“af Se tery LIBRARY OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY PRINCETON, N. J. PRESENTED BY Japan oe! ety, TS jam] mm (~ Division, mde Seod WI wud Sad me om i — A Wel ta) a aS ie f 4 ‘ a hy i ie ; " ig bat Pa i Wie Aun “dl Me ae i) ( hy Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https://archive.org/details/presentdayjapanOOtsur PRESENT DAY JAPAN BY YUSUKE ‘TSURUMI Special Edition Printed for the JAPAN SOCIETY 36 WEsT 44TH STREET New York City j > p. 1S) i . Hl a) { L— Bie —ractely} NEW YORK COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS Copyright, 1926 By CoLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS Published August, 1926 Reprinted April, 1927 CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. Tue Ovp OrpeR.. ; ; £ g 4 : a 1 Il. Tue CuHaAutence or New Forces . ‘ , ; LRN Ba: | III. InvTevtectuaL CurrRENTS IN JAPAN . s P : JSR: IV. Mopern Lirerature— THe Novet, THe Drama, AND Po- ETRY . ; : : : ‘ : : ; ine Oe V. Mopern Literature (continued) . : : : Str ts: VI. Tue Impact or THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW ON JAPANESE Lire. : A " : ° . vee OD hi i ihe : We yn a aa tip i He hug | My 4 ‘ea7' AM ba i a | ivi ny’ ye an ; hi ee F a, A ¢ f - a i a j i j a A Y f . vy : 7 i EAs Pty } ‘ fe PY No 4 4 I r, Lan f Gh ida f ) eh BL NA) Cis Aan bale We, 4 ; bh ‘er ies ; \ i. "y Ht A) hy ; B ¥ ¥ rie ane r} j q f 4 : ) : a Co i ret TR Aa Ol (8 Pat aT Rive iy F () ‘i , Wie j : ny ie ts a Ni on on iy A oD, ue f ail if heey He i re ey it / be i | ie ve Ai qi a a y dh Ai mt ay hae | PRESENT DAY JAPAN LECTURE I THE OLp ORDER THE honor of an invitation to lecture in this great university is one which every Japanese student may well covet. In all the colleges and universities of Japan the works of Columbia professors are read and respected as authorities of the first rank. In every branch of public service and private enterprise throughout the Japanese Empire are to be found Japanese graduates of this institution. When we cross the narrow seas to China we find Columbia grad- uates among the leaders in every sphere of culture also in that ancient and charming nation. Tokyo has its Columbia Club which holds periodical meetings and gives the right hand of fellowship to Columbia gradu- ates who visit the land of the Rising Sun. As I read of the rapid expansion of this university under the able direction of President Butler, I am led to wonder whether our Japanese institutions of higher learning may not be absorbed in the extension department of Columbia in the near future! The spirit of this university, as I understand it, is the spirit of challenging directness and scientific in- quiry. So I feel under obligation to give you frankly 1 2 PRESENT DAY JAPAN at the very outset the burden of my argument which is to be sustained in detail by my series of lectures. It is that changes of epochal significance have taken place in the Orient during the past four of five years —changes which render obsolete the historical trea- tises now used in the schools — changes which aug- ment the weight of the East in world affairs — changes which concern above all the United States and Japan as Pacific powers. The dikes of the unchanging East have burst, and the floods run under the bridge so swiftly that the old observers are breathless; and those who formed their judgments on the state of things yesterday must revise their opinions to-day. A new Asia confronts us. Only a few years ago the powers of the world treated China as an entity, a body politic, ruled by a sover- eign authority with its center at Peking; the hypothe- sis was always more or less tenuous, and the policies founded upon it never worked with precision. To- day, even this fiction is abandoned and all mankind waits on the conflict of social forces in China — a con- flict that may last a thousand years as in the feudal Europe that followed the collapse of Rome, or that may be resolved before we are aware by some stroke of state foreseen only by the gods of fate. In India, where British rule seemed secure for centuries to come, a new spirit, a wide-spread unrest, challenges the old order — with what hazardous consequences no living person can divine. And where is the great Muscovite Empire that thundered now at the gates of the Baltic, now at the straits, now at the Far Pacific? The rivalry of powers in Siberia that vexed the capitals of ten THE OLD ORDER 3 countries a few months ago has been resolved by the extension of Soviet authority over that vast region. Moscow and Peking have begun to gather up the threads of their diplomacy; the silence of the Russian Embassy in the legation compound is broken by the feverish activities of shrewd men whose profession is revolution and whose astuteness is not to be denied. And last but not least, Japan is being subjected to changes so deep and thoroughgoing that a new era no less remarkable and critical than the Restoration of 1868 is now upon us. There, of course, the old land- marks have not been submerged, and superficial ob- servers imagine that as it was yesterday, it shall be forever; but in fact Japan also bows to the universal law of change. Shifting economic forces, the cumula- tive clangor of the printing press, the steady drive of universal education, the repercussion of changes in for- eign countries, and the growing pressure of interests in the Pacific — all these things are working out a new social and political pattern in Japan. It is not given to mortal men to see over the horizon of to-morrow, but can we doubt that the flooding and ebbing tides of the East will beat along the shores of the West? The late President Roosevelt, as you know, was fond of saying that ancient civilization flourished on the Mediterranean with Rome as the strategic center, that modern civilization has grown upon the Atlantic, and that the future belongs to the Pacific. There seems to be solid substance in that contention. The vast Pacific, seventy times the area of the Mediterranean, nearly twice the area of the At- lantic, stretches under every clime and washes the 4 PRESENT DAY JAPAN shores of vast continents inhabited by peoples of every race and in every stage of social development. Civili- zations old and new, endowed with vast resources and immense commercial strength, border upon it. Fast steamers can plow their way from Seattle to Yoko- hama in less time than it took a Roman captain to sail from Gibraltar to Phoenicia, — in one-fourth the time consumed by the clipper of Washington’s day in cross- ing the Atlantic. The islands of the United States stretching off the coast of Alaska are only seven hun- dred miles from the boundaries of Japan; they are not so far from Japan as Chicago is from New York; swift airplanes can make the journey in a few hours in the trail of the recent path breakers. That is not all. On a clear day the last Formosan outpost of the Japanese Empire can be seen with a glass from the nearest island of the Philippine group. America’s trade is bound to expand in the East; America’s intellectual interest is destined to reach out more and more to Asia; the achievements of America in science, com- merce, and diplomacy will weigh heavily in the Pacific balance. The policies, ideals, and measures of America, therefore, have a deeper significance for Japan than those of all the other nations on the globe combined. And what shall we say of Japan? Is it immodest to declare that she occupies a strategic position on the western shores of the Pacific? Mr. Hughes may an- nounce the end of the Lansing-Ishii agreement; the geographical and economic facts underlying it remain unchanged. At all events, it cannot be denied that Japan must sit at every council table where the affairs of the Orient are discussed and adjusted. Her policies. THE OLD ORDER 5 ideals, and measures must in turn inevitably affect’ America, not so deeply of course, but still vitally. Though this is true, I do not find any responsible statesman in Japan who believes that any issue arising between the two nations cannot be solved by methods of conciliation and compromise. I am sure that not one views the possibility of war with America in any other light than that of horror. On the contrary they are grateful to the United States for innumerable serv- ices rendered since the opening of our gates by Admiral Perry, and they believe that the fundamental purposes of the American people are pacific. Yet they are ad- mittedly puzzled by the numerous statements of high American authorities implying that our relations must be strained and that the imminence of war must al- ways be uppermost in our minds. For example, last June, Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, in a public state- ment to the Secretary of the Navy, warned the United States against too much confidence in pacific relations with Japan. “I do not mean to suggest,’ he said, “that war is even possible; but nevertheless, it may be pointed out that the Japanese and the Americans have taken attitudes that are irreconcilable, and that the Japanese have virtually broken off diplomatic rela- tions by giving their ambassador a ‘ vacation’! Such attitudes and such acts have usually preceded wars though they have not always been followed by wars. But even if war is not to come, the American people ought to realize that we are unprepared for it if it does come.” ‘Then again, only three weeks ago, Mr. Wilbur, the Secretary of the Navy, standing on the shores of the Pacific, said, in words of painfully obvious 6 PRESENT DAY JAPAN implication, “There is nothing so cooling to a hot temper as a piece of cold steel.” I do not utter a breath of criticism against these high authorities for the sentiments they have ex- pressed. It would be wholly improper for me to do so in this forum. On reading these words, however, I am profoundly pained to learn that Americans of such undoubted position and character regard my country as a standing menace to the security of the United States, and I am driven to wonder whether these opin- ions represent the solemn judgment of the American people. If they do, then there must be a new searching of hearts in Japan. Is it really inevitable that the two countries should glower at each other across the Pacific as did Rome and Carthage across the Mediterranean? Frankly I do not believe that this must be. Openly and without re- serve, I declare my opinion that a war between the United States and Japan would be stupid, profitless, and calamitous beyond measure, no matter what the result might be. By no conceivable calculation could either country gather from such a disaster fruits of any value comparable to the cost in life and treasure and human anguish. It is understanding, concilia- tion, and negotiation that we need; not bickering, con- troversy and defiance. Therefore, a part of my argu- ment —the justification of these lectures—is that American scholars, publicists, and journalists should give more attention than ever to the current tenden- cies in Japanese life. A distinguished trustee of this University established in the Imperial University of Tokyo a chair in American history and institutions. THE OLD ORDER ii It is too much to hope that a similar chair in Japanese history and institutions may be sometime founded in Columbia University —here in the very center of American intellectual and economic power? It will be my purpose in these lectures to develop the argument that I have presented in this introduc- tion and to show, if my powers permit, that the study of Japanese history and institutions is worthy of your labors and your talents — American labors and talents bestowed with such unremitting zeal on the history and institutions of Europe. It is my intention to dis- cuss, in such detail as time will permit, the clash of interests and classes in Japan, the tendencies in cur- rent opinion, the influences of these forces on foreign policies, and, what is of vital importance to friends of peace, the influence of foreign relations upon the course of Japanese domestic affairs. After all, the drama of politics in Japan is not altogether novel; the names, the language, the theater, are strange to most Occiden- tals; but the plot is as old as Euripides. There are forces that work for the dominance of statesmen who believe in what are called, in the polite language of diplomacy, “ vigorous foreign policies’’; even the late Mr. Lodge would hardly take that as a “ veiled threat.” There are forces that work for the dominance of states- men who would direct the energies of the nation mainly to the solution of pressing internal questions; and who would pursue, in the sphere of foreign relations, the policy of conciliation, codperation, and peace. There are in spirit Disraelis and Morleys in Japan. The things that are said