aoe a reed : 3 ‘ Se isa s os Mant) ") i . " 5 besa! : aeeteains ai tise, sess ithe . i avrg aniciy MS * saree . Coerkrire 2 ig i t , " ie, : . : ke i Rkeake , ‘ ; iinet uu UaMaceitn tetas 2 if 3 jae ut erie ‘ x! : cathy i : : x ‘ eal 7 : p . ran fa : : “ ify Sud, ets owes th My - ! i t He rot! te : ri isepy nko : od comneetaine arity ; Sorte } ; i aii Acta aie Sees i tearm ; Hass : oh “i Toc Bo eAs ea Fologicdadl Seminary. PRINCETON, N. J. THE SUPERNATURAL IN THE NEW TESTAMENT POSSIBLE, CREDIBLE, AND HISTORICAL. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https://archive.org/details/supernaturalinneOOrowc THE SUPERNATURAL IN THE NEW TESTAMENT POSSIBLE, CREDIBLE, AND HISTORICAL: OR AN EXAMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF SOME RECENT OBJECTIONS AGAINST CHRISTIANITY AS A DIVINE REVELATION. BY va Rit Vew Cae Ae ROW MAN. PREBENDARY OF ST. PAUL'S; AUTHOR OF “ THE JESUS OF THE EVANGELISTS,” ‘‘ THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF DIVINE INSPIRATION,” ‘THE MORAL TEACHING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT,” ETC. LONDON: FREDERIC NORGATE, 17, BEDFORD STREET, COVENT GARDEN: WILLIAMS & NORGATE, 20, FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH. 1875. LONDON: G. NORMAN AND SON, PRINTERS, MAIDEN LANE, COVENT GARDEN, TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE SOCIETY. My Lorps anp GENTLEMEN, Havine undertaken to compose this work at your request, | beg permission to dedicate it to you. In doing so I feel that it is a duty which I owe both to you and to myself that I should state the position which we respectively occupy with regard to it. Your re- sponsibility is confined to having requested me to compose a work in refutation of certain principles now widely disseminated, which impugn the supernatural elements contained in the New Testament. For the contents of the work and for the mode of treatment I alone am responsible. WhenI considered the position of the present controversy, I felt that it was impossible to treat the subject satisfactorily except on the princi- ple that the responsibility for the mode of conducting the argument and of answering the objections should rest with the writer alone. In dealing with a subject so complicated, involving as it does questions of philo- sophy and science as well as the principles of historical criticism, I can scarcely venture to hope that every position which I have taken will prove acceptable to IV DEDICATION. all the various shades of theological thought. I have endeavoured to take such as seemed to me to be logically defensible without any reference to particular schools of theological opinion. As the entire question is essentially historical, I have done my utmost to exclude from it all discussions that are strictly theolo- gical. Modern unbelief however puts in two objections which if valid render all historical evidence in proof of the occurrence of miracles nugatory, namely that they are both impossible and incredible. In meeting these 1 have been compelled to appeal to what appear to me to be the principles of a sound philosophy. In all other respects I have viewed the question before me as exclusively one of historical evidence. If the Resurrection of our Lord is an actual occur- rence, it follows that Christianity must be a divine revelation. If it is not, no amount of other evidence will avail to prove it to be so. As it has been strongly affirmed that for this great fact, which constitutes the central position of Christianity, the historical evidence is worthless, I have devoted the latter portion of this volume to the consideration of this question, with a view of putting before the reader the value of the New Testament when contemplated as simple history. Using the Hpistles as the foundation of my argument, IT have endeavoured to prove that the greatest of all the miracles recorded in the Gospels rests on an attes- tation that is unsurpassed by any event recorded in history. For this purpose I have used the Epistles as simple historical documents, and I have claimed for them precisely the same value which is conceded to other writings of a similar description. The feeling DEDICATION. V among Christians that these writings contain the great principles of the Christian faith has occasioned it to be overlooked that they are also contemporary historical documents of the highest order. As such I have used . them in proof of the great facts of Christianity, above all in proof of the greatest of them, the Resurrection of our Lord. With these observations I now present you the following work, with the hope that it may prove the means of removing many of the difficulties with which recent controversial writers have endeavoured to obscure the subject. Trusting that it may be accepted by the great Head of the Church, the reality of whose life and teaching as they are recorded in the Gospels it is designed to establish, T remain, my Lords and Gentlemen, Your’s faithfully, C. A. ROW. Lonpon, January, 1875. . ‘ q ; ~~, ? : ‘ ¢- Ps mas @ a : 4." di Bs al A , i ~ he we Tod : ' : 9 > S : 4 w é ‘ z Tae 2 » i is » CONTENTS. ey eC) Dat Ga) Ne THE POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE OPPO- NENTS AND THE DEFENDERS OF REVELATION. The issues raised by unbelievers, p. 1—4. The historical truth of the delineation of Jesus Christ in the Gospels, the centre of the Chris- tian position, 4—8. The distinction between Revelation and Theology, 8—13. Atheism, Pantheism and Theism in their bearing on the argu- ment for the truth or falsehood of the supernatural, 13—20. The line of argument taken in the present work, 20—25. CHAPTER II. : DEFINITION OF TERMS. Confusion introduced into the argument by an indistinct use of terms, 26—28. ‘ Nature’? —what does it include, 28—32. The various meanings assigned to the term “ Law,’ 32—35. The distinction be- tween the laws and the forces of nature, 35—-39. Supernatural events, miracles ; their value and the distinction between them, 39—46. Is a law of miracles possible, 46—48. CHAPTER ITI. THE SUPERNATURAL ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. IN WHAT DO THEY CONSIST, AND WHAT VIEW DO ITS AUTHORS TAKE OF THEM? The Person of Jesus Christ superhuman and supernatural, 49—51. The distinction between this manifestation and ordinary miracles viewed as “signs,” “mighty works,’ and ‘‘ wonders,’ 51—55. Our Lord’s affirmation that miracles are not the highest evidence of His divine mission considered, 55 —66. vill CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. MIRACLES ; WHAT DO THEY PROVE? The Person of Jesus Christ, how far self-evidential, 67—73. The nature of the proof which miracles afford to a revelation, 73—77. A moral element essential to a miracle, 77—78. Miracles prove not doc- trines but a divine commission, 78—85. Miracles cannot prove moral truths, 85—87. ‘The question considered, if miracles are objects of faith, how far they can be media of proof, 87—94. CHAPTER V. THE ANTECEDENT IMPROBABILITY OF MIRACLES. THE UNKNOWN AND UNKNOWABLE GOD. The Christian argument founded on the assumption of the existence of a personal God, 95—98. This assumption not a petitio principii, but a legitimate mode of conducting the argument, 98—102. Mr. B. Powell’s reasoning on this subject fallacious, 102—107. The theories of Mr. Herbert Spencer and Dr. Mansel considered, 107—110. God not unthinkable nor unknowable, 110—112. Fallacies connected with the use of the term “ Infinite” as applied to God, 112—115. God’s moral attributes not infinite but perfect, 115—117. The personality of God neither unthinkable nor a contradiction, 117—120. Our knowledge of God imperfect but real, 120—123. CHAPTER VI. THE OBJECTION THAT MIRACLES ARE CONTRARY TO REASON CONSIDERED. A miracle not an effect without a cause, 124—126. Miracles not violations of the law of nature, nor do they involve a suspension of its forces, 126—130. The order of nature not invariable, but modified by the action of natural forces, and by man, 130—136. The distinction between material and mental forces, 136—138—The question whether miracles are effected by a power either above or beside nature consi- dered, 1388—144, Man capable of introducing a new order of physical events, 144—147. If there be a God, the performance of a miracle is not inconsistent with His character, 147—154, CONTENTS: 1X CHAPTER VII. THE ALLEGATION THAT NO TESTIMONY CAN PROVE THE TRUTH OF A SUPERNATURAL EVENT. The nature of experience; in what sense miracles are contrary to it, and how far our belief in unusual occurrences depends on their being within the range of our experience, 155—162. The antecedent proba- bility of an event modifies the amount of evidence necessary for its proof, 161—164. Mr. Mill’s views as to the value of Hume’s argu- ment, 164—169. The mode of the divine acting in nature, 169—172. The absurdity of rejecting unusual occurrences as false because they have not fallen within the prior experience of mankind, 172—175. God a force adequate to work a miracle. The validity of the argu- ment, 175—179. CHAPTER VIII. THE OBJECTION THAT THE DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY ASSUME CERTAIN FACTS, THE TRUTH OF WHICH CAN ONLY BE KNOWN BY REVELATION, AND THEN REASON FROM THESE FACTS TO THE TRUTH OF THE BIBLE, CONSIDERED. The objection stated, 180—183. Theology not Revelation, 183—185. Revelation does not involve the idea of the marring of the divine plan in Creation, 185—-187; nor does the New Testament assert it, 187—190; but that Creation and Redemption form portions of God’s eternal plan, 190—192. The New’ Testament affirms that Revelation is not an afterthought to remedy a failure, but a consistent carrying out of the divine plan, 192—196. Invariable progress not the law of human development as exhibited in history, 196—198. CHAPTER IX. DEMONIACAL MIRACLES—-GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. Difficulties involved in the supposition of the possibility of demonia- cal miracles, 199—203. The New Testament not pledged to them as actual occurrences, 203—204. The supposed Satanic miracle wrought at our Lord’s Temptation considered, 204—208. No general