ele 19 193. _ Digitized the Internet Archive © in 2022 with a yom t ar y ‘ he ae orgdetals/socialpsychologyOdallp_0 is SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BY FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT Professor of Social and Political Psychology School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University che Riversive Press: HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY BOSTON - NEW YORK - CHICAGO - DALLAS - SAN FRANCISCO The Riverside Press Cambridge COPYRIGHT, 1924 BY FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT ALL RIGHTS RESERVED INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE THIS BOOK OR PARTS THEREOF IN ANY FORM The Riverside Press CAMBRIDGE - MASSACHUSETTS PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. TO THE MEMORY OF JOHN EDWARD ALLPORT BELOVED FATHER, WISE COUNSELOR, GREAT AND TRUE FRIEND PREFACE ONLY within recent years have the psychologists of this country turned their attention seriously toward the social field. With one or two exceptions, the earlier works upon this subject, as well as a number of recent ones, have been written by sociologists. To these writers psychologists owe a debt of gratitude for revealing new and promising opportunities for applying psychological science. Socio- logical writers, however, have given their attention mainly to the larger aspects, the laws of behavior and consciousness as operative in social groups. In so doing they have naturally adopted as ma- terials the concepts of human nature provided by the older psychol- ogists of good standing. With the recent expansion of psychology and growth of psychological insight, it has become necessary to modify many of these earlier conceptions and to add not a few new ones. Social science has not yet profited by taking account of this advancement, but has lagged behind in its fundamental assump- tions regarding human nature. A need has therefore arisen of bringing to the service of those interested in social relationships the most recent psychological investigation and theory. I have written this book as an attempt in the direction of supplying this need. More specifically, there are two main lines of scientific achieve- ment which I have tried to bring within the scope of this volume. These are the behavior viewpoint and the experimental method. A considerable number of psychologists are now regarding their science as one fundamentally, though not exclusively, of behavior. This approach has revealed a wealth of principles for the under- standing of human beings — understanding, that is, in the truest sense, namely, the explanation of their acts. Like every funda- mental viewpoint in a science, behaviorism is simply a convenient way of conceiving the facts. Many of its hypotheses are still un- proved. Yet, on the whole, it fits the facts so well, and is so re- plete with possibilities for gaining further knowledge, that it should be of basic value to students of social science. | v1 PREFACE While the behavior viewpoint has been developing a richer inter- pretation of the facts, the method of experimentation has been yielding the facts themselves. Psychologists have recently con- ducted many investigations either social in their setting or sugges- tive of important social applications. The bearing of these experi- ments upon social psychology has in some cases been noted; but, so far as I am aware, no attempt has been made to collect them in a systematic way. My second purpose, therefore, has been to fit these experimental findings into their broader setting in social psychology, and to draw from them certain conclusions of value to that science. In addition to these two main fields of progress, there is a third which deserves especial recognition. I refer to the Freudian con- tributions to psychology. Notwithstanding its investment in a dogmatism which is repellent to many, psychoanalysis has un- earthed facts which are valuable for the understanding of human nature. The bearing of these facts upon social conflict I have dis- cussed in various places throughout the book, and particularly in Chapter XIV. There are certain innovations in the treatment of the subject for which it may be well to prepare the reader. To one interested primarily in social relations it may seem that I give an unusual amount of space to purely individual behavior. This is in accord- ance with my purpose, explained in Chapter I, to adhere to the psy- chological (that is, the individual) viewpoint. For I believe that only within the indwidual can we find the behavior mechanisms and the consciousness which are fundamental in the interactions be- tween individuals. I have, therefore, postponed until the last chapter almost all the material treated in books which have been written from the sociological viewpoint. If the reader finds that not until the final chapter has he arrived upon familiar ground, I shall venture to hope that his understanding may have been in- creased through treading the less familiar pathways. Another deviation will be found in the treatment of instincts. The instinct theory has fulfilled an important mission in diseredit- ing the earlier, mechanical theories of motivation. The notion, however, of complex inherited patterns of behavior is in turn suc- PREFACE Vil cumbing to the process of analysis and closer observation. Some psychologists have, indeed, gone too far in their rejection of in- stincts, in that they have denied the existence of any definite in- born modes of response. The instinct theory was right in asserting that there is an hereditary basis for behavior; its error lay in its failure to analyze behavior into its elementary components of in- heritance and acquisition. The theory of prepotent reactions, developed in Chapter III, aims to combine the virtues and omit the defects of both sides of éhie controversy. The book is intended to be used as a text in courses in social psy- chology and in courses in the various social sciences which give a part of their time to the psychological foundations. I hope also that it may prove of service, not only to college students, but to all who are interested in the social adjustments of individuals and the broader problems of society. For the benefit of those to whom psy- chology is a new subject, a chapter upon the physiological basis of behavior has been included. Teachers will find it advisable to assign the chapters in the order in which they occur. The closing chapter is to be regarded merely as an outline. It was written primarily to guide the student in his application of the principles of social psychology to sociological questions. It is suggested that, where the book is used for a full year’s course, a large portion of the second semester be given to expanding this last chapter with the aid of the references appended. ‘Throughout the course the student should be directed in collecting illustrations and incidents from contemporary social life for the purpose of testing or applying the principles discussed. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS For the origin of my interest in social psychology I am indebted to the memory of Hugo Miinsterberg. It was he who suggested the setting for my first experiments and who foresaw many of the pos- sibilities which have been developed in this book. To my former teacher and colleague, Professor H. 8. Langfeld, my sincere thanks are due for a careful reading of the manuscript and for many val- uable criticisms and constructive suggestions. I wish to express equal gratitude to my present colleague, Professor J. F. Dashiell, vill PREFACE for reading the manuscript and offering effective suggestions con- cerning the theories advanced. I owe much to my association with Professor W. F. Dearborn and Dr. E. B. Holt, and have used sev- eral illustrations derived directly or indirectly from their teaching. In particular, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to my brother, Dr. G. W. Allport, both for assistance with the manuscript and for stimulating discussions of some of the problems raised. He also kindly furnished me with a number of facts from his own re- search, of which mention has been made in the text. My thanks are due also to Professor J. F. Steiner for advice regarding the sociological aspects of the last chapter. Valuable comments upon several chapters were given by Miss Ada L. Gould whose kindness I desire gratefully to acknowledge. To our departmental secretary, Mrs. G. Wallace Smith, I am indebted for effective work in prepara- tion of the manuscript, as well as for helpful suggestions in regard to style. The theory of emotion developed in Chapter IV appeared in substantially the same form in the Psychological Review for March, 1922. My thanks are due to the editor of that journal for permission to republish it here. Finally, I wish to