and done in the homes, lecture rooms, and council chambers of America will pro- 8 PRESENT DAY JAPAN foundly affect the fortunes of politics in Japan, and the politics of Japan will no doubt affect in turn the drift of events throughout the world. For this we have the high authority of the late President Roose- velt, who saw clearly that the East and the West, though twain, were forever one, in the strife and inter- course of nations. To give the first chapter in the Japanese story will be the purpose of this lecture. If I may be allowed to anticipate, I will venture to say again that throughout this story from the be- ginning to the latest cable, the United States of America has played an important réle in our development — one that is destined to be even more impressive in the future. Japan is intensely eager to know and understand America. Our newspapers and magazines are con- stantly publishing articles about this great country, while new books about America and Americans are published by the dozen every month. Never before has American influence in Japan been so great as it is to-day. In almost every Tokyo street you may read the unmistakable signs. Things Ameri- can are everywhere. In the business center of Tokyo stand huge office buildings of distinctly American de- sign, and you might be made homesick by the sight of so many Ford automobiles parked at the curb. American influence is still more noticeable in our homes, where we have adopted all the conveniences and comforts of American life—from Victor phono- graphs to ice cream freezers. American motion pic- tures have become one of the principal amusements of the Japanese people, and although all kissing scenes THE OLD ORDER 9 have been deleted by the police board in the past, I understand there is now a new rule which tolerates movie kisses lasting no longer than thirty seconds! English is spoken throughout Japan, and to some ex- tent, what your Mr. H. L. Mencken calls the ‘“ Ameri- can language”; but we have improved somewhat on your grammar and pronunciation — to the great dis- may of visiting Americans. I might continue indefinitely enumerating such il- lustrations of the Americanization of Japan. My only regret is that we are not able to Japanize you Ameri- cans, to even the score. The great westward drive of your civilization has crossed the American prairies and is now reaching the shores of Asia. May I venture to say, without displaying any more immodesty than the American traveling salesman, that the Japanese civili- zation has some things to offer you beside silk and yen in exchange for material goods? I do not refer to cherry blossoms, prints, and carving, but to things more difficult to discover and divine. Business men in a hurry to sell us tractors and engines, round-the-world trippers whirling through Japan in ten hours, may overlook them; but if some will come to us without any interest except fine curiosity, and tarry long enough, they may discover imponderable values be- yond price. To give a balanced picture of the background for modern Japan is a difficult task even for us Japanese. Keenly aware of my own lack of qualifications for this task, I made a special effort to prepare myself when I accepted your invitation. I spared no effort in dis- cussing my task with Japanese whose opinions are 10 PRESENT DAY JAPAN more worthy than are my own. Before leaving Japan I visited and talked with almost a hundred people, leaders in every sphere of our modern life, with whose aid I hope to give you a realistic picture of the main currents in my country. The choice of materials, of course, lay with me; but in selecting them I have tried to be a fair and impartial judge. II I have no intention to attempt to take you through the labyrinth of Japanese history, and make you all anti-Japanese by hurling at your heads such historical names as Saki-no-kampaku-Dajodaijin-Hoshoji-no- nyudo-Fujiwara-no-Yorimichi. This is the full name of one man, you know, and when I was a boy it was considered quite a feat to repeat it all in one breath. On the contrary, I shall start by summarizing as quickly as possible the fundamental elements of the revolution in Japanese society in 1868 which followed the opening of the country by the treaty with the United States in 1858. The men who made that revo- lution, and their sons, are still among the mighty fac- tors in Japanese foreign and domestic policies. The society which they created remained for half a cen- tury “The Old Order of Japan.” In the first place, it must be noted that restora- tion bears no analogy whatever to the French Revolu- tion which was brought about by the new bourgeois who, assisted by the common people, imposed a consti- tution upon a monarchy. Our “revolution,” if I may say so, was the restoration of the Japanese Emperor to THE OLD ORDER 11 full authority by the arms of powerful feudal lords and a majority of the samurai, or professional warriors of the country. In the second place, the Japanese restoration in- stead of destroying feudalism, as did the revolution in France, was itself an expression of revived feudalism. As a great man of letters, the late Fukuchi, said in his history: “It was feudalism that gave the Toku- gawa family 260 years of peace, and it was feudalism that destroyed the family in the end.” In other words, the shoguns, the Tokugawas, had been unable to crush feudal lords; they ruled by the sword and by the arts of political management. In the end the shogunate was overthrown by a revival of feudalism that wrested power from the Tokugawas, and distributed it among the great lords, under the sovereignty of Emperor Meiji. In the third place, feudalism was undermined later by the rising power of the nation’s merchants who had been growing in prosperity during the Tokugawa régime. Moreover, when feudal tenures were finally abolished, the landlords received government bonds in payment for their rights, and thus, by a strange stroke of history, they became capitalists in one quick transaction. Thus the mercantile bourgeois and the holders of government debentures, instead of being in deadly conflict as were the landlords and bourgeois of England and France, were drawn together in bonds of common economic interest. No profound difference in social psychology separates the clipper of government coupons from the clipper of industrial coupons. In the fourth place, the abolition of feudal tenures. 12 PRESENT DAY JAPAN when it was effected, did not, as in many European countries, end in an almost complete triumph of a free-holding peasantry. On the contrary, the effect of the abolition was more like that in England where many great landlords continued to hold their estates on a rental or crop-sharing basis. So the feudal clans that had brought about the restoration continued to hold their power, as did the feudal lords of England in the age of the Tudors. In the fifth place, the main check on the power of the great Japanese lords was the Emperor Meiji, supported by the affection and desires of his people. He saw clearly the danger of that decentralizing and disintegrating feudalism which the Germans call “ Zer- splitterungswesen.” In his policy, he was supported by many wise and far-sighted statesmen who believed that a representative system of government was neces- sary to offset the power of the great clans. This idea was also popular among those who had studied Eng- lish and American democracy and were thoroughly im- bued with western democratic theories. So among the now famous five articles proclaimed by the young Emperor on March 14, 1869, was one which declared that: “ Deliberative assemblies shall be established and all official acts shall be in accord with public opinion.” In this article all liberals saw the ringing note of the new spirit. It is my own belief that the leaders at that time had only the vaguest notions re- garding the parliamentary systems of the west. It has been said that the article in the Imperial oath never contemplated a parliament by people; at all events, it gave strength to the faith of the rising liberal THE OLD ORDER 13 group that saw in the adoption of democratic politi- cal institutions the hope of the future. During this transition, as I shall point out later, many Japanese were in Europe and America zealously studying the art of self-government. Among them was Prince Iwa- kura, who with his able lieutenants, Okubo, Kido, and Ito, toured the world, and returned to Japan deeply impressed by western progress and firmly convinced that Japan’s first need was internal reform. In the sixth place, the whole course of the Res- toration was deeply influenced by foreign affairs and by the education of the new Japanese leaders in the high and mystic arts of foreign diplomacy. It must be remembered that for 216 years Japan had been sealed to foreign nations, that she had devoted her energies to the arts of peace, and that she had left far behind the age of internal wars and foreign conquests. I repeat that this basic fact must not be overlooked by those who would understand Japan today and the position of those Japanese who do not favor so-called “vigorous foreign policies.” It was foreign pressure that hastened the overthrow of the shogunate; it was the operations of the foreign powers in China and in HKastern waters that forced the Japanese, whether they liked it or not, to readjust their internal affairs and to seek ways and means to avoid the fate of India and China. So the course of internal progress in Japan, the democratization of Japanese society, could not go on without any thought about foreign policies and national defense. So from the very beginning, the potential Russells, Gladstones, and Morleys of Japan have had to work 14 PRESENT DAY JAPAN under the thundering guns of the Western powers blowing their way to new territories, new empires of trade, new spheres of influence. It is not surprising that they made little headway. One cannot help ask- ing where English democracy would have been if its growth had been conditioned by such circumstances. I think it will not be necessary for me to apologize therefore for devoting some time to post-Restoration diplomacy. I hope that you will find this part more in- teresting, especially as the government of the United States and a number of individual Americans played great roles in formulating that diplomacy. The remarks I shall make in this connection are based upon the researches of Prof. Katsumaru Naka- mura, of the historical department of the Imperial University of Tokyo, who has kindly permitted me to make use of some of his hitherto unpublished ma- terials. It is important to remember that the foreign policies of Japan since the Restoration have not been those of a small island empire, isolated from the main current of world politics. In reality they have been part and parcel of the world’s great political drama. The fall of the Tokugawas was by no means the result of mere internal disturbances, but was made necessary by two outside causes. One cause was the rise of the great Pacific Problem; the other was the Monroe Doctrine of America. The expansion of the European Powers in the Far East was rapidly advancing in the middle of the nine- teenth century. England and France were approach- ing steadily from the South, while the tentacles of the THE OLD ORDER 15 Russian octopus were stretching down hungrily from the North. England’s position around Hongkong was strengthened enormously by the Nanking Treaty which she signed with China at the conclusion of the Opium War in 1842; while Russia in 1855 signed the Aigun Treaty with the Peking Government and thus acquired the vast territory of the Maritime Province. France occupied Saigon in 1859 and laid the first stone in the foundation of her colonial empire in French Indo-China. The warships of these three powers had appeared even before this time in the peaceful waters surround- ing Japan. Russia invaded Japan’s Northern Island in 1805, while British battleships intruded into Naga- saki in 1808. French ships of war reached the Loochoo Islands in 1844. It appeared quite probable that Japan, where peace had reigned for three unbroken centuries, would soon be the scene of a mighty contest between the powers of Europe. Had either Russia, coming from the North, or Eng- land from the South, been given a free hand in Japan, the modern history of the Orient would have been vastly different. The object lessons of Persia and Siam suggest what might have happened. But at this critical moment there arrived on the scene a third party —the American battleships under Commodore Perry, who dropped anchor at Uraga in 1853. The Monroe Doctrine was beginning to spread its benefi- cent influence over the diplomacy of Asia. The policy enunciated by President Monroe