at Mo pa fase Uepies q Shak bees bs Seba Sable y eran na aeotet ene! ia ASH: tte unimaee °F parts Divisi: 2 Section Lae 2 he rhs "ha, it, , aoe a) THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY THE MOSLEM W OAS. INO RAB AN EDITED, WITH A FOREWORD AND CLOSING CHAPTER, BY JOHN R.YMOTT CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL NEW YORK GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY First published « » »« 1925 Made and Printed in Great Britain. Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury. FOREWORD THE Moslem world of to-day is markedly different from that of yesterday. The social and religious system of Islam, for centuries the most rigid, exclusive, resistant, and, as some would say, the most intolerant of all, has during the first quarter of the present century, and notably during the last decade, been undergoing stupendous and well-nigh unbelievable changes. Almost every Moslem land—in Africa, in Western, Central, and Southern Asia, and in the East Indies—is ablaze with new national and social aspirations and ambitions. Through- out these vast regions the traveller in these days is vividly conscious of the thrill of a new life. On every hand he finds an earnest struggle to achieve a political organization of a more democratic and constitutional form. This is often coupled, however, with pronounced hostility to Western governments. The most remarkable event of all has been the abolition of the Caliphate. The effect of this startling development has been like dropping from its place the keystone of an arch, for true it is that the Caliphate has been the binding centre of the extensive and imposing arch of Pan-Islamism. This weakening of the sense of solidarity and moral unity of the Moslem peoples will be felt increasingly. In profound and far-reaching significance it may be likened to the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire. Almost as vil viii FOREWORD wonderful has been the social upheaval, the most im- pressive evidence of which is the elevation in so many Moslem countries of the status of women. The renaissance of Arabic culture, the rapid multi- plication of periodicals and of book and pamphlet literature, the great increase in the numbers of Moslem youth in schools and colleges of Western learning, and the rising and surging tide of new thought, all bear witness to a notable intellectual awakening. The new search for truth and the ferment of dynamic and even of revolutionary ideas are exerting a great emancipating, liberalizing, and transforming influence. The larger political and intellectual freedom leads inevitably to greater religious freedom. Reactionary conservatism, inertia, and intolerance are giving way to the spirit of scientific inquiry. Moslem teachers and writers reveal that they have a growing realization of the weaknesses of Islam as a religion to meet the social, national, and international demands of the modern age or to satisfy the searching questions of the mind and the deeper longings of the heart. They seem to be aware of the disintegrating processes within and the dangerous im- pacts from without. With increasing numbers of Moslems the old complacency has given way to a genuine solicitude and to a hopeful spirit of reform. A re-evaluation of Islam as a religion is taking place, and Moslem thinkers are seeking to restate both their offensive and their defensive apologetic. A Moslem world undergoing such varied, such exten- sive, such profound, and such momentous changes is of supreme interest and concern to all Christendom. As a matter of fact, the attention of Christians is to-day riveted on Islam as at no time since the Moslem invasion of Europe. And well it may be. The position, trends, FOREWORD 1x and purposes of a religion of over 230,000,000 adherents necessarily have large meaning to the Christian religion, with its world mission and programme. The fact that possibly as many as seven out of every eight Moslems in the world are living under the flag of one or another Christian nation serves to accentuate their significance to all who bear the Christian name. The attitude and welfare of the followers of Islam have a vital bearing on the international and interracial relations of man- kind, and, therefore, on the peace of the world. Now that the world has found itself as one body, it can no longer be a subject of indifference to any part of the world, and most certainly not to any Christian people, what conditions obtain and what the tendencies, ideals, and ambitions are in any other part. Such vital and burning issues as we see now absorbing the Moslem peoples present a challenge and an opportunity to the Christian faith. The threatened and impending dis- integration of Islam calls for an adequate substitute. Only Christ and His programme can meet the need. The new generation in whose hands rests the destiny of all the Moslem lands—a generation which has so recently come under the spell of the modern age, and whose brain and heart are beginning to surge with new thought and social passion—make an irresistible appeal to Christians everywhere to present in their message, in their lives, and in their relationships, a winning and convincing apologetic. This matter of the attitude of Christians and of Christian nations toward Islam and its adherents is most vital and pressing. What the attitude of Christians is to be will determine that of Islam to Christendom. Great is the need of Christianizing the impact of the so-called Christian nations upon the Moslem world. It x FOREWORD is to be feared that much of the diplomacy, the territorial designs, the administrative policy, and the commercial activities of Christian Powers have been and still are non-Christian as judged by their effects. The spread of Western materialism and of the corrupt influences of modern civilization, unless the adequate counteracting and transforming energies of vital Christianity are more largely brought to bear, will result in making the last state of Moslem lands worse than the first. There is need, likewise, on the part of the Christian movement, as it comes to the Moslem world, of exercising larger toleration. Happily the modern approach of Christian missionaries to Moslems is a much more positive, constructive, fraternal, and co-operative one than generally obtained in earlier days. Only as the pro- gramme of Christianity is based upon a sympathetic understanding of the Moslems (and upon unselfish co- operative service with them) is there any prospect of winning them, but along that pathway there is infinite hope. With such intimate and helpful contacts, and with such an atmosphere of faith as this attitude and practice will afford, there must be presented the message of the living Christ and His redemptive Gospel. In this way only will there be broken the spell of fear, fatalism, and despair which rests upon multitudes of Moslems, and will there be imparted to their lives the superhuman faith, freedom, and hope which only He communicates to men. The twenty-three papers which constitute this volume of composite authorship present with real comprehension and living interest many of the more important aspects of the Moslem world of to-day and describe the causes underlying the tremendous changes which have taken place in Islam in recent years. They show convincingly FOREWORD x1 why this situation is one of urgent interest and concern to all Christendom. With penetration and sympathy they reveal the attitude which should characterize Christian nations and Christian Churches, as well as individual Christian workers. The authors of the various papers have been in intimate and vital contact with Islam, most of them for a long period of years. Their interest has not been merely academic but one of heart concern as well. They have prepared their contributions without collaboration with one another. The aim in the volume has not been to present a complete and symmetrical treatment of all aspects of Islam, nor to treat all Moslem lands, but rather to present a composite view of those phases of the subject which to-day are of most living interest and which most need to be lifted into prominence. The editor has made no attempt to unify the points of view of various authors. Because of this fact it is somewhat remarkable to find such a consensus among so large a group of writers of widely differing background, experience, and outlook. In order to bring the volume within the desired limits, and to avoid certain repetition, it has been necessary to abridge a few of the papers. It need hardly be added that each writer is responsible for the views set forth in his paper. We have been unable to provide references for all quotations because of inability to reach certain of the writers within the time limit set for publication. More- over, it has been impossible to be entirely consistent in transliterating Arabic and other oriental terms. General usage has been followed rather than scholastic precision attempted. Particular recognition is given to Henry H. King and Charles H. Fahs for their pains- taking collaboration in the processes of editing and X11 FOREWORD proof-reading. We are also under obligation to Professor — J. C. Archer of Yale University, Professor R. 5. Mc- Clenahan of the American University at Cairo, and Professor W. G. Shellabear of the Hartford Seminary Foundation for bringing their expert knowledge to bear in the review of the various manuscripts and for many invaluable suggestions. Thanks are also due to the editors of Zhe International Review of Missions for permission to use in amended form the materials of the last chapter. Joun R. Mort. CHAPTER If II. III. TV VII. CONTENTS FOREWORD Joun R. Mott THE IMPACT AND INFLUENCE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD JamMEs L. BARTON -THE RENAISSANCE IN THE MOSLEM NEAR EAST : : : : : JuLius RICHTER THE CALIPHATE YESTERDAY, TO-DAY, AND TO-MORROW : 3 é g ‘ D. S$; MARGOLIOUTH THE INSTITUTION OF THE CALIPHATE AND THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE . } ; ANONYMOUS FERMENTS IN THE YOUTH OF ISLAM : Basin MATHEWS ISLAM AND THE RACE PROBLEM . ‘ C. SNoucK HURGRONJE THE REACTION OF MOSLEM INDIA TO WESTERN ISLAM ‘ F J i MurRRAY T. Titus xiii PAGE Vii 21 33 47 61 79 a5 X1V CHAPTER VIII. IX. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. CONTENTS THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF CHRISTENDOM TO THE PEOPLES OF THE MOSLEM WORLD Joun E. MERRILL PRESENT-DAY JOURNALISM IN THE WORLD OF ISLAM . , ‘ : u ; SAMUEL M. ZWEMER SoME TYPES OF LITERATURE IN THE WoRLD oF ISLAM ; : y : CONSTANCE E. PADWICK WESTERN EDUCATION IN THE MOSLEM WoRLD—FORCES, PURPOSE, AND RE- SULTS ; ‘ ; : } : WILLIAM H. HALL WESTERN EDUCATION IN THE MOSLEM WoRLD—CHANGING FACTORS fk ; PauL MONROE INFLUENCES TOWARDS A NEW ART IN EGYPT AND PALESTINE ‘ , : W. A. STEWART MOVEMENTS IN THE LIFE OF WOMEN IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD—THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST . : : : : CAROLINE M; BUCHANAN MOVEMENTS IN THE LIFE OF WOMEN IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD—NORTH-WEST AFRICA, ; : ‘ £ y I, Lirias TROTTER [PAGE ish BH 123 157 169 183 199 2iI 231 CHAPTER VG XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXII. AXIT. AXITI. CONTENTS MOVEMENTS IN THE LIFE OF WOMEN IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD—INDIA i: é RutH E. ROBINSON THE ANCIENT ORIENTAL CHURCHES AND ISLAM : : ; : ; : RENNIE MAcINNES AND HERBERT DANBY ORIENTAL CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES AND THE EVANGELIZATION OF THE MOSLEMS W. H. T. GAIRDNER THE MysTICAL LIFE IN MODERN ISLAM . GEORGE SWAN NEW TRENDS IN MOSLEM APOLOGETIC . ARTHUR JEFFERY CHRIST'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MOSLEM , PauL W. HARRISON THE IssuE BETWEEN ISLAM AND CHRIS- TIANTU YS Ors 4 : ; , ROBERT E, SPEER THE OUTLOOK IN THE MOSLEM WORLD . Joun R. Mott APPENDIX . . ; ; XV PAGE 249 263 279 291 305 325 341 361 383 391 THE IMPACT AND INFLUENCE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD BY THE REV. JAMES L. BARTON, D.D., LL.D., Senior Foreign Secretary, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions CHAPTER I THE IMPACT AND INFLUENCE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD IsLAM, in its doctrine, its traditions, and its practices, has been declared to be stereotyped beyond possibility of change. Principal Fairbairn,! Sir William Muir,’ Lord Cromer,’ William Gifford Palgrave,‘ Lord Houghton,’ and Stanley Lane-Poole, as well as others, have taken the ground that Islam is inflexible, unprogressive, in- capable of adapting itself to new conditions, stationary. Palgrave says: “It justly repudiates all change, all development,’’ and Lord Houghton adds: ‘‘ Whatever savours of vitality is by that alone convicted of heresy and defection.”’ If this is true, then we should expect little influence on the Islamic world from contacts with Western civiliza- tion. While theoretically Islam may not change in form or in practice, the fact remains that marked modifications have taken place, especially within this generation, and many others are indicated. Most of the divisions in Islam are evidence of internal change both in beliefs and in practices. 1 Contemporary Review, 1881, p. 806. 2 Annals of the Early Caliphate, London, 1883, p. 459. 3 Modern Egypt, New York, 1908, vol. 2, p. 202. 4 Narration of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, London, 1865, vol. 1, p. 372. 5 Quoted by Samuel Graham Wilson, Modevn Movements Among Moslems, New York, 1916, p. 12. 3 4. THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY We shall consider, first, what are the impacts between Islam and the Western world; and, secondly, what influences upon Islam are resulting from these impacts. Since Islam ceased to expand by conquest, Moslems have remained largely aloof from the rest of mankind. Also in the world of art, literature, education, science, commerce, and civilization they have seemed to occupy spheres by themselves. They generally occupy areas not attractive to the ordinary traveller and commercial agent. Moslems have not sought outside contacts, and have offered little inducement for the approach of other peoples. It is only within this generation that the Islamic world has experienced the shock of external impacts. These have come about through a variety of sources and of changed conditions. In the first place, Mohammedan countries have been invaded by Western tourists and travellers in increasing numbers and for various purposes. At the same time, many Moslems have found their way into Western lands. This intervisitation has been facilitated by newly con- structed railroads, steamship lines, and automobile routes. Railroads in India, Turkey, Persia, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and even in Arabia are comparatively recent. Public automobiles are in regular service in North Africa, Arabia, India, Persia, and in many other _ Moslem countries. The Moslem world has begun to travel, and Moslem lands are being invaded by travellers, concessionnaires, and commercial agents from the outside. The minds of the Moslem youth have been awakened from the lethargy of centuries, furthermore, by the impact of Western learning. Modern education has entered most Moslem countries. Up-to-date colleges and universities have been established in many of the great Moslem centres. Mohammedan youth were slow IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION’ 5 to avail themselves of the advantages these institutions offered. Taking note, however, of the advantages gained by non-Moslem students through Western learning, Moslem youth have begun to seek these ad- vantages for themselves. In increasing numbers Moslem men have sought education abroad in most of the great centres of learning in Europe and America. The attend- ance of Moslem students in mission schools and in modern institutions in Moslem lands has greatly in- creased since 1920. Western schools in Turkey and Persia are overcrowded, and are turning away Moslem students who are almost demanding admission. Among Moslems in India school attendance has risen from 3 per cent. thirty years ago to 15 per cent. at the present time. Mohammedans of the East Indies, and, in fact, of nearly all Moslem lands, are seeking modern education. A third means of contact with non-Moslem lands has been an increased knowledge of Western languages. Modern events have demonstrated to the Islamic world that Arabic and native vernaculars alone are inadequate to meet the demands of the present age. While they may regard Arabic as a sacred language, Moslems are discovering that it is not the language of world commerce or of that learning which permits profitable contact with the West. European languages have necessarily found a place in the more advanced modern Islamic schools, while from the first these languages have con- stituted an important part in the curricula of all Western schools in Moslem countries. English, French, and German have commanded the largest places. With the acquisition of a Western language there inevitably follow a desire and a demand for literature in that language. This influence, constantly upon the 6 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY increase, is arousing new ambitions and is implanting in the minds of this Moslem generation ideas out of harmony with tradition. Eighteen sets of the Ency- clopedia Britannica were sold in two years to Arab customers by a single book-shop in Iraq. New ideas which have no place in the old Islamic scheme of the universe are coming in like a flood. The effect of the war has been revolutionary and startling. Moslems of many countries were involved, and upon different sides in the conflict. The Arab and the Turk, the Turk and the Indian Moslem, fought each other. In nearly all of the national armies there were Moslem contingents. The call for a 7zhad had failed, and Moslem was arrayed against Moslem in deadly combat. Nationalism came to the front and religion receded. The war took Moslems into lands strange to them and among peoples hitherto unknown. Old seclusions were forcibly broken up. Moslems of many races were thrown into a whirlpool of nations. The spectacle of Christian arrayed against Christian revealed the lack of solidarity in the Christian world and destroyed in the minds of many Moslem leaders that fear of and respect for the Christian domination of Moslem races. The Indian Moslems caught new visions of independence. The Arabs dreamed of a new Arab kingdom. Egypt determined to throw off a foreign yoke. North Africa entertained a hope of autonomous self-government. Persia adopted a constitution. Turkey achieved a new measure of independence. The Moham- medan world awoke from the war with ideals of democracy as opposed to the old conception of theocracy. Among the influences and results of the impact of Western life upon the Islamic world, the first to be considered is the multiplication of contacts which have IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION (! forced intelligent and observing Moslems to note the differences between the two civilizations. This has led to sharp discussions as to the merits and demerits of the two. The place of women among the nations of the East is a matter of comment. The low state of education in Moslem countries, and especially among women, has been interpreted as one of the chief causes for the back- ward state of Islamic civilization. It is only within the last few years that the Persians have begun to realize the vast superiority of Occidental education. In Arabia there is a growing conviction that Islam is not up-to-date, that the powerful nations in the West have won their place in the world through education and through better social laws. The educated Moslems of all countries are beginning to see the economic and social values in modern philosophic and scientific principles and in Western social and economic truths. The pull is towards those ideals prevalent among Christian nations and away from traditional Islam. S. Khuda Bukhsh, an Indian Moslem and an Oxford graduate, contrasts many of the customs of Islam with those of Christian nations to the detriment of the former. The present Turkish Government has gone to the extreme limit in officially adopting national, economic, and social lawsand regulations which forcenturies have been regarded as contrary to the teachings of Islam. The abrogation of the Caliphate and the expulsion of the Caliph was a radical and startling step taken in order to prevent interference in the modernization of Turkey by an unprogressive religious hierarchy. Eshref Edib Bey made the following statement in St. Sophia in Constantinople to a vast Turkish audience : “In an epoch when all the inhabitants of the earth are advancing into new realms of science, in a period 8 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY when all cities and all nations are going through an evolution toward a final ideal, let us escape from this laziness which has caught us in its grasp. Let us free our lives from this dark veil of ignorance.” ! When intelligent Moslems began to appreciate the deficiencies in their own systems they began to agitate for better education among their own peoples. This movement for better schools has already gained great momentum in Persia, Turkey, Arabia, Egypt, North Africa, and Malaysia. Moslems in India are establishing colleges like the Moslem colleges at Aligarh, Vaniyambadi, Peshawar, Hyderabad, and Lahore. Even the Amir of Afghanistan, in his earnestness to spread education, has instituted travelling schools for nomadic tribes. French, Italian, and German professors and doctors have been imported to conduct the more important of the national schools. Christian Literature in Moslem Lands reports that “ there is a striking post-war desire for education, and there are crowded schools everywhere. Ability to read is everywhere coveted,” Social changes are no less revolutionary. This fact is most apparent in the new freedom for women and in the agitation over plural marriages, hitherto assumed to be one of the constant features of Islam. An educated Indian Moslem recently spoke of the hideous deformity of Moslem society, and of the vice and immorality, the selfishness, self-seeking, and hypocrisy which are corrupt- ing it throughout the world. A prominent Turkish lawyer in Constantinople who recently printed a series of six articles in one of the leading Turkish papers of that city upon the subject of marriage and divorce, says : + Reported to the writer by a missionary of the American Board, IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 9 “ The younger men revolt against the Moslem custom, and declare that such things ought not to be allowed in the twentieth century. These younger men look upon Moslem polygamy and divorce as a curious antique.” } The author advocates the promulgation of a law forbidding the marriage of more than one wife. He also declares that Turkish women are demanding the registration and publication of marriages, “‘ a custom adopted everywhere in the world.” This forceful article called out but little protest. The founder of the sect in the Punjab, India, known as “‘ the people of the Koran,’ says that he considers polygamy as bad as fornication. A National Assembly of Albanians recently held at Tirana declared that their fundamental principles of independence include the prohibition of polygamy and the abolition of the wearing of the yashmak used by women to cover their faces. In Turkey and in Persia the use of the veil by women is rapidly becoming obsolete. This sweeping social change affecting the place of women in society is greatly aided, in fact has its origin, in the new education that is reaching the women and girls as well as the men of all Moslem countries. The new and the old jostle one another throughout the Islamic world to-day in the spheres of education, social transformation, and religious discussions. The fathers for the most part cling to the old, while the younger generation have a genuine desire to lift the entire social, intellectual, and religious order to new levels. A new spirit of mutual tolerance is also to be noted. There are yet many who believe that Mohammedans are universally bloodthirsty and cruel, and that it is impossible to have friendly relations with them. Within 1 Translated for the writer from Igdam, a Constantinople paper, by the Rev. Charles T. Riggs. 