oe : prietivve . ‘ ry ot vs lot ghrelin lefeth Pe ° - > oo r agi edel'e Fo giote ete eicheic¥ a CN > = Oo o. ial w pe. she Atti ed es rere i 7h; } My et ; ey ot has By U a be . < ¥ a NORA) ‘ate ' ro > A, j 2 ays ie ie on Honest 4 7 Glau a nS \ at 4 ‘ * a \ ‘ ei % Ae "Digitized by the tere Eikrchivd Ke in 2022 with funding from ie Princeton Theological Seqiip lary Lib Vs BISHOP BUTLER’S ANALOGY OF RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED, TOOTH CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. “ Rjus (4vplogicz) hee vis est, ut id quod dubium est, ad aliquid simile, de quo non quzritur, referat, ut incerta certis probet.”—Quinct. Inst. Orat., 1. 1, ¢. vi. cent Gr PRIyp (= anattion Sg Pe ap ae * SEP 27 19] Pee es wy, c > Se a Butler 1* XVill LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. Bristol was the poorest of the English sees, the revenues being but £400 per annum, and Gooch’s claims are said to have been _ far inferior to those of the author of the Analogy. Butler, though a modest man, was by no means destitute of spirit; and in the letter to Walpole, in which he acknowledged and accepted his appointment, he resented, in strong terms, the slight which it implied. The effect of his remonstrance was soon perceived ; for in 1740, the king nominated him to the Deanery of St. Paul’s, London. Immediately upon obtaining this promotion, he resigned his living at Stanhope, which he had till then retained, and his prebendary stall at Rochesta.. The large revenues of the Deanery of St. Paul’s enable him’ to gratify his taste for building and ornament. He is said to have expended, in improving the episcopal palace at Bristol, between four and five thousand pounds, a greater sum than he received from the Bishopric during the whole period of his incumbency. To assist in what was to him a labour of love, the merchants of that city presented him with a large quantity of cedar. In altering the private chapel, he placed (as already stated) a white marble cross over the communion table. This unfortunate step not only occasioned scandal at the time, but gave plausibility to the charge of # leanmg towards Popery, which was made in the latter part of his life, and after his death. The cross remained in its place until the destruction of the palace by a mob, in 1831. In 1746 he was made clerk to the Ais of George IT, In 1747, upon the decease of Archbishop Potter, he was offered the Primacy, but refused it, declaring, “that it was tco late for him to try to support a falling Church.’ He took a gloomy view of the prospects of the Establishment. His relations at Wantage wished very much to see him elevated to that high dig- nity; and one of his nephews, supposing that his uncle’s refusal grew out of a fear of the heavy expenses to be incurred at his entrance upon the office, offered to advance £20,000, or any other sum which might be thought necessary. He was exceed. # .* LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. XixX ingly dissatisfied when he found the Bishop’s purpose was not to be altered. The see of Durham becoming vacant in 1750, by the decease of Dr. Edward Chandler, the king was desirous of advancing Butler to it. When, however, Butler understood that the lieu- tenancy of the county, which had usually gone with the Bishop ric, was about to be separated from it, he at first declined the honour. He appears to have been unwilling that the see should lose a single one of its established dignitics. Out of regard to his feelings in this particular, the proposed change was deferred until the next vacancy. Another instance of his delicacy of feeling in this connection is given by the present Bishop of Exeter. “On his translation, the Deanery of St. Paul’s was to be vacated. The minister wished to give it to Butler’s oldest and best friend, Secker, who held a stall at Durham, which, in that case, it was proposed that the Crown should give to Dr. Chapman. Unfortunately, the arrangement was’ mentioned to Butler before he was translated; and highly gratifying as it would have been to him for Secker’s sake, his conscience took the alarm, lest it should bear even the semblance of a condition of his own promotion. He for some time hesitated, in conse- quence, to accept the splendid station, which solicited him; nor did he yield till his scruple respecting all os notion nf con- dition was removed.” What his feelings were upon this accession of honour and fortune, is shown in the following extract from a letter to a friend — <‘TIncrease of fortune is insignificant to one who thought he had enough before; and I foresee many difficulties in the station I am coming into, and no advantage worth thinking of, except some greater power of being serviceable to others; and whether this be an advan- tage, entirely depends on the use one ‘Hhall make of it: I pray God it may be a good one. It would be a melancholy thing, in the close of life, to have no reflections to entertain one’s self with, but that one had spent the revenues of the Bishopric of Durham, in a sumptuoua course of living, and enriched one’s friends with the promotions of it, * xx LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. instead of having really set one’s self to do good, and promote worthy men; yet this right use of fortune and power is more difficult than the generality of even good people think, and requires both a guard upon one’s self, and a strength of mind to withstand solicitations, greater, I wish I may not find it, than I am master of.” In the year 1750, Bishop Butler drew up a plan for intro. ducing Episcopacy into America. Up to this time, and after: wards, the Hstablished Church, in the English Colonies, was under the charge of the Bishop of London, through whose com- missaries its affairs were managed. As this plan of Butler’s is highly illustrative of the wisdom and moderation of his cha- racter, we subjoin it entire :— ‘“¢1. That no coercive power is desired over the laity in any case, but only a power to regulate the behaviour of the clergy, who are in episcopal orders; and to correct and punish them according to the laws of the Church of England, in case of misbehaviour or neglect of duty, with such power as the commissioners abroad have exercised. ‘¢2. That nothing is desired for such Bishops, that may in the least interfere with the dignity, or authority, or interest of the Governor gr any other officer of state. Probates of will, license for marriages, &c., to be kept in the hands where they are; and no share in the tem- poral government is desired for Bishops. “3. The maintenance of such Bishops not to be at the charge of the colonies. ‘‘4. No Bishops are intended to be settled, where the government is left in the hands of Dissenters, as in New England, &c. But authority to be given only to ordain clergy for such Church of Eng- land congregations as are among them, and to inspect into the manners and behaviour of such clergy, and to confirm the members thereof.” This plan awakened so much opposition among those for whom it was intended, and particularly in New England, that, though revived again as late as 1768, it was finally abandoned. Shortly after his arrival in his ‘diocese, Butler addressed to his clergy a charge upon the “Use and Importance of External Religion.” Alas! it was the only one he was permitted to de- LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. xXx) liver as Bishop of Durham. This charge, though full of excel. lent advices to the clergy, yet contains some statements which are liable to be misunderstood. Indeed, it may be doubted, whether its fundamental idea is not a mistaken one. After stating, that the distinction of the age was “a scorn of religion in some persons, and a disregard of it in the generality,’’ he proceeds to give some directions upon the best means of reviving piety among the common people. “These he conceives to be: ‘the keeping up the form and face of religion,’”’ and “ then endeavouring to make this form subservient to promote its reality and power.” ‘The repairing of churches, the regular at- tendance upon Divine service, uniformity in public and private prayer, the offering of thanks at meals, the catechism and in- struction of children, etc., are the several steps of this process proposed. He fortifies his assertion of the power of forms, by instancing the influence of the forms of Mohammedanism, of Catholicism, and of the old ritual of the Jews. We humbly conceive that when practical piety is dying away in a nation, the effort to resuscitate it by a renewed devotion to external re- ligion, is simply beginning at the end. The form is the symbol of an inward feeling and life; and when the internal correspon- dent is gone, a more rigid observance of the form may produce superstition, but it can effect no good,—it cannot awaken the dead. That Mohammedanism, whose power Butler cites, gained its triumphs over Christianity, and seized the time-honoured seats of our faith, because the Fathers, by unwisely teaching a ritual religion first, and a spiritual one afterwards, had made the Church superstitious in doctrine, corrupt in practice, and feeble to resist the inroads of error. John Wesley, a presbyter of the Church of England, was a contemporary of Butler’s: he saw the lamentable irreligion of the common people, and de- plored it as deeply as the Bishop himself; and, with his pecu- liar sagacity, he discerned that the evil was only to be remedied by an earnest, spiritual preaching, addressed to them in a style suited to their capacities and wants. In the year 1750, the XxX1l LIFE OF BISHOP. BUTLER. period ot Butler’s accession to the See of Durham, he had already been engaged eleven years in his career of mingled obloquy-and triumph. His success is a matter of history. The parish churches were filled with hearers, and their altars were crowded with communicants, who, having been aroused to a sense of their duty by his appeals, hastened to render their cbe- dience to the outward service and ritual of the Church. And all this was the least of the fruit of his labours. From the time of the pubkcation of this discourse, until some years after his death, Butler was violently assailed in pamphlets and newspapers, as addicted to superstition, as inclined to Po- pery; and finally, as dying in the communion of the Church of Rome. The acrimony of these assaults is undoubtedly to be attributed to the violence of party spirit. Butler’s detestation of Popery is strongly enough expressed in his works ;* and the charge itself was the offspring of a pure desire to promote a ‘revival of the vital spirit of religion in England. It can only be objected against, as proposing means the most unsuitable of all for ‘accomplishing this end. His life at Durham exhibits the same tastes and habits which have been described in the preceding pages. Having now a magnificent income, he made extensive repairs in Durham Cas- tle, and greatly improved the episcopal residence at Auckland. At the same time he gave still wider scope to his almost un: bounded benevolence. He is said to have subscribed £400 pet annum to the county hospital. . Considering it his duty to sup- port the dignity of his station with liberality, he set apart three days of every week for the entertainment of the neighbouring gentry. He was likewise exceedingly attentive to his clerical brethren. The following incident shows his benevolence in a * very pleasing light :— * See the Sermon before the House of Lords, and the remarks on positive institutions, Analogy, part II., chap. i. LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. Xxii «A gentleman once waited upon him with the details of some pro jected benevolent institution. The bishop highly approved of the object in view, and calling his house-steward, inquired how much money he then had in his possession. The answer was: ‘ Five hun- dred pounds, my lord.’ ‘Five hundred pounds !? exclaimed his mas- ter; ‘What a shame for a bishop to have so much money! Give it away; give it all to this gentleman, for his charitable plan.’ ”°—Bart- lett, p. 196. He once declared to his under-secretary, Mr. Emm:—“ 1 should feel ashamed of myself, if I could leave ten thousand pounds behind me.” And in this he kept his word; he died worth but little over nine thousand. We believe this sum was not quite half his annual income. But though liberal in dis- , pensing the hospitalities of his station, he was exceedingly slm- ple in his private habits. It is related, that a young gentleman of fortune once dined by appointment with him, and the table was set out with nothing more than a joint of meat and a pud- ding. The bishop apologized for his fare, by saying, ‘That it - was his way of living; that®he had been long disgusted with the fashionable expense of time and money at entertainments, and was determined that it should receive no countenance from — his example.’ He was rigidly honest in distributing his patronage. It was nis desire to prefer worthy and capable men to benefices in his gift; but the sudden termination of his life prevented him from carrying out his purposes, in this respect, to any great extent. He did not suffer the claims of relationship to warp his impar- tiality. His eccentric nephew, John Butler, in expressing his Jisappointment, that the bishop had done so little for his family, is reported to have said very bluntly, —“ Methinks, my lord, + is a misfortune to be related to you!’’ | But, as if to give another proof of the vanity of all earthly hings, two years had scarcely elapsed after the settlement of \e bishop in the See of Durham, when his health began to fail. itso. the advice of the most eminent physicians, he at first tried XXIV LIFE OF BISHOP’ BUTLER. the waters of Clifton: but these affording no relief, he was con veyed, in a sinking condition, to Bath. Here he was constantly attended by his chaplain Dr. Forster, and was visited by his friend, Bishop Benson. Secker was himself just recovering from illness, and could not safely travel. From Dr. Forster’s fre- quent letters to Secker, we have a full account of Butler’s last hours. In one of these, he writes: “All his physicians seem « be clear that his disorder is owing to some obstructions in the organs of digestion, without being able to tell where the fault principally lies. They say, however, that he is so weak at pre- sent, that any attempt to remove these obstructions as yet, would be death to him.” Benson, the day after Butler’s death, writes to Secker on this point more definitely: —“'The liver, by the account which the physicians gave, was so much decayed that no art was capable of restoring it; and nothing but the forma- tion of a new organ could restore him.” His weakness was so great, that during these closing scenes he spoke but little. In parting with Benson, he remarked, says the Bishop, “It must be a farewell for ever ; and said Kind and affecting things more than I could bear.” After lingering thus twelve days, he died, June 16th, 1752, in the 60th year of his age. Tradition reports several expressions, as being among the dying words of Butler, all going to show that he expired with an humble trust in the ° Saviour; but as these, though perhaps founded upon truth, are not substantiated by any direct evidence, they are here omitted. On Saturday, June 20th, he was interred in the cathedral at Bristol. Over his remains there was placed a marble stone, with an inscription by Dr. Forster. In the year 1834, an ele- gant monument was erected, by subscription, in Bristol cathe- dral, to his memory. Part of the funds for this purpose was contributed by Oriel College, as a testimonial of their reverence for the memory of the eminent scholar, and divine, who had gone forth from their midst. A beautiful inscription was fur- nished for this monument by Dr. Southey. Three portraits of Butler were taken while he lived: the first during his residence LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. xxv at Stanhope, in the fortieth year of his age ; the second shortly after he was made Bishop of Bristol; and the last, not long before his death, when his body was already beginning to sink under the attacks of disease. The engravings from the first likeness show a calm and benignant countenance; regular and delicate features, with a sweetness of expression shining through. put, which hardly could have failed to win attachment and love. The following descriptions will assist us in conceiving his per- sonal appearance in the latter part of his lifs. . The first is from Hutchinson’s History of Durham, and the second from Surtees’ account of the same place :— ‘¢ He was of a most reverend aspect: his face thin and pale; but there was a Divine placidness in his countenance, which inspired vene- ration, and expressed the most benevolent mind. His white hair hung gracefully on his shoulders, and his whole figure was patriarchal.” ‘During the short time that Butler held the See of Durham, he conciliated all hearts. In advanced years, and on the episcopal throne, he retained the same genuine modesty, and native sweetness of dib- position, which had distinguished him in youth and in retirement. During the ministerial performance of the sacred office, a Divine an.- mation seemed to pervade his whole manner, and lighted up his pal:, wan countenance, already marked with the progress of disease, like a torch glimmering in its socket, yet bright and useful to the last Be He was regular in his attendance upon Parliament, but nev -r spoke in the House of Lords. This fact led Horace Walpcie to say, that “the Bishop of Durham had been wafted to thit see in a cloyd of metaphysics, and remained absorbed in it!” Such was Butler. His pure, transparent character needs no elaborate summary. His was not one of those close, hidden natures, which elude and perplex us after the most searching study. The marks of truth and goodness here are so plain, that he who runs can read them. He was no illustration of Bacon’s aphorism, that “The way to great place is by a winding stair.”’ No crooked courses, nor time-serving, nor dancing attendaace upon the great, brought him to eminence. His dignities were XXXVI LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER. thrust upon him. It does not in our land (saving as a proof of the esteem of his contemporaries) heighten our regard, to know that he was invested with the lordly honours of an English See. All that was the transitory, the outward decking, which in itself has no lustre. But his scrupulous conscientiousness, his sincerity of purpose, his honesty of action, his life-long endea- vours to do good,—these are the abiding, the immortal, and _ stamp him infallibly as a true man. His position in Theology has been compared with that of Bacon in Philosophy. Both relied upon observation for the dis- covery of truth; both strenuously opposed hasty theorizing ; both rested their systems upon the sure ground of fact. Indeed, analogy and induction involve similar mental operations. In those departments of inquiry, to which his attention was chiefly directed, Butler enjoys the good fortune to have written nothing which is yet cast aside as error; with the lapse of time, men’s confidence in his views has increased. His influence upon the thinking world has been deep and wide; for he has spoken through others, as well as in his own person. His friend Secker, in his own day, popularized him ; Paley has translated him in his admirably executed Evidences; Chalmers has gloried in being his expounder; and our Wayland has acknowledged him as the principal. source of his theory of Ethics. If any judg- ment can be formed from the variety of editions issued, his works are more read now than ever. _ He has reared for himself an enduring monument. John Wesley, long ago, said, “that the Analogy was too deep for the men for whom it was written ; for he had found that free. thinkers were not usually close thinkers.’ It has, how-ver, proved a precious legacy to the Church: for often the very - objections which are boastfully urged by the sceptic, afflict and distress the believer’s heart. To him, these unanswerable rea, sonings are then a help and relief, to clear his vision, to quiet his doubts, to animate and strengthen his fondest hopes. ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. (xxvii) tO if él. | nwt fa / 2 os . > weg AON Ah Yoo bo. —— INTRODUCTION. 1. Analogical reasoning in general. (Pp. 83--85.) 1. Nature. (Pp. 83, 84.) 2. Use. (P. 84.) 3. Value. (Pp. 84, 85.) II. Application of it to religion. (Pp. 86-90.) 1. Propriety of such application. (P. 86.) “ 2. Superiority of this mode of argument to hypothesis and speculation. (Pp. 86-89.) 3. Method of the argument. (Pp. 89, 90.) - 7% Analogical reasoning in general. (Pp. 83-85.) ~ 1. Nature. (Pp. 83, 84.) ad < Probable evidence, as distinguished from demovstrative, ad mits of degrees. The foundation of probability is verisimili tude, i. e. likeness to some truth, or true event; and according rs to the degree of likeness, there is produced either a presump- z tion, or an opinion, or full conviction. 2 U8e;.(P,. 84:) Probable evidence is relative only to beings of limited capa: city, since nothing which is the possible object of knowledge can be probable to an infinite intelligence. 3. Value. (Pp. 84, 85.) To us, probability is the very guide of life. Even in specula- tion, we have to decide for that side, on which lies the greater presumption; and in practice, we are bound, in point of pru- dence, to act on still lower presumptions; yea, often even © where the chance is greatly against our succeeding. This general way of arguing then, is evidently natural, just, and conclusive. II, Application of analogical reasonirg to religion. (Pp. 85-90.) 1. Propriety of such application. (P. &6.) 9, * (XX1x) ExXx ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. If the Scripture and the constitution of nature have the same _ Author, we may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in both; therefore such difficulties no more prove the former not to be from God than the latter.” An Author of Nature being supposed, an analogy or likeness between the system of revelation and the known course of nature, affords a pre- sumption that they have the same author; and furnishes an answer to such objections against the former’s being from - God, as would lie equally against the latter. . Superiority of this mode of argument to bynetbens and spec- ulation. (Pp. 86-89.) To form our notions of the constitution and government of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for our princi- ples, or upon reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to-which we have no ground to apply them, are kindred errors. But it is just to argue from known facts to such as are like them, —from what now is to what shall be, —from what we see, to what lies beyond us. We ought not to speculate how the world might have been, or ought to have been framed otherwise than it is; for we have not the requisite faculties for such speculations. If we must con- clude, that the ultimate end designed is the most virtue and happiness possible, yet we cannot judge what are the neces- sary means of accomplishing this end. . Method of the argument. (Pp: 89-90.) We ought to observe how the teachings of religion correspond with the known constitution and course of nature. This anal- ogy will amount, in some few instances, to a practical proof; and where it does not, it will still be a confirmation of what is proved in other ways— will show that religion is not a sub- ject of ridicule, unless nature be so too, and will afford an answer to almost all objections against the system of religion, and, in a very considerable degree, to the objections against the evidence of it. It is proposed, therefore, in this treatise, ‘9 show that the particular parts principally objected against in natural and revealed religion, are analogous to the constitu- tion and course of nature; and that this argument is of weight on the side of religion, nouniietandine any objections which may seem to lie against it, and any difference of opinion re- specting the degree of its weight. a ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. XxXX1 Be AG bes Bea le 4 NATURAL RELIGION. OUTLINE. * i. ee PLAN OF NATURAL RELIGION. Chaps. 1-5. ee HAT MANKIND ARE APPOINTED TO LIVE INA Future State. C . THAT THERE EVERY ONE SHALL BE REWARDED OR PoNisHED a Pac 2. ; 8. REWARDED OR PUNISHED, AS VIRTUOUS OR Vicious. Cha y. 2 ie Ser i a 4. Tuar our Present Lire 18 A PROBATION FOR THAT FUTURE © Pa el yee g onz. Chaps. 4, 5. (tee omy thot f (1.) A Proparion mmpLyine TRIAL, DiFFICULTIES, AND Dan- GER. Chap. 4. . (2.) A PROBATION INTENDED FOR Morat DIscIpLine. Chap. 5. (3.) A PROBATION INTENDED FoR THE MANIFESTATION OF PER« SONS’ CHARACTERS TO THE CREATION. Close of Chap. 5. II. OBJECTIONS TO THE PLAN ANSWERED. Chaps. 6, 7. 1. OpsEctions To Trs Existence. Chap. 6. 2, OBJECTIONS TO ITS WISDOM AND Goopness. Chap. 7. I. CONCLUSION. * EXXii ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. | (.)THE PLAN OF NATURAL RELIGION. Chaps. 1-6. R 3 0 THAT-MANKIND ARE APPOINTED TO LIVE IN A FurTuRE STATE. er. Chap. ae , if Z 2 oa L Iti is a general law of nature, that the same creatures should exist in degrees of life and perception, in one period of their being, greatly different from those of another period. Why then may we not exist hereafter, in a state as different from the present, ~» as this is from our former? (Pp. 91, 92.) il The possession of living powers now, is a presumption that they ref oe will exist hereafter, unless there is reason to believe that they will be destroyed by death. (Pp. 92-104.) But there is none. __ For there is no ground to believe death to be | / © (Z) Either the destruction of living agents. (Pp. 93-101.) _-~~--{II.) Or the destruction of their present powers of reflection. Si see. (Pp. 101, 102.) (ID.)Or even the suspension of the exercise of those powers (Pp. 102-104.) And SEL) There is no ground to believe death to be the destruction _ of living agents: either “1. From the reason of the thing ;—for we know not what death is, but only some of its effects, nor what our living powers depend upon. (P. 94.) . Or from the analogy of nature;—for we cannot trace animals after death, and up to that time, the analogy is against the destruction of their living powers. (P. 94.) 8. Or from imaginary presumptions to,that effect, arising from early and lasting prejudices. Because ; 1.) They go on the supposition that living beings are com- aerd pounded, and so discerptible; which is not the case — for consciousness being simple and indivisible, so must bo be the conscious being. And, therefore, our organized bodies are no part of ourselves, and their dissolution is _ not our destruction. (Pp. 95-96.) (2.) The same conclusion may be deduced, from observing that men may lose their limbs, their senses, and even y ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. the greatest part of their bodies, that the bd all animals are undergoing a constant change, ar each living agent remains the same being. (Pp. 3 97.) A. More particular statement of the argument. (Pp. 97- 100, .) a. Unless the living being is larger than the solid elemen- tary particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no reason to think death a dissolution of it, though it is not abso- lutely indiscerptible. (P. 97.) b. As the dissolution of matter in which we are nearly interested, (e. g. our flesh and bones,) is not our disso- lution; so we have no ground to think that the dissolu- tion of any other matter will be our dissolution, from . the like kind of relation. (Pp. 97, 98.) c. The same conclusion is reached, if we consider our body as made up of organs and instruments of perception and motion. An eye, for example, bears the same relation to us, in kind, though not in degree, as a microscope, and there is no more reason to suppose that the living agent is destroyed by the loss of the one than of the other. And so of all the other organs of the body. (Pp. 98- 100.) B. Objection answered. (Pp. 100, 101.) If it be objected that these observations would go to prove ms brutes immortal, and capable of everlasting happiness, it may be answered, ‘a. If it were even implied, in the natural immortality of — ’ prutes, that they must become rational and moral agents, j this would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent capacities they may be endowed with. (P. 100.) b. But the natural immortality of brutes does not, inthe ~ least, imply that they are endowed with any latent capa- y cities of a rational or moral nature. All difficulties, in short, as to how they are to be dis- posed of, are founded in our ignorance. (Pp. 100, 101.) aL) There is no reason to believe death to be the destructior “of the present powers of reflection. (Pp. 101, 102.) eMectats Because, it does not appear that the gross body is neces- ~~ ~"™gary to thinking; to our intellectual enjoyments or suffer \ \ : ~ ‘ ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. ings: —If our bodies and our present reflecting powers mutually affect each other, this, as has been already shown, _ affords no presumption that the dissolution of the one is the destruction of the other; while the fact, that there are instances of their not affecting each other, (as in those mortal diseases, which leave the mind unimpaired to the »- last,) affords a presumption of the contrary. (IIL) There is no ground to believe death to be even the suspen- ~~" sion of the exercise of the present powers of reflection; for the same reasons as under preceding. Death may, in Some sort, answer to our birth: and like it, instead of being the suspension of our faculties it may put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life. (Pp. 102-104.) (Remark.— The destruction of a vegetable not analo- gous to that of a living agent, because it lacks the power of perception and action, the only thing we are inquiring about the continuance of.) ConcLusion.—As death does not appear likely to destroy us, it is _ probable we shall live on; and the next life may be as natural as _. this present. This credibility of a future life seems to answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof. — Indeed a demonstrative proof of it would not be a proof of religion, though any presumption against a fature life is & presumption against religion. (Pp. 104-106.) (2) THAT IN THAT FuruRE STATE EVERY ONE SHALL BU REWARDED or PuNisHep. Chap. 2. I. Uf Rewards*and Punishments in general. (Pp. 107-111.) II. Of Punishment in particular. (Pp. 112-116.) a t. Of Rewards and Punishments in general. (I.) Importance of the inquiry. —It makes the question’ 6 future life more intensely interesting. (2). dae qd.) Argument.—In the present state, pleas e consequences of our actions; and wee. eu * + ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. a author of our nature with capacities of foresecing these ¢ sequences. (Pp. 107, 108.) ) qi) Objections. 1. To the wisdom and goodness of this constitution. ‘* Why does not the Author of Nature make his creatu. happy without the instrumentality of their own actions and prevent their bringing any suffering upon themselves” (Pe 108.) a. Answer : — . 2 (1.) It may be impossible, or (2.) It might produce less happiness, or (3.) Divine goodness may be a disposition to make “I 5 the good happy, or om (4.) The end of God’s government ae be beyond ihe ne. reach of our faculties. (5.) However we may explain it, the fact itself cannot be questioned, that God does thus govern us. (P. 109.) __ 2. ‘All this is to be ascribed’ to the general course of na- ture.” Answer. —Yes; but a course of nature implies an opera: ting agent: God's acting uniformly is no proof that he — does not act at all. (P. 109.) 3. ‘The argument would seem to prove, that the peas naturally accompanying every particular gratification of passion, was intended to put us upon gratifying ourselves in every such particular instance, and as a reward to us for so doing.” Answer. — As it is obvious that eyes were intended for seeing, though there may be some things on which we ought not to look, so the foreseen pleasures and pains be- longing to the passions were intended, in general, to induce mankind to act in such and such manners. (P. 110.) s1V.) Conclusion, From the fact that God has given us to understand, that he has appointed pleasure to be the consequence of one course of action, and pain of another, and from our finding such consequences uniformly to follow, we learn tkat we are at present actually under his government; i. e. that he rewards and punishes us for our actions. It matters not whether _ {such consequences are brought about by his continued action, _ _ or by virtue of the original constitution of things, which he Of punishment in particular. (Pp. 112-116.) (L.) (IL) fTII.) Value of this analogy. (Pp. 115, 116.) /nas established. Nor does it affect the question, that men ma . ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. * ridicule the thought of lesser pains being considered as in- stances of divine punishment, for this cannot be denied, with out denying all final causes. If then it be true, that God is now actually exercising that government over US, which implies rewarding and punishing, there is nothing incredible in supposing that he will reward and punish men hereafter. (Pp. 110, 111.) Reason for considering this separately. —It is most objected against. (P. EIS) Circumstances in natural punishments analogous to what religion teaches of future punishments. (Pp. 112-115.) 1. They often follow actions which are accompanied with much present pleasure. 2. They are often much greater than the pleasure. 3. Their delay is no presumption of final impunity. 4. After such delay, they often come suddenly. 5, They come, though men may not have a distinct, full ex- pectation of them: e. g. though thoughtless youth may not consider, or even believe beforehand, the consequences of rashness/and folly, yet this does not prevent them from following. 6. Opportunities once neglected may never be recalled. 7. The consequences of folly and extravagance are often irre trievable. 8, Neglects are often attended with consequences altogether as dreadful as any active misbehaviour. - 9. Many natural punishments are final to hin who invurs them, e. g. capital punishments under civil government, and mortal diseases brought on by dissolute life. These circumstances are things of every day’s experience, and are so analogous to what religion teaches us concerning future punishment, thatthe same words may be applied to poth, e. g. the address of Wisdom in the first chapter of Proverbs. (Pp. 114, 115.) eh! ’ &, my It is sufficient to show what the laws of the admit, and to answer objections against the. redibiiy af roi a future state of punishment, drawn from ' our nature and external temptations, from Leste ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. _ XXxXvil from suppositions that the will of an infinite being cannot — be contradicted, or that he cannot be offended or provoked. 2. It is adapted to impress even the most serious, much more ought it to alarm those who exhibit a fearlessness of the future, which nothing could justify, but a universally ac, knowledged demonstration of atheism. Jy n- ‘al So (x THAT IN THE FururE State, MEN SHALL BE REWARDED OR PUNISHED, AS VIRTUOUS oR Vicrovs. Chap. 3. \ a. Preliminaries. (Pp. 117-119.) (I.) Definitions. — Final causes prove an intelligent Creator. The particular final causes, pleasure and pain, prove him an in- © telligent Governor. If the pleasure and pain be distributed according to the virtue or vice of his subjects, this would prove him a moral or righteous Governor.. And if this were _ done, with regard to all intelligent creatures, in exact pro- portion to their personal merits or demerits, then the moral goyernment would be perfect. (II.) Mistaken view of the Deity. It is a mistake to suppose the only character of God to be that of simple, absolute benevolence. Though there may possibly be beings in the creation, to whom he manifests himself under that character, yet he has given us proof, in the constitution and conduct of the world, that for us he is a Governor (Chap. 2.), and it may be that we shall find there nor. / (MIL) The divine government which we are under in the present state, taken alone, is admitted not to be perfect in degree. Yet _ . it may still be moral in kind. “Y2 (I, Desiza of this chapter. It is, to inquire how far the principles and beginnings of a moral » government over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding mi and amidst all the confusion and disorder of it. (Pp. 119-184.) Ad 38 & aS ae also, clear and distinct indications that he is a moral Gover- ~ XXXVili ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. The common argument, that we have an instance of an existing moral government, in the fact that in general less uneasiness and more satisfaction are the natural consequences of a virtuous than of a vicious course of life, in the present state, is not insisted on here; because it is difficult to weigh pleasures and uneasinesses, so as to estimate the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue. ', Amidst the infinite disorders of the world, there may be excep- tions to the happiness of virtue, even with regard to those who have been blameless from their youth up; much more in regard to those who have reformed after a long career of vice. But though it is not doubtful whether virtue, upon the whole, is hap- pier than vice; yet if it were, the beginnings of a righteous administration may, beyond all question, be found in nature. (Pp. 119, 120.) For ) (1.) As it is matter of experience that God does govern us by the method of rewards and punishments, it is more natural for - us to suppose that he will finally reward or punish us accord- ing as we are virtuous or vicious, than by any other rule. (Pp. 120, 121.) (II.) Some sort of moral government is implied in the fact that such is the constitution of things, that prudence and i impru- dence, (which are of the nature of virtue and vice,) are respectively rewarded and punished. (P1219 (I.) Society being a natural institution, the punishments which are inflicted on the vicious as mischievous to society, as well as those which they suffer from fear of detection, afford an instance of a kind of moral government actually taking place. (Pp. 121, 122.) j Objection. —*‘ Good and beneficial actions are often punished, / and mischievous actions rewarded.” Answer: 1, This is not necessary, and consequently not natural.’ 2. Good actions are never punished, considered:as beneficial, nor ill actions rewarded, as mischievous. (Bo 1225) (1V.) We have an instance of moral government begun and estab: / / lished, in the fact that, in the natural course of things, vir ud tue as such is rewarded, and vice as such punished. Pp. 122~ 128.) cag 1. Evidence of the fact. (Pp. 122-125.) (1.) In the good and bad effects of virtue and vice on men’s . | ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY. XXXIX own minds. Besides the effect of an action, abstracted from all consideration of its morality, there is an effect produced by its virtuousness or viciousness. Vice, as such, produces uneasiness, and virtue, as such, procures peace and satisfaction. To which may be added the: fears of future punishment, and the hopes of a bett«y, life, which are matter of present uneasiness and sa¥i2- faction. (Pp. 123, 124.) ural (2.) In men’s disposition to befriend virtue, as such, | | to discountenance vice, as such, im others: instances of which we have in the operations of public opinion, and in domestic and civil government, both of which are natural. (Pp. 124, 125.) 2. Causes of this course of things. (Pp. 126-128.) (1.) The moral nature which God has given us. (2.) His having given us, together with this nature, so great a power over each others’ happiness and misery. In this constitution of things we have a declaration of the Author of Nature, for virtue and against vice. iV.) There is, in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce their good and bad effeets in a greater degree than they do in fact produce them; and this is an instance of somewhat moral in the constitution of nature. (Pp. 128- 134.) 1. In individuals, these tendencies are obvious. 2. In society, too, power under the direction of virtue has s / necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power, not under the direction of it; just as power under the direc- tion of reason has a tendency to prevail over brute force. If the latter be admitted, so ought the former. And the natural superiority of reason is admitted, notwithstanding it is necessary that certain circumstances should concur in _ order to secure it, e. g. (1.) There* must be some reasonable proportion in num- bers, between the brutes and rational beings. (2.) There must be an opportunity of union among the rational beings. ‘83.) There must be sufficient time for reason tp exert it- self. (Pp. 128, 129.) | So also it must be admitted that virtue has a natural xl ANALYSIS OF BUTLER § ANALOGY. tendency to triumph over vice, though similar circum. stances must concur in order to give effect to that “tendency. Whenever virtue does not thus triumph, it is owing to hindrances which may be remoyed in a future state. The happy tendency of virtue, even in the present world, may be illustrated by Gonsidering the supremacy which a kingdom would attain, where perfect virtue existed for many ages. (Pp. 180-184.) _ Objection. — ‘‘ Notwithstanding these natural effects and tendeny cies of virtue, things may go on hereafter in the same mixed way as at present.” (P. 134.) Answer. — The author’s object is not to prove God’s moral govern- ment over the world, but to observe what there is in the consti- tution and course of nature to confirm the proper proof of it, sup- posed to be known. And the foregoing observations are a very strong confirmation of the proof of a future state of retribution. For * 1. They show that the Author of Nature is in favor of virtue, and against vice. (Pp. 184, 135.) 2. The distributive justice, which religion teaches us to expect at _ the last, will not be different, in kind, but only in degree, from what we now experience. (P. 185.) 3. Our experience that virtue and vice are actually vowatien and punished at present, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear that they may be rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter. (P. 135.) 4, And that they actually will be rewarded and punished in a greater degree hereafter may be expected from their good and bad tendencies respectively. For these tendencies are essential, while the hindrances to their becoming effect are only acci- dental. (Pp. 135, 186.) From these things arises a presumption that the moral govern: ment established in nature will be carried on much farther— indeed, absolutely completed. And from these things, joined _ with the moral nature which God has given us, considered ag given by him, arises a practical proof that it will be completed. (Pp. 136, 137.) 2 ta eS ee ae) ee ee HI. Iy. ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’4$ ANALOGY. (4) THAT OUR PRESENT Lire 18 A PROBATION FOR A FUTURE STATE, Chaps. 4, 5. A PROBATION IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND D aeR. Chap. 4. The state of trial which religion teaches that we are in, Wr regard to a future world, is only of a piece with the state of trial which we are in, with regard to the.present world; e.g. whenever we are tempted to any course of action which will probably occasion greater temporal uneasiness than satisfac- tion. Because The causes of our trial in both capaci are the same, viz: (Pp. 140, 141.) (I.) Something in our external circumstances. (II.) Something in our nature. . Our trials in both capacities have the same effect upon men’s be- haviour, (Pp. 141, 142.) the ill behaviour of others, by a wrong education, by general bad example, and by the corruptions of religion; so in our temporal capacity, they are increased by a foolish education, by the extra- vagance and carelessness of others, by mistaken notions concern- ing temporal happiness, and by our own negligence and folly. (P. 142.) The equitableness of this state of degradation is vindicated, in both cases, by the same consideration, viz: That there is no more required of men, than they are well able to do. And we can no more complain of this, with regard to the Author of Nature, than of his not having given us other advantages, belonging to other orders of creatures. (Pp. 142, 143.) Conciusron.— Our experience of a state of trial in our natural capa- city, makes it eredible that we are in such a state in our moral capacity, notwithstanding any speculative difficulties which may be connected with it. (Pp. 143, 144.) a As in our religious capacity, our trials are greatly increased by ~ ‘lit ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'’S ANALOGY. : < (2) Our pRresenT Lire 1s a State or PROBATION, INTENDED re Morat Discrpuine. Chap. 5. } All the reasons for our being placed in such a state of trial, we may not be able to understand. But the end is, our improve-~ ment in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification fer a future state of security and happiness. And this is analogous to the beginning of life as an education for mature age in the present world. ‘ 1, A correspondence necessary between our nature and our condi- tion.— As there must be a correspondence between our nature and our external circumstances here, in order to life and happi- ness; so there must be some character and qualifications, without which persons cannot but be incapable of the life of the good hereafter. (P. 146.) ; IL Capability of improvement. — We are so constituted that we are capable of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for - . which we were once wholly unqualified. We can acquire habits _ of perception and habits of action; —habits of body and habits of mind. As habits of body are produced by external acts, so habits of mind are produced by the exertion of inward practical principles. And thus a new character in several respects may be formed. (Pp. 146-150.) : UL. Necessity for improvement. — These capacities for improvement are necessary to prepare us for our mature state of life. And as nature has given us the power of improvement, so she has placed us in a condition, in infancy, childhood and youth, fitted for it. As childhood, then, is a state of discipline for mature age, so this life is a state of discipline for the next. If it be objected, that we do not discern in what way it is so, it may be answered, so neither do children understand how food, exercise, &c., are preparing them for mature age, yet such is the fact notwithstand- ing. (Pp. 150-152.) ae IV. How, and in what respects, the present life may be a preparation for the future state. (Pp. 152-168.) pe: A. As regards the active principle of obedience to God’s com- mands. (Pp. 153-161.) — 3 . ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY. xiii B. As regards passive submission to his will. (Pp. 161-163.) A. As regards the active principle of obedience to God’s com- mands. (I.) The character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualifi- cation for the future state. (P. 153.) — (II.) We want and are capable of improvement in that cl] racter, by moral and religious habits. (Pp. 1538-15, (III.) The present life is fit to be a state of discipline for improvement. (Pp. 158-160.) And (1.) The character of virtue and piety is a necessary qu tion for the future state. — Because it is according to analogy to suppose, that the future state will be an active one—a community. And it is reasonable to suppose that this com- munity will be under the more immediate government of God; that there will be occasion for the exercise of liberality, justice, and charity, among its members; or at all events, for that character, which is the result of the practice of those virtues. The necessity for such a character may fur: ther be inferred from the fact that the government. of the universe is moral. ES {fI.) We want, and we are capable of, improvement in our moral character by discipline. (Pp. 153-158.) 1. That we are capable of it, has been shown in what has been said of our natural power of habits. (P. 153.) 2. We want it: ku) As finite creatures. (Pp. 153-157.) 2) As corrupt creatures. (Pp. 157, 158.) And (1,) As jinite creatures. é Creatures without blemish, as they come out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going wrong, and so may '/ + need the security of virtuous habits, in addition to the z ve moral principle wrought into their natures by him. This eg Shi 3 occasions, times, degrees and manner of their gratification: me | ae the principle of virtue can neither excite them, nor ee Fe prevent their being excited. They are naturally felt when __ the objects of them are present to the mind, not only be- - fore all consideration whether they can be obtained by ay xliv ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. lawful means, but after it is found they cannot. Such propensions, then, must have some tendency, however small, to induce persons to forbidden gratification. This tendency may be increased” by circunistances until it be- comes effect. Such an indulgence of a propension is not only criminal in itself, but depraves the inward constitu- - tion and character. Thus it is that creatures made upright fall. On the other hand an undeviating obedience to the moral principle, is not only right in itself, but it improves the inward constitution and character ; and it may improve it to such a degree, as almost. to remove the danger of defection. (2.) As corrupt creatures. Upright creatures, as we have just seen, may want to be improved: but depraved creatures want to be renewed, If discipline, therefore, be expedient for the former, it is absolutely necessary for the latter. | {fiI.) The present life is fit to bea State of discipline for moral improvement. (Pp. 158-160.) The trials, difficulties and temptations which surround us render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state of dis- cipline to those who will preserve their integrity, because they render being on our guard, resolution and self-denial i necessary in order to that end. And this practice of virtue has a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue. Whether there is any limit to this capacity for improvement, as in the case of our bodily and intellectual powers, we know not. But what has been said is sufficient to prove the truth of the proposition. Objection 1.— «<< The present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, on the contrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice.” (P. 160.) | ieee Answer. — The fact is admitted, and also that for this very reason the good have a better opportunity to improve. themselves. But this does not prove that the present world was not intended for moral discipline: any more thant fact that many seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals never reach maturity, proves that they were never intended to do so. (Pp. 160, 161.) ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. xly Objection 2. -— ‘*So far as a course of behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds-from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline of self-love.” (P. 161.) Answer. — Doing what God commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. Veracity, justice and charity, regard to God’s authority and to our own chief interest, are not only all three coin- cident, but each of them is in itself a just and natural motive or principle of action. “3. As regards passive submission to the will of God. (Pp. 161- 163.) The above remarks on active obedience apply to passive sub- mission. It is a mistake to suppose that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for or require this virtue, that it cannot be necessary to qualify us for a state of perfect happiness. Prosperity and imagination may give occasion for its exercise: and though there can be no scope for patience when sorrow shall be no more, yet there may be need of a temper of mind which shall have been formed by patience. Habits of resig- nation may be requisite for all creatures;—certainly for human creatures. And affliction is the proper discipline for * resignation. Conciusion. — Since the general doctrine that the present world is a state of moral discipline for another, is so entirely analogous to childhood’s being a discipline for mature age, it is in vain to object against the credibility of the doctrine, that all the trouble and dan- ger of such discipline might have been saved us, by our being made at once the creatures and the characters which we were to be. For we experience, that what we were to be was to be the effect of what we would do. (Pp. 163, 164.) ® A PROBATION INTENDED FOR THE MANIFESTATION OF PERSONS CHARACTERS TO THE CREATION. (P. 164.) This may be a means of their being disposed of suitably to theis characters; and of its being known to the creation, by way of example, that they are thus disposed of. At all events, it con- tributes very much, in various ways, to carrying on a great part. of that general course of nature, respecting mankind, whick comes under our observation at present. xlvi Cy d The t ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. OBJECTIONS. TO THE PLAN OF NATURAL RELIGION AN: GY ake Chaps. 6, 7. (3) OnsECTIONS TO Irs Ex1sTENCE. Chap. 6. fatalist, reasoning from his principle of universal necessity, would allege that there cannot be any such moral plan at all. Answer.—If that opinion be reconcilable with the constitution of nature, it is also reconcilable with religion. For I il. _ Preliminary argument. — The opinion of necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of Nature, whose existence has been taken for granted throughout this treatise (Pp. 166, 167.) The opinion of universal necessity does not account for the for- mation of the world, any more than for the structure of a house. We do, indeed, ascribe to G'od, a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. But this is a peculiar form of expression, arising from the scantiness of language, and would not be applied to any thing else. When, therefore, a fatalist asserts that every thing is by necessity, he must mean, (1,) by an agent acting necessarily ; and (2,) that the necessity by which such an agent is supposed to act does not exclude intelligence and design. Main argument. (I.) The opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibi- lity, with the constitution of the world, and the natural government which we experience, is also reconcilable with the system of religion. (Pp. 167-171.) 1. Though this opinion were speculatively true, yet, with re- gard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our ex- perience reaches; as may be seen in the instances of a child who should be educated in accordance with this opi- nion; or of a man who should act upon it in regard to the ~ preservation of his life. And religion being a practical subject, the notion of necessity is as if it were false with respect to it. (Pp. 168-17 ) 2. If a will and character be reconcilable in us with fate, ANALYSIS OF BUTLER ’S ANALOGY reconcilable with it in the Author of Nature. (Besia natural government and final causes imply a will and cha racter in the governor and designer.) And this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular character of benevo- lence, veracity, and justice in him, which attributes are the foundation of religion, as with any other character. And if the fatalist supposed the attribute of “ justice’”’ to be inconsistent with necessity, it may be observed that a necessity which destroys the injustice of murder, for in- stance, destroys also the injustice of punishing it. And further, the very fact that the fatalist objects to punish- ment as unjust, shows how the notions of justice and in justice will cling to the human mind. (P. 171.) (f1.) The opinion of necessity does not destroy the proof of reli gion. (Pp. 171-175.) 1. It does not destroy this general proof, viz., that there is an _ intelligent Author of Nature —that he governs by rewards © and punishments —that he has given us a moral faculty, by which we approve some actions as virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert; and has thus told us that he will reward the virtuous and punish the vicious. All which is verified by the natural tendencies of virtue and vice; and by the punishments ~ inflicted on vicious actions as such, and as mischievous to society. (Pp. 172-174.) _It does not destroy the external proof of religion. drawn from its universality, its antiquity, and the historias account of its origin. (Pp. 174, 175.) (1.) Its universality. The fact that religion has been pro- fessed in all’ ages and countries, shows it to be con- formable to the common sense of mankind. (2.) Its antiquity. That religion was believed in the first . ages of the world, is a proof of this alternative, either that it came into the world by revelation, or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. (8.) The historical account of its origin, which represents | religion as having been taught mankind by revelation, must be admitted as some degree of real proof that it WAS 80. | , ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. Remark. —It ought. to be recollected, after all procfs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that our moral understanding may be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. And our liableness to prejudice and perversion, is a most Serious admonition to us to be upon our guard with respect to what is of such consequence as our deter- minations concerning virtue and religion. (Pp. 175, 176.) Objection. —“‘ The method of government by rewards and punishments, and especially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert, as such, respectively, must go upon suppo sition that we are free, and not necessary agents. And it is incredible that the Author of Nature should govern “us upon a supposition as true, which he knows to be false; and therefore absurd to think he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter, especially that he will do it under the notion that they are of good or ill desert.” Answer. — The whole analogy of Providence shows that the conclusion is false, wherever the fallacy lies. The doc- trine of freedom shows where, viz., in supposing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free agents. But upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished, since it is a matter of fact that they are so. (Pp. 176, 177.) si, Conciusion. We see then in what sense the opinion of necessity aa Ne _is destructive of all religion, and in what sense it is not. (P. 178.) 1. It is destructive of it : me eet (1.) Practically, by encouraging men in vice and disregard of religion. ene. ie, (2.) Strictly, because it is a contradiction to the @ consti- _ tution of nature, and so overturns every thin; 3 2. It is not destructive of religion, if it can be recc constitution of things; for then it may also be religioa Me , Fics * ji. e. Upon and after considering it. ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY. 1XX) from the hope of impunity. (2.) As intended for the dis. cipline and improvement of virtue. As the generality of the world, from their insensibility to any thing distant, or which is not the object of the senses, are chiefly tempted to outward wickedness, so there are persons of a deeper seuse of the future and invisible, who have small tempta- tions to behave ill in tte common course of life. Teo this class of men the practice of religion, after conviction, is. easy and unavoidable, and hence they stand in need of a higher moral discipline, than such easy practice would afford them. Or, (3.) They may be required to give a higher manifestation of their character to the creation of God than this practice would be. IIl_ Concluding remarks. (Pp. 267-271.) 1. te These difficulties may be our own fault. (Pp. 267, 268.) If men are not heartily desirous of being informed in religion: if they attend less to evidence than to difficulties, and more tu objections than to what is said in answer to them; if they con- sider religion usually in the way of mirth and sport, they will just as likely be hindered from seeing its truth, as men, who carry these dispositions into common life, are hindered by them from arriving at that knowledge and right understanding which fairer minds attain. Levity, carelessness, passion and preju- dice do hinder us from being rightly informed with respect to common things: and they may, in like manner, perhaps in some providential manner, with respect to moral and religious subjects; may hinder evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it is. . The general proof of religion lies level to men of common ca- pacity. (Pp. 268, 269.) Common men are capable of being convinced, that there is a God, who governs the world, and they feel themselves to have & moral nature, and to be accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in with this natural sense of things, so they can be made to appreciate the evidence of miracles, and of the appearing completions of prophecy. And though such men are not able to clear up the difficulties, and to answer the objections to which this proof is liable, so as to satisfy curiosity (which indeed no one can do) yet they are capable of seeing that the proof is not destroyed by them. Ixxii ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 8. It must be remembered, that the object is not to procare the performance of the outward act, but to cultivate the disposi- tion of the agent. (P. 269-270.) This observation is an answer to the objection, that if s prince were to send directions to a servant, he would take care that those directions should bear certain marks of having come from him, and that their s@nse should be so plain, that there could be no doubt about their meaning or authority. In this case, and in that of giving, by revelation, a rule of life to man- kind, the objects are different; the cases are not parallel. To objections of this kind, it may also be answered, that we cannot argue thus with respect to him who is the governor of the world; for he does not afford us such information in our tem- poral affairs; as experience abundantly shows. | FINALLY, a state of religion implies a state of probation; and we have no ground, from the reason of the thing, for saying that our only probation can be, whether we will act suitably to such information as admits of no doubt, so that our sole danger shall arise from our not attending to what we know, or from going contrary to it. Our probation may also be, whether we will take due care to inform nur- selves, and whether we will afterwards act upon the evidence we have, however doubtful. (III.) Tue ParticuLaR EVIDENCE FoR CHRISTIANITY, AND THE OB3a0- TIONS AGAINST THAT EVIDENCE. Chap. 7. The object of this chapter is to inquire what the analogy of nature suggests as to the positive evidence for Christianity, and the objecticns against that evidence. It contains I. Observations relating to miracles, and the appearing compietiuns of prophecy, and as to what the analogy of nature suggests 'e- specting the objections to this evidence. (Pp. 278-287.) Il. Some account of the general argument, consisting of the direct and collateral evidence considered together. (Pp. 287-3802.) and I. Observations, &c. ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY ixxill (L) Miracles. (Pp. 273-283.) 1. Arguments in favour of this evidence. (Pp. 273-275.) 1.) The miracles are recorded in hooks, which must be admitted as authentic, genuine history, till somewhat positive be alleged to invalidate it, such as historical evidence on the other side, general incredibility in the . things‘related, or inconsistence in the general turn of the history. And in particular, a. We have the same evidence of the miracles related in these books, as of the common matters of history recorded in them. b Parts of Scripture, containing accounts of miracles, are quoted from the age in which they were written to the present; and no parts are omitted to be quoted in such a way as to cast a suspicion on their genuineness. e. The miraculous history in general is confirmed by contemporary events; viz. by the establishment of the Jewish and Christian religions. These event: are just what we should have expected, upon sup position that the miracles were wrought. And the miracles are the only satisfactory account of the events which can be given. (2.) In the epistles of Paul, (of the authenticity of which (3. — there is strong proof,) the Apostle speaks of having received the gospel itself by miracle, and states that he and others were endowed with miraculous powers. These powers he speaks of as publicly and familiarly known. (Pp. 275, 276.) Christianity was first preached and received upon the allegation of miracles, and in this differs from all other religions. The success, then, with which it met, is real eyidence of the truth of those miracles, distinct from the direct historical evidence. For it is not to be supposed that such numbers of men, under such circumstances of difficulty in forsaking the old reli- gion, and of trial and danger in aceepting the new, would embrace Christianity unless they were fully convinced of the truth of the miracles, wrought iv its attestation. (Pp. 276-278.) {xxiv | ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 2 Objections to the evidence of miracles. (Pp 278~28).) “(1.) ‘Many enthusiastic people have exposed themselvea to similar difficulties for the most idle follies.” Answer. — We must in every case distinguish between opinions and facts. Testimony only proves a man’s belief in reference to them. And if the Apostles and their centemporaries endured sufferings and death for their belief of the facts of religion, their belief is a proof of those facts, for they were such as came under the observation of their senses. (Pp. 278, 279.) (2.) ‘‘ Enthusiasm weakens (if it does not destroy) the evi- dence of testimony, even for facts, in matters relating to religion.” Answer. — Not unless there is incredibility in the things a.) attested, or contrary testimony, neither of which is the case here. And until either the one or the othe. of these is established, it cannot be expected, tha such a far-fetched account of the evidence, as enthu- siasm is, will be admitted, when we have the easy, obvious one, —that the witnesses speak the truth. But if this objection be insisted on, it is to be observed that prejudices of a like kind to enthusiasm, —ro- mance, affectation, humour, party spirit, custom, &c., —affect men in common matters, and yet human testimony is naturally and justly believed notwith- standing. (Pp. 279, 280.) “It is possible, that the early Christians might in part be deceived themselves, and might in part design to deceive others.” Answer. — There are such combinations in human cha- racter, and yet, notwithstanding this, human testi- mony remains a natural ground of assent. (Pp. 280, 281.) (4.) ‘‘Mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded by pretences to miracles.” Answer. — Not more by these pretences than by others. Phe 2015) (5.) ‘There is considerable historical evidence for mira- eles which are acknowledged to be fabulous.” Answer. —This does not overthrow the evidence of ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. Ixxv Christian miracles, against which nothing of the kind can be proved. If evidence be confuted by contrary evidence, or in any way overbalanced, this does not destroy the credibility of other evidence, neither con- futed nor oVerbalanced. (P. 281.) 