had closed the American continents to European aggres- sion, and thus had helped turn the eyes of European 16 PRESENT DAY JAPAN statesmen towards the Far East for the fulfillment of their ambitions. When, however, Russia and England and France at last reached Japan, they found them- selves once more face to face with the same stone wall —the declaration of Monroe with reference to the Pacific. The Monroe Doctrine had served not only to pro- tect America’s eastern shores from Europe but also to expedite her own westward expansion. The Louisi- ana Purchase, though it preceded the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, was prompted by the same spirit, and it was followed by the annexation of Texas, the opening of California and the purchase of Alaska. Still America marched westward. The tremendous drive of the Slavic race toward the East was perhaps the foremost reason that sent Ameri- can as well as British battleships to Asiatic waters. The potential power of Russia is perhaps one of the greatest factors that has determined and will continue to determine, the policies of the Pacific Powers. John Quincy Adams, about a century ago, spoke of the danger of the Pacific’s becoming a Russian lake. The concern of the British for the safety of India’s northern frontier is well known. The purpose of the Monroe Doctrine would be fulfilled only if the Pacific coast of America were protected fully against the dangers of Slavic expansion. It was the beginning of the contest for supremacy in the Pacific —in other words, the Pacific Problem. Japan in those days scarcely realized the importance of her own strategic position in this great game. Only America’s timely arrival saved the situation for us, a THE OLD ORDER 17 fact for which we shall be eternally grateful. Amer- ica’s presence in the Far East stemmed the tide of Kuropean aggression and gave the Japanese reformers a brief time to work at putting their house in order. Throughout the pre-Restoration period, the danger of foreign intervention had given serious concern to the leaders in the Imperialist cause. England was ob- viously in sympathy with the Satsuma clan and later with its ally, the Choshu, while France was even more closely associated with the Tokugawas. The young leaders of the reform movement were unafraid of the Shogun’s power itself but were genuinely alarmed at the prospect of France’s rendering assistance to the Tokugawas. At the suggestion of certain Britishers, the Satsuma clan decided to send Hohei Iwashita as a representa- tive to the International Exhibition of Paris in 1867. The Shogun’s emissaries were headed by his own brother, Shimidzu Mimbu-Tayu. The two hostile groups, meeting in Paris, took advantage of the oppor- tunity to plead their opposing cases before the French Government. France, it was then revealed, realized that the shogunate was no longer in supreme control at home; and the French attitude accordingly became more cautious. Opinions differ even now regarding the extent of the aid the foreign powers were willing to give the Opposing parties, but it may be stated safely that French sympathy was with the Shogun while the British looked favorably upon the Imperialists. A French offer of assistance, made to the Shogun and re- jected, is a matter of historical record. Some who sat 18 PRESENT DAY JAPAN in the Shogun’s councils were in favor of seeking for- eign help but the Shogun himself and his best coun- cillors were firm in their opposition to this. They were concerned less with the immediate problem of with- standing the attack of the clans, than with the ulti- mate effect of foreign intervention on Japan’s domes- tic affairs. The Imperialists also were very cautious in considering the possibility of foreign assistance against the shogunate. The present generation of Japanese are sincerely grateful for the wisdom with which their ancestors con- ducted this phase of their relations with foreign coun- tries. The Tokugawas were willing to lose their fight with the clans rather than remain in power with the help of foreign powers. The prudence and discretion of the contending parties, in striking contrast with the revolutionary tactics observed in some neighboring countries, enabled Japan to pass the most crucial period of the Restoration in safety. The new government of Meiji during the first few years of its existence had no definite foreign policy. The officials were much exercised regarding frontier problems, and Japanese claims for possession of the Loochoo and Bonin Islands were enforced. It proved necessary, on the other hand, to concede Saghalien to Russia in exchange for the Kurile Islands. Japan’s relations with Korea were anything but satisfactory. The sending of a punitive expedition to Korea was urged immediately following the Restoration, because Korea had failed to reciprocate the courtesy of the new Government that had sent an official emissary to re- port the change of regime. The surplus energy of the THE OLD ORDER 19 Samurai class, however, had quite as much to do with this agitation as the offense taken at Korea’s impolite attitude. The episode had no connection whatever with the question that later resulted in the Japanese annexation of Korea and attracted the attention of all the world. The diplomacy of the restored Imperial Government for half a century revolved about two pivots. In the first place, Japan desired the revision of the treaties she had signed with the foreign powers in 1858, so that she might attain a position of equality among the na- tions. This I shall discuss later. In the second place, Japan realized the necessity of safeguarding her terri- torial integrity by the formulation of a definite Asiatic policy. With the hope of achieving the first of these pur- poses, Prince Iwakura was sent abroad at the head of a mission in 1871. The mission was unsuccessful, but a curious trick of fate during Iwakura’s absence led to the formulation of Japan’s continental policy. This policy in definite form came from an American citizen. General Le Gendre, a Union officer in the American Civil War, after the close of hostilities, was appointed American Consul General at Amoy, China. While as- signed to this post, he was obliged on one occasion to visit Formosa, just across the narrow straits, and con- duct negotiations with the chiefs of the aborigines there. On his return to Amoy, he sent his Govern- ment a dispatch in which he recommended the occupa- tion of the island by the American Navy. After a period of service at Amoy, General Le Gendre was appointed minister to a South American Republic, 20 PRESENT DAY JAPAN and on his way to his new post he passed through Japan. Being introduced by the American Minister to Count Soyeshima, Foreign Minister in the absence of Prince Iwakura, General Le Gendre took occasion to express his views regarding the policies he thought Japan should follow in order to consolidate her posi- tion. He impressed upon Soyeshima the menace of Russian aggression from the North, and the danger of British and French designs in the South. The Ameri- can visitor said, in effect, that Japan would be secure only if she could formulate a continental policy and carry it out before it was too late. He even said that it was the duty as well as the right of Japan. The policy recommended by General Le Gendre con- templated the expansion of Japanese territory to form a crescent skirting the Asiatic mainland, and embrac- ing both Korea and Formosa, in the North and South respectively. He emphasized the great danger which lurked in the possibility of Russia occupying Korea, and of England or France occupying Formosa, In either of these events, he contended, Japan’s security would be seriously threatened. Soyeshima was urged to make the seizure of both Korea and Formosa funda- mental in Japan’s foreign policy; and as precedents for such a plan, the American official cited the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of Alaska by the United States: These steps, he pointed out, had been made necessary by the Monroe Doctrine. Count Soyeshima was greatly influenced by General Le Gendre’s arguments, which also found high favor with Saigo of Satsuma, who had served the Restora- THE OLD ORDER 21 tion cause with such distinction. Since the Imperial House had regained its long-lost authority, Saigo had withdrawn from the public eye and had found himself frequently in disagreement with the policies of the new government. Although he was a member of the Cabi- net, his opinions frequently were overruled by a major- ity of his colleagues. When he heard of the new sug- gestion that had come from an American official, he was intensely interested and sent his right-hand man, Kirino, to Soyeshima to obtain a detailed explanation of Le Gendre’s views. The idea fascinated him and immediately he began to advocate the military occupa- tion of Korea. The ambitious program was destined, however, to meet with determined opposition from Prince Iwakura, who soon returned from his travels with his able lieu- tenants, Okubo, Kido, and Ito. The great Minister. had been deeply impressed with the progress being made in western countries and returned home firmly convinced that Japan’s first need was internal reform. This difference of opinion culminated in the civil war of 1878, in which Saigo attempted vainly to compel the adoption of his aggressive views. The Imperial Gov- ernment emerged from the brief conflict with its posi- tion strengthened rather than otherwise. It was just about this time that another American assisted in shaping Japan’s foreign policy. General Grant, who was touring the world after the expiration of his term as President, reached Japan in 1877. The adoption of a policy of peace was strongly urged in a long and memorable interview between the former President and the young Emperor. At the very mo- 22 PRESENT DAY JAPAN ment, a war between China and Japan was pending over the possession of the Loochoo Islands; but Gen- eral Grant explained how wars among Asiatic countries could not fail to advance the plans of European coun- tries. He explained the example and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and argued that Japan should strengthen herself by peaceful means.. These calm views did much to influence the statesmen of Meiji in formulating their policy. General Grant’s advice was followed and the Japanese house was put in order. It was only when the Japanese felt fully prepared that they acted upon Le Gendre’s policies, acquiring For- mosa in 1895 and Korea in 1910. Thus (in the words of Professor Nakamura) Japan’s Asiatic policy was thoroughly in accord with the suggestions of two Ameri- can military men and, to an extent difficult to meas- ure, grew out of their advice. In passing, I may add that Le Gendre remained a long time in Japan as an adviser to the Foreign Office. His writings are found in the official library of the Cabinet. It is not necessary for me to rehearse before this audience the story of the Sino-Japanese War or the Russo-Japanese War or to review the foreign policies of our own time. Neither do I propose to criticize those wars or those policies. I hope that I may venture the suggestion that no spokesman of any of the Great Powers that have been busy during the past three hun- dred years, down to the latest moment, conquering and annexing under the banner of imperialism, has any just ground for criticizing Japan. A sweeping condemnation of imperialism and its works, I understand and I re- spect; but the writer who singles out Japan as the sole THE OLD ORDER 23 target of his criticism will receive, and I think deserves, no consideration at my hands or the hands of my countrymen. But this is no part of the argument which I desire to lay before you. I have merely sought to show you how vitally foreign affairs have reacted upon our domestic politics. I have tried to explain how the germ of liberal and representative government that sprouted in the early days of the Restoration received little nourishment from the revo- lution itself. I have endeavored to indicate how it was blasted and withered in the storm that broke when in the name of defence (and certainly not without justi- fication), and following in the wake of the great West- ern powers, the leaders of the nation turned their energies from domestic reform to “a vigorous foreign policy.” But in the heyday of the vigorous foreign policies of the old order, the unseen hand of fate was busy weaving, away from the gaze of the world, a new bro- cade for the coming drama of Modern Japan. The germ of liberalism which seemed crushed by the strong hand of conservatives was quietly sprouting. As Spring follows Winter, and Gladstone followed Dis- raeli, the Japanese liberals were destined to rise once more and valiantly challenge the supremacy of the old order. LECTURE II THE CHALLENGE oF New Forcss THERE was a certain vein of radicalism in the move- ment that brought about the Restoration of 1868. The young enthusiasts of those days dreamed many a fantastic dream. Their greatest concern was how to avoid the mistake made in 1334 in the restoration of Kemmu when the Hojo Shogunate was overthrown, only to be succeeded by another of the Ashikagas. To prevent this succession, they thought, the only possible means was to strengthen the new government against the feudal lords by inviting the people to share in gov- ernment. Therefore, the people’s restoration was the goal of the new restoration. During the first few years the policies of the new government tended toward a realization of this pro- gram. Gradually, however, the same old reaction be- gan to set in. It came in the shape of foreign policy as was explained in the preceding chapter. The group of statesmen who thought Japan’s first duty lay in se- curing her political integrity rapidly increased their power, and the others who stood for a more radical in- ternal reform had to leave the seat of power one after another. The radical vein of the new government thus steadily faded. Those who left the government natu- rally went into the ranks of the opposition. These were the men who organized the political parties of Japan. 