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MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
Vol. 
 
 6é 
 
 &¢ 
 
 DOGMATIC THEOLOGY 
 
 BY 
 FRANCIS J. HALL, D.D. 
 
 A series of ten volumes, each complete in itself, 
 designed to constitute a connected treatment of the 
 entire range of Catholic Doctrine. 
 
 i 
 i. 
 
 Introduction to Dogmatic Theology. 
 Authority, Ecclesiastical and Biblical. 
 
 The Being and Attributes of God. 
 
 The Trinity. 
 
 Creation and Man. 
 
 The Incarnation. 
 
 The Passion and Exaltation of Christ. 
 The Church and the Sacramental System. 
 The Sacraments. 
 
 Eschatology. Indexes. 
 
MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 BY THE 
 Rey. FRANCIS J. HALL, D.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE » 
 GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK CITY>, ey 
 
 AND THE 
 Rev. FRANK H. HALLOCK, D.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITIC LANGUAGES 
 IN SEABURY DIVINITY SCHOOL, FARIBAULT, MINN. 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. 
 §5 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 
 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E. C. 4 
 TORONTO, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, AND MADRAS 
 
 1924 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1923, BY 
 LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. 
 
 MADE IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
HBredicated 
 
 WITH HIS GRACIOUS PERMISSION 
 
 TO THE 
 RIGHT REVEREND 
 WILLIAM WALTER WEBB, D.D. 
 
 BISHOP OF MILWAUKEE 
 AND 
 
 AUTHOR OF THE VALUABLE MANUAL 
 
 “THE CURE OF SOULS” 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2022 with funding from 
 Princeton Theological Seminary Library 
 
 https://archive.org/details/moraltheologyOOhall 
 
PREFACE 
 
 I HAD intended, after finishing the production of 
 my series of ten volumes in Dogmatic Theology, to 
 add as sequel thereto a work on Moral Theology, a 
 subject which I taught in the Western Theological 
 Seminary for some twenty years. Various reasons, 
 however, threatened greatly to delay my completion 
 of this work, when my scholarly friend and former 
 pupil, Dr. Frank H. Hallock, offered to help me in 
 preparing existing material of mine for immediate 
 publication. I was the more ready to accept his 
 kind offer because of the numerous letters which I 
 was receiving, urging the present need of some kind 
 of handbook of Moral Theology. 
 
 Accordingly, Dr. Hallock has taken my Western 
 Seminary Syllabus, has slightly enlarged it, amended 
 it, and brought it up to date, and has filled in the 
 footnotes—an arduous undertaking. I have in turn 
 gone over the footnotes and, with occasional slight 
 amendments of both text and notes, have added to 
 the bibliographical matter. I am also responsible 
 for the opening chapter on “The Study of Moral 
 Theology.” 
 
 With grateful thanks to Dr. Hallock for his most 
 valuable help, I express my earnest hope that our 
 
 vil 
 
Vili PREFACE 
 
 book may help on the revival so much needed of the 
 study of Moral Theology. It is, of course, a mere 
 handbook, and does not remove the need of more 
 adequate treatises. 
 
 LO Pils & 
 
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 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 Part I. Introductory 
 
 PE ROUIVALOLITILELES Eeyore eee ee Uae Ua eg Tce 
 . Onesided Tendency of Ethical Literature.......... 
 Pieurrent Utilitariany LGGAlSs ce ue og ail ie ie 
 
 Part II. Survey of Moral Science 
 
 . Its Several Branches: Practical Aspect............ 
 . Legalistic and Ascetic Elements. 0) .0..003655 
 . The Place of Psychology...... TOM Onge Nhat teeta 
 
 Part III. Some Snares 
 
 . In Distinguishing Venial and Mortal sin.......... 
 . In Judging the Guilt of Relapses................. 
 . In Teaching the Need of Sacramental Confession... 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 . Definitions eoeepeveoeveeere ee epee eovnee sree ed eeooeoe ene eone@ 
 
 Part I. Ancient Pagan Ethics 
 
 37 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 x 
 PAGE 
 Sa) Greek Ethics o's lela visteie t mauelemre. alee: petenue arnt oar 24 
 §)\5)) Greco-Roman Ethics. hogs oie emais ern ea aeane 30 
 Part II. Christian Ethics 
 $6.) New departures.) ‘sa cys cleiebile eels Cy ene ieee 32 
 S 7) Patristic: Ethics ny ion wo aa ee aataretrar onare 27 
 $5. Scholastic Behics, Jee Oc nel ae eat ea AI 
 $0. Later; Roman Ethics.) (ace gama cise eee 44 
 Sto.|' Protestant Ethics .:.!0. eed eens Ue mines aie tae 46 
 Part III. Modern Ethics 
 Sir. Hobbes to Hume oy eee hee 47 
 §12:\Precipitations after umesr nie aay hha 50 
 §13. Epitome of Ethical Systems..... a ncd es phga Waa we) OnL lel onan ate 
 CHAPTER III 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY OR SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 St) Assumptions... ee ra. rete iegia cieievehk ane 60 
 Part I. The Agent 
 §'2.\ The Intellectual Faculties f073 (isa eee ae 62 
 $3: The Emotions) ui uiet Aa) Cuan aman oe ee 68 
 Sep ane WTA OTT OEM er VANS Un ti iMag) Ay Nhat 69 
 8) 6. The Body s Ve ue Dare ae a acco ea Ra Oa ca 75 
 $!'6,' Man’s: Moral History dupe ua aus ee wen ee 76 
 Part II. The End 
 § 7. Ends of Moral Conductom uy ima, ae oa cua aan 77 
 88) Motivese. ge IO Aa a en at ae Gee 80 
 Part III. The Act 
 8.9. The Morality’ of Actions (vie mie ls cn aera 83 
 $10. Acts Classified iit i) i Cn nl TE nS cD a lia 86 
 Sir. Virtues and) Vitese Join Ole Wily ae ine 89 
 §12, ‘The Practice of Religion. (Ann cunaiaeuaie ss wue g2 
 
602602602 6072602607 602COR 
 Cony Qui > Wh H 
 
 CONTENTS xi 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 Part I. The Law of God 
 
 PAGB 
 
 - Definition of Moral Theology Proper............. 95 
 UME WW IL an Law OL. Gr0du ice int ielsa aa aele wt 97 
 POVLELDOC Ob) ETERCINON Uys wana wat ianier stint 99 
 
 Part II. The Law of Reason 
 PAINOtviciias Obligations. rarer Pen a ie 100 
 Pr OOCIAL CDG AtIONS it's slaaaeitad cele puree te were IOI 
 Part III. Superimposed Moral Law 
 . The Decalogue and Christ’s Summary............ 102 
 Le First Commandment vii Genie 45 6 beaver eu 105 
 The: Second Commandment wwii eee oe 106 
 A neuLnird AcommaAndiment cgay ee Uy 107 
 ‘he; Fourth Commandment .s 0.) aes cS 109 
 POG UAC COM MANGMeNG. wi c)hslslee fies ke whe seleib ois i12 
 Moi a COMMAnOMenL sce A aie eats 117 
 THeimevench, COmMManCMeNnt ww y juny nual wie II9 
 Matte signi i Commandmenty sii) signs ca syle do e's 122 
 Wise MINDEN COMmMMaAnamMent ye Wire cle ok gat male hace 124 
 PRVOCMLENEN COMMMANGMENL, . galsicy decimate gc uray ie 126 
 CHAPTER V 
 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 ne acramien tatty Crenetats suis clas si die eee oars ete 129 
 BAAN hd LESSER LAT erate eb ehaihl celal) Wid tate drm a Rodd oa ewe 131 
 PPALONTIETIALION | un mene Rack Ce vrata hte tanita 20 133 
 POL COMMUNION Vs Sere Ce NS car nas Tas 
 
 PR EMIALICOW cre ts ons ai ites CUM Ian Eccles stad la. '8 tara otc mane 137 
 POLO AIT GET SI hoot ae Caters shale WOMAN cy ati’ "ob a a natal 142 
 METROUY UNI AVITEOTIY © tie hrenate ea iG. se raia rary bie nie vie a areal ats 146 
 SITET OLFLHE ICR Shite so Gite nyt Waly Sa eee dala ara ea 150 
 
€OR 00? 60200? 60760200? 
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 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 Part I. Notable Duties 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PLAY ET ain ss aie. oul pinibiace's <3 gmie Wie Strout ite en noes 152 
 
 » PASTING 2. so saoo esd lala oe ale SP MG ene Ren Tet err eae 154 
 Almsgiving< 3.055.452 spine ees ova emer n cena 155 
 
 Part IT. Civil Obligations 
 SOUECO) Se he ee a en ae 157 
 LUTE ele nb getaue ce ep wala teehee ole tie ean ein ee 158 
 Part III. Soctological Obligations 
 ; in General, Socialism.3 7c) nen ss eee eee ee 160 
 . Industrialism .):* : (awit os sceieick sc eieee ieee en en eee 163 
 Contracts 3555.5) ) ctoleale ica i aieleeti eerie da cae ee cae nn a at 164 
 Economic Laws, 0.0 ie vin cuivanty ee aaienias kee ee 165 
 Incidental Questions, (2 Wiese) esesee oie abe ween 168 
 Part IV. Obligations Voluntarily Incurred 
 
 OP VOWS ee ae a tie fear oy Aner ehee eae mae 172 
 Of vocation Orilife workie i. ia veo ea ae Les 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 
 
 . Non-legalistic Obligations: The Call to Perfection.. 175 
 ») Virtues and @iaracter [ao Ge ain ub ey gine mete hares 176 
 »/ Christian i Manneras iy ven eiius, E ican As ce Gaon tenet a 178 
 , Expediency: Permissions sc uxeiis. cts) eel sia eine es 179 
 COunsels oe ee i aaah igi tee Statens 181 
 Example 27 Or c's eile Guk CWI tseN a went Ger ee aaa 185 
 
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 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 PE ACASUIGEDY for, eel ici eieise so hae are ate hen gh Ras ue 4 
 
 The Requirements of this Sacrament............. 
 The Duty and Profit of Confession............... 
 
 eualincations of the Priest so. ywieg sacle domes ole 
 . The Mode of Hearing Confessions...............- 
 PEIPTCELORAtIONS Atte huis a uiee hamiG male mene dee ek 
 Mr ypestOlye CMIteNtS es sche visi roe ae sieime aera bee Sirk 
 
 Confessions of the Sick and Dying... ..seeesreeee 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 SIN 
 
 PPL IOUIM ONG Cs ce See ee res Pe Poptare dtd iomrey Weatnnai 
 PEC ATACLErIstics: ANGOTIFIN  . Se ass see ace als Were 
 PEINLOTERT AOC) VEDIAL ITE ae ou lari erec nme tial ate 
 
 Temptations and Occasions of Sin...........0.02- 
 
 PIS ITIS OE INL triatey ite yet tee ae ane ete Late aN Tyee 
 mele seven Capltalisingayy cue eee ke sy 
 . Sins that Cry to Heaven for Vengeance........... 
  Lhe.Sin against.the Holy Ghost... yoko 
 
 Bibtiograpiical, INGeK aw. vases asic eee He sas 
 DUOC INUCK si ils tor sia anny F te wine Gilato teed 
 
 PAGE 
 189 
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 203 
 209 
 210 
 214 
 220 
 
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MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 I. Introductory 
 
 § 1. One of the most encouraging incidents of the 
 catholic revival in the Anglican communion is the 
 renewal of interest in Moral Theology which is grad- 
 ually extending among the Anglican clergy. This 
 interest, however, is far from being as yet what it 
 should be, and its development is retarded by a very 
 serious lack of literature in the subject adapted to 
 Anglican conditions and needs. Quite a few con- 
 tributory productions of value have appeared in 
 recent years; but constructive manuals of systematic 
 and comprehensive nature, suitable for the general 
 guidance of priests in dealing with souls, are not in 
 evidence. They are greatly needed; and the imme- 
 diate urgency of this need explains our publication 
 of this comparatively brief handbook, without the 
 long delay that would be required for its full elab- 
 oration. 
 
2 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 § 2. The general tendency of moral writers outside 
 the Roman Communion has been to deal almost 
 exclusively with the more pressing problems of indus- 
 trial and social life, and beyond that field to confine 
 their attention to ethical theory. Moreover, in 
 ethical manuals of to-day the claim of supernatural 
 religion to be the true organizing principle of life 
 and character in this world is very generally ignored. 
 This is a very serious omission. Its natural result 
 is that current practical ideals are largely of exclu- 
 sively humanitarian and utilitarian types—as if man 
 were his own end, and general human welfare in this 
 world the organizing aim of all human duty. The 
 larger Christian meaning and purpose of human 
 effort, whenever it is sought to be reénforced, is stig- 
 matized as an interimsethic, or as “‘other-worldiness”’; 
 and is lightly put aside as antiquated and unhelpful 
 to those who would face the problem of this twen- 
 tieth century—the problem, that is, of making this a 
 better world to live in, here and now. The supreme 
 duty towards God, if discussed at all, is re-defined as 
 consisting in helping our neighbours, in promoting 
 their earthly well-being. 
 
 That to do earthly good to our neighbours, or to 
 serve them as opportunities occur in matters of tem- 
 poral welfare, is an integral and vital part of Christian 
 duty cannot rightly be denied, of course. Christ 
 Himself has set us an example in going about doing 
 good, and so far as modern practical idealism repre- 
 sents in this direction a recovery of Christian sense 
 
INTRODUCTORY 3 
 
 of responsibility to do physical works of mercy, and 
 a call to promote the present welfare of all classes of 
 society with the aid of improved social science, it 
 ought to obtain our entire approval and enlist our 
 earnest practice. 
 
 § 3. None the less, the swing of the pendulum 
 has been excessive, and the central and organizing 
 principle of Christian ethic has been driven out of 
 sight in the utilitarian idealism referred to. Doing 
 present good, healing the sick and so forth, was cer- 
 tainly an inevitable adjunct and promotive factor in 
 what Christ came to do. But the purpose which 
 brought Him into the world was to bring men to 
 eternal life—into living touch with God forever. 
 His immediate good works were undertaken as revela- 
 tions of His love and as adjuncts of His main design— 
 to facilitate the turning of men to God. The Gospel 
 evidence of this is abundant, and while the Catholic 
 Church has never ceased to include temporal benefi- 
 cence among Christian duties, it has consistently 
 retained Christ’s standpoint and aim as the organizing 
 principle of its ethical teaching. 
 
 This world is our school for the life which is to be 
 enjoyed hereafter. It is the sphere of probation and 
 discipline; and present happiness, even of the great- 
 est number, cannot be made the controlling aim of 
 all earthly endeavour, the supreme standard of refer- 
 ence in determining duty, without shifting the moral 
 centre from where God has placed it, and conse- 
 quently altering in fatal ways the righteousness 
 
4 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 which we are set to cultivate. It dethrones God and 
 reduces Him to a mere agent for human purposes 
 and human comfort. 
 
 A true moral science places God at the centre, as 
 our chief end. Whatever we are and for whatever 
 end we came to be are determined wholly by God’s 
 will and purpose in making us; and He made us for 
 Himself, to be His friends forever. Accordingly, He 
 has so made us that no temporal good, no purely 
 human fellowship, can satisfy us in the long run. 
 God does indeed will that we should attain to hap- 
 piness; but He has so determined our nature that no 
 abiding happiness is possible if we seek it otherwise 
 than through life with Him. This means that our 
 chief end does not lie unqualifiedly in seeking and 
 promoting happiness, but in making the happiness 
 which we seek and promote to consist in the life with 
 God and His saints for which we are made. 
 
 So it is that religion, or the cultivation of true 
 relations with God, is no mere aid to natural goodness, 
 but is the central element of righteousness, the ele- 
 ment that organizes all obligations and ideals what- 
 soever around our chief end. Apart from its prac- 
 tice the natural virtues—virtues though they truly 
 are—fail to be linked up with their higher and 
 heavenly complements, with the way to life and the 
 light that reveals that way. Problems of present 
 distress are treated as if they were the ultimate ones; 
 and the remedies sought to be applied serve as con- 
 cealments of the real situation instead of means of 
 
INTRODUCTORY 5 
 
 recovery for the journey to God. It is idle to set 
 over against this the widespread neglect by catholic 
 Christians of the utilitarian branch of their duties, as 
 if this justified giving such duties the paramount 
 place. A reformation of this neglect is rightly 
 demanded, but to make this world’s social welfare 
 the controlling standard of moral obligation is to 
 subvert the teaching of Christ and to revert to 
 paganism. Moral Theology should measure all 
 obligations in the light of their bearing on eternal 
 life; and when this is done practically the true and 
 abiding welfare of mankind will be promoted effect- 
 ively and in the manner that God wills. 
 
 §4. An adequate and justly proportioned moral 
 science, suitable for the conditions under which Angli- 
 can priests have to labour, has yet to be developed— 
 a development that will make no important headway 
 so long as our moral writers postpone experimental 
 effort in producing really constructive treatises. The 
 ideal treatise of which we dream cannot come except 
 as the sequel of pioneer efforts and numerous imper- 
 fect manuals. 
 
 In the meantime, our clergy are under obligation 
 to study Moral Theology, if they are to serve as 
 intelligent pastors and guides in and out of the 
 confessional, and not to be reckless exploiters of indi- 
 vidualistic judgments, judgments unrelated to the 
 cumulative experience and consentient opinions of 
 their predecessors from the beginning. Where shall 
 they turn? 
 
6 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 First of all they need to study Holy Scripture, espe- 
 cially the New Testament, as a storehouse of deter- 
 minative data—the moral teaching of Christ and His 
 Apostles, the cases in which their teaching received 
 significant application, and the ideal of Christian 
 conduct and character there exhibited. 
 
 Then they need to study the post-apostolic moral 
 teaching, precepts and discipline of the Catholic 
 Church, tracing it carefully through the ages to the 
 present day. This study, along with the biblical, 
 will provide the materials of Moral Theology and 
 afford many determinative hints both for constructive 
 ordering of moral science and for pastoral judgment. 
 Above all it will go far to save the student from one- 
 sidedness, whether of ecclesiastical provincialism or 
 of modern utilitarianism. 
 
 The great ethical classics should receive attention, 
 especially Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and St. 
 Thomas’ Summa Theologica, Part II, which more 
 than any other ethical treatises have created the 
 terminology of moral science. To St. Thomas we 
 owe the accepted definition of many moral concepts, 
 and to leave him out is like leaving Hamlet out of 
 Shakespeare’s drama of that title. 
 
 Again, we cannot pass over the study of Roman 
 Catholic treatises. In them alone do we find large 
 and constructive treatments of the whole subject. 
 These treatises have defects, and are adjusted to 
 ecclesiastical conditions other than ours; and some 
 of their defects will be indicated in these pages. But 
 
SURVEY OF MORAL SCIENCE 7 
 
 nowhere else can we find complete handling of many 
 questions which we have to face somehow in dealing 
 with souls. 
 
 Finally, an adequate study of moral science must 
 include a reckoning with modern ethical literature of 
 the contributory type, both Anglican and other— 
 the modern manuals of Ethics (mostly theoretical) 
 and Anglican contributions from such writers as 
 Bishop Gore, T. B. Strong, K. E. Kirk, F. G. Belton 
 and others mentioned in our footnotes. In particu- 
 lar, the modern industrial situation has to be faced, 
 and some knowledge needs to be gained of law, eco- 
 nomics, sociology and psychology. Surely the sub- 
 ject of moral science is large; but its largeness ought 
 not: to conceal the imperative need of mastering it as 
 well as we can. 
 
 IT. Survey of Moral Science 
 
 § 5. The several branches of Moral Theology in 
 general are as follows: (a) Moral Philosophy, the 
 principal content of modern ethical manuals, con- 
 cerned with ethical theory and the definition of the 
 fundamental ethical concepts; (b) Moral Theology 
 Proper, giving a logically connected account of all 
 Christian obligations, in the light of the law of both 
 God and man and of the terms of the Christian cove- 
 nant; (c) Casuistry, concerned with problematical 
 cases of conduct, and with the principles which should 
 guide a priest in dealing with individual souls; (4) 
 
8 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 Ascetic Theology, or the science of Christian progress 
 towards perfection; (e) Mystical Theology, con- 
 cerned with the supernatural experiences of those who 
 in this life attain to occasional enjoyments of union 
 with God approximating that which is pledged to the 
 faithful in Heaven. 
 
 It is to be noticed that the study of moral science 
 has a practical aim, an aim which cannot be fulfilled 
 by concerning ourselves exclusively or chiefly with 
 ethical theory. Sound ethical theory, which means 
 theory that reckons seriously with the supernaturally 
 revealed Christian faith and covenant, is indeed 
 indispensable; but it should be regarded as intro- 
 ductory only, and should be applied in a coherent 
 treatment of the whole range of Christian obligations, 
 Godward and manward, of supernatural religion 
 and of good morals in the usual sense of that phrase. 
 The widespread assumption that no such science is 
 needed, even for Christian pastors, is hopelessly mis- 
 taken. Without it the range of duty is inadequately 
 understood by the clergy; and the problems that con- 
 tinually arise in the guidance of souls are apt to be 
 handled crudely and determined badly, with oblivi- 
 ousness of established principles and precedents in the 
 Church of God. Moral Theology Proper, its supple- 
 ment of Casuistry, and its complement of Ascetic 
 Theology are plainly necessary, therefore, for the 
 equipment of priests. 
 
 § 6. I have called Ascetic Theology the ‘‘comple- 
 ment’ of Moral Theology Proper. The realization 
 
SURVEY OF MORAL SCIENCE 9 
 
 of this is needed if we are to avoid a serious danger, 
 one not wholly escaped in Roman moral treatises. 
 I mean the danger of setting up two standards of 
 Christian vocation and duty, the legalistic and the 
 ascetic. The distinction between sinlessness and 
 positive perfection is indeed real and important; 
 and therefore the separate treatment of Moral The- 
 ology Proper, concerned mainly with distinguishing 
 between the sinful and the non-sinful, and of Ascetic 
 Theology, concerned with growth in heavenly virtue, 
 is justifiable and convenient. The former science, 
 coupled with Casuistry, is for the judicial equipment 
 of priests in the tribunal of Penance; while the latter 
 is for their equipment in guiding souls in the way to 
 God that has still to be travelled by those whose sins 
 are being forgiven and forsaken. 
 
 But no penitents, however backward in spiritual 
 culture, should be allowed without corrective enlight- 
 enment to acquiesce finally in the notion that the 
 avoidance of sin is the only obligation imposed upon 
 them by their Christian vocation. All Christians are 
 called of God to positive perfection—not indeed as 
 immediately attainable, but as the appointed goal 
 towards which they are under obligation by God’s 
 grace to direct their efforts. In saying this I do not 
 forget that backward souls have to be dealt with 
 very patiently, and that in a vast number of cases 
 they cannot be expected in this worldly stage of 
 progress wholly to escape from the legalistic concep- 
 tion of Christian duty. My point is that their ulti- 
 
10 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 mate escape from it is a sine qua non of their entrance 
 into the joy of God. A merely sinless creature is not 
 fit for full divine communion and fellowship until 
 perfected in the positive graces of character which 
 Christ has exhibited for our attainment. So it is that, 
 limited in scope though it be, no Moral Theology 
 Proper is rightly studied and applied except from the 
 background of the fuller conception of Christian 
 obligation which is unfolded in Ascetic Theology. 
 For this reason, brief as this manual is, we have given 
 our seventh chapter to a short summary of the higher 
 side of Christian responsibility. 
 
 § 7. The work of the Holy Spirit and His opera- 
 tions of supernatural grace in the hearts of Christians 
 are necessarily presupposed and allowed for in Moral 
 Theology. But the work of grace is not subversive of 
 human nature and freedom and of the natural laws 
 of human conduct. The purpose of grace is to assist 
 and uplift human nature on its own lines and to 
 sanctify it. But in those aspects of conduct and 
 development of character which are susceptible of 
 observation the laws of human nature hold their 
 own, and their investigation is a useful adjunct of 
 Moral and Ascetic Theology. 
 
 This means that the Psychology of behaviour and 
 of sainthood is a legitimate and fruitful line of study; 
 and works like those of Joly, on the one hand, and 
 James, on the other, furnish important contributions 
 to our science. But in admitting this we ought not 
 to forget an important limitation of psychological 
 
SOME SNARES I 
 
 science. Like other natural sciences it is concerned 
 exclusively with natural factors; and the self- 
 coherence and apparent self-sufficiency of its descrip- 
 tion of the laws that control the natural functioning 
 of our spirits should not blind us to the evidences that 
 the higher level of sanctity in which such functioning 
 occasionally results is not explained by natural factors 
 alone. Psychology describes the course of nature 
 that is involved in saintly development; but that it 
 should pursue such a course, and with such a result, 
 is due to supernatural grace and to lines of self-dis- 
 cipline which such grace alone makes possible and 
 successful. Valuable as knowledge of the natural or 
 psychological factors of moral behaviour is to a 
 priest, Psychology for his purpose is a handmaid 
 rather than the mistress of his moral science. 
 
 III Some Snares 
 
 § 8. The danger of acquiescing in a double standard 
 of Christian obligation, above referred to, is not the 
 only one that attends the study and application of 
 moral science. The distinction between venial and 
 mortal sin is plainly made in Scripture, and is very 
 necessary for practically judging the gravity of sins 
 both in the tribunal of Penance and in self-examina- 
 tion. A momentary loss of temper is not to be 
 treated as having the degree of guilt which is to be 
 ascribed to deliberate and wilful murder; and if we 
 would not drive men to despair, we ought not to deal 
 
12 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 with their lighter sins as if immediately fatal to the 
 spiritual life. ) 
 
 But serious danger, none the less, attends the 
 rather common habit of making the technicalities of 
 venial and mortal sin take the place of careful and 
 discriminating judgment. ‘The distinction referred to 
 is qualitative, and in its application requires consider- 
 ation not only of the gravity of matter or the act as 
 such, but also the degree of knowledge, deliberation 
 and wilfulness of the sinner. Sins of invincible 
 ignorance, of sudden impulse, and of weakness in 
 unusually severe temptation, are not invariably to 
 be reckoned as mortal because of the gravity of their 
 matter; nor are the small sins, materially considered, 
 to be treated as venial when they are committed and 
 clung to with deliberate, malicious and obstinately 
 impenitent wilfulness. To forget this, and to neglect 
 careful consideration of the subjective as well as the 
 objective elements of sins, invites one or other of two 
 serious consequences: (a) of driving struggling souls 
 to despair by undue severity of judgment, treating 
 sins as mortal when they are really venial; and (0) 
 of lightly estimating sins of relatively light matter, 
 as if necessarily and invariably venial, when perhaps 
 they are forms of deadly malice and guilt. 
 
 The distinction between venial and mortal sin is 
 often set forth before simple folk in a way that encour- 
 ages the notion that one need not worry at all about 
 venial sins—a very dangerous notion indeed, and one 
 very apt to be encouraged by unqualified assurances 
 
SOME SNARES 13 
 
 that venial sins need not be recalled and mentioned 
 in the confessional. It is of course true that an 
 exact enumeration of all one’s sins, however minute, 
 is neither possible nor necessary. But the inference 
 frequently made by simple minds that venial sins 
 need not be repented of, and therefore are not neces- 
 sary matters of contrite self-examination and con- 
 fession im genere, is hopelessly false and apt to be 
 fatal in its consequences. All sins of every degree 
 need to be repented of by implication at least, and to 
 suppose that besetting sins, even though venial, can 
 safely be forgotten in confession is a very precarious 
 opinion. 
 
 § 9. Another snare that needs careful avoidance is 
 that of an undiscriminating judgment as to the state 
 of those who fail wholly to abandon, or even visibly 
 to reduce the frequency of, sins that have been 
 ostensibly repented of. Besetting sins by long con- 
 tinuance modify the subjective aptitudes of the mind 
 and will, and seriously reduce the power of avoiding 
 their repetition; and this is as true of the graver forms 
 of sin as of lighter ones. The power of grace is lim- 
 ited after all, and the entire removal of the danger of 
 relapse into previously well-established habits of sin 
 is not to be looked for in this world. Such relapses 
 may indeed reveal the insincerity of repentance, or a 
 malignant carelessness that is very serious indeed. 
 But they may be due entirely to weakness, and may 
 leave unaltered a growing dissociation of the peni- 
 tent’s fundamental aim and attitude from the 
 
14 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 habits not yet overcome. The genuineness of 
 repentance may indeed be brought under just 
 suspicion by the lack of visible amendment of 
 sinful habits, but the suspicion should be aban- 
 doned if there is*evidence of the sinner’s growing 
 detestation of his sinful habit, grounded in increasing 
 love of God. 
 
 Of course, relapses have to be attended to with 
 great care; and the penitent should be urged to avoid 
 the occasions which his previous habits make 
 dangerous, and to cultivate by every means in 
 his power the growth of his love of God and of 
 his hatred of his sin. Never should a case be 
 abandoned as hopeless, so long as opportunities of 
 spiritual care remain. 
 
 § ro. A further snare is encountered in hasty con- 
 clusions as to the necessity and obligation of resorting 
 to the sacrament of Penance. The conventional 
 teaching that this sacrament is necessary for salvation 
 in case of mortal sin is too precise and sweeping to 
 be accepted without qualifications, and is not prim- 
 itive. Obviously the necessary conditions of salva- 
 tion are not more numerous to-day than in the apos- 
 tolic age. The most that can be said unqualifiedly 
 is that, when adequate contrition and repentance are | 
 practically impossible without resort to Penance, 
 that sacrament is necessary; and the Church’s experi- 
 ence justifies the further teaching that this impossi- 
 bility is apt to exist when the soul has been hardened 
 by the graver degrees of deliberate and wilful sin. 
 
SOME SNARES 22 
 
 Furthermore, the Church has authority to impose 
 such disciplinary rules in this direction as its experi- 
 ence dictates. 
 
 But the doctrine that adequate contrition secures 
 divine forgiveness in any case is undoubtedly biblical 
 and ecumenical, and the disciplinary requirements 
 referred to have not been precisely set forth except 
 provincially and variously. Anglicans are bound 
 only by the requirements of Anglican discipline, 
 which leave the determination of personal need and 
 obligation in this matter to individual judgment. 
 Whatever may be our opinions as to the merits of this 
 peculiarity of Anglican discipline, it should be clear 
 that Anglican priests may not impose disciplinary 
 requirements upon their people which the Anglican 
 province does not impose. What they both may and 
 ought to do is to make clear to those under their 
 spiritual care the great value of sacramental confes- 
 sion, and the grave danger that failure to make use 
 of it may in many instances mean failure truly to 
 repent. 
 
 Summing up what has here been said on the snares 
 that beset the study and application of moral science, 
 these snares arise mainly from the careless use of the 
 technicalities of Moral Theology. ‘These are neces- 
 sary for scientific purposes, and are true when taken 
 with the important proviso that moral principles are 
 larger than the rules which are deduced from them, 
 and are insusceptible of exclusively technical consid- 
 eration. Similarly, moral states of the soul are not 
 
16 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 rightly estimated and judged unless their qualitative 
 nature is carefully borne in mind. Rules are helpful, 
 but they do not obviate the need of exercising a dis- 
 criminating judgment in each case. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 § x. “Ethics is the science of Conduct. It con- 
 siders the actions of human beings with reference to 
 their rightness or wrongness, their tendency to good 
 or to evil.” 1 It concerns itself largely with the 
 attempt to define the meaning and content of such 
 terms as “‘good,” “‘right and wrong,”’ “obligation,” 
 “duty,” ‘‘conscience.”’ While Ethics, or Moral 
 Philosophy,” is often confused with Moral Theology, 
 there is a distinction between them. The latter is 
 the science of the Will of God with relation to the 
 conduct of men; and is distinguished from Moral 
 Philosophy in that one rests upon divine revelation, 
 the other upon the processes of human reason. Ina 
 wide sense Moral Theology is the science of human 
 duty and conduct considered in the light both of 
 nature and of supernatural revelation. As Ethics 
 usually deals only with the former of these factors, 
 it is comparable to Natural Theology; while Moral 
 
 1J.S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, p.1. But it is often treated 
 philosophically, and is then the philosophy of conduct and of duty, 
 
 rather than the science of them. 
 2F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 237-248. 
 
 17 
 
18 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 Theology, including both, may be compared to 
 Dogmatic Theology. Moreover, as usually handled, 
 Ethics is theoretical, philosophical rather than sci- 
 entific, so as to be distinguished from Moral Theology 
 proper as the philosophy of a thing is from its science, 
 and is, therefore, properly called Moral Philosophy.! 
 A science is described as theological in so far as it 
 treats of its subject-matter in relation to God, and 
 moral science is called Moral Theology because it 
 treats of conduct and character in relation to divine 
 purpose and government. No moral science can be 
 adequate, or even sound, which fails to reckon with 
 the revealed will of God and with true religion. This 
 will appear in the historical sketch of ethical systems 
 which will occupy the greater part of the present 
 chapter. 
 
 The term “‘moral’? comes from the Latin mos, 
 moris, which means custom, or practice. The cor- 
 1 They are thus distinguished in this treatise. See ch. ili, init. 
 
 2Cf. the German term Sittenlehre. ‘‘Customs were not merely 
 habitual ways of acting; they were ways approved by the group or 
 society.” Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 1. Their origins appear 
 when men first begin to live in groups, the earliest being the family. 
 Cf. Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. ii; F. H. Giddings, The Principles 
 of Sociology. Sometimes the clan takes the place of the family, as 
 when husband and wife are of different clans and the wife and children 
 remain with the wife’s clan, to which the husband is only a visitor. 
 Custom, taboo (the thing to be avoided) or ritual (the way the thing 
 prescribed is to be done) gradually, but slowly, emerge to the point 
 where conscience becomes a deciding factor. Dewey and Tufts, 
 op. cit., chh. iv-v. The earlier state is that of customary morality, 
 
 when dress and the manner of wearing the hair are on a par with 
 marriage regulations and laws regarding murder. This customary 
 
INTRODUCTION 19 
 
 responding term ‘‘ethics” comes from the Greek 
 700s, which means custom, or character, and #6:xés, 
 which means that which pertains to conduct or char- 
 acter, and is closely related to 0s, signifying custom. 
 
 As has been said, the data of Moral Theology are 
 taken from both natural and revealed sources—in 
 particular from our general experience of human 
 nature and conduct, and from that which is made 
 known to us of the character, operations, will, and 
 purpose of God. A sound and adequate moral science 
 assumes that the catholic faith and religion are true, 
 and that it is man’s duty to be guided by the light 
 which that religion affords.! 
 
 stage gradually passes over to the reflective, but a great mass of 
 custom always remains. 
 
 See H. Rashdall, Is Conscience an Emotion?, Lec. ii, on the transi- 
 tion from emotional to rational ethical judgments. While allowing 
 for the predominance of the emotional, which E. Westermarck, 
 Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, thinks wholly explanatory, 
 Rashdall holds that far down in the social life we may find glimmerings 
 of the rational. But conduct never advances to the state where it is 
 based upon rational motives alone, where there is no impelling desire 
 to be reckoned with, nor is it desirable that it should. There is 
 room for both. Rashdall, op. cit., pp. 118-119, “‘The practical 
 morality of a man like Kant was as defective on one side as that of 
 St. Francis was on another. A more rational morality would per- 
 haps have induced St. Francis to recognize that he had no right to 
 give away his father’s property to the poor, that cleanliness is not 
 necessarily inconsistent with godliness, and that it is better to take 
 care of one’s health and live to the age of seventy than to neglect it 
 and die at forty-five. A more emotional morality might have led 
 
 Kant to visit his crazy sister as well as to support her pecuniarily 
 out of respect for the Categorical Imperative.” 
 
 1Qn Ethics as related to other branches of philosophy, see J. S. 
 Mackenzie, of. cii., pp. 23-24; A. Alexander, Christianity and Ethics, 
 
20 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 I. Ancient Pagan Ethics 
 
 § 2. An historical survey of the more important 
 types of ethical theories is desirable before under- 
 taking a more systematic treatment of our subject.! 
 The most significant of the ancient gentilic systems 
 are Buddhism, Confucianism, and the Greco-Roman.? 
 
 Buddhism was taught by Gautama, born in India 
 about 560 B.c. Impelled by pity for human sorrows 
 he sought to show a way of escape from them. This 
 way consists of knowledge of the cause and of the 
 remedy. Ignorance brings desire, which induces 
 clinging to existence and involves pain. Suffering 
 
 pp. 14-21; Geo. H. Palmer, The Field of Ethics, passim. Pro- 
 found metaphysical problems lie back of the study of Ethics and 
 appear from time to time in its course. Limitations of space, and 
 of the purpose of this work, have obliged us almost entirely to neglect 
 them. J. G. Hibben, The Problems of Philosophy, ad rem, may be 
 read with profit. 
 
 1 On the hist. of Ethics, see H. Sidgwick, Hist. of Ethics; Hastings, 
 E.R.E., s.vv. ‘Ethics,’ “Ethics, Rudimentary,” “Ethics and 
 Morality” (series), and for the various systems; A. B. Bruce, The 
 Moral Order in Anc. and Modern Thought; J. Martineau, Types of 
 Ethical Theory; W. E. H. Lecky, Hist. of European Morals; W. 
 Wundt, Ethical Systems; H. H. Scullard, Early Christian Ethics in 
 the West; Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s. v. “Ethics,” IL (with fuller bibliog.); 
 and the Histories of Philosophy, esp. F. Ueberweg. 
 
 2¥For still earlier beliefs and practices, see S. A. B. Mercer, Relig- 
 tous and Moral Ideas in Babylonia and Assyria; Growth of Religious 
 and Moral Ideas in Egypt; also a series of articles by the same author 
 in the Journal of the Society of Oriental Research, vols. 1-V. These 
 articles contain matter dating from as early as 3850 B.c., and show 
 much more advanced standards than would generally be expected. 
 
ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 21 
 
 is remedied by the final destruction of desire, and, in 
 the meantime, by the acceptance of the eight-fold 
 way of right as a guide for life: (a) insight; (0) 
 thoughts; (c) words; (d) deeds; (e) behaviour; (f) 
 striving; (g) remembering; () self-suppression.! 
 Five prohibitions are given: (qa) not to kill any living 
 thing; (6) not to seize the property of another; (c) 
 not to touch another man’s wife (monks not to touch 
 any woman); (d) not to speak untruth; (e) not to 
 drink anything intoxicating. The ideal man is the 
 wise man who practices apathy. These ways and 
 prohibitions are for those who have not entered the 
 higher way of abandonment of home and of all desire. 
 The goal is Nirvana—the state of salvation, in which 
 no re-births occur, and which merges in an impersonal 
 blessedness. Buddhism has no god, no sacrifice, and 
 no sense of sin or need of salvation therefrom; but 
 in popular practice Buddhists are polytheists. 
 
 The defects are: (a) an erroneous account of pain, 
 which, in fact, does not come from desire but from 
 natural causes and from perverted desire; (6) lack 
 of sense of sin; (c) absence of a genuine religion and 
 of dependence upon God; (d) denial of personal im- 
 mortality, and consequent lack of a goal of develop- 
 ment; (e) pessimistic inertia, nullifying progress; 
 (f) an aristocratic confinement of its higher blessings 
 to the few; (g) intellectual pride. In practice Bud- 
 
 1 These are interpreted by Prof. Rhys Davids, Sacred Books of the 
 East, vol. II, p. 144 (abridgement in J. H. Leuba, A Psychological 
 Study of Religion, p. 286). 
 
22 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 dhism has gendered immorality. Even its boasted 
 altruism has reference to humanity at large con- 
 sidered in the abstract. The Western systems of 
 Theosophy and Christian Science contain Buddhistic 
 elements with Christian additions; they are hybrid 
 systems, vitiated by the Pantheism which underlies 
 Indian thought, and are really non-moral; they 
 foster a pseudo-spirituality and a blinding self- 
 satisfaction.? 
 
 § 3. Confucianism? was founded by Confucius 
 (551-478 B.c.). It presupposes a state religion and 
 one which has no determinative creed. Propriety, 
 convention, and precedent rule. Virtue is described 
 as consisting of knowledge, magnanimity, and valour. 
 Worship is directed towards (a) heaven; (0) non- 
 human spirits; (c) dead ancestors; especially the 
 last. 
 
 Confucius eschewed dogmatism about the super- 
 human, tolerating and ignoring popular superstitions. 
 He based all upon the law of human nature and upon 
 duties to men. ‘The worship of heaven was reserved 
 for the emperor, as representing the people, who are 
 to worship their ancestors. The family is the centre 
 of his religion, and filial piety is the essence of virtue. 
 
 1H. Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, pp. 264-271, has a good crit- 
 fcism of the attempts sometimes made to equate Buddhistic and 
 Christian theology and ethics, 
 
 2See P. V. N. Myers, History as Past Ethics, ch. v; J. Legge, 
 Religions of China. Curious correspondences between early Chinese 
 and Greek thought in ethics and in metaphysics are shown by 
 Aubrey L. Moore, Essays Scientific and Philosophical, ch. ix. 
 
ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 23 
 
 Taoism and Buddhism are tolerated, subject to 
 ancestor worship and filial piety. Human nature is 
 good and, if followed, will lead men aright. This 
 involves social relations and functions between: (a) 
 sovereign and subject; (6) husband and wife; (c) 
 parent and child; (d) elder and younger brother; (e) 
 friend and friend. These are natural relations and 
 involve four rules: (a) serve the sovereign; (6) serve 
 parents; (c) serve elder brothers; (d) set an example 
 to friends. ‘The sum is reciprocity,” but it is shown 
 by observing rules of propriety. ‘These were elab- 
 orated and were fixed by convention and by precedent. 
 The result was a purely legalistic and external system 
 which could not reform mankind. It cultivated con- 
 ceit, a low morality, and stagnation.! The inspiration 
 of Chinese morality comes rather from Buddhism 
 than from Confucianism. 
 
 Lao-Tse, born about 604 B.c., met Confucius in 
 517 B.c. He saw the futility of Confucian ethics and 
 sought to remedy it by urging a revolt from civilized 
 conventions in favour of the virtues of primitive sim- 
 plicity and the cultivation of mystical wisdom, but 
 his effort was abortive. 
 
 1 Ethics, as everything else in China, has been stationary. P. V.N. 
 Myers, op. cit., p. 7, “It is largely because Europe has been con- 
 stantly getting a new conscience that its history has been so dis- 
 turbed and so progressive, just as it is largely because China has had 
 the same Confucian conscience for two thousand years and more, 
 that her history has been so uneventful and unchanging.” ‘Taoism 
 is pantheistic and may be compared to Nietzscheism, see P. V. N. 
 Myers, op. cit., p. 57, note 3. 
 
24 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 § 4. Greek ethical developments! properly began 
 with Socrates, who may be called the “father of moral 
 philosophy.” Previous to his career we have only 
 the fragmentary sayings of the so-called “wise men 
 of Greece.’ Physical and metaphysical ideas had 
 predominated. The Sophists had thrown all funda- 
 mental principles into confusion and, in fact, made 
 virtue the same as self-interest.” 
 
 Socrates, 470-399 B.C., was the noblest of pagan 
 prophets, and rose to as high a level as was possible 
 apart from revelation.2? It is noteworthy that he 
 
 1A, Alexander, op. cit., pp. 35-44; Dewey and Tufts, of, cit., 
 ch. vii; T. B. Strong, Christ. Ethics, pp. 26-34. 
 
 2H. Sidgwick, Hist. of Ethics, pp. 13-22; R. A. P. Rogers, A Short 
 Hist. of Ethics, Greek and Modern, pp. 31-34. The leaders of the 
 Sophists were Protagoras of Abdera (nat. c. 480 B.c.) and Gorgias 
 of Leontini (mat. c. 483 B.c). The first of these made ethics sub- 
 jective. Carried to its conclusion his system was anarchical, imply- 
 ing that each may do what he likes without reference to the good of 
 others. The teaching of the second leads to skepticism, as there is 
 no objective standard of truth and goodness. 
 
 3H. Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 22-34; R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 
 34-36; B. Rand, The Classical Moralists, ch. i. He ignored meta- 
 physics, natural science and mathematics, and made the study of 
 moral man and his duties as a citizen central in education. He was 
 skeptical as to the possibilities of knowledge in other fields. He is 
 certain that the one thing that man can know is himself. Hence his 
 motto ‘Know thyself,’ which does not refer to physiological or 
 psychological knowledge but to ethical. His chief claim to fame lies 
 in the emphasis he puts upon the authority of conscience; but his 
 teaching must be carefully distinguished from that of Kant on the 
 categorical imperative. The latter leads one to do his duty without 
 inclination for it; whereas according to Socrates the desire for hap- 
 piness is fundamental, and coincides with duty; for only the ful- 
 filment of duty brings happiness and is worth striving for. His end 
 
ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS a 
 
 thought himself to be inspired by a good demon. He 
 undertook the mission: (a) of establishing the 
 objective value of truth, goodness, and beauty; (0) 
 of making men see their ignorance; (c) of turning 
 them to self-knowledge. His method was a critical 
 definition of accepted ideas and their amendment by 
 induction. 
 
 His chief principles are: (a) there is a God, a future 
 life of the soul, future responsibility, and absolute 
 good; (b) virtue and happiness coincide and are based 
 upon wisdom and knowledge, especially self-knowl- 
 edge.| These emancipate the will by turning it 
 towards the good.” 
 
 Plato, 427-347 B.c., introduced metaphysical and 
 psychological additions to the thought of Socrates 
 and may be described as the flower of his teaching, 
 while Aristotle was its fruit.2 As with Socrates, knowl- 
 was practical. ‘‘The quest of Socrates was for the true art of con- 
 duct for an ordinary member of the human society, a man living a 
 practical life among his fellows.” Sidgwick, op. ci#., p. 39. His 
 system contains the germ of all the chief Greek ethical systems. 
 The difficulty of interpreting him fully is shown by the variety of 
 schools that profess to follow him, the most important of these 
 ethically being the Cynics, founded by Antithenes, and the Cyrenaics, 
 founded by Aristippus. He wrote no books on ethics. The outcome 
 of his speculations was the stimulation of thought, and the attempt 
 to give exact expression to this thought begat the several schools 
 from which, broadly speaking, the Stoics and Epicureans later on 
 developed. 
 
 1“ Knowledge is virtue,” cf. Plato’s Protagoras. This involves 
 practice rather than mere intellectual knowledge, and rests upon the 
 hypothesis that ‘‘no man is knowingly vicious.” 
 
 2-H. Sidgwick, of. cit., pp. 21-32. 
 
 3H. Sidgwick, op. cii., pp. 34-50; R. A. P. Rogers, of. cit., Pt. I, 
 
26 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 edge is the essence of virtue, especially knowledge of 
 pure reason, of ideas, of principles intuitively seen in 
 their internal sense. Ideas are the true realities, 
 and are the eternal types of which mundane things 
 are passing impressions.! 
 
 Pleasures are to be distinguished because they are 
 often contrary. ‘The true ideal is to know and attain 
 to the summum bonum, which is likeness to God who 
 is the absolute good. As this cannot be embraced 
 in its unity, it is to be sought in the manifold by 
 rational understanding of truth, beauty, and virtue. 
 Man’s perfection lies in resemblance to God. Virtue 
 is the harmony of the soul, vice its deformity. Virtue 
 is essentially one, but may be distinguished under 
 
 ch. ii; Wm. De W. Hyde, Five Great Philosophies of Life, ch. iii; 
 B. Rand, of. cit., ch. ii (a very useful source book). Among modern 
 writers who have felt in an especial degree the influence of Plato, 
 Carlyle represents the stronger side, Emerson (in whom the Neo- 
 Platonic predominates) the weaker. Plato’s chief ethical work is 
 the Republic. It seeks to determine the nature and worth of justice 
 and the means whereby it is to be realized in the State. The Philebus 
 should also be read for the sake of its inquiry into the nature of good 
 to the individual. 
 
 1W. Wundt, Ethical Systems, vol. II, p. 10, says, “ Plato’s phi- 
 losophy rests wholly and entirely on an ethical basis.” Also p. 11, 
 “When Plato, perhaps influenced more by the Socratic life than by 
 the Socratic doctrine, rises to the principle that it is better to suffer 
 wrong than to do wrong, he can no longer avoid the conviction that 
 the good and the pleasurable do not necessarily coincide. It would, 
 however, be intolerable to suppose a permanent conflict between 
 pleasure and good. There is thus no way out of the difficulty save 
 by the opposition of permanent to transitory pleasure; and, since 
 the former is unattainable in the life of sense, it must be sought in a 
 supersensuous existence.” 
 
ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 27 
 
 four heads in relation to the faculties of the soul: 
 (a) of the reason, prudence or wisdom; (8) of the pas- 
 sions, fortitude or courage; (c) of the appetites, tem- 
 perance; (d) of the harmony of all, justice! These 
 are the so-called Cardinal Virtues? of Christian 
 Ethics, and are found in the later Jewish writers, in 
 the works of St. Ambrose, who first applied the term 
 “Cardinal,” of St. Augustine, and of all moral writers 
 since. 
 
 He argued at length for the immortality of the soul;3 
 but the Christian idea of the immortality of the entire 
 man, resurrection from the dead, lay outside of all 
 pagan thought. In common with all Greek writers 
 Plato treated ethics as political, and regarded the 
 individual as subordinate to the state. 
 
 There are certain defects in his system: (a) knowl- 
 edge and theory is elaborate, but power is wanting; 
 (6) it is an ethic for philosophers, not for men in gen- 
 eral; (c) the problem of evil was not faced, but was 
 
 1He attempts a psychological distinction of the faculties of the 
 soul, Adyos, Ouuds, éwiuula, reason, emotion (not an accurate 
 translation as we have no equivalent word), and desire. The proper 
 fulfilment of the function of each leads to virtue. 
 
 2Of the Cardinal Virtues Justice is fundamental. “For the 
 intelligence it consists in the correctness of thought (codla, pirocodgla) ; 
 for the will, in courage (dvdpla); for the sensibility, in temperance 
 (swppoctvn). Wisdom is the justice of the mind; courage, the 
 justice of the heart; temperance, the justice of the senses. Piety 
 (6o.6rys), is justice in our relation with the Deity. It is synony- 
 mous with justice in general.” A. Weber, Hist. of Philosophy, p. 99. 
 Cicero terms justice “the mistress and queen of all virtues.” 
 
 * See especially the Phedo. 
 
28 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 thought to reside in the corporeal, in that which was 
 becoming, and was thought to be without remedy. 
 
 Aristotle, 384-322 B.c.,| separated ethics from 
 other sciences and began his work with a discussion 
 of the summum bonum, which he found in man’s 
 welfare, not in God, and regarded as political, this. 
 resting upon his well-known description of man as a 
 political animal. The end of conduct is the welfare 
 of the state, not of the individual. The Greek has 
 no more duties to the barbarian than he has to the 
 wild beast.2, The summum bonum consists in happi- 
 ness, which is defined as a perfect practical activity 
 of soul in a perfect life. Mere pleasure, as such, is 
 neutral, depending for its relation to happiness upon 
 the use made of it. Virtue is founded in natural 
 sentiments and in habits which issue in 700s, a moral 
 character2 These are of two kinds: (a) moral vir- 
 tues, which are developed by acts and the habits 
 caused by them; (6) intellectual virtues, which per- 
 fect the moral. Practically speaking, the essence 
 of virtue is moderation or a mean between two ex- 
 
 1H. Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 50-71; R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. I. 
 ch. iti; J. E. C. Welldon, Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle; B. Rand, 
 op. cit., ch. iii. 
 
 2P. V. N. Myers, op. cit., p. 169, ‘The relationships and activities 
 of the Greek as a citizen, and not his relationships and activities as a 
 husband or father or business man, determined his chief duties. 
 Conscience was very little involved in that part of his life which lay 
 outside the civic sphere. It was solely as a member of a city com- 
 munity—that he could live the truly moral life and attain the highest 
 
 virtue.” 
 3 He was the first to use the term “‘ethics.’’ 
 
ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 29 
 
 tremes, the via media... The importance of the will 
 is emphasized as contrasted with knowledge. The 
 evolutionary view of sin may be traced back to 
 Aristotle, for he regarded sin as a necessary stage on 
 the way to goodness, or as goodness itself in so far as 
 it had not yet proceeded from potency to act. There- 
 fore it was a mere imperfection, or a less good? 
 