8. General remark. (Pp. 281-283.) The fact, that men are liable to be deceived by enthusiasm in religion, and by principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, does indeed weaken the evidence of tes- timony in all cases, but does not destroy itin any. No- thing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or probability that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they testify, or that they are under some indirect influence in giving it, in such particu- lar instance. Neither of these is likely in Christianity. Its - importance would make men unwilling to be deceived them- selves, The obligations to veracity which it i mee ae would make them unwilling to deceive others. (II.) Prophecy. — Observations suggested by the analogy of na- ture concerning evidence of a like kind to that from Pro- phecy. (Pp. 283-287.) 1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a pro- phecy does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising from the appearing completions of those parts which are understood. ' For it is the same as if the parts not understood were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown tongue. Suppose a writing, partly in cypher, and partly in plain words, and that in the plain, intelligible part, there appeared mention of several known facts. No one would imagine that if he understood the whole, perhaps he would find that those facts were not really known by the writer. (Pp. 285, 284.) 2. A long series of prophecy berg applicable to certain events, is itself a proof that i was intended of them. — There are two kinds of writing which have a great resem- blance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before us, the mythological and the satirical. In both these kinds, we judge that certain persons or events are intended, from the fact that the writing is applicable to them; and our confidence that we understand the intended meaning is Ingvi r ~ ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY greater or less, in proportion as we see the general turr . of the composition to be capable of such application, and in proportion: to the number of particular things capable of it. And thus if along series of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the church and the world, and if a long series, delivered before the coming of Christ, is appli- cable to him, these things are a proof that such prophetic history was intended of him, and of those events. (Pp 284, 285.) 3. The showing that the prophets thought, in their predic tions, of other events, or that the predictions are capable of being applied to other events, than those to which they are referred by Christians, would not destroy the force of the argument from prophecy; for it is not alleged that the prophets were the original authors of the predictions, but the contrary. Thus, if we knew one to have com- piled a book of memoirs, which he received from a person of vastly superior knowledge on that particular subject, we would not suppose we had the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler; for the original author may have had some meaning, which the compiler never saw. To say that the prophecies of Scripture have no farther meaning than the writers sup- posed, is to suppose that the writers were thé original, sole authors of the books; i. e. that they were not inspired. If events correspond to prophecies, interpreted in a different sense from that in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them, this is a proof that this different sense was originally intended. So that the question is, has a prophecy been fulfilled in a natural and proper, that is, in any real sense of its words. (Pp. 285 —287.) me Some account of the general argument, consisting of the direct and collateral evidence considered together. (Pp. 287-302.) 1. Reasons for adducing this. (P. 288.) (1.) Because the proof of revelation is not only express ani direct, but consists also of a great variety of circum- stances; and though each of these circumstances is first t« be considered separately, yet their proper force is obtained. by uniting them together in one view. (2.) If these matters of fact are laid together they must: be acknowledged to be of weight. ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. -XXVI) 2. Statement of the proposition. (Pp. 288, 289.) That God has given us, by external revelation, not only the system of natural religion, but also a particular dispensatios of providence, which reason could in no way have discovered, and a particular institution of religion founded upon it, for the recovery of mankind, and raising them to perfection and final, happiness. &. Character of this revelation. (Pp. 289-291.) 41,) Considering it as wholly historical, (for prophecy is but the history of events before they come to pass, and doe- trines and precepts are matters of fact,) it is a history of the world, as God’s world, from the creation, until the consummation of all things. . (2.) It embraces a great length of time and a great variety of things, thereby affording abundant opportunity for confu- tation, if false. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, so far from implying a positive argument, that it is not true, appears on the contrary to imply a positive argument, that it 7s true. For if a relation of such ex- tent and antiquity cannot, in an age of knowledge, be refuted to the satisfaction of reasonable men, this should be considered a strong presumptive proof of its truth; in- deed it is a proof, in proportion to the probability, that if it were false, it might be shown to be so. 4. Its contents. (Pp. 291-293.) Besides the moral system of the world, it contains a chrono- logical account of its beginning, and from thence the genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history begins ; — the promise of a Messiah —his advent—his ministry and the suc- cess of his religion— together with a prophetic account of the state of this religion to the end of the world. 5. Facts admitted in relation to it. (Pp. 298-299.) (1.) That the establishment of natural religion in the wort] is greatly owing to this revelation. s (2.) That it is of the earliest antiquity. (3.) That its chronology and common history are entirely cre dible, being confirmed ‘by the natural and civil history of the world. The events described arise naturally out of foregoing ones; each age is represented conformably te what we know of ite manners; the characters’ have all the 6 * Ixxvin (¢.) (B.) ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. internal marks of being real; the genealogies carry the appearance of veracity, and the narrative is unadorned There are no more mistakes of transcribers, than were to have been expected in books of such antiquity. As all this is applicable to the ordinary history of the New Tes- tament, so also are its statements confirmed by profane authors. And this credibility of the common Scripture history gives credibility to its miraculous history ; for they are both interwoven together, and make up one relation. (Pp. 294, 295.) That the-Jews appear to have been the people of God. (Pp. 295, 296.) That the Messiah did come, was rejected by the Jews, and received by the Gentiles on the evidence of miracles. (here 0.) (6.) That his religion prevailed in spite of great opposition, and then became the religion of the world. (P. 296.) (7.) That the Jewish polity was destroyed, and the nation dis- persed, and that they have notwithstanding remained a distinct people; at once a fulfilment of some prophecies, and a token of the fulfilment of others. (Pp. 297, 298.) (8.) That there are circumstances in the state of the world, besides what relates to Jews and Christians, corresponding with prophecy. (P. 299.) 6 Concluding observations. (Pp. 299-3802.) (1.) This general view of the confessed historical evidence for (2. — miracles, and the many obvious appearing completions of | prophecy, together with the collateral things here men- tioned, taken together amounts to real evidence of the truth and divinity of religion: Men may deny the force of the evidence, but they must admit the facts. And no one can think the collateral things here given to be no- thing, who considers their importance in the evidence of ° probability as distinguished from demonstration. It re- quires, indeed, the truest judgment to determine the ~ weight of circumstantial evidence, but it is often as con- vincing, as that pee is most express and direct. (Pp. 299, 300.) It is safer to admit the evidence than to reject it. True, to believe and disbelieve upon the consideration of safety (3. ) ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. Ixxix or of danger is ® prejudice; and it is manifestly unrea- sonable to apply to men’s passions, — their hopes or their fears, —in order to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning conduct, nothing is more reasonable than to take its importance into the account. (P. 301.) Those who attack Christianity have the advantage oyer those who defend it; because it is easier to assail single points, tl.an to adduce the whole mass of evidence. (P. 302.) & (1V.) OpsEcTIONS AGAINST THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. Chap. 8. I The objections. (Pp. 308, 304.) J. ‘It is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by saying that there are the same in natural religion.” 2. ‘It is a strange way of convincing men of the obligations of religion, by showing them that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits.” 8. “‘A strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the system of religion, by showing that like objections exist against natural providence.” 4. ‘This way of reasoning mtst leave the mind unsatisfied.” 5. ‘Men cannot be expected, upon such evidence, to forego their pleasures.” ud. The answers. (Pp. 304-3812.) 1. As to the first objection. (Pp. 804, 305.) (1.) To ask to have all difficulties cleared, is to ask to compre- (2. 4 hend the divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting. But it has always been allowed to argue from what is acknowledged to what iy disputed; and it is no otherwise a poor thing to argue from natural religion to revealed, than it is to argue in number- less other ways of probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, as we are constantly compelled to do. Besides, It ts a thing of consequence, to show that objections against revelation are as much levelled against natural religion; » ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANAI DGY. and when such objections are shown to be equally appl cable to both, they are, properly speaking, answered But even in the latter part of this treatise, the admission of natural religion has not been insisted on; and Chris- tianity has been vindicated not from its analogy to natu- ral religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature.’ &. As to the second objection. (Pp. 305, 306.) (1.) Religion is a practical thing, consisting in such a-course of life, as we have reason to think to be commanded by the Author of Nature, and conducive te our happiness If men are convinced that they have like reason to believe this, as to believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage, such conviction cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion. And if the interest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater than our temporal interest, then there must be proportiona~ bly greater reason for endeavouring to secure the one than the other. (2.) But the force of this objection consists in the supposition, ‘* That if religion were true it would not be left doubtful, and open to objections; hence, that it is so left, is a presumption, perhaps a proof, that it is false.” Now the constitution and course of nature shows, that God appoints us to act, in our temporal affairs, upon evidence of a like kind+and degree to the evidence of reli- gion, and this is an answer to such objection. 8. As to the third objection. (Pp. 306-3808.) The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men; and observations may tend to make out the latter, wnich do not appear, by any immediate connexion, to the purpose of the former; which is jess our concern, than many think. For, (1.) We need not justify the dispensations of Providence, any farther than to show, that the things objected against may be consistent with wisdom and goodness, and even instances of them. 3 The objections against the divine justice and goodness are not removed, by showing that there are like objections against natural providence; but the objections being shown to be inconclusive, the things objected against are famther ehown to conform to the constitution of nature ae Nias ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY. iXAX] (3.) This conformity would be of weight, though the objections (against the divine justice and goodness) were not an- swered; for religion implying matters of fact, it shows that these facts are not incredible. Religion being reducible to matter of fact, we may answer objections against its credibility and truth, without con- sidering the reasonableness of the system. Nor is it neces- sary, (though it may be useful and proper,) to show the reasonableness of every precept and particular dispensa- tion. The obligations of religion are fully made out, by showing the reasonableness of its practice. 5.) Though analogy is not an immediate answer to objections against the justice and goodness of religion, it is an answez to what is intended by such objections, viz., That religion is incredible. 4. As to the fourth objection. (Pp. 308, 309.) (1.) We are obliged to take up with very unsatisfactory evi- dence in the daily course of life. (2.) Religion is intended to try the honesty and integrity of men, and to exercise and improve those virtues; and therefore the real question is, whether the evidence of religion is sufficient to discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. (8.) Even if the argu- | ment is not satisfactory, it is sufficient to show us what course of conduct is prudent. 5. As to tho fifth objection. (Pp. 309, 310.) If the evidence is sufficient to induce men to embrace religion, it is nothing to the purpose to say that they will not. For the object of this treatise is to inquire not what men are, but what the light and knowledge afforded them, require that they should be. And religion, considered as a probation, has had its end upon,all persons, to whom it has been proposed; for by this means, they have been put into a state of trial, let them behave in it as they will. ty thi3 whole treatise, no use has been made of the abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness, but the endeavour has been to prove the xuth of religion, as matter of fact. This proof may be cavilled at, may indeed be easily shown not to be demonstrative, for it is not offered as such, but it cannot be evaded or answered; and thus the obligations of religion are fully made out. Hence, there- fore, may be observed distinctly, what is the force of this treatise — (4. Ixxxii ANALYSIS OF BUTLER’S ANALOGY.’ (1.) As to those who believe, it will clear the scheme of Christianity of objections, and strengthen its evidence. (2.) As to those who do not believe, it will show the credibility of Christianity, and the ab- aurdity of all attempts to prove it false. CONCLUSION +* We are under moral obligations to inquire seriously into the evi- dence of Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to embrace it; for we are bound to listen to the voice of God, through whatever channel it may reach us. And yet many reject both natural and revealed religion; and some go so far, as to treat Christianity witb scorn and contempt. We have shown, however, that the evidence for the latter cannot be considered as amounting to nothing: and the objections against it, in general — against its particular doctrines — against the mode in which it has been left us — against the positive _ testimonies for its truth—have been proved to be without weight. Having reason, therefore, to believe that the whole of religion, — both natural and revealed,—is entirely credible, we may conclude, (1.) That immorality is aggravated in those who have been made acquainted with Christianity, whether they believe it or not; for the moral system of nature, or natural religion, which it lays before us, commends itself almost intuitively to a reasonable mind. (2.) That between satisfaction of the truth of Christianity, and satisfaction of the contrary, there is a middle state of serious apprehension that it may be true, joined with a doubt whether it be so; and this is as far towards infidelity as any one, who has had its’ evidences fairly pre- sented, can go. (3) That if men, notwithstanding this light, cap continue vilifying and disregarding Christianity, there is no reasor to think they would act otherwise, even though there were a demon- ftration of its truth. * The Conclusion is moiniy composed of a recapitulation of the contents cf the preceding chapters. Tits | ANALOGY OF RELIGION NATURAL AND REVEALED, — TO THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE Fa THE RIGHT HONOURABLE CHARLES, LORD TALBOT BARON OF HENSOL, LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN, THE FOLLOWING TREATISE IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, INSCRIBED, IX ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE HIGHEST OBLIGATIONS TO THE LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM, AND TO HIMSELF, BY HIS LORDSHIP’S MOST DUTIFUL, a MOST DEVOTED, AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT, JOSEPH BUTLER. 7 (lzxxv3 ADVERTISEMENT ¥VAEFIXED TO THE FIRST EDITION. {r the reader should meet here with any thing which he had not before attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution and course of nature, these being all obvious; but in the application of them: in which, though there is no- thing but what appears to me of some real weight, and there- fore of great importance; yet he will observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, if we can think things . to be of little importance, which are of any real weight at all, upon such a subject as religion. However, the proper force of the following Treatise lies in the whole general Analogy considered together. It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that it is now, at length, discovered to be fictitious. And, accordingly, they treat it as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of ‘mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its havin g so long interrupted the pleasures of the world. On the cen. (ixxxvii ) Ixxxvill ADVERTISEMENT. trary, thus much, at least, will be here found, not taken for granted, but proved, that any reasonable man. who will tho- roughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his own being, that it is not, however, so clear a case. that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, strong-evidence of its truth; but it is certain no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. And the practical consequence ta ‘be drawn from this is not attended to by every one who is con gerned in it. May, 1736. CONTENTS. [wrropucTI0N 200000888 ceeeeeG8O coeee eeeeecoveee eee cecses eee oe Hee Ree Soe @eoete ees Page a3 PART I; OF NATURAL RELIGION. CHAP. I. PPMPABEULUTOS Liver, cose sese tee ere ere Ne Rs Tae CHAP. II. Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punishments; and par- RECHT: OLF ENG-IRLLON™..cces GeascvesBsceceeueves covesie one Pericustspecdcaee Seer kn CHAP. III. Of the Moral Government of God ........0..00 ceoaceushecdeseeriqcsseseretarte mine CHAP. IV. Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and Danger ... 138 CHAP. V. . Of a State of Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and Im- provement....... eeaasecs weaeeecses sed cvesenestresseecese ceostese rete es teacctace 145 CHAP. VI. Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Practice ...... eee 165 CHAP. VIL Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended ...........06 SoA ePisdeccecstascuese ealaaneeses . 180 CONCLUSION ....000. RIC ORERT ace tea eeigihessceccce eaceatureutes Sesees Seestaniede sees coe Eee 7 * (1xxxix ) xc CONTENTS. PAX LpaL Ls OF REVEALED RELIGION. CHAP.2T. Otstposumportance of Christianity,....csocaaacescsccetr bes enncececsnen se consys ten EOE CHAP. *1T. Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered as EMITACULOUSacetstesseteseisonsesstes eteesvestecesccetese ons sess sees ten=atnanmm 213 CHAP. III. Of our Incapacity of judging what were to be expected in a Revela- tion; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must contain Things appearing liable to Objections .... ....c.cdscosecscevsccoes ve eneeeetne : CHAP SLY. Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imperfectly POMMPTCHENAET 52....cccecrscovececcsecees cEaebatodic, De cavnecctacsacuare seat eamiee 233 CHAP. V. Of the particular System of Christianity; the Appointment of a Me- diator, and the Redemption of the World by Limi .........secssessovers 240 CHAP. VI. Of the Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the supposed De- Heiency.in the Proot :Ofeib la. s.c.s ssccsessassuscnstesseesetaeetacvees’ aeianes . 256 CHAP. VII. Of the particular Evidence for Christianity .....cccscccsseese secevenee sscensene 272 ? Ot APs LET. Of the Objections which may be made against arguing from the Ana- booy of Nature to Religion, . %.ic <..sseece tenors segeess coneceenswenetettas voessnelud ONCLAUSTON cosa ce coc cacsccencesecsSarcnthcasGecestrecteteetes cecescceceenrine Satadecetemonel DISSERTATION I. Or Personal *1dentity, \.. nen tS ie 5 7 eid ees CW ts oe ies a REED HE ge igen -~ se. eae = M INTRODUCTION. PROBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished from demon. gtrative by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the. very lowest presumption. -We cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a question, there may be some against it: and though there be not, yet a slight présumption does not beget that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from” hence, that such low presumption often repeated, will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man’s having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presump- tion, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow. But the observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will: That which chiefly constitutes probability is expressed in the / word likely, that is, hike some truth* or true event; like it, in’ itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of its circum-- stances. For when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind’s remarking in it a likeness to some other event, which we have observed has come to pass. And this observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that sich event has or will come to pass; according as the observation is, that the like event has sometimes, most * Verisimile. [‘« Like it in itself” seems to indicate the case in which we have ascertained the whdle nature of the truth or known fact, e. g. ascer- tained the whole of the conditions upon which a given consequence takes place. This is the case of a strict induction. ‘‘ Like in its evidence,” when the same testimony or proof which we have found credible for some cases, leads us to believe something else. ‘‘ Like it in some more or fewer of its circumstances,” refers to analogies, in the popular sense of the term, ns before explained. F ] 93) ( 84 INTRODUCTION. commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the belief, that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature and strength of a man; that food will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a nuraber of days be its certain destruction. So, like- wise, the rule and measure of our hopes and fears concerning he success of our pursuits; our expectations that others will et so and so in such circumstances; and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles ;—all these rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, fear, expect, judge; I say, upon our having observed the’ like, either with respect to others or ourselves. And thus, whereas the prince,* who had always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and yielding: we, on the contrary, from analogy, conclude, that there is no presumption at all against this; that it is suppo- sable there may be frost in England any given day in January next; probable, that there will on some day of the month; and that there isa moral certainty, that is, ground for an expecta- tion, without any doubt of it, in some part or other of the - winter. ' Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imper- _ fect kind of information, and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or fature, can be probable to an infinite Intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely, as it is in itself, certainly true, or cer- tainly false. But, to us, probability is the very guide of life. From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence ' cannot be had, or is not seen, if the result of examination be, _Ahat there appears, upon the whole, any the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree greater, this determines the question, even in matters of speculation; and, in matters of practice, will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act upon that presump- sion, or low probability, though it be so low as to leave the * The story is told by Mr. Locke, in the chapter on Probability. @ INTRODUCTION, 84 mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole appears, according to the best of his judgment, to be for his happiness, as what he certainly knows to be so. Nay, further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man w:tl think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions itan these ; such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question to be as supposable and credibly as the other; nay, such as but amount to much less even than this. For numberless instances might be mentioned respecting the com- mon pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a ‘literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less, and where the probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding.” It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation, and measure of probability ; or whence it proceeds, that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in every one; or tc guard against the errors to which reasoning from analogy is liable. ‘This belongs to the. subject of logic, and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed, I shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent, compass, and force of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general heads and rules, and the whole be formed into a system. But though so little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them, this does not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that analogy is of weight, in vari- ous degrees, towards determining our judgment, and our prac- tice. Nor does it in any wise ccase to be of weight in those cases, because persons, either given to dispute, or who require things to be stated with greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of in practical’ matters, may find other cases, in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies, which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question but that the sun will * See Chap. vi. Part. II. nl &H INTRODUCTION. Forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume, whether from the attributes of God or any thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Descartes. Forming our notions upon reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, from mere mathematics, without sufficient data) is an error much akin to the former: since what is assumed in order to make the reason- ing applicable, is hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue. from such facts as are known, to others that are like them; hi from that part of the divine government over intelligent crea- tures, which comes under our view, to that larger and more general government over them, which is beyond it; and, from i * Xp pév roe ye tov drat rapadckduevoy rod krloavros toy Kéopoy elvar tavrac ras ypagas wenetoOa, Ort Goa repi Tis KTicews anavTg@ ToIs Cnrovot ray rept adrijg Aéyov, Tadra kal rept rOv yeegav. Philocal. p. 23. Ed. Cant. [ This saga- cious remark is, however, strangely misapplied by Origen to the establishment of one of his favourite theories,—that there is'a mys tical’meaning in every word and even letter of Seripture. F.] INTRODUCTION. 8T what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incre. ‘dible, will be hereafter. This method, then, of concluding and determining, being practical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act world. For as there is no presumption against this prior to the proof of it, so it has been often proved with accumulated evi- dence; from this argument of analogy and final causes; from abstract reasonings; from the most ancient tradition and’ testi- mony; and from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of religion. Ee: As there are some who, instead of thus attending to what is in fact the constitution of Nature, form their notions of God’s government upon hypothesis; so there are others who indulge themselves in vain and idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been framed otherwise than it is; and upon sup- position that things might, in imagining that they should, have been disposed. and carried on after a better model, than what appears in the present disposition and conduct of them.—Sup.- pose, now, a person of such a turn of mind to go on with his reveries, till he had at lengths fixed upon some particular plan of Nature, as appearing to him the best,—one shall scarce be thought guilty of detraction against human understanding, if ‘one should say, even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person would,fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, probably would not be the very best, even according to his own notions of best; whether he thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives for the exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the greatest happiness, or that these two were necessarily connected, and ran up into one and the same plan. However, it may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the amount of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system of Nature, or how far they would mislead us. And it seems there could be no stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as 88 INTRODUIQTION. these :—That all creatures shouid at first be made as perfect and as happy, as they were capable of ever being: that nothing, to be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon them to do, (seme indolent persons would perhaps think, nothing at all): or certainly, that effectual care should be taken that they should, whether necessarily or not, yet eventually, and in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to happiness, which would be thought easy for infinite-power to effect; either by not giving them any principles which would endanger their going wrong, or by laying the right motive of action, in every instance, before their minds continually in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing them to act conformably to it: and that, the whole method of government by punishments should be rejected as absurd ; as an awkward round-about method of carry- ing things on; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, for which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely, happiness. Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has been above intimated is a full, direct, general answer to it, namely, that we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation. For though it be admitted, that, from the first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be absolutely in themselves prete- rable to others, and that the ends now mentioned, or, if they run up into one, that this,one is absolutely the best, and, con- sequently, that we must conclude the ultimate end designed in the constitution of Nature and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and happiness possible; yet we are far from being uble to judge what particular disposition of things would be most friendly and assistant to virtue; or what means might be absolutely necessary to produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our own world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should suppose it detached from the whole of things. Indeed, we are so far from being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what may be the neces- sary means of raising and conducting one person to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are not competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection if to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. “And-this will for / ever be a practical proof of his moral character, to such as will | consider what a practical proof is, because it is the yoice of God” INTRODUCTION. — 89 _ speaking in us. And from hence we conclude, that virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature; and that regularity, and order, and right, cannot but prevail finally, in a universe under his government. But we are in no gort judges what are the necessary means of accomplishing this end. Let us, then, instead of that idle and not very innocent em- ployment of forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of Nature with respect to intelligent creatures ; which may be resolved into general laws or rules of adminis- tration, in the same way as many of the laws of Nature respect. ing inanimate matter, may be collected from experiments. And let us compare the known constitution and course of things, with what is said to be the moral system of nature; the acknow-. ledged dispensations of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with what religion teaches us to believe _ and expect; and see whether they are not analogous, and of a piece. And upon such a comparison it will, I think, be found, that they are very much so; that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of — Divine conduct. The analogy here proposed to be considered, is of pretty large extent, and consists of several parts; in some more, in others less exact. In some few instances, perhaps, it may amount to a real practical proof, in others not so: yet in these it is a con- firmation of what is proved otherways. It will undeniably / show, what too many want to have shown them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is not a subject of. ridicule, unless that of Nature be so too. And it will afford — an answer to almost all objections against the system both of natural and of revealed religion; though not perhaps an answe1 in so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer, to the objections against the evidence of it: for objec tions against a proof, and objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe, are different things Now the Divine government of the world, implied in the notion of religion in general, and of Christianity, contains in it,—That mankind is appointed to live in a future state ;* that there every one shall be rewarded or punished ;} rewarded or punished respectively for all that pehaviour here, which we | gx * Ch. i. £4 + Ch: ii. if 90 ' "INTRODUCTION. comprehend under the words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil;* that-our present life is a probation, a state of trial,+ and of disciplinet for that future one, notwithstanding the objections which men may fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there being any such moral plan as this af —all:§ and whatever objections may appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to us at present:|| that this world being in a state of apostacy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense both of their condition and: duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence, of the utmost importanze,{] proved by miracles,** but containing in it many things appearing to us strange, and nos to have been expected;t} a dispensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of things,{t carried on by the me- diation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the world ;]||] yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is re- vealed; but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.J] The design, then, of the following Treatise will be to show, that the several parts principally objected against in this moral and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth; that the particular parts principally objected against in this whole dis- pensation, are analogous to what is experienced in the constitu- tion and course of Nature, or Providence; that the chief objec- _ tions themselves, which are alleged against the former, are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact to be inconclusive; and that this argument, from analogy, is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion, notwith- standing the objections which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of what may be looked for in the following Treatise. And I shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all our fears—all our hopes and fears which are of any consideration—I mean a Future Life. foGh a. + Ch. iv. + Ch.y. 9 Ch. vi. || Ch. vii. { Part ii. Ch. i. ** Ch. ii. +t Ch, iii. tI Ch. iv. I|[| Ch. v Tf Ch. vi. vii. ke Che wilt THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION, &ce i ae PART: b OF NATURAL RELIGION. CHAP. - I. Of a Future Life. PC STRANGE difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of our existing now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments; which whoever thinks it worth while, may see considered in the first Dissertation at the end of this Trea tise. But, without regard to any of them here, let us consider what the analogy of Nature, and the several changes which we have undergone, and those which we know we may undergo without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or may not, have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable, that we may survive this change, and exist in a future state ef life and perception. I. From our being born into the present world in the help. less imperfect state of mfancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same creatures, the same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of aztion, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their being greatly different from those appointed them in another period of it. And in other creatures the same law holds. For the difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth Ke go no higher) and in maturity; the change of worms into e-* 166 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART ! Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of nature, and the actions of men, that every thing, and every mode and circumstance of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have been otherwise, it is to be observed, that this necesssity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, and to certain ends; because all this is matter of undoubted experience, acknowledged by all, and’ what every man may, every moment, be conscious of, And from hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, and how things came to be and to continue as they are; but only an account of this circumstance relating to their origin and con- tinuance, that they could not have been otherwise than they are and have been. ‘The assertion, that every thing is by necessity of nature, is not an answer to the question ; Whether the ‘world came into being as it is, by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not, but to quite another question ;. Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner which we call necessarily, or in that way and manner which we ‘all Freely. For suppose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and one who kept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself a free agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their respective opinions, and they should happen to instance in a house, they would agree that it was built by an architect. Their difference concerning necessity and freedom, would occasion no difference uf judgment concerning this, but only concerning another matter, whether the architect built it necessarily or freely. Suppose then they should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution of nature: in a lax way of speaking, one of them might say, it was by necessity, and the other by freedom; but if they had any meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a free agent, so the former must at length be reduced to mean an agent, whether he would say one or more, acting by necessity; for abstract notions can do nothing. Indeed, we ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, 1. e. immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be somewhat, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype of*it. And from henee (for this abstract, as much as any other, implies a concrete) we con: clude, that there is, and cannot but be, an infinite and immense i Ti cae il CHAP. VI. ] -AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 167 sternal Being existing, prior to all design contributing to his existence, and exclusive of it.* ‘And from the scantiness of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced, that necessity is the foundation, the reason, the account of the existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it bé at all intended, that every thing exists as it does by this kind of necessity, a necessity antecedent in nature to design; it cannot, I say, be meant, that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of necessity, upon several accounts; and particularly, because it is admitted that design, in the actions of men, contributes to many.alterations in nature. For if any deny this, I shall not pretend to reason with them. . From these things it follows, first, That when a fatalist asserts that every thing is by necessity, he must mean, by an agent acting necessarily: he must, 1 say, mean this; for I am very sensible he would not choose to mean it: and secondly, That the necessity by which such an agent is supposed to act, does not exclude intelligence and design. So that were the system of fatality admitted, it would just as much account for the for- mation of the world, as for the structure of a house, and nc more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent to be the former of the world. And the appearances of design and of final causes in the constitution of nature, as really prove this acting agent to be an intelligent designer, or to act from choice, upon the scheme of necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of freedom. It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy the proof, that there is an intelligent Author of Nature and natural Governor of the world, the present question, which the analogy before-mentioned} suggests, and which, I think, it will answer, is this: Whether the opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibility, with the constitution of the world, and the natural government which we experience exercised over it, destroys all reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state of religion; or whether that opinion be reconcilable with religion, with the system and the proof of it * [This argument is taken by Butler from Dr. Clarke. Like all of Clarke’s attempted demonstrations of the being of God, it has been closely scrutinized, and its validity questioned. Sce for instance Duke’s Analysis of Butler’s Analogy, appendix, p. 83.] + Page 165. 168 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART i Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, in his own principles; that the child should reason upon them, and conclude, that since he cannot possibly behave other- wise than he does, he is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded or punished: imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commendation wut of his mind by means of this system; to form his temper, and character, and behaviour to it; and from it to judge of the treatment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad into the world; as the fatalist judges from this system, what he is to expect from the Author of Nature, and with regard to a future state. I cannot forbear’ stopping here to ask, whether any one of common sense would think fit, that a child should be put upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice? And a man has little pretence to rea- son, who is not sensible that we are all children in speculations of this kind. However, the child would doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of fear and shame, with which his playfellows were fettered and embar- rassed ; and highly conceited in his superior knowledge, so far beyond his years. But conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the influence which these principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted upon, during the course of his education. He must either be allowed to go on, and be the plague of all about him, and himself too, even to his own de- struction; or else correction must be continually made use of, to supply the want of those natural perceptions of blame and com- mendation, which we have supposed to be removed, and to give him a practical impression of what he had reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be punished for doing what he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, but that the correction which he must meet with in the course of his education, must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed in were not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and, somehow or other, misapplied it to practice and common life; as what the fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present ought, in all reason, to convince him, that his scheme is misapplied, when applied to the subject of religion.* But supposing the child’s temper could remain still formed to the system, and his expectation of the — ee * Page 163. —— a Sa ee eld eee ee es CHAP. VI. ] _.AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 169 treatment he was to have in the world be regulated by it, so aa to expect that no’ reasonable man would blame or punish him for anything he should do, because he could not help doing it; upon this supposition, it is manifest he would, upon his coming abroad into the world, be insupportable to society, and the treat- ment which he would receive from it, would render it so to him; ~ and he could not fail of doing somewhat very soon, for which he would be delivered over into the hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be convinced of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor. Or suppose this scheme of | fatality, in any other way, applied to practice, such practical application of it will be found equally absurd, equally fallacious, in a practical sense: For instance, that if a man be destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no care of his own preservation; or if he be destined to die before that time, no care can prevent it; therefore all care about preserving one’s life is to be neglected; which is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients. But now on the contrary, none of these prac- tical absurdities can be drawn, from reasoning upon the suppo- sition that we are free; but all such reasoning, with regard to the common affairs of life, is justified by experience. And therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity were speculatively true, yet with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches; that is, to the whole of our present life. Tor, the constitution of the present world, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is as if we were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, de- liberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so.* But * [Compare Berkeley’s Minute Philosopher, Dial. vii. s. 20:— ‘Eupur.—tTell me, Alciphron, do you think it involves a contradiction that God should make man free? Atc.—I do not. Eupur.—lIt is then possible that there may be sucha thing? Aznc.—This I do not deny. . . Eupur.—Would not such a one think that he acted, and condemn himself for some actions, and approve himself for others, &c. Tell me now, what other characters of your supposed free agent may not be found in man?” So Clarke, Remarks on Collins’ Inquiry, p. 24: ‘As to that which this gentleman calls the Fourth (but which is, indeed, the only) Action of man, viz., Dorna as we will, or actually exerting this self-moving faculty. Of this I say, as before, that since, in all cases, it does now, by experience, seem to us to be free, that is, seems to us to be really a self-moving power, exactly in the same t iB 170 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, _ PART 1. the thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are or not. Were this opinion, therefore, of necessity, admitted to be ever so true, yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this application always misleads us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present interest. And how can people think themselves so very secure then, that the same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also, in some analogous manner, with respect to a future, a more general, and more important interest? For, religion being a practical subject, and the analogy of nature showing us, that we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and thence conclude that we are free from its obliga tions, it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will still remain just reason to think, whatever appear ances are, that we deceive ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner as when people fancy they can draw contradictory con- clusions from the idea of infinity. rom these things together, the attentive reader will see it — follows, that if upon supposition of freedom, the evidence of re- ligion be conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of neces- sity; because the notion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects; i. e. with respect to them, is as if it were not true, — Nor does this contain any reflection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasonable. For to pretend to act upon reason, in — opposition to practical principles which the Author of our na- ture gave us to act upon, and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to which our own short views, and even our experience, will show us it cannot be depended upon,—and such at best the subject of nec:ssity must be,—this is vanity, — conceit, and unreasonableness. manner as it would do upon supposition of our being actually free agents; the bare physical possibility of our being so framed by the — Author of Nature, as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter by — every experience of every action we perform, is no more any just — ground to doubt the truth of our liberty, than the bare natural possi- bility of our being all our life-time, as in*a dream, deceived in our belief of the existence of the material world, is any just ground te doubt of the reality of its existence.”— F.] Dee cn Pe RRO ny end ty DTT HAP. VI. ] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 171 3ut this is not all. For we find within ourselves a will, and are conscious of a character. Now if this in us be reconcilable with fate, it is reconcilable with it in the Author of Nature. And besides, natural government and final causes imply a cha- racter and a will in the Governor and Designer ;* a will con- eerning the creatures whom he governs. The Author of Nature then being certainly of some character or other, not- withstanding necessity, it is evident this necessity is as recon- eilable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, and justice in him, which attributes are the foundation of reli- gion, as with any other character; since we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent than cruel; true, than faithless; just, than unjust; or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. Jor it is said indeed, that what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just punishment, upon suppo- sition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust; because it is ‘punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy tho injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the injustice of punishing it. However, as little to the purposa as this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to observe from it, how the notions of justice and injustice remain, even whilst we endeavour to suppose them removed; how they force themselves upon the mind, even whilst we are making suppositions destructive of them: for there is not, perhaps, a man in the world, but would be ready to make this objection at first thought. But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that charac- ter in the Author of Nature, which is the foundation of religion; ‘Yet, does it not plainly destroy the proof, that he is of thut character, and consequently the proof of religion?’ By no means. For we find that happiness and misery are not our fate in any such sense as not to be the consequences of our behaviour, but that they are the consequences of it. We find God exercises the same kind of government over us, with that which a father exercises over his children, and a civil magis- * By will and character is meant that, which, in speaking of men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words temper, taste, dispositions, practical principles; that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another. + Chap. IL. 172 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART 1 trate over his subjects. Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority, or government, to a Being who can have no competitions, or interfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects. ; - But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties which run up into the most — abstruse of all speculations, and as the opinion of necessity seems to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself, it may be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion. ‘The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of Na- ture is not affected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of things.* And it is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards and punishments ;+ and also that he hath © given us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish between ac- tions, snd approve some as virtuous and of good desert, and dis- approv; others as vicious and of ill desert.{ Now this moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind; for it carries in it authority and a right of direction; authority in such a sense, as that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned.§ And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a sense including sanc- — tions, may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of considering it as given them by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense — of duty, but also a sense of security in following it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direction of the Author of Nature, given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him: and a command from him neces. sarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the sense or perception of good and ill desert,|| which is con- tained in the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, — and makes it appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his ‘ * Page 165, &c. + Chap. IT. { Dissertation IT. < 2 Sermon IT. 14 the Rolls || Dissertation IT. SHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCI® G PRACTICE. 173 method of government is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. or he must have given us this discernment and _ sense of things, as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter ; that is, by way of information beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this world. There is then most evident ground to think, that the government of God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which he has given us, and that in the upshot and issue of things, happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice re- spectively; as he has already, in so peculiar a manner, asso- ciated the ideas of them in our minds. And from hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious worship, were it only to be considered as a means of preserving upon our minds _a sense of this moral government of God, and securing our obe- | dience to it; which yet is an extremely imperfect view of that most important duty. Now I say, no objection from necessity can lie against this general proof of religion: none against the proposition reason- ed upon, that we have such a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a mere matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is thus constituted: none against the conclusion ; | because it is immediate, and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion that God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit* that * However I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and te speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intel- ligible to say, that i¢ és fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness, then fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposi- tion to be true, without supposing somewhat prior to it to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not, therefore, appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in, the nature cf things, than to sneak of abstract truth as thus founded. ts* 174 Or THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PAR { ke should, but from its appearing, that he has told us he wxll. And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise and threat. _ ening, which, it hath been observed, the notion of a command « implies, and the sense of good and ill desert, which he has given _ us, more distinctly expresses. And this reasoning from fact ig confirmed, and in some degree, even verified, by other facts; by che natural tendencies of virtue and of vice ;* and by this, that God, in the natural course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous to society, and also vicious actions ag such, in the strictest sense.- So that the general proof of reli- gion is unanswerably real, even upon the wild supposition which we are arguing upon. It must likewise be observed farther, that natural religion hath, besides this, an external evidence, which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be true, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the observations and reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion; that there is a God, who made the world, who is the moral Governor and J ndge of mankind, and will, upon the whole, deal with every one accord- ing to his works; I say, suppose a person convinced of this by reason, but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind, it would be natural for such a one to be in- quisitive, what was the history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in what manner, it came first into the world; and whether it were believed by any considerable part of it. And were he upon inquiry to find, that a particular person, in a late age, first of all proposed it as a deduction of reason, and that mankind were before wholly ignorant of it; then, though its evidence from reason would remain, there would be no addi- tional probability of its truth, from the account of its discovery, But instead of this being the fact of the case, on the contrary, he would find what could not but afford him a very strong con- firmation of its truth: First, That somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions and alterations, hath been profess- ed in all ages and countries of which we have any certain infor- mation relating to this matter. Secondly, That it is certain historical fact, so far as we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief, that there is one God, the Creator and moral Governor of the world, and that mankind is in a state of reli- gion, was received in the first ages. And thirdly, That as —— a ¥ ", : * Page 128, ¢ Page 121, &e. CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. . 178 there is no hint or intimation in history, that this yystem was first reasoned out; so there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, that it was taught first by reve- lation. Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The first of them, general consent, shows this system to be con- formable to the common sense of mankind. The second, name- ly, that religion was believed in the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that there were then any super- stitious or false additions to it, cannot but be a farther confirma. tion of its truth. Jor it is a proof of this alternative; either that it came into the world by revelation, or that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will consider, how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And as itis shown in the second part* of this Treatise, that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption | against a revelation in the beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against subsequent ones; a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pretences to revelation, than by supposing some real original one, from whence they were copied. And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express his- torical or traditional evidenve, as ancient as history, of the sys- tem of religion being taught mankind by revelation ; this must be admitted as some degree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a fact, against which there is no pre- sumption? And this proof is mentioned here, because it has its weight to show, that religion game into the world by revela- tion, prior to all consideration, of the proper authority of any book supposed to contain it; and even prior to all considera- tion, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down and related, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account which we have, of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of necessity. And the ex- fernal evidence, even of natural religion, is by no means incon- eiderable. But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to ke recollected won we ee - — * Chap. 2. 176 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I > after all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This indeed proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical faculties of perception ; against their being intended by nature to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are to behave, and what we are to expect, in conse- quence of our behaviour. Yet our liableness, in the degree we are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious admo- nition to us to be upon our guard, with respect to what is of auch consequence, as our determinations concerning virtue and religion ; and particularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of honour, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to mankind, for the only moral rule.* The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the thing, and the history of religion, amount, when taken together, to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted; such a proof as, considering the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the actions of men, who act upon thought and reflection; if it were admitted that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be said; “There are many probabilities, which cannot indeed be confuted ; i. e. shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities on “the other side ; much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may be clearly shown to be false, without med- dling with such arguments at all, but leaving them just as they are.~ Now the method of gavernment by rewards and punish- ments, and especially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert, as such, respectively, must go upon supposition, that we are free, and not necessary agents.t And it is incredible, that the Author of Nature should govern us upon a supposition ag true, which he knows to be false; and therefore absurd to think he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter ; especially that he will do it under the notion, that they are of good or ill uesert.’’ Here then, the matter is brought to a point. And the answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded: that the ee eee, * Dissertation 2. + Page 838, 89, { See note at the end of this chapter. CHAP. VI.] - AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 177 whole constitution and course of things, the whole analogy of providence shows, beyond possibility of doubt, that the conclu- gion from this reasoning is false, wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed clearly shows where—in supposing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free agents. But upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished. But that, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even brute creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the natural course of things. And men are rewarded and punished for their actions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being so, punished for vicious actions as such, by the natural instrumentality of each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the rewards and punishments following from them, which in general are to be considered as natural, 1. e. from the Author of Na- ture : these rewards and punishments, being naturally* annexed to actiqns considered as implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill desert; these natural rewards and punish- ments, I say, are as much a contradiction to the conclusion’ above, and show its falsehood, as a more exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert, as such. So that if it be incredible that necessary agents should be thus rewarded. and punished, then men are not necessary, but free ; since it is matter of fact thaf they are thus rewarded and unished. But if on the contrary, which is the supposition we have been arguing upon, it be insisted, that men are necessary agents, then there is nothing incredible in the farther supposition of necessary agents being thus rewarded and punished; since we ourselves are thus dealt with. From the whole, therefere, it must follow, that a, necessity supposed possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, does in no sort prove, that the Author of Nature will not, nor destroy the proof that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal government, render his creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in words conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy of nature shows us, that the opinion ew. — $$$ —__— -— — * Sermon 8th at the Rolls. 178 OF THE OPINION OF NECESS. TY, [PART I. of necessity, considered as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the supposition above-mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of revealed. From these things likewise we may learn, in what sense te understand that general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is essentially destructive of all religion. Furst, In a practical sense; that by this notion atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to all religion. And secondly, In the strictest sense; that it is a contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, and to what we may every moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns every thing. But by no means is this assertion to be understood, as if necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things, and with what we experience, were not also reconcilable with religion; for upon this supposition it demonstrably is so. [Nore.