10 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY a single decade in Western schools and universities, in relations of host and guest, in conversations upon matters of morals and religion, in the formation of treaties as well as in the contacts of war, there has been created a new measure of mutual appreciation. Moslems have not hesitated to declare that there is much in Christianity that they admire and accept, while Christians have learned that the followers of Islam are not wholly bar- baric. Familiarity and better acquaintance are producing an increasing measure of mutual respect. A desire for democracy in place of theocracy is an outstanding example of change of ideal which has been carried into practical operation in Turkey. Within twenty years Turkey represented a government whose sovereign regarded himself, and was acclaimed by the people, to be the Shadow of God on earth. He claimed divine and absolute authority over his own people, and through his office as Caliph a large measure of authority over all Moslems. The Sultan has been deposed by his own subjects, the Caliphate abolished, and a constitu- tional democracy established which makes no claim for authority above that of the voice of the people. Turkey has separated Church and State. Persia has adopted a constitution which gets its authority from the people. Egypt has set aside eccle- siastical law in civil affairs. If the common interpreta- tion may be accepted, the fifth stripe in the new flag of democratic China gives to the Mohammedans of that country a status equivalent to that of a racial group. The government of Iraq under King Feisal does not claim divine sanction. More important than written constitutions and regulations is the constantly rising spirit of freedom that is spreading to all Moslem peoples. Nationalism is a vital force among Moslems to-day, IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 11 setting aside divine fiat law and substituting laws that spring from the will of the people. Within a century there has never been a time more propitious for a general Moslem uprising than the period immediately preceding the Great War. Throughout his reign the Caliph, Abdul Hamid II of Turkey, assid- uously cultivated Moslem unity. His emissaries pene- trated the great Moslem centres preaching the strength and solidarity of that religion which was destined by Allah to become the one supreme, dominant religion of the world, and the Caliph of Islam, the one triumphant ruler. Contacts and alliances with European nations aided in furthering the design. Mecca and Medina were used as centres from which to propagate among all Moslem peoples the gospel of unity and ultimate victory. The supreme moment came at the outbreak of the Great War, when the call went forth from the Caliph to all the faithful to rise and strike for Moslem liberty. The complete failure of the call for the jzhad is a matter of history. There is far less possibility of a coalition of the Moslem peoples of the world now than there was at that time. Pan-Islamism has become impossible. Turkey has lost her peculiar relationship to the Moslem world by the abolition of the Caliphate and the expulsion of the Caliph. Arabia is hopelessly divided; Egypt claims fellowship with no other Moslem country ; Persia is under a constitution ; India seeks self-government at home, but contemplates no alliance with outside coun- tries; the Moros are content under American rule; the Moslems in the Dutch East Indies have a rising spirit of self-determination ; and Russian Moslems are held by the Soviet régime. There appears to be no chance whatever for a new spirit of Pan-Islamism to get a foot- hold in any Mohammedan country. 12 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY Even though Pan-Islamism is no longer practicable, religious leaders in the Turkish Grand National Assembly have attempted to secure the passage of laws for the protection of the faith and for the punishment of the religiously careless. Lord Ronaldshay, in his India, a Bird’s-Eye View, says: “The views which the Mohammedan deputation [of the All-India Moslem League] placed before the Viceroy in 1906 were those of a community acutely conscious of the fact that it differed fundamentally in its religious, social, and ethical ideals from the majority of the in- habitants of the land in which it dwelt; and further, that, faced with a movement in the direction of the democratic constitutionalism of the West, it was in danger of losing that which it desired above all things to maintain, namely, the individuality which it derived from its participation in the world of Islam.” This awakening to new perils constitutes a real Islamic achievement. It brings a unity in action as well as unity in spirit and resistance, binding together races and different nationalities. It presents a new and formidable barrier to an approach that would further disintegrate Islam. In the attempt to save itself from the disastrous results of the higher criticism of its sacred books and ancient traditions, a new barrier is erected against other religions. Soon after the Chinese Republic was formed, the more enlightened and energetic among the men in the Moslem communities in various parts of China began banding themselves together into societies in order to stir up and promote a new enthusiasm for their faith. In Mesopotamia the old and the new jostle one another with confusing and startling contrasts. Modern innova- VP Are. 249. IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 18 tions like the motor-car, aeroplanes, moving pictures, Western intoxicants, a great increase in _ periodical publications, are more and more becoming a part of the daily life of the Arab and fire him with a new vision of another golden age. The religious leaders are aroused by this unprecedented awakening of the Arab youth which shows a corresponding apathy toward religious ideas and practices. The religious forces are arousing them- selves to stay the rising tide of unbelief. A prominent Indian Moslem, Mr. Jafar Ali Khan, recently said : “The combined attacks of Christian Europe against the integrity of Islam and the covert and overt designs of Western Powers against the remnant of Turkey have made too deep an impression upon the mind of Moslems to be easily effaced.” The defeat of the Turk united the loyal followers of the Prophet in India against the British and drove them to make with the Hindus a common cause against “ their common enemy.” With them the question was not so much religious as political. They defended their faith in order to present a united front in their resistance. They have belittled religious differences in order to strengthen the bands of resistance. Moslems every- where are beginning to see in the flood of new literature and the multiplying modern Press a new agency for the solidification and unification of their co-religionists perhaps as powerful as the Mecca pilgrimage. In Syria_ and Egypt, as well as in other Moslem countries, there is a general effort to produce a new religious literature that will reconcile modern science and ancient Islam. To this one phase of modern thought the intelligent world of Islam is devoting its best energies. The Wah- 14 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY habi movement in Arabia and the Ahmadiya movement in India are but results of this attempt to meet new conditions. A reinterpretation of Islam in terms of modern science has become necessary if the new generation of enlightened men and women are to be held true to the faith. None see this more clearly than do the intelligent Moslem leaders who view with uneasiness the spread of Western learning in all Moslem countries and among both sexes, attended by a loss of religious zeal. A writer in China says: “The impact of modern thought is producing results which tend to cause a breaking away from orthodox Chinese Mohammedanism. This is due in part at least to a feeling that Islam is unable to meet the demands of modern hfe. Attempts are being made to meet these demands.”’ Stewart Crawford of Beirit writes: “The methods of Western higher criticism are being adopted by some of the younger scholars in Islam, who are attempting a new exposition of the literature and the tendencies of their religion. The orthodox leaders are disturbed by this new freedom in the use of the sacred book. But they are unable to check the tendency of modern education to create new forms of religious activity and of personal piety in the Moslem world.” S. Khuda Bukhsh says : “Mohammedans are free to adopt whatever is good in any civilization. All religions are alike in their governing principles. There is nothing in the teachings of Mohammed which conflicts with or militates against modern civilization. Modern Islam, with its hierarchy of priesthood, gross fanaticism, appalling ignorance, and superstitious practices, is a discredit to the Islam of the Prophet.” IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 15 Therefore he calls for reforms, intellectual, social, and religious, and refers to the present as “‘ the dawning era.’ Modernism in Islam is an attempt to bring the thought and the life of Moslem peoples into harmony with the present age and to reconcile Oriental learning and tradition with the new literature, new ideas, and modern science. The modernist preaches a gospel of free inquiry, of a tolerant spirit, and of a higher morality. The reformers in Egypt, in public addresses and in writings of all kinds, are advocating under the watchword “ Back to the Koran,” or “‘ Back to Mohammed,’’ a break with the great body of tradition. Some of these devotees of modern interpretation are inclined to idealize Mohammed. They all, however, appear to agree in the purpose to break with antiquated customs and laws and to bring Islam into harmony with Western thought. One of the modern methods of the reformers is to introduce textual criticism. This method is demonstrated in the publication of the Woking Koran, with parallel Arabic and English texts and in a binding like that of an Oxford Bible. The contention for liberty of thought, of interpretation, and of action, with the spirit of independence increasing as modern education and the spread of modern literature become more general, opens a fresh door of approach to the Moslem world and provides a common ground for a new Christian approach. Wherever the idea prevails that it is not a sin to discuss philosophy and religion, a formidable barrier is removed. Wherever the right to doubt the authority of ancient traditions is conceded, discussion and inquiry will inevitably follow. Dr. Zwemer tells us that ‘‘ in the city of Meshed, once as exclusive as Mecca itself and still the glory of the Shia world, there is complete liberty. Moslem newspapers 16 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY criticize the Moslem ecclesiastics.’”’ Dr. Robert E. Speer reports that a Moslem editor told him that there was no hope for Persia until the power of Islam is shattered. There seems to be a widely expressed opinion in Persia that the spirit of constitutional government and that of Islam are forever incompatible. This same idea prevails in Turkey; the conservatives declare that constitutional government has destroyed the power of Islam, the liberals that it has given liberty to Moslems to think and act according to the dictates of their con- sciences. The Press in Turkey is free to discuss religion and life as it has never been before. In the treaty be- tween Great Britain and the King of Iraq, signed in 1922, there are articles giving religious liberty, freedom of conscience, and the free exercise of all forms of public worship. Dr. Zwemer reports that extensive corre- spondence with missionaries in many Moslem mission fields brings out the general expression of a hope that they are facing the dawn of a new day of liberty. In Malaysia the hitherto unruffled waters are being stirred and the symptoms of awakening life appear. Western education, eagerness for scientific enlightenment, thirst for modern intellectual equipment, are the tokens of the new day. The Ahmadiya movement has absorbed some of the principles of Christianity, especially upon the side of ethics. It is a sign of progress in the direction of intellectual emancipation. An educated Turk recently said to a missionary : “ Of all the forms of liberty, that of the liberty of conscience is the most essential and the most sacred. A man who is not free to choose and to declare his belief loses hold of his own soul. The purposes of education and instruction ought to be to prepare the individual to be self-reliant and not to depend upon society. It IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 17 ought to develop and strengthen character more than intelligence.”’ } The Rev. J. Tackle, of India, writes : “ The spiritual revolt against a cold formalism, ration- alism, and traditionalism, in the Islam that preaches a lonely, inaccessible, unfeeling deity, is spreading everywhere.” Dr. Speer reports that there is in Persia a manifest dissatisfaction with Islam among the thinking people. There is talk among the intelligent part of starting a Protestant movement in Islam. The desire for social reforms, now so general throughout the world of Islam, presents a common ground for arousing a new interest in the larger spiritual needs of society and the race. Gottfried Simon writes : “T have noticed discontent with the teachings of Islam among those Moslems who have come into contact with Christianity, and also among Malay pilgrims, who, on returning from Mecca, cast away their turbans and give strong utterance to their indignation at the practices of Mohammedanism.”’ The Sultan of Sulu, the Mohammedan religious leader of all the Moros, not only patronizes the schools among his people but sent his daughter to the United States for further studies after she had completed the course taught in local schools. The Moslem Albanians have practically broken with Islam by the prohibition of polygamy, the exposure of the faces of their women, the abolition of ceremonial ablution, prostration, and genu- flections in prayer. In Egypt there is a growing feeling of national unity between Moslems and Christians which 1 Reported to the writer by the Rev. Dr, William N. Chambers, of Adana. 3 18 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY is now assuming more the appearance of permanence than heretofore. Islam of a generation ago is passing into new forms. Religious, social, and intellectual revolutions are in progress in the Islamic world. This movement is more general and more fundamental than any similar religious movement since the Reformation. It seems to be but at the beginning. Awakened intellects will not brook fanatical dictation. Blind tradition cannot stay the rising tide of reason as applied to religion. Moslem States are falling into line with the world sentiment in favour of intellectual and religious freedom. Propagation of Islam by force is no longer advocated. A free Press is regarded everywhere the sign and guaranty of personal freedom. Modern education is accepted among Moslems of every country. In its train follow an awakened Press and re-evaluation of Islam as a religion to meet the needs of a people and a State. THE RENAISSANCE IN THE MOSLEM NEAR EAST BY DR. JULIUS RICHTER, Professor of Missions, University of Berlin Ley Nee °) ; path Ore Yh enn tae + f . itn ‘ a 7 ' cone ‘ ee Leer pee bide ef vy CHAPTER? UL THE RENAISSANCE IN THE MOSLEM NEAR EAST THE Near East has an area almost as great as the United States and about half as many inhabitants. Yet its population is much more diverse than even that of the United States. Even leaving aside the Oriental Churches, there are the Egyptians and the Arabs, the different Syrian aboriginal tribes like the Druzes and the Nusairis, the Turks and the Kurds, the many Persian tribes and the Afghans ; almost all of them with different languages, traditions, and outlook. Yet in spite of all differences there has seemed to be a curious homo- geneity of the higher life. It was the world of Islam with Mecca as its heart, Cairo as its head, and Con- stantinople as its hands. The situation has been changed considerably during the last twenty-five years by that world-wide movement outside of the old Christian countries which we describe as the world renaissance. We remember that wonderful century from 1450 to 1550 in the history of Europe. For seven centuries Western Europe, apart from the greater part of the Balkans and of Russia, had been an isolated peninsula shut off from the rest of the world by a cordon of Moslem countries, reaching from Spain and Morocco in the West across North Africa and Asia Minor to the White Sea. And this seclusion had been 21 22 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY so absolute that even the name of the prophet Mohammed and all but the haziest tradition concerning India and China had been lost. It is true, Europe had built up in this isolation a remarkable civilization, a beautiful architecture with wonderful cathedrals, astounding systems of theology and philosophy, and a good deal of beautiful poetry. But the material which they worked upon was always more or less the same. They were like children who, with the same small wooden blocks, one day build a house, the next day a church, the third day a castle. So their systems in one generation were realistic, in the second nominalistic, in the third sceptic. But there was no wide enlargement of their scope and outlook. Then from the midst of the fifteenth century the scene changed rapidly. Venetian and Florentine traders advanced into the Near East; Christopher Columbus discovered America; Vasco da Gama found the sea route to India. New worlds and wide realms of know- ledge dawned upon that generation. The art of book | printing, the compass, gun powder, and numerous other. inventions followed. The great civilizations of Greece and Rome rose out of their graves with their wonderful poets, philosophers, historians, sculptors, and architects. An unheard-of mass of new material of knowledge and learning really flooded Western Europe like a rising tide. The astounding fact was that in connexion with this new spiritual flood a great number of first-rate men arose, indeed a larger number of brilliant geniuses than have lived contemporaneously in Europe in any other age : painters like Raffael Sanzio and Leonardo da Vinci, sculptors like Michelangelo, poets like Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, politicians like Machiavelli, religious reformers like Savonarola, learned men like Erasmus THE RENAISSANCE IN NEAR EAST 28 and Reuchlin, and many others. It was the famous cinquecento, the high-water mark of literary Europe. Yet altogether there were interesting and instructive differences among the countries in which the humanitarian Renaissance was centring. Half of Europe in the same century experienced that deep religious revival movement of the Protestant Reformation. These nations were rejuvenated in the deepest springs of their national life. They became the advancing nations of Western and Northern Europe, Holland with its wonderful expansion, Great Britain with its world-wide colonial empire, Sweden almost suddenly emerging out of its northern remoteness under Gustavus Adolphus, Germany with its wonderful spiritual development of philosophy by Leibnitz, Im- manuel Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, of poetry, by Lessing, Schiller, and Goethe, of music, by Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, and Richard Wagner, almost all of them grown on the ground of the German Reformation. On the other hand, those nations which rejected and crushed the Protestant revival movement, like Italy, Spain, and Portugal, were spiritually and morally and soon, also, politically crippled. The wonderful flower of their springtime did not yield fruit because it lacked the spiritual vitality of the Protestant Reformation. The application of this marked historical parallelism is interesting with regard to every Asiatic country. It is particularly striking in the Moslem Near East. It is’ a well-known fact that those countries have cultivated , a reactionary conservatism and an intolerant fanaticism. Al Azhar University at Cairo and other similar centres of Arabic learning have maintained a medieval scholas- ticism of an extreme character. And the whole life of the Moslem population has been regulated by the supposedly divine law of the Sharia and by an enormous 24 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY mass of senseless superstition. And as in a stuffy house with closed windows and barred doors, the political and religious leaders were quite reluctant to let in the fresh breeze of the modern life. One needs only to remember the reign of Abdul Hamid in Turkey, hardly two decades ago. Now the situation has totally changed since the be- ginning of this century. Every country has opened its doors, however reluctantly, to the modern world life of Europe and America, and, by reason of the fact that the Near East lies just before the doors of Europe, the rising tide is the more irresistibly flooding country after country and district after district. The more highly educated classes who, particularly in Paris, but later in London and Berlin too, have come under the influence of modern civilization, in their wholesale admiration of everything European and modern have fallen into agnosticism and scepticism. Many families of the middle class are trying to get the best out of the changed conditions, and order their members to learn each at least one of the world languages, to be prepared for all chances. And behind them all there are the blind and fanatical leaders of the old Moslem régime, the wlama and muftt and kadi, who feel the sources of their influence and of their income slipping away, and the broad masses of the ignorant lower classes, farmers and craftsmen, who in their conservatism resent all innovations and are the easy prey of the reactionary agitation of their religious leaders. Again, this transformation of the Moslem Near East presents very different aspects in the different countries. In some, like Persia, there is a curious divergence between an extremely fanatical and imperious priestly class and broad masses of modernist people who welcome the THE RENAISSANCE IN NEAR EAST ~ 25 foreigner, and even the missionary and his gospel, with open arms. In others, like Egypt, which have become high-roads of world traffic and of globe-trotters, the European and modernist influence is permeating all classes and districts. In others, again, like Turkey, a despotic dictatorship is attempting brutally to crush all non-Turkish influences and concerns as well as the old-Turkish reaction, maintaining its reckless autocracy in the face of almost equal opposition from modernism and from reaction. In a country like Afghanistan the modern light has been longest and most definitely shut out and a change only now seems slowly to appear. Of course all this transformation of the Moslem Near East is deeply influencing the Protestant missionary movement. It is opening new doors and pointing to new opportunities. Yet it seems not to be in the matter of accessibility that the central problem of Christian missions lies. It is a far larger question looming in the background. Will there be, parallel to the humanitarian