 In general, in Greek ethics human nature was con- 
 ceived as essentially good; and morality was mainly 
 secular as contrasted with that of the Hebrews. 
 Hence it advanced beyond the static religion.4 Greek 
 ethical theories gave form and system to those of the 
 Church, but Christianity itself gave the spirit which 
 
 1A, Weber, op. cii., p. 132, ‘‘Courage, for example, is a virtue, 
 and as such the mean between timidity and foolhardiness; liberality 
 is the mean between avarice and prodigality.” R. A. P. Rogers, 
 op. cit., p. 72, has a good illustration of this important point of 
 Aristotle’s teaching: 
 
 Excess Mean Defect 
 Rashness Courage Cowardice 
 Licentiousness Temperance Apathy 
 Extravagance Generosity Miserliness 
 Bad temper Good temper Servility 
 Flattery Courtesy Rudeness 
 
 The middle column is printed so as to suggest that the mean is often 
 nearer one extreme than the other. 
 
 2W. Wundt, op. cif., vol. II, pp. 19-20, “Aristotle was the first to 
 recognize the will as the specifically ethical function within the 
 general domain of reason; and for him, accordingly, moral virtue 
 consists, not in right knowledge, but in the good will, which is indeed 
 dependent upon reason, but not identical with it.” 
 
 3 Metaphysics, XIX, 4, 7d kaxdv adrd 7d Surdwer dryabby, 
 
 4Cf. Aubrey Moore, in Lux Mundi, Essay ii. 
 
30 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 made them living and realizable. This is often over- 
 looked when the debt of Christianity to Greek ethics 
 is magnified, or the statement made that Ambrose is 
 Cicero with a Christian veneer. Christianity brought 
 a new motive power into morality, united the virtues 
 in the spirit of love, and attached a new value to 
 personality. 
 
 § 5. In Greco-Roman Ethics, Platonic and Aristo- 
 telic efforts brought to birth two opposed systems, 
 the Stoic and the Epicurean, emphasizing respectively 
 virtue and happiness.! 
 
 The Stoic system? was founded by Zeno, 340-260 
 B.c. Among his followers, more or less consistent, 
 were Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Panztius, Posidonius, 
 Pompey, Cicero, Seneca? Epictetus, and Marcus 
 Aurelius. From the standpoint of the pious heathen 
 the Stoics were men of lofty virtue. They held that 
 virtue is the only true good, the swummum bonum and 
 the ultimate source of all happiness; but even virtue 
 must be sought in a disinterested manner, for its own 
 sake, not for that of consequent happiness. The rule 
 of virtue is to live according to nature, which means 
 according to enlightened reason. Hence only phil- 
 osophers can follow this way. Indifference is the 
 proper attitude to observe towards the circumstances 
 
 1 On the Roman moral systems in general, see P. V. N. Myers, op. 
 cit., ch. xi; H. Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 70 ff. 
 
 2'Wm. De W. Hyde, op. cit., ch. ii; R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. I, 
 ch.v; Wm. Wundt, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 25-28. 
 
 ? On the relation of Seneca to St. Paul, see Bp. Lightfoot, Ep. to the 
 Philippians, App. 2. 
 
ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 31 
 
 of life—health, fortune, honours, pleasures. All these 
 are parts of the system of things, adiaphora, that is, 
 indifferent to the wise man. Fortitude under all cir- 
 cumstances is the sovereign rule; and all human 
 passions are regarded as the sources of evil. They 
 are not merely to be restrained, as Aristotle taught, 
 but to be eradicated entirely. The chief defects of 
 the system are: (a) arrogant self-sufficiency; (0) 
 aristocratic indifference to the common people; (c) 
 apathy, which is fatal to genuine moral progress; 
 (d) immorality, growing out of the principle of 
 adiaphora; (e) inevitable resort to suicide when the 
 evils of this life become unbearable.! On the good 
 side it emphasized the power of the soul to live its 
 own life, rising superior to misfortune and suffering, 
 and the authoritativeness of duty. 
 
 Epicureanism ” had for its chief promoters Epicurus, 
 342-271 B.c., and Lucretius, a Roman poet of the 
 second century B.c., and, later on, it was popularized 
 by Horace. The summum bonum was happiness,’ 
 
 1Cf. the terse advice of Marcus Aurelius to one who found life 
 hard, “If the house smokes, go out of it.” 
 
 2R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. I, ch. iv; Wm. De W. Hyde, op. cit., 
 ch. i. It is based upon an atomistic materialism, and has regard to 
 physical and psychical, rather than moral or spiritual, well-being. 
 It is best exemplified in Toto Melema of Geo. Eliot’s Romola. J. 5S. 
 Mill bases his system upon it, but incorporates elements from all 
 other systems, so that his presentation becomes a hodge-podge of 
 contradictory elements. 
 
 3W. E. H. Lecky, Hist. of European Morals, vol. I, p. 14, gives the 
 Epicurean canons, “The pleasure which produces no pain is to be 
 embraced. The pain which produces no pleasure is to be avoided. 
 
32 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 which was interpreted to mean pleasure in action 
 and in repose, the latter being the more complete. 
 The Epicureans found no standard higher or more 
 authoritative than the agreeable; but it is to be 
 noted that pleasure of the soul is placed above that 
 of the body. Virtue means wisdom (¢povyots, or 
 insight) in seeking the forms of happiness which will 
 not end in disappointment. 
 
 Both systems inculcate the cardinal virtues of 
 Plato, although the Stoics interpreted them ideally 
 and the Epicureans from a purely hedonistic stand- 
 point; but both lack power and adequate motive. 
 The Epicureans inevitably gravitate towards Hedon- 
 ism, or pleasure of the moment, ‘Let us eat and 
 drink, for to-morrow we die.” 
 
 Il. Christian Ethics 
 
 § 6. The Holy Spirit alone enables men to arrive at 
 a sound moral philosophy.! He does this through 
 
 The pleasure is to be avoided which prevents a greater pleasure, or 
 produces a greater pain. The pain is to be endured which averts a 
 greater pain, or secures a greater pleasure.” Wm. Wundt, op. cit., 
 vol. II. p. 29, ‘‘While, like the Stoics, they emphasize repose of 
 mind as an essential condition of happiness, the evil to be avoided 
 is not, as with the Stoics, passion, but pain. Not apathy, but 
 ataraxia, painlessness, is extolled as the blessed state. Thus, while, 
 for the Stoics, virtue, since it consists in control of the passions, is a 
 good to be sought for its own sake, and from whose possession true 
 happiness first arises; for the Epicureans the relation is reversed. 
 The goal of all effort is happiness, and virtue is only a means to this 
 end.” 
 
 1 Ethical theories are not evidential as to the moral state cf a 
 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 33 
 
 both natural and supernatural means. To Him is 
 due the dispensation of paganism, which represents 
 His work through the natural reason alone, in prep- 
 aration for supernatural revelation. In the earlier 
 dispensations moral truth is developed in fragmentary 
 forms and a definite philosophy cannot be developed 
 without caricature. The Mosaic and Christian dis- 
 pensations represent a gradual development of authen- 
 tic relations with God;! and this development makes 
 possible a true knowledge of righteousness and a dis- 
 pensation of saving grace. The outcome is a moral 
 philosophy which is both sound and capable of appli- 
 cation. 
 
 Judaism, or the system which resulted from the 
 Mosaic dispensation, supplied what paganism lacked, 
 that is, authentic relations with God; but righteous- 
 ness was conceived externally as the fulfilment of 
 God’s will by God’s people, that is, as obedience to the 
 law, for moral obligations were identified with divine 
 
 people, for their embodiment in actual practice is very limited. 
 P. V. N. Myers, op. cit., p. 4, “The facts for a history of morals must 
 be sought chiefly outside the literature of ethical theory and specu- 
 lation. They must be looked for in the customs, laws, institutions, 
 mythologies, literatures, maxims, and religions of the different races, 
 peoples, and ages of history.” Cf. H. Rashdall, Conscience and 
 Christ, lec. vi; and, for the moral conditions when these systems were 
 fully developed, Sir S. Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus 
 Aurelius, passim. 
 
 1J. R. [llingworth, Christian Character, starts with theses which 
 correctly describe the guiding principle of revealed ethic: that life 
 is the goal of truly guided human effort, and that sin, being destructive 
 of life, is man’s chief enemy. 
 
34 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 commands. Thus was developed; (a) a sense of 
 sin and of need of salvation from above; (b) the mes- 
 sianic hope, that the law would some day be written 
 on men’s hearts, and become effective among all 
 peoples in a kingdom of righteousness.! 
 
 In relation to Judaism Chrisitanity? translated 
 divine and moral perfection into human terms in the 
 life and conversation of God-incarnate. Thus was 
 unfolded the deeper implications of the older dispen- 
 sation: (a) the philosophy of love, which at once 
 
 1Qn Old Test. ethics, see A. B. Bruce, Ethics of the Old Test.; 
 T. B. Strong, Christ. Ethics, pp. 12-20, 35-46; C. E. Luthardt, Hist. 
 of Christ. Ethics, pp. 33 ff; Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. vi; A. Alex- 
 ander, op. cit., pp. 44-52; P. V. N. Myers, op. cit., ch. ix; Hastings, 
 Dic. of Bible, s. v. “Ethics.” On Jewish ethics in our Lord’s time, 
 C. E. Luthardt, op. cit., pp. 57 ff.; Hastings, Dic. of Bible, as cited; 
 H. Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, pp. 77-94. Special attention is 
 called to S. A. B. Mercer on O. T. Morals, in Angl. Theol. Rev., 
 May and Dec, 1918, Oct., 1919. With refreshing honesty he shows 
 that the Old Test. morals are less elevated than usually represented. 
 
 2On Christ’s ethical teaching, and the distinctive elements of 
 Christian ethic, see Chas. Harris, Pro Fide, pp. 335-356; Chas. 
 Gore, The Sermon on the Mount; T. B. Strong, op. cit., Lec. ii; W. L. 
 Davidson, Christ. Ethics, pp. 4-10; Hastings, Dic. of Christ, and 
 Dic. of Ap. Church, s. vv. ‘Ethics.”” The crude interitmsethic theory, 
 set forth by A. Schweitzer, Quest of the Hist’l Jesus, that Christ 
 believed the end of the world to be immediately impending and 
 therefore disregarded men’s responsibilities for this world, is met by 
 E. D. La Touche, Person of Christ, pp. 163-167; C. W. Emmet, in 
 Expositor, Nov. 1912; A. Alexander, op. ctt., ch. vili. The para- 
 doxical commands of Christ are to be taken as heightened illustra- 
 tions of principles; e.g. Have love enough to turn the other cheek 
 also, if that is expedient. And the virtues exemplified by his exam- 
 ple are of abiding value for this world. They have the note of 
 universality. . 
 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 35 
 
 explains the law and emancipates from it. Duty is 
 no longer constraint, for its principle is love; (0) the 
 new external rule of the imitation of Christ; (c) the 
 working power which pagan systems lacked; (d) 
 a clear revelation of man’s chief end and destiny, 
 which is to become the friend of God in life eternal. 
 
 In relation to paganism! Christianity achieved 
 three results: (a) it absorbed whatever was true in 
 pagan systems; (0b) it supplied the principles which 
 enabled men to bring the fragmentary truths of pagan- 
 ism into harmonious relation and to apprehend their 
 ultimate meaning: (z) that we were made for God 
 and for His fellowship; (z) the whole conception of 
 Christian immortality; (cz) the true meaning of sin 
 and evil; (iv) the gospel of redemption and grace; 
 (v) a complete manifestation in human terms of what 
 man is intended to become in the example of Christ; 
 (c) It transformed what it assimilated from paganism, 
 e.g., the pagan cardinal virtues took on a transfigured 
 meaning when brought into relation with the heavenly 
 virtues of faith, hope, and charity. 
 
 Some of the more obvious innovations? which 
 emerged were: (a) Monotheism and the consequent 
 
 1W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. II, p. 33, says the chief points of differ- 
 ence between pagan and Christian ethics are: (a) the latter substi- 
 tutes love for fear; (6) the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood 
 of man for the limits of nationality and rank; (c) gives an adequate 
 view of the origin and future destiny of man. Christianity also 
 effected certain changes in terminology: “virtue” was replaced by 
 “righteousness,” “‘happiness”’ by “blessedness,”’ ‘‘evil” by “‘sin.” 
 
 2,'W. L. Davidson, of. cit., ch. ii. 
 
36 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 unification of practical ideals by relating them to one 
 God; (b) Catholicity of appeal to all men in behalf 
 of a common brotherhood; (c) Certain new virtues,! 
 such as humility and self-judgment, purity and self- 
 discipline, as distinguished from destructive forms 
 of asceticism; (d) The putting of a new valuation on 
 individual lives. Christ did not teach a moral phil- 
 osophy or science, but: (a) taught and exemplified 
 certain fundamental principles which made the devel- 
 opment of a satisfactory ethical system possible; 
 and (0) established a concrete society or Church 
 wherein the conditions of ethical development are 
 afforded. Considered in its scientific aspects, how- 
 ever, every ethical system is the work of human think- 
 ers, fallible and progressive. 
 
 The Christian Church was intended by Christ to 
 become a leavening force ina larger world. In it are 
 supplied: (a) what the New Testament calls the 
 “Way” of Life, and that in concrete and social form; 
 (6) effectual relations with God as man’s chief end; 
 (c) means of supernatural grace which are the imme- 
 diate sources of the power that pagan society lacks; 
 (d) an effective propaganda. In this manner was 
 established a twofold process: (a) of applying the 
 principles gained through apostolic experience of 
 Christ to an ever-widening and varying experience of 
 the world; (6) of growth of articulate ethical concep- 
 tions and of a systematic Christian ethic. But this 
 growth was necessarily conditioned and hindered 
 
 1'W. L. Davidson, op. cit., ch. x 
 
 CO tS oOo 
 
 ese 
 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 37, 
 
 by certain accidents of the Christian propaganda. 
 In order to leaven the wider world-society, imper- 
 fectly converted men of the world had to be received 
 within the Church, and they brought with them many 
 pagan notions. The progress of moral development 
 which is involved in this may be summarily described 
 as having three stages: (a) the revelation of Christian 
 principles to the Church in terms of apostolic experi- 
 ence of Christ; (6) progressive application of these 
 principles to wider and more varied experience under 
 the handicap of the invasion of pagan ideas; (c) 
 a slow development of ethical definitions and, finally, 
 of a scientific ethic. The definitive stage culminated 
 in the scholastic period, but began in the patristic. 
 Systematic schemes, developed in the scholastic 
 period, have been given a more truly inductive and 
 scientific form in modern days. 
 
 § 7. The patristic period was one of tentative 
 exposition and definition of particular ethical ideas, 
 called forth, and also hampered, by the Church’s 
 contact with classical paganism! and with the 
 northern barbarism. This contact involved many 
 centuries of struggle with pagan ideas, which entered 
 the Church in two general forms: (a) an exaggerated 
 asceticism, which makes invidious distinctions be- 
 tween religious and secular and between the flesh 
 and the spirit, as if the secular and the flesh were 
 
 1See T. R. Glover, The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman 
 Empire; Chas. Bigg, The Church’s Task under the Roman Empire; 
 T. B. Strong, op. cit., Lec. IV; C. E, Luthardt, of. cit., pp. 77 ff. 
 
38 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 intrinsically evil; (0) naturalism, or treatment of 
 Christianity as designed simply to improve natural 
 morality. The patristic age under these circum- 
 stances saw the accumulation of material for moral 
 science and the determination of certain preliminary 
 issues with paganism. The battle with false asceti- 
 cism emerged in the rise and condemnation of Monta- 
 nism and Novatianism, which represented recoil from 
 pagan social life, and were coloured by belief in the 
 inherent evil of flesh and its pleasures. This belief 
 was embodied openly in the Gnostic and Manichean 
 systems. Incidental manifestations within the Church 
 were due to the exaggerated emphasis placed upon 
 monastic life and celibacy. The Church came to the 
 position that these are vocational, and that true spir- 
 itual development is possible in the world and in 
 married life. The conflict between Christian ideals 
 and the purely natural conception of morality came 
 to the surface in the Pelagian controversy of the fifth 
 century, which drew pointed attention to the subject 
 of the will’s capacity and responsibility, and to the 
 doctrines of grace and predestination. 
 
 It was St. Augustine’s task in this connection to 
 vindicate the dependence of human wills upon super- 
 natural grace for power to choose and to follow the 
 
 1 This error still explains much indifference to supernatural religion 
 and to its embodiment in the Church. Religion’s claim has reference 
 to the cultivation of those relations with God wherein eternal life 
 consists. Natural morality, indispensable for this Christian purpose 
 
 though it be, cannot of itself bring men to God and to the enjoyment 
 of their chief end hereafter. 
 
 Ee 
 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 30 
 
 good. Pro forma, he made the will the basis of 
 responsibility, but his definition of divine predestina- 
 tion threatened to overthrow the doctrine of human 
 freedom. However, he was a prolific writer and is 
 not to be regarded as merely the founder of what is 
 called Augustinianism. By his improved classifica- 
 tion of the virtues, as well as by his treatment of free 
 will and grace, he marks a period in the history of 
 Christian ethics. He connected the cardinal virtues 
 with the theological;! and laid the foundation for 
 the Calvinistic view that the virtues of the heathen 
 are “‘splendid vices,’ being apart from the love of 
 God in which all true virtue is grounded. Among 
 his contributions to moral science are the following: 
 (a) The summum bonum is the vision and love of God, 
 and the means of attainment is growth in virtue by 
 which all man’s faculties reach their highest per- 
 fection and the complete satisfaction of all his desires. 
 (b) Love is the sum of virtue and is threefold in its 
 object, namely, of God, of self, of neighbour. Its 
 manward branches are the so-called cardinal virtues. 
 
 1C, E. Luthardt, of. cit., p. 225, ‘The four cardinal virtues become 
 virtues in so far as they are manifestations of love to God (de Mor. 
 Eccl. Cath., 1, xxv, 15): temperantia, in opposition to love of the 
 world; fortitudo, as the overcoming of suffering and pain by love; 
 justitia, as service to God; and prudentia, as the right distinction 
 between what is to be avoided and what is to be chosen (de Mor., 
 I, xxxv-xlv).” St. Augustine defines virtue: “Definitio brevis et 
 vera virtutis: ordo est amoris,” de Civ. Det, XV. 22. On his ethical 
 teaching in general, see T. B. Strong, op. cit., pp. 188-199, 245-251, 
 258-250. 
 
40 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 (c) The essence of moral evil is the privation of good 
 by choice of inferior good. 
 
 The patristic age saw the beginning of what is 
 called ‘‘Canon Law,” which is based upon the prin- 
 ciple that Christians owe obedience in practice to 
 the Church because of the charge of Christ, “Make 
 disciples of all nations.’”’ The Canon Law, in its 
 larger sense, includes: (a) divine law, as interpreted 
 by the Church; (0) the Faith, as supplying the light 
 by which we ought to live; (¢) liturgical require- 
 ments, including the so-called jus liturgicum of bishops; 
 (d) canons, strictly so-called, or the laws enacted 
 by councils and the decrees of competent ecclesiastics, 
 especially of the Papal See; (e) ecclesiastical customs 
 and traditions, which are reckoned to outweigh indi- 
 vidualistic private judgment; (f) decisions of com- 
 petent ecclesiastical courts, which constitute much of 
 the so-called common law; (g) Church laws enacted 
 by the state, in so far as they have been accepted by 
 the Church; (hk) digests, collections, penitentiaries, 
 which have gained recognition by ecclesiastical 
 authority. 
 
 The penitentials ! were originally lists of sins with 
 their appropriate penances, compiled from patristic 
 literature for the guidance of the clergy in dealing 
 with penitents. They began to appear in the sixth 
 century and developed into collections of miscella- 
 neous rules calculated to assist in the administration 
 
 1C. E. Luthardt, op. cit., pp. 288-297; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “‘Peni- 
 tential Canons.” 
 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 4r 
 
 of public penances. With the decline of public 
 penances these manuals dropped out of use, but 
 their materials were incorporated into later moral 
 treatises. 
 
 § 8. During the middle ages! and subsequently 
 the line of opposition between rival systems of ethics 
 was determined by the emphasis, on the one hand, 
 and rejection on the other, of those elements in Chris- 
 tian ethics which are distinctively Christian and 
 supernatural. 
 
 Abelard (1079-1142 A.D.) treated Christian ethics 
 as simply a reformation of natural ethics, and made 
 intention, or intellectual motive, the subject matter 
 of moral distinctions, rather than the actions which 
 follow. 
 
 The mystics of the twelfth century represented a 
 reaction from the ethics of Abelard, and over-empha- 
 sized the supernatural side. The chief original 
 promoters of this development were St. Bernard 
 (r0gI-1153 A.D.), and Hugo of St. Victor (1097- 
 II4I A.D.). They made union with God the proper 
 business of human life, and said that this was to be 
 gained through withdrawal from the sensuous, illu- 
 mination, and ecstatic contemplation, resulting in 
 union with God based upon love. They anticipated 
 the later division of the spiritual life into the purga- 
 tive, illuminative, and unitive ways or stages. Their 
 
 1Qn medieval Ethics, see C. E. Luthardt, op. cit., §§ 50 ff.; H. 
 Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 134-151; Extracts in Benj. Rand, The Class- 
 ical Moralists, ch. xi-xii. 
 
42 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 one-sidedness appears in their ascetic disparagement 
 of the normal conditions in the world, to which 
 Christians in general are bound to adjust themselves, 
 and of the practical virtues of everyday life. 
 
 The main lines of ethical development were car- 
 ried on by Peter Lombard and by St. Thomas Aquinas. 
 The former laid the foundation for scholastic devel- 
 opment by collecting in systematic order the opinions 
 of the ancients in four books of Sentences. This 
 work became a universally employed text-book for 
 several centuries, and every scholastic writer of emi- 
 nence wrote commentaries upon it. The scholastics 
 were too profound and too restless to be satisfied 
 with mere reproductions of patristic opinions, and 
 the commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences 
 contained much original thought and prepared the 
 way for the great Summae. The flower and most 
 representative product was the Summa Theologica 
 of St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274 A.D.). The second 
 part of this work not only finished the codrdination 
 and systematic presentation of moral science up to his 
 time, but crystallized the science on lines that have 
 been followed ever since in the Roman Church. It 
 also contains many of the elements of modern Protest- 
 ant systems. St. Thomas combined the Christian 
 standpoint with a free use of Aristotelic and Platonic 
 elements and forms of thought. God is the chief 
 end. Good and being are the same in fact or reality, 
 and evil is defect or falling short. Considered in the 
 abstract the good is the desirable, whether morally 
 
 ————— ae 
 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 43 
 
 desirable, useful, or simply pleasurable. The moral 
 good constitutes the determinative end of Christian 
 conduct. It pertains to voluntary actions, and these 
 are formally good according to their end or intention, 
 materially according to their own nature. This dis- 
 tinction appears in speaking of sin. We are formally 
 guilty when we sin knowingly and wilfully, but our 
 guilt is only material when we sin ignorantly or invol- 
 untarily. Every human act has good for its end, 
 positively speaking. The sinfulness of a sinful act 
 lies in the substitution of a lower good for one that is 
 higher and ought to be pursued. ‘The intellect, when 
 acting in the moral sphere, consists of: (a) synderesis, 
 or the theoretical faculty; (0) conscience, which 
 applies moral principles to conduct. All virtues fall 
 under seven heads, the four cardinal virtues and the 
 three theological. The former are natural and lead 
 to natural happiness, while the latter are fruits of 
 supernatural grace and lead to supernatural beati- 
 tude; but the fall makes God’s help necessary for the 
 acquisition even of the natural. So God becomes 
 the source of all virtues. The divine law is grounded 
 in the reason of things as seated in the divine nature, 
 and the divine will is what it is because of the divine 
 nature, not vice versa. 
 
 After St. Thomas a decay of scholasticism set in 
 and moral ideas degenerated. Two factors hastened 
 this decay; namely, the theory of works of super- 
 erogation, with its mechanical and commercial scheme 
 of merits and indulgences, and, in the seventeenth 
 
44 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 century, that form of probabilism which is called 
 laxism. 
 
 §9. Modern Roman Moral Theology is largely 
 based upon St. Thomas, but is influenced negatively 
 by the indulgence system, and is elaborated with 
 reference to the conditions of modern life. In most 
 moral treatises the principal heads adopted are: (a) 
 ‘Virtues; (6) the Decalogue; (c) Precepts of the 
 Church; (d) Sacramental Obligations; (e) Contracts 
 and Civil Obligations of all kinds. 
 
 Certain special departments of moral science have 
 also been developed: (a) Casuistry, the chief pro- 
 moters of which have been the Jesuits; (0) Ascetic 
 Theology; (c) Mystical Theology. 
 
 During the reformation period the chief influences 
 at work were a partial reform of the system of indul- 
 gences by the Council of Trent, and the development 
 of Probabilism.! The pioneer in this last-mentioned 
 
 1QOn Probabilism, see C. J. Shebbeare, in Ch. Qly. Rev., July, 1912; 
 K. E. Kirk, op. cit., pp. 194-197; Koch-Preuss, Moral Theology, 
 vol. I, pp. 218-235; J. P. Gury, S.J., Compend. Theol. Moralis, 
 §§ 51-80; Cath. Encyc. and Schaff-Herzog Encyc., q.vv. There are 
 six theories: (i) Rigorism, that the safest course should always be 
 followed, even when the less safe is more probable. This would 
 often result in a negation of action, and it was condemned by Alex- 
 ander VIII, Prop. dam. 3, Dec. 7, 1690. (di) Tutiorism, that the 
 safe side must be taken unless the preponderance of probabilities 
 for liberty is very great. (ci7) Probabiliorism, which does not require 
 more than a perceptible preponderance of evidence for liberty. (zz) 
 Equi-probabilism, that we are at liberty when the balance of argu- 
 ments is equal; the view of St. Alphonsus Liguori, whose writings 
 
 have had great influence. (v) Probabilism, which concedes liberty 
 if there are solid reasons for it, even though the reasons against 
 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS AS 
 
 development was Bartholomew a Medina (d. 1581). 
 Starting with the thought that a doubtful law cannot 
 impose indisputable obligations, the question arises 
 between the safer and the more rigid course and the 
 apparently less safe but probably permissible one. — 
 The various systems of probabilism are distinguished 
 by their attitude towards this issue. The rigorist 
 school makes the safer course obligatory. At the 
 other extreme was laxism, which maintained the per- 
 missibility of any course that had any probability in 
 its favour. The ultimate form which probabilism 
 took in Roman moral science makes a freer or less safe 
 course permissible, if it is based on “‘solid”’ probabil- 
 ities and upon due enquiry. The less safe course may 
 never be resorted to by a conscience which is sub- 
 jectively certain that the safer course ought to be 
 pursued, nor is a doubting conscience free to choose 
 the less safe course until enquiry has been made as to 
 whether “solid” probabilities make it permissible. 
 In this form the system is crystallized in the more 
 mature writings of St. Alphonsus Liguori. 
 
 Current moral science of the Roman type differs 
 from medizval literature in its adjustment to changed 
 ecclesiastical and civil conditions. The independence 
 which the state has gained in modern days, although 
 not fully recognized by the Roman See, is to some 
 it are stronger. This and the preceding are the theories generally 
 followed. (vz) Laxism, which justifies liberty when any arguments 
 can be advanced for it. It was condemned by Innocent XI, Prop. 
 
 dam. 3, March 2, 1679. Laxism was ridiculed with terrible power 
 by Pascal, Provincial Letters. 
 
46 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 extent recognized in moral science. Modern socio- 
 logical questions are also reckoned with, although 
 under the handicap of a terminology which is not 
 wholly intelligible to the modern mind. One rather 
 important illustration of development is the treat- 
 ment of usury, or receiving interest on money loans. 
 Down to quite recent times surplus money was 
 regarded in the light of a means for moral service, 
 and it was considered wrong to charge for such service. 
 The progress of the science of political economy has 
 made it clear that money is also a commodity, and 
 that to charge for its use is in line with rentals of real 
 estate. Therefore usury is now sanctioned, or, 
 rather, the word usury is applied only to excessive 
 interest. 
 
 Among the standard manuals of Roman moral 
 theology are those by Gury, Lehmkuhl, Liguori, 
 Thomas Slater, and Koch-Preuss, the two latter 
 being written in English. 
 
 § io. The Protestant movement of the sixteenth 
 century, ethically considered,’ was a revolt against: 
 (a) excessive ecclesiastical control; (6) the whole 
 scheme of wage-merit and works of supererogation; 
 (c) mechanically conceived purgatorial penalties, 
 and indulgences therefrom. ‘The emphasis was laid 
 upon: (a) private judgment; (6) justification by 
 faith independently of good works; (c) human deprav- 
 ity and arbitrary predestination. The consequences 
 
 1See P. V. N. Myers, op. cit., ch. xvii; T. C. Hall, op. cit., ch. viii; 
 Thos. B. Strong, Christian Ethics, Lec. vii. 
 
MODERN ETHICS 47 
 
 of this revolt, or rather of its excessive thoroughness, 
 were: (a) a loss of vital elements of the Christian 
 covenant and a serious reduction of the divinely 
 appointed machinery of grace; (6) ethics was grad- 
 ually divorced from religion and reverted to a natural- 
 istic form, somewhat akin to pagan ethics; and this © 
 paved the way for modern utilitarianism. Among 
 the particular developments should be mentioned: 
 (a) the monastic life was barred out entirely; (6) 
 legalism revived in what was at a later date called 
 Puritanism, with its man-made precepts and repro- 
 duction of Judaic requirements under Christian con- 
 ditions. It represents partly a reaction from six- 
 teenth century antinomianism and partly a protest 
 against wickedness in high Anglican life; (c) Casuistry 
 was at first retained on the basis of Scripture and pri- 
 vate judgment in interpretation; but it soon gave 
 way to the naturalistic point of view, which makes 
 the unaided reason or common sense a sufficient 
 guide in morality. 
 
 III. Modern Ethics } 
 
 § x1. From Hobbes dates a revival of interest in 
 ethical studies, stimulated in part by the reaction to 
 his theories, which Deism strongly tended to keep 
 alive. He was the founder of the modern non- 
 
 1On modern Ethics, see H. Sidgwick, op. cit., ch. iv; Jas. Mar- 
 tineau, Types of Ethical Theory; Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s.v. “ Ethics,” 
 yan, 
 
48 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 theological ethics and approximated the position of 
 Epicurus.! 
 
 Thomas Hobbes,? 1588-1679 A.D., maintained that 
 man is by nature selfish and egoistic. The result is, 
 that, to prevent moral clash, the state must regulate 
 personal life, and the authority of the state must 
 be absolute in the determination of right and wrong? 
 This is a reversion to pagan political ethic. He was 
 assailed on two lines: (a) in behalf of the absolute- 
 ness of the principles of right and wrong, as intui- 
 tively discerned, as against all wills, governments, etc., 
 by the Cambridge Platonists, e.g., Ralph Cudworth # 
 
 1Thos. Whittaker, The Theory of Abstract Ethics, pp. 40-54, 
 regards him as the founder of abstract ethics. 
 
 2R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 126-143; T. C. Hall, of. cit., pp. 
 445-447. 
 
 3R. A. P. Rogers, of. cit., p. 136, ‘Thus the primitive egoism, with 
 which Hobbes starts, ends in the opposite extreme of Political 
 Absolutism;” that is, he shows the impossibility of maintaining the 
 thesis with which he begins. W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. II, p. 56, 
 _ “For Hobbes the natural moral law consists in a correct weighing 
 of the beneficial or harmful consequences of an act. A breach of 
 the law is therefore an error of the understanding merely; it can 
 proceed only from false deduction, since nobody intentionally acts 
 contrary to his own advantage. It is impossible that divine law, 
 which is contained in the moral teachings of Holy Scripture, should 
 have any other contents than that of natural law.” Hobbes says, 
 On Human Nature, ch. vii, § 3, Even the goodness which we appre- 
 hend in God Almighty is His goodness to us.” With the Leviathan, 
 his chief ethical work (pub. 1651), we may compare Mandeville’s 
 Fable of the Bees, and Rochefoucauld’s Maxims. R. B. Perry, 
 Approach to Philosophy, p. 261, says his “‘unblushing materialism and 
 egoism stimulated by opposition the whole development of English 
 ethics.” 
 
 4 Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, published 
 posthumously, 1731. 
 
MODERN ETHICS 49 
 
 (1617-1688), Henry Moore, and Samuel Clarke 
 (1675-1729); (0) in behalf of common good, regarded 
 as secured by divine sanctions and laws, prior to 
 human law, e.g., by Richard Cumberland (1632- 
 1719). Hobbes was the precursor of modern utili- 
 tarianism,! and emphasized the greatest benefit 
 to all as the summum bonum. 
 
 In the meantime René Descartes (1596-1650) had 
 propounded, on the continent, the doctrine of innate 
 ideas, or self-evident truths.2 This raised the ques- 
 tion as to moral truth being of this nature. Male- 
 branche and Leibnitz viewed moral truths as absolute. 
 Spinoza? (1632-1677), the pantheist, reduced moral- 
 ity to an inevitable play of love and hate, expressive 
 of a universal law of substance. Rationally perceived 
 law is sovereign and explains moral conduct. The 
 will is an illusion. 
 
 John Locke (1632-1704), rejected innate ideas, 
 especially moral,* and founded modern empiricism. 
 
 1 The title was first used by Jeremy Bentham. 
 
 2See W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 87-92. Descartes made 
 doubt a means for testing truth; laying aside all that could be 
 doubted he fell back upon innate ideas. 
 
 3R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 143-146; W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. 
 IT, pp. 92-97. 
 
 ¢ Essay concerning Human Understanding, ch. iii, § 6, ‘ Virtue is 
 generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable.” 
 Self-love is the ultimate motive for all moral acts. W. Wundt, 
 op. cit., vol. II, p. 62, says his labours “‘ were less distinguished by the 
 novelty of his ideas than by the circumspection of his judgment, and. 
 his careful avoidance of such extreme views as might seem para-- 
 
 doxical to healthy human reason. . . . He is especially anxious to 
 steer clear of Hobbes’ radicalism,” Jbid., p. 65, ‘‘All judgments om 
 
50 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 All knowledge is obtained through sensation and 
 reflection, and it is thus that we arrive at the knowl- 
 edge of moral law. This law is independent of 
 pleasure, although supported by the Christian belief 
 in happiness or misery hereafter. 
 
 Joseph Butler 1 (1692-1752), the greatest writer of 
 this age, vindicated the authority of conscience in 
 judging what is right and what is wrong. He speaks 
 of conscience as a “faculty,” but really makes it 
 equivalent to the true self. 
 
 David Hume? (1711-1776) formulated the skep- 
 ticism that was involved in the philosophies of Des- 
 cartes, Locke, and Berkeley, and reduced the mind 
 to a mere stream of impressions possessing no real 
 unity. All our knowledge is derived from experi- 
 ence, we have no knowledge of law, whether moral or 
 other, and the will is an illusion. For practical pur- 
 poses he was, however, a utilitarian? 
 
 § 12. After Hume four issues came to the front: 
 moral values are the results of rational insight and intellectual 
 deliberation.” But this intellectualism is distinguished from that 
 of earlier schools by the increased weight he gives to empiricism. 
 See also T. C. Hall, op. cit., pp. 447-450. 
 
 1R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 163-176. See his Sermons on Human 
 Nature. 
 
 2R. A. P. Rogers, of. cit., pp. 177-190; W. Wundt, of. cit., vol. II, 
 pp. 74-79; T. C. Hall, op. cit., pp. 460-465. His chief ethical work, 
 the Treatise on Human Nature, was published in 17309. 
 
 3H. Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, p. 28, “Utility, according to 
 Hume, is the true criterion of morality just so far as utility actually 
 pleases. But real utility does not always please. The public does 
 not always know its own interests; and what is useful to one circle 
 #8 pernicious to others.” 
 
MODERN ETHICS SI 
 
 (a) between the intuitional and the empirical view of 
 the knowledge of moral distinctions; (6) between 
 belief in the absoluteness of moral distinctions and 
 the utilitarian interpretation of morality; (c) between 
 the acceptance of freedom as a fact and its denial 
 by necessitarianism; (d) between intellectualism and 
 sensationalism or estheticism. 
 
 Thomas Reid (1710-1796) fought for the superiority 
 of innate knowledge over empirical, and the self- 
 evident and intuitive nature of fundamental and 
 moral ideas. He was followed in the same line by 
 Dugald Stewart and Victor Cousin. A long series 
 of later writers have also taken the intuitionalist point 
 of view, including Henry Calderwood.! 
 
 Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804 A.D., reduced knowl- 
 edge to impressionism, in which forms and categories 
 and transcendental ideas are postulated, but not 
 themselves known. Modern empiricism owes much 
 to him. As a counter-poise to his skepticism con- 
 cerning knowledge, he set forth the “categorical 
 imperative,” or rule of duty, and the necessity of 
 living in accordance with its requirements. He sum- 
 marized all duty in the proposition, ‘‘ Act on a maxim 
 which thou canst will to be a universal law.’”? His 
 
 1His Handbook of Moral Philosophy. Pt. I. His contention 
 that conscience can not be educated is characteristic of his position. 
 Cf. H. Sidgwick, of. cit., pp. 224 ff. 
 
 2R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 191-210; W. Wundt, of. ci#t., vol. I, 
 pp. 106-119; T. Whittaker, op. cit., pp. 56-65; F. Ueberweg, Hzst. 
 of Phtlos., §123. For a criticism of his theory of the ‘Good Will,” 
 see Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., pp. 240-246. 
 
 *The moral quality of an action is wholly dependent upon its 
 
52 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 moral position agrees with Butler’s assertion of the 
 authority of conscience; but he may be criticized 
 as undermining the intellectual validity of moral 
 judgments, as making morality too much a matter of 
 law, and as leaving too little place for the emo- 
 tions. 
 
 Meanwhile, the intuitionalists contended for the 
 absoluteness of moral truth, while the empiricists 
 became avowedly utilitarian, making moral distinc- 
 tions either equivalent to, or at least wholly deter- 
 mined by, happiness. Happiness was further de- 
 fined as permanent and of the greatest number. 
 
 William Paley (1743-1805) made benevolence the 
 characteristic principle of morality and the mark of 
 divine government, which provides everlasting hap- 
 piness as the reward and motive for righteousness. 
 
 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)1 said that the 
 greatest happiness of the greatest number deter- 
 mined the moral quality of actions. 
 being done in fulfilment of what is conceived as duty, the ideal man 
 morally is one whose acts are entirely independent of inclination or 
 desire. For a criticism of this view, see quotation from H. Rash- 
 dall, p. 19, note, above. 
 
 1R, A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 235-237; W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. 
 II, pp. 142-146. The securing of pleasure and avoiding of pain 
 “point out what we ought to do, as well as determine what we shall 
 do.” The personal value of pleasure depends upon: (a) its intensity; 
 (6) its duration; (c) its certainty; (d) its propinquity; (e) its fecund- 
 ity, ie., its ability to beget other pleasures; (f) its purity, ie., its 
 freedom from accompanying pain; and (g) its value for the com- 
 munity depends upon its extent, i.e., upon the number of persons 
 
 who may share it. It may be described as an algebraic system, 
 pleasure standing for positive quantities, pain for negative. 
 
MODERN ETHICS 53 
 
 John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)! was utilitarian, 
 while maintaining that the love for virtues as such, 
 without reference to utility, is to be cultivated. This 
 is because utility is thus promoted. Universal benev- 
 olence, with discrimination between higher and lower 
 forms of happiness, should determine conduct. 
 
 The publication of the Origin of Species by Charles 
 Darwin (1809-1882) in 1859 originated a line of 
 thought which has had profound effect upon recent 
 ethical theories. ‘The moral sense came to be regarded 
 as a product as well as a factor in the evolution of 
 the species; its foundations were treated as biological 
 and social, and utilitarianism was modified by the 
 thought that the happiness of the species is to be 
 sought because it makes for the preservation and 
 development of the species. Theologians criticize 
 Darwin for interpreting nature as cruel, and for giving 
 to brute power to survive the higher place; but it 
 must be acknowledged that Darwin did not regard 
 the process of survival by the extinction of the weak 
 as a moral process. Evolutionary thought also 
 raised the question as to whether moral judgments 
 have any larger validity than that of passing phases 
 of evolution. 
 
 In the hands of naturalistic thinkers evolutionary 
 
 1R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 237-240; W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. 
 II, pp. 151-153. 
 
 2Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) especially. His fundamental 
 ethical principles are found in the Data of Ethics and in Justice. 
 See R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 261-279. Evolutionary ethics sees 
 bad only as good in the making, and reacts against personal respon- 
 
54 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 ethics have become “‘scientific,” by which is meant 
 that all our ethical undertakings should be guided 
 by the law of evolution. The propagation of the 
 species, e.g., should be regulated by eugenics so as to 
 produce offspring fit to survive. There is a ten- 
 dency also to deprecate hospitals and all forms of 
 philanthropy calculated to preserve the unfit. The 
 Christian reply is that moral distinctions are what 
 they are, and possess absolute validity, independently 
 
 sibility and moral effort. As Aubrey L. Moore says, Lux Mundi, 
 p. 47, ‘‘Moral evil is ‘sin’ only to those who believe in God.” Bp. 
 D’Arcy, A Short Study of Ethics, Pt. ILI, ch. iv, has a good criticism. 
 Ibid., p. xxvi, ‘Consciousness and will erect an eternal barrier against 
 the attempt to explain the spiritual activities of man by the processes 
 of nature.” See also Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., pp. 371-375; W. 
 Wundt, op. cit., vol. IL. pp. 153-159; R.A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. IL. 
 ch, viii. Ernst Haeckel, Riddle of the Universe, ch. xix, sets forth 
 the theory in terms of crassest materialism; also H. A. Taine, who 
 says, in History of English Literature, Introd., ‘Whether facts be 
 moral or physical, it makes no matter. They always have their 
 causes. There are causes for ambition, courage, veracity, just as 
 there are for digestion, muscular movement, animal heat. Vice and 
 virtue are products like vitriol and sugar.” We acknowledge that 
 there is no uncaused action, but we still allow for freedom of choice. 
 The method of evolutionary ethics is to explain the present condi- 
 tion by tracing the past history and stages of development. This 
 is shown especially in E. Westermarck, of. cit.; and in W. R. Sorley, 
 Ethics of Naturalism. One result is to evolve conscience out of 
 existence, and to lead us on to Nietzsche’s “superman,” who becomes 
 “‘super,” in part, because he has no conscience and is swayed only by 
 the ‘will to power.” See the very able refutation of Nietzschean 
 ethics and philosophy by J. N. Figgis, The Will to Freedom. Fora 
 full historical account and defence of evolutionary Ethics, see C. M. 
 Williams, Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory I 
 Evolution. 
 
MODERN ETHICS 55 
 
 of the manner in which the human capacity to per- 
 ceive them originated. If this capacity is of evolu- 
 tionary origin it is not less trustworthy on that ac- 
 count, nor are the judgments of conscience reduced 
 in authority by the nature of the origin of the con- 
 science. 
 
 What is called ‘‘Transcendental Ethics”’ was first 
 evolved by G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831),! to whom 
 thought was the fundamental reality. This actu- 
 alizes itself in society, regarded as the sphere of per- 
 sonal self-realization. 
 
 Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) ? translated this 
 into terms of English thought. He said man’s chief 
 end is to be a person, i.e., to realize himself in a society 
 of persons. The Christian idea is to grow like God, 
 who is the only complete person. Green touched 
 on important matter but he did not complete it. 
 The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him. 
 
 § 13. Little attention has been paid in these out- 
 lines to separate definitions of the ethical systems 
 that have been developed. It will be convenient to 
 classify them as objective and subjective? The 
 
 1R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 215-230; Wm. Wundt, op. cit., 
 vol. II. pp. 124-127. It is impossible to give his ethical ideas apart 
 from a study of his whole system of philosophy, which would require 
 too much space. It may be criticized as too abstract to admit of 
 general practical application. It also abounds in contradictions. 
 
 2R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. II. ch. ix. Green’s system is set 
 forth in his Prolegomena to Ethics, which is of an extremely meta- 
 physical character. 
 
 3 J. H. Hyslop, Elements of Ethics, ch. viii, is followed in this sec- 
 tion. W. E. H. Lecky, Hist. of European Morals, ch. i., divides 
 
56 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 objective theories are further classified as ontological 
 and nomological. The ontological ground morality 
 in the nature of God, or of the universe, or of both. 
 The nomological ground it in will, either: the divine 
 will, as found in the law of God, or human law and 
 convention. The subjective theories are either teleo- 
 logical or gnosiological; the éeleological relate morality 
 to the end sought, whether utilitarian, hedonistic, or 
 properly moral. The gunosiological theories are non- 
 teleological and regard moral qualities as unrelated 
 to all else, whether they are perceived intuitively or 
 learned by experience. : 
 
 The true theory is ontological, in that it grounds 
 morality in the divine nature; and teleological, in 
 that it treats actions as moral with reference to their 
 bearing on the attainment of divine fellowship. The 
 will, both of God and of society, may furnish rules and 
 standards of moral action, but may not be regarded 
 as the ultimate source of moral quality and obligation. 
 Right is right, of course, whether we discern its per- 
 tinency to our chief end or not; but the reason for its 
 being right is that it does so pertain. 
 
 It is well at this point to define in terse terms the 
 chief specific ethical theories. LEgoism makes the 
 good of the agent the end of action; while Altruism 
 substitutes the good of others. Iniuitionalism claims 
 ethical theories into intuitive and utilitarian, the former treating the 
 sense of duty and the fundamental moral ideas as independent of 
 utilitarian considerations and intuitively certain, the latter deriving 
 
 moral ideas inductively from experience and making the pursuit of 
 happiness the determinative ideal. 
 
MODERN ETHICS 57 
 
 that we can see clearly and immediately the contents 
 of duty and their absolute nature. Hedonism makes 
 pleasure the aim of conduct. Utilitarianism is 
 hedonism universalized by making the aim the hap- 
 piness or welfare of the greatest number or of society 
 at large—the happiness referred to is earthly. Mod- 
 ern practical idealism is utilitarian, as is also socialistic 
 ethics. Evolutionary ethics in its several forms pre- 
 supposes that moral distinctions and the moral sense 
 are products of biological development, having their 
 roots in pre-human stages of evolution! From the 
 
 1In general Bishop D’Arcy says, op. cit., p. 229. ‘Though the 
 various ethical theories may be described as rivals, the opposition is 
 not so great as it appears. Each theory has contributed some valu- 
 able element to the whole of ethical thought.” Dewey and Tufts, 
 op. cit., p. 224, “A classification of types of theory is rendered diffi- 
 cult, a thoroughly satisfactory classification almost impossible, by 
 the fact that the problems arrange themselves about separate prin- 
 ciples leading to cross divisions.” ‘This last work classifies them as 
 (a) Teleological and Jural; (6) Individual and Institutional; (c) 
 Empirical and Intuitional. Egoism and Altruism may be identified 
 by holding that “the Zrue Good for every man is a Common Good 
 and an Absolute Good,” Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., p. 102. For “this 
 cosmos will not be good for self if determined with reference to self 
 only; for persons, though each as a person, that is, for himself, is 
 separate and unique, must yet be members of a higher order, com- 
 bined by the operation of some transcendent principle of unity. 
 They are all one in God. What is good for one is good for all,” 
 ibid., p. 104. Bishop D’Arcy develops this at length in Pt. I. 
 ch. iili-v. See also Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., pp. 375-391. 
 
 A good description of modern extreme Egoism is found in Geo. 
 Meredith’s novel, The Egoist. Intuitionalism is excellently described 
 by Bishop D’Arcy, of. cit., Pt. III. ch. i. He says, p. 230, “This 
 theory claims conscience as a special faculty, whose office is to give 
 judgment upon conduct. Conscience, it is said, is ultimate. It is 
 
58 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 
 Christian standpoint the battle to-day lies between 
 opposite notions of man’s chief end. Christianity 
 makes eternal life with God the goal and organizing 
 
 intuitive in its judgments. It is an essential part of human nature. 
 It is therefore supreme. ‘There is no appeal to any higher court.” 
 This is the position taken in Jas. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, 
 and criticized by H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Bk. III, ch. xii. 
 
 Hedonism is described by Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., Pt. III. 
 ch. ii. He says, p. 236, “The basis of Hedonism is the assump- 
 tion that the object of desire is always pleasurable.” On p. 237, 
 “In general, the mistake of Hedonism seems to be a confusion of self- 
 satisfaction with pleasure. Self-satisfaction is the true end of all 
 volition. Pleasure, as a rule, accompanies self-satisfaction; but it 
 is not even an index to the value of any particular satisfaction. For 
 some of the objects of desire which, when obtained, yield most pleasure 
 are among the least satisfying.” 
 
 “Utilitarianism, Bishop D’Arcy says, p. 243, “ is Hedonism grown 
 democratic.” See the same work, Pt. III, ch. iii; R. A. P. Rogers, 
 op. cit., Pt. I, ch. vii. H. Spencer’s criticism, that the ‘method of 
 universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism, is far more unsatisfactory 
 than egoistic hedonism,” Data of Ethics, p. 133, seems to be war- 
 ranted. Germany, e.g., would be justified in all that it did in the 
 late war if it acted on the premise that its dominion was for the great- 
 est good of the greatest number. That is, the end would justify the 
 means. As W. E. H. Lecky says, op. cit., vol. I, p. 40, “Even if 
 every virtuous act were incontestably useful, it by no means follows 
 that its virtue is derived from its utility.” T. C. Hall, op. cit., p. 
 596, “English utilitarianism has had a long and honorable history, 
 but it has been mainly outside of or even in avowed indifference or 
 antagonism to organized Christianity.” We may sum up the teach- 
 ing of this important school by giving its fundamental doctrine “the 
 greatest happiness of the greatest number,” the attainment of which 
 supplies the ultimate ethical standard by which conduct is to be 
 judged. Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), attempted to form a com- 
 bination of the Intuitional and Utilitarian positions. Idealism is 
 best set forth in T. H. Green’s Prolegomena, and finds many adherents 
 in the modern ethical world. 
 
MODERN ETHICS 59 
 
 principle of conduct; while current secular idealism 
 makes the earthly welfare of society determinative. 
 The former stresses the other world, while the latter 
 emphasizes the improvement of this world. To 
 the Christian supernatural religion is of central impor- 
 tance, but to the modernist religion is an adjunct 
 only of idealistic aims in this present world-society.! 
 
 1See F. J. Hall, “This Miserable and Naughty World,” in Anglican 
 Theol. Rev., Oct., 1920. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY OR SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 § 1. Moral Philosophy deals with the theory or 
 rationale of duty and virtue.! It is here treated under 
 the heads of the Agent, the End, and the Act. 
 
 We must state at the outset certain specific assump- 
 tions upon which our treatment rests, assumptions 
 which do not belong to Moral Science as such, but 
 do affect its treatment. 
 
 (a) “The chief end of man is to glorify God and 
 enjoy Him forever.’ 
 
 (6) To fulfil this end requires the light and prac- 
 tice of true religion.? Religion, concretely speaking, 
 is the working system by which men are brought into 
 
 1 Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. xvi. A very brief summary of 
 Moral Philosophy is given by F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 
 226-248. Among the best manuals are, Jos. Rickaby, Moral Phi- 
 losophy; H. Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy; J. S. 
 Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics; N. K. Davis, Elements of Ethics; 
 N. Porter, Elements of Moral Science. For larger lists, see J. M. 
 Baldwin, Dic. of Philosophy, vol. III, pp. 812-912; Schaff-Herzog 
 Encyc., s.v. Ethics.” 
 
 2 Westminster Catechism. See F. J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 243-245. 
 
 3F, J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 229-232; M. MacColl, Christianity in 
 Rel. to Science and Morals, pp. 292-303. 
 
 60 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 6r 
 
 relation with God, and true religion is nowhere fully 
 exhibited except in the Catholic Church.! 
 
 (c) Holy Scripture, viewed as recording a pro- 
 gressive revelation, and interpreted by the Catholic 
 Faith, affords true and determinative knowledge of 
 the will of God and of human duty.? 
 
 (d) Men are born in a state of moral insufficiency 
 and corruptibility, with more or less blinded con- 
 sciences, perverted affections, and weakened wills; so 
 that, apart from supernatural revelation and grace, 
 they are naturally prone to sin and vice. 
 
 (e) The death of Christ is the basis of remedy 
 for this evil; and the means of recovery and per- 
 fection are committed by God to the stewardship of 
 the Catholic Church. The entire removal of the 
 taint of evil is not achieved, however, until aiter 
 death.* 
 
 (f) This life is probationary. Men are respon- 
 sible agents. An everlasting future is to come after 
 death, determined as to its nature by the judgment 
 of God upon the moral value and tendency of our 
 lives in this world? 
 
