THE 
 
 THEORY OF TASTE 
 
 FOUNDED ON ASSOCIATION, 
 
 TESTED 
 
 BY AN APPEAL TO FACTS. 
 
 SIR GEORGE STEUART MACKENZIE, Bart. 
 F.R.SS.L, & E., F.S.S.A., &c. 
 
 * Opiuionum commenta delet dies, 
 NaturfT judicia confirmat.'--r?>. 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 EDINBURGH : 
 PRINTED FOR MACLACHLAN, STEWART & CO. ; 
 
 AND STMPKIN, MARSHALL, AND CO., LONDON. 
 MDCCCXLIT. 
 
4 
 
 MURRAY AND GIBB, PRINTERS, 21 GEORGE STREET, Et)iNBURGH. 
 
TO 
 
 WILLIAM AND ROBERT CHAMBERS, 
 
 THE ENLIGHTENED AND BENEVOLENT 
 
 INSTRUCTORS OF THE PEOPLE, 
 THIS ESSAY, 
 
 AS A CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THE DISPERSION OF ERROR, 
 AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRUTH, 
 IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED 
 BY 
 
 THE AUTHOPv. 
 
advertisement: 
 
 The following Essay was first published 
 in the year 1817 ; at a time when prejudice 
 was so strong, that nothing was more dis- 
 agreeable to the public than a call for 
 investigation. Consequently it attracted 
 scarcely any attention, but from those few 
 candid and high-minded persons, who per- 
 ceived the new light that had been shed 
 on mental philosophy, and were able to ap- 
 preciate its value. The author, in reality, 
 published his Essay too soon ; and even 
 now he might feel that the proper time had 
 not arrived, had it not been he was informed, 
 that some old speculations on Taste were 
 preparing for re-publication, together with 
 
vi 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 a defence of the Theory which he had un- 
 dertaken to dispute. Believing that the 
 world is not yet prepared with patience 
 enough to investigate the Theory with 
 which he would replace all former ones, 
 the author has confined himself, almost 
 exclusively, to a criticism of the Theory 
 most recently promulgated, and apparently 
 the most approved ; leaving it to other 
 hands to expound what will, in due time, 
 be universally acknowledged to be the b*ue 
 Theory of the Beautiful and Sublime. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, . . 9 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF THE MEANING OF THE WORDS BEAU- 
 TIFUL AND SUBLIME, . . 19 
 
 PART IL 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION, . 38 
 
 Sect. 1. — of the basis of the theory, . 38 
 
 Sect. 2. — of the theory as applied to form, . 49 
 
 Sect. 3. — op the theory as applied to colour, 123 
 
 Sect. 4. — of the theory as applied to sound, 159 
 
 PART III. 
 
 OF THE DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, 
 
 172 
 
THE THEOEY OF TASTE 
 
 FOUNDED ON ASSOCIATION 
 
 TESTED, 
 
 INTRO DUCTOBY REMARKS. 
 
 Of the different branches of metaphysical 
 inquiry, none, perhaps, has embarrassed the 
 speculations of philosophers more than that 
 known by the term Taste. On entering 
 into a subject of this kind, with views of 
 it considerably different from those enter- 
 tained by the eminent men who have dis- 
 played so much ingenuity and talent in 
 their attempts to establish their doctrines, 
 I might have felt diffident, were it not that 
 I have been confirmed in my opinions by 
 the observation of nature continued through 
 a period of twenty-five years ; and enabled 
 
 A 
 
JO 
 
 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 
 
 to state, that no theory can be true, but 
 one that has its foundations in nature. 
 Views of any subject, differing from those 
 commonly entertained, especially when the 
 Fatter appear variously modified, being likely 
 to excite discussion, and thus bring us 
 nearer to truth, I venture to submit to the 
 consideration of others, a detail of what has 
 occurred to me. 
 
 It has been truly remarked by a writer 
 in the Edinburgh Review, that ' The stu- 
 dies to which Mr Stewart has devoted 
 himself, have lately fallen out of favour 
 with the English public ; and the nation, 
 which once placed the name of Locke im- 
 mediately under those of Shakespeare and 
 of Newton, and has since repaid the meta- 
 physical labours of Berkeley and of Hume 
 with such just celebrity, seems now to be 
 almost without zeal or curiosity as to the 
 progress of the philosophy of mind.'* The 
 Same writer remarks that it would be curi- 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, vol. xvii. p. 167. 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. H 
 
 ous, and not uninstructive,to investigate the 
 cause of this distaste, but that the inquiry 
 would be laborious. The difficulty, however, 
 does not appear to be very great in assigning 
 a reason for the declining attractiveness of 
 the philosophy of mind. It is certainly not 
 to be found in the age having become fri- 
 volous and impatient of labour ; for it is 
 notorious that, in the present times, an in- 
 finitely greater body of talent is devoted to 
 scientific and other laborious pursuits, than 
 at any former period. Neither is the cause 
 to be found, as the writer I have quoted 
 seems to think, in the more general diffu- 
 sion of knowledge, nor in the multiplication 
 of its branches, which have given a character 
 to the present age. I attribute the decline 
 of metaphysical study, to the neglect of 
 the advice given by a sage of antiquity, and 
 in everybody's mouth, ' Know thyself.' 
 Man is now only beginning to study his 
 own nature ; and it is of infinite import- 
 ance to his welfare, that he should perse- 
 vere until he understands it. 
 
1^ INTRODUCTORY REMARKS- 
 
 But it is not alone ignorance of his own 
 nature, that leads man astray from the study 
 of mind. It is the apparent hopelessness 
 of discovering that of which he is in search, 
 which changes the direction of mental ef- 
 fort. 
 
 There is always, in the investigation of 
 matter, an apparent limit to inquiry in 
 every branch. The mathematician knows 
 the possibility of arriving at a demonstra- 
 tion of the correctness or fallacy of a the- 
 orem ; and he is tolerably certain that, of 
 every problem, there may be a solution 
 within the reach of human invention. The 
 chemist knows that a body is compound ; 
 that the means of analysing it are attain- 
 able, and that the . materials of the com- 
 pound may, by the discovery and proper 
 application of the means, be spread out 
 before him. In zoology, botany, and in 
 every branch of physical knowledge, there 
 is a prospect of reward for him who pursues 
 them ; and the attainment of the honour 
 of discovery, together with the application 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 
 
 18 
 
 of discovery to the increase of human com- 
 fort and happiness, appear, in such pursuits, 
 so nearly within our grasp, that the stimu- 
 his to active research is continually felt. 
 
 This is not the case with the investiga- 
 tion of any thing belonging to the invisible, 
 intangible mind. There is no such stimu- 
 lus ; there is no prospect of arriving at the 
 end of the analysis ; there is nothing to be 
 discovered which can directly be added to 
 the stock of human happiness ; there is no 
 honour of discovery ; no reward, except the 
 admiration excited by a display of exten- 
 sive reading, retentive memory, ingenious 
 observation, profound thought, and elegant 
 wri<;ing, — a reward, which, though great, is 
 not of that substantial kind which is chiefly 
 tempting to the exercise of talent. 
 
 The preference to the one kind of inves- 
 tigation over the other, is thus easily, and, 
 perhaps, accurately accounted for. The 
 conviction of the very small prospect of 
 substantial reward likely to be derived 
 from the investigation of mind, has been 
 
14 
 
 IXTIIODUCTOHY REMARKS. 
 
 strengthened by the apparent facility with 
 which one system is made to supplant 
 another, and by the risk of every new one 
 being in its turn overthrown. Each sys- 
 tem, on w^iichever branch of inquiry it may 
 be founded, seems, as it arises, to satisfy 
 scarcely any one but its author. The cause 
 of this dissatisfaction, which appears to have 
 been overlooked, perhaps also has contri- 
 buted to the relinquishment of metaphy- 
 sical studies. It seems to exist in every 
 investigator having considered, exclusively, 
 his own individual perceptions and con- 
 sciousness, as they happened to regard the 
 objects of his inquiry ; and from his having 
 set them up as a standard, to which th(*per- 
 ceptions and consciousness of every other 
 human being were to be referred. Hence 
 some philosophers have been accused of 
 indulging in reveries, others in wild fancies, 
 and many have been said to have yielded 
 to the whims of disordered imaginations. 
 It is no wonder, then, that men dislike ven- 
 turing into regions where they are exposed 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 
 
 15 
 
 to such unmerciful treatment, and prefer 
 the examination of physical subjects, to 
 the investigation of one which is not tan- 
 gible. 
 
 No theorist, who believes his own con- 
 sciousness and perception to be the proper 
 standard for all men, ought to expect any- 
 one to agree with him, who does not hap- 
 pen to have a similar standard perception 
 and consciousness. But such ill founded 
 expectation has probably been the cause 
 of theories of taste having so rapidly suc- 
 ceeded each other, and of their having left 
 so few traces of satisfaction behind them. 
 One individual may perceive that a build- 
 ing is before him, but may not be conscious 
 of those emotions which, he is told, are ex- 
 cited by it in the minds of others. Ano- 
 ther may be conscious of hearing sounds, 
 but he may not perceive those relations of 
 sound, which are employed in the compo- 
 sition of music ; while others are not only 
 conscious of hearing sounds, but are quick 
 in perceiving their relations, and take de- 
 
16 
 
 INXnODUCTOllY HEMARKS. 
 
 light in hearing them combined according 
 to these relations. 
 
 As it is a fact universally known, that 
 some individuals are always to be found, 
 to whom the scenes of nature impart no 
 pleasure ; in whom the skill of the archi- 
 tect, and the art of the sculptor, excite no 
 emotion ; and some to whom music is 
 merely noise ; we may reasonably ask, why 
 have philosophers neglected such facts ? Is 
 it not equally interesting and important to 
 inquire, why some men have no enjoyment 
 in what gives pleasure to others, as to la- 
 bour incessantly to discover the nature of 
 the enjoyment, in those who are capable 
 of receiving it ? Such questions tempted 
 me, after a very long interval, during which 
 I had submitted to the influence of those 
 causes to which I have attributed the ge- 
 neral neglect of metaphysical studies, to 
 resume the consideration of subjects which 
 I had in a manner forgotten ; and to en- 
 deavour to discover, Avhether the investi- 
 gation of the causes of variation in Intel- 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 
 
 17 
 
 lectual endowment might not lead into 
 some track by which we might at length 
 arrive at the great road to truth, and reach 
 the right explanation of the differences in 
 taste. 
 
 The progress towards the discovery of 
 truth, may be compared to the effects of a 
 spark of fire communicated to a combusti- 
 ble body. The rays emitted from the com- 
 bustion are, at first, feeble ; but they gra- 
 dually and constantly acquire new power, 
 till at length the light blazes in full re- 
 splendence, defying every effort to extin- 
 guish it. It may, notwithstanding, be 
 smothered, and prevented from bursting 
 into view, by the mists of prejudice, and 
 the clouds of bigotry. If I can contribute 
 to prevent its being yet longer smothered 
 (for I think the light has appeared), I may 
 believe that, in doing so, I act as every man 
 ought to do who loves truth, and desires to 
 see it established. 
 
PART T. 
 
 OF THE MEANING OF THE WORDS BEAUTIFUL 
 AND SUBLIME. 
 
 Nothing, perhaps, has so much retarded philo- 
 sophers in the investigation of subjects connect- 
 ed with Taste as the want of definition for the 
 terms employed ; and probably most people, who 
 begin to reflect on the meaning of the words 
 Beautiful and Sublime, are, at first, and it may 
 be permanently, in doubt regarding what they 
 are to understand by these signs. Mr Stewart 
 has well observed, that ' the function of language 
 is not so much to convey knowledge (according 
 to the common phrase) from one mind to ano- 
 ther, as to bring two minds into the same train of 
 thinking ; and to confine them, as nearly as pos- 
 sible to the same track. Many authors have 
 spoken of the wonderful mechanism of speech ; 
 but none has hitherto attended to the far more 
 wonderful mechanism which it puts into action 
 
20 OF THE MEANING OF THE WORDS 
 
 behind the scene.'* This, though it fully ex- 
 plains the cause of the endless variety of phrase 
 which may be used (and used with propriety 
 and effect) to express the same thing, does not, 
 perhaps, account for the extraordinary prostitu- 
 tion of the word Beauty. It appears to me to 
 have originated, not so much from too great an 
 anxiety to make ourselves understood, as from 
 the vain and silly conceit so often manifested, 
 by those who wish others to believe that they 
 know, and that they feel, a great deal more than 
 they actually know or feel. It is sufficiently no- 
 torious, that the propensity to exaggerate, has 
 added many useless words to our language, mar- 
 red the meaning of others ; and has even de- 
 stroyed confidence between man and man, and 
 set suspicion on the alert. While in many 
 cases, the propriety of using language originally 
 metaphorical, but w^hich has been brought to 
 signify what is definite may be admitted; the 
 propriety, or legitimacy, of many of the appeals 
 to ordinary language, which have been made in 
 support of some theories of taste, may not be al- 
 lowed. In ordinary language, custom reconciles 
 us to many expressions, which we should not 
 chuse to write. The playfulness of ordinary con- 
 Ph. Essays, p. 158. 
 
BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 
 
 21 
 
 versation, in which words are, unquestionably, 
 very frequently abused, ought never to serve as 
 an excuse for our not separating, in philosophical 
 discussions, propriety from abuse. 
 
 Lord Jeffrey (the lively, and very able author 
 of the article Beauty in the Supplement to the 
 Encyclopaedia Britannica) has observed, that ' the 
 words beauty and beautiful must mean some- 
 thing, and are universally admitted to mean 
 something much more definite than agreeableness 
 or gratification in general ; and while it is by no 
 means easy to define what that something is, the 
 force and clearness of our perceptions of it, is de- 
 monstrated by the readiness with which we de- 
 termine, in any particular instance, whether the 
 object of any pleasurable emotion is or is not pro- 
 perly described as beauty.""* That every one 
 has a clear perception of what he may chuse to 
 call Beauty, without being able to tell what it 
 is, is not to be wondered at while men continue 
 to believe Beauty to be something siii generis; 
 and while there is a great variety of causes 
 which give rise to the perception in different in- 
 dividuals. Mr Stewart has endeavoured to shew 
 that Beauty does not mean one thing, but 7nany 
 things ; and he has ingeniously attempted to ex- 
 Sup. Enc. Brit. vol. ii. p. 174. 
 
9.2 OF THE MEANING OF THE WORDS 
 
 plain, that the term Beautiful may originally 
 have been applied to colour as being agreeable to 
 the eye ; and that it may have been afterwards 
 extended to the agreeable impressions made by 
 other things on the other senses. 
 
 As all the senses are coeval, and as their sus- 
 ceptibility of being impressed both agreeably and 
 disagreeably must have been known, before the 
 invention of a term to convey that impressions 
 were felt, and why they were felt ; the conjec- 
 ture that the term Beautiful was first applied to 
 the agreeable impressions made upon the eye, is 
 scarcely more plausible, than if it had been made 
 with respect to the impressions which are agree- 
 able to the ear, the nose, or the tongue. Ad- 
 mitting, however, the conjecture to be right, 
 there does not appear any sufficient reason for 
 fixing on the impressions of colour in preference 
 to those of form. Colour is by no means so ge- 
 neral, nor so various, in its effects, as form ; and 
 it is probable, there is a far greater number of 
 persons who are capable of judging of form, than 
 of those who can judge of colonic We meet 
 with persons whose eyes do not enable them to 
 distinguish some colours ; but we seldom meet 
 with any v>'ho cannot distinguish forms. With- 
 out, however, disputing that beautiful was ori- 
 
BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 
 
 23 
 
 ginally used to denote the pleasure which colour 
 gives to the eye, I may observe, that leading us, 
 as Mr Stewart has done, to the first occasion of 
 the term being employed, proves that originally^ 
 it meant one thing ; for, although it might have 
 been very rapidly extended in its application, the 
 very term extension implies previous limita- 
 tion. 
 
 Beautiful must have been applied, originally, 
 either to some object possessing a quality which 
 conferred agreeable sensation to the eye, or to 
 the quality itself, or to the effects of the quality. 
 The following sentence leads me to believe, that 
 the quality is what is regarded by Mr Stewart 
 as that to which the term Beautiful is applied. 
 ' Although I have endeavoured to show that 
 our first notions of beauty are derived from co- 
 lours^ it neither follows that, in these complex 
 ideas of the beautiful which we are afterwards 
 led to form in the progress of our experience, 
 this quality must necessarily enter as a compon- 
 ent part ; nor, where it does so enter, that its 
 effect must necessarily predominate over all the 
 others.'* Now, though we may successfully 
 trace the laws of thought and of speech, which 
 have been the causes of the extended application 
 
 * Ph. Essays, p. 303. 
 
24 
 
 OF THE MEANING OF THE WORDS 
 
 of this troublesome word, we are not satisfied in 
 regard to what the quality called Beautiful con- 
 sisted of, since the quality colour is not beauty. 
 Hence, though it is quite evident that the search 
 after Beauty, as something sui generis^ is absurd, 
 the suggestion of Mr Stewart has not led us much 
 nearer to the solution of the enigma which has 
 so long puzzled the philosophical world. 
 
 There is yet another consideration, arising out 
 of the suggestion made by this great and amiable 
 author, which it is necessary to mention. There 
 seems to be an error in supposing, that any thing 
 is either agreeable, or disagreeable, to the eye it- 
 self^ as an organ, excepting either too great a 
 blaze of light, or too little for rendering objects 
 distinct. * The organ itself receives an impres- 
 sion ; that is, it is so contrived that an image is 
 formed on the retina. The formation of an 
 image, or the contact of coloured light, enables 
 
 * ^ It is not necessary for any of the purposes which I have 
 at present in view, that I should attempt to investigate the 
 principles on which colours, forms, or motion, give pleasure 
 to the eye. With the greater parts of Mr Alison's remarks 
 on these quahties, I perfectly agree ; although, in the case of 
 the first, I am disposed to ascribe more to the mere organic 
 impression^ independently of any association or expression 
 whatever, than he seems willing to allow.' — Ph. Essays, p. 235. 
 See also pp. 29d, 300. 
 
BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 
 
 25 
 
 the eye to convey form and colour to the Brain ; 
 but it is not the organ that makes an estimate 
 either of the one or of the other. There is an 
 internal faculty to which the perception is con- 
 veyed, and which judges and determines which 
 perceptions are those of Beauty, and which are 
 those of ugliness. Were it the eye alone that 
 judged of its perceptions, the moment its func- 
 tions ceased, all our ideas of form and colour 
 should vanish. But in the dark, or when our 
 eyes are shut, the impressions of external objects 
 remain with us. A man who becomes blind by 
 accident, or by disease, still retains the impres- 
 sions which were formerly made through the 
 medium of the eye. In sleep w^e see objects and 
 their qualities, as distinctly as when w^e are 
 awake ; and we can give a distinct account of 
 persons, their actions, and of the colours of their 
 dresses, as they appeared to us in our dreams. 
 Persons who are blind, but who have once seen, 
 retain the impressions of colour and form, and 
 see in their sleep, as well as others whose organs 
 are perfect. I have, fortunately, had an oppor- 
 tunity of ascertaining this fact, in the case of a 
 friend now deceased, whose talents were of no 
 ordinary cast ; and w^hose upright character re- 
 moved every suspicion of inaccuracy, wlrich 
 
^6 OF THE MEANING OF THE WORDS 
 
 might be attached to the accounts of themselves, 
 given by uneducated persons in the lower walks 
 of life. The gentleman to whom I allude, lost 
 his sight at an early period of life. He continu- 
 ed to dream of persons and of objects he had for- 
 merly seen, and to think that he saw them ; and 
 often the consciousness of his being blind, and of 
 its being necessary for a person to lead him, oc- 
 curred to him in his dreams, at the same time 
 that the objects of which he dreamed were dis- 
 tinct before him. Of persons and things he 
 had never seen, he formed ideal images, and of 
 these he dreamed as if he saw them. It maybe 
 worth while to add the curious fact, that the 
 same gentleman, for some time after he had be- 
 come blind, frequently dreamed that he was in 
 danger of losing his sight, and suffered much 
 more misery in these dreams, than he ever ex- 
 perienced from the actual conviction of the se- 
 vere privation he had suffered.* 
 
 ^ I have no doubt that other persons, in the same circum- 
 stances, dream ii,s my friend did ; that persons horn bhnd, 
 dream of forms which they have ascertained by touch, and 
 also of ideal forms. The examination of intelligent persons 
 in such circumstances, will certainly lead to the establishment 
 of some important truths connected with the philosophy of 
 mind. 
 
BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 27 
 
 That the eye does not judge, is proved also by 
 the fact, that two persons, whose eyes are per- 
 fect, do not pronounce the same judgment on the 
 same thing, in regard to the impressions it makes 
 upon them. Each must see the object exactly 
 as it is seen by the other ; that is, the image on 
 the retina must be the same on the eyes of both. 
 Yet what is Beautiful to one may be ugly to 
 another, and mce mrsd. If the eye itself per- 
 ceived and judged, there could be no such thing 
 as difference of taste. I conclude, therefore, that 
 the eye can neither be pleased nor displeased; 
 that it has nothing to do in the determination of 
 what is Beautiful, or of what is ugly. The de- 
 termination is the office of internal faculties. 
 The same kind of illustration is applicable to the 
 other senses. Hence all arguments derived from 
 the supposition that the external senses not only 
 perceive but judge, are useless. Their instru- 
 ments are adapted to convey impressions to high- 
 er powers, which receive or reject them. 
 
 To follow the mind of Mr Stewart, so strong 
 in itself, and which became so gigantic in its 
 power by regular and constant exercise, in an 
 attempt to discover what has baffled the efforts 
 of the greatest philosophers, may appear pre- 
 sumptuous. It is a duty, however, to assist, as 
 
^8 OF THE MEANING OF THE WOllUS 
 
 far as my abilities will go, in the search for truth. 
 Hitherto it seems to have been expected that the 
 metal was to be found, like gold, in a state of 
 purity, and its ores have been thrown aside as 
 useless dross. An ore has been found in which 
 the true metal is concealed. Whether it can be 
 shown that I have been deceived in my attempt 
 to reduce it, I do not know : The process and 
 its result, however, is submitted to abler analysts. 
 
 It will be readily granted that perception and 
 consciousness existed before language. We are, 
 therefore, not to attempt to adapt these to the 
 word beautiful ; but to trace its meaning out of 
 the consciousness of those effects of perception, 
 which the word was originally intended to convey. 
 
 Every sense, and every faculty of the mind, 
 desires to be gratified, and shuns whatever is 
 likely to oppose gratification. The eye is grati- 
 fied by certain quantities of light, and offended 
 by others. Smell is more or less acute in different 
 persons, but in all it is pleased by some impres- 
 sions, and annoyed by others. The senses also 
 of hearing and touch can be gratified or offended. 
 In the same manner the faculties of the mind are 
 affected ; if we read a book, the subject, or the 
 manner in which it is treated, is either agreeable 
 to us, or disagreeable. Imagination creates ideas 
 
BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 
 
 29 
 
 which may please or offend ourselves, or enable 
 us to please or offend others. Memory recals 
 events which may excite laughter, or overwhelm 
 us with sorrow. In short, every thing of which 
 the mind is capable, whether we refer to the 
 effects of perceptions conveyed by the instruments 
 of sense, or to the activity of the higher powers, 
 can be excited only by two effects of perception 
 opposite in their nature, or the reverse of each 
 other ; and each of which has various degrees of 
 power or influence. 
 
 The words Pleasure and Pain may be taken 
 to express the two effects under which every 
 emotion of the mind, excited by perception, may 
 be arranged. Each effect, considered as generic, 
 has its species ; and each species has its degrees. 
 We derive one species of pleasure from seeing a 
 fine building, and another species of pleasure from 
 beholding a rainbow\ One building is capable 
 of yielding to us a greater degree of pleasure than 
 another ; and a rainbow that is indistinct affords 
 us less pleasure than one that is full and clear. 
 We experience one species of pain in seeing an 
 animal put to death ; and another, when w^e look 
 at any thing which is deformed. If torture be 
 employed in putting an animal to death, we ex- 
 perience a greater degree of pain, than we do 
 
so OF THE MEANING OF THE WOllDS 
 
 when the process of killing is rapid. The human 
 figure, with a hunch on' the back, is, in degree, 
 less disagreeable than when to the hunch is add- 
 ed deformity of the limbs. 
 
 Now, the words Pleasure and Pain refer nei- 
 ther to an object itself, nor to the qualities of an 
 object, but to the effect of its qualities on the 
 mind. In the same manner beautiful appears to 
 be an expression, not for an object nor its quali- 
 ties, but for some effect which the perception 
 of its qualities excites in the mind. This effect 
 can only be pleasing or painful ; and that it is a 
 pleasing effect is evident. Hence beautiful ex- 
 presses simply a certain degree of certain species 
 of pleasurable effect excited in the mind. 
 
 This view of the subject seems to derive con- 
 firmation, from the facility with which it explains 
 the extensive application of the word Beautiful. 
 Men, rather than take the trouble of inventing 
 new terms, have transferred those which signify 
 a particular sensation or emotion, to the expres- 
 sion of other sensations or emotions similar in 
 relation to their genus, though differing in their 
 species. For instance, a colour is said to be 
 Beautiful, also a sound, and likewise a form. 
 Pleasure is here the genus of the effect produced ; 
 but the pleasure derived from colour is of a spe- 
 
BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 
 
 81 
 
 cies different from that conferred by sound ; and 
 that arising from form differs from both. But 
 they all produce the generic effect, pleasure ; and 
 hence the same words have come to be employed 
 to denote the same degrees of all the species. 
 The term beautiful may therefore be classed, 
 with other words denoting correspondent degrees 
 of pleasure, in this way : agreeable, handsome, 
 pretty, elegant, beautiful? lovely, enchanting, 
 angelic, &c. It adds to the probability of this 
 conjecture being right, that each of these words 
 is just as much in want of definition as beautiful. 
 We call an object pretty ; let us substitute this 
 or any other for beautiful, and repeat the obser- 
 vation of Mr Jeffrey : — ' The words pretty and 
 prettiness^ elegant and elegance^ lovely and loveli- 
 ness, must mean something ; and are universally 
 felt to mean something much more definite than 
 agreeableness or gratification in general; and 
 while it is by no means easy to define what that 
 something is, the force and clearness of our per- 
 ception of it is demonstrated by the readiness 
 wdth which we determine, in any particular in- 
 stance, whether the object of any pleasurable 
 emotion is or is not properly described ^^pretti- 
 ness, elegance, or loveliness!'^ 
 
 Goodness and badness, and their species, are terms as 
 
S2 
 
 OF THE MEANING OF THE WOKDS 
 
 From the view of the subject thus taken, the 
 extension of the word beautiful to denote maiiy 
 things, to which it might not have been originally 
 applied, is shown to be easy and natural ; and it 
 
 extensively applied as pleasure and pain, and their varieties ; 
 and it would be as much in vain to seek for any species of 
 goodness as something sui generis, as it is to search for beauty. 
 Goodness and badness are equally applied to religion, to mo- 
 rality, and to the impressions made on our senses. We speak 
 of a virtuous man as good, and also of the taste of an orange, 
 and of the smell of a flower : of an immoral man as bad, and 
 also of the taste of putrid meat, and of the smell of a dunghill. 
 If we take goodness and badness in the same manner as plea- 
 sure and pain, as generic, we shall be at no loss to find the 
 degrees of every variety of both. Of moral character, we say 
 that a man is of a character that is benevolent, or generous, 
 or noble, or upright, or affectionate, &c., all of which goodness 
 may be said to embrace. It appears evident that, among such 
 terms, any one of them stands, in the same manner as beauti- 
 ful does among its congeners. If we speak of taste or of smell, 
 we have agreeable, fine, pleasant, delightful, delicious, &c., as 
 degrees of every species of smell and taste of the genus good. 
 They are applied to perfumes, flowers, liquors, meats, vegeta- 
 bles, comfits, &c. We speak of the prolongation and shorten- 
 ing of distance, of sound, of time ; because the impression of 
 interval is the genus, and the intervals of sound and of time 
 are specific. Space and time have come to be considered as 
 synonymous, probably on account of the idea that they are both 
 infinite ; infinity being the genus of which they are species. 
 I might continue the illustration much farther ; but my object 
 is only to throw out hints. 
 
HEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIMK. 
 
 33 
 
 still appears to mean only one thing, though ap- 
 plied to many. 
 
 We are generally tempted to exaggerate every 
 account of our emotions, either from vanity, or 
 fi^om a desire to flatter ; and beautiful being high 
 up in the scale, we are more accustomed to use 
 it, and to hear it used, than any other term. It 
 is not unlikely that the disputes which have so 
 long subsisted among philosophers concerning it, 
 have contributed to the darkness which has hung 
 over this term ; and we are very apt to set an 
 imaginary value on all things which attract the 
 notice of philosophers, though they be often of 
 little real importance ; as well as to believe, that 
 we do not understand what is familiar to us, as 
 soon as we find that it becomes the object of 
 philosophical research. Thus, the original mean- 
 ing of words may be lost in a confusion of ideas. 
 
 It is not, perhaps, any great stretch of fancy 
 to conjecture that the application of such a term 
 as Beautiful, was transferred, from objects in their 
 natural condition, first to correct imitations of 
 objects in that condition. Hence various works 
 of art have been called pretty, elegant, beautiful, 
 and so forth. There may be some occasions on 
 which the use of the word Beautiful may be 
 supposed incorrect ; for instance, in spite of the 
 
34 OF THE MEANING OF THE WORDS 
 
 most disagreeable associations, a dead body is 
 sometimes called Beautiful. When the eyes are 
 closed, and the mouth shut, there is then a com- 
 posure of feature, and a resemblance to the state 
 of sleep, which, on more occasions than one, I 
 have myself felt to be positively Beautiful. It 
 has been remarked that, after death, there is 
 sometimes seen a repose of expression seldom ob- 
 served in the living, and which impresses the 
 mind agreeably. To this may be added the con- 
 viction that suffering is at an end, and that the 
 last throe in which we witnessed the loss of a 
 dear friend, is over, and no longer felt. 
 
 We never hesitate to say that a ship sails, the 
 stars shine, the sun sets, beautifully; because, 
 here, the action is in the object. But I should 
 hesitate to say, that a picture is beautifully 
 painted. In an ill painted picture, we can easily 
 discover that the scene or figure intended to be 
 represented is Beautiful, though the imitation 
 be far from correct in all its parts. In a good 
 picture, we discover no more, except that the 
 imitation is better. We should never confound 
 the talent of the artist with the object which he 
 imitates ; it is to the latter alone, and to the 
 imitation, if correct, that the term Beautiful 
 ought to be applied. Nevertheless we hear it 
 
BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 
 
 S5 
 
 said, every day, that a person draws or paints 
 Beautifully ; plays upon a musical instrument 
 Beautifully. These are evident misapphcations 
 of the term ; for in such expressions w^e actually 
 mean the skill of the performer or artist ; not any 
 impression made by the music, or by the scenes 
 or figures represented. 
 
 If a poet describe natural scenery with accu- 
 racy, it is as easy to transfer the term Beautiful 
 from the thing described to the description, as 
 from a thing imitated to the imitation. In the 
 latter, indeed, we get nearer to the reality ; but 
 in the former, imagination supplies any defici- 
 ency. But we go farther, and speak of a Beauti- 
 ful description of what is ugly ; of what excites 
 emotions of pain. Here the application of the 
 term is explained by the circumstance, that the 
 description confers pleasure from its faithfulness ; 
 it satisfies us, in the same manner as the well 
 executed representations of scenes of distress, or 
 of slaughter, on canvas. So the Beauty ascribed 
 to a mathematical demonstration, though the 
 term may appear to be misapplied, consists in the 
 pleasure conferred by its ingenuity, and the re- 
 gularity and precision of all its parts. We are 
 conducted by it, step by step, without obstruc- 
 tion, to the discovery of truth ; and as such a 
 
36 OF THE MEANING OF THE WORDS 
 
 discovery confers no common degree of pleasure, 
 the term Beautiful occurs more readily, perhaps, 
 than neat, elegant, or any other term of praise, 
 indicating that we have been much pleased. 
 
 Should a definition of the words Beauty and 
 Beautiful be required, I am inclined to consider 
 them as the signs by which we express the consci- 
 ousness of certain pleasurable effects^ following in 
 a high degree^ the perception of certain qualities 
 of objects. 
 
 The word sublime has been, and still is, intended 
 to convey to others that we experience an emo- 
 tion attended by a very elevated degree of plea- 
 sure. The sound of thunder is called Sublime ; 
 and to many it is highly pleasing. But the 
 pleasure seems to be affected, first by the uncer- 
 tainty of the place w^ience the sound proceeds, 
 and afterw^ards, by the knowledge of the de- 
 structive effects of the lightning, which is the ap- 
 parent cause of the sound. Emotions of terror 
 and of horror have been, but erroneously, de- 
 scribed as Sublime, as I shall have occasion to 
 exemplify in the course of my remarks on the 
 theory of association. 
 
 If these considerations, which have induced 
 me to fix on a particular place in our language 
 for the word Beautiful, be well founded, I should 
 
BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME. 
 
 37 
 
 express my opinion that, in all discussions with 
 regard to the emotions of which the human mind 
 is capable, we should keep strictly in view^ the 
 generic effects, Pleasure and Pain. By doing so, 
 we may avoid any future misunderstanding, 
 w^hich might arise from the indiscriminate use 
 of terms which mark degrees of the different 
 species, or from any accidental importance being 
 attached to any one of them, as probably has 
 happened with respect to Beautiful. It may be 
 expected that, in the remainder of this Essa}', I 
 should adopt this suggestion of reform. But 
 it is necessary for the present to adhere to the 
 terms made use of by the authors, on wdiose opi- 
 nions I am about to offer some remarks. To 
 depart from the usual nomenclature all at once, 
 might lead to misrepresentation, and to misap- 
 prehension. Should, however, occasional oppor- 
 tunities present themselves, for illustrating the 
 preceding considerations, I shall not hesitate to 
 embrace them. 
 
PART II. 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION. 
 SECT. I. 
 
 OF THE BASIS OF THE THEORY. 
 
 The ingenious and elegant author of the 
 Theory of Association, attributed the emotions 
 of Sublimity and Beauty (or, as I would speak, 
 the emotions of Pleasure arising out of the per- 
 ception of certain qualities of form, colour, and 
 sound), altogether to imagination ; his doctrine 
 being this, That the emotions of Sublimity and 
 Beauty are excited, not by any object in which 
 what is expressed by these terms may be sup- 
 posed to reside ; but by the recollection of certain 
 circumstances, events, or scenes, with which the 
 object may be supposed to be connected ; which 
 circumstances, events, or scenes, associating 
 themselves with it, confer on the object what we 
 call Sublimity and Beauty. This theory appears 
 
OF THE BASIS OF THE THEORY. 
 
 39 
 
 to have been very generally admitted as the most 
 correct ; nevertheless it may be shewn not to be 
 generally applicable. 
 
 The basis of the theory is thus stated by its 
 able supporter Lord Jeffrey, ' The beauty which 
 we impute to outward objects, is nothing more 
 than the reflection of our own inward sensa- 
 tions, and is made up entirely of certain little 
 portions of love, pity, and affection, which have 
 been connected with these objects, and still 
 adhere, as it were, to them, and move us anew 
 whenever they are presented to our observa- 
 tion."** Whether this enunciation, or the one 
 I have given, accords best with Mr Alison's 
 ideas, I will not pretend to determine. It im- 
 plies, certainly, what may also be gathered from 
 the Essays on Taste, that no object, at first sight, 
 has any influence in connexion with Taste ; that 
 we must first associate something with it, before 
 it can excite any emotion ; and that this emotion 
 may not be felt till we behold the object a second 
 time : so that we may connect whatever we 
 please with an object, and regulate our future 
 emotions accordingly. This seems to be little 
 else, than the usual foundation of a system of 
 artificial memory. It is like conferring a sort of 
 
 Sup. Eiic. Brit. vol. ii. p. 181. 
 
40 
 
 OF THE BASIS OF 
 
 magnetism, by which we consent to be attracted 
 in all time coming ; nay more, it implies that 
 we can create Beauty. What strikes us chiefly 
 in the enunciation quoted, is, that ' certain little 
 portions of love, pity, and affection,** are said to 
 constitute ' the reflection of our own inward sen- 
 sations." It is needless to quarrel with this mode 
 of expression ; a protest against the exclusive 
 privilege of judging in matters of Taste being 
 given to those only w^ho can love, pity, and feel 
 attachment, may, however, be taken. As many 
 benevolent, and, in all respects, excellent charac- 
 ters, are to be found, totally incapable of deriving 
 pleasure from the contemplation of external ob- 
 jects ; so abandoned characters are to be found 
 among men of the greatest genius. As amiable 
 dispositions do not confer on us the power of 
 enjoying what external objects can bestow, so the 
 want of these cannot deprive us of it. 
 
 In pursuing this subject we should beware of 
 confounding natural language, the result of cer- 
 tain laws of our nature, with associations which 
 are voluntary, as Lord Jeffrey appears to do, when 
 he makes the following observations: — ' The most 
 obvious, and the strongest associations that can 
 be established between inward feelings and ex- 
 ternal objects, is, when the object is necessarily 
 
THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION. 
 
 41 
 
 and universally connected with the feeling by the 
 law of nature, so that it is always presented to 
 the senses when the feeling is iiiipressed upon 
 the mind — as the sight or the sound of laughter, 
 with the feeling of gaiety — of weeping with dis- 
 tress — of the sound of thunder with ideas of dan- 
 ger and power.^ We certainly never go through 
 the process of establishing^ as is here supposed, 
 any connexion that is necessary^ or already formed 
 by a law of nature. But without disputing 
 about words, the attention of the reader, is re- 
 quested for a moment, to what is conceived to be 
 the proper distinction between natural language 
 and speech. This is the more necessary, because 
 ordinary language has been called natural by 
 Mr Alison.* 
 
 Natural language consists in gesture, in cer- 
 tain modifications of the countenance, and certain 
 intonations of the voice. When a man is angry, 
 he can express his emotion without the aid of 
 speech, so as to be perfectly intelligible to the 
 whole human race. Even the lower animals 
 understand the expression of anger ; and the ex- 
 tent to which natural language is common to them 
 and to man, is much greater than most persons 
 imagine. Without being taught, a child under- 
 Essays on Taste, vol. ii. p. 35. 
 
 C 
 
42 
 
 OF THE BASIS OF 
 
 stands the stern configuration which displeasure 
 gives to the countenance ; and when the features 
 relax into a smile of approbation, it is answered 
 by a smile of pleasure. The meaning of sighs 
 and groans is never misundersood : weeping and 
 laughing are expressions made use of by all na- 
 tions to convey the same emotions. Indeed every 
 emotion which can be excited in us, has its ex- 
 pression in natural language. The opening of 
 the features on the communication of pleasure ; 
 their contraction in consequence of pain ; their 
 distortion when we feel disgust and horror ; the 
 carriage of a man w^ho is proud ; the air of a man 
 who is vain ; the obsequiousness of a man who is 
 cunning ; are all consequences of what nature has 
 implanted in us. Nature, too, has taught us to 
 prostrate ourselves when we supplicate the for- 
 giveness of a Superior Being, and to raise our 
 hands and eyes, when we wish to implore his fa- 
 vour. Natural language, in short, is universal. 
 Artificial language, adapted to the organs of 
 speech, was probably first used to facilitate an 
 extended communication of certain emotions, 
 which have their expression in natural language, 
 but which expressions could not be conveyed to 
 so great a distance as the sound of the voice ; and 
 afterwards to enable us to communicate our 
 
THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION. 43 
 
 thoughts. Natural language may be said to ex- 
 press simply what we feel, artificial language that 
 which we prefer, or wish to convey. The former, 
 it is scarcely necessary to mention, must be dis- 
 tinguished from mimicry or pantomime. Feel- 
 ings may be expressed in pantomime ; that is, 
 natural language may be imitated ; but there is 
 only one way of expressing certain feelings when 
 they are actually excited in us. 
 
 That which is a law of our nature cannot be 
 dependent on association. When a child enters 
 the world, it cries ; but no one ever thought of 
 asserting that it does so, because the process of 
 associating crying with pain is carried on in the 
 mind of a new-born infant. If the connexion 
 between crying, and pain or distress, is to be 
 called association, it is not that kind of association 
 which is said to belong to matters of taste. This 
 last is evidently supposed to be artificial ; to be 
 a voluntary, not a necessary, exertion of our fa- 
 culties. 
 
 That seeing or hearing laughing in others, 
 communicates a feeling of gaiety to us in certain 
 circumstances, is true ; but that it always, neces- 
 sarily does so, is contrary to fact ; it only indicates 
 that others are gay. If the cause of laughter be 
 communicated to us, we may then, perhaps, ex- 
 
44 
 
 OF THE BASIS OF 
 
 press our being pleased, in the same manner. 
 But it may happen, that the cause of laughter 
 in others may excite in us feelings, which are to 
 be expressed in a very different manner. Weep- 
 ing, we know, indicates distress, pain, or vexation; 
 but our seeing this sign does not necessarily com- 
 municate any of these feelings ; it often only ex- 
 cites compassion, without informing us of the 
 cause, or of the actual feeling of the person who 
 weeps. Do people never weep for joy ? The 
 same cause that excites laughter in one person 
 may produce weeping in another. How often, 
 in this world, is one person's loss another's gain i 
 
 The example of the sound of thunder appears 
 to have been misplaced in the last quotation. A 
 person, who has never known that lightning has 
 destroyed life, may be pleased with its sudden 
 blaze, and delighted with the sound that follows. 
 There is no law of our nature which necessarily 
 connects the sound of thunder with power or 
 danger. The connexion is the result of experi- 
 ence, or of education. 
 
 ' I had occasion to observe,' says Mr Stewart, 
 'in a former publication, that the theory which 
 resolves the whole effect of beautiful objects into 
 association, must necessarily involve that species 
 of paralogism, to which logicians give the name 
 
THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION. 
 
 45 
 
 of reasoning in a circle. It is the province of 
 association, to impart to one thing the agreeable, 
 or the disagreeable effect of another ; but asso- 
 ciation can never account for the origin of a class 
 of pleasures different in kind from all the others 
 we know. If there was nothing originally and in- 
 trinsically pleasing or beautiful, the associating 
 principle would have no materials on which it 
 could operate.'' * He goes on to state, how Mr 
 Alison, by being aware of this objection to the 
 notions formerly entertained of association as it 
 is applied to objects of taste, has struck out new 
 lights, which entitle him to the honour of having 
 framed what is usually called the theory of asso- 
 ciation. Mr Alison, Mr Stewart observes, 'does 
 not deny, that, independently of custom and 
 habit, there are numberless sources of enjoyment 
 in the human frame, arising from its adaptation 
 to the various objects around it. He only asserts 
 that a large proportion of the qualities which 
 produce these pleasures, although they cannot 
 be called beautiful, while they affect the bodily 
 organs immediately, may yet enter largely, by 
 means of the association of ideas, into the beauty 
 of the visible creation.** "I* 
 
 Judged by his own writings, however, Mr 
 * Ph. Essays, pp. 288, 289. f Ibid. p. 288, 
 
46 
 
 OF THE BASIS OF 
 
 Alison appears to have asserted a great deal more ; 
 for the whole object of his very elegant work seems 
 to be the illustration of the following principles ; 
 viz., that no form, colour, nor sound, though it 
 may make an agreeable impression, is ever felt to 
 be Beautiful or Sublime, until, with the assist- 
 ance of imagination, we connect it with some- 
 thing which we have formerly admired, or which 
 has excited strong emotions of pleasure in our 
 minds ; that whenever we associate with forms, 
 colours, or sounds, any thing that is disagreeable, 
 they also become disagreeable ; that, when we 
 consider anything Beautiful, but by subsequent 
 information or recollection, connect with it any- 
 thing disagreeable, its Beauty is immediately de- 
 stroyed ; and that all these are necessary conse- 
 quences of association. 
 
 In detailing and examining various examples, 
 my purpose is to show, that the perceptions of 
 form, colour, and sound, are capable of raising 
 direct emotions of pleasure or of pain (to the 
 degree of beauty and of ugliness) without any 
 assistance from imagination : that, when we as- 
 sociate any form, colour, or sound, with any 
 circumstance, event, or scene, we do so in con- 
 sequence of the form, colour, or sound, acting as 
 stimulants to memory ; that the emotions which 
 
THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION. 
 
 47 
 
 the memory of events, circumstances, or scenes, 
 may excite, are distinct from those emotions 
 which form our taste ; and are merely repeti- 
 tions of the same emotions, which the circum- 
 stances, events, or scenes, recalled by memory, 
 originally excited ; and which, in many cases, 
 the stimulating object could not of itself excite, 
 supposing that the associated circumstances, 
 events, or scenes, were out of the sphere of our 
 knowledge. Farther, I w^ill endeavour to show, 
 in opposition to the principle of association, that, 
 although very disagreeable circumstances, events, 
 or scenes, may be connected with an object, we 
 still continue to admire it, if it possess certain 
 qualities ; and that the most agreeable associa- 
 tions may fail to enable an object to excite emo- 
 tions, such as those which form our taste. 
 
 No one will think of denying that, in many 
 instances, associations add a 7'elisk to the plea- 
 sure, or an aggravation to the pain, which form, 
 colour, and sound, are capable of exciting. It is 
 only maintained that such relish or aggravation 
 have nothing to do in regulating, or in fixing our 
 taste. This declaration is not used as a means of 
 escape from the censure of Lord Jeffrey, who has 
 rejected, somewhat rashly, 'as intrinsically absurd 
 and incredible, the supposition, that material ob- 
 
48 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 jects which do neither hurt nor delight the body, 
 should yet excite, by their mere physical quali- 
 ties, the very powerful emotions which are some- 
 times excited by the spectacle of beauty.'* Nor 
 when the perceptions of colours and of sounds are 
 spoken of, and in many of which there is a primi- 
 tive and natural beauty, by which is meant a qua- 
 lity the perception of which produces a certain 
 pleasurable effect, as producing the same kind of 
 effect, is there an attempt to escape the guilt 
 of which Mr Knight has been accused, of a 
 ^ heresy inconsistent with the very first princi- 
 ples of Catholic philosophy for it is consi- 
 dered that form may be joined with colour and 
 sound, as being capable of exciting emotions of 
 Beauty, independently altogether of the fetters 
 with which this Catholic philosophy is disposed 
 to encumber us. 
 
 In reviewing the theory of association as laid 
 down by Mr Alison, it is proposed to treat first 
 of Form, as that which most extensively occu- 
 pies our observation ; and then to proceed to 
 offer some considerations respecting Colour and 
 Sound. 
 
 Mr Alison has been accused of being too pro- 
 fuse in illustration ; but, surely, in treating of a 
 ^ Sup, Enc. Brit. vol. ii. p. 181. f ^bid. p. l80. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 49 
 
 subject on which so great a diversity of opinion 
 had previously existed, and on which a ne\Y 
 light was to be thrown, the greater the number 
 of apposite examples that are brought into view 
 the better ; and as Mr Alison'*s work is addressed 
 chiefly to the student, and less to the proficient, 
 he ought rather to have been commended for his 
 great assiduity in collecting and adapting his 
 examples. Indeed his Essays on Taste could, 
 in my opinion, have been of comparatively little 
 value without them ; though it is confessed that 
 I have been induced to state this partly by way 
 of bespeaking indulgence for myself. For it is 
 proposed to carry some of Mr Alison's examples 
 a little farther than he has done, and to submit 
 new ones for consideration. I may probably be 
 thought to trespass too much ; but it is better to 
 suffer censure for profuseness, than for leaving 
 any thing in obscurity. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION AS APPLIED 
 TO FORM. 
 
 ' The sublimity and beauty of forms,' says Mr 
 Alison, ' arises altogether from the associations 
 
50 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 we connect with them, or the qualities of which 
 they are expressive to us.'* ' The forms which 
 distinguish bodies that are connected in our 
 minds with ideas of danger or power, are in ge- 
 neral sublime. There is scarcely anything in 
 inanimate nature more remarkably so, than all 
 those forms which are appropriated to instru- 
 ments of war. The forms of cannon, mortars, 
 &c., have all a character of this kind. Military 
 ensigns, although approaching to very common 
 and neglected forms, partake of the same cha- 
 racter. There are few things more sublime than 
 the forms of armour, particularly the steel ar- 
 mour which was in use in the middle ages. 
 Even the familiarity of common use does not 
 altogether destroy this effect : the sword, the 
 spear, the javelin, the dagger, are still sublime 
 forms, and enter with propriety into the su- 
 blimest descriptions either of poetry or paint- 
 ing.^t 
 
 When we see a brigade of artillery, or walk 
 on the main deck of a man-of-war, the objects 
 before us, without doubt, bring to our recollec- 
 tion a variety of scenes, events, and circumstances, 
 which excite very strong emotions. But these 
 
 Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 317. 
 
 t Ibid. p. 321. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 51 
 
 emotions are altogether unconnected with the 
 consideration o{ form^ the effects of which, I wish 
 to distinguish from those of general appearance. 
 The general appearance of a city, or that of a 
 cultivated country, brings under our considera- 
 tion industry and consequent wealth. But in- 
 dustry and wealth have no share in assisting our 
 decision with respect to architecture or rural 
 scenery. The array of battle, the smoke, the 
 din, in the midst of which so much human blood 
 is spilt, give us no aid when we pronounce judg- 
 ment on the forms which are found among the 
 deadly instruments, and in the dress and equip- 
 ment of the troops. My object, therefore, will 
 be to trace the effects of mere form, without any 
 regard to general appearance ; and to try what 
 effect association may have in fixing, or in alter- 
 ing, our opinions ; in other words, in the forma- 
 tion of our taste. The effect of general appear- 
 ance belongs properly to combination of forms ; 
 and here, too, a distinction must be made between 
 forms made up of different forms, and the general 
 appearance of a number of such compound forms. 
 
 If we examine cannon of various kinds, it is 
 surely possible to pronounce a judgment on their 
 forms, without any reference to the uses to which 
 they are applied. No one will hesitate to say 
 
52 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 that a well cast cannon is more elegant in form 
 than a carronade ; while, with regard to both, 
 the associations are precisely the same. The 
 appearance of instruments of war may excite op- 
 posite emotions in different persons ; and yet all 
 may agree with respect to the particular forms. 
 It is delightful to a victorious general to behold 
 the apparatus of war ; but it may be doubted 
 whether the same objects excite similar emotions 
 in the mind of a general who has been continu- 
 ally beaten, and who has retired from service dis- 
 comfited. If association alone directs our judg- 
 ment in regard to form, all instruments of war 
 ought to appear sublime to the fortunate, and 
 disgusting to the unfortunate general. Both, 
 however, may agree in thinking that a long 
 eighteen-pounder is a more elegant looking in- 
 strument than a stumpy gaping mortar ; which 
 is the opinion of most people over whom associa- 
 tions may be supposed to have a much less de- 
 gree of influence. Here, then, it is evident that 
 there is something in form, which elicits a pre- 
 ference independently of associations of the most 
 opposite nature ; a preference that is instantane- 
 ous. With regard to w^hat may be thought to 
 be properly called sublimity, I am inclined to 
 think that, while walking on the ramparts of a 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 53 
 
 fortress, our attention is much more powerfully 
 arrested by a large and well shaped cannon 
 mounted on its carriage, and attended by all its 
 apparatus, than by a mortar. Association, how- 
 ever, if we have had experience, and if we take 
 time to reflect, ought to change our opinion, and 
 induce us to bestow the palm of sublimity on 
 the form of the ugly mortar, fixed, at an invari- 
 able angle, on its platform. The cannon makes 
 a breach in a stone wall, or opens a gap in a 
 close column of men. But the mortar hurls 
 death into the city ; neither sex nor age is 
 spared; its weapon forces its way into the hall of 
 mirth, and into the chamber of sorrow; health, 
 sickness, guilt, innocence, are undistinguished 
 by its horrible explosion. But such associations 
 cannot alter our opinion that the form of a mor- 
 tar is less capable of raising emotion, than that 
 of a cannon. Every thing, to which the same 
 associations can be applied, ought, by this theory, 
 to excite the same emotions; but what can make 
 us consider the form of a grain of gunpowder, a 
 piece of rope match, or a drumstick, as Sublime 
 or Beautiful ? 
 
 The dagger is various in its form; we have 
 the stiletto; the dagger of India; the Malay 
 crease ; the dirk, &c. All these forms are equally 
 
54 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 capable of stimulating the memory to recollect 
 the very same circumstances ; but the forms are 
 not all equally pleasing. A sharp debate might 
 arise about the beauty of the different forms, and 
 no regard be paid to midnight assassinations, 
 suicides, or scenes of tragedies. Nothing can be 
 more pleasing to some persons than the descrip- 
 tion of a battle ; and the impressions it has once 
 made, may be revived by the sight of an engine 
 of war of any form. But it is contended that the 
 forms of some engines are more pleasing than 
 those of others ; and the preference, which we 
 give to one form over another, is doubtless an 
 emotion of pleasure, and has its origin in a pecu- 
 liar effect of the perception of the form, uncon- 
 nected with events, circumstances, or scenes. 
 
 ' The forms that in general distinguish bodies 
 of great duration, and which of consequence ex- 
 press to us great power and strength, are in 
 most cases sublime. In the vegetable kingdom, 
 the forms of trees are sublime principally in pro- 
 portion to their expression of this quality.*** If 
 the forms of trees be sublime in proportion to 
 their expression of duration and strength, there 
 should be nothing sublime in the weeping birch. 
 Here there is no such expression ; yet there is 
 
 * Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 322. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 55 
 
 much sublimity to be found, by association, in 
 this tree. We do not associate with the birch, 
 deUcacy, tenderness, and the like ; but bold 
 overhanging precipices, in which it has fixed its 
 roots ; mountain torrents ; and every part of a 
 magnificent highland scene. The sturdy oak is 
 seldom seen in perfection, but in the carefully 
 arranged scenery of a park. Hence an oak sel- 
 dom leads to associations of natural sublimity. 
 It depends more on its own proper form for ad- 
 miration. A person who has been all his life 
 accustomed to the romantic scenery, in the midst 
 of which the birch is so commonly found, and 
 who is capable of deriving pleasure from natural 
 scenery, never hesitates to prefer the form of the 
 oak to that of the birch ; although he has to con- 
 tend with the associations of rocks, lakes, rivers, 
 waterfalls, and woods. 
 
 Perhaps the most common association which 
 we connect with the oak is a ship of war ; and I 
 believe that the vulgar admiration of oak timber 
 (for many who never saw the tree, admire the 
 mere name), arises from the associations roused 
 by the popular song of Hearts of Oak, The pine 
 has just as much right to be associated with the 
 very same things. Without masts, yards, and 
 bowsprit, of pine, the oaken hull could not be 
 
56 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 carried into battle; nor could we enjoy the en- 
 chanting sight of a fleet under sail. The form 
 of the pine, however, is not improved by such 
 associations, although they must be acknow- 
 ledged to be powerful. This can be accounted 
 for only by the circumstance of mere form hav- 
 ing a certain influence in the one case, which it 
 has not in the other. 
 
 The variety of tastes in regard to the forms of 
 trees need scarcely be mentioned, except to give 
 an opportunity of stating a circumstance some- 
 what in point ; and for which I had the autho- 
 rity of my deceased friend Henry Mackenzie. 
 The celebrated author of the tragedy of Dou- 
 glas, in his first sketch of it, had the words 
 ' Here stands the ash the monarch of the wood ;** 
 and he changed it, by the advice of a friend, to 
 oak. This anecdote will serve to shew that as- 
 sociation could not lead even a poet, to prefer 
 any form to that which had made on him its 
 original and most powerful impression. 
 
 There is no particular association that entitles 
 the sweet chesnut tree to compete with the oak 
 in form ; yet I have seen trees of this sort which 
 have excited as much emotion as the finest oak. 
 The sycamore and elm exhibit in many instances, 
 forms equal to either ; yet with respect to dura- 
 
AS APPLIED TO FOllM. 
 
