefathers. Are we not still the same Russian nation of whose exploits the memorable events of 1812 bear witness ? May the Almighty assist us to prove this by deeds! With this hope, combating for our persecuted brethren, followers of the faith of Christ, with one accord let all Russia exclaim : " Lord, our Redeemer ! whom shall we fear ? May God be glorified, and His enemies be scattered ! " St Petersburg, ~- February 1854.' This manifesto created a very uneasy feeling throughout Western Europe; it so evidently shewed what efforts would be made to give the approaching war a religious aspect, and to kindle the torch of fanaticism in aid of the czar's views. To say that ' England and France have sided with the enemies of Christianity against Russia com- bating for the orthodox faith,' was to say that which would rouse millions of ignorant serfs into implacable hostility against Western Europe. The formal declaration of war by England is here given in full, as an official record of the circumstances which led to hostilities : — 'It is with deep regret that Her Majesty announces the failure of her anxious and protracted endeavours to preserve for her people and for Europe the blessings of peace. The unprovoked aggression of the Emperor of Russia against the Sublime Porte has been persisted in with such disregard of consequences, that after the rejection by the Emperor of Russia of terms which the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, and the King of Prussia, as well as Her Majesty, considered just and equitable, Her Majesty is compelled by a sense of what is due to the honour of her crown, to the interests of her people, and to the independence of the states of Europe, to come forward in defence of an ally whose territory is invaded, and whose dignity and independence are assailed. Her Majesty, in justification of the course she is about to pursue, refers to the transactions in which Her Majesty has been engaged. The Emperor of Russia had some cause of complaint against the Sultan with reference to the settlement, which His Highness had sanctioned, of the conflicting claims of the Greek and Latin Churches to a portion of the Holy Places of Jerusalem and its neighbourhood. To the complaint of the Emperor of Russia on this head justice was done, and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had the satisfaction of promoting an arrangement, to which no exception was taken by the Russian Government. But, while the Russian Government repeatedly assured the Government of Her Majesty, that the mission of Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople was exclusively directed to the settlement of the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, Prince Menchikoff himself pressed upon the Porte other demands of a far more serious and important character, the nature of which he in the first instance endeavoured, as far as possible, to conceal from Her Majesty's Ambassador. And these demands, thus studiously concealed, affected, not the privileges of the Greek Church at Jerusalem, but the position of many millions of Turkish subjects in their relations to their sovereign the Sultan. These demands were rejected by the spontaneous decision of-the Sublime Porte. Two assurances had been given to Her Majesty — one, that the mission of Prince Menchikoff only regarded the Holy Places ; the other, that his mission would be of a conciliatory character. In both respects Her Majesty's just expectations were disappointed. Demands were made which, in the opinion of the Sultan, extended to the substitution of the Emperor of Russia's authority for his own over a large portion of his subjects, and those demands were enforced by a threat ; and when Her Majesty learned that, on announcing the termination of his mission, Prince Menchikoff declared that the refusal of his demands would impose upon the Imperial Government the necessity of seeking a guarantee by its own power, Her Majesty thought proper that her fleet should leave Malta, and, in co-operation with that of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, take up its station in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. So long as the negotiation bore an amicable character, Her Majesty refrained from any demonstration of force. But when, in addition to the assemblage of large military forces on the frontier of Turkey, the Ambassador of Russia intimated that serious conse- quences would ensue from the refusal of the Sultan to comply with unwarrantable demands, Her Majesty deemed it right, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French, to give an unquestionable proof of her determination to support the sovereign rights of the Sultan. The Russian Government has maintained that the determination of the Emperor to occupy the Princi- palities was taken in consequence of the advance of the fleets of England and France. But the menace of invasion of the Turkish territory was conveyed in Count Nesselrode's note to Reshid Pacha of the ^ of May, and re-stated in his despatch to Baron Br'unnow of the npj^f> which announced the determination of the Emperor of Russia to order his troops to occupy the Principalities, if the Porte did not within a week comply with the demands of Russia. The dispatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, authorising him in certain specified contingencies to send for the British fleet, was dated the 31st of May, and the order sent direct from England to Her Majesty's Admiral to proceed to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles was dated the 2d of June. The determination to occupy the Principalities was therefore taken before the orders for the advance of the combined squadrons were given. The Sultan's Minister was informed, that unless he signed within a week, and without the change of a word, the Note proposed to the Porte by Prince Men- chikoff on the eve of his departure from Constantinople, the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia would be occupied by Russian troops. The Sultan could not accede to so insulting a demand ; but when the actual occupation of the Principalities took place, the Sultan did not, as he might have done in the exercise of his undoubted right, declare war, but addressed a protest to his Allies. Her Majesty, in conjunction with the sovereigns of Austria, France, and Prussia, has made various attempts to meet any just demands of the Emperor of Russia without affecting the dignity and independence of the Sultan ; and had it been the sole object of Russia to obtain security for the enjoyment by the Christian subjects of the Porte of their privileges and immunities, RUPTURE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS :— 1854. 71 she would have found it in the offers that have been made by the Sultan. But, as that security was not offered in the shape of a special and separate stipulation with Eussia, it was rejected. Twice has this offer been made by the Sultan, and recommended by the Four Powers — once by a Note originally prepared at Vienna, and subsequently modified by the Porte ; once by the proposal of bases of negotiation agreed upon at Con- stantinople on the 31st of December, and approved at Vienna on the 13th of January — as offering to the two parties the means of arriving at an understanding in a becoming and honourable manner. It is thus manifest that a right for Eussia to interfere in the ordinary relations of Turkish subjects to their Sovereign, and not the happiness of Christian commu- nities in Turkey, was the object sought for by the Eussian Government. To such a demand the Sultan would not submit, and His Highness, in self-defence, declared war upon Eussia ; but Her Majesty, neverthe- less, in conjunction with her Allies, has not ceased her endeavours to restore peace between the contending parties. The time has, however, now arrived when — the advice and remonstrances of the Four Powers having proved wholly ineffectual, and the military preparations of Eussia becoming daily more extended — it is but too obvious that the Emperor of Eussia has entered upon a course of policy which, if unchecked, must lead to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. In this conjuncture, Her Majesty feels called upon, by regard for an ally, the integrity and independence of whose empire have been recognised as essential to the peace of Europe, by the sympathies of her people with right against wrong, by a desire to avert from her dominions most injurious consequences, and to save Europe from the preponderance of a Power which has violated the faith of treaties, and defies the opinion of the civilised world, to take up arms, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French, for the defence of the Sultan. Her Majesty is persuaded that in so acting she will have the cordial support of her people ; and that the pretext of zeal for the Christian religion will be used in vain to cover an aggression undertaken in disregard of its holy precepts, and of its pure and beneficent spirit. Her Majesty humbly trusts that her efforts may be successful, and that, by the blessing of Provi- dence, peace may be re-established on safe and solid foundations. Westminster, March 28, 1854.' The English and French governments, as has been before observed, steadily maintained the political character of the struggle — especially England, who had no concern with the question of the Holy Places, except that of a well-wisher, ready and willing to heal the wounds of all parties, had it been possible. The purport of the war is clearly stated in the above Declaration. Lord Palmerston stated, in the following year: ' It is not necessary for me to follow in detail all the extensions of territory which have marked the advance of Russia for a long time. It would be easy for me to follow her from the eastern shores of Asia through Central Asia, through the Caspian Sea, through Armenia, Poland, and the Danube, and then through the extreme confines of Norway and the Arctic Sea — it would be easy for me to shew that in her treaties she never took any natural boundary as the limit of her territory, but some artificial separation, which would give her the pretence or the occasion for further aggression. When such has been the policy pursued by Russia, and when we find the present Emperor of Russia [Alexander II.] declaring that his mission was to carry into effect the system pursued by Peter and Catherine, by Alexander and Nicholas, we felt that the time was come for defending the independence of Turkey and of Europe from such aggression.'* Lord Palmerston, in another speech, delivered himself as follows : — ' When Count Nesselrode asserted, at a later period, that our government had known from the outset what were the whole demands of Russia upon Turkey, he asserted that — I am bound to say it — which was utterly at variance with the fact. It is painful to speak of a government like Russia in terms of censure or reprobation ; but I am bound to say, on behalf of the English government, that the Russian government, by itself and its agents, has throughout these transactions exhausted every modification of untruth, concealment, and evasion, and ended with assertions of positive falsehood.' Lord John Russell, too, in one among many speeches on the subject, said : ' At each step Russia has threatened Turkey. She has kept Turkey in that state that, without giving imme- diate alarm to Europe, she could dictate at Con- stantinople. Late years have seen a considerable change in the government of Turkey. I will not say that that change has extended to all its inferior pachas and governors ; but the government of Turkey have seen that there are new and improved modes of government, consisting in dispensing equal justice to all her subjects, whatever might be their religion, and which might make Turkey stronger as a power than she had ever been while her strength rested upon the ascendancy of the Mohammedan race and the subjugation and degra- dation of every other race. That improvement of Turkey has excited the jealousy and apprehension of Russia. You will see that in no case has the government of Russia, which has pretended to be anxious for Christian privileges and for the good of the Christian subjects of Turkey, been favourable to those amendments and enlightened reforms which the government of Turkey have made. On the contrary, the language of Russia has always been : "Turkey must fall, unless her ancient Moham- medan maxims are maintained in force — Turkey must fall, unless the old Mohammedan system is kept up in full vigour — Turkey must fall, unless the separation between the Mohammedan and Christian races is carefully preserved and strengthened." Such being the language of Russia, who can doubt what is the intention of Russia ? Who can doubt that, going from step to step, augmenting her territory and increasing her influence, alienating the Christian subjects of the Porte from the sovereignty of the Porte, her final object — which * Speech in the House of Commons, June 8, 1855. 72 ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. commenced before the middle of last century, and which, might not be completed for some time to come — who can doubt, I say, that her final object must be the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire, and the absorption of a great portion of that empire in her own dominions, while the other portion, nominally independent, would be depen- dent, in fact, on her influence and her authority 1 Such a state of things would be so dangerous to Europe that we, on our side, must not stop until we have obtained some security against such a consummation being effected; we on our side, must not stop— and, let me say it, will not stop.' * These views certainly accorded Avith those enter- tained by the nation at large, and spoke the true feeling of British statesmen on the case between Russia and Turkey ; but it is to be regretted that the same energetic tone was not assumed through- out in their diplomacy. The czar, bearing on record the adulatory phrases so frequently applied to him in former years by English statesmen, was tempted to assume an air of injured innocence; while the English nation, comparing their heroic denunciations with a timid and vacillating course of policy, remained long doubtful of the sincerity of the government officials. The terms on which England and France under- took to assist Turkey — or, rather, the objects to be attained — were defined in a convention, ratified on the 15th of April 1854, of which the following are the principal clauses : — ' Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of the French, having determined to afford their support to His Majesty the Sultan Abdul-Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, in the war in which he is engaged against the aggressions of Russia ; and being, moreover, com- pelled, notwithstanding their sincere and persevering efforts for the maintenance of peace, to become them- selves belligerent parties in a Avar which, Avithout their active intervention, would have threatened the exist- ing balance of power in Europe, and the interests of their own dominions ; have in consequence, resolved to conclude a convention in order to determine the object of their alliance, as well as the means to be employed in common for fulfilling that object ; and have for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries — [here the names of the Earl of Clarendon and Count Walewski are given, in the pretentious style of such documents ; after which the clauses of the Convention appear as follow] : — Art. I. — The High Contracting Parties engage to do all that shall depend upon them for the purpose of bring- ing about the re-establishment of peace between Russia and the Sublime Porte on solid and durable bases, and of preserving Europe from the recurrence of the lamentable complications which have now so unhappily disturbed the general peace. Art. II. — The integrity of the Ottoman Empire being violated by the occupation of the provinces of Moldavia and of Wallachia, and by other movements of the Russian troops, their Majesties, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of the French, have concerted, and will concert together, as to the most proper means for liberating the territory of the Sultan from foreign invasion, and for * Speech in the House of Commons, July 24, 1854. accomplishing the object specified in Article I. For this purpose they engage to maintain, according to the requirements of the Avar, to be judged of by common agreement, sufficient naval and military forces to meet those requirements, the description, number, and destination whereof shall, if ocoasion should arise, be determined by subsequent arrangements. Art. III. — Whatever events may arise from the execution of the present convention, the High Con- tracting Parties engage not to entertain any overture or any proposition having for its object the cessation of hostilities, nor to enter into any arrangement with the Imperial Court of Russia, without having first deliberated thereupon in common. Art. IV. — The High Contracting Parties being animated with a desire to maintain the balance of power in Europe, and having no interested ends in view, renounce beforehand the acquisition of any advantage for themselves from the events which may occur. Art. V. — Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of the French, will readily admit into their alliance, in order to co-operate for the proposed object, such of the other Powers of Europe as may be desirous of becoming party to it.' Another convention between England and France, relating to prisoners of war, was ratified in London on the 20th of May 1854. Its principal clauses run as follow : — ' Art. I. — The prisoners made in the course of the present war shall, as far as possible, be divided equally between the two countries. Whenever one of the two countries shall have main- tained a greater number of prisoners, or shall have supported a certain number for a longer period of time, an account shall be made every three months of the excess of expenditure which may have been incurred, and repayment shall be made of the half of the amount by the government of the other country. Art. II. — Instructions shall be hereafter concerted between the two governments, in order to make knoAvn to the officers of their naval and military forces the places or ports to which the prisoners are to be sent. Art. III. — If a depot for prisoners should be estab- lished in any place not in the possessions of either of the two countries, the expenses of it shall be borne between the two governments ; but the advances to be made shall be by the government which shall have appointed officers to take charge of the establishment. Art. IV. — Whenever the two governments shall agree to an exchange of prisoners with the enemy, no distinction shall be made between their respective subjects who may have fallen into the hands of the enemy, but their liberation shall be stipulated accord- ing to priority of the date of their capture, except under special circumstances, which are reserved for the mutual consideration of the two governments.' It Avas a natural consequence of the unity of purpose Avith A\ r hich Eugland and France entered upon the war, that the two nations should place themselves, as nearly as possible, on an equality in all that concerned actual conflict Avith Russia. Hence, the foreign secretary sent to all our consuls, the colonial secretary sent to all our colonial governors, the Admiralty sent to all naval com- manders on foreign stations, and the French government sent to all their consuls and naval commanders, instructions, the general tenor of which maybe gathered from the following: — 'It RUPTURE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS :— 1854. 73 is a necessary consequence of the strict union and alliance which exists between Great Britain and France, that, in the event of war, their conjoint action should be felt by Russia in all parts of the world ; that not only in the Baltic, and in the waters and territory of Turkey, their counsels, their armies, and their fleets, should be united either for offensive or defensive purposes against Russia, but that the same spirit of union should prevail in all quarters of the world; and that, whether for offence or defence, the civil and military and naval resources of the British and French Empires should be directed to the common objects of pro- tecting the subjects and commerce of England and France from Russian aggression, and of depriving the Russian government of the means of inflicting injury on either. For these reasons, Her Majesty's government have agreed with that of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, to instruct their civil and naval authorities in foreign parts Jo consider their respective subjects as having an equal claim to protection against Russian hostility ; and for this purpose, either singly or in conjunction with each other, to act indifferently for the support and defence of British and French interests. It may be that, in a given locality, one only of the powers is represented by a civil functionary, or by a naval force ; but in such a case, the influence and the power of that one must be exerted as zealously and efficiently for the protection of the subjects and interests of the other, as if those subjects and interests were its own.' So far in respect to England and France. The attitude assumed by Austria and Prussia towards Russia was much less clearly defined. A convention between those two powers was signed at Berlin on the 20th of April 1854; but this convention did not bind either to assist against Russia. It stated that ' His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, penetrated with deep regret at the fruitlessness of their attempts hitherto to prevent the breaking out of war between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey, France, and England on the other,' had deemed it necessary to make arrangements for defending each other, and Ger- many generally, whether attacked by Russia or by England and France. The convention consists mainly of the following five articles : — 1 Akt. I. — His Imperial Apostolic Majesty, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, guarantee to each other reciprocally the possession of their German and non- German possessions, so that an attack made on the territory of the one, from whatever quarter, will be regarded by the other as an act of hostility against his own territory. Art. II. — In the same manner, the High Contracting Parties hold themselves engaged to defend the rights and interests of Germany against all and every injury, and consider themselves bound accordingly for the mutual repulse of every attack on auy part whatsoever of their territories; likewise, also, in the case where one of the two may find himself, in understanding with the other, obliged to advance actively for the defence of German interests. The agreement relating to the latter-named eventuality, as likewise the extent of the assistances then to be given, will form a special as also integral part of the present convention. Art. III. — In order also to give due security and force to the conditions of the offensive and defensive alliance now concluded, the two Great German Powers bind themselves, in case of need, to hold in perfect readiness for war a part of their forces, at periods to be determined between them, and in positions to be fixed. With respect to the time, the extent, and the nature of the placing of those troops, a special stipulation will likewise be determined. Art. IV.— The High Contracting Parties will invite all the German Governments of the Confederation to accede to this alliance, with the understanding that the federal obligations existing in virtue of Article 47 of the final Act of Vienna will receive the same extension for the States who accede as the present treaty stipulates. Art. V. — Neither of the two High Contracting Parties will, during the duration of this alliance, enter into any separate alliance with other Powers which shall not be in entire harmony with the basis of the present treaty.' An additional article to this convention was signed on the same day, binding the two powers to endeavour to bring Russia to peaceful views, and defining the minimum of aggression which would induce them to attack Russia in hostile form : ' A mutual offensive advance is stipulated for only in the event of the incorporation of the Principalities, or in the event of an attack on or passage of the Balkan by Russia.' Just before war between Russia and the Western Powers actually commenced, the czar placed many parts of his dominions in a state of siege — all commercial and civil proceedings being rendered subservient to military rules. Five imperial ukases or orders were issued at St Petersburg on the 5th March. One placed the government of Ekatherinoslav and the district of Taganrog in a state of siege, under General Khomuloft* ; a second related to St Petersburg, under the Czarevitch or Grand-duke Alexander, afterwards Alexander II. ; a third, to the governments of Esthonia and Livonia, under General Berg and General Suvaroff-Kiminski ; a fourth, to the government of Archangel, under Vice-Admiral Boel. The fifth ukase related to the western and south- western provinces — Poland, Courland, Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, Volhynia, Podolia, Bessarabia, and so much of the government of Kherson as is situated on the right or western side of the river Boug, were declared in a state of siege ; the command in the western provinces was given to Prince Paskevitch and General Rudigcr, and in the southern or south-western to Prince Gortchakoff and General Osten-Sacken. The Grand-duke Constantino, the most daring and ambitious of the four sons of Nicholas, commenced an energetic arming of all the salient points of the empire on the shores of the Baltic ; he travelled with untiring activity from station to station, examined all the fortifications ; and, in his capacity of Grand Admiral, made defensive arrangements against the formidable fleets of England and France. One remarkable circumstance connected with 74 ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY. this war, illustrative of the sympathy felt by the British colonists for the mother-country, was the presentation of numerous addresses from the colonists to the crown — first, when the news of the declaration of war arrived ; and, secondly, when a Patriotic Fund was established for the relief of the widows and orphans of the soldiers who might fall in the war. The Earl of Elgin, as Governor-general of Canada, transmitted to England 'loyal addresses' from the Legislative Council, the Legislative Assembly, the municipal councils of some of the towns, the ministers and elders of the Presbyterian community, and the chiefs and sachems of six nations ofi Canadian Indians. At a later date, the same colony transmitted £20,000 from the Canadian legis- lature for the soldiers' widows and orphans. New Brunswick sent three addresses from the Council, the Assembly, and the inhabitants. Newfoundland, Barbadoes, Grenada, Gibraltar, New South Wales, Van Pieman's Land, South Australia, New Zealand — all in like manner sent addresses to the crown in the summer of 1854, and contributions to the Patriotic Fund in the following winter. One pleasing incident in respect to these expressions of sympathy was, that the munificent Canadian donation of £20,000 was sent, half to the British, and half to the French forces — thus regarding them truly as brethren in arms. The Emperor Napoleon, in acknowledging this gift, spoke in graceful terms of the bygone days when the Canadians were French colonists. So long a period had elapsed since Europe had been involved in an extensive war, that the more ardent advocates of hostility with Russia were scarcely prepared for the numerous disturbances of ordinary commerce which immediately and necessarily followed. The Declarations, Procla- mations, and Orders in Council, issued between February and April 1854 by the British govern- ment, were many in number, and bore relation to the following subjects : — Proclamation, 18th February, prohibiting the exportation of arms, ammunition, gunpowder, military and naval stores, or steam - marine apparatus : Proclamation, 9th March, prohibiting the equipment of any ship in British ports for the service of a foreign state, without an express royal licence: Declaration, 28th March, explanatory of the causes which had compelled Her Britannic Majesty to go to war with Russia : Declaration, 28th March, to the effect that, while the queen maintains the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any blockade she may establish against the enemy's coasts, she will, nevertheless, waive the right of seizing enemy's property (not contraband of war) on board a neutral vessel ; and also the right of issuing letters of marque to privateers, in order to render the war as little injurious as possible to the states with which she remains at peace: Order in Council, 29th March, granting a general reprisal or power of seizure of all Russian ships and goods, whether belonging to the emperor or to his subjects, and to condemn and sell the prizes thus taken : Order in Council, 29th March, placing an embargo on all British ships from entering Russian ports, or Russian ships from entering British ports, except under certain special circumstances : Order in Council, 29th March, allowing a period of six weeks for the loading and departure of any Russian merchant-vessels which happened at that date to be in British ports: Proclamation, 29th March, regulating the mode in which the net-value of any prizes shall be distributed among the commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, seamen, and marines on board the ship or ships which might have captured the prize, and defining the circum- stances which would justify a claim to rank any particular ship of the fleet among the captors: Order in Council, 4th April, lessening the severity of the terms of the proclamation of 18th February, and allowing powder and other materials of war to be exported, except to places where they might be likely to be rendered available to Russia : Order in Council, 7th April, relating to Russian ships in India and the colonies, and allowing them thirty days to take in cargo and depart, reckoning from the time when they should receive formal notice of this order: Order in' Council, 7th April, extending to the Channel Islands and to the Isle of Man the same restrictions as to other British ports, in respect to the cessation of trade with Russia : Order in Council, 15th April, relaxing the severity of the declaration of 28th March, and permitting the ships of friendly nations to import or export cargoes at British ports, to whomsoever those cargoes might belong — with these provisos, that the goods shall not be contraband of war, and that the trade shall not be with blockaded ports: Order in Council, 15th April, extending the time during which Russian ships may take in cargoes for a British port, in respect to Russian ports of shipment in the Baltic and the White Sea: Order in Council, 15th April, prohibiting the exportation of arms, ammunition, or steam- marine apparatus, from Malta or Gibraltar, without especial licence from the respective governors of those places. One observation suggests itself at the close of this Chapter. The war was distinguished by a double current of operations, simultaneous but independent — that of diplomacy, and that of campaigning. The diplomacy assumed varying hues, according to the progress of the campaigning ; and thus it arises that both currents must be watched in turn, to trace the mode in which each acted upon the other. The diplomacy of 1854, in which England and France endeavoured in vain to induce Austria and Prussia to partici- pate in the war, will suitably present itself for notice in a more advanced portion of the work. CHAPTER IY. COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES IN 1854. HE alliance between England ^ and France for a common object, 1 to be attained by warlike means if diplomacy should fail, was at first scarcely comprehended by the two nations. It was something so strange, that men doubted how to understand it. From the days of Crecy, 'Poitiers, and Agincourt — from the reigns of "the Edwards and the Henries of feudal times — England had experienced alternations of war and peace with France, but none of warlike alliance and co-operation. There may, possibly, have been instances slightly approximating to such com- munity of interest during times of Avar, but none of such magnitude as to occupy a prominent place in the pages of history. Many manifestations of national pride, many of mutual irritation, had been presented from time to time ; insomuch, that when the Treaty of Alliance was signed, and war against Russia declared, prejudices had to be swept away on both sides. Again, England had never been at war with Russia, except to a slight degree during the complications which followed the French Revolution ; and even then it was a war rather of paper than of cannon. That our country should sever all friendly ties with the powerful czar, seemed therefore as novel as the formation of an alliance by which England and France would fight side by side in the same cause. The explicit declaration in the Treaty, that neither power sought for any aggrandisement by reason of a contest intended to assist the sultan against a formidable enemy, appealed to the justice and good faith of the English and French nations; and this appeal met with a warm response. FORCES AND STRATEGY OF THE WESTERN POWERS. But England had something more to learn than the remodelling of alliances. She was called upon to meet the difficulty of waging war after a long period of European peace, during which the arts of industry had flourished, and the enthusiasm for military and naval glory had cooled down. The Duke of Wellington, during the last twenty years of his life, had repeatedly drawn attention to the fact, that the military arrangements of this country were in a defective state — coast-defences crumbling away, militia system neglected, stores insufficiently maintained. The assertion was in some quarters disbelieved, and in others regarded as of no import- ance; while those who admitted and deplored the fact, were too few in number to possess a remedial power in the government or in parliament. The army and ordnance estimates were invariably high each year, however profound the state of peace may have been ; and there was a feeling spread abroad in the country, that if inefficiency appeared in our military power, offensive or defensive, it must be attributed to misappropriation of means, and not to the parsimony of the nation in respect to the amount of supply. Happily, or unhappily, nothing had occurred to put to the test the defen- sive power of Britain ; nor was it known, except to a few, how limited were our military means of external attack ; but various circumstances, neces- sarily made public during the progress of the war, rendered abundantly evident the fact that, in 1854, England was ill prepared for a campaign, so far as the exigencies of military service abroad were concerned. Slowly and painfully did this truth become apparent. The object of the war being primarily to protect Turkey from the attacks of Russia, and, in a secondary degree, to lessen the power of the czar to inflict mischief on his neighbours generally, it became a duty on the part of the Allied Powers to agree on a plan for obtaining these results. In all wars, strategy must be intimately dependent on geography, both natural and political ; and in this war against Russia, geography had marked out certain conditions to which the plans of the Allies must bend. Glancing at a map of this gigantic empire, we see that the czar's dominions touch the ocean at only a few practically available* points. The Arctic Ocean, along the whole of the northern coast of Europe and Asia, from Norway to Behring's Strait, bounds these dominions ; yet it presents but one single port of any commercial or political value — namely, Archangel. Eastward, the power of Russia is bounded by the sterile and thinly I inhabited coasts of the North Pacific ; westward, 76 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. her commerce finds an outlet by means of the Baltic and the Sound ; in the south, the Black Sea and the Bosphorus furnish the only maritime channels to the Mediterranean; while in the south-east, the Caspian, an inland lake without an outlet, simply separates the Russian dominions from certain Persian and Tatar provinces. The maritime regions, therefore, in which an enemy could weaken Russia, are the shores of the Baltic and the Black Sea : the others being of compara- tively smaller value. In respect to land-frontier, Russia touches upon the dominions of Sweden, Prussia, Austria, Turkey, Persia, the Tatar Khans, and China ; and her vulnerability on any part of this wide-spreading frontier must depend upon the relations existing between the various governments. Now, the only one of these states which was in hostility with Russia in 1854, was Turkey ; for in the midst of the diplomacy of the period, Sweden, Prussia, and Austria, all kept free from any actual rupture with the czar. The land-frontier brought within range of probable warfare, was that which is conterminous to Russia and Turkey — namely, at the boundary between Moldavia and Bessarabia, marked by the river Pruth ; and an irregular line from the eastern end of the Black Sea to Mount Ararat, separating Asia Minor from Georgia and the Caucasus. These conditions determined the limits and nature of any plan whereby the Allies might act effectively against Russia. English or French troops could be brought into action in four regions — the shores of the Baltic, the shores of the Black Sea, the Russian frontier at the Pruth, and the Russian frontier between Georgia and Asia Minor. All other military operations, on anything like an extensive scale, were virtually interdicted by the political relations existing at the time between Russia on the one hand, and the states of Northern or Central Europe on the other. The elder Napoleon frequently demanded a right of way for his armies through the central states of Germany, when Prussia, Russia, or Austria was to be attacked ; but the Western Powers, in 1854, neither asked nor could have obtained such a permission. To attack and capture all Russian vessels on the high seas ; to blockade all Russian ports of any commercial value ; to land armies on any or all of the four Russian boundaries above named — these were the courses open to the Allies. It was speedily determined that both powers should despatch fleets to the Baltic and the Black Sea ; that both should send armies to Turkey, there to be employed as circumstances might suggest ; and that the forces of both powers should act together — sharing the cost and the dangers equally— earning equally any glory which might accrue from the struggle — and contributing equally to the liberation of Turkey from the trammels of the czar, and Europe generally from the disastrous influence of the czar's power. The plans of the Allies were not publicty known at the commencement of the war ; but circumstances transpired early in the next following year, which led the governments of both countries to afford explanations concerning the strength and destination of the respective forces in the spring of 1854. The Duke of Newcastle, who was secretary of state for war and the colonies when the war broke out, was appointed to a new office, minister or secretary for war, in the autumn of the same year ; and in this office, it was his duty to superintend all the arrangements for the conduct of the war. The following were the answers to five questions, relating to the plan of campaign, which the duke gave before a Committee of the House of Commons : — ' At what period was the expedition to the East first determined on ? — The first official order for sending any troops abroad was given on the 9 th of February. Those troops were sent to Malta. When it was first decided upon, was it intended to make an expedition to Turkey ? — Certainly. With what object was that expedition undertaken ? — The first and immediate object was to protect the Turkish Empire from invasion, then threatened by the Russian forces, which had advanced upon the left bank of the Danube. What was the origin of the determination to make war? — The course taken by the Emperor of Russia in invading the Principalities — a part of the Turkish dominions — was the immediate cause. Can you explain why Malta was selected, in the first instance, as the destination of the troops ? — The reason was this : it was considered desirable that at the moment of declaring war, or of signing a convention with Turkey, we should send a military force into the sultan's territories, and it was desirable that that force should be as large as possible. The distance from England being so great, I considered it right to recom- mend to the government, which adopted my suggestion, to send out a body of 10,000 men to Malta in the first instance ; to have the steam-transports which had conveyed those troops sent home to fetch a similar number of troops ; while the advanced corps at Malta could be transferred, by means of sailing transports and the men-of-war steamers, to Turkey ; so that the whole force of 20,000 or 25,000 men would be landed there in one-half the time which would have been requisite had none been sent on first to Malta.'* The Duke of Newcastle gave further information concerning the preliminary arrangements made by the English government, before the actual declara- tion of war. ' As early as the beginning of January, foreseeing the great probability of our being obliged to send out a military force to that country, we sent Lieutenant-colonel Vicars, with three other officers of engineers, to Turkey, with general directions to inspect the country, and the means of defence especially bearing upon the capital, and also • to render any assistance they could to the Turkish government to prepare defences. Colonel Vicars was taken seriously ill at Gibraltar, and unable to proceed ; in consequence of which, we applied to Sir J. Burgoyne to recommend an officer to suc- ceed him, and Sir J. Burgoyne at once, in the * Proceedings of the Committee on the State of the Army before Sebastopol. The history of this committee belongs to a later portion of the present work ; but the evidence collected will occasionally be adverted to, in so far as it throws light on circumstances connected with the early stages of the war. FORCES AND STRATEGY OF THE WESTERN POWERS:— 1854. handsomest manner, offered to go himself. He did so, leaving this country hy the next mail ; I think about the 27th or 28th of January. They made an accurate survey of the whole country, and recommended that lines should be thrown up at Bulair, and even, if necessary, in front of Constan- tinople. Soon after he had left this country, I, believing he had not a sufficient engineering staff, sent out Major Dickson of the artillery — a dis- tinguished officer, who was selected on account of his knowledge of the Turkish language and manners — and three other engineer officers, with further instructions to examine the country, and report upon its salubrity, to ascertain what places were suitable for the encampment of troops, and Avhere wholesome water Avas to be procured. Those officers executed the duty intrusted to them, and Major Dickson subsequently reconnoitred the Danube and the greater part of Bulgaria: Sir J. Burgoyne having confined himself to Roumelia, with the exception of a visit to the camp of Omar Pacha.' Powerful as is the navy of this country, both royal and mercantile, the arrangements for the shipment of troops and artillery were very defective when the war began ; the old system had fallen into disuse since the end of the former Avar, and had not been succeeded by anything of better character. There is the authority of Captain Milne, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, for the statement, that in February 1854 the Admiralty had not a single transport-ship in its service : the duties of the transport-service being performed by the comptroller of the Victualling Department. A Transport Board Avas established later in the year, in connection Avith the Admiralty ; but at the period no\v under notice, the Avhole system Avas in utter confusion. Sir James Graham, first Lord of the Admiralty, aftenvards gave evidence, that ' requisitions to the Admiralty used to come from seven different quarters — occasionally from the Secretary of State as to the embarkation of men ; frequently from the Horse Guards, after consulta- tion Avith the Secretary of State ; from the Board of Ordnance, in reference to the embarkation of artillery and engineers ; then from the Treasury, as to the commissariat; from the Secretary at War, for the medical supplies ; and then a double requisition from the Board of Ordnance, sometimes as to ammunition, and sometimes as to stores. I found the inconveniences arising from that state of things to be so great, that I represented strongly my opinion that it was absolutely necessary that these various requisitions should be brought to a common centre ; and I suggested to the Secretary for War, that day by day the requisitions should be fiated and approved by him, and that when so approved, it should be the duty of the Transport Board to carry them out.' The government being almost wholly unprovided Avith means of transport to the East, tenders Avere sought from such shipowners as Avould undertake the service. As a means of dispatch, steamers Avere preferred to sailing-vessels; and thus an enormous amount of steam-power Avas speedily called into use. This, however, was so costly, that sailing-vessels Avere mostly selected as transports for artillery and heavy stores ; and it Avas planned that there should be an incessant passage of such transports to and from the Levant, as rapidly as the voyages could be made. The government applied to seventeen steam-navigation companies for aid in respect to steamers, and to individual shipowners in respect to sailing-vessels. The Avithdrawal of many steamers from the various mail-packet routes, consequent on these urgent demands of the executive, occasioned for many months considerable derangement in the postal service. Some of the transports thus taken up Avere engaged with the question of payment left to arbitration, under a clause of the mail-packet contracts, which empoAvers the government so to hire vessels belonging to the steam companies; Avhilc others Avere engaged at a certain sum per month. During the month of February, the Admiralty was called upon to furnish means of transport for 509 officers, 10,933 men, 272 Avomen, 12 children, 1598 horses, 750 tons of camp-equipage, 850 tons of baggage, 989 tons of ordnance, and 1088 tons of provisions. Small as an army of 10,000 or 12,000 may be, it becomes here evident how enormous is the weight to be moved when such an army is provided Avith all its accompani- ments; and when it is further considered that the Avhole had to be transported to a distance of 3000 miles to reach the Black Sea, the magnitude of the undertaking is sufficiently displayed. Under the dislocated arrangements of our transport- service, it Avas a work of great labour to despatch tAvelve steamers by the 20th of March, containing a little more than 10,000 officers and men. The stores Avere sent on tAvo plans : in the first, a ship Avas hired at so much per ton for the voyage, and it Avas the interest both of the government and the shipowner that the voyage should be completed as quickly as possible ; on the other plan, the ship Avas hired at so much per month, insomuch that the oAvner had no especial motive to expedite the voyage. The authorities preferred the former of these plans, but Avere often obliged to adopt the latter, particularly in respect to the large steamers. A sum of about 50s. per ton per month was the usual average rate at which the govern- ment hired steamers ; and thus a steamer of 2000 tons burden, employed in carrying troops to the East, cost the country at the rate of £5000 per month. The government Avould have found it much cheaper in the end to have purchased the A'essels at once: but men were Avanting; the pay is higher in the commercial navy than in the royal naA-y ; and anomalies Avould have been introduced by the entry of the transports into the rank of government vessels. Thus, the charge upon the nation Avas rendered higher because the available hands Avere too fcAV. At a later period, hoM'ever, the government purchased the Himalaya 78 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. and the Prince, two noble steamers belonging to the fleet of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam- navigation Company. But it was not alone in the means of transport that the war found England ill prepared. The ord- nance store had fallen to a low condition since the former war; and it was only by great exertions that it could be augmented during 1852. Lord Hardinge, commander-in-chief, in affording infor- mation concerning the state of the artillery at the beginning of the war, said : ' My first act, on taking office in March 1852, as Master-General of the Ordnance, was to examine into the state of our artillery; and I found the number of guns, field- batteries for Great Britain, to be about forty or fifty, and those of the date of the battle of Waterloo. I proposed to Lord Derby's government, in a long memorandum, my reasons for considering that to be a dangerous condition for our artillery to be in, and I recommended that 300 guns, and two wagons to each gun, should be immediately prepared. Lord Derby's government assented to that proposal, which was carried into effect by the succeeding government.'* When the ordnance came to be Lord Raglan. despatched to the East, vessels were freighted especially for this service ; and with every gun were sent the men, horses, ammunition-wagons, and stores requisite for one gun, in order that, when landed, each consignment or detachment might be complete in itself. With 24 guns were despatched from Woolwich 42 officers, 1090 men, 961 horses, and 124 ammunition- wagons. The English army itself, taken in its totality, had fallen into an ill-organised state during a peace of forty years. It was not enough that conquests had been made in India, China, Birmah, Kaffir- land; it is not by such conquests that an army can be maintained in the discipline and habits of European warfare; and, indeed, most of these conquests were made by troops belonging to the East India Company, calling forth only a small amount of service from the queen's troops. At the beginning of 1854, the British army, besides the Guards composing the Household Brigade, con- sisted mainly of 100 regiments of the line, including the rifle brigade, together with 8 local corps. The cavalry, including 7 regiments of dragoon-guards, made up 23 regiments. The artillery numbered 14 battalions. The 23 regiments of dragoons, light dragoons, dragoon -guards, hussars, and lancers, together with the horse-guards and 2 regiments of life-guards, supplied about 12,500 sabres ; the regi- ments of the line, with the grenadiers, Coldstreams, fusileers, and rifles, amounted to about 105,000 infantry. Making allowance for certain deductions, the effective army, at the end of 1853, scarcely * Evidence : Sebastopol Committee. FORCES AND STRATEGY OF THE WESTERN POWERS :— 1854. •79 exceeded 100,000. It received, however, two augmentations, shortly before the commencement of the war, of 10,000 and 15,000 ; and in that state it comprised about 4600 commissioned officers, 9000 non-commissioned officers, and 114,000 privates. These were independent of a few colonial corps, such as the Ceylon Rifles, the Canada Rifles, the Malta Fencibles, &c, making about 6000 or 7000 more. The artillery, comprising horse-artillery, foot-artillery, engineers, and sappers and miners, numbered about 17,000 men at the close of 1843; but about the time of commencing the war, the number had augmented to nearly 19,000. Glancing at the widely spreading British dominions, we become forcibly struck with the fact, that England can have little to spare for European warfare out of such a force. The 30,000 queen's troops in India may bear a small ratio to the Company's army of 250,000 men ; but they constitute a serious deduction from the imperial army. Then, all the various colonies must be so circumstanced as to command military aid when necessary. The commander-in-chief must think of Gibraltar, controlling the entrance to the Mediterranean; of Malta, the small but important military position in the middle of that sea ; of the Ionian Islands, in such near proximity to Turkey and Greece ; of the Cape of Good Hope, and its neighbour the Mauritius ; of the rapidly growing Australian colonies; of the isolated but influential positions at China, Singaporo, and Ceylon; of the colonies which occupy so large an area in North America; of the scattered West India Islands — all required, when the war broke out, a Bharo of military protection from the mother- country. When, therefore, the announcement was made that 10,000 men would bo despatched to Turkey, to be followed by 12,000 or 15,000 more, it was felt to be a great draught from the British army, however small to contend against so gigantic a power as Russia. This British portion of the Allied army was placed under the command of Lord Raglan, who, as Lord Fitzroy Somerset, had during many years been military secretary to the Duke of Wellington. The Duke of Cambridge, the Earls of Cardigan and Lucan, Generals Brown, Evans, England, Bentinck, Scarlett, Campbell, Penne- father, were among the chief officers appointed to the expedition. Great was the excitement when the several regiments began to leave our shores for their destination in the East. So long a time had elapsed since the din and turmoil of war had been heard in England, that a new generation had sprung up, whose knowledge of the costs and horrors of warfare was little other than traditionary. Two months elapsed before any cavalry left England, for there was long a doubt whether it would be transported through France, or round by way of Gibraltar ; but the infantry began to depart at the end of February — a month before the actual declaration of war. As regiment after regiment embarked, cheers, tears, good wishes, high hopes, accompanied them. The Fusileers, quartered in the Tower, were among the first to depart ; and when the cavalcade, headed by the band playing inspiriting airs, emerged from the old fortress, and threaded its way through the busy streets of the metropolis, countless thousands watched and greeted the soldiers as they passed — not that all understood the real nature of the quarrel which was to issue in battling ; for many of the soldiers could never comprehend why they were called upon to fight against an emperor, merely because that emperor had behaved wrongfully towards the sultan. Setting politics aside, however, the troops, actuated by an esprit de corps, departed cheerfully for the East, resolved to maintain the honour of their flag and country in any contests in which they might be engaged. Southampton was one of the chief ports of departure ; and the military value of railways was fully experienced in the facility with which troops were conveyed from London and the heart of England to that port. Cork was the chief place of embarkation for the troops despatched from Ireland. Liverpool was another scene of active operations. The embarkation of the 88th was one only among many exciting scenes which that town displayed during the early spring. The regiment arrived at Liverpool by railway from Preston, and marched through the streets to the landing-stage. The troops were in high spirits ; but there was the usual drawback to their enthusiasm. ' A number of women, the wives and sweethearts of the men, wcro taking their adieus ; and it was most painful to witness their unrestrained grief, and the efforts of the men to comfort them. A few minutes before one o'clock, the order was given to march ; the band playing several bars of St Patricks Day, and the multitude cheering heartily as they set out. In defiling through the streets old men, women, and young boys, jostled with each other, and struggled for the honour of shaking hands with the troops, who were greeted with good wishes from all sides.' \ The Ripon steamer was one of the first which conveyed troops to Malta, on their way to the East. This fine vessel, belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam-navigation Company, made the passage from Southampton to Gibraltar in five days. On each morning, the men were exercised at Minie-rifle shooting, firing at a target hanging from the end of one of the ship's yards ; while in the evening, soldiers and sailors joined in dancing and singing. As with the Grenadiers on board the Ripon, so with the Coldstream Guards on board the Orinoco, all went well, under the care of the commanders of those vessels. It was on the 22d of February that these two vessels, accom- panied by the Manilla, received detachments of the Household troops at Southampton ; and on the 23d, all three started for Gibraltar, in the midst of a rough sea, which tried the patience and good- humour of the men. A space of fourteen inches is ' man-of-war's allowance ' for the width of 80 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. hammocks on board ship, but the Guards were allowed eighteen inches; and this half-yard was in many instances a troubled region of sea-sickness. Malta became a scene of strange excitement. Steamer after steamer arrived during the month of March, bringing consignments of troops, until the little island was almost filled to repletion. Valetta, the chief town, became busy as a fair; and the Maltese made a fine harvest on the occa- sion. Besides the three steamers already named, the Niagara, the Himalaya, the Vulcan, the Emu, the Kangaroo, the Simoom, and the Valetta, succes- sively arrived ; and as the troops conveyed in these vessels were landed at Malta, the military throng became very great. It was a fine achieve- ment of that magnificent steamer, the Himalaya — at that time the largest ship in the world — to bring 1500 men from Plymouth to Malta in seven days ; and, indeed, the steamers belonging to the several companies invariably eclipsed the few belonging to the government employed in this service. Among 10,000 or 12,000 soldiers, thus conveyed in a small number of steamers, some complainings and repinings were to be expected. In one vessel, the provisions were badly cooked ; in another — the government steamer Simoom — the machinery went Valetta. wrong, and the voyage was rendered very tedious. For the most part, however, the men landed at Valetta in high spirits ; and those who had money to spend, whether officers or privates, met with little difficulty in so doing. Every Maltese work- man found immediate and incessant employment, to supply the numberless little wants of so large a body of persons. The provisioning of this unoccupied army became a matter of much importance. That the troops were idly detained at Malta for many weeks, was a subject of regret both to officers and men ; and severe strictures were made both at home and abroad on the government, concerning the enforce- ment of this idleness. The delay was occasioned partly by the indecision of the home authorities, and partly by the necessity of acting in concert with the French ; but, explained as it may be, the long detention at Malta was injurious to the object in view, which would have been better secured by an earlier advance from that island to Gallipoli or Constantinople. In a former paragraph, the Duke of Newcastle's arrangement is adverted to, whereby it was expected that if 10,000 men were despatched to Malta by swift steamers, they might be for- warded thence to Gallipoli by sailing-vessels ; while the steamers returned to England for 10,000 more, which would in that case proceed direct to the Levant without landing at Malta. The plan might perhaps have been judicious ; but it does not explain the unprofitable detention of the first 10,000 at that island. The commissariat officers were incessantly engaged in providing for the wants of these troops. The regiments arrived more rajudly than these functionaries were pre- pared for them; and it was alleged, in defence, that the instructions sent out from England were tardy and insufficient. Sometimes coal, sometimes lamps and candles, sometimes the more important items of food and forage, were deficient in quantity at the tents of the camps. The livestock on the island diminished very rapidly when the troops FORCES AND STRATEGY OF THE WESTERN POWERS:— 1854. 81 were added to the resident population, and the commissariat officers were despatched to Tunis to purchase oxen. Biscuit was made and baked at the rate of 30,000 pounds per day, partly for present consumption, and partly to accumulate a supply for the East. There was a kindliness of intention, if not a skilfulness of application, in many of the government arrangements. For instance, about the middle of March, a Treasury minute was issued, whereby directions were given to the commissariat department for supplying the troops with malt liquors, preserved potatoes, choco- late, coffee, tea, sugar, rice, and Scotch barley for broth. These articles of diet were in addition to the ordinary rations of bread and meat, and to be supplied in detail at their nearest wholesale cost, without payment of duty, and excluding inconve- nient fractions, thus leaving the public to bear the expense which would be incurred for freight, packing, and other incidental charges.* The regulations under which these different articles were to be delivered in bulk by the com- missariat to each regiment, and then distributed in detail, were left to the commander-in-chief to determine — his duty being, to fix a limit to the quantity allowed to officers and men, in order that the boon thus conferred might not be con- verted to other purposes than the soldiers' benefit. The importance of this precaution was pointed out in the Treasury minute, it being very naturally presumed that in the article of beer, especially, the predilections of our troops were likely to undergo no change from service in the East. The fulfil- ment of this minute, however, was scarcely rendered available until after the troops left Malta. About the end of March, Sir George Brown, one of the officers to whom the management of the expedition was intrusted, landed at Malta ; and arrangements were forthwith made to transfer the troops from that island to Gallipoli. The last-named town is a seaport on the Straits of the Dardanelles. It is situated in a peninsula which juts down southward from the mainland of Turkey, bounded on the east by the Dardanelles, and on the west by the Gulf of Saros or Xcros. The sea distance from Malta to Gallipoli is about 750 miles, round the southern point of Greece, and threading a way between the numerous islands forming the * The following Tabular Statement shews the supplies provided, the cost-price, and the rate of proposed charge : — Articles. Quantities Provided. Cost-price. Rate of Proposed Charge to the Troops. Porter, Pale Ale (for the Officers), Preserved Potatoes, Chocolate, . Coffee, . . Tea, . Sugar, . Kice, . Scotch Barley for Broth, . 64,800 gals. | 2,700 , 50,000 lbs. 10,000 o 80,000 » 8,000 » 100,000 » 200,000 » I 10,000 * 35s. per bar. of) 36 gals. . J 40s. per barrel. 5d. per lb. £1, 16s. perewt. £61, 108. per ton. Is. per lb. £1, Is. Gd. perewt. £26, 10s. per ton. 14s. 6d. per cwt. 3d. per qt. 4d. » 5d. per lb. Id. • 6.U1. » Is. » 2d. " 3d. » ljd. » Grecian Archipelago : having the kingdom of Greece on the west or left hand, and Asia Minor on the east or right hand. To this place it was, during April, that the British troops were conveyed from Malta, in consignments or detachments of such magnitude as the ships available could accommo- date. Mrs Young — better known by her earlier name of Mrs Postans, as the authoress of various works relating to India — who was at Malta and Gallipoli during this stirring period of 1854, has given a lively description of the scenes which preceded and accompanied the embarkation. ' After passing about a month in this fashion — all racket and arrival at Valetta, all bustle and confusion in the harbours, all anxiety and dis- traction at the barracks — the order came for the gallant regiment to advance. Then came a scene baffling all description. The square within the fine new barracks of Vedcrla was crowded with Maltese, trying hard to dispose of baggage- animals of all descriptions — the blind, the halt, the spavined, the vicious — donkeys, mules, horses, ponies Then the packing, the exchanging, the selling superfluous comforts; the collection of a few standard edibles ; the saddles to be mended at the last moment ; the tin dinner-services — of two plates, one dish, and a drinking-cup — to be made complete; the camp bedsteads and stools to be selected; the parading, the drumming, the orders and counter-orders; the private frying of bacon and eggs for officers' breakfasts — often by the officers themselves — on the most doubtful fires, and in the most unworthy frying-pans; and, at last, the embarkation on board the Vesuvius steamer ! The crowding, the discomfort ; the luxury of one officer, who was allowed to he on the floor in the surgeon's cabin, with his feet under the chest of drawers ; the misery of another, taken on board so ill as to be scarcely considered out of danger for the voyage ! But at last it ended ; and at sunset of the 6th of April, away steamed the Cyclops, with her troublesome burden in toAv, to arrive in a dreadful snow-storm in the Darda- nelles, and to land at Gallipoli in as much misery as the newly arrived on Turkish soil perhaps ever endured. Of this, however, I was not a personal witness, intending, as I eventually did, to follow in the wake of the grande armee by some more tranquil means.' * With more or less of such discomforts as usually accompany landsmen when afloat, the 10,000 British soldiers were conveyed from Malta to the Dardanelles ; and 10,000 or 12,000 more were afterwards conveyed from England without an intermediate detention at Malta. It becomes necessary now to notice the French preparations for war, coincident with, and in furtherance of, the operations of their Allies. When the war was about to commence, the French newspaper Le Pays gave a detailed account, apparently from trustworthy sources, of * Our Camp in Turkey, and the Way to it, p. 18. 82 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. the organisation and amount of the French army at that time. According to this document, the directing or controlling power of the army consisted of a general staff, a staff corps, and a private staff for the artillery and engineers ; there were in it 7 marshals of France, 80 generals of division, 160 generals of brigade, and 560 officers of the staff, from the rank of colonel to that of lieutenant. The bulk of the army, consisting of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, was thus constituted : — The infantry was composed of 100 regiments, of 3 battalions each ; 20 battalions of foot chasseurs ; 3 regiments of Zouaves and 2 of the foreign legion, with 3 battalions; 3 battalions of native sharpshooters ; 3 of African light infantry ; and, lastly, a few companies of veterans. The 100 regiments of the line could afford immediately 2 battalions of 1000 men each, and had also the means for recruiting with a third battalion from the reserve. The 9 battalions of Zouaves, the 6 of the foreign legion, the 6 of the sharp- shooters and of the light infantry, were on a war-footing, and could furnish from 20,000 to 25,000 men ready at once to enter on a campaign. Of the 20 battalions of the foot-chasseurs, 10 were organised, and 10 in course of organisation ; they numbered 1200 men each, able to give war-battalions of 1000 men. The force of the French infantry ready to enter on a campaign, while leaving good staffs of regiments at their depots in France, was thus estimated at 240 war-battalions, or 240,000 men. The cavalry was composed of 12 reserve regiments, 20 of cavalry of the line, 20 of light cavalry, all with 5 squadrons ; and 8 regiments of light cavalry — 4 of African chasseurs, 3 of Spahis, and 1 of Guides — with 6 squadrons. The mounted troops gave, consequently, 300 squadrons. Each of the 52 regiments, with 5 squadrons, could immediately furnish 4 war-squadrons of 130 horses each ; and the 8 regiments, of 6 squadrons, 700 horses each. Thus the force of the cavalry ready to enter on a campaign was estimated at from 32,000 to 35,000 sabres, leaving, to keep up the regiments, the fifth squadrons, of good cadres and of young horses. The artillery was composed of 14 regiments, of 16 batteries ; and in addition, 1 regiment of ponton- niers, of 12 companies ; 13 companies of military workmen ; 4 squadrons of flying-artillery ; and 5 companies of veteran artillerymen. The force of this artillery, ready for battle, was 360 guns, and from 28,000 to 30,000 men, including the flying-train. The engineers formed 3 regiments, with 2 battalions each, or 6000 men. The total force of the army able to enter at once on a campaign was, conse- quently, nearly 300,000 men and 60,000 horses; while the military organisation of France provided the means of raising this army to a much higher number, if occasion required. The above analysis referred to the beginning of the year 1854 ; but levies were soon afterwards made, which increased the disposable force at the service of the government. The course of strategy marked out by the French government, doubtless with the concurrence of their English allies, was embodied in the instruc- tions which the Emperor of the French drew up for the guidance of Marshal St Arnaud, to whom the command was given. The chief paragraphs of these instructions, which were dated the 12th of April 1854, were the following : — ' In placing you, marshal, at the head of a French army, to fight at a distance of more than 600 leagues from our mother-country, my first recommendation is to have a care for the health of the troops, to spare them as much as possible, and to give battle only after having made sure first of, at least, two chances out of three for a favourable result. The peninsula of Gallipoli is adopted as the principal point of disembarkation, because it must be, as a strategical point, the basis of our operations — that is to say, the place d'armes for our depots, our ambulances, our provision-stores, and whence we may with facility either advance or re-embark. This will not prevent you on your arrival, should you deem it advisable, from lodging one or two divisions in the barracks, which are either to the west of Constantinople or at Scutari. As long as you are not in presence of the enemy, the spreading of your troops cannot be attended with inconvenience, and the presence of your troops at Constantinople may produce a good moral effect ; but if, perchance, after having advanced towards the Balkan, you should be constrained to beat a retreat, it would be much more advantageous to regain the coast of Gallipoli than that of Constantinople ; for the Russians would never venture to advance from Adrianople upon Constantinople, leaving 60,000 good troops on their right. If, nevertheless, there should be the intention of fortifying the line from Kara-su, in front of Constan- tinople, it should only be done with the intention of leaving its defence to the Turks alone ; for, I repeat it, our position would be more independent, more redoubt- able, when on the flanks of the Russian army, than if we were blockaded in the Thracian peninsula. This first point established, and the Anglo-French army once united on the shores of the Sea of Marmora, you must concert measures with Omar Pacha and Lord Raglan for the adoption of one of the three following plans : — 1. Either to advance to meet the Russians on the Balkan. 2. Or to seize upon the Crimea. 3. Or to land at Odessa, or on any other point of the Russian coast of the Black Sea. In the first case, Varna appears to me the most important point to be occupied. The infantry might be taken there by sea, and the cavalry more easily, perhaps, by land. On no account ought the army to go too far from the Black Sea, so as to be always in free communication with its fleet. In the second case, that of the occupation of the Crimea, the place of landing must first be made sure of, that it may take place at a distance from the enemy, and that it may be speedily fortified, so as to serve as a point d'appui to fall back upon in case of a retreat. The capture of Sebastopol must not be attempted without at least half a siege-train and a great number of sand-bags. When within reach of the place, do not omit seizing upon Balaklava, a little port situated about four leagues south of Sebastopol, and by means of which easy communications may be kept up with the fleet during the siege. In the third case, my principal recommendation is — never to divide your army ; to march always with all your troops united, for 40,000 compact men, ably FORCES AND STRATEGY OP THE WESTERN POWERS :— 1854. 83 commanded, are always an imposing force; divided, on the contrary, they are nothing. If compelled, on account of scarcity of provisions, to divide the army, do so in such manner as always to be able to unite it on one point within twenty-four hours. If, when marching, you form different columns, establish a common rallying-point at some distance from the enemy, that none of them may be attacked singly. If you drive back the Russians, do not go beyond the Danube, unless the Austrians enter the lists. As a general rule, every movement must be concerted with the English Commander-in-chief. There are only certain exceptional cases, where the safety of the army might be concerned, when you might act on your own resolution.' Toulon and Marseilles were the Southampton and Liverpool of Prance in the busy spring of 1854. France being more extensively a military power than England, and being nearer the scene of action, it was from the outset agreed that the French army in the East should be more numerous than the English, while the English fleet was to be more numerous than the French. The French, having a much more complete military organ- isation than ourselves, proceeded in their- plans systematically and quickly. Toulon and Marseilles, the two great French ports in the Mediterranean, became alive with military and naval preparations. The harbours crowded with shipping ; the quays laden with military stores ; the barracks filled with soldiers; the hotels occupied by officers about to embark ; the cavalry horses located in temporary stables ; the artillery gradually approaching the place of embarkation ; dealers and venders of all kinds making a harvest during the sunny-time of prosperity ; men volubly discussing and actively ges- ticulating ; messengers and aids-de-camp hurrying to and fro, to receive and communicate orders — all tended to make these southern French ports foci of intense activity and excitement. It was about the end of March when the embarkation commenced. The French troops were packed on board ship more closely than their English allies, in reference to the number of troops to the tonnage of each vessel. One screw-steamer, the Jean Bart, received 1200 soldiers, besides the crew necessary to navigate it. The first convoy, of about 20,000 troops, was despatched in six or seven divisions, as follows : — 5400 men in the Montcbello, Alger, Jean Bart, and Villc de Marseilles; 3450 men and 225 horses in the Asmodec, Ulloa, Labrador, Coligny, Meteore, and Gorgone ; 1495 men and 40 horses in the Mouette, Eclaireur, Laplace, and Infernal ; 1130 men and 20 horses in the Caffarelli, Veloce, and Brandon; 3040 men in the Napoleon and Suffren ; 4663 men and 80 horses in the Montezuma, Panama, Albatross, Canada, and Titan ; and the rest in the Christophe Colombo. The whole of these vessels sailed within a few days of each other ; and further contingents took their departure at a later date. The men were mostly despatched from Toulon ; the cavalry horses, munitions, provisions, and articles for encampment, mostly from Marseilles, at which port more than 300 vessels were freighted for their conveyance. Malta, by an arrangement between the two governments, was adopted as a midway resting- place for a few French troops, in addition to the English who had arrived; and thus the little island became still more vivacious and bustling. The Christophe Colombe and the Mistral, which had left France on the 19th of March, arrived at Malta on the 23d, bringing General Canrobert, General Bosquet, General Martimprey, about 50 other officers, and 800 or 900 soldiers. It was a strange French Soldiers and Zouave. scene to the men. Malta had never before been trodden by English and French troops at the same time, except during the heat and passion of war ; and the soldiers now gazed at each other with intense curiosity. The dress of the Highland regi- ments was a wonder to the French troops ; while the Arab-like Zouaves of the French were no less an object of attention to the English. But curiosity and wonder soon gave place to enthusiasm ; the troops ' fraternised ' — to use a favourite French term — with great heartiness, and the national anthems, God Save the Queen and Parian t pour la Sj/rie, were exchanged from ship to ship, and band to band, in complimentary style. The Zouaves were originally a tribe of Arabs, in or near the regency of Algeria. When the French effected an occupation in that country, some of the Zouaves agreed to join their army ; and being active, fearless, and dashing fellows, they became great favourites ; young Parisians joined their corps, although in distinct companies ; and by degrees 84 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. there was established a regular branch of infantry under the name of Zouaves — French in composition but Arab in dress, and fitted for a particular kind of service in active warfare. The Zouave dress is picturesque — an open, simply ornamented jacket of blue cloth, faced with red ; an under-tunic of red, descending to the hips ; a broad silken sash coiled round the waist ; dazzling scarlet pantaloons, very full above the knee, and gathered in folds just below it; embroidered yellow leather greaves, covering the leg from the knee to the ankle ; a red fez cap, with a roll of cloth at the edge to protect the head — such was the dress of the sun- burnt Zouaves, upon whom the British troops gazed in the harbour of Valetta. The full-pantalooned Zouave and the kilted Highlander might well scrutinise each other with some curiosity. The sojourn of the French at Malta did not amount to a residence. A troop-laden ship would anchor in the harbour of Valetta for a day or two ; and the officers and a few men would take advan- tage of the opportunity to exchange civilities with their allies. The beginning of April found French as well as English soldiers tossing on a frequently stormy voyage towards the Dardanelles. The officers reached their destination in many ways — some via Marseilles and Malta, some by way of Vienna and Trieste, while others took the sea-route from Southampton to Gibraltar and the Levant. Not only was Malta a central point, touched upon by many regiments both of the French and English ; but it was rendered available in some respects as a depot for the British fleet in the Mediterranean, and was visited also by the French admirals. Added to this, it was a station at which mail- steamers stopped on their way from Southampton, Gibraltar, and Marseilles, in one direction ; and from Trieste, Constantinople, Syria, and Alexandria, in the opposite direction. Hence, nothing could exceed the turmoil, activity, money-spending, polyglot loquacity, and belligerent speculations, of which Malta was the scene during the spring of 1854. PROCEEDINGS AT GALLIPOLI, PERA, AND SCUTARI. A strange scene, too, was presented to the quiet Turks, when the Allies soon afterwards took posses- sion of Gallipoli. The singular oblong peninsula, the Thracian Chersonese,* forming one side of the Dardanelles, is well fortified, to maintain the rights of the Porte in respect to the passage of ships through those straits; thus, Bovah Kalessi Kiamleh Kalessi, Dyrmen Bounoun, Killis Bahar, Kamasieh, and Seetil Bahar, are all fortified posts in the Chersonese, near the southern mouth of the Dardanelles, mounting from 200 to 300 -The Greeks frequently applied their name for a peninsula (Cliersonesus) in geography. Thus, Thracian Cliersonesus was the name for the peninsula now under notice; while the Crimea was the Taurica Cliersonesus. guns, and faced by a line of yet more strongly armed forts on the opposite or Asia-Minor side of the straits. Higher up, however, where the straits terminate in the Sea of Marmora, and where Gallipoli is situated, military arrangements are less prominent ; and the 12,000 or 15,000 inhabitants of that town — a medley of Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews — occupy themselves with a peaceful trade in corn, wine, oil, and fruit. Such a place, then, could not have been otherwise than disturbed by an impetuous rush of military men from the "West. The French preceded, by a brief interval, their English allies in their arrival and encampment at Gallipoli; or, rather, although both continued to arrive for some weeks, a French regiment was the first to make a landing. One consequence of this soon appeared. War is more a matter both of busi- ness and of pleasure to a Frenchman than to an Englishman ; in accordance with this tendency, the French troops made their new home comfortable in a very brief space of time ; and in so doing, appropriated the best of everything, leaving inferior accommodation to the English Avho were to follow them. It was not simply an exempli- fication of the proverb, ' First come, first served ;' but those who came first were better able, by their previous habits, to make the best of that which was available. By the first week in April, 4000 French troops were encamped in and near Gallipoli, under the command of General Canrobert; and, to assist them in fortifying the peninsula — a plan at one time proposed, but only partially carried out — a body of English sappers were employed. It was on the 5th of the month that the Golden Fleece anchored off Gallipoli, bringing the first contingent of the regular British army ; and by the 21st, there Avere no fewer than 22,000 French and 5000 English soldiers in the peninsula, cooped up in quarters ill prepared for their reception. There is a defi- ciency of water near the town ; and for this and other reasons, partly strategical, a camp was formed at Bulair (Blejar, Boulehar, Bulari), seven or eight miles higher up the peninsula than Gallipoli, and overlooking the Gulf of Saros. Gallipoli presented at that time a motley spec- tacle to the troops who successively arrived. The elements of the East and the West were there, mingled in utter confusion. Possessing all the characteristics of a Turkish town — narrow, crooked streets, dilapidated houses, filthy roadways, pic- turesque mosques and bazaars — it had also the living accompaniments of such a town. Turks squatting on their shop-boards, smoking their pipes, and marvelling why the English and French are always in such a hurry; women with their veiled faces and yellow-booted feet, gliding along the streets ; children rolling about and glorying in the mud ; dogs, large, shaggy, fierce, and dirty, picking up the offal Avhich scavengers should have removed — such Avas Turkish Gallipoli. Then there were the Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, who PROCEEDINGS AT GALLIPOLI, PERA, AND SCUTARI :— 1854. 