 1 F, J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 213-226. Cf. H. P. Liddon, Some Elem. of 
 Religion, Lec. i. 
 
 2N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 140-144; J. B. Mozley, Ruling Ideas in 
 Early Ages, passim; F. J. Hall, Theol. Outl., vol. I, Q. xvii, §§ 3-4. 
 
 3 F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, ch. ix, esp. pp. 285-289; H. Calder- 
 wood, op. cit., Pt. V; J. J. Elmendorf, Moral Theology, I, vi.1o. 
 
 4F, J. Hall, op. cit., ch. x, §§ 1, 6-7; and Passion and Exalt. of 
 Christ, pp. 103-109. 
 
 SF, J. Hall, Eschatology, ch. ii, §§ 4-6, 8. 
 
62 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 (¢) Men will hereafter be judged not only accord- 
 ing to the knowledge which they have actually 
 acquired, but also according to their disposition to 
 obtain knowledge of the divine will. It isa part of 
 human righteousness to learn, so far as opportunities 
 permit, wherein righteousness of life and heavenly 
 virtues consist. 
 
 I. The Agent 
 
 § 2. Men are called moral agents because they pos- 
 sess rational freedom and can distinguish and choose 
 between right and wrong action, having a sense of 
 responsibility for their choice.2 As moral agents 
 they possess what are called moral faculties, and these 
 correspond to the psychical faculties of intellect, feel- 
 ing, and will. The moral faculties are neither inde- 
 pendent nor separable; but are specific functions and 
 operations of the above-named psychical faculties. 
 Moreover, we may not divide the psychical faculties 
 from each other, for each faculty is conditioned in its 
 exercise by the action of the others; neither pure intel- 
 lect, nor pure emotion, nor pure will have ever been 
 experienced.2 The moral faculties of the intellect 
 are the ordinary intellectual faculties, which are 
 called moral in so far as they are given moral direc- 
 tion and are subject to moral conditions; any good 
 
 1F, J. Hall, Eschatology, ch. vi, §§ 6-8. 
 
 2H. Calderwood, op. c##., Pt. I, div. I, ch. i, §§ 8-9. 
 3F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 190-194. 
 
THE AGENT 63 
 
 treatise of psychology is, therefore, a serviceable 
 introduction to their study. 
 
 For the purpose of moral science these faculties 
 may be conveniently divided into the theoretical and 
 the practical. The theoretical faculty, called syn- 
 deresis by scholastic writers,| has to do with the 
 speculative and scientific appropriation and consid- 
 eration of moral truths and principles. It calls into 
 play external perception, intuition, memory, imagina- 
 tion, generalization, and discursive thought gen- 
 erally. Its exercise furnishes the mind with axioms,” 
 facts, and generalizations which make possible 
 and guide moral judgment. ‘The moral judgment, as 
 its name indicates, is the practical faculty by which 
 we apply moral principles to determine the moral 
 quality of immediate lines of action and of habits. 
 The conscience is this faculty of moral judgment as 
 exercised with reference to one’s own actions and 
 habits. By it the individual determines whether his 
 actions are right or wrong.? ‘The rational faculties do 
 
 _ 1 The scholastic writers define it ‘‘as a habit:by which the soul per- 
 ceives the general principles of right conduct,” Koch-Preuss, of. cit., 
 vol. I, p. 188. See Jos. Rickaby, op. cit., pp. 137-138; J. J. Elmen- 
 dorf, op. cit., p. 499. J. M. Baldwin, op. cit., s.v. “Conscience,” 
 gives the full history of the meaning of the two terms and the change 
 of the meaning of conscience. 
 
 2H. Calderwood, of. cit., I. I. iii, shows that the fundamental 
 intuitions of morality cannot rationally be contradicted, nor can 
 they be proved. They do not result from induction. Cf. ch. iv, 
 as criticized below. 
 
 3 Of the immense literature on the subject we mention only cer- 
 tain works which are representative of different points of view. 
 
64 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 not become either more or less trustworthy merely by 
 being exercised in a moral direction. It may there- - 
 
 See in general H. Calderwood, op. cit., I, I, ii, §§ 9-12; I, I, iv; J. J. 
 Elmendorf, op. cit., p. 499; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. I, § 36; Bishop 
 Butler, Sermons on Human Nature, serm. ii; J. Locke, Essays on the 
 Understanding, Bk. I, ch. iii, § 8; R. H. Lotze, Practical Philosophy, 
 § 3; Jeremy Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium, Bk. I, ch. i; Robert San- 
 derson, Lectures on Conscience and on Human Law; H. Rashdall, 
 Is Conscience an Emotion?; G. L. Richardson, Conscience, Its Origin 
 and Authority. We refer to these authors below by name only. 
 
 It may be helpful, first, to see some typical definitions. St. John 
 Damasc., de Fide Orthod., IV, 22, says conscience is the law of the 
 mind, which defines it objectively. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
 Theol., I, lxxix, 13, says conscience is an act; Bp. Sanderson, p. 14, 
 says it is neither an act, nor a form, nor a power; but a habit, partly 
 innate and partly acquired. He defines conscience as “‘a Faculty or 
 Habit of the Practical Understanding, which enables the Mind of 
 Man, by the use of Reason and Argument, to apply the light which it 
 has to particular Moral Actions.”’ According to the Aristotelean 
 division of the mental faculties,—(a) Cognitive Intellect, speculative 
 and practical; (6) Appetitive, or Will—conscience belongs to the 
 practical cognitive. So Kant, Intro. to the Metaphysical Elements of 
 Ethics, § XII (B), says, “Conscience is man’s practical reason, which 
 holds before him his law of duty in every case so as either to acquit or 
 condemn him.” Bp. Butler, Sermon i, it is “the principle in man, by 
 which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions.” 
 J. Martineau, op. cit., it is “the critical perception we have of the 
 relative authority of our several principles of action.”” N. K. Davis, 
 op. cit., p. 77, “Conscience is pure reason discerning morallaw. This 
 faculty has the moral law for its exclusive object, and its exercise is 
 the primary, original antecedent condition of any moral activity 
 whatever, without which liberty has no moral restraint, and volition 
 no moral character.” H. Calderwood, I, I. iv. § i, “Conscience is 
 that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each individ- 
 ual for the guidance of his conduct.”’ All these trace ultimately to 
 Aristotle, and are well summarized by Origen, In Ep. ad Rom., lib. 
 II, ch. ii, who says it is affectum corrector, aique anima pedagogus. 
 
THE AGENT 65 
 
 fore be said that the synderesis and moral judgment or 
 conscience ought to be educated and rightly informed 
 
 As distinguished from other knowledge, Hugo of St. Victor well says, 
 Inst. Monast., III, xi, Conscientia est cordis scientia; also, Cor noscit 
 se et alia. Quando autem se noscit appellatur conscientia, quando 
 preter se alia noscit appellatur scientia, Jeremy Taylor relates it 
 to God and gives it a wider basis in human nature; he says, ‘God 
 rules in us by His substitute our conscience.”’ As all are related to 
 God none can be wholly without a conscience, through it God wit- 
 nesses to Himself, it is a perpetual pulse; passively conceived it is a 
 witness, actively it is a guide in all moral acts, words, thoughts. 
 
 As to the mental faculties involved, he says, “‘although conscience 
 be primarily founded in the understanding, as it is the law-giver and 
 dictator, . . . yet it is also memory, when it accuses or excuses, 
 when it makes joyful and sorrowful; and there is in it some mixture 
 of will; . . . so that conscience is a result of all, of understanding, 
 will, and memory.” To the same effect Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, 
 p. 192, ‘‘We may roughly define conscience as a habit or capacity of 
 the three faculties of the soul—intellect, will, and feeling,—by which 
 man is bound to the moral order of the universe, i.e., the will of God; 
 or, in other words, the capacity of applying objective laws to sub- 
 jective conduct or of regulating man’s actions in accordance with the 
 law.” 
 
 Most modern definitions may be criticized as being too one-sided; 
 thus Bp. D’Arcy, op. cit., “‘ Conscience is simply the consciousness of 
 obligation,” which places it too much upon a basis of feeling. On the 
 other hand, H. Sidgwick, “Conscience is essentially Intellect or 
 Reason applied to Practice,”’ errs in identifying it too thoroughly 
 with the rational faculty. G.L. Richardson attempts to include both 
 sides, “Conscience is the whole personality acting ethically,” p. 69; 
 and from a different, practically Christian rather than philosophical, 
 standpoint, “Conscience is not sentiment, but a healthy abhorrence 
 of sin,” p. 200. H. Rashdall argues against Edw. Westermarck and 
 Wm. McDougall (in An Iniro. to Social Psychology) that conscience 
 is not an emotion but a rational faculty, for if it is merely an emotion 
 ft can have no more objective value than a liking or disliking for 
 mustard. Emotions fluctuate. It is by no means certain that I 
 
66 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 for their best exercise. The necessary and universal 
 intuitions and axioms of the spiritual reason, indeed, 
 
 will react emotionally to-morrow as I do to-day. Westermarck’s 
 thesis, op. cit., vol. IT, p. 738, is that “‘the moral concepts which form 
 the predicate of moral judgment are ultimately based on moral 
 emotions,—they are essentially generalizations of tendencies in cer- 
 tain phenomena to call forth either indignation or approval.” The 
 hollow unreality of his whole scheme is shown by his treatment of 
 the Parable of the Good Samaritan, vol. I, p. 111; and his thesis 
 seems to be defeated by such statements as the following, “ Moral 
 ideas are expressed in moral judgments,” vol. I, p. 158, for one does 
 not ordinarily think of judgments as being founded upon the emotions, 
 certainly not in a well-regulated mind. 
 
 As to the origin of conscience there are two opposed schools, one 
 regarding it as due to intuition (Calderwood), the other to evolution 
 (Spencer). Christianity is committed to neither position, but may 
 be said to furnish a synthesis of the two. ‘The fault of the first posi- 
 tion is that it denies the ability of conscience to be educated. ‘‘That 
 conscience intuitively recognizes moral law, that it is supreme in its 
 authority, and that it cannot be educated, are three propositions 
 which hang or fall together,’”’ H. Calderwood, p. 71. The argu- 
 ments which he uses do not hold good, for both the eye and the ear 
 may be, and are, educated. His view is considerably modified in 
 the chapter on Moral Sentiments. In opposition we may set the 
 statement of Jeremy Taylor ‘Conscience is only a good guide when 
 we are truly informed,” in which we should mark the adjective 
 “good,” for, as we have seen, conscience must in any case be our 
 guide. The error of the evolutionary school is more serious, for it 
 tends to leave God out of consideration and to regard conscience 
 merely as a natural product. 
 
 Finally, as to the authority of conscience, this is supreme. ‘Had 
 it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, 
 it would absolutely govern the world,” Bp. Butler. In moral decis- 
 ions the fundamental standards of judgment are invariable, e.g., 
 truthfulness and honesty. They are not like the standards of zsthet- 
 ics, or even of measurements, which may vary. H. Calderwood, 
 Pp. 53, ‘Truths which are ultimate, . . . are universal not particular; 
 
THE AGENT 67 
 
 cannot be rationally rejected, for they constitute the 
 basis of all moral conclusions and, for that reason, 
 are beyond either proof or disproof. But moral 
 science can be more soundly developed and the judg- 
 ments of the conscience can be changed by education, 
 fuller knowledge, and more deliberate reflection. Yet 
 no appeal may be taken from the conscience, for its 
 judgment signifies our existing knowledge or convic- 
 tion as to right and wrong. To disregard this is 
 culpable. The practical authority of the conscience 
 
 necessary not adventitious; self-evidencing not demonstrable; un- 
 questionable (indubitable and indisputable), incapable of contra- 
 diction, whether in thought or practice.” G. L. Richardson, p. 96, 
 “As we are bound to trust reason in the intellectual sphere, so we 
 are bound to trust conscience in the moral sphere. To deny the 
 authority of the one or the other is to distrust the Power in whom 
 physical and moral law have their source. The authority of con- 
 science is thus paramount for the individual; it will be better for me 
 to do what is objectively wrong, but what I conscientiously believe 
 to be right, than to do what is in fact right, but what my conscience 
 disapproves. And the reason is that to distrust and to disobey 
 conscience is an act of disloyalty to my personality; it is a kind of 
 moral suicide. Conscience will work itself clear of error in propor- 
 tion as it is used and trusted, just as intellectual truth is attained 
 by the exhaustion of error.” P. 97, ‘‘The essential thing is not the 
 verdict, but the motive which underlies it; and the motive must 
 be that we shall allow the Divine Purpose to move freely through 
 the human personality.” 
 
 As to the relation to other authority, T. Slater, $.J., A Manual 
 of Moral Theology, vol. I, p. 57, says: “The voice of the conscience 
 is the authoritative guide of man’s moral conduct. Not that the 
 individual conscience is independent of all authority; if the individual 
 conscience is right, it proclaims the duty of submitting to all properly 
 constituted authority, and especially to the supreme and absolute 
 authority of God.” 
 
68 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 is self-evident and impregnable. Sin has, indeed, 
 clouded the human mind, and made its moral judg- 
 ments less accurate and trustworthy. But, even in 
 error, one is morally bound to do what he thinks right 
 and to avoid what he thinks wrong, although previous 
 neglect of light may make the error itself blameworthy. 
 
 § 3. Some of the more important emotions of the 
 moral nature are: (a) pleasure and pain; (bd) desire 
 and aversion; (c) love and hate; (d) hope and fear. 
 Pleasure and pain are impelling and deterring feel- 
 ings which attend, or result from, action or experi- 
 ence, whether internal or external, mental, emotional, 
 volitional, or physical. Desire and aversion have 
 some thing or event for their object, the former seek- 
 ing, the latter avoiding, it. Love and hate have 
 persons for their object. Love impels to union with, 
 and, therefore, also to self-sacrificing service in behalf 
 of, persons. Love towards God is the basis and 
 regulative principle of righteous love towards man. 
 Hate is the opposite of love.' Hope and fear are con- 
 cerned with future and contingent events or results 
 supposed to be possible. Hope is based on desire 
 that the possibility may be realized. Fear is anxiety 
 growing out of belief that what is hoped for is uncer- 
 tain, or that what is undesired is probable. Despair 
 is the entire absence of hope, due to the belief that 
 what is desired has become impossible, or that what 
 is not desired is inevitable. Sin has caused the 
 
 1F. J. Hall, Eschatology, pp. 250-253; H. Calderwood, op. cit., 
 p. 155. 
 
THE AGENT 69 
 
 wounds of concupiscence and malice. By reason of 
 concupiscence the feelings of pleasure, desire, love, 
 and hope are directed upon or controlled by inferior 
 objects and ends, while malice causes a misdirection 
 of pain, aversion, fear, and hate. 
 
 The activities of the intellectual and emotional 
 faculties afford the motives by which the will is influ- 
 enced, but with a difference. Intellectual motives 
 are either directive or prohibitive, while emotional 
 motives either impel or restrain. But the intellect 
 and the feelings are inseparable. The emotions help 
 or hinder the mind in arriving at truth, and to a real 
 extent determine the judgments of conscience. The 
 mind, on the other hand, affords the objects which 
 call forth the emotions. 
 
 § 4. The will! is the power of choice, and must be 
 distinguished from the power of executing choice. 
 The acts which are caused or determined by the will 
 are called voluntary. Many human acts are either 
 
 1A, Alexander, op. cii., ch. v; Wm. James, Psychology, Briefer 
 Course, ch. xxvi; R. Hooker, Eccles. Polity, ‘‘Appetite is the will’s 
 solicitor, and the will is appetite’s controller; what we covet accord- 
 ing to the one, by the other we often reject.”” A. L. Moore, Essays 
 Scientif. and Philos., p. 134, “‘ Will is a power of control over the other 
 faculties and capacities of our nature, by means of which we are 
 enabled to determine personal activity.’ Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., 
 p. 177, ‘ What is of the utmost ethical importance is the cultivation 
 of a virtuous will, that is, a will habituated to subordinate desire of 
 every kind to the true good whatever it may be.” See further 
 sbid., Pt. I, ch. iii; H. Calderwood, of. cii., Pt. III; J. J. Elmendorf, 
 op. cit., I, ii; N. Porter, op. cit., ch. iv; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. I, 
 §§ 4 ff. 
 
%o MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 involuntary or non-voluntary. These may often, 
 however, be controlled, modified, or ended by the 
 will! If actions were never really determined by 
 the will, there could be no moral responsibility for 
 them. ‘The will is the pivot of all moral conduct.? 
 The will, as will, is necessarily free.? Voluntias, 
 will, and voluntary have the same root. ‘The willis a 
 true cause. So far, indeed, as the origination of its 
 activity is concerned—the choosing of something— 
 it is subject to causation; that is, as a rational being 
 man must have a motive which moves him to act or 
 to refrain from action. But so far as the direction 
 of its choice is concerned—its choosing between 
 alternatives—it is itself a cause, and free, within 
 certain limits imposed on human freedom. In 
 other relations than that of choice between courses of 
 action the effects of choice are, of course, subject to 
 
 1H. Calderwood, op. cit., III, ii; N. Porter, op. cit., p. 110. 
 
 2.N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 70-72. 
 
 8J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 11 ff. Cf. Ecclus. xxxi.10. Kant, Intro. 
 to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, init., “Nothing can possibly 
 be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good 
 without qualification except a good will. ... A good will is good 
 not because of what it performs or accomplishes, not by its aptness 
 for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply in virtue of 
 its volition, that is, it is good in itself. . . . Even if it should happen 
 that, owing to special disfavour of fortune or the niggardly provision 
 of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to 
 accomplish its purpose, . . . it would still shine like a jewel by its 
 own light, as something which has its whole value in itself.” On 
 the conflict between free will and determinism, see C. Harris, op. cit., 
 ch. xiii. 
 
 4N. K. Davis, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
 
THE AGENT nt 
 
 laws of causation which lie beyond the sphere of the 
 human will! The freedom of the human will, and 
 of every creaturely will, is circumscribed, because it is 
 finite and part of a higher will-scheme. Its limita- 
 tions include: (a) occasions and motives, for we can- 
 not simply choose to choose apart from motive or 
 interest;? (6) power of execution, for what is known 
 or thought to be impossible or unpreventable is not a 
 matter of choice;? (c) external environment and per- 
 sonal influence, whether of men or of unseen spirits;* 
 (d) heredity; (e) divine determination, and grace, 
 although grace is not irresistible;> (f) character and 
 habits,® which within their sphere tend to become 
 more and more difficult to alter;’ (g) bodily condi- 
 tions, e.g., need of food and sleep, sexual cravings, 
 
 1W. G. Ward, Essays on the Philos. of Theism, distinguishes be- 
 tween spontaneous impulse and the effort often made to resist such 
 impulse. The fact that we can thus resist, and choose action which 
 is contrary to spontaneous impulse, affords clear proof that the will 
 is free and not merely the register of antecedent causes and motives. 
 
 2N. Porter, op. cit., parag. 28, §§ 2, 4; H. Calderwood, of. cit., 
 Ill, ii, 3; J. Caird, Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, vol. II, pp. 
 53-56. 
 
 3J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, ii, 36; R. Hooker, op. cit., I, vii, 5. 
 Compulsion may leave the will unaffected, but relieves of responsibil- 
 ity for the act, when not consented to. 
 
 4N. Porter, op. cit., ch. xiv. On angels and their influence, see 
 F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, ch. v. 
 
 5 F, J. Hall, op. cit., ch. i; H. Calderwood, op. cit., Metaphysic of 
 Ethics, ch. v, div., II; J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., pp. 18, 20; St. Thomas, 
 I. xxiii. 3 ad tert. 
 
 6 Habits are either infused by grace or acquired; and may be good 
 or evil. See Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 275-284. 
 
 TN. Porter, op. cit., parag. 34, and ch. vi. 
 
gz MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 disease. These limitations circumscribe or influence 
 the will more or less, but do not determine it abso- 
 lutely or nullify it.! 
 
 One is responsible only when free and within the 
 divinely ordered sphere of freedom. But avoidable 
 limitations, such as those imposed by habit and char- 
 acter, or vincible ignorance, wittingly and freely 
 incurred, do not exempt from accountability; which 
 also somewhat depends in degree upon the amount of 
 mental deliberation in choice. 
 
 The will never acts apart from the mind and the 
 feelings. Yet these should be carefully distinguished. 
 The mind and the emotions are the sources of motives. 
 Thus desire affords a motive of choice, but the will 
 chooses,? sometimes against strong desires and 
 impulses. The mind affords reasons for choice 
 and the judgments of conscience have authority, 
 but the will is free to choose contrary thereto. Yet 
 there is no such thing as non-intelligent choice; and 
 what is so described is really an instinctive act? 
 Choice is an act of will in a given case. Purpose 
 or intention is a state of will with reference either 
 to future action or to an end designed to be subserved 
 by such action.4 
 
 1 Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 86-90, gives three chief individ- 
 ual determinants of free will: age, temperament, talent; and, pp. 
 91-97, three social determinants: sex, education, society. Lom- 
 broso exaggerated the strength of this last factor and made it mechan- 
 ically and absolutely determinative. 
 
 2H. Calderwood, op. cit., ITI, i, 2. 
 
 3 Ibid., III, ii, 6. 
 
 *N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 33-34. 
 
THE AGENT rR 
 
 The will is momentary or habitual. A habitual 
 will is one which has become more or less disposed to 
 similar choices between similar alternatives, so that it 
 acts with slight deliberation, almost spontaneously.! 
 Personal character is constituted by the habitual will. 
 
 Liberty means personal success in the sphere of 
 choice, or the power of self-control and of realizing 
 one’s purpose in action. License means choice with- 
 out reference to moral principles and ends. It is 
 fatal to liberty because opposed to the will of God, 
 which cannot really be thwarted. Experience shows 
 also that license gradually subjects the will to the 
 passions, thus narrowing its freedom.” 
 
 Pot enos, Lo LL, iexvil) 75. 7.) Slater, op. /ct., Vol. Ly p20, 218 
 the power of deliberation is wholly wanting, the act which follows 
 cannot be sinful, however wrong objectively; if the act is semi- 
 deliberate, however grievously wrong in itself, it will be imputed to 
 the agent only as a more or less serious venial sin. These principles 
 are of great importance for forming an estimate of the moral guilt of 
 children, of habitual drunkards, of persons long habituated to sins 
 of the flesh, and persons with weak intellect.” Jbid., vol. I, p. 36, 
 Acts of this sort become sinful only ‘when consent is yielded to them 
 after advertence to their malice.” They lack the consent of the 
 will which is essential to make an act sinful. Such acts are said by 
 theologians to proceed from antecedent concupiscence or mono- 
 * mania, ib7d., vol. I, p.35. The agent, however, is bound to use every 
 precaution, and the means of grace, to prevent their recurrence and 
 especially to avoid occasions. Moreover the responsibility for 
 falling into inveterate evil habits must be reckoned with and empha- 
 sized. 
 
 2See H. Calderwood, op. cit., III, iv, 1; H. P. Liddon, Unio. 
 Sermons, 1st Series, iv, pp. 78-81; N. K. Davis, op. cit., p. 55. The 
 thought is pre-Christian, Seneca said Parere Deo libertas est; but 
 the dynamic is found only in the Christian dispensation. Koch- 
 
74 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 Sin has weakened and enslaved the human will. 
 Divine grace operates to emancipate it, by impelling 
 towards righteous ends and actions. But the bene- 
 ficial efficacy of grace depends upon the will’s response, 
 and the cure of sin is gradual; for grace does not take 
 the place of practice in self-control or self-discipline, 
 but assists us in such practice. The will’s response 
 to, or use of, grace consists in this practice—practice 
 in obeying higher motives, and in thwarting lower 
 impulses and motives, even when these motives do 
 not directly pertain to sinful ends or actions. The 
 essence of self-discipline lies in this thwarting of 
 impulses that are not in the given instances sinful? 
 
 Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 8, “true liberty, i.e., ‘the liberty of the chil- 
 dren of God’ (sanctity, 2 Cor. iii. 17-18) is not the beginning but the 
 end and object of morality and religion.” It is “victory over sin 
 and passion, the result of a constant and patient codperation with 
 grace.” As St. Anselm points out, if liberty meant the ability to 
 sin or not to sin, neither God nor the angels would possess it. Koch- 
 Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 149, “Christian liberty means order in con- 
 formity with the law of God, not license.” 
 
 1See Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 102-112, the friends or foes 
 of the will are the instincts, affections, passions. Affections belong 
 to the rational appetite, passions to the sensual. ‘The will is respon- 
 sible only as it consents and codperates wittingly. It is not respon- 
 sible for their origin. ‘They are ours not to annihilate, as the Stoics ~ 
 taught, but to control by the aid of grace and by the training of the 
 understanding. The passions and affections are listed somewhat 
 differently from the list here given: (a) love and hate; (6) joy and 
 sorrow; (c) desire and repugnance; (d) hope and despair; (e) fear 
 and daring. 
 
 2H. Calderwood, op. cit., Pt. V, 9, points out that the laws of moral 
 victory are those of (a) attention, selecting dispositions and motives 
 with which to concern one’s self; (b) habit, directed to establishing 
 
THE AGENT 75 
 
 § 5. Man has a composite nature, and his moral 
 faculties are conditioned and influenced in their 
 operation by the bodily organism. The mind is 
 determined in its operation by the condition of the 
 brain and nervous system, which means practically 
 by the condition of the whole body. An unhealthy 
 physical condition tends to induce dulness of mind, 
 and even to pervert the moral judgment. Unneces- 
 sary carnal emotions and passions tend to debase the 
 mind and will, and are frequently either caused or 
 increased by bodily disorders. Even the healthy 
 appetites and normal propensities of the body require 
 discipline and self-control, if they are to be kept in 
 line with moral interests. The will itself is often 
 weakened and made inert by physical weakness, 
 excessive weariness, and disease.} 
 
 Bodily conditions are most apt to influence the 
 moral faculties when they themselves have been 
 caused by moral antecedents, because they then 
 express, crystallize, and perpetuate such antecedents. 
 Thus the physical results of intemperance and lust 
 render these vices more difficult to remedy, and their 
 evil effects may even be perpetuated in offspring. 
 Physical heredity and other native physical condi- 
 tions have effect upon the moral faculties, and tend 
 to develop corresponding moral habits. For example, 
 
 this concern. He adds that philosophy alone cannot solve the prob- 
 lem of enabling the will to persevere along such lines. He refers to 
 an essay on Moral Dynamic in Shairp’s Studies in Poetry and Phi- 
 losophy, p. 348. 
 
 1Cf. F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 190-194. 
 
76 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 men have what we call passionate natures, and are 
 impelled to unregulated passions accordingly. Physi- 
 cal environment also has moral influence by calling 
 forth bodily responses which are either favourable or 
 unfavourable to moral interests. Fortunately the 
 mind has some power to combat and even to improve 
 bodily conditions and their effects upon moral inter- 
 ests, and this power is susceptible of enhancement by 
 self-discipline.t No bodily conditions can change 
 the material quality of the moral actions resulting 
 from them; although they may reduce the formal 
 guilt to the extent of the individual’s lack of respon- 
 sibility for their presence. 
 
 § 6. Man’s moral history is marked by a series of 
 dispensations or covenants established with him by 
 God: (a) a primitive dispensation of innocence and 
 grace, nullified by sin; (6) the patriarchal and 
 Mosaic dispensations, in which, by reason of sin, 
 men had to assume a propitiatory attitude towards 
 God—one which in itself was symbolic, and ineffective 
 for the remedy of sin,—and in which they were placed 
 under revealed laws that could not secure obedience 
 and thus made their sinful inclinations more manifest; 
 (c) the Christian dispensation, grounded in the pro- 
 pitiatory death of Christ,? and affording means of 
 sanctifying grace, with the assistance of which grad- 
 
 1 This is illustrated by the phenomena of mind healing, Christian 
 Science, etc. The grace of Unction of the Sick assists the mind in 
 exercising this power. See F. J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 320-324. 
 
 22 Cor. v. 14 (R.V.). 
 
THE END 77 
 
 ually the body can be brought under control, the 
 conscience illuminated, the affections purified, and 
 the will strengthened, for the fulfilment of man’s 
 chief end through the attainment of everlasting life 
 with God. This cannot be achieved, however, 
 except through life-long discipline and a progress 
 which continues after death.! 
 
 II. The End 
 
 § 7. The end of every act, so far as it is rational 
 and free, is some good, whether higher or lower, real 
 or apparent.2_ By the good is meant the desirable. 
 It is of three kinds: (a) the useful; (6) the pleasur- 
 able; (c) the morally desirable. The last men- 
 tioned constitutes the true end of moral conduct. 
 The useful and the pleasurable often minister to the 
 moral good, and then take on moral value;? but 
 they are not moral goods either in themselves or under 
 all circumstances. 
 
 Utilitarianism,* which identifies moral good with 
 
 1F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 220-223 and ch. x. 
 
 2 J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., I, ii, 3; St. Thomas, I, I, x, x. 
 
 3N. Porter, op. cit., § 130. 
 
 4 Treated historically and critically by H. Calderwood, op. cit., 
 div. II, ii, ff. He does not clearly distinguish Hedonism, which is 
 concerned indiscriminately with pleasure, whereas Utilitarianism 
 stresses higher and social well-being and lasting happiness, distin- 
 guishing values of pleasures. J. 5S. Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, 
 searchingly criticizes Utilitarianism; also W. E. H. Lecky, op. cit., 
 vol, I, ch. i. Cf. H. Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 236 ff. The practical 
 idealism of our day is essentially a species of Utilitarianism in its 
 tremendous emphasis upon efficiency for immediate results and upon 
 the perfecting of human welfare in this world 
 
78 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 well-being or happiness, and Hedonism, which iden- 
 tifies it with pleasures of the moment, are absolutely 
 to be rejected. They both substitute inferior for 
 higher good, and this is the distinctive mark of evil 
 aims. It is man’s duty to seek the morally good, 
 and, when alternative goods are involved, the high- 
 est one. Progress in attaining moral ends is, indeed, 
 attended and to some degree conditioned by present 
 pleasure, and results necessarily in ultimate happi- 
 ness. If it were not so, we would have reason to 
 suspect our whole philosophy and the justice of the 
 universe. Pleasure and happiness are none the less 
 incidental to moral good, and at times have to be 
 sacrificed in its interest. Moreover, beatitude is not 
 happiness in the abstract, but that form of it which 
 we obtain through making our chief objective end 
 to be life with God.! 
 
 The moral ends of conduct are immediate and 
 remote. The immediate ends are duties? and vir- 
 tues—present obligations to be discharged, and habits 
 to be cultivated and maintained. The chief end, or 
 summum bonum, is “to glorify God and enjoy Him 
 forever,” that is, perfected divine communion and 
 fellowship? As essential to the realization of this, 
 
 1 See F. J. Hall, ‘This Miserable and Naughty World,” in Anglican 
 Theol. Rev., Oct., 1920. 
 
 2 Duties in the comprehensive sense of what we ought to do under 
 existing conditions—including the promotion of others’ present wel- 
 fare, when legitimate opportunities occur. 
 
 3 J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, i; Westminster Catechism, 1st answer; 
 R. Hooker, op. cit., I, xi, 1-2; St. Thomas, I, I, i-v. 
 
THE END 79 
 
 personal perfection in virtue and character is also a 
 necessary remote end of moral life. This means per- 
 sonal assimilation of character to that of God, the 
 only possible basis of either divine pleasure in us or 
 our enjoyment of God. Such personal perfection is 
 also needed for unqualified and lasting enjoyment of 
 mutual human fellowship. The communion of saints 
 obtains its fruition in common life with God, and is 
 the only communion between human beings which is 
 unattended by disappointment. Thus true brotherly 
 love looks to the future, and seeks mutual sanctifi- 
 cation, as the necessary condition of its realization. 
 Personal sanctification is also the road to self-realiza- 
 tion, or to what Aristotle described as ‘‘ perfect activity 
 in a perfect life,” attended by perfect happiness. To 
 seek such self-realization is not selfish, for it does not 
 require or permit us to make the attendant happiness 
 of self our aim. Thus Christian love when satis- 
 fied is pleasing, but is by nature unselfish. To be 
 pleased with what is righteous makes the pleasure 
 righteous. And the self thus realized is what God 
 created after His own likeness.! 
 
 Christian Ethics is both individual and social. 
 ‘Men are placed under social conditions by God, 
 and are by nature social beings.2, A man must realize 
 himself because he is a moral individual, and his per- 
 
 1Gen.i. 26. Cf. J. Caird, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 56 f. 
 
 2 God places us in the world society as the sphere of our probation; 
 and He gathers those who respond to His call in the Church, which 
 is the inception of that blessed society which in its perfection will 
 enter into the full joy of God in the world to come. 
 
80 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 fection is essential to the common good, as well as 
 to a fulfilment of his personal obligation to please 
 God. But his achievement of this is conditioned by 
 the love of others, and by seeking the welfare of 
 others. One is to love his neighbour as himself 
 Altruism and egoism, as usually conceived, are 
 alike inadequate. Both of the ends which these 
 systems severally emphasize exclusively are vital, 
 and neither may be sacrificed to the other. 
 
 §8. The final causes or ends of moral choice 
 become moving causes, when subjectively considered, 
 and are embraced within the motives of action. The 
 term motive ? describes whatever immediately moves 
 and consciously influences the will from within. 
 Motives spring either from intellectual or emotional 
 sources. The intellectual motives are reasons for 
 action or non-action. They are either directive or 
 prohibitive, taking the form of practical judgments 
 upon the ends and results of actions, whether in the 
 sphere of utility, of pleasure, or of morality. They 
 have as sources: (a) experience;? (6) reflection on 
 experience; (c) intuition and a priori considerations. 
 Emotional motives impel or restrain. They may arise 
 from (a) immediate excitement; (0) subsequent’ 
 imagination; (c) temperament. They take the 
 
 1 God alone may be loved with all one’s heart and soul and mind. 
 
 2See H. Calderwood, op. cil., Pt. If; J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., 
 I, ii, 4-5. 
 
 3 Conceived of as including the reception of divine revelation and 
 moral education at large. 
 
THE END 8x 
 
 form of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, love or 
 hate, and of hope or fear.! 
 
 The motives are always mixed, being both intel- 
 lectual and emotional; and are often conflicting ?— 
 making both for and against the pursuit of the highest 
 good. The question sometimes asked, whether the 
 will is inevitably determined by the strongest motives, 
 is ambiguous. If ‘‘strongest’”? means the motives 
 which in fact prevail, the question is idle and has an 
 affirmative answer, of course. If it means the most 
 rational or the most excitingly felt, these do not in 
 fact invariably determine choice. The will really 
 determines, and is no mere register of the inherent 
 strength of the motives involved. 
 
 1Cf. § 3, init., above. On the last, see T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, 
 PP. 37-39. 
 
 2 Per contra, Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., p. 33, “A conflict of motives 
 is impossible. What is called a conflict of motives is properly a 
 conflict of desires.”” The motive is “that which moves to action,” 
 tbid., p. 80 (cf. pp. 80-83). The motive is the desire which prevails; 
 it is helpful to remember that motive and motion come from the same 
 root. Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., p. 237, ““A ‘mere’ motive which 
 does not do anything, which makes nothing different, is not a genuine 
 motive at all, and hence it is not a voluntary act.”” There is a con- 
 fusion here in terminology between motive and act; but the thought 
 is that the motive can hardly be conceived as a determinative which 
 does not strongly tend to realize itself in act. Hence it is possible 
 to speak disparagingly of the “‘good’’ man, that is, the man whose 
 motives are good, but who rarely expresses them in act. Ibid., 
 p. 238, ‘The man with a truly benevolent disposition is not the one 
 who indulges in indiscriminate charity, but the one who considers 
 the effect of his gift upon its recipient and upon society.” Kant, we 
 may note, in his theory of the “good will” over-emphasizes the 
 motive. 
 
82 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 Motives and choices are inseparable although dis- 
 tinct phenomena of personal activity,! and the person 
 is simplex. Motives do not determine the will from 
 without, as separate factors, but from within as 
 personal considerations and feelings? The will 
 exhibits personal attitude, while motives exhibit 
 personal conditions of that attitude. The will 
 expresses self-determination, and nothing else is 
 really meant when we say loosely that motives deter- 
 mine the will. We should not confuse determina- 
 tion as thus used with compelling conditions, nor 
 forget that the will can so direct attention and reason 
 as to modify the motives? The will itself is the 
 personal faculty by which the choice of action is 
 made. ‘The will ought to be influenced by the high- 
 est motives—i.e., by those which make for holiness 
 of life and character, and for the attainment of the 
 summum bonum. 
 
 The highest of all motives is the love of God or 
 desire of union with Him—a motive which grows out 
 of true and adequate faith and knowledge, and which 
 is sustained by the hope of realization. This love 
 in its perfection is the result of much moral and spir- 
 itual development. Owing to our sins, the sense of 
 guilt, and the expectation of penal consequences, the 
 earliest motive which makes for better things is nor- 
 
 1H. Calderwood, op. cit., III, iii, 5-14, treats of the relation of 
 motives to the will. Cf. R. Hooker, of. cit., I, vii. 
 
 2 J. Caird, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 44-45; R. Hooker, op. cit., I, vii, 3. 
 
 3H. Calderwood, of. c#t., ITI, iii, 14-19. 
 
THE ACT 83 
 
 mally the fear of punishment—‘ servile fear.” This 
 fear, in those who seek an escape, leads to aversion 
 to sin and to desire of its opposite; which in turn 
 induces love of Him in whom the opposite is clearly 
 to be found. All this, including the desire to escape, 
 is contingent upon the illumination and prompting 
 of grace. Thus it appears that, while servile fear is 
 not an adequate motive or worthy of heaven, it is a 
 necessary “‘beginning of wisdom,” and the motive 
 of heavenward repentance. Repentance signalizes 
 the birth of “holy fear” or loving anxiety lest we dis- 
 please God.! 
 
 The conscience judges with authority, and there- 
 fore the motives afforded by its judgments ought to 
 govern the will in every instance. It is true that the 
 divine will is the supreme standard to which the 
 human will should be conformed. But the con- 
 science is the faculty by which we judge whether 
 given acts are in accord with the divine will.? 
 
 Ill. The Act 
 
 §9. The moral quality of actions is ultimately 
 determined by their relation to our attainment of 
 the summum bonum, and for Christians this makes 
 supernatural religion with knowledge, love and ser- 
 vice of God, central.2 No act is moral which does 
 
 1F, J. Hall, Eschatology, pp. 220-222; F. H. Hallock, in Amer- 
 scan Church Monthly, June, 1921, pp. 346-355. 
 
 2F, J. Hall, zdem, p. 185. 
 8F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 229-232; J. J. Elmendorf, 
 
84 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 not either immediately or remotely pertain to this. 
 The possibility of moral acts depends upon the pos- 
 session by their agent of a moral nature. Such acts 
 have to be rational and free. Moral actions include 
 the operations of psychical faculties, and the use of 
 language, as well as physical movement—that is, 
 “thought, word, and deed.” 2 
 
 The causes which may make materially moral 
 actions to be formally non-moral are: (a) invincible 
 ignorance;? (6) necessity or compulsion.* If, how- 
 ever, these conditions are due to previous fault of the 
 agent,® they do not have this effect; and in any case 
 actions which under normal conditions have moral 
 quality are likely to be followed by moral conse- 
 quences. Man is a responsible agent. He will be 
 held to account by the supreme Judge for any witting 
 
 op. cit., I, iii; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. I, §§ 22 ff; Koch-Preuss, op, 
 cit., vol. I, pp. 264-274; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 41-55. Koch- 
 Preuss, vol. I, p. 264, ‘“By the morality of an act is understood its 
 intrinsic relation to the moral order and to reason. Every human 
 act, in concrete, is either good or bad. It is good if it conforms to the 
 moral law; it is bad if it violates that law. The sources of morality, 
 i.e., the factors or principles which determine the relation of an act 
 to the moral law, are: (¢) the object or matter of the act; (iz) its 
 form, intention, or end; and (iii) the attending circumstances. 
 Generally speaking, an act is good if all three of these factors codp- 
 erate in making it conformable to the right order; it is evil if any 
 one of them is wrong or sinful.” 
 
 1H. Calderwood, op. cit., Pt. I, div. I, i, 3. 
 
 2F, J. Hall, Eschatalogy, pp. 175-178. 
 
 3 J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., I, vi,6; T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 30-34. 
 
 ‘T, Slater, op. cit., vol. I, p. 40. 
 
 6 E.g., the failure of the priest to obtain the knowledge which he 
 needs for his work, a matter of obvious obligation. 
 
THE ACT 8s 
 
 and avoidable failure to use his faculties to their 
 best advantage for attaining the swmmum bonum, 
 that is, within the limits of his providential opportu- 
 nity and available knowledge.! 
 
 Duty, in the concrete, is an action or series of 
 actions which ought to be done. In the abstract 
 it is the quality or relation which is common to such 
 actions, and which distinguishes them from all else— 
 their oughtness.2 The sense of duty is universal and 
 necessary. It teaches every man that he ought to 
 do right, and also to seek his highest end. It implies 
 in every normal mind the distinction between right 
 and wrong, or between what he ought and what he 
 ought not to do. The reality and nature of duty 
 are grounded in the nature of God and of man; and 
 its contents are measured by the standard of the 
 divine will. But we cannot explain why men ought 
 to seek any end. Yet all men know that they ought, 
 however grotesque and mistaken their notion of the 
 particulars of duty may be.? 
 
 The ultimate source of morality is the divine nature; 
 but it is also grounded in human nature, and is made 
 known to us by the will and law of God.* Subor- 
 
 1OQn the imputability of human acts see Koch-Preuss, of. cit., 
 vol. I, pp. 256~263. 
 
 2.N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 2-3. 
 
 3H. Calderwood, of. cit., I, i, 5. In ch. vi he shows that duty 
 implies a natural and inherent right to act according to duty in spite 
 of all hindrances. Cf. N. Porter, op. cit., § 5. 
 
 4H. Calderwood, op. cit., div. I, ch. v; J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., 
 pp. 35-36; N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 128-129; N. K. Davis, op. cit., 
 
86 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 dinately and in particulars, the will of God is deducible 
 from the laws of nature, and from humanly created 
 law and social convention. These last two factors 
 we shall consider later. The relation of the sover- 
 eignty of God’s will to the permission of evil con- 
 stitutes the most baffling of all problems. We can 
 only maintain that God’s will is righteous, and the 
 standard of righteousness; and that somehow, 
 unknown to us, the existence of evil can be reconciled 
 with this.! 
 
 Many actions are seen to be right without conscious 
 consideration of their ends, but it is always to be 
 assumed that they do in fact pertain to man’s chief 
 end. This assumption may arise either from the 
 natural constitution of the mind, or from previous 
 moral culture; and can be brought to light by sub- 
 sequent reflection. Some actions are normally right 
 or wrong because their effect upon the attainment of 
 the swmmum bonum is normally in the same direction? 
 The moral quality of actions, however, is also depend- 
 ent upon circumstances; and grave problems may 
 arise, calling for the judgment of learned and trained 
 casuists.? 
 
 § 10. Acts are either moral or non-moral, and 
 
 PP. 202-204. By the will of God is meant the “will of signs,” or 
 what He makes known that we should do and should not do. St. 
 Thomas, I, xix, 11-12; F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 246 f. 
 
 1F, J. Hall, Being and Atirib. of God, pp. 187-193; and Creation 
 and Man, ch. iv. 
 
 * They afford the sphere of moral law. 
 
 *N. Porter, op. ctt., §148 and ch. xvii. 
 
THE ACT 87 
 
 moral acts are either virtuous or vicious as they con- 
 form or fail to conform to the requirements of moral- 
 ity. Non-moral, spontaneous, or reflex acts may be 
 produced by the will without due knowledge or at- 
 tention; and to this class belong also those acts in 
 which the will has no part, as in sleep, in disease, 
 or under compulsion; also, and more generally, acts 
 which are morally indifferent.! 
 
 A moral act is a free and rational one, to which 
 moral judgment is applicable, whether in relation to 
 the divine law or to the summum bonum. It must pro- 
 ceed from the will with knowledge and deliberation, 
 in which case it is truly voluntary; but, if the knowl- 
 edge and deliberation are not complete, it is imper- 
 fectly voluntary, although still moral. The consent 
 of the will may be implicit or explicit. Virtuous acts 
 agree with the divine will and conduce to our attain- 
 ment of the summum bonum, while vicious acts disa- 
 gree therewith. Virtues and vices are the habits 
 which issue respectively in virtuous and vicious acts. 
 
 A vicious act is called sinful in relation to the divine 
 law. Sin? strictly defined, actual sin, signifies con- 
 scious disobedience of the divine law, but applies 
 practically to any conscious violation of God’s will. 
 Original sin, a symbolic use of terms, is the sin breed- 
 ing state of nature when deprived of grace, caused by 
 
 1 Koch-Preuss, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 113-118. 
 
 2On sin, J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., I, vi; H. V. S. Eck, Sin, Pts. 
 J-II; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. I, §§ 143 ff; W. W. Webb, The Cure of 
 
 Souls, pp. 71-90; F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 247, 290-297: 
 Hastings, Dic. of Bib., s.v. “Sin.” Cf. ch. ix, below. 
 
88 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 the first man’s disobedience and universally inherited 
 by natural birth. It is called sin because its existence 
 is due to sin and its results are sinful.! 
 
 Actual sin is distinguished as material and formal. 
 It is material in so far as the act, as such, is wrong; 
 and formal in so far as the agent acts freely and with 
 knowledge of the sinfulness of his action. By formal 
 sin the agent incurs formal guilt and penal respon- 
 sibility for the act. Sins of ignorance are material 
 only, but become formal when either persisted in or 
 not repented of after their sinfulness is perceived.” 
 
 Actual sins are distinguished also as venial and 
 mortal or deadly. They are called venzal when they 
 have not become so grave as of themselves to be fatal 
 to the spiritual life, being without wilful deliberation 
 and concerned with relatively light matter. They 
 are called mortal when of themselves they are fatal 
 to the spiritual life, unless remedied by repentance 
 and pardoning grace; either because due to deliberate 
 wilfulness or because concerned with grave matter? 
 The distinction between venial and mortal sins is 
 
 1F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, ch. ix. 
 
 2 Jas. Skinner, A Synopsis of Moral and Ascetical Theology, p. 11, 
 gives the causes of sin as: (a) ignorance; (6) weakness; (c) wilful- 
 ness; (d) habit; (e) contempt. 
 
 3J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, vi, 11; W. W. Webb, of. cit., p. 75, 
 “The gravity of sin is the measure of its maliciousness, whether 
 it be more or less offensive to God, and is more or less worthy of 
 punishment.” P. 76, “Three things are necessary to make a sin 
 mortal: (a) grave matter either in itself or on account of the cir- 
 
 cumstances; (0) Full intention to commit a malicious act; (c) A 
 perfect consent of the will. 
 
THE ACT 89 
 
 relative, and no exact boundary line can be drawn 
 between them in practice. No sin, known to be 
 such, can be treated as outside the scope of need of 
 repentance; and to console one’s self with the thought 
 that one’s sins are venial is most dangerous. By 
 being cherished venial sins become mortal! The 
 divine covenant provides remedies for every form of 
 sin on the basis of Christ’s death, and under the con- 
 dition of sincere repentance; and every sin causes 
 the need of repentance and remedy. But sin may 
 crystallize in habit, and in that form may reach sucha 
 climax of obstinacy in conscious rebellion as to 
 become irremediable and unpardonable—the sin 
 against the Holy Ghost. 
 
 § 11. Analysis of righteous conduct in the light of 
 nature and revelation brings to the surface certain 
 fundamental principles of action which lie behind all 
 moral laws. Taken together these constitute an 
 eternal law or order which is grounded in the divine 
 nature. ‘They constitute fundamental premises of a 
 right conscience. So far as they have become dis- 
 positions favourable to righteous conduct they are 
 called virtues, as are also the habits of action conform- 
 ing to them. To define, virtues are the regulative 
 principles or habits of conduct which when fully 
 observed produce perfect righteousness of life and 
 character.” 
 
 1Qn the comparative guilt of sins, see J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., 
 I, vi, 3; Jeremy Taylor, Doctrine of Repentance, III, ii, 5. 
 2J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, v; Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., Pt. IT; 
 
90 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 Virtues are generalized under the two heads of 
 cardinal and theological virtues. The cardinal or 
 earthly virtues pertain to the natural order and to 
 earthly relations, and fall under four heads: wisdom 
 or prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice. 
 Wisdom is seated in the intellect, temperance and 
 fortitude in the emotions, justice in the will! The 
 theological or heavenly virtues pertain to the super- 
 natural order and are directly and expressly related 
 to the attainment of the summum bonum. ‘They are 
 faith, hope and charity.2 They supplement and 
 
 Koch-Preuss, op. cté., vol. I, p. 277; A. Alexander, op. cit., ch. xi; 
 Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. xix. N. K. Davis, op. cit., p. 140, 
 “Virtue is the conformity of the will to the law discerned by practical 
 reason or conscience.”” W. W. Webb, op. cit., p. 91, “‘ Virtue is the 
 habit of doing right.” He distinguishes virtues as natural or super- 
 natural; infused or acquired; theological or moral. Virtue is some- 
 times derived from vis, strength; but usually from vr, man. Soc- 
 rates held that it wasa kind of knowledge, and that no one does 
 wrong knowingly; but this removes the responsibility for sin and 
 the possibility for blame, and is inadequate as resting upon only 
 one side of man’s nature. 
 
 1J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, v, 4, and Pt. III; T. B. Strong, Christ. 
 Ethics, Lec. iv. 
 
 2j. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, v, 5-7; J. B. Strong, op. cit., Lec. iii; 
 J. P. Gury, op. ci#., Pt. I, §§ 185 ff; W. W. Webb, of. cit., pp. 92-115. 
 Bishop Webb distinguishes faith as (z) habitual or actual; (i) 
 explicit or implicit. Explicit faith must extend to the Creed, the 
 doctrine of the Sacraments as taught in the Catechism, the Deca- 
 logue, and the Lord’s Prayer. Implicit faith may suffice for other 
 truths of revelation; (i) Exterior or interior; exterior involving an 
 open profession of our faith, and duty to God, to our neighbour, and 
 to ourselves. Solemn profession is prescribed when certain sacra- 
 ments are received; (iv) Living (bearing fruit in charity and good 
 works) or dead (not joined to sanctifying grace). Koch-Preuss, 
 
THE’ ‘ACT. or 
 
 transfigure the cardinal virtues, giving them a per- 
 tinent relation to the attainment of the swmmum 
 bonum which is otherwise lacking; that is, the car- 
 dinal virtues are made to serve supernatural pur- 
 poses. Faith elevates wisdom, hope elevates justice, 
 and charity elevates temperance and fortitude; but 
 in a complex interaction and mutual dependence. 
 Vices are principles and habits which produce un- 
 _ righteousness of life and character. They have been 
 summed up under seven heads, called capital sins; 
 pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy and 
 sloth. Every sin can betraced to one or more of them.} 
 
 op. cii., vol. I, p. 279, “Faith furnishes certain supernatural prin- 
 ciples, which the intellect perceives by a divine light. Hope directs 
 man to his supernatural end. Charity unites the will with God.” 
 On faith in general see Heb. xi. T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 165-176. 
 P. 165, “It is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth of a propo- 
 sition, not because it is evident to reason, but because its truth is 
 vouched for by some one who knows and whom we can trust.” By 
 it, p. 166, “we believe all that God has revealed and the Church 
 proposes to our belief on the authority of God Himself.” This faith 
 must extend to all that God has revealed. The detailed treatment of 
 it belongs to dogmatic theology, but it has also a place in moral 
 theology, for it is a necessary means to the attainment of our super- 
 natural end, and without it the divine precepts of the Decalogue 
 could not be accepted, except upon such authority as natural reason 
 supplied. The chief sins against faith are infidelity, heresy and 
 apostasy. Material heresy is not necessarily a sin, for one often falls 
 into it through ignorance; but either formal heresy (the knowing and 
 wilful rejection of revealed truth, proposed for our acceptance by the 
 Church) or wilful doubt of such truth is sin. Apostasy is the aban- 
 donment of the faith in its entirety. On hope and charity, see 
 T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 177-206. 
 
 1W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 79-90. For a more detailed treatment, 
 see ch. ix, § 6, below. 
 
92 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 § 12. It has been assumed in these outlines that, 
 in order to fulfil his chief end, man must practice true 
 religion, and that this can be done normally only in 
 the Catholic Church. True religion brings us into 
 authentic relations with God.2 Thus it secures a 
 knowledge of the nature of, and means of attaining, 
 the summum bonum, without which we may indeed 
 seek after God, but can hardly expect to find Him. 
 The summum bonum cannot be won by unassisted 
 human wisdom and power, but is the gift of God. 
 And it is promised only to those who seek it in His 
 appointed way, with the use of His ordained means of 
 grace. The Catholic Church is the sphere within 
 which this way and these means are provided; and 
 the death of Christ is the necessary basis and war- 
 rant for the bestowal of these benefits upon sinful 
 man. 
 