 57 
 
 tion and strength, we can associate them only 
 with tables, chairs, and other pieces of household 
 furniture. The forms of the linden and of the 
 horse chesnut are extremely pleasing ; they at- 
 tain a great age and size ; but their unfitness for 
 any purpose in which duration and strength are 
 requisite, does not in the least degree diminish 
 the effects which their forms produce on the 
 mind. What appears quite conclusive with re- 
 gard to the point at issue, is the fact, that every 
 oak tree does not equally excite the same feelings. 
 Out of a hundred, or any number of trees, all of 
 the same age, all in the same state of vigorous 
 growth, all capable of exciting ideas of du- 
 ration and strength to the same degree, one 
 may be chosen, the form of which is preferred 
 to the forms of all the others. This individual 
 excites emotions of pleasure above all the rest, 
 and may be selected for representation in a pic- 
 ture, for no other reason, than because its form, 
 without regard to any of its other properties, or 
 to any of the uses to which it is known to be ap- 
 plied, excites the emotion of pleasure, to the de- 
 gree of Beauty. 
 
 Before leaving the vegetable kingdom, some 
 examples may be noticed, in which association 
 may find very disagreeable expressions, which do 
 
 D 
 
58 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 not, however, destroy the agreeable impressions 
 made by the form itseh"*. The vine is generally al- 
 lowed to be a very elegant plant, and its form to be 
 Beautiful. If we eagerly seize a cluster of grapes, 
 admiring its form, and presuming that it is to slake 
 our thirst, and gratify our palate ; and if we find, 
 in place of a rich and highly flavoured juice, no- 
 thing connected with the exterior Beauty, but 
 austerity ; we dash the deceitful tempter to the 
 ground. When we see another person tempted, 
 we warn him, not by saying, that the clusters of 
 this particular vine are ugly ; but by saying, Let 
 not the Beauty of that grape deceive you ; here 
 is one whose form is less pleasing, but whose 
 juice is more gratifying. We may also appeal 
 to the acknowledged Beauty of many flowers, 
 fruits, and plants, which are well known to be 
 poisonous ; an association of the most powerful 
 kind ; yet not sufficient to alter our opinion of 
 form. 
 
 ' Nothing," continues Mr Alison, ' is more Sub- 
 lime than the form of rocks, which seem coeval 
 with creation, and which all the convulsions of 
 nature have not been able to destroy." The 
 mountain burst asunder by a volcanic explosion, 
 or shattered into fragments by an earthquake, 
 may rouse emotions of Sublimity of the highest 
 
AS APPLIED TO FOKM. 
 
 59 
 
 order. But whatever may have been the cause 
 of the form of a rock ; whether it stands before 
 us as it came from the hands of the Creator ; or 
 as an example of some awful exertion of his 
 power; it may be shewn that its form, inde- 
 pendently of such considerations, operates with 
 fall effect upon our minds. Let us imagine two 
 rocks, exactly alike in every respect, and of a 
 form such as is usually called picturesque. Let 
 one of them be supposed to be surrounded by the 
 sea, and the other to rise from a plain. If a 
 preference can be given to the one over the other, 
 it cannot be in consideration of form ; because 
 there is no difference in this respect. Association 
 commands us to prefer not the rock in the sea, 
 but the situation ; because we may then imagine 
 that, when a storm arises, the sea w^ill be dashed 
 into white foam upon its base ; and that mis- 
 fortune may direct a vessel and its crew to this 
 spot, to find a watery grave. Perhaps no better 
 example can be given, to show distinctly that 
 there is a wide difference between the effects pro- 
 duced by form, and those produced by association. 
 The /orm gives rise to certain emotions of pleasure ; 
 the situation of the same form rouses emotions of a 
 different kind ; but does not affect us in such a 
 manner as to debar us from admiring the form, 
 
60 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 by altering the emotions, which this last nat- 
 turally excites. 
 
 But when we contemplate two rocks of differ- 
 ent forms, and both in a similar situation, and 
 every associated event and circumstance the same, 
 the form of one will be preferred to that of the 
 other. The decision is instantaneous ; and is 
 owing, not to the associations, which are the same 
 in both cases, but to the effects of the form alone. 
 
 ' The forms, which distinguish bodies that are 
 connected in our minds with ideas of splendour 
 and magnificence, are in general Sublime. The 
 forms of the throne, the sceptre, and the diadem, 
 approach, in fact, to very common and neglected 
 forms, yet they are all Sublime, from being the 
 signs of the splendour and magnificence of roy- 
 alty/ * 
 
 It is not easy to reconcile the idea that a form 
 may be very neglected, with the idea that it may 
 be, at the same time, capable of raising emotions 
 of Sublimity. It seems to be universally ac- 
 knovA ledged by men of taste, that the splendid 
 decoration of neglected forms merits the appel- 
 lation tawdriness. If a form be in itself pleas- 
 ing, the addition of chaste decoration may pos- 
 sibly add to its power of pleasing ; but this may 
 • Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 32*?. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 61 
 
 also be destroyed by too great a lavishment of 
 rich ornainent. The office of king being the 
 first in the state, we are bound to pay all out- 
 ward respect to him who fills it ; and, to take 
 advantage of a very common weakness in human 
 nature, in order to enforce respect from those, 
 who are not capable of understanding the value 
 of regular goverment, the wisest have, in all 
 ages, agreed to surround the chief with splen- 
 dour, and to place the great engine of power, an 
 army, at his disposal. But no man of good taste 
 ever permits himself to be led astray by the re- 
 spect he feels for the office of king, or by the 
 splendour attending it. 
 
 Should the decorations of a palace be wholly 
 composed of the richest materials, they may, by 
 a deficiency of Taste, be so contrived and ar- 
 ranged as to be absolutely disgusting, in spite of 
 the costliness of silk, the lustre of silver and of 
 gold, the rich and lively glittering of precious 
 stones. A form used for a throne, if not capable 
 of exciting admiration in a piece of furniture any 
 where else, will not be admired in a palace. 
 Form can be of very little consequence wdien w^e 
 use it merely as a sign. It appears that, in the 
 last quotation, the sign and the thing signified 
 are not fully distinguished. The throne, the 
 
62 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 sceptre, and the diadem, are more than signs ; 
 they are themselves a chief part of the splendour 
 and magnificence attached to the person of a 
 king. 
 
 No two kings wear a crown of the same form, 
 nor a robe of the same fashion ; facts apparently 
 sufficient to demonstrate that form is deemed of 
 importance, as well as splendour ; and that it 
 merits a distinct consideration from the mate- 
 rial of which it is composed, and of the decora- 
 tions which are to be added to it. Now, though 
 we admit the signification of every ensign of 
 royalty, and feel the highest respect for the office 
 of king ; we are not bound to believe that the 
 form of every ensign necessarily pleases us. I 
 have already explained my own idea of Sublimity ; 
 it is neither the vulgar admiration of power ; nor 
 the fear of its weight ; but the consciousness of 
 an elevated degree of satisfaction imparted to our 
 faculties. We can very easily imagine a form 
 of a throne, of a diadem, of a sceptre, which 
 would please us in a very high degree ; and, 
 with the respect due to royalty, this degree 
 might reach Sublimity. It is not a necessary 
 consequence that we should experience the same 
 emotions, on beholding ^i?^ry form which may be 
 adopted for the signs of royalty. Splendour and 
 
AS APPLIED TO I'OliM. 
 
 68 
 
 magnificence of themselves, are not objects of 
 Taste; it is in their application where Taste is 
 exercised and discovered. 
 
 ' The forms," says Mr Alison, ' which distin- 
 guish bodies connected in our minds with ideas 
 of awe and solemnity, are in general sublime. 
 The forms of temples, although very different as 
 forms, have in all ages been accounted as sublime. 
 Even the most common forms employed in reli- 
 gious service, derive a character of this kind from 
 the qualities with which they are connected.'* 
 It may be asked, whether St PauFs in London, 
 . or the cathedral of York, be the finest building. 
 Each is as capable as the others of exciting the 
 very same ideas of awe and solemnity ; never- 
 theless the forms are not alike pleasing. The 
 difference of opinion, or the preference, express- 
 ed, must be acknowledged to be an effect on the 
 mind, caused by something different from the as- 
 sociated ideas; and that admiration may be ex- 
 pressed without such associations ever occurring, 
 must also be allowed. Many country parish 
 churches, in different parts of this and other 
 kingdoms, maybe passed by without regard, and 
 considered as barns or stables. If the theory of 
 asssociation be correct, the person who has 
 
 * Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 323. 
 
64 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 passed by, on being informed of the use to which 
 such a building is appropriated, ought to turn 
 round, and regard it as sublime. But it is more 
 probable he would hold not only the building in 
 utter contempt, but the taste of those who dedi- 
 cated such a hovel to the service of the Almighty. 
 Let the form of a barn be magnified to any ex- 
 tent ; let it be spacious and lofty, still it cannot 
 produce the emotions which a Grecian or a 
 Gothic temple instantaneously and irresistibly 
 impresses upon us. Not all the pomp of service 
 practised by the church of Rome, nor the sim - 
 plicity of Presbyterian worship, nor the soul rais- 
 ing peals of the organ, can divest this form of 
 meanness. Should the association of this form 
 with the operations of husbandry, mingle itself 
 with those which are proper to the house of God, 
 the effect could not be said to be favourable to 
 the theory. 
 
 Let us take a form very common in temples, 
 the dome, and consider its effects upon the mind. 
 This figure, in certain situations, has been consi- 
 dered as truly sublime. Whoever has seen St 
 Peter's church at Rome, or St Paul's in London, 
 must have felt the powerful addition which this 
 form gives to the effect of these superb specimens 
 of architecture. With what is this figure asso- 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 65 
 
 ciated, when we become conscious of its influ- 
 ence ? Is it with the idea of an inverted cup ? 
 Is it with the idea of sections of eggs or of 
 acorns? Although it be possible that an egg- 
 shell may have first suggested this form of 
 roof, such associations do not bring the dome into 
 disrepute, as we might expect, if association had 
 any real influence in our approval or disapproval 
 of forms. 
 
 ' The forms of all those things,' continues our 
 author, ' which are employed in the burial of the 
 dead, are strikingly sublime. The pall, the 
 hearse, the robes of mourners, &c., even the 
 plumes which in general are so beautiful, and 
 the colour of which is in most cases so cheerful, 
 are, in this situation, above all other things, pow- 
 erfully sublime.' 
 
 A dead body placed in a plain wooden box, or 
 inclosed by four rude stones, is unquestionably 
 capable of raising the same emotions as a body in 
 a sarcophagus. By the theory before us, we 
 should have no preference to give to the form of 
 any one of these receptacles. The dead body of 
 a beggar and the carcass of a king, are not to be 
 distinguished in the abodes of death ; they equal- 
 ly remind us of the common fate of animated 
 creation. The form of the sarcophagus, however. 
 
66 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 is admitted to have the greatest effect ; and 
 should it be supposed to have derived its influ- 
 ence from its containing the mortal part of roy- 
 alty, we have only to remove it, and to deposit 
 the mouldering remains of a peasant in its stead. 
 The form preserves its influence ; nor could that 
 influence fail, had the custom of all nations, from 
 the beginning, been to bury their mendicants in 
 sarcophagi of granite, and their princes in plain 
 boxes of wood. A rude antique urn of baked 
 clay does not excite the admiration which we 
 willingly express, on beholding an urn of sculp- 
 tured marble ; or even the humble material of 
 clay wrought to a tasteful model ; though all 
 contain the ashes of the dead. It is not easy to 
 tolerate the moderji method of conducting a fu- 
 neral, and it is to be regretted that Mr Alison 
 should have appealed to what is, by very general 
 suffrage, considered as contemptible. Fantastic 
 dresses and whimsical ornaments can only detract 
 from the solemnity and impressiveness of the last 
 duty which we perform to our fellow creatures, 
 instead of this melancholy scene conferring any 
 sublimity or beauty on the conceits issuing from 
 the brain of an undertaker. 
 
 If the theory of association be correct, every 
 thing should be felt as sublime as soon as we can 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 67 
 
 attach to it, scenes, events, or circumstances 
 which are said to be calculated to raise emotions 
 of sublimity. No one, however, can prevail on 
 himself to consider the stump of a pen as a sub- 
 lime object. Nevertheless, we can associate it 
 with certain circumstances, the whole sublime 
 force of which is most sensibly felt. In a goose 
 quill. Bacon found means to teach us the genuine 
 method of pursuing science ; and Shakespeare 
 to raise every emotion of which the mind is 
 capable. Such associations confer nothing on 
 the form of a pen ; nor can a pen be considered 
 as a very disagreeable object, merely because we 
 know it to have been employed to disseminate 
 great abundance of trash, and to excite the minds 
 of the turbulent to mischief. 
 
 ' The Sublimity of forms, in many cases also, 
 arises from their magnitude, and this quality 
 alone is often sufficient to bestow Sublimity. 
 With magnitude, accordingly, we have many 
 distinct and powerful associations.'* It must 
 be here observed, that we ought to understand 
 the nature of the connexion between form and 
 magnitude, before we enter into any discussion 
 concerning them. In reality, magnitude can 
 have no sort of effect on form, because it cannot 
 
 Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 324. 
 
68 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 alter it. The smallest globule of leaden shot 
 has precisely the same form with the sun ; and 
 the vast difference of magnitude in this case, 
 does not in the least degree alter the primary 
 emotions which the form itself excites. Mag- 
 nitude constitutes no part of form ; form is given 
 to magnitude ; not magnitude to form. The 
 Creator has given to a certain quantity of matter 
 the form of a globe ; he did not give the matter 
 to the form. We give to a stone the form of a 
 column ; not the stone to the form. Hence, 
 form being evidently a quality of magnitude, it 
 is erroneous to speak of magnitude as a quality 
 of form. On this subject a few more observations 
 will be made, when we come to consider mag- 
 nitude as connected with inanimate forms. 
 
 ' In animal forms, magnitude is strongly as- 
 sociated in our minds with the idea of propor- 
 tionable power and strength, and is chiefly 
 Subhme from its expression of this quality. 
 Animals of great size, but feeble or harmless, 
 are so far from being Sublime, that they are in 
 general contemptible ; a fact which may easily 
 be observed even in the opinions of children. ""^ 
 
 It was not to be expected that, in this age of 
 observation, any ideas could be entertained con- 
 
 * Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 32.5. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 69 
 
 trary to well ascertained facts ; facts which so 
 continually present themselves, that we cannot 
 help observing them. There is no proportion 
 between the size of animals, and their power 
 and strength. If viewed with a regard to their 
 strength as it is proportioned to their size, the 
 race horse, in swiftness, would appear contempt- 
 ible hen compared to a flea ; and the elephant, 
 with all his sagacity and power, w^ould sink from 
 a comparison with the little insect Necrophorus 
 V^espillo.* In general, the muscular power of 
 insects in proportion to their size is prodigious ; 
 and when we compare quadrupeds together, it 
 will be found that a dog is far superior to the 
 largest animal in strength as proportioned to its 
 size. Were the muscular power of a flea to be 
 increased in the ratio of size, and given to all 
 other animals, man excepted, the human race 
 would quickly lose its boasted control, and dis- 
 appear. Such being the real state of the case, 
 the idea of proportional power and strength has 
 nothing to do in the excitement of emotions of 
 Sublimity. 
 
 We never experience such emotions, on be- 
 
 * A single beetle of this kind, buried a mole forty times its 
 own bulk and weight, in two days. See Kirby and Spence's 
 Introducfhn to Entomology, Letter xi. 
 
70 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 holding a very large animal, as if they were ex- 
 cited by its form ; because animals of great size 
 have forms which are very far from being calcu- 
 lated to excite any other emotion than that of 
 disgust. It is very improbable that any person 
 who had never heard of any thing connected with 
 the elephant, such as his sagacity, or the pro- 
 minent part he acts in Eastern pageantry, and 
 in w^ar, would exclaim, on seeing this animal for 
 the first time. What a large and sublime creature ! 
 It is more likely that the exclamation would be, 
 what a large ugly brute ! The associations, 
 which educated men form with the elephant, 
 are unquestionably of such a nature that, were it 
 possible, we should be induced to admire the 
 form of this animal, and to call it Beautiful. 
 But no one was ever heard to praise the shape 
 of this huge mass of animated matter. There 
 is no animal, with which so great a number of 
 impressive events, circumstances, and scenes, can 
 be connected, than with the whale ; yet they 
 totally fail to banish the strong feelings of dis- 
 gust which the form of this immense creature 
 excites. 
 
 Mr Alison has evidently confounded size with 
 form. The dimensions of the whale ; the ap- 
 pearance of this huge creature moving through 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 71 
 
 the deep ; the idea of the power which gave life 
 to such an enormous mass of matter ; give to the 
 contemplation of it, a character of Sublimity 
 which no man can resist. But such considera- 
 tions do not mingle with our estimates of form. 
 To illustrate this still more, we need only name 
 the tiger, whose physical strength, as well as his 
 size, are far inferior to those of the elephant. 
 The form of the tiger is universally allowed to 
 excite more powerful emotions of admiration, 
 than that of the elephant. Without knowing 
 the character of the tiger, any person will, with- 
 out hesitation, express his admiration of the form ; 
 and knowing his character, he will never allow, 
 that in form this animal is inferior to the ele- 
 phant. 
 
 This opportunity may be taken to compare 
 animals which differ in form and character, 
 and to discover whether association has any 
 real effect in settling, or altering our notions 
 of form. We do not suppose that any one who 
 has reduced his taste to be subordinate to asso- 
 ciation, and who is acquainted with the history 
 of the wolf, will connect anything with this animal 
 but what is calculated to raise emotions of Sub- 
 limity. He will think of a band of travellers 
 crossing a mountain with painful circumspection ; 
 
72 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 and starting at the distant howl, indicating that 
 the scent of his prey had reached the destroyer ; 
 he will think of the sudden halt ; of the hasty 
 arrangement of the beasts of burden in the cen- 
 tre ; of the fastening of palisades and the kind- 
 ling of firts , of the snorting and trembling of 
 the horses ; of the attack of the famished multi- 
 tude ; of the sanguinary conflict; and he will 
 figure to himself the slow and unwilling retreat 
 of the few that remain of the assailants. The 
 mean cunning, and despicable cowardice of the 
 larger and stronger tiger, compared to the open 
 and brave attack of the wolf, depress him low 
 in our estimation. The wolf, when his hunger 
 is satisfied, departs ; the cowardly tiger, the pro 
 totype of human tyrants, gluts himself with 
 carnage, and to enjoy destruction, tears to pieces 
 whatever is unable to withstand him. But does 
 the bravery of the wolf render his form an object 
 of admiration ? or the knowledge of the cowardice 
 and cruelty of the tiger resist the powerful im- 
 pression of the beauty of his shape ? The form 
 of the wolf is disagreeable, whatever may be the 
 power of the associations we may be able to. con- 
 nect with it ; that of the tiger is Beautiful, in 
 spite of our detestation of his character. 
 
 In the views of most writers who speak of the 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 73 
 
 emotion of Sublimity, fear and the sense of danger 
 have been confounded. Fear, as formerly ob- 
 served, forms no part of the emotion of Su- 
 blimity, though a sense of danger may. A brave 
 man may be fully aware of his being in a situa- 
 tion of danger, and may, in that situation, ex- 
 perience emotions of Sublimity, without the 
 slio^htest indications of fear stirrino^ within him. 
 To such a man we should not hesitate to declare 
 the opinion, that the form of the timid stag is far 
 more sublime than that of the more powerful, 
 and more ferocious buffalo. We would ask him 
 in what respect his emotions differed, when, in 
 one case, he sees a stag start from a thicket at his 
 side, bound over every obstacle, and, reaching the 
 summit of a rock, stop for a moment to regard 
 the object of his alarm ; and then, resting his 
 antlers on his shoulders, plunge into the dark 
 pine forest, and disappear : and in another case, 
 when traversing an Indian plain, studded with a 
 few" scattered jungles, he happens to encounter 
 a herd of wild buffaloes ? Doubtless he would 
 answer that the superior bulk and strength of 
 the buffalo raised no emotions of admiration ; 
 while powerful emotions were felt on the appear- 
 ance of the stag. The power and strength of 
 the buffalo, can never alter the impression of the 
 
74 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 clumsiness of his form ; the very timidity of the 
 stag renders his figure most impressive. 
 
 With regard to the opinions of children, an 
 appeal to them is equally illegitimate with an 
 appeal to ordinary language. One child may 
 cry, and run away, when a dog comes near him ; 
 and another will go boldly up to the animal to 
 caress it, or to drive it away. Such facts, if we 
 admit association, would lead us to the absurdcon- 
 clusion that a dog was at the same time a Sublime 
 and a contemptible animal. Even the w^ant of per- 
 sonal courage in us, can never render the form of 
 an animal disagreeable. Let an animal be shut 
 up in a cage, and let us be assured of our safety, 
 and we are always ready to admire even what 
 w^e feai and to acknowledge that the form of 
 an objec can yield us pleasure, although it be 
 associated with the most disagreeable circum- 
 stances. 
 
 ' In inanimate forms,"* says Mr Alison, ' mag- 
 nitude seems to have different expressions to us, 
 according to its different appearance or descrip- 
 tion." * In discussions of this kind, we must 
 never forget that form must be defined ; we must 
 be acquainted with the general form of an object 
 before we can speak of the emotions which it is 
 Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 325. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 75 
 
 capable of exciting. Of the forms of trees, of 
 rocks, of mountains, of animals, &c., we have a 
 definite notion. But of magnitude we have no 
 such notion, till we fix on some particular object, 
 and consider it in the different states of large 
 and small. Mr Alison, it will be observed, does 
 not here speak of magnitude as a general quality 
 belonging to an object, but applies it to the form. 
 He then goes on to detach it from the form, and 
 to apply it to particular dimensions. He speaks 
 of m.agnitude in height ; of magnitude in depth ; 
 of magnitude in length; and of magnitude in 
 breadth, as each expressive of something. Now 
 what is magnitude ? It is a combination of all 
 these ; and hence some impropriety may appear 
 in applying the whole of a thing, to denote a 
 quality in a part of the same thing. The conse- 
 quences of this erroneous notion of the meaning 
 of the word magnitude, may be made apparent, 
 by attention to Mr Alison s illustrations. ' Mag- 
 nitude in height,' says he, ' is expressive to us of 
 elevation, and magnanimity.'* As magnitude 
 denotes comparative bulk ; so elevation denotes 
 comparative height. Metaphorical language has 
 transferred the latter expression to the virtues of 
 human character ; and we speak of character as 
 Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 325. 
 
76 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 elevated, as it were, above what is mean or ordi- 
 nary. But the height of objects does not, in con- 
 sequence of this metaphor, lead to any association 
 with human character ; although the latter may 
 tempt us to a fanciful comparison. No objec- 
 tion can be made, if any one chooses to compare 
 a man that is magnanimous to a church steeple, 
 or to the Peak of Teneriffe ; but we are not 
 bound to believe a church steeple, or the Peak 
 of Teneriffe, as expressive of magnanimity, merely 
 because such a comparison has entered the ima- 
 gination of another person. My friend Dr Hol- 
 land, in describing the effects of the establish- 
 ment of the ancient constitution of Iceland, has 
 said that, ' like the Aurora Borealis of their na- 
 tive sky, the poets and historians of Iceland, not 
 only illumined their own country, but flashed 
 the lights of their genius through the night, 
 which then hung over the rest of Europe." No 
 one will refuse to acknowlege the extreme pro- 
 priety and beauty of this simile. But no one 
 would venture to say that the Aurora Borealis 
 w^as Sublime or Beautiful because it is express- 
 ive of poetry or history. If the fanciful imagery 
 of comparison and metaphor be allowed to have 
 any legitimate connexion with the formation 
 of our Taste, we may find the best comment- 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 77 
 
 ary on the theory of association, in a book of 
 riddles. 
 
 ' Magnitude in depth is expressive to us of 
 danger or terror, and, from our constant experi- 
 ence, of images of horror. In all countries, the 
 popular hell is considered as an unfathomable 
 abyss, into which the souls of the wicked are 
 plunged.'* It has already been stated that fear 
 can have no share in the genuine emotion of 
 Sublimity. The thought of hell very seldom 
 occurs when great depth is before us. Stand- 
 ing at the mouth of a deep mine, we know that 
 it has been excavated by human labour ; and we 
 descend without any fear of encountering the 
 devil, or of seeing any thing which answers to 
 the description of Pandemonium. Standing on 
 the top of a high rock, we do not feel terror, nor 
 horror, when we behold beneath us a deep valley 
 studded with cottages ; skirted with wood ; with 
 a river winding its way through it into a lake 
 and all the treasures of Autumn spread out be- 
 fore the sun. 
 
 ' Magnitude in length is expressive to us of 
 vastness, and when apparently unbounded, of 
 infinity; that being naturally imagined to be 
 without end, to which we can discern none. It 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 326. 
 
78 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 is impossible to see a vast plain, and above all, 
 the ocean, without this impression.'* A vast 
 plain, and the ocean, have breadth, just as much 
 as length. They appear to be a circular space, 
 bounded by a line in every part equidistant from 
 the place w^here we stand. It is obvious, that 
 any consideration of length, in its proper accepta- 
 tion, as connected with form^ of which Mr Ali- 
 son had lost sight, can never give the impression 
 of vastness or of infinity. 
 
 ' Magnitude in breadth, is expressive to us of 
 stability, of duration, of superiority to destruc- 
 tion.'-f- We certainly know by experience, that 
 any thing with a broad base will stand more 
 firmly, than if the base were narrow. But 
 we also know that this is the result of a law 
 which governs matter ; and the consequences of 
 such laws are as little connected with association, 
 as natural language, or any thing else which na- 
 ture herself regulates. Were associations, such 
 as those to which Mr Alison in general has attri- 
 buted Beauty and Sublimity, necessary and in- 
 voluntary, they would be universally acknow- 
 ledged, and no theory would be required to de- 
 monstrate their effects. No one can refuse to 
 admit necessary associations ; such as that hun- 
 
 ^- Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 326. t Ibid. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FOllM. 
 
 79 
 
 ger is associated with food ; fire with heat ; ice 
 with cold. Hunger is not pleasant because it is 
 associated with food ; nor is food disagreeable 
 because it is connected with huno^er. Fire is 
 disagreeable when associated with burning ; but 
 it is delightful because it keeps us warm. When 
 we see ice, it reminds us of our warm clothing, 
 and we wish it away ; in a hot crowded room, we 
 are glad to eat it. What does the theory gain 
 by all this ? No one will leap, for amusement, 
 from a precipice, because he associates with such 
 an action, broken bones, and a period to all future 
 amusement ; but he admires the precipice ne- 
 vertheless. To speak of the ' stability of nations, 
 of empires, of the laws of nature, of the future 
 hopes of good men," because ' we are accustomed 
 to judge of the stability of every thing by the pro- 
 portion of its base,** is to speak metaphorically and 
 comparatively. When we reflect on how far such 
 figures of speech maybe carried ; and on how many 
 ridiculous connexions may be formed between dif- 
 ferent things, which have some qualities in com- 
 mon ; when we consider that, if we admit meta- 
 phor and comparison among matters of taste, we 
 plunge at once into the midst of jest, puns, rebuses, 
 charades, and nonsense of every kind ; we cannot 
 subscribe to a theory which depends on such support. 
 
80 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 If we take any particular form, and examine 
 its expressions according to the principles of as- 
 sociation, we may perhaps discover, that the 
 abstract idea of size has been mixed up with, 
 and probably substituted for, magnitude as it is 
 connected with form. We must keep in view 
 that the theory requires that each dimension 
 must have its peculiar expression, according to 
 the proportion it bears to the rest. Any object 
 that is very high is said to be expressive of mag- 
 nanimity. Such an object must have a base 
 narrow in proportion to its height, otherwise 
 the elevation cannot be the most prominent fea- 
 ture. But narrowness of base expresses want of 
 steadiness, which does not accord with magnani- 
 mity. This quality, or rather combination of 
 qualities, should be best expressed by a cube, if 
 we admit the theory of association to be correct. 
 An object with a very broad base, but low, ex- 
 ])resses steadiness ; but also want of magnanimity. 
 Perhaps in this case the expression may be 
 found out to be obstinacy. The real question 
 seems to have gone out of view, when the idea 
 of these expressions occurred. The general 
 eff'ects of erdire form, is the subject, not the con- 
 sideration of any particular dimension of form. 
 It is very true, that some particular dimension 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 81 
 
 often gives a character to form ; but this pro- 
 perly belongs to our ideas of proportion, which 
 are not under consideration at present. 
 