24 THE CHALLENGE OF NEW FORCES 25 Itagaki organized the Liberal Party, and Okuma the Progressive Party. The former party was more under the influence of French radicalism of the Rousseau school, while the latter drew its inspiration from the liberals of England. The former followers of the de- feated Tokugawas also joined these parties. News- papers were founded to oppose and criticize the activi- ties of the government. Okuma started a college, called Waseda University, while a noted samurai of Toku- gawa affiliation started another, Keio University. The liberals and radicals of those days were in- trenched in these new quarters and continued their fight against the government. The first clash of forces came over the question of the proclamation of the con- stitution. The government took the thunder off their clamor by ordering Ito to draft a new constitution for Japan. It was promulgated in 1889 and the Parlia- ment opened in 1890. The forces of democracy fought the government by this new political weapon, but the internal and international situation was against them. The conservatives who ruled the country were men of no small talents. They were constructive and moder- ately progressive. They gave the people prosperity at home and security abroad. People preferred the con- structive policies of these conservatives to the high- sounding ideals of the radicals. There was another fundamental reason for the failure of the liberals of those days to arouse the enthusiasm of the common people; namely, that both the ministerialists and the opposition belonged to the same social class. It was mainly a case of people who had belonged to the samu- rai class in the feudal days carrying on a factional 26 PRESENT DAY JAPAN fight for power in the new day. There was no particu- lar reason why the opposition should be considered as representing the interest of the common people. The latter preferred, on the contrary, the sane progress under the old order to the wild agitation of the radicals. There was another strong weapon that the conserva- tives used to bolster up their position. That was the educational system of new Japan. The progress of modern Japan is due to the success of its educational system more than to anything else — particularly to its public education. In forty years it diminished the percentage of illiteracy to less than five per cent of the whole population; the school attendance of the chil- dren of school age in 1923 was 99.03 per cent. A highly competitive system of examinations was practiced in the schools. The best brains were competing to get into the government school, as those who stood well in examinations were given recognition by the general public. At the apex of the whole system were the imperial universities. The students all vied with one another to reach the top; and once in the university, they competed with an intense passion to stand well in its examinations. Those who got honors in the exam- inations were given state recognition and their future careers were assured. Into the mind of the student was thus instilled a strong nationalism; and the graduates of these government universities went mostly into gov- ernment service where, owing to a very strict civil service system, everybody had a chance to get recogni- tion of his talent. Contrary to the notion accepted abroad, Japan is a country where a poor man’s son has a fair chance of promotion — due to this strict com- THE CHALLENGE OF NEW FORCES OF petitive system. No political pull or family connec- tion works there. Through the system the conserva- tive rulers of the land skillfully skimmed the cream of the nation and invited into the government the ablest talents who would otherwise have joined the opposition. This was the secret of the endurance of the old order and the weakness of the liberal opposition. The World War changed the whole situation. The prosperity that came to Japanese business and indus- try during the war created a strong and prosperous middle class, which gradually began to agitate for a change in politics. From 1916 to 1918 the tide of liberalism began to rise. Leaders of liberal] views be- came more and more popular. It was also the time when the voices of men like Wilson were ringing all over the world. The political current of Japan began to swell high. In the field of actual politics people de- manded more liberal policies. The preponderance of the executive branch of the government was challenged and the power of the legislative branch began to in- crease. The upshot of the whole thing was the demand for the extension of the suffrage as a domestic reform and for the change of Japan’s continental policy, espe- cially in relation to China. In March, 1925, the uni- versal manhood suffrage law passed both houses of the parliament and ten million new voters were added to the old three million. In 1922, Japan decided to fall in line with America and return the remaining part of the Boxer indemnity, accruing to her, to China. This amounts to seventy-three million yen, or thirty-six and one-half million dollars gold. In harmony with a pro- gram, called “Cultural Work in China,” the whole 28 PRESENT DAY JAPAN amount will be used to help advance the civilization of China. The first appropriation of 5,350,000 yen was granted by the July session of the Parliament of 1924. This will be spent in six years for the creation of two institutes of research in Peking and Shanghai. The one in Peking will be devoted to research in the fields of philosophy, literature, and social science ; the one in Shanghai to research in the field of natural sciences. These institutes are not to be confined to Chinese and Japanese scholars, but their doors will be wide open to all properly qualified foreigners; their findings are to be published in Western languages. Japan has also de- clared on every occasion her intention to keep aloof from any policy of intervention in Chinese domestic affairs. Thus the economic changes that began to take place in Japan in recent years have already changed her in- ternal and international policies. The vigorous foreign policy adopted at the early stage of the new regime is fast being modified. The rising tide of liberalism 1s making a steady advance on the citadels of conserva- tism and the strong nationalistic policy is being toned down. The reason why liberalism failed in the early days was because it lacked the sympathy of the com- mon people. This time it sprang from the conscious- ness of the people and was not the slogan of a few poli- ticians. How this liberal spirit was being formulated in the field of thought will be discussed in the next chapter. When the tide of liberalism was rising in Japan, an- other great change was following close at its heels. It was the sudden rise of the power of labor. The THE CHALLENGE OF NEW FORCES 29 business boom that came to Japan after 1915, the sec- ond year of the Great War, sent wages soaring to the sky, or at least so it seemed to the long-underpaid Japanese labor. With the increase of wages came the consciousness of power. A labor movement began to figure highly in Japanese public life. Since the rise of the power of labor was sudden, it lacked leaders at first from its own ranks. Naturally, students of labor problems, men of socialistic affiliations, assumed direc- tion of the labor movement. Now socialism had an un- fortunate history in Japan. In 1910 socialists were in- volved in a plot against the Imperial Family and were strictly prohibited from propaganda. They lived in obscurity. In the heyday of the labor movement they suddenly came out of their life of hibernation into open daylight. The Russian Revolution of 1917 stimulated the interest of young Japan and adherents of socialism swelled in numbers. The industrial workers gradually came under its spell. From 1917 on, Japan began to witness a great number of sensational strikes — mark- ing such a change from the solid, compact nation bent on the prosecution of a vigorous continental policy. From 1919 to 1922 radical syndicalists were the lead- ers of the organized labor of Japan. In 1922, in Sep- tember, the national conference of labor unions was won over by the leaders of communistic affiliations > in October, 1923, leadership passed to reform socialists somewhat like those of the British labor party. In the days of the syndicalistic and communistic ascendency, Japanese labor ruled political activities out of their program. Their only weapon was direct action. Now with the realization of the universal manhood suffrage 30 PRESENT DAY JAPAN they are preparing to fight their cause with the new political weapon of parliamentary representation. A more important phase, in a way, of the Japanese labor situation is the agrarian movement. According to the census of 1920, 67 per cent of the population of Japan lived in rural districts; two thirds of the popu- lation was engaged in agriculture. When the boom of industry sent the prices of manufactured goods sky- ward those of farm produce were slow to follow. That made the position of the farmers rather difficult. Good days came a little later, it is true, but they did not last long. Agricultural conditions became more serious. Japan is a hilly country, and the total arable land amounts to only 15 per cent of the national area. This means that Japan has to support 969 persons by one square kilometre of cultivated land, whereas Bel- gium has thus to support only 394, Italy 305, Nether- lands 273, and England 226. The land in Japan is di- vided among small landowners. When the business slack came after the war and the cost of living did not go down accordingly, the condition of the Japanese peasant became impossible to bear. Farming ceased to be a paying undertaking. Two-thirds of the Japa- nese farmers are tenants who till the leased land of others; therefore the Japanese agrarian problem is a tenant problem. Violent methods were used by these desperate tenants at first, but gradually they began to use the more effectual method of an organized move- ment. How these tenants are going to move ulti- mately in their political and economic agitation cannot be foreseen, but it is quite within the limit of reason- able speculation to predict that they will not go the THE CHALLENGE OF NEW FORCES 31 way of industrial workers. In the first place, because of the nature of their work they are more conservative; and secondly, they have been better trained politically. The strongholds of the Japanese political parties were always in the rural districts and, in consequence, the farmers are more used to attaining their ends by politi- cal means than are industrial workers. The agrarian movement will be a more important factor in deciding the political future of Japan, at least in the coming twenty or thirty years. In the contest of the liberals and socialists for leadership over the newly-emanci- pated masses of people, rural districts will hold the balance of power and decide the outcome. If the economic pressure continues to tighten and drives the rural districts of Japan to vote more radical. tickets, the political situation will gradually resemble that of Great Britain; namely, the clean-cut conflict between capital and labor. If, on the other hand, the government succeeds in finding an economic solution for the people at large and particularly for the agrarian labor, the latter will continue to support