STREET IN SEDAN 
 
PLAN 
 
 OF THE 
 
 BATTLE OF SEDAN, 
 
 ACCOMPANIED BY 
 
 A SHOET MEMOIE. 
 
 BY 
 
 CAPTAIN FITZ-GEORG-E, 
 
 ROYAL WELCH FUSILIERS. 
 
 hjj HJUps an* Wu\a%. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 EDWARD STANFORD, 6 & 7, CHARING CROSS, S.W. 
 
 1871. 
 
 All rights are reserved. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2014' 
 
 https://archive.org/details/planofbattleofseOOfitz 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Being in the vicinity of Sedan last winter, and finding 
 that at that time no sketch of the country, on which 
 the battle of Sedan was fought, was published, I con- 
 ceived the idea of drawing up a rough Plan of the 
 battle-field, to enable those who could not spare the 
 time, or who were unwilling to go there, to understand 
 the nature of the country, and the extraordinary and 
 unusual positions taken up by both armies engaged. 
 
 The place and neighbourhood being declared in a 
 state of siege, this was necessarily a task of some 
 difficulty, not to say danger, from the liability of being 
 mistaken as a spy both by Franc-tireurs and German 
 patrols ; the materials at hand were of the most limited 
 nature, and in consequence the Plan is sadly wanting 
 in detail. 
 
 Wishing to add to the interest of it, I have drawn 
 up from the meagre details at command a precis of the 
 battle, and of the engagements preceding it, besides 
 generalizing on such subjects as affected it. I have 
 endeavoured to make the memoir as brief as possible, 
 and aiming at no literary merit, to limit it to what 
 might interest the general public. 
 
 To the attention of those who desire fuller informa- 
 tion, I recommend the ' Franco-Prussian War/ edited 
 
IV 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 by Captain Hozier, and published at uncertain intervals 
 in divisions, in one of which an accurate description of 
 the battle will shortly appear. 
 
 In offering the Plan and Memoir to the public, I am 
 fully conscious how far my humble efforts fall short of 
 what is due to the subject I have taken in hand ; but 
 whatever be the shortcomings in them, I shall feel that 
 I have not quite worked in vain if I succeed in 
 interesting or conveying the least information to my 
 readers. 
 
 I must not omit to acknowledge my obligations to 
 the able and spirited war correspondence of the London 
 Press, as well as to the Correspondents I had the good 
 fortune to meet at Sedan, to whose encouragement this 
 modest brochure mainly owes its publication. 
 
 G-. Fitz-George. 
 
 London, 2drd April, 1871. 
 
plai\ op -r:j£ vjcJj x u-ry o? szoAh, 
 
 SHEWING THE POSITIONS OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 
 30™ AUGUST AND DAYBREAK ON THE I" SEPTEMBER. 1870 
 
MEMOIK OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 The culminating disaster that befell the Imperial 
 army of France, in the recent campaign, was fated to 
 take place in the vicinity of the fortified town of 
 Sedan, a place probably unknown, by name even, to 
 most Englishmen until the telegrams in the news- 
 papers announced the total overthrow of MacMahon's 
 army, and the surrender of the Emperor Napoleon III. 
 and of the survivors of the terrible conflict fought there 
 on the 1st September, 1870. 
 
 Although the fall of Metz, and the surrender of 
 Bazaine with the Imperial Guard and the bulk of the 
 remainder of the original Imperial army, to the troops 
 of Prince Frederick Charles, were subsequent to the 
 battle of Sedan, still, inasmuch as the Imperial dynasty 
 was formally deposed in Paris on the 4th September, 
 1870, I consider the surrender of the 1st the final 
 disaster that befell the armies of the third Napoleon. 
 
 In the ' Edinburgh Gazetteer ' we find : 
 
 " Sedan, a considerable town in the north-east of France, 
 department of the Ardennes. It is situated on the right bank 
 of the Meuse, and is strongly fortified, being surrounded with 
 wails, bastions, ditches, and other works, constructed partly 
 by Vauban. The old castle, in which Turenne was born, is 
 now converted into an arsenal, and is one of the best in 
 France. The town is divided into Upper and Lower ; and, 
 
 B 
 
2 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 though not badly built, is, from the uneven and rocky nature 
 of the ground which it occupies, very irregular. Of the 
 population, in number nearly 11,000, a part are Protestants. 
 Sedan has been long noted for its manufactures of superfine 
 woollens, and for a very different branch of industry, the 
 making of fire-arms and copper articles ; it has likewise a 
 cannon foundry. Sedan was formerly the seat of a Protestant 
 University. 37 miles S.E. of Charlemont, and 170 N.E. of 
 Paris. Long. 4° 57' 50" E., lat. 49° 42' 29" N." 
 
 The above was written in 1827. 
 
 Johnston's 4 Gazetteer ' in 1859 gives a population 
 of 16,759, and at the present clay, including the 
 suburbs, it has about 20,000 inhabitants. 
 
 Sedan is one of three fortresses — namely, Sedan, 
 Mezieres, and Montmedy — originally constructed to 
 meet and check any invasion of France from Belgian 
 territory, and is the principal town in the fourth 
 arrondissement of the department of the Ardennes, 
 being situated on the east bank of the Meuse, about 
 160 miles north-east of Paris. 
 
 The fortress is constructed on a combination of 
 Vauban's different systems, and a few years back could 
 have stood a long siege ; but the improvements in 
 modern artillery have rendered it untenable, owing to 
 the high ground unfortified that environs it, and at 
 present it is only a cul-de-sac for any shot or shell 
 that may be projected against it from the surrounding 
 heights. 
 
 It is built on an uneven site, surrounded by 
 meadows, chateaux, and cultivated fields, and has an 
 admirable defensive system of inundations and wet 
 
NATURE OF THE COUNTRY. 
 
 3 
 
 ditches, the water for which is obtained from the 
 Meuse, which winds picturesquely through the southern 
 part of the town. 
 
 The hospital stands out prominently on the north 
 side, while the citadel is on an eminence to the south- 
 east. There are also an arsenal, and three large 
 barracks, besides stores and officers' quarters. 
 
 The fortress is overlooked by masses of dark forest ; 
 and, while here and there may be seen large plateaux, 
 the surrounding hills, more especially on the north side, 
 are broken into deep and precipitous gorges ; and the 
 rivers Meuse and Chiers, and numerous smaller streams, 
 winding fantastically here and there, form an intricate 
 network of obstacles difficult for an army to overcome, 
 when faced by a determined and skilful adversary. 
 
 Commercially the town is noted for its woollen, 
 cloth, linen, and numerous other manufactures ; while 
 historically it is associated with the names of Henry IV., 
 Louis XIV., and of Marshal Turenne — who was born 
 there, and whose statue is one of the local objects of 
 interest. 
 
 The positions of the different corps constituting the 
 French army, and their relative strength in men and 
 guns at the opening of the campaign, were as follows : — 
 
 Advanced Line. 
 
 1st Corps, under Marshal MacMahon, consisting of 90 
 guns, 3,500 cavalry, and 35,000 infantry, at Strasbourg. 
 
 2nd Corps, under General Froissard, 72 guns, 
 2,600 cavalry, and 26,250 infantry, at St. Avoid. 
 
 b 2 
 
4 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 4th Corps, under General L'Admirault, of similar 
 strength, at Thionville ; 
 
 And the 5th Corps, under General De Failly, also 
 of similar strength, at Bitche. 
 
 The advanced line, therefore, forming a total of 
 306 guns, 11,300 cavalry, and 113,750 infantry. 
 
 In Support, 
 
 The 3rd Corps, comprising 90 guns, 3,500 cavalry, 
 and 35,000 infantry, under Marshal Bazaine, at Metz. 
 
 The Imperial Guard, consisting of 60 guns, 3,600 
 cavalry, and 16,650 infantry, under General Bourbaki, 
 at Nancy. 
 
 In Reserve. 
 
 At Chalons: — The cavalry reserve, numbering 36 
 guns and 6,250 sabres; and the 6th Corps, comprising 
 90 guns, 3,500 cavalry, and 35,000 infantry, under 
 Marshal Canrobert. 
 
 At Belfort: — The 7th Corps, numbering 72 guns, 
 2,600 cavalry, and 26,500 infantry, under General 
 Felix Douay. 
 
 The whole forming a grand total of 
 
 Guns. Cavalry. Infantry. 
 
 654 30,750 226,900 
 
 The French position strategically viewed was thus 
 as follows : — 
 
 Strasbourg, Bitche, St. Avoid, Metz, and Thionville 
 were on one line of railway. 
 
 Strasbourg had also railway communication with 
 
POSITIONS OF THE FEENCH ARMY. 
 
 5 
 
 Nancy and Metz by Saverne, Sarrebourg, and Lune- 
 ville ; and with Belfort to its rear. 
 
 Nancy communicated with Paris by Vitry and 
 Chalons; and Thionville with Paris by Montmedy, 
 Mezieres, and Rheims. 
 
 Thus the whole front towards Germany had ample 
 railway connection, and from different points along 
 the French line railways were available to concentrate 
 troops in rear or on the flanks. 
 
 Strasbourg was the base of operations for the 
 French right, and Metz for the centre and left. 
 
 Besides Strasbourg and Metz other frontier fortresses 
 strengthened the advanced line — Bitche and Phalsbourg 
 in the Vosges, and Thionville on the Moselle. 
 
 The French army occupied, therefore, a very long 
 line, and its advanced corps, extending from Thion- 
 ville on the left to Strasbourg on the right, were 
 scattered over too wide a front, insufficiently con- 
 nected, and too far from their supports at Metz ; and, 
 as the result proved, were liable to be beaten in 
 detail and cut off from each other. Had the French 
 organized their troops rapidly at the above places, 
 and then, concentrating at some point, crossed the 
 Rhine and separated Southern from Northern Ger- 
 many, a different finale might have been the result of 
 initiating the war in the enemy's country ; but scat- 
 tered along so wide a front, and ill-informed by its 
 scouts, the French army was strategically in a very 
 dangerous position. It is believed that the Emperor's 
 original plan of the campaign was as follows : — 
 
MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 To concentrate at Metz and Strasbourg, and form 
 his reserves at Chalons — thus leaving the enemy in 
 doubt as to his point of crossing the frontier. 
 
 The armies from Metz and Strasbourg were then 
 to be combined, and crossing the Ehine at Maxau, 
 leaving Eastadt on their right, to cut the communica- 
 tion between Northern and Southern Germany. The 
 reserves were to follow and protect the rear of the 
 French and also the eastern frontier. 
 
 The French fleet were to cruise in the Baltic, thus 
 detaining a large German force to watch the coast. 
 
 The delay in the organization of the different 
 French corps, and the bad system of men joining their 
 regimental depots instead of proceeding at once to 
 their stations — added to the pernicious system of ex- 
 treme centralization that prevailed, and the fact that 
 the mate'riel was stored in different cities in enormous 
 magazines instead of being convenient to the districts 
 requiring it, in consequence of which many things 
 lumbered up the railways, never reaching their desti- 
 nation, and numerous regiments entered on the cam- 
 paign deficient of tentes d'abri, havresacks, camp- 
 kettles, &c— all conduced to upset the Emperor's 
 plan, the only chance of success for which was in 
 surpassing the enemy in rapidity of movement. 
 
 The German armies consisted of the 1st, or Army 
 of the Saar, under General von Steinmetz, comprising 
 the 7th Corps of Westphalians, under General von 
 Zastrow ; the 8th Bhinelanders, under General von 
 Goben ; part of the 10th Corps ; and the Brandenburg 
 
POSITIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMIES. 
 
 7 
 
 division of cavalry ; total strength, 70,000 men, and 
 186 guns. 
 
 The 1st Army occupied the line of the Saar, from 
 Saarburg on the right, to Saarbriicken; while its 
 supports were at Ottweiler, Homburg, and Landstuhl, 
 in the vicinity of the railway to Saarbriicken. 
 
 The 2nd, or Army of the Ehine, under Prince 
 Frederick Charles of Prussia, comprising the 1st East 
 Prussian Corps, under General Manteuffel ; the 2nd 
 Pomeranian, under General Fransetzky ; the 3rd 
 Brandenburger, under General von Alvensleben II. ; 
 the 4th Prussians, Saxons, and Thuringians, under 
 General von Alvensleben I.; the 9th Schleswig 
 Holstein, under General von Manstein • the 10th 
 Hanoverians, under General von Voigts Ehetz ; the 
 12th Saxons, under the Crown Prince of Saxony; the 
 Hesse Darmstadt division ; the Garrison of Mayence 
 (Mainz) ; and the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 10th, and 12th 
 cavalry divisions ; making a total of 250,000 men, with 
 660 guns. 
 
 The above having crossed the Ehine at Mayence 
 and Mannheim, prolonged the line to the left by Zwei- 
 briicken, and held Kaiserslautern and Neustadt in force. 
 
 And the 3rd, or Army of the South, under the 
 Crown Prince of Prussia, consisting of the Corps of the 
 Guard, under Prince Augustus of Wiirtemburg ; the 
 5th Poseners, under General von Kirchbach ; the 6th 
 Silesians, under General von Turnpling; the llfch 
 Hesse and Nassau, under General von Bose; the 
 Wiirtemburg contingent, under Lieutenant-General von 
 
8 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 Obernitz; the Baden contingent, under General von 
 Beyer ; the Bavarian contingent, under General von 
 der Tann ; and the 6th cavalry division : making a 
 total of 250,000 men, with 660 guns. 
 
 This army occupied the junction of the railways 
 which come from Neustadt and Carlsruhe, and occupied 
 Landau, Neustadt, and Spire with its reserves. 
 
 These three German armies formed a grand total 
 of about 570,000 men, with 1,506 guns, and strategi- 
 cally were admirably disposed to defend their country 
 from the invader. Although the system of railways 
 on their side was hardly as complete as on the French 
 side, yet the superior organization existing on the 
 German lines compensated for any advantage on that 
 score. General Steinmetz had a railway along his front, 
 commencing at Treves (Trier), and connecting with 
 Prince Frederick Charles's position by Homburg ; 
 while the Crown Prince of Prussia had railway com- 
 munication with the 2nd Army by Neustadt and 
 Landau ; and the whole line extended from Saarburg 
 on the right to a junction called Wenden on the left ; 
 and as the railways between those points are con- 
 cave to the French frontier, the lines were available 
 with safety for rapid concentration at any point. 
 There were several lines of retreat by rail available 
 for each army, and the position was strengthened by 
 the fortresses of Mayence, Landau, and Germersheim. 
 
 I append lists, containing fuller details of the forces 
 of the French and German armies, taken from an 
 account by a staff officer published shortly after the 
 
STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 9 
 
 commencement of the campaign. While I do not 
 vouch for their correctness, I believe the totals shown 
 in the tabular estimates to be reconcilable with the 
 figures I have already given ; especially when we take 
 into consideration the difficulties all writers laboured 
 
 r 
 
 under at the beginning of the campaign, from the hos- 
 tility of the commanders to all who did not belong to 
 either army ; especially to those who, by their statistics 
 and military criticisms, might have afforded indirectly 
 information to the enemy. 
 
 French Army. 
 
 TJie 1st Corps d'Armee. Marshal MacMahon. 
 
 Chef d'Etat Major, Colson, Gen. de Brigade. 
 Chef d'Artillerie, Forgeot, Gen. de Brigade. 
 
 
 Battalions, 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 
 or 
 
 Squadrons. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 . 1st Division. Ducrot, Gen. de Div. 
 Two brigades — 
 1 battalion of Chasseurs, 4 regiments of the"! 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 8,750 
 
 
 Total 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 8,750 
 
 
 2nd Division. Abel Douay, Gen. de Div. 
 
 Two brigades — 
 1 battalion of Chasseurs, 2 regiments of the! 
 
 1 ditto of Zouaves, 1 ditto of Turcos 
 Artillery, 2 batteries 
 
 7 
 
 6 
 
 i2 
 
 4,750 
 4,500 
 
 
 Total 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 9,250 
 
 
 3rd Division. Raoult, Gen. de Div. 
 Two brigades — 
 1 battalion of Chasseurs, 2 regiments of the") 
 
 1 ditto of Zouaves, 1 ditto of Turcos 
 
 7 
 
 6 
 
 12 
 
 4,750 
 4,500 
 
 
 Total .. .. 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 9,250 
 
10 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 Hie 1st Corps d'Armee — continued. 
 
 4th Division. Lartigues, Gen. de Div. 
 Two brigades — ■ 
 1 battalion of Chasseurs, 2 regiments of the j 
 
 line / 
 
 1 ditto of Zouaves, 1 ditto of Turcos 
 Artillery, 2 batteries 
 
 Total 
 
 Cavalry Div. Duhesme, Gen. de Div. 
 Three brigades — 
 1st Brigade, 1 regiment of Hussars, l j 
 Chasseurs a cheval . . . . I 
 2nd „ 1 regt. of Lancers, 1 Dragoons j 
 3rd „ 2 „ Cuirassiers .. ..) 
 Artillery, 2 batteries 
 
 Total 
 
 Artillery reserve of this corps, 5 batteries 
 
 Grand total of 1st Corps oVArm€e 
 
 Battalions, 
 or 
 
 Squadrons 
 
 13 
 
 2S 
 
 28 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 Infantry. Cavalry. 
 
 12 
 
 12 
 
 12 
 
 30 
 
 4,750 
 4,500 
 
 12 9,250 
 
 90 36 
 
 500 
 
 3,640 
 
 3,640 
 
 3,640 
 
 The 2nd Corps d'Armee. Lietjt.-General de Froissard. 
 
 Chef d'Etat Major, Saget, Gen. de Brigade. 
 Chef d'Artillerie, Gagneur, Gen. de Brigade. 
 
 
 Battalions, 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 1st Division. Verge, Gen. de Div. 
 
 or 
 
 Squadrons. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Two brigades — 
 1 battalion of Chasseurs, 4 regiments of| 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 8,750 
 
 
 Total 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 8,750 
 
 
 2nd Division. Bataille, Gen. de Div.,1 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 8,750 
 
 
 3rd Div. Laveau-Coupet, Gen. de Div., ditto 
 Cavalry Division. Letellier, Gen. de Div.,) 
 1 brigade Chasseurs, 1 ditto Dragoons, > 
 
 Artillery reserve of this corps, 4 batteries 
 
 13 
 16 
 
 12 
 12 
 
 24 
 
 8,750 
 
 2,080 
 
 Grand total of 2nd Corps oVArmee 
 
 3 9 
 16 
 
 72 
 
 26,250 
 
 2,080 
 
STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 11 
 
 The 3rd Corps oVArmee. Marshal Bazaine. 
 
 Chef d'Etat Major, Maneque, Gen. de Brigade de Artillerie. 
 De Rocliebouet, Gen. de Brigade. 
 
 
 Battalions, 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 
 or 
 
 Squadrons. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 1st Division. Montandon, Gen. de Div. .. 
 2nd „ De Castagny „ „ 
 3rd „ Metman „ „ .. 
 4th „ Decaen „ „ .. 
 Cavalry — ■ 
 
 1st Brigade. 3 regiments of Chasseurs .. ) 
 2nd „ 2 „ of Dragoons . . J 
 3rd „ 2 „ of „ ..) 
 Artillery reserve of corps like 1st Corps . . 
 
 13 
 13 
 13 
 13 
 
 28 
 
 12 
 12 
 12 
 12 
 
 12 
 
 30 
 
 8,750 
 8,750 
 8,750 
 8,750 
 
 3,640 
 
 Grand total 3rd Corps oVArmee 
 
 5 2 
 2 8 
 
 90 
 
 35,000 
 
 3,640 
 
 The 4dh Corps oVArmee. Lieut.-General de l'Admirault. 
 
 Chef d'Etat Major, Besson, Gen. de Brigade. 
 Chef d' Artillerie, Lafaille, Gen. de Brigade. 
 1st Division, De Cissey; 2nd, Rose; 3rd, De Lorencez; 
 Cavalry— Legrand, Generaux de Division. 
 
 
 Battalions, 
 or 
 
 Squadrons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Same strength and composition as thej 
 
 39 
 1 9 
 
 72 
 
 26,250 
 
 2,080 
 
 The Uh Corps oVArmee. Lieut.-General de Failly. 
 
 Chef d'Etat Major, Besson, Gen. de Brigade. 
 Chef d' Artillerie, Liodot, Gen. de Brigade. 
 1st Division, Goze; 2nd, De l'Abadie; 3rd, Guyot; 
 Cavalry — Brahans, Generaux de Division. 
 
 
 Battalions, 
 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 
 or 
 
 Guns. 
 
 
 
 
 Squadrons. 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Same strength and composition as thel 
 
 1^ 
 
 72 
 
 26,250 
 
 2,080 
 
12 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 The Imperial Guard. Lieut.-General Bourbaki. 
 
 Chef d'Etat Major, d'Auvergne, Gen. de Division. 
 Chef d'Artillerie, Pe d'Arros, Gen. de Brigade. 
 
 
 Battalions, 
 or 
 
 Squadrons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 1st Division. De Ligny, Gen. de Div. 
 Two brigades — 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 
 850 
 7,200 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 8,050 
 
 
 2nd Division. Picard, Gen. de Div. 
 Two brigades — 
 
 2 
 9 
 
 12 
 
 3,000 
 5,400 
 
 
 Total 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 8,400 
 
 
 Cavalry Division. Devaux, Gen. de Div. 
 1st brigade, 1 reg. Chasseurs, 1 ditto Guides 
 2nd „ 1 „ Dragoons, 1 „ Lancers 
 3rd „ 1 „ Carabineers, 1 Cuirassiers 
 
 8 
 8 
 8 
 
 12 
 
 
 1,200 
 1,200 
 1,200 
 
 
 24 
 
 12 
 
 
 3,600 
 
 Artillery reserve of the Imperial Guard, \ 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 Grand total, Imperial Guard 
 
 2 4 
 2 4 
 
 60 
 
 16,450 
 
 3,600 
 
 The 6th Corps. Marshal Canrobert. 
 