Renaissance, a strong, deep religious revival movement which can do for the Islamic countries what the Protestant movement did for Western and Northern Europe? It is hardly possible that such a religious revolution and rejuvenation will come out of Islam itself. Whoever has watched its sterility, its petrification and disintegra- tion during the last half-millennium, particularly since the Turkish sultans became dominant in the Near East, will not doubt that its spiritual vitality is spent. What there is left of really or of seemingly vital forces is in- significant and insufficient for so great a task. It is one of the tragic events of modern history that the Caliphate has been given up by the Turks of their own free will. The Caliph was at no time a spiritual head like the Prophet or the Pope. 26 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY Yet if it was one of the main purposes of Mohammed’s mission to win the recognition of Allah as the legitimate sovereign of the universe and to subject all nations to his absolute divine law, the function of the Caliph was after all the central religio-political office in the Moslem community. Its bearer represented the claim to uni- versal rule. The idealism and the fanatical hope of one-eighth of the human race has centred for a millen- nium round this curious idea, which has now been abandoned. The Turks have expelled the last Caliph from their country ; he is living as an exile somewhere in Europe. The spurious attempts of other Moslem rulers to adopt the title and claim of the Caliph have been futile. It has sometimes been alleged that the Moslem dervish orders retained that vitality from which a spiritual restoration of Islam might develop. Yet he who has studied the Senussi movement in Italian Tripoli or the Ikhwan movement in Central Arabia sees almost no chance in that direction. Yet in the time of the Reformation, too, the inspiration of the religious revival in most countries came from out- side, from Wittenberg and Geneva. Will it in our age come from Christendom? The really central question is: Has a missionary Protestantism vital power and Spiritual energy enough to flood the spiritual deserts of modern Islam with the rising tide of a spiritual revival which will lead to a religious reformation and trans- formation ? ‘That such an evolution is possible can hardly be doubted. Islam and Christianity are near enough one to the other to be deeply influenced by each other. Half of their spiritual heritage they have in common. And the spiritual development of Islam in the first few formative centuries from Mohammed to al-Ghazali THE RENAISSANCE IN NEAR EAST 27 was largely under the influence of Hellenized Christianity or Christian Hellenism. Here we are confronted with a crucial question: Has modern Christianity a convincing and comprehensive gospel which is able not only to command the full and unreserved allegiance of the Moslem, but also to yield the vitalizing and transforming power of a spiritual reformation? Evidently a reduced Christianity of the First Article, just claiming Jesus as a saintly prophet of the fatherhood of God and of the brotherhood of man, has not this power. It can only purge Islam of some real or apparent excrescences and effect a deepening of some of its issues. It would mean no change of religion. It would simply attempt to bring about a similar reduction in Islam as it has attempted in Chris- tianity. The impotence of an intellectualized and impoverished Christian message in its reaction upon Islam is its final sentence. An eloquent declaration that the unbroken resistance of Islam is no reflection upon the vitality of Christian missions scarcely hides this awkward fact from the standpoint of the superficial onlooker. And all undertakings of Christian philan- thropy and of social helpfulness are no real and effective substitute for a poor and ineffective message. So Moslem missions become the very Hic Rhodus, ic salta of modern Protestantism in its missionary function. We remember how, in quite similar cir- cumstances, St. Paul in his letter to the Galatians developed his fundamental conception of Christianity against the shallow Jewish monotheism of his day. Is not modern Islam, crystallized in a bulky system of theology, in many lines somewhat similar to the old Judaism of the scribes and of the Talmud? Will it, then, not be a wise plan to consider very carefully the 28 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY apologetics and polemics of St. Paul to see clearly our issue and its possibilities ? The apostle is quite definite in his assertion that it is not any actions of our own that bring about the righteousness of God, but the divine love revealed in the reconciliation through Jesus Christ. It is on this objective fact of salvation through God’s love and mercy that he puts the whole emphasis. Yet, to be quite clear about the difficulty and perplexity of our task, is it not helpful for us to realize that, after all, Christian missions among the Jews failed in the first two centuries, and Jewish missions have never recovered from that fundamental failure? And evidently our chances with regard to the Moslems in our generation are not greater, or even so great. Yes, we have the same renaissance in contemporary Islam which Judaism ex- perienced in the first century in its vital touch with the Hellenistic civilizations. And men like the Jewish philosopher Philo show how far that renaissance went and how deeply it modified the narrow Jewish con- ception. Yet, besides Apollos, we know of scarcely one Alexandrian Jew for whom this Hellenistic renaissance became a bridge into the Christian faith. What con- vincing proof have we that the effect will be more lasting and more favourable in Islam at present? And our missions are burdened with the wrong political traditions of the so-called Christian Powers. It is true, we ourselves are convinced that the decay and downfall of political Islam and of the Ottoman Empire was the unavoidable consequence of inner dete- rioration ; yet we can understand how the overwhelm- ing majority of the Moslems may see in it the treacherous machination of a supercilious policy—not the saving knife of the amputating physician, but the reckless avarice of insatiable Powers preying on the poor ‘ Sick Man of THE RENAISSANCE IN NEAR EAST 29 the Bosphorus.” It is this traditional hatred of the European Powers, coupled with a deep-seated suspicion of their motives, that renders all missionary approach in Islam so difficult. And the widespread lack of confidence on the part of the Christians, the fruit of more than a thousand years of failures and defeats in their relations with Moslems, enhances this difficulty in our own camp. Has the Protestantism of our time vitality and spiritual energy enough to start a thoroughgoing religious revival, a reformation which in this case really would mean a transformation in the Islamic countries of the Near East ? Only then would the renaissance mean the same, and bring the same beneficent results, as in the cynquecento of Europe. etd: i age set *) ye, dene VE yerel Yea eet AE APT IT OS SaaTe) pi Fae WS agi ny i i 1 att F a ) >| we ts BEB oa yy Wit CATT PE AN Hy ts Lik DALY, TO-DAY, AND TO-MORROW BY De SAuMARGOLIOUE HD Bitte: vl BoA: Laudian Professor of Arabic, Oxford University iiss ay STKE ER ae Ad ri) } ate ig ~~) hy 4 f 4 b TA > : ay iat aed D ¥ i in Xs Me ‘ : ] : “ res 1! cu \ On Od | “Zt y Haas ts ¢ eae CLS, ; ie oy Ci | Baer es 8) ; SS he Sines ie ae | Ma ; ‘hee CHAPTER . IIT THE CALIPHATE, YESTERDAY, TO-DAY, AND TO-MORROW AT the time when the Caliphate agitation was at its height one of its spokesmen in England asserted that, unless there were a Caliph who was an independent sovereign, the daily prayers of all Sunni Moslems would be invalid. This person was a Shii lawyer, and therefore of doubtful authority on this matter; and indeed the Sunni Lawbooks, which enumerate the conditions whereby prayer is rendered valid, do not seem to know of this condition. At the time when these lines are being written there is no longer a Caliph who is an independent sovereign ; for, though the abolition of the Turkish Caliphate in March 1924 was immediately followed by the assumption of the office by the King of the Hejaz, who was then independent, this Caliph has since been driven from his realm, and, having abdicated his kingship, though not his Caliphate, can no longer give validity to Sunni orisons, if the condition mentioned be really re- quired. The North African Caliph lost his independence in r9g1r; and it would appear that no other potentate of consequence holds the office. The conference sum- moned to meet in Cairo in March 1925 has been postponed for a year; should it, on convening, succeed in making an appointment, and should that appointment obtain recognition among Sunni communities, the fact will 4, 33 34 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY be that for many months the Islamic world will have remained without an independent Caliph. This has not happened since the death of the Prophet; many a dynasty which claimed the Caliphate has fallen; but hitherto there has always been another ready to take over the torch. The question of the Caliphate is rendered obscure by certain assumptions, which, unless they are scrutinized, are apt to mislead. The word khalifa means “ sub- stitution,’ or ‘‘substitute.”” In pre-Islamic Arabic it is used for “‘ viceroy ’’ ; when the Prophet left his capital for raids, pilgrimage, or for some other purpose, he would appoint a “substitute ’”’ to discharge his duties during his absence. When he had departed on his last journey, a substitute was required. Such a sub- stitute should, of course, have been a prophet ; but his followers made no claim to be the recipients of revelations, and no credence was given in official circles to those persons who took the opportunity to urge their claims to prophetic gifts. The substitute could then discharge only the sort of duties which were executed by those who had acted as the Prophet’s substitutes during his life- time. They could administer; but they could not legislate. A man’s natural substitute is his son; the hereditary principle was even more widely recognized in the East than in the West. Had Mohammed left a son, his right to the succession would probably have been at least for the time unquestioned; but his sons died in infancy. He had, however, allied various influential persons to himself, either by giving them his daughters, or by himself marrying theirs; and from the relations thus obtained his first five followers were chosen. The first two were fathers-in-law ; the second two sons-in-law ; THE CALIPHATE 35 the fifth a brother-in-law. The “substitute ’’ was in each of these cases a member of the Prophet’s family ; the last of this series founded a dynasty. Although it is strictly correct to say that with this dynasty the hereditary principle became established in Islam, yet the fact should not be ignored that its founder’s predecessors were all of them allied by marriage to the Prophet. The reign of the first of these was very short; the second, third, and fourth met with violent deaths; the precedents for getting rid of an obnoxious Caliph by violent means were thus established at the commencement of Islamic history. The causes of the insurrection wherein the third Caliph fell are obscure ; if the clue of cuz bono P (who was the gainer ?) be followed, suspicion must rest on Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, whose adherents, the Shia, to this day look upon his three predecessors as impious usurpers. But that murder led to a war of succession, since the Prophet’s favourite wife, whose father had been the first Caliph, had a grudge against Ali, and was determined that he should never sit safely on that throne ; she lent her influence to another cousin of the Prophet, who presently fell in battle, but whose son after some years set himself for a time on the Prophet’s throne; while a brother-in-law of the Prophet, who was related to the third Caliph, and claimed to be his natural avenger, found in the Koran a text which justified him in assuming the sovereignty, and, being a man of consummate ability, founded, as has been seen, an hereditary dynasty. Since the commencement of the first War of Succession, just a quarter of a century after the Prophet’s death, there has been no unity in Islam. The word khalifa, then, if taken literally as substitute for the Prophet, but limited to administrative functions, 36 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY implies that the Moslem community remained somewhat as he left it: an Arab nation, ruled from Medina. But in fact, after his death it spread by rapid conquest over large portions of Asia, Africa, and Europe; and the difficulty of communication, together with the sentiment of nationality, rendered these provinces far harder to retain than to conquer. Moreover, it was not forgotten that the founder of Islam had organized an army and raised himself to a throne in the character of religious reformer; this furnished a precedent which able and ambitious men could follow. Numerous persons in this capacity took the title Substitute for the Prophet ; several, finding it easier to advocate the claims of some- one else rather than their own, founded kingdoms and placed supposed heirs of the Prophet on the throne. Now all these Caliphs were legitimate in the opinion of their adherents. Sometimes those adherents were few in number ; in several cases, as in those of the South Arabian and in some of the African dynasties, the terri- tory over which they ruled was neither extensive nor thickly peopled; but the title which was won by the sword was defended by argument. One who is a member of the Moslem community may well hold that one dynasty was legitimate and another usurping ; but those who are outside the community have no criterion whereby they can thus distinguish them. In modern Europe, owing to the popularity of The Arabian Nights, the word Caliphate naturally suggests Baghdad ; but the Abbasid dynasty, with that city as capital for nearly the whole of its duration, was at no time in control of the whole Moslem community ; the family which they had displaced founded a dynasty in Spain and North Africa, and presently felt strong enough to resume the title of Caliph, and ere long’ yet another Caliphate was established in OE eee.LTLTLTLhT — THE CALIPHATE 37 Egypt. It is an accident that the fame of these Cali- phates has found little echo in modern Europe. The rulers whom they produced were, in the opinion of large masses of men, “ substitutes ’’ for the Prophet. | When an Arab made himself master of an Arabic- speaking population, he usually took the title of Caliph ; for to decline it would imply that he considered himself dependent on, or at least inferior to, some potentate who held it. The simultaneous existence of three Czsars in Europe was due to similar considerations. But when a foreigner made himself master of an Arabic-speaking population, there was an incongruity in his assuming the title of Substitute for the Prophet ; hence another plan was followed. Some member of the legitimate family was left in possession of the title, whereas the real power was in the hands of the usurper. The date A.H. 324 (A.D. 936) is of capital importance in Islamic history, since in that year a Turkish officer, one Ibn Raiq, for the first time made such an arrangement with the Abbasid Caliph. For more than two centuries this system prevailed in Baghdad, and it was afterwards in a somewhat excessive form continued in Egypt. In Baghdad, where the Abbasid family represented the founders of the city, the Caliph was revered by the population, and, though the foreign usurpers thought little of deposing and blinding a Caliph who gave trouble, they found it worth their while ordinarily to keep on good terms with the Caliph, and were eager to ally them- selves by marriage with the imperial family. The Caliphs, therefore, under these usurpers enjoyed con- siderable influence, and exercised it in judicial and religious affairs; in consequence, they were able ulti- mately to shake off the yoke and for a time assume independence, The case was different in Cairo, which 38 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY had been founded by another branch of the Prophet’s family, and where, in consequence, there was no tradition of loyalty to the Abbasid dynasty. When, therefore, the able though unscrupulous Sultan Baibars accepted the claim of a supposed representative of the Abbasids, and received investiture from him, on condition that all the functions of sovereignty were delegated to himself, the sacrifice which he made to the sentiment of legitimacy was small; for the suzerain whom he appointed was entirely dependent on himself, and had no natural following in the country. If, as a foreigner, he could not be Caliph in an Arabic-speaking country, he by this expedient secured himself against dependence on any other Caliph. And these Egyptian Abbasids were allowed no interference with any branch of public affairs. When a foreigner was sovereign of a foreign (non- Arab) Moslem population he had not to reckon with the sentiment that has been mentioned, and could, if he thought fit, assume the title Substitute for the Prophet. This happened both in Turkey and in India. Other titles were more familiar in these countries, just as in England, though the King has the title ‘‘ Defender of the Faith,” it is rarely used. Only the Ottoman Sultan or the Moghul Emperor was Caliph not because he had inherited the office from a relation of the Prophet, but because he was a Moslem king. The question therefore, Who is the legitimate Caliph of the Moslems ? has about the same amount of meaning as the question, Who is the legitimate king of the Christians ? Neither of these communities constitutes a political or even a religious unit; both are divided into nations and into sects. The nations will have their political and the sects their religious heads. Yet there is one feature of the Islamic system which THE CALIPHATE 39 involves unity, and that is the Pilgrimage. Every Moslem ought at least once in his life to make a pilgrimage to Mecca ; and reverence to the Prophet requires as well a visit to Medina, where his grave is. This is not feasible unless these Sanctuaries and their approaches are in the hands of a Moslem power; it must be the business of some such authority to secure to the Moslems the chance of discharging this obligation. Hence the power that is in possession of the Sanctuaries occupies a peculiar position in the Moslem world; and sovereigns who were not in possession of these Sanctuaries have hesitated to take the title Caliph in consequence. Normally, it may be said, they have been in the possession of the most powerful Moslem government of the time; and so, when the Caliphate of Egypt had come to an end, and a century later that of Baghdad also terminated owing to the Mongol conquest, the Sherif of Mecca of the time applied to the Moslem sovereign whom he supposed to be the best qualified from the point of view of power to take over the obligation. When the two Caliphates of importance were the Ottoman and the Moghul, the latter proposed that each of them should have possession of a Sanctuary. Although, then, the Ottoman Sultan could claim the title Caliph on the principle that has been explained, he first became de facto Caliph when he entered into possession of the Sanctuaries ; and with the loss of them his title lapsed, inasmuch as the Moslem community no longer depended on him for the possibility of discharging their duty of pilgrimage. At the time when the Ottoman president abolished the office, which he could do only for Turkey, there was good reason for thinking that this question of the pilgrimage would soon become a practical one; and the danger which this astute man 40 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY foresaw has materialized. The Sanctuary of Mecca has passed out of the possession of the King of the Hejaz into that of the Wahhabi ruler, whose attitude towards pilgrims cannot be certainly foreseen; correspondents of the newspapers assure us that this ruler, so far from interfering with the pilgrims, will encourage their arrival, if only for financial reasons; but the ruler’s fanatical followers may have something to say in this matter, and they may well impose such conditions on pilgrims as may make them unwilling to visit the Sanctuary so long as the Wahhabi régime prevails. Moreover, while these lines are being written, Jidda, the port of Mecca, is still in the hands of the new King of the Hejaz, and serious difficulty would be occasioned to pilgrims by the port and the Sanctuary being occupied by mutually hostile Powers. Possibly the ex-King of the Hejaz still clings to his title Caliph because he hopes he may be able to restore the situation. Certainly any real Caliph would be compelled to clear it up. For the Sanctuary of Islam ought not to bein the hands of a sect which, in proportion to the others, is exceedingly small and notoriously fanatical in its attitude towards those others. When this difficulty is pointed out to Moslems, they reply that the duty of pilgrimage is in the Koran made conditional on ability; if the pilgrimage became im- possible owing to the occupation of the Sanctuary by a Power that did not permit it, then the obligation would lapse. This view is clearly sound; but therewith the sole factor which maintains unity in Islam would also disappear, for it was by separating the religious from the political capital that the founder of Islam secured for his system the ability to outlast the constantly in- creasing divisions and the rise and fall of dynasties. The fall of a Caliphate could not affect this ; the posses- THE CALIPHATE 41 sion of the religious capital by a fanatical sect would seriously impair it. There would seem, at the moment, to be two proposals before the Moslem peoples: one, that representatives should meet in Mecca to determine the future of the Sanctuaries ; another, that such should meet in Cairo to settle the question of the Caliphate. It is difficult to suppose that the former of these congresses could do more than register the wishes of the Wahhabi Sultan ; he has on his side the logic of the “ stricken field,” which few if any Oriental potentates have ever declined to emphasize. The persons who attend such a congress will certainly be unaccompanied by forces which would enable them to resist legislation of which they disapprove, and it is unlikely that those whom they represent would be in a position to back them up. It is asserted that the Wabhabis, on their entry into the Sacred City, proceeded to perform a series of acts which would certainly move the indignation of the bulk of the Moslem world; the “ Station of Abraham ”’ itself with difficulty (according to this report) escaped being broken up. The business of the foreign representatives will, then, at best be to communicate to those who despatch them the conditions on which the Wahhabi conqueror intends in future to permit the pilgrimage. Those conditions may be acceptable to the Moslem community, or they may ~ be otherwise. The Cairene project admits of far greater liberty of expression of opinion, for it is improbable that free speech will be suppressed. On the other hand, though the sheikhs of Al Azhar might well be consulted on points of religious law, it is not clear how either they or the delegates whom they invite could have any exe- cutive power. They themselves, in their manifesto, A2 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY asserted that the Ottoman Caliph had forfeited his rights owing to his proved inability to defend himself. In order to be consistent, they will have to confine their choice to a powerful prince. To select the Wahhabi Sultan would be equivalent to identifying