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 THE POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 AND OL EPEC, 
 
 BY 
 
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 Vv 
 THOMAS: HILEY D:D.; LL-D. 
 
 Lormerly President of Harvard University, and Lecturer on T, heology and Ethics in 
 the Meadville Theological School. 
 
 BOSTON: 
 Gro H. EL.is, 141 FRANKLIN STREET. 
 
 1895. 
 
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 By Gero. H. Exuis. 
 1895. 
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 GEO. H. ELLIS, PRINTER, 141 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON. 
 
eRe AGEs 
 
 THE two courses of lectures included in this volume 
 are those repeatedly given by their author while he held 
 the position of Lecturer on Theology and Ethics in 
 the Meadville Theological School. The lectures on the 
 “Postulates of Revelation” were last delivered in the 
 spring of 1891; and their delivery was, as it happened, 
 the last work of his life. Of this course, the last two 
 lectures were also included among those given at the 
 Lowell Institute in Boston, in 1870, on the “ Natural 
 Sources of Religious Knowledge.” Though they repeat 
 some points of the earlier lectures, they are inserted in 
 this place, partly because they were sometimes used in 
 connection with the others, but mainly because they treat 
 one or two topics more fully, and give a certain complete- 
 ness to the expression of the author’s thought. Espe- 
 cially characteristic and valuable are some portions of the 
 chapter on “ Authority and Influence.” | 
 
 It should be remembered, however, that these two lect- 
 ures do not appear to have been lately revised by Dr. 
 Hill, and that there may therefore occur in them some 
 
iV PREFACE 
 
 views, or forms of expression, which, after twenty years, 
 he would have wished to modify. The manuscripts of 
 the other lectures show that he made frequent additions 
 and erasures,— changes which, however, usually serve 
 rather to illustrate or apply his thought than to affect 
 its substance. Ten chapters of the ‘ Postulates of Reve- 
 lation” were published in the Unitarian Review during 
 the years 1885-87; and they form the only portion of 
 the book which has had the advantage of the author’s 
 revision. These chapters retain here the form in which 
 they were originally printed, except that the style of 
 direct address has been restored, as well as, in a few in- 
 stances, an apposite figure or illustration. The titles of 
 chapters have also, in a few instances, been modified or 
 restored. 
 
 The remaining lectures have been changed as little as 
 possible. I have believed that the friends of Dr. Hill, 
 and certainly those who listened to these lectures, would 
 prefer to have this book — which may be regarded as in 
 some sense a memorial volume — retain as much as might 
 be of the flavor of his personality. To this end, inci- 
 dental explanations, personal opinions, the frequent happy 
 use of current discussions, the special shaping of his 
 theme to the character of his auditory,—more than all, 
 the many bits of intellectual autobiography which gave 
 added clearness and zest in the hearing,— may, perhaps, 
 be welcomed also by the readers of these lectures. Their 
 
PREFACE Vv 
 
 interest would be much increased doubtless, too, if it 
 were possible to recall more of the wealth of literary or 
 scientific anecdote, and the frequent statement of per- 
 sonal observation and experience, which the _ lecturer 
 poured forth freely from apparently inexhaustible stores, 
 and which often formed a delightful running commentary 
 upon the severer discussions of the text. For the same 
 reason, I have seldom changed the passages in which he 
 sought, from year to year, to utilize current aspects of 
 ethical or religious discussion, or to meet the mental 
 posture and needs of those before him. While such para- 
 graphs may sometimes break the continuity of the argu- 
 ment, or give undue emphasis to some passing phase of 
 thought, they yet have a biographical interest which has 
 seemed to warrant their retention. So, too, the repeti- 
 tion incident to spoken discourse, and to the discussion 
 in successive courses of allied and in part coincident 
 themes, and the summaries found at the beginning of 
 most chapters, and sometimes at the end, however super- 
 fluous to the scholar, will probably be found helpful to 
 the average student and the general reader. 
 
 These lectures contain in completer form the leading 
 views of the author on the topics discussed in a series of 
 articles in the Bzbliotheca Sacra — reprinted in “ The Nat- 
 ural Sources of Religious Knowledge’ —and in the little 
 work called “‘Geometry and Faith.” That they form a 
 valuable contribution to the study of the grounds of relig- 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 ion and ethics is the judgment of many who have heard 
 or read them. Few have brought to this discussion so 
 large and varied knowledge, such comprehensive grasp of 
 the principles of science and the laws of the human mind, 
 an insight so keen, a judgment so well trained and saga- 
 cious, and a spirit at once so receptive, so impartial, and 
 so reverent. To the large intelligence of the great ob- 
 server and the fearless thinker, Dr. Hill joined the enthu- 
 siasm of the unceasing seeker for truth, and the higher 
 wisdom of the pure in heart. To many of those who 
 knew him, the opinion will not seem extravagant that for 
 intellectual strength, wealth and variety of acquirements, 
 and the vigor and justness of his thought, Dr. Hill had 
 very few equals and fewer superiors among the men of 
 his time. He would hardly have failed to achieve dis- 
 tinction as a mathematician, a naturalist, a psychologist 
 or metaphysician, even beyond that which he attained as 
 an educator and theologian. Had his literary faculty 
 equalled his mental power and the wide ranges of his 
 knowledge, I know not what American writer would have 
 excelled him in exposition of his chosen themes, 
 
 It is probable that this breadth and fulness of knowl- 
 edge have removed his writings somewhat from popular 
 sympathies, and prevented his thought from being valued 
 at its inherent worth. His treatment even of familiar 
 themes often presupposed scientific and mathematical 
 knowledge that is far from being universal. Few, even 
 
PREFACE Vii 
 
 of those who regarded themselves disciples of the scien- 
 tific method, were prepared to appreciate the familiar 
 handling and far following of the facts and theories of 
 science, in whose pursuit and companionship he took such 
 delight. His hearers, even among theological students, 
 did not always find it easy to realize the world of mathe- 
 matical forms, whose harmonies he so clearly perceived, 
 and in which he moved with such ease and secure footing. 
 Possibly, even, some readers of these lectures will be 
 ready to accord with Matthew Arnold’s suggestion, that 
 for the average man a little mathematics goes a great 
 way. 
 
 A. more serious lack of sympathy between Dr. Hill 
 and the scientific and religious fellowships to which he 
 belonged grew, doubtless, from his lack of conviction as 
 to the prevailing current theories of evolution. A warm 
 friend and disciple of Agassiz, he shared that eminent 
 naturalist’s objections to the Darwinian doctrine of the 
 genetic development of species; and was utterly sceptical 
 concerning natural selection as a main causal agency in 
 the unfolding of the cosmic order and the mounting forms 
 of life. To him the universe was manifestly the sphere 
 of purposive thought; and he counted it unscientific to 
 substitute unconscious process for intelligent directive 
 Power. Darwinism was to him as unphilosophical as 
 unproved. But his opposition was mainly to the agnostic 
 
 inferences drawn from it by many of its advocates, who 
 
Vill PREFACE 
 
 disowned all teleological causation, and to whom, at first, 
 as one of them has lately said, “it seemed to begin and 
 end only in materialism.’”’ It will be seen by the readers 
 of these lectures that the methods Dr. Hill employed to 
 refute this conclusion are largely those approved, in recent 
 discussions, by eminent evolutionists themselves; and it 
 is clear that his results as to the religious implications of 
 science are much more consonant with the tendencies 
 and spirit of contemporary scientific thought than they 
 were when first advanced a generation ago. On the 
 other hand, he soon came to the conviction, expressed in 
 these pages, that theories of evolution are questions of 
 purely scientific interest, by the acceptance or rejection 
 of which the basis of religion will remain essentially un- 
 affected. 
 
 While these lectures aim to establish a basis for Chris- 
 tian theology and ethics, they include a survey of the 
 whole field of natural religion, and deal broadly with the 
 grounds and implications of theism, as found in the uni- 
 verse and in human nature. Dr. Hill was a convinced 
 and devout Christian disciple; and he held this posture 
 in fearless loyalty to the uttermost results of science and 
 the profoundest investigations of right reason. The 
 title of his volume of sermons, ‘“‘ Jesus, the Interpreter of 
 Nature,” indicates his assured conviction of the essential 
 harmony of Christianity with natural and universal relig- 
 ion. Readers of these lectures will find in them nothing 
 
PREFACE iX 
 
 of the belittling, and even contempt, of reason which 
 must seriously qualify our admiration of certain recent 
 brilliant defences of religion, and limit their service in 
 re-establishing confidence in the grounds of faith. Dr, 
 Hill’s central reliance on the moral and religious nature 
 of man, as the rational and final witness to spiritual 
 reality, lifted him above all anxieties as to the survival of 
 ethical convictions and devout sentiments, and disengaged 
 his interest from special forms of theological argument 
 and Christian dogma. For instance, his treatment of 
 final causes shows that the defence of teleology is not 
 necessarily connected, and so far as he is concerned never 
 has been connected, with the crude anthropomorphic form 
 it bears in the caricatures of its assailants. 
 
 It is interesting, also, to observe that, like several other 
 leading defenders of spiritual ethics,—like Dr. William B. 
 Carpenter and James Martineau,— Dr. Hill began as an 
 advocate of necessity and utilitarianism, and like them 
 early abandoned this position. That this has happened 
 so frequently among minds of the first order, in the face 
 of the wide-spread trend of evolutionary ethics in the 
 opposite direction for the last generation, is, perhaps, as 
 remarkable a testimony to the inextinguishable conviction 
 of moral freedom, as the more religious interpretation of 
 nature and science that is happily coming to prevail, and 
 especially the recent notable instances of return from 
 scepticism to faith, are persuasive evidences of the failure 
 
X PREFACE 
 
 of concurrent agnostic theories, and heralds of a brighter 
 day of rational conviction and religious trust. 
 
 The dawning of that better day the former associates 
 and pupils of Dr. Hill have believed that the publication 
 of these lectures might contribute to advance. It has 
 been a grateful service to superintend their publication, 
 since increasing familiarity with them has but constantly 
 deepened the lifelong sense of obligation and reverence 
 for the author’s thought and character. 
 
 Acknowledgments are due to Rev. A. W. Jackson, and 
 to Professor H. B. Hill, of Harvard University, who have 
 kindly assisted in correcting the proof-sheets for this 
 volume. 
 
 HiwHieen: 
 
 MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, 
 May 18, 1895. 
 
BLL. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 at 
 
 POSTULATES OF KEVELATION. 
 
 THE UNSEEN REAL . 
 
 THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 THE INFINITE KNOWABLE 
 
 FINAL CAUSES. 
 
 THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF ART 
 POWER AND POSSIBILITY . 
 LOGIC AND LOVE . 
 
 BEAUTY 
 
 THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE . 
 THE INFINITE IN MAN 
 RELATIVITY AND REALITY 
 
 THE UNIVERSE A REVELATION 
 AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION . 
 
 SUMMARY OF NATURAL SOURCES OF 
 KNOWLEDGE 
 
 ik 
 
 POSTULALES) OW VE TAICS: 
 
 THE FIELD OF ETHICS . 
 
 THE VALIDITY OF MORAL PERCEPTIONS . 
 
 THE NATURE OF ETHICAL RELATIONS. 
 
 105 
 123 
 140 
 
 160 
 
 » -175 
 
 RELIGIOUS 
 
 193 
 209 
 
 227, 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 THE INNOCENCE AND SINFULNESS OF ERROR 
 LOVE AND DUTY. 
 DETERMINISM AND UTILITY. 
 
 DUTIES RELATIVE TO SELF . 
 
 THE CONNECTION OF ETHICS WITH RELIGION . 
 
 NON-RELIGIOUS MoRALS AND MORALISTS 
 
 IERARNING: BY DOINGS. be ea tscue 
 
 PAGE 
 290 
 
 304 
 315 
 328 
 339 
 351 
 366 
 
POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
DHE SUNSEENG RE AT: 
 
 No man does anything voluntarily without some feeling 
 prompting him to the action. The feeling may be a mere 
 impulse, selfish or unselfish. It may be a sense of obli- 
 gation, of the constraint of duty, or the constraint of 
 necessity. It may lie between these extremes. But the 
 general truth embraces all these cases. The general 
 proposition is that every action and every course of action 
 is prompted by a more or less permanent state of feeling 
 or desire, in the shape of taste, inclination, aversion, senti- 
 ment of honor, friendship, ambition, sense of obligation 
 or duty,— whatever be the motive toa voluntary action, 
 it acts through feeling. 
 
 The preacher who would mould character and lead 
 men to right courses of action must therefore awaken 
 in men some sort of feeling, some sentiment or emotion 
 which will prompt to the desired course of action. None 
 of the good works of the Christian Church are accom- 
 plished by men who have no motives or feelings, good 
 or bad, which lead them to engage in them. So far, 
 therefore, those are undoubtedly right who say that a re- 
 ligious character and religious life consist in a virtuous 
 course of action, a life of usefulness to men, undertaken 
 from good motives, prompted by right feelings; and that 
 right feelings, holy and kind affections, being the springs 
 
4 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 of all right endeavors, are to receive the earnest attention 
 of the Christian Church and of the Christian preacher, as 
 essential foundations of the superstructure of benevolent 
 action. Every voluntary action, every true volition, is 
 prompted by something which has the nature of a feeling; 
 that is, a desire, an aversion, a cherished conviction. 
 
 The Church had for many centuries exalted right opin- 
 ions so highly that many Christians were led to consider 
 orthodoxy of incomparably more value than morality. 
 Now, for fifty years, we have had moral character exalted 
 so highly that many Christians appear to be forgetting that 
 character is influenced and modified by belief. Character 
 is of vastly more consequence than creed. Nevertheless, 
 character is greatly influenced by creed. There are forms 
 of intellectual belief which directly discourage and under- 
 value all attempts to perfect holiness. There are other 
 forms which are a direct stimulus and help to right 
 endeavor. The will is prompted by feeling: feeling 
 depends upon our view of the situation. Those who 
 undervalue Christian doctrine, and say that it is no 
 matter what a man believes, if his heart is only right, 
 fall into the error of supposing that no form of belief can 
 have any injurious effect on the heart. 
 
 But we may go further. Every feeling, whatever may 
 be its form, is accompanied by, and rests upon, a belief. 
 The most foolish passion, the most purely instinctive 
 aversion, not only blinds the judgment and misleads be- 
 lief; it was accompanied by an error of belief from the 
 beginning of its manifestation ; and the only way in which 
 an adult ever learns to overcome foolish fondness and 
 foolish aversions (which, if not innate, are sometimes con- 
 nate) is by first disabusing himself of the foolish fancies 
 
THE UNSEEN ‘REAL 5 
 
 connected with his feeling. And, if this be so in regard 
 to these extreme cases, much more is it so with regard to 
 actions in general. It is idle for men to say that the 
 Christian preacher should confine himself to the domain 
 of feeling and action. As action implies feeling,— and, 
 in general, feeling must be aroused in order to produce 
 action,— so feeling implies belief; and, in general, a cer- 
 tain belief must be produced before the feeling can be 
 aroused. In other words, men will not generally feel 
 right about a matter until they take the right view of the 
 matter. The Christian preacher will not induce his peo- 
 ple to do that which he desires, unless he makes them 
 also desirous of doing the same thing. And, although 
 this awakening of the right desire is largely to be accom- 
 plished by the contagion of sympathy, by the contact of 
 living soul with living soul, yet it cannot be accomplished 
 even so, unless it be preceded or accompanied by a per- 
 suasion to look at the desirable things in the right light, 
 to see and understand the truth concerning them. 
 Christian preaching must therefore deal with truth, 
 with doctrine. It cannot effect anything in the world 
 if it ignores truth, if it follows the advice so frequently 
 thrust upon it during the last few decades, and confines 
 itself to religious aspiration and feeling, to the sense of 
 honor and the hope of usefulness. All these sentiments 
 imply foundations of truth, imply belief or doctrine. 
 Men may, it is true, professedly deny the underlying 
 truth, and still retain the feeling. But this is simply be- 
 cause in their professed metaphysic they are doing un- 
 conscious wrong to their own convictions, precisely as 
 every believer in philosophical necessity admits that 
 he practically believes in freedom as much as the man 
 
6 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 professedly believing in free will. Men may thus build 
 secretly on foundations of whose existence they are not 
 aware. They do not look below the surface, perhaps 
 think their edifice stands independent of the rock be- 
 neath. But, if the earthquake shakes the rock, their build- 
 ing totters; and, if the rock falls into a subterraneous cave, 
 their edifice follows. In other words, a man may hold 
 verbally very foolish theories concerning the great sub- 
 strata of morality and religion, and yet live a good life. 
 But, if you really take out of his heart the deep convictions 
 on which right actions justify themselves to reason, then 
 you can no longer trust him when it comes to a real trial 
 of his integrity. 
 
 Strip Christianity of everything that can by the utmost 
 rationalist be considered an accretion or a superfluity, and 
 you still find that Jesus came “to bear testimony to the 
 truth’”; and that, “whatever be’ the date “of ‘thes Pp aupen 
 Gospel, that Gospel does not misrepresent the spirit of the 
 great Teacher when it reports him as saying, “If ye con- 
 tinue in my word, ye will be truly my disciples; and ye 
 will know the truth, and the truth will make you free.” 
 That truth is to be found not only in an acknowledgment 
 of Christ’s truthfulness, but in the acknowledgment that 
 he gave true teaching concerning God and duty and im- 
 mortality. But, as he was teaching Jews, who had for 
 centuries been a nation of believers in God, he takes for 
 granted that his hearers accept this truth, that there is 
 one God, the Father of all, and that our duty toward him 
 is the highest duty. 
 
 If, on the other hand, instead of reducing Christianity 
 to its lowest terms, we enrich it with all the precious doc- 
 trines concerning Jesus, his offices and functions, which 
 
THE UNSEEN REAL fé 
 
 the cooler understanding will permit us to accept from 
 among the stores of Christian thought in past ages, we 
 shall all the more need to admit the truths which he im- 
 plied in his teaching, and took for granted that the Jews 
 would admit. 
 
 I have been for many years accustomed to call these 
 truths the postulates of revelation. Deny them,—that is, 
 really and in the heart deny them,—and you deny the 
 possibility of a revelation in any ordinary sense of the 
 word. The morality of Jesus, which, confessedly, even on 
 the lowest possible view of his authority, is the purest and 
 best moral teaching extant, is built on religious founda- 
 tions. It is the sublimated essence of all the Jewish 
 morality, freed from the errors and narrowness of that 
 earlier religion. It demands love and good will toward 
 all men, because all are children of the same Father. It 
 asks us to show mercy, that we may obtain METCy.  ELCetS 
 reproduced admirably in Paul’s exhortation, “Be ye imi- 
 tators of God, as dear children.”’ 
 
 But, take away from a man all faith in the being of 
 God, lead him to the thoroughly agnostic position of deny- 
 ing that there are any evidences whatever of wisdom or 
 love ruling the operations of Nature, and you render it 
 impossible for him to be a Christian believer, even in the 
 sense of accepting Christ’s teaching,— more impossible, if 
 I may be allowed the expression, to believe that Jesus is 
 the Christ, that he was sent, that he testified of what he 
 knew. 
 
 Even if, therefore, it would be to no profit for Christian 
 believers in general to discuss these postulates of revela- 
 tion,—and in ordinary preaching to men as they come, it 
 may even be far better to avoid such themes, and to take 
 
8 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 for granted that all the congregation believe in one God, 
 the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, All- 
 wise, All-holy, All-good,— yet it is well also for the Chris- 
 tian preacher to be ready on occasion to fortify those 
 whose faith is assailed by agnostic speculations, those 
 who feel the chilling atmosphere which breathes from so 
 much of our modern literature, aiming to be _half- 
 scientific,— to fortify them by showing that he, too, has 
 heard of the theories which deny the great postulates of 
 revelation, and has examined those theories sufficiently to 
 say with certainty that, whenever they conflict with these 
 postulates, it is because the theory is either false or partly 
 false, and needs correction; and that the postulates of 
 revelation will stand as immovable as the axioms of 
 geometry. 
 
 Let us, therefore, endeavor to discover the real origin 
 of these conceptions in the human mind, and to estimate 
 their basis and validity as a foundation for a religious 
 faith. Of course, we cannot expect to arrive at a perfect 
 unanimity of opinion. Native differences of mental con- 
 stitution and differences of early education will infallibly 
 lead us to take different views on every subject. Even 
 an algebraical equation or an axiom of geometry presents 
 different phases to different minds. But there is always 
 hope, if we are candid and truth-seeking, that we can come 
 to a substantial agreement. The body of mathematical 
 truth is agreed upon by all; and the unity of belief upon 
 morality and religion will, after full and earnest discus- 
 sion, become equally general. 
 
 Let us begin, then, by inquiring what are the primal 
 truths of consciousness, It has always seemed to me 
 that the first intellectual act is the recognition of physical 
 
THE UNSEEN REAL 9 
 
 motion; which is virtually a recognition of the existence 
 of space and time. The first distinctly intellectual con- 
 ception in the child is probably composed of three simul- 
 taneous elements not separated in the act, but then inex- 
 tricably fused. These are the consciousness of self, the 
 consciousness of the motion of its own limbs and of the 
 resistance to motion. But, as motion involves space and 
 time, it may be said that this first probable intellectual 
 act of the human being involves the perception of the 
 existence of self, of matter, of space, and of time. In this 
 first act of the intellect the grand problem of ontology is 
 presented to it,—the high mystery of space, time, and 
 spirit. 
 
 The moment that the child is born we know by obser- 
 vation that its intellectual activity concerning geometrical 
 figure and concerning motion very far exceeds all its 
 other intellectual activities. In a few weeks it learns to 
 distinguish human beings at sight, in a few months it 
 recognizes individuals. Before five years have passed it 
 recognizes every kind of material object in engravings 
 and photographs, and of course can do it only by the 
 slight similarity of figure in the picture to the natural 
 object. I admit that the child five years old has learned 
 ten thousand other things. Jouffroy speaks well when 
 he says that a man learns far more in the first five years 
 of life than in any subsequent five. But I maintain that, 
 in this vast amount of knowledge and of intellectual skill 
 acquired in the first five years of life, by far the greater 
 part is included in the knowledge of geometrical forms 
 and of modes of motion. 
 
 And modern science in its patient search after the 
 unity of law has arrived at the grand result that probably 
 
IO POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 all physical phenomena are merely modes of motion. 
 The five senses by which we take cognizance of the exist- 
 ence and attributes of matter are capable of nothing 
 further than the perception of motion or the resistance to 
 motion. Touch, if we include in it the sense of muscular 
 contraction, recognizes the motion of masses of a finite 
 size, and the resistance to it. It also recognizes tempera- 
 ture, which Bacon from a false induction, Huyghens and 
 Rumford from correct reasoning, showed to be merely a 
 mode of molecular motion. Touch further distinguishes 
 between rigidity, plasticity, fluidity, and the gaseous con- 
 dition ; and these have been reduced by modern science to 
 difference in the movements of the atomic constituency of 
 matter. 
 
 Hearing is but the recognition of a certain tremor or 
 vibration produced in the nerves of the ear by motions of 
 the air, or of solid bodies in contact with the solid frame- 
 work of the head. 
 
 Sight is in the same way the recognition of certain 
 tremors or vibrations in the optic nerve, referred to the 
 vibrations of an ether by the almost unanimous judgment 
 of modern men of science. 
 
 Taste and smell are not so readily shown to be the cog- 
 nition of motion. They apparently lay hold of chemical 
 differences and identities. But what are chemical differ- 
 ences and identities? They are referable in all instances 
 to other standards than those of taste and smell. They 
 are always capable, by proper manipulation, of being made 
 manifest to sight and touch. Even the chemical forces 
 can be weighed against the weight of the materials, and 
 thus shown to be merely new manifestations of mechan- 
 ical force; z.2., of the force that produces motion. Thus 
 
THE UNSEEN REAL II 
 
 it is, in the view of science, highly probable that the elec- 
 tric, magnetic, and chemical phenomena, since they are the 
 result of forces which can be weighed against gravity and 
 measured by motion (so many pounds, so many feet in a 
 second), are themselves simply modes of motion. But 
 what is physical motion? It is the passage of matter 
 through space in time. It occupies time and _ space. 
 And what is matter? It is that which is capable of mani- 
 festing motion. We cannot get behind that. Push and 
 drive your analysis as you may, you come to sensible 
 properties which are shown by modern scientific experi- 
 ment to be merely modes of motion in the molecules, or 
 in the atoms. And what is an atom? All we know of it 
 is that at a certain point in space there is a series of mani- 
 festations of power repelling or attracting other points 
 in certain directions. Make it a vortex ring in a homo- 
 geneous, frictionless fluid, and you only drive the mystery 
 further back. You create a finer kind of matter, to be 
 defined in a similar way. What the thing itself is eludes 
 our grasp. We only get its action, which is the manifes- 
 tation of the force that produces or resists motion. 
 
 All the universe of matter is thus reduced for us to a 
 display of motion. This motion is communicated to our 
 nervous system; and, when the. nervous system receives 
 this motion and transmits it to the brain, we perceive it. 
 We do not, however, recognize it as motion unless it pro- 
 duce a finite motion in our nerves, passing sensibly from 
 one part of the retina to another, changing in intensity 
 within a finite time, etc. If it be infinite to us,—z.e,, 
 moving all parts of our systems uniformly,— it is not rec- 
 ognized at all. On the other hand, if the motion be in- 
 finitesimal to us, we do not recognize it as motion, but 
 call it sound, warmth, color, smell, and the like. 
 
12 POSTULATES, OF REVELATION 
 
 How does the motion of the nervous system produce 
 these changes in our consciousness? We do not know, 
 nor can we conceive any mode while we are living in the 
 body by which we can know. We are shut up simply to 
 these conclusions: that we know the external universe, 
 including our own bodies, primarily and directly, only 
 through sensations; and that sensations are produced 
 only through peculiar motions of the nervous system, 
 communicated from motions of the outward world. But 
 this movement of the outward world is, for us and as far 
 as our knowledge can at present extend, a phenomenon 
 of time and space only, producing changes of conscious- 
 ness in us. The conscious self, and something not our- 
 selves, as inscrutable as our self, illustrating for us by mo- 
 tion the laws and relations of space and time,—this is all 
 that is given to us in the simple act of sense-perception. 
 To go higher, the conscious self must, since the content 
 of that consciousness is simply self, and something not 
 self, be aroused to new and higher action than simple 
 sense-perception. 
 
 It is aroused, first of all, to perceive that the phe- 
 nomenon of motion involves space and time. The eternal 
 and necessary existence of space is the thing which is 
 usually first seen above and beyond sense-perception. 
 We attempt to run out beyond the limits of vision; and 
 we see that space must extend ever beyond. We try to 
 imagine the removal of matter from a certain space, and 
 see that the space itself cannot be removed. The neces- 
 sary and eternal flow of time is usually the next of super- 
 sensible things which is immediately perceived by the 
 mind, The two ideas of space and time are fundamentally 
 distinct, yet one cannot be conceived without the other. 
 
THE UNSEEN REAL 13 
 
 Space must endure throughout all time; and we can 
 imagine endurance in time only as being throughout all 
 space. Motion takes place in both at once, and they are 
 logically necessary antecedent conditions of motion. 
 
 But, thirdly, when we study motion in any form, finite 
 or infinitesimal, we perceive that it implies the existence 
 of cause, efficiency, or power. This is a direct vision of 
 that which escapes the senses. Motion is conceivable to 
 us only as the passage of a something which is capable of 
 motion, under pressure of a force capable of producing 
 motion. Yet, as we have already said, when the physicist 
 pursues his conception of an atom and hunts it down to 
 its last analysis, he cannot distinguish it from a mere 
 point in space whence certain forces flow. Even molar 
 motions may therefore be said to be merely the transfer 
 of the centres emanating force from point to point in 
 space. Matter is known to us only as portions of space 
 in which certain forces are manifested. And all forces 
 are supposed by modern scientific men to be one and the 
 same force, producing various modes of motion, as deter- 
 mined by the action of the surrounding points. 
 
 The two modes of motion, or force- manifestation, 
 which are most widely diffused are elasticity and gravity. 
 I strike a telegraph wire, and the jar courses along it by 
 the elasticity of the iron at the rate of some three miles 
 a second. I fire a cannon, and the sound flies only one- 
 fifth of a mile in a second. But the light of the flash flies 
 nearly a million times as fast. We thus learn that the 
 elasticity of the wire is more than two hundred times as 
 great in proportion to the weight of its molecules as that 
 of air, and that the elasticity of the fluid or gas through 
 which the wave of light is communicated is nearly a trill- 
 
I4 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 ion (2.é., million million) times as great as that of the air. 
 The immense tension of this elastic force goes beyond the 
 reach of our imagination. The impulse given to it by the 
 flash of the powder flies out at the rate of 186,000 miles 
 a second. And this force, this compression, is omni- 
 present. The most distant star visible to the most power- 
 ful telescope announces to us, by the very fact of its 
 visibility, that the source and the effects of this mighty 
 grasp extend beyond the reach of the telescope. 
 
 But the force of gravity, if it be communicated through 
 undulations, must move ten million times as fast as light. 
 At least, this is the calculation of Laplace. “If gravity 
 require time for transmission,” he said, “its speed is at 
 least ten million times that of light.’”’ But this would re- 
 quire the universal presence of a fluid at least a hun- 
 dred trillion times as elastic as that in which light moves; 
 that is, a hundred trillion trillion times as elastic as air. 
 We stagger under the conception of the luminiferous 
 ether, a million million times as elastic as air; but, when 
 we are presented with another substance a hundred million 
 million times as elastic as ether, we throw off the burden, 
 it cannot be borne. And we prefer to conceive of gravity 
 as a force acting immediately at a finite distance from a 
 finite mass. 
 
 The phenomena of elasticity also force us by logical 
 necessity to admit that the atoms (whether we conceive 
 of them in Newton’s fashion as perfectly hard little 
 masses, or in Boscovich’s fashion as mere centres of 
 force, or in the modern fashion as vortex rings) exert 
 force without direct contact. This conclusion will not be 
 affected by any view taken of Leibnitz’s monadology and 
 principle of continuity, being forced upon us by the ex- 
 perimental facts of elasticity. 
 
THE UNSEEN REAL 15 
 
 The cosmical phenomena also force us to the conclu- 
 sion that the weight of a body is the result of a force 
 exerted upon it by the mass of the earth, without the 
 intervention of any material agency. This power of the 
 cosmical bodies is omnipresent and constant. What 
 Leibnitz meant by saying that the amount of force in the 
 universe is constant I do not know. I have not had the 
 opportunity to examine; but I cannot believe that he 
 meant it in the sense in which it has often been asserted 
 in our own days. There are, however, several senses in 
 which I do not question its truth. First, the elasticity of 
 the ether and its compression are the same in all parts of 
 the universe, and probably the same throughout countless 
 ages,—although of this latter point we have no direct 
 proof. 
 
 Secondly, when a disturbance is produced in this ether, 
 say, by the passage of an electric spark, the wave spreads 
 in every direction, and, if there be no opaque obstacle, 
 forms the surface of a constantly enlarging sphere. The 
 surface of the sphere constantly enlarging, the amount of 
 motion originally communicated is spread out thinner and 
 thinner. But the total amount remains the same, pro- 
 vided the elasticity is perfect. If not perfect, a part of 
 the motion is retained within the sphere in some other 
 fermen. ‘EFhus, as the elasticity of the air is not perfect, a 
 wave of sound not only spreads out thinner and fainter as 
 it goes, but part of it is lost and left behind in the form of 
 infinitesimal warmth and electrical excitement. What I 
 referred to as a doctrine of conservation which I cannot 
 believe is the assertion that the wave of light or heat 
 which passes out beyond the boundaries of telescopic 
 vision is returned again to us. Of that we have no 
 
16 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 proof; and it is even said by some geometers to be 
 mathematically incredible. 
 
 But, thirdly, the sum of the gravitating power of the cos- 
 mic bodies remains constant. Meteors and comets fall 
 into the sun or upon the earth, and slightly increase their 
 gravitative force. But the increased force is simply the 
 sum of the old forces. And the gravitating power of the 
 earth is the same at all distances. The moon is sixty 
 times as far from the earth’s centre as we are; and it is 
 usually said that gravity there is only z¢50 part as great 
 as it is here. It is true in the sense in which it is meant. 
 When a wave of light has travelled sixty miles, it is spread 
 over 3,600 times as much surface as when it has gone one 
 mile, and only appears z¢o5 part as bright. Yet the total 
 amount of light remains the same. 
 
 As with this actual force of light undulation, so with 
 the potential force of gravity. The earth actually holds 
 only one moon in her orbit, but is potentially able to 
 attract with the same power any other body coming to 
 the same distance as the moon; and at the moon’s dis- 
 tance there is 3,600 times as much space for bodies to be 
 arrayed. The sum of the power to attract there is there- 
 fore 3,600 times sey; that is, it is the same as at the 
 earth’s surface. Nor, according to the accepted theory of 
 gravitation, could this potential power ever be exhausted 
 by increasing its actual exercise. Let moon upon moon 
 or planet after planet be bowled gently by the side of our 
 earth until she were lost among them, like a gnat in the 
 midst of an innumerable swarm of gnats, and still she 
 would hold her present moon with precisely as firm a hold 
 as at present. 7% 
 
 We find, then, an omnipresent force of elasticity and an 
 
THE UNSEEN REAL 7 
 
 omnipresent force of gravity; and all the phenomena of 
 external nature, which at first seemed to be the solid real- 
 ities of the universe, fade, under the searching glance of 
 reason guided by science, into that which religious philos- 
 ophy had long since declared it,— the inscrutable clothing 
 of inscrutable power. That which moves matter without 
 the intervention of matter or material agency is consid- 
 ered magical or spiritual; yet the force of gravity moves 
 matter without the agency of matter. What is it, then, 
 but an omnipresent spiritual power, manifesting itself ? 
 
 And matter itself is, by the phenomenon of elasticity, 
 and by the nature of nerve-sensation, shown to be a con- 
 geries of points without dimensions, acting on each other 
 without contact, manifesting, by the actual forces dis- 
 played, the presence of almost illimitable powers, poten- 
 tial forces slumbering in those mysterious centres. 
 
 We turn back to our first consciousness, aroused in 
 sense-perception. We have shown that it gives us, when 
 interrogated sharply, the existence of space, time, and 
 force,— 2.¢., power-producing motion,— but that we fail to 
 get any distinct view of the thing moved. It seems to 
 elude analysis, and vanish into the self-contradiction of a 
 moving point, or the equally difficult conception of forces 
 acting from a centre which has no assignable dimensions, 
 but which is driven from point to point in space, and 
 drives other centres. 
 
 We now turn to the self side. What is it which thus is 
 conscious of sense-perception? Am I, the me which per- 
 ceives, also a mere mode of motion? No: I do not rec- 
 ognize in myself any direct relation to motion, force, 
 space, and time. I see them without, outside of myself. 
 I trace the external motion into my body, into my ner- 
 
18 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 vous system, up to my brain; but I do it by the use of 
 sight, touch, and hearing, and not by self-consciousness. 
 When I turn my mind upon the act of sense-perception, 
 and, attempting to analyze it, come at length to the con- 
 templation of the conscious me, then I become self-con- 
 scious. I feel at once that I have stepped across a wide 
 gulf, the sides of which are separated, to use Hamilton’s 
 expression, by the whole diameter of being. I see myself 
 related to or connected with my body, which is in space 
 and time subject to force, receiving modes of motion, and 
 thereby leading to sensation. But the sensation itself is 
 not a mode of motion nor apprehended by sensation as 
 motion is: it is apprehended by a direct intuition, just as 
 space, time, and force are apprehended. In sense-percep- 
 tion we think that we see matter moving, or hear sounds, 
 or smell odors; and, undoubtedly, the senses do give us 
 trustworthy testimony of the existence of something real, 
 which to our senses is continuously extended. Sharper 
 analysis shows, however, that matter itself is invisible. 
 The eye recognizes modes of motion, the ear other modes, 
 and so on, But no science can destroy the testimony of 
 the internal self, the immediate vision of space, time, 
 force, and sense, or show the possibility that either of 
 these can be a mode of motion. 
 
 Space is indestructible even in imagination ; so, also, is 
 time ; the existence of force as a cause of external motion 
 can no more be denied than our own existence. Think 
 for a moment of the means by which our great cities are 
 now illuminated. Here is a mass of common cast and 
 wrought iron wrapped with copper wires ; and within it 
 a sphere of similar materials, turning upon a delicately 
 poised axis, so arranged that the friction is practically 
 
THE UNSEEN REAL 19 
 
 nothing: the smallest child could turn the sphere, which 
 is separated by a blank space of a finger’s breadth on 
 every side from the cast-iron cups in which it turns. Yet 
 a powerful steam-engine is set to rotating this sphere. 
 At first but little steam is requisite to overcome the 
 trifling friction of the axis; but, as the velocity increases, 
 more and more power must be applied, so that at the end 
 of two or three minutes the whole force of the powerful 
 engine is required to turn this little sphere, which at first 
 the smallest child could spin. What, then, becomes of 
 the force of the engine, which goes on laboring hour after 
 hour, putting forth all its strength to accomplish what at 
 first seemed so trifling a task? The answer is that the 
 power of that engine leaps across the space between the 
 sphere and the iron cups, and, being magically converted 
 from the mechanical force of the engine into magnetism 
 and into an electric current, is led from one end of the 
 axis through a long circuit of wire, returning to the other 
 end of the axis. In the course of this long circuit, how- 
 ever, around the streets of the city, it is interrupted at 
 various points, and dispersed in the form of powerful rays 
 of light. Nine-tenths of the power of the steam-engine 
 are thus in the best forms of the dynamo converted into 
 electricity, and the greater part of that electricity con- 
 verted into light. But the agent in transforming this 
 mechanical force of the engine into the continuous cur- 
 rent of electricity through the wire is a finger’s breadth of 
 space, which would act just as well were it as perfect a 
 vacuum as art can make. The connection is through the 
 ether, which is cognizable by not one of the five senses, 
 but shows itself to reason as a fluid without recognizable 
 friction and under tremendous universal pressure. 
 
20 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 Still more striking evidences of the reality of the un- 
 seen are furnished by the consideration of organic life, 
 but it would carry us too far from the simplicity of our 
 main line of thought to pursue them. As a single illus- 
 tration of the facts to which we refer, take the heredity 
 which plays so important a part in the theories and specu- 
 lations of modern naturalists. All the plants and animals 
 of the world are produced from seeds and eggs, and these 
 seeds and eggs sprout and hatch into a likeness of both 
 parents. Even those naturalists who suppose that the 
 difference of species has been produced by gradual varia- 
 tion — from a few original types or from one — admit that 
 the variation is usually very slow. For many generations, 
 even for thousands upon thousands, like produces like. 
 What is it in the ovum or ovule which makes it develop 
 into the likeness of the parent? Is it a peculiar arrange- 
 ment of the atoms of which the little globule consists, or 
 is it something inscrutable? Clerk Maxwell argues that 
 the little ova or ovules cannot contain a sufficient number 
 of atoms to admit of all the variety of arrangements 
 requisite to produce the prodigious number of fossil and 
 living species of plants and animals. His argument, from 
 the limits assigned to the size of atoms, becomes doubly 
 strong when we apply it, not to the ovule or ovum, but to 
 that exceedingly minute portion of fluid, filtered through 
 at least two apparently impervious walls, which, in the 
 case of hybrids, is seen to convey to the offspring numer- 
 ous peculiarities of the male parent. 
 
 All that is really given by the act of sense-perception, 
 apparently revealing to us a world of solid material and 
 complex variety, is the existence of a conscious self, float- 
 ing in boundless space and boundless time, surrounded 
 
THE UNSEEN REAL ZI 
 
 and sustained by boundless power. But these it does give; 
 and the conscious self refuses to be identified with either 
 of the other three, or with any combination of them. 
 
 The object of stating so fully these first truths of con- 
 sciousness will, I hope, become manifest in the succeed- 
 ing lectures. 
 
1EE 
 THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 In our first lecture we attempted a rough analysis of 
 the contents of consciousness in the first act of simple 
 sense-perception. We found that it contained or implied 
 the existence of the subject self perceiving something 
 external to self, and, at first, of something moving. Next 
 we found that all sense-perception has been proved by 
 modern science to be, in fact, the perception of motion, 
 because all sensible phenomena have been resolved, with 
 great probability, into various modes of motion. On a 
 sharper analysis of the thing moving, it is resolved into 
 manifestations of force in space and time,—three entities 
 which entirely elude the outward senses, and whose being 
 is avouched to us, precisely as our own being is, by an 
 inward perception, or intuition. As we know that we 
 ourselves exist, so and by the same sort of evidence we 
 know the existence of space, time, and force,— immaterial 
 entities seen by the inward eye more clearly, and under- 
 stood more perfectly, than anything seen by the outward 
 eye can be. Outward sense shows the action of forces ; 
 and reason follows up, and shows us that this is all that 
 outward sense can show, 
 
 Let us now turn to the first of the entities perceived by 
 the inward eye: itis our own conscious self. The conscious 
 self is in philosophy called the subject. It is so difficult 
 
 \ 
 
THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 23 
 
 to examine, that the school of Positive Philosophy declare 
 it impossible. As well, says Comte, may a man attempt 
 to look at his own eye as to attempt to look at his own 
 mind. On the other hand, the schools of philosophy wor- 
 thy of the name unite in declaring that the whole field of 
 philosophy lies embosomed in consciousness, and that it is 
 only by an examination of the processes going on within 
 us that we can arrive at any truth worth knowing. There 
 is, however, a great difficulty in analyzing the action of 
 the mind. It is well illustrated by the familiar fact that 
 uncultivated persons are wholly unable to give the real 
 reasons for their daily judgments, even when the judg- 
 ments are sound. This inability, it is true, sometimes 
 proceeds merely from the lack of words in which to for- 
 mulate their knowledge; but it still more frequently 
 arises from a want of skill in cross-examining the wit- 
 nesses of memory, testifying concerning the process by 
 which the judgment was reached. 
 
 Now, in looking at the conscious self, we depend very 
 largely upon the memory. Comte is right so far as this: 
 that, while the mind is wholly absorbed in some other proc- 
 ess, it cannot also be giving its whole strength to the 
 analysis of that process. We must, in general, remember 
 the process, and, while the memory is still vivid, hold off 
 the subjective process as an object of thought. It re- 
 quires long practice to attain skill in this dissection of a 
 past process; but it requires still greater practice and 
 rarer power to be able to observe the action of the mind 
 while the process is actually going on. 
 
 The consequence is that very few persons know them- 
 selves, in any emphatic sense of the words. Their fancied 
 knowledge of themselves is only the knowledge of their 
 
24 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 own portrait, frequently of a portrait unskilfuily taken. 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes pleasantly describes one of the 
 results of this self-ignorance}; namely, that in every 
 dialogue there are at least six speakers. When, for ex- 
 ample, the Secretary of State has a private interview with 
 the President, there are at least twelve persons present, 
 modifying all that is said: first, the two men themselves 
 in their real character; second, the two officials in their 
 official characters, which will probably differ more or less 
 from the real private character. Here are four. The 
 other eight consist of the estimates or pictures of these 
 four formed by each of the two men; and eight more 
 could easily be described. 
 
 Passing, however, from these pictures of character, pict- 
 ures of the subject, to the reality, what is the subject, 
 the conscious self? Can it be resolved into either of the 
 four elements which we have already found? Space? 
 Time? Force? Or the guartum quid, which eludes 
 analysis, and makes certain points of space manifest force 
 at certain moments of time? 
 
 Space and time are at once excluded. The ego, me, or 
 self stands in relation to space and time only through its 
 ability to see them by an inward perception, and to meas- 
 ure them by real or imagined motion. The life or mani- 
 festations of the ego are for the present in time, and 
 even connected with the imagination of space; but the 
 ego itself is conscious of no dependence on either. 
 Neither are its manifestations modes of motion. That 
 they may all be connected, for the present, with modes of 
 motion in the nervous system of the body is very proba- 
 ble, if not fully proved. But this by no means makes 
 them consist of modes of motion. Modes of motion are 
 
THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 25 
 
 recognizable only through sense-perception : they are out- 
 side the sphere of consciousness. The perception of mo- 
 tion is the immediate perception of the not-me. Modes 
 of consciousness are, on the other hand, recognizable only 
 through consciousness. They are thus absolutely discrete 
 and heterogeneous from motion. 
 
 Yet there is a large school at the present day of men 
 who follow the lead of Comte and of Herbert Spencer in 
 a fallacious course of reasoning by which they would 
 show that consciousness is only a manifestation of me- 
 chanical force. This argument is stated by Comte some- 
 what in this form :— 
 
 “Man dies if either deprived of food or if overfed, if 
 either frozen or overheated, if either drowned or over- 
 dried, if deprived of air or over-supplied with oxygen ; 
 and, finally, if a metaphysician were made to stand on his 
 head five minutes, all his eternal realities would become 
 non-existent. Therefore, man is a part of the material 
 universe, and the result of its physical forces.” 
 
 It is strange that intelligent men should be deceived 
 by such an evidently fallacious argument which confounds 
 the concomitant conditions with the causes of a phenome- 
 non. The fallacy is most readily exposed by a carefully 
 copied parody of the argument which I have given else- 
 where. Here is a mantel clock which, its owner affirms, 
 goes by a spring within. No, says a positivist, that is 
 not so. It will stop if not oiled and it will stop if over- 
 oiled ; it will stop if frozen, it will stop if overheated ; it 
 will stop if plunged under water, it will stop if it be ex- 
 posed to a dry and dusty air; and it will stop in an 
 instant if you turn it upside down. The spring is a con- 
 ceit of your imagination. The clock goes by gravity, 
 
26 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 just temperature, proper hygrometric conditions, and a 
 proper feeding with oil. But the owner of the clock 
 knows it has a spring in it; and I know that I have a soul 
 in me. 
 
 The infinite gulf between the motion of a nerve and the 
 consciousness of a sensation can be bridged by no such 
 loose and careless engineering. The conscious me is no 
 more a part of the body and a result of external agencies 
 than the mainspring of the mantel clock is a part of the 
 train which it drives or a result of the oscillation of the 
 pendulum. 
 
 What, then, is the conscious me, the subjective sub- 
 ject? It is a guzntum qutd, recognizable only in con- 
 sciousness, just as the guartum quid of matter is recogniz- 
 able only through force producing motion. When matter 
 ceases to exert any force, it ceases to produce even the 
 infinitesimal motions of heat and light, it offers no re- 
 sistance to other matter: it ceases to exist to us; we can- 
 not follow it even in imagination; it has reverted to the 
 abyss of potentiality. So with the conscious subject, if it 
 ceases utterly from consciousness; as, for example, it is 
 supposed, not only by unbelievers in immortality, but by 
 numerous Christians, believers in the sleep of the soul, 
 to cease from consciousness at death, and to lie dormant 
 for centuries after the body has returned to dust. Then, 
 I say, the conscious me ceases to exist to us, and to our 
 thought. We cannot follow it even in imagination. It 
 has reverted to the abyss of potentiality: its resurrection 
 to life cannot be construed to our imagination as other 
 than a new creation, more wonderful than the first, be- 
 cause in that re-creation the soul would come forth with 
 crowded memories of the past. 
 
THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 2/7 
 
 Consciousness is the distinguishing characteristic of 
 the subject, as motion is of matter, extension of space, 
 duration of time. The ego, or subject, has no finite me- 
 chanical force. Its manifestations and actions cannot 
 be measured in foot pounds. The consumption of phos- 
 phorus may indicate, if you please, the amount of move- 
 ment in the brain; and thus the brain movement be 
 weighed in foot pounds against other motions. But that 
 brain movement is not a measure of consciousness, not 
 even of its amount, and much less of its character and 
 value. A blockhead or a villain may consume as much 
 phosphorus every twenty-four hours as a genius or a saint. 
 Consciousness is measured more nearly by quality than 
 by quantity of brain-work. The finer quality of work 
 may require finer tools; and thus it may be true, as Dr. 
 J. C. Warren thought it, that a man of genius has a 
 brain of finer and more delicate organization. 
 
 But consciousness is not mere motion, nor is mental 
 action measurable by physical force: it is not the result 
 of the exertion of force, except as we use a description 
 of external nature as a typical expression of the facts of 
 internal consciousness. (And this appears, by the way, 
 to spiritual philosophy to be one of the main uses of 
 external nature; namely, to furnish types whereby to 
 express spiritual things.) P 
 
 What, then, are the faculties of the ego, as revealed in 
 consciousness? Psychologists of every school have for 
 a century past included them in three,— sight, feeling, 
 thls es 
 
 By sight we mean the power of perceiving or knowing. 
 This seems the first and fundamental thing in con- 
 sciousness. What is consciousness but knowing, or co- 
 
28 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 ordinating knowledge? We have been in the first and 
 in the present lecture asking, What do we see in every 
 conscious moment? taking it for granted that we see. 
 We perceive external sensations, and perceive that they 
 are external. We perceive space and time and motion. 
 We perceive the existence of force. We perceive the 
 existence of cause, a genus of which force is a species. 
 We perceive that we perceive. All these are forms of 
 direct sight, which I give, not as exhausting, but simply 
 as illustrating, the power of direct or immediate percep- 
 tion which I call sight. 
 
 But we also perceive that we feel. Even sensations 
 are pleasant or unpleasant. It is impossible for us to 
 imagine ourselves in a state of consciousness absolutely 
 devoid of feeling; that is, in which we should neither 
 be pleased nor displeased, contented nor discontented, 
 soothed nor annoyed, interested nor disgusted. Some 
 slight degree of feeling of some kind must accompany 
 every state of consciousness imaginable by us, because 
 some degree has accompanied every state experienced 
 by us. So far as our experience goes, every state of 
 consciousness includes a state of feeling; and a state 
 of absolute indifference is like a state of unstable equi- 
 librium in mechanics, only capable of being maintained 
 for an inappreciable instant. 
 
 The feelings culminate in desires which are but intensi- 
 fied feelings, and the desires prompt to volition. Will is 
 the highest action of the ego, and the most difficult of 
 analysis. But at every conscious moment we not only 
 are percipient in the intellect and recipient in the heart, 
 but accipient or excipient in the will; that is, we are act- 
 ing or refraining from action. 
 
THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 29 
 
 The simplest action of the ego is the mere act of atten- 
 tion or refusing attention. In the momentary sphere of 
 consciousness a thousand things present themselves, to 
 the external sense, to bodily sensation, to memory, to 
 imagination, to reason ; and the ego, the proper self within, 
 chooses to which it shall give its principal attention. 
 
 This power of the mind to concentrate its forces on one 
 part of the sphere of consciousness, and remand the other 
 parts to the abyss of potentiality, differs greatly in differ- 
 ent men; but it is to some extent always present, and is 
 one of the main differences between sanity and insanity. 
 Of course, it is finite in a finite being. If a fly flew into 
 the room, it would of course be in the power of any one of 
 us to withhold attention from it. But if, on the other 
 hand, a hand-grenade with a smoking fuse came in at the 
 window, or a meteoric stone descended through the roof, 
 it would be impossible for any one to refuse attention to 
 it. Limited, however, as the power is, it is nevertheless 
 a real power, and is the grandest faculty of our nature. 
 In that power of directing and concentrating attention 
 lies the first element of success, and of greatness, in what- 
 ever department of thought or action. 
 
 The second action of the conscious self through will 
 power is the command of the body. Through involun- 
 tary muscular movements the attention of the infant is 
 early called to its being in a body capable of motion. As 
 I said in the first lecture, this is probably the earliest state 
 of consciousness, the consciousness of bodily motion. As 
 the conscious self comes to higher activity, it wills that 
 some of these involuntary motions shall be repeated ; and 
 they are repeated. How, by what agency, the child does 
 not know. Nor does the most thorough student of the 
 
30 POSTULATES ‘OF REVELATION 
 
 physiological action of the brain and nervous system even 
 to-day know, any better than the infant, how the immeas- 
 urable gulf between consciousness and the material body 
 is spanned. I pronounce the word “speech,” or I write it 
 upon this sheet of paper. The chemist and the mechanic 
 may explain the nature of ink and of my stylographic pen. 
 The anatomist may describe with minute accuracy the 
 movement of every muscle, and show through what nerves 
 the commands come to those muscles. The physiologist 
 may fancy that he can tell from what particular set of 
 nerve-cells the command originated. But not one of them 
 can tell, or will probably ever be able, in this world, to 
 tell how the decision of my will started those nerve-cells 
 to their peculiar action. The will, the conscious self in 
 the act of volition, has no measurable force, no power to 
 be developed into motion. But it has a power to develop 
 the dormant power of the nerve-cells into a motion which, 
 in its turn, shall develop or arouse the dormant power 
 of the muscular fibre. Still more wonderful, this decision 
 of the conscious will decides the direction and amount of 
 force which shall be brought into play by each muscle. 
 How this thing is done we know not. The lower ani- 
 mals perform the same thing, although not in such com- 
 plicated modes. Agassiz opened a snapping tortoise’s egg 
 some weeks before it was ready to hatch; and the young 
 tortoise, although but three-fourths ready for its entrance 
 upon outer life, snapped at the lead-pencil which was 
 brought near it. The Darwinist says that this simply 
 proves that the young tortoise had been practising snap- 
 ping at pencil-points for a million of years, so that the habit 
 was inveterate,— practising, of course, in the person of its 
 fathers. But this spreading of the marvel over a million 
 
THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE al 
 
 of years does nothing to diminish its marvellous charac- 
 ter. A good draughtsman sees a figure which is new and 
 striking, or sees a child at play take a new and particu- 
 larly pleasing attitude ; and in a moment he sketches with 
 his pencil a correct outline. The draughtsman knows 
 nothing about the action of his nerve-cells and muscles. 
 He wills that his pencil shall reproduce a new outline, 
 and it does it. The Fuegian Indian, wholly untutored, 
 hears a foreign word, containing, perhaps, sounds which 
 do not occur in his native language, yet he pronounces it 
 accurately at the first effort. All this control of the mind 
 over the body is magic. It cannot be reduced to the nexus 
 of physical causes and effects. It is not a manifestation of 
 force, but is simply a guidance of force. The will does 
 not come under the categories of external nature: itis not 
 a cause, in the physical sense of the word. It lies in the 
 realm of consciousness; and we do not know and cannot 
 imagine the mode in which it reaches over the gulf of 
 separation, and guides the forces of the external world. 
 The materialistic philosophy attempts to make the will 
 simply a part of the nexus of physical causes and effects, 
 and thus to get rid Of the necessity of confessing magic. 
 But the attempt is unsuccessful, because it is impossible 
 to construe to consciousness the proposition that con- 
 sciousness, or any of its modes, is a mode of manifesta- 
 tion of material motion. The two things are separated 
 “by the whole diameter of being”; and the materialistic 
 philosopher is simply beclouding himself with words to 
 which he cannot attach an intelligible sense, when he at- 
 tempts to make them one. | 
 
 To return to the first faculty,— that of sight,— let us 
 consider for a few moments the question whether we can 
 
32 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 depend upon sight. This is the first and most impor- 
 tant point to be settled in philosophy, whether we can 
 trust our own faculties. But it is a question that settles 
 itself, when properly stated. In all departments of human 
 knowledge and of intellectual investigation the solution 
 of a problem is never really possible until the problem is 
 clearly and correctly stated; and the clear, correct state- 
 ment is usually a great step toward the solution. 
 
 Can we believe what we believe? can we see what we 
 see? can we hear what we hear? The questions answer 
 themselves in the affirmative. To answer in the negative 
 is to deny our own existence, and to deny one’s own ca- 
 pability of denying. Sober philosophy proceeding to that 
 step becomes mad reverie and senseless jargon. 
 
 We see what we see: the real question is, What do we 
 see? Take as an illustration the act of literal sight with 
 the bodily eye. The new-born child turns his eye toward 
 the window, and sees, let us say, a green tree waving in the 
 wind just outside. He actually sees a something green in 
 motion, and knows that it is not himself. And that is all 
 that he actually sees when in mature life he looks out at 
 the same object, although he may then think he sees that 
 it is a tree of a definite species, size, distance from the 
 house, etc. But these details are inferences, judgments ; 
 and the actual direct sense-perception is simply some- 
 thing of mottled green in motion, not himself, not his own 
 body, but outside his body. This last point, the distin- 
 guishing of sight from vision, is more difficult, but in a 
 sane mind always possible. In fact, the organ of vision, 
 the expansion of the optic nerve, has three functions in 
 connection with the mind (and, mutatis mutandis, what I 
 am about to say of this nerve may be said of every part of 
 
THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 33 
 
 the nervous system, brain andall). It receives impressions 
 normally from without, which cause sensations ; it receives 
 normally a gentler impression from within, from the men- 
 tal action, and this gives vividness to memory and imagi- 
 nation of sensible things; thirdly, it is capable of abnor- 
 mal excitement through accident or disease, giving rise 
 to pseudo-sensations, to which memory and imagination 
 sometimes lend form, thus producing visions and subjec- 
 tive impressions, as of hearing music, tasting flavors, etc. 
 But these visions are distinguishable by a sound mind 
 from the real normal impressions from without. The 
 sound mind knows that it perceives something green ex- 
 ternal to itself, external even to its own body. What that 
 something is, it judges by inference; but that there is some- 
 thing there is the direct testimony of consciousness, and 
 cannot be denied without opening the door to insanity and 
 turning reason adrift. 
 
 But it is said that this something may not be at all like 
 our sensation. Of course, it is not: the sensation is a fact 
 of consciousness, the something external is a fact in the 
 external world. Between them there may be a corre- 
 spondence, but there cannot be a similarity. What of it? 
 That does not invalidate the testimony of consciousness 
 that there is something there which produces the sensation 
 which we call the perception of a green color. It is a 
 mere quibble upon words to say the grass is not green. 
 It is precisely like denying that this tuning-fork is E-flat. 
 The fork is not the vibration of the air, much less is the 
 fork the particular musical sensation which vibrations of 
 that particular frequency give to a musical ear. But the 
 fork, if set in vibration, will give vibrations which will pro- 
 duce in a musical ear the sensation called E-flat. There- 
 
34 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 fore, the fork is called E-flat. In like manner the leaf of the 
 tree responds in the light of the sun to particular vibra- 
 tions which give to a healthy eye the perception of a color 
 which is called green; and that is all that is meant by 
 saying the leaf is green. The eye does not deceive you. 
 It says that here is something which will produce in every 
 healthy human mind, turning toward it in common day- 
 light, a healthy normal eye, a peculiar sensation known to 
 us as the perception of a green color. And this is true. 
 The green tree does look green to ninety-six or ninety- 
 eight persons out of every hundred; nay, to even a 
 greater percentage of women. To say what looks green 
 is not green, is a quibble, an attempt to make a new mean- 
 ing to the word. All that we know or can know of the 
 material world through the senses, without reason, is that 
 it produces sensations in us; but that we do know, and 
 know with certainty. So far from the eye not giving a 
 true report in giving color, it gives a report which modern 
 science shows to be richer in content than was formerly 
 dreamed. The chemist thrusts a fragment of an unknown 
 substance into his Bunsen flame, and instantly tells from 
 the play of colors in the blaze the chemical nature of the 
 substance. The green leaf is shown by its greenness to 
 have its particles so arranged as to make light reflected 
 from it vibrate at a certain frequency. 
 
 All other forms of sense-perception are in like manner 
 truthful. We may carelessly misinterpret the report of 
 sight, and, in Charles Darwin’s expressive phrase, “fill the 
 gaps of knowledge with loose and unfounded speculation.” 
 But, if we attentively, carefully consider what it is that we 
 see, we may be certain that we see something, and some- 
 thing real. And all processes of the intellect are simply 
 
THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 35 
 
 processes of direct sight, internal or external. Reasoning, 
 as an intellectual process, is the direct perception of the 
 interrelation of truths ; and, as an art, it is the arrange- 
 ment of truths in such a mental order as to make their 
 interrelation visible. He who argues to show the inabil- 
 ity of the human mind to attain or perceive truth is, with 
 gross inconsistency, himself depending upon the veracity 
 of his own internal sight to see the validity of each step 
 of his fallacious argument. 
 
 But it is said that we can, after all, only see things as 
 they appear to us. Again I enter the demurrer. What 
 of it? Of course, we can see things only as we see 
 them. That is plain enough. And our vision is very 
 limited. That is plain enough. But, as far as we see, we 
 see. Is not that also self-evident? A child sees in a 
 circle not a thousandth part of the wonderful truths which 
 the mathematical genius of ages has evolved out of the 
 simple figures ; but the child certainly sees the circle, the 
 equidistance of its centre from all parts of the boundary, 
 the equal curvature of all parts of the boundary, and the 
 equality of ail its diameters, and this is seeing something 
 real and something valuable. The highest geometer does 
 not see in the circle all its relations. From century to 
 century new truths are evolved from that simplest of 
 curved figures ; but all that the geometer Has seen he has 
 SEEN. How what he has seen appears to the Intellect 
 which sees all things, of course, the geometer cannot 
 know. But of this the geometer is certain: that all 
 human mathematics must be included in the knowledge of 
 an Infinite Intellect. Absolutely perfect knowledge of a 
 circle can never make the equality of its diameters appear 
 a falsehood, or reduce the ratio of its circumference and 
 diameter to any exact numerical equivalent. 
 
36 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 So with all other human knowledge in all departments. 
 It is the knowledge of relations; but, when carefully 
 analyzed and corrected, it is a real knowledge of actual 
 relations. It is the knowledge of the relations as they 
 appear to us; but that is a real knowledge as far as it 
 goes. It is knowledge of the relation of the relations to 
 a finite perception. 
 
 To deny that the human mind can come to any real 
 knowledge of the universe is, then, only to justify Cicero’s 
 remark,—that there is no opinion so absurd that is not held 
 by some philosopher as truth. In this case the absurdity 
 is self-evident ; and yet it has frequently been maintained 
 that we know that we know nothing,— that is, we do not 
 even know that we know nothing, and that we must doubt 
 all things, even doubt whether we doubt all things. 
 
 To this we are reduced by the doctrine drawn from 
 Kant and Swedenborg,—I think by misinterpretation of 
 their language,— the doctrine that space and time are sim- 
 ply regulative forms of human thought; a doctrine ren- 
 dered popular among English-speaking people by Carlyle’s 
 weird prose poem, “Sartor Resartus’’; a doctrine erring 
 on the side of idealism as greatly as the doctrine of the 
 identification of space with bodily extensiveness on the 
 side of materialism. 
 
 Space and time, instead of being as Teufelsdréckh puts 
 it, the clothing of the material world, are the limitless 
 atmosphere in which the material world is immersed. 
 The material world exists, so far as we can see, only for 
 the sake of its symbolism. It is a language whereby we 
 can express to each other our thoughts and feelings about 
 space, time, and spirit; and we can thus use it, only 
 because it is a language wherein we are addressed by the 
 
THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE a7 
 
 Infinite Spirit whose thoughts it embodies, whose power 
 and love it manifests, 
 
 To the reality of these things seen by the inner eye — 
 space, time, motion, force, spirit, or self—and to the 
 reality of our knowledge concerning them, all the experi- 
 ence of life bears an ever-accumulating testimony. Her- 
 bert Spencer resents with indignation the insinuation that 
 he supposed there could be any vice in the constitution of 
 things. Other writers, of even more pronounced mate- 
 rialism, have affirmed that they rest with implicit con- 
 fidence on the everlasting harmony of the movements of 
 nature. We cannot live without that faith: even the 
 earthquake does not destroy the faith of the survivor in 
 the stability of the earth on which they re-erect the fallen 
 city. Peirce analyzed this confidence in the uniformity 
 of nature into a moral confidence in the truthfulness of 
 God. A student asked him one day in my hearing, 
 How do we know that the sun will rise to-morrow? And 
 he instantly replied, Exactly as we know everything 
 else that we do know; on the veracity of God. To sup- 
 pose that the course of nature will be interrupted without 
 a sufficient reason is to suppose the Source of the uni- 
 verse unreasonable and false. 
 
 To suppose that the faculties of man inevitably and 
 continually deceive him, so that no carefulness of analysis 
 and of scrutiny can ever make him justly certain that he 
 knows anything, is not only, as I have already shown, an 
 intellectual self-contradiction, an inconceivable intellect- 
 ual absurdity, but it is also a denial of our highest moral 
 ideals, a making of ourselves more truthful and noble than 
 the Infinite Source of the universe in which we are but a 
 part. 
 
38 
 
 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 Oh, never deem 
 This world a dream 
 
 Of things which are not what they seem; 
 For He who hurled 
 Through space this world, 
 
 And the starry skies above unfurled, 
 Can never lie, 
 And earth and sky 
 
 Are what He wrote for the human eye. 
 The fool, indeed, 
 Or child, may read 
 
 Only the letters with careless heed, 
 And fail to see 
 What mystery 
 
 Contained in the sacred whole may be; 
 But he whose sight 
 Is open to light 
 
 Finds the page with heavenly glories bright. 
 Though the clearest ray 
 Of the infinite day, 
 
 Through this elder Scripture beaming alway, 
 Gives the steadfast hope 
 That there yet shall ope 
 
 On our stronger vision a wider scope ; — 
 When through Christ’s grace 
 We, face to face, 
 
 Shall see what passeth all time and space; 
 When the brightest dream 
 Of the present shall seem 
 
 But darkness beside that immortal beam. 
 Yet bright also 
 Is the present glow 
 
 Of the glories of heaven that round us flow; 
 And on Nature’s face 
 We still may trace 
 
 The tokens of Godhead in every place. 
 
THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
 In every line 
 God’s power divine, 
 His love and wisdom, steadily shine. 
 In His hand we lie, 
 And with raptured eye 
 
 Read His glorious truth on earth and sky. 
 
 39 
 
Tie 
 THE INFINITE KNOWABLE. 
 
 We endeavored in our second lecture to show that 
 the first fundamental faculty of the human being, of the 
 real self within us, is the faculty of sight; that is, of 
 perceiving truth. This faculty corresponds to external 
 vision; it is the internal vision by which external vision 
 is analyzed and understood; it is the internal vision by 
 which we see the entities without us, of space, time, and 
 mechanical force producing motion, and of a fourth some- 
 thing which moves, and gives us thereby our notions of 
 motion, figure, color, hardness, etc. It is the internal 
 vision by which we see also the entities of the microcosm, 
 the powers of intellect and feeling and will, and of an 
 internal fifth something, the self, the ego, the me, the 
 soul, the subject which thus sees what is without and 
 what is within itself. 
 
 We endeavored further to show that what we thus 
 clearly see is something to be seen. The external world 
 is not a delusion, but a reality: we can know of it only 
 its sensible properties and its time and space relations ; 
 but there is nothing more that we need to know. When 
 I see a piece of red granite, I see only a something that 
 looks red to me; but I see in the peculiar tone and 
 variety of its color that it is a something which is very 
 hard, will stand firm under great pressure, is composed 
 
THE INFINITE KNOWABLE 41 
 
 of three kinds of crystals, each with such and such sensi- 
 ble properties, that under fire it would behave so and so, 
 that it is capable of a high polish, that it is a portion of 
 the oldest rock on the globe found in substantially similar 
 form in such and such chains of hills, that its crystals on 
 ‘decomposition would yield such and such gases, such and 
 such metals, and so on, and so on. What more do we 
 want? We see something which has such and_ such 
 physical properties; that is, which could, under the right 
 conditions, manifest to us such and such sensible prop- 
 erties. The idealist must grant this, and the materialist 
 has no right to ask the realist to grant more. But the 
 realist has the right to ask the materialist to grant that 
 the other faculties are as trustworthy as those of sense- 
 perception. I see the immaterial entities of space, time, 
 spirit, and force. I see them by the inward sense even 
 more clearly than I can perceive the sensations which 
 reveal the existence of matter. No other man’s blindness 
 can prevent my seeing these immaterial and spiritual 
 entities. The materialist’s denial of the trustworthiness 
 of my sight can no more make it untrustworthy than 
 the color-blind man’s denial of the perception of red 
 could destroy the reality of my vision of those lower 
 rays of the spectrum. 
 
 The reality of the soul’s power of perceiving, of com- 
 ing into immediate contact with and vision of realities, 
 having been vindicated, the next question is whether it 
 can lay hold of the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Uncon- 
 ditioned. This question is one of those most earnestly 
 debated by metaphysicians. One class have zealously 
 
 taken the negative, the other the affirmative, in regard | 
 
 to all three divisions of the question. Our faculties, say 
 
 \ 
 
42 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 one class, are, of course, finite and limited: they cannot 
 possibly lay hold of the infinite, the boundless. Our 
 faculties are tentative; they attain only approximations ; 
 they can never comprehend the absolute, the perfect. 
 Our faculties act only under narrow conditions: they 
 cannot seize upon the unconditioned. 
 
 Yet the very fact that we can discuss such a question 
 is a fact of sublime significance. A child of less than 
 four years, wholly unaware that I was overhearing her 
 soliloquy, said one morning in a pensive reverie, “‘ How 
 much easier it is to think than it is to do! Now, witha 
 dog it is just the other way.” The human faculties excel 
 those of the brutes most notably in this,— that the brutes 
 so seldom and so feebly manifest any power of transcend- 
 ing, in their imagination, their faculties of action. 
 
 The saving efficacy of Christian faith lies in its giving 
 us a vivid sense of the presence of an all-loving but a just 
 and holy Father, who can forgive the penitent, but who 
 will inflexibly bring punishment upon those who choose 
 evil. 
 
 The debate of the highest importance in all ages of 
 human society is, therefore, on the evidences of Chris- 
 tianity, not in the narrow sense in which the phrase is 
 sometimes used, but in the broad sense, including a dis- 
 cussion of those things which Christianity assumes or 
 takes for granted to be true, the more important of 
 which are the being of God, the reality of his moral 
 law, and the existence of a life after death,— an immortal 
 life in which the sanctity of that law shall be more fully 
 avouched. 
 
 It is by some denied that man has any faculties by 
 which he can attain any knowledge on such questions. 
 
 — ——— a 
 
THE INFINITE KNOWABLE 43 
 
 And yet man not only transcends, in his imagination, 
 all his faculties of action and all his imagination of the 
 possibilities of action, but he transcends in his reason 
 all his imagination of the possibilities of imagination. 
 
 Who can imagine points in space which are neither in, 
 above, nor below the plane of the horizon? Who can 
 imagine epochs in time which neither were before nor 
 will be after the present instant? Yet the mathematician 
 can locate any number of such points, determine any num- 
 ber of such epochs, and by rigid demonstration show the 
 distance of the centre of the earth from each point at 
 each epoch. What his imagination pronounces to be ab- 
 solutely impossible, his reason thus surveys and measures 
 as though really existent. 
 
 In like manner, in philosophy, the reason asserts with 
 emphasis the existence and properties of that which the 
 imagination is powerless to construct. 
 
 Yet even reason cannot penetrate into the ultimate re- 
 lationship of space and time to spirit. Our own sense of 
 the ineffable supremacy of the finite spirit over finite time 
 and space disposes us to consider the possibility that the 
 Infinite Spirit, by his omnipresence, constitutes space ; by 
 his eternity, time. But herein we rise as far above the 
 stretch of reason as reason rises above the flight of imagi- 
 nation. And this power of dimly peering into regions 
 transcending the infinite as much as the infinite tran- 
 scends the imaginable, what a sublime power it is! How 
 emphatically it affirms the reality of our apprehension of 
 the infinite, the absolute, and the unconditioned! The 
 men who deny our knowledge of religious verities, in their 
 very denial of the possibility of our laying hold upon 
 these high objects, show that they do lay hold of them. 
 
44 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 If they did not, if the incapacity of the human mind was 
 what men of that school of thought declare, they could 
 not argue upon it: they would be forced to content them- 
 selves with a blank denial that they understood anything 
 about the question. Their comprehension of the terms of 
 the question demonstrates that they have an apprehen- 
 sion of the meaning of the terms. There is, then, in the 
 human intellect, finite as it is, a power of seeing that the 
 Infinite at least exists. 
 
 In the ego, the self-determining subject, lies something 
 akin to the Unconditioned and the Infinite,— something 
 which, in the midst of its conditioned thought, appre- 
 hends the existence and attributes of the unconditioned. 
 