thank the vari- ous publishers who have given their permission to reproduce cer- tain of the illustrations. Fioyp H. ALuport CHAPEL Hitt, NortH CAROLINA ; December, 1923 CONTENTS PR Rr ACH eee tie bee OUR Seigler ean MPT tae ee CHAPTER I SoctaL PsycHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS om einee tia 0) s+ Veen ay iss The present standpoint in psychology The province of social psychology Social psychology as a science of the individual. The group fallacy Psychological forms of the group fallacy. > 1. The ‘crowd mind’ 2. The ‘collective, or class, mind’ 3. The ‘group mind’ Conclusions regarding the social mind Biological forms of the group faliacy Social psychology and soci- ology Behavior and consciousness in social psychology Ao working definition of social psychology. Plan of its treatment in this book. PART I. THE INDIVIDUAL IN HIS SOCIAL ASPECTS CHAPTER II Tuer PHYSIOLOGICAL Basis oF HUMAN BEHAVIOR The adaptive function of behavior The neuron The receptors and effectors Reflex are conduction: properties of the syn- apse The main subdivisions of the nervous system The spinal cord and spinal nerves The parts of the brain The medulla The cerebellum, pons, and mid-brain The cere- bral hemispheres The thalamus and corpus striatum The functions of the cortex Cortical activity in social behavior The autonomic portion of the nervous system The relation of the autonomic to the cerebrospinal system Compound reflexes in behavior The use of the term ‘reflex.’ CHAPTER III FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES — INHERITED AND LEARNED InsTINcT, MATURATION, AND HABIT The origin of fundamen- tal activities The criteria of instinct Post-natal development of structure Maturation versus learning in the analysis of an ac- tivity Conclusions: the need of genetic study in the determina- tion of instinct. THE PREPOTENT REFLEXES AND LEARNING in fundamental activities I. Starting and withdrawing The afferent modifications The efferent modifications Learning and thought in the efferent modification of the withdrawing reflex Reflexes involved x CONTENTS Conclusions regarding modification II. Rejecting III. Struggling Afferent development: extension of the stimuli of the fighting reactions The social influence upon the struggle reflex The yielding response — habits of activity and passivity IV. Hunger reactions. The approaching responses The learning process in hunger reactions Autonomic interests as drives in learning The human hunger reflexes and their develop- ment Prepotency in habit —— Social and affective aspects of stimulus transfer V. Sensitive zone reactions. Response of the infant to tickling Relation of the sensitive zones to hunger and sex Pleasurable habits based upon the sensitive zone reflexes VI. Sex reactions. The original sexual reflexes The affer- ent modification of sexual reflexes. Sex attraction The prob- lem of sex training Sex and sensitive aone reactions in familial behavior The sex reactions and learning ‘Sublimation.’ SocraL Factors IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVI- TIES Imitation Gregariousness. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES. CHAPTER IV FEELING AND EMOTION ee Crone ee Ws Ca mA CO neh The nature of emotion The classification of emotions The physiology of feeling and emotion A theory of feeling and emotion Evidence from introspection and latent period How are the emotional reactions further differentiated? dence from genetic development of unpleasant emotions Evi- Conditions favoring the arousal Complex emotional states in social be- havior The social conditioning of emotional response The control and direction of emotion as a social problem. CHAPTER V PERSONALITY — THE SoctaAL MAN aes ; Rv prea ese: The individual basis of per- Personality is largely a social fact sonality The selection of traits INTELLIGENCE Mo- TILITY TEMPERAMENT SELF-EXPRESSION Drive Compensation Extrovercion — Introversion Insight —— Ascendance — Submission Expansion — Reclusion So- CIALITY. CHAPTER VI THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY .. cw Toe eG 1. Methods of judgment by associ- ates A. Systematic questionnaire methods B. Rating methods 2. Testing methods Types of personality. GENERAL SuMMARY — Tue Inpivipuat As A Unit In SoctAt Br- HAVIOR. Introductory statement CONTENTS xl PART II. SOCIAL BEHAVIOR CHAPTER VII Ture NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SoctAL BEHAVIOR : . 147 Definition and classification —— Linear and circular social Reheat ior Direct and contributory social stimuli Controlling and self-adapting social behavior. SoctiAL BEHAVIOR IN ANIMALS The lower forms of life. Ad- justments based on difference of structure Insects and allied forms Vertebrates The social behavior of pigeons The social behavior of apes and monkeys Sociological aspects of animal behavior Conclusions. CHAPTER VIII SocrAL STIMULATION — LANGUAGE AND GESTURE . . . . . 169 Forms of social stimulation. THE PHysIoLoGIcAL Basis of VocaAL EXPRESSION The organs of speech — General view The larynx Laryngeal tone pro- duction Pitch and intensity of laryngeal tones The forma- tion of vowels Articulate speech. Consonants. THE GENETIC DEVELOPMENT OF VOCAL EXPRESSION Gesture Pre-linguistic or laryngeal stage of vocal ex- pression The development of language: Stage 1. — Random ar- ticulation with fixation of circular responses Stage 2. — Evoking of the articulate elements by the speech of others (so-called ‘Imita- tion’) Discussion of the theory involved in stages 1 and 2 Stage 3. — Conditioning of the articulate elements (evoked by oth- ers) by objects and situations Development of response to lan- guage. GESTURE AND VocAL EXPRESSION IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Infantile and primitive language Theories of the origin of lan- guage. Gesture Graphic gesture in relation to infantile and primitive language - The interjectional and onomatopoetic theo- ries A social behavior account of the origin of language Written language. ConcLusion — THE Soctat BAsIs AND VALUE OF LANGUAGE. language in infants CHAPTER Ix SocraAL STIMULATION — FACIAL AND BopILy EXPRESSION . .. . 200 Introductory statement. EXPRESSION IN EMOTION AND ALLIED STATES The facial mus- cles and their expressive function The language of the face I. The pain-grief group II. The surprise-fear group Ti The anger group IV. The disgust group V. The pleasure xii CONTENTS group VI. The attitudinal group —— Dynamic and _ bodily components of expression. THE THEORY oF FactAL EXPRESSION ples A reinterpretation of Darwin’s theory The mimetic responses Theory of mimetic expression Summary. EXPRESSION THROUGH POSTURE AND PHYSIOGNOMY tonus and posture as social stimuli Physiognomy. THE STIMULUS VALUE OF FaAcIAL AND Bopity EXPRESSION Genetic aspects and extremes of sensitivity Experiments in reading facial expression General aspects of expressional stimu- lation. Minor Forms oF SociAL STIMULATION. Darwin’s three princi- Muscle CHAPTER X RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION: ELEMENTARY Forms . .. . 233 Types of reaction to social objects. SYMPATHY The mechanism of sympathy favoring the sympathetic response Conditions The social significance of sympathy Summary. IMITATION An analysis of acts to which the term ‘imitation’ is applied. SUGGESTION Various definitions of suggestion The po- tency of spoken language in bodily control as a control of attitude 1. Suggestion in the formation of atti- tudes 2. Suggestion in the release of attitudes 3. Sugges- tion in the increase of responses already released Conditioned response in suggestion The conditions of suggestibility Final definition of suggestion. LAUGHTER Genetic origin of laughter. The incongruous Laughter as a release of inhibited emotion. Freudian wit —— Laughter is a social phenomenon. Suggestion defined CHAPTER XI RESPONSE TO SocIAL STIMULATION IN THE GROUP... . . 4 ,. 260 The more complex social situations. INFLUENCE OF THE Co-AcTING GROUP Social facilitation: the influence of the group upon the individual’s movements —— The influence of the group upon attention-and mental work The in- fluence of the group upon association The influence of the group upon thought The influence of the group upon judgments of comparison Individual differences in social facilitation So- cial consciousness in the co-working group Rivalry —— Auto- rivalry, ‘team-work,’ and esprit de corps The physiological basis of social facilitation and rivalry Summary of the experi- mental study of the group influence. INFLUENCE OF THE Face-To-F'ack Group —— The nature of face- . CONTENTS xill I Social control, participation, and sex as prepotent Conversation and discussion. to-face groups drives in primary groups CHAPTER XII RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION INTHE CRowb . . . .. .. 