 If it should be asserted that any form excites 
 emotions of Sublimity, simply because its di- 
 mensions are greater than those of another, we 
 should admire the rhinoceros, more than the 
 roe ; a round backed mountain, more than one 
 whose cubic contents are less, but which is va- 
 ried by peaks and precipices ; a man of twenty- 
 four stone weight, more than one who weighs 
 only twelve. If it should be asserted, that any 
 form excites sublimity, in proportion as one di- 
 mension may exceed all the rest ; we should 
 soon be guilty of trespassing against the rules 
 which men of acknowledged Taste have laid 
 down, regarding just proportion ; and we should 
 be involved in the questions arising out of the 
 differences of Taste, which is distinct from the 
 one before us. 
 
 Mr Alison has observed ' That there is node- 
 terminate magnitude, which is solely or pecu- 
 liarly Sublime, as would necessarily be the case, 
 were magnitude itself the cause of the emotion 
 of Sublimity.'* It is not clear whether, in this 
 proposition, our author meant to say that there 
 
 ^' Essays on Taste, vol. i. p, 328. 
 
82 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 is no limit to magnitude, beyond or below which 
 it is not capable of exciting emotions of Su- 
 blimity ; or whether, admitting a certain range 
 of magnitude to be Sublime, he meant to deny 
 that there is any point in that range which is 
 the most Sublime. In this state of uncertainty 
 as to the precise extent to which the proposition 
 is meant to be carried, we may consider, 1st, 
 whether natural objects that are animated, 2d, 
 whether those that are natural but inanimate, 
 and 38, whether artificial objects, may have a 
 determinate magnitude, which has greater effect 
 in exciting emotions of Sublimity than any other 
 magnitude to which form may be given. 
 
 1. Every thing animated, we must allow, has 
 a determinate magnitude, which if it exceed, it 
 is not Sublime, but monstrous ; and if it fall 
 short of this magnitude, it is dw^arfish and con- 
 temptible. The human figure in maturity when 
 it much exceeds six feet in the male, or when it 
 reaches that height in the female, is disagree- 
 able. We do not speak of a dwarf with admi- 
 ration. A very large horse is clumsy ; a very 
 small one we consider as a play- thing for children. 
 
 All men acknowledge propriety in the laws 
 of nature. She has prescribed limits to the size 
 of animals, and she has impressed us with a con- 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 83 
 
 viction, which we fondly cherish, that her laws 
 cannot be violated without disturbing that har- 
 mony which we desire to see permanent around 
 us. We see, and we feel, that the magnitude 
 which nature has given to every animal, is that 
 which we necessarily admire the most ; for we 
 are dissatisfied whenever we try the effect of en- 
 cumbering it with any addition, or when we at- 
 tempt to reduce it by mutilation. The same re- 
 marks are applicable to the vegetable kingdom. 
 No man can desire that a rose should be a foot 
 in diameter ; nor would the flower of the Kal- 
 mia be prized, were it extended to the dimen- 
 sions of a platter. As it is not in our power to 
 alter the magnitude of living creatures or of 
 vegetables ; and as we always consider any ac- 
 cidental deviation as monstrous or despicable, we 
 must consider such objects as each possessing a 
 determinate magnitude that is more agreeable 
 than any other. Some species of flowers, and of 
 animals, are large, and some small, and both are 
 considered beautiful. This may appear to some, 
 to contradict what has been affirmed, and an ex- 
 planation may be necessary. A cabbage rose is 
 beautiful, and so is a rose not a fourth of its bulk. 
 But the large rose reduced to the size of the small 
 one, or the small one increased to the size of the 
 
84 
 
 OF THE THEOllY OF ASSOCIATIOX 
 
 large one, would not be pleasing, because, the 
 form of both are adapted to the size which nature 
 has chosen. In plants and animals, there are 
 always proportions among the small ones that 
 would not be agreeable if given to the large ones, 
 however close the general resemblance of form 
 maybe. There is a natural adaptation of parts 
 to the condition allotted to the animal ; and when 
 any part is enlarged or diminished accidentally, 
 the adaptation ceases, and the animal becomes 
 unfitted for its condition, and its appearance dis- 
 agreeable. 
 
 2. With regard to natural objects that are in- 
 animate, it may appear, at first sight, difficult to 
 assign to them a determinate magnitude. If 
 there be any magnitude that is not Sublime, 
 there is surely a possibility of imagining that 
 magnitude increased or reduced till it become 
 sublime. Sublimity must begin and end some- 
 where ; and the point where it begins determines 
 the object to be sublime. Different persons may 
 not agree with regard to the fixing of this point ; 
 but to each there is a determinate magnitude 
 that is sublime. A waterfall six feet high maj^ 
 not be considered a sublime object ; but one per- 
 son may say, what a sublime object this would 
 be were it fifty feet high ; and another might say 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 85 
 
 that, in his opinion, it would not be sublime till 
 it had reached an hundred feet in height. Hence 
 there is, in the first place, a determinate magni- 
 tude necessary for an object to possess, in order 
 to become at all sublime. Now, if we reflect a 
 little, we must acknowledge it possible for any 
 object to be so magnified, as to lose its effect en- 
 tirely. If any object be magnified so as to be 
 beyond our reach, or removed to such a distance 
 as to prevent us from distinguishing any quality 
 or character belonging to it, except its mere ex- 
 istence, we are dissatisfied. The instance of a 
 waterfall may be continued, in order to prove 
 that there is a magnitude which is most sublime. 
 
 Let us keep in view any waterfall with which 
 we are familiar ; and suppose that the edge of 
 the precipice, over which the water flows, was 
 raised to an elevation of some thousand feet ; 
 and we should find that the water would be dis- 
 persed into spray, and dissolved in the air, before 
 it had descended low enough to be visible to us 
 as a fall. Now, it is maintained that, until we 
 reduce the elevation to that point, from whence 
 the whole of the water may reach the ground 
 without being converted into spray, we do not place 
 the fall on a footing of comparison with the same 
 body of water falling only sixfeet. Letmebe under- 
 
86 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 stood : I confine myself to a given body of water 
 flowing over the edge of a precipice, and falling 
 with great noise into a pool below. This is the 
 object I look at, and which I desire to raise to 
 the utmost possible height, but still retaining the 
 form entire. That there is a limit to my desire 
 is evident ; and that limit is found where the 
 water begins to be converted into spray. Let 
 us suppose that six feet is the limit the other way. 
 Now, from this limit there is clearly an approach 
 upwards towards the most sublime effect ; and 
 from the opposite limit, when the water disap- 
 pears, there is an evident approach downwards 
 to the same point. There must necessarily be 
 some point in elevation from which the water 
 will fall with greatest power. If it be raised 
 above that point, it becomes more and more di- 
 vided by the air, and more and more liable to 
 be dispersed and dissolved. If it be lowered, 
 the impetus of the body of water is more and 
 more diminished ; it collapses into a solid mass, 
 and approaches nearer and nearer to its ordinary 
 quiet movement along its channel. When we go 
 to see a celebrated waterfall, we are disappointed 
 if long dry weather has diminished the quantity 
 of water, below that which is properly propor- 
 tioned to the height of the rock, and we long for 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 87 
 
 wet weather to bring the scene to its full effect. 
 If there has been so much rain as to swell the 
 river, so that the body of water rolls over the 
 precipice in one unbroken mass, we wish for dry 
 weather to reduce it to the state in which we 
 admire it most. Scarcely any object in nature 
 ever occurs to our notice, which we could not 
 wish to be altered in some respect or other, in or- 
 der to bring it to that state, which we think 
 would afford us more complete satisfaction. 
 Hence, in all cases, there is one magnitude 
 which is more sublime than every other. 
 
 3. With regard to artificial objects, it is 
 quite unnecessary to enter into any formal detail 
 to prove, that there is a magnitude necessary for 
 them also to acquire, before they can possess 
 such influence as is wanted to raise emotions of 
 sublimity. There is also a point of monstrosity 
 to which magnitude in them may reach. Hence 
 there must be some peculiar magnitude on which 
 our minds can rest with more satisfaction than 
 any other. 
 
 It is also observed, 'That the same visible 
 magnitude which is sublime in one subject, is 
 often very far from being so in another, and mce 
 versa,'' * If this means, that the same form 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i, p, 32. 
 
88 OF THE TKEOIIY OF ASSOCIATIOX 
 
 varies in the effects it produces, according to the 
 quantity of matter to which it may be given ; in 
 other w^ords, according to its dimensions; the 
 truth of the proposition cannot be denied. But 
 the preceding remarks have shewn that this can- 
 not be considered as any proof that there is no 
 magnitude pecuHarly subhme. It is only in com- 
 bination, that any variation is to be discovered 
 in the limit to dimension, inasmuch as it may 
 be necessary to render a form most impressive. 
 It appears that the effects of magnitude are re- 
 gulated by circumstances and combinations ; and 
 that there is always a limit to the dimensions of 
 any inanimate form, which it cannot pass either 
 way wnthout becoming disagreeable ; and that 
 this limit is determined by the situation in which 
 the form may be placed. It seems to be this 
 which gives origin to our perception of proportion. 
 
 ' In comparing two vases, or two wreaths, or 
 two festoons, or any other ornamental forms, a 
 person unacquainted with the theories of philos- 
 phers, w^ien he is asked the reason of his pre- 
 ference, very readily answers, because it is more 
 delicate ; but never thinks of assigning any cir- 
 cumstance of the form itself, as the foundation of 
 admiration.' * The answer supposed to be given 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 3-13. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 89 
 
 is here assumed, upon what grounds does not ap- 
 pear, as that which every one would give. Un- 
 less there be proof that the cause assigned for the 
 preference is the same in the case of every per- 
 son ; unless it be established that the same vase, 
 festoon, or wreath, is universally preferred, the 
 affirmation contained in this quotation is of no 
 weight. Let us present such objects to different 
 persons, and we shall immediately find a differ- 
 ence of opinion ; whenever expression is spoken 
 of, we shall probably discover that the expression 
 which may please one person, cannot be con- 
 ceived by another. Hence nothing can be in- 
 ferred in favour of the theory, from the effects of 
 a particular form on a single individual, being ex- 
 pressed by a particular word. It is by no means 
 necessary to prove that there is something in 
 form itself which excites emotions of beauty, 
 that any circumstance of the form should be as- 
 signed as the foundation of admiration, were it 
 possible to assign such a thing. If an octagonal 
 form be more admired than one which is square, 
 no reason for preference is assigned, Mdien it is 
 said, that the octagon is liked, because it has 
 eight sides and eight angles. No particular pre- 
 dilection is felt for the number eight ; no reason 
 can be given for the preference. The fact is all 
 
 F 
 
90 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 that can be answered for ; and no one is ever a- 
 ware of reasoning at all, when an emotion of 
 preference is felt. In viewing certain works of 
 art, which are varied for the purpose of attract- 
 ing different tastes, we are apt to be led astray 
 by a thousand circumstances, which are very far 
 removed from those which excite the primary 
 emotion of preference as it regards form ; and 
 therefore, we appeal to certain regular forms 
 which may belong to a variety of objects, and 
 which raise the primary emotion without admix- 
 ture. Let us take the example of a turret ; and 
 ask any person whether he likes a square, a 
 round, or an octagonal turret. Whichever may 
 be preferred, it is impossible for any man to de- 
 tach any circumstance of the form, and assign it 
 as the reason of his preference. He can only say, 
 I like this better than that. No one can tell 
 what a round tower expresses different from a 
 tower of any other shape ; that is, with what it 
 could be associated, in order to account for its 
 being preferred to others. They are of the same 
 height ; the wall is of the same thickness ; all 
 are equally well adapted for defence, or for 
 watching the approach of an enemy : in short, 
 every circumstance which can be connected with 
 the one, can also be connected with the others. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 91 
 
 The theory of association gives us no assistance 
 in this case ; and we are left with a conviction 
 that there is some connexion between form itself 
 and the mind, of which philosophers take no 
 account. 
 
 ' If we were to describe the most beautiful 
 vase in technical terms, and according to the dis- 
 tinguished characteristics of its form, no one but 
 an artist would have any tolerable conception of 
 its beauty ; but if we were simply to describe it 
 as peculiarly delicate in all its parts, I believe it 
 would leave with every one the impression of 
 the beauty of its form. If, however, there were 
 any original and independent beauty in particu- 
 lar forms, the description of this form would be 
 alone sufficient to convey the idea of its beauty ; 
 and the circumstance of its delicacy or fineness 
 would be as little able to convey this idea, as 
 that of its colour.'* If we describe a thing in 
 technical language, to a person ignorant of that 
 language, it will be no wonder that we are not 
 understood. Although a person might, from the 
 simple description of its being delicate, believe 
 that a vase, which he never saw, was Beautiful ; 
 it by no means follows that he believes what is 
 true in regard to his own individual feelings, 
 * Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 343, 344. 
 
92 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 Bring the vase into his view, and he may be as- 
 tonished at his credulity, and wonder at the taste 
 of him who could discover such extraordinary 
 Beauty in the object, as to merit the description 
 he had given of it. 
 
 Description ought to have no place in the con- 
 sideration of a theory of taste ; because just no- 
 tions of form can be conveyed to the mind only 
 by sight and touch. No one can form accurate 
 ideas of a landscape, however animated and cor- 
 rect the description of it may be, without some 
 other help. Who ever thought of enabling a 
 painter to delineate a particular scene, merely by 
 post-office communication ? If a painter were to 
 put upon canvas what a description conveyed, 
 and so that every part of the picture agreed with 
 it, still it might be very different from the real 
 scene ; and so different, that the author of the 
 description might be unable to recognise it. The 
 experience of every one who has visited a coun- 
 try of which he had previously read a descrip- 
 tion, demonstrates that the beauties and defor- 
 mities were such as he had no idea of. This 
 seems to arise from its being impossible by any 
 means but a drawing, to convey the relative pro- 
 portions and distances of the objects described. 
 From reading, only general ideas can be formed; 
 
AS APPLIED TO FOUM. 
 
 93 
 
 and every reader, who has the necessary power, 
 figures out of the description something w^hich 
 he thinks suitable ; yet when he visits the real 
 scene, it is quite new to him. It most frequent- 
 ly happens that the ideal object is the more beau- 
 tiful of the two ; but we may be agreeably, as 
 well as disagreeably, undeceived, 
 
 Mr Alison goes on to say, ' That the language 
 and opinions of children and of common people, 
 are inconsistent with the notion of any original 
 or absolute Beauty in any particular forms.' 
 The very opposite opinion must be entertained 
 by all who have made attentive observation. 
 For my own part, judging from experience, I 
 consider the remark just quoted, as unfounded. 
 The same diversity of opinion in matters of 
 Taste, is to be found among the lower, as obtains 
 among the higher and well educated classes. 
 Whoever has had occasion to be much among 
 the lower orders, must have observed, that one 
 cottager displays order, neatness, cleanliness, and 
 decoration, in the inside, and as much ornament 
 on the outside of his dwelling as he can afford ; 
 while another is slovenly and dirty. All mecha- 
 nics will be found to be better judges of form in 
 general, than mere labourers ; and some indi- 
 viduals of the latter class will be found more 
 
94 Ot THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 handy in performing their work than others. 
 Some children, at a very early age, shew great 
 quickness in distinguishing and recollecting 
 forms ; as may be observed in their recognising 
 persons whom they have seen ; and in their 
 knowing the pictures of various objects ; they 
 are also quick in learning the alphabet. In- 
 stances also occur, when children not only ex- 
 hibit readiness in distinguishing forms, but a 
 wonderful talent in imitating them, by drawing, 
 or cutting out figures in paper, &c. Other child- 
 ren shew nothing of this. Whoever, therefore, 
 will attend to the opinions of common people 
 and of children, with that degree of observation 
 which is not satisfied with a mere passing view, 
 will find that nothing is to be gained for the 
 theory of association from this appeal. 
 
 With regard to curvilinear forms, it is of im- 
 portance to consider, whether, according to the 
 theory of association, it will be found, that they 
 cease to be regarded as Beautiful, when they 
 cease to be expressive of tenderness and delicacy.* 
 The very obvious example of a snake, might per- 
 haps be sufficient to convince us, that where, be- 
 sides the absence of tenderness and delicacy, as- 
 sociations may be formed very far from agreeable, 
 * Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 346. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 95 
 
 curves continue to be admired. But the anima- 
 tion of this figure, as of many others which 
 might be selected from the animal kingdom, 
 might perhaps be objected to. I will therefore 
 be content with examples to which no objection 
 of that kind can be made. 
 
 The varied undulations of the outline of a 
 mountain scene, will scarcely be considered as 
 expressive of tenderness or of delicacy ; nor can 
 any associations be formed in connexion with it, 
 that do not express the opposite to these. Yet 
 the beauty of such an outline depends altogether 
 on its curves. 
 
 I cannot associate tenderness and delicacy 
 with a winding path across a hill. A zig-zag 
 path is not so agreeable : but the cause of the one 
 being more pleasing than the other, is not to be 
 found in associations. The same end may be at- 
 tained by both : the ascent by the one may be 
 as easy as by the other. Hence, all ideas of fit- 
 ness and use are out of the question. Yet there 
 is something more pleasing in the winding path ; 
 and this must be ascribed to something different 
 from the associations, which are the same in 
 both cases. If association be the cause of our 
 admiring any form, we ought to admire every 
 form to which the mme associations belong; 
 
96 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 j3^^t whenever the theory is tried by this test, it 
 fails. 
 
 If winding or curvilinear forms in artificial ob- 
 jects, cease to be felt as Beautiful, when they 
 cease to be expressive of tenderness or delicacy, 
 a ship under sail ought to be a very disagreeable 
 object to look upon. It is made up, almost en- 
 tirely, of such forms ; and every part expresses 
 the opposite of tenderness and delicacy. But 
 who has seen this object without having felt 
 strong emotions of Sublimity and Beauty ? Who, 
 in admiring a bridge, will say that this admira- 
 tion is excited by its expression of tenderness? 
 There is no delicacy in the bending of a bow, 
 even in the hands of Cupid. 
 
 ' There are many parts, however, of the vege- 
 table kingdom, which are not distinguished by 
 this character of delicacy. The stem of some 
 species of flowers, and of almost all shrubs, the 
 trunk and branches of trees, are distinguished by 
 opposite characters, and would indeed be unfit 
 for the purposes of vegetation if they were not. 
 In these subjects, accordingly, the winding or 
 serpentine form is very far from being beautiful, 
 as it has no longer its usual expression of fineness 
 or delicacy.' Were we to agree in this con- 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 347. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 97 
 
 elusion, we should be obliged to consider trees as 
 disagreeable objects ; and we should heartily join 
 in applying the axe, to rid the world of every 
 vegetable production not necessary for food. If 
 there be any beauty in trees, which all men ad- 
 mit, not the least portion of that beauty is found 
 in the twisting and curving of the branches ; 
 and it is in proportion to the degree and manner 
 of this twisting and curving, that trees are com- 
 monly admired. Our author has already declared 
 the forms of trees to be sublime in proportion to 
 their expression of duration and strength ; * now, 
 however, they are deprived of beauty, for the 
 very same reason. Were it not otherwise an- 
 nounced, that Beauty and Sublimity are consid- 
 ered by Mr Alison as entirely separated, this 
 would be sufficient to show that he believes them 
 to be different. It must appear somewhat re- 
 markable, therefore, that Lord Jeffrey should have 
 shewn, that the theory of association, as to its ne- 
 cessary consequences, establishes the identity of 
 the Sublime, the Beautiful, and the Picturesque. f 
 ' All the different bodies which constitute the 
 mineral kingdom, are distinguished by a greater 
 degree of hardness and solidity, than is to be 
 found in any other of the productions of nature. 
 Essays on Taste, p 822. t Supp. Enc. Brit. vol. ii. p. 1 95 
 
98 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 Such bodies, however, by different exertions of art, 
 may be moulded into any form we please : but 
 the beauty of the serpentine form, in such cases, 
 is lost, from our consciousness of the absence 
 of that delicacy which in general accompanies 
 such forms. It is possible, for instance, to imi- 
 tate the winding of the ivy, the tendrils of the 
 vine, or the beautiful curves of the rose tree, in 
 iron, or in any other metal. It is possible, also, 
 to colour such imitations in so perfect a manner, 
 as at first to deceive the spectator. If I am not 
 mistaken, however, the moment we are unde- 
 ceived, the moment we know that the subject is 
 different from that which characterises such forms 
 in real nature, the beauty of the forms is destroy- 
 ed, and instead of that pleasing sentiment of 
 tenderness which the delicacy of the vegetable 
 excites, a sentiment of disappointment and un- 
 easiness succeeds ; of disappointment, from the 
 absence of that delicacy which we generally in- 
 fer from the appearance of such forms ; and of 
 uneasiness, from the conviction of force having 
 been applied to twist the subject into so unnatu- 
 ral directions.** * 
 
 If these ideas be well founded, there ought to be 
 a gradation in the beauty of imitations, according 
 
 * Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 349. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 99 
 
 to the rigidity of the material of which they are 
 made. An imitation in iron has no beauty, ac- 
 cording to the theory, but while w^e remain ig- 
 norant of the material. An imitation in lead, 
 which is a softer material, must be considered 
 less distantly removed from Beauty, as it is more 
 easily wrought. A still nearer approach must 
 be made by an imitation in clay ; which should 
 affect us much more agreeably; I should say, 
 perhaps, less disagreeably, than either the imita- 
 tion in iron, or that in lead. In the above quo- 
 tation, that part of the basis of the theory, which 
 allows association to destroy Beauty, is clearly 
 stated. On such principles, the beauty of a 
 statue must vanish before the conviction that it 
 is formed of a substance very different from flesh. 
 The contemplation of such an object should stir 
 up discontent, because it is improper to give to 
 marble a character which does not belong to it ; 
 and from the total absence of delicacy ; and ex- 
 cite a feeling of uneasiness, because force has 
 been employed in its formation. So far, however, 
 from discontent and uneasiness being excited by 
 a statue, it is generally acknowledged that some 
 statues exist, which represent the human figure 
 as more beautiful than is commonly seen in nature. 
 Mr Alison seems to have been aware of the 
 
100 OF THE THEOriY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 difficulties which he had to remove in order to sub- 
 stitute the affirmations contained in the last quota- 
 tion ; but there is doubt of his having been suc- 
 cessful in his attempts to obviate them. 'There are, 
 however," hesays, 'undoubtedlycases in which cur- 
 vilinear forms in such subjects are beautiful. I ap- 
 prehend, however, that this takes place only when 
 a kind of adventitious delicacy is given to such sub- 
 stances, and of consequence the same character 
 is retained by the form which we have generally 
 associated with it in real nature. This effect is 
 generally produced by the following causes : 1st, 
 When the quantity of matter is so small, as to 
 overcome our sense of its strength and durabihty ; 
 and 2dly, When the workmanship is so excel- 
 lent, as to produce an opinion of fineness or deli- 
 cacy, independent of the nature of the subject 
 upon which it is employed. In either of these 
 cases, such forms may be beautiful, though 
 . assumed by the hardest or most durable mate- 
 rials.'* 
 
 With respect to the first cause, it seems to have 
 had no effect in the imitation of the rose tree in 
 iron, which contained no greater quantity of 
 material than was necessary to represent the na- 
 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 351. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 101 
 
 tural bulk of the object ; nor had the second 
 cause any influence, although the excellence of 
 the workmanship was such as to deceive us into 
 a belief of the reality of the object. ' A bar of 
 iron, for instance, or of any other metal, may be 
 twisted by force into the most perfect spiral 
 form ; but in such a case, the conviction of force 
 and labour destroys altogether the beauty of the 
 general form. Suppose this bar lengthened, un- 
 til it becomes as slender as the wires which are 
 made use of in musical instruments, and as deli- 
 cate as such wires are, and the form becomes 
 immediately beautiful." * 
 
 To me this example appears to be the fittest 
 possible to illustrate the fallacy of the theory of 
 association. The idea of force and labour, to a 
 certain extent, is said to destroy Beauty ; and 
 the idea of much additional force and labour is 
 said to restore it ! For every one knows, that 
 to twist a bar of iron into a spiral form requires 
 far less force and labour, than to bring it to . the 
 form of fine wire. According to the principles 
 thus laid down, the more delicate the wire, the 
 more should the expression of delicacy be obli- 
 terated by the idea of the increasing amount of 
 
 ^ Essays oil Taste, vol. i. p. 352, 
 
102 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 the labour employed, instead of any beauty being 
 acquired. It may be said, indeed, that the ratio 
 in which the delicacy increases, is greater than 
 that of the force and labour. But this does not 
 remove the conviction of their having been em- 
 ployed ; and seems to amount to nothing more 
 than if I were to say, while I was puffing and 
 blowing and wiping my brow, that there was 
 no difficulty in climbing up a very steep hill, 
 because I continually approach the summit, and 
 because there is a gentle slope to go down by, on 
 the other side. 
 
 Nor has Mr Alison been more happy in get- 
 ting free of the same kind of obstacles which 
 meet him in the vegetable kingdom, when he 
 attempts to explain why angular forms are some- 
 times beautiful. 
 
 ' In the vegetable world, although it is gene- 
 rally true that winding forms are those that are 
 assumed by young, or feeble, or delicate plants, 
 yet this rule is far from being uniform, and there 
 are many instances of similar productions being 
 distinguished by forms of an angular kind* 
 There are accordingly many cases, where this 
 form is considered as beautiful, because it is the 
 expression of the same qualities which are gene- 
 rally expressed by forms of the other kind. The 
 
AS APPLIED TO FOllM. 
 
 103 
 
 myrtle, for instance, is generally reckoned a 
 beautiful form, yet the growth of its stem is per- 
 pendicular, the junction of its branches form 
 regular and similar angles, and their direction is 
 in straight or angular lines. The known deli- 
 cacy, however, and tenderness of the vegetable, 
 at least in this climate, prevails over the general 
 expression of the form, and gives it the same 
 beauty which we generally find in forms of a 
 contrary kind. How much more beautiful is 
 the rose tree when its buds begin to blow, than 
 afterwards, when its flowers are full and in 
 their greatest perfection ; yet in this first si- 
 tuation, its form has much less winding surface, 
 and is much more composed of straight lines 
 and of angles, than afterwards when the weight 
 of the flower weighs down the feeble branches, 
 and describes the easiest and most varied 
 curves.*' * 
 
 The instance of the myrtle, is scarcely appli- 
 cable, in illustrating the assertion that the same 
 form is capable of producing opposite emotions 
 at different times, and in different circumstances. 
 This plant is said to be beautiful, because, in our 
 climate, it is delicate. From this we cannot 
 avoid inferring that, in its native climate, the 
 Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 359. 
 
104 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 plant is really ugly, because there it expresses no 
 delicacy nor tenderness. But in its native cli- 
 mate the myrtle is acknowledged to be far more 
 beautiful than it is in our drawing-rooms. We 
 might just as well say, that a forced hyacinth in 
 Scotland is more beautiful than one growing in 
 the open air in Holland ; or that a peach blossom 
 in a hot-house, is more beautiful than the same 
 blossom in the open air in France or America. 
 The instance of the rose tree is not fairly stated ; 
 because the mention of the flower buds is apt to 
 lead us astray, and to conceal from our view the 
 tree itself, in which there is nothing to be ad- 
 mired. It is contrary to the principles of the 
 theory to say, that the weight of the flowers 
 causes the tree to describe the easiest curves ; for 
 weight implies force ; and if there was any 
 beauty in the curves of the branches, from this 
 cause, it should disappear. Hence this is an ap- 
 peal to beauty, where the theory does not allow 
 it to exisfc. 
 