power of working miracles attributed to Satan in the New Testament, 208—210. The extent of the action which its authors attribute to him, 210—213. The absurdity of attributing to the writers of the New US etalon the superstitions in the Talmud, 213—222. vd x CONTENTS. CHAPTER X. THE EXISTENCE AND MIRACLES OF SATAN. The existence of evil in the universe the real difficulty, that of Satan being only one of degree, 223—229, Satanic action confined within de- finite limits, 229232. The Satanic action referred to in the New Tes- tament not material, but mental, 232—234. Clearly distinguishable from the miracles of Christ, 234—938. CHAPTER XI. POSSESSION—IS THE THEORY THAT IT WAS MADNESS SUB- VERSIVE OF THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF TH GOSPELS, OR INCONSISTENT WITH THE VERACITY OF CHRIST ? The difficulty stated, 239—242. The degree of supernatural enlight- enment possessed by the authors of the Gospels, 242—246. The prac- tice of exorcism, 246—250. ‘The cases of the demoniac of Gadara and of the lunatic youth considered in their bearing on our Lord’s veracity, 250—257. Our Lord in the habit of using the current language of the times, 257—263. Hig teaching in connection with this subject, 263— 267. CHAPTHR XII. POSSESSION, 1F AN OBJECTIVE REALITY, NEITHER INCREDI- BLE NOR CONTRARY TO THE ASCERTAINED TRUTHS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. The facts respecting possession to which the New Testament is pledged, 268—273. Considerations involved in the denial of its possibility, 273 —276. Incompleteness of our knowledge of the causes of various con- ditions of the human mind, 276—278. Religious frenzy, the ecstatic state, mania, 278—282. Our present knowledge of mental phenomena does not justify the affirmation that possession was impossible, 282—286. CHAPTER XIII. THE ALLEGED CREDULITY OF THE FOLLOWERS OF JESUS. The absurdity of charging the authors of the Gospels with supersti- tions of which their pages afford no evidence, 287—291. The grounds on which a writer may be justly charged with credulity, 291—298. The general contents of the New Testament prove that its writers were neither superstitious nor credulous, 298—304, The contrast presented by the genuine and apocryphal Gospels, 304—309, CONTENTS. XI CHAPTER XIV. THE LOVE OF THE MARVELLOUS—ITS BEARING ON THE VALUE OF TESTIMONY TO MIRACLES. The views of the ancient world respecting marvellous occurrences, 310—312. The faculties of imagination, wonder, and veneration essen- tial portions of our minds, 312—316. The possibility of their being used wrongly, no argument against their legitimate exercise, 316—320. Fictions cannot be eliminated from history by an arbitrary rule, but by the exercise of our reason, 320—325. CHAPTER XV. OUR SUMMARY REJECTION OF CURRENT SUPERNATURALISM CONSIDERED IN ITS BEARING ON THE EVIDENCE OF MIRACLES. The grounds of this rejection, 326—327. The bearing of the pheno- mena of spiritualism on this subject, 327—331. The supernaturalism of the ancient world monstrous, grotesque, and incredible, 331—335. Contrasted with that recorded in the New Testament, 335—337. Eccle- siastical miracles—the grounds of their rejection, 335—342. The asser- tion not accurate that no eminent man has ever alleged that he himself wrought miracles, 342—345. CHAPTER XVI. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO MIRACLES AS CREDENTIALS OF A REVELATION. Miracles attest not doctrines, but facts, 346—348. The attestation by miracles of a divine commission neither hackneyed nor useless, 348— 351. Nor does such a mode of attestation betray a want of divine ori- ginality, 351—356. The belief in ecclesiastical miracles subverted before the birth of modern science, 356—358. Several of the manifestations of supernatural power affirmed in the New Testament designed for other purposes than purely evidential, 358—360. The supernatural gifts, not intended to be permanent in the Church, 360—365, Pious frauds, 365 —367. L- eke CONTENTS. CHAPTER XVII. THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE GREAT FACTS OF CHRISTIANITY REST—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. The truth of the Resurrection is the turning-point of the contro- versy, 368—372. Statement of the facts on which the argument is founded, 372—375. Theories propounded by unbelievers to.aeccount for the origin of the belief in the Resurrection incapable of standing the test of historical verification, 376—383. The nature of the historical problem requiring solution, 383 —386. Tradition as a means of trans- mitting historical truth—the rnles for determining its validity, 386—392. CHAPTER XVIII. THE TESTIMONY OF THE CHURCH AND OF §8T. PAUL’S EPIS- TLES TO THE FACTS OF PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY. THEIR HISTORICAL VALUE CONSIDERED. The existence of the Church as a visible institution fonnded on the belief in the Resurrection of Christ—the importance of its testimony, 393—399. St. Paul’s Epistles contemporaneous records, 399—401. Their value as historical documents, 401—404. Proving that both he and his opponents held a common Christology, 404—408. And that he claimed to be a worker of miracles, 408—411. That both he and the churches to whom he wrote were firmly persuaded that they possessed supernatural endowments, 411—413. His account of the phenomena with which they were attended an evidence of reality, 413—418. Con- clusions deducible from the facts, 418—422. CHAPTER XIX. THE EVIDENCE FURNISHED BY THESE EPISTLES TO THE FACTS OF OUR LORD’S LIFE, AND TO THE TRUTH OF THE RESURRECTION, The assertion that St. Pavl was imperfectly acquainted with the human life of Jesus incredible, 423—426. The extent of his know- ledge of it as deduced from the direct assertions in the Epistles, 426—430. The indirect references prove that the Church was in possession of a general outline of the facts, 430—433. The fact of the Resurrection accepted by the Church and its various partics as the foundation of their Christianity, 433—436. ‘Testimony of the Epistle to the Romans and of the book of Revelation, 436—441. The belief in it accepted by every Christian Church from the earliest times as the sole ground of its existence, 441—443. The chiefs of the Church at Jerusalem affirmed that they had seen the risen Jesus, 443—446. CONTENTS, x1 CHAPTER XX. THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST AN HISTORICAL FACT, The points proved, and the alternatives which they present, 447—449. The belief in the Resurrection not of gradual growth, 449—452; but originated immediately after the Crucifixion, 452, 453. The facts de- mand a definite solution, and cannot be accounted for by general charges of enthusiasm and credulity, 453—457. The theory that the belief originated in a mental delusion untrue to human nature, 457—460. The rapid spread of the belief cannot be accounted for on the suppo- sition that it originated in the heated imagination of a few fanatics, 460—466. The theory that Jesus was taken down alive, and his reco- very mistaken for a restoration to life examined, 466—472. CHAPTER XXI. THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE GOSPELS AS DEDUCED FROM PREVIOUS CONSIDERATIONS. The proof of the Resurrection as an actual occurrence removes all the antecedent difficulties with which the narratives in the Gospels are attended, 473—475. The Gospels not histories, but religious memoirs, 475—478. Distinction between memoirs and regular histories, 478—481. Even if we assume the dates assigned by opponents to the Synoptic Gospels, they were published far within the period of undoubtedly his- torical tradition, 481—484. The means possessed by the Church for accurately handing down traditionary history, 484—487. The Synoptics present all the indications of traditionary history, 487—492. CHAPTER XXII. THE HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF THE GOSPELS AS DEDUCED FROM THEIR INTERNAL STRUCTURE. The identities and variations of expression in the parallel narratives and discourses, 493—496, Their importance considered as bearing on their historical character, 496—500. The variations prove that the narratives must have passed through a period of oral transmission, 500—504. Other considerations which prove that they are historical, 504—509. The Gospels restored to their place in history, 509—512. The nature and value of their testimony to the Resurrection, 512—516. Comparison of the different accounts of our Lord’s appearance on the evening of Haster-day, 516—522. Conclusion, 522—524. * f | i i CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. THE POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE OPPO- NENTS AND THE DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. ALTHOUGH every portion of the Bible is vehemently assailed by the various forms of modern Scepticism, it is clear that the real turning point of the controversy between those who affirm that God has made a super- natural revelation of himself to mankind, and those who. deny it, centres in those portions of the New Testament which affirm the presence of the supernatural. The question may be still further narrowed into the inquiry whether the person and actions of Jesus Christ, as they are depicted in the Gospels, are historical facts, or fictitious inventions. If the opponents of Revelation can prove that they are the latter, the entire contro- versy will end in their favour. It would in that case be utterly useless to attempt to defend any other portion of the Bible; and the controversy respecting the Old Testament becomes a mere waste of labour. If, on the other hand, Christians can prove that the narratives of the four Gospels, or even of any one of them, are a true representation of historical facts, then it is certain that God has made a revelation of himself, notwithstanding the objections which may be urged against certain K 2 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN positions which have been taken by Ecclesiastical Chris- tianity, and the difficulties by which certain questions connected with the Old Testament are surrounded. It follows, therefore, that the historical truth of the facts narrated in the Gospels constitutes the central position of the entire controversy. It is not my pur- pose on the present occasion to discuss the general question, whether the delineation of Jesus Christ which the Gospels contain is one of an ideal or an historical person. That question I have already considered in “The Jesus of the Evangelists.’ But as the various forms of modern unbelief are making the most strenu- ous efforts to prove that the supernatural elements of the New Testament are hopelessly incredible, and that the attestation on which the supernatural occurrences mentioned in it rests, is simply worthless, it is my in- tention to devote the present volume to the considera- tion of this special subject, and to examine the question of miracles, and their historical credibility. Modern scepticism makes with respect to super- natural occurrences (under which more general term I include the miracles of the New Testament), the three following assertions, and endeavours to substantiate them by every available argument : 1st. That all supernatural occurrences are impos- sible. 2nd. That, if not impossible, they are incredible ; that is, that they are contrary to reason. 8rd. That those which are narrated in the New Tes- tament are devoid of any adequate historical attesta- tion, and owe their origin to the inventive powers of the mythic and legendary spirit. It is my purpose, in the course of the present work, to traverse each of these three positions, and to show : OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 3 lst. That miracles and supernatural occurrences are not impossible ; and that the arguments by which this has been attempted to be established are wholly incon- clusive. 2nd. That they are neither incredible, nor contrary to reason; but are entirely consistent with its dictates. drd. That the greatest of all the miracles which are recorded in the New Testament, and which, if an actual historical occurrence, is sufficient to carry with it all the others, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, rests on the highest form of historical testimony. Such is my position. A recent writer, who has ably advocated the princi- ples of modern scepticism, the author of ‘“ Super- natural Religion,” has in the opening passage of his work clearly placed before us the real point at issue. He states the case as follows: “On the very threshold of inquiry into the origin and true character of Christianity we are brought face to face with the supernatural. It is impossible, without totally setting aside its peculiar and indispensable claim to be a direct external revelation from God of truths which otherwise human reason could not have discovered, to treat Kcclesiastical Christianity as a form of religion developed by the wisdom of man. Not only in form does it profess to be the result of divine communication, but in its very essence, in its principal dogmas it is either superhuman or untenable. There is no question here of mere accessories, which are com- paratively unimportant, and do not necessarily affect the essential matter, but we have to do with a scheme of religion claiming to be miraculous in all points, in form, in essence, and in evidence. This religion cannot be accepted without an emphatic belief in supernatural interposition, and it is absurd to imagine that its B 2 4 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN dogmas can be held, whilst the miraculous is rejected. Those who profess to hold the religion, whilst they dis- credit the supernatural element, and they are many at the present day, have widely receded from Hcclesias- tical Christianity. It is most important that the in- separable connection of the miraculous with the origin, doctrines, and the evidence of Christianity should be clearly understood, in order that inquiry may pursue a logical and consistent course.”—Supernatural Reli- gion, page 1.* I fully accept all the chief positions laid down m this passage as an adequate statement of the points at issue hetween those who affirm and those who deny that Christianity is a divine revelation. A few minor points require a slight modification, as incurring the danger of confusing ideas that ought to be carefully distin- guished. The writer before me also raises no minor issue. Although the work is entitled “ Supernatural Religion, or an inquiry into the reality of divine revelation,” its object, which is consistently carried out throughout it, is to impugn the historical character of the Gospels, and to prove that the supernatural occurrences which are recorded in them are fictitious. The title of the work might have justified the writer in assailing other portions of the Bible ; but he clearly sees that to adopt this course is only to attack the outworks of Christianity, and to leave the key of the entire position unassailed. In doing so he has pursued a far nobler course than that which has been adopted by many of the opponents of the Christian faith. He has directed his attack against the very centre of the Christian position, the his- * My quotations throughout this work are taken from the first edition. The passage here quoted is somewhat altered in the third edition, but not so as to affect the general meaning. OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 5 torical credibility of the supernatural actions attributed to Jesus Christ in the Gospels, being well aware that a successful assault on this position will involve the cap- ture of all the outworks by which it is supposed to be protected; while it by no means follows that a suc- cessful assault on any of the latter involves the capture of the citadel itself. This writer does not take up a bye question, but he goes direct to the foundation on which Christianity rests. In doing so, it must be ac- knowledged that he has taken a straightforward course, and one which must bring the question of the truth or falsehood of Christianity to a direct issue. I fully agree with the chief position taken in the quotation before us, that Christianity imvolves the presence of the supernatural and the superhuman, | what in fact is generally designated as the miraculous, or it is nothing. To remove these elements out of the pages of the New Testament, is not to retain the same religion, but to manufacture another quite dif- ferent and distinct from it. In the first place, we have the great central figure in the Gospels, the divine person of Jesus Christ our Lord, and the entire body of his actions and his teaching. He, although de- picted as human, is at the same time depicted as super- human and supernatural, not merely in his miraculous works, but in his entire character. ‘lio remove the divine lineaments of Jesus Christ out of the Gospels is simply to destroy them. Besides this, we have a large number of miraculous actions attributed to him. These are inextricably interwoven with the entire narrative, which, when they are taken away, loses all cohesion. lives of Jesus which have been set forth, deprived of their supernatural and superhuman ele- ments, are in fact nothing better than a new Gospel composed out of the subjective consciousness of the 6 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN writers. Various attempts have been made to pare down the supernatural and superhuman elements in the Gospels to the smallest possible dimensions. Still they obstinately persist in remaining. If everything else is _ struck out of the Gospels, except their moral teaching, we are left in the presence of teaching which is raised at an immense elevation above the thoughts and con- ceptions of the age that produced it; and of a teacher, who while distinguished by the marks of pre-eminent holiness and greatness of mind, is also distinguished by . a degree of self-assertion in his utterances of moral truth, which is without parallel, even among the most presumptuous of men. Deal with the Gospels as we will, while we allow any portions of them to remain as historical, we are still in the presence of the super- human. As the narrative now stands it is at least harmonious. The lofty pretensions of the teacher bear the most in- timate correlation to the supernatural and superhuman facts that are reported of him. The one are the com- plement of the other. Ifthe facts are true, the lofty self-assertion of the teacher is justified ; if they are not true, his pretensions conflict with the entire concep- tion of his holiness and elevation of mind. The use which a wide spread school of modern criticism so freely makes of the critical dissecting knife, for the purpose of amputating the supernatural from the Gospels, can only be attended by the fatal termination © of destroying the entire Gospels as of the smallest historical value. It is marvellous that persons who retain any respect for Christianity as a system of reli- gious and moral teaching, should have attempted to throw discredit on this element in the Gospels with a view of saving the remainder. Nor is the case different with the other portions of OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 7 the New Testament. Christianity, as enunciated by its writers, does not profess merely to teach a new and improved system of morality. If this was its only pre- tension, it would certainly have but little claim to be viewed as a divine revelation. In morals its teaching is both unsystematic and fragmentary ; though it is an unquestionable fact, that a great system of moral teaching may be deduced from the principles it un- folds. But if one thing is plainer than another on the face of the New Testament, it is that the great purpose sought to be effected by Christianity is to impart a new moral and spiritual power tomankind. It professes to be, not a body of moral rules, but a mighty moral force, which is concentrated in the person of its Founder. The acceptance of it had generated a new power or energy, amoral and spiritual life, which raised those who had embraced it above their former selves; and which it professes to be able to impart to all time. This super- natural element, concentrated as I have said that it is in the person of its founder, runs through