Islam with Wahhabism: but the difficulties of choosing any other Moslem potentate would seem to be enormous. If the functions of their Caliph were to be purely passive, that is, to be mentioned in public prayer—he would certainly not be mentioned on the coins of any but his own State, —it is improbable that the ruler of one Moslem State would allow this to be done in his dominions for the ruler of another State; and it is improbable that any one of these personages would grasp at such a distinction. If, however, the Caliph is to have duties as well as rights, the recovery of the Sanctuary from Wahhabi hands would be the first which would be incumbent on him. It is exceedingly improbable that the sheikhs will find any prince who is willing to undertake this. Moreover, the appointment of a Caliph by sheikhs and delegates is an innovation. Historical appointments of Caliphs were appointments of sovereigns, heads of governments ; and these could naturally be made only by those who were actively engaged in public affairs and had personal acquaintance with the possible candi- dates. The ship of State could not be left for a moment without someone at the helm; and, where there was no actual law of succession, the court intrigue was the natural and probably the best method of securing a helmsman when the emergency arose. There is now no State requiring a helmsman ; the Moslem world has dispensed with a Caliph for a considerable period, and it would be difficult to show that any Moslem had suffered, at any rate to any extent which the existence of a Caliph THE CALIPHATE 43 would have prevented. This fact was conceded by the Sheikhs when they decided to postpone their congress. So far as a Caliph has any administrative duties, each Moslem State has its Caliph, or government, already. It is not conceivable that the choice made by sheikhs and delegates will affect this matter even in the slightest degree. If, however, the Caliph to be appointed is to be merely an ultimate authority on religious questions, his charac- ter will be very different from that of former holders of the title. If we take Harun al-Rashid as the type of a Caliph—and his is the name most familiarly associated with that title—it is quite certain that he, at any rate, ostensibly subordinated his judgment to those who had made a profounder study of the law than himself. Having caught his son in the commission of a capital offence, he would have executed judgment, but held his hand when a jurist explained to him that he could not act on his personal knowledge, but only on the attestation of others. Certainly, among those who took the title of Caliph, there were persons who were themselves religious reformers ; the title was taken, in most of these cases, after sovereignty had been won, and not in virtue of their claim to purify religion. The interpreter of the law is rather the Mufti, or the Sheikh al-Islam. Qualified jurists usually are tenacious of the right to dispute the rulings of the government Mufti, as the famous Mufti, Mohammed ‘Abdu of Egypt, experienced. Would the jurists resign this right in favour of a Caliph ? And would the orthodox schools, which have lasted for eleven centuries, agree to amalgamate ? Forecasts that are based on general considerations are at times rendered false by the sagacity of states- men; such persons can find outlets where those who 44 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY have neither the experience nor the astuteness see only a blank wall. Hitherto, however, those students of Islamic history who declared the Caliphate agitation to be factitious and frivolous have been shown by the event to be right. It remains to be seen whether the future has any surprise for them. THE INSTITUTION OF THE CALIPHATE AND THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE ANONYMOUS CHAP CER ULV: THE INSTITUTION OF THE CALIPHATE AND THE: SPIRIT, OF THE’ AGE THE word Caliph, in Arabic khaltfa, means successor, and it describes the person holding this office as the Successor of the Prophet Mohammed. As_ prophet, Mohammed had no successor: his prophetic office came to an end with his death. The Caliph succeeds only to the rule and authority wielded by the Prophet. The Moslem Caliphate has existed in different centres successively for 1,292 years, and there have been times when several rulers in different countries have claimed the Caliphate, as, forexample, in Baghdad, in Spain, and in Egypt. The Caliphate has been held by different successive dynasties (in Mecca, 632-660; in Damascus, 660-750 ; in Baghdad, 750-1258; in Egypt, 1258-1517 ; in Con- stantinople, the Ottoman Caliphate, 1517-1924). There was also a Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt and North Africa, go8-II7I. The Republic of Turkey put an end to the reign of the Ottoman Sultans by a resolution adopted by the Grand National Assembly, November 1, 1922, and it discarded the name Ottoman in favour of the name Turkish. That resolution declared that “‘ by the law of fundamental organization, the Turkish Nation having transferred its sovereign power to the moral personality 47 48 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY of the Grand National Assembly, the Sultanate ended for all time on March 16, 1920,” when the Republic was declared. A few days after the adoption of this resolution, on November 18, 1922, Abdul Mejid Effendi, the heir- presumptive, was chosen Caliph by the Grand National Assembly without any definition of his powers. Thus the Turkish Republic put an end to the Ottoman Sultanate, but continued the Caliphate as a purely spiritual office devoid of temporal power. Historically, however, the Caliph has been a political functionary rather than a religious one. He has pos- sessed no spiritual functions which are not possessed by all Moslems ; so it was only a question of time how soon the Turks would perceive that there was no reason for the continued existence of the Caliphate. The next step was taken by the Grand National Assembly in the beginning of March 1924, when it abolished the Caliphate also and expelled Abdul Mejid and all the members of the royal family from Turkey. Abdul Mejid was the thirty-eighth Ottoman Caliph and the ninety-fourth in the line of succession from the death of Mohammed in 632 to 1924, not counting rival claimants to the office, of whom there have been as many as eight at one time (in the eleventh century). The Ottoman Dynasty held the Caliphate from about 1517 down to the year 1924. The beginning of the Ottoman Caliphate is generally attributed to Sultan Salim, who is said to have taken it over from the Abbasid Caliph in Egypt in 1517; but there is much vagueness in the accounts of this event, and the Ottoman Sultans often regarded themselves as appointed by God to the Caliphate in accordance with two texts of the Koran, 38 : 25, “‘ and we have made thee a caliph on the earth,” and 6: 165, ‘‘ He hath made you caliphs on the earth.” INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE A9 The question now arises whether it is the Caliphate, considered as an office pertaining to the whole world of Islam, which has come to an end, or only the Turkish Caliphate, which will be succeeded by that of some other dynasty, as has been the case so often in the history of Islam. In order to form any opinion on this question we must understand the causes which led the Turks to repudiate the Caliphate, and the effects which this re- pudiation has produced among Moslems. In the minds of the Turks religion and nationalism have been held as synonymous terms—an apostate from Islam was looked upon as a traitor to his nation. At the present time there is a strong tendency towards a purely secular nationalism divorced from religion. The Grand National Assembly is animated by a strong desire that Turkey should become a modern, progressive, homogeneous Moslem State. The abolition of the Caliphate is to be regarded as the result of this desire pushing them to a series of steps rather than as a policy deliberately conceived beforehand and consistently carried out. Every step taken led the way to the succeeding steps. When the Assembly adopted a republican form of government they did not at once realize that this would lead them to abolish the Sultanate and the Caliphate, but they were carried along on the strong tide of the new nationalism. The creation of the Grand National Assembly invested with both legislative and executive functions robbed the Sultanate of its reason to exist, and the decree of the Assembly only registered what was already an accomplished fact. The Sultanate died when the Republic was born. The Caliph then remained, it was said, as a purely spiritual leader—the religious head. The Caliph, how- 5 50 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY ever, has never been a spiritual leader. He is no pope, and there is no place for a pope in Islam. It is difficult for Westerners to realize what a startling innovation the deposition of the Caliph was in Turkey. The Caliphs have not been theologians, nor have they proclaimed new doctrines or interpretations of the Sacred Law: the Caliphs themselves have been subject to the Sacred Law, as all other Moslems are, and the interpretation of that law pertained to the Ulama, or Scribes—the body of men learned in the law. When the temporal power was taken away from the Caliphs they were left without any adequate content for their office—an office without functions, for the Caliph is really a temporal sovereign and not a spiritual head. Mawardi (quoted by Sir Thomas Arnold, The Cah- phate, p. 72), defines the functions of the Caliph as follows: “‘the defence and maintenance of religion, the decision of legal disputes, the protection of the territory of Islam, the punishment of wrongdoers, the provision of troops for guarding the frontiers, the waging of war, jihad [or holy war], against those who refuse to accept Islam or to submit to Muslim rule, the collection and organization of taxes, the payment of salaries and the administration of public funds, the appointment of competent officials, and, lastly, personal attention to the details of government’’—in a word, “the defence of religion and the administration of the State.”’ Mawardi was writing in the eleventh century, but his distinguished contemporary, al-Beruni, recognized ‘‘ that what was left in the hands of the Abbasid Caliph at that time was only © a matter that concerned religion and dogmatic belief, since he was not capable of exercising any authority in the affairs of the world whatsoever.” That was the period of the degradation of the Caliphate, INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE 51 and in 1924 the Caliph had again fallen into like degrada- tion. The Caliph had no power, either political or spiritual; he had become a mere figurehead, whose chief functions were to receive visits and to attend the weekly ceremony of the Salamlik and of public prayer. It was difficult to reconcile this empty existence with the dignity and authority which history and tradition have accorded to the Caliphs of Islam in the past. Abdul Mejid could not be satisfied with such a life, and many devout Moslems felt that such a position was not worthy of the religious head of the Islamic world. Notably the Agha Khan and Ameer Ali appealed to the Turkish Government to define clearly the powers and the authority of the Caliph and to give him a position commensurate with the traditions of his high office and of its relations with the world of Islam. Unfortunately, the Grand National Assembly saw in their intervention only collusion between these men abroad and certain parties in Con- stantinople, and they looked upon it as a covert attack upon the Republic. It seemed to them that the Caliphate could be exalted only at the expense of the Republic. The bad feeling between Angora and Constantinople aggravated the difficulty. Turkey has virtually two capitals, the old one, Constantinople, enjoying a unique situation of unparallelled beauty on the European and Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus, a city abounding in historic associations, a centre of sea-borne commerce, and exposed to European influences; and the new capital, Angora, a small provincial town in Asia Minor, removed from foreign influences, in the midst of a peasant population, the terminus of a branch line of the Baghdad Railway, and having no adequate buildings in which to house the Government and its officials. The Caliph resided in the old capital, and the seat of government 52 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY was in the new. If the Caliph had been transferred to Angora, where he would have been under the eye of the Government, he might have enjoyed a longer reign. Angora was exceedingly suspicious of Constantinople, looking upon it as a centre of foreign intrigues and only half-loyal to the Republic. Constantinople thought that a provincial town like Angora could not understand the problems of the metropolis or legislate wisely for its foreign trade. The Angora men regarded the Caliph as the centre of intrigues hostile to the Republic and considered that the religious head of Islam was likely to be dangerous to the new State whenever it was weak. Abdul Mejid is an upright man, sincerely desirous of promoting the best interests of his people ; but the Assembly at Angora, looking at him from a distance, invested him with other traits of character, and became wholly estranged from the Caliphate which had lost its traditional hold upon them under the influences of the new nationalism. The principal reasons which impelled them to abolish the Caliphate were: 1. Economy. They desired to get rid of the expense of supporting the former imperial family. 2. Fear. They feared that the members of this family would always be wedded to the old régime and would seek to restore it. They pointed to the plots. and crimes which stain the history of the Ottoman Sultans, and they thought that whenever the Republic might be exposed to danger from without the members of the old dynasty would become an internal danger. 3. Modernism. They wanted to become a modern State which could take its place among the other nations on a basis of equality with them. To this end they believed that it was necessary to separate Church and INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE 53 State. They proposed to do away with the Sharia (Sacred Law) and with the medressés (religious schools), to secularize education, and to remove the Department of Worship from the Cabinet. These changes, so radical and so sweeping, startled the whole world; Turkey, and with her Islam, seemed to be breaking with the past and starting on new careers. At first it caused a great deal of excitement in the Moslem world, which was taken quite by surprise at this sudden measure. Protests were made in different countries, notably in Syria and Palestine and in India, where the Moslems looked upon the abolition of the Caliphate as an attack upon the religion of Islam made by an ungodly government. In Egypt the first excite- ment seems to be giving place to acquiescence in the action of the Turkish Republic on the ground that it is a matter which concerns Turkey alone. This seems to carry with it the implication that the Caliphate of the Ottoman Sultans was merely a Turkish Caliphate, and not one legitimate and valid for all the world of Islam; but it has been generally held that the Caliph, as successor to the Prophet, was in some sense the religious head of the whole Moslem world. It remains to be seen whether that world will allow the Caliphate to lapse or whether it will revive the office in some new form. A meeting of the Ulama held in Cairo called for a Moslem congress to be held in 1925 to consider the question of the Caliphate; but the convening of that congress has been postponed for a year. In Turkey itself the abolition of the Caliphate caused astonishment and bewilderment to many devout Moslems and to the common people generally. The question was often asked, In whose name is the prayer to be offered in the mosques on Fridays in connexion with the sermon 54 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY (khutba) ? According to the best authorities the name of the reigning Caliph ought to be mentioned in the prayer. The National Assembly issued instructions that prayer should be offered for the prosperity and welfare of the Republic of Turkey. The religious feelings of the people suffered considerable shock. In the past the Turks have been held together by devotion to their ruler and to their religion ; now it seemed to them that the very foundations had been cut away from under them. They missed the religious sanctions of their long-established traditions. The Angora men _ con- sidered that the functions of the Caliph are now vested in the Grand National Assembly, which will discharge them through a Council of Public Worship ; apparently there is a loss of religious authority in the process of change, which it will be difficult to restore. The consternation caused to pious Moslems by the abolition of the Caliphate may be compared to that felt by their predecessors in Baghdad when Hulagu put the Caliph to death, as described by Sir Thomas Arnold in The Caliphate, pp. 81, 821: “It is difficult to estimate the bewilderment that Muslims felt when there was no longer a Caliph on whom the blessing of God could be invoked in the khutbah ; such an event was without precedent throughout the previous history of Islam. Their suffering finds ex- pression in the prayer offered in the great mosque of Baghdad on the Friday following the death of the Caliph : ‘ Praise be to God, who has caused exalted personages to perish, and has given over to destruction the inhabitants of this city. ... O God, help us in our misery, the like of which Islam and its children have never witnessed ; we are God’s, and unto God do we return.’ ”’ 1 Quoted from C, d’Ohsson, Histoive des Mongols, t. ili, pp. 251-4. INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE 55 The Caliphate had lost much of its historic sanctity in 1924; still, its abolition gave a severe shock to devout Moslems, and many are still unreconciled to it. Whatever view may be taken as to the importance of the Caliphate, it can hardly be denied that it did con- stitute a bond of moral unity among the Moslem peoples of the world, and its abolition tends to weaken that unity. The Law of Sunnite Islam requires that there be a Caliph. The author of the Sharhwl Muwakif says: “ The appointment of an Imam [Caliph] is incumbent upon the united body of Muslims according to the orthodox law of the Sunnis.’’ The religious feelings and the traditions of Moslems call for the appointment of a new Caliph for all Moslems. A commission from India is said to be urging that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the President of the Turkish Republic, assume the office of Caliph. The argument for this course is that the strongest Moslem ruler should be the Caliph. Except in Turkey, Persia, Af- ghanistan, Turkistan, and Arabia, the Moslems of the present age live under the rule of non-Moslem sovereigns. For them the possession of civil power is not possible. On the other hand, not all Moslems have accepted the Ottoman rulers as Caliphs. The Shias do not accept the Caliphate of the Ottoman Sultans, or that of any living ruler. “The Shiahs hold the twelfth and last historic Imam, the Mahdi Mahomed, born in the middle of the third century of the Moslem era, to be the Lord of the Age and the Salvation of God; that though invisible, he still lives and looks after the affairs of mankind, both spiritual and temporal. They allow the title of Caliph 56 ‘THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY to no one save the Lord of the Age, and deny that he has appointed any deputy.” ! So the Shias, numbering perhaps 15,000,000, must be taken out of a universal Moslem Caliphate. Some Moslems hold that the Caliphate really lasted only thirty years. One Tradition represents the Prophet as saying : “ The Caliphate after me will endure for thirty years ; then will come the rule of a king.” ? The Sherif of Morocco is reverenced by his subjects as Caliph, and there are claimants of this office in other countries also. Hence, any Caliph who may be appointed will not be universally recognized by all Moslems. No Caliph who may be appointed can fulfil the historic functions of the Caliphate, such as the guardianship of the two sacred shrines of Mecca and Medina and the civil power over all Moslems. The sovereignty of the Caliph is incompatible with constitutional government. Sell, in The Faith of Islam, published in Madras in 1880, wrote words which sound like prophecy at the present day. He says (p. 87): “Tt is a fatal mistake in European politics and an evil for Turkey to recognize the Sultan as the legal Khalifa of Islam, for, if he be such, Turkey can never take any steps forward to newness of political life.”’ In view of this comment, it is highly significant that, when Turkey awakened and desired to take a step towards newness of political life, she should have felt constrained to throw off both the Sultanate and the Caliphate. 1 The Times, London, September 24, 1924, “‘ Report of the Conference on Living Religions within the British Empire,”’ 2 Sir Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate, p. 107. INSTITUTION OF CALIPHATE 57 In a revised and enlarged third edition, published in 1907, Sell prefaces this comment by quoting from Cunningham’s Western Civilization (vol. 2, p. 118): ““ The rule of the Caliphs was, in its ultimate basis, a theocracy ; it would submit to no limitations, and the objects which it set before itself, in the conquest of the world to the Faith and the attainment of Paradise by fighting for it, gave no scope for a doctrine of the re- sponsibility of civil rulers and of duty to the governed.’ “The Council of the Ulama in July, 1879, anent Khairu’d-din’s proposed reform, which would have placed the Sultan in the position of a constitutional sovereign . . . declared [this] to be directly contrary to the law. ‘ The law of the Sheri does not authorize the Khalifa to place beside him a power superior to his own. The Khalifa ought to reign alone and govern as master. The Vakils [Ministers] should never possess any authority beyond that of representatives, always dependent and submissive.’ ”’ Sell adds : “This is one of the most important decisions of the jurists of Islam.... It proves as clearly as possible that, so long as the Sultan rules as Khalifa, he must oppose any attempt to set up a constitutional government. There is absolutely no hope of real reform.” This was written over forty years ago, and it states clearly the fact that this institution of Islam—the Caliphate—is incompatible with the spirit of this age and with reform. No ruler can accept this office without either breaking away from the historic conception of the Caliphate or parting with all ideas of progress and reform. Hence we come to the conclusion that the Caliphate has lost its place in Islam because it is incompatible 58 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY with constitutional government and reform. At the same time, it is also true that, in losing the Caliphate, Islam has lost a certain sense of solidarity and moral unity, and this loss will make itself felt increasingly. The Caliphate lost its reason for existence, and yet its abolition takes from Islam a certain element of strength. FERMENTS IN THE YOUTH OF ISLAM BY BASIL MATHEWS, M.A., Literature Secretary, World’s Alliance of Young Men’s Christian Associations hes A eS ‘ ely ca ‘i Loh hb i Lion top ie RAPE aT KAM EE “Fy GALE: OVATE AIA: Tied ad Z wi auite EAs Vinee ahi! TRY hiya suet Ny , SRY arp Oee RS Wiad AEM 4 7 CHAPTER V FERMENTS IN THE YOUTH OF ISLAM WHILE watching a torrent of Egyptian youth from Al Azhar University racing and roaring along the streets of Cairo to demonstrate before Zaghloul Pasha, I won- dered whether any generation has ever been swept from ancient footholds by such a tidal wave as is surging around and over the youth of the Moslem world to-day. That almost untranslatable French phrase, le choc des idées (carrying the sense not only of shock but also of intellectual combat and of a cavalry-charge of fresh thought), conveys something of the force of the sweeping movement that is at this hour transforming the meaning of life among the new generation of all Islamic peoples. The fact that the waves break upon youth born and bred within the most rigid, resistant, and self-complete of the world’s religious and social systems makes the tur- moil all the more turbulent and dramatic. If we examine somewhat closely the causes of the incident of that shouting procession of students (trivial as it was in itself), we shall be carried to the heart of many of the ideas that are changing life so radically for youth. We shall also see some of the concentric forces that are irresistibly driving those ideas home. Any thoroughgoing examination of those ideas and forces must seem inchoate and confused. For the 61 62 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY whole movement of thought and feeling is as confused as it is profound. The fury that carried those undergraduates of Al Azhar University along the streets was wrath against a Labour Prime Minister in England who had just declared his allegiance to the understanding between Britain and Egypt by which the former retained its control of the Sudan. The precise rights and wrongs of that political question do not touch us here. The fermenting idea, however, which surely is our concern, was a vehe- ment nationalism issuing in an uncompromising and unqualified clamour for self-determination. The facts that this clamour by Egyptians for self-determination for the Sudanese (who had not asked for it) overleaped the banks of consistent nationalism and that the Egyp- tian Prime Minister sent the demonstrating students back to their studies of the Koran rather chastened, only serve to illustrate the occasionally dizzy and un- certain results of these whirling movements. The Prime Minister, Zaghloul Pasha, was himself perhaps the most astounding product of le choc des idées that could be discovered in the post-war world. Within some hours of this student demonstration the writer had opportunity of unhurried talk with him. It took one’s breath away to remember, first, that this man was the first Egyptian to rule in Egypt (the oldest home of civilization in the world) since the Persians overthrew the Pharaohs over forty centuries ago; that he was the first ruler whom the Egyptians ever elected by their own will to supreme power; and that he who now > exercised this supreme rule had only a few months earlier been a rebel in exile from his own land. The concentra- tion of nationalistic will and passion in Egypt that brought Zaghloul Pasha to power had in Egypt actually THE YOUTH OF ISLAM 63 brought Moslem mulvis into Christian pulpits and Coptic priests into Moslem mosques, bridging the yawning religious chasm between Christianity and Islam in a way that would have been incredible a decade earlier. In a word, for the first time perhaps in Islamic history political union with infidels was stronger than Islamic exclusiveness. Nationalism, then, with its practical policy of self- determination, is the outstanding primary idea fermenting in the mind of Moslem youth to-day. The idea of self- determination was the central architectonic principle of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and of the Allied war aims, and as such, it was shouted (to use Walt Whitman’s phrase) “ across the roof-tops of the world,”’ in all the languages of Asia as well asof Europe. This fact is often forgotten when we hear the same principles come back under such war-cries as Swaraj (i.e. “India for the Indians’’) or “‘ Egypt for the Egyptians.”’ Cer- tainly the West ought not to be surprised that nationalism everywhere in the Moslem world is the fiercest of the fermenting forces among youth. Whether you walk in Delhi or Angora, talk with young Baghdadi merchants, Arab camelmen, or Algerian senior schoolboys, listen to the young bloods of an Afghan fighting force or the newer journalists and poets of the Persian plateau, the voice and accent are different, but the idea is in essence one. In the mind of Moslem youth the idea of the nation has irreparably torn into fragments the enormous, heavy tapestry of Pan-Islamism. Nothing parallel to this has happened in the mind of any generation of youth since the Reformation shattered the unity of the Holy Roman Empire. In the case of Islam, as in that of the Holy Roman Empire, a unity, semi-religious and semi- 64 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY political in nature, has been shattered by a vivid series of smaller, more intense national unities. These national unities are, as indeed they were in the case of the Holy Roman Empire, wholly political in character, yet they call out a passionate devotion essentially religious. The shock that the action of young Turkish nationalists has inflicted on the older Moslem consciousness came home to the writer in an unforgettable scene in the home of the Sheikh of Nain. The writer had ridden across the Plain of Esdraelon from Nazareth on a quiet pilgrimage, following from place to place in the footsteps of Jesus Christ and attempting, in visualizing His life in those places, to find rest of spirit and mind from the almost torturing pressure of the terrific problems of the post-war world. There, on the slopes of Mount Moreh, lay the primitive homes of the people of Nain. At the top of the village was the sheikh’s home. Calling upon him, we found that the Sheikh of Endor had cantered across the corner of the plain to visit his friend. Surely, one felt, no problem of the great world of unrest could send even an eddy into this backwater of remote simplicity. But within a few minutes the two sheikhs, with an agitation and vehemence unusual in Arabs holding authority, were urging me to bring it about that the Prime Minister of Britain send to Mustafa Kemal at once an appeal and a reprimand, calling on him to cancel his horrible acts of destroying the Caliphate in Turkey and of exiling the ex-Caliph. “It is wicked, wicked,” they reiterated. “‘ He is a bad, bad man.” If we can imagine a Mussolini in Italy abolishing the Papacy and exiling the Pope; and if we can conceive the horror and anger of, say, a devout Roman Catholic in South America at the act, we arrive at some parallel idea of the chasm that to-day lies between the old Arab THE YOUTH OF ISLAM 65 and the new Turk generation responsible for abolishing the Caliphate. Curiously enough, however, the same fire of nationalism and the same desire for self-determination were burning in the Sheikhs of Nain and Endor as in the young Turks, for they went on to urge upon me with equal vigour these questions: ‘‘ When are the British going to give to the Arabs the self-government that they promised to them during the war?” and “ Why do the British favour the new Jews from Europe in Palestine more than the Arabs who have been there for three thousand years >?” There we were, in that remote spot, with the problems of white domination, of Asiatic self-determination, and of race-antagonisms as between Asiatics (Arab versus Jew), breaking in upon us in wave after wave. As I looked round the faces of the dozen younger men who had assembled from the village for the talk, it was clear that for them these were the supremely absorbing issues that were fermenting in their minds. Many of them were certainly unable to read ; but they were discussing issues identical with those that reverberate in the cloisters of Al Azhar University and appear in the leading articles of Moslem daily papers from Bengal to Morocco and from Thrace to Abyssinia. That discussion at Nain leads us to another cause of the new ferment in the mind of young Islam. It is that the end of the war saw a great extension of white, and, in the technical sense, Christian authority over Moslem peoples, due largely to the carving of Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Arabia out of the old Turkish Empire. This intensified a hundredfold the already critical debate of the Moslem mind as to Western civilization—the life of Christendom. The moral standards of Western life 6 66 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY —its diplomacy and commerce, its absorption in material prosperity and in the expansion of its own control over other peoples, above all its actions and motives during and after the war—are challenged and debated with a singularly sustained vehemence wherever the young Moslem is assembled with his friends. They see, for instance, in Western diplomacy, European and American, a far more intense interest in oil than in Armenians. They believe that all the acts of Western statesmanship are dictated by the desire for imperial expansion or for commercial gain, or for both. Paradoxically enough, in odd contrast with their moral condemnation of Western Christendom (a con- demnation, be it noted, of which the touchstone is the Christian standard and not the Moslem), we find a swiftly increasing appreciation and imitation of Western tech- nical science applied to raising the standard of living. The sewing-machine and the telephone, the electric light and the automobile, the typewriter and the dictaphone, the rotary printing press, the street car, and the cinema, may seem to be mere mechanical adjustments affecting life in its externals. When, however, those forces push ever in upon a life that has been practically static for centuries they become means of distributing the leaven through the lump. The sewing-machine is everywhere to-day replacing the hand-sewing of four thousand years. The writer met a caravan of camels striding down that most ancient pass in the world, the Cilician Pass, and carrying in the footsteps of Alexander the Great, of | Cicero, and of St. Paul sewing-machines to the mothers and daughters of Tarsus. This alone means that the minds of the girls are moved toward the West that produces these machines, and begin to work in new modes. Adolescent boys and girls, the latter with THE YOUTH OF ISLAM 67 their mothers in the harem galleries, witness at the cinema pictures of Western romance in which men and women meet on an equal plane, and where women have the freedom of the wide world—a world in which the relations of the sexes are presented in terms of the choice of youth by youth on a plane of personal attachment and choice. Mary Pickford, Pola Negri, and Gloria Swanson, when appearing on the film before tens of thousands of women and girls in an environment of Moslem social conditions and among people of a relatively low standard of lit- eracy, are likely to be more potent instruments of social revolution than a hundred books on the theory of the family. For the millions of young men who see these films also receive a fresh conception of womanhood in which higher and lower qualities are strangely blended. The discussion thus stimulated in the mind of the younger generation is only one element in a fresh hunger for new ideas. All the forces acting upon the younger and more malleable minds, the shattering impact of the war, followed by this intense ferment of discussion on nationalism, self-determination, race conflicts, and Western civilization, have combined to stimulate a quite unprecedented inquisitiveness of mind in Moslem youth. If any single thing was true of the pre-war Moslem mind it was that it retained the strong, unbroken Islamic sense of self-adequacy—the feeling that Islam was able to say the last word on any issue. To-day that com- placency is gone. Moslem youth is scanning the horizons for other truth. Literacy has increased; but reading has leaped forward in a still more startling way. In particular, the young effendi class—the more intelligent business and professional men and men of leisure—are absorbing great quantities of this reading. An examination of the bookshops frequented by 68 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY Moslems in Beirit, Constantinople, Agra, and Cairo to-day as contrasted with, say, 1914, would reveal a perfectly amazing development.t The writer found in Beirit a score of bookshops in which a constant stream of French fiction, of translations into Arabic, of European and American literature, and of books written in Arabic on a basis of Western reading, was eagerly absorbed. Cairo has 217 printing presses from which the production averages one book, brochure, or pamphlet in Arabic each day of the year. | A considerable and increasing proportion of these books presents at either first- or second-hand a con- siderable amount of material of current Western applied science. The literature in many cases assumes the open-minded yet critical attitude of twentieth-century Western thought. Or it presents, through fiction, the pagan, superficial aspects of the structure of the social order of the life of Western Europe. Even the attacks on Christianity in this literature are less and less from a Moslem point of view and more from the point of view of the destructive type of higher criticism which (though already discredited by Western scholarship) is a useful tool in the hands of the modern Moslem critic of Chris- tianity. What is only just beginning to be realized is that the very assumptions and methods on which that higher criticism is built are drastically destructive of the more rigid structure of Islam. The widespread influence of these varied types of literature leads to an outlook that is not Islamic and is. not Christian. It is difficult to sum up its characteristics in a generalization. But,asa whole, it may be described 1 See, for the whole of this subject, Christian Litevature in Mos- lem Lands, New York, 1923. An authoritative report based on thorough investigation. THE YOUTH OF ISLAM 69 as a careless, unsystematic agnosticism, cheerfully cynical in outlook on the world, with few enthusi- asms save those accompanying the assertion of inde- pendence. . This should lead to the recognition of the fact that, to impregnate the mind of Moslem youth with secular Western ideas, to break down through Western commerce Moslem traditional habits of business, to replace peasant industries with a highly organized factory system, is not to move an inch nearer to Christianity. When at dawn the factory siren calling youth to the factory has drowned the voice of the muezzin calling to prayer, and when the factory chimney has replaced the minaret, we have not moved toward the Kingdom of God. This increasingly secular point of view of the young Moslem shows itself in astonishing ways that nearly take away the breath of folk to whom the unity of the Islamic religion, with its own social and political order and the old idea of the brotherhood of Moslems of all races, have come to be axiomatic. The most striking development here, of course, is the view frankly taken by a considerable number of young Turks that the great historic mistake made by the Turkish people was in embracing Islam. Islam, they say, has kept them in a backwater for cen- turies, so far as secular progress is concerned. That, they feel, is largely the reason why, while Western civilization has leaped forward in wealth and power, Turkish strength has steadily diminished. So they tend to turn from Islamic to racial, political, and economic unity and independence for the hope of the future. The marvellous driving force that has inspired Mustafa Kemal, perhaps the one essential genius in the world’s politics to-day, the young Turks who act with him, and the women, like his brilliant wife, who urge his policies 70 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY forward, is the national conception sung by Mehmed Emin Bey : ‘Tam a lurk? My language and race are great.”’ ‘My language and race,’’ secular ideas, be it noted, and not “ my religion,” or “‘ my social system.” This divorce of race from religion, indeed this elevation of race and nationality into a faith, this break between Turkey and the Pan-Islamic policy, and the leaning of the young Turk and the young Egyptian to Western ways of life and even to Western ways of achieving their own separation from Western governmental or financial domination, means the dawning of a new day. It is not, as might conceivably be the case in the Islamic world, a new day simply for manhood. In other chapters of this book the life of its womanhood is set forth ; and in some places, as will be seen, little that is new appears to be happening. When, however, Moslem ladies in automobiles join in with nationalist processions through the streets of Cairo and the women make speeches in the street at times when the procession is held up ; and when in centres like Angora, Constantinople, and Cairo, Moslem women, inspired by a new ideal of family life familiar already in the West, are organized to work for a higher minimum age for marriage, equitable divorce laws, the abolition of polygamy, and reforms in the marriage laws, it is clear that a new day is beginning to dawn here also. The writer has before him a late Turkish newspaper in which the short story tells of the - fight of a young Turk for the right to marry the girl of his own choice, one who loves him and whom he loves, against the fury of his father, a Turk of the old Moslem school, who insists on his marrying a wealthy girl under THE YOUTH OF ISLAM 71 an arrangement made solely by the old man without reference to the son’s wish or to the girl’s own desire. This is typical of the new ferment regarding the relation of the sexes, and of the chasm between the older and the younger generations. It is also a symptom of the fact that in the Moslem world, as everywhere, the ferment of ideas is at once created by and reflected in the periodical press of the whole area. The immense expansion of newspaper publication in the Moslem world is one of the most significant features of this new ferment of ideas. Young Islam is reading to-day well over 1,500 daily and weekly papers, of which just over 700 are in Arabic and as many as 350 are in Persian. The influence of these runs far beyond the literate population. If you go up the Nile Valley, for instance, among the fellaheen villages you will see in each village a reader who, with the youth as well as the older folk of the village around him listening eagerly, reads aloud from the Cairo paper the news and the comment of the day. Cairo is, of course, both as the intellectual head of Islam and as the nerve-centre of forces playing between North Africa, Nearer Asia, and Europe, the place of greatest ferment. But an isolated city like Baghdad, cut off by desert from the play of the world’s life, has a dozen newspapers and other periodicals that bring in the story of the movements of the earth. Among these movements from outside, Bolshevism is the most active, but its successes have been sporadic and local. Through all this post-war period, all over the Moslem world, youth has been subject to the inter- mittent waves of Bolshevik influence. In the first years after the war a veritable tidal wave of Bolshevik pro- paganda poured across the Caucasus into the Arabic, 72 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY the Persian, and the Afghan lands; into North India and the Dutch East Indies ; down the A‘gean and across Anatolia into Egypt and across North Africa. But after the first enthusiasms were exhausted, and youth had had time to compare promise with fulfilment and to assess the actual working of the machine as contrasted with the paper-scheme, a reaction set in. The present reactions of young Islam to Bolshevism are significantly different in the various countries con- cerned. Oddly enough, the most vigorous effect of Bol- shevik propaganda among youth in the Moslem world is in the Dutch East Indies. There the relatively primi- tive Moslems swing towards the most extreme phase of sovietization, that is, clancommunism. This is natural, as it fits their tribal background far more easily than state communism in a national or racial sense. In British India we find here and there fervid nuclei of Bolshevik feeling. But, in relation to the total mass of 70,000,000 Indian Moslems, the element is insignificant and shows little sign of growth in volume or influence. The furious early advance of Bolshevism like a forest fire into Moslem Persia and on into Afghanistan burned itself out almost as swiftly as it ran. Disillusionment followed close upon the heels of enthusiasm. In Turkey the hard, bright flame of nationalism has replaced all other movements in the mind of youth. The liaison between Angora and Moscow is a diplomatic affair— having no relation to movements of the spirit. This does not mean that Bolshevism has entirely ceased to work as a leaven in youth. It may even be that the Soviet idea of political working by occupational groups (which is as old as the silversmiths at Ephesus, led by Demetrius) may be severed absolutely from the Marxist class-war communism with which it is associated THE YOUTH OF ISLAM 78 in Russia, and may be applied by the new generation to the working of political institutions in Asia and Egypt. At this point we need to warn ourselves against a danger. The ‘sound and fury” of these violent tides of human youth may hide from our eyes quieter, yet deeper and, in the long run, often more powerful streams. For instance, a close observer who penetrates into the inner forces of the great centres of Moslem life to-day will find sturdy and effective young personalities about whom little is said and nothing written because they do nothing sensational. He will also discover personalities, many of them quite young men, who are quietly changing the outlook of the neighbourhood, in places remote from * the vehement modern centres. Their influence modern- izes without occidentalizing ; it usually creates a more open and friendly attitude toward the non-Moslem world. It stands, as a rule, for a constructive and co- operative spirit. In a considerable—even a predominant—number of cases of this kind that have come under the writer’s own notice and that have been conveyed to him by correspondents and in conversation, it has proved that the power of those young men (and occasionally women) has come from the fact that they have been educated in one or other of the colleges and universities estab- lished from America or Britain, or from both—established not to make Western ideas dominant, but to train a new and a truly Oriental young leadership. They are proof, on the one hand, against the ‘ wild and whirling words” of the revolutionary, whether Bolshevik or anarchist, and, on the other hand, against the blind, arrogant reactionary. The young man in question may be a dentist or a doctor, a journalist or a lawyer, a teacher or a servant TA THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY of government. He has, however, in receiving his education for the position that he holds and the work that he does, received something else. He has absorbed —say at Robert College, Constantinople; the Inter- national College, Smyrna; St. Paul’s College, Tarsus ; the American University at Beirfit ; the English College at Jerusalem, or the American University at Cairo, or the College at Asyfitt—a spirit of good-will, a capacity for co-operation, a will to progress, a sense of equity and of straight-dealing—in a word, the team-spirit. It may well be that, at the end of the day, we shall discover that the men who have in their lives this less explosive ferment, this leaven of human strength of character, this blend of progress with permanence, are the real constructive forces of the new world in Moslem lands. The most recent communication that has come out of a very difficult part of the Moslem world from an experienced and authoritative source is unexpected evidence of the working of this type of leadership on the side of exploration in religious fellowship. The writer says : “Abundant evidence is at hand of the desire on the part of members of all faiths for tolerant and practical application of religious teachings to the common problems of every-day life, character, and social relationships.” In this connexion there has been formed in this centre a prayer-circle of the faiths, in which discussions were opened, for example, by a Greek Orthodox layman on “Purity ’’; by a Persian Moslem on “ Religion and Business ”’ (the interest compelling them to run to two sessions); by a Tartar Moslem on “ Morality and Re- ligion ’’ (running to three sessions) ; by a Greek Orthodox THE YOUTH OF ISLAM 75 layman on “ Service,’ and by an Armenian Protestant on “ Religion and Life.’’ It is, then, obvious to-day, wherever you touch the life of Islam, that a profound disintegration of the fibre of the old life is going on with a thoroughness and a speed that increases every day. Looking back over our argument, we see how this must be so. When we have discounted all the ineffective and evanescent papers, the play of the remaining thousand newspapers upon the life of young Islam, from Constantinople in the North to Khartoum in the South and from Morocco in the West to Bengal or Java in the East, is incessant and transform- ing. When it is viewed together with the steady and increasing flow of popular books, the incessant flicker of the cinema films in every city and town, the fresh movement of life due to the penetration of the cheap motor-car into areas where, a decade ago, the bullock- or horse-wagon was the way of transport, the new linking up of areas by which to-day the railway-train runs in a night across the desert from Egypt to Palestine and the motor-service dashes in less than twenty hours from Damascus to Baghdad on a route which the camel could barely traverse in a week, the total influence is seen to be enormous. In addition, we need to note that large numbers of Moslem young men now go every year from North Africa to earn their living in France. There are no precise figures available as to the number of Moslems in France. The magnitude of the invasion, however, can be assessed from the fact that of one of the most primitive of the tribes—the Kabyles—r1oo0,o00 have migrated to France, attracted by wages four times higher than those paid in Algeria. It is said that 40,000 of this tribe (who are Berber in origin and whose fore- fathers were Christian before the Moslem conquest of 76 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY North Africa), are living in Paris, beside an unnumbered host of Arabs and Turks and other Moslems, It is not for us to draw inferences in this chapter as to the attitude that should be taken by those outside the Moslem world who care, as so many of us do care intensely, for the future welfare of its peoples. What we may well note here, however, is that so widespread and so deep a ferment issuing in so manifold a transformation of out- look among Moslem youth calls for a complete revalua- tion and reconsideration of the attitude of Christendom to the peoples of Islam. Progress can come only through co-operation, and if the youths of Christendom and of the Moslem world, as well as those of Farther Asia, are to help each other, they must understand each other. To do that, they must put aside the accepted attitudes of past and even of present diplomacies. They must cease to think of the Moslem mind as closed against new ideas. Especially is it necessary that those who look out on the world attempting to see it with Christian eyes should revise radically the alinement of their thought both as to the resistant attitude of the peoples of the Islamic faith and as to the quality of the contacts which the civilization of peoples who call themselves by the name of Christ should have with those who have been born in this astonishing day of new possibility. ISLAM AND THE RACE PROBLEM BY C. SNOUCK HURGRONJE, D.Sem.Litt., Professor, University of Leiden; Counsellor to the Dutch Mimstry of the Colones Ae Veh, hie ‘ pene eho wie thie Ror y Wwe oad Oe) BP eenie iy hy rahi 4 r Les iP ah bier dar as SNtee DL eal PA hamid ; y i ry eee Pa t MeGiAy) pe: CHAPTER VI ISLAM AND THE RACE PROBLEM THE map of the world, in its recently revised form, has suggested to many sharp-sighted politicians the question when and where the next war is to break out, and whether it may be possible to prevent a renewed effort to settle the political dissensions of mankind by a contest of brute force. Hardly anybody will consider such a violent solution as durable, but any other issue is despaired of by the masters of diagnosis. Among the innumerable obstacles to a peaceful settlement none seems to be considered so insurmountable as the race conflict. Even those who think it possible to arrive at a mutual under- standing concerning questions raised by difference of religion, language, civilization, or nationality, describe the race problem as a chronic illness without remedy. The racial characteristics are the only ones a man cannot rid himself of from his birth until his death, and the increase of the population of our globe, together with the decrease of all distances, are unmistakable omens of an acute racial conflict in the immediate future. The Science of Races is too young to supply us with a clear formulation of the problem. Anthropology, archeology, comparative linguistics, and ethnography con- tribute what they can to direct her steps, but her move- ment still lacks security. The criteria she uses are ever changing: there is not yet a map of races supported 79 80 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY by the consensus of competent scholars. When treating race problems of a practical nature even specialists, for the sake of simplicity, recur to the popular colour criterion. Many of them hold out before us terrifying pictures of the dangers menacing the white man from yellow, brown, red, and black races—dangers so enormous and so acute that all other contrasts in the human world appear to be mere trifles in comparison with them. The measures recommended by some talented writers in order to exorcise the approaching crisis are of a radical and violent type. Their starting-point is the absolute excellence of the white race, or at least of that part of it to which they themselves belong ; so the preservation of that portion of mankind is to be secured even at the sacrifice of all the rest. We cannot help fancying that, if such a view of the question came to be adopted by the excellent race, a racial struggle would ensue, compared with which the recent war would be no more than a child’s game. But, although we must absolutely reject all tactics of that sort as inhuman and impracticable, we fully agree with the authors alluded to in deeming the race problem even more baffling than that of the establishment of political harmony between the nations of Europe. | Under such circumstances one is inclined to search for illumination in history, for racial conflicts have demanded solution from time immemorial, and an inquiry into the attitude of such a large international community as that of Islam concerning the question cannot fail to. teach us some lessons. Now we must bear in mind that the proportion of the system of Islam to the preaching of Mohammed was that of the full-grown tree to the seed from which it sprang: its growth occupied about three centuries. The ISLAM AND THE RACE PROBLEM 81 scribes who taught and wrote during that period in the central countries of Islam, Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia, though formally only inter- preters of the “revealed” law, actually performed legislative work. So deep was their conviction that they only enounced what Mohammed would have said if he had lived down to their time that they boldly attributed their conclusions to the Prophet by means of fictitious traditions. Whenever we want to know Mohammed’s personal opinion, therefore, we should consult almost exclusively the Koran as containing his authentic oracles. The system of law, dogmatics, and mysticism which assumed to fix everlasting rules for the individual, family, economic, and political life of the Moslems, arrived at completion in its main features only in the tenth century of ourera. This system always left much room for difference of opinion as to details. Besides that, there has always been a gulf between doctrine and life in Mohammedan society ; but, nevertheless, the Moslems all over the world show a remarkable unity in most respects, and the importance of their unanimous acknowledgment of the all-embracing system as the ideal of their international community can hardly be overrated. Mohammed did not intend to preach anew religion. As he conceived it, his religion was the only true one from Adam down to the Day of Resurrection, preached by all the apostles of God, his predecessors. Several times in the Koran ! Allah is said to declare emphatically that He sent Mohammed to warn a people, to whom no warner had been sent before. Eleven times’? the word “ Arabic ’’ occurs in the Koran : it is always to accentuate TSICOLalls 620°. 40} 32) 2°34 SARS 30 2 55 SEINOVMI ON 12 ¢ ot; 13% 30-7; 16% 1057 20 Sella 7720. FORO 39: 28-9 ; 41: 1-28, 443 42:53; 43: I-33 46: 11. 7 82 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY the fact that this revelation is given in clear Arabic, without tortuous wording, so as to cut off all ways of exculpation from the heathen Arabs, for whom it is destined. There is no contradiction between these explicit statements, that Mohammed, the Arabic prophet, is sent to the Arabs, and other verses of the Koran, which call Mohammed and his mission a blessing for “ man,”’ ‘mankind,’ or “ the world.’’ On the one hand, these words are not to be taken in their widest sense when used by a man who during all his life had to do with Arabs only and who left to his successors as an unachieved task the subjection of Arabia to his religion. On the other hand, the fact that he was charged with the con- version of Arabia did not diminish the more inclusive character of the religion revealed in his Koran, for his was but the Arabic edition of the Eternal Book of Allah, and, when Jews and Christians rejected his divine mission, then in his mind this could be attributed only to corrup- tion of their sacred scriptures, which in their unaltered form could not but confirm what was revealed to him by the only God, whom all of them adored. The universalization of the Koran was the natural consequence of the attempt of the newly Islamized Arabs to conquer the world. The wonderful success of their raids was undoubtedly due to the powerful impulse given by Mohammed to the energy of the Arabs, united for the first time under his banner; but this effect was not foreseen by him, much less was it the execution of a plan projected by him. In full accordance with the former revelations, adhered to by the ‘“‘ People of the Sacred Book” (Jews and Christians), the Koran teaches the descent of man from Adam and Eve (Hawwa), implying the equality of all men, notwithstanding the variety of characteristics of ISLAM AND THE RACE PROBLEM 88 individuals or groups. The actual multiplicity of lan- guages and colours is described in the Koran, next to the creation of heaven and earth, as one of the mag- nificent signs of Allah’s wisdom,’ without any attempt to explain its origin. The Prophet of Arabia had no reason to combat, from this point of view, the enmity prevailing between human races; his application of the principle of equality was directed against the tribal fanaticism which divided the Arabs amongst themselves. Mohammed did not succeed in eradicating the tribal feuds of the Arabs altogether, but he enforced the universal recognition of the principle of equality, and he united all those tribes, whose division seemed hopeless, in such a way that they were able to perform actions amazing to the whole world. The pregnant expression of Mohammed’s doctrine of the unity of mankind is found in a passage of the Koran * evidently directed against the mutual quarrelling, sarcasm, scorn, and disdain occurring in the community of Medina. The exhortation could therefore have in view only Arabs, including perhaps a few Jewish followers of Mohammed, African, Persian, or Greek slaves, and some foreigners who happened to be staying there. “The faithful are brethren; therefore make peace between your brethren, and fear God. Haply ye may obtain mercy. O believers, let not men laugh men to scorn who haply may be better than themselves. . Omen! We have created you from a male and a female, and divided you into groups [the Arab word shu‘db, used here, may denote tribes, nations, races or any other division of men] and tribes, that ye might know [dis- tinguish] one another. The noblest of you in the sight of God is the most God-fearing ; verily God is knowing, cognizant.” * Koran: 30: 2%. 2 Koran : 49: Io-13. 84 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY The difference of men in outward appearance and qualities is explained here in a naive, teleological way as serving to distinguish individuals and groups from each other. Piety is called the only criterion for the estimation of the value of man—his attitude, that is, towards God and towards his fellow-creatures. This supreme criterion was maintained in the system of Islam. Thereon it based a division of mankind into three main groups, almost identical with the grouping of civilized, half-civilized, and savage men, current amongst ourselves. That the degree of civilization was made dependent on religion in the flourishing period of Islam (A.D. 650-1000) goes without saying; such was the prevailing opinion of the Middle Ages. The first class were the Moslems, who enjoy the full light of revela- tion ; the second the People of the Scripture, like Jews and Christians, who, because of their rejecting the mission of Mohammed, walk in the dusk, and whom the Moslems may only by moral means try to raise to their own height ; the third are the heathen, who are to be in- corporated into human culture by persuasion or by force, and in the worst case to be made innocuous to the civilized world. The culture criterion was applied, even independently of religion, so as to adopt into the second class nations like the Parsis, who, although not having sacred books recognized by Mohammed, were assimilated to the People of the Scripture on account of their social development. Moslem world-empire, extending in the eighth century from Morocco and Spain to the borders of China, having absorbed a great part of the ancient empires and still seeing large possibilities of extension, regarded in Southern and Eastern Europe as a constant menace, represented indeed in the early Middle Ages the acme of civilization. ISLAM AND THE RACE PROBLEM _ 85 At that time no more vanity was necessary for Islam to feel called upon to lead humanity to its destination than there is now for white men spontaneously to under- take such a mission. As to the difference of races, the system not only stuck to the Koranic edict, but it accentuated its contents by fictitious sayings of Mohammed, in which not only Arabic tribes, but nations generally, are put on the same level. ‘‘ The Arab does not excel the non-Arab, unless he is the more pious of the two,”’ is one of these sayings, attributed to the Prophet. It cannot surprise us that it proved necessary re- peatedly to inculcate this principle, if we think of the amazing energy shown by the Arabs in the triumphal progress of Islam through the world. Once being united by religion and having come out of their sterile peninsula, those nomads proved able to govern the cultivated nations succumbing to their fresh vital force, to change the administration of the conquered States to such an extent as their interests as overlords required, and to induce millions to gather around their Prophet’s banner. | The Arabic language did no 18s miraculous work than the Arabic armies. In almost all the central countries of Islam it entirely supplanted the vernacular; to this day foreigners are in the habit of calling Syrians, Meso- potamians, Egyptians, and North Africans by the name of Arabs. During the first century Islamizing a people meant Arabizing it. The wonderful language of the desert adapted itself with incredible suppleness as an instrument for treating the most intricate theological, jurisprudential, and philosophical problems, universal history, geography, ethnography, grammar, and poetry, with the utmost precision and grace. 86 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY Conversion to Islam in those days meant becoming an Arab. The new Moslems adopted Arabic names, they were annexed as “clients”’ to Arabic tribes, and they tried as soon as possible to pass for genuine Arabs. Moslem science and literature, indeed, owe more to non-Arabs than to Arabs. When we speak of the rich Arabic literature and of the prevalence of Arabic science in the Middle Ages, we mean the international Moslem science and culture which had Arabic for their means of expression. It was only Persian, and some time later Turkish, which succeeded in obtaining a place in the second rank behind Arabic, and even that only after swallowing a great part of the Arabic dictionary. Malays, Moslem Chinese, Indians, Persians, Turks, and Egyp- tians, all of them have accurately to recite the Arabic Koran at the beginning of their religious instruction ; the divine service they have to perform five times daily is full of Arabic formule; on Fridays and on the two official yearly festivals they attend an Arabic sermon. Although fully authorized to pray in their mother-tongue, on formal occasions they prefer praying in Arabic. In the principal towns of all Islamic countries there are men of letters able to converse in Arabic with their colleagues at the other end of the world. | The language is only one of many manifestations of the uniformity of life and thought, shown by the Moslem league of nations. Their common attitude is by no means a copy of that of the Arabs at Mohammed’s time, any more than the universal Arabic is identical with the language of the Koran and of the ancient poets; but all those expressions of human life show an Arabic stamp characteristic of the central countries of Islam during the three centuries of growth of the system. Two Mos- lems, from whatever countries, arrive at mutual under- ISLAM AND THE RACE PROBLEM 87 standing in every respect sooner than two members of any other international association. The unrivalled success of the Islamized Arabs is a phenomenon too complex to be explained by one or two causes; but one of the important factors was cer- tainly Mohammed’s strongly accentuated limitation of his message to the Arabs. As circumstances transformed that Arabic message into a universal one, Islam had already become so Arabic to the very marrow that non-Arabs had in some degree to change language and life to feel at home in it. This historical development was not fitted to make Mohammed’s principle of equality deeply penetrate the minds ofthe Arabs. The Moslem State of the first century has rightly been called the Arabian empire. The Arabic supremacy was felt by the subjected nations as a heavy oppression, particularly by. those who had attained the highest degrees of culture before Islam. The artificial erafting of individuals, families, and even entire nations on the genealogical tree of the Arabs served as a palliative ; but its use was naturally limited, and not all converts were willing to be naturalized in such a way. At length they demanded acknowledgment of their equality or even of their superiority on account of their own merits. Most of the Arabs, in whom Islam had not even ex- tinguished the pagan tribal particularism, were not at once ready to accept such demands. They poured out streams of ignominy on the heads of those barbarians who dared to take up places near or above them at Mohammed’s table. Reaction did not fail to appear, however. After the rise of the Abbasids (A.D. 750) Persians and Turks rose to the highest ranks. In the second and third centuries of Islam there flourished a rich literature of racial com- 88 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY petition. The opponents of Arabic prerogatives, in their turn, were not content with equality: they proffered arguments from history, sacred and profane, to demon- strate the inferiority of the Arabic race. Almost all Islamized nations partook in this literary strife. The non-Arab protagonists took their starting-point from the verse of the Koran (49:13) wherein the division of mankind into shu‘%b is mentioned, and they applied this word specially to non-Arabian ‘races,’ and the other one to the ‘‘tribes’”’ of Arabia. Therefore the non-Arabian race-fanatics acquired the name of Shu- ‘abiyya, “racists.” The Arabians vehemently contra- dicted the arguments of the “ barbarians.’’ It is curious to see all the finesse of Arabic prose and poetry used on both sides in this sometimes amusing, in the bulk, dis- tasteful, literature, and still more curious to observe that some of the literary “racists ’’ are of pure Arabic descent, whereas some of the defenders of the Arabic prerogatives have no Arabic blood in their veins. This literature of insult had its following, but this was not the people in general, and least of all the scribes. These honestly upheld the religious principle of equality, albeit with just recognition of the nobility of the Arabs, based on their merits for Islam. Thus the’ doctrine admitted of no caliphs except those from Mohammed’s tribe, the Koraish ; this rule was only the theory of what | was practised for six centuries, down to the fall of the Abbasids. Then, in the opinion of many interpreters of the law, the marriage of an Arabic woman with a non- Arab, of a woman of Koraish with a non-Koraishite, of a female descendant of Mohammed with a man of another family, is deemed to be a mésalliance, to be permitted only for exceptional reasons. But even these modest rules of nobility have never acquired the consensus ISLAM AND THE RACE PROBLEM 89 needed to give them dogmatic force. The opinions on the connubium prevailing in different countries were in a large measure dependent on social circumstances. Since the Ottoman dynasty had obtained actual su- premacy in the sixteenth century, the scribes as well as the mass of the people gave up their opposition against Caliphs of non-Koraishite or even of non-Arab extraction. Pamphlets have been written by descendants of Mo- hammed to defend the Turkish Caliphate, arguing that the value of man is determined by merit, not by birth. Practically in the Moslem world neither birth nor colour has prevented men from reaching the highest positions. Persians, Turks, Mongolians, Berbers, and Negroes have occupied the most important state offices and acquired the greatest fame in scholarship. Islam offered a chance to all races, and all of them have availed themselves of it in the measure of their talents. In the mosque of Mecca during the lecturing hours students and professors with all gradations of complexion: coal- black, green (as the Arabs call a somewhat brighter nuance), brown, yellow, and white, may be seen frater- nally gathering, and the same variety is shown by the citizens of the Holy City, sometimes even by the members of one family. The old propensity to mutual scorn, combated in the “ race-verse ’’ of the Koran, has not yet entirely died out, but the principle of equality is respected in practice as well as in theory. Moslem newspapers, when discussing the actual policy of European States with regard to Oriental countries, often take a pride in stating that political injustice, as represented by man- dates, protectorates, or colonies, where ‘“ natives”’ are practically enslaved by their oppressors on account of their colour and race, have never found support in Moslem doctrine nor a place in Moslem history. 