 We are, however, told by writers of the Hamiltonian 
 school that we can attribute no attributes to the infinite, 
 or to the absolute, or to the unconditioned. The same 
 remark was made by the first great Christian philosopher, 
 Scotus Erigena, in the ninth century. We can affirm 
 nothing of the infinite, says Scotus, because every affirm- 
 ation is of the nature of an equation between the subject 
 and the predicate; and nothing can be set in equation 
 against the infinite. Yet Scotus goes on to predicate 
 excess. An affirmation may be of inequality as well as 
 of equality. God is not great, he says, because he is 
 more than all greatness; nor good, because he is more 
 than all goodness; nor wise, because he is more than 
 all wisdom. In like manner, Herbert Spencer asks 
 whether there may not be a mode of existence transcend- 
 ing consciousness as much as that transcends uncon- 
 sciousness, 
 
 The word “infinite” is used in three different but 
 cognate significations: first, in the Hamiltonian sense, 
 
 /~ 
 
 LL 
 
THE INFINITE KNOWABLE 45 
 
 the mere etymological sense, as if from a past participle, 
 —not finite, not bounded, indefinitely large; secondly, 
 in a stricter metaphysical sense, not only indefinitely 
 large and unbounded, but, in the direction under con- 
 sideration, incapable of being bounded,— not only infinite, 
 but, to coin a word, infiniendum; thirdly, in its highest 
 sense, the Infinite, that which is incapable of definition 
 or boundary in any direction. To this third meaning of 
 Infinite apply more nearly than to the others the denials 
 of the Agnostic school. But the reason does not clearly 
 demand the existence of an entity having infinitude in 
 every attribute. The reason does not demand therefore 
 the existence of the Infinite as thus described. For 
 aught that reason can see, the infinite spirit, the infinite 
 space, and the infinite time may be heterogeneous co- 
 existences, of which neither has any of the attributes of 
 the other. 
 
 But with regard to infinite space we can certainly make 
 affirmations. It is in all its parts space; it has every- 
 where its three dimensions; it everywhere offers a fields 
 for coextension. So with infinite time we certainly can 
 make similar affirmations. Let us, however, observe that 
 many modern writers (led partly by the Kantian doctrine 
 of the forms of thought, and partly, perhaps, influenced by 
 a curiously literal translation of a sentence in the Apoc- 
 alypse into our modern tongues) make a distinction be- 
 tween boundless, infinite time and eternity, using the 
 word “eternity” to indicate an independence of time, just 
 as we use the words “ideal” or “imaginary” to indicate 
 independence of both space and time. 
 
 Let us now observe that, if we take infinity in the sec- 
 ond sense,— that is, real infinity in given directions and 
 
46 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 on given attributes,— there is a great practical difference 
 in the ease and certainty with which we may argue. Not 
 to confuse ourselves with logical terms, we may roughly 
 state the difference in this way,—that we can argue to in- 
 finity much more safely and certainly than we can argue 
 from it. This remark holds true in whatever department 
 of thought we may be moving, whether in simple geom- 
 etry or in the highest and most intricate theological prob- 
 lems. Let us take as an example the hyperbolic spiral. 
 A pair of shears stands open, one blade horizontal, the 
 other in a vertical plane above it, making an angle of 64°. 
 Let us suppose the blades of such a length that, if the 
 upper were closed down upon the under one, its point 
 would describe an arc five inches long. Now, suppose 
 that, as this upper blade comes down, both blades lengthen 
 in precise proportion to their approach. That is, when 
 they make an angle of 32°, they are twice as long as at 
 first; when an angle of 16°, they are four times as long; 
 when at 8°, eight times as long; when at 4°, sixteen 
 times as long; when 2°, thirty-two times as long; when 
 at 1°, sixty-four times as long; and so on forever. When 
 at any angle, say 1°, if the increase of length in the blades 
 were to stop, the points would be separated by an arc of 
 one-sixty-fourth the curvature, but of 64 times the radius 
 of the arc at first. It would therefore be an arc of the 
 same length, five inches; and there would be an arc of 
 that length always separating the points of the blades. 
 But, as the angle grew smaller, the arc would erow 
 straighter, and the points of the blades grow farther 
 apart. At the distance of a few hundred feet the distance 
 would be practically five inches, and from that point out 
 through infinite space remain five inches. The end of 
 
THE INFINITE KNOWABLE Ay 
 
 the lower blade would run out on a straight line, the end 
 of the upper blade on a hyperbolic spiral; and it has been 
 easy for you to perceive with certainty that this hyperbolic 
 spiral runs out into a form which, in the infinite distance, 
 becomes a parallel straight line five inches above the first. 
 But, go now in imagination out to an infinite, or even to 
 a moderately great, distance, and see. Here are two 
 parallel straight lines five inches apart: one is really 
 straight, and the other, you are told, is a curve which 
 runs back in this apparently straight form for miles and 
 miles and miles, and then becomes a curve. What of it ? 
 Can you by any imagination, or effort of reasoning, tell 
 what kind of acurve it is? Where is its finite origin? 
 What the law of its formation? Not at all, there is infin- 
 ity in the premises given you; and from infinite premises 
 it is seldom possible to draw finite conclusions. 
 
 Numerous examples might easily be given illustrating 
 in a similar manner the fact that in the science of analyti- 
 cal geometry, and of the differential and integral calculus 
 as applied to space, it is comparatively easy to pass (by 
 the most rigid and certain deductions) from the relations 
 of finites to the relations of mathematical infinites,— not 
 simply of mathematical indefinitely large quantities, but 
 mathematical infinites of an infinite order,—but very 
 much more difficult to pass from the relation of infinites 
 to that of finites. I have elsewhere shown that the same 
 thing holds in theology, and that a majority of the theo- 
 logical errors and fantasies of outgrown sects in Christen- 
 dom have actually grown from or been supported by 
 arguments drawn from the infinity of God.* And, even at 
 the present hour, the most fascinating of modern specula- 
 
 * The Natural Sources of Theology, page 13. 
 
48 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 tions in science, philosophy, and religion, are insecurely 
 built upon deductions from premises involving infinity. 
 The sciences of space and time —that is, mathematical cal- 
 culus — show and illustrate the fact that, in order to argue 
 from premises involving infinity, very peculiar precautions 
 against error are necessary. With these precautions, we 
 may perhaps argue safely, and come to indisputable con- 
 clusions; but without them the liability to error is a 
 thousand-fold greater when arguing from infinity than 
 when arguing to it. 
 
 The philosophers who most earnestly deny the reality 
 of our knowledge of the Infinite, and forbid us to make 
 any affirmations concerning it, are continually making 
 affirmations themselves and arguing from them. I have 
 mentioned Scotus Erigena’s saying,—that the Deity can 
 be called neither wise nor good, because he is more 
 than wisdom and more than goodness. In this earnest 
 denial of the possibility of making an affirmation Scotus 
 was affirming more than all affirmations. 
 
 The modern thinker, opposing theology in his earnest 
 advocacy of his doctrine of the unknowable, simply repro- 
 duces the doctrine of Augustine, of Erigena, and other 
 Christian philosophers concerning the inscrutability of 
 God. Indeed, in the Pentateuch, a writing of antiquity, 
 but certainly of earnest theism, the same doctrine is sub- 
 limely stated. Thou canst see my presence, the Lord 
 is represented as saying: no manner of similitude is 
 shown thee; but thou recognizest my presence by the 
 operations and results of my word. 
 
 Herbert Spencer is indignant at theologians who attrib- 
 ute consciousness to God. May there not be a mode 
 of being, he cries, as much transcending consciousness 
 
THE INFINITE KNOWABLE 49 
 
 as consciousness transcends unconsciousness? Of course 
 there may ; and, if Mr. Spencer had known anything of the 
 Christian theology which he speaks of so contemptuously, 
 he would have known that all Christian theologians of any 
 elevation of thought have acknowledged it. It is the con- 
 stantly reiterated statement of the Hebrew Scripture that 
 God’s thoughts are not as our thoughts, that his ways 
 are as much higher than ours as the heavens are higher 
 than the earth. In Agassiz’s contemplations of God in 
 the cosmos, that great naturalist, whose childlike relig- 
 ious trust in the paternal character of God made him 
 undervalued by modern thinkers tinctured with material- 
 istic and atheistic philosophy, declares emphatically that 
 we can form no image or picture to ourselves of the 
 divine consciousness, because the intellection of God is 
 not conditioned in time or space. Agassiz drew by in- 
 duction from the cosmos what philosophy draws from the 
 microcosm; and the prophets declare by inspiration that 
 in the divine mind. there is no tentative, progressive ad- 
 vance of knowledge, but that in that intellect the end is 
 known from the beginning, and every detail is simulta- 
 neously conceived. This mode of being, of course, is as 
 much above our human consciousness, or any picture of 
 consciousness which human imagination can draw, as con- 
 sciousness is above unconsciousness. Nevertheless, this 
 mode of the Divine Being includes rather than excludes 
 consciousness. Conscious spirit, possessing knowledge, 
 wisdom, power, and love, is the highest thing that we can 
 imagine. It thus becomes, as Aristotle has shown, our 
 fittest expression and symbol of the highest being which 
 reason can apprehend. 
 
 Of course, we are not to attribute to the Infinite Being 
 
50 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 the limitations of our personality. We are not to suppose 
 his thoughts are, like ours, necessarily consecutive ; nor 
 his love, like ours, necessarily partial. But, in imitation of 
 the processes of reasoning in lower things, we may take 
 the attributes of personality, and imagine them indefinitely 
 extended, and judge from their behavior under this indef- 
 inite extension whether they can bear extension to infin- 
 ity. If not, they are not attributes of the Infinite. But, if 
 yes, then they are attributes of the Infinite and Absolute. 
 
 The indefinite expansion of the field of intellectual con- 
 sciousness may be conceived without necessitating the 
 slightest breach of the laws of intellectual perception. 
 And, when the expansion is infinite, we arrive without 
 any violence to reason or imagination at a point above im- 
 agination, but real to reason, —the existence of an Infi- 
 nite Being to whom is known all that may be known, all 
 that is and all that is not, all that is possible and all that 
 is impossible, to whom the knowable and the unknowable 
 are alike lost in the known. . 
 
 But the greatest difficulty is usually felt in reconciling 
 the conception of love with the existence of the Infinite, 
 That God is wisdom seems to many persons easier to be- 
 lieve than that God is love. Yet, when we consider the 
 matter fully, there is no real wisdom without love, the de- 
 sire to confer happiness on sentient beings. Imagine this 
 growing and increasing in the mind and heart of one who 
 is growing in wisdom and power. With the increase of 
 wisdom, such a mind would see a gradation in kinds of 
 happiness ; and the desire would constantly be for giving 
 purer kinds of happiness. It is easy to see that this 
 increasing beneficence, accompanying increasing wisdom 
 and increasing power, involves no self-destructive or self- 
 
THE INFINITE KNOWABLE Si 
 
 contradictory elements as it passes on to indefinite expan- 
 sion, It may therefore be reasonably predicated of the 
 Infinite. 
 
 We have, therefore, no philosophical hindrances, but, 
 on the contrary, strong philosophical helps on the path 
 to accepting the teachings of the Jewish and the Chris- 
 tian Scriptures concerning God. Neither the finiteness 
 of man nor the infinity of God presents any real difficulty 
 to the partial knowledge of God by man. On the other 
 hand, we have, before entering on any detailed examina- 
 tion either of the world without or of the world within, 
 the strongest presumption from this preliminary survey 
 of the general field that the theism of the Hebrews is 
 philosophically true. The very nature of the soul is to 
 see, to feel, to will. Among the truths which it sees is 
 the truth of its own superiority to the external world, and 
 its own inferiority to the great First Cause of the universe. 
 It sees that the Cause of the universe is infinite, and can- 
 not be comprehended in any finite mind; but in the very 
 act of seeing this it sees the existence and the infinitude 
 of this cause. 
 
 It sees that infinite as the Supreme Cause is, that cause 
 is perfect, absolute, self-existent, self-determined, existing 
 in a mode unconditioned and uncontrolled,—a mode in- 
 conceivable to our imagination, but seen by our reason to 
 be the mode in which God exists. 
 
 The mind cannot see that it is limited except by tran- 
 scending its limits. Absolutely unthinkable is void, is ab- 
 solutely dark: we cannot peer into it, we cannot know it 
 or talk about it, except as we may of yellow sounds. The 
 absolutely unimaginable may be brought under the do- 
 main of reason, but the absolutely unthinkable can be 
 
52 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 brought under no faculty of the mind. The First Cause is 
 not absolutely unthinkable. On the contrary, it is thrust 
 upon our attention at every moment of our higher life. 
 No man can speculate at all without running back in his 
 speculation to the First Cause, absolutely unimaginable, 
 . but always an object of thought, thinkable, and by that 
 thought separated from the conditioned and exalted to the 
 unconditioned. We think him to be, although we cannot 
 think what or how he is, except that he is infinite in the 
 attributes of real being, absolute in all perfections, and un- 
 conditioned in his existence and action. 
 
IV. 
 EEN ALG Ge aUisy ha: 
 
 THE strict force of our argument in the preceding lect- 
 ure was to show that we could by reasoning, if carefully 
 conducted, arrive at sound conclusions concerning the In- 
 finite, the Absolute, and Unconditioned, and that there was 
 no objection arising from the infinity of God or the rela- 
 tivity of human knowledge insuperably in the way of our 
 ascribing to him the spiritual faculties of wisdom, love, 
 and will. But we also showed that it is logically safer to 
 argue from the finite to the infinite than from the infinite 
 to the finite. 
 
 By what induction, therefore, from the finite shall we 
 show the infinite wisdom of the Deity? Is there any 
 induction that is valid? Two lines of induction have been 
 followed by theologians in all ages. Socrates, in the 
 Memorabilia of Xenophon, gives us admirable examples 
 of the first. He shows that the human frame, and par- 
 ticularly the human eye, is built with such an admirable 
 adaptation to its purposes as to indicate a wise Creator. 
 This is known as the teleological argument. It was pecul- 
 larly suited to the Greek mind: their very language 
 indicated in the recognized meanings of the word Zéos, 
 that they identified cause and effect in the adaptation of 
 a means to an end. If we attempt to formulate this 
 argument from design into a canon of induction, it might 
 
54 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 run something like this: When an organ is found ef- 
 fecting a result, the presumption is that it was created to 
 effect that result; and the presumption is strengthened 
 in the compound ratio of the complication of the organ, 
 the efficacy of its action, the value of the result, and our 
 inability to see other uses for the organ or better means 
 of effecting the result, the presumption thus being readily 
 raised to moral certainty. 
 
 The other line is the morphological. It was not fully 
 developed by early writers, although finely stated by 
 Cicero as a Stoic argument, but has been made of more 
 importance by men of our own day. A magnificent ex- 
 ample of it is found in the Introduction to Agassiz’s 
 “Essay on Classification,” prefixed to his “ Contributions 
 to the Natural History of the United States”’; also in the 
 lectures of Professor Benjamin Peirce. It is a stronger 
 line of induction than the teleological, but not so readily 
 apprehended by uncultivated minds. The peculiar argu- 
 ment is that, when a material body conforms in its time 
 or space relations to a thought, to a mental law, so that, 
 for example, a proposition concerning one point of its 
 surface or one instant of its duration shall be true for 
 all the points, and for every instant, the presumption is 
 that it was created in obedience to that law; and this pre- 
 sumption increases with the simplicity and beauty of the 
 law, and the complication of the details coming under it. 
 So that the presumption rapidly strengthens into moral 
 certainty. 
 
 But, in order to feel its full force, we must revert for a 
 moment to the nature of time, space, and force. By force, 
 I mean the activity of that power which imparts or resists 
 motion. It lies dormant in certain points of space which 
 
 EL ee a re 
 
FINAL CAUSES 55 
 
 we call the centres of atoms. What the atoms are we 
 cannot tell, otherwise than that they are points in space 
 from which, locally, the manifestations of force proceed, 
 as I have once before said. The idealist must admit so 
 much as this, and the materialist cannot justly claim to 
 know more. 
 
 But we see by the inward eye space so clearly, so per- 
 fectly, and, as it were, on every side, that we know the 
 power which is manifested in force does not inhere in or 
 flow from the point as its efficient cause. The cause may 
 be in the place, but the place is not the cause. In like 
 manner we see time so clearly and distinctly that we 
 know that the instant of time is not itself the efficient 
 cause of the force revealed at its arrival. 
 
 The force in an atom—that is, in a centre of action—re- 
 veals itself in the phenomena of motion and of the resist- 
 ance to motion. These phenomena arrange themselves 
 readily under two groups. The one group betrays polar- 
 ity of a more or less pronounced and of a more or less 
 complicated character. That is to say, it shows that the 
 forces in the atomic centre act with varying strength in 
 various directions, making fixed angles with each other. 
 Such are the phenomena of chemical quantivalence and of 
 electric and magnetic disturbance, and the phenomena of 
 crystallization. To this group also we may annex those 
 properties of matter which show a constancy and individ- 
 uality in the strength of the forces in a given atom; for 
 example, the laws of definite proportions, in all the various 
 forms in which such laws pervade chemistry. 
 
 The other group consists of those manifestations of 
 force which seem to act equally in all directions from the 
 centre, like the forces of electrical repulsion and attrac- 
 
56 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 tion, or like the force of gravity. Whatever is purely 
 physical and reducible to the effects of mechanical force 
 can be explained by referring it to one or both of these 
 modes of the manifestation of force. 
 
 The first law of motion as determined by physical ex- 
 periment is that a body in motion continues in motion 
 with uniform velocity in a straight line forever, unless 
 subjected to accelerating forces. These accelerating 
 forces act, as we have just shown, in one of two modes, 
 either by polarity on definitely arranged axes or in de- 
 flection around a centre. By the latter mode we obtain 
 the revolution and rotation of planets, the oscillations of 
 the pendulum, and similar phenomena; while by the first 
 mode we obtain chemical changes, the aggregation of 
 crystals, and so on. By either mode the result tends 
 either toward a dynamic equilibrium, as in the planetary 
 motion, or a statical equilibrium, as in crystals. 
 
 In the passage toward a form of permanent equilibrium, 
 atoms and masses are frequently passing into positions of 
 unstable equilibrium, where, like the ass between two 
 bundles of hay, they are equally drawn in various direc- 
 tions. For example, take a body of simple linear polarity, 
 like a dipping needle, and place it with its poles exactly 
 reversed. It has, so to speak, the choice of innumerable 
 directions in which it can turn to reverse its poles again 
 to their normal position ; and, without figurative language, 
 if the poles are exactly reversed, it requires only an infin- 
 itesimal force to decide the path in which it shall rotate 
 back to its right direction. But what decides the direc- 
 tion of this infinitesimal impulse, which sets in motion 
 what may prove to be a chain of interlinked reactions of 
 great magnitude? If we say that sometimes one thing, 
 
FINAL CAUSES 57 
 
 sometimes another, produces the initial impulses, then we 
 obtain results as disconnected as the causes of the infin- 
 itesimal movements. But, if we admit that the causes of 
 the beginnings of the motion are interconnected, then the 
 results will be interconnected ; and the nature of the con- 
 nection of the effects will show the nature of the inter- 
 connection of the causes. When the effect is manifested 
 in a resultant material form or in a resultant measurable 
 motion, the crystalline or the amorphous form, or the 
 rhythmic movement, may show that the guidance was 
 simply the atomic forces themselves in their combined 
 action. When a force is manifested in motion or in 
 pressure, the direction of the motion can be guided only 
 by force. But, when the atom is passing through a posi- 
 tion of unstable equilibrium, it can be guided, as I have 
 just shown, by an infinitesimal force; and, if the position is 
 absolutely unstable, the guiding force may be absolutely 
 infinitesimal,—that is, may be zero. There is, then, in the 
 very constitution of an atom-built world, an opportunity 
 for the exercise of a spiritual guidance of force. 
 
 This spiritual guidance is of various kinds; but, if we 
 keep ourselves near the philosophical foundation of con- 
 sciousness as possible, we shall look first at voluntary 
 motion. To return to one of the illustrations, I deter- 
 mine to write the word “will.’ Immediately upon my vo- 
 lition the point of my pen traces the word “will” upon 
 the paper. Here is a voluntary guidance of my fingers 
 and of the pen held in them, to the effecting of this result 
 by mechanical motion. My will has certainly no finite or 
 appreciable physical force in itself. Its action upon my 
 fingers and the pen is wholly inexplicable by either spirit- 
 ual or materialistic philosopher. It is, as I have already 
 
58 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 shown in the second lecture, magic. No explanation of it 
 can be given. The physiologist shows us the nerves re- 
 porting the sensation from the fingers’ ends to the brain, 
 and the nerves carrying the command back from the 
 brain to the muscles, in obedience to which they alter- 
 nately contract and relax in such a manner as to make 
 the pencil write “will.” But the physiologist can show 
 no connection between the cells of nervous matter in the 
 brain and the form of the sensation reported or the form 
 of the command given. All that we know is that the 
 nervous matter, the muscular tissue, and the blood glob- 
 ules are bodies in a state of unstable chemical equilib- 
 rium, so that they tumble down at an infinitesimal touch 
 into the lower forms of urea, carbonic dioxide, etc., and 
 that the conscious will directs, by magic, the paths in 
 which they turn in their fall, and thus determines the re- 
 sultant motion of the pen. I say by magic, for the con- 
 scious self is not conscious or cognizant of any of these 
 intermediate steps and agencies which he between its vo- 
 lition and the final result. 
 
 Here, then, is a vera causa, not in the physical nexus; 
 for there there is no cause needed, the absolutely infini- 
 tesimal being zero, and it only requiring an absolutely infi- 
 nitesimal force to direct the stream at its beginning. But 
 here is a vera causa as a logical cause for the guidance of 
 forces. And it is the only vera causa known to us which 
 does guide and direct the action of forces. The forces of 
 nature are thus partially under our control. The ego, 
 being absolutely dissevered by the widest conceivable or 
 rather inconceivable gulf from matter, from the force 
 which produces motion, is enabled, by this magic of con- 
 trol over the unstable equilibriums in the body, to guide 
 
 ee 
 
 ———— 
 
FINAL CAUSES 59 
 
 not only the forces of cerebral and nervous and muscular 
 contraction in our own body, but thus the external terres- 
 trial forces of sun and wind and wave and electric current 
 and chemical reaction to our own purposes. But there is 
 also guidance where we are not conscious of guiding, 
 Take this very instance of simple muscular movement. 
 The child wills to grasp his rattle and shake it, and very 
 soon learns to do what he desires. His will guides his 
 muscular force to the seizing and shaking of the toy. But 
 the will and the final result is all that enter his conscious 
 thought. His will is the real cause which determines the 
 result of shaking the rattle. But where lies the cause of 
 the guidance of the intermediate series of relaxations and 
 contractions? This was not guided consciously by his 
 will. I guide by my volition the movement of my finger 
 ends by which I write the word, but I do not guide by con- 
 scious volition the nervous and muscular movements of 
 the arm. Iam not even conscious of their existence. Yet 
 there was guidance there, otherwise the arm would have 
 moved aimlessly as an infant’s. And that guidance was 
 put ultimately under control of my conscious volition, 
 else the words written would not be what I desired. The 
 only vera causa known to us in the guidance of the force 
 is, as I have just shown, a conscious will, a guiding intel- 
 lect. Surely, the law of parsimony would lead me to 
 attribute the whole guidance to intellect, and thus regard 
 my body as a machine made with wonderful skill and put 
 under my partial control. : 
 When we step back of the conscious will, we observe 
 that the will is prompted by desire and guided by reason. 
 In other words, we are reasonable beings, not acting 
 capriciously and without motive. There is a basis in 
 
60 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 our own nature for the division of the inductive argu- 
 ment for the wisdom of God into the teleological and 
 the morphological lines. 
 
 In Paley’s well-known treatise, and in the major part 
 of the eighth Bridgewater treatise the arguments are 
 from the apparent design of fitting a means to an end 
 or making a tool for a purpose. Thus Socrates argues 
 that the protection of the eye from sweat by the brow 
 and from dust by the lid, and the perfect adaptation of 
 the position of the eye in the head, and its internal 
 organization to the purpose of seeing, proves that it 
 was made skilfully as an instrument for sight. It is 
 the modern fashion to despise this argument, and there 
 were in the days of Socrates those who despised it. One 
 popular writer of our day calls it the carpenter theory 
 of creation, and another speaks of it as a miserable watch- 
 tick business. It is by others supposed that the doctrine 
 of evolution would, if established, thoroughly dispose of 
 it. All these objections and criticisms are founded upon 
 a misconception of the real nature of the argument. 
 When Goethe asks contemptuously, — 
 
 “Was war’ ein Gott, der nur von aussen stiesse, 
 Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse!”’ 
 
 he is building a man of straw to fight with. No Chris- 
 tian theist supposes God to be outside his world, man- 
 ipulating it from without. No Christian philosopher ever 
 supposed that God “manufactured ” the world, or “ built” 
 it, or “made” it, or “shaped” it in any such exterior 
 sense. The theology of both the Jewish and Christian 
 theologians has always been consonant with that of 
 Saint Paul, who says of the Divine Being that zz Him 
 
FINAL CAUSES 61 
 
 we live and move and have our being, and who quotes 
 with approval from Cleanthes and Aratus the words, 
 Tod yap kal yévos éopev, “ For we also are his offspring.” 
 
 In other words, Christian theology, and Jewish also, 
 have been as pantheistic as reverent reason and devout 
 common sense would permit them to be; and those who 
 ridicule the argument from design on the ground that 
 it makes the Deity a carpenter, a manufacturer standing 
 outside his work, either fail utterly to apprehend the 
 argument or else they carry their pantheism beyond 
 the limits of reverent reason and devout common sense. 
 
 The objection drawn from the doctrine of evolution 
 is equally futile. Organic development is simply a mode 
 of carrying out a plan: it does not alter the nature of 
 the plan. If it were possible to prove (what I deem the 
 extravagantly improbable, if not impossible, theory) that 
 the human eye was gradually developed by a process 
 occupying a million ages, from the diffused sensitiveness 
 to light found in the zodphytes, it would not affect the 
 strength of Socrates’s argument from the eye, unless 
 you could also prove that this gradual development was 
 a necessary result of mechanical force acting upon for- 
 tuitously scattered atoms of matter. The organic growth 
 of the eye in the individual from the embryonic cell to 
 a perfect manhood is just. as inconsistent, and just as 
 consistent, with the argument for design from the struct- 
 ure of the eye as would be an organic growth from spe- 
 cies to species in an ascending series through the eons. 
 
 We may therefore dismiss the question of the evolution 
 theory from the consideration of the arguments. And I 
 think we may also dismiss the objection impled in the 
 contemptuous epithets of watch-tick and carpenter theory. 
 
62 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 The argument from design does not imply a God who 
 stands outside the world. What it does imply is that 
 the Divine Agency is not an unconscious necessity, aris- 
 ing from mechanical force operating within the Divine 
 Being to bring out the forms of the universe without 
 His knowledge or approval; but it is the action of in- 
 finite power, under the guidance of unerring wisdom, freely 
 doing what is best because it is best. The canon of 
 induction from teleological considerations simply declares 
 that the eye is effective as an organ of vision; that the 
 complication of parts of the organization conducing to 
 this is very great; that the value of the result is im- 
 measurable ; that we see no other use for the organ than 
 vision, and that we can imagine no improvement or better 
 means of effecting the result; and that, therefore, the 
 presumption that the eye was made for seeing amounts 
 to a moral certainty. There is no presumption here, and 
 no implication, that the eye was made in any other mode 
 than by organic growth. The evolutionist has no more 
 reason to apply the contemptuous epithet, “carpenter 
 theory” than one not believing in evolution would have 
 for retorting, “Topsy theory.” 
 
 But there are other and equally strong arguments by 
 which to show the presence of thought in the guidance of 
 force. As the human will acts not only in devising means 
 to ends, but also freely uses material forms as symbols or 
 as expressions of its own state of thought and feeling, it 
 learns to see in the forms of the exterior world a symbolic 
 meaning or a direct expression. A work of art is not a 
 means to an end, but it is the expression of a thought or 
 a feeling. Thought may be expressed in material forms 
 without symbolism, and without any other feeling than 
 
 (ee 
 
 — ee 
 
 a 
 
 =—~*ou 
 
FINAL CAUSES 63 
 
 the desire to express the thought. Thus the diagrams of 
 the geometer are the direct expression of his mathemat- 
 ical ideas, in which he may take no other interest than an 
 intellectual interest in their truth. The designs of orna- 
 mental architecture, on the other hand, express not only 
 the thought of the architect, but his taste, which is a 
 slight degree of artistic feeling. Very little more can be 
 said of the simplest forms of sculpture and of drawing. 
 But, when we pass to the higher forms of either of these 
 arts, or add coloring from the painter’s pencil, we have 
 the expression of feeling, or sentiment, predominating 
 over the expression of thought. 
 
 The universe is far more than a mere series of adapta- 
 tions‘of means to ends, unless we exalt the word “ends” 
 to include the expression of thought and feeling. The 
 universe is a work of art. It is a combination of philo- 
 sophical ideas expressed in their clearest forms; it is the 
 manifestation of an all-embracing divine love; it is a poem, 
 the utterance of all truth and beauty and goodness. And 
 those who object that this language, like the teleological, 
 makes the creation something outside of and separate 
 from the Creator, put into it a meaning which is not 
 necessarily there, and which is certainly not intended by 
 those who use these figures. 
 
 When I see a geometrical diagram upon a blackboard, 
 I know that the particles of the crayon and the surface 
 of the board have had no power to guide the movement 
 of the crayon to the formation of the figure. I know also 
 that the figure does not exactly and rigorously fulfil geo- 
 metrical law. The chalk line has an appreciable width. 
 It is not a mathematical line without breadth. And the 
 centre of this chalk line does not rigorously fulfil the con- 
 
64 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 ditions of any geometrical locus. Nevertheless, the ap- 
 proximate fulfilment of those conditions by the white 
 mark upon the board gives me an absolute certainty — 
 that is, if the figure be moderately complicated —that the 
 geometrical conditions were known, explicitly or implic- 
 itly, to the mind which directed the drawing of the dia- 
 gram. This conclusion would not be affected by any 
 speculations or any discoveries concerning the actual 
 mode in which the diagram was drawn. A circle may be 
 drawn in a great variety of ways, each based upon a dif- 
 ferent mode of looking at its geometrical nature. The 
 mechanical draughtsman may draw it with a pair of com- 
 passes, basing his method upon the intellectual concep- 
 tion of the equality of the radii. A blacksmith makes it 
 by passing his tire between three rollers, basing his ac- 
 tion upon the intellectual perception of the uniformity of 
 its curvature. The artist drawing with free hand may not 
 distinctly have either of these ideas in his mind; but his 
 feeling of the perfect symmetry of the figure bases itself 
 upon some sort of intellectual conception. In whatever 
 manner, therefore, a diagram be drawn, let us say of the 
 hyperbola and its asymptotes, we find in it invincible 
 proof of the presence of an intellect guiding in some 
 manner, through a longer or shorter series of instrumen- 
 talities, the movements of the crayon. 
 
 Now there is no valid reason why the same induction 
 should not be made from the forms of nature. The whole 
 creation is a wonderful collection of geometrical diagrams, 
 from which the geometer and the physicist have de- 
 veloped all the mathematical sciences. The thoughts 
 of Newton’s “Principia” and Laplace’s “ Mécanique Cé- 
 leste,” and Peirce’s ‘Analytical Mechanics,” and Hamil- 
 
FINAL CAUSES 65 
 
 ton’s “‘ Quaternions,” were all suggested by the forms of 
 nature in which the elements of them were found em- 
 bodied. In this assertion it is of course not intended to 
 say that the creative Mind takes the same view of space 
 and time relations as is taken by the mathematician, nor 
 that the Infinite Spirit which created the universe is 
 obliged to go through the same processes of induction and 
 deduction by which we arrive at an idea and at its mode 
 of expression. 
 
 To charge Christian theism with imposing such limita- 
 tions upon the divine thought is to attribute to it a con- 
 fusion which is not in it, but in the mind of its critic. 
 What the Christian theist does say is that the atoms of 
 matter are in millions of examples so arranged as to ex- 
 press with the closest degree of approximation our own 
 a priort conceptions of space and time. In numerous in- 
 stances the forms of nature have suggested to the mathe- 
 matician laws of space and of time, extending far beyond 
 the examples which suggested them. A development of 
 these laws by a@ priovt reasoning, entirely independent 
 of the generalizations of experience, has led to the predic- 
 tion and the discovery of new phenomena in nature; and 
 these predictions have been, sometimes after the lapse 
 of centuries, fulfilled by observation, as in the familiar 
 instance of the ellipse, studied by geometers as an a priorz 
 form four centuries before Christ, and never discovered 
 as actually occurring in nature until the sixteenth century 
 after Christ. Another striking instance is less familiar. 
 Division in extreme and mean ratio was invented asa 
 purely a priori process in the third century before Christ, 
 and was not known to play any part in the economy of 
 the external universe until 1849, the middle of the nine- 
 
66 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 teenth century of our era. These are pure examples of 
 the morphological argument. An idea is attained by a 
 process of internal vision, and examination of the process 
 suggested always by the hints given first by the external 
 world, but the idea not involved explicitly, or even im- 
 plicitly,in the hints. An idea is thus attained which may 
 be thus justly called a przorz, since it is not taken from 
 external observation; and the forms of the outward world 
 have not suggested it, but only suggested the path by 
 which we attain the spiritual intellectual idea. This idea 
 is developed frequently with great fulness and minuteness 
 of detail, and is a commonplace possession of all cultivated 
 minds for years and even for ages before it is discovered 
 that the idea is nevertheless embodied perfectly in external 
 nature. I say perfectly, but of course this is hyperboli- 
 cal language. It is not possible apparently for material 
 objects, whether natural or fashioned by human art, to 
 conform perfectly to a geometrical or algebraical ideal. 
 Even our methods of measurement detect variations 
 from perfect geometric figures and from perfect alge- 
 braical rhythm; and our methods of measurement fall far 
 short of being able to detect infinitesimal error or to es- 
 tablish perfection. But, in judging of that which is made 
 by human art, we arrive at absolute certainty concerning 
 the idea of the artist or artisan without requiring more 
 than a rude approximation to a fulfilment of the ideal. 
 Why, then, should we not have the same certainty in re- 
 gard to the works of nature, in regard to the diagrams of 
 creation? It is not necessary to suppose —and I think 
 no intelligent theist supposes — that the conception of an 
 ellipse, or that the conception of extreme and mean ratio, 
 or that any one of the innumerable mathematical concep- 
 
FINAL CAUSES 67 
 
 tions of which the world offers us natural illustrations, 
 lies in the divine mind in the form in which it lies in 
 the human mind. We do not pretend to pattern God’s 
 thoughts; but we do affirm that the simplest explanation 
 of the presence in all parts of nature of these expres- 
 sive and approximately exact illustrations of our human 
 thought is to say that the origin of the universe is in a 
 Universal Reason, an Intelligence whose thoughts compre- 
 hend and include all our thoughts. 
 
 Ii the heavens declare, as Comte says, the glory of 
 Hipparchus and Kepler and Newton and Laplace, then 
 a fortiort they declare, as the Hebrew Psalmist has said, 
 the glory of God. If Hipparchus and his noble successors 
 win immortal honors by deciphering and unveiling the 
 hidden laws of planetary motion, what adoring wonder is 
 due to the Intelligence and Power which guides the planets 
 on their courses! If Maraldi and McLaurin made them- 
 selves a name by showing that the bee’s cell is built on the 
 highest mathematical laws, is there no honor to be as- 
 cribed to the Creator and Inspirer of the bee? Agassiz, 
 and Cuvier, and Linné deserve the high honor they have 
 received for unfolding partially the plan of the organic 
 kingdoms; and is there no profound wisdom and skill in 
 the formation of those kingdoms upon such a plan? The 
 sculptor tells in marble a thrilling tale which stirs the 
 heart ; but the highest praise of his work is that it is true 
 to nature. Is not nature’s work as expressive as sculptor’s, 
 and the Creator of the human frame the highest sculptor ? 
 
 Was there no meaning, Emerson asks, in the live repose 
 of the valley behind the mill, and which Homer or Shak- 
 spere could not re-form for me in words? The painter re- 
 forms that meaning in a landscape, and expresses his own 
 
68 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 feeling thereby. The meaning is a breathing of peace 
 from the beautiful repose: it is a benediction, it is an out- 
 flow of divine love. 
 
 The musical composer lifts us up or casts us down. He 
 expresses every emotion of the heart, and carries us by 
 the contagion of sympathy into the region of his own feel- 
 ing. What higher evidence of genius and of spiritual 
 power can be given than by a composer, for example, like 
 Bach, the Shakspere of musicians, who chases away care, 
 and fills the heart with quiet cheerfulness by a merry 
 gavotte or jig; casts it down with sorrow, and wrings it 
 with remorse, by a portrayal of the sufferings in Geth- 
 semane; and again rouses you to heroic endeavor and 
 religious enthusiasm bya grand toccata summoning the 
 hosts of the Church militant to the last grand battle of 
 Armageddon ! 
 
 But what could Bach do for us, were not the human ear 
 built in wonderful accord with the tones of nature, and 
 trained from infancy to recognize the expressiveness of 
 natural sounds, the mother’s lullaby, or words of endear- 
 ment and words of reproof, the laughter and the sobbing 
 of playmates, the song of birds, and the cries of animals in 
 distress, the wailing of the winds, and the bass of the 
 awful thunder ? 
 
 The moment that the unprejudiced mind recognizes in 
 the forms of outward nature the evidences of intellect, it 
 rushes not unreasonably, but by sure and safe roads, to the 
 conclusion that the Intellect which framed the universe is 
 unerring in wisdom, and that its wisdom is prompted to 
 action by inexhaustible goodness. 
 
 Of course, this language is inadequate ; for all finite sym- 
 bols must be inadequate to set forth infinite realities. 
 
FINAL CAUSES 69 
 
 The Infinite Intellect does not, like the finite, require time 
 for inter-election, but separates truth from falsehood, good 
 from evil, by an eternal action of which we can form no 
 image. Nevertheless, it thus separates, inter-elects, knows. 
 The Infinite Being is not prompted to action by impulses, 
 as we are: there is no pro-motion, or pushing him forward. 
 Nevertheless, his acts are all reasonable in the highest 
 moral and religious as well as intellectual sense. They are 
 consonant, in the largest view of human nature and human 
 destiny, with our highest conceptions of holiness and love. 
 They can be criticised by John Stuart Mill, or by others, 
 only on the previous assumption that the highest truths of 
 consciousness are falsehood, and that man is like the 
 beasts that perish, his highest end being the happiness 
 of this earthly life. 
 
 The rapid induction by which the unprejudiced mind 
 arrives at the being of one God, infinite in all his perfec- 
 tions, is not illusory ; and we are endeavoring in this course 
 of lectures to illustrate and vindicate some of the postu- 
 lates on which that induction proceeds. The induction is 
 so strong and drawn from such numerous sources that it 
 would be impossible in so brief a course to examine all its 
 parts in detail. 
 
V. 
 THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF ART. 
 
 We have spoken, in a previous lecture, of the two dis- 
 tinct lines into which the argument from design may be 
 divided. The teleological takes instances in which a 
 means is adapted to an end, and argues that the end was 
 the object for which the means was created. This argu- 
 ment has been reproached with making the Creator stand 
 outside the universe, to plan, deliberate, and contrive how 
 to evade or surmount difficulties. But this is a complete 
 misunderstanding: there is nothing in the argument in- 
 consistent with the view that he saw from eternity the 
 whole plan and development of the universe, down to its 
 minutest details. The morphological argument, on the 
 other hand, takes forms or rhythms in the external world, 
 which do not appear to be acting as means to an end, but 
 which conform to laws of thought. In these cases the 
 position of innumerable points, at innumerable instants, 
 can all be expressed by one proposition, declaring the 
 position of one point at one instant. Inasmuch as space 
 and time are impotent, utterly destitute of power or force ; 
 inasmuch as conscious will is the only thing actually 
 known to us as guiding force through positions of un- 
 stable equilibrium,—it is reasonable to infer that this 
 arrangement of points into symmetrical form or rhythmi- 
 cal movement is the work of a guiding intellect. 
 
THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF ART 71 
 
 The objection that this would make the thoughts of the 
 Infinite Being like our thoughts is not sound. We do 
 not find that different artists have the same ideas of the 
 same form, and it is readily shown that the conception 
 of an indefinitely increasing knowledge does not imply 
 that the lower amount of knowledge is false. The dullest 
 school-boy, in his perception of the human eure hasea 
 correct conception of it, so far as it goes. He expresses 
 the idea of a human body as unmistakably by stiff chalk 
 lines as Raphael by his marvellous multitude and va- 
 riety of living, graceful attitudes. Raphael’s facility 
 shows that his conception of the living body was incom- 
 parably more complete and accurate than the school- 
 boy’s; but his conception, nevertheless, includes the 
 school-boy’s notion of a head, a trunk, and four limbs. 
 Even infinite knowledge of geometrical form would not 
 render false our human knowledge, but would include it. 
 As the school-boy’s rude sketch indicates that in his 
 mind there is some faint likeness to that of Raphael, so 
 our human conceptions of geometrical law, being found 
 expressed in nature, indicate that in our finite minds lies 
 some faint likeness to the Eternal Mind. Of course, we 
 must concede that this likeness does not extend to the 
 method of embodying the conception; nor does any intel- 
 ligent theist suppose that it does. 
 
 Let us now take a rapid glance at the immensity of the 
 field which is covered by these two branches of inductive 
 proof. Every one is aware how much additional strength 
 is given to an inductive conclusion by a multiplication of 
 instances from which it is drawn, and how much greater 
 the additional strength given by the consilience of differ- 
 ent lines of induction toward one conclusion, An induc- 
 
72 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 tion is thus frequently made just as practically certain as 
 a deduction, or even as an intuition. For example, the 
 existence of fellow-men, similar in their principal physical 
 and psychical endowments to ourselves, is only an induc- 
 tion; yet it is a conclusion of which every sane mind is 
 absolutely certain,—as certain as it can be of its own 
 existence. Herbert Spencer says that there is the same 
 certainty of the existence of an ultimate cause of the uni- 
 verse. The existence of such a cause is, he tells us, 
 forced upon our attention and upon our belief by every 
 experience in every day’s life. It is this consilience of 
 innumerable lines of induction which leads us to leap to 
 certainty. 
 
 We may go further. Spencer used to stop short with 
 the existence of such a cause; he declared it to be 
 absolutely unknown and unknowable; he forbade us 
 to make any affirmation concerning it or to ascribe any 
 attribute to it. But he could justify himself in issuing 
 this prohibition only by a fallacious argument from the 
 infinite nature of the ultimate source of all things. Argu- 
 ments from the infinite are almost always fallacious. 
 Every cause may be known from its effects. The uni- 
 verse is intelligible, fulfilling plans of the highest wisdom 
 and highest beneficence: its courses fight against the 
 wrong-doer and for the upright; and the Cause of the 
 universe is thus avouched to us as possessing the high- 
 est knowledge, wisdom, goodness, holiness. To these 
 conclusions the inductions, also, from every hour's expe- 
 rience conspire in leading; and this consilience gives to 
 these conclusions a certainty as great as that which we 
 have of the existence of our fellow-men. 
 
 The mode in which the results of induction become 
 
THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF ART 73 
 
 certainty may be illustrated by the doctrine of mathemati- 
 cal probability. Let us suppose that one of a pair of 
 dice has been carefully measured and found to be a perfect 
 cube; that it is then thrown repeatedly upon a table, and 
 a record kept of the sides which come up. Let us further 
 Suppose that the ace constantly appears at every fourth 
 or fifth throw instead of at every sixth. At first, we may 
 Suppose that this was an accidental variation; but, if it 
 continue constantly to appear too frequently, we shall 
 begin to suspect that the opposite side of the die is the 
 heavier. Let us now suppose that an examination shows 
 that opposite side to be discolored. From this, we should 
 not directly infer that that opposite side is the heavier, 
 although we might infer that it was of a different specific 
 gravity. Let us now try a third line, by throwing the die 
 repeatedly into water. If now the ace comes up every 
 third or fourth throw, it will be scarcely possible for us to 
 resist the conclusion that the side of the six pips is too 
 heavy. Yet, strictly speaking, all the evidence has been 
 only an evidence of probability. The chance that the ace 
 turns up at any throw is one in six, and the chance that 
 it turns up one-sixth of the time becomes greater and 
 greater as the number of throws is increased. Yet in order 
 to have it certain, even with a perfect die, that the ace 
 shall appear one-sixth of the time, we must have an infinite 
 number of throws. A divergence from this sufficiently 
 great would, however, very soon give moral certainty, 
 even if not confirmed by the discoloration on the opposite 
 side, and by throwing the die into the denser medium of 
 water, thus allowing more time for the heavy side to act. 
 Since the tendency toward a greater ratio than one-sixth 
 does not show a change in any one direction, as the num- 
 
74 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 ber of throws is indefinitely increased, we infer that the 
 ratio would remain more than one-sixth, even were the 
 throws multiplied to infinity. We are, therefore, justly 
 certain that there is some one cause, constantly acting, to 
 bring up the ace. 
 
 When two arguments from induction conspire to give 
 probability to one conclusion, that probability increases 
 at least as fast as the product of the separate probabilities. 
 We say, at least as fast, because, while the doctrine of 
 chances gives it that ratio, the moral probability of the 
 conclusion is usually increased by vague and undefined 
 presumptions, not to be measured numerically, and yet to 
 be allowed their just influence in a moral judgment, pre- 
 cisely as the discoloration of the die has justly an influence 
 in the argument, although that influence is incapable of 
 any exact numerical measurement. These presumptions 
 may, in some cases, amount to a great deal, leading the 
 mind irresistibly to exalt the probability to certainty ; 
 while, in other cases, they may amount to very little. 
 But it is always in the power of a sufficient number of in- 
 ductions to make the mind rush to the conclusion that the 
 number might be indefinitely increased, and thus give cer- 
 tainty to the probability. This is the manner in which 
 the laws of physics have been established ; and the con- 
 sent and consilience of induction is the foundation rock 
 upon which the magnificent temple of modern science 
 stands. There is not a single one of her laws, unless we 
 except some elementary laws of mechanics, which rests 
 upon any other basis than inductions of probability. Yet 
 there are numerous laws of physics of which we are just 
 as certain as we are of the simplest axioms of geometry. 
 In arriving at the laws of natural science, the students 
 
THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF ART 75 
 
 have always been accustomed to leap fearlessly from the 
 indefinitely great to the infinite. 
 
 Those who oppose the conclusions of theism concede 
 that the great majority of intelligent men agree with Soc- 
 rates and with the Stoics, in seeing the marks of intelli- 
 gence and wisdom legibly inscribed upon the creation. 
 They admit that every form of Atheism, Agnosticism, 
 and Pantheism, whether materialistic or spiritual, has to 
 contend against what the great mass of men consider 
 their common sense. The common sense of mankind 
 asks with Napoleon, ‘Who made these things?” Nor 
 is the common sense of mankind satisfied with the 
 answer,— that they were not made at all, but grew. That 
 reply, whether from the ancient philosophy or from the 
 new, appears to common sense to be a mere quibble upon 
 the word ‘‘made,” as though the word ‘‘make” implied 
 the mode of making. No such quibble can blot out of 
 sight the evident fact that the parts of the universe are 
 exquisitely adapted to each other, in innumerable rela- 
 tions of means to ends, precisely as if by infinite wisdom. 
 It cannot hide the evident fact that the whole universe 
 moves by law, precisely as if in the fulfilment of a Divine 
 ideal. It cannot satisfy the longings of the heart for an 
 infinite love whereon to rest. Nor can it still the voice 
 of conscience; reproving our sins, and giving us dread 
 intimations of the universality of the moral law and of its 
 eternal sanctions. Theism is the natural conclusion, not 
 only of the intellect of man, but of his heart also. Au- 
 guste Comte, the great founder of the school of Positive 
 Philosophy, gives us a singular testimony to this fact in 
 that broad generalization with which he opens his pon- 
 derous “Cours de Philosophie Positif.” He says that the 
 
76 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 human race and the individual man always pass, first of 
 all, through a theological stage, in which we attribute the 
 existence and order of the world to a Divine creation. 
 A true, unprejudiced, reasonable examination of this 
 first conclusion of the human mind upon beholding the 
 regularity, intelligibility, and beauty of external nature, 
 will confirm and strengthen it: it will not, as Comte im- 
 agines, dissipate it. In Cooke’s admirable volume, “ Relig- 
 ion and Chemistry,” he shows that the ultimate constitu- 
 tion of matter, so far as modern physics have succeeded 
 in unveiling it, bears abundant testimony that an All-Wise 
 Intellect presided at its creation. Critics of various 
 schools quibble upon the word “creation,” as they do 
 upon the word “make”; but their pleasantries are di- 
 rected against their own caricatures of theistic thought, 
 and not against the thought itself. No intelligent Chris- 
 tian supposes that any finite or human language can be 
 adequate to express infinite realities. By saying that in- 
 tellect presided at the creation of matter, he means that 
 
 “Out of Thought’s interior sphere 
 These wonders rose to upper air.” 
 
 ‘“‘ Ever fresh the broad creation, 
 A divine improvisation, 
 From the heart of God proceeds, 
 A single will, a million deeds.” 
 
 Thought preceded, logically, if not chronologically, the 
 formation of the elements. It is objected that creation 
 never could have taken place in time, because that would 
 imply a time before creation, when God dwelt alone; and 
 creation would thus become an accident, a change in the 
 
THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF ART Tih 
 
 Divine life; but the infinite and eternal cannot suffer 
 change. And the reply of Christian theism is obvious: 
 first, that we cannot argue safely from the infinite; and, 
 secondly, that in this objection the infinite is not made 
 absolutely infinite. Of course, the potentiality of all 
 being lay in him; and nothing could come into existence 
 which was not already in the abyss of potentiality with 
 him, any more than lava could flow from a volcano were it 
 not already in the caverns beneath. But this objection to 
 creation, that it would make a change in the Divine life, 
 forgets that changes are actually and incessantly occur- 
 ring in the world. The eruption of volcanoes, for exam- 
 ple, certainly takes place in time and in space. But the 
 eruption of a universe out of potentiality into existence is, 
 in respect to the infinite, no greater than an eruption of 
 Vesuvius out of quiescence into action. 
 
 In the very elements of matter; in the law of definite 
 proportions by weight ; in the law of multiple volumes; in 
 the peculiar quiescence of some of the most abundant 
 materials ; in the alternation of perfect quietude and in- 
 controllable fury, displayed by oxygen; in the value of 
 both moods to human life; in the instability of nitrogen, 
 and its consequent adaptation to form organisms, of un- 
 stable equilibrium, as a residence for our incarnate spirits ; 
 in the prevalence of polarities, producing definite crystal- 
 line forms, marvellously exact in their conformity to geo- 
 metrical law,— in these, and in various other peculiarities 
 of inorganic matter, Professor Cooke shows that numerous 
 lines of induction run together, and confirm beyond rea- 
 sonable cavil the conclusion that, in the very constitution 
 of matter itself, we have abundantly demonstrative evi- 
 dence that it is the work of a far-seeing, wide-reaching 
 
78 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 Intelligence, immeasurably exceeding and yet including 
 our wisest conceptions of geometric and physical fit- 
 ness. 
 
 Let us pause for a moment to consider a single one of 
 these numerous evidences, the offices of water. At the 
 average temperature of the surface of the globe, water is 
 the most abundant of liquids. It enters largely into the 
 composition of the rocks, and is held mechanically in the 
 soil. It is more nearly a universal solvent than any other 
 known liquid. The substances soluble, for example, in al- 
 cohol or ether or in carbonic bisulphide, and not in water, 
 are rare and infrequent in comparison with those which 
 water will dissolve. It is through this solubility alone 
 that sufficient mobility is given to the components of plants 
 and animals to allow their psyches to guide the forces of 
 the sunbeam in building up organic forms. Water itself 
 also largely enters into those forms as a component. 
 
 It is an almost universal law that bodies contract with 
 cold, expand with heat. In some instances there is an 
 apparent exception, just at the moment of passing from a 
 liquid to a solid form. But there are two notable cases in 
 which the liquid begins to expand by cooling while yet 
 above the temperature at which it solidifies. One of these 
 instances is found in bismuth, a comparatively rare metal, 
 in which the exception to the law has not led to many 
 results of interest. But, in the case of water, the excep- 
 tion is well marked. It is found that water, when cooling, 
 begins to expand while yet nearly eight degrees Fahren- 
 heit above the freezing point. This exception has as yet 
 been accounted for by no physical theory of the constitu- 
 tion of matter in general or of water in particular. It 
 stands out as an unmistakable and important exception to 
 
THEC UNIVERSE AX WORK OF2ART 79 
 
 what would otherwise have been regarded as an invariable 
 law of nature; and this exception naturally leads to ex- 
 ceedingly interesting teleological inferences. 
 
 Water covers more than half the surface of the globe, 
 and permeates in sensible quantity a large proportion of 
 the surface which it does not cover. Besides its great 
 function as a solvent of other bodies, thus allowing mobil- 
 ity of parts and evolution of organic forms, water is the 
 great governor, regulator, or moderator of changes of tem- 
 perature. The organic life of the world requires a very 
 nice adjustment of the temperature of the surface within 
 narrow limits of variation. Two miles below the surface 
 the heat is everywhere greater than plant or animal could 
 bear. Four miles above the surface the cold is always too 
 intense for life to be maintained. Between these exceed- 
 ingly narrow limits of space the narrow limits of climate 
 are to be maintained, else the earth becomes uninhabit- 
 able. This balance of climates or temperatures is main- 
 tained through the agency of water. A blast from the 
 north sweeps down upon us, and the vapor in the air is 
 condensed into rain or snow, giving out its heat into the 
 borean air and bringing its temperature up nearer to the 
 average. A breeze from the south comes laden with suf- 
 focating heat, the snow or moist earth, or the summer 
 foliage filled with water, takes away the heat, and pours 
 out vapor in return. When a portion of the water in a 
 lake has given out its heat to the northern blast, it is con- 
 densed by cooling, and sinks to the bottom, sending up 
 
 / warmer water to supply its place and to temper a new 
 a portion of northern air. This process continues until 
 the lake is chilled through to its depths, and brought down 
 
 to about thirty-nine degrees Fahrenheit, where the proc- 
 
80 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 ess stops. The surface water cooled below that point ex- 
 pands, and by this exceptional behavior remains on the 
 surface, and shields the water below. Presently it freezes, 
 makes a solid coating of ice over the whole; and a most 
 intense and protracted winter can make that ice only a few 
 feet thick. Beneath it lies the great body of the lake, 
 still held at about forty degrees, except as the warmer bed 
 of earth below may raise the lower portion, and send it 
 slowly up to be cooled by contact with the colder strata 
 near the ice. 
 
 Now let us consider for a moment what would take 
 place did water not thus form an exception to the general 
 rule. The whole lake or river would then be chilled to the 
 freezing point, and readily be frozen solid. The river 
 would thus perpetually gorge and choke itself by bottom 
 ice, and all winter be spreading new fields of ice over its 
 adjacent intervales. No summer sun would have power 
 to thaw out the bottom of the lakes nor of the largest 
 rivers. Not only would all organic life within the waters 
 become impossible, but the whole earth would be perpet- 
 ually glaciated, and even the torrid zone be narrowed into 
 a belt of alternate frost and vapor bath, so that terrestrial 
 as well as aquatic life would disappear from the earth, 
 
 Common sense can scarcely refuse to see, in this strik- 
 ing peculiarity of water, in this one great exception to the 
 universal law of shrinking by cold, in this standing — or, 
 rather, perpetually flowing and reappearing — miracle, a 
 strong evidence of fore-knowledge. The constitution of 
 water was preadapted to the races of plants and animals 
 which were to be placed upon the terraqueous globe. No 
 objection, subtly drawn from the nature of infinity and 
 from the impossibility of attributing to the Infinite Being 
 
THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF ART SI 
 
 so personal an attribute as intelligent forethought, can 
 prevent common sense from seeing, in this behavior of 
 water, a testimony to the wisdom of God. This is, how- 
 ever, but a single one of numerous instances brought for- 
 ward by Professor Cooke and by others, to show that the 
 original constitution of matter is planned in conformity 
 with the design of bringing man upon the world. Each 
 of these instances forms a strong argument. The com- 
 bination of the whole is invincible. 
 
 As Professor Cooke argues from the molecular and even 
 from the atomic constitution of matter, so astronomers, 
 geologists, and geographers show us that in the cosmical 
 arrangements there is similar evidence of a wise adapta- 
 tion of part to part. If the present condition of things 
 came without forethought or plan, it certainly is such 
 a condition as wise forethought would have produced. 
 There is evidence, in the formation of the continents and 
 in the direction of mountain chains, that the present 
 obliquity of the ecliptic has remained substantially the 
 same since before the earliest azoic era. Yet that obliq- 
 uity is so exactly suited to the present condition of things 
 that any considerable diminution of it would make the 
 torrid regions uninhabitable from heat and the temperate 
 regions uninhabitable from cold. On the other hand, any 
 considerable increase of it would carry frost to the equator, 
 and make the summers of the temperate zones unendur- 
 ably hot. Similar circumstances, as has been shown by 
 Guyot and others, would follow any considerable change 
 in the form and position of the continents. The size and 
 distance of the moon, and her effect upon the tides, and 
 many other things of this nature increase still further the 
 lines of induction leading to the same great conclusion. 
 
82 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 Most numerous, however, are the lines of induction 
 which may be followed in the examination of organic 
 forms. The etymology of all languages shows that the 
 earliest observers and thinkers were impressed with the 
 fact that an animal, and even a plant, may be considered 
 as having organs; that is, instruments designed and 
 adapted for effecting ends. That impression is still made 
 upon every observer. Evolutionists of to-day, holding 
 the most agnostic or even atheistic philosophy, express 
 the facts of organic nature by using teleological language. 
 They speak just as freely as any other writers of the 
 object of the various modifications of vegetable and animal 
 forms ; that is to say, they use the words, “object, ences 
 and “purpose,” as the easiest way of expressing their per- 
 ception of the uses and advantages of the modifications, 
 
 The innumerable instances of the adaptation of means 
 and ends in nature are most easily thus described. Now, 
 we may, if we see sufficient evidence to lead us so to do, 
 suppose that all these modifications were produced by the 
 mutual relation and reaction and limiting effect of hered- 
 ity, of variability, and survival of the fittest. But, if we 
 do so, then it seems to me that the facts of nature should 
 also lead us to maintain (with Professor Asa Gray and 
 some other modern writers, and with Erasmus Darwin, 
 the grandfather of Charles Darwin,—a man of great 
 genius and learning, whose name is strangely overlooked 
 and ignored by those who, through the grandson, have 
 received some of his doctrines) that the variation and 
 survival are, nevertheless, through pre-established lines, 
 since the total result bears the marks of infinite wisdom 
 and power,—the evidence of having resulted from the 
 ordination of Eternal Wisdom. 
 
THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF, ART 83 
 
 Certainly, the whole series of organic forms and func- 
 tions, whether taken individually, taken in their smaller 
 groups, or taken in their total connection, is precisely of 
 the same character as if it were the fulfilment of a plan,— 
 a plan of all-comprehensive, unerring wisdom, using the 
 resources of infinite skill and power. Spherical astron- 
 omy treats, properly, only of the apparent motions of the 
 heavenly bodies on the apparent interior surface of an ap- 
 parent hemisphere or sky; but, in a certain treatise, the 
 writer, after describing various apparent diurnal motions, 
 sums them up by adding “precisely as if the earth were 
 turning on its axis from west to east.” And this is the 
 reason why the Copernican system is believed to be true, 
 because it is thus in perfect accord with the appearances 
 in the sky. When any hypothesis explains the facts 
 which it was framed to explain, and is discovered also to 
 explain other facts not known or not considered when 
 framing it, the hypothesis rapidly becomes a theory; and 
 that theory is, by the increase of the facts which it ex- 
 plains, more and more firmly established as science. 
 
 Now, the morphological and teleological arguments of 
 theology make the hypothesis that the universe is framed 
 and fashioned after an intellectual ideal of perfect wisdom, 
 so that the parts are adapted to each other with infinite 
 skill, to accomplish the fulfilment of the ideal. It is ad- 
 mitted that we cannot grasp that ideal in its entirety. It 
 is admitted that we can only partially judge of the adapta- 
 tion of means to ends. It is admitted that we can see 
 only a part of the ends, and that we may, therefore, some- 
 times err in our perception of the uses of parts. But we 
 certainly find, in the universe, abundant evidence of the 
 presence of thought. The direct road from the high @ 
 
84 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 prior’ assumptions, which the teleological and morpholog- 
 ical arguments make, leads back to many truths of obser- 
 vation, not included in those from which the assumptions 
 were made. For example, we have been led to assume 
 that a God of infinite wisdom and power will not waste 
 any force. Whatever he does will be done with the least 
 possible expenditure of power. Now, it is a historical fact 
 that, out of this purely theological statement, out of this 
 reverent theological assumption of Maupertius, mathemat- 
 ical writers have drawn as freely as from a horn of plenty. 
 From it, as a premise, the mathematician deduces many 
 laws of mechanics, which the physicist learns by observa- 
 tion. The reader will doubtless recall the familiar in- 
 stance of the optical laws, Light, in passing from point 
 to point, through a medium of uniform resistance, would 
 spend a minimum of force by going in the shortest path,— 
 that is, in a straight line. Observation shows that light 
 does move in straight lines. If we ask that the light, in 
 passing through the uniform medium from one point to 
 another, shall, upon its way, be reflected from the surface 
 of a mirror, then the point of reflection must be so sit- 
 uated as to make the total path of the incident and re- 
 flected rays as short as possible. Calculation proves that 
 the angles of incidence and of reflection must therefore be 
 equal. Observation shows that they are equal. If the 
 light goes through two media of different densities, then 
 the path in the more difficult medium must be shortened, 
 that in the easier lengthened, in such manner that the 
 total force expended shall be the least possible. Calcula- 
 tion proves that the sines of the angles of incidence and 
 refraction must therefore be proportioned to the ease of 
 motion in the media. Observation proves that they are 
 sO proportioned. 
 
THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF ART 85 
 
 Again, look at the arrangement of leaves upon the 
 stems of plants. Our theological conceptions would make 
 us say that the wisdom, we might almost say the justice, 
 of God would make him impress upon the plant a law by 
 which the leaves should be evenly scattered around the 
 stem, so that every leaf should have the fairest chance at 
 light and air. The mathematician shows that this re- 
 quires the successive leaves to divide the horizontal circle 
 in extreme and mean ratio: the botanists show us this 
 is the very law by which the leaves are arranged. This 
 division in extreme and mean ratio was invented before 
 the Christian era for purely abstract geometrical uses. 
 Until the year 1849, no one was aware that it had been 
 used in nature; but then it was shown to be embodied, 
 not only in the plants, but in the arrangements of the 
 solar system. Although the two instances are in such 
 different regions of nature,—the one in the leaves of 
 terrestrial plants, the other in the revolution of the ce- 
 lestial bodies,— and even in such different regions of 
 thought, the leaves dividing space in this ratio and the 
 planets simply dividing time, yet the algebraical concep- 
 tion is the same in both. The use also is similar in both 
 cases. The planets are kept scattered like the leaves; 
 and a heliacal conjunction of more than two is a rare oc- 
 currence, frightening the astrologically timid only at rare 
 epochs of time. 
 
 The physical philosopher may justly object to the inju- 
 dicious use of a grzorvt methods, such as brought contempt 
 upon many of the ancient physical speculations, such as 
 will probably, hereafter, bring contempt upon some con- 
 temporaneous speculations. But he cannot justly object 
 to a legitimate use of the method, as has just been shown 
 
86 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 by examples of what it can do, when judiciously handled. 
 Those examples are striking, but they are not excep- 
 tional. The mathematical method has been more easily 
 applied, heretofore, to mechanical and cosmical problems ; 
 but the same method is gradually extending itself into 
 modern chemistry and physiology. All that is purely 
 physical even in the human brain may be finally resolved 
 into modes of motion, and must therefore, in the prog- 
 ress of human knowledge, become more and more amen- 
 able to mathematical treatment. In other words, that 
 which is purely physical must become more and more 
 purely ideal. With every step of that progress, hereto- 
 fore, the teleological and morphological arguments have 
 become firmer and more multiplied. The enormous num- 
 ber of these consenting and consilient lines of ever- 
 strengthening induction may be inferred, when we recol- 
 lect how many treatises have been written in the mere 
 attempt to enumerate them. The fulness of particular 
 lines may be illustrated by a reference to the Duke of 
 Argyll’s volume upon the wings of birds, or to Agassiz’s 
 one hundred and thirty-seven inferences from the classifi- 
 cation of the animal kingdom. There is no evading the 
 overwhelming number and conclusive forms of these argu- 
 ments, no avoidance of the conclusion that “there is one 
 God,” and that “science is the knowledge of him.” There 
 is no resisting the evidence of his infinite wisdom, his ab- 
 solute foreknowledge from the earliest epoch of all that 
 has since transpired, There is no resisting this joy-in- 
 spiring, uplifting conclusion, except by methods which 
 deny the validity of all reasoning, and destroy the possi- 
 bility of ever resting in any conclusion or belief whatever. 
 Taken as a purely intellectual proposition, the evidence of 
 
THE UNIVERSE A WORK OF ART 87 
 
 the being of an all-wise and almighty Creator of the uni- 
 verse is as conclusive as the evidence of the being of our 
 fellow-men, 
 
 The world is not a machine, running independent of 
 its Creator’s sustaining power; neither is it an organism 
 of which He is the unconscious psyche: it is a perpetual, 
 increasingly intelligible revelation of his divine wisdom, 
 his unfathomable goodness, his eternal power. Men may 
 err in their attempts to interpret it; but Bacon’s compari- 
 son of final causes to vestal virgins, and Huxley’s coarser 
 allusion to /etazrae, are as false to the history of science 
 as they are disagreeable to modern taste. 
 
VI. 
 POWER AND POSSIBILITY. 
 
 THOSE who have ridiculed the arguments of natural 
 theology have usually assumed that the teleological and 
 morphological arguments were intended as a demonstra- 
 tion of the wisdom of God. But, certainly, no theological 
 writer of sound discretion has ever so misunderstood his 
 own lines of thought. We could not demonstratively 
 prove, from an examination of the external world, that the 
 Creator is infinitely wise, absolutely unerring. We could 
 not do this unless we were ourselves unerring in wisdom, 
 unlimited in power, and examined the whole of a bound- 
 less universe in every part. As it is, however, we obtain 
 indefinitely great confirmations of our faith in the wisdom 
 of God. Various lines of induction lead us toward the 
 grand conclusions of faith in him; and reason shows that, 
 in rising upwards toward a consideration of the source 
 and origin of all things, we can find no rest for the in- 
 quiring spirit except by faith in an infinite source,—a 
 God infinitely and unerringly wise. It is a moral neces- 
 sity in our own nature, which leads us thus to push 
 through and beyond the indefinitely great,— thus to leap 
 to and cling to the infinite. The same conclusion arises 
 from a consideration of the Divine Power. The universe, 
 in its actual manifestations of force, is indefinitely great. 
 These forces imply still greater potentialities. And the 
 
POWER AND POSSIBILITY 89 
 
 mind will not be satisfied without the conviction that in 
 the Being in which these powers abide there is a poten- 
 tial abyss of infinite depth and capacity. 
 
 We have already alluded to the rich fruits which math- 
 ematical and physical science has gathered from fields 
 covered by the principle of the least action—the dogma 
 of theism that an infinitely wise God will waste no force. 
 As it was from theology that mathematics and physics re- 
 ceived this valuable, instructive, fruitful dogma, so it is to 
 theology that they are still to look for limiting guides 
 that may prevent their wresting it to their own destruc- 
 tion, In the present day, when the domain of physical 
 force has been so widely extended by brilliant experi- 
 ments, and the induction that all manifestations of force, 
 in space and time, are merely modes of motion, has been 
 so firmly established, carrying with it the consequence 
 that all forces are really correlated forms of one force, it 
 is sometimes hastily assumed that the doctrine of the 
 conservation of the ws vzva has been equally established 
 as a universal truth. It is sometimes said that as the 
 sum total of matter in the universe is constant, nothing 
 being created and nothing being annihilated, so in like 
 manner the sum total of force in the universe is constant, 
 none being added, none being destroyed. It is said that 
 all the forces in the universe are either being manifested 
 as energy, or becoming potential as power; and that the 
 universe, therefore, has been in motion from eternity, 
 and will be in motion to eternity. | 
 
 Yet for this form of the doctrine there is no distinct 
 evidence; and it has been stated, by very high authority, 
 that it can be shown to be mathematically impossible. 
 Wherever we see matter in motion, not under the guid- 
 
QO POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 ance of organic life, it is moving toward a position of 
 stable equilibrium, either statical or dynamical. By this 
 phrase, ‘‘dynamical stable equilibrium,” we refer to such 
 movements as those of the planets of the solar system. 
 
 But a grave suspicion has been entertained that the lu- 
 miniferous ether, or, perhaps, some grosser interplanetary 
 matter, is slowly retarding the motions of the planets, so 
 that these examples of apparently stable dynamic equi- 
 librium would fail to give us assurance of an absolute per- 
 petuity to the cosmos. The tendency everywhere is to 
 move toward a final state of stable statical equilibrium,— 
 a state indistinguishable by our imagination from a state 
 of annihilation ; for a final, universal, statical equilibrium 
 implies an absolute quiescence of all motion, a return of 
 all force to the abyss of potentiality, a disappearance of 
 every conceivable phenomenon. And this state is threat- 
 ened by the universal phenomenon of cooling. The sun, 
 for example, radiates his floods of light and heat. They 
 may last millions of years, but they are not inexhaustible; 
 they may be supplied by showers of meteors and comets 
 falling into it, but that supply cannot be infinite: for all 
 that physical science can see, the sun must finally be as 
 cold and dead as the moon, Even should two dead suns 
 fall into each other, the concussion would produce only 
 a temporary, partial return of the heat; for all the energy 
 that could be converted into new heat would be the 
 force which is in the translation of the two cold suns. 
 Whereas, at present, the suns have all that energy, and 
 their present heat beside. The energy of that heat is 
 radiated outward, from the universe as known to us, with 
 a constant flow; and science knows no way whatever by 
 which it can be restored. If, therefore, physical science 
 
POWER AND. POSSIBILITY OI 
 
 believes in an eternal, physical universe, she must, in 
 order to find any basis for her belief, leave the domain 
 of physics and come into that of theology. Science her- 
 self can Jead backward only to a wonderful fire-mist, fill- 
 ing universal space; forward only to absolute zero, four 
 hundred and sixty degrees below zero, Fahrenheit,— pitch 
 dark at that. For any origin of that inconceivable en- 
 ergy of pristine force, for any recovery from that total 
 stagnation of utterly unimaginable cold and darkness 
 wherein no physical forces will be manifest, she can turn 
 only to the theological conception of God. 
 
 Whether theology demands of us faith in the existence 
 of a physical universe from eternity to eternity is, how- 
 ever, a difficult problem, upon which there may not be 
 an agreement among the deepest thinkers. Certainly, 
 the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures seem to imply an 
 absolute creation at a definite era of time, and an absolute 
 destruction, at some future era, of the present existing 
 universe. We have just said that purely physical science 
 seems to point to the same conclusion. Yet, in those 
 same Scriptures, the realities of the spiritual world are 
 always represented in figures drawn from the natural 
 world. Philosophy, speculating upon the same question, 
 fails to perceive the possibility of any communication be- 
 tween mind and mind, except through the medium of 
 something perfectly analogous to matter. The authors 
 of an ingenious little book, ‘The Unseen Universe,” en- 
 deavor to show that there may be ethereal bodies bearing 
 the same relation to our present material bodies that 
 the luminiferous ether bears to the grosser fluids of the 
 atmosphere and the ocean. The fundamental fault in 
 their treatise is the apparent assumption that man can- 
 
Q2 POSTULATES) OF .REVELATION 
 
 not exist without a body; and their argument for immor- 
 tality only goes to the extent of saying that it is possible 
 that we have an ethereal body which may outlast the 
 material body by thousands, or perhaps hundreds of thou- 
 sands, of years. This does not, however, satisfy the 
 demand of pure reason, which shows that the soul of 
 man, which reads and partially understands the lessons 
 of external nature, is directly akin to the Eternal and 
 Infinite Spirit which writes these lessons. Seventy 
 thousand years is no nearer to the true immortality of 
 the human soul than seventy. That soul does not de- 
 mand a body in order to exist, but simply demands 
 control over some form of motion in time and space, by 
 which it may express itself to other minds. How nearly 
 analogous that control of motion in the spiritual world 
 may be to our control of motions in the material world 
 is a question which probably can never be answered 
 until we have passed beyond the veil. 
 