 Justification signifies a state of acceptance by God 
 which makes available the opportunity and means of 
 salvation from sin and of attainment of the summum 
 bonum. It signifies that a man is reckoned righteous 
 because he has been put in the way of becoming so 
 with divine help. ‘That is, the child of God is valued 
 at the outset for the fullgrown man of God into which 
 he is to grow—the condition being presupposed, how- 
 ever, that he will achieve this growth with the help of 
 grace. In order thus to be justified we must have a 
 
 1Cf. F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, ch. vii, esp. § 6. 
 2On religion see H. P. Liddon, Some Elements of Religion, Lec. i; 
 F. J. Hall, op. cit., ch. vii, §§ 1-4. 
 
THE ACT 93 
 
 living faith in Christ and be born anew of water and 
 of the Holy Spirit.t 
 
 For the growth in the righteousness which justifica- 
 tion initiates, certain means of sanctifying grace, 
 called sacraments, are provided in the Church, the 
 use of which, in their several applications, is necessary. 
 The result of sanctification is personal merit, or 
 moral fitness to enter upon divine fellowship. With- 
 out such merit or fitness of personal character we can 
 neither be pleasing to God nor find pleasure in the 
 personal fellowship with Him, wherein the crowning 
 joy of heaven consists and upon which our future hap- 
 piness depends. This merit should not be confused 
 with wage-merit. No works of ours can earn the 
 summum bonum. ‘The value of such works lies in 
 their making us worthy, and in showing that we are 
 worthy, to receive it as a gift. The earning of it 
 was achieved by Christ.? 
 
 The practice of religion has for its central purpose 
 to bring us into touch with God and to develop our 
 relations with Him. Therefore its central action is 
 worship, and this requires habitual performance. 
 The fundamental element of worship is sacrifice or 
 self-oblation; and this has to be expressed and per- 
 formed objectively, for what is not thus expressed 
 soon ceases to have vitality within ourselves. The 
 
 1F, J. Hall, of. cit., pp. 343-345; and The Church and the Sacra- 
 mental System, pp. 259-263. 
 
 2F, J. Hall, The Church and the Sacramental System, pp. 271-278; 
 Creation and Man, pp. 348-352. 
 
904 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
 
 appointed method of this expression is the formal 
 offering to God of a representative gift of sufficient 
 value to be acceptable to Him. This has been 
 made possible by the death, resurrection, ascension, 
 and perpetual heavenly oblation of Christ; and it is 
 performed by us in the Holy Eucharist. In this 
 service men both express and perpetuate the rela- 
 tions necessary for keeping in touch with God and 
 for making progress towards their chief end.1 
 
 The chief defect of modern systems of Ethics is 
 their neglect of the central place which religion and 
 its sacraments occupy in true righteousness. 
 
 1F, J. Hall, The Incarnation, pp. 283-293; and The Sacraments, 
 ch. v, esp. §§ 11-12. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 I. The Law of God 
 
 §1. Moral Theology Proper is the practical branch 
 of our subject, and treats of specific obligations and 
 duties. Inasmuch as the standard of righteousness 
 is the will of God, it treats of the application of the 
 will of God to human conduct, whether considered 
 at large or in relation to particular estates and con- 
 ditions.1 The will of God here meant is technically 
 
 1QOn the history and literature of Moral Theol. (cf. p. 20, note 1, 
 above), see Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s.v. ‘Theology, Moral;” ‘Thos. 
 Slater, Short Hist. of Moral Theol.; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, 
 pp. 41-73; Cath. Encyc. s.v. “Theology,” pp. 604-611. 
 
 Anglican works (more frequently contributory than systematic), 
 W. W. Webb, Cure of Souls; J. J. Elmendorf, Elem. of Moral Theol. 
 (follows St. Thomas); Bp. Sanderson, Lec’s on Conscience and Human 
 Law (trans. by Wordsworth); Jeremy Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium; 
 and Holy Living; James Skinner, Synop. of Moral and Ascetical Theol. 
 (rare, needs reprinting); V. Staley, The Practical Religion (popular); 
 R. L. Ottley, The Rule of Life and Love; T. B. Strong, Christian 
 Ethics (Bamp. Lecs.); Chas. Gore, Christ. Moral Prin’s; A. J. Hum- 
 phreys, Christ. Morals; K. E. Kirk, Some Prin’s of Moral Theol. 
 
 95 
 
96 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 called the ‘‘ Will of Signs,” or the revealed will of God 
 with regard to our conduct. Its revelation may be 
 either natural or supernatural, but supernatural reve- 
 lation is primary, in so far as it is more definitive of 
 the manner in which we must fulfil our chief end. In 
 applying the will of God to our individual actions we 
 judge in terms of conscience, therefore conscience has 
 authority from which there is no earthly appeal. 
 In brief, our primary guides are: (a) the will of God 
 as objective standard; (6) the conscience as subjective 
 interpreter. 
 
 tn their Applic’n; W. W. Williams, Moral Theol. of the Sac. of Pen- 
 ance; F. G. Belton, A Man. for Confessors; and Present Day Problems 
 tn Christ. Morals; Cyril Bickersteth, The Min. of Absolution; A. H. 
 Baverstock, The Priest as Confessor. 
 
 Roman works (more complete and systematic, necessary for con- 
 sultation but requiring cautious adaptation to Anglican conditions), 
 Thos. Slater, Manual of Moral Theol., 2 vols.; A. Koch (ed. by A. 
 Preuss), Handbook of Moral Theol., 5 vols.; J. P. Gury, Compend. 
 Theol. Moralis; Aug. Lehmkuhl, Theol. Moralis, 2 vols.; St. Thomas, 
 Summa Theol., Pt. II; A. Tanquerey, Brev. Synop. Moralis et Past. 
 St. Alphonsus’ Theol. Moralis, 4 vols. is historically important, but 
 needs cautious reading. 
 
 A. Alexander, of. cit., p. 22 says, ‘‘ Christian Ethics presupposes 
 the Christian view of life as revealed in Christ, and its definition must 
 be in harmony with the Christian ideal. The prime question of 
 Christian Ethics is, How ought Christians to order their lives? It is 
 therefore the science of morals as conditioned by Christian faith; 
 and the problems it discusses are, the nature, meaning and laws of 
 the moral life as dominated by the supreme good which has been 
 revealed to the world in the Person and teaching of Christ.” The 
 Roman distinction between General and Special Moral Theology 
 corresponds roughly to what is here designated as Moral Philosophy 
 and Moral Theology Proper: Koch-Preuss, vol. I, p. 74. 
 
THE LAW OF GOD 97 
 
 § 2. The “Will of Signs,” as we have seen, includes 
 commands, prohibitions, permissions, counsels and 
 example. These five branches may be conveni- 
 ently reduced to three: (a) Law, including commands 
 and prohibitions; (6) Expediency, including permis- 
 sions and counsels; (c) Example, embodying the 
 Christian ideal in concrete form. Commands and 
 prohibitions are included in what is called law, and 
 they are treated as the primary and immediate 
 basis of Moral Theology Proper; but the funda- 
 mental principles of love and expediency have 
 also to be reckoned with, and the example of 
 Christ throws needed light upon many problems 
 of duty. 
 
 Law signifies that which is fixed or set, but has many 
 forms and applications outside the moral sphere. In 
 Moral Theology it means formal requirement or 
 authoritative definition of what ought to be done 
 and what ought not to be done. All law is ulti- 
 mately grounded in the eternal law of Divine Nature.! 
 The various branches of law by which this eternal 
 law gains expression and fulfilment are exhibited in 
 the following table: 
 
 1Rich. Hooker, op. cit., I, xvi, 8; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, 
 p. 120, “Law is but another name for the divine will recognized as 
 the standard for human conduct.” Jbid., p. 141, “The moral law 
 of the New Testament is the purest and most perfect expression of 
 the divine will.” Its superiority to the moral law of the Old Testa- 
 ment appears from its character as: (c) a new law; (0) a law of the 
 spirit; (c) a law of grace and liberty; (d) a law of love. 
 
98 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 Of ( Internal ee Divine Processions, Rela- 
 
 
 
 Divine | and tions, and Character. 
 Opera- | Essential 
 tions : 
 External { Of Causation—natural law. 
 and Vol- \ Of Progress—supernatural. 
 Eternal Healy, 
 Law of the 
 divine 
 nature, gov- 
 erning all Of Innate—of Reason. 
 Human 
 Actions | Super- Revealed—Will of Signs, etc. 
 _imposed 
 Human Ecclesiastical. 
 Dispensa- Civil. 
 tions Conventional.! 
 
 Moral Theology Proper treats of the laws of human 
 actions. ‘These laws may be either (a) universal and 
 
 1 Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 156, “ Human law is in every respect 
 subordinate to the natural and to positive divine law, and its pre- 
 cepts have binding force only if they agree with both. . . . Christ ex- 
 pressly bestowed legislative power upon HisChurch (St. Matt. xvi. 19; 
 xviii. 17; St. Luke x. 16), and furthermore Himself acknowledged the 
 laws of the State and exhorted His disciples to obey them (St. Luke 
 xx. 25; Acts xv. 28; xx. 28). St. Paul says that all power is from 
 God and that the ordinances of legitimate authority bind in con- 
 science (Rom. xiii. 1 ff.; cf. St. John xix. 11).’”’ Human law is an inter- 
 pretation and application of the general principles of the natural and 
 revealed divine law. Jbid., p. 157, ‘Every human law is mediately 
 and by derivation a divine law.”’ J. Skinner, op. cit., p. 7, gives the 
 heads of law: in genere, (2) Cause; (b) Object; (c) Subject; (d) 
 Promulgation; (e) Acceptation; (f) Obligation; (g) Interpretation; 
 (4) Dispensation; (7) Cessation; in specie, (a) Natural and divine; 
 (b) Positive and divine; (c) Ecclesiastical; (d) Civil; (e) Penal; 
 (f) Ineffective; (g) Custom; (4) Privilege. 
 
THE LAW OF GOD 99 
 
 naturally revealed;! (6) covenantal and_ positive, 
 made necessary by the fall, and for the attainment of 
 man’s supernatural end. Covenantal law may be 
 either immutable or mutable, this distinction being 
 ordinarily indicated by the terms moral and ceremonial. 
 The ceremonial law is also subject to many excep- 
 tions, according to necessity and enlightened discre- 
 tion.2, Even moral law has exceptions, although 
 they are rare and of a nature to prove the rule; for 
 it is impossible to define moral obligations in human 
 terms that will accurately describe duty under all 
 possible circumstances. 
 
 § 3. We shall treat of our subject in the following 
 order: (a) innate moral obligations, or the law of 
 reason; (b) superimposed law,? this being sub- 
 divided under the heads of the Decalogue, inter- 
 preted in the light of our Lord’s summary of love, 
 and so treated as to include ecclesiastical, civil and 
 conventional requirements; (c) virtues and vices. 
 It will be necessary to supplement these comprehen- 
 sive divisions by special treatment of (d) social and 
 individual aspects of duty, (e) economic obligations, 
 
 1 Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 122, “By the moral law of nature 
 is understood the sum-total of those ethical precepts which God has 
 implanted in the rational nature of man.” It is fundamental, and 
 no other law can abrogate it. 
 
 2Cf. St. Matt. xii. 1-8; St. Mark ii. 27. 
 
 3T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, p. 83, “Divine law is either natural or 
 positive. The natural law is promulgated in the rational nature of 
 man, and is a participation in human reason of the eternal law of 
 
 God, which bids us observe right order, and forbids its disturbance. 
 Positive divine law is made known by revelation.” 
 
too MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 (f) voluntarily incurred obligations, (g) expediency, 
 (hk) example. 
 
 II. The Law of Reason 
 
 §4. The law of natural reason teaches certain 
 obligations which are capable of being ascertained 
 and recognized by all who seek to do right, whether 
 they are Christians or not. They may be divided 
 into individual and social obligations. 
 
 Of individual obligations the general law is that we 
 should live according to nature as it comes from the 
 hand of God. Todo this means to maintain a perfect 
 activity of our faculties and to preserve them in the 
 fulness of their capacity. The aim of all education, 
 properly conducted, is to lead out, educere, all our 
 faculties in just proportion and relation, in order that 
 we may be emancipated from every unnecessary 
 hindrance to do and be what we ought to do and be. 
 (a) It is a natural duty to obtain good and nourish- 
 ing food, and to partake of it in the quantity and 
 manner which available knowledge shows to be con- 
 ducive to the preservation and development of physi- 
 cal, mental, and moral capacity. (0) Sufficient sleep 
 should be taken at regular times and without excessive 
 indulgence, the amount being controlled by the laws 
 of health and efficiency. (c) Habitual work is essen- 
 tial to good morals, but also needs to be regulated. 
 We ought to exercise our powers as fully as possible, 
 but without overstraining any of them. This requires 
 
THE LAW OF REASON IOr 
 
 that labor should be systematic, and that hurry as 
 well as worry should be banished as much as possible. 
 Work of high quality is more valuable, morally as 
 well as otherwise, than a large quantity of work poorly 
 done. (d) Recreation is a closely related obligation, 
 the form and quantity of which ought to be deter- 
 mined by its value in improving the efficiency of our 
 work, and in facilitating our personal development. 
 The word “‘recreation”’ itself signifies the true end of 
 all righteous forms of pleasure—to re-create our facul- 
 ties. This does not mean that we should take our 
 pleasures solemnly, for that would be to defeat their 
 moral function. The point is that we should deter- 
 mine the manner and duration of play with reference 
 to the general purpose of increasing the value of our 
 lives and characters. (e) All other rules of health, 
 such as outdoor exercise, fresh air, reasonable clean- 
 liness, etc., pertain to natural moral obligations. 
 
 § 5. Man is by nature a social animal, and it is 
 part of natural law that he should adjust himself 
 to his social environment. The law of natural evo- 
 lution teaches that utility depends upon adjustment, 
 and that natural selection works against those who 
 disregard this requirement. This adjustment may 
 be described in moral terms as the duty of recognizing 
 and protecting the rights of others: (a) The right 
 to enjoy life and happiness, which includes oppor- 
 tunity to earn one’s living, under suitable conditions, 
 and with proportionate results; (0) The rights of 
 kinship as between parents and children, brothers 
 
102 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 and sisters, husband and wife, and others. Nature 
 teaches that the obligations between husband and 
 wife normally include propagation of the species; 
 (c) The rights of strangers, including those whom 
 we meet in public, and especially those who are com- 
 pelled to depend upon our hospitality; (d) The rights 
 of enemies to be treated as human beings; (e) The 
 general duty of advancing the greatest good of the 
 greatest number. The fallacy of utilitarian ethics 
 is that it makes this the sum and substance of morality, 
 and in effect repudiates the probationary relation of 
 this life to eternal life. All natural obligations can 
 be reduced to the heads of prudence or wisdom, tem- 
 perance, fortitude and justice, the so-called cardinal 
 virtues.! 
 
 III. Superimposed Moral Law 
 
 §6. The revealed law of God is described in 
 Deuteronomy as consisting of statutes and judgments. 
 Statutes define forms of conduct, which are either 
 commanded or forbidden; and judgments determine 
 particular cases and constitute authoritative prece- 
 dents. In Christian application many of these prece- 
 dents cease to be valid because of the new dispensa- 
 tion and the change of conditions.2 Divine statutes 
 
 1 Cf, ch. ili, § 11, above. 
 
 2R. L. Ottley, Aspects of the Old Testament, p. 171, “It would be 
 misleading to speak of Mosaism as if it embraced a formal system of 
 
 ethics. It did, however, prepare the way for a system by a gradual, 
 but in the long run effectual, elucidation of two great ideas which a 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 103 
 
 contain two elements: (a) moral and permanent; 
 (b) ceremonial, pertaining only to the dispensation in 
 connection with which they are given. Some statutes 
 are exclusively moral and some are exclusively cere- 
 monial, but others, such as the fourth commandment 
 of the Decalogue, contain both elements and have to 
 be interpreted accordingly! The ceremonial ele- 
 ment may cease to apply either because of counteract- 
 ing necessity or by reason of a new divine dispensa- 
 tion. But some ceremonial laws, in particular that 
 of tithing, reveal degrees of moral responsibility of 
 abiding validity; and these retain a certain moral 
 value even when the law as law has ceased to bind. 
 The revealed moral law is found primarily in two 
 documents, the Old Testament Decalogue and our 
 Lord’s twofold summary in the Gospels. The former 
 consists of specific rules, the latter defines the deter- 
 minative principle of righteousness which should 
 control their interpretation and the practical appli- 
 cation of all rules of conduct. The law of the Old 
 Testament was binding in its letter only upon the 
 Chosen People; whereas the Christian summary, 
 given by Christ, is for all men, and is permanently 
 binding upon all who have learned of it.2 The older 
 must be Christianized by the newer. The provisions 
 religious system of morals seems to presuppose: first, the idea of holi- 
 ness; secondly, the idea of the worth and dignity of personality.” 
 1Tbid., p. 215, The Decalogue ‘“‘defines in broad outlines the con- 
 ditions of a right relation to God and to all that He has made.” Cf, 
 St. Iren., adv. Haer., IV, 15, i; IV, 16, iii; St. Thos. of. ctz., I, I, c. 3. 
 2St. Matt. xxii. 36-40; xxviii. 19-20. 
 
104 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 of the older are rightly criticized as largely negative 
 and external, regulating outward conduct; but 
 Christianized they_ stand for positive principles 
 regulating thought as well as word and act.! The 
 Decalogue is not exhaustive, although it gives 
 leading and representative examples of how we ought 
 to conform to the divine will. Its requirements pre- 
 suppose the binding force of the laws of human dis- 
 pensations, whether ecclesiastical, civil or conven- 
 tional, and afford guidance in their fulfilment. They 
 will here be treated in this light and as including (a) 
 ecclesiastical application (growing out of the sacra- 
 ments, canon law and ecclesiastical precepts); (0) 
 civil law; (c) social customs and institutions. 
 
 The several commandments constitute so many 
 methods by which the principle of love ought to be 
 applied Godward and manward. ‘This is also true 
 of all special statutes and judgments of God.2 The 
 Decalogue is divided into two tables, concerned 
 respectively with duties to God and duties to man. 
 The division between these is usually drawn between 
 the first four and the last six; but it is more scientific 
 to include the fifth in the first table, because it has to 
 do with obedience to authority, and every legiti- 
 
 1 Chas. Gore, Christian Moral Prin’s, Serm. ii-iii, and pp. 110 ff. ‘ 
 
 2Qn the Commandments in general, see W. W. Webb, op. cit., 
 ch. v; R. L. Ottley, The Rule of Life and Love; T. Slater, op. cit., 
 vol. I, pp. 207-473; Hastings, Dic. of Bib., s.v. “Decalogue”; J. P. 
 Gury, op. cit., §§ 257-472. Gury says, “Sicut Symbolum epitome 
 est credendorum, sic decalogus agendorum.” 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 105 
 
 mate authority represents, in ultimate analysis, the 
 authority of God.t 
 
 § 7. The general principle embodied in the First 
 Commandment is that of entire and exclusive allegiance 
 to the one and only true God.? In practice this 
 allegiance ought to be shown in four directions: (a) 
 The profession of a true faith, not only in God Him- 
 self, but in all that He has revealed concerning our 
 relations to Him, His purpose for us, and what He 
 has done and is doing in and for us. The truths 
 which we ought to believe consist of those which are 
 known to have been revealed, and we may not make 
 exceptions because some of the truths do not appear 
 to us to be vitally important. Our allegiance to 
 God is violated by rejecting even the slightest authen- 
 tic revelation from Him. Moreover, the acceptance 
 
 1In Roman use, the first two are counted together as the first; 
 and the tenth is broken into two, the ninth being, ‘Thou shalt not 
 covet thy neighbour’s wife.” 
 
 2 The first commandment may be summed up as defining the duty 
 of worship and prayer, faith being presupposed. The opposed vices 
 are: (a) superstition, magic and divination; (the last including telling 
 of fortunes by palmistry, cards, etc., reliance upon dreams, the use of 
 the Ouija board, consulting of mediums). ‘These need not be thought 
 of as sins when the motive is light, but become such when they are 
 taken seriously; (0) Irreligion; (c) Tempting God by our failure to 
 use ordinary means to secure an end, as neglect of remedies in sick- 
 ness (Christian Science); seeking a miracle for the support of one’s 
 faith; the ordeals of the Middle Ages, which the Church condemned 
 as superstitious; (d) Sacrilege, the irreverent treatment of sacred 
 persons, places, and things dedicated to the service of God. Under 
 this head is included receiving or administering sacraments in a state 
 
 of mortal sin. A more common offence is that of joking or light | 
 speaking in religion. 
 
106 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 of revelation carries with it the duty of professing 
 our faith, so far as our circumstances afford suitable 
 occasions for such profession, and whenever the 
 Church of God requires. 
 
 (b) The practice of religion is necessary to this 
 allegiance, for in its practical aspects religion is all 
 one with a conformity of our lives to the relations in 
 which we stand to God. The duty of taking part in 
 public, especially Eucharistic, worship rests upon the 
 individual as a member of the group from which cor- 
 porate worship is due. The form which this wor- 
 ship takes is determined by the authority of the 
 Church; and public or common prayer may be con- 
 ducted only according to the forms provided by eccle- 
 siastical authority, whether by canon law or by 
 bishops in the exercise of such jus liturgicum as is 
 consistent therewith. Private prayer and the other 
 ‘notable duties” of religion.are considered below.! 
 
 (c) This allegiance also involves the fulfilment of 
 all the conditions of the covenant which God has 
 given us. The duties involved may be summed up 
 by saying that we ought to be faithful members of the 
 Church and obedient to all ecclesiastical precepts.? 
 
 (d) Observance of the covenant carries with it certain 
 specific obligations pertaining to the sacraments.® 
 
 § 8. The Second Commandment has reference to wor- 
 ship in the sense of /atreia, and requires that it should 
 
 1In ch. vi, §§ 1-3. 
 2 Treated of in § 11, below. 
 3 Treated of in ch. v, below. 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 107 
 
 be paid exclusively to God and in the manner ap- 
 pointed by Him. The use of images, as external aids, 
 must be determined and controlled not by our device 
 but by divine revelation. And this last principle 
 applies not only to sensible images but to mental ones. 
 Two leading classes of sin are, therefore, forbidden, 
 external idolatry and false doctrine, so far as em- 
 bodied in worship. Incidentally all superstitious ob- 
 servances, such as we have already referred to under 
 the first commandment, are forbidden here also, as is 
 participation in schismatic worship. The latter is for- 
 bidden because it violates Christian unity and substi- 
 tutes for divinely appointed worship a modified and 
 human substitute. The divinely appointed worship is 
 the Holy Eucharist, and around this should be gath- 
 ered and subordinated all our approaches to God. The 
 lawfulness of any form of worship, therefore, can be 
 tested by its agreement with, and capacity of min- 
 istering to, the Holy Eucharist. Material art may be 
 used to make worship more effectual, but not in such 
 wise as to alter its object or divinely appointed 
 method. This commandment also implies and reg- 
 ulates the duty of prayer in all its branches. Fasting 
 and almsgiving are usually grouped with prayer, 
 because these three constitute what are called the 
 “notable duties” of religion. These will be consid- 
 ered below.! 
 
 §9. The Third Commandment inculcates reverential 
 piety, or that loving loyalty to God which moves one 
 
 1Tn ch. vi, §§ 1-3. 
 
108 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 to avoid treating anything divine or sacred in a 
 thoughtless or careless manner. Among the obvious 
 branches of its violation are: (a) irreverent use of the 
 divine Name as an expletive, oath, or common 
 exclamation, and of sacred things; (6) Tempting 
 God by challenging His particular providence; (¢) 
 Sacrilege, or the handling of sacred things for secular 
 purposes; (d) Blasphemy, or the use of God’s name 
 for purposes of sin. (e) Simony, or buying spiritual 
 advantages;! (f/f) The facetious use of Holy Scripture 
 and other sacred language; (g) Trifling in sacred 
 places; (%) Careless ceremony in participating in 
 religious services. 
 
 One of the problems which arise under this com- 
 mandment is, what constitutes a lawful oath or vow’? 
 
 1 Acts. viii. 18. 
 
 2 On oaths and vows, see W. W. Webb, pp. 131-137; J. J. Elmen- 
 dorf, pp. 343-353. An oath is “the calling on God to witness to the 
 truth of what we say,” T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, p. 240. It may be 
 either solemn, when attended by the ceremonies prescribed by law, 
 as holding up the right hand, kissing the Bible, or simple, when these 
 ceremonies are omitted. Such oaths are not only permissible, but 
 are public professions of our belief in God, His omniscience, truth, 
 etc. They are not forbidden by St. Matt. v. 34; cf. Jerem. iv. 2. 
 A promissory oath is not binding when a change of circumstances 
 makes it unlawful, useless, or an obstacle to a greater obligation. 
 The obligation to fulfilment may be annulled, dispensed, commuted or 
 relaxed, in the same way as a vow; but private judgment alone is not 
 competent except in obvious necessity. 
 
 A vow “is a contract with God, a deliberate taking on one’s self of 
 a new obligation which binds the conscience,” T. Slater, op. cit., 
 vol. I, p. 246. It differs from a mere promise of amendment. .To 
 constitute a vow there must be full knowledge, complete use of reason, 
 freedom from force, and physical and moral possibility of fulfilment. 
 It may be either absolute or conditional. 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 109 
 
 The answer in brief is, that we ought to have a suf- 
 ficiently grave reason, and should have in view the 
 interests of truth and righteousness. A reverent 
 manner and careful fulfilment are also necessary. 
 The legal name for false oaths is perjury; and this is a 
 double sin because including both the sinful use of 
 God’s name and lying. A vow which cannot be ful- 
 filled without sin is sinful and does not bind. In 
 every Christian vow there is a qualifying assumption 
 that competent authority may, for sufficient and law- 
 ful reasons, either dispense from vows or overrule 
 them. 
 
 The spirit of this commandment cannot be ful- 
 filled except by those who cultivate the moral and 
 spiritual tone which lies behind reverence for holy 
 things. High tone is of Christian obligation, and 
 flippant vulgarity is a hindrance to the fulfilment of 
 this commandment. 
 
 § 10. The Fourth Commandment requires the con- 
 secration or appointing of regularly recurring times, 
 sanctioned by religious authority, for the public 
 worship of God and for the fulfilment of other relig- 
 lous responsibilities.1 In form it is ceremonial, be- 
 cause the selection of the seventh day and abstaining 
 from all labour do not constitute morally necessary 
 and permanent conditions of the fulfilment of its 
 spirit. The Lord’s day has displaced the Sabbath, 
 
 1See Vernon Staley, op. cit., Pt. II, ch. xi; F. G. Belton, Present 
 Day Problems, ch. vi; J. A. Hessey, Sunday (Bamp. Lec.); H. R. 
 Gamble, Sunday and the Sabbath; W. B. Trevelyan, Sunday. 
 
110 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 Christian festivals have displaced the Jewish Calendar, 
 and the question of labour on Sunday is not deter- 
 mined by definite divine precept. 
 
 Various problems arise under this commandment. 
 They are determined by a very simple principle, that 
 Sunday has its own proper business to be fulfilled. 
 If under normal conditions that business is ade- 
 quately and sincerely attended to, freedom remains 
 as to what else is done or is indulged in, similar to 
 that which we enjoy on other days of the week. In 
 application, however, questions of expediency arise, 
 as distinguished from law; and it is our duty to show 
 reasonable regard for other people’s consciences and 
 for our own moral and spiritual reputation. Public 
 association of ideas causes a natural sense of incon- 
 gruity between the appointed Sunday business and 
 certain forms of self-indulgence. This limitation, 
 however, is wholly extrinsic; and we may not raise 
 to the level of legal requirement matters which per- 
 tain to variable expediency.! 
 
 The business of Sunday, or its positive obligations, 
 include: (a) public worship, especially the Holy 
 Eucharist; (0) the practice of religion in any and all 
 of those elements for which other days of the week do 
 not afford sufficient opportunity, reading of the Bible, 
 spiritual books, etc.,—in short, making religion the 
 day’s specialty; (c) works of mercy, both corporal 
 and spiritual; (d) the religious instruction of the 
 young. The sum of the matter is that to observe 
 
 1See H. R. Gamble, Sunday and the Sabbath, passim. 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW IIt 
 
 Sunday is to fulfil its positive business, in so far as it 
 pertains to each individual; and in other respects to 
 control Sunday occupations in such wise as not to 
 reduce either the external fulfilment or the spiritual 
 value of what pertains to Sunday duties, regard 
 being had also to the effect of our example upon 
 others. 
 
 As we have said, questions of expediency come 
 sharply to the front. We have, therefore, to con- 
 sider in this connection what is permitted, on the one 
 hand, and what is to be advised, on the other. Taking 
 permissions first, it is intrinsically lawful to do and to 
 enjoy any and everything that it is lawful to do and 
 to enjoy on other days of the week, provided nothing 
 is done that interferes with a reasonably adequate 
 and habitual fulfilment of Sunday’s proper business. 
 On the other hand, from the point of view of counsel, 
 it is often inexpedient and may, in effect, become sin- 
 ful under some conditions to take part in: (a) bois- 
 terous and strenuous occupations of secular nature; 
 (6) occupations which our neighbours consider sinful 
 on that day; (c) amusements that offend weak 
 consciences at all times. Like all positive precepts, 
 this commandment may cease for the moment to 
 bind when real necessity interferes with its fulfilment, 
 e.g., (a) in sickness; (0) when one’s subsistence 
 depends upon continuing work on Sunday; (¢c) when 
 a Sunday’s outing is the only possible way of obtain- 
 ing sufficient recreation. It is to be observed, how- 
 ever, that we are responsible for planning our life 
 
112 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 work, as far as possible, in ways that permit an 
 adequate discharge of religious obligations. 
 
 As regards absorbing occupation, ordinary servile 
 work is forbidden except under unusual circumstances; 
 but agricultural labor is allowable under necessity, as 
 in harvest time, when grave loss might be occasioned 
 if it were neglected; and the same liberty applies to 
 foundry labour customarily, to transportation of all 
 sorts, especially at sea, to preparing food and, in gen- 
 eral, to any form of occupation which could not be 
 interrupted for a day without grave loss or incon- 
 venience. Admitting this liberty, there is in various 
 directions much room for doubt as to whether what is 
 customarily termed necessary is really so. It is 
 plainly sinful for employers to require labour on Sun- 
 day without real necessity.1 The broad principle is 
 involved that every duty should have provided its 
 appropriate time for attention, and that a life which 
 is without plan or system is one that makes many sins 
 inevitable. 
 
 §11. The Fifth Commandment requires obedience 
 
 3 This applies to such unnecessary recreations as involve the labour 
 ‘ofothers. Encyclical Letter of the Lambeth Conference, 1888, ‘‘The 
 due observance of Sunday as a day of rest, of worship, and of religious 
 teaching, has a direct bearing on the moral well-being of the Christian 
 community. We have observed of late a growing laxity which threat- 
 ens to impair its sacred character. We strongly deprecate this ten- 
 dency. We call upon the leisurely classes not selfishly to withdraw 
 from others the opportunities of rest and of religion. We call upon 
 master and employer jealously to guard the privileges of the servant 
 and the workman. In ‘The Lord’s Day’ we have a priceless heri- 
 tage. Whoever misuses it incurs a terrible responsibility.” 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 113 
 
 to all divinely sanctioned authority, whether involved 
 in providential circumstances at large or based upon 
 specific divine appointments. Speaking broadly, its 
 sphere is threefold: the family, the Church and the 
 State. In each sphere the duties are twofold: of 
 inferiors to superiors, and of superiors to inferiors. 
 To-day the second class of duties is apt to receive a 
 false emphasis because of reaction, inasmuch as the 
 rights of inferiors were formerly insufficiently acknowl- 
 edged. But emphasis upon rights gradually becomes 
 forgetfulness of duties; and a crying need is a general 
 revival of unselfish emphasis upon duties to others. 
 (a) In the family } children owe obedience, love, and 
 reverence to parents in all things lawful;? and the 
 younger owe deference to their elders. On the other 
 hand, parents and elders owe to the young teaching, 
 both secular and religious, example, guidance, and 
 discipline, along with physical support. The ful- 
 filment of these obligations ought to be governed 
 
 1A, Alexander, op. cit., pp. 220-229; N. K. Davis, op. cié., Pt. II, 
 ch. ii; Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. xxvi; F. G. Peabody, The Chris- 
 tian Life in the Modern World, ch. i; W. F. Lofthouse, Ethics and 
 the Family; Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.v. “Family (Biblical and 
 Christian).” 
 
 2St. Bernard, Ep. cxi, ‘‘There is only one circumstance in which it 
 would be wrong to obey parents, and that is when God forbids it.” 
 Cf. St. Matt. x. 37. Obedience only ceases to be obligatory when 
 children attain their majority; and then arises the duty of supporting 
 parents if needful. Parental authority during minority is supreme 
 if rightly exercised. When abused the State may interfere; but the 
 Church may not do s0, e.g., if parents refuse to permit their children 
 to receive one of the sacraments. Parental responsibilities towards. 
 illegitimate children are the same as towards legitimate offspring. 
 
114 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 by a love which is neither backboneless amiability 
 nor careless disregard of the rights of the young. 
 Related to family obligations are those between 
 teacher and pupil at school, and these relations are 
 determined by parental consent and by the necessi- 
 ties of real education. Within their recognized limits 
 they involve parallel duties of authority and of obe- 
 dience. 
 
 (b) In the Church* the relationship which deter- 
 mines duty is that between mother and mistress of 
 souls and individual children of God. It isa relation, 
 however, which is limited, on the one hand, by the 
 authority of parents over minors, and on the other 
 hand, by the authority of the State over temporals. 
 In brief, it is a spiritual relation based upon the per- 
 suasion of free agents and to be enforced only by 
 spiritual penalties. Its branches are usually formu- 
 lated in what are called the precepts of the Church. 
 These precepts are either ecumenical or provincial. 
 The word ‘‘precept”’ is here applied to every form of 
 obligation known to be imposed by the Church, 
 whether by canon, by liturgical, rubrical, or sacra- 
 mental prescription, or by recognized custom. These 
 precepts may not be dispensed by mere private 
 caprice, and judicial decisions and decrees have 
 authority in their interpretation. An individual 
 Christian is bound both by ecumenical precepts and 
 by those of his own portion of the Church. 
 
 1T. B. Strong, op. cit., Lec. viii; V. Staley, op. cit., Pt. I, chh. 
 x-xi; A. Alexander, op. cit., pp. 236-244; N. K. Davis, of. cit., Pt. 
 II, ch. v. 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 115 
 
 The ecumenical precepts are reduced by moral 
 writers to five or six heads, of which the following is a 
 general summary:! (1) To observe the canon law and 
 ecclesiastical judgments wherever applicable; (2) 
 To take habitual part in the public services of the 
 Church in the manner ecclesiastically and provin- 
 cially prescribed, and to avoid schismatical worship; 
 (3) To observe the holy days appointed, whether fes- 
 tivals or fasts, in the manner directed;? (4) To give 
 habitually and in proportion to our means for the 
 support of the Church and her interests, whether 
 parochial, diocesan, institutional, or missionary.? 
 (5) To receive the sacraments in their appointed 
 order and manner, and to promote their reception 
 by others. (6) To repent habitually of sin, using 
 the sacrament of Penance when ecclesiastical rules 
 require, and at least as often as needed for rightly 
 quieting the conscience. Underlying all these is the 
 obligation of faith, of belief in the doctrines of the 
 Trinity and the Incarnation, and in all the other chief 
 articles of the Christian Faith as set forth by the 
 Church. 
 
 1Bp. Cosin, Works, vol. II, p. 121; vol. V, p. 523; Bp. Webb, 
 op. cit., pp. 194-202; J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 473-516; T. Slater, 
 op. cit., vol. I, pp. 564-581. 
 
 2 Fasting, we may note, has the psychological value of aiding dis- 
 cipline, keeping under the body and bringing it into subjection, and 
 the moral value of aiding penitence. 
 
 31 Cor. ix. 13-14. 
 
 4St. John vi. 53-58 establishes the general obligation of commun- 
 
 ion, the details of its application being left to the regulation of the 
 Church. 
 
116 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 (c) The authority of the State! pertains to the reg- 
 ulation of those temporal concerns which require 
 public control. Within that sphere and under the 
 limitations of human constitution and law, the 
 officers of the state are entitled to obedience; being 
 themselves under obligation to avoid either tyranny, 
 laxity or partiality. Men also owe loyalty to the 
 State as an institution, and the virtue of patriotism 
 is a Christian virtue.” 
 
 Somewhat related to this sphere of authority is 
 that of employer or master, over employee and ser- 
 vant.? Like civil constitutions, these relations are 
 subject to alteration and reformation; but existing 
 laws and customs determine for the time being the 
 
 1A, Alexander, op. cit., pp. 229-236; N. K. Davis, op. cit., Pt. II, 
 ch. ili-iv; Wm. McDougall, An Introd. to Social Psychology, passim. 
 
 2Rom. xili. 1-7. We treat of civil obligations in ch. vi, §§ 4-5, 
 below. LEncyc. Letter of Pope Leo XIII, Jan. 10, 1890, “Law is of 
 its very essence a mandate of right reason, proclaimed by a prop- 
 erly constituted authority, for the common good. But true and 
 legitimate authority is void of sanction, unless it proceeds from God, 
 the supreme Ruler and Lord of all.” Some recent writers, e.g., 
 Durkheim, Royce and Ames, have found the basis of all religion in 
 social obligation. 
 
 8 Of employees is required a faithful discharge of their appointed 
 duties and a proper care for the interests of their employers. Morally 
 they are bound to make restitution if they waste time or cause damage 
 by their neglect. Of employers a fair wage, considerate treatment 
 and good working conditions are required. Obviously the moral 
 standard is higher than the legal. In the present confusion of social 
 conditions Moral Theology must deal with broad and unquestionable 
 principles, rather than enter into details concerning which practical 
 sociology is still uncertain or perplexed. Reason is to be used and 
 an undue intrusion of partisan emotion is to be guarded against. 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 117 
 
 nature of the obligations involved. The reason is, 
 that to disregard existing institutions which have the 
 sanction, whether formal or informal, of the com- 
 munity, is to introduce disorder and to cause greater 
 wrongs than the particular disobedient course can 
 remedy. The right of revolution lies, not with 
 private individuals, but with society as a whole. 
 
 § 12. The second table has reference to the manner 
 in which love should control conduct towards our 
 neighbours. Interpreted from the Christian stand- 
 point, the love with which this table is concerned is 
 determined primarily in form and reference by the 
 prospective congenialities of a heavenly communion 
 of saints, these congenialities being perceived to be 
 already potential in our neighbours because of 
 redemption and grace. ‘The fruition of love requires 
 personal friendship and contact, but to snatch at this, 
 here and now, is often to violate love and to sin most 
 grievously. ‘The sum of the matter is that the second 
 table requires such lines of conduct as will promote 
 and ultimately secure the future fellowship which 
 constitutes the joy of eternal life. Therefore no 
 works of charity are really Christian unless they are 
 religious in standpoint and quality; for although 
 Christian love presupposes and exercises natural 
 affection, the standpoint or aim is supernatural, and 
 is determined in its reference and intended effect by 
 consciousness of a supernatural destiny—one in which 
 the highest welfare of all men alike is involved. 
 
 The Sixth Commandment requires display of love 
 
118 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 with reference to our neighbour’s person, in the popu- 
 lar and physical sense of that term. Murder is the 
 most conspicuous.form of its violation, and murder 
 is to be defined as malicous or unlawful killing. But 
 the principle involved obviously applies to all forms 
 of physical injury, and to the malice which affords 
 motives for such conduct. Suicide is self-murder.! 
 Among the special forms of sin which come under 
 this commandment are duelling, unlawful warfare, 
 abortion,? bullying, hazing and every form of inhuman- 
 ity, as well as anything which causes danger to the 
 persons of others, e.g., reckless automobile driving, 
 which the English law treats as manslaughter. 
 Capital punishment is not forbidden by this com- 
 
 1 See E. Westermarck, op. cit., ch.xxxv. For pagan views, W. E. H. 
 Lecky, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 212-222; Virgil, Aeneid, vi, 434, mildly 
 censures suicide. For the related modern problem of Euthanasia, 
 see F. G. Belton, Present Day Problems, ch. xi. An interesting prob- 
 lem in casuistry is afforded in W. R. Thayer’s Theodore Roosevelt, 
 p. 393. In the Brazilian forest Mr. Roosevelt, sick and injured so 
 that his condition retards the progress of the rest of the party towards 
 safety, determines to shoot himself if his condition does not speedily 
 improve. Sir Thomas Browne in his Religio Medici has an expression 
 worth noting. ‘When life is more terrible than death it is the truer 
 courage to dare to live.” One is not, however, bound to use extreme 
 and difficult measures for the preservation of one’s life, as resort to a 
 surgical operation when the outcome is uncertain, or to remove to a 
 distant climate; but he is bound to use available and ordinary 
 precautions for the preservation of life and health. A physician, or 
 any one in care of the sick, may not omit anything that would prolong 
 life, in order that the period of suffering may be shortened. 
 
 2 See E. Westermarck, of. cit., ch. xxi; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “Duel.” 
 
 3T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 312-315; Cath. Encyc., g.v.3 C. 
 Coppens, Moral Principles and Medical Practice. 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 119 
 
 mandment; Holy Scripture allows it,! and the 
 Church has never legislated against it. It belongs 
 to the State by natural reason, for the State must have 
 liberty to act so as to secure and preserve its well-being 
 and safety.2 The right of inflicting such punishment 
 belongs to the properly constituted authority and 
 cannot be exercised by any private individual or 
 unofficial group of individuals. Therefore lynching 
 is a violation of this commandment. “ Justifiable” 
 homicide, likewise, is not forbidden. It may be 
 defined as the killing of an assailant in order to protect 
 one’s own life, limb, chastity, or property, including 
 that of another; but it is not justifiable when less 
 extreme measures will secure the end, nor is it war- 
 ranted for insult or contumely. Lawful warfare is 
 not forbidden, the legality of any particular war 
 being dependent upon its being undertaken by the 
 state to which obedience is due? 
 
 §13. The Seventh Commandment requires us to 
 have regard for the holiness of our neighbour’s body,in 
 
 1 Rom. xiii. 4, 
 
 2E. Westermarck, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 490-496. 
 
 3G. L. Richardson, Conscience, Its Origin and Authority, ch. xix; 
 and the various works on the Thirty-nine Articles under Art. xxxvl. 
 E£.g., E. J. Bicknell, Theol. Introd. to the Thirty-nine Articles, pp. 
 548-540, “As civilization advances the use of force is abated. Con- 
 duct becomes moralized. Higher motives for obedience tend to 
 supplant the lower. But at the bottom there must always be the 
 appeal to force to put down disorder. . . . War is simply the result 
 of human sin and self-seeking. It is a symptom of the depravity 
 of the human heart. Christianity sets itself not to abolish the 
 symptom only but to root out the cause of the evil.” 
 
120 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 the older sense of its consecration to God. It implies 
 the obligation of preserving the same holiness of our 
 own bodies.! 
 
 The text of the commandment names a most obvi- 
 ous external violation of its principle, but there are 
 at least five principal lines of external sin involved: 
 (a) with the married, adultery; (6) with the unmar- 
 ried, fornication;? of these two the most aggravated 
 form being incest in which relationship either of 
 blood or of marriage is involved; (c) Intemperate 
 
 d unnatural use of marital privileges; (d) Unnat- 
 aral sexual actions between members of the same sex,* 
 or between human beings and the lower animals; 
 (e) Sins against one’s own body.5 
 
 The principle of the commandment covers purity 
 of thought and speech, as well as of physical action, 
 and every sphere of conduct which is connected with 
 the preservation of purity. The following lines of 
 conduct are therefore sinful, although in varying 
 degrees: (a) immodest dress, including any form of 
 dress which because of its violation of convention 
 obtrudes immoral suggestion; (0) any departure in 
 
 1W. W. Webb, o?. cit., pp. 169-176. A full treatment of the whole 
 subject will be found in St. Thomas, IJ, II, cliii ff.; A. Vermeersch, 
 De Castitate. See also Koch-Preuss, of. cit., vol. II, pp. 73-77; T. 
 Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 324-339. 
 
 2 Ephes. v. 5. 
 
 3St. Aug., de Bono Mair. 8, expresses in strongest terms the evil 
 of incest, ‘Adultery will be good because incest is worse.” 
 
 ‘See Koch-Preuss, of. ci#., vol. II, p. 88; E. Westermarck, of. cit., 
 
 ch. xliii. 
 5 z Cor. vi. 9-10, 15-20; cf. Gal. v. ro. 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 12 
 
 conduct from social conventions that involves such 
 suggestion; (c) undue intimacies, whether between 
 the sexes or between those of the same sex; (d) 
 loose conversation, especially scandalous gossip, 
 suggestive witticisms and dubious stories; (e) giving 
 rein to the imagination in relation to sexual indul- 
 gence;! listening to foul conversation and looking at 
 pictures which are either obscene or suggestive; (g) 
 reading trashy stories, or attending plays which 
 exploit sexual problems and affect realism in the 
 alleged interest of more perfect information concern- 
 ing human life; (%) high living, that is, a life of habit- 
 ual self-indulgence in the comforts and luxuries which 
 wealth and modern invention place at our disposal; 
 (i) taking part in, or sanctioning in any way, dances 
 which are suggestive or tend to give rise to impure 
 thoughts and desires; (7) slothful physical habits; 
 (k) unnecessary meddling with one’s own body; (/) 
 marriage contrary to the law of God.” 
 
 There are four lines, among others, along which 
 antecedent protection against the sins of which we 
 have spoken is to be sought: (a) preoccupation, 
 both of body and of mind; (6) cultivation of a 
 wholesome atmosphere, both in relation to compan- 
 ionship and to reading and thought;? (c) the main- 
 
 1 This includes the custody of the eyes; St. Matt. v. 28. “For it 
 is all one with what part of the body we commit adultery, and if a 
 man lets his eye loose and enjoys the lust of that, he is an adul- 
 terer;” Jeremy Taylor, Holy Living. 
 
 2 Cf. ch. v. § 7, below. 
 
 3 Philip. iv. 8. 
 
122 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 tenance of good health and the avoidance of nervous 
 exhaustion; (d) in some instances marriage! The 
 one immediate way of resisting temptation when it 
 comes is flight.2 This may be either interior, by 
 change of attention, or exterior, by physical removal. 
 The effectiveness of this flight will depend upon imme- 
 diate resort to prayer. If one undertakes to reason 
 with this kind of temptation he is almost certain 
 to yield to it, because the temptation does not per- 
 tain to reason but appeals to the imagination, and 
 to argue is to keep the imagination fixed upon the 
 subject. Diversion*of mind is what is needed. 
 
 §14. The Eighth Commandmeni inculcates love in 
 reference to care of our neighbour’s possessions.2 It 
 forbids three principal things: (@) unjust appropria- 
 tion of another’s goods, e.g., by secret theft, open 
 robbery, fraud, or embezzling; * (0) failure to give to 
 each his dues, e.g., defaulting in matters of debt, legal 
 injustice, personal extravagance to the injury of 
 dependents and the poor, delaying the payment of 
 debts, mutual injustice between capital and labour, 
 
 1 As indicated by St. Paul in 1 Cor. vii. 9. 
 
 2St. Aug. Serm. 350, “If you want to win a victory against the 
 temptation of lust, flee.” 
 
 3°W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 177-187; J. P. Gury, op. cit., § 436, 
 ‘‘prohibet omnem injustitiam externam in bonis fortuna proximi. ... 
 Decimum vero peccata etiam interna seu concupiscentiae, i.e., 
 desiderii bonorum proximi et actiones injuste vetat.”’ 
 
 4J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 605-625, treats of the species of theft: 
 (a) furtum; (6) rapina (with violence); (c) fraus et dolus; (d) sac- 
 rilegium; (e) peculatus. For the causes excusing from theft, see 
 §§ 615-625; and on restitution, §§ 626 ff. 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 123 
 
 and violation of contracts; (c) all private practices 
 and habits which create a personal disposition unfav- 
 ourable to keeping this commandment.! This last- 
 mentioned head includes: (a) undue wealth, which 
 stimulates avarice and disregards the interests of 
 employees and smaller capitalists; (6) substitution of 
 the maintenance of rights for the Christian ideal of 
 doing justice to others; (c) extravagant habits, which 
 preclude just administration of wealth, whether this 
 wealth is one’s own or is administered in behalf of 
 another; (d) living beyond one’s means, which induces 
 temptation to secure greater means by illegitimate 
 methods; (e) waste and needless destruction of what 
 might be useful to others; (/) overcharging for 
 services, commodities, etc., that is, profiteering; (g) 
 all forms of failure of employees adequately to render 
 the services for which they are paid. 
 
 In offences of this sort the mark of genuine repent- 
 ance is effort, whenever possible, to make sufficient 
 reparation. So far as is possible restitution must 
 be made for whatever damage has been caused. The 
 same applies to one who either assists in or sinfully 
 
 1T, Slater, op. cit., vol. I, p. 339, ‘‘Directly and explicitly it for- 
 bids theft, but implicitly it commands us to observe justice in our 
 dealings with others;” 7.¢., to give to every one his due or right. 
 Moral theologians in speaking of one’s right to do as he will with his 
 own, e.g., to throw away his money, disregard the important principle 
 of stewardship, which is a corrective of the plea, “‘Shall I not do what 
 I will with mine own?” 
 
 2T. Slater, op. cil., vol. I, pp. 398-453, gives a fuller treatment. 
 See St. Thomas, I, II, xii. 
 
124 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 benefits by an act of injustice. The offender is 
 released either if the offended does not wish restitu- 
 tion, or if there is either physical or other legitimate 
 incapacity to make it; but this release ceases when 
 the incapacity ceases, even though there be no legal 
 obligation, as, e.g., in bankruptcy cases.! 
 
 Questions of title to property, etc., are legal 
 rather than moral. Presumably the pertinent civil 
 laws are in harmony with sound morality; and, inas- 
 much as these laws are complex and differ in various 
 states, it is not to be supposed that any one except a 
 legal specialist can make expert determinations con- 
 cerning them. 
 
 §15. The Ninth Commandment requires love in 
 relation to our neighbour’s name and mind. The 
 common forms of its violation are evil speaking, lying, 
 and slandering. In the sphere of thought we may 
 include rash judgments, which arise from malice and 
 violate Christian charity.2 Reporting evil of another, 
 except when required by duty, is always sinful. Its 
 most frequent form is ill-natured gossip. A lie? 
 
 17T, Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 438-451, gives authorities pro and 
 con and concludes to the contrary. 
 
 2St. Matt. vii. 1-3; Rom.ii.1. On this commandment, see W. W. 
 Webb, oP. cit., pp. 187-192; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 456-473. 
 
 $ Col. ili. 9; Eph. iv. 25. Durant Drake, Problems of Conduct, 
 ch. xix, Truthfulness and its Problems. St. Augustine says it is 
 never under any circumstances permitted to falsify. This is not 
 universally accepted; but Roman casuists and Jeremy Taylor allow 
 too many exceptions to the general principle, e.g., in the form of men- 
 tal reservations. gsA lie may be told by either gestures, other signs, 
 _ tone of voice, or silence, as well as by word of mouth. St. Augustine, 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 125 
 
 means an unjust falsehood, but falsehood is so rarely 
 just that in normal practice the qualification should 
 be left out. Yet there are cases in which duty requires 
 falsehood, e.g., to the insane in dangerous emergencies. 
 The burden of proof always lies on him who would 
 falsify, and it is almost always the case that the ele- 
 -ment of doubt is practically absent. The reason why 
 truth-telling must be observed, even when its neces- 
 sity is not apparent, is that the general welfare of 
 mankind, as well as the virtue of the individual speak- 
 ers, depends upon the ability of one man to trust 
 another. <A justifiable falsehood will not occur often 
 in any normal lifetime, and in many cases never.? 
 
 de Mendac. 3, “He tells a lie who has one thing in his mind and says 
 something else by word or by any sign whatever.” 
 