90 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY The attempt of Islam to unite all mankind under one banner has not been successful. The religious belief which underlies this form of civilization was unacceptable to a vast number, and the legal system, destined to regulate the whole of human life by unchangeable rules, showed too clearly the traces of the place where and the time when it took its origin, to become the universal law. Besides this, the early division of the theocratic Caliphate ‘into numberless despotic kingdoms, making war upon one another in spite of their Moslem doctrine, stood in the way of the continuation of the union. But the race-paragraph of the system of Islam contributed much to the initial success and redounds to the perpetual honour _of this international community. Mohammed did not claim originality for his religion, and Christianity, to which he so often referred, had already removed the difference between Greek and Jew, Barbarian and Scythian, bond and free. But the league of nations founded on the basis of Mohammed’s religion took the principle of equality of all human races so seriously as to put to shame other communities. White men’s churches kept closed to coloured Christians, a missionary boycotted on account of his marrying a negro woman, and the habit of lynching, are often quoted by Moslems as instances of the backwardness of Christian society. The ideal of a league of human races has indeed been approached by the Moslem community more nearly than by any other. | 1 Colossians, 3: II. THE REACTION OF MOSLEM INDIA TO WESTERN ISLAM BY THE REV. MURRAY T. TITUS, B.L., District Superintendent, Methodist Episcopal Church, North India Conference, Moradabad District ya ’ w is . i ee & Ey 2 yey _ Ned wae: a | piviaas f ext ff LOM: ,, 4, f Pot AY 23"? Aa \ p' 45 é 1 rq i ’ 7 ‘ . qiyidcoae oF Ae ay et 18 f *\ Fo Biabalea LS Ye DRA ARS BAA § rhe Barat . : B f g CHAPTER VII THE REACTION OF MOSLEM INDIA TO WESTERN ISLAM MosLeM India, numbering 68,735,2331 persons, forms the largest single group of Moslems in the world. Dr. Zwemer points out, “‘ The province of Bengal has a larger Moslem population than all Arabia, Egypt, and Persia together. The number of Mohammedans in the Punjab alone is nearly as large as in Egypt.’ Not only is it the largest group in the world, but it is also probably the most mixed group—mixed as to racial origin and sects. Here are the Arab, Persian, Turanian, and Mongol all blended with the Indo-Aryan and Dravidian strains in a community which comprises most of the various shades of theological opinion found in the Moslem world. The Sunni, the Shii, the Wahhabi, the Ismaili, the modern Mu'‘tazili, and the heterodox Ahmadi are all here. But, in spite of these wide variations, there is present that element of cultural coherence, characteristic of the Moslem world as a whole, and an essential community of thought and point of view that on occasion is able to speak with authority through its various representative bodies, like the All-India Moslem League, the Central Khilafat Committee, and the All-India Educational Conference, and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. Without question Moslem India very keenly feels her 1 Census of 1921, 93 94 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY burden of responsibility for the welfare of the world of Islam. Geographically she knows herself to be the centre of that world, and, because of her contact with the deep spiritual currents so natural to the life of India, she is second to none in her zeal for the Faith. As The Muslim Herald, Madras, puts it: ‘* Situated as India is between the Far Eastern Muslims and the Muslims of the Near East, holding easy inter- course with Arabia, Persia, and Egypt on the one hand, and the Far Eastern countries on the other, it is obviously the duty of Islamic India to take the lead in advancing Islamic learning.’”’ It is with this same conviction of responsibility for the Faith that the Ahmadi missionary goes to the ends of the earth, and the Ali brothers urge the claims of the Caliphate. Moslem India to-day, therefore, is sensitive to all that takes place in the whole Moslem world: trouble on the Iraq frontier over the possession of Mosul oil, Egyptian disappointment over the Sudan, the possibility of foreign intervention in the settlement of the Hejaz affairs, the triumph of the Riff armies, dissatisfaction of Palestinian Arabs with the Mandate, are all broadcast to the ends of India from day to day by the ever-growing Moslem vernacular and English press, with the result that even in the villages, to a large extent, Moslems are alive to what is happening to their brothers in various parts of the world, and are prepared to show their sympathy. The attitude of the Indian Moslem is frankly Pan- Islamic. Since the days of the well-known promoter of modern Pan-Islamism, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, India has ever shown a warm response to the extension of the power and prestige of the Caliphate over the Moslem nations of the world. Even during the Great War, when MOSLEM INDIA AND WESTERN ISLAM 95 Moslem Indians were fighting the armies of the Caliph, they were ever and anon seeking to justify their seemingly inconsistent action with the argument that, because they were helping the victorious Allies, they would be able on that account to help secure better peace terms for the Caliph and the Moslem world, as a reward for their loyalty. In fact, as soon as the war was over, the organization known as the Central Khilafat Committee, with headquarters in Bombay, was started, and large sums of money were secured to press for the restoration of Turkey to sovereignty, and to free Arabia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia from foreign control, all of which centred around the prime object of the preserva- tion of the Caliphate. A delegation was sent to London and to the Peace Conference at Paris, an extensive pro- paganda was kept up in both India and England, and great was the disappointment at the terms given to Turkey by the ineffective Treaty of Sévres. The deep interest of Indian Moslems in the preservation of the Caliphate is clearly summed up in a paragraph of an address presented by the Indian Khilafat Deputation to the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, at Delhi on January 109, 1920, which reads: “The preservation of the Khilafat, as a temporal no less than a spiritual institution, is not so much a part of their [the Indian Moslems’] faith, as the very essence thereof ; and no analogies from other creeds that tolerate the lacerating and devitalizing distinction between things spiritual and things temporal, between the Church and the State, can serve any purpose save that of clouding and befogging the clearest of issues. Temporal power is of the very essence of the institution of the Khilafat, and Mussulmans can never agree to any change in its character or to the dismemberment of its Empire.’’ } 1 The Indian Khilafat Delegation Publications, No, I, p. 6. 96 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY But not only were the Sunni Moslems interested in the preservation of the Caliphate. When it became known that Turkey was herself making plans for the abolition of her connexion with it, two of the leading Shii Moslems of India, Sir Syed Ameer Ali and H.H. the Agha Khan, submitted their famous letters of protest to Turkey, and did all that could be done to show how seriously the religious feelings and prestige of the whole Moslem world would be injured by such a revolutionary step. Then, of a sudden, came the message announcing the banishment of the Caliph and the abolition of the Turkish Caliphate. Reuter’s message, however, could not be accepted as authentic by the distracted Moslem leaders. Cables were sent in feverish haste both to the banished Caliph and to Mustafa Kemal Pasha asking for authorita- tive information. With what distress and consternation the whole Moslem community was affected may be gathered from a telegraphic reply to a message from Mustafa Kemal himself in which he had verified the information that had reached India. ‘This reply, dated March II, 1924, sent jointly by the Central Khilafat Committee and the Jamuat-ul-Ulama-1-Hind, reads as follows : “The news so far received from Turkey regarding the abolition of the Khilafat has caused deep distress and consternation among young Indian Moslem brethren. The Mussulmans of India are not partisans favouring the retention of the Khilafat as the monopoly of any par- ticular family or the perquisite of any individual. They entirely dissociate themselves from any desire to intervene in the national affairs of their Turkish brethren, who are quite competent to deal with them. But they are deeply concerned with the question of the retention or | 1 Associated Press message, published in The Pioneey, March 16, 1924. MOSLEM INDIA AND WESTERN ISLAM 97 the abolition of the office of Khalifa itself, which is the very essence of the Islamic faith, and was designed to maintain and conserve the ideal of Islamic brotherhood through a definite and well-established institution. It is true that when, in the hour of his need, the Khalifa called upon the members of the world-wide Moslem brotherhood to assist him and his nation, the response of the Moslem world was very poor; but it is equally true that this was for want of a properly and effectively functioning Khilafat organization. As a consequence of this not only Turkey, but the entire Moslem world, suffered grievously. But we learned our lesson in the terrible school of suffering, and awakened at last to a proper sense of the need of a reformed and renovated Khilafat. “Indian Mussulmans expected that Your Highness, after achieving such a well-earned and signal success, would revive Islam’s fundamental institution of the Khilafat, purging it of such excrescences as were not required by the Shariat, but were the growth of personal greed and dynastic ambitions, and re-establish it on a firm democratic basis. But the entire abolition of the institution of the Khilafat, just at the time when the Moslem world was showing unmistakable signs of an awakening, destroys all our expectations. We believe that the Khilafat and the Republic are not incompatible with each other, and that the continuation of the Khilafat after its reform will not only not be detrimental to the internal unity of Turkey, but will also be a source of strength to the Turkish nation in its relations abroad. “We would, in any case, implore Your Highness and the National Assembly not to belittle the importance and advantages of the continuation of the institution of the Khilafat, and its re-establishment on true democratic foundations. The existence of the Khilafat does not, of course, depend upon the good-will of any particular Moslem nation or state, but Turkey, as the last great Moslem Power, is best fitted to remain associated with the Khilafat, and this connexion, we fervently trust, 8 98 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY will benefit not only the rest of the Islamic world, but Turkey herself. If the National Assembly’s decision abolishes the institution of the Khilafat itself, it is bound to cause a diversion and dissipation of energy and strength in the Moslem world, and would open the door to the mischievous ambitions of hosts of undeserving claimants. Seventy million Indian Mussulmans appeal to their brethren of the National Assembly to reconsider their decision, so far as it relates to the abolition of the office of the Khalifa itself, and give an opportunity to the delegation of Indian Mussulmans, which desire to visit Angora, to make fuller representation on the subject.” This was the beginning of India’s rude awakening, and ever since March 1924, Indian Moslems have been seeking for the proper mental adjustment that will enable them fully to understand what it is that Turkey has done to herself and to the Islamic world. The more liberal-minded are inclined to agree that Kemal Pasha was right in removing the Caliphate from Turkey. They are quite prepared to admit that the Caliphate, as it has been constituted in the past, was inconsistent with the development of a modern republican form of government. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the well- known philosopher-poet of India, defends the action of the Grand National Assembly in a scholarly essay on Ijtihad. In discussing the point whether it is contrary to the spirit of Islam to vest the Caliphate in an elected Assembly, rather than in a single person, this learned writer says : : ‘ The religious doctors of Islam, in Egypt and India, as far as I know, have not yet expressed themselves on this point. Personally, I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound. ... The republican form of govern- ment is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit MOSLEM INDIA AND WESTERN ISLAM 99 of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam.” } Sir Muhammad and this school of political thinkers agree that the Caliphate, or Universal Imamate, has failed in practice, and that now the time has come for every nation of the Islamic world “‘ to sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics.”” Then he conceives that in due time the old Caliphate idea, born of Arabian imperialism of the earlier centuries of Islam, will be displaced by a League of Moslem Nations, “‘ which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.” The question that immediately began to be asked in India after the banishment of the Caliph, Abdul Mejid Khan, was, ‘‘ Who is Caliph?” The first inclination was to hold to the view that the deposed Caliph was still Caliph de jure, and should be recognized as such, since he had been deposed, not by the world of Islam, but by only one part thereof. Messages expressing warm affec- tion and allegiance were immediately sent to him, and in due course comfortable life-pensions totalling Rs. 6,000 per mensem, were granted him by the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Begum of Bhopal. It is now recognized, of course, that there is no Caliph, and accordingly reference to him is omitted from the Friday sermon. The assumption of the title and office of Caliph by King Hussein of the Hejaz was met in India by prompt repudiation. The reasons for complete dislike of this 1 The above and the following quotations from Sir M. Iqbal are from an unpublished essay on Jjtihad which he very kindly permitted the writer to use. 100 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY Hashimite family which are set forth in the following editorial from The Muslim Herald, Madras, are alleged to be their dependence on British bayonets and gold for support of their pet schemes. The editor of the Herald says: “ The affairs in the Holy Land [Arabia] to-day de- monstrate how unreal the Treaty Settlements in this portion of the world have proved themselves to be. These settlements aimed, it need hardly be said, at (I) the unification of Arabia into a strong confederation; ... (2) the constitution of a strong and, nominally, at any rate, independent Muslim State such as would satisfy the Muslim sentiment that the Holy Places should not be under the protection of any but purely independent Muslim States. Neither of these objects, however, has the treaty fully secured. The Arab States are at present as far from developing into a strong, unified confederation under the auspices of the Sheriffians as they were ever before. Kingdoms are not made strong and independent at the mere wish of a foreign potentate. We see, there- fore, the spectacle of all the three Sheriffian States—the Hejaz, Iraq, Trans-Jordania—declining into nominal dependencies at the mercy of an alien power for their very existence. The Trans-Jordanian administration has been dubbed incapable and corrupt; the Iraquian is weak, and, at any rate, there is no contentment in the land ; while, in the Hejaz, Hussein’s rule and his treat- ment of all the Hajis especially stink in the nostrils of the world at large. The Sheriffians’ sanction for their tule is the British bayonet without which behind their back they would have been nowhere now, and this very support brings down upon them the execration of their people, and makes their positions as insecure as that of hated sovereigns can be with a people whose loyalty is dependent on the sword of a dominating ally.”’ . 1 The Muslim Herald, September 20, 1924, p. 7. MOSLEM INDIA AND WESTERN ISLAM 101 Since the “traitor ’’ Hussein is so cordially disliked by all persuasions of Indian Moslems, it is not surprising that the attack of Ibn Saud, King of Nejd, on the Hejaz was welcomed rather than deplored. True it was that bloodshed in the vicinity of the Holy Places was regarded with regret, but, when it became apparent that Ibn Saud was coming off victorious, feelings of regret were drowned in feelings of joy over the abdication of Hussein, and the King of Nejd was proclaimed the saviour of the Holy Places of Islam. As for the future of the Caliphate, Indian Moslems are living in high hopes. Keen interest is being taken in the proposed Moslem world conference to discuss the future of the Caliphate, and to elect a Caliph. While King Fuad of Egypt, the Amir of Afghanistan, and Ibn Saud of Nejd are being mentioned as possibilities, yet a Turkish Caliph is still the desire of many Indian Moslems. As stated by the Muslim Outlook, Lahore, recently, ‘ the chief reason why some Indian Muslims would like to see the Caliphate restored to Turkey is because the Turks are independent and able to defend their inde- pendence.” Before we go further in our study of the reaction of Moslem India to specific developments in Turkey and elsewhere, it is necessary to notice the Indian Moslem attitude toward the whole general break-up of old ideas and customs that have for long held sway, and have been considered indispensable to Islam. In other words, what is India’s attitude toward the modern view of Ijtihad, or the “exercise of independent thought in Mohammedan Law,” that is evidently prevalent among the powerful leaders of Turkey? Perhaps, as Sir Muhammad Iqbal suggests, “it is a bit too early to judge the reaction ” in India, but at the same time, in 102 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY his essay on Ijtihad above referred to, he makes some very pertinent remarks which are worth considering : “We find that the idea of Jjtihad, reinforced and broadened by modern philosophical ideas, has long been working in the religious and political thought of the Turkish nation. We in India have practically no know- ledge of the intellectual life of modern Turkey. Nobody in India knows, for instance, that. Halim Sabit has developed a new theory of Muhammadan Law grounded on modern sociological concepts. The series of articles in which he developed this theory was, as far as I know, never translated in India. ... The little knowledge that I possess of the thought-currents of Turkey is derived from German sources. . . . If the renaissance of Islam is a fact, and I believe it is a fact, we too, one day, like the Turks, will have to re-evaluate our intellectual inheritance, and, if we cannot make any original con- tribution to the general thought of Islam, we may, by healthy conservative criticism, serve, at least, as a check on the rapid movement of Turkish Liberalism.” The authority above mentioned, following the same line of thought as that developed by Moulavi Cheragh Ali, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, and Sir Syed Ameer Ali, considers : «That with the return of new life the inner catho- licity of the spirit of Islam is bound to work itself out, in spite of the rigorous conservatism of our doctors. And I have no doubt that a deeper study of the enormous legal literature of Islam is sure to rid the modern critic of the superficial opinion that the Law of Islam is sta- tionary and incapable of development. Unfortunately, the conservative Moslem public of this country is not quite ready for a critical discussion of Figh [canon law], which, if undertaken, is likely to displease most people and raise sectarian controversies.”’ MOSLEM INDIA AND WESTERN ISLAM 103 This Indian advocate of liberal ideas declares further that the founders of the four schools of Moslem juris- prudence never did claim finality for their reasonings and interpretations. Therefore, he argues: “The claim of the present generation of Moslem liberals to reinterpret the foundational legal principles in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern life is perfectly justified.” On the question of the separation of Church and State, as carried out in Turkey, our Indian authorities are, generally speaking, true to the conservative tendency that Sir Muhammad Iqbal indicates in dealing with the whole subject of reform : “There are at present in Turkey, two main lines of thought represented by (1) the Nationalist Party, and (2) the Party of Religious Reform. The point of supreme interest with the Nationalist Party is, above all, the State, and not religion.... They, therefore, reject old ideas about the function of State and religion and accentuate the separation of Church and State. ... I think it is a mistake to suppose that the idea of State is more dominant and rules all other ideas embodied in the system of Islam. In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains. ... In Islam it is the same reality which appears as Church looked at from one point of view and State from another.... Islam isa single, unanalysable reality, which is one or the other as. your point of view varies. The truth is that the Turkish Nationalists assimilated the idea of the separation of Church and State from the history of European political ideas, without understanding the nature of primitive Christianity which-largely determined its evolution in Europe, where State and Church confronted each other as distinct powers with interminable boundary disputes between them. Such a thing could never happen in 104. THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY Islam, for Islam was from the very beginning a civil society, having received from the Koran a set of simple legal principles which, as experience subsequently proved, carried great potentialities of expansion and development by interpretation. The nationalist theory of the State, therefore, is misleading, and open to grave objections from the Islamic standpoint, inasmuch as it suggests a duality between Church and State which does not exist in Islam.”’ The Nationalist Movement in Egypt and Turkey has begotten a marked response in India. But this interest seems to centre in the possible power that will be added to the world of Islam from the strengthening of the units in that world, rather than in the manner of actual national development itself. It is well known in India that the Turks are the leading nationalists of the world of Islam, and that they are even inclined to place love of country above love of religion. Maulana Muhammad Ali, the great nationalist and Khilafat worker in India, in an address in the Jama Masjid, Aligarh, immediately following the announcement of the banishment of the Caliph, expressed his disappointment in the Turkish attitude toward Islam when he said : “ During my stay in Paris had I not reason to weep when one of our best coadjutors, who was a Turk, had said to me at my own dinner-table, in all seriousness, that the Turks would have fared better if they had never embraced Islam ? ”’ 4 In India the attitude runs to the other extreme and it is common to hear the expression, ‘‘I am a Moslem first, and an Indian afterwards.”’ It is doubtful if many Indian Moslems appreciate at 1 Associated Press Message of March 8, 1924. MOSLEM INDIA AND WESTERN ISLAM 105 all the strong national feelings of the Turks. Dr. Iqbal thinks that the supplanting of Arabic by Turkish in religious exercises is sure to be condemned by most Moslems in India, and the following sentiments expressed by Zia, the poet of Turkish Nationalism, as quoted by him, would be resented rather than applauded by his co-religionists in India : “The land where the call to prayer resounds in Turkish ; where those who pray understand the meaning of their religion; the land where the Koran is learnt in Turkish ; where every man, big or small, knows full well the command of God; O son of Turkey! that land is thy fatherland ! ” In India Arabic still prevails as the language of religion, and any move to displace it with Urdu or any other vernacular would, as indicated above, be met with the highest disfavour, for this would savour of disloyalty to the universal Faith. The Indian Moslem’s strongest reaction to the nation- alist movements in other parts of the Moslem world is to be found in the movement for the development of a strong communal spirit. In fact, the present indica- tions are that the whole of the Moslem population in India is opposed to any further modification or extension of the Reforms Act in India granting a larger measure of Home Rule, unless and until the interests and position of the Moslem community are more carefully safeguarded than they are at present. The present position seems to be to stress the development of a strong community in league with the world forces of Islam above the de- velopment of a programme of Indian Nationalists. To this end, it is apparent, the present activity of the various organizations is dedicated. The Khilafat Committee 106 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY is interested chiefly in (zr) the coming Islamic World Congress that is to elect a Caliph and provide for the protection of the Holy Places in Arabia ; (2) the removal of all foreign and non-Moslem influence from Arabia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia (a group of countries commonly called the Jazirat-ul-Arab) ; and (3) tanzim, or the organization and improvement of the Moslem community in India. , Much emphasis is being laid on the so-called National Islamic schools, chief of which is the Jama Mullia Islamia, or the National Moslem University of Aligarh. In these the aim, according to Maulana Muhammad Ali, the founder of the Jamia, is to turn out not only young men of culture according to modern standards, but also true Mussulmans imbued with the spirit of Islam, and possessing enough knowledge of their religion to be able to stand by themselves as sufficiently independent units in the army of Islam’s missionaries.} Therefore in this programme of “ National ’’ education an intimate knowledge of the Koran is regarded as a necessity, likewise a good knowledge of Arabic and the usual theological studies, including the commentaries on the Koran, the Traditions, Canon Law, Systematic Theology, and the History of Islam. In this connexion there is no development that is more truly national, while being at the same time Moslem, than the establish- ment of the Osmania University in Hyderabad, Deccan, where degree and post-graduate courses are taught entirely in Urdu, English being taught only as a second language. The Moslem University of Aligarh, the foun- dations of which were laid by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in his Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, is still the 1 Muhammad Ali, A Scheme of Studies for National Muslim Educational Institutions in India, pp. 4, 5. MOSLEM INDIA AND WESTERN ISLAM 107 premier Moslem educational institution of the country and may be said to derive no small share of its present- day interest in the progress and advancement of the Moslem community in India from the example being set by Turkey and Egypt. The emancipation of woman, as it is being carried out in the lands of the Near East, is viewed with mixed feelings in India. There are many advocates of the larger freedom among Moslems, and the tendency is in some quarters for greater freedom to prevail. But it is significant of the clinging conservatism of India that, at the Bombay Provincial Moslem Ladies’ Conference, held at Poona recently— “While the ladies decided on going in for enlighten- ment by resort to modern education, they did not lose sight of the fact that they had special functions to perform as distinct from those which the opposite sex were called on to do. The Poona ladies pressed for reform on cautious lines. They did not despise the purdah [veil]. Indeed, their chief function there was to show how enlightenment was not incompatible with the furdah, and how they could learn the most effectively to dis- charge the duties they had been called on by their Maker to undertake, without throwing themselves into the modern feminist movements in Europe and America. It was their ambition to be better mothers and wives [rather] than indifferent clerks or lawyers or states- men.’ + None the less, there are Moslem women who are fear- lessly pushing forward the crusade to secure equal rights for themselves and their sisters, so that the day will come when Moslem women in India will be as free as they give promise of being in Turkey and Egypt. In 1 The Muslim Herald, Madras, October 25, 1924, p. 6. 108 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY the matter of divorce, while in Turkey there is now equality for men and women before the law, yet in India, says Dr. Iqbal: ‘‘ A Muslim woman who wishes to get rid of an unr desirable husband cannot do so without becoming an apostate. Nothing could be more distant from the aims of a missionary religion.” Therefore, in his opinion, a radical revision of the Mo- hammedan law of divorce is badly needed. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that Moslem India is at the cross-roads. She realizes that her life is vitally connected with the world-currents of Islam, and she has the conviction that somehow she is the special custodian of the faith of the fathers. Her liberal leaders are striving to be progressive, but not too pro- gressive. The masses are, for the most part, still led by the orthodox mulvis, and reflect the mind of their leaders in strong aversion to radical reform and in the strictest adherence to all that is Moslem, so far as they understand the term. Moslem India is awake. The two things that have aroused her from her lethargy in the last half-century are unmistakably the revolutionary modern education movement, inaugurated by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, coupled with the unfading vision of a federated world of Islam. Having the courage of their convictions, Indian Moslems are not content to sit in silence and let the world go by. They are ever ready to take part in international Islamic affairs of moment, and, in the words of William Lloyd Garrison, they are in earnest, they will not equivocate, they will not retreat a single inch, and they will be heard ! THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF CHRISTENDOM TO THE PEOPLES OF THE MOSLEM WORLD BY THE REV. JOHN E. MERRILL, Ph.D., Principal, Boys’ High School, Aleppo ; formerly President, Central Turkey College, Aintab CHAPTER VIII THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF CHRISTENDOM TO THE PEOPLES OF THE MOSLEM WORLD THERE is throughout Christendom a growing interest ~ in the peoples of foreign countries. Of its extent in America the success of publications like The National Geographic Magazine and Asia is an index, while in Europe it is of much longer standing. There is likewise in Christendom a growing readiness to view the customs and convictions of other peoples with toleration, and even with sympathy. Yet, in the background, there exist deep-rooted prejudices, and at any time a wave of nationalism may accentuate racial incompatibilities and sow afresh the seeds of distrust and ill-will. Each of these tendencies has shared in forming the sentiment of Christendom regarding the Moslem peoples. During the war, and especially since the armistice, the attention of Christendom has been focussed upon Islam as never since those days when, in the sixteenth century, Europe was threatened with invasion by the Turks. The attitude toward the Moslem world which is to result from this new interest is a matter of prime concern to the future Christian Church. For, in the first place, this attitude will determine the future action of the peoples of Christendom toward the peoples of Islam. A Christendom which sees in Islam _ a menace will prepare for self-defence. A Christendom 111 s 112 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY which sees in Islam an enemy will plan how that enemy may be destroyed. A Christendom which sees in Islam a rival faith will gird itself to compete for world su- premacy. Only a Christendom which sees in the Moslem peoples brothers and sisters in need of help will have the will to help them. The past is full of proofs that fear, hatred, and rivalry bear only bitter and costly fruits, demonstrating their own futility. Only in the path of helpfulness is there hopefulness, and we help sincerely only those whom we sincerely love. This attitude will determine, also, the future dis- position of the Moslem people toward Christendom. For, in a real degree, they may be expected to act toward us as we have acted toward them. It is common know- ledge that Moslems everywhere are in reaction now against the imperialistic diplomacy of Christendom. Christendom is reaping that which it has sown. Educated Moslems in India, in Egypt, in Syria, and in Turkey are reading books and articles written by Christians about Islam. Often translations from these publications appear in Moslem papers in the vernacular. The tenor of a single article or of a single citation may be regarded by Moslems as characteristic of the attitude of Christendom in general, with corresponding effect upon Moslem sentiment. | Further, there are in Christian countries many Moslem immigrants. They share the freedom of these countries, but they suffer from their inequalities, and they realize that often the best of these countries is withheld from them. Their hearts fill with resentment and bitterness < at the exclusiveness and the unfriendly spirit manifested toward them. “‘ We have nothing to say against the American Government,” said a Moslem in conversation not long ago, “‘ but we have many things to say against CHRISTENDOM AND MOSLEM WORLD 113 the American people.” No doubt ignorance of the language of the country and difference in religion have contributed greatly to the peculiar isolation of the Moslems in America. Without doubt, also, many Christians could be found ready to extend a sincere and hearty welcome, if the need were understood and the necessary opportunity provided. Yet it remains true that the Ahmadiya Movement, with its missionary centre for America in Chicago, is able to conduct among the negro population of that city an effective propaganda for Islam, based upon the racial inequality which charac- terizes Christian civilization, as compared with the / brotherhood of Islam which knows no colour line. When Moslem immigrants write of their experiences to their relatives and friends at home, the report of this prevalent unsympathetic attitude must have great weight in forming an opinion unfavourable to Christianity. In the Moslem countries, likewise, there have been for centuries many representatives of Christianity, adherents of the ancient Churches and representatives of Western Christendom. The Moslems have not failed to study with care the spirit of these Christians. There have been happy instances in which Moslems have been attracted. Said a Moslem not long since to a native Christian in Turkey, “‘ If all the Christians had been like you, these events [1915-19] would not have happened.” It was a Moslem, attracted by the Gospel, who said years ago, “If the Christians lived the Gospel, we all should be Christians within fifty years.’’ Christians often are not aware of the influence exerted silently by their lives. Only a crisis may reveal it. But wherever Christians, of whatever race, show themselves to the Moslems as grasping, unreliable, and insincere, they can but expect the Moslems to turn against Christianity. 9 114 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY It may be added that the attitude of Christendom toward Islam furnishes to Christendom an involuntary revelation of its own spirit. Only the Christ-like heart is perfectly Christian. The Moslem problem provides an automatic test of the conformity of Christendom to the mind of Christ. The attitude of Christendom as a whole to the Moslem peoples is made up of the sentiment and attitude of a multitude of groups in Christendom. As typical, the attitude of diplomacy and commerce, the attitude of public opinion in general, and the missionary attitude of the Churches may be selected. Study of this composite attitude discloses the portentous fact that the attitude of Christian peoples to the peoples of Islam rests chiefly upon non-religious considerations, and that it is motivated by purposes which are not truly Christian. The attitude of diplomatic and commercial Christendom toward the peoples of Islam is based confessedly upon non-religious considerations. The political relationships existing between Christian Governments and their Moslem colonials, as well as be- tween themselves and the independent Moslem Powers, necessitate the adoption by them of diplomatic policies toward the Moslems. Commercial relationships follow diplomatic, and result, likewise, in the adoption of policies on the part of commercial men. Many nations of Western Christendom are involved in such relations. Foremost are England in Egypt and other parts of Africa and in India, and France in Africa and in Syria. Italy has Moslem dependents in North Africa, Spain in Morocco, Holland in the East Indies, and the United States in the Philippine Islands. Russia includes Moslem peoples in Western and Central Asia. These and still other nations seek favourable relationships with Turkey, with CHRISTENDOM AND MOSLEM WORLD 115 Persia, with the Arab States, and with Afghanistan. In these relationships the attitude assumed by diplomatic and commercial men is based usually and frankly upon self-interest. At its best, the self-interest seeks mutual welfare and is guided by mature judgment. The ac- tivities which result are not without advantage to the Moslem peoples, for the Christian Powers strive to main- tain peace and order and to advance civilization. But it is well understood that the Christian Powers expect to retain a paramount influence, making secure their own position, and leaving themselves free to execute any project which they consider expedient. In carrying out a policy based upon self-interest it is essential that the Christian Powers should adopt what- ever methods of dealing with the Moslem peoples may appear most advantageous, and this is true not only in general but specifically in view of the religious charac- teristics of these peoples. For Islam as a religion enters deeply into the lives of its adherents, giving them an undertone of religious feeling, a unity, and a sensitiveness that may not be disregarded. Therefore diplomatic wisdom and commercial prudence are always at pains so to act toward the Moslems as to forestall religious opposition, and the oscillations of public feeling are studied with great care. Unquestionably every Christian nation which bears responsibility for large numbers of Moslem colonials is compelled to face serious problems respecting them. Also, the most trifling incident may relate itself suddenly to a national or racial solidarity, which is rooted in turn in the international and interracial brotherhood of the world of Islam. Therefore the need is definite and urgent for the formulation by each of these nations of an adequate Islamic policy. Our present interest in 116 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY these policies has to do only with the motives on which they may be based. And the significance of the fact cannot be overestimated that, in general, the political wisdom of Christendom, while recognizing the obligations of those who govern toward the governed, has ac- knowledged the determining factor in its treatment of the millions of the Moslem world to be self-interest. Add to this, also, the existence of urgent pressure from non- official quarters, demanding more intensive study of Moslem character, including its religious phases, in order thereby to facilitate political control of the Moslem peoples and their commercial exploitation. Two references will serve as illustrations of this pressure. Let it be remembered that the Governments mentioned are regarded by the world of Islam as leading repre- sentatives of the spirit and practice of Christendom. A comparatively recent book,! publication of which was not allowed during the war, summons the Govern- ments of France and Italy to the study of Islam as a religious movement, in order to take advantage of the religious psychology of the Moslems, and so gain greater power among them. It is declared that England already has adopted such a policy in its dealings with Egypt, and that the plans made for the re-Islamization of that country show the highest degree of political wisdom. A more recent article in the Revue du Monde Musul- man (1923) cites the success of German diplomacy in leading many of the Moslem peoples to see in Germany their only true friend among the Christian nations, a psychological asset of great political value. The article then asserts that this psychological propaganda has been continued by German commercial agents without abate- 1 L’Islam et la Politique des Alliés, adapted from the Italian of Dr. Enrico Insabato. Paris, 1920. CHRISTENDOM AND MOSLEM WORLD 117 ment, producing a corresponding advantage for German trade. France should appreciate the immense prospec- tive volume of commerce with the Moslem peoples, and enter the same field. The attitude of public opinion in Christendom regarding the Moslem peoples rests, partly, upon knowledge of them, and, partly, upon current presuppositions. Both are chiefly non-religious. There is a growing popular literature regarding the peoples of Islam, and it is evident that Christians desire to learn more about the Moslems. This public opinion has no ulterior purpose as concerns the Moslem peoples beyond that of forming an honest judgment regarding them, and then alining itself accordingly upon public questions where they are in- volved. In attempting to do this, Christian public opinion fastens upon two classes of facts. One is the racial characteristics of some single Moslem nation. These characteristics are then transferred to all Moslems. The other is certain customs and characteristics which are supposed to mark every Moslem as a Moslem, Public opinion, for instance, has become confirmed regarding certain racial characteristics of the Turkish people, and these characteristics have coloured Christian imagination regarding all Moslems. But quite other racial traits distinguish the Arabs, the Malays, or the Chinese, who may be equally good Moslems. Or, a traveller reports some occurrence which has been observed by him in a Moslem land. The incident may have to do with poly- gamy, or slavery, or divorce, with observance of the hours of prayer or of the fast, with patient endurance of misfortune. A single event is generalized, and all Moslems are imagined to be like those described, while this may be far,from the fact. 118 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY The substantial facts in view of which public opinion regarding the Moslems is formed are those regarding the degree of civilization in Moslem countries, the state of commerce and industries, the conditions of family and of social life, the administration of government, safety of life and property, the means of education, the honesty and morality of the people—facts other than those concerning religion. Religious considerations, however, are included, and there is a strong tendency to connect social conditions among the Moslems with the religion of the Moslems, as effect with cause. If the judgment of Moslem institutions is favourable, it may be accom- panied by the statement that the excellences of these institutions are due to Islam. If the judgment is the reverse, all evils among the Moslems may be looked upon as the direct fruits of Islam. Going a step further, public opinion then passes judgment upon Islam itself. Islam may be declared a religion well suited to the character and needs of its adherents, provided that they are sincere. Or Islam and its adherents may be placed under the severest anathemas. These various phases of public opinion are reflected constantly in the literature of Christendom. The most marked feature to-day is an increasing cleavage between those looking with toleration upon the Moslems and those looking with hostility. The former attitude is, in part, simply a reaction from extreme anti-Moslem © propaganda. The harsher judgment arises especially from sympathy with Oriental Christians who have suffered so terribly at the hands of the Turks. The more tolerant judgment often reflects sympathetic study of Moslem literature and institutions or personal acquaint- ance with Moslems of worth. In either case, a funda- mental understanding of Islam as a religion has little CHRISTENDOM AND MOSLEM WORLD 119 share in shaping the final judgment. Yet the essence of Islam is religiousness. In so far as the missionary attitude of the Churches of Christendom rests upon a purely religious basis, it Wy finds this basis largely in the traditional ideas regarding Islam. These ideas had their source among the Oriental Christians of the early Moslem centuries, and were passed on by them to the Christians of Europe in the Middle Ages, from whom they have been transmitted to us. These ideas see in Islam a rival religion, late born, false in its claims and in its teachings, evil in its licence and in its commands, the religion of an invading enemy, hostile to Christendom and to Christianity. The issue of these ideas is a crusade of arms, as in the Middle Ages, or a crusade of ideas, an anti-Moslem propaganda. This latter is to demonstrate the superiority of Chris- tianity, to force Moslems to confession of their errors and to acceptance of the truth, and so to secure the down- fall of Islam. | In the minds of many earnest Christians, such a missionary programme is looked upon as natural and right. It is open, however, to serious criticism, trenchant and vital. For such a purpose ignores deliberately the best that there is in Islam, making no attempt to ascertain the religious truth which it may contain. Such a purpose is charged with feelings of Christian superiority, not with Christian sympathy. Such a purpose wills the destruction of a religious faith which others hold sacred. How can such a purpose relate itself to the purpose of Jesus, who came “not to destroy, but to fulfil’ the aspirations of the human heart in search of God, as truly as the premonitions of the Mosaic law ? This type of missionary effort has not met with great success, and the causes of its lack of success are inherent. ” 120 THE MOSLEM WORLD OF TO-DAY Had it succeeded, its success would have been as open to criticism as is the success of any Holy War. If spiritual success among the Moslem peoples is to be expected, the Christian missionary enterprise, in utter contrast to such a programme, must base itself upon sympathetic understanding of the religious life of Moslems, and upon loving service to them. PRESENT-DAY JOURNALISM IN THE WORLD OF ISLAM BY THE REV. SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, D.D., LL.D., F.R.G.S., Editor, ** The Moslem Worla”’ 4 ™ ae rae “