292 The crowd situation. PrepoTeNntT InpiIvipuAL Reactions As THE Basis oF CRowpD. PHENOMENA Prepotent drives in various crowds Crowds as struggle groups Individual factors are often neglected in crowd theories. RELEASE AND HEIGHTENING oF INDIVIDUAL REACTIONS IN CROWDS ‘Contagion.’ The induced emotion theory Social facilitation in crowds The origin and spread of social facilita- tion. Special devices Spatial factors and circularity in crowds. The social behavior of the audience Suggestion and the sugges- tion consciousness in crowds The conservatism of the crowd man. ATTITUDINAL AND IMAGINAL FAcTORS IN THE CROWD BEHAVIOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL The impression of universality Social projection The crowd attitudes and public opinion. SprcrAL MECHANISMS FOR THE RELEASE OF PREPOTENT REACTIONS _ IN Crowpbs Allied and antagonistic responses. Resolution of individual conflicts in the crowd The moral consciousness of the crowd man —— Crowd ethics in vocational and fraternal groups Martin’s principles of crowd behavior Summary. CHAPTER XIII SocrAL ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS ee Darcie Ol) General social attitudes Attitudes toward specific groups —— Self-expressive social attitudes Attitudes toward specific persons Attitudes based upon the behavior of others toward us: the social self Building up attitudes in others toward us —— Maintaining the attitudes of others toward us Social conscious- © ness The genetic development of social consciousness and the social self Some general aspects of social consciousness. vp eere CHAPTER XIV SOCH TMA DIUSTMENTS te cu) cyl dcohl oe UE mem nies If gees Uinteeie . 336 ° Conflict and adjustment in social behavior Clues to inhibited unsocialized reactions The major conflicts and their social ad- justment. 1. StRuGGLE ConFruicT: ADJUSTMENTS IN ANGER version of the struggle response Rationalized anger. - 2. Spx ConFLIcrT AND ADJUSTMENTS IN Famity Lire The intro- Types of struggle inhibition Sex XIV ~ CONTENTS differences. Attitudes toward women Adjustments between husband and wife Causes of marital disharmony —-— Adjust- ments between parents and children. Introductory statement The Freudian conception Restatement of the Freudian theory: 1. The love of the child for the parent 2. The love of the parent for the child Personal and social significance of the child-parent fixation Further problems in the parent-child relation. The evil of neglect Brothers and sisters, and other adjustments of consanguinity The selection of friends and associates. 3. INFERIORITY CoNnFLicT: ADJUSTMENTS OF PERSONALITY TRAITS The nature of inferiority conflict Types of inferiority con- a. The intellectual_ sphere b. The economic sphere: radicalism and conservatism c. The moral sphere: reformism. SocroLoGicaL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT ADJUSTMENT Conflicts between egoistic drives and social standards: group aspects Conflicts between egoistic drives and group traditions Covert conflicts in hostility between groups Is conflict a symptom of socialization or degeneracy? flict - CHAPTER XV SocIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY ets Fe At eal A ole RS The place of social behavior in the social sciences. SoctaL AGGREGATES: UNITY Social behavior in relation to population —— Primary group and community Caste and social class Race and racial adjustments Nationality. Tur THEORY oF SocIetry The origin of human aggregation The nature of society: theories of the ‘ego-alter’ type Imi- tation and sympathy theories. SocraAL ORDER: ORGANIZATION AND ControL —— The nature of so- celal control Unorganized controls: fashion Fad and craze Convention Custom Rumor Public opinion Mob rule Control through institutions: a. Government Education c. Religion. SocraL BEHAVIOR AND ConTROL IN THE Economic SPHERE —— Social behavior in commercial attitudes. Credit and panic Social control and exploitation in business Industrial phases: behavior in co-working groups Industrial conflict. SocrIAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE The concept of social hered- ity The social character of the individual’s thinking Social behavior in discovery and invention Leadership ——— The per- sonality of the leader Popular movements. Lines or Future DEVELOPMENT Social progress as the well- being of the individual Summary: Social behavior in relation to progress. bag INDEX e e e 6 ° e ° ° e e e e e e e 435 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY CHAPTER I SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS | The Present Standpoint in Psychology. Psychology is the sci- ence wnich studies behavior and consciousness. Of these two terms behavior is placed first because it is an explanatory principle, and therefore more fundamental. The essential formula for be- | havior is as follows: (1) Some need is present in the organism, such as the necessity of withdrawing from weapons injuring the body, or the need to obtain food or to secure a mate. The need may also be of a derived and complex order; for example, the necessity of solv- ing some problem upon which the satisfaction of the more elemen- tary wants depends. (2) The organism acts: it behaves in such Bae manner as to satisfy the need. Need, in the sense here employed, signifies a biological maladjust- ment. The relation existing between the organism and its sur- roundings is injurious rather than beneficial to life, and must be changed if the individual is to survive. More specifically, a need arises when certain objects excite the external sense organs, as in an injury to the skin; or when muscular changes in the internal organs, as in hunger, excite sense organs inside the body. These excitations, or stxmulations, set up a current of nervous energy which is prop- agated inward to the central nervous system and outward again to the muscles controlling bodily movement, causing them to act in such a way as to fulfill the need through which the chain of events originated; that is, in the examples used, to withdraw from harm and to obtain food. The making of these adaptive movements is called the reaction. But the word ‘need’ may be used in another sense beside that or 2 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY biological requirement. It may denote a felt, or conscious, lack, as when we say we feel hunger or feel the need of companionship. Need in this sense is a part of the immediate and private experience of each individual. We can never be directly aware of the felt needs of others; they can only be inferred by observing their behavior when they are biologically maladjusted to their surroundings (need in the former sense). This personal awareness which accompanies behavior extends to other facts beside need or desire. We are aware of the stimulating object, aware of fear or anger when these emotions are a part of our adjustment to it, aware of our purpose in making the reaction, and of our thinking and acting toward that end. These conscious states likewise are known in others only by inference from appropriate reactions. It is clear that consciousness stands In some intimate relation to the biological need and the behavior which satisfies it. Just what this relation is still constitutes an unsolved and perplexing problem. One negative conclusion, however, seems both justified and neces- sary as a working principle: namely, that consciousness is in no way a cause of the bodily reactions through which the needs are fulfilled. Explanation is not derived from desire, feeling, will, or purpose, however compelling these may seem to our immediate awareness, but from the sequence of stimulation — neural trans- mission — and reaction. Consciousness often accompanies this chain of events; but it never forms a link in the chain itself.} To present detailed evidence for the stand we have just taken would lead us too far afield. If the reader is inclined to challenge this hypothesis, this book should be weighed as an argument for its validity. Any hypothesis must rest its case upon its capacity for explaining the phenomena with which it deals, in this case the phenomena of human action. If it fails in this, it must be rejected. 