 1° W. Hermann, oP. cit., p. 128, “We must not conceal from ourselves 
 that under certain definite circumstances the use of untrue speech is 
 not only permitted but may be our duty.” He instances an actor in 
 case of a fire in a theatre telling an untruth to prevent mad flight from 
 the building, and a man meeting a criminal on his way to commit a 
 crime; St. Augustine used the last illustration and drew the opposite 
 conclusion. The Jesuit Cathrein charged the German philosophers, 
 Paulsen, Wundt, and Ziegler, and the theologians Martensen and 
 Harless, with making lies permissible (which Hermann concedes), 
 and rejected the permission 7m toto—a curious reversal of tradition. 
 Kant, in his Uber ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu Liigen, 
 strongly opposed all justification of falsehood. 
 
 2 Expressions are often used which have two senses, true in one, 
 untrue in the others; e¢.g., a servant may reply that her mistress is 
 not at home, meaning not that she is away from home, but that she 
 does not wish to see callers—a convention] usage. A physician, 
 lawyer or priest, questioned about professional secrets, may reply 
 that he does not know, meaning that he has no knowledge which he 
 may either communicate or betray his possession of. These instances 
 
126 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 Slander consists in evil-speaking falsely. It has 
 double guilt, and is the worst form of sin under this 
 commandment. . 
 
 We should include under the above heads all forms 
 of action or inaction by which we knowingly convey a 
 false impression. And, apart from the leading forms 
 of sin against this commandment, certain incidental 
 and connected kinds of wrong-doing are involved: 
 (a) unnecessary judging, because predisposing to evil 
 speaking; (b) suspicion, when based upon lack of 
 charity, or nourished in violation of it; (c) violation 
 of secrets, which puts the party concerned in the 
 wrong light; because we cannot hope to reproduce 
 first-hand information in a form that will produce a 
 correct impression. In any case the secret is our 
 neighbour’s, and we have no right to betray it; (d) 
 flattery, as involving deceit and fostering conceit; 
 (e) perjury, or false oaths; (f) self-deceit, as depriv- 
 ing one’s self of the knowledge of himself which he 
 ought to acquire; (g) false representation of one’s self, 
 which is either hypocritical or the cause of self-deceit 
 and pride; () exaggeration; (z) rash and unconsid- 
 ered assertions. 
 
 § 16. The Tenth Commandment requires love in 
 relation to our neighbour’s estate, especially as com- 
 
 hardly fall in the class of ‘‘mental reservations.” Clerical vows can- 
 not be reduced in effect by such reservations, for these vows register 
 obligations which in any case are binding on those ordained, and are 
 also violations of veracity. Cf. J. N. Figgis, Fellowship of the Mys- 
 tery, pp. 263-271; H. Sidgwick, Practical Ethics, pp. 142-177. 
 
SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 72% 
 
 pared with our own. In a sense it also recapitulates 
 the second table in interior aspects, since it largely 
 determines our whole moral attitude, and when prop- 
 erly kept, is likely to insure the keeping of the four 
 previous commandments. 
 
 Covetousness involves setting up our own welfare 
 as an idol in the place of God, and constitutes rebel- 
 lion against the conditions of our state of probation. 
 For this reason it is called idolatry, because it sub- 
 stitutes inferior good for God. This command- 
 ment does not prohibit temperate desire for earthly 
 good, but requires that it shall be a branch of our 
 desire to attain our chief end, and that its forms 
 shall be capable of ministering to that end.2 The 
 principal sins are (a) covetousness; (0) envy; (c) 
 discontent with one’s earthly estate, or such ambition 
 as 1s inconsistent with acceptance of providential 
 conditions and with hearty recognition of the nghts 
 and welfare of others; (d) idleness, especially when 
 caused by envy and discontent. The most prominent 
 and characteristic form of sin under this command- 
 ment to-day is the race to get rich, and the inevitably 
 resulting war between capital and labour, which 
 cannot be effectually remedied by mere external 
 adjustments of industrial relations. The problem is 
 primarily moral, and should be so regarded by the 
 clergy and other Christian workers. This is not to 
 deny either the need of industrial adjustments or 
 
 1 Ephes. v. 5; Col. iii. 5. 
 2St. Matt. vi. 19-213 xvi. 26; 1 Tim. vi. 9-11. 
 
128 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
 
 their value in correcting certain forms of current 
 injustice; but it presupposes that without a reforma- 
 tion of selfishness and covetousness this value will 
 be seriously limited and temporary. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 § 1. The sacraments, in so far as they are divinely 
 instituted for our use, involve obligations connected 
 with our employment of them in their proper place 
 and connections. The duty to use them involves 
 the duty of observing the rubrics and other canon 
 laws which regulate the manner, occasion and fre- 
 quency of their use. The Prayer Book constitutes 
 the chief source of information on the subject for 
 Anglicans, but regard is to be had for the force of 
 catholic tradition in details not there covered. 
 
 The sacraments are efficacious ex opere operato, 
 because their efficacy depends solely upon the pledged 
 operation of God. ‘Therefore we cannot receive them 
 without spiritual results of some kind. This is de 
 fide. If we receive them worthily, with faith and 
 penitence, we obtain their intended benefits. Other- 
 wise, and until the proper subjective conditions are 
 present, their effects are injurious. All that is 
 required for their administration is a proper minister, 
 possessing jurisdiction, using the proper matter and 
 form, with the ostensible intention of doing what the 
 
 1F, J. Hall, The Church, etc., pp. 321-323. 
 129 
 
130 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 Church does.! Attention, however desirable, is not 
 essential to validity, although carelessness is irreve- 
 rent. It isa grave sin for one not in a state of grace 
 to administer any sacrament. Accordingly, in view 
 of the fact that sacramental ministrations pertain 
 regularly to his God-given duties, and may have to be 
 fulfilled suddenly and unexpectedly, a priest is under 
 peculiar obligation to live habitually in a state of 
 sanctifying grace. 
 
 It is sinful for a minister unnecessarily to refuse the 
 administration of a sacrament, when he is lawfully 
 and reasonably called upon for such administration 
 by one who is qualified to ask for it. Peril to health 
 or, in case of grave necessity, even to life itself does 
 not exempt him, e.g., in the case of one dying of con- 
 tagious disease. ‘This responsibility normally belongs 
 only to one having actual pastoral jurisdiction over 
 the person concerned; but in grave emergencies it 
 extends to any competent minister who is available. 
 On the other hand, a priest sins gravely in adminis- 
 tering a sacrament to one who is known to be un- 
 worthy of its reception and impenitent. Such 
 administration is forbidden for two reasons: (a) 
 our Lord’s prohibition to give that which is holy to 
 dogs or to cast pearls before swine;? (0) resulting 
 scandal to the faithful. If the knowledge by which 
 the priest is here guided has been obtained in the con- 
 
 1 Idem, pp. 319-320. 
 
 2St. Matt. vil. 6; 1 Tim. v. 22. First rubric of the Communion 
 Office, American Prayer Book. 
 
BAPTISM 131 
 
 fessional, it may not be used for public refusal of 
 sacraments, because this would violate the seal. But 
 he may use such knowledge in private refusal of 
 the sacrament! As regards matter and form, a 
 strict obligation to use those prescribed by the Church 
 rests upon the minister; but a slight accidental vari- 
 ation in language does not affect the validity of the 
 sacrament unless it occurs in a vital part, e.g., in the 
 words of consecration in the Eucharist. 
 
 § 2. By Baptism the soul is cleansed from all the 
 stains and guilt of sin, original and actual, sanctifying 
 grace is imparted, and character is imprinted. Al- 
 though of universal obligation,? Baptism requires for 
 its safe and righteous reception, the removal of exist- 
 ing barriers to its beneficial effects. Therefore adults 
 should not be baptized without sufficient evidence 
 of real faith and of repentance; and the sponsors for 
 infants should be neither incompetent nor careless. 
 Parents are bound to have their children baptized 
 as soon as may be after birth. When private Bap- 
 tism has been administered it should be followed, 
 
 1See Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 108-114; and especially 
 T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 27-40. ‘These references apply to the 
 minister. On the obligations of recipients, see Koch-Preuss, pp. 
 115-117; Slater, pp. 41-45. 
 
 2 The “‘necessttas medi” is found in St. John iii. 5, the “‘mecessttas 
 preceptt” in St. Matt. xxviii. 19. Baptism must be received either 
 actually, i re, or, at least, by intention, 77 voto; but nothing can 
 release from the necessity of reception in re except the positive inabil- 
 ity thus to receive it. On baptismal requirements, see F. J. Hall, 
 
 op. cit., pp. 323-327; D. Stone, Holy Baptism, ch. ii, ix-x; St. 
 Thomas, ITI, Ixvi-lxviii; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “Baptism,” passim. 
 
132 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 whenever possible, by public reception in the Church. 
 It is a mortal sin avoidably to allow an infant to die 
 unbaptized, although ignorance may qualify this con- 
 clusion. Moralists generally hold that it is a mortal 
 sin to postpone Baptism for more than a month. 
 
 As the rubrics give dipping the preference over 
 pouring, a priest may not refuse to baptize by immer- 
 sion without sufficiently grave reason in the particular 
 instance; but any application of water to the head is 
 valid. Any person may administer Baptism in case 
 of necessity; and some one should do so immediately 
 after birth, if there appears to be reasonable doubt as 
 to whether the child will live until a priest, the proper 
 minister, can arrive. Those apparently stillborn, 
 and abnormally formed infants (monstra) should be 
 baptized sub conditione, “‘If thou art able to receive 
 baptism,” etc. Certain abnormal cases may be 
 briefly referred to. Uterine Baptisms should be admin- 
 istered when any part of the child appears in process 
 of delivery and there is grave doubt of the delivery of 
 a living child being completed. In the case of an 
 unknown and unconscious person, im extremis, Bap- 
 tism under a double condition 2? may be administered, 
 the supposition being that one who has omitted the 
 reception of the sacrament would ask to receive it 
 
 1 Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 119-120; A. E. Sanford, Pas- 
 toral Medicine, p. 93. 
 
 2 “Tf thou art not already baptized” (if there be uncertainty as to 
 the fact) ‘‘and art capable of receiving Baptism.” In such cases, it 
 may be noted, the giving of a name is no essential part of the service. 
 
CONFIRMATION 133 
 
 in extremis if he were capable of expressing his desire. 
 Baptism may also be administered to those appar- 
 ently dead under the same condition! We say 
 ‘“‘apparently dead” for there is considerable uncer- 
 tainty as to the moment of death, the beginning of 
 putrefaction often being the only certain sign of its 
 occurrence. 
 
 After the Baptism of children the parents, god- 
 parents, or guardians are bound to provide Christian 
 education for the child, and to prepare him for his 
 later sacramental privileges. 
 
 § 3. Confirmation? in the West, is required to be 
 received when the baptized child reaches the age of 
 discretion, which means the age at which the child 
 can distinguish between right and wrong and can 
 perceive the broad lines of Christian obligation. 
 It does not mean that he should be a theologian, a 
 philosopher, or a scientist, or even that he should be 
 able rightly to control his future life without the 
 guidance of his elders. Incidentally, parents and 
 sponsors are under obligation to bring children to 
 
 1A, E. Sanford, op. cit., pp. 223-235. The Roman Church allows 
 twenty-four hours to elapse before death is to be taken as certain. 
 This seems an extreme period; and an hour would, probably, be quite 
 sufficient under normal circumstances to determine whether death 
 has occurred. But abnormal cases, especially those of coma and 
 drowning, have to be reckoned with. 
 
 2 See Acts viii. 17-18; xix. 6. On its requirements, see F. J. Hall, 
 op. cit., pp. 327-330 and The Sacraments, pp. 45-48, 61-68; A. C. A. 
 Hall, Confirmation, ch. iii-iv; A. T. Wirgman, Doctr. of Conf., 
 
 ch. v. Their history: Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.v. “Confirma- 
 tion.” 
 
134 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 Confirmation unless impediments emerge, and in that 
 case the obligation of hastening their removal is 
 incurred. The following impediments have to be 
 reckoned with: (a) the authority of parents or 
 guardians over minors, which may not, in ultimate 
 issue, be overruled;! (6) a state of impenitence; (c) 
 unbelief; (d) insanity;? (e) the Church’s rule that 
 none shall be confirmed but such as can say the Creed, 
 the Lord’s Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, and 
 are sufficiently instructed in the other parts of the 
 Church Catechism.” As this is a positive rather 
 than an intrinsic impediment, cases may occur in 
 which failure to exact full literal obedience would 
 violate in no way the real mind of the Church; (/) 
 Unwillingness of the child. The authority of the 
 parents extends to bringing their children to be bap- 
 tized and confirmed, but it is the duty both of 
 parents and of pastors, not to press the matter in the 
 face of continued unwillingness. All who are able to 
 recelve this sacrament are in duty bound to do so; 
 but 1f neglect on the part of one instructed is inspired 
 by known contempt of the sacrament, its adminis- 
 
 1'The Roman Church has determined (T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, 
 p. 56, giving the decree) that children of seven years and upwards 
 may determine for themselves and receive Baptism in spite of the 
 opposition of their parents. If we are sound in our interpretation of 
 the Fifth Commandment this is not true—certainly not under Angli- 
 can conditions. 
 
 2 This prohibition, including also cases of imbecility and idiocy, 
 does not extend to Baptism; the latter sacrament is “necessitas medit,”’ 
 
 of receiving supernatural life, extending to every living soul; whereas 
 Confirmation is “necessitas pracepti.” 
 
HOLY COMMUNION 135 
 
 tration becomes plainly sinful. Bishops are bound 
 to give those within their jurisdiction opportunity at 
 reasonable intervals of receiving the sacrament.! 
 
 There is no obligation, on the part of either minister 
 or recipient, to receive either Baptism or Confirmation 
 fasting; but St. Thomas says ‘‘where it can con- 
 veniently be done, it is more becoming.’? Nor may 
 sacramental confession be required canonically as a 
 normal condition of Confirmation. It is often, how- 
 ever, highly desirable; and the circumstances of a 
 given case may make the need of it so obvious that 
 the pastor will be justified in demanding the evidence 
 of readiness for Confirmation which such confession 
 in the given instance can alone afford. A pastor is 
 also entitled, if the general condition of his cure 
 appears to justify it, to urge upon his classes for Con- 
 firmation the desirability of the use of confession. 
 
 § 4. Holy Communion? being generally necessary 
 for salvation, is obligatory upon all who can fulfil its 
 conditions,* viz.: (a) previous Baptism; (6) Confir- 
 
 1 The new Roman Codex Juris Can., can. 785, §§ 3 ff., says at least 
 once every five years; but within our own communion the canon law 
 requires once in three years: Engl. Canons of 1603, lx; American 
 Digest, Canon 17, § II. 
 
 2 Summa Theol., III, lxxii, 12 ad 2. 
 
 8 On its requirements, see F. J. Hall, The Church, etc., pp. 330-333) 
 and The Sacraments, pp. 182-188; D. Stone, Holy Communion, 
 ch. xii-xiv; St. Thomas, IIT, Ixxiv, Ixxviii, lxxxii. 
 
 4T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, p. ror, ‘‘The sacramental reception of 
 the Eucharist is not a necessary means of salvation, for it is a sacra- 
 ment of the living and supposes the grace of God in the soul, and a 
 soul in the state of grace has everything which is necessary for salva- 
 
136 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 mation, or at least readiness and desire to be confirmed. 
 In case of serious illness some latitude may be wisely 
 used in the interpretation of this condition; (c) faith 
 and repentance; (d) lawful opportunity; (e) fasting, 
 when no law of necessity interferes. As fasting is a 
 ceremonial precept, it cannot be rightly applied in 
 such wise as to excommunicate people who are sin- 
 cerely desirous of obeying the law of the Church. It 
 is an act of devotion.! As to frequency of reception, 
 one of the fundamental desires of the Anglican 
 Reformers was that communions should be made more 
 frequently, and an English Prayer Book rubric re- 
 quires parishioners to communicate “at least three 
 times in the year, of which Easter is to be one.” ? 
 
 tion.”” We hold, however, that, while reception is not possible for 
 all and is not invariably necessary absolutely, it is so in normal cases 
 for those having the use of reason and the opportunity of reception. 
 Our Lord’s words, St. John vi. 53-58, make reception necesstias 
 precepti, and, under the conditions noted above, necessitas medit. 
 The priest is morally bound to do all he can to provide that the qual- 
 ified shall receive the viaticum; see First Council of Nicea, Can. xiii, 
 
 1 It is, of course, a very important one, and should be treated nor- 
 mally as a serious obligation. Cf. ch. vi. § 2 fin., below. 
 
 2 There is much to be said for daily reception, as was customary in 
 the early Church. See, e.g., St. Aug., Ep. 54.4. The Roman Church 
 (Conc. Lat., IV, can. 21; Conc. Trent, Sess. xiii. can. 9. CE. 9, BP 
 Gury, op. cit., vol. II, §§ 218 ff.) requires reception at least in Easter- 
 tide, or, if this is physically impossible, as soon after as it may be 
 possible, anticipating the time, if that can be done, when it is known 
 that Easter reception will be impossible. In America this is now con- 
 strued to mean between the First Sunday in Lent and Trinity Sunday. 
 It is presupposed (see proposition condemned by Innocent IX, 
 Denzinger, Enchirid, § 1205) that this means worthy reception. In 
 recent days the Roman Church has sought to increase the frequency 
 of communion, cf. Decree promulgated by Pius X, Dec. 20, 1905. 
 
PENANCE 137 
 
 Preparation is usually divided into two parts, that 
 of the soul and that of the body. That communion 
 may be received worthily the soul must be free from 
 mortal sin;! to insure which the sacrament of Penance 
 may be used, or an act of perfect contrition made. 
 There should be also such use of prayer, meditation, 
 etc., as will predispose one towards a beneficial recep- 
 tion. The preparation of the body lies mainly in 
 observance of the precept of fasting, which forbids 
 the taking of food or drink after midnight.? It is 
 expedient, although not commanded, that the married 
 should abstain from the marital privilege immediately 
 before and after receiving? As to intention, the 
 recipient should have the purpose of pleasing God, 
 of becoming more closely united to Him, and should 
 seek this heavenly provision as food for his soul and 
 as medicine for its weaknesses. 
 
 The priest is the minister of the consecration; dea- 
 cons may assist in the administration to the people, 
 and in case of necessity administer the reserved sac- 
 rament. In the early Church the latter privilege 
 was sometimes exercised by laymen, and would prob- 
 ably be lawful now; but occasions would practically 
 never arise. 
 
 § 5. As to Penance, the American Church directs 
 sinners to come to the priest whenever they cannot by 
 
 Ax) Cor, xi. 27 ff. 
 
 2 And for at least six hours previous to communion. See St. Aug. 
 Ep. 54, 8; St. Thomas, III, lxxx, 8 ad 5. This obligation does not 
 in the Roman Church bind invalids, Cod. Jur. Can., can. 858, § 2. 
 
 § Cf. Exod. xix. 14-15. 
 
138 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 private methods of repentance quiet their consciences, 
 but require further comfort and counsel.! As the 
 English exhortation makes clear, the comfort referred 
 to includes priestly absolution.” ‘The vagueness of 
 this language, a concession to Protestant prejudice, 
 ought not to lead us to anti-catholic inferences. 
 Nothing is more certain than that an appeal to an- 
 tiquity was the ostensible and formal principle of 
 the Anglican reformation. Therefore we ought to 
 interpret the Prayer Book references to this subject, 
 in spite of their shunning certain technical expressions 
 of medizval origin, and abandoning the rule requiring 
 an annual Confession, as intended to preserve unal- 
 tered the ancient catholic doctrine and precept con- 
 cerning Confession. There were variations in the 
 rigourand method of discipline in the ancient Churches; 
 but all were agreed as to the necessity and obligation 
 of confession to a priest for Christians who had 
 become guilty of the graver forms of sin. Accordingly, 
 although Anglican discipline leaves the sinner free 
 to judge for himself whether he has sinned gravely 
 enough to need this remedy, he is still under precept 
 to confess to a priest when such need arises, that is, 
 
 1 See the first of the longer Exhortations in the Communion Office. 
 On the requirements of this sacrament, see F. J. Hall, The Church, 
 etc., Pp. 333-336, and The Sacraments, pp. 235-245; W. W. Webb, 
 op. cit., ch. ii; W. W. Williams, Moral Theol. of the Sac. of Penance, 
 passim; F. G. Belton, Manual for Confessors, passim. 
 
 2 Cf. The denial in the Preface of the American Prayer Book of in- 
 tention “to depart from the Church of England in any essential 
 point of doctrine, discipline, or worship.” 
 
PENANCE 139 
 
 when in Prayer Book language he cannot otherwise 
 ‘quiet his conscience.” Obviously to “quiet’’ here 
 means to secure assured pardon of God by really 
 effectual repentance. The duty of Confession Is not 
 left wholly optional. What is left to private judg- 
 ment is, whether the conditions which make it one’s 
 own duty have actually arisen. 
 
 In technical terms it is said by catholic theologians 
 that ‘“‘mortal” sin makes sacramental Confession 
 necessary and obligatory.1 But we ought to remem- 
 ber that the distinction between ‘mortal’ and 
 “venial” sin is less precisely determinative of par- 
 ticular cases than it is often thought to be. Mortal 
 sin means fatal sin, a question of degree that calls for 
 discriminating judgment in each case; and to say 
 that mortal sin makes confession necessary ought to 
 be understood as a technical way of punctuating the 
 broad proposition that one may fall into a degree of 
 guilt which will in all probability prove spiritually 
 fatal, unless the sinner resorts to the sacramental aid 
 of Penance, provided for this very emergency. The 
 
 1F, G. Belton, Manual for Confessors, pp. 8-9; A. H. Baverstock, 
 The Priest as Confessor, ch. i; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 135. 
 The Council of Trent, Sess. xiv, ch. v, can. 6, describes this sacrament 
 as a necessitas medit. 
 
 2 To teach an ordinary congregation in a baldly technical way that 
 “mortal sin’? makes the sacrament of Penance a necessity, coupled 
 with equally bald assertions that certain sins are “mortal” (no 
 intimation being given that the sins called ‘“‘venial’? may be ‘mor- 
 tal” in their malicious deliberateness, and that the so-called “mortal” 
 
 sins may be venial because of ignorance and lack of deliberation), 
 is to impart a mechanical aspect to the whole subject; and is to run 
 
140 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 further proposition follows that the perceived possi- 
 bility that one has sinned thus gravely makes it 
 imprudent and unsafe to neglect the use of this sacra- 
 ment. 
 
 The American Office for the Visitation of Pris- 
 oners authorizes the use of the form of absolution in 
 the Communion Office. On the other hand, we Amer- 
 icans inherit the form still found in the English Office 
 for the Visitation of the Sick; and this form is not 
 only better suited for private absolution, but is 
 also widely used in the Catholic Church at large and 
 for that reason strongly recommended to our use. 
 
 Inasmuch as repentance includes what is technically 
 called “satisfaction” and this includes acts of penance 
 to God, both custom and the nature of things require 
 that a priest should impose some form of penance, 
 readiness to fulfil which should be a condition of 
 granting absolution. But the penance should not be 
 so severe as to challenge resistance or to suggest the 
 notion that it is in any sense an offset to sin. Its sole 
 value lies in its function of expressing and completing 
 repentance; and this value depends upon the dutiful 
 spirit of its performance rather than upon its quanti- 
 tative and intrinsic importance. The customary 
 
 a grave risk of causing misconception and revolt. It is usually safer 
 to use untechnical language that will be understood, and that will not 
 soothe people’s consciences with regard to their smaller sins—as if 
 they required no repentance. Orthodoxy does not lie in rigid 
 technicalities, but in the truths which catholic technicalities are 
 designed to preserve among teachers and pastors, presumably capable 
 of rightly understanding them. 
 
PENANCE I4I 
 
 penance is a brief prayer or meditation, chosen with 
 reference to the ascertained moral state of the peni- 
 tent, with a time assigned for its fulfilment.1 Both 
 priest and penitent are bound by the so-called seal; 
 that is, what is said in the confessional is official and 
 privileged, and may not be revealed even on the wit- 
 ness stand without mutual consent.? 
 
 The matter of the sacrament, or the things to be 
 confessed, includes all post-baptismal sins not pre- 
 viously brought to sacramental Confession, so far as 
 they can be recalled by dutiful and careful self-exam- 
 ination.? For the integrity of Confession it is espe- 
 cially necessary that every species of mortal sin as 
 above defined should be confessed, with reasonably 
 intelligent indication of the gravity and frequency of 
 each. And, since repentance is not sufficient unless 
 it has reference to all forms of sin of whatever degree 
 of gravity, no species of sin which can be recalled 
 should be concealed; although a complete catalogue of 
 venial sins is practically impossible, and is unnecessary 
 provided one’s besetting sins and their frequency are 
 acknowledged. In brief, a good confession means 
 one in which the penitent sincerely makes a “clean 
 breast” of his wrong-doings. An incidental reason 
 
 1 On suitable penances, see E. B. Pusey, Advice . . . Abbé Gaume’s 
 Manual of Confessors, ch. v. art. ix; F. G. Belton, op. cit., Pt. I, 
 ch. vi; A. H. Baverstock, op. cit., ch. vi. 
 
 2On the seal, W. W. Williams, op. cit., pp. 112-125; F. J. Hall, 
 The Sacraments, pp. 240-243. 
 
 3See F. J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 239 f.; W. W. Williams, op. cit., pp. 
 12-18. Technically it is called guasi matter. 
 
142 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 for this requirement is that the priest’s part in judg- 
 ing, instructing and comforting the penitent is thereby 
 made more intelligent and effective for the soul’s 
 guidance and help in attaining his appointed goal of 
 entire sanctification. Moreover, dutiful faithfulness 
 of the penitent in doing his part will remove the 
 danger of mechanical and unprofitable use of the sac- 
 rament. In order to receive it beneficially, one must 
 fulfil the several parts of repentance as adequately 
 as he can. To this end he must cultivate genuine 
 contrition, a firmly fixed purpose of amendment, and 
 readiness to accept and perform whatever penance 
 may be imposed.! 
 
 On the part of the priest there is need here for 
 greater preparatory study than in the case of any 
 other sacrament. He forgives or retains not accord- 
 ing to his pleasure, but according to the moral con- 
 ditions which he perceives in the person making, 
 Confession. He cannot hope to judge these rightly, 
 to give wise counsel, and to assign penance justly, 
 without the knowledge which the study of Moral 
 Theology and Casuistry affords.? 
 
 § 6. In Holy Orders, the obligations involved per- 
 
 1 These matters are treated of more fully in ch, ix, below. 
 
 2K. E. Kirk, op. cit., ch. i; F. G. Belton, Present Day Problems in 
 
 3Samuel Wilberforce, Addresses to Candidates for Holy Orders 
 (covering the Ordination vows); John Gott, The Parish Priest in the 
 Town; P. V. Smith, The Legal Position of the Clergy (in England); 
 H. P. Liddon, Clerical Life and Work; W.C. E. Newbolt, Speculum 
 Sacerdotum; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 197-200; T. Slater, 
 op. cit., vol. II, pp. 241-250. 
 
HOLY ORDERS 143 
 
 tain respectively to candidates, to ordained minis- 
 ters and to laymen. 
 
 It is the duty of candidates to acquaint themselves 
 with the canon law touching ordination, and to fulfil 
 its requirements at the stated times and in the stated 
 manners. The candidate should have pure motives, 
 i.e., a desire to promote the glory of God in loyal 
 conformity to the faith and discipline of His Church, 
 and to codperate in the salvation of souls and in the 
 extension of the Kingdom of heaven. He should 
 be wholly free from carnal ambition and from dis- 
 turbing desire for worldly position or gain. A two- 
 fold preparation is required for the state to which he 
 believes himself called, intellectual and_ spiritual. 
 This preparation he is morally bound to use every 
 effort to secure as thoroughly as he can;! and the 
 responsibility of enlarging this equipment continues, 
 of course, throughout his life. 
 
 Ordained ministers come under the specific obliga- 
 tions which are defined in the so-called ordination 
 vows of the Ordinal,? and under those canons which 
 
 1S$t. Thomas, III, suppl. xxxvi, 1-2. 
 
 2 Current arguments of “Liberalism” justify calling specific atten- 
 tion to the “material” dishonesty of disregarding the contract and 
 vow before God and the congregation “‘always so to minister the doc- 
 trine . . . of Christ, as the Lord hath commanded, and as this 
 Church hath received the same.” The minister is ordained to take 
 official part in a propaganda defined by the Church. His pledge is 
 unambiguous, and his obligation either to fulfil the pledge or to 
 renounce his office is too clear rationally to be combated. What 
 “this Church hath received” is obviously determined by its 
 formularies, understood substantially in the sense in which they 
 
144 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 describe the content and limitations of their duties 
 and privileges. In addition to these canonically 
 defined obligations are those which obviously inhere 
 in the relations in which they stand to superior min- 
 isters, on the one hand, and to those to whom they are 
 sent, on the other hand. Among the latter should be 
 mentioned, as liable to be overlooked by those who 
 have had no previous business experience, the con- 
 tract obligations involved in their acceptance of a call 
 or appointment and their obligation to maintain visi- 
 ble financial integrity in all their relations. 
 
 Lay officials, of course, have official obligations 
 beside those which pertain to the lay estate in general. 
 The office of /ay-reader carries with it no other priv- 
 ileges and powers, and no other permanency, than are 
 defined in the canons and are explicitly given by the 
 bishops. Deaconesses are subject to the same limita- 
 tions and, officially speaking, are entirely under the 
 authority of the ministers under whom they are 
 licensed to work. ‘Their office is a lay office and is not 
 to be compared with the diaconate. Allowing for 
 differences of conditions, the same holds true of the 
 members of religious orders, whether male or female. 
 Such members are not ministers unless they have been 
 ordained to be such inthe appointed manner. Official 
 positions in a parish do not abrogate or qualify minis- 
 terial authority over the services and their music, 
 and over the teaching and spiritual discipline within 
 
 were originally imposed. It is not at all determined by current 
 unofficial opinion and speculation. 
 
HOLY ORDERS 145 
 
 the parish. The vestry has authority as a body over 
 the temporal concerns of the parish; but the rector 
 is ex officio chairman of the vestry, and cannot canon- 
 ically be excluded. Organists, choir officers, Sunday 
 School helpers, masters of ceremony, etc., are all sub- 
 ject in the manner of their discharge of duties to the 
 rector or priest-in-charge.! 
 
 Every layman is under obligation to be canonically 
 connected, when possible, with some recognized parish 
 or mission, preferably where it is most natural for him 
 to attend public worship. If he moves from one 
 parish to another, he ought to secure a formal letter 
 of transfer; and it is the duty of the minister not only 
 to furnish this letter, but to use legitimate influence 
 to have it presented. No layman may disregard 
 excommunication by his pastor, unless it has been 
 reversed by competent episcopal authority. A lay- 
 man should contribute to the support of the parish 
 to which he belongs, and may not in this particular 
 assume a seditious attitude towards his canonical 
 pastor. His relations to his pastor are not nullified 
 by clerical folly, but either by his removal into another 
 parish or by canonical removal of the pastor. 
 
 To the laity also belongs the duty, often neglected, 
 of providing for a supply of clergy: (@) by prayer, 
 especially at Ember seasons, that God will ‘‘send forth 
 labourers” into His harvest; (0) by contributions 
 towards the support of seminaries or theological 
 
 1 We follow here the American canon law. On English conditions, 
 see P. V. Smith, op. cit., ch. iv. 
 
146 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 schools and of those colleges in which candidates are 
 especially trained for admission to them; (c) by sug- 
 gesting the vocation to their sons and others for con- 
 sideration, not placing any obstacle in the way of 
 those who have felt themselves called; (d) by uphold- 
 ing the dignity of the priesthood, not making it a sub- 
 ject of captious criticism, but loyally supporting the 
 priesthood in general, in spite of the imperfections of 
 individual priests. 
 
 § 7. Holy Matrimony: A formal engagement to 
 marry constitutes a contract, subject to the limita- 
 tions in general of human contracts, and to such as are 
 involved in established social custom. If it is due to 
 compelling fear, or if either of the parties is a minor, 
 it is not valid. Circumstances may arise which will 
 nullify either explicit or tacit conditions of the con- 
 tract; and if nullifying impediments are discovered 
 or created, the contract ceases to bind. If others are 
 aware of nullifying impediments, it is their duty to 
 declare them before the intended marriage is at- 
 tempted. The obligations connected with the dura- 
 tion and conditions of an engagement may be deter- 
 mined by: (a) prior obligations, such as the support 
 
 1 On its requirements, see F. J. Hall, The Church, etc., pp. 339-342, 
 and The Sacraments, ch. ix; W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 214-236; 
 O. D. Watkins, Holy Matrimony, passim; W. J. Knox Little, Holy 
 Matrimony (popular). Also, with allowance for considerable dif- 
 ferences in Roman Canon law, prohibitory degrees, etc., Koch-Preuss, 
 op. cit., vol. II, pp. 201-211; J. P. Gury, op. cit., vol. II, §§ 569 ff; 
 T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, Bk. viii; H. A. Ayrinhac, Marriage Legisla- 
 tion in the New Code of Canon Law. 
 
HOLY MATRIMONY 147 
 
 of parents; (6) temporal estate, or ability to support 
 a family in a manner suited to the social rank of the 
 parties concerned; (c) charity, when a protracted 
 engagement is prejudicial to one of the parties; (d) 
 preservation of purity; (e) convention. A betrothal 
 does not constitute a nullifying impediment if one of 
 the parties contracts a marriage with a third party, 
 although such marriage is sinful unless the betrothal 
 referred to has been justifiably terminated. The 
 publishing of banns, while regulated as to its form, 
 is not required in the American Church; but a revival 
 of the practice would help to discourage hasty and ill- 
 considered marriages. 
 
 The spiritual benefits of the sacrament depend upon 
 faith and repentance in those who participate in it; 
 and careful spiritual preparation for Matrimony is 
 obviously needed. This may necessitate use of the 
 sacrament of Penance; and reception of the Holy 
 Eucharist is plainly a desirable accompaniment of 
 marriage. To be sacramental, Matrimony must be 
 lawfully complete and have baptized persons for its 
 subjects; and no nullifying impediments ! must exist. 
 Non-sacramental unions become sacramental by sub- 
 sequent Baptism of both parties. 
 
 Matrimonial impediments? are of two kinds: (a) 
 
 1 Impediments which are declared to be nullifying by the express 
 law of God or by the Church are here included as well as those of 
 civil law. 
 
 2On impediments, see F. J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 294-306; 
 
 O. D. Watkins, oP. cit., pp. 103-107, 336 f. ef passim; J. J. Elmendorf, 
 op. cit.. pp. 629-640; W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 240-251. The 
 
148 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 impedimentia impedientia, those which without nulli- 
 fying make marriage unlawful or undesirable; (0) 
 impedimentia dirimentia, those which nullify it ab 
 initio. No lists’ of impediments have ecumenical 
 authority in all their particulars, and the Roman list 
 of nullifying impediments is from our standpoint 
 excessive.! We therefore give a list more in accord 
 with Anglican conditions. The nullifying impedi- 
 ments include: (a) error as to identity of one or other 
 of the parties to the marriage; () compulsion, or fear 
 equivalent thereto; (c) consanguinity and affinity, 
 or mutual relationship, whether by blood or by mar- 
 riage, within degrees prohibited either by the law of 
 God, by the Church or by the state. The list of pro- 
 hibited degrees given in the English Prayer Book 
 has force in the American Church so long as this 
 Church enacts no substitutionary legislation; (d) 
 physical impotence of either party, if it be initial 
 and irremediable; (e) immaturity of age, prior to 
 puberty; (f) in the case of minors, the withholding of 
 consent by parents or legal guardians; (g) previous 
 valid marriage while both parties thereto are living. 
 Among impediments which make a marriage either 
 irregular or inexpedient are: (a) disparity of social 
 status or culture; (b) elopement; (c) clandestinity, 
 even where the law does not make this a nullifying 
 impediment; (d) previous vow of chastity, without a 
 
 Roman Church has a larger list: St. Thomas, III, suppl. I-Ixii; 
 Cath. Encyc., q.v. It does not bind Anglicans. 
 1Tn particular, in including certain species of spiritual affinity. 
 
HOLY MATRIMONY 149 
 
 proper dispensation therefrom; (e) disparity of cult 
 or religious divergence; (/) the solemn seasons within 
 which the Church discourages marriage except in 
 necessity.} 
 
 The nullifying impediments (a) and (0) obviously 
 cease to be nullifying if both parties to the marriage 
 subsequently and with sufficient knowledge freely 
 consent to the union. But the impediment of pre- 
 vious marriage can be removed, while both parties 
 thereto are living, only by pronouncement from legally 
 competent authority that the said previous marriage 
 was null and void ab initio. To Christians, divorce, 
 as distinguished from a decree of nullity, affords no 
 moral liberty to remarry while the other party lives. 
 Even when a nullifying impediment to the previous 
 union has been discovered, the right to remarry does 
 not arise until a lawful decree of nullity has been pro- 
 nounced. But, of course, such discovery makes the 
 continued exercise of marital privileges sinful. 
 
 The obligations of the marriage estate include: 
 (a) the procreation of offspring—an obligation which 
 obvious necessity alone can abrogate; (6) temperance 
 in marital intercourse, the health and spiritual interests 
 of both being preserved and brutal tyranny being ex- 
 cluded; (c) avoidance of each and every method 
 of interference with the natural consequences of mari- 
 
 1 Bishop Cosin specifies: (a) from Advent Sunday until eight 
 days after Epiphany; (0) from Septuagesima until eight days after 
 Easter; (c) from Rogation Sunday until Trinity Sunday. All these 
 days are inclusive. 
 
150 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 tal intercourse, whether by preventing conception,! 
 by abortion ? or by any other method such as Onan- 
 ism,? etc.—the only righteous way of avoiding pro- 
 creation, when such avoidance is legitimate, being the 
 exercise of self-restraint or abstinence at those seasons 
 when conception is liable to occur; (¢d) mutual fidelity, 
 the sins of adultery and fornication being equally 
 grave for both parties; (e) cultivation of mutual regard 
 and affection, that the union may agree in its loving 
 quality with that between Christ and His Church; 
 (f) the common enjoyment of available earthly goods 
 and advantages, both being equally bound also by the 
 principles of stewardship; (g) mutual recognition of, 
 and adherence to, the complementary relations of 
 man and wife—the headship of the man and the glory 
 of the wife and mother being alike protected from 
 degradation and subversion; (/) parental obligations, 
 as previously set forth.4 
 
 § 8. Unction of the Sick, subject to the right of the 
 Church to determine and regulate its administration, 
 is a blessing to which the sick are entitled, on the basis 
 of Scripture and Catholic consent.° Circumstances 
 
 1F, W. Foerster, Marriage and the Sex Problem, Pt. I, ch. vii. The 
 whole book is a valuable contribution to sane ideas concerning sex 
 problems. 
 
 2On abortion, see Cath. Encyc., q.v.; Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., 
 s.v. “Foeticide;”? C. Coppens, Moral Prin’s and Medical Practice. 
 
 8 Gen. xxxviil. g—I0. 
 
 4In ch. iv, § 11 (a), above. 
 
 5 St. James v. 14-15. Cf. St. Mark vi. 13; xvi. 18; St. Matt. x. 8. 
 On its lawfulness and desirability in the Anglican Communion, see 
 F. J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 315-317, 329 ff; F. W. Puller, The Anointing 
 of the Sick, ch. ix. Legislation is in process in the American General 
 
UNCTION OF THE SICK 151 
 
 may even make it the duty of the sick to claim the 
 right, but certain conditions qualify it. The Angli- 
 can Church makes no definite provision for it; and 
 in many dioceses the oil is not available, and episcopal 
 authority is exercised against its use. Peace and 
 charity may demand self-denial by the sick. The 
 use of ostensible substitutes, however, such as Chris- 
 tian Science treatment, is not justifiable. In view 
 of the rapid growth of modern healing cults the 
 advisability of a general restoration of Unction is 
 obvious. But the use of natural remedies is obliga- 
 tory, because grace is not designed to displace nature 
 but to supplement and perfect it. 
 
 Unction may be administered in any serious illness, 
 before an operation, or in cases of nervous disorder. 
 The authority of the physician in particular cases 
 may not be disregarded without sufficiently grave 
 reason. When all the sacraments suitable for the sick 
 are administered at the same visit the order should 
 be Penance, Communion, Unction. Spiritual as well 
 as physical benefits ought to be expected, for the 
 physical effect is itself a work of grace, and we may 
 not think that any religious instrument appointed of 
 God in His Church can fail of spiritual results when 
 rightly employed. But the habit of confining the use 
 of Unction to the moment of death is an abuse.} 
 
 Convention which will probably provide in the American Prayer 
 Book an authorized form for Unction. 
 
 1Qn the whole subject, F. J. Hall, of. cit., ch. x; A. P. Forbes, 
 XXXIX. Aris., pp. 465-474; F. G. Belton, Manual for Confessors, 
 Pt. VI, ch. iv; St. Thomas, III, suppl. xxix-xxxiii; F. G. Belton, 
 Present Day Problems, etc., ch. vii. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 I. Notable Duties 
 
 4 §1. The Notable Duties are so-called because they 
 are conspicuous elements of religion under all condi- 
 tions: They are prayer, fasting and almsgiving.! It 
 is sometimes said that Christ did not command them. 
 He did more, for He gave rules for their observance as 
 being too generally acknowledged to require specific 
 command.? 
 
 Prayer 3 has the two branches of public or corporate 
 and private prayer, giving obligatory expression 
 respectively to our social or ecclesiastical and our 
 personal relations to God. ‘The former has already 
 been considered elsewhere. The obligation of habit- 
 ual prayer is elementary, among other reasons, be- 
 
 1 Vernon Staley, The Practical Religion, Pt. II, ch. ii. 
 
 2 Cf. St. Matt. vi. 2-18. 
 
 3, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 88-90; and Eschatalogy, pp. 
 10-128; A. J. Worlledge, Prayer; H. P. Liddon, Some Elements of 
 Religion, Lec. v; A. C. A. Hall, Christ. Doctr. of Prayer; W. J. 
 Carey, The Life in Grace, pp. 113-127; and Prayer and some of its 
 Difficulties. 
 
 4JIn ch. iv. § 7 (0), above. 
 
 152 
 
NOTABLE DUTIES 153 
 
 cause unless we habitually express our dependent 
 relations to God we soon cease to realize their central 
 importance and fall away from God. Eucharistic 
 worship affords the proper background and controlling 
 principles of private prayer, which may be either oral 
 or mental. 
 
 Oral prayer, or prayer expressed in words, is possible 
 for all and is of universal obligation. It contains 
 several distinct elements, no one of which should be 
 habitually neglected; although the proportions in 
 which they are present in individual acts of devotion 
 will necessarily vary widely. In its fulness it con- 
 sists of acts of homage, self-oblation, penitence, 
 praise, thanksgiving, petition for oneself and inter- 
 cession for others. The minimum of private oral 
 prayer, according to enlightened consent, should be 
 every morning and evening. 
 
 Mental prayer or meditation, although not required 
 of all by specific precept, emerges as an inevitable 
 and necessary step in Christian advance towards 
 perfection! A mistaken impression exists that it is 
 wholly out of the reach of ordinary Christians. The 
 truth is that meditation is an act which can be prac- 
 tised by all, but which has many degrees of perfection. 
 Only those who practice it systematically can rise to 
 
 1A. G. Mortimer, Helps to Meditation, vol. I, pp. xiii-xix; P. B. 
 Bull, The Threefold Way, pp. 1-13; W. H. Hutchings, The Life of 
 Prayer, Lec. v; A. Poulain, The Graces of Interior Prayer, ch. i-ii. 
 Strictly speaking, meditation is only one of the forms of mental 
 
 prayer; but it is practically the only one generally available. We 
 are not in this treatise concerned with contemplative prayer. 
 
154 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 its heights; but even in forms which lie within general 
 capacity it constitutes the salt of religious life. This 
 can be seen in its definition. Meditation is the appli- 
 cation severally of all our mental faculties to the sacred 
 lessons of our religion for the purpose of making them 
 more effectual factors in our lives. Thus it may be 
 either a rough and ready affair or a highly developed 
 practice. Its parallel in everyday life may be sig- 
 nified by the word brooding. When a man broods 
 over anything that he feels inclined to dwell upon, he 
 is meditating; and since every man broods, every 
 man can meditate if he is vitally inclined to do so. 
 In its developing form meditation employs rules and 
 divisions just as any other practice does; and it is by 
 means of these rules that practice is made perfect 
 and more highly effectual for its purpose. But the 
 rules are merely the grammar of meditation and cease 
 to be felt restrictively after they have perfected one 
 in the practice. 
 
 § 2. Fasting} is sufficiently universal among truly 
 religious people, whether Christian or pagan, to be 
 regarded as a natural mark of religion. Its present 
 neglect is not the fruit of enlightenment, but of 
 the great stress and luxury of modern life. The nec- 
 essary connection between some measure of fasting 
 and consistent religious practice remains unaltered. 
 For the Christian its obligation is: (a) assumed 
 
 1V,. Staley, op. cit., Pt. II, ch. vi; E. Westermarck, op. ctt., vol. 
 II, pp. 292 ff.; Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., g.v.; St. Thomas, II, H, 
 xlvi-xlvii; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “Fast.” 
 
NOTABLE DUTIES Iss 
 
 in our Lord’s teaching; (b) required by universal 
 ecclesiastical precept; (c) recognized to be a chief 
 instrument of self-discipline; (d) having devotional 
 significance in itself, and therefore invariably asso- 
 ciated with any extraordinary act of religion. 
 
 Ecclesiastical language is governed by the dis- 
 tinction between fasting and abstinence. A day of 
 fasting means a day of total refusal of nourishment 
 until evening. A day of abstinence means one in 
 which flesh-meat and luxurious diet will be abandoned. 
 This Church imposes but two fasts, Ash Wednesday 
 and Good Friday. According to the historical con- 
 notation of terms, she requires abstinence from flesh- 
 meat on all Fridays except Christmas Day, during 
 the Lenten season, and on Ember and Rogation days. 
 The definitive American formula is, “‘Such a measure 
 of abstinence as is more especially suited to extraor- 
 dinary acts and exercises of devotion.”’ Modern con- 
 ditions make it impossible for many people to fulfil 
 these rules according to their full letter. In such 
 cases, however, the spirit of the law remains in force, 
 and full observance ought to be approximated so 
 far as conditions and circumstances permit. These 
 considerations apply also to the precept of fasting 
 Communion.! 
 
 § 3. Almsgiving? under Christian conditions has 
 
 1Qn fasting communion, F. J. Hall, The Sacramenis, pp. 186-188; 
 F. W. Puller, Concerning the Fast before Communion; J. W. Legg, 
 Papal Faculties Allowing Food before Communion. 
 
 2On almsgiving, see G. Uhlhorn, Christian Charity in the Ancient 
 Church; E. Westermarck, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 548-569; V. Staley, 
 
156 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 three ends: (a) to express our relation to God; (6) 
 to support and extend the Church; (c) to express and 
 fulfil brotherly love. 
 
 In determining the measure of obligation in alms- 
 giving it is to be noted that the Jewish law of tithes 
 is no longer law, but still affords a revelation of what 
 constituted the minimum of acceptable self-denial 
 under Jewish conditions. It should be added that 
 Christian love cannot normally be thought to express 
 itself adequately or acceptably to God by a less onerous 
 self-denial than God required of the Jews; but the 
 onerousness and spiritual significance of self-denial 
 cannot be measured accurately by the conditions of 
 another race and age, or by unchanging mathematical 
 ratios. The basis of estimate is, broadly speaking, 
 the amount of money, or of any form of wealth, which 
 the man has available for current personal expendi- 
 ture. Thus the man who receives no revenue within 
 a given period, but who is none the less in a position 
 to spend $3000 a year for purposes of subsistence, is in 
 the position, touching almsgiving, of enjoying a salary 
 of $3000. 
 
 It must be acknowledged that many people have 
 no other mode of giving alms than by devoting time 
 and labour to God’s service and to that of the poor. 
 It is a subtle temptation to assume this fact without 
 
 op. cit., Pt. Il, ch. iti; F. G. Peabody, Christian Life in the Modern 
 World, pp. 147-163; St. Thomas, II, I, xxx-xxxiii. Weare not here 
 concerned with the tithes of English law, which in current conditions 
 belong to legal dues rather than to almsgiving. 
 
CIVIL OBLIGATIONS 157 
 
 due warrant, and to salve one’s conscience by con- 
 tributing fussy activity that is really a form of rem- 
 edying ennui rather than of self-denial. 
 
 In the matter of giving to the poor, careful judg- 
 ment may be needed to avoid hurting instead of 
 helping, and to escape the evil of wasting resources 
 which should be administered to the best advantage. 
 But in doing this we incur the danger, generally over- 
 looked, of forgetting a vital Christian aim in alms- 
 giving, which is to show personal love, and to win 
 persons to God. Accordingly, we always incur a 
 risk when we refuse to give money to persons because 
 we do not feel sure that the gift will be properly used. 
 
 II. Civil Obligations? 
 
 §4. The civil authority is ordained of God? 
 It is essential for public order and for common wel- 
 fare, especially in temporal things. These things 
 are not intrinsically the most important for man, 
 but extrinsically they afford conditions which are 
 
 1Bp. Butler, Three Sermons on Human Nature, serm. ii, “Because 
 some are unworthy we cannot excuse ourselves from all giving.” 
 Morally the position taken by the man who says “‘I never give to 
 beggars” is apt to be very questionable. While we should observe 
 the findings of sound sociological science, the requirements of visible 
 Christian love may not give way to them, lest we become mere 
 utilitarians. 
 
 2 The subject of Ecclesiastical Precepts, logically taken up at this 
 stage, has been given such treatment as our space permits in ch. iv, 
 § rx (b), above. 
 
 3? Rom. xiii. 1-7. 
 
158 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 normally necessary for fulfilment of the higher spirit- 
 ual ends. Within the limits already indicated in 
 treating of the Fifth Commandment,! Christians are 
 under obligation: (a) to obey the civil law and civil 
 authority; (b) to defend it against enemies, whether 
 external or internal; (c) to serve it when occasions 
 arise, whether officially or by exercising an intelligent 
 suffrage; (d) to cultivate esprit du corps or patriotism. 
 
 § 5. The limits of obligation in these directions 
 include: (a) natural rights, generally acknowledged 
 to belong to individuals; (6) constitutional rights; 
 (c) international rights and international laws; (d) 
 conflict with spiritual jurisdiction; (e) violation of 
 conscience. 
 
 When a conflict of rights arises in relation to the 
 state, two alternatives present themselves to citizens: 
 (a) revolution; (6) passive obedience. The right of 
 revolution does not belong to private individuals but 
 to the people at large; although if individuals were 
 not morally permitted certain forms of agitation, cal- 
 culated to bring about revolution, no revolution would 
 ever be justifiable. In practice, however, revolu- 
 tionary agitation can never be condoned by the state 
 except when it becomes successful. ‘The distinction 
 between lawful revolution and seditious agitation is 
 often difficult to draw; but the burden of proof lies 
 always with the revolutionist, and his only method of 
 shouldering that burden is to succeed in his agitation. 
 Fortunately the question will rarely arise with a.sin- 
 
 1In ch. iv, § 11 (c), above. 
 
CIVIL OBLIGATIONS 159 
 
 cere Christian. Passive obedience means submission 
 to the legal consequences of obeying one’s conscience 
 contrary to civillaw. In certain instances a man may 
 not only be permitted, but is morally obliged, to 
 refuse to undertake positive acts and to violate pro- 
 hibitions in defiance of civil law. But this does not 
 exempt him from submitting to the legal consequences, 
 except so far as the law itself provides him with means 
 of resistance. 
 
 Civil obligations involve and include so much study 
 of civil institutions and of civil law as is necessary 
 for a reasonably intelligent fulfilment of these obli- 
 gations.! 
 
 1 Our treatment of Civil obligations is necessarily lacking in detail. 
 See, in general, N. Porter, op. cit., chh. xiv-xvi; T. Slater, op. cit., 
 vol. I, Bk. 3, a good and full treatment; J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 81 ff., 
 and on Law and Justice, §§ 517-589; N. K. Davis, op. cit., Pt. IT, 
 ch. iv; Koch Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 119-181. St. Thomas, 
 I, II, xc, 4, defines law as “‘a rational institution for the common 
 good, promulgated by him who has the care of the public.” J. P. 
 Gury says, ‘‘Lex est regula externa et remota actuum humanorum, 
 sicut conscientia seu dictamen practicum rationis est eorumdem 
 regula interna et proxima.” It begets in the subject an obligation, 
 and therefore is of the nature of a precept, concerning that which 
 ought to be done, rather than of a counsel. It is promulgated by a 
 competent authority with the view of imposing an obligation; laws 
 imposed by those who lack competent authority, e.g., the Germans in 
 Belgium, do not bind the conscience. For the well-being and peace 
 of society it is necessary that the power of imposing laws should be 
 vested in some supreme authority, and authority to impose implies 
 the power to secure obedience. 
 