 All researches into the constitution of the natural world. 
 show that there is an intellectual connection of all the 
 parts; that there is a unity of thought, even in places 
 where we discover no unity of cause, unless we seek that 
 unity of cause in the ideal connection existing in the 
 thought which nature embodies. Thus there is an intel- 
 lectual connection between the force of gravity, the ve- 
 locity of light, and the velocity with which the wave on 
 the vibrating strings of a harp runs up and down the wire. 
 There have been writers in our own day who have admitted 
 this manifestation of wisdom and skill in the co-ordinated 
 movements of the universe, but who have found them- 
 selves unable to admit that any mind, even that of the 
 Ruler of the visible universe, could have the control of 
 
POWER AND POSSIBILITY 93 
 
 unlimited physical energy. Mill thought that, if we 
 yielded to the arguments for the being of a wise and 
 beneficent God, we must at the same time admit that 
 his power was limited. His opinions on theology are 
 curious evidences of the impossibility of utterly expelling 
 the spiritual nature from a man, even by such an educa- 
 tion as that under which his growth was cramped and 
 distorted. The evidences, which he thought he detected, 
 of limitation to the power of the Almighty, appear to us 
 to have no weight. But, on the other hand, reason will 
 show that there are limitations to the Almighty Power, 
 which unreasonable men frequently overlook. Physical 
 necessity, which to the common mind appears to be an 
 absolute necessity, is, in fact, the weakest form of neces- 
 sity. Logical necessity overrides it; and the highest 
 necessity, moral necessity, reaches far above either of 
 the other two. We rise by reason to the higher concep- 
 tion of infinite power, which can manifest itself in any 
 form of existence, in the creation of a soul or of a world. 
 To such an Almighty Power there are, of course, no 
 limits in the quantitative sense, else the power would 
 not be almighty. But there are qualitative limits, which 
 we are not to disregard in our speculations concerning 
 God’s actions. For example, we cannot conceive that 
 power has any control over the relations of space. It 
 space be dependent on the infinite, absolute Being for its 
 existence, it would seem to be simply this, that the divine 
 omnipresence constitutes space. Space, therefore, could 
 not be withdrawn into potentiality, even by infinite power. 
 Again, neither reason nor imagination can conceive that 
 even infinite power could make two straight lines enclose 
 a space, or make commensurate the diagonal with the 
 
94. POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 side of a square, or the diameter with the circumference 
 of a circle. In like manner reason presents the existence 
 and relations of time, as being independent of power. 
 If time be dependent at all upon God, it seems to 
 reason that it is dependent on his being, and not upon 
 his will. In other words, it may be constituted by his 
 eternity, but not by his fiat. Nor can we, in the most 
 reverent frame of mind, admit that he could create a real 
 period of time, either before or after the present in- 
 stant. To such conclusions we are compelled by a 
 necessity stronger than that of power; namely, logical 
 necessity. 
 
 Now, since space and time are thus independent of 
 power, it follows that there must be things in the physical 
 universe, also, which are out of the control of power. 
 Force and energy are potentially unlimited in the will of 
 God, and in actuality may be increased or diminished by 
 him. But, inasmuch as physical forces are manifested by 
 motion, and motion is manifested through space and time 
 relations, physical forces must conform in their manifesta- 
 tions to the laws of geometry and algebra, which are inde- 
 pendent of power. Thus, of logical necessity, there arise 
 physical impossibilities. There must be absolutely con- 
 tradictory qualities in matter, as a function of space and 
 time, which could not possibly be manifested in the same 
 substance at the same time. 
 
 When we enter the realm of spirit, the reason, even in 
 its most reverent moods, recognizes the fact that there 
 are also contradictories in spiritual things, absolute contra- 
 dictories, so that it would not lie within the sphere of 
 power to reconcile them. It is true that our sight in this 
 realm is not so clear as it is in space and time. It requires 
 
POWER AND POSSIBILITY 95 
 
 sharper insight and more patient thought to see the high 
 realities of the spiritual’ world. We may not, therefore, 
 be able to point out spiritual instances of the limitations 
 of almighty power so unmistakable as the incommensura- 
 bility of surds in mathematics. Yet we may certainly say 
 that a being cannot be properly conscious and unconscious 
 of the same thing at the same moment; that it cannot 
 hate and love the same thing at the same instant; that it 
 cannot be morally free, and yet controlled in choice by 
 physical necessity. In our theological speculations, there- 
 fore, concerning the attributes of the Infinite Being, we 
 are not hastily to assume that, because the Infinite One 
 is almighty, he can do what is impossible. ‘With God 
 all things are possible,” is a truth which has its own limi- 
 tations. It is not possible for him to err, to be ignorant, 
 or to be unjust. It is not possible for his power to effect 
 what lies out of the sphere of power. 
 
 And He alone knows, in all cases, what is within the 
 sphere of power. He alone knows, also, what things 
 within the range of power are best to be done. The in- 
 ductions which show his wisdom confirm the decision of 
 the higher reason, which runs beyond the conclusions of 
 induction, and declares that the knowledge and wisdom 
 of the uncreated First Cause must be infinite. <A great 
 deal of labor has been given by religious writers to the 
 task of reconciling the goodness of God with the exist- 
 ence of so much apparent evil. A great deal might have 
 been given to the equally difficult task of reconciling his 
 holiness with the existence of so much pleasure in the 
 world, tempting men so frequently to sin. If an apology 
 is necessary for the existence of pain and evil, an apology 
 is equally necessary for the existence of pleasure and of 
 
96 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 beauty. But, in writing upon these topics, men have 
 usually failed to recognize the limitations of human knowl- 
 edge. They have failed to acknowledge that man does 
 not know the limits of the possible and of the impossible, 
 that man does not know what is best nor what would be 
 inexpedient. Those who have been bold enough to say 
 that the evil in the world is real evil, and that it was 
 within the power of God to prevent it, have usually been 
 those who deny, or at least overlook, the spiritual and 
 immortal interests of man, and who have thought that 
 man perishes utterly when the body dies. 
 
 God alone knows what is within the limits of possibil- 
 ity, and He alone knows what is best. To me it seems 
 evident that he has seen that virtue is the highest good; 
 that there cannot be any happiness so high as that of a 
 voluntary free co-operation of our spirits with his spirit. 
 It is neither within the power of my imagination nor of 
 my reason to conceive higher happiness, for a finite, a 
 created spirit, than a happiness of a free voluntary sub- 
 mission of the will to the will of the infinitely Wise and 
 infinitely Good; that is, than the happiness of becoming 
 a willing co-worker of God. But this highest happiness 
 is impossible without freedom; and freedom, in a finite 
 being, involves the certainty of occasional sin; and the re- 
 demption from sin can be accomplished only by a co-oper- 
 ation of the spirit of God with the human will. The fun- 
 damental postulates of reason, confirmed by inductions 
 from every part of nature, thus involve the necessity for 
 the occurrence of sin; and sin involves the necessity for 
 redemption by a higher power than that of nature. The 
 will itself cannot be reached ad extra, by influences of the 
 natural world. It can be reached, and aided in its infirm- 
 
POWER AND POSSIBILITY Q7 
 
 ity, only by an influence from that power which originally 
 gave it being. This is the nigh prerogative of its free- 
 dom. 
 
 Again, inasmuch as the highest happiness is attainable 
 only through freedom; and inasmuch as communication 
 of spirit with spirit is, so far as we can see, attainable only 
 through the guidance of forces producing motion, this ma- 
 terial external nature must contain unstable equilibriums 
 which our free choice can turn in any direction. Hence 
 the body must be of a texture which may allow it to be 
 governed by spirit; and this involves a whole scheme of 
 organic nature. But what human intellect can decide the 
 possibilities and impossibilities involved in such a scheme? 
 A recent French writer maintains that the peculiar chem- 
 ical nature of nitrogen must, of necessity, produce every 
 conceivable form of chemical instability ; and that, among 
 these, those fitted to survive must occur. These survi- 
 vors are, he says, the actual organic forms of nature. We 
 quote this absurd conclusion only to show how universally 
 conceded are the facts from which the sounder conclusion 
 is drawn, that the plan of the organic kingdoms involved 
 the necessity for the chemical peculiarities of nitrogen, 
 precisely as the plan of giving to free finite spirits a body, 
 in which to receive their primary education, involves the 
 necessity for an organic kingdom. 
 
 Now, our limited means of knowledge will not, at pres- 
 ent, permit us to deny that, in the best adaptation of the 
 clobe to be the habitat of organized beings, there was in- 
 volved a necessity for earthquakes, conflagrations, pesti- 
 lences, and the like, just asin the plan of giving these 
 free spirits liberty, and the education of free-born children, 
 there is involved the necessity of allowing them to sin, 
 
98 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 and sometimes to sin grievously. Much less are we at 
 liberty to deny that these physical evils are essential for 
 the education of the spirit. We would not rashly limit 
 the powers of the Almighty. He is almighty, but he is 
 also all-wise and all-holy. It is impossible for him to err 
 or to be unjust. It is frequently said that, because he is 
 infinite, he cannot do this and he cannot do that. Such 
 negations of his power are unreasonable. His infinity 
 prevents no action that 1s possible; but his holiness and 
 wisdom make error and sin impossible to him. His in- 
 finity does not prevent finite and special actions, if such 
 actions are wise and holy. On the contrary, infinity is 
 not infinite, if it do not include all the finite. Yet 
 Strauss, in the introduction of his “Leben Jesu,” says that 
 God, being infinite, can act only through all space at once, 
 and through all past and coming eternities at once. 
 Hence, he argues, no miracle is possible, since a miracle 
 would be an action of God ata given time in a given 
 place. 
 
 The fallacy of this reasoning is twofold. In the first 
 place, even if sound, it is directed only against one par- 
 ticular theory of miracles. He therefore greatly errs in 
 applying it to disprove the occurrence of miracles them- 
 selves. It would just as much disprove the occurrence of 
 any and every change, or event of any character, in time 
 and space. In the second place, it is fallacious, because 
 it argues from infinite premises to finite conclusions. 
 The infinite being is not infinite, unless it embraces all 
 finitude. God is not infinite in power, unless he can act 
 at any point and at each point of space, at any or at each 
 instant of time. Strauss, therefore, in his attempt to 
 argue from the infinity of God, that he can act only simul- 
 
POWER AND POSSIBILITY 99 
 
 taneously throughout all space and synchronously through 
 all eternity, is really imposing upon the Infinite one of 
 the feeble limitations of his own thought. 
 
 We do not say that there was a physical impossibility 
 (arising out of the necessary character of space and time 
 relations) of avoiding the various forms of suffering and 
 death. Neither do we say that there was a spiritual im- 
 possibility of giving man the highest education, and lead- 
 ing him most surely to virtue and to the most profound 
 and abiding joy, without the misery and sin of this world. 
 But we do say, and say emphatically, that human knowl- 
 edge will not at present enable us to deny either of these 
 impossibilities. For aught we know, these are impossibil- 
 ities lying in the very nature of things, and seen in the 
 absolute and eternal reason of the Creator, before the 
 creation of man. We add that we agree with Leibnitz, 
 and believe with our whole hearts that the infinite knowl- 
 edge of God, seeing from the beginning all possible and all 
 impossible forms of creation, chose the very best because 
 it was the best ; and we know it was the best because he 
 chose it. It has been asserted that Nature is as cruel to 
 our race as she could be without destroying it. Yet, if 
 we look at the Aryan races, we certainly find that in those 
 countries where Nature is most cruel man is the happiest. 
 He is not happy without labor; yet he is too lazy to work, 
 unless he is compelled. 
 
 It has sometimes been said that, if it was not in the 
 power of Omnipotence to prevent sin, it would have be- 
 fitted the Divine Holiness and Beneficence to have re- 
 frained from creation. If sin be the greatest evil, if a free 
 finite being will inevitably sin, why create him and put 
 him in a world so fair, so full of enjoyment, misleading 
 
100 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 him into temptations, so full of sorrows, also misleading 
 him into rebellion? And, when we answer that thus only 
 is virtue possible, and that virtue, goodness, holiness, are 
 sources of joy so great that the amount of happiness thus 
 given to the good far outweighs the suffering of sinners, 
 then we are answered, “Not if the suffering of each 
 sinner is infinite and everlasting.” But is the delivery of 
 the human soul clearly in favor of the doctrine that the 
 retribution for sin is eternal and infinite? 
 
 Sin is something more than ignorance or error, or cor- 
 rupted affections and sentiments. All these are evils 
 which may lead to sin, but they are not themselves sin. 
 Sin is a misdirection of the will. It is a wrong choice. It 
 lies at the very centre of our being. Therefore, it can be 
 reached neither by light alone nor by anything else which 
 is external to the man. We may protect him from all ex- 
 ternal assaults ; we may shield him from all tempters from 
 without ; we may set before him, in the clearest possible 
 light, the reality of the moral law, its provisions and its 
 penalties; and, nevertheless, the man may, in spite of all, 
 choose to do evil. The freedom of the will is very limited ; 
 but, so far as it goes, it is realfreedom. There may be very 
 few occasions wherein an ordinary man exercises, either 
 consciously or unconsciously, much choice. He may drift 
 on, as Cecil somewhere observes, for weeks and for months, 
 in the right direction, carried by the current, without 
 any clear individual self-conscious determination to go in 
 that direction. But, occasionally, opportunities occur for 
 choice. Then the soul freely chooses, sometimes against 
 light, against good impulses, deliberately yielding to the 
 bad. This alone is emphatically sin. It is the fatal defect 
 and misdirection of the will itself. It is a wrong choice. 
 
FOWLER AND] POSSIBILITY IOI 
 
 All the experience of human life shows that this wrong 
 choice may be persisted in for an indefinite time. How 
 can we be sure that a man, thus persistently choosing 
 wrong, will not choose wrong forever, and in sheer obsti- 
 nacy draw everlasting suffering upon himself? In that 
 case the awful words of our Lord would be literally true. 
 It would be better for that man if he had never been born. 
 But, by that view, we should seem to tax creative wisdom 
 with error in having made a soul which had better never 
 been made. The answer which the restorationist has made 
 to this question is that divine power has infinite resources, 
 and will find means to conquer the obstinate folly of every 
 rebellious spirit. Many passages also are quoted from the 
 Old and New Testaments, to show that prophets and 
 apostles expected a day when all souls should be brought 
 into righteousness. Yet there is a metaphysical difficulty 
 in accepting that solution of the problem. This difficulty 
 arises from the freedom of the will. How can even infi- 
 nite power coerce a free spirit? How can even infinite 
 power compel the obedience of the heart, the choice of a 
 free moral agent? Such compulsion, such coercion, would 
 destroy the freedom of the sinner: that would be altering 
 his very nature, and rendering him incapable of the high 
 happiness of the blessed. We all hope and pray for the 
 salvation of all souls; but it is not clear to the eye of 
 reason how it is possible even for Almighty Grace to be 
 irresistible to a soul which retains its liberty. But liberty 
 is the essential condition on which righteousness and sin 
 are alone possible. 
 
 A second solution is given by the New Church in the 
 infinite goodness of God. It is said that the man who 
 obstinately refuses the glorious inheritance of the sons of 
 
102 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 God will be allowed to enjoy at least the pleasures of the 
 beast. In the psychology of the New Church, it is said 
 that a persistent choice of evil makes at length the sinner 
 hopelessly wedded to evil, his conscience becomes seared, 
 he is shut out of the heavens and confined in the hells; 
 but he enjoys them in his own low way. This view, how- 
 ever, appears inconsistent with our conceptions of the 
 infinite holiness and justice of God. It makes too feeble 
 a response to the awful sense of necessity laid upon us by 
 the moral intuitions. A third solution is therefore pro- 
 posed, drawn from the analogy of the spiritual to the 
 organic life. In the body, irreparable injury mercifully 
 ends in death. The abuse of the body ends in the de- 
 struction of the body. Why may not the persistent 
 wronging of the soul end in the death of the soul? This 
 would be giving a literal interpretation to the saying of 
 Saint Paul, that he that soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh 
 reap destruction. Thus, the merciful provision of nature, 
 that excess of pain or of mutilation brings death, would 
 be extended into the spiritual as well as animal organism. 
 
 The reply is frequently made that the spirit is, in its 
 own nature, indestructible; but we confess that we do 
 not ourselves feel the weight of merely metaphysical and 
 ontological arguments to prove the indestructibility of the 
 soul. The strongest argument for human immortality is 
 that which Jesus uses with the Sadducees; namely, the 
 moral argument. It is inconsistent with our highest con- 
 ceptions of the goodness and justice of God to suppose 
 that he would give us sucha knowledge of himself and 
 awaken in us such hopes of an eternal service of his chil- 
 dren, did he not mean to fulfil those hopes. But it is 
 apparent that this moral argument loses its force when 
 
POWER AND POSSIBILITY 13 
 
 applied to a persistently wicked man,—to one who delib- 
 erately chooses the things of the flesh in preference to 
 those of the spirit, and deliberately rejects the knowledge 
 of God. 
 
 On the other hand, we must acknowledge that the 
 same sense of justice, which revolts against belief in the 
 endless suffering of a single child of God, revolts also 
 against allowing triumphant, exultant wickedness, cru- 
 elty, injustice, contempt of human life, to escape all other 
 punishment than the mere extinction of life in the grave. 
 It is certainly difficult for any man who has a strong 
 moral sense not to feel that wickedness, deliberate disre- 
 gard of moral law, deserves a more positive penalty than 
 simple annihilation. It is easy for us, in some states 
 of mind, to condemn the idea of retributive or vindictive 
 punishment. At such times, we are inclined to affirm 
 that all punishment should be purely remedial or prevent- 
 ive. But when we see a man deliberately disregarding 
 what he knows to be the rights of his fellow-men, sinning 
 against clear, undoubted light, and without the palliation 
 of impetuous passion or apparent necessity, it is difficult 
 for us not to feel with Dr. Franklin, concerning the de- 
 liberate traitor to his country, that if there is no retribu- 
 tive justice and suffering awarded to him, in the world to 
 come, there at least ought to be. In James Burgh’s re- 
 markable volume on the dignity of human nature, he 
 draws an argument for believing in the immortality of 
 souls from this demand of our moral nature,—that the 
 wicked, who have gone through this life without adequate 
 punishment, should receive a due recompense in the world 
 LOSCOMEC, 
 
 For our own part, we do not see that the light of nature, 
 
104 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 or that the light of the New Testament, makes the final 
 fate of a persistently rebellious and wicked man clear and 
 unmistakable. We utterly refuse to believe in the ever- 
 lasting torment of any sentient being, and we should re- 
 joice to believe in the final happiness of all souls. But no 
 happiness worth having is possible without virtue, no 
 virtue is possible without freedom; and, with freedom, 
 there is always possibility of persistent choice of wrong. 
 Where, however, reason fails to point out clearly the 
 probable issue and sequence of events, we should walk by 
 the light of faith, which is the highest reason. The high- 
 est reason assures us, above all things, of the infinite wis- 
 dom, the omnipotent power, the unfathomable love of 
 God. We may therefore be assured, at least, that every 
 soul which is worth saving will be saved; that the uni- 
 verse is framed on laws of such perfect wisdom that they 
 will result in the best possible effects, not only for the 
 race, but for each individual. But God alone knows what 
 is possible, and what is really best. 
 
VIE 
 EOGICPAND PILOVE! 
 
 SINCE the days of Swedenborg and of Kant, the attri- 
 butes of spiritual or personal being have been usually 
 grouped under three general heads,— intellect, feeling, 
 and will. In the consideration of the Infinite and 
 Almighty Being, these take the slightly different phases 
 of knowledge, love, and power. The intellect of man is 
 his power of inter-electing truth from falsehood. It is the 
 power of perceiving realities and imaginations, estimating 
 and comparing them, and taking note of their relations. 
 The result of these processes is knowledge. But it is evi- 
 dent that in the Divine mind there is no need of this 
 gradual process of inter-election. With him, all knowl- 
 edge and all wisdom are present from eternity to eternity. 
 
 The intellectual attributes of God may therefore, in the 
 sum of their results, be more justly called infinite wisdom, 
 which includes all knowledge. The will of man is feeble 
 and tentative. It exerts no measurable amount of physi- 
 cal force. It is only capable of guiding Divine force, and 
 that only toa certain degree. This ability of the will to 
 guide force suggests to us, however, that force is itself the 
 product of will. So imperious is this suggestion, so close 
 is the association of ideas between will and power, that all 
 men, in all ages, have assumed that our finite wills have a 
 limited power of exerting force; and that sharper analysis, 
 
106 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 which has shown that we have only the power to guide 
 the forces of nature, does not destroy it, does not even 
 weaken the presumption which is created by that universal 
 assumption. Nay, if we run from this sharper to the 
 sharpest analysis, we may say that the guidance of forces 
 when in unstable equilibrium, although requiring only an 
 infinitesimal force (which may be considered as zero with 
 reference to the forces guided), does require an infinitesi- 
 mal force, and cannot be accomplished with an absolute 
 zero of force. If, therefore, the amount of mechanical 
 force directly exerted by the human will be infinitely in- 
 finitesimal, it is not an absolute zero. But the forces of 
 nature, thus shown to be cognate with the infinitesimal 
 forces of the human will, are also thus shown to be the 
 result of an infinite will, of that Being in whom lies the 
 abyss of all potentiality. 
 
 The feelings of man are changeable, evanescent,—rising 
 into intense heat, dying away into indifference. In this 
 changeable, fickle form, they of course cannot be attrib- 
 uted to the Infinite One. But a closer analysis of human 
 feeling shows that the apparent excitement and excess of 
 passion arise either from a physical state or from a mis- 
 direction of feeling, growing out of ignorance and _hin- 
 drance. Physical states, however, can, in the Divine mind, 
 only be a knowledge of our states; and ignorance and 
 hindrance, of course, are foreign to our conception of the 
 All-wise and the Almighty. As a man’s knowledge in- 
 creases, and his range of sympathies with his fellow-men 
 increases the tumultuous passions of his heart grow 
 calmer ; and he sees more clearly that the highest state of 
 feeling is a settled perpetual enjoyment of the joy of others. 
 He thus learns to attribute to the Infinite Being an inex- 
 
LOGIC AND LOVE 107 
 
 haustible benevolence, an all-embracing love. Thus, in 
 the trinity of Divine attributes, love is the analogue to 
 human feeling. In man, we find mind, heart, and will; 
 in God, we recognize wisdom, love, and power. 
 
 In previous lectures, we have endeavored to show that 
 both physics and metaphysics —the examination of the 
 world without and of the world within — prove God to be 
 unerring and omnipotent. Let us now pass to the in- 
 quiry what the light of nature may show concerning his 
 moral attributes. In particular, let us ask what are the 
 natural bases on which we may build our acceptance of 
 the Beloved Apostle’s declaration that God is love. 
 
 Let us, in the first place, frankly confess that there are 
 new difficulties attending this division of our inquiry. In 
 morphological and teleological inquiries, we remain wholly, 
 or almost wholly, in the realm of the intellect. We show 
 that a certain form in nature is the embodiment of our 
 own a priori ideas of number, space, or time; perhaps, 
 also, that a second form embodies the same idea in a 
 totally different manner. If this were discovered to be 
 the case in two works of human art, we should say that, 
 unquestionably, the workman who built, or at least, the 
 master who planned those forms, was cognizant of that 
 relation. We add that we can see no valid reason why 
 the same induction should not be made concerning the 
 Master-builder of nature. Or we show that an organ is, 
 by many complicated relations, adapted to perform a cer- 
 tain office, and that it performs that office admirably. In 
 this case there is no reason why we should not draw the 
 same conclusion that we should from an artificial organ, 
 there is no reason why we should not admit that the in- 
 strument was skilfully made for the very purpose of ac- 
 
108 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 complishing that end. At least, we may say that no 
 objections ever yet brought against these arguments from 
 final causes have any real logical validity. 
 
 But, when we pass behind the mechanical purpose, and 
 behind the intellectual conception,— that is to say, when 
 we come to the moral motive,— we are upon different 
 ground. We feel the great difference, even when the 
 argument would prove the moral motive of a fellow-man. 
 It is easy to show that Raphael had a very clear concep- 
 tion of the human figure in its variety of forms and 
 motions. It is easy to show that a Jacquard loom must 
 have been invented by a man thoroughly acquainted with 
 the weaving of silk. But it is quite another thing to at- 
 tempt to discover the amount of moral and religious feel- 
 ing, of philanthropy and piety, which moved either of 
 those men to his inventions. Feeling does not come di- 
 rectly within the pale of intellectual proof. It can be 
 manifested, it can be recognized from the manifestations; 
 but the canons by which we recognize it have never been 
 brought into distinct formulas, and perhaps they never can 
 be. There are even physical facts which, at present, re- 
 fuse in like manner to come within the formulas of words ; 
 that is to say, there are physical inferences, which we are 
 certainly justified in making, but which we cannot justify 
 by any canon of logic ever yet devised. Some inferences 
 of this character are as certain as any deductions of geom- 
 etry, and yet no man dares attempt to give his reasons for 
 drawing the inferences. No man can mistake a plum for 
 a cherry, but no botanist has ever yet succeeded in de- 
 scribing the distinction between those two fruits. No 
 man would hesitate to swear to the identity of one with 
 whom he is well acquainted, but no man can safely at- 
 
LOGIC AND LOVE IOQ 
 
 tempt to say how he identifies even his best known friend. 
 These are illustrations of the fact that there are things 
 recognized by external sight as being absolutely certain ; 
 and, nevertheless, we cannot put into words the grounds 
 of our certainty. We may emphatically say that our 
 knowledge of the external world exceeds our own ability 
 to formulate it in words. 
 
 We may say still more emphatically that the sphere of 
 the internal affections is not under the direct dominion of 
 the intellect. No man of good character and sound mind 
 is without friends, of whose fidelity, permanent good-will, 
 and affection he is certain, and justly certain; yet no man 
 could put the evidence on which he builds his confidence 
 of the love of mother, of wife, or brother or sister, into a 
 form that would stand the canons of strict inductive logic. 
 It would be easier to prove by intellectual argument the 
 personal identity of a friend than to prove in that manner 
 his personal love toward you. Ifa man asked for strictly 
 scientific, logical, intellectual proof of his wife’s love, his 
 peace would be at the mercy of any damned Iago. But 
 
 ‘¢ Love asks no evidence 
 To prove itself well placed.” 
 
 The evidence comes unsought, unasked, in a form that 
 satisfies the heart, and, through the heart, the head. The 
 satisfaction is not the less perfect from our inability to 
 put the proof into logical form. We are just as sure of 
 the difference between plums and cherries as though we 
 could describe it. We are just as sure that there is a 
 fundamental likeness between the mental processes and 
 feelings of our fellow-men and our own as though we were 
 capable of demonstrating the likeness. Thus, also, we 
 
ITO POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 are as justly sure that certain friends and relations love 
 us as we are that we love them; although we can give no 
 proof of their love capable of reduction to a syllogistic 
 form. 
 
 When, therefore, we turn to the question whether the 
 love of God is manifested toward us, whether we have 
 any evidence of his kindness toward individuals, we ought 
 not to be surprised that the evidence is incapable of being 
 put into the logical forms to which the morphological and 
 teleological arguments for his wisdom are reduced. Yet 
 there is the same kind of consilience of inductions. The 
 trouble is that each line of induction is so much more 
 vague, so difficult of definition. Let us also acknowledge 
 that there are here counter-lines, which puzzle us by ap- 
 parently, at first sight, running against the main conclu- 
 sion. Nothing in nature can be quoted as an evidence of 
 intellectual error or a breach of intellectual harmony. But 
 when we are arguing for the beneficence of the Deity, and 
 draw our inferences from the adaptation of nature to 
 man’s needs, from the multiplicity of the sources of 
 human pleasure, from the wide-spread happiness of 
 the animal creation, including man, we are confronted 
 also with an array of evils, or apparent evils. The storm, 
 the earthquake, the pestilence, fire and sword, wild beasts 
 and destructive insects, poisons, insidious contagion, the 
 thousand ills that flesh is heir to, and by which we are 
 afflicted in mind and body and estate,-—these all seem 
 inconsistent with the doctrine that God is love. These 
 difficulties are pressed upon our consideration; not 
 merely by irreligious men, who think thereby to overthrow 
 Christian faith in the goodness of God: they are brought 
 forward, also, by thoughtful and somewhat religious nat- 
 
LOGIC AND LOVE BOL 
 
 ures, as real difficulties in the way of finding religious 
 peace. They are sometimes brought forward by truly 
 religious persons,—not that they themselves have any 
 doubt concerning the love of God, but they ask what 
 they shall say to others who are in doubt. They do 
 not know how to answer those who complain that God 
 hides himself in clouds and in darkness. 
 
 In the attempt to solve this problem and to make our 
 religious faith stand justified to reason, let us, first of all, 
 not forget that, although the matter is not within the pale 
 of direct intellectual proof, we are not justified in refus- 
 ing credence to the instincts of the heart, simply because 
 we fail to explain them by our intellectual view. A few 
 years ago, a report was published, giving an abstract of 
 a sermon from a professedly Christian pulpit, speaking 
 contemptuously of the devout gratitude of certain sur- 
 vivors from a terrible shipwreck. The preacher asked: 
 “Why not thank God for drowning their shipmates as 
 much as for saving the survivors? Why have a God that 
 picks up a few? Why not have a God that would prevent 
 shipwreck?” The preacher is reported to have answered 
 that God neither drowned the one, nor saved the other. 
 He simply established general laws, by which or under 
 which the shipwreck occurred, and part of those on board 
 perished. But this was only putting the difficulty one 
 step further back. Why did the All-wise appoint gen- 
 eral laws under which such discriminations were possi- 
 ble, that one should be taken and another left?. The 
 preacher who thought thus to escape the irreverence of 
 finding fault with God for destroying life — by ridiculing 
 the gratitude of men for deliverance from death, and 
 declaring that it was not God, but only his law, which did 
 
II2 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 either—was not yet filled with the sense of infinite 
 knowledge, infinite power, and infinite love. 
 
 The absolute and invariable laws of the physical uni- 
 verse leave, as we have previously shown, the opportunity 
 for freedom of action in man. Certainly, men are not 
 prevented by the universal reign of law from pursuing 
 their own thoughts, and giving them a partial embodi- 
 ment in material forms. The Duke of Argyll has admira- 
 bly shown that it is the reign of law which gives the 
 finest opportunity for the display of intellect, in using 
 that law to fulfil special designs. Peirce has shown, in 
 his lectures on analytical morphology, that it is the reign 
 of law which makes the world the school-house for man, 
 capable of developing human thought and stimulating 
 men to a griorvz research. His son has shown, from the 
 doctrine of mathematical probabilities applied to the prog- 
 ress of physical science, that the human intellect is pre- 
 adapted to the investigation of existing laws. The reign 
 of law, which thus leaves the finite, created will and in- 
 tellect free, surely cannot bind or fetter the uncreated 
 God. He can, without any violation of law, in the simple 
 guidance of forces according to law, bring any event to 
 pass which he pleases, provided only that the event is 
 not forbidden by moral or logical necessities. He, being 
 almighty, can control and guide all physical forces; but 
 he cannot do that which is unreasonable and absurd, nor 
 that which is unjust. 
 
 Whatever physical sufferings are brought upon men, 
 therefore, are sent by the express foreknowledge of God. 
 Of course, we cannot believe that the destruction of a 
 part of those on board the wrecked ship and the saving 
 of the rest came from his miraculous intervention; but 
 
LOGIC AND LOVE Ts 
 
 they came in fulfilment of his will. They came as the 
 result of natural forces, acting under universal, invariable 
 laws. Does it follow that the survivors are not to thank 
 God for their deliverance? or that, thanking him for 
 deliverance, they are also to give thanks for the destruc- 
 tion of their companions? To answer in the affirmative, 
 as was done in the reported sermon, would be not only 
 to reject the teachings of the New Testament, but to 
 reject the dictates of common sense and the natural 
 impulses of the human heart. And this rejection is 
 asked in obedience to a fallacious argument, drawing 
 finite conclusions from infinite premises. 
 
 Every wise parent in his treatment of his children is 
 obliged sometimes to do that which is disagreeable to 
 them. Does it follow that they are not to thank him for 
 kindnesses and gifts, unless they also thank him for the 
 things whose use they do not understand, and which are 
 at the moment irksome to them? It may be that I hear 
 a complaint that some friend who has treated me with 
 uniform kindness has treated some other person harshly. 
 Does it follow that I am not to be grateful to him for his 
 kindness to me, unless I am at the same time grateful 
 for his alleged harshness to another man? 
 
 In our relations to the All-seeing, the All-wise, and 
 All-good, we know with certainty only concerning our- 
 selves, and are not always certain even there. If I know 
 that to me the lines are cast in pleasant places and that 
 I have a goodly heritage, my heart impels me to thanks- 
 giving; and it is reasonable that I should be thankful. 
 If, at the same time, I see others suffer, apparently less 
 favored than I, and beyond the reach of my power to 
 help, I will trust that the Infinite Goodness knows how 
 
IIl4 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 to make that apparent evil a real good to them. The 
 sovereign will of God is not arbitrary. It moves under 
 the guidance of infinite wisdom and at the command of 
 infinite love. We may not be able to understand all his 
 counsels; but, surely, we are not, on that account, for- 
 bidden to be grateful for that which we do understand 
 and which we see and feel to be good. Those who laugh 
 at our thanksgiving, and declare it to be unscientific 
 to have devout affections of gratitude and trust in the 
 Divine Providence, will some day, in a wider reach of 
 thought, perceive that there is no greater folly than that 
 which on the strength of feeble logic, drawing unsound 
 inferences from mere forms of human speech, assails the 
 convictions of religious faith. Those convictions are built 
 upon something stronger than any argument. They are 
 built upon the holiest and purest instincts of the human 
 heart, and upon a direct vision of things invisible to out- 
 ward sense, but nevertheless real, immutable, eternal. 
 The earthquake, the storm, the battle-field, do not testify 
 any more strongly to the sovereignty of God and to the 
 terrible mystery of his decrees, than the flowers and sing- 
 ing birds, the innocent affections of human homes and 
 holy examples of human virtue, bear witness to his un- 
 speakable love. It is the cultivation of a grateful spirit, 
 by dwelling on these manifest mercies, which will finally 
 bring us into that higher state of mind, in which we can 
 rejoice to believe that it is also in loving kindness that 
 the All-wise and All-good creates evil. 
 
 In looking at the testimony of outward nature, we may 
 first observe that happiness preponderates over suffering. 
 Among all the tribes of animals, the occurrence of disease 
 is exceptional. The vast majority of animals meet a pain- 
 
LOGIC AND LOVE IT5 
 
 less death either by the jaws of a stronger, or by a quiet, 
 drowsy loss of sense and of life through drying up or 
 being frozen. While living, they are apparently playful 
 and happy. It is when we come to man that the mystery 
 begins. Yet, to the vast majority of men, life is sweet. 
 They complain of it, but they are unwilling to give it up. 
 The exercise of every faculty gives pleasure. Aristotle, 
 the prince of all observers of nature, is said to have de- 
 fined pleasure to be the emotion arising from the unim- 
 peded exercise of any faculty. Yet we must acknowledge 
 that there are many hindrances to impede human action. 
 There are many diseases which cripple man’s powers, 
 many which give him absolute pain. Pessimism declares 
 that, with man, misery is the rule, happiness the excep- 
 tion; but this is a gross exaggeration. If we confine our- 
 selves to the report of observation, and to more easily meas- 
 ured enjoyment, we must admit that, in regard to human 
 as well as animal life, the preponderance of testimony is 
 in favor of the beneficence of the Creator. Carrying our 
 investigations no further, we might still say: The ob- 
 scure passages in a volume cannot destroy the meaning of 
 the plain passages. The general testimony of nature is 
 in favor of the kindness of God, and we shall not reject it 
 simply because we do not understand the testimony of 
 suffering and grief. 
 
 But there is a second way of viewing the whole ques- 
 tion. The different kinds of good are to be weighed 
 against each other. We are to consider whether the very 
 things which, in relation to the lower good, seem evil, 
 may not in themselves be conducive to a higher good. 
 As we count animal life of slight value in comparison 
 with human, so we count the pleasures of sense as noth- 
 
116 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 ing, in comparison with those of the mind and of the 
 heart. Nor can we refuse to see that, in all the higher 
 departments of man’s life, hindrances are, in an important 
 sense, helps. The mind finds an intense intellectual 
 pleasure in the surmounting of intellectual difficulty. If 
 we admit Aristotle’s definition, that pleasure is the emo- 
 tion which accompanies the unimpeded exercise of energy, 
 we must not forget that the exercise of energy seems to 
 imply an obstacle to be surmounted. The energy of the 
 muscles demands a mass to be moved; the energy of 
 the mind, difficulties to be solved. It may be so with the 
 energy of the heart likewise. Even beauty and virtue are 
 appreciated more keenly by contrast with ugliness and 
 sin. It is said that Swedenborg reported that even in 
 heaven the angels in their private theatricals introduce 
 bad characters as shadows, to make the light of virtue 
 more effective. 
 
 In other words, there may well be supposed to be an 
 invincible necessity, in constituting a world wherein men 
 taste the high happiness of intellectual and moral growth 
 and development, an invincible necessity for permitting 
 the occurrence of error, sin, and suffering. Furthermore, 
 it may well be supposed that, out of this very necessity, 
 an all-wise Creator will extort higher benefits, so that we 
 shall finally see that there is a maximum good in the 
 world, in spite of all the evil. That this is the case 
 may be inferred, not only from the axiom of the infinite 
 wisdom and goodness of God, to which our first survey of 
 the universe leads us, but from a consideration of the evil 
 itself. It has been said that Nature is as cruel to the 
 race as she can be, without destroying it. Yet the high- 
 est development and highest happiness of the race, if the 
 
LOGIC AND LOVE 117 
 
 quality as well as amount of happiness be taken into ac- 
 count, is found in countries where the soil is not, by nat- 
 ure, most productive nor the climate most perfect, but in 
 countries where a rougher climate and more sterile soil 
 combine to demand of men constant labor as the very 
 condition of existence; and men find it also the condition 
 of happiness. 
 
 “‘ Life’s cares are comforts ; such by Heaven designed ; 
 He that hath none must make them, or be wretched.” 
 
 Still, we must admit to the complaining and perplexed 
 inquirer that this seems harsh. It seems to require the 
 misery of some, in order to make the happiness of others. 
 It is all very well for the intellectually and morally suc- 
 cessful to feel that, without difficulties and temptations, 
 they would not have known and rejoiced in their strength ; 
 but what shall we say of the feeble-minded, the perplexed, 
 the erring, the sinful, or of those crushed beneath inextri- 
 cable misfortune and suffering? For these cases there 
 are two considerations, which may make the reconciliation 
 of both with the divine goodness less difficult. In the 
 first place, we may observe that, as the heart alone know- 
 eth its own bitterness, so the heart alone knoweth its own 
 consolations. We frequently misjudge in our perspective. 
 It is frequently the case that, when we come into direct 
 contact with great sufferers, we find that they discover in 
 their own case alleviation and compensations. The horror 
 and suffering are, very frequently, not so great as they at 
 a distance appeared to be. It was our imagination that 
 lent exaggerated tones to the coloring. The night is very 
 seldom pitch-dark : the starlight finds its way through the 
 densest clouds. 
 
I18 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 In the second place, we may observe that, when we set 
 man high in intellectual and moral qualities above other 
 animals, we have not yet set him high enough. Man is 
 also always, more or less, a religious being. He has more 
 or less faith in the reality of his own intercourse with the 
 Infinite God. And when we compare his faith in God and 
 in God’s love as a source of happiness with other sources, 
 it is found to be far superior even to the satisfaction of 
 a clear conscience. The very anxiety with which men 
 seek to reconcile the existence of evil in the world with 
 their faith in the goodness of God shows how high a value 
 they set on the knowledge of God. There is no life, no 
 happiness, comparable for an instant with the life which is 
 sustained by resting in implicit confidence on the Al- 
 mighty arm, with the happiness that flows from a trusting 
 surrender to the care of God’s eternal love. The longings 
 of the human heart are infinite, and cannot be satisfied 
 with any finite object. And, now, it is a fact of experi- 
 ence that the very evils which create the doubt concern- 
 ing God’s love, are the agents which most frequently 
 bring men into a peaceful trust in that love. Every pastor, 
 of any experience, can recall cases in which slight losses 
 and troubles produced unhappiness, complaint, and rebell- 
 ion against Divine Providence; but additional, heavier 
 troubles and deeper griefs brought, first religious faith, 
 and then religious cheerfulness and settled peace. «This 
 fact has been poetically expressed by saying that God 
 presses us down with one hand until we feel his other 
 hand supporting us, and then we are at rest, Of course, 
 this still leaves the question (perhaps insoluble to finite 
 minds) why the human heart should be so constituted that 
 it must needs be unhappy before it can be happy. That 
 
LOGIC AND LOVE 16 Ke) 
 
 may arise from necessities of moral freedom which are, at 
 least at present, unfathomable by our intellects. 
 
 This suggests another element to be taken into con- 
 sideration in weighing the testimony of nature concerning 
 the being of God. We have seen that the only entities 
 absolutely known to us are time, space, and spirit. We 
 might add mechanical force; but force, being under the 
 control of spirit, leads to the inferences that it is a mere 
 creation of spirit, and that the material world is but the 
 expression or symbol of thought, through which the In- 
 finite Spirit speaks to us, and by which he enables us to 
 speak to each other. Man is thus of nearer kindred to the 
 Creator than he is to the creation. The Creative Spirit 
 talks to us through the material universe, as we talk to 
 each other. The whole progress of the physical sciences 
 (as Joseph Henry said in his last letter to Mr. Patterson) 
 has been an interrogation of the Author of nature, and 
 the reception from him of intelligible answers to every 
 intelligent question. To this state of things, we may 
 apply that argument of Jesus implied in his conversation 
 with the Sadducees concerning immortality. The beings 
 with whom God thus deigns to hold converse must have 
 been made in his image, and therefore in the image of his 
 eternity. In man’s power to untangle and decipher parts 
 of the mysteries of creation, in his ability to trace law 
 throughout the whole, he has an evidence and pledge of 
 his own superiority to nature, and of his own immortality. 
 And, if there be any part of his own nature higher than 
 another, it is certainly his moral and religious nature, his 
 sense of justice, his expansive charity, his recognition of 
 his relation to God, which exalt him. He may well, there- 
 fore, have an assurance that the justice and mercy which 
 
120 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 seem sometimes obscured here will appear more clearly in 
 the eternal world. In that realm, some of the hindrances 
 to a perfect justice may be removed, and every soul be 
 fully satisfied that all the dealings of the infinitely Just 
 and Merciful are right. 
 
 At this point arises, anew, the question to which we 
 have before alluded, of the future of retribution for sin. 
 If the soul be of its own right immortal, and if it be of its 
 very nature free to choose, why may not a soul perpetually 
 choose evil, and thus bring upon itself everlasting misery? 
 And how can the goodness of God be reconciled with the 
 everlasting anguish of a single creature? Better that the 
 whole universe should have remained in the abyss of 
 potentiality, than that a single created being should suffer 
 eternal and infinite torment. To this outcry of the heart, 
 two answers have been made by those who have held to 
 the doctrine of everlasting punishment. It is said that 
 everlasting, wilful refusal to repent would deserve ever- 
 lasting punishment. To which it may be replied that, if 
 that punishment be infinite torment, it would have been 
 better not to create a soul capable of everlasting wilful 
 refusal. In answer to this, it is sometimes said that ever- 
 lasting torment is not necessarily infinite torment, that 
 the misery may be finite and proportioned to the sin, 
 But, again, it is replied that eternity of even finite pain 
 becomes infinite, and outweighs all good. In answer to 
 which, it is again said by some that punishment is not 
 necessarily torment. By some, it has been said that, in 
 the goodness of God, the punishment may be the means of 
 a lower kind of happiness; that is, if a man will not be- 
 come a saint, he may be allowed to become a beast, and 
 to be contented with beastly pleasures. Others say that 
 
LOGIC AND LOVE I2t 
 
 a fine is punishment, and that everlasting punishment 
 may be the being perpetually below what one might have 
 been. Still others press the literal meaning of Saint Paul’s 
 language, that those who sow to the flesh shall of the flesh 
 reap destruction. 
 
 In support of the latter view, it may be said that the 
 arguments to show the soul’s immortality do not strictly 
 show that it is in its own right immortal. It is capable 
 of communing with God: that ability to commune with 
 the Infinite and Eternal is a pledge of immortality. But 
 when the soul abdicates its heaven-born position, sells its 
 heavenly birthright for earthly pottage, ceases to com- 
 mune with the infinite and eternal Fountain of life, and 
 confines all its thoughts and aspirations to the use of 
 things that perish with the using, its thoughts have cer- 
 tainly become mortal, it is no longer feeding on the bread 
 from heaven, it has become of the earth earthy. Why may 
 it not destroy itself by absolute spiritual starvation? The 
 light of nature, which asks for an immortal life whereby 
 to vindicate its own assertion of the infinite goodness of 
 God, cannot admit the existence of infinite and eternal 
 torment. But neither can it prove the ultimate restora- 
 tion of every soul to the highest estate of eternal happi- 
 ness. It cannot even disprove the possible extinction of 
 a soul by the persistent choice of the ways of death in 
 preference to the path of life. 
 
 The love of God is chiefly evidenced by the imperative 
 demand of the hearts which he has created for an infinite 
 love whereon to lean. To doubt his infinite love is to in- 
 troduce into the heart an element of sadness outweighing 
 all possible causes of happiness. It would be as irrational 
 and intrinsically incredible in the moral sphere, as doubt- 
 
I22 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 ing the intelligible order of nature would be in the intel- 
 lectual sphere. We fall back upon the irresistible assump- 
 tion that “there is no vice in the constitution of things,” 
 but that the everlasting harmonies of the universe re-echo, 
 from eternity to eternity, the song of the angels at Beth- 
 lehem,— “Glory to God in the highest, and on earth 
 peace, good-will toward men.” 
 
VIII. 
 BEAUTY. 
 
 In our survey of the universe, as revealed to the senses 
 and to reason, we are always inclined to classify, under 
 general abstract heads, the impressions made upon us. 
 These generalizations and abstractions proceed upon vari- 
 ous grounds, and each one may embrace a greater ora less 
 diversity of objects. Men constantly use language which 
 seems to imply the existence of distinct entities, forming 
 the grounds of such classification. It has been a matter 
 of debate, with psychologists and ontologists, whether 
 these generic and specific grounds of classification have 
 any existence outside the human mind, and, if so, what is 
 the nature of that existence. With certain persons, the 
 attempt to answer this inquiry leads at once to a refer- 
 ence to the Divine Being. For example, what is truth? 
 To me, no answer is so satisfactory as that which defines 
 truth to be conformity to the knowledge of the All-know- 
 ing. That is, if we could see the whole truth concerning 
 any matter, it would be seeing it as God sees it. No other 
 definition of truth has been satisfactory to us. It is not 
 long ago that a distinguished Englishman defined truth to 
 be that body of opinions on which the best-informed men 
 are, for the time being, agreed. According to this defini- 
 tion, that which was true ten years ago may be false 
 to-day, and become true again ten years hence. But we 
 
I24 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 cannot believe that that definition will ever become true, 
 according to its own definition of truth, because well- 
 informed men can never agree in the acceptance of such 
 an absurdity. 
 
 In like manner, we can see no answer to the question of 
 the Psalmist, Who shall show us any good? except in 
 defining the good to be that which God’s infinite wisdom 
 and love decide to be the best. No temporary expediency 
 can satisfy a rational man. He desires to do that which 
 will be good not only for himself, but for his children and 
 for his race forever. What that is can be directly, abso- 
 lutely seen and recognized only by the absolutely Wise and 
 Good. Thus, also, we would define the beautiful as that 
 which pleases God, that which is beautiful in his eyes. As 
 our own minds are more and more cultivated, we attain to 
 a higher and higher standard of beauty. There is no rea- 
 son why this may not go on forever, no reason why the 
 Infinite Being is not capable of seeing an immortal and 
 uncontained beauty which is beyond our power of vision. 
 
 We propose to consider this theme of beauty a little 
 more in detail. We expand the idea of beauty rather than 
 that of the good or the true, not because it is more im- 
 portant, but because it is somewhat easier to handle in 
 detail. The sense of beauty is a peculiar pleasure. It may 
 be difficult to bring it under Aristotle’s definition, as a 
 concomitant of the unimpeded exercise of power. The 
 power in this case is hardly exercised: it is a capacity 
 rather than a faculty,—the capacity of perception. The 
 sense of beauty, the feeling of beauty, in our finite souls, 
 is the pleasure given by the perception of an object con- 
 taining nothing to hinder, to interrupt, to dull, to deaden, 
 to shock, or to weary the perceptive powers. The object 
 
BEAUTY 125 
 
 must, therefore, have both unity and interest for the mind. 
 These requirements make it, therefore, necessary that it 
 should have either an actual or a virtual complexity, and 
 that, nevertheless, its parts should be bound together in 
 one law. It is not necessary that the law, the intellectual 
 mode of connection, should be visible; but it is necessary 
 that the connection should be felt at the moment of the 
 perception of the object. This appears to us to be the 
 widest and most satisfactory definition of beauty: it is 
 that quality of an object which makes it give pleasure in 
 the mere perception of the object, irrespective of all asso- 
 ciation of ideas and of all symbolism. But the effect of 
 beauty is, in almost every case, heightened to a greater or 
 less degree by the association of ideas, or by the recogni- 
 tion of expression, or by the perception of utility. 
 
 The simplest form of beauty will be found in geometri- 
 cal figures. By analyzing and describing the elements of 
 beauty in a geometrical figure, we shall obtain formulz 
 which will apply with slight modifications to other kinds 
 of beauty. A geometrical figure, in order to be beautiful, 
 must manifestly have a law. It is not necessary that that 
 law should be understood, but only that its existence 
 should be perceived; that is to say, the eye must run 
 along the outline of the figure, or over its surface, with 
 the easy feeling of being led along from point to point. 
 In the technical language of mathematics, the outline or 
 the surface of a beautiful object must be a locus. All the 
 points of the line, or of the surface, must be so arranged 
 that a mathematician of sufficient technical skill could 
 frame a sentence which, in describing the position of 
 one point, should describe the position of all. If this 
 be not so, then the artistic eye will detect some break, 
 
126 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 some breach of continuity, which will be a hindrance to 
 the unimpeded sweep of the vision, and so rob the be- 
 holder of pleasure. Of course, it is possible to make 
 sometimes a combination of such lines which, in spite 
 of its real want of unity, shall be pleasant to the eye. 
 But it is pleasant because the combination approaches 
 the form of some real single locus sufficiently to deceive 
 the eye by its suggestion. This demand for unity in the 
 geometric figure is repeated in regard to every object 
 which can be called beautiful. Such an object must 
 have a unity which makes itself felt by the observer. 
 The mind must be able to take it all in with ease, 
 and to perceive that the parts are connected, even 
 though it do not perceive the precise mode of connec- 
 tion. The landscape, says Emerson, belongs to the man 
 whose eye can integrate the parts. And I add, that the 
 landscape is not beautiful unless the parts are capable 
 of being integrated. The picture must have unity, or 
 it is not a picture, whether it be painted on canvas or 
 only on the retina of the eye. 
 
 The beauty of a merely geometrical figure is propor- 
 tioned not only to the simplicity of its law, but also to the 
 variety of the manifestations of that law. For example, 
 the ellipse has more variety than the circle, and is there. 
 fore more beautiful. The elastic curve, simple in its law 
 as a circle, and yet, having a marvellously complicated 
 variety of figures, becomes one of the most beautiful of 
 curves. The charm of the acorn arises from its combina- 
 tion of variety with simplicity. The demand for variety 
 of manifestation, like the demand for unity, is made in 
 whatever department of the beautiful we look, whether at 
 the landscape, or at flowers or living figures, or at poetry 
 
BEAUTY 127 
 
 or the drama or music. That object of beauty is finest, 
 and awakens the deepest sense of beauty, in which the 
 unity is felt most perfectly from beginning to end, but in 
 which, nevertheless, the number and relation of the parts 
 have the greatest variety and freshness. : 
 
 We also demand, in a mere geometrical figure, a cer- 
 tain proportion of parts. One ellipse is more beautiful 
 than another, if the proportion of its length to its breadth 
 is better. 
 
 We have made numerous experiments upon unpreju- 
 diced persons, ignorant of the object of our inquiries, and 
 have found that Hay’s law, in general, holds good,— that 
 it is not simplicity of proportion in the length of lines, 
 but in the proportion of the actual or potential angles of 
 the figure, which creates beauty. Hay’s law, confirmed 
 by these experiments, thus shows that direction or angle 
 is a more important element of beauty than distance is. 
 We might have reached the same conclusion by simply 
 considering the facts of similarity of figure. The smallest 
 miniature may be as expressive as a life-size portrait. 
 The elliptical motion of an atom is intellectually as grand 
 an object of study as the elliptical motion of a planet. 
 The difference between the two is in the amount of space 
 and time occupied by one or the other: the direction and 
 form in the two cases are alike. A law of proportion 
 holds also in other objects of beauty as part of the law 
 of unity, so that without proportion the perception of 
 unity would be impeded. In the simple case of the rec- 
 tangle, the eye glances across from corner to corner, and 
 receives an impression from the direction of its motion 
 with reference to the enclosing sides. In like manner, in 
 an ellipse, the eye runs from the ends to the mid-sides, 
 
128 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 and secretly compares its direction of motion with the 
 principal diameters. But in a picture we have not only 
 this proportion of dimensions in the outlines of the draw- 
 ing: there is also proportion in the relative depth of light 
 and shadow, and in the similarity and contrast of colors. 
 In musical compositions the proportion is felt in the 
 rhythmical balancing of parts, also in the harmony and 
 succession of chords, also in the relative strength of tone, 
 and in the balance and blending of the voices and instru- 
 ments. We would remark in passing, that Hay’s law 
 must be modified; geometric beauty lying in approxima- 
 tion to the square root of five, musical beauty in approx- 
 imation to roots of two. 
 
 In the organic world, another element of beauty enters 
 more distinctly, although it has a partial effect in some of 
 the examples which we have already treated. The law 
 which gives unity to the geometrical figure of the crystal, 
 or to architectural ornamentation, is usually carried out 
 with such close approximation to perfection that no oppor- 
 tunity is left for the exercise of imagination. More pleas- 
 ure would be obtained were the suggestion equally clear, 
 but the approximation less perfect, thus leaving some work 
 for the imagination. This is the case with the majority of 
 organic forms. Not only do they embrace much greater 
 variety in their unity than crystalline structure does; but 
 the unity, being partially concealed by various causes, re- 
 quires some exercise of imagination to detect it. We fre- 
 quently find a stiff, set appearance in artificial flowers or 
 stuffed animals, arising from their perfect symmetry. The 
 higher beauty of living plants and animals arises from the 
 concealment of symmetry in their ordinary positions, 
 which leaves to the imagination the discovery of the sym- 
 
BEAUTY 129 
 
 metry in its potentiality. An analogous fact holds in all 
 higher works of art: they must have symmetry as well as 
 unity, but it must not be thrust obtrusively on the atten- 
 tion. 
 
 Beauty is frequently enhanced in our eyes by some asso- 
 ciation of ideas, awakened on the perception of the beauti- 
 ful object. Erasmus Darwin maintained that all sense of 
 beauty arises from association of ideas with early sensuous 
 pleasure. He wished, by a forced application of Occam’s 
 razor, to reduce all pleasures to the gratification of the 
 bodily senses, or to relief from bodily discomfort. Accord- 
 ing to him, beauty consists in some more or less remote 
 resemblance to the mother’s breast, and gives pleasure 
 through association with the memory of the earliest satis- 
 faction of appetite. To obviate the objection that, on that 
 principle, a child brought up by hand would have no sense 
 of beauty, we have only to bring in the principle of ata- 
 vism, or persistent heredity. The theory seems to us too 
 whimsically inadequate to merit serious discussion. Yet 
 the pleasure arising from the perception of beauty is, fre- 
 quently, very much enhanced by pleasant memories and 
 associations. A landscape becomes more beautiful when 
 it has been familiar from childhood, or when it embraces 
 the home of beloved ones, or when it contains the site of 
 some interesting episode of history. Emerson truly says 
 that the heroism and virtue of men lend a glory and charm 
 to the frame in which their actions are set. 
 
 Beauty is also enhanced, at times almost immeasurably, 
 by its expressiveness. Every natural fact, says Emerson, 
 is the type of some spiritual fact. A beautiful object has 
 frequently a symbolism, either natural or artificial, by which 
 it suggests other thoughts than those which it directly 
 
130 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 embodies. Fulfilling its own law of unity in variety and 
 variety in unity, it is also frequently, by an original law of 
 correspondence, directly suggestive of some spiritual truth. 
 And, if not, it is frequently adopted, by a conscious con- 
 sent and device of men, to be the symbol of truth, not 
 directly or naturally connected with it. The meanings, 
 advantages, and limitations of this artificial symbolism are 
 obvious, and are less important for our present subject 
 than the natural symbolism of correspondence. Many 
 movements of animate and inanimate nature bear a sort 
 of analogy to movements of our minds, and all our daily 
 language implies a recognition of that fact. A thousand 
 familiar phrases may be quoted in illustration, such as 
 fiery zeal, a gust of passion, a storm of anger, soaring 
 hope, brilliant imagination, dark counsel. 
 
 But there is a natural expression more subtle than that 
 which shows itself in the use of such metaphors. For ex- 
 ample, consider the expressiveness of tones and the inar- 
 ticulate cries of animals. The plaintive lament of our 
 meadow lark, the bold free tone of the brown thrush and 
 the oriole, the joyous hilarity of the bobolink, the question- 
 ing whine of bleating sheep, the cheery interrogation of a 
 horse’s neigh,— these, and similar instances, prove that in 
 the minute imperceptible rhythm of a tone there is a 
 moral expressiveness. We do not think that this expres- 
 sion of tone has ever been successfully analyzed into the 
 association of ideas, The meadow lark and the bobolink 
 come at the same time into the same meadow. The dif- 
 ference of their tones is recognized before we notice the 
 pensive stride of the one and the ecstatic fluttering of the 
 other. 
 
 The human countenance, also, and, by analogy, other 
 
BEAUTY 131 
 
 animate forms have a power of expression transcending all 
 analysis into correspondence, analogy, or association. 
 More than once in my youth, before I had acquaintance 
 enough with men to generalize from any association of 
 faces with character revealed in action, I recognized and 
 described correctly the character expressed in a face. 
 Self-conceit, falsehood, different forms of licentiousness, 
 grasping avarice, disregard of moral law, contempt for 
 human rights,— these, and other sins, and various marked 
 virtues, have, at different times, been pointed out by me 
 in a stranger’s face; and inquiry has shown that they 
 notably existed in the stranger’s character. This was not 
 accident, neither is this gift peculiar to me. I know men 
 who possess it in a much higher degree than I. Every 
 man of any spiritual discernment recognizes the moral ex- 
 pression of the human face, and is drawn, attracted, or re- 
 pelled, driven off by it. It is even one of the necessities 
 of social life that men should have a fair degree of this 
 power to see their neighbors’ characters in their faces. 
 Without it, the difficulties of commercial and social inter- 
 course would be vastly increased. 
 
 We have mentioned the expressiveness of tone, but the 
 expressiveness of a musical composition contains some- 
 thing in addition even more remarkable. Indeed, the ex- 
 pression of the meadow lark and of the bobolink does not 
 lie altogether in the quality of their tones. It depends 
 partly upon the rhythm. The lark’s dismal drawl is con- 
 trasted with the exceedingly quick and sportive play of 
 the bobolink’s gushing melody. The one seems self- 
 restrained, the other self-abandoned. All these contrasts 
 are still more observable in human compositions. The 
 variety of human voices, the greater variety of orchestral 
 
132 POSTULATES: OF REVELATION 
 
 instruments, the various voicings of the same kind of 
 instrument,— these are, as it were, an increase of the dif- 
 ference between the voices of the two birds. The differ- 
 ence of rhythm, also, is vastly greater: it extends beyond 
 one or two phrases to the rhythm of a whole composition, 
 balancing phrases against phrases, theme against theme, 
 part against part. 
 
 Other elements in human music are almost altogether 
 wanting in the music of nature,—namely, harmony, 
 progression of chords, modulations from key to key. 
 These add immensely to the power of expression, so 
 that, in human art, music becomes a natural language of 
 the affections, capable of giving utterance to emotions 
 with a delicacy and with a force, with a precision and 
 with a breadth and misty vagueness, unapproachable in 
 any conventional language. Consider, for example, the 
 closing chorus of Beethoven’s “Christ on the Mount of 
 Olives.” In the original words, which he set to the 
 music, the angels are represented as singing the praises 
 of Christ for his sacrifice of himself upon the cross, and 
 as saying, “Worlds are singing thanks and honor to the 
 exalted Son of God.” I once took a friend to hear this 
 music, when it was sung simply to the words, “ Praise 
 Jehovah.” My friend (a clergyman of whose truthfulness 
 there cannot be a doubt) had never so much as heard of 
 the oratorio, and had a very slight knowledge of music; 
 in fact, almost none. But, after hearing this chorus, he 
 said: “ Those words cannot be a correct translation of the 
 original, for which Beethoven wrote that music. It is 
 very far from being a hymn of simple praise to God. It is 
 Christian music. It has a grandeur exceeding all the con- 
 ceptions of even Hebrew prophets. It is re-echoed from 
 
BEAUTY 133 
 
 land to land, and from world to world, till the universe 
 rings with the song. And that song is thanksgiving for 
 the forgiveness of sin,— forgiveness announced or pro- 
 cured through a mediator. You may depend upon it, the 
 music was written for a hymn of praise to Christ, or a 
 hymn of thanksgiving for the reconciliation effected by 
 @hrist:? 
 
 The highest end of beauty is this moral end. The 
 mere outward charm is nothing in comparison with this 
 inward power. A _ beautiful object is one which gives 
 pleasure in its mere perception, independent of considera- 
 tions of its object or utility. Nevertheless, in order to 
 give pleasure, it must permit the unimpeded exercise of 
 our perceptive power. Evidently, it will not do this in 
 the highest degree, unless all the perceptive powers are 
 gratified simultaneously. An example of this highest 
 degree of beauty is found when, on the human face, we 
 see not only the symmetry of form, the proportion of light 
 and shade, the delicate play of color satisfying the intel- 
 lectual nature in its passion for unity, but when we also 
 see the expression of a noble character at peace with 
 itself and with the world, and consecrating itself in a sub- 
 lime unity of purpose to the service of its Creator. An- 
 other example of the highest beauty is found when, in a 
 piece of music, we find not only the unity of form, the 
 charm of progression, the proportionate balance of chords, 
 — both in voices and instruments,— the proportionate in- 
 crease and diminution of force delighting the ear and the 
 intellect, but also feel that the moral condition of the com- 
 poser at the time of the composition was healthy, and that 
 he was pouring out sentiments worthy of being uttered 
 through the divinest of the arts. It is in such recogni- 
 
134 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 tion of the expression of spiritual and moral truth through 
 beauty that an unimpeded exercise of energy is allowed 
 to all of our highest moral and religious faculties, thus 
 giving to us the highest enjoyment, and thus justifying us 
 in saying that this beauty of expression is the crown and 
 glory of beauty. 
 
 From these brief remarks upon a theme which would 
 bear indefinite expansion, it will be seen how vast the 
 field whence the harvest of religious truth may be gath- 
 ered. Confining ourselves, for the present, to the eye and 
 the ear, as organs of sense,— their intricate mechanism in 
 the human head, and their modifications for the use of 
 lower creatures, are, in the first place, an absolute demon- 
 stration of the wisdom and beneficence of the Creator. 
 All attempts to show that such complicated and wise adap. 
 tations of means to ends arose without design are abso- 
 lutely futile: they owe their present popularity simply to 
 what may be called jugglers’ tricks in logic, to a skilful 
 playing with words, to puzzle the moral and intellectual 
 perception, as sleight of hand may puzzle the eye of the 
 Spectator. 
 
 The impressions made upon these delicate and compli- 
 cated machines, the eye and ear, by the minute tremors 
 of the air in sound, and by incomparably more minute 
 tremors of the ether in light, are a\ natural language of 
 signs and tokens, whereby we are informed of the pres- 
 ence and position of objects, capable of being also exam- 
 ined by the other senses. This language of sight and 
 sound is the principal means by which we are instructed 
 concerning the truths embodied in the external world. 
 Nor do we see any flaw in the argument which would 
 show that this language of vision and hearing is as real a 
 
 & 
 
BEAUTY 135 
 
 communication with God, as the communication through 
 ordinary speech is with our fellow-men. Joseph Henry’s 
 conclusion is sound,—that all the vast fabric of physical 
 science is merely a transcription into human speech of 
 the answers which God has given, through this language 
 of vision and hearing, to the patient questioning of intel- 
 ligent scientific explorers. These impressions on the eye 
 and ear are mere symbols; in themselves they bear no 
 resemblance whatever to the physical properties which are 
 revealed through them. The physical properties, thus 
 announced, are afterward verified, through handling and 
 experimentation, by touch and by muscular mechanical 
 action. They are trustworthy symbols: they do not de- 
 ceive or mislead one who patiently learns to interpret them. 
 
 But this language, described by Berkeley and alluded to 
 by Henry, is prose. Through the same organs we re- 
 ceive also poetry. In other words, God speaks not only 
 to the head, but to the heart. The language of vision and 
 of hearing expresses not only thought, but feeling: it 
 awakens the deepest sentiments. This is admitted even 
 by those who refuse to take the further step of admitting 
 that this utterance of sentiment through language proves 
 the existence of a Divine love in Him who utters it. Yet 
 it is manifest that as the symmetry, the order, and the 
 adaptations of the universe prove its Author to be an all- 
 wise Creator, so the presence of beauty in all things, the 
 power of expression, and the power of receiving and in- 
 terpreting the expression of nature, prove its Author to 
 be all-loving. All attempts to explain expression in the 
 manner of either Erasmus Darwin, or of his grandson, 
 seem to me to be fallacious. I have been familiar with 
 the writings of Erasmus Darwin from earliest boyhood, 
 
136 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 and was, in my youth, captivated with them. But as my 
 knowledge of nature increased, and especially as I in- 
 vestigated by numerous actual experiments questions of 
 zesthetics, I saw more and more clearly that there is no 
 just explanation of the adaptation of the universe to the 
 highest as well as the lowest needs of man, except in the 
 assumption of the infinite love of God. By the power of 
 spontaneity, of freedom, we attend to the evidences of his 
 being, or close our eyes to them; we dwell upon the 
 cogency of the lines of consilient inductions which lead 
 to the acknowledgment of him; or we dwell upon diffi- 
 culties and objections, and upon the fact that probability 
 is not certainty. Even our intellectual convictions are 
 thus partially under the control of the will. It is an 
 error to suppose that, because the mind decides according 
 to the evidence before it, its decisions are necessary. 
 The evidence is not before it, until it has been admitted; 
 the witnesses may testify clearly, and yet the judge arbi- 
 trarily rule out the testimony. We may put ourselves, if 
 we choose, in the position of one who doubts everything, 
 doubts even whether he doubts, doubts whether he exists 
 to doubt. But if we admit our own existence, and our 
 own ability to know something, and if we are willing to 
 be led wherever the preponderance of evidence inclines, I 
 do not see why the beauty, the melody, and harmony of 
 the world, and the exquisite adaptation of the eye and the 
 ear and the heart of man to enjoy it all, do not make 
 the existence and the loving kindness of an Infinite 
 Father as certain to us as any truth whatever can be. 
 
 The universe is not merely an embodiment of geometri- 
 cal and algebraical ideas, a philosophical collection of 
 diagrams, an illustration myriad-fold of the adaptation of 
 
BEAUTY 17 
 
 means to ends; but it is also a poem, formed of unnum- 
 bered other poems, woven together, and yet having exqui- 
 site unity; it is a concert of loveliest music; it is a drama 
 of fascinating interest. Examine it in every way we will, 
 and with the exercise of every power, we constantly come 
 back to this conclusion: that it is constituted throughout 
 exactly as if it sprang from the will of an Infinite Being 
 of unbounded power and love, knowing all the secrets of 
 the human heart, and addressing himself to the supply of 
 every normal desire. 
 
 While studying the space relations of the universe, the 
 intellect predominates over the heart; but, in apprehend- 
 ing time relations, there is a stronger appeal to the heart 
 than to the head. In the beauty of geometric figure and 
 of manifest rhythm, the understanding is appealed to as 
 directly as the affections; and it finds a pleasure in re- 
 sponding to the appeal. But in color, in heat, in tones, 
 in harmonies, the direct appeal is to the feeling; and the 
 intellect may, at first, be almost wholly unmoved. Thus, 
 also, in the beauty of expression, even when the expres- 
 sion is through sensible rhythm and figure, it enters di- 
 rectly into the heart. Poetry has been defined to be the 
 language of passion. Its rhythmic form is not essential : 
 its essence lies in the depth of right feeling, which always 
 leads toward figurative expression and rhythmic movement. 
 Color and tone are the poetry of the natural language of 
 vision and hearing. They consist in symmetrical motions 
 of such minute extent that, singly, they are not recog- 
 nized by sense. Thus, they provoke no intellectual anal- 
 ysis; they keep the head cool; and all their force is 
 expended in warming the heart. So far as human knowl- 
 edge goes, neither color nor tone is essential to either 
 vegetable or animal life; they are not even essential to 
 
138 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 intellectual life. A man may attain to high scholarship, 
 he may show marvellous powers of mind, without any 
 conscious thought concerning color or tone. But, when 
 his feelings are aroused, their first native utterance is 
 through the tones of his voice. It may be from this fact 
 that the art of expression through music has been grad- 
 ually developed. The first expressions of pleasure in a 
 young child are usually called forth either by tones or by 
 colors. The art of the cultivated man, using color as a 
 means of expression, does not rise so high above nature 
 as it does in music; yet it goes far enough to make the 
 successful painter, who adds the charm of coloring to the 
 forms of his drawing, to be held in perpetual remem- 
 brance and honor. 
 
 These effects of musical tone and of color are not nec- 
 essary to the bodily nor to the intellectual life, but they 
 would certainly be greatly missed by the heart in the 
 moral life. It is difficult for the imagination to paint 
 what the condition of human hearts might be in a world 
 without color and without tone. Laura Bridgman and 
 Oliver Caswell have made famous the condition of human 
 beings with good natural endowments entirely deprived 
 both of hearing and of sight. We know that they have 
 warm hearts and lively affections. But we must remem- 
 ber that these are isolated cases. They were in a world 
 of people having full possession of sight and hearing. 
 They were cared for, educated, tenderly caressed by 
 those who saw and heard, and who had inherited the 
 culture of ages derived from sights and sounds. The 
 value of the eye and of the ear to the human race is not 
 to be thus negatively measured by the loss incurred by a 
 few blind and deaf individuals, who still share with others 
 the contents of books and the fruits of civilization. 
 