1 To illustrate, let us consider the act of satisfying hunger. When a man goes to dinner the combined stimulation from the sound of the bell and his restless stomach enters his nervous system and goes out to the muscles of walking to the dining- room, sitting, and eating. The man himself experiences hunger pangs, and consid- ers these sufficient reason for his eating. Actually, however, “hunger sensations”’ are only a description of the consciousness accompanying the behavior. The cause of going to the table lies in the sequence stomach-stimulation — nerve transmission — reaction. The act could be equally well explained if the subject had no con- sclousness whatsoever. AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 3 While there remain many problems yet to be solved, a material advance has been made in psychology since the adoption of the mechanistic and behavior viewpoint. Much of the confusion resulting from including conscious or ‘mental’ entities in the sequence of cause and effect has been dispelled; and there is promise of wide future development under the guidance of the behavior hypothesis. There are a few psychologists who maintain that, since conscious- ness does not explain events, it has no place in the science which studies behavior. This is a serious mistake. No scientist can afford to ignore the circumstances attendant upon the events he is observing. Introspection on conscious states is both interesting in itself and necessary for a complete account. The consciousness ac- companying reactions which are not readily observable also fur- nishes us with valuable evidence and information of these reactions, and thus aids us in our selection of explanatory principles within the mechanistic field. ‘The phenomena we shall study in this book comprise both behavior and consciousness, with emphasis upon the former because it holds the key to explanation. The introspective account will aid in our interpretations and will supplement them upon the descriptive side. Having outlined the position of present- day psychology as a whole, we may now approach the special branch which is our present interest. The Province of Social Psychology. Behavior in general may be ,- regarded as the interplay of stimulation and reaction between the individual and his environment. {Social behavior comprises the ~ stimulations and reactions arising between an individual and the social portion of his environment; that is, between the indiyidual and his fellows. Examples of such behavior would be the reactions to language, gestures, and other movements of our fellow men, in contrast with our reactions toward non-social objects, such as plants, minerals, tools, and inclement weather. The significance of social behavior is exactly the same as that of non-social, namely, the correction of the individual’s biological maladjustment to his environment. In and through others many of our most urgent wants are fulfilled; and our behavior toward them is based on the same fundamental needs as our reactions toward all objects, social \ 4 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY or non-social.! It is the satisfaction of these needs and the adapta- tion of the individual to his whole environment which constitute the guiding principles of his interactions with his fellow men. Social Psychology as a Science of the Individual. The Group Fallacy. Impressed by the closely knit and reciprocal nature of sucial behavior, some writers have been led to postulate a kind of ‘collective mind’ or ‘group consciousness’ as separate fromthe minds of the individuals of whom the group is composed. No fallacy is more subtle and misleading than this. It has appeared in the literature under numerous guises; but has everywhere left the reader in a state of mystical confusion. Several forms of this theory will be examined presently. The standpoint of this book may be concisely stated as follows. ¢ There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individ- uals. Social psychology must not be placed in contradistinction to the psychology of the individual; zt 7s a part of the psychology of the individual, whose behavior it studies in relation to that sector of his environment comprised by his fellows. ) His biological needs are the ends toward which his social behavior is a developed means. Within his organism are provided all the mechanisms by which. social behavior is explained. There is likewise no consciousness except that belonging to individuals. Psychology in all its branches is a science of the individual. To extend its principles to larger units is to destroy their meaning. Psychological Forms of the Group Fallacy. 1. The ‘Crowd Mind.’ The most flagrant form of the group fallacy is the notion of ‘crowd consciousness.’ It has long been observed that persons in an excited mob seem to lose control of themselves, and to be swept along by tempestuous emotions and impelling ideas. It is there- fore alleged that there is a lapse of personal consciousness and a rise of a common or ‘crowd’ consciousness. The objections to this view are fairly obvious. Psychologists agree in regarding 1 An interesting point of difference, however, exists in the social as distinguished from other environmental relations. In the social sphere the environment not only stimulates the individual, but is stimulated by him. Other persons not only cause us to react; they also react in turn to stimulations produced by us. A circular character is thus present in social behavior which is wanting in the simpler non- social adjustments. AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 5 consciousness as dependent upon the functioning of neural struc- ture. / Nervous systems are possessed by individuals; but there is no nervous system of the crowd.4-Secondly, the passing emotion or impulse common to the members of a crowd is not to be isolated introspectively from the sensations and feelings peculiar to the individual himself. Another argument for crowd mind proceeds as follows. The turbulent and riotous deeds of a mob point to the existence of a ‘mob consciousness,’ for such behavior would be quite unthinkable for men in their right minds taken separately and in isolation. There is an element of absurdity in this argument: we are asked to explain the nature of crowd action by considering the individuals in isolation; that is, when there is no crowd at all. The mere adding up of the reactions of isolated individuals has no meaning whatsoever beyond mere enumeration. But given the situation of the crowd — that is, of a number of persons within stimulating distance of one another — we shall find that the actions of all are nothing more than the sum of the actions of each taken separately. When we say that the crowd is excited, impulsive, and irrational, we mean that the individuals in it are excited, impulsive, and irrational. It is true that they would probably not be in this state if they were in isolation from one another; but that means that only in the close group each is so stimulated by the emotional behavior of others that he becomes excited to an unusual degree. The failure to take note of these interstimulations and reactions between individuals has given rise to the illusion that a ‘crowd mind’ sud- denly descends upon the individuals and takes possession of them. The crowd as a whole has been attended to rather than the individ- ual members. Spectacular mob action has thus combined with loose terminology to draw attention away from the true source of crowd explanation, namely, the individual. N 2. The ‘Collective, or Class, Mind.’ Another sense in which the group is sometimes said to possess a consciousness and behavior of its own is in the sameness of thought and action among the members of such a body as an army, a political party, ora trade union. In these groupings the uniformities of mind are considered as elevated to the position of a separate entity participated in by all. One vv LAs 6 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY hears, for instance, such phrases as ‘‘the spirit of the meeting,” ab “the community of opinion,” ‘‘the army personality,” and ‘esprit de corps.” If these terms are used in a literal, rather than a metaphoric, sense, they partake of the group fallacy. A particular segment of the individual’s life is picked out because of its similarity -with the corresponding segments in other individuals, and is set up as a separate psychological entity. The question, of course, arises as to what becomes of the spirit of the meeting when it is broken up and the minds of its members are concerned with other matters; or what becomes of the army personality when the soldier is off on furlough. The answer to the latter question is that the so-called ‘army personality’ is merely a set of military habits belonging to the individual. \ He retains these as neurological patterns when off on leave, and employs them in action when under military duty. He does not suddenly acquire the ‘mind of the army’ upon coming into the presence of his fellow soldiers, any more than a man at- tains skill upon the violin by coming into an assembly of accom- plished violinists. Un both cases we are dealing with individually acquired habits.