 
 Battalions, 
 or 
 
 Squadrons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 1st Division of cavalry 1 Probably 1 light j 
 2nd „ „ > division and 2 < 
 3rd „ „ ) heavy ditto . . ( 
 
 Artillery reserve, probably 5 to 6 batteries, j 
 
 16 
 16 
 16 
 13 
 
 12 
 12 
 12 
 12 
 
 30 
 
 8,750 
 
 3,600 
 3,600 
 3,000 
 
 Grand total 6th Corps aVArmge 
 
 JL3 
 48 
 
 78 
 
 8,750 
 
 10,800 
 
 " The 7th Corps is said to be in course of formation, under 
 General Felix Douay, with troops that still remain in 
 
STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 13 
 
 Algeria, from whence about 18,000 men of the 1st Corps 
 have been already withdrawn. The division hitherto in gar- 
 rison at Rome will also be available, it seems. This corps, 
 when formed, will probably have the same composition and 
 strength as the 2nd and 4th Corps. 
 
 " The sum total of the Army of the Ehine will therefore 
 be, according to our mode of reckoning, merely the com- 
 batants of the infantry and cavalry, and the guns of the 
 artillery, as follows : — 
 
 
 Batta- 
 
 Squad- 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 
 lions. 
 
 rons. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 1st Corps oVArmee in the 1st line 
 
 2nd „ „ „ 
 
 3rd „ „ „ .... 
 
 4th „ „ „ .. .. 
 
 5th „ „ .... 
 
 52 
 39 
 52 
 39 
 39 
 
 28 
 16 
 28 
 16 
 16 
 
 90 
 72 
 90 
 72 
 72 
 
 36,500 
 26,250 
 35,000 
 26,250 
 26,250 
 
 3,640 
 2,080 
 3,640 
 2,080 
 2,080 
 
 Total 1st line 
 
 221 
 
 104 
 
 396 
 
 150,250 
 
 13,520 
 
 
 24 
 13 
 
 24 
 48 
 
 60 
 78 
 
 16,650 
 8,750 
 
 3,600 
 10,800 
 
 
 37 
 
 72 
 
 138 
 
 25,400 
 
 14,400 
 
 
 258 
 
 176 
 
 534 
 
 175,650 
 
 27,920 
 
 203,570 
 
 Add to this for the artillery . . . . 17, 000 
 „ „ engineers .. .. 4,000 
 
 „ „ train 5,000 
 
 „ „ non-combatants .. 4,000 
 
 30,000 
 
 And we have in the field 233,570 
 
 The smaller number of infantry shown here can be 
 accounted for by the supposition that there were more 
 regiments of Zouaves in the field forces than the com- 
 piler of the above allowed for ; and, to explain my 
 meaning, I must state that a regiment of Zouaves has 
 three battalions, whereas a regiment of Chasseurs has 
 but one. 
 
14 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 He has also understated the numbers of the cavalry 
 and artillery, under the supposition that the squadrons 
 and batteries were more under their war establish- 
 ments than they really were. 
 
 German Armies. 
 
 Batta- 
 
 Squad- 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 lions. 
 
 rons. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry* 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 6,000 
 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 24 
 
 9,000 
 
 550 
 
 ID 
 
 A 
 
 at 
 
 15,000 
 
 550 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 6,000 
 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 • • 
 
 24 
 
 6,000 
 
 550 
 
 
 A 
 "± 
 
 
 12,000 
 
 550 
 
 
 Q 
 O 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 8 
 
 
 1,100 
 1,100 
 1,100 
 
 
 24 
 
 8 
 
 
 3,300 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1,000 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1,000 
 
 
 29 
 
 32 
 
 9G 
 
 29,000 
 
 4,400 
 
 > c 
 
 The Corps d'Armee of the Guard. — 
 Prince Augustus of Wiirtemburg. 
 '1st brigade of infantry, 2\ 
 
 regiments J 
 
 2nd brigade of infantry, 3~l 
 
 regiments / 
 
 1 regiment of light cavalry 
 1 division of foot artillery, 1 
 k 4 batteries J 
 
 Total 1st Division 
 
 '3rd brigade of infantry, 21 
 
 regiments j 
 
 4th brigade of infantry, 2"! 
 
 regiments J 
 
 1 regiment of light cavalry 
 1 division of foot artillery, 1 
 \ 4 batteries / 
 
 .5 0 
 P^ 
 T3 I— I 
 
 a 
 
 ^P 
 
 b P 
 
 Total 2nd Division . . 
 
 fl brigade heavy cavalry, 21 
 
 regiments / 
 
 1 brigade light cavalry, 2) 
 
 regiments / 
 
 1 brigade light cavalry, 21 
 
 regiments J 
 
 ^ Horse artillery, 2 batteries 
 
 Total Cavalry Division 
 
 3rd foot division, 4 bat-"l 
 
 j2 g I talions / 
 
 •g § j 3rd horse artillery, 4 bat-1 
 
 <] P3 ' talions / 
 
 1 battalion Jager of the guard . . 
 1 battalion sharpshooters of thel 
 guard / 
 
 Total Guards .. .. 
 
STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN ARMIES. 
 
 15 
 
 The 1st Corps, Lieut-General von 
 Manteuffel. 
 
 TP , fist Division 
 
 Infantry | 2nd Division <# ^ 
 
 Jager, 1 battalion 
 
 Cavalry, 6 regiments, with horsej 
 artillery 2 battalions . . . . / 
 Artillery reserve 
 
 Grand total 1st Corps 
 
 The 2nd Corps, Lieut.-General von 
 
 Fransetzky 
 
 The 5th Corps, Lieut.-General von 
 
 Kirchbach 
 
 The 6th Corps, Lieut.-General von 
 
 Tiimpling 
 
 The 7th Corps, Lieut.-General von 
 
 Zastrow 
 
 The 8th Corps, Lieut.-General von 
 
 Goben 
 
 The 10th Corps, Lieut.-General von 
 
 Voigts Rhetz 
 
 The 3rd Corps * Lieut.-General von 
 
 Alvensleben II 
 
 The 4th Corps, f Lieut.-General von 
 
 Alvensleben I 
 
 The 9th Corpse Lieut.-General von 
 
 Manstein 
 
 The 11th Corps, Lieut.-General von 
 
 Bose, has 3 infantry divisions, 
 
 and 3 Jager battalions, with but 
 
 2 regiments of cavalry 
 The 12th Corps, the Crown Prince 
 
 of Saxony, with 1 extra infantry 
 
 regiment and 2 Jager battalions 
 
 Total of the North German Con- 
 federation, including Guards . . 
 
 Batta- 
 
 Squad- 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 lions. 
 
 rons. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 12 
 12 
 2 
 
 24 
 
 24 
 24 
 
 8 
 40 
 
 12,000 
 12,000 
 1,000 
 
 * * 
 
 3,300 
 
 25 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 25,000 
 
 3,300 
 
 25 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 25,000 
 
 3,300 
 
 25 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 25,000 
 
 3,300 
 
 25 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 25,000 
 
 3,300 
 
 25 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 25,000 
 
 3,300 
 
 25 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 25,000 
 
 3,300 
 
 25 
 
 21 
 
 96 
 
 9^ ooo 
 
 o , OU\J 
 
 28 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 28,000 
 
 3,300 
 
 31 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 Ol AAA 
 
 ol ,000 
 
 O OAA, 
 
 29 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 29,000 
 
 3,300 
 
 35 
 
 8 
 
 96 
 
 35,000 
 
 1,100 
 
 29 
 
 24 
 
 96 
 
 29,000 
 
 3,300 
 
 356 
 
 304 
 
 1,248 
 
 356,000 
 
 41,800 
 
 * 1 brigade has 3 regiments. f 2 brigades have 3 regiments each. 
 
 % This corps has 2 Jager regiments and 1 brigade with 3 regiments. 
 
 " Supposing that two of these Corps oVArmee be retained 
 in the north of Germany for the defence of the coasts, that 
 is to say, the 9th and 10th in Schleswig and Hanover, the 
 sum total of these would be 54,000 infantry, 6,600 cavalry 
 combatants, and 192 guns, which being deducted from the 
 total of the North German Confederation Army, would leave 
 the latter 302,000 infantry, 35,200 cavalry combatants, with 
 
16 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 1,056 guns, to oppose to the French Army on the Rhine. 
 To this force, however, must be added the troops of Southern 
 Germany, that is to say, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and Baden. 
 
 "Bavaria can bring into the field two corps with four 
 infantry divisions of two brigades each, the brigade consist- 
 ing of two infantry regiments and one Jager battalion (with a 
 battery of six guns) ; and in addition to this, ten regiments 
 of cavalry, of four field squadrons each, with twenty-eight 
 foot and four horse batteries. 
 
 " The Bavarian Field Army amounts altogether to — 
 
 Infantry of the line, 16 regiments 
 Total in 2 Corps oVArm€e 
 
 Batta- 
 lions. 
 
 rons. 
 
 Combatants. 
 Infantry. Cavalry. 
 
 48 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 .. 
 
 40 
 
 .. j 192 
 
 45,000 
 5,000 
 
 5,000 
 
 56 
 
 40 j 192 
 
 50,000 j 5,000 
 
 " The Wurtemburg Division consists of one division, three 
 brigades of infantry, one division of cavalry, and nine bat- 
 teries of artillery, viz. : — 
 
 Infantry of the line, 8 regiments 
 Total Wurtemburg Division . . 
 
 Batta- 
 lions. 
 
 Squad- 
 rons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Comba 
 Infantry. 
 
 tants. 
 Cavalry. 
 
 16 
 
 3 
 
 16 
 
 54 
 
 16,000 
 3,000 
 
 2,500 
 
 19 
 
 16 
 
 54 
 
 19,000 
 
 2,500 
 
 "The Division of the Grand Duchy of Baden : — 
 
 Total Baden Division 
 
 Batta- 
 lions. 
 
 Squad- 
 rons. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 Infantry. Cavalry. 
 
 18 
 
 12 
 
 42 
 
 18,000 
 
 1,800 
 
 18 
 
 12 
 
 42 
 
 18,000 
 
 1,800 
 
POSITION OF THE FRENCH. 
 
 17 
 
 " The entire Field Force of the north and south of Ger- 
 many may therefore be thus calculated : — 
 
 
 Batta- 
 
 Squad- 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Combatants. 
 
 
 lions. 
 
 rons. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 9th and 10th Corps d'Armee for"! 
 defence of Northern Coasts • . / 
 
 54 
 
 48 
 
 192 
 
 54,000 
 
 6,600 
 
 Guards— 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, j 
 6th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 12th CorpsJ 
 on the Rhine | 
 
 South German troops — Baden, j 
 Wiirtemburg, Bavaria . . . . J 
 
 302 
 93 
 
 256 
 68 
 
 1,056 
 
 288 
 
 302,000 
 87,000 
 
 35,200 
 9,300 
 
 Total on the Rhine a'.id~i 
 Southern Germany . . J 
 
 395 
 
 324 
 
 1,344 
 
 389,000 
 
 44,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 433,500 
 
 In order to make these figures nearly tally with my 
 previous ones I should remind my readers that the 
 Engineers' train is not included in the above totals ; 
 and that in my own figures I allowed for the feeding 
 reserve of 220 guns, 129,000 infantry, and 16,000 
 cavalry, all close by in the fortresses and camps, and 
 available at any moment, since they could be replaced, 
 as they afterwards were, by the Landwehr. 
 
 The German armies were commanded by the King 
 of Prussia, who had General von Moltke as his strate- 
 gical director ; Lieutenant-General von Blumenthal 
 was Chief of the Crown Prince of Prussia's staff ; while 
 Colonel von Stiehle held a similar position on the staff 
 of Prince Frederick Charles. 
 
 The Emperor Napoleon commanded the French 
 army in person, with Marshal Leboeuf as his Chief of 
 the staff, or Majeur-Ge'neral de l'Armee. 
 
 The position of the French advanced corps was 
 well suited for attack, but not at all adapted for 
 
 c 
 
18 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 defence, as they covered such an extent of front. As- 
 suming the offensive, they might have cut the rails 
 and held the junction of the lines from Treves (Trier), 
 Bingen, and Mayence, and thereby have severed the 
 communications of the different German armies with 
 each other, besides ascertaining the arrival of the 
 enemy in great force at Treves and at Landau ; at 
 which latter the Crown Prince massed large bodies of 
 his troops quite close to the division of General Felix 
 Douay, who appears to have been totally unaware of 
 his vicinity. In fact, the French seem to have thought 
 that the Germans would act entirely on the defensive, 
 and this may in some measure account for the gross 
 carelessness and inactivity of their leaders. 
 
 The German commanders advanced rapidly to the 
 positions assigned to them, and their armies were com- 
 plete in materiel of every kind. Finding the French 
 still inactive, the Germans taking the initiative 
 assumed the offensive, and advanced to the frontier ; 
 and on the 4th of August the Crown Prince of Prussia 
 struck the first effective blow of the campaign. 
 
 Having thus given the positions of the two armies 
 at the commencement of the campaign, I shall restrict 
 my narrative to the events more immediately affecting 
 the battle of Sedan. 
 
 War is considered to have been declared on the 15th 
 July, 1870, when M. Ollivier made his memorable 
 speech in the Corps Legislatif, though the formal de- 
 claration was delayed a few days. 
 
 The causes of this great war between two neigh- 
 
DIARY OF THE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 19 
 
 bouring and powerful nations lie out of my province 
 and find no place here, as my object is merely to 
 give a rough and general sketch of the battle of Sedan, 
 to enable my readers to understand more clearly the 
 two plans which accompany it, and if I succeed in 
 doing that, my object will be achieved. 
 
 Before the first action took place, the following 
 changes had been effected in the disposition of the 
 French army : — 
 
 The Imperial Guard had reached Metz, the 6th 
 Corps had arrived at Nancy, and the 1st was between 
 Strasbourg and the Lauter. 
 
 On the 21st July a skirmish took place near 
 Saarbriicken. 
 
 On the 2nd August, the heights of Saarbriicken 
 were carried by the French. 
 
 On the 4th, a portion of Marshal MacMahon's corps, 
 under General Abel Douay, was defeated and routed 
 at Weissenbourg by the Crown Prince of Prussia, 
 and its commander killed. 
 
 On the 6th, the forces under Marshal MacMahon 
 were totally defeated at Worth by the Crown Prince 
 of Prussia, and General Froissard's corps was beaten 
 at Spicheren and driven back on Metz by General 
 von Steinmetz's army. 
 
 On the 10th, Bazaines, Canrobert's, Froissard's, 
 and L'Admirault's corps and the Imperial Guard con- 
 centrated at Metz under Marshal Bazaine. 
 
 On the 14th, the indecisive action at Courcelles was 
 fought. 
 
 c 2 
 
20 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 On the 16th, Bazaine was beaten back from Mars 
 la Tour. 
 
 On the 18 th, the bloody and decisive battle of 
 Gravelotte was fought, and Bazaine' s army driven 
 back on Metz. 
 
 The Lines of the Saar, Moselle, and Meuse, and the 
 Passes of the Vosges, being abandoned, and Bazaine 
 surrounded at Metz, I shall now follow the fortunes of 
 MacMahon, who had retreated to the camp at Chalons 
 with the remnant of his shattered army, and had there 
 been organizing the levies of Garde Mobile, and shall 
 continue to narrate the movements of the forces 
 under him up to the final catastrophe around Sedan. 
 
 The political situation was as follows:— On the 
 9th August the Ollivier Ministry resigned, and on 
 the following day Count Palikao assumed the reins 
 of the Government by command of the Emperor, who 
 also on the 17th appointed General Trochu — famous 
 for a work (published in 1867) advocating an imme- 
 diate reform in the army — to be Governor of Paris, 
 and Commander-in-Chief of the forces assembling for 
 its defence. 
 
 On the 19th, the Empress Regent issued a decree, 
 appointing a Defence Committee for Paris, constituted 
 as follows : — General Trochu, President ; Admiral 
 Rigault de Genouilly, Baron Jerome David, Marshal 
 Vaillant, Generals de Chaubaud la Tour, Guiod, 
 d' Autemarre, d'Erville, and Soumain, Members ; and 
 a number of defensive works were commenced to com- 
 plete the circle of forts surrounding the capital. 
 
DISORGANIZATION OF MACMAHON'S TROOPS. 21 
 
 Meanwhile MacMahon haying retreated through 
 Saverne, had been collecting the remnant of his corps 
 at Chalons, and had under his command about 140,000 
 men belonging to the corps of De Failly, Felix Douay, 
 and Canrobert. He had also about 36,000 Garde 
 Mobile, recently levied, and with so little discipline as 
 to be almost a hindrance to his future movements. 
 Their want of discipline had, in fact, infected the old 
 soldiers, previously disposed to be insubordinate from 
 their disorderly and hasty retreat, and from a want of 
 confidence in their leaders, who had shown such 
 culpable incapacity in the opening engagements of the 
 campaign. 
 
 Irregularities and disorderly conduct prevailed in 
 his camp, instead of the stern discipline and constant 
 drill so necessary to bring his discouraged troops and 
 raw levies to that standard of excellence which alone 
 could have saved him from the final disaster to which 
 he was rapidly drifting. 
 
 The troops spent their time in the baneful delirium 
 of the concert rooms, and dancing saloons, and all the 
 worst features of a large garrison town prevailed ; 
 while not a few publicly abused the Emperor and their 
 own commanders, without any restraint being placed 
 upon them, or any steps being taken to check the 
 rapidly rising symptoms of insubordination. 
 
 Such was the state of things when the Emperor 
 arrived at MacMahon's Head-Quarters, having but 
 narrowly escaped the ubiquitous Germans in his 
 retreat from Metz. 
 
22 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 There were two plans that then recommended them- 
 selves to the Emperor and MacMahon : one was to 
 retreat towards Paris, harassing, if possible, the flank 
 of the Crown Prince of Prussia's army ; and the other 
 was to attack the rear of the German armies investing 
 Metz, and so, relieving Bazaine, possibly annihilate 
 that portion of the enemy's forces, and catch the 
 Crown Prince between the reunited French armies 
 and the Army of Paris. 
 
 A council of war was held in the camp, and it was 
 thereat determined to pursue the former course, and 
 retreat on Paris, as the latter was considered too 
 dangerous an experiment with the troops available, 
 and with so determined and active an opponent as the 
 Crown Prince. 
 
 The folly of the movements of an army in the field 
 being directed, principally for political reasons, from 
 the capital, instead of by those on the spot, able to 
 judge, better than those at a distance, of the disposi- 
 tions of the enemy, and of the materials they them- 
 selves have at their command, was now fully and 
 unfortunately evinced. 
 
 The Empress Regent and the Ministry of Count 
 Palikao directed MacMahon to proceed to the relief of 
 Metz, and on no account to retreat on Paris, pointing out 
 the danger the Emperor would incur should he return 
 to the capital leaving Bazaine shut in around Metz. 
 
 MacMahon at first remonstrated, and breaking up the 
 camp at Chalons, commenced on the 21st his march to 
 Rheims, intending to retreat on Paris ; writing at the 
 
THE IMPERIAL OPINION. 
 
 23 
 
 same time to the Government, that it was necessary to 
 rest and reorganize his army under the protection of 
 the Paris forts, ere he could hope to offer any successful 
 resistance to the rapidly advancing enemy. 
 
 He foresaw the extreme danger, so evident to the 
 military student, of a flank march across a difficult 
 country in such close proximity to so enterprising an 
 enemy acting on interior lines. At all times, and 
 under the most favourable circumstances, such a march 
 would be made with imminent risk ; but in face of an 
 enemy so active in his movements, so superior in point 
 of numbers, with troops elated by recent successes, and 
 with the knowledge of the inferiority of the morale and 
 equipment of his own troops, MacMahon, though but a 
 poor strategist at any time, saw the risk he would run, 
 and felt the serious responsibility of giving in to the 
 wishes of the Government, and of making the attempt. 
 
 That the Emperor also held the same views we now 
 know from the contents of a pamphlet, since published 
 at Brussels, purporting to be from the pen of one of 
 the Imperial Head-Quarter Staff, but attributed to 
 the Emperor, or written at his instigation, and there 
 is but little doubt that its contents may be considered 
 authentic. 
 
 The Emperor had at first wished to resume the 
 reins of power in Paris, but had yielded to the wishes 
 of the Regency that he would not do so. 
 
 He dissented, however, from the course proposed by 
 the Empress Regent and the Government; as from 
 his knowledge, gained in the field, of the position, 
 
24 
 
 MEMO J R OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 numbers, and resources of the Germans, and seeing 
 the condition of his own troops, he felt convinced that 
 the proposed flank march was pregnant with dangers 
 innumerable. Unfortunately, however, he failed to 
 put his veto on the move, from what may now be con- 
 sidered a false notion, that he had no longer any right 
 to interfere with the plans of those to whom after all 
 he had only temporarily entrusted the Imperial power. 
 
 Had he used his authority to prevent the fatal flank 
 march, the history of the campaign might have been 
 very different ; but he wavered, hesitated, and then 
 resigned himself to his fate, showing again that fatal 
 indecision and want of firmness which had characterized 
 all his movements from the commencement of the cam- 
 paign ; and one can only attribute to sickness of body 
 the want of elan and firmness that had previously been 
 his metier. 
 
 Feeble in body, and borne down by the unexpected 
 calamities that had so suddenly overtaken him, his 
 mind wanted vigour, and accompanied by his son, 
 thus early taught (poor child !) his first lesson in the 
 rough school of adversity, and oppressed with anxiety 
 for the future of his dynasty, the feeling of whose 
 coming downfall already overshadowed him, he ham- 
 pered the movements of the Marshal and his army, to 
 whom his safety was an hourly anxiety, and carried 
 with him, amidst his disheartened soldiers, not the 
 martial presence (inspiring confidence) of the First 
 Empire, but the idle pomp and state of the third, 
 utterly out of place on such an occasion. 
 
POLICY OF THE FRENCH CABINET. 
 
 25 
 
 His carriages, horses, escorts, and baggage waggons 
 blocked the road, and impeded the onward march, while 
 the daily necessities of his numerous retinue trenched 
 largely on the resources of the ill-managed Intendance. 
 
 Fallen greatness is always the object of our deepest 
 sympathies, and no one more than myself feels for the 
 Emperor, deserted in his hour of need by those who 
 but yesterday hypocritically fawned upon him, and 
 received (cap in hand) the favours he lavished on all 
 but himself; and I trust I may not be deemed pre- 
 sumptuous in expressing the hope that he may soon 
 again have it in his power to restore France to the high 
 and prosperous position she so long maintained under 
 the Imperial sway ; but I cannot conclude this digres- 
 sion without giving it as my opinion that had the 
 Emperor gone through the campaign, after the first 
 reverses as a general, without the pomp of a sovereign, 
 and shared more jealously the privations of his soldiers, 
 not one but would have followed him cheerfully into 
 his temporary captivity with feelings of devotion and 
 respect. 
 