the construc- tive policies of the liberals. The Japanese have a curious aversion to extremity. Moderation is the virtue we cherish, sometimes to an immoderate degree. Frankly admitting the seriousness of the economic con- ditions in town and country, I still believe that a way will be found to bridge over the difficult period of transition. In sixty years, Japan has spent the vigor and force of the spirit of the Restoration of 1868. We have reached a point where the internal and international policies are all to be overhauled. The population has 32 PRESENT DAY JAPAN increased from thirty to sixty millions in these sixty years, and the situation of the whole world has changed. Japan now stands at the crossroads. Eco- nomically she has no choice. Industrialization is her only way forward. Her only concern is how she can avoid some of the mistakes committed by other na- tions. The strength of the Japanese nation lies in her agrarian population. To my mind, a decentralization of industries, by which the interdependence of indus- tries and agriculture can be worked out, is one of the possible solutions of her social plight. There is another phase to the future changes of the Japanese policies; that is the question whether Japan will be driven to a purely Oriental policy and theatre of operations, or whether she will be brought forward to a closer cooperation with the whole world. The an- swer will depend, not on the future development in Asiatic politics, but more on the attitude of the West- ern nations toward the Eastern races. LECTURE III INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN I BRoaDLy speaking, there are five schools of ethical and religious conviction that are living forces in Japa- nese life: Shintoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Bu- shido, and, quite recently, Christian teachings. How systems acted and reacted on one another, and what will be their future course, is a most interesting sub- ject for anyone eager to understand the social and political development of the East. It will be particu- larly interesting to Americans who have sent most of the missionaries to Japan, to understand what rdéle Christianity is going to play in that country and eventually in the whole East. In studying the history of the development of ethical and religious systems in Japan, the following character- istics will attract the attention of a careful student. It is these national traits which have functioned in the past and will continue to function in the future, that will shape the intellectual currents in the first instance and the political and social policies of the country in the end. In the first place, the Japanese people are exceed- ingly quick to accept foreign ideas. This receptive power, which sharply marks the Japanese from the Chinese, has been the source of much sarcasm directed 33 34 PRESENT DAY JAPAN against Japanese by a number of foreign observers. They have called it “ imitation ” and in some cases, an “ apish mimicry.” Without going into the discussion of whether there is any categorical difference between imi- tation and originality, I shall content myself with say- ing that the real test in the case should be whether the receiver ends by contributing something to the great so- cial heritage of mankind, or not. This adaptability of the Japanese to new ideas has helped them to graft to their own stock, branches of different schools of phi- losophy and religion that later sent forth flowers of dif- ferent fragrances and hues from the original. _ The receptive power of the Japanese nation would have been of rather little avail in its spiritual develop- ment, had it not been accompanied by another trait, that is, the power of digestion. This is where casual observers have utterly failed to understand Japan. By looking at the temples and pagodas in Japan they have hastily rushed to the conclusion that Japanese Bud- dhism was the same as in China. Then again by notic- ing the tall office buildings and noisy automobiles in Tokyo, they have written down in their charming im- pressions of the East that Japan had been thoroughly occidentalized. They did not take the trouble to find out that in each of these temples there sat a Japanese priest, and that under each of the silk hats there was concealed a Japanese head! The discrimination and digestion that accompany the adoption of new ideas in Japan are to be explained by the fact that every new thought encounters great resistance at the time of its introduction. This capa- city for quick reception and quick opposition, although ti INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 35 at first seemingly paradoxical, has helped the progress of the Japanese people. Confucianism in the third cen- tury, and Buddhism in the sixth century, underwent the same process at the time of their introduction. This is a very remarkable phenomenon and needs some explanation, as it throws a light on Japanese psychology and also helps us to divine the future course of Christianity in Japan. When Buddhism was first introduced into Japan from Korea in 552 a.p., it brought about a commotion in the minds of the ruling class. From the Emperor down to the lowliest retainer, the Japanese were af- fected by the novel idea. But gradually there appeared among the great ministers in the court a strong resist- ance which was not put to an end until after some bloodshed. However, the real resistance was not the mere outside opposition of the politicians, but was rather in the disturbed minds of the thinkers of those days. They could not reconcile the ideas of Buddhism with the ruling thought of Japan inherited from their ancestors. The idea of putting Buddha above all other gods was in contradiction to the idea of Shintoism, which recognized the Sun Goddess as the supreme Guardian Deity of Japan. This was not solved until the great priest Gyoki in the eighth century formulated a new interpretation of Buddhism by saying that Buddha and the Sun Goddess were not different personalities. When the Creator appeared in India, she took the form of Buddha and there was no innate difference in spirit nor teaching. Gyoki thus removed the troublesome obstacle, and paved the way for the reconciliation of Buddhism and Shintoism, which secured for Bud- 36 PRESENT DAY JAPAN dhism unmolested progress in the country. The same thing can be said of Confucianism, Taoism, and the teachings of other foreign thinkers. It is only half a century since Christianity was introduced after a long period of suppression. That faith is now passing through the same stage in Japan through which other teachings have passed; and I very much doubt whether Christianity as developed in America and Europe will be accepted as such by large numbers of the Japanese. The same tenacious resistance is being seen; and Chris- tianity, in my opinion, will not make much headway in Japan unless its teachers are reconciled to the fact that the Japanese will not accept a foreign thought without impressing upon it their own stamp. The third trait, which is more or less connected with the above, is the Japanese love of harmony. I am rather inclined to think that the main difference be- tween the East and the West springs from their dif- ferent attitudes toward harmony. Individual liberty has been accentuated in the West and it is undoubtedly the foundation of Western progress, while in the East, at least in Japan, the foundation of moral ideas has been harmony. It is not mere collectivism —it is more the love of harmony. Everything in the Uni- verse must find itself in perfect harmony with the whole. A thing is always valued at the position it holds in the whole plan of the Universe. This love of harmony always drove the Japanese to an attempt to connect each new thought with the ideas already ac- cepted. Confucianism had to fit in with the indigenous thought of Shintoism; and Buddhism again had to be reconciled with the two systems of thought that existed INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN SL there. This tendency to seek harmony can be found in all the great thinkers of Japan. They have not been like Protestants and Catholics and Christians and Mo- hammedans. Instead of fighting for supremacy and trying to stamp out the opposition, Japanese philoso- phers and ethical teachers have sought a way to forge all different systems of thought into one harmonious whole. That tendency is clearly seen in Japan at present in the efforts to bring together the leaders of three different religions. I dare say that you recently read in the newspapers the story of Japanese Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian leaders meeting for codpera- tion. It doubtless looks very queer to you, but it is the national trait of Japan. We do things in our own way. This quest for harmony among thinkers is the spirit of tolerance, and it is the reason why we are not good haters. It isa weakness as well as astrength. It tends to soften down bold and confident personalities and it blurs the sense of distinction. But at the same time, it enables us to avoid much of the unnecessary waste that comes from fighting over things which are not very important. We have harmonized all exotic thought with our in- digenous idea of Shintoism. Now it remains to be seen how the three new ideas that are fermenting in the Western world are going to be Japanized and incorpo- rated into Japanese thought; I mean, Christianity, De- mocracy, and Socialism. The fourth outstanding characteristic of the Japa- nese is the love of action, or the predominance of the theory of action in contradiction to the theory of exist- 38 PRESENT DAY JAPAN ence or the pure metaphysical reflection. All the Japa- nese ethical systems of thought have the stamp of con- duct. A philosophy for a Japanese is not a pure system of metaphysical thought, but is a thing that is to be translated into daily conduct. Knowledge is not real knowledge until you act on it. The philosophy of the great teacher, Zinsai Ito (1627-1705), is the most typi- cal illustration of the Japanese mode of thinking. He glorified action and expounded the theory that the Uni- verse exists by and for action. The goal of his action was benevolence and justice. Action exists for action itself and not for any recognition to be won from others. He explained the order of Heaven, declaring that when a man believes in the order of Heaven and never loses his peace of mind on account of outward honors or criticisms, he can be said to have reached the state of a sage. To do one’s utmost and leave the result to the order of Heaven is a precept that has constituted a fundamental ethical idea of the Japanese. The phi- losopher Ito in his lifetime had three thousand disci- ples; and one of these three thousand was the famous Oishi, the head of the forty-seven ronins. This Japanese love of action is clearly seen in their leaning toward Wan-Yang-Ming’s philosophy, which places action above all things; and also in their taking Christianity very seriously. In Japan Christianity is construed in a very strict sense, and when a man does not drink or smoke people will ask him whether he is not a Christian. Here is the sign of our belief in the theory of conduct. Everything you believe you are expected to translate into your daily conduct. Another trait of the Japanese is his optimism. Even INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 39 Buddhism with all its quiet pessimism could not change this national trait. The philosophy of the Japanese nation is optimism. The mild climate, the fortunate geographic situation that has spared them the misery of a foreign yoke, and the spirit of tolerance, which sprang up among them, all tended to make them cheerful and optimistic. The joy of life is vibrant in their blood and their ethical opinions run along that line. This was given the best expression by the phi- losopher and the first popular educator of Japan, Yoki- ken Kaibara, who lived from 1630 to 1714. The Japanese by nature are not good philosophers. They are more artistic than scientific, and are not given to abstract meditation. Their philosophies of life have not culminated in great and complicated systems of thought. They tended to become simple and informal. The great teacher of Shintoism, Norinaga Motoori (born 1730, died 1801), said that in Japan there was no necessity for any system of morals, as every Japa- nese acted aright if only he consulted his own heart. It was not so much any philosophy or system of morals that counted among the Japanese, as the fact that they could lead contented and peaceful lives as individuals and as a nation for many centuries; and they have shown a spirit of strong resistance whenever their peace of mind and peace of community life have been dis- turbed by foreign opinions alien to their mode of life. New ideas could find a permanent place only after they were adjusted to Japanese life and thus served to strengthen and perpetuate the individual and com- munity life of the country. In this connection I should like to give a brief sketch 40 PRESENT DAY JAPAN of the ethical ideas of Motoori, as he is considered by many as one of the great teachers whose thought in- spired the Restoration of Meiji in 1868. His views are also important in giving a clue to the original Japa- nese view of life, which served as the ethical founda- tion of the country. He attributed all the phenomena of AW: world to the will of God, and said that the duty of man consisted in carrying out the divine will. As for guidance in ascer- taining that divine will, he pointed to the sincere heart of man given to him by God. } Motoori then laid down four cardinal rules of con- duct: 1. To live a peaceful life by contentedly carrying out one’s daily duties. 