the entire epistles, and constitutes their most distinguishing feature. If the supernatural elements in the person of Jesus Christ be removed from their teaching nothing remains but a number of moral precepts robbed of all their vitality. In one word, the whole system of teaching simply collapses. ~- In a similar manner, if we eliminate every thing supernatural out of the New Testament, with a view of arriving at a residuum of truth, we are brought into immediate contact with the most unique fact in the history of man, the creation of the Church of Jesus Christ, the greatest institution which has ever affected the destinies of our race, and which has for eighteen centuries exerted a most com- manding influence on human happiness and _ civiliza- 8 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN tion. This is professedly based on a miraculous fact, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. If, therefore, we remove the supernatural elements out of Christianity, this institution, mighty for good in its influence on the progress of our race, has been based on an unreality and a delusion. Here again we encounter something which has very much the appearance of the super- natural. On these accounts, therefore, I cordially accept the position which is laid down by the author of “ Super- natural Religion”? as a correct statement of the case, that Christianity involves the presence of the super- natural, or it is nothing. We must either defend the chief supernatural elements of the New Testament or abandon it as worthless. But there is an expression which occurs in this quo- tation, and which is frequently made use of in subse- quent parts of the work, which requires consideration, “ Keclesiastical Christianity.” What is intended by it? The meaning is nowhere defined, and unless we come to a clear understanding with respect to it, we shall be in danger of complicating the entire question. The expression is ambiguous. If by it is meant any other form of thought, than that which is contained in the pages of the New Testament ; if, in fact, by it is in- tended a systematic arrangement of doctrinal truth, which has been elaborated at a subsequent period, I emphatically assert that those who are called upon to defend the divine character of the Christian Revelation have nothing to do withit. The only thing which those who maintain that the New Testament contains a divine revelation can be called on to defend, is the express statements of the book itself, and not a system of thought which subsequent writers may have attempted to deduce from it, OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 9 This point is so important, that I must make the position which I intend taking with respect to it clear. It involves the distinction between revelation and theology. The religious and moral teaching which is contained in the New Testament is in a very unsyste- matic form. Notone of its writings is a formal treatise on theology, nor does one of them contain a systematised statement of what constitutes Christianity. Its teaching of religious truth is incidental, and is called forth by the special circumstances of the writer. The plain fact is that four of the writings which comprise the New Testament are religious memoirs. One is an historical account of the foundation of the Church. Twenty-one are letters, written to different Churches and indivi- duals, and all called forth by special emergencies. These all partake of the historical character. ‘The only one which does not participate in this character is the Apocalypse, which, being a vision, is utterly unlike a formal or systematic treatise on Christianity. The result of the form in which the New Testament is com- posed is that its definite teaching 1s always incidental, called forth to meet special circumstances and occasions in the history of Churches and individuals, and never formal. It is also universally couched in popular, as distinct from scientific or technical language. Not one of its writers makes an attempt to formulate a system of Christian theology. The person of Jesus Christ constitutes Christianity in its truest and highest sense. Three of the Gospels embody the traditionary teaching of the Church on this subject. The fourth is the work of an independent writer. The epistles maybe received as a set of incidental commentaries on the person and work of Jesus Christ, called forth by the special occasions which gave them birth, and embodying the author’s general views as to‘his 10 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN work and teaching as adapted to a number of special circumstances and occasions. Between the contents of the New Testament and what is commonly understood by Hcclesiastical Christianity the difference is extremely wide. The New Testament contains a divine revelation. Hcclesiastical Chris- tianity is a body of religious teaching in which Chris- tianity has been attempted to be presented in a systematised form, or, in other words, it is a theology more or less complete. It is necessary that we should have a clear apprecia- tion of the difference. Theology is an attempt of the human intellect to present to us the truths communi- cated im Revelation in a systematised form. It is in fact the result of the human reason investigating the facts and statements of Revelation. Theology there- fore is a simple creation of human reason erected on the facts of divine revelation. As such it is subject to all the errors and imperfections to which our rational powers are obnoxious. It can claim no infallibility more than any other rational action of the human mind. Theology is a science, and is subject to the imperfections to which all other sciences are liable. It stands to the facts of Christianity in the same relation as philosophy and physical science stand to the works of nature. In the one the human intellect investigates the divine revelation contained in the works of nature, and endeavours to systematise its truths: in the other it does the same with respect to the divine revelation which in accordance with the assertions of the New Testament has been made in the person of Jesus Christ. What I am desirous of drawing attention to is that theology is not revelation. Systems of theology may be accurate deductions of reason from Revelation; or OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 11 they may be inaccurate and imperfect ones. It is very possible that a system of theology which has been evolved by human reason, although it may have at- tained a wide acceptance, may be as inadequate an explanation of the facts of revelation, as the Ptolemaic system of astronomy was of the facts of the material universe. Objections which were raised against the latter were no real objections against the structure of the universe itself. In the same way objections which may be raised against a particular system of theology, may leave the great facts of revelation entirely untouched. If we look into the history of Christianity, we shall find that as soon as the Church began to con- solidate itself into a distinct community, the reason of man began to exert itself on the facts of revelation, and to attempt to reduce its teaching to a systematic form. From this source have sprung all the various systems of theology which have from time to time pre- dominated in the Church. It has been a plant of gradual growth, and as such may bear a fair comparison with the slow growth of philosophy or physical science. Such an action of reason on the facts of revelation was inevitable and entirely legitimate. What Iam desirous of guarding against is the idea that when reason is exerted on the facts of revelation, it is more infallible than when exerted on any other subjects which come under its cognisance. f am not ignorant that there is another theory re- specting the nature of theology. A large branch of the Christian Church holds that a body of dogmatic statements has been handed down traditionally from the Apostles and other inspired teachers, which has been embodied in the system of theology which is accepted by this Church, and that this was intended to 12 FOSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN be an authoritative statement of the facts of the Chris- tian revelation. It is also part of the same theory that the Church as a collective body has in all ages pos- sessed an inspiration, which enables it to affirm autho- ritatively and dogmatically, what is and what is not Christian doctrine, and that which it thus authorita- tively affirms to be so, must be accepted as a portion of the Christian revelation as much as the contents of the New Testament itself. I fully admit that those who assume a position of this kind are bound to act consistently, and to defend every statement in their dogmatic creeds as an integral portion of Christianity. Nor is it less certain, if this principle is true, that if any portion of such dogmatic creeds can be successfully assailed as contrary to reason, as for instance the formulated doctrine of transubstantiation, it would imperil the position of Christianity itself. Those, however, who have taken such positions, must be left to take the consequences of them. It is not my intention in undertaking to defend the historical truth of the supernatural elements in the New Testament, to burden myself with an armour which seems only fitted to crush beneath its weight ee person who attempts to use it. It has been necessary to be explicit on this point, in order that the argument may be kept free from all adventitious issues. The introduction into it of the expression, “ Ecclesiastical Christianity,” brings with it no inconsiderable danger of diverting our attention from what is the real point of controversy. I must therefore repeat it. Hcclesiastical Christianity is a development made by reason from the facts of the New Testament, and is a thing which is entirely distinct from the contents of the New Testament. With its affirmations therefore I have nothing to do in the OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 138 present discussion. Jt will not be my duty to examine into its