 The Government in Paris, wishing to encourage the 
 Parisians with the hope that Bazaine could be released 
 from Metz, and backed by the Privy Council, now 
 issued imperative orders to MacMahon to advance to 
 the relief of Metz, and by forced marches to traverse 
 the passes of the Argonne, and crossing the Meuse, to 
 operate from the line of Montmedy, Longuyon, and 
 Thionville, against the rear of the German army in- 
 vesting Metz. 
 
26 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 The language of reason was no longer understood in 
 Paris, and MacMahon, yielding to the pressure put 
 upon him by the Government, and fearing his objection 
 to march to the relief of Bazaine might be attributed 
 to personal jealousy, quitted Rheims with his army on 
 the 22nd August, and marched towards Bethenville, 
 on the Suippe, but his rear-guard did not clear Rheims 
 till the following day. 
 
 The forces under the Marshal were composed of the 
 remnant of his own 1st Corps (all veterans, of 
 African experiences) ; of the 5th Corps, under 
 De Failly ; of the 7th Corps, under General Felix 
 Douay ; of the 12th Corps, composed of new regiments 
 of reserve troops, and of marines ; and of a portion of 
 the cavalry of Canrobert's corps. Besides these he 
 had about 500 field-pieces and mitrailleuses. 
 
 The soldiers were more or less disaffected, and the 
 disgraceful plundering that took place on the departure 
 of the army from Rheims, showed the utter want of 
 discipline prevailing; in fact, the new levies were 
 rather a source of weakness than of strength to the 
 Marshal, as they straggled, and could not be persuaded 
 to march at a fair pace ; a most important point, when 
 we consider the necessity there was for forced marches, 
 if the enemy were to be successfully eluded. 
 
 The Intendance broke down immediately after 
 starting, and MacMahon was forced to diverge in his 
 march, so as to move along the line of railway ; and 
 he reached Rethel on the 24th, whither he had 
 directed his route, in order to obtain the necessary 
 
MOVEMENTS OF GERMAN TROOPS. 
 
 27 
 
 supplies for his troops, which were being hurried on by 
 the railway from Mezieres to Thionville, while the 
 line was also employed to bring up reinforcements in 
 the shape of new levies. His cavalry, and the larger 
 portion of his guns, had, however, been sent on in 
 advance towards Montmedy, by Suippe and Youziers. 
 
 Meanwhile the Germans were rapidly advancing 
 north-eastwards, and feeling their way all over the 
 country ; and such was the terror of the peasantry, 
 that the presence of three or four Uhlans (German 
 Lancers) was sufficient to cause a panic in a village, 
 and all classes seemed paralyzed. 
 
 The main body of Prince Frederick Charles's army 
 were surrounding Bazaine's army in and around Metz, 
 and having entrenched themselves strongly, by the 23rd 
 they had completed the investing circle. 
 
 The Crown Prince of Prussia was pushing forward 
 towards Paris, and his advance guard reached the 
 deserted Chalons on the 24th August. He was sup- 
 ported on his right by a portion of Prince Frederick 
 Charles's army, about 80,000 strong, consisting of the 
 4th Corps, the 12th Saxons, and of the Prussian Guards 
 under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, 
 who swept the country along the Belgian frontier north- 
 wards, keeping parallel with the Crown Prince, and 
 marching by Verdun and Menehould. 
 
 The King of Prussia arrived on the 24th August at 
 Ligny, where the Head-Quarters of the Crown Prince 
 were established. 
 
 On the 25th the Crown Prince reached Bar-le-Duc, 
 
28 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 when his advanced guard sent him the news that 
 MacMahon had broken up his camp at Chalons, burnt 
 his tents, and marching through Rheims, had struck 
 off in a northerly direction. 
 
 According to Count Moltke's instructions the Crown 
 Prince of Saxony was immediately directed to oppose 
 MacMahon's march, and keep him in check, while the 
 Crown Prince was to sweep round on his right flank, 
 and throw him back on to the Belgian frontier. 
 
 On the 26th the Crown Prince of Saxony was 
 marching for Stenay on the Meuse, and the Crown 
 Prince of Prussia was hurrying the 3rd Army on by 
 forced marches to Clermont-en-Argonne and Grand Pre. 
 
 Meanwhile MacMahon had been advancing but 
 slowly, whereas the only chance of success on his part 
 lay in the rapidity of his movements, as, having a 
 good start of the Crown Prince of Prussia, he might 
 have engaged the Crown Prince of Saxony alone had 
 he pushed on quickly, and, driving him back towards 
 Metz, have enabled Bazaine to break the circle of 
 investment, and thus have united the two French 
 armies. But his heart was not in the march, and his 
 troops were influenced by his slowness. 
 
 The Marshal had divided his army into three divi- 
 sions; one of which, consisting of 20,000 men, pro- 
 ceeded by rail to Mezieres, where it was to join a 
 corps from Paris under General Vinoy, and to follow 
 the other divisions as soon as they should have effected 
 the passage of the Meuse. The other two divisions 
 under MacMahon himself moved by two roads ; one to 
 
MACMAHON'S POSITION. 
 
 29 
 
 the north by Stonne and Mouzon, the other to the south 
 by Vouziers and Buzancy, both heading for Montmedy. 
 
 On the 27th, on reaching Le Chene Populeux, 
 MacMahon first ascertained the immediate danger of 
 his position, and the near approach of the German 
 armies. His first impulse was to retreat, and indeed 
 he gave orders to that effect, but the Government 
 again sent him orders to advance, and he yielded 
 himself up to the necessity of carrying them out. 
 
 On the same date some Prussian outposts were 
 driven back by the French near Vouziers; and at 
 Buzancy the 12th Regiment of French Chasseurs was 
 dispersed and fearfully cut up by the 3rd Cavalry, some 
 of the 18 th Uhlans, and a battery of Prussian guns. 
 
 On the 28th, the outposts were engaged at Dun, 
 Stenay, and Mouzon ; and Vouziers, an important 
 junction of roads through the Argonnes, fell into 
 German hands. 
 
 On the 29th, the village of Vrizy, occupied by 
 Turcos, was taken by two squadrons of Prussian 
 Hussars, and two officers of MacMahon's staff were 
 taken into Grand Pre as prisoners by some Uhlans. 
 
 By the same date the Crown Prince of Saxony was 
 in possession of both sides of the Meuse at Stenay, 
 while the Crown Prince of Prussia was nearing the 
 French right advance ; thus MacMahon was threatened 
 in flank and rear, his army being concentrated behind 
 Stonne and Mouzon preparing to cross the Meuse, 
 while he himself had his Head-Quarters at Paucourt. 
 
 By this time he was fully aware of the peril of his 
 
30 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 position, and that the Crown Prince of Saxony was 
 prepared to dispute his further advance towards 
 Metz; while the probability of the Crown Prince of 
 Prussia having turned off from his march on Paris, 
 and being on his way to assist the Crown Prince of 
 Saxony, necessitated his crossing the Meuse early 
 next morning, and beating back the combined army 
 without further loss of time. In despair, he felt the 
 necessity of immediately playing his last card, and of 
 trying to force the Germans back to the Moselle, 
 feeling sure that, if defeated, he could retreat on 
 Sedan and Mezieres, and there holding his antagonists 
 in check, delay their onward march to Paris till the 
 National Guards and other levies should be ready for 
 its defence. Meanwhile, he was hourly expecting 
 stores and reinforcements of the 13 th Corps, such as 
 they might be, by the Northern railways of France, 
 by way of St. Quentin, Avernes, and Hirson, and he 
 considered that the proximity of the Belgian frontier 
 would make any attempt to turn his left flank futile. 
 
 Although his orders were peremptory, and coun- 
 selled haste, still his slowness in carrying them out, 
 on which doubtless the Government at Paris had not 
 calculated, and the ignorance of strategy he as usual 
 displayed, must, I think, to a certain extent condemn 
 his movements in any history of the war. He had 
 thrown away the position that promised most hope of 
 success, namely, the line between Rethel and Mezieres, 
 whence, if beaten, he could have retreated to Laon 
 and Soissons, and his retreat to Paris would probably 
 have still been feasible ; whereas his present line of 
 
DIGEST OF MACMAHON'S SERVICES. 
 
 31 
 
 retreat could only be by Mezieres and Sedan, if the 
 Crown Prince of Prussia should remain ignorant of 
 his movements, a hope which that commander's former 
 proceedings by no means justified ; or else through a 
 corner of Belgium, in which case he would infringe its 
 neutrality, and bring political complications on France 
 which she was ill prepared to grapple with. 
 
 And here I think a sketch of the life and previous 
 career of Marshal MacMahon will not be out of place. 
 His name is Marie Edme Patrick Maurice MacMahon, 
 and he is a descendant of a noble Celtic family, whose 
 members fought in Ireland for the last of the Stuarts, 
 and afterwards emigrated to France. He was born at 
 the Chateau de Sully, near Autun, in the year 1808, 
 and was educated at the seminary of that town. At 
 seventeen he went to the military school of St. Cyr, 
 and leaving it after two years with the rank of 
 " sous-lieutenant eleve," he joined the Staff School of 
 Application. 
 
 He acted in Algeria in 1830 as orderly officer to 
 General Achard, and distinguished himself in the first 
 Medeah expedition, by carrying an important despatch 
 through the Arabian army to Blidah. For this he 
 received the cross of the Legion of Honour. In 1832 
 he was present at the siege of Antwerp, where he was 
 promoted to the rank of Captain. In 1836, at the 
 second siege of Constantine, in Algeria, he acted as 
 Aide-de-Camp to General Damremont, and being 
 wounded, he received the rank of Officer of the Legion 
 of Honour. Next we find him on the staff of General 
 Changarnier, and in 1841 he was appointed to com- 
 
32 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 matid a regiment of Chasseurs-a-pied, and assisted 
 later in subduing the great Arab chief, Abd-el-Kader. 
 In 1855 he replaced General Canrobert in the com- 
 mand of the 1st Division of the French Crimean army, 
 and directed the attack on the Malakoff. In 1856 he 
 became a senator. In 1857 and 1858 he commanded 
 the Algerian forces. In 1859 he was engaged in the 
 Italian campaign ; on the 3rd June he gained a 
 victory at Turbigo, and on the 4th turned the battle 
 of Magenta into a victory for the arms of France. 
 For this latter he was made a Marshal of France, and 
 received the title of Duke of Magenta on the field of 
 battle. In 1861 he went to Berlin as ambassador 
 extraordinary. Shortly afterwards he was appointed 
 Governor-General of Algeria. He also, for a season, 
 commanded one of the summer camps of instruction at 
 Chalons. He was always noted for his energy and 
 personal courage, and made a splendid General of 
 Division ; but no event has yet shown his fitness to 
 command an army, while his recent defeats have 
 rather proved the contrary. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 30th, the French 
 began to cross the Meuse, and Paris was cheered by 
 the news, telegraphed by the Emperor, that two 
 corps of MacMahon's army, having crossed in safety, 
 were marching on Montme'dy by way of Carignan, at 
 which place he himself afterwards was present, during 
 its occupation by the troops. 
 
 These two corps alluded to proceeded through 
 Vaux to Carignan. 
 
KOUT OF DE FAILLY'S CORPS. 
 
 33 
 
 Hardly had they effected the passage of the river 
 in safety, when the right wing, under De Failly, which 
 was encamped north of Beaumont, and which had 
 been thrown back facing south to cover the flank and 
 rear of MacMahon's army during its passage of the 
 Meuse, was surprised by the 1st Bavarian corps of 
 the 3rd Army (Crown Prince of Prussia), which, 
 apprised by its scouts of the presence of the enemy in 
 its front, had under cover of the intervening woods 
 advanced, and catching De Failly's corps unawares, 
 routed it with severe loss ; the tents, camp equipage, 
 large quantities of baggage, and numerous prisoners 
 falling into the victors' hands. 
 
 The 4th Prussian corps, forming the left of the 
 combined army (Crown Prince of Saxony), was simul- 
 taneously advancing up the Meuse, and to the right 
 of thgulst Bavarian corps. 
 
 The 5th Prussian corps was moving on Stonne, 
 while the 11th was making for Chemery; and the 
 2nd Bavarians were supporting the advance. 
 
 The artillery cannonade above Beaumont had no 
 sooner commenced, than the different advanced posts 
 pushing forwards opened fire, and a general fusillade 
 ensued. 
 
 De Failly's corps being routed, and his flank and 
 rear exposed, MacMahon immediately ordered the 
 troops on the west bank of the Meuse to retreat across 
 the river, masking the move with great tactical skill, 
 and the French fought gallantly on this occasion ; but 
 only a portion of them had reached the opposite bank, 
 
 D 
 
34 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 when the 4th Corps, forming the left of the combined 
 army, sweeping up the eastern bank from Stenay, and 
 forming line, fell upon the French, already in great 
 confusion from their hurried retreat at Mouzon, and 
 utterly routed them with heavy loss. 
 
 About the same time the two French corps, which 
 had crossed early in the day, and whose advance 
 had already entered Carignan, were attacked by the 
 12th Corps of the combined army, supported by the 
 Prussian Guards, and driven back across a small 
 river called the Chiers, which runs north-west from 
 Carignan, and empties itself into the Meuse near 
 Remilly, and behind which they effected a junction 
 with the remainder of MacMahon's army, which 
 had evacuated Stonne and all its advanced posts, 
 and fallen back along the eastern banks of the 
 Meuse ; so great indeed was the panic of the centre, 
 that the troops threw away their arms and accoutre- 
 ments, and the whole French army crossed the Chiers 
 before the panic could in any way be checked, or any 
 attempt at a more orderly retreat be made. 
 
 Night coming to their aid, found the French army 
 behind the Chiers, between Douzy and Eemilly ; while 
 the combined German army, and the 1st Bavarian 
 corps of the 3rd Army, bivouacked on the ground that 
 they had won, — the 4th Corps having taken several 
 thousand prisoners and twelve cannon; the 12th, 
 numerous prisoners and four mitrailleuses ; and the 1st 
 Bavarian corps, several prisoners, a few cannon, large 
 quantities of baggage, and stores of different kinds. 
 
POSITION OF THE GERMAN ARMIES. 
 
 35 
 
 The total French losses were estimated at 7,000 
 prisoners, besides the killed and wounded, and 20 guns. 
 The result of the day was to stop MacMahon's advance 
 to the south-east. 
 
 The main body of the 3rd Army, acting under 
 instructions from General Moltke, which were carried 
 out by its commander and General Blumenthal (Chief 
 of his staff), had been engaged since the 26th in 
 swinging round half-right on to the French line, and 
 in performing a sort of right wheel on an extended 
 circle, in order to throw back MacMahon's right, and 
 cut him off from any retreat, unless he should choose 
 to infringe the neutrality of Belgium. The positions 
 of the corps in this strategical movement were similar 
 to those shown on the small plan ; and only one 
 corps, the 6th, having the outer or most westerly 
 portion of the circle to march on, was unable to arrive 
 in time to take part in the engagements that led up 
 to, and concluded in, the battle of Sedan ; it marched, 
 however, to its point diagonally, and was ready to 
 guard the German left and to support the Wtirtem- 
 burgers if necessary. 
 
 Opposed to an active enemy commanding a well- 
 organized army, this would have been a most dan- 
 gerous manoeuvre, as the German rear might have 
 been attacked while the armies occupied so extended 
 a line ; but shrewdly guessing at the condition of his 
 enemy's troops, and not believing in any such danger, 
 the Crown Prince of Prussia swung his left round, 
 and by the dogged pluck of his troops throughout the 
 
 d 2 
 
36 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 forced marches, which were necessarily of the most 
 fatiguing nature, succeeded in carrying out the stra- 
 tegical movement ordered by General Moltke ; and 
 in a great measure to the endurance and splendid 
 marching of the 5th and 11th Corps, who had nearly 
 the outer edge of the circle to traverse, and who 
 marched twenty-five miles on the 30th, must be attri- 
 buted the German success at Sedan. 
 
 During the 30th, with the exception of its right 
 corps, the 1st Bavarians, who bore the brunt of the 
 day so nobly, the troops of the 3rd Army were hardly 
 engaged, except in trifling outpost skirmishes, as 
 neither party was near each other in force \ and the 
 evening found them, wearied with their severe marches, 
 occupying Beaumont, and bivouacking about Stonne 
 and the country on either side of it. 
 
 The camp-fires, extending along a line from near 
 Chemery, through Stonne, Beaumont, Mouzon, and 
 Carignan, showed during the night of the 30th the 
 positions held by the two German armies. 
 
 During the day the King of Prussia had sent the 
 following telegram to the Queen at Berlin : — 
 
 "Yarennes, August 30th, 3.30 p.m. — We won a 
 victorious battle yesterday. MacMahon was beaten 
 by the 4th and 12th Saxon and the 1st Bavarian 
 Army corps, and was driven back from Beaumont 
 beyond the Meuse, near Mouzon. Twelve cannon and 
 several thousand prisoners, together with a very large 
 quantity of war materiel, are in our hands. Our losses 
 are moderate. I am about to return to the battle- 
 
KESULT OF THE FIGHTING. 
 
 37 
 
 field, to follow up the results of the victory. May 
 God help us further in His mercy, as He has done 
 hitherto." 
 
 During the 31st, both French and German com- 
 manders were making their dispositions for the 
 supreme effort, and some desultory fighting took place 
 between Douzy and Bazeilles. 
 
 The following telegram was also sent officially to 
 Germany : — 
 
 u Yarennes, August 3 1st — The results of yester- 
 day's victory over Marshal MacMahon's army only 
 become known gradually, in consequence of the great 
 extent of the battle-field. Up to the present it is 
 ascertained that some 20 cannons, 11 mitrailleurs, 
 and about 7,000 prisoners have fallen into our hands." 
 
 The German plan for the next day arranged by 
 Moltke was as follows: the combined army (4th) 
 was to advance before nightfall, and occupy a new 
 line on the driers; at the same time the 3rd Army 
 was to occupy a position to a certain extent along the 
 Meuse, and extending from Eemilly on the right to 
 Donchery on the left. On the following morning 
 (1st September) they were to engage the enemy at 
 daybreak ; the Crown Prince of Saxony was to cross 
 the Chiers, and attacking the French in front, as soon 
 as possible wheel round his right flank, turn their left, 
 detaching a force from his extreme right to sweep 
 round near the Belgian frontier under the cover of the 
 woods, and effect a junction north-east of Sedan with 
 a detachment of the 3rd Army, sent round by the 
 
38 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 Crown Prince of Prussia, who would simultaneously 
 engage the right centre of MacMahon's army at 
 Bazeilles, and endeavour to overwhelm his right wing ; 
 when, if both the German armies should prove suc- 
 cessful, the French army would be enveloped, and 
 being hemmed in at Sedan, would have to surrender 
 unconditionally. How ably and gallantly this plan 
 was carried out in every particular is now a matter of 
 history. 
 
 During the whole of the 31st the Germans were 
 taking up the positions assigned to them, and marched 
 along in review order, their knapsacks being carried 
 on country carts and ambulances ; the King of Prussia 
 slept at Vendresse; the Crown Prince of Saxony 
 moved his Head-Quarters to Yillers-lez-Mouzon, and 
 his right, consisting of the Prussian Guards, occupied 
 the heights above Francheval. The Crown Prince of 
 \ Prussia advanced his Head-Quarters to Chehery, 
 though most of the correspondents named Chemery as 
 his Head-Quarters, a place about three miles south of 
 the former, to which similarity of names doubtless the 
 mistake may be attributed. About 4 a.m. on the 
 morning of the 1st September the German armies 
 were, as nearly as can at present be ascertained, in 
 the positions ascribed to them in the small plan. 
 
 MacMahon might have escaped with the greater 
 portion of his army by rapid marching on the 31st, in 
 the direction of Mezieres, had he abandoned his bag- 
 gage and such artillery as was not efficiently horsed ; 
 but he feared to risk a running fight with his dis- 
 
FRENCH POSITION BEFORE SEDAN. 
 
 39 
 
 heartened troops, and preferred offering battle to the 
 enemy in the following position, which he took up, 
 evidently expecting to be attacked in front and on the 
 right flank ; and which position both the Emperor 
 and himself seem to have thought offered a fair chance 
 of success. 
 
 His left rested on Givonne ; and he considered his 
 position in its vicinity so strong, from the heights 
 surrounding it intersected by ravines and broken 
 ground, and covered with dense forests, that he placed 
 there his weakest troops, evidently believing that the 
 natural obstacles and the proximity of the Belgian 
 frontier would prevent his left flank being turned, or 
 even seriously attacked. Thence his line extended to 
 the Meuse by Balan, and Bazeilles, the key to his 
 right centre, and which latter, from its being on the 
 high road to Carignan and projecting rather beyond 
 his line, he occupied in great force with his best 
 troops; entrenching this line where he deemed it 
 advisable, and placing his guns on such wooded emi- 
 nences as he thought would best cover them, and 
 enable them to catch the enemy at a disadvantage in 
 the intervening valleys. His right was drawn up 
 north of Sedan, protected by the Meuse and the 
 western end of the fortress and town, and by the 
 system of artificial inundations previously mentioned, 
 and held the village of St. Menges and the plateaux 
 and ridges of Floing and La Garenne. 
 
 Looking at all the circumstances of the case, and 
 taking into consideration his determination not to 
 
40 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 retreat without engaging the enemy, this was probably 
 the best position he could have chosen. His line from 
 Grivonne to Bazeilles, on a series of wooded heights, 
 intersected by three parallel ravines, running north 
 and south from the Belgian frontier, two towards the 
 Chiers, and the third close to Sedan towards the 
 Meuse, with the Chiers between him and the bulk of 
 the right of his enemy, formed a succession of formid- 
 able lines of defence ; while the eminences near Floing 
 and La Garenne, crowned with woods and villages, 
 every one of which might be successively defended, 
 with the Meuse, forming a double obstacle to be over- 
 come by the Germans, made his right flank, as he 
 thought, almost unassailable. 
 