2. Always to keep purity of heart. 3. To revere one’s ancestors. 4. To make the Emperor’s will one’s own will and reverently to obey him. These precepts are important in the sense that again and again they come back with the revival of the na- tional spirit. These views are also seen constituting the basis for the nationalism of Meiji whch I will explain later in this lecture. II When we consider the moral code of the Japanese na- tion, the word Bushido comes into the minds of many. We owe the enunciation of this idea for the outside world to the great work by Professor Nitobe, whose humble disciple I am. There is, therefore, no need on my part to dwell on that any more. The thing to which INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 41 I want to call your attention is the fact that whereas Bushido furnished a great code of morals for the Bushi or warriors who were the aristocracy of those days, there were other teachings which furnished codes of morals for the masses — for Democracy. In my first lecture I referred to the fact that the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate was being pre- pared by the changing fabric of society. In the end of the shogunate new social forces were rising and chal- lenging the supremacy of the samurai or warriors. The merchant class, which during three centuries of un- broken peace had been gradually accumulating wealth, finally menaced the economic system of feudalism which rested on landed aristocracy, composed of the Bushi or warriors. Along with material wealth, the merchant class acquired cultural attainments. And this culture of the lower class of people was furnished by a number of great teachers who turned their atten- tion from teaching warriors to educating the new emancipated mass of people. The first popular edu- eator, Yokiken Kaibara (1630-1714), expounded the difficult Confucian teachings with the plainest of words and wrote over a hundred books that went into the hands of the poor. Even greater than this was the in- fluence of the famous Baigan Ishida (born 1685, died 1744). He started his career as a clerk in a shop in Kyoto, and wound up his life as a great teacher for the newly rising Democracy. His teachings were based on the three great systems of Shintoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Those who belonged to this school of teaching took particular pains to make it easy to under- stand. In sharp contrast to the writing of the teachers 492 PRESENT DAY JAPAN of the aristocracy, their style was easy to follow and their books spread all over the country. Even now the books by these teachers are most interesting reading, enlivened as they are by allegories and fables, and splashed with genial humour. Then again there was another great teacher whose power was strongest among peasants. He was called a peasant-sage and his teachings are a living force even now, not only among peasants but also among intellect- uals. The name of the teacher was Sontoku Ninomiya, and he lived from 1787 to 1856. His teachings were very practical and concrete, and wherever his teachings are well observed the peasant class is very well-to-do and public-spirited. The present minister of education be- longs to this school of thought. The way was well paved by these teachers for the arrival of a new epoch; and it was no wonder that the Japanese people — not only the aristocratic samurai but the democratic masses as well — were ready for the new adventure in statecraft when the country was opened to the world in 1868. Il When the gate of the great dam was opened after the three long centuries, the flood of Western learning rushed into the Island Empire with stupendous veloc- ity and volume. It looked as though the intellectual life of the whole country was to be submerged by oc- cidental philosophies. Everybody turned to the new ideas; and for the moment Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism were all thrown to the winds. Gradually, however, the same old resistance to new ——————e INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 43 ideas began to assert itself. First narrow-minded chau- vinism and finally sane, well-balanced criticism began to loom up over the inundation of Western thought. This reaction culminated in the latter part of the Meiji era in the consolidation of a new system of thought, that is, the nationalism. The basic principles of Shinto- ism — loyalty to the Emperor, the idea of national unity and exalted views of the founding of the country — were formulated into a new theory of the state with the assistance of the newly imported ideas of national- ism in the Western sense, particularly the German school of thought along the Hegelian philosophy, ideal- izing the state. It was systematically taught in schools, and through books, speeches, and newspapers. All Japanese who were educated in those days bear its mark in a very strong degree. Other ideas that did not attune to this idea of nationalism were looked upon with sus- picion, if not antagonism. It was with this strong na- tionalistic spirit that we went into wars with China and Russia, and finally into the Great War of 1914-1918. But underneath the apparent undisputed supremacy of Nationalism, there were other systems of thought being prepared quietly but steadily. These empha- sized, for instance, the idea of individuality advanced by Christian teachings, and the non-resistance theory of the Tolstoyan school. The remarkable popularity of Russian literature, particularly the writings of Tol- stoy, had a great deal of influence with the young men of Japan; and unconsciously the way was being paved for changing the psychology of the nation. It needed only changes in the world of affairs to bring these new forces into action. 44 PRESENT DAY JAPAN The changes came with the World War. The speeches of the statesmen of the allied and associated powers were real propaganda for liberalism and democ- racy. Liberals at home became bolder and more active. Utterances of men like Professor Nitobe and Professor Yoshino were stamped by the government with the brand of dangerous thoughts; but they kept on increas- ing their adherents. The years from 1916 to 1918 were marked by a nationwide discussion of liberalism and democracy, although Japan was then under the pre- miership of the conservative statesman, Terauchi. Those who belonged to the old nationalist school found it more and more difficult to arouse enthusiasm among the people. Many books bearing the title of “Democracy” appeared, and newspapers and maga- zines were full of articles on the subject. This tendency was capitalized by the shrewd Hara who, organizing his cabinet in the fall of 1918, posed as the first Commoner Premier at the head of a real party government. It caught the imagination of the people, and the liberal opinion of Japan was solidly behind him. During the first half of his administration he really served the cause of Liberalism by removing the restrictions on press, publication, and speech. His internal and inter- national policies were also liberal. But it was not the changes in the field of politics that accelerated the on- ward march of liberalism in Japan. It was the eco- nomic changes, as I stated in my second lecture, that created an independent and prosperous middle class. But there was another element. That was the rapid growth of journalism in those days. Newspapers and magazines increased their circulations by leaps and INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 45 bounds. This made them financially stronger, and in turn encouraged the growth of a new class of people, 1e., the independent writers. Before the days of the economic prosperity of 1916- 1919, independent writers in Japan were in a most un- enviable position. Even a popular novelist found it difficult to keep his body and soul together. Many, in fact, died in misery. The situation was so piquantly epitomized by the famous Ryoku-u, or the Green Rain, in his undying words, ‘“ Why, the pen of a writer is one in number, while his chopsticks are two. No won- der that he is so hopelessly outnumbered!” The es- sayists were in a far worse position than the novelists. They could not make a living without some kind of salary. Now in the heyday of Japanese journalism came days of prosperity and power for writers and novelists. Their books sold by the thousand and there were con- stant and ever-increasing demands for articles. The prices of these articles went up by leaps and bounds. Writers for the first time found out that they could fight two chopsticks with one pen. Now independent writers are always very dangerous opponents of con- servative rulers. When their bread and butter is se- cure beyond the reach of the police and rich employers, then they sharpen their pens against the wrongs of the existing society. This universal tendency began to work among the Japanese writers. They began to get bolder and more outspoken. The intellectual cur- rents of Japan began to flow swiftly and in swelling volume. Nationalism was challenged on its supreme throne of immunity. Liberalism and Democracy made 46 PRESENT DAY JAPAN a steady advance on the citadel of the conservative doctrine of the state and the constitution; and accepted historical traditions were put to the severe test of searching, scientific criticism. The hundred-page ar- ticle of Professor Yoshino on the meaning of Democ- racy, which appeared in the New Year’s number of the Central Review, a popular magazine, started a great discussion among the thinkers of the country. A new theory of the state emerged from the controversy, and promised to supersede the old one. At this juncture, the conservatives woke up one fine morning and found still more dangerous foes walking into the scene of battle. They were socialism, syn- dicalism and anarchism. The growing force of labor on one side and the example of the social revolution in Russia on the other, strengthened the hands of the radical thinkers in Japan; and they came out of their long hibernation into the open daylight. They laughed at the lukewarm attitude of the liberals and preached the doctrine of fire. Extreme ideas are always fas- cinating to young men and many of the advocates of liberalism were gradually converted to the cause of socialism. From 1919 to 1922 the socialistic writers had the ears of the nation, and newspapers and maga- zines were full of articles on socialism, on Karl Marx, on Lenin, and so forth. It led the outside observers to wonder whether a social revolution were coming in Japan. The thing they overlooked was the strong resistance that was bound to come later against all these new and radical ideas; and the reaction came with the earthquake of 1923. The national calamity sobered the minds of Japa- INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 47 nese and they began to look at things from a new angle. They realized that in the days of uncertainty and suffering after the earthquake, the thing that helped them most was not high-sounding ideas but hard-headed practical work. They realized also that they were greatly reduced in wealth and power, and that they could not afford to play with extreme theories any more. Then it dawned upon them that the one thing that would help them was not the half-digested foreign ideas, but the indigenous ethics of the country, which had served them through dark and trying days. The intellectual currents made another turn. The pendulum of opinion was swinging back to a more tra- ditional line of thought. It sometimes looked as though Japanese thinkers were returning to the same old reactionary nationalism. Particularly during the first few weeks following the disaster, when there were no newspapers and martial law reigned in the dev- astated area, the intellectual atmosphere was