 The same defect in reasoning appears when he 
 says, ' In the smaller and feebler tribe of flowers, 
 for instance, as in the violet, the daisy, or the 
 lily of the valley, the bending of the stem con- 
 stitutes a very beautiful form, because we im- 
 mediately perceive that it is the consequence of 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 105 
 
 the weakness and delicacy of the flower. In the 
 rose, on the contrary, and the white lily, and in 
 the tribe of flowering shrubs, a class of vegetables 
 of greater strength, the same form assumed by 
 the stem is felt as a defect, and instead of im- 
 pressing us with the idea of delicacy, leads us to 
 believe the operation of some force to twist it in- 
 to this direction.' * 
 
 Is there no force employed to bend the stalks 
 of the violet, the daisy, or the lily of the valley ? 
 Is it not apparent that the weight of the flowers 
 is the force which produces the form, which we 
 admire? The form is not the consequence of 
 the weakness and delicacy of the flower, but of its 
 weight overcoming the strength of the stalk. 
 Wherever this bending of the stalks of flowers is 
 considered as beautiful, the same cause, which is 
 considered by our author so hostile to beauty, 
 will be found to operate ; and if we agree with 
 him, that in any case such forms are defects, let 
 us try the experiment of giving to the vegetable 
 that form which nature has denied to it, but 
 which we may think more beautiful than the 
 natural one, and we shall soon find a demonstra- 
 tion of the inaccuracy of appeals to the imagina- 
 
 Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 347. 
 
 G 
 
106 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 tion. Let us reduce the branches of the oak to 
 straight lines, and stretch out every curve which 
 we find without tenderness or delicacy, and we 
 shall be shocked at the offences which the theory 
 of association would have us to commit, although 
 but in fancy. 
 
 Appropriateness of form must be kept apart 
 from form itself in our inquiries. To give to a 
 book and its pages the form of an octagon, would 
 be far from appropriate ; and I should scarcely 
 object to such a book being called ugly. But I 
 could not consent to the octagon being called an 
 ugly form, merely because it had been misap- 
 plied. Keeping this distinction in view, it ap- 
 pears to be wrong to say that the same thing can 
 express two things which are opposite ; that a 
 curve can express tenderness and delicacy, and 
 also duration and strength. The truth is, that 
 a great many vegetables which climb and trail 
 are great deceptions, if they be supposed to ex- 
 press tenderness and delicacy ; for many of them 
 will be found capable of resisting very considera- 
 ble force. It is unnecessary to extend the argu- 
 ment further respecting such subjects. We may, 
 however, illustrate by means of a different sub- 
 ject, to which Mr Alison has appealed, an appa- 
 rent neglect of matters of fact, which is often 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 107 
 
 concealed by his elegant style of writing. I hope 
 to be excused for the length of my quotations. 
 
 ' In the manufacture of glass, the great beauty 
 of the form is in proportion to this expression 
 (Delicacy). Nothing is less beautiful than thick 
 and massy glass, which, from its quantity, seems 
 intended to compensate for its fragility. No- 
 thing, on the contrary, is more generally beauti- 
 ful than thin and transparent glass, which, from 
 experience, we know to be the most decisive 
 sign of its delicacy and weakness. In such a 
 manufacture, winding lines cannot be observed, 
 without necessarily increasing the quantity and 
 thickness of the material, and of consequence 
 diminishing its fineness and transparency. Such 
 forms, accordingly, are less beautiful than those 
 composed of more direct and angular lines, which, 
 as they admit of greater transparency, express 
 also greater delicacy and fineness. To take a 
 very common instance, the stalk of a wine glass 
 might with equal ease be fashioned into serpen- 
 tine or winding forms, as into the angular com- 
 partments in which we generally find it ; yet I 
 am much deceived if it would be nearly as beau- 
 tiful, because these lines could not admit of that 
 apparent fineness of surface, or transparency of 
 matter, which is obtained by its angular divisions. 
 
108 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 In a lustre, in the same manner, one of the most 
 beautiful productions of this manufacture, all is 
 angular. The form of the prism, one of the most 
 regular and angular of all forms, obtains every- 
 where, the festoons even are angular, and instead 
 of any winding or waving line, the whole surface 
 is broken into a thousand little triangles ; yet I 
 conceive no person will deny its beauty. A lustre, 
 on the other hand, composed of the most beautiful 
 curves, and studiously varied into the most wav- 
 ing surface, would not be nearly so beautiful ; 
 because the necessary thickness which it would 
 give to the glass, would in this case be expressive 
 of strength and solidity, instead of delicacy, and 
 would diminish altogether that fine transparency, 
 which in this manufacture, is immediately the 
 sign of tenderness and fragility.'* 
 
 Here form appears to be confounded with the 
 material to which it may be given ; as if form 
 could be altered by the kind or quantity of mat- 
 ter to which it is given. The form of a prism 
 is the same whether it be given to wood or to 
 glass. I might appeal to the generally acknow- 
 ledged beauty of dessert Bets of glass, which are 
 massive and angular ; but the fallacy of the whole 
 illustration consists in the neglect of a single 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 364. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 109 
 
 circumstance, so obvious, that the neglect ma}^ 
 appear inexcusable. Angular forms are given to 
 glass, not for the purpose of expres:3ing delicacy 
 or fragility, which in general lessens the value of 
 glass, but to produce certain pleasing effects on 
 light. I deny that the form of a lustre is angu- 
 lar. The whole is made up of curves ; angularity 
 of the individual parts being invisible at a little 
 distance, and intended only to reflect and refract 
 light, so as to produce a play of colour. The 
 same form could be made out, just as well by 
 means of little round beads, as of beads having 
 their surfaces cut into facettes ; and with much 
 less trouble and expense. It would possess all 
 the delicacy and fragility of a common lustre ; 
 but would not be so beautiful, as when the 
 beauties of light and colour are made to corn- 
 bine with that of form. No additional thick- 
 ness can be necessary in constructing a lus- 
 tre of curved rods, instead of angular pieces ; 
 on the contrary, more fragility may be m.ade 
 to exist in a lustre without angles, than what 
 the angular form of the individual parts in 
 common lustres can possibly express. Hence, 
 the whole of this illustration, wdiich at first may 
 be somewhat alluring, is useless to the theory. 
 ' In the forms which are given to jewels, the 
 
110 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 same rule universally obtains. The delicacy of 
 such subjects is in their brilliancy. The only form, 
 therefore, that is beautiful in them, is that which 
 displays it.' This same brilliancy must also be 
 the delicacy of a glass lustre ; but to say that 
 delicacy consists in brilliancy, is not, perhaps, 
 altogether correct, inasmuch as brilliancy is ge- 
 nerally understood, with respect to light, to be 
 that degree of it which is farthest removed from 
 delicacy. 
 
 A very few observations on the theory of as- 
 sociation, applied to architectural forms, w^ill suf- 
 fice to show, that it is better adapted to the 
 formation of an artificial taste, than to account 
 for one that is natural. ' There are few things,** 
 says Lord Jeffrey, ' about which men of virtu 
 are more apt to rave, than the merits of the 
 Grecian architecture ; and most of those who 
 affect an uncommon purity and delicacy of taste, 
 talk of the intrinsic beauty of its proportions as 
 a thing not to be disputed, except by barbarian 
 ignorance and stupidity. Mr Alison, we think, 
 was the first who gave a full and convincing 
 refutation of this mysterious dogma ; and while 
 he admits, in the most ample terms, the beauty 
 of the objects in question, has shewn, we think, 
 in the clearest manner, that it arises entirely from 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 Ill 
 
 the combination of the following associations : 
 1st, The association of utility, convenience, or 
 fitness for the purposes of the building ; Sd, of 
 security and stability, with a view to the na- 
 ture of the materials ; 3d, of the skill and power 
 requisite to mould such materials into forms so 
 commodious ; 4th, of magnificence, and splen- 
 dour, and expense ; 5th, of antiquity ; and 6th, 
 of Roman and Grecian greatness.** 
 
 As men unacquainted with the theories of phi- 
 losophers, have been appealed to in support of 
 the theory of association, I therefore propose to 
 take a person of that description to a proper 
 point, within vievv of a building presenting all 
 the elegance of the Grecian architecture ; but of 
 the existence of which he had no previous know- 
 ledge, nor of the rules and proportions followed. 
 Will this person admire the structure, or will he 
 not? Will he instantly feel an emotion? or 
 will he take time, before he utters a word, or al- 
 lows himself to be moved, to find out for what 
 purpose it was erected ; and whether, according 
 to his own ideas, it be properly adapted to that 
 purpose ? Does he suspend his feelings till he has 
 examined the kind of stone, and learned its qua- 
 lities; till he has probed the thickness of the 
 
 * Supp. Enc. Brit. vol. ii. p. 1 90. 
 
112 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 walls, and dug down to the foundation to ascer- 
 tain whether it be rock or sand ? Will he pause 
 to consider whether much skill and much power 
 were exerted in the erection ? Will he hesitate 
 till he calculates the expense ? Will he approach 
 the portal to search for the date ? Will he sit 
 down to meditate quietly on the greatness of 
 Rome ajid of Greece ? If he did all this, no one 
 would be astonished at his being called little 
 better than insane. So far from such an operose 
 process being consequent, we should find the 
 effect instantaneous ; and although it should be 
 discovered, after a painful search, that, in its in- 
 terior arrangement, this fine building was ill 
 adapted to its purpose ; that it was constructed 
 of a stone far from durable, and on an unstable 
 foundation ; that it cost but little money ; and 
 was but a month old ; the only feeling which 
 such circumstances are likely to excite, is regret 
 that so imposing an exterior had not been formed 
 of more durable materials, and that the accom- 
 modations were ill contrived ; it would never be 
 said that the elevation was ugly. If we take the 
 reverse case, and come in sight of a building 
 which has a very plain and unadorned exterior, 
 w^ithout regularity or any sort of proportion ; and 
 find the interior exceedingly commodious and 
 
AS APrLIED TO FORM. 
 
 113 
 
 well arranged, the apartments well proportioned, 
 and richly and splendidly furnished, we could 
 never admire the elevation of such a building, 
 although we have the knowledge of the superio- 
 rity of the internal arrangements, solid walls, 
 everlasting granite, and a foundation of rock to 
 assist us. It would be absurd to say that we 
 cannot admire the elevation of a street, unless 
 we make ourselves acquainted with the interior 
 arrangement, and other circumstances connected 
 with the houses. When we enter a city, we may 
 surely be permitted to say what we think of the 
 buildings, without previously troubling the inha- 
 bitants with unseasonable visits. 
 
 To prove that association has little connexion 
 with the admiration which architecture excites ; 
 that there is something in our minds which di- 
 rects us to prefer certain forms, and certain pro- 
 portions in one form relatively to another ; I have 
 only to go back to the individual who invented 
 any of the orders belonging to Greece, oi* to him 
 who invented the Gothic style ; or to any one 
 who has improved on the first idea of them ; and 
 to ask, what could have led an individual to con- 
 struct what he had never seen or heard of? 
 What could have induced him to fix on certain 
 proportions for one part of a building to bear to 
 
114 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 another? Nothing surely but his own innate 
 powers. He must have felt certain forms to be 
 more pleasing than others ; certain arrangements 
 of these forms more satisfactory than others ; and 
 certain proportions between them to be more 
 appropriate than others. To him certain pro- 
 portions in columns were irresistible; and he re- 
 duced them to practice. Subsequent ages have felt 
 that they cannot be altered without giving offence. 
 
 The first association can have nothing to do 
 with the exterior of a building ; but it is to the 
 exterior that the skill of the architect is chiefly 
 directed, and to which our attention is most for- 
 cibly called. If this association had any effect, 
 any external form would be entitled to admira- 
 tion, w^henever the purposes of the building were 
 obtained. A dead wall, with no opening but 
 what m.ay be sufficient to allow a man to pass, 
 would be just as beautiful as a Grecian portico. 
 
 The second association implies the conse- 
 quences of a law of our nature ; and I have al- 
 ready shown that nothing involuntary can be 
 called association. No man ever builds a house 
 of feathers ; nor with any view but to its dura- 
 tion; at least when he builds it for his own use, 
 or to perpetuate his memory. 
 
 The third association implies a comparison be- 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 115 
 
 tween our own skill and that of others ; and is, 
 therefore, applicable only to those who have no 
 skill, or very little. I apprehend that the mere 
 mechanical labour of cutting a stone to a pattern, 
 and of placing it on another, never occurs to us 
 when we look upon a specimen of architecture ; 
 or, if it does, it cannot have any effect on the 
 form. We may praise the genius which invent- 
 ed the plan ; but when we look at a mason carv- 
 ing a capital, we see nothing but what is very 
 simple; and the mason himself will smile if we 
 say that there is any thing very wonderful in the 
 movements of his chissel and mallet. If there 
 be any thing in this association, it must follow, 
 that a man who is skilful himself, and who has 
 the power and the means requisite for erecting a 
 temple or other building, cannot feel any emo- 
 tion of beauty or sublimity, on seeing his own 
 works, or those of others, because he possesses 
 the same means and power. But it is notorious 
 that men who have skill and power, feel more 
 than those who have them not. Men who in- 
 vent are more passionately fond of the subject of 
 their powers, than those who cannot invent for 
 themselves. 
 
 The fourth association seems to lead to an ab- 
 surdity. If I wished to erect in Spitzbergen, 
 
116 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 a fac simile of St PauPs cathedral the expense 
 might be at least ten times what it would be, 
 were I to fix on a spot near Edinburgh, where 
 the finest stone and abundance of lime are to be 
 found. But two buildings exactly alike, cannot 
 differ in form ; and unless there be a difference, 
 there can be no preference. Nor can the form 
 alter, though wedges of gold were used instead 
 of stone. A cottage with walls of silver, and 
 thatched with straws of gold, is not more likely 
 to excite emotions of Beauty, than the same 
 form made up of mud and reeds. 
 
 The fifth association leads to little better ; 
 for it can never be allowed that we call a form 
 beautiful, because it belongs to a structure that is 
 old. If it can, then we must admit, that every 
 style of architecture which preceded, was neces- 
 sarily more beautiful than that of the Greeks. 
 But this, I suspect, will be strenuously resisted 
 even by the advocates of association. 
 
 The sixth association implies that the ancient 
 Egyptians were not a powerful people ; that 
 Asia could not boast empires as great, and of 
 princes as rich and munificent, as any claimed 
 by Europe. In Egypt and in India, there are 
 specimens of architecture plainly indicative of 
 stability, of skill, power, magnificence, and 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 117 
 
 splendour, and so ancient, that all traces of the 
 period in which they were erected are lost. But 
 the forms of those specimens, with all the aid of 
 such associations, fail to impress us so powerfully 
 as the architecture of Greece. 
 
 There is something peculiar in the mind, 
 which is never satisfied, till it rests on certain 
 qualities of form, regardless of imaginary asso- 
 ciations which, as they could not have led to the 
 invention of forms which we admire, cannot be 
 necessary to lead us to admire them. Our ad- 
 miration, or dislike, or indifference, whatever we 
 may offer as the cause of the one, or as an apo- 
 logy for the others, arise from something in our 
 nature over which we have no control. 
 
 I will conclude the consideration of form, with 
 a very few remarks on what has been said re- 
 specting the power of association, in directing 
 our estimates of the beauty of the human coun- 
 tenance. 
 
 To follow all the details brought forward, in 
 illustration of the theory appears to be unneces- 
 sary. Lord Jeffrey comes boldly on, and gives, 
 in the following passage, the whole essence of 
 the theory. 
 
 ' The most beautiful object in nature, perhaps, 
 is the countenance of a young and beautiful wo- 
 
118 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 man ; and we are apt at first to imagine, that, 
 independent of all associations, the forms and 
 colours which it displays are, in themselves, 
 lovely and engaging, and would appear charming 
 to all beholders, with whatever other qualities 
 or impressions they might happen to be con- 
 nected. A very little reflection, however, will 
 probably be sufficient to convince us of the fal- 
 lacy of this impression ; and to satisfy us, that 
 what we admire is not a combination of forms 
 and colours, which could never excite any men- 
 tal emotion, but a collection of signs and tokens 
 of certain mental feelings and affections, which 
 are universally recognised as the proper objects 
 of love and sympathy. Laying aside the emo- 
 tions arising from difference of sex, and suppos- 
 ing female beauty to be contemplated by the pure 
 and unenvying eye of a female, it seems quite 
 obvious, that among its ingredients, we should 
 trace the signs of two different set of qualities, 
 that are neither of them the object of sight, but 
 of a higher faculty ; — in the first place, of youth 
 and health ; and in the second place, of inno- 
 cence, gaiety, sensibility, intelligence, delicacy, 
 or vivacity.'* The reply to this will be very 
 short. 
 
 * Supp. Enc. Brit. vol. ii. p. 182. 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 J19 
 
 It would be a strange assertion to make, that 
 we could not distinguish whether a woman was 
 young and healthy, unless we considered her face 
 beautiful. Yet such an assertion is implied in 
 the quotation. As no one can be hardy enough 
 to deny, that the indications of youth and health 
 are as distinct in a plain, as in a beautiful face, the 
 theory of association ought to lead us to admire 
 both of them equally, because the same associa- 
 tions are applicable to both. Innocence is just 
 as easily discovered in a plain as in a beautiful 
 face ; and it would be extreme presumption in 
 us, to separate virtue from a homely female, and 
 appropriate it exclusively to one who is beautiful. 
 Hence it would be absurd to affirm that a woman 
 with a plain face was not innocent. We have 
 been already told that the idea of force and la- 
 bour eflFectually destroys the beauty, which we 
 might imagine to exist in the imitations of na- 
 tural objects. The idea of vice is surely more 
 repugnant when attached to the female charac- 
 ter, than force and labour when connected with 
 inanimate matter. But shocking as this idea is, 
 it does not destroy the beauty of the female 
 couiitenance. Among the abandoned women of 
 a great city, the proportion of beauty will scarce- 
 ly be found to be less, than among the same num- 
 
120 OF THE THKORY OF ASSO(MATION 
 
 ber taken at random from among the virtuous. 
 The Goddess of Beauty herself is described as a 
 notorious strumpet and adulteress, and as actively 
 employed in encouraging vice in others ; yet we 
 look upon her statue as a model of perfection in 
 the female form. 
 
 With respect to gaiety, it seems scarcely ne- 
 cessary to remark, that it is a quality common 
 to the whole sex, handsome and ugly. There is, 
 however, considerable difference found in the de- 
 grees of sensibility, but they are common to both 
 classes ; and so are the differences in intelligence, 
 delicacy, and vivacity. If beautiful women were 
 found to be the patentees of youth, health, inno- 
 cence, &c., then the force of such associations 
 might be comprehended. But I can never allow 
 that qualities which are common to the whole 
 sex, can confer anything on particular individuals, 
 whether they be beautiful or ugly. We have no 
 right to appropriate to a beautiful woman what 
 is possible she may actually not possess. Pretty 
 idiots are, perhaps, more common than ugly ones; 
 and a considerable number of female geniuses 
 have been known, and some are now in existence, 
 whose face no man could persuade himself to 
 consider beautiful. That Beauty cannot be com- 
 bined with all that is virtuous, amiable, and in- 
 
AS APPLIED TO FORM. 
 
 121 
 
 teliigent, is not affirmed ; but it is maintained 
 that want of beauty does not indicate any defi- 
 ciency of such qualities, nor Beauty the possession 
 of them. We wish for the combination ; but 
 our wishes cannot effect it. We do not, how- 
 ever, for that reason, say of a beautiful woman 
 who is silly and vicious, that she is ugly ; nor of 
 a plain woman who is known to be virtuous and 
 intelligent, that she is beautiful. Hence every 
 association of this kind is impossible, or at least 
 entirely fanciful and arbitrary. It is evident that 
 there must be something in certain forms of the 
 human countenance, quite independent of such 
 associations, and of every other, which has the 
 power of affecting us with emotions of Beauty. 
 
 The same author, by way of enforcing what I 
 have endeavoured to refute, goes on to ask us to 
 suppose ' that the smooth forehead, the firm 
 cheek, and the full lip, which are now so dis- 
 tinctly expressive to us of the gay and vigorous 
 periods of youth — and the clear and blooming 
 complexion which indicates health and activity, 
 had been, in fact, the forms and colours by which 
 old age and sickness were characterised ; and 
 that instead of being found united to those sources 
 and seasons of enjoyment, they had been the 
 badges by which nature had pointed out the 
 
122 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 state of suffering and decay, which is now signi- 
 fied to us by the livid and emaciated face of sick- 
 ness, or the wrinkled front, the quivering lip, 
 and hollow cheek of age ; — if this,' says he, 
 ' were the familiar law of our nature, can it be 
 doubted that we should look upon these appear- 
 ances, not with rapture, but with aversion, and 
 consider it as absolutely ludicrous or disgusting, 
 to speak of the beauty of what was interpreted 
 by every one, as the lamented sign of pain and 
 decrepitude 1 ' * 
 
 I never could have expected to see an argu- 
 ment of this kind resorted to, if argument it can 
 be called. I do not hesitate an instant to declare 
 that, knowing the decrepitude of age to be indi- 
 cated by Beauty, and remaining constituted as I 
 am^ I should certainly consider beauty as some- 
 thing still to be admired ; but I might feel it to 
 be hideous, and wrinkles and grey hairs to be 
 charming, w^ere my constitution to be assimilated 
 to that which is mentioned in the Persian Tales, 
 to have belonged to Queen Scheherbanou and her 
 subjects whose propensities may perhaps have 
 suggested the illustration of what is incompre- 
 hensible, by the assumption of what is impossible. 
 
 Supp. Enc. Brit. vol. ii. p. 182. 
 t Story of Adis and Daliy. 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 123 
 
 I might, with equal propriety of illustration, and 
 equal force of argument, neutralise any effect 
 which such an assumption might have, by say- 
 ing that, if such a change was to take place in 
 the indications of youth and of age, our constitu- 
 tioiis would also undergo a change which would 
 render the reversion of the indications agreeable 
 to us. If old age were to be indicated by the 
 present signs of youth, and our constitutions to 
 remain as they are, we should lament the change, 
 but never alter our opinions of beauty nor of 
 ugliness. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION AS APPLIED 
 TO COLOUR. 
 
 Mr Alison has expressed himself as not anxious 
 to dispute whether some colours of themselves 
 produce agreeable, and others disagreeable, sen- 
 sations. He separates, however, this effect from 
 the emotion of Beauty, and asserts that this last 
 is felt only in consequence of their expression, 
 and not of any original fitness in the colours 
 themselves to produce the emotion. In the first 
 part of this essay, it has been shown that the 
 
OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 emotion of beauty cannot be any thing else than 
 a pleasurable emotion, and I will not enter into 
 any dispute about the difference which may be 
 supposed to exist between sensation and emotion; 
 although I rather use emotion for what concerns 
 the mind, and sensation for the more obvious 
 effects of matter coming in contact with our 
 nervous system. If by sensation is here meant 
 simple organic affection, it has been already 
 shown that the mere organic operation of seeing, 
 can have no effect whatever on our taste. Let 
 us examine, however, some of the reasons for 
 supposing that any colour excites pleasurable or 
 painful emotions, from association alone. 
 
 That colours are beautiful only on account of 
 something which they express, Mr Alison thinks 
 obvious from the following considerations, which 
 1 propose to examine in detail. 
 
 ' 1. The different sentiments of mankind, 
 with regard to the beauty of colours, are incon- 
 sistent with the opinion that such qualities are 
 beautiful in themselves. It is impossible to in- 
 fer, because any particular colour is beautiful in 
 one country, that it will also be beautiful in an- 
 other ; and there are in fact many instances 
 where the same colour produces very different 
 oninions of beauty in different races of men. 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 125 
 
 Black to us is in general an unpleasant colour. 
 In Spain, and in Venice, it is otherwise. Yel- 
 low is to us, at least in dress, a disagreeable co- 
 lour. In China it is the favourite colour. 
 White is to us extremely beautiful. In China, 
 on the contrary, it is extremely disagreeable. 
 Instances of the same kind must have occurred 
 to every person. 
 
 ' If we inquire, on the other hand, what is 
 the reason of this difference of opinion, we shall 
 uniformly find, that it arises from the different 
 associations which these different people have 
 with such colours ; and that their opinion of this 
 beauty is permanently regulated by the nature 
 of the qualities of which they are expressive. 
 Black is to us an unpleasant colour, because it is 
 the colour appropriated to mourning. In Venice 
 and Spain, it is the colour which distinguishes 
 the dress of the great. Yellow is, in China, the 
 imperial colour, and sacred to the emperor and 
 his property ; it is therefore associated with ideas 
 of magnificence and royalty. Among us it has 
 no distinct association, and is therefore beautiful 
 or otherwise, only according to its degree or 
 shade. White is beautiful to us in a supreme 
 degree, as emblematical both of innocence and 
 cheerfulness. In China, on the other hand, it is 
 
1^6 OF THE THEOllY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 the colour appropriated to mourning, and conse- 
 quently very far from being generally beautiful. 
 In the same manner, wherever any peculiar co- 
 lours are permanently favourite, there will al- 
 ways be found some pleasing association which 
 the people have with that colour, and of which 
 they, in some measure, consider it as signifi- 
 cant.'' * 
 
 That difference of taste exists ; that there can 
 be no such thing as a standard of taste ; that 
 every man derives pleasure from the contempla- 
 tion of external objects according to the nature 
 of his mental constitution ; in short, that there 
 is no disputing about tastes, are things so obvi- 
 ous, that no person of ordinary observation can 
 possibly refuse to admit them as established 
 facts. But it is very far from being proved, as 
 Lord Jeffrey seems to infer, "f- that they stand al- 
 ways in that relation to our minds which the 
 Theory of Association assumes them to do. 
 With regard, for example, to the associations 
 now brought into our view, I deny that black is 
 either exclusively appropriated to mourning in 
 this country, or generally felt to be disagreeable, 
 unless when unsuitable for its particular situa- 
 
 * Essays on Taste, vol. ii. p. 299. 
 t Supp. Enc. Brit., vol. i. p. 19G. 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 127 
 
 tion. It is the full dress of all persons in office. 
 A clergyman is not habited in black, because it 
 is desired to impress us with ideas of religion 
 being a gloomy and a melancholy institution. A 
 lawyer does not wear black, because it is wished 
 we should be deterred from appealing to justice. 
 A lord mayor of London, or a lord provost of 
 Edinburgh, does not preside at turtle feasts, in 
 dresses of black velvet, to damp the joy of his 
 guests. Black, during many years, has formed 
 a portion of the full dress of every gentleman. 
 If, therefore, it cannot be shown that black is 
 never associated with cheerfulness, and never 
 devoted to any thing but mourning, the associa- 
 tion can have no effect. But there seems to be 
 a radical mistake in the assertion that black is 
 disagreeable, because it is applied to mourning. 
 Mourning itself is disagreeable ; and it is more 
 likely that something disagreeable should be ap- 
 plied to it, than that any thing should be ren- 
 dered so by unnecessarily creating an association 
 of this kind. It seems more correct to say, that 
 black was applied to mourning, because it had 
 been previously felt to be in harmony with the 
 saddened state of the mind, and hence to be thus 
 more agreeable than a brighter colour. Thus, 
 if it be really disagreeable, it is not so by this 
 
J 28 OF THE THF.OIIY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 association, but from some other cause. So far, 
 however, from black being generally disagreeable 
 in this country, I will venture to assert that no 
 colour for dress is so much tolerated by universal 
 consent. We prefer seeing some persons dressed 
 in black, because they look better in it than in 
 any other colour. We are often offended by co- 
 loured dresses, but never by black.'* 
 
 I am not disposed to admit that white is beau- 
 tiful to us in a supreme degree, although it be 
 emblematical of innocence and cheerfulness. 
 Every one desires to be thought innocent, whe- 
 ther his conscience admit the fact or not. Why 
 then do we wear the snowy emblem next our 
 bodies, and cover it up with black or variegated 
 clothes ? If white be agreeable in a supreme de- 
 gree, why do we make so little use of it ? Few 
 persons admire a room which is painted entirely 
 white ; we never see white carpets ; we com- 
 monly dislike white houses ; white sheets are 
 covered by yellow blankets ; how very few ar- 
 ticles in household furniture are white ; sedan 
 
 ^ If the opinions of children be of any value, it may be 
 mentioned, that at a time when death had deprived me of a 
 near relation, I overheard one of my children calling out to 
 his brothers, ' See, see, my pretty mourning, look, look 
 what Beautiful mourning !' 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 ]29 
 
 chairs, carriages, all things intended for show, 
 are never white. Why should we, in Scotland, 
 call the only part that is white in mourning 
 dress, weepers ? Why do we not resist the im- 
 ^pression, that white in the human face is the 
 sign of sickness ? Mr Alison gives no authority 
 '% for stating that white is disagreeable in China, 
 although there it be appropriated to mourning. 
 I should be disposed to think (I am quite igno- 
 rant of the fact, however), that white is as 
 agreeable in China, and everywhere else, as it is 
 with, us ; and for the very same reason, which I 
 shall now endeavour shortly to trace.'"' 
 