positions, with a view of ascertaining whether they are developments of Christian teaching which can be logically deduced from its pages; still less to accept and to defend them as authoritative statements of its meaning. In defending the New Testament as containing a divine revelation, I have only to do with the contents and assertions of the book itself, and with nothing outside its pages. What others may have propounded respecting its meaning can form no legitimate portion of the present contro- versy. ‘The real point at issue is one which is simple and distinct. It is, are the supernatural incidents recorded in it historical events or fictitious inventions ? As that is the question before us, I must decline to allow any other issue to be substituted in the place of it. Our inquiry is one which is strictly historical. Another statement made by the author before me requires qualification. He says that ‘‘ Christianity is a scheme of religion which claims to be miraculous in all points, in form, in essence, and in evidence.” This statement I must controvert. Christianity does not profess to be divine on all points. On the contrary, it contains a divine and a human element so intimately united, that it is impossible to separate the one from the other. It is also far from clear to me how it can be miraculous in form when it is contained in a body of historical writings. I shall have occasion to show hereafter, that although miracles form an important portion of the attestation on which it rests, they are not the only one. With these qualifications I fully accept the position taken by this writer as a correct statement of the points at issue between those who affirm, and those who deny the claims of Christianity to be a divine revelation, and 14 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN accept his challenge to defend the supernatural elements in the New Testament, or to abandon it as worthless. To maintain that any of its dogmas can be accepted as true while its miraculous elements are abandoned seems to me to involve a question which is hopelessly illogical. Modern unbelief rejects every supernatural occurrence as utterly incredible. Before proceeding to examine into the grounds of this, it will be necessary to lay down definitely the bearing of the present argument on the principles of atheism, pantheism, and theism. As far as the impossibility of supernatural occur-” rences 1s concerned, pantheism and atheism occupy precisely the same grounds. If either of them pro- pounds a true theory of the universe, any supernatural occurrence, which necessarily implies a supernatural agent to bring it about, is impossible, and the entire controversy as to whether miracles have ever been actually performed is a foregone conclusion. . Modern atheism, while it does not venture in categorical terms to affirm that no God exists, definitely asserts that there is no evidence that there is one. It follows that if there is no evidence that there is a God, there can be no evidence that a miracle ever has been performed, for the very idea of a miracle implies the idea of a God to work one. If therefore atheism is true, all controversy about miracles is useless. They are simply impossible, and to inquire whether an impossible event has happened is absurd. ‘To such a person the histo- rical enquiry, as far as a miracle is concerned, must be a foregone conclusion. It might have a little in- terest as a matter of curiosity; but even if the most unequivocal evidence could be adduced that an occur- rence. such as we call supernatural had taken place, the utmost that it could prove would be that some OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 15 most extraordinary and abnormal fact had taken place in nature of which we did not know the cause. But to prove a miracle to any person who consistently denies that he has any evidence that any being exists which is not a portion of and included in the material universe, or developed out of it, is impossible. Nor does the case differ in any material sense with pantheism. When we have got rid of its hazy mysticism, and applied to it clear principles of logic, its affirmation is that God and the Universe are one, and that all past and present forms of existence have been the result of the Universe, i.e. God, everlastingly developing himself in conformity with immutable law. All things which either have existed or exist are as many manifestations of God, who is in fact an infinite imper- sonal Proteus, ever changing in his outward form. From him, or to speak more correctly, from it (for he is no person), all things have issued as mere phenomenal bubbles of the passing moment, and by it will be again swallowed up in never-ending succession. Sucha God must be devoid of everything which we understand by personality, intelligence, wisdom, volition or a moral nature. It is evident therefore that to a person who logically and consistently holds these views the occur- rence of a miracle is no less an impossibility than it is to an atheist, for the conception of a miracle involves the presence of personality, intelligence, and power at the disposal of volition. All that the strongest evi- dence could prove to those who hold such principles, is that some abnormal event had taken place of which the cause was unknown. It is evident, therefore, that the only course which can be pursued with a professed atheist or pantheist, is to grapple with him on the evidences of theism, and to endeavour to prove the existence of a God possessed 16 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN of personality, intelligence, volition, and adequate power, before we attempt to deal with the evidences of miracles. Until we have convinced him of this all our reasonings must be in vain. ‘here are four modes of reasoning by which the being of a God may be established. I will simply enumerate them. First, the argument which is founded on the principle of causation ; second, that which rests on the order of the universe; third, that from its innumerable adaptations ; fourth, that which is derived from the moral nature and personality of man. If the argument from causation fails to prove to those with whom we are reasoning that the finite causes in the universe must have a first cause from whence they have originated; if that from the orderly arrange- ments in the universe fails to prove that there must be an intelligent being who produced them ; if its innu- merable adaptations fail to establish the presence of a presiding mind; and if the moral nature of man fails to prove that there must be a moral being from whom that nature emanated, and of whom it is the image, it follows that the minds must be so differently consti- tuted as to offer no common ground or basis of reason- ing on this question. ‘The whole involves an essential difference of principle, which no argumentation can really reach. ‘To attempt to prove to a mind of this description the occurrence of a miracle, is simply a waste of labour. A work, therefore, on the subject of miracles can only be addressed to theists, because the very concep- tion of a miracle involves the existence of a personal God. To take this for granted in reasoning with a pantheist or atheist is simply to assume the point at issue. It is perfectly true, that a legitimate body of reasoning may be constructed, if the pantheist or the OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. iW. atheist agrees to assume that a God exists for the purpose of supplying a basis for the argument. We may then reason with him precisely in the same way as we would with a theist. But the contest will be with one who has clad himself in armour which no weapon at our disposal can penetrate. After the strongest amount of historical evidence has been ad- duced, and after all alleged difficulties have been answered, he simply falls back on his atheism or his pantheism, which assumes that all supernatural occur- rences must be impossible, and therefore that all alleged instances of them are delusions. This is not unfrequently the case in the present controversy. A considerable number of objections which are urged against the supernatural elements of Christianity, derive whatever cogency they possess from the assumption that there is a God who is the moral Governor of the universe. ‘These are not un- frequently urged by persons who deny the possibility of miracles on atheistic or pantheistic grounds. It is perfectly fair to reason against Christianity on these grounds ; it is equally so for a person who holds these opinions, to attempt to prove that the historical evi- dence adduced in proof of the miracles recorded in the New Testament is worthless as an additional reason why men should cease to believe in them. But it is not conducive to the interests of truth to urge objec- tions which have no reality except on the supposition that a God exists who is the moral Governor of the universe, and then to fall back on reasonings whose whole force is dependent on the data furnished by pantheism or atheism. I shall have occasion to notice a remarkable instance of this involved mode of reason- ing hereafter. 