 The strength of the position he thus took up does 
 not in my opinion absolve the Marshal from the 
 flagrant error in strategical judgment he undoubtedly 
 committed in not retreating towards Mezieres, and 
 trying to engage and defeat the 3rd Army before the 
 combined army could come to its assistance ; and he 
 had still possession of the railway to aid him in the 
 attempt, had he essayed this early on the 31st. But 
 having determined to fight in the positions he took 
 up, I conceive his chief faults were : 1st, not having 
 strong cavalry patrols along the road to the Belgian 
 frontier,- 2nd, not ascertaining more correctly the 
 movements of the 3rd Army approaching his right ; 
 and 3rd, in not destroying the railway bridge across 
 the Meuse near Bazeilles, by means of which the 1st 
 Bavarians chiefly crossed ; and this latter is the more 
 
STRENGTH OF BOTH ARMIES. 
 
 41 
 
 unaccountable as the other railway bridge at Villette 
 was blown up by his orders. Further criticism on his 
 movements I leave to the future historians of the cam- 
 paign. 
 
 As far as can be at present ascertained, the number 
 of the French troops engaged on the 1st of September 
 was about 100,000, divided into four corps, and com- 
 manded as follows : — 
 
 1st Corps General Ducrot, 
 
 with about 450 guns and mitrailleuses. Marshal 
 MacMahon commanded in chief, while the Emperor 
 was present, but without any definite command until 
 the battle ceased. 
 
 Besides the above, one division of the French 
 marched from Mezieres to join in the battle, but after 
 a short skirmish with the Wurtemburgers retreated to 
 that fortress. 
 
 The Germans were about 200,000 strong ; for 
 although General Moltke originally computed them at 
 240,000, yet we must remember that the 6th Corps 
 took no part in the battle, and the 4th Corps was only 
 partially engaged, and that after the hardest portion 
 of the action was finished. The King commanded in 
 person ; while the 3rd Army, composed of the 1st and 
 2nd Bavarian corps, the Wiirtemburger division, and 
 the 5th and 11th Corps, besides a large force of 
 cavalry, was under the Crown Prince of Prussia and 
 
 5th 
 7th 
 12th 
 
 General De Wimpffen, 
 General Douay, 
 General Lebrun, 
 
42 
 
 MEMOIK OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 the 4th or combined army, consisting of the 4th and 
 12th Corps and of the Prussian Guards (the 4th Grena- 
 dier regiment of which lost 500 men out of a thousand), 
 was under the Crown Prince of Saxony. From 600 
 to 700 guns were divided amongst these two armies. 
 
 On the King of Prussia's staff were, amongst others, 
 Generals von Moltke and von Eoon, and Count Bis- 
 marck ; Generals Sheridan and Forsyth, of the United 
 States army ; and the correspondent of the ' Pall Mall 
 Gazette.' 
 
 Accompanying the Crown Prince of Prussia were 
 the Dukes of Augustenberg and Coburg Gotha, and 
 the Princes of Weimar, Mecklenburg, Wiirtemburg, and 
 Hohenzollern, and the correspondent of the ' Daily 
 News.' 
 
 Early on the morning of the 1st the French and 
 German armies were nearly in the positions shown in 
 the small plan, and under cover of a thick fog the 
 combined army crossed the Chiers in safety unper- 
 ceived, and the 1st Bavarian corps made the passage 
 of the Meuse unopposed, partly by the railway bridge 
 and partly on pontoons ; and effecting a junction with 
 the left of the combined army, advanced to the attack 
 of Bazeilles. 
 
 At the same time the 5 th and 11th Corps of the 
 3rd Army were marching northwards to get round the 
 bend of the Meuse, and then attack St. Menges and 
 the troops in position behind Floing and the woods 
 of La Garenne. 
 
 The cavalry under Count Stolberg were massed 
 
GERMAN ATTACK ON SEDAN. 
 
 43 
 
 west of the Meuse, under cover of some hills, and out 
 of cannon-shot range ; and the 2nd Bavarian corps was 
 advancing to occupy the commanding hills south of 
 Sedan and of the Meuse, accompanied by a powerful 
 artillery. 
 
 The King of Prussia and his staff took up a position 
 on a hill above the village of Cheveuge ; and the 
 Crown Prince of Prussia on an eminence half a mile 
 off to the west, in front of a newly-built chateau over- 
 looking Donchery, in which respective positions both 
 remained nearly the whole day. 
 
 Before 6 a.m., only a few shots were fired, but the 
 fog lifting about that hour, the Bavarians commenced 
 a heavy cannonade, and the sun shone down mockingly 
 on the effects of man's ambition below. 
 
 To describe the battle with the meagre details at 
 command is beyond my pen, but I subjoin the general 
 features of it, and trust in conjunction with the large 
 sketch they may enable my readers to form some idea 
 of the principal tactics on both sides, which resulted in 
 the overthrow of the French under the walls of Sedan. 
 
 The first position marked in the large sketch repre- 
 sents the ground occupied by both armies about noon, 
 when the closing in had succeeded, and the desired 
 junction between the two German armies taken place ; 
 while the second position shows the final disposition of 
 both sides at the close of the battle. 
 
 Soon after 6 a.m. the action became general, and 
 the 11th Corps forced its way into St. Menges, under 
 cover of a heavy Prussian cannonade from a battery 
 
41 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 splendidly served posted on ground commanding the 
 village of Floing ; and the 5th Corps slowly but gra- 
 dually crept round through Fleigneux and Illy, north- 
 west of Sedan. 
 
 The 2nd Bavarians meanwhile were throwing quan- 
 tities of concussion shells into the troops defending 
 Balan and Bazeilles, already on fire in several places, 
 and which latter the 1st Bavarians were attacking 
 gallantly in front, while it was as gallantly defended, 
 principally by marines, and a very serious fight 
 ensued for its possession. 
 
 The 4th German corps was rapidly coming up in 
 support, while the 12th Corps to the right was attack- 
 ing the defenders of the line of Givonne, Daigny, and 
 La Moncelle. Behind this latter corps, in reserve, were 
 the Prussian Guards, covering the road to Carignan 
 and Montmedy. 
 
 Soon after nine a heavy artillery fire was going 
 forward along the whole attack, and the French left 
 near Givonne was turned by the combined army, and 
 beaten back panic-stricken into the woods, and the 
 Germans pushed their right rapidly round in a north- 
 westerly direction. 
 
 By this time, however, the 1st Bavarians and 12th 
 Saxons were undergoing a very heavy fire of musketry 
 and mitrailleuses, and shortly before eleven the grunt 
 of the latter, and the sharp rattle of the former became 
 one continued roll, showing how well the French 
 appreciated the importance of holding Bazeilles. 
 
 On the German left the battery near Floing had 
 
JUNCTION OF THE GERMAN ARMIES. 
 
 45 
 
 silenced two French batteries opposed to it, and, no 
 longer supported by their guns, the infantry evacuated 
 Floing, and soon after were forced to retreat still 
 nearer to Sedan, owing to the numberless effective 
 shells which burst amongst their ranks, pitched by a 
 Prussian battery at St. Menges. 
 
 At twelve noon the long-desired junction was effected 
 between the Crown Prince of Prussia's left and the 
 Crown Prince of Saxony's right, and from that 
 moment the result of the day could no longer be in 
 doubt ; and though numberless moves of troops were 
 subsequently made, every change was limited to so 
 confined a space as not to be worthy of being 
 chronicled. 
 
 Soon after this, some of the French began to retreat 
 from Bazeilles, while others were going to support its 
 defenders through the woods of La Garenne. At one 
 o'clock the 11th Corps advanced to take the hill 
 north-west of La Garenne, and was received by a 
 heavy artillery fire from the French batteries on the 
 edge of the wood. 
 
 Describing the attack at this position of the line, 
 and what followed, the correspondent of the 6 Pall 
 Mall Gazette' writes : — 
 
 " At 1.5 yet another French battery near the wood opened 
 on the Prussian columns, which were compelled to keep 
 shifting their ground till ready for their final rush at the 
 hill, in order to avoid offering so good a mark to the French 
 shells. Shortly after we saw the first Prussian skirmishers 
 on the crest of the La Garenne hill above Torcy. They did 
 
46 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 not seem in strength, and General Sheridan standing beside 
 me exclaimed, 'Ah! the beggars are too weak, they can 
 never hold that position against all those French.' The 
 General's prophecy soon proved correct, for the French ad- 
 vancing at least six to one, the Prussians were forced to 
 retire down the hill, to seek reinforcements from the columns 
 which were hurrying to their support. In five minutes they 
 came back again, this time in greater force, but still terribly 
 inferior to the huge French columns. ' Good heavens ! the 
 French Cuirassiers are going to charge them,' said General 
 Sheridan ; and sure enough the regiment of Cuirassiers, their 
 helmets and breast-plates flashing in the September sun, form 
 up in sections of squadrons, and dash down on the Prussian 
 scattered skirmishers. Without deigning to form line — 
 squares are never used by the Prussians — the infantry re- 
 ceived the Cuirassiers with a most tremendous 6 schnell-feuer ' 
 (quick fire), at about 108 yards, loading and firing as fast as 
 possible into the dense squadrons. Over went men and 
 horses by hundreds, and the regiment was compelled to 
 retire much faster, it seemed to me, than it came. The 
 moment the Cuirassiers turned bridle the plucky Prussians 
 actually dashed in hot pursuit after them at the double. 
 Such a thing has not often been recorded in the annals of 
 war. The French infantry then came forward in turn and 
 attacked the Prussians, who waited quietly under a most 
 rapid firing of chassepots, until their enemies got within 
 about 100 yards, when they gave them such a dose of lead 
 that the infantry soon followed the cavalry to the c place 
 from which they came ' — that is, behind a ridge some 600 
 yards on the way to Sedan, where the tirailleurs could not 
 hit them. The great object of the Prussians was gained, as 
 they were not dispossessed of the crest of the hill, and it 
 was fair betting that they would do all that in them lay to 
 get some artillery up to help them before Napoleon III. 
 was much nearer his deposition. ' There will be a h — 
 of a fight for that crest,' says Sheridan, peering through 
 
ATTACK ON THE WOOD OF LA GAKENNE. 
 
 47 
 
 his field-glass at the hill, which was not three miles from 
 where we stood, with the full fire on it from behind us. At 
 half-past one the French cavalry, this time I fancy a regi- 
 ment of Carabineers, made another attempt to dislodge the 
 Prussians, who were being reinforced every minute. But 
 they met with the same fate as their brethren in the iron 
 jackets, and were sent with heavy loss to the rightabout, the 
 Prussians taking advantage of their flight to advance their 
 line a couple of hundred yards nearer the French infantry. 
 Suddenly they split into two bodies, leaving a break of a hun- 
 dred yards in their line. We were not long in seeing the 
 object of this movement, for the little white puffs from the 
 crest behind the skirmishers, followed by a commotion in the 
 dense French masses, show us that ' ces didbles de Prussiens 9 
 have contrived, Heaven only knows how, to get a couple of 
 4-pounders up the steep ground, and have opened on the 
 French. Something must have at this point been very 
 wrong with the French infantry, for instead of attacking the 
 Prussians — whom they still outnumbered by at least two to 
 one — they remained in column on the hill, seeing their only 
 hope of retrieving the day vanishing from before their eyes, 
 without stirring. The cavalry then tried to do a little Ba- 
 laklava business, but without the success of the immortal 
 six hundred. We took the guns in the Balaklava valley. 
 Down came the Cuirassiers once more, this time riding 
 straight for the two field-pieces. But before they had got 
 within 200 yards of the guns the Prussians formed line as if 
 on parade, and, waiting till they were within fifty yards, gave 
 them a volley which seemed to us to destroy almost the whole 
 of the leading squadron, and so actually block up the way to 
 the guns for the next ones following. After this last charge, 
 which was as complete a failure — although most gallantly 
 conceived and executed — as the two preceding ones, the in- 
 fantry fell back rapidly towards Sedan, and in an instant the 
 whole hill was covered by swarms of Prussian tirailleurs, 
 who appeared to rise from the ground. After the last des- 
 
48 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 perate charge of the French cavalry, General Sheridan 
 remarked to me, ' 1 never saw anything so reckless, so 
 utterly foolish, as that last charge — it was sheer murder.' 
 
 " The Prussians, after the French infantry fell back, ad- 
 vanced rapidly, so much so that the retreating squadrons of 
 French cavalry turned suddenly round and charged despe- 
 rately once again. But it was all no use. The days of 
 breaking squares or even lines are over, and the ' thin blue 
 line ' soon stopped the Gallic onset. It was most extraordi- 
 nary that the French had neither artillery nor mitrailleurs — 
 especially these latter — on the hill to support their infantry. 
 The position was a most important one, and certainly worth 
 straining every nerve to defend. One thing was clear enough, 
 that the French infantry, after once meeting the Prussians, 
 declined to try conclusions with them again, and that the 
 cavalry were trying to encourage them by their example. 
 About two, more Prussian reinforcements came over the 
 long-disputed hill between Torcy and Sedan, to reinforce the 
 regiments already established there. 
 
 " All the time that this great conflict was going on 6 under 
 Fritz's eyes' and those of your correspondent, another was 
 proceeding, none the less severe, and as murderous for the 
 Bavarians as the one I have attempted to describe was for 
 the French. If there was a want of mitrailleurs on the hill 
 above Torcy, there was certainly none in the Bazeilles ravine. 
 On that side there was for more than an hour one continuous 
 roar of musketry and mitrailleurs, and the Bavarian officers 
 told me on the 2nd that the loss in their regiments was 
 terrific, the mitrailleurs having made lanes in their columns. 
 At 2.5 p.m. the French totally abandoned the hill between 
 Torcy and Sedan, and fell back on the faubourg of Cazal, 
 just outside the ramparts of the town. ' Now the battle is 
 lost for the French,' says General Sheridan, to the great 
 delight of the Prussian officers. One would almost have 
 fancied that the French had heard his words, for they had 
 hardly been uttered before there was a lull in the firing all 
 
NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM. 
 
 49 
 
 along the line, or rather circle, as it has now become. Count 
 Bismarck took advantage of this to come and have a talk 
 with his English and American friends. I was anxious to 
 know what the Federal Chancellor had done about the 
 threatened neutrality of Belgium, and my curiosity was soon 
 gratified. ' I have told the Belgian Minister of War/ said 
 Count Bismarck, ' that so long as the Belgian troops do their 
 utmost to disarm any number of French soldiers who may 
 cross the frontier, I will strictly respect the neutrality of 
 Belgium ; but if, on the contrary, the Belgians, either through 
 negligence or inability, do not disarm and capture every man 
 in French uniform who sets his foot in their country, we shall 
 at once follow the enemy into neutral territory with our 
 troops, considering that the French have been the first to 
 violate the Belgian soil. I have been down to have a look 
 at the Belgian troops near the frontier,' added Herr von Bis- 
 marck, ' and I confess they do not inspire me with a very 
 high opinion of their martial ardour or discipline. Why, 
 when they have their great-coats on one can see a great deal 
 of paletot, but hardly any soldier/ I asked his Excellency 
 whether he thought the Emperor was in Sedan. ' Oh, no,' 
 was the reply, 'Napoleon is not very wise, but he is not 
 quite so foolish as to put himself in Sedan just now.' For 
 once in his life Count Bismarck was wrong. 
 
 " At 2.45 the King came by where I was standing, saying 
 he thought the French were going to try and break out just 
 beneath us, in front of the 2nd Bavarian corps. At ten 
 minutes to four General Sheridan told me that Napoleon and 
 * Loulu ' were in Sedan. No one, however, believed this. 
 
 " At 3.20 the Bavarians below us not only continue to get 
 inside the fortifications of Sedan, but maintain themselves 
 there, wending their way forward from house to house. 
 
 " About four there was a great fight for the possession of 
 the ridge above Bazeilles. That gone, Sedan was swept on 
 all sides by the Prussian cannon. This point of vantage was 
 carried by the Prussians at 4.40, and from that moment there 
 
 E 
 
50 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 could not be a shade of doubt as to the ultimate fate of 
 Sedan." 
 
 Dr. Eussell, writing to * The Times,' vividly describes 
 the same scene, as well as the fighting at Bazeilles 
 and Balan, in the following words : — 
 
 " The Prussians coming up from Floing were invisible to 
 me. Never can I forget the sort of agony with which I 
 witnessed those who first came out on the plateau raising 
 their heads and looking around for an enemy, while, hidden 
 from view, a thick blue band of French infantry was awaiting 
 them, and a brigade of cavalry was ready on their flank below. 
 I did not know that Floing was filled with advancing columns. 
 There was but a wide, extending, loose array of skirmishers, 
 like a flock of rooks, on the plateau. Now the men in front 
 began to fire at the heads over the bank lined by the French. 
 This drew such a flash of musketry as tumbled over some and 
 staggered the others; but their comrades came scrambling 
 up from the rear, when suddenly the first block of horse in 
 the hollow shook itself up, and the line, in beautiful order, 
 rushed up the slope. The onset was not to be withstood. 
 The Prussians were caught en flagrant delit. Those nearest 
 the ridge slipped over into the declivitous ground ; those in 
 advance, running in vain, were swept away. But the im- 
 petuosity of the charge could not be stayed. Men and horses 
 came tumbling down into the road, where they were disposed 
 of by the Prussians in the gardens, while the troopers on the 
 left of the line, who swept down the lane in a cloud of dust, 
 were almost exterminated by the infantry in the village. 
 There was also a regular cavalry encounter, I fancy, in the 
 plains below, but I cannot tell at what time ; the Cuirassiers, 
 trying to cut their way out, were destroyed, and a charge of 
 two Prussian squadrons, which did not quite equal expecta- 
 tions, occurred. The feat of these unfortunate cavaliers only 
 cleared the plateau for a little time. In a few minutes up 
 
CHARGES OF FRENCH CAVALRY. 
 
 51 
 
 came the spiked helmets again over the French epaulement, 
 crossing their sabred comrades, and therefore all alive to 
 the danger of cavalry. They advanced in closer order, but 
 still skirmishing, and one long, black parallelogram was 
 maintained to rally on. As the skirmishers got to the ridge 
 they began to fire, but the French in the second line of 
 epaulement soon drove them back by a rattling fusillade. 
 The French rushed out of the ejoaulement in pursuit, still 
 firing. At the same moment a splendid charge was executed 
 on the Prussians, before which the skirmishers rallied, on 
 what seemed to me to be still a long parallelogram. They 
 did not form square. Some Prussians too far on were sabred. 
 The troopers, brilliantly led, went right onwards in a cloud 
 of dust ; but when they were within a couple of hundred 
 yards of the Prussians, one simultaneous volley burst out 
 of the black front and flank, which enveloped all in smoke. 
 They were steady soldiers who pulled trigger there. Down 
 came horse and man ; the array was utterly ruined. There 
 was left in front of that deadly infantry but a heap of white 
 and grey horses — a terrace of dead and dying and dismounted 
 men and flying troopers, who tumbled at every instant. 
 More total dissipation of a bright pageantry could not be. 
 There was another such scene yet to come. I could scarce 
 keep the field-glass to my eyes as the second and last body 
 of cavalry — which was composed of light horse also — came 
 thundering up out of the hollow. They were not so bold 
 as the men on the white horses, who fell, many of them at 
 the very line of bayonets. The horses of these swerved as 
 they came upon the ground covered with carcases, and their 
 line was broken ; but the squadron leaders rode straight to 
 death. Once again the curling smoke spurted out from the 
 Prussian front, and to the rear and right and left flew the 
 survivors of the squadrons. The brown field was flecked with 
 spots of many colours, and, trampling on the remains of that 
 mass of strength and courage of man and horse, the Prussians, 
 to whom supports were fast hastening up right and left and 
 
 E 2 
 
52 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 rear, pressed on towards the inner epaulement, and became 
 engaged with the French infantry, who maintained for some 
 time a steady rolling fire in reply to the volleys of the Prus- 
 sians. To me the French force seemed there very much 
 superior in number. But they had lost courage, and what 
 was left of it was soon dissipated by the advance of a Prussian 
 battery, which galloped up to the right flank of their infantry, 
 and opened a very rapid fire, to which there was no French 
 battery to reply. The French left the epaulement, and made 
 for a belt of wood, dropping fast as they retreated, but facing 
 round and firing still. In a few moments more the plateau 
 was swarming with the battalions of the 11th Corps, and the 
 struggle there was over. Only for a minute, however, because, 
 from the flanks of the wood came out a line of French in- 
 fantry. The musketry fire was renewed ; but it was evident 
 the Prussians were not to be gainsaid. Their advance was 
 only checked that they might let their artillery play while 
 their columns assisted it by incessant volleys. A fierce on- 
 slaught by the French, made alter they had retired behind 
 the wood, only added to their losses. The Crown Prince's 
 army, notwithstanding the cavalry success at the outset, had 
 by three o'clock won the key of the position of the French 
 right with comparatively small loss. 
 
 " The Bavarians of Yon der Tann's corps, on whom devolved 
 the difficult task of carrying the village or town of Bazeilles, 
 and Balan (a suburb of Sedan outside the fortifications), 
 suffered enormously. They were exposed to a fire of infantry 
 in the houses, and to the guns of the works and the musketry 
 from the parapets. The inhabitants joined in the defence, 
 and as soon as the Bavarians had crossed the Meuse by their 
 pontoons and by the railway bridge, they could receive but 
 little protection from their artillery placed on the heights. 
 The French made the most strenuous attempts to repulse 
 them, in which the marines were particularly distinguished ; 
 and three divisions of Bavarians, which began to fight at 
 four o'clock, were exposed to three distinct onslaughts from 
 
GALLANTRY OF THE EMPEROR. 
 
 53 
 
 the town and from the corps under the walls. At one time 
 it appeared as if they would be overpowered, although it 
 seemed as if success against them would scarcely have secured 
 the French army from its ultimate fate. 
 
 " It is believed by the Bavarians that MacMahon himself 
 was wounded very early in the day, when directing his troops 
 in an offensive movement against Bazeilles. General Ducrot 
 then took command of the whole army, but General de 
 Wimpffen, producing a sealed letter, showed that he was 
 authorized to assume the control of the operations of the 
 army in case of any accident to Marshal MacMahon. The 
 Marshal was wounded early in the morning, and, according 
 to the reports of French officers, prisoners of the Bavarians, 
 there was a difference of opinion between General Ducrot 
 and General Wimpffen respecting the plan of attack which 
 the French adopted at one period of the day as the best 
 means of defence. Having beaten the Bavarians out of Balan 
 at one time, the French made a rush in the direction of Illy, 
 as if determined to cut their way through on the flank of the 
 Saxon army, and pass towards Metz. But the Crown Prince 
 of Saxony had by that time resumed the offensive, and had 
 brought an overwhelming force to block their way. They 
 were driven back, delivering the Bavarians from the stress 
 to which they had been exposed. Their divisions advanced 
 once more, and Bazeilles, or as much as remained of it, was 
 firmly occupied ; but the fight about Balan lasted much 
 later. 
 