—See page 176. ] ' . { We must carefully distinguish between the religious and the irre- ligious necessitarians. The question between the maintainers of free will and the religious necessitarian is this: When I blame [or com- mend] myself for an action, is there necessarily involved in this moral judgment, the consciousness that, under all the circumstances pre- ceding the act of volition, I might have willed otherwise? The religious necessitarian holds the negative ;«the maintainer of free will, the affir- mative; and the irreligious fatalists so far agree with the latter. They say that the sense or persuasion of liberty is requisite to constitute the sense of responsibility for the past,—requisite as a ground of hope or purpose for the future; that, without it, there would be no room for remorse for what we have done, or forethought for what we should do. But then they maintain also, that this feeling is delusive; that it may be demonstrated to be a mistake; and that, consequently, here is a conflict between the rational and the moral principles of our nature. Such a scheme is essentially sceptical, representing the im- mediate judgments of the mind as contradictory of each other. It represents the mind as pronouncing certain volitions, when viewed under a speculative aspect, to fall under the law of cause and effect ; and yet, pronouncing the same volitions, when viewed under a prac- tical aspect, to be exempt from it. Now, upon such a scheme, as there is a direct conflict between the independent decisions of our own consciousness, it seems clear that we have no more right to pronounce the mora judgment delusive, than the rational. Each would be brought equally into doubt if this state- ment were correct. But, even upon this statement the obligations — CHAP. VI.] “AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 179 of morality will remain. I know not, suppose, which judgment is true and which delusive; but still it is not, and cannot be a matter of indifference which of the two I practically follow: because, if I act in disregard of the moral consciousness, I am, by the very hypothesis, self-condemned. The moral faculty is the practical faculty ; and, when the question is what is to be done?—I am in the sphere of action, not of speculation. Reason, in her province, may refuse to register the decree, but she does not, for she cannot, superinduce a contrary practical obligation. The doctrine of necessity, in its religious form, takes this expres- sion:—that moral acts of the will are determined by their motives (meaning by motives all that is the result of temper, organization, education, and outward circumstances), as certainly as physical con- sequences are by their antecedents; but that the acts which proceed from certain classes of motives are approved or condemned by the moral faculty, as being the results of certain motives, without the implied intervention of any such consciousness of freedom as thé maintainers of the liberty of the will suppose. — F. | 180 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, [PART I CHAP. VII. Gf the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Con stitution, imperfectly comprehended. THOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, that the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the general doc- trine of religion, and to the several particular things contained in it, considered as so many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity ; yet still, objections may be insisted upon against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the divine government, implied ia the notion of religion, and against the method by which this government is conducted, to which objections analogy can be no direct answer.* For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact, does not immediately prove any thing concerning the wisdom or goodness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately or directly, than show such and such things to be true or credible, considered only as matters of fact. But still, if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a moral government over it, analogy suggests and makes it credi- ble, that this government must be a scheme, system or constitu- tion of government, as distinguished from a number of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness ; and like- — * [It is obvious that the direct way of showing a certain course of conduct to be wise or good, is to show the precise relations which rei- der it so; the goodness of the ends and the suitability of the means. The indirect way is to show that there may be such relations, though we do not see them, coupled with the proof that such a course of conduct is the conduct of one whom we have good reason, on other grounds, to believe wise and good. Indeed, there have not been wanting persons who have chosen to represent Butler’s argument, throughout this analogy, as tending to overthrow the whole proof of God’s attributes of justice, wisdom, and goodness, by establishing the matter of fact of our being under a goverment no way consistent with such attributes. The object of the present chapter is to obviate such a misrepresentation. Cowpare throughout, P. 11. chap. viii. —F.] CHAP. VII.] ~ A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 18] wise that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct generai answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it; then analogy is, remotely, of great service in answering those objections, both by suggesting the answer, and showing it to be a credible one. Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, frst, Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests, and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension ; and this affords a gen- eral answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it. And, secondly, A more distinct observation of some par- ticular things contained in God’s scheme of natural government, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in his moral government, will farther show how little weight is to be laid upon these objections. 3 I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension: and this affords a general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it. It is most obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that upon supposition of a moral government it must be a scheme, — for the world, and the whole natural government of it, appears to be so—to be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts correspond to each other, and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or as any particular model of a civil consti- tution and government. In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals have various peculiar relations to other in- dividuals of their own species. And whole species are, we find, variously related to other species, upon this earth. Nor do we know how much farther these kinds of relations may extend. And as there is not any action, or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single and unconnected as not to have a respect to some other actions and events; so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a remote natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond the compass of this present world. There seems indeed nothing, from whence we can so much as make a con- jecture, whether all creatures, actions, and events, througltout *the whole of nature, have relations to each other. But, as it ia 16 182 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, ~ [PART } obvious that all events have future unknown conseyuences, st if we trace any, as far as we can go, into what is connected with it, we shall find, that if such eyent were not connected with somewhat farther in nature unknown to us, somewhat both past and present, such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor can we give the whole account of any one thing whatever ; of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not have been. By this most astonishing connexion, these reciprocal correspondencies and mu- tual relations, every thing which we see in the course of nature, is actually brought about. And things, seemingly the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be neces- sary conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so that any one thing whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other. The natural world then, and natural government of it, being such an incom- prehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a man must really in the literal sense know nothing at all, who is not sensible of his ignorance in it: this immediately suggests, and strongly shows the credibility, that the moral world and govern- ment of 1t may be so too. Indeed, the natural and moral con- stitution and government of the world are so connected as to make up togetherbut.one scheme: and it is highly probable, that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organ- ized bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is, without inquiring how far the administration of the natural world is subordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility that one should be analogous or similar to the other: that there- fore, every act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond itself and its immediate object; may have some reference to other parts of God’s moral administration, and to a general moral plan; and that every circumstance of this his moral government may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole of it. Thus for example: the determined length of time, and the degrees and ways in which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wick- edness is permitted to have its progress; the times appointed for the execution of justice; the appointed instruments of it ; the kinds of rewards and punishments, and the manners of their distribution; all particular instances of divine Justice and good- hess, and every circumstance of them, may have such respects ie sin ie. CHAP. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 183 to each other, as to make up altogether a whole, connected and related in all its parts; a scheme, or system, which is as pro- perly one as the natural world is, and of the like kind. And supposing this to be the case, it is most evident that we are not competent judges of this scheme, from the small parts of it which come within our view in the present life; and therefore no objections against any of these parts can be insisted upon by reasonable men. This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from it, are universally acknowledged upon other occasions; and though scarce denicd, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to argue against religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the most reasonable men, always to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make due allowances for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be useless to go on a little farther, in order to show more distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance is, to objections against the scheme of Providence. Suppose then a person boldly to assert, that the things complained of, the origin and continuance of evil, might easily have been prevented by repeated interpositions ;* interpositions so guarded and circum- stanced, as would preclude all mischief arising from them; or, if this were impracticable, that a scheme of government is itself an imperfection; since more good might have been produced without any scheme, system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated acts of distributive justice and goodness ; be- cause these would have occasioned no irregularities. And far- ther than this, it is presumed, the objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious; that were these assertions true, still the observations above, concerning our ignorance in the scheme of divine government, and the consequence drawn from it, would hold in great measure, enough to vindicate religion against all objections from the disorders of the present state. Were these assertions true, yet the government of the world might be just and good notwithstanding: for at the most, they would infer nothing more, than that it might have been better. But in- deed they are mere arbitrary assertions; no man being sufit- ciently acquainted with the possibilities of things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of probability. For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet many instances may ba alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of suppositiona absolutely impossible, and reducible to the most palpable self- * See page 185, 186. 184 | THE GOVERNMENY OF GOD, [PART i contradictiuns, which not every one by any means would per- ceive to be such, nor perhaps any one at first sight suspect. From these things it is easy to sce distinctly, how our igno- rance, as it is the common, is really a satisfactory answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of Providence. Ifa man, contemplating any one providential dispensation, which had no relation to any others, should object, that he discerned in it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of goodness, nothing weuld be less an answer to such objection, than our ignorance in other parts of Providence, or in the possibilities of things, no way related to what he was contemplating. But when we know not but the parts objected against may be relative to other parts uaknown to us, and when we are unacquainted with what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in the case before us, then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because some unknown relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is odjected against just and good; nay, good in the highest prac- ticable degree. Ii. And how little weight is to be laid upon such objections will further appear, by a more distinct observation of some par- ticular things contained in the natural government of God, the like to which may be supposed, from analogy, to be eontained in his moral government. ’ Virst, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appears so be accomplished without means; so we find that means very undesirable often conduce to bring about ends, in such a measure desirable, as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. And in cases where such means are conducive to such ends, it is not reason, but experience, which shows us that they are thus conducive. Experience also shows many means to be conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before experience, we should have thought would have had even a con- trary tendency. Now from these observations relating to the natural scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analo- gous to it, arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery in each other’s power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice, to the degree we are; and in general, that those things which are objected against the moral scheme of Providence, may be, upon the whole, friendly and_assistant. to—virtue, and productive of an overbalance of happiness; i. e. the things ob- jected against, may be means by which an overbalance of good — will, in the end, be found produced. And from the same obser- ree OUmNRETEY “OQHAP. VIL] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 18h vations, it appears to be no presumption against this, that we de not, if indeed we do not, see those means to have any such ten- dency, or that they seem to.us to have a contrary one. Thus those things, which we call irregularities, may not be so at all; because they may be means of accomplishing wise and good ends more considerable. And it may be added, as above, that they may also be the only means by which these wise and good ends are capable of being accomplished. After these observations it may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from any of them, that though the constitution of our nature, from whence we are capable of vice and misery, may, as it undoubtedly does, contri- bute to the perfection and happiness of the world; and though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial to it, (i. e. it would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself abstained from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted); yet notwithstanding, it might have been much better for the world if this very evil had never been done. Nay it is most clearly con- ceivable, that the very commission of wickedness may be bene- ficial to the world, and yet that it would be infinitely more bencficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the natural world, there are disorders which bring their own cures; diseases, which are themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been for the gout ora fever; yet it would be thought madness to assert, that sickness is a better or more perfect state than health; though the like, | with regard to the moral world, has been asserted. But, Secondly, The natural government of the world is carried on by general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons : thé-Wisest and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And that there are such reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of nature; by our being made to experience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed all the good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means, that the laws by which the world is governed, are general. For we have scarce any kind of | epjoyments, but what we are, in some way or other, instru- mental in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we foresee likely to procure them: now this foresight could not be at all, were not the government of the world carried on by general laws. And though, for aught we know to the contrary, every single case may be at length found to have been pro 16* » . a6 THE GCVERNMENT OF GOD, | [PART Y vided for even by these; yet to prevent all irregularities, ot remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in the nature of things, as we see it is abso~ lutely impossible in civil government. But then we are ready to think, that the constitution of nature remaining as it is, and the course of things being permitted to go on, in other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to prevent irregulari- ties, though they could not have been prevented or remedied by any general laws. And there would indeed be reason to wish—which, by the way, is very different from a right to claim—that all irregularities were prevented or remedied by present interpositions, if these interpositions would have no other effect than this. But it is plain they would have some visible and immediate bad effects; for instance, they would encourage idleness and negligence, and they would render doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by this very. thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general laws. And farther, it is certain they would have distant effects, and very great ones too, by means of the wonderful connexions before-mentioned.* So that we cannot so much as guess what would be the whole result of the interpositions desired. It may be said, any bad result might be prevented by farther interposi- tions, whenever there was occasion for them ; but this again is talking quite at random, and in the dark.f Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons why the course of the world should be carried on by general laws, and good ends accomplished by this means; and for aught we know, there may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends accomplished by it. We have no ground to believe, that all irregularities could be remedied as they arise, or could haye been precluded by general laws. We find that interpositions would produce evil, and prevent good; and for aught we know, they would produce greater evil than they would prevent, and prevent greater good than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not interpo- sing is so far from being a. ground of complaint, that it is an instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient; and - going farther seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties, But it may be said, “ that after all, these supposed impossi- bilities and relations are what we are unacquainted with; and we must judge of religion, ag of other things, by what we do know, and look upon the rest as nothing; or however, that the — —_.. __. << * Page 181, &e. 7 Page 183, 184. 4 ; | { ‘ CHAP. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. -187 answers here given to what is objected against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it, since their stress lies so very much upon our ignorance.” But, First, Though total ignorance, in any matter, does indeed equally ‘lestroy, or rathér preclude, all proof concerning it, and objectioas against it, yet partial igtidrance does not. For we may in any degree be Cofivinced, that a person is of such a cha- racter, and consequently will pursue such ends, though we are greatly ignorant what is the proper way of acting, in order the most effectually to obtain those ends; and in this case, objec- tions against his manner of acting, as seemingly not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by our ignorance, though the proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be in- validated by it.* Thus the proof of religion is a proof of the moral character of God, and consequently, that his government is moral, and_that-every one upon the whole shall receive ac cording to his deserts; a proof that this is the designed end ot his government. But we are not competent judges what is the proper way of acting, in order the most effectually to accomplish this end.+ Therefore our ignorance is an answer-to objections against the conduct of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so ob- vious that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objec- * [The concluding observations of this chapter are all-important for the vindication of Butler’s whole argument. They show most satisfactorily how our ignorance may invalidate the objections against, and yet not invalidate the proof of, the thing. The essence of the reasoning here lies in the distinction between our knowledge of God’s will and our knowledge of His ways. We have positive proof of His moral character, in virtue of which He wills both the righteousness and the happiness of His creatures; and yet may be utterly in the dark as to the most effectual ways or methods of procedure by which these objects can be most fully accomplished. We may know the end, and yet not know the best means of bringing it about. A total ignorance would place both the objections and the proof alike beyond our reach, but a partial ignorance may not. God’s wisdom may be learned by its vestiges within the limits of a mere handbreath, as in the construction of an eye; yet, after having learned this, we may fail in our judgment of the subserviency of things that go out and far from view, whether widely in space or distantly in time. And so within the homestead of one’s own conscience may we read the lesson of a righteous God, and yet be wholly unable to pronounce on the tendency or effect of those measures which enter into the policy of His universal government.— Chalmers. ° + Page 88, 89. 188 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, [PART f. tions against a thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance inya- lidates the proof of religion, as it does the objections against it. Secondly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations, might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of reli- gion, as well as to answer objections against it, and that in consequence of this the proof of it were doubtful; yet still, let the assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations would.remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the whole be the conse- quences of observing or violating them. For these obligations arise immediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate-Without beg self-condemned. And they would be certain too, from consi- derations of interest. Tor, though it were doubtful what will be the future consequences of virtue and vice, yet it is however credible that they may have those consequences which religion teaches us they will; and this credibility is a certain* obliga- tion in point of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the conscientious practice of all that is good. But, Phirdly, The answers above given to the objections against religion, cannot equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. For, upon the supposition that God exercises a moral " government over the world, analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehension. And a thousand par- ticular analogies show us, that parts of such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought they had no tendency at all to accomplish ; nay ends, which, before experience, we should haxe thought such parts were contradictory to, and had a tendency to prevent. And therefore all these analogies show, that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion is de- lusive ; because they show it is not at all incredible, that, could . we comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders objected against, to be consistent with justice and goodness, and even to be instances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the objections against it; and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, as it does these objections. * Page 84, and Part II. chap. vi. ¢ Sermons st the Rolls, p. 812, 2d Edit. CHAP. VII.| A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 189 Lastly, From the observations now made, it is easy to see, that the answers above given to the objections against Provit dence, though, in a general way of speaking, they may be said to be taken from our ignorance, yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from somewhat which analogy shows us\ concerning it. For analogy shows us positively, that our igno- rance in the possibilities of things, and the various relations in nature, refiders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to object. So that the things above insisted upon, are not mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and rela- tions; but they are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation of serious men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of nature. And therefore, to take these things into the account, is to judge by experience, and what we do_ know; and it is not judging so, to take no notice of them. : 4 4 so" oe f f ; 190 CONOLUSION. [PART 1. CONCLUSION. THE observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this . little scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as having a reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan of things. Whether we are any way related to the more distant parts of the boundless universe into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident, that the course of things, which comes within our view, is connected with some- what past, present, and future, beyond it.* So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not a fixed, but a progressive one, every way incomprehensible; incom- prehensible in a manner, equally with respect to what has heen, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. And this scheme cannot but contain in it somewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and conception,} as any thing in that of religion. for, will any man in his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive how the world came to be, and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor of it? or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, that there is some other rule of government more natural, and of easier con- ception, than that which we call moral? Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of Nature, no account at all can be given, how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we are concerned, came to. be, and the course of it to be carried on as it is; nor any of its general end and design, with- out a moral Governor of it. That there is an intelligent Author of Nature, and natural Governor of the world, is a principle gone upon in the-foregoing treatise, as proved, and generally known and confessed to be proved. And the very notion of an intelligent Author of Nature, proved by particular final causes, implies a will and a character.{ Now as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and good; so we can scarce in ima- gination conceive what it can be otherwise. However, in conse- quence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed ~~ oe —_—— * Pages 181, 182. ¢ See Part ii. Chap. 2. { Page 171. a PART I.| CONCLUSION. 191 the universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does, rather than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational crea- tures act this their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them, without any reflection. But one would think it impossible, that creatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet at least, whither we are going, and what-the inysterious sc Sine iw the Midst of which we find our- selves, will at length come out and produce; a scheme in which it is certain we are highly interested, and in which we may be interested even beyond conception. For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall cease to be at death. Particular analogies do most sensibly show us, that there 1s nothing to be thought strange in our being to exist in another state of life. And that we are now living beings, affords a strong probability that we shall continue so; unless there be some poSitive ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a persuasion of this kind ever so well grounded, there would surely be little reason — to take pleasure in it. But indeed, it can have no other ground than some such imagination, as that of our gross bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience. Hxperience too, most clearly shows us the folly of concluding from the body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that thie dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And there are remarkable instances of their not affecting each other, which lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition then, which in all reason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature will continue after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable, to form an institution of life, or to act upon any other supposition. Now all expectation of immortality, whether more or less cer- tain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears ; since we see the constitution of nature is such as to admit of misery, as well as to be productive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both in some degree; and since we-can- not but know what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there is no presumption against believing farther, that our future interest depends upon our present behaviour; for we see our present interest doth; and that the happiness and misery, which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently do not follow till long after the actions are done to which they are 192 CONCLUSION. |PART I respectively annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether it were likely that the Author of Nature, in giving happiness and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not; yet, since we find by experience that he hath such regard, the whole sense of things which he has given us, plainly leads us at once, and without any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, indeed must, be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions misery; or that he will, upon the whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who do evil. To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been observed, that some sort of moral government is necessarily. implied in that natural government of God which we experience ourselves under; that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and punished, not only as bene- ficial and mischievous to society, but also as virtuous and vicious; and that there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and punished in a much higher degree than they are at present. And though this higher degree of distributive justice, which nature thus points out and leads towards, is prevented for a time from taking place, it is by obsta- cles which the state of this world unhappily throws in its way, and which therefore are in their nature temporary. Now as these things, in the natural conduct of Providence, are observa- ble on the side of virtue, so there is nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A moral scheme of government then is visibly established, and in some degree carried into execution ; and this, together with the essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us an apprehension, that it will be carried on farther towards perfection in a future state, and that every one shall there receive according to his deserts. And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under the moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our -pehaviour, notwithstanding the difficulty which this may occasion of securing it, and the danger of losing it; just in the same- manner as our temporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour, notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger. For, from our original constitution, and that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves, with our own conduct, and our own interest. And from the same constitution of nature, especially joined with that course of things which is owing to men, we have tempta- tions to be unfaithful in this trust, to forfeit this mterest, te PART I.] CONCLUSION. 193 negiect it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From these temptations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it. ‘There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing, there may be the like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final good which religion lays before us. Indeed the whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed in such a con- dition as this, must be beyond our comprehension. But it is in part accounted for by what religion teaches us, that the character of virtue and piety must be a necessary qualification for a future state of security and happiness, under the moral government of God; in like manner, as some certain qualifications or other are necessary for every particular condition of life, under his natural government; and that the present state was intended to be a school of discipline, for improving in ourselves that charac- ter. Now this intention of nature is rendered highly credible 4 observing; that we are plainly made for improvement of all Winds: that it is a general appointment of Providence, that we ultivate practical principles, and form within ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were wholly unfit for before ; that in particular, childhood and,youth is naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age: and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral dis- cipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole notion of moral government and a probation-state, from the opinion of necessity, it has been shown, that God has given us the evidence, as it were of experience, that all objections against religion on this head are vain and delusive. He has also, in his natural government, suggested an answer to all our short- sighted objections against the equity and goodness of his moral government, and in general he has exemplified to us the latter by the former. — These things, which, it is to be remembered, are matters of fact, ought in all common sense, to awaken mankitfd, to induce them to consider in earnest their condition, and what they have todo. It is absurd—absurd to.the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life, or even in that immoral thoughtlessness which far the greatest part of them are fallen wmto. And the credibility of religion, arising from experience and facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage them to live in the general practice of all virtue and piety: 17 19-4 CONCLUSION. [PART £. under the serious apprehension, though it should be inixed with some doubt,* of a righteous administration established in nature, and a future judgment in consequence of it; especially when we consider, how very questionable it is. whether any thing at all can be gained by yice;f how unquestionably little, as well as precarious; the pleasures and profits of ifare at the best? and low soon they must be parted withat the longest. “For, mn the deliberations of reason, conceriiing what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case; so inducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest, so small and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as in the view of reason, to be almost nothing in themselves, and in comparison with the importance of religion, they quite disappear and are lost. Mere passion indeed may be alleged, though not as a reason, yet as an excuse for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an excuse it is will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in a condi- tion in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, by being necessitated to govern them; and to lay ourselves under the same kind of restraints, and as great ones too, from temporal regards, ,as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course of things, require. Phe plea of ungovernable passion then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all things; for it is no reason, and but a poor excuse. But the proper motives to religion, are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the presages of cons¢iénce, and our natural apprehension of God, under the character. of a righteous Governor and Judge; a nature, and conscience, and apprehension given us by him; and from the confirmation of the dictates of reason, by life and tmmortality brought to light by the gospel ; and the wrath of God revealea from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. . * Prt IL. Chap. 6. ns + Enge 119. Br, eae tae THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION, &c iepard afl INE, OF REVEALED RELIGION. CHAP. I. Of the Importance of Christianity. SOME persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light of nature,* avowedly reject all revelation, as, in its very notion, incredible, and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is cer- tain, no revelation would have been given, had the light of. nature been sufficient in such a sense, as to render one not wanting and useless. But no man in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so, who considers the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation, and its present state in those places which have borrowed no light from it- particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men con cerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the natura, inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impos: sible to say who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system, which we call natural religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition; but there is certainly no ground to afirm that the generality could: if they could, there is no sort of probability that they would. Admitting there were, they would highly want a standing admonition, to remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. And farther still, were they * [This is the main argument of Tindal’s famous book, ‘ Chris- tianity as old as the Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Law of Nature,” first published in 4to., London, 1730. —F.]| 17* (197) BGS oe OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART TR as much disposed to attend to religion as the better sort of mon are, yet even upon this supposition, there would be various ocea- sions for supernatural instructicu and assistance, and the greatest advantages might be afforded by them. So that to say, revela- tion is a thing superfluous, what there is no need of, and what ean be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at random.* Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present state, and life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction to suppose eur con- dition capable of being in any respect better. There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, whe seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were, overlooking revelation, as of small importance, provided natural relfgion be kept'to. With little regard, either to the evidence of the former, or to the objections against it, and even upon supposition of its truth, “the only design of it,’ say they, “must be to establish a belief of the moral system of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue. The Dee eS eS ee * [It may be doubted whether Christian apologists are called upon to demonstrate elaborately the necessity of Revelation, prior to the ‘consideration of dts truth, as matter of fact. Paley disposes of this whole question in a single sentence, by simply saying, ‘‘I deem it unnecessary to prove, that mankind stood in need of a revelation, because I have met with no serious person, who thinks that, even under the Christian Revelation, we have too much light, or any degree of assurance which is superfluous.” Dr. Chalmers, on this topic remarks, “Possessed as we are, of such competent proofs on the credibility of this said revelation, are we to suspend the determination — of it, till the previous question of its necessity has been settled and set by? Are we to forego the consideration of the evidences which | lie patent before us on the field of observation till we take up a mat- _ ter, not so much, let it be noticed, of palpable fact as of recondite principle? The necessity of revelation involves in it topics that stand related both to God and to eternity—to the hidden counsels of the One, to the fathomless unknown, and by us, undiscoverable, of the other. The truth of revelation depends on credentials which lie on an open platform, or certain tangible things within the circle of our perceptions, which have been addressed to human.eyes, which have been heard by human ears. It is not sound dialectics to suspend the second of these topics on the first of them.” . tis usual to argue the necessity of revelation from the state of — religion and morals in the ancient heathen world. The reader who © is interested in this line of investigation, would do well to examine Tholuck’s masterly essay, on the ‘‘Nature and Moral Influence ot Heathenism,” in Clark’s Biblical Cabinet, No. 28.] ¥ yen oe CHAP. £,] OF CHRISTIANITY. 199 Welief and practice of these things were, perhaps, much pro- moted by the first publication of Christianity ; but whether they are believed and practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature or of revelation, is no great matter.”* This way of considering revelation, though it is not the same with the for- mer, yet borders nearly upon it, and very much, at length, runs up into it, and requires to be particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem to be getting into this way. The con- sideration of it will likewise farther show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the truth of the observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into the Importance of Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction: to a treatise concerning the credibility of it. Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and com- manded those things which are commanded in Christianity, it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot in enywise be an indifferent matter, whether we obey or disobey those commands; unless we are certainly assured, that we know all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are now ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves in particular. And it is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this; for our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case, since the whole analogy of nature shows, what is indeed in itself evident, that there may ee infinite reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted. But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly appear, $y considering it more distinctly: first, as a republication, and external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to the present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote aatural piety and virtue; and secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation of things, not discoverable by reason, in con- sequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it. I. Christianity is a republication of natural religion. It in * Invenis multos propterea nolli fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi precepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est Christus? Nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adul- terio contaminor. Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod repre- hendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianem. — aug. in Psa. EEX. 200 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART IL structs mankind in the moral system of the world: that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under his govern iment; that virtue is his law; and that he will finally judge mankind in righteousness, and render to all according to their works, in a future state. And which is very material, it teaches natural religion in its genuine simplicity, free from those super stitions with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost. Revelation is farther an authoritative publication of natural religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in Serip- ture, were intended to prove a particular dispensation of Provi- dence —the redemption of the world by the Messiah; but this does not hinder but that they may also prove God’s general providence over the world, as our moral Governor and Judge. And they evidéntly do prove it; because this character of the Author of Nature is necessarily connected with, and implied im that particular revealed dispensation of things: it is likewise continually taught expressly, and insisted upon by those persons who wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies.. So that indeed, natural religion seems as much proved by the Serinture revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation been nothing else than to prove it. But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove natural religion; and notable objections may be urged against this proof of it, considered as a matter of speculation: but con- sidered as a practical thing, there can be none. For suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation, who had lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it, and to declare he was commissioned by God so to do; suppose him, in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no human foresight could have guessed at; to divide the sea with a word; feed ereat multitudes with bread from heaven; cure all manner of diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life: would not this give additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what that of a common man would have, and be ar authoritative publication of the law of nature, 1. e. a new proof of it? It would be a practical one, of the strongest kind, per. haps, which human creatures are capable of having given them The law of Moses then, and the gospel of Christ, are authorita- tive publications of the religion of nature: they afford a proof of God’s general providence, as moral Governor of the world, CHAP T] OF CHRISTIANITY. 201 as well as of his particular dispensations of providence towards sinful creatures, revealed in the law and the gospel. As they are he only evidence of the latter, so they are an additional evidence of the former. To show this farther, let us suppose a man of the greatest and most improved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the world, that it was under the direction and moral government of an infinitely perfect Being, but ready to question, whether he were not got beyond the reach of his faculties ; suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into great danger of being carried away by the universal bad example of almost every one around him, who appeared to have no Sense, no practical sense at least, of these things; and this perhaps would be as advantageous a situation, with regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed any man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a person, all at once to find, that this moral system of things was revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had, from principles of reason, believed in; and that the publishers of the revelation proved their commission from him by making it appear, that he had intrusted them with a power of suspending and changing the general laws of nature. Nor must it, by any means, be omitted, for it is a thing of the utmost importance, that Hfe and immortality are eminently brought to light by the gospel.* The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a course of wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, ara not only confirmed in the gospel, but are taught, especially the last is, with a degree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness. Farther: As Christianity served these ends and purposes, when it was first published, by the miraculous publication itself; so it was intended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by means of the settlement of a visible church ; of a society, distinguished from common ones, and from the rest of | gah EE ee SN ee nes eee eae, ae eR * [For even though natural religion might teach some efficacy to be in repentance, it could not certainly teach the efficacy of it in the Christian sense, i. e. its efficacy wholly to cancel the punishment of sin, and restore us absolutely to God’s favour. And though natura: religion might show us much danger in. wickedness, it could not show us, certainly, the great danger resulting from our probation being terminated for ever by death, and the everlasting punishment which will then ensue. —F.] 202 OF THE IMPORTANCE [part nh the world, by peculiar religious institutions; by an ‘institutes method of instruction, and an instituted form of external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the first preaghers of Christianity, in order to their introducing it into the world a visible church was established, in order to continue it, and carry it on successively throughout all ages. Had Moses and the Prophets, Christ and his Apostles, only taught, and by miracles proved, religion to their contemporaries, the benefits of their instructions would have reached but to a small part of mankind. Christianity must have been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible church was instituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing memorial to the world, of the duty which we owe our Maker; to call men continually, . voth by example and instruction, to attend to it, and by the form of religion ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality; to be the repository of the oracles of God; to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and propagate it throughout all generations to the end of the world—the light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than as designed to enforce natural religion. And in proportion as Christianity is professed and taught in the world, religion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly and advantageously laid before mankind, and brought again and again to their thoughts as a matter of infinite importance. . A visible church has also a farther tendency to promote natural religion, as being an insti- tuted method of education, originally intended to be of more — peculiar advantage to those who would conform to it. For one © end of the institution was, that by admonition and reproof, as — well as instruction; by a general regular discipline, and public — exercises of religion, the body of Christ, as the Scripture — apeaks, should be edified ; i. e. trained up in piety and virtue, — for a higher and better state. This settlement then, appearing © thus beneficial ; tending, in the nature of the thing, to answer, — and in some degree actually answering, those ends; it is to be remembered, that the very notion of it implies positive institu- tions: for the visibility of the church consists in them. Take © away every thing of this kind, and you lose the very notion — itself. So that, if the things now mentioned are advantages, — the reason and importance of positive institutions in general is _ most obvious; since, without them, these advantages could not be secured to the world. And it is mere idle wantonness, to E ; 4 = CHAP. I. | OF CHRISTIANITY. 208 ‘nsist upon knowing the reasons why such particular ones were fixed upon, rather than others. 7 The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, which Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are very slow in apprehending: and yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a very plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest really say, that the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advantageous a situation, with regard to natural religion, as they are now amongst us: that it was laid before them, and enforced upon them, in a manner nw distinct, and as much tending to influence their practice ? The objections against all this, from the perversion of Christianity, and from the supposition of its having had but little good influence, however innocently they may be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive, upon any principles but such as lead. to downright atheism; because the manifesta- tion of the law of nature by reason, which, upon all principles of theigm, must Have been from God, has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the same manner. It may indeed, I think, truly be said, that the good effects of Christianity have not been small; nor its supposed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking. Perhaps too the things themselves done have been aggravated; and if not, Christianity hath been often only a pretence; and the same evils in the main would have been done upon some other pretence. However, great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have really been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon prin- ciples of theism. or one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without | laying it down as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are not to be judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies ; not by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect if mankind did their part: that part which is justly put and left upon them. It is alto- gether as much the language of one, as of the other: ‘“ Ze that is unjust, let him be unjust still, and he that is holy, éci him be holy still.”’* The light of reason does not, any more than that of revelation, force men to submit to its authority: both admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with the consequences of each; and after this cave * Rev. xxu, Ll. 204 : OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART £1 them at fuil liberty to act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment. Every moment’s experience shows that this is God’s general rule of government. To return then; Christianity being a promulgation of the law of nature; beimg moreover an authoritative promulgation of it, with new light, and other circumstances of peculiar advan- tage, adapted to the wants of mankind; these things fully show its importance. And it is to be observed farther, that as the nature of the case requires, so all Christians are commanded to — contribute, by their profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is the very scheme of the gospel, that each Christian should, in his degree, contribute towards continuing and carrying it on; all by uniting in the public profession, and external practice of Christianity; some by instructing, by having the oversight, and taking care of this religious com- munity—the church of God. Now this farther shows the im- portance of Christianity, and, which is what I chieflyggintend, its importance in a practical sense, or the high obligations we are under, to take it into our most serious consideration; and the danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating it despitefully, which I am not now speaking of, but in disre- garding and neglecting it. or this is neglecting to do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all this holds, even though the only thing to be considered in Chris- , tianity were, its subserviency to natural religion. But, If. Christianity is to be considered in a further view, as con- taining an account of a dispensation of things not at all dis- coverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. Christianity is not only an external institution of natural religion, and a new promulgation of God’s general providence, as righteous Governor and Judge of the world; but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispen- sation of providence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are represented in Scrip- ture, to be in a state of ruin. And in consequence of this revelation being made, we are commanded to be baptized, not only in the name of the Father, but also of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ; and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of these duties may be judged of, by observing that they arise, * ~~ CHAP. I.| OF CHRISTIANITY. 26 not from positive command merely, but also from the offices which appear, from Scripture, to belong to those divine persons in the gospel dispensation, or from the relations which we are . there informed they stand in to us. By reason is revealed the relation which God the Father stands in-to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In Scripture are rcv2aled the relations which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty which we are ander to them. ‘The truth of the case, as one may speak, ip each of these three respects, being admitted, that God is the Governor of the world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the Mediator between God and man; and the Holy Ghost our Guide and Sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation: the truth of the case, I say, in each of these respects being admitted, it is no more a question, why it should be commanded that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter seems to require to be more fully stated.* Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under the twofold consideration of internal and external; for the latter is as real a part of religion, of true religion, as the former. Now when religion is considered under the first notion, as an inward principle, to be exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and heart, the essence ef natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to God the Father Alinighty; and the essence of revealed religion as distinguished from natural, to consist in religious regards to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. And the obligation we are under, of paying these religious regards to each of these Divine persons respectively, arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us. How these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration in the case; because the duties arise out of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed of them. The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world: the one our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not then the duty of religious regards to both these divine persons, as immediately arise to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices and relations, as the inward good. * See ‘The Nature, Obligation. and Efficacy, of the Christian Sa- eraments, &c. and Collider of Revealed Religion, as there quoted. 206 | | OF THE IMPORTANCE |PART 1 will and kind intention, which we owe to our fellow-creatures, arises out of the common relations between us and them? But it will be asked, “ What are the inward religious regards, ap- pearing thus obviously due to the Son and Holy Spirit, as arising, not merely from command in Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations which they stand in to us?” J answer, tho religious regards of reverence, honour, love, trust, gratitude, fers, hope. In what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, is a matter of pure revealed command; as perhaps the external manner in which God the Father is to be wor- shipped, may be more so than we are ready to think; but the worship, the internal worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no farther matter of pure revealed command, than as the relations they stand in to us, are matter of pure revelation; for the relations being known, the obligations to such internal wor- ship are obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason of these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the words, Son and Holy Ghost. If this account of the Christian religion be just, those persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, provided natural religion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, has yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. For the office of our Lord being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external command, immediately out of that his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget, that revelation is to be considered as informing us of somewhat new in the state of mankind, and in-the government of the world; as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. And these relations being real, (though before revelation we could be under no obligations from them, yet upon their being revealed,) there is no reason to think, but that neglect of behaving suitably to them, will be attended with the same kind of consequences undei God’s government, as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations made known to us by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in the the other: the ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally volintary, in both cases. * —_— os . at UHAP. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY. 207 {f therefore Christ be indeed the Mediator between God and man; i. e. if Christianity be true; if he be indeed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God, no one can say what may follow, not only the obstinate, but the careless disregard to him*in those high relations. Nay, no one can say what may follow such dis- regard, even in the way of natural consequence.* For as the natural consequences of vice in this life, are doubtless to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted by God ; so likewise, for aught we know, the judicial punishments of the future life may be, in a like way, or a like sense, the natural consequence of vice ;} of men’s violating or disregarding the relations which God has placed them in here, and made known to them. Again: If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, and so are unfit for that state which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples; and if the assistance of God’s Spirit be necessary to renew their nature, in the degree requisite to their being qualified for that state; all which is implied in the express, though figurative, declaration, Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God : ‘supposing this, is it possible any serious person can think it a slight matter, whether or not he makes use of the means expressly commanded by God, for obtaining this divine assist- ance? especially since the whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect any benefits, without making use of the appointed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us nothing of the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal or spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from experience or revelation. And experience, the present case does not admit of. The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity being supposed either true or credible,yit is unspeakable irre- verence, and really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. It can never justly be esteemed of little con- sequence, till it be positively supposed false. Nor do I know : higher and more important obligation which we are under, whan that of examining most seriously into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility ; and of embracing it, upon supposition of its truth. The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their being mistalren. * Pages 104, 105. &e + Chap. 6. 208 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART 11 First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction between what is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we sce; positive precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we do not sec.* Moral duties arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external command. Positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command received from him, whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner in which the nature of the case, or the fact of the rela- tion, is made known, this doth not denominate any duty, either positive or moral. That we be baptized in the name of the Fa- ther, is as much a positive duty as that we be baptized in the name of the Son;.because both arise equally from revealed command; though the relation which we stand in to God the Father, is made known to us by reason; the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dis- pensation of the gospel admitted, gratitude as immediately be- comes due to Christ, from his being the voluntary minister of _ this dispensation, as it is due to God the Father, from his veing the fountain of all good; though the first is made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason. Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness sake, it may be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a twofold consideration : They are either institutions founded on natural religion, as bap- tism in the name of the Father; though this has also a par. ticular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; or they ara * This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts, con sidered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have some: what of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them considered in this‘view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 200, &c. and p. 209. [It should be farther added, to prevent misconceptions, that a prevept may be positive, even though it have a ground or reason visible to us, if that reason do not, of itself, constitute the thing required an abso- 6 lute duty. There are, for instance, visible reasons for the propriety of such an initiative rite as Christian havtism, and yet baptism is only a positive institution, because those reasons are not sufficient of themselves to make the observance of sucn a rite an absolute duty. — F.] CHAP. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY, 209 external institutions founded on revealed religion, as baptism in the name of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Secondly, From the distinction between what is moral and what is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar preference, which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the former. | The reason of positive institutions in general is very obvious, though we should not see the reason why such particular ones are pitched upon, rather than others. Whoever therefore, instead of cavilling at words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive institutions in general, as distin« guished from this or that-particular one, have the nature of moral commands; since the reasons of them appear. Thus for ‘instance, the external worship of God is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to be taken, when & comparison is made between positive and moral duties, that they be compared no farther than as they are different; no farther than as the former are positive, or arise out of mere external command, the reasons of which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into endless confusion. Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the same authority; that in certain conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both; that the former is moral, i. e. a precept of which we see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular case before us; but that the latter is positive, i. e. a precept of which we do not see the reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the former, because there is an apparent reason for this preference, and none against it. Far- ther, positive institutions, I suppose all those which Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral end; and the end must be acknowledged more excellent than the means. Nor is ob- servance of these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral prin- ciple. This seems to be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter; but will, perhaps, be found less appli- cable to practice than may be thought at first sight. And therefore, if a more practical, though more lax way of consideration, and taking the words moral law and positive instr tutions, in the popular sense; I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed command, as positive institutions 13. * 2rV OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART YI. are; for the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect then, they are both upon a level. But the moral law Is, moreover, written upon our hearts; interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be preferred, when they interfere. But there is not altogether so much necessity for the deter- mination of this question, as some persons seem to think. Nor are we left to reason alone to determine it. For, first, Though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obe- dience to moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all between them, and consequently without determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions.of that kind to be utterly subversive of true” religion; as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole genera] tenor of Scripture, and likewise to the most express particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral virtue. Secondly, Upon the occasion of men- tioning together positive and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the latter, and never upon the former; which, though no sort of allowance to neglect the for- mer, when they do not interfere with the latter, yet is a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter are to be preferred. And farther, as mankind are for placing the stress of their reli- gion any where, rather than upon virtue, lest both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly; our Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, has taken occa- sion to make the comparison between them and moral precepts, when the Pharisees censured him for eating with publicans and sinners ; and also when they censured his disciples for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. Upon this comparison he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authori- tative determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it general, £ will have mercy, and not saerifice.* The propriety of the word proverbial is not the thing insisted upon, though [ think the manner of speaking is to be ‘called so. But that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the * Matt. ix. 18 and xii. 7. te tee Be ee, » _ . a? set a te ee ee es eS OHAP. 1. ] OF CHRISTIANITY. 21] determination general, is surely indisputable. or had it, in the latter case, been said only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, most justly might we have argued that he preferred mercy likewise to-the observance of other ritual institutions, and in general, moral duties to positive ones. And thus the determination would have been general, though its being so were inferred, and not expressed. But as-the passage really stands in the gospel, itis much stronger; for the sense, and the very literal words of our Lord’s answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a comparison between positive and moral duties, as to this upon which they were spoken. And if in case of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought that justice is to give,place to them. It is remarkable too, that as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are introduced, on both the fore-mentioned occasions, with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not under- stand the meaning of them. ‘This, I say, is very remarkable ; for since it is scarce possible for the most ignorant person not to understand the literal sense of the passage in the Prophet,* and since understanding the literal sense would not have pre- vented their condemning the guiltless,} it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our Lord really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had not learned from it, as they might, wherein the general spirit of religion consists; that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as distinguished from forms and ritual observances. However, it is certain we may learn this from his divine application of the passage in the gospel. - But as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be ef greater importance than the other, to consider this other as of scarce any importance at all; it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how great presumption it is to make light of any institutions of divine appointment; that our obligations to obey all God’s commands whatever, are absolute ani indispen- sable; and that commands merely positive, admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them; an obliga- tion moral in the strictest and most proper sense. To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now given of Christianity, most strongly shows and enforces upon —- — ee * Hosea vi. + Matt. xil. 7. 212 OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. [PART I, us the obligation of searching the Scriptures, in order to see what the scheme of revelation really is, instead of determining beforehand from reason what the scheme of it must be.* Indeed, if in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming mean- ing of which is contrary to natural religion, we may most cer- tainly conclude such seeming meaning not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a presumption against an interpreta- tion of Scripture, that such interpretation contains ‘a doctrine which the light of nature cannot discover,} or a precept, which the law of nature does not oblige to. oe # Chap. 8. $ Pages 214, 216. CHAP. I.] OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION, &c. 213 ° CHAP. IT. Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, consideren as miraculous. HAvina shown the importance of the Christian revelation, and the obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth or its credibility; the next thing in order is, to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in general; which shall be the subject of this chap- ter; and the objections against the Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of some following ones.* For it seems the most natural method to remove these prejudices against Christianity, before we proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it, and the objections against that evi dence.t It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian scheme of things, at least against miracles; so as that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than would be sufficient to convince us of other events or matters of fact. Indeed the consideration of this supposed pre- sumption cannot but be thought very insignificant by many persons; yet as it belongs to the subject of this treatise, so it may tend to open the mind, and remove some prejudices, how- ever needless the consideration of it be, upon its own account. I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy # of nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, that God — created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ, and by him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, i. e., render sto every one according to his works; and that good men are under the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are or are not to be called miraculous, is perhaps only a ques- tion about words; or however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises any presumption against this gen- — — * Chap. 2, 4, 5, 6. © ~+ Chap. 7, * 214 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION [PART I= sral scheme ot Christianity, it must be, either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience, or else because it is unlike that course of nature, which is. But analogy raises no pre- sumption against the truth of this scheme, upon.either of these accounts. . First, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or experience. Jor suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most impoved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of natural philosophy and natural religion, such a one could not but be sensible, that it was but a very smali part of the natural and moral’system of the universe, which he was acquainted with. He could not but be sensible, that there must be innumerable things in the dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible government over the world at present carrying on, and in what is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant,“ and which could not be discovered without reve- lation. Whether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or not, it is evidently vast, even beyond all possi- ble imagination. And doubtless, that part of it which is open to our view, is but asa point in comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout eternity past and future; im comparison of what is even now going on in the remote parts of the boundless universe: nay, in comparison of the whole scheme of this world. And therefore, that things lie beyond the natural reach of our facuities, is no sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them; because it is certain, there are innumerable things, in the constitution and government of the universe, which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties. Secondly, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the things contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon account of their being unlike the known course of nature. For there is no presumption at all, from analogy, that the whole course of things, or divine government, naturally unknown to us, and every thing in it, is like to any thing in that which is known; and therefore no peculiar pres sumption against any thing in the former, upon account of its” being unlike to any thing in the latter. And in the constitu- tion and natural government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we see things, in a great degree untske * Pages 182, 183. CHAP. II.] AGAINST MIRACLES. | 218 one another; and therefore ought not to wonder at such unlike- ness between things visible and invisible. However, the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of nature; as will appear in the following parkof this treatise. The notion of a miracle,* considered as a proof of a divine mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines; and is, L think, sufficiently understood by every one. There are also invisible miracles: the incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, being secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission; but require themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revela- tion itself too is miraculous, and miracles are the proof of it; and the supposed presumption against these shall presently be considered. All which I have been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call every thing in the dispensations of Providence, not discoverable without revelation, not like the known course of things, miraculous; and whether the general Jhristian dispensation now mentioned, is to be called so, or not; she foregoing observations seem entirely t6 show, that there is no presumption against it, from the analogy of nature. II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some operations, which we should now call miraculous; particularly, none against a revelation at the beginning of the world; nothing of such presumption against it, as is supposed to *be implied or expressed in the word miraculous. For a miracle, ia its very notion, is relative to a course of nature; and implies somewhat different from it, considered as being so. Now, either there was no course of nature at the time which we are speak- ing of; or if there were, we are not acquainted what the course of nature is upon the first peopling of worlds. And therefore che question, whether mankind had a revelation made to them ut that time, is to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more or less, to admit the report of tra dition, concerning this question, and concerning common mat ters of fact of the same antiquity; for instance, what part of the earth was first peopled. Or thus: When mankind was first placed in this state, there “was a power exerted, totally different from the present course of nature. Now, whether this power, thus wholly different * [For a beautiful development cf the idea of a miracle, the reader iz referred to Mr. Trench’s work on the Miracles, preliminary essay. ] 216 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION [PART Il from the present course of nature, for we cannot properly apply to it the word miraculous ; whether this power stopped imme- diately after it had made man, or went on, and exerted itself farther in giving him a revelation, is a question of the same kind, as whether an ordinary power exerted itself in such a particular degree and manner or not. Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world, be considered as miraculous, or rather be called by that name, the case will not be different; since it must be acknowledged, that such a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged that our Saviour spent some years in a course of working miracles; there is no more presumption worth mentioning, against his having exerted this miraculous power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain degree less; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer; in this, than ip another manner.* * [This observation’ applies with great force against the modern rationalistic attempts to explain away some of our Saviour’s miracles into natural events, as long as it is confessed that he wrought real miracles, or that his mission was really miraculous. Such explana- tions are really more improbable than the common ones which suppose a miracle, because there is no general improbability in supposing that a person endowed with the power of working miracles exerted it upon a particular occasion ; whereas there is an improbability in supposing that an unusual natural event occurred; and when this system of interpretation is carried on, and applied to a great number of cases, the improbability of a whole series of strange natural events taking place unaccountably one after the other, amounts, I think, to a far greater improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles; because everything that is improbable in the physical strangeness of miracles applies to such a series of odd events, whilst we are deprived of the means of accounting for them by supposing an extraordinary interposition of the Deity. A romance made up wholly of natural occurrences which happen sometimes, but very rarely, is just as incredible as a romance made up of stories about genii and enchanters, and things wholly supernatural. The improbability of both, with respoct to physical strangeness, is just the same. ‘Some infidels,” says the Archbishop of Dublin, “have laboured to prove, concerning some one of our Lord’s miracles, that it might have been the result of an accidental conjuncture of natural circumstances; next they endea- vour to prove the same concerning another, and so on; and thence infer that ald of them, occurring as a series, might have been so. They might argue, in like manner, that because it is not very impro- bable one may throw sixes in any one out of a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hun- dred times running.” — Logic, b. iii. 8. 11.— F.] . de CHAP. II. | AGAINST MIRACLES. Zi It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when man was first placed upon the earth. Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in history or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out; but the whole of history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came into the world by revelation. Indeed, the state of religion in the first ages, of which we have any account, seems to suppose and imply, that this was the original of it amongst mankind. And these reflections together, without taking in the peculiar authority of scripture, amount to real and a very material degree of evidence, that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, and therefore mentioned in the former part of this treatise ;* so likewise, it has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent revelation. III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against revelation, after the settlement and during the con- tinuance of a course of nature. Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed in general, that before we can have ground for raising what can, with any propriety, be called an argument from analogy, for or againsé revelation considered as somewhat mira- culous, we must be acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the history of some other world, seemingly in like cireum- stances with our own, is no more than a parallel case; and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet could we ¢ome at a presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, from being informed whether such world had one, or not; such a proof, being drawn from one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More particularly: First of all, There is a very strong presumption against common speculative truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the proof of them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof. There is a pre- sumption of millions to one, against the story of Cesar, or of any other man. For suppose a number of common facts so and so circumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should happen to come into one’s thoughts; every one would, without wny possible doubt, conclude them to be false. And the like ——-___, a Y * Page 174, &e. 19 218 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION [PART It. inay be said of a single common fact. And from hence it ap- pears, that the question of importance, as to the matter before us, Is, concerning the degrze of the peculiar presumption sup- posed against miracles; not whether there be any peculiar pre- sumption at all against them. For, if there be the presumption of millions to one, against the most common facts, what ean a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing.* The only material question is, whether there be any such presump- tion against miracles, as to render them in any sort ineredible ? Secondly, if we leave out the consideration of religion, we are in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, the present course of nature depends, that there does not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that five or six thousand years may have given scope for causes, occasions, reasons or circuwstances, from whence miraculous interpositions may have arisen. And from this, joined with the foregoing observation, it will follow, that there must be a pre- sumption, beyond all comparison greater, against the particular common facts just now instanced in, than against miracles in general ; before any evidence of either. But, thirdly, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral system of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons for miracles; tc afford mankind instruction additional to that of nature, and te attest the truth of it. And this gives a real eredibility to the * [Butler supposes, in the first instance, @ series of events to have come gratuitously into one’s mind; and, after stating the almost infi- nite number of chances against its being true, supposes, in the second instance, these very events to be deponed to by a credible witness. Now, that both the first and the second of these things should happen in coincidence together were the strongest possible unlikelihood; and Butler says truly, that the presumption against a miracle is a small presumption additional to this; for, in fact, this were itself a miracle. The proper way of estimating the strength of the presumption against, or of the proof that would be necessary for the establish- ment of a miracle, is to bring it into comparison, not with the pre- sumption against the truth of a previously conceived story, but with the presumption against the truth of an already reported story that related to events which were not miraculous. There will be found in this case a difference very much greater than the small additional presumption which Butler speaks of; and so, however striking or original his observation may be, there seems nothing in it which can guide us into a right track for the solution of the difficulty that since his time has so exercised the skill of controversialists. —- Chalmers. } CHAP. II.] AGAINST MIRACLES. 219 supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of things, that there should be miraculous interpositions. Then, lasily, Miracles must not be compared to common natural events; or, to events which, though uncommon, are similar to what we daily experience ; but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. And then the comparison will be between the p.esumption against miracles, and the presumption against such uncommon eppearances, suppose, as comets, and against their being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, so contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with tnese powers. And before any one can determine, whether tiere be any peculiar presumption against miracles, more than against other extraordinary things, he must consider, what, upon first hearing, would be the presumption against the last-mentioned appearances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the duily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this earth, and with those common powers of matter which we every aay see. Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such pre- sumption against miracles, as to render them in anywise incre- dible; that on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons for them, gives a positive credibility to the history of them, in cases where those reasons hold; and that it is by no means certain, that there is any peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distin- guished from other extraordinary phenomena; though it is not worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence, in order to determine a question, which, without such inquiries, we see* is of no importance. Sr ce erecta ge * Page 217, &. eee en we eee 220 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [eART 1 ‘CHAP. IIL. Of our Incapacity of judging, what weére to be expected in a Revelation ; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must contain things appearing liable lo Objections.* Bestpes the objections against the evidence for Christianity, many are alleged. against the scheme of it; against the whole manner in which it is put and left with the world, as well as against several particular relations in Scripture: objections drawn ~ from the deficiencies of revelation; from things in it appearing to men foolishness :+ from its containing matters of offence, which have led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny and wickedness; from its not being univer- sal; and. which is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence not beins so convincing and satisfactory as it might have been ; _ for this last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against ee ee *[The )bject of this chapter is to prove the likelihood, in the gen- eral, of revelation being liable to objections, or at least that its being sa forms no proper ground for the rejection of it. This reduces us to the consideration of its proofs, as the only relevant inquiry that we have to do with. Doubtless every objection against these proofs — must be entertained, and satisfactorily disposed of. But this is differ- ent from objections against the subject-matter of a revelation. These form what are here called its internal improbabilities, much insisted on by Deists; but all proceeding on the competency of the human understanding to decide upon a topic which is here shown to be much too high for it, we being no more judges beforehand of what a reve- lation ought to be, either in the way it ought to be conducted or what it should contain, than we are judges anterior to experience of what ought to be the course of nature. The alleged imperfections and anomalies in the methods by which Christianity distributed and gave forth her lessons, are most effectually met by the analogous imperfec- tions and anomalies, if such they must be called, as contrary to all the likelihoods of previous expectation, that might be observed in the gifts and teaching of nature. — Chalmers, | © P COn lige OHAP. III. | LIABLE TO Ob ECTIONS. 221 its truth.* It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the several particulars comprehended under the objections here referred to, they being so various according to the different fancies of men. There are persons who think it a strong objec. tion against the authority of Scripture, that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writing. And the scorn is inexpressible, with which some of he prophetic parts of Scripture are treated; partly through the ashness of interpreters, but very much also on account of the nieroglyphical and figurative language in which they are left us. Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly considered in the following Chapters. But my design at present is to observe in general, with respect to this whole way of argu- ing, that, upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand, we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree; and that it would contain many things appearing to us liable to great objections, in case we judge of it otherwise than by the analogy of nature. And therefore, though objections against the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet objections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous; almost all objections against it, except- ing those which are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from God. I express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason, which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even revela- tion itself; or be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed reve- lation cannot be proved false from internal characters. For it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions; and either of these would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that 1othing else can possibly render any supposed revelation in- credible. Yet still the observation above is, I think, true beyond doubt, that objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous. ‘T'o make out this, is the general design of the present Chapter. And with regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, that the proofs might be attended to, rather than the assertions cavilled at, upon account of any unacceptable consequences, whether real or sup- posed, which may be drawn from them. For after all, that which is true, must be admitted; though it should show us the shortness of our faculties, and that we are in nowise judges of * Chap. 6. 19* 222 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART TT. many things, of which we are apt to think ourselves very coin, petent ones. Nor will this be any objection with reasonable men; at least upon second thought it will not be any objection with such, against the justness of the following observations : — As God governs the world, and instructs his creatures, accord- ing to certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature, known by reason together with experience; so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of divine Providence, additional to this. It relates, that God has, by revelation, instructed men in things concerning his government, which they could not otherwise have known, and reminded them of things which they might other- wise know; and attested the truth of the whole by miracles. Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things are both from God, if.they coincide with each other, and together make up one scheme of Providence, our being incompetent judges of one, must render it credible that we may be incon petent judges also of the other. Since, upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly different from what, before experience, would have been expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie great objections against: this renders it beforehand highly credible, that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expectations formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to ereat objections; objections against the scheme itself, and against the degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was attested and carried on. Thus suppose a prince te govern his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common known laws; and that upon some exigencies he should suspend these laws, and govern, in several instances, in a different man- ner: if one of his subjects were not a competent judge before- hand, by what common rules the government should or would be carried on, it could not be expected, that the same person would be a competent judge in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended or deviated from. If he were not-a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary administration, there 18 no reason to think he would be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had objections against the former, doubtless, it is highly supposable, he might think also, that he had objec- tions against the latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes, whenever we pretend, otherwise than from expe CHAP, II.j LIABLE TO OBJEOCYVIONS. 223 rience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of nature, it is evidently supposable beforehand that we should fall into as great, in pretending to judge, in like manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any more ground to expect that this - latter should appear to us clear of objections, than that the for- mer should. These observations relating to the whole of Christianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are m no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were to have been expected that God would naturally instruct us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what proportion, it were to be expected, that this supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information, it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own reason and experience; nor how far he would enable, and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself by which we are capable af attaining it, reason, would be given us at once, or gradually. In like manner, we are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge, it were to be expected, God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of his affording one; or how far, opr in what way, he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to whom he should originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live; and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it would be certain, or highly probable, or _ doubtful;* or whether all who should have any degree of in- struction from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same: or whether the scheme would be revealed at _ 3nce, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we are not in any sort able to judge, whether it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have been committed to writing; or left to ba _— OO — ea ee ee * See Chap. 6. 224 THE CREDIBILITY GF REVELATION [PART Tl handed down, and consequently corrupted by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as they will. But it may be said, “that a revelation in some of the above- mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, which was not com- mitted to writing, and thus secured against danger of corruption, would not have answered its purpose.’’? I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered all the purposes which it has now answered, and in the same degree; but it would have answered others, or the same in different degrees. And which of these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general go- vernment, we could not at all have determined beforehand. Now since it has been shown, that we have no principles of reason upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to be ex- pected revelation should have been left, or what was most suita- ble to the divine plan of government, in any of the fore-men- tioned respects; it must be quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any of them, against its being left in one way rather than another ; for this would be to object against things upon account of their being different from expectations, which have been shown to be without reason. And thus we see that the only question concerning the truth of Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation; not whether it be attended with every circumstance which we should have looked for: and con- cerning the authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to be; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulgated, as weak men are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should. And therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor any other things of the like kind, though they had been much more con- siderable in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority of the Scripture; unless the Prophets, Apostles, or our Lord, had promised, that the book, containing the divine revelation, should be secure from those things. Nor indeed can any objec- tions overthrow such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims. to be, since there are no objections against the morality of it,* but such as can show, that there is no proof of miracles wrougnt originally in attestation of it; no appearance of any thing — -—- * Page 230, & CHAP. IIT. | LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 225 miraculous in its obtaining in the world; nor any of prophecy. thet 1s, of events foretold, which human sagacity could not foresee. If it car be shown, that the proof alleged for all these, is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned But were it allowed, that the proof of any one, or all of them, is lower than is allowed; yet whilst any proof of them remains, revelation will stand upon much the same footing it does at present, as to all the purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence upon our behaviour. From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth remarking, that there ave several ways of arguing, which, though just with regard to other writings, are not applicable to Scripture ; at least not to the prophetic parts of it. We cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be the sense or intent of such a passage of Scripture, for if it had, it would have been expressed more plainiy, or have been represented under a more apt figure or hiercglyphic ; yet we may justly argue thus, with respect to common books. And the reason of this difference is very evident; that in Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in common books, how plainly it were to have been expected, what is the true sense should have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The only question is, what appearance there is that this is the sense? and scarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately it might have been expressed or figured ? “ But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of ali kinds, weaken external probable proof?” Doubtless. But to what practical purpose can this be alleged here, when it has been proved before,* that real internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony? and when it now has been made appear, that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here considering? as will farther appear from what follows. For though from the observations above made, it is manifest, that we are not in any sort competent judges, what supernatural instruction were to have been expected; and though it is self: evident, that the objections of an incompetent judgment, must be frivolous; yet it may be proper to go one step farther, and observe, that if men will be regardless of these things, and pre. a * Page 217, &c. 226 THE CREDIBILYY OF REVELATION [PART IL tend to judge of the Scriptures by preconceived expectations, the analogy of natme shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible they may, but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong objections against it, however really unexceptionable : for so, prior to experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances, and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which is afforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and to man- kind by these together with reason, matter of probable proof, and not of certain observation, it would be rejected as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and circumstances, of it. For instance: would it uot have been thought highly improbable, that men should have been so much more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws of matter, and the magni- tudes, paths, and revolutions of the heavenly bodies ; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many other things, in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in astronomy? How capricious and irregular a way of informa- tion, would it be said, is that of invention, by means of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in many things upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend ; that a man should by this faculty be made acquainted with a thing in an instant, wken perhaps he is thinking of somewhat else, which he has in vain been searching after, it may be, for years. So likewise the imperfections attending the only method, by which nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to each other, are innumerable. Language is in its very nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negli- gence; and so liable to it from design, that every man can deceive and betray by it. And to mention but one instance more, that brutes without reason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those respects, would be thought impossible. Yet it 1s cer- tain they do act with such superior foresight: whether it be their own indeed, is another question. [rom these things it is highly credible beforehand, that upon supposition God should afford men some additional instruction by revelation, it would — be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects which we should be apt to fancy we had great objections against the CHAP. III. | LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 227 credibility of Not are the objections against the Scripture, nor against Christianity in general, at all more or greater than the analogy of nature would beforehand,—not perhaps give ground to expect; for this analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation upon ;—but no more nor greater, than analogy would show it, beforehand, to be supposable and credible, that there might seem to lie against revelation. By applying these general observations to a particular objec- tion, it will be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to others of the like kind; and indeed to almost all objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence. It appears from Scripture, that as it was not unusual in the apostolic age for persons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts; so, some of those persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner: and this is made an objection against their being really miraculous. Now the foregoing observations quite remove this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of these gifts, for instance, that of tongues; it is to be sup- posed that he had the same power over this miraculous gift as he would have had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study, and use, as it ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he had over any other natural endowment. Consequently. he would use it in the same manner he did any other ; either regularly and upon proper occasions only, or irregularly and upon improper ones; according to his sense of decency, and his character of prudence. Where then is the objection ¢ Why, if this miraculous power was indeed given to the world to propagate Christianity, and attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected, that other sort of persons should have Been chosen te be invested with it; or that these should at the same time, have been endued with prudence; or that they should have been continually restrained, and directed im the exercise of it: i. e. that God should have miraculously inter posed, if at all, in a different manner or higher degree. But, from the observations made above, it is undeniably evident, that we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were to, have been expected he should miraculously interpose; upon supposition of his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course of Providence, are superior gifts of tiemory, eloquence, knowledge, and other talents of great 228 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART 0 influence, conferred only on persons of prudence and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use of them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly in our education, commonly given in a manner the most suited to recommend it; but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such instruction. One might go on to add, that there is a great resemblance between the light of nature and of revelation, in several other respects. Practical Christianity, or that faith and behaviour which renders a man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing; like the common rules of conduct, with respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct and particular knowledge of those things, the study of which the apostle calls “ going on unto perfection,” and of the prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natura! and even civil knowledge, may require very exact thought and careful consideration. The hindrances too, of natural and of supernatural light and knowledge, have been of the same kind. And as it is owned, the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood, so, if it. ever comes to be understood before the “restitution of all things,’ and without miraculous interpositicns, it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at; by the continuance and progress of learn- ing and of liberty, and by particular persons attending to, com- — paring, and pursuing, intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all improvements are made; by thoughtful men’s tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book which has_ been so long in the possession of mankind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For all the same phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, from which such great dis- eoveries in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age, were equally in the possession of mankind several thousand years before. And possibly it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, should open and ascertain the _ meaning of several parts of Scripture. . It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material respect; for that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence. But I have been speaking of the general instruction, which nature does or does not afford us. And besides, some parts of natural EE CHAP. IIT. ] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 229 knowledge, in the more common restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect, yet it might be abundantly supplied from the whole consfitution and course of nature; which shows that God does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantage and conse- quence they would be of to us. And this in general, with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together make out an analogy full to the point before us. But it may be objected still farther, and more generally— “The Scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in these respects where nature fails; in particular, to supply the defi- ciencies of natural light. Is it credible then, that so many ages should have been let pass, before a matter of such a sort, of so great and so general importance, was made known to mankind ; and then that it should be made known to so small a part of them? Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so very deficient, should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable to the like perversions; in short, lie open to all the like objections, as the light of nature itself?”* Without determining how far this in fact is so, I answer; it is by no means incredible that it might be so, if the light of nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to diseases; for which God, in his good-providence, has provided natural remedies. But remedies existing in nature have been unknown to mankind for many ages; are known but to few now; probably many valuable ones are not known yet. Great has been, and is, the obscurity and difficulty, in the nature and application of them. Circumstances seem often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely necessary. It is after long labour and study, and many unsuccessful endeavours, that they are brought to be as useful as they are; after high contempt and absolute rejec- tion of the most useful we have; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be endless. The best remedies too, when unskilfully, much more if dishonestly applied, may produce new diseases ; and with the rightest application, the success of them is often doubtful. In many cases, they are not at all effectual ; where they are, it is often very slowly: and the application of them, and the necessary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncom * Chap. 6. + Chap. 5. 230 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION |PART 11 monly, so disagreeable, that sorae will not submit to them ; and satisfy themselves with the excuse, that if they would, it is not certain whether it would be successful. And many persons, who l@bour under diseases, for which there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies which nature has provided for diseases, are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. And indeed the same principles of arguing, which would lead us to conclude, that they must be so, would lead us likewise to con- clude, that there could be no occasion for them; i. e. that there could be no diseases at all. And therefore, our experience that there are diseases, shows, that it is credible beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal ; because it shows, that’the principles upon which we should expect the contrary are fallacious. And now, what is the just consequence from all these things? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of divine revelation. For this would be to infer, that we are un- able to judge of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason cay, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence, of revela- tion. First, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture; i. e. not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, just, und good Being; for objections from hence have been now obviated ; but whether it contains things plainly contradictory te - wisdom, justice, or goodness ; to what the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed upon suppo- sitions, which would equally conclude, that the constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not. Indeed, there are some particular precepts in Scripture, given to partizular persons, requiring ac- tions which would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see, that all these are of such a kind as that the precept changes the whole nature of the caseand of the action ; and both constitutes and shows that not io be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must haye appeared and really have been so: which may well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it were com: manded, to cultivate the principles, and act from the spirit of OHAP. Tit. | LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 231 treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter the nature of the case, or of the action, in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an external action ; for instance, taking away the property or life of any, For men have no right to either life or property, but what arises solely from the grant of God: when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either; and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which without command would be immoral, must make an immoral habit, yet a few de- tached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts, which require not vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from their being offences; i. e. from their being liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes, and, perhaps, to mislead the weak and enthusi- astic. And objections from this head, are not objections against revelation, but against the whole notion of religion as a trial; and against the general constitution of nature. Secondly, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of revela- tion, and of the objections urged against that evidence; which shall be the subject of a following Chapter.* But the consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the question upon which the truth of Christianity depends, is scarce at all, what objections there are against its scheme, since there are none against the morality of it; but what objections there are against its evidence: or, what proof there remains of it, after due allowances made for the objections against that proof : because it has been shown, that the objections agains! Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evt: dence, are frivolous. For surely every little weight, if any a. all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied to the general constitution of nature, experience shows not to be conclusive: and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting treated of throughout this chapter. It 1s resolvable a * Chap. 7 232 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION, &c. [PART If into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us ta. think, that the Author of Nature would not act, as we experience he does; or would act, in such and such cases, aS we experience ne does not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear yet more evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected against, are justified, as shall be farther shown,* by distinct, particular, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of nature. But it is to be remembered, that as frivolous as objections of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed revelation is more consistent with itself, and has a more genera] and uniform tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could have been expected from enthusiasm, and political views; this is a presumptive proof of its not proceed- ing from them, and so of its truth; because we are competent judges, what might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views. * Chap. 4, latter part; and 5, 6. " 7 [In arguing that a revelation cannot have come from perfect wis- dom, because there are in it things which seem to us foolishness, we are arguing in the dark. But in arguing that it cannot have come from human fraud or enthusiasm, we are dealing with matters which we may perfectly understand, because coming within the sphere of our daily experience. See the latter argument admirably pressed in the Archbishop of Dublin’s Essays on the Peculiarities of the Chris- tian Religion, and on th? Omissions cf Scripture.—F.] aap. Iv | CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME, Xc. 233 CHAP HIV: Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Consiitution, um perfectly comprehended. Ir hath been now shown,* that the analogy of nature renders it highly credible beforehand, that supposing a revelation to be made, it must contain many things very different from what we should have expected, and such as appear open to great objec- tions; and that this observation, in good measure, takes off the Sorce of those objections, or rather precludes them. But it may be alleged, that this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating them; because it doth not show at all, that the things objected against can be wise, just, and good; much less, that it is credible they are so. It will therefore be proper to show this distinctly, by applying to these objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christianity, the answer above} given to the like objections against the constitution of nature; before we consider the par- ticular analogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against in the former. Now that which affords.a sufficient answer to objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the constitution of nature, is its being a constitution, a sys- tem, or scheme, imperfectly comprehended; a scheme, in which means are made use of to accomplish ends; and which is carried on by general laws. For from these things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but also to be credible, that those things which are objected against, may be censistent with wisdom, jus- tice, and goodness; nay, may be instances of them: and even that the constitution and government of nature may be perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be a scheme. and of the like kind, it is evident, the like objections against it must admit of the like answer. And, I. Christianity is a scheme quite beyond our comprehension #* In the foregoing Chapter. + Part i. Chap. 7, to which this all along refers. 20* * 234 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME [PART 11> The moral gov:rnment of God is exercised, by gradually con. ducting things so in the course of his providence, that every one, at length, and upon the whole, shall receive according to his deserts; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of providence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion with regard to mankind : consisting itself also of various parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been carry: ing on from the time the world came into its present wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a divine per- son, the Messiah; who is “to gather together in one, the chil- dren of God that are scattered abroad,’’* and establish “an everlasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness.”’+ And in order to it, after various manifestations of things, relating to this great and general scheme of Providence, through a succes- sion of many ages ;—(for “the Spirit of Christ, which was in the prophets, testified beforehand his sufferings, and the glory that should follow: unto whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us, they did minister the things which are now reported unto us by them which have preached the gospel ; which things the angels desire to look into :’’{)—after various dispensations, looking forward and preparatory.to this final sal- vation, ‘in the fulness of time,” when infinite Wisdom thought fit, He, “being in the form of God, made himself of no repu- tation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled. himself, and became obedient to death, even the death of the cross: wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name : that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.’’§ Parts likewise of this economy are the miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assist« ances given to good men; the invisible government which Christ at present exercises over his church; that which he himself refers to in these words, “Jn my Father’s house are many man- sions—TI go to prepare a place for you ;’’|| and his future return to “judge the world in righteousness,”’ and completely * John xi. 52. + 2 Pet. iii. 13. td Peters 2 Phils 6) shi: || Jchn xiv. 2. | : eHAP. Iv. | {MPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED 235 re-establish the kingdom of God. “For the Father judgeth no man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father.’* “ All power is given unto him in heaven and inearth.”’t “ And he must reign, till he hath put all his enemies under his feet. Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the king- dom to God, even the Father ; when he shall have put down ali rude, and all authority, and power. And when all things shall be subdued unto him,then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him, that put all things under him, that God may be all iv all.’’t Now little, surely, need be said to show, that this system, or scheme of things, is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The Scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And indeed - one cannot read a passage relating to this “great mystery of godliness,”’§ but what immediately runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it, as every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part of the Christian scheme which is revealed in Scriptnre, will find so mnch more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the purposes of judging and objecting, we know as little of it, as of the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much an answer to our objections against the perfection of one, as against the perfection of the other.|| If. Itis obvious too, that in the Christian dispensation, as. much as in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of to accomplish ends. And the observation of this -furnishes us with the same answer, to objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to objections of the like kind, against the con- stitution of nature. It shows the credibility, that the things objected against, how foolish** soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplishing the very best ends. And their appearing foolishness is no presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension.}} Iit. The credibility that the Christian dispensation may have been, all along, carried on by general laws,{t no less than the course of nature, may require to be more distinctly made out. Consider then, upon what ground it is we say, that the whole common course of nature is carried on according to general fore -_ — * John v.. 22, :23. 7 Matt. xxviii. 18. $1 Cor. xv. 25, 28. ¢1 Tim. iii. 16. || Fage 181, &c. *ET Cort Tr Page 184. it Pages 185, 186. 236 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME [FART 11 ordained laws. We know indeed, several of the general laws of matter; and a great part of the natural behaviour of living. agents is reducible to general laws. But we know in a manner nothing, by what laws storms and tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments of destruction to mankind. And the laws, by which persons born into the world at such a time and place, are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the laws, by which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases ; and by which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world; these laws are so wholly unknown to us, that we call the events which come to pass by them, accidental; though all reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance; and conclude, that the things which have this appear- ance, are the result of general laws, and may be reduced into them. It is then but an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that we can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general laws. And it is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it to be capable of being reduced into them; only from our seeing, that part is so. It is from our finding, that the course of nature, in some respects and so far, goes on by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest. And if that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it supposa- ble and credible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that God’s miraculous interpositions may have been, all along, in like manner, by general laws of wisdom. Thus, that mira- culous powers should be exerted at such times, upon such occa- zions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such persons, rather than others; that the affairs of the world being permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should just, at such a point, have a new direction given them by miraculous interpositions; that these interpositions should be exactly in such degrees and respects only; all this may have been by general laws. These laws are unknown indeed to us; but na more unknown than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as they are born, and others live to extreme old age, that one man is so superior to another in understanding ; with innumerable more things, which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules at all; though it is taken for granted, they are as much reducible to general ones as gravitae tion. Now, if the revealed dispensations of Providence, and UHAP. IV. ] IMPERFECTLY CO7APREHENDED. 237 miraculous interpositions, be by general laws, as well as God’s ordinary government in the course of nature, made known by reason and experience; there is no more reason to expect, that every exigence, as it arises, should be. provided for by these general laws of miraculous interpositions, than that every ex1- gence in nature should, by the general laws of nature: yet there might be wise and good reasons, that miraculous interpositions should be by general laws; and that these laws should not be bruken in upon, or deviated from, by other miracles. Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in nature, is owing to its being a scheme but in part madé known, and of such a certain particular kind in other respects. Now we see no more reason, why the frame and course of nature should be such a scheme, than why Christianity should. And that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible, that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part, and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, like to that of nature; so the credi- bility, that it may have been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course of nature, has been distinctly sroved.. And from all this it is beforehand credible that there night, I think probable that there would, be the like appearance f deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity, as in nature ; that is, that Christianity would be liable to the like objections, as the frame of nature. And these objections are answered by these observations concerning Christianity ; as the like objections against the frame of nature, are answered by the like observa. tions concerning the frame of nature. —__—_ THE objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of fact,* having, in general, been obviated in the preceeding chapter; and the same considered as made against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated in this; the next thing, according to the method proposed, is to show, that the principal] objections, in particular, against Christianity, may be answered by particular and full analogies in nature. And as one of them is made against the whole scheme of it together, as Just now described, I choose to consider it here, rather than in a diptinet * Page 220, &c. 238 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME [PART Il chapter by itself. The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel, is, “that it seems to suppose, God was reduced to the necessity of a long series of intricate means, in order to accom- plish his ends, the recovery and salvation of the world; in like sort as men, for want of understanding, or power, not being able to come at their ends directly, are forced to go round-about ways, and make use of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them.’’ Now every thing which we see shows the folly of this, considered as an objection against the truth of Christianity. For according to our manner of conception, God makes use of variety of means, what we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, for the accomplishment of all his ends. « Indeed, it is certain, there is somewhat in this matter quite beyond our comprehension; but the mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity. We know what we ourselves aim at as final ends; and what courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But we are greatly ignorant how fat things are considered by the Author of Nature, under the single notion of means and ends; so as that it may be said, this is merely an end, and that merely means, in his regard. And whether there be not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of conception, concerning this matter, somewhat con- tradictory, arising from our extremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to say. However, thus much is manifest, that the whole natural world and government of it, is a scheme, or system; not a fixed, but a progressive one: a scheme, in which the operation of various means takes up a great length of time, before the ends they tend to can be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower, is an instance of this; and so is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those of animals, though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature state. And thus rational agents who animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed to form, each his own manners and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience, and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only successive, as it must be of necessity, but one state of our life and being is appointed by God to be a preparation for another ; and that, to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one: Infancy to childhood ; childhood to youth; youth to mature age. Men are impatient, and for precipitating things; but the Author of Nature appears deliberate throughout his operations 3 accom — ee eee TY | q | : CHAP. IV. ] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 239 plishing his natural ends by slow successive steps.