18 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN I shall now proceed briefly to state the mode in which I propose to treat the present subject. ‘The point which I have to defend is not any conceivable body of miracles or their evidential value, but specially the supernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testa- ment. I must therefore endeavour to ascertain what is the extent of the supernaturalism asserted in the New Testament, and what is the degree of evidential value which its writers claim for it. It has been asserted by many writers that the sole and only evidence of a revelation must be a miraculous tes- timony. Whether this be so or not, this is not the place to enquire. Butin relation to the present controversy the plain and obvious course is to ask the writers of the New Testament what is the precise evidential value of the supernatural occurrences which they have narrated. This is far preferable to falling back on any assertions of modern writers, however eminent, on this subject. They may have over-estimated, or under-estimated their evidential value. The writers of the New Testament must be held responsible, not for the assertions of others, but only for their own. I must therefore carefully consider what it is that they affirm to be proved by miracles. One primary objection against the possibility of miracles is founded on that peculiar form of theoretic belief, which affirms that both philosophy, science, and religion alike point to the existence of a Cause of the Universe, which is the source of all the forces which exist, and of which the various phenomena of the uni- verse are manifestations, and designates this cause by the name of God. But while it concedes his existence, it proclaims him to be Unknown and Unknowable. If this position is correct, the inference seems inevitable, that any thing like areal revelation of him is impossible. OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 19 It will be necessary therefore for me to examine into the validity of this position. A vast variety of arguments have been adduced both on philosophic grounds and from the principles estab- lished by physical science, for the purpose of proving that the occurrence of any supernatural event is con- trary to our reason. If this be true, it is a fatal objection against the entire mass of supernatural occurrences that are recorded in the New Testament. The most important points of these reasonings will require a careful consideration. A very important objection has been urged against the Christian mode of conducting the argument from miracles. It is alleged that 1t involves reasoning in a vicious circle, and that Christian apologists endeavour to prove the truth of doctrines which utterly transcend reason by miraculous evidence, and then endeavour to prove the truth of the miracles by the doctrines. If this allegation is true, it is no doubt a fatal objection to the argument. I shall endeavour to show that it is founded on a misapprehension of the entire subject. An attempt has been made to re-affirm the validity of Hume’s argument that no amount of evidence can avail to prove the reality of a miracle unless the false- hood of the evidence is more miraculous than the alleged miracle. It will be necessary to consider the validity of the positions which have been lately assumed respecting it. A very formidable objection has been urged against the truth of the supernatural occurrences recorded in the New Testament on the ground that the followers of Jesus were a prey to anumber of the most grotesque beliefs respecting the action of demons, and that their superstition and credulity on this point was of so extreme a character as to deprive their historical testi- oO 2 20 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN mony, on the subject of the supernatural of all value. As this objection is not only one which is widely extended, but has been urged with great force by the author of “ Supernatural Religion,” I shall devote four chapters of this work to the examination of the question of possession and demoniacal action as far as it affects the present controversy. The entire school of modern unbelief found a very considerable portion of their arguments against the historical character of the Gospels, on the alleged credu- lity and superstition of the followers of our Lord. This is alleged to have been of a most profound cha- racter, and it forms the weapon which is perhaps in most constant use with the assailants of Christianity. All difficulties which beset their arguments are met by attributing the most unbounded credulity, superstition and enthusiasm to the followers of Jesus. It has also been urged that the belief in supernatural occurrences has been so general, that it renders the attestation of miracles to a revelation invalid. I purpose examin- ing into the validity of this objection. As this may be said to be the key of the position occupied by modern unbelief, I must examine into the reality of the affirmation, and also how far the love of the mar- vellous in mankind affects the credit of the testimony to miracles. This I propose discussing in two distinct chapters. It is an unquestionable fact that in these days we summarily reject whole masses of alleged supernatural occurrences, as utterly incredible, without inquiry into the testimony on which they rest. It will be necessary to inquire into the grounds on which we do this, and how far it affects the credibility of the miracles re- corded in the New Testament. The historical value of the testimony which has OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 2] been adduced for the truth of the miracles recorded in the New Testament, has been assailed by every weapon which criticism can supply. It is affirmed in the strongest manner that they are utterly devoid of all reliable historical evidence. The Gospels are pronounced to consist of a bundle of myths and legends, with only a few grains of historic truth hidden beneath them. ‘They are affirmed to be late compositions, and that we are utterly devoid of all contemporaneous attestation for the facts recorded in them, and that the true account of the origin of Christianity is buried beneath a mass of fiction. If this be true, there cannot be a doubt that itis a most serious allegation, which affects the entire Christian position. It is further urged that while the defenders of Christianity publish works in which they attempt to prove that miracles are possible and credible, they carefully avoid grappling with the real point of the whole question by showing that any historical evidence can be produced for a single miracle recorded in the Gospels, which will stand the test of such historical criticism, and it is loudly proclaimed that no real evidence can be made forthcoming. Such a charge as this, it is impossibleto pass over in silence. I propose, therefore, to examine into the general truth of these allegations, and to consider the nature of the historical evidence which unbelief, after it has exhausted all its powers of criticism, still leaves us unquestionably in possession of. This consists of the epistles of the New Testament viewed as historical documents. Their value as such has been greatly overlooked by both sides to the con- troversy, especially by the Christian side. Christians have been in the habit of viewing them as inspired compositions, and have studied them almost exclusively 22 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN on account of the doctrinal and moral teaching which they contain, and each sect has viewed them as a kind of armoury from which to draw weapons for the establishing its own particular opinions. In doing this they have forgotten that they are also historical documents of the highest order, the great majority of which even the opponents of Christianity concede to have been composed prior to the conclusion of the first century of the Christian era, and many of them at a much earlier period. Of these writings four are universally admitted to be genuine, and to have been composed prior to the year 60 of ourera. Four more are genuine beyond all reasonable doubt, and of two more the evidence in favour of their authenticity is very strong. The Apocalypse, which is also admitted to be genuine, although not strictly an historical document, can be rendered valuable for the purposes of history. Of the remaining writings the genuineness is disputed ; but whether genuine or not, it is impossible to deny their antiquity, and that they are faithful representa- tions of the ideas of those who wrote them. In fact the names of their authors are of no great importance in the present controversy, when the writings them- selves bear so decisively the marks of originality. Thus the epistle of James, by whomsoever written, bears the most unquestionable marks of the most primitive antiquity. Itis in fact a document of the earliest form of Christianity,—in one word, the Jewish form, before the Church was finally separated from the synagogue. Such are our historical materials. Little justice has been done to their value in the writings of Christian apologists. As included in the Canon of the New Testa- ment, it has been for the most part the practice to view OPPONENTS AND DFFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY, 23 them as standing in need of defence, rather than as being the mainstay of the argument for historical Christianity, and constituting its central position. lt will be admitted that it will be impossible for me to do full justice to such a subject in a work like the present. ‘To bring out all the treasures of evidence respecting primitive Christianity, and the foundation of the Christian Church which these writings contain, the whole subject would require to be unfolded in a distinct and separate treatise exclusively devoted to the subject. Still, however, this work would be very incomplete if I did not accept the challenge so boldly thrown down to us, and show that Christianity rests on an historical attestation of the highest order. T'o this I propose devoting the six concluding chapters of this work. I intend, therefore, in the first place to examine the value of the historical documents of the New Testa- ment, and show that several of the epistles take rank as the highest form of historical documents, and present us with what is to all intents and purposes a large mass of contemporaneous evidence as to the primitive beliefs, and the original foundation of the Christian Church. In doing so I propose to treat them in the same manner as all other similar historical documents are treated. T shall then show that these documents afford a sub- stantial testimony to all the great facts of Christianity, and especially to the existence of miraculous powers in the Church, and that the various Churches were from the very earliest period in possession of an oral account of the actions and teachings of Jesus Christ substan- tially the same as that which is now embodied in the Gospels; and that this oral Gospel was habitually used for the purposes of instruction. Further, that this 24 POSITION