| Collective consciousness and behavior are simply the aggrega- tion of those states and reactions of individuals which, owing to similarities of constitution, training, and common stimulations, are possessed of a similar character. Many social applications follow from this homogeneity. All men in political life try to “keep their finger on the pulse of the public,” and neglecting minor dissensions strike the high peak of the curve of “public opinion.” In this sense the collective mind is not an entity in itself, but a practical working concept. It is a convenient designation for certain uni- versal types of reaction which interest political leaders because they represent points of contact with thousands of separate individuals and therefore serve as means of acquiring widespread control. Thus ‘collective opinion’ exists only in the form of a class concept or symbol of thought. . Similarly, the General issues an order and all the men of the division or army obey as one man. Owing to disciplined and uni- form response, he is able to handle this body of men as if it were one individual, but with a result a thousand-fold more potent. It 1s AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 7 expedient, therefore, to speak of the entire body as a unit, and call it an army, a corps, or a division. We must not forget, however, that the ‘one-ness’ lies not in the army as an entity, but solely in the ability of its members to act uniformly and to be controlled as one man. It is in the General’s attitude toward the aggregation rather than in the aggregation itself. ‘The General issues his orders: to the army; but it is always individual men who obey the orders. Language makes it possible for us to speak conveniently about the collective exploits of a body of this sort. We say “the army captured the city” and are as correctly understood as though we had said “the individuals of the army captured the city.” Simi- larly, we state that the ‘crowd’ stoned the martyr or stormed the Bastille. But language also has its disadvantages. So long as we speak of overt action there is no possibility of confusion — we obviously mean that individuals performed the acts in all cases. When, however, we read in the words of the older social writers that the crowd ‘feels’ and ‘wills,’ or ‘is emotional,’ ‘intolerant,’ ‘im- moral,’ and the like, we come perilously near to regarding the crowd as possessing a mind of its own, apart from the minds of its individual members. The very intangibility of these states, com- bined with the striking vehemence of their manifestation, aids language in establishing this illusion. In cases, therefore, where psychological factors are involved, it is better to use the less facile but more exact phrase, “the individuals in the crowd are’emotional, intolerant, immoral,’ and soon. This is no mere pedantry; for it lays the emphasis upon the true source to which we must look for an explanation of crowd phenomena. If we believe that it is the crowd mind rather than the individual’s which exhibits the altered phases of consciousness, all explanation fades into mere description. LCrowds, for example, are alleged to be irrational or suggestible merely because that is the nature of crowd’ mentality. ( Thus crowd behavior is explained in terms of what crowds generally do — a circular explanation, indeed! There is, moreover, according to this view no reason for one crowd to exhibit different mental characteristics from another; all are subject to the same laws of emotionality, irrationality, simple-mindedness, and the like. Against these inadequacies and fallacies we must again 8 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY urge the importance of going below group phenomena to a deeper level, the individual in the group. It is only through social psy- chology as a science of the individual that we can avoid the super- ficialities of the crowd mind and collective mind theories. 3. The ‘Group Mind.’ A third form of the group fallacy re- _ mains to be considered. This is the notion that a social mind exists, not in crowd consciousness nor mental collectivity, but in the sense of permanent organization. “People are said to be closely united through attitudes of mutual respect and codperation, and through adherence to a culture, a tradition, or a symbol of national life. Institutions fix these various forms of human association, and carry them into the very center of the individual’s life/ A university, for example, consists essentially, not of buildings, equipment, or even specific professors, but of a system of ideals and interrelations among human beings expressed in intangible, and, as some con- sider, mental form. ; The mind of this sort of group is therefore a kind of ‘mental structure’ of organization, distinguishable from the minds of the individual members. Individuals may come and go; but this organized mental life goes on indefinitely. The age-old solidarity of the Catholic Church, the Jewish race, or the English nation illustrates this form of social entity to which a mental exis- tence is ascribed separate from the existence of the individuals composing it. When closely examined this hypothesis appears to be a subtle variety of the collectivity and crowd theories. “The organization of a university exists really in the attitudes which individual teachers and students have toward one another and toward the body of recorded and transmitted rules and traditions of the in- stitution. We have here a collection of similar response tendencies. Hach member also knows that the others respect and obey the ' standards which they all hold in common in the same way that he respects and obeys them; and this awareness seems to knit the group more firmly together. This again is simply a set of common ideals and feelings rendered more uniform by the conscious effects of one individual upon another. It is a type of uniformity differing only in complexity from the unified responses of the callectivity theory. AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 9 In order to answer the question where this mental structure of the group exists, we must refer again to the individual. Nation- ality, Free-Masonry, Catholicism, and the like are not group minds expressed in the individual members of these bodies; they are sets of ideals, thoughts, and habits repeated in each individual mind and existing only in those minds.!. They are not absorbed in some mysterious way from the group life, nor are they in- herited. They are learned by each individual from the specific language and behavior of other individuals. Where such con- tinuity of social contact ceases the organized life of the group disappears. Were all the individuals in a group to perish at one time, the so-called ‘group mind’ would be abolished forever. It is not necessary to have the same personnel for continuity of group structure; but there must be some personnel. Conclusions regarding the Social Mind. At every point we are thus led back to the individual as the locus of all that we may call ‘mind.’ Alike in crowd excitements, collective uniformities, and organized groups, the only psychological elements discoverable are in the behavior and consciousness of the specific persons involved. All theories which partake of the group fallacy have the unfortunate consequence of diverting attention from the true locus of cause and effect, namely, the behavior mechanism of the individual. They place the group prior to this mechanism in order of study, and sub- stitute description of social effects in place of true explanation. On the other hand, if we take care of the individuals, psychologically speaking, the groups will be found to take care of themselves. The reasons for our repeated insistence upon regarding social psychol- ogy as a phase of the psychology of the individual should now be fairly evident. Biological Forms of the Group Fallacy. The psychological varieties of the social entity hypothesis have a curious parallel upon the biological side. Many analogies have been pointed out between the human organism and the organized group or society. 1 Many of the supporters of the belief in a mind of the group independent of the nervous systems of individuals belong to the philosophical school known as objective idealists. Mind, in the larger and impersonal sense, is for them the true reality; hence they find no difficulty in conceiving of an objective group mind over and above the minds of the individuals, or comprising the minds of the individuals. 