* And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which, frora the nature of it, requires various systems of means, as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution. Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates in the very same manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity, making one thing subservient to another; this to somewhat farther; -and so on, through a progressive series of means, which extend, both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course of nature, is as much an instance, as any part of the Christian dispensation. eee Ag ar Ee ae 3 RM Ss oe el ee *[** We shall find that all the great developments of the moral being have resulted in the advantage of society, and that all the great developments of the social condition have raised the character of humanity. The movement takes its peculiar character from which- ever of the two facts predominates and lends its lustre. . ‘Sometimes, long intervals of time, a thousand transformations and obstacles, occur before the second fact is developed, and comes as il were to complete the civilization which the first had commenced But close observation convinces us of the bond which unites them. The ways of Providence are not confined within narrow limits; he hurries not himself to display to-day the consequence of the principle that he yesterday laid down; he will draw it out in the lapse of ages, when the hour is come: and even according to our reasoning, logic is not the less sure because it is slow. Providence is unconcerned as to time; his march (if I may be allowed the simile) is like that*of the fabulous deities of Homer through space; he takes a step, and ages have elapsed. How long a time, how many events, before the regene- ration of the moral man by Christianity exercised its great and legitimate influence upon the regeneration of the social state! It has succeeded, however; who can at this day gainsay it?” —»(ivizor’s Lectures on Civilization in Europe, Lecture I.] 240 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART Ih. oe CHAP. V. Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by him. THERE is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity which has been more objected against than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of its parts. Yet, upon thorough con- sideration, there seems nothing less justly liable to it. For, I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined pre- sumption against the general notion of “a Mediator between God and man.’’* For we find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others; and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means. So that the j visible government which God exercises over the world, is by [ the instrumentality and mediation of others. And how far his ; invisible government be, or be not so, it is impossible to deter- | mine at all by reason. And the supposition that part of it is | so, appears, to say the least, altogether as credible as the con- trary. There is: then no sort of objection, from the light of — nature, against the general notion of a mediator between God — and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity, or as an ap- pointment in this dispensation; since we find by experience, — that God docs appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good _ and evil to us, the instruments of his justice and his mercy. — And the objection here referred to is urged, not against media- tion in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely against the whole notion itself — of a mediator at all. II. As we must suppose that the world is under the proper — moral government of God, or in a state of religion, before we © can enter into consideration of the revealed doctrine concerning — the redemption of it by Christ; so that supposition is here to be distinctly taken notice of. Now the divine moral govern- — * 1 Tim. ii. 5. CHAP. V.!* A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 24) ment which religion teaches us, implies, that the conseyuence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his appointment, is necessarily implied. But as it is not in any sort to be supposed that we are made acquainted with all the ends or reasons for which it is fit future punish- ments should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent misery should follow vice; and as we are alto gether in the dark, how or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the instrumentality of what ® means; there is no absurdity in supposing, it may follow in a * way analogous to that, in which many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present; poverty, sickness, infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may follow wickedness of course, as we speak, or in the way of natural consequence, from God’s original constitution of the world ; from the nature he has given us, and from the condition in which he places us; or in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural consequence, breaks his limbs, suppose; in the way of natural consequence of this, without help, perishes. Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing. it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the future punishments of wickedness may be in the way of natural consequence; as if this were taking the execution of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature. But they should remember, that when things come to pass according to the course of nature, this does not hinder them from being his doing, who is the God of Nature; and that the Scripture ascribes those punishments to divine justice, which are known to be natural ; and which must be called so, when distinguished from such as are miraculous. But after all, this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it must be admitted, that the future pun- ishment of wickedness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; it comes, for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there were a difference, it is allowable in the present case, to make od 242 THE APPOINTMENT OF . [PART It. this supposition, plainly not an incredible one, that future pun- . ishment may follow wickedness in the way of natural conse- quence, or according to some general laws of government already established in the universe. IfI. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the constitu- tion of nature, or appointments of Providence: the provision which is made, that all the bad natural consequences of men’s actions should not always actually follow; or that such bad con- sequences, as, according to the settled course of things, would inevitably have followed, if not prevented, should, in certain degrees, be prevented. We are apt presumptuously to imagine, © that the world might have been so constituted, as that there would not have been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary, we find the Author of Nature permits it. But then he has provided reliefs, and, in many cases, perfect remedies for it, after some pains and difficulties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the fruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the course of nature, would have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such remedies. And this is an im- stance both of severity and of indulgence, in the constitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now mentioned, of a man’s trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And though all were not, yet some of them might, by proper interposition, if not rejected; by another’s coming to the rash man’s relief, with his own laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case — required. Persons may do a great deal themselves towards pre- venting the bad consequences of their follies; and more may be done by themselves, together with the assistance of others, their — fellow-creatures; which assistance nature requires and prompts — us to. This is the general constitution of the world. Now sup- | pose it had been so constituted, that after such actions were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer, it should have been no more in human power to have ~ prevented that natural consequent misery, in any instance, than — it is in all; no one can say, whether such a more severe consti- — tution of things might not yet have been really good. But that, on the contrary, provision is made by nature, that we may _ and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our — follies; this may be called mercy, or compassion, in the original — constitution of the world; compassion as distinguished from — goodness in general. And, the whole known constitution and — | | | OHAP V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER, 243 course of things affording us instances of such compassion, it would be according to the analogy of nature to hope, that, how. ever ruinous the natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of God’s government over the universe, yet provision might be made, possibly might have been originally ‘made, for preventing those ruinous consequences from inevitably following ; at least from following universally, and in all cases. Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. “The gene- rality of mankind are so far from having that awful sense of things, which the present state of vice and misery and dark-’ hess seems to make but reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension, or thought at all, about this matter, any way, and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly con cerning it. But let us observe, what we experience to be, and what, from the very constitution of nature, cannot but be, the consequences of irregular and disorderly behaviour ;hoven or such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend, that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison between these irregularities, and the greater instances of vice, or a dissolute profligate dis- regard to all religion; if there be any thing at all in religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral agents, presumptu- ously to introduce that confusion and misery into the kingdom of God, which mankind have in fact introduced ; to blaspheme the sovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; to be in- Jurious to the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, the ereatures of God. Add that the effects of vice, in the present world, are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death: and upon putting all this together, it will appear, that as nO one can say, in what degree fatal the unprevented conse- quences of vice may be, according to the general rule of Divine government; so it is by no means intuitively certain, how far 8e Consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing, be ee consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there would be large ground to hope, that the universal govern. ment was not so severely strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal consequences prevented. Yet, IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we could do, would alone and of itself prevent them; prevent their follow 244 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART If ing, or being inflicted. But one would think, at least, it were impossible that the contrary should be thought certain. For we are not acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not informed of all the reasons, which render it fit that future pun- ishments should be inflicted; and therefore cannot know, whe- ther any thing we could do would make such an alteration, as to render it fit that they should be remitted. We do not know, what the whole natural, or appointed consequences of vice are, ner in what way they would follow, if not prevented; and therefore can in no sort say, whether we could do any thing, which would be sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us recollect the analogy of nature, or providence. Tor though this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive epinion upon, in this matter; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion, without any kind of eyi- dence urged by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider then: people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; they bring diseases upon themselves by excess; they incur the penalties of civil laws, and surely civil government is natural; will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving well for the future, alone and of itself, pre- vent the natural consequences of them? On the contrary, men’s natural abilities of helping themselves are often impaired ; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon several accounts, and in different ways: assistance which they would have had no occasion for, had it not been for their misconduct; but which, in the disadvantageous condition they have reduced themselves to, is absolutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. Now since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of this — world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the natural government of God, which however has a great deal moral in it; why is it not supposable, that this may be our case also, in our more important capacity, as under his perfect moral govern- ment, and having a more general and future interest depending (f we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment which God has annexed to vice; it is plainly credible, that behaving well for the time to come, may be—not useless, God forbid—but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment; or to put us in the condition which we should have been in, had we preserved our innocence CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER 24 And though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we reason concerning the Divine conduct, yet it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to ali our notions of government, as well as to what is, in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose that doing well for the future, should, in all cases, pre- vent all the judicial bad consequences of having done evil, ox all the punishment annexed to disobedience. And we have manifestly nothing from whence to determine, in what degree, nd in what cases, reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing that it would in some. And though the efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had rendcred themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they had forfeited, is now insisted upon, in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion, of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind. Upon the whole then; had the laws,-the general laws of God’s government, been permitted to operate, without any in- terposition in our behalf, the future punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or have any reason to think, must inevi- tably have followed, notwithstanding any thing we could have done to prevent it. Now, V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you please, revelation comes in; confirms every doubting fear which could enter into the heart of man concerning the future unpre- vented consequence of wickedness; supposes the world to be in a state of ruin, (a supposition which seems the very ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if not provable by reason, yet it is in nowise contrary to it); teaches us too, that the rules of Divine government are such, as not to admit of pardon im- mediately and directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it: but then teaches at the same time, what nature might justly have hoped, that the moral government of the universe was not so rigid, but that there was room for an interposition te avert the fatal consequences of vice; which therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, that the unknown laws of God’s more general government, no less than the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present, are compassionate, * as well as good, in the more general notion of goodness; and that he hath mercifully provided, that a ——— * Page 242, &e. , a aw oe 246 THE APPOIATMENT OF [PART 31. there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind, whatever that destruction unprevented would nave been. ‘ God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth,” not, to be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, “‘ that whosoever believeth in him should not perish ;’* gave his Son in the same way of goodness to the © world, as he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures, when without it, their temporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies; in the same way of goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely higher degree. And the Son of God “loved us, and gave himself for us,” with a love which he himself compares to that of human friendship; though, in this ease, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in such a manner, as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should otherwise have been executed upon them ; or in such a manner, as to prevent that punishment from actually following, which, according to the general laws of Divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such interposition.} If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, in- * John iii. 16. f It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed, or implied, in any thing said in this Chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general redemp- tion, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that several questions, which have been brought into the subject before us, and cetermined, are not in the least entered into here; questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rash- ness, contrary ways. For instance: Whether God could have saved the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government? And, had not Christ come into the world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses, in his prayer, asserts repentance was not appointed? The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous; and neither of them can properly be answered, without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the case. And perhaps, the very inquiry, What would have followed, if God had noi done as he has? may have in it some very great impropriety; and ~ ought not to be carried on any farther, than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate conception of things. ‘ 4 ; SHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 247 eonsistent with Divine goodness, a second, I am persuaded, will entirely remove that appearance. For were we to suppose the constitution of things to be such, as that the whole creation must have perished, had it not been for somewhat which God had appointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin; even this supposition would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. But still it may be thought, that this whole manner of treating the subject before us, sup- poses mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us inte this state. Whoever will consider the manifold miseries, _ and the extreme wickedness of the world; that the best have great wrongnesses within themselves, which they complain of, and endeavour to amend; but that the generality grow more profligate and corrupt with age; that heathen moralists thought the present state to be a state of punishment; and what might be added, that the earth our habitation, has the appearance of being a ruin; whoever, I say, will consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he has little reason to object against the Scripture account, that mankind is in a state of degradation ; against this being the fact: how difficult soever he may think it to account for, or even to form a distinct concep- tion of, the occasions and circumstances of it. But that the érime of our first parents was the occasion of our being placed n a more disadvantageous condition, is a thing throughout, and particularly analogous to what we see, in the daily course of natural providence ; as the recovery of the world, by the inter- position of Christ, has been shown to be so in general. VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the redemption of the world, or his office as Mediator, in the largest sense,*between God and man, is thus represented to us in the Scripture : “ He ts tke light of the world ;’’* the revealer of the will of God in the most eminent sense: he is a propitiatory sacrifice ;f the “ Lamb of God ;”{ and as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is styled our High-priest.§ And, which seems of*peculiar weight, he is described beforehand, in the Old Testa- * John i. and viii. 12. __ 7 Bom. iii. 25, and v. 11; 1 Cor. v. 7; Ephes. v. 2; 1 John ii, 2: Matth. xxvi. 28. { John i. 29, 36, and throughout the Book of Revelation. ¢ Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews. 248 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART ITI. ment, under the same characters of a priest, and an expiatory victim.* And whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by © way of allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the apostle, on the contrary, affirms, that “the law was a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things ;”+ and that the “priests that offer gifts according to the Law—serve tinto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. For sce,’ saith he, “that thou make all things according ta the pattern showed to thee in the mount ;"T i. e. the Levitical priesthood was a shadow of the priesthood of Christ, in like manner as the tabernacle made by Moses was according to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals: of the former of which, the Levitical priesthood was a type; and of the latter, the tabernacle made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allu- sions to the great and final atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; and not that this was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express and determinate, than the following passage: “It is not possible that the bloo.l of bulls and of goats should take away sin. Vherefore, when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering,” 1. ec. of bulls and of goats, “thou wouldst not, but a body hast ihou prepared me—Lo, I come to do thy will, O God.—By which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all.”§ And to add one passage more of the like kind: “ Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many ; and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, without sin ;” i. e. without bearing sin, as he did at his first coming, by being an offering for it; without having sur tniguilies again laid upon him, without being any more a ein-offering :—“ unto them that look for him shall he appear ike second time, without sin unto salvation.’’|| Nor do the in- spired writers at all confine themselves to this manner of speak- ing concerning the satisfaction of Christ, but declare an efficacy in what he did and suffered for us, additional to, and beyond * Isa, liii.; Dan. ix. 24; Psal. ox. 4, + Heb. x. 1. t Heb, viii. 4, 5. @ Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10 \| Heb. ix. 28. . CHAP. V. ] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 245 mere instruction, example, and government, in great variety of expression: “ That Jesus should die Jor that nation,’ the Jews; “and not for that nation only, but that also,” plainly by the efficacy of his death, “he should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad.:’’* that “he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust :’ that “he gave his life, himself a ransom :’T that “we are bought, bought with a price: § that “he redeemed us with his blood: redeemed us ‘from the curse of the law, being made a curse Jor us 2” || that “he %s our advocate, intercessor, and propitiation 27 that “he was made perfect (or consummate) through sufferings ; and being thus made perfect, he became the author of salva- tions” ** that “ God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself, by the death of his Son by the cross j not imputing their trespasses unto them 2’ +f and, lastly, that « through death he destroyed him that had the power of death.” tt Christ, then, having thus “humbled himself, and become obe- dient to death, even the death of the cross, God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name ; hath given all things into his hands ; hath com- mitted all judgment unto him 3 thet all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father.” §§ For, « worthy ts the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing ! Jind every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, heard I saying, Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb; for ever and ever !’’ ||\| These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express the chief parts of Christ's office, as mediator between God and Iman, so far, I mean, as the nature of this his office is revealed ; and it is usually treated of by divines under three heads, * John xi. 51, 52. f 1 Pet. iii. 18. { Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45; 1 Tim. ii. 6. @ 2 Pet. ii. 1; Rey. xiv. 4; 1 Cor. vi. 20. | 1 Pet. i. 19; Rev. v. 9; Gal. iii, 13. ] Heb. vii. 25; 1 John ii. W2: ** Heb. ii. 10, v. 9. Tf 2 Cor. v.19; Rom. vy, 10; Eph. ii. 16. Ti Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, RXxili, 24. #3 Phil. ii. 8, 9; John iii. 35, and v, 22, 23, |} Rev. v. 12, 12 250 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART I}. First, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: “that Pro. phet that should come into the world,’* to declare the divine will. He published anew the law of nature which men had corrupted ; and the very knowledge of which, to some degree, was lost among them. He taught mankind, taught us authori- tatively, to “live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world,’ in expectation of the future judgment of God. He confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional evidence of it, the evidence of testimony. He distinctly revealed the manner in which God would be wor- shipped, the efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punish- ments of a future life. Thus he was a prophet, in a sense in which no other ever was. ‘To which is to be added, that he set us a perfect “example, that we should follow his steps.” Secondly, He has a “kingdom, which is not of this world.’ He founded a church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of religion, and invitation to it; which he promised to be with always, even to the end. He exercises an invisible government over it, himself, and by his Spirit; over that part of it which is militant here on earth, a government of discipline, “for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying of his body ; lill we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.’{ Of this church, all persons scat- tered over the world, who live in obedience to his laws, are members. For these he is gone to prepare a place, and will come again to receive them unto himself, that where he 1s, there they may be also; and reign with him for ever and ever 3§ and likewise “to take vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not his gospel.’?|| , Against these parts of Christ’s office, I find no objections but what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter. Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and made atonement for the sins of the world; which is mentioned last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expi- ation were commanded the Jews, and obtained amongst most other nations, from tradition, whose original probably was reve- lation. And they were continually repeated, both occasionally, and at the returns of stated times; and made up great part of * John vi. 14. + Page 200. Jt Eph. iv. 12, 138. @ John xiv. 2, 8. Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15. || 2 Thess. i. 8. CHAP. V. | A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 251 the external religion of mankind. “ But now once in the end of the world Christ appeared, to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.’’* And this sacrifice was in the highest degree, and with the most extensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree, and with regard to some persons. How and in what particular way, it had this efficacy, there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to explain; but I cannot find that the Scripture has explained it. We seem to be very much in the dark, concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be made, i. e. pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to complain for want of farther information, unless he can show his claim to it. Some have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of what Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has , authorized ; others, probably because they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, and confining his office as Re- deemer of the world, to his instruction, example, and government of the church. Whereas, the doctrine of the gospel appears to — be, not only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but ren- dered it of the efficacy which it is, by what he did and suffered for us: that he obtained for us the benefit of having our repent- ance accepted unto eternal life: not only that he revealed to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it; but moreover, that he put them into this capa- city of salvation, by what he did and suffered for them; put us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by performing the conditions upon which it is offered on our part, without disputing how it was procured on his. For, VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a future state would have followed wickedness in this; nor in what manner it would have been inflicted, had it not been pre- vented; nor all the reasons why its infliction would have been a ————an * Heb. ix. 26. 20% THE APPOINTMENT OF | PART 0 needful; nor the particular nature of that state of hajpiness which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples; and since we are ignorant how far anything we could do, would, alone and of itself, have been effectual to prevent that punishment to which we were obnoxious, and recover that happiness which we had forfeited ; it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently to revelation, whether a mediator was or was not necessary to obtain those ends; to prevent that future punishment, and bring man- kind to the final happiness of their nature. And for the very same reasons, upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges, antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his office, or the several parts of which it consists: of what was fit and requisite to be assigned him, in order to accom- plish the ends of divine Providence in the appointment. And from hence it follows, that to object against the expediency or usefulness of particular things revealed to have been done or suffered by him, because we do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with than this absurdity. But if it be acknowledged beforehand, that we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of Christ’s mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown positively, not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be accomplished; or that it is in itself unreasonable. And there is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive kind: that the doc- trine of his being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents God as being indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the guilty. Now from the foregoing observations we may see the extreme slightness of all such objections, and (though it is most certain all who make them do not see the consequence) that they conclude altogether as much against God’s whole original constitution of nature, and whole daily course of divine Providence, in the. government of the world, i. e. against the whole scheme of Theism and the whole notion of religion, as against Christianity. For the world is a consti- tution, or system, whose parts have a mutual reference to each other; and there is a scheme of things gradually carrying, on, called the course of nature, to the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in varlous ways to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural providence, it is appointed that —T Ss - eS ge ae ey Pes, ae a CHAP. V.]| A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 253 innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objestion as the instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater importance of that appoint- ment of Christianity which is objected against, does not hinder bat it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same kind with what the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural providence, than against Christianity; because under the former, we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated, whether we will or not, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. The world’s being under the righteous govern- ment of God does indeed imply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one shall receive according to his personal deserts : and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine government. But during the progress, and for aught we know, even in order to the com- pletion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and absolutely necessary. Men, by their follies, run them- selves into extreme distress; into difficulties which would be absolutely fatal to them, were it not for the interposition and assistance of others. God commands by the law of nature that we afford them this assistance, in many cases where we cannot do it without very great pains, and labour, and sufferings to ourselves. And we see in what variety of ways one person’s sufferings contribute to the relief of another; and how, or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, from the constitution and laws of nature, which come under our notice : and being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So that the reason of their insisting upon objections of the fore- going kind, against the satisfaction of Christ, is either that they do not consider God’s settled and uniform appointments as his appointments at all, or else they forget that vicarious punish» rent is a providential appointment of every day’s experience: and then, from their being unacquainted with the more general laws of nature, or divine government over the world, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, they conclude his sufferings could not contribitte to it any other way. .. And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemption—its tendency to vindicate the authority of 22 254 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART IL God’s laws, and deter his creatures from sin; this has never yet been answered, and is, I think, plainly unanswerable: though T am far from thinking it an account of the whole of the case. But without taking this into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations above made, that this objection is not an objection against Christianity, but against the whole general constitution of nature. And if it were to be considered as an objection against Christianity, or, considering it as it is, an objec- tior against the constitution of nature, it amounts to no more in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment cannot be hecessary or expedient, because the objector does not discern it to be so; though he must own that the nature of the case is such, as renders him incapable of judging whether it be so or not; or of seeing it-to be necessary, though it were so. It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men, to find people arguing in this manner, objecting against the credi- bility of such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or expediency of them. For though it is highly right, and the most pious exercise of our under- standing, to inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of God’s dispensations; yet when those reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are, against things in Christianity analogous, or like to those natural dispensations of Providence, which are matter of expe- rience. Let reason be kept to; and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ, can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up: but let not such poor creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that we do not sce the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call this reasoning ; and, which still farther heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we are not actively concerned in. _ For it may be worth mentioning, : Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to have the like information concerning the Divine conduct, as concerning our own duty. God instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, but experience, which instructs us,) what good or bad consequences will follow from our acting in such and such CHAP. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 255 manners; and by this he directs us how we are to behave our- selves. But, though we are sufficiently instructed for the sommon purposes of life, yet it is but an almost infinitely small part of natural providence which we are at all let into. The case is the same with regard to revelation. ‘The doctrine of a Mediator between God and man, against which it is objected, that the expediency of some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was done on God’s part in the appoint- ment, and on the Mediator’s in the execution of it. For what is required of us, in consequence of this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none can complain for want of in- formation. The constitution of the world, and God’s natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as the Christian dispensation. Yet under the first, he has given men all things pertaining to life; and under the other, all things pertaining unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is nothing hard to be accounted for, in any of the common precepts of Christianity ; though if there were, surely a Divine command is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations to obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive institutions are manifestly neces- sary to keep up and propagate religion amongst mankind. And our duty to Christ, the internal and external worship of him, this part of the religion of the gospel manifestly arises out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and dominion, ana the relation which he is revealed to stand in to us.* ee # Page 204, &o. 256. REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: {PAR* ‘NX CHAP... VI. Of the Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the sup posed Deficiency in the Proof of it. Ir has been thought by scme persons, that if the evidence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argu- ment against it; because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And the objection against revelation, from its not being universal, is often insisted upon as of great weight. Now the weakness of these opinions may be shown, by ob- serving the suppositions on which they are founded, which are really such as these:—that it cannot be thought God would have bestowed any favour at all upon us, unless in the degree which we think he might, and which, we imagine, would be most to our particular advantage; and also, that it cannot be thought he would bestow a favour upon any, unless he bestowed the same upon all: suppositions which we find contradicted, not by a few instances in God’s natural government of the world, but by the general analogy of nature together. Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against it, should be put upon considering, what that evidence indeed 1s, which they act upon with regard to their temporal interests. Hor, it is not only extremely difficult, but in many cases abso- lutely impossible, to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side the overplus is. There are the like difficulties and impossibilities, in making the due allowances for a change of temper and taste, for satiety, — disgusts, ill health; any of which render men incapable of en- joying, after they have obtained, what they most eagerly de- sired. Numberless too are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death, which may even probably disappoint the best concerted schemes; and strong objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed or answered, but which scem overbalanced by reasons on tke other side; sc as that the ecer- OQUAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 257 tain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by every one, thought justly disregarded, upon account of the appearing greater advantages in case of success, though there be but little probability of it. Lastly, Kvery one observes our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false appearances of things; and this danger must be greatly increased, if there be a strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to favour the deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof, wherein our tem- poral interest really consists; what are the most probable means of attaining it; and whether those means will eventually be successful. And numberless instances there are, in the daily course of life, in which all men think it reasonable to engage in pursuits, though the probability is greatly against succeeding ; and to make such provision for themselves, as it is-supposable they may have occasion for, though the plain acknowledged probability is, that they never shall. Then those who think the objection against revelation, from its light not being uni- versal, to be of weight, should observe, that the Author of Nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon some, which he does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed, he appears to bestow all his gifts, with the most promiscuous variety, among creatures of the same species: health and strength, capacities of prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and all external advantages. And as there are not any two men found of exactly like shape and features, so, it is probable, there are not any two of an ex- actly like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertain- ties and varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world; and there is such a thing as a prudent and impru- dent institution of life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that his natural government. As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been universal, and as they have been afforded to a greater or less part of the world, at different times, so likewise at different times, both revelations have had different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during the succession of prophets, i. e. from Moses till after the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth of their religion, than those who had lived in the interval between the last mentioned period and the coming of Christ. And the first Christians had higher eviderce of the -miraclea Zag 258 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART YL wrought .n attestation of Christianity than what we have now. They had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of much greater force in way of argument, than many think, of which we have very little remaining; I mean, the presumptive proof of its truth, from the influence which it had upon the lives of the generality of its professors. And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it, which they could not have, from the conformity between the prophetic history, and the state of the world, and of Christianity. And farther : if we were to suppose the evidence which some have of religioz to amount to little more than seeing that it may be true, but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule of life; others to have a full conviction of the truth of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and others severally to have all the intermediate degrees of religious light and evidence, which lie between these two—if we put the case, that for the present it was intended revelation should be ne more than a small light, in the midst of a world greatly over- spread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and darkness; that certain glimmerings of this light should extend, and be directed, to remote distances, in such a manner as that those who really partook of it should not discern from whence it originally came ; that some, in a nearer situation to it, should have its light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted ; and that others should be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet, that even to these it shonld be no more than a light shining in a dark place: all this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the conduct of Providence, in the distribution of its other blessings. If the fact of the case really were, that some have received no light at all from the Scripture; as many ages and countries in the heathen world: that others, though they have, by means of it, had essential or natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to their considera- tion; and the ancient Persians and modern Mahometans may possibly be instances of people in a situation somewhat like to this: that others, though they have had the Scripture laid betore them as of divine revelation, yet have had it with the system and evidence of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with false miracles, as te CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 259 seave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state of some thoughtful meu in most of those nations who call themselves Christian; and lastly, that others have had Christianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence, as persons in countries and churches of civil and of Chistian liberty ; but however that even these persons are left in great ignorance in many respects, and have by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to teach them their duty, and encourage them in the careful discharge of it: [ say, if we were to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the degrees of moral and religious light and evidence, which were intended to be afforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is their situation in their moral and religious capacity, there would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtful- ness, and uncertainty, in all these varieties and supposed disad- vantages of some in comparison of others, respecting religion, ‘at may be paralleled by manifest ayalogies in the natural dis- pensations of Providence at present, and considering ourselves merely in our temporal capacity. Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would, seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we would really keep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably with ; instead of forgetting this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in this various economy of Provi- dence, would be lost, if we would keep in mind, that every merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be required of any one, than what might have been equitably expected of him, from the circumstances in which he was placed; and not what might have been expected, had he been placed in other circum- stances: 1. e. in Scripture language, that every man shall be accepted “according to what he had, not according to what he had not.”* This, however, doth not by any means imply, that all persons’ condition here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity. And Providence designing to place some in greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge, is no more a reason why they should not endeavour to get out of that darkness, and others to bring them out of it, than why ignorant and slow eee. in matters of other knowledge, should not endeavour tc sarn, or should not be instructed. -~ — es * 2 Cor. viii. 12. 260 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART 38] {t is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Authoi of Nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures, dis- posed him also to place creatures of like kinds in different situa: tions; and that the same principle which disposed him to make creatures of different moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of like moral capacities in different religious situations: and even the same creatures, in different periods of their being. And the account or reason of this, is also most probably the ae- count, why the constitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for a considerable part of that duration in which they are living agents, are not at all sub- jects of morality and religion ; but grow up to be so, and grow up to be so meve and more, gradually from childhood to mature age. What, in particular, is the account or reason of these things, we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so very little even of our own case. Our present state may pos- sibly be the eonsequence of, somewhat past, which we are wholly ignorant of; 9s it has a reference to somewhat to come, of which we know scevee any more than is necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in its notion, implies variety : and so complicated a2 one as this world, very great variety. So that were revelation auiversal, yet from men’s different capacities of understanding, from the different lengths of their lives, their different educatiors, and other external circumstances, and from their difference of temper and bodily constitution ; their religious situations would bo widely different, and the disadvantage of some in comparisor of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. And the true account, whatever it be, why man- kind, or such a part of mankind, are placed in this condition of ignorance, must be supposed also the true account of our farther ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why, or whence it is, that they are placed in this coadition. But the following practical reflections may deserve the serious consideration of those per- sons, who think the circumstances of mankind, or their own, in the fore-mentioned respects, ground of complaint. First, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may constitute one particular part of come men’s trial in the religious sense : as it gives scope for a virtuous exercise, or vicious negleet, of their understanding, in examining or not examining into that evidence. There seems no possible reasn 40 be given, why we may not be in a state of moral prokatiun, wit reyes | to the ox. CMAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. zO1 ercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in common affairs. ‘The former is as much a thing within our power and choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid down for certain, that the same character, the same inward principle, which, after a man is con- vinced of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the pre- cepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an examination of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his thoughts ; and that in the latter state, his examination would be with an impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportion- able to what his obedience is in the former. And as inatten- tion, negligence, want of all serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and such importance, when offered to men’s con- sideration, is, before a distinct conviction of its truth, as real immoral depravity and dissoluteness, as neglect of religious practice after such conviction; so active solicitude about it, and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before such convic- tion, is as really an exercise of a morally right temper, as is re- ligious practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and inference; that a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, col- lected with heedful attention to premises: this as much consti- tutes religious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, oppor- tunity, for right and wrong behaviour, as any thing whatever does. And their manner of treating this subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their heart, and is an exertion of it. Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not so much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, the evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest supposable degree; even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them into a general state of probation, in the moral and religious sense. or, suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether such a person had not done him the greatest favour; or, whether his whole temporal interest did not depend | upon that person; no one, who had any sense of gratitude and of prudence, could possibly consider himself in the same situa- tion, with regard to such person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just to say, that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say, the situations now mentioned would leave a man ns entirely at liberty, in point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he certain he had received no favour from such * 262 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART IL, person, or that he no way depended upon him. And thus, though the evidence of religion which is afforded to some men, should be little more than that they are given to see the system of Christianity, or religion in general, to be supposable and cre- dible, this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical appre- hension that it may be true. And even this will afford matter of exercise, for. religious suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution and self-government; because the apprehension that religion may be true, does as really lay nien under obligations, as a full conviction that it is true. It gives occasion and motives to consider farther the important subject ; to preserve attentively upon their minds a general implicit sense that they may be under divine moral government, an.awful solicitude about reli- gion, whether natural or revealed. Such apprehension ought to turn men’s eyes to every degree of new light which may be had, from whatever side it comes, and induce them to refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live in the conscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness; for this the very nature of the case forbids; and to treat with highest reverence a matter upon which their own whole interest and being, and the fate of nature depends. This behaviour, and an active endeavour to maintain within themselves this temper, is the business, the duty, and the wisdom of those persons, who complain of the doubtfulness of religion; is what they are under the most proper obligations to: and such behaviour is an exer- tion of, and has a tendency to improve in them, that character, which the practice of all the several duties of religion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in others; others, I say, to whom God has afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance of veligion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be said in general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly, may see there is not near so much difference, as is commonly imagined, between what ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons who are fully convinced of its truth, and to those who have only a serious doubting apprehension that it may be true, Their hopes, and fears, and obligations, will be in various degrees; but, as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the same, so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they are bound to do and to refrain from, is net so very unlike. Sap eee eee ee © ne ees A = eS Ce oe ee CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. © 263 It is to be observed, farther, that from a character of under. standing, or a situation of influence in the world, some persons have it in their power to do infinitely more harm or good, by setting an example of profaneness and avowed disregard to ali religion; or, on the contrary, of a serious, though perhaps doubt- ing, apprehension of its truth, and of a reverend regard to it, under this doubtfulness, than they can do by acting well or ill in all the common intercourses amongst mankind; and conses quently they are most highly accountable for a behaviour, which, they may easily foresee, is of such importance, and in which there is most plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as is pretended. The ground of these observations, and that which renders them just and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies some degree of evidence for that of which we doubt. For no person . would be in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced, which should accidentally come into his thoughts, and of which he had no evidence at all. And though in the case of an even chance, and where consequently we were in doubt, we should in common language say, that we had nv evidence at all for either side; yet that situation of things, which renders it an even chance and no more, that such an event will happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is such evidence on both sides of a question,* as leaves the mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases, there is no more evidence on the one side than on the other; but there is (what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the truth of a number of facts which come into one’s thoughts at random. And thus, in all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, lower degrees of evidence, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher still. Any one, who will a little attend to the nature of evidence, will easily carry this observation on, and see, that between no evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords ground of doubt, there are as many intermediate degrees, as there are between that degree which is the ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we have not faculties to distinguish these degrees of evidence, with any sort of exactness, yet, In proportion as they are discerned, they ought to influence our practice. For it is ag real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be influenced ooo — * Tntroduction. 264 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL : [PART WV. in practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned, as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in all sub jects which men consider, they discern the lower as well as the higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, propor- tionably to their fairness and honesty. And as in proportion to defects in the understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases $a ai proportion to the corruption of the heart, they seem capakle of satisfying themselves with having no regard in practice to evi- dence acknowledged real, if it be not overbearing. From these things it must follow, that doubting concerning religion implies such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the obliga- tions before-mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all their behaviour. 7 Fhirdly, The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of zomplaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which others are placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state a more improving state of discipline,* than it would be otherwise ; as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens it more than an easier or less attentive exercise of it could. Now speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of the very same nature with these external temptations. For the evidence of religion not appearing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to reject it, without any consideration at all; and therefore requires such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such temptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has been in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind, of explaining away, and deceit- fully hiding from itself, that evidence which it might see : and also for men’s encouraging themselves in vice, from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least, that these hopes are uncertain: in like manner as the common tempt * Part i. chap. 6. — A — ee er ES ee a ee CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. - 268 ation to many instances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with impunity; i. e. the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that sucn foolish behaviour will thus end in infamy aud ruin. On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evi- dence of religion calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themselves up to the proper infuence of any real evidence, though doubtful; and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though under some uncer. taimty, whether the government in the universe may not possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. And in gene- ral, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to wrong, and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as the greater ones; temptation, I say, as such, and of every kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional to what would otherwise have been wanting, cannots but be an additional discipline and improvement of virtue, as well as pro- bation of it, in the other senses of that word.* So that the very same account is to be given, why the evidence of religion should be left in sucha manner, as to require, in some, an atten- tive, solicitous, perhaps painful, exercise of their understanding about it; as why others should be placed in such circumstances, as that the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, and pains; or why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to some; as why external difficulties and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others. ‘The same account also is to be given, why some should be exercised with temptations of both these kinds, as why others sLould be exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were. Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing that the speculative difficulties in which the evidence of religion is in- volved, may make even the principal part of some persons’ trial. For as the chief temptations of the generality of the world, are the ordinary motives to injustice or unrestrained pleasure; 01 to live in the neglect of religion, from that frame of mind, which renders many persons almost without feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the object of their senses; so there ave ee ee * Part i. chap. 4, and page 163. 23 266 - REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: | PART IL other persons without this shallowness of temper, persons of 2 ‘leeper sense as to what is invisible and future, who not only see, hut have a general practical feeling, that what is to come will be present, and that things are not less real, for their not bemg the objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the common course of life. Now when these latter persons have a distinct, full conviction of the truth of religion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it ig to them unavoidable, unless they will do a constant violence to their own minds; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise in a higher degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they should give some further manifesta- tion™ what is their moral character, to the creation of God, than such a practice of it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be-the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved; and their principal and dis- tinguished trial may be, how they will behave under and with respect to these difficulties. Circumstances in men’s situation in their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure to this; respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world, as that their chief difficulty, with regard to conduct, is not the, doing what is pru- dent when it is known; for this, in numberless cases, Is as easy as the contrary: but to some, the principal exercise is, recollec- tion, and being upon their guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of those about them; against false appearances of rea« son and prudence. ‘To persons in some situations, the principal — exercise, with respect to conduct, is attention, in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really the reasonable and qi prudent part to act. | But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that men’s dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion, is not owing to their neglects or prejudices; it must be added, on the other _ ce ae * Page 164. cneeeemnetenelient mene ie ne OHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 20cm hand, in all common reason, and as what the truth of the case tlainly requires should be added, that such dissatisfaction pos- sibly may be owing to those, possibly may be men’s own fault. for, . If there are any persons who never set themselves heartily, and in earnest, to be informed in religion; if there are any, who secretly wish it may not prove true, and are less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, and more to objections, than to what is said in answer to them; these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom themselves to consider this subject usually in the way of mirth and sport; if they attend to forms and representations, and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the real things intended by them, (for signs often can be no more than inadequately expressive of the things signified) ; or if they substitute human errors in the room of divine trath ‘ why may not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that evidence, which really is seen by thers ; a5 a like turn of mind, with respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right understanding, in matters of common speculation and practice, which more fair and attentive minds attain to? And the effect will be the same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of religion, and their indirect behaviour with regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness or from the grosser vices; or whether it be owing to this, that forms, and figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, administer occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far, ag to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general, levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice, do hinder us from being rightly informed with respect to common things; and they may, in like manner, and perhaps in some farther providential manner, with respect to moral and religious subjects; may hinder evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it is. The Seripture* - * Dan. xii. 10. See also Isaiah xxix. 13, 14. Matt. vi. 23, and xi. 25, and xiii. 11, 12. John iii. 19, and v. 44. 