BEAUTY 139 
 
 Neither is the happiness of the color-blind nor of those 
 who have no ear for music any evidence of the slight 
 value of tone and color to the race. The color-blind and 
 the musically obtuse are still sharers in the general life 
 of the race and of the nation,—sharers, perhaps, in the 
 highest forms of cultivation. They are thus, although 
 perhaps unconscious of the origin of their pleasure, sharers 
 in all the happiness which flows to the race directly from 
 musical tones in nature and from the charm of coloring. 
 Through these the heart of God speaks directly to the 
 heart of man. This evidence of the universal Father’s 
 love is not susceptible of reduction to intellectual proposi- 
 tions or syllogistic arguments; but it is appreciated and 
 felt, and gives reasonable and solid assurance to the hearts 
 of his loving children. When a mother draws her child to 
 her, enfolds it in her arms, and silently presses it to her 
 bosom, the child has no proof of its mother’s love suscepti- 
 ble of logical formulation ; but it has proof stronger than 
 any syllogism. Thus in the intercourse of the human soul 
 with God. I cannot prove his love by any process of 
 argument, the affections are not within the pale of logical 
 deduction ; but, nevertheless, I know his love with a 
 knowledge transcending all merely intellectual belief. I 
 am bathed in that love from day to day, from hour to 
 hour. It manifests itself to me inall the beauty of natural 
 forms, in all the tenderness of natural coloring on the 
 earth or in the sky; it utters itself in all the natural 
 sounds, also; it breathes itself into my heart with the 
 affection of my dearest beloved friends. And when my 
 heart rises into thanksgiving, and throws itself with un- 
 reserved confidence upon his infinite goodness and mercy, 
 that love floods my whole being with light and joy. 
 
IX. 
 THE TESTIMONY: OP GONSCIENGE 
 
 WE have shown that space and time are in themselves 
 impotent over matter and over mind, utterly powerless to 
 control either sensuous perception or sensuous imagina- 
 tion. From this it follows that sensuous perceptions and 
 sensuous imagination, when they conform to order in 
 space or order in time, capable of intellectual recognition, 
 and perhaps of intellectual analysis, and of description in 
 general intellectual propositions, show that intellect con- 
 trolled the causes of those perceptions and imaginations. 
 This is the morphological argument, drawn from the con- 
 formity of the external universe (whether in its atomic, 
 molecular, crystalline, cosmical, or organic forms) to laws 
 of space and time, and showing that that universe is cre- 
 ated and upheld by infinite wisdom. 
 
 The teleological argument is somewhat similar. The 
 perception of the adaptation of means to ends,— for exam- 
 ple, the nature and proportion of the elements in their 
 adaptation to the needs of animals and of man; the cos- 
 mical arrangement of our planet in such manner as to 
 suit human needs; the myriad-fold adaptation of plants 
 to their surroundings, and the delicate, intricate contriv- 
 ances for their propagation; the creation by the plants of 
 storehouses filled with coal and petroleum for our use; 
 the multiplied mechanical contrivances for carrying on 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE I4l 
 
 the functions of animal life in the myriad forms of higher 
 and lower animals,—the perception of all this not only 
 shows that the soul which perceives it has in itself the 
 conscious power to adapt means to secure ends, the secret 
 consciousness of causal energy, which can bend things to 
 its will: it also shows that the whole universe is guided 
 by a universal reason to the accomplishment of harmoni- 
 ous designs, to the fulfilment of universal plans. The 
 sunbeam is as powerless in itself to decompose carbonic 
 acid and to deposit the carbon in a future coal-bed as 
 space is powerless to form a cubic crystal, as time is 
 powerless to determine the periods of the long rhythmic 
 successions of vegetable and animal life. The succession 
 of organic life is rhythmic. It returns at intervals to the 
 potentiality of the ovum and of the ovule. Therein lies a 
 secret beyond the power of space or time or mechanic 
 force. Potentiality is intellectual. The ovum or ovule 
 has no measurable force. Its power is infinitesimal, com- 
 pared with the chemical forces of even one molecule of 
 carbonic dioxide or of water. But behind it or within it 
 lies a power comparable to nothing known to us except 
 to the spontaneous choice, the free action, of our own will. 
 This infinitesimal power is omnipotent to guide the di- 
 vision of the molecules, when the tremors of the solar 
 ray have thrown the atoms, for an instant, to some point 
 of unstable equilibrium. At such moments, the ovule 
 directs the parts in different ways. The oxygen is per- 
 haps returned to the air; while the carbon is laid in place, 
 according to a predetermined plan, to build an organic 
 form similar to that of the parent’s plan. Somewhere, 
 that plan of the parent form exists in its entirety. It 
 potentially exists, else it would not become, at regular 
 
142 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 periods of a generation, an actuality. A potential plan — 
 proved, by its becoming actual, to have existed potentially 
 — existed in a mind,—a mind which designed and accom- 
 plished the design. This is the teleological argument, 
 which, like the morphological, builds partly upon a priori, 
 partly upon inductive, reasoning. It derives its irresist- 
 ible potency from the consilience of so many strong lines 
 of induction to the one conclusion,— the being and attri- 
 butes of God. 
 
 Thirdly, the perception of beauty, whether in things 
 sensible or in things intelligible, shows, not only that the 
 soul which perceives it possesses the third great attribute 
 of spirit,—the power of feeling: it also shows that the 
 Creator of the universe and of the soul is beneficent. 
 He has created man to be a partaker in his own divine 
 joys. Finite symmetry speaks to the head, infinitesimal 
 symmetry to the heart. To the Creator there may be 
 nothing great and nothing small. Even to our human 
 reason, the mere scale on which a thing is built is unim- 
 portant, in comparison with the intellectual skill of its 
 design and the beauty of its form. “Time and space are 
 great only with reference to the faculties of the beings 
 which note them.” It is in the power of God alone to 
 determine what shall be great, and what small, to us. 
 That is, he alone can establish our scale, and give us our 
 unit. He has done so, not only by fixing the size of our 
 planet, the average size of our bodies, and their average 
 strength, the maximum velocity attainable in our atmos- 
 phere, and the like, but also by limiting our power of per- 
 ception. There is a minimum z7szbile. Even the most 
 wonderful microscope has limits to its magnifying power, 
 the most wonderful telescope limits to its ability to pene- 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE 143 
 
 trate space. We cannot set the limits to human ability 
 with precision; but we know that it has limits in every 
 one of our senses and faculties. 
 
 Within the limits of direct observation, those phenomena 
 which are distinctly seen to be modes of motion make 
 their primary appeal to the mind, and only secondarily 
 affect the feelings. But those phenomena which are not 
 recognized by sense as modes of motion — for example, 
 odors, flavors, temperatures, colors, and tones — appeal 
 primarily to feeling only, secondarily to thought. They 
 give us sensuous pleasure, they make up the comforts of 
 life ; and, when odors, flavors, temperatures, have put the 
 body at ease, then color and tone delight the mind, and 
 afford a vehicle for the expression of spiritual feeling. 
 They are a vehicle of spiritual expression. God, in them 
 and through them, gives us higher views of spiritual 
 beauty, and calls us more lovingly and earnestly to attain 
 for ourselves the beauty of holiness. 
 
 We do not, by this last expression, mean to indorse the 
 sentimental theory of ethics. But, in the discussion of 
 ethics, it is emphatically true that of many different and 
 divergent theories each may have in it a portion of truth. 
 When we attempt to examine this fourth field, and con- 
 sider the question of the nature of right and wrong, which 
 the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures assume that men 
 can, at least in large degree, determine for themselves, we 
 shall find that it has analogies to each of the preceding 
 fields. The unity of human nature and of the universe is 
 so great that Emerson’s Sphinx declares,— 
 
 ‘Who telleth one of my meanings 
 Is master of all I am.” 
 
144 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 Thus, Tennyson also declares that, if he could but 
 understend wholly the little weed in the cranny of the 
 wall, he would also know what God and man is. When 
 we attempt to probe the question of right and of duty, 
 when we ask ourselves what is the foundation of obliga- 
 tion, we perceive that in the spiritual world, in the rela- 
 tions of men looked at on the side of the heart, there is 
 order or disorder; that moral good consists in a conform- 
 ity to this divine order in the moral universe. Herein is 
 the analogy between ethics in the spiritual, and morphol- 
 ogy in the external world. Thus regarded, the question 
 of right is an intellectual question. In considering it, 
 the intellect sees that the moral order of the spiritual 
 world was, like the physical order of the material uni- 
 verse, established by unerring wisdom, by an infinite 
 mind, foreseeing all consequences from the beginning and 
 arranging all things with perfect skill. Here also is the 
 analogy between ethics and the teleological view of ex- 
 ternal nature. The spiritual faculties, the tastes, pas- 
 sions, and sentiments of man, are such as to bring about 
 the historical ends designed by God. This view leads to 
 the sciences of political economy, of social statics and dy- 
 namics, of politics and statesmanship, in the best senses. 
 In all these sciences, the assumptions are secretly made, 
 which the Hebrew prophets from the beginning openly 
 declared, that the Judge of all the earth will do right; that 
 the course of nations and of individuals is subject to his 
 control, and that he rules them to attain his own final 
 ends. 
 
 It must also be acknowledged that there is a beauty in 
 holiness, just as there is a beauty in figures, tones, or colors. 
 When the mind takes in the perception of a rounded, sym- 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE 145 
 
 metrical character, standing in just and harmonious rela- 
 tions with other men, and in a reverent, filial, trusting, 
 obedient attitude toward God, it certainly has a quiet 
 delight in the perception. This sense of moral beauty is 
 more satisfying and profound than can be given by any 
 other object whatever, whether in the realm of nature, art, 
 or fiction. Yet that sense of beauty, awakened by the 
 perception of a holy character, is certainly a very different 
 thing from the sense of our own obligation to be holy. 
 That this sense of obligation also exists in the human 
 heart is the testimony of all human languages, in all ages 
 and in all countries. 
 
 The attempt is often made to account for this sense of 
 obligation without admitting the reality of obligation. For 
 example, it is said that the experience of men early teaches 
 them that certain courses of action are destructive to the 
 interests of the community. The community, then, inter- 
 dicts such action; and generations of children brought up 
 under such interdiction presently acquire a sense of obliga- 
 tion to refrain. In proof that this is the source of the 
 sense of obligation, we are referred to the familiar fact that 
 persons brought up to regard innocent things as wicked 
 feel as much horror of conscience in transgressing the 
 fancied obligation as they would from real sin. This argu- 
 ment is part of the general system of empirical philosophy, 
 which refers everything to custom and to experience. 
 But custom and experience can only develop and bring 
 out into clear light and actual consciousness ideas and 
 perceptions which already lay potentially in the mind and 
 in the objects of perception. Otherwise, custom and ex- 
 perience might make a Shakspere from an ass’s colt, a 
 Newton from the spawn of an oyster. Matter and motion 
 
146 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 bring out into distinct consciousness our perceptions of 
 Space and time; but experience in matter and motion 
 never could give the judgment of necessity in the relations 
 of space and time. Experience never could have sug- 
 gested to Mathesis the consideration of a fourth dimen- 
 sion in space, and of a duration in time neither before nor 
 after a given epoch. Custom and experience may guide 
 or misguide us in deciding what is right and what is 
 wrong ; but they could not create in the soul that pecul- 
 lar sense of obligation, which looks not at the act ap- 
 proved or disapproved, but at the motive, the purpose, 
 which is justified or condemned. 
 
 Still, it may be asked on what grounds we condemn or 
 justify the motive, if it be not upon the grounds of a 
 broader utility. When we say that a certain motive is to 
 be condemned, do we mean by it, in the last analysis, any- 
 thing more than this: that we perceive that, in the indul- 
 gence of such motives, there would come harm in the long 
 run? When we say that a motive is good, do we mean by 
 it anything further than this,— that the indulgence of that 
 motive would, in the end, lead to good? 
 
 The answer is manifest. Expediency and utility, taken 
 in this broadest sense, may be, and are, exceedingly useful 
 tests of moral axioms. But there are cases to which we 
 cannot apply the test,— cases, also, in which dependence 
 on that test would be exceedingly dangerous. The ethi- 
 cal instincts of an individual are, very often, too weak to 
 withstand the sophistry of the individual mind. Yet the 
 individual mind, almost universally, trusts its own intel- 
 lectual conclusions. If, therefore, a man saw no possible 
 harm, and great actual benefit, as likely to result from an 
 act, he would, under such a utilitarian theory of morals, 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE 147 
 
 be very apt to disregard utterly the ethical judgment of 
 the community, and even to regard his own scruples as 
 weaknesses. 
 
 A great many examples might be brought forward 
 to illustrate this point. Let one suffice. Innumerable 
 breaches of trust, embezzlement of funds, and forgeries of 
 notes, have been committed by persons who intended no 
 injury or injustice to any one. They thought that they 
 were certain of success in their speculation, and that they 
 would replace the funds, or take up the notes, and never 
 be detected ; that they would do no one else any harm, 
 and yet enrich themselves. Now, according to the theory 
 of morals which we are considering, the sin of these men 
 seems to have been only that of acting when they were 
 not absolutely sure. If they had had actual certainty of 
 their gains and of escaping detection, if they had never let 
 any living soul know of their action, then they would have 
 done neither present nor prospective harm, and on this 
 false theory would have been justified in their acts. Yet 
 every honest heart revolts against such a decision. 
 Every honest heart feels that such a man would have lost 
 his integrity. If he did not feel ashamed of himself and 
 feel guilty in God’s presence, he ought to feel ashamed, he 
 ought to lose his self-respect. At the basis of this moral 
 judgment of honest, honorable men there lies a peculiar 
 idea of moral right,— not capable of being resolved into 
 utility or into reasonableness, unless utility and reasona- 
 bleness be redefined for the express purpose of making the 
 words include the right. It must be conceded that every 
 manifestation of spiritual power is made through the 
 medium of motion in some form. It does not follow that 
 every manifestation of spiritual power is to be explained 
 
148 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 by geometry and algebra. However perfectly the science 
 of acoustics and musical statics may analyze the movements 
 of the air and of the ear, in an oratorio or symphony, they 
 can give no account whatever of the sensations felt by a 
 musical ear that hears it and a sympathetic heart that feels 
 it. No analysis of geometrical forms and rhythmical pulses 
 in the waves of light can interpret the “meaning in the 
 live repose of the valley behind the mill.” That speaks 
 out of the heart of God to the heart of man,—secret 
 chambers which lie not in space nor time, but in spirit. 
 And just as the sensation in consciousness is different 
 from and of a higher order than any motion in the body by 
 which the sensation is produced, just as the sentiment or 
 expression of a work of art is different from and of a higher 
 order than the mere sensation or sensuous pleasure which 
 it gives, so the judgment of right and wrong is different 
 from and higher than any judgment of individual or general 
 happiness or utility, than any judgment of reasonableness 
 or unreasonableness, folly or wisdom. It bears a strong 
 analogy to these latter judgments; and, by a strained use 
 of the words “utility” and “reasonableness,” either of them 
 may be made to cover right and duty. But it is unwise to 
 put this strain upon those words. The effect will inevi- 
 tably be, not to enlarge and dignify the words, but to de- 
 grade our conception of right by dragging it down to the 
 ordinary meaning of usefulness and expediency, or to the 
 ordinary meaning of wisdom and prudence. The unso- 
 phisticated, pure heart feels that there is a heaven-wide 
 difference between a virtuous man, whose heart is not in- 
 clined to evil, but is set on what is right, and a prudent 
 man, who is afraid to do wrong lest discovery bring dis- 
 grace and punishment. Let us not, by any abuse of lan- 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE T49 
 
 guage, do anything toward confusing that difference in 
 any mind. 
 
 Jouffroy, in his Introduction to Ethics, briefly reviews 
 the principal attempts which have been made to analyze 
 the idea of right. Before so doing, he gives a brief sketch 
 of his own views, in the form of a summary of the facts of 
 consciousness. This summary, as I recall it, was some- 
 what of the following character: An infant acts from 
 sporadic impulses, almost unconsciously or automatically. 
 As he grows older, he controls these impulses, and more 
 consciously directs them to gain his ends; but those ends 
 are, at first, simply the fulfilment of chance impulses. 
 Presently, difficulties arise in the way of his action. He 
 concentrates and bends his energies to overcome them. 
 He deliberately chooses a course, and presses on to follow 
 it. This course, however, is at first short, leading only 
 over and through the particular difficulty which arouses 
 him to action. But, by this means, he is awakened to a 
 true self-consciousness. He learns that he need not be 
 and ought not to be driftwood, the sport of winds and 
 waves. He begins to feel that he ought to seize the helm, 
 choose his own course, consult the heavens, and stead- 
 fastly force his vessel to use wind and wave, to accom- 
 plish the voyage upon which he has determined. At this 
 time, the question arises, What should be the end and 
 aim of his course? 
 
 Then there dawns upon his mind the idea of right: 
 there arises in his heart the feeling of obligation, of duty. 
 The question next arises, What is right? We may put 
 this answer still into the same figurative form in which 
 we have put this question. The youth, asking what 
 course to take, examines his vessel, his books, his charts, 
 
I50 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 and his instruments, and in this search finds that he is 
 sailing under sealed orders. These are to be opened, and 
 read with care: they define his duty. The vessel is not 
 his own: he has not gone out for his own pleasure, on a 
 yachting excursion. The master of the vessel, to whom 
 he owes everything, has given him these sealed orders, 
 which he must open, consult, and obey. In other words, 
 the duty of a created being is to fulfil the object of his 
 creation, to perform his destined duties and attain his 
 destined end. And the destined uses and ends of a cre- 
 ated being can be discovered by a study of its powers and 
 capabilities. 
 
 Thus, we are brought back, in the consideration of duty, 
 as in all other excursions of the reason, to the one central 
 Being out of whose power and wisdom and love all thing's 
 flow. Weare bound to fulfil the duties, to aim at the end, 
 for which God made us. We can discover what those 
 duties are, what that high end is, only by a careful study 
 of our own nature, our powers and capabilities. In the 
 study of this nature, we must, of course, study not simply 
 our individual self, in whom some unusual defect may 
 occur, but we must study the human race. In this study 
 of human nature, we find revealed to us the existence of a 
 profound moral order, embracing all the spiritual universe. 
 Right consists in conformity to that universal moral 
 order. Thus, right, like truth, like beauty, like the good, 
 cannot be known in its absolute perfection by finite man, 
 but only by the infinite God. Thus, the Apostle Paul 
 says that he was conscious of no sin; yet that did not 
 prove him innocent, since the only true judge of innocence 
 is the Lord. Right is that which is right in his sight. 
 
 It is frequently objected that the will of God cannot be 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE ISI 
 
 thus made the ultimate foundation of duty, since that 
 would imply that he might have commanded sin to be 
 holy. There is, however, no such implication in the doc- 
 trine. When we approach these highest and deepest 
 questions, we should remember that logic-chopping and 
 quibbling are as much out of place as puns or jokes would 
 be. Our conception of God, to which every line of induc- 
 tive reasoning leads us, forbids the possibility of his mak- 
 ing us to do aught else than that which is right. As his 
 unerring wisdom and infinite knowledge forever prevent 
 our even imagining that he could attempt aught that is 
 contradictory to mathematical laws, or aught that would 
 be absurd, so they prevent the possibility of our imagining 
 that he could create moral beings to live in immoral rela- 
 tions. He has made us subject to the laws of moral har- 
 mony. He has given us that limited freedom by which 
 alone we could learn to understand what moral order is; 
 and what a sublime inheritance he offers to those who will 
 voluntarily conform to that order! Wedo not doubt that, 
 in the Divine mind, reasonableness, utility, and right are 
 one with infinite beauty and truth. But, to the human 
 mind, that unity is seen only by faith, not by sight. To 
 the human mind, that which is rational and reasonable is 
 so constantly disparate from that which is useful that one 
 cannot be a safe guide to the other. In like manner, that 
 which is right seems, to a human mind, so frequently dis- 
 tinct from that which is profitable that any attempt to live 
 by a consideration of either alone would be foolish. We 
 are often at a loss to know which of two courses would 
 be most profitable, when both of them appear to be per- 
 fectly right; that is, we are perplexed to know which of 
 two courses duty demands, and cannot see that either of 
 
152 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 them would be more useful than the other. On the other 
 hand, we sometimes have a strong sentiment, a moral con- 
 viction, that certain courses of action or moods of feeling 
 are wrong, although we cannot see any immediate or pro- 
 spective evil to arisefrom them. Nay, we sometimes thus 
 condemn, in our secret conscience, things in which we 
 could not distinctly see anything but pleasure and ad- 
 vantage were they not condemned by the moral sense. 
 
 This ethical sense is as original and peculiar a gift as 
 any of the faculties of our nature. It frequently takes the 
 place of reason for us, in the same manner that hunger and 
 thirst take the place of reason. The appetite takes the 
 place of reason by making us eat and drink at such times 
 and in such quantities as will sustain the bodily strength. 
 Smell and taste take the place of reason for us by leading 
 us to a choice of wholesome foods. Throughout our nat- 
 ure, powers of sensation, feeling, and impulse, lead us, in 
 an automatic way, to do that which we might forget or 
 neglect to do, if we were left wholly to the guidance of our 
 own conscious thought. This is the continual action of 
 faculties that lie too deep for consciousness, implanted and 
 guided by the unerring and eternal wisdom and love of the 
 Creator. In a perfectly analogous manner, the ethical 
 sense, the deep feeling of obligation, of duty, of the neces- 
 sity for obeying God, is a perpetual witness to his kind- 
 ness, his condescension to his children. The highest fruits 
 and highest benefits of life can be enjoyed only through a 
 voluntary, spontaneous conformity to the divine moral 
 order of the spiritual universe. The sense of obligation, 
 of duty, is our perpetual reminder of this vital truth. 
 It is, as the very structure of many languages shows that 
 it has been always felt to be, the testimony of God himself 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE 1$3 
 
 to us, the perpetual witness of the spirit of God to our 
 spirits that we are the sons of God, and bound to live as 
 becomes our high origin. Conscience is, as the word im- 
 plies, a mutual knowledge of the sinner and of the one 
 sinned against. A conscience, to have real peace, must 
 be at peace with God, and rejoice in communion with 
 him. 
 
 But the restless reason, remote from the feelings, even 
 from the feeling of obligation, may still ask, Wherein is the 
 necessity for conformity to the moral order of the universe, 
 any more than for conformity to the physical order? 
 Why, she asks, should you insist upon an “I ought” and 
 “I must” in regard to morals, any more than in regard 
 to any other department of human thought,— science, for 
 example, or fine art? The first answer obviously is that 
 we make this difference because there is a difference. We 
 make a difference between colors and odors because there 
 is a difference. Colors affect the eye, odors the sense of 
 smell. The judgments on the two cannot be compared 
 with each other. In like manner, an error of judgment is 
 lamented as a mistake; an error of choice in matters of 
 fine art is a mere defect of taste; but an error of choice 
 in matters of duty is a sin. That is human nature: it 
 feels concerning moral actions a peculiar kind of approval 
 or condemnation. It feels that we ought or we ought 
 not. T’hus, moral necessity seems to us stronger than 
 logical necessity, just as logical necessity is ee: than 
 physical. 
 
 The inquiry perpetually arises as to the consequences 
 of disregarding this feeling of moral necessity. The dis- 
 regard of physical necessities leads to an injury of mate- 
 rial property or of the human frame. A disregard of 
 
154 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 logical necessities leads to intellectual errors, which may 
 or may not draw us into the further folly of disregarding 
 physical necessity. These are the natural sanctions at- 
 tached to the physical and intellectual laws of nature. 
 They may, figuratively, be called the punishments for the 
 violation of such law. But what are the consequences of 
 disregarding moral obligation? If this obligation be 
 higher than either of the other two, one might suppose 
 that the consequences of disregarding it will be more 
 serious. In other departments of our nature, conformity 
 to natural law brings a benefit, neglect of that law brings 
 suffering, or, if not suffering, at least a crippling of power 
 and loss of enjoyment. This is the origin of a large pro- 
 portion of the evils and miseries of the world, they arise 
 from'a disregard and infraction of manifest natural law. 
 Ignorance of this law excuses no man, because plain and 
 repeated reminders of its existence and its penalties are 
 constantly given in the course of providence and by the 
 endowments of the human frame. It must be so also in 
 regard to moral law. In the moral sense and in religious 
 convictions there is a constant assertion of the supremacy 
 of moral and religious considerations. No judgment, said 
 Dr. Channing, can be just or wise which is not founded 
 upon a conviction of the paramount worth and importance 
 of duty. Reason herself must acknowledge that the high- 
 est of all laws is the law which binds us to obey law. 
 And, if all lower laws have their sanctions annexed, so 
 that their infraction brings misery, it is certainly so, also, 
 with the highest law. The disregard and neglect of 
 moral and religious obligation is a violation of the condi- 
 tions on which alone the highest life is possible. It must 
 therefore be followed by the most terrible loss, by the 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE 155 
 
 deepest death. This may be the reason why our ever 
 kind Creator implanted in us this peculiar, deep feeling of 
 the obligation of moral duty. That which is right is the 
 most useful of utilities, the best of all good, the highest 
 reason for all that is reasonable. The right is, therefore, 
 to be sought with every power of mind and heart and 
 soul. Conformity to the right is eternal joy. It is com- 
 munion with the All-holy and the All-good. On the 
 other hand, that which is wrong is more to be shunned 
 than all error or loss or suffering. Sin is worse than 
 idiocy, it is more unreasonable than folly, it is worse than 
 suicide, it is more than death. It is a destruction of the 
 highest life and highest powers. 
 
 There is another distinction, in our feelings concerning 
 right and wrong, which does not seem to us to be well ex- 
 plained by any utilitarian, or rational, or sentimental the- 
 ory of morals. When aman makes an intellectual error, 
 and brings upon himself loss or suffering, or when a man 
 shows himself destitute of appreciation for art and in- 
 capable of the enjoyment of beauty, we simply pity him. 
 We think that the course of nature gives him sufficient 
 punishment. We have not the slightest desire to add to 
 it. On the other hand, it is a universal feeling, when a 
 man does wrong, not only to condemn it, but to be indig- 
 nant at it, and to feel a desire to punish the wrong-doer. 
 This is a universal feeling, unless it be that a few of the 
 highest saints may find their indignation at sin swallowed 
 up in their profound pity for the sinner. But we all feel 
 how natural was that exclamation of Dr. Franklin (to 
 which we have before alluded), when he was told an in- 
 stance of treasonable treachery, and cried that if there 
 was no hell ready for such a traitor one ought to be made, 
 
156 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 The existence of this universal wish, to add punishment 
 to the natural effect of sin, is a problem for reason to 
 explain. 
 
 The solution of this problem must go deep into the 
 nature of sin and of punishment. When we talk of 
 natural law, we refer to that interlinked series of causes 
 and effects through which the actualities of existence are 
 manifested in sensible forms. In the external universe, 
 the natural laws are the conditions of existence and man- 
 ifestation. The violation of those laws simply interrupts 
 or defeats the possibilities of life, or of its special manifes- 
 tations which were dependent on those violated condi- 
 tions. In all this, we naturally feel that we have no part. 
 The universe is the embodiment of one grand thought of 
 its Creator. In any true work of art, a central idea takes 
 possession, so to speak, of the artistic soul, and necessi- 
 tates by its own nature, manifesting itself to his clear 
 imagination, every detail of the drama, or the symphony, 
 or the picture. Thus, in the universe, which is the arche- 
 type of all art and the formula of all sciences, one infi- 
 nitely complex, yet absolutely simple, thought, conceived 
 before eternity in the Eternal Mind, involves all the 
 minute details; and those details are not to be criticised 
 by our feeble and limited understanding of them. 
 
 In the moral sphere, it is totally different. There, the 
 idea of cause enters in its true sense as an uncaused 
 cause. The series of causes and effects in the universe 
 embraces only causes in a secondary sense of that word. 
 In the primal sense of the word “cause,” physical causes 
 are no causes. They are prior effects. Reason can accept 
 nothing as truly a cause except that which itself is un- 
 caused. There alone it can rest. Thus, in tracing back 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE 157 
 
 physical causes, we come finally to the act of God; and 
 there we rest in the ultimate cause. Precisely in the same 
 manner, in the consideration of human actions, we come 
 toasimple “I chose”; to a Pilate’s “What I have written 
 I have written,” behind which we cannot always go. 
 These simple volitions of men choosing good and evil are 
 therefore only partly involved in the courses of secondary 
 cause and effect. The reasons which flow from the natural 
 effect of our actions are not deemed by men sufficient, as 
 affording motives to right choice, either by way of reward 
 or by way of punishment. The conception of moral obli- 
 gation, of virtue, and of sin, involves the conception of 
 good or ill desert ; and human experience shows that men 
 do not always get their deserts. We remember hearing 
 men, fifty years ago, maintain that it was an arraignment 
 of the Divine justice to say this. From a peculiar inter- 
 pretation of the New Testament, they denied the existence 
 of any suffering beyond the moment of death, and there- 
 fore felt impelled by their sense of the justice of God to 
 affirm earnestly that the amount of happiness and misery 
 in this life is in exact proportion to a man’s virtue or sin. 
 But this affirmation is so contrary to the general experience 
 of mankind that this peculiar form of religious doctrine is 
 no longer pressed upon us. All believers in the immortal- 
 ity of man now admit that his condition in the world to 
 come must depend partly upon his character in the present 
 life. The history of speculation upon this subject shows 
 how ineradicable in the human mind is the conviction that 
 sin deserves, and must receive, a recompense of evil; how 
 ineradicable, also, the conviction that it does not, invari- 
 ably, receive that recompense from the natural course of 
 events in this life. 
 
158 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 It is, however, still affirmed by some that the recom- 
 pense for sin arises solely from the inevitable working of 
 universal and invariable laws, extending into the life be- 
 yond the grave. The attempted demonstration of Strauss 
 is applied to this question. God being infinite, he says, 
 can act only simultaneously throughout all space, and syn- 
 chronously through eternity. We can, however, admit no 
 such conclusion concerning the Infinite First Cause. Be- 
 cause he is the First Cause, uncaused, he is removed from 
 any such supposed necessity, and is free to do whatever is 
 reasonable, wise, holy, and beneficent. Even our own 
 will, feeble as it is, being still free, is partly removed from 
 the domination of secondary causes. We therefore feel the 
 need of arbitrary reward and punishment to help its feeble- 
 ness. All parental government, all school discipline, all 
 civil and criminal jurisprudence, proceeds upon this as- 
 sumption, and goes upon this basis. We may frequently 
 err, and do frequently err, in our attempt to supplement 
 natural laws; but we do not on that account decline to 
 make the effort to supplement them. We cannot shake 
 off the duty of government. We cannot admit the doc- 
 trine that the natural consequences of sin are a sufficient 
 punishment for sin. We cannot admit it without intro- 
 ducing confusion and discord into the family, and misery 
 and anarchy into the state. How, then, can we doubt 
 that, when the whole history of man is known in this life 
 and in that which is to come, we shall find a system of 
 divine rewards and punishments, independent of and sup- 
 plementary to the natural effects of secondary causes? 
 This is that which renders the forgiveness of sin possible, 
 and thus justifies our Lord Jesus in teaching us to pray, 
 “Forgive our sins, for even we forgive those who trespass 
 
THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIENCE I59 
 
 against us.” If the punishment for sin consisted wholly 
 in the natural effects of universal and invariable law, no 
 forgiveness would be possible. Neither parents nor friends 
 could forgive their children, nor could God forgive us. 
 
 We are, of course, speaking of absolute forgiveness. 
 In a relative sense of the word, there is a provision for 
 forgiveness in the physiological constitution of man. 
 Poison and disease may be completely eradicated from 
 the system. Opportunity is given for repentance until 
 the transgression has reached a certain amount. The 
 moral obligation upon man requires absolute chastity, 
 absolute temperance; but this obligation cannot be proved 
 by observation from experience. It requires an appeal to 
 first principles in spiritual things, above the reach of any 
 finite experience. And the fact that minor sins against 
 temperance and chastity, if early repented of and thor- 
 oughly, completely, forsaken, may leave no visible trace 
 of mischief on the bodily frame, confirms the metaphysic 
 of the Lord’s Prayer. It gives a natural ground for hope 
 that the moral condemnation which visits the slightest 
 infraction of these laws and weighs heavily against the 
 character, even though the body be unharmed, may also 
 be removed by sincere shame and true repentance. But 
 our sense of justice, demanding punishment beyond the 
 natural consequence of guilt, expressing itself in penal 
 regulations in the family, school, church, and state, is a 
 strong, an unanswerable argument for attributing justice 
 to God; and for believing that, although the natural 
 course of events may not punish guilt, a Divine course of 
 action reaching beyond the domain of nature will infallibly 
 bring a just retribution, unless a sincere shame and true 
 repentance first bring the transgressor to seek forgiveness 
 at the foot of the cross. 
 
X. 
 THE INFINITE IN MAN. 
 
 In preceding lectures, we have briefly sketched a few of 
 the numerous lines of argument confirming the great pri- 
 mal truth of the being and attributes of God. Starting 
 from the primary facts of knowledge, we show that things 
 which appear, only appear; and that the realities behind 
 the appearances are time and space and conscious mind. 
 These alone we absolutely know to exist. The force which 
 causes motion may proceed from conscious will. Origi- 
 nally, it must have proceeded from conscious will. Our 
 sense of necessity is not satisfied when we simply attrib- 
 ute motion to some preceding motion. The clear inward 
 vision, infinitely sharper than any microscope and reach- 
 ing infinitely further than the telescope, perceives that 
 there must necessarily be a cause of motion. It is, there- 
 fore, not satisfied by being shown a means. The physical 
 philosopher, starting on a search for causes, pursues his 
 inquiries for thousands of years, builds up great sciences, 
 and fills libraries with the results of his labors. But, 
 among all those results, he has not reached a cause: 
 he has only shown means and instruments and methods 
 by which the results are accomplished. The original 
 cause, equally with the final purpose, lies outside of 
 what are now recognized as the limits of purely physical 
 inquiry. 
 
THE INFINITE IN MAN IOI 
 
 Physical science seeks only to discover the consecutive 
 order of the phenomena. For her purposes, it is sufficient 
 to consider an immediately preceding phenomenon as the 
 cause of the succeeding. For all that physical science 
 cares, the universe may be considered self-caused, as 
 being in its totality, at each instant, an effect of its state 
 in the preceding instant, and the cause of its state in the 
 succeeding instant. Such a view of cause will not, how- 
 ever, satisfy the demand of reason. It implies a continual 
 change in the total state of the universe, and gives no 
 hint of a cause of that change. In finite things, this de- 
 mand for a cause is only satisfied by reaching the self- 
 determined choice of a free agent. In regard to physical 
 changes, the discovery of what is called the physical cause 
 is only the discovery of a means, exciting a new curiosity 
 to trace the cause further back. It is only when we 
 come to the determination or choice of a moral agent that 
 we find any rest in this search for cause. We are led, in 
 like manner, to attribute the original state of the universe, 
 its original emergence from potentiality into actuality, to 
 the free choice of an infinite, sovereign Will. No other 
 cause can be assigned for the perpetual series of changes 
 in the totality of its conditions. To this conclusion, we 
 have found various lines of inductive reasoning to give 
 strong confirmation. The universe embodies and _ illus- 
 trates myriad laws of symmetry in space, and of rhythm 
 in time. This is almost in itself a demonstration that 
 nature sprang from a mind capable of seeing symmetry 
 and rhythm. We have shown that this result is further 
 strengthened by the discovery that certain forms of sym- 
 metry in space and of rhythm in time, embodied in nature, 
 are capable of being expressed in one and the same alge- 
 
162 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 braic formula, as though one mind had planned both em- 
 bodiments of the one algebraic law. | 
 
 But the world is not only thus the embodiment of 
 mathematical ideas: it is a vastly complicated system of 
 means and ends,— so much so that teleological language 
 is the simplest mode of expressing many of the facts of 
 nature. 
 
 Even further than this, the assumption that everything 
 in nature has been accomplished with the utmost economy 
 of force and the greatest attainment of purposes becomes, 
 in the hands of the mathematician, a fertile means of dis- 
 covering laws of nature. For example, many facts of 
 acoustics, thermotics, and optics; many, also, in the 
 higher branches of vegetable and animal physiology,— 
 have been or may be deduced from the simple assumption 
 of the infinite wisdom of God, and the corollary that he 
 would waste no force. 
 
 Still further, we have shown that the world is the em- 
 bodiment of beauty, of love, and of justice. We have, 
 however, confessed that in these higher departments the 
 arguments are less capable of being put into logical 
 formule. Those who discuss questions of natural theol- 
 ogy are always inclined to seek intellectual forms of argu- 
 ment, and have, therefore, not usually felt so keenly the 
 strength of these arguments from higher sentiments. 
 The world, however, in general, does not endeavor to 
 formulate its convictions in language. Its clearest, strong- 
 est, and most assured beliefs are frequently incapable of 
 being either put into definite words or defined by syllogis- 
 tic argument. The conclusions of the heart are, in gen- 
 eral, less liable to error than those of the head. The 
 number of those who are indifferent to the moral expres- 
 
THE INFINITE IN MAN 163 
 
 sion of Nature is not so large as the number of those who 
 are incapable of analyzing her thought. 
 
 All lines of inductive reasoning, however, fail of leading 
 absolutely to the infinite. The universe, as we see it and 
 know it by observation, is not infinite. Our demand for a 
 first cause of the visible universe does not, therefore, ask 
 for an absolutely infinite cause. Much less do lines of in- 
 duction, which take in but a few facts of observation, lead 
 to absolutely infinite results. It has therefore been ob- 
 jected that theological reasoning can only render probable 
 the existence of a God, and cannot prove the existence of 
 God in the highest sense. Even some of the strongest 
 theists have made this concession. Dr. Samuel Clarke 
 admits that, in his demonstration of the being of God, he 
 only proves the existence of a wise God, not of an infinitely 
 wise and infinitely powerful being. Immanuel Kant, in 
 his “Critique of the Pure Reason,” states very strongly the 
 same view of the impossibility of demonstrating infinite 
 attributes in the Creator of a finite universe. Yet the 
 idea of causation shows that the universe had its origin in 
 an eternal, self-existing being. This, says Clarke, is one 
 of the first and most natural conclusions which any man 
 who thinks at all can form, All things cannot possibly 
 have arisen out of nothing, neither can they have de- 
 pended upon one another in an endless succession. In 
 either case, the universe would be without a cause. The 
 question is, however, What are the attributes of the 
 original cause? This question, it is usually thought, can 
 be answered only by induction from the universe itself. 
 
 Here, then, we appear to leave demonstration. We 
 rest upon the evidence of finite facts: therefore, our con- 
 clusions cannot reach infinity. Let us, however, remem- 
 
164 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 ber that an inadequate cause is not a cause. There must 
 be some proportion between the cause and the effect. 
 The effect, the universe, embraces intelligent moral 
 beings: the cause of the universe, therefore, cannot be 
 devoid of intelligence and of moral attributes. John 
 Stuart Mill has seen fit to put an answer to this theistic 
 argument into the absurd form of saying that pepper in 
 the broth does not prove pepper in the cook. The reply 
 is so obvious that Mill can hardly have failed to see it; 
 namely, that pepper in the broth does prove that the cook 
 had pepper. We are under a logical necessity of assum- 
 ing every being to be either conscious or unconscious. 
 A being neither conscious nor unconscious is as im- 
 possible to our imagination as a period of time neither 
 past nor future. We are also under a logical necessity of 
 regarding that which is conscious as of higher rank than 
 that which is unconscious. We are under the equal 
 necessity of agreeing with Anselm in making a cause of 
 higher rank than the effect, of admitting that the depend- 
 ent must depend upon something greater than itself. We 
 cannot imagine or admit that an unconscious cause can 
 produce conscious being. If we allow Mr. Mill's postu- 
 late, that a cause need not be similar to its effect, we must 
 also claim the postulate that a cause must be sufficient for 
 its effect. Matter and mechanical force are not a suffi- 
 cient cause for the production of even a finite personality, 
 while an infinite person is a sufficient cause for the whole 
 universe of matter and motion. 
 
 It may appear, however, that the great gap to be 
 bridged is the interval between a personal, self-existent 
 cause of the universe and the absolutely infinite God, per- 
 fect in every attribute. All our arguments seem to run 
 
THE INFINITE IN MAN 165 
 
 from the fact of existence, on the chain of causation, to a 
 self-existent being; from the fact of finite, personal, moral 
 agents up to the personality of that self-existent cause. 
 But it may be said that the difficult problem is, How from 
 such a God, proved by reasoning from finite facts, we are 
 to rise to the conception of an ideal, infinitely perfect 
 being. Clarke does it simply in the manner of Anselm, 
 from the higher rank of a cause, as compared with an 
 effect. ‘The self-existent being must of necessity, being 
 the original of all things, contain in itself the sum and 
 highest degree of all the perfections of all things.” 
 Kant’s ground is very similar. “The present world,” he 
 Says, “opens to us so immense a theatre of diversity, 
 order, fitness, and beauty, whether we seek after them in 
 the infinite of space or in its infinitesimal divisions, that, 
 even in the knowledge which our weak reason has been 
 able to attain, language lacks power to express the multi- 
 tude and greatness of its wonders, so that our judgment 
 of the whole terminates in a speechless, and therefore the 
 more eloquent, astonishment. We everywhere behold a 
 chain of effects and causes, ends and means, regular begin- 
 nings and endings. Nothing has come of itself into its 
 present state, but always indicates another thing further 
 back as its cause, rendering precisely the same inquiry 
 into causes necessary, so that the great universe would 
 sink into non-existence did we not admit something self- 
 existent, original, independent, external to this vast series 
 of changes, the cause of its origin. How great are we to 
 represent this primal cause of the universe? We are not 
 acquainted with the whole of the universe, still less can 
 we compare the actual with the possible. But why should 
 we not, since we require an external being superior to all 
 
166 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 the actual as a cause of the actual, suppose that being to 
 be superior also to everything possible?... It would be 
 comfortless, and also futile, to attempt to show any lack 
 of authority for such a supposition.” 
 
 We perceive, therefore, that both the great Englishman 
 and the greater German metaphysician make the same 
 leap across the chasm. They admit that demonstration 
 only goes so far as to prove the existence of one original, 
 self-existent cause. They claim that induction goes so 
 far as to show overwhelming evidence that the cause of 
 the universe is a wise intelligence, whose will is the cause 
 of the phenomena which his wisdom planned. Then, by 
 a single leap, they spring to the conclusion that this wise 
 power is the one original, self-existent Being, and that his 
 attributes are all absolutely infinite, that he is infinite in 
 his perfections. Mr. Herbert Spencer admits the first 
 conclusion. He says, indeed, that the existence of one 
 original, self-existent cause is the most certain of all 
 truths; not exceeded in certainty by our knowledge of our 
 own existence, and equally thrust upon our attention at 
 every turn of our conscious life. Further than this he at 
 first refused to go, and would not admit that induction 
 shows the Creator of the world to be wise or good; much 
 less, that it shows him to be infinitely wise and infinitely 
 good. 
 
 Yet the induction for the wisdom and even for the good- 
 ness of God is immeasurably strong. It is impossible for 
 fancy to imagine a universe moving by law, fulfilling or 
 carrying into realization an ideal plan, and showing any 
 more numerous and satisfactory proofs of the intelligent 
 foresight and perfect skill of its creator than the actual 
 universe shows. All actuality, all realization, known to 
 
THE INFINITE IN MAN 167 
 
 us, 1S in space and time, and therefore amenable to mathe- 
 matical law. So far, therefore, as the purpose and func. 
 tion of actually existing things are known to us, we may 
 test the foresight ‘and skill of the Creator by subjecting 
 the creation to mathematical analysis. We may not be 
 sufficient masters of analysis to apply it to every actual 
 case in the creation; but, so far as we can apply it, it is 
 an absolute test. If we have no power to see and test 
 truth at all, then it is idle to argue either against or for 
 belief in God. To be thoroughly agnostic, a man should 
 be thoroughly sceptical; and a thorough sceptic, being 
 able to disprove nothing, ought to hold all things equally 
 true or equally false. He should therefore be just as sure 
 of spiritual realities as he is of the existence of the every- 
 day world about him. But if, on the other hand, we have 
 any power to see and test truth, then mathematical con- 
 clusions have absolute certainty, and mathematical tests 
 are absolute tests, 
 
 We cannot, however, bring external things into abso- 
 lute conformity to mathematical law, neither do we find 
 in nature any absolute conformity. If nature did, in any 
 instance, conform exactly to law, we could not recognize 
 it, because we have no means of absolute accuracy in the 
 measurement of either space or time. Vet we men bring 
 external things into so close a conformity to mathematical 
 law as to give absolute certainty of our intent; and, in 
 nature, we find a conformity so close as to give absolute 
 certainty to our interpretation. For example, the laws of 
 planetary motion and the laws of crystalline forms are 
 held, in the mind of the man of science, to be absolutely 
 certain. Yet no observed position of the heavenly bodies 
 and no observed forms of crystals ever yet agreed exactly 
 
168 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 with those laws. Now, in applying mathematical law as 
 a test of the wisdom and foresight of the Creator, there 
 are numerous instances in which the law of the created 
 form is demonstrated to be the perfect and only perfect 
 law, although the actual individual form may never be in 
 absolute conformity with that law. It may, however, be 
 said that these numerous instances do not absolutely 
 prove that it is so in every instance. They demonstrate 
 the wisdom and foresight of the Creator; but they do not 
 demonstrate the perfection of that wisdom, much less do 
 they give a demonstration of the perfection of his moral 
 attributes. How, then, isit that we presume, with Kant, 
 to make the leap, and rush to the conclusion that the 
 original, self-existent cause is not only absolutely eternal 
 in his being, but absolutely infinite in every conceivable 
 and inconceivable perfection ? 
 
 To answer this question, let us look a little more closely 
 at the meaning of infinity; and let us begin with the 
 simplest infinite,— the infinite of space. The word “infi- 
 nite” is negative in its form, meaning without bounds; but 
 its signification is positive. It does not so much refer to 
 the absence of limits as to the surpassing of all limits. 
 A line of infinite length is not simply a line without ends 
 nor a line to which you can assign no ends. It is a line 
 which actually and actively passes beyond all assignable 
 and all unassignable limits. When you attempt, in imagi- 
 nation, to trace such a line,—to pursue, for example, a 
 hyperbolic comet into space,— you recoil, not merely with 
 a sense of the impossibility of your coming to an end. 
 That merely negative perception could never generate 
 the sense of the sublime. You recoil at the perception 
 of the possibility of going on forever. Let us suppose 
 
 i et Mi to a a oh ar Mant a al aa NR a 
 
THE INFINITE IN MAN 169 
 
 your motion to be with accelerating velocity forever. 
 You can still go on forever. There will be, indeed, no 
 end. But that is not the peculiarity. The peculiarity is 
 that your motion would in that case be always beginning, 
 and that you will have at the end of eternity as far to go 
 as you had at the beginning, or would have had, had you 
 begun an eternity sooner. 
 
 Let us illustrate, further, by the conception of an end- 
 less but not infinite motion in space. Suppose a locomo- 
 tive to be running at the rate of a mile a minute. It is 
 evident that she will run two miles in two minutes, But 
 now suppose her to be of no weight, to be a mere point 
 in motion. Suppose, further, that, in the midst of this 
 run at the rate of a mile a minute, we may interpose as 
 many instantaneous stops as we please. The detention 
 is to operate instantaneously without slackening ; and, on 
 release, the speed of a mile a minute is to be instantane- 
 ously resumed. All this is of course physically impos- 
 sible, but our locomotive is now imaginary and without 
 momentum. Let, then, these detentions be as short as 
 we please,—say, for example, one second, or any fixed 
 minute fraction of a second. We have the choice of say- 
 ing when she shall stop. Let us choose that she should 
 stop a thousandth part of a second at the end of the first 
 mile, an equal time at the end of the next half-mile, then 
 at a quarter-mile, and so on, running each time half as far, 
 but having each detention the one-thousandth part of a 
 second, Then she would keep moving to all eternity, and 
 could never reach the end of the second mile. There 
 would be no end to her motion, but it would be far from 
 infinite. It would be all enclosed within two miles. The 
 motion in this case would be endless, both in space and 
 
170 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 in time; but it would be limited in space, and infinite only 
 in duration. 
 
 The idea of infinity, therefore, is not negative, but posi- 
 tive. It is not a merely fanciful idea, derived from such 
 examples of spectre locomotives and of hyperbolic comets 
 which may never have existed. It is an idea forced upon 
 every human being who has risen to conscious thought 
 concerning his origin and ‘his destiny. The child and the 
 savage as well as the philosopher wrestle with it, and are 
 vanquished by it. But that wrestling reveals to them 
 their strength. Like the fabled riddle of the Boeotian 
 sphinx, it reveals to the questioner himself. The mind 
 which can grapple with and wrestle with the problem of 
 the infinite, even though it be baffled by it, rises a victor, 
 in so far as this,— that it learns to recognize the element 
 of infinity in itself. A man’s power to reason out results 
 which he cannot imagine — to see, for example, that, how- 
 ever far he goes in one direction, he is still as exactly 
 in the centre of infinite space as before —conclusively 
 proves that he is not the mere product of a few pounds 
 avoirdupois of flesh and blood and bones. It is absolutely 
 impossible either to imagine or to reason out the possi- 
 bility of a few kilograms of chemicals rising to such con- 
 clusions concerning infinite space. In the language of 
 Emerson, man is himself a “clothed eternity.” The 
 “currents of universal being flow through him.” “He is 
 part or particle of God.” He sees the infinite, because he 
 is partaker in the infinite. 
 
 The vision of the infinite is by no means confined to 
 space and time. Why should we ask to explain our sud- 
 den leap, from the induction of the finite to the infinite, 
 in regard to spiritual attributes? Since we clearly see 
 
 ee a ee en ee ee ee 
 
 ee ee ee 
 
THE INFINITE IN MAN I7I 
 
 the infinite in space and time, what hinders our seeing 
 the infinite in spirit? The bodily senses take cognizance 
 only of finite extensions and finite durations, but the 
 mental vision sweeps beyond the universe and through 
 the eternities. In like manner, the sense of effort in 
 attention, the consciousness of volition in producing mo- 
 tion, the conscious resistance to pressure, give instances 
 only of finite measures of force. But long and patient in- 
 terrogation of Nature, voluminous records of her answers, 
 and patient scrutiny and analysis of those records 
 have revealed to man the omnipresence of the force 
 of gravity and of the elasticity and compression of the 
 ether. These forces are, in their amount, as much be- 
 yond the power of Arabic figures wielded by reason as 
 they are beyond our imagination. But it is not by mere 
 induction from even these tremendous forces that we 
 attain the idea of absolute omnipotence. The human 
 mind sprang to that conception, as it did to the concep- 
 tion of infinite space, from its own eagle vision. We bow 
 before the omnipotence of God, which we recognize be- 
 cause we have been made in his image. In a certain 
 sense, we have an omnipotence in ourselves in the very 
 ability to apprehend that such omnipotence exists. The 
 idea is its own voucher, and asks for no inductive proof 
 of its own certainty. The long lines of induction which 
 are sketched in essays upon natural theology are not 
 proofs—they are simply confirmations and illustrations 
 —of the truth to which the mind attains by a single 
 glance toward God. So far from being necessary in order 
 to convince us of the being and attributes of God, they 
 are, in that direction, of scarce any value. But, on the 
 other hand, they are invaluable in leading us to meditate 
 
172 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 upon, to expand, and to render clear our apprehension of, 
 his being and attributes. We attain the conception that 
 God is almighty by a single leap; but we give expansion, 
 definiteness, vividness, to our conception by a study of 
 the movements of the universe. 
 
 Thus, also, with the higher ideas of love and justice and 
 holiness: they lie above the sphere of induction and of 
 deduction; but they are not inaccessible to the mind of 
 man, since he is created in the image of the All-loving, 
 All-good, All-holy. We do not ask nor need the aid of 
 inductive reasoning to prove the reality and the infinite 
 value of these Divine attributes. But just as we need 
 extended bodies and rhythmical movements to be our 
 guides in bringing us to a knowledge of space and time 
 and in leading us to a recognition of and study of their re- 
 lations, and just as we need physical obstacles to our own 
 movements, and need arithmetical calculations of the 
 greatness of the mechanical powers of the universe, to 
 lead us to the contemplation of the Eternal and Almighty, 
 so we need the discipline of family relationship and social 
 intercourse, the rapture of conjugal love, the peace and 
 blessedness of philanthropy, the difficulties of human 
 government, and the study of jurisprudence and states- 
 manship and social science, to lead us to the contempla- 
 tion of that moral perfection, that unfathomable love and 
 justice, which guides and governs the universe. In this 
 moral realm, it is precisely as it is in regard to space and 
 time and mechanical force: induction does not lead to, 
 but only toward, the infinite. Induction leads us simply 
 to look in the right direction ; and then, by direct vision, 
 we see the infinite as clearly, incontrovertibly, unmis- 
 takably, as we can see the finite. 
 
THE INFINITE IN MAN 143 
 
 The mind cannot be satisfied without the perception of 
 the infinities of space and time, and of an original, self- 
 existent cause of all things, The heart cannot be satisfied 
 without an infinite, absolute justice, without an eternal, 
 infinite pity, without an almighty protector for injured in- 
 nocence and an inflexible avenger for insolent tyranny, 
 cruelty, and heartless wrong-doing. In other words, the 
 heart will not be satisfied without God. The intellect sees 
 that this unappeasable longing of the heart was implanted 
 there by the Creator. Thus, these heavenly affections 
 themselves become the strongest witness of the reality of 
 the things for which they long. 
 
 It is not unreasonable, then, for Kant and Dr. Samuel 
 Clarke to assume that we poor, finite creatures do not 
 construct in our own imagination any higher God, any 
 more potent, original, self-existent cause, or one endowed 
 with higher attributes, than are found in the real Cause of 
 the universe. There may be a great deal of pride and of 
 self-conceit in the human heart; but, in a sane mind, it 
 cannot go to the length of asserting that mortal man is 
 better or wiser than the original Builder of the universe, 
 or that he is even capable of conceiving one better. Even 
 the agnostic and the atheist indignantly repel the charge 
 that they think themselves capable of improving the con- 
 stitution of the world. The pessimist himself would have 
 to think more than twice before he could suggest any im- 
 provement in the laws of nature. 
 
 ‘* All is well and wisely put”’; 
 and there is nothing that can reasonably be said against 
 
 the doctrine that the soul of man, having in itself a cer- 
 tain infinite power of laying hold of infinity, has a direct 
 
174 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 vision not only of the infinite nature of space and time, 
 but of the infinite character of intellect, the possibility of 
 absolute knowledge,— nay, of the existence of an infinite 
 Mind governing the universe. The soul of man has, also, 
 a direct vision of the existence of a universal, absolute 
 justice, holiness, and benevolence, among the attributes of 
 
 the infinite God. 
 
XI. 
 REVATIVIDY ; AND REALLY. 
 
 Sir WitiiamM Hamitrton, of Edinburgh, was unques- 
 tionably one of the most learned and one of the most 
 acute Englishmen of the last generation; and his philo- 
 sophical writings are worthy of the most attentive study. 
 You will not, therefore, I trust, consider me as under- 
 valuing him and his labors if I point out to you a palpable 
 fallacy in one of his arguments, Berkeley, who preceded 
 Hamilton by more than a century, was a man of less 
 erudition, but of greater genius. Berkeley demonstrated 
 in a beautiful manner— what experiment afterward con- 
 firmed and illustrated —that the sense of sight, alone and 
 unaided,does not give the idea of space. Even the sight 
 of motion would not give the idea of space in three dimen- 
 sions. For this full idea of space we need the testimony 
 of the consciousness of muscular movements in all direc- 
 tions. So far Berkeley was unquestionably right. But 
 from that point his arguments and deductions became 
 less satisfactory, and some of them have been generally 
 rejected. Hamilton not only rejected Berkeley’s conclu- 
 sions, but rejected his well-established premises. Hamil- 
 ton himself was, I judge, peculiarly deficient in the ability 
 to see space. He spoke repeatedly with contempt of 
 geometry, the science of space; and he affirmed that 
 touch and motion could give no idea of shape. Shut a 
 
176 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 man up in a perfectly dark room for hours, he said, and, 
 let him feel about as he may, he cannot form any idea 
 of the shape of the room or of any object in it that is 
 too large for him to span. Not content with this absurd- 
 ity, he goes on to argue that the idea of space is derived 
 from sight, as is shown by the fact that imagined space 
 is always imagined as either light or dark. But he caps 
 the climax of absurdity by saying that even a man born 
 blind, who, according to his theory, ought to have no 
 conception of space at all, must, if he can imagine space, 
 imagine it dark. 
 
 When I first read this, I laughed outright, and said to 
 the class of young people who were reading with me, 
 Do you not see that a man born blind can have no 
 more imagination of darkness than of light? When 
 Samson had his eyes put out, in mature age, he could 
 sing, “All dark, amid the blaze of noon.” But the man 
 born blind is not in a world of darkness: he is in a world 
 as free from darkness as from light,—a world of sound 
 and temperature and motion, of odors and flavors, of 
 roughness and smoothness, of weight and friction, press- 
 ure and resistance to pressure, but not in a world visible 
 or invisible. The darkness and the light are both alike 
 to him: they lie for him in the abyss of potentiality; and 
 it is not in the power of his will or of his imagination to 
 evoke them. Sir William Hamilton of the nineteenth 
 century here falls immeasurably below the young George 
 Berkeley of the seventeenth. 
 
 A few weeks afterward I met a friend blind from 
 birth, in whom the power of seeing space is strongly 
 developed, and said to him: “I want to put you a prob- 
 lem. Draw a straight line of infinite length.” ‘“ Well,” 
 
RELATIVITY AND REALITY 177 
 
 said he, “I have done it.” “How did you draw it?” 
 “Straight, and infinitely long.” But, upon my pressing 
 him for the manner of the imagination, I found that he 
 had conceived a thread stretched, absolutely stretched, 
 and imagined himself gliding along, with the end of his 
 forefinger feeling the thread, and finding it without kinks, 
 without sag, and without end. His imagination of space 
 was not an imagination of the visible or of the invisible, 
 but of the tangible. At other times testing him, I have 
 found him in his imagination clucking, and listening to 
 the echoes from the form which I described to him, 
 his imagination thus interposing the audible and inaudi- 
 ble between his genuine space conception and his realiza- 
 tion of form by touch. 
 
 It might be inferred from this that his conception of 
 space and mine are entirely different. My imagination 
 of space is, as Hamilton described it, wholly visual. I 
 see, as it were, with the outward eye: I make a guasz 
 picture, or drawing, or visible model of forms in space; 
 and, if a model, imagine myself looking at it on every 
 side. None of this enters into his imagination, which, 
 on the contrary, is built up entirely of things that do 
 not enter at all into mine,— imagined sensations of his 
 finger-tips, or of his ears,as he feels or clucks at the 
 figure. 
 
 From this comparison certain men are fond of drawing, 
 with great positiveness, the conclusion that neither my 
 friend nor I have any real conception or knowledge of 
 space as it is. We know it, they tell us, only as it ap- 
 pears to us; and it appears entirely different to each of 
 us,— to me as a something visible, and to him as a some- 
 thing tangible or audible. There is nothing in common 
 
178 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 between his imagination of space and mine, and nothing 
 in common between either of our imaginations and the 
 reality. All that we know is our own sensations and our 
 imagined sensations; and, as in this case my friend im- 
 agines one kind of sensation,—touch or hearing,— 
 while I imagine only another,— sight,— there is nothing 
 in common in our imagination, and we neither of us have 
 any real knowledge. This is a philosophy which has 
 been put forward in all ages, and which threatens to be- 
 come fashionable at the present day. But, before we 
 adopt it, let us consider this special instance of my 
 blind friend and myself a little further. He was born 
 blind; nor have I been able by any cross-examination to 
 discover that he ever had any further sense of vision than 
 that in his early childhood there was a difference to him 
 between bright sunlight and pitch darkness, but not a 
 difference sufficient to be of the slightest use in finding 
 his way toward a window, for example, or toward the 
 shade in the heat of summer. Whatever dim remem- 
 brance of the sensation of light he may have is totally 
 disconnected with the sense of space. Now, we studied 
 together four or five hours a day for six months, going 
 through trigonometry and analytical geometry. He was 
 just as apt to help me as I to help him. We studied 
 together: I drew diagrams by the eye, he felt them with 
 his finger-tips; and neither perceived in the other any 
 different conception of the meaning of those diagrams, 
 In our six months’ study together, making five or six 
 hundred hours of close grappling together with problems 
 of pure space, neither of us had recognized in the other 
 any mental difference of grappling with those problems: 
 we each of us felt that we had both thoroughly mastered 
 
 f 5 
 PO ee: ee Pee ee ee ee 
 
RELATIVITY AND REALITY 179 
 
 the elementary processes of analytical geometry, the 
 science in which the simplest conjunction is made be- 
 tween space and time. 
 
 Now, I ask, How is it possible to conceive that, never- 
 theless, his real conception of space is different from 
 mine, and that neither of us had acquired any absolute 
 knowledge of forms, of conic sections, and solids of revo- 
 lution ? 
 
 I have thus described the case of myself and my friend 
 in our study of analytical geometry, in order to illustrate 
 the futility of those objections to theological study which 
 are frequently made in our own day, and which have, in- 
 deed, been made from the beginning,— the objection that 
 we cannot know anything as it is, but can only know it as 
 it seems to us. This case shows, I think, the correctness 
 of the answer which may at once be given, We only 
 know a thing as it seems to us, as it is viewed by us; 
 but what hinders it from being seen correctly by us, being 
 viewed in its right light? My friend’s imagination or 
 picture of a form in space is entirely different from 
 mine. Neither of them is really a picture of space at all: 
 each is a picture of possible sensations. Yet beneath 
 our false pictures of the visible to me and of the tangible 
 to him lies the eternal reality disclosed to the vision of 
 Plato and to ours,—to the vision not of our imagination, 
 but of our reason, the eternal reality on which not only 
 Plato and his school built the wonderful intellectual tem- 
 ple preserved for us in Apollonius, but on which the 
 architecture, the engineering, the navigation, the com- 
 merce, and the science of the nineteenth century stand 
 as on an immovable foundation. 
 
 The religious scepticism which would deny theological 
 
180 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 conclusions on the ground that we cannot attain real 
 truth, but only attain to our view of truth,— to what seems 
 true to us,— ought, if it would be logically consistent, to 
 deny in like manner all scientific conclusions, and be as 
 uncertain and ignorant of the laws of geometry and alge- 
 bra, of matter and motion, as it professes to be in ontol- 
 ogy and theology. 
 
 I was recently reading -a laborious argument by an un- 
 believer, endeavoring to prove that there is no religious 
 knowledge possible, through the whole of which argument 
 occurred at intervals the refrain, ‘“ Remember the color- 
 blind.” The writer appeared to regard the existence of 
 color-blindness a positive proof that no human beings see 
 colors; and, if we cannot see colors, much less can we see 
 spiritual realities. Wherefore, theology is a delusion. 
 
 But what is the fact concerning color-blindness? Sim- 
 ply this,—that on examining any large number of our 
 European race we shall find two or three per cent. of 
 those examined to be incapable of seeing one or more 
 colors. That is the whole. But does negative testimony 
 do anything toward disproving the existence of the color 
 which the witnesses are unable to see? I see color, I dis- 
 tinguish its myriad shades with perfect ease. The vast 
 majority of my neighbors do the same. What gives the 
 few who have imperfect sight the right to say that we are 
 all under delusion? Is the positive testimony of twenty- 
 nine men that they do see a color to be offset and de- 
 stroyed by the negative testimony of the single thirtieth 
 man that he doesn’t see it? 
 
 But it is persistently urged that the case of the color- 
 blind shows that colors are not what they seem. If they 
 were real, all men not blind would see them, and see 
 
RELATIVITY AND REALITY I8i 
 
 them alike. I answer, How do you know it? You are 
 arguing from pure assumption. The color-blind are blind 
 to some particular color, usually to red. Other things 
 they see. But the existence of the red which they do not 
 see is testified to not only by the testimony of thirty 
 times as many who do see it, but is proved also by nu- 
 merous physical experiments in both optics and chemistry. 
 
 Similar freaks are observable in the other senses, and 
 they have no more significance. The winter-cress is to 
 most palates pungent, but to some it is intensely bitter. 
 Some ears are delighted with harmony, and some appre- 
 ciate melody, but not harmony; and some appreciate 
 neither. Some ears are deaf to very shrill notes, others 
 to very bass notes, others to all sounds. Does all this 
 prove that there is no such thing as sound? There is 
 no hearing of sound where there is no ear to hear, no 
 perception of odors or flavors where there are no palate 
 and fauces. But the vibration of the air runs on the 
 same, whether heard or not; and the odors rise in the 
 air and the flavors lurk in the food, whether eaten and 
 smelled or not. The sensations in these cases do not 
 resemble the physical causes of the sensations, and the 
 unscientific man learns no more of acoustics from hearing 
 a symphony than he does of optics and chromatics on 
 seeing a landscape. What of it? 
 
 I raise my eyes from my writing, and look down through 
 the blossoming branches of a great elm, at the shipping in 
 the harbor, the light-house on the breakwater, the fortifi- 
 cations on the island, the wooded crests of the islands 
 beyond, then at the blue Atlantic rolling under an ap- 
 proaching thunder-cloud. It is, of course, true that the 
 sensuous image of all this landscape is very unlike the 
 
182 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 realities. But is it not also true that, by the training of 
 many years in the analysis of sensations and imaginations, 
 I get from this view many actual relations? I can esti- 
 mate correctly how much higher the attic window from 
 which I look is than the water, and know how to verify 
 the estimate. I know the number, size, and character of 
 the vessels and of the fortifications and islands, their dis- 
 tance from each other, and so on. It is all a knowledge 
 of the relations of things to each other, and to my body 
 and my capacity for muscular exertion: it is relative 
 knowledge, but it is a knowledge of real relations. It is 
 a real knowledge, valuable in a thousand ways; and yet 
 it is a knowledge derived from this vision so totally unlike 
 the things seen. 
 
 The investigations of modern science, so far from dis- 
 crediting the senses, or showing that they give no real 
 knowledge, have shown that the content of sensation is 
 vastly richer in information and truth than we supposed. 
 ‘More servants wait on man than he’ll take note of.” I 
 once proved by a series of careful experiments that my 
 touch was more delicate and my hearing more acute than 
 those of a blind friend. My ear heard all and more than 
 all which his heard, while we took our daily walks together 
 during six months of intimacy. Yet I was a stranger to 
 the meaning of the language which conveyed to him the 
 most accurate and abundant information. The echo of 
 our footsteps as we walked was heard by us both, but I 
 learned almost nothing from it: it kept him informed of 
 every object that we were passing with marvellous truth- 
 fulness and fidelity. 
 
 The art of music has been built up on sensation and 
 feeling alone. It has been growing for thousands of 
 
 \ 
 SSE i 
 
RELATIVITY AND REALITY 183 
 
 years, and for the last hundred years with great rapidity. 
 In certain respects there is a great diversity of judgment 
 and feeling concerning it, even among those most conver- 
 sant with it; while in other respects there are numerous 
 points toward which the judgment of all musically in- 
 clined people has been coming to a more and more perfect 
 unity. But science in the nineteenth century, investigat- 
 ing carefully the minute motions of the air produced in 
 music, has demonstrated that the musical growth of the 
 eighteenth century was in strict accord with the laws of 
 geometry, arithmetic, and algebra; that the musical com- 
 positions which have become obsolete and rejected failed 
 to give to the particles of air in their minute movements 
 symmetrically, rhythmically beautiful orbits, while the 
 style of musical composition which has been gaining 
 steadily in public favor does give such orbits, 
 
 In other words, the ears of music-loving people, decid- 
 ing consciously only on what is beautiful and satisfying to 
 their musical feeling, are also unconsciously deciding on 
 algebraic and geometrical forms of beauty described by 
 invisible particles of air in an invisible dance of the atoms. 
 Not only were the musical sensations of music-lovers in 
 the eighteenth century giving correct and valuable infor- 
 mation concerning the nature and uses of music, but they 
 were testifying beforehand, prophesying in an unknown 
 tongue, now interpreted, of the discoveries of mathemati- 
 clans and physicists in this nineteenth century. The 
 inability of certain men to appreciate music does not 
 destroy or even invalidate the testimony to the reality 
 and value of modern physical studies of musical statics, 
 given a century beforehand by the delicate musical sense 
 of the great masters under whose inspiration and direc- 
 
184 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 tion the wonderful art of musical composition grew and 
 flourished. 
 
 In like manner the physical sensation of color, in the 
 eye of one capable of discriminating nicely the delicate 
 shades which give the peculiar charm and glory to a 
 really great colorist’s paintings, has been demonstrated by 
 modern science to be much more than a mere subjective 
 pleasure, a gentle titillation of the optic nerve. To take 
 a single instance, so accurate and trustworthy is the in- 
 formation given by these delicate shades of color that the 
 whole success of one of the greatest of the mechanic arts 
 of to-day, the manufacture of Bessemer steel, depends 
 upon the chemical facts reported thus in the evanescent 
 hues of the tongue of flame rising from the furnace. 
 What weight should the color-blindness of two or three 
 per cent. of the population of a village have in persuading 
 the directors of a Bessemer steel company that the color 
 of the flame affords no sure indication of the proper time 
 to close the charge? Just as much exactly as the agnosti- 
 cism and materialism of the materialistic school should 
 have in persuading Christian preachers and Christian 
 teachers that our religious sentiments and religious expe- 
 riences have no value as evidences of theological truth. 
 
 These gentlemen would fain persuade us, first, that they 
 are the only truly scientific men,—as though such mathe- 
 maticians as Peirce and Chauvenet and Sylvester and 
 Sir William R. Hamilton, such physicists and chemists as 
 Henry and Gibbs and Alexander and Cooke, such bota- 
 nists as Torrey and Gray, such zodlogists as Agassiz and 
 Jeffries Wyman, were not scientific men, simply because 
 they were and are spiritual and devout; and, secondly, 
 they would persuade us that they are the only truly philo- 
 
RELATIVITY AND REALITY 185 
 
 sophic men. Having more science than the leaders of 
 science, they also know more of philosophy than the leaders 
 of philosophy. They assure us that religion is a matter 
 of feeling only, and that we must be content with feeling, 
 and not attempt to attain any knowledge whatever on re- 
 ligious themes. The attempt, they assure us, must be 
 futile ; man cannot possibly rise above himself or know 
 anything above himself. Man, they tell us, cannot possi- 
 bly know anything except as it appears to him. He must 
 infallibly judge everything by a human standard. His 
 ideas of the universe and of its Author must inevitably be 
 petty. As the ass takes an asinine and the goose an 
 anserine view of the universe, so man takes a human view, 
 and cannot possibly rise higher. 
 
 Be it so. I can take only a human view of the uni- 
 verse; but is it not a true view as far as it goes? Does 
 not the ass with his asinine view know correctly that 
 thistles suit his digestive powers, and the goose with her 
 anserine view know correctly that she may launch herself 
 safely on the lake? And man knows correctly, in his 
 human view, that he may launch himself safely on the 
 broad ocean of eternal infinite truth, and indulge forever 
 in ever-increasing acquisition of knowledge,— absolute 
 knowledge independent of the weakness of his sight. 
 Man knows that he may gather not only figs and grapes 
 for food, but that all things shall finally serve him. His 
 intellectual appetite and assimilative power seizes upon 
 and appropriates to himself every part of the universe ac- 
 cessible to him. Comte, the great modern hierarch of 
 the so-called Positive Philosophy, issued about fifty years 
 ago his interdict, forbidding the human mind to go beyond 
 the bounds of the solar system, and warning men that 
 
186 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 the fixed stars are beyond our ken. But scientific men 
 laughed at his prohibition; and have gone on not only to 
 measure the distances and the orbital revolutions of the 
 stars, but even the rate of their direct approach or retro- 
 gression from us; nay, they have run up on the slender 
 rays of light to the stars and nebula, and subjected the 
 very materials of their composition to chemical analysis. 
 
 Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles, and neglected 
 father of the best modern theories of evolution, in like 
 manner nearly a century ago, forbade the human mind to 
 attempt to find anything in music worthy of intellectual 
 attention : music was a purely arbitrary art without any 
 real foundation in nature. But, despite the pope of Lich- 
 field and Derby, Beethoven went on, and composed his 
 wonderful sonatas and symphonies, and wrote that mar- 
 vellous chorus in the “Mount of Olives,” and Mendels- 
 sohn his “ Elijah” and “St. Paul”; and the art of music 
 stands higher and is more profoundly appreciated by the 
 intellectual and cultivated world to-day than ever before. 
 Those who have most thoroughly studied its powers and 
 capabilities, so far from agreeing with Darwin’s view, 
 would incline to take as reality the visions of the Apoca- 
 lypse, which represent music as the language of redeemed 
 and glorified spirits in the courts of heaven. 
 
 Man can only take a human view, but the human view 
 includes the vision of divine things. Man’s eye is not 
 satisfied, says Emerson, without a horizon. He will not 
 be satisfied if pent up within the brick walls and under 
 the low ceiling of merely physical phenomena. His eye 
 is not in healthful conditions to preserve its powers 
 unless he can see a horizon, peer out into the infinite, 
 and descry, even if it be but dimly, the fixed stars of 
 
RELATIVITY AND REALITY 187 
 
 eternal justice, absolute truth, infinite wisdom, unfathom- 
 able love. The sensations of awe and reverence and obli- 
 gation are richer in content of absolute knowledge than 
 the mere sensations of color and tone. As the investiga- 
 tions of physical science have shown that the sensations of 
 color imply and prove the existence of a luminiferous 
 ether, with its incredible tenuity and incredible elasticity, 
 moving its atoms with almost infinite rapidity in almost 
 infinitesimal orbits with perfect rhythmical and geomet- 
 rical beauty, and this again implies the existence of 
 specific forms of grosser matter to determine the limits 
 of these orbits; as the investigations of physical science 
 have shown that the sensations on hearing music prove 
 the existence of somewhat similar motions in the atoms 
 of the air; as esthetic criticism shows that the presence 
 of certain colors and forms on the canvas, the succes- 
 sion of certain melodies and harmonies in the musical 
 score, prove the presence of certain emotions and pur- 
 poses in the mind and soul of the painter and the com- 
 poser,— so the analysis of the theologian demonstrates 
 and with just as absolute certainty, that the sensations of 
 awe and reverence and obligation, and similar religious 
 and spiritual sentiments imply and prove the existence 
 of spiritual and religious realities which can by proper 
 care and attention be intellectually defined and presented 
 to the mind, with a perfect certainty of their objective 
 truth. 
 
 The new-born babe exhibits, sometimes from the very 
 moment of birth, a knowledge of the difference be- 
 tween a human being and an inanimate thing. The 
 warmest and softest pillow will not satisfy it: it must 
 nestle on its mother’s breast. It has not formed any 
 
188 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 definite intellectual theory concerning consciousness and 
 unconsciousness, sympathy and want of sympathy, or any 
 other differences between a pillow and a bosom; but its 
 little heart is wiser than its head, and a much safer guide. 
 Men are but children of a larger growth. Men in general 
 know the existence of their fellow-men with absolute 
 certainty, as the baby knows the existence of its mother 
 without ever having had a thought about it. The inborn 
 sympathy of man with man, the attraction which draws 
 us together, the native gregariousness, if I may so say, of 
 our race, is a sub-intellectual (that is, an indistinctly 
 recognized) ground of our ineradicable faith in each 
 other’s existence, just as the bodily appetites and 
 passions are an indistinctly recognized or sub-intellectual 
 ground of faith in the existence of the proper objects of 
 those appetites. | 
 
 In like manner, and even more strongly, the sentiments 
 of awe and reverence and obligation are an immovable 
 ground of faith in the existence of the proper objects of 
 those sentiments. And these sentiments demand some- 
 thing more than unconscious force, unconscious law, con- 
 sensus or harmony of the universe. If any man say, as 
 some do, that the universal consensus of the physical har- 
 monies of the universe is a sufficient object for his 
 sentiments of awe and reverence and obligation, then I 
 would respectfully say to him: Remember the case of the 
 color-blind. To me, and I think to the great majority of 
 spiritually-minded men, you seem like a man color-blind: 
 you are blind to the highest conceptions of awe and rever- 
 ence and obligation. These all imply an element of per- 
 sonality: we cannot feel proper awe or reverence except 
 for a person, nor obligation except to a person ; and there- 
 
RELATIVITY AND REALITY 189 
 
 fore these sentiments, if they really exist in your heart, 
 cannot be satisfied with the recognition of any other 
 object than an Infinite Person. 
 
 But we are immediately answered by a reference again 
 to our human limitation. We are told that we can form 
 no picture to ourselves of anything greater than a person, 
 simply because we are ourselves persons. May there not 
 be, asks Herbert Spencer, a mode of Being as much tran- 
 scending conscious personality as that excels unconscious 
 matter? Of course there may; and the religious thinker 
 is more eager to admit it than the irreligious can be. The 
 Hebrew Scriptures, with all the complaints of their de- 
 scribing God as man, contain far more sublime asser- 
 tions of the absolute inscrutability of God than can be 
 found in any other literature. The Christian holds God 
 to be absolutely perfect in every attribute and infinite in 
 every power. There are no limitations to his personality, 
 there is no likeness even in spiritual things whereto we 
 can compare him. But we are told that this is admitting 
 that we can know nothing about God: we must not there- 
 fore ascribe personality to him, our conception of per- 
 sonality is derived from ourselves; we cannot rise above 
 ourselves, we cannot rise above the conception of a lim- 
 ited personality. 
 
 Very well, I will admit that we cannot ad imaginatione 
 rise above the imagination of a limited personality ; but 
 Christians do not pretend to imagine the personality of 
 God. We believe devoutly in the doctrine of the Penta- 
 teuch, which forbids us to attempt to form any image or 
 similitude of God, and represents him as saying, Ye can- 
 not see me, but ye can see by the evidence of my action 
 where I am present. We can form no image of the con- 
 
IgO POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 sciousness of God, of his knowledge or his omnipotence, 
 or his infinite goodness and holiness. But reason can far 
 transcend imagination ; and reason demonstrates the exist- 
 ence of these attributes in God, of which the imagination 
 can form no picture, with which it can be satisfied as a 
 likeness of the reality. 
 
 How, then, it may be asked, can we have any affections 
 toward him? If the imagination utterly fails to picture 
 him, in what form can the heart lay hold of him? Are 
 not the feelings always dependent upon what is perceived 
 by the senses or upon what is imaged in the imagination ? 
 
 I answer that the feelings, the affections, cannot lay 
 hold of that of which the imagination presents absolutely 
 no picture, or that of whose existence reason gives no 
 proof. But the feelings can certainly be aroused to their 
 most intense activity by a picture known to be purely im- 
 aginary ; and in the like manner they can be kept in the 
 state of sustained awe and trust and confidence by that of 
 which reason assures them, even when imagination utterly 
 fails to draw any picture of that in which the trust is 
 placed. No intelligent Christian, even when his rhetoric 
 had led him to speak otherwise, ever supposed himself 
 capable of picturing in his mind the state of God’s mind; 
 yet the most intelligent, learned, philosophic Christians 
 have had a serene faith, like that of the humblest and most 
 ignorant, in the everlasting love of the eternal Father who 
 guides all things in infinite wisdom at the prompting of 
 infinite love. 
 
 That we cannot feel without either knowledge or imagi- 
 nation is very true; but, on the other hand, it is equally 
 true that we can feel, and feel deeply, when our knowledge 
 goes very little further than knowing that the thing which 
 
RELATIVITY AND REALITY IOI 
 
 excites the feeling exists, and when the imagination goes 
 very little way toward picturing the cause of the emotion. 
 Let a congregation hear upon the organ a solemn, earnest 
 piece of music, and the majority of them will be deeply 
 moved by it, and be brought into a similar state of feeling. 
 Suppose it to be that grand toccata in F, by Sebastian 
 Bach, which was afterward written out for an orchestra. 
 The majority of those who hear it. will feel inspirited, 
 strengthened, cheered, nerved up to action by it, even 
 though they know nothing concerning music, and even 
 though they form no imagination whatever concerning 
 the origin or object of the composition,— perhaps fully as 
 much moved as though they understood the laws of sound 
 and of musical composition, or fancied to themselves that 
 Bach was sounding a trumpet-call to rally the hosts of the 
 church militant to the last great assault upon the citadels 
 and strongholds of sin. And this fact of the congregation 
 being thus moved is the strongest proof that the compo- 
 sition came from the great composer when he felt inspired 
 to utter a note of encouragement and noble cheer. We 
 have a sort of direct communication from him in this fact. 
 If the organist plays with spirit and feeling, we recognize 
 in him an interpreter who understands his author, and 
 reads him aloud to us with understanding and with the 
 spirit. 
 
 We understand and know but little of the divine Being ; 
 but that little we do know, and it is enough to fill our 
 minds and hearts full to overflowing. Our imagination 
 can represent to us almost nothing even of the little that 
 we know; but that faint and shadowy adumbration of this 
 greatest of all realities is enough to arouse the deepest, 
 holiest, most enduring, most controlling sentiments of 
 
Ig2 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 which we are capable. The reality and depth of religious 
 emotions in many men, whose intellectual culture and 
 own express language show that they form the human- 
 ized picture of the divine Being, are unquestionable. 
 Mathematicians and physicists, statesmen, philosophers, 
 poets, the peers of any among the living or the dead, are 
 still found clinging earnestly to the grand fundamental 
 doctrines of the Christian religion. Their positive testi- 
 mony certainly ought to outweigh the negative testimony 
 of those who find no religious verities. 
 
 When a man is in perplexity, doubt, trouble, and sor- 
 row, or is tempted to do what he fears is wrong, if, then, 
 instead of speculating and debating with himself, he casts 
 himself boldly on the promise, Ask, and ye shall receive, 
 and opens his heart and mind prayerfully to the influences 
 of the Holy Spirit, he finds peace and light and strength 
 come into his heart; and he cannot then doubt that God 
 hears and answers prayer, he cannot then refrain from 
 thanksgiving and praise. 
 
XII. 
 THE UNIVERSE A REVELATION. 
 
 I HAVE mentioned the fact that some of the most distin- 
 guished agnostic and atheistic writers have not only ad- 
 mitted, but vigorously insisted upon, the existence of a 
 self-existent, ultimate Cause, or (I should prefer to say) 
 First Cause of the universe. They admit that they believe, 
 and must believe, in an antecedent cause of every effect, 
 and of the universe as in its totality an effect. But after 
 this admission they think they see two logical escapes 
 from theism. The atheistic escape is to declare the uni- 
 verse itself the self-existent cause of itself. The agnostic 
 escape is to declare the First Cause utterly inscrutable, so 
 that we can assign to it no attributes whatever. 
 
 To declare that the universe is its own cause, that it is 
 self-existent from eternity, is, as I have in a previous lect- 
 ure shown, to forget the very nature of cause. What the 
 mind demands in a cause is unity, but this atheistic solu- 
 tion of the universe gives no approach toward unity. To 
 run the universe back into a nebulous fire-mist is not to 
 find any true unity; for that mist must contain all the 
 present cosmos, in all its variety, potentially concealed. 
 This beauty of arrangement could not come out of it 
 unless it were first in it. And the potential multiplicity 
 needs explication, and demands a cause as much as the 
 actual. To assume the eternal self-existence of the uni- 
 
194 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 verse in motion, the eternal cause of its successive forms, 
 is simply to refuse the demand of the intellect for a cause, 
 and to refuse it under pretence of granting it. 
 
 To declare that the First Cause is utterly inscrutable, 
 and that we cannot assign to it any attributes whatever, is 
 likewise to annul the admission of a First Cause. A cause 
 must be a cause, and have the attributes of a cause. 
 These attributes, as I have shown, are the attributes of 
 spirit. There are but four possible elements of whose 
 existence we have any evidence. The whole universe is 
 but a manifestation in space and time of mind, or spirit, 
 and mechanical force. But that idea of force is not de- 
 rived from motion alone, which would only give invariable 
 succession: it is derived from conscious effort in intellect- 
 ual attention and in muscular exertion. The probability, 
 therefore, becomes enormously strong that force is the 
 product of mind, of spirit. Now, the idea of cause is inti- 
 mately associated with that of force: it is derived from 
 self-conscious, spontaneous determination to exert force,— 
 either figuratively, by applying the mind, or literally, by 
 muscular contraction. In this spontaneous determination 
 of the ego is the only instance known to us of uncaused 
 cause. Here we rest as in a cause which is a cause, and 
 not merely a link in the chain of effects. And here alone 
 can we really rest in the search for an ultimate cause of 
 the cosmos: that ultimate cause is the spontaneous deter- 
 mination of an Infinite Will. Mistaken theologians may 
 strive to make the first chapter of Genesis a history of 
 the process of creation, and mistaken physicists may 
 speak of it contemptuously as a Hebrew myth; but, never- 
 theless, that chapter stands in its sublime simplicity, solv- 
 ing at a date of unknown antiquity the problem of prob- 
 
THE UNIVERSE A REVELATION 195 
 
 lems, and announcing the truth of all truths as perfectly 
 as the highest philosopher of our century can do so,— the 
 problem of the origin of all things, the truth of all truths, 
 — that everything which is flashed into being at command 
 of the infinite God. 
 
 That a cause is a cause cannot be denied: neither is it 
 a mere tautological assertion. It is an answer to the as- 
 sertion sometimes made, that we can predicate of the First 
 Cause no attributes whatever, when that assertion is made, 
 not reverently,—as Scotus Erigena made it, only for the 
 sake of emphasizing more earnestly the affirmation of 
 God’s perfection,— but made for the purpose of invalidat- 
 ing religious faith. A cause is a cause, with causal power 
 manifesting itself in causal energy. The First Cause is a 
 cause of infinite power, manifesting itself in the energies 
 which pervade and move the universe. 
 
 In the action of finite causes, properly so called,— that 
 is, in the determinations, volitions, words, and deeds of 
 finite creatures,— there is a revelation of the spiritual 
 Mature.or-character ,of.the) actor.’ All» our actions are 
 Speech, and, the proverb says, speak louder than words. 
 Everything which a man does or Says, whether con- 
 sciously or unconsciously, is a revelation of his character, 
 A good judge of character does not ask to see or hear 
 much of a man in order to gauge him. He is “well able 
 of the lion’s claw to judge his royal symmetry and further 
 properties,” 
 
 It is so also in the action of the infinite First Cause. 
 There is not an atom of matter which does not bear testi- 
 mony to his infinite power, his perfect wisdom, his inex- 
 haustible goodness. Even agnostic writers, as I remarked 
 in a previous lecture, declare that there js no vice in the 
 
196 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 constitution of things, and that they can rest in serene 
 confidence upon the ultimate beneficence of the workings 
 of natural law. I say that, in the light of a true meta- 
 physical analysis, these declarations are an admission of 
 the truth of the theistic conclusions that God is power, 
 that God is wisdom, and God is love. It is only a sort 
 of color-blindness in the unbeliever’s mind, which renders 
 him apparently incapable of seeing the reality of the rela- 
 tions of: personality to infinity. He thinks personality 
 necessarily finite. We see that personality transcends 
 with ease all limits of finitude. 
 
 The creation is in itself, therefore, a revelation from 
 God. The primary use of the outward world is to serve 
 the spirit. Nature serves as commodity for bodily needs ; 
 but how charmingly Emerson has shown us in his first 
 little volume, which he has never surpassed, that she also 
 opens to us the mysteries of our own intellectual powers, 
 furnishes us with symbols of speech, disciplines and in- 
 vigorates our moral powers, touches and sanctifies us by 
 her beauty, lifts us up to the vision of eternal good by 
 her constant growth and decay of perishable forms! 
 
 The external world is thus a school-house of God’s 
 building, wherein we are—according to the prophet’s 
 word, quoted with approval by our Saviour —all taught 
 of God. All science, literature, and art is but the fruit 
 of the exercises in that school. God is giving us perpetu- 
 ually varying object-lessons, which we interpret to each 
 other as he gives us ability. When children, we rest in 
 the external and more obvious meaning of these objects; 
 are “pleased with a rattle, tickled with a straw,” and do 
 not know that we are gradually gaining better knowledge 
 and deeper wisdom. Scholars differ in ability: some rise 
 
THE UNIVERSE A REVELATION 197 
 
 more and some less rapidly to the higher truths. But 
 the direction of all, at least of all faithful students, is up- 
 ward. Gradually, but surely, we learn that these things 
 which perish with the using are leaving in the faithful 
 mind things which are unseen and eternal. Gradually, 
 but surely, we learn that the whole visible, sensible uni- 
 verse is but a shadow passing away; and that it is a 
 shadow of an intelligible world that passes not away. 
 The lessons of nature do for us what the lessons of relig- 
 ious and philosophic teachers, re-echoing the lessons of 
 nature, fail to do. They teach us that the grass with- 
 ereth, the flower fadeth, but the word of our God endur- 
 eth forever; heaven and earth may pass away, but the 
 word which createth shall not pass away. Very few 
 thoughtful men, however much they may have despised 
 religious teaching in their youth, come to the grave with 
 gray hairs without expressing some obscure faith and 
 hope in immortality. 
 
 Nevertheless, it must be admitted that in some minds 
 these religious hopes and aspirations remain very feeble 
 and weak. There is a vast difference in the religious and 
 moral, as there is in the artistic and scientific endowment 
 of men. There are multitudes who seem incapable of 
 receiving scientific truth, of shaking off superstition and 
 belief in magic; there are multitudes apparently incap- 
 able of appreciating beauty either in color or tone; and 
 in like manner there are multitudes who appear unable to 
 appreciate a higher morality or to grasp firmly a spiritual 
 faith. 
 
 If we adopt the theistic faith, and believe that an infi- 
 nitely wise Being, who has created us to be happy, and 
 made our nature such that our highest happiness —we 
 
198 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 might almost say our only happiness —is in love, in the 
 interchange of thought, and in the mutual expression of 
 affection, has also created the outward world to be a 
 means of communicating with one another and with him, 
 we must be ready to adopt, also, the conclusions which 
 will flow naturally and necessarily from that view. 
 
 It would seem that, if we and the universe are the crea- 
 tion of an infinitely wise and infinitely good Being, then 
 the recognition of that fact, the return of thanks to him, 
 the remembrance of his goodness, the endeavor to carry 
 out his purposes, the discipline of our will into submis- 
 sion and even into unison with his will, the hope of his 
 approval, the hope of further knowledge of him and of a 
 better service to him, would be sources of joy greater and 
 purer than any other joy. And it is not credible that an 
 infinitely wise and good God would suffer such hopes and 
 aspirations to be kindled in human hearts without per- 
 mitting their fulfilment also. Whatever is really desir- 
 able is possible; and whatever is really desirable and 
 possible will, under the administration of an infinitely 
 wise and good Creator, be one day actual. Effects are 
 a revelation of the cause, and the highest and best effects 
 most adequately reveal the cause. We judge of the qual- 
 ity of a Newton, not by anecdotes about his absent-mind- 
 edness, but by his “Principia.” John Milton is not to 
 be judged by his sophisms on divorce, but by his 
 “Paradise Lost” and his greater “Paradise Regained.” 
 We may perhaps say that in the great poem of the uni- 
 verse all parts are equal, that there is nothing superior 
 to anything else, because all is perfect. Yet there is a 
 difference of grade in the objects. Take, for example, 
 the external world, and we cannot but regard crystalliza- 
 
THE UNIVERSE A REVELATION 199 
 
 tion as a higher phenomenon than shapeless massing. We 
 cannot but regard chemical changes as more interesting 
 and higher than mechanical. Vegetable growth is more 
 wonderful than chemical reaction, and animal life is supe- 
 rior to vegetable. And the phenomena of consciousness 
 in the animal kingdom rise grade above grade, until in 
 man they take a sudden rise far above the highest animal. 
 This is the untutored judgment even of a child. A boy 
 of eight years old, visiting Cambridge, Mass., for the first 
 time, was taken to call at a house where there was a 
 baby six months old, and then to look at the wonders of 
 Agassiz’s Museum. At night he was asked what was the 
 most wonderful thing he had seen that day. Without a 
 moment's hesitation, and entirely saa sponte, he answered, 
 “Oh, the baby,” and then went on to say why,— because it 
 would grow into a man, and even after death live eternally. 
 
 Man’s will, his spontaneous self-determination, is a 
 cause; but it is not a self-existent cause. We cannot go 
 behind it in the chain of causation. We may give 
 reasons for a choice, but the reasons did not cause the 
 choice: the choice selected from the reasons, those to 
 which to allow weight ; and the selection was more or less 
 arbitrary. The human will is, therefore, a veritable cause. 
 But it is a limited, restricted cause,— its range is finite in 
 time and space and power. The individual will appears 
 in time. <A year before a child was born that particular 
 cause, which now manifests itself in the child’s nascent 
 will, was hidden in the abyss of potentiality. The 
 human will, therefore, is not a self-existent cause: it iste 
 caused cause, it is an effect of the First Cause. And to us 
 men it is the most wonderful of all effects known to 
 us. In the magnitudes of space, time, and mechanical 
 
200 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 force, other things in the cosmos far exceed us; and 
 the old philosophers called the external world the macro- 
 cosm, the internal world the microcosm. But, if we 
 measure by dignity, by the grandeur which appeals to 
 reason rather than to the senses, the names should be 
 reversed. It is philosophy which deals with the great 
 world of thought and affection, wisdom and love; and 
 science deals with the little world of matter and mo- 
 tion,— matter and motion which are glorified only by 
 being the medium through which the Eternal Mind com- 
 municates expressions of thought and affection, wisdom 
 and love, to the finite mind. If “stars and tides and 
 matter and motion” do not reveal to us the thoughts of 
 an infinite God, and unfold within us powers of thought 
 akin to those of the great Creator, if they do not express 
 to us the paternal love of God, and awaken in us holy 
 sentiments of grateful loyalty, let the physical sciences 
 be given over to the ridicule of Swift’s voyage to Laputa, 
 Johnson’s ponderous censure in the ‘‘ Rambler,’ and 
 Coleridge’s contemptuous supposition that the stars were 
 created ‘‘to make dirt cheap.” 
 
 The physical sciences are of interest and value to us 
 - men only because the external world is the embodiment 
 and illustration of the very same ideas of space and time 
 which are developed in us by @ priorz speculations, and 
 thus prove our kindred not to the things which perish, but 
 to the eternal, uncaused, self-existent Cause of all causes. 
 Take the so-called positive view of physical science; that 
 is, assume that science is simply a generalization of the 
 facts, of material existence, and not an interpretation of 
 the ideas and meaning of the Author of nature, derived 
 from a study of his autograph works, and you have made 
 
THE UNIVERSE A REVELATION 201 
 
 physical science a mere Gradgrind array of statistics, put 
 into formulz only as into mnemonics. The distinction 
 between empirical and rational formule becomes under 
 that view obliterated : the distinction between magnitude 
 and greatness vanishes. It must have been to star-gazers 
 of this kind, to whom the ephemeris of the heavens was 
 the end and crown of astronomy, that Schiller addressed 
 his indignant lines : — 
 
 ‘Talk not to me, astronomers, always of stars and of motions : 
 Worlds had never been made simply for science to trace. 
 Grand is heaven’s host, doubtless ; in space there’s nothing sublimer ; 
 But, good friends, the sublime wasn’t embodied in space.” 
 
 The sublime lies in the act of the mind, reaching out 
 beyond al] space and time, grasping at the infinite and 
 eternal, expressing through the fleeting finite that which 
 is alone stable and immeasurable. The value of the ex- 
 ternal world, as interpreted by physical science, lies in 
 the light it pours both ways; upon the Infinite Mind 
 which created and upon the finite mind which studies it. 
 This finite mind of man is itself the grandest thing which 
 it can lay hold of, and make any approach toward under- 
 standing. It is grandest in itself, in its actual manifesta- 
 tion of intellect and heart and will. It is immeasurably 
 grandest when you perceive that in this power of thought, 
 of affections, of volitions, is the evidence of our sonship to 
 God. In the human mind, as the grandest product of the 
 great First Cause, we find the surest key to the nature of 
 that Cause. No eternal flow of mechanical forces, how- 
 ever great the variety of physical effects which it might 
 produce, can be imagined as producing this human mind, 
 which asserts itself to be more than a flow of mechanical 
 
202 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 force. No result of the mechanical force can be imag- 
 ined to include the evolution of a new consciousness, con- 
 scious perception, emotion, volition. The Ultimate Cause 
 of this evolution must itself be a conscious perception of 
 tenderest, holiest affections of Almighty Will. 
 
 I acknowledge that I can form no imagination of an 
 infinite degree of those attributes. But reason is higher 
 than imagination; and reason shows that perception may 
 exist in a degree that sees all the past, all the future, as 
 present ; reason shows that love may exist in an infinite, 
 all-wise benevolence; reason shows that a will may exist 
 at whose single fiat the whole universe may spring out of 
 an eternal potentiality into an eternal actuality. Nay, 
 reason goes further, and from the necessity of a cause 
 adequate to produce all the effects of human intelligence, 
 human affection, and human enterprises, declares that 
 such an infinite Personality does exist, and that it is his 
 word which sustains creation. 
 
 The creation is sustained by the word of God and, in 
 one sense, is his word. It is a revelation of his being, 
 his thoughts, and his purposes. “The duty of a created 
 being,” says Jouffroy, ‘is defined by the design of his 
 creator ; and the design of his creation may be discovered 
 from a study of his organization.” Jouffroy here uses 
 organization in its largest sense. The normal plan of 
 animal life may be discovered from the organization of the 
 body. I once heard Agassiz show a club of farmers how 
 the very skeletons of the horse and of the ox proved that 
 the latter could bear confinement in a stable with less 
 injury than the former: the horse needed abundance of 
 daily exercise, the ox but little; and this fact is written 
 unmistakably even upon the bones of their frame. 
 
THE UNIVERSE A REVELATION 203 
 
 In like manner the body of man shows to a thorough 
 student what are the proper rules for preserving bodily 
 health and strength. Its period of growth and maturity 
 indicate the normal limits of old age. With equal cer- 
 tainty the mind and soul of man show to the careful and 
 thorough student what are the best means of educating 
 and developing its powers. This is a more important and 
 more difficult study than the study of the body, and its 
 progress is necessarily much slower. Man, for some rea- 
 son, learns more slowly than the animals do. They all 
 readily come up to the mark set by the higher geniuses in 
 their species. The differences in the habits of animals of 
 one species are trifling compared with the differences 
 among men. 
 
 The capacities of the species are judged by the best 
 specimens of that species. The highest attainments of 
 the best men indicate the grade to which men are to be 
 elevated. The power of self-determination in man, his 
 moral insight, his capacity for religious ideas and capabil- 
 ities of religious emotion, are much more developed in 
 men of the highest character; but they are unmistakably 
 present even in the lowest man, and they set him incom- 
 parably above all the animals. They are parts in his 
 moral or spiritual organization, they indicate the end for 
 which he was destined, they mark out his duty. Their 
 possession is equivalent to having a direct command from 
 God to walk in the light, to govern one’s self by the 
 highest moral law, and consecrate one’s self to a religious 
 obedience. But, when we attempt to obey this command, 
 we find immense difficulties. We see constantly that a 
 better life is possible. We labor year after year with our- 
 selves, not trying to do what more gifted neighbors may 
 
204 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 have done, but trying to live as well and rise as high as 
 we think we can and ought to do. Yet the progress is 
 slow, and in many of the best men goes on to the very 
 end of a long life. When we have learned how to live 
 and are just beginning to do a part of what we wish, we 
 are interrupted by death. Is that the end? 
 
 This is the third of the three great topics,— God, Duty, 
 Immortality. A majority of the great philosophers of the 
 world have believed that man is immortal, that at death 
 he passes into a state of being where he retains conscious- 
 ness, memory, all spiritual faculties, yet without a body; 
 at least, without such a body as that which we now have. 
 Christ gave this faith in immortality such new emphasis 
 that it became in the Christian a new life-inspiring doc- 
 trine. He does not, however, appeal to it as a postulate, 
 but rather develops it as a corollary. He says to the 
 Sadducees, You admit that God exerted a special provi- 
 dential care over Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, and 
 revealed himself to Moses. Do you not see that this 
 intercourse of the infinite God with men proves man to 
 be immortal, proves man to have been made in the image 
 of God, and therefore in the image of his eternity? This 
 reasoning of Christ is, in fact, the strongest of natural 
 evidences for the immortality of the soul. When a man 
 has clearly seen and admitted the existence of God,— that 
 is, has admitted the wisdom and love, the truth and holi- 
 ness, of the Ultimate Cause of the universe,— he very sel- 
 dom fails to see that this proof of the being of God is a 
 proof that man is made in the image of God. He very 
 seldom fails, therefore, to be lifted by it into a hope of his 
 own immortality. Those who refuse to believe in God say 
 that this is making God in the image of man, degrading 
 
THE UNIVERSE A REVELATION 205 
 
 the Infinite Cause of all to a likeness of our earthly frailty. 
 But the objection is not of real weight. We are under 
 an invincible necessity of assuming a cause of the uni- 
 verse. We are under an equal necessity of assuming that 
 either conscious or unconscious being is our best type 
 of that cause. And we clearly see that consciousness is 
 higher than unconsciousness, therefore the better type 
 of the highest. We clearly see, also, that conscious will 
 is the only real finite cause known to us, therefore the 
 only just type of the infinite First Cause. This very 
 process, by which the idea of an infinite God is brought 
 out distinctly in our minds and contrasted with all the 
 things which he has made, leads us, therefore, also to sec 
 that we, in our spiritual powers of mind and heart and 
 will, are the nearest likeness which we can have of him 
 who is not in the likeness of any outward thing. 
 
 The philosophers find, also, in various spiritual consid- 
 erations, confirmations of the faith that we are made in 
 the image of God’s eternity. The indivisible unity of the 
 self-conscious spirit has been used as an argument for its 
 indestructibility. The power of the mind to see and lay 
 hold of ideas of the eternal, the infinite, the unchange- 
 able, is also a proof of its own independence of change 
 and motion. The moral instincts, the ineradicable faith 
 in God's truth and justice, also demand an immortal life, 
 wherein the inequalities of this life shall be rectified, and 
 _ the righteous and the wicked be dealt with more exactly 
 according to their deserts. The necessity of a future 
 state for reward and punishment has been strongly felt by 
 all nations who have shown any strong sense of moral 
 right, any faith in the existence of a moral government in 
 the universe. 
 
206 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 The ever-expansive power of the soul of man is another 
 argument. There is no limit discernible to knowledge in 
 any department. The works of God are inexhaustible, 
 the curiosity of man insatiable. We want an eternity 
 in which to pursue science. The heart also expands as 
 widely as the horizon of the mind: art is as progressive 
 as the arts. Social affections, social pleasures, are capa- 
 ble of rising continually to higher planes, and taking in 
 wider circles. The language of strong feeling always 
 inclines to expressions which are called hyperbole. They 
 surpass the present occasion, but they cannot exceed the 
 nature of the soul that utters them. The heart has 
 illimitable capacities for happiness, and its longings reach 
 after an infinite love. 
 
 Can these longings of the feeble human heart be 
 greater than the riches of the whole universe? Cana 
 feeble creature like man lay out in his thought and imag- 
 ination a future grander, greater, more blessed, than the 
 totality of all existence in which he is but a part? Can 
 a small part contain immeasurably more than the immeas- 
 urable whole? Surely not. That which is really desir- 
 able for man, and which is revealed to man as desirable, 
 is also possible, and shall one day be actual, even if it 
 take an eternity to accomplish it. 
 
 But, with our comparative ignorance, we do not always 
 know what is desirable; and it is not always safe to pro- 
 nounce upon what is possible. Every philosopher of note 
 in all ages, even those most confident of the glorious 
 reality of spiritual things and most firmly believing in 
 God, in duty, and in immortality, has nevertheless con- 
 fessed the weakness and fallibility of human reason. Like 
 Cicero, in his Tusculan Questions, he has acknowledged 
 
THE UNIVERSE A REVELATION 207 
 
 that he was simply arriving at the most probable conclu- 
 sions, not at demonstrations. 
 
 But, it may be asked, how is it consistent with theistic 
 faith in the wisdom and the love of God for him to allow 
 these truths, the knowledge of which is so essential to 
 the highest happiness and welfare of man, to be so ob- 
 scurely revealed? Why did he not make them as plain 
 as the plainest axiom of geometry? In reply to this 
 doubting inquiry we may first remember that we do not 
 know anything of the limits of possibility. There are 
 men who find it exceedingly difficult to grasp the simplest 
 truths of mathematics with any firmness of conviction: 
 there are men who lay hold of spiritual truths with a firm- 
 ness that cannot be shaken. The cause of such differ- 
 ences, their possible limits, their possible elimination, and 
 the advantages of their existence, are alike unknown to 
 us. We are in the presence of facts, and can simply bow 
 before the sovereignty of God; pleased and happy when 
 we can understand the borders of his works; reverently 
 silent and studious when we reach the confines of our 
 present knowledge. 
 
 We do not know why spiritual truths are not made glar- 
 ingly certain to all men; but we do see that there can be 
 no high happiness without virtue, no virtue without the 
 opportunity of choosing between right and wrong, no op- 
 portunity of choice between right and wrong unless there 
 are times and opportunities when, at the parting of the 
 ways, it may seem to admit of doubt which is the right 
 way. There was a time when the Christian pulpit 
 pressed earnestly upon its hearers the doctrine that this 
 life is a scene of probation, wherein men are tried 
 whether they will choose evil or good. The doctrine con- 
 
208 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 tains important truth: life is a scene of probation. 
 God does not tempt us to evil, but he gives us opportunity 
 to choose good; and that, of necessity, implies the possi- 
 bility of choosing evil. He gives us the opportunity to 
 choose good, knowing that in that free choice of good 
 lies the highest happiness. 
 
 Thus also with the perception of truth, and of the 
 greatest of all truths,—the being and attributes of God. 
 Our highest happiness comes from our free action. We 
 rejoice in the truth; but especially in the truth which we 
 find for ourselves. The discovery is the mount of rap- 
 ture. May not this be one reason why the God of Infi- 
 nite Love is a God that hideth himself? Spiritual truth, 
 like mathematical and physical, is more highly prized 
 when discovered by us. 
 
 In the Scriptures of the Jewish and the Christian faith 
 it is constantly implied, and sometimes distinctly as- 
 serted, that man is made in the image of God. When 
 the reason sees this clearly by intuition, and the under- 
 standing confirms it by induction, and the will distinctly 
 accepts it as a guiding and controlling truth, then the 
 heart finds in it a source of illimitable peace and strength 
 and joy. 
 
XIII. 
 AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION. 
 
 F Rom our own sense of truthfulness and from the funda- 
 mental axioms of the oneness of human nature we learn 
 to trust the testimony of our fellow-men. The whole 
 structure of human society is based upon our confidence 
 in each other, at least upon this as one of the chief corner- 
 stones. Hence, testimony continually becomes a source 
 of knowledge; and rules, or criteria, for estimating the 
 value of testimony become as important as rules for test- 
 ing the results of observation or for testing the deduc- 
 tions of logic. 
 
 Our fellow-men may testify to us either concerning 
 their observations of sensible phenomena, of what they 
 have seen, heard, felt, etc.; or concerning their states of 
 consciousness, what they believe or feel, what they know 
 or think they know, and what are their judgments of the 
 grounds of their knowledge. And we form our estimate 
 of the value of their testimony, not simply on our confi- 
 dence in their truthfulness, but also on our confidence in 
 their soundness of sense and of judgment, and on their 
 probable or known opportunities for observation and for 
 knowledge. The authority of those who tell us aright is 
 thus estimated by us with care, and may range in its value 
 from an absolute worthlessness up to an absolute author- 
 ity which makes us as sure of what we are told as though 
 we knew it from our own knowledge. 
 
210 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 Nor is any sphere of human thought exempt from the 
 domain of authority. Go to the lowest spheres, in which 
 it might be supposed there is least need of leaning on 
 the testimony of authorities, and in which, indeed, it is 
 often said that authority is not recognized, and you will 
 find, on the contrary, that in the mathematics men lean 
 continually on authority ; and that, without the most con- 
 stant and complete trust in the testimony of men of au- 
 thority, we could have had nothing of our modern naviga- 
 tion, engineering, methods of insurance, and other applica- 
 tions of the various forms of calculus. Even the greatest 
 masters of the @ priori sciences of space and time build 
 continually their most sublime deductions partly upon con- 
 fidence in the results attained by the men of inferior genius 
 who perform the drudgery of calculation for them, partly 
 upon the theoretic conclusions of their fellow-masters in 
 the highest fields. It is so also in the physical sciences, 
 and so to a large extent in the historical sciences. 
 
 When, however, we approach the psychological and the- 
 ological departments of human science, the function of 
 testimony and authority is diminished ; and there are those 
 who refuse to allow them any place in these departments. 
 I cannot, however, find any logical break in the grand 
 hierarchy of sciences ; and the different position of testi- 
 mony and authority in the different departments seems to 
 me to arise only from the difference of development in the 
 sciences themselves. Geometry is the foundation of learn- 
 ing, and is first developed. Then come the other mathe- 
 matics, then mechanics, next chemistry, and afterward 
 physiology. Here already, before leaving physics, we have 
 arrived at a science in which comparatively little is thor- 
 oughly established, and in which, therefore, testimony and 
 
AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION 211 
 
 authority have less weight. We pass into and through 
 the historical sciences, and enter the psychological. We 
 find still the well-known and established parts contracting, 
 and the partially known occupying relatively more space. 
 Yet there are established laws in psychology, and we may 
 reasonably ask a child to accept as certain those psycho- 
 logical truths which are conceded by metaphysicians of 
 every school. Thus also when we ascend into theology. 
 It is reasonable that authority should have its weight here. 
 
 The object of this course of lectures does not require 
 me to go into the question of the evidences of Christian- 
 ity, which were a vast subject to occupy even a whole 
 course. /\s Christians, we believe that testimony is com- 
 petent to assure us of facts that would demonstrate that 
 certain men have had special opportunities of gaining 
 knowledge in religion, and that their words are thus 
 clothed with special authority on religious subjects ; and 
 we believe that the Christian Church is not unreasonable 
 in giving implicit faith to the words of the Great Teacher 
 who testified of what he had seen in the bosom of God. 
 But, in speaking of the natural sources of theology, it is 
 only proper for me to point out that this implicit faith in 
 the authority of Jesus is not contrary to the analogy of 
 our conduct in other matters, and even in regard to other 
 religious teachers. 
 
 The child accepts his parents’ authority even in relig- 
 ious matters, and it is reasonable that he should do so. 
 And, although in adult age he learns that his parents were 
 fallible and may have erred, yet their faith ought to create 
 some presumption in favor of their creed. And, to what- 
 ever years of wisdom we may attain, there always remains 
 a presumption that even in the most difficult of all fields 
 
212 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 of human thought the general consent of wise and ju- 
 dicious persons to a doctrine indicates the truth of that 
 doctrine. It is not a mark of wisdom in a young man 
 when he flies in the face of all his elders, and flippantly 
 denies the fundamental doctrines of religion, in which the 
 holiest and best men of all parties and sects are agreed. 
 Man certainly is a religious being, and that is presumptive 
 proof of the strongest kind that man sees some real 
 truth in religious matters. This insight in religion is also 
 to be presumed to be in some degree proportional to the 
 religious character of the individual. The agreement in 
 religious doctrines among the holiest and most saintly men 
 of all denominations of Christendom, and even in Moham- 
 medan and heathen lands, is much greater than the care- 
 less observer would suppose. Men of religious character 
 even in pagan countries, with sufficient civilization to 
 make this character apparent, have held monotheistic 
 views, have clung to a faith in the wisdom and benefi- 
 cence and holiness of God, have believed in his provi- 
 dence over individuals, in his answer to prayer, in his dis- 
 pleasure at sin and his willingness to forgive the penitent, 
 in his inspiration of our holiest and best thoughts, in 
 the immortality of the individual soul and the retribu- 
 tions of the world to come, in the obligations of piety 
 and charity, and in love to God and kindness to men as 
 the prime duties of man. These glorious doctrines of 
 our Christian faith are, I say, held not only by all the 
 best and noblest men in every age of the world and in 
 every sect of Christendom, but in a more or less distinct 
 form by the best and most enlightened heathen, of any 
 saintliness of character. And this concurrent testimony 
 to those great and main truths has a decided weight of 
 
AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION 213 
 
 authority in their favor, creates a strong presumption on 
 their side, and throws the burden of proof wholly upon 
 those who would deny them. 
 
 I have alluded to the fact that we Christians also accept 
 a much higher authority than this. We believe that for 
 special purposes in the course of human history, there 
 have been witnesses to theological truth admitted to 
 peculiar opportunities of learning divine things, and that 
 sundry great prophets and apostles, and, above them all, the 
 spotless One who is the head of the Church, have spoken 
 to us of that which they knew by means above those open 
 to ordinary men. One of the great evidences they have 
 given of their communion with God is the perfect con- 
 formity of their teaching with our highest deductions from 
 the light of nature. Especially in the case of the Lord 
 when upon earth, we are convinced of the divinity of his 
 mission and his authority, partly by the divinity of his 
 character, by the conformity of his actions and sayings, 
 under all circumstances, with our highest a priorz concep- 
 tions of the dignity of the Son of God. 
 
 We have in our own days a great many claimants to a 
 certain sort of authority in spiritual and religious things; 
 I refer to those who claim to be in communication with 
 departed spirits. The claim is by no means new,—on the 
 contrary, we have had it in all ages of the world,—and as 
 far back as history goes we find allusions to those who 
 held supposed intercourse with the dead. The fact that 
 this belief has been common in all ages is certainly, at 
 first sight, an argument in favor of itstruth. The doctrine 
 must be founded on something real in human nature or 
 human history. 
 
 But, on the other hand, the most religious people have 
 
214 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 not usually accepted it, or have deemed it a wholly unsat- 
 isfactory mode of getting a knowledge of the invisible 
 world. Moses forbade it, the Christian Church has. re- 
 pudiated it; and in its modern revival it has shown to us 
 the causes of its perpetual presence in the world, and of 
 its perpetual failure. Its presence is due to the inextin- 
 guishable faith of man in human immortality, to the 
 inappeasable longing of the heart for renewed commun- 
 ion with the beloved dead, to the insatiable curiosity of 
 the mind in regard to the unseen and future, and to the 
 constant appearance of phenomena above our power to 
 explain. Its perpetual failure to command the general 
 assent and respect of the most enlightened men (despite 
 the worth and standing of some who believe in it) lies 
 partly in the very unsatisfactory nature of the tests by 
 which it is attempted to establish the fact of communion 
 with the dead, and partly in the total want of correspond- 
 ence between the information given us by the supposed 
 spirits and our own best and purest ideas of the spiritual 
 world. The evidence which is strongest in behalf of the 
 divine origin of the Bible is strongest against the claims 
 of both ancient and modern necromancy,— the evidence 
 arising from the comparison of the asserted revelation 
 with the religious truths of direct intuition. The wide 
 prevalence of faith in intercourse with the dead is a very 
 strong argument in favor of believing such intercourse 
 possible; but the utter failure of necromancy to obtain 
 from the spirit world any responses worthy the higher 
 light into which the saints have ascended leads us to sup- 
 pose that, if the saints are permitted to have intercourse 
 with the living, it is by the way of inspiration and provi- 
 dential guidance,— by influences of which the recipient 
 
AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION 215 
 
 is not directly conscious. It is the faith of a very large 
 majority of the Christian world that these influences from 
 our ascended friends are not only possible, but actual,— 
 influences which we, the recipients, cannot distinguish, 
 on the one hand, from the workings of our own minds, 
 nor, on the other, from the influences of the Spirit of God. 
 And it is a universal belief of Christendom that the 
 Spirit of God influences the hearts of men, and is the 
 prompter of our best and holiest thoughts. 
 
 Against this faith in spiritual influences, whether from 
 angels and spirits or from God, the pseudo-science of our 
 century cries out. In vain the goodly fellowship of the 
 prophets, the noble army of martyrs, and the holy Church 
 throughout the world unite in ascribing deliverance from 
 temptation and the inspiration of holy thoughts and pur- 
 poses to the indwelling Spirit of Christ and of God. The 
 modern psychologist answers that all human thought and 
 feeling must move by invariable laws of association, and 
 that both free will in man, and the interference of free 
 will in spiritual beings to influence us, are rigidly excluded 
 by this reign of law. And I answer that this rigid in- 
 variability of law, excluding the action of free will, is a 
 mere assumption, not warranted by anything in the nature 
 or necessities of science, and absolutely forbidden by the 
 clear voice of consciousness and by the truths implied 
 in the moral judgments of conscience. The doctrine of 
 necessity, as I have already said, whether as expounded by 
 Augustine, Calvin, Edwards, Priestley, or Spencer, is a 
 fallacy, arising from the attempt to argue from infinite 
 premises. 
 
 Certainly, in the present case it can have no force. 
 We influence each other’s thought and feeling in a thou- 
 
2h0) POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 sand ways. A judicious parent teaches his children, and 
 endeavors to form their taste and judgment, not only by 
 direct precept and open endeavor, but very often in silent 
 ways without their knowledge. We receive influences 
 very often without being conscious of it: we exert in- 
 fluence also unconsciously. If these facts do not conflict 
 with the certainty and invariability of psychologic laws, 
 neither would the influences of angels or spirits. These 
 spiritual influences could as well be in accordance with 
 law, and yet be forever hidden from detection by us while 
 in the flesh, as the unconscious influences of parents, 
 teachers, and friends can be in accordance with law. 
 There is no difficulty arising from the nature or action 
 of psychological or physiological law which would hinder 
 either God or angels or spirits from exerting influences 
 over us similar to those we unconsciously exert over one 
 another. The apparent difficulty comes from our at- 
 tempting to argue from the infinite nature of God and 
 the infinite or universal and invariable nature of law. 
 From these premises, as I continually insist, it is not 
 logically lawful to argue. If it were, I, too, could argue 
 on the other side, and show that to Infinite Wisdom and 
 Infinite Power laws inflexible and invariable become per- 
 fectly plastic, and lead to any result deemed desirable by 
 the infinite and infinitely loving God. What are we, and 
 what our knowledge, that we should presume to say that 
 the Almighty is not as free in his loving treatment of us 
 as we in our treatment of our children? 
 
 But the very nature of the organized bodies in which 
 we dwell disproves this assumption of invariable law, 
 and demonstrates that this house wherein the soul dwells 
 is open for the reception of spiritual visitors. Let the be- 
 
AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION 217 
 
 liever in the development and evolution theories struggle 
 as he may to reduce the laws of organic life to simplicity 
 and unity, he cannot succeed in annihilating the differ- 
 ences and specialties of the organic world. When he can 
 conceive it possible that any inventive skill could make a 
 machine which would (to expand Diderot’s simile) cast 
 constantly a succession of type, and then, worked only by 
 steam, and without human guidance to arrange the letters 
 so as to make successively the Iliad, the Odyssey, the 
 fEneid, the Divina Commedia, the Paradise Lost, the 
 plays of Shakspere, the Principia of Newton, and so on 
 through all the range of human literature,— when he can 
 at my request conceive this machine possible, then I may 
 at his request attempt the much more difficult concep- 
 tion that any general laws whatever can have produced 
 the myriads of specific forms of plants and animals, each 
 showing the guidance of thought as distinctly as any 
 poem or other work of human art, and all bound together 
 by the most beautiful laws of intellectual connection and 
 harmony into one divine scripture of nature. In every 
 organic form, and @ fortzorz in the human body, the most 
 perfect of those forms, there is evidence of a constant 
 spiritual guidance of the forces of nature to bring about a 
 specific result. And whatever be the nature of that con- 
 stant spiritual guidance, whether it be the incessant voli- 
 tion of a conscious spirit higher than ours, or the un- 
 conscious action of such a spirit, or the unconscious 
 action of our own souls, following the laws of our spiritual 
 nature,—in either case, I say, there is demonstrative evi- 
 dence that in our human frame other powers are at work 
 than the mere forces of nature. There is a spiritual 
 guidance of those forces to make them build and repair 
 
218 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 the individual and unique form of our body. This cuid- 
 ance cannot result from any conceivable system of general 
 physical laws,—laws of matter and motion; and yet this 
 guidance is not in opposition to, or violation of, those 
 laws, nor inconsistent with the supposition of spiritual 
 laws governing our conscious life. This spiritual cui- 
 dance of the chemical forces, leading them to build up 
 the body peculiar to each individual man, proves that 
 we are not simply under the domain of the universal and 
 invariable molecular forces; that spirit rules within us to 
 the accomplishment of special ends, without our con- 
 scious recognition of that rule; and that, therefore, the 
 doctrine of inspiration by higher spirits, and the gracious 
 influences of God,—Zinspiration given without our con- 
 scious reception, and manifested only in the purer affec- 
 tions, the more spiritual wisdom, the more saintly lines 
 of its recipients,— is, as I have said, not inconsistent with 
 the truths either of physiology or psychology. 
 
 By the very hypothesis of such inspiration it is assumed 
 to be indistinguishable by us from the action of the laws 
 of the association of ideas and from the promptings of 
 genius. Genius is native talent, ability born in us, and 
 usually supposed to be the inheritance of ancestral cult- 
 ure. Toa large extent we can trace the laws of inheri- 
 tance, and show from what ancestry men of particular 
 ability derived their peculiar gifts. The inheritance of 
 mental and moral characters, and especially the inheri- 
 tance of such qualities from the father’s line of descent, 
 cannot be ascribed to the mere laws of matter and motion. 
 It must be ascribed to spiritual laws, —laws acting on some- 
 thing else than the mere brain and body, acting on that 
 spiritual nature which guides the molecular forces in the 
 
AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION 219 
 
 building of the body. Genius must therefore forever be 
 indistinguishable by us from the promptings of inspira- 
 tion; and here is another opening whereby we are left free 
 for visitations from on high, which shall not interfere with 
 our conscious liberty. When the man of poetic genius 
 suddenly and without conscious effort or the slightest pre- 
 meditation utters a new poem; or the mathematician in 
 like manner, while thinking of something entirely foreign 
 to his science, sees as by a flash of heavenly light some 
 new geometrical truth that unlocks at once a thousand 
 secrets of nature, and puts new keys of power into the 
 hands of men; or when the humble Christian believer, 
 struggling under infirmities of his own temper, under the 
 force of temptations to a sinful and selfish life, under 
 doubts and blindness, and dread lest it be true that mat- 
 ter and motion are the sum and substance of all things, 
 and that the end of all is to be eternal silence, eternal 
 frost, and eternal death, suddenly feels his heart thaw as 
 under a heavenly sun, beholds the mists roll away, and a 
 world of transcendent spiritual beauty reveal to him his 
 own higher destiny as a child of the infinite and infinitely 
 loving God, and his soul swells and thrills in that glorious 
 liberty,— when thus men in various moods and of various 
 powers experience a sudden influx of life and light, lifting 
 them for the moment far above the level of their ordinary 
 experience, it is, and may forever be, impossible for them 
 to decide to which of three sources they shall attribute 
 the happy change,— to some physiological action on the 
 brain, giving it unwonted freedom in response to their 
 spiritual activity; or to some unwonted energy of their 
 own spiritual action, compelling the brain to more prompt 
 obedience than usual; or to some inspiration from unseen 
 
220 POSTULATES. OF REVELATION 
 
 spirits, and perchance from the highest source of spiritual 
 life, from the ascended Saviour, or from the Almighty 
 God. I have, I think, shown that this third supposition, 
 which is the doctrine of the Christian formula of bap- 
 tism, is not discordant with the doctrines of natural 
 science. 
 
 The light of nature will not, however, carry us beyond 
 the recognition of the being of God and his attributes. 
 We cannot, by arguing from those attributes, since they 
 are infinite, gain anything more than probable results, or 
 results of very general form. The forgiveness of sins, and 
 the influence of forgiveness upon the retribution for guilt, 
 are points upon which we cannot dogmatize. On the 
 one side it has been argued from the justice of God and 
 his infinite holiness, that sin is by nature unpardonable, 
 and retribution infinite and eternal. On the other hand 
 from those same infinite attributes and the infinite love 
 of God, it is argued that sin must be temporary and the 
 final eternal blessedness of all souls certain. From in- 
 finite attributes we cannot argue demonstratively and 
 boldly. 
 
 Thus, also, with the doctrine of the influences of the 
 spirit of God: it cannot be demonstrated; it can only 
 be defended from the objections of pseudo science, and 
 shown to have strong @ griort probability in its favor, 
 That probability arises from the paternal character of the 
 Deity and from the longing which every religious soul has 
 for the assurance of a personal intercourse with Him. 
 The desire of all nations shall come. What is universally 
 desired by the best souls, and desired with an ardor pro- 
 portionate to their holiness of character, must be truly 
 desirable ; and all that is truly desirable is possible, and 
 
AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION 221 
 
 will become actual. But whether the higher light flood- 
 ing the soul and awakening it to a renewed consciousness 
 of its divine origin and kindred comes from genius or 
 from inspiration, it gives to its recipient a certain measure 
 of authority over us. We are often competent to receive 
 truth and to test its truthfulness, when we are not at all 
 competent to its discovery. As school-boys may know 
 whether a formula is correct or not by testing it, by its 
 application to a variety of simple numerical examples, and 
 yet not have the slightest power to discover the true 
 formula, or correct its error if erroneously given, so men 
 in general may recognize at once moral and religious 
 truths, the beauty and holiness, the truthfulness and value, 
 of the best utterances of saints and prophets, without 
 being themselves able to put their best thoughts into 
 words, or even to lift their thoughts unaided to the 
 heights to which the word of the saints may lift them. 
 Men know this divine character of the best moral and re- 
 ligious utterances by the echo it finds in their own hearts, 
 and by the evident justness of its application to their own 
 experience and that of their neighbors. There is a sense, 
 also, in which a man in his better moments may become 
 an authority to himself in his weaker hours. The mathe- 
 matician may forget the steps by which he once demon- 
 strated a truth, and through temporary indisposition be 
 unable to recall them; but, if he remembers that he 
 once proved the truth, he still believes it true on his own 
 authority. | 
 
 I have already spoken of the authority possessed by the 
 united testimony of the good; and I might add that the 
 agreement of the great multitude of the saints in all ages 
 of the Church, and even in pagan lands, in so many of the 
 
222 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 great doctrines of monotheism, creates also a presumption 
 that the presence and guidance of the Spirit of Truth have 
 not been wanting. But even in cases in which the multi- 
 tude of the saints has not spoken, even on points of rarer 
 interest or of deeper and more peculiar experience, the 
 voice of a man of holy character is entitled to weight, and 
 creates a presumption in favor of the truth of what he 
 says, strong in proportion to his holiness and the glow of 
 divine love within him.” To the great Swedish seer, I 
 believe, we owe the sentence that love is luminous; and it 
 embodies a pregnant truth, acknowledged in some form by 
 all the wise and holy men before and since the apostle 
 John, who gave us the formula, “He that dwelleth in love 
 dwelleth in God, and knoweth God.” 
 
 While the law is undoubtedly true that feeling and per- 
 ception as states of consciousness have some tendency 
 to exclude each other, and that therefore a man may be 
 blinded by the ardor of his feelings, it is also true that 
 there can be no clear vision without attention, and no at- 
 tention until an interest be aroused, and no interest in 
 the beautiful and the holy without adoration. 
 
 No man cold and indifferent to the issues of the late 
 Civil War, without sympathy in the ordinary trials, suffer- 
 ings, and joys of life, and without a quick feeling of the 
 expression of form, can give a just judgment on the ex- 
 quisite statuettes of Rogers. No man unmoved by har- 
 monies of coloring, indifferent to the grandeur of the 
 mountains, and to the solemnity of the storm, and to the 
 tragical interest of the White Mountain Notch, could be 
 a just judge of the fine effort to tell on canvas the story 
 of the eventful August night which has hung its shadow 
 over that pass for more than sixty years. No man who 
 
AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION 223 
 
 despises natural science, and is totally devoid of interest in 
 the questions it discusses, is competent to sit in judgment 
 upon the works of Peirce, of Gibbs, of Dana, of Gray, or 
 of Agassiz. What is the judgment of a man entirely de- 
 void both of ear and of taste for music,— I ask, what is his 
 judgment worth concerning the value of Beethoven’s 
 ‘“‘Mount of Olives” or Rossini’s “ William Tell” ? 
 
 It is evident that, while enthusiasm may mislead and 
 too great a depth of feeling may blind the judgment, it is 
 even more emphatically true that coldness will lead to un- 
 just judgment, and aversion or dislike to a subject render 
 it almost impossible to form any correct opinions on it. 
 If we are moved by human testimony and by the authority 
 of our fellow-men at all upon any question, we should give 
 the greatest weight, other things being equal, to the opin- 
 ions of those interested in that question and moderately 
 enthusiastic upon it. I say, moderately enthusiastic; be- 
 cause we must acknowledge that an over-zeal leads to ex- 
 travagance of opinion. But the highest healthy enthu- 
 siasm gives the clearest sight. 
 
 If, now, we apply these self-evident remarks to the 
 questions of theology, we shall see that it is only those 
 who are of religious temperament that are likely to form 
 a sound judgment on religious matters, and that it is per- 
 fectly reasonable for those who have less feeling upon the 
 matter to give great weight to opinions agreed to by the 
 majority of more devout men. 
 
 If for any cause I am inclined to doubt the being of 
 God, the efficacy of prayer, the immortality of the soul, 
 the forgiveness of sin, and sink into acquiescence with the 
 notion that man perishes at death, then I ought to remem- 
 ber that those whose lives have given the best proof of a 
 
224 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 religious nature, and who have been most thoroughly and 
 practically interested in such questions, have with great 
 unanimity proclaimed those doctrines which I am doubt- 
 ing,—proclaimed them as the most certain of all truths. 
 When the deeper feelings of the heart are aroused, we 
 leave all pantheistic speculations, and fly to the bosom of 
 God as to afather. In the hours of deepest need, and 
 when our holiest longings are awakened, God is not an 
 unknown and unknowable mystery, but a Father of infi- 
 nite power, of unsearchable wisdom, of boundless love, of 
 unspeakable tenderness, who is the only judge to decide 
 what suffering and disappointment, what agony and bloody 
 sweat, may be necessary for us in this life, to prepare us 
 for the unutterable joys of the world to come. These 
 doctrines held by men of devout character at all time, and 
 held by nearly all men in their hours of thorough awaken- 
 ing, are rendered a priori probable by the very fact that 
 they thus command assent from the best judges. 
 
 I was recently reading to a friend the report of a scene 
 in our National Academy of Sciences. The superintend- 
 ent of the Coast Survey had poured out with great ear- 
 nestness a mathematical discovery of his own, which he 
 deemed of the highest importance; but it was necessarily 
 clothed in language perfectly unintelligible to the great 
 majority of his hearers. When he had closed, and all were 
 sitting in silent bewilderment, the great zodlogist arose, 
 and said in substance, “I must confess I have not under- 
 stood one word of this communication ; but I have hereto- 
 fore had such ample reason to believe in the speaker's 
 clearness and soundness of thought that I accept what 
 he has now said as undoubtedly true, and undoubtedly to 
 be of great practical value.” When I had read this an- 
 
AUTHORITY AND INSPIRATION 225 
 
 ecdote to my friend, he exclaimed: That is precisely my 
 feeling toward Jesus Christ. Jesus assures me of the 
 paternal character of God and of the immortality of the 
 individual soul. How he gets that knowledge I do not 
 know. I cannot see those truths written clearly on the 
 world, nor on the human soul. Without Christ, I could 
 only hope they were true. But I have seen and do see 
 so many proofs of the wonderful wisdom and clearness of 
 thought and holiness of character in Jesus Christ that, 
 when he says he knows they are true, I believe he does 
 know; and I rest implicit faith in his word. Theorizers 
 about it may debate as they will concerning the character 
 and degree of his inspiration, and the nature of his rela- 
 tion to God and man. It is enough for me that the 
 whole volume of the New Testament gives me perfect 
 faith in his wisdom and holiness and truth; and, when 
 he says he knows God is our father, I know that he 
 knows it, and therefore I know it. 
 
 It is always possible to wander from your road either 
 by going to the left or by going to the right. In our 
 Protestant liberty we have justly refused to admit either 
 the infallibility of the pope or of the Church; but we run 
 into danger of great folly and absurdity, if we are thereby 
 led to deny all authority in matters of religion. It is 
 always reasonable to defer to the opinion of those best 
 qualified to judge. Those best qualified to judge in any 
 matter are those whose interest in it is real and practical, 
 and has led them to devote their lives to it. We ought, 
 therefore, in matters of religion to defer to the opinion of 
 the holy and the pure in heart who have made it the study 
 of their lives to gain a practical acquaintance with relig- 
 ious truth, by first of all subjecting themselves to its 
 
226 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 power. These holy men may have gained their clearer 
 knowledge of truth in various ways. Partly it came from 
 their warmth of feeling, their interest in the subject. 
 Partly it came from their purity of heart; for the law 
 announced by the Lord, that the pure in heart shall see 
 God, is a law of nature, and manifestly true. Partly it 
 may have come from communing with angels and spirits, 
 the unconscious reception of inspiration from the heavenly 
 world. And partly it comes from the inspiration of 
 God; first in the gift of a religious genius, and after- 
 ward in the gracious influences promised by Jesus Christ, 
 But, from whatever source it come, a holy and religious 
 character is presumptive evidence of a correct knowledge 
 of religious truths; and, therefore, the presumption is 
 always in favor of those main doctrines of monotheism 
 and piety which have been held with unwavering convic- 
 tion by the saints of all ages and of all churches. 
 
XIV. 
 
 SUMMARY OF NATURAL SOURCES OF 
 RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Let us pass the last hour of our meditation together 
 in a recapitulation of the sources of religious knowledge 
 which we have found on examination trustworthy ; and, in 
 order that we may carry away a positive impression of 
 faith rather than any impression of controversy with 
 doubt or denial, let us omit in this recapitulation any 
 allusion to the modern forms of unbelief, which in my 
 previous lectures I have endeavored to show all stand 
 upon utterly untenable foundations, mostly drawing their 
 conclusions from premises which attempt to define the 
 infinite. 
 
 The grand fundamental truth on which all philosophy 
 and all science is built is that man has the power of per- 
 ceiving things and their relations, of perceiving them 
 either by outward sense or by inward apprehension. And 
 for this power of perception, inward or outward, we use 
 the term “sight.” Whatever we see, touch, hear, smell, 
 taste, we say we see by outward sense. Whatever we per. 
 ceive by reflection, or are conscious of in our own hearts 
 and minds, we say we see by inward sight. 
 
 In our first survey of the universe we see the difference 
 between our own self and the rest of the universe,— the me 
 and the not-me, myself and what is not myself. That is 
 
228 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 the first grand division which we make in classifying the 
 objects of our perception. Then we quickly again divide 
 the not-myself into my body and what is not my body. 
 My body is subservient to my thoughts and wishes. 
 What is not my body is not so directly obedient to me. 
 It obeys only a compulsion applied in some manner 
 through some part of my body. We then very rapidly, 
 very early in our conscious life, proceed to another divi- 
 sion, and discover the existence of other selves in the 
 world, each with its body more directly subservient to 
 it, and through its body obtaining, as we do, some con- 
 trolling influence over matter. We thus learn the exist- 
 ence of men as dwellers in organic forms and partial lords 
 of the material world. We see, too, that the material 
 world is vastly more like our bodies than it is like us. 
 We take the further step long before adult age, and class 
 our bodies in as a part of the material world; and our 
 division becomes simply into matter and spirit. We rec- 
 ognize that, to a large extent, spirit is lord over matter ; 
 and careful experiment convinces us that matter is wholly 
 inert. Yet we see matter in motion, even when no 
 human spirit is acting upon it. Even the distant and 
 vast stars are in motion. We rise at once to the con- 
 ception of a mighty Spirit ruling the world, as we rule 
 the small portions of it under our control; and reason 
 pushes us to the conclusion that this Spirit is not only 
 mighty, but almighty. 
 
 Thus readily is the human intellect led to perceive the 
 existence of the Almighty God, and the likeness to him in 
 which man is created. But the notion thus obtained is 
 very meagre. It presents the Deity only as the Almighty, 
 and does not satisfy the longings of the heart after God, 
 
NATURAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 229 
 
 While man is in a rude and savage state, and his better 
 affections are largely dormant, while the bodily appetites 
 and passions, together with the lust for power and the 
 greed for wealth, fill constantly the sphere of his con- 
 sciousness, he does not feel the need of any better idea of 
 God than this rude symbol of a chieftain or king mightier 
 than any earthly ruler. 
 
 But in the progress of higher culture, and especially in 
 the culture of our Christian civilization, as it has been 
 affected for centuries by the sublime teaching and hu- 
 manizing influences of the gospel, men begin to desire 
 some better knowledge of their Creator. A longing for 
 communion with him arises. They look anxiously in 
 every direction for further light concerning his being and 
 character. They would fain test and legitimate to them- 
 selves the sweet words concerning him which they find in 
 the biographies of Jesus and in the books of those who 
 follow that marvellous teaching. 
 
 In search of these trustworthy natural sources of the- 
 ology, they look within, and study their own intellectual 
 and moral powers and powers of will, and find in each 
 department some rays of the light for which they are 
 longing. 
 
 The intellect, beginning with the consideration of that. 
 which is plainly known and thoroughly understood, finds 
 itself, however, constantly confronted with an impene- 
 trable wall of mystery. It recognizes the existence of 
 spirit, yet finds that it knows spirit only by means of a 
 few phenomena, and that the laws of those phenomena are 
 only partially comprehended. There are hints which lead 
 us to suspect our own minds and souls to be reservoirs 
 of hidden, reserved, even unknown powers; and there are 
 
220 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 v 
 
 clear proofs that the soul within us undergoes many modi- 
 fications and accomplishes many effects which are not 
 brought to the light of consciousness at all Yet these 
 hidden depths of our being, bringing up their effects at 
 length to the surface, show those efforts to be reasonable, 
 exactly as though our reason and understanding had 
 worked within us more deeply than we knew. But we 
 cannot ascribe the guidance of the motion in these abysses 
 of our nature to our own wisdom. We find in the rational 
 results of the movement evidence of a Divine guidance, 
 controlling to some extent, by laws hidden from our sight, 
 the inmost springs and currents of our being. 
 
 Moreover, we find the intellect striving incessantly after 
 the infinite, pushing its inquiries into the past and coming 
 eternities, inward to the very centre of the atom, outward 
 beyond all the physical universe. The intellect refuses to 
 find any here or now. Here has no limits. It is anywhere, 
 everywhere: its boundaries are nowhere. Mow has no 
 existence, All time is past or future; and the past and 
 the future have no limits, save as they crowd against each 
 other in the non-existent now. The intellect, thus refus- 
 ing to be limited in thought, cannot believe itself limited 
 in being. It asserts its own immortal and divine nature. 
 Yet it is humbled in the consciousness of its ignorance, 
 and, even with the vaguest recognition of the presence 
 of thought in the universe, perceives that thought infi- 
 nitely to transcend in wisdom all human powers, 
 
 Thus the first inward survey of the powers of thought 
 gives new testimony to the existence of the all-wise, om- 
 niscient God. 
 
 Searching, then, the affections, we find them betraying 
 the like infinite nature. The very passions and appetites 
 
NATURAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 231 
 
 of the body rage within us like stormy seas, and sometimes 
 seem entirely too vast for the little frame in which they 
 are implanted. But a closer examination shows this to 
 be an illusion. We are blending spiritual powers with 
 carnal affections, and deceiving ourselves with a vain 
 show. Not so, when we pass into the higher region of the 
 affections,— the love of beauty, the love of friends, charity 
 toward men, reverence toward men of excellence, grati- 
 tude toward benefactors. In these higher affections which 
 bind us to our fellow-men, we find no limits necessarily 
 affixed, All the highest genius of our race has been ex- 
 hausted in the vain endeavor to express the highest senti- 
 ments of our nature; and, while we gratefully receive 
 these attempted expressions at the hand of genius, and 
 bow with reverence before the powers that have expressed 
 so much, we, nevertheless, all feel that within our hearts 
 are glowing deeper things than any that have yet been 
 uttered. We could not rival the man of genius in his 
 power of utterance; but were his friends, instead of prais- 
 ing his utterance, to praise his depth of feeling, we should 
 instantly feel offended, as Hamlet felt toward Laertes 
 when boasting of his love, and ery with him, “T! ‘too? 
 
 “I loved Ophelia: forty thousand brothers 
 COudsnOL a 
 Make up my sum,” 
 
 No sculpture, no painting, no oratory, no poetry, not even 
 any music, ever expressed all the depth of feeling in the 
 human heart. Not even any music, do | say? Not even 
 the sacrifice of all personal hopes and happiness, in the 
 endurance of poverty, toil, suffering, and agonizing death, 
 has expressed the whole depth of love in the hearts of 
 
232 POSTULATES ‘OF REVELATION 
 
 many of those who have been glad to endure all things for 
 the sake of wife or husband, parent or child, or for coun- 
 try, or for humankind. 
 
 And this heart so strong in love toward others has also 
 an infinite longing for love in return. It rejoices in the 
 smile of good men, it is glad with the sympathy of its be- 
 loved; but it also looks trustingly up, and longs for for- 
 giveness and blessing from God. All its great tides, bear- 
 ing up our hopes and joys and sorrows, flooding every 
 inlet of our being, and daily renewing our whole life with 
 their motions, are perpetual witnesses to the existence of 
 the great centre of attraction, the Author and Inspirer of 
 all forces. The love of God is the only fountain copious 
 enough to supply such a sea. The intellect, surveying 
 these wondrous manifestations of the human heart, sees 
 at once that it is absurd to ascribe such effects to any 
 petty mechanical causes in the organization of the human 
 body, and that the only rational conclusion is to refer 
 them to a Being whose unfathomable love is commensur- 
 able only with his almighty power and boundless wisdom. 
 
 But our survey of the internal world, beginning early 
 with our recognition of the will, and leading us to the Al- 
 mighty, then recognizing the intellect and the heart as 
 leading us justly and infallibly to ascribe wisdom and love 
 to the Almighty God, now reveals to us sundry features 
 of the world within and without that both confirm our 
 first inductions, and open to us new consequences and 
 new views of the truth attained. 
 
 We have seen that we are not alone in the universe, 
 that there are other men around us, that there may be 
 other conscious beings than men, and that certainly there 
 is a Being above all, in whose likeness, to some extent, we 
 
NATURAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 233 
 
 have been formed, since he manifests power and wisdom 
 and love unlimited, as we manifest them faintly and 
 feebly. In the contemplation of this spiritual universe, 
 this goodly company of men and angels made in the image 
 of God, we perceive that certain relations exist and must 
 exist between them, that they have been made with refer- 
 ence to each other, and that out of this order of relation 
 to each other and to their Maker springs an obligation, 
 binding us to certain courses, and forbidding others. 
 We perceive that there is a difference outranking in im- 
 portance all those which we have previously considered. 
 It is the difference between right and wrong. We 
 demand of ourselves conformity to the right. We are 
 ashamed of ourselves that we choose the wrong. We 
 carry this judgment of ourselves into our most secret 
 thoughts and our most private hours, and are ashamed of 
 ourselves and condemn ourselves for cherishing an un- 
 worthy thought even in solitude. We feel that even for 
 such secret wrong we deserve rebuke and chastisement, 
 and we expect to receive it. Butfrom whom? We push 
 this question, and find that this voice of conscience 
 within us must be considered the voice of God within us, 
 that it is his witness set in our hearts to remind us con- 
 stantly of his perpetual knowledge of us and his just 
 dealing with us. The Being who created all things, 
 whose existence and power we see to be necessary as the 
 cause of all, whose wisdom is the only explanation of the 
 harmonies of the universe and whose inspiration is the 
 only source of holy affections,—this God of wisdom, 
 power, and love, must also see — nay, must have ordained 
 —the relations between spiritual beings that first reveal 
 to us the difference between right and wrong. God or- 
 
234 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 dained these relations, gifted us with power to see them, 
 and with the moral sense to feel obligation and to rever- 
 ence holiness. He must himself be all-holy. 
 