85 constitute a large portion of the population, each in his national costume. To these were added the red-coated English soldier, the neat and quiet- looking rifleman, the kilted Highlander, the crimson-trousered Frenchman, the dashing Zouave, the officers seeking about for their quarters in the tumble-down houses of the town. The Turkish population looked upon all this in quiet amaze- ment — wondering why so many English and French soldiers should thus settle down at a place so far distant from the Danube, where Omar Pacha at that very time would have been glad of their aid. The English officers and men complained seriously of the discomforts to which the imperfect arrange- ments of the home-government subjected them. The very first day was enough to dishearten them ; for when the Golden Fleece arrived, there was no pilot to shew her where to anchor, no one came off to her from the shore, no British flag shewed that she was expected and welcomed, no British consul or interpreter was at hand ; and when, on the following morning, the officers landed, they had to learn that horses were scarcely obtainable ; that food was dear : and that the French had Gallipoli. secured all the best localities in and near the town. Rustum Pacha, the Turkish governor, effected all that good-will could accomplish ; but he could not render Gallipoli suddenly capable of accommo- dating twice its ordinary number of inmates. The French found quarters in the Turkish part of the town, and the English in the Greek — that is, the latter did so after having been cooped up two days and a half in the Golden Fleece in Gallipoli harbour : a thousand soldiers having been so circumstanced, because no sufficient arrangements had been made for receiving them on shore. It did not improve the temper of these men to see, during these two or three days, French vessels arrive and land their contingents of troops with ease and celerity. At a later date, when complaints reached the home-government, direct denials were frequently given in parliament concerning their truth ; and from these denials, together with the details of evidence given before a Committee of the House of Commons many months afterwards, it appears that the discomforts ought not to have been expe- rienced, if the different parts of the government machine had been fitted for harmonious working ; but it was this want of harmony which lay at the root of the evil. The Duke of Newcastle, when examined by the Sebastopol Committee, Avas asked whether, in his capacity as minister of war, he had sought information as to the capabilities of Turkey to furnish supplies for the wants of the army ; to which he replied : ' Directions were given to the commissariat officers, who were sent out at the very commencement — on the 7th or 8th of February. Inquiries as to the capabilities of the country were not, in the first instance, made in Bulgaria, but were confined to Roumelia — the first object being to send troops to Gallipoli. Commissary- general Smith was sent from Corfu, he being to a certain extent acquainted with the languages of the East, Greek and Italian. He had provided, I believe, generally speaking, sufficient supplies before the arrival of any troops at all at Gallipoli. It was in conse- quence of the recommendation of Sir J. Burgoyne, on strategical grounds, that Gallipoli was occupied; that officer's opinion being confirmed by that of Colonel S6 COMMENCEMENT OP HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. Ardent, who had been sent by the Emperor of the French for a similar purpose. What steps were taken to prepare for the reception of troops at Gallipoli ? — Instructions were given to the commissariat, who were informed of the number of troops for whom they would have to provide. Did you receive information that they had provided for the wants of the army when it came ? — I did not receive any such information from the commissariat directly. It was not then under me. The commissariat corresponded with the Treasury, and from the latter department I received information of its movements. I should say vast supplies of all kinds were sent from England. What supplies did you expect to find in the country where the army was to be sent ?— Principally fresh meat, and, of course, bread to the greatest extent to which it could be obtained. In apprehension of the possibility of the supply of bread there failing, a large supply of biscuit was sent out from this country. As to forage for horses ? — I considered that ought to be provided in that country, but provision was never- theless made for sending out hay from England. I apprehend none of that hay was landed at Gallipoli, as it was sent from here in sailing-vessels, which would not arrive until after the troops had left Gallipoli. No cavalry was landed at that place. But the infantry had all their wants supplied , at Gallipoli ? — At first there were complaints ; but, to the best of my recollection, more of want of transport than of provisions.' This minister was further asked, whether there had not been a great want of means of transport at Gallipoli. His reply was : ' I cannot say. It was undoubtedly the duty of the commissariat to provide such transport as was needed ; whether they have any justification, I cannot say. My impression is, that there had been considerable difficulty in procuring animals in that part of the country, although there was none nearer to Constantinople. I was not aware of any difficulty having arisen, until I received an intimation of it through a private source.' Sadly frequent were the instances, in the earlier months of the war, in which the British officials at home were ignorant by whom instructions ought to have been given ; and equally ignorant whether the instructions, when given, had or had not been properly carried out. As more and more troops arrived at Gallipoli, new camps were formed outside the town ; and in these camps the superiority of the French commis- sariat arrangements was speedily exhibited, in the better supply of the men with tents, food, fuel, and medicines. The French landed with their baggage- trains, and conveyed their stores to the camping- ground with great quickness ; the English had to seek for vehicles and animals of draught before they could move. The commissaries worked actively and willingly ; but they were too few in number ; and had not the advantage of a well- organised system to work upon. Such, in like manner, was the case with the medical department of the British troops at Gallipoli ; the surgeons were few ; and there was unaccountable delay or neglect in forwarding the medicine- chests from Malta. At a time when the 4th, 28th, 44th, 50th, and 93d regiments were all in or near Gallipoli, as well as the rifle-brigade and many sappers and engineers, any dislocation in the commissariat and medical departments was sure to be felt with some severity and dissatisfaction. Soldiers have a tendency to make the best of circumstances as they arise ; yet many such letters as the following, from an officer of the 50th, found their way into the English newspapers during the spring of 1854 : — 'Camp, Gallipoli, April IS. Our encampment is very wretched, and hardly any- thing except the men's rations to be got to eat ; no beer, or anything but rum — "one gill," the same as the men. The commissariat is dreadfully managed : nothing of any sort. The French have everything — horses, provisions, good tents, and every kind of pro- tection against contingencies. To-morrow morning, we march at six o'clock to another encamping-ground, where we are to throw up trenches, and to remain for two months ; it is about seven miles from this place ; the ground is beautifully situated, overlooking the Bay of Gallipoli. It would be a good lesson to some of our government to take a lesson from the French : the care and attention paid to their troops are perfect. I had to purchase a mule, and pay £11 for him. Everything is dear. I cannot get any tea to drink ; I should have found it a great comfort. The streets are horrible, and the town is bad. I never saw anything to equal it anywhere. We are all obliged to sit on the ground, and eat what we can. My breakfast consists of a piece of brown bread — no butter, and no milk ; and till yesterday our men got no breakfast. We get eggs, and they are the only things to stand by at present, as the meat served out is so bad no one can touch it. We have no potatoes, or any other kind of vegetables, except onions. It is really more than a joke, and all owing to the very bad management of our commissariat department.' Here we see that the commissariat, whether in fault or not, had to bear the burden of censure — a burden which those officers deemed exceed- ingly unjust. A private in one of the regi- ments wrote home thus : ' The French are one hundred years in advance of us in regard to military equipments for the field. We are loaded like packhorses, with our knapsacks, cross-belts, with sixty rounds of ammunition, haversack, and an article termed a " canteen," shaped like a butter firkin, which would wear out a pair of trousers in a month. We were nicely fooled at home as to getting all the things furnished to us at about cost- price. We were to get the best London porter at 4d. per quart — I have not seen a drop of porter since I came here.' This ' London porter ' grievance Avas bitterly dwelt upon by the men ; owing to clumsy management, the casks of porter were far away from the spot where the beverage was needed. The main bulk of troops remained idle several weeks in and near Gallipoli; but some of the regiments, as lately mentioned, sought quarters at Bulair. The idleness was, however, not shared by the engineers or sappers, who were employed in forming a series of field-works and intrench- ments across the peninsula. Much diversity of opinion seems to have existed concerning the PROCEEDINGS AT GALLIPOLI, PERA, AND SCUTARI :— 1854. policy of this arrangement ; for, irrespective of the improbability that the Russians would penetrate so far southward, there was a deficiency of wood and water in the Chersonese ; and, more- over, most of the provisions for the commissariat had to be brought from the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. Be the explanation what it may, however, the camp of the sappers and miners, and of two infantry regiments, was on the gentle slope of a ridge between Gallipoli and Bulair, about seven miles from the former and three from the latter. Near Bulair, the peninsula narrows to an isthmus less than three miles in width, between the Dardanelles and the Gulf of Saros ; intrench- ments and earthworks were carried across this isthmus, and a fort constructed about midway in the line, for the defence of the position. English and French troops worked in turn, to construct these defensive posts ; and by degrees there appeared a trench 7 feet deep by 13 broad at the top, with a parapet and banquette formed of the earth dug out of the trench. The 28th and 44th British regiments were quartered near these works. Their camp consisted of streets of bell- tents. The French camp was not far distant ; and there were daily rounds of visitings between the troops of the two nations. The extreme novelty of the alliance raised a doubt in some minds concern- ing the light in which the soldiers would regard each other ; and Lord Raglan deemed it prudent to issue the following order : — ( The commander of the forces avails himself of the earliest opportunity to impress upon the army the necessity of main- taining the strictest discipline ; of respecting persons and property, and the laws and usages of the country they have been sent to aid and defend; particularly avoiding to enter mosques, churches, and the private dwellings of a people Avhose habits are peculiar and unlike those of other nations of Europe. Lord Raglan fully relies on the generals and other officers of the army to afford him their support in the suppression of disorders; and he confidently hopes that the troops themselves, anxious to support the character they have acquired elsewhere, will endeavour to become the examples of obedience, order, and of attention to discipline, without which success is impossible, and there would be evil instead of advantage to those whose cause their sovereign has deemed it proper to espouse. The army will, for the first time, be associated with an ally to whom it has been the lot of the British nation to be opposed in the field for many centuries. The gallantry and high military qualities of the French army are matters of history; and the alliance which has now been formed will, the commander of the forces trusts, be of long duration, as well as productive of the most important and the happiest results. Lord Raglan is aware, from personal communication with the distinguished general who is appointed to command the French army, Marshal St Arnaud, and many of the superior officers, that every disposition exists through their ranks to cultivate the best understanding with the British army, and to co-operate most warmly with it. He entertains no doubt that Her Majesty's troops are animated with the same spirit, and that the just ambition of each army will be to acquire the confidence and good opinion of each other.' Any doubt on this matter was speedily dispelled ; the troops greeted each other heartily on all occasions ; and, indeed, the ' fraternisation' was at times so excessive, that a Zouave and a High- lander on one occasion partially exchanged dresses under the influence of an exhilarating cup, and appeared at muster the next morning in strange motley — kilt and baggy red trousers having changed places. The sojourn at and near Gallipoli, while it shewed that the organisation of the various departments of the French army is more complete than that of the English, revealed also the fact, that the French private soldier is a better manager, a better caterer, than the English. He knows how to make the best of such supplies as are obtainable ; how to provide ingenious substitutes for such appliances as may be wanting. In or near Bulair, the English troops suffered many annoyances through defects in the commissariat, which they had not adroitness enough to remedy ; whereas the French hunted about for eggs, caught tortoises, gathered herbs, and prepared dishes and ' potages,' Avhich perfectly astonished their Anglican neighbours. The French soldier is encouraged in the practice of numerous employments and con- trivances, which render essential service during the precarious events of a campaign. The month of May was far advanced before any considerable number of the troops made a move from Gallipoli towards the scenes of warfare in the Black Sea. There had been a long detention at Malta ; there was now a long detention at Gallipoli. The necessity for fortifying the country around Gallipoli seems to have been overrated ; and thus the labours of many weeks were ren- dered of no avail. The Turks marvelled greatly at the proceedings of the English and French. Omar Pacha was at that time maintaining a desperate struggle Avith the Russians on the banks of the Danube; and it was fully expected by the Osmanlis, that their western Allies would have advanced at once to Shumla or Silistria, to assist them in their heavy trial. But the generals Avere in communica- tion Avith the ambassadors at Constantinople ; the ambassadors were in correspondence Avith the diplomatists at Vienna ; the diplomatists were receiving instructions from London, Paris, Berlin, and St Petersburg ; and thus military operations were retarded by the obscure and fluctuating course of diplomacy. The officers, for the most part, arrived in the East long after the troops. Sir George Brown, on the part of the English, and General Canrobert, on the part of the French, accompanied the earliest contingents to Gallipoli, towards the close of March, to prepare the en- campments ; but the commanders and the princes 8S COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. arrived much later, and, in most cases, steamed on towards their quarters at Constantinople without stopping at Gallipoli. On the 22d of April, Sir de Lacy Evans and staff arrived ; on the 23d, General England and staff; on the 2d of May, Lord Raglan and Lord de Ros ; a day or two afterwards, Prince Jerome Napoleon ; on the 7th, Marshal St Arnaud ; on the 9th, the Duke of Cambridge. Reviews and inspections, courtesies and visitings, folloAved these arrivals : pleasant in themselves, but absorptive of fine days, which should have been appropriated to active operations further north. As we have traced the two armies from the English and French shores to Malta, and from Malta to Gallipoli ; so does it now become neces- sary to follow them to Pera and Scutari, where another detention awaited them. At this point it is desirable to attend a little to the topography of the region around Constanti- nople ; for, on the one hand, it is well to know why other nations have so eagerly sought to possess this magnificent locality ; and, on the other, a knowledge of the topography is essential to a due comprehension of the relations which Con- stantinople bears to the Dardanelles and Gallipoli on the south, to Scutari on the east, to Adrianople on the west, to the Bosphorus and Varna on the north. Constantinople is thirsted for by the Russians as gold by the miser : czar, princes, patriarchs, priests, nobles, serfs — all inherit more or less the tendency to regard Constantinople as one of the great prizes which destiny has in store for Russia. The longing for this splen- did locality underlies many aggressive schemes. Whether the secret archives of France or Austria contain the outlines of any plan for the acquisition of the city of the Bosphorus, the world may perhaps one day know ; but that Russia has entertained such dreams, is as plain as noonday. The knowledge of this fact inspires dread in the rulers of other nations ; and it is thus that may be explained, in part, the perpetual interference of other powers in the affairs of Turkey. Never, perhaps, was there such another position for a commanding city. It controls the only outlet from the greatest of European lakes to the greatest of European seas ; for although the Euxine, under its modern name, is the Black Sea, it has most of the characteristics of a lake. Con- stantinople almost touches Asia ; for while the city itself is in Europe, Scutari, a sort of suburb, is in Asia ; they are separated by the channel of the Bosphorus. There can be little doubt that this Bosphorus is a mere rent in the land, caused by some geological convulsion, or by the impetuous rush of the waters of the Euxine to find an outlet ; if such be the case, Europe and Asia were once joined at this point. In commanding the Black Sea, Constantinople commands also the commerce of the fine wheat-growing countries on the northern margin of that sea, watered by the Don, the Dnieper, the Boug, the Dniester, and the Pruth. In the same way, and for the same reasons, Constantinople is the key which un- locks the treasures of the Danube and of Southern Germany ; the produce of Bavaria, Austria, Hungary, Servia, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bul- garia, naturally seeks the Danube as the easiest and most profitable outlet; but this produce cannot leave the Black Sea for the Mediterranean unless Constantinople permit. Again, Constantinople is on the great highway from Europe to the regions of the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the Indus — a highway which, though superseded in great degree since steam-navigation developed its power, is yet followed largely by the Armenian, Greek, and Persian merchants. As if to render this extraor- dinary spot still more powerful as a commercial and political watchtower over the south-eastern corner of Europe, it has a second narrow strait almost under its immediate control. The waters of the Black Sea flow through the Bosphorus into the Sea of Marmora, or Marmara (the ancient Propontis), and thence into the Mediterranean through the narrow but deep channel of the Dardanelles (Ifdlcspontus). Is it, then, strange that nations should have cast a longing eye at such a commanding position ; or that struggles, both diplomatic and warlike, should have resulted from the wish to possess it ? The topography of Constantinople must be described in brief, as a means of rendering intel- ligible the positions which the English and French troops took up in May 1854. The city is built on undulating ground, fronting both the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora, at the southern extremity of a wedge-shaped promontor} 7 . The opposite coast of Asia is so near to the point of this wedge, that a boat can be rowed thither, across the Bosphorus, in a quarter of an hour. Exactly at the point, the wedge is split into two by the magnificent harbour called the Golden Horn, which runs up north-westward beyond the limits of the city. Thus the Turkish metropolis consists essentially of three distinct parts, all combining to form one great city, although separated by channels of deep water : Constantinople, the city proper, frequently called Stamboul — although this name is sometimes applied by the Turks to the entire city — containing the Seraglio and the chief public buildings, is bounded on one side by the Golden Horn, and on another by the Sea of Marmora ; Pera, containing the residences of the foreign ambassadors, with Galata, the ' Wapping ' of Constantinople, and Tophane, a little higher up — occupy the jutting peninsula bounded on one side by the Golden Horn, and on the other, by the Bosphorus ; while Scutari is in Asia, on the east side of the Bosphorus, and immediately opposite Constantinople. The whole, collectively — including Pera, Galata, Tophane, Scutari, and Stamboul — form the Turkish capital, and contain a population variously estimated at 700,000 to 1,000,000. Not only is the actual site of the city undulating, but it is bounded by higher ground landward. This PROCEEDINGS AT GALLIPOLI, PERA, AND SCUTARI :— 1854. 89 character of surface imparts a beautiful appearance to Constantinople, and a degree of salubrity and cleanliness which would not otherwise exist in a city belonging to the Turks. Constantinople receives healthy breezes from all sides, and the steep slope of the streets assists in carrying off all filth into deep water. The depth of the water in the Bosphorus, the Golden Horn, and the Sea of Marmora, greatly increases both the magnificence and the practical value of the site. The occasional heavy rains, the abundant supply of pure water by means of aqueducts from artificial reservoirs ten or twelve miles inland, and the numerous public fountains, all tend towards the purification of the city. Notwithstanding the disappointment ex- pressed by travellers at the dissolving of many beautiful views when Constantinople is actually entered, it does not appear that the streets are so filthy as those in many other Turkish towns, except in the humbler trading districts near the water ; although on other grounds there is sufficient reason for discontent at the mean and dilapidated appear- ance of most of the houses and buildings. There is only one really long street, extending from the The Bosphoros. high walls of the Serai or Seraglio to the Adrianople Gate ; all the rest are short, narrow, crooked, and comfortless. They have, too, a dull and deserted appearance. Indeed, this feeling of desolation is experienced in a remarkable degree at many points both within and without Constantinople — remarkable considering the largeness of the population. Immediately beyond the magnificent city-walls built by the Greek emperors, but utterly neglected by their Moslem successors, the waste and solitude are at once observable, to which a sort of melancholy interest is imparted by the white marble tombs and dark cypresses of numerous cemeteries. Within the city, the narrow streets are rendered still more narrpw by the projecting windows, latticed and closed most jealously ; or, if these be not present, the streets are rendered still more dull and irksome to the eye by the absence of windows altogether, nothing being present to break the monotony but low and narrow doorways. So little tendency have the Turks to repair old buildings, that they have even left untouched the breach in the city-wall, through which the Ottoman army entered Constantinople 400 years ago, when Sultan Mohammed conquered these regions from the Emperor Palseologus : the rent is simply fringed with straggling trees and brushwood. The old Greek structures in the city, too, have been allowed to fall utterly to ruin. One among many indignant writers has bitterly reproached the Turks for this matter. 'Even the coldest philosopher,' he says, 'could scarcely lament the passing away of a race who never founded but one civilised empire in the world (Granada), and who, from the palsying influence of Mohammedanism, have done nothing for art, science, or literature, during the 400 years that they have possessed, in wealthy leisure, one of the finest countries upon earth ; who have done worse — who have suffered the sands to collect upon her storied monuments, and the pride of her palaces and towers to crumble into dust. Where stood the Forum of Constantino, the founder of the city, with its porticos and lofty 90 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. columns of porphyry 1 Where is the colossal statue of Apollo, supposed to he the "work of Phidias 1 Where is the stately Hippodrome, with its statues and ohelisks 1 — the Baths, with their threescore statues of hronze 1 — the Circus 1 — the Theatres 1 — the Schools ? — the marvellous treasures of antiquity, which would have heen standing to-day had they fallen into other hands 1 Alas ! every one is destroyed, and the thoughtful traveller may look in vain for anything to remind him of the thousand glories of the past.' If the doom of Turkey were pronounced by an art-student, the race of Osman would unquestionably fall to rise no more. In respect to the accommodation for the Allies in the earlier months of the war, the waters around Constantinople were of much importance. The Golden Horn constitutes a splendid harbour — safe, capacious, and beautiful ; and it is adequate to the accommodation of an enormous commerce — far larger, it must be candidly confessed, than Constantinople is ever likely to have as a Turkish city. But it is the Bosphorus that affords the most magnificent prospect. Glowing descriptions without number have been given of the whole locality. The Earl of Carlisle supplies a lively sketch, not so much of the natural beauties of the Bosphorus, as of the celebrated points concerning which guides and interpreters have something to say. Under date of 10th August 1853, he has this entry : ' Steamed down to Constantinople. Mr Skene was with me, and made an incomparable cicerone for the Bosphorus, telling me the tenants of the long line of palaces, and their histories. This was the house of Mehemet Ali of Egypt. This is the house of his chief rival, old Khosrew Pacha, now living there at ninety-six ; he has filled the office of grand vizier for fifty years altogether, with various breaks, and still retains many of the simple habits of his origin as a Circassian shepherd. Here Darius Hystaspes crossed the strait on his Scythian expedition ; here he sat on the rock to witness the passage ; the inscription on the stone to com- memorate it, which was formerly known to exist, has not been discovered. The ground on either side is now occupied by the tall round white towers of the forts, the Rumili and Anatoli Hissars — Castle of Europe and Castle of Asia : the first, built by Mohammed II. before the capture of the city, still goes universally by the name of the conqueror. From that window, or rather slit in the wall, he used to examine the means of approaching the capital. Under that low culvert, in the after-destination of the place as a prison, the bodies were floated into the Bosphorus. The European fort is built on the most fantastic plati, to imitate the Arabic letters of the word Moham- med, On one side is Balta Liman, on the other Unkiar Skelessi, both famous in the annals of modern treaties. This rapid bit of current is the Sheitan Akindesi, or Devil's Current ; so said to be called because a sultana had been angered by seeing a Christian congregation coming out of a church on a Sunday, and had immediately given orders for the destruction of the church ; whereupon, on her return, her boat was upset, and all saved but herself. It was in that long- spreading house in the bay that the sister of the present sultan, the wife of Halil Pacha, kept long- watch over her boy, to avoid the law which doomed all the male children of the sisters of sultans to immediate death ; and when at last she found that the child had been strangled, she died herself from the shock very soon afterwards. This tragedy has happily put an end to the practice. That very long facade is the house of Fuad EfFendi, whom Prince Menchikoff found the other day prime minister, and refused to visit.' * The earl, like most travellers, was struck with the contrast between the distant beauty and the near squalor of the Turkish metropolis. ' On landing and walking up to Messiri's Hotel at Pera,' he says, 'I was struck far beyond my expectation with the ruggedness, the narrow- ness, the steepness, and the squalidness of the streets ; an impression which the extension of my walk through Galata (the old Genoese quarter) and Constantinople proper (Stamboul), materially aggravated. I could not see the close dwellings and bazaars, the mangy dogs, and the swarms of human kind, without wondering — not that the plague has ever got there, but that it has ever got out again.' Such is the region, with its mingled beauties and deformities, towards which the English and French troops were conveyed on their way from Gallipoli to Varna. By agreement with the Turkish government, arrangements were made for the reception of a portion of the British troops in a large pile of buildings at Scutari, forming the new barracks ; while others were encamped at Unkiar Skelessi. The 33d, 41st, 49th, 77th, and 88th regiments thus found a temporary location on the east of the Bosphorus. One of the famous voyages of the Hima- laya was from Malta to Scutari, with 2100 souls on board — a number perhaps unprecedented in the annals of sea-transit. When landed, the officers and men tried to while away the time as they best might — still marvelling when and where they should meet the Russians, against whom they expected to have had to contend; some ran foot- races, and some played at cricket — a game which many of the astonished Turks are said to have almost lost their senses in endeavouring to com- prehend. By the third week in May, the above- named regiments were further augmented by the 7th, 19th, 23d, 30th, 47th, 93d, and 95th, together with the Rifles and three battalions of the Guards. Of cavalry, there was yet none ; and the artillery was rendered very incomplete by deficiency of horses. Lord Raglan and his staff had before this arrived, and frequent inspections of the troops took place. The weather was becoming hot ; the supplies * Diary in Turkish and Greek Waters, p. 111. PROCEEDINGS AT GALLIPOLI, PERA, AND SCUTARI:— 1854. 91 were frequently lax and insufficient ; and men and officers were desirous of pushing on to some scene of active exertion. The 55th regi- ment arrived to swell the numbers at Scutari ; and the cavalry officers also, hut without the cavalry. The closing weeks of the month of May were full of excitement at Scutari. Lord Raglan's quarters — a neat, but perfectly plain wooden building, situated on the beach, at a distance of half a mile or so from the barracks — was the focus of general activity. Officers of all grades were hastening to and fro, receiving and communicating orders. The Turks and Greeks from Scutari were wont to squat on a grassy knoll near this house, and gaze on the high-pressure intensity of everything going forward — the Greek, lively and inquisitive, the Turk lost in wonderment why men should move so quickly, and should give themselves so much trouble to serve others. The Guards were encamped near this spot ; the other regiments pitched their camps further inland; and near these camps a number of suttling-booths were established by Smyrniote Greeks, who obtained permission to drive a profitable trade in cakes, sweetmeats, lemonade, and sherbet — to which stronger beverages were added when practicable without detection. The most wondrous specimens of horseflesh, almost valueless even as a gift, were vended for sale by worthies whose honesty was on a par with the merits of their beasts. Jew and Armenian money-changers, with their bags of gold and silver, completed the motley scene, in which English, Turk, Greek, Armenian, and Hebrew, were thus strangely mingled. On the Queen's birthday, 24th Ma} r , to keep up home-associations when far away, 15,000 British troops were paraded on the outskirts of Scutari, in the presence of a few Turks who cared suffici- ently about it to walk half a mile, and of a larger sprinkling of foreigners from the opposite side of the Bosphorus. Nearly all the principal officers were present, including Lord Raglan, the Duke of Cambridge, the Earl of Lucan, Sir George Brown, Sir de Lacy Evans, Sir Colin Campbell, and Generals Bentinck, Pennefather, Airey, Adams, Buller, &c. Meanwhile, the French had not been idle ; although the activity was such as scarcely responded to the wishes of men who looked forward to the excitements of active service. Portions of the French army, under General Bosquet, after sojourning awhile at Gallipoli, proceeded to Adrianople. This city, the second in importance in Turkey, is situated in the fertile plains of Thrace, about 100 miles north of Gallipoli, and 150 west or north-west of Constantinople ; it is of considerable strategical importance, being at the point of confluence of the principal rivers of Thrace, and on the high road from Constantinople to the Balkan and the north-western provinces. The Allies, wavering between many plans, knew not whether it were better to act on the defensive or the offensive in Turkey ; and, during this period of uncertainty, they deemed it well to occupy Adrianople. The French camp occupied an island formed by the two arms of the river Joungia, and also the left bank of that stream. General Bosquet enlivened the Adrianopolitans by many entertainments and field-days, during which the dashing Zouaves and Chasseurs d'Afrique excited no small degree of admiration. General Prim, a Spanish officer, who was pre- sent as a spectator at many of the incidents of the war, was one of the guests at Adrianople on this occasion. Large bodies of French troops were conveyed from Gallipoli up to Varna, without stopping at Constantinople, and without adopting the inland route via Adrianople. The means of transport possessed by the French were inferior to that which was available to their allies, so far as vessels were concerned — one of the very few points wherein England held a superior position during the war. The English, even in the magnificent Himalaya, scarcely went beyond an accommodation for 1500 or 1G00 troops ; whereas the Eicphrate, a steamer belonging to the Messageries Impe'riales, was employed to receive nearly an equal number in less than half the space. The French soldiers are said to have been 'packed close all around, like negroes in a Brazilian schooner ; ' the buo} r ant spirits of the men, however, maintained them in good-humour amid all the discomforts of the passage. It was at Constantinople, nevertheless, that the gay trappings of war, or rather of warriors, were presented with most effect to the gaze of the Turks. On one occasion, towards the close of the sojourn there, a review of the French troops was held in brilliant style. Marshal St Arnaud, Prince Napo- leon, and a staff of officers decked to the highest pitch of military splendour, proceeded to a plain situate between Daoud Pacha and Rumilsifilk, on the Avestem or Adrianople road, whither marched the French troops from their temporary barracks near Constantinople, and whither the sultan and his courtiers also proceeded, to witness the spec- tacle. Cuirassiers, Spahis, Chasseurs de Vincennes, all turned out in their best ; and their wheeling and deploying, their marching and countermarch- ing, delighted the sultan, as he galloped his magni- ficent black charger along the line. Whatever might be the moral or political equality of the two nations, there were many circumstances during the war which gave the French an exterior advantage over the English in the eyes of the Osmanli. The French studied effect. The Prince Napoleon, when he first landed, was dressed in full splendour, and surrounded by a brilliant staff; the Duke of Cambridge, when he touched Turkish soil, wore a round hat and a shooting-jacket ; and the Turks were driven to infer that the French prince must necessarily be a more important personage than the English. Travellers accustomed to Oriental ideas assert that it is not prudent to disregard 92 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. externals, when a stranger would convey an impres- sion of his dignity, rank, or influence : moral grandeur is less understood in the East than in the West. Reverting, however, to the military inspec- tion outside Constantinople, the sultan had rarely appeared so delighted and animated as when he rode for three hours between the marshal and the prince ; he perhaps formed in his thoughts a golden picture of the aid which such allies might furnish in reviving the strength and healing the wounds of the Osmanli. He thanked the marshal, and expressed his regret that his imperfect know- ledge of the French language did not permit him to render justice to his feelings. Madame St Arnaud was on the ground in a carriage ; and the sultan paid her a degree of delicate attention which greatly astonished the Turks of the old school, who could not reconcile themselves to the idea of a Giaour, even though the wife of a marshal, being so condescendingly treated by the Padishah of All the Ottomans. The sultan invited the lady to take up her abode temporarily in his kiosk at Therapia, and to visit him at the palace — a further departure from Oriental usages. The proceedings of this day at Constantinople, which immediately preceded the departure of the French troops from the neighbourhood of the capital to Varna, were regarded as among the most brilliant which the Turks have witnessed in modern times. They made a great impression at the time ; and they had a national and political importance, in so far as they indicated a tendency in the sultan and his court to adopt European habits and usages. During the brief sojourn in the neighbourhood of the Turkish metropolis, the English and French troops were on opposite sides of the Bosphorus. The English, as has been said, were encamped on the heights near Scutari ; while their allies occupied a position at Mashlak, a short distance from Pera. Here ai'rangements were made for encamping 50,000 men, if the plans of the Allies should lead to the location of so many French troops in that quarter. One of the aqueducts which convey Avater to Constantinople was rendered available for the service of the camp. Pera became almost as much a French as a Turkish town, so busily was it occupied by the officers and soldiers of that nation. During several years past, the Turks, in so far as they have studied foreign languages, have attended to French rather than any other ; and French is beginning to supersede Italian among the motley groups of foreigners always to be found at Pera ; French merchants and dealers, too, have settled there in considerable number ; and French fashions and usages are being adopted by the' wealthier natives ; insomuch that the French are, all things considered, more at home at Pera than the English. By a happy stroke of ingenuity, the soldiers converted the designation ' Frank quarter ' into ' French quarter,' as a general appellation for Pera as one component part of the Turkish metropolis ; and they behaved in many respects | in a very frank fashion. An eye-witness described them as ' roaming through the halls of the sultan's new palace in their muddy boots ; while a Mussul- man submissively walked behind with a wet cloth to wipe the polished floor, which the "Western warrior had dirtied at every step.' Nearly all the large public buildings in Pera were made over to the use of the French, together with some of those in Stamboul or Constantinople proper. The hills north of Pera were white with the tents of the French camp ; and the roads were covered with wagons and carts, each bearing its little tricolor-flag, or its board with the inscription, 'Armfc Francaise! All the horses around were bought up ; and meadows were appropriated on the banks of the Bosphorus for the cattle and horses. In short, the French arrangements at Constantinople presented an aspect rather of permanent occupation than of temporary location. It was a time of rich emolument for the boatmen of Constantinople. French officers at Pera, and English at Scutari, interchanged courtesies as frequently as opportunity permitted : they had occasional recourse to the boatmen ; and the Turks themselves, intensely enjoying the lazy luxury, did likewise. A beautiful sight it is when the waters are speckled with caiques or kaiks — boats generally manned by two or three rowers. Darting across the Golden Horn, from Stamboul to Pera ; or across the Bosphorus, from Stamboul and Pera to Scutari ; or up the Bosphorus to Therapia, Buyuk- dere, Beikos, and other villages on its shores — the caiques throw great life into the whole scene. Though slight, they are suited to the particular service required of them. Carrying no ballast, and being very light, these dancing, buoyant, tricksy caiques would speedily be capsized by a sudden gush of wind ; and hence the boatmen have acquired great dexterity in managing oar, sail, and helm, at such a time. War might possibly be a mis- fortune for Turkey ; but it was a source of profit to the Constantinopolitan boatmen, in bringing so many English and French officers to the shores of the Bosphorus. Here it may be well to advert to the fact, that Turkey is gradually experiencing the advantages accruing from steam-navigation ; and, moreover, that she possesses a supply of fuel in convenient proximity to the capital, available both for war- steamers and for ordinary traffic. There is a useful bed of coal at Kozlou, near Heraclea or Erekli, in Asia Minor, about midway between the Bosphorus and Sinope. When the war commenced, the English and French governments each made a contract with the owners of these coal-mines, for the supply of several hundred tons per week, at a price somewhat less than a pound sterling per ton. The cost of coal brought from England was so enormous at Constantinople, that these Heraclea pits became of essential service — directly to the Allies, and indirectly to the sultan, who was to be benefited by those Allies. The pleasure-traffic of the Bosphorus, too, has VARNA: PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA :— 1854. 93 been brought within the range of steam ; and the English and French officers, during their resi- dence in the Turkish metropolis, availed them- selves of the advantages thus offered. In addition to the caiques, there are now small steamers plying across the Bosphorus, and up and down between Constantinople and Therapia — their decks rendered gay by the richly coloured dresses of the Turkish ladies, as well as by the picturesque costumes of Osmanlis and Greeks. One act of thoughtful kindness was much appre- ciated by the officers : the sultan placed at their disposal a pretty little steamer, cushioned with scarlet cloth, shaded by an awning, and supplied with refreshments ; this steamer crossed from Constantinople to Scutari at the even hours of the day, and from Scutari to Constantinople at the in- termediate hours ; and as the whole Avas provided at the sultan's expense, the officers were always certain of a convenient and costless means of transit. Many of the arrangements for the reception and accommodation of the English troops in Turkey, whether at Gallipoli or Scutari, seem to have been unfavourably affected by the circumstance that the Turkish language was but little understood by those employed. The following facts, mentioned some months afterwards by Commissary-general Smith, illustrate a fcAv of the difficulties against which the officers of the commissariat were called upon to contend. He was sent in March 1854 from Corfu to Constantinople, to make arrange- ments preparatory to the arrival of the forces. He took with him an officer and two clerks. None of the party spoke Turkish, but the two clerks were well acquainted with Creek and I talian. Having been furn ished by Sir C. Trc velyan (secretary to the Treasury) with credentials, imme- diately on arriving at Constantinople, he waited on Lord Stratford de Redcliff'e, who promised him every co-operation in his power. The Turkish government appointed an officer who spoke English to assist witness, but that person was so destitute of intelligence that he was quite useless. Lord Stratford de RedclifTe then gave him the assis- tance of his chief dragoman or interpreter ; and he had two intervieAvs with the Seraskier Pacha as to the means of providing for an English army in Turkey, and the information he then received Avas generally of a satisfactory nature. Mr Smith further stated: 'It was not part of my duty to' find barracks for the troops, but I did so — that is, assisted in finding them. I had no indication of the place Avhcrc the troops were likely to be quartered, but I suggested to Lord Stratford the necessity of getting the barracks at Scutari for them. He applied for and obtained them in the beginning of April. I visited them then, and found them in a better condition than Turkish buildings usually are. Commissary-general Filder arrived about the 21st of April, the troops ha\ r iug arrived before that date at Gallipoli.'* * Evidence : Sebastopol Committee. VARNA: PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA. The desultory proceedings of the Allies — first at Malta, then at Gallipoli and Bulair, and then at Pera and Scutari — having thus been traced, a further stage in the progress now aAvaits attention — namely, the expedition to Varna. This Turkish seaport is on the western shore of the Black Sea, about 180 miles, sea-distance, from Constantinople, 160 north-east of Adrianoplc by land, and 100 south-east of Silistria. This last- named fortress, at the period to which the narrative has arrived, was under siege by the Russians ; and it was partly in reference to that siege that the advance to Varna was made. Varna bears a reputation similar to that Avhich belongs to most Turkish towns : it is crooked, irregular, dirty, dilapidated, and unfitted for the due accommoda- tion either of visitors or of mercantile dealers. And so the Allies found it, Avhen military necessity led them to make it a temporary place of residence. The advance from Constantinople to Varna was commenced soon after the arrival of the Allies at the first-mentioned place ; for, Avhatever may have been the vacillations in council, a long detention in the neighbourhood of the capital did not enter as a component element into the plan. About the middle of May, the Turkish minister of Avar, Riza Pacha, steamed up to Varna, as did likcAvise the Allied generals and admirals, with a view of holding a council of war Avith Omar Pacha, cither at that place or at Shumla, Omar's head-quarters. The Turkish generalissimo Avas known to be exceedingly anxious that the Allies should advance to Silistria, then deemed to be in a precarious state ; or, supposing him to advance with rein- forcements from Shumla to Silistria, his hope Avas that the Allies would occupy the country betAvcen Shumla and Varna, thereby cutting off any threatened advance of the Russians from the Dobrudscha to the neighbourhood of Constanti- nople. "Whatever may have been the imperfect acquiescence in Omar's plans in other respects, an advance to Varna Avas speedily resolved upon ; and the camps of the Allies — the British near Scutari, and the French near Pera — soon became alive with busy scenes of embarkation. The last Aveek in May Avitncsscd the commence- ment of this sea-journey for the troops. More regiments had come up from Malta and Gallipoli, and a large fleet of transports Avas ready in the Bosphorus, between Pera and Scutari. There was a Avharf or landing-place at Scutari, surprisingly good in the eyes of the Turks, but rickety and inefficient in the estimation of those accustomed to the convenient piers and quays of Southampton and Portsmouth, of Marseilles and Toulon. Officers superintending the carriage of stores and equip- ments from the camp to the Avharf; sappers and miners busily engaged in fitting up horse-boxes on board the transports ; boatmen paddling about 94 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. in hundreds, conveying casks of water and barrels and packages of provisions; buffalo-carts making toilsome journeys to and fro between the elevated camp and barracks and the sea-shore; aids-de- camp galloping or walking hither and thither — • such was the busy scene, at which the Turks looked on with their wonted apathy. Some of the transports were despatched northward with stores only, while others were fitted up for the accommodation of troops. Mr Russell, an able correspondent of the Times, was in a position, even at so early a stage in the history of the war, to detect numberless defects in the organisation of the British military in the East — not in the willingness of officers and men to fulfil their duties bravely and efficiently, but in the preparations made by the home-authorities. In reference to some of these defects, he remarked in one of his letters : ' Who was the wise man who warned us in time of peace that we should pay dearly for shutting our eyes to the possibility of war, and who preached in vain to us about our want of baggage and pontoon-trains, and our locomotive deficiencies? No outlay, however Vaena. prodigal, can atone for the effects of a griping penuriousness ; and all the gold in the Treasury cannot produce at command those great qualities in administrative and executive departments which are the fruits of experience alone. A soldier, an artilleryman, cannot be created suddenly, no matter how profuse may be your expenditure in the attempt.' The miseries which resulted from imperfect administrative organisation, developed themselves still more forcibly as the war advanced. The same writer proceeded with his strictures thus : ' It would be a great national blessing if all our political economists [meaning, of course, economists who are politicians, for assuredly the. political economist is not necessarily a votary of frugality] could be caught and enlisted in this army at Scutari for a month or so, or even if they could be provided with temporary commissions, till they have had some practical knowledge of the results of their system.' This might be a correct reproof, if the arguments of the econo- mists, or the alleged 'griping penuriousness' of the parliament and the nation had brought below a proper level the amount of supplies furnished annually for the united services; but such has not been the case. The grants for the army, navy, and ordnance, taken collectively, during the thirty- eight years of peace from 1815 to 1853, were amply sufficient for the due development and maintenance of every arm of the service, had they been better distributed ; but wasteful extravagance and inju- dicious management in some departments dissi- pated the funds which might have provided all the necessities in others ; and thus, while new ships of war were being constantly built, and unused ships constantly rotting in the harbours, the supplies were squandered which should and could have provided all that was required in transports, gun-boats of light draught, pontoon-trains, baggage- trains, and other necessities of warfare. The tax- payers and the legislature have been amply liberal in these respects ; but the managers of the complex machine have not duly adjusted the several parts of which the machine consists. VARNA : PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA :— 1854. 95 To return to the embarkation for Varna. Sir George Brown and a few other officers preceded the troops, to superintend the arrangements for their landing. The light brigade, on the 29th of May, struck their tents with wonderful celerity, packed them on carts or arabas drawn by cattle, formed into order, marched down to the beach, and embarked in the vessels, some sailing and some steamers, prepared for their reception. The scene was full of animation. The 7th and 23d Fusileers, the Connaught Rangers, the rifle-brigade, the 33d, 77th, 19th— 6000 or 7000 men in all- embarked, and passed on their way up the beautiful Bosphorus towards Varna. Ten steamers and nine sailing-vessels thus received their living freights. Onward they went, between and amongst the numerous ca'iques, and in sight of the pretty villas and villages which deck the borders of the Bosphorus. Arrived at Varna, near which the Allied fleets were then stationed, the troops were assisted in their disembarkation by the ships' boats ; and when the month of June opened, the small British army was safely located on the shores of Bulgaria — that is, the portion of the army thus despatched from Scutari in the first instance. The steamers and transports returned to the Bosphorus for other consignments ; while further reinforcements were sent from Malta or from England without an intervening stoppage in the straits. The arrangements made at and around Varna comprised a temporary camp near the town ; another at Aladyn, nine or ten miles distant; and a third at Dcvno or Devna, eightoen or twenty miles inland from Varna. A few of the regiments stopped temporarily at Aladyn, while others marched up to Devna immediately on lauding. Omar Pacha had provided an immense number of horses, oxen, buffaloes, and carts, to assist in conveying stores and provisions from the shore to the camps ; and very speedily the roads were rendered full of life by the passage to and fro of hundreds of teams. The camp at Aladyn was fixed at a spot near a small lake ; but the water of the lake was impure — one of many minor troubles which the troops were called upon to bear as best they might. Provisions were moderately good and cheap at Varna, for the officers who had the means of making purchases ; but the troops depended on the commissariat, and knowing that many promised comforts, including London porter, had not yet made their appearance, the men were less satisfied than if no such promises had been made. The soldier's life on active service is affected by numberless contingencies, which necessity compels him to meet ; nevertheless, he feels more indignantly any privations duo to the want of skill or of attention on the part of his own government, than such as may be traced to actual collision with an enemy. One of the com- forts, almost necessities, of the commissariat at such a time was a supply of fresh vegetables, which the commissaries had much difficulty in procuring ; and another deficiency was in medi- cines and medical comforts, concerning which there was much confusion at Malta, Gallipoli, Scutari, and Varna. Busy with military proceedings was the whole vicinity of Varna. As regiments passed onward from that town to Aladyn and Devna, so did new comers take their places. Early in June, the Himalaya made one of her wonderful voyages — having brought a military load from Cork to Varna in twelve days, without detention at any intermediate port, without discomfort to the men, without injury to the horses. She brought three or four hundred men of the 5th Dragoon Guards, with all their horses : these being the first British cavalry which landed. The transport of cavalry is always one of the difficult achievements in the prosecution of war in a distant country — arising, in great part, from the susceptibility to injury on the part of the horses. Many horses belonging to the British cavalry were lost in the Black Sea, not so much in the passage to Varna, as in the passage from thence at a later date. Diversity of opinion has existed concerning the best mode of stowing cavalry horses on shipboard. One plan, exten- sively followed by Hull shipowners in their horse- trade with the Baltic, allows more room for each horse than the government plan ; but the trans- port officers assert that a plan adopted by the government is better fitted for cavalry horses during a long voyage. Whatever be the relative merits of the two phius, there were a few horses lost in the Black Sea by being placed on the upper- deck ; a storm came on, the poor animals broke loose, and were speedily washed overboard. The point, however, most conclusively proved was — the superiority of such a steamer as the Himalaya in providing a quick and easy passage for horses as well as men. When she arrived at Varna with the dragoons and their horses, the latter were landed by means of large boats, and a sort of stage built over two paddle-box boats lashed together ; they were lowered from the ship on this stage, and were towed to a short pier; here they were picketed for the night on a bit of turf close to the beach, and next day they set off to the inland camp. The horses were in such admirable condition, owing to the careful stalling and feeding they had enjoyed, that the military men were forcibly struck with the superiority over the ordi- nary arrangements. The dragoons, who were well pleased to see their horses thus treated, applied to the Himalaya the frolicsome designation of ' Her Majesty's floating mews.' Little did the troops expect, when landed at Varna, that seventeen weeks of detention awaited them. The delays already experienced had wearied the men, who now fully expected a resumption of active service ; but the middlo of September arrived before opportunity for such ser- vice presented itself. Under these circumstances, the salubrity of the place became a consideration 96 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. of more importance than had at first been supposed. Varna, Aladyn, and Devna, proved to be less favourable than the quarter-master's department had expected. The camp at Aladyn was on a hill, at the foot of which are meadows watered by a small fresh-water lake; and the Devna camp was also near a lake, which imparted something of picturesqueness to an otherwise wild scene ; but the hot days of June, July, and August, shewed that the lake and meadows were sources of much sickness and disaster. Varna itself, said one of the officers who was not well pleased with his quarters, 'is such a town as only could have been devised by a nomadic race aping the habits of civilised nations. If the lanes are not so painful to walk upon as those of Gallipoli — if they are not so crooked and inexplicable — if they are not so rugged and fantastically devious — it is only because nature has set the efforts of man at defiance, and has forbidden the Turk to make a town built upon a plain as unpleasant to peram- bulate as one founded on an irregular surface.' The town is built on a slightly elevated bank of Himalaya Steam-ship. sand, on the northern side of a semicircular bay, about a mile and a half in depth, and two miles across. The land is so low at the bottom of this semicircle, that the fresh waters from the neigh- bouring hills form a lake, which extends for some distance through the marshy lands and plains that run westward towards Shumla. General Canrobert, who had derived much experience from Algerine campaigning, expressed doubts when he visited the English camps concerning the salubrity of the spot, which seemed to him exposed to liability of malaria and its attendant agues and fevers. The sand-bank whereon Varna is built vai'ies so much in its elevation, that whereas in some places the base of the city-wall is twenty or thirty feet above the sea-level, at others it sinks to the level of high- water. This wall, about ten feet high, is of stone, loopholed ; and landward of it are some detached batteries, well provided Avith heavy guns. On the sea-face of the wall are two batteries of earthworks and fascines, and two heavy stone parapets and embrasures, all supplied with cannon of large calibre. As viewed from the sea, the town pre- sents a huge jumble behind the wall of red-tiled houses, speckled with mosques and minarets. Opposite the towii are three small wooden jetties ; while a portion of beach between the sea and the wall, a few yards in width, serves as a landing-place for boats and barges. When the Allies arrived, this beach was encumbered with tens of thousands of shot and shells, for artillery of all dimensions. And here, as at Gallipoli and Scutari, the Turks who Avere not actually engaged looked on in great Avonderment at the activity of their Avestern Allies. This characteristic, hoAvever, was less marked than it had been at the two places just named ; for Varna, being situated in Bulgaria, contains rela- tively few Turks, being chiefly those in some way employed by the government. The native inhabitants — Bulgarians of the Greek religion — are wholly a different race, and sympathise more readily with the Greeks of the south than AA r ith the Osmanli. VARNA : PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA :— 1854. 97 The troops having arrived in large number in Varna and its neighbourhood, the town speedily put on some such appearance as Gallipoli had presented when similarly invaded by the warriors from the West. The dealers wrote inscriptions on strips of gaudy-coloured calico, in English, French, Turkish, or Greek, and hung them up in front of their open stalls or shops, to denote that beer or spirits or other comforts were on sale within. Most of the shops, indeed, were windowless ; and in front of them were passing and repassing, loitering, chattering, bargaining, and purchasing, endless groups of Chasseurs, Zouaves, English military servants, interpreters, cantinieres, Greeks, Smyr- niotes, Italians, French, Turks, Bashi-Bazouks, and a motley group of dirty vagabonds, whose origin and country were not very apparent. Gallipoli and Scutari had been profitable places to hundreds of itinerant dealers; and when the regiments successively advanced from those towns to Varna, the dealers followed them, with the intent to open shop in that locality in the same primitive Style as before. Hams, pickles, tongues, brandy, biscuits, saddles, confectionary, wine, preserved soups and vegetables, crockery — all found their way to the open shops and bazaars at Varna. The costumes were as diverse as the wares and the languages : shakos, Highland bonnets, wide- awakes, turbans, fezzes, Guernsey-frocks, haver- sacks on officers' backs, jackets of all colours and shapes — all were to be seen in the busy streets of Varna; and an eye-witness speaks of 'a captain in a crack English regiment riding through the sally-port with a bottle protruding from his pocket, a haversack containing tea and sugar over his shoulder, and a large mat rolled up behind his saddle.' By the end of June, the neighbourhood of Varna had become one vast camp of 60,000 English, French, and Turks ; while 300 vessels lay at anchor in Kavarna Bay. ready to ship English troops from Varna, or French from Baltschik. When the news reached Varna that the siege of Silistria was raised, all hopes of sharing the honours of beating the Russians in that quarter were dissipated ; and officers and men began then to speculate on the probable future before them. The route which the Russians had taken in their retreat was quite unknown in Varna ; and to ascertain this import- ant fact, a few dragoons, under the Earl of Cardigan, made a galloping excursion towards the Danube and the Dobrudscha ; they ascertained that the Russians had crossed into Wallachia ; and they returned to Varna with a strong impression that the north-eastern part of Bulgaria is a wretched region for an army, in respect to rations, fodder, and encampment. What little the Cossacks had left, the Bashi-Bazouks had either plundered or destroyed. The earl, a few months afterwards, gave a vivd voce account of this expedition. ' I received orders to proceed with a body of cavalry to ascertain what had become of the Russian army ; for the siege of Silistria had been raised, and the commander-in-chief was totally ignorant whether the Russians were about to advance towards Varna and attack our position, or retreat towards their own country. You can easily imagine that this was a somewhat anxious undertaking, and one that required considerable caution. We might have come at any moment upon the Russian army or its outposts. We travelled over the country, which I may call a perfectly wild desert, for three hundred miles. My orders were to proceed as far as Trajan's Wall, on the confines of the Dobrudscha. We marched one hundred and twenty miles without ever seeing a human being, nor saw a single house in a state of repair or inhabited, and not an animal to be seen except those which inhabit the wildest regions. Having ascertained that the Russian army had retreated by Babadagh, and having given the information to the commander-in-chief by means of my aid-de-camp, Captain Maxse, I proceeded on a very interesting march, patroling along the banks of the Danube to Rustchuk and Silistria, and returned thence by that grand fortress Shumla.' * Prince Napoleon arrived at Varna in the third week in June, to take the command of one of the French divisions ; and transport-ships, laden with English and French troops, continued to cast anchor in the bay. The Duke of Cambridge at first fixed his quarters at Varna, but afterwards camped out near the men of his division. Early in July, Omar Pacha rode over from Shumla, inspected the Allied troops, and conferred with the English and French commanders concerning the future plans of campaign. Amongst the strange medley of soldiers, there was now an encampment of Bashi-Bazouks near Varna — varlets whose dirtiness and rascality rendered them unwelcome neighbours to the English and French camps, and whom it would be necessary to lick into shape before they joined the Turkish army. An Englishman, General Beatson, and an Algerine, General Yusuf, had undertaken the difficult task of taming these wild spirits. In respect to the Allies of the Turks, the French maintained their encampment principally at and near Varna; while the English Averc spread over the country to a distance of twenty miles .west or north-west of that town. The men became wearied. They had little to do ; no laurels to gain. As they possessed less of the dancing, singing, dramatic, and culinary tastes than their French companions, the English desired books and newspapers to read ; but these desiderata were supplied very scantily. The officers became careless in their attire ; Sir George Brown waged war against their beards and moustaches; Lord Raglan reproved them for the shooting-jackets and wide-awakes they wore in private ; and when this matter was remedied, he issued a further order relating to the undress- uniform itself : ' The sword may be worn, the * Speech at the Mansion House, February 6, 1S55. 98 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. jacket may be tlie regimental jacket, and the cap may be tbe uniform forage-cap ; but such want of care is shewn in wearing the uniform in a becoming manner, that it is difficult to recognise the officers in some cases as officers at all. The shell-jacket is allowed to fly open, shewiug under- neath a red flannel-shirt, with nothing round the neck, not even a white shirt-collar. Often a turban is worn over the forage-cap ; the chin unshaven ; and there is an absence of what is befitting the appearance of an officer in the whole person.' How like the reproof which a group of idle boys might have called down upon themselves ! Officers and men were insufficiently employed ; they had few amusements j the weather was hot ; and hence came a languor which rendered them careless of personal appearance. Towards the close of July, consequent on a council of war between the commanders, a portion of the French army broke up its encampment, and moved northward towards the Dobrudscha. Some of the officers, too, took ship on a short exploratory voyage towards the Crimea ; and portions of the naval squadron arrived with news picked up on the shores of Circassia. In August, the soldiers began to be employed occasionally in making gabions, fascines, sand-bags, and other military requirements for a siege ; and whispers spread about the camp that something would shortly be attempted in the Crimea, where the Russians had one of their strongest arsenals. Some of the officers had, indeed, approached so near this arsenal, Sebastopol, as to be enabled to count the guns in the formidable fortress. The two armies now began to receive their siege-trains of heavy guns, which remained on shipboard until required ; stores arrived in enormous quantity ; and vessels of all kinds assembled in the bay. Great, indeed, was the excitement attending the expected move- ment of 80,000 soldiers, to which number the Allies now amounted. It is necessary here to notice the plans of the Allies in respect to Gallipoli, Constantinople, Varna, and the Crimea. That the Allies did not, in the first instance, meditate an advance upon Russian territory, is evident. The original plan was entirely defensive, under the apprehension that Turkey was placed in great and immediate peril. The minister who had the conduct of the various diplomatic negotiations throughout the war, on the part of England, him- self acknowledged this. In the autumn, while the army was yet at Varna, the Earl of Clarendon spoke as follows : — ' Little more than four months ago, it was the universal opinion — I do not mean the opinion of Her Majesty's government, but of the most able and experienced military officers in England and France — that Russia meditated a war of further aggression. Nobody believed, with the great forces she had in position on the north of the Danube, with all the efforts she had made, and with all the mass of materiel she had accumu- lated, that she did not intend to march south of the Danube. Although we did full credit to the known bravery of the Turks, we could not bring ourselves to believe that they would be able to resist the great numerical superiority of well- disciplined troops, under experienced generals, to whom they were opposed — more especially, too, as the only Turkish general of whom we had know- ledge by name was Omar Pacha, who, however well established his reputation may be now, had not then had the opportunity since afforded to him of achieving for himself a lasting renown. My lords, so much were we convinced of this, that Sir J. Burgoyne and an experienced French officer of engineers were sent to Constantinople, in order to devise the means of defending that city and the Dardanelles ; and so much importance was attached to this mission, and so entirely was the whole plan of the campaign supposed to be con- nected with it, that the departure of Lord Raglan and General St Arnaud was delayed, in order that they might have personal communications with a view to that special object. The Allied armies then went to Gallipoli, where great works were thrown up. They then went to Constantinople, still having this necessity of defence in view ; and upon their arrival there, were received with the greatest enthusiasm, and imparted new vigour and courage to the Turks. The commanders of the two armies went to Varna to meet Omar Pacha ; and he entreated that a large portion of the Allied forces might come to Varna, knowing well how great would be the moral effect of such a movement on the part of the Allied troops. The Russians made then every exertion to take Silistria before the arrival of these troops, and that fortress was heroically defended by the Turks. The arrival of the Allied army was made useful to them, and, as your lordships are aware, the siege was raised ; the Russian army recrossed the Danube, the most part of the Dobrudscha was evacuated, and all thoughts of offensive operations on the part of Russia were at an end. The Allied armies are therefore now ready, and have, perhaps, already commenced more important operations.' * ' This course of policy was further elucidated by the English government at a later date, through the instrumentality of the Sebastopol Committee. The Duke of Newcastle, being asked at what period the expedition to the Crimea was determined on, replied : ' We received by telegraph on the 27th of June the intelligence that the siege of Silistria had been raised. On the following day, a mail left this country for Constantinople. I wrote privately to Lord Raglan, informing him that he would receive by the next mail official instructions to prepare for an expedition to the Crimea and to besiege Sebastopol, as I was about to prepare a dispatch to that effect to be submitted to the cabinet.' His Grace had previously written to Lord Raglan, on the 10th of April, a dispatch which pressed upon the commander the necessity for * Speech in the House of Lords, August 10, 1854. VARNA : PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA :— 1854. 99 making careful and secret inquiries into the condi- tion and amount of the Russian army in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of Sebas- topol, as in the event of the Russians making any further movement, it might become essential that operations of an offensive character should be undertaken. No blow could be struck at the southern extremity of the Russian Empire which would tend more to the conclusion of a solid and satisfactory peace, than the taking of Sebastopol and the destruction of the Russian fleet. It recommended Lord Raglan to ascertain whether during the previous few months the works of the fortress had been materially strengthened on the land-side : Captain Drummond having reported on the sea-defences. The dispatch requested his lordship to make himself acquainted with the facilities for landing troops upon any part of the coast between KafFa and Eupatoria ; he was also requested to ascertain, if possible, the number of troops in the Crimea — reported to be 30,000 — and how they were distributed ; and as it was stated that the water for the town was derived from a source eight miles off, it was important and advisable to ascertain that fact. The amount of provision for the garrison and the town was also an important point to be ascertained if possible ; and as the siege-train could not arrive for three or four weeks, the dispatch urged upon the general in command the necessity of using the interval to obtain the required information. Such was the tenor of a dispatch which, written a few days after the declaration of war, certainly shewed that the Avar- minister was alive to the importance of obtaining correct information respecting Sebastopol and the Crimea. The Duke of Newcastle also read to the committee a dispatch, dated 29th June, two days after the government had received information of the raising of the siege of Silistria. After referring to the dispatch of the 10th of April, it stated that the gallant and successful resistance of the Turkish army had compelled the Russian army to raise the siege of Silistria, and it was expected they would evacuate the Principalities ; consequently the safety of Constantinople was for the time secured. No further advance of the Allied army could on any account be contem- plated, as to occupy the Dohrudscha would be dangerous to the health of the troops ; and Lord Raglan was desired to concert measui"es for under- taking the siege of Sebastopol, unless he should be in possession of information unknown to the government, and which, in his opinion, left no reasonable prospect of success in the undertaking. If he should be of opinion that the united strength of the armies was insufficient for the purpose, he was not precluded from exercising that discretion which had been originally intrusted to him, although the government was of opinion that the difficulties in the way of the siege of Sebastopol were of a nature more likely to be increased than diminished by delay. As the communications by sea were in the hands of the Allies, it was of importance to cut off the communication between the Crimea and the rest of the Russian dominions which object would be obtained by the occupation of Perekop, if a sufficient number of the Turkish army could be spared, and assisting them with English and French officers to advise them ; and that, as Captain Drummond had recommended, vessels of a light draught of water should be obtained, if possible, to prevent the passage of troops from the Sea of Azof. The dispatch, after noticing the importance of selecting favourable weather for a descent upon the coast of the Crimea, referred to the Russian fortifications on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, and observed that the reduction of Anapa and Soudjuk Kale would be, next to the capture of Sebastopol, of the greatest importance ; but their fall was of less consequence than that of the other place, as the reduction of Sebastopol would in all probability immediately lead to their surrender. In the event of delay being necessary, the dispatch invited Lord Raglan to consider with Marshal St Arnaud whether the Turkish army could not be made available to interrupt the march of the Russian army. After expressing reliance that Lord Raglan would not expose the army to unnecessary risk, the dispatch concluded by observing, at the same time, that it was to the gallantry of the troops under his command that the country was looking to secure the results of a just war, for the vindi- cation of national honour, and the restoration of peace in Europe. It further appeared, from information supplied to the Committee by Mr Sidney Herbert, at that time secretary at war, that the primary instructions given to Lord Raglan had been to defend Gallipoli and the Dardanelles from any threatened attack by the Russians, as a consequence of an inland march via Adrianople ; that in case of any advance of the enemy short of that place, he was to defend the line of the Balkan, from Varna and other points ; that he was advised, at the same time, to collect all possible information concerning Sebas- topol and the Crimea ; that when, on the 29th of June, the expedition to the Crimea was determined on by the government, Lord Cathcart was sent out with a reinforcement of troops ; and that a speedy coup de main, rather than a long campaign, was contemplated in the Crimea. Thus much, then, in respect to the views of one of the two Allied powers ; and it may be inferred that, as an accompaniment or rather a preliminary to effective joint action, the other ally formed plans based on corresponding considera- tions. At various periods during the Russo- Turkish war, the views of the imperial govern- ment were made public through the columns of the Monitcur. Such was the case in respect to the motives of the Allies in advancing from Varna to the Crimea in September 1854. In two long papers, which may be regarded as semi-official French documents, the policy of this advance was defended — at a time when the public mind was 100 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. agitated by unsatisfactory news from the East. The Kussians having raised the siege of Silistria, and re-crossed the Danube, the position of the Allies was thus touched upon in the documents in question : — ' What could the united generals do at Varna after the retreat of the Russian army ? Were they to remain in an inactivity which would have led to discourage- ment, and from which the prestige of our flag would inevitahly have suffered? Neither military honour nor political interests allowed the commander-in-chief to take such a position. Once on this great theatre, inaction was out of the question : it was necessary to act, to shew our object to the troops, to compel the enemy to fear us, to excite the ambition of Europe to follow us, by arousing its admiration and respect. It was then only that a landing in the Crimea was mooted. An expedition against Sebastopol might hasten the de'nouement of the war. It had a determined and limited object ; it might place in the hands of the Allies a province and a stronghold which, once conquered, would be a pledge and a means of exchange to obtain peace. It was under the influence of those considera- tions that the commanders-in-chief conceived the idea and decreed the execution of the plan. This expedition having been examined at Paris and London as an eventuality, the Marshal St Arnaud received then, not the instructions— they could not be given at such a distance — but the following advice : — " To obtain exact information of the strength of the Eussian forces in the Crimea ; if not too con- siderable, to land at a spot which might serve as a basis for operations. Theodosia (now Kaffa) appeared the most eligible spot ; although that point of the coast has the disadvantage of being distant forty leagues from Sebastopol, it nevertheless offers great advantages. First, its bay is vast and safe ; it would hold all the vessels of the squadron and the vessels with provisions for the troops. Secondly, once estab- lished on that point, it might be made a real basis for operations. In thus occupying the eastern point of the Crimea, all the reinforcements coming by the Sea of Azof and the Caucasus could be cut off. A gradual advance could be made towards the centre of the country, taking advantage of all its resources. Simferopol, the strategic centre of the peninsula, would be occupied. An advance would then be made on Sebastopol, and probably a great battle fought on that road. If lost, a retreat in good order on Kaffa, and nothing is compro- mised ; if gained, to besiege Sebastopol, to invest it completely, and its surrender would follow as a matter of course in a short interval." ' The Allied generals and admirals, it is fully evident, had very insufficient knowledge of the territory which was to be attacked. ' It may have been the misfortune, but it is also the defence of the government in the conduct of this campaign, that it had no access to extraordinary or secret sources of information. We were compelled to send our fleets to seas which had never been navigated by our ships of war — to land our troops where no soldier of Western Europe had trodden since the Crusades. The Russian government is in full possession of all the advantages of secrecy and absolute power, which had long since built an impassable barrier round the vast resources of the empire. A disposition existed to underrate the power of a state whose springs of action are diametrically opposed to our own ; and the first events of the war heightened this disregard of the strength of Russia into absolute contempt of the troops and generals who had failed to force the hues of Kalafat or the outworks of Silistria ; and, by the same rule, the power of the Ottoman Empire Avas exaggerated and enhanced by its partial successes.' * Partially informed of plans which they were bound to keep secret, if such were possible, the Allied generals and admirals conferred and debated, examined and calculated, without communicating definite arrangements to those under them ; and thus it happened that, during June, July, and August, the armies and fleets were held in torment- ing suspense, ready to enter on active duty, but ignorant when and where that duty would present itself. In June, rumours went from tent to tent, from camp to camp, that an advance would soon be made to Silistria ; but when the rumours died away without further result, officers and men fell back to their enforced but unwelcome idleness. Mrs Young — one of a small number of officers' wives who tasted camp-life at Gallipoli and Varna before the advance of the troops to the Crimea — has given a lively description of this sort of life under its more pleasant aspects, free from the stern disasters and miseries which had afterwards to be encountered. Arriving at Varna from Con- stantinople in the Caradoc, she had to search her Avay as best she might through the town to the spot where her husband's regiment was encamped, two miles distant ; surmounting many difficulties occasioned by her ignorance of the Turkish lan- guage, and threading her route between the tents of a French camp. At last reaching the place, ' There,' she says, ' was our little tent, half-covered with the well-known mat ; our servant, revelling in green-wood smoke, as usual, in the rear ; there were the ponies, and the charger, and the mule ; the packsaddles and the towels drying on the bushes ; the red flag of the colonel's tent ; and the band playing pleasantly as the men wound back by the side of the lake after their morning's parade. One feature, however, was quite new, and a very pretty one it was : the tents were everywhere interspersed with bowers of green leaves. The soldiers had been employed in cutting branches from the trees that clothed the hillsides ; and long poles, borrowed from the commissariat stores, being forced into the ground, light boughs were arched over them, secured with strong twine ; and on these, all the leafy twigs that could be found were heaped in abundance. Nearly every officer had a bower ; and while kept green by continual relays of leaves, nothing could be more agreeable than these retreats ; their fresh coolness, and the admission of air they permitted, forming such a delicious relief to the heat and want of circulation of air, from which, after seven in the * Edinburgh. Review, No. CCV. VARNA : PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA :— 1854. 