OF THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN oral Gospel was a substantial embodiment of the beliefs of the primitive followers of Jesus, and that the Church as a community was a body especially adapted for handing down correctly the account of the primi- tive beliefs respecting its origin, and that the peculiar position in which it was placed compelled it to do so. I shall further show on the evidence furnished by those epistles, the genuineness of which unbelievers do not dispute, that from the earliest commencement of Christianity the whole body of believers, without dis- tinction of sect or party, believed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a fact, and viewed it not only as the groundwork on which Christianity rested, but as the one sole and only reason for the existence of the Christian Church. I shall be able also to prove on the same evidence that a considerable number of the fol- lowers of Jesus were persuaded that they had seen him alive after his crucifixion, and that his appearance was an actual resurrection from the dead. The same writings prove to demonstration that this was the universal belief of the whole Christian community, and that the Church was established on its basis. These things being established as the basis for my reasonings, I shall proceed to prove that it is impos- sible that these beliefs of the Church could have owed their origin to any possible form of delusion; but that the resurrection of Jesus Christ was an historical] fact, and that no other supposition can give an adequate ac- count of the phenomenon. Having proved that the greatest of all the miracles which are recorded in the Gospels is an historical fact, I have got rid of the @ priori difficulty with which the acceptance of the Gospels as genuine historical accounts is attended; but further, if it is an historical fact that Jesus Christ really rose from the dead, it is in the OPPONENTS AND DEFENDERS OF CHRISTIANITY. 25 highest degree probable that other supernatural oc- currences would be connected with his person. I shall therefore proceed to restore the Gospels to their place as history, and to show that even on the principles of the opponents of Christianity, they have every claim to be accepted as true accounts of the action and teaching of Jesus Christ as it was transmitted by the different Churches, partly in an oral, and partly in a written form. I shall also show that even if they were composed at the late dates which are assigned to them by opponents, they were yet written within the period which is strictly historical, while tradition was fresh and reminiscences vivid, and long befere it was possible that a great mass of facts which must have formed the basis of the existence of the Christian Church could have been superseded by a number of mythic and legendary creations. Having placed these facts on a firm foundation, I shall proceed to consider their accounts of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and to estimate its historical nature. The proof that the greatest miracle recorded in the Gospels, the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, is an event which has really occurred, places the remainder of them in point of credibility in the same position as the facts of ordinary history; and they must be accepted and regarded in conformity with the usual methods of testing evidence. CHAPTER II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. Noruine has more contributed to import an almost hopeless confusion of thought into the entire contro- versy about miracles than the ambiguous senses in which the most important terms connected with it have been employed, both by theologians and men of science, by the defenders of revelation as well as by its opponents. Of these terms the words * nature,” “natu- ral,” “law,” “ force,”’ “ supernatural,” ‘‘ superhuman,” “miracle,” and “ miraculous,’ are the most con- spicuous. It is quite clear that unless we use these terms in a definite and uniform sense, we shall be fighting the air. The neglect to do so has thrown the greatest obscurity oyer the entire subject. ‘This vague and uncertain use of them is not confined to writers on theological subjects, but is diffused over a large number of scientific works. My object in the present chapter will be, not to lay down strictly aceu- rate definitions of all the terms used in the controversy (for this in the present state of thought on the subject is hardly possible) but to endeavour to assign a definite meaning to those which it will be necessary for me to employ, and to draw attention to some of the fallacies which a vague use of language has introduced. First: No terms are more frequently used in this controversy than the words ‘‘ nature” and “ natural.’ DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. 27 They are constantly used as if their meaning was definite and invariable. Nothing is more common than to use the expression “laws of nature,’ and to speak of miracles as involving contradictions, viola- tions, and suspensions of the laws and order of nature, as though there was no danger of our falling into fallacies of reasoning by classing wholly different orders of phenomena under a common name. What do we mean by the terms “nature” and “natural”? It is evident that no satisfactory result can come from reasoning on this subject, unless the parties to the discussion agree to attach to those words a steady and consistent meaning. Are we in fact under the expression “‘ nature” to include both matter and its phenomena, and mind and its phenomena? Is nature to include all things which exist, including their causes, laws, and forces; or is it to be restricted to matter, its laws and forces? Oris it to include all things that exist, except God? I need hardly observe that the laying down some clear and definite principles on this subject is vital to the present controversy. Again: What do we mean by the laws of nature? How do we distinguish between the laws and the forces of nature? Do the laws of nature, in the sense in which that expression is used by science, possess any efficient power whatever ; or ought not efficiency to be predicated only of the forces of nature, and never of its laws? Or when we speak of the forces of nature, do we recognise any distinction between material and moral forces, or do we confound phenomena so utterly differing in outward character, and on whose difference some of the most important points of the controversy about miracles rest, under a common name? What again do we mean by the order of nature? Is it its material order; or does it include the order of the 28 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. moral universe? Until we can agree to attach a defi- nite meaning to these expressions, to argue that miracles are contrary to nature, or involve a suspension of its laws, or a violation of its order, or even to affirm the contrary position, is fighting the air. Yet this | may almost say is the present aspect of the con- troversy. Again: What do we intend, when we use the different expressions, “ miracles,” ‘supernatural,’ ‘ super- human,” or events occurring out of the order of nature ? lt is evident that whether they point to any real dis- tinctions or not, it 1s necessary to employ them with consistency. The mere enumeration of these questions makes it clear that by a vague and indefinite use of terms, or by attaching to them meanings which they cannot accur- ately be made to bear, we may unconsciously assume the entire question at issue. First : With respect to the terms “nature” and “natural.” What do we include under them? Bishop Butler considers that the latter term is satisfied by attaching to it the meaning “usual.” Nature then would mean the ordinary course of things. But such a meaning would by no means satisfy the requirements of modern science, philosophy, or theology. One obvious sense to attach to the word “nature ” is to use it to denote the entire mass of phenomena as contemplated by physical science. In this point of view it would include matter, its forces, and its laws, and embrace the entire range of those phenomena and forces where action is necessary, and into the concep- tion of which neither volition nor freedom enters. If “nature” and “natural’’ had been used only in this sense, it would have saved us from a great mass of incon- clusive reasoning. But this is far from being the case. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. 929 ‘Not only are they used to include matter, its laws and forces, but also the whole phenomena of mind. To this use of the terms the Duke of Argyll has given no inconsiderable countenance in his admirable work, “The Reign of Law,” especially in the sixth chapter. He uses the term law as alike applicable to the operations of mind and matter, and this of course implies that the whole of our mental phenomena form a portion of nature and its order. He is led to this, among other considerations, by the use which we make of the word “natural” as applied to the results of all kinds of mental operations. The question may fairly be asked, Are not the works wrought by man in nature, or is not the building of its nest by a bird, or of its comb by the bee, a natural operation? If so, man, bird, and bee, must form a.portion of nature, and their various actions, of its order. In a popular point of view such expressions involve no difficulty, and asa mere verbal distinction the whole question would not be worth the labour of discussion. But in a question like the one now under consideration, which requires the utmost accuracy both of thought and reasoning, the case is far different. The classing together of phenomena which differ so entirely as mind and matter, under a common term, leads to the in- ference that there is no essential difference between them, which involves at the outset a petitio principia of the entire question under definition. I shall have occasion repeatedly to point out in the course of this work the number of fallacious reasonings which have been introduced into the question about the possibility and the credibility of miracles by