 " Here it was, according to Bavarian reports, that the 
 Emperor, declaring that he only served as a private soldier, 
 went with an attacking column composed of the remnants 
 of various regiments, to drive out the Bavarians. But the 
 artillery on the heights above the river and the cross-fire 
 from the heights above the road were too much for troops 
 shaken by incessant fighting and frightful losses. Shell and 
 shot rained fast about the Emperor, one of the former bursting- 
 close to his person and enveloping him in its smoke. The 
 
54 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 officers around entreated him to retire, and the Bavarians 
 quickly following occupied Balan and engaged the French 
 on the glacis of the fort. I cannot say whether this was 
 previous to the period referred to by General Wimpffen in 
 his address to the army. He speaks therein of a supreme 
 moment when it was necessary to make a final effort and cut 
 their way through the masses of the enemy at any hazard. 
 But of all that great host of 90,000 men, there were only 
 2,000, he says, left who answered to* the appeal. Of the 
 remainder, there were probably 20,000 in the hands of the 
 Prussians ; but 60,000 men, deducting killed and wounded, 
 had by this time become an utterly disorganized mass, without 
 cohesion, ' willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike,' and 
 crushed out of all semblance of military vitality by an over- 
 whelming and most murderous artillery, of which the moral 
 effect was at least as great as the physical. The bitterness 
 of recrimination between officers and men shows that long 
 before the battle a radical element of force was wanting. 
 There was not only a deficiency of cordial relations in their 
 kind between the officer and the soldier, but a worse evil still 
 — an actual apprehension on the part of the officers of those 
 whom they were to command, a fear to enforce the ordinary 
 rules of discipline, lest the soldier should become unmanage- 
 able altogether. The scene cannot be either imagined or 
 described which occurred when the army, or that uniformed 
 rabble, had been fairly driven in by the beatersj to be shot 
 down at will. The French artillery had practically ceased 
 to exist as a protecting arm. The guns on the works are 
 ridiculously small ordnance of the date of 1815, with a few 
 heavy pieces here and there ; and Sedan, commanded com- 
 pletely from the south bank of the Meuse, was to all intents 
 and purposes an open town, with the inconvenience of having 
 a walled enceinte to embarrass the movements of the troops. 
 The Emperor retired, I believe, within the place, but not, 
 surely, for safety, but rather to escape from the surging mass 
 of impotent soldiery. There was a rain of Prussian and 
 
DESTRUCTION OF BAZEILLES. 
 
 55 
 
 Bavarian bombs upon the town, filled with terrified citizens 
 who had had no time to escape. The troops outside had been 
 fighting without food since the morning, and there were no 
 resources within the city to meet their wants. They were 
 in an angry and terrible mood, upbraiding their officers, 
 mutinous ; and every shell that fell increased the evil of their 
 spirit. To one of many missiles was now reserved a great 
 mission. A shell fell into a warehouse or manufactory in 
 which was stored some inflammable material. A vast volume 
 of flame rushed for a moment into the air, and a volume of 
 thick white smoke, which towered and spread out so as to 
 overshadow half the city, gave rise to apprehension on one 
 side and expectation on the other that some central magazine 
 had gone up. But no noise ensued. Still, at the moment, 
 the resolve was taken that Sedan and all that it contained 
 should be placed in the power of the victor, in the belief that 
 it was impossible to resist with any prospect but that of ruin, 
 complete, however lingering." 
 
 Another writer describes the cruelty of the 
 Bavarians to the inhabitants and defenders of Bazeilles, 
 out of which they were driven several times by the 
 gallantry of the French marines. Almost to this day 
 the place remains a heap of ruins. The observer 
 alluded to writes : — 
 
 "Bazeilles was near the Meuse, and near Sedan: the 
 inhabitants of the village, on hearing of the arrival of the 
 enemy in the neighbourhood, donned their National Guards 
 uniforms, and tried to hold in check a Bavarian corps, and 
 a division of Prussian reserves. The French were driven 
 back, and the Prussians entered the town ; it was said that 
 shots were fired from the windows of private houses upon the 
 Prussian troops ; be this as it may, it is certain that a scene 
 of horror, and nameless excesses then commenced, that must 
 
56 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 for ever disgrace their perpetrators. In order to punish the 
 inhabitants of the village for presuming to defend them- 
 selves, they set fire to the place. The population sought 
 refuge in the cellars. All — women and children — were burnt 
 alive! Out of 2,000 inhabitants, barely 300 survived to 
 relate how the Bavarians drove the women and children back 
 into the flames, and shot those who succeeded in escaping. 
 A description of the village after the Prussians left was 
 sickening — there was not a house standing. A fearful smell 
 of charred flesh pervaded the air, and the calcined bones of 
 the inhabitants lay on the thresholds of their own dwelling." 
 
 Although the Germans were now everywhere 
 victorious, and were holding all the entrances into the 
 town, still their batteries continued to bombard it, 
 now so full of troops and material as to be indefensible, 
 and set fire to it in several places ; at five o'clock p.m. 
 the firing ceased, and soon afterwards a French colonel, 
 escorted by two Uhlans, one of whom carried a white 
 flag, rode up to where the King had taken up his 
 position, and asked for terms of surrender. After a 
 short consultation between the King and General 
 Moltke, the French colonel was informed that when 
 the capitulation of so large an army and of so 
 important a fortress were in question, an officer of 
 higher rank should have been sent. " You are there- 
 fore to return to Sedan, and tell the Governor of the 
 town to report himself immediately to the King of 
 Prussia. If he does not arrive in an hour, our guns 
 will open again ; you may tell the Commandant that 
 it is useless trying to obtain other terms than uncon- 
 ditional surrender." 
 
NAPOLEON'S LETTER TO KING WILLIAM. 
 
 57 
 
 Soon after his departure, the King sent Colonel 
 Brousart into Sedan with his demand for the capitula- 
 tion, who, on his arrival, was introduced to the 
 Emperor, who wished to give him a letter for the 
 King ; on learning his mission, however, Napoleon 
 referred him to General de Wimpffen, who was in 
 command (MacMahon having been severely wounded 
 early in the day by a piece of shell), and sent his 
 Adjutant, General Reille, with the letter to the King. 
 
 About seven o'clock Colonel Brousart returned, 
 and informed the King of MacMahon's being wounded, 
 and of the presence of the Emperor in Sedan: the 
 King's escort then drew up in line, and the King, in 
 front of his staff, received General Reille, who, dis- 
 mounting, handed the Emperor's letter to His Majesty, 
 saying, at the same time, that he had no other orders. 
 King William having said, " But I demand, as the 
 first condition, that the army lay down its arms," 
 commenced reading the Imperial letter, since become 
 famous, and very remarkable, when we consider its 
 result. It ran as follows : — 
 
 " Ne pouvant pas mourir a la tete de mon armee, je viens 
 mettre mon epee aux pieds de votre Majeste." 
 
 " Being unable to die at the head of my army, I lay my 
 sword at the feet of your Majesty." 
 
 The King, after consulting with the Crown Prince 
 of Prussia, who had previously joined him, and with 
 Count Bismarck and Generals Moltke and von Roon, 
 wrote as follows : — 
 
58 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 " SlRE, MY BROTHER, " Before Sedan, September 1st, 1870. 
 
 " Kegretting the circumstances under which we 
 meet, I accept the sword of your Majesty, and I invite you to 
 designate one of your officers provided with full powers to 
 treat for the capitulation of the army which has so bravely 
 fought under your command. On my side I have named 
 General Moltke for this purpose. 
 
 " I am, 
 
 " Your Majesty's good Brother, 
 
 (Signed) " Wilhelm." 
 
 The King handed the above to General Reille, who 
 received it bareheaded, and then returned to Sedan, 
 escorted by the two Uhlans. 
 
 On his departure the King gave General Moltke 
 power to negotiate, and ordered Count Bismarck to be 
 at hand in case of political complications, and then 
 drove to his quarters at Vendresse, amid the cheers of 
 his soldiers. 
 
 While giving the King, General Moltke, and the 
 army, the credit of the success of the day, Count Bis- 
 marck is reported to have claimed some credit for 
 effecting the unity of so many of the German races, 
 who had that day made common cause, and fought 
 side by side against the enemy in defence of the 
 fatherland. 
 
 The Germans celebrated this great victory by im- 
 promptu candle illuminations and the singing of the 
 usual patriotic airs ; but their leaders, discussing the 
 chances of the future, felt that there might yet be 
 
DEMORALIZATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 59 
 
 many a hard day's fighting before peace would be 
 declared. 
 
 The situation of the French at the conclusion of the 
 day, and while the bearer of the flag of truce was pro- 
 ceeding to the German Head-Quarters, is shown in 
 the 2nd position on the large sketch ; the town was 
 entirely surrounded by the Germans, whose well-served 
 guns, carrying with murderous effect over 4,900 metres, 
 planted on all the surrounding heights, dominated the 
 place, and could have shelled it so that hardly a house 
 would have been left standing; while the defeated 
 French soldiers, crushed into the narrow streets with 
 no longer any organization, were perfectly demoralized, 
 and exasperated by their bloody but useless struggles, 
 were ripe for mischief and much more dangerous to 
 friend than foe. The scene in the town was, I have 
 heard from several of the inhabitants, of the most 
 harrowing description : dead horses and men encum- 
 bered the ground 5 and horses, limbers, guns, caissons, 
 and baggage-waggons all pell-mell, broke the surging 
 mass of soldiers, who wandered about indiscriminately, 
 drunk and cursing their leaders and officers, whom 
 they threatened to assassinate. Under such circum- 
 stances what course remained open to the Emperor 
 and his advisers but that which His Majesty wisely 
 and humanely took ? 
 
 General de Wimpffen had assumed the command of 
 the French army when MacMahon was wounded, 
 although the Marshal had given General Ducrot, in 
 presence of the Emperor, orders to mass the troops 
 
60 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 behind Sedan and retreat on Mezieres; whether he 
 had orders from Paris to that effect or not is not yet 
 ascertained, but General de Wimpffen took the com- 
 mand, some say under the plea of being the older 
 general of the two, and considering the proposed 
 retreat a false move, rashly commanded an advance, 
 with what result we well know. That he was not 
 wanting in courage is evident from the attempt he 
 made to rally the troops : crying out that Bazaine 
 was attacking the Prussians in rear, he rallied a few 
 thousand soldiers, and, leaving by the Porte de Balan, 
 attacked the church garrisoned by the Prussians, who 
 were at last taken prisoners owing to the doors being 
 blown in by cannon, but he and his party were soon 
 driven back into the town. Probably fresh from 
 Africa, and full of the military traditions learnt there, 
 and ignorant of the really inefficient and demoralized 
 state of his troops, he thought that a good dash would 
 restore victory to the French arms ; but he counted 
 without his host, and numberless killed and prisoners, 
 and the immediate fatal consequences of his defeat, 
 testify to his rashness and incompetence as a great 
 leader ; and if his name — as he is reported to have said 
 it would — goes down to history linked with so humi- 
 liating a capitulation as he subsequently signed, he 
 must remember that such a fate is not wholly unde- 
 served; his wilfulness in arrogating to himself the 
 command after MacMahon was wounded, and his rash- 
 ness in counter-ordering the wise retreat the Marshal 
 had directed, deprive him of the sympathy he would 
 
DEPARTURE OF NAPOLEON FROM SEDAN. 61 
 
 otherwise have been entitled to, and leave him with- 
 out a word of defence. 
 
 The conduct of the Emperor during the battle, and 
 amid such trying scenes, has won him the good report 
 of those who were impartial witnesses of it. He was 
 among his troops, encouraging them all the morning, 
 heedless of the projectiles which fell around him, and 
 visited several of the corps in the centre, including 
 that of Lebrun at Balan, and re-entered the town in 
 the belief that all was going on favourably. Later on 
 he essayed to leave it, but found his exit prevented 
 by the retreating soldiers and waggons ; and a shell 
 bursting under his horse in the Place Turenne killed 
 the horse of a general behind him, but any emotion 
 he may have then shown was not that of fear. A 
 general, too, was killed in a cafe close by him (pro- 
 bably General (xuyot de Lespars), and the waiter 
 (still there) was struck by a piece of the same shell, 
 but not killed. Finding he could not leave the town, 
 Napoleon retired to the Sub-Prefecture, where, after 
 ordering the capitulation and writing to the King of 
 Prussia, he passed the night doubtless a prey to bitter 
 thoughts, on which, however, it is no business of mine 
 to speculate. 
 
 At five o'clock on the morning of the 2nd, Napo- 
 leon, accompanied by a few of his staff, quitted Sedan 
 in one of his carriages, and proceeded towards Don- 
 chery in search of Count Bismarck, who, warned by 
 an officer of his advent, dressed and hastened out to 
 meet him. The Count, in his undress uniform, met, 
 
62 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 cap in hand, the Emperor, who alighted; saying, on 
 being requested to resume it, "Sire, I receive your 
 Majesty as I would ray own Eoyal Master." Escorted 
 by the Count on horseback, the Emperor drove 
 towards Donche'ry, and stopping the carriage near 
 that town, alighted, and entered in company with the 
 Count a weaver's house ; but shortly afterwards came 
 and sat outside, and a long conversation ensued, con- 
 ducted principally in German at the wish of the 
 Emperor, who was aware that Count Bismarck was no 
 great French linguist. 
 
 The Emperor tried to obtain a favourable capitula- 
 tion for his army, but Bismarck would not entertain 
 the question at all, which, he said, being a purely 
 military one, was in the hands of Generals Moltke and 
 de Wimpffen. The Chancellor, however, proposed 
 negotiations for peace ; but the Emperor, as a prisoner, 
 expressed his inability to enter into any, and referred 
 him to the Executive authority at Paris, which alone 
 was empowered to entertain any such proposals. The 
 Emperor also submitted to Bismarck the question as 
 to the practicability of allowing the French army to 
 cross the Belgian frontier, there to be disarmed and 
 interned ; this question had, however, been propounded 
 the previous evening, and negatived by General 
 Moltke. It is believed that the Emperor deplored 
 the misfortune of the war, and stated that, though not 
 desiring it himself, he had been forced by public 
 opinion in France to declare it. The Emperor wished 
 very much to have an interview with the King before 
 
THE CAPITULATION SIGNED. 
 
 63 
 
 the capitulation should have been signed, but the 
 Chancellor demanded its signature first, as it was the 
 King's wish to leave his officers to settle the terms 
 with the French Generals, reserving for a subsequent 
 personal interview merely such matters as would 
 directly affect the Emperor. 
 
 Count Bismarck then went to confer with the King, 
 and the Emperor, escorted by a detachment of the 
 1st Prussian Cuirassiers, and attended by some of his 
 staff, went to the Chateau Bellevue, belonging to a 
 M. Amour, of Sedan, and prettily situated above the 
 village of Frenois, on a wooded knoll sloping towards 
 Sedan in the front, and behind towards the Meuse, 
 from which it is about fifty yards distant : being sur- 
 rounded by a small plantation and a pleasure ground, 
 it possesses the advantage of seclusion, an object 
 Napoleon much desired, as he wished to avoid the 
 observation of his countrymen. 
 
 According to the best authorities, the capitulation 
 was settled and signed by Generals Moltke and de 
 Wimpffen in the same chateau. The terms proposed 
 by General Moltke were considered very hard by De 
 Wimpffen ; but though the French troops were furious 
 at the idea of any capitulation at all, the terms 
 eventually accepted by their commander were quite 
 justifiable, when the position of the French is con- 
 sidered. The town was commanded by numerous 
 batteries placed on the surrounding heights, which 
 would have rained a perfect tempest of shot and shell 
 on the exposed town, whose streets were crowded with 
 
64 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 masses of disorganized troops, horses, guns, and 
 materiel, had the question been unsettled at noon. 
 The town could have offered no resistance, and the 
 troops still in the suburbs outside the gates must have 
 been annihilated. De Wimpffen, while deploring his 
 misfortune in having to sign such a document so 
 shortly after his return from Algeria, yet seeing the 
 impossibility .of further defence, and the useless and 
 sanguinary results that a continuance of the fighting 
 would entail, subscribed to the capitulation, of which 
 the following is the text : — 
 
 "Fkenois, September 2nd, 1870. 
 
 " Between the undersigned, the Chief of the Staff of King 
 William, commanding-in-chief the German armies, and the 
 General Commandant of the French army, both being pro- 
 vided with full powers from their Majesties King William 
 and the Emperor Napoleon, the following convention has 
 been concluded: — 
 
 "Article 1. — The French army placed under the orders 
 of General Wimpffen, finding itself actually surrounded by 
 superior forces round Sedan, are prisoners of war. 
 
 "Article 2. — Seeing the brave defence of this French 
 army, exemption is made in respect of all the generals and 
 officers, and also of the superior employes having the rank of 
 officers, who pledge their word of honour in writing not to 
 bear arms against Germany, nor to act in any manner against 
 its interests until the close of the present war. The officers 
 and employes who accept these conditions will retain their 
 arms and personal effects. 
 
 " Article 3. — All arms as well as the materiel of the army, 
 consisting of flags, eagles, cannon, ammunition, &c., shall be 
 immediately delivered at Sedan to a military commission 
 appointed by the General-in-Chief, in order to be forthwith 
 handed over to German commissaries. 
 
NORTH VIEW OF CHATEAU BELLEVUE 
 
TERMS OF THE CAPITULATION. 
 
 65 
 
 " Article 4. — The town and fortified works of Sedan shall 
 be given up in their present condition, at latest, on the 
 evening of the 2nd of September, and be subject to the dis- 
 position of His Majesty King William. 
 
 " Article 5. — Those officers who shall not have accepted 
 the engagement set forth in Article 2, together with the dis- 
 armed troops, shall be marched out, ranged according to 
 their regiments or corps, in military order. This proceeding 
 will commence on the 2nd of September, and will terminate 
 on September 3. These detachments will be marched to 
 the districts bordering upon the Meuse, near Iges, to be 
 handed over to German commissaries by their officers, who 
 will then resign their commands to their sub-officers. The 
 chief surgeons, without exception, will remain behind to 
 attend to the wounded. 
 
 " Von Moltke, 
 
 " WlMPFFEN." 
 
 The capitulation signed, General Moltke went to 
 the battle-field, where at noon he met the King, who 
 at eight o'clock having received no news at Vendresse, 
 drove, according to previous agreement, to the place of 
 rendezvous. 
 
 Having notified his intention of paying his captive 
 a visit, the King, accompanied by his staff and by the 
 Crown Prince of Prussia, and escorted by cavalry, 
 started about half-past twelve for the chateau, where 
 he arrived a few minutes later. 
 
 The Emperor received his conqueror with grave 
 politeness, and seemed perfectly calm ; after a few 
 moments' conversation, they retired alone into a little 
 boudoir or glass wing off the centre rooms, where 
 they remained about a quarter of an hour. On 
 
 F 
 
66 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 returning, the Emperor seemed much affected by the 
 King's kindness and generosity, and indeed expressed 
 as much with tears in his eyes to the Crown Prince, 
 with whom he conversed for a few moments after the 
 above interview. His face looked worn, but observant 
 of all around; he frequently pulled his moustache, 
 the ends of which were waxed as usual, but main- 
 tained his calm demeanour except for the few moments 
 during which he was talking to the Crown Prince. 
 His chief anxiety was to avoid his troops, and to 
 obtain permission to pass through Belgium, instead of 
 through France, to Aix-la-Chapelle, en route for the 
 palace of " Wilhelms Hohe," in Cassel, a palace where 
 his uncle, King Jerome of Westphalia, had once lived, 
 when it was called " Napoleon's Hohe," and which 
 place the King had appointed for his residence during 
 the continuance of the war. The King also gave him 
 permission to take with him some of the officers of 
 his household, his servants, horses, carriages, and 
 baggage, and appointed General Bozen (Prussian) and 
 Prince Synar, late Prussian Secretary of Embassy in 
 Paris, to attend him as Aides-cle-Camp. 
 
 Dr. Russell has given us some interesting notes of 
 the conversation that took place between the two 
 sovereigns, which, though at first contradicted by 
 Count Bismarck's paper, yet as personally the Count 
 denied the contradiction, may be considered authentic. 
 Dr. Russell, writing to * The Times,' says : — 
 
 " The King spoke first. God, he said, had given the vic- 
 tory to his arms in the war which had been declared against 
 
INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE SOVEREIGNS. 
 
 67 
 
 him. The Emperor replied that the war had not been sought 
 by him. He had not desired or wished for it, but he had 
 been obliged to declare war in obedience to the public 
 opinion of France. The King made answer that he was 
 aware it was not the Emperor's doing. . He was quite sure of 
 it. 4 Your Majesty made war to meet public opinion, but it 
 was your Ministers who created that public opinion which 
 forced on the war.' His Majesty, after a pause, remarked 
 that the French army had fought with great bravery. ' Yes,' 
 said the Emperor ; ' but, Sire, your Majesty's troops possessed 
 a discipline in which my army has been wanting lately.' 
 The King remarked that for some years the Prussian army 
 had been availing itself of all new ideas, and watching the 
 experiments of other nations before '66 and subsequently. 
 
 * Your artillery, Sire, won the battle. The Prussian artillery 
 is the finest in the world.' The King bowed, and repeated 
 that they had been anxious to avail themselves of the expe- 
 riences of other nations. ' Prince Frederick Charles decided 
 the fate of the day,' remarked the Emperor. 'It was his 
 army which carried our position.' ' Prince Frederick Charles ! 
 I do not understand your Majesty. It was my son's army 
 which fought at Sedan.' t And where then is Prince Frede- 
 rick Charles ? ' 6 He is with seven army corps before Metz.' 
 At these words the Emperor started, and recoiled as if he 
 had been struck; but he soon recovered his self-possession, 
 and the conversation was continued. The King inquired if 
 his Majesty had any conditions to make or to propose. 
 