101 morning, we suffered so terribly in the bell-tents. My first demand was for a bower ; and in about three hours, with the aid of a strong fatigue-party, I had one that was quite the pride of the camp. Then a charming little oval deal-table, the top of which closed like a draught-board, was set therein ; a bullock-trunk and a hamper for chairs ; and in this green drawing-room we breakfasted, wrote, and received our visitors. Being in the East, we felt little hesitation in asking our friends to subside on what formed our Turkey carpet.' * This holiday tone was not of long continuance at the camp. Many a soldier's letter reached home from Varna, as from Gallipoli, complaining of deficient rations or camp discomforts. One writer compares the English and French arrangements in many particulars ; and in the course of his observa- tions he says : ' The Zouaves are armed with rifles, and I suspect know how to use them pretty well. One of the best articles of their equipment is the water-bottle. Ours is a heavy, lumbering wooden thing, fit to carry beer for haymakers, which chafes the leg on the march, and interferes with the handling of the musket, and makes a man cover at Interior of an Officer's Tent at Varna. least four inches more ground ; theirs is made of metal, covered with cloth, fitting to the body, and by the curving way it is adjusted, is no impediment to the man. Their commissariat and staff are better able, by their experience, to carry out the intentions of their government than ours are. Notwithstanding all that is said in the newspapers and elsewhere about the liberality of the govern- ment, our men get no tea or groceries of any sort, and those in the town are too dear fur them to buy. The officers, of course, can carry a small supply of things about with them from place to place ; but the men can do nothing of the kind, and suffer a good deal if they do not get their breakfast and supper.' The writer comments on the * Our Camp in Turkey, p. 1G7. tailoring achievements of our army authorities, and proceeds : ' Our tents are much better than those of the French, but wc must pitch them exactly in a straight line, regardless of ants' nests, furze-bushes, or steep inclines. In this, and in many other cases, real utility and the comfort of the men are disregarded, for the purpose of satisfying an absurd craving for an unattainable uniformity. So about whiskers and moustaches. God gives one man red whiskers, and another black ; some can grow moustaches, and some cannot ; so, do what we will, wc cannot make ourselves exactly, or even nearly alike; nor does the reasoning, which proves the necessity of a uniform system of clothing, apply at all to whiskers and beards.' In numerous other letters which reached the public eye, and of the authenticity of which there is no reason to 102 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. doubt, the writers complained sometimes of the quality of the food, sometimes of its deficient quan- tity, hut more frequently of the irksome idleness in a foreign land during the hot season. "When, at a later period in the history of the war, the Duke of Cambridge communicated the results of his experience at Varna, he adduced an instance of the clumsy mode in which the book- keeping arrangements of the commissariat were managed at that place — not irrational, perhaps, in relation to the quiet everyday proceedings at home during a time of peace, but unsuited to the exigencies of war. 'The system,' said his royal highness, 'is exceedingly inconvenient, throwing difficulties in every one's way instead of removing them. I will give an instarice of that which occurred at Varna soon after we landed. My division had gone on to Aladyn, but I remained behind for a few days, as the ammunition-horses had not been duly equipped, and I had my own tents. A company was left in charge, and I was of course anxious that the men should be properly rationed, and I therefore desired their officer to get rations from the head-quarter commissariat. The first day I sent, although the men were in want of their daily rations, instead of sending those rations at once, the commissariat sent a printed form to the officer for him to fill up. Hence there was considerable delay; and then, not satisfied with that, the officer was supposed to have put down one or two more horses than he was entitled to. Instead of sending the rations for the men, and pointing out the inaccuracy in the return of horses, they would send no rations at all because the form was wrong. Upon that the officer came to me, and I desired him to go with his animals to get the rations, and put matters to rights ; and he did then get them that day, although very late. As it turned out, the commissariat officer was wrong, and there was no mistake in the return at all. I think that is a mode of proceeding quite preposterous.' * Preposterous it certainly was; and to such formalism was due the loss of many valuable lives, not only of horses, but of men, during the war ; nevertheless, the actual amount of blame deserved by the commissariat officers must depend on the stringency of the rules imposed upon them by their superiors. In respect both to the supply of rations to the men and fodder to the horses, and to the conveyance of provisions and stores, the commissariat was ill provided ; the officers of that department reached Varna only a few days before the troops themselves ; and hence they were called upon to effect a month's work in a weekj under circumstances of much difficulty. i Seldom, perhaps, has an army been more embar- rassed for means of locomotion than the English at Varna. The troops were frequently compelled to submit to scanty food, because the commissariat was deficient in means of transport; and the possibility * Evidence before the Sebastopol Committee. of an advance towards Silistria, to assist Omar Pacha against the Russians, was rendered doubtful on the same grounds. The evidence collected many months afterwards by the Sebastopol Com- mittee was conclusive on this point. Captain Wrottesley, who was sent to Varna to superintend the construction of wharfs for landing the horses, gave evidence, of which the following is a summary. "When the troops arrived at Varna, there was a great want of means of transport. It was the chief difficulty the English engineers had to contend with ; the French sappers brought their own horses from France ; while to convey wood for the wharfs, the English engineers, after sending a requisition to the quarter -master- general's department, whence another requisition went to the commissariat, had to depend on the native arabas. Thus, though the French, who were building wharfs at the same time, often worked with less skill as workmen, the English engineers were so unfavourably circumstanced, that they were beaten from not having the same means of transport. Five hundred bullock- wagons were sent down to Varna by Omar Pacha, being all he could spare from his own army ; but when they arrived, there were no arrangements for organising them ; the drivers were not regularly fed or paid, and gradually they all ran away. There was an absolute want of horses, although officers were then in Syria and Spain purchasing them. A few fine mules were obtained, but they were vicious brutes, quite unused to harness. No horse fit for the shafts of an army-carriage constructed for English horses could be obtained. The ambu- lance-carts sent out could not be used, for there were no means of drawing them. If a Turkish horse were placed in a cart built for the English standard, the shafts would be on a level with his backbone ; few horses of the country exceeded eleven hands in height. The medicine-chests of the army were all too large ; they were used as tables, and would dine four persons very comfort- ably, but they could not be carried by mules. The engineers were ordered to make smaller ones. Captain Wrottesley further stated that the siege- train of artillery was not landed at Varna at all, because it was sent out from England without the means of traction. It was the opinion of this officer that the commissariat ought not to be charged with the transport of the army. Over- whelmed on the one hand with applications for food and forage, and on the other with applications for means of conveyance, the officers broke down in spite of their best exertions. Military authorities estimate that an army of 53,000 men requires 16,000 draught-horses and baggage-mules, together with 9000 commissariat mules for its due service ; that is, nearly half as many horses and mules as men. In this ratio, the British army at Varna should have possessed more than double the number of animals which was actually available ; for 25,000 men, they had about 5000 animals, instead of 12,000. Sir C. Trevelyan, VARNA : PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA :— 1854. 103 secretary to the Treasury, was at that time at the head of the commissariat department ; and from his replies to a series of questions, it will be seen how lame was the organisation — each official placing blame on the shoulders of others, rather than bearing the burden himself. ' Did you ever form in this country a scheme founded on this calculation, of what amount of transport is required to move an army of 25,000 men in the field ? — It was not necessary for us to do so. It is the business of the commissary-general to form the estab- lishment required to move the army. Our system is to draw on the resources of the country to the utmost extent, and to send from home only what the country will not supply. Then, on this side, you never originated any plan, knowing the probable operations before Mr Filder could have known them, by which the commissariat could have provided sufficient transport for the army to have been fed? — We placed at his disposal the only means that could be provided — ample funds, and authority to purchase the means of land-transport in the country : this Mr Filder did to the extent of his ability ; besides which, we sent from Spain and Malta what was required. But you never formed any calculation here? — That was not our duty ; it is the duty of the commissary- general, an experienced officer, acting under the general commanding, and possessed of full information, not only from treatises, but from his long experience, to determine what amount of transport is required for the army, and to provide that amount from all the resources the country can afford. Then, here you had no general scheme ? — That was not our duty.' * That the English could not, if they had wished, assist the Turks at Silistria, has been shewn by a most competent authority, General Sir de Lacy Evans, who in his evidence said : ' When the Russians crossed the Danube, Omar Pacha applied for assistance ; and the answer was, that the army had not the means of transport, which ought to have been provided long before. I think the government was still waiting for notes and pro- tocols from Vienna, and no great exertions were made to put the army in a condition to move ; for delay from this cause, of course, the commissariat department was not responsible. The Russians were carrying on the siege of Silistria, and still the army was not in readiness to move. Even eighteen miles from Varna there was the greatest difficulty in getting provisions ; we had to send to Varna for them ; and such was the state of confusion there, that a train of one hundred arabas would come back from the town without any supplies. At that time the deficient personnel of the com- missariat was severely felt. Having been applied to, I lent one hundred non-commissioned officers and privates to help it; and on application to Lord Raglan, two volunteer officers were allowed to be detached to assist the commissariat, and he found great advantage from it.' The Duke of Newcastle — at that time responsible in England for the management of the war — appears, from the evidence given before the Committee, to * Evidence before the Sebastopol Committee. have been unaware of the fact that the army had insufficient means of transport. Without actually disputing the opinions of Captain Wrottesley and General Evans, he still thought that Lord Raglan and Mr Commissary Filder might, between them, have effected all that was necessary. No one wrote home to him officially to say that aught was wrong, and hence he inferred that all was right. His Grace spoke of the 'official reasons' which he had for believing that the unfavourable reports must have been erroneous — his reasons being, the non- receipt of official confirmation of those reports. The duke was at that time at issue with the Admiralty, concerning the proper superintending power over the commissariat; indeed, there were three current theories on the subject, advocating respectively the Treasury, the War-office, and the Admiralty, as the department to which the com- missariat should look up for orders. The experience of everyday life will enable any one to compre- hend that such conflicting views must necessarily have weakened the efficiency of the protege thus trebly protected. When the commissariat-officers at Varna were harassed by applications to which they could not adequately respond, and hurt by censures which they had not justly incurred, it was right that an eye-witness should say a word or two in their defence. The Times correspondent at that place wrote: 'A commissariat-officer is not made in a day, nor can the most lavish expenditure effect the work of years, or atone for the want of experience. The hardest-working Treasury-clerk — and, I must say, they all evince the greatest zeal and most untiring diligence in the discharge of their duties — has necessarily much to learn ere he can become an efficient commissariat-officer in a country which our old campaigners declare to be the most difficult they ever were in for procuring supplies. Let those who have any recollections of Chobliam, just imagine that famous encampment to be placed about ten miles from the sea, in the midst of a country utterly deserted by the inhabitants, the railways from London stopped up, the supplies by cart or wagon cut off, corn scarcely procurable, carriages impossible, and the only communication between the camp and port carried on by means of buffalo and bullock arabas, travelling about one and a half mile an hour — and they will he able to form some faint idea of the difficulties of getting the requisite necessaries out here. Besides, here we are absolutely at war — obliged to carry enormous masses of ammunition, as well as tents and tent-equipage, provisions for the men, medical stores, all the various articles and means for cooking, &c, through a country Avhich, to all intents and purposes, is held by enemies [in so far as the Bulgarians hate the Turks]. To give a notion of the requirements of such a body as this army of 25,000 men in the field, I may observe that it was stated to me on good authority the other day, that not less than 13,000 horses and mules would be required for the conveyance of 104 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. baggage and stores. About twelve o'clock to-day, just as all the officers were making preparations for their start to-morrow morning, orders were received countermanding those which had been issued for the march of the division ; and it may- be inferred, that the difficulties of which I was just writing when the aid-de-camp arrived have been found to be insuperable, and that the commissariat has not been able to provide the means of convey- ance for the stores, either of Sir George Brown's or of the Duke of Cambridge's division. To continue my remarks on the nature of these difficulties : I may observe, that not only is it a work of time, labour, and money to find the horses, mules, and buffaloes, bullock and araba carts, required for our march, but that when we get them Ave cannot keep them. Buffalo and bullock carts and their drivers vanish into thin air in the space of a night. A Bulgarian is a human being after all.' Again, the same well-informed writer wrote on another occasion : ' The report in the camp is, that the commissariat declared themselves unable to comply with the requisitions for moving the division, and that therefore we do not move to-morrow, or probably the next day. I regret very much to have to state, that for several days last week there was neither rice, nor sugar, nor preserved potatoes, nor tea, nor any substitute for these articles issued to the men ; they had, therefore, to make their breakfast simply on ration brown bread and water. After breakfast, they were paraded and exercised for an hour or two in the hot sun — on one occasion, for more than four hours — and the result has been that illness increased rapidly. The dinners of the men, as long as the want of rice continued, consisted of lean ration-beef boiled in water, and eaten with brown bread, without any seasoning to flavour it. The supplies ran out, and it was no fault of the commissariat that they did so. Who was to blame, I don't pretend to say.' No one, it is remarked by the same authority, unacquainted with the actual requirements of an army, can form an adequate notion of the various duties which devolve upon an English commissariat-officer, or of the enormous quantity of stores required for the daily use of men and horses. In the middle of July, when most of the troops in the English army were quartered at distances varying from ten to twenty miles from Varna, there were required daily for the men, 27,000 pounds of bread, 27,000 pounds of meat, besides rice, tea, coffee, sugar, &c. ; and for the horses, 110,000 pounds of corn, chopped straw, &c. Besides being responsible for the supply of these immense quantities, the commissa- riat-officers were burdened, by the strange organ- isation of the service, with the duty of providing horses, carts, saddles, tents, and interpreters. In addition to other reasons why the army could not have advanced to Silistria, little or no water is to be found on the first thirty miles of road from Varna; and the commissariat had neither vessels to contain water, carts to bear the vessels, nor horses to draw the carts. It is difficult to over- estimate the amount of loss and suffering incurred by the British army in the East through the deficiency in means of transport. Stern calamity of another kind visited the troops at Varna as the heats of summer approached — calamity more serious than mere irregularity in supplies. Disease and death visited the camps. Strategical reasons having mainly determined the selection of Varna as a military position, the health of the place was not the first consideration. Nevertheless, this important matter had not been wholly forgotten by the authorities. The Duke of Newcastle sent out orders to inquire into the sanitary condition of the town and neighbourhood before the troops were removed thither ; and he depended on the commander-in-chief and the commissary-general for the due fulfilment of this duty. Omar Pacha, when appealed to for his advice, said : ' If you disembark at Varna, by keeping clear of the lake of Devna, and encamping on the heights to the south of the town, you will find a healthy situation, surrounded by abundance of good water, with a fine climate to restore the men and horses after their sea-voyage; and the barrack in the town can be made use of as an hospital, if necessary.' Some of the troops were encamped close to the lake, contrary, in this respect alone, to Omar Pacha's advice ; and it is possible that sickness may have been thereby occasioned. In the middle of June, slight sickness appeared in the camp, but not to such an extent as to induce anxiety. AVhen the next following month brought an increase of heat, however, the dreaded cholera accompanied it ; and then, indeed, did the officei's feel solicitude for themselves and their men. The French were attacked more severely than the English, and the Turks and Egyptians more severely than either. Numerous officers, being placed on the sick-list, returned home when able so to do. All the romance of expectant warfare was dissipated when July heat, heavy storms, vermin, and disease attacked the camp. Mrs Young, in spite of her womanly endeavours to lessen rather than increase troubles, felt and Avrote despondingly. ' The dews became very heavy, rain Avas common, and our storms of thunder and lightning were more frequent and more violent. To imagine anything more wretched than our tents noAV became, Avas scarcely possible. They had no time to dry under the hot sun before the rain recommenced ; so that the atmosphere strongly resembled that which woidd be enjoyed by hanging a room round with wet linen, lighting a large fire therein, and spending the first half- hour on a stool in the centre, one's feet supported on a wet sponge ; and if the reader Avill oblige me by trying to realise this idea, a very tolerable notion will be formed of our indoor comforts in the camp at Varna. Outside, matters were still more deplorable. The mud was of the kind adhesive ; it clung about one Avith the tenacity of old prejudices ; shaking it off Avas out of the VARNA: PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA :— 1854. 105 question. How the servants managed at all, I have no idea, sliding and sinking in all this weary mire ; and how the tough old fowl, or the morsel of mutton, was ever boiled in the dirty water, or brought to us in that smutty pan, day by day, remains quite an open question.' * But the sickness was a more grave concern. It became necessary to convey one of the invalided officers from Devna to Varna. ' Now, it will seem extraordinary, no doubt, that an army should have been sent to Turkey, liable to all sorts of accidents, even if not actually employed in the field, and yet that no carriage for the sick was provided. Yet such was abso- lutely the case ; and a poor officer from Devna with a broken limb had been sent jolting in an araba only a few days before, to the intense suffering, as may be supposed, of the unfortunate patient.' Arrived at Varna, our authoress, after infinite trouble, succeeded in procuring quarters for a sick officer, and found the town filled with people of all nations, in a frightful state of heat and disease, and overrun with vermin. As the still hotter month of August approached, sickness increased at the camp. Many were afflicted with cholera ; nearly all with diarrhoea. Scarcity of numerous comforts, and even neces- saries, led the men to eat and drink too abundantly of such articles as were within reach, especially apricots ; and thus the evil was augmented. When the general hospital at Varna became filled with as many sick soldiers as it could possibly accommodate, temporary hospitals were established in the neighbouring villages ; and the surgeons became overburdened with their daily labours. The Duke of Cambridge was among the officers attacked with illness. The Light Division, when visited by cholera, moved on to Monastir, eight or ten miles beyond Devna, in the hope of finding a more salubrious place for encampment. The First Division had to bear the attacks, not only of cholera, but also of typhus ; and the Third Division, encamped near Varna, was like- wise severely visited. It became mournful work for the men to bury their dead companions by dozens and scores, and added to the causes of dissatisfaction at the position in which they were placed. It was upon the French, however, that the dread disease fell with the greatest severity ; they sank under it at the rate of sixty or eighty per diem. A portion of their army, under General Canrobert, had advanced from Varna to the margin of the Dobrudscha ; to these were added 2500 Zouaves, who went by sea from Varna to Kustendji ; and these hapless troops, passing through a marsh where the Russians had left dead men and horses, were swept off by whole com- panies. Canrobert left nearly 3000 of his poor fellows dead in that wretched district. In the midst of the tragedy, the French general issued a sympathising address to the troops, commending highly their endurance and devotion. * Our Camp in Turkey, p. 251. The hospital at Varna became a terrible place. It had been a barrack, and seems to have retained a certain amount of insalubrity from its occupation by the Turks — never a cleanly people when assem- bled in masses. The French, distrusting the place in cholera-time, abandoned it, and established tent- hospitals in the fields for their poor sick comrades. Had this condition of affairs remained many weeks longer, the armies would have become nearly disorganised : officers were wearied and discontented; the men were reckless; the surgeons and the commissariat were worked almost beyond endurance. Great, therefore, was the joy when the end of August brought the end of cholera, and the announcement of a speedy and certain expedi- tion to the Crimea, there to encounter hand to hand those Russians of whom so much had been said and so little seen. The French generals are more prone to the issue of proclamations and manifestoes than the English, and their soldiers appear to derive exhilaration therefrom. Nothing could be more striking than the contrast between the documents put forth by Raglan and St Arnaud on the eve of de- parture for that expedition which was destined to be fatal to both of these commanders : the one, plain, short, and business-like; the other, glowing and dazzling. The following was one among many: — ' Soldiers ! — You have just given fine examples of perseverance, calmness, and energy, in the midst of painful circumstances which must now be forgotten. The hour is come to fight and to conquer. The enemy did not wait for us on the Danube. His columns, demoralised and destroyed by disease, are painfully retiring. It is Providence, perhaps, that has wished to spare us the trial of these unhealthy countries; it is Providence, also, which calls us into the Crimea, a country as healthy as our own, and to Sebastopol, the seat of Russian power, within whose walls we go to seek together the pledge of peace, and of our return to our homes. The enterprise is grand, and worthy of you. You will realise it by the aid of the most for- midable military and naval force that has ever been seen collected. The Allied fleets, with their 3000 cannons, and their 25,000 brave seamen, your emulators and your companions-in-arms, will bear to the shores of the Crimea an English army, whose high courage your forefathers learned to respect ; a chosen division of those Ottoman soldiers who have just approved themselves in your eyes ; and a French army, which I have the right and the pride to call the elite of our whole army. I see in this more than pledges of success. I see in it success itself. Generals, commanders of corps, officers of all arms, you will partake of the confidence with which my mind is filled, and will impart it to your soldiers. We shall soon salute the three united flags floating together on the ramparts of Sebastopol with our national cry, " Vive VEmpereur!" A. de St Arnaud. Head-quarters, Varna, August 25.' The enthusiasm of the French was further aroused by the following proclamation, sent to them about the same time, by the Emperor: — ' Soldiers and Sailors of the Army of the East! — You have not fought, but already you have obtained a signal success. Your presence, and that of the English troops, have sufficed to compel the enemy to recross the Danube, and the Russian vessels remain 106 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. ingloriously in their ports. You have not yet fought, and already you have struggled courageously against death. A scourge, fatal though transitory, has not arrested your ardour. France, and the sovereign whom she has chosen, cannot witness without deep emotion, or without making every effort to give assistance to such energy and such sacrifices. The First Consul said, in 1797, in a proclamation to his army : " The first quality required in a soldier, is the power of supporting fatigues and privations. Courage is only a secondary one." The first you are now displaying. Who can deny you the possession of the second? Therefore it is that your enemies, dis- seminated from Finland to the Caucasus, are seeking anxiously to discover the point upon which France and England will direct their attacks, which they foresee will he decisive ; for right, justice, and warlike inspiration are on our side. Already, Bomarsund and 2000 prisoners have just fallen into our power. Soldiers ! you will follow the example of the army of Egypt. The conquerors of the Pyramids and Mont Thabor had, like you, to contend against warlike soldiers and against disease ; hut, in spite of pestilence and the efforts of three armies, they returned with honour to their country. Soldiers ! have confidence in your General-in-chief and in me. I am watching over you, and I hope, with the assistance of God, soon to see a diminution of your sufferings and an increase of your glory. Soldiers ! farewell, till we meet again. Napoleon.' Busy, indeed, were the armies during the last ■week in August and the first in September, pre- paring, with the aid of the Allied fleets, one of the most formidable armaments ever sent forth. Ships in almost countless number were assembled in the Bay of Varna, and off the coast for many miles north and south of that harbour; while every available kind of vehicle and animal of draught or burden was brought into requisition to convey baggage, stores, and camp-equipments of every kind, down to the beach. It was a time of intense excitement for all. THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA: 1854. As a necessary condition of perspicacity in the narrative, the proceedings of the Allied armies have been traced without interruption by naval details. The present, however, is a convenient point at which to narrate the proceedings of the English and French fleets in the Straits and in the Black Sea. The mighty war-ships were about to take part in the struggle which was to engage the attention of the armies; the seamen were to share with the soldiers the honour accruing from any hoped for victories in the Crimea. The armies, as we have seen, had spent more than six months in a kind of negative position. The first regiments left England in February; they did not quit Varna for the Crimea until September had arrived ; and in the intervening period of thirty weeks, they had been wearied with detention at Malta, detention at Gallipoli, detention at Scutari, and still more lengthened detention at Varna — hoping almost against hope, and striving to keep up their spirits by forming images of future glory. We have now to see how far the fleets were called upon to share in this forced inaction. The two principal seas of Europe, the Mediter- ranean and the Baltic, are differently circumstanced in respect to the maritime powers. England and France always maintain fleets in the Mediter- ranean : never in the Baltic, unless special service is required. The Mediterranean is so all-impor- tant ; it is a highway for so large and valuable a commerce ; it is an outlet for the produce of so many fertile countries ; it contains the outlying portions of the dominions of so many sovereigns ; it is a region so jealously watched by those sovereigns, lest any one of their numbe^ should acquire too much power in it — that several nations are willing to bear the charge of main- taining fleets on its bosom. England is interested in the Mediterranean, on account of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, and the highway to India through Egypt ; France is called upon to maintain free intercourse between her mainland, Corsica, and Algeria ; Spain is washed along her southern coast by this sea, and derives thence a large proportion of her commerce ; the Italian states are dependent on this sea for all their maritime influence, such as it may be ; Austria touches salt water only at the Adriatic, the most northerly bend of the Mediterranean ; Turkey, with her former provinces of Greece and Egypt, is especially a Mediterranean power ; while Russia has ever sought to increase her influence in this important sea. Frequent, though incidental, mention has been made in former chapters of the English and French fleets in Turkish waters, touching the delicate negotiations concerning Russo-Turkish affairs. Threats that those fleets would approach Constantinople, alternated with invitations that they might do so, according to the varying tone of politics. Admirals were recalled, and replaced by others ; ships were sent home, to be superseded by others of newer build ; but England and France never ceased to have fleets in the Mediterranean, anchored at spots which, though not giving umbrage to other powers, might yet be near enough to enforce the decisions of the two cabinets on any important question connected with the policy of the East. Admiral Dundas, or, more precisely, Vice-admiral J. W. D. Dundas — there being two other admirals of the same name in the Royal Navy at that time — commanded the British fleet in the Mediter- ranean during the earlier stages of the war. About the middle of the year 1853, when war was becoming almost inevitable between Russia and Turkey, he moved towards the Dardanelles. Three months earlier, at the time when the Menchikoff mission was agitating Constantinople, Admiral Dundas was with his fleet at Malta ; Colonel Rose, in the absence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, called up the fleet to protect Turkey against the designs of Russia ; but the admiral THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA :— 1854. 107 did not feel himself justified in responding to this summons without instructions from the govern- ment at home. At a later time, however, when the political clouds further darkened, delay was no longer admissible ; and the admiral received orders, on the 8th of June, to proceed from Malta to Besika Bay, there to place himself under the guidance of the British ambassador. This bay, situated near the mouth of the Dardanelles, was considered to be sufficiently near Constantinople to enable the fleet to render aid in case of urgency. There the admiral remained about five months, until, on the 30th of October, he received orders to advance to the Bosphorus. In the Constantinopo- litan waters two months more of detention awaited him ; until at length, in the beginning of 1854 — after the tragedy at Sinope had driven the Allied govern- ments to the adoption of something like a definite policy — officers and men were alike delighted by an order to advance to the Black Sea, yearning, as they had been, to exchange listless inaction for enterprise and possible glory. It is to this period, and this region, that the Earl of Carlisle's Diary chiefly relates ; the attempts to 'kill time' on board the ships ; the impatient desire for change to active service ; the pleasure-trips up and down the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles ; the visitings and dinner-parties between the officers of the English and French fleets — all are depicted by the earl ; and they suffice to shew that the last six months of 1853 were months of complete inaction on the part of the Allied fleets, at a time when Turkey, driven into war by the intolerable aggres- sion of Russia, was bravely fighting her own cause on the banks of the Danube. At that time, our admirals possessed as little trustworthy knowledge of the strength of the Russian fleets, as our generals of that of the Russian armies. Admiral Dundas received from the Admiralty a rough outline of the supposed state of the czar's fleet in the Black Sea ; but neither this outline, nor the information possessed by the British ambassador at Constantinople, was very definite. The French fleet, which throughout the second half of the year 1853, had been anchored in near proximity to the British, was equally destitute of authentic details concerning the naval resources of Russia. The first day of the New Year found the Allied fleets busily preparing in Beicos Bay for more active service. This bay is in the Bosphorus, on the eastern or Asiatic side, about midway between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea ; whereas Besika Bay, where the fleets had previously anchored, is a little south of the Dardanelles ; the distance between the two bays being about 180 miles. On the 4th of January 1854, the fleets entered the Black Sea. Among the principal English men-of-war were the Britannia, Albion, Jupiter, Vengeance, Sanspareil, Rodney, Bcllerophon, Trafalgar, Agamemnon, London, Queen, and Terrible; while the French sent out the Bayard, Ville de Paris, Jena, Henri IV, Valmy, Friedland, Charlemagne, Descartes, &c. The most important of these vessels were steamers ; and in this respect the Black Sea in 1854 introduced a new era in the history of naval warfare. A signal was hoisted on the flag-ship — 'Turks are to be protected from all aggression by sea or land ! ' This was the first formal declaration that the Allies would employ the force of arms against Russia, if necessary. The fleet, joined by a Turkish flotilla, bent round eastward, and coasted Asia Minor towards Sinope. The sight here was miserable. Although many weeks had elapsed since the Russian attack, mutilated bodies were still lying about the beach ; several hundreds had been covered with earth, but again uncovered by ferocious dogs and vultures. The town was nearly destroyed ; the beach was covered with masts and spars; the tops of sunken ships appeared in the water; and the wretched inhabitants of the few remaining houses were nearly in a starving state. On the 8th, the Agamemnon, Sanspareil, Charle- magne, Terrible, Mogador, Sampson, and Descartes, were ordered to get up steam, and to escort several Turkish vessels, containing powder and stores, to Trebizond and Batoum — Turkish ports on the southern and south-eastern shores of the Black Sea. This done, they returned to Sinope. England and France not being yet at war, the admirals were not authorised to attack Russian ships ; they were to defend Turkey and Turks from Russian attacks; and in the performance of this duty, they shielded the six Turkish steamers appointed to convey munitions of war to Turkish ports on the Black Sea. It was small work, however, for such fine ships. Sir Edmund Lyons' 91 -gun screw-steamer Agamemnon, the Sanspareil screw of 71, and such like noble vessels, were powerful forces for such a service. Rumours Avere afloat that a Russian squadron of four line-of-battle ships and four steamers had been seen off Batoum ; the Allies loaded and shotted all their guns in readiness ; but no Russians appeared, to the evident disappointment of those who would willingly have had a brush with the czar's ships. It was, however, ascertained, that three Russian steamers had been off the coast three days before the Allies arrived, trying the range of their guns at some of the Turkish forts; hence it may be inferred, that the Allies exerted a preventive, if not an active influence, by appearing in this quarter as defenders of the Turks. The fleets returned to the Bosphorus after this short expedition, and resumed their course of inaction, not being empowered by the home authorities to make any active demonstrations against Russia. One event mortified the officers and sailors exceedingly. The Russians succeeded in capturing some Turkish coal-vessels, in spite of the proximity of the English and French fleets. The Vladimir, a Russian frigate, was painted like an Austrian vessel, and exhibited the Austrian number for the Ferdinando Primo ; it approached three Turkish vessels; the Turks regarded it as 108 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. belonging to a friendly power ; but the mask was speedily thrown off, and the ships taken. The captured crews were put on board the smallest vessel, and allowed to return home ; while the other two ships, with the captains, were carried off to a Russian port. This achievement by Captain Bougatoff was a bold one — to elude twenty-four sail of the line, and to cany off two trading-vessels; it greatly elated the Russians, and equally mortified and irritated the Allies, who felt humbled in the eyes of the Turks by such an event. The coal-ships here referred to had taken in their cargoes at Heraclea. The mines near this place became of considerable importance to the Allies, considering the large number of steam-ships employed by them in and near the Black Sea. When the news of the actual declaration of war by England and France reached Constantinople, coal at that place was 65s. per ton ; the coal-ships from England had not now back-freight in corn ; hence a price was charged for the coal which would cover the expense of a double voyage. It was at that time that the attention of the admirals was drawn towards the Heraclea coal-fields, where the seams were worked by Croats, Montenegrins, Bosnians, and other workmen drawn from the quarries near Constantinople ; the coal, when dug, was carried in baskets from the mines to the surface by labourers from the neighbouring villages ; and from thence it was transported to the coast by mules. The whole operations were conducted in the rudest and most primitive manner ; but when a few English engineers were sent to superintend the workings, the system underwent improvement. It was in consequence of a visit to these mines bj r the officers of the Spitfire steamer, that the arrangement was made, mentioned in a former page, whereby the Allies might obtain coal at about 20s. per ton. A certain district was ceded by the Porte, at a specified rental, to be worked by English skill and capital, for the benefit both of the English and the French steam-fleets. Many difficulties, however, occurred in the carrying out of this plan. So much in its infancy is commercial enterprise in Turkey, that any attempt to conduct large enterprises on European principles encounters many obstacles. Early in March, Admiral Dundas despatched Captain Jones, in the Sampson, on a reconnoiter- ing cruise along the coasts of Anatolia, Georgia, Circassia, and the Crimea, from which he returned to Beicos Bay about the 18th of the month ; and soon after the Allied fleets left the Bosphorus, and took up a position in Kavarna Bay, a portion of the Black Sea a little northward of Varna. An earlier removal to this position had been contemplated, but the steamers had been delayed by reason of a difficulty in obtaining coal — the arrangements at Heraclea being yet very incomplete. The fleets at that time comprised ten English and eight French line-of-battle ships, with six English and six French steamers of smaller size ; other additions were made afterwards. The Russian coasts of the Black Sea, at the commencement of the war, were very little known to the English and French admirals ; the jealousy between the various powers having restricted the facilities for the entrance of ships of war into that sea. The Russian portion of this coast commenced at the easternmost extremity of the sea, marked by Fort St Nikolai'a, near which, on the Turkish border, is Batoum. This point is about 330 miles eastward of Sinope. From thence the Russians held all the coast to the Sea of Azof, the entrance ■to which is formed by the Straits of Yenikale or Kertch ; then, all the coast of the Crimea ; and, lastly, the north-western coast of the Black Sea, from Perekop past Kherson and Odessa to the mouths of the Danube. Silently and indefati- gably had the czars built fort after fort along this extensive line of coast ; and it became essentially necessary, on the breaking out of war, that the Allies should know something con- cerning the number and strength of these posts. At that period, the chief of the forts eastward of the Crimea was at Anapa, distant a few miles from the Straits of Yenikale'. This important fortress, originally constructed by the Turks to protect their commerce with the tribes of the Caucasus, had been afterwards converted by the Russians into a strong military position. Com- mercially, it is of little account, for the harbour is open to every wind, and can only be used in the fine season. The western chain of the Caucasus commences at Anapa ; and this was practically the eastern limit of Russian power on that sea ; for the Circassians laid claim to all the coast, and the Russians have never succeeded in establishing any first-class forts beyond Anapa. The forts further east have always been isolated ; the gai-risons being in danger of annihilation if they left the protection of stone walls. At a short distance from the coast are mountains and forests, among which the Circassians and other ti-ibes find a home ; the Russians have seldom yet been left by these tribes in quiet possession of the north-east shores of the Black Sea. At the period of the commencement of the war, the first Russian fort eastward of Anapa was Soudjuk Kale* (Sudjuk Kaleh), defended by three redoubts; it was at this place that a Russian squadron captured the British ship Vixen, causing thereby great diplomatic excite- ment in 1837. Next to this was Ghelendjik (Gelendshik), possessing a fine and safe harbour, and regarded by the Russians as a place of much importance : a flotilla being there located, to watch the movements of the Circassians. A few miles further east is the Bay of Pchiat, at the entrance of which the Russians built a fort in 1837. Numerous little bays then occur, fringed with villages, the inhabitants of which have succeeded in repelling all hostile attacks of the Russians. After passing Kavakinskoi and Gagri, there were presented Pozunda and Bomborai in Abasia ; and then Soucoum Kale (Suchum Kaleh), possessing one of the best bays on this part of the coast. At the THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA :— 1854. 109 mouth of the small river Ingour was Fort Anaklia. Redout Kale" and Poti, at the mouths of two other small rivers, were also provided with Russian forts. The last Russian fort was at St Nikolai'a, near the boundary between the ancient provinces of Mingrelia and Gouriel. The Russian forts, from the Straits of Yenikale to the Turkish frontier, were about sixteen in number. During the summer, many a cruise was made to these Circassian coasts, first as a matter of recon- naissance, but after the declaration of war, as a means of conquest or destruction. Fort after fort was visited, and the exact state of all ascertained. Dotting the coast at intervals of ten or twenty miles apart, these forts were found to present a general family-likeness : they were mostly situated at the mouths of small mountain rivers, so as to command the valleys through which these streams find their way to the sea. The country intervening between the forts is for the most part hilly and rugged, matted with impenetrable forests. The forts were found to be mostly constructed of sand- stone, brought from Kertch ; they were square, loopholed for musketry, provided Avith towers at the angles, and mounted with a few large traversing- guns, with a mortar or two in the centre ; the walls were somewhat lofty, to frustrate escalade by the Circassians. Each fort had a garrison of 500 to 1000 men, living in wooden barracks. A strong stockade on the outside enclosed a few outhouses, a small vegetable garden, and a small number of cattle and horses. If, on the one hand, the Russians commanded the whole coast by means of gun-boats cruising from fort to fort, they were, on the other hand, restricted entirely to the coast ; for even in an expedition of a few miles in search of fodder, it was necessary that the troops should sally out in battle-array, lest they should be cut oft" by the Circassians. Most of these forts were blown up by the Russians, after removal of the garrisons, to prevent capture by the Allies. When Sir Edmund Lyons was engaged on one of these expeditions in May, he allowed the officers to go on shore to inspect the blown-up fort at Gagri, situated at the mouth of a deep gorge. The place had evidently been evacuated in a hurry; for the ordnance stores were strewed about, including thirteen guns, several 10-inch mortars and howitzers, iron-balls to be fired from the mortars, shells, and canister-shot. The fort Avas square, with bastions at the angles ; and there Avas a block-house at some distance from it up the valley, to command the passage. At another spot, the voluntary destruction took place under the very eyes of the Allies. Sir Edmund Lyons, Avith the Agamemnon, Charlemagne, Highflyer, Sampson, and Mogador, appeared off Redout Kale on the 19th of May ; he saAV Russian officers on the parapet of the fort, and Cossacks galloping at full speed from the beach toAvards the toAvn ; he sent a flag of truce, demanding the immediate evacua- tion of the place. The Russians remitted an evasive answer, to gain time ; and just before the ships Avere about to open fire, masses of smoke began to ascend from the toAvn — the Russians had fired it. The conflagration became very striking ; houses and trees burned together during the Avhole night ; and fierce flames and lurid smoke illuminated the 110 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. decks of the ships. Kedout Kale was the most important of all the Russian forts between Anapa and the Turkish frontier ; it was on the Georgian coast, commanding the communication between Tiflis and the Black Sea ; and was the place of landing for- many of the troops of the Russian army of Asia. Redout Kale, or what remained of it, was handed over to the keeping of the Turks as soon as their Allies had frightened the Russians from it; the Turks proceeded immediately to repair some of the fortifications ; while the Sampson, under Captain Jones, remained in the harbour as a protection. About the middle of March, just before the actual declaration of war, but when war was inevitable, the Emperor Nicholas had ordered the abandonment of all the forts, except the three of greatest importance — namely, Anapa, Soudjuk Kale, and Redout Kale; and thus it arose that the forced evacuation of the last named was regarded as important by the Allies. Sir Edmund Lyons, in the course of this expedition, examined the Straits of Yenikale, opening into the important Sea of Azof ; but the result of his examination was to deter him from any immediate operations in that quarter, owing to the shallowness of the water. One of his ships grounded in water marked ' deep ' on the Russian charts, and was with difficulty set afloat again ; this, and many other events during the war, induced a belief in some quarters, that the Russian authorities had purposely sanctioned the dissemination of erroneous charts, so as to entrap their enemies. Viewed in relation to the immediate necessities of the Turks, the east end of the Black Sea was regarded by the Allies as of more importance than the northern coast ; and it was on this account that one or two ships of war remained for several weeks off Redout Kale. Nor was the precaution superfluous ; for the Russians, in June, returned to the place from the heart of Georgia, and would perhaps have besieged it but for the presence of a couple of formidable war-steamers. The English officers were glad to have something definite to employ them ; but the swampy region, in a hot season, occasioned much visitation of ague. The officers of the Sampson were one day agreeably surprised by the appearance of that much-coveted luxury — London porter ; a commodity little to be expected then at Redout Kale, in the midst of the confused nationalities of Russians, Turks, Circassians, and Georgians. It appeared, from investigations subsequently made, that a French trading-vessel, laden with London porter and other commodities, had entered Kertch about the time of the declaration of war, but was not allowed to land her cargo ; she then tried Soucoum Kale", where, by a manoeuvre not altogether creditable, a native chieftain contrived to possess himself of the bottled luxury without paying for it. Ulti- mately, the beverage was offered to Captain Jones as a free gift ; but he insisted upon pay- ing for it, at the legitimate London prices of eightpence and fourpence per bottle, according to the size. Before tracing the naval operations of the Allies in other parts of the Black Sea, during the spring and summer of 1854, it may be desirable to notice how far, and in what manner, the Turks were enabled to take part in these operations, by aiding those Allies who had come to aid them. The Turkish fleet underwent a re-organisation soon after 1770, in which year the Turks had received a signal defeat from the Russians in the Gulf of Tchesme. Hassan Ghazi, the commander of the principal Turkish ship in that engagement, was one of the few survivors ; he was appointed Capudan Pacha, or chief admiral, by Sultan Mustapha, and immediately commenced a reform of the Turkish navy. The duty of the fleet, up to that time, had been chiefly to make summer trips to the different pachaliks, to collect the tribute payable by the pachas to the sultan ; and, in a smaller degree, to hunt down the pirates in the Greek waters. The ships were heavy, unmanage- able, and slow. Subsequent to the battle " of Tchesme, Hassan caused lighter ships to be built, but was unable to effect reform in armament, stores, or crews. After him, another naval reformer appeared, in the person of Kutchuk Hussein Pacha. Appointed Capudan Pacha by Sultan Selim, he sent to France and Sweden for skilful shipwrights ; adopted the terms employed in the French naval service ; established, or rather re-organised, a mathematical school for marine officers and engineers ; subjected the crews to repeated and strict disciplinary exercises ; felled immense quantities of ship-building timber in the vast forests in the southern chain of the Taurus ; and in six years built twenty sail-of-the-line at Constantinople, Sinope, and Rhodes. The French traveller, D' Olivier, who visited Turkey during the reign of Selim, found an efficient fleet of about forty war-ships, mostly constructed by Kutchuk Hussein. Speaking of the state of things which had existed shortly before, he said : ' Ships of war were not long since fitted up in such a manner, that each Turk had his berth, and everything necessary for his cooking and other arrangements. The between- decks were so encumbered, that it was frequently very difficult to make use of the great guns, and the Mussulmans might receive several broad- sides from the enemy before they were in a condition to repel an attack. The guns them- selves were of different calibres, and served without order or preparation ; the shot which were brought for loading the cannon, were frequently either too large or too small — rendering a ship of great power unable to cope with one much smaller.' Of the sailors he observed : ' The Turks, in general, are not fond of the sea. They cannot conform to the active life which a seaman is obliged to lead ; they cannot accustom themselves to the privations which that profession entails. THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA :— 1854. Ill They commonly prefer making use of the Greeks, who display in this line, as in every other, an intelligence and an activity of which the Turks are incapable. The Greeks manoeuvre tolerably well, and conduct their little vessels with much skill in the seas with which they are acquainted ; but they have not the smallest theory of naviga- tion : almost all of them navigate without a compass, steer only by their knowledge of the mountains and coasts, bear up for every wind that blows somewhat strongly, and wait for fine weather in the nearest port.' * In short, the navi- gation of ancient times was retained even in modern days. The period to which D'Olivier's description relates was about 1798. Soon after this, many improvements were made. The Turks introduced order into their ships, kept the spaces 'tween-decks more clear, acquired more skill in gunnery, and organised the daily duty with more intelligence. The sailors were Turks of the maritime villages, or Greeks of the Archipelago, and received regular pay ; the marines were all Mussulmans, who received pay only so long as their ship was in commission. The Greek sailors were intrusted with the working of the ships : the Mussulmans with the defence. In certain state exigencies, the sultan had the power to summon merchant-ships and merchant-seamen to his service. After the death of Hussein Pacha, the improvements were checked, and the Turkish navy fell again into a very depressed and inefficient state. During the first quarter of the present century, the fleet was weak ; the disastrous battle of JNTavarino, on October 20, 1827, nearly annihilated it ; and the establishment of the independent kingdom of Greece, deprived the Porte of the aid of Greek sailors from the Morea and its islands. The Turkish navy had to be created almost anew. This duty was intrusted by Sultan Mahmoud to Tahir Pacha, the grand-admiral ; he, being a clever and earnest man, worked sedulously at his task, and in ten years raised Turkey to an honourable rank among the second-rate maritime powers. In 1840, during the contest between the sultan and his rebellious vassal Mehemet Ali of Egypt, the Turkish admiral, Achmet Fezir Pacha, treachei*- ously betrayed his fleet into the hands of Mehemet ; but a restitution was subsequently made. The steam navy, which had been commenced in 1837, made rapid progress between 1840-50 ; and all the elements of a naval armament received steady improvement. At the time of the breaking out of the war in 1853, the Turkish navy comprised two 3-deckers of 120 to 130 guns ; two of 74 to 90 guns ; ten sailing-frigates, of 40 to 60 guns ; six corvettes, of 22 to 20 guns ; fourteen brigs, of 12 to 20 guns ; sixteen schooners and cutters, of 4 to 12 guns ; six steam-frigates, of 450 to 800 horse-power ; and twelve steam-vessels of smaller dimensions — making a total of about seventy vessels. * Voyage dans VEmpirc Ottoman, VEgyptc, ct la rcrso. The navy was under a Capudan Pacha, or grand- admiral, assisted by an Admiralty ; and the general organisation of the fleet bore a resemblance to that of the fleets of the Western Powers — except in this, that the crews Avere divided into com- panies, analogous to the military companies of a regiment of the line. The sailors were about 34,000 ; the marines, 4000 ; and in the bravery of the men, and the construction and management of the ships, the Ottoman navy had attained a creditable position. The sanguinary but cowardly attack by the Russians at Sinope weakened the Turkish navy and exasperated the Turks. In the subsequent naval operations in the Black Sea, the Turkish ships seldom acted alone, but usually formed com- ponent elements in the Allied fleets. Sometimes the English officers and seamen looked down with a little contempt on their Ottoman allies ; but there is no proof that this was justifiable, for the Turks shewed themselves ever ready to bear their share of enterprise and danger. During the early part of the year 1854, the Turkish fleet was not applied to much use by the Allied admirals ; but on the 4th of May, it left Constantinople for the Black Sea, after a long detention in the Bay of Buyukdere. It was a fine fleet of 22 ships, comprising one first-rate of 124 guns, the Mahmoudie ; three of 104 guns ; two of 90 ; two of 84 ; and one of 74. One of the 84-gun ships, the Techrifie, was commanded by an Englishman, who had been many years in the Turkish service — Admiral Slade, under his Oriental designation of Mouchavir Pacha. The fleet also comprised three laige frigates, two brigs, and seven or eight steamers. The fleet was inspected before its departure by Mehemet, the Capudan Pacha. Admiral Slade, combining his experience as an English naval-officer with his knowledge of Turks and Turkey, was a valuable coadjutor in the fleet. This fleet, after conference with the Allied admirals, was bound for the Circassian coast, to aid in those operations already described. It appears, however, that little as the English and French fleets effected in the Black Sea during that year, the Turks were permitted hardly any share even in that little. A correspondent at Constantinople of one of the journals, writing in August, thus commented on the matter: 'With all deference to nautical men, it may be allowed to regret that this squadron, strong in the number and size of its vessels, and in, at least, the valour and determination of its crews, was not turned to a better use during its last visit to the Black Sea. To hear the contemptuous manner in which the English officers have spoken of it, and of the necessity of keeping it quiet for fear of its impeding the operations of the Allies, one would think that a succession of Trafalgars had occupied the last few months, and that these inexpert Mussulmans had been condemned to Baltschik Bay that they might not interfere with the activity and brilliancy of our own operations. But where nothing is 112 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. done, the Turk stands as high as his supercilious critics. No doubt the Ottoman sailors, though capable of obstinate resistance in a fight like that of Sinope, are not sufficiently skilful for elaborate evolutions ; still, they might have been made more serviceable than they were during their two months in harbour, where they died of starvation and scurvy, and were as useless as if they had remained within the Bosphorus The unhappy Turks were left, without money or neces- saries, to starve in the sight of plenty, and perish with disease close to crews in perfect health. They saw provisions bought up and taken to the Allied fleet, while they had nothing but their wretched allowances ; they became demoralised and dispirited, and out of their moderate squadron they lost 1000 men.' The Turks had, indeed, no great reason to be delighted with their Allies, who failed to come to their aid during the critical exigencies of the Danubian campaign and the siege of Silistria, and neglected their willing and well-meant co-operation in naval matters. It is now time to trace the small achievements of the great fleets — for in such terms they must in candour be characterised — in the western half of the Black Sea, during the spring and summer of 1854. The news of the declaration of war reached the combined fleets at Varna on the 9th of April, and immediately threw officers and men into a state of heroic excitement. They felt ready to attack the Russians anywhere, everywhere ; and impatiently waited for orders to that effect from their com- manders. Already, besides the preliminary expe- ditions to the Circassian coast, there had been a few hasty trips to the neighbourhood of the Crimea and Odessa, intended as a means of picking up a little information concerning the strength of the Russian land and sea forces in those quarters ; but an English consul remained at Odessa so long as hostilities had not actually commenced. When, however, the news of the declaration of war arrived, the steamer Furious Avas despatched from Varna to Odessa to bring away the consul. With a flag of truce flying at her mast-head, she anchored in the bay, and sent off a boat, also carrying a flag of truce. A delay in obtaining an answer induced the lieutenant in command of the boat to return towards the steamer ; but no sooner did he do so, than the Russians opened a fire from the batteries; five or six shots were aimed, but fortunately none hit the boat. This breach of all the rules of honourable warfare aroused much indignation in the fleet, which immediately advanced, and anchored before Odessa on the 20th of April. An explanation was demanded of General ■ Osten- Sacken, military commander of Odessa. The general had before this date written to Admiral Dundas, expressing his surprise at the report that a British flag of truce had been fired upon ; stating that the boat had not been fired upon at all, and that the batteries had only opened upon the Furious when she came with hostile intention within range of the guns. To this letter the admirals returned the following reply from the fleet before Odessa on the 21st : — ' Sir — Inasmuch as the letter of your Excellency, dated the 14th of April, which has only reached us this morning, only sets forth erroneous statements to justify the indescribable aggression committed by the authorities of Odessa iipon one of our frigates and her boat, both carrying a flag of truce ; Inasmuch as, notwithstanding this flag, the batteries of the town fired several shots on the frigate, as well as on the boat, at the moment when this boat was leaving the quay of the mole, to which it had repaired with confidence ; The two Vice-admirals commanding the combined squadrons of France and England think themselves entitled to demand a reparation from your Excellency. Consequently, all the British, French, and Russian vessels now at anchor near the citadel, or the batteries of Odessa, must forthwith be delivered up to the combined squadrons. If, at sunset, the two Vice-admirals have received no answer, or a negative answer, to this communication, they will be compelled to resort to force to avenge the flag of one of the combined squadrons for the affront offered to it; although the interests of humanity induce them to adopt this alternative with regret, and they cast the responsibility of such an act on those to whom it belongs. Hamelin, Vice-admiral. D. Dundas, Vice-admiral.' No adequate response to this demand having been received, the admirals prepared to bombard Odessa. The celebrated commercial seaport thus about to be placed in peril, is situated at the north- west extremity of the Black Sea, about 125 miles north-cast of the Sulina mouth of the Danube, and 200 miles north-west of Sebastopol. It is at the head of a small inlet, called the Bay of Adschai. When, in 1791, the Empress Catherine obtained from the Turks possession of the district around this spot, Odessa was a mere village, passing under the name of Kodschabeg. Intensely desirous as Russia had long been of obtaining a good seaport on the Black Sea, Catherine immediately began to give effect to this wish by converting the humble Kodschabeg into the imperial Odessa. She employed several regiments in digging the foundation, and in constructing public works. The site was well chosen; for although there is no river, the bay is deep even close inshore, and is rarely frozen except in intense winters. The work steadily progressed, and Alexander completed what Catherine had begun : he appointed the Due de Richelieu, a French emigrant nobleman, governor ; and under the duke's auspices the town and port rapidly acquired importance. At first inhabited only by a few Greek families, its popu- lation rose to 15,000 in 1S04; and in 1854, the inhabitants probably numbered 100,000. The town is regularly built in the form of an oblong parallelogram, on a declivity sloping towards the sea. The harbour, formed by two large moles, and defended by strong works, will accommodate 200 vessels. Near it, are a citadel, a quarantine THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA :— 1854. 113 harbour, a light-house, and the Admiralty port ; and facing the centre of the harbour are extensive barracks. The streets of the city are broad, and well paved ; the houses of stone, and generally two stories in height. The sea-front, on either side of the harbour, is adorned with several magnificent houses, belonging to Prince Woronzoff, the highest officials, and the rich merchants; and a splendid walk or boulevard, planted with rows of trees, and occupying a broad space between the houses and the cliff, is a favourite spot for promenaders. A flight of steps — one of the finest in Europe — leads up from the beach to the cliff; and the city contains many pleasant squares and colonnades. Com- mercially considered, Odessa is by far the most important town in Southern Russia; its exports of corn, tallow, wool, and other articles of domestic produce, are very large ; and it is the entrepdt of extensive stores of European manufactures for Russian use. In the few years immediately pre- ceding the war, Odessa sent out 1500 laden ships annually. One who knew the town well, has thus described Odessa and its inhabitants as they ap- peared in 1853: c Odessa is a very peculiar town, in M nana ■ JU Odessa. which nearly every nation in Europe is represented. Through this variety in the population, it bears a great resemblance to Tiflis, except that here the confusion of peoples is still more confounded, and is more visible, through the publicity of living in the East. In Tiflis, too, the Asiatic element is more fully represented; while in Odessa, Europeans are most numerous. Odessa is certainly a Russian commercial town ; but it possesses the Russian character in so slight a degree, that it can hardly be considered so. The number of actual Russians is in no proportion to that of Greeks, Italians, and Germans. The military, and swarms of officials, are alone Russian ; but even among the latter there are many non-Russians, principally French and German. Odessa possesses something obtained from nearly every part of Europe. Externally, and principally in public life, in the Opera, and buildings, we recognise the South European town, with a prominent Italian character. The shops of the first class are imitations of the French; but they do not equal them in elegance, though their owners are principally Frenchmen. The artisan class, as nearly through the whole of Russia, is German ; German gardeners from the adjacent districts supply the market with vegetables. Although society is generally regulated after the French model, and that language is principally spoken, still a yearning for English manners may be traced. This is very evident in the clubs. The cause may be found in the circumstance, that Prince Woronzoff was educated in, and always displays a preference for the customs of, that country.' * But Odessa, like all other showy Russian towns, loses its attraction immediately beyond the barriers : ' It can scarcely be credited that a town, which is entirely dependent on the interior provinces, and has grown rich through their produce, has done nothing at all to facilitate the mode of communication for the poorer inha- bitants of New Russia and Bessarabia. As far as I am aware, the streets of Odessa are only * Koch. The Crimea ; with a Visit to Odessa. 114 COMMENCEMENT OP HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. macadamised, but not paved ; and even this road- way ceases after the barrier is passed. As long as it is good weather, and the ground is dry, all goes well, for it is quick travelling on the illimitable steppe; but wo to the traveller who is compelled to proceed into the interior of the country during a rainy season! Bottomless roads prevent his progress for days.' Such is the Russian port which, towards the close of April, was bombarded by the Allied fleets. It appears that, immediately after the firing upon the flag of truce, Osten-Sacken, apprehending that serious consequences would follow, issued a procla- mation to the inhabitants, advising or ordering them to remove into the interior. Immediately on the approach of the Allied fleets being observed, he sent off telegraphic messages to St Petersburg and to Sebastopol, and prepared for resistance. After a few merchant vessels had been captured, twelve war-steamers opened fire on Odessa on the 22d ; and in a few hours destroyed the fortifications, the batteries, and the military stores; blew up two powder-magazines ; sank several ships of war ; and carried off about a dozen ships laden with munitions of war. No attempt was made to capture or destroy the town, or to injure the commercial harbour and the merchant shipping which it contained ; nevertheless, many of the principal buildings, including the Woronzoff palace, were destroyed, the steeples of many of the churches, and nearly all the windows in the town were broken. Odessa had been strengthened, in the early part of the year, by seven batteries, mounting altogether about fifty guns; and these batteries kept up a brisk fire during the ten hours the bombardment lasted, but with little injury to the Allies. The Russians suffered much more considerably; about 200 were killed, and a much larger number wounded. The Terrible fired red- hot shot, which worked great destruction. The bombardment was commenced by the Sampson, Furious, Vauban, and Mogador, which were joined about two hours afterwards by the Tiger, Terrible, Retribution, Arethusa, and three or four French steamers. The dockyard, fired by 24-pounder rockets, remained burning for two days and nights, the flames consuming all the ships and stores. 'Why spare Odessa?' was a question frequently asked in England, when the news of this bombard- ment arrived. The admirals had issued orders to spare the town, the people, and the commercial harbour and shipping, as much as possible, aiming the shot and shells and rockets so as to destroy the government works and property. Probably, this course of proceeding Avas in accordance with instructions from home, and a sentiment of humanity may possibly have suggested it ; but forbearance in time of war is not always humane in its results. The fleets made no lodgment, main- tained no blockade, at Odessa ; they departed the next day towards the coast of the Crimea. The inhabitants of Odessa, scarcely crediting the fact that they were to be thus released, set energeti- cally to work in restoring the defences, and strengthening the town ; and the Allies afterwards suffered severely from the resources which the Russians were enabled to obtain by making Odessa a depot. It is in this enlarged sense that the policy of having spared Odessa may be questioned. Shortly after this event, the Tiger, Vesuvius, and Niger, were detached from the Allied fleets, and ordered to reconnoitre Odessa, concerning which the admirals appear to have remained in some anxiety. A dense fog speedily led to the separa- tion of the three ships ; and on the evening of the 12th of May, at about six o'clock, the Tiger ran aground, four or five miles from Odessa, near a light-house, and under a high cliff. The crew imme- diately got out her boats, laid the anchor astern, and lightened her by throwing the guns overboard. The Russians, on the look-out above, did not fail to take advantage of the situation of the unfortunate ship. The seamen were annoyed with musketry while employed in endeavouring to relieve their vessel ; and about nine o'clock, the firing became still more determined, by the employment of field- pieces. The luckless Tiger — a steamer of sixteen guns, and about 1270 tons burden — resisted until Captain Giffard had received desperate wounds, and a midshipman and two seamen were killed, and one wounded. The captain, seeing his hope- less condition, struck his flag, and the Russians took the crew prisoners. At this critical time, the Niger and Vesuvius hove in sight. The Russians there- upon ordered the prisoners to hasten on shore, or they would again fire ; and when the two steamers came within gunshot, the prisoners were placed in front of the Russians on the beach. Captain Giffard and his poor fellows were then marched or conveyed to Odessa, where they received every kindness from the inhabitants : Giffard himself being lodged in the governor's house. They were allowed considerable liberty ; were permitted to write to their friends ; and were visited, under a flag of truce, by the first-lieutenant of the Vesuvius. Care seems to have been taken, on this occasion, that the Russians should not be open to any charge of dishonouring a flag of truce. The news speedily reached St Petersburg ; and the Invalide Russe, on the 19th, contained a dispatch from General Osten-Sacken to Prince Paskevitch — stating that the Tiger, when too much injured to be preserved, was purposely burnt by means of red-hot shot ; that the flag and Union-jack had been kept as trophies ; that some of the guns had been secured, and taken to Odessa ; and that the prisoners, besides Captain Giffard, numbered 24 officers and warrant-officers, and 201 seamen and marines. Mrs Giffard, wife of the unfortunate captain of the Tiger, went to Odessa early in June in the Vesuvius, with the determination to share the captivity of her husband ; she reached that place on the 9th, but found that he had sunk under his sufferings a week THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA :— 1854. 115 previously. She was allowed to land for a few hours to visit his grave, and to converse with some of the captured crew of the Tiger ; and she received much consideration from the authorities. An episode of a remarkable kind is connected with this fate of the Tiger — the production of a volume, narrating the kind treatment and liberation of one of the prisoners. In this volume,* every- thing Russian is so highly praised, that its tone became subject to much commentary. Since gentleness has seldom been a characteristic of the Russian government, a supposition has been put forth that the treatment of the crew of the Tiger was a special affair, intended to produce a particular effect in Western Europe. Be this the case or not, it would be difficult for the most ardent admirer of Russia and the Russians to overpass Lieutenant Royer in the use of adula- tory words and phrases. Apart from the tone of the book, however, the facts of the imprisonment were simply as follow : — When the prisoners were landed on the grounds of M. Cortazzi, chief magistrate of Odessa, the wounded received immediate attention ; and the rest, guarded by Destruction of the Tiger. a large body of troops, and gazed at by half the population of Odessa, were marched off to the quarantine-station near the city. Here they were comfortably housed, well fed, and kindly treated — being allowed also to receive letters, clothes, and money from English ships, which, as just stated, approached under flag of truce for that purpose. They were perhaps the first body of English prisoners ever made by Russia ; and were treated somewhat as pets or phenomena accordingly. Early in June, the decision of the czar was received concerning the destination of the prisoners : the chief officer was to proceed to St Petersburg ; and the other officers and men to Riazin, a town about 100 miles south-east of Moscow — the officers to travel in carriages, the men to proceed by easy marches on foot. An offer, however, having been made by the English admiral for an exchange of prisoners, this was accepted ; and nearly all the crew were liberated at Odessa in July. The * Itoyer. The English Prisoners in Russia. 