1 Cor. ii. 14, and 2 Cor. iv. 4. 2 Tim. iii. 18, and that affectionate, as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, ‘‘He that hath ears ta 4 268 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART IL. does declare, that every one shall not understand. And it makes no difference by what providential conduct this comes to pass ; whether the evidence of Christianity was, originally and with design, put and Jeft so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations, should not see it, and that honest-mindea persons should ; or whether it comes to pass by any other means. _ Harther: the general proof of natural religion and of Chris- tianity, does, I think, lie level to common men: even those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age, is taken up with providing, for themselves and their families, the common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life; those, I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof, or attending to it. Common men, were they as much in earnest about religion as about their temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evidence, that there is a God who governs the world : and they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and account- able creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many appearing completions of prophecy. But though this proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be rtin up into difficulties ; which, however, persons who are capable, not only — SS Eee hear, let him hear.” Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in | these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as tosay, that — the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, — for this very purpose: Ut cta sermo Livangelit tanquam lapis esset Lydius — ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur. De Ver. R. C. lib. 2, towards the end. [We give the passage from Grotius in full: «If there be. anyone who is not satisfied with the arguments hitherto alleged for | the truth of the Christian religion, but desires more powerful ones, he ought to know that different things must have different kinds of ‘. proof; one sort in mathematics, another in the properties of bodies, — another in doubtful matters, and another in matters of fact. And @ we are to abide by that whose testimonies are void of all Suspicion: if this be not admitted, not only all history is of no further use, and _ a great part of physic; but all that natural affection, which is between q parents and children, is lost, who can be known no other way. And | it is the will of God, that those things which he would have us believe, yo as that faith should be accepted from us as obedience, should not — be so very plain, as those things we perceive by our senses, and by — demonstration; but only so far as is sufficient to procure the belief, — and persuade a man of the thing, who is not obstinately bent against — it: So that the gospel is, as it were, a touchstone, to try men’s honest dispositions by.’’] a oe en CHAP. VI-j SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PRUOGF. 269 of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable also of scelng | through; i. e. not of clearing up and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we are rot capable with respect to any one thing in nature; but capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion, with regard to these objections, which cannot be the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and from the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as time and attention, to see how the evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. Now if persons who have picked up these objections from others, and take for granted they are of weight, upon the word _ of those from whom they received them, or by often retailing of them, come to see, or fancy they see, them to be of weight, will not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a compe- tent degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and atten- tion to the subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such information: in this case, they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error; in the saine way as they must with regard to common sciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed in them. But still perhaps it will be objected, that if a prince or com- mon master were to send direetions to a servant, he would take care that they should always bear the certain marks who they came from, and that their sense should be always plain; so as that there should be no possible doubt, if he could help it, con- cerning the authority or meaning of them. Now the proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to him who is the governor of the world; and particularly, that he does not afford us such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and interests, as experience abundantly shows. _ How. ever, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature of religion. Tor, the reason why a prince-would give his directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such an external action should be done, without concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it is done; i. e. he re- gards only the external event, or the things’ being done, and net at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the action. Where- as, the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in action 23 * 270 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: - [PART II. itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if the prince be supposed to regard only the action; i. e. only to desire to exercise, or In any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant, he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. It may be proper to add, that the will of God, re- specting morality and religion, may be considered, either as ab- solute, or as only conditional. If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act virtuously in such given circumstances; not that we should be brought to act so, by his changing of our circumstances. And if God’s will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, to do or to con- tradict his will; which is a most weighty consideration. Or his will may be considered only as conditional,—that if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded ; if otherwise, punished : of which conditional will of the Author of Nature, the whole constitution of it affords most certain instances. Upon the whole: that we are in a state of religion necessarily implies, that we are in a state of probation: and the credibility of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it is, in those respects which are above objected against. There seems no pretence, from the reason of the thing, to say, that the trial cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably to certain information, or such as admits no room for doubt ; so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or — from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty; and since the two former are to be put to the same account, as difficulties | in practice; men’s moral probation may also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by impartial considera- — tion, and afterwards whether they will act as the case requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubtful. And this, we find by experience, is frequently our probation,* in our temporal capacity. For the information which we want, with regard to our worldly interests, is by no means always given us _ of course, without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward secret prejudices; and algo to —— the deceit of others. So that to be able to judge what is the -—-—__..-_—. * Pages 112, 264, &e. —P ee = CHAP, VI ] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 271 prudent part, often requires much and difficult consideration Then after we have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is per- petually doubtful to a very high degree. And the constitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that want of impar- tial consideration what we have to do, and venturing upon ex- travagant courses, because it is doubtful what will be the con. sequences, are often naturally, i. e. providentially, altogether is fatal, as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion. Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, perhaps unintelligible to many good men. But if the persons for whose sake they are made, think so; persons who object as above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence; I desire them to consider again, whether their thinking so, be owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations, or to their own not having such a sense of religion, and serious solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism does in all reason require? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and condition neces- sarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower than what is commonly called probable; to guard | not only against what we fully believe will, but also against what we think it supposable may, happen; and to engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against success, if it be eredible that possibly we may succeed in them. 272 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART 37 CHAP. VII. Of the particular Evidence for Christianity.* THE presumptions against revelation, and objections against the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it, being removed, there remains to be considered, what posi- tive evidence we have for the truth of it: chiefly in order to sea what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evi- dence, and the objections against it; or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of objections against it, that we have in the case before us. Now, in the evidence of Christianity, there seem to be several things of great weight, not reducible to the head, either of iira- cles, or the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation f the words. But these two are its direct and fundamental proois; and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs ; but always to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of Chris- tianity will be a long series of things, reaching, as it seems, * [At the place where we now find ourselves, Butler makes a transi- tion in his argument; he passes from the subject-matter of Christi- anity to its evidence. He has hitherto been employed in removing the objections against Christianity itself by the argument of analogy, and by the same engine he now proceeds to remove the objections that may be levelled against the proof of it. The two objects are altogether distinct. * * * * Jn the discharge of this second service, he is = ot called upon to propound very fully, or in the way of positive vin- lication, the evidences of Christianity. He adverts to them ; he states what they are; he even renders a passing homage to their authority and force; but his proper task is to do by them what he had before done by the subject-matter of revelation, that is, clear away the objec- tions, not now against the doctrine of Christianity, but against the proof of it, and that by showing that the similar or analogous objeo lions in other cases are not admitted to have the validity which, ip the case of the evangelical story, the opponents of the gospel would fain allow to them. — Chalmers | * y | OHAP. VII. | FOR CHRISTIANITY. 273 from tLe beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the col. lateral proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argu. ment; the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other works of art; a result from a great number of things so and so disposed, and taken into one view. I. shall therefore, first, make some observations relating to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; and consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought against this evidence. And secondly, I shall endeavour to give some account of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the direct and col- lateral evidence, considered as making up one argument: this being the kind of proof, upon which we determine most ques- tions of difficulty concerning common faets, alleged to have happened, or seeming likely to happen; especially questions relating to conduct. First, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objec- tions alleged against it. : I. Now the following observations, relating to the historicai evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, appear to be of great weight. 1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the com- mon civil history of Moses and the kings of Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, as of the common matters related in them.* This indeed could not have been affirmed by any rea- * [This was clearly observed, and distinctly stated by Lord Boling- broke: ‘‘The miracles in the Bible are not like those in Livy, detached pieces that do not disturb the civil history, which goes on very well without them. But the miracles of the Jewish historian are intimately connected with all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and insepa- rable part. The whole history is founded in them: it consists of little elge; and if it were not a history of them, it would be a history of nothing.” — Bolingbroke’s Posthumous Works, vol. iii. p. 279. The state of the case seems to be, that the gravity, distinctness, and good sense of the Scripture histories, in relating civil affairs, prove those narratives not to be mythical, i. e. not to be the product of imagina- tion, And the intimate connection of the miraculous with the natural facts, proves that the former are not merely introduced for the sake of ornament. — F, ] 274 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART I. sonable man, if the authors of these books, like many other historians, had appeared to make an entertaining manner of writing their aim; though they had interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances, and upon proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation, amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same account would natu- rally have been given of them, as of the speeches and descrip- tions of such authors; the same account, in a manner, as is to be given, why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned narratives: and both of them appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same footing of historical evi- dence. Farther: some parts of Scripture, containing an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from the age in which they are said to be written, down to the present: and no other parts of them, material in the present question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine. And as common history, when called in question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent events more known and acknowledged ; and as the common Scripture history, like many others, is thus con- firmed ; so likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances, but in general. For the establishment of the Jewish and Christian religions, which were events contem- ~ porary with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them, these events are just what we should have expected, upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of those religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events, of which no other satisfactory account can be given, nor any account at all, but what is imaginary merely and invented. It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct account of this hise ' tory, how it came to be written, and to be received in the world ws a true history, is, that it really is so; nor can any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may indeed be, and often is, the true account of a matter; yet, it cannot be admitted on the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative. Now the just consequence from all this, I think, is, that the CHAP. VII. | FOR CHRISTIANITY. 279 Scripture history, in general, is to be admitted as an authentic genuine history, till somewhat positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. But no man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none; even though the evidence now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by historical evidence on the other side, if there be any; or general incredibility in the things related, or incon- sistence in the general turn of the history, would prove it to be of no authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first and general view, the appearance is, that it is an authentic history, it cannot be determined to be fictitious without some proof that it isso. And the following observations, in support of these, and coincident with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of Christianity. 2. The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, and moreover, from several of them being written, not to particular persons, but to churches, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond what can be, in a mere historical aarrative, left to the world at large. This evidence, joined witk that which they have in common with the rest of the New Tes. tament, seems not to leave so much as any particular pretence. for denying their genuineness, considered as an ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism. I say, particular pretence for denying tt; because any single fact of such a kind and such “antiquity, may have general doubts raised concerning it, from the very nature of human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be mentioned, a distinct and particular evidence of the genu- ineness of the epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians : from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of his own to that Church.* Now these epistles afford a proof of Christianity, detached from all others, which is, I think, a thing of weight; and also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For, In them the author declares, that he received the gospel in general, and the institution of the communion in particular, not from the rest of the apostles, or jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ himself; whom he declares, likewise, confor. mably to the history in the Acts, that he saw after his ascen- * Clem. Rom. Ep. I. ch. 47. 276 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART Nt. sion.* So that the testimony of St. Paul is to be considered as detached from that of the rest of the apostles. - And he declares farther, that he was endued with a power of working miracles, as what was publicly known to this very people; speaks of frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts,-as then subsisting in those very churches to which he was writing; which he was reproving for, several irregularities, and where he had personal opposers: he mentions these gifts inci lentally, in the most easy manner, and without effort; by way of reproof to those who had them, for their indecent use of them; and by way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues. In short, he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous powers, in the manner any one would speak to an- other of a thing, which was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as any thing in the world.f And this, as hath been observed by several persons, is surely a very con- siderable thing. 3. It 1s an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation, 1. e. as unbelievers would speak, upon the pre- tence of miracles, publicly wrought to attest tle truth of it in such an age; and that it was actually received by great numbers in that very age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. And Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other religions. I mean that this does not appear to be the case with regard to any other. For surely it will not be supposed to lie upon and person, to prove, by positive historical evidence, that it was not. It does in no sort appear that Mahometanism was first received in the world upon the footing of supposed mira-_ cles,t that is, public ones: for, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence of mira- cles. And it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the very first, propagated by other means. And as particular insti- tutions, whether in paganism or popery, said to be confirmed by miracles, after those institutions had obtained, are not to the- purpose; so, were there what might be called historical proof, that any of them were introduced by a supposed divine com- teal Coral, wannccse? b. COre xy, oe + Rom. xv. 19; 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-—28, &c., and chap. xii# 1, 2 8, and the whole xivth chap.; 2 Cor. xii. 12, 18; Gal. iii. 2, 5. } See the Keran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii. CHAP. VII. ] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 277 mand, believed to be attested by miracles, these would not be in any wise parallel. Tor single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power in their hands; and the leaders of them are in veneration with the mul- titude ; and political interests are blended with religious claims, and religious distinctions. But before any thing of this kind, for a few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such great numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon the particular evidence of miracles; this is quite another thing. And I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances of it, is peculiar to the Christian religion. How- ever, the fact itself is allowed, that Christianity obtained, 1. e. was professed to be received in the world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in which it is said those mira- cles were wrought: or that this is what its first converts would have alleged, as the reason for their embracing it. Now cer- tainly it is not to be supposed, that such numbers of men, in the most distant parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their country, in which they had been educated; separate themselves from their friends, particularly in their festival shows and solemnities, to which the common people are so greatly ad- dicted, and which were of 4 nature to engage them much more than any thing of that sort amongst us; and embrace a religion, which could not but expose them to many inconveniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a great degree, even from the very first, and before the empire engaged in form against them : it cannot, be supposed, that such numbers should make so great, and, to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their whole institution of life, unless they were really con- vinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it. And it will, I sup- pose, readily be acknowledged, that the generality of the first converts to Christianity must have believed them; that as, by becoming Christians, they declared to the world they were satis- fied of the truth of those miracles, so this declaration was to be eredited. And this their testimony is the same kind of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, and these writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence, because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full opportunity to inform themselves of. It is also distinct from the direct or ex- press historical evidence, though it is of the same kind; and it 24 278 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART IT. would be allowed to be distinct in all cases. For, were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient historians, and dis- puted in after ages ; that this fact is acknowledged to have been believed, by great numbers of the age in which the historian says it was done, would be allowed an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct from the express testimony of the historian. The credulity of mankind is acknowledged, and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged too; and their backward. ness even to believe, and greater still to practise, what makes against their interest. And it must particularly be remem- bered, that education, and prejudice, and authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So that the imme- diate conversion of such numbers, is a real presumption of some- what more than human in this matter: I Say presumption, for it is not alleged asa proof, alone and by itself. Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this Chapter be considered as a proof by itself; and yet all of them together may be one of the strongest. Upon the whole: as there is large historical evidence, both direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, collected by those who have writ upon the subject, it lies upon unbelievers to show, why this evidence is not to be eredited. This way of speaking is, I think, just, and what per- sons who write im defence of religion naturally fall into. Yet in a matter of such unspeakable importance, the proper questioni is, not whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, to maintain or confute objections; but whether there really are any, against this evidence, sufficient in reason, to destroy the credit of it? However, unbelievers seem to take upon them the part of showing that there are. They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties which the primitive Christians did; and are ready to give up their lives, forthe most idle follies imaginable. But it is not very clear, to what purpose this objection is brought. For every one, surely, in every cise, must distinguish between opi- nions and facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthu- slastic opinions, or of any opinions at all 3 yet it is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of facts. And a person’s laying down his life in attestation of facts, or of opinions, is the strong- est proof of his believing them. And if the apostles and their contemporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of which they CHAP. VII. ] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 279 exposeil themselves to sufferings and death, this their belief, or rather knowledge, must be a proof of those facts; for they were | such as came under the observation of their senses. And though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full opportunity to inform themselves, whether they were true or not, and give equal proof of their believing them to be true. But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of testimony, even for facts, in matters relating to religion; some seem to think, it totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon this subject. And indeed the powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases, too, which operate in a like man- ner, are very wonderful, in particular instances. But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard such things plainly with their eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest; such testimony is evi- dence of the strongest kind we can have for any matter of fact. Yet possibly it may be overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by contrary testimony. And in ‘an instance where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider, how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm: for it seems as if no other imaginable account were to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown, or contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such tes- timony, as that of enthusiasm must be; an account so strange, that the generality of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by it; it cannot, I say, be expected, that such account will be admitted of such» evidence, when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account of it, that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible, which they affirm sincerely, and with full assurance, they did see and hear. Granting ther, that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an absurd, but a pos- sible account of such testimony, it is manifest that the very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition, that the things so attested are incredible; and therefore need uot be considered, till they are shown to be so. Much less need it be considered, after the contrary has been proved. And I think it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there is no incredibility im reve- [3 280 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART IE lation, in general, or in such a one as the Christian in particular. However, as religion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be observed, that prejudices almost without number, and without name, romance, affectation, humour, a desire to en- gage attention or to surprise, the party spirit, custom, little com- petitions, unacvountable likings and dislikings ;. these influence men strongly in common matters. And as these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to be considered as influ- ences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in common matters is naturally and justly believed notwithstanding. It is intimated farther, in a more refined way of observation, that though it should be proved, that the apostles and _ first Christians, could not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and, in other respects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon the world, yet it will not follow, that their general testimony is to be believed, though truly handed down to us ; because they might still in part, i. e. in other respects, be de- ceived themselves, and in part also’ designedly impose upon others; which, it is added, is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm and real knayery, to be met with in the same characters. And, I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this observation upon mankind, is not to be denied ; and that somewhat very much akin’ to it, is often sup- posed in Scripture, as a very common case, and most severely reproved. But it were to have been expected, that persons capable of applying this observation, as applied in the objection, might also frequently have met with the like mixed character, in instances where religion was quite out of the case. The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued, with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they say: but from many occasions, they are liable tc be prejudiced, and biassed, and deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive others, in every different degree; inso- much that, as we are all liable to be deceived by prejudice, se likewise it seems to be not an uncommon thing, for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not invent a lic entirely with- out any foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening eir- cumstances, after it is once invented, and set agoing. And others, though they would not propagate a lie, yet, which isa lower degree of falsehood, will Jet it pass without contradiction * . j ‘ f 7 ‘ CHAP. VII.] FOR OHRISTIANITY. 281 But notwithstanding all this, human testimony remains still a natural ground of assent; and this assent, a natural principle of action. It is objected farther, that however it has happened, the fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be deceived by these pretences, than by others. It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of histo- rical evidence for miracles which are on all hands acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose that there were even the like his- torical evidence for these, to what there is for those alleged in proof of Christianity, which yet is in nowise allowed, but sup- pose this; the consequence would not be, that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the world who, in common cases, would conclude thus. For what would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted, nor overbal- anced? ‘To argue, that because there is, if there were, like evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the latter case is not to be credited; this is the same as to argue, that if two men of equally good reputation had given evidence in different cases no way connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury,-this confuted the testimony of the other. Upon the whole then, the general observation that human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in reli- gion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from negligence; and that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavouring to deceive others; this does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things will appear to different men to weaken the evidence of testimony in different degrees ; in degrees proportionable to the observations they have made, or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the weak- ness, and negligence, and dishonesty of mankind; or concern- ing the powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems to me, that people do not know what they say, whe affirm these things to destroy the evidence from testimony, which we have of the truth of Christianity Nothing can aA 282 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE JPARD 1 destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or probability, that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they give testimony; or that they are actually under some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of human actions require that testimony be admitted. It can never be sufficient to over- throw direct historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many principles, from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe. And it is sur- prising persons can help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes, they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, of which they speak thus; or that they can avoid observing, if they do make this reflection, that it 1s, on such a - subject, a very material one.* And over against all these objections, is to be set the import- ance of Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from carelessness, than they would in common matters ; and likewise the strong obligations to veracity, which their religion laid them under: so that the first and most ob- vious presumption is, that they could not be deceived theme selves, nor would deceive others. And this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony we have been con sidering. In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have an air of positiveness, which sometimes is not very easy: yet they are ‘necessary, and necessary to be repeated, in order to connect a discourse, and distinctly to lay before the view of the reader, what is proposed to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now the conclusion from the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond all doubt this: that unbelievers must be torced to admit the external sevidence for Christianity, i. e. the proot of miracles wrought to attest it, to be of real weight and very considerable; though they cannot allow it to be sufficient, to convince them of the reality of those miracles. And as they must, in all reason, admit this, so it seems to me, that upon consideration they would in fact admit it; those of them, I mean, who know any thing at all of the matter: in like manner a8 persons, in many cases, own they see strong evidence from > ————— * See the foregoing Chapter. ee ae ee ee CHAP. VII. ] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 283 testimony for the truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced are true; cases, suppose, where there is contrary testimony, or things which they think, whether with or withont reason, to be credible. But there is no testimony contrary to that which we have been considering; and it has been fully proved, that there is no ineredibility in .Christianity in general, or in any part of it. II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall only make some few general observations, which are sug- gested by the analogy of nature; i. e. by the acknowledged natural rules of judging in common matters concerning evidence of a like kind to this from prophecy. 1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a pro- phecy, does not in any degree invalidate the proof of foresight, arising from the appearing completion of those other parts which are understood. For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts which are not understood, were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown tongue. Whether this observation be commonly attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can scarce bring one’s self to set down an instance in common matters, to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in cypher, and partly in plain words at length, and that in the part one understood, there appeared mention of several known facts ; it would never come into any man’s thoughts to imagine, that if he understood the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not in reality known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example, and the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not understanding the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether one understood the literal meaning of such a part; but this comes under another consideration. For the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having turned his studies this way, even so much as to judge, whether particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled ; yet he may see, in general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree, as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in such prophecies, and of such events being intended by them. For the same reason also, though by means of the deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of historians, the most learned should not be able to make out to satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history have been 284 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART AJ minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong proof of foresight may arise, from that general completion of them which is made out: as much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the Giver of prophecy intended should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy. 2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events, is itself a proof, that it was intended of them ; as the rules by which we naturally judge and determine, in common cases parallel to this, will show. This observation I make in answer to the common objection against the application of the prophecies, that considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear, that they were intended of those particu- lar events to which they are applied by Christians; and there- fore it is to be supposed, that, if they meant any thing, they were intended of other events unknown to us, and not of these at all. _ Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great re- semblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before us ; the mythological and the satirical, where the satire is, to a cer- tain degree, concealed. And a man might be assured, that he understood what an author intended by a fable or parable, ra lated without any application or moral, merely from seeing it co be easily capable of such application, and that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully assured, that such persons and events were intended in_a satirical writing, merely from its being applicable to them. And agrees ably to the last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, though he were not enough informed in affairs or in the story of such persons, to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction, that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these writings, would be greater or less, in propor- © tion as he saw the general turn of them to be capable of such application, and in proportion to the number of particular things capable of it. And thus, if a long series of prophecy is appli- cable to the present state of the church, and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand years after these prophecies were delivered, and a long series of pro- phecy delivered before the coming of Christ is applicable to him; these things are in themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was intended of him, and of those events ; In proportion as the general turn of it is capable of such application, and to the number and variety of particular prophecies capable of it, a ee UBAP. VIT.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 985 And though, in all just way of consideration, the appearing completion of prophecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to determine their meaning; yet it is to be remembered farther, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a Mes- siah before his coming, in much the same manner as Christians do now; and that the primitive Christians interpreted the pro- phecies respecting the state of the church and of the world, in the last ages, in the sense which the event seems to confirm snd verify. And from these things it may be made to appear, 3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and such predictions, and not those at all which Christians allege to be completions of those predictions; or that such and such pro- phecies are capable of being applied to other events than those to which Christians apply them—that this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For, observe how this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that one knew the whole of what he intended in it, one should be assured or satisfied to such a degree, that one knew the whole _ meaning of that book; for the meaning of a book is*nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have compiled a book out of memoirs, which he received from another, of vastly superior knowledge-in the subject of it, espe- cially if it were a book full of great intricacies and difficulties, it would in nowise follow, that one knew the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler; for the original memoirs, i. e. the author of them, might have, and there would be no degree of presumption, in many cases, against supposing him to have, some farther meaning than the compiler saw. ‘To say then, that the Scriptures and the things contained in them can* have no other or farther meaning, than those persons thought or had, who first recited or wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were the original, proper, and sole authors of those books, i. e. that they are not inspired ; which is absurd, whilst the authority of these books is under examination, i. e. till you have determined they are of no divine authority at all. Tull this be deterinined, it must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, for this is taking for granted that they are inspired, but that they may have some farther meaning than what the compilers saw or understood 236 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART yy And upon this supposition, it is supposable also, that this farther meaning may be fulfilled. Now events corresponding to pro- phecies, interpreted in a different meaning from that in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them ; this affords, in a manner, the same proof that this different sense was origi nally intended, as it would have afforded, if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did; because there is no presumption of their sense of them being the whole sense of them. And it has been already shown, that the apparent completions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, i. . in any real sense of the words of it. For such completion is equally a proof of foresight more than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have understood it in a different sense. I say, supposed; for though I think it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full meaning of their predictions, it is another question, how far they thought they’ did, and in what sense they understood them. Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy ~ themselves, who endeavour to prove that the prophetic history . is applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages before it. Indeed, to have proved this before there was any appearance of a further completion of it, might have answered some purpose; for it might have prevented the expectation of any such farther completion. Thus, could Porphyry have shown, that some principal parts of the book of Daniel, for instance, the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events which happened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; this might have prevented them from expecting any farther com pletion of it. And unless there was then, as I think there must have been, external evidence concerning that book, more than is come down to us, such a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way of Christianity itself; considering the authority which our Saviour has given to the book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this discovery, had there been any such,* would be of very little weight with reasonable men now ; es * It appears, that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. For Jerome on the place says: Duas posieriores bestias — in UNG Yacedonum regno ponit. And as to the teu kings: Decem reges enume- CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. Lee: if this passage, thus applicable to events before the age of Por- phyry, appears to be applicable also to events which succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate, that the division of this empire — into ten parts, for it was plainly divided into about that number, were, alone and by itself, of any moment in verifying the pro- phetic history; but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of. And thus, upon the whole, the matter of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether the prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of the world and of the church; applicable in such a degree as to imply foresight : not whether they are capable of any other application; though I know no pretence for saying, the general turn of them is tapable of any other. These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence referred to in them, real; though there may be people who will not ac- cept of such imperfect information from Scripture. Some too have not integrity and regard enough to truth, to attend to evi- dence, which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort from what théy expected. And it plainly requires a degree of modesty and fairness, be- yond what every one has, for a man to say, not to the world, but to himself, that there is a real appearance of somewhat of great weight in this matter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it; but it shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its appearing reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in with the negligence, pre- sumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to determine at once, with a decisive air, there is nothing init. The prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, with which this evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention. For what indeed ean be said to persons, who are weak enough in their under- standings to think this any presumption against it; or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject ? I shall now, Secondly, Endeavour to give some account of the general argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the direct and circumstantial evidence, considered ag rat, qui, fuerunt seevissimi; ipsosque reges non unius ponit regnt, verbs gratia, Macedonie, Syrie, Asie, et Lgypti; sed de diversis regnis unwm efit regum ordinem. And in this way of interpretation, any thing may be made of any thing. 288 OF THE PARTIOULAR EVIDENCE [PART Ii, making up one argument. Indeed to state and examine this argument fully, would be a work much beyond the compass of this whole treatise; nor is so much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet the present subject requires to have some brief account of it given. Tor it is the kind of evidence upon which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined; evidence arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm each other, and in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the point under consideration. And I choose to do it also: frst, because it seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by every one, that the proof of revelation is, not some direct and express things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also ; and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be joined to- gether; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the result of those several things, considered in their respects to each other, and united into one view; and, in the nezt place, because it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknowledged by them also to contain together a degree of evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several things be- fore themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider them together ; instead of that cursory thought of them, to which we are familiarized. -For being familiarized to the cursory thought of things, as really hinders the weight of them from being seen, as from having its due influence upon practice. The thing asserted, and the truth of whichis to be inquired into, is this: that over and above our reason and affections, which God has given us for the information of our judgment and the conduct of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given us an account of himself and his moral government over the world, implying a future state of rewards and punishments; i.e. hath revealed the system of natural religion; for natural religion may be externally* revealed by God, as the ignorant a may be taught it by mankind, their fellow-creatures—that God, — :: I say, has given us the evidence of revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this moral system; together with an account of a particular dispensation of Providence, which reason ould no way have discovered, and a particular in- ee me a ee eee * Page 199, &c. pia al tte it ee : ' & CHAP. VII. | FOR CHRISTIANITY. 289 stitution of religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out of their present wretched condition, and raising them to the perfection and final happiness of their nature. This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of events before they come to pass: doctrines also are matters of fact: and precepts come under the same notion. And the general design of Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, _thus considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an account of the world, in this one single view, as God’s world; by which it appears essentially distinguished from all otker books, so far as [ have found, except such as are copied from it. It begins with an account of God’s creation of the world, in order to ascertain and distinguish from all others, who is the object of our worship, by what he has done; in order to ascertain who he is, concerning whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this sacred book all along treats; the Maker and Proprietor of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of Nature: in order likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, which are either imaginary beings, i. e. no beings at all; or else part of that creation, the Bistorical relation of which is here given. And St. John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account of the creation, begins his gospel with an account of our Saviour’s pre-existence, and that “all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made thal was made ;’* agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, that “ God created all things by Jesus Christ.’+ This being premised, the Scripture, taken together, seems to profess to contain a kind _ of an abridgment of the history of the world, in the view just now mentioned; i. e. a general account of the condition of reli- gion and its proressors, during the continuance of that apostacy from God, and state of wickedness, which it every where sup- poses the world to lie in. And this account of the state of reli- gion.carries with it some brief account of the political state of things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation indeed considers the common affairs of this world, and what is going on in it, as a mere scene of distraction, and cannot be supposed to concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all places equally * John i. 3. + Eph. iii. 9. 25 290 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART It, aspire to be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give any account of this wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some Pi very general account of the chief governments of the world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or shall be, affeeted by them, from the first transgression, and uring the whole interval of the world’s continuing in its present state, to a certain future period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great variety of expression: “ The times of the restitution of all things :’* when “the mystery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the pro- phets ;’+ when “the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people,”’y as it is represented to be during this apostacy, but “judgment shall be given to the saints,’’§ and | “and the kingdom and dominion, and “they shall reign ;”| the greatness of the kingdom under the whale heaven, shall .be— g£ 5 ’ given to the people of the saints of the Most High.’’4 Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, — how great a length of time the whole relatieu takes up, near six thousand years of which are past: and how great a variety of things it treats of; thé natural and moral system or history of the world, including the time when it was formed, all con- tained in the very first book, and evidently written in a rude and — unlearned age; and in subsequent books, the various common and prophetic history, and the particular dispensation of Chris- tianity. Now all this together gives the largest scope for criti- cism; and for confutation of what is capable of being confuted, — either from reason, or from common history, or from any incon- sistence in its several parts. And it is a thing which deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that whereas some imagine, the sup-_ posed doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation implies a posi- — tive argument that it 1s not true; it appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is true. Hor could any com- mon relation, of such antiquity, extent, and variety, (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing lies) be ) proposed to the examination of the world; that at could not, — in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable men; this — would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its#uth. Ana — * Acts iii. 21. + Rev, x. vi t Daa ti. @ Dan. vii. 22. || Rev. {{ Dan 7a ae ee OHAP. VII. ] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 29) indeed it must be a proof of it, just in proportion to the proba- bility, that if it were false, it might be shown to be so; and this, [ think, is scarce pretended to be shown, but upon principles and in ways of arguing which have been clearly obviated.* Nor dos it at all appear, that any set of men who believe natu. ral religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has been thus confuted. But to proceed: Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testa- ment contains a chronological account of the beginning of it, and from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history begins; and carried on as much farther, as to make up a continued thread of history, of the length of between three and four thousand years. It containg an account of God’s making a covenant with a particular nation, that they should be his people, and he would be their God, in a peculiar sense; of his often interposing miraculously in their affairs; giving them the promise, and, long after, the possession, of a particular country; assuring them of the greatest national prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition to the idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his com- mands, and threatening them with unexampled punishments, if they disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry ; inso- much, that this one nation should continue to be the observation and the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly, that “God would scalter them among all people, from one end of the earth unto the other ;” but that “when they should relurn unto the Lord their God, he would have compassion upon them, and gather them, from all the nations whither he had scattered them; that Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an ever- lasting salvation, and not be ashamed or confounded, world without end.” And as some of those promises are conditional, others are as absolute as any thing can be expressed, that the time should come, when “the people should be ail righteous, and inherit the land for ever ; that though God would make a Jull end of all nations whither he had scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them: that he would bring » again the captivity of his people Israel, and plant them upon their land, and they should be no more pulled up out of their land ; that the seed of Israel should not cease from being a nation for ever.”’+ It foretelly that God would ‘raise. them up a par. = Chap. 2, 3, &c. + Deut. xxviii. 64. Ch. xxx. 23. Isa.xlv.17. Ch. Ix. 21. ser. maxx. 11. Ch. xlvi. 28 Amos ix.15, Jer. xxxi. 36. laps OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART Tha Hicular person, in whom all his promises should finally be ful-— filled ; the Messiah, who should be, in a high and eminent sense, — their anointed Prince and Saviour. This was foretold in such — a manner, as raised a general expectation of such a person in ~ the nation, as appears from the New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact; an expectation of his coming at such a par- ticular time, before any one appeared claiming to be that person, — and when there was no ground for such an expectation but from — the prophecies; which expectation, therefore, must in all reason” be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if there — were any doubt abuut their meaning. It seems moreover to foretell, that this person should be rejected by that nation, to” whom he had been so long promised, and though he was so much desired by them.* And it expressly foretells, that he should be the Saviour of the Gentiles; and even that the com- pletion of the scheme contained in this book, and then begun and in its progress, should be somewhat so great, that, in com- parison with it, the restoration of the Jews alone would be but_ of small account: “ It is a light thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the pre= served of Istael: I will also give thee for a light to the Gen-— tiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the end of the earth.’ And, ‘In the last days, the mountain of the Lord's” iouse shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills ; and all nations shall flow into a— for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of — the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among the nations — and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day, and © the idols he shall utterly abolish.”’+ 'The Scripture farther cons tains an account, that at the time the Messiah was expected, a person rose up, in this nation, claiming to be that Messiah, to be the person whom all the prophets referred to, and in whom they should centre; that he spent some years in a continued course of miraculous works, and endued his imm sdiate disciples” and followers with a power of doing the same, as a proof of © the truth of that religion which he commissioned them to pub- lish; that, invested with this authority and power, they made > Aa * Isa. viii. 14,15. Ch. xlix. 5. Ch. Iii. Mal. i. 10, 11, and Ch. in, + Isa. xlix. 6. Ch. ii. Ch. xi. Ch. lvi. 7. Mal. i. 11.—To which must be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament, and very many in the Old, which describe what shally be she completion of the revealed plan of Providence. ey SHAP. VU.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 293 _ humerous converts in the remotest countries, and settlea and _ established his religion in the world; to the end of which, the Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of the state of this religion amongst mankind. Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have all this related to him out of the Scripture. Or suppose _ such a one, having the Scripture put into his hands, to remark hese things in it, not knowing but that the whole, even its _ ivil history, as wéll as the other parts of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire invention; and to ask, What truth _ was in it, and whether the revelation here related was real, or a fiction? And instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at ~ onee, to be told the following confessed facts; and then to unite _ them into one view. Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and establishment of natural religion, the belicf that there is one God to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that man- kind shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here; in how very great a degree, I say, the pro- fession and establishment of this moral system in the world, is _ owing to the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained in this book ; the establishment of this moral system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the Seripture.* Let him be told also what number of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. Let him then take in the consideration, of what importance religion is to mankind. And upon these things, he might, I think, truly observe, that this _ supposed revelation’s obtaining and being received in the world, with all the circumstances and effects of it, considered together _ as one event, is the most conspicuous and important event in the story of mankind: that a book of this nature, and thus _ promulged and recommended to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have its claims most seriously examined into; and that before such examination, to treat it _ with any kind of scoffing and ridicule is an offence against natu- ral piety. But it is to be remembered, that how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the proof of reli- _ gion from reason; any more than the’ proof of Kuclid’s Ele- _ ments is destroyed, by a man’s knowing or thinking, that he Lal es Se re eae * Page 258, 25* 294 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART I should never have seen the truth of the several propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. iuet such a person as we are speaking of, be, in the next place, informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this book ; and that its chronology, its account of the time when the earth, and the several parts of it, were first peopled with human creatures, is no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil history of the world, collected from : common historians, from the state of the earth, and from the — late invention of arts and sciences. And as the Scripture con- tains an unbroken thread of common and civil history, from — the creation to the captivity, for between three and four thousand — years; let the person we are speaking of be told, in the next — place, that this general history, as it is not contradicted, but is — confirmed by profane history, as much as there would be reason to expect, upon supposition of its truth; so there is nothing in the whole history itself to give any reasonable ground of sus- — picion of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally — true genealogy of men, and series of things. I speak here only ~ of the common Scripture history, or of the course of ordinary — events related in it, as distinguished from miracles, and from ~ the prophetic history. In all the Scripture narrations of this ~ kind, following events arise out of foregoing ones, as in all other — histories. There appears nothing related as done in any age, — not conformable to the manners of that age; nothing in the © acccunt of a succeeding age, which one would say could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of things in the pre- | ceding one. There is nothing in the characters which would ~ raise a thought of their being feigned; but all the internal | marks imaginable of their beimg real. It is to be added also, — that mere genealogies, bare narratives of the number of years which persons called by such and such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction; perhaps do carry some presumption of — veracity : and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to — surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presump- | tion too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly — eredible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken — alone in the naked way they are told, may appear strange, espe- cially to persons of other manners, temper, education ; but there are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many of most persons’ — lives, which, in the same circumstances, would appear to the full Wins Ce CHAP. VII. ] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 295 as strange.* There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may be other rea. or seeming mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for; but there are certainly no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than what were to have been expected in books of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to discredit the general narrative. Now, that a history claiming to commence from the creation, and extending in one continued series through so great a length of time, and variety of events, should have such appearances of reality and truth in its whole eontexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance in its favour. And as all this is applicable to the common history of the New Testament, so there is a farther credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane authors; many of these writing of the same times, and confirming the truth of customs and events, which are incidentally, as well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this credibility ofthe common Scripture history gives some credibility to its miraculous history: especially as this is _ raterwoven with the common, so as that they imply each other, ‘ad both together make ~1p one relation. Let it then be more purticularly observed to this person, that if is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in the foregomg observation, that there was such a nation as the Tews, of the greatest ntiquity, whose government and general polity was founded on the law, here related to be given them vy Moses as from heaven: that natural religion, though with * [See this though’ presented in a most agreeable and lively form ‘a the Archbishcp of Dublin’s “‘ Historic Doubts” concerning Napo- eon Bonaparte. Compare the following conversation given in Bos- well’s Life of Johnson (Ann. 1763): «Talking of those who deny the ruth of Christianity, he said, ‘It is always easy to be on the negative Ch a ee I deny that Canada is taken, and I can support my venial by pretty good arguments. The French are a much more awumerous people than we; and it is not likely that they would allow as to take it.’ ‘ But the ministry have assured us, in all the formality of a Gazette, that itis taken.’ ‘Very true. But the ministry have put us to an enormous expense by the war in America, and it is their mterest to persuade us that we have got something for our money.’ ‘But the fact is confirmed by thousands of men who were at the wking of it.” ‘Ay, but these men have still more interest in deceiving as. They don’t want that you should think the French have beat them, but that they have beat tbe French. Now, suppose you should go over and find that it really is taken; that would only satisfy your- self; for when you come hask we will not believe you. We will say vou have been dribed.”’ —~F. | 296 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART If rites additional, yet no way contrary to it, was their established religion, which cannot be said of the Gentile world; and that their very being, as a nation, depended upon their acknowledg- ment of one God, the God of the universe. or suppose, in | their captivity in Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, there would have remained no bond of union, to keep them a distinct people. And whilst they were under their own kings in their own country, a total apostacy — from God would have been the dissolution of their whole govern- ment. They, in such a sense, nationally acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. And this, so remarkable an establish- ment and preservation of natural religion amongst them, seems to add some peculiar credibility to the historical evidence for ; the miracles of Moses and the prephets; because these mira- cles are a full satisfactory account of this event, which plainly wants to be accounted for, and cannot otherwise. Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be ac- quainted farther, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish _ extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from the pro- phecics above-mentioned, expected the Messiah: that he wag rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold he should, by the body of the people, under the-direction of their rulers: that — in the course of a very few years he was believed on, and ac- knowledged as the promised Messiah, by great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,* of which mira- cles we aiso have strong historical evidence ; (by which I mean here no more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy, our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity ;+) that this religion approving itself to the reason — of mankind, and carrying its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its system, and being no way contrary ta reason in those parts of it which require to be believed upon the mere authority of its Author ; that this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself, for some hundred years, not only without any assistance from temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and often the bitterest persecutions from it, eee * Page 276, &e. 7 Page 281, & #“F OHAP. VII. | FOR CHRISTIANITY. 29) and then became the religion of the world: that in the mean time, the Jewish nation and government were destroyed in a very remarkable manner, and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the most distant countries ; in which state of dispersion they have remained fifteen hundred years: and that they remain a numerous people, united amongst themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as they were in the days of Moses, by the profession of his law; and every where looked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how distinctly to express, but in the words of the prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it came to pass: “‘ Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb and a by-word, among ail nations whither the Lord shall lead thee.”* The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the confirmation which this event appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be thought to be answered by their religion’s forbidding them inter- marriages with those of any other, and prescribing them a great many peculiarities in their food, by which they are de- barred from the means of incorporating with the people in whose countries they live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which it pretends to account for. But what does it pre- tend to account for? ‘The correspondence between this event and the prophecies; or the coincidence of both, with a long dis- pensation of Providence of a peculiar nature, towards that people formerly? No. It is only the event itself which is offered to be thus accounted for ; which single event taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared miraculous; but that correspondence. and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be supposed not. Thus, the concurrence of our Saviour’s being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy, and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous—the series of prophecy, and other coin- cidences, and the event being admitted : though the event itself, his birth at that place, appears to have been brought about in a natural way; of which, however, no one can be certain. And as several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to have verified the prophetic history already; so likewise, they may be considered farther, as having a peculiar aspect towards tbe full completion of it; as affording some presumption that — — * Deut. xxviii. 37. sm 298 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART IL the whole of it shall one time or other be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet to come; that natural religion came forth from Judea, and spread in the degree it has done over the world, be- fore lost in idolatry; which, together with some other things, have distinguished that very place, in like manner as the people of it are distinguished: that this great change of religion over the earth was brought abou. under the profession and acknow- ledgment, that Jesus was the promised Messiah: things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of the prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that people; concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state of the world, under this sacred government. Such circumstances and events compared with these prophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first being informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic his- tory of things still future, give it some additional credibility, have the appearance of being somewhat in order to the full com- pletion of it. Indeed, it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great calmness and consideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Christianity, from that part of the prophetic history which relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the state of the church, from the establish- ment of Christianity to the present time. But it appears, from a general view of it, to be very material. And those persons who have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable to ‘imputations of prejudice, insiet upon it as determinately conclu- sive. Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first to recol- lect the passages above-mentioned out of Scripture without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then to be in- formed of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to unite them all into one view: that the profession and establishment of natural religion in the world, is greatly owing, in different ways, to this book, and the supposed revelation which it con- tains; that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity; Tee Te, re a Sow eg ge ee a ae Oe ee ee ees a ne — gp SL ak rs - ee CHAP. VII. | FOR CHRISTIANITY. 299 that its chronology and common history are entirely credible; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, ap- pear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a distinguished sense; that, as there was a national expectation amongst them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah ; that he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gen- tiles, not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the religion he taught supported itself under the greatest dif_i- culties, gained ground, and at length became the religion of the world; that in the mean time, the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth: that, notwithstanding this, they have remained a distinct ang numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day ; which not only appears to be the express completion of several prophe- cies concerning them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy possibility, that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be fulfilled. And to these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been supposing add, as I think he. ought, whether every one will allow it or not, the obvious appearances which there are of the state of the world, in other respects besides what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian church, having so long answered, and still answering to the pro- phetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the things before-mentioned out of the Scripture, and seriously com- pared with them ; the joint view of both together, must, I think, appear of very great weight to a considerate reasonable person ; of much greater, indeed, upon haying them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so familiarized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention for that purpose. All these things, and the several particulars contained under them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined into; that the weight of each may be judged of, upon such ex- amination, and such conclusion drawn as results from their united force. But this has not been attempted here. I have gone no farther than to show, that the general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed historical evidence for mira- eles, and the many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together with the collateral things* here mentioned, and there * All the particular things mentioned in this Chapter, not reducible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of pro- plecy. See pages 272, 273. 800 O¥ THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART IL. are several others of the like sort; that all this together, which, being fact, must be ackncwledged by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter ; evidence much more important than careless men, who have been accustomed only to transient and partial views of it, can imagine; and indeed abundantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, [ apprehend, must be acknowledged by unbelievers. Vor though they may say, that the historical evidence of mira- eles, wrought in attestation of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them that such miracles were really wrought, they cannot deny that there is such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that there is. They may say, the con- formity between the prophecies and events is by accident; but there are many instances in which such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those above-mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanci- ful people; and that such as are fanciful in any one certain way, _ will make out a thousand coincidences, which seem to favour their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk thus; but no one who is. serious can possibly think these things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as distin- guished, in nature, from the evidence of demonstration. In many cases, indeed, it seems to require the truest judgment, to determine with exactness the weight of circumstantial evi- dence; but it is very often altogether as convincing as that which is the most express and direct. This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered _ as making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious persons, to set down every thing which they think may be of any real weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of prophecy; and they will find, that, judg. ing by the natural rules by which we judge of probable evidence in common matters, they amount to a much higher degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than could be supposed upon considering them separately, at different times, how strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence, but multiply it.* Nor should I dissuade * [If the thing to be proved have in it an apparent character of truth, this constitutes an improbahility of its falsehood. If it have * CHAP. VII. | FOR CHRISTIANITY. 301 any one from setting down what he thought made for the con- trary side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous than a mistake on the other. And what course is most safe, and what most dangerous, is a consideration thought very material, when we deliberate, not concerning events, but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by this consideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed as much prejudice as any thing whatever. And like other prejudices, it operates contrary ways in different men. For some are inclined to believe what they hope; and others what they fear. And it is manifest unreasonableness, to apply to men’s passions, in order to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning conduet, there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account, than the importance of it. For suppose it doubtful what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary manner; still, that taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequences, and taking the other might be attended with the greatest, must appear to unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act. But the truth of our religion, like the truth of comma matters, 1s to be judged of by all the evidence taken together And unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been by accident, (for here the stress of the argument for Christianity lies, ) then is the truth of it proved ; in like manner, as if in any common case, numerous. events acknowledged, were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed ; the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it, but though no one of them singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged events taken together, could not in reason another character of truth, this constitutes another improbability of its falsehood. If this were a complete statement of the argument to be drawn from the coexistence of the two characters of truth, the second improbability would only require to be added to the first ta give the value of the whole. But in reality the argument is much stronger. For the improbability that they should simultaneously exist in the thing under examination, and yet that thing be false, is evi- dextly different from the sum cf the improbabilities.that each sepa- vately should exist in it if false. ---F.] 2 302 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE, &C. [PART D be supposed ty have happened, unless the disputed one were . true. It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in con- versation. For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, that such and such things are liable to objection, that this and another thing is of little weight in itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument in one view. However, lastly, as it has been made appear, that there is no presumption against a revelation as miraculous; that the gene- ral scheme of Christianity, and the principal parts of it, are con- formable to the experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible; so the account now given of the posi- tive evidence for it shows that this evidence is such as, from the hature of it, cannot he destroyed, though it should be lessened. . ee a a CHAP. VIII.] OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY, &e. 305 GHAP VALLI, Of the Objections which may be made against arguing from the Analogy of Nature to Religion. Ir every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge and give characters of, the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to be expected; for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against: since this treatise, in common with most others, lies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight; and, be- sides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. And they are such as these :— “That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by saying that there are the same in natural religion; when what is wanting is to clear both of them, of these their common, as well as other their respective difficulties: but that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them, that they have as little reason for their worldly pur- suits; and a strange way of vindicating the justice and good- ness of the Author of Nature, and of removing the objections against both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show, that the like objections lie against natural providence; a way of answering objections against religion, without so much as pretending to make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are reasonable — especially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when it is confessed, that analogy is no answer to such objections; that when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state; and that it must be unac- eountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be pre- 304 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [PART It vailed with to forego their present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence.” Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that ap. pearance will be found in a great measure owing to half views, which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly ; and to undeterminate language. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and ludicrous men by themselves. And even those who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and at once clearly see through the per- plexities in which subjects themselves are involved ; and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this objection severally, may be of some assistance 3 as It may also tend a little to stop and silence others. First, The thing wanted, i. e. what men require, is to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any thing we know to the contrary, it may be, the same, as requiring to comprehend the Divine nature, and the whole plan of Provi- dence from everlasting to everlasting. But it hath always been allowed to argue, from what is acknowledged to what is dis- puted. And it is in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it, is to argue in numberless other ways of probable deduc- tion and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are con- tinually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet poor may be applied, I fear, as properly to great part, or the whole, of human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. -Is it not a poor thing for a physician to have go little knowledge in the cure of diseases, as even the most eminent. have? to act upon conjecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned? Undoubtedly it is: but not in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark. Further : since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against natural religion ; and those who do this, if they are not confuted themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that they are arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral Providence : it is a thing of consequence to show, that such objections are as much levelled against natural religion, as against revealed. And abjections, which are equally applicable to both, are properly CHAP. VIII. | OF NATURE TO RELIGION. Bo speaking answered, by its being shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted to be true. And without taking in the consideration, how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things objected against in natural religion, are of the same kind with what is certain matter of ex- perience in the course of providence, and in the information which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under his government; so the objections pgainst the system of Chris: tianity and the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which are made against the system and evidence of natural - religion. However, the reader upon review may see, that most of the analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the former; that there is an Author of Nature, or natural Governor of the world: and-Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly, from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature. Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a determinate course of life; as being what, there is reason to think, is commanded by the Author of Nature, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness under his government. Now if men can be convinced, that they have the like reason to be- lieve this, as to believe, that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion. And if there be really any reason for believing one of these, and en- deavouring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it; then there is reason also for believing the other, and endeavouring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the interest which religion proposes to us, be infi- nitely greater than our whole temporal interest, then there must be proportionably greater reason for endeavouring to secure one than the other: since, by the supposition, the probability of our securing one, is equal to the probability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable; and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it be, which is afforded us. But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the objection, lies in another place. For it is said, that the 26 * 806 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY | PART n proof of religion is involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful; and that it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections taken together, are turned into a positive argument against the truth of religion ; which argument would stand thus.—If religion were true, it would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in which it is: therefore, that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it weak, and lesséns its force in proportion to the weight of such objections; but also shows it to be false, or is a general presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argument; be- cause it shows, that it is according to the conduct and character of the Author of Nature, to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be sup- posed to appoint we should act upon: it is an Instance, a general one made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, similar to what is said to be incredible. And as the force of this answer lies merely in the parallel which there is between the evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct, the answer is equally just and conclusive ; whether the parallel be made out, by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower. Thirdly, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men: it is not to justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. And though they may at length run up into each other, yet observa- tions may immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connection, to the purpose of the former; which is less our concern than many seem to think. For, first, It is not necessary we should justify the dispensa- tions of Providence against o jections, any farther than to show, that the things objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and goodness. Suppose then, that there are things, in the system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would be unjust; yet it hag been shown unanswerably, that if we could take in the reference CHAP. VIII. ] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 303 which these things may have, to other things present, past and to come; to the whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of; these very things might, for aught we know, be found to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed, it has been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus, objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindi- cation necessary. Hence it appears, secondly, That objections against the divine justice and goodness are not endeavoured to be removed, by showing that the like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural providence ; but those objec- tions being supposed, and shown not to be conclusive, the things objected against, considered as matters of fact, are farther shown to be credible, from their conformity to the constitution of nature ; for instance, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does reward and punish them for their actions here.- And this, I apprehend, is of weight. And I add, thirdly, It would be of weight, even though those objections were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above set down, and religion implying several facts; for instance again, the fact last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter ; the observation that his present method of government is by rewards and,punishments, shows that future fact not to be in- credible: whatever objections men may think they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, as improbable, for it is evident no objection against it, as unjust, can be urged from necessity; since this notion as much destroys injustice, as it does justice. Then, fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of religion, cannot indeed be answered without entering into consideration of its reasonableness, yet objections against the credibility or truth of it, may: Because the system of it is reducible into what is properly matter of fact; and the truth, the probable uth. of facts, may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, co give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined us. and of every particular dispensation of Providence which somes into the system of religion. Indeed, the more thoroughly 308 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THERE ANALOGY [PART It a person of a right disposition is convinced of the perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he will advance towards that perfection of religion which St. John* speaks of. But the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shown, though no more could be proved than that the system of it may be so, for aught we know to the contrary; and even without entering into the distinct consideration of this. And from hence,-fifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is not an imme- diate answer to objections against the wisdom, the justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion, yet it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such objections ; which is to show, that the things objected against are incredible. Fourthly, It is mostly readily acknowledged, that the fore- going treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but so would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains; and whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world. And were all such controversies settled, which perhaps; in speculation, would be found involved in great difficulties; and were it determined, upon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved; yet still, the rules which God has been pleased to afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, in future contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all cer- tain, what is the best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them in the proper sense of the word; i. e. what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is doubt- ful in a much higher degree. Indeed, the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard the interest of it, upon account of ~~ * 1 John iv. 18. WAP. VIIT.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. ° 3809 this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those who object against it, as not satisfactory, 1. e. as not being waat they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being: ror satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a ereature as man. And, which is more material, they forget also the very nature of religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty ; which it was intended to try whether men have or rot, - and to exercise, in such as have it, in order to its improvement Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in which you speak; or as warning a man of any danger, presup- poses that he hath such a regard to himself as that he will en- deavour to avoid it. And therefore, the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory :* but Whether t be, m reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it presupposes? Now the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of probation; how far soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of curiosity, or any other: and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in several respects, which it would not do, if it were as overbearing as is required. One might add farther, that whether the motives or the evidence of any course of action be satisfactory, meaning here by that word, what satisfies a man, that such a course ot action will in event be for his good; this need never be, and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical question in com- mon matters. But the practical question in all cases is, Whe- ther the evidence for a course of action be such, as taking in all circumstances, makes the faculty within us which is the guide and judge of conduct,* determine that course of action to be prudent’ Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent; but evidence, almost infinitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too, even in the conduct of every day. Fifthly, As to the objection concerning the influence which this argument, or any part of it, may or may not be expected to haye upon men, I observe, as above, that religion being intended for a trial and exercise of the morality of every person’s cha- racter, who is a subject of it; and there being, as I have shown such evidence for it, as is sufficient in reason, to influence men ee * See Dissertation IT. 810 = — “OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [PART 1! to embrace it; to object, that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing io the purpose of the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is not to in- quire, what sort of creatures mankind are; but, what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them, requires they should be: to show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how, in fact, they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their own concern; the personal concern of each man in parti- cular. And how little regard the generality have to it, expe- rience indeed does too fully show. But religion, considered as a probation, has had its ends upon all persons, to. whom it has been proposed, with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice; for by this means they have been put into a state of probation, let them behave as they will in it. And thus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us, that by the evi- dence of religion being laid before men, the designs of Provi- dence are carrying on, not only with regard to those who will, but likewise with regard to those who will not, be influenced by it. However, lastly, the objection here referred to, allows the things insisted upon in this treatise to be of some weight; and if so, it may be hoped it will have some influence. And if there be a probability that it will have any at all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a greater influence. And farther, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the whoie of the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have argued upon the principles of others,* not my own; and have omitted what I think true, and of the utmost importance, be- cause by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of the Fatalists, which I do not believe ; and have omitted a thing of the utmost importance, which I do believe—the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever: which I apprehend as certainly to determine the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the Divine judgment. Indeed, the prin- ciple of liberty, and that of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, the ancients as well as moderns, * By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe is meant, not proving any thing from those principles, but notwithstanding them. Thus religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity, which is absurd, but notwithstanding, or even though, that opinion were admitted to be true CHAP. VIIT. | OF NATURE TO RELIGION. ott have formed their language upon it. And probably it may ap- pear in mine, though I have endeavoured to avoid it; and, in srder to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to express my- self in a manner which will appear strange to such as do not observe the reason for it; but the general argument here pur- sued, does not at all suppose, or proceed upon, these principles. Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view than merely as a question of fact; and in this view it is here con- sidered. It is obvious that Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. And even natural religion is properly a matter of fact. For, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is so; and this proposition contains the general system of natural religion. But then, several abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are usually taken into consideration in the peoof of it; whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of fact. To explain this: that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth; but that they ap- pear so to our mind, is only a matter of faet. And this last must have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, who would not have admitted the former ; but pre- tended to doubt, Whether there were any such thing as truth ; or, Whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case. So likewise, that there is, in the nature of things, an original standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all will, but which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise that moral government over the world which religion teaches, i. e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively ag they act right or wrong; this assertion contains an abstract truth, as well as matter of fact. But suppose, in the present state, every man, without exception, was rewarded and pun- ished, in exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of right and wrong, which God has implanted in the nature of every man; this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. And though this fact were acknow- ledged by every one, yet the very same difficulties might be raised, as are now, concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness: and we should have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that the government of the world was per- fectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those ques- tions: and this proof would remain, in what way soc ver they 312 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY, &c. [PART IT. were determined. And thus, God having given mankind a mora. faculty, the object of which is actions, and which natu- rally approves some actions as right and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong and of ill desert; that he will, finally and upon the whole. reward the former, and punish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as his doing so at present would be. ‘This future fact I have not indeed proved with the force with which it might be proved, from the principles of liberty and moral fitness; but without them, have given a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the general analogy of nature; a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown not to be de- monstrative, for it is not offered as such; but impossible, J think, to be evaded. or answered. And thus the obligations of religion are made out, exclusively of the questions concerning liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed with dif culties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may. Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force of this treatise. 6 will be, to such as are convinced of religion, upon the proof arising out of the two last-mentioned principles, an additional proof and a confirmation of it: to such as do not admit those principles, an original proof of it,* and a confirma: tion of that proof. .Those who believe, will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened: those who do not believe, will at least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Chris- tianity false; the plain undoubted credibility of it; and, I hope, a good deal more. And thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that malogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from it in a disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question but that it is a real one. for religion, both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous facts; analogy, being a zonfirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, as it is the anly proof of most, cannot but be admitted by every one to be 4 material thing, and truly of weight on the side of religion, ooth natural and revealed; and it ought to be particularly re- garded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings. thc Mnmne. ss * Pages 172, &c. PART II.] SONCLUSION. 3138 CONCLUSION WHATEVER account may be given of the strange inatténtion and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter of such importance as religion, it would, before experience, be incredi- ble, that there should be the like disregard in those, who have had the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculeated upon them; because this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions to convince an unprejudiced understanding, that there is a God who made and governs the world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties; when once such are raised; when the very meaning of those words, which express most intelligibly the general doctrine of religion, is pre. tended to be uncertain, and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of speculation. But to an unpreju diced mind, ten thousand thousand instances of design, cannot bat prove a Designer. And it is intuitively manifest, that creatures ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker; and that justice and charity must he his laws, to creatures whom he has made social, and placed in society. Indeed, the truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its being received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of mind, as inattention to natural reli.” gion; because, when both are laid before us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. For revelation claims to be the voice of God; and our obligation to attend to his voice, is surely moral in all cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive, upon thorough consideration of it;.s0 it offers itself to us with manifest obvious appearayces of having somo- thing more than human in it, and therefore in all reason req:ures, to have its claims most seriously examined into. It is to be 27 * 314 CONCLUSION. [PART M1. added, that though light and knowledge, in what manner socver afforded us, is equally from God; yet a miraculous revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and awe: and this is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what claims to be so with such appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain, that our obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence uf Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense. Let us then suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously in quired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of inf delity. And all of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect of. religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its restraints. Some go much beyond this. They deride God’s moral government over the world: they renounce his protection, and defy his justice: they ridicule and vihify Christianity, ana blaspheme the Author of it; and take all occasions to manifest a scorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an active setting themselves against religion; to what may be considered 1s a positive principle of irreligion; which they cultivate within themselves, and, whether they intend this effect or not, render habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. And others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless. Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons act upon what they think principles of reason, and otherwise they are not to be argued with ; it is really inconceiva- ble, that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all; nor do they pre- tend this. They are far indeed from having a just notion of its evidence; but they would not say its evidence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of science or history. So that their manner of treating it must proceed, either from such kind of objections against all religion, as have been answered or obvi- ated in the former part of this treatise; or else from objections and difficulties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revela- tion and miraculous interpositions. They find things in Serip. ture, whether in incidental passages or in the general scheme of - PART II.] CONCLUSION. 31a it, which appear to them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if Christianity were true, the light of it must have been more general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather overbearing; that it must and would have been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable ; but quite another thing. It is being fortified against the evi- lence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see the system of Christianity or somewhat which appears to them neces- sarily connected with it. to be incredible or false: fortified against that evidence, which might otherwise make great impression upon them. Or lastly. if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their be- haviour seems owing to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that such doubtipg is in a manner the same thing, as being certain against it. To these persons, and to tkis state of opinion concerning reli- gion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. for all the general objections against the moral system of nature having been obvia- ted, it is shown that there is net any peculiar presumption at all against Christianity, either considered as not discoverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered; nor any worth mentioning, against it as miraculous, if any at all; none cer- tainly, which can render it in the least incredible. It is shown, that upon supposition of a divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think probable, that many things in it must appear liable to great objections, and that we must be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very utmost importance: but it is urged, as J hope it will be understood, with great caution of not vilifying the faculty of reason, which is “ the candle of the Lord within us ;” though it can afford no light where it does not shine; nor judge, where it has no principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being first answered in the view of objections against Chris- tianity as a matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more immediately, against, the wisdom, justice, and good- ness of the Christian dispensation. And it is fully made out. that they admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections against the constitution of nature admit of : that, as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things. which, upon farther consideration and knowledge of their re!n 316 CONCLUSION. [PART II tions to other things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly credible, that the things objected against the wisdom and good- ness of the Christian dispensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness by their reference to other things beyond our view; because Christianity is a scheme as much above our comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from our ignorance; but from somewhat posi- tive, which our observation shows us. For to like objections, the like answer is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel] cases. The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated in general and together; the chief of them are considered dis tinctly, and the particular things objected to-are shown credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of na- ture. Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive state, and to be © restored, and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our recovery; it were to have been expected, it is said, that this should have been effected at gnce, and not by such a long series of means, and such a various economy of persons and things; one dispensation preparatory to another, this to a farther one, and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished ; a scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning revelation to be highly unreasona- ble; and is a satisfactory answer to them, when urged as objec- tions against the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence in the redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to be accomplished in this manner. As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a Mediator between God and man; this has been shown to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature, i. e. the God of Nature, in appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we — experience in the daily course of Providence. The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances; inferred, that human nature was fallen from its original rectitude, and in - PART I1.] CONCLUSION. 317 consequence of this, degraded from its primitive happiness. Or, however this opinion came into the world, these appearances must have kept up the tradition and confirmed the belief of it And as it was the general opinion, under the light of nature, that repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was noi sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to it; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such conclusion; so every day’s experience - hows us, that refurmation is not, in any sort, sufficient to pre- vent the present disadvantages and miseries, which, in the natu- ral course of things, God has annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments, which, by the general laws of divine government, are annexed to vice, may be prevented ; that provision may have been even originally made, that they should be prevented by some means or other, though they could not by reformation alone. For we have daily instances of such mercy, in the general conduct of nature; com- passion provided for misery,* medicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original consti- tution of the world, that much of the natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others; assistance, which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to afford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay in wickedness, and consequently, in ruin, ‘God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son,’ to save it; and, “he being made perfect by suffering, became the author of eternal salva- tion to all them that obey him.’+ Indeed, neither reason nor analogy would Jead us to think, in particular, that the interpo- sition of Christ, in the manner in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world, which the Scrip- ture teaches us it was: but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other particular means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows they are, in numberless in- stances. And therefore, as the case before us does not admit of experience; so that neither reason nor analogy can show, how, or in what particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy which it is there repre- sented to be; this is no kind or degree of presumption against its being really of that efficacy. Farther: the objections against * Sermon 6th, at the Rolls. + John iii. 16. Heb. v. 9. 27* ——— 318 } CONCLUSION. [PART JF, Christianity, from the iight of it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given us, have been answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the for- mer; but that he dispenses his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds, amongst creatures of the same species, and even to the same individuals at different times, is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from being the method of Providence, in other coses, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity, that, on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to act, in common matters, throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that God has afforded ‘to some, no more than doubtful evidence of religion, the same account may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not impossi- ble,* surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men’s own fault, it deserves their most serious consideration, whether it be not so. However, it is certain, that doubting imphes a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt; and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations, as demonstrative evidence. The whole then of religion is throughout credible; nor is "there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed dispensation of things more different from the experienced constitution and course of ‘nature; than some pazts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it. And if so, the only question which remains, is, What positive evidence van be alleged for the truth of Christianity? This too in general has been considered, and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what ‘che analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them; and then consider, what are the practical consequences from all this, upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon, (for I am writing to persons who entertain these principles J and upon such consideration it will be obvious, that immorality, as little excuse.as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons who have been made acquainted with Christianity, whe- ther they believe it or not; because the moral system of nature, * Page 266. a PART I. | CONCLUSION. 319 or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed, that there is a middle, between a full satisfac- tion of the truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state of mind between these two, consists in a seriou: apprehension, that it may be true, joined with doubt, whethe it be so. And this, upon the best judgment I am able to mak« is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any sceptie can at al be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, with thc proper evidence of it, laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them. For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard of it; because it seems evident, that in many countries called Christian, neither Chris- tianity, nor its evidence, are fairly laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear to be some who have very little attended to either, and who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention; and yet are by no means without understanding in other matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life; a regard, not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same, with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under. Lasily, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, I mean with regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. For there is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; and these, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it. if this be a just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood ; there is no reason to think they would alter their behaviour to any purpose, thongh there were a (lemonstratior of its truth { = TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS. Ca a ae ee pee a I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. hi, OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. (821) ADVERTISEMENT. {n the first copy of these Papers, I had inserted the two following Dissertations into the chapters, Of « Fulure Life, and Of the Moral Government of God; with which they are closely connected.. But as they do not directly fall under the title of the foregoing Treatise, and would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight; it seemed more proper to place them by themselves. (822) DISS. I. ] PERSONAL IDENTITY. 323 DISSERTATION Jf. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. WHETHER we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity, or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in any two successive mo- ments. And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us, the persons who are making it. And though few men can be misled by such sub- tleties, yet it may be proper a little to consider them. Now, when it is asked wherein personal identity consists, the answer should be the same as if it were asked, wherein consists similitude or equality; that all attempts to define, would but perplex it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed to- . gether, there arises to the mind the idea of similitude; or upon swice two and four, the idea of equality; so lkewise, upon comparing the consciousness of one’s self, or one’s own exist- ence in any two moments, there as immediatety arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality, but also show us, that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal; so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two moments; the present sup- pose, and that immediately past; or the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. Or, in other words, by reflecting upon that, which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self. But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain 324 PERSONAL IDENTITY [DISS. 1. our personal identity to ourselves, yet, to say that it makes per. sonal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and there- fore cannot constitute personal identity, any more than know- edge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it pre- upposes. a : This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence, that to be endued with consciousness, is inseparable from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For this might be ex- pressed inaccurately thus—that consciousness makes personality ; and from hence it might be concluded to make personal iden tity. But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel, is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of past actions, or feelings, is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings. The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the common acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal identity; because the word samé, when applied to them and to person, is not only applied to different subjects, but it is also used in different senses. For when a:man swears to the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as to all the purposes of property and uses of common life, and not that the tree has been all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know, whether any one particle of the present, tree — be the same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the word same; it being evidently a con- tradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of their sub- stance, and no one of their properties, is the same: no part of their substance by the supposition; no one of their properties, because it is allowed, that the same property cannocs be trans- ferred from one substance to another. And therefore, when we say the identity, or sameness, of a plant consists in a continua. tion of the same life, communicated under the same organiza- tion, to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or not, the word same, when applied to life and to organization, i P pIsssb}* PERSONAL IDENTITY. $25 cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in thia * very sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life, and the organization, and the plant, are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no any thing, can be the same with that, with which it hath indeed nothing the same. Now, sameness is used in this latter sense when applicd to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of substance. The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, Whether it, i.e. the same self or person, be the same identical substance ? And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the question, than that which he gives it in form. For he defines person, a thinking, intelligent being, §c. and personal identity, the sameness of a rational being.“ The question then is, whe- ther the same rational being is the same substance; which needs no answer, because being and substance, in this place, stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person be the same substance, is said to be this: that the con sciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive moments, is not the same individual action,} that is, not the same consciousness, but different sue cessive consciousnesses. Now, it is strange that this should have occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now, which it was when he contemplated it formerly; yet in this case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception of it in any two moments, cannot be one and the same perception. And thus, though the successive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the same, yet are they conscious- nesses of one and the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent. ‘The person, of whose existence the cun- sciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a year ago, i8 discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the same person; and therefore is one and the same. Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear hasty ; and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions which — i * Locke’s Works, vol. i. p. 146. + Locke, pp. 146, 147, 28 826 PERSONAL IDENTITY. [DISs. a he has made relating to it.* But some of those hasty observa tions have been carried to a strange length by others; whose notion, when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this:+ “That personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing; that it lives and dies, begins and ends, con- tinually : that no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together, than two successive moments can be one and the same moment: that our substance is indeed con- tinually changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose; since it is not substance, but conscious- ness, alone, which constitutes personality ; which consciousness being successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently the personality constituted by it.’ And from hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which befell*us yesterday, or that our present self will be interested in what will befall us to-morrow: since our present self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken for it; to which another self will suc- ceed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow: for if the self or person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only like persons, the person of to-day is really no more inte- rested in what will befall the person of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other person. It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of the opinion we are speaking of; because those who maintain it allow, that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches. And indeed, they do use the words identity and same person. Nor will language permit these words to be laid aside: since, if they . were, there must be, I know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the room of them, But they cannot, consistently with themselves, mean, that the person is really the same. For it is self-evident, that the personality cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it consists is not the_ same. And as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, so,” I think, it appears they do not mean, that the person is really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense: in such a * Locke, p. 152. t See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s third defence of his letter to Mr Dodwell, 2d edit. pp. 44, 56, &e. Diss. 1] PERSONAL IDENTITY. 327 sense only as they assert; for this they do assert, that any num- ber of persons whatever may be the same person. The bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems the best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to be put upon it, I add the following things: First, This notion is absolutely*contradictory to that certain zonviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves: when we reflect upon what is past, and look forward upon what is tocome. All imagination of a daily change of that living agent which ¢ach man calls himself, for another, or of any such change through- out our whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, that though he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, be the same person he is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to act, with respect to a future life, upon this notion, that personality is transient; it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the present. Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to our temporal concerns; and every ene sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter ase. If, therefore, any can take up with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but must be owing to an inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart. _ Secondly, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and action, of happi- ness and misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole time of their existence. Consider then a living being now existing, and which has existed for any time alive: this living being must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly (this living being, I say, and not another) as really as it does and suffers and en- joys, what it does, and suffers, and enjoys, this instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forget- ting; since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoyments, 828 _ PERSONAL IDENTITY. [DIss. 1, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know, or remem ber, or forget, any thing else. Thirdly, Every person is conscious that he is now the same ' person or self he was, as far back as his remembrance reaches; since, when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely, himself, the person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the action was at all done. Nay, very often a person’s assurance of an action having been done, of which he is abso- lutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it. And this he, person, or self, must either be a substance or the property of some substance. If he, if person, — be a substance; then consciousness that he is the same person, is consciousness that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property. of a substance; still consciousness that he is the same property, is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness that he remains the same substance would: be; since the same property cannot be trans- ferred from one substance to another. But though we are thus certain that we are the same agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly be deceived in it? And this question may be asked at the end of any demonstration whatever; because it is a ques- tion concerning the truth of perception by memory. And he who can doubt, whether perception by memory can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or, indeed, whether intuitive perception can. Here then, we can go no farther. Tor it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other percep- tions of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than ey the use or means of those very suspected faculties them- selves, DIss. II.] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 329 DISSERTATION ITI. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. Tua which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions: so also are we. But addi-' tional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous, and of good: desert ; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill-desert. That we have this moral approving and disapproving* faculty is cer- tain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters : from the words, right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many others of like signification in all languages, applied to actions and characters; from the many written sys- tems of morals which suppose it; since it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout all these treatises, had abso- lutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical: from our natural sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good and * This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,* and is made use of, as seeming the most full and the least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, doxtpao- tix} and axodoxtpasrix}, upon a double account; because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from all other facul- ‘ties, or natural principles of action: in the very same manner, as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood; and, at the same time, is attended with a conscious- ness upon reflection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs * to it. * Arr. Epict. lib.»i.. cap. 1. 28 * rd 330 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [POL soe intending it; from.the like distinction, every one makes between injury and nzre harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to man- kind; and between injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the consideration of human laws. It is manifest, great part of common language, and of common behaviour over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty ; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of, the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both.