 * None. I have no power. I am a prisoner.' ' And may I 
 ask, then, where is the Government in France with which I 
 can treat ? ' ' In Paris ; the Empress and the Ministers have 
 alone power to treat* I am powerless. I can give no orders, 
 and make no conditions.' " 
 
 The King on the same day sent the following tele- 
 gram to the Queen at Berlin : — 
 
 f 2 
 
68 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 " From the King to the Queen. 
 
 " Before Sedan, Feance, 
 
 " Friday, Sept. 2—1.22 p.m. 
 
 " A capitulation, whereby the whole army at Sedan are 
 prisoners of war, has just been concluded with General 
 Wimpffen, commanding, instead of Marshal MacMahon, who 
 is wounded. The Emperor surrendered himself to me, as he 
 has no command, and left everything to the Kegency at 
 Paris. His residence I shall appoint after an interview with 
 him at a rendezvous to be fixed immediately. Under God's 
 guidance, what a course events have taken ! " 
 
 And in subsequently referring to the same ever- 
 memorable event, wrote : — 
 
 " Varennes, Sept. 4 — Morning. 
 " What a solemn moment when I met Napoleon ! He was 
 bowed down, but dignified. I have assigned him Wilhelms- 
 hohe,, near Cassel (capital of Hesse Cassel), as his residence. 
 Our meeting took place in a little castle in front of the 
 western glacis before Sedan. From there I rode along the 
 front of the army at Sedan. The reception of the troops you 
 can hardly imagine. It was indescribable. At eight o'clock, 
 when it became dark, I finished my ride, which had lasted 
 five hours, but I did not return here till one. May God help 
 us further." 
 
 In a letter to the Queen he also recurred to the 
 meeting, and gave an account of the battle of Sedan in 
 the following terms : — 
 
 " Vendresse, South of Sedan, Sept. 3. 
 " You already know through my three telegrams the entire 
 extent of the great historical event which has just happened. 
 It is like a dream, though one has seen it unroll itself hour 
 by hour. 
 
 " "When I reflect that after one great and successful war, I 
 
KING WILLIAM'S ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE. 
 
 69 
 
 could expect nothing more famous during my reign, and when 
 now I see it followed by this act, forming part of the world's 
 history, I bow myself before God, who alone has chosen me, 
 my army, and my allies, to accomplish it, and has appointed 
 us the instruments of His will. Only in this sense can I 
 comprehend the work, in order with humility to praise God's 
 guidance and grace. 
 
 " Now for a picture of the battle and its consequences, in 
 very brief form. 
 
 "On the evening of August 31 and the morning of the 1st 
 inst., the army had reached the prescribed positions round 
 Sedan. The Bavarians formed the left wing, near Bazeilles, 
 on the Meuse ; next them were the Saxons, towards Moncelle 
 and Daigny ; the Guards were still marching towards Givonne, 
 and the 5th and 11th Corps were towards St. Menges and 
 Fleigneux. As the Meuse here makes a sharp bend, no corps 
 were posted between St. Menges and Donchery, but at the 
 latter place were Wiirtemburgers, who also covered the rear 
 against sallies from Mezieres. Count Stolberg's cavalry divi- 
 sions were in the plain of Donchery as the right wing. In the 
 front, opposite Sedan, were the rest of the Bavarians. 
 
 " The battle began, in spite of a thick fog, at Bazeilles, 
 quite early in the morning, and by degrees a very hot fight 
 developed itself, in which house by house had to be taken, this 
 lasting almost the whole day. Scholer's Erfurt Division (4th 
 Corps of the Beserve) were obliged to take part. When at 
 eight o'clock I reached the front before Sedan, the great battery 
 was beginning its fire against the fortifications. At all points 
 there now broke out a hot artillery fire, which lasted for hours, 
 and during which ground was gradually gained on our side. 
 The villages above named were taken. 
 
 " Very deep ravines with woods made the advance of the 
 infantry difficult, and favoured the defence. The villages Illy 
 and Floing were taken, and, by degrees, the circle of fire drew 
 closer and closer round Sedan. It was a grand sight from our 
 position, on a commanding height behind the before-mentioned 
 
70 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 battery, to look beyond the village of Frenois over Point 
 Torcy. The vehement resistance of the enemy commenced 
 gradually to slacken, as we could perceive by the broken bat- 
 talions, which hastily retreated from the woods and villages. 
 Their cavalry endeavoured to attack several battalions of our 
 5th Corps, who, however, maintained their position excellently. 
 The cavalry galloped through the spaces between the battalions, 
 then turned round, and went back the same way ; this being- 
 repeated three times by different regiments, so that the field 
 was strewn with corpses and horses. All this we could see 
 perfectly well from our standpoint. I cannot yet learn the 
 number of this regiment. 
 
 " When the retreat of the enemy at all points became a 
 flight, and all — infantry, cavalry, and artillery — pressed into 
 the town and its immediate vicinity, and when no indication 
 yet presented itself of the intention of the enemy to extricate 
 himself from this hopeless position by a capitulation, nothing 
 remained but to bombard the town with the before-named 
 battery. After it had, in twenty minutes, set fire to the town 
 at several points, which, with the many burning villages over 
 the whole battle-field, made a terrible impression, I ordered a 
 suspension of the firing, and sent Lieutenant-Colonel von 
 Brousart, of the General Staff, with a white flag, to propose 
 the capitulation of the army and fortress. He was met by a 
 Bavarian officer, who informed me that a French jparlemen- 
 taire, with a white flag, had announced himself at the gate. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Brousart was admitted, and on asking 
 for the Commander-in-Chief he was unexpectedly led before 
 the Emperor, who wished immediately to hand him a letter 
 for me. The Emperor asked what kind of proposal he brought, 
 and being told a summons for the surrender of the army and 
 fortress, he replied that he must refer him on this point to 
 General de Wimpfifen, who had just assumed the command in 
 lieu of the wounded MacMahon, and that he would now send 
 his adjutant, General Reille, with the letter to myself. It was 
 seven o'clock when Reille and Brousart came to me, the latter 
 
KING WILLIAM'S ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE. 
 
 71 
 
 a little in advance ; and it was first through him that I learnt 
 with certainty the presence of the Emperor, You may ima- 
 gine the impression which this made upon all of us, but par- 
 ticularly on myself. Eeille sprang from his horse and gave me 
 the letter of the Emperor, adding that he had no other com- 
 mission. Before I opened the letter I said to him, ' But I 
 demand, as the first condition, that the army lay down its 
 arms. ' The letter begins thus : — ' N' ay ant pas pu mourir a 
 la tete de mes troupes, je depose mon epee a voire Majeste 1 
 (Translation : ' Not having died at the head of my army, I yield 
 my sword to your Majesty ') ; leaving all the rest to me. 
 
 " My answer was that I deplored the manner of our meet- 
 ing and begged that a plenipotentiary might be sent, with 
 whom we might conclude the capitulation. After I had given 
 the letter to General Reille, I spoke a few words with him as 
 an old acquaintance, and so this act ended. I gave Moltke 
 powers to negotiate, and directed Bismarck to remain behind in 
 case political questions should arise. I then rode to my carriage 
 and drove here, greeted everywhere along the road with the loud 
 hurrahs of the troops, who were marching up and everywhere 
 singing the National Hymn. It was deeply touching. Candles 
 were lighted everywhere, so that we were driven through an 
 improvised illumination. I arrived here at eleven o'clock, 
 and drank with those about me to the prosperity of an army 
 which had accomplished such feats. 
 
 " As on the morning of the 2nd I had received no news 
 from Moltke respecting the negotiations for the capitulation, 
 which were to be carried on in Donchery, I drove to the battle- 
 field, according to agreement, at eight o'clock, and met Moltke, 
 who was coming to obtain my consent to the proposed capitu- 
 lation, and told me, at the same time, that the Emperor had 
 left Sedan at five o'clock in the morning, and had come to 
 Doncbery. As he wished to speak with me, and as there was 
 a chateau and park in the neighbourhood, I chose this for our 
 meeting. At ten o'clock I reached the height before Sedan. 
 Moltke and Bismarck appeared at twelve, with the capitulation 
 
72 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 duly signed. At one o'clock I started again with Fritz, 
 escorted by the cavalry staff. I alighted before the chateau, 
 where the Emperor came to meet me. His visit lasted a 
 quarter of an hour. We were both much moved at meeting 
 again under such circumstances. What my feelings were, 
 considering that I had seen Napoleon only three years before 
 at the summit of his power, is more than I can describe. 
 
 " After this meeting, from half-past two to half-past seven 
 o'clock, I rode past the whole army before Sedan. 
 
 i( The reception given me by the troops, the meeting with 
 the Guards, now decimated — all this I cannot describe to- 
 day. I was much touched with so many proofs of love and 
 devotion. 
 
 " Now, farewell, with a heart deeply moved at the conclu- 
 sion of such a letter. 
 
 " WlLHELM." 
 
 The Emperor passed the night at the chateau, and 
 on the following morning (3rd) about 9 a.m. the 
 Imperial cortege started for Libramont in Belgium. 
 The Belgian Government, in answer to the applica- 
 tions of both sovereigns, had previously given leave 
 for the passage of the Emperor and his suite through 
 Belgium ; and the route chosen was by road through 
 Bouillon to Libramont, a station on the Luxembourg 
 and Brussels railway, thence through Liege to Verviers, 
 where the Emperor was to sleep, and so by Cologne to 
 Cassel. 
 
 The carriages were escorted by two troops of Black 
 Hussars, who rode uncloaked, notwithstanding the 
 heavy rain which was falling. The Emperor, accom- 
 panied by Achille Murat, was in a brougham, and was 
 dressed in the undress uniform of a Lieutenant-General, 
 
DEPARTURE OF NAPOLEON TO GERMANY. 73 
 
 with the Legion of Honour on his breast. To those 
 who saw him pass, he looked pale, tired, and anxious, 
 but still calm and free from nervousness. A long 
 string of Imperial carriages followed, containing 
 French and German officers, and then a number of 
 mounted French officers, grooms, led horses, fourgons, 
 &c. It is worthy of remark that the Imperial servants 
 and horses were as well turned out and as splendidly 
 appointed as in the piping times of peace at Paris. 
 
 Every courtesy and respect were shown to the 
 Emperor throughout the route to Cassel, where he 
 was received with military honours, and attended by 
 Generals von Plonski and Grafmonts, Governor of the 
 city of Cassel, and Captain von Dupenbrock Gruiter, 
 commanding the hussars stationed at the palace. 
 Among others of his recent favourites, he had with 
 him Generals Felix Douav and Lebrun. In his 
 temporary captivity I shall now leave him, and return 
 to the events that took place at Sedan after the 
 capitulation. 
 
 Having returned from signing the capitulation, 
 General de Wimpffen had the following proclamation 
 posted over the town : — 
 
 " Soldiers ! — Yesterday you fought against very superior 
 forces. From daybreak until nightfall you resisted the 
 enemy with the utmost valour, and expended almost your 
 last cartridge. Exhausted by the struggle, you were unable 
 to respond to the appeal made to you by your generals and 
 your officers to attempt to gain the road to Montmedy, and 
 to rejoin Marshal Bazaine. Two thousand men only were 
 able to rally, in order to make a supreme effort. They were 
 
74 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 compelled to stop at the village of Balan, and to return to 
 Sedan, where your general announced, with deep sorrow, that 
 there existed neither provisions nor ammunition. The defence 
 of the place was impossible, its position rendering it incapable 
 of offering resistance to the numerous and powerful artillery 
 of the enemy. The army collected within the walls of the 
 town, unable either to leave it or to defend it, and means of 
 subsistence for the inhabitants and the troops being wanting, 
 I have been compelled to adopt the sad resolution of treating 
 with the enemy. Having proceeded yesterday to the Prussian 
 head-quarters, with full powers from the Emperor, I could 
 not at first resign myself to accept the clauses which were 
 imposed. It was only this morning, when threatened by a 
 bombardment to which we had no means of replying, that I 
 determined to make further efforts, and I have obtained con- 
 ditions which relieve you as far as possible from the humili- 
 ating formalities which the usages of war usually exact under 
 such circumstances. Nothing now remains for us, officers 
 and soldiers, but to accept with resignation the consequences 
 of necessities against which an army could not struggle — 
 want of provisions and deficiency of ammunition. I have at 
 least the consolation of having avoided a useless massacre, 
 and of preserving to the country soldiers who are capable at 
 some future time of rendering good and brilliant service. 
 
 " De Wimpffen, 
 
 " General Commanding-in-Chief." 
 
 The scene in the town on the terms of the capitula- 
 tion becoming known beggars description, and I have 
 been assured by eye-witnesses and by the inhabitants, 
 that the disorganization that prevailed was so dan- 
 gerous, and there was such a scarcity of provisions, 
 that the civilians were glad to receive their conquerors 
 with civility. The men vowed they had been betrayed, 
 and threatened their officers with assassination, and 
 
STATE OF THE TOWN. 
 
 75 
 
 indeed General de Failly narrowly escaped their 
 vengeance. Some were boastful, others seemed 
 inclined still to fight, whilst a very large proportion, 
 seeking to drown their shame in liquor, staggered 
 about intoxicated, dangerous alike to friend and foe. 
 Discipline was conspicuous only by its absence. Not 
 one regiment could muster its scattered units, who 
 wandered about a prey to conflicting passions, seeking 
 on whom to vent their curses and chagrin. Many of 
 them, indeed, were wounded, but found no means avail- 
 able for the dressing of their wounds. Gruns, waggons, 
 and caissons blocked the extremely narrow streets; 
 and one of the most piteous sights was that presented 
 by the horses, who in many cases tied to gun and 
 waggon wheels, and abandoned by their riders, and 
 furious with hunger, squealed and kicked in their 
 endeavours to get free, and many of them succeeding 
 in their endeavour, dashed wildly about in their 
 paroxysms of fear and hunger. Dead horses were cut 
 up and eaten by the soldiers ; human corpses lay here 
 and there ; abandoned arms and equipment of all 
 kinds littered the streets; the rain poured down in 
 torrents, and the streets seemed a perfect pande- 
 monium, and presented an ever-changing scene of 
 horrors to the unwilling observer. With reference to 
 the destruction of arms I should add that quantities of 
 arms of all kinds, equipment, and even mitrailleuses, 
 were thrown into the Meuse to prevent their falling 
 into the enemy's hands, and the eagles were burnt or 
 broken up. Indeed, fishing arms out of the Meuse 
 
76 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 afforded amusement to the German garrison for many 
 a day afterwards. 
 
 19,000 French troops succeeded in escaping into 
 Belgium, where they were disarmed and interned; 
 and a similar fate befell a large number of German 
 wounded. The wounded of both sides were sent to 
 Namur. 
 
 On the 3rd Sedan was delivered up to the Germans, 
 and the French prisoners, accompanied by many of 
 their officers, who refused to give their parole not to 
 fight against the enemy during the rest of the 
 campaign, were marched out to a great camp formed 
 on the peninsula made by the bend of the Meuse, 
 according to the terms of the convention. Luckily no 
 collisions occurred, owing to the exertions of the 
 French officers and to the judicious management of 
 the Germans, who avoided as much as possible any 
 direct contact with their prisoners. 
 
 The prisoners were afterwards sent to Germany 
 under escort at the rate of about 10,000 a day. 
 
 About 95,000 prisoners fell into the conquerors' 
 hands, besides an enormous number of guns and horses ; 
 in fact persons in the vicinity bought up horses for 
 five and ten francs apiece. The number of cannon 
 and mitrailleuses taken was very large, and they 
 covered acres of ground when parked, and many of 
 them were used by the Germans in their subsequent 
 sieges of Verdun and Mezieres. 
 
 I have chosen the following as one of the most com- 
 plete accounts of the after-scenes on the field of battle. 
 
DEPARTURE OP FRENCH PRISONERS. 
 
 77 
 
 The correspondent of the 'Daily News' writes as 
 follows : — 
 
 " The evacuation of the town has gone on in earnest to- 
 day. Already there is a great camp on the peninsula within 
 the bend of the Meuse. The prisoners taken in the battle 
 have gone away in strong detachments, guarded by German 
 troops ; and those who were upon the rainy, muddy road to 
 the rear last night, as was the present writer, saw columns 
 of Frenchmen tramping briskly along, with the German 
 escort marching by their side in the worst of humours at 
 being so employed, and with blankets muffled over the men's 
 heads to keep off the rain. Well might the villagers stare 
 at so novel a sight — their own countrymen blocking the way, 
 but blocking it as prisoners — their own uniform dragged to 
 prison, as if it were a capital crime to be a Frenchman. The 
 poor folks seemed chiefly anxious to avoid further loss, and 
 chiefly suspicious of soldiers of any kind. But it was clear 
 that amid all their terror and all their fear of downright 
 starvation, they had a warm corner in their hearts for the 
 lads of their own language and nation. I have seen many 
 women to-day cooking for the prisoners and trying to push 
 through the crowd to bring them small dainties. In the 
 church at Donchery there were hundreds of French soldiers 
 collected this morning. Cavalry and infantry, Zouaves and 
 Cuirassiers, huddled together in marvellous fashion. The 
 smart, dashing men whom we have seen when we travelled 
 through France were reduced to a condition of semi-shabbi- 
 ness and blank despondency which was something new to see. 
 They were wont to be the gayest fellows in the world, and 
 here were rolled up, tumbled over, and generally ' done for,' 
 by men whom they had been rash enough to despise. 
 
 " I rode over the greater part of the battle-field yesterday 
 morning — the morning after the fight. It was a shocking 
 thing to see so many dead men and wounded men, and dead 
 and wounded horses, crowded together in some places. It 
 
78 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 was a sight to cause reflections, as the old Frenchman said 
 who lived in the village where the fighting had been hottest. 
 "Ah! mon Dieu, monsieur, c'est la la guerre." He took a 
 sombre view of la guerre, for the scene was horrible. With 
 two friends who were anxious to study the positions of the 
 armies contending on September 1st, I went round through 
 Donchery and past the great bend of the Meuse, came 
 towards the French lines as the 11th Prussian Corps had 
 come, and pushing southward between the outposts of the 
 hostile armies, traversed the railway bridge at Bazeilles, to 
 return to head-quarters. The first sign of active and imme- 
 diate war was the block of prisoners at Donchery. There 
 they were, of all arms of the service, the dark-faced Turco 
 and the young boyish conscript, collected in a mass, ready to 
 be marched away. The plain beyond Donchery was covered 
 with slightly-wounded men wandering to the rear. French 
 and German, friend and foe, it mattered not ; they went 
 amicably along, the common suffering making them friends. 
 No one seemed to dream of further violence and further 
 fighting. The battle was over, and they were glad to creep 
 together to the rear, with little civilities exchanged in the 
 way of pipe-lights and sips of brandy, and with no more 
 hostile feeling than two patients already in an hospital. 
 We passed hundreds of them as we went round the bend of 
 the stream and came upon the first signs of the conflict of 
 the day before. There was a dead horse, a cuirass, a heap 
 of broken weapons. In this cottage were several wounded 
 Frenchmen, taking some soup with a wounded Prussian, who 
 seemed almost too much hurt to eat. Behind the garden 
 wall was a dead cuirassier, his hands clutching the grass in 
 the agony of death, his face stern and determined. No one 
 noticed him any more than if he were a dead horse. In 
 quiet England whole districts will turn out to see a murdered 
 family, and here on a battle-field the same murdered family 
 would be trampled into the mud without being noticed. 
 This meadow on the hill-side is full of mangled horses and 
 
SCENES ON THE BATTLE-FIELD. 
 
 79 
 
 dead cuirassiers. It was here that they made a frantic 
 attempt to break through, and were mowed down by the 
 Prussian fusillade. You must have been on several battle- 
 fields to understand the signs of what has taken place by the 
 look of the spot next morning. This group of dead horses, 
 with a helmet or two and a dozen cuirasses, with a broken 
 trumpet and three dead cuirassiers, means serious work. The 
 dark stains on the ground are where the wounded have lain 
 and been removed. The little heap of swords under that 
 hedge is where some dismounted troopers were forced to sur- 
 render. Then we come to Prussian helmets crushed and 
 trampled. Some are marked by shell or bullet, and have 
 blood upon them. They tell of loss to the regiment to which 
 they belonged. Others have no particular trace of violence, 
 and may either be signs of wounded men, or of men who 
 have simply thrown their helmets away in the heat of action, 
 and put on their forage caps to march more lightly. These 
 dark stains, surrounded by knapsack and rifle, by great-coat 
 and cooking-tin, are where men have lain who have been 
 badly wounded, or even killed, but whose friends have made 
 them as comfortable as could be under the difficulties of the 
 time. One has a little shelter of twigs and branches put to 
 keep off the sun ; another has had a blanket propped on two 
 rifles, and his knapsack for a pillow. But he has died in the 
 night, and is left with his cloak over his face until the burying 
 party shall come round. See yonder drums and knapsacks, 
 stains of blood, and dead men lying on their faces. It is 
 where a blow has been struck at some infantry regiment. 
 The men have fallen under a musketry fire, and the line of 
 dead shows where the ground was held. Come a few steps 
 farther to the rear. You perceive a few more dead men, 
 shot whilst in flight, and a number of bright, well-cleaned 
 rifles scattered on the turf. This is where the regiment 
 broke and fled, where some perished with their backs to the 
 foe and others threw down their arms. We might gather 
 the minutest details of the loss on either side if only human 
 
80 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 strength and energy sufficed to traverse this immense tract 
 in a single morning. When another day has passed, and the 
 dead are buried and the arms collected, it is difficult to judge 
 of the fight by seeing the ground ; whilst on the third or 
 fourth day, the dead horses become so much decayed that, 
 until they are removed, it is well-nigh impossible to move 
 about where they have fallen. All honour to the helpers of 
 the wounded — to the regular and volunteer hospital assistants. 
 Their red-cross badge must be a joy to many a sufferer ; and 
 though some who wear the badge seem disposed to " loaf " 
 about rather than to be helpful and active, yet the greater 
 part do their duty well. The better sort of volunteers in the 
 work — the Sisters of Charity and surgeons who have donned 
 the badge — are full of zeal. Some of the best families of 
 Germany are represented among these helpers of the 
 wounded ; there are several foreigners, too, engaged in the 
 common cause of humanity. Thanks to all that is done, the 
 wounded are so soon removed to villages, or placed under 
 some sort of shelter, that even next morning there are but a 
 few of them to be seen on the ground. They are being 
 brought to the nearest ambulance waggon on stretchers, with 
 many cries and groans, Heaven help them ! or are lodged in 
 a cottage near the field, or are carefully bandaged up and 
 laid on straw, and sent jolting painfully away in country 
 carts to a more remote hospital. 
 