1S54. officers remained more like guests than prisoners in that city ; but on the 8th of June, Lieutenant Royer started for St Petersburg, in obedience to the emperor's rescript. This officer describes his long journey in terms very similar to those employed by other travellers in Russia, but with more of the couleur de rose. He appears to have been provided with a good travelling-equipage, for he reached Moscow on the 15th. He then started by rail for St Petersburg, having for his especial use a carriage, 'about ten feet square, furnished with two sofas and chairs, a small card-table, and two side-tables.' Arrived at St Petersburg, the lieutenant was lodged in a good hotel. The emperor commanded his attendance at Peterhof, a few miles from St Petersburg. The lieutenant had an interview with the Grand- Duchess Alexandra Josefovna, wife to the Grand- Duke Constantine ; and then with the Grand- Duke himself: he was delighted with both, and describes minutely all the details of his recep- tion, his tea, the dresses of the ladies, &c. On 116 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. the 25th, he was introduced to the emperor, who, after a short but courteous conversation, announced his intention of giving the lieutenant his liberty. On the 29th, after being much feted by officers of the court and the army, the lieutenant departed for England. The loss of the Tiger was one of the mortifying incidents of the war for the Allies. Another was the death of Captain Parker, which occurred a few weeks afterwards. During the closing scenes of the Danubian campaign, the Russians were driven by the Allied fleets from the Sulina mouth of the Danube ; but in order to complete the expulsion, a small expedition was sent to destroy some Russian batteries, stockades, and buildings, and it was then found that the Russians had not been so fully dislodged as had been imagined. Com- mander Powell of the Vesuvius, wrote a dispatch to Admiral Dundas on the 8th of July, giving an account of the exploit which had that day caused the death of a favourite officer. The following are the chief points in this description : — ' Captain Hyde Parker directed a strong party of boats from the Firebrand and Vesuvius to accompany him up the Danube, for the purpose of destroying some Avorks which were occupied by the Russians. At two p.m., the boats entered the Danube, Captain Parkers gig in advance. At the bend of the river, opposite a number of houses on the right bank and a large stockade on the left, a sharp fire was opened upon him, and his boat was nearly liddled. Some of his men were wounded. The heavy boats were coming Tip, and Captain Parker at once pulled back to them, hailing me to land the marines, and be ready to storm. This order was executed by the marines and a detachment of seamen in the same gallant spirit Avith Avhich it Avas given. Captain Parker then dashed on shore in his gig, and at once advanced with a few men. Ho Avas in front, and greatly exposed. A tremen- dous fire Avas soon opened by the enemy upon them, and a feAv minutes after landing, a bullet passed through their leader's heart, and in a moment this gallant sailor ceased to live The command of the force then devolved upon myself. I directed the gun-boats and rocket-boat at once to be brought to the front; the storming-party Avas formed by Lieutenant Jull, R.M.A. ; the gun-boats commenced a most effective fire upon the houses and battery, and in a short time the enemy's fire was silenced. I directed the storming-party to advance, and the place Avas entered at a run by a detachment of marines and sailors, headed by Lieutenant Jull, R.M.A., and Lieutenant Havvkey, R.M. We found that the enemy had already retreated at the rear, and so thick Avas the -cover, that pursuit Avas in vain. The Avork that we had taken Avas a gabion-battery, the guns of which had been taken aAvay, and the embrasures filled up. It consisted of a front along the river, raised about 15 feet high, and 400 yards in extent. In the rear Avas a morass, and the two flanks, which \vere not 30 yards in length, Avere defended as in front. This Avork enclosed about fifty government houses, stables, storehouses, and a magazine. The works haA r e been entirely demo- lished, the houses destroyed, and nothing iioav marks the spot but a heap of ruins. Part of the town of Sulina, whence the enemy had opened fire, has been burnt ; the principal street I have thought it proper to spare. There was no means of computing the enemy's loss, although they were seen to fall inside the intrenchments. I am disposed to think that they Avere assisted in carry- ing off their wounded, and even defending the place, by some Greeks, as men in the dress of that country were seen intermixed Avith the Russian troops. From the heavy fire that Avas opened upon us, and from the number that Avere seen afterwards collected at a distance, the enemy must have been in great force before they retreated.' The bravery of Captain Hyde Parker cannot be in dispute ; but it may be doubted Avhether his A T aluable life Avas not thrown away by reckless daring, unneeded for the object in view. His loss Avas much deplored in the fleets. "While military operations Avere yet in progress between the Turks and Russians on the banks of the Danube, Lieutenant Glyn of the Britannia, Avith Prince Ernest of Leiningen, and a body of petty-officers and seamen, Avere detached from the fleet, and placed at the disposal of Lord Raglan. They Avere sent, with a party of sappers — the whole body amounting to about 150 men — overland from Varna to Rustchuk on the Danube. Lieutenant Glyn expected to find some Turkish gun-boats at that place, Avhich he proposed to man Avith some of his sailors. Through some unaccountable delay or neglect, the Russians had all this time been permitted to maintain a small steam-flotilla in the Danube; and the supposition now Avas, that by occupying the Sulina mouth of the river, and by manning any Turkish gun-boats that might happen to be lying at Rustchuk or Giurgevo, the Russians Avould be caught between tAvo fires. The sappers Avere to be employed in budding a militaiy-bridge for the Turks over the Danube at Rustchuk. On the 8th of July, Lieutenant Glyn and most of his 150 men set out from Varna, all on horseback. They returned about six Aveeks afterwards, overgroAvn Avith beards and moustaches, covered with dirt, and quite willing to get back to their own ships — the expected application of their services at Rustchuk not having been realised. The sappers remained behind, howevei', to assist the Turks. The achievements jet noticed in the Black Sea, were far too trivial to satisfy the aspirations of men Avho entered upon the campaign Avith such ardour as the British naval-officers and seamen. The tars Avished to distinguish themselves by daring and successful exploits ; to do something Avhich should give them renoAvn when they returned to England. They Avere tired of mere excursions to the Circassian coast ; of escorting Turkish ships ; of firing shot and shell into a town Avithout any definite object or result. The bays THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA :— 1854. 117 at Varna, Kavarna, and Baltschik, were places of rendezvous for the fleets in the intervals between the periods of active service — intervals too many and too long to be welcome. The state of inaction was found more injurious to discipline than the most fatiguing work ; insomuch that the officers had difficulty in maintaining good order among men whose only fault at that time was that they would have preferred occupation to inactivity. When Lord Raglan sent word to Admiral Dundas of his plan for the overland expedition to the Danube, noticed in the last paragraph, and applied for a body of seamen, the excitement of the men knew no bounds — every one wished to go, as a means of exchanging listlessness for enterprise ; petty- officers came forward, begging to be disrated to able seamen, and offering to forfeit all their petty- officer's pay if their respective captains would only send them on this service. No other arrangement could be devised than that of drawing lots ; and many an officer envied Lieutenant Glyn and Midshipman Prince Ernest, both of the Britannia, when they were chosen to conduct the expedition. At a later period of the war — when the lieutenant had become a commander, and the midshipman a lieutenant — these two officers and thirty of the seamen received honorary medals from the Turkish government. Reference has been made in former pages to Sebastopol and the Crimea. It was known that the principal stronghold in the southern part of the Russian Empire was Sebastopol, near the south-west corner of the peninsula of the Crimea ; it was felt that a blow in this quarter would be a serious demonstration against Russia ; and it was from the first seen that preparations might judiciously be made for such an expedition. But the English government was very ignorant of the internal state of the Crimea ; not only was there nothing of the cunning system of espionage which prevails so largely in Russia, but the authorities do not seem to have worked well together in obtaining even a small amount of information on this important subject. Curious illustrations of this fact were furnished, at a later date, by the evidence taken before the Sebastopol Committee. The Duke of Newcastle wrote to Lord Raglan, the Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and Sir James Graham to Admiral Dundas, requesting them to obtain all possible information respecting the Crimea and Sebastopol ; but the three officials do not appear to have worked in concert to this end. The Duke of Newcastle, in exonerating himself from blame at a later period, considered that Admiral Dundas had not made a very energetic search for information. His Grace was asked by the Committee : ' Do you not recollect seeing in those dispatches any accounts of any steps which Admiral Dundas had taken, or urged to be taken, to acquaint himself with the strength of the Russian fleet and defences 1 ' The answer was : ' I don't say that he did not urge any to be taken, but I certainly do not think he stated that he had taken any. I recollect his stating what he believed to be the amount of the Russian forces in the Crimea at that time, which certainly was extremely inaccurate.' Admiral Dundas, himself giving evi- dence, quoted a private letter he had written, dated May 10, 1854, before Lord Raglan came to the Black Sea : ' Sebastopol is a second Gibraltar. We see many new works erected, and from pri- soners we learn that the land-side is being equally strengthened. An encampment is seen, of large size, close to the south of the town ; and we are told there are 120,000 men in the Crimea, 30,000 of whom are in Sebastopol. The ships — fourteen or sixteen sail-of-the-line — have their sails bent ; and I expected, when we attacked Odessa, they would have come out, and drawn us off to protect the steamers ; but now I fear we are doomed to a long blockade. I hope you have better information on Russian matters than I have been able to get.' The admiral, at the same time, disclosed the following brief but remarkable confidential note which he had written to Sir J. Graham : — ' It is said all Russians are to be bought or bribed ; if so, our diplomatic engines have failed.' Whatever may have been the amount of infor- mation possessed by the government before the Avar, or obtained by diplomatic means at the commencement of the war, concerning the strength of the Russian forces at Sebastopol, the fleets certainly made many exploratory trips to the neighbourhood of the Crimea ; on some occasions having a skirmish with the Russians, but generally returning without seeing an enemy. The combined squadrons left Kavarna Bay on the 17th of April for the Crimean and Circassian coasts, and re- turned on the 20th of May, after a cruise of about five weeks. Admiral Hamelin, writing to the French government an account of his proceedings, complained that the Russians would not give the Allies anything to do. ' It has not depended on us that the feats of war which have occurred from time to time during that month's cruise were not more numerous and more important ; but the Russian naval forces have kept themselves so completely shut up at Sebastopol, and under the shelter of the thousand guns of that place, that during twenty days passed in cruising at a short distance from that port, we have not been able to induce a single vessel of the enemy to venture on a combat, even with our look-out vessels. On the other hand, our steam-cruisers were picking up throughout the whole extent of the Black Sea vessels bearing the Russian flag, which constitute a tolerably good number of prizes.' The Allies were able to make out, in the enclosed harbour at Sebastopol, from 14 to 18 Russian sail-of-the-line, 15 steamers, and 7 frigates. The steamer Fury, of G guns, was engaged in one of the very few smart encounters which fell to the lot of the seamen during this campaign. Cruising along the coast of the Crimea alone, a few days before the com- bined fleets started to those regions, the Fury espied two small merchant vessels coming out of 118 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES. Sebastopol ; while two brigs of war and two frigates were near the mouth of the harbour. She immediately tacked about, captured one of the merchant ships, took the crew on board, made fast the prize by a hawser, and then steamed away with all speed. An exciting chase ensued : four large ships in pursuit of one small war- steamer, for the frigates and brigs instantly set forth after the Fury. The little steamer had a start of three miles, but this distance became soon diminished ; and she soon afterwards cut her prize adrift. Raise her steam as she might, and set forth every inch of canvas, she yet could not maintain her position ; and she threw overboard nearly all her supply of fresh water, to lighten her load. After a time, one of the frigates gave up the chase, but the other and the two brigs maintained it. At length this frigate and the Fury came within long-shot of each other, and opened fire ; but as the guns of the Fury carried better and further than those of the frigate, no great harm was received by the former. A Russian steamer, however, now approached from Sebastopol, and the Fury, satisfied with its achievement, steamed away rapidly out of danger, to the no small mortification of the Russians in pursuit of her. In the St Petersburg newspapers of that period, occasional mention was made of the British and French fleets, but always under such circumstances as would imply that those fleets were afraid to meet the Russian ships. In one dispatch from Prince Menchikoff, it is stated that ' three enemy's steamers were sighted off Sebastopol on the 27th of June, but made off as soon as our division went out to meet them. The chase of our ships after the enemy, two English steamers and one French, was accompanied by a cannonade which destroyed one of the enemy's boats. . . . the enemy got off .... it is possible that they are the same steamers which, previous to shewing themselves off Sebas- topol, made their appearance that same morning at Eupatoria, where they captured a coasting- trader, without crew or cargo : as she lay beyond musket-shot from the shore, she could not be defended.' If this account were corroborated, even approximately, by any evidence obtained from other quarters, or by antecedent probability, it would be satisfactory to present such a dispatch with the same degree of fulness as those from English and French commanders ; but the frequent untruthfulness of the Russian dispatches, rendering them unworthy of reliance, was painfully displayed throughout the war. In the instance here noticed, Captain Darricau of the Descartes, writing to Admiral Hamelin, gave an account of a cruise made by that French vessel, accompanied by the English ships Furious and Terrible, along the coast of the Crimea. The Russian exploit seems to have been nothing more than an attempt on the part of six large steamers and three men-of- war to draw the three exploring-ships into the harbour by a cunning and deceptive device, and there battering them by an overwhelming force, after the example of Sinope : the device failed ; the nine ships came out in pursuit of the three ; the three hauled up, commenced firing, and did not retire until the Russians had gone back to their former quarters, behind the granite defences of Sebastopol. Such was Captain Darricau's dispatch. He further stated, that the three Allied steamers proceeded to Cape Chersonesus, a little southward of Sebastopol, and there offered battle to two Russian ships-of-the-line — one a three-decker, and two frigates ; but that the invitation was declined. Admiral Hamelin, reporting on these occurrences to the French authorities, summed them up by saying that the three Allied ships could not per- suade the Russians to measure strength with them. Analogy, furnished by subsequent experience, enables us to decide on the relative merits of these conflicting accounts of one and the same event. On the 2d of July, the French squadron under Admiral Bruat joined that under Admiral Hamelin at Baltschik ; bringing 9000 troops from Gallipoli to Varna, and strengthening the French fleet in the Black Sea. There were then, anchored off the hue of coast between Varna and Baltschik, seventeen British ships-of-war — the Agamemnon, Britannia, Queen, Trafalgar, Albion, Vengeance, London, Bellerophon, Rodney, Retribution, Sidon, Tribune, Diamond, Caradoc, Sanspareil, Simoom, and Spitfire; together with fourteen French line-of- battle-ships and several steamers. This magni- ficent combined fleet remained, with very little to do, during a further period of two months. The officers interchanged visits, and astonished the Turks at Varna with a sight of the games of cricket and quoits ; but they yearned for more stirring employment. On the 21st of July, the greater portion of both fleets sailed and steamed out of harbour, bound on another exploratory cruise, and carrying out some of the generals of the Allied armies. While progressing northward, the men were overjoyed with the report that ' twenty- three ships were in sight ;' they formed visions of brisk actions and Russian prizes ; and were not a little chagrined to find that the ships turned out to be trees, off the St George's mouth of the Danube. On the 25th, three of the steamers went ahead of the fleet, and cut across to Sebastopol; these steamers, the Fury, Terrible, and Cacique, had on board Sir George Brown, General Canrobert, Sir Edmund Lyons, and the chief pilots of the two fleets ; their mission being minutely to examine Sebastopol and the adjacent coast of the Crimea. An officer in the fleet thus described what took place : ' The Fury, Terrible, and a French steamer, were purposely sent in somewhat ahead, so as to arrive at early dawn. The moment they shewed themselves, there were commotion and preparation in the harbour ; steamers sent up tall columns of smoke, to help out the large ships, which unfurled sails, &c. But before they had sallied out to chase away these impertinent foes with an overwhelming force — to be recorded in a magnificent dispatch as a grand victory — the signalman on the hills above THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA :— 1854. 119 descried the fleet coming in ; so the steamers moved up into the dockyard creek, and put their fires out ; the ships furled their sails ; and we were tranquilly allowed to make a narrow examination of them and their prison from sunrise to sunset of a beautiful clear summer's day. Before we came up, the Fury, Terrible, and French steamer had ventured in rather near to the north side of the harbour, and several shots were fired at them. The distance might have been about a mile and a half, and the Russian fire was so good, that the rigging of the Terrible was cut immediately, and the little Fury was hulled just below the water : the ill-conditioned shot destroying two jars of the midshipmen's butter in their berth. Luckily, nobody was touched. The fire was returned, and the steamers moved on. The works on the northern shore have been much strengthened since my last look at the place, and the strength of the sea-batteries is undeniable. Inside, the Russians have, of course, a complete sense of security at present. No sea-force could damage them without exposing itself to destruction. With telescopes we could see the men bathing from the two or three liners behind the booms at the harbour's mouth.' The fleets returned to Varna and Baltschik, after the generals and admirals had satisfied themselves by a close examination of the formidable Sebas- topol ; and then ensued another period of inaction. During the several expeditions to the north-west portions of the Black Sea, some of the ships had frequently approached near Odessa; and on those occasions the ladies could be seen, seated on the cliffs, shaded by their pink parasols, watching and sketching the English ships. When, however, late in the month of August, the Allied fleets and armies, after a wearisome period of sickness and detention, prepared for a vast expedition to the Crimea, the inhabitants of Odessa were thrown into a state of great trepidation. The following proclamation was posted up on the walls : — 'To the Inhabitants op Odessa. — The enemy is again seen, in greater force than ever before, at no great distance from our city. We are armed, and well prepared. Any attempt made by the enemy to land will be energetically resisted; but the guns of his vessels have a very long range. Do not lose courage, but keep wet cloths and hides of oxen prepared to cast over any shells which may be thrown into the city. Tubs full of water must be kept on the roofs of the houses, so that any fire may be at once extinguished. Should the enemy, however, carry on the war with obstinacy under protection of his guns, we will retire to Tiraspol, after having reduced the city to ruins and ashes, so that no asylum may be found. Wo be to those who may remain behind, or attempt to extinguish the fire ! Krusenstebn, Governor. August 30, 1854.' This Moscow-like proclamation increased the consternation. Almost all the corn was removed to Tiraspol, a town on the Dniester, sixty miles from Odessa; the Avomen and children were sent away ; the pavement of the streets was taken up ; the male population were drilled every day; and the defences were strengthened. No attack was, however, made ; Odessa was again spared — for rea- sons which were not publicly known at the time, but which will require notice in a later Chapter. At length, in the first week of September 1854, were completed all the arrangements for one of the most formidable enterprises of modern times — an attack on Sebastopol by the Allied naval and military forces, comprising, in effect, three fleets and three armies. This was to be the crown- ing reward for all that the soldiers and sailors had suffered from insufficient employment. The detentions at Malta, at Gallipoli, and Bulair ; at Adrianople and Constantinople ; at Scutari and Unkiar-Skelessi ; at Varna and Aladyn and Devna — all were to be compensated to the troops by an immediate and important onslaught on the Russians. The delays at Besika and Beicos, at Varna and Baltschik — all were to be made up to the tars by a dashing attack against Russian ships or Russian granite forts. CHAPTER Y. HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS IN 1853-4. "HILE the Turks were repelling, single-handed, the masses of Russian ^troops on the banks of the Danube ; r while the English and French armies 'were slowly creeping along towards the Crimea ; while the Allied fleets in ; the Black Sea were engaged in small achievements quite disproportionate to the number and magnitude of the ships employed ; while Europe was being inundated with protocols and notes, conferences and treaties, by diplomatists who were at war with each other while endea- vouring to preserve or to restore peace — there were warlike proceedings in other parts of the neighbourhood of the Black Sea, arising either from actual hostilities between the Russians and Turks, or from intrigues of Russia among the Christian subjects of the sultan. It was only to a small extent, and in an indirect way, that the English and French allies of Turkey participated in these proceedings. Nevertheless, the plans of the war, in its larger operations, were influenced by this frontier warfare in 1853-4, preceding, as it did, in the order of time, the great expedition to the Crimea. The operations had relation to the position of Schamyl among the Caucasian mountains ; to the campaigns on the Turkish frontier of Armenia ; to the insurrections, fostered by Russia, among the Christian tribes of European Turkey ; and to the irritating Russo-Greek irrup- tion across the southern frontier of the sultan's territory. SCHAMYL, AND THE CAUCASUS. Schamyl, the ' prophet-warrior of the Caucasus,' has been a name dreaded by the Russians during a long series of years. Few great battles are recorded in connection with his career; yet has he, in a system of mountain-warfare, committed terrible mischief on Russia, and materially re- tarded the progress of that power towards the south-east. Against Schamyl, and chieftains of lesser fame who preceded him, the Czar Nicholas in vain sent powerful forces, under the best generals of his empire — Yermoloff, Paskevitch, Gortchakoff, the two Viliaminoffs, Rosen, Rajewski, Aurep, Golovine, Grabbe, Veidhadt, Woronzoff— all tried, and all failed in subduing the bold adherents of Schamyl. The association of the name of Schamyl with Circassia and the Circassians, in many English works, is erroneous. Schamyl was not born in Circassia, nor were his military operations con- ducted with the aid of Circassians in so great a degree as that of other Caucasian tribes. The Caucasus is a mountain-range extending from the Black Sea to the Caspian, in a line bearing slightly to the southward of east. It forms the south-eastern boundary between Europe and Asia, but is entirely unconnected with any other mountain-range belonging to either of those two divisions of the globe. It begins near Anapa, on the north shore of the Black Sea, and terminates at the peninsula of Abcheron, on the west shore of the Caspian — the distance between these two points being little less than 700 miles. The rugged mountains extend over a width, from north to south, varying from 60 to 120 miles. The highest peak of the Caucasus, always snow-clad, is Mount Elbruz or Elborus, 16,800 feet in height ; the range thence westward to Anapa is comparatively of small elevation ; but eastward, towards Abcheron, the general height is very considerable, including Mount Kazbek, 14,400 feet, and Shah Dagh, 13,000 feet. There are numerous offshoots from the main range, some of which stretch out south-west to the very shores of the Black Sea. No elevations other than mere hills connect the Caucasus with the mountains of Armenia and Kurdistan ; while on the north, the Caucasus is bounded by plains or steppes of almost undeviating level : along the whole distance from the inner angle of the Sea of Azof to the Gulf of Kouma, in the Caspian, there is scarcely a mile of ground so much as 120 feet above the level of the Black Sea. The northern side of the mountains, however, has more offshoots than the southern ; and these offshoots generally end abruptly in cliffs so steep as to be almost inaccessible. Instead of mountain -lakes, the Caucasus is distinguished for its naphtha-springs and mud-volcanoes. Nothing can be more different than the aspects of the country north and south of the Caucasus. The range itself, marked by a thousand jagged SCHAMYL, AND THE CAUCASUS :— 1853-4. 121 fantastic peaks, separated by profound ravines, constitutes the Caucasus proper, or White Moun- tains; but beyond this, to the north, is a lower range, the Black Mountains; and further yet to the north, are the rivers Kuban and Terek, forming together nearly a continuous water-line from the mouth of the Sea of Azof to the Caspian. Beyond this, from the Kuban to the Don, and from the Terek to the Volga, is the wretched steppe- country, all dust in summer, and all mud in winter, with marshes instead of rivers, and reeds instead of trees. South of the Caucasus, on the contrary, the rich hills and valleys of Mingrelia, Imeritia, and Georgia, represent Asian luxuriance in all its splendour. So much for the general configuration of the Caucasus. The next subject for notice is the system of roads by which this mighty mountain- barrier may be crossed. There arc only two such roads worthy of the name. One of these runs along the shores of the Caspian, at no great distance from the sea, in a narrow strip of flat country ; it unites the town of Kizlar, on the Terek, with Derbend and Baku, where it joins the Caucasian Provinces and Parts of Asiatic Turkey. rich countries south of the Caucasus. Although unencumbered by mountains, this road is difficult to traverse on account of numerous rivers, which, after the melting of the mountain snows in spring, spread over a great extent of country; while, in the hotter seasons of the year, the district is very unhealthy. The second or more frequented road crosses the Caucasus nearly at the centre of its length, from Mozdok, on the Terek, to Tiflis, on the Koor. A mountain-pass constitutes a portion of this road, between the fortresses of Kazibeg and Passanaur; the pass is 8000 feet above the level of the sea, and is bounded b} r lofty mountains on either side, with the towering Kazbek not far distant. The fortress of Dariel gives its name to the pass. In some parts of the pass, the road runs along the edge of an abyss, which descends as far below it as the mountains rise above it. The road maintains the character of a pass almost to the fortress of Vladikaukas— ' Lord of the Caucasus '—where the valley of the Terek may be said to begin. Not only is this road terrific for its permanent characteristics, but the difficulties of the traveller are frequently in- creased by the sudden fall of avalanches, or the sudden swelling of mountain torrents. Both of these roads are very ancient ; they were known to the Persians and the Greeks at least as far back as the time of Alexander the Great. All the other routes across the Caucasus are mere mountain- paths, which few, except the hardy natives, would venture to use. Such, then, is the formidable region familiarly known as Circassia, but more correctly designated Caucasia, or the country of the Caucasian tribes, of whom the Circassians are one. The region would be a difficult one to enter, to conquer, to hold, under any circumstances; but it is rendered yet more difficult by the extraordinary diversity among its inhabitants. It is supposed that no other country on the globe, of equal extent, contains such a number of different nations or tribes. Strabo spoke of seventy different dialects there even in his time. Some of these dialects bear a 122 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. resemblance to Persian, some to Turkish, some to Finnish, while some contain numerous Teutonic or German words. A letter of Schamyl's is said to have reached Constantinople, and to have puzzled all the interpreters, until an Armenian, learned in the Caucasian languages, took it in hand. The tribes or nations whose names are best known in Western Europe are the Tcherkes- kaia or Circassians, the Lesghes or Lesghians, the Dagkestanes, the Ossetes, the Abasians or Abha- sians, and the Kabardenes. The Mingrelians and Imeritians are inhabitants rather of the southern plains than of the mountains. The Circassians inhabit chiefly the portion of mountain country south and west of the sources of the river Kuban — plateaux and gorges between the rugged peaks, scarcely accessible to any but mountaineers. The Lesghians, on the other hand, dwell principally among those mountains of the Caucasus situate east and south of the source of the Terek. As the Kuban rises near the foot of the Elbruz, and the Terek near that of the Kazbek, these- two mountains may conveniently mark the limits of the respective countries of the two tribes. The whole country from the Kazbek to the Caspian is often called Daghestan, and it is here that the main struggles have been carried on between Russia and the mountaineers. The portion of Daghestan more immediately under the control of the Lesghians is described as being flanked on the north with dense forests of magnificent beeches ; twining creepers bind the trees together ; and vast boulders, stripped by thousands of winters from the granite and porphyry of the upper ranges, and borne along by the fierce mountain torrents to the valleys and passes which form their beds, afford every advantage to the lightly equipped moun- taineer — every obstacle to an invading force. The interior of the country is yet more formidable ; it is one mass of ridges and ravines, at the bottom of each of which a brawling stream, fed by the snows and rains of the upper regions, rushes down to the river Koissu or its affluents. The origin of the Caucasian people is wholly lost in the mists of antiquity. The prevailing opinion is, that, instead of being a distinct race or tribe, they are remnants of various surrounding nations, who, during long centuries of misrule and devastating warfare, have taken refuge in the mountains. It is thus that may be explained the presence of Mongol, Arab, Cossack, Osmanli, and Persian elements among them. Although the whole are hardy mountaineers, they differ much in appearance, language, and religion. The Cir- cassians — of whom there are sub-tribes of the Adighi, the Ubighe, and others — are Mohamme- dans, with a small admixture of Christianity ; next to them are the Abasians, more zealous Mohammedans ; next, the Ossetes or Ossetians, a small Christian tribe ; eastward of these the Tchetchenes and the Lesghians — all fierce believers in Islam. The Circassians and the Lesghians, the two chief tribes, differ essentially in their form of government. The former is feudal : each clan having its chief, its nobles, its freedmen, and its serfs ; but as there is much mutual jealousy between the several clans, they are ill fitted to combine for any important extensive operation. The Lesghians, on the contrary, were strongly democratic, until the day when Schamyl arose among them, and converted their democracy into a theocracy by claiming to be a prophet as well as a warrior. Another point of difference is in personal appearance : the Circassians have great beauty of form and feature, fair complexion, and an open European expression of face — indeed, the loveliness of the women has led to the notorious Circassian slave-trade at Constantinople ; whereas the Lesghians exhibit more of the Asiatic element — darker skin, a deeply-seated eagle eye, and a fiercely passionate temperament. In past ages, when Georgia was governed by a king, his dominions were frequently harassed by these mountaineers from the rugged Caucasus, who descended southward into the luxurious plains, and robbed all whom they encountered. The northern or Cossack plains, in like manner, were subject to raids from the Caucasians, although the country invaded presents far fewer attractions. A century and a half ago, the mountaineers were split up into an infinite number of clans or petty tribes, having no sort of national organisation, and professing a religion in which a morsel of Chris- tianity was mixed up with a morsel of Islamism. It was Peter the Great that incensed them into unity of action. ' Russian aggression,' as has been well said, 'has caused Caucasian organisation.' Peter, when he established his line of military posts from the Volga to the Don, may have possibly adopted a reasonable course to protect his newly acquired territory from turbulent attacks ; but when later czars sought to obtain the moun- tains from the Caucasians, the enterprise assumed a far different character. One incident in the history of the district is especially characteristic of Russian policy — the Ossetians are Christians ; the czars, about a century ago, began to ' protect ' them on account of their Christianity ; and this protection has enabled Russia to bring the priests into her pay, as a means of Russianising the people. It was about the year 1785 that the encroaching spirit of the czars was first met by fierce resistance on the part of the Mohammedan tribes of the Caucasus. When they saw that Georgia, and all the rich plains south of the mountains, were gradually falling under Russian domination, they readily comprehended that their own independence was in jeopardy — that the continuance of their freedom depended on themselves. Religious zealotry gave the war-cry, Avhich thenceforward seldom ceased to be heard. The Dervish Mohammed, better known as the Sheik Mansur, appeared sud- denly among the Tchetchenes, exclaiming: 'Ye have forgotten Allah and his prophet Mohammed ; therefore he has given you over into the hands SCHAMYL, AND THE CAUCASUS :— 1853-4. 123 of the Infidels.' Frugal, ascetic, learned, active, energetic, Mansur was well fitted to make an impression on the mountaineers, and rouse them to united action. After six years of active labour, he was captured and put to death by the Russians in 1791. Then succeeded a period of many years, during which Russia steadily strengthened her position in Georgia, disturbed by frequent but desultory contests with the Lesghians. Generals Zizianoff and Yermoloff, the first two governors of the Caucasian provinces of Russia, were able men, who strictly carried out the Russian policy : they established, from the Sea of Azof to the Caspian, a line of Cossack stanitzas, which combined the characteristics of villages and forts ; the duty of the dwellers in which was to defend the northern plains from the mountaineers. To this day, the Caucasians and the Cossacks watch each other fiercely and untiringly on either side of this chain of posts ; and if they chance to meet, indiscriminate slaughter ensues. In 1823, there lived in one of the Lesghian aouls or villages called Jarach, Mohammed the Mollah, an Ulema learned in the Koran and in the Saturn.. law. Many pupils attended him; among whom was Khas Mohammed, a young man from Bokhara. This student, after he had returned to his home, with a high repute for the lore which he had acquired, became acquainted with a holy man of Persia, one Hadji Ismail, whose teachings created great excitement among the Mohammedans ; and at the invitation of Khas Mohammed, Mohammed the Mollah went to visit the holy man. The two Mohammeds were earnest in their conference ; they seem to have deeply imbued each other with zeai for Islam, and to havo been fully aware of the designs of the Russian giaour against them and their faith. When Mollah Mohammed returned to Jarach, an anti-Muscovite feeling spread around him, more deeply seated and fiercely burning than had yet been exhibited ; many young pupils or murids, drinking in enthu- siasm from his teachings, acted as emissaries to spread the impulse around. General Yermoloff, when he heard of these things, took preventive measures ; and there immediately commenced a system of warfare which met with little respite for thirty years. One of many daring chieftains whom the occasion brought forward was Khasi- Mollah : after some years of indomitable struggling against the Russians, he fell at Himri, with all his Moslem supporters dead around him, except one young murid or pupil, who, though pierced by bullet and bayonet, yet lived. This young murid was Schamyl. From that eventful day, Schamyl never ceased to be a leader of the mountaineers, an inveterate enemy of the czars, down to the time when the 124 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. war of 1853 brought upon him the attention of the Western Powers. His characteristics were peculiarly fitted to render him a man of authority among the ardent tribes of the Caucasus. His recovery from the desperate scene at Himri had about it a mystery which to many seemed miracu- lous ; and a halo of the supernatural surrounded him ever after. On a later occasion, he was again the only one preserved among many, in a contest arising out of a blood-feud among the mountaineers. So rapidly did his power increase, that soon after- wards, in 1834, he became — virtually, if not formally — imaum and sultan of the Eastern Caucasus. He was then thirty-seven years old — silent and earnest, intensely determinate, learned beyond those of his class and tribe, extremely sensitive of defeat or disgrace, sternly impassive, and un doubting in his faith that he was a favoured recipient of insp iration from Allah ; in person, of middle stature, with fair hair, eyes overshadowed by well-defined brows, a well-formed nose, a small mouth, delicate hands and feet, skin fair and fine beyond most of those around him, an air noble and dignified, and an eloquence fiery and persuasive. It was not until 1838 that Schamyl succeeded in putting down the pretensions of other leaders to supreme power ; but from that date he had no competitor. The history of the Caucasus was a history of continuous struggle, from 1838 to 1853, between Schamyl and the Russians. He sent his murids or pupils, missionaries of Islam, from mountain to mountain, from village to village, rousing up the Lesghians to fight against the Muscovite infidels. He established his head- quarters at Akhulgo, a place built upon almost inaccessible rocks, embosomed in the mountains ; this he fortified with trenches, earthen-parapets, and covered-ways ; and stored it with provisions and ammunition. In 1839, the Czar Nicholas, irritated at the fanatic audacity of Schamyl, sent against him a powerful Russian force under General Grabbe, with orders to attack Akhulgo, and to take Schamyl dead or alive. Grabbe twice defeated Schamyl — at Burtani and at Arguani — before the latter shut himself up in Akhulgo ; and then commenced a fearful siege. After an enormous loss on the part of the Russians, and the destruction of almost the whole of Schamyl's force, Akhulgo was taken — but not Schamyl. The prophet-warrior again escaped, under circumstances almost incredible ; and he was thence looked up to with more reverential obedience than ever. Many a victory is fully as disastrous as a defeat to the victors. Such was the case in this instance. The Russians took Akhulgo, and slaughtered 1500 of Schamyl's followers ; but they raised blood- feuds between themselves and every tribe in the Eastern Caucasus; and, moreover, they aroused increased hatred on account of their brutal conduct on the march towards tribes who would at the least have been neutral. Henceforward Schamyl's cause was strengthened ; large numbers joined him ; and, taught by experience that his mountaineers were not well able to stand against the Russian masses in regular battle, he resolved on the adoption of a guerilla-warfare — a system of tactics in which mountains and ravines play an important part. Russia tried in vain to cope successfully with this system. Year after year did Schamyl frustrate all the attempts of the generals to root him out of his fastnesses ; they could never boast of a second Akhulgo. The prophet-warrior set up his standard at a new spot, Dargo — an unfortified village, deeply im- bedded in a forest. Here he organised a system which virtually converted the whole of Lesghistan into a vast military colony. He opposed no sort of obstacles to the approach of the Russians across the frontier of what he considered to be his dominions ; rather did he encourage it, until the Russians found themselves entangled among thick forests, mountain ravines, and passes commanded by overhanging rocks — then did the half- wild Lesghians, climbing upon the steeps and crags, pick off the invaders one by one with their fire- locks ; until the Russian generals saw their forces greatly weakened, without the glory or pretension of a regular battle. Persistently did Schamyl adopt this system ; losing many warriors, but causing a greater loss to his opponents. On one occasion, in 1842, General Grabbe made a formidable attack on Dargo ; but was repelled with disgrace, and Avith a loss of 2000 men. On another occasion, in 1844, Schamyl, with equal success, repelled an attack by General Neidhardt. The Czar Nicholas became greatly mortified and irritated ; he saw that twenty years had effected little towards the subjugation of these audacious tribes. In 1845, he appointed Prince Woronzoff to the command in the Caucasus; the prince was a skilful and accomplished man, and ranked among the most respected of the Russian nobles. Much was expected from this appoint- ment. He received powers more plenary than is customary with Russian governors, and became little less than a king in rank. Against his own judgment, as is alleged, but at the czar's com- mand, Woronzoff made an attack on Dargo with a large force ; he captured it, or rather he captured a heap of smoking ruins ; while Schamyl and his followers, commanding all the heights and passes, intercepted the Russian convoys, com- pelled Woronzoff to retreat, and almost anni- hilated his army. Generals Wiktoroff, Passek, and Fock were killed ; and the prince himself had a narrow escape from being taken prisoner with the remnant of his army. Russian ingenuity converted this capture of Dargo into a victory ; but Woronzoff was urgent with his imperial master to avoid any more such victories. In the next year, 1846, Schamyl assumed the offensive ; he made an irruption with 10,000 men into Kabardah, a region between the Caucasus and the river Terek, crossing the line which is marked by the chain of Russian fortresses. This he did SCHAMYL, AND THE CAUCASUS :— 1853-4. 125 again in 1848, in 1850, and in the beginning of 1853; and it continued to require all the watch- fulness and energy of the Russians to enable them to maintain these fortified posts. Such was Schamyl; such the mountaineers of the Caucasus. The mischief he caused to the Russians is almost inconceivable. Schamyl's power extended over about 600,000 souls out of a total Caucasian population of 1,500,000 ; but his lighting-men never exceeded 20,000, available in one spot at a given time. Yet did the Russians maintain here a vast army of 80,000 to 150,000 men, of whom about 20,000 were swept off each year by disease or warfare. Woronzoff kept a bettor hold of the Russianised provinces south of the mountains ; but it became a matter of equal importance and difficulty to command the military road over the Caucasus, b} r which Georgia is placed in connection with European Russia. The Caucasians are said to retain a tradition that a sultan in the west is one day to arise who will finally deliver them from the aggressions of the Muscovite. The struggles of 1853-4-5 have brought this tradition to memory. Who is this sultan to be ; and from Avhat region in the west will he come ? The Caucasians, mostly Moham- medans, are on friendly terms with the Turks ; insomuch that when the European war broke out in 1853, men speculated on the possible participa- tion of Schamyl and his followers in the contest. It is true that these mountaineers would as indig- nantly reject any compromise of their independence in respect to the sultan as to the czar; but the Padishah of the Osmanlis has reached beyond the days of all-grasping dominion ; if allowed tu hold his own, he will no longer be an aggressive neighbour to other nations or races. In the case of Schamyl, as in that of many other heroes around whose names a halo of romance has formed, sober facts require a little diminution in the brilliancy of any delineation. Mr Duncan, who had opportunities of seeing the Caucasian mountaineers in time of war, formed an opinion that the ill-disciplined and badly-armed warriors, though invincible in their mountain fortresses, are of little account in the plains of Georgia. These hardy men, when their fields are sown, and until harvest-time arrives, have leisure and inclination for an exciting enterprise, which is none the less welcome to them if it involve a scene of plunder. They like ta descend rapidly and secretly upon the Russian or Cossack villages — sack, pillage, burn, and cither make slaves or commit butchery. It is true that Cossacks are equally ready to mete out the same doom to Caucasians, if they can catch them ; and in this respect the relentless enmity is paralleled. But in relation to systematic warfare, Mr Duncan asserts that a single Russian dragoon regiment, backed by a troop of horse-artillery, would suffice to rout any force that Schamyl could have brought into the Georgian plains around Tiflis. A full knowledge of this fact was possessed by the chieftain himself, who displayed consummate wisdom in disposing of his materials according to their capabilities. In their own inaccessible re- cesses and wooded heights, the tribes of Daghestan are almost unassailable : their weakness begins when they descend into the plains. The real strength of Schamyl, during the early stages of the Russo-Turkish war, was exhibited, not in actual conflicts with the Russians, but in the fact that he occupied a spur of the mountains which juts down southward to within forty miles of Tiflis. He did not directly aid the Turks who were fighting in Asia Minor ; but he indirectly assisted them by keeping the Russians in alarm concerning their safety on the mountain frontier of Georgia. The Russian generals, knoAving that he might possibly stop their supplies and intercept their reinforce- ments, felt a necessity for keeping a watchful eye on his movements. He might at any time havo threatened the capital of a disaffected province by a sudden surprise. It was physically possible for Schamyl to have reached Tiflis from his mountain stronghold in forty-eight hours ; to have made a sudden irruption into that town ; to have burned a considerable part of its buildings ; and to 'have escaped back to the mountains with a vast booty — all this was attainable if the city had been left ill guarded ; and the consciousness of this hypothetical catastrophe unquestionably exercised a moral influence over the Russians. When the contest with Russia assumed larger proportions than a mere dispute with Turkey con- cerning a few old rickety buildings at Jerusalem, the Caucasian region became an object of interest on other than Turkish considerations. The sultan was chiefly interested in so far as the mountaineers might act as a barrier between him and the much-dreaded czar ; but the Allies of the Turks, especially England, had additional motives to actuate them. The traditionary aggressive policy of Russia (traced in Chapter I.) affects England indirectly — in a Avay which it may be appropriate to notice here, since it involves the question of Caucasian independence. Assuming, as an undisputed proposition, that Russia has long cast a wistful glance at the British possessions in India, there yet exists much diversity of opinion concerning her power to work mischief in that quarter. Mr Duncan, who spent many months with the Turkish army in Asia in 1854, in near proximity to the Russian forces in Georgia, insists strongly on the existence of this power of doing injury. He points out that Russia has maintained her power in the Trans-Caucasian provinces at an unparalleled sacrifice of blood and treasure, with the view of advancing from thence towards the Indus. The successive wars which she has carried on with her weakened and distracted neighbours, Turkey and Persia, have enabled her not only to secure a good strategic position in Georgia, but also to instil into the Oriental mind an admiration or an appre- hension of her vast power : especially is this the case in Persia. ' Although I reject the idea of an 126 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. armed invasion of our Eastern Empire by some future czar, at the same time it is undeniable that a moral triumph, prejudicial alike to the interest of Great Britain and her ally the Sublime Porte, has been achieved by Russia in the East. The British Empire in England is governed no less by a moral force than by a physical rule ; and should the first be weakened by Russian intrigues, and by doubts in the invincibility of our armies, the consequences at some future period may prove calamitous. It is certain that every fresh step taken by Russia in Asia, inflicts a moral injury on the interests of Great Britain.' * On the other hand, such considerations as the following have been brought forward, in support of the opinion that a Russian attack on British India is not much to be apprehended. It is urged that the North-western Province is the only fron- tier on which India could be attacked; that this frontier is strongly guarded ; that the countries next beyond — Cabul and Beloochistan — have irre- gular governments, ill-organised resources, no public economy, and little national strength beyond that comprised in a legion of mounted freebooters ; that the next country to the west, Persia, though wretchedly weak, never sides with Russia unless England appear too heedless to defend her. In this view, all that would have to be effected is to maintain a moral influence over the court of Persia — a moral influence founded on physical greatness. An English army could as effectually reach the heart of Persia by way of the Persian Gulf, as a Russian army by the route through Georgia ; and the advocates of the more hopeful theory urge, that if the court of Teheran be duly and frequently impressed with this fact, nothing more would be wanted to insure the closing of the route from Russia to India via Persia. Con- tradictory as the two opinions may seem, they yet converge to this one point — that the maintenance of a moral influence by England in Persia is alone sufficient to insure the desired result. The chief divergence is in respect to the question, whether England has in recent years bestowed sufficient thought on her prestige among the Persians. The considerations are in some respects different, concerning a route from Russia to India through Tatary. That strange region is inhabited by various tribes — some leaning towards Russia, some towards China, some in doubtful subjection to Tur- key or to Persia, and the rest independent. The Kirghis Tatars north-east of the Caspian are about 2,000,000 in number ; their occupation consists chiefly in tending their flocks, and hunting ante- lopes, boars, and wild horses ; while their pleasure consists in plundering caravans, or attacking neighbouring tribes. This is one part of Tatary. Another is the independent province of Khiva, situated eastward of the Caspian ; the city of the same name stands near the banks of the river Oxus, which flows from the hills near Cabul and * A Campaign with the Turks in Asia. Cashmere, and passes on its way near Bokhara. On this account, Khiva and the Oxus are regarded as important in connection with a Russo-Indian line of passage. But the difficulties of the route are frightful to a large army. There is a formid- able region of parched desert between the Caspian and Khiva, which must be traversed before that city can be reached from Russia. It is certain that the Czar Nicholas had long meditated the conquest of Khiva, and had disbursed large sums of money in bribing neighbouring chieftains ; but he did not live to see Khiva under his power, although he succeeded in sowing discord between the khan and the other Tatar leaders. The Tatars themselves, inured to desert-life, might work mischief as marauders on the Cabul frontier ; but whenever a Russian army, or even a small body of European troops, has attempted to reach Khiva from Orenburg or from the Caspian, its sufferings have been terrific, from intense cold in winter and insupportable heat in summer. Russia possesses small steam-boats both on the Caspian and on the Sea of Aral, the one westward, and the other northward of Khiva : these have been constructed in the hope that they would furnish means of transport for Russian troops, from various points on the Russian frontier-coast, to the mouth of the Oxus, at which point a voyage up to Khiva would commence. Such is believed to have been the purpose held in view, after the abandonment of a land-route as too tragical in its consequences. The fixity of purpose displayed by the Russian government is unquestionably very remarkable, for immense trouble was taken to convey these small steamers to the Sea of Aral; they were built at St Petersburg, navigated up certain rivers and canals to the Volga ; down the Volga to Astrakhan ; across the Caspian to its eastern shore; and then conveyed to the Sea of Aral by some means which have not been clearly explained ; for although a river or rivers once existed between the two seas, little else than sandy dried-up beds now remain. If Russian pertinacity and Russian bribes were, however, to succeed in obtaining control over Khiva, how much would even then remain to be done! The distance from Khiva to the Indus by way of Balkh, the vast snowy range of the Hindoo- Koosh, Cabul, and Peshawur, is certainly not less than 1100 English miles, and the route is beset with difficulties of the most perilous kind, even if there were no British army on or near the Indus. Count de Bibrnstjerna, one of the best modern writers on India, pronounces a Russian invasion of that country impossible ; but an impartial estimate of the different views put forth by various writers seems to lead to this average or mean — that Russian policy is certainly a standing menace to British India; but that it is a menace which England, by moderate circumspection and activity, can render comparatively harmless. At an early period of the war, two agents were despatched from Constantinople to Circassia, CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC TURKEY IN 1854. 127 apparently from the British embassy, to make in- quiries concerning the state, number, and feelings of the mountaineers in respect to the great objects of the war. They first visited such of the Russian forts as had been abandoned between Anapa and Batoum. The agents, Mr Sarrell and another Englishman, found, in the first place, that the inhabitants of Abasia, between the Caucasus and the north-east shore of the Black Sea, were willing to join in any operations against the Russians ; and, in the second place, that they were under the authority of a naib, named Emin Bey, who was lieutenant, or deputy, of Schamyl. The great chief of Daghestan had thus extended his influence over Circassian tribes. In the course of about eight years, Emin Bey, invested with authority by the warrior-prophet, had worked a great change in the numerous tribes around him. Some had been little better than pagans ; some Moham- medans, who had forgotten all but the name of Islam ; yet the lieutenant had succeeded in working great results among them. His chief weapon of argument seems to have been, that the only hope of the mountaineers to remain permanently independent of Russia would depend on a united and holy faith in Islam — to conduct their struggle, indeed, on religious as well as political grounds. This was adding one more to the already large number of instances, during the war, of hot fanaticism being employed in aggravation of national hostilities. However friendly the moun- taineers may have been to any hostile attack against Russia, it does not appear that the agents succeeded in establishing any definite arrangement or agreement with them. CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC! TURKEY IN 18 5 4. Such, then, was Schamyl ; such the mountaineers of the Caucasus ; such the relations between them and Russia at the period when the war commenced. A collision between the Turks and Russians in Asia was certain, whether the Caucasians sided with the former or remained neutral ; for the Asiatic boundary between the two empires is not less than 400 miles in extent, in the irregular line from Batoum to Mount Ararat. This celebrated moun- tain forms the meeting-point of three empires — the Russian, Turkish, and Persian ; and from thence to the Black Sea at Batoum, the Russianised countries of Georgia, Imeritia, and Mingrelia, confront the rugged regions of Asiatic Turkey. It may be well here to note that Asia Minor — the ancient name for the remarkable peninsula which is bounded on the north, west, and south, by the Euxine, the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, the iEgean, and the Mediterranean — is not a name adopted by the Turks. The peninsula is divided by them into pachalics or eyalets, such as Anadoli or Anatolia, Karamania, Adana, Era-rum or Erzeroum, Trebizond, Kars, &c. Armenia, like Poland, is now little more than a geographical name : as the latter unfortunate country has been partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, so has the former been appropriated by Russia, Persia, and Turkey. The name, however, is not unimportant in connection with any contest between Russia and Turkey ; for Erzeroum, Kars, Erivan, and Bayazid, are all in Armenia, and the groundwork of the population is Christian Armenian, having more ties of sym- pathy in faith with the Muscovite than with the Osmanli, although in few respects better treated by the former than by the latter. Irrespective of the forces in other provinces of the two empires, it becomes necessary to shew the relative strength of the opposing armies at and near the Asiatic frontier, at the breaking out of hostilities between Turkey and Russia. The following is on the authority of General Klapka, who went out to the East, apparently as an observer, on the commencement of hostilities, and who was in correspondence with Hungarian officers engaged in the war. * The Turks, when the sultan declared war in October 1853, had, in accordance with the mili- tary system established ten years earlier, four army-corps or ordus in Asia — namely, those of Anatolia, Irak, Arabistan, and the Guards. Or, rather, such ought to have been the case ; but the ordu of Irak was wholly absorbed in garrison duty ; the ordu of Arabistan was only of half strength ; and the ordu of Guards was mostly employed in European Turkey. Hence the effec- tive force was far below the regulations of the system. It amounted to about 36,000 foot, 4000 horse, and 100 guns. In the course of the autumn, 24,000 Bashi-Bazouks and other irregulars joined the army ; and, in addition, a fresh levy was ordered in Syria and Anatolia. These forces Avere distributed in unequal proportions on three different points. Two-thirds were encamped at Kars, under Abdi Pacha, the Mushir or Marshal of Anatolia ; the larger half of the third part was at Batoum, under Selim Pacha, formerly commander of the Guards at Constantinople ; and the remainder in the vicinity of Bayazid, under another Selim Pacha. The Russian strength at the same time was somewhat as follows. The so-called army of the Caucasus was formidable in number — about 80,000 men ; but the extent of territory which it was called upon to defend was immense. The forces were distributed on both sides of the Caucasian chain. One duty was to defend the frontier-line running along the base of the mountains, from the Black Sea to the Caspian ; another, was to occupy the ports and fortified posts of the Crimea; a third consisted in the maintenance of the forts on the north-east coast of the Black Sea, such as Anapa and Soudjuk Kale ; a fourth, in the protection of the great military road over the Caucasus from * Klapka : The War in the East, p. 37. 128 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. Vladikaukas to Tiflis ; a fifth, in watching the movements of Schamyl up in the mountains ; and a sixth, in guarding the frontier-line on the southern hase of the Caucasus. These duties absorbed the services of so large a number of troops, that the Russians possessed but a small force to repel any hostile attack on the part of the Turks. This force amounted to about 25,000 men, and was disposed in five positions — namely, one portion, of 10,000 men, at Gumri, to protect the road to Tiflis against the Turks ; another, in the Upper Koor valley ; a third, in the province of Gouriel, on the road to Kutai's or Kutaiah ; a fourth, on the main road from Erivan to Bayazid ; while the fifth was kept as a disposable reserve near Tiflis. The Russian troops sent to the Caucasus com- prised draughts from the various kinds of arm in the czar's service, and were about equal in courage and skill to their compatriots north of the moun- tains. But the Turkish regiments were mostly below the level of those in European Turkey : the further removed they were from Constantinople, the more did the Ottoman generals indulge in that system of official peculation which prevails so largely both in Russia and in Turkey, and which subjects the poor soldiers to such sad privations. The motley group of officers belonging to the sultan's service at that time was distinguished by these two characteristics — that it comprised natives of various countries, nations, and religions ; and that the true original Turkish or Osmanli officers were for the most part not only venal but un- skilful. Many of those who gained renown in the war were not Turks, although in Turkish service. Omar Pacha was the Croatian Michael Lattas ; Behram Pacha was General Cannon ; Mouchavir Pacha was the English Captain or Admiral Slade. It was in Asia, however, that these Orientalised Europeans appeared in greatest number : some, men of unquestioned ability ; others, merely adventurers. The abortive revolutions of 1848-9 had left large numbers of Poles, Hungarians, and Italians, hanging loose on society ; and many of these, when Avar broke out in 1853, hastened to Constantinople to offer their military aid to the sultan. Officers as well as men being wanted, the Porte accepted the proffered aid without due inquiry into the merits of the applicants. As a consequence, questionable characters came into the receipt of Turkish money and Turkish titles. The good and the bad were equally hidden under high-sounding Oriental designations. Under the cloak of Kurschid Pacha was General Guyon, the distinguished Hungarian; Iskender Bey was Count Ilinski; Ismail Pacha, General Kmeti, the Hun- garian ; Fezzi Bey, General Colman ; . Ferhad Pacha, General Stein ; Nevris Bey, Major Bon- fanti ; Sadik Bey, a Pole named Chyka ; Shahin Pacha, General Brainski ; Arslan Pacha, General Bystronowski ; Emir Bey, Baron Schwartzenberg ; Tophan Bey, Colonel Gotschiminski. To what extent these officers had been entitled to appro- priate the rank of 'general,' the Turkish seraskier or war-minister did not take much pains to ascertain. When the sultan declared war against Russia, the year 1853 was far advanced, and little oppor- tunity occurred for hostilities in Asia. Klapka contends that the Turkish commander should have guarded his army against partial losses, by remain- ing strictly on the defensive in respect to the Russian main army opposite Kars; and should have struck a well-planned and rapid blow against Erivan, in Russian Armenia, as a means of obtaining the aid of the inhabitants of the Lower Koor, who are always ready to act against the Muscovites. Abdi Pacha adopted one of these plans, but not the other ; he posted part of his army as a corps of observation near Kars, and placed the rest in winter-quarters at Erzeroum as a reserve. He received orders from Constantinople, however, to commence an active attack, leaving to his own judgment the selection of place and circumstances. All around this neighbourhood is a region of rugged mountains. The pachalic of Erzeroum is the most important in Asia Minor, extending over a population of 800,000 souls, distributed in 1500 villages and a few large towns. The chief city itself, Erzeroum, is roundly estimated to contain 40,000 inhabitants, besides the garrison, of which number 30,000 are Osmanlis ; for here, as in Asiatic Turkey, the real Turks are found mostly in the towns, while the villages are chiefly inha- bited by Armenians, or other Christian nations. Erzeroum was once held by the Genoese, in the zenith of their power ; and it then contained 100,000 inhabitants : even in 1828, it numbered 80,000, which number has been reduced one-half by pestilence and emigration. The town contains twenty-eight khans, thirteen public baths, seventy mosques and mesjids, and churches for the Arme- nian, Greek, and Latin Christians. Considered strategically, the town is unfavourably situated; for although it is at a considerable elevation above the level of the sea, it is commanded by a higher hill, called Palan Dukan, which would be formidable in the hands of an enemy. At the commencement of the war, Erzeroum was wholly tin fortified, except in the possession of a shattered and decayed Genoese wall, a deep but overgrown ditch, and a few crumbling round and square toAvers. The Avestern branch of the Euphrates, called the Kara-su, rises at a short distance from the town. This name, Kara-su, is applied to many Turkish rivers ; it is equivalent to our Black-Avater, of which there are several among the rivers of England and Ireland. Kars and Tiflis are north- east of Erzeroum ; Erivan and Bayazid are nearly east ; and Trebizond north-west. * While Abdi Pacha was preparing to execute the operations intrusted to him, Zarif Mustapha Pacha., * It may be useful to note here the distances, along the usual hut wretched roads, from Erzeroum to three of the towns named above —namely, to Trebizond, 180 miles; to Kars, 120 miles; to Tiflis, 250 miles. This is reckoned at 3j English miles to the 'hour' — the Oriental road-measuring being rather by time than by space. CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC TURKEY IN 1854. 129 governor of the province of Erzeroum, collected a body of Bashi-Bazouks, crossed from Ardahan into the district of Akhaltsik (Akhiska), and impetuously attacked a small body of Russians there posted. The Russians retreated, shut themselves up in the fortress of Akhaltsik, and were there besieged by Mustapha, aided by an additional body of troops sent to him. Meanwhile, the main Turkish army crossed the frontier near the river Arpachai, and established a camp upon Russian ground, as a base for an offensive movement against Gumri. The last- named fortress is an important defence for the city of Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, and was well looked after by the Russians during the war. It was a hostile attack in this direction which Klapka conceives to have been ill judged on the part of the Turkish commander. At first, the plan of Abdi Pacha seemed likely to be attended with some success ; but he was without a siege-train ; the winter set in with great severity, and his Bashi- Bazouks had devastated the country all around, rendering the labours of the Turkish commissariat exceedingly difficult. He was obliged to retreat from Gumri to Kars; the Russians followed him, overtook his army about midway between the two towns at a place called Gediklcr, and utterly routed Eezeboum. them. The Russians, deeming a further advance imprudent, retreated to Gumri, where they fortified and provisioned themselves for the winter, while the Turks similarly retreated to winter at Kars. This was not the only discomfiture experienced by the Turks. While Abdi Pacha was thus sus- taining a defeat at Gediklcr, Zarif Mustapha Pacha was equally unfortunate at Akhaltsik; the Russian garrison of this place, receiving an augmentation of force under General Andronikoff, was enabled to attack and defeat the Turks who were besieging the fortress, and to drive them over the frontier back to Ardahan. These twofold defeats, at Gediklcr and Akhaltsik, depressed the Turkish troops, annoyed the government, and led to the deposition of Abdi Pacha. The Turks in Asia Minor had no Omar Pacha among them ; they were not well commanded. Two circumstances combined to render these victories less advantageous to the Russians than might have been expected. A heavy fall of snow, presaging the immediate approach of stern winter, put an end to any further operations near Kars; while Schamyl, at a time when the Russians were engaged in another direction, suddenly descended from his mountains into the plains of Georgia at the head of 16,000 horse, fired 200 small villages, and carried away, as hostages, several Russian ladies who were residing in their country-houses near Tiflis. The Russians, to expel these intruders, found themselves called upon to confine their attention during the winter mainly to the vicinity of Tiflis and Gumri. At the commencement of the year 1854, the Turkish army in Asia was in a thoroughly disor- ganised state, owing partly to defeat, but still more to mismanagement. "While winter -snows yet enveloped the country, General Guyon (Kurschid Pacha) arrived from Damascus with an ill-defined commission from the Porte to reorganise the army. He was a favourite with the troops, but was viewed with jealousy by the Osmauli pachas ; 130 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. and at no time during the war was he enabled fully to render the service which his abilities and his inclination prompted — being, as he was, thwarted by others, who envied where they could not equal. He proceeded, however, with great energy in his labour of re-forming the scattered materials of the army. Hai'redden Pacha, minister of police at Constantinople, arrived about the same time at Erzeroum from the capital, as commis- sioner to inquire into the conduct of the Turkish generals. It was soon found that the poor troops had suffered dreadfully ; they were almost without food or clothing during a period of typhus and fever; the pachas had appropriated to their own use the money in the military- chest, thereby leaving the troops without supplies. The men had on some occasions passed four or five days without regular rations. Even if the pachas had been honest, the troops would still have suffered ; for the road from Kars to Erzeroum was blocked up with snow, insomuch that fifteen days, instead of five, were required to bring even the smallest amount of stores from the latter town to the former. The shoes of the poor soldiers were worn to tatters, at a season of intensely biting frost. At the best of times, the shoes are the worst part of the Turkish soldier's equipment. An eye-witness has said, that 'so long as the Turkish army is shod as it is, it never can march well. Behind stone- walls, in the breach, and in garrison, they are the bravest of the brave; but I verily believe they could not, if the safety of the empire depended on it, make a forced march, or continue one of fifteen miles a day for a week, either for the purposes of retreat or attack. While they were an army of cavalry, this practice did not matter much, parti- cularly as the wide Turkish stirrup protected the foot; but infantry must knock up on hard roads and in bad weather with such shoeing. It would be curious to inquire how much the decay of the Osmanli may depend on the soles of their shoes since they ceased to be an equestrian army, and assumed European tactics and formation, without abandoning the most objectionable portion of their Mohammedan attire.' The disadvantages must, of course, have been all the greater when the shoes, such as they were, had become merely rags. Guyon and Hai'redden speedily effected improve- ments in the condition of the troops — the former by his skill as a general, the latter by virtue of the high powers intrusted to him. The offending pachas were either dismissed or sent to Constan- tinople for trial; clothes were provided; the troops received a month's pay on account; the contractors for provisions were detected and punished for fraud ; and the army began to assume a regular shape. Hai'redden executed justice on an offending baker in a style truly Oriental. The bread supplied to the troops had been black and gritty, although the contractor had received the government price for a better quality ; whereupon Hai'redden caused five large loaves to be brought to him, and, taking out all the filthy, black, coarse crumb, forced the contractor to swallow the whole quantity, until he was 'swollen to nearly double his usual breadth.' A change of ministry in Turkey affects govern- ment appointments as in England, but much more grossly. Mehemet Ali Pacha, when minister of war towards the close of 1853, appointed as com- mander of the Asiatic army Ismail Pacha, who had just distinguished himself at Kalafat ; but Riza Pacha, chosen successor to Mehemet, revoked the appointment of Ismail, and gave the command of the army of Asia to Zarif Mustapha Pacha, at that time governor of Erzeroum. Mr Duncan, who was with the Turkish army throughout the campaign of 1854, considers this to have been a selection very disastrous to the interests of the sultan — Zarif Mustapha being in no sense equal to the duties imposed upon him. Hai'redden's commission terminated when Zarif's appointment became known ; and it remained to be seen how far Zarif, with an acknowledged position, and Guyon in one more doubtful, could succeed in managing a campaign against the Russians. Guyon had not merely the enmity of Osmanli pachas to contend against ; there were Polish officers also, in the sultan's service, who held the Hungarian in no good- will. Among the many remarkable examples, fur- nished by the Russian war, of the untiring energy and unsparing liberality of the English newspaper press, were those connected with the military operations of the Turks and Russians in Asia in 1854. Sharing in all the vicissitudes and hardships of the Turkish camp were two Englishmen, who encountered snow and ice, dust and heat, rain and mud, privation and disease, in order that they might send to London regular accounts of the progress of the army. One of these was Colonel Thorne, special correspondent of the Times, whose health gave way under the hardships of a winter-journey from Trebizond to Erzeroum ; the other was Mr Duncan, to whose pen the English public is indebted for a mass of curious information con- cerning Asia Minor, its people, and its warfare* This part of Asia is in a frightful state in respect to roads; the travelling arrangements are of the most primitive kind ; and Colonel Thorne and Mr Duncan were compelled to mark out for their own use routes of communication, through which their letters might be despatched. Little did the London readers of the letters from ' our own correspondent' know or think how much ingenious planning and costly working were required to secure the transmission of those letters. The two Englishmen, after many abortive plans — of which one, very expensive and not very successful, was that of employing mounted Tatars or couriers — decided on engaging three swift sais or messengers, to walk or run to and from Erzeroum and Kars. These messengers were gray -headed old men, whose powers of endurance as pedestrians were * A Campaign ivith the Turks in Asia. CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC TURKEY IN 1854. 131 remarkable, and whose honesty and zeal were above suspicion. Two of these men were con- stantly on the road, one coming from, and the other going to, Erzeroum — Kars being the head- quarters. Every Tuesday morning one of the messengers started from Kars with the letters, consigned to the care of an Armenian merchant at Erzeroum, who sent back the messenger with any letters or newspapers which happened to have arrived from England. The letters from Kars were forwarded, under cover, from Erzeroum to Trebizond by a regular, or rather a very irregular post; from Trebizond to Constantinople they were conveyed by one of the Black Sea steamers ; and from Constantinople to England by the ordinary mail. A whole month was consumed in the conveyance of the letters from Kars to London; they were consigned to six different authorities in succession; and the postage in the end 'reached a very pretty figure,' as Mr Duncan states. The 'mail' between Erzeroum and Trebizond was a mounted Tatar ; and when this mail brought letters from England, he also brought from Trebi- zond a stock of coffee, candles, and other luxuries, Trebizond. for the two Englishmen — which luxuries were duly handed over to the sais for conveyance from Erzeroum to Kars. It was quite an event at Kars when these men arrived. Only two accidents occurred to them — an attack of snow-blindness on a dreadful winter-day; and a robbery by brigands, to whom the contents of the wallet from Kars could not have been very satisfactory. The third sais was retained in pay, in case of exigencies. The relative distances between Trebizond, Erze- roum, Kars, and Tiflis, have already been given ; but it is desirable to notice briefly here the route in question, because it is that by which all European supplies reached the Turkish army at Kars. Trebizond, the ancient Trapesus, is a seaport on the south-east shore of the Black Sea. The ancient Trapesus was a colony from Sinope, which was itself a colony of Milesians. The town, in one or other of its several periods, was owned by Greeks, then by Pontians, next by Romans, afterwards by Byzantines, then by the monarchs of a Trebizond kingdom, and, lastly, by the Turks. The population may now amount to about 30,000, mostly Osmanlis, but including a few thousand Greeks and Arme- nians — the Mohammedans residing within the walls, and the Christians outside. After Odessa, Trebi- zond is the first commercial port in the Black Sea ; it is the place at which European manufactures are landed, for inland conveyance through Erzeroum and Bayazid to the heart of Persia. Steamers are now engaged in this trade, bringing cargoes from Constantinople in three or four days. Mr Duncan sets down the imports in 1852 at the large sum of £2,100,000 ; the exports being about one-third of that amount : three-fourths of the imports were manufactured goods from England. The com- mercial importance of unrestricted trade to the south-east coast of the Black Sea becomes hence fully evident to English merchants. Such is Trebizond. But the route thence to the scene of warfare and of commerce in the interior is surrounded with terrible difficulties. Khans or inns, with littlo to eat and no beds for the weary 132 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. traveller ; pathways instead of roads, on which neither care nor money seems to have been laid out ; mountain-passes, bounded on the one hand by lofty perpendicular rocks, and on the other by frightful abysses ; slippery paths, down which the poor horses and mules are frequently hurled and dashed to pieces in the ravines far below ; inter- mediate plains, which are sultry and feverish in summer, and converted into wild pathless solitudes when clothed with snow in the winter ; ascents and descents, so steep that no wheel-vehicles of any kind can traverse them, while a whole day is required for ten oxen to drag a cannon four miles along them — these are the characteristics of the 180 miles which separate Trebizond from Erzeroum. The Turkish commissioner, Hairedden Pacha, followed this route in mid- winter ; and, though provided with a formidable convoy, several of his baggage-horses perished, and two of his attendants were frozen to death. A caravan, laden with Persian goods for Trebizond, was about the same time overtaken by a snow-storm, which destroyed a score of horses and several men. At that very period, a caravan was passing from Trebizond to Erzeroum, comprising 200 horses laden with bales of Manchester cotton goods, two large bales to each horse ; the cottons, in the white state, were intended, when safely deposited at Teheran in Persia, to be printed or dyed in various colours, for the surrounding markets — in this way does commerce mark out channels for itself, in spite of war and all other embarrassments. The road from Erzeroum to Kars is less difficult ; but it presents scarcely a single khan or house of reception for travellers ; insomuch that, unless a wayfarer carry his provisions with him, his wants are likely to be scantily supplied; the hospitality of the Turks in the villages would, indeed, be almost the only barrier between him and starvation. Along this strange road, then, and through this rugged region, had to be conveyed most of the European supplies to the Turkish army, wherewith to commence the campaign of 1854 ; the other portion being landed at Batoum, nearer the Cau- casian frontier. The Turkish government, roused to activity by the disasters of 1853 in Asia, sought to place its army on a better footing. The exer- tions of Guyon and Hairedden to this end have already been adverted to. Various regiments, distributed over Kurdistan and Arabistan, were ordered to advance to Kars ; while the redif or reserve troops, collected from their village-homes in the provinces of Tokat and Sivas, bent their steps in the same direction. Bands of Syrian and Arabian irregulars, also, were called up to swell the num- ber of available soldiers on the bleak plateaux of Armenia. Munitions of war continually poured in from Constantinople via Trebizond. The Russian forces in Georgia and on the shores of the Caspian, in the early spring of 1854, were ascertained with much exactness by Mr Duncan. The forts on the Black Sea — Soucoum Kale, Redout Kale, Soudjuk Kale, &c. — were, as narrated in the last Chapter, destroyed by the Russians during the course of the spring and summer, in apprehension of threatened attacks from the English and French ; but further east, whither those opponents had not penetrated, the forts were carefully maintained. Several such forts, of which the chief was at Derbend, dotted the western side of the Caspian ; they were capable of offering a successful resistance to badly-armed mountaineers, but would speedily have fallen before a regular army. The regiments were frequently changed, but the strength of the garrisons was kept up. At the period now under notice, a regiment of chasseurs was at Grozno, a temporar} r fort situated in a plain washed by the river Sountcha ; a second regiment of chasseurs at Nizapni, a stone-fort on a mountain near the river Andreievska, two days' march from Grozno ; a regiment of the line at Temerhauloure, a mud- fort in a plain two days' march from Nizapni ; another line-regiment at Kazikoumik, near Der- bend, five days' march from Temerhauloure ; a regiment at Kouba, a temporary fort, three days' march from Kazikoumik ; a regiment of chasseurs at Harahatche, an unfortified spot> about eight days' march from Kouba and two from Tiflis ; a regiment of Georgian grenadiers at Gori, a dis- mantled stone-fort, two days distant from Tiflis ; the regiment of Erivan at Manglis, a day and a half from Tiflis ; a regiment of dragoons in the district between the river Terek and the fort at Temerhauloure ; while a few regiments of Don Cossacks were employed in watching the Persian and Turkish frontiers. In addition to these forces, there were sixteen battalions of veterans spread over the country, either in small forts or in towns. Some of the chieftains of the districts over which Russia had a kind of protective control furnished also bodies of armed men, whom the Russian government took into its pay — namely, 1000 horse by Prince Andronikoff; 1000 by Prince Orbelianoff ; 2000 by Ahmed Mehinlinski ; 1000 by Kouminski Bey ; and 3000 by the Alahdan or Aladin of the Kazikoumiks. In the month of April, besides the troops stationed in the above-named forts, Mr Duncan estimated that the Russians had 30,000 men ready to meet the Turks in the field. These forces were thus disposed — 15,000 at Gumri, under Prince BebutofF; 8000 at Orzugheti (Urzughetti), under Prince Andronikoff; 3000 at Erivan, under General "Wrangel ; and 4000 at Akhaltsik. To oppose these, there were four bodies of Turkish troops, 37,000 in all — namely, 20,000 at Kars, under Zarif Mus- tapha Pacha ; 13,000 at Batoum, under Selim Pacha ; 2000 at Bayazid, under another Selim Pacha ; and 2000 at Ardahan, under Osman Pacha. The reserve-depot for the Russians was at Tiflis ; and that for the Turks at Erzeroum. An intelli- gible idea of the hostile array may be formed by tracing the frontier, from its commencement at the eastern end of the Black Sea, in an irregular line south-eastward to Mount Ararat ; four Russian armies or bodies of troops Avere on one side of this CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC TURKEY IN 1854. 