* Nor is it at all doubtful in general, what course of action this faculty, or practical dis- cerning power within us, approves, and what it disapproves. For, as much.as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars, yet,, in general, there is in reality an universally acknowledged stand- ard of it. It is that which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public; it is that which every man you meet puts on the show of; it is that which the primary and funda- mental laws of all civil constitutions, over the face of the earth, make it their business and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon mankind; namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common ggod: It being manifest, then, in general, that we have such a taculty, or discernment as this, it may be of use to remark seme things, more distinctly, concerning it. . First, It ought to be observed, tliat the object of this faculty is actions, comprehending under that name, active or practical principles; those principles from which men would act, if occa- sions and circumstances gave them power; and which, when fixed and habitual in any person, we call, his character. It does not appear, that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events; or that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all * [Butler’s meaning appears to be that, if it be referred to the understanding, it differs from other acts of the understanding, in par- taking of the nature of feeling; and that, if it be referred to the heart.or feelings, it must be allowed to partake of the fature of per- ception. Compare the language of Adam Smith, in describing the system of Hutcheson. ‘* This sentiment being of a peculiar nature, distinct from every other, and the effect of a particular power of per- ception, they give it a particular name, and call it a moral sense.”— Part vi. chap. ill. p. 856. —F. | old? dperh Kai kaxia—év reicet, adda évepyeiag M. Anton. lib. 9, 16.—* Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Offic. lib. 1, c. 9. piss. ‘.] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 331 an olject to their perception. But to ours they are: und they are the object, and the only one, of the approving and disap. -proving faculty. Acting, conduct, behaviour, abstracted from all regard to what is, in fact and event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural object of the moral discernment, as specula- tive truth and falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such consequences, indeed, is always included; for it is part of the action itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of the action, as if they did. In like manner, we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil which persons of such characters have it actually in their power to do. We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or, for. having impressions made upon us which we con. sider as altogether out of our power; but only for what we do or would have done, had it been in our power; or for what we leave undone which we might have done, or would have léft un- done though we could have done it. Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions, as morally good or evil, implies m it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill desert. It may be difficult to explain this percep- tion, so as to answer all the questions which might be asked concerning it; but every one speaks of such actions as deserving punishment ; ‘and it is not, [ suppose, pretended, that they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now the mean- ing plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of society, that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer. For if unhappily it were resolved, that a man who, by some innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left to perish, lest, by other people’s coming near him, the infection should spread ; no one would say, he deserved this treatment. Inno- cence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always supposes guilt; and if one be not part of the other, yet they are evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The sight ofa man in misery raises our compassion towards him; and, if this misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty, our compassion exceedingly lessens, and, in many instances, our indignation wholly subsides. Now, w shat produces this effect, is ihe conception cf that in the sufferer. which we call ill desert ao OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. . [DISS. IL. Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of vies and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. And thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural and moral evil, wickecaess and punishment. If this association were merely artifical or accidental, it were nothing ; but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead of endeavouring to explain it away. It may be observed farther, concerning our perception of good and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to common instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that it does not appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this prin- ciple is prevalent ; since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act well in many common instanées. And on the other hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to such vices. For, vice in human creatures con- sisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle, though a man be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not from thence appear, to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears is, that he shad it not in such a degree, as to prevail over the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would have rendered him proof against common temptations. ‘ Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. or the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do, would, in many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest degree vicious. And this determination must arise from such comparison, ‘and be the result of it; because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And iteis the same also with respect to positive vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought not. For, every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or child, and by one of mature and common under. standing; though the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the action, be the same; as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capable, not only of doing mischief, but also of intending it. Now, this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious; and the want of which .n the other, renders the same action innocent or less vicious; vISS. II. ] _ OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 838 and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previcus to our determining an action to be vicious. And hence arises a proper application of the epithets, incongruous, unswitadle, dis- proportionate, unfit, to actions which our moral faculty deter mines to be vicious. Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without reason, than to make other people so; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has committed to their care. It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence in our language; it should seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blameable: since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion of this last kind of perception, is satisfaction or uneasiness; whereas the object of the first is active behaviour. In one case, what our thoughts fix upon, is our condition; in the other, our con- duct. It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly either in ourselves or others, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty; I suppose, be- cause that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we always carry about with us, renders such sensible dis- ipprobation less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from impru- lently neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring our- selves, than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others, to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard; and also because imprudence and folly, appearing ty bring its own punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious behaviour, it less needs the additional punishment. which would be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible indignation against it, as against injustice and fraud and cruelty. Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natural gbject of compassion, the unhappiness which people bring upor themselves, though it be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this, of course, lessens our displeasure against them. 28 * . 334 OF THE. NATURE OF VIRTUE. | ([DISS. M But still it is matter of experience, that we arv formed so, as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of imprudent. neglects and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others. In. instances of this kind, men often say of themselves with re- morse, and of others with some indignation, that they deserved: to suffer such calamities, because they brought them upon them- selves, and would not take warning. Particularly, when per- sons come to poverty and distress by a long course of extrava- gance, and after frequent admonitions, though without falsehood’ or injustice; we plainly do not regard such people as alike ob-. jects of compassion, with those who are brought into the same condition by unavoidable accidents. Irom these things it ap- pears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice: meaning by folly, somewhat quite different from mere incapa- city; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to our own happiness, which we had capacity for. And this the word properly includes, and as it seems, in its usual acceptation; for we scarce apply it to brute creatures. However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as not applicable to prudence and folly; but must beg leave to insist, that the faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves imprudent ones; J say, prudent and imprudent actions as such, and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion. And by the way, this observation may help to determine, what justness there is in that objection against religion, that it teaches us to be interested and selfish. Fifthly, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, vir- tue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it may be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in the review of one’s own character, or that of others, our moral understanding, and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing, but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting, That is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some per: sons rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon any other account, than merely as an overbalance of hap- piness was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by the second. But now, on the contrary, suppose twe men competitors for any thing whatever, which would be of Oe a te a DISS. IT. } OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 335° equal advantage to each of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent, than for a stranger to busy )iimself to get one of them preferred to the other; yet such endeavour would be virtue, in behalf of a friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant consequences: as that examples of gratitude and the cultivation of friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his labour, with intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, would have as much pleasure from it. 4s would balance the pleasure which the first possessor would h..ve ‘had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also that no bad consequences would follow; yet such an action would surely be vicicus. Nay far- ther, were treachery, violence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of misery to society ; then, if in any case a man could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon others by it, would amount to, such a piece of injustice would not be faulty or vicious at all, because it would be no more than, in any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another’s in equal degrees. The fact then appears to be, that we are con- stituted so, as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injus- tice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others,’ abstracted from all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery. And _ there- fore, were the Author of Nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were his moral char- acter merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition, indeed, the only reason of his giving us the above-mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of our nature would produce more happiness, than forming us with a temper of mere general benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us, and benevolence, to some preferably to others, virtue, abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to produce. Now if human creatures are endowed with such a moral na- ture as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural object of which is actions; moral governmeut must con- 336: OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [DIss. Ti. sist in rendering them happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty ;* in rewarding and punish- ing them upon account of their so doing. I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, con- tradicted what any author designed to assert. But some of great and distinguished merit have, I think, expressed them- selves in a manner which may occasion some danger to careless readers, of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state; and the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance ot unhappiness in it; than which mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that some of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of persecution, may, in many sup- posable cases, not have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery in the present state; perhaps some- times may have the contrary appearance. For this reflection might easily be carricd on; but I forbear.—The happiness of the world is the concern of him who is the Lord and the Pro- prietor of it; nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavour to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has direvted; i. e. indeed, in all ways not con- trary to veracity and justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeavouring, in some sort, to do good without regard to these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed endeavours proceed, almost always, from ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed, perhaps, in great measure from persons themselves. And though it is our busi- ness and our duty to endeavour, within the bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-creatures; yet from our short views, it 1s greatly uncertain whether this endeavour will, in particular mstances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole; since-so many and distant things must come into the account. And that which makes ié our duty, is, that there is some appearance that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side; and also, that * Part i. chap. 6, p. 176. os wd ws D1ss. .] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. such benevolent endeavour is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence. However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule of life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech generally understood, cannot be falsehood, and in general that there can be no designed falsehood without designing to deceive. It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his intending it. For it is impossible not to foresee, that the words and actions of men in different ranks and employments, and of different educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each other; and it cannot but be so, whilst they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges of, even though they considered it with great attention. INDEX. ABSTRACT REASONING. May be, with propriety, joined with the observation of facts, 88. From the opinion of necessity, fallacious, 169, 170. ACTION. This world a theatre of, 164. As distinguished from the thing done; the chief object of religion, 269, 270. ACTIONS. Pleasure and pain, the consequences of our, 107. To be distinguished from their moral quality, as virtuous or vicious, 123. The provision made, that all their bad consequences should not always actually follow, 242. Will and design constitute their nature as such, 330. Distinguished from events, 330. AFFLICTION. | The proper discipline for resignation, 162, 163. ANALOGY. Butler’s, a work demanded by the times in which it was written, 15. Force of the argument in the, 16, 312. Topics embraced in the, 89, 90. The objection against, as being unsatisfactory, answered, 308, 309. Upon what principles the argument in, is conducted, 310, 311. In general, a just and conclusive mode of reasoning, 85. When applied to religion, superior to hypothesis and speculation, 86-89. Whately’s definition of, 82. Mill’s definition of, 82. Butler’s sense of the term, 82. Sad ANALOGY [between the course of nature and the moral system of tho world]. ‘ Affords no ground fcr believing that death will destroy our living yowers, 94. ( 339 ) 840 INDEX. ANALOGY — continued. Confirms the proof of the indiscerptibility of living agents, 96. Gives credibility to the doctrine of future rewards and punishmen*s, 111. Answers objections against future punishments, 112-115. Between our trial in our tsmporal and that in our religious capacity, 140-142. Between the beginning of life, as a preparation for mature age, and our present state, as a preparation for a future one, 146-164. Of the waste of seeds, as answering the objection, that the present state is not, to many, a discipline in virtue, 161. . Between the speculative reason and the moral understanding, 176. Argument from, not affected by the scheme of necessity, 165-181. Answers objections against the wisdom and goodness of God’s govern- ment, indirectly, 180. Between God’s natural and his moral government, as to their vastness and incomprehensibleness, 181, 182. Between the natural and the moral world, as regards means and ends, 184, 185. Affords no argument against the general scheme of Christianity, 213. No presumption from, against a revelation at the beginning of the world, considered as miraculous, 215-217. Answers supposed presumptions against miracles, 217-219. Shows objections against Christianity itself, 4s distinguished from objections against its evidence, to be frivolous, 221-223. Makes it probable that, if we judge of Christianity by preconceived expectations, we shall find many things seeming liable to objec- tions, 222, 223. Between natural information and inspiration, 223, 224. More particularly, between the limitations and hindrances of natural in- formation and the instruction afforded us by revelation, 226, 228. Between the use of miraculous gifts and the use of the gifts of memery, eloquence, &¢., 227, 228. Makes it credible that the.Scripture contains truths as yet undisco- vered, 228. Between Christianity, as a remedial system, and the natural remedies for disease, 229, 230. . Answers objections against the wisdom of the means used by Chris tianity, 235. Makes it credible that the Christian dispensation may have been af along carried. on by general laws, 235, 236. . Answers objections against Christianity, as being a slowly- operat and complicated scheme, 238, 239. Removes all presumption against the general notion of a Mediator, 246 eT ge - oy, Pg INDEX. 34] ANALOGY -~‘continued. Makes it supposable that future punishment may follow vice, by way ef natural consequence, 240, 241. Shows that we have no reason to believe that repentance alone will prevent future punishment, 244, 245. Answers the objection that the death of Christ represents God as indif. ferent whether he punishes the innocent or the guilty, 252-256, Shows that we cannot expect to have the like information concerning God’s conduct as concerning our own duty, 254, 255. Answers objections from the want of universality in revelation and the doubtfulness of its evidence, 256, 257. Of a prince sending directions to his servants, whether applicable te God, 269. Between prophecy and satirical and mythologic writing, 284, 285. Between a prophet and a compiler of memoirs, 285. Objections against arguing from the Analogy of nature to religion, 303-312. ANTIQUITY. Of religion, as one of its evidences, 174. ANTONINUS, M. | Quoted, 103, 330, n. ARISTOTLE. Quoted, 154, n. ATONEMENT. Our ignorance of the manner in which the ancients understood it to be made, 251. ATTENTION. £ . Moral, how exercised and disciplined by the circumstances of our trial, 159. AUGUSTINE. Quoted, 199, n. AUTHOR OF NATURE. Existence of, assumed in this treatise, 87. Reveals himself to us as a righteous Governor, 118. Is deliberate in his operations, 238, 239. BUTLER, JOSEPH. Birth and education, 7, 8 Friendship with Secker, 8, Correspondence with Dr. Clarke, 9. Joins the established church, 10. Appointed preacher at the Rolls’ Court, 10 Publishes hij fifteen sermons, 11, 12. 29 * 342 INDEX BUTLER, JOSEPH. —- continued. Defence of his style, 14. Publishes the Analogy, 15. Bishop of Bristol and Dean of St. Paul’s, 18. Refuses the primacy, 18. Bishop of Durham, 19. His plan of Episcopacy for America, 20. Charge to clergy of Durham, 20-22. His benevolence, 24%, 23. Sickness and death, 24. Appearance, 25. Character, 26. Position in theology, 26. BHITAVIOUR. Of men in their present state of trial, 141, 142. BENEVOLENCEH. Absolute, defined ; whether it is tha only character of God, 118. God’s, toward us, how limited, 118. And the want of it, not the whole of virtue ana vice, 234, 335. BERKELEY, BISHOP. Quoted, 169, n. BODY. Our present, relation of, to us not necessary to thinking, 96. BODIES. Our organized, may be presumed to be no part of ourselves, 96. Made up of organs and instruments of perception and motion, 98 10@ BRAHMANS. Their notion of death, 103, n. BRUTE FORCE. Natural tendency of reason to prevail over, 128-130. BRUTES. Question of their natural immortality argued, 100, 101. Instinct of, superior in some things to the reason of men, 226. Have no reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events, 330. CERTAINTY. Moral, highest degree of probable evidence, 83. CHALMERS, DR. His view of Butler’s argument in P. I. ch. 1, 106. Quoted, 117, 122, 138, 145, 187, 218, 220, 272. CHANCE. In reality, no such thing as, 236. CHANGES. ‘ Which we have already undergone, afford a presumption in favour of a future existence, 91, 95-97. The, which various creatures may undergo without destruction, 91, 92, INDEX. 343 CHARACTER. What is meant by, 171. n. Our capability of forming a new, 150. Of virtue and piety, a necessary qualification for a future state, 153. Our capacity of improvement therein, 153-158. Our moral, to be manifested to the creation by means of a state of trial, 164. CHILDHOOD. A state of discipline for mature age, 151. HRIST. The Scriptural representation of his interposition as Mediator, 247-249, His prophetical, regal, and priestly offices, 250-251. . His sacrifice not an allusion to the Mosaic sacrifices, 250-251: Ground of its efficacy not explained in Scripture, 251. Objection against the death of, as a propitiatory sacrifice, 252-256. Sufferings of, voluntary, 253. CHRISTIANS. Primitive, their conversion and zeal, as proving the reality of tra Scripture miracles, 277, 278. CHRISTIANITY. Not, if it be from God, of small impurtance, 199. A republication of natural religion, and with what circumstances of advantage, 199-204. Has brought life and immortality to light, 201. Preserves the knowledge of religion for all ages, by means of a visible church, 201, 202. Good effects of, not small, and alleged ill effects do not properly be- long to it, 203. Contains an account of a aeponeatans not discoverable by reason, carried on by the Son and Spirit, 204. Enjoins, in consequence, new duties, not otherwise to be ascertained, 204, 205. No presumption against the general scheme of, whether considered miraculous or not, 213-215: None, because it is not discoverable by reason or experience, 214, 215: None, because it is unlike the known course of nature, 214, 215. - Objections against, as distinguished from objections against its evi- dence, frivolous, 221. True question concerning, is whether it be a real revelation, not whether it is such a one as we might have expected, 224. : What objections against, would be valid, 224, 225. | Practical part of, plain and obvious, 228. Objection against, from the long delay of its publication to the world, 229, 230. 344 INDEX. CHRISTIANITY — continued. Objections against the goodness and wisdom of, not valid, 233, 237. See Revelation, Revealed Religion. CHRISTIAN DISPENSATION. May appear natural to some beings in the universe, I05. CHURCH. The visible, design of the institution of, 201, 202. The carrying out of its design, implies positive institutions, 202, CICERY. Quoted, 330, n. CLARKE, DR. SAMUEL. His “‘ Demonstration,” 9, 167, n. COMPASSION. ; Evidence of, in the original constitution of the world, 242. Unhappiness the natural object of, 333. CONSCIENCE. How it appears that we have the faculty so called, 329, 330. Includes both a sentiment of the understanding and a perception of the heart, 330. Has for its object actions, 330, 331. CONSCIOUSNESS. Indivisibility of, a proof of the indivisibility of the conscious being, 95. Does not constitute personal identity, but ascertains it to ourselves, 324, 325. The doubt on this subject shown to be groundless, 325. SONTINUANCE. Of all things, natural presumption in favour of, 93. CORRESPONDENCE. Between our nature and our condition, necessary to life and happi- ness, 146. ? CREATION. Scripture begins with the, in order to ascertain for us the truc objest of our worship, 289. CREATURE. Notion of an upright and finitely perfect one, 154, 155. In what way such a one may fall, 155, 156. CREDIBILITY. (Of a truth or matter of fact, distinguished from the wisdom and goods ness of it, 180. > INDEX. 845 H\ANGERS. Implied in our state of probation for a future life, 142. DANIEL. The book of, referred to, 286, 287. DEATH. Known to us only in some of its effects, 94. Not likely, from any thing we know, to destroy living agents, 93: Nor their present powers of reflection, 101, 102: Nor even to suspend the exercise of those powers, 102-104. Like our birth, may put us into a more enlarged state of life, 103. Notion of the Brachmans concerning, 103. DEFINITIONS. Sometimes serve only to perplex, 323. DEGRADATION. Marks of our being in a state of, 142, 148, 247. DEMONSTRATION. As distinguished from probable evidence, 83. DESCARTES. An example of those thinkers who would frame a world upon hypo» thesis, 86. DESERT. Good and ill, the perception of, defined, 331. DISCIPLINE. Effect of, to improve the principle of virtue in us, 155. Needed by upright creatures, 153-157. Indispensably necessary for corrupt creatures, 157, 158. Tkis world peculiarly fit to be a place of, for our moral improvement, 158-160. DIFFICULTIES. In religion, unreasonable to expect to have them all cleared, 304, 305. As to the evidence of religion, are analogous to those attending the practice of it, 264. These may be the principal part of some persons’ trial, 265, 266. DIFFERENT. Degrees of evidence in religious matters consistent with justice, 259. - DIFFERENCE. ” Of mon’s situations in religious matters, to be accounted for in the game manner as their different situations in other respects, 260 Would fot be prevented, though revelation were universal, 260. 846 INDEX. DISEASES. Of the body and the mind, analogy between the remedies for, 229, 230 Mortal diseases, not affecting our intellectual powers, afford a presump- tion that those powers will not be destroyed by them, 162. DOUBT. Implies some degree of evidence for that of which we doubt, 263. With regard to religion, implies an obligation to regard it in practice 264. DREAMS. Our experience of, what it shows us, 99. DUTIES. Our, to the Son and Spirit, arise out of their relations to us, and are strictly moral, 205, 206. Moral and positive, distinguished. 208. ECCLESIASTES. Quoted, 146, and n. END. The whole, for which God made and governs the world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties, 109. See Means and Ends. ENTHUSIASM. Christianity not such a scheme as would have been expected from, 232. As an objection ta the Christian evidences, considered and answered, 278-282. Will not account for the conversion and zeal of the first Chris tians, 279. Religion not peculiarly liable to, 280. The case of enthusiasm and knavery combined considered, 280, 281. General observations upon, cannot overthrow direct historical evidence, 281, 282. EPICTETUS. Quoted, 329, n. EVIDENCE. Probable and demonstrative, distinguished, 83. See Probable Hviden:e, The external, for natural religion, 174, 175. Of Scripture, reason competent to judge of, 231. Doubt implies some degree of, 263. Circumstantial, often as convincing as the most direct, 300. Not only increased, but multiplied, by the adding together of separate, probable proofs, 300. INDEX. 847 EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. The state in which it is left, not inconsistent with justice, 259. Not inconsistent with wisdom and goodness, 260-266. Doubtfulness of, may put men into a state of trial, 261-264. A state of trial similar to that from external circumstances of tempta- tion, 264-266. Our dissatisfaction with, may be our own fault, 267, 268. Lies level to men of common capacity, 268, 269. Total result of the direct and collateral, may be compared with the effect in architecture, 273. Direct and circumstantial, view of, as forming one argument, 287- 302. Safer to admit it, than to reject it, 301. Cannot, from its nature, be destroyed, though it may be lessened, 302. True question with regard to, 309. EVIL. Prevalence of, no argument against the power or goodness of God, 108, n. | Permission of, may be beneficial to the world, 185. y Yet would have been better if men had refrained from it, 185. Reliefs and remedies originally provided for, 242. EXAMPLE AND EDUCATION. . Effect of a bad, in increasing the dangers of our state of trial, 142. EXISTENCE. Necessary, in what sense attributed to God, 166. EXTERNAL. Objects, as related tw the particular affections of our nature, 154. - Circumstances, one of the sources of trial in our present state, 140. — FALL OF MAN. Explicable, from the nature of particular affections, 155, 156. Not accounted for, solely from the principle of liberty, 156. Appearances of a, in nature, 142. Our condition resulting from the, does not afford just matter of com plaint, 143. The Christian dispensation grounded upon the supposition of a, 245. The Scriptural account of it analogous and conformable to what we see and experience, 247. FALSEHOOD. The several kinds of it, 280. Whether the use of certain forms of speech ig. 387. 348 INDEX. FATALIST, THE. His scheme of the world stated, 166. Shown, by pertinent examples, to be absurd in practice, 168-170 His objection to the justice of punishments refuted, 171. Religious and irreligious fatalists distinguished, 178, 179, n. PATE, See Necessity. BEAR AND HOPE. Legitimate moral motives, 161. Of future punishnent and reward, cannot be got rid of by greater part of the world, 124. FINAL CAUSES. The notion of, does not. always imply that the end designed is an- swered, 161. The pleasures and pains attending our actions, instances of, 111. The proof from, of the existence of God, not destroyed by the schemes of necessity, 166, 167. FITNESS, MORAL. Whether, and in what sense, it determines the will of God, 173, n. The proof of religion from, not insisted on in this treatise, 173, 310. - And unfitness of actions, in what sense understood, 332, 333. . FITZGERALD, PROFESSOR. Quoted, 83, 86, 92, 108, 119, 131, 134, 136, 149, 154, 169, 178, 180, 197 201, 208, 216, 232, 273, 295, 300, 330. FOLLY. Defined and shown to be akin to vice, 333, 334. Of mankind, as to present and future interests compared, 141. FUTURE STATE. A, will probably be a social one, 105, 158. Question of, why so important to us, 107. Three questions relative to, considered, 103, n. Demonstration of, not of diself a proof of religion, 105. Yet implied in religion, 106. Security of the good in, may be derived from the habits formed in a state of probation, 158. This life a state of discipline for, P. I. ch. v. #UTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. Will differ only in degree from those of our present state, 135. As conceived by natural reason, and as specially described in Scrip. ture, 114, n. . NDE 849 FUTURE PUNISHMENTS. General consideration of, belongs to natural religion, 114. Doctrine of, shown by Analogy to be altogether credible, 112-115, May follow vice, by way of natural consequence, 241. Reformation and repentance alone insufficient to prevent them, 244, 245, See Punishments. » GENERAL LAWS. The manifest wisdom of carrying on the natural government of the world by means of, 185. Interruptions of, would produce evil and prevent good, 186. Credible that the Christian dispensation may have been, all along, carried on by, 235-237. And hence, that miracles may proceed from, 236. Only from Analogy, that we conclude the whole course of nature to be carried on by, 236. GIFTS. Superior, not always bestowed on persons of prudence and decency, 227, 228. | GOD. True idea of, that ef a Governor, 111. His Existence: Why taken for granted in this treatise, 87. Not disproved by the scheme of fatalism, 166, 167. ° In what sense necessary, 166. His Will: How determined, 173, n. May be considered as absolute or conditional, 270. | Resignation to His will, an essential part of virtue, 162, 163. What temper of mind in us corresponds to his sovereignty, 163. And character, what is meant by, as applied to Him, 171. His Goodness: May seek to make only the good happy, 109. Shown by experience to be no good ground for expecting him te make us happy all at once, 163. Does not give us the same information concerning his conduct as con- cerning our duty, 254, 255. Dictates of conscience, the laws of, 172. Our duties to God the Father: to the Son and to the Holy Sprit, 204-206. &50’S GOVERNMENT. End of, probably beyond the reach of our faculties, 109. His natural government of us, by rewards and punishments, 107-116. The course of nature, but another name for, 109. Not the less certainly established, though in it He act not immediately, 110; 111: His moral government: Proofs of its existence and operaéion, 117-137 30 850 INDEX. GOD’S GOVERNMENT. ~-continued. Not yet, in this present state, carried on to its perfection, 119. Ye tends to perfection, 128. His natural and moral government compared, 180-189. May both together make up one scheme, 182. Likely that, as His natural government is a scheme beyond our com. prehension, the moral may be such a one, too, 181-184. His visible government over the world exercised by the mediation of others, 122. 240. 3O0D’s PROVIDENCE. The series of his providential dispensations progressive, 238, 239. Objections to his providence usually founded on our ignorance, 183. How far we are concerned to answer objections against, 306-308. 400D AND EVIL. Natural, the great variety and seeming inequality of their distribution, 256, 257. GOOD MEN. Disposed to befriend good men, as such, 124. Difficulties in the way of their union with each other here, 131. GOODNESS. The Divine. See God. GOVERNMENT, The formal notion of, what it consists in, 110. Natural and moral defined, and distinguished from each other, 117, 118 Domestic and civil, ordained of God, 125. Punishes vice as such, and as hurtful to society, 125. GROTIUS. Quoted, 268, n. GUILT. The idea of, always associated in our minds with that of ill-desert, 332, GUIZOT. Quoted, 239. WABITS. Defined, 147. Our capacity of acquiring them, 147. Distinguished as habits of perception and habits of action, habits of body and habits of mind, 147. Active, may be growing stronger, while passive impressions are be. coming weaker, 148, 149. Of mind, produced by the exertion of inward practical principles, 148, The acquisition of, necessary to us, 150. Of virtue, necessary to all rational creatures, whether virtuous or de. praved, 153. INDEX. 356] HAPPINESS. Our present, mainly depends upon our own behaviour, 107, 108. Why not given to all promiscuously, without regard to conduct, 108, * 109. A result from our nature and condition jointly, 146. Of virtue, possibility of exceptions to, 120, 127. Virtue produces, and tends to produce it in a still higher degree than at present, 121-125, 128-133. The fact that our present, is not to be secured without difficulty and trial, makes it credible that the same may be true of our future, 140, 141. Of mankind, the aiming at, without regard to veracity and justice, not a correct idea of virtue, 336. HEATHEN. World, state of, shows the importance of revealed religion, 197. Different relations of the, to the genuine Scripture revelation, 258. HINDRANCES. The present, of the natural tendencies of virtue, only accidental, 136. HISTORY. What account it gives of the origin of religion, 175. 217. The whole of revelation, including prophecy and doctrine, may be eonsidered as a history, 289. The common, in Scripture, altogether credible, 294. The failure to invalidate the Scripture history, a strong argument in its favour, 290, 291. IDENTITY. Or sameness, different senses of the word, 324. In what sense applied to persons, 325. . Not constituted by consciousness, but ascertained by it, 324. Absurdity of the supposition that we are not the same beings in suc. cessive periods of time, 327, 328. JEWS. A summary of their history, as a nation, 295-297. Their history, as contained in Scripture, confirmed by known fact, 295, 296. Their continuance as a distinct people, in their dispersion, a standing miracle, and a confirmation of the truth of Scripture, 297. Their final restoration, 298. {[GNORANCH, OUR. How this life is a preparation for another, no objection against the credibility of its being so, 152. Of the scheme of nature and of Providence, 182, 183. *, 352 INDEX. IGNORANCE, OUR. — continued. Partial and total, distinguished, 187. When an answer to objections against God’s method of government, and when not, 184, 187. Even total ignorance of the conzzquences of oar actions would not in- validate moral obligation, 188, The argument from, cannot be used equally for or against religion, 188. Arguments from, rather taken from what Analogy teaches us about it, 189. In connexion with the question of the credibility of miracles, 218, 236. In matters of religion, owing frequently to men’s negligence and pre- judices, 266, 267. Of the nature of our condition, natural and moral, and the reasona why we are placed in it, 259, 260. IMAGINATION. The source of erroneous presumptions that death will destroy us, 95. IMPROVEMENT. Of our faculties, in all respects gradual, 150, 151. Our capacity for, 146-150. Necessity for our, in virtue, 150-152. Effected by the acquisition of moral and religious habits, 153. * IMMORALITY. The charge of, against certain precepts in Scripture, not valid, 231. YSNNOCENT. Persons, are appointed, in the course of nature, to suffer for the guilty, 252, 253. : . INSPIRATION. In what manner or degree it should be vouchsafed to mankind, not ascertainable by reason, 223, 224. INTEREST. Sense of, defined, 155, n. In what sense consistent with virtue, and part of its idea, 155, n. As coincident with virtue, needs strengthening by discipline, 155, n. IRREGULARITIES. Apparent, in nature and in Christianity, whence they arise, 237. Unreasonable to expect them to be remedied by occasional interpe sitions, 186. IRRELIGION. ; Its aggravated guilt, beyond that of other vice, 243. Especially in persons of high rank and character, 263. Not justifiable upon any pretence of want of evidence in religion, 264, INDEX. 853 KINGDOM. Idea of a perfectly virtuous and happy, 132, 133. Christ’s, as described in Scripture, 250. KNOWLEDGE. Our, of Scripture, will be perfected in the same way as our knowledge of nature, 228. LANGUAGE. In its very nature, liable to infinite abuse, 226. LIBERTY. Does not, of itself, account for the fall of finite creatures, 156. Why the proof of religion from, is omitted in this treatise, 310, 311. Implied in the constitution of the world, and our condition therein, 169. Doctrine of, shows where the fallacy lies in the scheme of necessity, when reduced to practice, 177. LIFE. Our present, a probation for a future one. As implying trial and dan- ger, 188-144. As intended for moral discipline, 145-164. For the manifestation of character, 164. See Future Life. LIKENESS. Various species of, defined, 83, n. LIVING POWERS. Twofold sense of the phrase, 93, n. Our, not likely to be destroyed by death, 93-104. ‘Their not being exercised, does not imply their non-existence, 94. LOCKE. . Quotation from his: chapter on Probability, 84. His notion of personal identity examined, 325, 326. MACKINTOSH, SIR JAMES. Quoted, 9, 12. MAHOMETANISM. Was not received in the world on the foot of public miracles, 276. MARTYRS. The primitive; their sufferings a testimony to the truth of the Chris. tian miracles, 277, 278. Were not enthusiasts, 279. MATTER. Indiscerptibility of its elementary particles by any natural power, 97. Our being affected by, does not prove it to be part of ourselves, 97. See Body. 30 * Ba4 INDEX. MATTER OF FACT. The system of religion viewed as, irrespective of all speculation, i72, Distinguished from abstract truth, 311. Objections to Christianity, as matter of fact, answered, P. II. ch. 3. MEANS AND ENDS. Events are related to each other as, 184. Our incompetency, prior to experience, to judge of either, 184. No presumption against the wisdom of the means used by Christianity, 235. The objection that they are complicated. and of slow operation, answered, 237-239. MEDIATOR. No presumption from the course of nature against the general notion of a, 240. Scripture view of his office, 247-251. Christian doctrine of, in what respect most objected to, 252. This objection answered, 253-255. See Sacrifice. MICROSCOPES AND GLASSES. Our organs of perception compared with, 98, 99. MIRACLES. In Scripture, effects of, equivalent to habits, 194, n. Prove the system of natural religion, as well as the revealed, 200, 201. No presumption against, at the beginning of the world, 215, 216. The incarnation of Christ an invisible miracle, 215. No argument from Analogy against, after the settlement of the course of nature, 217. - No greater presumption against, than against ordinary facts before proof, 218. Occasions may arise for, in the course of ages, 218. The moral system of the world gives distinct reasons for, 218. Must be compared with the extraordinary phenomena of nature, 219. May be subject tc general laws, 236, 237. The Christian, are recorded in books of authentic, genuine nistory, 273-275. The reality and truth of, affirmed in the epistles of St. Paul, 275, 276, Christianity first preached and received wpon the allegation of, 276-278, Mahometan and Popish not parallel, 276, 277. MIRACULOUS. : Gifts, in the apostolic age; the objection from their disorderly exercise answered, 227, 228. What events, seemingly natural, may be so esteemed, 297. INDEX. 355 MISTAKES, Of transcribers of Scripture: No more than were to have been ex: pected in books of such antiquity, 295. o MORAL. Action, whether the nature of, can be altered by a command, 230, 234. Duties, arise from revealed relations, as well as from those made known by reason, 208. Faculty, our: its dictates the laws of God, in a sense including sane- tions, 172. Hence, affords a proof of religion not tc be invalidated by fatalism, 172. See Conscience. Government. See Government. Evil, voluntary in its very notion, 145. Our inability to account for, 145. Part of religion, why preferred in Scripture to the positive, 209-212. Precepts. See Positive. Theory, Butler’s contributions to, 12. Understanding, our, liable to be impaired and perverted, 175, 176. MORALITY. ‘Of Scripture, reason competent to judge of, 230, 231. Of actions, depends chiefly on the intention of the agent, 329, 330. Partly, also, on a comparison of his intentions with his nature and capacities, 332. MOTION. Supposed indivisible, compared with consciousness, 95. MYSTERIES. To be expected, if we judge from experience, in such a scheme as Christianity, 222. 235. As great in nature as in Christianity, 236, 237. 252-255. NATURE. Light of, insufficient, 197. Teachings of, as to a future state, and the efficacy of repentance, 114, n. 243-245. v‘ourse of, implies an operating agent, 109. 241. No presumption against revealed religion, from its being unlike the, 214, 215. How ascertained to be by general laws, 235, 236. Is not a fixed, but a progressive scheme, 105. Our ignorance of the causes, &c., on which it depends, 218, We know not what is the, upon the first peopling of worlds, 215 as a source of our trial, 140, 141. 856 INDEX. NATURAL. ; True sense of the term, 105. Our notion of what is, may be enlarged by a greater knowledge of the works and the providence ef God, 105. God’s natural government probably subservient to his moral, 182. Religion, Christianity a republication, and an external institution of, 199-204. Sse Government — Religion. ‘ NECESSARY. . Existence of God, in what sense to be understood, 166. NECESSITY. Opinion of, Butler’s mode of considering, 165. Does not exclude deliberation and choice, 166. Does not destroy the*proof of an intelligent author and Govgrnor of nature, 166. . Supposed reconcilable with the course of nature, is reconcilable also with the system of religion, 167-171. Does not destroy the proof of religion, 171-175. However true in speculation, yet shown by experience to be false in practice, 168-170. The attributes of veracity, binevolence, and justice in God, reconcilable with, 171. The conclusion from, that it is incredible that God should reward and punish us, fallacious, 176, 177. In what sense destructive of religion, and in what sense not, 178. NEGLIGENCE. . Ne more excusable in matters of revealed, than of natural religion, 204. 313. ; Zs one source of our dissatisfaction with the evidences of religion, 267, 268. 2 QBIECTIONS ANSWERED. The ob. against our natural immortality, from the case of brutes, 100, 101: From the case of vegetables, 104. The ob. against the natural government of God, by rewards and punishments, 108, 109: Against punishments in particular, 112-116. Ihe ob. to the position, that virtue and vice, as such, are rewarded and punished by society, 122. The ob. to the assertion, that the natural tendencies of virtue may cease hereafter to be hindered, 134. A conceivable ob. to the supposition, that we are at present in a state | of trial, 143, 144. INDEX. | 357 NBJECTIONS ANSWERED.— continued. The ob. that our present state does not prove to be, to many, a disci- pline of virtue, 160. The ob. that a virtuous life, proceeling from hope and fear, is only a discipline of self-love, 161. The ob. from the opinion of necessity, 165-179. The ob. that it is incredible that God should govern us, upon the sup position that we are free, and not necessary agents, 176, 177. The ob. that evil might have been prevented by repeated divine inter. positions, 183, 184. The ob. against the argument from our partial ignorance, 187. The ob. against Christianity, from the sufficiency of the light of nature 197. , . The ob. against Christianity, from its perversions, 203, 204. Th€ ob. that a revelation, not committed to writing, would not have answered its purpose, 224. The ob. that the internal improbabilities of Christianity weaken its ex. ternal probable proof, 225-227. The ob. from the disorderly exercise of miraculous gifts in the apos-. tolie age, 227, 228. The ob. to the whole Analogy between natural and supernatural light and information, 228, 229. The ob. that if Christianity were a divine remedial system, its publi. cation would not have been so long delayed, &c., 229, 230. The ob. against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christianity, Pally oh. 4 The ob. against the means used by Christianity, as being complicated and of slow operation, 237-239. The ob. that the death of Christ represents God as indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the guilty, 252-256. The ob. against Christianity, from its want of universality, and the doubtfulness of its evidence, 256-271. The ob. from the case of a prince sending directions to a servant, as applied to Revelation, 269, 270. The ob. to the evidence of miracles, 278-281. The ob. to the Christian evidences, from enthusiasm, 278-282. The ob. that the prophecies were not intended of those events to which they are applied by Christians, 284, 285. The ob. to the entire argument, from the Analogy of nature to religion, 303-312. . OBLIGATIONS. Of duty, arising from the bare supposableness or credibi-ity of religion, 188. 261, 262. Gur, to the Son and the Holy Spirit, from what they arise, 205, 206, 858 INDEX. OBSCURITIES. In Scripture, no valid objectior. against it, 224, 225. OPTIMISM. Religious and irreligious distinguished, 119, n. ORIGEN. His observation relative to the Scriptures and nature, 86. PASSIONS. As making part of our state of trial, 140. Are excited towards particular objects, whether we will or no, 154. Bare excitement of, not criminal, 154. Yet always dangerous, 154. The principle of virtue the intended security against this danger, 154 How the fall may be accounted for from them, 155, 156. Supposable that they may remain in a future state, 155. a Are often inconsistent with reasonable self-love, as well as with virtue and religion, 140. PASSIVE IMPRESSIONS. Grow weaker by repetition, 148. Were intended to lead to the formation of active, practical habits 148, 149. PAUL, ST. His testimony: to be considered as detached from that of the rest of the Apostles, 276. His Epistles: evidence of their genuineness, 275. A distinct proof of Christianity to be derived from them, 275. PERCEPTION. Our organs of sense merely the instruments of, 98. Our power of, in dreams, without the organs of sense, 99. Ridiculous to dispute the truth of our perceptions, 328. PERFECT. Creatures, described, 156. May be improved by habits of virtue, 157, Moral government, what is, 118. PERSON. Defined, 325. Sameness of, independently of all consideration of ccn: sciousness, 324, Whether persunality is constituted by consciousness, 327, 328. PLEASURE AND PAIN. The consequences of our own actions, 107, 108. The annexing of, to our actions, the proper notion of government, 110, Pleasure, attending the gratification of our passions, whether and how far intended to put us upon gratifying them, 110. See Happincen, ew ov a INDEX 359 PuRPHYRY. His objections to the book of Daniel, 286, 287. POSITIVE. Institutions, implied in the notion of a visible church, 202. Are founded on natural religion, as well as on revealed, 208, 209. In general, have the nature of moral commands, 209. Mankind prone to place the whole of religion in the observans of, without regard to moral precepts, 210. ‘ Great presumption to make light of, 211. Precepts, wherein different from moral, 208. In what cases they must yield to moral, 209, 210. Duties, distinguished from moral, 208. And moral duties should be compared no farther tnan as they are different, 209. Christ’s decision upon the relation between them, 210, 211. PRACTICE. By what evidence matters of, are determined, 305, 306. 308-310. In matters of, their importance is always to be considered, 85. 301. In matters of, less proof than convinces judgment should influence be- haviour, 84, 85. 261, 262. 271. 309, 310. PRECEPTS. None in Scripture, contrary to immutable morality, 231. PREJUDICES. Several sorts of, 280. May hinder us from being rightly informed upon moral and religious subjects, 267, 268. Arising from contempt and scorn, weakness of yielding to them, 287. PRESENT EXISTENCE. Affords a presumption of continuance, 93. PRESUMPTION. A slight, does not beget that degree of conviction, implied in eailing a thing probably true, 83. The slightest possible, of the nature of probability, 83. PRIEST. Christ described as our, 250, 251. PROBABLE EVIDENCH. Defined and distinguished from demonstration, 83. Feundation of, 83. Relative to finite beings only, 84. Men, of necessity, influenced and governed by, both in speculation and ; in practice, 84, 85. Probable proofs, being added together, multiply the evidence, 360_ _— B60 INDEX. PROBATION. The peculiar, of persons of a reflective cast of mind, 266. Implied in religion, 270. Religion, considered as a probation, has had its end on all yersens te whom it has been proposed, with evidence sufiicient to influence practice, 310. See Trial. ‘PROPHECY. The primary design of the prophecies recorded in Scripture, 200. Slow they confirm natural religion, 200. Proof of foresight from the completion of intelligible parts of prophecy, not invalidated by the obscurity of others, 283. The proof of foresight made out by a general completion of, 283, 284. The applicability of a long series of, to certain events, a proof that it was intended of them, 284, 285. * The Analogy, in this respect, between prophecy and satirical and my- thological composition, 284, 285. How particular prophecies were interpreted by the ancient Jews and the primitive Christians, 285. Proof from, not destroyed by showing that the prophets applied them to other events than we do, or that we do not apply them to right ones, 285, 286. Of the future condition of the Jews, confirmed by their Dee and pre- sent history, 297, 298. The qualifications requisite to take the force of the argument Abe) 298, Conformity between the prophecies and the events, not accidental, 300, PROPHET. A, compared with a compiler of memoirs received from another -per- son, 285. . Christ a prophet, in what sense, 250. PROVIDENCE. See God. PRUDENCE. Meaning of the word, 333. When a course of action may be called prudent, 309. And imprudence, akin to virtue and vice, 121. 333, 334. PUBLIC SPIRIT. The true notion of, 130. PUNISHMENT. The proper notion of, 111. Natural, circumstances in, analogous tc what religion teaches of fature 112-115, aieceiend pig te — SS oe. INDEX. 36] PUNISHMENT. — continued. Of vice, as folly, 121. As mischievous to society, 121, 122. Of Vice, as such, 122-124, Of virtuous persons, and of virtuous actions, by society explained, F122. Why, in the natural course of things, punishment does not always reach the vicious, 127. Ascribed, in Scripture, to God’s justice, 241. future. See Future Punishment. Vicarious, instances of, in the daily course 6f Providence, 253. As the method of our redemption; the objection against, an. swered, 252-254. ' What is meant by deserving punishment, 331, 332. - - REASON. Can, and ought to judge of the meaning, the evidence, and the mee. rality of Scripture, 230, 231. Natural tendency of, to prevail over brute force, 128, 129. Inability of, to dstermine for us, whether the future punishment of sin "could be prevented, 243, 244. Hopes and fears of, confirmed by revelation, 245, 246. A very incompetent judge of the conduciveness of means to ends, 184 Could not have discovered the scheme of Christianity, 206. No pre- sumption against the scheme of Christianity on this account, 214, An incompetent judge of what was to be expected in revelation, 220, 221 Incompetent to judge beforehand, how revelation should have been left in the world, 223-225. Folly of objections to Christianity, upon supposed principles of reason, 314, REASONING, Upon the principles of others, what it means, 310. Abstruse, when necessary in matters of religion, 318. Upon the course of nature, without attending to known facts, apt to be fallacious, 86. See Abstract. B.EDEMPTION. Scripture doctrine of, stated, 247-251. Illustrated by the Analogy of natural remedies, 242. Agreeable to our natural notions, our hopes and our fears, 244-246. The manner of its efficacy not made known, nor discoverable by rea son, 251, &c. Rashness of seeking to explain it, farther than Scripture has done, 251 See Mediator, Punishment, Sacrifice. 31 862 INDEX. REFLECTION. Our present powers of, not likely to be destroyed or suspended by death, 101, 102. Do not depend upon our bodily powers of sensation, 103. May be improved by death, 103. RELATIONS. Of the several species and individuals in the natura: world, impossible for us to say how far they extend, 181, 182. The revealed relations of the Son and the Holy Spirit to us, 205. Duties arising from, strictly moral, 205, 206. Analogy the similarity or sameness of relations, 81.. RELIGION. Wherein the general spirit of, consists, 211. A Considered in this treatise solely as a question of fact, 311. Is founded in God’s moral character, 171, 172. What is implied in it: See P. I. chaps. 1-5. The proof and the obligations of, not destroyed by the opinion of ne- cessity, 167-175. The historical account of its origin, 175. 217. No argument from Analogy against, because its evidence is doubtful, 256, 257: Or because its evidence is not universal, 257. This state of its evidence not inconsistent with justice, 259: Nor with wisdom and goodness, 260-266. Proof of, lies level to men of common capacity, 268, 269. : Evidence of, like to that upon which we are appointed to act in our temporal affairs, 306. Objections against its reasonableness to be distinguished from objee- tions against its truth, 307. A trial of the integrity and honesty of men, 309. Natural, what, 174. 293. Has external evidences, 175. Whether it could have been reasoned out, 197. The great advantages which it receives from Christianity, 199- 201. 293. How promoted by the settlement of a visible church, 201, 202. Analogy of, properly used to remove objections to revealed, 304, . 305. See Revelation, Revealed Religion. BE MEDIES. Some diseases are remedies, 185. Analogy between natural remedies and Christianity, as a remedial pre: vision for us, 229, 230. The provision of them an instance of compassion in the original con- stitution of the world, 242. INDEX. 863 REPENTANCE. Its insufficiency to expiate guilt argued from Analogy, 245. Argued also from the general sense of mankind, 245. Its efficacy, whence derived, 251. RUSIGNATION. To God’s will, an essential part of virtue, 162. Afflictions, the proper discipline for, 162, 163. Prosperity and imagination may give occasion for, 162. REVELATION. Necessary to the explanation of the scheme of the uniy erse, 132. Shown, from the state of mankind, to be by no means useless, 197; 198: Discovers new relations, and consequently imposes new duties, 204-207. Whether a, made at the beginning of the world, should be considered miraculous, 215, 216. No peculiar difficulty in supposing one to have been made at that time, 216, 217. “ A supposed, might be proved false, from immoralities and contradic- tions, 221. its teachings as to the condition of men, and the means provided for their recovery, 245-247. Jewish and Christian, the degrees of their evidence different at different times, 257-259. Character of the revelation given us in Scripture, 289-291. Summary of its contents, 291-293. Facts admitted in relation to it, 293-299. Objections against, as much levelled against natural roan 304, 305. See Christianity, Religion. .ROVEALED RELIGION. Is'a republication and external institution of natural religion, 199-204; in its genuine simplicity, 200; with authority, 200, 201; with increasing light, 201; with a visible church and positive insti- ” tutions, 201, 202. Likely to differ from our preconceived expectations, and to be liable, on this account, to objections, 222, 223. ‘These objections, however, frivolous, 223. A particular scheme under the general plan of providence, 234. in what condition it supposes mankind to be, 229. 246, 247. May be considered as wholly historical, 289. To be judged of by all its evidences taken together, 301. See Christianity. REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. According to the natural constitution of things, correspond to virtue and vice, 127. . 364 INDEX. REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. — continued. 5 Though not equally distributed now, yet, in all probability, will he hereafter, 130, &e. Hope of reward, a legitimate motive to obedience, 161. See Punishment. RIDICULE. How it obstructs men’s seeing the evidence of religion, 267. Though applied to show the argument from Analogy in a disadvanta- geous light, yet cannot invalidate it, 111. 312.. SACRIFICES. Propitiatory, what the general prevalence of, shows us, 245. How they originated among the Jews, and other ancient nations, 250. The death of Christ a proper sacrifice, 247-249. Its efficacy, 251. Manner of its efficacy not explained, 251. Objections against it on this ground highly absurd, 251, 252. See Mediator. SCEPTICISM. Will not justify a presumptuous fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter, 116. Implies a general state of probation, in the moral and religious sense, 261, 262. The immorality and irreligion of sceptics utterly inexcusable, 518. How far towards speculative infidelity a sceptic can go, who has had true Christianity, with its proper evidence, laid before him, and has considered them, 319. See Doubting. ’ SCORN. Of religion, to what owing, 314. 319. SCRIPTURE. How to be interpreted, 212. 225. General design of, 289. What objections against, would be valid, 224, 225. Probably contains truths yet undiscovered, 228. Method by which we shall come to know its full meaning, 228. How far reason is competent to judge of, 230, 231. Contains no precepts contrary to immutable morality, 231. May be considered as wholly historical, 289. Considering its antiquity, and the variety of its contents, its not being .confuted, affords strong presumption of its truth, 290, 291. Summary of its contents, 291-293. z i SHAFTESBURY, LORD. INDEX. 363 SCRIPTURE. — continued. dy The establishment of natura] religion in the worl greatly owing to 293, 294. , Antiquity of its first parts, 294. - Its chronology and common history confirmed by tke natural and civil history of the world, 294, Has internal marks of credibility, 294. Has no more mistakes of transcribers, than were to be expected in books of such antiquity, 295. The credibility of its common history gives credibilicy to its miracu. lous, 295. See Christianity, Revelation, &¢. SELF. Indivisible, 95. Its sameness does not depend on the sameness of the body, 96, 97. SELF-DENTAL. The fact that it is necessary for our present happiness, makes it cre dible that it may be likewise necessary for our future, 140, 141 143, 144, Necessity of, argued from the nature of particular affections, 156. Productive of resignation to God’s will, 162. SELF-LOVE. Reasonable, is coincident with virtue, 155, n. Is daily seen to be overmatched by passion, 140. 155 n. No cause for its being disclaimed by moralists as a motive, 155, n. Has need to be approved and disciplined, 155, n. 182. His writings referred to, 13. 119; SIMPLICITY. Of a living agent, argument to prove, 95. SON OF GOD. The gift of, to the world, 246, 247. TEMPTATIONS. | Implied in the idea of a state of probation, 139. Sources of our, 148, 141, Those of our temporal and of our religious trial compared, 140-144. A means of disciplining the moral principle, 159. Virtuous habits the proper security against, 154, 155. The supposition of them lessens, in certain cases, the perception of ill. desert, 332. o.* 366 . INDEX. TENDENCY. Ambiguity ef the werd, 136, n. Mendencies of virtue will probably hereafter become effect, 136. TESTIMONY. : ; . When only it can be destroyed, 282. See Evidence, Evidence of Christianity. LRIAL. Our, in our temporal, compared with that in our religious capacity | 140-142. Proceeds in both from the same causes, and has the same effect upor behaviour, 141, 142. Difficulties of, increased by misbehaviour of others, 142: Also by our own errors and follies, 142. Hquitableness of our present state of, vindicated, 142, 143. Not possible for us to understand all the reasons of our being placed in, 145. End of, our improvement in virtue and piety, as a qualific future state, 145. May also be intended for the manifestation of our characters to the rest of the creation, 164. The present state of the evidence cf religion may be part of some men’s trial, 260-264: And yerhaps the chief part, 265, 266. Difficulties of belief afford a trial analogous to external temptations, 264-266. ation for a UNDERSTANDING. Our probation with regard to the exercise of the, 260, 261. UNIVERSALITY. Objections to Christianity from the want of, considered, 256-271. VEGETABLES. The destruction of, not analogous to the death of living agents, 104. What is meant by their identity, 824, 325. YERACITY. Our natural regard to it, 335. When violated, 337. VICE, What it chiefly consists in, 332. Folly a species of, 333, 334. Punished by society as hurtful to itself, 121, 122. This life is, to some men, a discipline in, 160. Future punishment of, may follow as a natural consequence, 241. Probable, from the course of nature, but not certain, that the penw an rsequences of, might be prevented, 242, a are INDEX: 367 VICE. — continued. No probability that any thing we could do, would, of itself, prevent them, 243, 244, See Virtue and Vice. VICIOUS. Actions, never rewarded by society, because they are vicious, 122, Persons, prosperity of, reconciled with moral government, 127, “VIRTUE. ° Possibility of exceptions to the happiness of, 120. Social advantages of, a proof of an established moral government, 124, Conditions necessary to its complete triumph over vice, 129, 130. Its natural tendencies hindered in our present state, 131. May be more advantageously situated hereafter, 131. A bond of union among all endued with it, 131, Happy effects of, set forth in the instance of a perfectly virtuous king- dom, 132, 133. ; Habit of, not formed by merely thinking and talking of virtue, 148. Virtue and piety, a necessary qualification for a future state, 153. Our capacity of improvement therein, by moral and religious habits, 153. Necessity of improvement argued, 153-158. Habit of, the security against the undue operation of particular affee. tions, 154-157. There is a universally acknowledged standard of, 320. Corresponds to our notion of good desert, 331. Common instances of, do not raise a strong perception of good desert, and why, 332. Prudence a part of virtue, 333, 334. Does not consist entirely in benevolence, 034, 335. — VIRTUOUS. Actions, never punished by society, because they are virtuous, 122, Persons, afflictions of, how reconciled with moral government, 127. VIRTUE AND VICE. . Are, in the natural course of things, rewarded and punished, as such, ‘bead As qualities of actions, effects of, on men’s minds, 123, 124. 126. Tendency of, to produce their effects in a greater degree than they da at present, 128-134, * Overbalance of happiness or misery, not the standard of virtue and vice, 335, 336. WHATELY, ARCHBISHOP. Quoted, 9. 868 i INDEX. a WILL AND CHARAOCTER. Explained, 171, n. May be affirmed of the Author of Nature, notwithstanding the scheme of necessity, 171. WORLD. Zhe present, fit to be a state of discipline for moral improvemont, 158-160. 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