 Our powers are his gifts. We can therefore neither see 
 nor imagine aught greater than he. Stimulate our 
 powers to their utmost, they cannot rise above the Being 
 that made them; and, as we can readily form the idea of 
 perfection,—that is, of a being to whom no new excellence 
 could be added and in whom no existing excellence be in- 
 creased,—God our Maker must be perfect, in holiness and 
 in all his attributes. He is therefore just and merciful 
 and true and faithful. Nor can our faith in these per- 
 fections of the Deity be readily shaken. They are held 
 explicitly or implicitly by all men of sound mind, as the 
 very basis of all our daily thought and action. How do I 
 know that the sun will rise to-morrow? I recently heard 
 this question asked by one of the leading physicists and 
 mathematicians of the world; and he answered himself by 
 saying: I know that the sun will rise to-morrow only as I 
 know the stability of every other law of nature. I know 
 the invariability of natural law only by knowing the truth- 
 fulness of the Deity. My moral conviction of the faithful- 
 ness of God is the only basis on which I build my confi- 
 dence in the permanence of natural laws. God has made 
 the world as a school-house for man, and our education 
 could not be well carried on if the laws of nature were 
 subject to any fluctuation. 
 
 In looking within, we notice also that we havea power of 
 seeing space and time. Their existence is implied in the 
 first phenomenon of matter,—that is, motion; and indeed, 
 since both space and time are without bounds or parts or 
 sensible properties, we should not have seen them but for 
 
NATURAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 235 
 
 motion, which calls our attention to them, and reveals our 
 power of dividing both space and time into parts at our 
 own will, by a mental act, and considering the relations of 
 the parts to one another. There we discover that these 
 intangible entities, having no powers either of spirit or 
 matter, are so perfectly within the grasp of our intellect 
 that we can make propositions perfectly defining certain 
 of these relations; and by using these propositions as 
 premises in reasoning we can deduce necessary conse- 
 quence. Thus space and time form the subject of the 
 first branch of mathematics, as defined in Peirce’s last 
 great work. Out of this is evolved a science of quantity 
 and a science of quality, mathematically treated, using 
 perfect definitions and thus drawing necessary con- 
 clusions. All this work upon space and time and quanti- 
 tative and qualitative analysis is founded simply upon 
 direct intuition or sight of truth, independent of the exter- 
 nal senses or the external world. The conclusions thus 
 mathematically reached upon space and time may be 
 called a priori truths. They rest upon a division of space 
 and time by our power of thought, and not to any great ex- 
 tent upon the nature of space and time in themselves, In 
 themselves and undivided, these elements are so devoid of 
 interesting properties that they would give us few ideas. 
 The conceptions of geometry and algebra, and of the 
 various forms of the calculus, are therefore to be con- 
 sidered pure creations of the human mind. Yet some of 
 these pure intellectual creations of the human mind are 
 found embodied in every atom of matter and in every 
 combination thereof. Many others are found embodied in 
 special parts of the material world, and some of these are 
 of a high and difficult order. Moreover, in very many 
 
236 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 parts of this physical creation we find ideas embodied 
 which, although not actually among those reached by the 
 a priort road, are of the closest similarity to them; and in 
 all parts of the universe we see manifest indications that 
 ideas are there which may be at length grasped by our 
 human minds. The whole encyclopzedia of the physical 
 sciences is indeed only a statement in human language of 
 the ideas which have already been discovered embodied in 
 the physical universe; and the whole army of scientific in- 
 vestigators are, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
 pursuing no other end than endeavoring to unfold ideas 
 expressed in the material universe and not yet read by 
 man. What is the meaning of this recurrence in nature 
 of the a priorz thought of man? Can we resist the con- 
 clusion that the Maker of the world is the Maker of the 
 soul, and that he has made the soul in the likeness of his 
 own Being, inspiring us with thoughts to some feeble ex- 
 tent like his own? 
 
 But it is not the physical sciences alone that bear this 
 glorious testimony to our divine kindred. The domain of 
 science is extending beyond physics into political economy 
 and government, education and psychology ; and the aim 
 of science is everywhere the same. She seeks to under- 
 stand things. She proceeds on the assumption that every- 
 thing is intelligible, that everything is governed by some 
 law which may be comprehended. And what is this as- 
 sumption which every scientific student must make,— 
 what is this but an assumption that everything was 
 comprehended before it was made, and arranged in this 
 intelligible order? Science is only an unfolding of the 
 harmonies of the creation, a reverent pointing out of 
 the wisdom and self-consistence of part of the creative 
 
NATURAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 237 
 
 thoughts of God. The whole universe may be thus con- 
 sidered as a combination and expression of philosophical 
 ideas, including many of those which we once considered 
 our own, and many which will perhaps be discovered by 
 the a priori road before they are perceived in the world. 
 Indeed, one of the ablest of English writers upon the 
 philosophy of the physical sciences maintains in a book 
 of immense learning that this is always the actual process 
 in the discovery of a natural law; namely, that the facts 
 do not directly give it, but only dimly suggest it, so that 
 the mind invents it a przorz as an hypothesis, and then 
 verifies it by comparison with facts. 
 
 But the world is not only an expression of thought, 
 it is the accomplishment of purpose. It is a wonderful 
 system of means and ends. The heavenly bodies accom- 
 plish changes on the earth absolutely necessary for the 
 vegetable and animal life upon our planet, in imparting 
 heat and light and electric and actinic forces, and dis- 
 tributing them aright; in providing also for those move- 
 ments in the ocean and in the atmosphere which produce 
 the changes of the weather,— the alternate sunshine and 
 rain,— so necessary for every form of terrestrial life. The 
 divisions of the earth itself are adapted to the same ends. 
 The proportion of land and water and of the various 
 elements, the elevation and slope of the continents, the 
 quality of the atmosphere,— these and other adaptations 
 fit the earth precisely for the home of living tribes. And 
 not only for animal life: the nature and proportion of 
 the elements fit the planet for the abode of civilized and 
 intellectual men. All is so arranged that this earth be- 
 comes the home, the workshop, the playground, the 
 school-room, the temple of worship, for our race. Coming 
 
238 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 down now in our observation to the smaller field of the 
 organized beings, to which all external things are adapted, 
 the parts of the plant, of the animal, and especially of the 
 human body, are all adapted to one another as perfect 
 means to the accomplishment of essential ends. The 
 organs of sensation, how wonderfully adapted to their 
 work! What a miracle of mechanical excellence is the 
 eye, and how little less miraculous the ear! The grosser 
 organs impress us less as marvellous in complication or 
 delicacy of adjustment, but are none the less perfectly 
 adjusted to accomplish each its accustomed work. 
 
 And I do not see any way in which a sound logic can 
 avoid the conclusion that these myriad adaptations of 
 means to ends were adaptations for those ends, that each 
 thing was adjusted for the accomplishment of an in- 
 tended end. 
 
 Furthermore, we recognize an adaptation in general of 
 the spiritual gifts in each animal to its organization. The 
 animals that are especially fond of flies have special 
 means of catching them,— the swallow, his swiftness and 
 the bristly corners of his mouth; the dragon-fly, his ability 
 to change his course instantaneously in flight; the spider, 
 his web; the ploiaria, sharp wrist-spurs and long nails. 
 
 Thus throughout the whole animal kingdom, thus in all 
 the variety of national and individual character in men, 
 each one finds pleasure in success, and likes to do what he 
 can do, and can do what he likes to do. And this grand 
 truth, illustrative of both the wisdom and the loving kind- 
 ness of the Creator, is made only more strikingly true by 
 the occasional instances in which the adaptation does not 
 seem in that individual and in that particular respect so 
 perfect as is usual. 
 
NATURAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 239 
 
 The universe is the embodiment of ideas, and the adap- 
 tation of a system of means to ends; and one of those 
 ends is to furnish an opportunity to intelligent human 
 beings for the exercise of their higher powers. In our 
 powers of perception we find special senses giving special 
 reports concerning the world of matter and motion. 
 The eye reports to us not only motions which we recog- 
 nize at once as motions, but motions which we did not 
 for many centuries know to be motions. We called them 
 colors. So the ear reports to us motions which for many 
 centuries we did not know to be wholly motions, although 
 we knew them to be accompanied by motions. We called 
 them sounds. The general nerves distributed over the 
 body report to us still other motions, which we did not 
 know to be motions, but called them heat, etc. We can- 
 not dispense with these names of heat and light and 
 electricity and chemical action, sound and color. These 
 various modes of motion, although all motions, are all 
 various; and each produces its specific effect on us, upon 
 our senses and upon our feelings. In exceedingly simple 
 cases of beauty we have been able to discover a part of the 
 causes of beauty. We have discovered that beauty arises 
 from the expression of simple arithmetical ideas, not 
 recognized by the ear or eye as arithmetical ideas or 
 forms of number, but only recognized as beauty of tone 
 and harmony. In more complicated cases of musical ex- 
 pression we are wholly without a clew to the meaning of 
 the beauty or the cause of the expression. Yet we know 
 that it cannot be accidental. The language of tone, the 
 pathetic effect of one modulation, the joyous expression 
 of another, the inspiriting power of martial strains, the 
 touching emphasis of a song of the affections,— these are 
 
240 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 acknowledged and felt by men of every nation,— nay, 
 even the animals are to some extent under their influence. 
 It is a flippant and childish philosophy that would put this 
 fact aside asof no meaning. There is proof here that the 
 Creator of man knew how to produce the highest pleasure 
 in us by the simplest means, and has taught us to recog- 
 nize in simple arithmetical ratios of vibration a means of 
 pouring out all the depths of varied passion and senti- 
 ment, from the thoughtless carelessness of popular airs to 
 the hellish fury of Medea as given by Cherubini, or to the 
 rapture of the ransomed worlds as given by Beethoven. 
 
 And the same argument may be drawn from other 
 forms of beauty and other modes of expressing passion by 
 means of art, as by form and color. They also are the ex- 
 pressions primarily of very simple geometrical and arith- 
 metical ideas, not recognized by us as intellectual ideas, 
 not actually developed by us in that form except in the 
 very simplest cases. To man is given not only the power 
 in all these cases of recognizing the beauty, but also the 
 divine power of reproducing it,—not only by a faithful 
 copy of the natural form, but also by a production, in the 
 spirit of nature, of new forms. And in the case of music 
 this production of new forms is carried to a point of per- 
 fection incomparably higher than that of the natural 
 model. 
 
 This work of artistic genius in creating the statue, the 
 picture, the symphony, is in some sense a higher work 
 than that of the intellect. It is at all events a distinctly 
 spiritual and exalted work, and commands reverence and 
 love toward the artist from those who see or hear the 
 work, 
 
 Now, the universe is not only a combination of ideas, 
 
NATURAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 24I 
 
 and of mechanical means to ends : it is a work of art of the 
 highest order. Musical expression is by no means wholly 
 wanting in it. The winds and the waves, the cries of ani- 
 mals, and especially the song of birds, make expressive 
 music. In beauty and expressiveness of form and color- 
 ing the natural world far exceeds the efforts of the painter 
 and sculptor. A glance of the living eye, lighted by the 
 living soul within, when that soul is filled with earnest 
 passion, makes the eyes even of Raphael’s faces dull and 
 meaningless. 
 
 One September afternoon, throwing its golden light 
 on the landscape, surpasses all the possibilities of mere 
 pigment, even under the hands of the highest human 
 genius. Can we believe these exquisite effects of the 
 landscape and of the human face were not foreseen by 
 the creative Mind? Or does not the perpetual presence 
 of beauty in all the forms and coloring of flowers, plants, 
 rocks, rivers, ocean, and sky, in the autumnal landscape, 
 and in the human face,— does not this perpetual presence 
 of beauty bear perpetual testimony to a wise and loving 
 God, and command love and reverence toward him from 
 every beholder ? 
 
 The artist also creates in his imagination ideal char- 
 acters, and in the drama and the tale holds the mirror up 
 to nature. The highest admiration is accorded to one 
 who creates new personages, and makes them living reali- 
 ties to us. The evidences of his skill are found in the 
 unity of each character introduced in his work, in the ex- 
 cellence and variety of the actors, and in the harmony 
 with which the action of each contributes to a final result. 
 But in these respects human society and human history 
 form together an artistic work of the highest character ; 
 
242 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 and the long course of ages, exhibiting its innumerable 
 individuals of wondrous excellence and its numberless 
 by-plots leading to separate issues of great interest, is still 
 ever tending to higher and higher final accomplishment 
 worthy of its long delay, and to the production of which 
 each of the various parts has been adapted, so that therein 
 are marks of the creative wisdom peculiar and altogether 
 different from those to which we have before referred, 
 
 But it is in vain to endeavor to condense into a single 
 hour an enumeration of all the varieties of argument by 
 which this main doctrine of natural theology is established : 
 that man is made in the image of his Creator, and may 
 justly argue from his own thought and feeling, care only 
 being taken to argue soundly and justly, to ie attributes 
 and purposes of God. This is a conclusion reached by 
 the many lines of induction, to which I have alluded very 
 often, and against which I can find no solid or valid argu- 
 ment. When from this conclusion, or from the attributes 
 and purposes which we are, in conformity with it, led to 
 assign to God, we attempt to draw inferences, then we 
 must beware lest we also silently add infinity to our prem- 
 ises, and reason from the infinite unreasonably. 
 
 The induction which leads us to assign but one Cause 
 to the universe, and to assign to that Cause infinite perfec- 
 tions, and among those perfections to place power, wis- 
 dom, holiness, justice, love, does not enable us to decide 
 what those infinite attributes will imply in all supposable 
 cases. Infinite power is not compatible with weakness, 
 limitations, inabilities; nor infinite wisdom with igno- 
 rance and mistakes and mal-adaptation of means to ends; 
 nor infinite holiness and justice with leaving sin unre- 
 buked and unpunished ; nor infinite love with leaving sen- 
 
NATURAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 243 
 
 tient creatures in infinite and never-ending torment. In 
 all these cases the conclusion is not drawn so much from 
 the infinity as from the attribute itself. We may be, 
 therefore, certain that God can and will hear and answer 
 prayer, and make all things work together for good to his 
 children ; and that he will certainly punish sin, but that 
 he will not leave his children in infinite and unending tor- 
 ment. But to argue from his infinite love that he must 
 bring every creature finally to eternal happiness, or from 
 his infinite justice that he must assign the incorrigibly 
 wicked to eternal torment,— these conclusions are drawn 
 from the infinite nature of the attribute more than from 
 the attribute ; and, therefore, they are not safe conclusions. 
 
 The light of nature is, indeed, clear, and leads us to 
 most valuable conclusions; and we may devoutly thank 
 God that it isso. But our natures are kindred to those 
 of the infinite God; and, the more we have, the more do 
 we desire. These inductions concerning our likeness to 
 our Creator, and the inference of our own immortality 
 which flows from them, make us only long more earnestly 
 for a closer communion with him, for a more direct spirit- 
 ual contact with him indwelling in our hearts. We pray 
 for his guidance of our thoughts, for his purification of our 
 desires, for his inspiration and strength to sanctify our 
 feeble and corrupted will. And we have abundant rea- 
 sons for believing that the prayer is acceptable and 
 accepted, and that holier influences are poured upon us. 
 Yet we are longing ever for more light, and trusting that, 
 after the night of death, shall come a morning refulgent 
 with a more heavenly glory. 
 
 And the Christian saints devoutly believe, and I be- 
 lieve with them, that this great light which is to break 
 
244 POSTULATES OF REVELATION 
 
 upon us, when the shadows of death flee, has already 
 dawned, and given us its first rays from over the hills of 
 Galilee. They find in the person of Jesus of Nazareth 
 a light clearer than the noon-day sun, and revealing to us 
 more truth than the light of nature ever could reveal. 
 They recognize in the man of Nazareth an image of God, 
 answering, far more perfectly than any ideal being could, 
 to our best conceptions of perfection. The ineffable ten- 
 derness of his love toward men, and the gentleness of 
 his dealing with sinners, give them an assurance of the 
 forgiveness of sins, and of the present aid of the Holy 
 Spirit, that they could not otherwise attain. . 
 
 It has not pleased him to make further revelation of 
 truths concerning God than were necessary to the salva- 
 tion of the world, and upon those truths we could attain 
 a glimmering light before; but he has made them plain 
 and certain,— that God will forgive those who trust the 
 promise of forgiveness and turn from their sins, that he 
 will sanctify them and inspire them with a new power of 
 holy and useful life, that both God and Christ will dwell 
 in the heart of the penitent believer and make him con- 
 queror over evil. 
 
 And the history of the Christian Church abundantly 
 witnesses the truth of these promises. In that Church, 
 despite its manifold corruptions and failures and sins, 
 there has always been a body of men distinguished for 
 excellence of private character and clearness of religious 
 faith, And I cannot resist the conviction that their 
 excellence of character creates a strong presumption that 
 their general views of religious things must have been 
 true. 
 
IL 
 POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 
 
THE FIELD OF ETHICS, 
 
 THE present course of lectures discusses several inde- 
 pendent and yet somewhat connected questions concern- 
 ing the science of morality. Morality in its scientific 
 aspect is, however, usually called by its Greek rather than 
 its Latin name, since we always connect the thought of 
 science with the Grecian rather than with the Roman 
 race. This opening lecture consists simply of some 
 remarks upon the general field of ethics, and its limita- 
 tions both in height and breadth. 
 
 “ From the cold earth in early spring, 
 A flower peeped forth, dear fragrant thing ! 
 Then sipped a bee, as half afraid; 
 Sure, each was for the other made.” 
 
 What a number and variety of contrasts and com- 
 parisons must be made by one who reads with apprecia- 
 tion this little poem of Goethe! The coldness of the 
 earth in the spring awakens remembrance of the winter 
 and hope of the summer; the deadness of the earth is 
 contrasted with the life of the flower, the absence of odor 
 in the one with the fragrance of the other, the life of 
 the bee with the lifelessness of the earth and with the 
 vegetable vitality of the plant, the enterprise of this bee 
 with the present sloth of the hive and with its future 
 
248 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 summer activity, and the relation between the bee and 
 the flower, and the relation of the whole to the divine 
 plan of the universe are suggested. 
 
 Comparisons and contrasts are thus always suggested 
 and implied in all conscious thought, since all thought 
 involves at least two ideas, or two objects and their rela- 
 tion. In order to analyze this phenomenon, we must take 
 simpler instances, or, at least, consider but a single one 
 of the many contrasts or comparisons evoked in so com- 
 plex an instance. 
 
 All knowledge is, under one aspect, the knowledge of 
 relations. All intellection is the interelection, or selec- 
 tion, of some one part of the content of consciousness for 
 a closer attention. It must thus of necessity pay a partial 
 attention to the surrounding parts, to mark the boundary 
 of the selected topic. All science is the result of these 
 attempts to divide and define the parts of the general 
 impressions made by the world upon the mind. Com- 
 plete definition includes, however, generalization as well 
 as differentiation ; the generalization being in fact a differ- 
 entiation into larger groups. 
 
 Lest these remarks should seem too vague and general 
 to be of value, let me illustrate by examples more exactly 
 what I mean by the general assertion that all knowledge 
 may be put under the aspect of a knowledge only of 
 relations. What do I know, for instance, of a material 
 object, except its ability to produce sensations? Its 
 relations to me or to other human beings —that is, its 
 ability either directly or indirectly to produce sensations 
 of color, smell, taste, sound, muscular resistance, tempera- 
 ture, and what not —are all that I know of it. If you say, 
 “Oh, no! I further know what the article is,’— gun- 
 
THE FIELD OF ETHICS 249 
 
 powder, for example, that it is made of willow charcoal, 
 saltpetre, and sulphur,— still I may ask, And what do 
 we know of willow charcoal except the appearance, smell, 
 taste, etc., of the willow-tree, the appearance and feeling of 
 the fire that chars it ; and what of the sensible properties of 
 the saltpetre and the sulphur? All our knowledge of the 
 external world is of these sensible properties, and of the 
 inferences logically involved in the sensations: it is, there- 
 fore, in one sense, all included in the relation of the parts 
 of the external world to one another and to our powers of 
 sensation. All our knowledge of space is, again, the 
 knowledge of the relations of the three dimensions each 
 to each, of the possibilities of coexistence therein in- 
 volved,— coexistence being a form of mutual relation in 
 the external things which we know only as related to 
 our possibilities of sensation. In like manner our knowl- 
 edge of time is but a perception of the relations of suc- 
 cession and the possibilities of duration; duration being 
 a relation of antecedent to succeeding states. Even 
 our knowledge of ourselves is, as it were, but a knowl- 
 edge of our relation to the other objects of our knowl- 
 edge,— that we see and know, and that they are seen 
 and known. 
 
 The human sciences are classified and divided, there- 
 fore, according to the particular set of relations with 
 which each one deals,— those relations being partly rela- 
 tions lying in the objects contemplated, and partly lying 
 between those objects and the percipient subject. In the 
 subject, in the me, there have been recognized, for a cen- 
 tury past, three great groups of faculties,— the intellect 
 which sees the true, the heart which feels the beautiful, 
 the will which strives after the good. When two ideas 
 
250 POSTULATES» OF /ETHICS 
 
 or two objects are presented together or in rapid succes- 
 sion to our attention, all three of the parts of our spiritual 
 nature are affected. The intellect forms a judgment, the 
 sentiments or feelings are to some degree excited, and the 
 will is attracted or repelled. It depends upon the nature 
 of the terms compared, which of the three departments of 
 our being is aroused to the greatest activity. Sometimes 
 the intellect is moved to a clear perception and judgment, 
 while the feelings and desires are almost untouched. At 
 other times the will is aroused to instantaneous action 
 with scarce any conscious intellection or feeling. 
 
 For example, two colors, when placed together, give to 
 most eyes at once a feeling, agreeable or disagreeable, 
 without exciting either the will or the intellect to con- 
 scious activity. In like manner two musical tones heard 
 simultaneously or in rapid succession awaken an agree- 
 able or disagreeable feeling; but do not, of themselves, 
 lead us to form any judgment or prompt us to any action. 
 On the other hand, two propositions presented in rapid 
 succession to the mind do not usually excite either feeling 
 or will; but they create an instantaneous judgment of 
 agreement or disagreement, connection or want of connec- 
 tion, inference or lack of inference. It is by this com- 
 parison of proposition with proposition that we extend our 
 knowledge of truth. It is by the comparison of forms, of 
 colors and tones, that we are aroused to the perception of 
 beauty. But when the two ideas presented to the mind 
 are the pictures of two persons, two beings possessed of 
 intellect, feeling, and the power of choice of action,— 
 especially when one of those beings is ourself, and we 
 consider our own relation to some other person,—then 
 among the sentiments which we feel is one different from 
 
THE FIELD OF. ETHICS 251 
 
 all others, one directly and primarily bearing on the will. 
 This is the feeling of duty ; and the judgment accompany- 
 ing this sentiment is also different from all other judg- 
 ments : it is a moral judgment. 
 
 When the intellect compares two propositions, a logical 
 necessity compels it to see their agreement or disagree- 
 ment, their relation or want of relation. The inference 
 which we draw from two propositions unmistakably clear 
 and unmistakably related, does not depend upon our 
 wish, our will, or our feeling, but solely upon the clear- 
 ness of our perception of the two truths and of their rela- 
 tion. It is a logically necessary inference. In like 
 manner, when we see two colors or hear two tones, our 
 feeling of pleasure or pain at the harmony or discord is 
 independent of our judgment and independent of our will. 
 It is an zesthetically necessary feeling. So also, when we 
 
 - contemplate the bringing of two persons into contact, there 
 
 is a necessity upon us, strong as the logical necessity of 
 drawing an inference, strong as the esthetic necessity of 
 appreciating harmony. It is the moral necessity of per- 
 ceiving that the relation of persons involves rights and 
 duties. It cannot be denied that in the logical necessity 
 there lies concealed some slight power of interesting 
 the feelings and stimulating the will, and that in the 
 esthetic necessity there is some obscure judgment, and 
 faint aversion or attraction slightly prompting volition. 
 Thus, also, the moral necessity involves some intellectual 
 action. There must be a perception of the reality of the 
 relation. It also has an effect upon the feelings; for 
 virtue is beautiful, and vice is ugly. Yet the distinguish- 
 ing peculiarity of moral necessity is that, precisely as logi- 
 cal necessity binds the judgment, and zsthetic necessity 
 
252 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 binds the feelings, so moral necessity constrains to voli- 
 tion and action. 
 
 Thus, of the three great groups of our faculties, each rec- 
 ognizes a necessity over it. The intellect must decide upon 
 the evidence before it, according to its view of the evi- 
 dence. If it fails so to do, it becomes folly and _ intellect- 
 ual weakness: it falls into errors, and believes in lies. 
 The heart is under an zsthetic necessity of being pleased 
 by the beautiful and repelled by the ugly. If it fails so to 
 do, it becomes corrupted, sinks toward a mere sensual and 
 earthly life, and loses the higher joys which are the true 
 birthright of man. But the highest necessity is the moral 
 necessity, under which the will of man is bound to follow 
 the right and avoid the wrong. If he fails to obey it, he 
 forfeits the highest privilege of his birthright, and entails 
 upon himself the greatest evil. The three parts of our 
 nature lie in this order, one above another; and the three 
 necessities lie in this order, the moral necessity being the 
 highest, and resistance to it being followed by the most 
 severe consequences. 
 
 Here, then, is the striking peculiarity of the science of 
 ethics. It treats not so much of that which is as of that 
 which ought to be. The mathematics deal with the 
 actually existing relations of space and time; physics, with 
 those of matter; zsthetics, with those between realities 
 and the soul perceiving them. But ethics, although deal- 
 ing with the actually existing relation between souls, 
 between persons, between beings capable of thought and 
 action, considers them only as they are capable of action, 
 and handles the question of what they ought to do, 
 There can be no moral relation between a person and a 
 thing unless that thing be connected with another per- 
 
THE FIELD OF ETHICS 253 
 
 son, and so become merely an intermediate term between 
 two persons. 
 
 Now, if we attempt to analyze a simple idea, we fall at 
 once into absurdities. Analysis must end when we come 
 to simples. There may be a difficulty in determining 
 what is simple, but certainly we sometimes arrive at ideas 
 that we can neither decompose nor conceive to be decom- 
 posable. No man can reduce to simpler elements the 
 idea of number or of space or of time or of motion, of 
 color, of sound, of taste. We may analyze the mode in 
 which we arrive at these conceptions, the mode by which 
 these ideas are called into the sphere of consciousness; 
 but the ideas themselves are each absolutely indivisible. 
 
 Suppose that we are asked why we are obliged to admit 
 the logical conclusion from two premises. No answer 
 can be given. When I have admitted that every a is 
 @wand that every'cis’ @, 1 'must, of necessity, admit 
 that every ¢ is 6, But I cannot say whence this ne- 
 cessity arises. Any attempt to do so merely brings 
 us to Molicre’s explanation that opium makes us sleep 
 because it has soporific qualities. I may reduce it to 
 the mathematical axiom that what is included in an en- 
 closure is included in the boundaries of that enclosure. 
 But this merely alters the form of statement. It does not 
 simplify the nature of that syllogism in barbara. I may 
 say that it is the constitution of my mind which compels 
 me to admit this verity, that it is an anthropomorphic 
 statement. But this does not simplify the conception, nor 
 take a step toward explaining it. It merely suggests a 
 new inconceivable hypothesis,— the hypothesis that there 
 may be minds, intelligent beings, who see that what is 
 enclosed in an enclosure is not contained within the 
 
254 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 boundaries of that enclosure. Take the simplest case, in 
 which both premises are self-evident truths: the conclu- 
 sion is then self-evident, and there is a logical necessity 
 for accepting it. The man who does not accept it merely 
 shows that, either from mental incapacity or from inatten- 
 tion, he does not see what is self-evident. And the 
 veriest agnostic idealist assumes, in his attempt to prove 
 his thesis, that there are self-evident truths. 
 
 In like manner, no zsthetic judgment can be reduced 
 to simpler elements. Here are two tones sounding to- 
 gether: every sensitive ear pronounces them discordant. 
 The musician cannot explain why they are discordant: 
 he can only state the fact. They are disagreeable to his 
 ear and to the ears of musical people in general. Why 
 they are so neither he nor they can tell. The man to 
 whom they are not disagreeable simply shows himself 
 to be incapable of appreciating harmony. His incapacity 
 casts no discredit upon the testimony of those who are 
 capable. 
 
 In the case of music, however, science comes in and 
 confirms the musical judgment by very peculiar testimony, 
 The musical sense, which is wholly an esthetic sense, re- 
 ferring only to the feeling excited by the chord or discord, 
 the melody or the false progression, is unable to explain 
 to the intellect the reason of its likes and dislikes. Physi- 
 cal science is equally incompetent to do so; and yet 
 physical science has demonstrated that in those musical 
 tones which are in harmony there is an arithmetical har- 
 mony, not perceived as such by the ear, but which, never- 
 theless, is doubtless the efficient cause of the musical 
 harmony which is perceived. 
 
 The testimony of science goes even further than this. 
 
THE FIELD OF ETHICS 255 
 
 It shows that the musical taste or power of civilized 
 nations has constantly improved in its judgment. Many 
 modes of music (in the technical sense of the word 
 “mode’’) have been discarded, especially since the mod- 
 ern improvements in harmony. The major and minor 
 modes are the only ones which at the present day are 
 used to any large extent; and, of these two, the major is 
 by far most frequently employed. This state of things 
 has not been brought about by any sudden change of 
 fancy in the musical public, but is the result of a gradual 
 growth in the art of music, guided solely by zsthetic feel- 
 ing. Dr. Erasmus Darwin declares that all musical taste 
 is wholly artificial, and dependent solely upon association 
 of ideas for its musical judgments. In Dr. Darwin’s day, 
 nearly a century ago, musicians could make no reply to 
 these assertions; that is, no reply which an unmusical 
 man could accept as satisfactory. But to-day the case is 
 far different. Physical science and the mathematics com- 
 bine to prove that the musical sense has, in all respects, 
 through the course of all ages, been guided by arithmeti- 
 cal harmonies, not perceived as such, but perceived only 
 in their zesthetic effect.* I call your attention to this 
 fact, not as a vindication of music, but as a vindication of 
 the zsthetic nature as being a safe guide to truth. 
 Science has not yet done for color so much as it has 
 accomplished for tone; nor have all the phenomena of 
 music, all its mental effects, been shown to depend upon 
 arithmetical proportion in the frequency of vibration in 
 the air. Nevertheless, the discoveries in musical statics 
 are very numerous and very important. They demonstrate 
 
 *In the major mode the arithmetical harmonies are most abundant. Then comes the 
 minor mode, after which at a long interval come the old discarded modes. 
 
256 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 beyond cavil that the musical sense of harmony and 
 melody is based upon what Plato paradoxically called 
 an unconscious perception of proportion in the frequency 
 of vibrations, which are too frequent to be recognized as 
 vibrations, but are heard as continuous tones. Hay, in 
 his science of beauty, has shown that the esthetic percep- 
 tion of beauty in form is, in like manner, the perception 
 of arithmetical ratios in angles and even in potential 
 angles; that is, angles*not as seen, but as suggested by 
 the figure. I have, myself, by numerous experiments, 
 both upon individuals and upon classes in school, and con- 
 ducted with every precaution against error, proved the 
 reality and accuracy of Hay’s results. I have even gone 
 further, and experimentally proved that a good eye for 
 geometrical beauty recognizes as beautiful forms involv- 
 ing the incommensurable ratio of extreme and mean pro- 
 portion. 
 
 The importance of these results would not be vitiated, 
 were it possible to establish the theory that the expres- 
 sion of music, of color, and of form, is due solely to the 
 association of ideas. But, in my judgment, there are no 
 facts which can be properly said to lend that theory a sup- 
 port; nor can I conceive any mode by which the associa- 
 tion of ideas should come in play in the process of mak- 
 ing a concord agreeable or a discord disagreeable. The 
 elements of the tones, whether of sound or color, have 
 never been distinguished by the unassisted eye or ear, 
 and are not known even by report to the best colorists 
 and musicians. The improvement in the art of music is 
 not due to any increase of knowledge concerning the sci- 
 entific elements of music, but solely to the increased ex- 
 ercise of discrimination in the feelings themselves. The 
 
THE FIELD’ OF ETHICS 257 
 
 musical sounds, on the one side, and the musical composer 
 hearing them in reality or imagination, on the other, and 
 judging of them solely by their effect on his feelings, as 
 he repeats or varies them,—these are the means by 
 which the oratorio and symphony of our day have been 
 developed from the rude essays of early art. 
 
 I may illustrate this by a blind friend, whom I proved, 
 through many carefully guarded experiments, to have a 
 less sensitive ear and less sensitive nerves of touch than 
 myself. I, therefore, heard and felt even more than he 
 did; but, by his long practice of discrimination, he had 
 learned the meaning of ten thousand variations in sound 
 which I did not even separate from the other sounds with 
 which they were mingled. Hearing became to him a tol- 
 erable substitute for sight; not because his ear was any 
 more sensitive than mine either by nature or by education, 
 but simply because his judgment concerning the sounds 
 which reached his ear was better trained. The modern 
 musical ear is no more sensitive than the ancient, nor 
 has modern acoustics been of any especial service to 
 music. In all respects the progress in music has arisen 
 from increased attention to the zsthetic effects them- 
 selves. 
 
 Analogous remarks, in all these respects, may be made 
 concerning the moral judgment and the science of ethics. 
 Moral relations exist between persons. Place two per- 
 sons in reality or in imagination in a given situation, and 
 a sound ethical nature gives at once an ethical judgment 
 concerning them, as direct, simple, and final as a musi- 
 cian’s judgment concerning the harmony of two tones or 
 a painter’s concerning the harmony of two colors. The 
 man who does not assent to the painter’s judgment is 
 
258 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 color-blind: his failure to perceive does not invalidate the 
 reality or correctness of the painter’s perception. The 
 man who does not hear the harmony or discord has no 
 musical ear: his lack of ear does not invalidate the testi- 
 mony of the musician, backed up by physical science and 
 the mathematics. In like manner the man who fails to 
 perceive the moral relation of one person toward another, 
 as declared by persons of sound moral judgment, simply 
 shows himself morally callous: his deadness does not de- 
 stroy the reality of moral truth. 
 
 The perception of moral relations improves from age to 
 age, like the taste for music, not by mankind becoming 
 more sensitive and therefore quicker to perceive, not by 
 their being intellectually more enlightened on ethical sci- 
 ence; but by their being trained to more frequent and dis- 
 criminating ethical perception, and therefore becoming 
 more capable of discrimination. Ethics thus becomes an 
 expanding science, exactly as music is an expanding art. 
 The foundations of ethics lie embedded in the foundations 
 of human nature. Persons cannot exist without personal 
 relations. Even if imagined to be isolated, they have re- 
 lations to their Creator ; and, if they are brought into con- 
 tact with each other, they must have moral relations 
 toward one another. It is impossible, therefore, for us to 
 exist as men — having an intellect capable of recognizing 
 relations, sentiments capable of feeling them, and a will 
 capable of choice and of action — without being thereby 
 put under obligation, having duties toward each other, 
 Standing in ethical relations. The heart will feel this, 
 and the will act upon it, before the intellect has made it 
 an object of conscious study. But in the course of his- 
 tory experience will lead to the study of these moral rela- 
 
THE FIELD OF ETHICS 259 
 
 tions, precisely as it has led to the study of music. The 
 conclusions reached by sound reasoning will then, as in 
 the case of music, confirm the voice of the feelings. 
 
 It will be shown that obedience to moral duty will in 
 the long run conduce to the individual and to the public 
 welfare. It will be shown, also, that the whole spiritual 
 universe, springing from the will, the wisdom, and love of 
 an Infinite Being, is arranged in conformity with his 
 designs, and that his design is in conformity with moral 
 order. Therefore, our highest duty, springing from our 
 relation to him, binds us to the performance of all lesser 
 duties, springing from our relations to his creatures. 
 
 It is manifest, therefore, that, while the idea of moral 
 duty is perfectly simple and not capable of decomposition, 
 the science of morals must be exceedingly complex. In 
 a scientific treatment of morality we are obliged to con- 
 sider not only the peculiar quality of moral relations, but 
 also all the related and connected ideas. Every science 
 has as its basis a very few simple conceptions, derived, in 
 many cases, by abstraction from a vast number of indi- 
 vidual instances. But in the scientific treatment of a par- 
 ticular theme,— take geometry as a striking example,— 
 although we begin with a few of the most general con- 
 cepts, we draw from them by deduction a vast, almost:an 
 unlimited, number of propositions and practical applica- 
 tions. When the science is less strictly deductive,— as, for 
 example, music,— the number of concepts which we are 
 obliged to introduce may be greater and the number of 
 deductions from them smaller; but it still remains true 
 that the simplicity of the most general concepts is not at 
 all inconsistent with great complexity in the details of the 
 science and of its practical applications. The funda- 
 
260 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 mental conceptions of ethics are very simple, but they 
 have great breadth and great depth. They embrace all in- 
 telligent beings, and reach to every possible relation of 
 one intelligent being to another. Hence ethical science 
 is capable of being mutilated and misrepresented in a great 
 variety of ways. For a full comprehension of its funda- 
 mental concepts or postulates a rich experience is evi- 
 dently required; and not only a rich experience, but a clear 
 insight into psychological truths,— logical power, also, and 
 freedom from prepossessions and prejudices. And every 
 gift would be in vain without a special aptitude for grasp- 
 ing and feeling the force of ethical conceptions. Here, as 
 in every other branch of human inquiry, a native aptitude 
 and a special training must be united in order to the 
 highest success. In our own day even the mathematics 
 have been drawn into the regions of doubtful debate, and 
 the fundamental axioms and simple propositions of Euclid 
 denied their true validity. What wonder, then, that ethics, 
 dealing with the most complex conceptions ever formed 
 by the human mind, have been a matter of debate and 
 divided opinion ? 
 
 Yet in one respect there has been a remarkable progress 
 toward unanimity. Practically, the sense of duty becomes 
 clearer and clearer with regard to all matters of social 
 and commercial intercourse ; and general benevolence or 
 philanthropy, which at the beginning of the Christian 
 era was recognized as a virtue by very few persons except 
 the Christian teachers, is now put forth as the highest 
 duty by nearly every writer who touches on ethical ques- 
 tions. This practical progress in ethics is similar to the 
 growth of music as an art, which was neither hindered nor 
 advanced by the rival theories of Pythagoras and Aristox- 
 
THE FIELD OF ETHICS 261 
 
 enes. And as the progress of science has finally demon- 
 strated, even to those devoid of musical ear, that Pythago- 
 ras’ ideal mystic theory is true, and that Aristoxenes’ 
 materialistic association theory, maintained by both Dar- 
 wins, is false, so I think there can be no doubt that Epi- 
 curean, utilitarian, and materialistic views of duty, will, by 
 the progress of science and the development of ethical 
 thought, be sent to oblivion with those of Aristoxenes ; 
 while the idealist view of duty will become universally ad- 
 mitted, and utility will be seen to be only one of the tests 
 of right, not its ultimate basis. 
 
It 
 THE VALIDITY OF MORAL PERCEPTIONS. 
 
 Ir has become fashionable in some quarters to say that 
 morals are but a matter of feeling or of custom. Ihave 
 in the previous lecture defined them as based upon the 
 perception of certain relations between persons. In order 
 to show that this basis is a solid foundation on which to 
 build a real science, I wish in this second lecture to vin- 
 dicate the trustworthy character of human perceptions. 
 and therefore will occupy the greater part of the hour 
 in a metaphysical examination of the validity of human 
 thought and the reality of human knowledge. For it is 
 manifest that our views of ethics must be modified by our 
 views of psychology; and it is further manifest that 
 our views of psychology are inseparably connected with 
 our ideas concerning the nature of knowledge, and of 
 logical operations. It may be taken as self-evident that 
 thought deals not with things in themselves, but with 
 our apprehension of them. It is almost a tautological 
 proposition that the process of reasoning does not deal 
 with things, but with our ideas of things. In this sense 
 and to this extent all knowledge may be said to be rela- 
 tive. Furthermore, our objects of thought are appre- 
 hended only as they stand related either to one another 
 or to us, so that knowledge may be said to be relative 
 not only because it is a knowledge of our ideas rather 
 
THE VALIDITY OF MORAL PERCEPTIONS 263 
 
 than of things, but also because our ideas lay hold of the 
 relations of objects rather than of the objects them- 
 selves. The finiteness of our intellect is still further 
 manifest when we remember that in all our representa- 
 tions of objects we grasp only a part of their relations 
 or properties. Even the simplest mathematical concep- 
 tion, that of a circle, for example, involves more relations 
 than have ever been distinctly pictured to the human 
 mind. Hence in every human judgment there is the 
 possibility that something important is omitted from the 
 consideration. 
 
 It has sometimes been inferred from these considera- 
 tions of the finitude and relativity of human knowledge 
 that no knowledge of reality is possible, but I take this 
 to be a far more sweeping conclusion than the premises 
 warrant. It is true that I know things only in their rela- 
 tions, that I have no knowledge and no conception of any- 
 thing absolute and in itself. But, because I know things 
 only in their relations, it by no means follows that I do 
 not know things in their relations. Those who push their 
 conclusion from relativity to the extreme of making rela- 
 tion all that is knowable, seem to forget that the percep- 
 tion of a relation necessarily implies the perception of 
 two objects in relation. When J affirm the real existence 
 of my own soul and of my own body, or of mass and 
 motion in the universe, or of space and of time, or of an 
 intelligent Creator to whom my spirit bears some resem- 
 blance, I am not affirming that I know any of these en- 
 tities and substances in any other way than in their 
 mutual relations. External or sense perception gives me 
 primarily simply a state of consciousness, but in this 
 state of consciousness is involved the perception of a 
 
264. POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 relation between myself and the external world. In 
 affirming this, I am not affirming that I have any other 
 knowledge of the external world than its capability of 
 exciting the sensation in me. All that a sensible man 
 can mean by calling the grass green is that it is capable 
 in the light of common day of producing a certain sensa- 
 tion in the man who has a normal eye for color. But this 
 is not saying nothing. On the contrary, modern physical 
 experiments have shown that in this sensation of green 
 there is an indication of a vast number of other time and 
 space relations, capable of being reduced to the manifes- 
 tation of various chemical and physical phenomena. The 
 perception is simply that of a sensation of color: the con- 
 ception is that of the likeness of this color to that pro- 
 duced by other objects, and its unlikeness to various other 
 colors. From the comparison of this concept with those 
 derived from other sensations new inferences concerning 
 relations are safely drawn, and optical, chemical, and 
 mechanical truths inferred. 
 
 As it is impossible to discuss ethical questions without 
 some presupposed psychology, and some careful definition 
 of psychological terms, I will, before going further, define 
 the sense in which I use certain words. In the olden 
 day, the word “perception” had among philosophers the 
 same breadth of meaning which it now has in ordinary 
 conversation. By perception we generally signify the act 
 of seizing a single intellectual object of thought. Thus 
 perception may be defined as a simple or indivisible act 
 of intellectual consciousness. By the power of attention 
 we can at any moment concentrate the mind upon any 
 part. of the field of consciousness. When the part of 
 the field thus separated is single, simple, indivisible, then 
 
THE VALIDITY OF MORAL PERCEPTIONS 265 
 
 the act of consciousness which recognizes that part of the 
 field is a simple perception. The act of attention by 
 which the mind is concentrated upon that is entirely an- 
 other affair. The perception is simply the indivisible act 
 of intellectual consciousness. Reid, and after him Kant, 
 limited the meaning of the word to acts of perception 
 through sensation,— through direct contact with the ex- 
 ternal world. But I prefer to keep to the old philosophi- 
 cal meaning, which, I think, is the meaning in ordinary 
 conversation. A perception is an indivisible act of con- 
 sciousness, such as the perception of light or darkness, 
 heat or cold, such as the perception of the truth or false- 
 hood of a fundamental proposition in mathematics or in 
 ethics. 
 
 But, although perception is an indivisible act of con- 
 sciousness, it always has two sides, inseparable, and yet 
 separated (as Hamilton expresses it) by the whole diam- 
 eter of being. For in the act of perception is implied the 
 actor who perceives and the thing perceived. The word 
 “actor” may be open to objection, and yet perception is 
 not wholly passive. The percipient must be aroused out 
 of pure passivity to at least a faint degree of attention in 
 order to a clear perception. The thing perceived is, so 
 far as perception is concerned, purely passive. Because 
 perception has its two sides, the percipient and the thing 
 perceived (which I may call the percept), it has been has- 
 tily assumed that all perception is merely the perception 
 of the relation between the percipient and the percept. 
 But this is a grave mistake. It is confounding the fact 
 of perception with our perception of that fact: it is con- 
 founding consciousness with self-consciousness. Percep- 
 tion is an individual act of consciousness, perceiving the 
 
266 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 percept. But that percept, or thing perceived, is not nec- 
 essarily the act of perception. When the act of percep- 
 tion is itself the percept, then consciousness has become 
 self-consciousness. The perception has become, in this 
 case, what Leibnitz calls apperception, which is only a 
 species in the genus, perception. 
 
 Using perception in the broad sense which I have 
 given it in my definition, and percept in the peculiar 
 sense of the thing perceived, we may say that percep- 
 tion, the indivisible act of consciousness, always implies 
 a percipient and a percept. The percipient is the con- 
 scious self designated in philosophy as the “ego,” the 
 “me.” The percept, on the other side, may be any one of 
 the indivisible elements of universal knowledge. 
 
 The percept may, for example, be a simple, external 
 sensation of sight, hearing, touch. It is to the percep- 
 tion of these external sensations that Reid and Kant 
 have confined the meaning of the word. In general, two 
 acts of judgment accompany the external sensation. A 
 simple judgment is the perception of a relation. The 
 first judgment upon a sensation usually is that it is not 
 me. The validity of this judgment can be denied only 
 by denying the possibility of direct perception, for noth- 
 ing can be more emphatic than the testimony of con- 
 sciousness declaring that external sensation is not a part 
 of ourselves. The perception is our act, but the thing 
 perceived is something not ourselves producing in us the 
 sensation, 
 
 The second judgment which usually accompanies ex- 
 ternal sensation is the perception of its likeness or un- 
 likeness to some remembered sensation. This takes us a 
 step further in the mystery of knowledge. It is the per- 
 
THE VALIDITY OF MORAL PERCEPTIONS 267 
 
 ception of an abstract idea or conception. Thus we pro- 
 nounce a certain color green, which is but the declaration 
 of its identity or similarity to previous sensations, and 
 affirms nothing whatever concerning the mechanical or 
 chemical nature of the object producing the sensation. 
 We may rise to the comparison of abstract with abstract, 
 and in each case the relation between two percepts or 
 concepts is itself a new percept. Thus the whole process 
 of reasoning is simply an intellectual arrangement of con- 
 cepts in such manner that we may proceed from direct 
 self-evident percepts as premises, through a series of self- 
 evident relations, each a direct percept, until we arrive 
 at the conclusion. The word “intuition” was, in the 
 older philosophy, used very much in the sense in which 
 I am now using the word “ perception,” — the sense of di- 
 rect or immediate vision; but it is now confined by most 
 writers to the perception of other things than those of 
 outward sense. Etymologically, however, all direct per- 
 ceptions might be called intuitions, 
 
 We may divide percepts — that is, things perceived — 
 into two categories, ontological and relative. First among 
 the ontological percepts are those given in apperception ; 
 namely, the existence of a percipient and a non-percip- 
 lent. This is equivalent to the recognition of the exist- 
 ence of a “me” and a “not me,” a “self” anda “not 
 self.” In the further expansion of our knowledge we rec- 
 ognize the existence of other intelligences than our own, 
 and extend this first division of beings into the classes of 
 the conscious and the unconscious; that is, percipient 
 and non-percipient. But in the progress of knowledge we 
 furthermore recognize the existence of divisions in the 
 unconscious. The cause of sensations, which at first we 
 
268 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 consider the ‘“‘not me,’ becomes to us simply masses in 
 motion. When we attempt to explain to ourselves mass 
 and motion, we arrive at the simple percepts of space and 
 time, which I, at least, in vain endeavor to elevate into 
 concepts; that is, I in vain endeavor to make them rela- 
 tive percepts. Clarke, following Newton’s suggestions, 
 would make time and space the eternity and omnipres- 
 ence of the Infinite Mind. Many of the supposed fol- 
 lowers of Kant have endeavored to reduce space and time 
 to modes of human thought. Comte and his school 
 would — like the ancient Romans, as described by Cicero 
 — reduce them to mere abstract concepts of matter. But 
 I think that the general judgment will agree with me in 
 refusing to carry our analysis of unconscious being further 
 than mass and motion, time and space. 
 
 Percepts of relation are by far more numerous: they 
 embrace all the indivisible elements of universal knowl- 
 edge. A large part of philosophy and science is occupied 
 with defining and separating them. They may be classi- 
 fied according to the ontological department to which 
 they most strictly appertain. Thus, they may be algebrai- 
 cal; that is, relating principally to succession and time. 
 They may be geometrical; that is, relating principally to 
 the order of coexistence in space. They may be material, 
 dealing with motion, not as an abstract conception, but 
 as existing in mass or molecule. And, finally, they may 
 be spiritual, discovered by a close interrogation of con- 
 sciousness and by observation of our relation to our fel- 
 low-men. In all these cases the perception of which I 
 am speaking is, it must be remembered, an indivisible act 
 ~of consciousness. It tells directly only the one thing,— 
 the percept seen in the perception, and which can be seen 
 
THE VALIDITY OF MORAL PERCEPTIONS 269 
 
 in no other way. The inferences from this percept may, 
 however, be exceedingly numerous, and may be of two 
 different characters, direct and indirect. [I am, however, 
 using the words “direct”’ and “indirect” in a much larger 
 sense than usual. 
 
 What I wish to call emphatically to your attention is 
 that the percept may not only be used as a direct start- 
 ing-point or direct link in the chain of reasoning, but in 
 our modern thought a direct percept becomes in numer- 
 ous cases an indirect sign of truths which cannot be con- 
 nected with it by any process of reasoning, but only by 
 the testimony of a constant experience. For example, 
 there is no direct connection of logical sequence between 
 the sensation of yellow, and table salt. And yet it is 
 easy to show that a certain shade of yellow gives, under 
 certain circumstances, a convincing proof of the presence 
 of salt in the air. This result, remember, has not been 
 reached by any direct reasoning from the sensation of 
 yellow, nor can it be demonstrated by any argument from 
 the sensation other than this: that salt is the most uni- 
 versally diffused form of sodium; that sodium at a cer- 
 tain heat produces a certain shade of yellow ; that no other 
 substance at that temperature is known to produce pre- 
 cisely that shade, and therefore, when an alcohol flame 
 contains in its colors that precise shade of yellow, it in- 
 dicates the presence of sodium, and thus presumably of 
 salt. Color, therefore, which is constantly spoken of as 
 a mere subjective thing, a sensation without any signifi- 
 cance except in the eye that perceives it, is shown to be 
 to the eye that can appreciate it a perfectly trustworthy 
 indication of many truths which can by no means be 
 evolved from an analysis of the sensation. 
 
270 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 A certain shade of color indicates a certain number of 
 vibrations in the retina, a certain number of vibrations 
 therefore in the ether, a certain number therefore in the 
 substance exciting the ether, which number indicates 
 first the temperature of the substance, and secondly in- 
 dicates also its chemical nature, and suggests thus its 
 origin and its capabilities. All this varied information is 
 given by a sensation of color, and given so accurately and 
 with such precision and certainty that in some of the arts 
 and manufactures vast pecuniary results are staked upon 
 the information thus received. Fifty years ago the sen- 
 sation of color was supposed to be the least trustworthy 
 of sensations; and the case of the color-blind has fre- 
 quently been appealed to, even within ten years, as a proof 
 of the worthlessness of all subjective impressions. And 
 yet the case of the color-blind proves nothing of the sort. 
 
 The manufacturers of sugar, of Bessemer steel, of edged 
 tools, and so on, rely with absolute confidence upon indi- 
 cations given by color, and never are deceived. Thus, 
 also, with the sensation of harmony. For many years con- 
 sidered as the indication only of some accidental associa- 
 tions, it has been proved to be the unerring index to 
 arithmetical and geometrical harmonies in the movements 
 of the air. I might illustrate from other sensations than 
 those of color and harmony the same truth; namely, that 
 an indecomposable percept, whose content in conscious- 
 ness is simply that of a sensation or a feeling, may be 
 proved by a course of indirect but perfectly satisfactory 
 evidence to be an infallible indication of the existence of 
 many conditions in the external world not appealing to 
 our senses, but capable of being sharply presented to our 
 intellect. 
 
7" 
 
 THE VALIDITY OF MORAL PERCEPTIONS 271 
 
 I say that this is often the case. And it is so often the 
 case that we may assume with perfect safety and entire 
 confidence that every percept gives an absolutely trust- 
 worthy testimony. The only questions are, first, What 
 rmythe percept ? and, secondly, What is its testimony? In 
 answering the first question, What is the percept? the 
 difficulty lies in the analysis of consciousness. A percept 
 is an indivisible act of consciousness; and, if we care- 
 lessly assume the simplicity and indivisibility of that 
 which is really complex, we are of course liable to be led 
 into further errors. In like manner, when endeavoring 
 to trace (either directly using that percept as a premise, 
 or indirectly using it only as an index) the remote conse- 
 quences or web of truths to which the original percept 
 bears testimony, we are at every step liable to mistake a 
 complex inference for a simple percept. Just as the eye 
 is sometimes dim, so the attention, or internal power of 
 sight, is sometimes dull. And just as the eye sometimes 
 winks, and may wink at the critical moment and lose 
 some instantaneous perception which it might otherwise 
 have gained, so the internal power of sight or attention 
 is occasionally subject to slips, temporary relaxations, or 
 oversights. This is a familiar fact, which may weaken 
 our confidence in the first result of our thought, but 
 which ought to have no effect whatever upon our accept- 
 ance of conclusions reached after repeated careful review 
 and criticism by reasoners of ability. The relativity of 
 human knowledge does not render human knowledge un- 
 certain. When we have carefully analyzed a perception, 
 and reached an ultimate indivisible percept, we have, at 
 least, reached a true relation, and, even if the terms of 
 that relation are themselves relations, they also are true 
 
272 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 relations ; and in the ultimate analysis we must arrive at 
 ontological percepts,—things which are. The universe 
 was not built upon a lie; and even the insane affirmation 
 that all our knowledge is deceptive contradicts itself by 
 assuming that the speaker knows it to be deceptive,— 
 knows, therefore, something in which he is not deceived. 
 
 The perception of relations must lead to the perception 
 of beings related, or-at least to the perception that such 
 beings exist. All thought assumes the existence of the 
 thinker. A man may in terms deny his own existence, 
 but he cannot imagine himself already non-existent. In 
 every act of perception is the recognition of one’s self as 
 perceiving. That is to say, perception is constantly ac- 
 companied by apperception, or self-consciousness. Now 
 we may not be able to see other souls with the directness 
 with which we see ourselves, and yet we have as absolute 
 a knowledge of the existence of other men as we have of 
 our own. The existence of the material world about us is 
 no more sure to us than the existence of the human race. 
 Nay, if there be any difference, it is in favor of our cer- 
 tainty of the existence of men. If there be any difference 
 between two certainties, the existence of the percipient is 
 more sure than that of the percept. The percept may be 
 merely phenomenal. 
 
 Nor can there be to a careful thinker any doubt of the 
 existence of God. The first glance at the outward world 
 proclaims its essential unity ; and the more thorough the 
 investigations of science, the more clearly that unity is 
 brought to light. The whole universe has a single cause, 
 whose existence is avouched to us by every act of thought. 
 ‘But the universe is manifestly in a constant condition of 
 change. Every fact of sensation proves that, according 
 
THE VALIDITY OF MORAL PERCEPTIONS 273 
 
 to the acute remark of Hobbes, “unchanging sensation 
 would be no sensation at all.” In the single unique 
 cause of the universe, therefore, lies this constant power 
 of producing constant change. Mind, intellect, person- 
 ality, name it as you will,— that which is revealed to us in 
 our own self, or ego,— is the only conceivable cause which 
 contains in itself this self-determining power, this moral 
 freedom. The Hebrew Scriptures contain in their first 
 chapter the announcement of this greatest, most impor- 
 tant truth at which the human mind has ever arrived, and 
 which the whole course of philosophy and science more 
 and more strongly confirms. Man was made in the image 
 of God. In our powers of perception, of feeling, and of 
 action, we have the only conceivable type of the cause 
 of the universe. God is a person, and has made the uni- 
 verse to subserve the needs of persons. In this likeness 
 to him we have the pledge of human immortality. This 
 I understand to be the argument that Jesus used with the 
 Sadducees. It was no quibble upon the tense of a verb, 
 but a solid argument built upon the intercourse between 
 man and God. Every discovery of physical science there- 
 fore, being, as Joseph Henry has said, the reception of an 
 intelligible answer to an intelligent question addressed 
 to the Author of the universe, adds new weight to that 
 reply by which our Lord silenced his cavilling questioners, 
 
 It will be seen that it is impossible for us to imagine an 
 isolated person. The attempt to imagine God without his 
 creatures is, of course, utterly beyond the strength of 
 a finite imagination. It is equally impossible to imagine 
 a man alone, even were we to take the sublime parable of 
 the temptation and fall of man asa history. Adam, be- 
 fore the creation of Eve, was in the Divine Omnipresence. 
 
274 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 The thought of God can never long be excluded from the 
 human mind. No tribe of savages has been shown to be 
 entirely without the conception of invisible beings. Even 
 those who attempt to account for the rise of such ideas 
 by the existence of shadows, reflected images, or vivid 
 dreams, must admit the presence of the ideas among 
 every tribe of men; and the moment that men make any 
 approach toward philosophy and reflection they assign the 
 operations of nature to the action of spiritual beings. 
 
 But, further than this, no man has ever shaken off en- 
 tirely the conception of his fellow-men. Selkirk quar- 
 relled with his captain, and asked to be left on an unin- 
 habited island ; but he supposed the island was frequently 
 visited by ships, and for nearly four years he kept upa 
 daily anxious watch for the approach of human beings. 
 For the whole of that time therefore he stood in conscious 
 relations to his fellow-men, and expected to be again 
 in direct communication with them. When Defoe built 
 from Selkirk’s and Serrano’s adventures his story of 
 Crusoe, he could not paint his shipwrecked man as having 
 lost all hope of rescue, and was even compelled, before his 
 rescue, to give him a companion. We may safely say 
 that, as the person is the highest form of being, so per- 
 sonal relations are the highest form of relations. The 
 great discoveries of modern science are valuable because 
 of their personal relations, because of the testimony 
 which they bear to the power of the human mind and to 
 the reality of its intercourse with the Divine Mind, 
 and because of the means they furnish to men for 
 aiding each other, and for penetrating still further into 
 the plans of the Creator. All other sciences are, of 
 course, more or less historical, or else psychological; and 
 
THE VALIDITY OF MORAL PERCEPTIONS 275 
 
 it need not be said that their interest and value arises 
 from their dealings with personal relations. The supreme 
 cause of the universe is a Person; his highest creations 
 are persons; and, therefore, personal relations are the 
 highest of all relations. | 
 
 In contemplating the relation between two persons 
 we shall find very numerous fundamental perceptions ; 
 among others that which pertains exclusively to the sub- 
 ject of this course of lectures. Every person standing in 
 the presence of another person has rights and owes duties, 
 The conception of right, and that of rights, are two simple 
 perceptions which always accompany each other, at least 
 when we consider finite persons; nor is it at all clear that 
 any exception should be made in respect to our relations 
 with God, 
 
IIT. 
 THE NATURE OF ETHICAL RELATIONS. 
 
 WHENEVER the idea of two persons in each other’s pres- 
 ence comes into our minds, it awakens more or less dis- 
 tinctly the idea of relative right and duty. It is a neces- 
 sity of thought that we should conceive each person as 
 owing something to the other, and as having a claim upon 
 the other. This concept of right and duty is a percept in 
 the sense in which I have defined the latter word: it is an 
 indivisible act of consciousness. As such, it is trust- 
 worthy: it means something. It is not simply a fiction 
 of our imagination. It is true that in one sense it exists 
 only in our thought, because, although a percept, it is en- 
 closed in a concept,—.e., it is a relation between our con- 
 ceptions of the persons; but it answers to, it denotes the 
 existence of, an actual relation of the persons themselves. 
 And, although one and indivisible, it may be regarded 
 under various aspects. Seen in an intellectual light, it is 
 a truth. As it awakens feeling, it contains an element of 
 beauty, more beautiful than that of outward form and 
 color. Regarded in its results, it makes part of a perfect 
 idea of utility. Nevertheless, in its own peculiar aspect it 
 is more than truth, than beauty or utility: it is right, be- 
 cause it is right. We may laugh at Cicero for reiterating 
 perpetually in his Offices that we must do right, simply 
 because it is right; but Cicero’s thought was not errone- 
 
THE NATURE OF ETHICAL RELATIONS 277 
 
 ous. Looked at on the side of the will, on the side of 
 action, on the conative side, we ave to do right, because it 
 is right. Nor is the meaning of the word “right” to be 
 sought etymologically in Horne Tooke’s fashion: we are 
 not to think that whatever is directed is right. That 
 which God directs is not made, but only shown to be 
 right by his directing it. His wisdom and holiness make 
 it certain that what he orders is right, that it conforms 
 to the highest wisdom and conduces to the highest good. 
 The sense of duty, of obligation, is simple, primitive; not 
 capable of analysis into any simpler elements. Neverthe- 
 less, it may be put under different forms; that is, con- 
 templated from different points of view. As pure feeling, 
 it is the sense of obligation, it is the categorical impera- 
 tive. To the intellect it is the perception of a relation 
 between two persons. Asa motive addressed to the de- 
 sires, it is an assertion of the highest good. From mak- 
 ing this latter fact over-important, utilitarian schemes of 
 ethics arise, to which we will again allude in future 
 lectures. 
 
 Upon the perception of a relation between two persons 
 the sense of obligation is awakened, the idea of duty 
 becomes visible, conscience utters its imperative “Thou 
 shalt.” It may be asked, “ And what if we disobey?” I 
 answer that all life is subject to conditions, and is depend- 
 ent upon compliance with those conditions. The intellect 
 seizes certain truths, and proceeds in its reasoning accord- 
 ing to certain laws. If a man neglect self-evident truths 
 or violates the conditions of logic, he cannot attain correct 
 conclusions. Ina similar way, if the laws of beauty, har- 
 mony, and proportion are violated, it is impossible for a 
 man to attain the highest enjoyment for his esthetic nat- 
 
278 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 ure. If he violates the mechanical laws, or the chemical, 
 or the commercial, or any other conditions of success, he 
 must suffer the restraints and inconveniences of failure in 
 his attempted actions. And, if a man act contrary to the 
 decisions of conscience, to the decisions of sound judg- 
 ment acting upon personal relations, involving rights and 
 duties, then he is criminal. He has not fulfilled the con- 
 ditions on which alone the highest life is possible. All 
 failure to attain the highest success must be accompanied 
 by more or less pain. There is not only a loss, but a 
 positive shock, which arouses the healthy soul to new care 
 and diligence. Even the exceptions to this law are more 
 apparent than real. An act of folly or a foolish speech 
 not only fails to attain the effects of wise counsel, but 
 usually brings vexatious self-reproach. The man who 
 does not enjoy harmony and beauty not only loses the 
 pleasures of taste, but is frequently mortified by some 
 sense of his deficiency. And every criminal, every man 
 who neglects his duty and disregards the rights of others, 
 condemns himself. His self-reproach is not always so 
 bitter as his acts deserve. But, although neither sharp 
 nor bitter, it is heavy. The wrong-doer almost invariably 
 has a dread of some coming chastisement. Accompany- 
 ing the sense of rights and duties, we have also a sense of 
 good and ill desert. The feeling that the man who does 
 wrong deserves pain and _ suffering,—this feeling is so 
 strong that it is to some a valid argument for immor- 
 tality. 
 
 The proper domain of the science of ethics lies in the 
 voluntary actions of persons standing in relation to each 
 other. But in our human nature voluntary action always 
 springs from a feeling, and is founded upon a thought. 
 
THE NATURE OF ETHICAL RELATIONS 279 
 
 The person is a unit ; and in the unity of consciousness are 
 always involved these three aspects,— thought, feeling, and 
 will. The errors of ethical systems have arisen largely 
 from the neglect of this triple aspect of personality. For 
 example, the theory of the moral sense has built too exclu- 
 sively upon the emotions awakened by the perceptions of 
 rights and duties, to the neglect of the intellectual condi- 
 tions upon which the conceptions of right and duty rest. 
 Again, those who have defined right as mere obedience 
 to law have looked at the will alone, neglecting both the 
 sentiment and the intellectual analysis of the reasons for 
 law. And those who have sought to refer all duty to the 
 will of God have only added the element of emotion to 
 that of action, and have neglected to observe that the will 
 of God must act in accordance with his perfect wisdom 
 and perfect holiness. 
 
 In other systems, the errors still arise from an imper- 
 fect recognition of the facts of our moral consciousness. 
 The attempt has frequently been made to identify the 
 right with the good, and again the good with the pleas- 
 ant. The coarsest form of this theory would make the 
 happiness of the individual the measure of right. In this 
 view, happiness is not to be divided into kinds ; but each 
 man is allowed to choose his own form of pleasure, and 
 that is right for him which will in the long run give him the 
 greatest amount of his own chosen kind of happiness. A 
 slight improvement upon this absurd view allows differ- 
 ences of rank in the kind of happiness, and makes it a 
 man’s duty to seek the highest kind as well as the largest 
 amount. From this purely selfish conception of self-inter- 
 est, well understood, we arise to the highest form of the 
 utilitarian theory,— the conception of the greatest good to. 
 
280 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 the greatest number. It is, however, perceived by mod- 
 ern advocates of such views that something is lacking, if 
 we attempt to make the greatest good to the greatest 
 number a practical rule for deciding what is right. The 
 moral judgment does not declare that such a course is use- 
 ful and therefore right. In many cases, at least, the pro- 
 cession is in the opposite direction. That is, we see a 
 course to be right, and conclude that it is therefore 
 useful. 
 
 To explain this, the utilitarian brings in first the action 
 of the association of ideas. The child, who has been 
 repeatedly forbidden to do an act, presently acquires the 
 habit of feeling that the act is prohibited, without remem- 
 bering whence the prohibition came. He thus mistakes 
 the feeling for an instinctive command of conscience. 
 But, secondly, when the associationist is pressed with facts 
 which show that the child feels this sense of wrong before 
 he has been taught, he replies that it is an inherited effect 
 of association in his ancestors. According to that school 
 of thinkers there are no such things as general axioms, or 
 axiomatic truths, except such as have been formed by a 
 tedious induction from external observations, extending 
 not only over the whole history of the human race, but 
 of its brute ancestry for millions of ages. 
 
 Notwithstanding the high reputation of many of those 
 who have accepted this revival of materialistic doctrine, 
 I cannot look upon it as anything else than an absurd 
 dream, which fascinated me in my youth, when I was 
 familiar with it in the attractive garb in which it was pre- 
 sented by Erasmus Darwin, but which I threw off with 
 other childish fancies as soon as I became a man. The 
 writings of Herbert Spencer, one of the most famous of 
 
THE NATURE OF ETHICAL RELATIONS 281 
 
 the modern writers who take this view of ethics, are full 
 of the most manifest false inferences. Whatever he may 
 be in his wonderful grasp of knowledge, in the ingenuity 
 of his theories, in the magniloquence of his definitions, he 
 is certainly exceedingly weak in every attempt at argu- 
 ment. 
 
 But, whatever assumption may be made concerning the 
 origin of our moral ideas, these utilitarian theories are in- 
 consistent with their present nature. It may be true, for 
 example, that honesty is the best policy; but no man can 
 admit for an instant that the converse is a safe proposi- 
 tion. The man who should attempt to make policy, even 
 the best policy, his guide in life, would run great risks of 
 sacrificing his integrity to his supposed interests ; and, 
 even should he escape this, and actually do the things that 
 are honest, yet, if it were known by his fellow-men that he 
 did so simply from policy, they would not, they could 
 not, give him credit for honesty, but only for prudence. 
 
 The true relation between that which is good and that 
 which is right may be shown from a consideration of that 
 definition of pleasure which I have seen ascribed to Aris- 
 totle,—‘‘ that pleasure is the sensation arising from the un- 
 impeded action of any faculty.” Whatever power we are 
 using, the use of it imparts pleasure. A right course of 
 action brings into exercise the best powers of the soul. 
 It, therefore, gives the highest happiness. But if we aim 
 directly at that happiness, make it the end and object of 
 action, then our action, being no longer guided by the 
 contemplation of right relations to our fellow-men, is no 
 longer right, and therefore fails to give us the happiness 
 at which we aim. 
 
 The same result is reached if, instead of looking at the 
 
282 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 idea of pleasure, we look at the cognate idea of good. 
 W. R. Alger has put the matter in a very neat form of 
 statement. ‘The good of any being,” he says, “is the ful- 
 filment of its functions.” You perceive that this definition 
 is cognate with that of Jouffroy, who says that the duty 
 of any being is to fulfil the purpose for which it was 
 made. But simply to say that good lies in the fulfilment 
 of functions fails to bring out the idea of duty which is 
 contained in Jouffroy’s statement. Therefore, in order to 
 lift his definition above the merely vegetable and animal 
 planes of existence, and give it its moral aspects, Mr. 
 Alger enlarges it by saying “that moral good is the fulfil- 
 ment of functions under such conditions and by such 
 methods as to lead to the universal and eternal fulfilment 
 of functions.” We may like or dislike the form of words 
 in which he has stated it, or the briefer form in which 
 Jouffroy puts it; but I can see no other end at which a 
 truly rational investigation of the matter can arrive. Per- 
 sonal identity lies at the foundation of all thought. Per- 
 sonality is the only real, enduring, substantial being. We 
 human beings are bound to each other in such wise that 
 no individual of the race is without a personal relation to 
 us; and we all stand in personal relations to that One Per- 
 sonality which stands at the centre of the universe, cre- 
 ating and sustaining all phenomenal existence. There is, 
 therefore, no sound ethics except that which coincides 
 with Christian ethics,— which teach that the whole duty 
 of man lies in becoming reconciled to God, and in striv- 
 ing to be a coworker with him for the benefit of the race. 
 
 It is objected to the intuitional view of morals that 
 men’s ideas of duty differ, and that they change. It is 
 said that were there an intuition of right relations, this 
 
THE NATURE OF ETHICAL RELATIONS 283 
 
 could not be the case. We may answer, in the first place, 
 that ideas of duty and of right have changed less than 
 any other ideas; that the changes in moral science have 
 been smaller and slower than those in any other science, 
 not because the science has remained imperfect longer 
 than others, but because it earlier attained to a compara- 
 tive perfection. Ethics, however, is not so advantageously 
 compared with the sciences as with the fine arts. It is 
 so directly and completely practical that it might indeed 
 be defined as the art of right living, rather than the sci- 
 ence of right relations. Now, in the fine arts the validity 
 of our intuitions and esthetic judgments has been, as I 
 have said in previous lectures, marvellously vindicated 
 by the use and discipline to which they have been sub- 
 jected. From the simple conception of space, as consti- 
 tuted of points, and capable of being divided into lines 
 and surfaces, a vast science of geometry has been built 
 up. When this science was eagerly and successfully cul- 
 tivated at Athens, the arts of sculpture, of drawing, and 
 of architecture, also flourished. In these arts, the artist 
 did not proceed upon those axioms on which the geome- 
 ter built his demonstrations, but upon an esthetic judg- 
 ment of proportion,—so just and true that the whole 
 world has acknowledged the perfection of the results 
 which it produced, yet so delicate and subtle that it 
 eluded intellectual analysis for more than two thousand 
 years. The zsthetic judgment of harmony of colors has 
 not yet been thus analyzed with perfect success. But the 
 history of the art of music gives a more complete vindi- 
 cation of intuitional theories than even that of archi- 
 tecture. 
 