 " We found the hill-side north-west of Sedan covered with 
 dead men and horses. The village in the hollow between 
 the hostile lines was not much knocked about, and there 
 were few shell-marks on the road leading up to the summit. 
 But once arrived at the point where the Prussian fire had 
 begun to tell, we found traces of its terrible effect. Here lay 
 a dead horse in the middle of the road, with saddle and 
 bridle, just as it had fallen. Here was a Frenchman shot 
 through the head, behind a small clump of earth, where he 
 had taken shelter in skirmishing. Then there were several 
 more horses and men lying upon the road ; and at length a 
 
SCENES ON THE BATTLE-FIELD. 
 
 81 
 
 slight breastwork to either side, carried along the ridge of 
 the hill, and full of French soldiers who had died in its 
 defence. The ground began to be ploughed up with the 
 shell-fire from the opposite rising ground, where the Prussian 
 artillery so long remained. Near the two trees and the 
 cottage prominent on the summit, were traces of the sharp 
 fighting which I had observed the previous day. 
 
 " A mitrailleuse battery, of four pieces, was surrounded 
 with dead bodies; horses and men were lying on all sides 
 — I cannot quite say in heaps, but very thickly scattered. At 
 one place there were horses as thick as they could lie. But 
 this was a little farther down the slope to the southward, 
 where I had seen that gallant cavalry charge. The Chasseurs- 
 a-cheval and the Chasseurs d'Afrique had dashed along the 
 hill-side, half-hidden in the dust which they raised, and had 
 been destroyed by a steady fusillade. Here lay the famous 
 light horsemen, with their bright uniforms dabbled in blood, 
 and their fiery little steeds crushed and mangled by Prussian 
 shells. Most of the men and horses now on the ground were 
 dead, but some few wounded men yet lingered in agony, with 
 white rings tied to sticks that were planted beside them as a 
 means of calling the surgeon's attention when he should have 
 time to revisit them. The badly wounded horses, more for- 
 tunate for once in being brutes, had been killed to put them 
 out of pain, and only a stray horse slightly wounded stood 
 dismally here and there, wondering, perhaps, what it could all 
 mean. Behind the scene of the light cavalry charge is a ra- 
 vine that separates this shoulder of the rising ground from 
 that immediately above Sedan. In the ravine there had been 
 great slaughter at the end of the fight, when the French were 
 crowded together from different points. Up behind the woods 
 on the farthest summit of the rising ground was all the debris 
 of a rout. It had been clear, even from a distance, that the 
 beaten army struggled hard. Yet, nevertheless, they had 
 been beaten, and here were arms thrown down, waggons aban- 
 doned, caps and coats, swords and rifles of every branch of the 
 
 G 
 
82 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 service, lying scattered on the ground. Some considerable body 
 of troops, cut off from Sedan by the advance of the Prussians, 
 had tried to break through to the town, and had been dispersed 
 or captured. The whole of the northward and north-eastward 
 slopes, at what we may call from this side the country, at the 
 back of the town, showed traces of this crowding together and 
 of the heavy cross-fire of German artillery, which had begun 
 so soon as the circle of the attack became narrowed to a 
 sufficient degree. Nearly 100,000 men, as now appears, were 
 hampered and shut in by less than 200,000 of their enemies. 
 No amount of devotion could extricate the French army when 
 once it had become the centre of a converging fire. The 
 ghastly wounds inflicted on most of the French dead, whom 
 I saw upon the hill, showed that they had fallen under an 
 artillery fire, and the ground was in many places so ploughed 
 up that a blanket could scarcely have been laid on it without 
 covering some spot where a shell had exploded. The thick 
 woods at the back of the town were full of wreck and rubbish 
 — abandoned waggons, with the dead horses at the side, to 
 show why they had been so left ; stores of biscuit, harness, and 
 soldiers' knapsacks were still very plentiful as one approached 
 the village of Bazeilles, southward of Sedan, where the Bava- 
 rians had fought. The village was on fire, and the streets 
 presented shocking sights to scare away the inhabitants again 
 for a couple of days more, should they now return. The half- 
 burnt bodies of Frenchmen and Bavarians were being brought 
 out from among ruins, and laid by the road-side. Men yet 
 living, but terribly wounded and scorched, were moved on 
 litters to beyond the st ifling smoke of the conflagration. There 
 was reason to fear that many poor lads had been literally 
 roasted when the fire came upon them, and their wounds 
 forbade all hope of escape. This village was, perhaps, the 
 gloomiest part of all the acres of pain and death spread around 
 Sedan. The interior of the town itself is said to be very much 
 injured, but that I have not yet had time to visit." 
 
 On the 3rd September the advanced guards of the 
 
THE GERMANS ADVANCE ON PARIS. 
 
 83 
 
 German army started for Paris. The 3rd Army 
 proceeded by Montmirail, Coulommiers, and Brie- 
 comte-Robert, while the combined army marched by 
 the valley of the Marne. In order to carry out this 
 arrangement the two armies had to cross each other's 
 route, and this their wonderful organization enabled 
 them to do at Eheims. My military readers will 
 appreciate the magnitude and danger of such an opera- 
 tion, and its successful issue speaks volumes for the 
 excellence of the staff. The subsequent acts of these 
 armies are now well known, and they pass out of 
 further notice in these pages, leaving us astonished at 
 the magnitude of their successes. 
 
 That Bazaine by some means or another was aware 
 of the date on which MacMahon should have been in 
 his vicinity is evident from the fact that on the 31st 
 August he attacked the 1st Army Corps of Prussians, 
 the division of General Kummer, and the 4th Land- 
 wehr division on the east side of Metz in great force ; 
 but though the French fought through the night till 
 the 1st September, they were beaten back at all points 
 by the Germans, who by means of a telegraphic cordon 
 they had established were enabled rapidly to concen- 
 trate their troops to repel them. 
 
 This sortie of Bazaine's convinces me that though 
 MacMahon's attempt to relieve Metz was a very rash 
 and dangerous strategical movement, yet that had he 
 marched more rapidly and warily it is quite possible 
 his object might have been achieved, and fresh lustre 
 been added to the arms of France. The material he 
 
 u 2 
 
84 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 had at hand, however, was to a certain extent very 
 inferior ; and much of the bad marching of the French 
 may, I think, be ascribed to the ridiculous system of 
 overloading their soldiers, who are required to carry 
 the enormous weight of 75 lbs., made up as follows, 
 viz. : — Chassepot rifle, 7f lbs. ; bayonet and scabbard, 
 3 lbs. ; ammunition, 93 rounds, 10 lbs. (distributed in 
 pouches and knapsack) ; 1 pair of shoes ; canvas havre- 
 sack, great-coat, blanket, pair of trowsers, comb, 
 brushes, housewife, 2 pair socks, 3 shirts, 4 lbs. rations, 
 water bottle, canvas of tente d'abri, and some of the 
 sticks for it ,• a camp kettle to every five men. Be- 
 sides the above many of them carry entrenching tools. 
 The Prussians on the other hand have an equipment 
 very similar in weight to our own, and carry 72 rounds 
 of ammunition. They have their knapsacks carried 
 for them on carts whenever expeditious marching is 
 required. This was the case before Sedan, and doubt- 
 less to this w T ise provision much of their success may 
 be attributed. To enable them to do this the Germans 
 have the Prussian Intendantur system, based on the 
 principle of dividing and subdividing the responsibility 
 into different sections, and applied even to regiments ; 
 in opposition to the French centralization system. 
 Each German corps d'armee has its provision column, 
 divided again into five columns (under proper officers), 
 and all liable to be subdivided into smaller bodies if 
 required ; each division or subdivision has a respon- 
 sible head, and any errors or shortcomings can at once 
 be brought home to the right person. The infantry 
 
THE INTENDANCE OF BOTH ARMIES COMPARED. 85 
 
 battalion, about 1,030 strong on active service, has its 
 ammunition waggon, a cart for the regimental books 
 and pay chest, a hospital cart, an officers' baggage 
 fourgon, and 18 horses. A cavalry regiment, about 
 700 strong, has four squadron waggons, one officers' 
 baggage waggon, one field forge, and a hospital cart, 
 for the draught of which 16 horses are allowed. 
 
 Each artillery regiment has nine ammunition 
 columns, consisting of 49 waggons and 344 horses, 
 subdivided into two divisions to supply ammunition to 
 the guns, as well as for the small arms of the cavalry 
 and infantry. 
 
 Besides these the artillery have further large reserves 
 of ammunition to feed the afore-mentioned columns. 
 
 With so excellent an organization it cannot be won- 
 dered at that there was never a want of ammunition in 
 the field ; and this contrasts most favourably with the 
 French Intendance, which frequently failed to supply 
 the troops in action with ammunition, besides suffering 
 from the constant break-down of its provision trains. 
 The Emperor's advisers preferred the system of cen- 
 tralization, basing it on the supposition, that it would 
 be too expensive to maintain separate materiel for 
 every regiment. 
 
 The French Intendance monopolizes all the supply 
 and transport branches of the service, and nothing can 
 be done without reference to the central authority. 
 The delays this caused to the French in the late war 
 may be easily imagined, and the inconvenience and 
 difficulty of expansion of the system condemned it at 
 
86 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 once when placed in juxta-position with that of Ger- 
 many. Eapid movements are essential to success in 
 modern warfare, but no commander can advance unless 
 assured of supplies of provisions and ammunition for 
 his troops ; and the dilatory movements of MacMahon 
 are in a great measure attributable to his anxiety on 
 that point, as not all the gallantry of his best soldiers 
 could compensate for a want of supplies and an ill- 
 managed Intendance. 
 
 But I must not dilate on what is at once so interest- 
 ing and so important, lest I should stumble lamely 
 through a subject that has already been so ably 
 treated by prominent writers of the day ; but before 
 summing up the principal causes of the failure of the 
 French arms, I intend to touch very lightly on the 
 rifles and cannon of the contending armies. Scientific 
 and professional men have already so well discussed 
 their respective merits that it would be idle on my 
 part to pretend to express any opinion concerning 
 them ; but as all of my readers may not have cared to 
 purchase the high-priced volumes in which many of 
 those opinions have appeared, I devote a few lines to 
 give the result of a contest, the issue of which exercised 
 so great an influence on the more important battles of 
 the campaign. 
 
 As the needle-gun of the Prussians was the first 
 breech-loading rifle that by its successful use attracted 
 the attention of Europe, I shall give it the precedence. 
 
 It was first patented in England in 1831 by a Mr. 
 Moser, and on an improved principle was first issued 
 
RIFLES OF BOTH ARMIES COMPARED. 
 
 87 
 
 to the Prussian troops in 1848 ; and though it has 
 undergone certain modifications in its construction, the 
 weapon of the present day varies but little from that 
 of '48. For those who desire a detailed account of its 
 mechanism, I think I cannot do better than refer my 
 readers to Captain Hozier's work on the war, published 
 in parts, in which I believe a very interesting descrip- 
 tion of its working, as well as that of the chassepot, 
 will be produced. 
 
 The chassepot was the pet weapon of the late 
 Empire, and was on its trial during the recent war. It 
 was invented especially to compete with the needle- 
 gun, and its superiority to the latter has certainly been 
 proved in the severe test it has undergone. The 
 chassepot has an initial velocity of 1,328 feet per 
 second ; the needle-gun of 990 feet per second. At 
 300 paces it scatters nearly double what the needle- 
 gun does — this is a disadvantage. It can be fired 10^ 
 times per minute, while the needle-gun can only be 
 discharged 7| times. 
 
 Its cartridges are smaller, and consequently more of 
 them can be carried — a great advantage in the eyes 
 of a French soldier, who fires in a great measure at 
 random, and presents a great contrast to the phleg- 
 matic and cautious Teuton. It carries effectively 1,800 
 yards, while the needle-gun can be depended upon 
 only up to 600 yards. The advantage of so long an 
 effective range must be patent to the most casual 
 observer, but the French soldier nullified this great 
 advantage by his random firing. Had it been in the 
 
88 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 hands of the Germans it would have been murderous 
 in its effect ; and they themselves frequently acknow- 
 ledged to me its superiority. 
 
 The mitrailleuse, another introduction of the Im- 
 perial regime, did not quite answer the expectations pre- 
 viously formed of it. Without an engraving of it it is 
 difficult to explain its construction. It is in reality a 
 series of rifled barrels, which by an ingenious mecha- 
 nism discharge about twenty-five balls at each turn of 
 the handle the soldier makes ; the director is able to dis- 
 charge one or all almost simultaneously. As the car- 
 tridges are ready fixed in the feed-cases, which are 
 placed in the mitrailleuse, the process of reloading is 
 very quick, and great rapidity of fire can be attained. 
 It carries about 2,000 yards, but is not considered a 
 great success, on account of its too concentrated de- 
 livery; where it strikes all must go down, but the 
 area over which it spreads is very small, and this 
 defect diminishes its importance as an effective weapon. 
 The French guns were chiefly muzzle-loading bronze 
 four and six pounders, carrying 15 lb. and 9 lb. shells 
 respectively ; while the Prussians used breech-loading 
 guns of similar weight and calibre. The trajectory of 
 the French gun, however, was very highly curved, 
 owing to the shape of the missile it projected and the 
 length of bore, and its initial velocity being small the 
 ball starts at as lower rate than that from the Prussian 
 gun, and opposing a larger area to the resistance of 
 the air it loses its velocity quicker. 
 
 The Prussian breech-loader was open to this objec- 
 
SUPERIORITY OF THE PRUSSIAN SHELLS. 
 
 89 
 
 tion, however, which I believe condemns it amongst 
 artillerymen in England, that after a few rounds there 
 was often great difficulty in opening the breech. 
 
 The Prussian concussion shells were much more 
 effective than the French shells exploded by time 
 fuzes, because the former striking the hard ground ex- 
 ploded most effectively, while the time fuzes generally 
 burst the French shells in the air, and it was much 
 more difficult to calculate the range. 
 
 The same remark applies to the artillery fire as to 
 that of the chassepot ; the French fired so rapidly 
 that they wasted most of their ammunition, while the 
 Germans, quite cool and acting on very strict scientific 
 principles, burst nearly every shell most effectively, 
 and the concentration of the fire from all points on the 
 unfortunate remnant of MacMahon's army at Sedan, 
 was a most successful and well-directed tactical 
 feature in the day's manoeuvres of so enterprising and 
 well- served an artillery. 
 
 But before passing on to finish my task, one most 
 important feature in the German armies that in a great 
 measure conduced to their superiority over the French ; 
 one cause of success that while adding to their mobility 
 blended the units of the army into a sentient machine ; 
 and for the absence of which no superiority of weapon 
 or organization could or would have compensated, must 
 not be overlooked. 
 
 Many of my readers will have anticipated what I 
 am about to refer to, and will endorse my views as to 
 the excellence of the German drill. 
 
90 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 The Germans used the company as their unit for 
 manoeuvring ; the French, the battalion. 
 
 In 1847 the Prussians adopted the system of 
 manoeuvring by companies ; their battalions were com- 
 posed of four companies, each about 250 strong, with 
 a mounted captain. Each battalion can at any moment 
 be broken up into four small columns, which are 
 formed by the breaking up of each of the four com- 
 panies into three subdivisions, each about 80 strong. 
 
 The captain thus commands a handy little battalion, 
 which he moves independently, unless otherwise or- 
 dered by the officer commanding. 
 
 It is needless to say that when this change was first 
 proposed it met with much opposition from the majors 
 and field officers, but the practical advantages of it 
 when tested in war became too apparent to allow their 
 prejudices to stand in the way of its adoption, and the 
 present system is nearly identical with that propounded 
 in 1847. 
 
 In the recent war the company column formation of 
 the Prussians has stood the severest practical tests, 
 and come victorious out of the contest ; wherever the 
 fighting was close and desperate; whenever rapid 
 movements were desirable, then and there it was re- 
 sorted to, and invariably with success. Covered by 
 skirmishers, these small and handy columns ever held 
 the ground they gained, and were not too unwieldy to 
 negotiate the difficult positions they so frequently had 
 to attack; besides which their numerical weakness 
 enabled them to find cover where a battalion would 
 
SYSTEMS OF DRILL COMPARED. 
 
 91 
 
 have stood but to have been decimated. The system 
 is at once so handy and convenient for the operation of 
 the breech-loader, and yet so loose, that none but highly- 
 disciplined troops, possessing an unshaken confidence 
 in their officers, could be trusted to work by it ; but 
 applied to the German armies it met with unmeasured 
 success ; and even when a temporary check was re- 
 ceived, or a retreat inevitable, no want of cohesion 
 ever presented itself, or permitted a retreat to become 
 a rout. Whether such a system could be successfully 
 applied to the French army is open to much doubt ; 
 but it could not experience a greater break-down than 
 that which befell the battalion unit system of the 
 French. They still stuck to their old traditions, but 
 trained their men to a looser method than before, and 
 in also employing masses of skirmishers rendered them 
 very mobile. But the free use of skirmishers necessi- 
 tates an amount of discipline, self-reliance, and con- 
 fidence in the officers that the French latterly wanted, 
 and that which proved an element of success in the 
 German army became a source of danger and failure 
 in the French. 
 
 The cavalry drill, too, of the Prussians was excel- 
 lent, but its chief merit lay not in the combined 
 movements of the mass, but in the instructions which 
 guided its units in making reconnaissances, in keeping 
 up the communications of the armies, in gaining infor- 
 mation of all kinds, and in so covering the flanks and 
 front of the advancing Teutonic hordes that the ill- 
 informed and badly-served French generals never knew 
 
92 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 whether their presence was due to the exigencies of 
 foraging, or whether it implied the propinquity of the 
 main army. The ubiquitous Uhlan, a name mis- 
 appropriately applied to all the German light cavalry, 
 is a European term herited from the late war; and 
 the whole cavalry force by its gallantry and dash have 
 achieved a well-deserved reputation. 
 
 With regard to its influence on MacMahons march 
 towards Metz much might be said, but I restrict 
 myself to the following remarks: — It gave the infor- 
 mation that enabled the Bavarians to surprise the 
 French at Beaumont, and the 3rd and 4th Armies 
 to combine on the 30th of August, and captured 
 numbers of prisoners, guns, and stores from the 
 retreating and routed columns of the enemy. It 
 covered the advance and swinging round of the 3rd 
 Army, and at the battle of Sedan materially assisted in 
 effecting the northern junction of the two German 
 armies. 
 
 I have alluded to the excellence of the German 
 artillery in a previous paragraph, and I only desire 
 to ascribe here much of its success to the admirable 
 Prussian tactical direction by which it was worked ; 
 the gist of all of which is that direct fire by masses of 
 artillery is of little avail, and to be avoided, but that 
 while batteries should be attached in great numbers to 
 an army they should have a common object to concen- 
 trate their fire on, and at the same time should do so 
 from such different positions as will enable them 
 mutually to bring a heavy cross and enfilade fire, if 
 
CAUSES OF THE FRENCH DEFEATS. 
 
 93 
 
 possible, to bear on the point of attack. And further, 
 rather in opposition to our own traditional instructions, 
 that artillery should act independently of infantry sup- 
 port. 
 
 How ably the German artillery fulfilled its mission 
 and acted up to these instructions at Sedan, and how 
 completely its batteries enfiladed the fortifications of 
 that fortress, and assisted the attack on Bazeilles and 
 Balan, we have already seen ; but I do not entirely go 
 with those who give it the only place of honour in the 
 success at Sedan, or attribute the French defeat there 
 to its influence alone. I rather incline to ascribe all 
 that took place there to a variety of causes, of which 
 it, however, forms an important one. And this appro- 
 priately leads me to the conclusion that from this 
 battle, as indeed from all those that preceded it, I am 
 justified in deducing the following causes of failure : — ■ 
 
 1st. The enormous difference in point of numbers 
 between the contending armies ; the Germans having 
 in this battle more than double the strength of their 
 adversaries. 
 
 2nd. The incapacity of the French Intendance to 
 furnish supplies of ammunition, provisions, and 
 stores. 
 
 3rd. The high state of organization of the German 
 armies, descending to such minor details as identifica- 
 tion tickets and grave-digging corps. 
 
 4th. The wastefulness of ammunition of the French 
 when using their chassepots. 
 
 5th. The admirable concentration of the German 
 
94 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 artillery fire on certain points from different positions, 
 and their numbers, weight of guns, range, and pre- 
 cision of fire. The first Napoleon used his artillery 
 in much the same way ; and the Germans attacked 
 Bazeilles under cover of its fire, and crossed the river 
 Meuse, getting close to the French centre, under cover 
 of the fog, as Napoleon L did at Austerlitz. 
 
 6th. The disparity between the training, education, 
 and position of the French and German officers. 
 
 7 th. The want of strategical genius to make up for 
 the German superiority in numbers. 
 
 8th. The strategical knowledge displayed by the 
 Germans, by means of which masses were brought to 
 bear on smaller bodies, and armies and corps separated 
 and beaten in detail ; and armies converged towards 
 each other and met at a given place on a given day 
 with mathematical accuracy. 
 
 9th. The unity of command in the German armies, 
 by means of which through the King, as Commander- 
 in-Chief, implicit obedience was yielded to General 
 Moltke's strategical directions, and the complete chain 
 of military command brought to bear on the execution 
 of them. 
 
 10th. And lastly, the inferior discipline and want of 
 cohesion in the French army, as compared with the 
 discipline, steadiness, and wonderful intelligence dis- 
 played by all arms of the German service; and 
 especially by the artillery in their knowing when to 
 advance unprotected by infantry, and what advan- 
 tageous positions to take up ; and by the cavalry, in 
 
DEFINITION OF " DISCIPLINE." 95 
 
 their scouring the country for intelligence, deceiving 
 the French as to the whereabouts of the main body, 
 and enabling their commanders to surprise the French, 
 ever heedless of such precautions, as at Beaumont, 
 where De Failly's corps was surprised and routed : all 
 of which shows the absolute necessity of teaching an 
 army in time of peace as far as possible the system 
 that it must follow in time of war. And before pro- 
 ceeding farther, I wish to lay before my readers the 
 meaning of the word discipline, as laid down by 
 Colonel Hamley, as I shall use it in two or three 
 places farther on : — " Discipline is a union of very 
 different qualities, each of which is an important 
 element in war. It means cohesion of the units and 
 suppleness of the mass ; it means increased firmness 
 and increased flexibility ; it means the most efficient 
 combination of many and various parts for a common 
 end." 
 