 White being properly the total absence of co- 
 lour (as black is of light), the slightest admix- 
 ture, the most minute spot, is perceived on any 
 thing that is white ; which is not so remarkably 
 the case with colours in general. Hence we 
 know, at once, whether any thing white be 
 clean. Cleanliness is generally agreeable to us ; 
 although taste differs in this, as well as in other 
 respects. When we wish to express that any 
 thing is free from admixture, we say it is pure — 
 we speak of pure white. As any impurity is 
 most easily detected in white ; as it is the only 
 thing which we can readily know and see to be 
 ^ The finest and most costly China-ware, is said to be white. 
 
130 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATIOK 
 
 without blemish, we have assumed it as the 
 standard of purity, to which we compare other 
 things. A truly virtuous mind we say, is as pure, 
 as white as snow ; that is, equally free from con- 
 tamination. We compare a woman who is a .7 
 virgin to snow ; and we dress a bride in white, 
 in consequence of this comparison^ to denote to 
 the bridegroom that she is pure and unsullied. 
 
 In the same manner, we consider darkness as 
 something, not indeed always disagreeable, but 
 as solemn and grave. We compare melancholy, 
 and also malignant spirits, to night — dark as 
 night. We connect darkness and many other 
 things in the same way — dark as the grave — 
 dark as death — a dark design ; and many such 
 comparisons are in daily use. But w^e also wel- 
 come the night as the season of rest, and of 
 sweet sleep, and of delightful dreams ; we in- 
 voke night to protect us ; and find it in many 
 respects agreeable. As the absence of light de- 
 prives us of our highest enjoyments, we naturally 
 connect black with what is disagreeable ; not, 
 however, by association, but by a law of our na- 
 ture. White being pure light, and black being 
 the absence or the opposite of light, we use them 
 by comparison^ as emblems of opposite qualities. 
 But a connexion formed by comparison, is very 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 131 
 
 different from one formed by association. These 
 are two distinct operations of mind, although the 
 distinction appears to have been overlooked by 
 the advocates of association. 
 
 Now, when we mourn, there are two things 
 which we may wish to express by our dress ; 
 either our own personal feelings, or the state in 
 which we wish, or believe, our deceased friend 
 to be. In this country we prefer to exhibit an 
 emblem of our feelings of lamentation — of our 
 sense of privation. It is not impossible that, in 
 China, white is really used to denote the purity 
 of a person who has departed to another w^orld ; 
 and the wishes of his friends that he may be in 
 a state to enjoy happiness as pure as the colour 
 of their garments. I do not know whether this 
 may or may not have been the origin of white 
 being used in China for mourning dress ; but I 
 should think it more amiable, at least less selfish, 
 to mourn in white than in black, if we were to 
 be guided in our choice by association. It is 
 singular that the custom with us should be to 
 dress a dead body in white ; and to have every 
 thing around it white, while we dress ourselves 
 in black. May not the same reason which in- 
 duces us to dress a dead body in white, have in- 
 duced the Chinese to mourn in white ? 
 
132 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 1 think it somewhat rash to assert that the 
 real opinions of individuals, or of nations, can be 
 discovered by the particular purposes to which 
 they may appropriate certain colours. If yellow 
 be beautiful without association, and only ac- 
 cording to its degree or shade, why should we 
 not allow it to be so to the Chinese ? What rea- 
 son can be given for supposing, that they did not 
 appropriate this colour to their emperor, because 
 they considered it to be beautiful ? No people 
 can be said to have rendered any colour perma- 
 nently beautiful by appropriating it to kings or 
 to professions, because they previously consider- 
 ed such colour disagreeable. Nor can a people 
 be said to be bound to believe that a colour is 
 beautiful, because it has been chosen by a king. 
 We may allow our actions, but never our senti- 
 ments, to be governed. We do not admire a 
 purple hyacinth, because purple has been worn 
 by kings ; nor a scarlet tulip, because scarlet 
 coats are worn by our soldiers. A colour worn 
 by a king may accidentally be associated with a 
 king, when we see it in some other object ; but 
 nevertheless, we do not find ourselves obliged 
 to consider the colour as beautiful ; nor do we 
 think we are guilty of treason when we pronounce 
 the taste of a king to be bad. 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 133 
 
 ' 2. It is farther observable, that no colours, 
 in fact, are beautiful, but such as are expressive 
 to us of pleasing or interesting qualities. All 
 colours obviously are not beautiful : the same 
 colours are beautiful only when they are expres- 
 sive of such qualities : and in general, I believe 
 it will be found that among all the variety of 
 colours we are acquainted with, those only are 
 beautiful which have similar expressions.' — ' It 
 is the colours only of the dress of the great, of the 
 opulent, or of distinguished professions, which 
 are ever considered in this light. The colours 
 of common furniture, in the same way, are never 
 beautiful : it is the colours only of fashionable, 
 or costly, or magnificent furniture, which are 
 ever considered as such.'* 
 
 The humming-bird may perhaps excite inte- 
 rest on account of the minute size of its body. 
 We might take pleasure in examining its habits ; 
 and delight in exercising benevolence by afford- 
 ing it protection. But the splendid attire of 
 this little creature is not beautiful because it is 
 expressive of its size, or of any thing connected 
 with it. There are not in the works of nature 
 colours so exquisitely pleasing, as the richly va- 
 ried and brilliant tints on the plumage of the 
 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. pp, 301. 322. 
 
]34 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION^ 
 
 humming bird ; but it is impossible to say that 
 they are expressive to us of any thing, but of the 
 wonderful power and beneficence of the Creator ; 
 an expression which may be* found in every 
 thing, whether we consider it beautiful or ugly. 
 We never refuse admiration to the variegated 
 hue of a serpent ; nor to the spotted skin of a 
 leopard ; nor to the tints of poisonous flowers ; 
 but of what pleasing quality are they expressive ? 
 The changing colours of the dolphin are never 
 beheld but with pleasure ; although they express 
 that the animal is in the agonies of death. 
 
 The infinite variety of objects to which colour 
 is natural, and to which we apply it, renders ex- 
 pression, when that is sought for, so infinitely 
 various, that we could never believe a colour to 
 be beautiful or ugly for two moments together. 
 If such principles were admitted, they would oc- 
 casion perpetual disputes. 
 
 There is no weight in an appeal to fashion, or 
 to the colours of dress appropriated by the great, 
 to account for our esteeming colours beautiful. 
 The colours referred to are preferred by the great, 
 because they are previously felt by all to be 
 beautiful. But although a colour may be fashion- 
 able, it by no means necessarily follows that it is 
 agreeable to every one who wears it, or even to 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUIt. 
 
 185 
 
 the person who brings it into fashion. Fashions 
 ace introduced by persons whose sole aim is to 
 appear different and distinguished from other 
 people ; and whose chief pleasure is in being ad- 
 mired and distinguished. The fashions are adopt- 
 ed by many who heartily disapprove of them, to 
 prevent the appearance of singularity in them- 
 selves, which they despise in others ; and thus 
 a general, and very laudable system of toleration, 
 leads us to follow with resignation, the fancies 
 and devices of the silliest of both sexes. This 
 seems to be the correct history of the rise and 
 progress of fashion. It accounts for the continual 
 changes it undergoes ; for all the varieties of 
 national fashions ; and it separates frivolous de- 
 vices from the proper objects of taste. 
 
 It will not be insisted on that a common sol- 
 dier is so great a man as a field marshal. On the 
 principles stated by Mr Alison, scarlet ought to 
 be beautiful on the back of the latter, and ugly on 
 that of the former. A blue coat, with a red cape, 
 was the undress of a staff-officer, and has been 
 worn by the king, at the same time that it was 
 the livery worn by some menial servants. The 
 velvet on the skin of a mole, is as beautiful as 
 that on the back of the highest officer of the state. 
 The scarlet cloak of a poor old Highland woman 
 
1S6 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 going to church, is as beautiful as the cloak of a 
 cardinal. Does not white yield us pleasure in 
 a supreme degree, equally in the attire of the 
 blooming daughter of a rustic, as in that of a prin- 
 cess ? I do not mean to say, that good taste may 
 not be displayed in the inventions of fashion ; it 
 is only maintained that, if the simple view that 
 has been taken of the rise and progress of fashion 
 be correct, as will probably not be doubted by 
 any one who has observed its votaries well, an 
 appeal to it to prove any thing, except that there 
 are vain and silly people in the world, is scarcely 
 to be reckoned philosophical. 
 
 ' It is observable, farther, that even the most 
 beautiful colours (or those which are expressive 
 to us of the most pleasing associations), cease to 
 appear beautiful whenever they are familiar, or 
 when the objects w^hich they distinguish have 
 ceased to produce their usual emotions. The 
 blush of the rose, the blue of a serene sky, the 
 green of the spring, are beautiful, only when they 
 are new, or unfamiliar. In a short time we ob- 
 serve them with the same indifference, that we 
 do the most common and unnoticed colours. 
 That, in the same manner, our perception of their 
 beauty, depends on the state of our minds, and 
 that it is only in seasons of sensibility that we 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 137 
 
 are conscious of it, is a fact which every man 
 knows so well from his own experience, that it 
 would be needless to illustrate it.' * Thus asso- 
 ciation is allowed to have no permanent effect ; 
 an admission which is a necessary consequence of 
 the tlieory, and marks it as imperfect. Thus too, 
 beauty is reduced to a transient gleam ; thus is 
 it levelled down to those grovelling pleasures, in- 
 dulgence in which induce satiety, disgust, and 
 nausea. But this degradation cannot be per- 
 mitted ; the theory of association cannot be suf- 
 fered to tyrannise over the sources from which 
 our chief enjoyments are derived. 
 
 If the blush of the rose ceases to be beautiful 
 when it is familiar, why do we take so much 
 pains to make it familiar ? Why do we force it 
 from its natural season of expansion, that we may 
 constantly enjoy it I Why do we wish for per- 
 petual spring, if the green of spring pleases but 
 when it is new ? Why do we lament the de- 
 parture of serene weather, when it is said we 
 should be sated ? Why do we grieve when clouds 
 obscure the blue vault of heaven ? Why is our 
 happiness hereafter described as never ceasing 
 enjoyment? No man will express a wish to be- 
 come sick, because health has become familiar to 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 303. 
 
 I 
 
138 OF THE THEOllY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 him ; nor, however short a fit of sickness may be, 
 will he ever cease to w^ish for the return of health. 
 We never become indifferent to any thing which 
 yields positive pleasure or positive pain. We 
 may be in that state of repose which the acquire- 
 ment of enjoyment induces ; but the instant 
 when the cause of the enjoyment is removed, our 
 repose is disturbed. This state of repose appears 
 to have been mistaken for a state of indifference ; 
 which last I take to be that in which we are not 
 liable to be affected by external objects, either 
 agreeably or disagreeably. It appears that, from 
 causes altogether foreign to the subject of taste, 
 and into the consideration of which I need not 
 enter, our minds are occasionally in a state unfit 
 for exertion, and consequently for enjoyment ; 
 and hence a temporary indifference to the beau- 
 ties of colour, in common with all other ex- 
 ternal sources of pleasure. 
 
 ' It may be observed, also, that no new colour 
 is ever beautiful, until we have acquired some 
 pleasing association with it.' * This, so contrary 
 to our daily experience, is attempted to be sup- 
 ported by an appeal to fashion, w^hich has been 
 already disposed of. It may be refuted on other 
 grounds. In the first place, such an assertion 
 * Essays on Taste^ vol. i. pp. 301, 303. 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOLJl. 
 
 139 
 
 tends to deprive us of the agreeable effects aris- 
 ing from the impressions of colour altogether ; 
 because a man may see many new colours, and 
 live to a good old age, without having been able 
 to discover any agreeable associations for them, 
 fn the second place, it implies that there is no- 
 thing between a state of indifference and an emo- 
 tion of absolute beauty, or one of absolute ugli- 
 ness ; that a colour must necessarily be beautiful, 
 indifferent, or ugly. It is needless to enter into 
 a grave detail to prove that much agreeable emo- 
 tion may be felt between indifference and beauty, 
 as this would be to prove a truism ; and to say 
 that some association is necessary to produce 
 every degree of pleasurable or painful emotion, 
 seems to leave an impression of absurdity, before 
 we have time to think why it should do so. If, 
 to render it beautiful, it be necessary to asso - 
 ciate a colour with any thing, we must, in the 
 meantime, feel the colour to be either disagree- 
 able or indifferent. If disagreeable, the theory 
 would compel us to believe that it is so, on ac- 
 count of some disagreeable association. We 
 must therefore have the means, which the theory 
 has neglected to furnish, of first getting rid of 
 such associations, before those of an opposite na- 
 ture can gain admission, so as to produce their 
 
140 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 desired effect. If the colour be indifferent to us, 
 it is scarcely necessary that we should give our- 
 selves any trouble about it ; but if we determine 
 to make it agreeable, and we set out a hunting 
 after associations, w^e are just as likely to stumble 
 on some that are unpleasant as on any that may 
 be agreeable. 
 
 ' S. When the particular associations we have 
 w^ith such colours are destroyed, their beauty is 
 destroyed at the same time.' * ' The colour of a 
 polished steel grate is agreeable, but is not in it- 
 self very beautiful. Suppose it painted green, or 
 violet, or crimson, all of them colours miieh more 
 beautiful, and the beauty of it is altogether de- 
 stroyed.'-]- 
 
 This, as well as the instances which precede 
 and follow it, shows, in the clearest manner, how 
 the anxiety to fit all things to a theory leads im- 
 ])erceptibly to obvious circumstances being over- 
 looked, and to the very object intended to be kept 
 in view being lost sight of. It is obvious, that 
 in a polished steel grate, it is not the colour that 
 is esteemed, but the property, possessed by the 
 polished surface, of reflecting objects. Polished 
 surfaces are esteemed according to the perfection 
 of this property, or else from the circumstance of 
 
 ^- Essays on Taste, vol, i. p. 306. f Ibid. p. 307. 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 polish giving a degree of transparency which en- 
 ables us to see the qualities of a surface more de- 
 fined. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the 
 beauty of a polished steel grate will be completely 
 destroyed by painting it. But what are the as- 
 sociations that are destroyed by this proceeding ? 
 The particular associations must be destroyed, 
 otherwise the alteration can have no eifect. The 
 purposes of the grate to hold burning fuel, and 
 to diffuse heat, are as well fulfilled as before, and 
 all the associations of comfort remain. I know of 
 no other. 
 
 Mr Alison seems to have departed from his 
 subject in this part of his essay. His theory 
 supposes that a colour is beautiful on account of 
 some pleasing association, and that if the associa- 
 tion be destroyed, the colour ceases to be beau- 
 tiful. But it is a very novel mode of proving 
 this, to say that the associations cease when the 
 colour ceases to exist. If we change a colour, we 
 of course change also the association. But to prove 
 his assertion, Mr Alison should have allowed the 
 colour to remain, and rung the changes on asso- 
 ciations only. A polished steel grate is no longer 
 a polished steel grate after it is painted green ; it is 
 then a green grate ; and to make it agreeable or 
 disagreeable, according to Mr Alison, new associa- 
 
14!^ OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 tions must be formed. If any one was to paint a 
 polished steel grate with any colour, howeverbeau- 
 tifulthe colour itself might be esteemed, we should 
 certainly be much displeased ; but this could not 
 possibly destroy any association we might choose 
 to connect with a polished grate. Let the colour 
 or the polish remain ; let the associations Mr 
 Alison supposed necessary to make it beautiful 
 be stated ; let it be shown how these associations 
 may be destroyed, without the subject being an- 
 nihilated ; and then we may be able to discover 
 the application of the example. 
 
 ' There are different professions in every coun- 
 try, which are distinguished by different coloured 
 dresses. Whatever may have led to this appro- 
 priation, and however fanciful and extravagant 
 it may sometimes be, after it is established there 
 is felt a kind of propriety in the dress ; and it is 
 strongly associated in our minds with the qualities 
 which such professions seem to indicate. We are 
 in some measure disappointed, therefore, when we 
 see a professional man not in the dress of his pro- 
 fession ; and when he is in this dress, we con- 
 ceive that there is a propriety and beauty in such 
 a colour. Change the colours of these several 
 dresses, and all the species of beauty is destroyed. 
 W e should not only laugh at the supposition of 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 143 
 
 the army and navy being dressed in black, and 
 the church and the bar in scarlet ; but we should 
 feel also a discontent, as if these colours had in 
 themselves a separate expression, and were in 
 these cases misapplied. Even in reversing the 
 dress of individuals of these different professions, 
 the whole beauty of their dress is destroyed ; and 
 we are conscious of a feeling of impropriety, as if 
 the qualities which are peculiar to such professions 
 were necessarily connected with the dress they 
 wear. So strong is this association even in trifles, 
 and so naturally do colours become expressive to 
 us of the qualities with which we have found 
 them generally connected.' * 
 
 I am scarcely old enough to remember the 
 habit of physicians, when it consisted of a black 
 dress, with a scarlet cloak over it, a full powder- 
 ed wig, a triangular hat, and the appendage of a 
 gold or ivory headed staff. I remember, however, 
 one physician in the city of Edinburgh, who per- 
 sisted to the last in retaining a dress different 
 from that of his brethren : but in place of all his 
 brethren having given offence by their accommo- 
 dating their dress more to the fashion of the 
 times, the individual alluded to was hooted at 
 by the schoolboys on the streets. At this day 
 
 Essays on Taste, vol. i. p, 307. 
 
144 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 medical men at the head of their profession are 
 known to vary their dress, without the number 
 of their fees diminishing in the least. The sight 
 of a doctor is no doubt, in some cases, alarming, 
 let him appear in what shape or colour he will ; 
 but I should be inclined to think that a patient 
 would rather see him in coloured clothes than in 
 black, which might, if he was influenced by as- 
 sociation, remind him at every visit of the dis- 
 mal array of a funeral. 
 
 Why should we laugh at a change in the dress 
 of our army and navy? Do we laugh at the 
 black dress of the hussars of Brunswick ? — at the 
 white military uniform of Austria? — at the same 
 colour in the navy of Russia? — at the scarlet 
 dresses of the high priests of the Romish church ? 
 — Why should we not laugh at our sailors, if an 
 association with live lobsters should occur ? — at 
 our soldiers, if they should remind us of boiled 
 ones ? — at English bishops, if the very natural 
 association of their dress with the plumage of 
 magpies should occur ? The same error has been 
 committed here as in the instance of the steel 
 grate. If we associate a soldier with scarlet, we 
 do not destroy that association by dressing him 
 in any other colour ; we only create a ne\v as- 
 sociation for the soldier, or for another colour, 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOLTR. 
 
 145 
 
 not a new one for scarlet. Besides, to assume 
 that professional dress is beautifid is to assume 
 too much. It is merely an arbitrary mark of 
 distinction, and has in fact nothing to do with 
 taste ; else we should very soon get rid of three- 
 tailed wigs, and of various and sundry wigs of 
 office, and of many other articles of dress, in 
 which beauty cannot be found even by associa- 
 tion. The king has his livery ; so has the hang- 
 man ; because it is proper to distinguish the low- 
 est as well as the highest executive office in the 
 state. The beauty of colours cannot depend on 
 their being used or not used as signs ; nor have 
 associations which may be supposed to belong to 
 the things signified, any thing to do with the 
 effects which follow^ the perception of colours. 
 
 ' 4. If the beauty of colours arose from any 
 original fitness in them to produce this emotion, 
 it is apparent, that they who are incapable of such 
 perceptions must be incapable of such emotion. 
 That the blind, however, may receive the same 
 delight, from the ideas which they associate with 
 colours, that they do who see, is a fact which I 
 think every one will be convinced of who reads 
 the poems of Dr Blacklock. No man who is not 
 acquainted yvith. the history of their ingenious 
 author, could perceive that he had the misfortune 
 
146 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 to lose his sight in early infancy. That from 
 conversation, and from the perusal of books of 
 poetry, it was possible for him to learn the dis- 
 tinguishing colours of certain objects, and to 
 apply them with sufficient propriety in his own 
 verses, I do not deny ; but the circumstance of 
 importance at present is this, that his poetry is 
 full of the same sentiments, and expresses the 
 same admiration with regard to the visible quali- 
 ties of matter, with that of poets who have had 
 no such defect ; and that the same power is as- 
 cribed to them in producing the emotions of 
 beauty, and with as great accuracy with regard 
 to particular instances, as in the compositions of 
 those who have had the sense of sight in the 
 fullest perfection. If our perception of the beauty 
 of colours arose from some original fitness in such 
 qualities to produce this emotion, it is obvious, 
 that the blind must be as incapable of perceiving 
 this beauty, as of perceiving the colours them- 
 selves ; but if the beauty of colours arises from 
 the associations we connect with them, this fact, 
 in the case of Dr Blacklock, admits of a very 
 simple solution. From reading, and from con- 
 versation, he has acquired the same associations 
 with the words that express such colours, as we 
 have with the colours themselves ; that the word 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 147 
 
 white, for instance, signifies a quality in objects 
 expressive of cheerfulness and innocence, — the 
 word purple, the quality of majesty, — the word 
 black, the quality of gloom and melancholy, &c. 
 In this case it is obvious, that he may feel the 
 same emotions from the use of these words, that 
 we do from the colours which they express ; and 
 that from the permanence of these associations in 
 a great variety of cases he may apply the terms 
 with sufficient propriety, either in sublime or 
 beautiful description. As this is in reality the 
 case, it seems to be a very strong confirmation 
 of the opinion, that the beauty of such qualities 
 arises from the associations we connect with them, 
 and not from any original or independent beauty 
 in the colours themselves." * 
 
 If this argument be good for any thing, we 
 must be convinced that, in affording enjoyment 
 from the contemplation of external objects, our 
 eyes are really of no use to us ; since a blind per- 
 son may appear to enjoy them equally with those 
 who have eyes. But it seems to be foreign to 
 the question of taste, in respect to form and 
 colour, to appeal to any thing unconnected with 
 perception. 
 
 It is quite evident that without the organ of 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 310. 
 
148 OF THE THEORY OK ASSOCIATION 
 
 sight, there can be no perception of colour ; and 
 it is impossible that the identical emotion pro- 
 duced by perception can be excited by mere idea. 
 A blind man who has never seen, cannot associ- 
 ate ideas with colour, any more than a deaf per- 
 son with music ; he can only associate ideas with 
 certain other ideas. For a blind person to form 
 the same associations with words, that another 
 with perfect organs may do with the things 
 which words express, may be very possible. But 
 allowing this, it by no means follows that a word 
 can produce in a blind person an emotion simi- 
 lar to that which the thing signified excites in a 
 person who sees. When we read or hear a de- 
 scription of any thing which we never saw, we 
 form ideas of it in a manner analogous to that 
 in which a blind man forms ideas of colour. But 
 as before observed, we never derive just notions 
 of any thing from description ; and the reality 
 very frequently contradicts the ideas we had 
 formed of it. A blind man can have no difficulty 
 in learning that a rose, the smell of which was 
 agreeable to him, had a visible quality which 
 those who had eyes call pink ; and that this same 
 pink was agreeable to them on the cheeks of a 
 female. It should therefore excite no surprise 
 that he spoke, by comparison, of the rosy cheeks 
 
AS iVrPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 149 
 
 of a blooming girl. But if a blind man was told 
 that something, which had a very bad smell, or 
 which was unpleasant to the touch, had the 
 quality pink, before he had ever smelt a rose ; it 
 is probable that when he did smell a rose and 
 was told that it was pink, he would conclude that 
 this quality in a rose was disagreeable ; and he 
 would not make the comparison. The ideas 
 which a blind person connects with wwds de- 
 noting colours, are not connected with the co- 
 lours themselves. Although the word red may 
 be understood by a blind person to denote 
 something inseparable from blood, yet this can- 
 not be the emotion excited in those who see, 
 by the colour itself. The effects of perception 
 cannot exist, in the case of colour, in one who is 
 blind ; and nothing but the effects of perception 
 enter into the composition of taste. A blind per- 
 son may learn to apply such w^ords as dazzling, 
 brilliant, clear, soft, &c., when colours are spoken 
 of ; but he can never experience the effects w^hich 
 are expressed by such words. Unless it be proved 
 that he does, the arguments derived from the case 
 of a blind person, born with the peculiar talents 
 which form a poet, prove nothing with respect to 
 the effects of colour on those who see. If I be 
 correct in believing, that the same kind of in- 
 duction by which, as Mr Stewart first observed, 
 
loO OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION' 
 
 children come gradually to understand language, 
 operates in the instruction of the blind regarding 
 colours, scenery, and such forms as they cannot 
 touch, it will not appear surprising that a blind 
 man, with poetical genius, should quickly combine 
 ideas with ideas, and with sentiments, and assi- 
 milate his feelings to those which he imagines 
 the real objects excite in others. Recommend- 
 ing to the reader's attention what Mr Stewart 
 has said upon this subject, I think it will appear 
 to him that the happy idea of this eminent phi- 
 losopher may be usefully carried farther than he 
 himself supposed ; and will account for the sin- 
 gular poetical efforts of Dr Blacklock. It is not 
 asserted that Dr Blacklock, or any blind person, 
 displayed any fondness for colour — any taste in 
 the arrangement of colours ; and therefore the 
 necessity, or use, of founding any argument on a 
 case where no such display was made, and when 
 such a display is necessary to evince taste, do not 
 appear. 
 
 In considering colour as an object of taste, it is 
 unquestionably incorrect to suppose, with Mr 
 Knight and Mr Stewart, that the pleasure or the 
 pain excited by it, is felt by the eye. These be- 
 long to the mind, as I have already shown ; the 
 eye being the mere instrument which receives 
 
AS APrLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 151 
 
 and conveys the impressions. The most agree- 
 able colour may offend the eye, when the quantity 
 of coloured rays is too great ; as we can easily 
 determine by experiment. But when our eyes 
 are shut, we can contemplate the idea of a colour 
 raised to a degree of brilliancy which, if realised, 
 might, when admitted into the eye, destroy the 
 power of vision altogether. To the organ, there- 
 fore, colour is absolutely indifferent ; but to the 
 mind, it is a source of much gratification. 
 