 A musical person needs no intellectual confirmation of 
 
284 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 his musical judgment. His ear is supreme arbiter to him. 
 It declares the voice to be in or out of tune, to be of 
 agreeable or disagreeable quality. It declares a progres- 
 sion of chords to be good or to be bad, it affirms the adap- 
 tation or want of adaptation of the music to the words or 
 to the occasion; and there is no appeal from its judg- 
 ments, unless we may say that the ears of a majority of 
 musical persons are a full bench to which we may appeal 
 from a single judge. Nor is there any satisfactory way of 
 accounting for these musical impressions by means of the 
 association of ideas or the inheritance of associations. 
 Erasmus Darwin attempted it, but it was a total failure in 
 his day; and recent more elaborate attempts have been 
 equally futile. That theory of Aristoxenes will not stand, 
 while that of Pythagoras is more and more clearly proved 
 by every new investigation. The musical judgment of the 
 European race has been made clearer, more discriminating 
 and accurate by centuries of practice in the art of music. 
 And this accuracy is demonstrated to persons not musical 
 by mathematical investigations of the vibrations produced 
 in the air during the performance of the music. 
 
 The man of fine moral endowment admits no appeal 
 from his moral sense, any more than the musical man from 
 his ear. He decides whether an action would be base or 
 honorable, whether a state of mind is right or wrong, 
 whether a state of heart is reasonable or unreasonable, 
 without any appeal to reason, or experience, or calculation 
 of consequences to himself or to others. In many cases 
 no such appeal would be possible. The consequences 
 would not be capable of calculation or estimation. But, 
 as the musical judgment has been improved simply by 
 centuries of careful practice, and by the increasing com- 
 
THE NATURE OF ETHICAL RELATIONS 285 
 
 plexity of esthetic emotions awakened in an increasing 
 civilization, so the moral judgment is from century to 
 century improved in the mass of men by a constant exer- 
 cise in the increasing complexity of social relations, and 
 under the influence of the high ideals of Christianity. No 
 man can measure the influence exerted by the great mas- 
 ters of music upon the musical taste of the public. A 
 refined taste among those not given wholly to the pur- 
 suit of the art cannot possibly be acquired except through 
 the presentation of models derived from the inspiration 
 of genius. All art is more or less imitative: it is at least 
 stimulated by examples. The first model is given by nat- 
 ure. After that the progress becomes more rapid in pro- 
 portion to the labors of men of special genius. 
 
 Thus Gluck, Bach, Handel, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner, 
 not only create a multitude of conscious copyists, but create 
 a still greater multitude of those who are unconsciously 
 stimulated, elevated, and guided by their labors. Nor is 
 this at all inconsistent with the fact that musical sense 
 is an innate gift, and that its judgments are not dependent 
 on associations of ideas, either personal or inherited. 
 
 Neither can any man measure the influence upon the 
 moral judgment exercised by the presentation of high 
 ideals through poets, prophets, and apostles, or suggested 
 by the presence of the actual realization of high ideals in 
 living examples. Nor is this influence inconsistent with 
 the fact that the moral sense is an innate gift, deciding 
 upon right and wrong, honorable and dishonorable, pre- 
 cisely as the eye decides upon shades of color or the ear 
 upon differences of tone. 
 
 But, as the judgment of the eye and the ear may be 
 confirmed by the testimony of other faculties, to which, 
 
286 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 nevertheless, they would not yield as to authorities, so 
 the judgment of the moral sense, although independent 
 and having exclusive jurisdiction in its own realm, may, 
 nevertheless, be confirmed by various forms of inductive 
 reasoning. Moreover, we may say that, as it is reason- 
 able for a man of feeble eye for color to abide, in the 
 selection of his clothes or in the furnishing of his house, 
 by the judgment of those who have a recognized ability 
 and taste in color, and as it is reasonable for a man 
 without musical ear to accept the judgment of the musi- 
 cal world concerning points on which the musical world 
 is agreed, so it is reasonable for the man whose sense of 
 honor is blunt, or whose perception of the importance 
 of moral distinctions is dull, to accept in ethical matters 
 the judgment of those men who are conceded to be men 
 of honor and integrity, and of keen moral discrimination. 
 We expect men to accept their judgment ; and the reason- 
 ableness of this expectation may be shown by various 
 lines of inductive argument. 
 
 The utility of obedience to generally recognized moral 
 law is admitted both by those who maintain that we have 
 an intuitive sense of moral distinctions and by all the 
 school of utilitarian moralists. The utility of right ac- 
 tions may therefore be considered settled if any human 
 opinion can be settled. When, therefore, a question arises 
 in the mind of one in whom the moral sense is blunt 
 whether a proposed action would be right or wrong, he 
 may, in some cases, decide by considering carefully which 
 course of action would be of the most general ana perma- 
 nent benefit, were it generally adopted. Thus the percep- 
 tion of utility may sometimes assist in leading to the per- 
 ception of right. Usually, the benefit is just the other 
 
THE NATURE OF ETHICAL RELATIONS 287 
 
 way. A man always knows which course of action will 
 be most useful, if he can learn which would be approved 
 as right by the soundest Christian moralist. 
 
 Again, the reality and value of moral distinctions may 
 be inferred, even by one who has not keen moral percep- 
 tions, if he will notice how universal is the testimony of 
 those who are acknowledged to have a high moral sense 
 to the high quality of the pleasure resulting from strict 
 adherence to the moral law. Both Christian and heathen 
 literature are full of testimonies to the peace and joy of 
 a good conscience. And, although our private experience 
 in our intercourse with men may have shown us many in- 
 stances of those whose consciences seem seared, and who 
 do not suffer from remorse, it has also shown us no faces 
 more expressive of inward peace and profound happiness 
 than the faces of those whom we have known to be most 
 faithful to their moral convictions. 
 
 The universal consent of all nations, and even of the 
 most savage tribes, to the existence of moral distinctions 
 is a strong presumptive argument for the reality of such 
 distinctions. It is true that, in barbarous tribes, practices 
 are sometimes considered innocent which civilized na- 
 tions condemn. Nevertheless, even the most savage tribes 
 recognize the obligation of some of the moral laws ac- 
 knowledged by civilized people. This is analogous to 
 the fact that, although barbarous people admit Dorian, 
 Phrygian, and Lydian modes of music, which we reject, 
 they nevertheless also admit the pleasing nature of some 
 of the fundamental chords; and their melodies move 
 through the same intervals as ours. Even the birds 
 usually whistle in a diatonic scale. But the science of 
 acoustics carefully applied to the investigation of musical 
 
288 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 statics has proved to us that the Chinese music is not 
 positively bad, but only relatively inferior. That which 
 the savage finds good in music is proved to be numeri- 
 cally good, although not so good as European music. 
 But the civilized nations have, in their long course of 
 musical practice, sifted the various modes of music, and 
 decided that the major and minor modes stand at the 
 head of the list, and are far superior, musically, to all those 
 used by less cultivated nations. Mathematical investiga- 
 tions show that these two modes, which are musically 
 superior, are also superior in their numerical relations. 
 
 In precisely the same manner those things accounted 
 good among savage nations, but which are morally con- 
 demned by civilized people, have in them, usually, some 
 good element, and are to be condemned only by rising to 
 the perception of something very much better. In the 
 progress of knowledge, in the development of social 
 statics, it will undoubtedly at some day be shown that the 
 code of the highest Christian moralists, although founded 
 upon the moral sense, sharpened and cultivated by moral 
 training, is perfectly conformable to sound intellectual 
 conclusions drawn from considerations of general and 
 permanent utility. We may say that it has already been 
 shown that the inferior moral codes of pagan nations are 
 not consonant with such conclusions. 
 
 And yet, we may also observe the unanimity with 
 which even savage tribes acknowledge that moral de- 
 mands upon the individual have an authority above all 
 considerations of personal interest. The veriest savages 
 have a code of criminal law. It may be crude and errone- 
 ous; but it recognizes the existence of crime, of sin, of 
 moral ill-desert. Its details may not be in conformity 
 
THE NATURE OF ETHICAL RELATIONS. 289 
 
 with the soundest intellectual conclusions; but its exist- 
 ence confirms the conclusion that moral instincts are an 
 integrant part of human nature, irreducible by analysis to 
 lower elements, and that savage and civilized man alike 
 feel that moral necessity overrides logical necessity, as 
 that overrides physical. 
 
IV. 
 
 THE INNOCENCE AND SINFULNESS® OF 
 ERROR. 
 
 THERE are three forms of activity in conscious life. 
 The first is described in general terms as thought or in- 
 tellection; the second, as feeling or sentiment; the third, 
 as impulse, which ripens into desire, and culminates in 
 will or volition. Christianity has frequently, I may say 
 generally, been preached in a form which implies that all 
 three departments or aspects of our nature are subject to 
 ethical law. The demand upon the hearer has been to 
 believe and obey the gospel; and the commands of the 
 gospel have been summed up in the single injunction, 
 “Thou shalt love.”’” A natural objection to such preach- 
 ing of the gospel has frequently arisen in the hearer’s 
 mind. It seems to make an unreasonable demand. It is 
 said, We are commanded to believe; and yet belief is not 
 a matter of will, but of logical necessity. A man must be- 
 lieve according to the evidence, as it appears to his mind. 
 We are commanded to love; but the affections are not 
 subject to will. A man cannot refrain from loving that 
 which seems to him lovely, nor from hating that which 
 seems to him hateful. A command, it is said, enforced 
 by any authority or by any sanctions, can only affect 
 action; and the sphere of ethics, of duty and obligation, 
 can only extend over actions. 
 
THE INNOCENCE AND SINFULNESS OF ERROR 291 
 
 We must acknowledge that these objections to the 
 Christian ethics have a great deal of plausibility. It may 
 be said without qualification that the mind decides upon 
 the truth of propositions through a logical necessity aris- 
 ing from the perception of self-evident steps connecting 
 that proposition with self-evident truths. Plausible, how- 
 ever, as the objections may be, they are not altogether 
 sound, We must remember that the three powers of the 
 mind figuratively described as the head, the heart, and 
 the hand are not, strictly speaking, three powers, but 
 simply three aspects of mental activity. Some slight 
 shade of feeling, some slight conation or effort of will, 
 attends the most purely intellectual process. The phe- 
 nomenon of attention is not to be overlooked. We select 
 from the field of consciousness some part on which to 
 fasten the intellectual activity. In this act of attention 
 we may not rise to apperception. The effort of wil] may 
 be so slight and the absorption in the object so great that 
 we suppose the action to be involuntary. Yet involuntary 
 attention is (in a strictly defined use of the words) self- 
 contradictory: attention is a voluntary act of mind. The 
 larger portion of the truths to which we have attained are 
 inferences, they are the results of processes of reasoning ; 
 and a process of reasoning is a voluntary arrangement of 
 propositions leading to the inference. Hence a man may 
 be to some extent, at least, justly held responsible for his 
 opinions. A mind vacillating and changeable in its views 
 on moral and religious questions indicates some moral 
 deficiency both in the affections and in the will. The 
 whole structure of civil society, the stability and happi- 
 ness of domestic relations, depend upon men’s subjecting 
 their opinion of one another to the stern control of will, 
 
292 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 and enforcing upon themselves care and impartiality in 
 the sifting of evidence. The law concerning libel and 
 slander takes it for granted that a man can refrain from 
 yielding his opinion to hearsay evidence, and that he iS 
 criminal if he repeats and intensifies such evidence with- 
 out careful examination. 
 
 History and biography, fiction and the drama, give us 
 innumerable instances in which men have sinned and 
 brought terrible suffering upon themselves and upon 
 others by simply lending too ready a credence to evil re- 
 ports. It requires a determined will to keep before the 
 mind the fact that human testimony is not, in itself 
 considered, conclusive evidence. Testimony must be 
 weighed; and not only that, the witness who gives 
 it is to be carefully weighed. When we consider how 
 various and apparently conflicting the laws concerning 
 legal evidence are, when we remember how intricate and 
 difficult the science of logic is, when we see how numer- 
 ous and how careful the precautions are, which are neces- 
 sary for arriving at the truth concerning a question of 
 mere outward nature, where we can put the matter into 
 any form we choose, and repeat and vary our experiments 
 as we will,— when we consider thus the difficulty of arriv- 
 ing at truth and the ease of falling into error, we under- 
 stand the more pressing need of care and caution in the 
 important decisions of life. We cannot but regard the 
 man who forms his opinions upon important matters of 
 politics, morals, and religion hastily, and who changes 
 them upon a slight re-examination, to be guilty of the 
 moral sin of carelessness. Eccentricity in opinion, change- 
 ableness, and obstinacy are alike to be condemned: they 
 indicate a grave defect in the character of the mind, but 
 
THE INNOCENCE AND SINFULNESS OF ERROR 293 
 
 a defect which is usually partly under the control of the 
 will, Whether the eccentricity take the form of extreme 
 scepticism or of extreme credulity, it may be made amen- 
 able to the laws of evidence if one bring the force of will 
 to compel attention to the evidence. The undue credulity 
 of the bigot and the undue scepticism of the infidel are 
 alike prejudices, condemned by both heathen and Chris- 
 tian moralists, 
 
 In other words, although a man can affect his opinions 
 only by indirect means, they are not beyond the control of 
 his will. The evidence which lies before my mind may 
 point to a conclusion which I do not wish to accept. 
 It may require of me a course of action repugnant to my 
 feelings. It may require me to give up cherished hopes, 
 to forego promised enjoyments, to enter upon tiresome 
 labor. In this case I naturally turn my attention, the 
 voluntary part of mental action, to a careful review and 
 scrutiny of the evidence, or to a search after new facts 
 bearing upon the question. If this search for the grounds 
 of a new conclusion is conducted fairly and honorably, it 
 is commendable. But it is evident that the extreme un- 
 palatableness of my first conclusion may drive me to an 
 unfair and unjust treatment of the evidence. 
 
 The old English proverb is as true, philosophically and 
 ethically, as it is accordant with experience and observa- 
 tion,— 
 
 “ He that’s convinced against his will 
 Is of the same opinion still.” 
 
 The Christian preacher is, therefore, not wrong in ascrib- 
 ing an ethical quality to intellectual belief, He may err 
 greatly in undertaking to decide in an individual case 
 
294 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 what are the causes of a man’s holding manifestly erro- 
 neous opinions. Error in opinion is certainly in itself 
 innocent. It is only in the steps which lead to the 
 formation of opinions that the Opportunity for sin 
 occurs. Even in so simple a matter as the holding of 
 one or another opinion on a matter of physical science, 
 the nice discrimination of causes and extrication of the 
 ethical element entering into the intellectual state is a 
 problem immensely complicated; and he who considers 
 it carefully will agree with Saint Paul’s doctrine that a 
 “man’s own conscience cannot give a really final decision 
 upon the question of one’s own innocence or guilt. 
 
 For the formation of sound ‘opinions a man needs in 
 general the moral quality of humility. The self-conceited 
 man rests in opinions accidentally formed, content to take 
 them without examination or with the slight confirmation 
 of his previous prejudices. “The more a man without 
 humility knows, the greater fool he is.” Without humil- 
 ity a man overrates his own knowledge and ability, while 
 underrating the knowledge and ability of those who differ 
 from him. But, in order to sound opinions, a man needs 
 not only a just estimate of himself, but reverent feelings 
 toward his superiors, and reverence toward truth. No 
 lover jests concerning his beloved; and truth is never 
 won except by those who court her with a lover’s ardor. 
 He who does not reverently confess and feel the exist- 
 ence of greater wisdom than his own has certainly no 
 proper knowledge of his own ignorance; and a man must 
 be aware of his own ignorance before there can arise in 
 his mind any desire for more knowledge. Thus it is evi- 
 dent, upon whatever side we approach the subject, that 
 the moral defect of self-conceit, of irreverent flippancy, 
 
THE INNOCENCE AND SINFULNESS OF ERROR 295 
 
 lies at the base of much of the ignorance and of the error 
 of men. 
 
 There are few subjects of general importance of which 
 a man of ordinary education has never heard. In the 
 general diffusion of knowledge, in the universal activity 
 of thought, all men have formed, more or less distinctly, 
 Opinions upon every kind of subject, or, at least, opinions 
 which have a bearing upon every subject which can be 
 named. When, therefore, new opinions are brought to 
 our attention, they are always either consonant with or 
 counter to some of our already forrned notions. Now, it 
 is a natural and healthy desire of the soul to hold to the 
 views which it has already attained. It is, indeed, an 
 instinct absolutely necessary, it would seem, for a consec- 
 utive and logical development of the understanding. Yet 
 herein lies a new ethical danger, lest by force of will we 
 withhold the mind from attention to the evidences of 
 new truth; while by force of will we keep the attention 
 forcibly held to the evidences of our old view. It may 
 be true, I acknowledge, that a man should hold to his 
 old opinions until forced by irresistible evidence to 
 change them. Nevertheless, when a probable case has 
 been made for the necessity of a change, he ought, in his 
 examination of the evidence, to place himself as nearly 
 as possible in an impartial attitude. 
 
 It is moreover evident that in every case in which the 
 Opinion is important a man is under moral obligation to 
 seek for evidence; and, by importance in this connection, 
 we must understand a reference to a personal relation. 
 If we do not see, nor even suspect, that a given question 
 bears upon our personal relations to other human beings 
 or to our Creator, we may consider the question, in an 
 
296 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 ethical point of view, unimportant. I cannot, for example, 
 see any ethical importance in the question of the true in- 
 terpretation of the logarithm of a negative number. The 
 great mathematicians of the world debated it for a full 
 hundred years without having their own personal relations 
 or their sentiments of piety affected by their views. But, 
 in proportion as we see that an opinion may have an effect 
 upon religious sentiment or upon our personal intercourse 
 with men, we ascribe to it ethical importance, and are not 
 only under obligation to weigh the evidence upon it, but 
 are also bound to seek for all accessible evidence regard- 
 ing it. It is a moral offence to pass a verdict in such 
 cases upon ex parte testimony. The facts which have 
 accidentally come to our knowledge might all point to a 
 conclusion which other facts within our easy reach would 
 completely overthrow. It is hardly necessary to add that, 
 whether the evidence be accidentally presented or dis- 
 covered by search, it is to be carefully examined and care- 
 fully weighed. The impression given at first sight proves 
 illusive as frequently in the internal vision as it does in 
 external sense. 
 
 If an opinion on any subject of importance to the moral, 
 political, or religious welfare of men has not been formed 
 with diligence and care in the examination of evidence, 
 with impartiality and reverent humility, a man not only 
 has done wrong in forming it, he will do still greater 
 wrong if he proclaim it. The wise Hebrew rightly de- 
 clares concerning the publication of evil opinion of one’s 
 neighbors, that it is madness to throw firebrands and call 
 it sport. But it is worse than madness, it is crime, to as- 
 sist in spreading a slander. The heathen sage was right 
 in saying that in slander three parties are injured ; and two 
 
THE INNOCENCE AND SINFULNESS OF ERROR 297 
 
 of them, the listener and utterer, are guilty of the injury 
 to all three. The same moral responsibility rests upon 
 those who utter ill-advised opinions upon any moral, 
 social, political, or religious matters. The man who pub- 
 lishes an opinion which, by its reception, may produce 
 serious effects on the happiness and the character of other 
 men, is certainly bound, before the publication, to givea 
 very careful and serious examination into the grounds of 
 that opinion. He who rashly utters a judgment which 
 may affect the happiness of his fellow-men is guilty of a 
 disregard of their rights. Our words and the utterance 
 of our opinions have a greater effect upon the hearer than 
 we are apt to imagine. 
 
 I dwell with the more earnestness and fulness upon this 
 question of the ethical character of belief because I think 
 I have perceived in the Christian Church the existence of 
 two parties, each holding extreme and erroneous views. 
 The one declare unbelief to be the great, almost the only 
 sin: the other proclaim in unqualified terms the inno- 
 cence of error. The first party pervert the doctrine of 
 justification by faith, and make it a doctrine of justifica- 
 tion through belief. It is said that he who believeth 
 shall be saved. It is assumed that the belief is an intel- 
 lectual assent to a scheme of salvation ; and it is forgotten 
 that the Christian Scriptures require faith to be operative, 
 to be the belief of the heart, and to lead to good works. 
 I certainly would not agree with this view that assent toa 
 creed is the faith which is necessary to salvation. 
 
 At the same time it appears to me to be mischievous 
 preaching to assert in unqualified terms the innocence of 
 error. The preaching of this doctrine without qualifica- 
 tion has, I believe, produced in thousands of cases a reck- 
 
298 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 less indifference to truth. I wish, therefore, to make 
 clear to myself, and thus perhaps assist you in making 
 clear to yourselves, what is the real measure of ethical 
 responsibility in the formation and utterance of opinions. 
 Ethical science assumes the existence of persons,— of per- 
 sons capable of arriving at a certain amount of real truth. 
 There can be no ethical relation between persons incapable 
 of comprehending something concerning their relative po- 
 sition and attitude. Moreover, ethics assumes truth to be 
 a good, not only in itself as a food to the intellect, but an 
 ethical good, because the knowledge of all truth whatever 
 tends to throw light upon our relation to the infinite Per- 
 son in whom all being centres. All truth, therefore, is a 
 good, but emphatically all truth pertaining to personal 
 relations. 
 
 Now, Christians assume that certain truths of our rela- 
 tions to each other, to Christ, and to God, have been 
 revealed through Christ. When I say that they assume 
 this, I mean that they affirm it in calling themselves 
 Christians. In another sense of the word, they would 
 earnestly deny that it was a mere assumption. They 
 believe, and I believe, that there is abundant evidence of 
 the reality of that revelation. Therefore, Christian ethics 
 maintains that a man can, if he will, see the evidence for 
 Christian faith, and be convinced by it. Of course, it 
 must be admitted that no man is required to believe a 
 falsehood, nor even to believe a truth for which he has no 
 evidence. The testimony of a competent personal wit- 
 ness must, however, be included in our enumeration of evi- 
 dence. By far the larger part of the business of this world 
 is conducted in absolute dependence upon the testimony 
 of those who know, and in whose word we trust. And it 
 
THE INNOCENCE AND SINFULNESS OF ERROR 299 
 
 has been repeatedly declared by men of the highest meta- 
 physical and scientific ability that all knowledge of every 
 kind —that is to say, all certainty —rests upon faith in 
 the veracity of our faculties, which, in turn, rests upon our 
 faith in the veracity of our Creator. 
 
 No man can be required to believe that of which he has 
 no evidence; but the Christian preacher maintains that 
 every man has before him abundant evidence of the truths 
 revealed through Christ. Therefore, every man is bound 
 to examine that evidence without prejudice, and be con- 
 verted by it. Of course, we are to push no proposition of 
 this kind to its extreme limits. We are not to deny the 
 possibility that an honest and good man may fail after ex- 
 amination to be convinced of the reality of the Christian 
 faith. We cannot deny the existence of mental peculiari- 
 ties analogous to color-blindness, affecting our internal 
 perceptions of truth. There are men incapable of distin- 
 guishing colors. There are men incapable of appreciating 
 harmony. ‘There are others who are apparently unable to 
 grasp relations of number, others blind to the axioms of 
 geometry ; some have no appreciation of wit; some fail to 
 enjoy poetic fancy, others to follow the higher flights of 
 imagination ; and some are incapable of appreciating the 
 force of an argument. But all these are more or less ex- 
 ceptional cases. Mankind, in general, can appreciate evi- 
 dence if they will but give honest attention to it. While, 
 therefore, we condemn those who assert the necessary 
 sinfulness of unbelief, while we lament the folly of those 
 who would frighten men by threats of eternal torment 
 if they venture to use their reason in matters of religion, 
 we must, on the other hand, lament the injudicious- 
 ness, and I might say foolish rashness, of those who 
 
300 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 declare the absolute innocence of all intellectual error. 
 One might as well declare the absolute innocence of all 
 outward actions. Such antinomianism would be no more 
 irrational than this doctrine of perfect indifference to 
 truth, and its kindred doctrine that we are never to attain 
 truth; that the truth of to-day is always to be outgrown 
 to-morrow. Men should examine with care, in proportion 
 to their time, opportunity, and capacity, every moral or 
 religious doctrine which is thrust upon their attention. 
 “Prove all things,” says Paul, “hold fast what is good.” 
 We all fancy that we are obeying him. Every man, so 
 soon as a new opinion is propounded to him, applies it to 
 the touchstone of his previous knowledge and belief. 
 
 What is needed is that the examination should be made 
 in a reverent, careful spirit, without undue bias or preju- 
 dice. One party in the Christian world obstinately adhere 
 to their own formulas of faith, and sometimes to their old 
 interpretations of them, irrespective of all evidence which 
 may be brought to show their error. But there is another 
 party which has been somewhat prominent in our day, so 
 anxious to avoid bigotry and prejudice that they appear 
 to mistake novelty for truth, movement for progress. We 
 cannot too earnestly warn ourselves against both these 
 faults in the conduct of the understanding. We must 
 remember that it is just as great a sin to let go old truth 
 as it is to cling to old error. Something must have been 
 gained in the past, else nothing can be gained now. And, 
 again, we must remember that it is as great asin to em- 
 brace eagerly a new error as it is to repulse a new truth. 
 If men have fallen into mistakes and adopted falsehoods 
 in time past, they are doing so to-day. 
 
 Dr. Holmes once read a lovely poem on the waves of 
 
THE INNOCENCE AND SINFULNESS OF ERROR 301 
 
 time washing away the old continents of faith to form 
 thereof new islands for the happier abodes of men. We 
 are fond of repeating Robinson’s famous declaration, that 
 there is more truth yet to break forth from God’s word. 
 All which was, forty years ago, valuable and suited to those 
 times. But herein America, since our Civil War, the times 
 have very much changed ; for that matter, in Europe also. 
 The difficulty is now not the difficulty of getting men to 
 move from their moorings, and from their anchorage to 
 iron-bound, immovable creeds. The difficulty in all de- 
 nominations is to persuade men, when they have weighed 
 anchor and hoisted sail or put on steam, to take also the 
 helm in hand, to consult the chart, to take observation 
 of the heavens. They are too apt to spread sail and drift 
 before the wind; to put on steam, and dash heedlessly 
 through foggy air, among rocky islands and icebergs. 
 That Christianity is living and capable of taking new 
 forms is true; but it is also true that Jesus Christ is the 
 same yesterday, to-day, and forever. And all forms must 
 be informed by his eternal and unchanging spirit, or they 
 are not forms of Christianity. There is always more 
 truth in God’s word, howsoever that word is spoken, than 
 men have grasped; but that truth in God’s word is cer- 
 tainly not the denial of the central facts and forces that 
 word reveals. 
 
 Emerson tells us that it is a fault of human rhetoric 
 that we cannot state strongly one truth without seeming 
 to belie some other truth. The Unitarian rhetoric in 
 praise of freedom and of liberty has been pushed to the 
 point of denying the value of law. Liberty is truly valu- 
 able only when guided by law,—that is to say, the only 
 freedom worth having is the liberty to do what is right, 
 
302 POSTULATES (OF VETHICS 
 
 freedom to perform our duty. And in intellectual matters 
 that is the same as to say that liberty is valuable only that 
 we may seek truth. But, if you say that the search is to 
 be perpetual, never rewarded with finding, you take away 
 all motive for the search, and therefore all value from free- 
 dom. Your shriek for intellectual liberty has become a 
 maniac’s howl. It is very true, as W. B. Greene says, 
 that there is more intense pleasure trolling for bluefish, 
 flying before a spanking breeze on the white-capped 
 Atlantic, than there is in gazing at piles of salted codfish 
 in a storehouse; but, nevertheless, my good friend Colonel 
 Greene would never make a yachting excursion after blue- 
 fish if it were demonstrated to him to a certainty before- 
 hand that he could catch nothing. The Unitarian de- 
 mand for liberty of opinion is frequently pushed to that 
 extreme: you may fish for truth forever, but you must 
 rest assured forever that you have never caught any. 
 Nothing is to be taken as a finality: you see it one way, 
 I another; and nobody can say that either is right. I say 
 this is an absurd extreme; as mischievous as blind faith 
 in an infallible church can be. It destroys all rational 
 motive to intellectual effort, and directly tends to produce 
 supreme indifference to truth. It is as irrational as it is 
 immoral. It is not borne out by any intellectual analo- 
 gies to other departments of thought. Some modern 
 agnostics perceive this unity of intellectual operations, 
 but, being unwilling to admit that truth can be attained 
 on religious themes, deny that it is attained in physical 
 and mathematical science. Even the conceptual world 
 gives them nothing sure. Two and two may not be four 
 to an inhabitant of Jupiter, and two straight lines may 
 completely enclose a surface beyond the North Star. 
 
THE INNOCENCE AND SINFULNESS OF ERROR 303 
 
 Such are the wild and absurd dreams into which a man 
 may be led by pushing the doctrine of the innocence of 
 error and of the supreme value of liberty. Error may be 
 innocent; but a man is responsible for that exercise of 
 choice and attention in attending to evidence, or neglect- 
 ing it, which may have led to the error. Liberty is sweet 
 and dear; but it is valuable only to the man who uses it 
 to seek patiently for new truth, and to cling to what is 
 established,—to break away from old errors, but to turn 
 also away from the new sirens and Circes who beset his 
 way. 
 
‘ V. 
 LOVE AND DUTY. 
 
 In the opening of the last lecture I mentioned two 
 objections which are naturally brought against Christian 
 ethics. The first was that we are called upon to believe 
 certain truths, while we are under a logical necessity of 
 believing according to the evidence. The consideration 
 of this objection led us into a discussion of the innocence 
 of error and of the sin of unbelief. 
 
 The second objection may at first sight appear still 
 more important, since it lies not only against Christian 
 ethics, but against a self-contradiction which is, apparently 
 at least, involved in every ethical idea. Duty, obligation, 
 would seem to rest imperatively upon the will alone, upon 
 the conative faculties. The sense of right and wrong, the 
 sense of moral responsibility, certainly appeals, primarily 
 and directly, to the power of voluntary choice. And yet 
 in all systems of ethics the chief stress is laid not upon 
 the action, but upon the motive. The great law-giver of 
 Israel summed up all human duty in love to God and love 
 to man,— not in courses of benevolent action, nor in relig- 
 ious ceremonies, but in the affections. The head of the 
 Christian Church repeated this declaration of Moses with 
 approval. But the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures are 
 not singular in this view of human duty. The unpreju- 
 diced feeling of every human being is that sin and right- 
 
Ww 
 
 LOVE AND DUTY 305 
 
 - 
 
 eousness lie in the motive, in the intent, in the affections 
 of the heart, not in the outward act. Those who have 
 attempted to write upon the science of ethics have gen- 
 erally arrived at the same conclusions. Jonathan Edwards, 
 one of the most profoundly original thinkers of our coun- 
 try, has defined holiness or righteousness as being a love 
 towards all being in exact proportion to its worth. In this 
 definition, I think that he implies that persons are the 
 only real beings, while things are merely appearances. 
 Our love, therefore, toward the infinite personality of the 
 Creator is, according to this definition of holiness and 
 righteousness, to be supreme; our love toward all other 
 persons to be in proportion to their worth, their personal 
 power, wisdom, and holiness. But what I wish particu- 
 larly to bring to your attention in this definition of 
 Edwards is that this acute and vigorous thinker agrees 
 with Moses and with Christ, as well as with the majority 
 of ethical philosophers, in making the sum of all human 
 duty to be expressed by this one word “love.” Holiness 
 or righteousness consists in the love of all being in pro- 
 portion to its worth. 
 
 And yet, just as logical necessity compels a man to be- 
 lieve according to the evidence before him, so zsthetic 
 necessity compels a man to love that which is lovely to 
 him, and to hate that which is hateful to him. The affec- 
 tions are not under the direct control of the will; and this 
 proposition holds concerning all the affections from the 
 lowest to the highest. How, then, it may be asked, is 
 it possible to be under obligation to love that which does 
 not seem to us lovely, or to hate that which seems to us 
 not hateful? All is determined, it may be said, by our 
 constitution and its adaptation to our circumstances. 
 
306 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 He may be more fortunate who is born with a loving 
 heart than he who is by nature jealous and morose, but 
 neither can change his disposition any more than the 
 leopard can change his spots. In other words, it may 
 seem that the ethical law, which lays its whole stress 
 upon having right and holy affections, commands us to 
 do that which lies in the power of the Creator alone; and 
 that it is self-contradictory in declaring that we must do 
 that which we cannot do. 
 
 In whatever direction the mind turns, it finds these con- 
 tradictions. Such antinomies do not belong to ethics or 
 to religion only, but to the weakness of every finite intel- 
 lect. We find them in the simplest geometry and me- 
 chanics as truly as in the most abstruse metaphysics and 
 theology. In the present case we shall most readily find 
 a solution by considering the unity of the spiritual nature, 
 precisely as we solved the difficulty concerning the inno- 
 cence of error and the sin of unbelief. Of course, we 
 must admit that there can be no obligation to love that 
 which is really unlovely. When our conscience unmistak- 
 ably declares that a thing must be loved, it implies that 
 the thing is truly lovely. If we do not see it to be so, we 
 are not looking at it in the right light. We need to see it 
 from a different standpoint, or to look at it with more 
 attention. The affections are not, so far as any direct 
 action is concerned, under the control of the will; but 
 they are indirectly under the control of the man concen- 
 trating all his powers to accomplish his purpose. A man 
 may acquire by indirect means a love even of that which 
 is bad, and aversion even to that which is good. Much 
 more can he obtain, if he choose, a mastery over his heart, 
 to guide it into the love of what is really lovely and into 
 
LOVE AND DUTY 307 
 
 the hatred of what is really hateful. A sound ethical 
 instinct never requires that which is unreasonable. It 
 is reasonable in asking of us holy affections, because it 
 is reasonable that such affections should be felt, “A 
 carnal mind,” says the apostle, ‘is enmity against God”; 
 that is to say, the mind which sees only truths pertain- 
 ing to the body and to material nature, the mind which 
 never rises to a contemplation of moral and spiritual 
 things, nor recognizes the reality and transcendent im- 
 portance of personal relations, has a natural repugnance 
 to being told that our first and highest duty is to love 
 the invisible and infinite God. We must make due allow- 
 ance for this condition of the natural mind,—the mind 
 which has not yet risen to a clear and vivid apprehension 
 of spiritual truths. 
 
 The love which is required and enjoined upon us by the 
 prophets and the apostles, and by the native moral feel- 
 ing of the noblest men of all ages and in all nations, al- 
 ways contains an element of awe and veneration; of rev- 
 erence,— a recognition of the superiority or dignity of the 
 beloved object. Thus the word most frequently used by 
 the Hebrew writers, and translated in our common ver- 
 sion ‘the fear of the Lord,” does not, I think, imply a 
 shrinking fear of God as the chastiser of sin, the sender of 
 earthquake and pestilence. An examination of the con- 
 text in which it occurs will show that it is rather obedient 
 reverence and grateful adoration. The etymology of the 
 word shows that it originally referred to the thrill caused 
 by all high and deep emotions, rather than to the shud- 
 dering produced by fear. The words used in the New 
 Testament imply either the same derivation of the word 
 from the thrill of deep feeling ; or the aspiration, the long- 
 
308 POSTULATES, OF ETHICS 
 
 ing after, which is awakened by the sight of excellence. 
 Christian friendship is more than an amicable interchange 
 of petty kindnesses. It recognizes the divine element in 
 each of the friends, and is built upon immortal hopes and 
 illimitable powers. And, when I say Christian friendship, 
 I mean that noble friendship which has existed always 
 among men of spiritual character, but which the Christian 
 revelation has sanctioned and sanctified, and the spread 
 of Christian faith has so greatly multiplied. The same 
 may be said of conjugal love, upon which Jesus set the 
 seal of his approval, and which his teaching and the 
 triumph of his gospel have rendered so much more fre- 
 quent and so much more enduring. Every noble man, 
 whether under the light of Christianity or of ethnic relig- 
 ions, has found in conjugal love an analogy to worship ; 
 and the language of adoration and of such love has in all 
 languages always been similar. This is simply because 
 the intensity of conjugal love opens the eyes to see the 
 high realities of life, the actually high excellence of a 
 human soul. 
 
 «A lover’s eye can look an eagle blind.” 
 
 Great heat is always accompanied by a brilliant light. 
 The clear vision of reality in a universe made by the All- 
 Good must awaken love; and the increasing love clears 
 the sight, and renders both the vision brighter and the 
 love itself more ardent. The only fixed limit in this 
 process is the ability of the finite soul to bear the blind- 
 ing light and the melting heat. The ardor of genuine love 
 is, therefore, proportioned to the native nobility of the 
 lover’s soul, to the clearness of his perception of the eter- 
 nal verities ; and thence his perception of the presence of 
 
LOVEFAND? DUT ¥ 309 
 
 a similar nobility of really high qualities in his beloved. 
 Thus profoundly true to the moral nature of man is that 
 memorable saying of Richard Lovelace : — 
 
 ‘TI could not love thee, dear, so much, 
 Loved I not honor more.” 
 
 Nor can I find a stable basis for philanthropy, if I do not 
 find it in the immeasurable dignity of human nature. 
 That interest in the welfare of the human race which is 
 commanded by the ethical law is based upon a recogni- 
 tion of the brotherhood of all men, and their dignity as 
 the sons of God. 
 
 That conscience is right in demanding love, in looking 
 to the state of the heart rather than to the quality of the 
 actions, may be made manifest by various considerations. 
 The sense of right and of obligation arises on the per- 
 ception of certain relations between persons; between 
 persons themselves, and not between their actions. 
 What is demanded by my sense of right is that the person 
 should take a certain attitude of inner personality toward 
 other persons. But a person is a conscious being; who is 
 capable not only of thought, but of feeling, and who has 
 the power of will. His state of consciousness always in- 
 cludes a state of feeling toward his fellow-beings; and 
 this must enter, of necessity, into the conception of his 
 relations toward them. The relation of person to per- 
 son does not stand in the accidental conflict or harmony 
 of accidental actions; but in the conflict or harmony of 
 voluntary actions performed with a knowledge of their ef- 
 fect upon others. This voluntary action is almost never 
 capricious. Indeed, we may say that it always proceeds 
 
310 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 upon motives, that the motives depend upon feeling, that 
 the feelings are founded upon or accompanied by beliefs 
 or states of mind. Hence, it is evident that both the head 
 and the heart —in fact, the whole personal being — must 
 be right before the action can be wholly right. Whatever 
 may have been the meaning of the Hebrew writer, the 
 received version utters truth when it translates, ‘“‘ Keep 
 thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues 
 Olslilcns 
 
 Still, the intellectual difficulty is brought forward, How 
 can we bring the heart to feel aright, seeing that it is not 
 under the direct control of the will? And, first of all, we 
 may answer that, even should the intellect fail to solve 
 this problem, it would not follow that the problem is in- 
 solvable or the command impracticable. The conception 
 of a curved line is apparently self-contradictory: at each 
 point it must either bend or be straight. If it is straight, 
 at that point it is not curved; while, if it bends at any 
 point, there is an angle there, and it is no longer one line, 
 but two meeting at that point. Yet this intellectual 
 puzzle in defining a curved line does not destroy the 
 existence of such a line, nor offer the least practical diff- 
 culty in the way of drawing it. So Zeno thought that he 
 had demonstrated the impossibility of motion. Many men 
 have thought that they could prove that Achilles could 
 not overtake a tortoise. Yet Zeno found no difficulty in 
 moving; and many a race has shown that, if no accident 
 occur, the swift will overtake the slow. It is thus with 
 regard to the power of the will over the heart. There 
 may be an intellectual difficulty in seeing how the affec- 
 tions can be governed by the will, but experience shows 
 that they are so governed. The homely proverb is true: 
 
LOVE AND DUTY 311 
 
 “Where there is a will, there is a way.” The three parts 
 of our nature move together ; and, in general, correct views 
 produce right feeling, and right views can be attained by 
 voluntary attention to the truth. If this fail, then, sec- 
 ondly, right action in obedience to right views will 
 awaken right feelings. Christian believers admit the pro- 
 found truth of our Lord’s saying: “If any man will do 
 the will of my Father, he shall understand my teaching.” 
 
 But there is an additional truth involved ; namely, that, 
 if any man will do his duty, it shall become his delight. 
 This truth of human nature has been acknowledged in all 
 ages by moralists and by poets,—that habit becomes a 
 second nature, that the voluntary servant learns to love 
 his service, and that voluntary conformity to God’s law at 
 length destroys the desire to transgress. I was much im- 
 pressed one day with the advice which I overheard a wise 
 lawyer giving to a client who was absurdly jealous of his 
 wife. The lawyer recognized some slight unsoundness in 
 the client’s mind. He perceived that he had not the 
 smallest real grounds for jealousy ; and he therefore ad- 
 vised the man to endeavor to forget the whole matter, 
 and, at all events, to treat his wife with the utmost cour- 
 tesy, kindness, and devotion; to treat her precisely as 
 though he loved her as in the olden days, and not to 
 allow her to perceive that a shadow of suspicion had ever 
 crossed his mind. And, when the client was gone, the 
 lawyer said to me, “That is the surest and, indeed, the 
 only way to bring back the old state of affection.” 
 
 I shall speak of this mode of modifying the heart in a 
 subsequent lecture, and have introduced it here only as 
 an additional proof that Christian ethics are not irrational 
 in demanding love to God and love to man as required 
 
312 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 affections, and in pressing upon the consciences of men 
 that they ought to and must cultivate these affections. 
 If they do not, they are fighting against all the forces of 
 the universe, and must yield or die. 
 
 The whole matter may be put ina few words. Ethics 
 deal with personal relations, or attitudes of person to per- 
 son. The moral instinct demands of us as a duty that we 
 should assume right relations to God and to our fellow- 
 men. In these right relations there is of course involved 
 aright state of feeling or affection toward them, a kindness 
 of heart and desire to assist them. Now, although man’s 
 control over his belief and over his affection is not direct 
 and unlimited, it is real and effective. He has the ability 
 to bring his heart and mind and all his powers into sub- 
 jection to his judgment of duty; and he is justly held re- 
 sponsible for his opinions and his affections, as well as for 
 his deeds. 
 
 I say, opinions and affections as well as deeds. I mean 
 that the whole man is subject to the law of God, and is 
 to be governed and ruled by conscience. We cannot em- 
 phasize one part to the neglect of another without doing 
 wrong tothe whole. The legalist and the ritualist observe 
 minute directions for conduct, and make no endeavor 
 to keep clean within. The Augustinian and Calvinistic 
 preacher has exalted intellectual conceptions above all 
 claims of the moral law, and set orthodoxy of the head 
 higher than purity of heart. On the other hand there 
 are some who, in reaction from this view, lean so strongly 
 to the other side as to lose their balance and fall into 
 equally ruinous positions. They tell us, for example, that 
 it is not unity of belief, or of creed, or of opinion, or of 
 dogma, that we need as the bond of union and of brother- 
 
LOVE AND DUTY oy ss 
 
 hood; but unity of spirit, unity of purpose, and unity of 
 faith, This sounds well; yet a transparent fallacy lurks 
 under it, which is capable of producing as much mischief as 
 any of the errors of orthodoxy. There cannot be unity of 
 spirit, nor unity of purpose, nor unity of faith, without 
 unity of view, unity of opinion, unity of belief. Every 
 feeling, every purpose, implies and is based upon some 
 view of the situation, some belief. Faith in man implies 
 a belief in the native character and ability of man, and the 
 same may be said of faith in the ultimate triumph of truth 
 and righteousness among men. Faith in God implies, as 
 the writer to the Hebrews says, a belief that God is, and 
 that he rules and orders the world to the final advantage 
 of those who obey his law. Between a man who has felt 
 the profound meaning of the words “I myself,’ and the 
 fathomless meaning of the sentence “I was made in the 
 image of God,’’— between such a man and one who has 
 persuaded himself that the universe, himself included, is 
 the product of an uncontrollable dance of uncreated atoms 
 of matter, there can be no unity of faith any more than 
 there is unity of belief. Unity in the Christian Church, 
 one would think, implies also unity of faith in Christ. It 
 is said, Yes; unity of faith in Christ, but not unity of be- 
 lief about him. And this must be granted, but not with- 
 out qualification. There cannot be faith in him with- 
 out some belief about him; and if faith in Jesus be, as 
 every one professing to be a Christian, in any just sense 
 of the word, believes it to be, the great regenerator of 
 men, then it is vitally important to retain in the Church 
 and in the world that knowledge of his history which will 
 lead to that belief about him which produces faith in him. 
 We cannot put faith in him, trust him, believe him, accept 
 
314 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 his teaching, unless we believe that he is trustworthy and 
 to be depended upon. 
 
 Whether he existed before his conception by Mary or 
 not, whether he was the son of Joseph or not, whether his 
 inspiration was of a kind peculiar to his individual case or 
 not, whether his humanity was simple, or whether his 
 inspiration was the indwelling of God the Father, or of 
 the Logos, or of the Paraclete,—all such questions of 
 dogma may be set aside as of no comparative importance. 
 No two men in the Christian Church will think alike upon 
 them. But that Jesus was trustworthy and to be trusted, 
 that he knew and spake the truth, that he knew and lived 
 a holy life, that what he promised in his Father’s name 
 will be fulfilled,— it is evident that a belief in such propo- 
 sitions as these is implied in Christian faith, and that there 
 must be unity of belief in them as a necessary prerequisite 
 to unity of faith in him. 
 
VI. 
 DETERMINISM AND UTILITY. 
 
 Ir has frequently been asserted by recent writers that 
 usefulness is the only measure of duty, and that man can 
 owe duty only to his fellow-man. He cannot owe duty, 
 it is said, to himself, because usefulness to one’s self is 
 prompted by self-interest ; and, however well understood 
 self-interest may be, it is generically different from disin- 
 terested goodness. He cannot owe duty to animals be- 
 cause animals have not sufficient mind and heart to appre- 
 ciate good; and that which bestows benefit on animals 
 alone, without any reflex benefit on men, may be kind, 
 but it is not, in the proper sense of the word, useful. 
 Neither can men owe duty to God; for, whatever may be 
 our views of the existence or non-existence, personality or 
 impersonality, of God, we must admit that he is infinite, 
 and cannot stand in need of the services of finite crea- 
 tures, nor receive benefits at our hands. In short, these 
 writers say that the received version of the Bible blunders 
 upon profound ethical truth when it renders the words of 
 David, “O Lord, my goodness extendeth not to thee, but 
 to the saints which are upon the earth.” 
 
 But, although this position has been taken by some 
 writers of the utilitarian school, it is by no means a neces- 
 sary consequence of the fundamental doctrine of utility. 
 Utilitarianism and determinism in philosophy are both 
 
316 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 capable of being held in a great variety of forms; and, 
 when either of these doctrines is carried out consistently 
 to its highest results, it ends in self-destruction. In other 
 words, it becomes absurdly identical in its results with 
 the very truths which it began by denying. I introduce 
 this mention of determinism, or, as it used to be called, 
 necessarianism, because it is commonly supposed to bear 
 directly upon questions of ethics. But, in reality, if the 
 doctrine of necessity be thoroughly and logically carried 
 to its extreme conclusions, it vanishes in an impalpable 
 mist, which can have no real bearing upon any practical 
 question. Let us give a few moments to the examination 
 of this preliminary question whether the doctrine of 
 necessity or determinism really renders the existence of 
 obligation and duty impossible. 
 
 The words “determinate” and “indeterminate,” as ap- 
 plied to philosophical questions, may be considered figures 
 drawn from algebra, just as such words as “upright,” 
 “ straightforwardness,” “rectitude” and the like, are figures 
 drawn from geometry. In algebra the simplest instances 
 of determinate expressions are found in those cases in 
 which as many expressed conditions are given as there 
 are unknown quantities involved. The unknown quan- 
 tities are then said to be determined by the conditions, 
 That is to say, if those conditions are expressed in alge- 
 braical language, any person having sufficient skill can ob- 
 tain fixed definite values of the unknown quantities. It 
 may happen that one of these quantities, or each of them, 
 may have more than one fixed value; but, if the number 
 of independent conditions is equal to the number of un- 
 known quantities, no one of those unknown quantities 
 can slide continuously from one value to another. Their 
 
DETERMINISM AND UTILITY 317 
 
 values are definitely fixed. Now, in the physical universe 
 it is almost universally assumed both by philosophers and 
 by scientific men that everything is thus determinate. In 
 other words, it is assumed that, if we have complete ex- 
 pressions of the present state of the universe, it will be 
 found that the number of conditions is equal to the num- 
 ber of possible changes, so that sufficient algebraic skill 
 could, from the present state of the physical universe, 
 calculate its future state. Astronomy gives us a close 
 approximation to this state of perfect knowledge. It 
 predicts, many years in advance, the movements of the 
 heavenly bodies, and experience justifies us in our abso- 
 lute confidence that the predictions will be exactly ful- 
 filled. What astronomy thus does for the cosmical masses 
 of matter, chemistry is attempting, with more or less suc- 
 cess, to do for the molecular combinations. 
 
 And determinism in philosophy declares that, if we had 
 complete expression of the present state of the human 
 mind as well as of the physical world, sufficient skill could 
 calculate with precision all future states of mind. Deter- 
 minism in philosophy declares that all human thought, 
 emotion, and action move through fixed states of sequence, 
 in accordance with fixed laws of progression as invariable 
 as those which govern the movements of matter. In fact, 
 the whole movement of society, from the family to the 
 state and the Church, proceeds, they tell us, upon the 
 assumption that human actions, thoughts, and feelings 
 may be calculated and predicted with certainty by per- 
 sons of wise forethought who have the requisite knowl- 
 edge of the conditions. It is a matter of common experi- 
 ence, they say, that we do calculate and depend upon the 
 decisions of reasonable beings under given circumstances ; 
 
318 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 and we can scarcely conceive that otherwise human society 
 and progress would be possible. There is no reproach 
 against aman more bitter than to say that we cannot de- 
 pend upon him, that we cannot foresee what he will do in 
 cases where it is plain what a reasonable man would do. 
 
 Now, the first aspect of determinism might lead us to 
 say that we should not reproach the untrustworthy man 
 for the uncertainty of his actions, but rather ourselves 
 for the uncertainty of our knowledge. It will be said, it 
 is our folly that does not know the difference between 
 Reuben and Zebulun. The nature and circumstances of 
 the one have as completely determined him to sit by the 
 brookside, and mingle his great thought and resolution 
 with the bleatings of his sheep, as those of the other lead 
 him to rush to the field of battle, and hazard his life in 
 the thickest of the fight. In the determinist’s philosophy 
 the sins of the wicked flow as inevitably from their cir- 
 cumstances and their inherited temperament as the 
 virtues of the saints flow from theirs. It would seem, 
 under this view, that there is no merit in goodness, that 
 there is no guilt in sin. The conception of good and iil 
 desert must be an illusion. We certainly cannot sit in 
 judgment upon the Almighty, and award him either 
 praise or blame. But even the Hebrew prophet puts into 
 the mouth of the Lord the saying, “I form light, and 
 create darkness; I make peace, and create evil.’ Good 
 and evil in the system of determinism can have reference 
 only to the utility of the results, not to the motives of 
 the actions. 
 
 Nevertheless, the stanchest determinist does reproach 
 the evil-doer. He reproaches himself if he detects base 
 and unworthy thoughts within. His very ability to con- 
 
DETERMINISM AND UTILITY 319 
 
 sider and discuss the questions of determinate or indeter- 
 minate, his very ability to comprehend the question of 
 good or ill desert, implies this sense of moral responsibil- 
 ity. He feels that, if his system of determinism is true, 
 this sense of responsibility is an illusion. Vet it is a 
 necessary illusion, which, according to his own system, he 
 cannot shake off. The necessarian not only believes but 
 feels, in many cases, that error was unavoidable. All 
 men admit that. We decide according to the evidence 
 before us. We may have sought honestly and_ear- 
 nestly for sufficient and trustworthy evidence, and failed 
 to find it. Hence the intellectual error was unavoid- 
 able and innocent ; but, when we come to the matter of 
 sinful motive, of mean, selfish desires, of sinful purposes, 
 it is far otherwise. The determinist says that these are 
 as unavoidable, as fixed and determinate, as any errors 
 of judgment. 
 
 At least his theory says so; but his heart and his 
 conscience say, “ You know better.” Yet, to make the 
 theory consistent with itself, we must say that this reply 
 of the heart and the conscience are as necessarily deter- 
 mined as the sin itself. In other words, a consistent 
 scheme of necessity must be inconsistent. It reduces 
 itself to the absurdity of saying that, while the man’s 
 head knows that his acts are determined, his heart and 
 conscience know that they are not; and this knowledge 
 that they are not determined is also determined. A 
 thoroughly consistent determinist or necessarian is thus 
 necessarily inconsistent. Dr. Joseph Priestley saw this, 
 although he did not see that it was fatal to the doctrine 
 of necessity. He held that it was our duty to feign anger 
 and indignation at sin, even when philosophy had destroyed 
 
320 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 those feelings in us by showing us that the sinner acts 
 under as strict a necessity of foreordination as the saint. 
 
 The truth is that, if a doctrine of necessity or determin- 
 ism is carried out consistently with regard to all physical 
 as well as spiritual states, it has passed beyond the reach 
 and power of any finite intellect to draw from it any con- 
 clusions whatever respecting finite action. The motion of 
 one part of the universe, however large that part may be, 
 if not equally shared by some other visible part, may possi- 
 bly be detected. But a motion in which all the universe 
 visible to man is moving, at the same rate and in the 
 same direction, cannot possibly be detected by human 
 observation or have the slightest bearing on human 
 action. Whenever a man draws any conclusion whatever 
 from his doctrine of necessity, or determinism, it is there- 
 fore certainly true that his doctrine is incomplete, and 
 that there is a logical flaw in his reasoning. His conclu- 
 sion may possibly be true; but, if so, it is by accident. 
 It does not follow from his premises. In all our me- 
 chanics, even in our celestial mechanics, we may assume 
 the visible universe to be at rest in absolute space. No 
 consequences could be logically drawn from supposing it 
 in motion. Therefore we rule out of mechanics the 
 hypothesis that it is all in motion, In like manner we 
 may rule out the doctrine of determinism as having no 
 bearing whatever upon any questions of human action. 
 We can arrive at practical truth only from finite prem- 
 ises; and even the stanchest necessarian is under the 
 necessity of thinking, feeling, and acting precisely as 
 though he were, what Aristotle declares him to be, 
 an entelechy,—a being self-determining, originating 
 his own movements, and defining his own ends. 
 
DETERMINISM AND UTILITY 321 
 
 We shall arrive at very similar conclusions if we exam- 
 ine the question of utilitarianism. The doctrine that 
 pleasure is the only object of human pursuit, and that 
 self-interest well understood is all that is really sought by 
 the man supposed to be virtuous, was long ago given up. 
 The modern doctrine is that we are to seek simply the 
 greatest good of the greatest number for the greatest 
 length of time, and that this pursuit of the highest utility 
 constitutes the whole of virtue. But we must remember 
 that utility in this largest sense is to be measured in four 
 directions. In the first place we are to take into account 
 the number of persons to be immediately or ultimately 
 benefited; secondly, the length of time the benefit 
 endures either for the individual or for his successors; 
 thirdly, the intensity of the pleasure given; and, 
 fourthly, the quality of the pleasure. Under the first 
 head of extension we may consider whether the benefit 
 is to accrue to an individual alone, or to extend to the 
 members of his family, or to the community, the State, 
 the nation, or the human race; under the second head, the 
 permanence of the benefit,— whether the pleasure given is 
 to be temporary, as with some hearers there is a delight 
 in music, which ceases in forgetfulness as soon as the 
 sounds have died away. Or is the benefit to be more 
 permanent, as in the making of a harp which shall, under 
 the hands of a skilful performer, give pleasure during 
 half a lifetime? Or shall it be like the writing of the 
 Iliad, which shall be a source of happiness to readers of 
 a hundred successive generations? Or shall it be as 
 Christians believe Peter’s preaching on the day of Pen- 
 tecost was for thousands of his hearers,— a source of hap- 
 piness to all eternity ? 
 
322 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 On the third point, of intensity, it is manifest that every 
 kind of pleasure may vary as much in intensity as it does 
 in permanence. There is a pleasure to a healthy appetite 
 in the eating of ordinary food, but far less intense than 
 that given by some delicious fruit or confection. There is 
 pleasure in listening to the most ordinary music, if it be not 
 marred by obtrusive faults ; but it is not comparable with 
 the intense rapture of- a susceptible person who hears for 
 the first time a great work of a great master. There is 
 happiness in the consciousness of right spiritual inten- 
 tion; but what is it compared with the rapture of Saint 
 Paul, caught up into the third heaven, not knowing if he 
 was in the body or out of the body, and hearing that which 
 is unutterable in human speech? or with that of the 
 Evangelist John, when he ascended above all the heavens, 
 when the scroll of all the eternities was unrolled before 
 him, and he heard the word which was from the beginning? 
 
 But utility is measured, not only by the extension, the 
 permanence, and the intension, but also by the quality of 
 the happiness produced. The pleasures of sense are in- 
 ferior in their essential character to the pleasures of 
 knowledge. The pleasures of knowledge must in like 
 manner be set in their very nature below the happiness 
 arising from friendship, from family affection, and from 
 social intercourse with our fellow-men. And even these 
 latter pleasures are not equal in dignity to the happiness 
 which arises from obedience to the conscience, or from 
 reverential and adoring aspiration, gratitude, and love 
 toward God. It is admitted and must be admitted that 
 there can be no sentiment in human nature higher than 
 that of reverent, obedient gratitude, adoring submission 
 to the Universal Cause, the Creator of the whole. The 
 
DETERMINISM AND UTILITY 323 
 
 highest utility, therefore, is found in those actions which 
 shall lead men to the acceptance of religious faith and 
 the practice of disinterested virtue. It is admitted by 
 modern advocates of the utilitarian theory of morals that 
 the highest virtue is attained only by the man who forgets 
 himself and lives for others, and who perceives that the 
 highest good which he can bestow upon others is to lead 
 them to disinterested love and to adoring gratitude. 
 
 We are therefore brought, in the consideration of 
 utilitarian morality, to the same conclusion which we 
 reached in regard to determinism in philosophy. Push 
 utilitarianism out logically and consistently, and you lose 
 yourself in an infinite mist where you have no guide, and 
 must fall back upon disinterested obedience to conscience 
 and to God. The theory is thus reduced to absurdity, 
 and can be saved from it only by the greater absurdity of 
 supposing that our consciousness of moral freedom and 
 responsibility deceives us, and that our sense of obligation 
 and duty are illusions, Of course, that cannot be said; 
 for, if consciousness and intuition are deceptive, we have 
 no basis on which to stand for any kind of reasoning 
 whatever. All argument must rest on premises, and the 
 first premise in the chain of argument can stand only 
 upon direct intuition and the direct testimony of con- 
 sciousness, 
 
 Whenever, therefore, a man would draw any practical 
 inference from utilitarianism, such as the impossibility of 
 man’s owing duty to God, we may be certain that there 
 is a fault somewhere in his logic, since utilitarianism, 
 carried out logically to its end, destroys itself precisely as 
 determinism does. It may be asked, Why, then, have the 
 doctrines of necessity in philosophy and of utility in 
 
324 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 morals always been so attractive to a large class of minds, 
 and to minds of a high order? I answer that they are, 
 like many other errors, founded upon a perception of real 
 truth, an imperfect perception leading to false inferences, 
 but an imperfect perception of immutable and important 
 truths. The falsehood and imperfection in every form of 
 the doctrines of fate, necessity, or determinism, are pro- 
 ductive of mischief, leading men to apathy, to indiffer- 
 ence, sometimes to despair and madness. But by virtue 
 of that measure of truth which the necessarian sees, and 
 clings to with such earnestness, his doctrine produces also 
 some of the finest results. The real truth which is half- 
 concealed in every form of determinism is the sovereignty 
 of indwelling grace. Man perceives that the Almighty 
 reigns over all his works, controls and guides all his chil- 
 dren; and this perception infuses indomitable courage, 
 untiring industry, unconquerable perseverance. The be- 
 liever works out his own salvation, with fear and trem- 
 bling, with all the more zeal because he knows that it is 
 God working within him to will and do of his good pleas- 
 ure. He pushes forward to do great works of public 
 utility, because he believes himself the man predestined 
 to accomplish them. 
 
 In like manner the falsehood involved in the utilitarian 
 theory of morals produces a moral indifference to personal 
 purity and inward piety; and it may even lead to under- 
 valuing right motives in general and overvaluing mere 
 outward action. But, on the other hand, the utilitarian 
 theory sees (sometimes dimly and imperfectly) the grand 
 truth of the Divine benevolence, that all things are work- 
 ing together for good to those who comply with and con- 
 form to the natural or divinely appointed conditions of 
 
DETERMINISM AND UTILITY 325 
 
 success. This view leads to lives of kindly beneficence 
 and practical usefulness. It leads men to be willing always 
 to lend a hand. Its failures come from the imperfection 
 and dimness of its view of that central truth which the 
 eagle-eyed apostle proclaimed for us, that “God is love”’; 
 a clear perception of which and acceptance in the heart 
 lead to still better fruits of piety and philanthropy. 
 
 The apostle tells us that “God is love,” that “he that 
 dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him,” that 
 “he who doeth good is of God’; and the Roman moralist 
 tells us that in nothing is man so like to God as in doing 
 good to men. God is good, and designs good; but he 
 sees that the highest good is not happiness, but the virtue 
 which infallibly leads to happiness. The two things are 
 coincident, but not identical. They cannot be separated in 
 act, but they can be separated in thought. The man of 
 highest virtue has the highest kind of happiness, but he can- 
 not attain that happiness by seeking it. The moment he 
 seeks it his disinterested virtue is gone, and his happi- 
 ness gone with it. What is thus true for the individual is 
 true for the race. If I seek the highest utility for my 
 fellow-men, I must seek their virtue; for none of them 
 can attain the highest happiness except in attaining the 
 highest virtue. Whatever promotes the highest virtue of 
 men is of the highest utility because it promotes their 
 virtue; and it is right because it promotes their virtue as 
 well as their happiness. That is useful, in the highest 
 sense of the word “useful,” which promotes universal and 
 eternal happiness; and nothing can do this except that 
 which promotes virtue,— which leads men to choose and 
 cling to what is right. 
 
 But we are persistently asked, What do you mean by 
 
326 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 right? I answer that right is as indefinable as happiness. 
 No simple idea can be really defined. It can be pointed 
 out. It can be illustrated. It can be set before us in 
 such manner as to make us recognize it. But it is to 
 be apprehended by direct sight, by intuition. No man 
 can say what is the meaning of such words as “hot” and 
 ‘cold,’ “red and!‘ green;” *¢space” and times haces 
 and “love,” “ pleasure”’ and “pain,” “right” and “wrong.” 
 The person constituted to perceive and receive the ideas 
 may have his attention called to them. He may learn to 
 distinguish and illustrate them; but he cannot be said 
 properly to define them, to analyze them, or reduce them 
 to simpler elements. We feel that we are under three 
 kinds of necessity,— the physical necessity of cause and 
 effect, the logical necessity of the sequence of ideas, and 
 the moral necessity of right personal relations. “It is not 
 necessary for me to live,” said More, “but it is necessary 
 that I should tell the truth.” 
 
 But in our idea of right is involved the idea of duty 
 toward God. The personality in ourselves receives its 
 highest dignity only when we perceive that we are in the 
 image of the Infinite Creator; that our personality con- 
 sists in our likeness to that Being whose origin and end 
 are in himself, and who is therefore eternal. The moral 
 instincts are aroused, therefore, to their highest and 
 noblest activity only in the recognition of God’s being 
 and of our duty to him. Monotheism, the recognition of 
 our relation to God, is the moral force which has lifted 
 Europe out of Epicurus’s sty, and given us the long list of 
 Christian heroes, and of moral victories over sin. 
 
 When it is said that henceforth the energy of the 
 Church must not be wasted in the attempt to serve God 
 
DETERMINISM AND UTILITY 327 
 
 and to live for eternity, but be used to serve men in the 
 present life, a Christian truth is presented in the garb of 
 a pernicious error, whose influence, so far as it is re- 
 ceived, would be to destroy all interest in what is high or 
 noble in human life. The Wesleyan sings, “To serve the 
 present age, my calling to fulfil”; and the Wesleyan 
 Church has been foremost and most successful in pro- 
 moting the temporal benefit of man. All the labors of 
 secularists and materialists, from the beginning, have not 
 done a hundredth part so much for the social happiness 
 and commercial prosperity of men as the Methodist 
 Church has done. But how have the followers of Wesley 
 wrought their miracles of reformation and transformation ? 
 It has been by the fervor of their piety toward God, their 
 zeal for Christ, their longing for the spiritual salvation of 
 men. 
 
 The history of that Church is thus a practical or exper- 
 imental illustration of the real value, even for temporal 
 things, of personal piety,—that is, of religious ethics,— 
 of acknowledging that the first and highest obligation is, 
 as Moses and as Christ have declared, to love the Lord 
 our God, with a consecration of all our powers, first of all 
 and above all, to him. 
 
Wale 
 DUTIES RELATIVE TO SEEF: 
 
 Ir we are right in the definition which we have 
 given of the sphere of ethics, it is not possible for a 
 man to owe a duty to himself. Duties are due to other 
 persons. They arise out of the relation of person to 
 person. It may even be doubted whether we can, in 
 the strictest sense of the word, owe duty, or be under 
 obligation to the lower animals. Their personality is of 
 so much lower order than ours that we can scarce apply 
 to them ethical terms, except figuratively ; and our obli- 
 gation to them is rather an obligation to their Creator 
 than to them. In other words, we cannot strictly be 
 guilty of injustice to an animal, but we may be guilty of 
 cruelty; and cruelty to an animal is a species of impiety 
 toward its Creator. 
 
 If, however, it were possible to conceive a finite being, 
 such as an individual man, absolutely self-dependent 
 and without relation to any other conscious being, created 
 or uncreated, such an independent finite being would have 
 no duties. It would be impossible to conceive of his 
 being under any obligation. We can, however, imagine 
 no such finite independence. But, even in regard to the 
 infinitely absolute, we are not able strictly to apply such 
 terms as “duty” and “obligation.” We reverently ac- 
 knowledge the holiness of God, we gratefully adore his 
 
DUTIES RELATIVE TO SELF 329 
 
 love; and we perceive that these coexist with absolute 
 wisdom and absolute freedom. 
 
 We cannot say that his nature compels him to wise 
 and holy action: the word “nature” is as inapplicable to 
 him as the word «“ compel.” * Wisdom and love and 
 power constitute his being, and nothing either compels or 
 hinders his absolutely free choice of that which is best. 
 His holiness is thus inscrutable to our reason. The only 
 holiness which we can clearly conceive and express in lan- 
 guage lies in a voluntary obedience to right. All our 
 words concerning it being human, derived from our finite 
 experience, imply bonds, as is shown not only in their 
 etymology, but in all our attempts to analyze the thought 
 which they convey. Thus duty and obligation in their 
 etymology speak directly of bonds: right indirectly refers 
 to rule or commandment. If it were possible to imagine 
 a finite being absolutely alone in a universe without 
 a Creator, he would be under no moral bonds. There 
 would be no other person to whom he could bear relation, 
 to whom he could be bound. Selkirk watched constantly 
 for his hoped for deliverance. Daily climbing to his look- 
 out on the mountain top, he searched the offing with long- 
 ing desire to see a sail. He was still consciously bound to 
 his fellow-men. More than this, he had been brought up 
 in Christian faith, he expected a future life, he recog- 
 nized his relation to the great family of preceding genera- 
 tions, he recognized his relation to God. Thus his so- 
 journ on the lonely island by no means released him from 
 moral bonds and obligations, or left him in the impossible 
 condition of owing duty simply to himself, 
 
 But, although there cannot be any duty owed directly to 
 
 * Aristotle says that God is eternally active wisdom, and Saint John says, God is love. 
 
330 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 one’s self, there are duties in reference to one’s self; and 
 when ethical writers speak, as they frequently do, concern- 
 ing our duties to ourselves, they use an elliptical expres- 
 sion, and mean our duties in reference to ourselves. Itisa 
 case in which the letter killeth, while the spirit giveth life. 
 
 To believe that we literally can owe duty to ourselves is 
 to introduce disastrous confusion into our ethical thought; 
 and it may even lead to grave ethical mistakes in the con- 
 duct of our inner and our outer life, as I believe it did in 
 the case of Goethe, and probably of other worshippers of 
 culture. Shakspere’s Polonius was a worldly-wise man; 
 and when he said, 
 
 «¢ To thine own self be true; 
 And it must follow, as the night the day, 
 Thou canst not then be false to any man,’’— 
 
 he said that which in the clear light of reason, as well as 
 of revelation, is absurdly false and mischievous. But to 
 recognize our duties in reference to ourselves is a highly 
 important part of practical wisdom,— indeed, in one as- 
 pect may be considered as the most important of all duties. 
 
 Let us recall for a moment the definition of duty 
 which I have quoted from Mr. Alger in a previous lecture. 
 Truth is, according to him, the form of being; beauty is 
 the unity of being; natural good is the end of being; and 
 right is the hierarchy of ends. In other words natural 
 good is the fulfilment of functions ; while moral rectitude, 
 or conformity to the hierarchy of functions, is the fulfil- 
 ment of function in the manner which will most effectu- 
 ally conduce to the perpetual and universal fulfilment of 
 function. 
 
 But the ends of being to be attained by the fulfilment 
 
DUTIES RELATIVE TO SELF 331 
 
 of functions are appointed of the infinite wisdom of the 
 Creator. Out of him, the uncreated, all creation springs; 
 and this, the created, constitutes the whole of that 
 which we can be properly said to know or compre- 
 hend. His being and attributes we simply apprehend. 
 The agnostics are right in Saying that the Uncreated is 
 unknowable. They are wrong in not adding the all-im- 
 portant exception, “except as he reveals himself.” He 
 reveals himself through creation and through inspiration. 
 The uncreated Creator, considered independent of his 
 creation and his inspiration, is absolutely unknowable by 
 us, Or, in the paradoxical expression of the German meta- 
 physician, ‘Pure being is the same as pure nothingness” 
 to human thought, since it can lay hold of neither. 
 Truth is the form of being; that is, the form of its 
 becoming manifested in creation. The being, the sub- 
 stance, the reality, are not comprehended by us. Their 
 existence is apprehended through the form or mode of 
 manifestation in which the Infinite Being brings the par- 
 tial being into contact with our consciousness. This form 
 of being is truth. Again, beauty is the unity of being, 
 not in its substance or reality, which is incomprehensible 
 to us, but the unity of its form of manifestation, the 
 unity of the thought by which it is created or brought 
 into possible contact with our consciousness. It is our 
 apprehension, more or less perfect, of this intellectual 
 unity binding together the parts of a complex truth, 
 which gives us the sense of beauty ; more or less intense 
 in proportion to the simplicity of the thought at the centre 
 and the multiplicity of the parts embraced under it. 
 
 Now, in like manner, ends are appointed of God. The 
 conception of end or purpose is inseparable from the con- 
 
832 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 ception of a creator or designer, as I propose to show 
 more at length in a succeeding lecture. Natural good is 
 the end of being; that is, the fulfilment of ‘the uses 
 for which the being is adapted. The duty of a being 
 subject to moral law may be discovered from a knowledge 
 of his destined end; and the destined end may be inferred 
 from the organization. This view is the foundation upon 
 which Jouffroy builds his whole ethical system. All 
 moral duty is included in the duty of conforming to the 
 order of spiritual being appointed by our Creator. All 
 duties constitute a sacred hierarchy, whose ranks and 
 orders are appointed of God. We are bound to respect 
 each in proportion to its dignity. This thought is prob- 
 ably identical with that which lay in the mind of Edwards 
 when he defined holiness as the love of all being in pro- 
 portion to its worth, But, as all being flows from the 
 one creative Source to which supreme homage is due, so 
 the love of all inferior beings may be considered as obli- 
 gatory, because of that first obligation. The second great 
 commandment of Christian ethics is, as it were, a corollary 
 from the first. 
 