10 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Plato likened the three portions of the ideal state, the rulers, the warriors, and the workers, to the three corresponding portions of the body, the head, the breast, and the abdomen respectively. Spencer found the ‘body politic’ to resemble the human body in its distributing agencies (arteries) and its controlling and communicat- ing functions (nerves), etc. \Another theory assigns separate minds to (1) individual cells in the organism itself, (2) the organism as a collection of these cells, and hence (8) society as an aggregation of conscious organisms.! This last theory combines the notion of the social organism with that of the’sccial mind. Where these biologi- cal formulations are advanced only as metaphors (as in the case of Plato and Spencer), they can scarcely be called fallacies. As analogies they are picturesque but exaggeratedY Although we can readily agree that there is organization within social groups, it is difficult to speak seriously of these groups as organisms. In the first place, there is no continuity of tissue between the units of the group as there is between cells and organs of the body. Secondly, the organization of the individual’s body is based upon integration, or the welfare of the entire individual; whereas, in the social body, the controlling principle of organization and function is the interest of the parts; that is, the separate individuals.? The individual, then, is the true organism, as he is the psycho- logical unit of society. The group merely furnishes him with a social environment in which he may react. And organized society is essentially a set of rules for guiding his reactions so that they do not trespass upon the life processes of his fellow organisms. Social Psychology and Sociology. Behavior, consciousness, and organic life belong strictly to individuals; but there is surely oc- casion for speaking of the group as a whole so long as we do not regard it as an organism or a mental entity. The study of groups is, in fact, the province of the special science of sociology. While the social psychologist studies the individual in the group, the sociologist deals with the group as a whole. He discusses its forma- tion, solidarity, continuity, and change. Psychological data, such 1 Espinas: Les Soctétés animales. Paris, 1877. 2 For an elaborate and ingenious social organism metaphor see Miinsterberg’s Psychology, General and Applied, pp. 265-69. AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 11 as innate reactions and habitual and emotional tendencies of in- dividuals, are explanatory principles upon which sociology builds in interpreting the life of groups. Other sciences also contribute to the same end. Certain sociologists speak of these universal human reactions as ‘‘social forces.”’ For example, hatred of a common enemy may be designated as a social force in a country at war. The social psychologist’s task is in this case the explanation of the causes and conditions of hatred in the individual, and the part played by his behavior in arousing this emotion in others. The sociologist is interested rather in the widespread effects of this reaction in unifying the group and producing concerted responses of great power in struggles between opposing groups. Psychology in general, and social psychology in particular, are thus foundation sciences of sociology. Social psychology has in fact grown up largely through the labors of the sociologists. It is a mistake, however, to suppose, as some have done, that it is a branch of sociology rather than of psychology. Professor Ellwood, for example, prefers for social psychology the designation ‘psycho- logical sociology.’ This seems to the present writer to minimize unjustly the claims of the psychologist. It is surely a legitimate interest to consider social behavior and consciousness merely as a phase of the psychology of the individual, in relation to a certain portion of his environment, without being concerned about the formation or character of groups resulting from these reactions. In spite of the good offices and interests of the sociologists the two a sciences must remain separate branches of inquiry. *~ Behavior and Consciousness in Social Psychology. The influ- ence of one individual upon another is always a matter of behavior. One person stimulates and the other reacts: in this process we have the essence of social psychology. {The means, however, by which one person stimulates another is always some outward sign or action; 7t 7s never consciousness. ‘Both the stimulating and the reacting behavior may be at times accompanied by a social type of consciousness in the respective individuals; but there is, so far as we know, no immediate action of the consciousness of one individ#~ ual upon the consciousness or behavior of another.! An attempt 1 The hypothesis of telepathy is not sufficiently established to be admitted as a possibility in the present issue. 12 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY is current in certain quarters to limit the conception of society and the field of social psychology to types of social interaction where consciousness of others and of social relations exists. From the standpoint of the present work this limitation is both non-essen- tial and narrow. Consciousness, as we have just intimated, exerts no influence, and therefore explains nothing in mutual reactions of human beings. In social psychology, as in non-social branches of the science, its réle is descriptive rather than explanatory. Even in the most socialized and conscious of groups there are no forces holding the group together, and no means of arriving at community of thought or organized life except through the interstimulation of one individual by the behavior of another. CIt is, moreover, not a ‘mental’ interstimulation, if by this term is meant a type of stimu- lation different from the physiological, for no type of stimulation other than physiological exists. It would seem more suitable, therefore, to admit to the field we are considering all forms of animal life in which we find definite social behavior; that is, reac- tions of individuals to one another. The question whether social consciousness accompanies such social behavior in the lower forms of life, though of speculative interest, may be waived as non-essen- tial in our present definition of social psychology. The element of social consciousness, however, will be by no means neglected in the following chapters. It will be recognized wherever it is significant in the whole situation or helpful in evaluat- ing the principles of behavior. A special chapter also will deal with social consciousness as an interest in itself. We shall seek a just pro- portion between the two phases of the social life of the individual. A Working Definition of Social Psychology. Plan of its Treat- ment in this Book. Defining a science is of value only for the purpose of concentrating attention upon a group of allied problems. With this practical rather than dogmatic aim in view, the following definition of our field is proposed {Social psychology 1s the science which studies the behavior of the individual in so far as his behavior stimulates other individuals, or is itself a reaction to their behavior; and which describes the consciousness of the individual in so far as it is a consciousness of social objects and social reactions. More briefly stated Gocial psychology is the study of the social behavior and the social consciousness of the indivic uals AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR = 13 Inasmuch as we have found the explanatory principles of social psychology to center in the individual himself, our first concern will be with the individual in his social aspects. It is largely through the profound effects of social influences in infancy, childhood, and youth that the habits, abilities, and personality of the adult are developed. The individual must be considered both as a product of social influences and as a potential unit in social interaction. The second portion of the book will proceed with the actual process of interstimulation and reaction between individuals as units of society. Our main theme, the social behavior of the individual, will be here developed. In particular, behavior will be discussed both as affording stimulation to others and as reaction to such stimulation from others. Finally, some attempt will be made to bring the laws of social behavior into the province of the sociologist, and to apply them to the theoretical and practical problems of modern society. REFERENCES Ellwood, C. A., Introduction to Social Psychology, ch. 1. Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, ch. 1. Miinsterberg, H., Psychology, General and Applied, chs. 2-4, 16 (pp. 224-27), 19. Ross, E. A., Social Psychology, ch. 1. Perry, R. B., “Is there a Social Mind?” American Journal of Sociology, 1922, XXVII, 561-72; 721-36. Ginsberg, M., The Psychology of Society, chs. 4, 5. McDougall, Wm., The Group Mind, chs. 1, 2 (pp. 41-55). Bentley, M., “A Preface to Social Psychology,” Psychological Monographs, 1916, xxi, 1-25. Maciver, R. M., Community. Boodin, J. E., “The Existence of Social Minds,”’ American Journal of Sociol- ogy, 1913, xIX, 1-47. Leuba, J. IL, “Methods and Penile in Social Psychology” (a review), Psychological Bulletin, 1917, xiv, 367-78. Allport, F. H., “Social iSydndterar® (a review), Psychological Bulletin, 1920, XVII, 85-94. Watson, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, chs. 1, 2. Sageret, J., ‘“Remarques sur la psychologie collective,’ Revue Philosophique, 1919, Lxxxvn, 455-74. Mead, G. H. Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology Psychological Bulletin, 1909, v1, 401-08. Williams, J. M., The Foundations of Social Science, Books m1, Iv. Gault, R. rie Soave Psychologu: The Bases of Behavior Called Social, ch. 1. Dunlap, K., “The Foundations of Social Psychology,” Psychological Review, 1923, xxx, 81-102. HOT? AUTRE Vw ag anv . : ot Tea Ak ee Rk it Lae eke ey ee " ST etree Y wcdirh one santa) PO tin han 5 Tea aire ae, eh: stenies. ¥ 5 UG BG Ak Ra Lest payt ih! ek ies wal, PNR A bi a © Pager, y Wakes oes | gm St) emer e rt ae cha tk PaaS oy ue het fut be | yes Trnty “ bed Mae USTs I)? sas ne a ee a ae ; ; f baal + AgunhtiMaary Eaten i eifyuxrridosred Ht “es ty irene. eon ays) nl ; Cree | " awed ae a fa ed r i J i ‘ j L F ee t {Ty ; ay ft @ ee Jab | athe 7 ety 7 ey i \ } PP, Fee wa | ‘ jg ti é aa ; oe Fi SER OE Lo puahbotey ase eH n : Toad 4 ' ey Pay Ae rt} +a ro) ry hn Prey hacen a ea Asa a NINES ame ct] i Open More ‘ Bee oy PETES Dragana ti i ih ce "i ; i Hetecaa aes A i j ; as (A OSCR TS: OR eS. ies ; e aN ee UF ot onal viagra enh ad 2 PD 8 Lo i rn ‘ iy hay ‘ Wk OnE i 1 % P| if Tae oe heh wt a4 I ‘ \ i \ . ody Yuka avisanyt yout ‘ | , ; 4 ae Pi Or ut wih ad CO OAT thy ait y ri byw is (sy j Lu ry r ‘ sedate ; , cy Oy Tis ata iI i tog (8 ay Wikeetcutsap cya F Lt ij ‘ v ti ‘ eae’ aie ¥ i) “hes. i Nie cles Heys vty ain ne fi fa it PART I THE INDIVIDUAL IN HIS SOCIAL ASPECTS PART I THE INDIVIDUAL IN HIS SOCIAL ASPECTS | CHAPTER II THE PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR The Adaptive Function of Behavior. Behavior may be defined as the process of responding to some form of energy in the environ- ment by an activity generally useful to life. The energy, or less exactly the object from which it is derived, is known as the ‘stimulus,’ while the resulting activity is called the ‘response.’y The response usually has some characteristic relation to the stimu- lus which evokes it, such as approaching, attacking, answering, consuming, caressing, or fleeing. The bodily structures and func- tions operating in behavior are of the same general sort whether the stimulus is furnished by a social or a non-social object. The first step, therefore, in the approach to social behavior is the under- standing of those physiological processes involved in behavior in general. The first stage in the adaptive process is the stimulation of the sense organ, or receptor; the final stage is the response-activity of the muscle or gland, commonly called the ‘effector.’ The excita- tion aroused in the receptor proceeds in the form of a nervous im- pulse along a chain of fiber-shaped nerve cells, called ‘neurons,’ to the effector. Conduction is therefore the most elementary function of nervous tissue. The chain of neurons traversed by the impulse consists of three portions: (1) the afferent (or sensory) branch con- veying the excitation from the receptor in toward the central nerv- ous system (brain and spinal cord); (2) the central portion lying within the brain or cord and directing the impulse toward the proper outlets; and (3) the efferent (or motor) branch transmitting 1 These terms are interchangeable with the previously used ‘stimulation’ and ‘reaction,’ though somewhat more specific. 18 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY the impulse outward to the effector.) The entire sequence is termed a feflex arc, and is to be considere¢ :.s the functional unit.of behavior. Especial significance attaches to the central region of the reflex arc, because it serves not only to connect the afferent and efferent portions of a single arc, but a'so to codrdinate various arcs one with another. The brain and spinal cord have essentially the function of a switchboard. A complex network of millions of cen- tral neurons connects functionally each afferent pathway with every efferent and each efferent with every afferent. We receive thousands of different stimuli daily, and are capable of an enormous variety of responses. Yet so remarkable are the central adjust- ments between our receptors and effectors that, except in un- familiar situations, a given stimulus almost invariably evokes the biologically correct response. The central adjustments involved in these specific responses are in some cases hereditary, and in others the result of learning through experience. In the former case they are termed reflexes, and in the latter, habits. The Receptors and Effectors. In order to obtain a closer view of the behavior mechanism we shall discuss under separate headings the components and properties of the reflex are and the functions of the central nervous organs. The receptors form the most natural point of departure. To do more than briefly enumerate them would, however, take us too far afield. The most important group of receptors has to do with sensations received from objects at a distance or at least external to the body. They are called the exteroceptors. ‘The group includes the senses of vision, hearing, smell, pressure (touch), and external cold, warmth, and pain. The behavior of other persons stimulates us exclusively through the exteroceptive senses. The walls of the internal organs possess sense organs, termed interoceptors, whose stimulation gives rise to diffuse, organic, sensory experiences. Interoceptive sensations form the basis of feeling and emotion. A third group of sense organs, called proprioceptors, are embedded inthe muscles, tendons, joints, and other movable parts of the body, and are stimulated by the movements of those parts. The proprioceptive (also called 1 The student should memorize these terms, since they will be used continually in the chapters following. PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 19 ‘kineesthetic’) sense 1s necessary for learning habits and acts _of skill. In this group is i##ehided the labyrinthine sense, whose recep- tor lies in the semicircular canals of the inner ear. Its appropriate stimulus is the rotation, movement, or change of equilibrium of the body as a whole. Propridcejtive stimulations evoke responses of movement and posture which are themselves of considerable im- portance as stimuli to others in social behavior. The effectors, or organs of response, in which efferent neurons terminate, consist of muscles and glands. The two general func- tions of muscles are the production of movement and maintenance of posture. Muscles are attached by tendons to bones which they move on the lever principle, with joints as fulcrums, by means of contracting, that is, by shortening, the muscle fibers. The jointed parts of the body have two types of muscle, the flexor and the extensor, the former serving to bend the member at the joint, the latter to straighten it. These two types are said to be antagonistic, since in order to move the member one must be relaxed, that is, elongated, while the other is contracted. Other opposed muscle groups exist, such as the muscle lifting the eyelid and the muscle closing it, the muscles opening and closing the mouth, the circular muscles constricting (and lengthening) the intestine and the longi- tudinal muscle shortening it, and many others. Visceral muscles produce waves of constriction and other movements which carry on the vital processes of circulation, respiration, and digestion. Move- ments significant in the production of social stimuli are made chiefly by the muscles controlling the organs of speech and by those of facial expression, gesture, and bodily posture. Glands are small, saccular, secreting organs existing either singly, as sweat and gastric glands, or grouped into complex structures, such as the thyroid, pancreas, and liver. Their secretions aid in the process of digestion and in the elimination of waste matter from the body. The so-called ‘ductless glands’ provide internal secretions which are absorbed directly into the blood stream. They contain substances (hormones or autacoids) which have a direct, energizing influence upon vital organs and upon bodily growth and development. Internal secretions play an important part in the emotions. The products of the sex glands are powerful 20 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY internal stimulants both of sexual development and sex behavior. The secretion of tears is one of the few glandular responses of direct value as a social stimulus. The Neuron. The nerve cells, or neurons, of which the nervous —— ™ FIGURE 1. DIAGRAM OF A NEURON d, dendrites; c, cell body contain- ing cytoplasm with chromophilic bodies; n, nucleus; az, axone; m, medullary sheath; col, collateral branches of the axone; ¢, terminal arborizations of the axone. system is mainly composed, are by their structure adapted to the collec- tion, conduction, and