gloomy with the reactionary spirit. But with the return of the newspapers, brighter days came back. In fact, the press was restored with in- creased circulations and increased vigor. The prob- lem of reconstruction brought about a new line-up of people in two opposing camps. The dismal failure of the old type of politician disappointed the people. Radicals began to see the need of working with the moderate liberals, and the intellectual currents of the country began to take on a practical and constructive tone. The Immigration Act of the United States broke upon us at this very moment. It swept the whole coun- 48 PRESENT DAY JAPAN try like a hurricane. All the papers were unanimous in protesting against it. At first it seemed as though it were going to affect only the political sphere. It gradu- ally began to go deeper. It made a tremendous im- pression on the thinking part of the nation. The dis- appointment with the West drove them to turn to their old schools of thought for enlightenment. Ori- entalism received a new stimulus; and I think I am not mistaken in saying that there will rise, with the new scientific method of the West, a greater and deeper de- sire for the study of Oriental culture. What kind of new thought will emerge, nobody is yet in a position to predict. IV The trend of opinion is formulated in many ways. But in our modern age the first place of importance must be given to newspapers. Now Japanese news- papers are in a very strong position. Very few people in foreign countries know that Japanese papers are next to only American and English papers in their cir- culations. The Osaka Mainichi has a daily circulation of one million and a quarter; and combined with the sister paper, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi under the same management enjoys the circulation of two millions. The Tokyo Asahi and the Osaka Asahi under the same ownership come pretty near the above figure. There are a number of other papers that have about half a mil- lion readers. As a political power, a business proposi- tion, or an intellectual organ, the newspaper holds a position not to be lightly considered. I think the day will come before long, when the world will take more notice of the significance of the Japanese press. INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 49 The number of Japanese papers exceeded eleven hundred in 1920; and I think that by a conservative estimate, their total circulation must be between six and seven millions. So it can safely be said that of the eleven million families in Japan, half of them take a paper every day. The percentage of illiteracy is very small in Japan, possibly under 5% of all the popula- tion. You will be surprised at the extent to which the papers are read by the laboring class. You will notice practically every rickshaw man reading a paper while waiting for a customer. It is by the papers that Japan’s democracy is being educated and supported. Because of their tremendous circulation, Japanese newspapers are great business enterprises. The leading papers in both Tokyo and Osaka have magnificent buildings five to eight stories high, and their annual out- lay reaches several millions. The fact that the Tokyo Asahi spends as much a year for foreign cables as the London Times, will give you an idea of its nature and standing. A few years ago a group of people started a newspaper in Osaka with two million yen of capital and lost all their money within a year and retired. Such are the financial risks of great journalism. You would also be surprised to learn how much advertising Japanese papers secure from American business firms, but I am not at liberty to give you the names and the amount that is spent. Some outstanding features of the Japanese press will not be altogether uninteresting: In the first place, the major portion of the proceeds of the Japanese newspapers is derived from the sale of papers and not from the advertisements, which in 50 PRESENT DAY JAPAN America constitute 90% of all the income of news- papers. The Hochi of Tokyo received 43% of its in- come from advertisements in 1922 and the rest from the sale of papers. This gives a peculiar feature to the papers themselves. It gives them an independence from big business men who place advertisements with them. This accounts for the peculiar spirit of inde- pendence that runs through their columns. They write freely about capital, labor, and government, foreign governments included. Japanese who spend some time in foreign countries deplore the freedom of the Japanese press, particularly in regard to the foreign countries. Japanese papers, in the second place, differ in their size from American and English papers. They are mostly eight pages; sometimes they run to fourteen pages. They resemble in that respect French papers. They are very easily read. But with such a meagre amount of space, a little less than half is given to the advertisements. In the substance of the articles, they are again dif- ferent from your papers. They give less attention to news and quite a great deal to what we call “ leisure articles’; for instance, literature, poetry, long series of essays by college professors, explanations of “ Go” (Japanese chequers), and Japanese chess. And every paper carries from two to three serial novels, running from one to twelve months. It is partly due to the Japanese love of literature, but there is also a pathetic side to it. Owing to the pressing daily needs, most of the Japanese people cannot afford to spend evenings in delightful movies or automobile rides, and the only meagre recreation they can contrive to get is by read- INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 51 ing stories and poems in the dailies after their work is done. Another aspect of the Japanese press which for- eigners fail to notice is the fact that a paper with politi- cal affiliations never succeeds in Japan. Chuo, the official organ of the Seiyukai, could never succeed in gaining a large circulation even during twenty years of the party’s ascendency. The circulation of the popular paper Mancho, suddenly dropped off when it decided to support the Okuma ministry in 1914. Therefore, the Japanese papers make it their policy to be cau- tiously independent of political parties and the govern- ment. They sell better when they are in the opposition. The success of the Japanese papers is all the more remarkable when we consider the disadvantages under which they have struggled. Such handicaps are numerous. The first handicap is the limitations created by press law. It gives the police authorities the power to stop the sale of particular copies, and also gives the Home Office the right to suppress the publication itself. Al- though these powers are not used often, they stand as a constant menace to the press. In the second place, Japanese papers have to em- ploy three times as many reporters as the American papers. The reasons are threefold: The imperfect state of communication and correspondence, the reluctance of the general public to give news, and lastly, the un- satisfactory organization of the news agency business. Japanese newspapers are greatly burdened by the necessity of delivering their papers to the houses of nearly all their subscribers. About fifteen million yen 52 PRESENT DAY JAPAN is spent by the papers annually for the piecemeal de- livery of the papers. Then there is the great handicap of the using of Chinese characters. We use some ten thousand of these for literary and scholarly work. Our written language consists of complex Chinese characters, and simple Japanese syllabaries of which there are only forty-seven. And, until quite recent times, the news- papers had to keep at least nine thousand of these Chinese characters. They have gradually cut down the number, however, and are now using some two thousand; but even then the types used by the Hochi for twelve pages of paper are seven million while those for English and American papers with twenty pages are only between 750,000 and 1,000,000. Because of this intricate business of using Chinese characters along with the Japanese syllabaries the Japanese papers can- not use high-speed machines. And yet a paper like Hochi prints eleven editions a day. There is now a movement in Japan to restrict the number of Chinese characters and write mostly with the simple Japanese syllabaries. It is proposed to cut them down to six hundred. Then the children of Japan will be saved all the agony of memorizing five or six thousand char- acters, and incidentally the newspapers will cut down their expenses. In conclusion, I may say that the Japanese news- papers are increasing in power, and they will be the mainstay of the Japanese liberalism. As they have taken particular pains to be independent of the Gov- ernment and have espoused the cause of the readers, which means the common people, they may be a great INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 53 instrument for bridging over the crucial time of transi- tion through which we are now passing. V Now, en passant, I must touch briefly on the Japa- nese magazines, which have some peculiarities of their own. We have over four thousand of them excluding those published for members only. Some popular magazines, and particularly those for ladies, have cir- culations somewhere near three hundred thousand. We have not a Saturday Evening Post yet, but we have many magazines like the Review of Reviews and World’s Work. One aspect that is rather unique in Japan is the popularity of serious and radical magazines. In this group fall two magazines which are by far the best in Japan, ie., the Reconstruction and the Central Ke- view, each of which has a circulation somewhere be- tween sixty and seventy thousand. If you study the contents of Reconstruction, you will be surprised at the great extent of its circulation. Take the August number for instance. An article of twenty-five pages entitled “ From the Society of Free Acquisition to the Society of Capitalistic Exploitation ”’ by a fa- mous economist; then thirteen pages on the bi-cameral system in legislatures; an article on the artistic phi- losophy of Deltai; twenty pages on the “ Reasons for the Decay of Civilization” and so on. These are all scholarly treatises. Reconstruction is a more radical magazine than the New Republic or the Nation. It prints in every number at least one article by an emi- nent Western writer, like Bertrand Russell, Kautzky, 54 PRESENT DAY JAPAN or H.G. Wells. Yet it enjoys a circulation of over sixty or seventy thousand. It also prints two to six short stories of very high artistic value. All the Japanese magazines of first-rate standing print long essays by scholars. Their subscribers are particularly fond of reading philosophical studies of from fifty to one hundred pages. Another feature of the high-class magazines is the publication of novels and short stories of undoubted merit. The success of the magazines augments in no small degree the increasing influence of independent writers. They are, in fact, mostly radical writers, socialistic writers being rather more popular because they can make bolder assertions than the liberals. Still I must conclude by saying that Japan is like England and France, and that the dailies are more powerful and prosperous than the magazines. Now I want to say a few words about publications other than periodicals. Books are not so successful in Japan as newspapers or magazines. The greatest sale on record is perhaps that of “ Human Bullet,” an autobiography of a young lieutenant at the siege of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War. It sold half a million copies in twenty years. In recent years “ Beyond the Death Line,” a story of an earnest social worker, sold over two hundred thousand in a few years, and the drama entitled “ The Priest and the Disciples ” had the same success. But as a rule books do not go beyond a few thousand. INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 55 VI Whither goes Japan then with all these new intel- lectual equipments? People talk about Japan in tran- sition; but all nations are passing through a period of transition all the time. There is no particular tran- sition for Japan at this particular moment. However, if we accept that terminology for convenience’s sake we can, roughly speaking, say that Japan is going through the period of foreign influence into a new one of formu- lating and consolidating her own thought. Intellectual currents of Japan are taking a new turn in that respect, and there are some landmarks to indicate the trend. 