 We can owe no duty strictly to ourselves; but, after the 
 considerations just presented, our duties in reference to 
 ourselves become very clear. Our organization, spiritual 
 and moral, shows our destined end, and therefore our 
 duty. The Westminster Catechism expresses it well: it 
 is “to glorify God, and enjoy him forever.” We are cre- 
 ated to become intelligent, willing, and obedient children 
 of God, coworkers with him in promoting the good of 
 men; that is, helpful, loving brethren in his family. It 
 may therefore, under one aspect, be justly said that the 
 most important of all duties is in reference to ourselves, 
 
DUTIES RELATIVE TO SELF 333 
 
 to bring ourselves into this state of obedience to him. 
 The highest obligation is the obligation to obey law, the 
 obligation to recognize obligation. In this aspect the 
 primal condition under which alone we can perform our 
 duties to other men and to God is that we first perform 
 our duty with reference to ourselves. Thus Cicero de- 
 clares self-government to be the sum and substance of 
 morality: “Totum in eo est ut tibi imperes.”’ President 
 Hickok calls it self-possession, although not in the ordi- 
 nary meaning of that word, but in the sense of obtaining 
 possession of one’s self. Every part of our being is, in- 
 directly and to some extent, under our control; and we 
 are to bring every thought into captivity to rule, and di- 
 rect our whole body, soul, and spirit in the way of God’s 
 commandment. 
 
 In a lecture upon education, W. T. Harris uses a very 
 quaint but very forcible figure in saying that no man has 
 yet entered into the highest life, and begun his spiritual 
 ascent, until he has first taken himself by the nape of 
 his own neck, and forced himself to walk in the strait 
 and narrow path. Until a man has done this, he has not 
 attained his full personality. True liberty comes only 
 in obedience to law, as may be illustrated from physical 
 and physiological as well as from mental laws. The 
 words of our Saviour— “He that committeth sin is the 
 bond-servant of sin’’—are profoundly true, and will stand 
 after the most rigid psychological analysis. The condi- 
 tions on which alone life is possible are narrow. Obe- 
 dience to law is the fulfilment of those conditions: sin is 
 the violation of them. Consequently, sin is a fettering, 
 hampering, and destroying first of the liberty of the soul, 
 then of the soul itself. 
 
334 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 Our duties in reference to ourselves may be subdi- 
 vided in two different ways. First, in reference to the 
 parts of our nature, we may consider our duties in ref- 
 erence to the care of the body, the training of the mind, 
 the cultivation of the affections, and the exercise of the 
 will. ‘These four divisions of body, mind, heart, and will, 
 may be so interpreted as to include all parts of our nature. 
 And in each of the four, two modes of self-control will 
 be found necessary,—the spur and the rein. In this 
 guiding of ourselves, our chart of directions is to be found 
 in our total knowledge, whether of ourselves, of our fel- 
 low-men, or of the world in general. We thus make eight 
 subdivisions of the question of our duty in reference to 
 self; and each one of these eight may be almost indefi- 
 nitely subdivided. 
 
 Take, for example, the care of the body; and, first of 
 all, we must care for its maintenance in full vigor, health, 
 and strength. Consider how many different points re- 
 quire our attention in this mere matter of maintaining 
 physical vigor. The choice of articles of food may be 
 guided to some extent by the general experience of man- 
 kind; but it also requires, in order to produce the most 
 satisfactory results, a careful attention to one’s own 
 idiosyncrasies and circumstances. Muscular exercise, or 
 gymnastics, may be regulated in a general way by estab- 
 lished rules; but that also must be adapted by special 
 variation to the individual. The supply of fresh, pure air, 
 the cleansing of the body, the modifications of the mode 
 by which that cleanliness is procured,— these and various 
 other points of merely physical interest require attention 
 and adaptation to the individual need. In all this matter 
 it will be perceived that both spur and rein are needed : 
 
DUTIES RELATIVE TO SELF 335 
 
 the rein to control the appetites and passions, and even 
 to control the animal spirits which might lead to over- 
 exertion ; and, on the other hand, the spur to stimulate and 
 drive us into doing that which we judge will most effectu- 
 ally preserve and increase health and strength. , 
 
 But there is an entirely different care of the body 
 needed besides that which provides for its healthful vigor 
 and enduring strength. Skill is just as essential to the 
 fulfilment of the ends of our being as strength; and skill 
 is to be acquired only by long-continued, intelligently 
 guided practice, to which we are driven by moral consider- 
 ations of duty with reference to ourselves. Moreover, both 
 our own esthetic sense and our regard for the feelings of 
 our neighbors require us to cultivate, so far as consistent 
 with other ends, grace of movement. In one aspect 
 gracefulness is only a part of skill; for skill would require 
 us to waste no force, and grace is the result of the utmost 
 economy of force. 
 
 The subdivisions in our care of the intellect are as 
 numerous as those in the care of the body, of which I 
 have by no means exhausted the enumeration. The life 
 bread of the intellect is knowledge ; and, as the nutritive 
 quality of different kinds of food is various, so the value 
 of different kinds of knowledge for strengthening the 
 mind is of different degrees. The gymnastic of the mind 
 is called study. It is the voluntary continuance of atten- 
 tion upon a chosen theme. Like exercise of the body, it 
 may be so chosen and directed as to increase the practical 
 strength of the intellect, or it may be so misdirected as 
 rather to injure the powers of the mind, precisely as inju- 
 dicious bodily exercise may do more harm than good. 
 The need of rest is equally great in the training of the 
 
336 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 mind and in the training of the body. While the muscu- 
 lar system is inactive in sleep, the nervous power is being 
 accumulated, ready to be expended on awakening, either 
 in the direction of new muscular movement or new men- 
 tal effort. The mind not only lays hold of the solid food 
 of knowledge, it breathes the air of fancy. The imagina- 
 tion is an essential and most valuable part of our intellect- 
 ual nature, and requires as careful a cultivation as do 
 the reason and the understanding. It is as easy to defile 
 the mind and conscience with the knowledge and imagina- 
 tion of evil as to weaken the body by unwholesome food. 
 And in all this government of the intellect it is evident 
 that spur and rein are both needed, the one to arouse us 
 from mental indolence, the other to restrain us from a 
 vain overtasking of our powers. 
 
 That the heart, the affections, need cultivation, and that 
 we are responsible for their state, is implied in the pre- 
 vious lectures. A man is to look carefully at himself, and 
 discover, if possible, his own defects in temper, taste, incli- 
 nation, habits; everything that makes him less of a man, 
 less worthy of the respect of his fellow-men and of the 
 approval of God. And, wherever he finds a failing or a 
 fault, he is to strive with his might to amend it. As I said 
 before, this is a primal duty,—this duty of self-improve- 
 ment, of self-culture; and it is so felt by every serious- 
 minded man. I was once greatly impressed by the man- 
 ner in which a man answered my inquiry how a neighbor 
 of his was getting along. ‘Oh,’ answered he, in a tone 
 of mingled contempt and indignation, “he goes along as he 
 used to, nursing his own faults instead of fighting them.” 
 “Nursing his faults instead of fighting them” clung to 
 me for years. It was alay sermon, as powerful to me 
 
DUTIES RELATIVE TO SELF 337 
 
 as many a much longer one from the pulpit. We can 
 serve others effectually by first making ourselves what we 
 ought to be. 
 
 Of course, in the contest with our own faults, we must 
 remember that self-absorption and egotism are faults. 
 “Took out, and not in,” is the motto for a healthy soul. 
 You look in, only that you may look out. You look into 
 the telescope only to remove dust or to arrange maladjust- 
 ments and put the instrument into order, that you may 
 look out upon God’s heavens and his earth. Nothing is 
 more ridiculous and useless than the man who is studying 
 himself and cultivating himself to the neglect of his duty 
 toward others. We want no Poloniuses nor feeble imi- 
 tators of the Titan Goethe, sitting in a circle, “where 
 self-inspection sucks its littlc thumb.” What we want is 
 that a man should govern himself in the right way so per- 
 fectly that other men shall think he does it naturally, and 
 that he himself shall forget how hard a struggle he had to 
 attain the victory. The proper end and reward of labor 
 is that it shall become play. The highest perfection of 
 art is attained only when the imitation of nature is per- 
 fect. 
 
 We must be careful, therefore, to teach men by precept 
 and example to live and act nobly, to bring their thoughts, 
 feelings, desires, words, and actions all into conformity 
 with the highest Christian standard, with no more thought 
 about themselves, no more self-examination, than is neces- 
 sary to that end; and to avoid entirely all display of them- 
 selves, of their own feelings and internal struggles. 
 
 The canon, ‘“‘ Artis est celare artem,”’ — it is the peculiar 
 proof of art to conceal art,— does not convey the whole 
 truth. The highest art conceals itself, not only from 
 
338 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 the spectator, but from the artist. As Horace Bushnell 
 showed so eloquently in his Phi Beta Kappa oration, 
 work is not perfectly performed until it has passed above 
 the sphere of conscious labor, and become play. From 
 the simplest mechanical arts, such as walking, running, 
 skating, up to the highest spiritual arts, such as sacred 
 oratory, poetry, music, the perfect mastery of the art is 
 not attained until all conscious sense of labor in it is lost ; 
 that is, until both to the man himself and to others the 
 thing seems to do itself through him, rather than he to 
 do it. 
 
 This is the final end of a man’s duty in reference to 
 himself. It is so to train himself, body and mind, heart 
 and soul, speech and action, that he may bring every 
 power of his being, according to the natural measure in 
 which he has been gifted, into perfect obedience to his 
 highest ethical instincts, so that he shall always, without 
 the need of conscious struggle, do and say, act and feel, 
 in perfect accord with his convictions of duty. The 
 highest state of liberty is in all departments found in the 
 strictest obedience to law. This profound truth, first 
 announced by our Lord, and confirmed by every line 
 of a priori as well as experiential reasoning, is most em- 
 phatically true in reference to morals and religion. It 
 is only by strict conformity to the conditions of life that 
 we can enjoy life. It is only by an unreserved conse- 
 cration of one’s self to the highest service of God and 
 man, by forgetfulness of self and concentration of our 
 powers upon obedience to the highest law, that we can 
 attain the highest freedom,—the glorious liberty of the 
 sons of God. 
 
VIII. 
 
 THE CONNECTION OF ETHICS WITH 
 RELIGION. 
 
 THE question has been debated, with a good deal of 
 interest, whether any form of ethics is possible in an 
 atheistic philosophy. The so-called positive school, re- 
 fusing to consider the existence of a First Cause, has, in 
 some instances, been pushed to the illogical extreme of 
 denying the existence of God, and reducing the whole 
 universe to matter in motion. The problem has been 
 raised whether under this completely materialistic view 
 of the universe there can be any true system of ethics. 
 It is evident that one of the great difficulties in answer- 
 ing this question lies in the difficulty of defining its terms. 
 God is infinitely great under whatever aspect he is viewed ; 
 and it is impossible sharply to define our apprehension 
 of attributes which we cannot comprehend. Ethics is a 
 broad science, covering the relations of personal beings 
 to each other; and we cannot sharply define what per- 
 sonal being is, nor what relations of personal beings are 
 included in ethics. Hence the difficulty of arriving at 
 conclusions which will be universally admitted with re- 
 spect to the connection between ethics and theism. 
 
 Another difficulty arises from difference of views as to 
 the nature of the connection which is sought. If it be 
 asked, Is ethics dependent upon theology? we may ask in 
 reply, Dependent in what sense? It was customary thirty 
 
340 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 years ago to make a distinction between logical and 
 chronological dependence. We may ask whether the 
 sense of obligation and the existence of duty logically 
 imply a belief in God, or we may ask whether they are 
 actually historically produced by a belief in God. It Is 
 admitted by almost every writer upon the topic that there 
 is an historical connection, that among all nations moral 
 duties are enforced to greater or less extent by religious 
 sanctions. Professor Huidekoper has indeed shown that 
 the connection between the religion of the classical times 
 and their morality was exceedingly slight, that monothe- 
 ism was practically necessary to give vigor and efficiency 
 to conscience; yet both Grecian and Roman literature 
 give us abundant proof that in the earlier days the gods 
 were supposed to be the avengers of the injured and the 
 punishers of certain kinds of crime. I once had a 
 personal acquaintance, and indeed intimacy, with a young 
 Chinaman, born and brought up in a country village near 
 Canton. He told me the story of his early rejection of 
 the polytheistic fables held for truth by the lower class of 
 Chinese, and he was very emphatic in affirming that the 
 first effect of this religious scepticism upon his mind was 
 to make him lose for a time all sense of the obligations of 
 truth and of filial obedience. 
 
 But, although the historical connection between ethics 
 and theology is thus uniform, and the chronological de- 
 pendence of morality upon religion so well-nigh universal, 
 it does not follow that there is a logical dependence. 
 That question is to be settled by psychological and 
 metaphysical analysis of the problem. There are many 
 at the present day who strenuously deny this dependence. 
 But I must confess that it seems to me that before this 
 
ETHICS AND RELIGION 341 
 
 denial is made both sciences, ethics and theology, are 
 eviscerated, emptied of their true content. It is very 
 easy to draw any conclusions you please concerning the 
 relations of two sciences, provided you may first define 
 and characterize the sciences as you please. When the 
 positive school declare that our whole knowledge is but 
 the knowledge of sensations, that we have no real power 
 of inward sight, that we do not know even our own exist- 
 ence, much less the existence of other men, and a 
 fortiort that it is impossible to know anything concerning 
 the existence of matter or of force or of God, it is evident 
 that their definitions both of theology and of ethics must 
 differ very widely from mine. 
 
 The great sciences consist of the knowledge of states 
 of being in mutual relation. Metaphysics deals with the 
 relation of being to being; ethics, with certain relations 
 of personal beings; esthetics, with peculiar relations of 
 parts to a whole; physics, with the modes in which 
 other being enters into relations with our consciousness ; 
 mathematics, with the relations of our consciousness to 
 space and time, which again are the relations of the uni- 
 verse to the omnipresence and eternity of its Creator. 
 
 Ethics, in the best sense of the word, deals with certain 
 relations of person to person ; the relation, namely, of re- 
 ciprocal rights and duties. It is manifest, therefore, that 
 the denial of personality to the human being, the reduc- 
 tion of the man to a course of motion wholly determined 
 by mechanical impact, denying to him all power of self- 
 determination, all freedom, takes away the possibility of 
 obligation, or duty, or rights. Ethics founded upon the 
 perception of obligation, of duty, implies a simultaneous 
 perception of the existence of personal being in ourselves 
 
342 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 and in others. It imperatively demands the recognition 
 in man of moral freedom. It regards man, to use Aris- 
 totle’s word, as an entelechy of a high order, containing 
 in himself the power of originating action, and of deter- 
 mining its end, Now, this admission of the self-determin- 
 ing power of the human mind —this admission that we are 
 what we know that we are, personal beings — leads at once 
 also to the perception that the whole universe must be, in 
 a still higher sense, and still more completely, in its total- 
 ity, under control of a free, self-originating, self-determin- 
 ing Actor. This has been shown by Aristotle and by 
 more recent thinkers in the Christian Church. William 
 T. Harris has successfully refuted Kant’s criticism of An- 
 selm’s demonstration, so that we may safely say that the 
 admission of the substantial, real personality of man in- 
 volves the admission of the personality of God. Thus the 
 existence of a true ground for morality implies the exist- 
 ence of a true ground for theism. Conversely, the admis- 
 sion of a personal God instantly, by our very definition of 
 ethics, makes religious ethics the most important part of 
 the science. It sets the whole matter in the light in 
 which it is placed by the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, 
 — that our first duty is love to God, and that our duties to 
 our fellow-men are rendered the more imperative because 
 men are his children. 
 
 On the other hand, the denial of personality in God, the 
 denial that he is Spirit, involves at once the conclusion 
 that all the universe consists merely of matter in motion, 
 and that ethical relations are simply a very refined and 
 very complicated variety of mechanical relations. Under 
 this view all our moral sentiments and moral intuitions are 
 a species of illusion, although this view leaves no one to 
 
ETHICS AND RELIGION 343 
 
 be deluded. For the materialist, in fact, assumes the self. 
 contradictory, unthinkable position of his own non-exist- 
 ence, yet of his ability to perceive the existence of mat- 
 ter, and to feel its ability to deceive him, a nonentity, into 
 the belief that he exists. The positivist does not plunge 
 into absurdity quite so deeply. He does not know 
 whether he exists or not, nor whether matter exists or 
 not. He only knows that, although he may be non-exist- 
 ent, he perceives motions in something which, however, 
 may also be non-existent. Under either system of philos- 
 ophy, materialist or positivist, the foundations for any 
 real and substantial ethics seem to me to be completely 
 Swept away. Moral science becomes a branch of what 
 Comte calls Social Statics, a consideration of the most 
 delicate motions of which matter is capable, the motions 
 of the brain. It isa branch of animal mechanics. It is 
 reduced to a branch of physiology,— not in Sterry Hunt’s 
 broad meaning of the word, as general physical science, 
 but in the narrow meaning of the knowledge of the 
 human body. 
 
 All the moral sentiments and feelings inwrought into 
 all human consciousness, uttering themselves in all lan- 
 guages and all institutions, among the most enlightened 
 and among the most savage people, are thus double wit- 
 nesses to the being of God and to the fact that man was 
 made in the image of God. This was the “impregnable 
 position” of Socrates, of Plato, and of Aristotle, in Opposi- 
 tion to the mechanical atheism of Democritus and Aristip- 
 pus. The former argued from the actual existence in the 
 human mind of reason, intelligence, and moral aspiration, 
 to the necessary existence of moral attributes in the 
 Creator of the universe. “Merely physical agencies” — 
 
344 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 matter and motion —could “never have evolved a moral 
 being seeing moral ends.” 
 
 Another point is involved almost necessarily in this 
 discussion, the connection of morality with the doctrine 
 of a future life. There have not been wanting, during 
 the last few years, men professing to be Christians and 
 to believe in human immortality, who have neverthe- 
 less said that the rejection of the Christian doctrine of 
 immortality does not necessarily weaken the sentiments 
 of duty, nor relax the sanctions of the moral law. If this 
 life were the whole of our being, they say, it would only 
 be the more incumbent on us to make it all the more 
 noble, and get the most out of it that we could. This has 
 a generous sound, and does credit to the moral sentiments 
 of those who utter it; but I do not think it will bear the 
 scrutiny of reason. ‘This idea of getting the noblest satis- 
 faction out of a short life is based ona secret feeling of our 
 being able hereafter to look back upon our course with ap- 
 proval. The brevity of life, to one thoroughly convinced 
 that death is the extinction of the soul, would have no ten- 
 dency to make a man select the noblest kind of pleasure, 
 but only to make him seek to enjoy to the utmost what 
 he could enjoy. Thus the conviction of annihilation at 
 death might lead to nobler efforts in a man already filled 
 with noble sentiments; but it would more surely lead the 
 majority of men to self-indulgence in whatever chanced to 
 be their ruling passion. The Anacreontic and Epicurean 
 poetry of the ancient world expresses the actual and, I 
 think, the natural effect of the denial of immortality: “Let 
 us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.” The poems of 
 Catullus and Horace, and the so-called Anacreontic odes, 
 are full of the expression of such views. 
 
ETHICS AND RELIGION 345 
 
 But it is objected that every such appeal to the sanctions 
 of a future state implies the selfish theory of morals. 
 John Locke says that Christianity gave virtue the advan- 
 tage over sin by throwing eternal happiness into the scale 
 on the side of virtue. Saint John, however, gives a differ- 
 ent view,— that we love God because he first loved us, and 
 that our love to God leads us to keep his commandments. 
 The rewards and punishments of the world to come are 
 secondary, not primary, agencies in producing moral 
 righteousness. Hope and fear are powerful to draw the 
 attention. Love alone has power to create enthusiasm 
 and to inspire holiness. The whole of duty is, indeed, 
 summed up in love. 
 
 But, in order that we may see more clearly the real con- 
 nection between ethics and faith in our own immortality, 
 let us consider for a moment some fundamental truths. 
 All finite being is dependent; but, in pursuing the chain 
 of dependence upward, we must finally come to an inde- 
 pendent absolute Being, on which all being depends. The 
 existence of such an original, or ultimate, source of being 
 is avouched to us, Herbert Spencer says, with a certainty 
 second only to the certainty of our own existence. Itself 
 is being, and possesses all the attributes of real being. 
 
 But what are the attributes of real being? The being 
 which I know with clearest knowledge, and of whose 
 existence it is impossible for me to doubt, is myself. 
 What do I know of my own real being? Nothing except 
 my states of consciousness, of perception and apperception. 
 I know, and know that I know. I feel, and feel that I 
 feel. I will, and I will to will. These powers of person- 
 ality are the only attributes known to me of the being, 
 myself, of whose existence I am most absolutely certain. 
 
346 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 I must therefore, by logical necessity, admit that the 
 attributes of real being include personality, and that the 
 attributes of the Ultimate Source of being include per- 
 sonality. 
 
 The moment that one is awakened to see clearly the 
 fact that all real being is found in personality — that is 
 to say, that God alone is, and that he upholds creation by 
 the word which called it into being — we perceive also 
 a sacred order in the scale of being. Matter altogether 
 under necessity, and dependent wholly for every move- 
 ment, and for the direction of the movement, upon exter- 
 nal forces, stands lowest, in the most complete antithesis 
 to personality. The plants, dependent on external forces 
 for motion, but having a feeble entelechy in themselves, 
 whereby they guide the motion to the building up of their 
 own forms, and ina very slight degree even to the selec- 
 tion of external ends, stand next. Thirdly, the animals, 
 having conscious ends in view, and capable in general 
 of free locomotion, approach much more nearly to being 
 truly self-determined persons. They have a recognizable 
 amount of freedom. But there is no satisfactory evidence 
 that the animal, however highly gifted, ever rises into the 
 region of generality, of abstraction, of speculation on the 
 infinite, of reasoning upon morality and duty. ‘These are 
 reserved for the fourth order in the scale of being, for 
 man. Man alone has a language by which to express 
 abstract ideas, to preserve the experience of the race, to 
 divide and intercommunicate unimpaired to each in- 
 dividual of the race the inheritance and life of the 
 whole. In himself he finds the image of God. The ob- 
 jection that this relativity of knowledge to himself renders 
 the knowledge untrustworthy is self-contradictory. 
 
ETHICS AND RELIGION 347 
 
 We discover that the earth rotates on her axils, and 
 wheels about the sun. Our position on the planet, our 
 inability to detect the motion by direct sensation or by 
 any observations taken from any other position than on 
 the rolling ball, does not hinder our flight, by reason, into 
 the central sun, or into the midst of the immovable ether, 
 and there demonstrating the motion which on the planet, 
 and in the planet, we cannot see. The relativity of man’s 
 knowledge — the impossibility of his seeing any thing ex- 
 cept as it appears to him—does not prevent his flight, by 
 reason, to the central throne of the universe, or into the 
 midst of immovable and infinite Being, and there dem- 
 onstrating the reality of the relations of man to the 
 central orb of righteousness. The assertion that my 
 knowledge of God is untrustworthy, and my conception of 
 the Divine Being unworthy, implies that the speaker has 
 worthier views and sounder knowledge than I; and, if he 
 has, I am glad that a brother man can attain such heights 
 of religious knowledge, even if he paradoxically calls it ig- 
 norance. It shows that man does grapple with problems 
 concerning the Infinite and Eternal. It shows that the 
 personality which dwells in us is of nearer kindred to the 
 Infinite Personality which creates, upholds, and guides the 
 universe toward one high, far-off, moral end. 
 
 And, immediately, the argument of our Lord to the 
 Sadducees enters into full force. We who are thus made 
 in the likeness of God, permitted to apprehend his being 
 to inquire into his will and purposes, to feel the sense of 
 obligation toward him,—we are not perishable beings: we 
 are made in the image of his eternity. This is the ground 
 of Aristotle for faith in human immortality. It will stand 
 the assaults of all inferior men, and be unshaken. 
 
348 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 The infinite fulness of the Divine Love in making us 
 partakers of immortal blessedness becoming thus mani- 
 fested to us, all our relations to God assume a new aspect. 
 Our obligation to love and serve Him is immediately 
 strengthened, and made so strong that all other obligation 
 is as nothing in comparison with it. Henceforth, even 
 more than before, we are to account the will of God as the 
 law of right. Whatever we can, from any source of light, 
 clearly discover to be his will, that must be binding and 
 obligatory upon us. Because it is his will who is all-wise 
 and all-good, it is also right. 
 
 But the aspect of our relations to other men is also 
 changed by the perception that we and they are fellow- 
 heirs of immortality. Certainly, we stand to each other in 
 a different aspect, if we are going to live through untold 
 ages, from that which we should bear to each other, were 
 the grave to be our final end. The doctrine of immor- 
 tality must therefore, of necessity, bear upon ethics, upon 
 our religious and also upon our social duties. 
 
 The question of future rewards and punishments enters 
 in a somewhat different manner. Pain and pleasure have 
 in themselves but little connection with morality. Yet 
 a sentient being desires happiness, and has no right to 
 inflict pain. The exercise of every faculty is accompanied 
 with pleasure, and its hindrance with pain. This pleasure 
 or pain is the immediate impulse to action. It is the im- 
 mediate impulse, but not the rational end; and it is a sin- 
 ful degradation of our nobler nature to make it the end. 
 Take, as a simple example, the pleasure in eating. We eat 
 when we are hungry, and select food that we like; yet we 
 eat to live. Physical health and strength are the rational 
 end of eating. He who lives to eat, who makes it a busi- 
 
ETHICS AND RELIGION 349 
 
 ness and deliberate purpose to please his palate without 
 regard to health, is despicable, and despised as a glutton. 
 But the same things are true concerning the highest 
 pleasures. They are impulses and incitements to action, 
 but not the rational ends of action. The Christian relig- 
 ion holds forth the happiness and the misery of a world 
 beyond the grave, not as the ultimate reasons for doing 
 right, but as incentives and aids to an enfeebled will. 
 Jesus is emphatic in declaring that duty is the ultimate 
 end, and that no man can do more than his full duty. He 
 is not less emphatic in setting forth love toward God and 
 charity toward men as the noblest incentives and motives 
 to enforce and invigorate the commands of duty. But he 
 also appeals to fear and hope, reaching beyond the grave, 
 as restraints and incitements that may bring the foolish, 
 erring, and spiritually benumbed to their senses, and lead 
 them to feel the power of holier motives. Nor can there 
 be a shadow of doubt that the fear of hell and the hope of 
 heaven have been practically the means of bringing many 
 thousands and tens of thousands to serious reflection, to 
 earnest endeavor, to earnest prayer, and thus to that love 
 which at length casts out fear, and loses itself in perfect 
 acquiescence in the divine will, and in longing only to be 
 made the instrument in God’s hand of blessing others. 
 The ordinary duties of our daily life, the ordinary ser- 
 vices whereby we are each daily doing our part toward 
 supplying the needs and wants of our fellow-men, acquire 
 new dignity, beauty, and grandeur in proportion as we 
 take higher views of the character and destinies of those 
 whom we are attempting to serve. If men are merely the 
 highest of the animals, and have no immortal hopes and 
 no kindship to superior beings, how petty and vain are all 
 
350 POSTULATES OF “ETHICS 
 
 the cares and labors of this world! But, if we are “ born 
 to rise through endless states of being,” if this world is 
 the school in which we are all taught of God, all the chil- 
 dren of an infinitely wise and gracious Father, and he is 
 preparing us for higher scenes and holier services here- 
 after, then every step of the journey of this life, every 
 duty which we can be called on to perform for a fellow- 
 man, becomes invested with a new and immortal value as 
 a sacred part of that course of education by which the 
 heavenly Father would prepare us for that eternal career 
 of a divine life. 
 
 I cannot, therefore, but arrive at the conclusion that a 
 system of ethics and a canon of rules of morality founded 
 upon our ethical instincts alone, without reference to the 
 religious instincts and convictions, must necessarily be 
 defective and partially ineffective. The religious in- 
 stincts of reverence and gratitude toward God, of obliga- 
 tion to defer to his will, the religious hope of immortal 
 life in which we may have a holier intercourse with each 
 other and closer communion, are integrant parts of 
 human nature; and the moral relation between human 
 beings is not completely understood and cannot be satis- 
 factorily analyzed and investigated if we leave this part of 
 their nature out of consideration. It seems to me, there- 
 fore, with all deference to the learned and ingenious men 
 who declare ethics to be independent of a belief in God 
 and in immortality, that ethics is not only historically, as 
 a matter of fact, interpenetrated with religion, but that itis 
 in part logically dependent upon theology, and that we can- 
 not have a thorough and sound ethics unless we have a liv- 
 ing faith in God, as an eternal righteous judge and moral 
 governor of men made in the image of his eternity. 
 
IX. 
 NON-RELIGIOUS MORALS AND MORALISTS. 
 
 I was one day speaking to Professor Peirce about a 
 student who found great difficulty in his theoretical 
 mathematics, although very ready and skilful in their 
 practical applications and in their geometrical illustration 
 by drawing. Peirce replied that it was a common case. 
 Indeed, he thought that there was something antipodal in 
 the power of geometric drawing and the power of geomet- 
 ric reasoning. And, in fact, with the limited power of a 
 human mind there is not only an impossibility of exerting 
 its full force in two directions at once, but there is a con- 
 stant tendency to anti-polarity ; that is, a strong exhibition 
 of power in one direction is apt to produce an appearance 
 of unusual deficiency in the opposite direction. Practice 
 and theory thus become antipodal, not only in geometry, 
 but in all departments of science and of action. When 
 Pascal invented a calculating engine, he felt it necessary 
 for his reputation among learned men to say that the ma- 
 chine was not intended to be useful to practical men. In 
 our day the subserviency of science to practical uses is 
 becoming more evident ; yet there lingers among the com- 
 mon people a prejudice that the scientific man is neces- 
 sarily unpractical,—a prejudice which justifies itself by 
 appealing to actual instances. Knowledge how to do a 
 thing, logically precedes action as the necessary basis of 
 
352 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 ability to do, Yet, chronologically, the knack generally 
 precedes the knowledge; and the science is composed of 
 or built upon an analysis of the usage. The order of 
 chronological development is generally, if not universally, 
 precisely the reverse of the logical order of creation. It 
 could hardly be otherwise without reversing the entire 
 nature of man, or else dooming him to a wretched series 
 of errors and misfortunes. Man has two poles,— matter 
 and spirit; and his development begins in the material, 
 and rises to the spiritual. He acts at first on the stimu- 
 lus of sensation and from animal impulse, then from in- 
 stinctive sentiment and from acquired habit, finally from 
 the deliberate choice of reason. 
 
 All this is directly applicable to the question whether 
 a correct theory of morals is necessary to produce a moral 
 life. Morality is chronologically an art before it is a 
 science. Men live together in communities, and feel their 
 moral relations to each other, and act upon moral senti- 
 ments and instincts many centuries before they analyze 
 their usages and instincts and build a system of moral 
 science. It is, therefore, a misapplication of our Saviour’s 
 rule — “ By their fruits ye shall know them’”— to say that 
 a man’s system of moral science must be right because 
 his life is right, or wrong because his life is wrong. The 
 actions of a man are indications of his own personal char- 
 acter,— indications which may be absolutely depended 
 upon. Whenatree bears figs, it isindeed a demonstration 
 that it is a fig-tree. But the actions are not necessarily an 
 indication of the truth or falsehood of a man’s theories. 
 The fig-tree has no theory about the method of making 
 figs. Indeed, to judge from the analogies in other matters, 
 we might expect a man of peculiarly strong practical 
 
NON-RELIGIOUS MORALS AND MORALISTS ae 
 
 moral instincts to be less likely to have a very clear _per- 
 ception of their intellectual implications and connec- 
 tions. And, on the other hand, a man may have great 
 metaphysical ability in analyzing the facts of conscious- 
 ness concerning moral relations without having peculiar 
 power or success in making his own life conform to 
 them. It is true that morality in conduct necessarily 
 implies some knowledge of moral truth; and a clear 
 perception of moral truth necessarily implies the pos- 
 session of moral instincts. The intellectual and the emo- 
 tional elements are not mutually exclusive. Neither can 
 arrive at its highest development without the presence of 
 the other. The only point I insist upon is that in the 
 majority of individuals one element is very largely in 
 excess of the other. 
 
 When our Lord said, “By their fruits ye shall know 
 them,” he was not speaking of theories, but of men. A 
 new system and theory concerning the culture of the 
 fig-tree might not produce immediate effects upon the 
 crop of the man who held it. A scheme of cultivation or 
 education must usually be in operation several generations 
 before its full effects are seen. In addition to the direct 
 inculcation of truth or of error, there is an unconscious 
 transmission by the power of example and the contagion 
 of sympathy, modifying the direct effects of teaching. 
 The various sects of the Protestant Church are readily 
 distinguished by an acute observer without reference to 
 the tenets on which they are professedly built, but by 
 the manifestation of the peculiar tone and spirit of the 
 founders and early members of the several denominations, 
 passed down unconsciously by the close contact of each 
 generation with the preceding. Personality, living char- 
 
354 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 acter, manifests itself frequently with much more power 
 in other ways than in the utterance of intellectual con- 
 victions or in verbal exhortations. 
 
 We are not, therefore, to judge of the utilitarian theory 
 of morals or of the agnostic separation of morality from 
 religion by the personal purity of life of some of the advo- 
 cates of the newethics. A careful analysis of the facts 
 of human nature, sometimes a careful examination of the 
 records of history, may show that an opinion which is 
 harmless to the personal character of one or two men may 
 become harmful when propagated widely as a dogma 
 among the unthinking many, or when passed down as a 
 traditional belief by several generations. It is said that 
 Epicurus lived chastely and temperately, and that, never- 
 theless, his teaching led multitudes to sensuality of every 
 form. In modern Europe and in the United States re- 
 peated instances can be shown in which the morals of 
 large communities have varied from generation to genera- 
 tion with their forms of religious belief, creating at least 
 a presumption that there is an organic connection in the 
 human mind between the two departments of activity. I 
 think that I have shown that theories of morality and 
 religion are indissolubly connected, and that they must 
 have in the long run an effect upon the moral sentiment 
 and moral action of those who hold them. Yet this influ- 
 ence may not show itself in the first or even the second 
 generation. Old habits cling obstinately to the people 
 who have formed them, and are transmitted either by in- 
 heritance or by personal contact to their children. Nor 
 is the influence of theory upon action always strongly 
 manifested in individual cases. Men holding the highest 
 views may live badly, and those holding very erroneous 
 
NON-RELIGIOUS MORALS AND MORALISTS 355 
 
 views may still live well. Pope was not truthful in his 
 utterance when he sang,— 
 
 “For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight : 
 His can’t be wrong whose life is in the right.” 
 
 No defence of utilitarianism and goodness independent 
 of religion, however passionate or poetical, can be any- 
 thing else than illogical and untrue to the essential nat- 
 ure of morals, to the holiest instincts of the human 
 heart, and to the notorious facts of human history. Ifa 
 man’s life be in the right, it shows perhaps that he in- 
 herited a good moral constitution, perhaps that he has 
 been carefully brought up, perhaps that he has lived with- 
 out serious exposure to moral temptation, perhaps that 
 he has been sobered out of vice by some great moral force 
 of a providential character; but it does not show that his 
 theory of the moral nature nor that his theory of religion 
 is true. Hehasa practical knowledge of his moral duties, 
 as is shown by his performance of them; but he may not 
 have acquired a theoretical knowledge of them. Practical 
 knowledge is the true foundation for theory; but a man 
 may have an excellent foundation, and put up a very poor 
 superstructure. The mere fact that the foundation is 
 good would, according to Pope’s couplet, prove the build- 
 ing to be good. If the foundation is poor, the goodness 
 of the building will not save it from tumbling; but, if the 
 building stands, we are not to infer its goodness, but only 
 its stability, which may be chiefly owing to the foundation. 
 
 We know that, historically, moral purity and nobility 
 of life have been due to monotheistic faith re-enforcing the 
 native conscience. The corruption of life and manners 
 
356 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 in the Roman Empire at the time of the advent of Christ 
 were too great to be described to modern ears. The un- 
 expurgated literature of those times proves it, the histo- 
 rians of that day give unmistakable evidence of it, the 
 excavations at Herculaneum and Pompeii give abundant 
 and revolting witness to it. “Even their mind and their 
 conscience were defiled.” Seneca quotes and indorses 
 Athenodorus as saying that men continually prayed to 
 the gods for things that they would be ashamed to whis- 
 per to respectable men. The corrupt polytheists had 
 been too powerful for the few earnest voices lifted up in 
 defence of purer and holier lives. But, when the world 
 by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolish- 
 ness of preaching Christ crucified to save the world from 
 ‘ts sins. The reformation of manners effected by the 
 preaching of Christianity cannot be questioned by any 
 unprejudiced reader of European history. And in the 
 course of the centuries down to the present time the 
 decays and the revivals of moral character in every part 
 of Christendom have been preceded and connected with 
 decays and revivals of faith, But of course there have 
 always been, and always will be, cases of apparent discon- 
 nection. There are men of devout temperament and or- 
 thodox faith who have not tender consciences, quick per- 
 ceptions of right and wrong, nor strength of will to hold 
 themselves to the performance of moral duty. There are 
 other men who inherit from ancestors brought up in 
 Christian faith and Christian virtue a temperament com- 
 paratively free from vicious inclinations, and filled with 
 kind and amiable dispositions. 
 
 They are also brought up to despise what is mean and 
 base, to admire what is noble. They are taught to be 
 
NON-RELIGIOUS MORALS AND MORALISTS 357 
 
 unselfish, and to seek the good of other men. They are 
 taught to see that there is a great deal of work to be done 
 in this world, and that it devolves upon them to do their 
 share. But with all this moral education they are some- 
 times taught to disbelieve in theological truth; and some- 
 times, by some peculiarity of their own intellectual endow. 
 ment, they are unable to see the evidences of spiritual and 
 theological truth,—they are naturally sceptical. Such 
 cases are sometimes appealed to as proofs of Pope’s coup- 
 let, as showing the uselessness of religion for the interests 
 of morality. They have been triumphantly appealed to 
 by a very brilliant writer of our own day. He says that, 
 so long as Christianity could truly say that infidels were 
 men of immoral lives, she had a great advantage in her 
 claims to truth, But now, he says, we have infidels of as 
 pure and lofty a morality as believers. Therefore, Chris- 
 tianity can no longer claim to be the only way of salva- 
 tion. Nay, we have even atheists of as pure and lofty a 
 morality as theists, showing that morality does not rest 
 upon so frail a thing as belief, even upon a belief in 
 God, but upon the ineradicable sentiment of self-interest, 
 the perception of utility, ingrained into men by many 
 generations of experience, so that now it assumes the 
 form of moral instinct. 
 
 In the consideration of this problem of non-theists liv- 
 ing lives of high and pure morality, we must look at it in 
 the full light of all the facts. : 
 
 Let us, in the first place, observe that the words “ high ” 
 and “pure” morality must, in the case of non-theists, ex- 
 clude the religious side of ethics. I have already shown 
 in the previous lecture that ethics properly includes re- 
 ligious duties toward God and religious duties toward 
 
358 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 men; and that a consistent logical exposition of the sub- 
 ject of ethics shows that our love toward men would lead 
 us to endeavor, as ambassadors for Christ, to reconcile 
 men to God; and that utilitarianism carried out to the 
 full brings us back to admit that nothing can be so useful 
 to men as to teach them to be trusting, loving, obedient 
 children of God. 
 
 But, passing this by, the claim that atheists may have 
 as high and pure a moral tone as theists is a claim some- 
 what difficult to prove. I confess I have never met with 
 any atheistic or even agnostic men, nor read of any, who 
 seemed to me to be of anything like the moral elevation 
 of the best Christians of my acquaintance whom I could 
 name by scores. In all that I have known, or read much 
 about, there was some eccentric disregard of the estab- 
 lished moral convictions of the world. 
 
 Let that, however, pass. Admit, if you will, that cer- 
 tain atheists and agnostics are, in regard to all their rela- 
 tions to their fellow-men, as upright, noble, disinterested, 
 and self-sacrificing as others, it must be remembered 
 that they are living in the full light of the gospel day; 
 that out of the writings of Hebrew prophets and Chris- 
 tian apostles men have been for twenty centuries draw- 
 ing lessons of the purest morality, until they have made 
 these high doctrines of revelation as common as the air 
 we breathe. John Stuart Mill was brought up in igno- 
 rance of Christian theology, but not of Christian morality. 
 On the contrary, that morality was earnestly enjoined 
 upon him from his earliest childhood, not only directly by 
 his father, but by all the good usages of the society in 
 which he mingled, and the civil and criminal legislation 
 and jurisprudence of the government under which he lived. 
 
NON-RELIGIOUS MORALS AND MORALISTS 359 
 
 The high and pure morality of such a man was there- 
 fore, conceding it to be real, not so independent of Chris- 
 tianity as is sometimes claimed. It was independent of 
 his own belief in Christianity; but it was nevertheless 
 directly derived from the influence of Christianity. That 
 is a matter which the atheist and agnostic cannot help, 
 He is born in Christendom, in the midst of the Church 
 universal, and into the Church, just as he is born to citi- 
 zenship in the nation. He may grow to manhood, and 
 find his State voting to secede, and he may vote to 
 secede, but that does not release him from citizenship. 
 He may think, on the other hand, that the Constitution 
 is a league with death and a covenant with hell, and may 
 therefore abdicate all his rights of citizenship. Still, he 
 cannot escape: he is a citizen, and amenable to all the 
 laws of his country, and subject to all its requisitions. 
 So a man born in a Christian country is born into the 
 Christian Church, and cannot evade the fact. The light 
 of Christian truth shines upon him; and, if he tries to 
 screen himself from its direct rays, it pours in upon him, 
 like the light of common day, by refraction and reflec- 
 tion from every surrounding object. He can no more 
 live independent of Christ than he can live independent 
 of the sun. When Emerson first went to see Carlyle, 
 it is reported that Carlyle said: “Well, we may say what 
 we may, Christ died on the tree: that built yonder kirk ; 
 and that brought you and me together.” : 
 
 One, talking with me about his perplexity as to the 
 nature and life of Jesus, said: “I wish it were possible to 
 try the experiment of a purely theistic church for several 
 centuries, and see whether it would maintain as high a 
 morality as the Christian Church. But [he added] the 
 
360 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 experiment is impossible for us to try, and that for a 
 double reason. It must last several centuries, so as to 
 free itself from the inherited effects of Christian culture, 
 and we, of course, shall die before one-half a century has 
 passed ; and, secondly, it ought to be carried on in isola- 
 tion, removed from the influences of Christian neighbors, 
 which, if it tended to rise above them, would drag it 
 down, and, if it tended to fall below them, would hold 
 it up.” I think he afterward concluded that, if the ex- 
 periment could be tried, it would be disastrous; for he 
 settled at length into the belief that Jesus had sources of 
 knowledge above those common to men, that the gospel 
 of Christ is essential to the preservation of active, earnest 
 faith in God, and that faith in God is essential to the 
 maintenance of a high moral character in the world. 
 
 I think he was right in his conclusions, and right in say- 
 ing that the effect of a purely theistic church could not be 
 fairly determined unless you could have a large church of 
 that character, isolated from Christendom, maintained for 
 some centuries. 
 
 In the midst of a Christian community, where the ma- 
 jority of men have for several generations tried to model 
 their lives according to a Christian standard, it is im- 
 possible to judge of the effects of particular theological 
 beliefs or unbeliefs by observation of a few cases. The 
 great general tone of the community derived from Chris- 
 tianity will overpower the effect of an individual creed. 
 What that effect would be if not hindered and restrained 
 can be decided only from a priori reasoning, or from find- 
 ing a community where the non-Christian creed is preva- 
 lent, and has been so for two or three generations. 
 
 The fact that unbelievers in Christianity —free religion- 
 
NON-RELIGIOUS MORALS AND MORALISTS 361 
 
 ists, theists, pantheists, agnostics, and atheists — unite with 
 so much unanimity in commending the morality of the 
 Sermon on the Mount, the twelfth chapter of Romans, 
 the thirteenth of First Corinthians, and the New Testa- 
 ment in general, is very far from being a proof that the 
 influence of faith in the New Testament is not needed to 
 teach and to give power to that morality. It is very far 
 from being an evidence that that morality would have 
 been developed and made as powerful in the world as it is 
 without faith in Christ and in God. I think that, on the 
 contrary, a careful study of the facts of history (not of the 
 inverted, transposed, and perverted facts as given by 
 Draper, but the real facts) will show that it is by the 
 steady influence of Christian preaching that this high 
 moral tone has been created in Christian lands, and that 
 these non-Christian classes in these lands partake of this 
 tone sympathetically, and by virtue of their being in the 
 midst of a Christian community. Destroy Christian faith, 
 bring the general mass of the community to the belief 
 that Jesus had no other sources of knowledge on religious 
 and ethical points than those which are open to all men, 
 and you would produce, in my judgment, a rapid decay of 
 belief in God, followed by a rapid lowering of the moral 
 tone of society. Without faith in the testimony of Jesus 
 to the paternal care of God over us, we readily become 
 confused and lost in the contemplation of God’s infinity. 
 We lose the apprehension of his personality and his per- 
 sonal care over us. He is no longer an ever-present 
 Witness, a faithful Judge, and Rewarder, an omnipotent 
 Helper. He becomes the vague generalization of the Ulti- 
 mate Cause, the unknown and unknowable Source of all, 
 the consensus of all laws and all energies; and this vague 
 
362 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 generalization has not the power over the heart which is 
 exercised by the sense of the divine love of a heavenly 
 Father, a divine Shepherd, the Creator, Redeemer, and 
 Sanctifier of the soul. 
 
 When the destruction of Christian faith destroys the 
 sense of personal piety, the sense of personal communion 
 with the Father, the sense of the indwelling of the Holy 
 Ghost the Sanctifier, then it destroys one of the great 
 safeguards and buttresses of the moral character. The 
 experience of twenty centuries has proved it,—that there 
 is no name under heaven given among men whereby they 
 can be saved other than the name of Jesus Christ, through 
 whom we are led to the Father. Those churches which, in 
 their horror of Orthodoxy, are carefully eliminating from 
 their Sunday-school and church services every allusion to 
 the name which is above every name, substituting Immor- 
 tality Sunday for Easter and Children’s Sunday for Whit- 
 sunday and New Year for Christmas, are not simply 
 falling into (what I deem) theological errors; that were a 
 matter of comparatively slight importance: they are try- 
 ing an experiment exceedingly dangerous to the morals of 
 the community, they are weakening greatly the present 
 moral defences of men against sin, and are neither putting 
 nor proposing to put any new defence in their place. 
 
 Is it said that my views imply the doctrine of total de- 
 pravity, imply that men naturally tend to the bad, and are 
 preserved from it only by the guasi perpetual miracle of 
 the influence of the supernatural? I deny the implication. 
 I hold, on the contrary, that men are the children of God, 
 and “heirs of eternity, born to rise through endless states 
 of being”; but I maintain that on that very account, be- 
 cause men are the children of God, God is unwearied in 
 
NON-RELIGIOUS MORALS AND MORALISTS 363 
 
 his love toward us. He has not only inspired us with holy 
 instincts and affections, and gifted us with reason to com- 
 prehend something of his works, but he has also made 
 assurance doubly sure to us by the testimony of prophets 
 and apostles and of the Lord Jesus Christ. We must re- 
 member that the very existence and perpetuity of our race 
 depend upon our being gifted not only with reason and 
 virtue and spiritual desires, but also with impetuous pas- 
 sions that shall act independent of our reason and pur- 
 pose, and drive us to self-defence and to the sustenance 
 of life, to the propagation of the race and to the care of 
 offspring. Without this substratum of physical energy 
 and animal passion within us the race would perish, 
 
 But at the same time these terrific forces need guidance 
 and restraint from the will, acting under the guidance of 
 an enlightened conscience, else anger leads to bloodshed 
 and violence, appetite to gluttony and to foulness that 
 cannot be named. 
 
 In this task of subduing the powers within us to work 
 according to the true hierarchy, making the natural serve 
 the spiritual, religious ideas and sanctions are of inesti- 
 mable value ; and the neglect of religious truths is exceed- 
 ingly perilous. Temptations sometimes assail a man, 
 which are very subtle. The tests of utility and of suppos- 
 ing the proposed action made into a universal rule, and of 
 self-respect and of self-interest well understood, sometimes 
 all fail; and the tempted man, longing to do something 
 which his own moral instinct condemns, easily persuades 
 himself that this moral instinct is a mistaken remnant of 
 some feeling which he ought to have outgrown. If he 
 has, then, no faith in an all-seeing Witness and Judge, he 
 is sure to fall, But if in that hour of extreme moral peril 
 
 ~ 
 
364. POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 he remembers and believes that God sees him, if he recog- 
 nizes the moral instinct as the voice of God in the soul, 
 then he arouses himself to resistance; and the tempter 
 flees. After the trial is over, he rejoices that he did not 
 yield, and perhaps even wonders that he felt the tempta- 
 tion,— so clear, after moral victory comes to him, the 
 truth that the devil was a liar from the beginning, and 
 that no pleasure or advantage gained by stifling the voice 
 of conscience can be anything else than an apple of 
 Sodom, full of ashes and bitterness. 
 
 To recapitulate: The true ethical law includes religious 
 as well as social duties, our duty to God being our first 
 duty, and our first duty to men being our duty to recon- 
 cile them to God. Men who have no belief in God must 
 of necessity fail in these religious duties toward him and 
 toward their brethren. 
 
 Secondly, it is a somewhat arrogant claim, and difficult 
 to substantiate, to claim that even in purely social duties, 
 and duties in reference to themselves, non-theists are of 
 as high and lofty a morality as the purest Christians. 
 
 Thirdly, were it even so, we must remember that in a 
 Christian community such men are in an atmosphere that 
 will constantly tend to modify the effect of their theories ; 
 and, moreover, such men in a Christian community are 
 usually descendants of Christian ancestry. 
 
 Fourthly, in maintaining that Christian views of theol- 
 ogy, the acceptance of the testimony of Jesus Christ, are 
 essential to a high development of moral character, and to 
 the lifting of the community in general out of the slough 
 of sensuality, we are not asserting the inborn depravity of 
 man in any ultra-Calvinistic sense. We are merely taking 
 the universally acknowledged facts that men are very 
 
NON-RELIGIOUS MORALS AND MORALISTS 365 
 
 prone to sin; that the great majority of men sadly confess 
 with Ovid,— 
 
 ‘Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor,’’? — 
 
 they see and approve what is good, but do what is bad; 
 the evident facts, also, that, in order to keep the great 
 world running, the animal appetites and desires must be 
 made strong and imperious, vindicating their necessity in 
 spite of all erroneous theories, but that this necessity for 
 inperious strength in the passions calls also for the utmost 
 exertion in self-government. 
 
 Fifthly, that this necessity for the utmost struggle and 
 exertion in self-government calls upon God as a wise and 
 loving Father to give every possible aid and encourage- 
 ment to those who strive to live according to their high 
 birthright; and therefore, if such aids as are offered by the 
 Lord Jesus Christ are possible, they are actual. The ex- 
 perience of many thousands has proved that they are 
 actual, and constantly received by those who strive to do 
 well. It is an ungrateful and mischievous business to do 
 anything to invalidate this cheering testimony of Christian 
 experience to such a blessed faith. 
 
Xs 
 LEARNING BY DOING. 
 
 TuE doctrine that practice is the foundation of theory, 
 that knack precedes knowledge, that we must do in order 
 to learn, holds not only in ethics and religion, but in 
 every department of education. It is the universal rule 
 in gaining knowledge. The good but non-religious man, 
 whom I described in the last lecture, is no exception to 
 the law. So far as he is moral, he attains a practical, val- 
 uable, experimental knowledge of ethics, greater than he 
 could in any other way obtain. The peculiarity of his case 
 is that he divides his duty, he limits his morality and his 
 knowledge of it to part of the great field, and, from some 
 idiosyncrasy, or some peculiarity of education, refuses to 
 look at the whole field of duty or to practise his full 
 duty as man. 
 
 He who framed us, and endowed us with our various 
 powers, doubtless intended that we should use them all. 
 The gift of a power is not only a grant to use it, but 
 imposes in some sense the obligation to use it. The 
 possession of a power, and the opportunity to use it, 
 creates in some degree the obligation to use it. Human 
 powers differ in different men,— differ in amount, differ in 
 their proportion ; but every man has head and heart and 
 hands ; a mind, a soul, a power of will, to be exercised ac- 
 cording to his ability and opportunity. The school of life 
 
LEARNING BY DOING 367 
 
 has its tasks fitted for every variety of pupil. The world 
 and its course of events furnish a proper stimulus and 
 proper food for every one of the numerous intellectual fac- 
 ulties of man, for every one of our emotions and sentiments, 
 and for strengthening our will in all the modes in which it 
 can be called into play. Yet, in every one of these greatly 
 varied studies in the school of life, our divine Teacher 
 employs one and the same method of education, — perhaps 
 with slight variations, but substantially the same method. 
 
 What is this method? Some special, individual thing, 
 appealing first of all to outward sense, awakens some 
 faculty within. The attention is aroused: the thing is 
 examined, It is compared with other objects. A larger 
 grasp of objects is attained: the faculty lays hold of some- 
 thing higher, either contained in or suggested by the 
 external objects. Thus abstract and general knowledge, 
 knowledge of the supersensible, is obtained. As examples 
 of this process, take the story of the Nile sweeping away the 
 landmarks, and exciting the Egyptians to invent geomet- 
 rical modes for re-establishing them, thus founding geom- 
 etry; or the story of the swinging lamp suggesting the 
 pendulum and the clock; or that of the falling apple lead- 
 ing to the theory of gravity; or that of the twitching of a 
 frog’s leg leading to galvanism, electrotyping, telegraphy, 
 telephone, electric light. The history of modern science 
 and art is full of instances in which some single curious 
 phenomenon of nature provoked investigation, and led to 
 inventions of great utility or to high results of scientific 
 truth. 
 
 On the other hand, when men have proposed and de- 
 sired to do some great thing, they have been very apt to 
 fail. A grand generalization, sought in an ambitious way, 
 
368 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 is apt to be vague and worthless. If reached in the 
 natural, healthful way, through the investigation of in- 
 dividual or special phenomena, it is usually valuable and 
 of practical utility. General views not built on a careful 
 experimental view of particular cases are in danger of 
 omitting essential features. On the other hand, the mere 
 details of individual cases, not leading to the perception 
 of any law, are wearisome, and without profit. 
 
 All that I have thus said of intellectual growth is true 
 of moral growth also, and of zsthetic culture. The gen- 
 eral love of an art is first awakened by some particular 
 instance or example in the art. This might be illustrated 
 by abundant examples from the biographies of sculptors, 
 painters, and musicians. All art is more or less imitative. 
 Nature gives the first pattern. Then successive artists 
 stimulate each other, and suggest to one another methods 
 of attaining higher and higher success in the arts sug- 
 gested by the pattern. The humblest arts and the loftiest 
 are alike under this law. Dr. Isaac Watts says the best 
 way to teach a child to read well is to read well to it the 
 very lesson which you are about to require it to read. 
 When I was teaching a common school, I received from 
 the superintendent of the school committee higher praise 
 for my success in teaching to read than for anything else; 
 and my plan was in accordance with Dr, Watts’s sugges- 
 tion. I would read the paragraph not badly, but tamely, 
 and ask a scholar to improve on my reading; and, when 
 all the class had tried, then I would read it as well as 
 I could, and ask them to improve on that, and they 
 often did. 
 
 Not only the reading of a composition is an art best 
 learned by the method of imitation, but the art of compo- 
 
LEARNING BY DOING 369 
 
 sition is itself of the same nature. The study of gram- 
 mar is comparatively useless in teaching one the use of 
 a language,— useless in comparison with the reading of 
 the language. And let the language be never so per- 
 fectly mastered by the intellect, a graceful, poetical use 
 of it is to be obtained only by reading graceful, poetical 
 writings in it. The temporary effect on the style pro- 
 duced by reading is sometimes wonderful. Many a man 
 can write an admirable parody on a poem who could not 
 write an original poem worth reading. And our best 
 poets are always readers of poetry. Not only poetry, but 
 eloquent prose, has a similar power. I was once required 
 to write a page of Latin, when I had not for twenty busy 
 years written a single Latin sentence. I knew just what 
 I wanted to say; but I could not have written a line of it 
 in Latin, had I not taken up first Cicero's De Senectute, 
 and read as diligently and rapidly as I could, without 
 grammar or dictionary, for about two hours. Then I took 
 my pen, and wrote, currente calamo, my page, and received 
 many compliments for the Ciceronian elegance of my 
 Latinity. In like manner Barnas Sears, of honored and 
 beloved memory, was once obliged to write a report when 
 his mind was in such a whirl that he felt incapable of 
 writing smooth English. He took up Burke’s Orations 
 and read for an hour, then rapidly wrote his report, and 
 was afterward told by a friend, “ You never wrote so 
 well before: it reads like an oration of Edmund Burke.” 
 
 Such facts — and I could multiply my quotations of them 
 ad libitum — make me insist upon it that the best way to 
 learn either your own tongue or a foreign tongue is to 
 read the works of the best writers, without grammar 
 or dictionary,— just read persistently until you can read 
 
370 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 easily. After that the grammar and dictionary will be of 
 great value. 
 
 Now, the end of ethical knowledge is right living; and 
 right living is of the nature of an art, like right speaking 
 and writing. It is largely to be learned by example, by 
 imitation, by emulation of those who would provoke one 
 another to love and good works. The adult of speculative 
 turn may, if he wishes, analyze the arts of sculpture and 
 painting and music and writing and speaking, and the 
 art of right living, and may develop rules and standards 
 for the performance of all of these arts. These rules and 
 standards may even be of great aid and assistance to 
 advanced pupils who blend in their nature the practical 
 and the theoretical faculties. But for young children, and 
 for adults who are chiefly practical in their tone of mind, 
 and who have little taste or ability for criticism, rules 
 and theories are comparatively worthless. Good models 
 are the only suggestive, inspiriting, and strengthening 
 teachers. 
 
 Herein, I think, lies the secret of what Bishop F. D. 
 Huntington has, in a remarkable lecture, called ‘“ uncon- 
 scious tuition.” In a country town there were two school 
 districts very similar in all their elements. Each school- 
 house was very near a cotton factory. Each school was 
 composed about one-half of children of Irish, the other half 
 of American parentage. Yet one of them was one of the 
 best, the other one of the worst schools I ever saw. In 
 one the scholarship was poor, the behavior bad,— profan- 
 ity and tobacco-chewing, and filthy language not only in 
 the mouths of the children, but scribbled and cut with 
 knives all about the school-house and its outbuildings. 
 In the other the scholarship was excellent, and the be- 
 
LEARNING BY. DOING 371 
 
 havior still better. It was a constant surprise and de- 
 light to see how clean and bright and happy the children 
 were, and how thoroughly they understood and enjoyed 
 their lessons. Not a mark or scratch of any kind was in 
 their school-house or on their outbuildings or fences. 
 Not a profane, coarse, or even rough or harsh word was 
 ever heard about the premises. 
 
 What was the reason? In the one school there had 
 been for many years an ordinary run of good teachers. In 
 the other there had been for many years one sweet, neat, 
 bright young woman. And how had she done it? She 
 did not know, she could not tell. She had made, she 
 said, no special effort. She did not know, but I think I 
 did. She was always gentle, she was always firm. She 
 was always most scrupulously neat and orderly. For the 
 first few months, if a scholar came to school dirty and 
 with tumbled hair, she would take him aside, and pleas- 
 antly suggest to him to go home and wash his face and 
 hands and comb his hair. It very soon became the fashion 
 in that school — one-half the children of Irish laborers — 
 for the children to come daily as clean and neat as soap 
 and water and towels and comb could make them. The 
 teacher never had a book out of place. The children 
 caught the trick, and kept their desks in order. Even in 
 the studies the teacher was really interested in the mat- 
 ters she was teaching. She thus unconsciously awakened 
 interest in her school. She declared she did not know 
 how she produced the remarkable effect on the school; 
 and she was honest: she did not know how she did it. 
 Still, in the best sense of the words, she knew how to do 
 it, and proved her knowledge by doing it. She kept her 
 own heart and own life right; she kept her mind awake 
 
372 POSTULATES OF “EABICS 
 
 and interested in knowledge; she kept her temper even, 
 and her heart full of gratitude to God,—full of delight in 
 the beauties of creation, full of kindness to the children; 
 she kept her habits right in scrupulous neatness and good 
 order. The children caught the influence as_ uncon- 
 sciously as she poured it out. All was freedom and glad- 
 ness in their hearts and lives. 
 
 Here was a very striking instance, the most striking 
 which I have ever seen in a school. But every man and 
 every woman is exerting influence in a similar manner, 
 although it may be to a less extent. A clergyman long 
 settled over any parish affects his people by this uncon- 
 scious tuition, this effluence from his whole life, as much 
 as by his direct teaching in the pulpit. The verbal teach- 
 ing, if it fall into monotony, begins to lose its power: 
 whereas the influence of an example is rather increased 
 by the steady perseverance of the example in the right 
 direction. 
 
 I have heard that the Rev. Dr. Stebbins named “ power 
 in the pulpit” as the first requisite for ministerial suc- 
 cess. But, if he did, he certainly must have taken for 
 granted that every minister would be a man of personal 
 piety and of moral integrity. No power in the pulpit can 
 atone for the want of these. I knew of a minister who 
 said to one of his parishioners, “I have not seen you at 
 church, lately, Mr. B.”” ‘No, sir,” replied he: “when I 
 lost the last particle of respect I had for my minister, 
 I thought it time to stop going to church.” “And may I 
 ask when that precise time was?’ said the minister. 
 “Yes, sir: it was when I found that you had lied to me!” 
 And the minister, instead of resenting the charge, whined, 
 and apologized that he had been cornered, and did not 
 
LEARNING BY DOING 373 
 
 know how to get out except by alie! How could such a 
 man’s preaching, even had it excelled that of Paul and 
 Barnabas, have been of any value to those who perceived 
 ‘n him so shameful a lack of manly uprightness and moral 
 integrity ?. 
 
 Even a false accusation against a clergyman’s moral 
 character sometimes neutralizes the value of his labors,— 
 how much more the accusation substantiated by his own 
 confession and wretched attempt at an apology! 
 
 Equally fatal is the lack of reverence, showing the ab- 
 sence of a personal piety. This lying clergyman after- 
 ward, in another parish, took the occasion, while standing 
 before the communion table ready to break the bread, to 
 tell his church members that he had bought some books 
 for the Sunday-school library, and wanted the money back 
 again. He had calculated that ninepence from each 
 church member would about make it up; and, therefore, 
 he would dun every church member, as he met them, for 
 ‘t, And then, with an incredibly sacrilegious and ghastly 
 attempt at humor, he stretched his arm over the sacred 
 symbols before him, and, shaking his forefinger at the com- 
 municants, added, “And, if the ninepence is not forth- 
 coming, I shall appear unto you!” 
 
 How could that church any longer endure the ministry 
 of such a minister? Yet that man, full of moral faults 
 and lacking in religious reverence, was settled over five 
 parishes before he left the calling which he so continually 
 disgraced ! ? 
 
 I have compared right living to an art, and shown that 
 in every art practical knack acquired by acting on native 
 impulse, and perfected by imitation and emulation of good 
 models, is more valuable than theoretical knowledge, and is, 
 
374 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 indeed, the only basis of a sound theory. But right living 
 is in one respect entirely different from all other arts, just 
 as the sentiment of duty and feeling of obligation are differ- 
 ent from all other sentiments and feelings. I may admire 
 the naturalness of Greek sculpture, the majesty of Michel 
 Angelo, the namby-pamby grace of Canova, the religious 
 simplicity of Thorwaldsen ; but I am not thereby put under 
 any obligation to model orcarve. I may be delighted with 
 the wonderful paintings of the public galleries and private 
 collections, but Iam not called upon myself to touch brush 
 or canvas. The great musicians of the world may move 
 my soul to its depths, but that puts me under no obliga- 
 tions to sing or play. Nor does my delight in the stately 
 eloquence of Webster or the facile fluency of Dickens, or 
 the pensive dignity of Tennyson or the polished refine- 
 ment of Longfellow, summon me to touch pen to paper. 
 
 It is far otherwise in the moral sphere. There all 
 admiration imposes obligation. It is true the obligation 
 is not strictly proportional to the admiration, because the 
 admiration is proportioned to another man’s powers and 
 the obligation to my own. But, whenever the admiration 
 is excited by moral virtue, then it imposes on me an ob- 
 ligation to acquire that virtue and to practise it to the 
 extent of my ability. My recognition of moral goodness 
 in another is the recognition of an obligation to all of that 
 goodness which with my powers and temperament I can 
 attain. My recognition of vice, moral defect, sin in 
 another, is the recognition of my own obligation to hate 
 and avoid that sin with all my strength. 
 
 This is the very form and essence of the ethical senti- 
 ment,— that it is accompanied by the sense of obligation, of 
 duty; and it is this peculiarity which renders so emphati- 
 
LEARNING BY DOING 375 
 
 cally important in this branch of knowledge the Froe- 
 belian motto, “Learn by doing.” If the sentiments of ad- 
 miration awakened by instances of conspicuous virtue do 
 not lead to an imitation of the virtue, then they degener- 
 ate into sentimentality, into leaves without fruit. This 
 is the constant danger in all attempts to teach morality 
 to children. In Mary Wollstonecraft’s “Elements of Mo- 
 rality,” of which in my boyhood I was, spite of its name, 
 very fond, she gives a series of simple stories connected 
 on the thread of a fictitious family history, illustrating 
 all the moral virtues by examples of the exercise of 
 the virtues and examples of persons exemplifying the 
 Opposite vices. M. F. Cowdery, of Sandusky, Ohio, 
 published a more extensive collection of stories, princi- 
 pally, perhaps wholly, from real life, and without the 
 connecting thread. Such books are intended to teach 
 morals by example. They doubtless have upon many 
 minds a good effect. Yet to others they become mere 
 precept, and produce no valuable result. All novels and 
 works of fiction have more or less the same character. 
 If, like a good drama, the novel holds the mirror up 
 to nature, and gives us a transcript of human life as it 
 might be or as it essentially is, then the novelist is set- 
 ting before us a series of pictures of good and bad people, 
 showing faults to avoid and virtues to emulate. He may 
 not have in his mind any moral effect which he con- 
 sciously makes the end of his endeavor; but, if he draws 
 upon a correct and healthy imagination, he holds up to us 
 portraits of men and women with virtues and vices, with 
 noble characters or with mean and ignoble traits. These 
 are, whatever their creator may design, models set before 
 us that must affect us morally with more or less power. 
 
376 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 A wise reader can use them to advantage in helping him 
 to understand his own faults and fight them, in stimulat- 
 ing him to make his own life sublime. But the constant 
 danger is that we simply let them arouse our feelings 
 without leading us to any nobler action. This is senti- 
 mentality,— to indulge in feelings over the novel or over 
 the tale of your neighbor’s real distress, and praise your- 
 self for the tenderness of- your feeling, but to let it die 
 away without any action. 
 
 If we do so, then the moral character is injured instead 
 of being benefited; and the frequent repetition of the 
 process blunts the sense of obligation and bewilders the 
 judgment concerning duty. Unswerving adherence to 
 the right, unhesitating and unwearied obedience to our 
 convictions of duty, is the only safe way, the only sure de- 
 fence against moral blindness. 
 
 Even with the best endeavors we can make, it is some- 
 times very perplexing to know what one ought to do. 
 The moral sentiment affirms strongly the obligations of 
 duty; and the moral judgment decides promptly and with 
 no uncertain tone concerning certain duties,—that we 
 must be true, reverent, faithful, chaste, temperate, kind. 
 But, when you attempt to decide the precise boundaries 
 of action thus imposed upon you, you frequently find very 
 difficult cases of conscience. I think it scarcely worth 
 while to discuss these in advance of the actual cases which 
 may arise to trouble you. I went one day to Dr. James 
 Walker to get his advice on a question of my own duty. 
 His treatment of it was very characteristic. Said 
 Jared Sparks one day, “He argues both sides so well 
 that you do not know which side he believes in.” 
 Dr. Walker heard my statement, and then said to me: 
 
 <i e 
 
LEARNING BY DOING 377 
 
 “This is one of those cases in which, whichever way 
 you may decide, it will be right. Now try to decide 
 that one is right and the other wrong; and you look 
 it over and over, and turn it around and around, until 
 it seems that your very brain is tired and sore with 
 the friction.” He went on then to state all the argu- 
 ments pro and con,—he seemed equally fair in stating 
 both sides,— yet he made the arguments so plain and 
 clear that it was an immense help to me. Before he 
 had fairly finished his summary, I had decided: I would 
 adhere to my purpose of entering the Christian ministry ; 
 and I have never for an instant regretted the decision. 
 
 There are, therefore, two errors to be carefully avoided 
 by the good man, and to be avoided with the utmost care 
 by the Christian minister. The one is that of failing in 
 moral integrity and in personal piety, These are the 
 things for which the universe itself exists. ‘God is 
 a Spirit; and they who worship him must worship in 
 spirit and in truth.”’ Personal spiritual communion with 
 the heavenly Father in thanksgiving, in penitence, in 
 aspirations after divine grace; and truthful, honest, hon- 
 orable obedience to his moral law in our intercourse with 
 other men,— this is the worship of God in spirit and in 
 truth, for which, as the highest end attainable in the uni- 
 verse, so far as we know, the universe exists. 
 
 No irreverence, no untruthfulness, no unfairness, no 
 equivocation, no lightness and frivolity, no unholy pas- 
 sions or desires, no malice or hardheartedness, must be 
 allowed in the heart, to be betrayed to the most lynx-eyed 
 foes or to be seen by the all-seeing and ever kind Friend. 
 
 But, on the other hand, we must not forget that we are 
 but dust. We should not demand of ourselves more than 
 
378 POSTULATES OF ETHICS 
 
 itis in human nature to perform. I have known a good 
 Christian worried and troubled at seeing me pluck from 
 a large and thrifty philadelphus bush overhanging the 
 fence of my neighbor’s dooryard a single green leaf to 
 show to some one its curious resemblance in flavor toa 
 cucumber. He thought that I was taking what was not 
 my own, and was mutilating an ornamental bush. Had it 
 occurred to him, I think he would have tried to convict 
 me of wrong in doing it by asking me what would be the 
 effect if every one who went by picked a leaf. In vain I 
 said that the leaf was of no value to the owner, and that 
 its loss did not mutilate or disfigure the bush, nor would 
 the bush be disfigured if every one who, like myseli, 
 wanted a leaf for a specific definite use, should take one. 
 I consider him morbidly conscientious, endeavoring to 
 conform to an impossible standard of morals. It was not 
 nearly so bad a fault as dishonesty and moral indiffer- 
 ence would have been, but still I thought it a fault. I 
 think that we may say of all virtues what in Miss 
 Edgeworth’s “ Helen”’ is said of truth,— that he is guilty 
 of constructive treason against virtue who makes truth- 
 telling unnecessarily disagreeable. A morbid, over-sensi- 
 tive conscience, tithing mint and anise and cumin with 
 too much care, makes religion and virtue offensive, and 
 leads bystanders to neglect the weightier matters of 
 the law. 
 
 Yet — I repeat it again and again — you had better even 
 be over-sensitive and over-rigid in your dealing with your- 
 self than lax and blunt in your dealing with men. For 
 your own clearness of moral view and for the sake of 
 your influence on others, keep yourselves from the possi- 
 bility of any just reproach, or just cause of suspicion, of 
 
LEARNING BY DOING 379 
 
 failing in the great fundamentals of the moral law. The 
 religion of Jesus demands purity in the thoughts and in- 
 tents of the heart, and makes the maintenance of moral 
 purity and personal integrity of the first and highest im- 
 portance. Better be drowned in the depths of the sea 
 than lead a fellow human being into sin! 
 
 This has in the olden days been considered the pecul- 
 iarity of the Unitarian denomination,— that its preachers 
 in the pulpit, and both preachers and people in their daily 
 lives, have exemplified and illustrated so fully personal 
 righteousness, justice, and integrity. May the good Spirit 
 and Providence of God make it again, and more abun- 
 dantly, the characteristic of the whole church of him who 
 came to purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of 
 good works! 
 
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