thus including under a common term phenomena utterly different in character. It would be far better to get rid of words so vague as “nature” and “natural” in this discussion, and 30 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. substitute for them terms of which it is impossible to mistake the meaning, than to employ them in senses which are simply ambiguous and misleading. But of this more hereafter. What then are we to do with man? Is hea part of nature and its order? I reply that man is within material nature as far as regards his bodily organ- ization ; but that he is outside, or above it, and belongs to a different order, as far as his rational action, his volition, and his moral powers are concerned. All that I am contending for is that a clear distinction must be preserved between the necessary action of the forces of material nature, and the voluntary action of man; and that terms must be used which accurately denote this distinction. Matter, its forces and laws, involve the conception of necessary action. They act in a particular manner because they cannot help so acting. With action purely intellectual I am not concerned, but all moral action is voluntary. Man as an agent can act or forbear acting; matter cannot. This dis- tinction is of the highest importance, and must not be lost sight of behind a confused use of such terms as natural, law, force, or order of nature, applied indeterminately to the necessary action of material agents, and the voluntary action of moral ones. It will doubtless be objected by a certain order of philosophy that all mental and moral force is only some special modification of material force, and consequently that there is no distinction between material and moral action, or between material and moral force, and that the words “ nature” and ‘‘natural ”’ are cor- rectly applied to both alike, as being simple manifesta- tions of the same original force. ‘To this it will be sufficient to reply, first: that this is an assertion only, DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. ae and never has been nor can be proved. Secondly: that it contradicts the highest of all our certitudes, the direct testimony of consciousness, which affirms that we live under a law of freedom, wholly different from the necessary laws of material nature. Thirdly: that it contradicts the universal experience of mankind, as embodied in the primary laws of human language and human thought. To assume this at the commencement of the argument is to take for granted the point which requires to be proved. Jt would be quite out of place in a treatise like the present to attempt to discuss the question of the origin of the free agency and the moral nature of man. ° It is . sufficient for the purpose to observe that, however voluntary agency may have originated, it is a simple fact that it exists in the universe, and that its pheno- mena belong to an order of its own. Itis no mere theory, but a fact, that man. not only is capable of modifying the action of the forces of the material universe, but thai he has modified them, and has produced results utterly different from those which would have followed from their simple action. ‘To use terms in this con- troversy which overlook this plain and obvious fact, can lead to no satisfactory result. Are then the actions of man, the bird, and the bee, properly designated as natural? In a popular use of language the question may be one purely verbal; but when we are dealing with subjects requiring accurate thought, it is in the highest degree necessary to use language which does not confound the distinct pheno- mena of mind and matter under a common designation. Both together compose the universe ; but each belongs to a different order of phenomena. The whole difficulty proceeds from the fact that both material forces which act in conformity with necessary laws, and moral ones Sid DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. which act in conformity with those of freedom, are united in the person of man. Another order of thought uses the term “ nature” as including everything that exists, even God; or in other words, it affirms that every thing which has existed and exists is a manifestation of Him. As this theory involves the denial of the personality of the Divine Being, it stands excluded from the question under consideration, namely, the credibility of miracles, which is utterly irrelevant, except on the assump- tion of the existence of a personal God. It ought to be observed, however, that while theism affirms that God and the universe, whether material or moral, are distinct, it. fully recognises the fact that God is imma- . nent in both the worlds of mind and matter, while at the same time he transcends them both. This is an important consideration, which is too often overlooked by both parties to the discussion. Secondly: a still greater confusion has been intro- duced by a vague and indefinite use of the term “law,” and by confusing a number of utterly diverse phe- nomena under the designation of the “ laws of nature.” It is absolutely necessary to trace this fallacy to its source. The Dukeof Argyll tells us in his “ Reign of Law ” that there are five different senses at least in which this word is habitually used even in scientific writings. They are as follows :— « First, we have law as applied simply to an observed order of facts.” “ Secondly, to that order as involving the action of some force or forces of which nothing more can be known.” « Thirdly, as applied to individual forces, the measure of whose operation has been more or less defined or ascertained.” DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. oo ** Fourthly, as applied to those combinations of forces which have reference to the fulfilment of purposes or the discharge of functions.” “Fifthly, as applied to abstract conceptions of the mind—not corresponding with any actual phenomena, but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought, necessary to an understanding of them. Law, in this sense, is a reduction of the phenomena, not merely to an order of facts, but to an order of thought.”’ ““These leading significations of the word Law,” says the Duke, “all circle round the three great ques- tions which science asks of nature, the what, the how, and the why.” ‘What are the facts in their established order ? “* How, 2.e. from what physical causes does that order come to be? What relation do they bear to purpose, to the fulfilment of intention, to the discharge of function ?”’ Such are the multiform acceptations attached by scientific men to the term “ law,” yet the Duke is not quite certain whether they may not be even more numerous. It is evident that if they are all imported into the question of the credibility of miracles, our position must resemble that of persons who are com- pelled to fight in the dark; and that the question whether an occurrenceis natural orsupernatural, whether it is contrary to, or a violation of the laws of nature, or above nature, and many others which enter into this controversy must be without definite meaning. It is clear that unless we can restrict the word “law” to one, or at most, two definite meanings, we shall get into hopeless confusion, or to speak more correctly, we shall open the gate wide for the introduction of any number of fallacies. The primary conception implied by the term “law” D “) 34 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. is unquestionably one which is strictly applicable to man and his actions, and can only be applied imeta- phorically, and in some systems of thought after a considerable change of meaning, to the facts and phe- nomena of the material universe. A law is a rule of action for human conduct and nothing more. Such rules of conduct for the most part pre-suppose that they are imposed by some external authority, which has the right or the power to enforce obedience to them; or else that the person obeying them has an inward feeling that it is right todo so, and knows that his conscience will reproach him for the omission. But law, strictly speaking, is simply the rule of action itself, as for instance, an Act of Parliament; but as in practice all such rules are enforced by a sanction of some kind, our conception of a law is also united with that of a lawgiver, who has both the right and the power to enforce it. It follows therefore that such a conception is essen- tially a moral one. Itis also intimately united with the knowledge that we possess the power to act or forbear acting in conformity with its dictates, and, if we prefer it, of taking the consequences of disobe- dience. But when such a conception is transferred to material nature it loses a considerable portion of its original significancy. In its application therefore to physical science, it may with strict propriety be used to denote an in- variable order of events: and if the human analogy could hold in physics it might be used to include the power which originated and enforced them. But as the consideration of will or purpose forms no portion of strictly physical science, and is expressly excluded from it, the term law as used by it ought to denote the invariable order of sequences, and not to include DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. 35 the forces which generate them. Unless this distine- tion is carefully observed, we shall be in danger of introducing into our reasonings human analogies to which there is nothing corresponding in nature viewed as a mere body of unintelligent forces. The use of the term “law” in physical science ought to be confined to denote the invariable sequences of the material phenomena. Physicists profess to know nothing of efficient causation; or of a lawgiver stand- ing outside his laws and possessing power to enforce them. The whole question of intelligent agency or purpose lies in a region outside their province. Law, as far as physical science is acquainted with it, can consist only of a set of antecedents, followed by an invariable set of consequents. Of any inherent efficacy in these antecedents to produce their con- sequents, it can affirm nothing.