distribution of nervous impulses. Figure 1 shows in diagrammatic form the main features of a neuron. The cell body (c), with its nucleus (vn) and flake-like masses called chromophilic bodies, is the cen- ter of the growth and nutrition of the cell. From it a group of branched fibrils, the dendrites, extend in many directions (d), and also a single fiber, usually fairly long and straight in its course, called the axone (az). Minute thread-like structures, the neurofibrils, run freely throughout the cell body and its processes. The axones of most neurons are surrounded by a white membrane, the medullary sheath (m), which has probably an insulating and a nutritive function. Axones lying outside the brain and cord have as a further outside covering a thin sheath, the neurilemma. : Excitation in the neuron takes place at the ends of the dendrites, the im- pulse being received either from the specialized cells of a receptor organ, for example, the retina, or from the branched terminations of the axone of another neuron in functional connection with the first. From the dendrites the impulse is conducted through the cell body and out into the axone. The axone terminates in branched form (¢ in PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 21 Figure 1), in connection either with the dendrites of another neuron or with a muscle or gland. In afferent neurons leading from a receptor to the spinal cord the dendrite resembles an axone in its length and medullation, the cell body lying near the entrance of the fiber into the cord. In its function of receiving the impulse it is, however, essentially a dendrite. In the brain and spinal cord there are many special types of neurons, varying in the length of their axones, and in the richness of their arborization, according to the function they fulfill. The nature of the nerve impulse is not fully understood. It will probably be found eventually to be the propagation either of a wave of chemical reaction or of local electrical effects involving changes in the polarization of the cell membrane. The impulse does not flow as a steady stream, but as a rapid and regular suc- cession of separate impulses forming waves of excitation along the fiber. This rhythm may be interpreted to mean that after a given impulse a certain time must elapse for the recuperation of the region of the fiber involved before it is able to transmit another impulse. The failure to respond again without an intervening period for recovery can be demonstrated by giving exceedingly rapid artificial stimulations. The interval necessary for the re- covery is called the refractory period. Its length does not exceed 002 of a second. As the nerve cell recovers from the diminished excitability of the refractory period, it very shortly reaches a brief phase of hyper-excitability. If a subsequent stimuluation occurs during this phase, the amplitude of the excitation will be increased above normal. Such variations in excitability partially explain why stimuli having a certain frequency, or occurring at a certain moment, are more effective than others in producing a response, when no outward reason for such inequality of effect can be dis- covered. The belief is gaining ground that the strength of the nerve impulse does not vary with the intensity of the stimulus, but is constant for a given neuron. The energy of the excitation is latent in the neuron itself, and is expended in its full force or not at all. If this theory is correct, gradations in the vigor of the response must be explained by variations in the number of nerve and muscle fibers brought into play. 22 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY _ Reflex Arc Conduction: Properties of the Synapse. Since all reflex arcs comprise two, and most of them more than two neurons, reflex arc conduction involves the passage of the impulse from one cell to another. ‘The finely branched terminations of an axone do not come into actual contact with the dendritic branches of the neuron next in the sequence. A minute space, filled probably by a non-neural membrane, exists between the fibrils of the two neurons. This space is called the synapse. ‘The introduction of synapses into neural ares has a number of important consequences which may be summarized as follows: 1. Resistance. The lengthened time required for reflex arc conduction, as compared with simple nerve fiber conduction, in- -dicates that the synaptic gap is a region of increased resistance. 2. Polarity. ‘The synapse serves as a kind of valve, allowing the impulse to pass only in one direction; tnat is, from the axone of one neuron to the dendrites of another. 3. Correlation. Synapses, being points of connection, make possible the integration of afferent neurons with a vast number of central and efferent neurons. They also permit the distribution of an impulse to a complex group of efferent pathways, such as those required in keeping one’s balance on a bicycle and other acts of skill. 4. Swmmation. By means of the multiplicity of afferent connections afforded, synapses give op- portunity for the summing up of minute and individually ineffec- tive impulses from many neurons into an intensity of excitation sufficient to cross the threshold and be drained off into an efferent pathway. Impulses thus supplement and reinforce one another. Minute, successive, as well as simultaneous, stimuli are summed up until their total strength is sufficient to bring about a discharge across the synapse. 5. Variability of Resistance. The resistance of the synapse is altered by various conditions. Fatigue and sleep seem to increase it. It is also affected in various ways by drugs, and by changes in circulation and oxygen supply. Concurrent stimuli of a powerful character and general nervous excitement appear to lower synaptic resistance. 6. Facilitation and Habitua- tion. If a subject squeezes a hand-grip apparatus (dynamometer) at the time when the knee-jerk reflex is being produced by tapping the tendon below the knee, the extent of the knee-jerk will be in-. PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 23 creased. This temporary effect may be interpreted either as a summation of impulses or a lowering of synaptic resistance in the knee-jerk reflex owing to an accompanying stimulus. The result, however brought about, may be regarded as the facilitation of a response by the agency of the synapse. Synaptic resistance may be decreased in a more permanent fashion by repetition. Each time a certain response is made the resistance to the impulse en- countered at the synapse becomes slightly less until a complete habit isformed. 7. Inhibition.¢ This is a necessary supplement to facilitation. Antagonistic and irrelevant responses are believed to be inhibited by an increase in their synaptic resistance, so that the response of the moment is given a ‘free field.’ 8. Temporal Aspects. There occur at the synapse in increased form the various phases of excitability, such as refractory phase and hyper-excitability, which occur in the single nerve fiber. Professor Sherrington found that in a dog with the spinal cord severed from the brain, leaving a pure spinal reflex mechanism, the rhythmic movements of scratching could not be elicited at a more rapid rate than four per second, no matter in what rapid succession the stimuli were given. A fourth of a second, in other words, was necessary as a recuperative interval before the reflex arc was capable of functioning again. We may conclude that at their maximum rate reflexes operate in rhythms peculiar to their own refractory periods. The stage of hyper-excita- bility following recovery no doubt facilitates and emphasizes responses to stimuli given at the most favorable rate. The Main Subdivisions of the Nervous System. The nervous system as a whole comprises the following subdivisions: (1) the/ brain; (2) the twelve pairs of cranial nerves arising from the brain, ” and supplying the sense organs and muscles of the head, face, and internal organs with afferent and efferent fibers; (8) the spinal cord projecting downward from the base of the brain, and protected by the bony vertebral column; (4) the spinal nerves which leave the cord in pairs at regular intervals, and furnish afferent and efferent fibers to the body wall and limbs on either side of the body; and (5) the autonomic system, an extension of the central nervous system which supplies the viscera. The first four of these parts are together called the cerebro-spinal system in distinction to the autonomic. 24 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY A brief sketch of these subdivisions must suffice for our present purpose. The Spinal Cord and Spinal Nerves. The spinal cord and brain are formed by the development and folding together of the neural groove, a depression extending lengthwise along the back of the td! ,