 The principle underlying the imposition of law should be that of 
 allowing to the individual as much liberty as is consistent with the 
 well-being of the community as a whole. The common good is 
 
160 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 III. Sociological Obligations 
 
 § 6. By sociological obligations! we mean those 
 which are involved in organized business and industry, 
 in contracts, and in the conventions of social inter- 
 course. In the field of organized business and indus- 
 
 always to be had in view. Certain limitations have to be reckoned 
 with: (a) Human laws can extend only to acts and words, not to 
 thoughts. This is the greatest point of contrast between human and 
 divine law. (0) As human laws are subordinate to the divine law, it 
 follows that they can not bind Christians when contrary to it. If 
 such a law is imposed, the duty of the individual is clearly to obey the 
 higher law at whatever cost. ‘‘We ought to obey God rather than 
 men,” Acts v. 29; cf. Acts iv. 19; Dan. iii. A law requiring some- 
 thing morally wrong is not valid, but imposes a negative obligation, 
 that of disobeying it. Divine law aims at securing justice, and when 
 any human law clearly disregards this end it fails to bind. St. Aug., 
 de Lib. Arb. I, 5, “A law that is not just does not appear to be a law 
 at all.” Bp. Sanderson, op. cit., pp. 177 ff., asks the question, What 
 certainty can a man have that a law is unjust? and answers that in 
 case of uncertainty he is to obey as following the safer course, it 
 being presupposed that there would be no uncertainty if the law were 
 clearly in opposition to the higher divine law. Human law may add 
 its explicit support to divine law, and may define and regulate its 
 application. Civil laws have reference in many cases to things which 
 are morally indifferent, e.g., laws regarding expectoration in public 
 places; but when such laws are imposed they become morally bind- 
 ing. This does not militate against the right to construe objection- 
 gle sumptuary laws as narrowly as their letter will permit, and to 
 agitate for their repeal or modification. An example is afforded by 
 prohibitionary legislation, which often inflicts injustice and infringes 
 on private right. If it forbade the use of true wine for sacramental 
 purposes, it could not lawfully be obeyed by catholic Christians. 
 
 1 Intelligent consideration of them presupposes some acquaintance 
 with sociological science; on which, Hastings, Encyc. of Relig. 
 and Cath. Encyc. q.vv. (with bibliog.); F. H. Giddings, Prin’s of 
 Sociology. 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 161 
 
 try, a multitude of serious problems arise, calling for 
 the attention of expert sociologists and economists, 
 and made difficult by the clash of mutually inconsist- 
 ent propagandas and by continually changing circum- 
 stances. We treat only of the chief moral principles 
 involved and of a few illustrative applications. 
 
 The more basic principles are: (a) the brotherhood 
 of man and the implied obligation of brotherly love, 
 exhibited in promoting common temporal welfare by 
 all methods consistent with bringing men to God 
 and to their chief end of eternal life; (6) the preserva- 
 tion of just balance between the rights of society at 
 large and those of private individuals; (c) the adjust- 
 ment of mutually conflicting claims of different social 
 and industrial classes in such wise as to promote 
 mutual and efficient service on the part of all; (d) 
 the protection of private individuals in their right to 
 a fair chance to obtain reasonable subsistence and 
 freedom in the management and enjoyment of their 
 daily life. In an enlightened Christian community 
 the personal emphasis will be placed upon one’s own 
 duties and upon the rights of others, rather than upon 
 one’s own rights and upon the duties of others.? 
 
 “Socialism”? designates several mutually conflict- 
 
 1 More comprehensively, what are called natural rights. See 
 J. H. Hyslop, Elem. of Ethics, pp. 432-440; N. K. Davis, Elem. of 
 Ethics, §§ 22-41. 
 
 2 The two are interrelated and in adequate definition imply each 
 other. 
 
 3On Socialism, Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., g.v.; Schaff-Herzog 
 Encyc., s.vv. “Christian Socialism” and “Socialism;” R. T. Ely, 
 
162 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 ing theories, but tends unduly to submerge individual 
 rights in those of society at large; to favour the labour- 
 ing class, so called, at the expense of other classes; 
 and to emphasize present welfare and comfort, to the 
 exclusion of religion and man’s chief end. Theeffort 
 to develop a ‘‘ Christian Socialism” which will escape 
 these dangers does not appear to be successful. The 
 reason is that every species of Socialism has for its 
 basic principle an exaggerated emphasis upon the 
 possibilities of ideal social adjustment in this world, 
 accompanied by an inevitable tendency to drive man’s 
 chief end into the background.! The indisputable 
 obligation involved, one that is independent of all 
 social theories and adjustments, is simply this, that 
 we should seek to promote mutual unselfishness be- 
 tween individuals and classes under all circumstances 
 and social systems. that actually prevail. A classic 
 illustration of this can be seen in the primitive Chris- 
 tian treatment of slaves and slavery.2_ The Christian 
 Church and its clergy are not charged with solving 
 the problems of sociological adjustment, but with 
 impelling competent leaders to bring Christian 
 motives and principles to their solution, and with 
 
 Socialism: Tis Nature, Strength, and Weakness; Thos. Kirkup, 
 Hist. of Socialism; J. T. Stoddart, The New Socialism; A. V. Wood- 
 worth, Christian Socialism in England; Robert Flint, Socialism. 
 
 1F, J. Hall, “This Miserable and Naughty World,” in Angl. 
 Theol. Rev., Oct., 1920. 
 
 2 Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.v. “Slavery (Christian),” 3-4; J. B. 
 Lightfoot, Epp. to Coloss. and Philem., pp. 316 ff. Cf. Philem; x Cor. 
 Zr ay Gal aes) Col. irr. 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 163 
 
 teaching all men to be governed by such motives and 
 principles in whatever sociological situation they 
 actually find themselves.! 
 
 § 7. Modern industrialism? is obviously in need 
 of reform, and in its present form is a hindrance to 
 the realization of Christian brotherhood. It has 
 grown out of the invention of labour-saving machinery, 
 the use of which requires capital and a species of 
 organization of labour which centralizes its control 
 in a few hands; deprives the individual worker of 
 ownership and control of his tools; and reduces the 
 security of his hold on profitable employment. The 
 most evil consequence of all is the reduction of per- 
 sonal relations and values. The individual worker 
 becomes a mere cog of a wheel in vast machinery; 
 and anything approximating personal relations be- 
 tween himself and his employer is rarely possible. 
 They are forced apart, and their interests are more or 
 less mutually antagonistic. The labourers are prac- 
 tically driven into self-defensive organizations, and 
 intermittent warfare prevails between employers 
 and labour-unions. 
 js Some remedy for this situation is plainly needed, 
 and the paternalistic schemes to which just-minded 
 heads of industrial plants occasionally resort do not 
 
 1¥, J. Hall, “The Church and Social Betterment,” in Angl. Theol. 
 Rev., Dec., 1920. 
 
 2 See Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.vv. “Industrialism,”’ “ Employers,” 
 “Employment,” and ‘“Economics;” J. A. Hobson, Evolution of 
 Modern Capitalism. 
 
164 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 meet the real difficulty—the sense of abject depend- 
 ence and insecurity to which the workers are reduced. 
 The solution will probably come through some system 
 of codperative ownership and management; but this 
 must be worked out gradually by carefully conducted 
 experiments, conducted by royal hearted leaders. 
 In the meantime, the Church can only supply inspira- 
 tion and emphasize the principles of righteousness 
 which ought to be observed in all situations and under 
 all systems—not failing to set forth the duty of effi- 
 cient service in every walk of life. 
 
 § 8. Among the obligations which ought to be 
 emphasized in all situations is that of the fulfilment 
 of contracts,! in spirit as well as in letter. Contracts 
 require: (a) fit matter, lawful, honest and possible; 
 {b) permissible cause; (c) legally capable parties; 
 (d) legitimate consent. This last constitutes the 
 contract itself; and it must be mutual; must have a 
 recognized external sign; and must be unconstrained, 
 reasonably deliberate, and without deception. 
 
 The obligations incurred by a lawfully made con- 
 tract are determined and limited: (a) by its explicit 
 terms; (b) by their necessary implications; (c) by 
 relevant civil law, the force of which is implied in all 
 contracts. 
 
 These obligations are terminated: (a) by their 
 complete fulfilment; (6) by mutual acceptance of a 
 substitutionary contract; (c) by mutual consent to 
 
 1On Contracts, Thos. Slater, op. cit, Bk. VII; F. Pollock, 
 First Book of Jurisprudence, Pt. I, ch. viii. 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 165 
 
 cancel the contract; (d) by allowed compensation; 
 (ec) by voluntary concession from the other party; 
 (f) by such counter obligations as, in lawful effect, 
 fulfil or dissolve it; (g) by obligations which legally 
 invalidate the contract; (4) by substantial mistake, 
 for then there was no real agreement; (2) if the con- 
 tract was made conditionally, by failure to fulfil the 
 condition; (j) by impossibility of fulfilment arising 
 from conditions which did not exist when the con- 
 tract was executed; (%) in many cases, by the death 
 of one of the parties. 
 
 § 9. Economic science ! exhibits certain laws which 
 control exchanges, whether the things exchanged are 
 commodities, services or money. They cannot be 
 violated when profit is in view, and can be disre- 
 garded only by substituting other ends, such as either 
 robbery or charity. When such substitution occurs 
 the consequences are sometimes morally evil and some- 
 times morally good. We give four illustrations of 
 economic laws. 
 
 (a) The law of supply and demand is that economic 
 values and prices are the result of an equation be- 
 tween supply and demand. Prices fall with an in- 
 crease of supply and rise with an increase of demand, 
 invariably expressing the balance of these two in- 
 fluences. Supply means what is available for ex- 
 change, and demand means what is sought for in 
 exchange. This law cannot be altered; but either 
 supply or demand can be, and often is altered, either 
 
 1 On economics, Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., g.v. (with good bibliog.). 
 
166 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 in the interest of selfishness, as in a ‘‘corner,’’! or in 
 that of charity, as when the available supply of goods 
 is increased in order to cheapen them for the poor. 
 But the interests of charity are violated when methods 
 of manipulation are employed which upset the gen- 
 eral stability of exchange and disturb the legitimate 
 profits of established business or industry. 
 
 (6) The law of profit in mercantile exchanges is to 
 buy in a relatively cheap market, e.g., a wholesale 
 market, and sell in a relatively dear one, e.g., a retail 
 market. In the example given the profit represents 
 remuneration to a commission merchant for facilitating 
 the exchange of goods between producer and con- 
 sumer. What are called speculative exchanges, how- 
 ever, aim at profit through buying at one time and 
 selling at another in the same market. This law of 
 profit cannot be broken. Ina succession of exchanges 
 profit cannot be obtained in any other way. Buta 
 man may, for charity’s sake, decline to seek profit. In 
 such case he withdraws from the sphere to which the 
 law of profit applies. Such procedure, however, can 
 only be exceptional; for if men generally refused to 
 engage in economic exchanges a large portion of the 
 community would be deprived of the means of sub- 
 sistence, and no one could obtain them except either 
 by producing them himself or by becoming an object 
 of charity. 
 
 (c) The law that every economic exchange involves 
 
 1Qn the moral aspects of monopolies in general, see T. Slater, 
 op. cit., vol. I, pp. 535-538. 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 167 
 
 mutual service, a quid pro quo on both sides, is invio- 
 late. The seller serves the buyer by furnishing him 
 with what he values more than its price. The buyer 
 serves the seller by giving him a price which he values 
 more than what he sells. Similarly the employer 
 gives wages which the employee values more than 
 relief from work, and the employee performs work 
 which the employer values more than what he pays 
 for it. The difference between selfish exchange and 
 Christian exchange lies in what is emphasized. 
 Mutual service is unavoidable; but the selfish man 
 thinks only of the service rendered to himself, while 
 the Christian thinks of the service which he is in a 
 position to render to the other. Justice works out 
 in this way: the Christian derives happiness from 
 service, and the selfish man gains the least satisfac- 
 tion from his profit. 
 
 (d) An economic exchange postulates freedom 
 from compulsion and from any other restraints 
 than those which the general conditions of human 
 subsistence require. If, therefore, men are com- 
 pelled to make disadvantageous exchanges, the 
 difficulty is not due to the laws of political econ- 
 omy but to some one’s selfish manipulation of the 
 conditions under which they operate, as in profiteering 
 and speculation. The moral quality of speculation 
 requires discrimination to estimate properly. It 
 consists of exchanges in which ultimate profit is con- 
 tingent upon future market values. The speculative 
 element is present in much necessary business, busi- 
 
168 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 ness which it would be absurd to regard as wrong. 
 The principle by which to distinguish between legit- 
 imate and harmful speculation is the law of mutual 
 service. It is true that every exchange constitutes 
 for the moment a mutual service; but the question 
 remains, Can a whole series of transactions of which 
 a given exchange is a factor, afford profit to all parties 
 concerned? If it obviously cannot do so, and profit 
 on one side can only be gained at the cost of loss on 
 the other, the exchange is rightly described as gam- 
 bling; which includes not only games of chance in 
 which values change hands, but also every form of 
 venture in which it is known beforehand that one 
 party’s profit involves the other party’s loss.! 
 
 § 10. (a) Gambling offers one of several moral 
 problems which demand attention here. The prac- 
 tice is justified on the plea that when the stakes are 
 moderate the loser is merely paying a price which he 
 can afford, and which he is willing to run the risk of 
 paying, for recreation. As thus defined and limited, 
 gambling cannot be said to be intrinsically wrong. 
 The difficulty is that the practice tends in a large 
 majority of instances to pass beyond defensible 
 limits both of time consumed and of resources put to 
 risk. At best it is a morally dangerous pastime, con- 
 trary to Christian expediency. Personal pride, as 
 well as the hope of a turn in the run of luck, prevents 
 the loser from withdrawing when the amusement is 
 
 1 On speculation, see S. J. Chapman, Transactions of the Statistical 
 Society, June, 1906. 
 
 z 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 169 
 
 becoming too costly, and the other party may be led 
 both by ignorance and eagerness of victory to bring 
 disaster—even ruin—upon him. The principle of 
 stewardship requires that every one shall protect 
 his resources from unnecessary risk of loss, so that he 
 may use them wisely in fulfilment of his responsi- 
 bilities under God. In brief, while not every form 
 and degree of indulgence in gambling is sinful, the 
 practice is usually unsafe and morally inexpedient.} 
 (b) Usury? means to-day the exacting of excessive 
 
 1On gambling, Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., and Cath. Encyc., q.vv.; 
 B. S. Rowntree, Betting and Gambling; W. D. Mackenzie, Ethics of 
 Gambling; Thos. Slater, op. cit., pp. 557 ff. Durant Drake, op. cit., 
 Pp. 242, says, ‘‘Even if a man be rich, he should steward his wealth 
 for purposes useful to society. And he must remember that if he 
 can afford to lose, perhaps his opponent cannot. Moreover, if many 
 cannot afford to lose, no one can afford to win. Insidiously this 
 getting of unearned money promotes laziness, and the desire to acquire 
 more money without work. It makes against loving relations with 
 others, since one always gains at another’s expense. It quickly 
 becomes a morbid passion, an unhealthy excitement, which absorbs 
 too much energy and kills more natural enjoyments.’”’ Games in 
 which no money is put to risk are, of course, a perfectly righteous 
 form of recreation; but their intemperate pursuit is sinful. The 
 profession of affording amusement to others, whether by games or 
 by the drama, is perfectly lawful if immoral elements are excluded. 
 Cf. F. G. Belton, Present Day Problems, ch. v. 
 
 2See T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 512-519. P. V. N. Myers, 
 op. cit., p. 155, “The loaning of money in ancient times was in gen- 
 eral a very different thing from similar money transactions in this 
 commercial and industrial age. Those seeking loans were the very 
 poor, who were forced to borrow to meet domestic necessities. Under 
 such conditions the taking of interest would naturally be denounced, 
 and those who did so would come to be regarded as extortioners and 
 robbers of the poor.’ There is an entire disregard of the changed 
 
170 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 rates of interest on financial loans, in particular, rates 
 higher than the law permits. Formerly it meant the 
 exacting of any interest whatever on such loans, and 
 the practice was regarded in Christian circles as always 
 wrong. ‘The reason was that money was then re- 
 garded exclusively as a fungible, a loan of it being not 
 a commercial service im se but an act of philanthropy. 
 To require pay for philanthropy rightly seemed sinful. 
 Under modern capitalistic conditions, however, the 
 use of money has value in the production of wealth, 
 and to lend is not only to postpone its use for oneself 
 but to reduce one’s resources for the increase of 
 wealth. We lend at cost to ourselves—a cost not 
 remedied by repayment merely of the sum lent. The 
 exacting of interest is therefore a lawful form of 
 securing remuneration for productive service. The 
 fact remains, of course, that excessive interest—the 
 present meaning of ‘‘usury’”—may not be exacted 
 without sin. It is a species of robbery. 
 
 (c) Business combinations and trusts * are inevitable 
 and to a degree necessary means for effectively organ- 
 izing and cheapening production, marketing and 
 other forms of economic service. They cannot rightly 
 be considered as wrong in themselves. Rightly built 
 
 circumstances by those who insist upon literal interpretation of Old 
 Testament passages, ¢.g., Deut. xxili. 19-20; and to regard the lan- 
 guage of the Fathers in this matter as binding us is wholly to mis- 
 take their application. Cf. Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.v. “Usury 
 (Christian).”’ 
 
 1Qn which, R. T. Ely, Monopolies and Trusts; Cath. Encyc., 
 s.0. “Monopoly”’; Thos. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 535-538. 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 171 
 
 up and used, they are beneficial to the public and are 
 to be welcomed. But they afford opportunities 
 and temptations to wrong-doing on a large scale; 
 and therefore require watchfulness on the part of all 
 concerned, along with regulative legislation. The 
 wrongs that are apt to appear are those of driving 
 smaller concerns out of business, of monopolistic 
 manipulation of prices and profiteering. Incidentally 
 the wrongs inflicted by capitalists on labour are apt 
 to be intensified, and made more difficult to remedy. 
 Of course, the labouring classes have also the right 
 to combine for self-protection, and labour unions are 
 perfectly lawful. But they too are susceptible of 
 abuse. They may inflict irreparable damage on 
 industry and, by increasing the cost and difficulty of 
 production, on the consuming public as well. Not 
 being legally incorporated, they cannot be effectively 
 restrained by suits for damages. These evils cannot 
 be permanently remedied except by the development 
 of social unselfishness in the community at large. 
 Without this, the most reasonable laws and external 
 adjustments fall short of adequate and abiding results. 
 
 (d) Poverty! is not invariably due to the fault of 
 others, or to the existing conditions of productive 
 service. A certain amount of it and of pauperism 
 arises from incompetence and inability of adjustment 
 having natural and unescapable causes. After every 
 effort to improve general conditions, poverty, while 
 
 1 Cath. Encyc. and Hastings, op. cit., g.vv.; B.S. Rowntree, Poverty; 
 R. Hunter, Poverty. 
 
172 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 it may be lessened in extent, cannot be wholly abol- 
 ished. So it is that, after all has been done in obe- 
 dience to Christian principles to reduce the reducible 
 causes of poverty, the duty of philanthropic charity 
 and almsgiving remains, whether to meet special 
 emergencies or to help the incurably inefficient. 
 
 IV. Obligations Voluntarily Incurred 
 
 § 11. Moral obligations are incurred not only by 
 contracts, as above indicated, but also by vows and 
 by choice of vocation in life. 
 
 Vows are promises made to God, and are dis- 
 tinguished as (a) solemn and simple, the former being 
 such as are made with the formal sanction of religious 
 authority, e.g., monastic vows; (6) personal and real, 
 according to whether they affect personal conduct 
 only, or property; (c) temporary and permanent, in 
 no case exempting from prior moral obligations. 
 
 In order to be valid, a vow (a) must have true 
 intention, voluntary, deliberate, with understanding 
 of the matter, and seriously expressed; and such 
 expression is not nullified or reduced in effect by men- 
 tal reservations; (+) must have in view something 
 morally lawful and morally possible. An invalid 
 vow, if followed by evil consequences to others, 
 creates the obligation to do what is possible to remedy 
 
 1 Hastings, op. cit., and Schaff-Herzog Encyc., g.vv.; St. Thomas, 
 
 IT, II, Ixxxviii, clxxxiv, 4; Thos. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 246-256; 
 J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 319-336; W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 139-143. 
 
OBLIGATIONS VOLUNTARILY INCURRED 173 
 
 the evil. <A “personal” vow binds only its maker; 
 but a ‘‘real”’ vow binds one’s heirs, that is, within the 
 limits of the inherited estate. 
 
 A vow may be nullified (a) by certain intrinsic 
 causes such as fulfilment when permanent action is 
 not required; expiration of the time in case of tem- 
 porary vows; failure of the conditions expressed; 
 and physical or moral impossiblity of fulfilment; 
 (6) by prohibition of competent authority, as in the 
 case of minors; (c) by ecclesiastical dispensation, 
 which is possible in the case of any vow that has not 
 obtained legal and civil force. 
 
 It is sinful to make vows of trivial nature and to 
 make any vows whatever for light reasons, impul- 
 sively and without serious deliberation. The reason 
 is that they have a religious nature, and enlarge our 
 moral responsibilities—a consequence which may not 
 be invited without earnest forethought and prayer. 
 
 §12. The obligations connected with personal 
 vocation or life-work come under the head of obliga- 
 tions voluntarily incurred, because normally each one 
 chooses or voluntarily accepts his or her own vocation. 
 In any case, each vocation involves distinctive obli- 
 gations pertaining to its proper fulfilment, falling 
 mainly under the following heads: (a) The choice of 
 vocation should be governed not only by personal 
 bent and natural gifts, but also by spiritual and moral 
 expediency, especially if a proposed occupation will 
 involve loss of religious privileges and exposure to 
 temptations to which the person concerned is pecu- 
 
174 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
 
 liarly liable to yield; (6) Preparation and training 
 for one’s life-work, especially if it is of highly special- 
 ized nature, is plainly of obligation, for vocational 
 duty is not concerned with getting a living merely, 
 but also with efficient service; (c) Regular and pains- 
 taking attention to one’s several vocational duties, 
 with the limitation that these duties shall not dis- 
 place the prior and common obligations of Christians; 
 (d) Proper relations towards, and coéperation with, 
 those who share in the same vocation or who have to 
 be reckoned with in its fulfilment; (e) Cheerful 
 acceptance of, and obedience to, the laws and authori- 
 ties under which the business of one’s vocation is 
 organized and carried on. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 
 
 §1. We have been considering thus far those 
 branches of Christian obligation which are contained 
 or implied in the first two parts of the divine “‘will of 
 signs,’ commands and prohibitions of laws and pre- 
 cepts. For the purpose of avoiding actual sin, and 
 for dealing with penitents, we have therefore covered 
 the necessary ground. But to stop here would be to 
 encourage legalism and to neglect in considerable 
 measure those higher Christian obligations which 
 have to do with attaining spiritual character and 
 fitness for the eternal life that constitutes our ap- 
 pointed destiny and the organizing principle of all 
 our obligations. It is true that the attainment of 
 perfection belongs in Moral Science to Ascetic The- 
 ology, rather than to Moral Theology Proper; but 
 the danger of a legalistic conception of human obliga- 
 tions, on the part of the clergy as well as of the laity, 
 is grave and ever present. We are therefore con- 
 
 1In the confessional a priest is immediately concerned with sin, 
 and must be governed in judging by laws and precepts. But both 
 for the penitent and for himself he is finally concerned with acquisi- 
 
 tion of positive holiness; and his success in dealing with sin will be 
 conditioned by remembering this. Mere freedom from sin is also a 
 
 175 
 
176 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 
 
 strained, before taking up the subjects immediately 
 connected with a priest’s work as confessor, to deal 
 with the other and more inspiring parts of the ‘‘will 
 of signs,’’ viz., permissions, counsels and example. 
 These are best understood in the light of a prelim- 
 inary consideration of virtues, and of the external 
 graces of a Christian gentleman. 
 
 § 2. Personal character, wherein worth and merit 
 in God’s sight primarily consist, determines whether 
 one is fit for, and capable of enjoying, heavenly beati- 
 tude. The acquisition of perfect character, there- 
 fore, is the organizing subjective end of all enlightened 
 Christian conduct and effort. Perfection is indeed 
 rarely attained even approximately in this world, 
 that is, in the strict and ultimately required sense. 
 In another sense, however, that of whole-hearted 
 devotion to progress in virtue and spiritual congenial- 
 ity to God, it is both practicable and obligatory 
 in this life; and the completion of our progress after 
 death is dependent upon our having initiated this 
 progress on earth—at least by sincere repentante, and 
 by such practice of holy virtue as our present oppor- 
 tunities permit. Our progress consists in our advance 
 in the several virtues which constitute the character 
 that is pleasing to God. 
 
 These virtues! are all summarized under the four 
 
 mere preliminary of such holiness. Cf. F. J. Hall, Eschatology, 
 pp. 82-83, 178-180. 
 
 1On virtues, W. W. Webb, od. cit., ch. iv; J. R. Illingworth, 
 Christian Character, chh. iv-vi; J. B. Scaramelli, Directorium Ascet- 
 tcum, vols. III-IV. 
 
VIRTUES AND CHARACTER 177 
 
 “cardinal” virtues of prudence or wisdom, temper- 
 ance, fortitude and justice; and the three heavenly 
 virtues of faith, hope and love—the last-named being 
 the crown and glorifying element in all perfect virtue 
 whatsoever. The cardinal virtues emerge in the 
 natural order of this world, and include those dispo- 
 sitions and habits which perfect our natural manhood 
 for all the responsibilities, individual and social, of 
 this natural life. They pertain to the moral life as 
 that is understood in secular thought, a life which has 
 many creditable illustrations even in non-Christian 
 circles. ! 
 But the natural man is not, even in the noblest 
 examples, fit for God, unless elevated by grace to the 
 supernatural order of sainthood, and brought by the 
 practice of true religion into transforming contact 
 with God. The heavenly virtues are those which 
 emerge in true religion, which pertain specifically to 
 man’s heavenly destiny, and which differentiate the 
 saint from the natural man, however perfect in his 
 native order. They both elevate the cardinal or 
 natural virtues by giving them a higher organizing 
 principle and supernatural dynamic, and supplement 
 them with direct reference to equipment for life with 
 God and for the communion of saints. The differ- 
 ence can well be illustrated by indicating the distinc- 
 tive meaning of love, considered as a heavenly virtue. 
 There is a natural virtue of love, but if purely natural 
 it is also purely utilitarian in its fruit, concerned with. 
 the extension of welfare in this world’s sense of that: 
 
178 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 
 
 term. But heavenly or Christian love is centred 
 in God. It indeed shines forth in manward mani- 
 festation; but the organizing principle and trans- 
 figuring aspect of it even in manward demonstration 
 is the conscious and patient effort which it inspires 
 to bring men to God for the blessed joy of mutual 
 fellowship in the communion of saints. 
 
 § 3. There is a certain finish and external grace 
 in the social life of a truly virtuous man or woman 
 which we have in mind when, without regard to 
 ancestry or social rank, we designate one as a “‘gen- 
 tleman” or a “lady.” Such an one practices good 
 manners, and does so without effort by reason of a 
 species of culture which goes along with good breed- 
 ing, but which has its roots in kindness and consider- 
 ateness for others. That is, it is a fruit of virtue and 
 @ practically important branch of virtuous conduct. 
 Like spiritual unction, good manners are sometimes 
 put on for occasions, but then betray their artificiality 
 and do not please. Only when practised for the sake 
 of kindness and true courtesy are they truly virtuous. 
 
 Good manners have conventional standards or 
 rules of etiquette, rules that vary in different social 
 circles and ranks, but which ought to be normally 
 conformed to as being the accepted methods of kindly 
 and courteous intercourse. This is the legalistic 
 aspect of the matter and may not be disregarded 
 without boorishness, that is, lack of kindness. But 
 a true gentleman or lady, while not forgetful of rules, 
 is not enslaved by them, but seeks to fulfil their pur- 
 
PERMISSIONS 179 
 
 pose even more than their letter. Accordingly, such 
 an one exercises discretion, and adjusts his or her 
 conduct to each and every one and to every occasion. 
 And the final test of good breeding—of kindness—is 
 seen in the manners practised towards those of 
 another social rankswhether inferior or superior. Itis 
 seen in considerate and kind regard for the manners 
 of other circles than our own, however uncouth, on 
 the one hand, or artificial, on the other, they may seem 
 to be when we estimate them unkindly. Truly 
 Christian gentlemen and ladies, in the sense above 
 indicated, constitute the highest nobility on earth, 
 although belonging to every social rank. Their 
 nobility is supernatural—made possible by grace. 
 
 § 4. To a Christian who has an adequate sense of 
 his vocation and implied responsibilities, we have 
 seen, the observance of laws and precepts, vital as it is, 
 is only an initial stage of duty, Over and above all 
 legalistic obligations is the principle of spiritual 
 expediency, of always aiming to conduct oneself, 
 whether in action or in avoidance of action, in the 
 manner that best expedites Christian aims for oneself 
 and for others alike! It is in this light that he inter- 
 prets the “will of signs” ? in its branches of permis- 
 sions and counsels—in all matters not specifically 
 either commanded or prohibited. 
 
 1x, Cor. vi. 12; x. 23-33. On various meanings and bearings of 
 “‘expediency,” see Hastings, Encyc. of Relig.,g.v. Cf. H. L. Goudge, 
 First Ep. to Cor., on ch. vi. 12. 
 
 2 Cf. ch. iv, § 2 init., above. 
 
180 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 
 
 Permissions consist of things which are neither 
 commanded nor advised, but which are not prohibited. 
 Permission does not in this connection mean positive 
 sanction or license. Permissions come to the front 
 especially in relation to practices which are liable to 
 abuse. The fundamental principle involved is that 
 we are given discretion, accompanied by responsibility 
 for doing what is expedient from the moral and spir- 
 itual point of view.! Christians are released from the 
 slavery of legalism, but not from the obligation to 
 apply the principles which lie behind the law of God 
 to the pursuit of Christian perfection both in them- 
 selves and in others.2 In final effect, the so-called 
 permissions are provisional, the proviso being that no 
 liberty be taken which is inconsistent with the pur- 
 suit of our chief end. The following branches may be 
 mentioned: (a) Christians are released from every 
 legal or ceremonial obligation which was originally 
 imposed in a dispensation and under conditions no 
 longer existing. (0) The privileges which enlight- 
 enment of conscience bring, inevitably have to be 
 exercised in a society containing many who are unen- 
 lightened and cannot rightly enjoy these privileges. 
 
 ! Puritanism, found in promoters of reformatory legislation who in 
 many instances would repudiate the theory in terms, tend to place 
 practices liable to abuse among things prohibited. In this they 
 revert to Judaic legalism and tamper with Christian liberty. 
 
 2 Christian liberty does not signify a lowering or lessening of obli- 
 gation, but the substitution of mature judgment for the external 
 rules of immaturity. 
 
 3 F.g., legalistic sabbatarianism. 
 
COUNSELS 18 
 
 Thus age emancipates from parental authority and 
 from many obligations pertaining to the young. 
 Education frees from many restraints imposed by 
 narrow-minded consciences. Illness removes many 
 obligations. Dispensations by competent authority 
 release those who receive them, while others remain 
 bound. In any case, the duty remains to avoid as 
 far as practicable any obtrusive exhibitions of priv- 
 ilege which are likely to make it more difficult for 
 the unprivileged to obey their consciences. (c) 
 The development of science and invention, and 
 changes in social life, bring new practices into vogue 
 which are not covered by any existing precepts, and 
 concerning which differences of moral judgment 
 emerge, ¢.g., smoking. In relation to such practices 
 we have to apply the principles of discretion above 
 described. 
 
 § 5. Along with permissions we have to consider 
 counsels. These may be either divine or human, and 
 may have reference either to heavenly perfection or to 
 earthly conduct. Technically speaking, it is not sin 
 to reject any particular counsel, but the habit of 
 rejecting counsel is certainly sinful, and in many 
 cases the rejection of a particular counsel will breed 
 sin. In brief, counsels afford needed help in moral 
 judgment, but do not extend the scope of moral law. 
 The obligation which they presuppose, and with ref- 
 erence to which they should be considered, is that we 
 should endeavour to advance towards the perfection 
 of Christ, and enlist prudent judgment in doing so. 
 
182 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 
 
 The so-called counsels of perfection really pertain 
 to one among other methods of advancing towards 
 perfection. ‘They.are given only to those who are 
 called to initiate in this life certain extrinsic condi- 
 tions of the future life of heaven, viz., poverty, chas- 
 tity, and obedience. To follow these counsels is said 
 to pertain to a higher life, but this is true only in an 
 external and relative sense, as just explained. The 
 call to interior perfection, or the full development of 
 spiritual character, is of obligation upon all; and is 
 within the reach of every truly Christian type of voca- 
 tion.! 
 
 It is to be noticed: (a) The counsels of perfection, 
 technically so-called, are not to be confused with 
 canonical discipline. Roman priests are under invari- 
 able obligation, except in Uniat Churches, to be celi- 
 bates, not because all priests have received counsel 
 to that effect, but because the canon law so requires. 
 A call to the priesthood is one thing, and the counsel 
 
 1On counsels of perfection, St. Matt. xix. 16-29 and parallels; 
 St. Thomas, I, II, cviii; Cath. Encyc., s.v. ‘“‘Counsels’”’; Hastings, 
 Encyc. of Relig., s.v. ““Counsels and Precepts.’”’ Many writers treat 
 these Counsels as offering a short road to perfection, but this needs 
 to ‘be accepted with great caution. To those who are called to a 
 “religious” vocation, the acceptance and practice of such vocation 
 certainly carries them upward; but to others the “religious” life is 
 likely to be a hindrance. It is needful to remember also in this 
 connection that Christianity offers but one standard of final attain- 
 ment for all. Those who are backward, especially those handi- 
 capped by ignorance, have indeed to be given “milk for babes”— 
 not because they are exempt, but because they are at an early stage 
 of progress. No one, however, can remain at the legalistic stage and 
 enjoy Christian beatitude. 
 
COUNSELS 183 
 
 to celibacy in that connection is another thing. (6) 
 Vows in this connection create the obligations of vows 
 generally, whether justified by genuine counsel from 
 God or not. Therefore the greatest caution needs 
 to be exercised in making them. (c) The religious 
 life, so-called, has no intrinsic superiority over any 
 other life which has a divine call behind it. No con- 
 ditions in this world afford intrinsic superiority in 
 Christian character except the sacraments of salva- 
 tion. (d) The life of a religious does not bring escape 
 from carnal temptation in its coarser forms. To 
 resort to it, therefore, as a safeguard against lust is a 
 frightful blunder. The divinely appointed safe- 
 guard against lust is marriage. (e) Those who are 
 married may receive counsel to practice temporary 
 approximations to the celibate life, but that the mar- 
 ried life should be or normally can be permanently 
 lived after the manner of celibacy is a very dubious 
 proposition. 
 
 The principle of counsels is of much wider applica- 
 tion than that which we have been considering. 
 Counsels pertain generally to the choice of methods 
 and practices which are favourable to spiritual ad- 
 vance, although not specifically required by precept. 
 The general obligation of seeking and weighing the 
 best advice available is certain, whether its supposed 
 excellence is based upon the official or upon the intel- 
 lectual superiority of the adviser. Thus the advice 
 of priests, of parents, of teachers, and of moral and 
 spiritual writers, may become of the greatest impor- 
 
184 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 
 
 tance. The terms of advice, as such, however, do 
 not constitute law, and their disregard is not of itself 
 sin. But we are verily bound by our convictions of 
 what is best to do, and advice may constitute an 
 important factor in attaining to intelligent convic- 
 tions. The need of advice is especially apparent 
 when we perceive that if we fail to seek and follow 
 it we are likely to fall into material sin. Probability 
 is often the only rule by which we can guide our 
 moral conduct, and knowingly to do what appears 
 probably either sinful in itself, or inevitably tending 
 to sin, is sinful. We should distinguish between 
 the obligation of seeking our chief end and that of 
 employing means and methods of doing so. In so far 
 as these means and methods are imposed by law, 
 whether divine or human, our conscience is bound; 
 but in other directions we have to depend upon fallible 
 judgment, and there is not the same strict and tech- 
 nical basis of responsibility. The emphasis to be 
 placed upon counsel is of course increased when there 
 is a divinely recognized relationship of superiority in 
 the position of him who gives advice. 
 
 Many individual Christians are troubled by 
 “scrupulous” consciences, that is, they are unable to 
 arrive at a determinate judgment, even when suf- 
 ficient data are available to warrant decision.!. More 
 often than not the cause is that most difficult of dis- 
 eases to cure, spiritual pride. Such persons ought to 
 be governed implicitly by the best advice that they 
 
 1 On scrupulous consciences, see ch. vili, § 7 (b), below. 
 
EXAMPLE 185 
 
 can obtain. The reason is that determinate conduct 
 is necessarily more safe than vacillation. | 
 
 § 6, Example exhibits in the concrete, whether in 
 its fulness or in its process of formation, the charac- 
 ter which God wills that we should assimilate and 
 into which we should grow. This character is the 
 character of God.! (a) It is partly exhibited in cre- 
 ative and providential operations of the natural order. 
 Really to live according to nature is, to some degree, 
 to imitate God. (0) It is given the most articulate 
 exhibition, and is translated into the terms of human 
 conduct, by the life and character of Christ. There- 
 fore the ideal of Christian life is to imitate Christ. 
 This cannot be done indiscriminately, for many of 
 His actions were justified only by His mediatorial 
 office and by conditions which are not repeated in our 
 lives. The imitation of Christ means growth in 
 the character which was exhibited in His life, the 
 manner of this growth being determined by our own 
 providential circumstances. His character repre- 
 sents the goal of our development, and His life trans- 
 cends our immediate possibilities; but His example 
 is effective because of the power which He communi- 
 cates to us in His Body, which enables us both to 
 imitate His character and to persevere in develop- 
 
 1 “Be ye therefore imitators of God,” Ephes. v. 1. Cf. St. Matt. 
 v. 48. No example binds us by its own right except that of God— 
 of Christ because He is God. F. J. Hall, Incarnation, p. 126. ITfno 
 example of moral perfection, recognizable as such, were available, 
 
 we should be deprived of a most powerful incentive and of final 
 proof of the reality of right. 
 
186 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 
 
 ment after His likeness.1 (c) The example of Christ 
 has to be supplemented by examples of progress out 
 of sin into righteousness. Christ could not afford 
 such example. Therefore the example of the saints 
 constitutes a factor in our imitation of God. The 
 value of saintly lives is due to their exhibiting illus- 
 trations of the practical possiblity of growth of sinners 
 in the perfection of Christ.? 
 
 § 7. Summarizing the distinctive marks and obli- 
 gations of truly Christian conduct, as set forth and 
 implied in all that has been said in this manual: (a) 
 Its controlling end and organizing principle is to 
 glorify God and to enjoy Him forever. (6) Its fun- 
 damental law is love toward God, a love abounding 
 also because of its nature and object toward man, 
 and determined in its specific branches by the Deca- 
 logue and by the terms of the Christian covenant; 
 (c) Its expediency requires an exercise of enlightened 
 discretion, both in interpreting the letter of the law 
 and in meeting the problems of conduct not deter- 
 mined by the law—resort to the best available counsel 
 in doubtful cases being gladly adopted; (d) Its liberty 
 is an emancipation from servile legalism and scru- 
 pulosity;—not license or the lowering of moral require- 
 ment, but the outcome of Spirit-guided insight, 
 
 1F, J. Hall, of. cit., pp. 259-267 (gives further refs. on p. 260). 
 Some of the more important texts are St. Matt. xi. 29-30; St. John 
 xiv. 6, 12; Rom. vili. 29; xv. 2, 3, 5; Ephes. v. 1-2; Phil. ii. 5-11; 
 x St. Pet. ii, 20-21; 1 St. John iii. 3. 
 
 2 Hugh F. Blunt, Great Penitents, passim; F. J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 
 262-263. 
 
CONCLUSION 187 
 
 enlightened judgment and an aim that is both ade- 
 quate and sincere. (e) Its distinctive earthly mark is 
 the habitual practice of repentance—‘‘the Way of 
 Purgation.’”’ (f) Its concrete example and objective 
 standard is the human life and character of God- 
 incarnate, Jesus Christ, the imitation of whom com- 
 pletely summarizes what a Christian should endeavour 
 to become; (g) Its supplementary examples are the 
 lives of Christian saints, as illustrating manners and 
 possibilities for sinners in the imitation of Christ on 
 earth; () Its indispensable conditions and aids are 
 the sacramental means of regenerating, sanctifying 
 and enabling grace, and the established methods of 
 spiritual culture—“‘the Way of Illumination.” (2) Its 
 ultimate result is a realization of personality by at- 
 tainment of perfection and by union with God—‘‘the 
 Way of Union’’—this introducing us to the com- 
 munion of saints, and bringing that form of abiding 
 happiness wherein true beatitude consists. 
 
 The rest of this volume is concerned with matters 
 related to a priest’s responsibilities in dealing with 
 penitent sinners, that is, with the problem of admin- 
 istering the dispensation of divine mercy. If this is 
 kept in mind by the reader, he will not make the 
 blunder of treating its distinctions and allowances as 
 in any way modifying the standard of Christian 
 responsibility above set forth. They have to do with 
 the oft experienced emergencies arising from human 
 ignorance and weakness—not with the aims to which 
 reconciled penitents need to be recalled. We may 
 
188 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 
 
 not forget that escape from sin, on the one hand, is an 
 essential preliminary of Christian progress in which 
 mercy to penitents is prominent; but, on the other 
 hand, is merely a beginning. Sinlessness is not 
 Christian perfection, although essential to it. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 § x. Casuistry is literally the science of cases.? 
 More largely, it may be made to deal also with the 
 methods, principles and rules to be observed in dealing 
 with moral and spiritual problems, such as are 
 brought to priests for solution, whether in the con- 
 fessional or elsewhere. It is preéminently designed 
 to assist the conscience in its judgments and to equip 
 those to whom pertains the guidance of souls in dif- 
 ficulty. Its scope may easily be, and here is, ex- 
 tended also to include treatment of the qualifications 
 needed by one who hears confessions, and of the 
 principles and methods to be observed in hearing 
 them. 
 
 The value of casuistry for a priest depends upon no 
 theory as to the degree of necessity of confession, or 
 
 1J. M. Baldwin, Dic. of Philos., g.v. Casuistry is “(x) The sys- 
 tematic discussion of the application of moral law to particular 
 cases (called ‘cases of conscience’) in which such application is 
 not clear and certain. (2) The over-subtle or verbal discussion of 
 the moral quality of particular acts or sentiments, especially when 
 tending toward greater moral laxity than is permitted by the dom- 
 
 inant moral opinion of the time or by the unsophisticated individual 
 conscience.” 
 
 189 
 
Igo THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 as to its desirable frequency. It arises from the 
 simple fact that, whether in or out of the confessional, 
 priests are called’ upon to give help in solving moral 
 and spiritual difficulties which cannot be solved by 
 mere common sense, even when sound knowledge of 
 the general laws of Christian conduct is possessed. 
 Their solution often demands much skill, and that 
 kind of knowledge which comes from the study of 
 precedents and of well-tested and matured results 
 of the experience of casuists of past ages. Casuistry 
 seeks to present these results in logical order for con- 
 venient mastery. 
 
 Two causes have brought casuistry into discredit: 
 (a) the abuse of the principle of probabilism; (6) 
 the minimizing of sin associated with such abuse. 
 
 1 Bp. D’Arcy, op. cit., p. 79, Casuistry is ““a complicated system of 
 laws for the breaking of laws, a system which, whatever its value, 
 could never be a complete system on account of the indefinite variety 
 of circumstances”’; also zbid., p. 218. This is typical of innumerable 
 sweeping condemnations which fail entirely to notice the first defini- 
 tion given above by J. M. Baldwin, and to allow for the inevitable 
 necessity of casuistry of some sort whenever men attempt to put into 
 practice the laws of moral life, All sound moralists would agree 
 with Bp. D’Arcy that casuistry “can never be a complete system”; 
 for if it became such it would be a dead system, out of relation to 
 ever-changing conditions of life. Dewey and Tufts, of. cit., pp. 327- 
 329, enumerate the dangers of casuistry; “ (a) It tends to magnify 
 the letter of morality at the expense of its spirit. (0) This ethical 
 system also tends in practice to a legal view of conduct. (c) Prob- 
 ably the worst evil of this moral system is that it tends to deprive 
 moral life of freedom and spontaneity”; but, as they continue, 
 ‘‘All fixed rules have the same tendencies,” and to go on without 
 rules reduces us to a state of pure individualism, intuitionalism in its 
 extreme form, where every man does that which seems right in his 
 
ITS REQUIREMENTS IQI 
 
 But there is a sound casuistry, and perverted science 
 should not be the ground for condemning science. 
 
 We make no attempt here to deal comprehensively 
 with the subject of Casuistry. But after a résumé of 
 the parts of the sacrament of Penance, our treatment 
 will cover—in brief outline—(a) The duty and profit 
 of Confession; (6) The priest’s qualifications and 
 methods; (c) Types of consciences to be reckoned 
 with; (d) The sick and dying; and, in a concluding 
 chapter, (e) Sin, and its distinctions. 
 
 § 2. As to the “matter” of the sacrament, the 
 Thomistic and generally accepted view regards it as: 
 (a) Proximate, or the confession itself with all neces- 
 sarily involved in it, z.e., contrition and satisfaction; 
 and (b) Remote, or the sins committed, necessarily 
 including every mortal sin, with mention of any ag- 
 gravating circumstances—the “free”? remote matter 
 being venial sin! Scotists hold that the ‘‘matter” 
 is the absolution. 
 
 own eyes. We must remember that casuistry, though quite dif- 
 ferently applied, is as firmly implanted in the Puritan system as in 
 the Jesuistic, and ultimately goes back in its evil form to the Phar- 
 isaic. H. Sidgwick, Practical Ethics, p. 17, “the odium which in 
 the seventeenth century overwhelmed the systematic discussion by 
 theologians of difficult and doubtful cases of morals—though unde- 
 niably in part deserved—went to an unreasonable length, and ob- 
 scured the real importance of the study against which it was directed.” 
 
 1See T. Slater, of. cit., vol. II, pp. 148-153. Mortal sin already 
 confessed may be confessed again when sorrow for it is renewed; 
 such confession and the absolution received confirms the older and 
 infuses fresh grace into the soul. Besetting sins, even though venial 
 in specie, ought to be confessed in genere. 
 
192 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 (a) Four essential parts are found in the sacra- 
 ment: Contrition, Confession, Absolution and Satis- 
 faction! Contrition is a hearty sorrow for one’s 
 sins as such, and because by them the love of God has 
 been outraged. It involves the will and the intellect 
 as well as the emotions. In fact it must originate in 
 the will, because sin itself originated there. It in- 
 cludes as necessary elements a thorough detestation 
 of the sins committed and a firm resolution, by God’s 
 help, to sin no more. All is summed up in the Ash 
 Wednesday Collect, “Create and make in us,” etc. 
 Whether or no the sacrament of Penance is used, con- 
 trition is a necessary stage in the salvation of all who 
 have fallen into grievous sin. Contrition may be 
 either perfect or imperfect. Perfect contrition springs 
 from a profound hatred of sin and has for its motive 
 the loveof God. Imperfect contrition, or ‘‘attrition,”’ 
 springs also from a hatred of sin, but is dominated by 
 some other motive than love of God, such as either 
 the fear of hell, or the desire for heaven. The dis- 
 tinction between attrition and imperfect contrition 
 is not easily made, but rests upon the fact that 
 attrition is mere remorse, having its source in 
 motives which are purely natural? In any case, it is 
 
 1See W. W. Webb, op. ci#., ch. ii; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. II, 
 § 414. 
 
 2 T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, p. 156, ‘“The sinner in the Sacrament of 
 Penance seeks reconciliation with God, and so the motives of his 
 sorrow must have reference to God; they must be supernatural,:- 
 founded on revelation and on faith.” 
 
 8’ Attrition is often so defined as to include cases of real but imper- | 
 
ITS REQUIREMENTS 193 
 
 not based upon the degree of sorrow felt, but upon the 
 motive which inspires the sorrow. The motive of 
 fear of hell, leaving unaltered the affection for sin 
 and the desire to commit it except for the fear, is 
 insufficient, even with the help of the sacrament, to 
 reconcile the sinner with God. 
 
 Contrition properly contains certain essential qual- 
 ities! It must be (a) internal, of the heart and soul; 
 (b) supernatural, owing its origin to grace and based 
 upon enlightened reason or motives supplied by super- 
 natural faith; (c) sovereign, or supreme, including a 
 hatred of sin as the worst of evils, a willingness to 
 
 fect contrition, e.g., Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, p. 142; W. W. 
 Williams, of. cit., p. 28. On the conflict between Contritionism and 
 Attritionism see Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, vol. III, pp. 170-180. 
 Neither is de fide; but there is a strong and widely spread feeling 
 against the sufficiency of attrition to secure absolution. F. J. Hall, 
 The Sacraments, pp. 235-238: “Attrition, or feeling caused by antici- 
 pated consequences of sin, is not sufficient until converted by love 
 into sorrow for sin itself. But the act of confession frequently causes 
 true contrition when it is otherwise wanting, and this is one of the 
 arguments for resort to auricular confession.”” In general, The Cate- 
 chism of Nicholas Bulgaris, p. 14, gives a helpful distinction: “‘Con- 
 trition is when a man repents for his sins, not out of fear of punish- 
 ment or other penalties, simply because he did not do the will of the 
 all-good God, which he regards as the greatest evil of all that he could 
 meet with. . . . Attrition is when a man repents for his sins, since 
 he fears that for them eternal punishment will overtake him.” 
 
 1See Bp. Webb, op. cit., pp. 21-31; F. G. Belton, Manual for 
 Conf., Pt. II, ch. i; W. W. Williams, op. cit., pp. 27-32; Schieler- 
 Heuser, Theory and Practice of the Confessional, pp. 98-111. Ibid., 
 p. 98, ‘If the Sacrament of Penance is to be received validly and with 
 fruit, the contrition must be real, formal, supernatural, universal, 
 supreme, and sacramental.’’ Adequate self-examination is obvi- 
 ously a necessary prerequisite. 
 
194 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 suffer all things rather than to sin, a thorough con- 
 version and turning to God; (d) universal, having 
 reference implicitly at least to all sins; for no sin can 
 be forgiven in isolation from others, if there be such. 
 Because sufficient contrition is the proximate matter 
 of the sacrament, it must precede absolution or be 
 present in the soul when absolution is pronounced. 
 
 (b) Confession is the next step in the sinner’s recov- 
 ery by means of Penance, and is the acknowledgment 
 before a priest of the sins committed, for the purpose 
 of securing absolution. This confession must extend 
 to details, a mere acknowledgment of wrong-doing 
 in general is not sufficient. If the sins are grievous, a 
 mention of the number and species is requisite. For- 
 gotten mortal sins should be confessed at the next 
 confession after they are recalled. Venial sins are 
 “free”? matter severally considered and need not be 
 confessed; but besetting sins should not be omitted 
 and confession of venial sins generally is most helpful. 
 Deliberate silence concerning them when they weigh 
 upon the conscience is most dangerous. 
 
 1See Bp. Webb, op. cit., pp. 30-31; F. G. Belton, op. cit., Pt. IL. 
 ch. ii; W. W. Williams, op. cit., pp. 32-52; F. J. Hall, Sacraments, 
 pp. 238-240; St. Thomas, III, suppl. vi-x; T. Slater, of. cit., vol. IT, 
 pp. 163-170; J. P. Gury, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 348-401; Koch-Preuss, 
 op. cit., vol. II, pp. 151-162; Schieler-Heuser, op. cit., p. 137, “‘Sac- 
 ramental confession is the self-accusation of sins committed after 
 Baptism and not yet remitted in the Sacrament, and it is made by 
 the penitent to a priest having the necessary faculties” (which means 
 with us any priest in good standing) “and with the object of obtaining 
 
 absolution.” We should dwell on the last phrase, for confession is 
 not a confidence given a priest as a friend. 
 