 Whoever may choose to take the trouble of in- 
 quiring, and of making observations for himself, 
 will find that there are individuals, and even na- 
 tions, who are so fond of mere colour, that, with- 
 out regard to any particular or harmonious ar- 
 rangement, they decorate themselves, their houses, 
 and every thing around them, with glowing co- 
 lours. ' The Dutch trader,"* as Lord Jeffrey has 
 observed, 'who paints over the outside of his 
 country house with as many bright colours as 
 are to be found in his tulip-bed, and garnishes 
 his green shutters with blue facings, and his 
 purple roof with lilac ridges, not only sees as 
 well as the studied colourist who shudders at the 
 exhibition, but actually receives as much pleasure, 
 and as strong an impression of beauty from the 
 finished lusthaus^ as the artist does from one of 
 
152 OF THE TPIEOliy OF ASSOCIATIOX 
 
 his best pictures.' Other men have no such 
 enjoyment from colour in this profusion ; and 
 many are, in their taste, the reverse of the Dutch- 
 man. Others again, having the power of deriv- 
 ing pleasure from colour, have also the talent of 
 distinguishing the natural relation of one colour 
 to another ; and this enables them to create new 
 pleasures for themselves in endless variety. If, 
 then, one person be acknowledged to have a taste 
 different from that of another person, and that 
 from nature, it is quite a violation of every legi- 
 timate method of reasoning, to explain the cause 
 of taste in one man, by means of any peculiarity 
 in the taste of another, or by its total want. Were 
 w^e to look upon two men, one who is well made, 
 and another who is very fat, we should be laughed 
 at were we to affirm that the one was handsome 
 because the other was fat. But a trespass some- 
 w^hat of this kind seems to have been committed 
 by Lord Jeffi'ey, when he says, ' that there are 
 no combinations of colour originally and univer- 
 sally pleasing or displeasing to the eye, indepen- 
 dently of association,** and that this is proved by 
 the case of the Dutchman. The man who knows 
 and feels the relations of colours to each other, 
 and admires certain combinations and arrange- 
 ' Sup. Enc. Brit. vol. ii. p. 1P3. 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 153 
 
 ments of them, I compare to the handsome man ; 
 the Dutch trader, with his rage for colour to the 
 fat man. The one has an ordinary and well re- 
 gulated appetite — he may be an epicure in co- 
 lour ; the other is a glutton. But I would not 
 say that the appetite of the one was well regu- 
 lated because the other was a glutton. The case 
 of the Dutchman clearly proves, that there is 
 some original quality in colour which pleases 
 him, and pleases him so well that he becomes a 
 debauchee. I know of nothing which the epi- 
 cure or the glutton can associate with colour but 
 pleasure ; and this pleasure, which each provides 
 in his own way, is the original and universal 
 effect of colour, independent of association. We 
 cannot account by means of association, for what 
 we may call an unnatural passion for colour in 
 the Dutchman, any more than for the unnatural 
 gratification of other appetites, which beings in 
 human shape sometimes exhibit. 
 
 To prove that colours are beautiful from asso- 
 ciation alone, Lord Jeffery argues in this way. 
 ' In the first place, we would ask whether there 
 is any colour that is beautiful in all situations ? 
 and in the next place, whether there is any co- 
 lour that is not beautiful in some situations ? 
 With regard to the first, take the colours that 
 
 K 
 
154 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 are most commonly referred to as being intrinsi- 
 cally beautiful, bright and soft green, — clear blue 
 — bright pink, — or vermilion. The first is un- 
 questionably beautiful in vernal woods, and sum- 
 mer meadows ; and we humbly conceive is beauti- 
 ful because it is the natural sign and concomitant 
 of those scenes and seasons of enjoyment. Blue, 
 again, is beautiful in the vernal sky ; — and, as 
 we believe, for the sake of the pleasures of which 
 such skies are prolific ; and pink is beautiful on 
 the cheeks of a young woman, or on the leaves 
 of a rose, for reasons too obvious to be stated.'* 
 
 Intrinsic beauty, and appropriateness of situa- 
 tion, are two distinct things, which ought to be 
 considered separately, and not be mixed up to- 
 gether. The prismatic colours are, to me at 
 least, each of them beautiful, and some of them 
 more than beautiful ; and in whatever situation 
 they may be placed, they are, as colours, beauti- 
 ful. But a beautiful colour may be very un- 
 suitable to the object to which it may be applied. 
 When we see a man with a jaundiced face, we 
 never think of arguing from such a fact that 
 greenish yellow w^as an offensive colour. Purple 
 on a royal robe does not derive its beauty from 
 being the appendage of a king ; nor is it ugly, 
 
 Supp. Enc. Brit., vol. ii. p. 192. 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUR. 
 
 165 
 
 because we may see it on the cheeks of a man 
 coming out of a drunken fray. When a colour 
 is felt to be beautiful, it cannot be so because it 
 is the colour of any particular object. If green 
 be said to be pleasant to us, because it is the co- 
 lour of grass, grass itself must be shown to have 
 some quality which confers beauty on its colour. 
 But green is pleasant from a thousand other ob- 
 jects, in the animal, and mineral, as well as in 
 the vegetable kingdom. Hence, as there is no 
 quality in any object which is necessarily or pe- 
 culiarly connected with its colour, the colour 
 itself must necessarily have some property in 
 itself which confers pleasure. Pink is not beauti- 
 ful because it is the colour of a rose ; for no 
 quality can be shown to exist in a rose necessarily 
 connected with this colour : if it could, then we 
 should not have yellow, nor white, nor purple, 
 nor red and white, nor red and yellow roses. But 
 we have all these varieties of colour in the rose ; 
 and unless we can show that every rose is neces- 
 sarily connected with pink, the association of pink 
 with a rose is not of that weight which has been 
 attributed to it ; and if the connexion between 
 pink and the agreeable qualities of a rose were 
 exclusively established, we should not find that 
 these qualities followed pink into every situation ; 
 
156 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 pink in some situations being very disagreeably 
 connected with objects, though in itself a beauti- 
 ful colour. If pink be beautiful on the cheeks of 
 a young woman, because she is young, black 
 ought for the same reason to be beautiful on the 
 cheeks of a plump young negress, or Hottentot 
 Venus. If youth can make pink beautiful, it 
 can make all colours beautiful which we find in 
 the human race, many of which are reckoned 
 ugly. If youth has not as much influence in one 
 case as in another, let it be shown why it has 
 not. If grass should be found to have a quality 
 which necessarily renders green a beautiful co- 
 lour, every thing which is green, whether vege- 
 table, animal, or mineral, must have the same 
 quality. A purple hyacinth must be shown to 
 have the same property with the robes of a knight 
 of the garter ; and if there be a necessary con- 
 nexion between a colour and the object to which 
 it may belong, this same purple must be con- 
 nected with the face of a drunkard, by the same 
 tie as it is with the robes of the knight. ' All 
 bright and clear colours are,'' says Lord Jeffrey, 
 ' naturally typical of cheerfulness and purity of 
 mind, and are hailed as emblems of moral quali- 
 ties, to which no one can be indifferent.'' It is 
 no doubt true that vermilion may be typical of 
 
AS APPLIED TO COLOUU. 
 
 157 
 
 cheerfulness on the face of a lover of good liquor ; 
 but alas ! where is the purity of mind ? I have 
 already shown, that the beauty of the female 
 countenance is no positive indication of inno- 
 cence ; neither can a part of that beauty, a pink 
 cheek, be typical of purity of mind. 
 
 Farther ; if purple be said to be beautiful in 
 the robes of royalty, and ugly in the blotched 
 face of a drunkard ; and if it be said to be beau- 
 tiful as being indicative of royalty, and ugly as 
 the sign of drunkenness, association actually 
 gains nothing. For unless we allow that the 
 unapplied colour purple is both beautiful and 
 ugly, which is impossible, it is evident that its 
 being used as a sign cannot alter what is unalter- 
 able. A piece of silver is the sign of a certain 
 value ; it expresses the value of a certain quan- 
 tity of turtle soup, which we greedily devour ; 
 and also the value of a certain quantity of whale 
 blubber from which we turn with disgust. But 
 still the silver is silver ; and we prize it whether 
 we associate it with the good things of the world, 
 or with what turns our stomachs. The colour of 
 gold is not disagreeable because it is sometimes 
 used to disguise pills. So purple cannot in its na- 
 ture be altered, whatever the objects may be to 
 which it is applied. A man who is very sober, 
 
158 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 may have the misfortune to have a purple face, the 
 consequence of something in his bodily constitu- 
 tion ; and the face of a drunkard is often pale. 
 Therefore purple is not necessarily connected with 
 drunkenness any more than with royalty. A 
 certain configuration of red nose has been called 
 a strawberry nose ; but on that account no one 
 can consider the nose as beautiful, nor straw- 
 berries ugly. 
 
 If green be beautiful because it is the colour 
 of spring, why is it beautiful where verdure 
 never fades ; and where also it is beautiful in 
 the emerald, and in the plumage of birds ? If 
 any thing be yet wanting to prove that form and 
 colour may be beautiful independently of associa- 
 tion, the instrument invented by my most ingeni- 
 ous friend Sir David Brewster, the Kaleidoscope^ 
 is a most ample demonstration. It presents to the 
 view an endless variety of forms, and arrange- 
 ments of colours, which yield the greatest plea- 
 sure to the most indifferent persons. Its effects 
 are like those of enchantment ; and cannot owe 
 any thing to association. 
 
AS APPLIED TO SOUND. 
 
 159 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION AS APPLIED 
 TO SOUND. 
 
 To a great many of Mr Alison's remarks on this 
 subject, I have only to reply, that fear has no 
 share in the emotion of sublimity, as I have al- 
 ready remarked ; and which every man must 
 acknowledge who believes fear to be a state of 
 great uneasiness. 
 
 Mr Alison has not, I think, separated simple 
 sounds from those which are multiplied and va- 
 ried in intensity ; and he has taken no notice of 
 some well known facts, which demonstrate that 
 there is something in simple sound independent 
 of association ; a certain quality which is neces- 
 sary to satisfy those who have what is called a 
 musical ear. 
 
 Some persons are totally indifferent to sounds ; 
 while there are others who enjoy them, and some 
 to whom they give pain. Without at present 
 drawing any inference from such facts, let us 
 take the case of a person to whom sound is capa- 
 ble of conveying pleasure and pain according to 
 circumstances. Let us suppose that he was em- 
 ployed to choose a bell for a church, and that 
 
160 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 several bells were hung ready for trial. Would 
 he choose indiscriminately, merely because he 
 knew that a bell when struck emitted sound, 
 without having heard that sound ? Certainly 
 not. But if there be nothing particularly pleas* 
 ing in simple sounds possessing certain qualities, 
 the answer should be aflSrmative. Suppose every 
 bell to have been formed to produce the same 
 note, and that they are sounded in succession : 
 one gives the sound in a tremulous, unsteady, 
 and ill-defined style ; another yields the sound, 
 but does not prolong it, or ring well : a third 
 gives the note clear, full, steady, and prolonged, 
 and it is chosen from among the rest. In the 
 same manner, a violin player, when fitting his in- 
 strument with strings, does not indiscriminately 
 employ any string that comes to his hand. If, on 
 putting on a string, he finds its simple sound dis- 
 agreeable, he removes it and tries another, and is 
 not satisfied till he finds a string which yields a 
 clear and soft tone. Any string will produce a 
 required note ; but all strings do not give that 
 note in an equally pleasing manner. If a violin 
 with bad strings gives pleasure to any one, we at 
 once declare his taste to be depraved. The finest 
 music from bad instruments is insufferable ; and 
 this can arise only from the existence of a certain 
 
AS APPLIED TO SOUND. 
 
 161 
 
 quality of sound which is agreeable to us. In the 
 organ there is a certain quality of sound, techni- 
 cally called voice. Even an inexperienced ear 
 is capable of distinguishing which of several 
 organs has the best voice. So in other instru- 
 ments, we always discover something in the ge- 
 neral quality of their sounds which directs us in 
 our choice of them. In such cases it is evident 
 there can be no association ; but there is clearly 
 a power in sound capable of giving pleasure or 
 pain ; or rather there is something in our con- 
 stitution which is affected by it agreeably or dis- 
 agreeably. This being proved, it is scarcely 
 necessary to consider what may be called natural 
 sounds, such as those occasioned by the motion 
 of the air, or by the rushing of water, by the 
 electric spark, and so forth. Some of these are 
 pleasing from the sounds being well defined ; 
 and others are extremely harsh. 
 
 An agreeable sound may excite very unpleasant 
 recollections ; and one that is absolutely painful 
 may rouse the memory to attend to the most 
 delightful scenes, without the quality of the 
 sound being in the least degree altered. For in- 
 stance, the very same bell that is sounded on a 
 day of rejoicing, gives notice also when some one 
 is about to be laid in the grave. Here, as in all 
 
162 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 cases of association, the pleasure or the pain con- 
 ferred by the simple sound of the bell, is totally 
 distinct from the pleasure or the pain excited by 
 the thing signified. When we hear all the bells 
 in a city set a-ringing, we guess that there is 
 good news, and we are happy. When we go 
 forth and learn the particulars, we may be still 
 happier. No one will say, however, that a bell 
 has a sound on a day of rejoicing different from 
 what it has on any other occasion. It is the 
 news that makes us happy, not the sound which 
 merely signifies that some good news has arrived. 
 A newspaper ought by association to be just as 
 beautiful an object to our eyes, as the sound of a 
 bell is agreeable to our ears, because it informs 
 us of the particulars, which are of more import- 
 ance than the general and vague information af- 
 forded by a bell. The noise of a mill is exceed- 
 ingly disagreeable ; but it may bring to our 
 recollection many delightful rural scenes. No 
 one, on that account, calls the sound beautiful. 
 
 I do not know whether it may be considered 
 proper in me to allude to any thing regard- 
 ing myself ; but as T believe that to every man 
 it has been recommended to study his own con- 
 sciousness, and as every man''s experience has 
 been appealed to, I may mention that I have 
 
AS APPLIED TO SOUND. 
 
 163 
 
 always been very fond of the sound of thunder, 
 of artillery, and of every sound resembling thun- 
 der. On one occasion, while I was watching 
 and enjoying a passing storm, the lightning shat- 
 tered a tree within a few yards of the place 
 where I stood. My alarm w^as not inconsider- 
 able, and I staggered, either from the effects of 
 the shock, or in consequence of alarm. During 
 the same storm, and not far from where I was, 
 the lightning killed a woman and her child. If 
 any thing could have cured a fondness for this 
 particular sound, the danger incurred, and the 
 melancholy event so well remembered, might 
 have been effectual ; but so far from my predilec- 
 tion being diminished, I am disappointed when a 
 thunder storm comes on, if the succession of the 
 claps is not so quick, and the rattle not so loud, 
 as they were on the day the events of which are 
 so strongly fixed in my memory. 
 
 If fear constitutes so large a share of sublimity 
 as Mr Alison and others seem to believe, no ob- 
 ject should be sublime without our feeling, in 
 some degree, afraid of it. If any object can be 
 felt as sublime, without fear forming a part of 
 the emotion, then there must be two kinds of 
 sublimity ; one in which fear is the chief ingre- 
 dient, and another in which it is absent. I have 
 
164 
 
 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 no objections to a distinction being made between 
 sublimity and fearful sublimity ; but if sublimity 
 be defined as an emotion which is agreeable, no 
 man who has not a due share of personal courage 
 can ever experience what sublimity means. 
 
 Mr Alison has used as an example of a con- 
 temptible sound, the unequal fire of a platoon at 
 a review. A feu de joye is a running irregular 
 sound, exactly like an ill fired platoon or volley ; 
 why is it not contemptible ? Because, the advo- 
 cates of association will say, it is expressive of re- 
 joicing. Of what then is an ill fired platoon ex- 
 pressive ? Of the awkwardness of those who fire. 
 If that be the case, we ridicule, not the sound, 
 but the soldiers. To give an instance in which 
 the very same event may follow two very different 
 sounds ; suppose that we saw one man shot dead 
 with a musket, and another with an air-gun. 
 The event must necessarily confer the very same 
 thing, if it confer any thing, on the two sounds. 
 If this thing be beauty, then the report of the 
 one, and the whiff of the other, become equally 
 beautiful ; if it be sublimity, both immediately 
 become sublime. No one, however, will ever 
 agree to wave all distinction between them, and 
 to give up the opinion that the one sound is far 
 more contemptible than the other. 
 
AS APPLIED TO SOUND. 
 
 165 
 
 With regard to the cries of animals, a great 
 deal need not be said. These cries are their lan- 
 guage, expressive of their feelings, and of certain 
 particulars which they wish to communicate to 
 each other. This is proved by the actions which 
 are observed to accompany their cries, and by the 
 events which precede and follow them ; and also 
 by animals being ensnared by the imitation of 
 their cries. The impressions, therefore, of the 
 sound of animal language, must be regulated, 
 either by our knowledge of that language ; or, if 
 we are totally ignorant of it, by the same circum- 
 stances which render simple sounds in general, 
 agreeable or disagreeable. 
 
 The song of birds is a very different thing 
 from their language. In the song of the lark, 
 and perhaps also of the canary bird, something 
 like arrangement and time may be discovered, 
 which places their songs on a footing with arti- 
 ficial melody. As some birds are capable of be- 
 ing taught songs different from their natural 
 notes, and as others of their own accord learn 
 to imitate the songs of other birds, we have no 
 other conclusion to come to, than that it has 
 pleased the beneficent Creator of all things, to 
 give to some birds the power of enjoying sound, 
 as well as to us. 
 
166 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 Mr Alison has observed, that ' the mere suc- 
 cession of related sounds is not in itself pleasing 
 but if he had considered that the mere succession 
 of sounds not related is displeasing, he probably 
 would not have made the remark. Whatever is 
 not displeasing, must be either pleasing or in- 
 different ; but when the opposite of any thing 
 displeases, it is impossible not to infer that the 
 thing itself is agreeable. 
 
 With regard to music, properly so called, a 
 very few observations will suffice to account for 
 the impressions which it makes. Music is an 
 artificial combination and arrangement of sounds, 
 conformable to certain laws of nature, which 
 regulate the relations of simple sounds, and to 
 the laws w^hich guide us in our estimates of time. 
 As the infringement of these laws offends us, it 
 cannot be association that leads us to be pleased 
 when they are adhered to. When a chord is 
 struck on a keyed instrument, the effect is pleas- 
 ing ; but the moment a single discordant note is 
 introduced, we are offended. There can be no 
 association in this case. When we speak of a 
 particular piece of music, or of some simple me- 
 lody, and argue for association by saying we are 
 affected by them, we forget that music is an art. 
 Some music is purposely addressed to certain 
 
AS APPLIED TO SOUND. 
 
 167 
 
 feelings, with the intention of rousing them. A 
 cook serves up a dinner, composed of a variety of 
 dishes, in order that there may be something to 
 suit the palate of each guest. We never account 
 for our being pleased with a particular pudding 
 or soup by means of association ; but simply by 
 saying that it suits our taste. So it is with mu- 
 sic. A composer offers a dish which may please 
 the ear of one, but not the ears of all ; because he 
 composes chiefly to gratify his own predominant 
 feelings; and he must address the predominant 
 feelings of all who hear, by varying his feast, 
 otherwise his music will not please generally. So 
 much are composers of music guided by their 
 own feelings, that connoisseurs readily discover a 
 composer by the character of his music. The 
 same thing which stamps a character on the mu- 
 sic of any composer, leads us to admire it. 
 
 When it is attempted to imitate by music, the 
 din and hurry of a battle, or the buzz of insects, 
 or any thing else, we are called upon to think of 
 the thing imitated, and to judge of the imitation. 
 There is association unquestionably in a part of 
 this process. We hear music ; we think there is 
 an expression of hurry and bustle ; but here as- 
 sociation stops, and we begin to compare the imi- 
 tation with the thing imitated, and to decide on 
 
168 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 its proximity to perfection. If we like the thing 
 imitated, we like the imitation according to the 
 success which has attended the effort of the com- 
 poser ; if we do not like the thing imitated, then, 
 however excellent the imitation, we may not be 
 pleased with it. 
 
 But there is, apparently, a closer connexion 
 between music and the minds of those who re- 
 lish it, than any which the effects of imitation 
 may be supposed to establish. There are pieces 
 of music which are not particularly addressed to 
 our feelings ; but consist merely of skilful com- 
 binations of sounds into harmony. These are 
 also admired by those who have talent and know- 
 ledge enough to be able to appreciate them. If 
 music gives pleasure by means of association 
 alone, why should not all men, who are capable 
 of forming associations, enjoy music ? There 
 lived a gentleman nearly connected with Mr 
 Alison and myself, who was very well versed in 
 metaphysics ; of a most benevolent disposition ; 
 happiest when he could tnake others happy ; 
 who was pleased to see his children learning to 
 play on musical instruments; but who could 
 not endure music. He could easily associate 
 music \Vith the happiness of those around him, 
 and most probably did so ; but it did not please 
 
AS APPLIED TO SOUND. 
 
 169 
 
 him ; he avoided it because it gave him pain ; 
 and it gave him pain without any disagreeable 
 association. He heard as acutely as others ; 
 hence the pain did not reside in his ear ; nor 
 does the pleasure which others receive from 
 sound proceed from that organ. 
 
 The love of sound, and musical talent, arc 
 discoverable in children who are born with them, 
 at a very early age, long before they can be sup- 
 posed capable of forming associations. One of 
 my own, when he was between three and four 
 years of age, took a particular fancy to a duet in 
 which the Copenhagen Waltz was introduced. He 
 had previously, before he could speak, shown a 
 decided love for music by his singing every tune 
 which he heard ; but there was something in the 
 tune which 1 have named that attracted him ; 
 and he long continued to ask for it whenever he 
 saw his sisters sitting down to play. Here, then, 
 is an instance of the effects of music, for which it 
 seems impossible for the theory of association to 
 account. That there is some character in this 
 particular tune which harmonised with certain 
 dispositions of the child's mind, I have no doubt 
 whatever; but that he formed any association 
 with a particular tune, though he possessed talent 
 
 L 
 
170 OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 and observation not very common at his time of 
 life, I cannot think possible.* 
 
 There is evidently a very remarkable con- 
 nexion between sound and our feelings and cha- 
 racters. ' The key or fundamental note of every 
 composition, from its relation to the tones of the 
 human voice, is naturally expressive to us of 
 those qualities or affections of the mind which 
 are signified by such sounds." -f* There are cer- 
 tain pieces of music which express themselves (if 
 I may so speak) better in one key than in an- 
 other. But the expressions of pleasure, of pain, 
 of anxiety, terror, and of every other feeling, are 
 uttered by different individuals in different keys, 
 each of which seems to be the natural key of 
 each voice. The expression is equally strong in 
 each individual, on whatever key the voice may 
 be pitched ; but the different notes used for the 
 different expressions are nearly the same in all. 
 The observation of Mr Alison may therefore be 
 
 ^ Another of my children, when a little more than two years 
 old, heard for the first time the air called the ^ White Cockade/ 
 introduced in a piece of music. He expressed the utmost 
 delight and great impatience when the simple air ceased. 
 The instant it was resumed, his face brightened, and he loudly 
 expressed the pleasure it gave him. 
 
 t Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 257. 
 
AS APPLIED TO SOUND. 
 
 171 
 
 made a little more general ; and it may be said, 
 ^ that the connexion which subsists between music, 
 and our feelings and characters, originates in the 
 law of our nature which appropriates certain in- 
 tonations of voice to the expression of certain 
 feelings. But such a connexion, formed by a 
 law of our nature, cannot be the result of volun- 
 tary association. So powerful is the connexion, 
 that it may be easily told what kind of music 
 would please a benevolent and affectionate cha- 
 racter ; and w^e might say with confidence, that 
 the same music would not delight a man known 
 to be of an opposite character ; provided that 
 both had good musical ears. But a person may 
 be so constituted as to enjoy all kinds of music ; 
 although there are very few who do not show a 
 perference to some one style. In short, it ap- 
 pears to me that our ability to judge of music, 
 as well as of form and colour, depends on some- 
 thing that is born with us ; and is not the result 
 of accidental or arbitrary associations. 
 
172 
 
 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 PART III. 
 
 OF THE DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND OF THE 
 CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 ' Every man,*' says Mr Alison, ' has had reason 
 to observe a difference in his sentiments, with 
 I'egard to the beauty of particular objects, from 
 those of other people, either in his considering 
 certain objects as beautiful which did not appear 
 so to them, or in their considering certain objects 
 as beautiful which did not appear so to him.'* 
 The same author has remarked in another place, 
 that ' the nature of any person's taste is, in com- 
 mon life, generally determined from the nature 
 and character of his imagination ; and the ex- 
 pression of any deficiency in this power of mind 
 is considered as synonymous w^ith the expression 
 of a similar deficiency in point of taste.' -f- 
 
 The differences in imagination (that is, ima- 
 gination as a single power being perfect or im- 
 perfect), are considered by our author as synony- 
 mous with differences in taste. It becomes ne- 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 84. f Ibid, p 4, 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 178 
 
 cessarj, therefore, to inquire, in the first place, 
 whether imagination be really a single faculty. 
 It appears that imagination varies not only in 
 degree, but in kind ; and this I shall endea- 
 vour to prove, by an appeal to every man's ob- 
 servation. 
 
 No one will deny to an able architect, a fine 
 taste or imagination for building ; nor to a clever 
 painter, a fine imagination for composing a pic- 
 ture. But the architect may not have any taste 
 for composing a picture, nor the painter for de- 
 signing a temple. One person may have a won- 
 derful imagination for novel writing, and an- 
 other an astonishing facility of improving the 
 grounds about country seats. But because the 
 one could not accomplish what was easy to the 
 other, we would not say that either of them had 
 no imagination. One person may have a fine 
 imagination in the composition of historical pic- 
 tures, and another in the composition of music. 
 The painter may accuse the musician of having 
 no taste, because he cannot enjoy his picture ; 
 and the musician may, with equal justice, retort 
 to the painter that he has no imagination, because 
 he does not understand music. We know that 
 there are persons who are poets, who cannot 
 paint ; architects who cannot compose music ; 
 
174 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 painters who are not poets ; musicians who are 
 not architects. Now, if imagination were one, 
 single, and undivided faculty of the mind, all the 
 professions I have named could never be sepa- 
 rated ; every man who had the power, would ne- 
 cessarily be able to embrace the objects of poetry, 
 architecture, music, painting, and a variety of 
 other things, in a greater or less degree. But 
 every day's experience of others and of ourselves 
 contradicts such a supposition. We cannot say 
 that the imagination of a great poet is defective 
 because he cannot design a building, compose a 
 landscape, or an overture. But, according to Mr 
 Alison'^s idea, imagination cannot be perfect un- 
 less it can embrace every thing ; a man cannot 
 be a poet, unless he be also a painter, an architect, 
 and so forth. It is impossible that imagination, 
 if single, can be brilliant in one department, and 
 dull in another, in the same person. But we 
 find it so. It appears that this has been at- 
 tempted to be explained by supposing the single 
 power to be modified. But modification does 
 not explain the facts I have enumerated. An 
 imagination for poetry, an imagination for archi- 
 tecture, and an imagination for music, cannot be 
 modifications of the same thing ; they must each 
 be separate and distinct kinds of imagination, 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 175 
 
 and each capable of existing in various degrees 
 of perfection. 
 
 It appears there is something else besides 
 imagination in the constitution of what is called 
 taste, in some departments. There is also some- 
 thing which enables a man of a fine imagination 
 to execute what he imagines. Without this 
 power of execution, he might not be able to 
 satisfy us that he possessed imagination at all. 
 A man, however, may possess imagination and 
 not the power of execution ; and another may be 
 able to execute what the other imagines, with- 
 out being able to invent for himself. A painter 
 cannot satisfy us of his taste without a power of ex- 
 ecution, which is distinct from the power of imagi- 
 nation. We determine whether his taste be good 
 or bad by the work of his hands ; and, unless his 
 work be well executed, his imagination is of no 
 value to us. Yet it is common that a person's imagi- 
 nation, or inventive power, is strong, while the 
 power of execution is totally w^anting. We would 
 not, however, say on that account, that he had no 
 taste. Nor would we say of a man who can execute 
 the designs of another, but who cannot design for 
 himself, that he had a fine taste. There are also 
 persons who can neither invent nor execute, who 
 yet are acknowledged to have taste. To be able to 
 
176 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 design implies the possession of imagination, and 
 the necessity of possessing it. But there is taste 
 where there is no power of designing. A man 
 may be quick in perceiving the beauties and de- 
 formities of a building, and yet be unable to in- 
 vent or draw a plan. While, therefore, imagina- 
 tion and the power of execution appear to be 
 necessary for the architect, the painter, &c., and 
 are constituent parts of what we call taste in them^ 
 there is yet what is called taste in others who 
 can neither invent nor execute. A man may em- 
 ploy several architects to give him designs for a 
 house; and though he is totally incapable of 
 making designs for himself, he possesses some 
 power which directs his choice. It is not a proof 
 that he has a fine imagination, that he chooses 
 that plan which is generally esteemed the best ; for 
 if he possessed a fine imagination, he might have 
 made designs for himself. Yet we acknowledge, 
 when we have observed his choice, and have heard 
 his opinion of various buildings, that he has a good 
 taste. Hence, I differ with Mr Alison in con- 
 sidering imagination and taste as synonymous. 
 