133 line ; four Turkish on the other : each of the one group confronted one of the other group ; and each group was backed by its reserve-depot. "When the news reached Ears that England and France had declared war against Russia, it was accompanied by a report that an English army was on its Avay to Kars md Trebizond and Erze- roum. The report gave extravagant delight, to be succeeded by gloom when the incorrectness of the rumour became evident. Mr Duncan, in this as in many other parts of his narrative, descants on the value of such a demonstration in Asia by the Allies. ' England could never have undertaken a campaign in which her interests were more at stake than in Georgia. By the expulsion of Russia from that province, and the destruction of her strongholds on the Caspian — which, in late years, has been a mere Russian lake — the influence of Russia in the East, and her covetous longings towards India, would alike have been dispelled. The fascination with which Russia, by her money or her intrigues, more than by force of arms, has enchained Persia and the vast regions bordering on the Caspian, would have snapped asunder, and the prestige of England have risen, if possible, still higher. At the same time, the difficulties to be overcome by force of arms were trifling, when compared with the largeness of the stake at issue.'* Mr Duncan, however, was forced to confess, that the topographical difficulties connected with the advance of an army from Trebizond to Tiflis vid Erzeroum and Kars are tremendous. On another occasion, when the Turks had suffered a reverse, the same writer said : ' By this defeat, Turkey has lost much, but England has lost still more. And on whom lies the blame ? A great deal certainly on the Turkish soldiers ; but, I declare solemnly, still more on England. The British authorities in London and Constantinople were well aware of the doubtful condition of this army, and had only lately been warned by the defeat of the Batoum corps. The English consular body in this part of Asia had never ceased impressing upon their responsible head the necessity of the presence here of an English or French division, however small its numerical amount — 3000 bayonets would have sufficed — for it was only needed to encourage the Turks by a brilliant example.' Any triumph of the Russians circulates with boundless exaggeration through timid Persia, and over the Caspian steppes, into the barbarous regions of Khiva and Bokhara. The nations and tribes of the East become visibly impressed with military success or greatness ; and any renown of the Russians in Asia tends to lessen the moral hold of England over her Indian posses- sions. The expediency of affording aid to the Turks in Asia was frequently urged in parliament about that period. The Earl of Ellenborough on one occasion said : ' Any blow struck against Turkey in Asia paralyses the Turkish Empire. More than that — the whole commerce between Turkey and * Duncan : i. 279. Persia is carried on by Trebizond and Erzeroum, and the occupation of those places by Russia puts an end to that trade, insulates Persia, and most materially affects her policy. But, notwithstanding these circumstances, we did not carry on war in Asia as we did in Europe, with army against army. "We had in Asia nations at our disposal. We had nations conquered, but yet disposed to throw off the yoke. "We had still more — a gallant nation which has been for years in arms, success- fully defending its independence. "We should make war with their army as well as by the troops we could detach for any operation of this kind ; but this mode of action has been altogether neglected.'* The plans of the Allies, whether judiciously or otherwise, did not comprise any expedition of English or French troops into Asia ; and the Turks had to prepare single-handed for the forth- coming campaign. The year had opened somewhat auspiciously for them. About the middle of January, 3000 Russians issued from Orzugheti, and marched on to Chefketil or St Nikolaia : the former is a small town in Georgia, north-west of Tiflis and Gumri, while Chefketil is situated on the sea-margin boundary of the two empires. Chefketil had belonged to Russia, but had been captured by the Turks in the autumn of 1853 ; and it was in the hope of effecting a recapture that the attack was now made. The Russians concealed themselves in a jungle near the fort, and prepared for a night-surprise. The Turkish pickets, however, gave a timely alarm ; the Otto- man garrison issued forth, and attacked the Russians so fiercely as to drive them back in the utmost disorder. The Russian loss was severe, while the Turks suffered comparatively little. Selim Pacha was one of the few Turkish officers who distinguished himself in Asia; it was he who, starting from Batoum soon after the declaration of war by Turkey, had captured Chefketil, in an action which cost the Russians 1000 men and a large store of ammunition ; and it was he who how defeated Andronikoff in the attempt to recapture the place. The main army from Kars, as lately narrated, had ended the year disastrously; the Bayazid army, under another Selim Pacha, had effected nothing ; while AH Pacha had been unfortunate in the neighbourhood of Ardahan and Akhaltsik. The success at the opening of 1854 was confined therefore to Selim Pacha's proceed- ings at Batoum and Chefketil. The Turks were enabled about that time to land troops at Batoum as reinforcements to the army, and also a supply of arms and ammunition for Schamyl, who had been prevented only by his limited stores from proffering active aid to the sultan. Schamyl's lieutenaut in Abasia — a narrow strip of country between the mountains and the Black Sea — had been instrumental in obtaining these supplies from the Turks. As the spring of 1854 advanced, the Turks * .Speech in the House of Lords, May 14, 1S54. 134 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. strengthened themselves at Kars and the Russians at Gumri, each narrowly watching the other. Both received reinforcements, especially the Turks ; hut the sultan's forces unfortunately suffered in consequence of the wrangles between the officers ; the Poles were in many cases jealous of the Hungarians, and the Osmanlis jealous of hoth. Had not the Russians heen doubtful concerning the intentions of the vacillating court of Persia, an attack on the Turkish positions would in all pro- bability have been made in spring ; but, distrusting their own safety, they postponed their advance. By about April, there were nearly twenty pachas with the army at Kars, weakening it by conflicting counsels, and by peculation which no amount of supervision could wholly prevent ; the troops, although increased in number and improved in discipline and supplies, suffered greatly from typhus, brought on mainly by previous neglect. One of the earliest hostile encounters in the year was a petty affair. Towards the end of April, about 3000 Cossacks and Russian infantry, with a battery of guns, left Gumri, crossed the river Arpachai, and attacked an outpost of Bashi- Kabs. Bazouks at the village of Eugene" ; they killed a few, took a few more prisoners, and then returned to Gumri. During April and May, the Turks at Kars were regularly drilled, to fit them for an evidently approaching conflict with the Russians. In this necessary work, however, the best arrange- ments were certainly not made. None of the European officers were regimentally employed; they were appointed to the staff headed by Guyon,' and were employed as inspectors of artillery practice, instructors in cavalry movements, and overseers of the commissariat ; these services were valuable, in so far as the jealousy of the Turkish pachas permitted their development; but even then the troops lost the benefit of the aid that might have been derived from the Hungarian generals in all that related to regimental drilling. The army at Kars having at that time reached 25,000, Guyon advised a march across the river Arpachai, to be followed by the seizure of Erivan ; and the troops were themselves eager to advance to action; but Guyon was outvoted by the Osmanli pachas at a council of war, and nothing was done. This council was held on the 18th of May ; and the few Englishmen who were then with the army were forcibly struck with the contrast between the men and their leaders, in all that related to courage, activity, and honesty. The sultan indeed, throughout the war, was inefficiently supported by his generals, except in a few instances. Kars, thus likely to be the scene of a contest between the opposing forces, was at one period the capital of a petty Armenian kingdom of the same name; but it had fallen greatly in importance, and at the breaking out of the war, it was scarcely known to Europe. Merchants stopped there, on their road to and from Persia ; but it was a poor, dull place; and hence the inhabitants, about 15,000 in number, became greatly excited when their town was occupied by the Turkish army. The inhabitants suffered before the troops advanced towards Gumri in October 1853 ; they suffered still more after the disastrous defeat ; and the ensuing CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC TURKEY IN 1854. 135 winter and spring brought them little relief, for the pachas were wont to seize all the humble stores of the shopkeepers and peasants, leaving the question of payment in a very unsettled state. The town is commanded by an extensive castle, built while the Genoese were possessed of this district; the castle, now nearly crumbled into ruins, stands perched on a rocky hill, at the foot of which flows the little river Kars-chai. This hill is, however, overtopped by one still higher, on the opposite side of the river, the Kara-dagh or Black Mountain ; and when Prince Paskevitch attacked Kars in a former war, he obtained control both over the town and the castle by occupying this higher hill with a few guns. One of the duties which the Turks undertook in the spring of 1854 was to crown this Kara-dagh with defences, which Guyon recommended should consist of eight redoubts, carrying 48 guns. The whole of the adult males of Kars were forced to assist in constructing these earthworks, which by degrees assumed formidable proportions. Gumri, a similar place to Kars, in so far as it was occupied by an army watching an enemy not very far distant, had been rendered by the Russians much stronger than Kars by the Turks. Since the czar had acquired possession of this town and its neighbourhood in the previous war, he had wonderfully improved it ; the streets and houses had been rebuilt in European style, in conformity with its change of name from the Oriental Gumri to the Russianised Alexandropol. Being situated on the banks of the Arpachai, which separates the two empires, it had been strongly fortified, far beyond anything that the Turks possessed in Asia ; it having at least 150 mounted cannon, many of them casemated. The distance between Kars and Gumri is less than twelve leagues ; the Russians knew all that was done at the first-named place, through the instru- mentality of numerous spies ; whereas the indo- lent and incapable Turkish commander made no efforts to obtain a knowledge of the state and strength of Gumri. Most of the emissaries sent by or to Schamyl, to concert measures with the pacha, were waylaid by the Russians ; and Zarif Mustapha remained in ignorance even of the proceedings of Selim Pacha at Batoum. At length, in the month of June, the antagonist armies approached nearer. On the 25th of the preceding month, 500 Russians, with four field- pieces, had crossed the Arpachai into the Turkish territory, pitched their tents and threw up a field- work — indicating an intention on the part of Prince Bebutoff to commence hostilities. On the 9th of June, four regiments of Russian cavalry, one of infantry, and fifteen guns, left Gumri, and took up a position atTechnitz, on the Arpachai, six hours distant from Kars ; here they encountered a body of Bashi-Bazouks under the Hungarian Kmeti, when a skirmish ensued, followed by the retreat of both parties to their respective camps. This was believed to be a feint, intended to draw off the attention of the Turks from a Russian attack in some other quarter. Kmeti, an old campaigner, had succeeded in bringing his Bashi- Bazouks into excellent trim ; and their cavalry charge on the Russians greatly exhilarated the Turks, who seldom effect any successful achieve- ments with cavalry. The Russians, about that time, exhibited symptoms of movement along their whole line from the Caucasus to Bayazid ; concen- trating a large body of troops near Gori. This town, situated in a plain about 40 miles from Tiflis and 150 from Chefketil, at the junction of the river Koor with a large stream flowing from the Elbruz mountain, afforded a favourable centre either for attack or defence, in respect to the opponent forces. It was, indeed, full time that active service of some kind should commence ; for the sword and the bullet would have been less disastrous to the Turks than other calamities which they were called upon to bear. In the seven or eight months from November to June, the Ottoman army in and around Kars had lost 10,000 men through typhus, hunger, cold, nakedness, and every kind of priva- tion, most of which might have been avoided if the pachas had possessed a moderate amount of skill and honesty. The Russians, too, had suffered terribly. Two regiments of the sixth corps d'armee had been nine months marching from Moscow to Gumri, over the Caucasus, amid sore privations; and even those quartered near Tiflis had been swept off in large numbers by disease. At a council of war, held at Kars towards the end of June, General Guyon, believing that the Turks, notwithstanding all their losses, were still well able to cope with the Russians, proposed a bold and comprehensive scheme, in which all the four bodies of troops at Kars, Batoum, Bayazid, and Ardahan, might take part; the main object being a simultaneous attack upon Kuta'is (Kutaiah), Erivan, Gumri, and Tiflis. But the Turkish mushir or commander, Zarif Mustapha, was utterly unfitted to appreciate or execute such a plan ; he had never before commanded even so much as a regiment in the field ; he had been placed in command solely by virtue of favouritism. Where an army is so managed that the commander-in- chief himself bastinadoes a contractor for sending in half-baked bread — an event which really occurred at Kars — it may be imagined that petty details, rather than comprehensive schemes, would mark the course of public affairs. Guyon was overruled; nothing was done; and an army, now reaching 30,000, began to suffer from heat as much as it had before suffered from cold. Mr Duncan asserts, from the knowledge which he obtained on the spot, that had Guyon and Kmeti been in com- mand, within two months Tiflis would have been captured, and the Russian forces either cut to pieces or driven out of Georgia across the Caucasus: so much larger at this time was the Turkish army near Kars than the Russian force at Gumri; for, with the regiments at Bayazid and Ardahan, the 136 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. Ottomans now numbered 40,000, with 120 pieces of artillery ; while the Russian force was believed to be limited to about 20,000. The month of July opened with active pro- ceedings on the part of the Russians. The garrison of Gumri, 15,000 strong, sallied forth under Prince Bebutoff on the 1st, crossed the Arpachai, and took up positions near the villages of Kurekdere and Ingedere, at about one hour's march only from Sobattan and Hadgi-Velikoi, at that time occupied by the Turkish outposts. There is a small moun- tain near the two villages ; and this mountain the Russians began immediately to fortify. On the 3d, Zarif Mustapha, vacillating between many plans suggested by his pachas, moved his army from Kars to Hadgi-Velikoi, and traced out an encampment. Here he was soon joined by Kerim Pacha, who brought the Turkish left wing from Ardahan, while Bebutoff in like manner received reinforcements which raised his army to 28,000; insomuch that there Avere now assembled nearly 70,000 Russian and Turkish troops, in the vicinity of the four villages above named. The Turks formed two camps, with Bashi-Bazouks in the van and on the flanks, and the cavalry and artillery in the centre. The advanced camp or division was placed under Kerim Pacha, while Zarif Mustapha himself took the command of the rear division. The Turks had a small mountain in front of them, like as the Russians; and these two mountains were occupied as observatories by the staffs of the respective armies. The incompetent Turkish commander at length resolved on an attack. On the 12th, he left his position, and advanced to within two miles of the Russian encampment. The Russians also advanced, and formed in order of battle. Kmeti began to skirmish with his Bashi-Bazouks, while the cavalry manoeuvred to the flanks, and the artillery advanced to the front. Just at this moment a storm broke forth, with a degree of fury hardly known before iu that district ; the ground was speedily converted into a deep morass ; the Russians retreated to their encampment, and Zarif Mustapha ordered a similar retreat. This unexpected event greatly disappointed the Turkish troops; they had braced themselves up to a bold and soldierly achievement, and there can hardfy be a doubt that they would have acquitted them- selves well if their efforts had been efficiently directed by their commander. Many wet, stormy days succeeded, and the Turks became disheartened, while Zarif exhibited the utmost bewilderment in attempting to decide whether to advance or to do nothing. From the moment when the advance of the army from Kars was made, the unruly Kurds who inhabit the mountain districts began to make predatory excursions ; the roads between Trebizond, Erzeroum, and Kars were rendered unsafe, and the unhappy villagers suffered greatly. After this unwelcome check, weeks passed without any decided encounter, although the two armies were within five miles of each other. Bebutoff was awaiting further reinforcements ; and Zarif displayed utter helplessness in respect to military plans. Disorganisation and treachery crept into the Turkish camp, while the Russians became so emboldened, that they came forth and reaped the corn in fields not far from the Turkish posts. On the 27th, a Russian force advanced to the village of Perghet, near the Turkish left flank, and cut and carried oiF a great quantity of wood ; the Turkish soldiers indignantly waited for orders from Zarif to attack them; but no such order came. By this time the five villages which have been named — Kurekdere, Ingedere, Sobattan, Hadgi-Velikoi, and Perghet — had become mere heaps of ruins ; the wooden houses had been destroyed for the sake of firewood; and every atom of corn and grass in the neighbourhood had been consumed by the men and horses of the two armies. One of the few active operations during the month was a dashing achievement by General Kmeti and his Bashi-Bazouks. In the dead of the night, on the 16th, he divided his 1500 horse- men into three columns, and galloped round the extreme left flank of the Russians. Having got to their rear without detection, he advanced silently to Baindir, a village near Gumri, defended by a small body of Cossacks and Georgian militia. At daybreak, one column attacked the village, one attacked the redoubts manned by the Russians, while the third remained in reserve. The Bashi- Bazouks utterly routed the enemy, taken thus suddenly by surprise ; but the main Russian army now shewed signs of approach ; and Kmeti and his active band succeeded in returning by another route to the Turkish camp, bringing with them five prisoners and 400 sheep. This daring act greatly delighted the Turks. Kmeti had offered to take even Gumri itself with his Bashi-Bazouks, but his timid commander would not allow him to make the attempt. On the 22d, another night-attack was planned by the Hunga- rian, to which Zarif Mustapha promised the aid of the regular troops. Shortly before daybreak, Kmeti charged with his Bashi-Bazouks at the centre of the Russian camp, and penetrated into the very tents of the enemy, capturing the first line of outposts. Speedily was he surrounded by the whole Russian army, and then it was that he looked for support from the regulars. But Avhere Avere these ? Zarif Mustapha, as usual — timid, irresolute, incompetent — did nothing; no regulars appeared, although ardent and eager to be engaged; and Kmeti had no resource but to cut his Avay back to the Turkish camp, losing many by the Avay, and burning Avith indignation at the unworthy treatment which he had received from his com- mander. The Bashi-Bazouks, under this heroic man, had shewn themselves susceptible of orderly discipline ; they had, indeed, acted as a light cavalry of an efficient kind, far better than Omar Pacha had been able to obtain for his Danubian campaign j and bitterly they lamented that the CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC TURKEY IN 1854. 137 mushir of the army of Asia was so utterly unequal to the duties of his high command. Little wonder that many of these primitive irregulars disbanded, and returned to their homes. August arrived, and with it a conviction that unless the Turkish commander speedily attempted something definite, his army would melt away or become disorganised. On the 5th, a night-attack was resolved upon ; Kerim Pacha to command the right division, Vely Pacha the left, and the mushir himself, Zarif Mustapha, to supei'intend both — or to spoil both, as the case might be. Guyon marked out the plan of the attack ; but his plan was not practically carried out. On Sunday the Gth of August, was fought a battle which covered Zarif Mustapha with dis- grace, and undid all that the Turks had effected in Asia, whether much or little, during the year 1854. In the dead of the night, the Turks left their encampment and began the march. The first error made manifest was, that the right division reached the enemy long before the left could come up to its support, in obedience to a stupid order by Zarif that the left should halt two hours, that daylight might assist its progress. The consequence was, that when the Russians — who were to have been taken by a night-surprise — saw that the right division was thus isolated, they at once con- centrated all their troops upon it, and commenced active proceedings before the left could arrive. The Turkish forces comprised 12 battalions of Arabistan infantry, 20 of Anatolian, 16 of rcdif, and 2 of rifles — making 20,000 infantry ; together with 3700 cavalry, 1300 artillery, and 78 guns. The Russians counted 20 battalions of infantry, 26 squadrons of dragoons, 4000 irregular cavalry, and 800 artillery, with 64 guns. Each army consisted of about 25,000 men ; but the Turks had also 8000 or 10,000 Bashi-Bazouks, who were, however, not engaged in this battle. If Guyon's plan had been followed, the two divisions of Turks would have attacked the Russians simultaneously, while a third Turkish corps would have obtained pos- session of the heights which commanded the enemy's encampment. But Zarif Mustapha ruined the scheme, and quietly smoked his chibouque while the right division was about to be attacked by nearly the whole Russian force. This division, under Kerim Pacha, numbered about 10,000 men. The artillery opened fire on both sides. The Russian infantry advanced, but were repelled by the Turks. The Russian dragoons then bore down at high speed, and with a loud cheer rushed upon the Turks, who, seized with a panic, turned and fled, leaving their artillery unprotected. This artillery then bore a series of terrific attacks from the dragoons ; both sides behaved courageously, and the fire was murderous. The Russian infantry made a second attack in large force against batta- lions of redif, who then witnessed fire for the first time ; the result was disastrous, for the redif turned and fled wildly towards Kars. The more disci- plined Turkish troops seem to have been chiefly in the left division, unfortunately abseut when most wanted. Meanwhile, the dragoons, after repeated attacks, captured the guns, the Turkish artillerymen remaining steadfast until nearly the last man was cut off. The dragoons, previously almost maddened with drink, then rushed indiscriminately at in- fantry, cavalry, and artillery ; and the Turks, completely paralysed by the impetuosity of the onslaught, gave way in all quarters ; the cavalry fled, the infantry were mowed down, the artillery- horses were shot, and the guns were captured. All the efforts of Kerim Pacha to re-form his division were vain. By this time the left division had arrived, and opened a vigorous cannonade on the Russians. For a time the tide turned. Kmeti attacked the Russian infantry vigorously; Tahir Pacha poured in a terrible fire from the artillery under his command; and Guyon bore down with 4000 cavalry on the Russian masses which began to waver. This was the critical moment — fatally critical for the Turks. The cavalry, coming suddenly upon a Russian infantry regiment at a spot where none was expected, were seized with so resistless a terror, that they fled panic-stricken, leaving Guyon alone with his personal staff These cowardly horsemen communicated a panic to the Bashi-Bazouks, who in their turn threw the infantry into such inextricable confusion that the generals lost command over them. All fled together in wild confusion towards Kars, pursued by the grapeshot of the Russian artillery and the sabres of the dragoons. Thus ended the disastrous battle of Kurekdere. The Turks lost 3500 in killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners ; while the Russians acknowledged a loss of more than 3000 in killed and wounded. The Russian dragoons and the Turkish artillery greatly distinguished themselves. Had the Turkish cavalry possessed any soldierly qualities, they might have redeemed even the disasters occasioned by Zarif Mustapha's folly ; but they and the untried redifs ruined all. The Russian officers were brave throughout, heading their men in all the charges, insomuch that no less than 111 of their number were killed or wounded ; whereas the Osmanli officers lurked in coward fashion in rear of their troops, with a very few exceptions. Bitter must have been the anger of Guyon and Kmeti to witness such conduct. Kerim Pacha, second in command, was one among the small number of exceptions ; he was a brave old man, and exerted himself indefatigably to keep up the courage of his troops. The defeat was most complete ; for not only did the Turks lose 5000 to 6000 men, but 6000 more fled in dismay to their homes after the battle, while the remaining moiety returned towards Kars in a state of the utmost disorganisation. Before noticing the close of this discreditable campaign in Asia in 1854, it will be necessary to trace briefly the proceedings of the subsidiary forces, in other parts of Armenia and Georgia. Sclim Pacha, it will be remembered, commanded 138 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. the Turks in the neighbourhood of Batoum. After Selim had obtained advantages at Chefketil and Orzugheti, in the previous winter, he might have effected yet more if he had well concerted his plans with Zarif Mustapha ; but the latter proved himself incapable of forming any comprehensive schemes. Selim remained during the spring master of his position ; but on the 9th of June, he deemed himself strong enough to assume the offensive. He sent forward a division of 3000 Bashi-Bazouks, and half a battalion of regulars, to attack two Russian redoubts, about six hours distant from Orzugheti, on the road to Kutai's. It appears to have been a mistaken piece of strategy ; the Turks were ignorant of the position and numbers of the Russians, and were defeated with great loss. This was followed by a still more serious defeat on the 16th. It was Prince KristofF who gained the day on the 9th, while Prince Andronikoff bore off the honours on the 16th. Andronikoff advanced towards Orzugheti on the 10th, with 8 battalions of infantry and 10 guns ; while Colonel Korganoff, with 4 battalions and 8 guns, advanced in the direction of Akty. They constructed a bridge over the little river Soupsu. On the 16th, Andronikoff, with the Russian force, now aided by cavalry, met Selim Pacha's army near Orzugheti, and defeated it. The Turks appear to have lost about 2000 men — a number swelled up in the Gazette du Caucase to 8000, according to a system frequently adopted by the Russian autho- rities. Selim was forced to retreat to Churuk-su ; and Andronikoff was thus enabled to spare troops to swell the main army at Gumri. The Russians made another attack on Selim in the night between the 18th and 19th, on the banks of the Tcholok, and obtained some success, though nothing of great importance. Selim Pacha was summoned to Constantinople to answer for his ill-luck, and was succeeded by Mustapha Pacha, who had distinguished himself at Oltenitza, under Omar Pacha. It is a point of some difficulty to distinguish between the numerous Selims, Mustaphas, and Achmets in the Turkish service. Another though smaller portion of the Turkish forces was at Ardahan. This was under the com- mand of Kerim Pacha, and numbered about 5000 men. During the spring, Kerim's force had remained nearly inactive, watching the Russians on the other side of the frontier, and being watched in turn. Early in June, however, the Russians, about 8000 strong, started from Akhaltsik, and threatened Ardahan. The result was mere skir- mishing, unimportant on either side. At Bayazid, however, near the frontier-line at Mount Ararat, the Turks met with a disastrous defeat.- "While Zarif Mustapha was wasting his strength and the fine summer weather in idleness at Ears, Prince Bebutoff was enabled to despatch strong reinforce- ments from Gumri to the army at Erivan, to enable it to attack the Turks at Bayazid. The Turks, 5000 in number, were commanded by Selim Pacha (not the general at Batoum); and, as they were weak, Selim was recommended not to make any attack on the Russians, but to retreat on Ears or Erzeroum if pressed by the enemy. Tins advice he neglected. On the 28th of July, General "Wrangel advanced from Erivan towards Bayazid with 8000 Russians, and 13 cannon. Selim at once sallied forth to a place called Kara-boulak, to meet this attack ; but his force being much smaller, he encountered a total defeat. The Turkish irregulars advanced against the Russian infantry, but were repelled, and were then pursued by the enemy's dragoons. The regulars then advanced, but could not contend against the more powerful Russian force: they turned and fled wildly towards Van, leaving 1500 dead, wounded, and prisoners. On the 31st, the Russians entered Bayazid, and seized a large amount of stores. This victory greatly aided the proceedings of the Russians in the battle of Kurekdere, fought by the main army a few days afterwards. The enormous exaggeration in which the Russian officers so frequently indulged during the war, was fully displayed in the dispatch announcing the victory at Kara-boulak. Wrangel asserted that the Turks were 15,000 strong; that 13,000 of these were engaged; that 5000 were cavalry ; and that 3000 were left dead on the field : whereas Mr Duncan, pointing out the extravagance of that report, states distinctly that the total Turkish force was 5000; that the cavalry (irregular) were 2500 ; and that the killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted altogether to 1500. It is painful to have to decide between two such utterly irreconcilable accounts; but the analogies furnished by the whole course of the war leave no room for doubt as to the relative trustworthiness of the two accounts. The battle of Kurekdere was a case in point; for Prince Bebutoff, in his dispatch relating thereto, sets down the Turkish force at nearly 50,000, and the Russian at only 18,000. Schamyl's name has been mentioned but little in this section. The mountain-chief was not engaged in any regular actions, but yet he conti- nually influenced and retarded the movements of the Russians; and, had he been supplied betimes with arms and ammunition by the Allies, there can be no question that he might have imparted a different aspect to the whole campaign. The cruising of a few English ships off the coast of Circassia was noticed in the last Chapter ; it was one of many attempts made to open communi- cation with Schamyl ; but those attempts were not sufficiently energetic or skilful to command much success. One of the English officers who accom- panied Sir Edmund Lyons in his expedition to the coast, had interviews with some of the natives, and has given an interesting sketch of their per- sonal appearance. 'As for the native chieftains,' says he, 'they are glorious fellows — tall, magni- ficently dressed, and fine-featured ; it is impossible to view them as savages. Among them, the naib (Enim Bey), Schamyl's lieutenant or representative, is the most powerful and the most thoughtful. CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC TURKEY IN 1854. 139 His will seems law along the whole coast, from Soudjuk to the Anakria river. Within those limits along the coast all are Mohammedans, and during the nine or ten years of his residence among the Western Caucasians — being a native of Schamyl's, or the eastern country, Daghestan — he has built mosques, created schools, and, in short, excited a revival of religion & la Wesley. " Before he came, we were beasts," said a chief to me lately; "and now, if he were to order us to march into the sea, we should go without question." Their hostility to Russia is inveterate and intelligible ; but they know well how unfit they are to cope with the Russians out of their own mountains, and the Russians equally well know them. Nevertheless, I hope that they will not be altogether useless. The naib is dignified and stately; he moves with an escort of wild mountaineer horsemen, preceded by a red and buff banner ; his white Circassian tunic, yellow vest, black cartridge-cases, and tall gray sheep-skin cap, admirably set off his dark strongly-marked face. In conversation, you at once find him a very superior man, clear in his views, thoroughly knowing his own position and that of his country- men. All the natives of the coast, from Soudjuk to Anakria, are bitter against the Russians, with the exception of one or two chieftains, who have received money and honours from them ; but these are isolated cases, and they have had no influ- ence on the people.' The Circassians themselves, the main body of the people, are described by this officer as 'a remarkably good-looking race — tall and well made, and generally fair, some even of the older warriors having quite pink cheeks ; and, odd enough, when one considers their roaming life, their feet and hands are remarkably small. They cut their skin-shoes to fit the foot exactly. In dress, they carry a huge affair on the head, of the calpac species ; a high cone of yellow cloth rises from a forest of fur which encircles the head ; their coats are principally made of a coarse woollen fabric, and reach far below the knee. The higher orders have this of brilliant yellow cloth ; round the throat a linen under-garment buttons exactly, and over this is frequently worn a smart silk affair, shewing between the folds of the coat. In their breast they carry about a score of bone or ivory cases, filled with loose powder, having the ball at the top. Some of the better sort wear smart scarlet leggings, and yellow or red slippers ; round the waist of all are fastened multitudinous knives and pistols upon a leathern belt; and slung over the shoulder, in a cloth-case, the rifle. They look altogether like a set of aristocratic savages.' The officers encountered Circassian maidens about to depart for Constantinople to adorn the harems of the wealthy Turks — an example of Oriental morality which has not yet given way to European customs. During the summer, Schamyl frequently threatened Tiflis, and so distracted the attention of the Russians, that if Guyon had commanded at Kars instead of Zarif, the Turks would almost for certain have fought a winning campaign. When the disasters of August arrived, it was unquestionably Schamyl who prevented the Russians from following up their advantage. He threatened Tiflis with 16,000 men; and Prince Bebutoffwas forced to send back a large portion of his army from Gumri to repel this attack. On the 1st of September — with part of his force at Akhalgori ; part at Gori, on the river Koor ; and part at Mycht, near Tiflis — Schamyl surprised and beat off the Russians, took much booty and many prisoners of high rank, and rendered it imperative that Bebutoff should suspend all further operations in Armenia. Advantages were gained by the Lesghian chieftain also at Pekhalon, Tavi, Childi, Alazan, Kavril, Zaktala, and other places whose names are scarcely to be met with on the maps, over the Russian generals Wrangel and Tchartchatz. In short, Schamyl, although his name appears in a flitting, meteor-like way, assisted the Turks more effectually than their English and French allies had up to this time done. The Emperor Napoleon sent him 12,000 muskets in September ; but those muskets would have rendered better service if despatched earlier. The year 1854 closed in Asia thus- wise. The Turks, utterly broken and disorganised at the battle of Kurekdere, could do nothing more than remain on the defensive at Kars; while the Russians, afraid of Schamyl and his mountaineers, durst not advance westward of Gumri, lest their rear should be attacked. Kars and Gumri remained the head- quarters of the two armies at the end of the year, as they had been at the beginning ; but the Turks had been weakened in the directions of Bayazid and Ardahan, while the Russians had become masters of the roads between Turkey and Persia. The state of the Turkish army had now become deplorable. Complete anarchy reigned at head- quarters. Zarif Mustapha, unable to appreciate the strategic plans of General Guyon, had ruined them at Kurekdere, and then turned round and accused Guyon of being the cause of all the disasters. Knowing the ill-will entertained by many of the Poles towards Guyon, he induced them to sign a paper demanding the dismissal or recall of the Hungarian. Guyon had remained a Christian, and, on this account, in accordance with a rule in the Ottoman service, he had no direct command ; he might advise, but was forced to succumb to the Osmanli pachas. Had he become a renegade in his faith, like many of the Hungarians and Poles, he would probably have received high powers. Under the existing state of feeling in the army, it would have been useless for Guyon to remain, however unjust the charges against him, and however incompetent those who made them : he was recalled. But Zarif Mustapha could not altogether blind the eyes of the Porte to his conduct; although . supported by the seraskier, Riza Pacha, he was summoned to Constantinople to explain his conduct. Here, however, favouritism carried the day. Zarif succeeded in obtaining an acquittal from all 140 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. blame in respect to the disaster at Kurekdere, and so bribed his judges as to procure condem- nation to fall upon Guyon. The Hungai-ian was dismissed from his post, reduced to half-pay, and left to retire into private life. The weak sultan was powerless through all these scenes ; kind, but indolent, he exerted little influence on those around him. Nor could the British ambassador at Constantinople stem the course of intrigue which led to the discomfiture of an able officer. Perhaps no Englishman had better opportunities than Mr Duncan of forming an estimate of the qualities of the Turkish private soldiers. ' By the introduction,' he says, ' of a strict discipline ; by an equitable system of promotion, and under the command of brave and honourable officers, the Turkish army could be raised to a point of excel- lence second to no European force. The sobriety of the men, their simple wants, unfailing patience, and power of resisting fatigue, offer the most splendid materials for creating an irresistible infantry. The men are both intelligent and courageous. A commander, in whom they pos- sessed confidence, they would folio w without hesitation or regret. And this confidence is facile to obtain. A few kind words, a display of interest in his welfare, and honesty of purpose, suffice to gain the poor Turk's heart for ever. The Turkish artillery is excellent, even in its present state, but is susceptible of great improvement. In the management of this arm, the Turkish soldiers shew great aptitude ; and the pride of the men in their batteries, and the affection they display for their respective guns, is admirable.' * The honesty of this opinion is tested by the impartial way in which Mr Duncan speaks of the cavalry; he condemns it in unmitigated terms, as being in its present state almost utterly worthless. But the greatest drawback is presented by the Osmanli officers. ' The causes that have largely contributed to weigh doAvn the existing virtuous elements in the Ottoman army, are the corruption and inca- pacity that prevail among its higher ranks ; and the disgraceful ignorance which distinguishes its subaltern officers. The Turkish private soldier, if well directed, is capable of great deeds ; but the corps of officers and non-commissioned officers are alike inefficient and unsusceptible of improvement. Promotion by merit alone is unheard of in the Ottoman service. The subaltern ranks arc filled by the personal slaves or domestics of the pachas ; and such commissions are often the wages of disgrace. Promotion to the superior ranks is obtainable only by bribery or intrigue ; the grade of colonel or pacha is purchased by the highest bidder ; who subsequently recovers the sum he has disbursed by defrauding his regiment, or robbing the government. The simplest military rules are ignored by the officers, who are often withdrawn from a civil appointment to occupy a high military position. This was the case with * Duncan : i. 1S9. the commander-in-chief of the army of Anatolia, Zarif Mustapha Pacha.' General Williams, an English officer of engineers, was appointed British Military-Commissioner to the Turkish army in Asia. As a sort of authori- tative adviser on military matters, he might possibly have exerted some influence over Zarif; but he did not reach Kars until September, when the mischief had been already achieved. He was a man who knew well the Turks and the Turkish language, and was much liked among them ; on this account, his presence a month or two earlier would have been especially valuable. But in this appointment, as in many other particulars, the movements of the Allies were tardy. INTRIGUES IN NOItTII- WESTERN TURKEY. Attention must now be directed towards Europe. The hostilities and intrigues on the Turkish frontiers in 18/53-4, to which the present Chapter relates, were partly displayed in the Slavonic provinces which bound the more purely Moham- medan part of European Turkey. There were turbulent proceedings in those regions, which call for a brief notice here, not because they were Slavic or Slavonic, but because they were Russo- Slavic — a development of that system which had rendered Russian interference intolerable to Turkey, and which imperatively called for a check from the Western Powers. Religion is the key to this system. Constanti- nople, when held by the Byzantine emperors a thousand years ago, gave Christianity — in a very perverted form, it is true — to the barbarous Russ ; and now that the Russ have become a powerful nation, they look to the acquisition of dominant control over that same Constantinople, at the expense of the Osmanli who at present govern it. Moreover, when the Ottomans made their conquests in Europe, the country now called Turkey was mostly inhabited by tribes of the Slavon or Slavonic race, the same as that from which the Russians are sprung ; and these Slavons professed the same religion as the Russians — that is, Christianity of the Greek Church. Hence there has been for 400 years a sympathy between Russia and the Christian provinces of Turkey— a sympathy which would command respect, had it not been employed as a tool by ambitious czars. In those cases where the authority of the Christian czar has been sub- stituted for that of the Mohammedan sultan, liberty of conscience, liberty of thought and speech, liberty of action and of movement, the sacredness of domestic life, the development of manly indepen- dence — none of these have been furthered, while many of them have been compromised. Laying aside the officials and the priests, the inhabitants of Russianised provinces have had little reason to congratulate themselves on their emancipation from the sultan's rule. In what manner Russian INTRIGUES IN NORTH-WESTERN TURKEY :— 1853-4. 141 audacity brought about the Turkish troubles in Moldavia and Wallachia, has been shewn in former Chapters ; but there were equally active, although less obvious, intrigues in progress by Russian agents in other parts of the Turkish dominions. Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia, Turkish Croatia, Her- zegovina, Montenegro, all are among the Turkish provinces in Avhich the majority of the inhabitants are Christians — some of them members of the Latin or Romish Church, but by far the larger number adhering to the Greek faith. Of the great Slavonic race, there are probably 60,000,000 (including 10,000,000 Poles) under Russian rule, 12,000,000 under Austrian, and 8,000,000 more or less under Turkish domination. These are nearly all Chris- tians, but not of the same church ; the Poles, most of the Austrian Slavons, and a few of the Turkish, are Roman Catholics; while all the rest, consti- tuting by far the larger number, are members of the Greek Church. It is quite lamentable to witness the bitter hatred between these two great bodies of Christians in the south-eastern region of Europe. Much as the Mohammedan may have crushed and spurned the Christian in past ages, yet in intensity of hatred he is more than paral- leled by the Christians themselves — Greek against Latin, Patriarch against Pope. There are not wanting grounds for believing that Poland owes much of its misfortune to these contests between the rival churches. When Poland and Hungary were large and independent kingdoms — the one more powerful than Russia, and the other than Austria — Romanism was the authoritative religion in both countries, although the Greek faith was professed by millions of subjects; and so relentless was the persecution which the one bod}' of priests maintained against the other, that many of the Polish adherents of the Greek Church were driven into the arms of Russia, while many of the Greek Church subjects of the kings of Hungary sought shelter even under the banner of the Crescent. This occurred many centuries ago; in later ages, the Greek Church, backed by the czars, has pos- sessed more power of persecution over the Latins. Without duly considering this triplicate of reli- gious discord, the strange condition of Turkey, and of Russian influence within it, cannot be under- stood. There arc, besides the Osmanlis or true Mohammedan Turks, Slavons who have become Mohammedans, Slavons of the Greek Church, and Slavons of the Latin Church ; and these hate each other for their diverse religions, more than they love each other for their common race or Slavonic blood. The sultan has the sympathies of the first, the czar of the second, while Austria endeavours to become the ' protector' of the third. If Roman Catholics were more numerous than they arc in Turkey, the intrigues of Austria would probably be nearly as mischievous, though not so grandly audacious, as those of Russia have proved to be. Austria has long coveted a portion of the triangular north-west corner of European Turkey, in which the Roman Catholic subjects of the sultan chiefly reside, and which borders on the Illyrian and Dalmatian provinces of the Austrian Empire. Herzegovina and Turkish Croatia are the extreme portions of this triangle. Whatever may have been the predilections of the Austrian court, however, the machinations of Russia are those which Turkey and her Allies were called upon to unmask and to repel. Glancing round the provinces which fringe European Turkey on the north and west, we first meet with Bulgaria, a region already described in connection with the Danubian campaign of 1853-4. Its inhabitants — a peculiar admixture of the Slavon with the Roumani — mostly profess the Greek faith ; and the events of the campaign abundantly shewed that the priests of the villages, high and low, were hand and heart with the czar, ready to have furthered the least success obtained by the Russian troops. When Prince Gortchakoft caused his flaming proclamation to be translated into the Bulgarian language, and disseminated throughout the province, he well knew the aid which the priests of the Greek communion would be ready to afford. In the large fortified towns, such as Widdin, Silistria, Rustchuk, Varna, and Shumla, where Osmanli officials and Osmanli soldiers are always placed, the influence of the Christian priests is less apparent ; but the country districts contain few Turks ; and there the Bulga- rian peasant is at the mercy of his papa or priest, in all that concerns belief and reverence. Many of the peasants' houses, during the war, were found to contain coloured daubs of the Emperor Nicholas, as wall-decorations. The emissaries of the late czar, both lay and clerical, had represented him to the simple Bulgarians as their Great Protector — one who would avenge the harsh usage which they have unquestionably received from the Osmanlis in past ages: the peasants had not yet learned to know that the czar might be a harder taskmaster than the sultan. So far as regards actual hostilities, the Russians did not succeed in this war in raising an insurrection in Bulgaria; the achievements of Omar Pacha, and the presence of the Allies at Varna, prevented this. Passing westward from Bulgaria, we come to one of the most remarkable nations in Europe — the Servians. A great Slavonic state in the four- teenth century, Servia has passed through many fluctuations of liberty and tyranny. Sometimes she has been under an oppressive Ottoman yoke ; at other times, an independent kingdom under her own krals or sovereigns ; and then, a sort of republic under a bold but tyrannical adventurer ; while at the present day her position presents an intermediate aspect. Servia is now as nearly free as a tributary state can well be. The sultan receives an annual tribute, and occupies Belgrade and a few other fortified positions ; but in other matters the Servians are almost wholly independent of Turkish control. A sort of parlia- mentary government exists ; schools arc numerous ; literature is rising; the country is fertile and 142 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. prosperous ; and there are many circumstances connected with it interesting to Englishmen. The attitude of the Servians during the war was excel- lent. They had to steer clear of three powers — Turkey, Austria, and Russia. The Turkish yoke has become so light as hardly to be felt, and the Servians shew no great desire to throw off what yet remains. Austria is not quite at ease, in contemplating a rising Servian state, in which liberty of speech and writing and action is more observable than in the Slavonic provinces of her own empire. Many occasions have presented themselves in which Austria has shewn a desire to pick a quarrel with Servia, or to interfere in the internal government of that state. At the outset of the troubles between Russia and Turkey, when the course of events could not be clearly foreseen, Austria assembled an army near the Servian frontier, as if to avail herself of any favourable conjuncture in the progress of the dispute. The Servians, however, exhibited no tendency either to quarrel or to coalesce with the Austrians : they simply wished to remain quiet and neutral. Russian influence was more considerable in Servia, on account of religious sympathies. The Servian princes are in some sense constitutional monarchs, but the principle of hereditary succession has not yet become determinately established ; and the czar has had an influence in the election of the princes. At the commencement of the Avar, Russian intrigue was busy in Servia ; emissaries endeavoured to embroil the Servians with the sultan. There was a spirit of nationality, however, exhibited. Servia refused to permit a Turkish army to traverse the province on its way from Bosnia to "Widdin ; she warded off the entrance of an Austrian army ; and she had a sufficient insight into the nature of Russian protection to keep on her guard against the mischievous intrigues of the czar. Servia remained unmolested. At the end of December 1853, the sultan issued a hatti-sherif, confirming, in a formal manner, all the internal constitutional privileges of Servia ; acknowledging the position of Alexander, Prince of Servia ; and rendering the rule of the Porte so light, as to leave little inducement to the Servians to wish to throw it off. The province adjoining Servia is more strangely circumstanced. Although mainly inhabited by Slavonians, these Slavonians have in great number become Mohammedans. Renegades in faith are frequently violent haters of their old religion ; and, in accordance with this tendency, the Moham- medans of Bosnia are more bigoted even than the Osmanlis, more rooted to the old Oriental usages of the Turks, and opposed to the useful reforms which Abdul-Medjid and his minister Reshid Pacha endeavoured to effect. Bosnian Mohammedans entertain a hearty hatred for the Greek Church ; and Austria has been enabled to avail herself of this circumstance to obtain con- siderable influence in the province. Most of the commerce is in the hands of Austrians ; Austrian ducats, zwanzigers, and bank-notes, pass current ; and Latin ecclesiastics in the interest of Austria have not been slow to win the good-will of many of the Bosnians, by pandering to their dislike of the Greek Church. The same may, to a consider- able extent, be said of the adjacent provinces of Turkish Croatia and Herzegovina ; these contain a greater relative number of Roman Catholics than any other Turkish provinces, and on that account there is a kind of natural religious sympathy between the inhabitants and the Austrians. Not that the Austrian government is viewed with much admiration by any of them ; the ties that assist in binding the dwellers on opposite sides of the frontier are those of religion and commerce. Throughout this region, it is Austria, rather than Russia, whose movements require to be watched by those powers which would fain maintain the integrity of Turkey. The wishes of Austria have long been known to statesmen ; and in the remark- able conversation between the Emperor Nicholas and Sir Hamilton Seymour in January 1853, as well as in the secret discussions of 1844 (Chapter III.), it is rendered manifest that Austria was ready to take part in the dissolution of the Turkish Empire ; to side with the czar in such a contingency, if the coveted ' Illyrian triangle ' were made over to her. In a geographical and commercial sense, this triangle might perhaps be more fittingly Austrian than Turkish ; but this was not the question Avhich the Allies of the sultan were called upon to con- sider in 1854. So far from this Austrian tendency being a counterbalance or frustration of Russian aggressive schemes, it was in reality an encourage- ment ; for Russia, if i>otent at Constantinople, would have allowed Austria — for a time at least — to obtain the Illyrian triangle. In this sense, Russian schemes were dangerous, even in provinces more likely to become Austrian than Russian in the event of a break-up of the Turkish Empire. Many revolts and turbulent insurrections occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1850-1-2 ; but as they Avere less connected with the czar's intrigues than others Avhich the sultan was called upon to meet, they may be passed without notice here. In Montenegro, however, the case was different. Here Russian tendencies were most manifest ; and it becomes necessary to acquire a clear notion of this extraordinary patch of country, in connection with the coherency or otherwise of the Turkish Empire. t "Whether the province be called Montenegro, Tchernegora, Mail-Zeze, or Kara-dagh, the signi- fication is the same ; for these four are, respec- tively, the Venetian, Slavonian, Albanian, and Turkish equivalents of ' Black Mountain,' a general name for the district. Nothing in Europe, perhaps, excels this extraordinary spot as a mountain fastness. Approached from any side, from Albania, or Bosnia, or Dalmatia, it presents to view an almost perpendicular wall of rock, jagged with peaks rising to a height of 6000 or 8000 feet, separated by ravines of the most rugged character. INTRIGUES IN NORTH-WESTERN TURKEY :— 1853-4. 143 From this boundary of mountains converge numerous minor chains, which divide and sub- divide the included area into deep valleys. The area is scarcely as large as an average English county, yet is it most difficult to enter, and nearly as difficult to traverse. This savage region has been the abode, the refuge, of hardy mountaineers for unnumbered centuries — attacked by various surrounding nations in turn, but never thoroughly subdued by any. The basis of the population is Slavonic. The sultans have claimed Montenegro as part of European Turkey for four centuries past ; but the claim has never been wholly admitted ; and hence has ensued terrible bloodshed. Being almost close to the Adriatic, Montenegro has been regarded with wistful eyes by Austria ; being of Slavonic race and of Greek Christian faith, Mon- tenegro has long been 'protected' by Russia ; and thus the mountain-state has been brought into a degree of political importance which it would not otherwise possess. In one among many contests to which the Montenegrins were exposed in past times, they Montenegro. were left without an acknowledged chieftain ; as a substitute, they gave temporal power to their vladika or chief-priest, constituting him a sort of warlike pope. This affords a clue to the hold maintained by Russia over the sympathies of Montenegro. Since the time of Peter the Great, the czars have claimed to be the head of the Greek Church; and although this claim may not have been formally admitted, a power has been virtually exercised in conformity with it. The priests of the Greek faith in all the Turkish provinces, as has been more than once explained, very generally admit this claim, covertly if not openly. The czars have been lavish to the vladikas, and have bid highly for power in Montenegro through the influence thus acquired. Captain Spencer, writing in 1851, speaks thus of Montenegro, in respect to the sympathy between the vladika and the Russians: 'The present vladika received his education in Russia The principal revenue of the vladika arises from a pension given by the court of Russia, amounting to about 30,000 florins — an enormous sum in a country like this, where luxury is unknown, and where, in the absence of a metallic currency, commercial transactions are carried on by barter. In addition to this, he possesses certain hereditary lands, fisheries on the Lake of Scutari,* and some trifling benefits as a dignitary of the Greek Church. So large a portion of his income being derived from his pension, some travellers, unacquainted with the democratic character of this people, consider the vladika to be an imperial Natchalnik, and Tchernegora a Russian dependency.' The consideration last named is one of much significance. Attracted as the Montenegrins may be towards the czar by the ties of race and religion, there yet remains a strong contrast in all that concerns government. The mountaineers retain a warm love of liberty, a scorn of such despotism as that under which the serfs of Russia live; they could ill brook an exchange of their * It is necessary not to confound this •with tho. Scutari which forms one of the suburbs of Constantinople. 144 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. highland freedom for Muscovite repression. M. Golovin, after asserting that no other Slavonian tribe is so devoted to the Russians as the Monte- negrins, proceeds to observe : ' But in reality, they are republicans and socialists. The greatest equality prevails amongst them ; and never could the Russians establish amongst their warriors any discipline or subordination. A Russian traveller, M. Chijof, told me that on his visit to the vladika, letters were brought and tea was served : the postilion took tea with them.' * The same writer adduces many examples in support of his assertion concerning the general leaning of the mountaineers to Russia in other than political or governmental matters. 'A Russian feels himself at home at Montenegro. The houses are built in the same Avay as the cabins of the Russian peasants; the holy images are always to be seen in the corner of the rooms ; the host treats the Russian as a friend, with true ancient Slavonian hospitality, which goes even so far as the washing of his feet. Montenegrin women kiss the hand of the guest, and are kept in a state of inferiority, serfdom, and contempt, which, however, may be accounted an Eastern rather than a Slavonic custom The portraits of the Russian czars are held in almost the same veneration as the holy images, and are also kissed by the people.' The boundary between Montenegro and Austrian Dalmatia was settled by a treaty in 1 840 ; the boundary on the Turkish side has never been determined, for the Ottoman Porte still insists that Montenegro is a state tributary to the sultan, Avhile the mountaineers will not admit any such subjection. In respect to religion, they are not more opposed to the Turks than to the Austrians or the Venetians ; for their Greek faith is of that intensity which leads to a bitter hatred of Roman Catholicism. The numerous contests between the armed bands of the sultan and those of the vladika have been rather national than religious, although 'Death to the Infidel!' has too often been the war-cry on both sides. To what extent the Montenegrins were incited by Russia, is imperfectly known ; but shortly after the declaration of war by Turkey, and before England and France had formally commenced hostilities, the vladika, Prince Daniel, shewed indi- cations of an intention to invade the neighbouring Ottoman provinces ; and the pachas of Herzegovina and Albania were ordered to keep a watch over his movements. Collisions frequently occurred, in February 1854, in the rugged district east of Montenegro, between those who braved and those who defended the sultan's authority: they were, however, rather raids or predatory excursions than regular hostilities ; and the Turks experienced no great difficulty in repelling the Montenegrins. Towards the end of March, Avhen the Greeks on the southern frontier of Turkey had risen in * The Nations of Russia and Turkey, p. 50. rebellion, the vladika made a bolder move ; he issued a proclamation to all the Montenegrins, dated March -J-|, from Cettina or Zettinye, the chief town of the mountain state, calling upon all the mountaineers to declare whether they would join him in a hostile attack upon Turkey, ' to shed their blood for the Holy Cross, the orthodox faith, and their country' — language precisely similar to that used about the same time by the czar and his generals. The movement was said to be fostered by Colonel Kovaleffsky, an emissary from St Petersburg. Four thousand men came forward in a crusading spirit, such as had ani- mated Europe seven centuries earlier; and 20,000 armed men, in all, were ready to join in any pressing exigency. A plan was formed whereby the vladika would enter Herzegovina ; while the voivode, George Petrovitch, with another force, would enter Albania ; and the two were then to endeavour to cause a rising among all the Christian villages against the Ottoman authorities. To what extent this movement might have aided the designs of Russia, it is now impossible to say ; but the jealousy of Austria was aroused — she feared the growth of a Russianised power within cannon- shot of the Adriatic. An arrangement was con- cluded between Turkey and Austria, to the effect that, if the vladika's plans were put in practice, an Austrian force should enter Herzegovina, and there check the progress of the mountaineers. This decision was effectual ; the Montenegrin inroads became insignificant ; and Russia shewed much irritation at the interference of Austria. GREEK ATTACKS ON THE TURKISH IiOBDER. The rapid sketch just given will have rendered intelligible the peculiar relation — to Turkey on the one hand, and to Russia on the other — borne by various provinces inhabited mainly by the Slavonic race. The sultan, while harassed and insulted by Menchikoff's demands, and while driven into a Avar rendered ine\dtable by Russian arrogance, Avas at the same time called upon to meet and subdue rebellious risings in many of his frontier proAdnces. In the Avhole extent, east and west, from the Black Sea to the Illyrian boundary ; and thence north and south, nearly parallel with the Adriatic — all the border provinces contain far more Christians than Mohammedans ; and of these Christians, the members of the Greek Church far outnumber those of the Latin or Roman Catholic. Hence it happened, that when hostilities commenced between Turkey and Russia, the czar calculated on great assistance from the sympathy of these Christians of the Greek Church. If this assistance did not reach the expected degree, the falling-off may be attributed in great part to religious antagonism — the ill-will between the Greek and Latin Churches. The intrigues caused worry and GREEK ATTACKS ON THE TURKISH BORDER :— 1853-4. 145 anxiety to the Ottoman government, but no large expenditure of forces or ammunition. Far more serious were the events which occurred on the southern frontier of Turkey, the boundary between the Turkish and Greek kingdoms. The Greek religion has been many times mentioned in this Chaper,.but not the Greek nation. There is a perplexity about this which sometimes leads to error. The religion of Russia and of many Slavonic provinces is called Greek, because it was established by the Greek or Byzan- tine emperors of Constantinople fifteen centuries ago ; whereas the Greeks, as a nation, occupy the chosen land of the great republicans of classic times, and speak a language but slightly different from the classic Greek. The nation whose capital is at Athens, is Greek in name and Greek in religion : if it has sympathy with Russia, this sympathy is due to religion, and not to race ; for the Greek race differs as much from the Slavonic as from the Osmanli. Greece was part of the Turkish Empire from the date of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople down to the year 1827. But the Greeks never coalesced with the Osmanlis: race and faith kept them asunder. Greeks are and have been spread about in all the towns of European Turkey, carry- ing on maity of the manufactures and branches of commerce, but always maintaining their character- istics as a distinct people. Never, at the worst of times, did they relinquish the hope of one day being again a free people. Their hope was realised, so far at least as in the formation of a petty kingdom, composed of the southern provinces of Turkey. The Greeks began to revolt about the year 1820; and a certain heroic tinge thrown over the events of the movement excited the admiration of Western Europe — of the people, if not of the governments. The success of the Greeks on the coasts of the Morea and the islands, due to their sea-faring capabilities ; the demand by the sultan of assistance from the pacha of Egypt ; the devastating warfare on land and sea that thence ensued, and lasted many years — at length attracted the attention of other powers. A treaty was signed, by virtue of which English, French, and Russian fleets fought for the Greeks against Turkey and her vassal. On the 20th of October 1827 was fought the battle of Navarino — an ' untoward event,' as the English minister truly designated it : an event which nearly annihilated the Turkish navy, and greatly increased the power of Russia to interfere in Turkish affairs. True, Greek independence of Turkish rule was advanced thereby ; but the elements of disorder still remained. It is now known that the English government of that day, when it took a part in Turkish affairs, did not at first contemplate the formation of a Greek kingdom distinct from Turkey* * The Earl of Aberdeen, foreign minister at the time, explained this matter twenty-five years afterwards. ' I have already, I think, referred in this liouse to the fact, which your lordships well know, that at the beginning, and during the progress of the Greek revolu- tion, Mr Canning never contemplated the existence of Greece as an Between the years 1827 and 1833, Greece was a scene of discord ; severed politically from Turkey, but unable to settle down into a regular state. At length the allies of Greece offered the crown of that newly formed kingdom to the king of Bavaria, for his younger son Otho, then a minor ; and the offer being accepted, Otho, accompanied by a council of regency, entered his dominions. Otho, who came of age in 1835, professed the Roman Catholic religion, as did likewise his queen, a princess of Oldenburg; but a clause in the con- stitutional charter enacted, that the children of the marriage should be brought up in the Greek faith, conformably with the religion of the country. The formation of this new Greek kingdom led to the aggressive movements of 1853-4 in this wise. Many Turkish provinces, containing more Greeks than Osmanlis, were left out of this repar- tition ; they remained subject to a Mohammedan sultan, instead of coming under the sway of a Christian king ; the Greek population exhibited a turbulent tendency on many occasions ; and when the czar of Russia saw that a movement in that quarter might aid his schemes, he spared neither influence nor promises, neither gold nor honours, to obtain a control over the king and court of Greece. Epirus and Thessaly — Turkish provinces having a marked preponderance of Greek inhabitants — were not included in the new kingdom. This mode of establishing a Greek kingdom has been characterised as ' one of those unfortunate half-measures, which, instead of solving a difficulty, only lead to further and more serious complications.' The establishment of the new kingdom, far from being regarded by the Greeks as a final measure, was only looked upon by them as the first step towards the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and as the sanction of Europe for the establishment of Greek rule on the ruins of Islam. A kind of secret society was formed in Greece, having in view a dreamy project for the re-establishment of a Greek empire, with Constantinople as its capital ; and the emis- saries of this society, spread throughout Epirus and Thessaly, kept the Greek-Christian inhabitants of those Turkish provinces in a fever of expectation, by holding out to them hopes of being one day freed from the Ottoman yoke. When Greece was formed into a kingdom, tbe boundary-line was ill chosen ; it left both sides open to incursions, and could only be guarded at an immense expense. independent kingdom ; neither did I nor the Duke of Wellington ever contemplate the existence of Greece as an independent king- dom, but solely as a vassal state under the suzerainete of the Porte, somewhat similar to Wallachia and Moldavia ; but when the Treaty of Adrianople was signed, it appeared to me, and my noble friend then at the head of the government agreed with me, that the condition of the Turkish Empire was so perilous in itself, that it would be extremely unwise to create a state, and place it under the protection and suzerainet(5 of an empire which itself was exposed to extreme peril, and the existence of which was not to be counted on for any time with the least degree of certainty. Therefore we proposed to our allies to convert that vassal state into an independent kingdom. Our allies agreed, and the Porto at last assented to it also ; and hence the existence of Greece as an independent kingdom is due to the impression produced on us by the terms of that treaty.'— Speech in the House of Lords, June 2G, 1854. 146 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. This circumstance afforded great facilities for predatory attacks on the Turkish territory from Greece. Moreover, the new government proved to be singularly unfitted for the development of a healthy nationality. The young king took with him the notions of petty despotism which too often belong to the German princes. Instead of leaving the Greeks their local institutions, he sought to subject everything to a courtly rule, ridiculous in so small a territory, and unsuited to the peculiar characteristics of the Greeks. A camarilla, or court- -party ; a centralised system of government, in which all honours and offices were bestowed by the king ; a large military force, where an efficient police would have sufficed ; a grand parade of courtiers, of lords and ladies of the household, for a state which could scarcely pay any of its debts ; a sumptuous palace at Athens, built at a cost which should have defrayed the legitimate expenses of the government — such were the means whereby King Otho misgoverned the country intrusted to his keeping. The Greek character deteriorated as a consequence ; a certain natural tendency to cunning, craft, deceit, was fostered; while the nobler qualities were repressed. The queen, too — a woman of great decision of character — belonged to one of those German families which almost worshipped the Czar Nicholas, as the incarnation of that despotic power which they so much wished to imitate in their own humbler sphere ; and this Russian tendency led the queen to advocate measures which would have rendered Greece a tributary to Russia, rather than an independent state. Athens became to a considerable extent a resort of needy adventurers from various countries ; European shops and coffee-houses, hotels and bilhard-rooms, French pei'ruquiers and milliners, Italian confectioners, German pipe-makers, English drapers, Armenian money-lenders, Oriental bazaar- keepers, Jewish clothes-salesmen, kilted Albanians — all mingled with the native Greeks in the once famous city of Theseus * A society, called the listeria or Hetceria, laboured for many years to bring about the establishment of a new empire, which should comprise the Greeks, the south Slavonians, or those of the Danubian provinces, and the Wallacks or Roumani, with Constantinople as the capital, and Greece as the chief member of the state. This was on the ground of community of religion. Another principle, busily disseminated during many years by men more zealous than observant, was that of Pansla- vism — the bringing into one whole of all countries inhabited by Slavonians. This was on the ground of community of race. While, as a third variety, there were Hellenists, who desired that all whose veins contained the true Greek blood should form one state, independent of the Osmanlis on the one hand, and of the Slavonians on the other, although allied to the latter in faith. These three moving forces occasionally coalesced, and occasionally met * Golovin. in opposition ; and it is not always easy to see which was most active in producing the turbulent proceedings of the Greeks on the Turkish border. It is possible, even, to name a fourth source of disturbance ; for the Russian sympathies of the court did not correspond exactly with the yearnings of the Heteria, or of the Panslavists, or of the Hellenists. Petty annoyances frequently occurred on the part of the subjects of King Otho towards the Turkish government between 1835 and 1853 ; but the Menchikoff mission was the signal for some- thing more daring. There is abundant evidence that the court of Athens was petted and flattered by the Czar Nicholas, as a part of his deep- laid scheme concerning Turkey. If the Greek Christians of Thessaly and Epirus could be roused into rebellion against the sultan, the weakening of the Ottoman power, ' the sick man,' would have facilitated Russian machinations. True, the Greeks themselves might have done this on the inspiration of nationality, the sympathies of the Hellenic race on either side of the border ; but the result would not the less surely favour the prosecution of his plans. Prince Menchikoff, it will be remembered (p. 16), delivered his credentials at Constantinople on the 2d of March 1853. At that very time, other Russian officials went to Athens, and were soon busily engaged with King Otho and his court. Admiral Korniloff was one of these ; he had a private interview with the king ; and soon afterwards much political agitation was observable at Athens. Early in April, the fruits of this appeared. Mr Wyse, British minister at Athens, wrote home a dispatch (April 7) stating that 1200 men, with four pieces of artillery, had just departed for the Turkish frontier ; that the English, French, and Turkish envoys had not been informed of tbe movement or its objects ; and the Greek govern- ment gave evasive answers concerning the intent of such a proceeding. Mr Wyse's language was full of significance, regarding the sleepless activity and unshrinking audacity of the Russian agents. Speaking of this sudden movement of Greek troops, he said : ' Some connect it with the events of Montenegro, others with the Russian mission of Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople, Admiral Korniloff' s arrival and supposed interviews with the king here, &c. Both regard it as little less than the commencement of another " War of Inde- pendence," in which all the Greek race will ere- long be called to share, and which is to terminate, not in a kingdom of Greece, but in the Hellenic Empire of the East. Of course the Greek govern- ment officially deprecate these extravagances, and the Russian legation cannot give them their avowed support ; but neither is of much conse- quence : the Russian government need do nothing, for everything is done for them by the Russian party, of which there is a large section in the ministry and the court, it is believed, at its head. If official documents are silent, their organ, the GREEK ATTACKS ON THE TURKISH BORDER :— 1853-4. 147 Aion, speaks in a tone which no Greek mis- understands. It abounds of late in unmeasured denunciations of the Christian powers who alone keep alive, it is alleged, the anti-Christian and monstrous tyranny of Turkey ; it calls upon them to break up the decrepit iniquity at once ; it points out the Hellenic Empire which is inevitably to replace it under the invincible arms of Russia, and already designates (with little heed to the reigning Bavarian dynasty) the Russian prince (brought up by a Greek nurse) who would be so well fitted to preside over its destinies Whatever may be the causes or pleas of this military movement, one thing is certain, that it has eminently contributed to keep alive, if not rouse, the antipathies, passions, and expecta- tions of the Greeks ; in other words, to prepare more and more the materials and instruments, in a Russian sense, for the crisis (to which all are now looking) whenever it shall come. This explains why there was such silence here until the arrange- ments were carried out, lest by any chance we should have impeded the execution.' * There appears to have been a dispute about that time, concerning the position of two villages, Avhether they were on the northern or on the southern, on the Turkish or on the Greek, side of the ill-defined frontier-line. The court of Athens pretended that the warlike movements were intended simply to enforce the Greek claim in respect to those two villages ; but this pretension was merely a screen to other objects. Besides this approach of Greek troops to the Turkish frontier — acknowledged, but not with a truthful explanation, by the court of Athens — there were repeated acts of brigandage, which the court disclaimed, but adopted no measures to prevent. The state of Athens was at that time peculiar. The Russian party had its newspaper organ, the Aion, while the independent or Hellenic party had the Athena; the former advocated the placing of Greece under Russian protection, while the Hellenists and their newspaper desired to see a true nationality arise — Greeks governed by Greek institutions in a Greek spirit. Had the king been worthy of his position, the Greek nationality might possibly have been fostered into healthy action ; but he was swayed by a narrow spirit of petty despotism ; he was greatly influenced by his queen, who, in her turn, was influenced by the promises and projects of the Czar Nicholas. She had day-dreams of being one day a queen, perhaps an empress, at Constantinople. While the diplomatists were dis- cussing the propriety or impropriety of the Greek intrigues on the Turkish border, the queen went to Germany, stopping at Trieste and Vienna on her way ; and at those places she called upon the Greek merchants to contribute towai-ds the efforts which their compatriots were making to throw off the Ottoman yoke. The king and queen were doubtlessly affected by varying motives in their * Parliamentary Papers on Greco-Turkish Affairs, p. 3. conduct, as the tide of events flowed on ; but the Russian agency in Greece, as in many of the Turkish provinces, was mainly carried on through the medium of the priesthood. ' The real secret of Russian strength in Greece,' it was observed at that period -in the Times, ' is, that it lies not in the cliques or coteries of Athens, but in the hearts of the people — in the deep fanaticism which forms the basis of the Greek character. It is not generals and senators who form the agents of the czar, but needy and ill-fed priests, sprung from the ranks of the people, the brothers and cousins of the savage borderers who have precipitated themselves on the Thessalian towns. So far from the higher classes having urged on a Russian propaganda, it is the fact that they have been forced into dependence on the Muscovite by the pressure of a priest-led people.' The czar, it appears from a dispatch written by Mr Wyse on August 14, had about that time distributed a large quantity of church vest- ments to various churches in Greece ; he also sent a Russian priest, who made a tour through the Morea, ' for his health and pleasure,' as he said ; but the priest, says Mr Wyse, ' is also chaplain to the Russian legation, and the period is singularly chosen.' The English and French ministers at Athens protested so strongly against the tendencies of King Otho's government, that no military inroads upon the Turkish territories were made during the summer, other than mere brigandage. As autumn advanced, however, more troops were sent from Athens to the frontier ; and M. Paicos, the Greek minister for foreign affairs, gave, in this as in numerous other instances, a hollow and disinge- nuous reply to Mr Wyse's demands for explana- tions on the matter. Collateral information from another quarter, about the same time, shewed in a remarkable way how little likely the court of Athens was to respect the southern provinces of Turkey. Bavaria, it has been explained, was the native country, the family home, of King Otho ; and the court of Munich had never ceased to take a deep interest in the welfare of the court of Athens. Sir John Milbanke, British minister at Munich, wrote a dispatch, in which he stated that the Bavarian ministers had openly sounded him on the desirability of taking Epirus and Thessaly from Turkey, and giving them to Greece — a proposal which, whatever might have been the case when the kingdom of Greece was first formed, came with an ill grace at a time when Turkey was weighed down by troubles brought on by Russia. The year 1854 opened in the midst of great excitement in the south-western provinces of Turkey. Emissaries from Athens, whether insti- gated by the court or otherwise, endeavoured to arouse the Greek inhabitants of Epirus and Thessaly to revolt. These endeavours continued throughout the month of January. The influence of Russia was unquestionably displayed during these move- ments, whatever may have been the case in respect to the unworthy occupant of the Greek throne. 