ITS REQUIREMENTS 195 
 
 The needed qualities of confession are variously 
 listed,! but include the following elements: (1) entire, 
 embracing all remembered mortal and besetting sins 
 not yet confessed, with mention of at least the approx- 
 imate number and specific circumstances which 
 change or affect their nature. Incase of doubt as to 
 the nature or quality of a sin, the penitent for safety 
 should confess it; (2) clear, not mixed up with 
 irrelevant things, but a bare declaration of sins com- 
 mitted, with as much brevity as is consistent with 
 clarity; (3) humble, in heart and body, the latter 
 including posture; (4) prudent, honest, discreet, of 
 one’s own faults and not of those of others; and the 
 name of any one implicated should neither be asked 
 for nor be allowed to be mentioned in any case; (5) 
 sincere and faithful, not attempting to misrepresent 
 or mitigate, without dissimulation, especially in grave 
 matters, lest there be added the sin of sacrilege; (6) 
 vocal, not by writing or by signs, except in case of 
 necessity; and the penitent must be present. Con- 
 fession may not be made by letter;? (7) sorrowful, 
 which might be combined with humble. Confession 
 
 1 These are variously reckoned by different writers; St. Thomas 
 Aquinas lists sixteen; while J. P. Gury, of. cit., vol. IT, p. 353, thinks 
 they may be reduced to two, entire and sincere; but to these Koch- 
 Preuss adds clearness. See Bp. Webb, oP. cit., pp. 34-36; whom we 
 have followed almost verbally. 
 
 2 The question arising in modern days as to the validity of absolu- 
 tion given over the telephone has been left open by Roman authori- 
 ties. See Koch-Preuss, of. cit., vol. II, p. 153, note 6; but Pohle- 
 
 Preuss, The Sacraments, vol. III, pp. 99-100, conclude against its 
 validity. The safeguarding of the “seal” would be impossible. 
 
196 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 is a self-accusation, not an excuse. (8) pure in 
 words, and in intention to obtain true absolution or 
 the grace of the sacrament—not to obtain the com- 
 passion of the confessor, etc. It should be made 
 bravely, not as seeking sympathy; (9) with the dis- 
 position of amendment, the purpose of abiding by 
 the judgment of the confessor, of avoiding occasions 
 of sin, of making restitution when possible, of per- 
 forming the penance assigned, and of using the reme- 
 dies suggested; (10) It is hardly necessary to add 
 that it should be voluntary. 
 
 General confessions! are never required, except of 
 course in the case of a first confession; but they may 
 be made at any time, will at times be found helpful 
 as acts of spiritual discipline, and should not be dis- 
 couraged unless too frequent, except in the case of a 
 particular class of scrupulous penitents of whom we 
 speak below. 
 
 (c) Amendment? is an indispensable accompani- 
 ment of repentance. It must be firmly purposed, 
 efficacious (for avoiding occasions of temptation, so 
 
 1See Bp. Webb, of. cit., pp. 42-44; F. G. Belton, of. cit., Pt. II, 
 ch. v; Koch-Preuss, of. cit., vol. II, p. 161; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, 
 pp. 169-170. 
 
 aF. G. Belton, of. ci#., Pt. II, ch. ii; W. W. Williams, of. cit., 
 pp. 31-32; Koch-Preuss, of. cét., vol. II, pp. 146-150. 
 
 § Roman theologians (Trent, Sess. xiv, cap. 4; J. P. Gury, op. cit., 
 vol. II, pp. 342-345) hold that it may be either explicit (formal) or 
 implicit (virtual), ordinarily it would certainly be the former. Self- 
 examination and contrition have the incidental value of leading to 
 proper recognition of the sins wherein an explicit purpose of amend- 
 ment is needed. 
 
ITS REQUIREMENTS 197 
 
 far as is possible), and universal in extending to one’s 
 life as a whole.! In short, it is a fixed determina- 
 tion of codperating with divine grace in resisting 
 temptation for the future. Its hope of success is 
 grounded in our trust in God, and rests upon the the- 
 ological virtues. Failures should not bring dis- 
 couragement and despondency;? but moral effort 
 is indispensable. It implies readiness on the part 
 of the penitent to employ all means necessary or 
 useful for the avoidance of sin, especially to shun all 
 voluntary proximate occasions, and to repair, so far 
 as possible, whatever injury has been done to others. 
 
 (d) Absolution® must be given by the priest to all 
 who confess their sins with a proper disposition, the 
 presumption being always in favour of the penitent. 
 We have already noticed certain cases in which con- 
 ditional absolution may be given. On the other 
 hand, the priest is bound under pain of mortal sin 
 to deny absolution when there is certainty that the 
 
 1Bp. Webb, of. cit., p. 29, ““This purpose of amendment should 
 have three qualities. It should be: 1x. Firm, there should be a vol- 
 untary determination not to relapse into sin, no matter how great 
 may be the loss, or how much influenced by human fear. 2. It 
 should be effectual for all occasions of sin. 3. Universal, extending 
 to all mortal sins.”’ To the last we may add, at least impliedly, 
 venial sins also. See further, St. Thomas, ITT, lxxxvii, 1, ad z. 
 
 RSC viatt, | xXVls/33-35),00-75. | 
 
 3 Bp. Webb, oP. cit., pp. 50-57; E. B. Pusey, op. czé., pp. 156-158; 
 F. G. Belton, op. cit., Pt. IV, ch. vi; Koch-Preuss, op. cié., vol. I, 
 pp. 177-182. 
 
 4F, G. Belton, op. cit., pp. 147-148; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, 
 Pp. 179. 
 
198 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 penitent is not properly disposed. But before send- 
 ing such a person away the priest should do all in his 
 power to secure a proper disposition. Reservation of 
 the case is a sort of half-way measure between abso- 
 lution and refusal, when there is doubt as to the reality 
 of the repentance and no danger in delaying absolution 
 for a time. Admittedly, however, it is a modern 
 practice and usually unjustified, particularly in our 
 own circumstances with which we are immediately 
 concerned. Either one alternative or the other had 
 better be followed.! As to the form, “I absolve thee” 
 is probably sufficient in emergency as a minimum; 
 but, as in the case of the other sacraments, the full 
 form should be used normally, practically always. 
 That given in the Office for the Visitation of the 
 Sick in the English Prayer Book is most commonly 
 used. 
 
 (e) Satisfaction normally presupposes the imposi- 
 tion of a penance, which, however, is not necessary to 
 the validity of the sacrament; although as a “‘faith- 
 ful steward of the mysteries of God the priest is 
 bound to impose a sacramental penance.’? It 
 should be proportioned to the sinner’s guilt and 
 adapted to the age, sex, condition, abilities, etc. 
 The penitent is strictly bound to perform the penance 
 assigned. If, however, he deems it too severe, he may 
 
 1 But per contra, see F. G. Belton, of. cit., pp. 147-150, who follows 
 Schieler-Heuser, pp. 411-415. 
 
 2F. G. Belton, of. cit., Pt. I, ch. vi; E. B. Pusey, op. cit., ch. v, 
 art. 9. 
 
ITS REQUIREMENTS 199 
 
 ask to have it commuted or consult another priest. 
 Failure to perform it, apart from weighty cause or 
 the smallness of the matter, becomes a mortal sin. 
 One penance may not be substituted for another by 
 the penitent, but he may in a subsequent confession 
 ask to have it commuted either by the same or by 
 another priest. 
 
 The penance should, as far as possible, be contrary 
 to the chief sin confessed, ¢.g., almsgiving as a remedy 
 for avarice, humiliations for pride, bodily mortifica- 
 tions, fasting, etc., for lust. They should by no 
 means be grave enough to suggest or imply the idea 
 of equivalence. They should be calculated to deepen 
 the loathing of the sins confessed. They should be 
 usually of a devotional nature, e.g., the Lord’s Prayer, 
 a Collect or Collects, a Psalm, a hymn of penitential 
 or devotional nature, a meditation. There is danger 
 in physical penances, fasting, etc., that they may 
 induce a sense of merit and equivalence. The pen- 
 ance should be imposed before absolution, but if over- 
 looked it may be validly imposed afterwards, but 
 before the penitent has left the tribunal. 
 
 Satisfaction ! has to do here with the sinner’s part 
 in identifying himself with Christ in His passion, by 
 contrite self-mortification and by willing endurance 
 of whatever temporal penalties or penances may be 
 
 1¥F, J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 232-235; E. B. Pusey, Is Healthful 
 Reunion Impossible? pp. 69-73; W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 57-70}; 
 W. Elwin, Conf. and Absol’n in the Bible, pp. 22-26, 410-415; St. 
 Thomas, III, suppl. xii-xv; T. Slater, op. cié., vol. Il, pp. 271-174; 
 Koch-Preuss, op. ci#., vol. II, pp. 183-187. 
 
200 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 imposed upon him, whether by divine justice or by 
 sacramental prescription of a priest. Its value and 
 acceptance by God rest entirely in the satisfaction 
 made by Christ on the Cross, while its essential con- 
 dition in us is true contrition and purpose of amend- 
 ment. The sacramental sign of this is the acceptance 
 of the penance given. Restitution should be made 
 - wherever it is possible. The validity of the absolu- 
 tion does not, however, depend upon the performance 
 of the satisfaction imposed, and no satisfaction other 
 than the penance need be imposed. 
 
 § 3. The duty and profit of confession is clear; 
 and the obligation to resort to sacramental confession 
 under certain conditions is partly intrinsic and partly 
 of ecclesiastical precept. Intrinsically the institu- 
 tion of the sacrament by the all-seeing Ruler of con- 
 sciences indicates that it will prove to be necessary in 
 cases for the end which it is designed to fulfil. As 
 the fulfilment of that end, the remedy of sin, is a 
 rudimentary obligation of Christians, resort to con- 
 fession will evidently be in cases obligatory. Its 
 occasional necessity is grounded in: (a) inability in 
 certain cases sufficiently to repent without it; (0) 
 the remedial grace involved; (c) the claims of eccle- 
 siastical discipline. Extrinsically, ecclesiastical re- 
 quirements have varied in different ages and in dif- 
 
 1The moral principle of satisfaction here accepted is ancient, and 
 need not be taken to imply the doctrine of indulgences, which is of 
 medizval origin, and is by us rejected. Cf. F. J. Hall, Eschatology, 
 pp. 88-89; The Church, p. 278 (with refs.). To pursue the subject 
 here is foreign to the purpose of this manual. 
 
DUTY AND PROFIT 201 
 
 ferent parts of the Church. Anciently confession 
 was expected after very serious offences, and in time 
 of dangerous illness.1 It was customary also for the 
 priest to impose upon those guilty of certain offences a 
 public acknowledgment of them and submission to 
 public penance. As this led to scandal the practice 
 was abandoned. 
 
 Later Canon Law both in the Eastern and Roman 
 Churches requires private confession once a year, and 
 a confession before each communion is often recom- 
 mended in the Latin Church. Our own discipline 
 makes confession obligatory only when other means of 
 repentance do not quiet the conscience, the deter- 
 mination being left to individual consciences. This 
 means that it is not “compulsory”’ by ecclesiastical 
 rule, but that the individual conscience should regard 
 it as obligatory when there is need. It should be 
 noted, moreover, that Holy Scripture implies that 
 those who are dangerously ill and have sins on their 
 consciences should confess them.? Such a precept 
 binds in every part of the Church, and a priest is 
 everywhere bound to move one 7m exiremis to con- 
 fession. 
 
 The value of confession is not confined to cases of 
 necessary precept, although its use when not indis- 
 pensable nor expressly required by the Church is of 
 counsel rather than of precept. It is useful: (a) 
 
 1A full history in O. D. Watkins, Hist. of Penance, epitomized in 
 F, J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 214-223. 
 2St. James v. 15-16. 
 
202 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 to deepen and perfect repentance, the danger of 
 habitually relying on perfecting contrition without 
 sacramental aid being often very serious; (0) to fortify 
 the bands of ecclesiastical discipline; (c) to revive 
 and tone up the powers of resistance against tempta- 
 tion; (d) as a routine means of humiliation and self- 
 discipline; (e€) to secure competent counsel and guid- 
 ance. 
 
 The right of private judgment outside the sphere 
 of positive precept is to be maintained. In fact, the 
 value of habitual confession depends partly upon its 
 voluntariness, and upon the sense of its value in the 
 penitent’s mind. Yet the private judgment referred 
 to ought to be enlightened judgment. The con- 
 science should be educated to discern the value of 
 confession, and the unlikelihood that any individual 
 can escape spiritual loss altogether or for very long 
 intervals while dispensing with its employment. It is 
 the prerogative and duty of priests to teach their 
 people on this subject, and to encourage and facilitate 
 the use of so valuable an aid to perfection, and to 
 spiritual security. Such teaching should, however, be 
 true. It is quite misleading to say baldly that no mor- 
 tal sin can be remedied without resort to confession. 
 It is true to teach that great advance towards perfec- 
 tion is as a rule dependent upon the use of this means 
 of grace, so that one who refuses to use it year after 
 year is in all probability suffering spiritual loss, and 
 may be failing altogether in really repenting. 
 
 A priest may not exact confession as a prerequisite 
 
QUALIFICATIONS OF A PRIEST 203 
 
 of Confirmation or other spiritual privilege, 7.e., as 
 making this a general precept. But he may, and in 
 cases ought to, urge such confessions as obviously 
 profitable. Moreover, if he is convinced that in an 
 individual case a candidate will not be duly prepared 
 for the privilege in question without confession, he 
 may refuse to be a party to his presentation until 
 such confession has been made. ‘The priest is entitled 
 to have reasonable assurance, in accordance with his 
 own judgment, that those whom he admits to the 
 privileges of grace are duly prepared therefor—sub- 
 ject, however, to the laws of the Church and the right 
 of appeal to the Ordinary. This prerogative is lable 
 to abuse, but so are many things; and a priest who 
 lacks sound judgment will always hinder the advance 
 of God’s kingdom. 
 
 The unbaptized are not to be admitted to sacra- 
 mental absolution, for prior to Baptism there exists 
 no capacity to receive the grace of this sacrament. 
 Baptism itself is a means whereby previous sins 
 are remedied; but the recipient may profitably makea 
 confession in advance, being taught that absolution 
 is recelved in Baptism. While such a practice may 
 rightly be encouraged, it may not be required. Its 
 value lies in the additional self-knowledge one secures 
 in the preparation, and in the deepening of contrition 
 which is gained thereby. 
 
 § 4. The qualifications of a priest! obviously in- 
 
 1See E. T. Churton, The Use of Penitence, chh. vii, viii, x; Bp. 
 Webb, op. cit., p. 1, “A confessor ought to have: 1. The love of a 
 
204 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 clude appreciation of the value of confession and of 
 his own duty. When it is lacking an attitude of mere 
 sufferance will be inevitable. or even of unwillingness. 
 That a worthy priest will enjoy hearing confessions 
 on any other ground than a love of duty and a desire 
 to help sinners is exceedingly unlikely. The gloating 
 curiosity imputed to priests by sensation mongers is 
 contrary to fact, especially in the case of those who 
 hear many confessions. The sinner’s attitude of 
 penitence, the sense of official relation, and the grace 
 of Order, alike hinder such curiosity. A priest is 
 not likely to possess the necessary qualifications unless 
 he has felt the need of confession for himself and 
 practised it. Personal experience is a great opener of 
 the mind. 
 
 Father. 2. Theskillofa Physician. 3. The wisdom of a Theologian 
 or spiritual Doctor. 4. The acuteness of a Judge.” For these quali- 
 fications in detail, see tbid., pp. 1-13. Bp. Webb does not clearly 
 make the distinction between a confessor and a spiritual guide, and 
 they need not always be the same. Fenelon’s Spiritual Letters 
 show that he was guide to many whose confessions he rarely or never 
 heard. Consequently much that is said by Bp. Webb has reference 
 to guides rather than to confessors. But the priest’s duty is not 
 done when he has heard the confession and given or refused absolu- 
 tion. T. Slater, op. ci#., vol. II, p. 216, ‘‘In the confessional he holds 
 the place of Christ for the reconciliation of sinners with God; he is 
 also the minister of the sacrament, and as such he is_ bound to see 
 that it is validly and lawfully received by the penitent.”’ In short, 
 his office is not merely mechanical, to convey absolution or refuse it. 
 All forms of confession in use request “‘counsel and advice”’ as well as 
 “absolution.”” On the four-fold office of the confessor, see further 
 Dr. Pusey’s very valuable translation of the Abbé Gaume’s Manual 
 for Confessors, pp. 3-75; F. G. Belton, op. cit., Pt. IV; T. Slater, 
 op. cit., vol. II, pp. 216-225. 
 
QUALIFICATIONS OF A PRIEST 205 
 
 “The priest’s lips should keep knowledge.” ! He 
 must be well versed in moral science in all depart- 
 ments, for the variety of moral questions which he 
 will be obliged to answer is practically endless. This 
 knowledge should be kept fresh by frequent reading 
 of moral works, and by the habit of consulting them 
 often on moral problems as they arise. It should not 
 be forgotten that individual experience is limited, 
 and fails to help in many inevitable questions. More- 
 over, the reading of good moral treatises serves to 
 protect the priest from loss of realization of the cen- 
 tral nature of those Godward factors in life which 
 the people about him overlook. 
 
 The priest should none the less have experience of 
 human needs, and of the needs peculiar to his time and 
 people. Books will help to articulate the results of 
 such experience and to guide the priest in taking note 
 of the right things. For this reason book-learning is 
 needed even in this connection. But experience itself 
 is indispensable. Such experience begins within. 
 To know oneself is to take a long step in the knowl- 
 edge of mankind. The common factors of moral life 
 are much larger than the individualistic, and com- 
 plete knowledge of one soul contains much knowedge 
 of every soul. Moreover, one’s own condition lies 
 open always to close study, which is not true of the 
 souls of others. Personal self-examination and repent- 
 ance is the true primary guide to the real significance 
 of the repentance of others. But experience is 
 
 1 Mal. ii. 7. 
 
206 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 not to be sought in abnormal lines not opened up by 
 divine providence. What is called “slumming” is 
 perilous and misleading to the mind. It is our own 
 people that we need to understand, and they are, 
 for the most part, normal. An effective pastoral 
 relation and a reflecting mind will supply what is 
 lacking in the experience of one’s own personal con- 
 ditions and needs. The reading of the Scriptures 
 is not to be overlooked; for they supply us with a 
 moral world divinely presented for our study. 
 Incidentally: (a) we should not confuse the 
 demands of the time with its needs; (6) we should 
 study such sciences as sociology, law, and political 
 economy; but as revealing the conditions under which 
 Christian virtues are to be practised, rather than for 
 the purpose of devising social schemes. The true 
 priest is a saver of souls, not a leader in politics. 
 Fatherly love is essential to success in dealing with 
 penitents. (a) This means, first of all, sympathy. 
 To be touched with the feeling of the penitent’s 
 infirmities, to the avoidance of unfeeling harshness 
 of judgment and tone. (6) It means patience also, 
 both in hearing the tale and in exercising delibera- 
 tion in speech. Impatient expressions will harden 
 penitents’ hearts rather than deepen their contrition. 
 Severity may be necessary, but it should be evidently 
 actuated by thoughtful regard for the penitent’s 
 recovery, as the severity of the surgeon who cuts to 
 heal. (c) It signifies paternal dignity and a solemn 
 sense of authority to bind and to loose. In relation 
 
QUALIFICATIONS OF A PRIEST 207 
 
 to confession the priest may not address his penitent 
 as if on equal terms, whatever may be the case in 
 other connections. Thus, if a priest hears the con- 
 fession of a bishop, or of a high civil dignitary, he is 
 for the time being the superior, and must assume the 
 dignity belonging to his office. But such dignity, 
 if real, is unaffected. Self-assertiveness and pom- 
 posity are hopelessly out of place. (d) Finally, it sig- 
 nifies disinterestedness. Personal ties and partialities 
 must be banished wholly from the confessional. The 
 priest’s manner must be judicially the same for all. 
 
 Self-restraint has often to be exercised in high 
 degree. The priest is engaged in the confessional in 
 an official capacity, and he may be obliged to recall 
 this fact, especially in dealing with females or with 
 those whose cases prove to be especially touching. 
 The personal element must be eliminated severely. 
 This does not mean that we should fail to show 
 sympathy when it is called for, but that this sym- 
 pathy should be priestly rather than personal—gen- 
 uine and abundant, but as from Christ and without 
 carnal emotionalism. ‘The lack of personal detach- 
 ment will often bring the priest into danger and may 
 involve the penitent in the same peril. Sympathy 
 may easily become maudlin, if not controlled by the 
 purpose which ought to be kept in view. 
 
 Skill in rapid diagnosis is to be cultivated most 
 earnestly. Hesitation is apt to breed a lack of con- 
 fidence on the penitent’s part; but it will often tax 
 a priest’s judgment sorely to give wise counsel with- 
 
208 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 out delay. The priest may pause to consider, but 
 not too long, nor with evidence of vacillation. If the 
 case is very grave, he may even reserve his decision 
 to an appointed time in the future; but in doing this 
 he must be able to show satisfactorily the need of 
 delay and the gravity of the question. Such skill is 
 the joint result of the supernatural gift of counsel 
 and of earnest study of human nature, accompanied 
 by mastery of moral science. Not every priest can 
 command the highest skill, but he is under obligation 
 to cultivate his gift in this direction and to exercise 
 prudence in uttering judgments. Promptness does 
 not mean nervous haste, or happy-go-lucky thought- 
 lessness. 
 
 Finally the priest must possess reserve. ‘This is 
 especially necessary in relation to what is heard in 
 the confessional; but a priest who is known to be gos- 
 sipy and without reserve in his ordinary conversation 
 is not likely to be trusted as to his power of secrecy in 
 official matters. 
 
 The seal of the confessional may not be broken 
 without the express and voluntary consent of the 
 penitent;! and the limitations expressed or implied 
 in such consent must be rigidly observed. What is 
 learned under this seal is not personal knowledge but 
 official; and the priest possesses it not as a man but 
 
 1F, J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 240-243; F. G. Belton, of. cit., 
 Pt. III; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “Seal”; T. Slater, op. cz#., vol. Il, p. 228, 
 ‘This obligation is imposed by the natural, the divine, and by positive 
 ecclesiastical law.’’ It is founded in justice and charity. 
 
HEARING CONFESSIONS 209 
 
 \ 
 
 as a representative of God. Personally the priest is 
 ignorant here, and according to most authorities may 
 honestly deny knowledge. The obligation extends to 
 everything connected with the sacrament, e.g., the 
 penance assigned, whether a certain person has made 
 confession, etc. The right to plead privilege in such 
 connection is recognized in the courts of civilized 
 nations.! Not only must all verbal betrayal of these 
 secrets be avoided, but every line of action which may 
 involve betrayal of the knowledge thus acquired. 
 Even in case of crime? no testimony may be offered 
 without the free consent of the party involved. The 
 death of the penitent does not release the priest from 
 the obligation. The obligation also extends to the 
 penitent, and obviously he ought normally to avoid 
 all reference to the matter. To violate the seal is 
 regarded universally as a sin of the gravest kind.? 
 
 § 5. Confessions may be heard wherever circum- 
 stances make it necessary or convenient; but when 
 practicable they ought to be heard in a religious 
 environment, such as an open Church, at a place 
 obviously devoted to that purpose, or in a confessional 
 box. The latter is especially suited to female peni- 
 tents, and to the avoidance of embarrassing publicity.* 
 
 1 See F. G. Belton, Present Day Problems, ch. i. 
 
 2T. Slater, of. cit., vol. II, p. 232. 
 
 3Innocent III, ‘‘The priest who reveals the sin confessed to him 
 sins more gravely than he who committed it.” 
 
 4A priest who recommends the use of the sacrament should not 
 make it harder or more embarrassing for the penitent than necessary. 
 He will promote the use of the sacrament by publicly announcing a 
 
210 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 The preliminary devotions should be brief. Thus, 
 the priest may say the Our Father and “ The Lord 
 be in thy heart and on thy lips that thou mayest 
 rightly confess thy sins.” If many are waiting the 
 Our Father may be omitted. During the confession 
 the priest will sit, and will wear cassock, surplice, 
 and violet stole. He should not unnecessarily look 
 at the penitent. 
 
 The penitent will invoke the Trinity and will begin 
 with some such form as is provided in a book of pri- 
 vate devotions or printed on a card provided for the 
 purpose; and after the indication of his sins the peni- 
 tent will conclude with the appointed form. The 
 priest will then give, without unnecessary prolixity, 
 such advice as may be called for, impose a suitable 
 penance, pronounce the absolution, and dismiss the 
 penitent with a blessing. The penitent will retire 
 at once and complete his devotions elsewhere. 
 
 § 6. Interrogations require caution. The peni- 
 place and time where and when he may be found for the purpose, thus 
 avoiding the necessity on the part of the one who seeks the sacrament 
 of making a special appointment. It has been found by experience 
 that many who would use the sacrament are kept from it by the 
 necessity of arranging for it in advance. This is one of the reasons 
 why an unusually large number of confessions is often heard at a 
 Mission. 
 
 1E. B. Pusey, of. cit., ch. iv; Bp. Webb, op. cit., pp. 44-48; W. W. 
 Williams, op. cit., pp. 82-87; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 162- 
 166; J. P. Gury, op. cit., vol. IT, §§ 462 ff. Questions will ordinarily 
 concern the number, specific character and attending circumstances, 
 of the sins confessed, occasions, relapses, and the duty of restitution. 
 
 They will be asked only when necessary for the formation of a right 
 decision, or for the reasons mentioned below. 
 
INTERROGATIONS 211 
 
 tent presumably has come to make his own confession 
 as dictated by his conscience. The priest, therefore, 
 in the absence of exceptional reasons, should simply 
 listen, assuming that the penitent is aware of his sins 
 and is giving a faithful account of them. Interrup- 
 tions and questions are normally to be avoided, and 
 advice is to be deferred ordinarily until the confession 
 has been completed. 
 
 But the priest may not neglect to give assistance 
 by question or criticism when evidence appears that 
 it is needed to make the confession what it ought to be. 
 Thus: (a) If the penitent is too obscure to be under- 
 stood, he ought to be questioned sufficiently to remedy 
 the obscurity. (0) If there is evidence of an effort 
 to avoid full disclosure or to give a false impression, 
 of unnecessary disclosures of the sins of others, or of 
 any other undesirable element in the confession, the 
 priest should intervene to correct the fault and secure a 
 proper confession. (c) If the penitent interrupts 
 himself to ask a question, the answer to which will 
 determine the nature of his confession, the question 
 should be answered at once. (d) Ignorance may 
 have prevented the making of a good self-examination, 
 consequently if the penitent, especially a child or an 
 untutored person, betrays important ignorance or 
 mistake as to sin or its opposite, ignorance which will 
 reduce the value of the confession and may be cor- 
 rected without danger of inducing more serious and 
 formal guilt, the priest should give the needed instruc- 
 tion as briefly as possible. (e) In a first confession, 
 
212 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 especially of a child or ignorant person, and when the 
 penitent is much embarrassed and unable to express 
 himself adequately, the priest may assist with judi- 
 cious questioning and direction calculated to secure 
 a good confession. In brief, a wise flexibility of 
 practice may be allowed. But in any case long inter- 
 ruptions, protracted dialogue, and all controversy 
 should be avoided, lest the penitent forget his busi- 
 ness, which is simply to make a good confession. 
 Controversy may never be permitted, for it is utterly 
 subversive of the relation to be maintained between 
 priest and penitent. 
 
 The utmost caution and circumspection must often 
 be exercised both in questioning and instructing a 
 penitent. The innocent must not ordinarily be given 
 knowledge of evil which their previous experience 
 has not supplied. ‘This is especially the case with sins 
 of impurity.1 The priest who avoidably supplies a 
 mind with material for subsequent vile imaginations 
 is gravely responsible. This rule is as effectively 
 violated by unnecessary and suggestive questions as 
 by direct explanations of the several forms of impure 
 action. Innocence is always presumptive. A lesson 
 touching impurity should never be illustrated by 
 anecdotes which contain descriptions or suggestions 
 of impure actions. No questions are justifiable the 
 necessity of which is not apparent at the moment. 
 
 17. Slater, op. cié., vol. II, p. 225, “In the matter of chastity it is 
 a maxim that it is better to fail in putting many questions than to 
 put one which is not necessary.” 
 
INTERROGATIONS 213 
 
 One’s private knowledge of the penitent’s life may 
 not be used in this matter. 
 
 Sex and age determine the limits of safe questioning 
 or definition: (a) A female should not be questioned 
 beyond what is necessary to make the nature of what 
 is confessed sufficiently clear. ‘‘I have been impure,” 
 is not sufficiently specific to enable the confessor to 
 form a judgment, for the penitent may refer either to 
 a passing thought or to an act of the gravest character. 
 (6) Neither sex should be questioned concerning the 
 sinful actions or words of the other. (c) Questioning 
 should cease, if it has been necessary, as soon as the 
 requirements of a sincere and sufficient confession 
 are being fulfilled. The mind of the penitent should 
 not be allowed to dwell on the circumstances of sin 
 after they have been sufficiently indicated. (d) 
 The young ought not to be questioned as to forms of 
 evil that they have not certainly become capable of 
 understanding. Sins which are not possible until 
 the attainment of puberty must be ignored in dealing 
 with those who have not reached that stage of develop- 
 ment. (e¢) The private organs or functions should not 
 be unnecessarily named, nor should they be described 
 vividly. Nicknames should be avoided absoutely, and 
 should not be tolerated in confession, because they are 
 used chiefly by the impure, and are directly suggestive 
 of evil. (f) The unmarried should not be instructed 
 or questioned in ways that suggest the relations of 
 man and wife, except in view of prospective marriage 
 and sincere enquiry occasioned by such prospect. 
 
214 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 Questions should be suited to the penitent’s voca- 
 tion. Thus the “religious,” those in business, in pro- 
 fessional life, etc., need different lines of questioning, 
 suited to the duties and temptations, and also the 
 desirable ignorances, of each. After advice has been 
 given and penance assigned, and before absolution, it is 
 often helpful to ask, “Is there anything more that you 
 would like to say?” The operation of grace during the 
 confession and subsequent advice may move the pen- 
 itent to perfect his confession by laying bare some 
 previously concealed sin or difficulty. — 
 
 § 7. Different types of penitents ! require different 
 methods of treatment; and they may be conveniently 
 classified according to their consciences as these are 
 right, erroneous, doubtful, scrupulous, probable, 
 optimistic, despairing or lax. These types emerge in 
 every walk of life, in both sexes, and at every level of 
 mental growth. 
 
 (a) A right conscience is sufficiently enlightened to 
 judge correctly, and is exercised with due care and 
 success, being kept right by careful self-examination 
 and by habitual study of God’s will. To have a right 
 judgment in all things is the result of the spiritual 
 gifts of wisdom and counsel, duly cultivated by edu- 
 cation and self-discipline. In its perfection such a 
 
 1See W. W. Williams, of. cit., chh. v, vii; Koch-Preuss, of. cit., 
 vol. I, pp. 194-202; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 58-79; Jeremy 
 Taylor, Duct. Dubit., Bk. I, chh. ii ff., who lists five varieties of con- 
 science: tender, hardened or obdurate, quiet, restless or disturbed 
 
 and perverse. He treats them at great length. Slater adds, certain 
 and strict consciences. 
 
TYPES OF PENITENTS 215 
 
 conscience is attained with difficulty, is easily lost 
 through carelessness and through failure of the will 
 to be guided by its judgments, and is a mark of gen- 
 uine sanctity. The whole aim of Moral Theology is 
 to exhibit scientifically the principles and rules by 
 which the judgments of a right conscience are deter- 
 mined. 
 
 (b) An erroneous conscience is one that in certain 
 directions gives wrong judgments, whether from blame- 
 less or invincible ignorance or from blameworthy and 
 avoidable causes. If due to invincible ignorance, it is 
 not blameworthy so long as it remains really invincible. 
 But when the mind becomes aware of means of obtain- 
 ing needed enlightenment and fails to make use of 
 them, its ignorance is no longer invincible or excusable. 
 Dulness or hardness of heart is a frequent cause of 
 this refusal of light; and careless or precipitate judg- 
 ments of the conscience are sinful causes of error. 
 None the less, the conscience is to be obeyed in any 
 case, because its judgment expresses what we think 
 to be right, so that to disobey it is to do what we be- 
 lieve to be wrong—contrary to God’s will. But if 
 the conscience is erroneous, we sin materially in obey- 
 ing it, although not wilfully and formally, if the cause 
 is that of invincible ignorance. If the ignorance is not 
 invincible we sin formally whether we obey or disobey 
 the conscience. Obviously, therefore, an erroneous 
 conscience should be educated and corrected, if pos- 
 sible. 
 
 But if it appears reasonably certain that a person 
 
216 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 who sins in ignorance, hitherto invincible, will cling 
 to his sin after enlightenment, his priest or adviser will 
 be justified in remaining silent, provided his silence, 
 or refusal to take the matter into official cognizance, 
 does not bring public scandal and spiritual injury to 
 others. 
 
 (c) A doubtful conscience is one that suspends judg- 
 ment, whether wisely and justifiably, or wilfully and 
 culpably. Such suspense of judgment may be justi- 
 fiable when no immediate action has to be considered; 
 and it may even be obligatory pending further enquiry 
 and deliberation, inasmuch as moral judgments should 
 be based upon adequate enquiry and sound reasons. 
 The scrupulous conscience, to which we shall come 
 shortly, is a very different matter. When immediate 
 determination of action or non-action is obligatory, a 
 doubtful conscience ought to condemn actions that 
 appear probably to be wrong, and to decide in favour 
 of actions which appear probably to be obligatory. 
 But so long as real doubt continues, the presumption 
 is on the side of refraining from the act under con- 
 sideration, if it can be avoided without sin, and of 
 
 1W. W. Webb, op. cit., p. 6, says, “‘If the penitent shows ignorance 
 touching things necessary to salvation, he must be enlightened. In 
 other things, even of precept, if there is danger of turning material 
 into formal sin, he need not be enlightened, except: 7. where there 
 may be danger of injury to the general welfare. 7. where the pen- 
 itent directly enquires. 7iz. or where he will ultimately be bene- 
 fited.”” Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, p. 165, ‘‘When a confessor 
 has reason to doubt whether instruction is likely to prove useful, he 
 had better say nothing.” 
 
TYPES OF PENITENTS o17 
 
 further enquiry. If, however, immediate decision is 
 necessary, what appears to be the safer course ought 
 to be preferred. In further enquiry and deliberation 
 the obtaining of competent advice ought to be in- 
 cluded; and official rulings ought to be accepted as 
 determinative, unless perceived certainly to be 
 wrong. 
 
 (d) A scrupulous conscience! is an evil form of 
 doubtful conscience which is obstinately and unduly 
 influenced by trifling considerations and motives, to 
 the neglect of proper attention to deeper and more 
 determinative principles. It vacillates when deter- 
 minate judgment and action is called for. It is a 
 symptom of moral defect in its possessor, and if 
 uncured paralyzes moral effort and spiritual progress. 
 It represents either spiritual pride (its most frequent 
 cause), the disguise of wilful evasion of responsibility, 
 or pathological abnormality. Its diagnosis and 
 treatment require the skill of an experienced guide of 
 souls. Its ordinary demonstrations are (a) repeated 
 questioning without decision; (0) frequent running 
 
 1 Dr. Pusey, op. cit., p. 376, says that the scrupulous ‘‘are like one 
 whose eyes are inflamed, and who perpetually adds to the inflamma- 
 tion by rubbing them; just so, friction of the conscience increases 
 scruple and anxiety of mind.” Bp. Taylor says in of. cit., that 
 ‘*a scruple is a great trouble of mind proceeding from a little motive, 
 and a great indisposition, by which the conscience though sufficiently 
 determined by proper arguments dares not proceed to action, or if it 
 do so it cannot rest.” Beside the refs. given in the previous note, 
 
 see £..B. Pusey, op. czt., ch. v, art. IT; F. G: Belton, Pt. V, ch. v; 
 J. Reuter, Neo-Confessarius, Pars. III, cap. xiii; W. W. Williams, 
 
 op. cit., pp. 195-200. 
 
218 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 for advice without result; (c) changes of mind for 
 small reasons; (d) habitual brooding over petty 
 considerations; (e) lack of assurance and recurrence 
 of fears after solemn absolution and comforting advice; 
 (f) confusing temptation with sin. 
 
 If the explanation is that of wilful evasion of respon- 
 sibility, serious admonition and present refusal of 
 absolution is needed. If it is pathological, the case 
 will call for merciful regard and pathological treat- 
 ment.1 In the more frequent cases, however, the 
 following remedies are recommended: (a) to cultivate 
 humility; (0) to avoid exciting devotional books; 
 (c) to shun the company of scrupulous persons; 
 (d) to confine self-examination to the greater and more 
 undeniable sins, and in confession to mention lesser 
 sins only en bloc; (e) to flee idleness, or opportunities 
 of unnecessary self-inquisition; (f/f) to ask grace to 
 follow advice implicitly, without running about to 
 different advisers. 
 
 (e) A probable conscience is one that does not hesi- 
 tate to decide on the basis of probabilities, without 
 waiting for certainty. It offers a sharp contrast to 
 the scrupulous conscience. When certainty cannot 
 be had and decision is obligatory—not a rare circum- 
 stance—probability, as Bishop Butler says, is a very 
 guide of life, and ought to be followed. But the 
 besetting danger of a probable conscience is careless 
 neglect of enquiry, and of effort to obtain certainty 
 
 - 1Cf. K. E. Kirk, pp. 233 ff., 202-4, 160; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “ Psycho- 
 analysis”; F. G. Belton, op. cit., pp. 224-5. 
 
TYPES OF PENITENTS 219 
 
 or an approximation to it, when it can be acquired. 
 If after due enquiry and deliberation has been resorted 
 to, probabilities alone are available, then and only 
 then do the principles of “probabilism,”! as it is 
 called, apply. Removable doubt is not a just excuse 
 for deciding upon a purely probable basis. 
 
 Probabilism when it applies, that is, after unsuc- 
 cessful effort to remove doubt, is concerned with two 
 alternatives of conduct, one of which appears to be 
 safer than the other, but neither of which is certainly 
 sinful. In the tribunal of Penance mercy has to 
 rule, and the penitent has to be given the benefit 
 of reasonable doubt, even when he has followed the 
 less safe course. That is, he may not be treated as 
 sinning until either his act itself or his motive therein 
 is clearly shown to be sinful. None the less the priest 
 is bound to cultivate in his penitents not only a sin- 
 cere purpose of avoiding sin—a purpose inconsistent 
 with habitually choosing the less safe course—but 
 also a sense of Christian vocation to make progress in 
 virtue. 
 
 He should therefore inculcate, as occasion affords 
 opportunity, certain general principles in deciding 
 between alternative courses: (1) If both involve 
 probable injury, the least injurious should be pre- 
 ferred; (2) If both bring moral advantage, the more 
 advantageous should be preferred; (3) If one is 
 
 1Qn which, see especially C. J. Shebbeare, in Ch. Q. Rev., July, 
 1912. His account of the various theories is summarized in p. 44, 
 note, above, where other refs. are given. 
 
220 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 always desirable and right and the other not always 
 so, the former should be adopted; (4) If one is always 
 likely to be injurious and wrong and the other not so, 
 the latter should be chosen. In general, that good 
 which is most clear and likely to be attained, and that 
 course which is least likely to be injurious or to lead 
 to wrong doing is to be chosen. But the judgment of 
 conscience cannot alter the material quality of the 
 act or refusal to act, although it does determine 
 immediate obligation and the formal guilt or non- 
 guilt of the course adopted. Therefore we ought to 
 gain the fullest light practicable and govern our 
 decisions by rationally ordered principles, deferring to 
 sufficiently authoritative commands.! 
 
 § 8. Confessions of the sick and dying? should be 
 dealt with in a manner neither apologetic, timid nor 
 perplexed, but authoritative, calm and decisive, 
 although sympathetic, kind, friendly and fatherly, 
 without stiffness and formality. He may well take 
 as his model the sick-room manner of a good physician. 
 He should get quickly to his task, and should insist 
 on being left alone with the patient, for his visit is 
 not merely that of a friendly caller, in which a mem- 
 ber of the family may rightly remain present to share 
 in the conversation. 
 
 1QOn the whole subject of a probable conscience and its right guid- 
 ance, see K, E. Kirk, op. cit., pp. 191-201; W. W. Williams, op. cit., 
 pp. 191-195; N. Porter, op. cit., ch. xvii (a significant recognition of 
 the need of casuistry). 
 
 2See E. B. Pusey, of. cit., pp. 324-353; F. G. Belton, op. cit., 
 Pt. VI; E. C. Linton, Notes on the Absolution of the Sick and Dying. 
 
THE SICK AND DYING 221 
 
 EK. C. Linton gives three classes of sick people; ! 
 the well-instructed, the partially instructed, and the 
 ignorant, that is, in the use of the sacrament of 
 Penance. Practically, all may be placed in either the 
 first or third group. With the first there is no diffi- 
 culty, and they may be particularly exhorted to recall 
 sins that have been omitted in previous confessions, 
 especially if the omission has been deliberate. With 
 the third class it may be well to avoid the technical 
 terms connected with “confession,” in order not to 
 rouse invincible prejudice. The following procedure 
 has been found helpful: The priest will ask if the sick 
 person has any sin troubling him. He may, perhaps, 
 speak of the influence of moral and spiritual condi- 
 tions upon the physical. If he receives the common 
 response “I have committed no sin”’ showing igno- 
 rance as to the nature of sin and failure to prac- 
 tise self-examination, he may question about 
 Church attendance, and ask whether absenting 
 oneself from public worship may not be thought of 
 as sin, and whether there is sorrow for it. He may 
 then follow the same procedure with reference to 
 prayer, going on to sins against God in general. He 
 may then proceed to sins against oneself or against 
 men, taking first those which the world treats lightly, 
 such as profanity. Next he may take up such sins 
 as men are apt most jealously to conceal. The exam- 
 ination may be concluded by some general questions: 
 “Are you sorry for all these?” “Do you want God 
 
 10>. cit., chh. iv-vi. 
 
222 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 
 
 to forgive you?” “‘Do you forgive all those who have 
 in any way injured you?” The priest will proceed to 
 give instruction concerning absolution, not neces- 
 sarily using the word, however, but speaking of it as 
 God’s assurance, ministering consolation to our doubts. 
 He will then give absolution, conditional or absolute, 
 if there is reason to hope that the man feels any 
 penitence. With the unconscious this may be taken 
 for granted. All can be done in a surprisingly short 
 time, a time not exceeding that to which a priest 
 should be expected to confine himself in visiting the 
 sick; and it will be found in many cases most efh- 
 cacious in opening the eyes of the soul to the presence 
 of sin and in leading to sincere repentance. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 SIN 
 
 § x. The Old and New Testaments use a number 
 of terms to describe sin in its various phases.! It was 
 necessarily dealt with from the beginning in the pa- 
 tristic age, and its nature was brought out with 
 increasing clarity as the Church gained practical 
 experience in dealing with its manifold forms. Much 
 of the theoretical treatment of the subject belongs 
 properly to Dogmatic Theology,? and we need not 
 concern ourselves at length with general definitions or 
 distinctions. Perhaps as good a definition as any 
 is that of St. Augustine: ‘‘Anything done or said 
 or desired contrary to the eternal law.’’? It is there- 
 
 1Space is lacking here for detailed treatment; but the Hebrew 
 and Greek terms and their proper meanings can be ascertained in 
 the lexicons, especially Brown-Driver-Briggs, Hebrew-English Lexicon 
 of the Old Testament, and J. H. Thayer, Greek-English Lexicon of the 
 New Testament. See also A. B. Davidson, Theol. of the O. T., ch. vii; 
 E. R. Bernard in Hastings, Dic. of the Bib., g.v.; 5S. A. B. Mercer, in 
 Anglican Theol. Review, vol. II, No. 3, pp. 234-236. 
 
 2¥F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 270 ff.; H. P. Liddon, Some 
 Elem. of Religion, Lec. iv; H. V. S. Eck, Sin; T. B. Strong, Christ. 
 Ethics, Lec. v; Wilhelm and Scannell, Manual of Cath. Theol., Bk. IV, 
 
 ch. 1. 
 3In c. Faust, xxii, 27. “The will of admitting or retaining that 
 
 228 
 
224 SIN 
 
 fore unnatural; that is, when nature is considered 
 from the standpoint of its Creator! It is a dis- 
 turbance of right order, and order has been described 
 as heaven’s first law. 
 
 § 2. Sin has certain characteristics, the considera- 
 tion of which will help us to deal with it from the 
 moral side that properly concerns us here: (a) It does 
 not inhere in the nature of things, nor proceed from 
 the divine essence or from some other independent 
 principle; but owes its existence entirely to free will. 
 “By the will a man sins or lives a good life.” 2 This 
 is the distinctively Christian teaching in contrast to 
 that of Aristotle, who placed sin in a defect of the 
 understanding. It is not, in scholastic terms, a sub- 
 stance, but an accident. It is a privation or corrup- 
 tion of good. (6) God is not the Author of sin# 
 
 which righteousness forbids, and from which one is free to abstain,” 
 tbid., c. Jul., i, 47. St. Ambrose, de Parad., cap. viii, 39, ‘What is 
 sin but the transgressing of the divine law and disobedience to the 
 heavenly precepts?” St. Thomas, I, lxxi, 6. T. Slater, op. cit., 
 vol. I, p. 133, ‘A sin is nothing but a bad human act, and it may be 
 defined as a free transgression of the law of God,” “act” here in- 
 cludes thought and word, of course. Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, 
 pp. 3-11; J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 143-184. The Westminster Shorter 
 Catechism, ‘Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, 
 the law of God.” 
 
 1St. Aug., c. Ep. Manich. Fund., xxxv, 39, ‘Sin is not nature, but 
 against nature.” 
 
 2 Tbid., Retract, I, ix, 4. St. Thomas, I, II, Ixxvii, 6, “‘Sin consists 
 essentially in an act of free choice, which is a function of the will and 
 of reason.” Jbid., II, II, lxxx, 1, “‘A man’s will alone is directly the 
 cause of his sin.” 
 
 8 Tbid., I, xix, 9, “God in no wise wills the evil of sin, which is the 
 
CHARACTERISTICS AND ORIGIN 225 
 
 The doctrine of the “divine concursus’’ does not make 
 God the Author of evil, but the accomplice, if we may 
 so speak, of the will’s freedom, for without Him 
 nothing can be done; but the will, by virtue of its 
 freedom, has the power of doing good or ill, and is the 
 determining cause.! (c) Because sin proceeds from 
 opposition of the human will to the will of God, who 
 is the supreme Lawgiver and the benevolent Father 
 of all, it is an act of disobedience and ingratitude. It 
 diverts man also from his own true end. It derives 
 its motives from an inordinate self-love. 
 
 As to its origin, according to Scripture, (a) the first 
 sin, that of Lucifer and his angels, was purely spiritual. 
 Man’s sin differs in that it is not purely spiritual but 
 partly carnal, and therefore, not the result of malice 
 alone but of malice and infirmity combined. Also 
 in human sin the effect of original sin is to be allowed 
 for, because even after its removal the wound of 
 privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural 
 defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which 
 such evils are attached.” Jdid., I, xlix, 2, ‘‘God is the Author of the 
 evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault.” 
 
 1 Jbid, I, II, xxix, 2, “God is the cause of the act of sin, yet He is 
 not the cause of sin (as such), because He does not cause the act to 
 havea defect.” Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, p. 8, ‘‘God’s contribu- 
 tion toa sinful act isin itself good. He merely enables man to employ 
 the faculties which He has given him for a good purpose. It is man 
 who renders the act evil by having a wrong intention.” Jbid., p. 9, 
 ‘Besides, God often employs sin as a means of punishing the sinner 
 and thus indirectly causes good to spring from evil.” In brief, 
 although God operates in man’s sinning, His end is holy and this 
 
 ultimately triumphs, overruling the evil. Cf. F. J. Hall, Creation and 
 Man, p. 74; B. Boedder, Natural Theol., pp. 355-370. 
 
226 SIN 
 
 concupiscence remains. Man, as distinguished from 
 the angels, can consequently be redeemed from sin. 
 (6) To understand the origin of sin aright, and to avoid 
 the modern tendency to make little of it, we must 
 remember that whether we take the Eden narrative 
 historically or symbolically, the Holy Spirit teaches 
 us thereby that sin grew out of ingratitude and con- 
 tempt towards special privileges and gifts. All light 
 views of sin are impossible when we recollect that 
 Christ became Man and died because of it. Its 
 heinousness to-day is aggravated by the fact that it is 
 committed by those whose minds are enlightened by 
 revelation, whose wills are strengthened by grace, 
 and whose emotions are stirred by the love of the 
 Atonement. 
 
 § 3. The distinction between mortal and venial 
 sin is very important both for priests and for peni- 
 tents, not less so because requiring judgment in appli- 
 cation. It helps priests in dealing with penitents 
 to avoid the opposite errors of rigorism, which treats 
 every sin as fatal, and of laxism, which underesti- 
 mates the gravity of certain sins and treats venial 
 sin as practically negligible. It also helps penitents 
 to avoid these errors in estimating the results of self- 
 examination and in making confessions which are at 
 once sufficiently full and discriminating Mortal sins 
 are those which because of their gravity in matter 
 and formal guilt are fatal to the life of grace. Venial 
 sins are less grave, proceeding largely from weakness 
 rather than from deliberate wilfulness, and not imme- 
 
MORTAL AND VENIAL 227 
 
 diately fatal in their results. The unequal gravity 
 and effect of various sins is everywhere taken for 
 granted in Scripture; 1 and St. John tells us expressly 
 that ‘‘there is a sin unto death . . . All unrighteous- 
 ness is sin: and there is a sin not unto death.” ? 
 The ancient exomologesis presupposed this distinc- 
 tion, and emphasized the peculiar gravity of certain 
 sins;* and as the Church’s experience widened, the 
 difference between mortal and venial sin was clarified 
 and technicalized.+ 
 
 The practical rules for applying this distinction 
 are easy to be understood, whatever may be the uncer- 
 tainties that in cases attend their use. The compara- 
 tive gravity of sins depends upon their matter and 
 upon the degree of deliberate wilfulness with which 
 they are committed. If the matter is grave, that is, 
 if the act itself is highly subversive of the divine will, 
 the sin is presumably mortal; and it certainly is so 
 when committed with consciousness of its gravity 
 and with deliberate wilfulness. On the other hand, 
 if the matter is comparatively light, like a momentary 
 loss of patience, the sin is presumably venial; as is 
 also the case when there is no deliberate wilfulness in 
 
 1Cf. especially St. Matt. v. 22; xil. 31-32; xxiii. 23-24. 
 
 21 St. John v. 16-17. 
 
 3See O. D. Watkins, op. cit., passim; F. H. Hallock in Anglican 
 Theol. Review, Oct., 1921. 
 
 4QOn the distinction, see pp. 11-13, above; F. J. Hall, The Sacra- 
 ments, pp. 239-240; K. E. Kirk, op. cit., ch. xi; T. B. Strong, op. cit., 
 pp. 228-231; W. W. Williams, of. cit., pp. 178-183; J. G. H. Barry, 
 Holy Eucharist, pp. 48-58; St. Thomas, I, II, lxii, 5, Ixxxvili-Ixxxix. 
 
228 SIN 
 
 its commission. Clear as these rules appear to be, 
 in practice both the gravity of matter and the delib- 
 erate wilfulness are matters of judgment, in many 
 instances of uncertain judgment. To forget this is to 
 make the distinction between mortal and venial sin 
 a source of danger instead of help to priest and pen- 
 itent. In doubt, the penitent will most safely sus- 
 pect himself of mortal rather than of venial sin; but, 
 in dealing with penitents, the priest errs most safely 
 for them on the side of merciful judgment, that is, of 
 course, when the sinner appears in practical effect 
 to repent truly of all his sins. 
 
 In judging whether a sin is mortal or venial, the 
 following considerations are helpful: (a) Even when 
 the matter is light, if the sinner thinks it to be grave 
 and under such impression commits it with formal 
 wilfulness, he sins mortally. In fact, any sinful act, 
 regardless of the sinner’s estimate of its material 
 gravity, is mortal when committed with gravely sinful 
 intention and deliberation. (6) When a particular 
 species of venial sin becomes habitual and is wilfully 
 cherished, it becomes mortal, especially when per- 
 ceived to nullify one’s purpose of conforming to the 
 will of God. (¢) A sin which is ordinarily mortal 
 because of the gravity of its matter may be judged 
 to be venial when the sinner is either blamelessly 
 ignorant of its gravity, or does not act deliberately 
 and intentionally in committing it. Marriages per- 
 mitted by civil law but forbidden by the law of God,! 
 