 Most people limit the causes of the misfortunes of 
 the late war, and the inefficient state in which the 
 declaration of war found the French army, to the 
 luxuries of the Empire and the system of centraliza- 
 tion prevailing in every department \ but in my 
 humble opinion, if we look below the surface, we shall 
 find much to account for the failure of the French 
 arms in the political state of the army at the outbreak 
 of the war. 
 
 Without doubt the nation, of which being conscript 
 the army was to a certain extent the reflex, had for 
 the last forty years been amassing enormous wealth, 
 
96 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 and had latterly hurried to make money to be spent 
 in the pleasures of the capital at a railroad pace. 
 The Emperor, understanding his people, had fostered 
 this commercial ambition, and sought to secure the 
 future of his dynasty by enriching their hearths 
 and homes, and by associating his name with every 
 great enterprise in art, literature, or commerce, as 
 his uncle's already was with the national military 
 glory. 
 
 The court was most luxurious, and among an imi- 
 tative bourgeoisie everything became subservient to 
 money. 
 
 The army did not escape the prevailing mania, and 
 its luxuries and excesses were winked at to keep it in 
 good humour till, demoralized by the material comforts 
 of civilization, it became enervated by a second 
 Capua. The pleasures of a luxurious life made fighting 
 unpleasant to the mass on the first reverses, and devoid 
 of the patriots' feelings, the scorn of death no longer 
 was their heritage. 
 
 The aristocracy of the army, however, and indeed 
 the mass of the officers, did not spare their best blood 
 to stem the torrent of invasion ; and fighting, as the 
 educated officers of every country have ever fought, 
 gave their lives for their country, preferring death to 
 dishonour, and added to the roll of those brave men 
 whose loss France is now lamenting. 
 
 Amongst the lower ranks, too, there were gallant 
 exceptions, and at Sedan, as on other battle-fields, 
 here and there groups of dead soldiers were found, 
 
SOURCES OF FRENCH MILITARY WEAKNESS. 97 
 
 who back to back had met their fate, weapon in hand, 
 and face to the foe. 
 
 I pass over the unfortunate break-down of the In- 
 tendance, and of the want of organization at the com- 
 mencement of the campaign, and I come to the political 
 cancer that had eaten into the heart of the French 
 army ; the pernicious doctrine of equality ; eighty 
 years before it had infected the nation, and then while 
 luxuries and absinthe rained their physique, this in- 
 sidious moral poison instilled itself into the veins of 
 the army. Discipline, as already defined, and sub- 
 ordination are essential to the success of an army, but 
 how can they exist alongside equality. The soldier 
 thought himself equal to his officer, and yielded but an 
 unwilling obedience. When promoted, having never 
 learnt to obey, he was seldom fitted to command. No 
 wonder success was wanting. To ensure it to an army 
 requires obedience, discipline, an absence of self, a 
 thirst for knowledge, a disregard of danger, and the 
 cheerful endurance of hardships, added to a perfect 
 organization in the civil departments. Politics must 
 be entirely excluded from it, and unfortunately these 
 elements of discord were but too present in the French 
 army. 
 
 In what I have written I trust I have given no 
 cause of offence. A more gallant army never faced 
 an enemy, and its heroism and valiant deeds do not 
 suffer by comparison with the doings and traditions of 
 a past century ; but I have only tried to touch on 
 some of the causes of its temporary failure to beat 
 
 H 
 
98 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 back the invader ; causes which doubtless by this 
 time it has itself eradicated. 
 
 The German army on the other hand has had a 
 different watchword, which has successfully carried it 
 through the fiery ordeal it has just undergone — obe- 
 dience to constituted authority ; there is the clue to its 
 success ; the main-spring that, having set in motion 
 the whole, has maintained its units, performing with 
 assured regularity their allotted task. No insidious 
 poison has been there, working to defeat the object of 
 the guiding hand; the master mind, planning the 
 most marvellous and wise combinations, the result of 
 sound practical study, has had but to turn the key 
 and set the machine in motion, confident of the success 
 that must follow the movements of a body so consti- 
 tuted. 
 
 The Prussian army, of which the other German 
 armies are exact copies, is the representative of a well- 
 organized monarchy. 
 
 The King, its head, though a perfect autocrat, while 
 following the principles laid down and maintained 
 during two centuries by his wise and brave ancestors, 
 has led the cause of progress, and adopted such changes 
 and reforms as are calculated to strengthen his own 
 power, while improving the condition of his people. 
 Simple in his habits, and frugal to a degree, he has 
 imparted a healthy tone to society ; and the army, 
 composed of all classes of the people, conscript in the 
 widest sense of the word, has not failed to imitate so 
 good and so high an example. The officers as a rule 
 
SOURCES OF GERMAN MILITARY STRENGTH. 99 
 
 belong to the aristocratic portion of the community, 
 and while exacting implicit obedience from those under 
 their command yield implicit obedience to their supe- 
 riors, and are an element of strength to the Crown and 
 the army. The soldier is sufficiently educated by a 
 paternal Government to appreciate the fact that unity 
 and obedience, which constitute discipline, are essential 
 to success in military matters ; and he therefore sinks 
 his political identity for the two or three years during 
 which he is called upon to serve, and becomes a living 
 machine, thinking only on such occasions as his 
 superiors require him to ; and at the conclusion of his 
 service he carries back to his family the habits of 
 order and discipline he has acquired in the army, and 
 his children, and consequently the nation, cannot but 
 profit hereafter by his influence. 
 
 The officers, instead of spending their time at the 
 cafes, and wasting their energies under the influence of 
 absinthe, direct their attention to the studies of war, 
 theoretical or practical, as they may have opportunity, 
 and gain the confidence of their men and a knowledge 
 of their temperaments and habits by a judicious inter- 
 mixture, and by showing their fitness for command. 
 
 Under such a system, where no link of the chain is 
 wanting to bind together king and peasant, where all 
 have had for years but one common object in view, 
 who can wonder at the success achieved ? One national 
 ambition has influenced the whole, and while raising 
 the Prussian monarch into a German Emperor has 
 disintegrated the neighbouring empire, and humiliated 
 
 h 2 
 
100 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 the people who made them drain the cup of degradation 
 to the dregs after Jena. Under such a constitution, and 
 with such a people, whose motto is " For God and for 
 the Fatherland," what great things may yet be done ! 
 What great things have already been achieved ! 
 
 One great cause of the German success that must 
 not be overlooked is the excellence of its staff, which 
 has from its honoured chief to its lowest grade evinced 
 such wonderful intelligence, and materially contributed 
 to the national success. Another is the perfection of 
 the German equipment, and the organization of their 
 admirable control departments of various branches; 
 and I think I may fairly ask the nation, Have we 
 these ? 
 
 My remarks have already exceeded the limits I had 
 intended, but I cannot conclude without a few words 
 on the gallantry and patriotism of Marshal MacMahon, 
 whose name will ever be identified with the battle of 
 Sedan. 
 
 With reference to his strategy before Sedan we must 
 remember that he was terribly hampered by the in- 
 structions he received from the Government at Paris, 
 and the tardiness of his movements in the march from 
 Eheims towards Metz may be in some measure attri- 
 buted to the inferiority of a large portion of his troops, 
 and of the inability of the In tendance to forward his 
 supplies. His personal gallantry on all occasions, his 
 great tactical skill, and his patience and endurance 
 under defeat must ever stand forth as bright spots in 
 his military career ; and I trust in holding him up in 
 
BELIEF OF THE SICK AND WOUNDED. 101 
 
 these pages to the British soldier as one whose gallant 
 deeds are most worthy of emulation, I shall not be 
 overstepping the limits of military etiquette. What- 
 ever his faults and the mistakes he committed, no dis- 
 honourable act has ever been imputed to him ; and 
 while the position he now holds in France shows the 
 estimation he is held in by the nation, his name will 
 go down to posterity as of one sans peur et sans 
 reproche. 
 
 If I have said ought to offend, my professional zeal 
 must stand charged with it, as I have written these 
 few pages with feelings of the highest admiration for 
 both armies. Where two contend one mast fail ; but 
 it is not always the victor who comes best out of the 
 conflict. 
 
 And thinking of the consequences of a battle and of 
 war in general I cannot omit to give my humble tes- 
 timony to the self-denial and unsparing efforts of the 
 agents of the International and other Red Cross 
 societies to alleviate the miseries of the sick and needy, 
 exposing themselves willingly, as they did, both male 
 and female, to dangers of which many of us in our 
 quiet English homes can form no idea. In the hospitals, 
 on the field of battle, and on the line of route from 
 place to place, they encountered difficulties and ran 
 risks which must have been seen to be appreciated ; 
 and though occasionally some injudicious members of 
 their craft clashed with the authorities, and were very 
 properly excluded from the service, still they did as 
 a body a vast amount of good; and many a con- 
 
102 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 valescent soldier has returned to his home and people 
 to speak with grateful recollection of the kind hand 
 and sympathizing foreigner, who bound up his wounds 
 and lightened his hours of weary pain. 
 
 Military writers will without doubt deduce much 
 that will prove valuable and instructive to us from 
 the incidents of this great war, of which the battle of 
 Sedan forms so interesting a feature ; and leaving to 
 them a task so difficult, and yet so necessary, I turn to 
 Colonel Hamley's ' Operations of War,' written some 
 time since, and there find a passage which conveys in 
 much clearer and more suitable terms than any in 
 which I could hope to express it, the lesson I desire to 
 convey from the result of this great war to the military 
 student and the public at large; and that is: — "Not 
 that numbers and wealth must prevail, nor that great 
 generals are heaven-born ; it is on the contrary that 
 the conditions of success are attainable and capable of 
 demonstration ; that the preparation of study and 
 thought is essential to skill in war; and that being 
 thus prepared, a leader, in order to achieve the most 
 notable successes, need not be gifted with inspiration, 
 but only with the more appreciable, though still rare 
 combination of sound sense, clear sight, and resolu- 
 tion." 
 
( 103 ) 
 
 " STBATEGY AND TACTICS DEFINED." 
 
 Having lately heard much discussion as to the correct 
 definitions of the military terms, " Strategy " and 
 " Tactics," and having seen them recently misapplied, 
 I venture to lay before my readers the definitions of 
 those terms as given by several well-known military 
 writers, in the hope that those who do not endorse 
 them, more especially referring to those in a position 
 to speak with some weight and authority, may be 
 induced to express their views on the subject in the 
 public journals, and thereby profit the public in 
 general, and the military student in particular. 
 
 To save trouble to those who may not have time to 
 search for themselves, or who do not know where to 
 lay their hands on books likely to contain definitions 
 of these terms, I append extracts in full from the 
 works of Jomini, Humbert, Ambert, Hamley, and 
 Macdougall, all celebrated writers on military subjects, 
 whose opinions are generally received as authorities 
 by the curriculum of military history. 
 
 In the ' Etudes Tactiques ' of General Baron Ambert 
 we find the following passages : — 
 
 " Si l'officier desire connaitre la tactique du champ de 
 bataille, c'est-a-dire la combinaison des armes entre elles, il 
 doit avoir recours a l'etude particuliere et consul ter les 
 ouvrages qui traitent de la guerre. Or, ces ouvrages le 
 
104 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 transportent, sans transition, du terrain de manoeuvre de la 
 garnison, dans le domaine de la strategie, que Napoleon I er 
 nomme la ' grande tactique.' 
 
 " Ce domaine est celui des generaux en chef. L 'esprit de 
 l'officier particulier s'y trouble, et son regard se perd dans 
 l'immensite de savantes combinaisons." 
 
 The Baron evidently intends the above definition of 
 " la grande tactique " to represent what we know as 
 " Strategy." 
 
 While he defines " Tactics " as follows : — 
 
 " II existe cependant un domaine intermediaire qui serait 
 celui de la ' petite tactique,' tactique du champ de bataille, 
 et qui consiste a connaitre l'emploi d'une arme associee et 
 oppose'e aux autres armes. 
 
 " C'est, dans la science de la guerre, la partie utile aux 
 generaux, colonels et officiers superieurs. C'est le cote pra- 
 tique du metier de chef de colonne et de commandant de 
 ligne." 
 
 Baron Jomini in his ' Precis de l'Art de la Guerre,' 
 in explaining the five heads into which he divides the 
 art of war, writes : — 
 
 " La 2 e est la strategie, ou l'art de bien diriger les masses 
 sur le theatre de la guerre, soit pour l'invasion d'un pays, soit 
 pour la defense du sien. 
 
 " La 3 e est la grande tactique des batailles et des combats. 
 
 "La 6 e est la tactique de detail." 
 
 Humbert, chef d'escadron, gives a more elaborate 
 definition of these terms in a work published by him 
 in 1866, and I subjoin selections from it : — 
 
 "Strategie. — La strategie peut etre definie la science des 
 conceptions et des directions ; elle consiste a faire la guerre 
 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS DEFINED. 105 
 
 sur la carte, et a determiner le plan de campagne : c'est la 
 science necessaire au general en chef. 
 
 " De la grande tactique. — La tactique en campagne sert a 
 appliquer les manoeuvres aux operations de la guerre ; c'est 
 sur le caractere des nations qu'elle doit etre basee, aussi 
 differe-t-elle ordinairement suivant les peuples." 
 
 And here he appends in a footnote an extract from 
 the writings of Jacquinot de Presle, which we might 
 almost imagine he had quoted in anticipation of the 
 late war, and which contains advice his countrymen 
 unfortunately neglected following : — 
 
 Footnote. — " Ainsi, chez un peuple vif, susceptible de pas- 
 sions violentes, la rapidite des mouvements et l'impetuosite 
 dans l'attaque sont necessaires; tandis que pour line nation 
 calme et tranquille le feu sera l'un des premiers elements de 
 sa force." 
 
 He then goes on to say : — 
 
 " La strategie combine et dirige de grands plans, la grande 
 tactique les execute, et par consequent lui est subordonne'e ; 
 celle-ci s'apprend, celle-la est pour ainsi dire innee. 
 
 " A defaut de regies absolues a poser, les souvenirs de 
 l'histoire ont servi a etablir un certain nombre de principes 
 generaux." 
 
 Footnote. — " Ces principes, qui ont de tout temps existe', 
 n'ont ete devoiles que recemment, a la suite des operations de 
 Bonaparte en Italie et du Prince Charles en Allemagne. 
 Alexandre, Annibal, et Cesar les avaient devines; G-ustave 
 Adolphe, le Prince Eugene, Turenne, et Frederic en avaient 
 fait de belles applications. 
 
 u Pour pouvoir appliquer judicieusement l'art de la grande 
 tactique, il faut connaitre les divers ordres de bataille en 
 usage, les manoeuvres et les marches, les positions militaires, 
 enfin le mecanisme des batailles. 
 
106 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OP SEDAN. 
 
 "Observons en outre que toute methode de guerre doit 
 se modifier suivant la configuration du terrain, et suivant le 
 moral ou les mouvements habitnels des adversaires. Des 
 manoeuvres invariables ne pouvaient amener a la longue que 
 des revers." 
 
 In Burn's ' Dictionary ' I find the following defini- 
 tions of Strategy and Tactics : — 
 
 Strategy. — " Science of military command, and of all the 
 operations of war." 
 
 Tactics. — "Science of military movements made in pre- 
 sence of an enemy, and within reach of his artillery; the 
 tactics of a soldier are the correct performance of military 
 movements ; those of the officer, to know how to direct their 
 execution ; and those of a general, to combine them in such a 
 manner as to ensure success." 
 
 Colonel Hamley, now a writer on military subjects 
 of European fame, gives a long but comprehensive ex- 
 planation of these two military terms. He commences 
 by summing them up briefly, and giving the key to 
 their meaning as follows : — 
 
 "The theatre of war is the province of Strategy. — The 
 field of battle is the province of Tactics." 
 
 Continuing, he says : — . 
 
 " It is the object of Strategy so to direct the movements of 
 an army, that when decisive collisions occur it shall encounter 
 the enemy with increased relative advantage. 
 
 " If two armies advance towards each other till they meet, 
 both equally covering their own communications, and equally 
 ready to concentrate for action, it is evident that Strategy 
 has no share in the result ; for all that has been done is to 
 bring them face to face, and leave it to force or tactical skill 
 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS DEFINED. 
 
 107 
 
 to decide the issue. But when the movements of one of two 
 armies have been so directed as to increase the chances in 
 its favour, by forcing the enemy either to engage at a dis- 
 advantage, or to abandon territory under penalty of worse 
 disaster, there is proof of a power which differs from the 
 mere ability to fight. 
 
 " The purely military advantages to be attained by strate- 
 gical operations are of two kinds : 1st. The probabilities of 
 victory ; 2nd. The consequences of victory. 
 
 " The triumph of Strategy is complete when the com- 
 mander of one side succeeds, by the combinations of the 
 campaign, in bringing his adversary's army into a position 
 where the chances of victory are greatly against it, and where 
 defeat will entail disasters beyond the loss of the battle. 
 
 " Strategical movements have the following objects : 1st. 
 To menace or assail the enemy's communications with his 
 base ; 2nd. To destroy the coherence and connected action of 
 his army, by breaking the communications which connect the 
 parts; 3rd. To effect superior concentrations on particular 
 points." 
 
 Colonel Macdougall, in his ' Theory of War/ treats 
 them in the following manner : — 
 
 " The arbitrary distinction which has been made by mili- 
 tary writers is that Strategy relates to the movements of an 
 army on the theatre of war, when not in actual presence or 
 eyesight of an enemy, however great or small the distance 
 which separates them; while Tactics relates exclusively to 
 the movements of an army when in the actual presence or 
 eyesight of an enemy. The following definition applies 
 equally to both : — 
 
 " Strategy and Tactics are the art of placing in a certain 
 position at a certain time (meaning the right position at the 
 right time) a body of troops in fighting order superior to that 
 body which your enemy can then oppose to you." 
 
108 
 
 MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE OF SEDAN. 
 
 In the 4 Penny Cyclopaedia ' we find Strategy de- 
 fined as follows : — 
 
 " Strategy (from the Greek arpar^yla, which may be trans- 
 lated ' Generalship ') is, properly, the science of combining 
 and employing the means which the different branches of 
 the art of war afford for the purpose of forming projects of 
 operations and of directing great military movements : it was 
 formerly distinguished from the art of making dispositions, 
 and of manoeuvring, when in the presence of the enemy : but 
 military writers now, in general, comprehend all these sub- 
 jects under the denominations of grand and elementary 
 tactics. 
 
 " Strategy consists chiefly in making choice of convenient 
 bases (fortified places or strong positions), in order to place 
 there in security the military establishments of an army; 
 such as the barracks, hospitals, and magazines of ammunition 
 and provisions, previously to commencing offensive opera- 
 tions, or in contemplation of the army being compelled to 
 act on the defensive. In the former case, it may be neces- 
 sary to decide on undertaking the siege of some fortress on a 
 frontier, for the purpose of holding the neighbouring district 
 in subjection, and commanding the roads by which it may be 
 thought convenient to penetrate into the enemy's country, or 
 by which the provisions and warlike stores may be brought 
 up to the immediate seat of war. In the latter case, choice 
 is to be made of positions strong by nature, or which may be 
 made so by art, in order that the army may be enabled to 
 dispute the ground gradually, to harass the enemy by fre- 
 quent skirmishes, or to prevent him from receiving supplies 
 by intercepting his convoys on the roads." 
 
 Tactics are defined in the following terms : — 
 "Tactics (raKTiKos) properly signifies the art of forming 
 the troops of an army in order of battle, and of making 
 changes in the dispositions of the army of either, according 
 as circumstances may require." 
 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS DEFINED. 109 
 
 I think I have quoted from sufficient authorities to 
 enable my readers to arrive at a definite conclusion as 
 to the correct meaning of these two terms, and also of 
 the manner in which they should be applied in refer- 
 ring to the incidents of a campaign ; and I shall con- 
 clude by giving as the result of my researches the 
 definitions, kindly sent to me by Colonel Chesney, R.E., 
 and inserted with his permission, and which it seems 
 to me, while embodying the views of the others, con- 
 dense the terms in which they are expressed, and in 
 terse and concise language convey their meaning to 
 the student, and leave but little opening for further 
 controversy : — 
 
 "An armed contest is in general, as Clausewitz shows, 
 composed of a number of distinct and complete acts, which 
 are in fact the actions, and which form units of themselves. 
 From this subdivision of a campaign or war there arise two 
 separate functions : the one being ' the arrangement and 
 management of the troops in action;' the other, 'the employ- 
 ment of actions for the general purpose of the war.' The first 
 constitutes ' Tactics ; ' the second, * Strategy.' 
 
 " Or, as the same authority elsewhere more briefly sum- 
 marizes it, Tactics teach ' the use of forces in action ; ' Stra- 
 tegy, ' the use of actions towards the object of the war J A 
 definition based, in my opinion, on principles much sounder 
 than those in ordinary military text-books." 
 
 FINIS. 
 
BOOKS AND PAPERS OP REFERENCE. 
 
 1. ' Des Causes qui ont amene" la Capitulation de Sedan.' Par un 
 
 Officier de 1'lDtat-Major (Napoleon III.). Bruxelles, 1870. 
 
 2. Dr. Eussell's « War Letters to The Times.' 1870. 
 
 3. 1 War Correspondence of the Daily News.' 1870. 
 
 4. ' War Correspondence of the Pall Mall Gazette.' 1870. 
 
 5. s Etudes Tactiques.' By General Baron Ambert. 
 
 6. ' Precis de l'Art de la Guerre.' By Baron Jomini. 
 
 7. Burn's 1 Dictionary.' 
 
 8. c Operations of War.' By Colonel Hamley. 
 
 9. * Theory of War.' By Colonel Macdougall. 
 
 10. 'Organization and Strength of the Hostile Armies.' By a 
 Staff Officer. 
 
 LONDON! PRINTED BT EDWARD STANFORD, 6 AND 7, CHARING CROSS, S.W. 
 
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