148 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. In February, the following proclamation and form of oath were distributed in the neighbourhood of Arta, one of the principal towns in Epirus : — •PROCLAMATION. We, the undersigned, inhabitants and primates (elders) of Radobitsa (Radovitzi), in the province of Arta, sighing under the pressure of the exorbitant taxation which has been imposed on us by Ottoman conquerors, who are not only incapable of civilisation, but, besides, violate the chastity of our maidens, do renew the struggle of 1821, and swear by the name of the Almighty and by our sacred fatherland, in no case, and under no plea, to lay down our arms until we have obtained our liberty. Now, at the commencement of the struggle, we hope to rouse the sympathy of our brethren, of the free Greeks, and of all those groaning under the Ottoman yoke, so that they may take up arms to renew the holy Avar of 1821, and fight for faith, fatherland, and our inalienable rights. The war is holy and just, and no one who considers the weight of our burden and the rights of nations will utter a word in defence of our barbarous oppressors, or advocate the cause of the Crescent, which is planted on the summit of our sacred church. Up then, brethren; rush to battle; throw off the hated yoke of our tyrants ; and with us loudly proclaim to God and the world that Ave do battle for our father- land, and that the Most High is our shield of defence. JOHANN CoSOVAKIS, DeMETER KoKAS, Costi Kosma, Bas Nakos, Ntulas Basos, Colios Mavromati, K. C. Stuma, Demeter Scaltriojanni, Georg Caezicgami, C. Merekas, K. Katzilas, Konst. Zegarides, THE OATH. I swear by the Holy Gospels, by the Holy Trinity, and by Him crucified, that I take up arms Avhich shall not be cast aside until our oppressors are driven from the homes of our fathers, and my fatherland is free. I also swear by an Almighty God to be faithful to my flag; and, if necessary, to shed the last drop of my blood in defence of my comrades.' It is believed that these high-sounding docu- ments must have emanated from a more influential source than an insignificant village, Avhose name hardly finds mention in any maps. The ferment which arose Avas not confined to the two provinces above named, but extended also into Macedonia, Rumelia, and Albania ; the Turks Avere forced to abandon the toAvns of Arta and Janina (Ioannina), in which the Greek element was too strong for them. One Spiridion Karaiskaki, lieutenant in the Greek army, was said to be at the head of the insurgents ; and although the government, conse- quent on the hints and threats of the British and French ministers, ordered him to return to Athens, many circumstances tended to sheAv that the court Avere with, rather than against, the insurgents. The Russian emissaries had everywhere declared, in the country districts, that the Western PoAvers were favourable to them ; that all the Christian states were longing for the downfall of the Ottoman race ; and that an insurrection among the Greek subjects of the sultan would be regarded by the potentates as a righteous act in a righteous cause. Many months elapsed before the Greeks discovered how grossly they had been deceived in this matter. When once the rising had commenced, it proceeded rapidly. Revolutionary committees, so called, went from village to village, urging the inhabitants to rebel against the Turkish authorities. Guns were distributed gratuitously to all who expressed their willingness to join the insurgents. In many cases the Turkish inhabitants of the towns, terrified by what was passing, fled for refuge into the interior provinces ; and one or tAvo of the pachas shut themselves up in strong fortresses. Prince Gortchakoff Avas at that time preparing to cross the Danube ; and the Turkish authorities obtained possession of a secret letter, by which two or three leaders of the Greek insur- gents were shewn to be in direct communication with the prince. So little did the king and court care to repress this movement, that criminals let loose from Athens and Chalcis, vagabonds from all the toAvns, and hot-headed young students, set off for the frontier to join the rebels, headed by Generals Grivas and Tzavella ; they were Avell supplied Avith money, which, it Avas afterwards known, came from Russia ; and a secret council sat at Athens, to direct the movements. AVhen these proceedings became known to Turkey and her Allies, the necessity for prompt interference Avas at once seen ; a small English and Turkish flotilla sailed from Constantinople to the Gulf of Volo, to watch the movements in Thessaly ; Avhilc Admiral Dundas sent a feAV ships to the Gulf of Arta, to protect Prevesa and other parts of the coast of Epirus. The tAvo gulfs here named mark, respectively, the east and west termini of the boundary-line betAveen the two kingdoms. Ships, however, could render little aid to the towns and villages in the interior. The insurgents obtained possession of the defile of Pente Pegadia, on the only road from Janina to Arta ; and hence the Turkish pacha of the former place experienced much difficulty in sending any reinforcements to Arta, which Avas one of the foci of the insurrection. In the port of Arta itself, a Greek gun-boat sank the Turkish guard-ship, before the English vessels arrived. An action took place near Arta, on 23d February, in Avhich the insurgents defeated the Turks ; and hence the latter, although retain- ing the citadel of Arta, lost possession of the toAvn. A double aspect Avas displayed throughout these strange transactions. The ardent, and perhaps sincere, insurgents Avere really Hellenists, desirous of forming a nationality which should include all the Greeks ; while Russia Avas watching, ready to foster the Hellenism up to a certain point, and then convert it into a species of Russianism. Mr Wyse informed the Earl of Clarendon, in one of his dispatches, that of the se\ r en cabinet ministers at Athens, Pa'icos, Vlachos, and Soutzo were vehement supporters of Russia ; Avhile Kriezis, Ambrosiades, and Pellika would folloAv where the others might lead ; leaving only one, M. Privilegio, GREEK ATTACKS ON THE TURKISH BORDER :— 1854. 149 minister of finance, almost powerless as an advo- cate of more national views. It hence became impossible for Mr Wyse, and the ministers of other powers in alliance with Turkey, to credit the assertions of Pa'icos, that the Greek court was not responsible for the insurrection. Officials of almost all ranks left Athens for the frontier, week after week — some with the intention of forming a provisional government in the revolted provinces ; for there seems to have been a project to erect into separate states the provinces which they might conquer, and afterwards vote their annexation to the kingdom of Greece, so as to avoid implicating the Greek government openly in the insurrection. The proceedings in Epirus were rendered doubly deplorable by the conduct of Arnaout soldiers, mountaineers of Albania, employed by the pachas to repel the insurgents ; these men, having offered to serve one month without pay, made no hesita- tion in avowing that plunder was their principal object ; and, as a consequence, the peaceful villages became completely devastated, and the inhabitants forced to seek safety in flight. Another wretched consequence of the anarchy was, that vagabond adventurers from various countries bent their steps towards Epirus, and engaged in a species of brigandage, under colour of assisting the Greeks in establishing their independence ; and thus the poor villagers suffered from all parties. Athens, as spring advanced, Avas in a state of wild excitement. ' All the streets,' said an eye- witness, f are full of groups discussing the actual fetate of affairs, indulging in the wildest schemes and hopes, and using their loud voices as proofs of their assertions. The coffee-houses and gin- shops resound in the evening with the Parisienne and the Marseillaise, both of which have been quite naturalised in Greece, and become national melodies, with suitable words adapted to them. Outside of the town, some forty or fifty patriots are drilling under the superintendence of a sergeant ; while in the town, the soldiers as well as the sailors of the two men-of-war cutters, which would be more appropriately called ftojw-of-war, are treated with marked regard. Even the rising generation seems to be roused. The excitement has taken with them a purely artistic turn, and shews itself in sundry chalk-portraits of the Emperor Nicholas on the walls.' Matters had now arrived at a pitch too serious for the Turkish government to remain longer quiet. Until the month of March, the Turkish charge d'affaires, Nesset Bey, remained at Athens, complain- ing and protesting in vain against the proceedings of the Greek government. He demanded, on the part of his court, the prosecution of those who had crossed the frontier, should they ever return within it ; and the exercise of control over one or two newspapers, which systematically promulgated the most violent doctrines respecting the extermination of the Osmanlis and their religion. The king refused his assent ; the Porte withdrew its repre- sentative from Athens about the end of March ; the charge d'affaires of Greece was withdrawn from Constantinople ; and diplomatic relations ceased between the two countries. One con- sequence of this series of events was most disastrous. Turkey contains a vast number of Greeks, and the Porte ordered the departure of such of their number as were subjects of the king of Greece. Constantinople itself contained at that time 25,000 or 30,000 of such Greeks, who had sore reason to deplore the weak folly of their sovereign. They were all ordered to quit Turkey within a specified time. A resident at Constanti- nople, in April, said that every steamer which left that city for the Archipelago was croAvded with human beings, so thickly Avedged together that to Avalk the decks was impossible. Most of these wretched creatures had been reduced to the depths of poverty; and Avhen thrown ashore, friendless and destitute, in Greece, three-fourths of the men went to swell the ranks of the Thessalian insur- gents, or took to their old trade of piracy in the ./Egean. Numbers of the shops in Pera were shut up by the expulsion of their owners. More than thirty medical men, the most skilful in the capital, were forced to leaA'e it. Hotel-keepers, dragomans, domestic servants, both male and female, all were comprised in this sAveeping edict. Of the Greeks in Constantinople, but a small number possessed the means of transporting themselves to Athens and seeking another occupation. They sold every- thing to obtain the passage-money for their families ; and Avhen disgorged by the steamers on the shores of Greece, they became as destitute as if thrown on the beach of a desert island. The upper classes of Greeks in Constantinople Avere comparatively less affected, for most of the Greek commercial firms had partners who were under French or Austrian protection, and Avho Avere still enabled to carry on the business of the firms. To the poor, the extra- dition Avas most desolating. The Allies of the Turkish government regretted the mode in which this expulsion, possibly necessary in a time of hostilities, was managed ; for, while burning hatred Avas infused into the minds of the Hellenists thus expelled, the much larger number of Greek rayahs (Greek subjects of the Porte) left behind were in no degree rendered more favourably disposed than before to their Turkish masters. The rupture with Turkey seems to have impelled the Greek court on its headlong course. The connivance of the government became no longer merely overt. The queen not only permitted many of her domestics to join the insurgents, but pro- mised them fifty drachmas per month each during their absence. At an interview which the English and French ministers demanded with the royal couple, the king expressed great irritation at the interference of the Western Powers in the matter. * The queen,' Mr Wyse remarked, in his dispatch relating to the interview, 'Avas if possible more excited. She indulged in the strongest invec- tives Whenever the king appeared to waver, her majesty interfered, and with powers of 150 HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS. persuasion which could not be resisted, and -which shewed against what influences he had to contend, overbore every chance of return to calmer and wiser conclusions.' The insurgents were at no time formidably numerous ; their power consisting rather in their mischievous audacity. Hence the warfare that ensued was scarcely of a character to admit of definite description. A few hundred insurgents would attack, or be attacked by, a few hundred Turks, with results varying according to the circumstances of each case, but in every instance attended by a vast amount of excitement, rumour, and exaggeration. A Turkish force of 1700 men, sent in April direct from Constantinople to Arta, under Fuad Effendi, was really formidable as against the insurgents. Fuad defeated them com- pletely at the town of Peta, not far from Arta, and succeeded in capturing a mass of correspondence which proved the complicity of the Greek govern- ment in the insurrection. It also proved that there was disunion among the leaders ; that the misguided soldiers suffered much privation and exhibited much discontent; and, moreover, that the Greeks of Epirus and Thessaly shewed far less sympathy with the emissaries from Athens than the latter had expected. The principal names among the leaders of the insurgents at that time were Theodor Grivas, Karaiskaki, Tzavella, Zaho Milio, Ralli, Vaja, Rangos, Zerva, Kucsonika, Papa Costa, Panuria, Hagi Petro, Kalamaras, Zachas, and Kataracha ; such a list, with a prefix of 'General' to many of the names, has an im- posing appearance ; but each leader had a few hundred men only under his command ; and this command was in many instances little more than that which a brigand holds over his followers. After the defeat at Peta, many of the insurgents departed to their own homes in a sort of panic ; and it required all the address of their leaders — by promises of arms, ammunition, money, and military instructors — to induce them to re-form. At the eastern scene of operations, in Thessaly, the insurgents met with a little more success. On the 11th of May, at Kalabaka in that province, the Greeks under Petros defeated a body of Turks commanded by Selim Bey ; the affair, though small in magnitude, afforded oppor- tunity for a Greek dispatch, written in an inflated style, imitative of those by the Russian generals. The Turkish troops, in respect to soldiers' pay and commissariat supplies, were in a neglected state at the time in Thessaly; and were ill fitted to meet an enemy in the field, ill supplied as that enemy may also have been. The consequences to the unfortunate Thessalians were fearful. It was difficult to decide who com- mitted most ravages — the Greeks in the insurgent ranks, or the Albanians who acted with the Turks. Plunder, murder, violation, burning, raged all around; no fewer than 700,000 sheep — belonging not only to Thessalians, but to the neighbouring mountaineers of Epirus and Macedonia — were carried off by the insurgents. This, be it remem- bered, was effected by men who professed to have come to liberate their brother Hellenists from the Turkish yoke. The Greek court, infatuated by Russia, pro- ceeded further and further in aid of the insurgents ; until at length the English and French govern- ments deemed strong measures necessary. Even so early as the first week in April, the Earl of Clarendon gave a significant warning to M. Tricoupi, Greek minister at the court of St James's, telling him 'that the court and government of Greece were deliberately aiding the cause of the emperor of Russia, with whom England and France are at war, and injuring the sultan, whose cause England and France are supporting; and that these being acts of direct hostility against two of the protecting powers of Greece, the king and queen of Greece must be prepared for the consequences.' * The instrumentality of Russian agents, in fostering the insurrectionary movement, became more evident than ever. Mr Wyse, writing to the home government on the 27th of April, said that King Otho had promised to take part openly in the movement, only on certain contingencies ; one of which presented itself in a wrangle for precedence among the chieftains. ' Six hundred thousand drachmas are understood to be reserved in the hands of M. George Stanoros, director of the National Bank, to meet the contingency. It is believed, on the old Byzantine plan, that when the disappointed chiefs, with their hungry followers, shall reappear, they can be bribed into tranquillity by the expedient. Prince John Soutzo, son of the Hospodar Michel Soutzo, domiciled here, and Secretary of Legation at St Petersburg, has just arrived from that capital, charged, it is said, Avith the same counsel from the emperor, and provided with means to carry it out. Far from the insur- rection having ended, he asserts that it has only begun, and that for two years at least, despite of any coercion from the Allied powers (whose threats and means to enforce them he regards with con- tempt), the Greek government can carry on a most successful war in the interior of the Turkish Empire. A subordinate portion of the plan is to represent Prussia and Austria as favouring, and England and France as likely to quarrel from the incompatibilitj r of their respective interests. In this mission he works with a zeal and unscru- pulosity not unworthy of his Greek and Russian masters.' In the middle of May, the English and French governments determined to send a combined mili- tary force to Greece, a small number of English, with a larger number of French : the whole to amount to 6000 or 7000, and to be placed under the French General Forey. This force was to proceed to the Pirseus, the port of Athens, to take * Parliamentary Papers on Greco-Turkish Aifeirs, p. 149. GREEK ATTACKS ON THE TURKISH BORDER :— 1854. 151 possession of that port, and there to sojourn until the effect of the measure on the "weak and infa- tuated king should have become apparent. In accordance with this determination, a few thousand troops and a small flotilla proceeded to Greece, and took up the proposed position in the vicinity of the capital. The effect was immediate. The king awoke from his dream of ambition. The great czar was far away, unable to send troops and ships to his aid ; Russian intrigues and Russian money were no match for the immediate presence of the Western Powers ; and the king, despite the passionate tears and disappointment of his consort, promised to discountenance the insurgents, and to aid in restoring peace on the Turkish border. Shortly before this transaction, three Russian ships at Trieste were bought by the insurgents, and paid for by means of money from the National Bank at Athens ; these had to be given up, immediately on the arrival of the expeditionary force. One salutary step taken by the king, consequent on the pressure applied to him, was to change his ministry, appointing another under Mavrocordato, empowered to recall the insurgents, to change the members of the royal household, and to dismiss the functionaries who had been . implicated in the insurrection. The king, however, hated the work whicli he was thus compelled to perform ; and viewed with dislike the ministers whose appoint- ment was thus forced upon him. He felt the bitterness of knowing that the enthusiasts, who had expected to found a new Byzantine empire, had ended their exploits by laying waste and plundering the Christian provinces of Turkey ; reducing thousands of Greek families to the verge of starvation, without seriously damaging the Ottoman authority ; while those who objected to the insurrection, but wanted spirit and resolution to oppose it openly, now experienced the morti- fication of seeing their country coerced into good sense by foreign powers. The new ministry issued a decree of amnesty for all the officers who had joined the insurgents, provided they returned within a month. Three commissioners — Colonel Packmore, on the part of Greece, and Mr Merlin and M. Guerin, belonging to the respective consulates, on the parts of England and France — were despatched to Thessaly, to make this decree as widely known as possible, and to support it by their personal and official influence. The insurgent chiefs quickly accepted the offer, seeing the uselessness of further attempts in their so-called patriotism. Their submission was the more readily obtained, on account of two defeats which the insurgents had suffered from the Turks — one about the end of May, at Radovitzi, a few hours' march distant from Arta ; the other in the middle of June, at Kalabaka, in Thessaly. The last-named contest was of serious import ; for Kalabaka had been regarded as the stronghold of the insurgents, Avho, by holding that place, interrupted the direct communication between Thessaly and Epirus, and spread a panic through the surrounding districts. Fuad Effendi, the general who had before given the insurgents a check in Epirus, crossed the Pindus range from Janina to Thessaly, and thoroughly rotited the insurgents at Kalabaka. No particular date can be assigned for the termination of this Greek, or rather Russo-Greek, attack on the southern frontier of Turkey. From the day on which the Anglo-French troops landed in the vicinity of Athens, May 26th, the struggle was virtually at an end. The months of June and July witnessed the gradual withdrawal of the insurgents from the Turkish territory, and the gradual restoration of peace to the distracted and impoverished provinces of Epirus and Thessaly. The last scenes of this episode were nearly coin- cident, in time, with the raising of the siege of Silistria ; with the evacuation by the Russians of the Danubian Principalities ; with the transference of the English and French armies from Scutari and Constantinople to Varna ; with the assembling of the Allied fleets at Kavarna and Baltschik ; with the hostile manoeuvres of the Russian and Turkish forces in the region around Gumri, Bayazid, and Kars ; with the suppression of the Russo-Monte- negrin attacks on the western frontier of Turkey ; and with the vain attempts of the diplomatists at Vienna to bring about such a peace as would render unnecessary an expedition of the Allies to the Crimea. CHAPTER VL NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH IN 1854. MPELLED as tlie Western Powers were, by every principle of honour and international justice, to make a bold stand against the pernicious ambition of Russia, the warlike ope- rations necessarily spread over a wide rea. No longer could the struggle be regarded as a mere means of protection for the sultan's dominions. It is one among the many miseries of war, that towns and provinces, far distant from those wherein the contest began, are made to suffer in a cause which the inhabitants perhaps regard with little sympathy. The hardy Finlanders of the north know little and care less for Turks or Crimeans ; yet were their homes and sea-side chattels certain to be placed in peril by the results of a quarrel which in the first instance affected the south of Europe only. It has already been pointed out (p. 76) that, so long as Russia remains at peace with all the continental states except France and Turkej r , there are only four regions in which she can be practically assailed by the "Western Powers. These are indicated, respectively, by the Black Sea, the Baltic, the White Sea, and the extreme northern part of the Pacific around Kamtchatka. How far the warlike proceedings in the southern or Black Sea regions, in 1854, were aided by any achievements of the Allied Powers further north, it is now necessary to consider. RUSSIAN POWER IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES. The Baltic, by far the most important sea in the north of Em-ope, is touched by a larger number of states than the Black Sea ; on whose shores Russia and Turkey alone hold dominion — unless, indeed, the Caucasian tribes can be said to, possess any of the coast-line. The Baltic provinces belong — some to Russia, some to Prussia, others to Sweden, others again to Denmark, while two of the minor German states touch this sea at the south-west corner. Taken as a whole, the Baltic is strangely shaped, affording many more nooks and corners, headlands, deep bays, narrow straits, isles and islets, than the Black Sea ; and its contiguity to England renders its geographical characteristics especially interesting to us in time of war. A map of Northern Europe will shew that the North Sea or German Ocean is bounded on the west by England, Scotland, and the Shetlands ; and on the east, by Holland, Denmark, and Norway. This sea, from Shetland in the north, to Ostend in the south, extends about 700 miles ; while its width in the central portion, between England and Denmark, may average about 400 miles. In carrying the eye along the east boundary of this sea, a broad opening will be seen, corresponding in latitude with the part of Scotland between Aberdeen and the north boundary of the Moray Firth ; this opening, the Skager Rack, is the mouth of the Baltic — the only place at which the waters of this sea, and of the rivers Neva, Diina, Niemen, Vistula, Oder, «fec, can escape to the ocean. It follows, from this position, that the Baltic is neai'er to Scotland than to England — about 140 miles nearer to Leith than to London, on the lines of route taken by ships. The Skager Rack is a broad strait, ex- tending nearly east and west for about 150 miles. At its inner or eastern end begins another strait, called the Kattegat, of about equal length, but extending north and south. The Skager Rack is bounded on the north by Norway, and on the south by Denmark ; while the Kattegat has Sweden on the east, and Denmark on the west. The Kattegat communicates on the south with the Baltic by three narrow straits — the Sound, the Great Belt, and the Little Belt. The ' Sound dues,' frequently a subject of diplomacy and dis- content, are an impost collected by Denmark upon all ships engaged in the Baltic trade, on their passage past Elsineur or Helsingor in the Sound. The Sound, between Sweden and the Danish island of Zealand, is the chief passage for ships ; although use can also be made of the Great Belt, between Zealand and Funen ; and of the Little Belt, between Funen and Schlesvig. Once within the intricate entrance to the Baltic, the waters extend nearly in a north-east direction, but not without many deviations. At the northern ' end is the Gulf of Bothnia ; on the east, those of RUSSIAN POWER IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES :— 1854. 153 Finland and Livonia. In one direction, from Tornea to Stettin, a line of 900 miles can be drawn, nearly north and south, with scarcely any interruption from land. The Gulf of Bothnia runs 400 miles north of the main body of the Baltic, with a width varying from 30 to 100 miles ; while the Gulf of Finland stretches 280 miles eastward, with a width varying from 40 to 70 miles. The Gulf of Livonia is much smaller than either of the others. All the rain that falls on one-fifth of the area of Europe flows into the Baltic through the medium of numerous rivers, five of which have just been named. Nevertheless, the Baltic is among the shallowest of large seas, owing in part to the quantity of mud brought down by the numerous rivers ; this mud cannot find an outlet into the German Ocean, aud hence the Baltic is yearly becoming more and more silted up. The navigation by a large fleet is difficult and danger- ous, owing to this as well as to other causes. If, practically rather than geographically, we consider Copenhagen to mark the beginning, and St Petersburg the end of the Baltic, the serpentine ship-route from the one to the other would be about 800 miles in length. This maritime region, considered in relation to the political ownership of its coasts, and to the chief ports enriched by its trade, presents the following features : — All the north-western portion of coast belongs to Sweden and Norway, marked by the tortuous line of the Skager Rack, the Kattegat, the Sound, the west side of the main portion of the Baltic, and the west side of the Gulf of Bothnia. Christiansand, Gothenborg, Lands- krona, Malmb, Christianstad, Karlskrona, Stock- holm, Umea — these are the chief towns or ports along this line of coast ; while Gothland and Oland are the chief of the Swedish islands. Further east and south-east, the mighty power of Russia displays itself; the east shore of the Gulf of Bothnia, both shores of the Gulf of Finland, the whole of the Gulf of Livonia, the coasts of Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland — all belong to Russia ; as do the Aland Islands, at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia ; Cronstadt Island, near St Petersburg ; Osel and Dago, at the mouth of the Gulf of Livonia. On this long and irregular line of coast are estab- lished the towns and ports of Tornea, Uleaborg, Vasa, Abo, Helsingfors, Viborg, St Petersburg, Peterhof, Revel, Port Baltic, and Riga ; while on islands near the coast, are the formidable fortresses of Cronstadt, Sveaborg, and Bomarsund. On the south and east, the waters of the Baltic wash some of the Prussian and German provinces, with the ports of Memel, Elbing, Dantzig, Stvalsund, Wismar, Liibcck ; and on the west, the Danish town of Kiel. Little is needed, besides the mere naming of these towns, to suggest an idea of the vast importance of the Baltic, both politically and commercially ; and of the necessity, during Avar with Russia, of main- taining a strict blockade of such of the ports as belong to that power. The course of the narrative in Chapter I., aided by the coloured map, will have shewn that Russian domination on the shores of the Baltic is compara- tively of modern growth. Peter the Great's first port was Archangel. How he and his successors struggled until they obtained ports in the Black Sea, has been narrated ; but this was not all. The Muscovites desired to obtain access to the Baltic, to share in the commerce and influence of that region : a reasonable wish, if carried into effect by no unfair means. Russia had, or professed to have, a slight claim to Livonia, a province on the eastern side of the gulf of the same name ; the claim was indeed loosely founded, but it served as an incentive to Peter's ambition. There were also two provinces, Ingria and Carelia, which Sweden had won from the Muscovites in former wars, and which Peter j-earned to regain. In the contest which followed, the great generalship of Charles XII. prevented Peter from reaping many advan- tages ; but still Russia succeeded in planting a foot on the shores of the Baltic ; and the city of St Petersburg, built near the confluence of the Neva with the sea, gradually rose into distinction as the representative of Russian dominion in those parts. The great event for Russia, having regard to her power in the north, was the acquisition of Finland. At various times during the eighteenth century, strips of country bordering on the Baltic came under the sway of the czars ; but it was reserved for the nineteenth century to witness the rise of Muscovite rule on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. The Fins inhabited the northern parts of Europe earlier, as is supposed, than the Slavonians of Russia, or the Scandinavians of Sweden and Norway. There is no record of a king of Finland having ever existed ; the Fins were a wandering rude race, who fell under the rule of their more organised neighbours. Hence the Muscovites subjected the Fins as far as the White Sea and the Frozen Ocean ; the Norwegians obtained control in Finmark ; while the Swedes took possession of the Finnish provinces adjacent to the Baltic. Six hundred years have now elapsed since Lapmark, Finmark, and Finland, were thus conquered by the three states just named. When the Treaty of Tilsit was signed between Alexander and Napoleon, in 1807, the two emperors treated the map of Europe as a toy, which they might cut up and partition at pleasure. Constantinople was saved from the clutches of Alexander, only because Napoleon deemed the treasure too precious to be thus appropriated. Poland, Prussia, and the several states of Germany, all came under the remodelling influence of the two emperors. A secret article foreshadowed the destruction of the Swedish monarchy, and the partition of that country between Russia and Denmark : unless Sweden should choose the alternative of joining France and Russia in a war against England. Hostilities became inevitable, as a consequence of this treaty. The English government, fearing 154 NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. that the Danish fleet was about to be employed with unfriendly intent, sent out an expedition with great speed; bombarded Copenhagen for three days ; destroyed a great part of the city, and forced a surrender of the Danish fleet (September 7th). Whether England was justified or not in this proceeding, it afforded a pretext for Russia to declare war against her, and to demand that all Swedish ports should be closed against English ships. Sweden resisted the applications of Russia, France, and Denmark to this end; and went so far as to conclude, on February 8, 1808, a new treaty with England. Denmark at once declared war in a formal way against Sweden ; but Alex- ander suddenly sent a powerful Russian force to take possession of Finland, without such a declara- tion, as if to anticipate any military or naval defence on the part of Sweden. It was a mode of obtaining a ' material guarantee,' analogous to that which his brother Nicholas adopted in Moldavia and Wallachia forty-five years afterwards. The king of Sweden caused the Russian ambassador to be placed in confinement ; and the emperor, who simply wanted some pretext for a decision long before made, thereupon declared that such an insult justified him in retaining possession of Finland, 'and uniting it for ever to his empire.' Hostilities ensued. The Swedes obtained a few , partial successes at Gothland, Aland, Vasa, and Roggerwick ; but suffered defeats of more import- ance at Ormais and Lokalar. Russia, during this campaign, adopted a course which has frequently been followed by the czars — that of watching and fomenting discord in a neighbour's country ; know- ing that there were malcontents in Finland, the Russian generals, as if to encourage them, issued orders not to receive any letters or any flags of truce which were sent in the king's name, but only such as proceeded from the Swedish generals. In November, a truce for the winter was signed by the two antagonist commanders, Kamenskoi and Adlercreuz. In June of the next year, 1809, a revolution deposed Gustavus IV., and placed Charles XIII. on the throne of Sweden. Alex- ander, on being applied to, refused to treat for peace with a government which he chose to consider in an insecure state ; hostilities recom- menced, and lasted until September, during which the Swedes suffered defeat in various parts of Finland. The Treaty of Fredrikshamn, signed on the 17th of September 1809, put an end to the contest, and at the same time deprived Sweden of some of her most fertile, valuable, and populous provinces. A glance at the coloured map will shew how serious this loss must have been to Sweden ; the provinces in question occupying nearly the whole peninsula, washed on two sides by the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland ; and when it is considered that these provinces were entered and occupied before any declaration of war between the two states, the grasping spirit which prompted the movement becomes sufficiently manifest. After the incorporation of Finland with the Russian Empire, the czar adopted the plan of furthering special Finnish interests and Finnish nationality, in opposition to the Swedish element, as a means of weakening the hold of Sweden on the affections of the people. Severity against the Swedes, clemency towards the Fins ; rigorous exclusion of Swedish books, with a comparatively liberal encouragement of Finnish literature — these were the tactics adopted by Alexander. In the years which elapsed between the Peace of Fredrikshamn and the war of 1853, the Fin- landers gradually formed themselves, politically speaking, into three parties. One group, small, but influential on account of social position, looked back with regret to the severance of the old Swedish ties : this was the Swedish party. Another group, comprising nearly all the public functionaries, dazzled by the splendour of Russia, felt, or affected to feel, proud of the annexation of their country to the czar's dominions : this was the Russian party. The third group, comprising the main body of the nation, although more favourably disposed towards Sweden than towards Russia, did not desire a return to their former condition as dependents on Sweden ; they would rather form, if it were practicable, a state governed by themselves, a nationality of Fins : this was the Finnish party. Another peculiarity in the relations between the several countries north of the Baltic needs to be noticed. Norway, although joined politically to Sweden since 1814, is jealous of any superiority in the latter power ; Norway is not a province of Sweden, but both are kingdoms under one king ; and the Norwegians would object to the acquisition by Sweden of Finland, because it would disturb the balance between the two countries, rendering Swedish power too preponderant over Norwegian. Norway has its own constitution, its own parliament or storthing ; and even so late as 1854, its legislature voted the abolition of the office of stadtholder, because such an office seemed to imply that Norway was a province of Sweden, instead of being an independent country, attached to Sweden only by the personal union in the crown. When the union took place in 1814, Finland did not belong to Sweden ; and the Norwegians have ever since regarded with uneasi- ness any prospective strengthening of Sweden that might invest her with too great a predominance over Norway. These Swedish peculiarities have had their due effect. When England and France declared war against Russia in the spring of 1854, and planned a Baltic campaign, it was natural to inquire what part Sweden would take in the contest. Prussia and Denmark, it was speedily evident, would remain neutral as long as possible ; but Sweden, remembering how Russia had deprived her of so valuable a portion of her dominions, might pos- sibly have desired to aid in humbling her proud neighbour. On the other hand, the Swedish party in Finland, as we have just seen, is limited FLEETS DESPATCHED BY THE WESTERN POWERS :— 1854. 155 in number ; the Norwegians would afford no countenance to the spread of Swedish power, unless it could be regarded as Norwegian power also ; while the king and the court had little personal inclination for a contest with the great czar. The crown-prince, it is true, was with the Allies in sentiment; while the Swedish people felt a sympathy with the liberal ideas of the West, rather than with the degrading serfdom of the East ; but this was not enough to induce the Swedes to draw the sword. If Sweden had joined the Allies, and the Allies had failed in bringing Russia to moderate terms, the full vengeance of the czar might afterwards have fallen on his Scandinavian neighbour. In April 1854, when the question of peace or war was in every Swede's mouth, a Stockholm newspaper, the Aftonblad (' Evening Sheet'), replying to some timid arguments urged by another journal, the Svenska Tidning (' SAvedish News '), maintained that Sweden might reasonably and advantageously side with the Western Powers against Russia, and gave a few particulars concerning the state of the Swedish army at that time. Sweden, without including Norway, had upon the war-footing 85,000 infantry, 5564 cavalry, and 4416 artillery — making a total of 94,980 men ; to which was added 8000 militia in Gothland, and 13,000 reserves — raising the total to about 116,000. The Swedish government, however, remained neutral ; and the year 1854 was destined to witness the sailing of a formidable English and French armament to the Baltic, with hostile intent against Russia, but on terms of amity — or at least neutrality — with three other Baltic powers, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia. FLEETS DESPATCHED BY THE WESTERN POWERS. The fleets of 1854 differed from any the world had yet seen, in the vast employment of steam- power. The mighty agency which the genius of Watt had brought to so much perfection, was applied to the commercial marine before the governments of Europe thought proper to bring it into requisition for ships-of-war. The interesting, though barely successful, expe- riments with small boats aided by steam-power, by the Comte d'Auxeron in 1774 on the Seine, by Perier in 1775 on the same river, and by the Marquis de Jouffroy in 1781 on the Saone ; the humble attempt at steam-navigation on the Delaware by Fitch, in 1783, with paddles instead of paddle-wheels ; the experiment of Rumsey on the Potomac, in 1787, by forcing a stream of water in at the bows and out at the stern of the vessel ; the miniature steam- voyage, with one paddle in the middle of the boat, in Dalswinton Lake by Patrick Miller in 1788 ; the duck-feet paddle steam-boat tried by Earl Stanhope in 1795 ; Symington's steam-tug on the Forth and Clyde Canal in 1802 ; Fulton's small steamer on the Seine in 1803 ; Evans's steam-dredger, tried on the American rivers in 1804 — all served as pre- parations for the commercial era in the history of steam-navigation. This commercial era may be said to have commenced when, in 1807, Fulton conveyed passengers 150 miles on the Hudson, from New York to Albany. Then ensued Stevens's voyage from New York to the Delaware in 1807, the first steam- voyage on the open sea ; the achieve- ment of Henry Bell's little Comet steamer, which plied between Glasgow and Helensburgh in 1812 ; the plying of the first steam-boat on the Thames in 1813 ; the gradual establishment of river-steamers on the Dee, Tay, Trent, Humber, Mersey, Avon, Severn, Orwell, Forth, Blackwater, and other streams ; the extension of this wonderful maritime improvement to nearly all the principal countries in the world ; the commencement of the Irish Channel transit by the Bob Roy, in 1818, between Greenock and Belfast; the first trip of the Great Western across the Atlantic; the rapid extension of ocean-steaming ; the improvements consequent on the use of the screw-propeller — these were the successive steps in the commercial history of steamers ; and it was not until a great advance had been made in the system, that governments ventured to apply steam-power to their men-of- war. The screw-propeller can be used as an auxiliary to sails ; it leaves the centre of a ship less encum- bered by machinery than paddle-wheels ; and for these, as well as other reasons, the screw has gradually acquired an ascendancy over the paddle in the English navy, except for small steamers. The steamers-of-war alone, besides the sailing- vessels, constitute a formidable fleet. On the 1st of January 1854, just before the declaration of war, the Navy List gave a table of 301 sailing- ships in the royal navy, carrying 11,397 guns ; 77 screw-steamers, of 26,534 aggregate horse-power, and carrying 3328 guns ; and 113 paddle-steamers, of 27,820 horse-power, and 518 guns. To these were to be added 14 sailing-ships and 21 steamers building, to carry respectively 1092 and 1038 guns. The grand total gave more than 520 ships-of-war, carrying not less than 17,000 guns — about 33 guns each on an average .* The Navy List recorded, at * The distribution, in respect to sizes of ships, built and building, was as follows :— Sailing- Screw. Guns. ships. steamers. 131 2 1B0 12 4 116 5 100 to 104 7 3 90 i 92 5 17 80 » 84 26 1 70 » 78 22 1 60 C 4 50 35 16 40 » 46 41 1 30 » 40 3 4 20 » 30 23 10 10 « 20 85 15 Less than 10 49 19 The paddle-steamers carried a relatively small number of puns, not above 5 each on an average — being employed to a considerable extent as transports and dispatch-boats. 156 NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. the same time, as the numher of effective officers in the navy (excluding half-pay and retired officers), 35 admirals, 41 vice-admirals, 207 rear- admirals, 652 captains, 1082 commanders, 1952 lieutenants, 589 masters, 315 mates, besides sur- geons, chaplains, instructors, &c. The officers of marines numbered 802 effective in different grades. The manning for the actual fleet, according to the Budget of 1854, comprised about 43,000 seamen and boys, and 8000 marines, besides a reserve body of marines in depot ; but this was afterwards considerably augmented. Shortly before the commencement of the war, the English government had instituted an inquiry into the customary mode of manning the royal navy, with a view to the introduction of such improvements as might be practicable. Under the plan until then followed there were certainly many defects. Sailors were accustomed to be entered on the books of particular ships selected by them- selves, nominally for five years', but practically for three years' service — except when on foreign ser- vice, where the duty was sometimes of more than three years' duration. After the expiry of the period, the ship was ( paid off,' and the men dis- banded, notwithstanding the expense, time, -and trouble bestowed in training them. Many of the men thus discharged never returned to the British navy ; some entered foreign service ; some aban- doned the seafaring-life altogether. The remainder, returning to duty in the Queen's fleet, did so at periods dictated by their own inclination or con- venience, and not by any regard to the wants of the service. This desultory system, or rather want of system, became a cause of much embar- rassment and expense in conducting the ordinary duties of the naval service; creating uncertainty as to the period at which ships might be ex- pected to be ready for sea ; and involving danger in the event of any political necessity for the sudden equipment of a fleet. On the 26th of July 1852, the Admiralty appointed a committee to consider this subject. The committee — consisting of Admiral Sir William Parker, Admiral Fan- shawe, Captain Dundas, Captain Richards, and Captain Shepherd — made a Report on the 14th of February 1S53, in which the results of the inquiries were embodied.* Their inquiries ranged over eleven subjects — the entry and training of boys and seamen, and the periods of service for which they are engaged ; whether, and by what means, the periods of service could be advanta- geously extended ; the practicability of permanently retaining the services of boys and seamen, as is the case with the royal marines, instead of dis- charging them after three years' service ; .whether a period of service abroad might usefully be followed by a period of service at home, in the coast-guard, dock-yards, or home-ports; whether a reserve of seamen could be organised to remain in England ; whether the means exist of raising * Parliamentary Papers, 1853. No. 173. a large body of seamen suddenly, if any exigency arose ; whether the rates of pay, prize-monej T , and bounty, might not advantageously be raised ; whether the treatment of petty-officers and seamen- gunners might not be improved ; whether any extension might be made in the award of good- conduct badges and of pensions ; whether there could be an entry of seamen into the coast-guard and the dock-yards } and whether the privileges of Greenwich Hospital might be made more accept- able to the men. In short, the practical question was — how to induce seamen to enter, and to remain in the royal navy, in which the advantages to the sailor are less than in those of some foreign countries. On all these points the committee reported at considerable length, making a large number of suggestions for the future manning of the navy. The principal result arrived at was, that the navy should be permanent, like the army and the marines. Increased pay and advantages being necessary to induce seamen to consent to longer service, a larger outlay would be called for. The Admiraltj 7 , therefore, in approving the plan, applied to the Treasury in March 1853 for their sanction to this increased expenditure. This increase, for a certain specified number of officers and seamen, was estimated at about £140,000 per annum beyond the expenditure of previous years. An Order in Council was issued on the 1st of April 1853, giving effect to the greater part of the recom- mendations of the committee. One recommendation had been, that the chief-gunners, chief-boatswains, and chief-carpenters in the royal navy, on account of their responsible positions and faithful service, should be placed on the same footing as non-com- missioned officers in the army — that is, should be eligible to the rank of commissioned officers for gallant conduct.* These new arrangements connected with the manning of the British navy, were being gradually carried into effect at the period of the commence- ment of the Russian war. * The following list, from the Order in Council ahove mentioned, shews how large is the number of gradations and designations under the rank of chief-gunner, chief-boatswain, and chief-carpenter, in the British nary : — Chief Petty-officers. Master at Anns. Chief-quartermaster. Chief-gunner's Mate. Chief-carpenter's Mate. Chief-boatswain's Mate. Seamen's Schoolmaster. Chief-captain of the Forecastle. Ship's Steward. Admiral's Cockswain. Ship's Cook. 1st Class Working Petty-officers. Ship's Corporal. Captain of the After-guard. Gunner's Mate. Captain of the Hold. Boatswain's Mate. Sailmaker. Captain's Cockswain. Ropemaker. Captain of the Forecastle. Carpenter's Mate. Quartermaster. Calker. Cockswain of the Launch. Blacksmith. Captain of the Main-top. Leading Stoker. Captain of the Pore-top. 2d Class Working Petty-officers. Cockswain of the Barge. Painter. Cockswain of the Pinnace. Musician. Captain of the Mast. Head Krooman. 2d Captain of the Forecastle. 2d Captain of the Fore-top. 2d Captain of the Main-top. Yeoman of the Signals. Cockswain of the Cutter. 2d Captain of the After-guard. Cooper. Captain of the Mizzen-top. Armourer. • Sailmaker's Mate. Calker's Mate. FLEETS DESPATCHED BY THE WESTERN POWERS :— 1854. 157 When the despatch of a formidable fleet to the Baltic was ordered, the command was given to Admiral Sir Charles Napier, whose long and brilliant services in various parts of the world had won for him a high reputation. Indeed, the delight with which the appointment was hailed was rather perilous to the veteran himself; since the dis- appointment would be the greater if circumstances should prevent him from achieving any great results. During a period of no less than fifty-four years, Napier had been battling either against human antagonists or against winds, and waves, and storms. As a volunteer in the Martin and the Renown; as a midshipman in the Greyhound ; as a lieutenant during a short period ; as a com- mander in the Pultusk and the Recruit ; as a captain in the Furicase and the Euryalus — the gallant officer had seen service in almost every part of the world, even before the peace of 1815. Fourteen years of peace left him without employment ; but in 1829 he commenced a new career ; he was for three years captain of the Galatea ; he then com- manded Don Pedro's fleet in the contest against Don Miguel concerning the crown of Portugal ; Sir CnARLES Naheh. — From a Photograph by Mayall. and next as commodore, he rendered brilliant service under Admiral Stopford off the coast of Syria. This last achievement won for him the honours of a K.C.B. and an aid-de-camp to the Seamen Leading Seamen. Yeoman of Store-rooms. Yeoman of Tiers. 2d Captain of the Hold. Sick-berth Attendant. Shipwright. Sailmaker's Crew. Blacksmith's Mate. Armourer's Crew. Stoker and Coal-trimmer. Carpenter's Crew. Cooper's Crew. Able Seamen. Bandsmen. Tailor, llutcher. The rank and the pay descend to ' Boy, 2d "Class.' and Others. 2d Head Krooman, Captain's Steward. Captain's Cook. Ward or Gunroom Steward. Ward or Gunroom Cook. Subordinate Officers' Steward. Subordinate Officers' Cook. Ship's Steward's Assistant. Ordinary Seamen. Cook's Mate. Barber. 2d Class Ordinary Seamen and K room en. Boy, 1st Class. Boy, 2d Class. gradually, from ' Master at Arms ' Queen, and insignia from Russia and Prussia. In 1846, Commodore Napier became rear-admiral, and in 1853, vice-admiral. A trifling incident, just before the departure of Sir Charles Napier for the Baltic, was a subject of much comment at the time, and a cause of mortification at a later period. On the 7th of March, the Reform Club gave a dinner to Sir Charles and to Her Majesty's ministers. During the customary health-drinkings and speech-makings, Lord Palmerston proposed the health of the admiral. In replying, Sir Charles said : ' I suppose we are very nearly at war. I suppose that when I get to the Baltic, I shall have an opportunity of declaring war.' Sir James Graham, in a eulogistic speech concerning Sir Charles, used these words : ' My gallant friend 158 NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. says that when he gets into the Baltic he will declare war ; I, as First Lord of the Admiralty, give him my free consent to do so.' It must be remembered that war had not at that time been declared by England and France against Russia. The matter was noticed in parliament, as involving an anachronism, if nothing worse ; and the minister was forced to take shelter under the privileges of an ' after-dinner speech.' The indiscreet oratory of the evening was bitterly remembered at a later period, when wrangling had succeeded to amity between the two persons chiefly concerned. During the winter of 1853-4, when it became evident that England and France would be involved in war with the czar, all the British naval arsenals were placed in a state of activity, to fit out a fleet for service in the Baltic. Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham, Sheerness, Ports- mouth, Devonport, and Pembroke, resounded with the labours of the artificers who were preparing the huge vessels for sea ; while the Admiralty was incessantly engaged in manning the ships as quickly as they could be placed in commission. The naval resources of England were never more strikingly displayed. While the utmost difficulty was expe- rienced in sending a small army to Turkey, the early spring witnessed the completion of one of the finest fleets the world had ever seen ; and this, too, in addition to the large fleet sent to the Black Sea, and to the ships reserved for home- defence and other service. The vessels destined for this Baltic war assem- bled at Spithead ; and the review of the fleet by Her Majesty was a spectacle worthy of the queen of a maritime nation. A review on the same spot in the previous August had produced a great impression, as a manifestation of the naval power of Britain ; but the display in March was yet more grand. Sir Charles Napier's fleet was to consist of about 44 ships-of-war, manned by upwards of 22,000 seamen, mounting about 2200 guns, and propelled by 16,000 horse-power of steam. Only six out of the whole number were to be sailing-vessels — the Neptune, 120; St George, 120; Prince Regent, 90; Boscaioen, 70; Monarch, 84; and Cumberland, 70 — all the rest being either screw or paddle steamers. It was arranged that some of these should form a first division, to start under Sir Charles Napier ; that others, as a second division, should follow under Admiral Corry ; and that the rest should be subsequently des- patched. Sir Charles's division consisted entirely of steamers, sixteen in number : comprising 8 screw line-of-battle ships, 4 screw-frigates, and 4 paddle-steamers* The Duke of Wellington and * Screw Lhie-of -battle Ships. Duke of Wellington, Royal George, St Jean d'Acre, Princess Royal, . Blenheim, Hogue, Ajax, Edinburgh, . Guns. 131 121 101 91 60 60 58 58 680 Men. Horse-power. 1100 780 990 400 900 650 850 400 660 450 660 450 630 450 630 450 6420 4030 the Royal George were three-deckers. Sir Charles's flag floated on the Duke of Wellington, Admiral Chads's on the Edinburgh, and Admiral Plumridge's on the Leopard. Of all the ships borne on the bosom of the ocean in 1854, the flag-ship of Sir Charles Napier exhi- bited in the most marked degree the characteristics of modern science as applied to marine architecture. This vessel may be said, indeed, to have altered her very principle of growth during her progress towards maturity, that she might be adapted for the reception of the fruits of invention and dis- covery. Originally laid down at Pembroke as a man-of-war of 120 guns, she underwent three changes — she was cut in two at the middle, and lengthened by 23 feet, for the reception of 11 additional guns; she had a screw-propeller fitted as an auxiliary to the power of the sails ; and her launching, occurring as it did about the time of the death of the great warrior, led to a change of name from the Windsor Castle to the DuJce of Wellington. Thus was produced the majestic three-decker of 131 guns — having an extreme length of 278 feet, extreme breadth of 60 feet, and a total weight, when fully equipped for sea, of 5600 tons. Such a leviathan had never before ploughed the seas, for it possessed large steam-power in addition to the usual fittings for a sailing man-of-war of the first class. The problem was yet to be solved, how far a vessel necessarily drawing so great a depth of water would be fitted for active service in a closed, shallow, intricate sea like the Baltic. Exciting was the day when Queen Victoria witnessed the departure of the fleet for Russian waters. On the 11th of March 1854, the shores of Hampshire and of the Isle of Wight were crowded with thousands of eager spectators, who then for the first time witnessed the departure of a large fleet destined to a possible career of war and destruction. The various ships being assembled at Spithead, the Queen came from Osborne in the Fairy yacht, steamed up to the gigantic flag-ship, received all the principal officers on board the yacht, and bade them farewell and God-speed. Early in the afternoon the signal was given, and the ships weighed, and sailed or steamed forth. The Royal George led the way ; then followed the St Jean d'Acre and the Tribune ; to these succeeded the Imperieuse, Blenheim, Amphion, Princess Royal, and the other ships in succession. Her Majesty Screw-friga tes. Guns. Imperieuse 50 Arrogant, 47 Amphion, 34 Tribune, 30 161 Paddle-wheel Steamers. Guns. Leopard, 18 • Dragon, 6 Bull-dog 6 Valorous, 16 46 Men. Horse-power. 530 360 450 360 320 300 300 300 1600 Men. 280 200 160 220 1320 Horse-power. 560 560 500 400 2020 FLEETS DESPATCHED BY THE WESTERN POWERS :— 1854. 159 literally headed the fleet; the little Fairy darted on in advance of all, insomuch that, when return- ing westward, the Queen passed the stately ships in succession. Nearly all the seamen were enabled to catch a glance of their sovereign, as she stood upon the deck of her yacht ; and the recognition was not likely to be forgotten either by seamen or sovereign. No such sight had been witnessed, perhaps, on English shores since Queen Eliza- beth's parting visit to her defenders at Tilbury, 266 years earlier, on occasion of the Spanish Armada. The fleet — or rather the one division of the fleet under Sir Charles Napier — passed the Downs at mid-day on the 12th. It pursued its majestic course up the German Ocean, through the Skager Rack, thence to Helsingbr, at the mouth of the Sound, and onward to Copenhagen, where Sir Charles landed on the 20th to pay his respects to the king of Denmark. The paddle-steamer Hecla had previously been sent out, on the 19th of February, to make a preparatory survey of the Baltic, carrying several masters and pilots ; she was absent about five weeks, during which time Duke of Wellington Screw War-steamer. a run of 3000 miles had been made — sounding and examining very carefully all the shoals and doubtful spots connected with Baltic navigation. The Hecla met the fleet off Dover; when Sir Charles took on board the masters and pilots who had thus gained practical experience, and distributed them among the various ships of his fleet. No sooner had the naval authorities at Ports- mouth despatched the first division of the fleet under Sir Charles Napier, than arrangements were made to send off the second division under Rear- admiral Corry — an officer who had seen nearly half a century of active service, although his name was not associated in a marked degree with any special achievements. On the 16th of March, the Queen visited Corry's squadron at Spithead, as she had before visited that of Napier. The ships ready at that time were few in number, not exceeding six or seven ; they sailed in the following week — to be succeeded by other vessels as rapidly as the equipment and manning could be completed. Admiral Corry in the Neptune, 120 guns, was accompanied in the first instance by the Cassar, 91 ; Prince Regent, 90 ; Boscawen, 70 ; Frolic, 16 ; and Bull-clog, 6. One arrangement was highly characteristic of an age in which steam-power and engine-machinery were about to be brought in aid of naval warfare. The Volcano, steam-frigate, was converted into a floating-ioorlshop, by Mr Nasmyth, of Patricroft, to afford speedy means of effecting repairs in the steam-machinery of the Baltic fleet. Instead of taking a damaged ship to the workshop, the workshop would be taken to the damaged ship. The first deck was converted into an engineering- shop, 104 feet long, 30 feet wide, and 10 feet high ; provided with a 12 horse-power steam-engine, and with turning-lathes, planing-machines, boiler-plate punching and shearing machines, drilling and boring machines, forges, blowing-fans, a cupola- furnace, a Nasmyth's steam-hammer, and all the tools and implements necessary for ordinary engineering work. This floating-workshop was 160 NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. in itself an epitome of the history of progress in the mechanical arts; and as thus applied to the necessities of a fleet in actual service, it presented a marked contrast to anything which the annals of naval warfare had before supplied. The day which witnessed the declaration of war by England and France, nearly coincided with that on which the fleet reached the Swedish and Danish shores. The two divisions joined on the 23d of March, at Wingo Sound, near Gothenborg ; they passed through the Great Belt, anchored off Nyborg on the 27th, and sailed on the 28th to Kiel, in Holstein. Dispatches reached Sir Charles Napier by mail-route from London ; and consequent on the information thus received, the following characteristic address Avas issued to the fleet by its commander : — ' Lads— War is declared. We are to meet a bold and numerous enemy. Should they offer us battle, you know how to dispose of them. Should they remain in port, we must try to get at them. Success depends upon the quickness and precision of your fire. Lads, sharpen your cutlasses, and the day is your own.' The fleet left Kiel Fiord on the 30th, and sailed to Kioge Bay, near Copenhagen, at which point the intricate navigation between numerous islands may be said to terminate, leaving an open sea for the subsequent course of the ships. When the month of April opened, the fleet, now numbering twenty-two ships- of- war, was at anchor in Kioge Bay. The St George, James Watt, Ccesar, Nile, Majestic, Boscawcn, Odin, Miranda, Rosamond, and several steam-sloops, had not yet joined it at that spot. Having thus traced the British fleet to the Baltic, it becomes necessary to notice the maritime contingent furnished by our French ally for the same service. France^as a military nation, has paid far more attention to campaigns on land than to encounters at sea. Her shipwrights and engineers, however, have not failed to watch and to profit by the improvements introduced in England ; and during the long peace, a fleet of considerable power was gradually formed. At the beginning of 1854, the naval forces of France comprised 290 sailing-ships and 117 steamers ; presenting an aggregate of about 13,000 guns, and 30,000 horse-power for the steamers.* Of this force, about 30 vessels were set apart to share in the Baltic expedition ; comprising 9 ships-of-the-line, 12 frigates, 4 brigs * The details were nearly as follows : — Sailing-vessels. Guns. 120 100 . 90 80 to 82 50 » 60 40 t, 46 Corvettes, 9 14 19 -11 42 16 39 Brigs and Cutters, 101 Smaller vessels, 39 Steam-vessels, Vessels-of-the-Line, 3 Frigates 20 Corvettes, 30 Dispatch-boats and other small vessels, . 64 and corvettes, and the remainder smaller vessels. They did not sail in a body, but started for the scene of operations as soon as equipped and manned. The fleet was placed under the command of Admiral Parseval-Deschenes. He left Paris for Brest on the 20th of March ; and the ships began to leave Brest for the Baltic on the same day. Great and powerful as were the fleets thus assembled at the entrance of the Baltic in April 1854, the next inquiry is — What were the naval forces against which they were called upon to combat 1 Russia began her navy (p. 4) under Peter the Great, who, as is well known, studied the art of ship-building in other countries to qualify himself for this self-imposed duty. The Russian mercan- tile marine has never been extensive ; nor are her ports numerous, considering the vast area of the czar's dominions : hence many difficulties have stood in the way of the formation of a powerful navy. Until the time of Catherine II., the Russian ships of war had only been employed in cruising about the Baltic ; but that empress sent a few of them by way of the Atlantic from the Baltic to the Black Sea ; since which time Russia has always maintained a fleet in the Constantino- politan waters. Russia was slightly engaged in naval hostility with England in 1801 and 1808 ; while in 1827, the two powers fought side by side at the ill-omened battle of Navarino. The 1 Russian naval forces at the beginning of 1854, appear, from the figures furnished by Haxthausen and other writers, to have comprised about 60 ships-of-the- line, ranging from 70 to 120 guns ; 36 frigates, of 40 to 60 guns ; 70 corvettes, brigs, and brigan- tines ; and 40 steamers — the whole carrying about 9000 guns, and requiring a force of 40,000 seamen. Somewhat later in the year, it was known that at Helsingfors (Sveaborg) and Cronstadt the Russians had not less than 30 ships of 74 guns or upwards each ; * with an aggregate armament of 2468 guns ; besides 3 steamers of 400 horse-power each, 2 of 120 horse-power, and 1 steam-corvette of 450 horse- power — the six steamers carrying collectively 56 guns. The numbers could not have deviated much from this in April, at the time when the English and French fleets entered the Baltic. There are many peculiarities in the Russian navy. The officers and sailors are not so much * At Heh'mgfors. Russia, . 120 Brienne, 74 St George the Conqueror 112 Arsis, .... 74 Ezekiel, . 74 Prochor, . 84 Andrew, . 74 Vladimir, . . 84 At Cronstadt. Guns. Guns. Emperor Peter I., . 120 Finland, . 74 * * * 112 Katzbach, 74 Enigheten, . . 84 Ingermanland, . . 74 Krasnoe, 84 Culm, . 74 Ganule, . 84 Pourgat Azofa, . . 74 Volga, .... S4 Sisoe the Great, 74 Empress Alexandra, . . S4 Villa jath, . . 74 Narva, .... 74 Natron-menga, 74 Beresina, . 74 Fr£re Champenoise, . . 74 Borodino, 74 Michael, 74 Smolensko, . 74 FLEETS DESPATCHED BY THE WESTERN POWERS -.—1854. 161 seamen, as soldiers afloat ; for the discipline partakes rather of the military than of the naval character. Many of the generals are admirals also ; and the ships are under the control of the commandants of the respective fortresses, to an extent not observable in England or France. It is remarkable that the Russians have never fought a great naval battle, in the sense in Avhich the Nelsons and Howes would have understood that term. When Peter the Great almost annihilated the Swedish fleet in 1715; when Orloff inflicted similar ruin on the Turks at Tchesme in 1770 ; when the Russians, as one of the allies, crushed the Turkish fleet at Navarino ; and when they made the ruth- less attack at Sinope in 1853 — it was in each case a crushing onslaught with a superior force, rather than a battle on equal terms fought out at sea. It is stated by Mr Oliphant,* as the result both of his reading and of his personal observations, that the Russian ships-of-war are not durable ; that pecula- tion prevails from the highest to the lowest among Russian officers; that while sound timber is paid for by the government, green pine and fir are largely used, the difference in value finding its way into the pockets of nefarious contractors and officials ; and that the vessels, imperfectly built of imperfect materials, become rotten in a few years — insomuch that Russia possesses A'ery few ships- of-war that could venture on a voyage round the Cape. The worm called the teredo navalis infests much of the timber with which the ships are built ; but it is believed that this worm is made to bear the blame, not only of the rot which it really produces, but of that more disgraceful rot which results from official dishonesty. The Emperor Nicholas expended such enormous sums on his armies, fleets, and fortresses, that the national exchequer could not support the pressure of an adequate remuneration for personal services ; almost all the officials, in the various grades, were underpaid in respect to emolument; they could not maintain a position as gentlemen on the recognised salaries of their respective offices, and were hence driven to the adoption of crooked means to enhance their incomes. Jobbing and official dishonesty were almost inevitable conse- quences. Wherever such is the case, the lowest grades, the unofficial, ultimately bear the severity of the burden ; and thus, in Russia as in Turkey, the common soldiers and the poor peasants suffer incalculable miseries from the peculations and tyranny of their superiors. This is one of the few points in which the dominion of the czar and that of the sultan approach to parallelism: neither despot is so fortunate as to be surrounded by honest officials. Anterior to the commencement of the war, the whole naval force of Russia was divided into the Blue, Red, and White fleets or squadrons — the first stationed in the Black Sea, the second in the Baltic, and the third in the White Sea. The few * Russian Shores of the Slack Sea. ships near Kamtchatka were too limited in number to be separately grouped. The Black Sea and the Baltic fleets were each in two divisions, and each division comprised two vessels of the first class, six of the second, six frigates, two corvettes, and several steamers. So far as organisation went, the fleets were strictly disciplined ; and if the ships and the seamen had been effective, the naval forces of Russia would really have been formidable. Of the ships, a little has just been said ; of the seamen, there is much evidence against their efficiency. ' Russia wants the first vital element for a navy — seamen. The reason of this is simple enough — she possesses [comparatively] no merchant-navy. The population of Finland, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia does not amount to more than 1,500,000 inhabitants ; that of the Black Sea provinces does not exceed 500,000 : it is therefore only from this limited number — most of whom, too, devote them- selves to agriculture — that Russia can raise her levies. Even those who are sailors are engaged in the coasting-trade, which they follow in the day- time alone, sheltering themselves at night behind the girdle of islands and eyots which line all the Russian coast. To man its ships, the Russian government is obliged to fall back upon the inha- bitants of the interior of the country. In this way it has, up to the present time, formed an army of sailors, who are frightened at the sea, which the majority of them never saw before. The levies for the navy, like those for the army, are composed of the strangest and most heterogeneous elements ; and it is therefore a very difficult task to prepare them for the rough calling for which they are intended. Neither the whip nor the knout will ever be able to bend the Russian to this kind of service : the cold and fanatical indifference of the Russian soldier on land, before hundreds of cannon belching out death, abandons him entirely on board a ship. Like the Arab and the Persian, the Cossack and the Tatar, he has a profound feeling of horror fur the sea. Besides this, he is destitute of vigour, idle, and without muscular strength ; for the muscles beneath his flabby skin, so often lacerated by the rod, are not capable of any great exertion. An Englishman or Frenchman is two or three times stronger, and more active in his movements. A Russian ship, consequently, requires twice as many men as one of our vessels does to make up its full complement. Again, it is not on board a number of pontoons, imprisoned in the ice or laid up in dock for the greater part of the year, that sailors are formed, or crews receive the practical instruction which it is necessary for them to ac- quire. Every year the Baltic is blocked up by the ice from the month of October to the end of April, at least; even the Black Sea is not always free from a similar obstruction; while, during the summer, the navigation of both seas is so danger- ous and so difficult, that there is a ukase punishing with degradation and death every officer who has not returned with his vessel before the equinoxes, or who happens to lose it from stress of weather. 162 NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH. In addition to all these considerations, good sailors are formed only by long voyages ; and, I repeat, the Russians of the Black Sea, as well as those of the Baltic, are employed merely in the coasting- trade.' * It remained to he seen whether the naval encounters of 1854 in the Baltic would tell in favour of the soldier-sailors who manned the Russian fleet. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALLIES IN THE BALTIC. Although the Allied fleets entered the Baltic early in April, the sea was not yet fitted for navi- gation by large ships, owing to the length of time during which the ice of winter clings to the ports and inlets. Cronstadt, the island-fortress which guards St Petersburg and the Neva, was naturally the point to which the attention of the two admirals was mainly directed ; and this island, together with the mouth of the Neva, were known to be encum- bered with ice at the time. A table, published in 1854,t shews for a period of 136 years — from 1718 to 1853 — the dates of the opening and closing of the river Neva. The dates are in the Old Style, according to Russian usage ; but by adding twelve days, they are accommodated to the New Style, as used in England. In no case did the opening of the Neva occur till April ; most of the openings were in the third or fourth week of that month ; while some were retarded until May. The closing begins generally some time in November. The ice lingers around Cronstadt nearly a week later than at the mouth of the Neva, insomuch that the month of May is in most years fairly advanced before the vicinity of that fortress can be safely approached by large ships. This icy fringe- work is present during about 150 days in each year. Slowly and cautiously did the Allied admirals advance, watchful of shoals in one part, and of ice in another. Of the enemy, there was rather a fear that he would not be met with ; the seamen were eager for an encounter; but it began already to be suspected that the Russian ships would shelter behind stone-fortresses. To many, even among the educated officers, the expedition partook of the nature of a voyage of discovery, or at least of exploration in a little-known region. J The Baltic had entered little into our speculations as a seat of war, and was to ships of the navy almost a mare ignotum. Merchant-vessels had traversed it backwards and forwards, and visited all its different ports with their cargoes ; but the profes- sional knowledge of its waters and shores was very small, and derived chiefly from foreign charts. The men of the last war, depending chiefly on their seamanship and enterprise, had added little to our scientific information on the * Germain de Lagny. + Almanac of the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences. subject, and left, as the result of their experience, only the warnings of disaster and a few oral records. The high hopes, therefore, which followed the departure of the first Baltic fleet, must have been dashed by a fear that some of those magnificent ships might return no more.'* The merchants engaged in the Baltic trade do indeed know the perils of that region — taught, as they have been, by costly experience. In a series of years imme- diately preceding the war, the vessels which passed the Sound, either inwards or outwards, numbered no less than 15,000 annually, of which nearly one- fourth were British. Never did a year pass without many of these ships being wrecked. The Baltic navigators have found the most dangerous points, in so far as regards wrecking on the coast, to be — Sandhammer and Falsterbd, near the southern extremity of Sweden ; the east coast of the island of Gothland; the Aland Islands; the Dager Ort, near the entrance to the Gulf of Finland ; and a hazardous shoal between Christian ia and Gothen- borg. Any criticism on naval manoeuvres in the Baltic would be unjust, which did not take into account the perils of such a sea to bulky ships drawing so great a depth of water as those in Sir Charles Napier's fleet. The Czar Nicholas, naturally expecting that the Gulf of Finland, containing Cronstadt and the approach to St Petersburg, would be visited by the English and French fleets, was not slow to prepare defensively for such a contingency. As early as November in the previous year, the formation of twenty Finnish battalions of troops had been ordered — to be dressed and equipped by the districts which provided them, but armed from the arsenals at Sveaborg. At the same time, defensive works were commenced at various points along the coast, where a landing might be apprehended ; and hospitals and lazarettos were established at a distance of a few miles inland. The military road from St Petersburg to Helsingfdrs, which crosses much marshy ground, was supplied with formidable batteries at certain points — insomuch that the swamps and the guns together might check the progress of an invading army along that route. The wonderful defences at Sveaborg and Helsingfdrs were still further strengthened. The Grand-Duke Constantine, second son of the czar, visited all the strong positions in the gulf in February 1854, in order that, when the expected declaration of war should arrive, no weak points might be left to the mercy of the enemy. It was a Swedish and Danish holiday-trip to steam forth and witness the passage of the mighty fleets into the Baltic. Lines of steamers ply between different ports on the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and Prussian coasts ; and many of these steamers bore extra numbers of passengers, incited by curiosity to see the novel and imposing display. On some occasions, a party of visitors, from Malmo or Gothenborg, or other port, would be admitted * Blackwood's Magazine, No. CCCCLXXVIII. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALLIES IN THE BALTIC :— 1854. 