 1 Marriages contrary to the law of God introduce a continuing 
 
TEMPTATIONS AND OCCASIONS 229 
 
 and killings either in self-defence or by accident, 
 supply examples. 
 
 Absence of certainty in determining whether 
 given sins are mortal or venial will not bring disaster, 
 if priest and penitent observe: (a) that all sins, even 
 venial ones, are really sinful and need to be repented 
 of; (6) that, if all sins known or thought to be mortal 
 and all besetting faults, so far as they can be recalled, 
 are contritely confessed, along with sincere expression 
 of contrition for sins not remembered, God will not 
 refuse mercy, and His priest may not in final issue 
 refuse sacramental absolution. 
 
 § 4. As we have seen, the will is the cause of sin; 
 for its functioning is the determinative factor in 
 converting moral motives into action. The fact that 
 evil impulses are thus actualized by the will consti- 
 tutes actual sin, and sin is wilfulness. But the 
 motives—feelings and considerations—by which the 
 will is influenced in sinning, while partly due to 
 inward habitual dispositions and native concupiscence, 
 are also called forth by external factors. Of these are 
 temptations and occasions. 
 
 Temptation to sin means putting the will to moral 
 proof, testing it, by affording opportunities and in- 
 ducements to sin.! In this its proper sense to be 
 
 state which is materially sinful in grave degree. The question of 
 their treatment by a priest is elsewhere considered. The possibility 
 of converting a sin of ignorance into formal rejection of God’s law, 
 and the interest of the children, have to be taken into account. The 
 priest may be justified in certain cases in not taking official cogni- 
 zance, if no public scandal is involved. 
 
 1Qn temptation, F. J. Hall, Incarnation, pp. 250-259; Hastings, 
 
230 SIN 
 
 tempted involves no sin whatever until we yield and 
 will the evil act°or non-action which is suggested. 
 The appeal is to natural cravings and propensities 
 which are lawful in themselves, but which cannot be 
 gratified or obeyed in the specific manner suggested 
 without sin. The fierceness and pain-producing 
 power of temptation are felt in degrees proportioned 
 to the will’s resistance. That is, one who remains 
 sinless alone experiences to the full the brunt and 
 agony of temptation; and Christ alone has fully 
 entered into the personal cost of overcoming tempta- 
 tion.! 
 
 (a) We are placed in this world on probation, and 
 inasmuch as without temptation no real probation 
 and establishment of interior virtue is possible, the 
 natural conditions of our lives afford opportunities 
 and inducements to sin, and divine providence brings 
 them to bear on us in manners wisely adapted to our 
 testing and to a fair chance to advance by rightly 
 meeting the test. In this sense alone we are tempted 
 of God? 
 
 (b) Because of that native lack of the supernatural 
 grace originally given to our first parents and conse- 
 quent insufficiency of our moral powers which we 
 call original sin, temptations come from within as well 
 as from without, and we are apt to yield to them. 
 Dic. of Christ, Blunt’s Dic. of Theol., and Cath Encyc., q.vv.; Hastings, 
 Dic. of Bible, s.v. “Tempt, Temptation”; J. B. Mayor, Ep. of Si. 
 James, on i. I-15. 
 
 1F, J. Hall, as cited, and refs. there given. 
 3 Cf. St. James i. 12-18. 
 
TEMPTATIONS AND OCCASIONS 231 
 
 We cannot invariably avoid actual sin, although in 
 no single instance are we literally obliged to sin, 
 unless previous habits of sin have deprived us of 
 all power to resist. This native tendency is called 
 concupiscence; and is symbolically described as sin, 
 not as really so, but as springing from primitive sin 
 and predisposing us to acts of sin of our own! By 
 divine mercy we have been redeemed; and the grace 
 of baptismal regeneration, while it does not at once 
 eradicate concupiscence and put sinlessness within 
 our power of immediate attainment, imparts the 
 potential principle of progress through life-long disci- 
 pline towards final and complete victory.” 
 
 (c) Men are social by nature and their develop- 
 ment is conditioned by social relations, and by the 
 influence of other persons than themselves. We are 
 also surrounded by personal spirits or angels, and are 
 subject to their influence, under limitations of divine 
 appointment; and among these are evil spirits 3— 
 the devil and his angels. So it is that we are often 
 tempted from without by evil men and angels, who 
 wilfully offer us suggestions and inducements to sin. 
 These sources of temptation are summarized in the 
 phrase “the world and the devil.” To social beings 
 in a world not wholly made up of perfect persons the 
 liability to external personal influence for evil is 
 inevitable—a necessary incident in the probation of a 
 
 1¥F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 277-279 and ch. ix. 
 2 Idem, The Sacraments, pp. 15 ff. 
 3 Idem, Creation and Man, ch. v. 
 
232 SIN 
 
 race. But even so, we are not in any given instance 
 tempted beyond power of resistance, unless our own 
 previous fault has made us helpless. We may be com- 
 pelled to perform actions materially sinful, but no one 
 can compel us to will sinfully, that is, to become per- 
 sonally guilty of sin.! Moreover, the power to 
 resist all forms of temptation, to outgrow concu- 
 piscence, is assured to us by sacramental grace when 
 codperated with in a life of progressive self-discipline 
 and imitation of Christ. 
 
 An occasion is an external circumstance which is 
 apt to afford temptation.2 It does not always bring 
 temptation, for there are many such occasions the 
 tempting factors of which do not secure our atten- 
 tion; but when attended to they tempt by suggest- 
 ing evil thoughts and inciting concupiscence. Like 
 temptations, occasions are indispensable tests of vir- 
 tue. For example, our honesty incurs no actual test, 
 when there is no occasion to steal2 Foreseen occa- 
 sions of sin are to be avoided whenever this is possible 
 without evasion of duty. 
 
 Various distinctions in regard to occasions have been 
 made: (a) a proximate occasion is one which leads a 
 person to sin more often than not; (6) a remote 
 occasion leads to the commission of sin only occa- 
 sionally. A proximate occasion is either absolute, 
 in that it constitutes a danger for all in all circum- 
 
 1_ Cor. x. 13. 
 
 2T. Slater, op. c#t., vol. II, pp. 220 ff. 
 + Eccles, xxxi..r0; 5. (Cor. v.20; 
 
TEMPTATIONS AND OCCASIONS 233 
 
 stances; or relative, when the danger involved de- 
 pends upon individual character or disposition. An 
 occasion of this sort which offers temptation to one 
 may offer none at all to another. Occasions are also 
 distinguished as either (a) voluntary, if wilfully 
 sought after when the danger has been discovered; 
 or (6) necessary, if they can be avoided only with 
 great difficulty or not at all. In the latter case, they 
 are called physically necessary. An occasion morally 
 necessary Is one which cannot be avoided without 
 great injury or inconvenience, because there is in- 
 volved a conflict of duties, perhaps an evasion of 
 responsibilities in one’s providential vocation. 
 Occasions are never to be sought, for such seeking 
 is foolhardy.! To avoid all remote occasions, how- 
 ever, Is impossible;? but we are morally bound to 
 avoid all proximate and voluntary occasions? To 
 expose oneself wittingly and without necessity to an 
 occasion which is apt to lead to mortal sin is itself a 
 grave sin, being in effect an acquiescence of the will 
 in mortal sin. And so long as one wilfully remains 
 thus exposed, although able to escape, he ought not to. 
 receive priestly absolution. In a morally necessary 
 proximate occasion one is bound to do all in his power 
 by fervent prayer, frequent and devout reception of 
 the sacraments, renewal of intention, avoiding perilous 
 
 1 Ecclus. iii. 27. 
 
 21 Cor. v. 9-10; St. John xvii. 15. 
 
 3 Prov. vi. 27-28; xviii. 6-10; St. Matt. v. 29-30; St. Mark ix. 
 41-46. 
 
234 SIN 
 
 company and other methods to convert the proxi- 
 mate into a remote occasion. The dangers of a 
 physically necessary occasion ought to be met by 
 the use of extreme caution and all other available 
 means. : 
 
 § 5. Sins are classified in numerous ways, and 
 knowledge of the distinctions involved is helpful in 
 dealing with penitents. Several of them have been 
 indicated, but a SpE survey seems desirable 
 at this point.! 
 
 The first series of distinctions have to do with 
 estimating the several degrees of guilt: (a) Material 
 sin means any objective violation of God’s will, any 
 action or non-action which as such is sinful; but is 
 very commonly restricted to sins which are committed 
 ignorantly or without sinful intention. Formal sin 
 is one committed knowingly and wilfully, and there- 
 fore culpably. (6) Venial sin is concerned with a 
 comparatively light matter, and represents momen- 
 tary weakness or impulsiveness. Mortal sin is con- 
 cerned with a grave matter, and is committed wit- 
 tingly and with deliberation. It benumbs the soul 
 and, unless remedied by adequate repentance, is 
 fatal to the life of grace.2 (c) Sins of ignorance, 
 that is, vincible and culpable ignorance; sins of 
 infirmity, due to passion and unconquered evil habits; 
 
 1 Qn these distinctions at large, W. W. Williams, op. cit., ch. vi; 
 W. W. Webb, of. cit., ch. iii; St. Thomas, I, II, lxxii-lxxiii; A. Lehm- 
 kuhl, Theol. Moralis, vol. I, §§ 220 ff. 
 
 2 Considered in § 3, above, where refs. are given. 
 
CLASSIFICATION 235 
 
 and sins of malice committed with deliberate fore- 
 thought; constitute a rising series in the degrees 
 of guilt. (d) Sins that cry aloud for vengeance; and 
 the sin against the Holy Ghost, which is obstinately 
 impenitent defiance of light, are singled out in Scrip- 
 ture as especially grave—the latter not subject to 
 forgiveness.? (e) Actual sins, are distinguished from 
 habitual, the latter consisting of such as are cherished 
 and persisted in without repentance, therefore espe- 
 cially grave. 
 
 A second series has to do with species of sin con- 
 sidered in the manner of their committal, or their 
 subjective factor. (a) Of commission, in violation of 
 prohibitive law; and of omission, failing to fulfil some 
 positive requirement. The former are usually more 
 grave, but the latter are apt to become dangerous 
 through neglect of repentance. (6) Sins are spiritual 
 or carnal according as they proceed from, or are com- 
 mitted in, the higher or lower part of our nature. 
 The latter are most scandalous, but the former, 
 especially pride, are the deepest and most difficult 
 to remedy, and therefore are often the most serious.® 
 
 1 J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., pp. 92-106; K. E. Kirk, of. cit., p. 224; 
 T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 30-34. 
 
 2St. Matt. xii. 31 and parallels. Cf. Heb. x. 26-31; 1 St. John 
 v. 16-17 (perhaps not pertinent). See §§ 7-8 below. 
 
 3 St. Thomas, I, II, lxxiii, 5, ‘Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than 
 carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of 
 greater guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole 
 difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more griev- 
 ous than carnal sins, other things being equal.” 
 
236 SIN 
 
 (c) Sins of thought, of word and of deed are distin- 
 guishable without the aid of definition. All sins 
 begin in thought, of course, but their classification 
 depends upon whether they are manifested in words 
 or deeds. Thought becomes sin when it amounts to 
 evil consent of the will, as in impure imagination 
 wilfully pursued, and in pride and hatred. 
 
 A third series of distinctions is determined by 
 external standards of right and wrong and by the 
 parties other than ourselves who are offended. (a) 
 In the category of law, sins may be against the Jaw of 
 natural reason or against the commands and prohibi- 
 tions of positive law. (6) They may be against the 
 revealed law of God or against human law, whether 
 ecclesiastical or civil. (c) Sins against God’s law are 
 chiefly against the Decalogue, and are then classified 
 according to its several commandments.! (d) With 
 reference to the parties involved, sins are aimed either 
 against God, against our neighbours, or against self. 
 In ultimate analysis, however, all sins are against 
 God. 
 
 § 6. The capital sins are so called as constituting 
 heads or categories under which all forms of sin can 
 be classified. They are comprehensive categories 
 because they are determined by the instincts in us 
 which make up the possible roots of sinful action; 
 and the list, which is ancient, is found to be substan- 
 tially in accord with modern psychological investi- 
 tigation. They are sometimes called “deadly sins”; 
 
 1 Treated in ch. iv, Pt. III, above. 
 
THE SEVEN CAPITAL SINS 237 
 
 but this is quite misleading, for each of them may be 
 either venial or mortal according to its comparative 
 degree of malice and gravity of matter. They are 
 seven in number: pride, covetousness, lust, envy, 
 gluttony, anger and sloth.’ Of these, lust and glut- 
 tony are carnal; pride, covetousness, envy and anger 
 are spiritual; and sloth may be either spiritual or 
 carnal, 
 
 Pride is inordinate self-esteem, with desire to 
 induce others to accept one’s exalted opinion of self. 
 Under this head are to be included: (a) vanity, which 
 may be shown either in undue care for one’s personal 
 appearance, attainments, talents and repute or in 
 the contemptuous neglect of the same; (6) ambition, 
 that is, inordinate as distinguished from that which is 
 fitting; (c) arrogance, including bragging and boast- 
 fulness; (d) hypocrisy or the feigning of virtues or 
 qualities which one does not possess. ‘The danger of 
 pride lies in its turning one’s thoughts from God, as 
 the source of all we have and are, and in making one 
 feel self-sufficient and independent, thus making 
 repentance unlikely. It is the sin of the Pharisee. 
 
 1 Thus enumerated in St. Gregory I, Moralia, xxxi, 45. On capital 
 sins, see St. Thomas, I, IT, lxxxiv, 3-4; T. B. Strong, op. cit., pp. 2597 
 266; K. E. Kirk, op. cit., pp. 264-270; W. W. Webb, od. cit., ch. ili, C.; 
 H. V. S. Eck, Sin, Pt. II, ch. vi; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 154-164. 
 For treatments of them severally, see in each case Cath. Encyc., 
 Hastings’ Encyc. of Relig., and Dic. of Bible, q.vv., where further refs. 
 are given. 
 
 2St. Matt. vi. 1-6; vii. 1-5; St. Luke xviii. 9-14; 1 Cor. x. 123 
 Phil. ii. 3-8. St. Thomas, I, I, clxii. 
 
238 SIN 
 
 It begets contempt of others and kills charity. The 
 opposed virtue is humility, a fundamental Christian 
 virtue! It is the mean between pride and the 
 opposed evil of pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness, 
 which keeps a man from occupying the place for 
 which God created him. Humility keeps him in his 
 place both with reference to God and to his fellowmen. 
 
 Covetousness or avarice is an inordinate longing for 
 earthly goods, with an immoderate desire to possess, 
 keep and increase them. It leads to the service of 
 Mammon instead of that of God;? and begets a 
 numerous offspring of sins, such as lying, deceit, 
 perjury, theft, treason, lack of charity in the narrow 
 sense of the term, and every form of injustice. There- 
 fore St. Paul terms it “the root of all evils.”? It 
 leads to insatiability, discontent and fear of poverty, 
 and is often responsible for great unhappiness tend- 
 ing to become fixed.4 
 
 Lust is that form of inordinate desire which breeds 
 the sins of unchastity. It may be either internal, 
 confined to thoughts and desires, or external, of words 
 or acts. Unless promptly overcome in time of temp- 
 
 1St. Matt. xi. 20, cf. v. 3; xviii, 3; St. Luke xiv. 1; St. John v. 14; 
 St. Jas. iv. 6. J.B. Scaramelli, Direct. Asceticum, vol. III, art. XI. 
 
 2St. Matt. vi. 21, 24; St. Paul calls it idolatry, Eph. v. 5; Col. iii. 5. 
 
 $1 St. Tim. vi. ro. Cf. St. Thomas, I, II, Ixxxiv, 1. Generally, 
 see St. Matt. vi. 31-33; St. John xii. 4-6; Heb. xiii. 5; 1 St. John 
 ii. 15. 
 
 4 T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 157 ff. Ibid., p. 158, ‘It is opposed to 
 liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by 
 excess.” 
 
THE SEVEN CAPITAL SINS 239 
 
 tation it is apt quickly to result in mortal sin. The 
 subject has been dealt with elsewhere.! 
 
 Envy is grief because of another’s good. Accord- 
 ing to one theory, it caused the fall of Satan.2 Envy 
 seeks another’s hurt or loss rather than his good, and 
 is therefore opposed to charity. From it spring 
 hatred, revenge, calumny and slander. A deeply 
 seated vice, it has far-reaching effects and destroys 
 interior peace. 
 
 Gluttony is inordinate desire for food and drink 
 on account of the pleasure they give. Of those 
 addicted to it St. Paul says that “their god is their 
 belly.” 4 It is opposed to the cardinal virtue of tem- 
 perance. Excessive eating and drinking are its chief 
 manifestations; but drunkenness is its most common 
 form. Sins committed during drunkenness are mor- 
 ally imputable, unless the state is due either to an 
 accident or to ignorance. Excessive drinking, even 
 when not resulting in intoxication, is sinful, and may 
 become very grave and mortal by reason of foreseen 
 liability to cause injury to health, scandal and neglect 
 of duty, and because practically every man knows 
 that excessive drinking is for him a proximate cause 
 
 1 Tn ch. iv, §13, above. Cf. ch. v, § 7. 
 
 2St. Aug., Serm. 254, alias 151, de Temp.; St. Thomas, II, II, 
 xxxvi, 1-4. Cf. Wisd. ii, 24. But see Isa. xiv. 12-15; 1 Tim. iii. 6. 
 
 3 On envy, 1 Cor. iii. 3; xiii. 4; 2 Cor. xii. 20; St. James iii. 14, 16; 
 v. 9. It is described as cause of the first murder, Gen. iv. 3-8; and 
 of the demand for our Lord’s crucifixion, St. Matt. xxvii. 17-18. 
 
 4 Phil. iii. 19; cf. St. Luke xxi. 34; Rom. xiii. 13-14; 1 St. Pet. iv. 3. 
 
240 SIN 
 
 of further sin It is a most common cause of crime, 
 disease, and human misery generally. 
 
 Anger is craving for revenge. Abstractly consid- 
 ered it is not always a sin, for there is a ‘‘righteous 
 anger’’ 2 which is praiseworthy and the lack of which 
 may be a sin, as when one is unmoved by evil acts. 
 But even this becomes a sin when it leads a man to 
 lose control of himself and harbour feelings of hatred 
 and enmity. And this is especially true when anger 
 lacks a just cause. It becomes a sin in a way analo- 
 gous to lust, by failure to control oneself ad rem.? 
 
 Sloth is sluggishness of soul which makes one shirk 
 physical and mental labour in the fulfilment of duty 
 and the practice of virtue. It may take the form 
 either of lukewarm indifference to these things, or of 
 disinclination for them, developing into positive aver- 
 sion. Its result is spiritual and moral paralysis.* 
 
 § 7. Sins that cry to heaven for vengeance, men- 
 tioned above, include in usual reckoning wilful mur- 
 der, sodomy, oppression of the poor, and defrauding 
 labourers of their hire5 They are not only moral 
 transgressions positively considered, but they violate 
 
 1 Prov. XX. 13 XXiii, 29-35; St. Luke xxi. 34; 1 Cor. vi. 10; Eph. 
 v. 18. 
 
 2St. Matt. iii. 7; St. Mark iii, 5; St. Matt. xxi. 12; Rom. xii. 17; 
 Acts v. 3 fi. 
 
 8 Psa. xxxvil. 8; Prov. xiv. 17, 29; xvii, 14; St. Matt. v. 22; 
 Ephes, iv. 31; St. James i. 19-20. 
 
 4 Prov. vi. 6-11; St. Matt. xxv. 26-27; Rom. xii. 11; 2 Thess. 
 iii, 10-12; Revel. iii, 15 ff. 
 
 5 Gen. iv. 10; xviil. 20 ff.; Ex. ill. 7; xxii. 22 ff.; Deut. xxiv. 14 ff.; 
 St. James v. 4. 
 
THE SIN AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST 241 
 
 with peculiar directness the laws of nature, out- 
 raging certain generally recognized natural instincts, 
 including those of self-preservation, the sexual and 
 the social. By their nature they are always mortal. 
 Of the first two mentioned we have already treated.} 
 Oppression of the poor, especially of widows and 
 orphans, is committed in a variety of ways, ¢.g., by 
 unjustly administering an estate, by the unjust 
 appropriation of goods, by defrauding one who is 
 unable to defend his right, by oppressive combina- 
 tions and monopolies of food, fuel, and other neces- 
 sities of life, by adulteration of such necessities, and 
 by usury. Labourers are defrauded of their hire 
 when compelled by necessity to accept a lower 
 wage than that to which they are justly entitled, as in 
 “sweat shops.” The latter forms of these sins 
 require special study at the present time in the light 
 of modern sociology and political economy. 
 
 §8. In final analysis every wrongdoing is sin 
 against the Holy Ghost, for all sins are in ultimate 
 reference against God. In particular, all sin is op- 
 posed to sanctity, of which the Holy Ghost is the 
 Author. But, technically speaking, the description 
 applies to a certain kind of sin? It is the most 
 malignant sin of all and the only unforgivable one, 
 for it does not proceed from ignorance or infirmity, 
 
 1In ch. iv, §§ 12, 13, above. 
 
 2 See T. Slater, Questions of Moral Theology, pp. 78 ff.; 176 ff. 
 
 3St. Matt. xii. 24, 31-32; St. Mark iii. 28-30; St. Luke xii. 10; 
 Heb. x. 26-31. 
 
242 SIN 
 
 but is a deliberate and unalterably fixed opposition 
 to the will of God as revealed by the Holy Ghost. St. 
 Augustine and Peter Lombard enumerate six distinct 
 sins of this kind,! but all may be reduced to one, 
 deliberate revolt from God with final impenitence. 
 Such sin is necessarily unpardonable, not because in 
 objective form any human sin is beyond the reach of 
 divine mercy, but because the sinner himself delib- 
 erately and finally rejects such mercy. He who thus 
 sins against the Holy Ghost cannot obtain forgive- 
 ness for the simple reason that with, incurable obsti- 
 nacy he refuses to be forgiven. It isthe fixedness of 
 his attitude of rebellion which explains the situation, 
 and all forms of sin are susceptible of final develop- 
 ment to this climax of incurable malignity. Pre- 
 viously to such development all are forgivable on 
 repentance. 
 
 1 Presumption against God’s mercy, despair, resisting known 
 Christian truth, envy at another’s spiritual good and obstinacy in 
 
 sin, are all steps leading to the last which is alone unpardonable. 
 See H. B. Swete, on St. Mark, inloc.; A. Plummer, St. Matt., in loc. 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 
 
 ALEXANDER, A. Christianity and Ethics. N. Y., tor. 
 
 AtpHonsus Licuort, St. Theol. Moralis. Many edd. 
 
 AMBROSE, St. JN. and P.N., vol. 10; M.P.L., vols. 15-17. 
 
 American Church Monthly. N. Y., 1917 ff 
 
 Anglican Theol. Review. N. Y., 1918 ff. 
 
 Anglo—Cath. Theol., Lib’y of. Ed. by E. B. Pusey and others, 88 
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 Ante-Nicene Fathers, The. Ed. by Coxe, 10 vols. N. Y., 1905 ff. 
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 ARISTOTLE. See Welldon. 
 
 AucusTINE, St. NV. and P.N., 1st ser., vols. 1-8; M.P.L., vols. 
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 ee H. A. Marriage Legisl. in the New Code of Canon Law. 
 INCU 3 LOLS, 
 
 Batpwin, J. M. Dic. of Philos. and Psychol. 3 vols., N. Y., Lond., 
 1902-5. 
 
 Barry, J. G. H. The Holy Eucharist. N. Y., 1920. 
 
 BAversTOcCK, A. H. The Priest as Confessor. Lond., Mil., 1915. 
 
 Betton, F. G. A Manual for Confessors. Mil., 1916; Present Day 
 Problems in Christ. Morals. Oxf., Mil., 1920. 
 
 BICKERSTETH, CyrtLt. The Ministry of Absolution. Lond., 1912. 
 
 BICKNELL, E. J. A Theol. Introd. to the Thirty-nine Arts. Lond., 
 IQIQ 
 
 BIGG, GANA The Church’s Task under the Rom. Empire. Oxf., 1905. 
 
 BLACKIE, J.S. Four Phases of Morals. N. Y., 1871. 
 
 deat. SIR Wm. Commentaries on the Laws of Engl. Many 
 e 
 
 Brunt, HucH F. Great Penitents. N. Y., 1922. 
 
 BLUNT, J.H. Dic. of Doctr’l and Hist’l T eae Lond., 1870. 
 
 BoEDDER, B. Natural Theol. Lond., 1801. 
 
 BrRown-DrivEr-Briccs. Heb, and Engl. Ps of the Old Test. Bost., 
 
 1906. 
 
 Bruce, A. B. The Moral Order of the World in Ancient and Modern 
 Thought. Lond., 1899. 
 
 Bruce, W.S. Ethics of the Old Test. Edinb., 1895. 
 
 Butcaris, Nicw. The Holy Catechism of. Lond., 1893. 
 
 Butt, P. B. The Threefold Way. Lond., 1916. 
 
 243 
 
PAA BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 
 
 an Jos. Serm’s on Human Nature. Ed. by W. E. Gladstone. 
 
 xf., 1896. 
 
 CatrD, J. Fund’l Ideas of Christy. 2 vols., Glasg., 1899. 
 
 CALDERWOOD, H. Handb’k of Moral Philos. 12th ed., Lond., 1885. 
 
 Carey, W. J. The Life in Grace. Lond., 1914; Prayer and Some of 
 its Difficulties. Lond., 1915. 
 
 Catholic Encyc., The. Ed. by Herbermann, 16 vols., N. Y., 1907. 
 
 Church Quart. Review, The. Lond., Spottiswoode. 
 
 Cuurton, E.T. The Use of Penitence. 2ded. Lond., 1913. 
 
 Coprens, C. Moral Prin’s and Medic. Practice. New and enl. ed. 
 N.Y; 102, 
 
 Costin, JoHN. Works. In A-C. Lib. 5 vols. Oxf., 1843-55. 
 
 CupwortH, Rate. Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable 
 Morality. Lond., 1731. 
 
 D’Arcy, C.F. A Short Study of Ethics. Lond., 190r. 
 
 Darwin, Cuas. The Origin of Species by Nat’l Selection. New ed. 
 Lond., 1900. 
 
 Davips, T. W. Rays. In Sacred Books of the East, vol. 2. Oxf. 
 
 Davipson, A. B. Theol. of the Old Test. N.Y., 1906. 
 
 Davinson, W.L. Christian Ethics. N. Y.,n. d. 
 
 Davis, N. K. Elements of Ethics. WN. Y., 1900. 
 
 DEARMER, PERcy. Body and Soul. N. Y., 1909. 
 
 De LEHEN, FRr., S.J. The Way of Interior Peace. N. Y., 1888. 
 
 Denzincer, H. Enchirid. Symb. et Definitionum. 12thed. Freib., 
 1913. 
 
 DEWEY, JOHN, and Turts, J.H. Ethics. N. Y., 1900. 
 
 Didache, The, or Teaching of the Twelve Apos. In A-N, vol. 7. 
 
 Didascalia Aposiolorum in English. Transl. by Eadem. Cambr., 
 1903. 
 
 Dit, Sir SAMUEL. Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius. 
 Lond., Igrt. 
 
 DRAKE, DurANT. Problems of Conduct. Bost., tor4. 
 
 Eck, HAV. 8) San. Lond. 1007; 
 
 ELMENDOoRE, J. J. Elements of Moral Theol. basedon .. . St. Thos. 
 Aq. N. Y., 1892, 1895. 
 
 ELwin, W. Confession and Absol. in the Bible. Lond., 1883. 
 
 Ey, R. T. Monopolies and Trusts. N. Y., 1900; Socialism: Its 
 Nature, Strength, and Weakness. Lond., 18094. 
 
 FENELON, ABP. Spiritual Letters. Transl. 2 vols. N. Y., 1878. 
 
 Ficcis, J. N. The Will to Freedom. N. Y., 1917. 
 
 FLiInT, Rosert. Socialism. Lond., 1904. 
 
 FOERSTER, F. W. Marriage and the Sex Problem. Lond., 1912. 
 
 Forses,A.P. An Explan. of theXXXIX Aris. athed. Oxf., 1881. 
 
 GAMBLE, H. R. Sunday and the Sabbath. Lond., N. Y., 1901. 
 
 Gaume. See Pusey. 
 
 Gippincs, F. H. Prin’s of Sociology. N. Y., 1898. 
 
 Giover, T. R. Conflict of Religions in the Early Rom. Empire. 
 Lond., 1908. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 245 
 
 Gore, CHas. In Lux Mundi. Lond., 1904; Christian Moral 
 Prin’s. Oxf., 1921; Dominant Ideas and Corrective Prin’s. 
 Oxf., Mil., 1918; The Sermon on the Mount. Lond., 1896. 
 
 Gott, Joun. The Parish Priest of the Town. Lond., 1888. 
 
 GoupbcE, H. L. The First Ep. to the Corinth. 3ded. Lond., 1911. 
 
 GREEN, T. H. Prolegom. to Ethics. Oxf., 1890. 
 
 Grecory I., St. In M.P.L., vols. 75-79. Trans. in Lib. of Frs. 
 Oxf., 1844. 
 
 Gury, J. P., S. J. Compend. Theol. Moralis. 2 vols. Ratisb., 
 1874. 
 
 HAECKEL, Ernst. Riddle of the Universe. N. Y., 1900. 
 
 Hatt,A.C.A. Christ. Doctr. of Prayer. N.Y. , 1904; Confirmation. 
 Lond., N. Y., 1900. 
 
 Hatt, F.J. Theol. Outlines. 3 vols., Mil., 1905 ff.; The Being and 
 Altirib. of God. N.Y., Lond., 1909; Creation and Man, ibid., 19123 
 The Incarnation, ibid., 1915; The Passion and Exalt. of Christ, 
 ibid., 1918; The Church and the Sac’l System, ibid., 1920; The 
 Sacraments, ibid., 1921; Eschatology, ibid., 1922. 
 
 Hay, T.C. Hist. of Hihics within Organized Chrisi’y. N.Y., 1910. 
 
 Harris, Caas. Pro Fide. New ed. Lond., rorq. 
 
 Hastincs, James. (ed.) Dic. of the Bible. 4 vols. with extra vol. 
 Edinb., N. Y., 1898-1904; Dic. of Christ and the Gospels. 2 vols. 
 tbid., 1906; Dic. of the Apos. Church. 2 vols., 1916-18; Encyc. 
 of Religion and Ethics. 12 vols., 1908-21. 
 
 HERMANN, WILHELM. Faith and Morals. N. Y., 1904. 
 
 HessEy, J. A. Sunday. 4thed. N. Y., 1880. 
 
 HrpeBen, J.G. The Problems of Philos. N, Y., 1898 
 
 Hosses, THos. On Human Nature. Lond., toy. “The Leviathan. 
 Oxf., 1881. 
 
 Hosson, J. A. Evolution of Modern Capitalism. Lond., 1894. 
 
 Hooker, Ricu. Works. Ed. by J. Keble. 3 vols. Oxf., 1865. 
 
 Hueco or St. Victor. In M.P.L. Vols. 175-177. 
 
 Hume, Davip. Treatise on Human Nature. Ed. Selby-Bigge. 
 Oxf., 1896. 
 
 Humpureys, A. J. Christian Morals. Lond., 1920. 
 
 HunTeER, R. Poverty. N. Y., 1904. 
 
 Hutcaines, W.H. The Life of Prayer. Lond., 1897. 
 
 Hux tery, THos. Collected Essays. 9g vols. N. Y., 1908. 
 
 Hype, W. DEW. Five Great Philos. of Life. 2ded. N. Y., 1913. 
 
 Hystop, J. H. Elements of Ethics. N. Y., 1895. 
 
 ILLINGWORTH, J. R. Christian Character. Lond., 1905. 
 
 IRENAEUS, ST. Against Heresies. In A-N., vol. 1. 
 
 JAMES, Wm. Psychology. Briefer Course. N. Y., 1920. 
 
 Joun or Damascus, St. Expos. of the Orthod. Faith. In N. and 
 P-N., 2d ser., vol. Q. 
 
 Journal of the Soc. of Oriental Research. Chi., 1917 ff. 
 
 Kant, Immanuet. Introd. to Metaph. Elements of Ethics. Trans, 
 by Semple. 3d ed. Edinb., 1871. 
 
246 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 
 
 Kirk, K. E. Some Prin’s of Moral Theol. and their Application. 
 2dimpr. Lond., N. Y., 1921. 
 
 Krrxup, THos. A Hist. of Socialism. Lond., 1909. 
 
 Kwox-LitrLe, W. J. Holy Matrimony. Lond., N. Y., 1900. 
 
 Kocu, A. Ed. by Preuss, A. A Handb’k of Moral Theol. 5 vols. 
 St. Louis, 1918 ff. 
 
 Lambeth Conferences, The Five. Ed. R.T. Davidson. Lond., N. Y., 
 1920. 
 
 Deca W.E.H. Hist. of European Morals. 2 vols. N. Y., 1874. 
 
 Lecc, J. W. Papal Faculties Allowing Food before Communion. 
 Lond., 1906. 
 
 LEGGE, J. Religions of China. Lond., 1880. 
 
 LEHMKUHL, AuG., S. J. Theol. Moralis. 2 vols. Freib., 1886. 
 
 LeusaA, J. H. A Psychol. Study of Religion. N. Y., 1912. 
 
 Lippon, H. P. Univ. Sermons. 1st ser. Lond., 1869; Some Elem. 
 of Religion. Lond., 1904; Clerical Life and Work. Lond., 
 1894. 
 
 Licutroot, J. B. Epis. to the Philippians. Lond., 1900; Epp. 
 to the Colossians and to Philemon. Lond., tgo0o. 
 
 LINDNER, D. Die gesetzliche Verwandtschaft als Ehehinderniss im 
 abendlindischen Kirchenrecht des Mittelalters. Paderb., 1920. 
 
 Linton, E. C. Notes on the Absol. of the Sick and Dying. Lond., 
 IQI5. 
 
 Locke, JoHN. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxf., 1894. 
 
 LorrHousE, W.F. Ethics and the Family. N. Y., 1912. 
 
 LorzE, Herman. Prac’l Philos. In Outl. of Philos. Ed. by G. T. 
 Ladd, vol. 3. Bost., 1885-92. 
 
 Lutwarpt, C. E. Hist. of Christ. Ethics before the Reformation. 
 Trans. by W. Hastie, Edinb., 1889. 
 
 MacCotzr, Matcotm. Christianity in rel. to Science and Morals. 
 Lond., 1903. 
 
 MAcKENZIE, J.S. Manual of Ethics. 4thed. N. Y., 1901. 
 
 Mackenzigz, W. D. Ethics of Gambling. Lond., 1889, 1897. 
 
 MANDEVILLE, BERNARD. The Fable of the Bees. Lond., 1714. 
 
 MartTInEAvU, Jas. Types of Ethical Theory. 2 vols. Oxf., 1901. 
 
 Mayor, J.B. The Epis. of St. James. Lond., 1892. 
 
 McDovucatt, Wu. Introd. to Social Psychol. Lond., 1912. 
 
 Mercer, S. A. B. Growth of Relig. and Moral Ideas in Egypt; and 
 Religious and Moral Ideas in Babylonia and Syria. Both Mil., 
 
 IQIQ. 
 
 Micne, L’Appk. (ed.) Patrologiae Cursus Completus. (Latin 222 
 vols. Greek 166 vols.). Paris, 1884 ff. Referred to as M.P.L. 
 and M.P.G. 
 
 Moore, AuBREY L. Essays Scientific and Philos’l. Lond., 1890. 
 
 Mortimer, A. G. Cath. Faith and Practice. 2 vols. N. Y., Lond., 
 1907, 1909; Helps to Meditation. 2vols. N. Y., 1881. 
 
 Moztey, J. B. Ruling Ideas in Early Ages. N. Y., 1879. 
 
 Myers, P.V.N. Hist. as Past Ethics. N. Y., 1913. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 247 
 
 Newso.t, W.C. E. The Cardinal Virtues. Lond. n. d.; Speculum 
 Sacerdotum. Lond., 1894. 
 
 Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, The. 1st series ed. by P. Schaff. 
 14 vols. Buffalo, 1886 ff. 2d ser. ed. by Schaff and Wace. 
 14 vols. N.Y., 1890 ff. Referred to as N. and P-N. 
 
 OricEN. In A-N., vol. 4; M.P.G., vols. 11-17. 
 
 Orttey, R. L. Aspects of the Old Test. Lond., 1904; The Rule of 
 Life and Love. Lond., 1913. 
 
 Parmer, G. H. The Field of Ethics. Bost., root. 
 
 PASCAL, BLAIsE. Provincial Letters. Many edd. 
 
 Preazsopy, F. G. Christian Life in the Modern World. N. Y., 1915. 
 
 Perry, R.B. Approach to Philos. N. Y., 1905. 
 
 PLummMer, A. An Exeg. Com. on the Gospel according to St. Matt, 
 Lond., N. Y., 1909. 
 
 Pour, Jos. (Ed. andtrans. by A. Preuss). Penance. In The Sac- 
 yaments, Vol. III. St. Louis, 1917. 
 
 Pottock, F. First Book of Jurisprudence. Lond., 1896. 
 
 Porter, Noan. Elements of Moral Science. N. Y., 1887. 
 
 Poutain, A. The Graces of Interior Prayer. Lond., 1912. 
 
 Putter, F. W. The Fast before Communion. Lond., 1891; The 
 Anointing of the Sick. 2d ed. rev. Lond., roro. 
 
 Pusey, E. B. Advice for those who Exercise the Ministry of Recon- 
 ciliation: being Abbé Gaume’s Manual for Confessors, abridged 
 . . . adapted, etc. Lond., 1893; Is Healthful Reunion Posst- 
 ble? Lond., 1870. 
 
 Rann, BENJ. The Classical Moralists. Bost., 1900. 
 
 RASHDALL, Hastincs. Conscience and Christ. N. Y., 1916; Is 
 Conscience an Emotion? Bost., 1914; The Theory of Good and 
 Evil. 2vols. Oxf., 1907. 
 
 REvTER, J.,S. J. Neo-Confessarius. Paris, 1895. 
 
 Ricwarpson, G. L. Conscience, Its Origin and Authority. Lond., 
 1915S. 
 
 RICKABY, Jos.,S. J. Moral Philos. WLond., 1912. 
 
 Rocers, R.A. P. <A Short Hist. of Ethics, Greek and Modern. Lond., 
 IQII. 
 
 RowntTrEE, B. S. Betting and Gambling. Lond., 1905; Poverty: 
 A Study of Town Life. Lond., 1901. 
 
 SANDERSON, BisHop. Lectures on Conscience and Human Law. 
 Transl. and ed. by Chr. Wordsworth. Lond., 1877. 
 
 SanrorD, A. E. Pastoral Medicine. N. Y., 1905. 
 
 ScARAMELLI, J. B., S. J. The Directorium Asceticum. 4th ed. 4 
 vols. Lond., 1897. 
 
 Schaff-Herzog Encyc., The New. Ed. by Jackson. 12 vols. N. Y., 
 1908-12. 
 
 Scureter, C. E. (Ed. by H. J. Heuser.) Theory and Prac. of the 
 Confessional: A Guide in the Admin. of the Sacrament of Penance. 
 ad ed. N. Y., 1906. 
 
 Scuweitzer, A. The Quest of the Hisi’l Jesus. 2d Eng.ed. Lond., 
 IQII. 
 
248 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 
 
 ScuLLarD, H.H. Early ssihW te Ethics in the West, from Clement to 
 Ambrose. Lond., 190 
 
 SHarrr, J. C. Studies in hats and Philos. WN. Y., 1868, 1872. 
 
 SIDGWICK, Henry. Methods of Ethics. Lond., 1890; Outlines of 
 the Hist, of Ethics. Lond., 1886; Practical Ethics. Lond., 1909. 
 
 SKINNER, JAS. A Synopsis of Moral and Ascetical Theol. Lond., 
 1882. 
 
 SLATER, THos., S. J. Cases of Conscience. 2 vols. N. Y., 1911; 
 A Manual of Moral Theol, 2 vols. N. Y., 1918; Questions of 
 Moral Theol. N. Y., 1915; Short Hist. of Moral Theol. N.Y., 
 
 1900. 
 
 SmitH, P.V. The Legal Position of the Clergy. Lond., N. Y., 1905. 
 
 Sortey, W.R. On the Ethics of Naturalism. Edinb., 1885. 
 
 SPENCER, HERBERT. Data of Ethics. N. Y., 1880; Justice. In 
 Prin. of Ethics, Pt. V, Lond., 1893. 
 
 StaLey, V. The Practical Religion. Oxf., 1897. 
 
 StopparT, J.T. The New Socialism. Lond., 1909. 
 
 Stone, DaRwELL. The Holy Communion. Lond., 1904. 
 
 Stronc, THos. B. Christian Ethics. Lond., 1896. 
 
 Swett, H. B. The Gosp. according to St. Mark. Lond., 1908. 
 
 TANQUEREY, A. Brevior Synop. Theol. Moralis et Pastoralis. N.Y., 
 IQItI. 
 
 Tayior, JEREMY. In The Works of. Ed. by Eden. trovols. Lond., 
 1883. 
 
 Tuaver, J.H. Greek-Engl. Lex. of the New Test. N. Y., 1887. 
 
 THAYER, W.R. Theodore Roosevelt. Bost., 1919. 
 
 Tuomas Aquinas, St. Summa Theologica. Many edd.; Aquinas 
 Ethicus: or the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, by Jos. Rickaby, 
 S.J. 2vols. Lond., 1896. 
 
 Toucner, E. D. La. Person of Christ in Modern Thought. Lond., 
 Bost., 1912. 
 
 TREVELYAN, W. B. Sunday. Lond., N. Y., 1902. 
 
 UEBERWEG, F. Hist. of Philos. Transl. from 4th ed. by G. S. 
 Morris, with addns. by N. Porter. 2 vols. N. Y., 1876. 
 
 UntHorn, G. Christian Charity in the Ancient Church. N. Y., 1883. 
 
 VERMEERSCH, A. De Castitate. Roma, roro. 
 
 Warp, W. G. Essays on the Philos. of Theism. 2 vols. Lond., 
 1884. 
 
 Watkins, O. D. A Hist. of Penance. 2 vols. Lond., 1920; Holy 
 Matrimony. Lond., 1895. 
 
 Wess, W. W. The Cure of Souls. 2d ed. Mil., 1910. 
 
 WEBER, A. Hist. of Philos. N.Y., 1907 
 
 WELDON, foo OD he N ED ethics of Aristotle. Lond., 
 1908. 
 
 WESTERMARCK, E. Origin and Devel’t of Moral Ideas. 2 vols. 
 Lond., 1906. 
 
 Wairraker, THos. The Theory of Abstract Ethics. Cambr., 1916. 
 
 WILBERFORCE, SAMUEL. Addresses to Candidates for Holy Orders. 
 qthed. Oxf., Lond., 1878. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 249 
 
 WILHELM, Jos. and SCANNELL, T. B. A Manual of Cath. Theol. 
 2vols. 2ded. Lond., 1899. 
 
 Wirtrams, C. M. Review of Evol’y Ethics. N. Y., Lond., 1893. ® 
 
 Wixuiams, W. W. The Moral Theol. of the Sacrament of Penance. 
 Lond., 1917. 
 
 Wis, E. F. The Worship of the Old Covenant. Oxf., 1880. 
 
 Wiroman, A. T. The Doctr. of Confirmation. Lond., 1897. 
 
 WoopwortH, A. V. Christian Socialism in England. Lond., 1903. 
 
 Wor.uebcE, A.J. Prayer. Lond., 1909. 
 
 Wonpt, Wu. Ethical Systems. Transl. 3 vols. Lond.,’1891. 
 

 
INDEX OF PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS 
 
 Adultery and related sins, 119 ff, 
 cf. “Impurity.” 
 
 Absolution, conditions of, 197f. 
 
 Agent, the moral, 62 ff. 
 
 Almsgiving, 155 ff. 
 
 Amendment, 196 f. 
 
 Ascetic Theology, 8. 
 
 Attrition, 192 f. 
 
 Baptism, 131 ff. 
 Body, moral aspect of the, 75 f. 
 
 Candidates, ministerial, 143. 
 
 Canon law, 40. 
 
 Capital and labour, 127 f. 
 
 Capital punishment, 118 f. 
 
 Capital sins, 91, 236 ff. 
 
 Casuistry, 7, 47, 189 ff. 
 
 Celibacy, 182 f. 
 
 Character, 176. 
 
 Children and parents, 113 f. 
 
 Christian ideal of conduct sum- 
 marized, 186 f. 
 
 Church: jethical place of the, 
 36 f, 92; authority and pre- 
 cepts of, 114 f. 
 
 Civil obligations, 157 ff. 
 
 Combinations and trusts, 170 f, 
 
 Communion, Holy, 135 ff. 
 
 Confession, sacramental:  re- 
 quirements of, 194 ff; duty 
 and profit of, 200 ff; qualifica- 
 tions of priests for, 203 ff; 
 mode of hearing, 209 ff; inter- 
 rogations in, 210ff; of the 
 sick and dying, 220 ff. 
 
 Confirmation, 133f, 202 f. , 
 
 Conscience, 43, 50, 52, 63 ff; 
 authority of, 67 f, 83; types of, 
 214 ff. 
 
 251 
 
 Contraceptives, use of, 149 f. 
 
 Contracts, 164 f. 
 
 Contrition, 192 ff. 
 
 Counsels, 181 ff; of perfection, 
 182 f. 
 
 Covenant obligations, 106. 
 
 Covetousness, 127 f. 
 
 Decalogue analyzed, 104 ff. 
 
 Dispensations, divine, 76. 
 
 Double moral standard, error of, 
 rr ff. 
 
 Duty, 8s. 
 
 Economic laws and obligations, 
 165 ff. 
 
 Emotions, 68 f. 
 
 Employer and employee, 116 f. 
 
 End, man’s chief, 4, 58 {, 78, cf. 
 “Summum bonum.” 
 
 Ends of action, 77 f. 
 
 Ethics: the term, 18 f; outline 
 of, ch. iii; and religion, 2, 8, 
 19, 92, 100. 
 
 Ethics, systems of: classified, 
 551; Altruism, 56; Aristot- 
 elic, 28; Buddhist, 20 ff; Chris- 
 tian, 34 ff; Confucian, 22 f; 
 Egoism, 56; Epicurean, 31 f; 
 Evolutionary, 53 ff, 57; He- 
 donist, 32, 57; Idealism, 57; 
 Intuitional, 51, 56 f; Old Tes- 
 tament, 33f; Platonic, 25 ff; 
 Protestant, 46 {; Roman Cath- 
 olic, 44 ff; Scholastic, 41 ff; 
 Socialistic, 57; Socratic, 24 f; 
 Stoic, 30; Transcendental, 55; 
 Utilitarianism, q.v., below. 
 
 Evil, problem of, 27 f, 224 f. 
 
252 
 
 Example, 79, 185 f. 
 
 Expediency, 179. . 
 
 Extreme Unction. See 
 tion.” 
 
 “Unc- 
 
 Fasting, 135, 136, 137, 154 f. 
 
 Gambling, 168 f. 
 
 Good, three kinds of, 77; the 
 highest. See “Summum bo- 
 num.” 
 
 Grace and nature, 10, 74. 
 
 Habits, 73, 235. 
 
 Happiness, 4, 79. See “Utili- 
 tarianism.” 
 
 Holy Ghost, sin against the, 235, 
 241 f. 
 
 Tgnorance, 215 f, et passim. 
 
 Impediments of Matrimony, 
 147 fi. 
 
 Impurity, forms of, 119 ff, 149 f; 
 safeguards, rar f. 
 
 Indulgences, 43, 44, 46. 
 
 Industrial problems, 163 f. 
 
 Justification, 92 f. 
 Knowledge, responsibility for 
 gaining, 62. 
 
 Labour and capital, 127 f. 
 
 Law, 97 ff; of natural reason, 
 too ff; superimposed, 102 ff; 
 of Christ, 103; of the deca- 
 logue, 104 ff. 
 
 Lay officials, duties of, 144. 
 
 Laymen, duties of, 145. 
 
 Liberty and license, 73. 
 
 Love, 82, 117." See." Virtues.’ 
 
 Lying and related sins, 124 ff. 
 
 Manners, 178 f. 
 
 Married, obligations of the, 149 f. 
 
 Material and formal good, 43; 
 sin, 88, 234. 
 
 Matrimony, 146 ff. 
 
 Meditation, 153 f. 
 
 INDEX OF PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS 
 
 Mercy, works of, 2 f. 
 
 Merits, 43, 46, 93, 176. 
 
 Moral, the term, 18. 
 
 Moral agents, 62. 
 
 Moral Philosophy, 7, 17 f, ch. iii. 
 See “ Ethics.” 
 
 Moral science: divisions of, 7 ff; 
 history of, ch. ii; study of, 
 ch. i; sources of, 5, 7. 
 
 Moral Theology Proper, 7, 17 f, 
 95, 97; general treatment of, 
 chh. iv-vi. 
 
 Morality: of acts, 83, 86 f; ulti- 
 wale ground and standard of, 
 85 f. 
 
 Mortal and venial sin, 12, 88 f, 
 139, 226 ff, 234. 
 
 Motives, 69, 72, 80 ff. 
 
 Murder and related sins, 118 f. 
 
 Mystical theology, 8. 
 
 Natural obligations, 100 f. 
 Notable duties, 152. 
 
 Oaths, 108 f. 
 Obedience, 112 f, 158 f. 
 Occasions of sin, 232 ff. 
 Order, Holy, 142 ff. 
 
 Parents and children, 113 f. 
 
 Penance, sacrament of, 14 f, 
 Ta7 ity TOs i, 
 
 Penances, 140 f. 198 f. 
 
 Penitents, types of, 214 ff. 
 
 Perfection: aim of, 78 f, 175 f; 
 counsels of, 182 f. 
 
 Permissions and privileges, 180 f. 
 
 Poverty, 171 f. 
 
 Prayer, 106 f, 152 ff. 
 
 Precepts of the Church, 114 f. 
 
 Probability and  Probabilism, 
 44 {, 190, 218 ff. 
 
 Probationary, this world, 3, 61. 
 
 Psychology, 10 f. 
 
 Relapses, 13 
 Religion in relation to ethic, 2, 
 19, 92. 
 
INDEX OF PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS 
 
 Responsibility, 62, 72, 85. 
 Restitution, 123 f. 
 
 Reverence, 107 f. 
 
 Revolution, the right of, 158. 
 Roman Catholic Moral Theol- 
 
 ogy, Of, 44 ff. 
 
 Sacraments: requirements of, 
 129 ff; obligations of, 131 ff. 
 
 Sacrifice, 93 f. 
 
 Satisfaction, penitential, 108 ff. 
 
 Scrupulous consciences, 184 f, 
 
 Seal, the sacramental, 130 f, 
 208 f. 
 
 Sin: defined, 87; general treat- 
 ment of, ch. ix; classifications 
 of, 234 ff; specific forms of, 
 ch. iv. Pt. II, ef passim. See 
 “ Capital sins.” 
 
 Social ethics, 79 f. 
 
 Socialism, 161 f. 
 
 Sociological obligations, 160 ff. 
 
 State, authority of the, 116. 
 
 Stealing and related sins, 122 ff. 
 
 Summum bonum, 87, 92; ideas 
 Oly 703: 25,130,301, ATs (42) 
 See “End, man’s chief.” 
 
 253 
 
 Sunday, roo ff. 
 Synderesis, 43, 63, 65 ff. 
 
 Temptation, 229 ff. 
 
 Unction of the Sick, 150 f. 
 Unions, labour, 171. 
 
 Usury, 46, 169 f. 
 
 Utilitarianism, 2 ff, 47, 49, 52 £, 
 
 SPP Ate 
 
 Venial sin. See ‘ Mortal.” 
 
 Via media, 28 f. 
 
 Vices, 87, oI. 
 
 Virtue, ideas of, 22, 25 ff, 28, 30; 
 defined, 80. 
 
 Virtues, cardinal and theological, 
 27, 43, 901, 176 fi. 
 
 Vocational obligations, 173 f. 
 
 Vows, 108 f, 172 f, 183. 
 
 Will, the, 69 ff; freedom of and 
 its limits, 70 ff, 74; and grace, 
 74; and motives, 8o fi. 
 
 Will of signs, the divine, 96 f. 
 
 World betterment, 2 ff. 
 
 Worship, 93, 106 f. 
 
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