 The taste necessary for various professions is 
 not the same in all. It is not necessary for an 
 architect to have a taste for music ; nor for a 
 musician to have a taste for architecture. It 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 177 
 
 follows that, if imagination be taste, it cannot 
 be a single faculty, but must be made up of cer- 
 tain constituent parts, some of which may be 
 perfect, and others defective in the same person. 
 There are m.any persons who are not affected by 
 the appearance of architectural objects either 
 agreeably or disagreeably. An architect, there- 
 fore, must, in the first place, possess a power which 
 enables him to derive pleasure from the contem- 
 plation of such objects. He must also possess 
 imagination ; judgment to enable him to arrange 
 what he has imagined, so that it may answer the 
 purposes he has in view, in the best manner ; and 
 likewise the power of constructing, at least on 
 paper, what his imagination has invented, and his 
 judgment arranged, so that others may reap the 
 benefit of his talents. But though imagination 
 and the power of construction may greatly assist, 
 they are not necessary to enable us to decide on 
 the merits of his performance ; but we must pos- 
 sess judgment, together with a capacity for receiv- 
 ing pleasure from architectural forms. Now, judg- 
 ment must also be of different kinds. For one per- 
 son who judges vastly well of music, cannot judge 
 of architecture ; and one who judges well of ar- 
 chitecture, may not be able to judge well of paint- 
 ing. In music, it sometimes happens, that a 
 
178 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 person can judge accurately of harmony, but not 
 of time ; and when he attempts to play on a 
 musical instrument in concert, he cannot keep 
 the time. In the same manner, a person may 
 be exceedingly alive to any trespass on time, and 
 yet not be sensible to an encroachment on har- 
 mony. Hence it is evident that judgment varies 
 in kind as well as imagination. 
 
 There is yet another faculty necessary for a 
 man of taste; and that is memory. That this 
 faculty varies in kind, is perhaps more apparent 
 than any variety in imagination or judgment. 
 One man may have a very strong memory with 
 respect to places where he has been ; and may 
 retain the relative position of every mountain, 
 tree, rock, river, and lake, so as to have con- 
 stantly at his command a picture of every place he 
 has visited, which he may contemplate, or com- 
 mit from his memory to the canvas. But the 
 possession of this kind of memory does not im- 
 ply that of retaining names. Without a memory 
 for names, a landscape painter may succeed per- 
 fectly ; but he cannot become a linguist ; nor a 
 botanist, nor a mineralogist ; nor pursue with 
 success any other branch of natural history. To 
 become a natural historian, two kinds of memory 
 are necessary, which are not always found toge- 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 179 
 
 ther; viz. a memory for forms, and a memory for 
 names. Some persons have an extraordinary 
 verbal memory ; that is, they remember whatever 
 they hear, and can repeat it ; they can get by 
 heart passages of prose and poetry with facility, 
 while others cannot retain a line ; they take plea- 
 sure in the study of language, while others con- 
 sider it dry and tiresome. Some persons have a 
 strong memory for number, and can, without the 
 help of setting down figures on paper, resolve 
 very difficult questions ; while others, with every 
 assistance, can scarcely retain the simplest rules 
 of arithmetic. A musician requires a memory 
 for form, to enable him to know the signs em- 
 ployed in music ; for place, to distinguish the 
 position of the notes on paper, and of the relative 
 position of his fingers on an instrument ; he must 
 also have a memory for time; and all these inde- 
 pendent of the peculiar musical talent commonly 
 called a good musical ear. Many persons have 
 very delicate ears for harmony and for time, and 
 even imagination for composition, who cannot 
 learn to play on an instrument. It follows, from 
 such facts, that there is an imagination and a 
 memory belonging to each talent ; and conse- 
 quently there must also be a distinct perception 
 and judgment for each. If perception, imagina- 
 
180 DIFFEllENCES OF TASTE, ANl) 
 
 tion, memory, and judgment, were each one in* 
 divisible faculty, it would be impossible that any 
 man could exhibit unusual perfection in one ta- 
 lent, and be defective in every other, instances of 
 which are frequently met with. 
 
 If it be necessary that a man, to be an archi- 
 tect, must have imagination, it is also necessary 
 that a man must have it to be a poet. But how 
 comes it that the same power does not enable 
 the architect to write poetry, and the poet to 
 build a temple ? 
 
 If it be necessary, in order to have any preten- 
 sions to taste in music, that a man should be 
 able to judge well ; he who pretends to enjoy pic- 
 tures must also have judgment. But how does 
 it happen, that a first-rate painter may be quite 
 indifferent to music ; or that the most celebrated 
 musician should hold painting in contempt? 
 
 If it be necessary that a man, to be an actor, 
 must have memory to enable him to repeat his 
 part, it is also necessary to enable a man to find 
 his way back after having passed through a thick 
 forest. But how comes it that one man can find 
 his way with much greater facility than another, 
 that he can have a local memory remarkably 
 strong, and yet not be able to get two lines of 
 poetry by heart ? In short, if we attend to hu- 
 
Cause of such differences. 181 
 
 man nature, and observe mankind, instead of 
 shutting ourselves up, and presuming to measure 
 man by ourselves, we cannot refuse to admit that 
 every art requires a peculiar talent, to which a 
 peculiar perception, imagination, memory, and 
 judgment, belong. The sciences require various 
 talents combined ; but each talent must have its 
 attendant powers. 
 
 Without attempting a more full illustration of 
 this at present, I proceed to remark that frequent 
 allusions have been made by metaphysical wri- 
 ters, to certain laws of our nature, and they con- 
 tent themselves with a reference to these laws, 
 without endeavouring to discover whether they 
 actually exist, or what they are. ' By a pecu- 
 liar law of our nature," says Mr Alison, ' there 
 are certain sounds of which the union is agree- 
 able, and others of which the union is disagree- 
 able.' * There must also be a law of our nature 
 which leads us to consider certain forms agreeable, 
 and others disagreeable, and another which di- 
 rects our estimates of colour. But all men are 
 not subject to such law^s : For one is found who 
 cannot distinguish harmony from discord; an- 
 other who is totally indifferent to form, all va- 
 rieties being to him alike ; a third, who is insen- 
 ^ Essays on Taste, vol. i. p. 252. 
 
182 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 sible to the power which colour exercises over 
 others. There are unquestionably laws which 
 govern form, colour, and sound ; and the proper- 
 ties which these laws have stamped on them, 
 are the object of inquiry to the mathematician, 
 the painter, and the musician. It is true, indeed, 
 that, when a man possesses the powers which are 
 necessary to make him a mathematician, he can- 
 not divest himself of these powers ; nor can a man 
 who has them not, acquire them. But it does not 
 seem quite correct to call that a law of our na- 
 ture which is not constant ; nor to confound 
 those laws of nature which govern form, colour, 
 and sound, with those talents which are neces- 
 sary for enabling us to derive pleasure from the 
 effects of those laws. The inconstancy and ex- 
 treme diversity in the human character, ought to 
 have, long ere now, led philosophers into a path 
 which might conduct them to the causes of that 
 inconstancy and diversity of character. What is 
 the cause that induces one person to like, and 
 another to dislike, or be indifferent to music ? 
 Why do some children, at a very early period 
 of life, before they can speak, show a decided par- 
 tiality for music, and begin to sing ; while others 
 are quite indifferent, and continue so all their 
 lives ? Why do some children display a strong 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 183 
 
 judgment with regard to form, and begin to build 
 houses of cards, to cut figures of paper, and show 
 their talent in a great variety of ways, while 
 others, when they attempt such things, are awk- 
 ward, or find themselves totally incapable ? Why 
 do some show an early pleasure in colours, while 
 others cannot distinguish or name them ? Though 
 such facts may be observed every day ; though 
 we wonder at the early talents of some children, 
 and admire the superiority of some men, we have 
 never considered it worth while to make even a 
 slight attempt to search for the causes of such 
 marked differences, and doubtless causes must 
 exist. We have wandered towards things out 
 of our reach, deeming it beneath the dignity of 
 the human intellect to look for solutions of our 
 difficulties among things at hand. I feel dis- 
 posed to follow the advice of Milton, who says, 
 
 ' But apt the mind or fancy is to rove 
 Unchecked, and of her roving is no end ; 
 Till warned, or by experience tauglit^ she learn 
 That, not to know at large of things remote 
 From use, obscure and subtle ; but to know 
 That which before us Hes in daily life. 
 Is the prime wisdom ; what is more is fume, 
 Or emptiness, or fond inpertinence ; 
 And renders us in things that most concern, 
 Unpractised, unprepared, and still to seek. 
 Therefore, from this high pitch let us descend 
 A lower flight, and speak of things at hand.' 
 
184 DIFFEIIKNCES OF TASTE, AXD 
 
 It is common, in proceeding to discover the 
 nature of any emotion of the mind, to assume 
 a cause, and go downwards towards the effect ; 
 as has been done in the instance of association, 
 which being taken as the cause of the emotion 
 of taste, the connexion with the effect is attempt- 
 ed to be traced. If, however, we consider for a 
 moment, how apt every man is to be guided by 
 his own mode of thinking with regard to differ- 
 ent objects ; and to set up his own feehngs as a 
 standard to which he expects those of every other 
 peison to be assimilated, even in spite of his 
 knowing the endless diversity which obtains 
 among men, both in their modes of thinking and 
 of acting ; the hazard of deception in the attempt 
 to analyse, arising (if I may use chemical lan- 
 guage) from the neglect of an affinity, and the 
 use of impure re-agents and tests, becomes con- 
 siderable ; and it is greatly magnified by a desire 
 which is difficult to resist, to twist facts so as to 
 make them accord with a favourite theory. For 
 these reasons, I am inclined to think, that tracing 
 matter upwards towards mind, is more likely to 
 lead to satisfactory results, than any attempt to 
 investigate the nature of mind itself. Let us 
 therefore consider how we are constituted ; whe- 
 ther the nature of the connexion betw^een body 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 185 
 
 and mind can be so far traced as to enable us to 
 account for the singular variety in our characters, 
 dispositions, and talents. 
 
 Every one is ready to admit that the living 
 human frame consists of two things, Body and 
 Mind. I do not imagine that any one will dis- 
 pute, that the body was made for the mind, and 
 not the mind for the body. That the mind i^ 
 immortal and not subject to change ; that the 
 body is mortal and liable to injury, will also be 
 admitted without hesitation. Hence, the body 
 must be considered as the instrument, the servant 
 of the mind, by which all its actions are directed. 
 A connexion between mind and body being ac- 
 knowledged, it becomes an interesting subject of 
 inquiry, in what manner does this connexion 
 subsist ? To unravel the mystery completely is 
 evidently beyond the reach of human research. 
 But although that be true, it should not deter us 
 from tracing the connexion as far as v/e possi- 
 bly can. 
 
 If the mind perceives the disagreeable sensation 
 of hunger, a desire that it should be removed, 
 immediately manifests itself. The eyes are di- 
 rected to search for some object which, from 
 experience or otherwise, we know to be capable 
 of allaying hunger. The limbs, when such an 
 
 M. 
 
186 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 object is discovered, are directed to carry the body 
 towards it ; the hands to seize it and to convey 
 it to the mouth, where the operation of mastica- 
 tion is performed ; and the last exertion places 
 it in the stomach, where so many mysterious 
 and involuntary operations are carried on, for the 
 purpose of preparing and dispersing the food 
 through the various channels by which each 
 portion is carried to its proper destination. How 
 is the mind enabled to employ its instrument, 
 the body, in this manner 1 How comes the mind 
 to be miserable when deprived of any of the 
 means of gratifying its desires? and how are 
 these desires dependent on the body for their 
 gratification ? Is there any thing in the struc- 
 ture of the body that can lead us towards a solu- 
 tion of the difficulties which such inquiries oppose 
 to us. 
 
 Anatomists have discovered, that every part 
 of the body is provided with nerves ; and they 
 have traced a connexion between these and the 
 brain. Physiologists have discovered that vo- 
 luntary motion depends upon the nerves ; for 
 when they are destroyed, let the will be exerted 
 to the utmost, the limbs will not obey the de- 
 sire of the mind. They have farther discovered, 
 that, without destroying the nerves, but by sim- 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 187 
 
 ply cutting off the communication with the brain, 
 the power of muscular motion ceases, and the 
 mind in vain attempts to exert its w^onted power. 
 If we divide the spinal cord close to the head, 
 the whole machine instantly drops. Thus it ap- 
 pears that, as we ascend upwards towards the 
 brain, we approach nearer to that part of the 
 body on which the mind seems to exert its most 
 direct influence. It is perfectly established that, 
 to produce voluntary motion, not only nerves are 
 necessary, but a communication with the brain. 
 When we desire to move, we call the effort of 
 our mind to produce the required motion, voli- 
 tion. From what is known, therefore, with re- 
 spect to the influence of the brain on the nerves, 
 it is impossible to deny that volition is exerted 
 first on the brain, from which its influence is 
 carried to the nerves, and by them is exerted on 
 the muscles. Voluntary motion, therefore, de- 
 pends on the brain ; and this organ is that on 
 which the mind directly acts in order to pro- 
 duce it. 
 
 Do the ears act upon the brain, or the brain 
 upon the ears ? A person may become deaf ; but 
 the recollection of his having once heard remains, 
 and he continues to use the language he was 
 taught to speak through th,e medium of his ears. 
 
188 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 The impressions of sound do not reside in the ear, 
 because when the ear is destroyed they remain ; 
 a man remembers a tune when the sound has 
 long ceased, and can repeat it with his own voice.* 
 The brain retains the impression made upon it. 
 In the same manner, the eyes are the medium 
 through which the impressions of light are com- 
 municated to the brain by means of the optic 
 nerve. If that nerve be divided, although the 
 whole eye remain perfect, blindness follows the 
 moment when the connexion with the brain is 
 cut off. There is something in the brain which 
 retains the impressions of light, after the influ- 
 ence of light has ceased, because blind men re- 
 member and can describe whatever they have 
 seen. So if the hands be cut off, the peculiar sen- 
 sations of hardness, softness, roughness, smooth- 
 ness, as connected with any particular body 
 we have touched, is remembered. Were the 
 tongue removed, we could still remember the 
 distinction between sourness and sweetness, and 
 so forth. 
 
 We can never discover what the mind is, nor 
 how it acts upon the brain so as to excite volun- 
 
 ^ Beethoven was a remarkable example of this. He com- 
 posed much of his admirable music after he had become 
 deaf. 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 189 
 
 tary motion, or to receive from it impressions of 
 external objects. But we can discover how far 
 the mind depends upon the body, in order that 
 its operations may be made manifest. The mind, 
 being immaterial and immortal, cannot be sub- 
 ject to change ; but the body, the instrument 
 of the mind, is mortal, and subject to change. 
 The inquiry that occurs next is, do the changes 
 of the body affect the mind, so as to obstruct its 
 usual functions ? That they do, it is scarcely 
 necessary to demonstrate, as the experience of 
 every day satisfies us of the fact. If the eyes be 
 diseased, the mind cannot receive any impression 
 from light ; it cannot acquire knowledge by 
 means of printed or written characters, of repre- 
 sentations of external objects ; nor by means of 
 objects themselves. Yet no one will say that 
 because the eye is diseased, the mind is diseased 
 also. A violent blow on the head is invariably 
 followed by a suspension of some, if not of all 
 the manifestations of the mind. But no one can 
 ever assert, that a blow can affect the mind itself ; 
 we can only say that a blow injures the organ of 
 the mind, rendering it unfit for the purposes of 
 the mind. In the case of suspended animation 
 from immersion in water, or in air unfit for breath- 
 ing, the whole body appears dead ; or, in other 
 
190 
 
 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 words, in a condition in which the mind has no 
 influence upon it. But when we restore the body 
 to a proper condition, the blood begins to circu- 
 late, its functions are received, and the mind 
 once more exercises its power. In what condi- 
 tion the mind may be, during the interval while 
 it does not act on the body, it is useless to inquire, 
 because we can never know. It is sufficient that 
 we can discover, that the body must be in a cer- 
 tain condition to enable the mind to make use 
 of it. Of the mind we know this, that it pos- 
 sesses a great variety of powers which it is capable 
 of exercising and gratifying by means of the body. 
 That it cannot exercise or gratify these powers 
 without the intervention of organization, appears 
 from the following considerations. 
 
 I take for granted that mind, essentially, is 
 the same in all persons ; that there is no variety 
 of mind. To every one who believes in the sa- 
 cred writings, this must be evident. Throughout 
 the whole volume, our souls are spoken of, as all 
 equally capable of enjoying immortality and ever- 
 lasting happiness ; and as being all equally liable 
 to eternal misery. If there were a variety of 
 minds this could not be ; for a mind so formed as 
 to be evil, being different from one formed to be 
 good, and being immortal and unchangeable, 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES, 191 
 
 could not be said to be capable of enjoying hea- 
 ven and eternity ; and repentance would be im- 
 possible. As mind is immortal, and unchange- 
 able in its nature, if it were created bad, it must 
 remain to all eternity bad. But we are not 
 warned in scripture to war against the spirit, 
 but to struggle w^ith the flesh, as that which is 
 the enemy of the soul. The body is described as 
 a burden on the mind ; and is acknowledged to 
 have so great a power over it, that there is more 
 joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, 
 than over ninety and nine just persons who have 
 no need of repentance. The reward of happi- 
 ness in a future state, therefore, we may expect 
 wnll be greater in proportion to the difficulties 
 which we have to overcome, and the extent of 
 the victory we gain. 
 
 Thus we have the very best authority for be- 
 lieving that mind is not various, and that it is 
 very much under the control of the body ; that it 
 is essentially the same in every individual, but 
 subject in different bodies to different degrees of 
 control ; in other words, liable to be drawn with 
 greater or less force, out of the line of duty pre- 
 scribed to us. The same authority teaches us, 
 that the bodies of all are not alike in their in- 
 fluence over the mind. 
 
192 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 On looking around us we at once discover an 
 infinite diversity in the configuration of our bo- 
 dies, and in the mode of exercising their various 
 functions. We distinguish one individual from 
 another, not merely by his countenance and 
 figure, but by his manner of walking, and va- 
 rious gesticulations. There is a most astonish- 
 ing variety in the human face ; yet this variety 
 is not more wonderful than that of the shape and 
 size of the head. Anatomists can testify that 
 the brain itself is as various in size and in the 
 proportions of its parts, as the face ; and indeed, 
 if we assume that the mind is the same in all, 
 we can come to the conclusion that the brain is 
 various, by reasoning, without their assistance. 
 Two persons have perfect ears; but the one dis- 
 likes music, while the other considers every 
 other enjoyment inferior, and sacrifices every 
 thing for it. Now, the mind being the same in 
 both, it cannot like and dislike the same thing. 
 Therefore, in the one case, the mind must pos- 
 sess the means of deriving pleasure from music ; 
 and in the other case, these means must be want- 
 ing. The brain being the organ of the mind, if 
 the brains of all were alike, the minds of all 
 should derive equal enjoyment from the same 
 things; but the minds of all do not enjoy the 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 193 
 
 same things ; therefore the brains of all are not 
 alike.* 
 
 Is the brain a single organ capable of obeying 
 every impulse of the mind ; or is it made up of 
 different organs, each having separate functions ? 
 If the brain wgyo a single organ, it might be 
 doubted that the senses could remain indepen- 
 dent of each other. We can hear very well 
 though deprived of sight, and see very well 
 though deprived of hearing. If the brain were a 
 single organ, the deficiency of any part should 
 affect the whole; but this is not consistent with 
 
 ^ The following passage occurs in the Edinburgh Review, 
 No. III. Art. 16 : — ' It has been the prevailing opinion, that 
 the mind can be morbidly affected, independent of any cor- 
 responding affection of the brain ; but this seems contradicted 
 by all accurate anatomical observation, which compels us to 
 yield to fact, when we resist speculation. The more recent 
 discoveries in physiology show that the phenomena of mind 
 (whatever may be their precise nature, or in whatever way 
 they are produced), are influenced, not merely by a peculiar 
 conformation of the brain, but by its chemical composition ; 
 and this is effected, directly by the blood, and indirectly by 
 air, exercise, and food. If no organic affections are said to 
 have been discovered, in some few instances, we should not 
 reason negatively from such dissections, perhaps cursorily and 
 ignorantly made, and with instruments ill adapted to detect 
 minute, and apparently trivial deviations from the natural 
 structure.' 
 
194 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 our experience. The brain being capable of en- 
 abling the mind to retain impressions, cannot be 
 assumed as an argument in favour of the single- 
 ness of the organ ; because in some individuals 
 impressions remain, w^hile the same impressions 
 cannot be retained by others. A man may have 
 ears, and no musical taste or memory ; eyes, but 
 be unable to remember faces ; again ears, but 
 without the power of remembering names ; or he 
 may remember names and not faces. Some can- 
 not recollect places where they have been ; others 
 cannot judge of form or symmetry ; some can- 
 not learn languages ; others in vain attempt the 
 science of number. There are men, however, 
 who possess all these faculties, more or less, and 
 some in a much higher degree than others. We 
 cannot, to account for this, say that the immortal 
 and unchangeable mind is perfect in one part, 
 and imperfect in another ; because, if we did, we 
 should acknowledge the mind to be material, 
 and capable of being mutilated. We must, there- 
 fore, attribute defects of talent to defects of that 
 part of the organ by means of which the talent 
 should be manifested. The proportion between 
 different parts of the brain, differ greatly in dif- 
 ferent individuals; and every anatomist who has 
 dissected not merely for the purpose of discover- 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 195 
 
 ing the presence of the brain, must have observed 
 such differences. 
 
 Farther, it is perfectly well known that inju- 
 ries done to the brain, and diseases of that part, 
 disturb the operations of the mind ; while inju- 
 ries and diseases of other parts of the body do not 
 affect them. * In the case of general inflamma- 
 tion, of increased rapidity of the circulation of 
 blood, or of any thing which affects the body 
 generally, w^e, of course, expect the brain to be 
 also affected ; and we are accustomed to consider 
 
 * Many cases are on record, which have been cited to prove 
 that sensation may continue, after extensive injuries have been 
 inflicted on the brain. The patients have lived ; have taken 
 food ; and have spoken ; or, as we are told, they have continued 
 quite well. No remarks, however, have been made on the 
 manifestations of the mind ; and it has not been ascertained 
 that the loss of a particular portion of the brain, has not been 
 accompanied by the partial or total loss of some mental power. 
 Cases are mentioned in which the patient appeared perfectly 
 sound in intellect, while the cerebellum was destroyed, or 
 schirrous. But no observation was made to ascertain whether 
 sexual desire continued or was extinguished. Such observa- 
 tions are yet to be made on future cases which may occur. 
 Motion may appear in an animal after the head has been re- 
 moved ; but it has never been asserted that the motion was 
 voluntary. The nerves of motion are independent, and may be 
 excited by other causes than volition ; but without brain there 
 can be no volition ; and without a connexion between the brain 
 and nerves, volition has no influence over them. 
 
196 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 delirium as an indication of the brain being af- 
 fected, and a consequence of it ; which is a suf- 
 ficient demonstration of the brain being in more 
 immediate connexion with the mind, than any 
 other part of the body. An injury sometimes 
 deranges, or destroys one function, and not an- 
 other ; and inflammation has been known to ex- 
 cite a function into activity, which in other cir- 
 cumstances was dormant. Some persons drink 
 w^ine or spirits for the purpose of exciting their 
 powers. The effect of such liquids, taken in im- 
 moderate quantities, is well known to be to ren- 
 der the brain not only unfit for the manifestations 
 of the mind, but for exciting voluntary motion. 
 A man who is drunk seems to be deprived of 
 mind altogether. A person may become insane 
 in regard to one particular operation of the mind, 
 while all the others are exhibited in a sound 
 state. As the mind cannot be said to like and 
 to dislike the same thing , so it cannot be said to be 
 able to do, and not to be able to do the same thing : 
 It cannot be said to be fit to investigate, and unfit 
 to investigate subjects connected wnth figure and 
 number. If one mind can investigate what an- 
 other cannot, the necessary part of the organ 
 must be perfect in one case, and defective in the 
 other. 
 
CAUSE OF SUCK DIFFERENCES. 
 
 197 
 
 We observe that the mental powers of man 
 increase with his age ; but no one thinks of say- 
 ing that tlie mind grows. It is the body and its 
 parts that become more and more fitted for the 
 purposes of the mind ; not the mind that becomes 
 more and more fitted to them. If the mind were 
 capable of increase, as the body is, by the addi- 
 tion of matter, it would then be material and 
 mortal as the body. * 
 
 If, then, the mind be essentially the same in 
 all ; and the brain be that part of the body which 
 is in most direct communication with the mind, 
 
 * Some have supposed tliat the very existence of the mind 
 depends on organisation ; so much does the state of the mind 
 depend on that of the body. But when we observe the whole 
 conduct of an individual directed by moral, religious, and po- 
 litical causes, we are led to the very opposite conclusion. The 
 difficulty is to ascertain the extent of the mutual influence of 
 body and soul. We may suppose, without imagining the mind 
 or soul to be the organising principle, that the differences in 
 our organisation are owing to some peculiar variations in the 
 operations of the principle. This seems to be more natural, 
 and more consistent with facts, than assuming the mind to be 
 the organising, as well as the animating and reflecting prin- 
 ciple. The most able artist cannot produce good work without 
 good tools ; the most skilful painter cannot produce a fine pic- 
 ture with bad colours ; so the mind, while connected with the 
 body, cannot exhibit its powers without being provided with 
 proper organs. 
 
198 DIFFEllEXCES OF TASTE, AND 
 
 it appears, from the differences in the manifesta- 
 tions of the mind, in different persons, that va- 
 rious parts of the organ are destined to as many 
 purposes ; and that the perfection with which 
 these purposes are accomplished, depends on the 
 perfection of the parts of the organ appropriated 
 to each. 
 
 Such considerations have led me to believe 
 that the only true explanation of the differences 
 of taste, and of taste itself, is to be found in the 
 doctrines of Phrenology : the basis of which is, 
 that the brain is made up of different parts, each 
 necessary to some manifestation of the mind, and 
 all in connexion with, and mutually influencing, 
 each other. If a particular part of the brain be 
 defective in development, the manifestations of 
 the mind appertaining to it are also defective. 
 When any part is well developed, the manifes- 
 tations are regulated, 1^^, By its perfection in 
 constitution ; 9,dly^ By its state of activity ; and, 
 Mly^ By the proportion it bears to the other 
 parts. 
 
 It is not my intention to enter, at present, on 
 the particular application of the doctrines alluded 
 to, in matters of taste ; because they have not 
 yet been generally studied ; and because many 
 who pretend to understand them have studied 
 
CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES. 
 
 199 
 
 but slightly, and by their erroneous remarks, 
 and their haste to become physiognomists, have 
 done injury to what they really believe. I con- 
 clude, by recommending an impartial and un- 
 prejudiced perusal of phrenological works; a 
 patient and persevering collection of observa- 
 tions, first on the larger organs, and then on the 
 smaller; and if opportunity occurs, an extensive 
 comparison of skulls and their contents. Let it 
 be first ascertained whether brains differ in size, 
 and then whether the bulk of some particular 
 external part does, or does not, accord with some 
 particular manifestation of talent or character. 
 To acquire readiness in observing is difiicult, but 
 it is not unattainable. Those who have learned 
 to make observations for themselves, will at once 
 perceive how simply and how accurately every 
 variety of taste can be explained. 
 
 I shall only add, in the words of Mr Alison, 
 that ' The most effectual method to check the 
 empiricism either of art or of science, is to mul- 
 tiply, as far as possible, the number of those who 
 can observe and judge ; and (whatever may be 
 the conclusions of my readers with regard to my 
 own particular opinions), I shall not have occu- 
 pied their attention in vain, if I can lead them to 
 think and to feel for themselves ; to employ the 
 
200 
 
 DIFFERENCES OF TASTE. 
 
 powers which are given them to the ends for 
 which they were given ; and, upon subjects 
 where all men are entitled to judge, to disregard 
 alike the abstract refinements of the philosopher 
 who speculates in the closet, and the technical 
 doctrines of the artist who dictates in the school.' 
 — Essays on Taste^ Introduction^ p. xxviii. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 MURRAY AND GIBB, PRINTERS, 21 GEORGE STREET, EDINBURGH. 
 
GETTY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
 
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