163 on board one of the gigantic ships, where they were speedily lost in admiration at the wonders of a modern war screw-steamer ; and on all these occasions, good wishes for the Allies accompanied the admiration. Early in April, a report obtained currency that a Russian squadron had been seen somewhere near the centre of the Baltic ; and this report had the effect of hastening the movements of Sir Charles Napier and his fleet from Kibge Bay towards the east. If such a squadron had really put to sea, however, it must have returned to port in good time for its own safety : the Allies saw nothing of it. Rear-admiral Plumridge, with the Leopard, Imperieuse, Tribune, and Amphion, was detached from the main fleet, on a reconnoitring expedition up the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland as far as the ice would permit. He was enabled to send back word to Sir Charles, that seven Russian line-of-battle ships and one frigate were frozen in at Helsingfdrs. On the receipt of this intelligence, April 12th, Napier set sail with fifteen vessels in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. The courts of Sweden and Denmark had by that time announced clearly the course they would follow in the delicate state of Baltic affairs, whereby the British admiral knew to what extent he might approach their shores ; the two courts, having determined to remain strictly neutral, forbade the entrance of either hostile fleet behind the defences at Wax- holm, Raholm, Karlskrona, and other specified places ; but facilities were to be afforded in all the ports of the neutral powers for the purchase of provisions and stores by the fleets, except articles contraband of war. When Sir Charles Napier thus began to move eastward, in the middle of April, his armament had accumulated to nearly forty ships, of which more than half were screw-steamers. The whole had on board about 1700 guns and 18,000 men ; with Corry, Plumridge, and Chads as the three admirals under Napier. But from that time, it was seldom that all the ships were assembled at or near one spot : special expeditions being always in progress, by detached portions of the fleet. The French fleet, commanded by Vice-admiral Parseval-Deschenes, comprised about twenty-four vessels* The commander hoisted his flag on the Inflexible; while Rear-admiral Penaud, second in command, sailed in the Duguesclin, Unlike the English armament, this French fleet took out a small body of infantry and another of artillery, ready for prospective land-service. These various Guns. Gam. * Tage, . 100 Trident, . 80 Austerlitz, 100 Semillante, . 60 Ilercule, . 100 Andromaque, . 60 Jemmappes, . 100 Vengeance, 60 Breslau, 90 Poursuivante, . 50 Duguesclin, 90 Virginie, 60 Inflexible, . 90 Zenobie, . 50 Duperr Highlanders. Scots Fusilcer ) 93d ) SECOND DIVISION. Sir de Lacy Evans. Brigadier-general Pennefathcr. Brigadier-general Adams. 30th Regiment, 41st Regiment, 55th a , 47 th a , 95th " . 49th u THIRD DIVISION. Sir Bichard England. Brigadier-general Byre. Brigadier-general Campbell. 1st Regiment, 44th Regiment, 28th 3Sth 50th OStli FOURTH DIVISION. Sir George Cathcarl. Brigadier-general Goldie. Brigadier-general Torrcns. 20th Regiment, 63d Regiment, 21st a , 40th ii , Rifles, 1st battalion. 57th » LIGHT DIVISION. Sir George Broivn. Major-general Codrington, Brigadier-general Buller. Rifles, 2d battalion, 19th, 7th (Fusileers), 77th, 33d, 83th (Connaught Rangers). 23d. The French marshal issued like orders to the troops under his command. A striking difference in the arrangements of the two camps was observable in this particular : that the French carried their tents with them, whereas the British re-embarked theirs on board ship. The French conveyed their tents in pieces, each man bearing a share of that which would cover him at night ; whether it was that the British tents were too heavy, or so constructed that they could not readily be separated into portions, the result was unquestion- able — that the British troops had thereafter to pass many a comfortless night without shelter, while their companions in arms were under canvas. It may have been that, as the Cossacks and Russian cavalry were known by this time to be employed in laying waste the country, sweeping off the supplies, and burning all the houses that lay between Old Fort and the Alma, the march Avas ordered too hastily to permit the tents to be taken. Be this as it may, however, the tents Avcre ordered to be conveyed down to the beach ; the boats came from the ships to re-embark them, and one brigade of the 4th division remained on the spot until this duty was performed. The march began in early morn. Officers and men scrambled up after their hasty night's rest, and made such arrangements for equipping and breakfasting as circumstances permitted. The scarcity of water was a sad evil ; it limited the power of obtaining an early repast, and it pre- vented the men from filling their kegs preparatory to a march over ground where water was nearly unattainable. Some of the officers breakfasted on cold roast pork and ' a pull at the water-barrel,' while large numbers of the men started without a morning-meal of any kind. The wagon-trains and the commissariat -carts having joined the divisions, the start was made. Three cavalry regi- ments formed the van ; next came the artilleiy, flanked on both sides by infantry ; next, more cavalry and the commissariat-train ; then the rest of the infantry ; and, lastly, the rear-guard. For fifteen miles they traversed a monotonous country, without seeing a drop of fresh water or a single tree ; while, as a troublesome compensation for the boisterous wet nights they had endured, the CAVALRY DIVISION. Earl of Lucan. LIGHT DRAGOONS. HEAVY DRAGOONS. Earl of Cardigan. Brigadier-general Scarlett. 4th,_ 2d (Scots Greys), 8th Hussars, 11th ii , 13th, 17th Lancers. 4th Dragoon Guards, 5th u // , Gth (Enniskillens). Sir John Burgoyne and Brigadier-general Tylden had the chief control of the ordnance and engineering operations ; while other officers were attached to the staff of Lord Raglan. Some of the regiments above named were not quite complete at the time of the march to the Alma. The artillery mounted about 00 field-guns. Although in the original plan the French were to have numbered double the English, and did so at a later period, the actual num- bers at and before the battle of the Alma preponderated on the side of the British— about 27,000 against 24,000. There were two reasons for this inferiority on the part of the French— they suffered many more deaths by cholera than the British, and they had insufficient means of transport. 210 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. sun's heat struck down upon them with great force, causing many a poor fellow to drop whose frame had previously heen weakened by illness, and many others whose only malady was intoler- able thirst. Frequent were the inquiries whether the boats might not have managed to bring them fresh water from the ships. The lamentable confusion which prevailed at that time in the commissariat and medical departments of the British army shewed itself, among other ways, in this — that there were few or no ambulance- wagons to convey the sick. Lieutenant Peard, who bore his fair share of officer's duties during the march, said : ' It was certainly much to be lamented that we had no ambulance-wagons for these poor sick fellows who fell out on the march ; for had they been carried a mile or two, or had a drink of water, I have no doubt half of them would have rejoined their companies. Ambulance- carts ought surely to have attended each brigade, and each should have carried some medicines, particularly where the cholera was likely to affect the army. The medical officers in general carried a small bottle of brandy and cask of water, which they gave the men, and were thus enabled to do much good. Some of our poor fellows actually came to me, and on their knees besought me for a drink out of my flask.' The tragic results that followed the want of vehicles and of animals to draw them, in the operations of the British army, will fill many sad paragraphs in the following Chapter. During the march, the route was mostly over a dreary plain, with irregular hilly ridges running at intervals down to the sea. The men occasionally halted, took off their packs, and lay down for a little rest ; and as division after division reached the Bulganak, the parched soldiers eagerly ran to obtain a draught of water, where it was clean and fresh enough for drinking. It was on this day that the troubles of the British commissariat began to assume such pro- portions as to afford anxiety to the commanders, and surprise and indignation at home. Already, on the shores of Bulgaria, the commissaries had been harassed, and the officers and troops discon- certed, by the imperfect organisation of that important branch of the military system;* and now, when an enemy's ground was under foot, the effects began to be still more severely felt. Not only were the commissaries called upon to provide food and beverage for 27,000 men in this foreign land, but also means of transport — a much more difficult duty, as events afterwards shewed. The French, from first to last, managed this department more successfully. Sorely must the British troops and the commissaries have been vexed: carts of a peculiar construction, provided at Woolwich, to contain a reserve of small-arm ammunition, had been left behind at Varna, because they were too heavy ; and an ambulance- * See pp. 101-104. train corps, with accommodation for the sick and wounded, had been left at Varna, because there were not animals to draw it. There was this matter, too, to take into consideration — that if any water, or forage, or fuel, were procurable on the march, the claimants for it would be 60,000 or 70,000 in number: since the French and the Turks took part in the expedition. About 24,000 French, under Marshal St Arnaud, Prince Napoleon, and Generals Canrobert, Bosquet, and Forey, were early on the march from Old Fort to the'Bulganak ; while 7000 Turks, under Suleiman Pacha, took a parallel route at a short distance. Good soldiers were not likely, at such a time, to make the worst of any defects in commissariat matters : they accepted what was offered, and looked forward to a speedy encounter with the foe. It was a grand sight. Stretching far and wide, presenting a martial front from east to west, and advancing in columns separated by small intervals, this army of more than 60,000 chosen men formed a gallant body. Here, the red coats of the line regiments, the bear-skin caps of the Guards, the picturesque dress of the Highlanders, relieved by the sober darkness of the riflemen ; there, the simple caps or shakos of the French, the bulky red trousers of the Zouaves, the flowing costume of the other African regiments, and the nimble tirailleurs ; further on, the Turks, Europeanised except in relation to the red fez ; and each — British, French, and Turk — anxious to stand well in the eyes of the others. The artillery, too, threw its bright specks into the picture. Each British division of infantry was attended by a division of artillery, consisting of eight 9-pounder guns, and two 24-pounder howitzers; and with the cavalry division was a troop of 6-pounder horse-artillery. As the artillery maintained a position at the right of its respective division, it threw a diversity into the scene. Turks close to the beach; French next; then English; then cavalry; and Rifles and light skirmishers furthest inland — presented a magnificent front; Avhile behind these, came the trains of horses carrying the reserve ammunition, the baggage- animals, the arabas with sick men and commis- sariat stores, the droves of oxen and sheep — which the commissaries had with immense difficulty collected — and the rear-guard to bring up the whole. The moving mass covered several square miles, and carried with it the hopes of three nations. Nor was even this the limit of the picture : a splendid fleet steamed and sailed south- ward as the army marched and rode southward — each, fleet and army, watching and admiring the other. An encounter was not far distant. On the afternoon of this day (the 19th), before the expedition had reached the Bulganak, curling wreaths of smoke on the south and east could be seen, marking the spots where villages and farmsteads had been fired by the Cossacks, and where the poor Tatars were rendered homeless by this characteristic specimen of Russian tactics. THE ADVANCE TO THE ALMA— THE BATTLE :— 1854. 211 Next could be seen, hovering upon and around the distant hills, dark bodies of cavalry, disposed as if to check the advance of the Allies by harassing attacks on their left flank. The Allies were well disposed to meet these assailants in the open field. The infantry and artillery being detained by the crossing of the Bulganak, a portion of the cavalry dashed on, to make a closer survey of the Cossack lances which glittered in the distance. These cavalry, about 500 in number (belonging to the 8th and the 11th Hussars and the 13th Light Dragoons), commanded by the Earl of Cardigan, galloped onward to meet the Cossacks. The Cossacks in sight were at least thrice the number of the English, and, as they commanded the brow of a hill, the question presented itself whether the little band should make a bold uphill attack upon them : the earl was willing to attempt this ; but Lord Raglan deemed the odds, both in numbers and in posi- tion, too unfavourable. The order was given to call in the skirmishers, and to retire slowly. Here, however, a new scene opened. The Cossack squadrons separated so far as to give play to some pieces of artillery, which poured forth a succession of shot upon the small body of slowly retreating British cavalry : the concealment of these guns having probably been part of a plan for enticing the British up the hill. By this time a troop of horse-artillery had arrived, under Captain Maude ; a smart -exchange ensued, in which the English had the advantage, indicated by the Russians retiring from the scene of contest. Had the 500 British cavalry ascended the hill in the first instance, it is doubtful whether half of them would have returned alive. It was tho first actual contest in the Crimean war ; a few limbs were shattered ; but the hussars and dragoons were proud to shew that they could bear pain without wincing. The work was not left wholly to the British ; for a body of French wound round the hill, and scattered a squadron of Russian cavalry by a few 9-pounders. Prince Menchikoffs dispatch relating to this affair com- prised the following particulars: — That when, on the 13th of September, the Allies appeared off Eupatoria, he at once resolved to take up a defensive position on the Alma ; that during their sojourn at Old Fort (a sojourn the length of which equally surprised and pleased him), he was enabled - to fortify his position ; that when they crossed the Bulganak on the 19th, he sent the 6th division of Russian light cavalry, nine sotnias of Cossacks, and a battery of horse-artillery, to check them ; and that, after a slight skirmish, the one party retired to the Bulganak, and the other to the Alma. The prince did not impart quite the same colour to these respective ' retirings ' as was given by the English officers ; but as the skirmish was only a trifle, neither side sought to make much of it. When tho Allies — the Russians having retired to the Alma — had all crossed the Bulganak, prepara- tions were made to bivouac for tho night. The commissaries opened their stores, and served out rations ; while the men gathered nettles, and weeds, and grass, to aid with broken casks in making up their camp-fires for cooking and for warmth. The night was cold, damp, and comfortless, sufficient to take the heart out of a man who had not other thoughts to cheer him. Mr Russell states, that he could tell of ' the sorrows of a tentless, baggageless man, wandering about in the dark from regiment to regiment, in hope of finding his missing baggage,' if he had wished to dwell upon such trifles ; and Lieutenant Peard, who was ordered on outlying picket for the night, says : ' I shall not easily forget my vain endeavours to find the bridge over the river in the dark, and walking up to my knees in the water ; this little casualty did not, as may be imagined, tend to make me more comfortable for the night : sleep was out of the question, for the sentries had to be visited every hour ; and when the morning dawned, it found us wet through with the dew, which was heavier than I had ever before experienced.' These are common incidents in a soldier's life; many poor fellows, however, who had been weakened by cholera, sank under their trials during the night : it was not their lot to share in the approaching victory. Morning broke on the 20th of September — the day of the Battle op the Alma — amid a busy camp, a buckling-on of accoutrements, a harnessing oi horses, and a hasty breakfasting on the part of those who had time and materials for obtaining that welcome repast. Many expected, though none could know, that tho dawn would usher in a day on which the first great battle would be fought by the English and French armies during this war — the only contests worthy of note before that day having fallen to the lot of the Turks, on the banks of the Danube and in Asia. Lord Raglan had made his head-quarters at a little post-house on the banks of the Bulganak, which the Cossacks had not succeeded in quite destroying by fire ; whether the other officers had aught to cover them is doubtful : the supper, the sleep, the breakfast, were all al fresco, leaving few domestic chattels to be disposed of when the morning's march commenced. The distance from the Bulganak to the Alma is between four and five miles ; and as it was by this time known that the Russians had strongly posted themselves on the banks of the last-named river, the Allies prepared by proper equipment for an encounter as soon as the Alma should be reached. The French had bivouacked during the night nearest to the sea ; next to them the Turks ; and the English further inland — the three camps forming a line nearly three miles in extent, at right-angles with the sea-shore. In this same order did they commence their march southward to the Alma : the line being now much more than three miles in length, owing to the skirmishing outposts of rifles and light cavalry, scattered far and wide inland to keep a keen watch on the enemy. 212 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. To understand the military operations of this momentous day, it becomes necessary to notice- first, the topographical features of the river's banks ; then the arrangements made by the Russians in defence of those banks ; and next, the plans of the Allies in relation to the forcing of a passage. The river Alma, formed by the junction of several streams which have their origin in the Tchatir-dagh, flows north-west to the road leading from Sebastopol to Simferopol, being crossed by that road at a point between Baktcheserai and the last-named town. From this point a course nearly westward takes it to the sea : its banks being dotted with several villages, of which those nearest to the scene of action are Kanitchko'i, Tarkhantar, Bourliouk, Almatamak, and Akles. The river, cutting through a soft red clay soil, is in most places shallow enough to be forded ; but there are occasional depths which render fording dangerous. The highest bank is sometimes on the right, sometimes on the left of the river ; but for a considerable distance near the mouth it is on the left or south side ; and thus the Allies, coining from the north, found themselves on the banks Tbince Menchikoff. of a stream commanded by higher ground on the other side. Small rivulets force their way into the Alma on the south bank, forming miniature ravines, or lateral valleys, which separate the southern bank into hillocks, knolls, or detached heights. The road from Old Fort joins the road from Simferopol at a point near the village of Bourliouk, and is carried over the Alma by a timber bridge. The knolls near the river's bank become united further inland into a plateau, which is commanded by a hilly ridge GOO or 700 feet in height, extending quite to the sea, Avhere it presents an abrupt cliff: this ridge, like the lower plateau, being cut up by lateral gullies into isolated hills. Such being the topographical features of the river and its banks, there was an obvious advan- tage on the part of the Russians over the Allies, both in the possession of higher ground, and in the defences they had had a whole week to form since the Allies made a landing at Eupatoria. Prince Menchikoff, who commanded in the Crimea at that time, did not fail to make use of these precious days. He took possession of all the heights which commanded the gullies, the river, and the northern bank : planting formidable batteries at every salient position ; some were earthworks, hastily thrown up, but armed with 24 and 32-pounders ; while others were field-batteries, further aided by howitzers. The chief of these batteries was an earthen redoubt, whose face formed two sides of a triangle, with the apex pointing towards the little bridge over the Alma, and the sides directed to two reaches or bends of the river, one above and the other below the bridge: this single work, therefore, commanding THE ADVANCE TO THE ALMA— THE BATTLE :— 1854. 213 an extensive portion of the river's course. Not only was this redoubt rendered formidable by its position near the brow of a hill, but the ascent to it was enfiladed or commanded by three or four batteries placed on neighbouring heights, the guns of which swept the slope of the hill leading up to the redoubt, or could readily be made to bear upon the bridge and the village. The various batteries and the redoubts were heavily armed with ordnance, mostly brass guns of fine Avorkmanship. Further to defend the ridge, and to prevent an ascent up the slopes which led to it, masses of skirmishers, armed with rifles, were placed ; insomuch that it would, in every sense, be an uphill struggle on the part of an enemy attempting to gain the ridge. The redoubt, being placed near the spot where the high road from Eupatoria to Sebastopol cuts across the ridge, was virtually the key to the whole position : whoever retained that redoubt, when the battle was over, would be the victor of the day. A large force of Russian lancers and heavy dragoons, and a formidable body of infantry, were ready to defend these batteries at all points, and to descend upon the Allies if any favourable opportunity should offer. The right wing was on the east of the main road ; the centre on the west of the same road ; while the left wing extended from the centre some distance towards the sea, from which the important point occupied by the redoubt was two and a half miles distant. An additional defence lay in this : that although the river is shallow, and generally fordable, the banks are extremely rugged, and in most parts steep ; the willows along the margin were cut down by the Russians, to prevent them from affording cover to the attacking party. Lord Raglan, in his dispatch relating to the battle, shews how much he was impressed with the strength of the Russian posi- tion, the defences of which he estimated at not less than 45,000 or 50,000 men, besides the formi- dable artillery. Marshal St Arnaud reported to his government that the Russian forces included the 16th and 17th divisions of infantry, a brigade of the 13th division, a brigade of riflemen, a force of about 5000 cavalry, and four brigades of artillery. The plans which the Allies formed for forcing a passage through these tremendous obstacles were as follow : — On the morning of the 20th, before the battle, the extreme right of the Allies was in the rear of the village of Loukoul, a short distance from the mouth of the Alma : it consisted of General Bosquet's or the 2d French division, with the Turks in the rear ; both being within a short distance of the sea, where the combined fleets could be seen in majestic amiy. The centre con- sisted of the 1st French division, under General Canrobert, and the 3d under Prince Napoleon, with the 4th division and the artillery in reserve. Further inland still, forming the left wing of the Allied army, were the 2d and light British divisions, under Sir de Lacy Evans and Sir George Brown ; behind these were the 3d and 1st divisions, under Sir Richard England and the Duke of Cambridge ; and to bring up the rear, the 4th division under Sir George Cathcart, and the cavalry division under the Earl of Lucan. About 65,000 men were thus placed in splendid order, with a frontage of nearly four miles, and a depth of half a mile. The system of operations determined on by the Allied com- manders consisted principally in this — that the French right should assail the Russian left by crossing the Alma at and near its junction with the sea, and climbing the steep rugged cliffs to the heights above ; that the French left and the English right should cross the river at or near the bridge, and ascend the heights imme- diately opposite ; while the English left should operate on the landward flank of the enemy. In view of the formidable position of the great redoubt, the English would appear to have had the hardest work cut out for them ; but this could only be judged by the result. Boats had, on the previous day, ascertained that the Alma was fordable near its mouth, and that one of the French divisions could easily cross it. Admiral Hamelin, it was arranged, should place eight French steamers off the cliff which forms the sea- side end of the ridge, to pour in a storm of shells upon any battery or battalion of the enemy which might attempt to interrupt the crossing of the troops. It fell to the lot of General Bosquet to com- mence the battle, aided in a remarkable manner by the French steamers. The heights descend to the sea so abruptly and steeply, that Menchikoff' appears to have relied mainly on natural defences at this part, placing most of his men and guns further inland, near the high road. The Allied commanders had not failed to notice this circum- stance; and Bosquet's attack was part of a plan for taking advantage of it : it was hoped that he might be able to ascend the rugged cliff-like steep, to gain the plateau, to outflank the left of the enemy, and thus distract them from the main attack in front. Rapidly but steadily did the French and Turks advance, crossing the Alma very near its mouth, and sending ahead a party of skirmishers and light troops to clear the gardens and brush- wood of any opponents ; but none such appeared ; for either the Russians did not regard the move- ment as one of importance, or they had no available batteries or battalions to bring to bear on that point. "With inconceivable activity the French climbed the cliff: the Zouaves being especially agile at this work — running, leaping, crawling on hands and knees, surmounting all obstacles of bush and gully. They gained the plateau ; and then, and then only, did the Russians open upon them. A smart interchange of firing took place, and Bosquet advanced by degrees towards the central position, although no fewer than five batteries were pouring forth their missiles. During the single hour, from half-past eleven to half-past twelve, in which Bosquet was thus 214 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. employed in obtaining possession of the heights between the enemy and the sea, Canrobert, with the 1st and part of the 4th divisions, was making arrangements to afford him aid at a time when he was becoming severely pressed by the Russian batteries. The river was boldly crossed by a ford at the village of Almatamak ; and Canrobert and Prince Napoleon found a small path which led up to the heights ; artillery was dragged up the opposite slopes in face of the Russian batteries and sharp-shooters ; and Bosquet, this diversion being made, was enabled to main- tain his advantageous position. In order still further to assist Bosquet, Marshal St Arnaud sent to him the remaining moiety of General Forey's division, the 4th ; and thus there were two streams of French troops crossing at different points, to aid Bosquet in maintaining his advantageous position. Now commenced a most exciting struggle. As Bosquet advanced by one oblique route, and Canrobert by another, they met on the heights near an unfinished octagonal tower, which was probably intended for a telegraph ; and around this spot the Russians had assembled a formidable power of infantry and field-batteries. Again and again did the French attack ; and each time did the Russians repel the onslaught. The Zouaves, more Arab than French in appearance, fought with all the ardour which Algerine campaigning had engendered ; bullets were forgotten as soon as the men came within bayonet-distance ; hand- to-hand contests were maintained on all sides ; and it became at length difficult for the batteries on either side to fire without hitting their own men. When at length the French obtained com- mand of the position, and the Russians retired, the vicinity of the tower was found to be covered with an unbroken mass of wounded and dying men, the opponents intermingled one among another. The French fleet afforded valuable aid during these operations ; the steamers ran in as close as they could to the bluff cliff, and shelled the heights in amazing style — pouring forth these terrible missiles, which passed over the crest of the bluff, and fell among the Russian batteries and battalions, at a distance of 3000 yards from the ships. Hot work this had been for the French. In the centre of the line, too, the exertions were immense, and the success great. The general movement of Marshal St Arnaud, with the chief of his forces, commenced at the moment when Bosquet with his division appeared on the heights. Infantry and artillery pressed on towards the river, pouring out volleys against the Russian sharp-shooters, and forcing them to retreat up the opposite slope. The French dashed into the river, each man crossing where he could or where he liked, re-formed on the other side, and pressed onward and upward with irresistible force : the infantry and guns in the lower position gradually gaining an ascendancy over those in the upper. The marshal and the officers were on the alert during this period, galloping about from point to point, to render aid where aid seemed to be most required; and the troops behaved with the ardour and courage which the French are wont to exhibit. The same men who would have cried ' Vive la Republique I ' at one time, now cried ' Vive TEmpereur V for the glory of France was in either case the sentiment which animated them : the cry was a battle-cry, an outpouring of enthusiasm. Few but terrible were the hours during which the British were engaged in fighting on this day of blood, and trying was the ordeal to be passed through by the men, very few of whom had actually seen war ; but Lord Raglan trusted in them, and his trust was not in vain. When the movement began, the light division, strengthened by horse-artillery and the 2d divi- sion, fronted the enemy, and were likely to be the first to fire and to receive fire ; the 1st and 3d divisions were in their rear ; while the 4th division and the cavalry were still further from the river, to act as a reserve, and to protect the left flank and rear against large bodies of the enemy's cavalry which had been seen in those directions. The advance having commenced, and the banks of the river nearly attained, the Allies were thrown into some confusion by the well-timed burning, by the Russians, of the village of Bourliouk, directly opposite the centre of the Russian position : it was w r ell-timed, because such a manoeuvre, among the sad but inevitable concomitants of warlike tactics, created a continuous blaze and smoke for 300 yards, obscured the Russian position, and obstructed the plans of the British for crossing the river. The advance was to be made when the French right had gained a certain position on the heights ; and, awaiting this moment, Lord Raglan ordered his troops to lie down, to escape in some measure the murderous hail ; there they lay, balls and shells falling into, and upon, and among them ; until at length the general, brooking no longer delay, ordered a rise and an advance. Sir de Lacy Evans's division thereupon separated into two brigades, one of which forded the river above the burning village, and the other below : the fording- places being deep and dangerous, and a destructive fire being maintained against them by the infantry and artillery on the opposite bank. And now did the execution become indeed tremendous ; for the Russians had placed twigs and sticks to mark the exact angles at which their ordnance would command the banks of the river at various points. Missiles whizzed over the heads of the British troops, ploughed in among their columns, rebounded, dashed up the soil in clouds, and carried death into every regiment. The disadvan- tages were rendered still more obvious by this circumstance : that, owing to the steepness and ruggedness of the banks, the artillerymen found it almost impossible to transport their guns to the opposite side of the stream ; insomuch that the THE ADVANCE TO THE ALMA— THE BATTLE :— 1854. 215 battle was far advanced ere two guns were successfully brought over by Captain Dickson. It was the light division, under Sir George Brown, that crossed the river under the most trying circumstances ; for this division was directly in front of the hill on which the formidable redoubt was placed. The banks of the river at that spot, rugged and broken, offered serious obstacles; and the vineyards through which the troops had to pass, as well as trees which the enemy had felled, created additional impediments, which prevented the men from forming in compact order. The noble fellows bore a fierce torrent of shot, shell, and musketry, while wading through the Alma ; and then scrambled up the slopes, through thickets and vineyards, scattered and dispersed, and ex- posed to a terrible fire in front and on both flanks. They were mowed down with fearful rapidity ; but, on the other hand, the English artillery wrought yet more fatal execution on the dense masses of Russian infantry, posted on various parts of the slope of the hills. Lord Raglan and his staff plunged into the river, and crossed near the bridge ; three of his staff-officers were struck down by the side of their commander, and the contest became most deadly. The veteran Sir George Brown saw his division cut down by fifties at a time ; but he never wavered ; he headed his men ; he was unhorsed, but i-ose again, shouting ' Twenty-third, I'm all right !' Now came the time when the 1st division, under the Duke of Cambridge, was to do its work : it consisted of splendid troops — Guards and High- landers. Grandly it advanced, crossing the river, and ascending the slopes in defence of the light division, advancing in line as if on parade, and regarding with superb disdain the batteries and dense columns high above them — arriving gradu- ally nearer and nearer to the redoubt, but having its ranks thinned at every instant by the incessant fire from the various batteries. An immense aud compact body of Russian infantry was now seen approaching, to aid still more in the defence of the main redoubt. The crisis approached. Unless the redoubt could be taken, the passage of the ridge could not be forced, nor the victory gained ; while, unless the Russian phalanx could be broken, the British could hardly hope to reach the redoubt. A few large guns were therefore brought to bear upon the dense mass ; and these, by a well-directed fire, broke it, and forced the infantry to retreat in various directions. Then came the moment for the grand charge of the Guards and the High- landers ; the former approaching the redoubt on the right, and the latter on the left. Cheered on by their commanders, they dashed up. Sir Colin Campbell, leading his Highlanders, and reminding them in a few terse exclamations of the old glories of the regiments, rushed up, ordering the men not to fire a shot until they came near the redoubt, when the musket and the bayonet were to work in rapid succession. The Duke of Cambridge cheered on the Guards, who, however, needed little prompt- ing to do their duty at such a moment. Up they went, Guards and Highlanders, through thickets, across gullies, over abattis of sharp-pointed branches, and amid the firing of batteries and battalions on all sides. They met the Russians muzzle to muzzle : they entered the redoubt ; and the 1st, 2d, and light divisions speedily commanded the hill and its defences, and virtually achieved the victory ; but not before the vicinity of the redoubt had become strewn with slain. The French by that time had attained a position which enabled them to pour in a destructive fire upon the retreating masses ; if they could have advanced somewhat further on the plateau, they would have seriously impeded the retirement of the Russians ; but the battle had been fought chiefly by infantry on the part of the Allies, and there was no cavalry in a position to pursue the enemy. Hence Menchikoff was able to retire in tolerable order, and to carry off his guns : this, however, he could not effect until he had brought up his reserve cavalry and artillery to cover the retreat. So many concurrent movements were made during the battle, that it becomes difficult to recognise their relative bearings one upon another ; but, expressed in brief, they may be understood as follows : — General Bosquet's division succeeded in turning the enemy's left flank, by the clever ascent of the bluff near the sea ; General Can- robert's division, with some field-pieces, crossed the river about a mile higher up, ascended the opposite bank, relieved Bosquet, and enabled him to maintain his commanding position ; Prince Napoleon's and Sir de Lacy Evans's divisions crossed the river at various points near the centro of the scene of operations, and surmounted the numerous obstacles presented on the opposite banks ; while Sir George Brown's and the Duke of Cambridge's divisions crossed above the bridge and burning village, and maintained the fearful struggle on the ascent to the heights. The artillery was brought effectively to bear on such points as it could command, and contributed materially to the success of the day's achievements. The cavalry was not called upon for active service ; but its position was important, keeping in check the lancers and the dragoons whom Menchikoff despatched to the left flank of the Allies. Sir George Cathcart's and Sir Richard England's divisions were not largely engaged ; though called partially to the front, they constituted rather a reserve force available in any contingency which might present itself. The Turks are scarcely mentioned in connection with the operations ; they were with Bosquet — martial in appearance, proud of taking rank beside their Allies, and eager to be employed ; yet they were nearly neglected. General Bosquet, it is true, spoke in his dispatch of the ' prodigies of rapidity' which the Turks executed in their march toward the Alma ; but little mention is made of any duties subsequently assigned to them. It can scarcely be said that the English and French rendered justice to the Turkish 216 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. soldiery during the war ; appellations, partly in pleasantry and partly contemptuous, were thrown at them ; they were condemned and abused if any of their manoeuvres terminated unfortunately, while few opportunities were afforded them to display soldierly qualities. This course of proceed- ing was neither wise nor generous ; for, when well commanded, the Turks shewed many heroic qualities on the Danube and in Asia. Omar Pacha understood them well ; and where he commanded, they fully maintained their ancient military reputation. Numberless were the tales which all, officers and privates, had to tell of this eventful day. Lord Raglan, in a dispatch which scarcely described with sufficient clearness the operations of the battle, pointed out the disadvantages* with which his officers and men had to contend. In naming the officers — always an invidious duty — who had dis- tinguished themselves, he somewhat dissatisfied those whose names did not appear ; but this is one of the natural consequences of the system — a system of questionable utility, because, as the subordinate officers are rarely mentioned by name, even-handed Battle of the Alma. justice cannot be rendered, however kind and conscientious the general may be. The etiquette of the English army renders still less possible the naming of any sergeants, corporals, or privates, who may have performed heroic deeds. It was not until the numerous ' soldiers' letters ' appeared in the public journals, that the minute and wonderful details of the battle of the Alma became known. An opinion has at times been expressed, that such letters constitute the best description of a battle, coming as they do from men who were plunged in the thickest of that which they describe ; but it should be considered that soldiers do not know the plans of their com- manders, neither can they see what is transpiring in distant parts of the field ; the letters "are valuable as elucidations of minor matters, which each man may feel acutely, but which become buried among the more important incidents of the day. Many of them, thus regarded, are valu- able. They are full of eloquence : the thoughts of home, and the heroic determination of the soldier, are mingled together in a narrative which derives force from its simplicity and truth- fulness. The passages here given,f written by a * ' My anxiety to bring into the country every cavalry and infantry soldier -who was available, prevented me from embarking their baggage-animals, and these officers have with them at this moment nothing but what they can carry, and they, equally with the men, are without tents or covering of any kind. I have not heard a single murmur. All seem impressed with the necessity of the arrangement ; and they feel, I trust, satisfied that I shall bring up their bat-horses at the earliest moment. The conduct of the troops has been admirable. When it is considered that they have suffered severely from sickness during the last two months ; that, since they landed in the Crimea, they have been exposed to the extremes of wet, cold, and heat ; that the daily toil to provide themselves with water has been excessive ; and that they have been pursued by cholera to the very battle-field, I do not go beyond the truth in declaring that they merit the highest commendation. In the ardour of attack they forgot all they had endured, and displayed that high courage, that gallant spirit, for which the British sold'ier is ever distinguished, and under the heaviest fire they maintained the same determination to conquer as they had exhibited before they went into action.' + ' I ought to be very thankful to God for sparing me to write to you this night, when so many of my brothers in arms are lying dead around me I have to inform you that we met our enemy yesterday, and they shewed us a full front, with, I believe, a much more powerful force than we were. The first shot was fired at half-past one o'clock, I believe, from our fleets ; then one from the Russians. There was a very large village between us and them, which they set fire to as soon as the fight began, which THE ADVANCE TO THE ALMA— THE BATTLE :— 1854. 217 sergeant in one of the regiments, will serve as an example of the letters here adverted to. A melancholy time was that when the muster- roll was called over, to ascertain who had been killed, who wounded, at the battle of the Alma. All knew that it would be a fearful list ; and a feverish anxiety prevailed in every part of the United Kingdom, from the date of the first tele- graphic dispatch, to know which beloved father, husband, brother, son, had fallen. It was soon evident, from the peculiar tactics of the battle, that the officers had been very much exposed, and that many families in the higher grades of society would have to join with those of humbler rank in mourning over the events of the day. They had, indeed, fallen thickly. Captain Monck of the 7th, after felling a Russian near him, was shot dead by another; Lord Chewton was severely wounded ; Captain Drew fell while serving one of the batteries ; and in all the regiments which had been most warmly engaged, the ratio of officers killed or wounded was seriously large. The London Gazette of the 8th of October contained the names of all the officers killed and wounded ; while that of the Plan of the Battle of the Alma. 17th was crowded with columns of names, those of the non-commissioned officers and privates ; and never, perhaps, were gazettes more keenly perused by those who, hoping almost against hope, ran the eye down the column with a wish that a cherished name might not be there. The first return contained the names of 26 officers killed, and 76 wounded ; the second comprised 327 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and caused us great disadvantage, as -we could not see them for the smoke ; but as soon as the smoke cleared off, we soon shewed them ■what the English could do. I do assure you they were completely mowed down by dozens by our artillery, who did their work to the satisfaction of all. I must tell you that when we came up the Kussians held a fine position— one which the English with half their number would have held against the whole world. It was on the side of a very high hill, with the whole face of it covered with intrench- ments and strong batteries. They fought well for about three hours ; then they began to fall back completely paralysed, as our men began to get close up to them ; at one time, some of our regimeats were only twelve paces from them, and such daring courage com- pletely astonished them. Then they began to throw away their knapsacks, and run as fast as their legs could carry them, and our army cheering in all directions After they ran over the top of the hill, our regiment, with five others that were in reserve, were ordered to follow them ; but owing to their throwing away their things, they were able to run well, so they got off; but our cavalry 1557 wounded or missing — a total of 353 of all ranks killed, and 1633 wounded. To this list, however, must be added those, many in number, who died subsequently of wounds received on this day. The inequality of loss among the different divisions was very striking, shewing in what different degrees they had been exposed to danger during those three fatal hours ; the light division, with which Sir George Brown crossed the river, soon overtook them, and used the sword to them, and made heads and arms fly in the air ; and our artillery soon'gained the hill and threw a few shells in among them. I can assure you it was an awful sight to see the dead lying about ; in some places we could not walk with- out walking over them. I will not attempt to describe the sight, as it is too disgusting, but I never wish to see the like again. It certainly looked very grand from the distance ; when it commenced, I was a long way in the rear, but as we advanced and came among the dead, it became awful. I cannot describe my feelings at seeing so many poor souls lying dead, and the cries and groans of the wounded. . . . We are all in the open air, and shall be now for some time. I have a slight cold ; but that I must expect, as very heavy dews fall at night, and the sun is very oppressive by day. I forgot to tell you that we have taken a great many big guns from them. They had 100. Just fancy the noise of 100 guns ; then ours and the French besides. Believe me, I shall never forget the 20th day of September 1854. I hope the people of England who complained of our delay are satisfied now.' 218 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. and ascended the hill under such a murderous fire, had no less than 987 brave fellows struck down, either killed or wounded ; the 2d division, 498 ; and the 1st division, 439 ; while the 3d, the 4th, and the cavalry division, the engineers, and the artillery, had less than 100 killed and wounded altogether. The 7th, 19th, 23d, 33d, 77th, and 88th regiments, together with the second battalion of the Rifle Brigade, forming collectively the light division, suffered unequally among themselves, according to the particular points at which they were called upon to bear the awful storm of ball and bullet ; the 7th, 19th, 23d, and 33d, each lost more than 200 of its number — a fearful gap ; the 77th, 88th, and Rifles, suffered less severely. Painful was the inquiry, how to deal with the wounded. Both from the want of surgeons and surgical appliances, and the dangers of an enemy's country, it became necessary to transport tbe sick to other shores, after a hasty attention to some of the more urgent cases. Constantinople and Scutari were the places chosen ; and trying work was it, to surgeons and commissariat officers, to convey the poor fellows down to the beach. It was a dreadful office to walk among the dead and wounded on the field of battle, to bury the one and pick up the other ; for many old Peninsular officers averred that never, excepting, perhaps, at the battle of Talavera, had they seen so many dead and wounded bodies around one spot as had fallen near the redoubt on this day: especially Russians. The Allies made no distinction of race or creed ; they buried men of all the four nations, and carried wounded men of all the four nations to Constantinople. The French found their loss to be about 260 killed, and 1100 wounded — equal to about two-thirds of the number lost by the English. Their arrangements were, however, admirable ; they had covered hospital-vans, to contain ten or twelve wounded men each, drawn by fine mules. Three French steamers conveyed the French wounded, and some of the Russian wounded, to Constantinople. A soldier in the 38th English regiment, writing two days after the battle, said : ' We were employed yesterday burying the dead, and have been at it all this morning, but we have not buried half of them yet. I saw the colonel, major, and three other officers, lying together yes- terday, dead, belonging to the 23d Fusileers.' All the medical officers in the British fleet, excepting one in each ship, were placed by Admiral Dundas at the service of Lord Raglan in this trying emer- gency ; all the boats, together with 600 seamen and marines, were at the same time sent to assist in carrying off the wounded. This was an arduous duty ; for the spot where most of the troops had fallen was four miles distant from the beach where the boats waited to receive them ; but the marines and seamen worked unremittingly in this dis- tressing service. The Duke of Newcastle, while adverting at a subsequent period to the aid afforded by the fleets to the armies, said : l After the battle of the Alma, when heaps of our wounded lay on the field for miles, and when the means for con- veying them were not sufficient, the navy assisted to bring them to the ships, and treated those soldiers, during their passage in the ships to the hospitals, with that same tenderness which has distinguished them towards their comrades in cases of cholera, attending upon them with an interest and a kindness which reflects immortal honour on the service.' The boats and seamen were employed on the 21st and two following days in this service : the Vulcan and the Andes sailed on the 22d with 800 wounded soldiers ; and the Orinoco and Columbo on the 23d with 900. The Avon transport took charge of several hundred wounded Russians to Odessa. Nothing can better shew the gallant and kindly spirit which dictated this latter proceeding than Admiral Dundas's letter to the governor of Odessa.* But the lamentations for the dead and wounded could not drown the spirit which rejoiced that the victory at the Alma had been won. "When the first dispatch concerning it reached England, great were the excitement and delight. The Minister at War sent copies of the dispatch to the London newspapers for publication ; guns were fired, and bonfires lighted ; the tenants on the Raglan estate assembled to do honour to the name of the military commander ; the news-rooms and places of public resort were crowded ; the managers of the theatres became warlike for a few moments ; the lord mayor announced the victory, first at the sheriff's inaugural dinner, within a few minutes after the arrival of the dispatch, and then to an assembled multitude outside the Royal Exchange, in confor- mity with an ancient custom ; and, on the following day, being Sunday, clergymen touched on the topic from the pulpit. Soon afterwards, when the names of the officers engaged became familiarly passed from lip to lip, the old Etonians pointed proudly to the names of those who had once sat on the forms of the celebrated school ; Harrow and Rugby, Winchester and Westminster, roused by the occasion, sought to shew that they also had claims to partake in the glory of the victors at the Alma ; while classical students, catching an idea from the collegiate usage of the word ' Alma,' sent * ' Britannia, off the Katcha, September 26. Sir — I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in conse- quence of the advance on Sebastopol of the Allied armies after the battle of the Alma on the 20th inst., a number of wounded Russian officers and soldiers were left in the rear, in the small villages near the places where they had fallen ; and by the request of his Excellency General Lord llaglan, I have collected as many as I could (about 340). In order to shorten the sufferings of these gallant soldiers, which a long sea-voyage must necessarily increase, I have sent them to Odessa, rather than to Constantinople, the distance to the former being so much less. Commander Rogers of the Royal Navy has charge of them, under a flag of truce, and I trust your Excellency will, in the same feeling of humanity, receive and consider them as non-combatants until regularly exchanged, granting to the officer in charge an acknowledgment of the number and grades of the prisoners delivered over by him to your Excellency.— I have, &c, J. W. D. Dundas, Vice-admiral and Commander-in-chief. Sit Excellency the Aide-de-Camp General Annenkoff,' THE ADVANCE TO THE ALMA— THE BATTLE :— 1854. 219 scraps of Latinity to the newspapers * And then, when it was found that imperfect organisation had left our gallant fellows ill provided with those necessaries and comforts which they so richly deserved, large-hearted kindness was exhibited on a scale rarely paralleled in any other age or country. How this kindness made itself manifest, and how it happened that the miseries to be relieved became so severe, a future Chapter will tell. Although a period of five weeks elapsed before the army received from the Queen a recognition of its distinguished services ; yet when it did arrive, the terms employed were grateful to the hearts of men who had so bled and suffered.t And when the Sovereign expressed a hope that ' such of her subjects as have been plunged in grief by the loss of relatives, will find some consolation in the reflection that those who have not survived to share in the triumph of their comrades have fallen in a just cause, and that their names will henceforth be inscribed in the annals of their country's glory' — all felt that the hope was well founded. An attempt was made some time after the news of the battle of the Alma had reached the Russian capital, to lessen the disgrace of their countrymen and the glfcry of the Allies, in connection with that encounter. The government organ, the Journal de St Petersburg, commenting on the estimates of numbers made by Lord Raglan and Marshal St Arnaud, asserted that those estimates were exagge- rated ; that the Russian infantry comprised only forty-two and a half battalions, equal to 30,000 men ; that the cavalry consisted only of sixteen regular squadrons and eleven sotnias of Cossacks, together about 3000 ; that the fighting-men were thus only 33,000 ; that the Allies had nearly 70,000 ; that the Russian artillery did not exceed eighty-four guns ; and that the batteries were less formidable and numerous than had been repre- sented. The Russians acknowledged that Generals Goguinoff and Stchelkmioff had been wounded and taken prisoners. The ratio of losses was disputed. This was a subject on which the Russians felt sore; for Prince Menchikoff had asserted in a dispatch * IN ALMAM FLUVITJM VICTOBIA CEUESTA A.D. XII. CAL. OCXOB, A.S. CIOCCCLIV. NOBILITATCM. Mater es, Alma, necis ; partce sed sanguine nostro Pacis tu nutrix, Almaque Mater eris. + ' The patience -with which the regimental officers and men bore, ■without a mnrmur, the unusual privations to which they were necessarily subjected after they landed in the Crimea, has elicited Her Majesty's warmest sympathy and approval. Their sufferings from disease before that time were such as might have subdued the ardour of less gallant troops, but have in their case only proved that in the hour of battle they remember nothing but the call of duty. Her Majesty feels additional pleasure in thus recognising the noble daring of her soldiers, and sympathising in their victory, when she reflects that that courage has been evinced, and those triumphs won, side by side with the troops of a nation whose valour the British army has in former times admired and respected in hostile combat, but which it has now, for the first time, tested in the generous rivalry of an intimate brotherhood in arras. Her Majesty trusts that the blood of the two nations, so profusely shed on the banks of the Alma— a subject of deep regret to herself and her people— may consecrate an alliance which shall endure for the benefit of future generations, when the remembrance of this battle- field is hallowed by gratitude for the consequences, as well as the glories of victory.' to the emperor, that he could hold the heights of Alma against 100,000 men for three weeks ; and it was generally believed among the Russian officers impossible for the Allies to force a line of heights so intrenched, armed, and defended : even ladies from Sebastopol, it was reported, came out to view the battle from the heights, as though the result would be a certain and speedy repulse of the enemy who had dared to invade the czar's dominions ; and yet this enemy mastered the entire position in less than four hours. Marshal St Arnaud, in his dispatch relating to the battle, said : ' It is difficult for us to estimate the loss of the Russian army ; but it must be considerable, if we may judge by the killed and wounded that they could not take off, and who remained in our hands : in the ravines of the Alma, on the plateau in front, and on the ground forming the position taken from the enemy by the English troops, tbe earth is strewn with more than 10,000 muskets, haversacks, and other articles of equipment.' In another place, he states that the Russians lost 5000 or 6000 men ; while in a third occurs this passage : ' The field of battle is covered with their dead, and our field-hospitals are full of their wounded ; we have counted a proportion of seven Russian dead bodies for one French.' The Russian journalist, commenting on certain discrepancies in these evidently hasty estimates, asserts that the English lost 3000, and the French 1800 ; but it is remarkable that the real Russian loss is not mentioned. The official organ acknowledges that the Allies attended humanely to the wounded Russians whom Menchikoff left behind ; but that, as the deficiency of surgeons in the English army was publicly notorious, the English wounded would naturally have the preference, and that hence large numbers of the Russians were wholly neglected. ' Another very sad testimony to the little care bestowed on our wounded is the state of suffering and exhaustion those were in who were landed at Odessa by the English steamer on the -Jf •{[ of September, 353 in number. Having been carried, after the combat, to the banks of the Alma, they remained there for six days without shelter, almost without help ; a few of them only had their wounds dressed, and even then with hay and straw instead of lint, which could but render their state worse. When, therefore, they arrived at Odessa, almost all the wounds presented symptoms of gangrene ; and by ^£Jp thirty-one of the number had already succumbed.' An attempt might possibly be made by Englishmen to dispute the correctness of this latter statement, were it not that our own wounded soldiers, at that very time, were being conveyed to Constantinople under circumstances of the most deplorable misery. One curious item in this Russian comment on the battle of the Alma bore relation to the alleged capture of Prince Menchikoffs carriage. Such a capture was distinctly mentioned in many English and French accounts of the battle. One officer Avrote that the carriage was left behind on the 220 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. heights; that it contained boxes and portmanteaus full of splendid uniforms, arms, watches, jewellery, and other valuables ; and that the carriage further contained that which is an unusual accompani- ment of a military officer's equipment — a pair of white satin slippers. Another stated, that the prince's carriage and coachman were taken ; that the former was sent to Constantinople, and publicly exhibited at Tophane; and that in the carriage were found documents explaining the full particulars of the English army, its strength, &c, shewing that there must have been spies in the Allied camp. Marshal St Arnaud was still more definite in his dispatch : ' My tent is on the very spot where that of Prince MenchikofF stood in the morning, and who thought himself so sure of beating us that he left his carriage there; I have taken possession of it, with his pocket-book and correspondence, and shall take advantage of the valuable information it contains.' On these statements the Russian comment was as follows : — ' Prince MenchikofF lost no carriage, nor any cor- respondence belonging to him. Every equipage belonging to head-quarters had been previously taken to a place of safety. The only capture that could, therefore, have fallen into the enemy's hands was a cleik attached to head-quarters, who left Sebastopol on the very day of the battle to rejoin the prince ; this clerk was the bearer of a certain number of route-papers in blank, and a few other papers of no great importance. Nothing has been known hitherto inspecting his fate ; the probability therefore is, that it is his capture that has occasioned the mistake.' Proper as it may be to attend to arguments on both sides of any disputed question, there is an inequality in the testimony above adduced, owing to the disregard of truthfulness on the part of those officially engaged by the Russian govern- ment in public affairs. It was a strong assertion for a British prime-minister to make,* that the Russian diplomatists in 1853-4 had ' exhausted every modification of untruth, concealment, and evasion, and ended with assertions of positive falsehood ; ' but support was given to the accusa- tion by numberless incidents during the war — insomuch that "Western Europe remained in a state of painful suspense whether to believe or disbelieve Russian asseverations. ALMA TO BALA K LAV A — T HE FLAN K- MABC H. A question for gi'ave discussion arose among the Allied commanders after the battle of the Alma. The strongly fortified port of Sebastopol being that which, if conquered, would give the Allies a virtual command of the Crimea, the problem to be solved was — how best to insure that conquest ; whether to advance southward to the formidable • Sec p. 71. heights on the northern side of Sebastopol Har- bour ; or to advance by another route, round the inner angle of the harbour, and assail the town on the south. The decision was likely to be affected by the line of retreat the Russians had taken, and by the tactics they might have been adopting at and near Sebastopol. Concerning the retreat, the Russian official papers of course made the best of it. In Prince Menchikoff's dispatch relating to the battle of the Alma, he stated that, seeing the Allied armies and fleets too powerful for him to contend against, he withdrew across the river Katcha on the evening of the 20th, and took up a position before Sebastopol on the 21st, preparing to offer a warm opposition to the enemy. Other accounts support this ; with the addition that the Russians, during their retreat, burned such villages and hamlets as lay in their way, that nothing but desolation might be left to meet the eye of their opponents. Another Russian dispatch stated, that after MenchikofF had reached the northern shore of Sebastopol Harbour, wishing to bring his troops into order, and to replenish their stock of ammunition and provi- sions, he crossed over by the bridge of Inkermann on the 21st, and entered Sebastopol, where he remained three days. An advanced-guard, sent out towards the Katcha, under Lieutenant-general Kirikoff, having ascertained some particulars con- cerning the movements of the English and French, the prince resolved on making a movement towards Baktcheserai, about twenty-four miles north-east of Sebastopol, as a means of checking any advance of the Allies towards the centre of the Crimea, and as a means, also, of commanding the high road from Simferopol, by which impor- tant route all supplies were brought from the mainland. Accordingly, on the 24th, leaving at Sebastopol about eight battalions, together with the sailors and marines of the fleet, he departed with the rest of his army, including all the artillery ; in the dead of the night he crossed the Tchernaya, ascended the heights to a place called Khutor Mackenzie or Mackenzie's Farm, and reached the banks of the Belbek at a point about half-way between Sebastopol and Baktcheserai, where the high road crosses that river. After resting here twenty-four hc#rs, near the village of Otarko'i, he continued his route till he struck the Katcha at a point about three miles from Baktcheserai : leaving at Otarko'i a reserve of troops under Major-general Jabokritsky. This movement was described in the dispatch as having three objects — to obtain provisions which were on the road from Perekop to Simferopol ; to obtain reinforce- ments from Kertch under General KhomoutofF; and to attack the English and French on their rear and left flank, in the event of their marching to the north side of Sebastopol. The particulars of this movement were not known to the Allies at the time. The direction in which MenchikofF had retreated from the Alma could only be surmised, although there could be ALMA TO BALAKLAVA— THE FLANK-MARCH :— 1854. 221 little doubt that Sebastopol would be the chief object of his solicitude. The generals, therefore, became anxious to obtain such information con- cerning the state of the great stronghold and its harbour as the fleets could gather. Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, while the struggles were in progress on the banks of the Bulganak and Alma, had kept a watch on the coast near the Katcha and Sebastopol, to report on any observable proceedings in those directions. These observations were continued immediately after the battle, Avhen, from the decks of the Terrible and Sampson, the Russians could be seen burning the villages during the retreat to the Katcha. Captain Jones, of the Sampson, was ordered to scrutinise the mouth of Sebas- topol harbour closely, to ascertain whether any marked changes were made consequent on Mcnchikoff's retreat. He had not long to wait for such evidence. On the night of the 21st, great alterations were made in the position of the Russian fleet. On the morning of the 22d, Captain Jones saw moored across the entrance of the harbour, one 3-decker, four 2-deckers, and two large frigates, ranged in line ; while at the head of the harbour were two 3-deckers, and five 2-deckers, lying with their heads down the harbour, having on the previous day had their broadsides in that direction. Resides all these, four or five other sailing war-ships and twelve steamers could be seen, all evidently subject to some manoeuvre. The land-defences were seen to be rapidly strengthening ; new batteries on both sides of the harbour had been constructed, defending the entrances and line of coast ; and one of these batteries, on the north side, had guns of such calibre and range that they could throw to a distance of 4000 yards, more than two and a quarter miles : two shots having passed over the Samj)son at that distance. On that same day, the 23d, was executed a manoeuvre of a most extraordinary kind : the sinking of a fine fleet, as a means of preventing another fleet from enter- ing a harbour with hostile intent. As soon as symptoms appeared, on the afternoon of that day, that the Allied fleets were about to approach Sebastopol, Prince Menchikoff ordered the sinking of the men-of-war which had been moored across tlie mouth of the harbour. A deserter from the Russian fleet had, on the 22d, told Admiral Dundas that the crews of these men-of-war, except a few hands, had been landed from the ships ; that the ships had been perforated and plugged ready for sinking ; that the guns and heavy stores were all left on board ; that the other ships were moored on the south side of the harbour, to defend it from any attack on the north ; that the battle of the Alma had greatly dispirited the Russians ; and that the whole Russian force in and near Sebas- topol barely exceeded 40,000 men. Credence to a limited extent was placed on this man's statements ; and he was, at Lord Raglan's request, sent to the army at the Alma, to act as a guide on the march to Sebastopol. Touching the sinking of the ships, the truth of the statement was soon made manifest. Captain Drummond, examining the mouth of Sebastopol Harbour on the morning of the 24th, found that the ships were sunk, the lower mast-heads just appearing above water ; and that the whole passage was thus closed, except a small space near a shoal oft' the north battery. The ships thus sacrificed comprised one of 120 guns, two of 84, two of 80, and two of 40. Unexampled, perhaps, was such a proceeding ; but it was most effectual in reference to its immediate object, for it rendered impossible any entry of hostile ships into the harbour. Captain Drummond at the same time ascertained that there were two strong booms inside the line of sunken ships ; that eight sail-of-the-line were moored east and west just within the booms ; and that three of these ships had been heeled over, to give their guns elevation sufficient to sweep over the land north- ward of the harbour. The Allied soldiers were much astonished at this sinking of the ships ; but the seamen were more than astonished — it damped their hopes of coming to close quarters with the enemy's fleet. These items of information, picked up by the fleets, reached St Arnaud and Raglan in due course, and had the effect of modifying very considerably the plans of the generals. In the first instance, the southward march was resumed, from the Alma to the Katcha, with an intent to approach the northern side of Sebastopol : a deviation from this manoeuvre was not contemplated until a day or two afterwards. After the terrible battle on the 20th, the French were ready to move before the English — as was the case, indeed, in most of the operations, on account of the imperfect organisation of many departments in the British army. The French removed all their wounded to their ships in a few hours, and St Arnaud proposed to march the next day : this, however, Lord Raglan declined, on account, probably, of the lamentable deficiency in his means of providing for the wounded. It is difficult to estimate the value of the two momen- tous days thus lost ; had the Allies proceeded at once to Sebastopol, while the Russians Avcre disordered and dispirited, the whole aspect of the campaign might have been changed ; and if the French chafed a little at the inaction thus forced upon them by their ally, they might justly be pardoned. On the evening of the 20th, on the whole of the 21st and 22d, were the British — bandsmen, soldiers who had not been much engaged during the fight, sailors, and marines — employed in burying dead British and Russians, and in conveying wounded British and Russians down to the beach ; and even then, distressing as it must have been to the kind heart of Lord Raglan, numbers of wounded Russians were left behind on the hills — the necessity for marching being now extreme. The surgeons worked night and day, amputating shattered limbs and binding 222 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. up wounds. The wounds were such as are only to be seen on a battle-field. One of the surgeons, writing concerning the ' pluck ' of the British soldiers at the Alma, said : ' They laugh 'at pain, and will scarcely submit to die. It is perfectly marvellous — this triumph of mind over body. If a limb Avere torn off or crushed at home, you would have them brought in fainting, and in a state of dreadful collapse ; here they come with a dangling arm, or a riddled elbow, and it 's "Now, doctor, be quick, if you please — I'm not done for so bad but I can get away back and see ! " And many of these brave fellows, with a lump of tow wrung out of cold water wrapped round their stumps, crawled to the rear of the fight, and with shells bursting round them, and balls tearing up sods at their feet, watched the progress of the battle. I tell you as a solemn truth that I took off the foot of an officer, Captain , who insisted on being helped on his horse again, and declared that he could fight now that his " foot was dressed ! " ' The surgeons attended the Russians, too, on the 21st ; but 700 of these miserable relics of Menchikoff's army still remained where they had fallen, and where they had lain sixty long hours, the victims of unspeakable suffering and privation. That the poor fellows might not actually rot to death where they lay, Lord Raglan, on the eve of his departure, sent to a village up the valley, to entreat the Tatar inhabitants to render what assistance they could to the wounded Russians. In order to attend to their wounds, Dr Thomson, of the 44th regiment, and his servant, were left behind. Seldom, perhaps, during war has there been a position more peculiar and more honour- able than that in which this medical officer was thus placed ; cast adrift, as it were, undefended and unarmed, in an enemy's country, solely to render succour to that enemy's wounded troops ; he was provided with a flag of truce, and with a small store of provisions and medicines. A wounded Russian officer addressed the men who were lying around, explaining the mission of Dr Thomson, and his claim upon their good-will ; and thus did the surgeon remain among the prostrate gray-coated occupants of the bloody field, with nothing above him but the sky, and nothing to cheer him but the thought that he was nobly fulfilling a duty suggested by the humanity of his commander. His career, alas ! was soon ended ; cholera carried off Dr Thomson soon after he had rejoined the army at Balaklava. In early morn on the 23d, the Allied armies took leave of the Alma, a name never thereafter to be forgotten. The French, up and ready before the English, assembled to the sound of drum and trumpet, and began their march southward to the river Katcha, distant about seven miles. The British had not all in readiness until eight o'clock, at which hour they started. The fleet out at sea, too, made a parallel advance from the mouth of the Alma to that of the Katcha, continuing to maintain its character as a support to the united army. The route was barren and uninteresting, over hills or hillocks which presented little but thistles ; but when the river was approached, the ground declined gently to the stream, and the banks were seen to be fringed with trees and luxurious verdure, vineyards, and gardens, dotted here and there with white cottages. Crossing this river, the small village of Eskel was reached, deserted, but affording a little fodder for the horses. There were sad evidences that the inhabitants had hastily withdrawn, and that the Cossacks of the retreating Russian army had ransacked and pillaged everything which tempted their cupidity. A short day's work was this. The armies rested for the night near the village, the French under tents, and the British under none — our tents were uselessly stowed away on board ship, instead of being in the right place at the right time. The 1st, 3d, and light British divisions bivouacked on the heights south of the river ; while the 2d and 4th divisions took up a resting-place on the side of the hills close to the river, Lord Raglan occupy- ing the best house in the village. The French encamped at the village of Mamaschai, about a mile lower down the stream. On that same day, the Himalaya, conveying a portion of the Scots Greys to the scene of war, witnessed first the sinking of the Russian ships at the mouth of Sebastopol harbour, and then the march of the Allied armies over the hills from the Alma to the Katcha. The majestic steamer anchored off the mouth of the last-named river, and landed the cavalry, which at once joined Lord Raglan's army. This vessel shared with the Agamemnon the admi- ration — almost the affection — of the whole fleet. ' Though the Himalaya} wrote one of the seamen, ' was the largest ship, Captain Killock handled her as if she was a small boat ; he even offered to beach the Himalaya gently, so as to lower the horses into the sea, and then let them walk on shore ; but this was declined.' On the 24th of September, Prince Menchikoff determined on his flank-movement from Sebastopol to Baktcheserai. On the 24th of September, Lord Raglan and Marshal St Arnaud determined on their flank-movement from the Katcha and the Belbek to Balaklava. It was the most remarkable day for strategy, perhaps, throughout the war ; each army was ignorant of the movement of the other, each attempted to frustrate the supposed plans of the other, and each would necessarily cross the path of the other, at some point near Khutor Mackenzie — a name derived from a Scotch admiral in the Russian service, who had made at this spot a plantation for trees for the imperial navy, and had built a guard-house for a few soldiers to watch the plantation. As the Russian movement has been explained by the terms of Prince MenchikofFs dispatch, so may we look to the Allied commanders for the best account of the motives which led to their own movement. Lord Raglan's dispatch stated that, when the Allies reached the Belbek on the 24th, from the Katcha, it was found that ALMA TO BALAKLAVA— THE FLANK-MARCH :— 1854. 223 the enemy had established a work which com- manded the entrance to the first-named river, and debarred its use for the disembarkation of troops, provisions, and materials of war; 'and it became hence expedient to consider whether the line of attack upon the north side should not be abandoned, and another course of operation adopted. It having, after due delibe- ration, been determined by Marshal St Arnaud and myself that we should relinquish our com- munication with the Katcha, and the hope of establishing it with the Belbek, and endeavour, by a flank-march to the left, to go round Sebastopol and seize Balaklava, the movement was com- menced on the 25th.' It thus appears that the Allied commanders were chiefly induced to this step by the difficulty or impossibility of obtaining their indispensable supplies by way of the Katcha or the Belbek. Admiral Hamelin, in a dispatch to the French government, dwells rather on the closing of the harbour of Sebastopol as the cause of change in strategy. It had, he states, been determined that the armies should take the northern forts ; while the fleets, after destroying the booms, should enter the harbour, and assist the army in battering and capturing the southern half of the town. This plan, however, having been frustrated by the sinking of the ships, ' the generals-in-chief decided upon turning Sebastopol by the east, and throwing themselves upon the south of the town, after they had placed themselves in communication with the fleets at Balaklava, and obtained provisions and munitions.' Whether advantageous or not in other respects, and apart from the boldness and brilliancy which charac- terised the manoeuvre, there can be little doubt that this flank-movement was in a manner forced upon the Allied commanders by the defensive Russian arrangements at the mouth of the Belbek and at Sebastopol. The flank-march itself may be considered to have commenced at the Belbek, though there can be little doubt that the commanders arranged their plan while yet on the Katcha, on the morning of the 24th. The Allies were on that morning strengthened by the arrival of the Scots Greys, an infantry regiment, and 9000 French, all of whom had been landed at the mouth of the Katcha. The sun's heat was great on that day, and the troops became much wearied by remaining exposed during the forenoon. About mid-day, however, they moved and marched to the Belbek, which they crossed by a small bridge, near the village of the same name, four miles from the sea. On reaching the southern bank, and ascending the hill, the officers could espy, with the aid of their glasses, that city which had during so many months occupied men's thoughts — Sebastopol ; the houses and windows were distinctly visible, about four miles distant : much of the inter- vening ground being covered with trees and brush- wood. Near this bridge the armies encamped for the night, some on the hills, some in the hollows between the hills, and the officers in the village. The morning came : the morning of a day dis- tinguished by a march, since become as celebrated as the battles preceding and following it ; cele- brated not for its length, but for its boldness and difficulty. The distance from Belbek to Balaklava, difficult to measure by the route actually adopted, does not exceed fourteen miles in a straight line; yet was the flank-march one of peril and trying responsibility. Even those who condemn the Allied governments for sending too small a mili- tary force, ill provided with cavalry, artillery, and stores, all agree in admiring the energetic character of this movement — a movement which changed the base of operations from the west to the south coast. ' Such a change could only have been effected while a steam-fleet was off the coast, and could re-open its communications with the army as soon as it had appeared on the opposite side of Sebastopol ; this daring measure has demonstrated one of the many immense advan- tages which steam confers upon an invading force. The flank-march having been resolved upon, was executed with considerable skill, and with that determined spirit which is so characteristic of British troops. It was a bold and hazardous undertaking. The country was difficult and unknown. Thick woods, deep ravines, and preci- pitous hills, only crossed by mountain-tracks, were to be traversed by the army. Had the enemy learned our intentions, we might have been exposed to the most fatal disaster.' * The 25th was indeed a day to be remembered by all in the army; for two-thirds of the distance, from the Belbek to the Tchernaya, were accom- plished on this day, in the midst of the most complicated difficulties. The 4th division was left behind until the following day, to guard the rear and to convoy numerous invalids down to the ships ; but all the rest advanced south. At five o'clock in the morning they set forth. The instructions issued were virtually little more than this — ' Enter the forest or jungle before you; traverse it by compass S.S.E. ; emerge at the other margin in the best order you can ; and rendezvous near Mackenzie's Farm, on the Simferopol and Sebastopol road.' Every officer and soldier had his story to tell Iioav this daring scramble was effected — now diverging too far to the west, and coming in dangerous proximity to Sebastopol ; now losing the track altogether, and dashing through a labyrinth of trees and under- wood ; now hemmed up in a pathway, where a few Russian cavalry, or a gun or two, would have made sad havoc among them. In some places the jungle was so thick that the men could hardly see each other ; one brigade became mixed up with another, Guards with Highlanders, Rifles with soldiers of the line, in an apparently inextricable mass of confusion ; each man threaded a path * Quarterly Revmo, No. CXCI. 224 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. as best lie could, and many thousand infantry emerged from the jungle about two o'clock. It was at this time that occurred the most extraordinary incident in this extraordinary march. Lord Raglan rode at the head of the British army, the French and Turks being at some distance on the flank. He was one, of the first to emerge from the wood upon the high road, and suddenly fouud himself close to a portion of the Russian army ! The two lines had intersected. The opponent commanders had commenced their flank-marches nearly at the same time : Menchikoff having the start by a few hours — the Allies south-east from Belbek towards Balaklava, the Russians north-east from Sebastopol towards Simferopol ; each planned a flank-march, which was really cleverly conceived ; each was entirely ignorant of the other's movement ; each took Mackenzie's Farm in the line of route ; and the two encoun- tered at this spot. Not on equal terms, however, for the van of the British came upon the rear of the Russians ; and although the surprise was perhaps equal on both sides, the terror was on the part of the Russians, who had been greatly dispirited by the battle of the Alma, and who had formed an exaggerated estimate of the strength of the Allies. A few cavalry only, Scots Greys and others, were near Lord Raglan at the time ; yet did the Russians, entirely ignorant of the extent of the force thus suddenly coming upon them, lose all presence of mind. The British brought a few guns, a squadrou or two, and a battalion of Rifles, to bear on the spot ; a volley and a charge followed ; and the Russians, after a brief stand, rushed pell-mell along the road to Simferopol, leaving everything behind that might have impeded their flight, and strewing the road for two or three miles with wagons, carts, tumbrils, provisions, ammunition, the military-chest, baggage, officers' uniforms, personal ornaments, and a countless array of miscellaneous articles. Some portions of this captured booty were placed under guard by Lord Raglan's orders, but much also was left as a prize to the men — a prize which not a little pleased them as a relief from the laborious work of this day. ' Our gunners,' said one of the artillery officers, ' got hold of the baggage of some general officer and his staff, for they were soon laden with embroidered hussar jackets, pelisses, and garments of various kinds ; they also got a quantity of jewellery and watches ; and some, more lucky than the rest, got hold of the general's luncheon-basket, and feasted on wild-boar, washed down with champagne.' As the stragglers came up, by dozens or twenties, a halt was made for an hour or two, on the heights near Mackenzie's Farm. This farm is about six miles in a straight line from Belbek Bridge, whence the flank-march had commenced ; and another straight line of four miles marks the distance from the farm to Tchernaya Bridge, or the Traktir Bridge over the Tchernaya, on the way to Balaklava ; but the real distances traversed by the troops were much greater, and the necessity for a little mid -day repose became evident. From time to time, the right flank of the army approached so near the eastern end of Sebastopol, that the red-coats must unquestionably have been seen from the houses and public buildings ; yet not the smallest attempt was made to check the march. From evidence afterwards obtained, it appears certain that the town contained few troops ; troops and inhabitants were alike in a terror-stricken state ; and it remains a fair problem, whether the Allies might not, on the night of the 25th or the early morn of the 26th, have forced the few defences at the upper end of the harbour, and entered Sebastopol. With the uncertain knowledge possessed by the Allies at that time, however, concerning the movements of Menchikoff, and with a natural anxiety to establish a line of communication with the fleet, such a venture was not made ; Balaklava, and not Sebastopol, was the goal towards which eyes were on that day turned. When the men had rested for awhile on the heights, Lord Raglan resumed his march, taking the steep winding road from the farm down to the Tchernaya. On the banks of that river he rested for the night : he and his officers being so completely separated from their baggage, which was far in the rear, that a dry ditch served as a bed for many of them. During the night, the baggage and stores arrived, as well as the 4th division, which had been left behind during a few hours as a rear-guard. On this day, and indeed ever since leaving the Alma, officers and men had been heavily laden. One officer wrote : ' Each man carries everything he possesses. We are allowed no tents and no baggage- wagons ; so you may imagine the difficulty and delay in moving an army of this description. At the end of a march, each man is glad to hunt for wood, fill his little water-barrel — every officer and man carries one — cook his rations, lie down as near the bivouac-fire as he can, and get to sleep till daylight, should he be fortunate enough not to be for picket.' And in relation to the fourteen hours of incessant exertion on the memorable 25th, the same officer described the position of himself and his men when their water-barrels were emptied before the Tchernaya was reached. The whole truth is conveyed in these few words : ' I would gladly have given my last guinea for a drink of pure water that afternoon.' On Tuesday, the 26th of September, the British army arrived from Tchernaya Bridge at Balaklava — a place which on that day acquired a European reputation, and which was never after- wards to be forgotten, either by soldiers or readers. The route between the two places was nearly south-west, generally on an ascent, and at an average distance of six or seven miles from Sebastopol. The French adopted a more circuitous route, and did not reach the heights southward of Sebastopol until the following day, having encamped on the Mackenzie heights during the night. ALMA TO BALAKLAVA— THE FLANK-MARCH :— 1854. 