1. The first landmark is the passing of enthusiasm for works translated from foreign languages. Japan has long been under the influence of translations, and the bookshops were long full of the works of American and European authors. But now the publishers are not very keen to print many translated works. The Japanese are turning to their own masters. The sow- ing has been done and the people are now preparing for the harvesting. 2. The passing of the age of translations meant the coming of the new study of Japan herself. The West taught Japan the scientific method of research, which she is going to apply to her own culture and the institu- tions bequeathed by her ancestors. New researches in Japanese history with special reference to politics, so- cial changes, economics, literature, ethical thought, and all kinds of institutions, are recasting our fundamental ideas. We now look at our past with new eyes and find that there are some things in the course of our 56 PRESENT DAY JAPAN natural development that we had not realized before. It also opens a new road for original thinking. 3. Then changes in the style of language facilitate the progress of the new orientation. We are getting away from our bondage to the Chinese classics. Our style is growing less and less formal; greater liberty is given to the free play of one’s thought and imagination. It is particularly striking in the case of children and young students. Their brains are taxed less with tor- tuous cramming in Chinese and Japanese classics as well as foreign languages, whereas until a decade ago study meant memorizing thousands of Chinese char- acters and idioms. The emancipation from stereotyped characters has meant the liberation of spirit. The way the young children of Japan now write is surprising. There is a new note of free thinking untrammeled by Chinese idioms. In my student days, which are not very far away, our supreme task was to commit to memory thousands and thousands of Chinese idiomatic expressions used in ancient literature and poems, be- cause otherwise we could not write with distinction. The free spirit that is manifest in Japanese children now, promises a great deal; and I am rather optimistic about the future outcome. The Japanese are cut away from their moorings to the dead formalism, and real free thinking will take place in the Island Empire before long. 4. The rising tide of new Japanism, if I may call it so, means less consumption of foreign books. In the early days after the Restoration the Japanese students used English books as texts for all kinds of study. In my days we referred to foreign books for research. INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS IN JAPAN 57 Now the Japanese student can study any line of work without the help of foreign books, with the result that foreign languages occupy a smaller place in our educa- tion. What will come out of this I do not pretend to know. The Japanese language was once considered an im- possible one for foreigners to learn; but with the use of fewer and fewer Chinese characters it will become easier. If so, it might not be altogether a dream to conceive of the Westerner coming one step forward toward us and spending at least one twentieth or one fiftieth of his brain power in the study of the Japanese language. If there were twenty Americans in New York who could read Japanese, the greater part of the misunderstanding about Japan would disappear. Then they would know that there are a few things in Japan besides Mount Fuji and Cherry Blossoms. If they could only read a few poems of Japan they would cease to think that we are all laundrymen and strawberry pickers. Japanese words are very simple and if any of you have curiosity enough to take home a few ex- amples I shall be delighted to give you some — (Ohio — Nevada — Utah) The story of the intellectual currents of one’s coun- try is never complete without a study of its imagina- tive literature. Then what is the modern literature of Japan which is forming the minds of the masses there? That is the subject I propose to discuss at my next lecture. LECTURE IV Mopern LiteratuRE— THE Novet, THE Drama, AND POETRY I In my last lecture I examined some outstanding traits of Japanese intellectual life, and surveyed journalism with special reference to its democratic tendencies. In this lecture to-day I propose to take up the story where I left it, and try to describe the subtler and more inti- mate side of Japanese life reflected in the imaginative literature of present-day Japan. I long wondered why the Japanese were so little understood by the outside world. Then it dawned on me one day that it was to a great extent due to the fact that the more human side of our life was not pre- sented to the outside world. We were mostly in touch with the great world through the channels of diplo- macy, trade, and sometimes warfare. The daily lives of the common man and woman who laugh and weep, just as their brothers and sisters in the Western world, have not been revealed to the latter. Even in the days of Romanoff rule, the Russian people had a place in the sympathy and affection of Americans. The systems of government were a thousand miles apart in those days; yet Americans realized that Russian peasants were simple-hearted, human creatures, capable of love and joy and admiration, as Ruskin would say. And did this 58 MODERN LITERATURE 59 not come about mainly through the popularity of Rus- sian literature in America? Through the works of Tol- stoy, Turgenev, and Dostoevski, you were led to the firesides of Russian people; and you could not help liking the simple folk on the great plains of Northern Europe. But the contrary has been the case with us. Our two countries have stood in intimate, friendly re- lationship for a long time; yet the life of no country is less understood in America than that of Japan. Nothing reveals the life of a people as much as its imaginative literature. If only we could present a Japanese “ Huckleberry Finn” or a “Kim” to you, how Japanese boys would be endeared to the hearts of American boys. “Japanese literature must be pre- sented to American audiences,” I said to myself, walk- ing along Fifth Avenue one autumn morning. Four years have passed since then. Nothing gives me greater pleasure, therefore, than having the rare privi- lege of presenting even a brief review of this very sub- ject to such a distinguished audience to-day. II Art and literature have a peculiar position in Japa- nese life. Partly because of our temperament and partly by tradition, our daily routine is inseparably bound up with literature and art. The tea ceremony and flower arrangement occupy a secure place in the life of not only the aristocracy, but also the middle class. The education of a young woman is never com- plete without some lessons in poetry-writing. It is not uncommon to find a master of a grocery shop or a cobbler sending in his poem in competition for a prize 60 PRESENT DAY JAPAN offered by the local paper to which he subscribes. The New Year’s number of all Japanese papers has a special feature every year. On that day is published the ten best poems selected by the poets laureate of Japan, to be read in the presence of the Emperor and his Court. The subject is given out a few months in advance each year, and thousands and thousands of people send in their poems. There is no qualification of class or stand- ing, not even nationality. In fact, a few years ago Mrs. Burnett, an American lady, won the honor. It is imaginative literature more than anything else that moulds the common opinions of a country. Lit- erary criticisms, historical essays, as well as poems, novels, and dramas have a great influence in giving currency to ideas and direction to popular thinking. Moreover, it is the literary people who usually fore- shadow coming changes. Japan is no exception to that generalrule. In that respect, too, the modern literature of Japan is important, because what these poets and novelists think to-day, Japan will do to-morrow. III THe First Periop The development of the modern literature of Japan since the Restoration of 1868 can be divided into six periods. The first period covers the first seventeen years from 1868 to 1884. This we can call a dark period of the epoch of literary chaos, when the atten- tion and energy of the whole nation were concentrated on the work of political and economic reconstruction. In those years of upheaval and commotion there was MODERN LITERATURE 61 little place for literature. It was the age of the cult of the West. We made a frantic effort to catch up with the progress of the West after the seclusion of three long centuries. Everything Western was welcome. Things Eastern were thrown aside, and in some cases even destroyed. The same was true with literature. Nobody paid any attention to Japanese writings. The great literature of the Tokugawa era was buried deep in neglect, and translations of Western literature filled the book-shelves of the progressives. Political novels were in vogue and the works of Lord Lytton and Lord Beaconsfield had a wide circulation. A number of politicians wrote political fiction that had more popu- larity than literary merit. Only three things in the realm of the spirit are worthy of mention in this period. They are the introduction of English utilitarianism by Fukuzawa, the founder of Keio University; the spread of Christian teachings by Niijima, the founder of Do- shisha University; and the propagation of the radical French philosophy by young men like Saionji, who is no other than the present serene conservative Genro, Prince Saionji. The first half of this period was marked by the ascendency of Anglo-Saxon literature, while the second half was characterized rather by zeal for French, German, and Russian literature. Another feature of this epoch must be noted, namely, the simplification of the Japanese language itself. The ornate classical style of ancient times was superseded by the simpler form advocated by Fukuzawa and Na- kamura. This, in turn, paved the way for the arrival of the second period of greater literary activities. 62 PRESENT DAY JAPAN THE SEcoND PERIOD The year 1885 was a memorable year for two rea- sons. It was in that year that the famous writer, Shoyo, wrote his epoch-making essay on “ The Essence of a Novel.” As he was a great student of Shakespeare, I will call him “ the Shakespearean.” He made clear the function of the novel and laid down fundamental principles for the writers of Japan in their quest for a new form of literary expression. He criticized the morality novels of the old school, and laid stress on the need of a novelist’s describing, with clear objectivity, the human life as such. He followed it up with a novel of his own, “ The Life of Contemporary Students,” which stirred a commotion among the literary people of those days. It opened the eyes of young men to a new type of writing; and Japanese literature took on a new color from this year. It was also this year that gave birth to a society of writers called “ Ken-yu-sha” or “The Association of Literary Friends,” under the leadership of another great novelist, Koyo (or Maple Leaves). It was this group of novelists that, for ten years to come, was to stand at the forefront of literary activities and prac- tically change the whole atmosphere of Japanese lit- erature. Koyo’s (the Maple Leaves’) great work, ‘The Con- fessions of Two Lovers — Two Nuns,” appeared in 1889 and won him national recognition as one of the greatest writers of the day. His many other stories followed with equal success. His contribution to the literary world was threefold. He started a new school of fiction by setting an example in objective description. He MODERN LITERATURE 63 also attracted the attention of the whole nation by making his stories especially entertaining, and thus created an atmosphere for future novelists. But his greatest contribution lay in the creation of a new style of prose — brilliant and ornate. He was, in fact, a master of our tongue; and by his conscientious and ar- tistic skill he changed the style of writing, not only for fiction but also for the whole range of literature. His strength, however, was his weakness. He became so absorbed in style and in the merely interesting phases of stories that he neglected sincerity and penetration. He and his followers more or less played with their novels, and did not rise to the height of truly great writers. In sharp contrast to Koyo (Maple Leaves) stood Rohan (as his greatest work was “ The Pagoda,” I will call him “The Author of The Pagoda”). The secret of his power was his indomitable idealism. His basic philosophy was Buddhism and he was more of a poet than a novelist. His place as a great writer was firmly established when he published his masterpiece, “The Pagoda,” in 1895. It is the story of an architect who built a towering pagoda on new principles, in the face of tremendous opposition from his colleagues.