225 A glance at the map will shew that a fleet off the mouth of the Katcha would be valueless to an army at Balaklava ; it became a matter of urgent necessity that the admirals should know of the generals' movements, and should steam round the Chersonese from the one position to the other, to provide a new base of operations. The messenger on this occasion had a perilous duty to perform — that of galloping back, alone, and at night, through an enemy's country. Lieutenant Maxse, of the Agamemnon, reached the Tchernaya on the night of the 25th, at the same time as some of the later divisions of the army, having come from the admiral with dispatches for Lord Raglan ; he immediately undertook to ride back, and fight his way through forests and Cossacks, to the Katcha. He did so ; the message was delivered ; and so prompt was Sir Edmund Lyons, that the steam-fleet appeared off the mouth of Balaklava harbour at the very hour when the army appeared on Balaklava heights : each greeted the other, in a position utterly new to both. The Avhole of the district around Balaklava and Sebastopol will require a detailed description Marshal St Arnaud. in the next section ; but before entering upon it, a few words may be useful here concerning two events, or rather a rumour and an event, connected with the closing days of September — namely, the alleged fall of Sebastopol, and the death of Marshal St Arnaud. Seldom have governments and newspaper editors been more completely deceived than in reference to the rumour above mentioned. On the 30th of September, within a few hours of the receipt of authentic news concerning the battle of the Alma, the London evening newspapers contained a tele- graphic abstract of an announcement in the Vienna newspapers of the same morning — that Sebastopol had fallen ; that a steamer had been despatched from the Crimea to Constantinople with the news ; that this steamer had met another on the route from Constantinople to Varna, whence the glorious announcement was transmitted to Omar Pacha, who in Ids turn sent it to Vienna, from which place the electric-telegraph conveyed it to London and Paris. London was in a fever of excitement on the next day, Sunday ; and this excitement was not lessened when, on the Monday morning, the Turkish ambassador gave official importance to the rumour by transmitting to the newspapers, with an evident implication of his own belief in the matter, the information he had received.* * 'The Turkish minister presents his compliments to the editor of the Times, and begs to transmit to him herewith a telegraphic dispatch which lie has received to-day from the Turkish ambassador at Vienna, and which is an unquestionable confirmation of the fall of Sebastopol. ISruanstun Square, October 2.' 1 Vir.NN A, October 2. The French embassy and the Austrian government have received 226 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. Paris was as credulous as London ; the ministers believed the news, and forwarded it to Boulogne to the emperor, who read it to the troops encamped there. At Vienna, Count Buol communicated what he had heard to the French ambassador, who in his turn transmitted it to Paris : nay more — Baron Hiibner, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, was charged by Count Buol to address to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the sincere congratulations of the Austrian cabinet on the brilliant exploit. Indeed the deception was most complete, nearly all parties for a time accepting the news as true. Day after day passed, however, without further details ; suspicions arose ; and at length the truth flashed upon a disappointed public, that the announced fall of Sebastopol was utterly untrue. Whether the Tatar or the telegraph were the more immediate instru- ment of deception, there arose and remained an opinion that speculators at one of the European bourses or stock - exchanges had planned the fraud, as a means of making profit by the sudden rising of the funds which always follows such aim ouncements. The death of Marshal St Arnaud was no mere rumour ; it was a stern reality, occurring imme- diately after the flank-march to which the Allied generals attached so much importance. Born in Paris in the year 1801, St Arnaud was yet in middle life ; but he had seen much rough service. He entered the Gardes du Corps at the age of fifteen ; and next served as a sub-lieutenant in the line. After a few years' absence from, the army, he re-entered it in 1831, first as a sub-lieutenant, and then as lieutenant. He was engaged under Marshal Bugeaud in various duties during the early years of Louis-Philippe's reign. The year 1836 took him to Algiers, where his reputation was chiefly established. As a captain, he distin- guished himself at the siege of Constantina, for which he was rewarded with the decoration of the Legion of Honour. After engagement in many battles, he was placed, in 1840, in command of the 18th regiment of infantry ; which he left some time afterwards to join the Zouaves. He was further raised to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in 1842, colonel in 1844, and major-general in 1847, inces- santly occupied in military duties of various kinds. In 1850, he attained the position of commandant of the province of Constantina, where he was engaged in a hot contest with the Kabyles. Return- ing to France in the following year, after fifteen from Bucharest, under date six p. at., September 30, the following telegraphic dispatch : — " To-day, at noon, a Tatar arrived from Constantinople -with dispatches for Omar Pacha ; his Highness being at Silistria, the dispatches had to be forwarded to him at that place. The Tatar announces the capture of Sebastopol : 18,000 Russians were killed and wounded, 22,000 made prisoners ; Fort Constantine was destroyed, and other forts, mounting 200 guns, taken. Of the Russian fleet, six sail-of-the-line were sunk, and Prince Menchikoff had retired to the bottom of the bay with the remaining vessels, declaring that he would burn them if the attack continued. The Allied commanders had given him six hours to consider, inviting him at the same time to surrender, for the sake of humanity. A French general and three Russian generals, all wounded, have arrived at Constantinople, which city was to be illuminated for ten days. We expect to-morrow the official report of the above intelligence from Omar Pacha." ' years of service in Africa, he was appointed to a command in the army of Paris. Being among the small number of distinguished generals who aided Prince Louis Napoleon to overthrow the French republic, and to become the Emperor Napoleon III., St Arnaud naturally rose in high favour at court ; he was made Minister at War, then Marshal of France, then Senator, and then Commander-in- chief of the French army in the East. Such was Marshal St Arnaud, who, on the 29th of September, sank under accumulated bodily sufferings, just at the moment when the Allies began to perceive that a formal siege of Sebastopol would be necessary. The declining state of his health had long been known ; indeed, when he left Paris to join the army in the East his strength was already broken ; and during the autumnal months his life was one continued struggle against fate. His determination and calmness were a matter of astonishment to those who, being near him, were aware of his sufferings. No doubt exists, however, that he was fully aware of his own condition ; for on the 12th of September, when on board the Ville de Paris, making the voyage from Varna to Eupatoria, he wrote a dispatch to the French Minister of War, in which he said : ' My situation in regard to my health has become grave. Up to this time I have combated the malady with which I am affected with all the energy of which I was capable, and for a long time I had hoped that I was sufficiently habituated to suffering to be able to exercise the command without making known to all the violence of the attacks which I am condemned to suffer. But this struggle has exhausted my strength. I have had the pain of discovering lately, and particularly on the passage, during which I was upon the point of succumbing, that the moment was approaching when my courage would not suffice to enable me to support the heavy burden of a command which requires a vigour that I have lost, and which I hardly hope to recover. My conscience makes me consider it a duty to explain to you this posi- tion. I should hope that Providence will permit me to complete the task which I have undertaken, and that I may be able to lead as far as Sebastopol the army with which I shall land to-morrow on the coast of the Crimea ; but that will be, I feel, a last effort, and I beg you to ask the emperor to allow me to appoint a successor.' Immediately after the battle of the Alma he wrote : ' My health is still the same. It continues between suffering, crises, and duty. All this did not prevent my remaining twelve hours on horseback on the day of battle. But will not my strength betray meV When bivouacking on the Tchernaya on the 26th, during the flank-march, the last hour of command came. His last official dispatch contained these words : ' My health is deplorable. An attack of cholera has just been added to the evils from which I have suffered so long, and I am become so weak, that to continue the command is, I feel, impossible. In this position, and, however painful it may be to SEBASTOPOL, AND ITS VICINITY :— 1854. 227 me, I feel it a duty of honour and conscience to place it in the hands of General Canrobert, -whom the special orders 'of His Majesty indicate as my successor.' On the 29th he died, near Balaklava. His body "was sent on board the Berthollet to Constantinople, where it was embalmed at the residence of the French embassy; and on the 11th of October, the Berthollet ended her melancholy duty by landing the remains of the deceased marshal at Marseille. Madame St Arnaud, who had resided at Constantinople during the expedi- tion to Varna and the Crimea, returned to France in the same ship that contained the dead body of her husband. After a solemn serrice had been performed in the cathedral of Marseille, the body was transmitted to Paris, where, on the 16th, a military funeral on an imposing scale was per- formed : the body being interred in a vault in the Chapel of the Invalides. Thus terminated the career of one who, a roving actor and wild adventurer in his youth, afterwards shewed many of the qualities of an energetic military commander. General Canrobert, on whom the command of the French before Sebastopol devolved, was a favourite in the army. Born in 1809, and entei'- ing the army early, he embarked for Africa in 1835, with the rank of lieutenant. He was speedily engaged against Abd-el-Kader ; then in the expedition to Mascara ; and then in various other services, which gained for him the rank of captain in 1837. He joined the Due de Nemours and General Damremont in an expedition to Constantina in that year, during which he was wounded. Returning to France in 1839, he received the decoration of the Legion of Honour, and an accession of rank. Another period of service in Africa then awaited him ; from 1840 to 1850, he was engaged in an incessant scene of warfare in every part of Algeria, serving under Cavaignac and other generals, and executing many achievements requiring courage and address. In 1850, he came once again to France, receiving decorative honours, the rank of general of brigade, and various duties connected with the armies of France. In 1853, he became general of division ; and in 1854, he was appointed one of the generals under St Arnaud in the war in the East. Raised to an onerous command at the age of forty-six, Canrobert briefly addressed his soldiers at the period of St Arnaud's death, and then set himself earnestly to the study of the arduous work before him. SEBASTOPOL, AND ITS VICINITY. Never was there battle-ground more requiring attention on the part of those who would read and understand the struggles which there occurred. The struggles were so numerous, so varied, so interrupted by hills and ravines, so dependent on surprises, that every little valley or eminence has acquired an historical interest. A district little less than a hundred square miles in area became, during the war, virtually one fortified town, post, or position, all the principal points in which were occupied by one or other of two hostile forces. To define the region thus indicated, let the reader suppose a straight line to be drawn from the village of Inkermann to the village of Bala- klava. This line, about eight miles in length, would run almost due north and south, and would cut off" a peninsula from the rest of the Crimea. Inkermann, or the bridge near it, may be regarded as the head or upper end of the harbour of Sebastopol, while Balaklava stands on one side of the small landlocked harbour of the same name ; so that the sea washes every part of this peninsula, except on the landward line above marked out. The westernmost extremity of the peninsula is a point or headland called Cape Chersonese, which forms the third angle of the triangle. The east side of this triangle is a rugged bare line of country, descending steeply to the Valley of the Tchernaya ; while the other two sides are formed of coast-line, indented with many inlets or small harbours. Taking the inner end of Sebastopol harbour as a starting-point, where the river Tchernaya enters it near the bridge of Inkermann, we find the harbour to extend east and west, with a length of about four miles, and a breadth varying from half a mile to a mile. On the north side are several creeks, named Golan- daya, Pianota, Soukhaya, etc. ; while on the south shore are creeks or inlets which run somewhat further into the land, and which are familiarly known as the Careening Bay, the South Bay or Inner Harbour, and the Artillery Bay. Emerging from the hai-bour, and following the line of coast a little to the south of west, the coast is seen to be deeply indented with inlets, imparting a broken appearance to this side of the peninsula. First is an inlet called Quarantine Bay ; then Chersonese Bay ; next, Streletska or Arrow Bay, much deeper than the other two ; and to this succeed, in order, Pestchanaya or Peschana Bay, Kamicsch or Cossack Bay, and Kazatch Bay, besides inter- vening bays of smaller magnitude and importance. The jutting promontory of Cape Chersonese being passed, the coast-line bends suddenly to the south- east, presenting a cliff so bold, rugged, and close to the shore, that no inlets worthy of notice are found until Balaklava is reached. Now, the triangle thus delineated, the sides of which may be roughly taken at about eight, ten, and twelve miles in straight lines, corresponds nearly with the peninsula called by the ancients the Heracleotic Chersonese, or the Peninsula of the Heracleans. The Allies during the war, in forming their several trenches, earthworks, head- quarters, and other military works, came frequently in contact with mementos of those Heracleans of early days. It must be numbered among the many re- markable features, historical and topographical, 228 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. presented by the Crimea, that the Heracleotic Peninsula was the home of a flourishing colony during no less than twelve centuries. Of the Bosphoric kingdom at the eastern extremity of the Crimea, a little has already been said ; and it is now necessary to bear in mind that the south- western extremity was likewise the territory of a community of Greek origin, wholly distinct from the former. At the commencement of the sixth century B.C., a body of Heracleans, from the Greek colonial town of that name in Asia Minor, on the southern shores of the Black Sea, set sail aci'oss the sea to the Crimea, and established a sub or branch colony in the peninsula now under notice. They built a wall, remains of which still exist, between the two points now known as Inkermann and Balaklava, to mark the boundary between their colony and the regions inhabited by the Tauric semi-barbarians further east, and to defend themselves from inroads. The classical myths relating to Iphigenia and Orestes are connected with this portion of the Ci'imea. It was no myth, however, but an historical fact, that the Heracleans built a city on the westernmost part of the peninsula, the promontory washed on one side by Kazatch Bay, and sometimes called the Peninsula of Phanari. So ancient was this city, called Cherson or Chersonesus, that it was in ruins at the time Strabo wrote, about the com- mencement of the Christian era. Nothing noAV remains of this old city but scattered stones and the foundations of Avails ; yet has it been inte- resting to mark that the French, in forming their offensive and defensive works against the Russians, frequently made use of stones which had belonged to Avails and houses on the same spot 2300 years earlier. Whether natural or political causes brought about the decay of old Cherson, there appears to have been another city built, having the same name, and situated a little to the Avest of the present Quarantine Harbour of Sebastopol, the distance betAveen the new and old Chersons being five or six miles in a straight line. This second city became large, beautiful, and powerful. The Heracleans commanded most of the trade on the north shores of the Black Sea, and were enabled to resist many political storms which engulfed their neighbours. The Bosphoric kings, jealous of the Heracleans, or, as we may perhaps term them, the Chersonians, frequently attempted to crush their power ; but unsuccessfully. Even Avhen the Romans had subdued the Bosphorians, and had themselves yielded to barbarous tribes in the countries north of the Black Sea, the Chersonians still remained a united and trading people. Relics of the Avorks constructed by these old Chersonians are strewed over many parts of -the peninsula. Portions of an ancient fortress, some old walls, and several beautiful Ionic capitals, Avere existing near Sebastopol at the time Avhen the Russian war began. Near the remains of the neAver or second city are many mounds in which pottery was found ; while at another spot, near the head of the present Quarantine Harbour, are tombs excavated in the rocks. On the south coast between Balaklava and Cape Chersonese, on a rugged precipitous cliff overhanging the sea, Avas once the Temple of Diana, the temple in which Agamemnon's daughter officiated as priestess ; the site is noAV occupied by the modern Greek monas- tery of St George. The wall of the second city, about tAvo miles in extent, and built of lime- stone, Avas five or six feet in thickness, AA'ith three towers, a gate of great magnitude, and a guard- house ; the French found on the ruins of one of these towers, inscriptions denoting that the toAver had been restored a.d. 491. Lines of stone and earth still mark the site of the principal street and market-place of the city. There are also remains of houses running along the cliff next the sea, of steps cut in the cliffs from the houses doAvn to the sea, of a landing-place, of an aqueduct, and of a well — all Avithin a mile or tAvo of the since celebrated Sebastopol. The remaining portions of the Heracleotic Peninsula Avere mostly occupied by gardens and orchards, the boundary-Avails of which are yet traceable. When the Roman, the Bosphoric, and the Chersonian poAvers declined in the Crimea, the interesting old city of Cherson became a prey to many other nations and tribes. During the Byzantine period, the emperors of Constantinople frequently afforded aid to the Chersonians, to protect them against the inroads of barbarians ; but those inroads became at length too formidable to be resisted. The Goths occupied the peninsula during many centuries, but Avere not likely to leave many relics behind them. Khazars, Tatars, Turks, Russians, all have in turn exercised control over this small but important spot. Perhaps the most remarkable circumstance in the history of Cherson and its vicinity, since the time of the Greeks, is that the Russians held it at two periods nearly 800 years apart. Vladimir, the Grand-duke of Russia, during one of his Avars AA'ith the Greek emperors of Constantinople, besieged Cherson a.d. 988, cut off the supply of water from a neighbouring spring, and forced the inhabitants to capitulate ; in gratitude for this conquest, Vladimir became a Christian, converted Cherson into a Christian city, and built many churches and other handsome structures. The late Emperor Nicholas ordered researches to be made among the ruins of Cherson, regarded as an early Russian city ; and as a result of the examination, there Avere brought to light the foundations and part of the walls of three Chris- tian churches, one of which had evidently been constructed from the I'emains of a Greek temple, perhaps the Parthenon of ancient Cherson ; for there Avere numerous Ionic columns, capitals, and bases, built into the Avails. After this early Russic period in its history, Cherson was destroyed during a war between the Muscovites and their neigh- bours ; and never since has the \ r enerable city been other than a heap of ruins. Such are the extraordinary associations Avhich 230 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. mark the spot where the English and French took up a military position in the month of September 1854. The French, partly by design and partly through inadvertency, carried still further the destruction which the old city had suffered. When the Turks took the Crimea about the year 1475, they found at Cherson empty houses and deserted churches, from which they removed the finest marbles for their buildings at Constantinople ; but even a century later, there were vast remains of beautiful palaces, churches, and monasteries, belonging of course to the Christian period of Cherson. The Russian authorities, during the late war, expressed a real or pretended indignation against the French, on account of an explosion among the ruins of one of the churches — probably accidental, but which the Russians chose to attri- bute to a wilful design of insulting the orthodox faith. English writers, on the other hand, advert indignantly to the manner in which the venerable Cherson has been despoiled by the Russians. Mr Danby Seymour says : ' What the Turks and the Tatars had spared, was taken by the Russians when they built Sebastopol. Sailors were sent to collect materials, and no ancient remains were respected : the walls and fine gateways which still existed were pulled down to build the Quarantine ; and when the Emperor Alexander issued orders to stop this vandalism, the ruin of everything precious had been already consummated. The last remains of works of art, which Lieutenant Cruse had collected with persevering industry, disap- peared after a detachment of soldiers had been lodged in the ruins for a few years at the time of the plague.'* Of the same tenor are Mr Scott's remarks : ' One cannot walk among the ruins of Chersonesus free from profound regret and indig- nation that so many beautiful relics, which even the Tatar had spared, should have been utterly destroyed by the barbarism of the Russian soldiers. Much of this appears to have been done from sheer wantonness, and subsequent to the period at which the government had given orders to preserve what then remained.' t One of the few structures on this remarkable plateau, yet remaining in a tolerably complete state, is the Greek monastery of St George, near which the Russian government erected a telegraph in recent years. This monastery, with its green- domed church, its terraces and gardens, is near the edge of a cliff several hundred feet above the level of the sea, and only to be approached by a zigzag path cut in the face of the cliff. The inlet now known as the Harbour of Sebas- topol, and called by the Tatars Kadi Liman, is by far the most important part of the coast of- the Heracleotic Peninsula, in so far as concerns natural advantages. Yet it does not appear to have been occupied by any important town, until the Russians obtained possession of the Crimea in the last cen- tury ; for we find no record of anything better than * Russia on the Black Sea, p. 161. + Baltic, Black Sea, and Crimea, p. 329. a collection of miserable huts, forming the Tatar village of Akhtiar, at the north-east corner of the harbour. The extraordinary natural advantages of this spot, as a great naval station, attracted the notice of the officers under Catherine II. ; insomuch that in 1780, shortly after the Russian conquest, the foundation-stone of the new town of Sebastopol was laid. Having no other than military and naval objects in view at this spot, the government cared not for commercial or manufacturing arrangements ; hence Sebastopol became entirely a government town, in which every proceeding had direct relation to imperial projects. In the first year of their occupancy, the Russians built houses for invalid seamen ; and in 1794, when Pallas visited the town, and when it was only ten years old, he found that the Admiralty, the Arsenal, two churches, four ports or havens, with a number of defensive forts and batteries, had been constructed, and that a vast and complete plan was being steadily followed. The successors of Catherine worked out this plan year by year. Sebastopol, or Sevastopolis — the ' august city ' — was built on a chalky stratum, varying from 30 to 200 feet above the level of the beach. This elevation, with the steep coast on the opposite or north side, defends the harbour in a most complete way. The harbour, the length and breadth of which have been already noticed, varies from three to eleven fathoms in depth, having abundant water in several places for ships of the greatest magnitude. It has scarcely a rock or shoal throughout its whole area. At the extreme inner end, where the Tchernaya* and a small rivulet enter it, the depth is insufficient for shipping. The harbour, as well as the small inlets contained within it, is protected from all winds by the chalk- hills which surround it ; insomuch that it is only during gales from the west that the shipping is exposed to any danger. In describing the town and fortifications of Sebastopol, this peculiarity presents itself — that the description must be in the past tense. The bombardment by the Allies before the capture, the cannonade by the Russians from the northern side when the southern was held by the Allies, and the systematic destruction which followed, almost extinguished Sebastopol from the list of towns ; while the Russian defences, enlarged incessantly during the siege, imparted to the fortifications almost a wholly new character. The best way, therefore, to render the details of the siege intelligible, will be first to describe the town and the fortifications as they existed shortly before the war, when additional defences had not yet been commenced. Taking the descriptions by Scott, Oliphant, Koch, Danby Seymour, Russell, and other eye-witnesses, we may be able to form a judgment concerning the arrangement and appearance of Sebastopol in the years 1853-4. * The full name, Tchernaya Retchka, Is equivalent to the Turkish Kara-su, ' Black-water ' or ' Black-river ; ' but the abbreviated name of Tchernaya or Tchernai'a, is generally adopted. SEBASTOPOL, AND ITS VICINITY :— 1854. 231 The principal part of the town was built in the shape of an amphitheatre, between Artillery Bay and the inner harbour. It consisted of parallel streets running up the steep acclivity, and divided into sections or quarters by a few transverse streets. The town itself, though con- taining a large number of public buildings, comprised but a small portion of the whole area covered ; for beyond its limits were the Seamen's Hospital, the Seamen's Barracks, the Magazines, the Garrison Barracks, the Artillery Barracks, and the Quarantine Station. The wide streets which ran up the incline from the water opened on a large square, separating them from the fortifications ; here was the residence of the commandant of the town. Between the prin- cipal street and the harbour, were a church for the Russian sailors, the Admiralty, and the Arsenal. A prolongation of this street led to a landing-place for craft which crossed the harbour ; and near this spot was a palace which had been hastily prepared for the Empress Catherine, on the occasion of her visit to the newly formed city in 1787. The principal church occupied a commanding position in the highest part of the town. Not far from this church, at a height of 240 feet above the level of the sea, Avas a telegraph, one of fourteen which established telegraphic communication between Sebastopol and Nicolaieff, another great naval station, 250 miles distant, on the river Bug. The houses and public buildings, being constructed mostly of stone, presented a fine appearance from a distance : indeed, some of them displayed considerable architectural effect — such as the Naval and Mili- tary Library, erected by the Emperor Nicholas for the use of the officers, and well furnished with books and maps ; the Opera-house ; the Club-house, with its brilliant array of ball-rooms and billiard-rooms ; churches ; the hospitals and barracks, &c. The impression produced on Mr Oliphant by the town is succinctly noticed as follows : — ' The town is an immense garrison, and looks imposing because so many of the buildings are barracks or government offices. Still, I was much struck with the substantial appearance of many of the private houses ; and, indeed, the main street was handsomer than any I had seen since leaving Moscow ; while it owed its extreme cleanliness to large gangs of military prisoners, who were employed in perpetually sweeping. New houses were springing up in every direction ; government works were still going on vigorously ; and Sebastopol bids fair to rank high among Russian cities.' No two estimates agree concerning the number of inhabitants ; but all alike admit that such traders and artisans only were admitted as were requisite to supply the wants of the soldiers, sailors, and government employes. The inlets on the south side of the harbour, which tended to make Sebastopol so important as a naval station, were many in number, and appro- priated to distinct purposes. The first, beginning on the east, was generally called Careening Bay or the Bay of Careenage; the teredo navalis, the terrible sea-worm which perforates and rots so many of the ships which sail on the Black Sea, renders necessary very frequent careening to the vessels — that is, cleaning, pitching, &c. ; and much of this careening was conducted in the small bay here under notice. The next bay, the most important of the series, called South Bay or Military Harbour, and by the Tatars Kartali Kotche or Vulture's Bay, runs due south from the great or main harbour; it is about a mile and three-quarters long, from north to south, with an average width of about a quarter of a mile ; it is rendered a splendid haven for shipping, by having a depth so considerable as to receive vessels of the largest size, and, by being so sheltered by hills on all sides, as to maintain the surface of its waters nearly always calm and unruffled. This, in the palmy days of Sebastopol, was the harbour in which the Black Sea fleet was moored in Avinter ; the largest ships being able to lie, with all their stores on board, close to the quays ; Avhereas the manned and equipped ships were in the great harbour : in the present work, it will be generally referred to as the inner harbour, a name Avhich indicates its relation to the great or main harbour. At the furthest or southern extremity, Avas the station for the old men-of-war, used as hulks for convicts, thousands of whom were generally employed in the docks and other great works. Just within the bay, near its mouth or northern end, is a subordinate inlet, on the shores of which were constructed the Dockyard and Arsenal. The inner harbour was thus rendered a vast naval station, bordered on its steep shores by naval hospitals, marine and artillery barracks, and a slolod or suburb of small neat cottages, occupied by married sailors and their families. A general name for the civil or non-official portion of Sebastopol eastAvard of this bay was Karabelnaia. A third bay, separated by the northern extremity of Sebastopol toAvn from the inner harbour, and much smaller in size, is Artillery Bay, sometimes called Merchants' or Commercial Harbour; since it accommodated, on the west, ships for landing artillery and stores, and on the east, ships laden Avith general mer- chandise for the town, garrison, and fleet. The merchants' quay, on the east side of this bay, was finely constructed and ornamented with pillars of granite, which had been brought doAvn the Dnieper from the interior of Russia ; and near this quay Avere the principal shops of the toAvn. The rocks on the western side of the bay had been blasted and allowed to fall into the water, to form a terrace Avhereon to construct buildings for the artillery and engineers. The only other bay on the south side of the harbour, necessary to be noticed here, is Quarantine Bay or Harbour, so named because the Russians built a lazaretto or quarantine establishment on its banks. Perhaps nothing effected by Russia, during the 232 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. reign of the Emperor Nicholas, displayed the hold grandeur of that monarch's plans more strikingly than the docks at Sehastopol, and the aqueduct which supplied those docks with water. All the ships-of-war were huilt at Nicolaieff, up the river Bug ; but the smaller ship-building, and the whole of the repairing and fitting, were conducted at Sehastopol ; and to afford accommodation for this work, docks were planned. It must have been no inconsiderable series of docks that was required ; for the Russian fleet at Sehastopol, when laid up for the winter 1853-4, comprised eighteen first-rates, seven frigates, thirty steamers, thirty- six smaller vessels-of-war, twenty-eight gun-boats, and thirty transports, with an aggregate register of 10,000 tons* English engineers have been largely employed in past years in the service of the Russian governments ; and it was the lot of an Englishman to construct those docks at Sehastopol which afterwards became so celebrated in connection with the events of the war. Mr Upton, before he went to Russia, was a surveyor, who assisted Telford in constructing the great mail-road to Holyhead ; he displayed much skill in his profession ; but having become amenable to the law, he hastily left England in 1S26, and Avent to the Crimea as an engineer in the Russian service. At that date, the harbour at Sebastopol was in a very inefficient state, there being great difficulty in maintaining a sufficient depth of water for large ships. Upton took the manage- ment of the works ; and during a period of nearly thirty years, he was engaged in constructing docks and other large works at Sebastopol and other parts of the Black Sea, The Emperor Nicholas conferred upon him the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the army. The docks, the chief result of Upton's labours in the east, were formed in the inlet which branches out of the inner harbour, and which was on that account frequently called Dockyard Creek. The works constructed, during a long course of years. were of vast magnitude. A basin, 400 feet long, 300 broad, and 24 deep, was formed for the reception of vessels which needed repair ; and connected with this basin were five docks — one for first-rate ships, two for second-rates, and two for frigates ; three of the locks which connected these with the basin, were nearly sixty feet in width. The labour required in these works was prodi- gious ; the basins and docks were cut in the solid rock, and lined with cement ; the quays were well * At the time when the Allies appeared off Sebastopol, in Septem- ber 1854, and before the sinking of the ships at the mouth took place, the harbour contained seventeen line-of-battle ships : the Twelve Apostles, 120 guns ; Paris, 120 guns ; the Three Saints, 120 guns ; the Grand-Duke Constantine, 120 grins; Vladimir, 120 guns ; Sviaboslatc, S4 guns ; Postislaw, S4 guns ; Uriel, 84 guns ; Chabrie, 84 guns; Tagudiel, S4 guns; Selaphcel, S4 guns; the Tliree Hierarchs, 84 guns ; Tro-Sviatitalia, 84 guns ; Varna, 84 guns ; Gabriel, 84 guns ; the Empress Mary, S4 guns ; and Tchesme, 80 guns. There were nine frigates, corvettes, and brigs : the Cagul, 60 guns ; Boulefgi, 60 guns ; Kararna, 60 guns ; Medea, 60 guns ; Calypso, IS guns ; Pylades, IS guns ; Ptolemwus, 20 guns ; Theseus, 20 guns ; JEneas, 20 guns. To these were added six large and six small steamers, and a multitude of smaller vessels, transports, gun-boats, &c, to the number of seventy-five. and strongly built of limestone, with granite copings. As the docks were above the level of the sea, ships had to be elevated into them by means of the locks, which effected a rise of ten feet each. Perhaps the aqueduct was still more remarkable than the docks themselves. With a hope of escaping the dreaded teredo navalis, the emperor determined that the basin should be filled with fresh water instead of salt ; and Upton taxed his ingenuity for the means of attaining this end. He made the waters of the Tchernaya available. To form a great reservoir, and thus to insure a constant supply of water, he constructed an enormous stone-dike across a mountain - gorge, near the village of Tchorgouna, eight or ten miles south-east of Sebastopol; proper sluices being so placed as to prevent too great a pressure of water in the eveut of unusually heavy rains. The aqueduct, a beautiful work about twelve miles in length, brought the water into the docks, keeping on the left bank of the Tchernaya, passing the bridge at Inkermann, and winding round the heights near the upper end of the harbour. Near the Careening Bay, the ravines and hills oppose such obstacles, that the due level of the aqueduct called for the construction of a tunnel 800 feet in length, another of smaller dimensions, and three elevated works to carry the water over the valleys. A great naval depot, on which so many millions of roubles had been thus spent, was not likely to be left by the Emperor Nicholas in an undefended state. Forts of vast magnitude were constructed at points where the guns might command the entrances to the various bays and harbours. The Quarantine Bay, outside the harbour, was defended by a double battery of the same name, mounting fifty gun.-. Near that was Fort Alexander, sixty-four guns, off which the line of sunken vessels began. Next was a battery of fifty guns, guarding the entrance to Artillery Bay. Between the bay just named and the inner harbour Avas an immense work, Fort Nicholas, mounting nearly 200 guns, and threaten- ing any ships which might approach. On the other or eastern side of the mouth of the same bay was Fort Paul, a small work of thirty guns. Beyond this point, higher up the harbour, no forts existed until the progress of the war suggested a further strengthening of Sebastopol. These various forts were of tremendous strength ; most of them were casemated, and some in double tiers ; and all were increased in poAver during 1854. The positions, too, were so chosen that a cross-fire could be maintained in almost every direction ; insomuch that, shoidd a hostile ship succeed in entering the harbour, it might encounter shots at every yard of its progress, and be completely riddled ere it reached the inner harbour or prin- cipal port. The arrangements were such, too, that guns might be accumulated on some of the forts, far beyond the nominal or usual strength. Although so eminently important a place, Sebastopol was left entirely undefended on the land-side until a comparatively recent date : the PORTK) 'IE CI! FORMING CHIEF SC Can Hi acted '■'■ Engraved i a COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE :— 1854. 233 government never suspecting the possibility of a hostile army occupying the plateau south of the town. There was not in 1834 so much as a gate or the smallest rampart — the streets of the town ascending to the open country or plateau itself without any interruptions. It was not until after a dispute with the English government in 1837, concerning the ship Vixen, that the emperor thought proper to attend to the land-defences of this place ; but even then the north side of the harbour, rather than the south, received his atten- tion ; for at the breaking out of the Avar in 1853 there were no other defences on the south than a short wall, loopholed for musketry, but without any strengthening by towers or bastions : a wall utterly useless against large ordnance. The north side of the harbour, though but little inhabited previous to the war, presents natural facilities for a position of great strength — facilities which the military engineers in the service of the czar did not neglect. The ground is higher than on the south side. On those heights were constructed what may be considered the citadel of Sebastopol, the Sievernaya, North Fort, Balaklava. or Star Fort, in such a position as to command the Avhole town and docks, while itself could be attacked only on the land-side. This fort was regarded as so important, that many authorities, before the siege of Sebastopol had far advanced, pronounced an attack on the south of Sebastopol useless until the Sievernaya were taken. Sir Howard Douglas considered it to be ' the key of Sebastopol.' On the heights were various minor forts ; while near the water's edge, at the entrance of the harbour, was Fort Constantine, a vast work of 104 guns, which, fronting Fort Alexander, rendered it perilous for any hostile ship to attempt to enter the harbour. Sir Howard thought that, ' the North Fort being taken, the Tele- graph and "Wasp Batteries on the northern heights, Fort Constantine and the forts below, being com- manded and attacked in reverse, must soon fall ; while the town, docks, arsenal, and barracks on the south side of the harbour would be at the mercy of the Allies, who by the fire of their batteries might entirely destroy them all. On the contrary, by attacking the place from the south, the enemy holding the northern heights, although the works on the crest of the southern heights should be breached and taken, the town, the bod}' of the place, with its docks and arsenals, will not be tenable by the besiegers till the great work on the northern side, and all its defensive depen- dencies, shall have been captured.' * It remained for the events of the siege to determine the justness or fallacy of these and other opinions expressed on the subject when the operations were about to beain. COMMENCEMENT OF T II E SIEGE. It was on the historically interesting peninsula described in the last section, that the Allied armies took up their position after the flank- march. From Inkermann to Cape Chersonese, * Naval Gunnery, Fourth Edition, p. G19. 234 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. from Cape Chersonese to Balaklava, all became by degrees virtually one great camp, having the formidable Sebastopol on its northern margin. Death deprived the French of their leader at this critical moment ; and it remained for Canrobert to assist Raglan in carrying out those arrangements which the latter had planned with St Arnaud. When Lord Raglan arrived with his army on the heights above Balaklava, on the 26th, he expected little opposition in that quarter ; but, as a measure of precaution, he sent on the Rifles to crown the heights, and arranged other battalions in commanding positions. On one of the heights was a small post of little value, an old ruined Genoese castle, that was soon taken by the artillery and the Rifles ; but before this capture, Lord Raglan had a narrow escape from a shell discharged by the garrison. The villages of Kadikoi' and Balaklava, the one on a small river two or three miles from the harbour, and the other on the eastern shore of the harbour itself, were taken and occupied ; and the heights being also occupied, the British had secured a wholly new base of operations. ' A narrow defile constitutes the only approach to the harbour on the land-side ; a small force of the enemy stationed here might have proved a formidable obstruction to the British ; but the Russians, not expecting an attack in this quarter, had left the defile undefended. Lord Raglan entered the village about noon ; the inhabi- tants presented to him fruit, flowers, bread, and salt; and he assured them they were safe from molestation. Small as the harbour is, the waters are deep, and the Agamemnon steamed in safely. Lord Raglan joyfully greeted Sir Edmund Lyons, who had arrived by sea ; for a position had been now attained where the supplies from the fleet were immediately in the rear of the armies requiring that service. It is asserted by Mr Danby Seymour, that no truer picture of this singular little harbour can be given than that presented by Homer of the port of the Lsestrigons, which Karl Ritter identifies with Balaklava.* Europe presents scarcely another harbour similar to it, except, perhaps, among the fiords of Norway. The coast near it consists of chalk-cliffs nearly 1000 feet in height, and the opening which affords entrance to the harbour is so narrow as scarcely to be visible at a distance of two miles at sea — not so much on account of its narrowness, perhaps, as because it is somewhat oblique to the coast-line. The entrance gradually Within a long recess a bay there lies Edged round with cliffs, high pointing to the skies. . The jutting shores that swell on either side, Contract its mouth, and break the rushing tide. * Our eager sailors seize the fair retreat, And bound within the port their crowded fleet ; For here retired the sinking billows sleep, And smiling calmness silvered o'er the deep. I only in the bay refused to moor, And fixed without my hawsers to the shore : From thence we climbed a point, whose airy brow Commands the prospect of the plains below. Pope's Homer, Odyssey, x. 101. widens, until the little inlet forms a harbour in which fifty or sixty ships may moor, and in which the water is deep enough for the largest vessels afloat. Two ruined fortifications, con- structed by the Genoese centuries ago, crown the heights on either side of the entrance ; and whatever military force commands these heights must of necessity command the harbour : hence the opinion of the Allies, formed many months earlier, that a sea-attack on Balaklava would be useless unless accompanied by an attack on land. The width of the entrance scarcely exceeds 800 feet ; and even the harbour itself is little more than 1200, resembling rather a large basin than a harbour. In some parts, the depth of water is so great as 100 fathoms. Whatever may have been the relation between the harbour and the mythic stories of the ancients, Balaklava was certainly known to the Greeks. The Genoese seized it during the middle ages, gave it the name of Cembalo, and built the two forts. After being occupied by Tatars and Turks, it passed in 1780 into the hands of a colony of Arnaout Greeks, who were encouraged by the Empress Catherine. A small population of trading Greeks continued to occupy the town or village down to the period of the war. Concerning the name, some writers trace it to Pallakium, a Greek fortress once standing here ; others to Baluchlacca, a name which has something Oriental in its appearance; but the favourite etymology derives the name from bella cZava, ' beautiful port.' The seizure being effected, no further mili- tary movements could be made until the fleet had brought round the guns, provisions, and other stores to Balaklava. Immediately on the receipt of Lord Raglan's message, conveyed by the nocturnal gallop of Lieutenant Maxse, naval arrangements were at once made by Admiral Dundas and Sir Edmund Lyons. The whole steam-squadron, headed by the Agamemnon, and accompanied by several transports carrying siege- guns, left the mouth of the Katcha on the 26th of September, and arrived off Balaklava on the same day, doubling Cape Chersonese. The officers and men on board the slower-sailing ships watched anxiously this departure. They ' looked after the steaming squadron,' according to a writer belonging to one of the ships, ' with a heavy heart, seeing vanish with it their hopes of glory and prize- money. Especially since the battle of the Alma — which the fleet, sailing close to land, could witness very well — a wish to emulate the heroism of the land-troops has seized hold of the crews; and not all the horrors which the fatigue-parties, sent on shore the next day to help in transporting the wounded, saw on the field of battle have cooled their ardour.' The main body of the fleet remained at anchor several days off the Katcha, there being insufficient anchorage for so large a number at Sebastopol. At the request of Lord Raglan, the admiral supplied 1000 marines, who were sent round in the Agamemnon to take the place of an COMMENCEMENT OP THE SIEGE :— 1854. 235 equal number of soldiers employed in guarding the heights that overlook the little harbour. Busy were the hours and days at Balaklava. Ships found ingress and egress by a gap so narrow, that careful handling was necessary to prevent collisions ; and these ships brought supplies of various kinds, not only from the main fleet at the Katcha, but from Constantinople and other depots. The largest and longest steamers could not enter, on account of the tortuous direction of the mouth : they anchored outside, while the smaller steamers and transports entered the harbour. The tents for the army were among the first articles landed ; during ten or twelve days, the soldiers had obtained but little covering at night, little shelter from rain, cold, and wind ; and many a poor fellow was cut off by the sickness thus engendered. The landing of the siege-artillery was more formidable work ; for Balaklava, being a mere village, had no quay worthy of the name, and hence the difficul- ties were serious in disembarking guns of great magnitude and weight : they were lowered from the ships into barges provided with a kind of drawbridge ; artillerymen and seamen aiding in this labour, and strings of horses being then employed in dragging the guns up to the heights forming the plateau between Balaklava and Sebastopol. About sixty heavy guns of the siege-train were thus successively landed. Among the reinforcements which, together with supplies, arrived during the first few days, were the 4th and 6th regiments of dragoons ; but it was speedily found that the medical department was defective in strength : many men fell daily under the influence of cholera, and medicines were too few for the wants of the surgeons, who were themselves also too few in number. By the 30th, all the heavy guns having been 'parked' or collected on the heights above Balaklava, the time had arrived for arranging the march towards Sebastopol, and the selection of ground for head-quarters, divisional quarters, depots, &c. On the 2d of October, the advance was made and the positions taken up ; the six divisions of the army being disposed in conformity with the general plan whereon the siege was to be conducted ; and posts of sentinels, pickets, vedettes, «fec, established to watch the move- ments of the enemy. When the soldiers were thus removed from Balaklava, the 1000 marines pitched their camp on the hills bounding the harbour, made a road, and cut some intrench- ments ; the position was easily defended by musketry, and prevented any attack by the Russians on the ships in the harbour. A naval brigade or division was also formed, under Captain Lushington of the Albion; and the sailors, about 1000 in number, displayed great alacrity and delight in pulling up their guns to the heights, being well disposed towards any tactics which would afford them a scene of excitement and of possible glory. The position taken up by the head-quarters of the army was about half-way between Sebastopol and Balaklava, three to four miles from each in a straight line ; but the advanced posts were much nearer the enemy, and received many a shot from the larger guns at Sebastopol. Meanwhile, the French had been landing their supplies and siege-material at another part of the peninsula, west instead of south of Sebas- topol. As the harbour at Balaklava, with all its advantages, can accommodate only a small fleet at once, General Canrobert soon decided on adopting a landing-place elsewhere ; he selected the two bays near Cape Chersonese, generally called Kamiesch and Arrow Bays, between Sebastopol and that Cape. The French quickly formed a landing-place in Kamiesch Bay, established a little town or cantonment on the beach, landed their artillery and stores, despatched their regiments up to the heights, and commenced their arrangements for the attack of the formidable stronghold. The 3d and 4th divisions, under General Forey, were charged with the duty of besieging the left or west side of Sebastopol ; while the 1st and 2d divisions, under General Bosquet, were formed into a corps of observation, to occupy the positions commanding the Valley of the Tchernaya, and to protect the siege operations against any attempt on the part of the enemy coming from the interior of the Crimea. The Turkish division, it was agreed, should form a reserve for either of these two French corps, as circumstances might render desirable. The landing having commenced at Kamiesch on the 30th of September, the advanced French pickets came, on the 1st of October, within 400 yards of the Cossack vedettes outside Sebastopol. On the next day, the 4th division took up a position about two miles from the town, its left resting on the coast at Arrow Bay, its right on a point about two miles further south, and its front commanding the west and south-west sides of Sebastopol. On the 3d of the month, siege-material continued to be landed in large quantity, while the generals and engineers made many and careful observations on the movements and defences at Sebastopol ; thirty large guns from the ships were landed, to be worked by Captain Rigaud ; and 1000 sailors were formed into a naval brigade, similar to that on the English side. On the 4th, the third division took up its place to the right of the fourth, and extending thence to a great ravine which runs down to the inner harbour of Sebastopol ; and on many successive days, stores of all kinds were landed at Kamiesch, and carried up to the siege-camp. Prince Menchikoff did not waste these momen- tous days in idleness. Having sunk the ships in the harbour, and having made the flank-march towards Baktcheserai, he awaited the manoeuvres of the Allies as a guide to his future proceedings. His spies, numerous and alert, had ascertained both the numbers and the movements of his opponents ; and having thus found that the north 236 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. side of Sebastopol was left entirely free from danger, he immediately planned measures for strengthening the defences on the south. On the 30th of September, he returned to the town, and set his engineers busily to work. At this juncture, reinforcements arrived westward from Kertch and southward from Perekop, effecting an immediate and important augmentation of the garrison. A brigade of light cavalry, under Lieutenant-general Ryjoff, took up a position near the high road over the Katcha, to maintain a communication with Simferopol ; while light detachments were sent to the mountains near Tchorgouna, the Tchernaya, and the Valley of Baidar, between the Allies and the interior of the country. A detachment of regular cavalry, Cossacks, and field-pieces, was sent to the village of Baidar, to prevent the Allies from obtaining cattle, fodder, or provisions. Another detachment started for Eupatoria, to ascertain what the Allies had effected there ; when it was found that the town had been put into a state of defence, and garrisoned by a small force of English, French, and Turks, backed by a squadron at sea. Kamiesck Bay. In order to observe the Allied position between Sebastopol and Balaklava, a force of cavalry advanced to the Tchernaya, and made a recon- naissance. During these movements in the field, which occupied the first week in October, pickets and bodies of skirmishers were planted wherever they might annoy the Allies during the progress of the siege-works. Meanwhile, the strengthening of Sebastopol progressed rapidly. Menchikoff obtained the valuable aid of an engineer named Todtleben or Todleben — a young man who, born of poor shopkeepers at Riga, had risen to the post of captain in the engineers at the age of thirty-two. When the siege was about to com- mence, Menchikoff is said to have asked the head- engineer how long a time it would require to place Sebastopol in a state of defence : the answer was 'two months;' whereupon young Todtleben stepped forward and undertook to effect the Avork in two weeks, if provided with a large number of men ; his offer was accepted, and he kept his word. The energy and skill displayed in this enterprise won for him the rank of colonel ; and from that time he had the direction of all the batteries and other works of defence on the margin of the town. Todtleben afterwards ro^e to the dignity of general and aid-de-camp to the emperor, and received distinguished attention from the grand-dukes and other high personages who visited the scene of operations. He appears to have well deserved the encomiums passed upon him, both by his opponents and his own countrymen. At this point it becomes desirable to explain the meaning of a few terms employed in fortifica- tion and sieges. The history of a war does not necessarily involve a description of the military art ; but the circumstances under which the siege of Sebastopol was carried on were so peculiar, that the details will be better understood if the nature of the trenches be previously known — those trenches which had so much concern in the miseries endured by the British troops in the following winter. COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE :— 1854. 237 When a town or post is to be defended from external attack, a ditch is the primary obstacle interposed — a dry ditch fifty or a hundred feet in width, by twenty or more in depth : facilities being in many cases at hand for filling this ditch with water. Within the ditch are constructed elevated ramparts or works, of earth or stone, or both combined, with embrasures or square holes cut in the upper edge, through which cannon can be pointed at the enemy. Within the crest of this rampart is a platform or banquette, whereon musketeers or riflemen may stand, to fire over the crest at any of the enemy's soldiers who may approach within shot-distance. Various kinds of works under the names of bastions, barbettes, cavaliers, &c, within the parapet, further enable the garrison to strengthen their position against the besiegers. Besides these inner- works, arc various outer-works, to shield the wall or rampart from the cannon-shot of the enemy, and to repel any infantry who may approach the ditch ; these outer-works comprise ravelins, redoubts, glacis, abattis, palisades, covered- ways, n .1 ■ 250 CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA. distance of nearly three miles ! The sharp crack of their explosion bears to the roar of ordinary guns some such relation as that of the rifle to the musket ; the ball rushes through the air with a noise and a regular beat bearing some resemblance to that of a locomotive engine, insomuch that the men speedily applied the name of the ' express train' to these missiles. Yet, although the effects of the Lancaster shot "were more destructive than those of ordinary guns when actual collision occurred, there were deficiencies, in accuracy of flight, that rendered these missiles less serviceable than had been expected. "When night closed in, and the gunners retired wearily from their work, the Allies could not conceal from themselves that the results were unsatisfactory. Hopes had mounted high during many days. Some authorities had pronounced that the Russian batteries would be silenced in tbree days ; while others limited the time for such an achievement to a few hours. Many parts of the Russian works, it is true, were injured ; the Malakoff Tower was deeply scarred by the heavy 68-pounder shot, and many of its guns dismounted, although at a range of more than 2000 yards ; a magazine in the rear of the Redan was fired by a shell, and many guns silenced thereby ; and all the defence- works were shaken and scarred by the tremendous force brought against them. Still, the damage was of small amount, considering that the works were mostly of earth, and that Sebastopol contained a large number of men wholly at the disposal of Menchikoff. Those Russians who, whether soldiers or civilians, had not worked severely during the day, were set to repair the parapets and embrasures at night ; insomuch, that when morning next dawned, the Allies had the mortification of finding that the battering of the preceding day had left the Russians little the worse. Prince Menchikoff, in his dispatch to the czar, stated that in one of his forts nearly all the guns, thirty-three in number, had been dismounted ; that Fort Constantine had been much damaged by the ships ; but that most of the other works had suffered slightly. He esti- mated his loss at about 500 killed and wounded, among whom General Kornileff was killed, and Admiral Nachimoff and Captain Yerganyscheff wounded. ' As a new bombardment was expected to-day,' he wrote on the 18th, 'the whole night was passed at Sebastopol in repairing the damage, and all the dismantled pieces were replaced.' Everything conspired to render this remarkable fact evident — that the defenders strengthened themselves more rapidly than the besiegers. Raglan and Canrobert were scarcely in a condition to commence the bombardment on the 17th, so many of their heavy guns and mortars not yet being in a position to render full service ; but, nevertheless, they saw that every day's delay would be more advantageous to the enemy than to themselves : the Avorks of the defence advancing more rapidly than those of the attack. As it was, the Russian guns were more numerous than those of the Allies ; and if the cannonade had been deferred for a week, the chances amount almost to certainty that the ratio would have become still more favourable to the Russians. The total loss by land and sea, English and French, appears to have been about 250 killed, and 860 wounded. Of the Russian loss no definite account has been given. The progress of the siege, from that day onward, was governed by the circumstance that Sebastopol was never invested. In ordinary sieges, the town or fortified post is completely surrounded by the besiegers, to prevent alike any exit by the garrison or the reception of any succours from without : in siege-language, it is invested. The trenches are then dug, the parallels and zigzags made, the parapets built, the guns planted on the earthen batteries, and the siege commences; and if the relative strength of the two forces permit, the place falls. At Sebastopol, however, the place was not invested, and this imparted a new character to the siege. The assailing force being insufficient to enclose the whole place and its works, the southern side of the harbour only was invested, leaving the formidable forts on the north unassailed, and the roads from Simferopol and Eupatoria free for the passage of supplies. Even had the Russian batteries been totally silenced, and the south side taken by assault, the great harbour, acting as a huge wet-ditch, would have presented a fresh obstacle, backed by a fresh line of batteries that would have required a new siege. The possession by the Allies of a powei-ful fleet did not much mend the matter ; for as this fleet could not enter the harbour on account of the sinking of the Russian ships — a manoeuvre Avhich, judged by its results, must be regarded as masterly, however adverse to the ordinary ideas of war — it could not cannonade the batteries on the north side that commanded the south. Not only was the siege rendered a work of enormous difficulty by this non-investment, but many autho- rities contend that the Allies had not on the 17th force sufficient to warrant a bombardment even of the southern portion. ' "We had brought with us a siege-train of sixty guns, including mortars, nearly all of a calibre inferior to those of the enemy. The French had a larger number, but they were of brass, and consequently inferior for all purposes to those of the besieged. In order to arm even three batteries, we were compelled to dismantle our ships and to employ our seamen. More than 800 rounds can rarely be discharged from one gun, on account of its liability to burst and the enlargement of the vent. Few guns, indeed, will bear much above 600 rounds. As during the first day we had fired above 100 rounds from each gun, if we had continued at this rate, in less than six days our batteries would have been disabled. The amount of ammunition avail- able was so small, that it would have been com- pletely expended in about five days. Some of the THE FIRST BOMBARDMENT BY LAND :— 1854. 251 most useful guns had been supplied with only 120 rounds each. The number of our artillerymen was so inadequate to the working of the siege-guns, that we were compelled to cease our fire during the night ; and thus the enemy was able to repair unmolested the damage done to his earthworks during the day. Even to keep up a moderate fire from sunrise to sunset, and to leave the proper reliefs for night-work, the officers and gunners were only every alternate eight hours off duty, which, deducting neai'ly an hour, the time required to go from the camp to the trenches, left but six for food and repose — an amount of labour which human strength could not long endure.'* These strictures, so far as they are just, apply to the governments, who failed to send out sufficient force, and not to the generals, who effected their best with the means placed at their disposal. The character of the siege, in the days follow- ing the 17th, is foreshadowed by the above facts and comments. On the 18th, after repairing much of the injury during the night, the Russians continued to meet boldly the fire of the Allies. They provided, too, incessant occupation for the troops left in camp ; for Menchikoff sent a field- army into the valley on the east of the Allied position, to distract attention, and call away as many troops as possible from the trenches : the manoeuvre so far succeeded as to render the Allies conscious that they were themselves liable to attack, and to compel them to keep up an exhaust- ing system of vigilance. The French batteries, not having yet recovered from the effects of the explosion, were not in a condition to resume the bombardment on the 18th ; and thus the Russians were free to direct all their force against the British, effecting quite as much mischief to the British battei'ies as the latter had wrought upon the former, chiefly the Malakoff, on the previous day. General Canrobert felt seriously the embar- rassment of his work, although scarcely so great as those against which Lord Raglan had to contend, ? The difficulties with which we are met,' he said in a dispatch to his government, ' are of two kinds — those resulting from the nature of the soil, the solid stratum of which, although insufficient, diminishes in proportion as we approach the place; and those resulting from the number and calibre of the pieces of artillery the enemy plants against us, almost in a right and very extended line. In this respect, the resources he draws from his vessels stationed in the port, men as well as materials, are almost inexhaustible.' One day was very like another at the camp, except that the firing of the Allies gradually lessened in vigour, while the work in the trenches became more and more severe to the soldiers, who were called upon to effect more work while their numbers were diminishing. On the morning of the 19th, shortly after daylight, Canrobert was * Quarterly Review, No. CXCI. enabled to resume his fire from the injured batteries, as well as from others he had constructed on the preceding day ; and with these he was enabled to maintain a steady cannonade against the south-west part of the town. Lieutenant- colonel Hamley, who himself shared in the artil- lery duties at that time, sufficiently characterises the labour of the British on the 19th and following clays in these words : ' The interest excited by a contest of artillery, without decided advantage on either side, soon languishes ; and in a few days the thunder of the bombardment was almost unheeded. But the troops in the trenches and batteries were hardly worked, and exposed by day incessantly to a tremendous fire. The space in the magazines in our batteries was at first insufficient to hold ammunition for the day's consumption ; and to take in fresh supplies formed one of the most trying duties which artillerymen can be called on to perform. "Wagons filled with powder, drawn by horses of the field-batteries, were driven down the face of the hill for upwards of half a mile, in full view, and quite within range of the enemy's guns. A shell bursting in the wagons would have blown horses and men into the air ; and to the risk of this were added the usual chances of being struck by shot or splinters; yet neither the officers — often mere boys — nor the drivers ever shewed the slightest hesitation in proceeding on their perilous errand. Several horses were killed by cannon-shot; and on one occasion a shell, lodging between the spokes of a wheel, exploded there, blowing off three wheels and the side of the wagon, and blackening the cases of powder without igniting their contents.' Now would a day pass on which the Allies appeared to gain a little advantage ; now one that was clearly favourable to the Russians : they varied in character, but the general result was a diminution in the intensity of the fire on both sides. When it was found, as frequently occurred, that the enemy fired three shots for every two on the part of the Allies, and that the guns in the garrison possessed enormous calibre and power, the anxieties of the Allied generals increased as the prospect of a speedy conquest became more and more doubtful. The cannon- ading was, on most days, diversified with smart skirmishes on the part of the troops, the riflemen on both sides approaching sufficiently near to be within range. On one occasion, these light troops nearly met at some quarries situated in front of the Redan ; and when the British riflemen had exhausted their store of ammunition, nothing daunted, they picked up stones and hurled them at the enemy ; the Russians, surprised at such a mode of fighting, resolved to imitate it, and then ensued a battery and counter-battery of these missiles; but the British proved more skilful, or at least more successful, than the Russians in the art of stone-throwing, and the latter retired. The danger attending the conveyance of ammunition 252 CAMPAIGN m THE CRIMEA. from the magazines to the batteries, adverted to in the last paragraph, was frequently incurred under circumstances displaying great intrepidity. One of the batteries was so placed that the ammunition could be conveyed to it only along a road wholly exposed to the enemy, and the hazards there encountered led to the appella- tion of the 'Valley of the Shadow of Death' to that road. The Sailors' Battery being especially obnoxious to the enemy's shot and shell, the officers and seamen who managed it delighted in displaying their hardihood in that service. On one occasion, the Union Jack being shot away by the Russians from the naval battery, Captain Peel jumped up to the parapet, and waved the ragged fragment high aloft amid a torrent of bullets and balls, until another flag had been brought to replace it. Individual acts such as these, frequent in occurrence, tended greatly to excite enthusiasm among the men, at a time when the course of events generally was not very satis- factory. Sometimes rockets were sent as means of destruction against the ships in the harbour and against the dockj r ard buildings, but with only partial effect ; the houses in the town, by express orders of Lord Raglan, were spared from direct fire, as a wish was felt to draw a line of distinction between the emperor's property and his unoffend- ing subjects. "When it became known, however, that an hospital had been fired, and that this hospital contained Russian soldiers who had been wounded at the battle of the Alma, much regret was felt ; as there was certainly no desire to limit the few comforts those poor fellows could receive. One peculiarity annoyed the Allies much : their fleets could not get at the Russian ships, but a Russian ship managed to assail the British troops ; for the Vladimir, anchored in the great harbour, by being heeled over, brought her mortars to bear upon the British siege-works, and killed and wounded several men by a skilful shelling : it was an enemy in a new direction, and a necessity for a new battery was speedily seen. But this was of little avail; the Vladimir quietly steamed out of the way of the new battery, and took up another position, where she could completely sweep the hill in front and rear of some of the British works. A storm of 13-inch shells from mortars, swung on the upper-deck, was terribly annoying: the sailors, who defended the battery chiefly assailed, although passing their pleasantries upon ' Whistling Dick ' — a name given by them to the enormous shells on account of the peculiar noise made during their flight — were taxed to the utmost in their attempts to get behind shelter before the dread missiles exploded. Day after day passed in this desultory struggle, each side labouring to repair injuries and to bring up more force. Two 68-pounders were added to Gordon's Battery, and two to Chapman's ; a transport arrived at Balaklava laden with siege- guns and ordnance-stores ; new batteries were constructed on the front and left of the left attack ; and more troops were landed from England. But so severe had been the labour and sufferings of six short weeks, that, notwithstanding reinforce- ments, the British troops fit for service had greatly lessened in number — at a time, too, when the work to be done had largely increased by an extension of the siege-works. The French likewise suffered severely ; they had more than one explo- sion ; and the Flagstaff and Garden Batteries cut them up terribly. There was a reason for this not well known till afterwards : the plateau whereon the French works were constructed had been a practice-ground before the war ; and hence the Russians well appreciated the range and dis- tances of various points. The horses of the British were even in worse plight than the men, being wholly insufficient, in number and strength, for the enormous exertions required of them in dragging guns and stores from Balaklava up to the plateau. On one occasion, Lord Dunkellin, commanding a trench-party in a dreary misty night, advanced too far, mistook a company of Russians for friends, and was taken prisoner. On another night, a small party of Russians, approach- ing the French pickets, and hailing out : ' Ne tirez pas : nous sommes Anglais,' succeeded in working much mischief ere the deceit was dis- covered. Indeed, during the war, circumstances frequently placed the Russians in the character of deceivers, in many cases breaking the conven- tional rules of honourable warfare, but in others doing no more than the Allies would have clone if similarly placed. For the purposes of the present Chapter, the narrative of the siege need k not be traced to a later date than the end of October. The Allied forces, it is true, remained before Sebastopol ; additions to the siege-train continued to arrive ; stores of ammunition were dragged up to the plateau ; new trenches and parallels were dug around the southern half of the town ; additional batteries of guns and mortars were planted ; over- worked troops continued to spend the dead hours of the night in the harassing duty of the trenches, some to dig, and others to watch. And then, on the other side, the Russians continued to repair by night what had been injured during the day ; they formed new lines of defence within the Redan and the Malakoff, to afford further resistance, if those strongholds should fall ; they brought more and more guns to their batteries, as if the available store were inexhaustible ; they received frequent reinforcements of men, provisions, and ammuni- tion, along the roads of arrival which the Allies could not control ; and, armed with these powers and resources, they maintained against the besiegers a fire generally more powerful than the latter could employ. But, from the very nature of such proceedings, there is little left to narrate : the enterprise became, for the Allies, most wearying, laborious, and disappointing. A few brief passages from familiar letters, written by officers engaged, and afterwards published, will BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA :— 1854. 253 suffice to convey a notion of the state of the Kussian works at that time, of the picket-duty on the part of the British, and of the trench- duty. After adverting to the supposed disappoint- ment of friends in England at the protracted duration of the siege, one officer thus speaks of the state of the town : ' We can knock the civilian part of the town to pieces ; but the great difficulty is to get at the dockyards, arsenals, &c, which are completely protected from straight shooting by the high cliffs of the harbour ; they, therefore, can only be reached by shells and rockets. Thus, in long range, it is very difficult to fire at exactly the right elevation ; consequently, we pitch almost as many shells into the harbour as we do into the stores. Again, I suspect all their roofs are bomb-proof, as we have not succeeded in setting them on fire to any great extent, although there have been almost nightly blazes of small huts,